Poland and the B61 : Theory-led Analysis of the Polish Official Position on American Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe

Abstract

This thesis analyses the motivation behind the Polish governments’ support for American extended nuclear deterrence in Europe between 2009 and 2014. I structure my argument along three main paradigms of international relations - neorealism, utilitarian liberalism and social constructivism. The main finding is that the B61’s role is strictly political and completely unrelated to the weapons’ military potential. From the perspective of the Polish government, the B61 serves two main roles. First, as a means to reassure continuous American engagement in Europe in response to a trust gap towards European NATO allies. Second, as a bargaining chip versus the mightier Russian arsenal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Because it is not the military potential of the B61 that matters to the government of Poland, searching for substitutes that would serve as a measure of reassurance while providing practical military value added might pave a way to rethink its presence in Europe.