IMPERCEPTIBLE POLITICS
RETHINKING RADICAL POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND PRECARITY TODAY

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Social change

This Dissertation is about social change. Or better, it is about social changes which are propelled by seemingly insignificant events of social life: when one undoes a standardised account of her life-story beyond given representations; when one works twelve hours per day and is paid for three; when one crosses the Mediterranean in a fishing boat. Contemporary discussions of social and political transformation – discussions taking place both in public discourse as well as in social theory – grant such incidents little relevance. These everyday experiences do not refer to a grand narrative of social change, nor are these events identifiable elements of broader, unified social movements. This Dissertation argues that the forces of change today can be traced in, and hinge on, these imperceptible everyday events of social life. But because of their seeming insignificance, they are easily overlooked.

Imperceptible politics is the term I employ to describe a mode of social change which is simultaneously elusive and forceful enough to challenge the contemporary regimes of control in the societies of the Global North Atlantic. The first Part of the Dissertation considers how imperceptible politics arise and operate in the field of contemporary polity.

The contemporary formation of power: Postliberal sovereignty (Section I)

The main actors in contemporary global politics are neither nation states nor transnational institutions. Rather, today's global actors are comprised of segments of what traditional sociology used to call social institutions and social strata: social classes, interest groups, social subjectivities, national and
international institutions. Segments of these social institutions and strata are vertically aligned with each other, whilst others are excluded from such alliances. In Chapter Three I describe how vertical aggregates intermingle segments of these institutions and strata and create large formations which act on a global scale. Thus, the main feature of today's formations of political sovereignty is its verticalisation.

My account of the verticalisation of sovereignty is preceded by a genealogical analysis of political sovereignty. I start with the modes of political engagement privileged by national sovereignty (Chapter One). Historically, national sovereignty is a matrix which connects a territory with a population. This connection gives birth to the political entity of the people as One (Volk), that is national space is understood to be inhabited by a unified set of people. The particular category of people as One is invented and sustained by the double-R axiom: rights & representation. A nation’s citizens make up its people who are supposedly represented in the national corpus and enjoy certain rights (citizenship being the most crucial). But as I show in my genealogical analysis, this all-inclusive liberal vision of the nation state is impossible.

In Chapter Two I consider how the limitations of the double-R axiom are exacerbated by transnational forces which traverse the realm of the nation. National sovereignty is thrown into crisis. The attack on the double-R axiom starts slowly in the post-war period and erupts in the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, this attack entails a thorough interrogation of the representational practices of national sovereignty. Previously excluded social groups contest canonical (and universal) modes of political representation and demand inclusion. There are mass exoduses from rigid forms of national regulation and they correspond with capital’s exodus from the boundaries of the nation state and the rise of the neoliberal project. Transnationalism emerges as a form of sovereignty which attempts to reconcile the crisis of national sovereignty with pervasive supranational forces. The exhaustive restructuring of social, cultural
and economic milieus which unfolds under these new geopolitical conditions effects the transition from national sovereignty to transnational governance.

One of the main characteristics of transnational governance is the attempt to create a global horizontal space, a space in which new modes of regulation can be effective. Others call this project globalisation, neo-imperialism, or empire. Of course the creation of a global unified, smooth, horizontal geo-space is, in itself, a means of domination. Countries do not have equal chances and powers to participate in and benefit from transnational operations. Nevertheless, there is something missing in this account of domination: globalisation has its winners and losers, but these winners and losers cannot be conceived as entire nation states. It is not even the case that nation states in their entirety participate in the processes of globalisation. Rather, we have alignments of distinct segments of different nation states, certain institutions, social groups, local or transnational companies, cultural and technoscientific bodies which operate in and attempt to dominate global transnational space. These are the vertical aggregates which I described earlier. In Chapter Three I discuss the formation and function of these postliberal aggregates. Their raison d’être is to create powerful actors as vertical composites which lie beyond the liberal axiomatic of the double-R principle.

Overcoming the predicament of resistance: Imperceptible politics (Section II)

How does social change happen in these conditions? What is the meaning of transformation? Where can we locate sites for intervention and change? The rest of the Dissertation addresses these questions, as they pertain to the new conditions of dominance imposed by postliberal sovereignty. Section II rethinks the relation between power, resistance and change. I start, in Chapter Four, by reconsidering the relation between control and flight and arguing that trajectories of flight precede their regulation. The productivity of power is
commonly thought to function in two related ways: processes of subjectification constitute individuals and biopolitics constitute populations as objects of control. Against this, I argue that the productivity of power is its capacity to capture and capitalise on people’s evacuation of spaces of control. People's flight, refusal, sabotage, exit all are the grounds on which power acquires its productivity. Exit comes first. Each of the three Sections of the second Part of this Dissertation describes the primacy of exit as it operates in different realms of social life today. Initially, I introduce this argument by reconsidering the history of mobility and its control in the late Middle Ages and in early capitalism. Vagabondage and other forms of unregulated mobility forced the transformation of disciplinary power so as to translate and tame this mobility into the subjectivity of the salaried worker.

Chapter Five explores theoretical articulations of the primacy of exit over the primacy of control. The movement of exit is always a historically and culturally situated form of resistance to control. We cannot understand exit as a decontextualised, overarching form of resistance. In this chapter I consider some powerful modes of evacuating the spaces of control in specific movements pertaining to the refusal of work, the refusal of the phallocentric subject, and the exit from an organicist understanding of the body. Each of these movements entails an exit from existing forms of representation. This because, as Rancière puts it, any attempt to represent and include neglected subjectivities into the given political architecture simply on the basis of an egalitarian principle can only lead to their control.

Naming-representation-inclusion constitute a continuum which returns to domination. Political agendas resulting from these three forms of political practice result in policing of the imperceptible revolting and escaping people. These forms of political practice are deeply manifest in contemporary polity and theoretical thinking of both the right and the left. I introduce imperceptible politics as I explore possibilities for breaking this form of policing. Politics (as opposed to policing) arises from the emergence of the miscounted, those who
have no place and whose capacities remain imperceptible within the normalizing organisation of the social realm. Refusing representation is a necessary move for doing politics from the position of those who have no part in community. Thus imperceptible politics does not refer to something which is invisible. Rather it refers to social forces which are outside existing regulation and outside policing.

Imperceptible politics challenge the controlling and repressive force of contemporary policing by evading existing systems of representation. This means that imperceptible politics is first and foremost a question of the senses, or perception. In Chapter Six I discuss the perceptual strategy engendered by imperceptible politics, one which differs from reflection and representation, a strategy akin to what Haraway denotes with the term diffraction. 'Diffraction does not produce "the same" displaced, as reflection and refraction do. Diffraction is a mapping of interference, not of replication, reflection, or reproduction. A diffraction pattern does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the effects of difference appear' (Haraway, 1992, p. 300). This diffractive quality of imperceptible politics allows me to examine contemporary modes of resistance and social change. Whilst imperceptible politics are a constituent force in changing current modes of control, when seen through the lenses of the existing representational architecture of politics they appear insignificant – and imperceptible. The second Part of the Dissertation (Section III-IV) investigates the sites in which imperceptible politics are creating the conditions for evacuating dominant forms of representation and postliberal control: mobility and labour.

My account of these two fields of imperceptible politics and postliberal control is of course not exhaustive of all different forms of imperceptible politics. I examine mobility and labour because these sites constitute the two primary fields of social conflict in the Global North Atlantic, tracing the primacy of exit in each of them. I treat these two fields as boundary objects seething with multiple active or latent forces. Some forces account for the
order of a field, or a field’s regime of control. Other arise in attempts to escape the regulation of mobility or labour, forces which transform the existing conditions of the field and (can) trigger an exodus from the modes of regulation prevailing in it. These movements which enact a departure from the given regime of control are a field’s imperceptible politics. Imperceptible politics does not aspire to restructure the representational arrangement of a field; rather it involves attempts to evacuate the regime of control, to exit from it.

*Regime of mobility control (Section III)*

The first field where I investigate the emergence of imperceptible politics is the regime of mobility control. In the first two chapters of this Section I examine the formation of the regime mobility control. In *Chapter Seven* I undertake a genealogy of the regime by examining migration policies in Europe. I trace the role played by the regime of mobility control in the political constitution of the present by investigating how migration policy evolves and transforms in conjunction with the national and transnational political changes of sovereignty in the context of the European Union. The main focus of this chapter is on the gradual process of the Europeanisation of migration policies. In particular, I examine how the various institutions partaking in the regulation of migration have evolved, merged and disseminated in the transnational European space. The development and implementation of the Schengen agreement serves as a key moment for analysing the Europeanisation of migration policies.

Against the backdrop of this genealogy I move, in *Chapter Eight*, to analyse how these institutions of migration control function in and contribute to the development of postliberal aggregates in European space. Institutions of migration control are marked by their liminality. They are liminal in a double sense. On the one hand, because they must adjust to the European Union’s
constantly and rapidly changing borders, they are highly adaptable. On the other hand, because they are institutions which are in constant transition, they are beyond immediate and direct open democratic control. Their liminality arises in response to transformations in the way mobility control is being practiced and characterised, that is mobility control no longer involves simply blocking or stopping migration (most especially illegal migration) at the borders; it is a matter of regulating the porosity of the European Union by creating various levees far beyond, on, and inside the borders. This shift in practice is only possible because it is aligned with a new approach to conceiving of mobility control, as the attempt to control of pores, passages and streams, instead of populations or individuals. The combination of these two features gives the name to the contemporary regime of migration control: Liminal Institutions of Porocracy.

The Liminal Institutions of Porocracy operate using three main strategies: the exterritorialisation of borders, the digitalisation of deportability, and the deceleration of migrational streams by routing them through camps. The exterritorialisation of borders involves the variant shifting of borders beyond their actual locality. One of the main concerns of the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy is to externalise or export the borders of the European Union to Eastern Europe and to North and West African countries. At the same time it is documented how borders are emerging within the very heart of the European territory with the establishment of highly policed areas in most European metropolises and with the proliferation of detention centres. The digitalisation of deportability is enabled by the virtualisation of surveillance and the establishment of virtual databases of control. The digitalisation of deportability proves to be one of the main tools in regulating the speed of migrational flows. Although migrants who appear on databases can be deported at any time, as we show, they are not necessarily deported immediately (or sometimes they are not deported at all). Digitalised deportability is a form of virtual imprisonment, state organised blackmail which constructs migrants as hostages of control.
Finally, the deceleration of migrational streams is organised around a multiple system of camps spread across the entire European Union and in some neighbouring countries.

I trace the functioning of these three techniques in Chapter Nine, through a specific focus on the space of the Aegean Sea, one of the most permeable and simultaneously policed lines of border-crossing in Europe. I examine how contemporary migration escapes its regulation and creates new conditions for mobility and movement. In this chapter I analyse ethnographic material from fieldwork with migrants crossing the Aegean transit space. My concern here is to show how migration challenges the regime of mobility control established through the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy. In particular I concentrate on the function of camps for travelling migrants and examine how they incorporate camps into their overall tactics of movement. This analysis demonstrates that the disciplinary institution of the camps evolves by following the escaping and moving masses.

In Chapter Ten I undertake a theoretical interrogation of migration as an exiting force from the contemporary regime of mobility control. I investigate how migrants evacuate the spaces of power, transform themselves and become imperceptible in order to bypass the regime of regulation. This chapter elucidates the constituent power of mobility for modern polity. This is evident when seen from the perspective of the autonomy of migration, an approach which questions both the economistic thinking of the so called new economics of migration as well as the humanitarian thinking of communitarians and refugee-studies alike. I do not regard migrational movements as derivatives of social, cultural and economic structures. Rather, the autonomy of migration lens reveals how migration is a constituent creative force in these structures. This questions the ubiquitous notions of the migrant prevalent in NGO paternalistic interventionism – as either a useful worker or as a victim. Instead, I show how migration becomes an imperceptible force challenging the very political formation of postliberal sovereignty.
The final Section of the Dissertation explores the conditions for value creation in contemporary capitalism. Following my work on the Postliberal aggregates in Section I, I argue that the production of value in postliberal capitalism is based on recombining and intermingling matter: humans, animals, artefacts and things. However, recombination does not only pertain to capitalism’s form of production, it also pertains to the changing configuration of the worker's body. In this constellation matter and bodies are the core moments of production: embodied capitalism. Value is produced through the recombination of bodies and the producer is able to produce through the recombination of his/her own body (Chapter Eleven).

The recombination of workers’ subjectivity is a process in which specific parts of a worker's body, capacities, potentials are dissected and exploited. This form of exploitation is precarity. On a merely descriptive level precarity is associated with the rise of atypical and insecure labour conditions (e.g. as part time, casual, short term, project-based, freelance, flexible, undocumented employment). This post-Fordist change corresponds to a broader transformation of production in embodied capitalism: de-industrialisation, feminisation of work, immaterial labour. But, against the backdrop of this kind of sociological account of the rise of precarious conditions, we are likely to misrecognise precarity. That is, the formation of a new social subjectivity germane to precarity can be mistakenly recast as a unified category of workers which is the result of the specificities of labour transformation in embodied capitalism. Against this reading of precarity, I interrogate the multiplicity of subjectivities which arise from how precarity is lived differently by precarious workers. These are embodied experiences of precarity, experiences which expand far beyond the immediate conditions of labour and colonise the whole life time-space of the worker. Chapter Eleven offers a phenomenology of the
main characteristics of embodied experiences of precarity from the standpoint of precarious workers.

If precarious subjectivities do not constitute a unified social actor (an actor like ‘the working class’, for example) how can they create a viable and effective social movement which can oppose the regime of labour control in embodied capitalism? What is an effective form of mobilisation of this multiplicity of precarious experiences? What forms does resistance, as I described earlier, take – that is, as a means of exit for precarious labourers? In Chapter Twelve I investigate the relevance of three traditionally effective forms of organisation in the history of labour and social movements: the revolutionary political party, the trade union and micropolitics. I argue that none of these forms of organisation can effectively respond to the perils of precarity and destabilise embodied capitalism. This is because revolutionary parties and traditional labour movement organisations seem to be incapable of addressing the inequalities emerging from the new regime of labour control. That is, both party and trade union modes of engagement are anchored in and seek to augment the national social compromise of normal employment, which foregrounds the protection of indigenous, male, white, skilled worker in full and stable employment inside the borders of a nation. But the proliferation of precarious subjectivities undermines faith in and the possibility of an effective national social compromise. Precarity challenges the pillars of traditional labour movements and of political representation.

At the same time social movements which operate on the newer terrain of micropolitics seem to be ineffective in addressing precarity. Micropolitics contest prevalent representational practices by claiming a new form of extended belonging or citizenship. They seek the inclusion of new social actors pertaining to transnational, post-welfare representations of participatory rights. Translated into the realm of precarity, this means the attempt to establish a new form of syndicalism, biosyndicalism, which puts pressure towards a new compromise between precarious labour and postliberal embodied capitalism in
the form of flexisecurity. The representational politics of extended citizenship and the demand for flexisecurity are particularly important responses to the concerns of the embodied experience of precarity. Nevertheless, they finally reterritorialise precarious workers' subjectivities in the matrix of a new postliberal statism. But this is not the end of the matter.

In the final Chapter Thirteen, I examine how the embodied experience of precarity escapes capture and reterritorialisation. Embodied capitalism necessitates the creation of sociability in order to be able to operate effectively. But there is an excess to this sociability. That is, sociability produces value which cannot be completely commodified and appropriated in embodied capitalism. This is a sociability which is inappropriate to the current regime of labour regulation and cannot be represented within it. Inappropriate/d sociability, as I call the excess generated by the experience of precarious workers, operates in the heart of embodied capitalism and at the same time it exists in a vacuum of control. This is a movement of exit, inappropriate/d sociability is the imperceptible politics of precarious workers.
PART A

THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT
Spaces of the nation

Giovanni Battista Piranesi’s *Carceri d’Invenzione*, a series of capriccios issued around 1750, present fantastic imaginary interiors, visionary dungeons. Piranesi, who in most of his other works delivered a romanticized version of Roman architecture, created here an image of social space characteristic of the emerging modern form of political sovereignty.

Piranesi’s capriccio can be read as a metaphor of a highly structured political space, filled with mysterious scaffolding and different interconnected hierarchical levels (Figure 1). Yet every level is clearly distinct from the other, always under surveillance from the internal tower. There are chasms between the levels, but also controlled possibilities for mobility. It seems that the main purpose of this structure is to make individuals and their bodies identifiable and manageable in space. The human body becomes domesticated, disciplined, productive, and individuals become people. This is the logic of representation which constitutes the political scene of modernity and with it also the category of people: i.e. a collective subject whose members occupy specific positions, perform certain activities, have rights, or in other words, are distributed in an ordered way within a certain space. But space is never abstract, it is always delineated and limited: space in modernity is territory.
Formalising the relation between national space and people: The double-R axiom

The core principle of modern polity is national sovereignty, which is the ideal correspondence between people and territory. There are distinct ideologies and practices employed in the attempt to grasp this congruence (Hobsbawm, 1990; Bhabha, 1990; Benedict Anderson, 1991; Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991). Modern political theory develops different models of how the relation between
people, nation, and territory can be configured in order to engender a viable form of sovereignty1 (Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2007a). However, what these accounts have in common is that they employ the notion of national sovereignty as an attempt to systematise and describe the relation between people and territory.

The correspondence between people and territory is instituted in two sequential moves. Firstly, nation building entails the separation and classification of people into classes and social strata, a process which occurs in the signification procedures of representation. Secondly, the nation state assigns rights of participation to each of these represented groups. National sovereignty is based on a national social compromise—a historical agreement which developed as a means of regulating the distribution of rights amongst different classes and strata of society (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Poulantzas, 1978). Historically, the city state—and later the nation state—consisted of wealthy, property owners only. Citizenship was available to those people who already recognised each other as participating in forging state institutions. The majority of the inhabitants of the territory of the state were excluded. But, the state tried (and tries) to include people by granting social rights. Social rights become a means of expanding the category of citizenship—but the move is always partial. For instance, the working class can be deemed eligible for social rights such as protection from unemployment or the inability to work and can be granted rights such as access to education for their children on the

1 One main tradition, for example, highlights the role of territory and refers back to the Schmittian concept of sovereignty (1997) according to which sovereign law is the rationalization of Landnahme (or the appropriate of land). For critical evaluations of Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty see Balibar (2004b) and Balakrishnan (2000). A second major model highlights the role of the people and refers back to Hobbes (1994). Here sovereignty entails a social contract between the people and the sovereign. Finally, in the tradition of Rousseau (1997) sovereignty can only be understood as national sovereignty, that is the ideal identification of the people’s will with the national constitution. Habermas (2001) attempted a continuation of this latter line of thought in the debates on world citizenship.
basis that they are involved in wealth production. But as social rights are extended to some they are held beyond the reach of others - on the basis of their sex, age, mode of employment, country of birth, etc. Because the move is partial its outcome is always a balance, continually open to being contested and transformed, but a balance which endures as a national social compromise.

This is the so-called double-R axiom, rights and representation. It is the insurmountable precondition of national sovereignty. In modern national sovereignty, constitutionalism, that is the established set of formalised rights, has always predominated as a mode of political engagement. Rights have dominated over issues of representation prevalent in gender and queer, cultural, identity and micro-politics (i.e., how different classes and strata are conceived in the social and cultural imaginary and in everyday life). As I shall discuss in the next chapter, the problem of representation has only recently attained a central role in the organization of polity in North-Atlantic nation states. Despite the predominance of the process of rights over representation, the latter remains an important element, even in the early stages of the emergence of national sovereignty.

Escaping the limits of North-Atlantic national sovereignty

The double-R axiom not only organizes the national corpus in terms of territory, it primarily designates the nation state's relation to other states and their people. Thus, the double-R axiom simultaneously defines the matrix of positive rights and representation within the national territory, and the non-existence of rights and symbolic presence beyond its borders. There are many attempts to explain this paradoxical constellation of the double-R axiom inside and outside the nation state which as a result of the incompleteness of national sovereignty. For example Gunsteren (1998) argues that citizenship must be considered as imperfect and rather than being a fixed category, it is a
continually developing and improving mode of political engagement. But, as I will argue later, the thesis that sovereignty is always incomplete and citizenship is always a process in the making is problematic. It does not account for situations when sovereignty is designed to be incomplete and exclusive, and citizenship *de facto* ceases to be a universal right and pertains by intention to particular social groups.

Thus, when I think of the double-R axiom I have to take account of the fact that it constantly refers to its exact opposite: to the absence of rights and representation. The double-R axiom is central to national sovereignty, not only because it organises political life inside the national space, but also because of its unavailability to certain social groups in the realm of the nation state (e.g. illegal migrants) and, of course, outside of it. This is the double function of the monopolisation of state power, as Elias describes it. On the one hand state power reconciles social antagonisms inside the borders of a certain nation, on the other hand it creates a belligerent and hostile competition with other states outside of its borders (Elias, 1981).

The double-R axiom retains its power not only when it is active but also when it becomes inactive—this is its potency. Modern political theory regards the state of exception as the crucial moment of modern national sovereignty (Schmitt, 1963). However, overemphasising the role of the state of exception in the consolidation of power in the modern North-Atlantic nation state creates a false picture. For example, Agamben argues that bare life (1998) and the camp (2001), a condition beyond life that is protected by the polity, epitomises modern political sovereignty. But explaining the genesis of modern sovereignty as simply naked violence over life is a reductionist, tautological move (Bojadjiev, Karakayali, & Tsianos, 2004). Certainly it articulates one element of this form of sovereignty, but it ignores that both the absence and presence of the double-R axiom are necessary in order to maintain national sovereignty. None of the two dimensions of the double-R axiom can exist without the other. Because national sovereignty inherently contains its own negation, it can
always deny its own foundations and withdraw from any responsibility to ensure the double-R axiom. The state of exception is the moment where borders are erected within the national territory, tearing up any apparent society of equals (Arendt, 1968).

Thus, to say that national sovereignty is incomplete is not to say that it can improve and become more inclusive, rather it means that national sovereignty is exclusive and incomplete by design. This Dissertation attempts to trace the formation and transformation of modes of being which exist in the spaces where sovereignty does not account for the inhabitants of its territory. It traces the emergence of many imperceptible and violent revolts, silent retreats, forceful refusals and unexpected insurgencies which question current forms of sovereignty, reveal its incompleteness, and escape its oppression.

These imperceptible actions never ceased to exist; in fact they have always accompanied the emergence of sovereignty designating its limits and foiling the repressive machinations of modern political constitution. Modern social and political history is full of all these attempts to exit, to refuse, to revolt against modern polity. Remember these incidents: March 26, 1871, Belleville, Menilmontant (and the massacre of 30,000 citizens of Paris); the Declaration of the Rights of Woman (rights which were not granted, instead the women's body was sexualized and neutralized: *Liberty Guiding the People/Liberty on the Barricades*); the Haitian revolution (whose representatives on being sent to the French revolution were simply executed); the Räterepublik (and the Freikorps); etc.

From imperceptible subjectivities to subjects of power

It is precisely imperceptible actions that must be suspended and rearranged under the directives of modern political sovereignty. More than that, the uncontrollable, singular potentialities of bodies which escape the order of
modern political sovereignty become the material matter necessary for the creation of the big Leviathan. Modern political sovereignty digests and accommodates all these imperceptible subjectivities, actions, potentialities into the grand corpus of modern polity. Imperceptible subjectivities have to be subsumed under the guidance of polity. In fact all these escaping subjectivities cannot be simply eradicated, they must be appropriated; for control to function, their endeavours to question sovereign power must be translated and mediated.

It is crucial to my understanding of national sovereignty that it is not primarily organised around oppression of the imperceptible potentialities of the singular body. Its primary focus is not the suppression of those social groups who escape. Rather, modern national sovereignty attempts to absorb these potentialities by including them in its social reproduction. Imperceptible subjectivities maintain an intimate relation to potentialities which escape given fixed forms of regulation (Grosz, 1993; Gatens, 1996). Modern national sovereignty does not refuse to work with these potentialities. Rather, it attempts to break the immanent relation between bodies and potentialities by introducing a third term, its own logic of development, which transforms by domesticating, adjusting, educating, tormenting, disciplining, training the bodies of the imperceptibles.

In other words, modern national sovereignty operates by mediating the relation between subjectivity and its potentials with a series of "body techniques" (Mauss, 1978) which include the body in given mechanics of polity. This is a long and painful process, a process which very much resembles the meticulous transformation of the body's habits, so powerfully described by Elias (1994). National sovereignty replaces the immanent relation between the body and its countless potentialities with a transcendent relation of the reflexive subject. Escaping, mobbing, refusing, revolting individuals are transformed into the primal ingredient of modern polity: subjects. National sovereignty transforms imperceptible subjectivities into subjects of power.
Consider Albrecht Dürer's famous painting *Draughtsman Drawing a Recumbent Woman* (Figure 2). Surveillance and method, domination and order, the invasive gaze and the scopic regime of controlling space. But these are widely discussed topics (Alpers, 1982; Nead, 1992; Haraway, 1997). What is particularly important for us is the relation between the subject of study and the device which makes study possible: the grid. Only through this grid can the artist control vision, dominate the object of study.

This upright grid of wires is the major actor in this woodcut: it splits the picture into two, transforming the artist into a male subject, and the subject of the drawing into a sexualized female object of domination (Figure 3). The hierarchical organization of gender relations and the organization of space along the terms of masculinized and homophobic imaginaries is the outcome of the very existence of a subject as such. Because before the grid is placed between the two subjects, these subjects do not exist at all. The grid is the metonymy for the order of modern sovereignty. The grid transforms imperceptible bodies and subjectivities into subjects; it classifies subjects into groups, groups into a territory. It produces social classes, institutional positions, social actors, it directs them to the pervasive regime of productivity and, finally, it establishes hierarchical relations between them. The standalone, self sufficient, reflexive subject, with the capacity to carry out intentional acts is the core image of the valorised individual actor of modern national
sovereignty. The subject is the polar opposite of the imperceptible body. By becoming a subject imperceptible subjectivity is amenable to discipline, to work and to production, to being trained and tormented. The imperceptible body is simultaneously the building material of modern political sovereignty and the most elusive and absent element of modern polity.

Unregulated struggles

There is nothing new about this observation about the centrality of the subject for the constitution of national sovereignty and as a means for taming imperceptible subjectivities. The debate between the two *maîtres penseurs* of the crisis of the social state, Michel Foucault and Nikos Poulantzas, as well as of their common teacher Luis Althusser (1971), has completely exposed the centrality of the emergence of the subject for understanding power. Foucault interrupts the classic dualism between individual freedom and repressive sovereign power, linking together discipline and freedom, sovereignty and the body. Discipline is the 'art of the human body', discipline attempts to make the body productive: the more it becomes productive the more it becomes docile.
Cooptation and training, subjugation and usefulness are inseparable for the operation of modern political rationalities of government (Foucault, 1991). Moreover, these microphysics of power effect the transformation of pervasive social antagonisms into technologies of the body. Social antagonism are rarely played out as violent struggles, they are increasingly managed through disciplining the body. In his later lectures on governmentality, Foucault develops this account of power as the regulation of individuals and starts to address the problem of state power (Foucault, 2004a, 2004b). There is no external relation between the modern state and the subject, government connect practices of the subject and practices of domination (Foucault, 1987, 1990). The modern state is understood as an individualizing and, simultaneously, a totalising form of power. Foucault's genealogy of the modern state is concurrently a genealogy of the subject itself (Lemke, 1997).

Nevertheless Foucault's extraordinary attempt to link the subject with power seems to neglect one important point in the function of the modern state, what Elias calls its capacity to pacify society (Elias, 1981). The modern state is more than a paramount form of government. It is not exhausted in technologies of the self and technologies of government. Rather, social antagonisms are productive, they create their own conditions for balancing and pacifying social conflicts. These conflicts are fought, resolved and contested again and out of these processes the institutions of the state emerge. For example, the welfare state arises in response to competing claims from different social actors—the balance it delivers acts to pacify (if temporarily) social conflict. Following but also criticising Foucault, Poulantzas (1978) highlights how the modern state evolves as a permanent but instable balance of compromises between different social groups and classes. This view retains Foucault's insight about the interconnectedness between the subject and state power, and builds on it by seeking to understand how the development of political sovereignty and social and subjective existence often follows disparate paths. This is distinct from both the classic Marxian approach which sees state power and society as a
binary, and Foucauldian proclamations about a fusion between state power and society. Poulantzas reads the state as a partly autonomous condensation of the energies of social conflicts. State power is the instable but, at the same time, reliable space for the articulation and resolution of social conflicts. State power is thus a platform which guarantees social cohesion and simultaneously leaves open space for transformation. Although the modern state creates the ground for the articulation of a commonality, this ground is open to the instigation of different strategies for its own transformation.

The importance of Poulantzas' move is that it opens possibilities to break the vicious and eternal Foucauldian circularity between power and resistance and to understand that although social struggles for refusal and the imperceptible politics of exit are tightly connected to the function of the state power they also evolve in relative autonomous trajectories. In Section II I discuss the autonomous transformation of these struggles in more detail. In fact, the second part—Sections III & IV—of this Dissertation is dedicated to elucidating such imperceptible politics in contemporary realms of experience, mobility and labour.

The nation state does not have resolution of social conflicts as its ultimate aim, rather it attempts to regulate conflicts by developing multiple ways to include subaltern social groups and classes. These complex inclusion practices create various social actors, or subjects of power, who participate in preserving and reorganising the national social compromise. Compromise, condensation of social conflicts, inclusion, production of subjects—this is the pathway which stabilises sovereignty in the realm of the North-Atlantic nation state. But it is this same complexity which leaves open spaces, excesses to processes of subject production and inclusion, in which strategies of imperceptible politics and exit emerge and push the state to its transformation beyond the coordinates of the existing social compromise (and these transformations from national to transnational and postliberal sovereignty are discussed in the remaining chapters of this section). While Foucault sees this kind of politics as an effect
of power and thus reads them as complicit with power, throughout this Dissertation I argue that they play a primary role in social transformation. Complicit struggles certainly exist. But imperceptible struggles come first. Adieu Foucault. Adieu melancholic Keynesianism. Adieu anxious liberalism. The struggles come first when it comes to social change.

That the struggles come first does not mean that these are always addressed towards the state. We are tired of these Marxist and post-Marxian readings of social conflict as solely organised around the state and its institutions (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Callinicos, 1994). Poulantzas' (1978) understanding of the modern state as a 'material condensation' of relations of power and of the multiple energies of social conflicts prevents a typical reduction of state power to the material scaffolding which supports the domination of a sole class. We are so tired by this 'Marxist' reading of state power as an instrument in the hands of a single social actor! When even the dominant social groups are not unified, let alone the subaltern groups and strata, the traditional view of state power becomes impossible: state power in neither an instrument in the hands of the dominant class nor a superstructure hovering over society. (This impossibility is particularly important for the current transformation of national sovereignty to postliberal condition as I will describe it in the following chapters). Thus when I say that the struggles come first and that imperceptible politics are pivotal to social transformation I mean that this form of politics is not primarily addressing state power. Rather the opposite is the case; imperceptible politics is performed by social actors who negotiate their embeddedness in state power under the signature 'exit' not under the imperative of inclusion. The imperceptible politics of exit attempt to escape both the Marxist fixation with the state as well as the Foucauldian paranoia of control pervading the whole of society.
Imperceptible politics and the pressure to escape national sovereignty

Working with the interconnected but also relative autonomous formation of state and modes of social existence, or else between power and resistance, enables us to identify the escaping powers of imperceptible politics in the realm of national sovereignty. Seeing national sovereignty as primarily a space for compromise inside the borders of a certain nation constitutes a break with the panoptical obsession of total control. It is then possible to investigate all these imperceptible spaces in which practices of exit are being formulated and performed. I want to interrogate forms of social and political excess which surpass (or slip between) the given mechanics of power, pressuring the declining nation state into transformation.

Poulantzas and Foucault faced the crisis of the nation state. Writing two decades later, Balibar (1993) examines its ongoing erosion. For Balibar, the nation state is a historical potentiality which emerged out of the social struggles calling for its redefinition. The very core of the welfare state is indeed the attempt to reconcile social conflicts by implementing an always more inclusive form of biopolitical regulation in the realms of education, family, health, social rights and in the space of private life (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991). This resulted in new practises of inclusion for various, primarily under-represented, social groups and it solidified the triptych between citizenship/nation/sovereignty. But the very same powerful, but equally fragile, triptych seems to be under attack from the vocal demands for further expansion of the compromising structure of the nation state. New social conflicts and new emerging social actors call for an enlargement of citizenship and the expansion of social and welfare state provisions. Consider shifts in migration, new forms of gender and queer politics, the increasing diversification of work beyond full time employment, new forms of cultural politics. And this is the exact moment
when the North-Atlantic post-war social compromise holding national sovereignty in place seems to be unable (and unwilling) to respond to these demands.

Drawing on Poulantzas we can see this as the moment where subaltern social groups put so much pressure on the modern state that the state cannot respond by expanding and expanding, instead a fundamental transformation of the state's own structure is initiated. In place of granting more rights these pressures triggered a new configuration of social regulation and a new regime of control, described in the next chapter.

The modern state as the compromise holding national sovereignty in place is according to Poulantzas a space-time-matrix. Technologies of the subject, social institutions, rebellions, imperceptible politics, and structures of domination all exist in the North-Atlantic post-war societies as part of the space-time-matrix of the nation. Certainly, the calls of the 1970s/1980s social movements for a radical expansion of citizenship and rights were articulated within the realm of the state. But, at they were pointing in a direction which would radically surpass the oppressive national social compromise which existed at that time. Instead of negotiating these calls for expansion within its own terms, national sovereignty went transnational and implemented new forms of neoliberal social regulation. I call this new regime of control transnational governance. In the next chapter I will examine how transnational modes of sovereignty arose in response to the pressures of all these imperceptible subjectivities calling for an exit from the patriarchal dominance of the nation state.
In Chapter One, I have described how actors are enjoined to participate in state sovereignty. State sovereignty only works with elements of experience which are already appropriated and visible. We see 'subjects'. What remains invisible is the excess—imperceptible modes of sociability which are unrepresented, inappropriated in modern state sovereignty. The inability to see and work with this excess compounds the cooption of subject's captured bodies. Yet there are still dimensions, moments of life that remain contingent and unresolved. Unsettled bodies persist in their existence, more than this, without being recognised they are productive in complicating and transforming subjectivity within the given regime of state sovereignty. In Section II I discuss in more depth this imperceptible excess and its attempts to escape contemporary regimes of control. In this chapter, my concern is to describe different ways in which regimes of control attempt to redefine and work with this excess in conditions of transnational governance.

The rupturing and domestication of the potentials of bodies is never a complete process. There is a reaction, and these potentials re-emerge and fuel new developments in regimes of control—different versions of state sovereignty or even the emergence of a new regime of control: transnational sovereignty. My concern in this chapter is to describe the emergence of transnational sovereignty, the way in which it works by harnessing—rather than breaking—the intimacy between bodies and their potentials and the limits of this regime of control.
The garden of exile and emigration

The Jewish museum in Berlin, on the borders of Mitte and Kreuzberg, was finished in 1998. In its rear courtyard, the Garden of Exile and Emigration, stand 49 rectangular concrete columns, each over six feet tall. Each column contains earth in which willow oaks grow (Figure 4). The oaks come together at the top of the pillars, unreachable. The distance between the columns is quite narrow, the ground inclined, walking between them urges you to look up. There you see the sky through the leaves and branches of the willow oaks, a feeling of calmness immediately descends upon you, yet there is something unapproachable and strange about this garden.

![Figure 4](image)

The space of the Garden of Exile is open, nothing of the subterranean darkness of Piranesi's capriccios. The garden seems to be the opposite of the order Piranesi presents as a hermetic whole with no exit and no entrance, regulated by fear, with chains, racks, wheels, and dreadful engines. Instead we
have an evolving and virtual order, with many different groups and actors, the different columns seem to be different ways of becoming, flows. You can never have an overview of the whole once you are in it, each different column can be encountered as a relatively coherent entity. At the same time these flows break, there are edges, blocked views. And yet the columns exist as a whole and come together in the form of thousand multiple connections. They have their individual story and still they are part of the same network of existence. This form of political order seems to present a shift away from national sovereignty.

The notion of neo-liberalism has been deployed by critical social theory in order to conceptualize sociopolitical transformations after WWII (Harvey, 2005). The concept has been developed in the attempt to address: (a) the emergence of new modes of transnationalist global sovereignty on the geopolitical plane (Jessop, 2001); (b) the consolidation of post-Fordist labour on the plane of production (Lipietz, 1992; Marazzi, 1998); (c) the dismantling of social welfare systems and the introduction of biopolitics on the social plane (Swaan, 1994); (d) the dissemination of postmodern life on the cultural plane (Bauman, 1993; Jameson, 1991); and (e) the rapid development of high tech, biotech and neuroscience on the plane of knowledge (Castells, 1996).

Neoliberalism delineates a passage which has undermined modern national sovereignty since WWII, leading to what, later in this chapter, I will call postliberal sovereignty. This passage which is dominated by neoliberal politics is our most recent past. But we have to historicize neoliberalism to escape its seemingly inescapable presence.

Together, neoliberalism, the biopolitical turn and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the crisis of the national social compromise brought about the collapse of modern national sovereignty and of the Fordist regime of production. On the one hand, global capital practised its own exodus from national regulation. On the other hand, the migratory mobility of workers intensified long-standing pressure on national borders. Neoliberalism
introduced the virtual order of global markets and irrevocably undermined nation states' monopoly on power. At the same time, biopolitics infused a deregulated and fluid governance of the population into the heart of the established Fordist regime of immobility. The eighties and the nineties was the era of transnational global sovereignty and of post-Fordist reorganisation of production in North-Atlantic societies.

*Representation: The second R of the double-R axiom*

The major concern of modern national sovereignty was the assignment of rights in order to sustain the national compromise between competing social classes and strata of society. In this process, representation was a minor concern, always present and active but still minor (i.e. representation was principally thought as the ways in which different social classes are interpellated by state apparatuses and are codified in the cultural imaginary). In the double-R axiom, rights were more central than representation. But neoliberalism brought about a major change: the dismantling of social welfare systems and the introduction of high levels of mobility by post-Fordist labour led to an increasing diversification of the social structure. And this diversification brought with it the politics of difference. In other words, the cultural politics of neoliberalism was postmodern culture: the fight for representation. Cultural studies, feminism, postcolonial studies, queer and political theory have all participated in and critiqued this fight for representation (Hall & Jefferson, 1976; Clifford, 1986; Sedgwick, 1990; Spivak, 1999; Warner, 1999; Butler, Laclau, & Zizek, 2000; Mouffe, 2000).

But what is this fight for representation, where does it come from? First of all, it comes from the dissolution of social class as the central actor in society. The different levels in Piranesi’s etching seem to represent social classes; but this is not the case for the columns in Libeskind’s *Garden of Exile.* Rather, they
appear as different social groups on a small scale, more akin to emerging subjectivities than to hierarchically organised classes. The political order of transnational sovereignty is an order with multiple players, establishing new relations of power, introducing alliances between them. And it is precisely this form of relationality which triggers the fight for representation. By gradually reversing the logic of the double-R axiom after WWII, social actors attempted to break the blockade which modern national sovereignty had imposed on the body's potentials. This is the moment where imperceptible subjectivities reappear on the political scene and threaten to disrupt sovereign power which functions through discipline, torture, training and wage labour productivity. We can trace the singular trajectories of bodies in civil rights movements, in the events of '68, in feminist movements, anti-work movements and new forms of cooperation, the 1960s cultural rebellions and in fights against colonialism. By the 1960s, the wild anomaly of the mobbing, refusing collectivities once again spreads through society, and disseminates into the world (Connery, 2005). This is the moment where imperceptible politics break the rule of national sovereignty and call for an exit from it.

**The intimacy of power**

As the body's potentials materialise in unsanctioned ways they undermine modern national sovereignty, forcing society to reconsider the transcendent relation between body and polity—a relation through which bodies are interpellated within normative discourse of the state. The intrinsic affection between bodies, potentials and power emerges as a productive force, an immanent force the modern nation state can no longer negate: sovereignty is challenged. But this challenge, in turn, triggers its own response. Neoliberalism is not primarily the answer to the quest for a new mode of economic regulation (Aglietta, 1979). Nor does it address demands for a new relation between
market and society (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996; Donzelot, 1984). Neoliberalism is the answer to the wild insurgency which emerges after WWII. Transnational sovereignty emerges as a means of reabsorbing the intrinsic affection between body, potential and power of the 1960s and 1970s. This capture transforms and channels the wild anomaly of the body's potentials into those of a docile, productive actor in globalized, transnational networks of power. There are neither historical laws nor inherent necessities of other kinds determining the emergence of transnational neoliberal sovereignty. There is only the necessity to tame the reappearance of imperceptible subjectivities in the post WWII period.

Now, the forms of domestication imposed on the body by modern sovereignty become constraining and even obsolete. Transnational sovereignty functions without starting from a transcendent viewpoint; instead of disrupting and negating the intimate affection between bodies and potentials this intimate relation is understood as the immanent, driving force of life. Transnational sovereignty accepts and works with the challenge of insurgent bodies which emerged in the post war period. Rather than negating the body's potentials and imposing a transcendent relation between bodies and powers, transnational sovereignty makes the intrinsic affection between bodies and potentials its core functioning principle. In the moment where the intimacy of body and potential is installed at the heart of sovereignty, sovereignty itself becomes intimate. And of course, what emerges is an intimate form of power.

We have here a new form of working with the body's potentialities. Modern sovereignty negates disruptive trajectories and the body's remaining potentials are absorbed into the grand corpus of society (the nation and the big Leviathan). Modern national sovereignty installs a hierarchical, transcendent relation between body and polity. Now, transnational sovereignty generalizes the intrinsic relation between body, potential and power into the paramount principle according to which society functions. The body's potentials are redoubled and incorporated—not as the object of power—but as the very
means through which transnational sovereignty operates. Singularity, potentiality are affirmed as necessary for participation in this flexible regime of control. Transnational sovereignty is decentralized and contagious. The redoubling of the body's potentials in transnational sovereignty means that the body itself takes on its own control. Control is not constructed as an transcendent relation between power and the body but is internalized in the very existence of the body itself (Deleuze, 1992).

Transnational sovereignty no longer attempts to regulate the state triptych of people, nation, territory, rather it abandons the notion that there must be one persistent and prevalent mode of ordering this triptych. There is no primary organizational principle, now organization arises out of subjectivities as autopoeitic systems (Luhmann, 1995) and the relationality of self-activating bodies. The self-activating body appears in different guises in conditions of transnational sovereignty—the self-organizing agent, the robot, the cyborg, the embodied mind, embodied feelings (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Haraway, 1991b; Brooks, 2002; Clark, 1997; Damasio, 1999).

Consider Guy Debord's psycho-geographical maps of Paris, made at the end of the fifties, maps which attempt to disrupt existing representations and convey different visions of subjective existence in space (Figure 5). Rather than being entirely new images, his psycho-geographic maps were modified versions of ordinary maps. The fight for representation is not simply an exodus from modernity. It comes from within modernity and turns it upside down. Cartographic order and categorization was and still is the canon. What changes is the method.
Debord's maps simultaneously deconstruct conventional cartography (both literally and figuratively), and preserve the logic of a graphic expression of spatial order. Conventional maps convey a certain abstract and geometric truth about the social environment through use of the grid (as discussed in the previous chapter); psycho-geographic maps are supposed to convey a subjective, existential or autopoetic optic. The maps show an experience of space as fragmented, discontinuous, undecided, interconnected, relational: networks. The imagination of neoliberalism and of transnational liberal sovereignty is dominated by one banal picture: nodes and lines, no beginning and no end. You can constantly withdraw or add new nodes, some of them are more powerful than others and manage a certain region of the network (Figure 6).
The logic of the network not only implies a specific way of ordering and making society, but it also reorganizes the very concept of subject. As discussed in the previous chapter, imperceptible subjectivities are domesticated by modern national sovereignty and transformed into subjects. In contrast, people do not become subjects in transnational sovereignty. Rather they become self-responsible agents in perpetual adaptation to others. "I think we
have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand 'I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!' or ... 'I am homeless, the Government must house me!' and so they are casting their problems on society, and who is society? There is no such thing as society! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people, and people look to themselves first." This is not a quote from Nikolas Rose, it is Margaret Thatcher in 1987 (Thatcher, 1987, 31 October)

In order to function, neoliberalism and biopolitics rely on advanced technologies of the self. Governmentality theory, a conceptual prototype for the way we understand individual experience and action in post-Fordism, introduced the idea of post-social rationalities of regulation (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Foucault, 2004a; N. Rose, 1996). Governmentality theory is an attempt to grasp how postmodern and neoliberal conditions of existence work upon the individual's sense of the self and of conduct (Papadopoulos, 2003). And this is what many conceive as the process of subjectification: that is, the production of subjectivities in the network of power. Where modern national sovereignty works through reflexivity and intentionality, a rather different mode of existence pervades this scene. Nodes in transnational sovereign networks are regulated through relating to themselves as self-governing subjects and through their investment in constantly attending to and working on their relations with others. Governmentality is the cipher of power in transnational sovereignty. There is nothing liberating in this. Governmentality and subjectification can only affirm the neoliberal structure of power. The wild anomaly of the 1960s and 1970s has, in the 1980s and 1990s, once again been transformed into a subjugated form of life. This is the domestication of the imperceptible politics in the post-war period which created the conditions for escape the repressive regime of national sovereignty in North-Atlantic societies.
The limits of transnational sovereignty

The body's potentials, once banned from the grand corpus of modern sovereignty, become the building material of the new transnational sovereignty, and, finally, become corrupted. But their corruption also demarcates the limits of transnational sovereignty. In modern sovereignty the national social compromise is based on the concept of social rights. The crisis of modern sovereignty, which I described earlier, mobilizes the most intimate bodily potentials: its existence becomes globalized and transnational; its productivity in cooperatively organized, subjectivity becomes indispensable (Atzert & Müller, 2004). But transnational sovereignty fails to integrate all these evolving spaces and capacities into a new system of transnational social rights. All these emerging common spaces become unrepresentable.

The double-R axiom still fails to perform its function of ordering society: none of its elements, neither representation nor rights, are powerful enough to accommodate and to address the life of the majority of people in transnational conditions. I said in the previous chapter that the order of the double-R axiom in the era of national sovereignty which I called national social compromise was unable to respond and to accommodate positively to pressure of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. This lead to the transformation of the double-R axiom into a new regime of regulation which I called transnational governance. But this again seems to reach its limits. There is a new articulation of imperceptible politics emerging (which I will describe in last two sections of this Dissertation) and at the same time there is a new ongoing transformation of the current transnational regime of control to a new system of control: postliberal aggregates (I describe this transformation in the next chapter).

Not only the configuration of the double-R axiom in the form of a national social compromise become insufficient and ineffective to tackle social exclusion and to address questions of equality but also the recent configuration
of the double-R axiom in the form of transnational governance. And in the few cases where the double-R axiom seems to be still active today it becomes the privilege of a few. Only those few social actors who manage to make of themselves proper subjects of representation and rights can play the game of the double-R axiom and shape society. The double-R axiom ceases to be a *commune bonum*, a property of the whole society and of everyone. Only some can use it. Only some can have it. The rest dwell in a space of non-space, a space beyond rights and beyond representation. Consider: the proliferation of camps, Guantánamo, gated communities, banned sexualities, queer subjectivities, new post-identitarian forms of experience, banlieues, the prison-industrial complex, favelas, townships, informal settlements, detention centres, illegal migrants, undocumented workers, precarious labourers.

The body's potentials get absorbed into the process of subjectification. By becoming an autopoeitic, self-governed agent the body is not so much dominated by state apparatuses of modern national sovereignty; rather, it incorporates the state into itself. The unsettled, imperceptible body of the 1980s and 1990s comes to confine itself. Walking in Daniel Libeskind's *Garden of Exile and Emigration* unveils this ambivalence of the newly co-opted body as a banal everyday perception. The distance between the columns is quite narrow, the ground inclined, walking between them urges you to look towards the sky. The gaze tries to escape the coldness of the concrete and the confining strict geometrical order of the columns' edges. The feeling is one of being incarcerated in the inescapable logic of these columns, in the columns which support the machine of transnational sovereignty. Certainly you are not prevented from walking, moving, looking around, getting out of the garden but... But while you are there, you definitely know that there is something—willow oaks, sky—which is simply there but it is never within reach. Something that is there, but never accessible, because of the already finished, already happened, arrangement of the materiality around you (Figure 7). That which is accomplished, that which has already materialized, that which has
been realized so that the unsettled body is reabsorbed by post War sovereignty. In the *Garden of Exile and Emigration* the ambivalence of imperceptible subjectivity—its promises and its corruption—become an embodied condition of being.

Figure 7
Postliberal sovereignty: Network and grid

The BMW plant in Leipzig Germany started production on May 1, 2005. In the medium-term, the plant will produce up to 650 vehicles per day. The new plant provides the necessary capacities to manage the planned growth in sales of up to 1.4 million vehicles per year in 2008. According to the architect, Zaha Hadid, the building enables innovative working time models and operating times of 60 to 140 hours per week, and because of this the plant can react quickly to specific changes in the market (Figure 8).

Figure 8
BMW Leipzig/Germany plant, start of mass production on 1st March 2005, Architect Zaha Hadid

The BMW plant is a strange building. You don't really know if it is modern or postmodern, Fordist or post-Fordist, it is a mixture of Piranesi's multilevel
scaled structure and the breathing porosity of Libeskind's construction. It is a network and a grid simultaneously. Despite the similarities to both Piranesi's and Libeskind's visions, the BMW plant represents neither a totality, as in Piranesi's hermetic environment, nor has it anything in common with the transversal design of Libeskind's garden. The BMW plant is a highly contingent and closed structure, inherently fluid and simultaneously inherently stratified.

From the worker on the production line to the managers, all share the same space, they pretend to belong to the same group of people; in fact, social stratification in the form of classes or subjectivities is reversed here and reincorporated into a virtual but effective matrix of a new commonality, into a vertical aggregate. And this vertical aggregate attains its strength precisely by placing all actors on a common horizontal corridor of action. The BMW plant is an interactive order, neither open, nor closed, but open as soon as it incorporates the actors necessary for its functioning, and closed as soon as it can protect and sustain its functionality. The BMW plant is not maintained by its exclusivity nor by an internally generated authenticity, but rather by a fluid belonging of different independent trajectories to an effective system of production. It is an aggressive structure, opposing everything that sets limits to its own internal interests or tries to infuse it with impurity. The BMW plant is aggressive because it reacts to the fear of viruses, it is aseptic, clean, pragmatic: western oblivion at the highest level, immunity is its major concern.

I use this image as the paradigmatic figure for the emergence of a new mode of political power, postliberal sovereignty, which breeds in the core of the dominant transnational sovereignty. Postliberal sovereignty is neither a substitute, nor an alternative, nor the next stage of transnational sovereignty. Transnationalism is an integrative constituent of postliberal sovereignty. The notion of postliberal sovereignty allows us to recognize the formation of emerging hegemonic projects which make up the space of transnationalism (Greven & Pauly, 2000). The commonality between transnationalism and
postliberal sovereignty is that both deal with the aporias of constitutionalism, that is, they both attempt to solve, on a global level, the national crisis of the double-R axiom. The difference between them is that transnationalism is inherently apolitical; it pretends to solve the problem on a simply horizontal level, while postliberal sovereignty inserts hegemonic political claims into the global horizontal space.

Transnational sovereignty presents a solution for the problem of rights and representation by adding dynamism to the borders of national sovereignty. Historically borders were lines of demarcation between national sovereignties. Transnationalism implodes these demarcation lines and reinterpellates, on a global scale, the participating actors of national sovereignty in many different ways (Brenner, 2004). Transnational sovereignty merges national spaces and their actors with other international players into a unified horizontal plane by asserting arbitrariness in the way borders are established (Castells, 1997). Borders are no longer by definition the limits between national sovereignties, rather—as discussed in Section III—they are erected wherever this is a need to solve and to organize social space and political governance (Larner & Walters, 2004; Rigo, 2005). Consider, for example, the emergence of the new virtual European borders in North Africa—borders erected to control the flow migration into Europe by maintaining aspiring migrants in externalized camps. Making and remaking borders in a contingent way was the strategy transnationalism deployed to solve the crisis of the double-R axiom.

Postliberalism appropriates this solution—and in this sense postliberalism is also the heir to the crisis of sovereignty and relies on the same organizational substratum as transnationalism. But postliberalism attempts to initiate a strategic rearrangement of the transnationalist horizontal and networked organization of space by establishing vertical aggregates of power in the midst of an even plane of global action. The break occurs when postliberalism leaves nationalist imperialist geopolitics behind irrevocably. Although it feeds on the horizontal transnational order of power, it introduces a new hegemonic strategy
with a project of global corporativism. Postliberalism is a verticalisation of horizontal geopolitics. Transnationalism is the legal algorithm of post-Fordist, neoliberal globalization. In this sense, transnationalism is hegemonic on a global scale. What postliberal sovereignty does now is to hegemonize hegemony.

The making of vertical aggregates

The figure of the BMW plant in Leipzig illustrates this verticalisation of horizontality. The social is not only constituted out of horizontal layers of different actors be they social classes, interest groups, or social subjectivities. The social consists of vertical aggregates containing and intermingling segments of social classes, social subjectivities, or other social groups into large formations along an imagined commonality. These social bodies condense economic, technoscientific, political and cultural power and control decision making processes. They are different to the social structures we have known up to this moment. There are no clear cut social institutions, social classes or associations of civil society interacting in the making of polity. There are no people (Volk) in the BMW plant (Figure 9). I rather observe the emergence of legitimate players consisting of many different bits of all these various actors and which together constitute social bodies vertically traversing society and its institutions.
There is nothing left over from the base-superstructure formation of political power. There is nothing left over from the politics of difference and subjectification. Neither ideology, nor discourse. The politics of difference of the 1980s and 1990s intervene in the given conditions of representation, renegotiating and rearticulating them under the imperative that resistance is possible. Cultural studies, postcolonialism, postfeminist positions, queer studies, radical democratic approaches revealed that the given systems of representation generate the effacement of certain differences (the migrant, the queer, the subaltern, the excluded) and introduce a new subversive strategy of visibility. But these times are over. The crisis of multiculturalism, the difficulties of aligning queer politics with other social movements, the gradual occupation of postfeminist positions by communitarian neo-essentialisms, the obsession of radical democratic approaches with the question of formal rights, all these mark a phase of stagnation of subversive politics and their absorption into the vortex of neoliberal thinking. The politics of difference fail to grasp how actors participating in vertical aggregates are detached from their original
indexes. They do not refer to themselves as members of collective interest formations (social class, ethnicity, gender etc.). They act as members of the vertical aggregate. I can understand this form of neo-corporativism as the rising need of different aggregates of local or international government for engaging in activities beyond their immediate borders.

These vertical aggregates are by no means solidified, unchangeable, closed systems. They are rather interactional entities, neither open nor closed. They are open to the extent that they can assimilate the actors necessary for their functioning and the retention of their power, and closed as much as is necessary to protect their existence. They carry neither the modern fetish of wholeness, nor the postmodern obsession with partiality. It is not so much that the state disappears or that transnational processes and institutions take control. We know that states play much harder now than at many other times in history. And we also know that patriotisms, fundamentalisms, new nationalisms play a crucial role in the make up of current cultural politics. The difference is that the state ceases to act as representing itself, it splits itself, and certain parts of the state participate in broader social aggregates. It participates by articulating interests, wills and political views linking with many different, particular segments of social classes, social groups, associations of civil society (such as trade unions, customers organizations, pressure groups), local business companies, TNCs, NGOs, international governments, transnational organizations. These aggregates use the cultural politics of patriotism, nationalism and fundamentalism in an arbitrary way, not because these politics refer to a nationalist ideology, but because they help to maintain the coherence of the aggregate. The main target of postliberal sovereignty is to articulate, in a combative way, the not-yet-represented commonality of the actors participating in the social aggregate.

The emergence of vertical aggregates of this kind constitutes a renewed form of corporativism, a form which attempts to get rid of totalitarian ideas as well as the commitment to a liberal democratic organization. Here I do not
mean corporativism as the domination of local or multinational companies and economic trusts in decision making. Rather, I use it in the Gramscian sense, to denote a form of social organization which attempts to resolve crises of state power by developing new modes of regulating social institutions (Gramsci, 1991; Sternhell, Sznajder, & Asheri, 1994). These forms of social regulation cut across established social interests vertically aligning *segments* of distinct class, interest and social groups with each other.

This mode of organisation becomes evident when we compare the functioning of neoliberal and postliberal modes of social regulation. On the one hand, neoliberalism responded to the crisis of the national state's inability to deliver on its promises of rights and representation, by introducing the need for actors to demonstrate responsibility before they could make claims on the double-R axiom. The neoliberal imperative to demonstrate responsibility works to maintain the coherence of distinct social groups and class: attempts to claim rights can be delegitimized if individuals or segments of a particular group can be shown to be irresponsible. On the other hand, when vertical aggregates cut across and through not just national interest groups, but transnational and global alliances, they spawn *post*liberal sovereignty.

In the scheme of postliberal power we have neither state supremacy and omnipotence (as in national sovereignty) nor self-governed actors (as in transnational sovereignty). The constitutionalist structure of modern national sovereignty retreats and, out of the practices of neoliberal governments, emerges transnational governance on a global level. In transnational conditions, connecting and realigning different segments of social groups into a horizontal plane on the base of common global normative principles becomes the predominant mode of governance (Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Castells, 1997). Now, governance signifies the erosion of the boundaries which delineate individual self-governed actors as well as the limits of constitutionalism. Governance is post-constitutionalism.
With the emergence of postliberal sovereignty there is no longer a centralized statist apparatus, nor a fluid network of regulation. There are new formations of power bringing together many different global actors, regulating their relations by using an inclusive and contingent strategy of governance guided by a set of normative universal principles (for example, all actors may be aligned in their support of human rights). But the project of postliberal sovereignty attacks the claim for global normative universal principles (for example, zones of exception are sanctioned and created, zones in which human rights are deactivated, or are only partially extended). Such attacks serve to install hegemonic claims into the geopolitics of governance. Not only does postliberalism install vertical aggregates at the horizontal level, as I described earlier. But these aggregates are only postliberal to the extent that they work to solidify their own internal coherence and alliances. They close down the horizontal, 'open' social space celebrated by actors involved in transnational governance, and consolidate new hegemonic modalities of power. Postliberalism employs a strategic selectivity to work on the level of horizontal geopolities.

Postliberal sovereignty and the question of people in Europe

The 2005 debates about the European constitution reflect some of the main features of the crisis of constitutionalism. These debates make apparent the need for a post-constitutional solution to the tension between national sovereignty, on the one hand, and transnational governance of the European space as a whole, on the other. To a certain extent both the failure of the 2005 referenda for the European constitution (which were supposed to establish for the first time a post-constitutional Europe) in France and in the Netherlands, and the resulting euroscepticism, address an issue which has been circulating in the dispute about the future of Europe for many years, namely if there is a state
in Europe (Balibar, 2004b). A peculiar alliance of left and right souverainistes celebrates this failure as a reappearance of the European people of different nations on the political scene. They proclaim that this is an answer to two questions. Firstly, it responds to the absence of representation of European people in the constitutional initiatives, and, secondly, it responds to the neoliberal support of this constitution. But the invention of 'European people' is just another European myth.

I argue that the reason for the failure of the referenda is not the result of the inherent weakness of the post-constitutionalism to revitalise the double-R axiom as souverainistes assert. There are no people (Volk) in Europe, and it is good that it is so. And there are no people because Europe can be neither a state nor a confederation of states (Beck & Grande, 2004; Nicolaidis & Howse, 2001).

Modern national sovereignty is finished in Europe and transnational sovereignty cannot yet solve the problem of a common European vision. It is true that transnational sovereignty and governance created the ground for a common European space. And here we know that this transnational space is by definition a hegemonic project (Chakrabarty, 2000; Mezzandra, 2005). But this horizontal governmental space of European unification has not answered the question of a unified hegemonic European block on a global scale—the territory of the debate is left confused. So, even people who supported the no to the constitution cannot hide their peculiar form of Eurocentric euphoria that actively calls for a new planetary hegemonic role for Europe: 'To put it bluntly, do we want to live in a world in which the only choice is between the American civilisation and the emerging Chinese authoritarian-capitalist one? If the answer is no then the only alternative is Europe. The third world cannot generate a strong enough resistance to the ideology of the American dream. In the present world constellation, it is only Europe that can do it.' (Zizek, 2005a). The moment when postliberal sovereignty could emerge never crystallised: without a firm strategy for a hegemonic Europe the referenda could not convey
a common global vision for Europe. Such a strategy could transform current
transnational Europe into a global postliberal project and instigate a European
attempt to hegemonize hegemony.

Instead, the referenda were used by different political forces in order to
articulate their opposition to the ongoing transnationalization of European
institutions. For example, many traditional left social movements and
organizations, such as national and European trade unions, ATTAC, and most
of the left parties represented in the European parliament (GUE/NGL), used the
internal political contradictions in single nation states, especially in France and
the Netherlands, to oppose the ratification of the proposed EU constitution.
Fear was the dominant element circulating in the public debates leading to the
European referenda. This was mobilised by the phantasms of an omnipotent
neoliberal hegemony, of a Europe with permeable borders, of a
multiculturalism out of control.

However, with Spinoza and since, we know that the politics of fear interrupt
the moment when people might actually frighten a given order. This is because
fear solidifies a transcendent relation between people and political
transformation by reactivating double-R axiom's mechanism of exclusion. Fear
encapsulates people within the national territory and confines them to its
institutions of representation, and excludes everything which threatens this
mediation between people and nation. That is, it excludes all these political
actors who are external to national sovereignty, but are nevertheless crucial
players in a transnational Europe. The EU constitution was rejected not
because this was an effective means to oppose neoliberal policies (as if the
national governments are not enforcing such policies) and the freedom of
movement in Europe (as if the Schengen agreement is not in force), but
because of the fear of new social actors entering the terrain of local national
politics: other groups and communities of Europe (remember the Polish
plumber in Aix en Provence), the new Muslim citizens of Europe (remember
the painful negotiations between the EU and Turkey), illegal migrants
(remember the Mediterranean Euro-African space), Bush and Blair, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the European Commission itself.

The target of the 'No' campaign was to prevent the ongoing transnationalisation of European states. But this proved to be a false strategy because blocking the ratification of the European constitution did not question the process of transnationalisation at all. The left social movements and organizations which participated in the 'No' campaign had neither the power nor the will to effectively oppose a series of major policies which have already made transnational governance in Europe a reality; such as the Schengen Agreement for the creation of common migration, border and surveillance policies across Europe, the Bologna process for the creation of the European higher education area, the Lisbon Agenda for innovating Europe's economy, etc.

The politics of fear simultaneously dissect the European transnational space into nationally regulated segments and negate the postcolonial constitution of this one Europe. As Balibar notes, the denial of the postcolonial condition of Europe disrupts any possibility for understanding the meaning of otherness and the problem with the ongoing make-up of European citizenship today (Balibar, 2004a, p. 46). Although the failure of the referenda did not have any serious effect on the transnationalisation of Europe, the 'No' campaign celebrated this failure in the name of the European people as a univocal synthesis which is they claimed was absent in the proposed constitution. But the very form of the referendum is the moment where political sovereignty mobilizes people as nation; the referendum is *par excellence* the materialization of the idea of national sovereignty.

And exactly this reinstatement of a nation-centred logic in left politics was heavily critiqued by a series of other left social projects and movements across Europe, such as the eurowide network against precarity (EuroMayDay), various border activist campaigns and migrant groups. These movements remind us that politics which refer to European people as a *Volk* come to forget
that it is impossible to think people outside of nation, i.e. without deploying a notion of a political subject bounded to national sovereignty. Eurosceptic political movements and traditional left organizations return us to the terms of national sovereignty. In so doing, they undercut the possibility for creating a common European social space which operates beyond the institutions of the nation state and creates a viable alternative to transnational neoliberal governance (and neither do they offer any tools for thinking about or beyond the regime of control which concerns us - postliberal sovereignty). Moreover, eurosceptics invoke a notion of European people through the discourse of a betrayed European nation. And it is on the basis of this betrayed univocal notion of European people that otherness is constructed in and expelled from the current political landscape.

Consider for example the 'moral panic' which shook the Netherlands after the assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004 (Mak, 2005). The declaration of the state of emergency and the pogrom-like raids which followed these events questioned thoroughly and irrevocably the established status of inclusion of migrants in Dutch society. A new form of exclusion of otherness is underway in current European politics. This exclusion is not primarily organized as a form of white supremacy (although in many cases this is valid) but it is the result of the creation of the illusionary paranoia of the univocal category 'European people.' The fiction of the notion of European people, which is nothing other than the annulment of the colonial and postcolonial past and present of Europe, manifests in conflicts around the eurocentric limits of integration (as the rebellion of the banlieus during the French riots of October-November 2005 showed), and over the freedom of movement across the new borders of Europe (consider the September 2005 crisis in Ceuta and Melilla, which is literally the first collective attack on a European border wall by transit migrants from Africa).

In conclusion, the resulting picture of the situation in Europe after the 2005 ratification failure has two aspects. Firstly, the dominant neoliberal forces did
not manage to create a postliberal global project for Europe out of the ongoing process of European transnationalisation. And secondly, the traditional European left failed to challenge neoliberal transnationalisation: rather, fancying the logic of national sovereignty, they returned to a melancholic Keynesianism, or better, 'left conservatism' (Connery, 1999).

*An apocalyptic passage to postliberal sovereignty*

The apocalyptic rhetoric of George W. Bush suggests a completely different picture regarding the emergence of postliberal sovereignty: he employs a universal language for the aggressive postliberal project of a new global corporativism. If the reappearance of neo-conservatism on the political scene in recent years has a meaning, this meaning must refer to the installation of a postliberal project of local and global sovereignty. Here, I do not only mean the influence of neocon think tanks and foundations on the Bush administration—such as the American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, Project for the New American Century, Adolph Coors Foundation, Koch Family Foundation, Scaife Foundation etc. Rather, I am interested in understanding social regulation; specifically, forms of regulation produced by the elaboration of a neo-conservative policy which primarily attempts to unite various parts of American society and different global actors on the global scale in a new solid, effective, and virtual vertical aggregate.

It has been argued that United States foreign policy during the Bush administration is serving to consolidate a new imperialism (Harvey, 2003). However, the role of the United States in the formation of a new global system of power is the main point of divergence between those attempting to grasp the current geopolitical situation (Arrighi, 2003; Atzert & Müller, 2003; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Panitch & Gindin, 2003; Wallerstein, 2003). In the case for characterising the United States as a new imperialistic power, the United States
is thought to reoccupy the power vacuum left after the collapse of Soviet Union claiming unipolar leadership. According to this position, the United States no longer performs Clinton's multilateral hegemonic geopolitics but a unilateral politics of violent dominance. But what this account of the new imperialism fails to understand is that if unilateral power is not part of global stable postliberal aggregate is naked power of a single actor. And naked power in the era of postliberal sovereignty blocks and cancels transnationalist horizontality between global social and economic actors. This is something which nobody can afford today. The United States—more than anyone else—needs a viable transnational, horizontal, hegemonic system that frees capital flows and access to both resources and to technological innovation. A neo-imperialist strategy could possibly impose domination in order to restore superiority when a rupture in the actual balance of power occurs, but the productivity of such an imposition is bound to be limited. A neo-imperialist strategy signifies the opposite of what the United States is actually striving for today: globalised markets, circulating culture, travelling technoscience.

The United States is not striving for neo-imperialist dominance but for a system of postliberal sovereignty. Rather, only by continuing to promote a transnational field crisscrossed by permeable, horizontal connections, is it possible to instate fluid, global vertical aggregates which incorporate different social actors in common hegemonic formations. These actors can vary immensely and can rarely be reduced to nation states. They are much more polymorphic, fragmented, energetic, and diversified than a massive block of a series of nation states. The United States is not undertaking nationalist based geopolitics, rather it attempts to create a strong formation of alliances with many different actors (not primarily nation states) using existing transnational multi-centred networks of power. The United States does not dominate globalization; it attempts to hegemonize the already hegemonic structure of globalization.
This necessitates a very different response and a very different form of resistance than a simplistic anti-imperialist approach or than the traditional left position which I described earlier in the case of European politics. The main problem with reductionist anti-Americanism, formulaic anti-imperialism or left conservatism is that they define themselves in the negative. They fail to connect with the productivity of power and they condemn resistance to melancholy (Brown, 1995). Resistance then becomes the constitutive outside of what it tries to negate.

A response to this situation requires two moves. Firstly, although, as my analysis of the differences between European and United States political discourse suggests, postliberal sovereignty is an emergent project. Part of the difficulty of recognising its form and function lies in the fact that it may not be solidified, and therefore evident, in the sense that national or transnational sovereignties have been. Secondly, counter-hegemonic project (Santos, 2001) of escape contest postliberal sovereignty. This is the moment where inappropriated bodies are reappearing on the sociopolitical scene of the nascent third millennium. Our immediate future contains the proliferation of both postliberal vertical aggregates of power and of unsettled bodies interrupting and refusing the operation of sovereign powers in whatever form they take.

In this chapter, I have only partly described this future: my concern has been to examine shifts in sovereign power, identifying its emergent forms. In discussing the passages from national to transnational sovereignty, I have suggested (without interrogating) the role of imperceptibility in these transformations. But I have not identified contemporary forms of escape and the ways in which they contest postliberal sovereignty. This is the objective of the Dissertation: to understand the new face of exodus.

In Section II, I trace the genealogy of escape and exit, analysing different ways in which unsettled bodies force responses out of the existing regimes of control. Then, in Sections III and IV I examine two central fields in which postliberal sovereignty is at work: the specific domains of mobility, and labour.
SECTION II
EXIT! ESCAPE!

CHAPTER 4
VAGABONDS

The primacy of exit

In the previous section I considered transformations of sovereignty on the way to the contemporary regime of postliberal power. I discussed three different forms of sovereignty: national sovereignty, transnational governance and postliberal aggregates. These three forms differ in terms of how they each order the constitution of bodies and the flows of populations in relation to space. Nevertheless, what is common is that sovereignty emerges as a historically concrete and productive way to harness and channel the intimate relation between the body and power, that is the singular uncontrollable, escaping potentialities of bodies and people who attempt to flee from the guidance of polity. The previous section discussed this tension between body and power from the perspective of its control in an attempt to delineate the contours of the contemporary order of domination. The picture of contemporary power I drew there will serve as the background for developing the main argument of the current section, and indeed of the Dissertation. This argument is that we can understand the formation of power only from the perspective of exiting people not the other way round; we cannot understand society and people's actions if we see them as regulated by power. Escaping people have primacy in relation to their control.

It is wrong to approach sovereignty as an already existing entity which was comprehensive control over people's actions and movements. Moreover, I will argue that it is people's escape, flight, revolt, refusal, desertion, sabotage or
simply acts beyond existing political norms that force sovereignty to reorganise itself and to respond to the new situation which exiting people create. Sovereignty manifests in response to exiting people. The struggles come first. Thus, when I discussed the transformations of sovereignty a matter of internal evolution in Section I, I had an analytical purpose. The rest of the Dissertation will show how these transformations – and in particular the contemporary emergence of postliberal sovereignty – are painful and difficult adjustments to people's evacuation of the places of a given regime of control.

Changing perspective on the relation between exit and sovereignty also necessitates a shift in my understanding of biopower. For Foucault biopower is the ubiquitous tool used to establish control by regulating populations. And this idea has been extremely important for my thinking: Foucault's (1978) analysis of the productivity of power (as disciplinary power and as biopower) offers invaluable insights which travel with me in every moment throughout this Dissertation. Nevertheless, now is the moment when different approach to biopower could develop, is needed. Where Foucault sees the constant refinement of biopower as the means of making people productive, I see it is a response to people's actions and escape beyond the regulatory practices of biopolitical control. That is, biopower explains, not the great confinement and control of free subjects, but the co-option of people’s escaping powers (Pieper et al., 2006). In this first chapter of Section II I exemplify this shift by discussing the example of mobility – in particular that of the vagabond masses in the transition period between feudalism and early capitalism. In the next chapter (5) I discuss theoretical tools for conceptualising exit. Finally, in the last chapter of this section, I present my understanding of exit in the conditions of postliberal sovereignty. I call this imperceptible politics.
The example of mobility: Coercion and freedom of the vagabonds

In the course of the 15th and 16th centuries there emerges an army of the poor, beggars and robbers; people who have neither land nor paid work since the masses of peasants forced off the land could not be absorbed into manufacturing which was almost inexistent at this moment. They were treated as 'voluntary' criminals and accused of no longer wishing to work under their former conditions. The poor laws with their brutal punishments (ear amputation, branding, whipping, slavery) served to control the sudden mobility of the population while the vagabonds were also to be coerced into work.

The establishment of the early capitalist mode of production is founded, not only on an invention of a new system of labour productivity, but also on the necessity to first reconstitute wandering bodies as a disciplined and industrious class—the working class. The coercion needed for the production of the working class involves attempts to incorporate the wandering mob’s surplus of freedom into a multiple system of control: a system of mobility control; a system of punishment and coercion; and a system of disciplining the body to become wage labourer. Over the course of several centuries, we can see national and local authorities seeking to prevent the free movement of the poor, beggars and workers by constantly refining this threefold system of control: whether as part of measures to control the poor, or by disciplining their habits, or by directing their work to manufacturing.

Seen from the perspective of biopolitical regulation, population control, and sovereign power people's mobility—this flight of the poor from labour—during the birth of capitalism appears as an important site for the exercise of control and the genesis of biopower (Foucault, 1991, 2004a, 2001). From my vantage point, mobility appears as a revolt, as an escaping force out of biopolitical population control. The fragmented history of vagabondage is not just a marginal phenomenon of the history of sovereignty; it is a symptomatic case which exemplifies how the primacy of exit provokes the conditions of its
control in the realm of production and labour in the modern nation state. As Negri says:

'Throughout the history of modernity the mobility and migration of the labor force have disrupted the disciplinary conditions to which workers are constrained. And power has wielded the most extreme violence against this mobility. [...] It would be interesting, in fact, to write a general history of the modes of production from the standpoint of the worker's desire for mobility [...] rather than running through that development simply from the standpoint of capital's regulation of the technological conditions of labor.' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 212)

In the image of the vagabond I see a paradigmatic figuration of a constant drift out of biopolitical discipline, a drift which simultaneously forced the development of some of the core strategies for the control of migration which we encounter today (these regulative strategies will be discussed in Section III, on migration).

_Wandering poverty_

Vagabondage makes its first appearance in France in about 1350; it is a term to describe undesirable forms of mobility which soon begin to become punishable under a series of decrees and laws (Geremek, 1994; Sachße & Tennstedt, 1986, 1998). It represents only one of a number of names bestowed on a problem which had previously had no label. Thus vagabonds are also referred to as paupers, beggars or idlers. These terms reflect the negative light in which feudal society viewed this force of uncontrolled mobility. In a society where the structure of control is based on the sedentary nature of the population, mobility challenges these very structures.

The types of mobility recognised as legitimate by feudal society are the
pilgrimage and more or less tolerated forms of nomadism. The crusades also belong to these forms of mass social mobility that begin to emerge during the 11th century and which partly at least represent waves of emigration. The so-called People's Crusade of 1096 initiated by Pope Urban II, for example, was originally planned as a military pilgrimage to Jerusalem. But it subsequently developed into a mass migration of about 100,000 impoverished peasants (Mayer, 1988).

Paupers, beggars, idlers, crusaders, pilgrims, nomads, vagabonds. The borders separating these categories were often rather blurred. Nomads referred to themselves—in order to legitimise their mobility—as pilgrims from Egypt, which in English then became 'gypsies'. These were often joined by others who were then referred to as 'counterfayte Egyptians', as bogus or disguised 'gypsies' (Lucassen & Lucassen, 1997, p. 231). Although one can differentiate between the 'gypsies' with their own culture, language and codes and seasonal workers prepared perhaps to settle in one place, the border between both is indistinct. And the authorities oscillate between attempting to differentiate between these groups or, because of a lack of appropriate instruments (documents, identification papers), identifying them as a single group. In addition, the streets of the late middle ages are also populated by jugglers, fable tellers, smiths and soldiers. Starting from the late Middle Ages the term vagabondage became increasingly broad until it eventually included all types of migration and nomadism. And the uncertainty around these categories was to last for many centuries.

'The [English] Vagrancy Act of 1744 assembled together categories of social condemnation that had been accumulating in various statutes since the days of Elizabeth and added new ones to bring it up to date with the labor discipline needs of eighteenth century masters. Besides giving magistrates the power to whip or imprison beggars, strolling actors or gamblers, gypsies, peddlers, and 'all those who refused to work for the usual and common wages' it empowered magistrates to
imprison wandering lunatics and 'all persons wand'ring abroad and lodging in alehouses, barns and houses or in the open air, not giving a good account of themselves' (Ignatieff, 1978, p. 25).

*Deterritorialisation I: The big exodus from the land*

Long before the violent proletarisation of labour in proto-capitalist economies (Polanyi, 2001; Marx, 1988; Wallerstein, 1976), the wandering mob and the flight of the peasants is an expression of the struggle against the feudal rent. The centuries before the Great Plague (1665-6), generally considered to form a watershed in the emergence of a pre-capitalist labour market, are characterised by an increase in the expenditures of feudal households. Everywhere in Europe peasants were leaving their estates 'illegally'. This flight from the land either spurred on the rapid growth of towns, flowed into colonisation movements towards the east or led the peasants to the life of the vagabond. In the passage from the 15th to the 16th century the feudal system, based as it was on villeinage, was plunged into permanent crisis by the flight of the peasants. 'The feudal manor system was undermined not by the change of feudal services into paid services but by the flight of the peasants. [...] Mass migrations away from the lord's manor accelerated the end of serfdom in England' (Dobb & Becker, 1972, p. 57).

Everywhere in Europe whole districts and villages were abandoned. In Middle Germany the peasants became colonists since the colonised Slavs had been 'partially exterminated' (Dobb & Becker, 1972, p. 61) and hence the need for labour was great. In some French provinces the resulting freedom enabled the emergence of free rural communities with their own mayor and system of justice. The flight and the associated structural shortage allowed the peasants as a whole to demand rights and privileges. Feudal lords reacted to these demands and the scarcity of labour in many ways, one quite widespread strategy was by
introducing monetary payment for services in place of feudal obligations (Wallerstein, 1983). Another strategy was the leasing of land to peasants. However, apart from cases where migrating peasants were 'won back', this flight from the land had a structural effect.

The reaction of the feudal lords to these developments was, however, not uniform. While in some parts of Europe concessions (payment, leasing of land) were made to the peasants, in others the nobles reacted with an intensification of labour services. Especially in Eastern Europe peasants who absented themselves were 'recaptured' and feudal obligations extracted by force (Dobb & Becker, 1972). Sometimes this politics of immobilisation indicate an attempt to return to the feudal order. For example, where there is an absolute shortage of labour the feudal lords resorted to coercive means in order to tie labour to the means of production. In effect, the two types of immobilisation (mild in the case of concessions and violent in the case of coercion) mutually support each other: in many cases indeed it is the same feudal lords who employ concessions to try and stem the flight from the land but soon make recourse to coercion in order to tie the fugitives to the land.

Despite the many different attempts during the late Middle Ages to suppress mobility and 'to prevent the influx of improverished peasants into the towns' (Geremek, 1994, p. 47; Sennett, 1994), vagabondage is not restricted, rather the opposite: the growing numbers of mobiles cause the towns to erect a dam against the pauperised peasants who stream into the towns. The peasants are now brassiers who enter the market by 'letting out their arms' (Moulier Boutang, 1997, p. 52). The vagabonds are still not proletarians able to work. In order to forge an 'army of unemployed workers' that will exert downward pressure on wages, they must 'either want or be forced to work' (Castel, 2003, p. 78). This is where the projects of disciplining and incarcerating paupers and beggars in poor and work houses, but also in monasteries, galleys and armies, begin to emerge—i.e. the institutions which are to be charged with solving the problem of the mobile classes, the 'mob', in the following centuries.
Now, for the first time, a more systematic form of control emerges as a response to the vagabonds. This is not so much an attempt (as described previously) to return the masses to feudal system, but to capitalise on their mobility and to absorb its potentials into a new system of accumulation of bodies and capital. Manufacture and proto-capitalist production go to the wandering masses. The new regime of control emerges to tame the exiting masses. And the genesis of a docile industrious worker can be located in these disciplinary efforts. The new regime of control responds to vagabondage on three levels. I. It tries to make poverty and the wandering masses visible and controllable by institutionalising poverty and territorializing mobility. II. It attempts to control mobility but, when it becomes dangerous, to suppress it completely by introducing new harsh laws for its punishment. III. Finally, it tries to transform the habits and the bodies of the wandering masses by incarcerating them in the workhouses in order to transform the energy of mobility into an energy of productivity.

Controlling the vagabonds I: Institutionalising poverty

It is true that nomadic life was already considered undesirable during the early Middle Ages and the differentiation between, on the one hand, those unfit for work and thus legitimate beggars and, on the other, those beggars who were fit for work and thus illegitimate, can already be found in the clerical debates of the time. However, with the expansion of the money economy in Europe from the beginning of the 12th century onwards a Christian doctrine or ethos of poverty begins to develop. It is 'primarily a protest against the wealth accumulated by the Church and the clergy' (Geremek, 1994, p. 35) and expresses itself in the fuga mundi, or asceticism, tolerated by the church as long as it remained an individual expression and, where it became collective and thus a potential threat, channelled through the foundation of mendicant
orders. The changes in social relations not only led to a criticism of wealth but also to the establishment of charitable institutions (such as the mendicant orders) able to productively mediate the contradictions between ownership of wealth and the Christian ethic (Ignatieff, 1978, pp. 11-12).

Thus, during the 12th and 13th centuries an increasing number of charitable institutions are founded allowing both access to salvation through charitable works and the display of wealth. There is now a division of labour between the occupational poor and wealthy Christians where economic and religious elements tend to overlap. The doctrine of poverty and the praise of alms allows a legitimisation of social difference and 'it effectively sanctioned wealth and justified it on ideological grounds' (Geremek, 1994, p. 20). The ritualisation and institutionalisation of poor relief turns poverty into an occupation; the recipients of alms are listed in town tax rolls as tax payers. For instance in 1475 in Augsburg out of 4,485 tax payers 107 were registered as beggars (Geremek, 1994, p. 45).

Criticisms of this ritualisation of poor relief became loud long before the Reformation. What was criticised was that the system of Christian poor relief made begging attractive, did not differentiate between the really poor and those fit for work, distributed too many alms and, finally, that praise of poverty ran contrary to the Christian obligation to work. These discussions would have been purely scholastic had they not been coupled with social and economic processes that lent them a certain significance and sustained relevance. The organisation of poverty as a constitutive element of the social politics of the feudal order entered a period of crisis. Deterritorialisation of poverty, its quantitative growth, and the concomitant development of new forms of work led to the emergence of wandering poverty, as I described in the previous passage. Now, in the 15th and 16th centuries, poor relief, care and surveillance of charitable institutions mainly assigned to the church, that gradually transforms the wandering mob into the identifiable mass of the poor. I see an attempt to institutionalise poverty by territorialising the wandering masses and
differentiating between local and foreign vagabonds: 'The exclusion of the foreign beggar is a dominant theme of the reorganisation of poor relief beginning with the earliest statutes regulating begging' (Sachße & Tennstedt, 1998, p. 43).

Controlling the vagabonds II: The punishment of vagrancy

The Black Death, the plague epidemic that accounted for the deaths of about one third of the population of Europe between 1347 and 1351 (Mottek, 1974, p. 193), accentuated the struggle for the distribution of the feudal rent. On the one hand, as a direct consequence of the epidemic the brassiers became 'scarce' leading to an increase in their wages. The rise in labour costs varied by branch and region. In Paris the wages of builder's labourers rose by 100% while the wages of agricultural day labourers in England were 2.35 time higher during the plague than at the beginning of the century. On the other hand, daily wages for English building workers rose by only 20% during the period (Mollat, 1986, p. 180). Around the year 1350 edicts were issued throughout Europe—in particular in England, Portugal, Castile, Bavaria and Aragon—against the wage increases due to the labour shortages. In 1351 an ordinance was issued by John the Good in France directed against vagrants who did not wish to take up their former work. It stipulated that all 'able-bodied persons who had in the past earned their living as hired labourers were to return to work immediately, on pain of the pillory, branding with a hot iron or banishment' (Geremek, 1994, p. 82). Some years later, 1354, traders justified their high prices because: 'labourers will not work if they are not paid the wages they demand; and the wages they ask are so high that we are forced to put up the price of our products' (Geremek, 1994, p. 82).

Where boroughs or regional nobles determined the price of labour, workers avoided these controls either through piece-work or by moving to areas where
these regulations were absent. Vagrancy is now considered to be equivalent to labour flight and wage extortion. In Spain, too, in 1351 regulations were issued setting the upper limit for wages and equating migrant labour with vagrancy. In England in 1349 the Ordinance of Labourers was issued stipulating compulsory labour until the age of sixty and the requirement to accept wages at the levels prevailing in 1325. Workers who had fled their place of work could not be employed elsewhere. The Ordinance of Labourers read: 'Because a great part of the people, and especially of workmen and servants, late died of the pestilence, many seeing the necessity of masters, and great scarcity of servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive wages, and some rather willing to beg in idleness, than by labour to get their living' (as quoted in Castel, 2003, p. 65). The ordinance that follows the description contains various elements including fixing wage rates or blocking the market mechanism and preventing flight from labour. The latter entails two components. Firstly, workers in employment should be prevented from leaving their masters 'Provided always, that the lords be preferred before any other in their bondmen or their land tenants, so in their service to be retained' (Castel, 2003, p. 65). Furthermore, a flight into beggary and 'idleness' should be prevented so that it is ordered that 'none . . . shall give anything to such as may labour' (Castel, 2003, p. 65). Breach of contract by servants, i.e. running away from work, is punishable by a prison sentence.

According to Castel, this new 'labour law' is, in the first instance, a 'reaction to the realisation that a particular section of the population not integrated within the structure of the division of labour has become a problem' (2003, p. 67). It is apparent that such measures alone could neither solve the problem of mobile workers nor effectively suppress them. It rather wants to control mobility. In every case where edicts to restrict mobility were issued, new ones soon followed with either the same or modified content. These policies were continued until well into the 15th century and beyond.

The malfunctioning of such strict measures cannot only be explained by the
absence of an appropriate state apparatus, the widespread failure of cooperation on behalf of the population as well as the masters and lords was vital. The incarceration and punishment of 'paupers and beggars' was rejected by the ordinary people who began to actively support beggars who resisted their incarceration (Geremek, 1994, p. 281; Linebaugh, 2003). This form of solidarity even went so far that 'among those who provoked riots and disturbances to defend the poor from imprisonment were craftsmen, servants and labourers' (Geremek, 1994, p. 226).

However, the alliances forged between the townspeople and the beggars would suggest that they recognised the fluidity that such dividing lines attempted to mask, and that they saw the draconian measures directed against the beggars and the 'vagabonds' as an attack on themselves. Moreover, this solidarity shows how widespread the phenomenon of vagabondage was, indicating that the laws should rather attempt to control it, than to eliminate it. It was simply impossible to eliminate the deep manifestation of vagabondage in the everyday culture of the time.

Thus, the increasing mixing together of what were formerly distinct categories of beggars, paupers, nomads and vagabonds is an index for the de facto blurring of these categories in social life. The workers for whom as yet no term existed moved between these categories. It is evident that they made use of different elements of these ways of life in whose name they were fought. 'The uncertainty of life from one day to another, and the very real possibility that they, too, might at any moment find themselves amongst the ranks of the unemployed, reduced to begging for a living, naturally bound the working population to these paupers' (Geremek, 1994, p. 227). It is the elite, intellectuals like Thomas Moore, Martin Luther or Erasmus of Rotterdam, theorists of welfare reform who were trying to draw a clear line between the 'real' and the 'fraudulent' poor.
Controlling the vagabonds III: Discipline and workhouse

Whilst population numbers returned to their pre-plague levels after about fifty years, the 'vagabond' phenomenon did not disappear. As late as the 18th century, the towns, villages, streets but not least the political debates of Europe were filled with paupers, beggars and vagrants. And the reason for this is that parallel to the phenomenon of vagabondage a new form of mobility appears: forced mobility through forced expulsion from land (Allen, 1994). With the enclosures of common land in England and its conversion to grazing, the peasants were driven from the land to form a new, unwilling army of paupers and beggars (Polanyi, 2001; Negt & Kluge, 2001).

These enclosures begin at the close of the 15th century, last for 150 years and increase again in the 18th century, this time in legal form under the 'Bill for Inclosure of Commons'. Aside from the mobilisation of peasants to proletarians, these enclosures create, on the one hand, tenants’ growing dependence on landlords, and on the other, an enlargement of the agricultural land of the new owners that was accompanied by a 'revolution in agriculture' (Marx, 1988, p. 717). Marx writes in the section VIII on primitive accumulation of the first volume of *Das Kapital*:

'The proletariat created by the breaking up of the bands of feudal retainers and by the forcible expropriation of the people from the soil, this 'free' proletariat could not possibly be absorbed by the nascent manufactures as fast as it was thrown up on the world. On the other hand, these men, suddenly dragged from their wonted mode of life, could not as suddenly adapt themselves to the discipline of their new condition. They were turned *en masse* into beggars, robbers, vagabonds, partly from inclination, in most cases from stress of circumstances. Hence at the end of the 15th and during the whole of the 16th century, throughout Western Europe a bloody legislation against vagabondage. The fathers of the present working class were chastised for their
enforced transformation into vagabonds and paupers. Legislation treated them as 'voluntary' criminals, and assumed that it depended on their one good will to go on working under the old conditions that no longer existed.' (Marx, 1988, p. 723)

The numerous and often draconian measures used to torment the beggars and vagabonds of Europe over many centuries, from branding and flogging up to the death sentence, can, according to Marx, best be understood within the context of the efforts taken to discipline the former peasants, a 'discipline necessary for the wage system' (Marx, 1988, p. 726).

Foucault sees a power form coalesce in the course of the 17th century that consists of subjugating and harnessing the body. In contrast to monastic discipline, aimed more at renunciation, the new disciplinary power is a machine that divides the body only to reassemble it again. Discipline produces a double result: on a technical level the formation of body's powers yields an increase in usefulness, on a political level this usefulness is allied with a symmetrical submissiveness (Foucault, 1977, p. 138).

According to Foucault (1977), the disciplinary techniques represent a type of hinge between the 'accumulation of people' and the 'accumulation of capital', which can no longer be combined in a productive correspondence using the instruments of feudal power. Discipline superseded the mechanisms of feudal power and established forms of power oriented towards the production of value. Foucault explicated this element of the subjugation of the productive body with the workhouse which acts as a model of temporary incarceration to encourage a specific subjectivity of work and mobility. Workhouses were model institutions whose mission was to re-educate beggars and young idlers.

In the 18th century the workhouse also appeared as an answer to the problem of chain deportations (the 'dangerous' wandering masses were being expelled from one territory to others). Foucault saw the proliferation of delinquency as the reason for the birth of incarceration:
'The establishment of a delinquency that constitutes something like an
closed illegality has in fact a number of advantages. To begin with, it
is possible to supervise it (by locating individuals, infiltrating the group,
organizing mutual informing): for the vague, swarming mass of a
population practising occasional illegality, which is always likely to
spread, or again for those loose bands of vagabonds, recruiting as they
move from place to place, and according to circumstances, from the
unemployed, beggars, 'bad characters' of all kinds, which sometimes
reach such proportions—as we saw at the end of the eighteenth
century—as to form formidable forces for looting and rioting, is
substituted a relatively small and enclosed group of individuals on
whom a constant surveillance may be kept.' (Foucault, 1977, p. 278)

Delinquency allows the regulation of the population as a whole through the
incarceration and surveillance of its 'dangerous' edges. Starting from the prison,
the individualisation of the whole society in a prison or disciplinary system
becomes possible, a system that forms an ever widening series of circles
around this core. Thus, individualisation, i.e. localisation in space and time,
forms the basis for the regulation of mobility. Disciplinary control comes as a
response to the wandering masses.

So, it is not disciplinary power which produces subjects to be tamed and
trained, as Foucault might say at this point. Disciplinary power has not the
primacy in shaping the order of control and regulation of population. Rather
disciplinary power follows the exit of people from soil, feudal rent, poverty.
And it follows it because this very exit is irrevocable. The exit of the
vagabonds had a constituent force which challenged the feudal system.
Disciplinary power comes to make this force productive. And this is
particularly important: disciplinary power does not simply attempt to block and
strangulate the exit of the vagabonds. In contrast, disciplinary power responds
to the exit and envisages transforming this exit into a productive force for the
establishment of a better system of control. This new system of control is wage labour.

*Labore nutriur, labore plector*

This is the line: exit of mobile vagabonds—discipline—wage labour. So, while Foucault (1977) would invoke the primacy of discipline in telling this story, there are other (Castel, 2003, chapter 2; Geremek, 1994, chapter 4; Ignatieff, 1978, chapter 7) who tell the story from the perspective of wage labour. They assert that beggars and paupers are often day-labourers, i.e. they are already workers, so, it is doubtful whether disciplining and training for work were the driving forces behind the foundation of the workhouses. Although this position is correct it neglects that the vagabonds were primarily flying from work. Thus the line: *exit of mobile vagabonds—discipline—wage labour* is the only option to understand the formation of control because neither the discipline oriented position nor the labour oriented can properly conceive the phenomenon of vagabondage. What control and disciplinary power has achieved is the appropriation and reterritorialisation of the force of mobility into the strictly regulated system of wage labour.

*Reterritorialisation and the genesis of wage labour*

Begging was forbidden not because it was morally reprehensible but because it facilitated the uncontrolled mobility of workers and prohibited the restriction and allocation of pauperism to a limited territory. Begging and vagabondage are escapes from feudalism and wage-labour. The laws directed against the poor are both a reaction to uprisings (a whole series from 1378 through the following years) as well as the attempt to control the mobility of labour in
France (Castel, 2003). For instance, at the end of the 14th century a domestic passport in the shape of a certificate is introduced that is mandatory for any person wishing to leave their borough. The certificate had to detail the reason for the journey and the date of return to the area of residence. The certificate was issued by a property owner (homme de bien), not necessarily an employer.

All this throws light on attempts to limit the mobility of labour within an area while it simultaneously testifies to the strong mobility in evidence within such areas. What is clear is that the paid labourer, working under a contract in conformity with the law, receives permission to move. Thus, it is not the journey that is the issue but rather mobility without a labour contract and therefore without the means to control the level of wages (of particular interest to the state) and the occupation carried out (of particular interest to the town corporations and therefore the guilds). At the beginning of the 16th century poor laws and those laws directed against vagabonds become more severe (an more innovative). The middle of the 16th century (1547) sees a massive intensification with the introduction of branding (first on the chest, then on the forehead).

In the 17th century we see increasing measures envisaging the coupling of the mechanism of indenture and bondage with legal judgements specifying fines (Breman, 1989; Potts, 1990; Moulier Boutang, 1998; Emmer, 1986). These were paid by a master who could thereby bind an employee to their service. These so called 'parish-slaves' show that the increasing installation of slavery in the American colonies during the same period was not an exception at all but rather part of a move to fix populations and workers. This same law also stipulated that whoever lived at least forty days in a parish without recourse to begging should receive a regular residence permit. So, a certain acknowledgement of workers mobility definitely existed even if it was heavily limited and framed within the compulsion to have a recognised domicile (which of course represented an impossible hurdle for the poor who could not afford a lease or rent). Official registration was replaced by a simple list of
names affixed to the church door on Sundays after the mass. Both those seeking work as well as parishioners could avail of this uncomplicated way to become resident. Of course, the way to avoid this control over mobility was through marriage. And just as with slavery, a precise legal framework had to be developed regulating dependents of the subjugated: the children, the marriage partners and other relations of the poor. On the one hand, the number of assistance seekers was to be reduced while, on the other, the possibilities of mobility offered by familial relations was to be limited.

During the course of several centuries we can see national and local authorities seeking to prevent the free movement of the poor, beggars and workers; whether as part of measures to rein in poverty or to direct labour to manufacturing. This exodus—this flight of the poor from labour—may also be seen as a revolt in the face of a politics of forced labour and a politics of wage limitation. Here, I encounter thus a second drift away from control. If I consider the first one as an escape from feudal immobility which becomes tamed by disciplinary power in order to consolidate the conditions of wage labour, then we can see here that this tension between exit and control continues to be active and to trouble the establishment of a system of wage labour. The exit of the vagabonds is not simply neutralised and effaced through discipline and punish, it continues to exist and to transform. Against the system of wage labour which the workhouse attempts to establish, the exit of the vagabonds becomes later an exit from labour. We can trace this story in the communities of exodus established in the sea, and this is not just a coincidence. As Linebaugh and Rediker (2000) assert, the strongest challenge to the disciplinary techniques for taming mobility, the vagabonds and the wandering poor came not from manufacturing or the workhouse, but from the ships of the British Empire (which had a greater number workers than the manufacturing industry or workhouses). And these ships were the first prototypes of the factory. In the ships we can find all the organisational principles of the later industrial architecture of production, 'in which large numbers of workers
cooperated on complex and synchronized tasks, under slavish, hierarchical
discipline in which human will was subordinated to mechanical equipment, all
for a money wage' (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2000, p. 150).

Deterritorialisation II: The maritime communities of exodus

The gangs and the vagabonds do not simply represent the marginalized or, in
Castel's terms, the outcasts of society. They are obviously more than just
organised gangs, specialised in robbery and theft. It is especially the street
gangs composed of runaway serfs that constituted the vagabonds: 'a collective
movement of the ordinary people, often the starting point for unplanned and
violent uprisings such as the peasants' revolt and the 'Jacquerie' (Castel, 2003,
p. 69). The vagabonds take part in tumults and uprisings of which they are
often the instigators. Like many other historians, Mollat described the poor in
the people's uprisings as the protagonists of a movement that almost always
fought in the front line and whose situation determined the demands and
slogans of these revolts (Mollat, 1986, p. 200; Linebaugh, 2003). These
multiple and localised forms of vagabond insurgencies anticipate the later
fugitive communities such as the maroons and pirates, demonised by
contemporary intellectuals.

The vagabonds are a precursor of the 'dangerous classes', as Louis Chevalier
characterised the working class of the 19th century (Chevalier, 2000). Although
the vagabonds and poor were the ultimate losers in any direct confrontations
with feudal lords and town patricians, Communities of Exodus that parallel the
movements of revolt were formed during the whole period from the
Renaissance up to the beginning of the industrial age. These were laboratories
where slaves, serfs or sailors established alternative societies beyond
compulsory wage-labour (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2000, p. 156): whether it was
the 'attempt to live in common poverty without differences of rank' (Mollat,
1986, p. 207) or in the Caribbean in the form of the 'law of the privateers' of the 17th century (which was both oriented towards the utopia of a classless society and contained practical forms of a collective social and political democracy).

The pirates—who were often former indenture slaves or free workers that had been more or less kidnapped by the pressgangs in the ports of the transatlantic empire and forced into galley service—paid into a form of retirement fund and elected their officers. The election of officers was a tradition in the context of the 'revolutionary Atlantic', 'just as they had done in the revolutionary army on the other side of the Atlantic' (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2000, p. 159). Similar to escaped slaves everywhere on the American continent, they formed communities of maroons where African runaways combined with indigenous tribes tried to escape the tyranny of slavery.

The communities of exodus too only had a limited chance of survival. Their production system was a combination of robbery and hunting/gathering—only possible in areas that had not been colonised. Where their moral economy was partially based on theft, the pirates were not only economically dependent on a society they rejected but could also be easily criminalized. Piracy was not only tolerated for a long time but was in fact commissioned in the battle carried out among the colonial powers for influence, territory and political and economic power. England employed pirates in the Caribbean to weaken the Spanish territories and colonial trade. The pirates were only declared enemies when they began to increasingly reject this instrumentalisation and establish themselves as an alternative model to the forced labour and exploitation aboard the imperial fleet (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2000, p. chapter 5).

The wandering workers were not only an economic and political problem. They were a practical and symbolic threat to the dominant order. The fugitive communities of exodus, pirates, maroons, runaway slaves, vagabonds, wandering poor, uprising peasants, and the mob in the harbour towns and the colonies made up the rebellious forces which, despite their ultimate decline, challenged sovereignty to the extent that it had to transform itself in order to
become an effective regime of control of the escaping mob. And it is not a coincidence that the word mobility not only refers to movement but also to the common people, the working classes, the mob. In the next chapter I will trace some of the unruliness associated with the escaping mob as I conceptualise the force of exit.
CHAPTER 5
OUTSIDE REPRESENTATION

Vagabonds escape, or the tension between exit and representation

The histories of vagabonds' mobility described in the previous chapter are histories of exit. I read the vagabonds histories' as revealing something about how the concept of exit changes our understanding of social conflicts and their biopolitical regulation. Social and political thought usually considers strategies of exit—for example refusal, desertion, sabotage, escape—as individual deviations from active organised forms of social conflict, or as uninspired reactions to intolerable pressure (Bennett, 2001). Exit is frequently considered to be a passive and irresponsible way to deal with an unfolding social conflict. In this chapter I argue the opposite: that exit brings us to the heart of social conflicts, and that it constitutes a form of creative resistance which is more capable than any other of transforming the conditions of power.

The vagabonds encounter a regime of control which functions by imposing immobility. Immobility disciplines bodies and renders them productive; it captures bodies and channels their potentials into the labour force. Bodies become territorialized; people become subjects of a specific territory, of a sovereign power. Theirs is not a reactive move against territorialisation, rather the forces of territorialisation are imposed on people's mobility. What was previously sheer movement now exists in a new field, it becomes escape. People moving—territorialisation—vagabonds escaping. So, although exit necessarily relates to the terms of control, it is not constrained by a given regime, exit exists prior to control. A regime of control becomes productive only through its capacity to seize on and capture the forces stemming from unsettled bodies, from people's mobility. The relation between control and exit is simply a relation of temporal difference: exit comes first. Unsettled bodies
escape, they become vagabonds, they leave the stage of sovereign power; power reorganises itself in order to respond to their exit.

Sovereign power mobilises representation to organise and contain social conflict. Representation is nothing other than the means of rendering various forces partaking in a social conflict visible to the gaze of power. Moreover, power relations operate by making social actors representable within a regime. As I described in the previous chapter, only when the escaping vagabonds are represented as a dangerous class and codified as mobile workforce do they enter the order of power. Or better, in response to the wandering masses power is forced to reorganise itself. Control encounters exit with representation. This is the formula of power. It is a form of power organised as spectacle, where abstraction and representation occupy the centre of social life and polity. For Debord (1994) the spectacle, that is the order of power in late capitalism, is not just a collection of images, representations and abstractions; rather these images and representations mediate every single social relationship. Exit attempts to dissolve the spectacle's domination through representation. This chapter traces the tension between solidified, congealed formations of representation and the amorphous, fluid dynamic of exit. The analysis of this tension enables me to identify possibilities for politics outside representation.

*Exodus in America in 1870s*

The case of the escaping vagabonds is not unique. Vagabondage is a system. Labour was something of a paradox in America in the late 19th century, for example. Migration meant that the country had to invest relatively little in the production of a labour force: it seemed like America was receiving a constant stream of ready made, adult workers. Yet, wages were high and it was difficult to find workers for waged-labour. 'The excess of people', according to Benjamin Franklin's diagnosis of the problem, were following their desires and
moving away from waged labour and into agriculture (Franklin, 1794; see also Virno, 2005). As long as land acquisition was a possibility, the people pursued it. The frontier of this young nation marched west with the people. The frontier consisted of mobile borders.

Marx turns to this problem in the last chapter of the first book of *Das Kapital* (Marx, 1988). Marx asked what had been interrupting the logic of capitalist wage-labour since the turn of the 17th/18th centuries—all the right conditions seemed to have been imported from Europe with the colonisers, the money for investment, the technical and business expertise and the absence of a feudal hold on people. The people too were there, but what had failed to take hold was their relation to the labour market. The opportunities presented in this new land were many, one of them was the opportunity to escape from relations of dependence between people and employers by acquiring and farming land. Thus, Franklin, in the attempt to ward off industrialists' requests for assistance in setting up new businesses, wrote that 'labor being generally too dear there, and hands difficult to be kept together, every one desiring to be a master, and the cheapness of lands inclining many to leave trades for agriculture' (Franklin, 1794), something which prevents the growth of manufacturing industries.

There is an ordinary reflex when hearing this case of labour escape: the reflex which sees in the escaping workers the fate of a body which later will become subject to disciplinary power. The escaping workers seem predestined to fail and subsequently to be punished. Such a reading could be easily bolstered by drawing on Foucault. When Foucault looked at workhouses (1991) he saw vagabonds who tried and failed to follow the trajectory of escape, and became the raw material of disciplinary force. But looking at America's tales of labour exodus, Marx saw something different: 'The wage worker of today is tomorrow an independent peasant, or artisan, working for himself. He vanishes from the labour market, but not into workhouse' (Marx, 1988, p. 756). For Foucault, mobility was constrained through the disciplining of bodies. Marx saw, in his momentary glance towards America, the failures of
these efforts (Erickson, 1984). And efforts were made: slave labour; indentured labour; negotiations with the British colonial government to increase the price of land so as to force people back into wage labour; the introduction of contract work; finally, the coolie system of importing indentured, closer to slave, labour. But after all these impositions had been introduced (and many abandoned) what was evident to Marx was the desire to move, not with industrialisation, but with the frontier.

Although Marx developed a prototypic approach to social conflict as a confrontational arrangement between antagonistic social classes, this does not prevent him from exploring the political quality of mobility in the practises of the runaways during the European migration to America. Because at this moment the rebellion against immobilisation is not only a search for a better future but a praxis of political significance which questions the very foundations of wage labour. Of course no exit is constituted as a pure rebellion. Exit is always a situated and an ambivalently arranged process. Moving with a frontier takes people beyond the repressive character of the factory system, but at the same time it is a move which proceeded along a great racial divide in the brutal process of the American conquest (Allen, 1994; Todorov, 1984). Thus, the concept of exit never existed outside as an abstract teleological move. Exit is always singular, it is a local historical process, one which is variously connected to simultaneously creating new forms of oppression and as freedom. The history of exit is plural. Virno sees in Marx’ reading of the runaways of American capitalism a forerunner to the contemporary 'cult of mobility, the aspiration to escape a definite condition, the calling to desert the regime of the factory' (Virno, 2005, p. 18).
Refusing work

The everyday life politics of the 1970s fuelled various practices of exit—exits from hegemonic conditions of work, from patriarchal social and sexual relations, from national subordinations of ethnic minorities etc. In Italy at this time, the flight from work was politicised as a strategy of refusal (Tronti, 1966). Workers leave the factories, and seek new forms of work; part-time, flexible work (Bowring, 2002; Thoburn, 2003). Together with students and jobless, they actively cultivate ways of living in precarious conditions.

Their mobility destabilises hegemonic labour relations, provoking a political crisis in Fordist society. They refuse to assume and act in accordance with identities based in work, escaping the disciplinary powers of the factory system. The movement is working on transforming everyday life, rather than gaining representation in state politics. The refusal is not simply a refusal to work, but an eschewal of collaboration—i.e. collaboration by translating social struggles into a set of demands addressed towards the redistributive capacities of the welfare state (Tronti, 1966). In this form of exit we see a direct linkage between the practices of escape and the negation of representation. The Italian movement was extremely important for rethinking exodus not so much because it entailed exit from the factory, but because it refused to reconnect this exit from the factory to some form of representation which would reintroduce the struggles back into the national social compromise. The refusal of work is in fact a refusal of representation. The movement out the factories explicitly severed assumed connections between state-politics and everyday life. People were only able to participate in the national social compromise to the extent that they held, or aspired to hold, full-time normal employment. However, when people started investing in efforts to transform everyday life, in creating a multiplicity of modes of existence, trajectories and desires, the normalising function of the national social compromise becomes increasingly evident and
with it the irrelevance of state-targeted politics. This brings Fordism to its limits.

Whilst the passage to post-Fordist labour conditions is often characterised as a transition initiated by employers seeking to expand the conditions of work, the story of the Italian Operaist (and later autonomist) movement suggests something else. Capital is clever (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Virno, 2003), it follows exodus, using it as the engine of its own development (Tronti, 1966). This is why Moulier Boutang (2001a) describes the powers of refusal as 'terribly efficient' in fuelling the evolution of capitalism. The history of capitalism is history of regimes of control being fragmented by exodus, transformed and fragmented again (Hardt & Negri, 2000).

My interest in exit is not that it culminates in a better configuration of life. Rather, the concept enables me to examine the, often neglected engine of transformation which occurs without a master plan and without guarantees. Exit is a means, not an end (Agamben, 2001). It is means without ends in action. Exit has no morality (remember that the runaways exit work by exterminating the natives). But it entails the desire to escape an oppressive morality, and exit follows this desire. Not every 'no' constitutes an exit, passive or reactive departures change little. Exit is a creative, positive move, one which radically alters the very conditions within which struggles over existence are conducted (Virno, 2003, p. 70). This creativity is made possible by working with the surplus of what is being harnessed by regimes of power (as the vagabonds did when they acquired licenses to travel for the purpose of marrying and used them to travel); by returning to potentials which have been neglected, misrecognised and remain unannounced (Irigaray, 1985b). Exit is an evacuation, not a protest. It is made of up everyday, singular, unpretentious acts of refusing subjectification.

When looking more broadly at the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the Italian experience of the autonomist movement and its discussion of exit as the refusal of work seem to be limited in scope. The refusal of work
seems to be only one of the many elements of a wider strategy of exit. If I, thus, engage in what Brett Neilson (2005) calls the 'provincialisation of the Italian effect' we can see the limitations of the Italian experiment and at the same time its embeddedness in a deeper and broader project of exit. This is exit from a subject-form prevalent in the North-Atlantic which is constituted as logocentric, productionist, heteronormative, and majoritarian. It is only because of local historical contingencies rooted in the social and cultural idiosyncrasies of the Italian left movements that the Operaist concept of exit was restricted to escape from the productionist, Fordist regime of work. But this refusal of work was in fact part of a broader movement of exit from the dominated and disciplined body. More radical refusals entail exit from the body, provoking a deeper challenge to the very notion of 'a subject'.

Exit from phallocentric modes of subjectification

If we keep on speaking the same language together, we're going to reproduce the same history (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 205).

It is in feminism that I find the most thorough discussions, not only of the material effects of the bodily disciplining (Gallop, 1988; Scarry, 1985) but of the importance of the body in sustaining that which escapes discipline (Haug, 1992; De Lauretis, 1987; Rubin, 1984). Writing in the 1970s and 1980s, Irigaray was concerned to intervene in liberal feminists' attempts to ensure the inclusion of women in public, political life (Irigaray, 1977, 1985b, 1985a). Demands for equality, in and of themselves, do not question the terms against which equality is measured. By failing to contest representations which materially constrain the embodiment of the feminine, liberal feminists' efforts risk contributing to a 'power to reduce all others to the economy of the Same' (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 74) in place of fuelling the radical social transformation
necessary to subvert patriarchy. Irigaray employs psychoanalysis to interrogate the construction of a social imaginary which actively excludes feminine potentials, potentials she understands as anchored in feminine morphology. Morphology, as used by Irigaray, designates the lived body, a body which is always already mediated by the social imaginary.

Of course, woman, the feminine, is present in the phallocentric economy. But twisted and constrained to one of two positions—phallic and masculine or passive and feminine—representations of the feminine serve as 'a more or less obliging prop for the enactment of man's fantasies' (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 25). Sexual difference feminism seeks to address the chasm between representations which exclude women and their real life inclusion within the very social spaces and relations in which they are thought not to belong (Whitford, 1988). More than this, the problem is to understand and contribute to women's powers to initiate change in the absence of forms of representation within which these powers can be recognised (Braidotti, 1993). That is, the aim is to recognise and elaborate amorphous, fluid modes of existence which, although they are lived, cannot be articulated in the present moment.

There is a disruptive excess to what this phallocentric economy excludes: the embodied, lived experience of the feminine (an experience which is not exclusively available to women). But it is not possible to work with an immanent relation between bodies and feminine potentials without first destabilising the mechanisms through which these potentials are captured. And here, Irigaray targets psychoanalytic notions of the body, sexual relations and identity. The hegemonic accounts we have of the sensory body privilege a masculine, phallic economy of pleasure.

'I think we must go back to the question not of the anatomy but of the morphology of female sex. In fact, it can be shown that all Western discourse presents a certain isomorphism with the masculine sex; the privilege of unity, form of the self, of the visible, of the specifiable, of the erection (which is the becoming in a form). Now this morpho-
logic does not correspond to the female sex: there is not 'a' sex. The 'no sex' that has been assigned to the woman can mean that she does not have 'a sex', and that her sex is not visible nor identifiable or representable in a definite form ... the sexual functioning of the woman can in no way lend itself to the privilege of the form: rather what the female sex enjoys is not having its own form' (Irigaray, 1977, p. 64).

The oppression of women is conducted at the level of bodily sensation and perception. Women's pleasures, embodied relation to others and to the world are unrepresented. Moreover, women internalise a masculine imaginary which constrains their embodied experience of the world.

In response, Irigaray develops an alternate language, or morphology, of the body, without claiming to give a true account of feminine bodily sensations. The masculine ascription of the feminine as 'not one' is subverted without being negated. By turning to the multiplicity of auto-erotic sensory pleasures experienced by women—'woman have sex organs just about everywhere' (Irigaray, 1985b)—Irigaray refuses the patriarchal gaze which reduces women to passive objects of pleasure. The language she develops seeks to articulate absence, multiplicity, simultaneity and non-identity.

One criticism of sexual difference feminism holds that it is founded in essentialist notions of the body. But this criticism entails reading Irigaray as attempting to represent the potentials inherent in female anatomy (e.g. Moi, 1985). However, any such endeavour is explicitly rejected by Irigaray, on the grounds that it could only an ever play into the fetishised desire to reveal the truth of the feminine and result in the 'recuperation of the feminine within a logic that maintains it in repression, censorship, nonrecognition' (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 78). She uses representation against itself (Grosz, 1986, 1989). The feminine is unrepresentable. But representations can be developed and employed to actively contest the economy of the same. The ground for intervention, then, is not anatomy, but morphology.
Irigaray's work offers an account of both the mechanisms through which a patriarchal regime of control disciplines the body and the feminine potentials which exceed control. She writes to open the path of exit—the point of tension which arises between discipline and excess as the unrepresentable feminine is put to work, not only to denaturalise phallocentric notions of the body, but to render them meaningless.

Feminist politics needs to go beyond the fight for inclusion within a regime of control. Sexual difference feminism suggests that inclusion will always be inclusion within a patriarchal regime of control, an expansion of patriarchy. Representation is a limited tool for feminist politics, it is useful for subverting existing representations, but not for articulating a positive feminist project and an exit from the phallocentric construction of the body. This is not because the terms of representation have been colonised by phallocentrism and decolonisation is seen as a lost cause. Rather, feminine potentials, the excess of disciplined bodies, are fundamentally unrepresentable.

Bodily productions

Donna Haraway pushes these questions about the body in a different direction. In her investigation of the fundamental unrepresentability of the feminine, Haraway tries to go beyond language and to interrogate the very material constitution of bodies. She contests the ubiquitous representationalism of the typical dichotomies between sex/gender and nature/culture by emptying them when she relocates them into a non-linear intermingling of human, animal, and machinic bodies. She examines the conditions for exiting from the fixed and closed representations of the North-Atlantic subject-form (…this logocentric, productionist, heteronormative, and majoritarian subject). The result is a masterful and ingenious exploration of the material processes of production through which bodies make themselves.
Haraway's concept of 'apparatus of bodily production' (1991a, p. 208) connects both the critique of productionism (as articulated in the exit from labour) and the critique of heterosexuality, or later heteronormativity (as articulated in the exit from phallocentric subjectivation), with the aim of overcoming their singular limitations. Not unlike Irigaray's work on morphology, she creates new feminist figures which 'cannot, finally have a name; they cannot be native. Feminist humanity must, somehow, both resist representation, resist literal figuration, and still erupt in powerful new tropes, new figures of speech, new turns of historical possibility' (Haraway, 2004, p. 47). But going much further than Irigaray, Haraway sees these new figurations as emerging in literal, material processes of creation. Thus, Haraway creates conditions of exit which are both literal and fictional. She bypasses the unbearable historicist realism of the tradition of refusal of work (s. also Badiou, 2005b, p. 42ff.). This takes us beyond strategies of exit which are thought to hinge on the actions of a subject who is constituted through his participation in social struggles around work.

By taking 'apparatuses of bodily production' her object of analysis, Haraway reveals that production is not an anthropomorphic enterprise, but one in which animals, objects, technologies and artefacts are all actively engaged. Not all actants involved in production are equally part of a humanist history of labour struggles. By foregrounding the involvement of these diverse actants in work, Haraway destabilises the familiar, realist terms I employ to understand exit. Now exit is characterised as simultaneously real and imaginary. This double movement of exit makes it a powerful force operating outside a given order of control. In fact, Haraway works with the imaginary, not only in the practice of refusal, but as a creative sensibility. By doing that she shows us the limits of exit in a positive way.

However, regimes of control can be deeply threatened by this knot of reality and imagination. Control attempts to interrupt this connection, to break the link between reality and fictionality. Or better, power attempts to absorb the reality of exit by inserting it into the process of representation and to excise its fictionality
by delegitimising it as unreal. Power works by policing the border between the fictional and the real. This policing of the imaginary is pervasive, it has been inserted into the very heart of politics, policing is a substitute for politics.

**Politics, policing**

Any project of exit is wary of co-option, the ever-present risk that their efforts to initiate or participate in radical social change could be hijacked and diverted in an opposite direction. Co-option happens. Co-option is not an anomaly, it is a mode of capture pervasively employed by sovereign power. As Wallerstein says, 'the revolutions never worked the way their proponents hoped or the way their opponents feared' (Wallerstein, 1998, p. 13). But co-option may not always be the result of an intentional act. It can be the outcome of misrecognition—misrecognising feminist efforts to intervene in sexist morphology as the articulation of the truth of women's sexual difference, for example. The problem lies at the level of perception, or sensory experience. If feminine potentials are unrepresentable, they remain invisible to those whose sensibility can identify neither excess nor absence. Attempts to harness and work with these imperceptible potentials will be misrecognised and translated into the given terms of representation. And it is precisely this form of limited sensibility which proliferates through policing (Rancière, 2000).

For example, the terms deployed to speak of 'migrants' (asylum seeker, *Gastarbeiter*, illegal migrant) constitute migrants as a homogenous social group and serve to police their insertion into broader society. The policing effected by these terms is situated. For example, the French term 'immigrant', has served to hide and expel the name 'worker' from political debates (Badiou, 2005b, p. 121). 'Immigrants' are a rather new species of subject in France (Rancière, 1998). 'They used to be called migrant workers or just plain workers. Today's immigrant is first a worker who has lost his second name,
who has lost the political form of his identity and of his otherness, the form of a political subjectification of the count of the uncounted. … What he has lost is his identification with a mode of subjectification of the people, worker or proletarian, as object of a declared wrong and as subject giving form to his dispute.’ (Rancière, 1998, p. 118). It is in the cold and underhand process of policing that certain social groups, such as migrants, are rendered visible and countable.

Policing is what Rancière (1998) identifies as standing in for politics in contemporary times. It results from attempts to found political actions and decisions in an egalitarian principle which holds that all should be included as equals. But egalitarianism is, of course, only a principle, not a description of the societies in which we live. All societies are understood to be comprised of different parts, of people who can contribute different skills, forms of wealth or knowledge.

The paradox of working with the egalitarian principle is that it demands that all should have an equal role in sustaining and governing society, but it cannot transform the fact that people's capacities to partake in society are perceived as unequal (Balibar, 1997). The capacities of the mother, the migrant, the worker may be simply undetectable for some. Being included on the basis of the egalitarian principle, rather than on the basis of actually having something to offer, compounds any perceived lack of capacity. Working with the egalitarian principle cultivates sensibilities which ignore what lies beyond immediate perception. Now, society seems to be comprised of self-evident groups or parts—of people who occupy the space that has been allocated to them and no other. Naming and representing is the political tool for controlling society. The result is that what typically stands in for politics in contemporary times is, in fact, policing: the realm where the normalizing functions of inclusion and co-option are enacted.
**Outside politics**

Political impropriety is not non-belonging. It is a belonging twice over: belonging to the world of properties and parts and belonging to the improper community, to that community that egalitarian logic sets up as the part of those who have no part. And the place of this non-belonging is not exile…. it is that of interruption or an interval. (Rancière, 1998, p. 137)

To escape policing and start doing politics necessitates dis-identification—the refusal of assigned, proper places for participation in society. As indicated earlier, exit functions not as a form of exile, mere opposition or protest but as an interval, a mode of being which interrupts everyday policing (Rancière, 1998). Political disputes—as distinct from disputes over policing—are not concerned with rights or representation. They are not even disputes over the terms of inclusion. They occur prior to inclusion, beyond the terms of the double-R axiom. They are disputes over the existence of those who have no part. Politics arises from the emergence of the miscounted, the imperceptible, those who have no place within the normalizing organization of the social realm. The refusal of representation is a way of introducing the part which is outside of policing, which is not a part of community. Outside politics is the way to exit the controlling and repressive force of contemporary politics; or else it is a way to change our senses, our habits, our practices in order to experiment together with those who have not part, instead of attempting to include them into the current regime of control.

This emergence fractures normalizing, police logic. It refigures the perceptible, not so others can finally recognize one's proper place in the social order, but to make evident the incommensurability of worlds, the incommensurability of inegalitarian distribution of bodies with the principle of equality. Politics is a refusal of representation. Politics happen beyond, before,
representation. Outside politics is the materialisation of the attempt to occupy this space outside the controlling force of representation.

If I return to my initial question of how people contest control, then I can say that when regimes of control encounter escape they instigate processes of naming and representation. Outside politics arises in the transition of exiting people when they attempt to evade the imposition of control. Outside politics is not simply a move against representation in a purely negative sense. It is not a matter of introducing pure potential in reaction to constraining power. Rather, exit is a creative movement—it is a literal, material, embodied movement. The space of outside politics is not another space that resides beyond the determinate realm of representation and policing, but, with Agamben I could say, 'it is a passage, the exteriority that gives it access' (1993, p. 68).

Of course, outside politics is embroiled in the very problem of representation it tries to contest. As I will discuss in the following chapter, this is not a limitation in and of itself. However a question does arise about whether the figure of exit limits the imaginary of outside politics. The figure of exit resides in 20th century fantasies. As I discussed earlier, strategies of exit invoke an agonising historicist realism. In the 21st century I want to look for outside politics in the amphibious and alkaline transformations of people against the metallic melancholia of postliberal sovereign power. In other words, I trace outside politics in the most intimate, I say imperceptible, niches of the everyday and the body—and this is the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6
IMPERCEPTIBLE POLITICS

The predicament of resistance

We find ourselves in a predicament in doing politics, writing about politics: the predicament of resistance. It is a timely predicament. From the beginning of the 20th century until the 1980s the value of traditional forms of organising resistance (in particular party and the trade union politics) was self-evident. But they no longer seem to offer a viable radical form of resistance. In response, the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s—identity politics, micropolitics and cultural politics, in particular—had a major role in taking us beyond the state-focused terms of traditional forms of resistance and in re-energising our potentials for action in everyday life. But now these movements seem to be increasingly ineffective in creating radical forms of resistance (I will discuss these various forms of resistance more extensively in the next two sections of the Dissertation; s. also Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006).

The 1990s was an important period of cross-fertilisation between familiar modes of resistance which target the state social movements which seek to transform social experience. Strategies for resistance commonly employed in party and trade union politics had been irrevocably exposed as reproducing inequalities by failing to question assumptions about universalist (and nation orientated) notions of a good life. At the same time, the risks of an exclusive focus on the politics of the everyday became increasingly evident. Seeing 'everything as political' can fold back on itself and become a depoliticising move, particularly when recognition of difference stands in for redistribution of resources, reallocation of positions and refiguring of sensibility (Rancière, 1998; Santos, 2001).
We passed through the 1990s, all of us involved in various forms of organisation and resistance, and we exited the decade in a form of speechlessness. In the first few years of the new century experimental forms of resistance, new social movements have emerged (Chesters & Welsh, 2006). We are part of these experiments. This Dissertation is an experiment to think politics after the predicament of resistance; to think, with Hoy, of 'resistance [as] both an activity and an attitude […] the activity of refusal […] an attitude that refuses to give in to resignation' (2004, p. 9). We find ourselves in a situation where people participating in state-targeted forms of resistance do not want to go on in the old way and those involved in the politics of everyday life are unable to go on in their way. If the times were Leninist we would be on the threshold of a revolution which would revolutionise existing forms of resistance. But the times are not Leninist; they seem to be quiet. What is audible is the predicament of resistance and the indeterminacy of experimentation. Or maybe we could raise the volume of something else—a form of politics which employs modes of resistance which are already materialising in our postliberal sovereign conditions: imperceptible politics.

**Imperceptible politics transform the body**

I have an ally in writing this Dissertation: time. Writing at the beginning of the 21st century I am not simply making reference to the present. The current times allow the Dissertation to happen. In the beginning of the third millennium, we are precariously situated on a rather aseptic, sober, glamorous facade, with lots of neglected agony beneath. This Dissertation could easily be fuelled by mourning and lament (as criticised by Brown, 1995), or culminate in some kind of genealogy (Rose, 1999) or critical deconstruction of the present (Zizek, 2005b). It could even attempt to refuse despondent visions of the future by promising that agony is, in principle, translatable into euphoria (a mode of
engagement critically analysed by G. Rose, 1996). But I am writing not as active and careful observers of our times, I am not even writing in the flow of time, as its loyal handmaidens. Rather, time—with all its stubbornness and smoothness, its warm reliability and its disorientating absence of synchronicity—fuels these micro-electrical firings which govern the muscles of my fingers on the keyboards of my sleek laptop. Time both writes us and yields material with which to work in addressing the predicament of resistance.

New tools of resistance are emerging, but they have not crystallised, they are ungraspable. This describes my encounter with imperceptible politics; they are not simply situated in our present conditions of postliberal sovereignty. Of course, imperceptible politics are demanded by our situatedness. But at the same time, they are imaginary and outside of history. It is not possible to work on the real conditions of the present without invoking imaginaries which take us beyond the present. And this trajectory away from the present is achieved by working in time, by intensifying the present.

Imperceptible politics work with the present. Time is fractured and non-synchronous—the historical present can be understood as containing both residues of the past and as anticipating the future (Marvakis, 2005; Bloch, 1986). Yet, it is impossible to identify either if one tries to move back or forward. Neither move is possible. Time forces us to work in the present by training our senses to examine what appears evident as well absences. This sensibility enables us to perceive and imagine things and ourselves in unfamiliar ways, to follow open trajectories. Time contains both experiences of the world which have been rendered invisible and the seeds of experience which, although not yet in existence, is realistically possible (Santos, 2003). Imperceptible politics can be neither perceived nor conducted from a transcendent perspective; that is, elaborating a 'metaphysics of the present' (as criticised in Adam, 1995) reveals nothing of the mode of engagement with the present I am describing. Rather, imperceptible politics entails experiencing time in a subjective and embodied way, being forced to transform ourselves in
order to deal with this current situatedness in the predicament of resistance. Imperceptible politics emerge in relation to the present historical regime of control, it is transformative, it involves *remaking the present* by *remaking our bodies*: the ways we perceive, feel, act. Imperceptible politics transforms our bodies.

Imperceptible politics love the present, exist in the present, are practised in the present. They work with social reality in the most intimate and immanent ways. In so doing, they recall the whole history and practise of exit, as I described earlier, and rethink it anew. Doing imperceptible politics entails the refusal to use our perceptual and action systems as instruments for representing the current political conditions of resistance. They function through diffraction rather than reflection (Haraway, 1997, p. 16, 1991c); diffraction creates 'effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here' (Haraway, 1992, p. 295). In this sense imperceptible politics are more concerned with changing the very conditions of perception and action than with changing what we see. Only such transformations of the body are sufficient for interrupting pervasive sensibilities which have failed to counter postliberal sovereignty.

*Imperceptible politics as a constituent force against postliberal sovereignty*

Postliberal sovereignty seizes power by creating vertical aggregates on a transnational level. In *Chapter Three*, I described these aggregates as hegemonising the hegemonic transnational space of global flows. Aggregates cut across and absorb distinct segments of traditional horizontal social structures such as economy, class, gender, race, social position, institution, the market, technology. Invisible borders are inserted between people, actants, who might previously have worked on a horizontal plane. These boundaries are not simply geographic, nor do they delimit companies, industries, governments,
NGOs or community alliances (Sassen, 2000). But these boundaries do not simply scatter and isolate, rather distinct elements of these different entities are recombined in vertical alignment with each other.

Like capital, postliberal sovereignty is inherently unethical and opportunistic. In this unscrupulous enterprise, so characteristic of the Bush-Blair era, resistance becomes just another structural element contributing to erection of postliberal aggregates. This is not because the very conditions for resistance are always directly entangled in power—as Hoy so brilliantly describes in his analysis of post-structuralist understandings of resistance (Hoy, 2004). Such entanglement does not necessarily prevent the development of effective strategies. Of course, sovereignty digests resistance: active forms of resistance are continually co-opted. But this twin movement of flight and capture only appears catastrophic, if I insist that there must be an ultimate solution to social conflicts. Certainly, resistance is frequently absorbed by power after its initial eruption. As Wallerstein says, 'the revolutions never worked the way their proponents hoped or the way their opponents feared' (Wallerstein, 1998, p. 13). Movement-cooption-resistance-capture happens all the time. The particular problem with the fate of state-targeted and everyday forms of political resistance in the era of postliberal sovereignty is that they loose their constituent powers. Their eruption no longer pushes power to reconsider and reorganise itself, to move to new directions (cf. also Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006). While these familiar forms of political engagement can certainly trouble the seamless unfurling of postliberal sovereignty, they do not take us beyond it—even in our imaginations—and they loose their power to become constituent forces of change. As I discussed in the previous chapters, the primacy of exit is that it can be a 'constituent force of resistance' (Negri, 1999).

Imperceptible politics attempt to approach this closure by developing a loyal stance towards strategies of exit from current amalgamations of postliberal representationalism and power. Although imperceptible politics address
postliberal sovereignty, this is not their intention. Their targets pertain to the specific social struggles in which they are located. And they work by *de facto* changing the immediate social reality of our existence. They are a constitutive force.

The second Part of this Dissertation (Sections III, IV) is devoted to examining these constituent powers of imperceptible politics (see table). I trace the tension between postliberal sovereignty and imperceptible politics in two fields: the fields of mobility, and labour. A field crosses various disciplinary domains and social spaces, and these crossings are effected by 'boundary objects' (Leigh Star, 1991) which exhibit a relative autonomy in their function (cf. also Bourdieu, 1990). Fields are like regions of the social world which are held together by a pervasive regime of control in alliance with distinct forms of social cooperation and expressions of social conflict. It is in these forms of cooperation and conflict that a surplus of social relations is produced, an excess which lies outside existing forms of representation. As imperceptible politics are enacted in a specific field, they arise from the tension between the dominant regime of control and social relations of excess.
For example, the micropolitical regulation of diasporic communities maintains and energises these communities. But at the same time, it becomes necessary for sustaining fragmented, transnationally organised, neoliberal space without in any way challenging and changing the conditions on which racism and geopolitical exclusion thrives. Here I trace the emergence of a new form of politics which harnesses a distinct form of experience (continuous experience) and radically breaks with the notion and the function of subjectification. Continuous experience intervenes in vertical aggregates, flowing between
them, rendering them permeable, enabling connections between people and communities beyond the normalising forms of subjectification.

The first field for the organisation of postliberal sovereignty is that of mobility. In Section III, I trace the emergence of the regime of mobility control. I examine how elements of the evolving transnationalism in Europe, in particular the process of Europeanisation of migration policy, contribute to a tendency towards establishing a postliberal sovereign system of power. I examine how this transnational European regime for mobility control manages the passages of migrational flows and the pores of borders. And finally I trace the historical emergence of the institutions involved in migration policies and their contemporary constellations and functions. I call this new regime of mobility control: Liminal Institutions of Porocracy (LIP). Identity politics, cultural politics, politics of difference, diaspora and hybridity—the forms of resistance which were employed in and after the 1960s and 1970s—have been indispensable in contesting inequalities arising out of regional and global mobility. And, in many spaces they continue to be fruitful. But, in the face of postliberal sovereign conditions of migrational mobility, they no longer coalesce into a viable strategy of resistance. Something else is happening: as people subvert the regime of the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy through their moves across borders, they are engaging in an imperceptible politics. The constituent quality of this movement, the autonomy of migration, is that it creates conditions which not only surpass national regulation but which simply cannot be accommodated by transnational sovereignty (as discussed further below).

Finally, in the field of labour, I explore how the emerging regime of labour control extends beyond seizing the body's capacities to be productive in traditional work, into the realms of subjectivity, non-work, domestic life, care and social relations (Section IV). This is the regime of embodied capitalism. Its constitutive moment is not primarily its cognitive quality (as theories of cognitive capitalism or information capitalism assert when they focus on the
production of information as an important characteristic of contemporary labour). Its constitutive moment is its embodied realisation. Shifts in the organisation of labour mean that bodies are literally manifest in new ways and with different capacities to affect and relate to other bodies. The regime of embodied capitalism is not primarily concerned with governing individuals (disciplinary power) or even with regulating populations (bio-power). Rather, it works by recombining matter: humans, animals, artefacts and things. North-Atlantic embodied capitalism, that is the organizational matrix of labour in postliberal conditions, is not a regime of control which attempts to dominate and to train the body; it wants to fracture it, to recombine its material, affective, social potentials in unexpected ways, to harness the body's own capacities for creative recombination.

Resistance in the realm of labour was been traditionally undertaken by revolutionary parties, labour (social-democratic) parties and trade unions. Of course, in the long history of the labour movement there have been many struggles entailing the politics of exit. Remember for example the Spanish anarcho-syndicalism or the Industrial Workers of the World, all of which have been suppressed and disciplined by the traditional labour movement. The traditional movement seems to be incapable of addressing the inequalities emerging from the new regime of labour control: that is, the proliferation of precarious conditions in the immaterial and service sectors, in care as well as in traditional industrial sectors. Neither state-targeted class representational politics nor trade unions' fixation on full stable employment tackle the problematic result from new working conditions: precarity. Although produced through the regime of embodied capitalism, the lived experience of precarity is not simply an experience of constraint. It has its own excess, an inappropriate/d sociability, which cannot be seized by this regime of control. Imperceptible politics in the field of labour harness the constituent powers of this excess: inappropriate/d sociability subverts the organisation of postliberal vertical aggregates.
How to address a void: The imaginary character of imperceptible politics

But what is the common energy mobilising imperceptible politics in its various forms—such as continuous experience, autonomy of migration or inappropriate/d sociability? The common dimension is that imperceptible politics is driven by imagination—the imagination required to address an absence, as Santos (2003) names it. As discussed above, representation diminishes the senses. Not only does representation dictate the terms of inclusion in political disputes. It hones our capacities to even perceive the multiple realities of bodies, people, desires—inappropriate/d forms of life, as Trinh Minh-ha (1987) and Haraway (1992) call them. These inappropriate/d modes of existence cannot be included into the existing system of regulation without being transformed into controllable objects of discourse: bodies become identities, people become *demos*, desires become demands. Imperceptible politics around experience, migration and precarity all operate, or even more, they address a void (Badiou, 2005a) which resides in the political system of representation. To the extent that the void will be reinserted and absorbed into existing systems of representation, it will fail to challenge our existing understandings of subjectification and embodiment, humanist migration policy, or traditional Fordist employment.

Only by working with inappropriate/d forms of life, or absences or a situation's void is it possible to deploy a politics of imagination. As Badiou (2001, p. 68) says about the void, it is the very heart of a particular situation around which 'the plenitude' of social and material relations making up this specific situation is organised. This plenitude is mirrored, managed and regulated through procedures of representation (it is policed as I said with Rancière in the previous chapter).

Consider for example, the highly patrolled, surveilled, and controlled passages of migrational flows through the porous borders of North-Atlantic countries. There is plenitude of laws, practices, institutions, customs, migration
police and border patrols, rituals, detention centres, informal migrant networks, knowledges, life projects and many more which makes up this situation. This abundance is structured around an absence: the embodied desire which people follow as they cross borders despite the regime of control which tries to close them off. In this plenitude we can find something of the knowledges and practices that border-crossers also find as they plan their passage. What is absent is their actual movement, what people become as they navigate the fissures of nation states. When they enter into the language of the plenitude these people are called illegal migrants, they are treated as a problem, an economic, social or humanitarian problem, which has to be solved through deportation, revisiting legislation or negotiations with other states. The absences of the inappropriate/d migrants constitute a void, a void around which this situation is organised. When all these inappropriate/d modes of existing beyond identity and passports become represented, it is to be measured, policed, and finally, suppressed. But they do not always become represented: when the void becomes an action it does so as a force which challenges the existing organisation of plenitude. Because it cannot be accommodated in the current situation within existing conditions of regulation, it is a constituent power pushing for a radical change. The imperceptible politics of the void cannot be ignored; the millions of inappropriate/d bodies rendering borders permeable *de facto* throw the current regime into chaos, forcing sovereignty to reassemble itself.

Imperceptible politics is the moment where the void of mobility (or labour) becomes resistance. But here I understand resistance in a positive way: as desire to depart from the plenitude. This desire comes from the very heart of the situation but leads directly and unconditionally beyond it. This is the only understanding of resistance which could be relevant for imperceptible politics, and it is indeed the only understanding of resistance which could escape the melancholic uptake of Foucault's work in neoliberal times. Foucault's dictum that where there is power there is resistance and where there is resistance there
is freedom is true when where there is resistance there is imperceptible politics. Resistance remains imperceptible to the representational policing of a situation and works with an excess of social relations which spring from the 'absent centre' of this particular situation. This is the imaginary character of imperceptible politics. It is only by conjuring up the fictional qualities (Haraway, 1992, 2004) of a situation that it is possible to address something which is absent and yet there, something arising from the core of the situation but which is yet to emerge. Imperceptible politics are here, always present within a regime of control, and at the same time it is only present because it cultivates an imagination of a radically different future.

If imperceptible politics harnesses fictionality to attend to the core of a certain situation, that is if imperceptible politics unfolds as a continuous break from existing forms of representation, then how do people actually do this in their everyday lives? How do people deal with the constant pressure of policing and representation, undo their fixed positions and enter into processes of dis-identification? Dis-identification is the moment where actors become other to themselves as they connect to each other in the situated process of escape. It is a situated process of becoming where 'something or someone is ceaselessly become-other (while continuing to be what they are)' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 177).

The concept of becoming points towards a political practice in which social actors escape normalizing representations and reconstitute themselves in the course of participating and changing the conditions of their material corporeal existence. Becoming is not only a force against something (primarily against the ubiquitous fetishism of individualism and against sovereign regimes of population control) but also a force which enables desire. Every becoming is a transformation of multiplicity into another, suggest Deleuze & Guattari (1987, pp. 254-262). Every becoming intensifies and radicalizes desire, creating new modes of individuation and new affections. Becoming is a drift away from representation. But this drift is not a wild, arbitrary move; neither is it a
teleological progression along a chain of hierarchically organised transformations (as Patton points out in commenting on Massumi’s interpretation of becoming, s. Patton, 2000, p. 82). Becoming, for Deleuze and Guattari, starts ‘from the forms one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the functions one fulfils; the transformations it entails, the ‘relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness … are closest to what one is becoming and through which one becomes’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 272).

This ceaseless process of diversification and transformation neither fabricates an infinite series of differences nor has it a predefined end. Becoming has no fixed telos—but Deleuze and Guattari are no 'difference engineers' (Ansell-Pearson, 1997). Deleuze is a meticulous manufacturer of unity, a unity without subjects. There is no 'final analysis' in this unity! Differences, individuations, modalities are only the starting point; they are the building materials of the world. So, interestingly enough, the end of all becomings is not the proliferation of difference, it is its elevation into a process of becoming everyone. It is a process which creates a unity of multiple singularities. Becoming indiscernible, impersonal, imperceptible occurs when 'one has suppressed in oneself everything that prevents [one] from slipping between things and growing in the midst of things' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 280).

Becoming everyone must be decided anew in each moment, in every place. Becoming everyone is a universal strategy because it prevents a certain form of becoming from being privileged as a universally acclaimed endpoint. Imperceptible politics is based on a continuous process of leaving behind all these forms of representation which break the connections between people and attempt to condense them into the next policing node of postliberal networks of control. This takes us beyond our current predicament, to work with modes of resistance which are already unfolding without announcing themselves:

'Becoming everybody/everything is to world, to make a world. […] It is by conjugating, by continuing with other lines, other pieces, that one
makes a world that can overlay the first one, like a transparency. Animal
elegance, the camouflage fish, the clandestine: this fish is crisscrossed by
abstract lines that resemble nothing, that do not even follow its organic
divisions; but thus disorganised, disarticulated, it worlds with the lines of
a rock, sand, and plants, becoming imperceptible.' (Deleuze & Guattari,
1987, p. 280).
PART B

A GUIDE THROUGH IMPERCEPTIBLE POLITICS
The institutional regime for the control of mobility

As I have shown in Section I, since the stubborn dominance of nation states within the European transnational space forms a barrier to the postliberal transformation of sovereignty, we can talk about a model of transnational rather than postliberal sovereignty at the level of European integration policy. However, the obvious difficulties encountered by the European integration process seem to have had little negative effect on the Europeanisation of migration policy. On the contrary, the European mobility control regime exhibits less the traits of transnational governance as those of postliberal policing: the Schengen process, this is my thesis, is a paradigmatic laboratory for the vertical aggregates of postliberal sovereignty that exist both within and parallel to the horizontality of the transnational European integration process. In this sense, while from an historical perspective the Europeanisation of migration policy does indeed result from the EU integration process, it has now advanced to become a generating moment of this same process. (Walters, 2004, Hess, Tsianos, 2006).

It is no coincidence that in this context Etienne Balibar refers to the double-edged nature of the “institution of the border” in Europe: on the one hand, it functions as a form of state regulation of populations and their movements and, on the other, constitutes a border institution (liminal institution) only seldom subject to democratic control (2003). Enrica Rigo (2003), in her work on the communitisation of eastern European border policy, has pointed to how
European migration policy leads to the diffusion and stratification of borders. In common with many other critical researchers (Walters 2002; Anderson 2000; Lahav/Guivandon 2000) Rigo refers to a “determinitorialisation” of state sovereignty: in certain cases, the knock-on effect of third-state regulations, the “police à distance” as Didier Bigot und Elspeth Guild (2003) call it, can stretch as far as Asia: “Thus an Asian migrant expelled from Germany might pass through Poland and Romania before being ‘sent home’ without necessarily his or her nationality ever being proven” (Rigo 2003).

Taken together, these moments—the liminal character of the new border institutions as well as the determinitorialisation of sovereignty—constitute what I seek to delineate as the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy. This postnational process of border displacement should not, however, be understood as a sovereign act by states to extend power or competence on foot of an abstract claim for hegemony and control; rather, it represents a multifaceted constitutive plane of struggle, where the regime of mobility control is itself challenged by the new, fluid, streamlined, clandestine, multidirectional, multipositional, and context-dependent forms of mobility. It is necessary to return to relations their subjective character.

Behind the so-called migration flows, the overloaded ships, and the increasingly stringent border controls, lies the absent names of the events of the constitutive power of exit. At first glance, this may seem like a heroic glorification of migrant ruses and tactics best suited to the egoistic, neoliberal ideal type of the homo economicus or, with Sabine Hess, the “ground staff of globalisation” (Hess, 2003). Initially, it is a question of acquiring a different perspective—of thinking the transformation of sovereignty as the result of global migrant practices, practices that tend to undermine the basis upon which sovereignty has hitherto functioned. It is a question of understanding migration as a movement, a movement within mobility, and, finally, a movement of mobility: ‘that possesses knowledge, follows its own rules, and collectively organises its own praxis' (Boutang 2002).
The work of the new migration economics as well as research on transnationalisation (cf. Bash/Glick Schiller/Szanton Blanc 1994; Morokvasic-Müller, Mirjana, Erel, Umut; Shinozaki, Kyoko, 2003; Smith, Michael Peter/Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo 1999) has shown that the conception of the migrant as an economic and, as a rule, male Robinson Crusoe cannot be sustained (cf. Hess/Lenz 2001; Kofman/ Sales 1998; Andrijasevic, 2004). These studies stress the importance of households, families and other networks as the context within which migration and decisions about migration take place. So, as I show in Chapter Nine, migrants never reach the border on their own.

Mapping Schengen

In is not my intention here to reconstruct in detail the complex evolution of the contemporary European border regime—what I term the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy—that has been forced ahead, both within and without EU institutions, over the last 20 years (for a detailed genealogy of the 'Schengen process', see Walters, 2002, Geddes, A. 2003, Guiraudon, 2003, Leuthardt 1999; Düvell 2002).

The MigMap project²: 'Governing Migration – a virtual cartography of European migration policy”, was motivated by the artistic-activist desire to create a situated cartography of migration policy in Europe since 1989, as opposed to a cartography of migration policy (re-)producing the territoriality of the border.

² MigMap has been developed and realised by Labor k3000 (Peter Spillmann / Susanne Perin / Marion von Osten / Michael Vögeli) and the researchers from TRANSIT MIGRATION (Sabine Hess, Serhat Karakayali, Efthimia Panagiotidis and Vassilis Tsianos). You can navigate the four maps that have been produced to date at www.transitmigration.org/migmap.
The aim was the literal visualisation of the concept of the *Autonomy of Migration*, and making this information available via the Internet. Map 3, (Figure 10) on the Europeanisation of migration policy, shows the decentred and continual variations of 'observing' and 'action' (Sciortino, 2004) at the transnational ‘multi-level system of governance”, in a form reminiscent of a subway map; here, the specific mode of productivity of the Liminal Institutions of Porocracry, with its contextual fluidity and flexibility, can be clearly discerned. It is no longer possible to grasp the ongoing non-linear development
by means of a simple chronology. What are involved are formal and informal advisory talks, meetings and conferences and a variety of papers dealing with strategy and concepts that are constantly being produced and filed away. In Map 3 we can follow the emergence of particular operative concepts: how they are followed up for a time and begin to overlap with parallel projects, until the debate takes an abrupt turn thanks to the arrival of new ideas or the exigencies of the political concerns of the day. (see Spillmann, 2007).

Transnationalisation from below, again

The partial loss of the ability to control and manipulate national migration policies, coupled with the increase in transnational migration, led to a shift from national or bilateral control of the recruited 'gastarbeiter', or postcolonial migrant in Fordist migration regimes, towards the control of illegalised labour migration. We can trace the insignia of this shift in European Union migration policy: it still focuses on the freedom of movement of EU labour migrants, on the partial integration of resident third-state immigrants within social legislation, and on a common restrictive policy towards migrants not in possession of documents.

The externalisation of the control of migration to beyond the Schengen borders in Morocco, Mauritania or Libya, however, represents a heterogeneous and hierarchicised space of circulation with stepped zones of sovereignty: 'spaces for the management, admittance, control and government of circulation' (Foucault, 2004, 52 ff.); these spaces that can be governed, neither through the inner-European principle of Schengen territoriality (homogeneous spaces with equal rights), nor through the national double–R axiom (see also Chapter One).

Thus the policy of extending migration control leads to a process whereby the margins of the European Union become centers of gravity for a new government of border crossing circulation. Now, the classical transit countries
such as Turkey, Libya, Morocco, or the countries of the former Yugoslavia, increasingly find that they have become the final destination for migrants on their way to north-west Europe (Bojadžijev, M. 2006; Anthias, F. and Lazaridis, G. 2000; King, R. and Lazaridis, G. and Tsardanidis, Ch. 2000). This clearly illustrates not only how their function has changed—from a source of emigration, to a transit route, to, finally, a destination for would-be immigrants—but also shows the ‘productivity’ of the European migration and border regime. The more difficult migration to north-west Europe becomes, the more attractive as potential immigration destinations the peripheral economies of south, south-east and eastern Europe become. As social-scientists such as Ayse Öncü and Gülsun Karamustafa (1999) conclude, this migration is both a precondition and a motor for a specific form of peripheral globalisation of the economies at the edge of Europe. The answer here seems to consist of mobile transnational migration and household strategies, as illustrated by the work of Sabine Hess (2003) on eastern European commuter-migrants to north-west Europe, of Rubah Salih on migrants from the Maghreb to Italy, and of Mirjana Morokvasic (1994) or Norbert Cyrus (1997). With her concept of ‘flexible citizenship’, the cultural-anthropologist Aihwa Ong also emphasises that migrants’ transnational mobility strategies bring with them new forms of subjectivity that permanently transgress the political borders of the nationally regulated labour market (cf. Ong 2005: 31 ff). Positioning is flexible both spatially and in relation to the specific labour market; it takes place in the context of the mutually intensifying dynamics of the imposition of discipline and the attempt to evade it. Many of these studies, however, limit themselves to confirming that some mutually determining relation does exist between commuter or transit migration strategies and restrictive migration policies, without going on to define this relation any further. They evaluate mobile migration strategies as creative responses to a situation where the chances of gaining official residency appear extremely remote. Up till now, the focus of transnationalisation research has habitually concentrated on migrants’
transnational practices and networks—regarded in most studies as 'counter-hegemonic political space' (cf. Appadurai 2000, Augustin, 2003). From this perspective, transnationalisation figures as both a defiant answer and unintended consequence of a restrictive migration policy that apparently attempts to counter this process but without success. (cf. also Rogers 2001, p. 15). However, this sense of the 'failure' of political measures of control misses the productivity of the new forms of migration government, the liminal institutions of porocracy, within the process of European integration. It seems that it is precisely the flexibility of migrant subjectivities’ adaptation within the context of border crossings that renders it an object to be managed rather than a target of hermetic containment. The making of Schengen is the history of how this adaptation process has been managed.

*Europeanisation revisited*

The Schengen Agreement became the central official policy instrument for achieving uniformity and extension within the EU. And it is the history of the Schengen Agreement that truly exemplifies the general modus of the Europeanisation of migration policy. It has its roots in an informal meeting of five government heads that took place in the Belgian town of Schengen in 1985: this meeting was held to discuss measures to unify European markets, especially ones aimed at removing internal border restrictions. Here, the five founding countries, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, deemed it appropriate to initiate compensatory measures for the disappearance of national border controls, and invented the 'common European border' (cf. Tomei, V. 1997; Walters 2002; Anderson, M. 2000). However, this outward redeployment of controls is only one element of the policy initiated for the restructuring of border controls. Schengen also brought an extension of internal border zones. An increasing number of internal spaces such as train
stations or motorways were redefined as 'border areas” (Lahav, G. / Guiraudon, V. 2000).

Besides the compensatory logic of the project of internal markets, security considerations also shaped the Europeanisation of migration policy from the outset. Thus, the first EU–wide bodies such as the TREVI group—an informal and highly secretive round of meetings between police chiefs and senior officials from the interior ministries—began to formulate a European migration policy in the 80s that was closely linked to policies on terrorism and organised crime. This security matrix also represents a leading dispositiv for the Schengen process, one that is amenable to simple and speedy popularisation. It is particularly useful for a recoding of migration in terms of organised criminality; whereby the anti-trafficking discourse can be seen as exemplary, dividing as it does the movement of migration into evil traffickers and smugglers one the one hand, and their poor victims one the other (Doezema, J. 2000).
Map 2 of the MigMap, the discourse map, depicts the migration regime as the knowledge regime of such recodifications that facilitate the integration, coordination, and provisional finalisation between the multiple forces of the various actors. This is where the most important discourses for recoding the axioms of migration policies can be found, discourses that provide the arguments used in favour of particular policies: human rights, security, asylum law, trafficking, war on terrorism, displace or submerge one another like meteorological turbulences.

The 11th September delivered a new impetus to the security dispositif by linking explicitly questions of migration control to the military complex. The new EU security and military policy also gained a clear migration policy
component. Here, the Kosovo war, or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, illustrate how, on the one hand, an anti-migration policy can also fall back on military intervention as an instrument. On the other hand, they also show how the new warriors now have their own refugee-protection troops and that migration containment has become part of military strategy. For many, the camp policy implemented during the war in Kosovo represented a blueprint for the forced deterritorialisation and regionalisation of migration policy in recent years (cf. Dietrich/Glöde 2000).

However, it was only with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 that the then multilateral Schengen Agreement became part of official EU policy (cf. Leuthardt 1999); whereby ‘Schengen-land’ with its ‘Schengen visa’ still represented a separate legal sphere: Great Britain and Ireland were not a part, while non-EU countries such as Norway, Island and Switzerland were. Broadly speaking, the Schengen Agreement contains three main features: shifting entry control to the outer borders, bringing entry regulations and asylum policy into line with one other, and putting in place measures directed against illegal immigration and transborder organised crime. (Fungueirino-Lorenzo, R. 2002, Niessen, J. 2002)

In this context, at least five EU institutions have emerged so far: Europol as a European police force; the Schengen Information System (SIS) for European-wide data comparison; the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossings of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI), which organises an early warning system for global migration movements; and the External Borders Practitioners Common Unit, which has since been attached to the border police agency known as FRONTEX. After concrete operational collaboration proved difficult, the last two bodies are now supposed to improve cooperation and information exchange between the national agencies involved, as well as supporting them in efforts to implement the EU measures (faster and better) through training programs and common projects. To provide financing, a program by the name of ARGO was initiated, an ‘action program for
administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum and immigration'.

Even if the new migration and border control system does constitute an advance for national administrations and executive bodies in informational and networking capabilities, nevertheless the image of a repressive IT apparatus is far from reality, at least for the moment (Koslowsky 2002). The ever recurring appeals contained in Commission texts indicate that, despite the various information systems and centers, information sharing and operational cooperation still remain deficient—not least on account of incompatibilities between national states. Thus a Commission study on illegal migration from 2004 comes to the conclusion that a lack of reliable and compatible data actually renders a common political strategy impossible (Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament: 'Study on the links between legal and illegal migration' 04.06.2004). At a Council meeting in Brussels in 2004, it was also necessary for the heads of government to admit that the aims of communitisation, as agreed at Tampere, had not been met; for instance, the decision to transfer complete responsibility for migration policy from individual states to the commission. The year 2010 has been set as the new deadline.

In the light of such unwieldiness in communitisation and the top-down model generally, it tends to be measures agreed at the inter-governmental level that have forced the pace of the Europeanisation of migration policy. These include measures implemented at EU level on German insistence, such as the 'first safe country' regulation, and the designation of safe countries of origins for refugees (since 1993); tightened visa regulations—the carrier sanctions—whereby airports and airlines have to take on the role of border police; or the invention of so-called 'Readmission Agreements' (Angenendt/Kruse 2003).

Nevertheless, the Schengen Agreement can be considered an extremely productive element of the Europeanisation of migration policy: its inclusion in the Treaty of Amsterdam means that it is part of the acquis communautaire that
accession candidates to the European Union must fulfil. It makes the adoption of the so-called Schengen acquis mandatory and links it to other political areas and financial programmes, meaning that failure to comply may lead to wide-ranging consequences for the candidate states. (Cholewinski, R. 2000, Lahav, G. 1998) The policy of deterritorialisation, however, extends well beyond the circle of EU accession state candidates. Thus, measures such as equipment aid and the provision of control know-how are not just limited to the circle of EU accession states, but form part of the EU regional treaties such as the stability pact for the Balkan states, the MEDA programme for the Mediterranean area or the Phare programme for the states of central/eastern Europe. The last mentioned case refers to an EU program with a budget of millions for 'technical and infrastructural cooperation' (cf. MEDA http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/).

In addition to measures in place at the supranational level, especially the core element, Schengen acquis bilateral agreements, too, have facilitated the extension of EU migration policy, with Germany playing a leading role, especially in relation to the states of eastern Europe. As well as 'advice', these agreements involve technical, administrative and training assistance for the expansion of border security; exchange of information; and the provision of IOLs (immigration liaison officers), who may also be operationally active locally (Holzberger 2003). At EU level, Germany, along with Finland, has the reputation of having the 'best application processing system' in its immigrant and asylum policy. Germany must no longer take part in the so-called 'alignment processes' to ensure its institutional practices are adopted. So, after consultations with the external office of the European Commission Directorate-General for Enlargement, Turkey was strongly advised to establish its migration institutions on the model of the 'Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees' as well as on the 'Federal Border Control'. Similarly, Mediterranean EU states such as Spain and Italy have confirmed the 'model character' of Greek border control policy (Baldwin-Edwards 2004).
Within current discussions, the concept of regime of migration control is becoming increasingly important as a means of expressing the loss of national sovereignty (as described in the first Section of this Dissertation). Where one often used to speak of migration systems, the term regime allows the inclusion of many different actors whose practices, while related, are not organised in terms of a central logic, but are multiply over-determined. To us, this appears important because when the concept of a system is applied to migration, it is above all control over the practices of migration that becomes the main focus, whether implicitly or explicitly. The concept of the regime allows the relation between the actions of migrants and those of agents of control to be thought beyond a simple subject-object relation.

The focus of regime analysis lies on the 'third space': the new plane of negotiation lying between and across the segments of interwoven political and economic transnational processes, processes that are no longer simply inter-governmental, but emerge with the installation of a regime. Of course, migration theorists are not the first to have recognised the advantages of the regime concept. Since the establishment of regime theory in international relations at the start of the 1980s, the concept has been taken up and applied to other theoretical and empirical questions by regulation theory authors such as (Lipietz 1985, Jenson 1997) or the Bourdieu school (Boltanski & Chiapello 2003). The issue here is how to encapsulate relations that are, by their very nature, extremely unstable, but that cannot be assumed to be exogenous: regulated or safeguarded by the state, for example. The 'regularisation' of social relations is rather to be conceived as emerging from social conflicts that, again and again, result in innovation (or overthrow) of institutional compromises.

The regime of the liminal institutions of porocracy has emerged through a
protracted regularisation process of the *Europeanisation of migration policy*. This is composed of two dimensions: one, a transformation in the mode of the political—from government to governance. This new 'intra-EU transnationalism' (Rogers, 2001) of migration policy—as Europeanisation is normally understood in the realm of public debate and within European studies—marks one central aspect: the implementation of migration governance as the normative matrix of the liminal institutions of porocracy. The second dimension involves a change in the regulatory fields of migration policy as, for example, measures to combat irregular transnational migration become deterritorialised. In this chapter, I will be discussing both these aspects in greater detail.

*Observing and acting*

In his understanding of the migration and border regime, Sciortino emphasises the flexible adaptation of *observation and action* to the specific modalities of clandestinised border-crossing mobility. According to Sciortino, the object of migration regimes is not so much the operative combating of transit as the establishment of anticipative strategies aimed at the flexible, unstable, temporary tactics of the border-crossings. Because it is precisely the security measures of the Schengen border space that generate the temporary mobility tactics necessary to overcome them: new transit solutions that are abandoned as soon as they have been discovered by the border guardians and recodified as problems of border security.

'It is rather a mix of implicit conceptual frameworks, generations of turf wars among bureaucracies, and wave after wave of 'quick fixes' applied to emergencies, triggered by changing political constellations of actors. The notion of a migration regime allows room for gaps, ambiguities and outright strains: the life of a regime is a result of continuous repair work
through practices. Finally, the idea of a 'migration regime' helps to stress the interdependence of observation and action. Migration regimes are rooted both in ways of observing and acting. The overall structure of the migration will determine how flows—regardless of their 'true' nature—will be observed and acted upon. Similar flows will be observed very differently within different regimes. Differential treatments will feed back in different ways of observing.' (Sciortino 2004, p. 32)

With the concept of the liminal institutions, I wish to concentrate the focus of my analysis on these institutionalised aggregates of observing and acting within the migration and border regime, whose productivity consists in transforming circulation along the border zones into circulation zones of graded sovereignty, to be governed as such. While national sovereignty strives towards a double homogenisation of a space—as a 'serial homogeneity' within a territory and the homogenisation of the laws therein—the space of the liminal institutions of porocracy can be understood as a regime of difference, where the mobility of the clandestine mobility streams and networks permanently forges a contingent 'border zone' out of territorial difference and the uniqueness of border places and routes. Transitory border areas are secured by surveillance and control procedures whose aim is to territorially fix the fragmentation of the Schengen space through the creation of separate zones, each distinguished by specific spatial practices of social cohesion—a 'differential homogeneity' accompanied by a correlative de-homogenisation of rights. The close linkage between Europol and numerous ad-hoc EU committees and informal (even paramilitary) international contact meetings—such as the SCSI think-tank founded on the initiative of Nato—clearly demonstrates how the liminal institutions of refugee and migration policy develop where parliamentary oversight is difficult. This logic of policing and the politics of military containment at the Schengen external borders emerged even more clearly during the war in Kosovo in south-
east Europe: the use of the Italian navy against refugee ships in the Adriatic since 1977, the creation of Macedonian and Albanian refugee camps in locations in the immediate vicinity of the border (i.e. the war zone) during the Nato bombardment. But the illegal mass deportations on Lampedusa and the use of weapons in Ceuta by the Guardia Civil (a unit with an explicit military status) also carry the double feature of the liminal institutions: firstly, as institutions of the transit spaces on and around the European borders, and, secondly, as constantly changing institutions themselves. In the following sections I will present the most important functional elements of the liminal institutions of porocracy: I. Governance as their normative matrix; II. Digitalised Deportability as knowledge and network based management of flows, III. Externalisation, and IV. Surveillance and deceleration: I will leave an explicit discussion of this final aspect until the following chapter, Chapter Nine.

I. The normative matrix of the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy: 'governance of migration'

It is unavoidable that European studies, and the numerous theoretical approaches that have emerged from this area, should provide the context for research on migration, in and about Europe. The approaches do correspond, at least in part, to political developments at European level—since the Treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht, the so-called realistic approaches have given way to theories that recognise the European Union as a new type of entity; one that is neither a new 'super-state' nor merely an inter-governmental agreement. (cf. Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996) Beyond these negative definitions, European studies oscillates between, on the one side, approaches centred on the nation state with a 'realistic' tendency to ascribe particular interests to the individual states who subsequently realise them at the European level. On the other side, we have multi-level approaches that place the supranational institutions in the
foreground and conceptualise the network as the matrix of a new form of governing.

Since the 1990s we can observe attempts to close the gap between supranational and realistic theories with, amongst others, approaches from regime theory (cf. Bieling/Steinhilber 2000). Especially in the context of migration studies, we often see the communitisation or the Europeanisation of migration policy being taken at face value. The metaphor of 'fortress Europe' and the continual emergence of new instruments of migration control at the European level tend to foster the idea that either a unified EU policy exists, or it is particular countries that hegemonise their migration policy.

Both in the public debate and in scientific European studies, Europeanisation of migration policy tends to be understood as 'harmonisation', i.e. the politically driven matching-up of the migration policies of the individual EU nation states. Pursuit of national policies at multinational level is seen as a zero-sum game: more EU means less regulation at the national level. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande criticise the functionalist paradigm and offer the concept of collateral effect regimes or regimes of transformation. Under collateral effect or transformation regimes, the authors understand that while the Europeanisation process—the 'process of creating of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' as it says in the Treaty on European Union—was intended, what was not intended was the institutional and material consequences. For these authors, what is important is that individual steps towards integration are not the consequence of some master plan, i.e. the aim has been left deliberately open: Europeanisation 'happens' more-or-less as the result of 'institutional improvisation'. (Beck/Grande 2004, p. 62). The strength of this approach lies in its ability to conceptualise the levels of expansive transnationalisation in the policy fields without falling victim to the common analyses of the neo-realistic, inter-governmental, or federative schools that see in the Europeanisation process a zero-sum game. The concept of 'collateral effects', on the contrary, implies a 'positive-sum game'; the expansion process
of transnational sovereignty is *more*: it produces more unintended effects on and for all political levels than the concept of a 'relinquishment of national sovereignty' expresses. Here, the 'more' resides precisely in the ability to govern the 'collateral effects', the unintended consequences of the process. A new type of politics also evolves that implies new forms of political practice; in particular, Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande see developments such as the 'decoupling of decision making and public controversy' as constitutive for the liminal character of the institutions of porocracy. They write: 'On the one hand, this (temporal, spatial and social decoupling) relegates the actors of democratic consultation and control to preventive post-hoc; on the other hand, the so-called 'momentum' of the Europeanisation process is now politically generated and implemented in direct executive cooperation between governments and European institutions.' (ibid. p.64).

Pushed to the background before the debate on the European constitution and thus receiving scant attention from a wider public, 'The White Paper on European Governance 2001' (Commission 25.07.2001) reads like the script for this. It calls for the strategic participation of civil society, the strengthened use of 'expert knowledge', the use of 'agencies' to implement measures decentrally, and the demand for 'multi-level governance' so as to involve national, regional and local actors more closely in EU policy making. In answer to the global challenges that have arisen since the 1980s, the 'new' or 'global governance' policing approach has been developed by politicians, advisers, and political scientists; the normative order of this discourse is substantiated by the inventory of concepts such as 'crisis management', 'think tank', 'multi level system', 'network state', 'catalyst for political action'. (cf. Brand 2000, Walters 2005, Hess/Karakayali, 2007). The concept of governance is a further development of the regime debate that was conducted within international relations theory in the 1980s. In these approaches, international regimes were

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5 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/governance_eu/index_en.htm (link from 15.03.2004)
defined as 'an institutionalised form of norm and rule based behaviour in the political management of conflicts or issues of interdependence occurring within different fields'. Regimes are composed of 'principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures' (Wolf 1994: 423). A variety of political actors combine in a networked form to deal with societal processes that national states either could never, or can now no longer control (cf. Nuscheler 2000). It is also clear that, at the level of international politics (the states) the regime concept reflects the problem that there can be no external monopoly of force and thus no world state. It is around this problem precisely that the mainstream debate about 'governance of migration' revolves a debate that is fostered most notably by the actors associated with international institutions. Under the banner 'governance in place of government', the lessons learned from regime theory find, as it were, practical application and a normative content. While it is true that transnational migration was an issue for inter-governmental and transnational institutions long before the governance debate, for the institutions it has only achieved the status of a genuine global phenomenon since the 1990s. The debate on a 'General Agreement on Movements of People (GAMP)' that has been led by the staff of the IOM is a characteristic example of this development. In 1951 in the context of the Cold War, the US and Belgium initiated the 'International Migration Conference' to organise migration from Europe. The focus was on those people who had left socialist countries after 1945. The result of the conference was the 'Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)'. Since 1989 it has carried the title 'International Organisation for Migration' (IOM). (See Düvell 2001; Gosh 2000; Hess/Karakayali 2007).

The limits of Ulrich Beck’s and Edgar Grande’s approach, however, become evident where the dynamics of the unintended effects of transnational European sovereignty collide with the restrictions on mobility, or in the words of Foucault: where the 'political efficiency of sovereignty is augmented by a territorial division' (Foucault 2004, p. 32). The governance of differential
homogeneity within the Schengen space combines with the political efficiency of the vertical aggregates of border control to accelerate the European integration process through the politics of control. Thus it can be shown that the central postnational project leading the Europeanisation process, namely the creation of a common internal market with freedom of moment, is already subject to multiple limitations, and that the so-called 'inner space' is quite spatially segmented. The postponement of freedom of movement for workers from the new east-European member states until seven years after accession is only one, though very obvious, example. Corresponding to spatial segmentation is a fragmented citizenry that produces not only differing standards of mobility, but also different political, social and economic legal standards. European migration policies operate completely within a regulatory field where sovereignty is deterritorialised and, in the case of irregular migration, constituted beyond the realm of citizenship (cf. Balibar 2003).

A clear demonstration of this contradiction between postnational aims and the 'real politik' of regulation can be found in the decisions reached at Tampere, described by the EU Commission as a 'milestone in the process European integration'. The EU summit in Tampere in October 1999 was originally intended to impart new impulses to European migration policy and to the creation of a European legal area: impulses which were, in the same year, to enter the Treaty of Amsterdam as the European 'area of freedom, security and justice'. It was emphasised that, on the one hand, a future asylum policy should rest on the 'unlimited and comprehensive' application of the Geneva Convention while, on the other, a large degree of harmonisation was agreed on 'residence, education and employment rights' for 'third country nationals who are long-term residents in the EU' (EU Commission document 2000). Both of these aspirations have yet to be realised. The points which have been implemented were subject to important restrictions as they were adopted. So agreement has yet to be reached, for instance, on an EU-wide asylum system including the necessary harmonisation of differing national regulations. The
proclaimed legal harmonisation for 'third-country nationals' had also to wait a year for the enactment of the EU 'Charter of Fundamental Rights' in Nice. This charter was graced by a decisive precision of 'third-country nationals legally resident in the EU', whereby the rights of the illegally resident population of Europe disappeared from the charter. (Official Journal EC, 2000).

II. Digitalised deportability

The most common manifestation of the border in Europe is not to be found along the geographical border line of the Schengen area but rather in the records on the laptops of the border police; in the visa records of the European embassies in Moscow, Istanbul, Accra or Tripoli; in the check-points of Heathrow, Tegel, Charles de Gaul or Odysseas Elytis; in the German central register of asylum seekers (ZAST); in the online entries of the Schengen Information System, where the data on persons denied entry to the Schengen area is administered (SIS); in the Eurodac, the data system administered by the Commission, where the finger prints of asylum seekers and apprehended illegal migrants are stored. Access to mobility is often via the computer screen. In this sense, Danna Diminescou talks of 'virtual prison'. Within the LIPs, the 'flows' term denotes the affinity between the fast, flexible multi-directionality of the mobile subjectivities of migration and the knowledge and network-based technologies of their surveillance. The denaturalisation of border control, with the double function of politics at a distance and virtual data collection, develops a logic of the extraterritorial net of control, which denaturalises not only the form of surveillance but also the form of punishment by extending the risk of deportability (de Genova, 2002) within and beyond state boundaries. Using the concept of digitalised deportability, I wish to refer to this knowledge-based shift in the form that technologies of control assume within the LIP.
Knowledge- and network-based management of flows

'People Flow. Managing Migration in a New European Commonwealth' is the title of one of the countless position papers produced by think tanks close to the EU, such as the British think tank DEMOS, or the European Policy Centre (EPC) headed by Theo Veenkamp (also the head of strategy of the Dutch Ministry of the Interior) (see the exemplary EPC conference paper, 'Global Governance of Migration, Challenges for the EU', 64/CC/mr/p. 500/30.10.03). While People Flow sounds like a slogan of European anti-racist and migration oriented movements on the left, central elements of this visionary paper can be recognised in recent political recommendations on the deterritorialisation of camps made by the British government. The position papers have long-since recognised that migration is essentially uncontrollable. They not only confirm the 'subjective factor', using the vocabulary of the latest migration research, but also refer to the need for a pragmatic approach to the 'humanitarian dilemmas' produced by the binary political division between the categories of 'genuine refugees' and genuine migrants. In the process, migrants should be addressed as 'responsible partners'. Primarily, however, it is a question of understanding the dynamic of migration—in their rhetoric, the 'autonomous migration drive'. The turnaround of this neoliberal Migration Management logic lies in their call for 'a network-based regime' to supplant a 'rule-based regime' and one that utilises migration streams in a way economically beneficial for the target countries.

People Flow suggests the establishment of a network of 'European Union Mobility Service Points' in the countries south of the Mediterranean. These Service Points should serve as reception centres for asylum seekers wishing to come to Europe, in the sense of international employment agencies along the transit routes. EU officials then have the role of 'diverting' migration routes: bringing them into line with the needs of the target countries as well as those of global migration control. In addition, the authors suggest that asylum applications and granting of protection should be the responsibility of 'open'
facilities, also outside of Europe. The help obtained, so the suggestion goes, could be paid for in work services rendered by the migrants and asylum seekers, or through low-interest loans to be repaid after arrival. In general, *People Flow* formulates a globalised immigration system that has been completely relocated to the countries of origin.

However, it would be incorrect to reduce the role of the think tanks to mere ideological agents of rationalisation for the liminal institutions of porocracy. On the contrary, their network based knowledge production is based on the same knowledge based regulatory field as the purely executive-operational formations of the LIP. The apex of the Schengen apparatus also operated with the first models of deterritorialisation in relation to the creation of a European maritime external border. At an informal meeting of EU interior ministers on 14.02.2002 in Santiago de Compostella, a 'comprehensive plan to combat illegal migration and people trafficking' was discussed what was to form the basis for the resolutions of the EU summit on increased effectiveness of the European external maritime border in Seville in June 2002 (see: *Council of the European Union (2002): Presidency Conclusions at the Seville European Council, III, Paragraph 33; Council of the European Union (2002): Advances made in combating illegal immigration, 10009/JAI 141, Migr 56, Brussels 14.6. 2002*). Treaties on trade, aid and support coupled with threats of penalties and sanctions are intended to pressurise countries of origin and transit states to accept a 'common management of migration flows' and the return of their own citizens, as well as transmigrants, who are unwelcome in Europe. In 2003, at the behest of the EU Interior and Justice Ministers, the French Interior Ministry think tank, CIVIPOL, produced a feasibility study on intensification of European maritime border controls. (*Council document 11490/1/03 from. 19.09.2003*) CIVIPOL delineates three possible maritime entries to the EU: harbours (entry as stowaway); geographically favourable sea routes (so-called focal routes, such as Gibraltar, Lampedusa, and the Aegean Islands, used by migrants picked-up on the coasts of the EU); and random routes (where
traffickers land their clients on random coastal areas). CIVIPOL operates on the basis of a concept of 'virtual borders'. Accordingly, border controls are to be relocated to the origin and transit points (coasts and harbours) of illegal migration from the transit states. On the basis of the CIVIPOL feasibility study, in November 2003 the Council decided on a 'programme of measures to combat illegal immigration at the maritime borders of the EU' (Council document. 15445/03 from 28.11.2003). What this involves, among other measures, is the pre-emptive interception and inspection of suspicious ships on the high seas. Where illegal migrants are found, the intercepted ships are to be returned to the harbours of the third countries where the migrants’ transport had begun. The EU intends to create reception centres in these transit states where those picked up at sea can be held in humane conditions until they are returned to their countries of origin. However, the policy of deterritorialisation necessitates strict border regime institutions that are capable of translating the measures agreed by the Council of Interior Ministers into transborder coordination and operational plans.

Starting with the multilateral framework of the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC), this body regularly coordinates operations that build on the experiences gained by EUROPOL since 1998 in so-called High Impact Operations, operations that seek to interrupt the routes used by migrants and to apprehend traffickers—for example, the Triton action plan, whereby border and customs police from Italy, France, Spain and Greece carried out an intensive operation between the 4th and 7th March 2003 that was based on an operations plan devised by Greece. In the course of this operation, over 200 ships were inspected and 226 migrants and 6 traffickers apprehended. Initially, they were taken to EU territory. A centre for risk analysis (RAC) was established in Helsinki to regularly compile reports on individual case analyses. The RAC has an operational arm (European Intelligence Centre—EIC) that develops and helps implement surveillance and border control activities, in cooperation with EUROPOL and the Immigration Liaison
Officers (ILOs) stationed in the third states. On the basis of the 'proactive' use of the ILOs—attached to the operational arm of their Foreign Ministries and charged with gathering strategic and tactical information to be passed on to the EUROPOL via their countries of origin—the EU assesses third-countries that 'do not prove cooperative in combating illegal migration'. Among other measures, the Thessalonica summit agreed on an evaluation mechanism and the creation of more extensive sea borders control mechanisms. Thessalonica European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 19./20.06.2003, (Point 12 and 13).

The detailed planning of these action plans is carried out in the forums of the Western and the Eastern Sea Borders Centre (WSBC und ESBC) that were founded in 2003. Based in Piraeus, the ESBC specialises in the timely and proximate implementation of these plans for maritime control in the Mediterranean area as well as for the registration and assessment of situation reports from ILOS officials; of the interrogation protocols of migrants being held in the camps, as well as their helpers along the route; and of all the relevant border-crossing modalities. (Evaluation Report on EU Sea Border Control Plan, Council Doc. 14300/2/02 from 19.11.2004). The Madrid based WSBC coordinates actions in the Atlantic, the English Channel, and the North and Baltic Seas. Taken together, these Sea Borders Centres form the organisational Schengen framework for future European maritime border control, whose restructuring began with the establishment in 2005 of the 'European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU Member States' (FRONTEX). 'Frontex' is designed to provide an overall coordinating function for the whole area of external border control. The aim of the 'agencies' is to improve cooperation, exchange and the transmission of EU directives into national political practices—following up the work of CIREFI in place of a community border police that is

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unacceptable at EU level. (coordination of return operations/deportations, obtaining travel documents and formulating training programmes and guidelines.) Within the last four years this programme has become the new maxim of EU migration policy, where singular, media-driven 'humanitarian catastrophes' appear to provide the main dynamic for this new direction in migration policy. While the official decision-making structures of the European Union seem extremely cumbersome, and the community aims decided at Tampere have yet to be achieved, an ad hoc politics that uses the opportunities produced by humanitarian indignation seems, on the contrary, to be highly productive. Even allowing for the instantaneous impact of media images of catastrophe on public perception and their recoding as a victim count, the power that migration movements possess may still be clearly discerned. Because despite the immense productivity and technological/military dominance of the LIP, the focus of control lies far less on expanding internal border controls than on increasing the pressure on the transit and migrant countries of origin to implement a policy of deterritorialisation.

III. Externalisation

By 2003 the British government had already promoted the so-called 'home based' erection of Regional Protection Zones or Transit Processing Centres, where both migrants in transit and refugees deported from the EU could be held. Initially, however, this initiative of Great Britain’s was criticised by individual states (such as Germany). The EU Commission, on the other hand, promoted the slogan, 'to bring safe havens closer to the people', at the summit in Thessalonica in 2003.

Orchestrated in the summer of 2004, the wide-spread public criticism of the failed rescue attempt by the Cap Anamur of ship-wrecked migrants helped to galvanise the debate and finally ensured the breakthrough by successfully
creating a broad liberal consensus. The German interior minister, Otto Schilly, together with his Italian colleague were then able to revive the idea in the light of the increased public interest. They presented the deterritorialisation of camps as a necessary humanitarian reaction to the deadly consequences of the increased militarisation of the borders; the pair represented their initiative as resulting from indignation 'about the large numbers setting out for Europe, often in un-seaworthy boats, and thereby risking their lives' (German Federal Ministry of the Interior press release on the occasion of Schilly’s meeting with Pisanu in Lucca/Tuscany, 12th August 2004). Following their example, Austria demanded the construction of camps in the Ukraine for refugees from Chechnya. The UNHCR also entered the debate with their own externalisation concept, which really only differed to the extent that they called for the camps to be erected within the borders of the EU, on the territory of the new member states. The 'International Organisation for Migration' or IOM—an organisation that already maintains an extraterritorial camp for Australia on the small island of Nauru—also got involved in this debate. In fact, the idea of establishing camps close to countries of origin is really not such a new one, as there are already a number of such camps in existence: one financed with Italian money in Tunisia, the north Iraqi protection zone, or the camps that were established in the context of the war in Kosovo.

The southern European border and the Mediterranean were also in the focus of migration politicians and liberal public opinion in the following two years. In the summer of 2005, it was the images of hundreds of African migrants storming the high-security fences around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila in Morocco that brought migration to the forefront of international media attention. The images had barley faded when in 2006 the international cameras captured images of small, overloaded wooden boats as, day after day they landed on the Canary Islands. Since the controls on the Straits of Gibraltar were intensified following the events in Ceuta, African migration has been forced to seek ever more distant coasts that of course mean longer passages.
Again we saw the same mix: humanitarian indignation in the face of human tragedy that is drowned out by horror scenarios and the ensuing flurry of activism on the part of the EU minister. And as was the case with the events of the preceding years, the narrative of the new humanitarianism is pressed into service with demands for a halt to migration in the interests of avoiding a human catastrophe.

Going further, the logic of the new humanitarianism also includes an imperative to act—similar to a regime of exception—that allows the European strategists of the border regime to implement actions and evade laws to an extent that would not be possible during ‘peace time’. But, these events must not only serve the integration of transit countries ever further inside the African continent within the EU border regime: African transit and countries of origin sat around a table in Morocco in June 2006 together with the EU and the largest non-state actors of migration management, such as the IOM, to agree controls close to the country of origin. This hysteria is also an excellent opportunity to generate new billions for new border control projects, just as the EU Commission managed in the case of the 9,000 migrants arriving on the Canaries: in addition to one billion euro for a surveillance package, finance was also agreed for the re-equipment of drones to secure the borders. The controversial EU border control agency, Frontex that began operations in Warsaw last year can now prove its usefulness by coordinating the support of EU member states for the Spanish government. At a conference on this theme held recently in Hungary—the 14th International Border Conference, attended by over 40 states from Europe, Asia and Africa—eight EU states were already able to agree common patrols along the west African coast involving five warships and helicopters. If this common border patrol troop is a success, there is a plan to send it to other migration flash-points; so a common border patrol troop will have been created that bypasses the EU parliament, which rejected exactly such a measure three years ago. But these latest activities of the EU in the area of migration control externalisation are already anchored in the Hague.
programme, which was passed by the chief ministers in 2004 after an evaluation of the Tampere programme that had been agreed five years previously. While they had to conclude that the aims of Tampere and the communitisation of migration policy had not been achieved, they now proclaimed a new phase in asylum and immigration policy. This new EU programme also proceeds from the understanding that the 'international migration movement will continue to exist'. In order to confront this reality, a 'comprehensive' and pragmatic approach is required. First and foremost, the 'external dimension of asylum and immigration' needs to be addressed. In plain terms, this implies further moves to deterritorialise migration controls that include readmission agreements and the accelerated establishment of camps. In pilot projects, regional security zones are to be created in third countries and—in the terminology of the EU—in 'partnership' with the authorities of the countries involved and in close cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR). The case of Morocco would seem to represent just such a pilot project.

The new 'integrated migration and border management policy' contains further, positive sounding strategies for managing migration at the global level. Along with 'cooperation in partnership' with the countries of origin, 'combating the causes of asylum and migration' is to be a priority. Furthermore, migration policy is defined as a general task forming part of good governance. Development aid has long since been pressed into the service of migration management: the implementation of measures for migration control is rewarded with the granting of development funds while non-implementation is punished with their being withheld. So recently we saw Blair threatening Turkey with sanctions, meaning the withholding of credit tranches, should they not prove more diligent in their efforts to combat human trafficking and

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5 Cf. Meeting of the European Council (Brussels, 4th/5th November 2004), Conclusions of the Chairperson – 14292/04, Appendix I: The Hague Programme to strengthen the areas of freedom, security and justice in the European Union.
border-crossing. In addition, the traditional emigration countries are tempted with immigration quotas (Morice 2004). The so-called cooperation with the countries of north Africa follows the same pattern.
The Aegean transit space

The marks on the map that denote the Aegean archipelago, or the Straits of Gibraltar or Lampedusa, denote geographical points of national control; but these spaces also guarantee, through their definition as international waters, unhindered circulation of goods and freedom of movement. Greece did sign the UNO 'Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime' on 13th December 2000. However, it has yet to be ratified.

One of the most important results of the meeting of the European Council in Thessalonica on 19–20 June 2003 was the emphasis on the importance of controlling sea borders. But according to the Ministry of Merchant Marine, the protection of the Greek sea board involves a number of difficulties primarily arising from its geographical specificities. It is a usual practice that as soon as the harbour police discover unidentified ships in Greek waters they attempt to move them back into Turkish waters. Sometimes the ships heed these calls and turn about; however, it is likely that the ships make further attempts to reach Greek territory as soon as the patrol boat has sailed on. In other cases, migrants try to reach the islands on inflatable dinghies, since these cannot be detected by the security cameras. The occupants of such boats have often reacted to a threatened expulsion into Turkish waters with a risky manoeuvre: they overturn or sink their boots. At such moments the role of the harbour police is transformed into a 'rescue mission', since as soon as drowning people are found in Greek territorial waters, it is the duty of the coastguards to come to their aid. Those rescued are brought to land and handed over to the police.
Border control in the maritime sector is becoming almost impossible in most of the Greek islands. Attempts have been made to send the castaway migrants back to Turkey from the island of Lesbos using cruise ships. However, this practice caused a 'diplomatic problem' since Turkey then accused the Greek state of organising and facilitating 'illegal migration'. Lesbos and Bodrum lie 8 km apart as the crow flies. The commander of the coastguard in Izmir explained—like his Greek colleague, off the record—that the maritime border with Greece is not only practically uncontrollable for geographic reasons, but that the coastguard cannot really keep up with the speed and ingenuity of the 'transport business'.

The Turkish Aegean coast has become a transit space where the diverse dynamics of a transnational social space clash. Paradigmatic of this field is the way hotels such as the 'Hotel Almanya' are used. Like many such pensions and hotels on the Turkish Riviera, it is used by the Turkish authorities. Here, you can find not only German and Russian tourists, but also transmigrants being held by the police until their status can be determined and they are either set free, or deported. Here, migrants from Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Liberia and Sudan are held in cramped conditions. Many of them possess a wide knowledge of migration matters, such as possible further routes, or the best places to apply for asylum and how best to go about it.

There are many such improvised 'deportation camps' in schools, empty factories or police stations. They are used by local authorities as temporary prisons in the absence of a state migration and asylum policy and of appropriate infrastructure. Many things can happen in this rather dubious system. For instance, migrants are packed off to Syria irrespective of whether they came from there or not. Alternatively, this situation can mean that a flu outbreak or a purported marriage leads to release from custody. There is also a market for fakes and frauds. The merchandise consists of fraudulent accounts of escape, faked papers or torture videos. Not only is use made of the categories of EU migration policy, but it is clear that there is also a wide
knowledge of the conditions of migration: how to make another believe that you are not coming from a 'safe country' or how to satisfy the documentary requirements of the European asylum process.

'Sheep trade'— Wild sheep chase in the Aegean

In contrast to the well known tourist destinations along the Turkish Mediterranean coast, Ayvalik is a small and almost sleepy resort that lies only a few kilometres from the Greek island of Lesbos. I visited Ayvalik as one of the sites of my ethnographic project on researching border camps in the South-Eastern Balkans in 2003-04 (cf. Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe, 2007). Talking to people in Ayvalik about 'migrants' can be somewhat confusing: 'Migrants—göçmen? You want to research the stories of the exchange of Greeks and Turks in 1923? Yes, there are some people living here who were driven off Lesbos.' It was only when we ask for accounts of refugees, 'mülteciler', that we are told: 'Yes, only last week our cleaning lady told us about a ship that sailed out with 23 people on board and capsized somewhere nearby. Only three survived. The coastguard doesn’t bother to raise the sunken and stranded ships anymore because there are so many of them. I can bring you to one.'

The journey did not lead to a stranded ship but to another person who knew the 'sheep trade' from personal experience. Just a few years previously the man had helped 800 migrants board a tanker. It happened the way it always does. He got a call from Istanbul to let him know his help was needed. They actually succeeded in transporting the 800 people to the sparsely populated coast and from there to the tanker which was to take them directly to Italy. Unimaginable that 800 people could remain undiscovered on this strip of coast where the only land route to the next town is a gravel path. 'Nothing is really secret or goes unnoticed here', remarked my interview partner. A day later he got the news
that they had captured the tanker. 'That’s the risk in this business. We here on
the coast just drifted into it. It all started at the beginning of the 1990s, at first
very small and secret until now it’s a big sector'.

The transport began when an Iraqi couple moved to Ayvalik and took a
holiday home on the coast. At first they helped a few of their relatives to flee
the Gulf war. 'Then, in the middle of the 1990s the Kurds also began to show
up, until now they’re arriving from all over. In the beginning they all travelled
by public transport; then they were brought with minibuses and eventually with
three or four big buses—until the police began to notice. So now they are
moved in trucks, squashed together like sheep.' He got involved in the business
himself when two young men approached him in his hotel one day and asked
him could he help. The boat they had travelled on from Istanbul had been
seized by the police. They needed help quickly as there was a group of
migrants waiting in a forest nearby. They asked him to try and get their boat
back for them. When the men led him into the forest he was shocked and could
not believe his eyes. Because there—it was December, cold and wet—he saw
men, women and children who had been waiting for days to make the crossing.
They could not light any fires for fear of discovery. He decided to become
involved and to even buy a boat if necessary. A few days later the refugees set
out to sea but they were found and arrested a short way from Lesbos. The two
men kept their word and pretended that they had stolen his boat. Still, he had
wanted to get his money; after all he was no 'good Samaritan'. That was why he
had gone to Istanbul—the central trans-shipment point and business
headquarters—to try and get his money back, but with no luck.

The story told by another smuggler, an old fisherman, sounded similar. He
also traced the beginning of his involvement in the business to his contacts
with the Iraqi couple. What started out as a favour lead to more and more
people asking him for 'help', until eventually he was arrested three years ago. It
was only during his two and a half years in prison in Greece that he realised
that the 'sheep trade' had become big business on the coast, he told us with a
smile. Much like the hotel owner, he wanted to help the 'poor migrants' but was quite happy to make a bit of money on the side. 'As long as there is war and destruction in the world, people will take flight—that’s the way it is. If people can only choose between death and hunger, they'll try and escape, even if it’s dangerous … and so I help them.' When I told him about the former East German border and the discourse on an impenetrable border control in Germany he laughed: 'I tell you people will always try and escape and others will always help them.' The situation has become more difficult because the checks have increased. The 'sheep trade' continues, however, and the only problem is that there is always another police unit waiting around the corner that has not been bribed yet.

A professional smuggler in Greece told me of his experiences with the practice of border crossings: 'The payment only comes at the end of the deal.' That’s the security that the customers or their relatives have. The deal is always a verbal one. The captain is 'trustworthy' because he suffers recurrent financial problems and needs the money. When the captain has been contacted and the agreement made then the date is set, the 'heads' are counted, and finally the price and method of payment is determined. The price varies according to the number of 'heads' and the type of journey. The captain can earn up to €15,000 per 'transport'. 'Sometimes, during the summer, we are finished in five minutes.' (see Panagiotidis/Tsianos, 2007).

Excessive movements

The social relations in the immediate vicinity of the border zone are closely tied to the current developments in the metropolitan areas of West Turkey, as my chance encounter with Mike in Bodrum shows. Mike lived for a number of years as a transmigrant in Istanbul and then made his way along the coast with a small photo in his hand looking for a friend of whom he had lost track after a
failed attempt to cross the border. 'Any other questions?' asked Mike somewhat reservedly during a second meeting in Istanbul. Years ago he had gone to Lebanon with his friend as a basketball player. They had managed to find a job there, a temporary work permit was not a problem. However, after years of civil-war Lebanon was a chaotic and difficult country. Both of them set out for Europe with forged passports and €1,500 in their pockets. They then arrived in Turkey via Syria. From there they made three attempts to continue their journey: with a visa and a scheduled flight to Poland, to Croatia, and by ship to Greece. Every attempt failed—there was not much money left. It is very difficult to save money in Istanbul. Mike complained that they only rarely found work, had to pay exorbitant rents and frequently change their accommodation. The areas where they lived were particularly prone to raids. He often spent days and months in prison. He still finds ways and means to get out of prison, and not only because the deportation flights to Africa are expensive and the state infrastructure underdeveloped in this area. He could not remember, he told us with a laugh, under how many names he had been arrested.

Luis, too, was released from custody some time ago. He travelled with an official student visa but was soon unable to pay the student fees which meant his visa was no longer extended. Like many holders of forged passports, not having the option of buying a flight ticket, he set out for the Aegean coast, but the minibus from Istanbul was intercepted and the group was imprisoned in an empty school. Again, he had to decide in which category of the official migration and mobility policy to place himself: Should he stay in Istanbul and eke out a meagre existence, or return to Ghana and from there apply for a new visa or, even better, asylum—this time in Germany? Or perhaps attempt to reach Germany via illegal routes? But as he said, actually, Greece would really be enough. Greece is in fact the first Schengen point of entry in this region, where the hubs of the migration routes are being linked under new conditions.
Resa, a migrant from Bangladesh, was involved in organising a transport from Lesbos to Italy. In the summer of 2004 he was detained in the main city of Lesbos, Mitilini, on suspicion of 'trafficking'. He used a dwelling on Mitilini to quarter the migrants whom he recruited in the camp in Pagani. He flew to the island after he was contacted by phone by a Palestinian living in the camp in Pagani. He informed the transmigrants in the camp that the 'transport' to Italy, including the initial accommodation in Mitilini and Athens, would cost €500. About 750 people were stuck in the camp in Pagani—guarded by eight policemen. A clothes donation organised by the local refugee support group on Mitilini offered a chance to visit the refugees. As soon as Resa caught sight of the camp, the prefecture official driving the truck with the clothing and medicines exclaimed with genuine enthusiasm: 'It’s great here, just like in prison.' Most of those detained knew that they would have to stay in the camp for three months and then go to Athens. They asked for telephone cards and telephone numbers of NGOs in Athens. When asked if they needed anything, it was a surprise to hear Minu's certainty: 'Yes, an English grammar book. … We want to go to Canada, you know!' (see Panagiotidis/Tsianos, 2007)

Apo was another inmate of this camp which was built as a so-called 'reception centre'. He told us that he was a 'guest worker' who had lived with his relatives in Stuttgart since the beginning of the 1980s. In the 1990s he had gone back to the Turkish mountains to fight with the PKK. When the PKK called a cease-fire he had withdrawn to Iraq. He had already spent some months trying to return to Germany, eventually managing to reach the Aegean island of Lesbos from the Turkish coast. He could not return directly to Germany since—according to the stipulations of the German Aliens Act—his legal residency was no longer valid due to his long absence. So although he had lived in Germany for 25 years, Apo would be illegal in Germany. Now he was trying to contact his relatives in Germany so they could get him out of the camp and back to Germany some way or another. Although he would qualify as a political refugee, he did not want to apply for asylum on Lesbos. He felt
the procedure was too uncertain and took too much time. The acceptance quota in 2004 was 0.6% and waiting periods of up to two years are not uncommon. If Apo applied for asylum in Greece, he would also have to be registered in Laurio—a camp for victims of political persecution, especially from Turkey, erected about 10 years ago South of Athens. If he were to be registered in Greece as a refugee, however, his first arrival data would be registered in the Schengen Information System (SIS). According to the Dublin Convention for Asylum and Visa issues which regulates first country provisions, this would rule out travelling on to Germany since he would have to reckon with his being sent back to Greece in case of arrest. However, since Apo wishes to live in Germany, he accepts the risks entailed in crossing borders illegally. He is counting on being able to leave Greece illegally with the help of his family networks. He also does not wish to apply for asylum in Germany. As an asylum-seeker he would automatically be sent to an asylum-seekers’ hostel, where he could neither work nor, due to the strictures of the residency regulations, live near his family.

On Crete, we find a repeat of this scenario in the pompous 'Hotel Royal', directly opposite the rather oppressive US military base. A few years ago one would have found high-ranking Nato generals in residence here; today the hotel is host to 140 migrants. The same decor as in the camp in Lesbos: bored, card-playing naval officers drinking frappe with two migrants. The spokesperson for the detainees, who was a teacher in Egypt, tells us that half of the detained migrants are Palestinians who have applied for asylum, while the other half do not wish to make an application. Actually, they are only in Greece by mistake. They really want to go to Italy. Their only demand was to help them free 'their brother', who had been identified during an interrogation as a 'trafficker', only because 'they needed someone to blame'. According to a naval officer in front of the hotel, the four 'traffickers' had actually not been apprehended yet. 'The migrants know exactly what they want', said the Amnesty International activist from Hamburg responsible for the case, who
showed little surprise. 'The Palestinians, or those who apply for asylum as such, don’t come from Egypt. For those who do come from Egypt and wish to go to Italy, however, it is better not to make an application for asylum, since, after their certain repatriation, they would end up in prison in Egypt as traitors. But this would mean not being able to make another attempt at immigration. And they always want to try again!' When viewed from a theoretical perspective of repression, the camps would appear to provide the ultimate proof for the efficacy and the misery of 'Fortress Europe'; however, the stories told by Mike, Resa, Minu and Apo provide exemplary evidence of the porosity and failure of this self-proclaimed panoptical and omnipotent 'fortress'. The counterpart to the discourse of Fortress Europe is smuggling. Security needs fear, repression needs risk, policing needs criminals, smugglers and illegal migrants alike. The figure of the 'trafficker' or smuggler is like a blind spot in the current analysis of migratory networks—rarely researched and the most criminalized. The mafia-like veil covering the transport networks is criticised in the few existing studies only as a factor of transmigrants' exploitation (e.g. Icduygu & Toktas, 2002; Sciortino, 2004). This argument is mainly used in order to prove the necessity of a better protection of borders and a stricter policing of migration, and to devalue migrants' agency (for a thorough critique of this understanding of trafficking see Andrijasevic, 2004).

But something else is happening in the turbulent Aegean transit space. Something imperceptible. Mike's, Resa's, Minu's and Apo's active embeddedness within criminal networks of cross-border mobility as well as their perseverance and the multi-directional flexibility with which they manage their biographies prompt an alternative understanding of both the impermeability of borders as well as the function of trafficking. From the standpoint of migration both, borders and trafficking, are part of the same structure of oppression. Migrants deal with this by incorporating borders and trafficking as necessary factors of their movements (Andrijasevic, 2003). They
do not oppose them, they undo them by moving to the next city, the next country, the next continent. Migrants undo them by incorporating them into their imperceptible excessive movements. In what follows I want to exemplify this in regard to the function of camps. When viewed through Mike's, Resa's, Minu's and Apo's eyes camps are tolerated transit stations, although these spaces seem to oppose the very core of migration: excessive mobility. Camps are heterotopias, in Foucault's (2005) words, that is spaces outside of all spaces, although they exist in reality. What makes the imperceptible politics of migration so powerful is that it incorporates, digests, and absorbs these spaces through the excessive movements of mobility.

Transit camps

The Europeanisation of migration policy and the installation of the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy clearly illustrates current tendencies in the transformation of sovereignty since (as discussed previously in Section I and in the previous chapters on the regime of migration control) the process plays a crucial role in the transnational reorganisation of European space and of European integration. This process of the Europeanisation of migration policy not only attempts to erect a rigid executive segment for policing migration but it also constructs a space for a new form of regulation of migration. While statist–legalist thinking understands undocumented and illegal migration as a criminal crossing of borders, it is, in terms of its local realities across Europe, a complex field amenable to management and control.

Apo, Reza and all the other transmigrants caught at the borders are confined to the camps on the islands until their nationality has been accurately determined. Because of pressure from the EU, a treaty of repatriation between Greece and Turkey was established in 2001 replacing the previous, ineffective bilateral repatriation agreements. However, this treaty is practically redundant
due, at least in part, to the established human rights regime. Threats of penalties and sanctions are meant to force countries of origin and transit states like Greece to accept a 'common management of migration flows' and the return of their citizens or transmigrants who are unwelcome in Europe. However, the application of the treaty diverges radically from the Schengen deterrence scenario when it gets translated into the actual practice of the border institution.

Those actors involved on the ground include not only the migrants and the militarised border patrols but also the intervening negotiation space where the different NGOs strive to implement European asylum law. In Greece, repatriations are illegal in the sense that 'just in time' sanctions against illegal border crossings (administrative deportation according to §50 of Statute 2910/2001 on leaving and entering Greek territory illegally) are, from a human rights perspective, secondary compared to a general presumption of a right to asylum or humanitarian assistance. The clarification of this procedure normally lasts seventy days. The treaty only works in cases where migrants can be classed as clear cut labour migrants from Turkey, and are either already registered in the SIS system for a previous illegal border crossing, or anticipatively 'out' themselves as such in order to make a renewed attempt at the border crossing from Istanbul or Ayvalik under better conditions. For migrants from Afghanistan, China and Africa, repatriation is even more difficult, since such migrants must be handed over to the bordering country of origin, insofar as it is a 'third country'.

The illegal border crossing is usually registered by the coastguard or border police and on arrest the police order an immediate administrative deportation on the grounds of illegal entry. However, the state prosecutor suspends this provisionally by not filing an individual case against the illegal migrant. This is a reaction to the fact that the police are unable to provide asylum procedures in the camps and, therefore, the illegal immigrant cannot be immediately deported because of a presumed right of asylum. As a rule, those not wishing to or
unable to apply for asylum, or those clearly identified as, for example, Iranians or Iraqis, are transported as quickly as possible to the detention camps in the Northern region of Evros and, in the worst case, 'clandestinely' sent back across the waters of the Evros river border—mostly under threat of violence. Those among the camp population not immediately deported leave the camp after three months with a document that requires them to leave the country 'voluntarily' within two weeks. Here, the subordinate clause in the 'document of release' is of interest as it states: 'in a direction of your choice'. Apo and other transmigrants may, after obtaining permission to leave the camp with their 'release permit', travel on to the mainland. The law states that whoever claims asylum, either verbally or in writing, may not be repatriated. The applicant is supposed to be interviewed within three months, but in practice this phase lasts from one to three years.

This administrative practice documents a political calculus that is an open secret: the migrant will waive his interview, remain illegal and move on. Until 1992 the responsibility for both the recognition of the right to asylum and the financing of initial reception lay primarily with UNHCR. The official policy on asylum was characterised by the political credo that Greece was only a transit stop on the way to the European heartland. The implementation of EU legal standards on asylum, mainly due to the intervention of NGOs, serves to put a brake on restrictive border controls and to a certain extent legalises the dynamics of mobility and transmigration. It could be termed a paradox that the Greek Ministry of the Interior refused to finance the construction of a large internment camp in the border triangle of Evros that was decided upon by the European Council in Thessalonica in 2003, and was to have had a capacity for 2000 inmates. According to the prefect of Evros, a mega-camp of such dimensions would transform the border area into a favoured rest-route for transnational 'migration flows'. The area would act like a magnet, upsetting the balance of control over the existing 'corridors'. It is deemed preferable to repay the sums of money allocated by the EU for the camp.
So, transit camps mark a provisional topography of stations along the various migration routes. The camps along the Aegean function less as a blockade directed against migration and more like an entrance ticket into the next journeys. While on the Turkish side, before the gates of the 'fortress', the emphasis is on immobilising migrants, the focus on the Greek side is on the opposite: institutionalising mobility. The improvised camps on the Turkish side cannot be understood simply as the results of the deterritorialisation of the cordon of camps to beyond European borders. They mark places where the directionality of a migration route towards the side of the Greek transit camps is only temporarily 'diverted'. These diversionary tactics continue within the Schengen space, on the other side in Lesbos, in London, in Amsterdam, in Berlin. In the context of Europeanisation migration policy, it is not simply that the heartland of Europe determines the general parameters and the south is then liable for local implementation. The EU countries of the Mediterranean play an active and central role in this process.

These changes of function of the camps of Southern Europe that I have described represent, at least in part, the beginnings of a productive transformation of (European) migration control. It would be a mistake to see the emerging migration and border regime in the Aegean zone as simply the product of EU migration bureaucrats or of 'Balkan corruption'. The implementation of EU migration policy across the whole South-Eastern European area, with its informal cross-border economies, is more a mode of transit regulation than of transit control; and this regulation is also changing in direction. This observation implies the necessity of rethinking both classic migration theory as well as European integration research, including of necessity the concept of the 'camp'.
Camps as regulators of migrational flows: Porosity & permeability

Lesbos lies precisely at the emblematic overlap of two maps of current critical migration policies. The 'Atlas of Globalisation' from *Le Monde Diplomatique* maps fatalities and mistreatment at the new external borders of the European Union in homocentric circles, while the 'Camp Atlas' of the *Project Migreurop* (www.migreurop.org) marks the edges of Fortress Europe with dots indicating detention centres (Figure 11).

![Camps in Europe Map](http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/carte-en.pdf)

They form an almost continuous line on the south-eastern edge of the European Union. The highest concentration of camps in Southern Europe is in the Aegean. But what exactly is a camp? The consensus on both sides of the
debate—the critical as well as the affirmative—with its talk of a fortress that Europe has erected against migration, awakens associations of a field of battle.

This association is particularly important for the ideological and political debates. Both the migrants in the camp, as well as the critics in the metropolises, rely on a human rights discourse that seems, at present, to be the only vehicle capable of articulating migrants’ interests (I develop an alternative approach to the human rights discourse on migration in the next chapter: the autonomy of migration). When I visited the camps in Lesbos, the detainees immediately referred to the scandalous and inhumane living conditions and explicitly requested that I photograph the inadequate sanitary facilities. However, an ethnographic analysis of the border space cannot afford to replicate in its research the usual imperatives of political control which are implicit in the associations of camps as battlefields or simply as humanitarian disasters. It is rather a question of producing a conceptual framework to elucidate the relation between camp and regulation as a spatalisation of social relations. The concept of the camp—the ultimate symbol of sovereign power over life itself, for Giorgio Agamben—cannot be separated from these associations. But these associations serve also as the evidence for Agamben’s approach. It is no accident that the official titles for the camps in countries such as Italy or Greece are ‘Welcome Centres’ or ‘Barracks’. In Greece in particular, the association with concentration camps cannot be avoided: thirty years ago, the military junta maintained such camps for communists and republicans.

When Agamben talks of camps and invokes the Foucauldian research perspective, camps seem to represent nothing other than repressive regimes of incarceration—even if this does an injustice to Foucault. He examines relations between sovereignty, the state of exception and the camp to explore the meaning of the camp within a changed political order. He is interested in an analysis of the political against the backdrop of its current crisis of representation, i.e. precisely the new political space that opens up when the political system of the nation state is in crisis. The definition of sovereignty as
the power 'to decide on the state of exception' has become a commonplace. The state of exception as an abstract juridical dimension, however, requires a location: for Agamben, it is the camp. Camps are areas of exception within a territory that are beyond the rule of law.

Moreover, the camp is the place where the biopolitical dimension of sovereign power becomes productive. Here, it lays hold of interned subjects. By denying them any legal or political status—as is the case in refugee or prison camps—it reduces them to their physical existence. Agamben elaborates how this temporally or geographically limited state of exception becomes the norm, describing the camp as a place from whence new forms of law emerge in response to the lawlessness pertaining therein. It is a type of catalytic converter that channels the abolition of one order into a new permanent spatial and legal order. The suspension of order transforms itself from a provisional measure into a permanent technology of governing. The state of exception that manifests itself in the different forms of extra-territoriality becomes the new regulator of the contemporary political system.

Various authors such as Ferrari Bravo (2001) or Mezzadra (2001) criticise Agamben’s concept of 'bare life' because it excludes the question of the regulation of labour power and focuses only on a legalist understanding of the function of camps. Such approaches reverse Agamben’s concept: the question now centres on the mode of articulation between deportation camp and the restructuring of the global labour market in contemporary capitalism. In his critique of Agamben, Sandro Mezzadra recasts the figure of the contemporary camp as a type of 'decompression chamber' which functions to disperse the pressure on the labour market, sectorally, locally and exterritorially.

'The detention centre is a kind of decompression chamber that diffuses tensions accumulated on the labour market. These places present the other face of capitalism’s new flexibility: they are concrete spaces of state oppression and a general metaphor of the despotic tendency to control labour’s mobility, which is a structural character of ‘historical
capitalism’ ... If, as many have argued, global capitalism gives rise to new forms of flexibility, then the continuous movement of migrants shows the subjective face of this flexibility. At the same time, migratory movements are clearly exploited by global capitalism, and detention centres are crucial to this system of exploitation. … In this perspective, the effort to control the migrant’s mobility becomes the motor of the capitalist system and the contemporary detention centre appears as one in a long line of administrative mechanisms that function to this end.’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2003, p. 19)

Although the thesis of the ‘decompression chamber’ returns to migrant mobility its 'subjective face', nevertheless it needs to be extended to include the porocratic view which I described in the previous chapter. The 'rotation principle' of the fordist 'gastarbeiter' era failed due to the uncontrollable nature of migrant mobility. Just as this failure resulted in an institutional compromise, involving the temporalised inclusion of the guest workers (see Karakayali/Tsianos, 2004), the 'failure' of the camp cordon represents a post-fordist laboratory for the institutionalisation of a new compromise within the flexible inclusion logic of an 'irregular' European migration regime. Within these legalised spaces there occurs a transformation of undocumented labour migration into autonomous migrational flows.

If one is to believe the official estimates of Europol, 500,000 undocumented migrants enter Europe annually via the South-European/Mediterranean route. This represents one fifth of the total estimate of undocumented immigration to Europe. Under such conditions, the camps of South-East Europe are omnifunctional institutions of migration policy, since they 'produce' the flexible separation of residence and labour rights, and the outsourcing of the reproduction costs of undocumented labour. In no sense are they places of totalitarian immobilisation. Their relative porosity and the temporary nature of residence gives them the function of stopover points. The camps are fields of
various forces which permeate the migration politics of the EU countries along various axes. Within them, migrants are subject to what appears initially to be a rigid system of mobility control, but which they seek to bypass where they can with microscopic 'sleights'. The camps represent less the paradigmatic incarceration milieu in the age of authoritarian neoliberalism than the spatialised attempt to temporarily control movement, i.e. to administer traffic routes; to render regulated mobility productive. Their porosity is thus an expression of an institutionalised border porosity that evolves through relations of power; relations of power where the actions of the migrants and their carriers play just as much a role as the clearly discernible population policy intentions of the EU.

Deceleration: The temporal control of mobility

As I have already mentioned, the camps that are meant to temporarily freeze migration movements form an element, not only of contemporary migration regimes, but also of the political and philosophical debate about sovereignty and nationality, as the work of Agamben testifies. My approach, which is to examine the dynamics of mobility and immobilisation, points in a different direction. Is it possible to think camps 'from below'? With the aid of Paul Virilio (1986), the catastrophic functionalism of Agamben’s position can be challenged insofar as one opposes the political disciplinary connotations of camp confinement and exclusion by using the figure of decelerated circulation of mobility. That is, viewing the camps from below reveals a constant flow of migrational mobility and camps as the spaces which most drastically attempt to regulate the speed of this circulation and to decelerate its velocity. Rather than stopping the circulation of mobility, camps reinsert a socially commensurable time in the migrants’ movements. They bring illegal and clandestine migration back into society by make it visible and compatible with a broad regime of
temporal control. Decelerated circulation means that migration is not regulated through space but through time.

The Schengen camps are less panoptical disciplinary prison institutions than, following Virilio, speed boxes. Camps as they appear in Fortress Europe, Zelimir Zilnik’s film, are markings on the map of travel; communication and information centres; rest-houses; and not infrequently small banks of undocumented mobility. Against the background of Foucault's Discipline and Punish, it would also seem important to examine the figure of decelerated circulation in the light of how it alters the relation of time, body and productivity (a relation I discussed in Chapter Four regarding Vagabonds' mobility). The centrality of temporal over spatial regulation for understanding migration today is also clear when I consider how the time regime of the camp is distinguished by the disassociation of the body from its direct economic utilisation. Previously, mobility was rendered productive by territorializing movements and inserting them into a spatial regulation of bodies. Consider for example the workhouse (as described in Chaper 4) or the situation of the first foreign worker hostels of the Gastarbeiter era, which territorialized mobility in order to create a productive workforce (von Oswald, 2002). However, with the current configuration of camps, this seems to have changed.

Camps do not attempt to make migration economically useful by making migrants productive in a spatial order, rather they make migrants productive by inserting them into a global temporal regime of labour. This regime is not based on disciplining bodies and regulating whole populations. The temporal regime of global labour follows the movements of people and invests where it finds a productive workforce in a state of flux. This allows global capital to thrive on labour and life conditions which are in a state of transition and, most importantly, are primarily unregulated and informal. With this global temporal regime of labour, the moving and changing workforce is rapidly embedded into capital’s productive structure. However, global capital also quickly abandons those recently and opportunistically embedded workforces as soon as new
possibilities for exploitation emerge elsewhere. What is significant for us, here, is that this is a temporal regime, rather than a spatial regime: the spaces where global capital invests do not exist as such previously, they constantly emerge and vanish as people move, migrate and change their lives.

How to understand migrants’ waiting, hiding, unexpected diversions, stopovers and settlements; the refusals and returns; the possibility of a fatal end to the journey? Is the deceleration of migration by way of the camps and border controls really productive for the European labour market? The camp regulates the temporalities and speeds of migration and in so doing it reintegrates the global vagabonds of the third millennium into a new temporal economy; an economy they have long since deserted on their journey. The main function of camps is to impose a regime of temporal control on the wild and uncontrollable unfolding of the imperceptible and excessive movements of the transmigrants.

Camps do not suppress migration, they attempt to make people’s escape productive by reintegrating them into a global neoliberal time management. The proliferation of camps is a response to people's escape. Exit comes first. Not power. Power follows. Changing perspective like this points towards the autonomy of migration—a thesis which I will deal with comprehensively in the next chapter—where the undocumented lives of the transmigrants succeed in imposing other uses, temporalities and turbulent geographies of mobility right there where the 'fortress' looms. Like in the halls of Ellis Island where migration biographies were hastily assembled, name and age invented, further routes planned, these new heterotopias of transnational living labour can be seen as deceleration machines, temporarily braking the speed of arrival and in the process producing new subjectivities of entry.
Porocracy

Governing dynamic migration movements means steering them into scaled time-zones so as to produce governable subjects of mobility from ungovernable streams. Time is mobility. The humanitarian dilemma of the European border regime lies in the need to institutionalise the difference between sanctioned, cross-border labour migration, on the one hand, and asylum law and juridical protection measures, on the other. This in turn generates camps as heterotopias of sovereignty where, from criminalized labour new migrational experiences and biographies emerge. Numerous studies on the US-Mexican border (De Genova, 2005) and also in the South-East European area (Andrijasevic, 2006) illustrate that the productive function of the border regime does not primarily consist of the need to stem or block migration flows. Rather, the effective governing of border porosity operates through registering movement and disciplining migrants in the camp-stations as subjects of neoliberal labour. This form of governing is what I call porocracy through the deceleration of migration flows.

At this point, I want to highlight a side-effect of the Greek legalisation acts that is often neglected and that points to a displacement of functional elements of the migration/border regime. In the course of the mass registration accompanying applications for legal residence permits, what is being gathered is information related in particular to mobility: information more related to recording transmigrants’ routes and networks than residence (Fakiolas, 2003). The drafting of controls and their restrictive premises is increasingly anticipative. They are aimed less at hindering existing immigration than using information to reduce the risks associated with a loss of control over existing cross-border transit routes and migration flows, and not least uncontrolled repatriation.

The porocratic dimension of regulation seems to be extended in the new law on 'Entry, Residence and Social Integration of Third Country Nationals in the
Hellenic Territory' (Law 3386/2005). The interviews that have been developed for this legalisation process involve not only detailed registration and reconstruction of the local points of entry. What this law really regulates is the transitory effects of the camp cordons in the Aegean zone. The legalisation only applies to those who did not receive documents in the course of past legalisation measures on account of invalid residence titles; in particular, migrants whose applications were turned down on grounds of illegal entry, as well as rejected asylum seekers, holders of 'pink cards' and those called upon to leave the country 'voluntarily' (cf. Walters, 2002).

The institution of the Greek-Albanian border is an exemplary case of this regulatory understanding of the camp. It can be delineated less by its topography than by the way it organises the relation between access to the national labour market in destination countries (in our example Greece as part of the European Union) and modes of mobility in their extraterritorial spaces (Albania). This relation is regulated in a porocratic manner, that is by attempting to control the speed and magnitude of migration in a totally flexible and liminal way. This is how I can explain the riddle of the missing camps: as is well known there are no camps to be found along the numerous border crossing routes on the Greek-Albanian border, although migrants from Albania constitute the biggest immigration group in Greece; nor were there any at the time of the mass exodus from Albania in the 1990s. The Greek-Albanian protocol from 1998 was always used for the massive deportations—a protocol that explicitly rules out asylum. Albanian migrants caught, for example, on Corfu were repatriated within one hour. This renders impossible the establishment of a human-rights regime, as is the case in the Aegean transit zone.

It is certainly the case that camps are spaces beyond law; they are recognisable as such spaces and become the target of humanitarian critique (consider the discussions about the Guantanamo Bay detention camp). However, camps are only one of the ways the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy
control migrational flows. The case of the Greek-Albanian borders shows that there are many other possibilities which go much farther in order to attempt a liminal porocracy. Here we want to emphasise again the double meaning of *liminality*. Firstly, porocratic control is undertaken by institutions which are highly flexible and impossible to control, since their function is constantly changing according to the contingencies of migration. Hence—this is the second meaning—these institutions are liminal in terms of their social visibility and of the opportunities which arise for public control of them. The barbarous raids of the Greek police at the end of the 1990s remained mostly unidentifiable because they were never institutionalised in a spatial way. They rather functioned as temporal measures which cannot and are not designed to stop or fully control migration, they rather attempt to regulate the inflows. Porocratic regulation is a highly undemocratic, repressive, violent—in a truly way postliberal—form of mobility control. It is not bare life that becomes the object of the porocratic regime of governing transnational migration, but rather the truly desubjectified naked subjectivity and labour power that is on the run from *Las Migras* of this world. It is not only the knowledge of the migrants, their bodies, and their experience of the border space that is registered in the camps; the time of their mysterious arrival is also regulated; and the time of the arrival of their fellow travellers also. Liminal porocracy is how postliberal control answers the excessive movements of contemporary migration, how it answers the autonomy of migration.
Migration as a constituent force of contemporary polity

To speak of the ‘autonomy of migration’ is to understand migration as a social and political movement in the literal sense of the word, not as a mere response to mere economic and social malaise. Consider for example the work of Jordan and Düvell (2002) on illegal migration in Europe. They emphasise that not all migrants benefit equally from global mobility—in this context they talk about the 'winners' and 'losers' of migration. While Jordan and Düvell see the establishment of any system of migration control as resulting from political struggles, they do not consider the migrants who break the control as actors themselves. When migrants become illegal they are conceived as people forced to respond to social or economic necessities not as active constructors of the realities they find themselves in and the realities they create when they move.

The autonomy of migration changes this optic: migration is autonomous, meaning that—against a long history of social control over mobility as well as a similarly oppressive scholarly thought—migration has been and continues to be a constituent power throughout the formation of modern polity. The autonomy of migration approach does not, of course, consider migration in isolation from social, cultural, and economic structures. It is the opposite; migration is understood as a creative force within these structures. This shift challenges the holy duality of the orthodoxy in migration theory: i.e. the economistic thinking of the so called new economics of migration vs. the humanitarianism of communitarian thinking and refuge studies alike. The autonomy of migration helps to overcome the liberal discourse of the new migrant as a useful and adaptable worker as well as the logic of victimization prevalent in NGO paternalistic interventionism.
The concept of the autonomy of migration is primarily a question of acquiring a different sensibility—I talked about this embodied commitment of imperceptible politics for carving a new formation of our senses in Chapter Six. From this stance, we can see how one of the crucial moments for the transformation of sovereignty involves the practices of global migrants, practices which tend to undermine the basis upon which sovereignty has hitherto functioned. Employing this sensibility, we can identify four characteristics of power. Power always follows that which it will later control. Power is primarily empty. Power becomes power because it creates by seizing on and controlling what precedes it. Power fabricates out of the subjectivities which go ahead of it forms of subjectification. This is how power controls escaping subjectivities.

Exodus from the zones of misery, as Hardt and Negri (2000) describe transnational migration, is understood as political articulation and genuine social struggle when seen from the perspective of the autonomy of migration. If I follow the plea of Negri to write the history of capitalism from the perspective of worker's mobility (see Chapter Four) I will probably draw the contours of a historiography of autonomy of migration along the uprisings of the slaves and the serfs, the flight of the vagabonds and the pirates, and the many insurgent movements proclaiming the refusal of work (Moulier Boutang, 1998; Mezzadra, 2001; Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2007b).

The concept of the autonomy of migration has broad significance for understanding the role of mobility as a constituent force in the formation of sovereignty. While I talk of autonomy of migration as a contemporary form of imperceptible politics escaping the present-day domination of postliberal power, I also see this concept as a tool for rereading the history of mobility. Mobility and exit play the role of protagonist in challenging and forcing each particular historical configuration of social and political control. Seeing the constituent power of today's migrational movements in escaping postliberal
control allows us to investigate the genesis of the present from the perspective of mobility instead of the perspective of its control.

I already discussed this perspective in *Chapter Four* on the history of the vagabonds: this is the perspective of the moving masses, or better a perspective that follows the directionality of the moving masses. Historically, the systematic control of the mobility of workforce was the reaction to masses' escape from their enslavement and indenture to the guild. The establishment of wage labour is the attempt to translate the freedom of the vagabond masses into a productive, utilisable, and exploitable workforce.

*Capitalism follows the flight of migration*

In his landmark book *De l'esclavage au salariat*, Yann Moulier Boutang shows how wage labour emerged out of the flight from indenture and slavery. Moulier Boutang explores how mobility becomes the first and primary area of control and gives birth to the system of the labour market (which is based on free wage labour). The freedom to choose and to change your employer is not a fake or ideological liberty, as classical working class Marxism suggests, but a historical compromise designed to integrate the newly released, disorganized, and wandering workforce into a new regime of productivity.

In fact, Moulier Boutang’s work suggests that from the outset wage labour is more an ordering principle of the surplus of worker's freedom than a mere mechanism of oppression. Only later and gradually with the emergence and global expansion of capitalist production does wage labour again become an oppressive constraint on workers' potential freedom (Ewald, 1986). Wage labour transforms the worker's liberty to be mobile into a fixed and stable workforce market. Later capitalism transformed the force of the freedom of mobility into competitively organized upward social mobility.
On the grounds of his genealogy of mobility, Moulier Boutang argues that there was absolutely no historical necessity to organise wage relations as free wage labour. Consider some examples: Ewald describes how widespread the system of patronage economy was in the beginning of the 19th century; Wallerstein describes the slave mines of Scotland in the 18th century; Max Weber reminds us how the workers of the following century were bound in chains; similarly, Geremek argues that modes of slavery such as the 'second serfdom' in eastern Europe in the 18th century did not represent some obsolete historical model but a widespread extreme form of labour immobilisation—see Chapters Four and Five for more discussion of these examples. Thus, wage labour could have also existed as serfdom, forced dependent labour, indenture, patronage economy, or as plantation slavery.

'The worker movement is not indifferent to slavery: after all, the abolition of the salaried worker, conceived as slavery, has figured into the statutes for some years, and has been suppressed only lately. However, Marx treats slavery as one page of the prehistory of capitalism, as a moment in the primitive accumulation of capital, before this absolute origin that he situates in 1789, or at the formation of a working class. Therefore, if we bring up, like Wallerstein or Braudel, the formation of capitalism toward the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries, we brutally reintegrate slavery into this history. [...] In other words, capitalism did not institute right away the free market in labor; it first invented the slave market, the repartition of serfs, the subordination of freedom to property. The interesting point is that at the moment when political economy begins to think of labor-value, everything begins to fall apart. Haiti, the island that produced half the sugar in the world, initiated a decolonization that lasted two centuries, got rid of the whites, and abolished the slave economy. Between 1791 and 1796, it was done: Toussaint L'Ouverture defeated Napoleon Bonaparte. The plantation economy was undoubtedly efficient; the problem was that it was unstable. If capitalism abandoned slavery as a
strategic perspective, it is because its own existence was menaced by the instability of the market that it put into place: if there had not been the Jamaican insurrection of 1833, the English Parliament would never have abolished slavery. The struggles of the slaves in the two centuries of modern slavery are worth ten times more than the struggles of the working class: they were more violent, more virulent, more destabilizing than the worker movement.' (Moulier Boutang, 2001a, pp. 228-229)

What does it mean that wage labour becomes free wage labour? How does the autonomy of migration approach understand this transformation? The difference between the slave market economy and the labour market economy does not mean the absence of middlemen or intermediaries in selling one's own labour power. The slave uprisings as well as the flight of the vagabonds rendered the coercive regulation of forced immobility ineffective and, finally, obsolete. From this point on, labour could only be regulated through contractual agreements (no longer through non-economic violence) and it became free labour, that is the freedom to choose your employer. So, the difference between the slave market economy and the labour market economy means something much more important than the absence of middlemen. It means that the possibility of changing employers becomes an indispensable feature of the capitalist market. The 'strive for freedom' is thus the fundamental element of the capitalist labour relation.

The freedom to choose you employer becomes so important for capitalist labour that it simultaneously becomes the main focus of control. The freedom to move is the main source of productivity and the main target for control. The spectre of the workhouse always hovers over free labour. The freedom, which is so central for the circulatory function of the market, needs always to be under control and surveillance. In this sense, free labour, that is self-determined, autonomous mobility, is always under the threat to being
immobilised and territorialised. The control of mobility is a social issue for capitalism, not just an issue pertaining to some atypical individuals.

According to Boutang, labour as an identifiable individual capability is a fiction. It is the wage form itself that creates the illusion that it is labour itself and not merely parts of one's own body that is sold. What is sold are not individual abilities but rather a social, collective power that is capable of setting the capital relation in motion. The wage form is the method of remuneration best suited to manage the basic insecurity inherent to the whole process of production and valorisation. This insecurity results from the possibility that workers might decline to provide capital with the most necessary ingredient for its functioning: labour power. So, from the perspective of the social conflict every 'non-contractual' freedom—that is every form of mobility which is not regulated from the system of salaries—can only be understood as the refusal of the worker to work and, even worse, to valorise capital. Thus, the worker is free to sell his/her labour power but s/he is not free to leave the position of dependent labour.

From the perspective of autonomy of migration the possibility of evacuating the position of the seller of labour power represents the essential threat under which capitalism developed. The threat has a name. Mobility. This is the reason why mobility has been such a concentrated target of state regulation and state intervention. In early capitalism, when wages only covered a small part of the reproduction of labourers and when they had the possibility to return back to subsistence production, the need to patrol and intervene in worker's mobility was crucial for the establishment of capitalism. The freedom to enter a dependent labour relation was simultaneously the freedom to leave such a relation. So, capitalism is very much organised around the conflict of mobility. In the words of Sandro Mezzadra:

'... capitalism is characterised by a structural tension between the entirety of subjective forms of practice, mobility of labour is one such practices, … and capitals endeavour to despotically control them … . This tension
gives birth to a complex dispositif of simultaneous valorisation and restraining of labour mobility. The specific forms of subjectivity which pertain to the mobility of labour are also part of this dispositif. … One could, thus, say: there is no capitalism without migration.' (Mezzadra, 2007, p. 179, my translation).

Rethinking autonomy of migration

But even if the primacy of mobility for the emergence of capitalism becomes the central focus of the concept of the autonomy of migration, this does not mean that the history of exit and mobility writes the other history of historical capitalism from below. The history of mobility is much more than a history of capitalism. Historical capitalism is just a specific historical form of the capture of mobility. For example, in Chapter Four I discussed the control of mobility in the late Middle Ages on the threshold to the proto-capitalist social organization. Whilst I agree with Moulier Boutang that the autonomy of migration is an exit from the system of plantation and slavery which gave birth to the wage labour capitalism, I also understand it as more than this.

Moulier Boutang's work usefully disarticulates the process of 'primitive accumulation' and the formation of early capitalism from the process of the proletarisation of the masses in Europe. He challenges the viewpoint which casts free wage labour as a 'natural phenomenon' or as a 'structural necessity' in the history of capitalism. Instead, he develops an autonomy of migration approach which highlights the roles of both the 'wild anomaly' of the slave uprisings and of the impossibility of governing the escaping masses in the emergence of capitalist wage labour. Nevertheless, there is an impasse resulting form the attempt to think the development of capitalism from the perspective of mobility, as Moulier Boutang and Mezzadra conceive it. This lies in the equation of subjectivity, which evolves in the practices of mobility,
with a generic potentiality of labour power to become productive. The subjectivity of escaping migration is reduced to a subjectivity of capitalist production. This productionist reading of subjectivity ends up *separating* mobility and its embodied experience (that is migration and the myriads of subjectivities which arise when people move). Moreover, migration is translated into the paramount Subjectivity of mobility which is then presented as the matrix and very form of capitalist production. The result is that the specificities of countless localised, embodied, situated experiences of migrants are elided at the expense of focusing on the single Subjectivity of the one productive Subject of capitalist production. Deleuze and Guattari describe this with Marx as follows:

'And in fact when Marx sets about defining capitalism, he begins by invoking the advent of single, unqualified and global Subjectivity, which capitalizes all of the processes of subjectification, 'all activities without distinction': 'productive activity in general,' 'the sole subjective essence of wealth…' And this single Subject now expresses itself in an Object in general, no longer in this or that qualitative state: 'Along with the abstract universality of wealth-creating activity we have now the universality of the object defined as wealth, viz. the product in general, or labor in general, but as past, materialized labor' (Marx). Circulation constitutes capital as a subjectivity commensurate with society in its entirety. But this new social subjectivity can form only to the extent that the decoded flows overspill their conjunctions and attain a level of decoding that the State apparatuses are no longer able to reclaim: *on the one hand*, the flow of labor must no longer be determined as slavery or serfdom but must become naked and free labour; and *on the other hand*, wealth must no longer be determined as money dealing, merchant's or landed wealth, but must become pure homogeneous and independent capital.' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 499-500)
If the autonomy of migration approach ends up identifying the experience of mobility as the subjectivity of capitalist production, it ultimately restores the subject of capitalist polity which it tries so hard to dismantle. Throughout this Dissertation I have employed the notion of imperceptible politics to defend and to articulate the constituent power of escaping subjectivities when they evacuate the fixed spaces of the subjects of sovereignty. More than anything else, imperceptible politics address a vacuum in the heart of contemporary sovereignty, one which arises from when the double-R axiom assigns rights and representation to a coherent, indivisible, distinguishable body. Imperceptible experiences effect the deterritorialisation of this body, they dissolve the subject of the double-R axiom. Imperceptible experiences finally become the worst nightmare of this subject whose new clothes are manufactured in the sweatshops of this earth.

The long history of the regulation and control of imperceptible experiences, the history of bodies and their mobility is not the other history of capitalism but the other history of the uncanny symbiosis between subject and sovereignty. The flight from this symbiosis is the refusal of subjectivity to be governed as subject (see also Chapter One). In today's postliberal conditions this has an important consequence for reconsidering the meaning of autonomy of migration. Postliberal sovereignty attempts to dissect the subject and to reincorporate it as a functional moment of the vertical aggregates of power. Earlier in this section (Chapters Seven and Eight) I described the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy as a form of postliberal control of mobility which tries to get rid of the rights-protected subject and population and to regulate migration as flows and passages. Postliberal aggregates are neither interested in protecting human rights nor in securing the migrants everyday social reproduction. Postliberal aggregates externalise their legal and social responsibility to the transnational communities sustaining the migrants. Migrants, in particular undocumented migrants, rely on their informal networks for maintaining their daily existence. In the gaze of postliberal sovereignty
migrants, are always in transit, even if they dwell for many years, decades in a certain country. The Liminal Institutions of Porocracy perform a double function: on the one hand, they regulate the pores of the transit postliberal space and the speed of passage of the migrational streams; on the other hand, they extrerritorialise and virtualise control, so that they bypass the implementation of human rights and social protection.

Postliberal sovereignty is nurtured by mobility. Mobility is a highly appreciated capacity. What migrants bring with them is not their labour power but their mobility. Postliberal power knows that, in fact postliberal power is a form of sovereignty which is very much organised around mobility and migrational flows. Postliberal power thrives on mobility, needs it more than anything else. Postliberalism not only recognises the importance of but also invests in mobility. The concept of the autonomy of migration which highlights the primacy of mobility finds itself in a position where postliberal power has also arrived! This is the predicament of resistance in the field of migration today. In response, throughout this chapter I will trace the formation of a new understanding of flight and exit, one which enables us to grasp how the autonomy of migration function as an imperceptible, constituent force which challenges postliberal power.

Documents

Although the arrival of Sir Alfred Mehran has been registered in many European police departments of immigration affairs, his figure remains an enigma. Sir Alfred Mehran's biography seems to be emblematic of the nomad (Mehran & Donkin, 2004). His desire was to come to Britain on a refugee passport with his original name Mehran Karimi Nasseri. In 1988 he flew from Brussels via Paris to London. In London he was refused entry into the country and sent back to Paris. But France also denied him entry and Brussels did not
accept him back. Since then he has lived in the transit area of the Terminal 1 in the Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris. When he finally got a UNHCR passport and was able to travel again and to leave the transit space, he declined to acknowledge and to sign these documents arguing that the person Mehran Karimi Nasseri does not exist any more. This person existed in 1988, today he is Sir Alfred Mehran.

This course of events is typical of nomadic life. What characterizes the nomad is not his/her passage through enclosures, borders, obstacles, doors, barriers. The nomad does not have a target, does not move and occupy a territorial space, leaves nothing behind, goes nowhere. The enigma of Sir Alfred Mehran's arrival does not result from his multiple displacements and final capture in Paris, rather it refers to the fact that this very moment of arrival lasts seventeen years. Arrival has a longue durée, it covers almost the whole life of the nomad, one is always there and always leaving, always leaving and always manifesting in the materiality of the place where one is.

You never arrive somewhere. Sir Alfred Mehran's spectacular story breaks with a classic conception of migration as a unidirectional, purposeful, and intentional process. In this version of the notion of migration—typical of Fordist societies—the migrant is the signifier of a particular conceptualization of mobility: the individualized subject laboriously calculating the cost-benefit ratio of his/her trip and then starting an itinerary with fixed points of departure and arrival. But migration is not an individual strategy, nor does it designate the option 'exit.' Rather it characterizes the continuous shifts and radical re-articulations of individual trajectories. Migration is not the evacuation of a place and the occupation of a different one, it is the making and remaking of one's own life on the scenery of the world. World-making. You cannot measure migration in changes of position or location, but in the increase in inclusiveness and the amplitude of its intensities. Even if migration starts sometimes as a form of dislocation (forced by poverty, patriarchal exploitation, war, famine), its target is not relocation but the active transformation of social
space. By being embedded in broader networks of intensive social change, migration challenges and reconstitutes the sovereign population control which functions solely through the identification and control of the individual subject's movements. Sir Alfred Mehran represents in the most radical way a non-representable migrant: the person who starts the journey is not the same at the end, the space which one inhabits is not the one intended, your new documents do not refer to who you are or who you were but to who you become in the journey. Travel becomes the law, becoming becomes the code.

Nomadism's dictum 'you never arrive somewhere' constitutes the matrix of today's migrational movements. Below, I will delineate various modes of nomadic becoming which govern migrants' embodied experiences: becoming animal, becoming women, becoming amphibious, becoming imperceptible. Finally, in the last part of this chapter, I discuss how these volatile transformations escape the ubiquitous politics of representation, rights, and visibility. This exit confronts today's configurations of postliberal political sovereignty with an imperceptible force which renders the 'walls around the world' irreversibly porous: this is the autonomy of migration.

**Animals**

The coyote is more than a canis latrans on the borderline of USA and Mexico. It designates all these commercial 'guides' who are able to cross the national borders and to organize illegal migrational movements and undocumented mobility. British sailors call the elusive helpers of stowaway passengers sharks, in the Greek-Albanian borders their name is 'korakia,' ravens. In Chinese they are called 'shetou,' snakehead, a person who is as cunning as a snake and knows how to use his/her agile head to find a way through difficult situations. 'Shetou' was also the name of the Chinese network blamed by the public anti-
trafficking discussion for the Dover tragedy, the death of fifty-eight illegal migrants in a container lorry at Dover in the beginning of this millennium.

The official anti-trafficking discourse is bound to a sovereign conception of border politic: It individualizes border crossing and presents migrants as victims of the smuggler mafia. In the sovereign public imaginary migration is an illegally organized scandal with only two players: lawbreaking migrants and criminal smugglers. But the criminalization of border crossing and the reduction of the complex and polymorphic networks which sustain migrational movements to a one act/two actors piece hides how the alleged sovereign humanitarian doctrine 'save the people' is nothing but the a violent fixation on the politics of 'save the borders' from unchecked intrusion. Migration is not a unilinear individual choice process, it is not an effect of the push and pull mechanics of supply and demand for human capital. Migration adapts differently to each particular context, changes its faces, links unexpected social actors together, absorbs and reshapes the sovereign dynamics targeting its control. Migration is arbitrary in its flows, de-individualised, and constitutive of new transnational spaces which exceed and neutralize the attempts to establish postliberal sovereign aggregates as I discussed in the beginning of this Dissertation. Migration is like big waves, they never appear precisely where they are expected, their arrival can never be predicted exactly, but they always come, they are of magnitude capable of reordering the entire given geography of a seashore, the sandbanks, the seabed, the maritime animals and plants, the rocks, the beach.

In Turkey trafficking with illegal migrants, 'koyun ticareti,' sheep trade, is more than an affair of corrupt policemen and has little in common with the phantom of a globally active 'smuggler' mafia. The coastal 'sheep trade' is a whole regime of mobility, a whole informal network in which hundreds of different actors participate, each one with different stakes, to make borders permeable. Migration makes material and psychosocial spaces porous, a Benjaminian porosity, where public and private intermingle, deviance and
norm are renegotiated, zones of exploitation and justice are rearranged, formal and informal situations are reassembled. Rendering states' apparatuses and borders porous is the tactic migrants deploy to oppose the control of desire. Becoming animal is neither only a mere metaphor for the transactions in the current regime of mobility, nor just a new academic theoretical trend; it is the cipher for the corporeal substratum of migration in times of a tenacious regime of forced illegality imposed by the Liminal Institutions of Porosity. I want to consider for example the importance of becoming for the migrants' border crossing of the Straits of Gibraltar.

_Brûleurs_

There is a rather short distance between Tangier and Tarifa. Changing continents takes less than two hours. In Tangier the harbour and the nearby streets are packed with people—people from North and West Africa, arriving in the cities of Maghreb, seeking a chance to come to the coastline and to cross the sea. Marrakesh, Beni-Mellal, Rabat, Casablanca, Quadja, transit cities. The southern frontiers of Europe: Tarifa, Sebta, frontiers reaching as far as Lampedusa, Crete, Lesbos. Both trajectories together, the European frontiers and Maghrebian transit places, mark the outlines of a living and breathing transnational space extending in many concentric cycles around the Straits of Gibraltar.

The border activist networks around Europe make maps of migration and mobility in the attempt to produce cartographic visualizations of the multiplicities of the social space migrants live and move within: routes of migration, transit and rest stations, informational channels, employment possibilities, illegal networks of trafficking, militarized spaces, places of increased electronic surveillance, detention centres, prisons, deportation centres. The _Map of migrational flows in the Estrecho de Gibraltar_ is very
different from Debord's psycho-geographic maps of Paris, which I discussed in *Chapter Two*. Instead of a fragmented experiential perception of urban space and the visualization of processes of subjectification, the *Map of the Estrecho de Gibraltar* represents spaces of pure sociability in movement (Figure 10). These asubjective maps of migrational flows seem to visualize a space which oscillates according to the power of postliberal sovereignty and yet develops in spite of it. If postliberal sovereignty hegemonizes transnational space, then the asubjective sociality of the stolen body infiltrates into transnationalism by means of a counter-hegemonic project from below.

Figure 10
Hackitectura, Map of migrational flows in the Estrecho de Gibraltar (Detail), http://mcs.hackitectura.net/tiki-browse_image.php?id=593

The *Map of the Estrecho de Gibraltar* opposes the logic of conventional maps which convey an abstract and geometric truth and simultaneously opposes a
simply subjective, existential and autopoeitic vision of the social and the political. The map conveys truth, a common and universal truth, a truth which is simultaneously abstract and situated. It is not a transcendental truth like the truth of universal human rights. This truth is defined by the common asubjective struggle to establish it (see also Chapter Six). This truth is here, it is the truth from the embodied standpoint of praxis. Nomadic motion is not about movement but about the appropriation and remaking of space. The nomad embodies the desire to link two points together, and therefore s/he always occupies the space between these two points, both the nomad's body and the space s/he occupy transform equally; co-evolution of body and space: becoming.

In 1991, Spain imposed a visa requirement for migrants from the Maghreb region. Since then migrants from Morocco, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania etc. gather in Tangier waiting for an appropriate moment to cross the Mediterranean. They are called 'Herraguas,' the burners, people prepared to burn their documents when they reach the Spanish Schengen border in order to avoid being sent to their country of origin. In the documentary film Tanger, le rêve des brûleurs (Morocco/France 2002) Leila Kilani follows the paths of Rhimo, Denis, and others and documents the de-individualized dreams and practices of all these burners (Kuster, 2006a; Kuster & Tsianos, 2005). But the strategy of dis-identification is not primarily a question of shifting identitarian ascriptions; it is a material and an embodied way of being. The strategy of dis-identification is a voluntary 'de-humanisation' in the sense that it breaks the relation between your name and your body. A body without a name is a non-human human being, an animal which runs. It is non-human because it deliberately abandons the humanist regime of rights. The UNHCR convention for asylum seekers protects the rights of refugees on arrival, but not when they are on the road. And we already know, the arrival has a long longue durée, it does not concern the moment of arrival but the whole trip, almost your whole life. This is how migration solves the enigma of arrival. As the burners say in
Leila Kilani’s film, if you want to cross the Spanish borders, it is not sufficient to burn your papers, you have to become a dog, to become an animal yourself.

'In 1950 this route has existed. Some people ... that our forefathers has ... in this route. Moving this route. We are not the first people moving on this route. We go with information. We make our journey to the desert. Among our way to the desert ... we find many things in the desert. So what I believe in this route that what ever you want to make on this route you don’t have to do it with money. Because some rogets, some bandits in the route. So that they can collect your money. You have to make the route without money. When ever you get to your last destination you call for money and the money will come for you. Millions of people die in the desert, in this movement, in this journey when they plan to go to Europe when they died. All people who made it on this route they are dogs. And people who live roget life. What to understand by roget life? Roget life means people who can live without nothing, not have money, not to have nothing in your pockets, but you have cigarettes, you smoke cigarettes, you drink water, something. You don’t bloody care. Even if they died you forget your ... you get me? You get me? You get me? People who made this route is dogs. Dogs. What I mean by dog. That is people who don’t, who – who believe that anything can happen. You understand me? I believe that anything can happen. By the god ... we get our last destination, no problem.' (Kilani, 2002, minute 28.40)

Becoming is essential to mobility. The trope of becoming animal is only one of the options migrants employ in order to claim their freedom of movement. Becoming woman, becoming child, becoming elder, becoming soil, becoming fluid, becoming animal is the migrants' answer to the control of their desire.
Consider for example the 'eternal' becomings of one interviewee—I met with him doing fieldwork for a project on transnational migration routes in a camp in Northern Greece, discussed in the previous chapter (see also Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe, 2006; Frangenberg, Cologne Kunstverein, & Projekt Migration, 2005)—a Chinese man on his way to France. He was forced to stay in Romania for some time, married and got a residence permit there, applied for an EU visa, was rejected, reapplied and got a three month work permit which brought him to Paris, after overstaying his visa for more than twelve months was caught and deported back to Romania (something which means that you are not eligible to apply for an EU visa for a period of ten years), in Romania he changed identity and gender, married again as a woman now, applied again for an EU visa, travelled to Paris, changed again identity and married in France, where he finally got a residence permit. Sometime later this person sent us an email that he or she—because the grammatical conventions of this sentence oblige us to choose a pronoun—arrived in Canada.

Becoming is the inherent impetus of migration. Migrants do not connect to each other by representing and communicating their true individual identities, nor by translating for others what they posses or what they are. Migrants do not need translation to communicate, migration does not need mediation. Migrants connect to each other through becomings, through your own gradual and careful, sometimes painful transformation of your existing bodily constitution, they realise their desire by changing their bodies, voices, accents, patois, hair, colour, height, gender, age, biographies.

But as I argued already in the chapter on imperceptible politics in the beginning of this Dissertation, becoming does not initiate a process of eternal diversifications and differences. Rather, the migrant's becoming creates the indeterminate materiality on which new connections, sociabilities, common lines of flight, informal networks, transit spaces thrive. Becoming is the way to
link the enigma of arrival and the enigma of origin into a process of dis-identification. I mean here dis-identification literally, as the way to become more than one.

Migrant's material becomings do not end in a new state of being, rather they constitute being as the point of departure on which new becomings can emerge. Being is similar to the transit spaces where migrants rest for a while, reconnect to their communities, call their relatives and friends, earn more money to pay the smugglers, collect powers, prepare their new becomings. Being is nothing more than becoming's intermediate stages. If being is a passport number, the migrant's becomings are countless. The multiplication of beings. Two, three, many passports! Dis-identification=being everyone. Because, you must be everyone in order to be everywhere. In Chapter Six I talked about Deleuze and Guattari's consideration of the cosmic formula of multiplicity: becoming imperceptible. The imperceptibility of migration does not mean that migration itself is imperceptible. On the contrary, the more migrational flows become powerful and effective by materialising the practices of becoming, the more they turn out to be the most privileged targets for registration, regulation and restriction by sovereign power. Becoming imperceptible is an immanent act of resistance because it makes it impossible to identify migration as process which consists of fixed collective subjects. Becoming imperceptible is the most precise and effective tool migrants employ to oppose the individualizing, quantifying, policing, and representational pressures of the settled Liminal Institutions of Porocracy.

*Visibility?*

What kind of political subject does imperceptibility create? How is migration woven into the emergence of the policing system of postliberal power and how does it escape it? As I said in Section I and II one of the major functional
moments which solidify control in the context of postliberal power is the double-R principle. Migration was one of the main targets of the double–R system, even if it was treated differently in different countries. In the most European countries, for example, migration was assimilated in the form of Gastarbeiter, temporary employment, which performs an inclusion of the right to work on the national level, without the extensive granting of equal political rights. Elsewhere, in countries which actively encouraged immigration, migrants were incorporated into the national social compromise (see also Chapters One and Two) by being accepted as an integral part of the national project in general. In this case migrants were granted not only full work rights but also political rights.

But despite the seemingly egalitarian treatment of migration in this second case, migrants came across the racist dispositifs prevalent in these societies. Equal rights did not mean the possession of equal symbolic capital in the politics of representation. That cultural studies and post-colonial theory (which are primarily, as I said earlier, concerned with the critique of the representational deficit) arose primarily in these countries and came later to continental Europe is the result of this particular historical experience, namely the coexistence between equal rights and racist treatment, between formal equality and de facto ethnic segmentation. Despite all these variations in the treatment of migration the main questions were about the assignment of rights and representational visibility to migrants.

This is also the case for alternative politics and the politics of difference in the 1980s and 1990s which try to address the living conditions of new and old migrants and to intervene in the given conditions of representation, renegotiate and rearticulate them under the imperative that resistance is possible. But as I already argued in Section I and II the politics of representation fabricate a form of resistance which today is not able to escape the forms of policing imposed by the current regime of migration control.
The decline of representation as an attractive politics of resistance and subversion means simultaneously the end of the strategy of visibility. Instead of visibility, I say imperceptibility. Instead of being perceptible, discernible, identifiable, current migration puts on the agenda a new form of politics and a new formation of active political subjects who refuse to become a political subject at all (rather than strive to find a different way to become or to be a political subject). Sir Alfred Mehran refused to use his original name when in 1999 he was offered a UNHCR passport which rendered him identifiable by the assimilationist logic of liberal-national administration. Many of the migrants in the border camps instead of waiting for a decision regarding their asylum status, escape the camps and dive into the informal networks of clandestine labour in the metropolises. The migrants waiting on the North shores of Africa to cross the Mediterranean in floating coffins choose to burn their documents and enter a life which *de facto* puts them outside of any politics of visibility. Meanwhile visibility, in the context of illegal migration, belongs to the inventory of technologies pertaining to the Liminal Institutions of Porocracy for policing migrational flows.

*Cunning*

Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights. This is because both visibility and rights function as differentiation markers, establishing a clear and visible link between the person and his/her origins, the body and an identity. And precisely this is not what migrants want when they are clandestine on the road, when they are moving between places, cultures, religions, homes, continents. They do it differently: the mestiza way. Anzaldúa: 'She is willing to share, to make herself vulnerable to foreign ways of seeing and thinking. She surrenders
all notions of safety, of the familiar. Deconstruct, construct. She becomes *nahual*, able to transform herself into a tree, a coyote, into another person' (Anzaldúa, 1999, p. 104). What they really want is to become everybody, to become imperceptible. They try to become like everybody else by refusing to be something, by refusing imperatives to become integrated and assimilated into the logic of border administration and cultural control. Migration is the moment where you prefer to say, I prefer not to be. And this is not something which characterizes contemporary migration alone. It is only because of the fixation on a communitarian, humanist and identity politics oriented conceptual system on the part of the social sciences (and associated public discourse) that we are prevented from seeing migration as one of the biggest laboratories for the subversion of postliberal politics today.

Even the emblematic Ellis Island cannot be considered as the melting pot out of which the new American citizen was born, but as the space where endless stories of virtual identities were invented in order to make one eligible to cross the 'golden door' into the American country (Luibhéid, 2002). The whole vision of an America welcoming everyone from abroad and as open to difference is based on an infinite series of inventions and lies. Valuable lies, nice lies, vital lies. America's history and the cunning of migration. Migration is the sister of transience, produces mixed forms, menwomen, new species. The cunning of migration breeds animals. How to register them in the clean and pedantic archives of the administration? How to respond to a sheep or a raven when it has the courage to encounter the gaze of the bureaucrat in a police department of immigration affairs and demand asylum? How to register all these liminal animals? How to record all these paperless subjects? How to codify all these continuous becomings? Impossible.

Migration's weapon of imperceptibility does not always succeed, it is a route without guarantees, it involves pain, suffering, hunger, desperation, torture, even the death of thousands of people in the sunken ships into the oceans of earth. But in this Dissertation I deliberately decided not to present migration
once again as a humanitarian scandal or as a deviation from the evolutionist human rights doctrine of western modernity. Is it a coincidence that the widespread images of migration in the media and public discourse as monstrous tragedies supply *equally* the ubiquitous humanitarian discourses as well as the xenophobic and racist politics of forced repatriation? Imperceptible politics attempt to change the perspective and to approach migration as constituent force of the current social transformation, a flight from post-liberal control which is primarily sustained by cooperation, solidarity, the usage of broad networks and resources, shared knowledge, collective anticipation (Kuster, 2006b). This is the autonomy of migration in action.

Throughout this Section, I have discussed some of the traits this flight takes today. In the emerging postliberal conditions migrants, become imperceptible enunciating their subjective lines of flight out of the current rigid and exploitative regimes of accumulation and culture. Migration is not intimidated by postliberalism's regulation of mobility nor by its sophisticated control. Migration is at home in mobility. In this chapter I have described how contemporary migration undoes the postliberal control of mobility: migration re-usurps the postliberal capture of the subject and becomes dog, animal, manwoman, everyone; migrants make use of the postliberal transnationalisation of their communities, transforming them into transnational communities of exit; instead of waiting for a better concept of citizenship, migrants practise dis-identification; migrants reunite their mobility with the experiences arising in it and overcome the perennial separation which is germane to the productionist reading of mobility.

The moving packs of migrants traversing continents create uncountable new subjectivities which are unlabelled, untamed, unidentified. People act together and make world without giving any permanent name to their alliances and conditions of existence. Without ever intending it this multiplicity of subjectivities is tantamount to univocality. It is a moment where social control is exercised from below, where social change is subjectless, where the new
elusive historical actors dwell in the world of imperceptibility and generate a persistent and insatiable surplus of sociality in motion, a new world in the heart of the old world: world 2 (Papadopoulos, 2006). World 2 does not redeem this surplus of sociality by establishing a new totalizing and messianic version of a better democratic polis, but it constitutes the imperceptible exit of the polis (A imperceptible exit against transnational governance of mobility and postliberal terror).
'What I have been able, with great difficulty, to discover, whenever the situation permitted it, in my conversations with the workers, is roughly as follows. A sub-proletarian, who 'invents' his work every day, has a precarious existence, but he does 'enjoy' a form of freedom and independence from all bosses. And in that sense he does feel himself to be free as a bird. This is why he looks down on the worker, for—as a comrade told me—he thinks: 'That bloke shuts himself up in a jail all day long, he turns himself into a slave, he agrees to obey a boss….' And when he sees a worker go off at a certain hour and return at a certain hour he reconfirms for himself that the worker’s life is one of forced labour, made all the worse by the fact that the handcuffs and chains worn by the worker were put there voluntarily. His, the sub-proletarian’s, life, on the other hand, is an independent one. And therefore he has no respect for the worker. If they meet on the street or elsewhere, they usually say nothing at all to one another. The sub-proletarian feels himself superior in intellect, inventiveness and, in general, in the art of living…. This is among the major reasons why the Neapolitan worker is so psychologically isolated. Any pride that may exist in having a steady job, a trade, is greatly diluted by the realization which is constantly present before his eyes, that he has given up ‘another way of life’, which his neighbours lead, and which is a life full of great opportunities for adventure and the exercise of imagination.
Moreover, unlike the sub-proletarian, he lives in constant fear of losing his job. Hence even his prospects are severely limited, because the worker, without the factory, is finished. His existence without his job would be that of a cripple, given that he has never learned the petty trades of the street or, rather, that he has never learned to invent a 'business' or a way of making a living. In other words, he has no resources. Or else, even if he succeeds, his very success means his complete degradation as a worker. Thus we see that this sadness of the workers has another source: it stems from their renunciation of their entire external environment, where everyone lives all the year round in the open air, in the streets, walks there, works there, carries on his interminable disputes and fights his fights there, and so on. The worker, sealed up in his factory, is like a cloistered monk who has cut himself off from the world of others and renounced that life. In doing this, he is aware above all of having renounced the air, the environment, the rules and the means of the secular life, the philosophers of which are the lazzari, as the sub-proletariat is called.


**Embodied capitalism**

In Section II I discussed the centrality of the body for the contemporary configuration of life in postliberal conditions. The regime of life control, works with emergent forms of life. In this Section I want to discuss how this transformation of life becomes embedded in the process of value creation in the contemporary regime of labour control. The articulation between life and labour will be our main focus: how the recombination of emergent bodies and
materialities—becomes both source and means of value creation today. This is the regime of embodied capitalism.

Embodied capitalism is two sided. On the one hand, it creates value by recombining and intermingling matter: humans, animals, artefacts and things. On the other hand, it recombines labourer's bodies; that is it reorganizes their materialities, abilities, social relations, their capacities to affect and relate to other bodies, their potentialities, and, finally, fractures this configuration and exploits only specific parts of their bodies. Productivity in embodied capitalism is not the outcome of the 'cooperation between brains' (as the paradigm of cognitive capitalism or knowledge based capitalism proclaims, e.g. Corsani, 2004; Gorz, 2004; Lazzarato, 2004; Moulier Boutang, 2001b) but of the cooperation between human bodies, machines, animals, and things. The Emergent Formation of Postliberalism constitutes life as a set of potentials to be worked with; embodied capitalism takes these potentials and develops a specific mode of working with them, and this is precarious labour (Tsianos & Papadopoulos 2006). Precarity, will be the focus of this chapter.

Precarious labour

The name of labour regulation in 20th century is welfare state. The welfare state's productivity resulted from transforming the vertical asymmetry of the class conflict into a horizontal arrangement of rights and resources for protection of labour. In addition to this, the welfare state's provision was extended beyond the immediate regulation of normal waged labour by protecting the life of the working individual (and his, and more seldom of her, dependents) in non-working phases (Ewald, 1986; Castel, 2003). But this regime of protection was based on the continual increase of labour productivity in the context of a nationally organised economy. The internationalisation of financial markets brought this form of labour regulation
into perennial dysfunction (Jessop, 1994). Productivity used to be driven by mass consumption, consumption which was regulated by the supply and demand of a certain national economy. The internationalisation of production and of financial markets rendered any nationally maintained order of labour relations increasingly inadequate. This was a direct attack on the fiscal grounds of the welfare systems. The escape of capital from national boundaries creates new global spaces of transnational governance, and with this shift nationally organised Fordist modes of regulating labour dissolve and sink into crisis. The neoliberal project attempted to transform socially guaranteed forms of labour protection into the individual duty of the solo enterpreneurial labourer.

If neoliberalism is the market driven institutionalisation of insecurity, its consequences are the decline of normal waged labour and the constant expansion of the zones of insecure employment relations. Precarity designates exactly this situation in the labour market. That is, precarity delineates how the multiplication of insecure and non-standardised forms of employment gradually becomes a central mode of labour in contemporary post-Fordist conditions. This trend affects not only the employment relations and living conditions of workers but also social systems as a whole; it influences social relations, people’ fears and desires and the participation on the part of people living in precarity in public discourse and civil society (Gallie & Paugam, 2003; Rodgers & Rodgers, 1989).

Contemporary research on insecure employment relations casts precarious labour as the proliferation of atypical and irregular work relations which are characterized by: (a) being contract based, part-time or short term employment; (b) being product oriented—usually in the form of subcontracted labour, project based jobs, freelance work—and being paid by the quality of the product the worker delivers; (c) being organized beyond existing structures of social welfare systems such as unemployment benefit, social security, health insurance, services for maternity leave etc; (d) an increased mobility, global or regional as well as national; (e) intensify the trans-sectorial mobility of
workers; (f) ranging from underpaid jobs (constituting the working poor) to highly paid executive jobs (elitist cognitariat); (g) and finally precarious work is non-unionized, although there have been some attempts to connect with traditional trade unions.

In the existing literature precarity is regarded as the result of a multi-layered rearrangement of the production process in post-Fordist societies, occurring mainly through deindustrialization, the feminisation of work and the rise of immaterial production. Deindustrialization means that workers who were traditionally involved in industrial and serial production processes were made redundant (Beynon, 2002; Revelli, 1999). Only a small proportion of Fordist workers subsequently re-enter similar production conditions. The turbulences of unemployment, the related destabilization of the social bond and the failure to qualify for further employment pushes workers into a system of precarious labour—usually casual work (Campbell & Burgess, 2001) or insecure labour (Heery & Salmon, 2000)—located in very different production segments or services than those in which they previously worked (Tálos, 1999). Seen from the perspective of deindustrialisation, precarious work *appears* as the result of the flexibilisation and neoliberalisation of the labour market (Katschnig-Fasch, 2003).

Secondly, there has been extensive investigation of the feminisation of work which is occurring alongside the reorganisation of employment relations. The Fordist gendered division of labour created a dichotomy of productive (production of goods) and reproductive activities (affective work, communication, caring, subjective work) with the latter being under-evaluated, primarily delegated to women and traditionally excluded from Fordist labour (Eichorn, 2004; Hochschild, 1983; Boudry, Kuster, & Lorenz, 2000; Preciado, 2003). Now, the feminisation of work occurs, in part through the incorporation of reproductive work into post-Fordist production processes. This incorporation largely occurs in the form of precarious labour. But this transformation does not mean that the patriarchal and gendered division of
labour has come to an end (Nickel, Frey, & Hüning, 2003; Skeggs, 1997; Walkerdine, Lucey, & Melody, 2001; Gill, 2002). It only means that the lines of exploitation of female labour traverse the production process in different ways: new contradictions and ambivalences arise in tandem with the shifting configurations of gender relations and heteronormativity in the current division of labour (Bridget Anderson, 2000; Hess & Lenz, 2001; Mayer-Ahuja, 2004; Mirchandani, 2003; Pieper & Gutiérrez Rodriguez, 2003).

Finally, an important debate concerning precarity emanates from the proliferation of immaterial production—immaterial labour is considered to be post-Fordism’s leading innovation in the production process (Lazzarato, 1996; Gorz, 1999; Marazzi, 1998; Bologna, 2006; Fumagalli & Lucarelli, 2006; von Osten, 2003). Immaterial labour is the production of commodities which are constituted by their cultural, emotional, creative or intellectual content. Immaterial labour can be understood as the process in which work becomes mainly subjective and communicative, demanding the whole investment of the worker's subjective and intersubjective abilities in the production of goods (Brinkmann et al., 2006; Moldaschl & Voss, 2003; O'Doherty & Willmott, 2001; Schönberger & Springer, 2003). Immaterial labour, especially in the creative industries (Ehrenstein, 2006; McRobbie, 2004; von Osten, 2006), demands that workers blend their domestic, virtual and actual work spaces (Hochschild, 1997; Huws, 2003; Lohr & Nickel, 2005). The virtualisation of workspace is made possible by technoscientific innovations, principally information networks, global media cultures and new management and organizational structures (Eaton, 1995; Henry & Massey, 1995). For some, the rise of immaterial production appears as something to be celebrated (Pink, 2001; Florida, 2004) or at least as holding promise for the future (Atzert, 2005; Dyer-Witheford, 2001; Hardt & Negri, 2000). Alternately, there is a pessimistic viewpoint which sees the developments of modern societies over the last three decades as pushing exploitation and the dissolution of social cohesion to new unexpected levels (Sennett, 1998; Boltanski & Chiapello,
Beyond a sociological reading of precarity

The concept of precarity carries its own risks. My particular concern here is with its use as a sociological category. Sociological analyses of precarity, often conducted through the figure immaterial labour, are useful to the extent that they articulate and describe the proliferation of features such as affective labour, networking, collaboration, knowledge economy etc. into what mainstream sociology calls network society (Lazzarato, 1996; Castells, 1996; Gorz, 2004). But this kind of sociological description is very different from an operative political conceptualisation of precarity which is situated in co-research and political activism (Negri, 2006; Colectivo Precarias a la Deriva, 2004). The political use of the concept of precarity entails its development through interventions into the power dynamics of labour relations in post-Fordist societies.

If the sole use of the concepts of precarity and immaterial labour is for the purpose of diagnosing our present contradictions of production, their role in conjuring up alternative modes of experiencing the present is neglected. When sociological descriptions of the present start becoming common places in public discourse and in mainstream social science they no longer inspire fear. In order to avoid just another apolitical sociological category, we need to focus on the ruptures, blockades, and the lines of flight which are immanent in the configuration of precarious labour. It is misleading to assert that precarious subjectivities are constituted by the sociological features of precarious and immaterial labour such as cooperation, creativity, linguistic exchanges, affectivity etc. Today's emergent social subjectivities cannot be described as one unified social actor with the same position in production and the same
characteristics. They do not simply mirror the proliferation of precarity and immaterial labour, nor are they produced as an outcome of shifts in labour. These subjectivities are the fluid substance through which these shifts occur, in which precarity materialises. More than this, these emergent subjectivities exceed the conditions of production entailed in precarious and immaterial labour. When subjectivity puts on the shirt of mainstream sociology its flesh is corroded and its bare bones exposed.

Precarious subjectivities are akin to diabolic cartoons which simultaneously evoke the contingent intensities of the production process and its excess. But there is nothing mystical about this excess of sociability and subjectivity; it arises in specific conditions; i.e. when there is an unbreachable gap between the conditions of work and its remuneration, a gap with which people have to live. And by investing in this incommensurable gap, people create an excess to the work they do. People mobilise social and personal investments in order to produce (e.g. social relations, networks, ideas)—some of this is entailed in the ‘final product’, but much remains outside of it. Of course, this excess can be harnessed and redirected to create new forms of capital—the next product. But equally, what has been created can enable a form of politics which is not absorbed into the regime of embodied capitalism.

Thus, the new subjectivities traversing the archipelago of embodied capitalism are not identical with the conditions of post-Fordist production. Rather, these new labour subjectivities are the experiences of the forms of exploitation which have emerged with embodied capitalism. Today's composition of living labour is the response to the risks imposed by embodied capitalism. What affords the emergence of these new subjectivities in post-Fordist societies is not the configuration of production—as for example Lazzarato (1996) or Corsani (2004) assert—but the embodied experience of shifting arrangements of exploitation. Precarity constitutes this new arrangement of exploitation of living labour in embodied capitalism.
Precarity is where the productivity of living labour meets the crisis of social systems which were based on the national social compromise of normal employment. As work—in order to become productive—becomes incorporated into non-labour time, the exploitation of the workforce happens beyond the boundaries of work, it is distributed across the whole time and space of life (Neilson & Rossiter, 2005). Precarity means exploiting the continuum of everyday life, not simply the workforce (Ehrenstein, 2006). In this sense, precarity is a form of exploitation which operates primarily on the level of time. This because it changes the meaning of what non-productivity is. The regulation of labour in Fordism was secured in an anticipative way independently of its immediate productivity. The protectionism of the welfare system operates through time management, by anticipating and securing the periods when someone becomes non-productive (through accident and illness, unemployment or age). In embodied capitalism this form of time management disappears. Not only because the future is not guaranteed, but also because the future is already appropriated in the present. From the standpoint of the labourer, work takes place in the present, which is, however, incorporated into his or her whole lifespan as a worker (Ehrenstein, 2006). And precisely this lifelong scope is destroyed in precarity: from the standpoint of capital the entire lifespan continuum of a precarious labourer is dissected into successive exploitable units of the present. Precarity is this form of exploitation which, by operating only on the present, simultaneously exploits the future.

How is this breakdown of the national compromise of normal employment and the reordering of time in precarious life conditions experienced by the individual labourer? If we understand the embodied experience of precarity we can avoid the reductionism of mainstream sociological conceptualisations of precarious labour discussed earlier. I mentioned that new social subjectivities cannot be described as a unified social actor (something similar to the working class) which mirrors the characteristics of post-Fordist productivity. Rather they are multiply constituted in the very different precarious positions and
modes of exploitation proliferating in them. Precarity is the embodied experience of the social conflicts and ambivalences of living labour in embodied capitalism.

The embodied experience of precarity is the attempt to live with incessant neoliberal imperatives to transform the self which proliferate in embodied capitalism. The embodied experience of precarity is characterised by: (a) vulnerability: the ongoing experience of flexibility without any form of protection; (b) hyperactivity: the imperative to accommodate constant availability; (c) simultaneity: the ability to handle at the same time the different tempi and velocities of multiple tasks; (d) recombination: the reorganisation of one’s own body to accommodate multilocal environments and the crossing of various networks, social spaces, and available resources; (e) fluid intimacies: the ongoing reinvention of an adaptable, versatile, polymorphic but finally unquestionable heteronormative matrix; (f) restlessness: trying to cope with and compress the overabundance of communication, cooperation and interactivity; (g) unsettledness: the continuous experience of mobility across different spaces and time lines; (h) affective exhaustion: emotional exploitation, or, emotional intelligence as an important element for the control of employability and multiple dependencies; (i) cunning: the response to the imperative to be cynical, energetic, attractive, pragmatic, trained, all in all a professional arsehole by being deceitful, persistent, opportunistic, imaginative, a trickster.
Neoliberal transformation-imperative of the self

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*Embodied experience of precarity: excess and freedom*

Thus, I consider embodied experience of precarity to be the immediate way in which people live with the aggressive imperative to transform the self in neoliberal conditions. In fact, the embodied experience of precarity is an excess emerging from the incorporation of the neoliberal postulates of transformation. Let us follow a historical analogy which I described in the Second Section of this Dissertation: the vagabond masses escape the regime of immobility embedded in the guild and by escaping they de facto annul the regime of dependent and unfree labour. The vagabonds create the conditions of the free worker, that is the worker who is able to choose where to sell his/her productive labour force. By doing this the vagabonds create the structural conditions for the emergence of the system of free waged labour which, of course, later comes to tame and control the exodus of the vagabond masses.
(There is no final solution in the history of exit.) The vagabonds force capitalism to evolve and form itself as a new system of regulating free labour. Similarly, in Section III, I described how autonomous migrational movements create the conditions in which a new post-national regime of mobility might emerge. Here, I want to argue that the embodied experience of precarity designates, on the one hand, the positive limits of the exit from the Fordist system, and on the other hand, the negative limits of neoliberal subordination.

Neoliberalism was the answer to the people's move away from the Fordist regime which solidified as a new system of regulation in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, neoliberalism was simultaneously a response to the intrinsic revolt against Fordism and a new order of domination. In these conditions precarity epitomizes the experience of the new neoliberal social order of domination and, in this sense; it creates the ground for a move which attempts to question and to exit the aging neoliberal blockade.

In the First Section of this Dissertation I called postliberalism the contemporary drift away from the neoliberal transnational project of the 1970s and 1980s. Postliberalism is the attempt to re-energise and redirect transnational neoliberal governance in a way that defends it from constituent trajectories of exit. One of the social forces which paradigmatically intercepts and interrupts the neoliberal project is the embodied experience of precarity. In the embodied experience of precarity we encounter the attempt to deal with the coercive elements imposed by neoliberal governance and at the same we encounter the seeds of exit from this system of domination. For example, in considering the phenomenology of the embodied experience of precarity, I described how the neoliberal pressure for flexibility and constant availability is experienced as an ambivalent process of vulnerability and hyperactivity. These modes of relating to the self simultaneously render the precarious worker capable of performing effectively in the regime of embodied capitalist production, inscribe the exploitative character of neoliberalism into his or her body, and create an excess of sociability. This ambivalent situatedness in the
heart of the neoliberal project and simultaneously in the drift leading outside of it marks the embodied experience of precarity as a line of flight.

The line of flight is energised by the precarious experience at the point where the negative limits of neoliberalism become decoded. The embodied experience of precarity is in the core of an open transformation taking place at the end of the neoliberal chronotope. In other words, this immanent mode of existence is ingrained in the very same move which the postliberal project mobilises in order to overcome the neoliberal blockade, and, at the same time, it experiments on the terrain of its own freedom with new ways to defend society. The excess which occurs through the embodied experience of precarity is a surplus of freedom—this is reinvested in the new system of postliberal domination but nevertheless it is also reinvested into emerging modes of escape away from the new great transformation of postliberalism.

 Inspiring fear?

What then are the potentialities for the political manifestation of the embodied experience of precarity? Who's afraid of the precarious workers? How can this surplus of freedom create possibilities for a line of flight against postliberal control? Obviously, it is difficult to imagine that there is somebody today who is afraid of precarious workers. And this has certainly nothing to do with the difficulties of comprehending the neologism precarity.

I already argued earlier in this chapter that the new social subjects of precarious labour are not identical with the conditions in which they find themselves. They create an excess of sociability and subjectivity which has a political significance (in the sense that precarious labour is a necessary element for the realisation of postliberal control). But, at the same time, this excess does not necessarily flow into the given modes of political representation (because
One way of working with the sociability and subjectivity of precarious workers is to neglect its excess. For example, it has been argued that the subjectivity of precarious workers is the effect of their position in production and—because of this—they constitute a unified social subject which can be called ‘precariat’. In this move, the subjectivity entailed in precarious work is approached as something which has been neglected—and once this neglect has been identified it invites a political response. Of course, one difficulty with this is that it casts subjectivity as identical with one’s position in the production process ends up reifying subjectivity—a problem I have discussed above. However, here my concern is with the political inadequacies of such a move. That is, if subjectivity is cast as something which exists but has been neglected, it then has to be introduced in the form of otherness. And the political logic of such an introduction is to incorporate subjectivity as otherness into the totality of political representation. Subjectivity is reduced to a part which is not yet included (Rancière, 1998; Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006). The inclusion of subjectivity into political representation revitalises democratic politics. But it does not make anyone afraid of precarious labourers. In fact, as I discussed in Chapter Five, such strategies neutralise the political excess of the precarious subjectivities and work only with elements of subjectivity which can be incorporated as a manageable part of existing political regulation.

A subject which is included as otherness is and never was a frightening subject for the given political order. It is not only that it does not frighten the given order, it is also an anxious and afraid subject. And with Spinoza, we know that when the mob is frightened, it inspires no fear (Balibar, 1994). Hence we can say that only when social subjects are unwilling to participate in the politics of inclusion can they inspire fear. But this raises a question about the possibilities which exist for organising fearsome subjects today. In the following chapter I consider the relevance of three organisational modes which
have, historically, delivered fearsome subjects for mobilising precarious workers.
Before exploring the significance of the embodied experience of precarity for the articulation of a political project of exit, I want to recall three alternative forms of fearsome action available in the social history of exodus: the party, the trade union, and micropolitical strategies. Could any of these three forms be a viable way to transform precarious workers into fearsome political actors? Can any of these forms translate the excess of the embodied experience of precarity as described in the previous chapter into an act of evacuating the evolving postliberal arrangement?

**The party form**

Historically one of the first occurrences of a frightening political subject in the long history of the organisation of the worker's subjectivity has been the revolutionary party. The main feature of this organised subjectivity is its militant character. The party transforms the workers’ subjectivity into a war machine. The materialisation of revolution has as its primary target the extinction of antagonist relations. The crucial point here is that this extinction happens not only on the level of the relations of production but also on the level of the institutions which maintain the dominance of capital over labour—primarily state apparatuses. The extinction of the antagonistic character of social relations leads to the extermination of the two particular moments which regulate liberal nation states, namely rights and representation (as discussed in Section I). This was the first and by far the most radical attempt to overcome the liberal political matrix of western nations. But the transformation continued and the organisation of worker's subjectivity, which was so efficient in
overturning the liberal matrix, was finally appropriated by the vertical organisation of the party form. The insurgent creativity of worker's subjectivity which departed from the liberal matrix, ended up in the facticity of the party's domination of society (Negri, 1999). A vampire-like domination absorbs the impulse of worker's subjectivity to disseminate it across society and then transform it to the building materials of a vertical organisation imposed from above.

The trade union form

A further frightening form of political action in the history of worker's subjectivity starts directly from the worker's immediate relation to production. It differs from the party form. The clash between capital and the party was mediated and facilitated by an attack on the institutional manifestation of capital which was primarily the capitalist state as a whole. In contrast, this fearsome subject arose directly in the spaces where class dominance was experienced, namely in the factory. The genealogy of the trade union form shows a parallel movement to the party form, one which in many historical moments was in direct contradiction to the party. The trade union form, unlike the party form, organised workers' subjectivity as a group with common interests according to its position in the system of production. If the party form engages in militant politics, the trade union form engages in politics of workers' protection, primarily in the form of syndicalism. If the party form is characterised by a historically unprecedented radicalism, the trade union form is characterised by a historically unprecedented moment of camaraderie and solidarity.

The trade union form is grounded on the principle of syndicalism, i.e. a belligerent sociability—belligerent towards the capital commando and sociable and protective towards its members. But the protectionist character of the trade
union sociability was invested in the attempt to moderate the asymmetrical relation between capital and work. This leads the traditional working class movement to restrict its interventions to the realm of the state and to become encapsulated in a purely productionist thinking. Reformism becomes the political logic of the trade union form because gradually parts of the working class saw their interests aligned with parts of the state. The trade union form of political action translated the surplus of the sociability of worker's subjectivity into institutionalised forms of state protection. Of course this institutionalisation of sociability was not equally distributed across various groups of workers. The statism of the trade union form radically changed the nature of capitalist nation state. The protection of labour becomes an inseparable moment of the modern state and gives birth to the triptych: social protectionism, institutionalised regulation, welfare state.

The micropolitical form

The last and most recent form of a fearsome social subjectivity is related to the radicalisation of the politics of everyday life. Here I encounter a departure from a political subjectivity which is primarily defined in terms of its relation to the production process. The micropolitical form returns to the immediate level of social life where experience gets under the skin and materialises, affecting selves and others. There is nothing exceptional to this functioning of the everyday. As Lefebvre (1991) says, it is the realm where all extraordinary, specialized activity has been eliminated. Micropolitics recognises that the everyday is not identical with itself, it is the source and the target of change. Feminism, civil rights movements, identity politics, urban activism, antiracism all start from the embodied experience of exclusion on the level of the everyday and they try to rearticulate this experience as difference, creatively cultivating difference and inserting it as a constitutive moment of the everyday.
When politics becomes politics of difference, the micropolitical form focuses on incorporating new social subjectivities into the established social compromise of the nation state—which was organised along whiteness, heteronormativity, waged labour, and property—by engaging in changing the dominant conditions of representation (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). The micropolitics of difference becomes the fight for representation. This political strategy finds its institutional equivalent in the concept of enlarged citizenship (Honig, 2001).

The logic of the politics of difference is that it operates on a radical externality which has yet to be inserted into society's institutionalised system of representations. By starting from spaces located outside dominant notions of citizenship, the politics of difference challenge factual forms of representation, and create the conditions for a transversal representation. Unlike the party form which targets the militant decomposition of the liberal state as a whole, and the trade union form which attempts to reduce existing asymmetries in the realm of the state, the micropolitical form positions itself on the neglected terrain of the everyday—a terrain which has been traditionally abandoned by the state—and from this very particular position attacks established modes of belonging which are regulated by state institutions. But by doing this it arrives again at the state, expanding the terrain of the state in the process (Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006). In this sense, the subjectivity connected to the event of representation is neither a departure, nor a facticity, it is an arrival.

The question for us then is: could any of these political forms become the vehicle for the transformation of the subjectivities of the precarious workers into a fearsome new social subject? The answer is no. This is because, as I will argue, these subjectivities create an excess of sociability, which cannot be accommodated by the three existing political forms without being neutralised and normalised. And the reason they cannot be accommodated is twofold. Firstly, because the embodied experience of precarity, as I described it earlier, is radically different from the experiences which historically built the ground
on which these three forms of political organisation thrived. Secondly, because the regime of control which has to be challenged by the fearsome subjectivities of precarious workers is radically different from the regimes which each of the three mentioned forms came to challenge in each particular historical time. So, why is it that neither the party nor the trade union nor the micropolitical form can render precarious subjectivities frightening?

'I don't have the time...'

Perhaps it is the first time in the history of worker's subjectivity that the expression 'I don't have the time' becomes an explicit political statement. It is an explicit political statement which designates a form of collective subjectivity which is radically different from the overregulated subjectivity in the party form. And the reason for this is that this expression does not refer to an individualised problem of personal time management. But it concentrates in an emblematic way the collective experience that time is already totally appropriated. The embodied experience of a restless movement between multiple time axes arises out of to the existential condition of precarious living labour which is organised on the continuous time of life (I discussed above how production and reproduction are intermingled, as is the case with work and non-work, work time and leisure time, the public and the private). The expression 'I don't have the time' is the paradigmatic figure for the subjective internalisation of non disposal over one's own labour power.

If precarious experience is structured by the dominance of a productive timeline which makes the expression 'I don't have the time' so obvious, then any liberation from the dominance of time over worker's subjectivities in post-Fordist production arises out of the capacity to tarry with time (Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006; Theunissen, 1991). That is, not simply going with the flow of time, but inserting various speeds into the embodied experience of
time. Tarrying with time is the moment of the reappropriation of the productive means of precarious labour (because the productive means of precarious labour is the whole living labour of each individual). In other words, it is the moment where precarious workers’ subjectivities are not constituted as devices for productivity, but breaks the immediate flow of time, becoming frightening because they escape the dominance of the linear chronocracy which organises precarious work-life. What is important for us here is that tarrying with time is purposeless in itself, it has no object, it is non organisable, it defies regulation. Tarrying with time is pure potentia, pure departure. In this sense it is the most powerful way to question the logic of precarity: it implodes the imperative to 'be creative'.

The party form is fixated on an over—determination and overregulation of time—its vertical and integral structure works with the chronicity of industrial production by trying to reorganise it. So, when people say ‘I don’t have the time to participate in politics’, we can understand this as a refusal to participate in a form of politics which is a mode of policing. This because, if liberation from production, that is if recovering from the pressure of simultaneity and restlessness, is constituted as a break with linear representations of time, then the party form of political engagement becomes obsolete in contemporary conditions. The precarious worker’s liberation from time and the party programme for liberation are unfolding along two incompatible timelines.

_Trade unionism and the vacuum of protection_

The trade union form is simply not applicable on the terrain of the embodied experience of precarity—and here I mean that it cannot fabricate a frightening social subject—simply because the constitutive needs of the precarious worker are by definition excluded from the structure of the national compromise on which the trade union form operates. This is because the crisis of social welfare
systems is nothing other than the end of a peculiar liaison between normal waged labour and state interventionism which was nurtured by the trade unions. As we already know, precarious work and the embodied experience of precarity are an exit from the system of waged labour. At the same time the new neoliberal state seized this exit in order to create a fuel the proliferation of the individuals’ entrepreneurial activity beyond state regulation. This means that the two foundational moments of the classical trade union reformism, i.e. statism of labour and interventionism of the state, are absent in the terrain of precarity.

If I want to spell out the divergences between the trade union form and the embodied experience of precarity then I need to start from the basic conditions of precarious labour. It has a trans-spatial order. If the trade union form starts from the immediate space of production and mobilises workers according to their common spatialised interests, a classical syndicalism against precarity will find as a major obstacle the trans-spatial movements of the precarious worker. I described two of the major characteristics of the embodied experience of precarity in the previous Chapter, i.e. hyperactivity and unsettledness. The embodiment of incessant movement and accountability in multiple locales destroys the possibility of the classic trade union organisation form based on a single locality.

The exodus of the subjectivity of the waged labourer into the subjectivity of the neoliberal entrepreneurial and self-managerial individual establishes a new relation between the state and living labour. Classical trade unionism is based on the articulation of a balance between parts of the working class and parts of the state. For example, consider state interventionism into protecting the rights of the male workforce and establishing a hierarchical order of labour. Female and migrant 'dirty work' (domestic labour, undocumented labour, unskilled employment, cf. Bridget Anderson, 2000) are on the lowest level of this hierarchy. Historically, the attempts of trade unions to reduce the power asymmetry between labour and capital was organised as a hierarchical order
between various kinds of labour subjectivities (Heery, 2005). By doing this, the normalisation of the subjectivities of the working class trade unionism *de facto* fractured the everyday sociability of living labour into social groups which were accorded different values.

The early neoliberal policies of the 1970s worked on this fragmentation of the social, breaking down the traditional concepts of protectionism, and systematically undermining the role of trade unions in the national compromise between labour and capital. The fruition of the neoliberal project amplified this fracture; in fact it elevated the fragmentation of living labour into a new regime of primary accumulation. The condition, which we encounter today, is that the trade union form cannot effectively protect labour and the neoliberal project no longer wants to protect it. The trade union form can ameliorate some of the problems workers face today, but they cannot effectively protect workers from the neoliberal attack against living labour.

We find ourselves in a vacuum of protection. The embodied experience of precarity very much reflects this vacuum: the almost existential condition of vulnerability felt as constant state of being in every moment of everyday life. The embodied experience of precarity calls for a new mode of protection, one which cannot be covered by classic form of trade union syndicalism. The income of the salaried worker was measured in relation to the quantification of an individual’s labour power. This measurement was guaranteed and protected by collective trade union negotiations. But this no longer holds; simply because collective bargaining cannot protect something which is immeasurable. There is no unified equivalent for the labour productivity of each individual precarious labourer. It is increasingly evident that the singular productivity of the precarious labourer is simply unquantifiable (Negri, 2003). Immaterial labour, in particular, confronts us with the impossibility of assigning an equivalent monetary value to creativity, affectivity and sociability. This leads us to say that life in precarious conditions needs a different form of protection, one which allows people to perform their everyday re-/productive activities and
at the same time guarantees an existential security when they are affected by neoliberal and postliberal forms of exploitation.

New social movements against precarity (e.g. the EuroMayDay network, www.euromayday.org) stress this necessity and demand a basic income as the unconditional protection from the precarity of living labour (Fumagalli & Lucarelli, 2006). But such efforts are likely to bypass classic trade unions, unless unions are radicalised and accommodate demands beyond the logic of waged labour. The logic of waged labour is incompatible with the demand for basic income because the latter calls for an uncoupling of wage from labour (i.e. the earning from the executed work). In this sense, there is a new form of syndicalism needed which, starting with the embodied experience of living labour, can overcome the limitations of the trade union form: biosyndicalism.

Biosyndicalism as a possible means of organising precarious subjectivities could bring various contemporary experiments with collective organisation (e.g. networks of collective actions such as Precarias a la Deriva, www.sindominio.net/karakola/precarias.htm; cf. also the precarity map, www.precarity-map.net) together with a new form of unionism. This new form of unionism operates on a transnational level (it follows the transnational flows of labour mobility), it is trans-spatial and trans-sectorial (i.e. it does not represent a particular sector or a particular locale in the cycle of production), it is non-identitarian (i.e. it questions the predominant workforce identity as male and native), and finally and most importantly, it attends to the life experience of precarity (i.e. it questions the centrality of work time in the unfolding of the worker's life). A syndicalism of this kind will preserve the most valuable and irreplaceable merits of the historical trade union form—i.e. caring, solidarity, and cooperation—and elevate them into new more complex forms of organisation (cf. Chesters & Welsh, 2006). In this sense it will be a truly life-oriented syndicalism (biosyndicalism), as it will operate on the immediate level of common life experiences. Nevertheless, the question remains whether this new form of experimental syndicalism can contribute to the creation of a fear
inspiring social subject against embodied capitalism. This can be answered by recalling a historical analogy: today the basic income for precarious workers is what the eight hour day was for the working class before the turn of the previous century. It was just the annunciation of a fear inspiring social actor.

The micropolitical enterprise and the failure of representation

I suggested earlier that the micropolitical has come to take the conditions of representation as its primary concern; it fights against dominant forms of representation and for the extension of representation. The question then is if this primary focus of micropolitics can address the embodied experience of precarity. To what extent can the representation contribute to the generation of a fear inspiring precarious worker? The difficulty here, as I described above, is that the embodied experience of precarity exceeds representationalism. Hence, micropolitical strategies cannot engage with precarity despite—and this is particularly important—the almost 'natural' proximity between the politics of the precarious workers and micropolitics.

There are three reasons for the affinity between micropolitics and precarious politics. Firstly, they share a common concern with the trouble of visibility. The embodied experience of precarity is crucially undermined and suffers a lot by its invisibility. Precarious labour has been effaced from the official agenda of the working class movement and its institutions. Hence, it was doomed to invisibility or subsumed under the category of the service sector or it was disparaged as a synonym for new economy, human capital, and in the best case immaterial labour was cast as knowledge work.

Secondly, an integral component of the embodied experience of precarity, dirty work (as discussed earlier) was linked in public discourse to the shadow economy and it was denigrated as counterproductive or at least irrelevant to national economies. It is the social struggles of the migrant and feminist
movements that made the issue of dirty work visible. The common struggles between the precarious movements and the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s still remain a crucial and irreplaceable strategic coalition for any form of activism related to precarity today. Thirdly, the proximity between micropolitics and the embodied experience of precarity arises out of their common situatedness in the everyday. Both start from and work on the immanent terrain of everyday life.

Despite these commonalities and strategic alliances, there is an insurmountable difference between the two, one which does not allow a micropolitical social movement against precarity to become a fear inspiring social actor. This difference refers to the failure of representational politics (Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006). Today, representation is the means through which post-Fordism enacts its own exodus from the blockade of the existing national compromise of distributive rights—a move which constitutes postliberal sovereignty, as discussed in Section I. The shift away from the national social compromise is, partly, executed through a transformation in the relation between productivity (as value creating work) and property (as the accumulation of value).

The productivity of precarious labour challenges the post-Fordist systems of wealth distribution. This is particularly the case with immaterial labour. In order to be productive, immaterial labour needs unrestricted access to the immaterial resources of production (i.e., to the netware, such as networks, databases, visual data, health, culture, freedom of circulation). Hence, immaterial labour becomes productive by blocking the capitalist principle of property. And, because the productivity of immaterial labour is essential for both the projects of neoliberalism and postliberalism, this unrestricted access must be enabled. In response to this paradox a solution, of sorts, is arising which, on the one hand, does not suppress the productivity, sociability, and creativity of immaterial labourers, and, one the other hand, reinstalls a new regime of wealth distribution—one which is based on establishing a new mode
of regulating the property of netware (Moulier Boutang, 2001b). This mode of
regulation is not founded on ownership of the means of production but only of
its products (such as, patents of intellectual goods and biodiversity; copyright;
restrictions in up/downloading from the net; privatisation of health; mobility
control etc.). This is because the very means of network-based production and
of embodied productivity are no longer machines installed in factories, they are
the immaterial worker’s singular creativity, affectivity, and sociability. The
new system of property which emerges controls the products of immaterial
labour rather than the means of production, which emanate from the
subjectivities of immaterial workers.

Among the new netware circulating today are the risks of living labour as
such. The monetarisation and commodification of the precarious workers’ life
risk is an essential part of the embodied experience of precarity (I described
earlier, the aspects of vulnerability, affective exhaustion, and recombination
which refer exactly to the pressures ensuing from the subjectification of risk in
precarious living conditions). When life is rendered precarious, the failures of
the national compromise of distributive rights are revealed: precarity entails
imposing restrictions on people’s rights to participate in the established
national compromise. Of course, one response to this partial exclusion is to
engage in the politics of representation. The micropolitical enterprise (e.g.
governmentality studies) does this when it attempts to understand how the
neoliberal project activates multiple social actors and then attempts to initiate
their inclusion in a new system of rights. This is the micropolitical New Deal
of neoliberal societies. It is obvious, that despite the centrality of micropolitics
in contemporary movements against precarity, such projects of inclusion do not
deliver a fear inspiring social subjectivity. This is because micropolitical
subjectivities are themselves itself anxious and afraid.

The codification of the micropolitical New Deal in the neoliberal state takes
the form of citizenship. In particular, the ideas of cultural citizenship (Rosaldo,
1993) and flexible citizenship (Ong, 1999) is an answer to the crisis emerging
out the inadequate solution to the tension between labour and property described above. Flexible citizenship shifts the gaze from a hermetically and exclusively structured form of national belonging to a form of a residual belonging beyond the destabilised dominance of national identity (e.g. Sassen, 2004) and opts for a new extended foundation of democracy (e.g. Honig, 2001). It accounts for new social actors working on transnational, post-welfare representations of participative rights (e.g. Mezzandra, 2001).

But—despite its enormous importance for the political constitution of the present—the problem with this understanding of political representation and flexible citizenship is that it is inherently defensive. That is, it cannot act beyond the already given ambiguous dynamics of the globalised neoliberal project. Of course the new politics of transnational representation and flexible citizenship are crucial for today's social movements: they *de facto* establish the right to escape dominant nationalist representations and the national compromise between labour and capital. However, by being defensive, these movements are merely fixated on arrival; they attempt to establish a new compromise between precarious labour and postnational capitalism in the form of flexisecurity. Representational politics and the demand for flexisecurity are necessary responses to the concerns of the embodied experience of precarity, but they reterritorialise precarious workers subjectivities in the matrix of a new postliberal statism.
In the previous chapters, I described precarity as the mode of exploitation of living labour in the regime of embodied capitalism. With the concept of the embodied experience of precarity we can grasp the myriad of singular subjectivities of people living and working in precarious conditions: the embodied experience of a chainworker in a high street fashion shop, of a student paying tuition fees by working as a security guard, of an illegal migrant who works as a dishwasher, of a qualified researcher who works on contract based research projects, of an unemployed academic who works in a call centre, of an au-pair worker who wants to stay in the country after the expiration of a contract, of a migrant computer expert who works as babysitter, of a non-unionised tube cleaner, of an architect who earns a living working on discontinuous projects, of a seasonal worker in the strawberry fields, of a cinematographer who works on three projects simultaneously and is paid (badly) only from one, of a single mother working part-time, of a graphic designer whose work extends far beyond the 10 hours she stays in the office. All these experiences vary immensely, but at the same time all are permeated by a pervasive social conflict. That is, all these various embodied experiences of precarity constitute the primary terrain on which value creation in embodied capitalism takes place, and simultaneously all of them are confronted by they structural insecurity imposed by the system of wage labour.

The system of wage labour and the corresponding welfare system produced a space-fixated (i.e. factory) work subjectivity (i.e. normal, full-time employment) measured according to work time. In contrast, precarious labour implodes this subjectivity on various levels: it is not space-fixated, the
precarious labourer works in a multiplicity of locales; his/her work cannot be quantified and remunerated according to the old system of wage labour measurement; finally, the subjectivities of precarious workers cannot be accommodated in the unified subjectivity germane to the national social compromise (I described these conditions in more detail in Chapter Eleven).

Thus, precarious labour does not exist as a unified subjectivity (hence, the problem with equating today’s 'precariat' with the working class), it exists only in the plural, as a multiplicity of subjectivities variously positioned, exploited, and experienced in the system of embodied capitalism. What is common to this multitude of subjectivities is that they all simultaneously suffer the blockade of the system of wage labour whilst they are one of its primary sources of value in North Atlantic societies and Australia. An additional commonality, is that none of the existing forms of organising labour into a political force can embody this multiplicity of subjectivities. The reason is that, when seen as a multiplicity, these subjectivities constitute a radical form of imperceptible politics which points towards an exit from the contemporary regime of labour regulation.

The creation of value in embodied capitalism is not the result of the valorisation of labour power but of the whole continuum of the embodied experience of precarity. Value in industrial capitalism is created by the appropriation of the strictly measured labour power of the worker. The worker is remunerated only for his/her labour power not for the entirety of his/her life (e.g. domestic labour remains unpaid). In contrast, valu population, it is not even concerned with fabricating individuality in the guise of disciplinary institutions, it rather attacks individuality en gros (see also Papadopoulos, 2004). Its new role is to dissect and dissolve the working subject and recombine it into new effective virtual compositions. Capitalism no longer deals with the link between subject, agency and power; it wants to get rid of all three and construct powerful composites which accumulate, in their bodies, different aspects of the public and the private, the natural and the artificial, the personal and the political. The individual only looks like an individual in its
apparent bodily shape (even this will not last much longer), but in reality it becomes a genetic source, an automated client, a set of competencies, a self-creating assemblage of skills, a register and a code, a body capable of extreme mobility.

The inappropriate/d sociabilities of precarious life

Thus, what embodied capitalism appropriates and what it remunerates is not the subjectivity of the worker, but a de-individualised recombination of skills, qualities, and capacities. Precarity describes life in these conditions of recombinant embodied capitalism. Embodied capitalism needs the everyday, but it only needs and can accommodate a small part of what people do in their everyday lives. I already argued that there is an excess which is fabricated in embodied capitalism’s conflictual process between value creation and recombinant exploitation. Consider the examples above: embodied capitalism capitalises on the mobility of the au-pair worker, and neglects his or her social or political rights, since this person is considered to be in the country of work only provisionally. The regime of embodied capitalism regards migrants' bodies as naked labour power, not as mobile subjects of rights. At the same time this person utilises his or her capacity to be mobile as an au-pair worker to gain the chance to enter the country and s/he uses his/her informal networks to stay after the expiration of the au-pair contract (regarding some of examples mentioned here see Hess, 2005; Morokvasic, Erel, & Shinozaki, 2003; Salih, 2003).

Similarly, the creativity of the architect, the cinematographer or the graphic designer stems very much from their capacity to connect, socialise, produce beyond the project in which one is involved and paid for. Whilst all these activities and experiences are necessary for work, at the same they exceed what capitalist e in embodied capitalism is created by the appropriation the whole of
the worker’s life and social relations. But this needs some clarification because it is not completely accurate. Embodied capitalism does not actually exploit the totality of the worker's subjectivity and life, but it dissects the subject and the entirety of his/her life, and appropriates only certain parts of it. In other words, embodied capitalism gets rid of the subject and recombines it. Let me explain this.

There is a widespread reading of the transformation from industrial to post-industrial capitalism which describes the appropriation of labour as the appropriation of the whole subjectivity of the worker (Beck, 2000; Gorz, 2004; Schönberger & Springer, 2003; Sennett, 1998; Lazzarato, 2004; Virno, 2003). But this is not correct. It is incorrect because embodied capitalism recombines the working subject and exploits specific parts of his or her everyday existence on a case by case basis. This is crucial, exploitation in embodied capitalism is situated and embodied. This is the reason that we have a multiplicity of precarious subjectivities and not the single pattern of an exploitable subjectivity which constitutes the One Subjectivity of a unified class.

In Chapter Eleven, I discussed the embodied quality of contemporary capitalism, i.e. how capitalism creates value by remaking life. Importantly, the way this is carried out is through the recombination of worker's body. In this situation, capitalism is no longer concerned with the calibration and management of the individual as part of an exploitation wants to appropriate and can appropriate. There is always a surplus sociability which remains unexploited in embodied capitalism. If this surplus were to enter into the terrain of social regulation, it would collapse this terrain, because is incompatible with the current system of labour measurability (regarding some of examples mentioned here see Ehrenstein, 2006; McRobbie, 2004; Vishmidt & Gilligan, 2003; von Osten, 2006; Widuch, 2005).

The illegal migrant dishwasher, the seasonal worker in the strawberry fields, or the sex worker from Eastern Europe all enter the highly exploitative, unregulated, and slavish conditions of undocumented labour, conditions which
embodied capitalism could tackle by assigning unconditional rights for all workers but refrains from doing so. At the same the existence of undocumented labour is the only way for illegal migrants to sustain themselves, to cross borders, to establish a new life. It is this possibility to be on the road and at the same time to partake in transnational informal networks of life which cannot be regulated by embodied capitalism (regarding some of examples mentioned here see Andrijasevic, 2004; Bell & Berg, 2002; Faist, 2000; Kasimis & Papadopoulos, 2005; Kasimis, Papadopoulos, & Zacopoulou, 2003).

The single mother, the unemployed academic working in a call centre, or the migrant computer expert working as a babysitter enter the job market in vulnerable positions in which they are under-employed. The gendered division of labour is mainly sustained by dismantling social systems of protection, a move which creates the conditions for the single mother’s exploitation in a flexibilised labour market. Embodied capitalism dissects, extracts and appropriates what it needs, in these cases people’s feminised social skills for affective and communicative labour; what is left behind includes people’s multiple skills and abilities (regarding some of examples mentioned here see Bridget Anderson, 2000; Parreñas, 2001; Shome, 2006).

Also with the working student or the researcher on a contract employment, they both actively participate in the production and reproduction of knowledge, while this knowledge is appropriated by senior members of staff or the institutions in which they work. Not only the student and academic, but also the single mother who works part-time in a lawyers office, the computer expert from Bulgaria who, (because her diploma is not recognised in her new country) works as a babysitter, or the unemployed English graduate who experiences the pressure to change his accent in order to hide his background from the international callers—it is not the case that the entirety of all of these precarious workers’ subjectivities is appropriate. Much is jettisoned.

The extreme insecurity and flexibilisation is not something which pertains only to the experience of the chainworker but increasingly it comes to
characterise previously secure jobs in the industrial sector. Precarity becomes a highly adaptive pattern of labour regulation across different sectors of production.

What is common to all these examples is that embodied capitalism extracts from the highly diversified subjectivities of these workers what is essential for creating value and at the same time it retreats from any responsibility for accommodating the complexities of these workers’ lives. There is an excess of social relations in the field of precarious life conditions, a plethora of inappropriate/d sociabilities, which is the main source for value creation, and, at the same time, this excess cannot enter the regulation of embodied capitalism. The term inappropriate/d sociability refers to twofold form of sociability: on the one hand to a sociability which exceeds what can be appropriated for the purposes of value creation in embodied capitalism; on the other hand, to something which is incommensurable that is inappropriate to the current regime of labour regulation (see Chapter Six for a general discussion of this concept, and Trinh T. Minh-ha, 1987; Haraway, 1992). The embodied experience of precarity exists and operates in the heart of the existing system of production and simultaneously it creates something which is inappropriate/d because it exists in a vacuum of control, it exists in a new imperceptible world in the heart of the embodied capitalist world of control: World 2 (Papadopoulos, 2006). Haraway on what is 'inappropriate/d':

'Designating the networks of multicultural, ethnic, racial, national, and sexual actors emerging since World War II, Trinh's phrase referred to the historical positioning of those who cannot adopt the mask of either 'self' or 'other' offered by previously dominant, modern Western narratives of identity and politics. To be 'inappropriate/d', does not mean 'not to be in relation with'—i.e., to be in a special reservation, with the status of the authentic, the untouched, in the allochronic and allotopic condition of innocence. Rather to be an 'inappropriate/d other' means to be in critical, deconstructive relationality, in a diffracting rather than reflecting
(ratio)nality—as the means of making potent connection that exceeds domination. To be inappropriate/d is not to fit in the taxon, to be dislocated from the available maps specifying kinds of actors and kinds of narratives, not to be originally fixed by difference. To be inappropriate/d is to be neither modern nor postmodern, but to insist on the amodern. Trinh was looking for a way to figure 'difference' as a 'critical difference within,' and not as special taxonomic marks grounding difference as apartheid.' (Haraway, 1992, p. 299).

The embodied experience of precarity exists within the matrix of labour in embodied capitalism and infuses a deconstructive relationality into it. These are forms of sociability—informal networks of existence, cooperation and social reciprocity, construction of socio-material artefacts, transformation of the worker's flesh—that challenge the process of subjectification as such. Inappropriate/d sociability thrives on the real fleshly, material social actors of precarity as a force which interrupt the process of labour recombination and introduces assemblages of its own. Hence, this plethora of precarious subjectivities, bodies and inappropriate/d sociabilities become a stream of decoding, a stream which places the excess of social, material, affective products created through the everyday life of precarious workers in an imperceptible space, a space which resides within without being coincident with the terrain of regulation. Inappropriate/d sociability is the flesh of imperceptible politics.

Do it without yourself (DIWY)

Imperceptibility as strategy is not an intentional or teleological act, but it is a formula to understand the aleatory creativity of precarious lives as they strive to escape the capture of productionism. Nevertheless, we cannot consider
inappropriate/d sociability simply as a counter-power to the regime of control of embodied capitalism. I have already rejected this productionist model which considers the subjectivity of counter-power to be identical with the cycles of production. The productionist model casts embodied capitalism as creating its opposite, the subjectivity of the precarious worker. This model is passé; it is the model which wants the exploited class to transform into a counter-power in the form of a class for itself, a class of total expressivity.

However, inappropriate/d sociabilities are not a unified social subject, but a multiplicity of actors who questions the symbolic and material order of power by creating a new life within this order. Inappropriate/d sociability forces us to think beyond imagining a unitary counter-power as a means of resisting embodied capitalism. In other words, thinking in terms of power and counter-power finally brings us to the line of least resistance. Instead, starting from inappropriate/d sociabilities we can follow a line of resistance.

'If the stories of hyper-productionism and enlightenment have been about the reproduction of the sacred image of the same, of the one true copy, mediated by the luminous technologies of compulsory heterosexuality and masculinist self-birthing, then the differential artifactualism I am trying to envision might issue in something else. Artifactualism is askew of productionism; the rays from my optical device diffract rather than reflect. These diffracting rays compose interference patterns, not reflecting images.' (Haraway, 1992, p. 299).

Against the regime of control which wants to dissect and select singular activities of ever expanding precarious life into a trajectory of production, imperceptible politics attempt to make spaces for purposeless action. Imperceptibility is a form of decoding: decoding the product of its use-value. It is also a form of resistance: resisting attempts to recode the product as useful. While Marx assigns the utility of a product to its intrinsic, almost naturalised, features, the embodied experience of precarity calls for its denaturalisation.
A non-natural thing is never overdetermined, it is immanent socio-matter. It can be either coded according to the productionist regime of recombination in embodied capitalism or it can enter an unspecified space of purposelessness. Inappropriate/d sociabilities exist in imperceptibles zones: zones where you can make-yourself-non-useful. This is the 'do it without yourself' culture: DIWY. The exiting force of the imperceptible politics of precarity is the moment of self-evacuation from the permanent process of auto-commodification. This evacuation of the productionist self fabricates desubjectified labourers, fabricates spaces where activity is inappropriate and cannot be appropriated. This is the cunning of precarity. This is the cunning of imperceptible politics.
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**WS 2006** und **SS 2007** Lehrtätigkeit in der Universität Hamburg in Zusammenarbeit mit Prof. Dr. M.

**SS 2007** Pieper: Immaterielle Arbeit und Migration: Geschlechterverhältnisse und Ethnisierungsprozesse (Projektseminar I, II)

### Ausgewählte Publikationen


Tsianos, Vassilis (2000): In Hörweite des Marxismus Cultural Studies und Stuart Hall. In: *Texte*
zur Kunst, Heft 40, Dezember 2000, 158-161.