VOLUNTARILY DISCONNECTED?

A CROSS-NATIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL STUDY
ON GENDER DIFFERENTIALS IN VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATION PARTICIPATION

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5 General Discussion and Conclusion

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English Summary

Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Eidesstattliche Versicherung

Curriculum Vitae
1 Introduction
“In democratic countries, the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of the former.”

(Alexis de Tocqueville 2010:902)

1.1 Background

When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States of America in the early 19th century and wrote about the functioning of American democracy (Tocqueville 2010), he introduced voluntary associations as research topic into the social sciences. He did so by attributing to them the fundamental role of bearers of democracy.¹ After the writings of Tocqueville, other hallmarks of voluntary association research can be identified: Almond and Verba’s (1963) first comparative study on voluntary association participation, the first longitudinal study on voluntary association membership by Babchuk and Booth (1969), McPherson’s work on the ecological niches of voluntary associations (1983) and Putnam’s writings about the role of social capital (1994) and its decline in the United States (1995, 2000). All of these classic writings emphasized the role of voluntary associations for society and resurged interest in and research on voluntary associations in their respective generations of social scientists. However, especially in sociology interest was not only in the role of voluntary associations for societal integration and their role in producing the common good. Sociological research also focused on the individual-level causes and consequences of voluntary association membership.² The individual-level consequences of voluntary association participation are manifold. It increases political engagement (Almond and Verba 1963; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990; McFarland and Thomas 2006), reduces anti-social behavior and has positive effects on physical health and mental wellbeing (Wilson 2000; Wilson and Musick 1999a). Voluntary association participation has also more tangible outcomes that are

¹ They do so by bringing together otherwise isolated individuals, by constraining raw self-interest and reducing the effects of individualism as well as by forming and articulating public opinion (Galston 2000).

² Sometimes this field of research has been coined the sociology of voluntary associations (Anheier 2001; Bonikowski and McPherson 2007) emphasizing the prominence and maturity this field of inquiry has achieved within sociology.
relevant for research on social stratification and social mobility like better-paid jobs and jobs with higher occupational prestige (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997; Ruiter and De Graaf 2009). Voluntary associations are therefore a relevant factor in structuring social inequality.

Among the major individual-level antecedents for becoming a member in voluntary associations has been gender. Women have been found to have a lower probability of being a member and to have fewer memberships than men (Knoke 1986; Smith 1975, 1994; Tomeh 1973). In addition, women have been found to be members of different kinds of voluntary associations than men (Inglehart and Norris 2003; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982, 1986; Popielarz 1999a). Although this gender inequality has been a fairly robust finding in the voluntary association literature, the gender gap in voluntary association participation has not been of central concern for gender scholars. However, given the ramifications of participating in voluntary associations the gender gap in voluntary association participation may be one facet in explaining persisting gender inequalities in status attainment.

Besides this rich literature on micro-level correlates of voluntary association participation there is a sizeable body of macro-level research. The prevalence of voluntary associations, the habit to participate in these organizations and the function they serve for society differ substantially between countries (Archambault 2009; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990; Salomon and Anheier 1998; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Consequently, the country has been a natural reference point for many comparative analyses of the nonprofit sector, voluntary associations and participation therein (Curtis 1971; Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis, Grabb, and Baer 1992; Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; Lam 2006; Paxton 2007; Pichler and Wallace 2007; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Van Deth and Kreuter 1998; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). However, for those who study voluntary association participation in cross-national perspective gender has not been of central concern. As a result, most authors in this field of inquiry have treated gender as simple control variable and usually modeled its influence as fixed effect, implying that the gender gap is constrained to be constant across countries. The so-estimated effect of gender
is a weighted average of country-specific gender differentials with flawed standard errors that therefore obscures more than it reveals (Snijders and Bosker 2012).

In contrast, in comparative research on welfare states it is regularly corroborated that gender gaps (e.g. in employment, working hours, wages, management positions, poverty, political representation etc.) vary across countries. Some countries are more egalitarian than others. Here too, the country context constitutes a natural point of reference as gender stratification is shaped by national social policies, national social institutions and national gender culture. Many of the existing comparative studies on gender inequality therefore allow the gender gap to vary across the surveyed countries (e.g. Hook 2010; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Mandel 2012; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Yaish and Stier 2009). However, the gender gap in voluntary association participation has gone largely unnoticed by gender scholars as well as comparative welfare state and social policy researchers. Rather, research efforts have been concentrated on the more obvious and seemingly more important areas of women’s subordination like the state and the market. The scarce existing evidence from the voluntary association literature suggests that the gender gap in voluntary association participation also varies between countries (Andersen, Curtis, and Grabb 2006; Curtis 1971; Gustafson, Booth, and Johnson 1979; Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Thus, although there is ample evidence from single-country studies of a gender gap in voluntary association participation and a sizeable stock of comparative studies on levels of voluntary association participation as well as research on gender inequalities in the family, the market and the state, there is a lack of a systematic inquiry of the gender gap in the voluntary sector in comparative perspective. This dissertation aims to fill some of this void. It adds to the existing literature by focusing on the antecedents of the gender gap in voluntary association participation. It does so by invoking a multilevel perspective including individual-level attributes as well as country-level characteristics. Using this perspective makes it possible to investigate cross-national patterns of the gender gap in voluntary association participation and to examine how this pattern is related to compositional effects and shaped by country characteristics. Studying the extent of the gender gap in voluntary association participation and identifying its causes may help in understanding women’s position in contemporary societies. If women’s
position in different areas of society is—at least partly—influenced by their participation in voluntary associations, then it will be fruitful to study the extent of this gender gap as well as its individual and societal antecedents. Hence, if we are going to take the aforementioned quote of Tocqueville seriously, studying voluntary association participation and the corresponding gender gap is not only important in itself. It may also fertilize research on other but substantively related research areas like research on gender, social inequality and welfare states.

1.2 The Voluntary Sector and Voluntary Associations

In order to investigate the gender gap in voluntary association participation a solid understanding of voluntary associations is needed. In the social sciences it is common to analytically divide society into different segments. One of the more common conceptualizations is the three sector model of society (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990; Salamon and Anheier 1992, 1998). According to this model, society is composed of the state, the market and the third, i.e. nonprofit, sector. This is why the nonprofit sector is sometimes called the third sector. This tripartite distinction was already implicit in the writings of Tocqueville (Wuthnow 1991). I refrain from using the term third sector and use the terms nonprofit or voluntary sector instead because I am frequently going to distinguish more than three societal sectors. In particular, for the purposes of this research it is fruitful to consider the private sphere of the family as an additional societal segment. This quadripartite model of society has already been used in comparative studies on civil society and voluntary association participation therein (Janoski 1998).

“The voluntary sector consists of activities that are [...] voluntary in the dual sense of being free of coercion [that would usually be a privilege of the state sector, SP] and being free of the economic constraints of profitability and the distribution of profits [which are characteristics of the market, SP]” (Wuthnow 1991:7). The nonprofit sector in turn is composed of organizations that are subject to the nondistribution constraint meaning that surplus is not distributed among the members belonging to the organization (Hansmann 1987). An essential constituent of nonprofit organizations are voluntary associations. A voluntary “[...] association is a formally organized named group, most of whose members—whether persons or organizations—are not financially recompensed for their participation” (Knoke 1986:2). The formal organizational structure of
voluntary associations in combination with the membership role assures that the existence of the association is independent of specific individuals and their social relations: “[...] formal associations survive beyond any particular member or internal social network” (Paxton 1999:100). Voluntary associations are a key element of Western democratic societies albeit their prevalence, types and functions are conditional on the historical, cultural and institutional context (Janoski 1998; Salamon and Anheier 1998; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). The organizational landscape within the voluntary sector is manifold within and across societies and the associations serve diverse aims at different levels (Anheier and Salamon 2006; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990; Salamon and Anheier 1998; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). The voluntary sector ranges from interest groups that try to influence political decision making to recreational organizations that offer self-expression and sociability to their members.

From the perspective of the individual actor being a member of a voluntary association is among the most fundamental attachments to society: “[...] there are two types of social ties: membership [emphasis added] and social-relations” (Breiger 1974:183). Voluntary associations offer their members an institutionalized setting for meeting others repeatedly. By joining a voluntary association an actor becomes part of a social network that might serve as source for emotional and instrumental support. They also serve to fulfill the fundamental human desire to belong: “[...] voluntary associations [...] can counteract the isolating effects of individualism” (Galston 2000:67) thereby reducing the threats of anomie. It should therefore come as no surprise that voluntary associations have been a vital research topic in the social sciences.

1.3 The Multilevel Consequences of Voluntary Associations

Voluntary associations and membership therein is usually expected to have positive and benevolent outcomes. However, there is a growing literature that questions this overly optimistic view of voluntary associations that is prevalent in the work within the tocquevillian tradition (Fiorina 1999; Iglič 2010; Van Deth 2010; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005). These critiques usually aim at the macro-level effects of voluntary associations. Precisely, it cannot generally be expected that all voluntary associations irrespective of their aims and memberships integrate society and foster democracy. This
critique is based on the awareness that some organizations pursue particularistic interests, discriminate against social groups or even have criminal objectives.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that from the perspective of the individual actor, almost all memberships in voluntary associations have positive payoffs. It can be expected that the member would leave the organization if this would not be the case. Contrary to other social ties (e.g. family and kinship relations), membership in voluntary association is by definition voluntary and the member can quit the organization at any time if perceived costs surpass perceived benefits. Thus, being a member in a fascist party may have negative externalities for the surrounding society, i.e. at the macro level. But for the individual there is a network of fellow members whose resources may become accessible for purposive actions. Membership in voluntary associations is therefore generally considered as one component of social capital (Putnam 2000).

Thus, the effects of voluntary associations operate at different levels. Therefore I am going to analytically differentiate the macro-level of society, the meso-level of voluntary associations as interest and advocacy groups and the micro-level of individuals that are members of these groups. I do this to more clearly delineate the theoretical focus of this dissertation. Although I am going to concentrate on the micro-level outcomes because the analytical focus is on the individual actor and how gender structures his or her capacity to access and mobilize diverse resources in order to achieve his or her aims, I will recapitulate the most important arguments why voluntary associations are important and what effects are attributed to them at all of these levels.

1.3.1 Voluntary Associations at the Macro-Level: Integrators of Society

It has been argued that voluntary associations are integrators of society (Babchuk and Edwards 1965; Putnam 2000). They do so by bringing together people from different social strata that would not have met otherwise. These organized groups serve as “opportunity structure for interpersonal contacts” (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982:884) or organizational “foci” (Feld 1981, 1982) around which social activities are organized. They are “arenas for the generation and maintenance of social networks” (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986:62). By bringing together people with different social back-
grounds, voluntary associations bridge societal cleavages and therefore integrate society. This bridging of social divisions is deemed necessary for solving collective action problems and issues of cooperation.

The mechanisms by which voluntary associations integrate society are assumed to be as follows. Voluntary associations instill norms of reciprocity and generate generalized trust (Putnam 2000). Generalized trust can be defined as “a ‘standard estimate’ of the trustworthiness of the average person” (Paxton 2007:48). Members of voluntary associations learn that fellow members from different social backgrounds behave predictable and can therefore be trusted. This socialization argument has been contested by scholars that argue that members are trusting in the first place (Stolle 1998; Uslaner 2002). Hence, there is a self-selection of trusting individuals into voluntary associations. However, evidence seems to support the socialization hypothesis more than the self-selection hypothesis (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Claibourn and Martin 2000; Paxton 2007).

There is the additional argument that different voluntary associations interact via individuals. Individuals with multiple memberships form ties between different organizations (McPherson 1981a, 1982; Paxton 2007). Multiple joiners create a network among voluntary associations. These connections are also supposed to weaken social cleavages. Individuals with multiple memberships appear in different organizational settings and encounter different co-members. This allows the flow of information, resources, viewpoints, values etc. between the organizations: “[…] each group’s membership overlaps to some degree with many other groups, and consequently there is some basis for agreement between groups” (Janoski 1998:117). McPherson (1981a, 1982) shows that the connectedness of the whole system of organizations is a direct function of the mean count of individuals’ voluntary association memberships.

The propositions about the integrative effects of voluntary associations have been contested in recent years (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005). Whether groups integrate or fragment society depends on the group’s aims and on the group’s composition.

3 In social network analysis this kind of network is called affiliation network (Wassermann and Faust 1994), membership network (Breiger 1974) or hypernetwork (McPherson 1982).
Voluntary associations can be antidemocratic or discriminating. Many groups have the purpose to protect or to improve the status of their membership and therefore pursue particularistic interests. In addition, members of voluntary associations usually do not meet fellow members from different social backgrounds. Therefore, the purported mechanism of learning to trust individuals who are different (i.e. the socialization hypothesis) is not totally convincing. This critique is based on research that has shown that members of specific voluntary associations are quite similar with respect to certain socio-demographic characteristics (Feld 1982; Marsden 1990; McPherson 1983; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Mellenhorst, Völker, and Flap 2008; Popielarz 1999a; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). This result is usually explained by invoking the principle of homophily meaning the tendency for individuals to be associated with people who are similar to themselves (McPherson et al. 2001). Hence, there are some sorting processes at work that cause the memberships of specific organizations to be homogeneous. Voluntary associations therefore primarily bring together similar people. As a consequence, voluntary associations may serve to integrate people within social strata but not across social strata. People from different social strata are therefore very unlikely to interact within voluntary associations. In summary, heterogeneous groups may have the potential to integrate society whereas homogeneous groups result in distinct and disjoint memberships and as a consequence in a fragmented society (McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Popielarz 1999b). Empirical evidence suggests that homogeneous voluntary associations are much more common than heterogeneous ones.

However, the dimensions on which sorting occurs are manifold (e.g. age, education, gender, religion etc.) and some organizations exclude on some dimension and include on others (Popielarz 1999b). Homophily (which induces exclusion) and its mirror image heterophily (which spurs integration) are multidimensional phenomena. Hence, integration and exclusion occur simultaneously. This argument is more elaborated in Chapter 1.4, where I am going to argue that even if voluntary associations are homogeneous with respect to certain socio-demographic dimensions, integration may nevertheless be achieved via multiple memberships.
1.3.2 Voluntary Associations at the Meso-Level: Catalysts of Interests

Voluntary associations also perform the role of intermediaries between individual citizens and the state (Janoski 1998:12). By way of bringing together a critical number of people with similar interests, formerly ignorable and unheard claims get a certain weight and may therefore receive attention by political elites. It is much more difficult for political leaders to ignore claims made by organized groups than requests made by atomized individuals (Galston 2000; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005). This mechanism may be especially important for minority groups to get some recognition in the public discourse. Hence, voluntary associations constitute a way through which marginalized or disenfranchised groups can articulate their claims or take a stance on public issues (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). This way “[...] a voluntary sector shields society from the tyranny of the majority” (Anheier and Salamon 1999:48).

This function is also what political scientists usually have in mind when they describe voluntary associations as interest representation or advocacy groups. Voluntary associations improve the quality and equality of political representation and public deliberation: “[...] associations can improve the quality of representation by allowing individuals—especially those who lack resources—to express their views in political arenas” (Fung 2003:516). Strong voluntary associations also force democratic institutions to be more responsive. They control political and economic elites and check political power.

For interest and advocacy organizations face-to-face meetings of their members are not at all necessary. In order to have an impact on the political discourse and other forms of decision making it is important that these organizations are large, i.e. that they represent many members. Nominal or card-carrying membership in these tertiary associations (as they are called by Putnam 1995, 2000) is usually sufficient to equip the leaders of these organizations with political influence.

However, the emancipatory role voluntary associations may have for minority groups and the marginalized may be overrated altogether. As highlighted by Fung (2003), the fact that socio-economic status and resource endowments are highly predictive of membership in voluntary associations implies that interests of people from higher social strata are much better represented in the public sphere. Associations may there-
fore be more inequality-reinforcing than they correct for imbalances in power or income.

1.3.3 Voluntary Associations at the Micro-Level: Networks and Social Resources

At the individual-level, voluntary associations are among the most important sources of social ties (Feld 1982; Fischer, Jackson, Stueve, Gerson, Jones, and Baldassare 1977; Grossetti 2005). For example, voluntary associations are the third most important source of nonkin ties (Feld 1982). These organizations provide institutional support for the generation and maintenance of social ties by creating repeated interactions among its members. This is in line with supply-side arguments that stress “opportunities for contact” (Blau 1977:79). Several studies show that members of voluntary associations indeed have larger social networks (Fischer 1982; Putnam 2000; Rotolo 2000a).

Co-membership in voluntary associations is frequently considered a weak tie relation. Weak ties are relations to others who are dissimilar and move in different social circles. Weak ties (links to acquaintances, friends of friends) therefore enhance ego’s network diversity and as a consequence broaden his or her pool of potential resources: “[…] when we pursue instrumental goals, the information and resources flowing to us form demographically different people are more advantageous than those coming from people who are similar to us” (Popielarz 1999b:266). Granovetter (1973:1375) noted that “two common sources of weak ties [are], formal organizations and work settings”. McPherson (1981a:337) explicitly stated that “[...] common membership in voluntary associations is one form of weak tie”. Thus, membership in voluntary associations constitutes an important means to study the antecedents and consequences of weak ties. Membership in voluntary associations may therefore represent a useful complement to survey research using name generators as social network data collection method. Whereas ties elicited by name generators are heavily biased towards strong ties (McPherson 2009), membership in voluntary associations captures some of the weak ties in ego’s social networks.

By joining a voluntary association ego becomes part of a social network. Ego’s co-members usually possess certain resources and these resources may become availa-
ble to ego for purposive actions. Consequently, membership in voluntary associations can be considered a component of individual social capital (Flap 2002; Lin 1999a, 2001). Ego’s voluntary association social capital largely depends on the number of memberships, the number of co-members within organizations, the quality and quantity of resources possessed by these co-members and the quality of relationship between ego and his or her co-members. The latter may be crucial for ego’s capacity to access and mobilize these socially embedded resources.

The larger the voluntary association the more fellow members are available. In addition, the more diverse the co-members the more diversified their resources are likely to be. In general, the diversity of co-members is more important than the sheer number of them: “For many goals, the availability of additional alters does not have proportional but diminishing returns: a limited number of alters usually suffices” (Van der Gaag and Snijders 2004:205). It is therefore important that at least one fellow member with a certain resource can be accessed. It is less central that many co-members with the same resources are in the organization.

However, from earlier research it is known that voluntary associations and types of voluntary associations tend to be homogeneous (Feld 1982; Marsden 1990; McPherson 1983; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001; Mellenhorst et al. 2008; Popielarz 1999a; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). It is therefore unlikely that joining a voluntary association provides access to a pool of diverse resources. However, as is elaborated in the next chapter, multiple memberships increase the number of fellow members and, even more important, the diversity of these co-members. Even if members of the same voluntary association type tend to be homogeneous, members from different types of voluntary associations are likely to be heterogeneous. Therefore, mul-

4 Typically, empirical evidence for homophily within voluntary associations comes from surveys that ask for membership in different types of voluntary associations (e.g. sports clubs, trade unions, environmental organizations etc.). This is a conservative test of the homophily hypothesis because the membership of a specific named organization (e.g. Hamburger Sport-Verein e.V.) is likely to be much more homogenous than the membership of the broader category of organizational type (e.g. sports clubs).
multiple memberships brings ego into contact with fellow members from divergent social structural positions.

1.4 Meeting Similar or Dissimilar Co-Members?

The literature on voluntary associations has not been unequivocal whether voluntary associations are incorporating individuals from different social backgrounds thereby enhancing the social network diversity of their members and the accompanying range of accessible resources (Babchuk and Edwards 1965; Eastis 1998; Putnam 2000) or whether mainly similar people meet in voluntary associations resulting in constrained network and resource diversity (Feld 1982; Marsden 1990; McPherson 1983; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001; Popielarz 1999a; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). The latter situation seems to suggest that information and resources available through co-members are largely redundant since they move in similar social circles. When the analytical focus is on the individual actor and his or her capacity to access and mobilize diverse resources in order to achieve his or her aims, multiple memberships in diverse types of associations have the potential to enhance ego’s network diversity thereby raising the range of resources accessible even if voluntary associations tended to be homogeneous (Davis and Aldrich 2003; Popielarz 1999b).

A large body of research suggests that voluntary organizations indeed tend to be homogeneous. Selective recruitment via homophilous network ties and shorter membership durations for atypical members are the mechanisms accounting for this homogeneity (McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnič 1992; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). These mechanisms result in a specific membership composition that constitutes an organization’s niche—a hypervolume in multidimensional social space from which members come from (Popielarz and Neal 2007). The niche position distinguishes different types of voluntary associations from another. Moreover, voluntary association types specialize on membership characteristics: “Each organizational type is a population of groups with distinctive memberships and activities” (McPherson and Rotolo 1996:180). Otherwise all associations would compete for similar individuals as members because of completely overlapping niches. However, an organization’s niche is multidimensional (McPherson 1983). Thus, even though different types of voluntary associations may have similar niche centers and niche breadths on one or more dimensions, not all social
characteristics of their respective memberships will be equal (e.g. although the age
niche location for professional and sports associations are similar, they differ with re-
spect to niche location of occupational prestige, education and sex composition, see
along some social dimensions and bridge across others.” Hence, homophily and heter-
ophily occur simultaneously but with respect to different dimensions.

Consequently, belonging to multiple types of voluntary associations could en-
hance ego’s network diversity if the organizations are located in different niches. These
different niche locations ensure that membership compositions among voluntary associ-
ation types differ—at least along certain dimensions. These different social circles in-
tersect within the individual member and constitute his or her potential pool of information and resources (Breiger 1974). Hence, as long as not all voluntary associations
are homogenous on exactly the same dimensions and therefore make available similar
types of contacts, multiple memberships in diverse types of voluntary associations pro-
 vide opportunities to encounter diverse fellow members who are different on some di-
mensions (Davis, Renzulli, and Aldrich 2006). To sum up, multiple memberships en-
 hance the prospects for getting non-redundant information and resources and the associ-
 ated payoffs.

This reasoning has two implications. First, multiple memberships within the
same type of voluntary association will not be instrumental for goal achievement be-
cause they make available the same, i.e. redundant, resources. Although survey ques-
tions on voluntary association affiliation have been repeatedly criticized for not count-
ing multiple memberships within the same type of voluntary association (Baumgartner

5 The salient dimensions of social space are likely to be correlated and therefore memberships will not be
spread evenly in niche space (McPherson 1983). This will restrict diversity among association types and
diminish the resource diversifying effect of multiple memberships. However, as long as the correlations
are not perfect, multiple memberships are likely to enhance network diversity and the accompanying
range of potential resources. In addition, the salient dimensions of social space are assumed to be increas-
ing due to modernization and industrialization (McPherson and Rotolo 1996). This allows for more niches
and, as a consequence, an increase in the number of voluntary association types. This too enhances the
chances of meeting different fellow members.
and Walker 1988; Diez de Uzurrun 2002), this will not be a problem for the current research. Second, since it is assumed that different types of voluntary associations make available fellow members from different social circles with different resources, it is instrumental to have many memberships—irrespective of the specific type. Therefore, I am not going to differentiate between different types of organizations (e.g. between political parties and sports clubs). The count of membership in different types of voluntary associations is going to be the dependent variable in the following analyses. This sum can be interpreted as the volume and diversity of socially embedded resources that can be accessed and mobilized by ego for purposive actions. Summing memberships across different voluntary association types implies a double averaging: across the number of organizations within organizational type and across the different types. Hence, contingencies specific to single organizations or specific organizational types are averaged out, thereby making the results more robust.

The relevance of the mere membership count has been also supported by studies from related fields of inquiry. Teorell (2003) showed that for explaining political participation measures of dissimilarity among fellow members lost their significance once the number of memberships was controlled for. Wollebæk and his co-authors found that the number of voluntary association memberships was more important in explaining trust and civic engagement than intensity of involvement (Wollebæk and Selle 2002; Wollebæk and Strømsnes 2008). Davis and Aldrich (2003) noted that multiple member-

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6 If the focus is not on individual life chances but on interest representation such a distinction would be vital. Membership in a political party or social movement organization is more instrumental in influencing political decision making than membership in sports or hobby groups.

7 In Chapter 4, where I am using combined data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, only the information on whether the respondent is member in at least one voluntary association is used as dependent variable. This is due to data limitations.

8 Thus, interest in the mean of voluntary association memberships can be justified theoretically. This is important because in using regression modeling, it is the conditional mean and only the conditional mean of the response variable that is analyzed. This narrow analytical focus on the first moment of the outcome distribution has been criticized, especially when the focus is on social inequality (Western and Bloom 2009).
ships diversify the social networks of the respondents in their study of entrepreneurs. In contrast, attendance of meetings within the organization or the specific type of organization in which respondents declared membership had no effect. Thus, membership per se seems more important than active participation within voluntary associations. This can be explained by the fact that even nominal membership increases the probability that two members will interact (due to identification with the group, homophily, membership directories, bulletin boards, newsletters etc.) thereby facilitating the flow of information or resources.

1.5 Gender and the Voluntary Sector

1.5.1 Gender Differences in Voluntary Association Participation

Research on the correlates of voluntary association participation evidences that women are less likely to be members of voluntary associations and that women have fewer memberships on average than men (Babchuk and Booth 1969; Booth 1972; Knoke 1986; Smith 1975, 1994; Tomeh 1973).

In addition, women join different types of voluntary associations (Booth 1972; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982; Popielarz 1999a). Women mainly join so called expressive groups whereas men join groups that are characterized as instrumental. This by now classic distinction between instrumental and expressive organizations was introduced by Gordon and Babchuk (1959). Participation in expressive organizations constitutes its own reward and is directed at preserving existing resources. Examples are sports clubs, churches, and youth clubs. In contrast, participation in instrumental organizations can be considered predominantly instrumentally-rational action (Bekkers, Völker, Van der Gaag, and Flap 2008) and is largely directed at obtaining new resources and at influencing people outside the group (Lin 2001). Examples are interest organizations, professional organizations, and political parties.

Research in organizational demography also shows that voluntary associations typically joined by women are smaller than organizations typically joined by men. In addition, organizations typically joined by women are more local, more sex segregated (meaning that women are more likely to be members of single sex groups) and more homogenous than men’s groups (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982, 1986; Popielarz
These organizational characteristics may facilitate coordinated action within women’s groups and provide emotional support. However, the gender-specific joining behavior and the different organizational features of the groups typically joined by men and women signify serious disadvantages for women with regard to societal integration, interest representation and status attainment.

1.5.2 The Multilevel Consequences of Women’s Joining Behavior

Because men are more likely to be members of voluntary associations they are better integrated into the voluntary sector and—as a consequence—into society. System integration is therefore more contingent on men. Since those who integrate the system are more important for the functioning of the system it comes as no surprise that men are more likely to occupy the more salient positions in society equipped with high levels of income and power. In contrast, women occupy more peripheral positions. Since men hold on average more memberships than women, they add more ties to the between-organizations network. Thus, men are better integrated into the organizational landscape thereby increasing their ability to mobilize organizational resources. The organizational overlap due to men’s multiple memberships increases the likelihood of coordinated action by the so connected organizations. Those who are well integrated, i.e. men, can use the organizations of the voluntary sector for their purposes. Those who are not well integrated, i.e. women, get even more marginalized. It has long been recognized that unequal rates of joining among different social groups reinforce or even amplify social inequality: “Those societies which have high levels of affiliation also appear to allocate that affiliation in ways which reinforce, rather than counteract, the distribution of inequality in society“ (McPherson 1981b:721).

For women the meso-level of voluntary associations in the form of interest or advocacy groups may offer some means of advancing their life chances and their societal position respectively. If women organize their interests in groups they can amplify their impact and therefore increase the probability that their claims are considered in political decision making processes (Orloff 1993). However, the finding that men have on average more voluntary association memberships than women implies the following. If voluntary associations are gender segregated, male organizations are larger or more numerous. Empirical evidence suggests that they are larger (McPherson and Smith-
Larger organizations are more salient in the public sphere, more internally differentia ted (which promotes flow of information) and have more resources that can be mobilized to achieve the organization’s goals. Larger organizations also provide more fellow members, some of which can be instrumentally useful. If voluntary associations are gender heterogeneous, men’s higher membership rates mean that men come to dominate voluntary organizations over time (McPherson 1981b). Both scenarios imply disadvantages for women in using voluntary associations for advancing their interests. As long as economic and political elites are dominated by men, the finding that women are much more likely to belong to gender segregated (i.e. all women) groups implies that women are isolated from the centers of power and authority. Also, participation in voluntary associations is one of the selection routes into political office as engagement in voluntary associations constitutes a signal of intrinsic public-spirited motivation to the constituency (Mansbridge 2009). As long as women lag behind in voluntary association participation this similarly implies disadvantage for effective female interest representation. Women are therefore less successful in joining and channeling their resources to make their claims heard. To sum up, according to the research results on women’s joining behavior and the characteristics of women’s groups, it is not very plausible that women’s issues are adequately represented by voluntary associations in public decision making processes.

The gendered patterns of voluntary association participation also affect the micro-level of actors. The findings that women are less likely to be members of voluntary associations and have fewer memberships on average imply that women meet fewer co-members and therefore have fewer weak tie contacts. As a consequence, the portfolio of socially embedded resources accessible via fellow members is smaller and less diverse. Hence, women’s ability to access and mobilize diverse resources to attain their goals is restricted. In addition, the result that women’s groups are smaller on average when compared to men’s groups means that women meet fewer fellow members than men. Also, social networks within smaller organizations probably have higher densities and are therefore more likely to provide more strong than weak ties. The finding that women’s groups are more homogeneous than men’s groups aggravates the effect of women’s having fewer memberships. Even if women had the same number of memberships than men on average, women would nevertheless be restricted in the resources available to
them. Thus, men meet more numerous and more diverse fellow members in their voluntary associations (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986). This enhances the probability that men access and mobilize resources that are embedded within these groups for pur-
positive actions and goal achievement: “[...] men are located in positions in the voluntary
network which are much more likely to provide access to information about possible
jobs, business opportunities, and chances for professional advancement. Women, in
contrast, are located in positions more likely to expose them to information about the
domestic realm” (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982:901). These results from the soci-
ology of voluntary associations may be one facet in explaining persisting gender ine-
qualities in status attainment.

1.6 Gender and Gender Equality

Given the role voluntary association membership plays for social integration, interest
representation and social mobility, unequal distribution of voluntary association mem-
berships across genders is unacceptable for at least two reasons. First, this situation is
 unacceptable on normative grounds—at least for those who value equality as such. Sec-
ond, such a situation is unacceptable for instrumental reasons. Those who have system-
atically less memberships are less integrated into society, less heard in decision making
processes and are disadvantaged in the status attainment process. Hence, this relational
form of social inequality may generate, maintain or even amplify social inequality along
other dimensions such as income, power or occupational prestige. Thus, the unequal
distribution of memberships has negative consequences on the life chances of women
because they are disadvantaged in this regard. Since gender and gender differences are
at the heart of this dissertation I will shortly delineate how the terms gender and gender
equality are used and operationalized in the upcoming analyses.

1.6.1 Defining Gender

Gender is one of the key social categories that structure the social world. In the context
of this research, it is sufficient to define gender as ideals, norms and values that regulate
the typical behavior of men and women (Lorber 2004). These different role expectations
have an impact on the relations between men and women. For example, if it is the norm
for women to do unpaid reproductive work within the private sphere of the family,
women are economically dependent on their husband (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). This lack of access to and control over resources implies restricted autonomy and agency (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2009). As a consequence of these gendered ideals, norms and values, men and women face different opportunities and restrictions affecting their position and life chances in society.

However, what is expected from men and women is not universal. Rather, a given gender culture is always ingrained into a specific societal context and therefore varies across countries (Pfau-Effinger 1998). The gender culture is also reflected by the social institutions of the welfare state and—at the same time—influenced by it. In particular, social policies have a major influence on gender stratification (Esping-Andersen 1999; Orloff 1993). Social politics therefore have been labeled gender politics (Orloff 1996) and the term women friendly welfare state has been used to describe countries that actively improve the situation of women as labor force participants, mothers and citizens (Borchorst and Siim 2002). In particular, these countries maximize women’s economic independence by providing public sector jobs, early childhood care, elder care, flexible work hours and paid leave benefits. Thus, the extent to which life chances of individuals are affected by their gender differs between countries. Some countries are more gender egalitarian than others. As such, the country context is of crucial importance in the analysis of gender and gender gaps as is the use of statistical models that allow the gender gap to vary across countries.

1.6.2 Clarifying Gender (In)Equality

Gender equality and gender inequality are terms that are often used but rarely clearly and almost never operationally defined (Robeyns 2007). From a theoretical point of view, gender equality is a multifaceted ideal that spans all sectors of society: “Social policy should promote women’s full participation on a par with men in all areas of social life—in employment, in politics, in the associational life of civil society” (Fraser 1994:599). Due to its multidimensionality, it depends on the dimension studied whether a specific society is considered to be more or less gender egalitarian (Mandel 2009). Therefore, one cannot infer that a specific country is highly gender egalitarian with respect to voluntary association membership (which would be one component of gender equality in voluntary sector) simply because it has been shown to be highly gender egal-
itarian with regard to parliamentary representation (which is one aspect of gender equality in the state sector). In addition, gender equality is not a dichotomy. Thus, the question is not whether countries are gender egalitarian or not. Rather, gender equality is a position on a continuum that is bound to the left by perfect equality and is in principle unbound to the right (Blackburn 2008).

Likewise, most often it is unclear what exactly is to be equalized. Some scholars stress the importance of equalizing inputs as would be the case for conceptualizations like *equality of opportunity* (Roemer 2008) or *equality of resources* (Dworkin 1981). From such a point of view, a situation where men and women have equal initial conditions is deemed fair. However, even if starting positions were equal, outcomes (i.e. the number of voluntary association memberships) may differ: “Women’s life chances […] are often worse than men’s even if their material resource holdings and personal skill sets are equal […]” (Browne and Stears 2005:358). Such a situation implies that the pathways to voluntary association affiliation differ for men and women. Gendered norms and institutions therefore affect how equal opportunities or equal resources translate into the focal outcome. If, for instance, a given resource endowment is more useful for men than for women (i.e. it generates more of a valuable and desirable outcome like memberships in voluntary associations), gender affects the conversion of resources into outcomes. Gender then acts as *conversion factor* as it is called in the parlance of Sen’s capability approach (Robyens 2007; Sen 2000). The same amount of a specific resource or input has different utility depending on whether this resource belongs to a man or a woman. When this is the case, equalizing inputs, for example by redistributive policies, does not produce gender equality in outcomes. Thus, equalizing opportunities or resources does not necessarily result in same number of voluntary association memberships for men and women. Accordingly, other scholars highlight the importance of *equality of outcomes* (Phillips 2004). Equality of outcome is probably the most contested of all equality conceptions. In particular, this equality conception is deemed to be incompatible with a meritocratic vision of society (Roemer 2008). Some of the controversy associated with equality of outcome is ameliorated if one shifts the focus from the individual (which is usually the moral unit of analysis in theories of justice or equality) to the group (Phillips 2004). In that view, gender equality is achieved if outcome distributions for men and women are equal. This allows for inter-individual differences with-
in groups (which usually is judged to be important as individuals should be held accountable for their choices) but at the same time maintains that women as a group should not be different from men (Phillips 2004; Seguino 2008). Thus, given equal starting positions in a fair and nondiscriminatory world, men and women should have equal outcomes on average if we assume that the genders do not differ in terms of intelligence, talent, effort and other productivity dimensions: “We can judge […] the extent of the equality by checking on the results, and should be reluctant to credit an initial equality of opportunity if the outcomes prove so dissimilar. […] When outcomes are different (read unequal), the better explanation is that the opportunities were themselves unequal” (Phillips 2004:6). Thus, when equal starting positions result in different outcomes, the societal context in the form of cultural legacy, social arrangements and institutions is likely to exert a moderating influence on the mechanism that translates inputs into outcomes.

1.6.3 Operationalizing Gender (In)Equality

Interestingly, most quantitative studies on gender differentials implicitly adopt group-level equality of outcome as equality metric. By incorporating a dummy variable for gender, group-level differences between men and women in the outcome variable are studied—controlling for (i.e. statistically equalizing) inputs (Cain 1986). This way of statistical modeling allows gender equality to be a continuous concept and there is a clear benchmark of gender equality in voluntary association participation against which the actual data can be compared.

Gender equality would be a situation where, conditional on all other relevant antecedents, there is no effect of the gender dummy on the outcome, i.e. voluntary association participation. Thus, gender equality is defined as absence of a difference in outcomes if both genders had the same inputs. In regression analysis, the irrelevance of

There is some controversy whether gender equality should be achieved by women getting all rights and duties as men (equality as sameness) or whether men and women should end up somewhere in the middle (equality as transformation), i.e. women becoming more similar to men and men becoming more similar to women (Fraser 1994; Verloo and Lombardo 2007). I admit that this is an important philosophical and societal debate. However, in both cases gender equality means absence of a difference between genders in
the gender dummy signifies that the first moments of the distributions of voluntary association memberships do not differ for men and women. Thus, we typically speak of gender equality if the means of the focal outcome distributions are equal although certainly other aspects of the distributions can differ even if the means are equal.

The effect of gender on voluntary association participation is likely to be distributed across many factors predicting membership in voluntary associations. For example, financial resources predict participation in voluntary associations and women have on average fewer financial resources than men. If, despite controlling for these factors, a gender effect remains, this net gender effect captures all gender differences that are not captured by the other predictor variables (Olsen and Walby 2004). Conditional on the assumption that the model explaining membership in voluntary associations is properly formulated (i.e. if it contains all relevant major antecedents) then a significant effect for the gender variable is likely to reflect gender differences in preferences regarding voluntary association affiliation and gender discrimination in the voluntary sector. Gender differences on predictor distributions other than gender (i.e. different average financial resources for men and women) may also reflect gender discrimination but these take place in other, more distal spheres of society (Cain 1986). These differences on predictor variables are not further investigated in this study. This restriction is legitimate because the focus of this dissertation is on gender differences in voluntary association participation and not on gender differences in its antecedents.

Including gender as main effect only assumes identical causal pathways for both genders. However, some factors may be more enabling or more constraining for women than for men. A more general approach is to estimate separate regression equations for men and women (or alternatively to include the full set of interactions with gender). In this formulation regression coefficients can be different for men and women and it therefore allows for gender-specific causal pathways to voluntary association participation. Such modeling—usually combined with some form of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (see Chapter 3)—even might reveal that the causal pathways differ for men and
women even though there is no gender gap in the outcome (i.e. voluntary association participation). It is an interesting philosophical question whether gender equality should also include identical causal pathways. Nevertheless, as long as there is an absence of a gender difference in voluntary association participation I am going to talk about gender equality irrespective of potentially different underlying causal mechanisms.

1.7 The Multilevel Antecedents of Voluntary Association Participation

1.7.1 The Micro-Level Model for Explaining Membership in Voluntary Associations

In exploring and explaining the gender differential in voluntary association affiliation in cross-national comparison, I am going to adopt a multilevel perspective—both theoretically and statistically (Snijders and Bosker 2012). The starting point is a micro-level model that posits that—in addition to gender—the individual actor’s resource endowments are the major predictors of membership (see Figure 1.1, Path (g) and Path (r)). Financial, cognitive and social resources as well as free time are among the fundamental push and pull factors to become a member of voluntary associations (Bekkers 2005; Bekkers et al. 2008; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999b).

These resources act as push factors because highly educated, wealthy and connected individuals with free time seek out organizations differentially. For individuals with high levels of resources the costs of membership (be them monetary like membership fees or cognitive for those who hold office or otherwise engaged in the activities of the association) are relatively lower. For the material resources to be push factors in the process of becoming a member, one has to assume that the individual actor not only has access to these resources but also has full control over them. This assumption is especially delicate for women living in traditional partnerships. In this case, reporting a certain household income does not automatically imply that the corresponding woman has control over this resource.

In addition, resources function as pull factors because educated, wealthy and connected individuals with free time are recruited by voluntary organizations differen-
tially. This can be explained by the fact that individuals with high resource levels are more valuable members for the organization because the organization may take advantage of the members’ resources, knowledge, skills and contacts. Therefore, resource differences between individuals give rise to selective joining by the individuals as well as selective recruiting by voluntary associations (McPherson 1981b).

This resource model implies that women may be less involved because they are disadvantaged with respect to resources driving voluntary association affiliation, i.e. they have a resource deficit or because these resources have differential utility for them in becoming a member, i.e. women face a return deficit or both (Lin 2000). The resource deficit effect actually implies mediation, i.e. gender has an indirect effect on membership in voluntary associations that is transmitted through resource endowments (Paths (e) and (r) in Figure 1.1). Thus, the resources, at least partially, explain why women have fewer memberships than men. The return deficit effect implies moderation, i.e. the effects of the resources are conditional on gender (Path (c.1) in Figure 1.1). Thus, how a given resource endowment translates into memberships depends on whether these resources belong to a man or to a woman. If women are disadvantaged in turning their resources into memberships, gender acts as conversion factor. Thus, the proposed micro-level model is an instance of moderated mediation (in particular it resembles the structure of Model 1 in Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007:195).

Gender differences that cannot be explained by resource differences likely reflect a return deficit due to gender specific preferences regarding voluntary association participation or discrimination that takes place in the voluntary sector. As argued in Section 1.6.3, I speak of gender equality if Path (g) in Figure 1.1 is not different from zero. This does not preclude gender-specific pathways to voluntary association affiliation (i.e. a significant effect of Path (c.1)) even in the absence of a gender gap in voluntary association memberships.

As was discussed in the Section 1.5.2, the unequal distribution of memberships is likely to affect status attainment and as a result resource endowments (Path (f) in Figure 1.1). This feedback loop has been explicit in the writings of Bourdieu (1983) and Lin (2000). It may also be the case that the effect of membership on resources differs by gender (Path (c.2) in Figure 1.1). This would also be an indication of gender acting as
conversion factor as gender affects how membership in voluntary associations can be used in mobilizing socially embedded resources. However, since this dissertation is restricted to the pathways to voluntary association participation and the role gender plays therein, the effect of voluntary association memberships on resource endowments and potential gender differences in this effect—although important for the relevance of voluntary associations in social inequality research—are not investigated further.

1.7.2 Economic Position, Resources and Voluntary Association Participation

Resource endowments are heavily affected by the actor’s economic position. Actually, many of the documented gender differences in voluntary association affiliation have been explained with men’s and women’s differing attachment to the labor market as this is the sphere where resources, social rights and prestige are allocated. For example, among women, those in the labor force have more memberships (Gustafson et al. 1979) and are members of much larger organizations than housewives (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982). The size differences of the organizations women and men belong to “[is] related to differing positions held in the economic sector” (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982:890). In addition, employed women are less likely to belong to all-female organizations than those not attached to the labor market (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986). As more and more women enter the labor force, their affiliation patterns become similar to that of men, i.e. they join instrumental voluntary associations that are useful in furthering one’s career (Gustafson et al. 1979; Klobus-Edwards, Edwards, and Watts 1984; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986; Rotolo 1999; Wilson 1990). Similarly, the literature on social movements has reported that the extensive influx of women into the paid labor force is associated with a higher protest potential and has reduced gender differences in protest behavior (Jenkins, Wallace, and Fullerton 2008). This is explained with converging political attitudes and behavior due to converging gender roles.

Economic position does not only influence resource endowments. It can be hypothesized that returns to resources are also linked to economic position. Differential returns to resource endowments (i.e. their varying utility in becoming a member) are probably the result of differing preferences and behavior among men and women due to gendered role expectations as well as discrimination within the voluntary sector. How-
ever, the more women’s labor force participation patterns resemble those of men, the more role expectations will converge with equalizing effects on returns on resources.

The mechanism for this has been explicated as follows. For women, labor force participation provides access to and control over resources. This constitutes the *sine qua non* of an independent livelihood without a husband. These new outside options expand women’s bargaining power within the household (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Orloff 1993). Women in paid labor are in a position to contest the traditional division of labor within households. As a consequence, actual behavior within households changes gradually. If more and more couples equalize their division of labor, social norms about the rights and duties of men and women will adjust accordingly. The more women’s labor force participation patterns resemble those of men, the more the role expectations will converge. It is expected that convergence in economic position induces convergence in preferences and behavior and that resources are valued equally by the voluntary sector irrespective of whether they belong to men or women.

However, economic position is not solely an individual attribute. Countries differ in women’s labor force participation rates, gender pay gaps, proportion of women working part-time, proportion of women in managerial position etc. This indicates that the institutional and cultural context plays a prime role in explaining gender differences in resource endowments and resource returns. Some countries actively enable women’s full integration into the market sector (i.e. by providing public sector jobs, early childhood care, elder care, flexible work hours and paid leave benefit etc.) whereas others maintain the traditional division of labor within couples.

### 1.7.3 The Role of the Country Context

#### 1.7.3.1 The Country as Essential Unit of Analysis

The micro-level model is embedded in a specific country context that can impact on all aspects of the model. Becoming a member of a voluntary organization is not just a matter of individual attributes: “People do not ‘just join’ voluntary associations because they are wealthy, educated, or trusting, or have particular interests or social problems to address. The act of joining, and the particular types of organizations people join, are embedded in cultural and institutional arrangements defined at the level of national poli-
ty” (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001:824). The organizational landscape, that is, the size as well as the composition of the voluntary sector, varies across countries. Also, the cultural, economic and political context affects the probability of becoming a member, the types of associations joined and the form as well as the intensity of involvement. For example, it is quite common for American students to be members of fraternities or sororities. In contrast, members of Burschenschaften or Studentenverbindungen are ostracized in Germany because these organizations are associated with right-wing extremist ideologies. Thus, the country context sets differential opportunities and restrictions thereby structuring the choices the potential member can make.

The context conditionality of the voluntary sector and the organizations therein pose a threat on comparability of survey responses across countries. However, this issue is especially problematic for “league table” research that focuses on the question of which nation is the nation of joiners (i.e. which country has the highest mean membership count or the highest proportion of respondents who declare to be members of voluntary associations). Issues of comparability are less problematic for research on the gender gap within countries. As men and women become members within the same context and therefore face the same organizational landscape, their membership counts should be roughly comparable.

The country context also frames the definition of gender. National government, national social policies, national institutions and economy as well as cultural traditions and heritage all affect gender relations within society. Therefore, gender differences—like overall levels of participation—within the voluntary sector cannot be explained by individual attributes alone. How many and what types of organizations are typically joined by men and women varies systematically between countries. Thus, features of the country context enable or impede women’s membership in voluntary associations. The country is therefore the natural aggregate unit of analysis for the study of voluntary sectors (Archambault 2009; Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990; Salomon and Anheier 1998; Salamon and Sokolowski 2003; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001) and gender stratification systems (Chan 2000; Esping-Andersen 1999; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Korpi et al. 2009; Mandel 2009; Orloff 1993, 1996).
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1.7.3.2 The Impact of the Country Context

In principle, there are several ways in which the societal context can affect participation in the associations of the voluntary sector as depicted in Figure 1.1. Perhaps the most obvious is the direct effect (d) of the country context on membership. This effect implies that in some countries it is generally more common to be a member in voluntary associations than in others. One of the more prominent approaches explaining cross-country differences in the prevalence of voluntary associations and membership therein is linked to the provision of key social services (Archambault 2009; Salomon and Anheier 1998). In countries in which the welfare state is weak, the voluntary sector is serving to fulfill otherwise unmet needs (i.e. providing social services in the areas of health, education, housing etc.). This has been interpreted from the demand side as reaction of civil society to demands of key social services (Salomon and Anheier 1998; Hodgkinson 2003) and from the supply side because “as federal economic and social responsibilities grew during the twentieth century, the state came to rely on civil society’s activism and encouraged its expansion [...] by involving voluntary groups in the implementation of welfare policies” (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001:812). The direct effect of the country context on membership in voluntary associations is gender neutral as it affects men and women alike. Research on the direct effect of the country context on memberships in voluntary associations is therefore more suited to explain differing levels of voluntary participation in comparative perspective. It is less helpful in explaining the gender gap in voluntary association memberships within countries. However, how the provision of key social services is organized in a country might have effects on women’s life chances in others domains. For example, a public childcare system might enable women’s labor force participation more than childcare that is provided by the voluntary sector. This in turn is likely to have an effect on women’s resource endowments.

The context effect can also be mediated via resources (Path (m) in Figure 1.1). The welfare state may affect the average resource levels and may therefore have an indirect influence on the levels of voluntary association affiliation. Thus, in addition to the direct effect of country context, country differences in average resource endowments can also explain different levels in voluntary association memberships across countries.
The country’s impact on predictor distributions (e.g. resource endowments) is also known as *compositional effect*.

It should be remembered that on the individual level indirect paths cannot go through fixed attributes like gender, i.e. mediators have to be variables that can be changed by antecedents (MacKinnon, Krull, and Lockwood 2000). However, in principle it is possible that the country context has an influence on the gender composition via the prevalence of sex-selective abortion and infanticide. As all the countries included in the current study are WEIRD (i.e. Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic) and show relatively constant sex ratios over the last decades (Grech, Vassallo-Agius, and Savona-Ventura 2003), I rule out such effects and do not include a path from the country context to being female.

The *moderating effect* of the country context has received some attention in the comparative literature that uses multilevel models (e.g. Lam 2006; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Van Ingen and Van der Meer 2011) because *cross-level interactions*\(^{10}\) are an integral feature of these models (Snijders and Bosker 2012). In terms of the model depicted in Figure 1.1, the country context can modify the effects of individual-level resources (i.1). For example, in more generous or redistributive welfare states individual income and education should be less discriminating among actors, i.e. income and education should matter less for becoming a member (Van Ingen and Van der Meer 2011). The main effect of gender on voluntary association membership may also depend on the country context (Path (i.2) in Figure 1.1). This effect captures the remaining gender gap in voluntary association participation that cannot be explained by gender differences in resources. As explained in Section 1.6.3, there should be no direct effect of gender in countries that have a gender-egalitarian voluntary sector.

\(^{10}\) A cross-level interaction is an interaction between variables defined at different levels (e.g. the individual and the country level).
The country context may also modify the effect of gender on resource endowments (Path (i.4) in Figure 1.1). For example, the welfare state may affect the distribution of resources between the genders by increasing the female labor market participation rate via active labor market policies, widely available and affordable child care as well as redistributive policies (Van Oorschot and Finsveen 2010). This kind of *moderated mediation* is especially important to explain gender differences in voluntary association participation because it provides a mechanism by which the context exerts its influence on the outcome. The country influences the extent of the average resource deficit faced by women.

The country context may also affect how men and women translate their resource endowments into memberships. This is an instance of *moderated moderation* as the moderator depends on the country context (Path (c.1) and Path (i.3) in Figure 1.1).
Thus, features of the country context influence the return deficit and therefore how much gender matters for the conversion of resources into memberships.

Since the unequal distribution of memberships is likely to have a feedback loop on resources (Path (f) in Figure 1.1), it is possible that the context also moderates the effect of memberships on resource endowments (i.5). It may also be the case that this feedback loop differs between men and women (Path (c.2) in Figure 1.1) and that the country context affects this gender difference in returns to memberships (i.6). In addition, via the direct effect of the country context on memberships (d) there is also a mediated path of the country context on new resource differences. Again, this dissertation is concerned with the analysis of the antecedents of voluntary association participation and not with its consequences. For that reason these feedback effects are not investigated.

The theoretical approaches that try to explain country differences in the voluntary sector and participation therein do not pick out gender as a central theme. Rather, they are designed to explain prevalence of associations, composition of the voluntary sector, levels of involvement, revenue structure etc. Therefore, these theories are only of limited value for the aims of this study. These approaches have to be combined with insights and results from research on gender and welfare states. In particular, since resource endowments and therefore women’s economic position are the central predictors in explaining gender differences in voluntary association participation, those approaches seem to be fruitful that explain country differences in female attachment to the labor market and women’s economic independence. In the upcoming chapters I am going to combine approaches from the voluntary sector research with insights from research on gender and welfare states to explain gender differences in voluntary association participation in comparative perspective.

1.8 Methodological Remarks

After having presented the theoretical framework for this dissertation, I am going to comment on some methodological issues that are relevant for all upcoming analyses. In particular, I am going to argue that the dependent variable (i.e. the membership count) is better regarded as a composite, that for cross-sectional comparative analysis regime
typologies have certain merits, that the interpretation of uncertainty estimates makes sense even for country characteristics and that the deliberate restriction to European countries has the benefit of limiting the number of potential confounders.

1.8.1 Measurement Assumptions Concerning the Membership Count

As discussed in Section 1.4, the count of memberships in different types of voluntary associations is going to be the dependent variable in most of the following analyses. I do not pretend that the sum of organizational memberships forms a unidimensional construct. Rather, it is more compelling to regard the membership variables as causal or formative indicators and the membership count as a composite formed by them (Bollen and Lennox 1991; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). In adopting this view, I follow the work of Guillen, Coromina, and Saris (2011) who treat associational membership variables as formative indicators of formal social participation (see also Parboteeah, Cullen, and Lim 2004). However, I refrain from using their more sophisticated approaches (i.e. Mokken scaling, multiple correspondence analysis, structural equation modeling) to combine the membership variables or to use additional information such as active participation or volunteering within the associations in which respondents are members. As shown in their paper, the payoffs of these modeling efforts—in terms of correlations with an external criterion reflecting the relative frequency of social contacts—are only modest (see also the research findings reported at the end of Section 1.4 on the importance of the simple membership count). From the formative indicators perspective, factor analyzing the membership variables that make up the count variable or reporting internal consistency estimates of reliability as is sometimes done in the literature (e.g. Van Deth and Kreuter 1998; Van Oorschot, Arts, and Gelissen 2006) does not make any sense (Bollen 1984; Fabrigar and Wegener 2012).

1.8.2 The Conceptualization and Operationalization of the Country Context

Since the country context is of utmost theoretical importance in any cross-national analysis, some words on this topic are in order. In principle, there are two opposing approaches to conceptualize and operationalize the country context. First, hypotheses about country differences can be stated with proper country names. For example: Vol-
Voluntary association participation is higher in the US than in Germany. The country-context is operationalized accordingly with country indicator variables or country dummies. Every country context is captured by a separate variable (except for the baseline or reference country). Thus, there is a variable representing the US and a variable representing Germany. These country indicators absorb all between-country differences. Yet, they do not explain them. For example, a model might reveal that the US and Germany differ significantly from each other with regard to the outcome at hand. This finding, however, does not reveal any clues about why this might be the case. Even worse, apart from substantial between-country differences, the country indicator variables also reflect all differences in sampling, fieldwork, question wording etc. between the countries. As a consequence, a significant between-country difference might be a purely methodological artifact thereby leading the researcher astray who tries to interpret the difference in substantive terms.

The second approach is to decompose the country context into country characteristics by explicitly using country variables (Kohn 1978). Or as stated by Przeworski and Teune (1970:12): “[...] general theory consisting of nomothetic statements can be formulated and tested in the social sciences if proper names of social systems are replaced by variables in the course of comparative research [...]”. This requires to abstract from the specific countries studied and to focus on their characteristics instead. Hence, the hypotheses are not about the countries themselves but instead are formulated in terms of their attributes. The so called crowding-out hypothesis (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005) might serve as an example: The more generous the welfare state the less individual actors participate in voluntary associations because there is no need of social service provision on the part of the voluntary sector. This way of conceptualizing and operationalizing the country context is usually preferred by quantitative comparative researchers because it leads to profounder knowledge as causal mechanisms are explicat-ed and to a more general formulation because proper names are removed from the theoretical statements. However, this modeling strategy implies that country characteristics can be isolated and changed in a ceteris paribus fashion to produce the outcome. This assumption is not unique to cross-national social research. However, it has been heavily criticized in single-level regression analysis because in reality only few factors can be changed in isolation (Berk 2004).
In contrast, more than a few comparative scholars would argue that certain country characteristics must work in conjunction to produce a specific outcome. This view is embodied in statements about institutional complementarities (Hall and Soskice 2004), institutional arrangements (Esping-Anderson 1990), institutional configurations (Streeck and Thelen 2005) or policy bundles (Stier and Mandel 2009) that are frequently found in the comparative literature. In the language of Przeworski and Teune (1970:10): “[...] societies constitute ‘systems’ and therefore various elements of societies interact with each other.” Thus, if specific combinations of values on a set of underlying variables are necessary to produce the hypothesized effects, it is useful to operationalize the country context using a regime typology. Regimes are a special kind of a theoretically derived multidimensional construct (Arts and Gelissen 2002). In principle, a regime typology is equivalent to what is called a profile model in research on multidimensional constructs. The defining feature of this type of multidimensional construct is that “[b]ecause of their theoretical nature, the dimensions of these multidimensional constructs cannot be combined algebraically” (Law, Wong, and Mobley 1998:746). Instead, “[...] researchers using the profile model will artificially dichotomize each dimension and use different combinations of the dichotomized dimensions to form various profiles of the multidimensional construct” (Law et al. 1998:751). Countries that are similar on these profiles are grouped together forming a specific regime type and are contrasted with countries that form different regimes. Thus, the country context is represented by a regime indicator variable.

The regime approach is somewhere in between the above identified approaches to conceptualize and operationalize the country context. Proper names have been eliminated and country indicators are replaced by regime membership indicators that represent specific configurations of country characteristics. It is sometimes criticized that the driving forces behind regime effects remain unclear and it would be more informative to directly use the country characteristics that were used in constructing the regime typology (Jæger 2006). However, in order to replace the regime typology it would be necessary to incorporate the main effects and many of the (partly higher order) interactions among the underlying country variables. This strategy would consume many degrees of freedom. Given the restriction that most cross-national data sets have only about 30 countries, this way of incorporating the country context is problematic as the number of
variables approaches the number of cases.\textsuperscript{11} This increases the likelihood of overfitting and capitalizing on chance (Babyak 2004). A regime typology is therefore a parsimonious representation of the complex country context that helps to analyze broad patterns in cross-national research.\textsuperscript{12} A limitation of using a regime typology is that it is hardly generalizable to countries not listed by the typology inventor.

I am going to use the \textit{welfare regime} (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999) and the \textit{nonprofit regime} (Anheier & Salamon 1999, 2006; Salamon and Anheier 1998; Salamon & Sokolowski 2003) typologies for studying cross-national differences in the gender gap in voluntary association participation.

Regime typologies are, however, less useful in longitudinal research as regime membership varies rarely over time. This relative stability over the time span for which comparable survey data is available implies that regime membership is a constant within country and therefore cannot explain country-specific developments over time: “Longitudinal designs are of little help when variables vary more over space than time” (Bollen, Entwisle, and Alderson 1993:337). In Chapter 4, I am going to focus on the dynamics of the gender gap in voluntary association participation in cross-national comparison using the longitudinal dimension of the combined World Values Survey and the European Values Study data sets. Therefore, in these analyses I am going to use more volatile country characteristics (i.e. female labor force participation rate and GDP) as explanatory variables.

\section*{1.8.3 Sample Selection and Statistical Inference}

Using cross-national survey data poses some problems on how to interpret parameter estimates and associated standard errors pertaining to country characteristics because countries in cross-national surveys do not constitute a random sample. In contrast, respondents in the respective countries are usually sampled at random. Inference about

\textsuperscript{11} Another possible strategy would be to reduce the number of predictors by means of principle components analysis. However, this approach would also obscure the real driving forces.

\textsuperscript{12} There are also considerable difficulties to acquire comparable cross-national data for all variables underlying the regime typology for all countries.
parameter estimates pertaining to their characteristics is therefore considered less problematic.

Some scholars argue that the countries included in cross-national research constitute a finite population, i.e. a fixed batch of data that could not have been different. Therefore, significance testing has no formal basis as there is no sampling error (Berk, Western, and Weiss 1995; Gill 2001). If such a viewpoint is adopted one only interprets point estimates of regression models because these are describing the population relationship and simply disregards uncertainty measures in the output.

However, it is controversial whether such a group of countries is better regarded as a population or as a non-random sample (Bollen 1995). Even if one maintains that the full set of countries in the data base forms a population, the number of countries used for analysis is typically reduced because of data problems. Country characteristics like GDP or the female labor force participation rate are normally not available for all countries and for all periods one has interest in. The included countries are hardly a random sample from the full set of countries as missingness on country characteristics is likely to be related to development and state institutional performance. For example, country-level data is systematically less available for post-socialist countries (Bollen et al. 1993). Hence, the data is not missing completely at random.

However, whether non-random samples or population data pose problems for statistical inference depends on the inferential framework invoked. In R. A. Fisher’s model-based framework of statistical inference random samples are not needed (Johnstone 1989; Lohr 2010; Smith 1983; Sterba 2009). This approach is usually contrasted with J. Neyman and E. S. Pearson’s design-based approach to statistical inference.

In the design-based approach inference is from the sample to the finite population and randomness comes from repeated sampling. Thus, with population data there is no randomness and therefore no uncertainty about population characteristics. In contrast, in the model-based approach inference is from the data to the data generating pro-

13 However, it has to be presumed that the sample is—given current knowledge (i.e. conditioning on variables known to affect inclusion probabilities)—not apparently biased.
cess and randomness comes from invoking a data generating model with distributional assumptions (Sterba 2009). The model generating the data is sometimes called the *superpopulation* model (Bollen et al. 1993; Snijders and Bosker 2012). It is assumed that this model has generated the finite population data from which the observations at hand had been sampled. One can therefore use the finite population data to estimate the parameters of the superpopulation model. Thus, under a superpopulation model it makes sense to use statistical inference even if the data at hands qualifies as a population. The reason is that statistical models are necessarily abstract and cannot explain every empirical case perfectly and therefore need to allow random deviations from the model. Accordingly, there is randomness even with population data. This argumentation holds irrespective of the process to be modeled is deterministic but imperfectly known or is assumed to be inherently stochastic (Broscheid and Gschwend 2005). The randomness of the data generating process is represented by the error term (or the conditional probability distribution of the dependent variable given predictor variables in generalized linear models) in statistical modelling. It represents omitted variables, the inherent unpredictability of social outcomes in a nondeterministic world, imperfect functional form specifications and measurement error in the dependent variable (Snijders and Bosker 2012).\(^{14}\)

From a model-based perspective, the actual sampling design is irrelevant if the data generating mechanism is correctly specified: “The design for how observations are sampled, then, should make little difference for finding the point estimates of regression coefficients, as every possible observation is described by the model” (Lohr 2010:449). The model-based approach to statistical inference is also much more in line with statistical modeling which is not only interested in estimating quantities for the specific population at hand but rather is interested in uncovering regularities generalizable to other populations as well (Snijders and Bosker 2012).

\(^{14}\) In addition, the usual assumptions in regression modeling do not impose any distributional assumptions on predictor variables. Thus, predictor values do not have to come from a random sample or from a specified probability distribution.
In summary, from a model-based perspective on statistical inference neither non-random samples nor population data pose any problems for statistical inference. Therefore, I am going to present standard error estimates and interpret significance tests even for country characteristics.

1.8.4 The Problem of Statistical Control in the Country Sample

The model-based approach is also preferred in situations when the sample size is small (Lohr 2010). However, the small number of countries in cross-national surveys is a limitation that not only has an impact on statistical inference. The small number of countries makes it impossible to use extensive statistical controls thereby provoking concerns about omitted variable bias. Restricting analysis on European countries only has therefore the potential benefit that a number of confounding country-level variables are hold constant without explicitly incorporating them into the model (Bollen et al. 1993; Van de Vijver 2003). Using a homogenous set of countries also makes it more likely that using the same measure in the different surveys indeed measures the same construct (Smelser 2003).

All European countries are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic, share a Christian heritage, experienced the Enlightenment etc. All these countries provide freedom of speech and freedom of association which are seen as the *sine qua non* of civil society and voluntary associations. Thereby these countries give their citizens the rights and liberties to form, join and quit groups at any time. It might not be very illuminating to study voluntary association participation in countries that differ in this regard as there is no real *voluntary* sector. Hence, restricting the country sample to European countries renders unnecessary the incorporation of numerous country-level predictors that otherwise would be essential in order to compare like with like. Hence, the few degrees of freedom available for modeling processes at the country level can be used to test country characteristics of real theoretical interest.
1.9 Overview of the Studies

It is not possible to investigate all paths of the theoretical model depicted in Figure 1.1 in a single analysis as it would be overly complex. Therefore, each of the upcoming chapters is devoted to certain aspects of the model.

Chapter 2 studies levels of voluntary association participation and the extent of the gender gap in voluntary association participation in cross-national perspective. Using the European Social Survey 2002/2003, results show that there is systematic variation in the gender gap across countries that cannot be explained solely by individual attributes. Using multilevel Poisson regression models and employing a gendered version of the theory of social origins of civil society (Salamon and Anheier 1998), the findings indicate that women in the social democratic countries have the highest participation rates, followed by women in corporatist and liberal regimes. In Mediterranean and post-socialist countries, women face a dual disadvantage. Their average number of voluntary association memberships is low, both in absolute terms and in comparison to their male counterparts. This chapter therefore focuses on paths (g), (r), (e), (i.2), (d) and (m) of the theoretical framework displayed in Figure 1.1.

Chapter 3 addresses the question of whether the gender gap in voluntary association participation is due to differences in resource endowments or due to differences in the effects of resources or both. It is also examined whether the underlying structure of the gender gap is influenced by the country context. Using the European Social Survey 2002/2003 and employing nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methods, the gender gap is decomposed into one part that is due to a resource deficit and another part that is due to a return deficit in order to give insights into the underlying structure of the gender gap. Results indicate that the Scandinavian countries provide gender equality with regard to voluntary association affiliation. There, women neither face a resource nor a return deficit. With the exception of France, the gender gap is significant in the countries belonging to the liberal and corporatist regimes. These gender differences are either due to a resource or due to a return deficit. No country exhibits both deficits. In countries where the gender gap is due to a return deficit, redistributive social policies are likely to be ineffective for achieving gender equality in voluntary association partic-
ipation. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to explore paths (g), (r), (c.1), (e), (i.1), (i.2), (i.3), (i.4) and (m) of Figure 1.1.

Chapter 4 builds on the distinction between instrumental and expressive voluntary associations. Women have traditionally been members in expressive voluntary associations but, when compared to men, have been underrepresented in instrumental organizations. This underrepresentation of women in instrumental, often work-related groups has been attributed to women’s lower attachment to the labor force in the literature. Since the female labor force participation rate has risen in the last decades these differences in joining behavior should have diminished. Memberships in instrumental and expressive organizations in 27 European societies are analyzed longitudinally in this study. Data come from combined World Values Survey and European Values Study, contributing 87 country-years in the period 1981–2009. These cross-national repeated cross-sections are analyzed using a three-level logistic multilevel model for change. In addition to individual-level predictors, the female labor force participation rate as indicator of women’s place in society is included in the analyses. To assess cross-country differences as well as developments over time, this indicator is decomposed into between-country and within-country variation. Results show that individual employment matters for women’s membership in instrumental and expressive organizations. In addition, women’s participation in instrumental voluntary associations is significantly related to between-country variation in women’s labor market participation rates. The results further suggest that the gender gap in instrumental organization affiliation is closing over time. However, the mechanism for this convergence is different than originally hypothesized. It is not that participation rates in instrumental voluntary associations are increasing faster for women than for men; rather, women disengage from instrumental associations at a significantly slower rate than men. This chapter investigates paths (g), (r), (e), (i.2), (d) and (m) dynamically.

The three empirical chapters were written as independent articles. Therefore, some overlap between the chapters could not be avoided, especially with regard to underlying theoretical reasoning and details on data.
2 Women and Their Memberships:
Gender Gap in Relational Dimension of Social Inequality\textsuperscript{15}

Draft versions of this article were presented at:

- Herbsttagung der Sektion für Modellbildung und Simulation der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie, Groningen, NL (24.09.2009)
- ESF HumVIB Workshop „Comparing European Countries: Multilevel Analysis of the Organization of the Life Course and Gender Inequity”, Utrecht, NL (26.11.2009)
- XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology, Göteborg, SE (13.07.2010).

\textsuperscript{15} This chapter is based upon Peter, Sascha and Sonja Drobnič. 2013. “Women and their Memberships: Gender Gap in Relational Dimension of Social Inequality.” \textit{Research in Social Stratification and Mobility} 31:32–48.
Abstract

Women tend to have fewer memberships in voluntary associations than men. Since voluntary associations create opportunity structures for the establishment of interpersonal contacts, memberships are considered to have beneficial ramifications by generating access to social resources. Using the European Social Survey 2002/2003, we examine variations in the gender gap in associational involvement in a cross-national context. We find systematic variation in the gender gap that cannot be explained solely by individual attributes. Using multilevel Poisson regression models and employing a gendered version of the theory of social origins of civil society (Salamon and Anheier 1998), we find that women in the social democratic countries have the highest participation rates, followed by women in corporatist and liberal regimes. In Mediterranean and post-socialist countries, women face a dual disadvantage. Their average number of voluntary association memberships is low, both in absolute terms and in comparison to their male counterparts. This study reveals a complex relationship between societal context and the gender gap in associational involvement. Inequality in voluntary association participation between the genders may be another piece in the jigsaw puzzle of overall gender inequality in contemporary societies.
2.1 Introduction

In her plea for gender equity, Fraser (1994) outlined several principles through which the welfare state can ensure gender equality and provide necessary conditions for women’s participation in society. “Social policy should promote women’s full participation on a par with men in all areas of social life—in employment, in politics, in the associational life of civil society” (Fraser 1994:599). Gender inequalities in employment and politics have attracted a lot of scholarly attention in the past decades. A substantial body of research investigated gendered employment chances, antecedents and consequences of the position of men and women in the labor market as well as the gender gap in political power. The third domain—gender inequalities in participation in civil society and in voluntary associations—has received considerably less attention so far, although it has been recognized that social groups and associations are an important source of interpersonal ties and resources which can be instrumental to individual goal achievement and thus important for the position of an individual in society. This is explicitly formulated, for example, in the social resources theory of status attainment (Aguilera 2008; Lin 1999b).

Membership in voluntary associations is frequently considered an important component of social capital and has associated individual pay-offs. If membership in voluntary associations is differentially distributed between men and women, the pay-offs accruing from being a member are also differentially distributed. There is a rich micro-level research tradition focusing on the individual-level determinants of voluntary association affiliation within which also gender differences have been studied. There is also a growing macro-level research which focuses on cross-country differences in membership levels but this research has not systematically addressed gender differences in voluntary associations. Like other instances of gender inequality, the gender gap in voluntary association membership varies between countries. Some countries are more gender egalitarian than others and this variation cannot be explained by individual-level attributes alone. Instead, one has to explicitly incorporate the institutional and cultural context to account for the varying gender gap. In this article we combine both the individual-level and the societal-level perspectives by employing a multilevel approach to study the gender gap in voluntary association membership in cross-national comparison.
We combine the theory of *social origins of civil society* (Salamon and Anheier 1998) with insights from the welfare state and gender literature to assess differing membership levels between genders in comparative perspective. Our study thus provides additional insights into the voluntary association literature by linking the individual-level and cross-national level research on gender gap in voluntary association memberships, proposes a novel theoretical framework for better understanding cross-national differences in membership gender gap, and contributes to the general understanding of the persistence of gender inequalities in contemporary societies by outlining the importance of the relational aspects of social inequalities.

### 2.2 Membership in Voluntary Associations and Gender Inequality

#### 2.2.1 Voluntary Associations as a Context for Social Ties

Many resources, such as information, help, emotional or financial support, are embedded in social networks and are accessible to individuals through their direct or indirect ties. Access to social networks and the potential to mobilize embedded resources and the associated “structural opportunity and advantage” (Lin 1999b:480), captured in the concept of social capital, is unequally distributed among individuals (Bourdieu 1983). This *relational* form of social inequality may generate, maintain or amplify social inequality in other dimensions such as income, power or occupational prestige and in this way underline and enhance gender inequality.

However, not all forms of network ties are equally conducive to achieving one’s aims. Granovetter (1973) pointed out the important distinction between strong and weak ties in social networks. Weak ties have repeatedly been identified as channels through which valuable information passes and “two common sources of weak ties [are] formal organizations and work settings” (Granovetter 1973:1375). One of the key sources of weak ties are voluntary associations that create an “opportunity structure for interpersonal contacts” (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982:884; McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnič 1992). Voluntary organizations are arenas for meeting and interacting with other people. As a result, networks are formed around these “organizing foci” (Feld 1981). They serve as an important context for gaining useful information and meeting
potentially important acquaintances (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982, 1986; Völker, Flap, and Mollenhorst 2009). The sum of associations to which a focal actor belongs constitutes an upper bound of potential voluntary association contacts (Popielarz 1999b). Hence, the more memberships an individual has, the higher the prospects of getting useful information or meeting important acquaintances.

Several studies have found evidence that members of voluntary associations do indeed have better opportunities in life, in particular with respect to the occupational realm. Stoloff, Glanville, and Bienenstock (1999) found that membership in voluntary organizations increases the probability that women participate in the labor force. Ruiter and De Graaf (2009) reported that members of voluntary associations have better-paid jobs and are employed in jobs with higher occupational prestige. Beggs and Hurlbert (1997) analyzed job search outcomes and confirmed that membership in voluntary organizations provides access to instrumentally useful contacts. These contacts in turn positively affect the prestige of the destination job and the probability that a job seeker who was looking for a particular job actually found it. However, these effects differed by organization type and gender. The authors concluded that the “[…] voluntary organizational context may itself be a type of social resource” (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997:618).

2.2.2 Unequal Distribution of Association Memberships

If voluntary associations facilitate access to social networks and mobilization of embedded resources, unequal distribution of memberships between men and women implies differential opportunities for reaping associated benefits. There is ample evidence of gender differences in voluntary association affiliation. In addition to the fact that women tend to be members of different types of voluntary associations than men (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982, 1986; Norris and Inglehart 2006; Popielarz 1999a), in most studies on voluntary participation women have been found to have fewer memberships than men (e.g. Babchuk and Booth 1969; Booth 1972; Curtis 1971; Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis et al. 1992; Lam 2006; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Smith 1975, 1994). This even holds true after controlling for socioeconomic variables. Hence, equality of opportunity may not be provided if gender differences in the access to socially embedded resources based on differences in associa-
Voluntary association affiliation is powerfully shaped by the societal context. Several comparative studies show that there are substantial differences in membership rates across countries (Curtis 1971; Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis et al. 1992; Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; Lam 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2006; Paxton 2007; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Van Deth and Kreuter 1998). However, only few studies explicitly consider the gender gap in voluntary association participation in comparative perspective. It is surprising that most of the literature studying cross-country differences in voluntary association affiliation seems to assume that the effect of gender on association participation is constant across countries, even though we know from other fields of inquiry that some countries are more gender-egalitarian than others.

Nevertheless, there are a few notable exceptions. Norris and Inglehart (2006) found a gender gap in membership levels in societies at all different levels of development, although the gap diminished from agrarian via industrial to postindustrial societies. Curtis (1971) noted substantial gender differences in associational memberships in his six-country study. While men had more memberships than women in all countries and showed similar levels of association across most countries, women’s participation differed substantially. He concluded that “[t]he differences in overall membership for these nations were largely a function of differences in the affiliation roles of women” (Curtis 1971:879). Gustafson at al. (1979) used the classification of voluntary associations in instrumental and expressive groups proposed by Gordon and Babchuk (1959) to explain country differences in female association participation. They hypothesized that women and men have equal rates of joining expressive groups, but differ with respect to memberships in instrumental groups. The primary reason for this difference in joining is involvement in the workforce which, in general, is higher for men than for women. As female labor force participation varies across countries, so does female participation in instrumental groups. Thus, controlling for employment status should substantially reduce the cross-national gender differences in association affiliation. Their analyses supported these expectations. Thus, cross-country differences were largely a result of compositional effects.
Andersen et al. (2006) investigated the time spent daily on civic association activity using longitudinal time-use data from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. They found a decline in civic engagement in the United States which was not evident in the three other countries. Their analyses showed that this decline pertains only to American women. The demands of paid employment and family, combined with low levels of state support for childcare and early childhood education, as well as weak restrictions on paid working hours have had a negative effect on the civic involvement of American women that was not found for women in the other three countries in the study. Thus, Andersen et al. explicitly considered the importance of country-level factors, i.e. context effects, but did not put these to a test.

We aim to fill this gap by investigating more systematically whether different cultural and institutional contexts are associated with different membership rates of men and women. Nevertheless, in order to adequately assess the effect of the country context on voluntary association participation, individual-level variables that are known to affect the outcome have to be controlled for. Otherwise, any potentially emerging country differences may be attributed to differences in population compositions.

2.2.3 Individual-level Predictors of Voluntary Association Memberships

Drawing on a large body of literature, several key individual-level predictors of voluntary association participation can be identified (Bonikowski and McPherson 2007; Smith 1994; Tomeh 1973; Wilson 2000).

Age has been found to have a curvilinear relation to voluntary association memberships. The middle aged are more likely to join than the elderly or young people. Changing roles during the life course accompanied by differing opportunities, constraints and expectations may account for this pattern (Knoke and Thomson 1977; Rotolo 2000b). Education is generally considered one of most consistent boosters of memberships in voluntary associations. Income is positively related to voluntary association participation in most studies. This association is consistent with approaches to voluntary association participation focusing on dominant status (Lemon, Palisi, and Jacobson 1972) or resources (Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999b). Employment status is as-
sumed to have two opposing effects. On the one hand, employment establishes new social ties which in turn offer new information about voluntary groups (Drobnić 1992; Rotolo and Wilson 2007). On the other hand, employment reduces the amount of free time available. This is why Putnam (2000) views part-time employment as the optimal combination. The effect of parental status depends on the children’s age (Knoke and Thomson 1977; Rotolo 2000b; Rotolo and Wilson 2007). Infants and toddlers tend to socially isolate their parents because of the high attention demands they pose. In contrast, school-aged children socially integrate parents because they face incentives and obligations as well as invitations to join activities that are organized around childhood and youth. Adult children are hypothesized to either have no influence (Rotolo 2000b) or to have a positive effect (Knoke and Thomson 1977) on their parents’ involvement. Marital status positively affects voluntary association participation (Knoke and Thomson 1977; Rotolo 2000b). Protestant denomination has repeatedly been attributed a driving role in explaining voluntary association participation (Lam 2006; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). Watching television is the main culprit in Putnam’s (2000) writings on declining social capital. Television is one of the major leisure activities in Western societies, absorbing free time formerly available for socializing in voluntary associations. Altruism is an attitudinal trait that brings individuals to care about others and engage in helping activities in civil society (Hwang, Grabb, and Curtis 2005). Length of residence has been found to be positively associated with voluntary association participation. This may be due to extended networks that are normally associated with staying in one place over a longer period of time. Community size is supposed to negatively affect associational memberships. Smaller communities are more integrative, emphasizing norms of solidarity and reciprocity and have more voluntary associations per capita than larger ones (Gamm and Putnam 1999; McPherson 1982).

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16 Community size is clearly not an individual-level predictor, but is treated as such because in the data employed here it varies at the individual-level.
2.2.4 Country-level Context: Nonprofit Regimes and the Affiliation Level

Some scholars raise serious doubts that cross-national differences in voluntary association participation can be explained solely by individual-level variables. “People do not ‘just join’ voluntary associations because they are wealthy, educated, or trusting, or have particular interests or social problems to address. The act of joining, and the particular types of organizations people join, are embedded in cultural and institutional arrangements defined at the level of national polity” (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001:824). Following this line of reasoning, we add that gender differences in voluntary association membership can also not be explained by individual attributes alone. The cultural and institutional context plays an equally decisive role in determining the gender gap in membership levels as well as the types of associations men and women join—although we only address the former in this paper.

One approach that explicitly accounts for the institutional context in the area of voluntary sector research is the theory of social origins of civil society proposed by Salamon and Anheier (1998; Anheier and Salamon 1999, 2006; Salamon and Sokolowski 2003), in which the role of the nonprofit sector in welfare provision is considered crucial for understanding different levels of voluntary association participation across countries. This approach was developed in order to integrate two previous theories. The first one is the government failure/market failure theory that considers the state and the nonprofit sector as substitutes in welfare provision. In this view, nonprofit organizations emerge in response to the state’s (and market’s) failure to produce public goods (Weisbrod 1975). Accordingly, social welfare spending and the nonprofit sector size are negatively related. The second theory is the interdependence theory that sees the state and the nonprofit sector as complements, i.e. partners, in welfare provision (Salamon 1987). The state funds the nonprofit sector to provide social services. Hence, social welfare spending and the nonprofit sector size are positively related. Both theories have received partial empirical support and the social origins of civil society aims at illuminating the circumstances under which the state and the nonprofit sector act as substitutes or as complements.
Table 2.1. The Four Nonprofit Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government social welfare spending</th>
<th>Nonprofit scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Statist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Social democratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: From Salamon and Anheier (1998:228).

Since key social services can be provided either by the state, the market or nonprofit organizations, the current mix of welfare provision is historically contingent on the respective power of different social classes within society and the complex interrelationships between the state and social actors in a country. These constellations affected decisions about welfare provision in the past and, due to path dependency, still impact welfare arrangements today. The current state of welfare provision indicates how social responsibilities are allocated and how much voluntary participation is therefore expected from citizens.

Salamon and Anheier (1998) identified social welfare spending and the scale of the nonprofit sector\(^{17}\) as the two key dimensions that jointly reflect the role of the nonprofit sector. By cross-classifying these dimensions the authors identify four ideal-type nonprofit regimes, each reflecting a particular constellation of social forces (Table 2.1). On the main diagonal are the ideal types in which the welfare state and the nonprofit sector act as substitutes. On the secondary diagonal are the ideal types in which the welfare state and the nonprofit sector are complements.

By focusing on the state-market-voluntary sector nexus in welfare provision, Salamon and Anheier ignore—like Esping-Andersen’s (1990) first formulation of the welfare regime typology on which the nonprofit-regimes are built—the family as a wel-

\(^{17}\) The scale of the nonprofit sector is usually assessed economically as paid and volunteer workforce in the nonprofit sector as percent of total employment. However, the relative importance of the two components differs across regimes. It seems to be the case that in those regimes where the nonprofit sector acts as a major welfare provider the paid staff to volunteer ratio is in favor of paid staff (Archambault 2009). However, for membership levels the volunteer workforce is the crucial part.
fare provider. In his later work, Esping-Andersen acknowledges the role of the family, but he essentially disregards the role of the nonprofit sector in service provision (but see footnote 2 in Esping-Andersen 1999:35). Combining both perspectives gives a more complete picture. This enables us not only to explain differing participation levels across countries but also to elucidate the variation in the gender gap in voluntary association membership and thus differences in the societal context in providing conditions for social participation of both genders.

The 

liberal

nonprofit regime emerged in countries in which the middle-class had considerable power, faced no opposition from conservative landed elites and successfully rejected claims from working-class movements. This resulted in ideological hostility towards any extension of government social welfare protection and a preference for social services either purchased in the market or financed via private giving and delivered by the nonprofit sector. In this regime, social welfare spending is low whereas the nonprofit sector is large—both with regard to paid staff as well as volunteers. Voluntary association participation is highly valued and widespread (Salamon and Anheier 1998). In the liberal nonprofit regime we therefore expect high membership levels.

The 

social democratic

nonprofit regime is characterized by a high level of social welfare spending and a relatively small nonprofit sector. This regime type reflects the ability of the working class to exert sufficient political power to enforce state-sponsored and state-delivered social welfare protection. Therefore, in contrast to the liberal model, where the nonprofit sector serves unsatisfied needs, the nonprofit sector in the social democratic regime does not act as major welfare provider. Rather, it is mainly members-serving in the social democratic model. According to the social origins theory, membership levels are nevertheless expected to be high because the sector is mostly composed of volunteers that participate in fee-financed associations serving the expression of political, social, cultural and recreational interests of their members.

The 

corporatist

nonprofit regime is characterized by both a high level of governmental social welfare spending and a large nonprofit sector. This is typical for countries with both a powerful aristocracy and a strong church preempting more extensive demands for social welfare protection from the working class by providing these services through nonprofit organizations. These (often church-based) organizations are
funded by the government in order to provide welfare in place of the state. Despite the large nonprofit sector, membership levels are expected to be moderate because these highly professional organizations rely more on paid staff than on volunteers (Archambault 2009).

The fourth model, with low social welfare spending and a small nonprofit sector is what Salamon and Anheier call the *statist* nonprofit regime. This is the ideal-type arrangement in which the state acts on its own behalf and has “[…] a fair degree of autonomy sustained by long traditions of deference and a much more pliant religious order” (Salamon and Anheier 1998:229). Since neither the state nor the voluntary sector act as social welfare providers, the market or the family are potential substitutes. Within the European context, we distinguish here between Mediterranean countries and the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe instead of using a unified statist regime type. This enables us to more precisely link the social origins theory to the welfare regime debate. In this regard, our approach is similar to that of Archambault (2009) although we put a stronger emphasis on gender relations (see below).

The nonprofit sector is less developed in the *Mediterranean* regime than in the liberal, social democratic and corporatist regimes. This is partly due to the comparatively short period of democratic rule in Greece, Portugal and Spain. In addition, there seem to be cultural impediments which some diagnose as a “traditional atrophy of southern Europe’s civil societies” (Ferrera 1996:30). Among these, the most important factor is familialism. The reliance on the family as welfare provider and the associated strong inward-looking family ties reduce generalized trust and many forms of civic engagement and political participation (Alesina and Giuliano 2009). The role of the family as welfare provider and social insurance is additionally reinforced by legal obligations to support extended family members in need (Trifiletti 1999). As a consequence, participation levels in voluntary associations are expected to be low because self-help inside the extended family, parish or village is the more dominant form of welfare provision (Archambault 2009).

Although there are arguments that *post-socialist* countries in Central and Eastern Europe are too diverse to be grouped together into one regime (Deacon 1992), there is evidence that they form a relatively homogeneous cluster if the focus is on civil society
(Howard 2002). In these countries, civil society continues to be relatively weak since the voluntary sector had to start from the scratch after 1989 (Archambault 2009). The legacy of Communism with state oppression and lack of fundamental rights and liberties during the socialist era are still affecting participation levels today. On the one hand, autonomous non-state activity was eliminated. On the other hand, memberships in state-controlled organizations were mandatory. This has instilled mistrust in public organizations in general. In response to these circumstances, there was a strong orientation towards the private sphere of close friends and the family during Communist rule as a result of generalized distrust. Disappointment with the post-communist era resulted in apathy and withdrawal from the public sphere. As a consequence, there are comparatively few voluntary organizations and low membership levels (Howard 2002).

2.2.5 Nonprofit Regimes and Gender Gap

The social origins theory and the nonprofit regime typology are not formulated in gender-specific terms. The typology addresses varying sizes of the voluntary sector in different countries and is conceptualized to explain differing levels of voluntary association participation. However, it is rather silent about the gender composition underlying a country’s average participation level. But different institutional solutions to provide welfare influence women’s position in the family and in society (Korpi 2000; Mandel 2009). Since both voluntary sector size and gender relations are ingrained into the same cultural and institutional context, both aspects have to be considered simultaneously.

Specifically, countries differ in their reliance on the family for welfare provision. Where neither the state nor the market nor voluntary associations take on the role of main service provider, the family becomes the last resort and it is mostly women who are in charge of doing domestic work and provide care for dependent children, the elderly, and the disabled. The locus of welfare provision is therefore fundamentally linked to the roles and opportunities of women in a society, including their opportunities to participate in voluntary associations. The more women are absorbed with caring activities in the private sphere of the family and the fewer social services are provided which would enable the reconciliation of work and family, the lower the prospects for women to participate in the labor market. Since the labor market is the arena where power, prestige and resources are allocated, participation therein is expected to increase women’s
membership rates because paid labor force participation brings resources (e.g. income, colleague networks) that are positively associated with voluntary association affiliation. Within the workplace women are also expected to accumulate knowledge and skills that facilitate participation in civil society.

Women’s labor force participation also fosters a progressive gender egalitarian culture (Kalmijn 2003) which enables women to be active in the public sphere of civil society—above and beyond of what can be explained by individual-level attributes. This gives women a sense of entitlement to participate in civil society on equal footing with men. The more traditional the division of labor between the genders, the less legitimate it is for women to participate in civil society and the lower the number of memberships. As Gustafson et al. (1979:55) wrote in one of the earliest studies on cross-national differences in the gender gap in voluntary association memberships: “[...] when conditions of female adult life become more similar to those experienced by men, their social participation also becomes more similar.” The obstacles that hinder women to enter the labor market or to engage in politics are essentially the same as those that inhibit their participation in the domain of civil society. We therefore supplement non-profit regimes with a perspective on gender relations to formulate hypotheses not only about membership levels but also about expected size of the gender gap in voluntary association memberships in cross-national perspective.

In the liberal nonprofit regime, there is a strong formal commitment to gender egalitarianism in the form of anti-discrimination laws, affirmative action and gender quotas (Chan 2000). However, due to the non-interventionist ideology in the liberal model, substantive help provided by the state that would support working mothers and carers is lacking. As a substitute for the welfare that working women cannot provide in the private sphere of the family, services are usually provided by and bought in the market. Although these services are comparatively cheap due to the unregulated labor markets in the liberal model, they are not universally affordable. It is predominantly for mothers and female carers from higher socio-economic strata that outsourcing of social services has clear positive payoffs (Esping-Andersen 1999). The rest face the double burden of labor force participation and family responsibilities which imposes restrictions on women’s voluntary sector participation (Andersen et al. 2006). Thus, we
expect that the participation rates in voluntary associations will be lower for women than for men, but this gap will be rather moderate.

In the social democratic nonprofit regime, the state provides de-familializing social services on a universal basis (Esping-Andersen 1999). Social spending is aimed at bringing women and especially mothers with young children into the labor market. These services, in combination with the promotion of a gender egalitarian ideology as embodied in the dual-earner/dual-carer model of the family, provide both a commitment to formal gender egalitarianism and substantive help (Chan 2000; Mandel 2009). Hence, since women do not carry the burden of being sole carers, they can participate in the market. This diminishes resource differences between the genders and results in more comparable roles between men and women, also with regard to participation in the public sphere. For this regime type we predict a small gender gap in voluntary association memberships.

Due to strong influence of the Catholic Church in the corporatist nonprofit regime, there is a strong emphasis on traditional gender roles. In addition, due to the adherence to the principle of subsidiarity the prime locus of welfare provision is the family (Orloff 1993). Social spending in the form of meager child allowances therefore aims at keeping mothers of young children at home with the additional effect of keeping them economically dependent on their spouses. This combines with Bismarckian social insurance models and unfavorable tax treatment of working women to reinforce the male breadwinner/female carer model (Esping-Andersen 1999). Compared to the liberal model, greater regulation of the labor market means that prices for social services provided by the market are rather high, making them unaffordable for most families (Esping-Andersen 1999). However, the large and state financed voluntary sector “provides a range of services related to caring for the elderly as well as for children” (Daly and Lewis 2000:289, referring to Germany), thereby cushioning the absence of direct public de-familializing services. Regarding the affiliation rates of men and women, we expect a moderate gender gap.

Since in the Mediterranean countries the state shifts the responsibility for providing social services to the family and there is no developed market for de-familializing social services (Daly and Lewis 2000), it is difficult to outsource caring
activities. Hence, it is mainly the women who remain responsible for these tasks (Trifiletti 1999). The resulting division of labor maintains traditional gender roles. Women are absorbed with household and caring activities within the extended family, which imposes restrictions to their voluntary sector participation. We therefore expect a large gender gap in voluntary association membership.

We also expect a large gender gap in the participation rates of men and women in the *post-socialist* regime. The transition states in Central and Eastern Europe were in economic crisis during the 1990s after the Communist system collapsed. The formerly high female labor force participation rates declined as jobs became scarce and state-delivered services that had previously supported women’s employment were curtailed (in some countries severely so) because of decreasing state revenues (Deacon 2000; Pascall and Manning 2000). Hence, women are pushed into paid employment out of economic necessity but service provision is poor. Care has become familialized again. In addition, women continue to be responsible for the household work. Women in post-socialist countries therefore face a triple burden of paid work, household labor and the development and activation of network resources for economic survival (Pascall and Manning 2000) which leaves them deprived of free time and disposable resources and restores traditional gender roles. Table 2.2 summarizes our predictions of the membership level and the size of the gender gap in the five nonprofit/welfare regimes.
Table 2.2. Predicted Membership Level and Gender Gap in Nonprofit/welfare Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Nonprofit/welfare regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership level</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender gap</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Data and Methods

2.3.1 Data Source

The data used in this study come from the module “Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy” of the first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), a set of international surveys involving 22 European countries. Field work took place in 2002 and 2003. In each country a random sample was interviewed using essentially the same questionnaire. However, membership questions were not posed in a comparable fashion in the Czech Republic and Switzerland. Thus, these two countries are excluded from the analyses. The data set used here therefore consists of 38,959 respondents in 20 countries. The national sample sizes range from 1,207 in Italy to 2,919 in Germany with an average of 1,948 respondents. Response rates varied from 43.1% in France to 80% in Greece with a mean of 62.8%. The data include only respondents aged 15 or older. After listwise deletion of cases with missing values, our analytical sample consists of 30,393 respondents in 20 countries.\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) The loss of cases is mainly caused by the socio-economic status variable ISEI which has 13.3% missing values (all other variables used in the analysis have less than 5% missing values). The percentage missing on ISEI varies across countries from a low of 3.1% in Sweden to a high of 24.9% in Greece. Despite the missing cases, controlling for socio-economic status is important as it predicts memberships and is unequally distributed between both genders. Using income and education as status markers instead of ISEI would lead to a doubling of excluded cases (doing so would leave the substantial conclusion unchanged, though).
2.3.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent measure is a count of memberships in voluntary association types per respondent. The count is based on the question about membership in any of the following 12 different types of voluntary associations during the last 12 months: (1) sports club or club for out-door activities; (2) organization for cultural or hobby activities; (3) trade union; (4) business, professional, or farmers’ organization; (5) consumer or automobile organization; (6) organization for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities, or immigrants; (7) organization for environmental protection, peace or animal rights; (8) religious or church organization; (9) political party; (10) organization for science, education, or teachers and parents; (11) social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women, or friendly societies; (12) other voluntary organization.

The number of voluntary associations to which respondents belong, constitutes a super-set of potential voluntary association contacts. However, as has repeatedly been noted in the literature, counting memberships in voluntary association types underestimates the actual number of respondents’ memberships because multiple memberships within one type of voluntary association are not counted (Baumgartner and Walker 1988; Diez de Ulzurrun 2002). However, the differentiation achieved through the rather extensive number of categories used in the ESS diminishes the probability of multiple memberships within types.

From the theoretical perspective, the effects of potential underestimation are reduced by structural and choice homophily (Blau 1977; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001). Homophily, or the tendency that like associates with like, implies that groups within the same type of voluntary associations will be structurally located close to each other, i.e. their membership compositions will be similar. Thus, multiple memberships in the same type of organizations will generate social ties that will provide access to similar information and resources. In contrast, multiple memberships in different types of organizations provide access to co-members from diverse locations in social space. Accordingly, these co-members will differ in the information and resources they can provide. This suggests that the exposure to new information and diverse resources in additional groups within the same type of voluntary associations tends to be lower than through memberships in disparate types of organizations. The
number of association types to which a respondent belongs therefore not only contains information on the volume of potential contacts. It also informs about their diversity. Both aspects are instrumental in the status attainment process.

2.3.3 Independent Variables

We use the following measures in the analysis: Gender is coded as FEMALE = 1 and male = 0. Age is measured in decades. To model the curvilinear effect that has repeatedly been found in previous studies, AGE SQUARED is also included in the analyses. Education and income variables in the ESS are problematic. Education was measured differently in the Austrian survey whereas income was assessed in a non-comparable fashion in France, Hungary, and Ireland. Thus, using education and income as predictors would reduce the sample size dramatically, since four countries with approximately 7500 respondents would be excluded from the analyses. To accommodate this problem, International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) scores are used as substitutes because these are “weighted averages of standardised measures of the income and education of incumbents of each occupation” (Ganzeboom and Treiman 2003:162).

Employment status is divided into the following six binary variables: FULL-TIME employment is when respondents are in paid work and normally work 30 hours or more per week; PART-TIME employment is when respondents are in paid work and normally work less than 30 hours a week. Actual working hours rather than contractual hours are used because it is the actual working hours that constrain voluntary participation. The cut-off point of 30 hours was proposed by the OECD for international comparisons and is adopted here (Langfeldt 2003). The remaining categories are UNEMPLOYED, HOUSEWORK, RETIRED, and OTHER status (which includes being in education, sick or disabled, in military or civil service, and other). In the analyses, full-time employment is the reference category.

Since the effect of children is hypothesized to vary with their age, we constructed indicator variables for the presence of INFANTS AND TODDLERS (from 0 to 2 years),

19 Syntax to convert ISCO-88 codes into ISEI scores can be downloaded from the ESS webpage (see http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/doc/ess1_social_class.pdf).
KINDERGARTEN-AGED CHILDREN (from 3 to 5 years) and SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN (from 6 to 17 years). No children under 18 in the household is the omitted category. MARITAL STATUS is coded as married = 1 and other = 0 which is the omitted category.

The effect of PROTESTANT denomination is captured by an indicator variable that is coded Protestant = 1 and other = 0. WATCHING TELEVISION was assessed with the question “On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching television?” Responses were measured on an eight-point scale ranging from “no time at all” = 0 to “more than 3 hours” = 7.

Altruism is measured using two items. The first is a behavioral measure that asks “Not counting anything you do for your family, in your work, or within voluntary organizations, how often, if at all, do you actively provide help for other people?” (HELPING). Respondents were offered a seven-point response scale ranging from “never” = 1 to “every day” = 7. The second is an attitudinal item asking “To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to support people who are worse off than themselves?” (IMPORTANCE SUPPORT). The response scale consists of eleven categories ranging from “extremely unimportant” = 0 to “extremely important” = 10. Since these two measures do not adequately fit into one scale by conventional criteria, we keep them separate in the following analyses.

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE is measured in decades. Cases in which length of residence surpasses age have been truncated at respondent’s age. Community size is assessed with a question that asks respondents to choose among five categories to indicate which best describes the area they live in. We constructed an indicator variable RURAL consisting of “country village” and “farm or home in the countryside”. The categories “big city”, “suburbs or outskirts of a big city” and “town or a small city” constitute the more urban areas and form together the reference category. In order to assess the effects of country-level variables controlling for individual-level effects, all individual-level predictors—except the variable female—have been grand-mean centered (Enders and Tofghi 2007).
### Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-level</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership count</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISEI</td>
<td>42.59</td>
<td>17.09</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housework</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employment</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants/toddlers</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten age</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>School age</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Helping</td>
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<td>1.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Importance support</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of residence</td>
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<td>1.87</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country-level</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-socialist</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* All variables are in original uncentered metric.

\[ N \text{ (respondents)} = 30,393; J \text{ (countries)} = 20. \]

We classified the countries into the five nonprofit/welfare regimes as follows (Archambault 2009; Salamon and Sokolowski 2003). Countries in the **social democratic regime** are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The social democratic
nonprofit regime is the reference category in the analyses. The LIBERAL REGIME consists of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Countries assigned to the CORPORATIST REGIME are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Israel and those in the MEDITERRANEAN REGIME are Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In the POST-SOCIALIST REGIME are Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Using regime types as country-level predictors is a parsimonious way of representing the specific configurations of different attributes. Splitting up the attribute bundles would require the inclusion of several main and interaction effects which is not feasible in an analysis with 20 countries. Descriptive statistics for all individual-level and country-level variables are displayed in Table 2.3.

2.3.4 Analytical Strategy

McPherson (1981) showed that the number of voluntary association memberships ($Y$) among individuals follows a Poisson distribution if the number of possible memberships is infinite from the individual point of view and all individuals have the same and constant rate of joining a new association and the same and constant rate of dropping memberships. In this model, the ratio of the rate of joining associations to the rate of leaving them equals the mean of the Poisson distribution in the cross-section ($\mu$), which is the mean affiliation rate, i.e. the ratio of the number of memberships to the number of individuals. The distribution of memberships in the cross-section is governed by this ratio. Hence, the model for the number of voluntary association memberships is:

$$P(Y = y | \mu) = \frac{\exp(-\mu)\mu^y}{y!} \quad \text{for } y \in \mathbb{N}_0 \text{ and } \mu > 0$$

(2.1)

Several assumptions have to be made when using this model. First, all voluntary associations are treated as interchangeable. Consequently, no differentiation is made between a membership in a political party or a sports club for example. This assumption is implicitly followed in all studies that measure voluntary participation by a simple membership count or the record of whether the respondent belongs to any voluntary association. Second, membership is treated as a simple dichotomy. Different levels of involvement are not distinguished. Third, the rate of joining new associations and the rate of dropping existing memberships and therefore the mean affiliation rate have to be
the same for all individuals. This is the most problematic assumption because previous research evidence shows that this assumption is not met (see the section on individual-level predictors of voluntary association participation). But it can easily be relaxed by allowing the mean affiliation rate $\mu$ to vary as a function of predictors.

This leads naturally to the Poisson regression model, which is frequently used to model count outcomes (Long 1997). In this way we expand McPherson’s approach by using a proper Poisson regression model to account for observed heterogeneity in mean affiliation rates. In addition to these considerations, the Poisson regression model can also be justified from a statistical point of view. Using a conventional linear regression model with count outcomes can yield inconsistent, biased and inefficient parameter estimates (Long 1997:217).

The hierarchical data structure of the ESS, with respondents nested in countries, may potentially cause dependence among observations due to clustering. Additionally, there are variables at both levels of the hierarchy with different sample sizes and therefore different degrees of freedom. To accommodate these issues, a multilevel Poisson regression model will be used to analyze the joint impact of the individual-level and country-level variables on the membership count (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Snijders and Bosker 2012).20 Our interest lies in whether the gender gap in association memberships varies between countries and if so, whether individual-level and country-level predictors can account for this variation. To implement these research questions a model with random effects for the intercept and the female indicator variable is used for the analyses. This model permits the mean membership count for men as well as the difference in mean membership counts between genders to vary across countries. All models are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator of the xtmepoisson command in Stata 11 (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).

20 The multilevel Poisson regression model has an additional error term at the aggregate level that allows for overdispersion (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).
Results

Examining Figure 2.1 reveals that the mean membership count for men is greater than the mean membership count for women in every single country in our sample. However, there is vast variability among the countries in the difference between genders. Plotting the difference in the mean membership count (Figure 2.2, hollow circles) illustrates that there is substantial variation in the gender gap, ranging from a low of 0.02 in Sweden to a high of 0.8 in Austria.\(^{21}\)

---

\(^{21}\) Austria seems to be an outlying case according to this figure. However, an outlier analysis using the multilevel generalization of Cook’s \(D\) that is implemented in the \texttt{mlt}-package (Möhring and Schmidt 2012) revealed that all statistics are well below the proposed cut-off value of 1 (Cook and Weisberg 1982:118). This indicates that no country has an undue influence on the estimated coefficients in our final model.
These findings are supported by the results of the multilevel Poisson regression models presented in Table 2.4. In Model 1, the number of memberships in voluntary associations is regressed on gender only. The mean membership count for men across all countries is \( \exp(0.272) = 1.31 \). The variance of the associated random effect is 0.372. The fixed effect of the female indicator is \( \exp(-0.215) = 0.81 \) with associated variance component of 0.021. Thus, being female reduces the expected membership count by a factor of 0.81 or by 19% on average. If we are inclined to assume that the countries constitute a random sample, these figures can used to construct plausible value intervals (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002:315). Assuming normality of the random effect, we expect 95% of the male mean membership counts to be found in the interval \( \exp(0.272 \pm 1.96 \times \sqrt{0.372}) = (0.40; 4.34) \). The respective interval for the effect of being female is \( \exp(-0.215 \pm 1.96 \times \sqrt{0.021}) = (0.61; 1.07) \). Thus, depending on the country, women are expected to have between 39% less and 7% more memberships than men.

Next, we control for different country compositions with regard to individual-level predictors (Model 2 in Table 2.4). Controlling for individual-level predictors, the mean membership count for the average man across all countries is estimated to be \( \exp(0.279) = 1.32 \). The associated variance component is 0.307. Thus, we expect 95% of the male mean membership counts to be found in the interval \( (0.45; 3.91) \). The fixed effect for the female indicator variable is \( \exp(-0.179) = 0.84 \) with an associated random effect variance of 0.023. Thus, being female reduces the expected membership count on average by a factor of 0.84 or by 16%. The 95% plausible value interval for this effect is \( (0.62; 1.12) \). Depending on the country and controlling for individual characteristics, women are expected to have between 38% less and 12% more memberships than men. Thus, the average gender gap is reduced when individual-level covariates are held constant while the between-country differences as embodied in the variance component of the female indicator increase. The context therefore seems to be especially important for women’s affiliations.
Figure 2.2 illustrates this graphically for the countries in our study. The gender gap in mean membership counts is reduced when individual predictors are controlled (black circles). Country-specific random effects are obtained by means of an empirical Bayes prediction after estimating Model 2. In order to arrive at the predicted values, all individual-level variables are set to their respective means. The gender differential for Denmark, Israel, Norway and Sweden actually becomes negative, meaning that on average women have more memberships than men when the effects of the individual-level predictors are taken into account. However, controlling the individual-level predictors of voluntary association participation does not lead to a disappearance of between-country differences in the gender differential.
Table 2.4. Multilevel Poisson Models for Number of Voluntary Association Memberships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.272*</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>0.743***</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.215***</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>-0.179***</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-0.027***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>-0.027***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISEI</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part–time</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.359***</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>-0.359***</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housework</td>
<td>-0.206***</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>-0.203***</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employment</td>
<td>-0.054**</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>-0.054**</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants/toddlers</td>
<td>-0.077***</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>-0.077***</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten age</td>
<td>-0.042*</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>-0.042*</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School age</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.097***</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>0.097***</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.195***</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>0.194***</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV watching</td>
<td>-0.036***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>-0.036***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping</td>
<td>0.061***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>0.061***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance support</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of residence</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>-1.187***</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-socialist</td>
<td>-1.417***</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fem. × liberal</td>
<td>-0.182*</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fem. × corporatist</td>
<td>-0.120*</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fem. × Mediterranean</td>
<td>-0.323***</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fem. × post–socialist</td>
<td>-0.349***</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Focusing on the effects of the individual-level predictors, age has the expected curvilinear relationship with a peak at around 47 years (Table 2.4). Socio-economic status (ISEI) has a strong positive impact on the number of memberships. Contrary to Putnam’s hypothesis, part-time workers are not statistically significantly different from the reference category of full-time employment. In contrast, being unemployed, retired, doing housework or being in the residual ‘other employment’ category significantly reduces memberships in voluntary associations. These results support Rotolo and Wilson’s (2007:500) claim that “social integration trumps free time”.

The hypotheses about the effect of parental status are fully confirmed. Infants and toddlers as well as kindergarten-age children tend to socially isolate their parents as these reduce the number of memberships by approximately 7% and 4% respectively. By contrast, school-age children increase the participation rates of their parents. These results confirm the arguments of Knoke and Thomson (1977), Rotolo (2000) and Rotolo and Wilson (2007).

Whereas married people and Protestants average higher on membership rates, watching television is negatively associated with the number of memberships. Thus, Putnam’s (2000) arguments concerning TV also apply to the European countries studied.
here. Both the behavioral as well as the attitudinal measures of altruism have positive effects on the number of memberships. Furthermore, the length of residence influences the membership count in the expected direction. Living for ten years in the same area increases the membership count on average by about 2%. Finally, living in a rural area as opposed to a more urban area increases participation rates by approximately 5%. Thus, with the exception of part-time employment, all individual-level predictors exhibit the expected effects.

We now introduce the nonprofit/welfare regimes (Model 3 in Table 2.4). To account for the variance in the mean membership count for men, the regimes are included as main effects. We additionally include the female × regime interactions to account for the variance in the gender differential. Since the inclusion of the regime types leaves the effects of the individual-level controls essentially unchanged, we focus exclusively on the regime effects.23

The intercept now represents the mean membership count for the average man in the social democratic regime, as this is the reference category. These men have on average \( \exp(0.743) = 2.10 \) memberships when individual-level predictors are held at their respective means. The female dummy denotes the effect of being a woman on the number of memberships in this regime. Since this factor is essentially 1 (\( \exp(-0.004) = 0.996 \)), women in the social democratic regime have on average the same number of memberships as their male counterparts. Hence, with regard to affiliation levels, the social democratic regime achieves gender equality.

The mean membership count for men in the liberal regime is reduced by a factor of 0.83 compared to the reference group of men in the social democratic regime. Wom-

---

22 One might argue that voluntary associations and TV compete for individuals’ time. In this sense, becoming a member in voluntary associations and watching TV is a joint decision. We therefore also re-estimated all models excluding ‘TV watching’. The coefficients remained essentially unchanged.

23 As a robustness check, we compared the multilevel Poisson regression results with the results from a two-step hierarchical Poisson regression analysis. As can be seen in Table A.1 in Appendix A, the restrictions imposed by the multilevel Poisson regression on the individual-level coefficients do not unduly affect the conclusions about regime effects.
en in the liberal regime have on average 17% fewer memberships than men in this regime type. In the *corporatist regime*, men have on average 22% fewer memberships than men in the social democratic regime type. Women in the corporatist regime have 11% fewer memberships than men in the corporatist regime.

Turning to the *Mediterranean regime*, the mean membership count for men is about 70% lower than the corresponding figure for men in the social democratic regime. Women in the Mediterranean regime have 28% fewer memberships than their male counterparts. Finally, men in the *post-socialist regime* have 76% fewer memberships than men in the social democratic regime. Women in the post-socialist countries have on average 30% fewer memberships than men in the same regime. Hence, the gender gap in these regimes is substantial.24

Table 2.5 summarizes these findings. The predicted mean membership counts are presented according to nonprofit regime and gender. All individual-level predictors are held constant at their respective means. Thus, our hypotheses regarding the effects of the nonprofit/welfare regimes (Table 2.2) on membership levels as well as the gender gap are fully supported by the data.

24 Although our dependent variable informs about the total volume and diversity of resources respondents can potentially access through their memberships, it can be argued that memberships in instrumental organizations matter more for women’s status attainment and gender inequality than memberships in expressive groups. Co-members from instrumental groups may give access to information and resources that are more valuable for status attainment. However, restricting the analysis to memberships in instrumental organizations (i.e. trade unions; business/profession/farmers organizations; political parties; consumer/automobile organizations; environmental/peace/animal organizations; humanitarian organizations) leaves the substantial conclusions about the regime differences unaltered.
Table 2.5. Gender-specific Predicted Membership Count and Relative Gender Gap by Nonprofit/welfare Regime, Controlling for all Individual-level Predictors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonprofit regime</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Relative gap$^a$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-socialist</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ Women’s membership count as proportion of men’s membership count ($\tilde{y}_{female}/\tilde{y}_{male}$).

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This study is the first to systematically address differences in the level of voluntary association memberships as well as variation in the gender gap in associational involvement in a cross-national context. If memberships in voluntary associations have beneficial ramifications by generating access to social resources (and there is a vast voluntary association literature which supports this assertion), the persisting gender gap in membership levels implies that women are clearly disadvantaged in many countries. Part of the gender gap in associational memberships can be traced to individual attributes and compositional effects. However, our findings show that women’s different membership rates across countries cannot solely be explained by individual-level attributes. Controlling for the individual-level predictors reduces the gender differential in memberships but does not fully account for it. Furthermore, holding these constant does not reduce the between-country variability in the gender gap. Hence, the scope of the gender disadvantage in this aspect of social capital depends considerably on the cultural and institutional context.

These findings suggest that context has a twofold effect on women’s memberships in voluntary associations—one on the overall level of memberships in various nonprofit/welfare regimes and the other on the gender gap within regimes. Countries associated with the social democratic regime have the highest mean membership count and are the most egalitarian when voluntary association participation is considered.
There are no differences between genders in the mean membership count. According to the weak ties argument, women in the social democratic regime are as likely as men to be in a position to meet potentially important acquaintances, access useful resources, gain new information, and in this way reap the benefits associated with membership in voluntary associations. This is in line with research showing that countries of the social democratic regime are most successful in providing equality of opportunity (Sørensen 2006). While there are no statistically significant differences in the participation rates for men in social democratic, liberal, and corporatist regimes, women in liberal and corporatist regimes have on average about 0.7 fewer memberships than women in the social democratic regime. But more importantly from the point of view of gender inequality, women in the liberal and corporatist regimes have on average 17% and 11%, respectively, fewer memberships than men in these regimes.

In accordance with the predictions, the most problematic situation is found in Mediterranean and post-socialist regimes. Not only do women in these countries have the lowest mean membership counts in absolute terms but women in Mediterranean countries have on average 28% fewer memberships than their male counterparts. In the post-socialist countries, women have on average about 30% fewer memberships than men. There is obviously large gender inequality with regard to the benefits of voluntary association participation in these countries.

In comparison with their female counterparts, the higher mean membership counts for men in the liberal, corporatist, Mediterranean and post-socialist regimes imply that men join voluntary associations at higher rates, drop existing memberships at lower rates, or both. In addition to the individual effects on accumulation of social capital and goal achievement, this finding has an additional adverse effect on gender equality. If voluntary associations are gender segregated, this implies that male organizations are larger or more numerous in these countries. Both scenarios suggest that male organizations have a greater salience in the public sphere. If voluntary associations are gender heterogeneous, these results mean that men come to dominate voluntary organizations over time (McPherson 1981b). Since voluntary associations often take a stance on many public issues, both scenarios imply that expression and articulation of female needs (e.g. childcare facilities, paid leave etc.) are not adequately represented.
Overall, the results suggest that in many countries women are disadvantaged in their access to social resources which are embedded in social networks and this relational inequality is another piece in the jigsaw puzzle of overall gender inequality in contemporary societies. Since women often cluster at relatively disadvantaged socio-economic positions, they may find themselves locked in a vicious circle: Being a woman is associated with fewer memberships (reflecting existing patterns of inequality) which translates into a deficit of relational opportunities like meeting potentially important acquaintances and getting access to useful resources and new information. This in turn has negative effects on the status attainment process, i.e. it generates inequality in other domains. This feedback loop is explicit in the writings of Bourdieu (1983) and Lin (2000).

Our findings also show that the effects of the individual-level predictors are contextual. Changes in the determinants of memberships on the individual level, such as women’s increased educational level and labor force participation are more salient in regimes that have policies to promote gender equality and provide structural opportunities to overcome gender gap in voluntary association participation. In broader terms, this analysis draws our attention to the nature of social ties and the mechanisms that constitute them, in particular the context of a broader historical analysis of public policies and political regimes.

Draft versions of this article were presented at:

- PhD Colloquium K. U. Schnapp (30.09.2010)
- Drei-Länder-Tagung für politische Wissenschaft, Basel, CH (14.01.2011)
- ESF HumVIB PhD Colloquium, Berlin, DE (07.09.2011)
- PhD Colloquium B. Hollstein/P. Böhnke (08.11.2011).
Abstract

Women tend to have fewer memberships in voluntary associations than men. In addition to violating normative ideals of gender equality, the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation may be one facet in explaining gender inequalities in status attainment since voluntary associations are arenas for the establishment of interpersonal contacts thereby generating access to social resources. Using the European Social Survey 2002/2003, variations in the gender gap in associational memberships are examined in a cross-national context. Following Lin’s (2000) distinction between resource deficit and return deficit and employing nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methods, the gender gap is decomposed into one part that is due to a resource deficit and another part that is due to a return deficit in order to give insights into the underlying mechanisms. Results indicate that the Scandinavian countries provide gender equality with regard to voluntary association affiliation. Here, women neither face a resource nor a return deficit. With the exception of France, the gender gap is significant in the countries belonging to the liberal and conservative regimes. These gender differences are either to a resource or a return deficit. Whereas no country exhibits both deficits, this study shows that gender equality in associational membership has not been achieved in these countries. In those countries where the gender gap is due to a return deficit, redistributive social policies are ineffective for achieving gender equality in voluntary association participation because the same resource endowments between men and women do not translate into similar number of memberships.
3.1 Introduction

While gender differentials in higher education, employment and political representation are under public and scholarly debate, gender differentials in voluntary association membership have gone largely unnoticed by gender and welfare state scholars, although women’s participation in “associational life of civil society” on a par with men is considered an important element in normative conceptions of gender equality (Fraser 1994).

Inconsistent with this normative ideal, there is an extensive literature from the sociology of voluntary associations showing that women join different associations than men (Inglehart and Norris 2003; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982, 1986; Popielarz 1999a) and that women have fewer memberships than men on average (Babchuk and Booth 1969; Booth 1972; Curtis 1971; Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis et al. 1992; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Smith 1975, 1994). These differences seem to be dependent on the societal context because the extent of the gender gap varies across countries (Curtis 1971; Gustafson et al. 1979; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Peter and Drobnic 2012).

In addition to violating normative ideals of gender equality the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation may—at least partially—account for persisting gender inequalities in status attainment. Voluntary associations constitute one of the most important sources of social contacts (Feld 1982; Fischer et al. 1977; Grossetti 2005). These ties to fellow members may be instrumentally useful because co-members may grant access to power, influence, information and other valued resources which can be mobilized to increase the chances of success in purposive actions (Flap 2001; Lin 2001).

Much research has been accumulated showing individual-level payoffs of voluntary association affiliation. Of relevance for the status attainment process are especially those payoffs that relate to the occupational realm. For example, membership in voluntary organizations raises the probability that women participate in the labor force (Stolloff et al. 1999) and it increases the probability that a job seeker who was looking for a particular job actually found it (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997). In addition, members of voluntary associations have better-paid jobs and are employed in jobs with higher occupational prestige (Ruiter and De Graaf 2009).
Hence, if voluntary association affiliation differs for men and women, the prospects accruing from these memberships vary with gender as well. If men have on average more memberships than women they will also meet more potentially important acquaintances and receive more useful information and valuable resources, all of which is instrumental in the process of socioeconomic achievement. As a consequence, this relational form of gender inequality may generate, sustain or amplify inequalities along other dimensions such as income, power and occupational prestige. In addition, if women have fewer memberships than men they also may be disadvantaged with regard to advocacy because their specific group interests may not be sufficiently organized and articulated in the public sphere (McPherson 1981b). Hence, there may be gender differences in “voice” and, as a consequence, in influencing decision-making processes in the political arena.

Membership in voluntary associations is commonly explained with resource endowments (Bekkers 2005; Bekkers et al. 2008; Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999b). Those, who have more cognitive, financial, or social resources (i.e. recruiting networks) are more likely to become members. Since resources are differentially distributed among social groups, affiliation levels are expected to differ accordingly. This resources approach to voluntary association affiliation implies that the gender gap in memberships is to a large extent the result of resource inequalities between men and women.

I will enrich the debate by separately considering gender differences in resource endowments and gender differences in the effects of these resources in explaining membership levels. I thereby follow Lin’s (2000) advice that in research on social inequality one should distinguish between the mechanisms of resource deficit and return deficit. Women may be less involved because they are disadvantaged with respect to resource endowments fostering voluntary association affiliation or because these resources have differential utility for them in becoming a member or both. Disentangling these two mechanisms gives theoretically and practically important insights because redistributive social policies aiming at the reduction of resource inequalities between men and women may not be successful in alleviating the gender gap in association affiliation if return differences exist.
A rich literature has documented that gender inequalities are heavily shaped by the societal context (i.e. culture as well as social policies and institutions of the welfare state) and therefore vary substantially between countries (Esping-Andersen 1999; Korpi et al. 2009; Mandel 2009). Cross-national variation has also been found for the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation (Curtis 1971; Gustafson et al. 1979; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Peter and Drobnič 2012). A comparative perspective is therefore adopted to examine how the gender gap in resource endowments as well as the gender difference in the effects of these resources vary between countries and how these two mechanisms jointly account for the gender gap in voluntary association memberships.

3.2 Resource Endowments, Resource Effects and Visions of Gender Equality

The distinction between resource and return deficit is also found in current discussions of normative ideals about gender equality. Visions of gender equality are manifold but some form of resource equality between genders usually forms a major constituent of normative ideals about gender egalitarian societies (Fraser 1994; Orloff 1996; Seguino 2008). Resource equality is a necessary precondition for men and women to have equal opportunity sets to choose from. In addition, since many forms of discrimination are based on and reproduced by material inequalities, resource equality is also a first step towards equality in recognition (meaning a situation where cultural or symbolic injustices are absent) because of the decoupling of material standing and gender (Olson 2001). Resource equality is usually approached by redistributive policies of the welfare state (Fraser 1994). This component of gender equality maps onto Lin’s (2000) resource deficit mechanism. That is, gender differences in membership levels can be explained by gender differences in resources. However, opportunity sets not only depend on individual resource endowments. The same amount of resources does not necessarily produce the same outcome: “Women’s life chances [...] are often worse than men’s even if their material resource holdings and personal skills sets are equal [...]” (Browne and Stears 2005: 358). The ability to convert resources into what individuals actually are able to be and are able to do often differs between the genders. As long as there is a return deficit for women, gender acts as a conversion factor (Sen 1999). Hence, given identical resource endowments for men and women, the gender gap in memberships
persists if the returns to or the effects of the resources differ between men and women. Gendered norms, values, and institutions at the societal level affect how men’s and women’s resources translate into opportunities or outcomes (Robeyns 2007). This return deficit is likely to be due to some form of discrimination rather than simple differences (Phillips 2004).

The societal context affects resource as well as return deficits. Both mechanisms are embedded into the same cultural legacy and institutional arrangements. The more gender egalitarian a society the smaller are resource differences between men and women and the more similar are the effects of these resources. Hence, in a gender-egalitarian society gender does not matter as a conversion factor (Robeyns 2007). The absence of resource and return deficits results in a small or even absent gender gap in voluntary association memberships. The more traditional the gender roles with accompanied gendered norms and institutions affecting men and women differentially, the larger are resource differences between men and women and the more differ the effects of these resources resulting in substantial gender gaps. If this is the case, gender acts as a conversion factor. Hence, the societal context may provide opportunities or impose constraints depending on the specific form of the respective resource deficit and return deficit mechanisms.

3.3 Explaining the Gender Gap in Voluntary Association Affiliation

3.3.1 Individual-level Antecedents of Voluntary Association Memberships

The preceding discussion about resource and return deficits leads inevitably to the question of which resources promote memberships in voluntary associations. In the literature resources endowments have been repeatedly used to explain individual-level differences in voluntary association affiliation (Bekkers 2005; Bekkers et al. 2008; Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999b). This resources approach posits that several key resources promote associational involvement. Financial, cognitive and social resources as well as free time are among the fundamental push and pull factors to become a member of voluntary associations. These resources act as
push factors because highly educated, wealthy and connected individuals with free time seek out organizations differentially. For individuals with high levels of resources the costs of membership are relatively lower compared to those who are worse off. They come to know about voluntary associations casually through their social networks, fees and other expenses related to association activities are easily paid, and they are more aware of the rewards of voluntary association participation and of the necessity to engage. In addition, resources function as pull factors because educated, wealthy and connected individuals are recruited by voluntary organizations differentially. This can be explained by the fact that individuals with high resource levels are more valuable members for the organization (as the organization may take advantage of the members’ resources, their knowledge, skills and contacts). Therefore, resource differences between individuals give rise to selective joining by the individuals as well as selective recruiting by voluntary associations.

According to this view, the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation can be explained by resource inequalities between men and women. This perspective, however, implies a twofold explanation that is generally not fully appreciated (for an exception see Schlozman et al. 1994). First, men and women can differ on average in their resource endowments (i.e. men may have higher levels of education) and their membership levels differ accordingly. Second, the utility of the resource endowments can be different for men and women, i.e. the returns to resources may be gender-specific (i.e. the same educational attainment might on average lead to more memberships for men than for women). This differential effect of resources on memberships may be due to differential behavior of the individuals themselves (i.e. women react differentially to their resources than men) or voluntary associations value the same resources differentially depending on whether the resources belong to men or women. If this is the case, gender acts as conversion factor. As such, one has to distinguish levels from effects of resources.

3.3.2 How the Country Context Structures Resource and Return Differences

There is a long standing tradition of comparative studies showing substantial differences in the level of voluntary association affiliation across countries (Almond and Verba
1963; Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis et al. 1992; Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; Lam 2006;
Paxton 2007; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Van
Deth and Kreuter 1998). However, there are only few studies explicitly considering the
gender gap in a comparative perspective (Curtis 1971; Gustafson et al. 1979; Inglehart
and Norris 2003; Peter and Drobnič 2012). These show that the gender differential in
voluntary association affiliation varies between countries thereby confirming a common
pattern in cross-national research that “degrees of inequality between citizens differ
considerably across countries” (Korpi 2010:S14).

One strand of theorizing explains cross-country differences in the extent of gen-
der inequalities with women’s attachment to the labor market (Inglehart and Norris
2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Since the labor market is the central arena for the
allocation of socially valued resources in contemporary democracies, cross-country dif-
ferences in female labor force participation give rise to different resource endowments.
As resources are at the center of explaining memberships in voluntary associations, this
approach is especially useful for explaining the varying gender gap in voluntary associa-
tion participation across countries. Hence, differences in resource endowments to a
large extent reflect men’s and women’s distinct positions in the economy.

Different countries support women’s employment to varying degrees. By
providing public sector jobs, early childhood care, elder care, flexible work hours and
paid leave benefits, some countries actively enable women and especially mothers to
enter the labor force (Gornick and Meyers 2006; Mandel and Shalev 2009). Also of
importance for women’s resource endowments is generous direct assistance for women
that are restricted in their labor market participation like single mothers. Some countries
are therefore more gender-egalitarian than others because they have social policies that
aim at alleviating resource inequalities between the genders and by way of doing so
affect women’s opportunities to engage in voluntary associations. These policies there-
by reduce what Korpi et al. (2009: 5) call agency inequality “conceiving of inequality in
terms of individuals as purposive actors differing with respect to resources enabling
them to make choices over a broad range of alternative activities”. These social policies
have been characteristic for social-democratic welfare states, albeit to varying degrees
(Sainsbury 1999).
Contrarily, the more social policies aim at keeping women at home, caring for dependents and doing household tasks, the greater the gender gap in resources is expected to be. As a consequence, women are economically dependent on their husbands implying restricted agency. These policies have been associated with the conservative welfare states of continental Europe in which the Catholic Church and confessional parties were successful in promoting traditional gender roles and the principle of subsidiarity (Bussemaker and Van Kersbergen 1999; Orloff 1996).

However, women’s voluntary association affiliation is not only dependent on their resource levels but also on social norms and institutions that regulate the typical behavior of men and women. Adhering to gendered norms and being influenced by gendered institutions leads to gender-specific behavior. These norms and institutions partly reflect the construction of gender in society that is heavily influenced by men’s and women’s economic positions (Eagly and Wood 1991). Thus, even if men and women had roughly the same levels of resources, the gender gap in association affiliation may persist if the actors themselves or their contexts (e.g., voluntary associations) react differently to their resource endowments implying that women have a return deficit and that gender therefore acts as conversion factor. The extent of behavioral differences between men and women is in part indicative of the persisting prevalence and acceptance of traditional gender roles meaning a rigid division of labor between men and women: Whereas men mainly do productive work for pay in the market sphere, women do reproductive work without pay in the private sphere (Davis and Greenstein 2009). Men are considered as breadwinners and women as homemakers. The more traditional the division of labor the more gendered are social norms and institutions and as a consequence the more will behavioral outcomes differ between men and women.

As such, one has to distinguish levels from effects of resources (Lin 2000). This distinction has an important policy implication. If effects of resources differ for men and women, redistributive policies that aim at resource equality will not result in association affiliation equality. As long as return differences exist, the structural basis for gender inequality remains. The gender gap in voluntary association participation will persist even when resource equality between men and women had been established.
3.3.3 Economic and Cultural Accounts of the Trend Towards Gender Equality

Because resource endowments and the social construction of gender roles (with accompanying gendered social norms and institutions) are both affected by women’s economic position, resource and behavioral differences are not independent of one another. The labor market is not only the key arena in which resources are allocated. It is also the impetus for value change (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Kalmijn 2003). For women, individual-level labor force participation provides access to and control over resources which enables an independent livelihood without a husband (as does direct public support for single headed households). These outside options expand women’s bargaining power within the household (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Orloff 1993). Formerly gendered divisions of labor become contested and actual behavior within the household changes. If more and more couples equalize their actual division of labor, social norms about the rights and duties of men and women will adjust accordingly. The more women’s labor force participation patterns resemble those of men, the more role expectations will converge. New egalitarian gender norms follow and reinforce female labor participation (as well as male caregiving). Thus, countries that directly improve women’s resource endowments and bargaining power within households via employment-enabling services (and direct public support) indirectly affect the social construction of gender. Studies indeed show that, men and women are more liberal in gender role attitudes if the prevalence of female employment in society is high (Kalmijn 2003; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Seguino 2007). This economic perspective on societal value change is also in line with exposure-based explanations of gender role attitudes meaning that exposure to egalitarian situations (e.g., working mothers) results in more egalitarian attitudes (Davis and Greenstein 2009).
Table 3.1. Economic Perspective on Societal Value Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender relation</th>
<th>Gender gap</th>
<th>Resource differences</th>
<th>Return differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender inequality</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This reasoning suggests a temporal ordering as depicted in Table 3.1. First, all countries are characterized by a gender gap in voluntary association memberships due to women’s deficient resource endowments and gendered effects of the resources, i.e. a return deficit for women. After the massive entry of women into paid employment, their resource endowments rise, i.e. the resource deficit of women vanishes. With some time lag, social norms and institutions adapt to women’s new position. Gendered norms and institutions are gradually replaced by egalitarian ones. Hence, the return deficit vanishes. Therefore, it is expected that in the long run the return deficit vanishes in countries with relatively high levels of resource equality and bargaining power parity. If both, the resource and the return deficit vanish, so does the gender gap in voluntary association participation. Thus, in order to challenge and to change gendered norms as well as the cultural and institutional aspects of society that disadvantage them, women need the material basis and social status that comes with employment.

There is an alternative view that posits value change as the major driving force for gender egalitarianism (Charles 2011; Kalmijn 2003). According to this perspective, broader value change in the direction of rationalization, secularization and individualization also affects gender roles. In addition, due to the influence of globalization and transnational actors countries converge to common laws and policies regarding the position of women in society (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). These new egalitarian gender roles in turn enable women to fully participate in the labor force. In accordance with this cultural perspective on societal value change, a gender egalitarian climate is the precondition for women’s labor force participation. It is therefore expected that the return deficit will disappear first because the gender egalitarian climate overcomes gendered norms and institutions. After this, the endowments effect vanishes as a result of rising female labor force participation as is depicted in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Cultural Perspective on Societal Value Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender relation</th>
<th>Gender gap</th>
<th>Resource differences</th>
<th>Return differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender inequality</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td><em>Present</em></td>
<td><em>Absent</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.4 Hypotheses

The above discussion about how the country context affects resource distributions and the return to these resources leads to the following hypotheses about regime differences with regard to resource deficit, return deficit and the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation.

In *social democratic welfare states*, extensive family and labor market policies aim at female employment. Equal opportunity legislation combined with universal state provided services and the availability of public sector jobs for working women allows the integration of work and family. The goal of social policies is to provide real freedom of choice: A mother can choose whether she wants to work or not. She is not hindered by availability, costs or quality of childcare. As a result, resource levels should be on average quite similar between both genders. The long period of high female labor force participation rates typical for this welfare regime should also have resulted in comparable roles between men and women and in egalitarian gender role attitudes. Behavioral reactions to resource endowments are therefore expected to be unaffected by gender. For that reason it is hypothesized that the effects of resources on associational involvement are also quite similar for men and women. Hence, the gender gap in voluntary association membership is expected to be small or not existent at all in countries belonging to this regime type.

Resource and effect differences between men and women are expected to be largest in the *conservative welfare states* of continental Europe. The influence of the Catholic Church, Christian parties and the principle of subsidiarity reinforce traditional gender roles by way of gendered norms as well as by way of corresponding social policies. There is neither a decided commitment to gender equality nor sufficient state-
provided services for working women and mothers both of which inhibit female employment. A large gender gap in voluntary association memberships due to inequality in resources and behavioral differences due to gendered roles are therefore expected. Hence, social-democratic and conservative welfare states define the opposite poles for resource deficit, return deficit and the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation.

There is strong formal commitment to gender equality (e.g., affirmative action, gender quotas) in countries belonging to the liberal regime. However, this is a mere legalistic approach. Equal rights may not be sufficient in achieving equality in real life as there is a general lack of state-sponsored services helping women to reconcile work and family demands. It is up to the women to manage these complexities on their own (e.g., buy these services in the market sphere what is only affordable for the better-off). Thus, women have only the formal opportunity as opposed to the real or feasible opportunity to hold a job. Equal rights between men and women do not translate into parity between the genders. Chan (2000) calls this formal egalitarianism as opposed to the substantive egalitarianism of the Scandinavian countries. It is therefore expected that the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation is bigger than in the social-democratic countries. But it is not expected to be as large as in the countries of the conservative regime that not even adopt an unconditional commitment to gender equality. Table 3.3 summarizes the expected resource deficit, return deficit and gender gap in voluntary association affiliation by regime type.

3.4 Data and Methods

3.4.1 Data Source

The data for this study come from the module ‘Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy’ of the first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), a set of international surveys conducted in 22 European countries. In each country a random sample was interviewed using essentially the same questionnaire. Field work took place in 2002 and 2003. For the current study, only countries that could be unambiguously assigned to the social democratic, liberal or conservative welfare regime according to the existing literature are selected for analyses. This results in a data set with 22,581 respondents from 11 countries. National sample sizes range from 1,503 in France to 2,919 in Germany with
an average of 2,053 respondents. Response rates varied from 43.1% in France to 73.2% in Finland with a mean of 62%. The data include only respondents aged 15 years or older. After listwise deletion of cases with missing data the analytical sample consists of 17,827 respondents in 11 countries.\textsuperscript{25}

3.4.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent measure is a count of memberships in voluntary association types per respondent. This measure can be interpreted as a measure of overall potential to mobilize resources from different social circles. The tally is based on the question about membership in any of the following 12 different types of voluntary associations during the last 12 months: (1) sports club or club for out-door activities; (2) organization for cultural or hobby activities; (3) trade union; (4) business, professional, or farmers’ organization; (5) consumer or automobile organization; (6) organization for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities, or immigrants; (7) organization for environmental protection, peace or animal rights; (8) religious or church organization; (9) political party; (10) organization for science, education, or teachers and parents; (11) social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women, or friendly societies; (12) other voluntary organization.

\textsuperscript{25} The country-specific loss of cases ranges from 9.5% in Sweden to 42.3% in Austria. The loss of cases is driven by the income variable that has 15.5% missing data (with a minimum of 3.1% in Norway and a maximum of 34.8% in Austria). All other variables have less than 3% missing data. Since income is among the key resources and is unequally distributed between men and women, it is deemed important to incorporate this variable into the analyses despite the high missingness.


### Table 3.3. Predicted Resource Differences, Return Differences and Gender Gap in Voluntary Association Affiliation by Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Resource differences</th>
<th>Return differences</th>
<th>Gender gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As has been repeatedly noted in the literature, this variable underestimates the actual number of respondents’ memberships because multiple memberships within the same type of voluntary association are not counted (Baumgartner and Walker 1988; Diez de Ulzurrun 2002). However, the differentiation achieved through the rather extensive number of categories used in the ESS diminishes the probability of multiple memberships within types. In addition, as membership composition within the same type of association tends to be similar (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987), the added value of additional memberships within the same type in terms of access to non-redundant alters will be rather limited. This rationale brings me to argue that not counting multiple memberships within the same association type is unproblematic for the present study.

### 3.4.3 Independent Variables

**INCOME** is used as an indicator of financial resources. The ESS measures income as household’s total net income categorically with 12 income brackets. To come up with a continuous measure, midpoints are assigned to each income bracket. Because the top category has no upper limit, the midpoint is undefined. Instead, the mean income of the top category has been estimated based on the Pareto distribution (Parker and Fenwick 1983; West, Kratzke, and Butani 1992). This was done on a country-by-country basis to better fit the different income distributions across countries. To take household composition into account, the income measure has been adjusted using the modified OECD equivalence scale. In a final step, income was converted into purchasing power parities (PPP) in thousands to eliminate different price levels across countries.

**EDUCATION**—reflecting cognitive resources—is measured with the number of years spent in full-time education. For cases where this variable surpassed respondent’s age minus the country-specific starting age of compulsory schooling (which represents
the respondent’s lifetime available for education) the value has been replaced by respondent’s lifetime available for education. In addition, the variable has been truncated at 24 years of full-time education as was done in Schröder and Ganzeboom (2010).

Employment status is also interpreted as a resource variable although it is assumed to have two opposing effects. On the one hand, employment establishes new social ties (Rotolo and Wilson 2007). Thus, those in employment are likely to have more social resources in the form of colleague networks. On the other hand, employment reduces available free time. This is why Putnam (2000) sees part-time employment as the optimal combination. Employment status is assessed using the following six binary variables: FULL-TIME employed are those who responded being in paid work and normally working 30 hours and more per week; PART-TIME employed are respondents who are in paid work and normally work up to 30 hours a week. Actual rather than contractual working hours are used because it is actual working hours that constrain voluntary participation. The cut-off point of 30 hours was proposed by the OECD for international comparisons and is adopted here (Langfeldt 2003). The remaining indicators are UNEMPLOYED, HOUSEWORK, RETIRED, and OTHER EMPLOYMENT (which consists of being in education, sick or disabled, in community or military service, and other). If respondents reported more than one activity, employment status was determined by the main activity. Full-time employment is the reference category.

Parental status is also interpreted as a resource variable with opposing effects on free time and social resources. The net effect depends on children’s age (Knoke and Thomson 1977; Rotolo 2000b; Rotolo and Wilson 2007; Taniguchi 2006). Preschoolers tend to socially isolate their parents because of the high attention demands they pose. In contrast, school-aged children socially integrate parents because they face incentives and obligations as well as invitations to join activities that are organized around youth. Adult children are hypothesized to either have no influence (Rotolo 2000b) or to have a positive effect (Knoke and Thomson 1977) on their parents’ involvement. Indicator variables are therefore constructed for the presence of INFANTS AND TODDLERS (0 to less than 3 years), KINDERGARTEN-AGED CHILDREN (3 to less than 6 years) and SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN (6 to less than 18 years). No children under 18 in the household is the omitted category.
LENGTH OF RESIDENCE can be conceived of as a social resource variable because staying in one place over a longer period of time is normally associated with extended networks. It is measured in decades. Cases in which length of residence surpasses age have been truncated at respondent’s age.

In addition to resource endowments, several other variables have been repeatedly identified to predict membership in voluntary associations (see the literature reviews in Bonikowski and McPherson 2007; Smith 1994; Tomeh 1973; Wilson 2000). Therefore, the following controls are also included in the upcoming analyses.

AGE is measured in decades. To model the curvilinear effect that was repeatedly found in the literature AGE SQUARED is also included in the analyses. Age and age squared have been centered to enhance interpretability and remove nonessential collinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken 2003).

Marital status is coded as MARRIED = 1 and other = 0 which is the omitted category. The French particularity of ‘Pacte civil de solidarité’, a registered partnership offering heterosexual as well as homosexual couples some recognition and protection for their partnership without undertaking all the commitments of marriage, is coded into the married category.

The effect of Protestant denomination is assessed using an indicator variable that is coded as PROTESTANT = 1 and other = 0.

WATCHING TELEVISION was assessed with the question “On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching television?” Responses were measured on an eight-point scale ranging from “no time at all” = 0 to “more than 3 hours” = 7.

Altruism is measured using two items. The first is a behavioral measure that asks “Not counting anything you do for your family, in your work, or within voluntary organizations, how often, if at all, do you actively provide help for other people?” (HELPING). Respondents were offered a seven-point response scale ranging from “never” = 1 to “every day” = 7. The second is an attitudinal item asking “To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to support people who are worse off than themselves?” (SUPPORTING). The response scale consists of eleven categories rang-
ing from “extremely unimportant” = 0 to “extremely important” = 10. Since these two measures do not adequately fit into one scale by conventional criteria, they are kept separate in the following analyses.

Community size\textsuperscript{26} is assessed with a question that asks respondents to choose among five categories to indicate which best describes the area they live in. I constructed an indicator variable \textsc{rural} consisting of “country village” and “farm or home in the countryside”. The categories “big city”, “suburbs or outskirts of a big city” and “town or a small city” constitute the more urban areas and form together the reference category. Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3.4.

\subsection*{3.4.4 Country Grouping}

Although variables indicating regime membership are not directly used in the analyses, interpretation of results depends on knowing which countries are considered as belonging to which regime. Even though many regime typologies have been developed over the last two decades the actual grouping of countries into the different regimes is astonishing similar across typologies (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Countries assigned to the SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC REGIME are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The countries in the LIBERAL REGIME are Ireland and the United Kingdom. Countries assigned to the CONSERVATIVE REGIME are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{27}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{26} Community size is clearly not an individual-level predictor, but is treated as such because in the data used here (see below) it varies at the individual level.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{27} In the data set are also Italy and Luxembourg both of which are usually classified as conservative welfare states. However, due to estimation problems these two countries are excluded from the analyses.}
### Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership count</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>22.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>12.69</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housework</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employment</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants/toddlers</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten age</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School age</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of residence</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV watching</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance support</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 17,827*

### 3.4.5 Analytical Strategy

To answer the research questions, a series of regression models are estimated and the resultant coefficient estimates are used as inputs for a decomposition technique that allows separating the effects of resource deficit and return deficit. Since the dependent variable is a count; i.e. the number of memberships in different voluntary association type, the Poisson regression model is used. Applying a conventional linear regression
model to count outcomes can yield inconsistent, biased and inefficient parameter estimates (Long 1997: 217).

Apart from statistical reasons the Poisson model can also be justified from a substantial point of view. McPherson (1981) argues that the number of voluntary association memberships among individuals follows a Poisson distribution if certain assumptions are made that are common in this field of inquiry (interchangeability of memberships, membership is binary, rates of joining and leaving are the same for individuals with identical predictor values, i.e. no unobserved heterogeneity).

At this point interest lies only in the estimation of regression coefficients as these are the inputs for the decomposition. Therefore, potential overdispersion that might bias standard error estimates is not an issue here. Note that the negative binomial regression that is routinely used in the presence of overdispersion produces exactly the same regression coefficients as the Poisson model (Berk and MacDonald 2008).

The ESS has a hierarchical data structure with respondents nested in countries. Instead of using hierarchical Poisson regression to account for potential clustering, country-specific Poisson models are estimated by gender thereby allowing the regression coefficients to differ arbitrarily among countries and gender. This is done for two reasons. First, interest lies in the country-specific gender gap in voluntary association affiliation and in the country-specific effects of the predictor variables by gender. Thus, country-specific models allow for different enabling and constraining factors in explaining affiliation levels in different countries thereby accounting for the context conditionality that is the cornerstone of cross-national research (Kohn 1987). In contrast, hierarchical models produce overall coefficient estimates across all countries with associated variance components. This pooled sample estimation can suffer from misspecification ills because of the restrictions imposed by the model (Franzese 2005). Second, since the ESS consists of large independent random sample surveys it is not expected that much cross-country information has to be incorporated into the models (for which hierarchical models are especially suited). Thus, country-specific modeling seems to be the analytic strategy of choice.
3.4.6 Decomposing the Gender Gap

The Poisson regression coefficients serve as inputs to a non-linear variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) which decomposes the gender gap in the mean membership count into a component that is explained by gender differences in resource endowments and a component attributable to gender differences in the effects of these resources. The decomposition is not unique and depends on the choice of a meaningful counterfactual point of comparison which adequately reflects the assumptions about discrimination in the population, i.e. whether there is positive or negative discrimination against one of the two groups (Jann 2008; Jones and Kelley 1984; Oaxaca and Ransom 1994; O'Donnell, Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, and Lindelow 2008).

In the following, men’s coefficients constitute the counterfactual for the way women would accumulate memberships in the absence of gender discrimination. Thus, whereas men accumulate memberships according to their characteristics, women’s return to their resource endowments is too low when compared to men. It is therefore assumed that men are not discriminated and that there is negative discrimination against women in the acquisition of association memberships—either by themselves due to gender-specific behavior or by voluntary organizations because they value the same resources less if these are possessed by women and recruit accordingly. This counterfactual seems legitimate since men typically have more memberships than women.

Originally, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition has been developed in the context of linear models and I will use these as point of departure for a conceptual outline. The number of voluntary association memberships is a function of the predictor variables presented in Section 3.3. Using the law of iterated expectations, the mean membership count can be expressed as the linear prediction at the means of these predictors:

$$E(Y_g) = E(X_g)\beta_g$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.1)

The gender gap in mean membership counts is the difference between Equation (3.1) for men (i.e., $g = m$) and Equation (3.1) for women (i.e., $g = w$): $E(Y_m) - E(Y_w) = \Delta$. It follows that the difference in mean membership counts can be expressed in terms of differences in predictor means and differences in coefficients:
\[ \Delta = E(X_m)\beta_m - E(X_w)\beta_w \]  

(3.2)

Adding and subtracting the counterfactual number of voluntary association memberships that women would have if they were as effective as men in converting their resources into memberships, i.e. \( E(X_w)\beta_m \), on the right-hand side of (3.2) and rearranging terms gives the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition:

\[ \Delta = \left( E(X_m) - E(X_w) \right)\beta_m + E(X_w)(\beta_m - \beta_w) \]  

(3.3)

The first component is that part of the gender gap that can be explained by different means on the predictors and is referred to as \textit{endowments effect}. As can be seen from equation (3.3), the difference in endowments is evaluated at the coefficient values of men because this is the rate of return women would have in the absence of any gender discrimination. It estimates the amount by which women have fewer memberships because of deficiencies in membership determinants. This component therefore estimates the mechanism that Lin (2000) has called resource deficit. The second component is attributable to different effects of, or returns to, the predictors and is called \textit{coefficients effect}. The difference in coefficients is evaluated at the endowments of women. Hence, it estimates in a counterfactual manner the change in women’s average number of voluntary association memberships if they converted their endowments into memberships in the same way as men. This component estimates Lin’s (2000) return deficit mechanism.

In the Poisson regression model the conditional expectation of the dependent variable is 

\[ E(Y_{ig} | X_{ig}) = \exp(X_{ig}\beta_{ig}) \]  

This differs from the usual linear prediction

---

28 For variables with quadratic effects like age, the mean of the squared term that enters (3.3) is the second central moment, i.e. the variance. Hence, group differences pertaining to differences in the variances of age enter the endowments effect in addition to group differences in the means of age (Clogg and Eliason 1986).
Therefore, the standard decomposition is not applicable. Recently, several generalizations of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the nonlinear case have been made (Bauer and Sinning 2008; Fairlie 2005; Yun 2004). Here, I use the method proposed by Bauer and Sinning (2008). The authors generalize the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition using counterfactual conditional expectations. For the Poisson regression model this approach leads to the following sample decomposition:

\[
\hat{\Delta}_P = \left( \frac{1}{n_m} \sum_{i=1}^{n_m} \exp (X_{m,i} \hat{\beta}_m) - \frac{1}{n_w} \sum_{i=1}^{n_w} \exp (X_{w,i} \hat{\beta}_w) \right) + \left( \frac{1}{n_w} \sum_{i=1}^{n_w} \exp (X_{w,i} \hat{\beta}_w) - \frac{1}{n_m} \sum_{i=1}^{n_m} \exp (X_{m,i} \hat{\beta}_m) \right)
\]

Endowments effect

\[
\text{Coefficients effect}
\]

(3.4)

This method is implemented in Stata via the *nldecompose*-package written by Sinning, Hahn, and Bauer (2008).

The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is calculated from regression coefficients and predictor means, both of which are subject to sampling variation. Consequently, the decomposition results are also subject to sampling variation (Jann 2008). However, analytic formulas for standard error estimates of the nonlinear decomposition results are not available. For that reason, empirical sampling distributions from which standard errors can be estimated are obtained via bootstrapping. In order to obtain reasonable accurate standard error estimates, 1000 bootstrap replications were used to assess the significance of the decomposition results.

The reported endowments and coefficients effects are aggregated in the sense that they add over all predictors. Detailed decomposition in which contributions of specific predictors to the endowments and coefficients effects are estimated, suffers from severe identification problems. Specifically, changing the reference category of dummy variables can fundamentally alter detailed decomposition results for the coefficients effect (Jann 2008; Jones and Kelley 1984; Oaxaca and Ransom 1999). To avoid this ambiguity, I only report total, i.e. aggregated, decomposition results.
Chapter 3: A Cross-National Decomposition Analysis

Results

As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the mean membership count for men is larger than the corresponding figure for women in every single country in the sample. However, there is vast variability among countries in the difference between men and women. The gender differential is ranging from a low of approximately 0.02 in Sweden to a high of about 0.8 in Austria. Hence, the countries analyzed here differ substantially in gender equality with regard to voluntary association memberships.

The analytical strategy outlined above resulted in estimating one model for each gender in each of the 11 countries. Estimation results of these 22 Poisson regressions can be found in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates served as inputs for the nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions, the results of which are displayed in Table 3.5.

Figure 3.1. Average Number of Memberships by Country and Gender

3.5 Results

As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the mean membership count for men is larger than the corresponding figure for women in every single country in the sample. However, there is vast variability among countries in the difference between men and women. The gender differential is ranging from a low of approximately 0.02 in Sweden to a high of about 0.8 in Austria. Hence, the countries analyzed here differ substantially in gender equality with regard to voluntary association memberships.

The analytical strategy outlined above resulted in estimating one model for each gender in each of the 11 countries. Estimation results of these 22 Poisson regressions can be found in Appendix B. Coefficient estimates served as inputs for the nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions, the results of which are displayed in Table 3.5.
The overall gender gap in mean membership counts is not significantly different from zero in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, France and Finland (Table 3.5). The fact that all Scandinavian countries are in this group supports the hypothesis that social democratic welfare states are the most gender-egalitarian countries. As was expected, neither the endowments nor the coefficients effect is statistically significant in any of the Scandinavian countries. Consequently, there are no differences in resource endowments and no differences in behavioral reactions to the resources in these countries. As such, there seem to be no gender-specific obstacles for affiliation with voluntary associations.

France is located in the egalitarian group even though it does not belong to the social democratic welfare regime. Although France is usually classified as conservative welfare state, it has very distinctive features that have led some scholars to group it (along with Belgium, which exhibits the smallest differential among the countries with a significant gender gap) into the conservative choice model “where women are treated as choosing whether they are primarily earners or caregivers” (Misra, Budig, and Moller 2007:137; see also Esping-Andersen 1999; Mandel 2009). Particularly, French women are enabled to enter the labor force by the provision of high quality public childcare. However, French women are also supported in their caring activities by generous parental leave and homecare allowances. Although the overall gender gap of 0.089 in France is not statistically significant, France deviates from the Scandinavian cluster because there is a significant endowments effect of 0.126. Thus, French women have deficient resource endowments that would give rise to an even larger gender gap of 0.126 association memberships. However, this endowments effect is partly offset by a favorable coefficients effect to produce the insignificant gender gap of 0.089. According to the coefficients effect women would have 0.037 memberships (42% of the observed gap but in the direction favoring women) more than men on average.

29 Small numeric differences between the results in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 and in Table 3.5 are due to fact that the gender gaps in the figures are simple mean differences whereas the gender gaps in Table 3.5 are estimates based on the respective Poisson models reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
The gender gap in the remaining six countries is statistically significant. Among the countries with the highest gender gap are Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, all of which belong to the conservative welfare regime. This partly supports the hypothesis that prevailing traditional gender ideologies and the corresponding social policies and institutions of the conservative welfare state hamper gender equality in voluntary association participation. Hence, countries belonging to the social-democratic and the conservative welfare regimes are defining the opposite poles of the gender gap continuum in voluntary association affiliation. Countries of the liberal welfare regime (i.e., Ireland and the United Kingdom) do not form a distinct cluster between social democratic and conservative countries as was hypothesized. Rather, the gender gap in the liberal countries is comparable to the conservative welfare states. This corroborates the argument that substantive state-provided support for working women is more important than a mere legalistic approach to gender equality (Chan 2000; Mandel 2009).
Table 3.5. Decomposition Results for the Gender Gap in the Number of Voluntary Association Memberships by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.799***</td>
<td>–0.071</td>
<td>0.870***</td>
<td>–0.089</td>
<td>1.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.504***</td>
<td>–0.000</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>–0.001</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.410***</td>
<td>–0.067</td>
<td>0.477**</td>
<td>–0.162</td>
<td>1.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.396***</td>
<td>–0.031</td>
<td>0.427**</td>
<td>–0.077</td>
<td>1.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>0.356***</td>
<td>0.297***</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.233**</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>–0.003</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>–0.029</td>
<td>1.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.126*</td>
<td>–0.037</td>
<td>1.418</td>
<td>–0.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>–0.006</td>
<td>1.192</td>
<td>–0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>–0.034</td>
<td>–0.055</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>–0.646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Raw = metric of the dependent variable, i.e. membership count; norm. = normalized metric, i.e. components sum to 1.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, two-sided; significance tests are based on bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 bootstrap replications.

Among the countries with a significant gender differential in voluntary association affiliation, two broad mechanisms underlying the gender gap can be identified. On the one hand, there is the Netherlands where the gender gap is mainly due to an endowments effect. On the other hand, there are countries where the gender gap is mainly due to a coefficients effect like in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Thus, it is noteworthy that in the group of countries with a significant gender gap there are no countries exhibiting both a significant endowments effect and a significant coefficients effect that disadvantage women.

Taking the Netherlands as an example of a country where the endowments effect is dominating, 0.297 memberships or 83% of the gender gap in memberships is due to the endowments effect. Hence, this part of the gender gap can be explained by the fact women have on average less of those variables that foster men’s participation and have on average more of those variables that hinder men’s participation. The remaining 17%
of the gender gap can be explained by the fact that Dutch women are not as successful in turning their resource endowments into memberships than Dutch men, i.e. the factors that contribute to men’s participation are less useful for women or factors that reduce men’s participation are even more hindering for women.

Countries with present endowments and absent coefficients effects contradict the expectation that gender egalitarian attitudes and behavior (i.e., no coefficients effect) are the result of equal economic conditions (i.e., no endowments effect) as predicted by economic and exposure-based explanations of value change as shown in Table 3.1. Whereas the presence of a significant coefficients effect in combination with an absent endowments effect can be interpreted as a country in the middle of transition to gender egalitarianism, the pattern found in France and the Netherlands is incompatible with such an explanation. Nevertheless, these cases are in accordance with the cultural perspective on societal value change as depicted in Table 3.2. According to this approach, gender egalitarianism is seen as part of broader value changes, such as secularization and individualization (Kalmijn 2003). Female employment and equality of resources are therefore the effect rather than the cause of egalitarian gender roles.

In the remaining countries with a significant gender gap in voluntary association memberships (i.e., Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom), the differential is mainly due to a coefficients effect. Accordingly, the gender gap can be explained primarily by the fact that factors that foster men’s participation have a smaller effect for women whereas factors that impede men’s joining have a larger effect for women. In these countries gender acts as a conversion factor. In Austria for example the gender gap of 0.799 memberships is almost exclusively driven by the coefficients effect. Although there is resource equality between the genders, women are less effective in turning their resource endowments into memberships. This is indicative of gender specific norms and institutions. Thus, the return to resources and therefore their value is dependent on whether the resources belong to men or women. This implies that women themselves or their contexts (e.g., voluntary associations) react differently to their resource endowments.

This pattern of an absent endowments effect with a present coefficients effect is in line with the economic perspective on societal value change as depicted in Table 3.1.
It describes the pattern that would be expected for a country in the transition from gender inequality to gender equality.

### 3.6 Discussion and Conclusion

The main finding from these analyses is that there is a coherent pattern of endowments and coefficients effects in the Scandinavian countries that is in accordance with theoretical predictions. However, in the countries with a significant gender gap in the mean membership count, no dominating mechanism shows up. Particularly, it is not the case that countries belonging to the conservative or liberal welfare regimes exhibit any clear pattern or form a coherent cluster—neither with regard to the relative importance of endowments and coefficient effects nor with regard to their magnitudes.

In countries where the gender gap in voluntary association participation is due to a return deficit or coefficients effect, gender inequalities in voluntary association affiliation are mainly due to behavioral differences presumably caused by gender specific norms and institutions. Women are not as effective as men in converting their resources into memberships. Hence, the pathways to voluntary association affiliation are gender-specific. Gender therefore acts as conversion factor. Consequently, even if policy makers are successful in eliminating inequalities in relevant resources by way of redistribution or women-friendly family and labor market policies, the different behavioral reactions would prevent equal membership rates of men and women. However, there may be equalization in the long run. Economic explanations of societal value change predict that the absence of a resource deficit found in these countries and the associated bargaining power of women will change gender norms and gendered institutions. This in turn may alleviate behavioral differences and result in similar affiliation rates. Since changes in gender role attitudes typically take place via generational replacement, it takes some time to materialize (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Wilcox 1991). Thus, the return deficit of women is expected to vanish in the future.

In countries where the resource deficit or endowments effect accounts for the gender gap, the pathways to voluntary association affiliation are the same for both genders. The corresponding gender gap can be explained by the difference in resource endowments (e.g. income or education). There are no behavioral differences between men
and women and no discrimination against women in the voluntary sector. Rather, the
discrimination takes place in those areas of society where the relevant resources are
generated and distributed, i.e. in the educational system or the market sphere. The
mechanism underlying the gender gap is comparable to a race where participants start
from different positions along the track. Apart from different starting positions, the
track is the same for men and women.

The fact that among the countries studied here, there are no instances where
women experience both a resource and return deficit suggests that some form of gender
egalitarianism is already established—even in those countries exhibiting a significant
gender gap. Thus, traditional gender roles are eroding. Whether economic or cultural
processes are the driving forces for these changes is inconclusive. Based on the patterns
of endowments and coefficients effects found in the current analyses, it can be conclud-
ed that the economic and the cultural explanations of societal value change are both
partially supported. It would be wrong to dismiss one in favor for the other. Each seems
to account for the developments in some countries. Future research should elaborate on
the conditions under that each approach accounts for the trends toward gender equality.

Despite these insights, this study has some limitations that should be noted here.
First, the dynamic causal processes stated by economic and cultural explanations of
societal value change are tested with cross-sectional data. This is admittedly a limitation
of the current study and future work should more comprehensively test these proposi-
tions using longitudinal data. Second, the decomposition analyses reported here are
purely descriptive. The study design of the ESS does not allow for a causal interpreta-
tion of the endowments or the coefficients effects. Third, the validity of the decomposi-
tion results is dependent on correct model specification. Group differences in unob-
served variables translate into differences between coefficients (Jann 2008). This may
be even aggravated in models without additively separable error terms like the Poisson
regression model (Mood 2010). Finally, to adequately address the original research
question it would be preferable to have detailed decomposition results that would allow
assessing the separate contributions each explanatory variable makes to the endowments
and coefficients effects. This is because the endowments and coefficients effects contain
predictors other than the resource variables on which the theoretical argument is based.
Due to the identification issues described above this was not possible. The alternative strategy to estimate models with resource variables only is also not acceptable because decomposition results are dependent on correct model specification. Therefore, all predictors known to affect the outcome have to be incorporated.

This study has nevertheless yielded interesting insights into the interplay between resource deficit and return deficit on the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation in 11 European societies. By integrating results from the micro-level oriented sociology of voluntary associations with the comparative research on welfare regimes it was possible to show that welfare states do not only differ in the size of the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation. Welfare states differ also in the mechanisms underlying the gender gap in voluntary association membership.

Given the documented effects and side effects of voluntary association membership, the findings of this study may explain some of the persisting gender inequalities in status attainment in contemporary European societies. In those countries exhibiting a significant gender gap, the higher mean membership count for men imply that men join voluntary associations at higher rates, drop existing memberships at lower rates, or both. One the one hand, this finding violates normative ideals of gender equality as men and women are not equal participants in all facets of social life. On the other hand, the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation has negative effects on women’s chances of mobilizing socially embedded resources in purposive actions.

Finally, the gender gap in memberships has additional adverse effects for equality of opportunity between the genders. When voluntary associations are gender segregated, this implies that male organizations are bigger or more frequent. Both scenarios suggest that male organizations have greater salience in the public sphere. If voluntary associations are gender heterogeneous, these results imply that voluntary organizations become dominated by males over time (McPherson 1981b). Since voluntary associations often take up a stance on many public issues, both scenarios suggest an advocacy deficit for women. Female issues may not be adequately articulated and represented in the public sphere. These differences in voluntary association affiliation may act to maintain status differences between men and women.
4 Persistence or Decline? The Gender Gap in Voluntary Association Participation Across Countries and Time\textsuperscript{30}

Draft versions of this article were presented at:

- Spring Meeting of the ISA RC28, Essex, GB (14.04.2011)
- PhD Colloquium K. U. Schnapp (29.09.2011).

\textsuperscript{30} This chapter is based upon Peter, Sascha and Sonja Drobnič. “Persistence or Decline? The Gender Gap in Voluntary Association Participation Across Countries and Time.” Revised and resubmitted for publication.
Abstract

Women have traditionally been members in expressive voluntary associations but, when compared to men, have been underrepresented in instrumental organizations. Since memberships in instrumental voluntary associations are considered particularly beneficial for generating access to valuable social resources, a gender gap in instrumental organization affiliation may importantly contribute to gender inequalities in socioeconomic achievement. Memberships in instrumental and expressive organizations in 27 European societies are analyzed in this study. We use combined data from a set of World Values and European Values Surveys, contributing 87 country-years in the period 1981–2009. These cross-national repeated cross-sections are analyzed using a three-level multilevel model for change. In addition to individual-level predictors, the female labor force participation rate as indicator of women’s place in society is included in the analyses. To assess cross-country differences as well as developments over time, this indicator is decomposed into between-country and within-country variation. Results show that individual employment matters for women’s membership in instrumental and expressive organizations. In addition, women’s participation in instrumental voluntary associations is significantly related to between-country variation in women’s labor market participation rates. The results further suggest that the gender gap in instrumental organization affiliation is closing over time. However, the mechanism for this convergence is different than hypothesized. It is not that participation rates in instrumental voluntary associations are increasing faster for women than for men; rather, women disengage from instrumental associations at a significantly slower rate than men. Implications for gender inequalities are discussed.
4.1 Introduction

There have been major changes in the position of women in contemporary Western societies. The educational gap between men and women is closing (Barro and Lee 2001) and in many countries younger cohorts of women currently reach higher educational levels than men. Women’s labor force participation is increasing (Charles 2011), as is their income (Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002). The proportion of women in managerial positions is rising (Schein 2007), and their access to political power is growing (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). Nevertheless, in many areas of social life gender differences persist. In particular, women are still lagging behind when various dimensions of social capital are considered (Lin 2000). Studies have shown that women have smaller and less diverse networks than men (Campbell and Rosenfeld 1985; Moore 1990). This may in part be due to the fact that women have fewer memberships in voluntary associations than men (Booth 1972; Curtis 1971; Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis et al. 1992; Lam 2006; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Smith 1975, 1994) and that women are members of different types of voluntary associations (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982, 1986; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Popielarz 1999a; Putnam 2000). Organizations typically joined by women tend to be smaller, more expressive, more homogenous and more local. As voluntary associations are among the major sources of social contacts (Feld 1982), women’s access to socially embedded resources is therefore restricted. Given the ramifications of social capital, these gender differences may be one piece in the puzzle of persisting gender inequalities in socioeconomic achievement.

A growing number of comparative cross-national studies show that there are substantial differences in membership levels across countries (Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis et al. 1992; Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; Lam 2006; Paxton 2007; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Van Deth and Kreuter 1998). However, only few studies explicitly consider the gender differential in voluntary association participation in a comparative perspective (Curtis 1971; Gustafson et al. 1979; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Furthermore, it is not clear whether country-specific gender differences in affiliation persist over time or whether these are changing, since there are no studies focusing on the gender gap in voluntary associations from both a cross-country and a longitudinal...
perspective. Results from longitudinal studies are inconclusive. Depending on the study, affiliation levels have been found to increase (Dekker and Van den Broek 2005), to decrease (Costa and Kahn, 2003; Putnam 1995, 2000) or to stay more or less stable (Hall 1999; Palisi and Korn 1989; Paxton 1999, Rotolo 1999).

In this article, we focus on the dynamics of the gender gap in voluntary association participation as one dimension of social capital in cross-national comparison. Using a multilevel growth model for repeated cross-sectional data, we estimate participation rates in instrumental and expressive organizations for men and women in 27 European societies over time. Controlling for individual-level covariates, we aim to assess the impact of societal conditions on differences and trends in the gender gap in associational involvement. Since female labor force participation is one of the most important factors of the changing position of women in contemporary societies, we use the female labor force participation rate as the key societal predictor of both within-country temporal dynamics and between country differences in voluntary association participation. This study therefore combines both an analysis of differences across countries with an analysis of trends over time within countries.

4.2 Theoretical Background

4.2.1 Individual-level Benefits of Voluntary Association Participation

Access to social networks and the potential to mobilize embedded resources can help individuals in socioeconomic achievement. Through network ties, an additional pool of resources may become available for purposive actions (Lin 1999b). However, not all forms of network ties are equally instrumental in achieving one’s aims. Granovetter (1973) pointed to the important distinction between strong and weak ties in social networks. Weak ties are relations to others who are dissimilar and move in different social circles. Weak ties (links to acquaintances, friends of friends) therefore enhance ego’s network diversity and as a consequence broaden his or her pool of potential resources. In addition, weak ties have been repeatedly identified as channels through which novel and valuable information passes (Granovetter 1973).

Since weak ties link individuals who move in different social circles, there must be contexts that enable the formation of these ties. Voluntary associations are an im-
important arena for meeting and interacting with others because they create an “opportunity structure for interpersonal contacts” (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1982:884). These organizations are therefore an efficient context to meet potentially important acquaintances and to get useful information and valuable resources. The position that co-membership in voluntary associations is a weak tie relation has been repeatedly taken up in the literature. Granovetter (1973:1375) noted nearly forty years ago that “two common sources of weak ties [are], formal organizations and work settings”. McPherson (1981:337) explicitly stated that “[...] common membership in voluntary associations is one form of weak tie.”

These propositions have been supported in various studies, which found that memberships in voluntary associations indeed enhance life opportunities of individuals. Particularly in the occupational realm, voluntary association affiliation seems to bring tangible payoffs. Membership in voluntary organizations increases the probability that women participate in the labor force (Stoloff et al. 1999) and members of voluntary associations have better paid jobs and are employed in jobs with higher occupational prestige (Ruiter and De Graaf 2009). For job seekers, membership in voluntary associations provides access to instrumentally useful contacts. These contacts in turn positively affect the prestige of the destination job and the probability that a job seeker who was looking for a particular job actually found it (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997). For entrepreneurs, membership in voluntary associations increases the likelihood of gaining access to resources relevant for business success. This effect seems to be stronger for women than for men (Davis and Aldrich 2000).

Voluntary association affiliation provides individual-level benefits in non-occupational realms as well. It reduces anti-social behavior and has positive effects on physical health and mental wellbeing (Wilson 2000; Wilson and Musick 1999a). It also increases the political activity (Schlozman et al. 1994). In view of these benefits, the gender gap in voluntary association participation may be one piece in the puzzle of persisting gender inequalities in socioeconomic achievement.
4.2.2 Gender Gap in Voluntary Association Participation and Trends in Gender Equality

The gender gap in voluntary association participation can be conceived as a specific aspect of gender inequality. Thus, research questions about determinants of and trends in the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation can be positioned in the broader discussion on gender differences in general. There seems to be a universal trend for societies to become more gender egalitarian over time as part of societal modernization (Bergh 2006; Charles 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Increasing secularization and democratization as well as educational expansion and rising female labor force participation are all hypothesized to result in converging gender roles.

Societal modernization increases people’s economic, cognitive and social resources as well as their leisure time (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Individual-level studies that focus on the antecedents of voluntary association membership stress the importance of personal resources in becoming affiliated. An analogous argument has been used in cross-national studies to explain why more affluent societies have higher membership levels: “[...] people in more developed societies generally have more material and social resources to engage in organizational activity” (Andersen et al. 2006:378). Thus, the long-term trends in increasing resource endowments are expected to boost voluntary association affiliation over time. Moreover, societal modernization is not only thought to increase the general level of voluntary association participation (Smith 1972; but see Putnam 1995; 2000). It also leads to a growing number of associations developing around the heterogeneous interests generated by social differentiation thereby increasing opportunities for participation (Baer, Curtis, and Grabb 2001; Curtis et al. 2001). Modernization is also assumed to contribute to closing the respective gender gap because educational expansion and female labor force participation diminish resource differences between men and women over time. In addition, secularization and increasing female labor force participation rates entail changing role expectations, especially for women (i.e. a gradual shift from the male breadwinner/female carer model to the dual-earner/dual-carer model). As a result, individual attitudes as well as social norms, values and ideals are becoming more gender egalitarian,
thereby reducing obstacles to women’s participation in the public sphere in general and voluntary associations in particular.

There is some indirect evidence for these propositions if one accepts a monoton-ic developmental path of societal modernization from agrarian via industrial to postindustrial societies, with agrarian societies the least and postindustrial societies the most modern and gender egalitarian. Inglehart and Norris (2003) found the largest gender gap in association memberships in agrarian countries. In contrast, the gap was smallest in postindustrial countries with industrial countries in between. The universal trend towards gender egalitarianism occurs at various levels and develops at various rates in different countries, reflecting their cultural and institutional legacies (Esping-Andersen 1999; Inglehart and Norris 2003). However, despite the ongoing transformations characteristic of societal modernization, women still remain less active in the public sphere. This finding holds for the majority of contemporary Western societies as the gender difference in voluntary association affiliation continues to persist in most European countries albeit to varying degrees (Peter and Drobnič 2013).

4.2.3 The Role of Female Employment

The massive influx of women into the paid labor force during the last decades has been one of the most significant social changes in Western societies. Several studies have stressed the role of female employment in explaining women’s social participation patterns and the respective gender gap in voluntary association affiliation. Shifting the focus from home to the work place is expected to have an important effect on social participation since the number of memberships as well the types of organizations joined differ between employed and non-employed individuals (Costa and Kahn 2003; Gustafson et al. 1979; Klobus-Edwards et al. 1984; McPherson and Smith-Lovin1982, 1986; Rotolo 1999; Wilson 1990). We argue that in addition to individual employment—which reduces gender gaps in resource endowments and exposes women to colleague networks, both of which are conducive to becoming a member in voluntary associations—the female labor force participation rate has to be considered as this is the crucial trigger of value change regarding the “proper place” of women in society.
According to the economic theory of societal value change “[…] production structures shape attitudes toward women and their ‘proper roles’ across countries and within countries over the longue durée” (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010:40). Good labor market opportunities for women in postindustrial service economies create options for an independent livelihood outside the family. This in turn increases women’s bargaining power and their influence over the division of labor within households. As more and more women enter paid employment, gendered norms, values and ideas about the rights and duties of men and women that previously regulated their typical behavior (i.e. the rigid division of labor where men do productive work for pay in the market and women do reproductive work without pay in the private sphere) become contested and are gradually replaced by converging gender roles (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Klobus-Edwards et al. 1984). Hence, theoretical arguments about social change due to women’s labor market participation are best conceptualized as multilevel phenomena. On the individual level, female employment has consequences for personal resource endowments and in the aggregate it has effects on shared gendered role expectations that transcend individual employed women.

Thus, changes in the social position of women are rooted in the labor market, which is therefore regarded as the core arena of achieving gender equality (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, Mandel 2009). Since states support or constrain women’s labor force participation to different degrees, female labor force participation rates vary considerably across countries (Cooke 2011; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002). They are shaped by economic institutions and educational systems (Estévez-Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010) as well as population, family and labor market policies (Cooke 2011; Esping-Andersen 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2006; Mandel 2009). Some countries are more women-friendly than others because they permit and instigate women to reconcile paid work and family work. They support women’s entry into the labor force by providing public childcare facilities, paid leave entitlements, encouraging fathers’ participation in childcare within the family as well as creating public sector jobs which are particularly attractive for women. The female labor force participation rate is therefore one of the crucial factors for and one of the key indicators of gender equality. A low share of women in the labor market is likely to indicate that their “proper place” is still considered to be the private sphere of the family whereas a high female labor force participa-
tion rate may be a sign of legitimacy for women to be active in spheres other than home and family. In previous studies, women’s labor force participation rate has been successfully used to explain other instances of gender inequality such as the gender gap in voting (Giger 2009), parliamentary representation (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Stockemer and Byrne 2012) and political protest (Jenkins et al. 2008).

However, educational, family and labor market policies that affect women’s labor market participation not only vary between countries, thereby reflecting different cultural and institutional legacies. These policies and female labor force participation rates also change within countries over time. According to modernization theory, female labor force participation rates would generally go up but the speed of change is not constant across societies. This is an important aspect in understanding gender inequality across countries and within countries over time.

The gender gap in voluntary association participation is hypothesized to be smallest in countries where high proportions of women are working for pay and to be largest in countries with low female labor force participation rates (between-country effect). In addition, rising rates of female labor force participation are assumed to be associated with increasing female voluntary association participation over time (within-country effect). The simultaneous consideration of both components allows us to assess the relative importance of between-country cultural and institutional differences and within-country dynamics of path dependency and incremental change.

4.2.4 Instrumental and Expressive Organizations

There is one important qualification that has to be made when analyzing the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation. Female labor force participation is not assumed to boost all kinds of voluntary association memberships equally. The distinction between instrumental and expressive voluntary associations introduced by Gordon and Babchuk (1959) is crucial here. Participation in instrumental organizations can be considered predominantly instrumentally-rational action (Bekkers et al. 2008) and is largely directed at obtaining new resources and at influencing people outside the group (Lin 2001). Instrumental groups are characterized by large, open networks with many weak ties and were traditionally dominated by men. It is therefore in instrumental voluntary
associations where members are likely to meet potentially important acquaintances and receive useful information. This type of organization is also what political scientists usually have in mind when they describe voluntary associations as interest representation or advocacy groups. Examples are interest organizations, professional organizations, and political parties.

Participation in expressive organizations constitutes its own reward and is directed at preserving existing resources. This type of organization is characterized by dense, closed networks with mainly strong ties. Examples are sports clubs, churches, and youth clubs. Women have traditionally been members of expressive organizations as many of them operate in typically female domains (Booth 1972; Klobus-Edwards et al. 1984).

It has been found that women’s individual-level labor force participation has a positive effect on participating in the former but no effect on participating in the latter type of groups (Gustafson et al. 1979; Klobus-Edwards et al. 1984; Wilson 1990). Female labor force participation should therefore lead to a convergence between men and women in instrumental organizations affiliation (Klobus-Edwards et al. 1984). Because resources and free time can be spent only once, it may also be the case that as women enter paid work, expressive memberships are substituted for instrumental ones, leaving aggregate participation more or less unchanged. These shifts in affiliation patterns cannot be explored without such a differentiating between instrumental and expressive groups. Since many of these arguments invoke changing gender roles as a causal mechanism, we supplement the existing research with the hypothesis that a high female labor force participation rate positively influences women’s membership in instrumental organizations over and above their individual-level attachment to the labor market. The pathway for this positive impact operates through prevailing norms, values and ideals concerning women’s “proper place” in society.

The expectation that the general level of voluntary association participation is rising due to increasing resources in modern societies combined with the hypothesis that the respective gender gap is decreasing because of converging resource endowments and changing gender roles induced by increasing female labor force participation imply that voluntary association participation rates are increasing at a faster rate for women
than for men. Hence, the gender gap is expected to diminish and vanish in the future. To sum up our theoretical arguments we postulate the following hypotheses related to changes in the levels of voluntary association participation and the gender gap over time:

\( H_1: \) Participation levels in both instrumental and expressive voluntary associations are increasing over time.

\( H_2: \) The gender gap in instrumental voluntary association participation is closing over time.

\( H_3: \) The female labor force participation rate is positively associated with women’s instrumental voluntary association participation. This association is hypothesized to hold within countries over time and between countries in the cross-section although the respective effects may differ in magnitude.

We do not expect to find a significant gender gap in expressive association participation. Also, we do not expect the female labor force participation rate to affect women’s affiliation with expressive voluntary associations.

4.2.5 Individual-level Antecedents of Voluntary Association Participation

When testing these hypotheses, we control for several individual-level characteristics that have repeatedly been identified to be associated with voluntary association participation, since these may account for cross-country or cross-time differences. At the individual level, voluntary association affiliation has been repeatedly explained by resource endowments (Bekkers 2005; Bekkers et al. 2008; Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999b). Financial, cognitive and social resources as well as time availability are among the key determinants of voluntary association affiliation. Resource differences between individuals give rise to selective joining and selective recruiting which results in unequal affiliation rates among social groups differentiated along these lines.

Labor force participation raises earnings and broadens social networks and information flows, all of which are assumed to be conducive to voluntary association par-
ticipation (Putnam 2000; Smith 1994; Wilson 2000). However, working for pay also increases time demands, especially for working parents. The direction of the effect of children on membership depends on their age (Knoke and Thomson 1977; Rotolo 2000b; Rotolo and Wilson 2007). Infants and toddlers tend to socially isolate their parents because of the high attention demands they pose. In contrast, school-aged children socially integrate their parents since they face invitations and obligations to join activities that are organized around childhood and youth. Adult children are hypothesized to either have no influence (Rotolo 2000b) or to have a positive effect (Knoke and Thomson 1977) on their parents’ involvement.

Education is generally considered the most consistent and one of the strongest predictors of voluntary association affiliation (Smith 1994; Wilson 2000). Higher educated individuals might be more likely to share interests in issues dealt with in voluntary associations and be more aware of the rewards of voluntary association participation and of the necessity to engage, which leads them to join groups at a higher rate. In addition, highly educated individuals are more likely to be asked to join associations because of their potentially valuable knowledge and skills.

Frequent churchgoers are more likely to be members of voluntary associations because they are usually integrated into religious networks. Through these networks they come to know about voluntary associations, are asked to participate and it will be harder for them to reject these requests (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006).

It is expected that there will be differences between religious denominations, even after taking church attendance into account. Those belonging to a Protestant denomination have been repeatedly identified to participate more in voluntary associations. Protestant congregations are less hierarchically structured, more democratically organized and are divided into smaller subunits. These characteristics are hypothesized to generate more involvement (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). Moreover, Protestantism is said to have an “extra-familial orientation” (Lam 2006:178), thereby fostering community participation.

Age has been shown to have a curvilinear relation to voluntary association membership (McPherson et al. 1992; Smith 1994; Wilson 2000). The middle-aged are
more likely to join than young people or the elderly. Changing roles during the life course accompanied by differing expectations, opportunities and constraints may account for this pattern (Knoke and Thomson 1977; Rotolo 2000b).

Finally, marital status has been found to positively affect voluntary association participation. Rotolo (2000) argues that marriage increases membership rates for men because of the extra-domestic orientation associated with the male breadwinner model. For women, marriage boosts memberships in religious and youth-oriented groups because this kind of engagement is part of the role expectations faced by married women.

4.3 Data and Methods

4.3.1 Data Sources

Individual-level data to test our multilevel hypotheses come from combining the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS), which span the period from 1981 to 2009. Our analyses are restricted to countries that were members of the European Union in 2012. Since data on several variables for some country-years was completely missing and non-comparability of measurement (see next section) led to the exclusion of two WVS waves, the data set reduces to 83,192 respondents in 87 country-years in 27 countries. Nominal sample sizes vary from a low of 178 respondents in Latvia in 1990 to a high of 2,764 respondents in Spain in 1990, with a mean sample size of 956. The average number of waves is 3.2 per country and the modus is 3. Analytical sample sizes by country and survey year are displayed in Table 4.1.

Country-level data on female labor force participation rates and gross domestic product come mainly from the World Bank’s Statistics Database. Note that all Central and East European countries entered the surveys after the collapse of communism. Hence, we cannot compare whether trends before 1989 are different from those after 1989.
## Table 4.1. Sample Sizes by Country and Year

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4.3.2 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in our study are memberships in instrumental and expressive voluntary associations. Measures of membership are not strictly equatable over time in the WVS/EVS because question wording as well number and types of voluntary associations have changed across waves. In particular, questions and answer categories in the 1994–1999 and 2005–2007 waves of the WVS are so different that these waves cannot be used for the purpose of analyzing social change. Among the remaining waves, the first wave of the WVS/EVS stands out because of its different question wording and differences in number and types of voluntary associations. Specifically, “sports clubs and recreational groups” were not included as a separate category. In addition, a residual category for “other groups” was missing.

In order to be able to retain the first wave of the WVS/EVS, we follow the strategy used by Ruiter and De Graaf (2006), although we acknowledge that this strategy is not without problems. In their analyses of the relationship between religiosity and voluntary association affiliation, the authors only considered memberships in the seven types of organizations that were continuously present across the selected waves of the WVS/EVS surveys.

To differentiate between instrumental and expressive organizations, we follow previous studies (Booth 1972; Gustafson et al. 1979; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986; Palisi and Korn 1989; Wilson 1990) and classify “trade unions” rather voluntary. Therefore, union memberships have to be excluded from all measures of voluntary association participation. This practice originated in the 1970s in studies on the US and has been adopted since then by scholars working with comparative data. It should be noted, however, that among European countries, closed shop arrangements were only common in the UK and Ireland. Since 1990 all forms of closed shop arrangements are illegal in the UK and their relevance in Ireland seems to be vanishing (Blaschke 2003; Schnabel 2003; Visser 2006). We nevertheless tested whether excluding UK and Ireland from the analyses for instrumental memberships changes the research outcomes but the results remained virtually unchanged. A similar argument about compulsory union memberships could be made for the former socialist countries. However, all of them entered the survey after the communist breakdown. Excluding union membership would ignore an important part of women’s changing forms of social partici-
groups”, “professional associations” and “conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights” as mainly instrumental organizations. “Religious and church organizations”, “education, arts, music or cultural activities” and “social welfare” are considered mainly expressive groups. We then constructed two indicator variables to be used as dependent variables in our analyses: One for being a member in at least one instrumental organization and one for being a member in at least one expressive organization.

4.3.3 Independent Variables

4.3.3.1 Level-1 Variables

Level-1 variables capture the individual-level characteristics in the data. FEMALE is an indicator variable taking the value 1 for women and 0 for men. Age is measured in decades. As the sampling universe in all countries consists of respondents 18 years or older, younger respondents were not considered in the analyses. To model curvilinear effects, age in linear and quadratic form is included (AGE, AGE SQUARED). EDUCATION is measured as age at which the respondent completed his or her full-time education. This variable ranges in 10 steps from less than 12 years to more than 21 years. EMPLOYED is coded 1 for those in paid employment (full-time, part-time or self-employed) and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we include a FEMALE × EMPLOYED interaction to test whether the effect of employment differs between the genders. MARRIED is coded 1 for those who are married and 0 otherwise. CHILDREN is an indicator variable for those respondents who have at least one child. It has been previously shown that the effect of children on voluntary association affiliation depends on the child’s age; however, the information in the data is restricted to having children irrespective of their age. CHURCH ATTENDANCE informs about how often the respondent attends religious services apart from weddings, funerals and christenings. The original variable ranges from “practically never” to “more than once a week”. Following Ruiter and De Graaf (2006), we recoded this variable to the approximate number of times the respondent visits church per year, i.e. it
ranges from 0 for no visits at all to 104 for more than once a week.\textsuperscript{32} \textsc{Protestant denomination} is coded 1 for those who belong to Protestant denominations and 0 otherwise. In order to assess the effects of higher-level variables controlling for individual-level effects, all individual-level predictors—except the female indicator\textsuperscript{33}—have been grand-mean centered (Enders and Tofighi 2007).

### 4.3.3.2 Level-2 and Level-3 Variables

Predictors at level 2, i.e. country-year, are time-varying characteristics of the respective country whereas predictors at level 3, i.e. country, are time-invariant attributes. Our main level-2 predictors are survey year and female labor force participation rate.

Survey year is measured as the year in which the survey was administered. To retain interpretability of the level 2 intercepts and to acknowledge that chronological time matters in our study, time is coded as actual survey year minus the year of the onset of data collection, i.e. 1981. This way intercepts can be interpreted as initial status, i.e. average participation rates in 1981, although this interpretation implies some extrapolation for some of the countries. The main effect of survey year allows the proportion of male members to change systematically with the passage of time. Its interaction with \textsc{female} allows the gender differential to change systematically with the passage of time.

\textsuperscript{32} The effects of the continuous variables, i.e. age, education and church attendance, were assessed as to whether they meet the functional form assumptions in the analytical sample. Using both a lowess smoother and the \textit{design variables} method as described in Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000:106 ff.), age has been found to meet the quadratic form assumption and is thus left as a continuous variable with age and age squared in the models. Education and church attendance are reasonably approximated with a linear effect specification.

\textsuperscript{33} \textsc{Female} is not centered because this facilitates the presentation of results. A grand-mean centered dummy variable has values \(-n_1/N\) for the reference group and \(n_0/N\) for the comparison group. Thus, in calculating expected values for men all terms would permanently be involved making the presentation of results cumbersome (i.e. the coefficient for \textsc{female} and all interactions involving \textsc{female} do not drop out of the equations in forming predictions for men if \textsc{female} is centered). However, centering \textsc{female} and doing all the algebra yields essentially the same results as those presented here.
Female labor force participation rate (FLFP) is defined as the percentage of the female population aged 15–64 that is economically active. The time series of female labor force participation rates convey two pieces of information. They provide information on the country’s level of female labor force participation on the one hand, as well as within-country change over time on the other hand. Hence, it represents an inextricable mix of the between-country effect and the within-country variation. Using a single parameter to capture the within- and between-country effects of FLFP on membership constrains both effects to be equal across levels of analysis and can lead to erroneous conclusions (Zyphur, Kaplan, and Christian 2008). Typically, country-mean centering would be used in growth models to disentangle both components in longitudinal studies (Singer and Willett 2003:173). This approach averages the values of the time-varying predictor within each country and subtracts this country-average from each country-year value to produce within-country deviation scores ($X_{jk} - \bar{X}_k$) that inform about within-country variation. The deviation scores are then used in conjunction with the country means ($\bar{X}_k$) that capture cross-country differences in levels.

However, as elaborated in Curran and Bauer (2011), this approach is valid only if the time-varying covariate is not trending; otherwise regression coefficients will be biased. The female labor force participation rate does not meet this requirement because it is trending in most countries. It is increasing in most northern, continental, and southern European countries and is decreasing in most central and eastern European countries during the period under study. This is particularly problematic in unbalanced data sets like the one used here, since countries that entered the survey at a later point in time may simply have a higher or lower female labor force participation rate because of the passage of time. One therefore has to detrend this variable using regression methods to adjust for these issues before it can be used in subsequent analyses. Specifically, the
female labor force participation rate is regressed on time (centered at 1981)\textsuperscript{34} using a two-level random coefficient model\textsuperscript{35} with country-years nested in countries. Since we have just over three waves per country on average, we use a linear specification for the time trend. The regression intercepts (obtained via empirical Bayes prediction) are then used as time-invariant between-country components in the level 3 equation (FLFPB) and the lower level residuals (calculated by taking the random effects into account) are used as the detrended time-varying within-country component in the level 2 equation (FLFPW). To facilitate interpretation of intercepts and interactions in subsequent models, FLFPB has been centered. Thus, the coefficient of the between-country component captures the effect of cross-country differences in 1981, whereas the coefficient of the within-country component captures the effect of longitudinal variation. This decomposition allows us to test whether the relationship between FLFP and voluntary association affiliation holds between countries as well as within countries. In addition to the main effects, we include their interactions with female (FEMALE × FLFPW and FEMALE × FLFPB) to estimate their effect on the gender gap. Hence, employment and its interaction with female are included at all three levels: at the individual level, at the country-year level and at the country level.

We also control for gross domestic product (GDP) because it has been shown that economic development is associated with membership in voluntary associations (Curtis et al. 1992; Curtis et al. 2001; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Smith 1972) and that economic development is associated with the female labor force participation rate (Goldin 1995). We use GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2005 international dol-

\textsuperscript{34} We alternatively centered time at the grand mean in the detrending model as suggested by Curran and Bauer (2011). Using these results in the multilevel logit models presented in the following section yielded essentially similar results. For ease of interpretation, we prefer centering around 1981 for two reasons: a) because of differing measurement occasions and varying numbers of waves across countries, the grand mean is not particularly meaningful and b) we avoid effects going backward in time.

\textsuperscript{35} By using multilevel models in conjunction with empirical Bayes predictions we are exploiting the borrowing strength or partial pooling property of multilevel models (Gelman and Hill 2007; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). In this way we are able to circumvent the problem that some countries have less than 3 waves of data.
lars using purchasing power parity rates to ensure cross-country and cross-time comparability. The same detrending procedure as for FLFP has been used to disentangle within-country (GDPW) and between-country (GDPB) variation. We also include their interactions with FEMALE. The inclusion of an indicator variable for post-socialist countries and its interaction with FEMALE did not have any effect—neither for instrumental nor for expressive memberships. Thus, FLFP and GDP seem to adequately capture the relevant differences between countries. Descriptive statistics for the pooled data set are displayed in Table 4.2.

4.3.4 Analytical Strategy

Multilevel models are especially suited for analyzing trends with repeated cross-sectional data (DiPrete and Grusky 1990; Firebaugh 1997). Cross-national repeated cross-sections can be conceived as a hierarchy of three nested levels where respondents are nested in surveys or country-years, which in turn are nested in countries (Duncan, Jones, and Moon 1998). We therefore estimate a three-level multilevel model for change (Singer and Willett 2003) with countries at level 3, country-years at level 2, and respondents at level 1. The two upper levels of this model (Equations 4.2 and 4.3) can be conceived as a growth model where countries are the units of analysis and the country-years represent the repeated measurements of these units. The repeated measures are the random coefficients estimated at the respondent level (Equation 4.1). These coefficients can be interpreted as describing the respective country at a specific point in time since they summarize the relationship between voluntary association affiliation and gender within that country-year. This is consistent with a view that “[...] treats the parameters from individual-level models as attributes of social systems. The goal under the latter formulation is to describe the fluctuations in these parameters and to explain how they were generated by macrolevel causes” (DiPrete and Grusky 1990:338). We can then ask questions about within-country change of these parameters at level 2 and between-country differences at level 3.
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-level</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental membership</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive membership</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>31.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83,192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country-year level</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FLFPW</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>−6.79</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPW</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>−2.98</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country-level</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FLFPB</td>
<td>55.23</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>23.79</td>
<td>78.66</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPB</td>
<td>12.98</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>34.03</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All variables are in original uncentered metric.

With three waves of data it becomes possible to sensibly analyze change (Singer and Willett 2003). Given that on average we have just over three waves of data for each country this precondition is met. However, just meeting the minimal condition restricts us to a linear shape of each country’s change over time. This implies that for every country the growth trajectory is characterized by the initial status at the first measurement occasion (i.e. the intercept) and the linear growth parameter, both of which are allowed to vary across countries.
Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, the following multilevel logistic regression model is used to test the hypotheses (Gelman and Hill 2007; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Snijders and Bosker 2012), where the Level-1 Model is

\[
Y_{ijk} \sim Bernoulli(p_{ijk})
\]

\[
\text{logit}(p_{ijk}) = \pi_{0ijk} + \pi_{1ijk} \text{FEMALE}_{ijk} + \sum_{p=2}^{P} \gamma_{p00} x_{pijk}
\]

the Level-2 Model is

\[
\pi_{0jk} = \beta_{00k} + \beta_{01k} \text{YEAR}_{jk} + \beta_{02k} \text{FLFPW}_{jk} + \beta_{03k} \text{GDPW}_{jk} + r_{0jk}
\]

\[
\pi_{1jk} = \beta_{10k} + \beta_{11k} \text{YEAR}_{jk} + \beta_{12k} \text{FLFPW}_{jk} + \beta_{13k} \text{GDPW}_{jk} + r_{1jk}
\]

\[
r_{jk} \sim N(0, \Omega)
\]

and the Level-3 Model is

\[
\beta_{00k} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001} \text{FLFPB}_k + \gamma_{002} \text{GDPB}_k + u_{00k}
\]

\[
\beta_{01k} = \gamma_{010} + u_{01k}
\]

\[
\beta_{02k} = \gamma_{020}
\]

\[
\beta_{03k} = \gamma_{030}
\]

\[
\beta_{10k} = \gamma_{100} + \gamma_{101} \text{FLFPB}_k + \gamma_{102} \text{GDPB}_k + u_{10k}
\]

\[
\beta_{11k} = \gamma_{110} + u_{11k}
\]

\[
\beta_{12k} = \gamma_{120}
\]

\[
\beta_{13k} = \gamma_{130}
\]

\[
u_k \sim N(0, \Omega)
\]

with \(i = 1, 2, \ldots, n_{jk}\) respondents in survey \(j\) in country \(k\), \(j = 1, 2, \ldots, J_k\) surveys in country \(k\) and \(k = 1, 2, \ldots, K\) countries. Control variables \(x_{pijk}\) are specified as fixed. All models are estimated using HLM 6.08 with full Penalized Quasi Likelihood approximation to the likelihood function. Cases with missing data have been excluded from the analyses.

Model specification in multilevel models requires a deliberate consideration of which level-1 predictors should be included into the model. Confounding variables have to be controlled for, otherwise the model would be mis-specified and all parameter estimates biased (Oakes 2004). Having said that, if it is assumed that the effects of higher-level predictors are mediated via level-1 covariates, it would be problematic to control for these mediators. Doing so would “explain away” the indirect effects of the higher-level predictors on the outcome (Blakely and Woodward 2000). This is sometimes re-
ferred to as overcontrolling. We therefore first estimate the models without individual-level predictors and add them in a final step. Specifically, FLFP may affect marital status (where women face good labor market opportunities, they are less reliant on finding a spouse who can support them), parental status (this effect is likely to depend on institutional solutions for childcare), church attendance (the erosion of traditional gender roles may induces further secularization), education (where it is common for women to work, investment in education has pay-offs), and individual-level labor force participation (the existence of a large labor market for women makes it easier for a focal woman to find work). Controlling for these variables would block potential mediated effects of FLFP on the dependent variables. Hence, we enter these variables in a final step. This strategy should give some information about the upper and lower bounds within which the effect of the societal context (FLFP) on voluntary association affiliation may be found.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Instrumental Associations

Plotting the proportion of men and women belonging to instrumental organizations in Figure 4.1, we see that in all 27 societies men were more likely to be members at the onset of data collection (i.e. 1981). However, the magnitude of this initial gap differs between countries. In most countries this gap is closing over time. We therefore observe converging trends. But speed and timing of this convergence also differ between countries.
Figure 4.1. Proportion of Respondents with at Least One Instrumental Membership by Gender, Year and Country (Cyprus Not Shown Because it Only Has One Wave of Data)
Turning to the estimation results, the null model (Table 4.3, Model 1) indicates that the odds of being a member in an instrumental association in a typical country-year in a typical country (i.e. \( r_{ijk} = u_{0jk} = 0 \)) are \( \exp(-1.351) = 0.259 \). Therefore, we expect about one member for every four non-members. The variance components reveal that there is more between-country than within-country variation in the odds of joining an instrumental group. Using the latent linear response approach to logistic regression allows the computation of the intraclass correlation for two randomly chosen respondents from the same country, which is 0.131 (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Snijders and Bosker 2012). The intraclass correlation for two randomly chosen respondents from the same country-year within the same country is 0.207. Hence, there is substantial dependency in the data calling for the use of a multilevel model.

The unconditional growth model (Table 4.3, Model 2) shows that the general trend is decreasing, that is, members disengage from instrumental organizations. The odds of being a member in an instrumental organization were \( \exp(-0.810) = 0.445 \) in 1981 and since then decreased by \( 100 \times \{\exp(-0.030) - 1\} = -3\% \) per year. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that societal modernization and the associated rise in resources increase participation levels in voluntary associations. However, initial status as well as rate of change vary significantly between countries. Assuming normality for the country-level random effects, we expect about 95% of the countries’ rates of change to lie in the interval \([\exp(-0.030-1.96\times\sqrt{0.001}) = 0.912; \exp(-0.030+1.96\times\sqrt{0.001}) = 1.033]\). Hence, in some countries the odds of participating in an instrumental organization are predicted to decrease annually by about 9%, whereas in other countries these odds are predicted to increase by more than 3% per year.

The growth model by gender (Table 4.3, Model 3) informs about the trajectories of men’s and women’s average instrumental organization participation during the last decades. The downward trend holds for both genders. However, the trajectories differ. On the one hand, men’s initial status is higher than the corresponding figure for women. For men, the odds of being a member in an instrumental organization at the first wave of data collection are \( \exp(-0.333) = 0.716 \), whereas the corresponding figure for women is \( \exp(-0.333-0.871) = 0.300 \). On the other hand, the downward trend for women is less pronounced than that for men. While the odds of being a member in an instrumental
organization decrease annually at a rate of $100 \times \{\exp(-0.040) - 1\} = -4\%$ for men, the rate for women is less steep: $100 \times \{\exp(-0.040 + 0.018) - 1\} = -2\%$. This results in converging trends over the observed time frame. Accordingly, the expected odds for men being a member in an instrumental association in 2009 are $\exp(-.333 - .040 \times 28) = 0.234$ whereas the corresponding figure for women is $\exp(-.333 - .871 + [-.040 + .018] \times 28) = 0.162$. The gender difference in the expected odds therefore decreased from 0.417 in 1981 to 0.072 in 2009. Thus, the hypothesis that men’s and women’s participation rates are converging over time is supported, but the underlying mechanism is different to that hypothesized. It is not that women’s participation rates are increasing at a higher rate than those of men. Rather, women disengage at a slower rate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–1.351***</td>
<td>–0.810***</td>
<td>–0.333*</td>
<td>–0.369*</td>
<td>–0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>–0.871***</td>
<td>–0.870***</td>
<td>–0.690***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.114***</td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
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<td>Age squared</td>
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<td>–0.074***</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.673***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female × Employed</td>
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<td>0.424***</td>
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<td>(0.041)</td>
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<td>Children</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.029)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
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<td>0.001*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>–0.040***</td>
<td>–0.038***</td>
<td>–0.044***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female × Year</td>
<td>0.018***</td>
<td>0.018***</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
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<td>Female × FLFPW</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDPW</td>
<td>0.080†</td>
<td>0.082‡</td>
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<td>Female × GDPW</td>
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<td>–0.018</td>
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*(continued)*
Table 4.3. (continued)

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<td>FLFPB</td>
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<td>0.024*** (0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female × FLFPB</td>
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<td>0.011*** (0.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDPB</td>
<td>0.065*** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.059*** (0.012)</td>
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<td>Female × GDPB</td>
<td>0.006 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.005)</td>
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<td>0.117***</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.610***</td>
<td>0.412***</td>
<td>0.389***</td>
<td>0.322***</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.127***</td>
<td>0.107***</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female × Year</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Est. = Estimate, Standard Errors (SE) in parentheses; coefficients on the log-scale. With the exception of FEMALE, all individual-level predictors are grand-mean centered. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two sided. 
N = 83,069; J = 87; K = 27.

We then introduce the within-country (FLFPW) and between-country (FLFPB) components of the female labor force participation rate and the within-country (GDPW) and between-country components (GDPB) of the gross domestic product per capita into the model (Table 4.3, Model 4). It can be seen that cross-national variation in the female labor force participation rate is positively associated with membership in instrumental organizations. Every percentage point increase in the between-country component of

---

36 Since the number of observations is 27 at the country level and 87 at the country-year level, results are sensitive to influential cases. We therefore checked for potential outliers by regressing the fraction of members in instrumental and expressive voluntary associations respectively on FLFPB and GDPB at the country level and on FLFPW, GDPW and YEAR on the country-year level. We then computed the influence statistic *Cook’s Distance* for the countries and the country-years. Using the proposed cut-off value
the female labor force participation rate increases the odds of participation for men by
100×\{\exp(0.031)−1\} = 3 % and by 100×\{\exp(0.031+0.015)−1\} = 5 % for women. Thus,
the between-country effect is greater for women than for men. In countries where it is
more common for women to work for pay it is also more common for them to be mem-
bers of instrumental organizations. In addition, the between-country component of GDP
has a positive effect on membership in instrumental organizations that does not differ
between males and females. The higher the economic development of the country the
higher are the odds of being member in an instrumental group. However, none of the
within-country components of FLFP and GDP nor their interactions with FEMALE have
effects on membership in membership in instrumental groups.

Finally, in Model 5 individual-level covariates are introduced. We now can in-
terpret the participation rates for men and the gender differential as adjusted for diffe-
rences in population composition with respect to the level-1 variables included. Two
findings regarding the trend are worth noting. First, after controlling for the level-1 vari-
ables the trajectories of men’s and women’s affiliation with instrumental organizations
become more similar. The gender differences in initial status, as captured by FEMALE,
and growth rate, as captured by FEMALE × YEAR, are reduced. Thus, part of the gender
differences in trends can be explained by individual-level covariates. However, the co-
variates cannot explain away these differences. Second, controlling for individual-level
covariates accentuates the downward trend for membership in instrumental groups. Ac-
cordingly, some of the developments in individual-level covariates (e.g. increasing edu-
cational levels) are countervailing/buffering the negative trend. Turning to the effects of
the level-1 covariates, being employed makes respondents more likely to be members of
instrumental voluntary associations. This effect is more pronounced for women than for
men. With the exception of the indicator variable for children, all remaining individual-
level covariates have the expected effects. Thus, individual-level employment and the
between-country female labor force participation rate have the hypothesized effects on
of 1 (Cook and Weisberg 1982:118), the results indicate that there are no cases that have an undue influ-
ence on the estimated regression coefficients at either level.
women’s membership in instrumental organizations. It seems indeed to be the case that the effect of female employment operates at multiple levels.

4.4.2 Expressive Associations

Figure 4.2 shows that in most countries there is virtually no gender gap in expressive organization affiliation. In addition, the trends for men and women generally move in lockstep. This impression is confirmed by the results of the multilevel models.

As shown in Table 4.4, Model 1, the odds of being a member in an expressive association in a typical country-year in a typical country are \( \exp(-1.245) = 0.288 \). We expect about one member for every three non-members. Thus, membership in expressive organizations is slightly more common than membership in instrumental organizations. The intraclass correlation for two randomly chosen respondents from the same country is 0.116. The intraclass correlation for two randomly chosen respondents from the same country-year within the same country is 0.228. Again, there is substantial dependency in the data. In addition, within-country and between-country variance in the odds of joining an expressive association have roughly the same magnitude.

Estimating the unconditional growth model (Table 4.4, Model 2), we see that contrary to membership in instrumental organizations, the coefficient for YEAR is essentially zero, i.e. the odds to affiliate with expressive organizations remain constant over the observed time frame. Because the associated variance component does not differ significantly from zero, this absence of a trend holds across countries.
Figure 4.2. Proportion of Respondents with at Least One Expressive Membership by Gender, Year and Country (Cyprus Not Shown Because it Only Has One Wave of Data)
The growth model by gender (Table 4.4, Model 3) reveals that the odds of being a member in an expressive association at the onset of data collection are on average $100 \times \{\exp(0.161) - 1\} = 17\%$ higher for women than for men. However, the associated variance component shows that there is a substantial variability between countries. The 95\% plausible value interval for this effect ranges from $\exp(0.161 - 1.96 \times \sqrt{0.050}) = 0.757$ to $\exp(0.161 + 1.96 \times \sqrt{0.050}) = 1.821$. Thus, in some countries women’s odds of being affiliated with expressive organizations are 24\% lower and in others 82\% higher than those for men. However, in contrast to instrumental organization affiliation, there is no gender difference in the growth rate. Thus, at least for the observed time span the trends are horizontal parallel lines. In addition, the associated variance components for the trend and the gender difference in the trend are in effect zero, meaning that there is no between-country variability in these figures.

In Model 4 (Table 4.4), FLFP and GDP are introduced. As expected, neither the longitudinal within-country component nor the between-country component of the female labor force participation rate are associated with membership in expressive organizations. This finding holds for men as well as for women, irrespective of whether individual controls are introduced into the analysis in Model 5. In contrast, the between-country component of GDP has a positive effect on membership in expressive organizations which does not differ by gender. Accordingly, as was the case for instrumental memberships, higher economic development makes membership in expressive organizations more likely.

The introduction of the full set of controls in the Model 5 renders the main effect of gender (i.e. the gender gap in initial status) insignificant, which means that the gender specific trends now coincide. Thus, in contrast to membership in instrumental associations, individual-level characteristics can fully account for the—in this case positive—gender gap. Whereas the main effect of employment is not statistically significant, its interaction with female is significant. Thus, employment increases the odds of being a member in an expressive organization for women but not for men. The remaining individual-level predictors have the expected effects.
Table 4.4. Three-level Logistic Regression Models for Membership in Expressive Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
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<td>Individual-level</td>
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<td>−1.334***</td>
<td>−1.424***</td>
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<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
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<td>0.161*</td>
<td>0.182**</td>
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<td>(0.063)</td>
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<td>Age squared</td>
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<td>Female × Employed</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female × Year</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
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<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
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<td>Female × FLFPW</td>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
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<td>GDPW</td>
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(continued)
### Table 4.4.  
(continued)

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<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
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<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
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<td>0.075*** (0.016)</td>
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<td>0.004 (0.004)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Female × Year</td>
<td>0.000† (0.000†)</td>
<td>0.000† (0.000†)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Est. = Estimate, Standard Errors (SE) in parentheses; coefficients on the log-scale. With the exception of FEMALE, all individual-level predictors are grand-mean centered.  
*† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two sided.*  
*N = 83,160; J = 87; K = 27.*

### 4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The evidence for our hypotheses is mixed. Contrary to our first hypothesis, based on modernization theory, the general trend for memberships in instrumental associations is negative. Hence, societal modernization and the associated increase in individual-level resources do not increase instrumental affiliation per se. However, without the increase in resources the drop would have been even larger. This finding is rather in line with Putnam’s writings on declining social capital (Putnam 1995, 2000). Nevertheless, the corresponding gender gap is indeed closing over time as expressed in our second hypothesis, albeit due to a different mechanism than assumed. The gender gap is not closing because instrumental organization affiliation increases faster for women than for men. Rather, women disengage at a slower rate than men. Our third hypothesis regard-
ing the effect of the female labor force participation rate on women’s instrumental memberships receives partial support. In addition to the positive effect of employment at the individual level, there is also a positive association of the between-country component of the female labor force participation rate and membership in instrumental voluntary associations. Both effects are stronger for women. In contrast, the within-country effect is not different from zero.

For membership in expressive organizations, the proportion of members is constant across time and virtually the same for men and women. Controlling the full set of individual-level covariates, the growth trajectories coincide. This is in line with our hypothesis of no gender gap and identical developments for men and women in expressive organizations. Again, contrary to our expectations, societal modernization does not lead to increasing participation levels in expressive groups, but there is no downward trend either. Whereas individual employment is associated with expressive memberships for women, the female labor force participation rate seems not be relevant for expressive voluntary association affiliation, as was expected.

Thus, the resources and colleague networks that come with individual employment increase women’s affiliation with voluntary associations in general, irrespective of whether these are of the instrumental or expressive type although this effect is much stronger for instrumental memberships. However, the impact of the female labor force participation rate is more complex. In accordance with our hypothesis, the changing position of women that comes with increasing rates of female employment affects their participation in instrumental but not in expressive organizations. In addition, this association is only observed between-countries and not within-countries. This supports our argument about women’s employment as a multilevel phenomenon. Since between-country differences in female labor participation rates reflect cultural and institutional differences, our results give some credit to theories stressing the importance of different institutional arrangement for membership in voluntary associations (Janoski 1998; Salamon and Anheier 1998) as well as female labor force participation (Esping-Andersen 1999; Mandel 2009). Institutional arrangements are assumed to exhibit relative stability. Thus, countries may incrementally develop over time but are constraint in their development by past trajectories (Thelen 1999). Hence, the reason for the absent
within-country effect might be too little variation in the FLFP within countries over the period covered (i.e. for the country-years studied 75 % of the variance in FLFP is between countries).

From these results, two additional insights have to be stressed. First, in longitudinal research on membership in voluntary associations it is important to distinguish between instrumental and expressive memberships because they exhibit different trends. In addition, societal conditions, like the share of women working for pay, seem to affect these memberships differently. Second, it is important to disentangle within-country and between-country variation of time-varying country characteristics. Whereas the between-country variation of FLFP and GDP is associated with membership in instrumental associations, within-country variation of these country variables seems to be irrelevant. Not disentangling between- and within-country variation is likely to attribute effects to the wrong level of analysis. Thus, in order to fully understand women’s changing roles, one has to take time and place into account.

Overall, it can be concluded that with changing norms, values and ideals concerning women’s “proper place” in society—as captured by the increasing female labor force participation rate—the gender gap in instrumental voluntary association participation may vanish over time. Our study therefore confirms what the authors of one of first cross-national studies on the gender gap in voluntary association participation already anticipated some thirty years ago: “[…] when conditions of female adult life become more similar to those experienced by men, their social participation also becomes more similar” (Gustafson et al. 1979:55). Hence, the differential distribution of benefits accruing from participation in voluntary associations may diminish and disappear over time as well. This may result in more equal opportunities for men and women and contribute to decreasing gender inequalities in socioeconomic achievement.
5 General Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Introduction

This dissertation is based on the premise that voluntary associations are an important facet in structuring social inequality. By joining a voluntary association the individual actor becomes part of a social network. The social resources embedded in this network may be accessed and mobilized for achieving one’s aims. Therefore, membership in voluntary associations has ramifications in the status attainment process.

The literature on gender differences in voluntary association participation together with the findings on voluntary association’s presumably role in the status attainment process lead to the fundamental assumption underlying this study: A potential gender gap in voluntary association affiliation matters for women’s position in other realms of society—in particular the market and the state sector. If women have fewer memberships than men they systematically have fewer and less diverse co-membership ties that can be capitalized on for instrumental action. Gender differences in the access to socially embedded resources may therefore constitute an important constraint that results in gender inequality in socioeconomic achievement. Consequently, it is important to study the gender gap in voluntary association participation and the gendered pathways to becoming a member and how the gender gap and the gendered pathways are conditioned by the societal context. Despite the obvious relevance of this topic, there has been a general lack of research on the gender differential in voluntary association participation in cross-national perspective. This dissertation fills some of this research gap.

5.2 Summary of the Empirical Findings

There is considerable variability in voluntary association participation across European countries. The Nordic countries of the social democratic regime have the highest mean membership count, followed by the liberal, the corporatist, the Mediterranean and post-socialist regimes. Thus, as has been previously reported in many studies (Curtis 1971; Curtis et al. 2001; Curtis, Grabb, and Baer 1992; Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen 2006; Lam 2006; Paxton 2007; Pichler and Wallace 2007; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Van Deth and Kreuter 1998; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005), there is a direct effect of the country context on
voluntary association participation (Path (d) in Figure 1.1). This direct effect of the country context cannot be explained away by controlling for individual-level attributes. Thus, the effect of the country context is not fully mediated via individual-level predictors, i.e. it is not due to compositional effects (Path (m) in Figure 1.1). These results stress the importance of the country context and its characteristics in research on voluntary associations.

In addition, in most European countries there is a gender gap (Path (g) in Figure 1.1) in voluntary association participation. On average, women have fewer memberships than men. However, this gap varies considerably across countries. Therefore, the country context moderates the effect of gender (Path (i.2) in Figure 1.1). Controlling for individual-level resources and attributes (i.e. introducing Path (r) in Figure 1.1) reduces the gap somewhat. Therefore, part of the gender effect on membership in voluntary associations is mediated via individual-level resources and attributes (Path (e) in Figure 1.1). However, even when individual variables are controlled for, differences between countries remain. Thus, the between-country variability in the gender gap in voluntary association memberships cannot solely be explained by compositional effects. There are substantial differences between the countries with regard to gender equality in voluntary association participation. These results stress the importance of incorporating the country context into analyses of gender inequalities.

In those countries that—in addition to having a legalistic approach to gender egalitarianism—provide substantive help for women to reconcile work and family, the gender gap in voluntary association memberships is virtually absent. These are the Nordic countries of the social democratic regime. Thus, women in this regime type are as likely as men to meet potentially important acquaintances, access useful resources, gain valuable information, and in this way reap the benefits of voluntary association memberships. In contrast, in all other regimes women have significantly fewer memberships than men—even when individual-level resources and attributes are controlled for. Women in corporatist regime have 11% fewer memberships and women in the liberal regime have about 17% fewer memberships than men in the respective regime type. The gender gap is most pronounced in the Mediterranean and post-socialist regimes where women have on average 28% and 30% fewer memberships than men. In these
regimes women are clearly disadvantaged because their potential to access and to mobilize the resources embedded in the social networks of voluntary associations is restricted. This relational form of social inequality is likely to be one facet in the puzzle of persisting gender inequalities in contemporary WEIRD (i.e. Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic) societies.

Following Lin’s (2000) distinction between resource deficit and return deficit, country-specific nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analyses further clarified the mechanisms underlying the varying gender gap. The decomposition analyses were restricted to countries of the social democratic, liberal and conservative regimes. These analyses revealed why the countries of the social democratic regime are gender egalitarian with respect to voluntary association participation. Women in this regime neither face a resource deficit nor a return deficit. Thus, on average men and women in the social democratic countries do not differ in the resource endowments that predict memberships, meaning the Path (e) in Figure 1.1 is absent in these countries. In addition, these resources are equally productive in becoming a member for men and women (i.e. Path (c.1) in Figure 1.1 is zero for social democratic countries). As such, there are no gender-specific obstacles for affiliation with voluntary associations in the social democratic regime. Thus, women in the social democratic regime are not systematically disadvantaged with regard to the consequences of voluntary association affiliation, i.e. social integration, interest representation and status attainment.

In contrast, the gender gap found in the countries of the liberal and corporatist regimes is either due to a resource deficit (i.e. women have less of those resources that contribute to men’s affiliation or have more of those factors that are a hindrance for men in becoming a member) or a return deficit (i.e. the factors that foster men’s participation are less useful for women or factors that reduce men’s participation are even more hindering for women). Among the countries in the study are no instances where both effects are present. This suggests that traditional gender roles are eroding and some form of gender egalitarianism is already established in Western democracies. However, in those countries where the gender gap is generated by a return deficit (e.g. Austria, Germany, UK), women are less effective in converting their resources into voluntary association memberships. It matters whether a given resource endowment belongs to a men
or a women. Thus, gender acts as a conversion factor (i.e. Path (c.1) in Figure 1.1 is different from zero in these countries). This result is indicative of gender specific norms and institutions. It follows that the pathways to voluntary association affiliation are gendered. In contrast, in those countries where the gender gap is due to a resource deficit (e.g. the Netherlands), the pathways to voluntary association affiliation are in principle the same for men and women. There are no differences in average preferences and behavior between men and women regarding voluntary association affiliation and no discrimination against women in the voluntary sector. However, since both genders differ in their resource endowments, women are discriminated in more distal sectors of society where resources are generated and distributed (i.e. Path (e) in Figure 1.1 operates). Among the countries belonging to the liberal or corporatist regimes no dominant mechanism emerged nor do these countries form any coherent clusters—neither with regard to the relative importance of resource deficit and return deficit effects nor with regard to their absolute magnitudes.

Thus, the decomposition analyses revealed that whether Paths (e) or (c.1) are of relevance depends on the specific country context. Therefore, Paths (i.3) and (i.4) seem to be at work, although the predictions about regime effects were fully confirmed only for the social-democratic regime.

Women’s participation in voluntary associations has frequently been linked to their attachment to the labor force. This dissertation expanded this theoretical account by considering women’s labor force participation as a multilevel phenomenon. At the individual-level, labor force participation brings the resource endowments that foster affiliation with voluntary associations. At the aggregate level, the female labor participation rate is an indicator of prevailing gender role expectations and a sign of women’s place in society. The higher the female labor force participation rate the more legitimate it is for women to be active in spheres other than home and family. Women’s increasing labor market participation rates during the last decades have been one of the most striking social changes in Western democracies. However, countries differ in trends of women’s labor market participation rates (Charles 2011). I exploited this cross-country cross-time variation to put the labor force hypothesis to a test. If one differentiates between membership in instrumental (i.e. work and policy related) and expressive (i.e.
social and recreational) voluntary associations, there is evidence of a gender gap (Path (g) in Figure 1.1) in instrumental group membership during the 28-year period between 1981 and 2009 that is closing over time. Whereas men were much more likely to be affiliated with an instrumental organization in the early 1980s, the gap narrowed substantially by the late 2000s. The gender difference in the expected odds of being a member in an instrumental voluntary association decreased from 0.417 in 1981 to 0.072 in 2009. However, this converging trend is not generated by increasing participation rates among women. Rather, the gender gap is closing because women disengage at a slower rate than men.

The hypothesis about the influence of the female labor force participation rate is partially confirmed. In those countries where female labor force participation is common women are more likely to be a member of an instrumental association (Path (i.2) in Figure 1.1). In contrast, within-country temporal changes of the female labor force participation rate are unrelated to women’s affiliation with instrumental groups. Thus, between-country differences in women’s economic position—reflecting fundamental differences in institutional arrangements and cultural traditions—seem to be more influential for women’s membership in instrumental groups than incremental within-country transformations of women’s role expectations.

Introducing individual-level resources and attributes (Path (r) in Figure 1.1) reduces the gender gap in trends to some extent indicating that part of the gender effect is mediated via resource endowments and individual attributes (Path (e) in Figure 1.1). The between-country effect of female labor force participation is also reduced when individual-level controls are introduced into the model. Thus, part of the effect of women’s labor force participation rate is mediated via individual-level resource endowments (Path (m) in Figure 1.1).

In contrast, there is no gender gap in expressive group affiliation—at least when the full set of controls is included in the model. In addition, membership in expressive groups is not related to the female labor force participation rate.
All these results are in line with the argument that if women and men have similar economic positions, their social participation and voluntary affiliation patterns become more alike (Gustafson et al. 1979).

5.3 Theoretical Implications

This dissertation gives insights into why women’s voluntary association affiliation is similar to that of men in some countries but falls behind men’s participation in other countries. The crucial starting point has been to conceptualize membership in voluntary associations as a multilevel phenomenon. Within the branch of sociology of voluntary associations there is a rich tradition of research focusing on individual-level antecedents of voluntary association membership. While this research tradition has been successful in explaining interindividual differences in voluntary association participation, it has been less compelling in accounting for cross-country differences in the level of affiliation. Therefore, features of the country context—in particular the role of the voluntary sector in welfare provision—have to be included into theoretical and empirical investigations of the voluntary sector.

The gender gap in voluntary association memberships also varies considerably between countries—even after controlling for a wide array of markers of socio-economic position and other individual characteristics. Thus, the scope of gender inequality in this aspect of social capital depends on country characteristics like social policies, institutional arrangements and cultural heritage. It cannot be explained by individual characteristics alone. With a few notable exceptions (Andersen, Curtis, and Grabb 2006; Curtis 1971; Gustafson, Booth, and Johnson 1979; Inglehart and Norris 2003), gender has not been of central concern in the comparative literature on voluntary associations. In contrast, the comparative analysis of gender gaps has usually been a key aspect of the sociology of welfare states. However, the gender gap in voluntary association participation has not yet received proper attention in this field of inquiry. Presumably, this is due to the fact that the voluntary sector in itself has been disregarded in many of the prominent accounts of the welfare state. For example, Cnaan (1992:70) criticized that by omitting voluntary organizations from his discussion of welfare provision, Esping-Andersen (1990) “misses an essential factor of Anglo-Saxon welfare”.

Consequently, for the purpose of analyzing the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation I combined the theory of *social origins of civil society* (Salamon and Anheier 1998) with insights from the comparative welfare state and gender literature. This eclectic approach clarifies the different ways in which the country context accounts for the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation. According to this approach, the gender gap in voluntary association affiliation is largest in those countries where the primary locus of welfare provision is the private sphere of the family. When neither the state nor the market nor the voluntary sector takes on the role of the main service provider, the family—and therefore mostly women—is responsible for the care of dependents. The more women are absorbed with caring activities and the fewer social services are externally provided which would enable reconciling work and family, the lower the prospects for women to be active in the labor market.

Since the labor market is the arena where central resources are allocated, female employment brings about those resources that are conducive to membership in voluntary associations. Thus, labor market policies and welfare arrangements that help women—especially mothers—to reconcile work and care, reduce resource differences between men and women (Path (i.4) in Figure 1.1). As differences in resource endowments give rise to selective joining by the individuals and selective recruiting by voluntary associations, this is one major explanation of the varying gender gap between countries.

In addition to affecting the distribution of resources between men and women, a country’s labor market policies and welfare arrangements also affect the returns to these resources. Women’s labor force participation enables an independent livelihood without a husband. This outside (i.e. exit) option expands women’s bargaining power within households. Thus, economically independent women are in a position to contest gendered norms and institutions about their “proper place” in society (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Since norms and institutions regulate the typical behavior of men and women, gendered norms imply different opportunities and restrictions for men and women. In contrast, converging gender roles are assumed to result in converging behavior on part of the actors and in converging reactions from the surrounding society (i.e. less discrimination due to gender). Thus, a country’s labor market policies and welfare
arrangements also impact via Path (i.3) in Figure 1.1. Path (i.3) represents a situation in which the return to a certain resource endowment depends on gender, i.e. gender acts as a conversion factor. With increasing female labor force participation return deficits decrease, i.e. gender no longer acts as conversion factor. The gender culture in these countries is highly egalitarian. Women can legitimately participate in the state, the market and the voluntary sector. Their sphere of action is not restricted to the private sphere of the family. Therefore, the location of care work, i.e. whether it is located as unpaid labor within the home or transferred to the public, the market or voluntary sector is of major importance for women’s agency (Korpi 2010:20). Thus, it is theoretically and empirically fruitful to follow Lin’s (2000) advice to distinguish the two mechanisms of resource deficit and return deficit. I expanded Lin’s approach by linking these mechanisms to features of the country context.

Women’s changing economic position is especially relevant for membership in instrumental associations. Whereas these associations were traditionally dominated by men, there is evidence for converging participation rates. In contrast, women’s affiliation with expressive organizations has not changed over time. Thus, in longitudinal research on voluntary association participation it is insightful to distinguish between membership in instrumental and membership expressive voluntary associations as these exhibit different trends. In addition, instrumental and expressive memberships are affected differently by women’s changing economic position. An effect of the female labor force participation rate has only been found for membership in instrumental groups. However, this effect is only present between the countries studied, but not within the counties over time. Therefore, in comparative longitudinal research on voluntary associations and gender inequality, it is important to correctly take time and place into account. That means that one has to disentangle between-country effects and within-country over time effects. Otherwise, the effects of focal predictors are confounded and research results are likely to be biased (Curran and Bauer 2011).

In summary, in countries in which women are more integrated into the labor market, they have more of the individual-level resources that are usually involved in explaining voluntary association affiliation. In addition to affecting the distribution of resources, women’s economic position also affects the return to these resources via
changing gender roles. Together these two mechanisms offer an explanation to why women’s voluntary association affiliation resembles that of men in some but not in other countries. When women’s economic position becomes similar to that of men, their affiliation patterns will also become more similar. As participation patterns in expressive organizations already have been quite similar for men and women, this particularly implies that with increasing female labor force participation women’s affiliation with instrumental voluntary associations aligns with that of men.

5.4 Directions for Future Research

This dissertation has been limited to the study of the multilevel antecedents of membership in voluntary associations. I deliberately disregarded Paths (f), (c.2), (i.5) and (i.6) in Figure 1.1. Rather, this dissertation is based on the premise that membership in voluntary associations matters for status attainment. That is, Path (f) is assumed to be significantly and substantially positive and several studies suggest that this is indeed the case (e.g. Beggs and Hurlbert 1997; Davis and Aldrich 2000; Ruiter and De Graaf 2009; Schlozman et al. 1994; Stoloff et al. 1999; Wilson 2000; Wilson and Musick 1999a).

However, the empirical support for the relevance of voluntary association memberships for status attainment comes almost exclusively from single country studies. Therefore, little is known about the role features of the country context may play in this relationship. Future research should investigate whether Path (f) is conditional on the country context. It may be the case that this effect is systematically stronger in some countries than in others and that these country differences can be related to specific country characteristics (i.e. the question is whether Path (i.5) is different from zero).

There is also some evidence that Path (f) is moderated by gender meaning that Path (c.2) is present (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997; Davis and Aldrich 2000; McDonald 2011). Thus, gender matters for the process of converting memberships into resources, i.e. gender acts as conversion factor. Again, this evidence comes from single country studies and future research should clarify whether the extent of these gender differences is related to specific features of the country context (i.e. whether there is an effect of Path (i.6) in Figure 1.1).
These insights would complete the picture about the role voluntary associations play in the status attainment process and whether the effects of voluntary associations on resources are gendered and how both aspects are related to features of the country context. Gender differences in the voluntary sector may be one facet in explaining gender inequality in other – more prominent – societal sectors like the state and the market. They do so because social contacts and social resources matter in status attainment. And these resources can be accessed and mobilized via voluntary associations. Thus, in spirit of Tocqueville one could argue that research on gender, social inequality and welfare states could substantially progress in explaining persisting gender inequalities in status attainment if more attention is given to the results of the science of association.
Appendix A  A Comparison of Multilevel and Two-step Hierarchical Poisson Regression Results
A Comparison of Multilevel and Two-step Hierarchical Regression Results

In Models 2 and 3 of Table 2.4 we treated all individual-level predictors other than the constant and the female indicator as fixed because these variables are not the focus of our study. This means that we assume the effects of these variables to be the same in all the countries included in our study. One may be concerned that the restriction of treating the coefficients of the control variables as fixed may bias our results. Therefore, as a test for the robustness of our results, we estimated the final model (i.e. Model 3) by using two-step hierarchical Poisson regression (Jusko and Shively 2005) instead of the multilevel Poisson regression. The two-step approach does not impose any restrictions on individual-level predictors. We therefore estimated 20 within-country Poisson regression models and saved the resultant parameter estimates. Subsequently, we regressed our key focal parameters (the constant and the gender differential) on the regime typology. To account for heteroskedasticity due to sampling error in the estimated dependent variables we used bootstrapped standard errors for the aggregate regressions as proposed in Lewis and Linzer (2005). The results are shown in Table A1.

Using the two-step approach requires the estimation of 20 regression coefficients within each of the 20 countries plus the two aggregate regressions at the country level (one for the constant and one for the female indicator) with 5 regression coefficients and a residual variance each. Thus, the two-step approach requires the estimation of 412 parameters. The estimation of the multilevel Poisson model requires the estimation of 28 regression coefficients and 3 variance components. As can be seen from Table A1 the substantial conclusions regarding the regime effects remain unchanged. Hence, treating all control variables as fixed does not have biasing effects on our conclusions. We therefore stay with the multilevel results as these are much more parsimonious. In addition, some methodologists are rather sceptical about the two-step hierarchical approach (Beck 2005; Gelman 2005).
### Table A.1. Comparison of Multilevel and Two-step Estimates of Regime Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country-level</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multilevel</td>
<td>Two-step</td>
<td>Multilevel</td>
<td>Two-step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Est. (SE)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic (const.)</td>
<td>0.743***</td>
<td>0.783***</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>−0.186</td>
<td>−0.149</td>
<td>−0.182*</td>
<td>−0.138***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>−0.253</td>
<td>−0.245</td>
<td>−0.120*</td>
<td>−0.129*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>−1.178***</td>
<td>−1.090***</td>
<td>0.323**</td>
<td>−0.307***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-socialist</td>
<td>−1.417***</td>
<td>−1.229***</td>
<td>−0.349***</td>
<td>−0.331***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>Note:</sup> Est. = Estimate, Standard Errors (SE) in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> Standard errors are based on 400 bootstrap replications as recommended in Cameron and Trivedi (2009:419).

<sup>*</sup> p < 0.05, <sup>**</sup> p < 0.01, <sup>***</sup> p < 0.001, two-sided.

N = 30,393; J = 20.
Appendix B  Poisson Regression Results Underlying the Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions
Table B.1. Poisson Regression Models for Voluntary Association Memberships and Predictor Means by Country and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Austria Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Austria Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Belgium Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Belgium Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>1.367</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1.214</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>1.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>0.047***</td>
<td>12.754</td>
<td>0.058***</td>
<td>12.354</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
<td>12.473</td>
<td>0.037***</td>
<td>12.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part-time</strong></td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>–0.117</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployed</strong></td>
<td>–0.313</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>–0.548***</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>–0.195</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housework</strong></td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>–0.415***</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>–0.012</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>–0.181</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retired</strong></td>
<td>–0.031</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>–0.280</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>–0.029</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>–0.558***</td>
<td>0.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other employment</strong></td>
<td>–0.072</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>–0.078</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>–0.113</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>–0.137</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infants/toddlers</strong></td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>–0.193</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>–0.105</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kindergarten age</strong></td>
<td>–0.050</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>–0.189</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>–0.158</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School age</strong></td>
<td>0.135*</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.342***</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>–0.099</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.264</td>
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Pseudo $R^2$: 0.079 (Austria Male) 0.080 (Austria Female) 0.029 (Belgium Male) 0.039 (Belgium Female)

$N$: 578 (Austria Male) 724 (Austria Female) 655 (Belgium Male) 596 (Belgium Female)

(continued)
Table B.1.  

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| N                         | 659          | 576    | 854            | 905          | (continued)
Table B.1.  

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Pseudo $R^2$         | 0.060 | 0.099 | 0.058 | 0.091 |
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<td>(0.063)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV watching</td>
<td>–0.034*</td>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helping</td>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
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<td>Importance support</td>
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(continued)
### Table B.1. Continued

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<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.340$^{*}$ (0.152)</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.176</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.058$^{***}$ (0.007)</td>
<td>13.313</td>
<td>0.059$^{***}$</td>
<td>13.145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>−0.084 (0.137)</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>−0.024</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>−0.444$^{**}$ (0.146)</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>−0.421$^{*}$</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housework</td>
<td>−0.030 (0.137)</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>−0.245$^{**}$</td>
<td>0.161</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>−0.056 (0.097)</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>−0.076</td>
<td>0.154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other employment</td>
<td>−0.067 (0.082)</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>−0.104</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants/toddlers</td>
<td>0.006 (0.082)</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>−0.010</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten age</td>
<td>−0.012 (0.077)</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School age</td>
<td>0.016 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.051$^{*}$ (0.024)</td>
<td>−0.071</td>
<td>0.098$^{***}$</td>
<td>−0.038</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>−0.013 (0.010)</td>
<td>3.017</td>
<td>−0.029$^{**}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.179$^{***}$ (0.054)</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.086</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.112$^{**}$ (0.043)</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.209$^{***}$</td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
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<td>Length of residence</td>
<td>0.030$^{*}$ (0.014)</td>
<td>2.279</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>2.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.083 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV watching</td>
<td>−0.037$^{**}$ (0.013)</td>
<td>4.074</td>
<td>−0.033$^{*}$</td>
<td>3.976</td>
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<td>Helping</td>
<td>0.066$^{***}$ (0.013)</td>
<td>3.560</td>
<td>0.064$^{***}$</td>
<td>3.653</td>
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<td>Importance support</td>
<td>0.039$^{**}$ (0.014)</td>
<td>7.640</td>
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<td>8.227</td>
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<td>−0.599$^{***}$ (0.178)</td>
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<td>−0.353</td>
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| Pseudo $R^2$              | 0.075 | −0.078 | −0.042 | −0.062 |
| $N$                       | 948 | 851 | 941 | 868 |
### Table B.1.  Continued

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<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Est. (SE)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Est. (SE)</td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>12.953</td>
<td>0.087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.017</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
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<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>−0.399***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.225)</td>
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<td>(0.097)</td>
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<td>0.020</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
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<td>Other employment</td>
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<td>−0.088</td>
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<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infants/toddlers</td>
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<td>(0.122)</td>
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<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
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<td>School age</td>
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<td>0.157</td>
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<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
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<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
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<td>3.206</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.200**</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.278***</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.226***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
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<td>Length of residence</td>
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<td>(0.020)</td>
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<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
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<td>TV watching</td>
<td>−0.035*</td>
<td>4.998</td>
<td>−0.022</td>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
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<td>Helping</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
<td>3.520</td>
<td>0.045**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
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<td>(0.015)</td>
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<td>(0.185)</td>
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<td>(0.214)</td>
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</table>

Pseudo $R^2$                  | 0.082          | –              | 0.127          | –              |
References


References


References


English Summary

This dissertation investigates the gender gap in voluntary association participation in cross-national perspective and gives insights into why women’s voluntary association affiliation is similar to that of men in some countries but falls behind men’s participation in other countries. This dissertation adds to the existing literature by focusing on the antecedents of the gender gap in voluntary association participation. The crucial starting point has been to conceptualize membership in voluntary associations as a multilevel phenomenon affected by individual-level attributes as well as country-level characteristics. Using this perspective makes it possible to investigate cross-national variation in the gender gap in voluntary association participation and to examine how the gender gap is related to composition effects and shaped by country characteristics. Studying the extent of the gender gap in voluntary association participation and identifying its causes may help in understanding women’s position in contemporary societies. By joining a voluntary association the individual actor becomes part of a social network. The social resources embedded in this network may be accessed and mobilized for achieving one’s aims. Therefore, voluntary associations are a relevant factor in structuring social inequality and membership in voluntary associations has ramifications in the status attainment process. If women’s position in different areas of society is—at least partly—influenced by the resources that become available via participation in voluntary associations, then it will be fruitful to study the extent of this gender gap as well as its individual and societal antecedents.

Although there is ample evidence from single-country studies of a gender gap in voluntary association participation and a sizeable stock of comparative studies on levels of voluntary association participation as well as cross-national research on gender inequalities in the family, the market and the state, there is a lack of a systematic inquiry of the gender gap in the voluntary sector in comparative perspective. Thus, in order to close this research gap the central research questions pursued in this dissertation are: Is there a gender gap in voluntary association participation in contemporary European countries? Does this gender gap vary across countries? Which individual-level and country-level characteristics as well as mechanisms can explain these cross-national
differences? Is the gender gap varying over time? Which factors can explain temporal variation in the gender gap in voluntary association participation?

In order to answer these questions, data from the European Social Survey, the European Values Study and the World Values Survey has been analyzed using different quantitative methods including two-level Poisson regression, nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and three-level logistic multilevel models for change. These analyses give insights into the multilevel antecedents of the gender gap in voluntary association participation. The specific results are as follows.

**Women and Their Memberships: Gender Gap in Relational Dimension of Social Inequality**

Chapter 2 studies levels of voluntary association participation and the extent of the gender gap in voluntary association participation in cross-national perspective. Using the European Social Survey 2002/2003, results show that there is systematic variation in the gender gap across countries that cannot be explained solely by individual attributes. Using multilevel Poisson regression models and employing a gendered version of the *theory of social origins of civil society* (Salamon and Anheier 1998), the findings indicate that there is considerable variability in the levels of voluntary association participation across European countries. The Nordic countries of the social democratic regime have the highest mean membership count, followed by the liberal, the corporatist, the Mediterranean and post-socialist regimes. Thus, as has been previously reported in many studies, there is a direct effect of the country context on voluntary association participation. This direct effect of the country context cannot be explained away by controlling for individual-level attributes. Thus, the effect of the country context is not fully mediated via individual-level predictors, i.e. it is not due to compositional effects.

In addition, in most European countries there is a gender gap in voluntary association participation. On average, women have fewer memberships than men. However, this gap varies considerably across countries. Therefore, the country context moderates the effect of gender. Controlling for individual-level resources and attributes reduces the gap somewhat. Therefore, part of the gender effect on membership in voluntary associations is mediated via individual-level resources and attributes. However, even when
individual variables are controlled for, differences between countries remain. Thus, the between-country variability in the gender gap in voluntary association memberships cannot solely be explained by compositional effects. There are substantial differences between the countries with regard to gender equality in voluntary association participation.

In those countries that—in addition to having a mere legalistic approach to gender egalitarianism—provide substantive help for women to reconcile work and family, the gender gap in voluntary association memberships is virtually absent. These are the Nordic countries of the social democratic regime. Thus, women in this regime type are as likely as men to meet potentially important acquaintances, access useful resources, gain valuable information, and in this way reap the benefits of voluntary association memberships. In contrast, in all other regimes women have significantly fewer memberships than men—even when individual-level resources and attributes are controlled for. Women in corporatist regime have 11% fewer memberships and women in the liberal regime have about 17% fewer memberships than men in the respective regime type. The gender gap is most pronounced in the Mediterranean and post-Socialist regimes where women have on average 28% and 30% fewer memberships than men. In these regimes women are clearly disadvantaged because their potential to access and to mobilize the resources embedded in the social networks of voluntary associations is restricted. This relational form of social inequality is likely to be one facet in the puzzle of persisting gender inequalities in contemporary Western societies.


Chapter 3 follows Lin’s (2000) distinction between resource deficit and return deficit and addresses the question of whether the gender gap in voluntary association participation is due to differences in resource endowments or due to differences in the effects of resources or both. Using the European Social Survey 2002/2003 and employing non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methods, the gender gap is decomposed into one part that is due to a resource deficit (i.e. women have less of those resources that con-
tribute to men’s affiliation or have more of those factors that are a hindrance for men in becoming a member) and another part that is due to a return deficit (i.e. the factors that foster men’s participation are less useful for women or factors that reduce men’s participation are even more hindering for women) in order to give insights into the underlying structure of the gender gap in countries of the social democratic, liberal and conservative regimes.

Results indicate that the Scandinavian countries of the social democratic regime provide gender equality with regard to voluntary association affiliation. There, women neither face a resource nor a return deficit. With the exception of France, the gender gap is significant in all investigated countries belonging to the liberal and conservative regimes. These analyses revealed why the countries of the social democratic regime are gender egalitarian with respect to voluntary association participation. Women in this regime neither face a resource deficit nor a return deficit. Thus, on average men and women in the social democratic countries do not differ in the resource endowments that predict membership. In addition, these resources are equally productive in becoming a member for men and women. As such, there are no gender-specific obstacles for affiliation with voluntary associations in the social democratic regime. Thus, women in the social democratic regime are not systematically disadvantaged with regard to the presumed consequences of voluntary association participation (i.e. social integration, interest representation and status attainment).

In contrast, with the exception of France, the gender gap is significant in the countries belonging to the liberal and conservative regimes. The gender gap found in these countries is either due to a resource deficit or a return deficit. Among the countries in the study are no instances where both effects are present. This suggests that traditional gender roles are eroding and some form of gender egalitarianism is already established in Western democracies. However, in those countries where the gender gap is generated by a return deficit (e.g. Austria, Germany, UK), women are less effective in converting their resources into voluntary association memberships. It matters whether a given resource endowment belongs to a man or to a woman. Thus, gender acts as a conversion factor. This result is indicative of gender specific norms and institutions. In contrast, in those countries where the gender gap is due to a resource deficit (e.g. the Neth-
erlands), the pathways to voluntary association affiliation are in principle the same for men and women. There are no gender differences in average preferences and behavior related to voluntary association affiliation and no discrimination against women in the voluntary sector. However, since both genders differ in their resource endowments, women are discriminated in those sectors of society where resources are generated and distributed.

Among the investigated countries of the liberal and conservative regimes no dominant mechanism emerged nor do these countries form any coherent clusters—neither with regard to the relative importance of resource deficit and return deficit effects nor with regard to the absolute magnitudes of these effects. Thus, the decomposition analyses revealed that whether women face a resource deficit or return deficit depends on the specific country context. However, the predictions about regime effects were fully confirmed only for the social-democratic regime.

**Persistence or Decline? The Gender Gap in Voluntary Association Participation Across Countries and Time**

Women’s participation in voluntary associations has frequently been linked to their attachment to the labor force. Chapter 4 expands this theoretical account by considering women’s labor force participation as a multilevel phenomenon. At the individual-level, labor force participation brings the resource endowments that foster affiliation with voluntary associations. At the aggregate level, the female labor participation rate is an indicator of prevailing gender role expectations and a sign of women’s place in society. The higher the female labor force participation rate the more legitimate it is for women to be active in spheres other than home and family. Women’s increasing labor market participation rates during the last decades have been one of the most striking social changes in Western democracies. However, countries differ in trends of women’s labor market participation rates (Charles 2011).

I exploited this cross-country cross-time variation to put the labor force hypothesis to a test using data from combined World Values Survey and European Values Study, contributing 87 country-years in the period 1981–2009. These cross-national repeated cross-sections are analyzed using three-level logistic multilevel models for
change. If one differentiates between membership in instrumental (i.e. work and policy related) and expressive (i.e. social and recreational) voluntary associations, there is evidence of a gender gap in instrumental group membership during the 28-year period between 1981 and 2009 that is closing over time. Whereas men were much more likely to be affiliated with an instrumental organization in the early 1980s, the gap narrowed substantially by the late 2000s. The gender difference in the expected odds of being a member in an instrumental voluntary association decreased from 0.417 in 1981 to 0.072 in 2009. However, this converging trend is not generated by increasing participation rates of women. Rather, the gender gap is closing because women disengage at a slower rate than men.

The hypothesis about the influence of the female labor force participation rate is partially confirmed. In those countries where female labor force participation is common women are more likely to be a member of an instrumental association. In contrast, within-country temporal changes of the female labor force participation rate are unrelated to women’s affiliation with instrumental groups. Thus, between-country differences in women’s economic position—reflecting fundamental differences in institutional arrangements and cultural traditions—seem to be more influential for women’s membership in instrumental groups than incremental within-country transformations of women’s role expectations.

Introducing individual-level resources and attributes reduces the gender gap in trends to some extent indicating that part of the gender effect is mediated via resource endowments and individual attributes. The between-country effect of female labor force participation is also reduced when individual-level controls are introduced into the model. Thus, part of the effect of women’s labor force participation rate is mediated via individual-level resource endowments.

In contrast, there is no gender gap in expressive group affiliation—at least when the full set of controls is included in the model. In addition, membership in expressive groups is not related to the female labor force participation rate.

The results of the analyses show that country-characteristics have to be considered in addition to individual-level attributes if the gender gap in voluntary association
participation is to be explained. The gender gap in voluntary association participation is smallest in those countries that actively enable the reconciliation of work and family. In those countries female employment is common. This results in comparable resource endowments between men and women. Because membership in voluntary associations is commonly explained by resource endowments, similar resource endowments between the genders is likely to bring gender equality in voluntary association affiliation if the effects of these resources are the same for men and women. The increasing economic independence of women initiates a movement away from traditional role models and brings an accompanying decline of gendered norms and institutions. Subsequently, in those countries where female employment is common, the effect of resources in becoming a member also becomes similar for both genders.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung


Deutsche Zusammenfassung


Frauen und Mitgliedschaften: Der Geschlechterunterschied in einer relationalen Dimension sozialer Ungleichheit

die Partizipation in Freiwilligenorganisationen, der bereits in früheren Untersuchungen wiederholt berichtet wurde. Dieser direkte Einfluss des Länderkontextes bleibt auch nach Kontrolle von Individualmerkmalen bestehen. Somit wird der Einfluss des Länderkontextes nicht vollständig über individuelle Prädiktoren vermittelt, d.h. die gefundenenen Länderunterschiede können nicht auf kompositionelle Effekte zurückgeführt werden.


In den Ländern, in denen Frauen bei der Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf aktiv unterstützt werden, d.h. die über einen reinen legalistischen Ansatz der Geschlechtergleichheit hinausgehen, ist der Geschlechterunterschied in Mitgliedschaften praktisch nicht vorhanden. Dies ist in den nordischen Ländern des sozialdemokratischen Regimes der Fall. Frauen in diesem Regime haben somit die gleichen Chancen wie Männer, potentiell wichtige Kontakte kennenzulernen, auf nützliche Ressourcen zuzugreifen, wertvolle Informationen zu erhalten und somit Vorteile aus der Mitgliedschaft in Freiwilligenorganisationen zu ziehen. Im Gegensatz dazu haben Frauen in allen anderen Regimen signifikant weniger Mitgliedschaften als Männer. Dieses Resultat gilt auch nach der Kontrolle von Individualmerkmalen. Frauen im korporatistischen Regime haben 11 % und Frauen im liberalen Regime haben 17 % weniger Mitgliedschaften als Männer im jeweiligen Regime. Der Geschlechterunterschied im mediterranen und im postsozialistischen Regime ist am ausgeprägtesten. Dort haben Frauen durchschnittlich

Eine ländervergleichende Dekompositionsanalyse des Geschlechterunterschieds in Mitgliedschaften in Freiwilligenorganisationen: Die Rollen von Ressourcen-Ausstattung und Ressourcen-Effekt


Unter den untersuchten Ländern des liberalen und des konservativen Regimes konnte kein jeweils vorherrschender Mechanismus identifiziert werden. Diese Regime
Deutsche Zusammenfassung


**Fortbestand oder Verringerung? Der Geschlechterunterschied in der Partizipation in Freiwilligenorganisationen über Länder und Zeit**


Die Ergebnisse der Analysen zeigen, dass neben individuellen Merkmalen insbesondere Ländereigenschaften berücksichtigt werden müssen, wenn man den Ge-
Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Eidesstattliche Versicherung


___________________________  _____________________________
Ort/Datum                Unterschrift
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Studium

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Universität Hamburg

Schule

1996
Gymnasium Lüchow
Abschluss: Abitur (Note: 2,4)
Veröffentlichungen

2014

2013
Peter, Sascha & Sonja Drobnič: „Women and their Memberships: Gender Gap in Relational Dimension of Social Inequality.“ *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 31: 32–48

2013

2011

2007

Vorträge auf wissenschaftlichen Konferenzen und Workshops

06/2014
„Income Inequality and Social Cohesion in Europe, 2002-2012“, Vortrag auf der BIGSSS International Conference „(Un-)stable, (Un-)equal & (Un-)predictable: The Link Between Social Stratification and the Welfare State“, Bremen, DE

09/2011
„Networks, Social Capital & Gender Inequalities“, Vortrag auf der ESF HumVIB Konferenz, Berlin, DE

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04/2011
„Persistence or Decline? Gender Gaps in Voluntary Association Participation Across Countries and Time“, Vortrag auf der Frühjahrstagung der ISA RC28, Essex, GB

01/2011
„Gender Gaps in Association Affiliation: A Cross-National Decomposition Analysis“, Vortrag auf der 3-Länder-Tagung für Politische Wissenschaft, Basel, CH

06/2010 „Women and their Memberships: A Multilevel Cross-National Study on Gender Differentials in Associational Involvement“, Vortrag auf der Sommertagung der ISA RC28, Göteborg, SE


09/2009 „Gender Differences in Association Involvement: A Multilevel Cross-National Study“, Vortrag auf der Herbsttagung der Sektion für Modellbildung und Simulation der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie, Groningen, NL

Lehrtätigkeit an der Universität Hamburg

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|                | Soziale Ungleichheit im internationalen Vergleich (Vertiefungsmodul Methoden, 2 SWS) |
| SoSe 2012      | Methodengrundkurs E (2 SWS)  
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| SoSe 2009      | Soziale Netzwerke (Lektüreseminar, 2 SWS) |
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2015  European Sociological Review  
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2012  International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice

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