Polonization of the EU and NATO
Socialization after Enlargement

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“Polish Membership of major institutions comprising the most developed countries of the World System – NATO and EU – will undoubtedly help maximizing our position within the World System.”

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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Annual National-Plan</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Annual Target Plans</td>
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<td>AAg</td>
<td>Association Agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>Akcja Wybiorcza Solidarność/Solidarity Electoral Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Big Constitution/Duża Konstytucja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Society Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defense Planning Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>ED</td>
<td>Eastern Dimension</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSZ</td>
<td>Komitet Spraw Zagranicznych/ Foreign Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens/EFA</td>
<td>Greens–European Free Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE/NGL</td>
<td>European United Left–Nordic Green Left</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarter</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Intensified Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>International Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWGDR</td>
<td>Joint Working Group on Defence Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin/League of Polish Families’</td>
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<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Lisbon Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Little Constitution/Mała Konstytucja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Maastricht Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZ</td>
<td>Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych/Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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NSC  New Security Concept
NT   Nice Treaty
NUC  NATO-Ukraine Commission
NPG  Nuclear Planning Group
NRC  NATO-Russia Council
PfP  Partnership for Peace
PAUCI Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PIS  Prawo I Sprawiedliwość/ Law and Justice
PISM Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych/Polish Institute of International Affairs
PO   Platforma Obywatelska/ Civic Platform
POLUKRBAT Polish-Ukrainian Peace Force Battalion
PSC  Political and Security Committee
PSL  Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe/ Polish-People’s Party
QMV  Qualitative Majority Voting
SecGen Secretary General
SEA  Single European Act
SLD  Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/ Democratic Left Alliance
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UK   United Kingdom
UN   United Nations
US   United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW   Unia Wolności/ Freedom Union
WT   Washington Treaty
WEU  Western European Union
1. Introduction

1.1 Polonization of the EU and NATO?

In 1989 I was only seven years old and more interested in playing with my dolls than what was happening on the world stage; but even I could not ignore the euphoria in our house in Germany and the sense of change. One big personal change was the ability to visit my relatives in Poland; previously it had been impossible. In the following years I was witness to the huge transformations unfolding. Only years later, I began to understand the substantial structural shift underlying these events: the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Aside from very personal consequences, the events challenged the whole world system. Suddenly, core conceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ vanished, giving way to an easier platform on which to build foreign relations. In Western Europe, besides nation states, international organizations – especially the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – were concerning themselves with the considerable changes taking place. Rapidly, both organizations opened up to the new sovereign states that rose following the collapse of the USSR. In 1998, NATO accomplished its first enlargement round granting three new states from Central and Eastern Europe membership.¹ Subsequently, in 2004, the EU followed this trend by allowing ten new states join the EU.² In both cases, Poland was among the new members states.

Writing now about the effects of Poland’s membership on organizational foreign policy in the context of the EU and NATO is challenging and pioneering work. It is challenging as it rethinks and reconstitutes complex processes, redefining old concepts. As such it offers a novel view on current processes with fresh insights from Political Science. It is pioneering as it sheds light on the ever-growing role of middle-range powers within organizations and offers an approach to meaningfully studying their input into broader changes within these international organizations. Until now, literature pertaining to the relationship between Poland and EU and NATO predominantly look either solely at the process of enlargement or through the prism of organizational input on changes within Poland. The first strand of literature is reflected in the enlargement literature; the second in the socialization literature. Whereas the enlargement literature tries to explain conditions for enlargement and examines the corresponding policies, the socialization literature has been primarily concerned with the adoption of organizational identities, norms and rules of states accessing the organizations. Both areas of the literature apparently paused investigation when enlargement was fulfilled. This is plausible for the enlargement literature as the process in focus had been accomplished. In contrast, socialization is a continuing process. Although looking through diverse lenses (rationalist, constructivist), one main characteristic governs all work done in the field of socialization. That is: until now, the dominant view of socialization processes from a top-down perspective.³ In this manner there exists a major consensus in the literature concerning

¹ Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland.
² Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
³ In the Europeanization literature – understood as a subsidiary approach of socialization - exceptions considering also ‘bottom-up’ and ‘horizontal’ directions of change may also be found. See e.g. Pomorska, Karolina (2007).
the EU and NATO as pre-socializing organizations, introducing new member states to the rules and norms of a given organization before accession. This epistemological implication builds on two fundamental preconditions: the stability of norms, rules and identities, and the asymmetry between socializer (organization) and socializee (state). Going beyond the behaviorist assumption that norms and rules are stable factors and looking from a constructivist standpoint that they are subject to change, socialization cannot be considered as an endpoint but has to be seen as an ongoing process, also occurring after accession. Taking into account the dynamic procedural perspective of changes in norms and identities, a block of questions comes up considering socialization processes after accession. Since the official date of membership (and some time before), the asymmetrical relationship between the new member states and the given organizations has been abolished, granting new member states with all the rights and responsibilities associated with membership. In this respect, the states are legal and practical parts of the ‘editorial’ staff formulating and constituting norms. From a constructivist, dialectical perspective, norms are one element constituting the very identity of a community (and are at the same time constituted by this community). The questions then are: what is the (new) member state’s input within the process of norm and identity change? And how does the process of input arise? Do given organizations socialize in the new member state’s manner? Investigating the case of a middle-range power, namely Poland, the guiding question of this work is:

How is Polonization of the EU and NATO possible?

Polonization is understood as a process of socialization according to Polish norms and identities, which happens within organizations. This shifts the focus of penetration of the national level towards concentrating on the organizational level. In opposition to conventional constructivists, I argue that socialization occurs in two steps: the doing, with a strong analytical emphasis on the reflexive, practical process; and the living bringing back the conventional constructivist assumptions in order to analyze the organizational use of the ‘uploaded’ concepts and effects of the process. This new view respects the new member states as part of the ‘making of’ organizational practice after accession, and allows investigating bottom-up and horizontal directions of change of change. Practice is understood, in a broad sense, in a routinized manner (of policy-making which results in norm change or emergence and identity change) enabling the new member state to input into a particular field where it executes a certain power.

It becomes clear that investigating the input of a new member state on organizations challenges the mainstream constructivist approach towards socialization. Thus, the concept needs first to be rethought and reshaped before being reintroduced into the focus of research.

A recent definition of socialization defines it as “a process of inducting new member states in the norms and rules of a given community”. Based on this assumption, research conducted in

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4 The notions of norm and identity are discussed in greater depth in the theoretical part of this work, pp.33-41.
5 Horizontal directions of change mean that states spread their interests in bilateral or regional manner (also regional organizations) in the first place before ‘uploading’ them to higher organizational level (e.g. EU and NATO).
the field of socialization treats the EU and NATO as pre-socializing organizations; thus inducting new member states into the norms and rules prevailing in the organization before accession. The ‘preparation’ of new member states happens, then, in a top-down manner via different mechanisms. In the case of the EU, the mechanism through which this kind of policy was realized has been the mechanism of conditionality. NATO, in comparison, ran a less prescriptive smoother way of institutionalization due to its limited powers. The mainstream approach to socialization builds on two fundamental preconditions which, as I argue, reveal the shortcomings of the prevailing approach. First, the approach builds on the stability of norms, rules and identities, and second, on the asymmetry between socializer (organization) and socializee (new member state). However, after the accession of new states, both presumptions become obsolete. First, external and internal changes rather than stability become the rule. Change occurs according to alterations in the environment and, in consequence, to the different influences and views of the new member states. In particular, this last remark remains an element largely neglected in the socialization literature. Research carried out in the field treats the new member states as well-behaving norm- and rule-followers once they are successfully socialized within the new community, and obscures the question of the new member states agency and potential to input in to organizations. Consequently it ignores the fundamental foreign policy objectives of any state. As reflected in the classic academic typology, any state follows four main goals in foreign policy: “1) independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2) national security, stability of the given state’s international surrounding, 3) conditions sustaining unhindered economic development (…), 4) the state’s role, prestige and position internationally”\(^7\). Despite membership in international organizations these goals remain untouched, as foreign policy – which ultimately – remains a national policy area. Thus, in order to realize its own foreign policy goals and to maximize its own position it remains possible that any new state would attempt to input meaningfully to organizational developments. The success of influence thus depends on different conditions like context and relative power of the agent.\(^8\) Already the possibility of input challenges the top-down view of socialization.

Second, the asymmetry vanishes as the new member states become an inherent part of an organization, fully equipped with comprehensive rights and obligations. This observation challenges the structural approach within the socialization literature, treating socialization as a consequence of the asymmetric relation on the level of agential behavior which emerges due to structural demands, neglecting agential input into the whole process. Acknowledging that changes to norms and identities happen due to agential input entrains a different location of the process of socialization. This is the moment where I rethink the concept and nourish it by the analytical level of practice, understood as a level between structure and agent. I argue that the changes that take place out of such practices have consequences at the structural level, namely on norms and identities and on the agential level, namely on behavior. Therefore, the focus on practice opens up the analytical possibility of changes happening in a top-down and bottom-up perspective.

\(^7\) Kuźniar, Roman (2009), pp.8f.

\(^8\) Those aspects are discussed in greater depth in the theoretical part of this study.
A further block of questions comes up if one challenges the two shortcomings underlying the socialization approach in the literature. The first question comes up if one considers the dynamic procedural perspective of changes in norms, identities and policies after accession of a state. Besides structural changes which are easily considered to be a source for change, the question of internal changes due to (new) agential input arises. Then one may ask how do changes in norm and identity happen at the organizational level? Which agent has an input on an organization’s set of rules, norms, identities and consequently policy, and for what reason? Which processes and mechanisms occur? Since the official date of membership (and for some time before, too) Poland had a say on the policy formulation of both organizations. So, what has happened to the given organizations after accession, when Poland as a new member has been able to influence the policy agenda and had input into it? More generally the question is: what happens when the new member becomes an official part of a community and is part of the interactional moment which constitutes and is constituted by practices and entrains the establishment of norms, rules and policies? And where do the new norms and policy approaches come from? In other words: what is the member states’ input within the process of norm and identity change? This work seeks to reveal some of the complex processes of agential input on norms and identity and thus, in consequence, on policy-making. Thereby I break through the view on agent or structure and put perspective on an intermediary level: practice. I demonstrate that Poland, as a new member in the organizations and as a middle-range power, is very much involved in the construction – and thus in the process of doing – of norms and identities. I reconstruct the ‘doings’ used by Poland to penetrate organizations with the self’s worldview. In order to examine Polish input into organizations, it is important to know and to analyze the context in which Poland has been able to have this input. Speaking about the context pushes the conditions to be looked at to the analytical foreground. Thus, this work also uncovers the conditions under which a state – here Poland – has been able to have input on organizational agendas. Admitting that a state may under certain conditions input into organizational policy, the question of the why comes up. Why is a state apt to input on into organizational policy? This question introduces the concept of power into the whole investigation. Power, in this work is not understood as a material advantage but is interpreted more subtly. Having this power in their pocket, states have the possibility to have input within organizations.

Presuming that Poland may have provided input on norms, identities and thus policy-making at the organizational level, another block of questions arises if one takes into consideration that the majority of states belongs to more than one organization which operates in the same field. The question then arises, what happens if belonging to two different organizations clashes in times of crisis when new norms are created and when the path of those organizations might diverge? Focusing on the EU and NATO, the question thus concerns whether membership of the EU and NATO bear a conflict situation for policy formulation at the organizational level in times of crisis. Or, are decisions to input into one agenda or the other mutually constituting?

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9 See for the definition of doing and the relationship between doing and practice see pp.41ff.
10 See for a discussion on power pp.32f.
Taking all these questions and observations into consideration, the fundamental theoretical question is thus: what happens after accession when new member states are part of organizations? Does socialization suddenly stop? I argue that socialization does not stop but that socialization after accession has to be seen in a new light, also taking into account new member states’ input on this process. In this manner I broaden the definition of socialization and understand it as ‘a process of inducting new member states into the norms and rules of a community and the input of new member states into norms and identities of a community’.

The crucial question which comes up is: which new member state has the will/wish and the power to input into organizations? I focus my research on a middle-range power, namely Poland. The question is: can a former Sovietized state, formerly excluded from the Western World for nearly 50 years and socialized for a long time with a purely Central and Eastern European view, input into Western organizations? The question is thus: whether or not states are able to transmit their interplay between identities, norms and foreign policy onto organizations? And how effectively they can do it? Investigating the case of Poland puts a state to the analytical foreground which after nearly 200 years of being subjected to domination and separation\(^\text{11}\) regained its full sovereignty and has since been ready to play a dominant role on the international scene.

The consideration of Poland is very useful. Out of the group of new member states, Poland is a middle-range power and thus takes a powerful position within the EU and NATO. In the literature, there exists no theoretical approach for the study of middle-range powers. In order to characterize the position of middle-range powers within communities, Thomas Jäger states that “middle-range powers may be defined as states which are according to their abilities able to display an order-political influence in alliances and coalitions but who do not manage to display this influence on their own”\(^\text{12}\). Jan Krzysztof Bielecki comments on this status from a Polish view as follows: “First of all, let’s say precisely and frankly that Poland is not and will never be a state that could only count on itself in international politics. We need an umbrella, now and in the future”\(^\text{13}\).

Thus, middle-range powers depend on membership in communities, and more precisely organizations, in order to account for their demand for international influence. As the quotation reveals, middle-range powers are able to impact on organizations with their own ideas and to spread a ranging political influence. This presumption accounts for Poland. Michael Stürmer comments on this situation as follows: “Poland has not become member of NATO and EU in order to be attributed by Brussels, Paris or Berlin with historical memories

\(^{11}\) Between the World Wars Poland experienced a short time of independence which formally came to an end in 1945.


\(^{13}\) [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Po pierwsze, powiedzmy sobie wyraźnie i szczerze, że Polska nie jest i nie będzie krajem samowystarczalnym w polityce międzynarodowej. Potrzebujemy parasola tak samo teraz, jak w przeszłość”. Bielecki, Jan Krzysztof (2003), p.32.

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or with political directives but Sikorski wants that Poland expands its strength beyond its weight.\textsuperscript{14}

The desire to increase one’s position is thus an inherent motive for a middle-range power. But it becomes clear that Poland as a middle-range power is dependent on its membership in organizations in order to institutionalize its interests and maximize its international position. There are a lot of works rewriting, retracing and reviewing those pre-socializing processes in the case of Poland. Poland, as a case example within those processes, seems to be of importance for several reasons. First, Poland has been part of the first enlargement rounds to the given organizations. Second, since the regaining of independence Poland has tried continually to increase its role in the region and the world – especially through membership in the given organizations. Third, Poland’s size, its geopolitical situation and its historical legacies leave room for suspicion on the real effect Poland is able to exert.

This thesis takes all unrevealed questions into consideration and explores the Polish input into norms and identity at the organizational level of the EU and NATO. The empirical part of the work focuses on the policy towards Ukraine as part of the proactive Eastern policy which aims stabilizing the near abroad in order to provide security for the whole region. This has, since the regaining of independence, been a major focus of Polish foreign policy. From the theoretical viewpoint, it builds on the insights of the socialization literature but challenges the main analytical focus. In this perspective, the work reconstructs the process of Polonization – understood as the process of input of a middle-range power into norms and identities of organizations. It thereby respects the alteration of organizational communities due to enlargement. I argue and demonstrate throughout the study that socialization after accession of a new state comes along in two phases: in the first, \textit{doing} phase where agents interact and practices are established and occur and a second, \textit{living} phase bringing back the conventional view on socialization and looking at the effects of socialization touching on the norms and identity of agents. Both phases constitute then what I call ‘\textit{Doing} and \textit{Living} Socialization’.\textsuperscript{15}

Considering these last points, the purpose of the work is twofold:

First, this work aims to reveal the input of Poland (as a middle-range power) into the creation of EU and NATO foreign policy towards Ukraine.

While investigating the effects of enlargement of the given organizations, this literature looks mainly at what happened in the new states due to accession. Thereby, alterations in norms, policies and identities are looked at from a top-down perspective focusing on different kinds of influence organizations play on states. This literature strand thereby ignores that the new member states – after accession – may take the role of a driving force toward changes at the organizational level.

\textsuperscript{14} [Translated by D.P.-H.]


\textsuperscript{15} See for a discussion of \textit{doing} and \textit{living} pp. 41ff.
While considering the input of states on organizations the literature considers mainly the ‘big’ ones like the United States (US) in NATO or Germany, France and United Kingdom (UK) in the EU. Thus the input of the new members seems to be ignored. As Poland tries to play an important role in the world system via membership in organizations, the question of how real an influence Poland is able to exert on organizations comes up. Foreign policy is therefore an excellent field of investigation. Foreign policy is considered to be a core identity-building activity and is therefore of high importance considering the essence and the evolution of organizations.\textsuperscript{16} A homogenous identity is important for the functioning of any organization.

With enlargement both organizations, the EU and NATO, changed the macro-contextual environment which had effects at different levels. One of the most influential changes was the alteration of the geopolitical situation of the given organizations. This demanded a new approach towards the new neighbouring states. Organizational policy towards the new neighbours may be considered as a crucial point of policy-making, deciding over possible conflicting situations in Europe.

Since the redefinition of foreign policy in Poland due to its regaining of independence, its Eastern portion was one of the most contested parts. At the same time it is the field where Poland hopes to play a bridge-building function in the transnational context. In this respect the questions of (a) the question of how real an influence Poland is able to exert on organizations and (b) the very content of any input remain open.

In this perspective, this work examines changes in organizational norms and identities which occurred after Poland’s accession to both organizations.

Second, within the theoretical part of this work I develop a new approach towards socialization in order to grasp the process of socialization after accession to an organization. It not only enriches the constructivist socialization literature by respecting the notions of bottom-up directions of change and power in the model but offers an examination of the possible conflict situation of policy formulation due to membership in more than one organization. It enriches the approach of socialization by the concepts of interaction and practice, the latter being a new tendency in the investigation of International Relations (IR). In sum, the approach of ‘Doing and Living Socialization’ overcomes the shortcomings of the prevailing socialization model and reshapes the analytical focus on the investigation of the input of organizations and especially states.

As the opening remarks show, this work deals with the input of Polish norms, identities and policies at the organizational level vis-à-vis relations towards Ukraine. Some further initial remarks will clarify the definition of the policy in focus, namely foreign policy, and explain why I focus investigation on Ukraine.

Regaining sovereignty in 1989 demanded that Poland renew and redefine its internal and external structures. Definition of foreign policy goals was among the main tasks. Foreign policy is defined here “to mean the activity of developing and managing relationships between the state (…) [in this case also EU and NATO, thus an agent] and other international

\textsuperscript{16} See e.g. Drulák, Petr (2001b), p.12.
actors, which promotes the domestic values or interests of the state or actor in question”.\textsuperscript{17} Activities can involve economic instruments but the goals of foreign policy are explicitly political or security-related. In comparison to foreign policy, external relations may thereby be defined as all kind of relations one actor holds with another actor in the world. The later also encloses economic ties.\textsuperscript{18} The scope of investigation of this work deals with foreign policy in the light of building stability, security and democracy. I exclude economic relations as they do not represent an activity of NATO. I concentrate on foreign policy and especially the policy towards Ukraine because it represents a field where all three actors have interests and are, in consequence, active parts. In the case of Poland, the interest towards Ukraine became evident since its regaining of independence. Thereby, the redefinition of foreign policy goals was a hard duty for Poland because it could not rely on a foreign policy tradition built on previous decades. Like other satellite-states of the former Soviet Union, foreign policy issues were defined in Moscow and transmitted to the Sovietized leaders in the capitals who executed them. Nevertheless, quite early Poland worked out a foreign policy programme which relied on three main goals:

1. Establishment of security (since the beginning interconnected with the US-providing-security character and expected to be attained mainly through membership in NATO)
2. Alignment with the West through membership in Western organizations, especially the EC (European Communities)/EU\textsuperscript{19} and NATO
3. Proactive Eastern policy\textsuperscript{20}

As Poland adhered to NATO in 1998 and to the EU in 2004, the first two priorities were attained. The third, remaining foreign policy pillar represents the field of investigation of this work. Whereas the foreign policy goals of security and alignment with the West built on a great consensus among the Polish political elite and the nation during the 90s, a proactive Eastern policy was much more contested. However, due to its geopolitical position and historical legacies, Poland fulfils a bridge-building function with the East. In this respect Poland also became an advocate for membership of Ukraine in Western organizations, especially the EU and NATO. This manifests in that Poland tries to input into organizational agendas, but the question of real Polish input remains and will be investigated throughout the study.

Ukraine, as the policy case focus, represents a state which has tried since the 90s to adhere to both organizations and as such holds vivid relations with both organizations since regaining its independence. As Boris Tarasyuk, former Ukrainian Foreign Minister declared,

\begin{quote}“(...)
integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and strengthening of our country’s position within the family of European nations, with whom we share common historical and cultural traditions, as well as values and view on the future of the continent, remain the consistent orientation of Ukraine”\textsuperscript{21}.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} Smith, Karen E. (2008), p.2.
\textsuperscript{19} According to the institutional development of today’s EU I use the term EC for the time before 1993 and the term EU afterwards.
\textsuperscript{20} Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, 26 April 1990.
\textsuperscript{21} Tarasyk, Boris (1999), p. 10.
Besides the character of relations all actors have with Ukraine, the examination of the policy towards Ukraine is highly important due to the strategic position of Ukraine in Europe. First and foremost, the geopolitical position of Ukraine and recent developments prove that Ukraine is easily made a plaything between the EU and Russia.\(^{22}\) The underlying question is thus, whether Ukraine will in the future transform according to European and Western standards or if it will fall back under Russian influence – no matter how this influence would come about. Second, the size of Ukraine makes it interesting concerning political and economic issues. From a political point of view the accession of Ukraine, with about 46 million inhabitants to Western organizations would allow an additional former Sovietized middle-range power to join the EU. At least formally, Ukraine would then have the right to have input on organizational developments. From an economical point of view, Ukraine offers a considerable marketplace for external products. And third, Ukraine is a transit state for energy supply towards Central and Western Europe and a transit state for migration. Stability and security in Ukraine and an adequate policy towards it are thus on the priority list of every Western organization and state.\(^{23}\)

Having detailed the topic of this work and delivered the main definitions and scopes for investigation, I start in the next part with some initial theoretical remarks. This highlights the significance of theory to this work and points to the fact that the study is concerned with the advancement of a theoretical concept, namely socialization. This implies that this work not only looks through the lenses of certain theoretical glasses but starts from a theoretical status quo, questions some shortcomings and reshapes the concept before it uses it for empirical data. After this theoretical introduction, I discuss the theoretical concepts and approaches in detail in part 2.1.

### 1.2 The Theoretical Breeding Ground of the Study

During the reading of concepts and approaches dealing with socialization I have made three main observations which I present because they challenge the mainstream view of this process and pave the way towards the approach presented in this thesis. But all in all, this work is clearly embedded and understands itself as part of the socialization literature.

First, my underlying assumption is that the socialization processes did not stop when Poland joined either organization.\(^{24}\) Going beyond the behaviourist assumption that norms and rules

\(^{22}\) At the time of writing Ukrainian President Yanukovych turned to Russia to the detriment of further deepening of relations with the EU (end of 2013/beginning of 2014). This development caused huge protests by the opposition in Ukraine.

\(^{23}\) The Russia-Ukraine gas disputes of 2005, 2007/08, 2008/09 turned into transnational political issues when becoming subject of disputes between West European states and Russia.

\(^{24}\) I use the terms *organization* and *institution* intimately in order to refer to the EU and NATO. In the literature the use of the term *institution* often leads to confusion as it is sometimes used in order to design an organization and sometimes to talk about an institutionalized ideational structure. In the ‘Old Institutionalism’ an institution is understood in its material, hard definition as an organization. The input of the ‘New Institutionalism’ came along with an understanding of institutions as formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and rules. See Hall, Peter A., and Taylor, Rosemary C.R. (1996). Referring to this discussion Antje Wiener speaks of *hard institutions* in order to design the organs of the EU and of *soft institutions* in order to refer to ideas, social and cultural norms, rules and/or routinized practices. See Wiener, Antje (2003), p.121. Besides the distinctive use in the ‘Old’ and the ‘New Institutionalism’, the different disciplines draw conclusions about a different use. While political scientists speak of *norms* in order to refer to behavioural and constitutive
are stable factors and looking from a constructivist standpoint that norms and rules are subject to change, socialization cannot be considered as an endpoint at the time of accession but has to be seen as an ongoing course happening also after accession. Thus, Poland has undergone a process of socialization before and after accession to both organizations. But the organizations also undergo a socialization process after accession. This process can happen in a Polish manner if Poland influences certain norms and identities in its own respect.

The literature treats socialization mainly as a top-down process, but recent studies plead to further the research of socialization by also taking a bottom-up approach into account. As Jeffrey T. Checkel and Michael Zürn point out, a “dynamic, cross-cutting approach might better alert to study feedback effects”\(^\text{25}\). Assuming that Poland’s membership of the EU and NATO also has consequences on policy-formulation of both organizations, I analyze socialization from a bottom-up perspective, too. By talking about the bottom-up perspective I mean the analytical focus on the direct Polish input on the directions of both organizations within the interactional process (doing). In other words, bottom-up implies the starting point for institutionalization of Polish factors (ideas, interests) at the organizational level. In analytical terms this part of the process is manifested in the doings of actors. In a second term, a process of socialization in the mainstream understanding starts, during which the organization internalizes the new norm (living).

The analytical value of the consideration of the bottom-up perspective is an appropriate extraction of mechanisms. If I started to analyze the socialization process with a given norm I could possibly analyze a compliant behaviour on the Polish national level to follow a mechanism of self-socialization in regard to organizational norms or policies. In analytical terms this would mean a false assignation of mechanisms. In this situation the general aim of analysis of the socialization process (to link an effect with a cause) would fail. Thus, if a new norm on the organizational level represents an institutionalized Polish idealistic factor, Poland does not have to be socialized within this norm. This observation reveals that the socialization process after accession to an organization does not start with a given norm (institutionalized idea) coming out of the blue, but rather that the very moment of agential interaction starts the analytical process of socialization. This observation is analytically captured by the doing part of the approach. In this respect, I argue that socialization is not exclusively an octroyed process happening to states from above but starts (after accession to an organization) at the interactional moment (praxis based) when the member states are able to upload their own interests.

Besides the analytical value of the bottom-up perspective, this view will reveal the degree of Polonization of both organizations and thus the infiltration of the given organizations by Polish idealistic factors.\(^\text{26}\)


\(^{26}\) Accordingly the following question arises on what I mean by talking about European- and NATO-norms in comparison to institutionalized Polish idealistic factors. One could argue that the EU and NATO consist of all members, thus Poland too. By talking about EU- and NATO-norms I mean institutionalized idealistic factors which came from other member states than Poland and on which the member states mutually agreed at the
Second, this work looks through thick constructivist lenses in its focus on the causal process of changes in norms and identity at the organizational level of the EU and NATO and at the national level of Poland provided by interaction. This perspective builds on the constructed nature of social life where intersubjectivity and intersubjective knowledge play a crucial role. The production of social life happens through a process of social interaction. Within this production, chain interests and identities are formed from which norms and policies evolve. But at the same time identities and interests are defined by norms. This dialectical perspective on the relationship of interest, identity and norm represents the constructivist approach of the mutually constituting character of agent and structure. The mutually constituting character of the concepts used is a main assumption of the approach of this work. It is mutuality and not one-sidedness of chains which characterizes the assumptions of this work. Taking this perspective into account, a framework of socialization after accession to an organisation cannot be purely based on bottom-up directions of change (in order to challenge the prevailing top-down approach in the literature) but has to consider the top-down perspective, too. In this manner norms and identities of the organizations may, after accession, also have an input on states. Not neglecting the top-down directions of change, this work clearly has its main focus at the states’ input within organizations. In this manner the work asks which input a middle-range power – here Poland – may have on organizations. The consideration of both, the top-down and the bottom-up approach and the consideration of the mutuality of concepts touch on the agent-structure problem and the question of agent and object of socialization. The underlying question concerning whether agents or structure trigger socialization becomes obsolete. In considering ‘both/and’ instead of ‘either/or’ in the socialization model of this work, I understand my approach as being one solution for the agent-structure problem and respecting the constructivist assumption of the mutual constituency of agent and structure and in between concepts.

Building the theoretical assumptions on a purely constructivist agenda bears the danger of overlooking other dynamics which can be better explained by a rationalist analysis. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink point out for one of the concepts used, “Norms and rationality are (...) intimately connected.” This work takes this argument into account and furthers the argument. Relating to both authors, I consider a rationalist perspective by assuming that the policy formulation (interests) at the national and the organizational level can possibly rely on a strategic formulation in order to maximise their own utility. This seems to be of crucial importance considering the case of Poland. As the opening citation revealed, Poland as a middle-range power wants to maximize its international position via its membership of the EU and NATO. This presumes the Polish input on organizations to be

organizational level. The distinction will be revealed in the fourth chapter which traces back norms, identities and practices before Poland’s accession to both organizations.

27 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt point out that this research approach is one characteristic of constructivist thinking. See Fearon, James, and Wendt, Alexander (2009), p.57.
30 See e.g. Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (1989); Wendt, Alexander E. (1987); Giddens, Anthony (1985).
31 I borrow the terminology of ‘both/and’ and ‘either/or’ from Michael Zürn and Jeffrey T. Checkel who use it to plead for a constructivist and a rationalist research design in socialization studies. See Zürn, Michael, and Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), pp.242f.
highly strategic, but another question remains: how to respect the probable strategic moment by clearly sticking to a constructivist approach? In order to answer this first view dilemma, I go back to Finnemore and Sikkink. In accordance with both authors, I interconnect the constructivist and the rationalist perspective by altering the understanding of the ontology of utility. Utility is, in consequence, not understood as relying on a materialistic ontology and maximising, for example, welfare gains but on an ideational ontology involving changing “the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs”\(^{33}\). This ‘strategic social construction’ respects the fact that the intersubjective knowledge (common knowledge) is not a static derivation generated in an automatic way out of history but “created by strategic actors in highly contested processes that are central to our understanding of politics”\(^{34}\). This ‘strategic social construction’ has consequences for the theorization of the behavioural logics. A consequential frame considers rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests. They engage in collective action because they attend gains from coordination. This perspective builds on rationalist assumptions. In opposition, an appropriative frame explains behaviour by reference to a common identity and rule-based actions in line with this identity. Thus, this perspective builds on constructivist assumptions. Having in mind that the combination of constructivist and rationalist assumptions is a “fruitful way to advance (…) [the] understanding of world politics”\(^{35}\), James March and Johan Olson stress that “political action generally cannot be explained exclusively in terms of logic of either consequences or appropriateness. Any particular action probably involves elements of each”\(^{36}\). They go further by pointing out the duality of ‘input’ which influences agent behaviour. “Political actors are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between them is often subtle”\(^{37}\). Building on an inductive, empirically oriented work, I do not define the relationship between the two logics as a priority\(^{38}\) and leave the analytical space to consider if the logics are still at work or are dominated by other dynamics like a practical sense for behaviour. Looking on the quality of agential behaviour puts the focus towards the effects of the process of socialization. The literature teaches us that the expected outcome of


\(^{34}\) Ibid., p.911.

\(^{35}\) James Fearon and Alexander Wendt speak of a “cross-paradigmatic exchange”. See Fearon, James, and Wendt, Alexander, p.53.


\(^{37}\) Ibid., p.952 [emphasis added].

\(^{38}\) In the literature four main interpretations of the relationship between the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness prevail. All four interpretations state a distinct and ordered relationship between the two logics and not a relational based on an equal viewpoint. The first interpretation assumes the domination of one clear logic over the unclear. In this interpretation a logic of consequences dominates when preferences and consequences are well known and when the identities of the rules are ambiguous. The second interpretation distinguishes between macro and micro decisions and attaches one of both logics to the former or the latter and vice versa. In the third interpretation the relationship is designed to be a developmental one. Agents converge around a certain issue for a consequence-based and thus instrumental reason. Under certain conditions and after the accumulation of experience, action becomes more rule- and identity-based. Agents cooperate for new instrumental reasons and the circle starts from the beginning around another issue. In the fourth reading either logic is a special case of the other. Thus, one logic dominates the other. See Ibid., pp.952-54. One has to consider that by combining a rationalist and a constructivist frame for the behavioural logics and giving no assumption ontological priority in order to advance the understanding of world politics, I cannot construct a relationship a priori but have to extract it from the empirical findings.
the process of socialization is sustained compliance with the norms and rules of a given community. This presupposes internalization and a ‘taking-for-granted’ of new norms based on a common identity, or in other words: a switch from a ‘logic of consequentialism’ to a ‘logic of appropriateness’. In the latter behaviourist logic, action follows a deep feeling of properness, thus not questioning the correctness of the action. Action is based on the common sense of identity. In the former behaviourist logic the correct action anticipates a consequence and therefore action does not follow an intrinsic feeling of properness. Introducing the concept of practice for investigation of the socialization process opens up the logic of practicality for the measurement of behaviour. In this perspective the behaviour of an agent bases on a common practice. Again, as the character of the empirical part is heavily inductive, chapters five and six will provide answers to those conceptual reflexions.

Third, the focus on the causal process of socialization and thus the question how the socialization process affects norms, policies and identity at the organizational level always leads one to think of mechanisms. Generally, mechanisms bring clarity to what happens between a cause and its effect and thus connect initial conditions with a specific outcome. Friedrich Kratochwil puts forward that “to show the mechanisms at work” in processes of international socialization, one needs to consider the “hidden power" bound up in a specific context. This argument brings in the notion of power for the analytical part of the investigation, as yet largely ignored by the socialization literature. I argue that the specific use of a mechanism reflects and is bound with the power of the socializer (agent) and the context (structure). Thus power is a dominant indicator, exerted in order to determine and/or use strong mechanisms like material incentives or weaker/soft mechanisms like social persuasion. Reflecting the inductive character of this work, mechanisms and the underlying power will be examined empirically throughout.

Having introduced the theoretical breeding ground of the study I will now introduce the design of the book.

1.3 Design of the Book

The examination of the Polonization process touches on different concepts and aspects. In order to allow an intersubjective understanding of this work I will precisely introduce and clarify all the concepts and aspects which will be stressed and the relations between them. Therefore the work proceeds in the following way:

Chapter 2 explains the theoretical and methodological imperatives of the research. Concerning the theory, this work is clearly embedded and understands itself as part of the constructivist socialization literature. Thereby the analytical approach of this work does not rest on the conventional assumptions about socialization but rethinks the concept. In this perspective the theoretical part (2.1) introduces and discusses the following concepts which are central to the socialization approach of this work: socialization, praxis, power, norm, identity and interest. Building on the assumptions in the literature and rethinking the concepts,

I develop a theoretical framework specifically geared to examine socialization not as a purely top-down-process but also from a bottom-up direction of change. This refocus allows one to account for socialization processes after accession to an organization.

Consideration of a new level of investigation, namely practice, releases the process of socialization from its structural premises (norms, rules, identities as structures) and locates the beginning of the process within the interactional moment. This substantiates the argumentative refocus that socialization does not purely happen to agents from above, but that socialization is done by all agents.

Chapter 2.2 explains the method choice, the methodology and the concrete method, namely content analysis. The latter follows the approach taken by Philipp Mayring and adjusts the ten step methodology tailored to recover mechanisms and effects of the Polonization process. The chapter concludes with an explanation of document choice.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the foreign policy-making systems of the three actors, namely Poland, the EU and NATO, and the agents operating in this policy field and charged with the making of the same. For a work within the Social Science literature it is of high importance to clarify what is meant by an actor and who is/are the agent/s while speaking about the ‘state’ or the ‘organization’. This work looks at a time (from 1989 until 2011) where a lot of internal restructurings took place within states and organizations due to substantial internal and external turnovers. Those internal changes altered successively agental rights and obligations in (foreign) policy-making. Reconstruction of the different foreign policy systems is important in order to provide the reader with the knowledge of which agent had the formal right to input into foreign policy. This will give further explications for the exact data sampling and provide the reader with the needed knowledge in order to understand document choice. Besides, this part of the book is also important for methodological requirements as it accounts for the reliability of document choice.

Chapter 4 represents the first empirical part of the study as it reconstructs norms, policies and identities of the three actors (Poland, the EU, and NATO) vis-à-vis Ukraine during the time between 1989 and 1999. The reason for the timeframe relies on each agent’s formulation of foreign policy directions, without interference with the other actors.

In 1999, Poland adhered to NATO. In consequence, the asymmetry between both actors vanished, providing Poland with the full formal right to input into organizational policy directions. Enlargement of the EU was agreed in 1998, and since 2000 Poland undertook its first attempts to input into EU-directions in the context of foreign policy. The reconstruction of norms, policies and identities in the given timeframe establishes a status quo from whence to analyze changes that took place after Poland started to input within these organizations.

The first part, therefore, reconstructs Polish foreign policy vis-à-vis Ukraine, its underlying norms and identity. My aim is not to present an overview of the whole Polish identity but to focus especially on those parts of the Polish identity formation and the corresponding norms which are relative to Ukraine. The second part focuses in analogy on European policy, norms and identity vis-à-vis Ukraine and the third part discloses the NATO policies, norms and identity vis-à-vis Ukraine between 1989 and 1999.
Turning to Chapter 5, it reconstructs the process of Polonization from both macro- and a micro-perspective. From the macro-perspective I reconstruct (through the prism of practices) the relations of the three actors towards Ukraine. Thereby, I reconstruct norms and identities of the three actors towards Ukraine. In the parts concerning the EU and NATO, I reconstruct relations through the prism of Polish input. The micro-perspective part surrounds three discursive moments in relations between Ukraine, the EU and NATO and analyzes if and how Poland affected the processes of policy-making, norm change and identity change. Precisely, analysis of each discursive moment follows a three step procedure starting by the reconstruction of the context, then looking at the doing before turning to the effects, the living of the Polonization process. This means precisely that the first step introduces the factors of time and context for analysis. The second and the third analytical steps are reviewed in separate doing- and living-parts which deal also with insights from analyzes from the macro-perspective. The guiding questions are then which actor’s ideational input will be manifested at the organizational level and how does the Polonization process takes place? Building on official speeches and secondary literature I will reveal the underlying tactics, mechanisms and powers of changes and thus link effects and causes.

Finally, reviewing the purpose of the work, the content of the sixth Chapter is twofold. At first, I will conclude the findings and summarize the process of input of a middle-range power on organizations in the light of the research question. This will precisely summarize how Polonization of the EU and NATO had been possible. Second, I will take stock of the contributions that this study seeks to make to the socialization literature. Therefore, I will return to the theoretical part of the book and review the theoretical assumptions in the light of the empirical findings. I conclude by presenting an evaluation of the expansion of the approach to socialization which is tailored to uncover causes and conditions after accession of new member states. In consequence, this work will pave the way for the study of the input of middle-range powers on organizations.

According to the design of the book, the next part engages in discussion about the theoretical concepts used throughout the study, and ends up with the presentation of the socialization approach developed and used in this work.

2. Theoretical-Methodological Background

2.1 Theoretical Background

This chapter introduces the theoretical assumptions of the research. It understands itself as a theoretical tool-box for the process of Polonization in which every single tool needs to be reviewed or even inserted in order to make the box usable for the examination of socialization processes from both bottom-up and top-down directions of change. By this reshaping, the tool-box will be well-equipped in order to examine the input of new member states which had formerly only been considered objects of the whole process. This shifts the focus of penetration from the national level towards a focus on the organizational level.
I start first by introducing the concept of socialization and link it to the Europeanization approach from which I borrow the perspective of bottom-up. At the end of this part, I present the working definition of socialization to be used along empirical lines of enquiry. In the next parts, I will take up the notions of practice and interaction which represent the core conceptions for the doing side of the approach presented in this work. The central position of these notions reshapes the character of socialization from being a structural process where one examines the mechanism and the effects of structures on agents towards an interactive process where social reality is constructed on the base of the mutually constituting character of agent and structure. As the concept of practice presents a new tendency in IR, the concept is not only reviewed but defined for the frame of this work. Furthermore I relate the notions of practice and interaction. Afterwards, I introduce and discuss the concept of power. The chapter follows by taking a closer look at the very contents of change within the socialization process, namely norms and identity. Having introduced all the tools needed, the next part introduces the socialization approach of this work. Therein I discuss first the notions of doing and living before closing the chapter by elucidating the socialization approach of this work.

2.1.1 Socialization

Socialization is a concept which is used in a variety of ways in order to explain and to understand phenomena and processes of change. Research done in this field focuses on the adoption of norms and rules into national institutions, behavior and discourses. The most recent definition of socialization in the Political Science field describes “a process of inducting actors in the norms and rules of a given community”\(^{42}\). In this perspective, works of socialization in Europe focus on the impact of organizations on member states. The focus on the top-down perspective means, in practical terms, that the organizations perform an educating role, socializing member states. Organizations are then conceptualized as agents of socialization promoting a certain set of norms, behavioural practices, policies and an underlying identity. The expected (pure) outcome of a socialization process is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new (organizational) norms and consequently a homogenous acting due to a common identity which is based on the given community. At this stage, agents comply with a norm because it is “the right thing to do”\(^{43}\). The motivation for an action switches then from a logic of consequence as an anticipatory element to a logic of appropriateness felt as a positive obligation.\(^{44}\) This conventional constructivist approach to socialization focuses on the internalization process of norms and rules, leaving aside

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\(^{42}\) Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007b), p.5. As international socialization represents a major focus in the literature, several – but equivalent- monodirectional (top-down) definitions exist. Frank Schimmelfennig defines socialization as “the process directed toward a state’s adoption of the (constitutive) norms of an international community”. Schimmelfennig, Frank (2002),., p.1.; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink see socialization “as a mechanism through which new states are induced to change their behaviour by adopting those norms preferred by an international society of states”. Finnemore, Martha, and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998),p.902, fn62. In the latest perspective socialization itself is seen as a mechanism and not as a process. This perspective treats socialization as an actual cause. From this perspective research cannot focus on the question of how socialization had happened and in this context explore the underlying mechanisms and conditions of socialization by having the notion of power in mind. This bears problems for the differentiation in the scope condition which is especially important for the consideration of power. See further discussion about power pp.32ff.


(analytically) the reflexive process whereby the agents struggle over the appropriateness of a behavior in a certain situation.

To sum up, the socialization process, according to the recent literature, may be presented as follows:

Research on socialization focuses on intersubjectively-produced ideational factors as identities, roles, rules and norms. The dominant research strand’s focus lies therefore on constitutive norms, those kinds of norms which constitute the very identity of a community.\(^{45}\) Thus, research aims to explain how, why and under which conditions states adopt these norms. There is agreement to all research strands on two preconditions: first, the asymmetry between socializer and the actor being socialized. This assumption is very close to the ‘power as resource’ approach, granting the socializer (organization) in analytical terms with material resources to change the behavior of the socializee.\(^{46}\) In consequence, this approach favors the investigation of the socialization process in a top-down manner. The second precondition is the stability of rules and norms. Therefore, differences exist regarding the questions of ‘how’ and ‘under which conditions’ socialization processes occur. Building on a rationalist approach, the minority of authors treats socialization processes in post-communist states as extrinsically motivated negotiation and adaption processes. Within those processes the socializer motivates the socializee to take over the rules and norms of the given organization through the praxis of material incentives and social influence.\(^{47}\) Building on a constructivist approach of socialization, the majority of authors thereby stress the mechanisms of persuasion.

\(^{45}\) See e.g. Cortell, Andrew P.; Davis, James W. (1996); Flockhart, Trine (ed.) (2005); Flockhart, Trine (2005b); Schimmelfennig, Frank, Engert, Stefan, and Knobel, Heiko (2006).

\(^{46}\) See for the notion of power in IR Barnett, Michael, and Duvall, Raymond (2005). Generally there exist two approaches to power in IR. The first, the older ‘power-as-resource’-approach understands power as an attribute of agent. Research done in this perspective focuses on the question how one state uses its material resources to change the behaviour of another state in order that the latter does something it initially does not want to. On the contrary the newer ‘relational-power’-approach understands power nearly synonymously to causality. In this perspective power is seen as a causal relationship in which the behaviour of one actor causes a change in the behaviour of another actor.

\(^{47}\) See e.g. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Engert, Stefan, and Knobel, Heiko (2006).
and learning within the socialization process through which interests and identities of the socializee change.\textsuperscript{48}

A related approach which can be summarized under the conceptual umbrella of socialization is the concept of Europeanization which is a very modern but contested concept.\textsuperscript{49} As Tanja Börzel stresses, Europeanization has “something to do with the penetration of the European dimension in national arenas of politics and policy”\textsuperscript{50}. As within the socialization literature, works building on the Europeanization approach focused at the beginning mainly on the changes at the national level. Robert Ladrech was one of the first to define the process of Europeanization as “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”\textsuperscript{51}.

Nevertheless Ladrech considered Europeanization as a pure adaptation process at the national level, leaving aside analytically the possible input of states within the process of organizational policy-making. The analytical challenge is thereby to consider the changes of domestic policy due to membership in the EC/EU without forgetting that domestic policy is a main motor of changes at the European level.\textsuperscript{52} So stating, the strict separation between cause and effect disappears. Europeanization is no longer a concept which explains, but which has to be explained.\textsuperscript{53}

Further works within this field worked out definitions of Europeanization respecting also member states’ input on the European policy agenda. In this perspective Claudio Radaelli defines Europeanization as

> “a process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.”\textsuperscript{54}

Even if the latter definition respects the interactive moment of definition and consolidation of the ‘making of EU public policy’ (bottom-up) it still focuses mainly on the national adaptation process (‘then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse (...)’) and leaves aside the effects at the organizational level. Further developments in the Europeanization literature shifted the view on the consideration of ‘bottom-up’ directions of change. Bottom-up means thereby the uploading of national ideational factors on the European level. Besides the consideration of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ directions of change, the view on ‘horizontal directions’ of changes recently had its advent in the Europeanization literature. ‘Horizontal direction’ of change is thereby understood as the penetration of the European dimension which does not happen from above, from the European arena, but between states.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{48} See e.g. Flockhart, Trine (2005b); Epstein, Rachel, and Sedelmeier, Ulrich (eds.) (2009).
\textsuperscript{50} Börzel, Tanja (1999), p.575.
\textsuperscript{52} See Olson, Johan (2002).
\textsuperscript{53} See Radaelli, Claudio (2004), p.2.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p.3.
\textsuperscript{55} See e.g. Wong, Reuben (2005).
latter case one state influences another (or others) concerning European issues not at the European level but in bi-national arenas or within other (regional) communities. Later on, those institutionalized influences are uploaded to the European level.

Taking into account the developments in the Europeanization literature constitutes a major input for the socialization approach used in this work. It becomes clear that pure considerations of ‘top-down’ directions of change are insufficient. Bottom-up directions of change have also to be considered within socialization processes. This respects the fact that nation states after accession to organizations are also part of the ‘making of policy procedures’ and may, in consequence, be a driving force for changes at the organizational level. This respects the mutual constitution of agent and structure.

Definitions of both socialization and Europeanization stress the procedural character. Speaking of this process raises the question of how the process comes about and under which conditions the process comes to an end. To answer how the process comes about relates to the analytical focus of the ‘making of’ policy. This will be answered in theoretical terms by the discussion of practice. Concerning the end of the process, at first glance one might think of the internalization side of the process, thus the living part of the approach. In the debates of the socialization literature, several approaches are presented in order to measure the influence of the socialization process and a variety of concepts on how to examine the causal influence of international norms, also respecting intervening variables such as domestic norms, the domestic salience of the norm or the domestic structural context. The degree and the effects of the causal influence of norms on state behavior are operationalized in a variety of ways, ranging from formal imposition into domestic law to deep internalization. Building on the assumption from the Europeanization literature that Europeanization is not absolute but, as Kevin Featherstone points out, “a matter of degree”, the measurement of the influence of the socialization process can only be investigated in gradual terms. Of course, socialization of a specific norm can be accomplished when the state (or an organization) transforms the norm into national (or organizational) law and behaves on behalf of the norm. But neither states and organizations nor the environment are static; rather, they are dynamic. States interact in organizations. The environment changes as change represents the only constant in reality. Those changes and interactions – or ‘making of policy’ – leads to changes in rules, norms and identity. This observation has two implications for the approach presented.

First, socialization does not stop when states have already adhered to an organization. It is an endowing process continuing after accession, too. Within this communicative and practical process, states interact, contribute their own interests, and new identity constructions or norms.

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56 E.g. Frank Schimmelfennig distinguishes between the normative effect (formal, behaviouristic and communicative) and the degree of internalization being the highest when an intrapersonal sanctioning process is established. See Schimmelfennig, Frank (2002), pp.9-11. Jeffrey Checkel distinguishes between Type I and Type II of socialization. In Type I agents behave appropriately by learning a role; in Type II agents adopt the interests or even the identity of a community. See Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007b), p.6.


60 Thereby the question of the ‘meaning in use’ of a norm remains. Presuming that a norm becomes applied in another context, does not indicate that the meaning of the norm remains the same. See Wiener, Antje (2007).
emerge or old ones change (*doing*). The question then is how this *doing* comes along. Presuming that the new conception does not purely reflect the interest and identity of a state or the organization (or the intersubjective knowledge of/within an organization) a process of internalization has to start in order to guarantee a norm conforming behavior (*living*).

Second, norms and interests can change. From a constructivist standpoint change does not indicate a material alteration but the emergence of new constitutive norms and rules based on collective intentionality or the emergence or alternation of social structures. Thus, norms are able to be changed.

Taking all these observations into consideration, the definition of socialization has to be broadened. Referring to the definition of Checkel, socialization after enlargement of an organization must be defined as a ‘process of inducing actors in the norms and rules of a given community *and* the induction of a given community with the norms promoted by an actor’. Thus, respecting bottom-up directions of change alters the concept of socialization as it takes the process of interaction into account (*doing*) and not exclusively the process and the effects of compliance to a norm (*living*). By respecting the *doing* side of socialization, this approach shifts the social construction where it starts: in between agent and structure.

Respecting both directions of change (with an analytical focus on ‘bottom-up’ changes) and the location of the production of the social in between agent and structure touches on the *agent-structure-problem* in IR. Watching through constructivist lenses I see my approach as being one possible answer to the problem in assuming and theorizing clearly that agent and structure mutually constitute each other and that both are relevant to explaining changes in norms and identity on both levels, thus on the member states’ and the organizational level. This follows Alexander Wendt’s assumption that “agents are inseparable from social structures in the sense that their action is possible only in virtue of those structures, and social structures cannot have causal significance except insofar as they are instantiated by agents”

Thus, neither agent nor structure is given ontological priority. This in turn reveals that the concentration on a purely top-down perspective - as it prevails in the socialization literature - bears the danger of constructing the work on a purely structuralist ontology and giving organizational structure priority over the agent. This will lead to explanations where identity, interest and behaviour of the agent are seen as produced and explained purely by relation to the structure. The problem of this monodirectional perspective lies in the presumption of a stable and unproblematic structure. But what happens after accession when structures change? And precisely, what happens in times of critical junctures and ideational shocks, such as in times of change? Building the research on a monodirectional perspective in times of change, the net view on structure cannot function as an explanandum anymore. While this work concentrates in its empirical part first at the time after accession of Poland to both organizations (when Poland was no longer the passive agent) and second on certain special cases (when Poland was clearly an active part), the only appropriate way to analyze the changes in norms and identity is to take a bidirectional perspective and to look at the changes

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62 Ibid., p. 365.
63 See Ibid., pp.347ff.
coming from the top and the bottom. In doing so, I take a both/and perspective. The question is then, where should I begin my analysis? As I locate the production of the social in between the agent and the structure, the question is unproblematic as I will direct the analytical focus to the doing of agents. Concerning the case studies, I will start by presenting the external structural level and then turn to the agential level. This procedure does not reflect a hierarchy in ontology but is only the result of an operational decision following the socialization model of this work.

Any study of socialization processes – be it in a top-down, bottom-up or horizontal direction – raises the question of how much the ideational factors of one agent can ‘cause’ the change of norms and identities of another agent. The task of the empirical part of a work is thus to uncover the reasons which drove actors to change. An analysis of the reasons for change involves reconstructing the situation when the change took place. This allows one to take a closer look into the motivation of an agent to take over the ideational structures of another agent. Reconstructing the situation means, in other words, to reconstruct the interactional moment when the negotiations between agents took place. From this perspective, it becomes possible to explore whether patterns of practices of Polish socialization after accession to both organizations exist. Subsequently, it will be possible to detect the input of Polish norms and identity on the given organizations. If socialization processes occurring in a bottom-up manner are successful, the socializer (here: Poland) provides the socializees (here EU and NATO) with new norms and a new identity vis-à-vis the policy towards Ukraine.

Another aspect while talking about the concept of socialization is the ‘place’ or ‘arena’ of socialization. The literature treats organizations and prominently the EU and NATO mainly as pre-socializing institutions. In their article about security communities, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett argue that “organizations (...) are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and perhaps even ‘teach’ others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are”65. Consequently, Adler and Barnett constitute organizations to be the sites of socialization and socialization then follows a ‘top-down’ direction of change. But respecting the duality of agent and structure I argue that socialization does not start either at one (agential) nor on the other (structural) level but is ontologically primarily located in an intermediary level, introduced in the recent literature in IR as practice before it is internalized in agents. I argue, thus, that such a place may not be located at the organizational level; that it is not so much within the organizations that socialization occurs, rather it is the interactions and practices between agents which are the initial ‘places’ or ‘arenas’ of socialization. Thus, the rationale for the consideration of the ‘bottom-up’ direction of change for research into socialization and Europeanization is the previously ignored input of (new) member states on norms and identities after accession, the latter being clearly subject to change and not stability. Especially research concerning the cases of socialization processes of the EU, NATO and the former Sovietized states demonstrate that this view has been ignored. The theorization of the ‘bottom-up’ approach of socialization and the location of the production of the social in between agent and structure relates to the question of how this process occurs. This demands a view on the interactional side of the process – understood in

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64 Of course, the focus of the work is on the bottom-up perspective.
the model as *doing* and building on the concept of praxis. In order to clarify the concepts of practice and interaction, in the next part I take a brief look at those notions and adapt them to the approach of this study.

### 2.1.2 Practice

As the ‘praxis turn’ reveals a new tendency in IR, common definitions of core concepts such as ‘praxis’, ‘practical conscience’ or ‘praxeology’ are still absent. As Nicholas Onuf states in 2013, “In the field of International Relations, many of us use the term *practice* … generally and loosely (…)”

Authors within practice literature rely on two main conceptions of practice. One model “highlights rules and their internalization as tacit knowledge, and the other highlights powers and their externalization as skills and goods”.

Any model specifies the relation between agent, practice and structure and defines from where practices are investigated. Understanding the process of socialization as *doing* (externalization) and *living* (internalization), I investigate the notion of practice largely in both readings.

Concerning the ontological essence of praxis, works concerned with praxis bring in a new view on the notion and thus location of the social. The social is thereby neither located at the level of the structure (e.g. norms, rules) nor at the level of the agent but in the practice, understood as an interface between agent and structure. The social is thus located at the level of the ‘social practices’ of the agents which build upon a ‘knowing-how’ routine. This knowing-how represents an incorporated understanding (through repetitive action) of the agents of how relations/actions/things function. Ideally, agents then act in the setting of the practice. Relating to the argument of this study, the latter presumption means that norm or identity change in a Polish manner comes along through a routinized way of *doing* in a Polish way. Thereby practice does not cause agents to do something and as such does not function as reason. Practice is a state of affairs constructed on how a process comes about. This means precisely that *what* an agent does relates to ideational structures like norms, interests or identity and *how* he does relates to the practices in play. Understanding practices as a process allows me to investigate the question of *how* Polish input into organizations has been possible. Research focuses then on the process of Polish input instead of only investigating the internalization of Polish norms and identities.

If I were to understand practices as causes, then the underlying question would be guided by a *w*-word. Then the research would be interested in what the reasons for Polish input are and identify those reasons as practices.

So far said, practices rely on a knowing-how routine. Thereby the crucial question is: should one define the routine to rely on reflexive and conscious knowledge or on inarticulated background knowledge? I understand practices to rely on both, on a conscious and an

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67 Ibid., p.135.
68 In opposition to ‘knowing-that’ or ‘knowing-what’.
70 Practice is differently considered as process or cause which depends on the philosophical standing of the author. See for an introductory discussion about this Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (2013), pp.137f.
inarticulated aspect. Admitting that practices also rely on a conscious aspect allows investigation of the input of Poland into organizations by respecting the strategic motive of Poland as a middle-range power to increase its international standing.

At first glance, the intrinsic character of practices to build on a knowing-how routine and the strategic motive of Poland to input on organizations seem to be in conceptual conflict because the notion of a knowing-how routine implies stability of practices. But this work focuses on the changes due to Polish input. In order to capture the creative moment of change for practices I go back to the argument of Michel de Certeau, until now neglected in practice-oriented works in the field of IR. In his famous “L’invention du quotidien” de Certeau makes the distinction between ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ underlying practices. Strategies are “the determination of relations which become possible in the moment when a subject of will and capability is isolatable from an environment”. Tactics on the other hand are a “determination which can neither count on a self, nor on a border which separates it from a visible entity”.

De Certeau’s main argument is that research ignores the reorientation of practices through the use of them. He argues that strategies are prone to powerful institutions or generally said agents who establish a structure. On the contrary, agents acting within those structures act on behalf of tactics and are then apt to change those strategies. This brings in the moment of creative redefinition of a practice within the patterns of the practice. This observation has two consequences for the work, one ontological and one epistemological. First and foremost: practices may change in a Polish manner. Second, the empirical part should focus on the tactics of Poland in relations to Ukraine within the patterns of national and organizational strategies. Once Polish practices are institutionalized, they develop a knowing-how routine at the organizational level. This approach nevertheless comes with an ontological shortcoming. The question is: what is praxis then before it comes along in a routinized way? Is the emergence or the learning time of the ‘knowing-how’ not praxis? Respecting also the conscious, strategic aspect of practice I argue that interactions which happen before the ‘automatized’ or the ‘knowing-how’ aspect comes into play have also to be considered as praxis. I understand ‘praxis’ therefore in a broad sense as a context-bound process of interaction wherein the agents adopt and transform reality and establish modes as the normal way of doing. It is the context-bound notion of practice which puts the process in relation with a certain degree of routine. This is also one reason why it is so important to consider context in the analysis. In other words: a practice is routinized (incorporated) if it takes place in the same or a similar context. But, at the same time, context thus given within the situation in which practice takes place, may change and thus alter practice. This happens prominently after enlargement, when the inner and external contexts of organizations change. To sum up, social practices are on the one hand characterized by routines and on the other by change.

71 I discuss this aspect in greater depth on pp. 41ff. when I relate the notions of practice and doing.
72 I discuss the notion of motive in the part of doing and living, pp.41ff.
73 [Translated by D.P.-H.] “…le calcul des rapport de forces qui devient possible à partir du moment où un sujet de vouloir et de pouvoir est isolable d’un ‘environnement’”. Tactics are on the other hand “un calcul qui ne peut pas compter sur un proper, ni donc sur une frontier qui distingue l’autre comme une totalité visible. De Certeau, Michel (1980), p.xlvi.
This, however, does not create a problem of contradictoriness, but represents the two sides of the ‘logic of practice’.\textsuperscript{76}

One main question remains at this point: why do organizations (and other states) conform or comply with the Polish input? From the Social Psychologist literature, two insightful principles are given that steer those processes which are interconnected with power: authority and social validation. Authorities may thereby function as experts or as agents of influence. Being considered as an expert, the capacity or the power to input relates to the presumed wisdom or knowledge of the actor. As agents of influence, the power and the capacity to input relies therefore on factors like experience, expertise or scientific recognition. Social validation is based on the assumption that actors frequently decide what to do in a situation by examining what others, especially those most alike, are doing in a certain situation. Another possible reason to conform or comply is similarity. Thus, actors decide to comply because they would like to follow actions of other actors similar to themselves. Another reason for a possible Polish input is uncertainty. Imagine that given organizations are uncertain how to choose correctly for reasons of a lack of familiarity with a situation or for reasons of difficulty. If Poland acts in those situations, the possibility to comply for the organizations is high.\textsuperscript{77} It turns out that the ‘success’ of an agent to upload practices is dependent on the power one agent holds. As the power concept is looked at from different angles the next part takes up this notion and clarifies the understanding of power for this work.

2.1.3 Power

Power is an “essentially contested concept”\textsuperscript{78} and needs therefore to be defined for the frame of this work. Within the literature on power two dominant approaches exist. The first, the older ‘power-as-resource’-approach, understands power as a hard attribute from the agent. This research strand focuses on the question of how one state uses its material resources to change the behaviour of another state in order that the latter does something it initially did not want to do. On the contrary, the newer ‘relational-power’-approach understands power as nearly synonymous to causality. In this perspective power is seen as a causal relationship in which the behaviour of one actor causes a change in the behaviour of another actor.\textsuperscript{79} I argue in this perspective that power – understood not as material power but more subtle as a knowing resource (e.g. good relations with a certain state, strategic position, historical interconnections) – allows the new member state to have input on a given policy area where new norms emerge or old ones change. Consequently, I define power as the production of normative and constitutive effects changing the status quo of agent and/or structure.\textsuperscript{80} Subsequently, power is one aspect which causes change.

\textsuperscript{76} The underlying characteristic of the logic of practice represents one of the main differences among the practice based researchers. Whereas Pierre Bourdieu for example builds on the logic of routine, Judith Butler stresses unpredictability as the characteristic identifying practice. See Reckwitz, Andreas (2004), pp.45ff.


\textsuperscript{80} This definition is close to the definition offered by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall who define power as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate”. Barnett, Michael, and Duvall, Raymond (2005), p.42. In their definition of power the
Admitting that change happens because one agent holds a certain power, provokes the question of legitimacy. In order to ‘use’ power, an agent must be considered as a legitimate normative guide in a special area. Thus, the power of an agent – in this case Poland – depends on the recognition of a legitimated actor to input (accorded by other actors in interactions). If this legitimacy is then attributed to an agent, it can act as a legitimate diffuser of ideational structures. In Adler and Barnett’s words, power must be understood “as the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we-feeling’ and practices of states”\(^\text{81}\). Power is thus attributed to an agent based on legitimacy.\(^\text{82}\)

The effects of the use of power by an agent may thereby be tagged in two ways: emergence of a new norm (which finds its base in the ideational structures of a certain actor) or convergence to a norm (which already exists in the stock of one actor). In this perspective both – norm and power – are understood to be agent and structure. Both effects (emergence, convergence) can be of behavioural or ideational nature. Referring to the relational approach to power it demands a definition of domain and scope in order to answer the question: power over what and how deep?\(^\text{83}\) The organizational convergence to a Polish norm or policy, or the emergence of a norm or policy is understood in terms of Polonization and probably varies from one issue area to another. It is the task of the empirical part of the work to extract those issue areas.

The notion of scope interconnects then with the degree of Polonization and hence the effects of the socialization process.

Having clarified the concept of power in this work I turn now to the very content of change, namely norm and identity.

2.1.4 Norm

The most influential definition of norms in the IR literature is made by Peter Katzenstein who defines norms as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”\(^\text{84}\). The early norms literature distinguishes between \textit{regulative} and \textit{constitutive} norms, the former regulating or anticipating the proper behaviour of an activity while the latter constitutes a set of practices that characterize a particular community. Thus, while regulative norms target a causal effect on activity, constitutive norms are concerned with the content or identity of an activity.\(^\text{85}\) In both readings, norms are understood as a prescriptive

\(^{\text{81}}\) Adler, Emanuel, and Barnett, Michael (1999b), pp.39f.
\(^{\text{82}}\) This brings us back to the question why practices change. Considering the topic of this work the power to cause change is thus attributed to Poland by the organizations through authority provision and social validation.
\(^{\text{84}}\) Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996b), p.5.
cause for proper behaviour. Other conceptions of norms as evaluative and stressing the morality or practical norms as commonly accepted notions of ‘best solutions’ have been eliminated from the modern constructivist research agenda. Therefore it should be noted that the evaluative dimension – the oughtness – is an intrinsic characteristic of norms themselves. What ought to be done is not just imposed on a community out of the blue but established relationally within the interaction of agents who struggle over the appropriateness of norms and thereby fix a norm’s meaning. In this context Finnemore and Sikkink stress that “we only know what is appropriate by reference to the judgements of a community of a society”.

Those comments on the characteristic of norms bear the two following observations. First, the notion of an evaluative dimension raises the question of the relationship between ‘value’ and ‘norm’. As Morris stresses, whereby “values are individual, or commonly conceptions of the desirable, […] norms are generally accepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, or prohibitions against others’ behaviour, belief or feeling”. Thus value “refers to a desirable state of the world and defines the (ultimate) ends of action, [whereby] a norm refers to the desirable behaviour of actors and defines the appropriate means of action (to achieve those ends)”.

Second, the relational character of norms evolves within a process of intersubjective communication. Thus, interaction is an underlying action and thus a precondition for the evolution or the change of a norm.

So far I have looked at the conception of norms and answered by this short interpellation the questions of ‘what is a norm?’ and ‘what is its inherent characteristic?’. Thereby, conventional constructivist research on norms focuses on the conception of norms (e.g. regulative and constitutive) or on a certain type of norm (e.g. sovereignty, human rights, citizenship). In this perspective, within the socialization literature Frank Schimmelfennig builds his conceptual approach on the dichotomy of ‘community norms' constituting the collective identity of an international community and ‘specific norms’ regulating behaviour in individual issue areas. Trine Flockhardt builds in her anthology on the definition of norms put forward by Farrell that “norms are seen as intersubjective beliefs about the social world, which have behavioural consequences”. Audie Klotz investigates the role of the norm of racial equality in defining identity and interests. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink look at the impact of human rights norms on domestic politics. Building research on a certain type of norm raises the question of the theoretical presumptions underlying the notion of ‘norm type’. Some authors propose a type classification of norms according to their epistemological or ontological understanding of norms. A prominent example is offered in this perspective by Katzenstein who distinguishes between three types of norms which may evolve in a process of communication. First, they can evolve spontaneously as a social practice. Second, they can be consciously promoted as political strategies to further interests or they can be deliberately

89 Schimmelfennig, Frank (2003), p.71.
negotiated as a *mechanism for conflict management*.\(^{94}\) Coming from a critical angle, Antje Wiener also distinguishes three types of norm. First, *fundamental norms* include such core constitutional norms or basic procedural norms as sovereignty, democracy or rule of law. Second, “*organizing principles* evolve through policy or political processes”. They organize the behaviour of individuals or communities, represented by, for example, accountability, transparency or flexibility. Third, *standardized procedures* entail rules and provisions in order to prescribe action. Those are, for example, qualified majority voting, unanimous decisions or proportional representation.\(^{95}\) The norm types looked at in this study are norms *promoted as political strategy*, *fundamental norms* and *organizing principles*. Studying norms which evolve from the relations of Poland towards Ukraine and the EU or NATO towards Ukraine, I concentrate on norms like democracy, independence, trust, friendship, mutual help, respect, recognition and strategic partnership. At first glance, these norms represent organizing principles, as they seem to evolve through policy or political processes and guide policy practices. Respecting also a rationalist approach towards norms I argue that these norms have not evolved through net policy or political processes but that they may have been promoted in order to maximize the agents’ utility.\(^{96}\) Respecting the notion of utility in analysis seems to be essential regarding that Poland wants to maximize its position within the region and the world system.

Having defined the type of norm for this study, nevertheless does “not allow for conclusions about the meaning of norms”\(^{97}\). If a norm switches from one context to another the meaning of a norm may change because the meaning is bound up in the practices of the agents.\(^{98}\) Thus, the meaning of a certain norm in EU-Ukrainian relations does not indicate that this norm, even if formally downloaded at national Polish level, spreads the same meaning (and vice versa). It is the task of the empirical part of the study to uncover the meanings of the norms according to the different agential levels. Respecting that the meaning of a norm is bound to the context leads to the question of the possible input of a norm in a certain context. In analytical terms, this pushes us to consider the ‘how’ of norms’ input. Conventional constructivist research done in this perspective is built on a monodirectional perspective on norms research studying the norms’ input *on* an agent. In this perspective, the quality of a norm is defined in structural terms and represents a behaviourist approach. Norms are considered as structures and political action is seen in ‘response to norms’. Thereby, a reflexive approach studies behaviour ‘in relation with norms’. Thus, behaviourist approaches consider norms as “stable social facts outside agency” whereby a reflexive approach deems norms’ meanings as “flexible and interrelated with agency”.\(^{99}\) This work follows the reflexive approach to norms research represented by Wiener. She stresses that through the “transfer between contexts the meaning of norms becomes contested – as differently socialized individuals (…) seek to interpret them”\(^{100}\). Building on Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, she brings in the notion of *dual quality* of a norm. Thereby she highlights not only the

\(^{94}\) See Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996b), p.21

\(^{95}\) Wiener, Antje (2007a), pp.8f. [emphasis added].

\(^{96}\) See for the notion of *utility* pp.19f.


\(^{98}\) Ibid., p.4.


structuring character of a norm (behaviourist approach) but respects especially the social construction of a norm through interaction in a context. Assuming that a norm is constructed in interaction requires that different understandings must compete until the meaning of a norm becomes fixed. This observation in turn reveals that a norm is going through a process of contestation when entering an arena. One should note that “norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interests”101. Thus, norms are not ‘floating’ around and fixed but evolve through a process of interaction (and possibly contestation) in context.102

This observation calls for the respect of the context while investigating the switch of norms between different arenas/levels. The notions of context and contestation require deeper investigation.

Generally, the context-bound notion is an important insight for norms research as it respects the norms’ meaning and validity in a time-space context. The notions of contestation and context bear two further observations. First, contestation brings in a democratic moment for norms’ emergence where “normative meaning is considered to evolve from different cultural backgrounds; arguing about norms hence brings different and potentially conflicting preferences of the norm setting negotiators to light”103. Second, the notion of context is important for the theorisation of the organizational and the national arena. On the organizational level, the context represents the institutional order of the organization itself. Whereas NATO is a classical intergovernmental organization based on negotiations and agreements that leaves state sovereignty formally untouched, the EU involves majoritarian decision-making with supranational rights, which erodes state sovereignty. Context may thereby be understood in two different ways. First, context represents the environment (historical, institutional) in which an interaction is taking place. Second, context may also represent the frame of reference. Thereby, “the stronger the shared frame of reference, the more likely is the successful implementation of the norm”104. But as already mentioned, the fixed meaning of a norm says nothing about the validation of a norm at another level. As the context changes, the revalidation and thus the contested moment comes back in a norm’s implementation because the agents who interpret them were socialised in different settings.105

This reflexive view on norms “shifts the focus from normative facticity towards validity”106.

Thus far I have discussed the conception, the type and the construction of norms’ meaning. As I announced in the introduction, I will investigate the Polish input into the processes of change or emergence of norms. This calls for a deeper look at the epistemological view on both processes.

From a constructivist standpoint, change does not indicate a material alteration but the emergence of new constitutive rules based on collective intentionality107 or the emergence or

104 Ibid., p.53.
alternation of social structures. Two observations follow from these remarks. First, norms and policy directions are able to be changed. Second, the process of change is interwoven within the process of emergence of ideational or structural factors.

Generally, norm sets are very stable structures because norm change is considered a costly process. Explanation for a norm change is a difficult task to undertake and the “macrotheoretical equipment of constructivism is better at explaining stability than change”. Constructivists agree that “norm change depends on the pre-existing institutional structures in which actors are embedded”. Thus, norm change is bound on actors and structure. The constructivist literature presents different occasions for changes of norms. They can take place following:

1. the change of the world-time context
2. when they are seen to fail
3. after destabilizing ideational shocks
4. when “changes in great powers’ interests change the dominant norms”
5. spontaneously evolving as social practice
6. consciously promoted as political strategy to further interests
7. deliberately negotiated as mechanism for conflict management

It turns out that from a constructivist point of view four main characteristics favour norm change. First, structural changes are favourable reasons for norm change (1, 2, 3, 4). Second, agents may change norms (1, 4). Third, the inherent essence of the norm may be reason for change. Taking a reflexive view on norms, the contestedness of norms has to be added to the latter argument as this process may alter the meaning of a norm (5, 6, 7). Fourth, reasons may be found in the practices of states (5, 6, 7). Furthermore, the list indicates the process of norm emergence as spontaneously evolving, consciously promoted or deliberately negotiated.

Generally, in times of structural change, agents are more open-minded to adopt new norms sets and new practices. This, of course, depends on a multiplicity of factors like the intensity and the (organizational and global) salience of a certain structural change, the legitimacy of the input agent or the agential salience of the norm. So far, I have explained that norms are able to be changed and to be newly constructed. The next question that arises touches on the analytical part and the how of investigation of these processes. A short anticipation of the

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112 Finnemore and Sikkink refer to world historical events such as wars or major depressions, changes in communication and transportation technologies. See Finnemore, Martha, and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998), p. 909.
116 The last three points go back to Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996b), p.21.
117 Of course, the list is not considered to be completed but indicates a picture of norm change presented in the recent norms’ literature.
methodological part will present an answer. In this study, the changes of norms or the emergence of new ones will also be investigated through the reconstruction of communicative processes (and not purely through behavioural outcomes). This respects the fact that socialization has not to be investigated as pure compliance to a norm but has to respect the interactional moment framed in this work as communicative interaction underlying practice. Klotz adds in this perspective that,

“focusing on communicative interactions shifts attention away from choices between structures or agents and toward the fundamentally shared or intersubjective nature of norms. By analysing communication, we can identify norms nontautologically through both justifications and actions, avoiding the problems of falsifiability that arise since behaviour contrary to norm prescription does not necessarily invalidate the norm”\textsuperscript{118}.

The focus on communication and thus social interaction in the socialization approach of this work focuses moreover on the very production of the intersubjective knowledge and identity labelled as practice. At the beginning of a communication process the agents hold a subjective conception of reality. Within the processes of interaction these agential ideas and interests develop (in its idealized version) into shared, intersubjective community conceptions of reality. This leads in the end to the development of a shared identity and thus to a relatively consistent interpretation of the world.

The preceding parts clarified the conception, the type and the characteristics of the understanding of norms in this study. But one remaining question remains on the agenda, namely, where does the content of norms (and also policies) come from? And, what changes when a norm emerges or changes? The answer to these questions can be found in the next part which takes a closer look at the notion of identity.

\textbf{2.1.5 Identity}

The previous section made clear that this work challenges the exclusive top-down perspective on socialization and highlights in contrast the bottom-up direction of change. In this manner, this work pushes to investigate Poland’s impact on the formulation of norms at the organizational level, which leads organizations – once the impact becomes internalized – to socialize in the given state’s manner. But what exactly is the content of the Polish ‘impact’? Where does it come from? In other words: where do the interests of Poland come from? And why are changes in the identity of the EU and NATO worth considering? Following Wendt’s assumption that “an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is”,\textsuperscript{119} identity is the core concept in order to explain the content of Polish impact and the importance of identity in foreign policy-making.

While approaching the study of identities, one might distinguish two dominant schools of thought: rationalist and constructivist. The former vision treats identities as developing attributes from a group’s common background, like “blood ties, language, values, norms, religious customs, traditions, models of thought and responses to specific situations, ways of experiencing things, and even eating habits”\textsuperscript{120}. This collective identity is considered to be

\textsuperscript{119} Wendt, Alexander (1999), p.231.
\textsuperscript{120} Szwed, Robert (ed.) (2007), p.17.
attributed to community members and inherited via a process of socialization. This perspective, nevertheless, looks exclusively at a top-down perspective of socialization.

Rationalists treat interests purely as coming from identities. Presuming a materialistic ontology, this school of thoughts often treats interests as based on a theoretical preloading on materialism. In this context, identities are seen as “markers of distributions of material power”\(^\text{121}\).

The problem of this approach lies in the assumption of a stable and unchanging socio-cultural context. Relating to the topic of this thesis, the question is thus, what has happened after Poland’s accession to the EU and NATO when the socio-cultural context changed? And what has happened in moments of change of norms or policies (represented as a discursive moment) which probably cause a shift in identities? Taking this change into consideration, the question can hardly be answered by a rationalist approach to identity.

Constructivists understand identity quite differently. From this perspective, identity is not termed as ‘consequence’ or ‘source’ of collective characteristics but rather as “an effect of mutual individual influences”\(^\text{122}\).

From a constructivist perspective identities are understood as being the basis of interests, but at the same time both terms have a mutually constituting character.\(^\text{123}\) Identities function as ideational structures that constitute the actions of agents. Those ‘structures’ are continually reproduced, reaffirmed or even contested by the actions of agents. This perspective highlights the formation of identity through the process of interaction and communication and the respect of external influences (context). Hence, identities from which actions follow do not come out of the blue but are produced and reproduced within interactional processes in a certain context – be it on the national ground or in communities beyond the state. Being the result of interactions which continue to happen permanently, identities are hence not fossilized and eternalized concepts, but undergo change and transformation.\(^\text{124}\)

The constructivist approach and within the respect of the context shows that identities are consequently not subject to stability but are social and cultural constructs able to be changed. The constructivist approach to identity underpins the theoretical approach of this thesis for three reasons:

1. It allows for analysis of change
2. It respects the factors of context and interaction
3. Considering the mutually constituting character of identities and interests, it allows examination of the Polish input (reflected in interests) into identity change at the organizational level.

Having clarified the characteristic and the content of identity, one question remains, namely, what exactly constitutes the concept of identity. The very content of identity is the “changing

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set of beliefs, ideas or norms that reflexive selves follow”\textsuperscript{125}. Klotz adds that “ideas, norms and rules constitute meanings which construct actors’ identity, interest and subsequent action”\textsuperscript{126}. The latter observations clarify the link between norms and identity. Changing norms also alter the content of identity. Kathryn Sikking and Peter Schmitz stress that “norms and principled ideas are assumed to have constitutive effects on the identity formation of actors, rather than simply intervening between interests and behaviour”\textsuperscript{127}. As ideas are individually held worldviews, I concentrate this work on norms, which rely on a common understanding of a certain community of people.

The very concept of \textit{identity} is thereby embedded in a self-understanding and needed in order to make sense of the self and others.\textsuperscript{128} The self and the others are in this perspective mutually required in order to generate a unique identity. Thus, the nature of identity is relational by looking outside the self in order to define the self and the others. Thereby the process of identity building is based on the process of self-definition and self-categorization of actors. In this respect, identity differentiates from \textit{role}. In the latter concept, self-definition \textit{and} definition from the outside constitute the characteristics.\textsuperscript{129}

Identity builds on a ‘common-we’ according to common features which makes one’s own actions appropriate and thus categorizes ‘our’ and ‘their’ actions as appropriate or not.\textsuperscript{130} In consequence, identity categorizes and homogenizes action. In communities beyond the state the creation of a collective identity and a ‘we-ness’ feeling is the core concept in order to guarantee order, shared interests and homogenous actions over time. Finnemore and Sikking stress in this context that “shared ideas, expectations and beliefs about appropriate behaviour is what gives the world structure, order and stability”\textsuperscript{131}. Thus, socialization processes within organizations are important in order to ensure a shared identity and thus shared actions.\textsuperscript{132} Within this development of a collective identity-formation in organizations – understood as communities beyond the state – the self-other distinction becomes blurred.\textsuperscript{133} At this point I have to identify the kind of identity I am speaking about while investigating the processes. By reconstituting the identities of agents I follow Flockhart who distinguishes between the conceptions of ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’ underlying the concept of identity. The distinction is a fruitful approach in order to grasp identity building on a national \textit{and} on an organizational level. On the national level identity is formed in the dichotomy of ‘self’ and ‘other’. At the organizational level all three notions (self, we, other) come into play. The constitution of self-identity follows a process of self-attribution which may be reconstituted in agential texts, agendas and policy-making documents. The ‘we-identity’ only comes into play at the organizational level and encompasses the collective identities of member states and prospective member states. It is the level where the concept of practice as ‘we-doing’ becomes relevant. Finally, the concept of ‘other’ is formed in distinction to the concepts of

\textsuperscript{126} Klotz cited by Ibid., p.12.
\textsuperscript{129} See for an analysis of the role concept Ziemer, Veronica (2008).
\textsuperscript{130} See Wendt, Alexander (1999).
\textsuperscript{132} See Ibid., p.11.
\textsuperscript{133} See Wendt, Alexander (1999), p.229.
‘self’ and ‘we’ and defines who is seen as the other. For doing so, the (re-)discovery of the other(s) is needed. But who is the other? Mikhail Bakhtin states that “the self has not only multiple others, but multiple kinds of others, including characters from our own past as well as from cultural narratives; historical others and generalized others”\(^\text{134}\). The ‘other’ may therefore be not only an agent outside national borders but also a constructed other which has its source in the self.

Not being a cause but a construction, identities “have to be discovered empirically and not assumed a priori”\(^\text{135}\). The latter argument reveals that characteristics of the very identity of an agent have to be extracted within the empirical part of a study. In order to extract the Polish input on organizations and to examine the Polonization process, the question that arises is, which interests and norms Poland has pursued towards Ukraine. In order to extract genuine Polish norms, policies and identity formation the first empirical part of the thesis will be concerned with discovering inductively the foreign policy norms and identity of Poland after it regained its sovereignty in 1989 until its accession to both organizations. The same will be done for both other agents, namely the EU and NATO.

The aim of reconstructing identities puts a methodological question on the agenda, namely ‘where’ identities are created. Thereby self and collective political identity towards Ukraine is necessarily a discursive identity because, following Giddens, “social and political identities are created through the formulation and reformulation of discursive narratives”\(^\text{136}\). Thus, the interpretation of texts is an excellent inquiry method in order to reconstruct the identities of the agents. Sources may thereby be agential texts, speeches or policy agendas. Document choice depends thereby on the legal rights of actors to be involved in those processes.\(^\text{137}\)

Having clarified the contents of the Polonization approach, the following part presents the model which is based on the insights of the literature.

2.1.6 Doing and Living

So far, the theoretical tool-kit labeled Polonization is well equipped with the notions of socialization, praxis, power, norm and identity. This chapter casts a further theoretical look on the notions of doing and living which are the core catchwords of the Polonization approach. In the literature, both notions are viewed from different angles. Therefore, it is important to define the understanding used throughout this work. As the work understands itself as a contribution to the socialization literature, the purpose of this part is not to offer a literature review concerning the notions of doing and living but to make the notions operational by aid of arguments provided by the literature. Concerning the notion of doing, I will start by revealing the nature of doing. Then I will explain the relation between practice and doing. Lastly I will clarify the occurrence of doing. Accordingly, turning to the notion of living, I will define the notion for this thesis and then turn to describing the effects of the process of socialization.

\(^{135}\) Hopf, Ted (2002), p.3.
\(^{137}\) See for document choice and method pp. 51-69 of this dissertation.
2.1.6.1 Doing

As the earlier discussion has shown, the new ‘practice turn’ in IR offers a new level of investigation located between agent and structure and labeled praxis. I defined ‘praxis’ in a broad sense, as a “context-bound process of doing wherein the agents adopt and transform reality and establish moods as the normal way of doing”. The shift of the focus to the production of the social in between agent and structure (middle ground) says nothing about the ontological and epistemological understanding of praxis. At this point in the thesis I approach the nature of praxis as the notions of praxis and *doing* are interrelated and their ontological understanding consequently correlates.

Thereby, the relationship between the two notions may be looked at from two different angles. In one reading, *doing* is praxis; in another reading, *doing* represents a part of praxis. The understanding of *doing* in this dissertation follows the second reading. In the following parts, I will show different understandings of the nature and occurrence of *doing* in the literature and argue why I understand *doing* to be a concrete deed within the patterns of practice.

As I have shown in previous chapters a ‘practice turn’ is on the way in IR. As for social theory, the term goes back to Karl Marx, who identified praxis as a “sensuous human activity”. Thus, practice has to do with human actions; in other words: what humans do. The notions of practice and *doing* are thus related and it remains to define the relationship. Until recently, the term of practice was used in IR by many authors in a loose and undefined way. With his recent contribution, ‘International Security in Practice’ Vincent Pouliot devotes time to define the term practice for IR and to operationalize the term for empirics. Therefore, the work offers a good starting point for consideration while investigating the nature of practice and doing. Pouliot’s general objective in operationalizing the term practice, is “to bring the background to the foreground”. He offers to investigate what agents think “from (the background of know-how that informs practice in an inarticulate fashion)” at the expense of what they “think about (reflexive and conscious knowledge)”. Thereby, he counters the representational bias which most investigations rely on, and introduces the logic of practicality relying on practical knowledge equipped with “inarticulate know-how learned in and through practice that makes conscious deliberation and action possible”. It is “knowledge within the practice instead of behind the practice”. Pouliot argues that it is learned from experience and is inarticulate because it appears self-evident to agents. At this point Pouliot cites Ludwig Wittgenstein with the following quote, “This is simply what I do”. Later, Pouliot cites Pierre Bourdieu by writing that, “Practice is the done thing…because one cannot do otherwise”. It turns out that for Pouliot, practice and doing

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139 See for a further elaboration on the evolvement of the use of the term *practice* in IR Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (2013), pp.131ff.
140 Pouliot, Vincent (2010), p.27.
141 Ibid., p.14
142 Ibid., p.28.
143 Ibid., p.24.
145 Bourdieu cited by Ibid., p.35.
are the same and, as a consequence, depend on the same presumptions.\textsuperscript{146} Being the same, doing in consequence relies on a “tacit, inarticulate and automatic” knowledge as opposed to a “conscious, verbalized and intentional”\textsuperscript{147} knowledge. As practice, doing is then ontologically prior to the other three logics of social action, namely the logic of consequence, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of arguing.\textsuperscript{148} But if doing relies on tacit knowledge, and is learned from experience, two fundamental questions present themselves. First and foremost, if doing as a purely reflexive deed relies on experience and is only learned by experience, then the question of the starting point (motive) for doing comes up. It is not a philosophical question, like the priority of the egg or the chicken, but touches on the essential assumptions of the logic of practicality proposed by Pouliot. I argue at this point that by paying too much attention to the non-representational aspect of doing, Pouliot neglects the representational aspect. Even if doing and practice rely on a type of experience, this kind of experience (like the peaceful settlement of disputes) relies on a strong representational aspect which may rely on a kind of identity (e.g. peaceful nation), norm (e.g. peace) or value (e.g. freedom). I agree at this point with Jacob Ole Sending whose “main critique concerns the exclusion of representational knowledge in the logic of practicality”\textsuperscript{149}. The exclusion does not only touch on the ontology of the notion of praxis, but also bears consequences for empirics. It is very hard to uncover inarticulate knowledge and as Sending correctly states, “The upshot of this is that what Pouliot reads as non-representational knowledge may very well be representational knowledge […]”\textsuperscript{150}. Precisely, in the field of Political Science, the empirical focus lies mostly in fields in which the agents not only do things in order to do them, but their actions are strongly based on strategic thinking. Especially in international, and specifically bilateral relations, routines may occur (which form praxis), but the motive for interaction remains mostly strategic and thus structurally bound. Building on assumptions from social psychology, interactions are goal-minded and, as such, rely on a representational aspect.\textsuperscript{151} I argue at this point, that practice and doing rely on a certain degree of non-representational knowledge (which can well be identified in a routinized manner) but are steered by representational aspects which are identified here as norms and identity.

A second question which comes up in relation to Pouliot’s argument touches upon the possibility of change. If doing relies on a tacit knowledge learned purely in and through doing as Pouliot suggests, then the sense and end of doing would be the doing itself. As I have already argued in previous chapters, especially in politics agents mostly do not interact in order to just interact, but their interactions rely on an ‘outside’ to these interactions.\textsuperscript{152} This ‘outside’ is then the steering wheel of what agents do and not the outcome of the doing. In the same line of argument, Sterling-Folker adds that if practices are only ‘inside’ processes with

\textsuperscript{146} As Pouliot makes no difference between practice and doing I use – in the following – the words interchangeable when I make reference to Pouliot’s argument.

\textsuperscript{147} Pouliot, Vincent (2010), p.28.

\textsuperscript{148} See Ibid., p.36.

\textsuperscript{149} Sending, Jacob Ole (2011), p.31.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p.32.

\textsuperscript{151} See for a further reflection on interaction Kenrick, Douglas T., Neuberg, Steven L., and Cialdini, Robert B. (2010).

\textsuperscript{152} Jennifer Sterling-Folker criticizes Pouliot’s false application of the ‘outside’ to practice that what he identifies as the desire for peace. She argues that Pouliot “confuse[s] normative preference with analytically-derived conclusions (…)”. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2011), p.36.
no ‘outside’, best practices would always occur. Those best practices would then be stable and repetitive deeds. Being stable, this would prevent any crisis or change of practice. This stability assumption of practice relies on the presumption of a stable and constant environment. But, as history shows, international relations and politics are subject to change and not stability. Respecting that the doing is dependent on an ‘outside’ and respecting the change of the environment, has two consequences for the nature of doing. First, the doing may transform completely according to the outside change. Second, the doing conserves its essence by adopting the change to an extent. Within empirics, I will identify the ‘outside’ in the context and in structural constraints, which steer my empirics, namely norms and identity.

Until now, I have specified the nature of doing as being composed of representational and non-representational knowledge and being based an outside which allows change. Although I rely on an ontological understanding of doing based on the assumptions made by the practice literature and in opposition to Pouliot, I do not consider practice and doing as representative of the same analytical entity. According to the definition of praxis I propose, I understand praxis as a repetitive and transformative process where “moods have been established as the normal way of doing”. Consequently, I understand doing to represent a concrete deed within a practice, and which originates from practice.

In order to describe how I understand the relationship, I go back to Laswell who established a relationship between doing and practice very early, although he uses the word practice in an unintended manner. As Onuf noticed in 1989, most of Lasswell’s “doings occur within those ‘integrated patterns of practices’ (…) which function on behalf of states, that is to say, governments”153. In the state-centered version of Laswell’s approach, influential agents adopt practices that institutionalize their advantageous position (in a field). Laswell identified three patterns of practice, demonstrating how influential agents keep what they want: “by manipulating symbols, controlling supplies, and applying violence”. Even though Laswell did not specify precis the notion of practice, the remarkable approach rests on the identification of doing taking place within patterns of practice. Thus, besides being defined by an active behavior, Laswell defines doing to be more than practice but occurring within the patterns which are established by practice. This understanding represents the relationship between practice and doing for this investigation. In order to connect to the topic of this work, I will determine the precise understanding of practice, doing and socialization. Empirics will focus on uncovering the practices of doing socialization. As such, socialization will become a social process on its own.

Having clarified the nature of doing and the relationship between doing and practice says however nothing about how doing evolves. What is meant when talking about the doing of agents? In order to answer this question, I will go back to Laswell’s approach which introduced an active version of behaviouralism for Political Science. In Laswell’s approach, doing covers a whole range of agents’ behavior. Active behavior is then doing.154 Doing, in

154 The terms of action and activity are also topic to different positions in the literature. The discussions nevertheless would lead too far as the aim of this part is not to understand all the notions used in their depth but to demonstrate the operational handling of the notions used for the approach of this work. For a discussion on action and activity see e.g. Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (2013), pp.132ff.
this reading, is a kind of activity. Throughout the frame of this work, I respect this understanding by detecting Poland’s activities (like organization of conferences or roundtables on the topic of Ukraine) concerning Ukraine. Thus, investigation looks at the Polish ‘making of’ relations with Ukraine – in a bilateral manner and at the organizational level. The term of ‘making of’ leads us to a core constructivist understanding of the world. In his famous “The World of Our Making” Onuf revealed that the world is not only discovered, but made by the people.


Conversely, we make the world what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other. Indeed, saying is doing: talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is.”

Following Onuf’s constructivist argument, doing is saying. Thus, the world is constituted not only by the activities of people, but specifically due to what people say. I respect this core constructivist account in the frame of my work by analyzing what the agents (responsible for relations with Ukraine) say in the scope of relations with Ukraine. As such, doing is based on discourse and relies on the same constructivist accounts as identity and norms. From this perspective, the act of speaking has normative consequences. As Onuf writes, “simply by being spoken, our stated intentions and plans have some degree of normative force in their own right”.

Having clarified the nature of doing, I will now explain the measurement of the process of Polonization, conceptualized in the model of this work as living.

2.1.6.2 Living

While doing is a concept easily captured because it is nourished by extant theoretical contributions defining the concept of living is unsettled. Consequently, let us start with a linguistic reflection of the word in order to fix the meaning necessary to the context of this work. Looking into Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary reveals that two primary definitions of living exist. First and foremost living means “alive now”. In a second meaning, living is defined as: “(…) 2 [only before noun] used or practiced now (…)”. The idea of living Polonization ranks clearly into the second meaning. The living part is thus concerned with the question of how organizations use and practice Polish norms and identities (once they have been uploaded). This shifts the focus to the effects of the process of socialization in a Polish manner, without presuming that considered effects are the latest ends of the process. The process of Polonization is ongoing in character and, as a consequence, effects may also change. In order to shift the focus from terminology towards empirical operationalization, some further concepts come into play while talking about the living part of analysis, namely context and mechanisms. The next few remarks will show reasons for consideration of the latter concepts.

My general aim in the living part is to capture the effects of Polish input at the organizational level and to focus on the question how the then effective uploading happened. As such, the living part focuses on the manifestations of Polish doings on an organizational level, as products of the conditions. Conditions are understood as the context and the mechanism

156 Ibid., p.116.
through which the uploading occurred. Consequently, in the *living* part of the analysis, I will focus on the effects of successful Polish *doings* at the organizational level and detect within the causes for the Polish uploading.

Before coming to the measurement of effects, I will show in the next few remarks that theoretical assumptions about the consumption of Polish effects can already be found in the literature. Therefore, it should be noted that I inspect the input of a state on organizations and not vice versa, which is the content of already-made contributions. As such, the consumption of effects may only be inspired by proclamations made in the literature but will be disclosed in the analytical part of the work. The additional remarks will clarify how and why context plays a role within the *living* part and which mechanisms exist to explain organizations being affected by Polish norms and identities.

Bearing in mind that I understand Polonization as a process and not as a state, the *doing* of Poland cannot be measured as the *cause* for organizational behavior. As Onuf points out in this context, "The practice cannot be said to cause these objects to do anything (…) Thus delimited, practice is no more than a state of affairs noted as such by an observer"\(^{158}\). Consequently, the *doing* part ‘only’ reflects what Poland did and does not answer the question how the process came along. The *living* part thus inspects the causes for uploading. In this context, I consciously speak of ‘cause’ and not of ‘reason’. Whereby “a hypothesis that articulates the cause of (…) [an action] seeks an explanation that corresponds with the world”, giving a reason for an action “explains (…) [the] action”\(^{159}\). Consequently, a reason justifies an action and a cause inspects the (world) context of action. Thereby, the aim of my work is not to devolve into “a battle of interpretations” but to inspect “how it became possible”\(^{160}\).

Thus, one element of the *living* part is to inspect causes of how the Polonization of organizations became possible, respecting that Polonization starts from practice and is an ongoing process which, at some point, may cause effects on the organizational level. This focuses, on the one hand, on the *context* in which uploading became possible, and, on the other hand, on the *mechanisms* that occurred. Keeping in mind that “every assessment of action depends on a theoretical or explanatory model of consumption”\(^{161}\) the literature already offers a discussion about the mechanisms of why actors take over norms (and identities).

Thereby, as already argued in previous theoretical parts, works within the field of socialization have mainly been concerned with the inspection of top-down processes, and thus, the input of organizational norms on states. Consequently, building upon this direction of change already builds upon certain state-eminent features. In this context, Finnemore and Sikkink point out in 1998, that “one central question of norms research is the effect of norms on state behavior”\(^{162}\). Both authors then identify different motivations to implement a new norm which are “legitimation, conformity, and esteem”\(^{163}\). Legitimacy refers to the recognized “role of international sources of legitimation in shaping (…) [actors’] behavior”. Conformity means that actors “comply with norms to demonstrate that they have adapted to

\(^{158}\) Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (2013), p.137.
\(^{159}\) Fierke, Karin (2007), p.68f.
\(^{160}\) Ibid., p.68.
\(^{161}\) Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (2013), p.140.
\(^{163}\) Ibid., p.903.
the social environment – that they ‘belong’”. Esteem covers the process that actors “follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and they want to think well of themselves”\(^{164}\). Turning the focus to the process, which inspects the conditions and mechanisms on how agents take actions within a given structure, Checkel has engaged in the question of why social actors comply with norms based on constructivist insights on mechanisms of social choice. Thereby, he identified (argumentative) persuasion and (social) learning as mechanisms allowing norm compliance.\(^{165}\) Persuasion is then defined as “a process of convincing someone through argument and principled debate”\(^{166}\). Social learning then evolves into “a process whereby agent interests and identities are shaped through and during interaction”\(^{167}\). This already provides an idea of which mechanisms may motivate organizations to comply with Polish norms and identities. A whole range of further works exists which focus on the implementation of norms within states.\(^{168}\) As those works focus more on a top-down direction of change based on a different structural context (e.g. asymmetry; coercion) than in this work, an in-depth consideration of the different approaches could only give an idea of possible paths but cannot clarify beforehand what will happen bottom-up. As such, the living part will inductively disclose why organizations have complied with Polish norms and identities. As compliance to norms occurs through identity redefinition, the concept of identity and its modernization becomes important for analysis. Considering all that has been said, one part of the living part is concerned with the detection of causes and mechanisms of Polish input and organizational effects. While talking about effects, the question which arises is how those effects, at the organizational level, are lived by the organizations which will in turn give an indication of the depth of the change. Secondly, this brings the focus to the organizations.

The literature presents several approaches on how to measure the influence of the socialization process\(^{170}\), and a variety of concepts on how to examine the causal influence of international norms while also respecting intervening variables like domestic norms\(^{171}\), the domestic salience of the norm or the domestic structural context\(^{172}\). The degree and the effects of the causal influence of norms on state behaviour are also operationalized in a variety of ways, ranging from formal imposition into domestic law to deep internalization. This all is grounded on a top-down perspective of change.

But before plunging into the theorization of the outcome let us recall how I define socialization. In this study, socialization is defined as ‘the process of inducting actors in the norms and rules of a given community and the induction of a given community with the norms and identity promoted by an actor’. Focusing on the ‘bottom-up’ approach, the outcome of the socialization process is then sustained by application of and compliance with the norms and the identity promoted by Poland at the organizational level. Schimmelfennig

\(^{165}\) Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999).
\(^{166}\) Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2002).
\(^{167}\) Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999).
\(^{168}\) See inter alia Risse, Thomas, and Sikkink, Kathryn (1999).
\(^{169}\) See Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999).
\(^{170}\) See fn 56, p.27.
distinguishes the gradual input of socialization processes as: a) normative effects and b) degree of internalization.\textsuperscript{173} I will adopt this distinction for the measurement of the outcome, as it allows me not only to investigate net behavioural changes according to norms, policies and identity but also the gradual dimension of internalization.

Normative effects are best measured in cognizance of the behaviour of the socializee – in this case both organizations. Thereby, I will analyze whether both organizations took over norm conceptions and policies (as political strategy) of Poland towards Ukraine in times of change and comport on behalf of it. If the norms and policies are internalized, then the behaviour of the organisations will follow a deep feeling of appropriateness. Normative effects are thereby best classified based on the conception of norms. As previously mentioned, a widely shared distinction of norms can be found between regulative and constitutive norms. From the regulative perspective, the effects of norms are measured with recognition of the behaviour of a state or the organization (socializee), and if this corresponds to the norm in question. The constitutive effect will reveal a change in the identity on the national or organizational level (level of the socializee).

The degree or depth of internalization may be analyzed in different ways. I will take insights from the Europeanization literature in order to analyze the depth of the process. Building on the assumption found in the Europeanization literature, that Europeanization is not absolute but as Featherstone points out ‘a matter of degree’\textsuperscript{174}, the measurement of the socialization process may also be investigated in gradual terms. For the measurement I will build upon the classification of Radaelli, discussing inertia, absorption and transformation.\textsuperscript{175} Thereby, inertia means that no alteration takes place. A precondition for inertia is a substantial misfit between Polish and organizational policy, norm or identity. Absorption represents a restrained adaptation without entraining a fundamental transformation. It represents a small and not fundamental form of adaptation, whereby the ideational nucleus remains untouched. Transformation characterizes the strongest effect. Thereby, the socializee completely changes its position.\textsuperscript{176}

Until now, the directions of change (bottom-up and top-down) and their effects are theorized. The mechanisms – as already mentioned – will thereby be uncovered by the empirical part of the study.

I consider the contestation of a norm to be an indicator for the depth of socialization. This brings in the notions of power and the validity of a norm and thus also the quality of a norm. It can be considered, that if a norm is not contested at all, the degree of internalization is high. Thus, the intersubjective knowledge is in line with the norm’s meaning. (This – in brackets – says nothing about the underlying mechanism leading to internalization: it could follow a path of self-socialisation or be the result of e.g. persuasion.) If a norm’s meaning is contested, then the degree of internalization is low. There can be contestation at the organizational and the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} See Schimmelfennig, Frank (2002), pp.9-11.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Featherstone, Kevin (2003), p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{175} See Radaelli, Claudio (2003), p.37. I leave aside a fourth dimension, namely retrenchment. Retrenchment describes a paradox effect in which national policy becomes less European as before. As a consequence, it is only useful in studies investigating socialization from a top-down perspective.
\item \textsuperscript{176} See Ibid., p.35.
\end{itemize}
national level. This perspective underlines the assumption in the literature, that a norm’s meaning) is not ‘just’ contested at the stage of emergence but also when a norm’s meaning) switches from one context to another. This leads to the consideration of a reflexive view on norms.

Having accessed the theoretical understanding of doing and living I will now turn to the presentation of how to apply the theoretical preloading into empirics.

2.1.6.3 Doing and Living and their Application in Empirics

The empirical part of the thesis covers a timeframe between 1989 and 2011. In a first analytical step, I will reconstruct the norms, identities and policies of the three agents (Poland, the EU and NATO) with respect to their relations with Ukraine, for the timeframe marking the end of communism until 1999. It is well-known that Poland did not access both organizations at the same time. There is a clash in the time of membership marking six years between accession to NATO (1999) and to the EU (2004). One may then argue that Poland did not formulate its foreign policy goals on a purely national level after entrance to NATO. But then one should consider that Poland already had a voice in the policy-making of the EU before formal accession. One may only think of the negotiations surrounding the Nice Treaty (NT) in 2001.

Reconstruction of norms, identities and policies of the three actors prior to Poland’s accession to both organizations is an important analytical step in constituting a starting point from whence to analyze change during the time after the accession. Reconstruction done in the first analytical phase does, however, not reconstitute the interactions of agents. Within the second analytical timeframe (between 2000 and 2011) I will reconstruct relations between the three actors and Ukraine and the conceptualization of core categories of the socialization process, namely norms and identities.

I now turn to the presentation of the socialization approach. As stated above, this dissertation is considered as part of the socialization literature. I present a socialization approach, which is constituted by two analytical steps: doing and living. The doing part summarizes the doings and practices of the agents with respect to relations with Ukraine. The living part then brings in insights from the conventional constructivist approach towards the process and looks then at the effects. As such, I do not understand socialization in terms of a pure measurement of compliance to a norm, but as the interactional process underlying the emergence or change of a norm and policy and also the effects measured along changes in the norms and identity of the agents. Therefore, the model of this work brings in a bidirectional perspective on socialization, which builds on a solid constructivist grounding but does not neglect rationalist assumptions on norms research.

179 See p.155.
2.1.6.3.1 Doing

After having reconstructed relations in the second timeframe including the case studies, I will summarize Polish doings with respect to penetration of the organizational level in the context of relations with Ukraine. The reconstruction of relations will reflect the Polish doings from a macro-perspective. Furthermore, I have chosen three discursive moments in the EU- and NATO-Ukrainian relations where Poland played an important role. Around these discursive moments, I will reconstruct the interactions and look on Polish doings from a micro-perspective. The doing part (from the micro-perspective) first reconstructs the discursive moment itself and then highlights the interactions of the agents. The interactional process is characterised by many meetings within which discussions take place. It is also characterized by different speeches, proclamations and programs which the agents in charge diffuse. The actors present their interests (which build on their identity or their utility) and try to further them by convincing other actors in the community. This study focuses on the Polish input within these processes and brings in the bottom-up perspective on socialization processes. It represents the moment of possible Polish input of genuine interests and policy approaches. The task is then to extract the tactics Poland is following while uploading its own interests at the organizational level. I have argued in the theoretical part, that norm or policy change in a Polish manner evolves through a routinized way of doing. In other words: the reason for a (new member) state’s – here Poland’s – input into norms comes from practice. I will summarize Polish doings in a separate part after having accomplished the reconstruction of relations of all actors.

2.1.6.3.2 Living

In the living part I will start with a reflection of the context and the time. Concerning the context, I will consider the setting, the institutional order of each organization and the frame of reference. The frame of reference means the intersubjective knowledge consisting of common interests and a common identity vis-à-vis the region in focus. I will extract this frame of reference from my fourth chapter, which traces back to the interests and identities of the three agents with respect to Ukraine. The notion of time is understood in both meanings. First, the discursive event as such represents a historical setting, which I will reflect. Second, time also introduces the notion of pressure on agents while interacting and struggling over the fixing of a norm or political strategy.

I have argued in the theoretical part that Polonization comes along with a pinch of power. This is the moment where the concept of power comes in analytically. Generally speaking, at this point in analyzes, ideas and interests were transformed into norms or policy by means of (certain) mechanisms which led other actors within the community to socialize with the norm and policy. In this study, it is the ‘task’ of the empirical part to find out whose interests were furthered and who had the power to cause changes. The most important effect or outcome of this phase is therefore the fixing of a norm’s meaning) at the organizational level. But how do institutionalization of ideational factors and power relate to each other?

180 See for a description of actors who are part of foreign policy-making in Poland, EU and NATO chapter 3.
181 Utility is here – of course – considered through constructivist lenses. See pp.19f.
The respect of power brings us to the consideration of norms, policies and identities of the three agents which existed before Poland adhered to the given organizations. As already noted, I understand power in its relational definition and not as ‘power-as-resource’. I go along with Baldwin’s definition of power measurement. I expect that the probability of the socializee’s compliance and the speed with which it complies to new norms and policies are relative to the convergence or divergence of norms, policies and identity the three agents have held on their own. In other words: if the frame of reference of the three agents had converged on some issues in former times, one could expect that the socializee will comply very quickly with the socializer’s institutionalized ideational factors. Thereby, socialization will follow a mechanism of self-socialization. The costs vis-à-vis the ideational utility may be measured with regard to the identity of each actor. If the identities are similar, then the ideational utility is high. The number of options for the socializee relates to the different viewpoints presented during the interactional phase. If very few viewpoints exist, the socializee will probably comply quickly. If, in contrast, a contrary picture results, the power of the agent will be high.

I expect that the mechanism of self-socialization will be dominant if the frame of reference is identical towards a norm or policy approach in question. If the intersubjective knowledge within the community is not the same, and thus contestation occurs, I expect other mechanisms (e.g. convincing or even pressuring) to occur.

The second phase looks at the effects, and thus examines the application at the organizational level. I will look at a time after the Polish doings and evaluate the effects of socialisation along two dimensions: (a) the normative effects and (b) the degree of internalisation. As described in the theoretical part of this work, I divide normative effects in regulative and constitutive effects, the former examining the behaviour of an actor while the latter looks at differences in the identity of an agent. I will evaluate shifts in the identity construction in comparison to the identity construction before Polish accession to both organizations. Turning to the depth of socialization, I will evaluate it in relation to the contestation of the norm if possible.

Having plunged deeply into a theoretical reflection of all the concepts which come into play while talking about Polonization, I will describe now the methodology and method of the study.

2.2 Methodology and Method

The research design of a work always consists of a triangular interconnection between philosophical world-views (ontological and epistemological assumptions), strategies of inquiry (qualitative, quantitative or mixed-methods) and a concrete research tool. Having introduced the ontological and epistemological assumptions in the theoretical part of the thesis, this chapter explains precisely the strategy of how to examine the Polonization of both organizations. I divide the chapter into three parts. First, I start by describing the method choice of this work, before turning second to the methodology – the kind of meta-theoretical

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assumptions underlying the qualitative frame of this work. Finally, I describe the method – content analysis – and highlight its place within the approach followed by Philipp Mayring.

2.2.1 Method Choice

The number of methods available for the social science inquiry is large and the decision to choose one amongst them is based on a diverse set of considerations shaped by “aims, epistemological concerns, and norms of practice (...) [and] thus also influenced by organizational, historical, political, ethical, evidential, and personal factors”\textsuperscript{183}. This contextualization of method choice makes this part of the work an exhausting step to pursue. In order to narrow down the complexity of choice considerations, I will focus on the research purpose in order to choose a concrete and just method. As Kathy Charmaz puts forward, “Let your research problem shape the methods you choose”\textsuperscript{184}. As described in the previous chapter the purpose of my work is twofold. First, I want to examine the Polonization of the EU and NATO and thus the input of Poland as a prominent middle-range power on both organizations. Second, I seek to develop a socialization approach which is valid \textit{after} enlargement of an organization. Three conclusions can be drawn out from this study and the underlying theoretical assumptions already made in the previous chapter for method choice.

First, the study of Polonization and thus the socialization of the EU and NATO in a Polish manner after enlargement means the investigation of a dynamic process and not the inquiry of a static moment. Hence, the study of Polonization means the study of a process. In this respect, this thesis focuses on the changes of norms and identity of the EU and NATO vis-à-vis Ukraine over a period of about twelve (NATO) and seven (EU) years. Hence, it examines the process of the constructed nature of reality due to social interaction and the underlying qualitative changes. But, without explanation and comprehension, the work would have “a similar status to an empirically observed correlation”\textsuperscript{185}. In order to explain why and how changes took place, I will look for the underlying patterns of interaction that enabled the transformation. This is where \textit{mechanisms} complement the study of the process. The theoretical part of this thesis has already revealed the possibility of change (in a Polish manner) related to the power Poland holds in a certain domain. Having in mind that Poland is a middle-range power, the notion and the study of power remains essential for this study. One way in which to study power relations is to “focus on the discursive moves that actors make in context”\textsuperscript{186}. Again – and thus also for the study of power – context plays a role and has to be considered. In both steps, this work seeks to discover patterns of practices, which are understood as mechanisms. John Lofland and his colleagues suggest six ways for extracting patterns in a research field: frequencies, magnitudes, structures, processes, causes and consequences.\textsuperscript{187} I will keep in mind these six characteristics while investigating the patterns of practices.

\textsuperscript{184} Charmaz, Kathy (2008), p.15.
\textsuperscript{185} Langley, Ann (2010), p.418.
\textsuperscript{186} Clegg, Stewart (2010), p.143.
\textsuperscript{187} See Lofland, John (2006), pp.149-65.
Second, looking from a macro-perspective on relations between all three actors and Ukraine and from a micro-perspective on specific moments in relations towards Ukraine, this dissertation is highly contextual and time-bound and thus traces back historical processes. Since every meaning relates to the whole in a reflexive way, the meaning of a subject is only understandable by relation to the context. With this perspective, the consideration of the context is important because indexical terms like ‘it’ or ‘that’ or ‘this’ could only be understood in context. Thus, the respect of the context permits an understanding of the process of Polonization in a reflexive way. I argue thus that the mechanisms occurring in the process of Polonization do not follow a certain logic in a linear way but function in a manner of a spiral with mutuality of influences at work. The latter argument respects the reflexivity of subject and analysis and thus the context-boundedness (and the power relations) of each meaning.

Third, this work builds on core constructivist theoretical assumptions but keeps a principal openness for the development of a theoretical framework which focuses on socialization after enlargement of an organization. The purpose of this work is thus to understand the phenomenon of Polonization from the insight respecting the reflexivity of the whole process. The criterion mentioned asks mainly for a qualitative methodological approach. In order to explain this choice, I will in the next step, highlight the methodological implications of the qualitative paradigm and reflect on it with a quantitative method choice.

### 2.2.2 Methodology

While looking for an empirical approach, the inquirer decides mainly between a quantitative and a qualitative research strategy. Every approach has its advantages and its inconveniences. Generally, while quantitative methods rely on metrical variables and the use of statistical analysis, qualitative methods refer to the measurement of qualities, hence no metrical characteristics. Thus, the first difference relates to the unit of inquiry. Studying socialization as an enduring process after enlargement and thus a qualitative change in norms and identity, the unit of inquiry of this work is a non-metrical variable and asks for a qualitative approach. Second, a difference exists in the purpose of investigation. While the purpose of quantitative approaches is mainly object-related and tries to explain (erklären), qualitative paradigms relate mainly to the subject and seek via a process of interpretation to understand (verstehen). Explanatory research frames take reality as a natural given with an underlying legitimacy and seek to explain causality via those natural laws. ‘Understandatory’ research frames, on the contrary, take reality as a social given, thus constituted and interpreted through people. Consequently, facts are not natural evidences but phenomena which gain their significance through social interactions. This work focuses on the doings of actors within the

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188 See Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.22.
190 We are in a time beyond a net debate of the epistemological and philosophical advantages and disadvantages of each approach. The discussion focuses nowadays on the practice oriented use of each approach. This is also reflected in the increasing attention paid to the mixed-method approach. See e.g. Flick, Uwe (2010), pp.53f.
191 See e.g. Mayring, Philipp (2010), p.17.
patterns of practices (doing) and the constructed nature of identity (living) and thus aims to understand the constituted nature via the process of reconstruction and interpretation. Thus the purpose of this work refers to a qualitative research design. A third difference between the two approaches relates to the underlying epistemologies and ontologies. While a quantitative research frame is mainly interconnected with a positivist or post-positivist world-view, a qualitative research frame relies principally on constructivist assumptions. The theoretical part of this work revealed that this work looks through thick constructivist lenses. Thus the epistemological and ontological assumptions of this work ask for a qualitative research frame too. It should also be noted that even if the empirical part of this work builds on theoretical assumptions (thus a certain vision of the world), I keep an open mind to the development of the theoretical model; thereby openness is a characteristic of a qualitative work. Thus, the procedure of this work is not a deductive one examining a theoretical frame, but an inductive one, specifying bottom-up directions of change for the socialization literature.

So far, I explained the choice for a qualitative research frame. Notwithstanding the decision for a qualitative approach does not exclude quantitative steps if both approaches are not understood as totally antithetic. In this manner Isadore Newman and Carolyn Benz argue that a “continuum including both methodologies is most effective”. A mixed-methods research approach thus overcomes the view of incompatibility of both paradigms, combining them in such a way that the strength of the work is greater than that being offered by just one approach. In this manner, quantitative and qualitative methods can be triangulated, combined in a complementary way. One approach can be developed or initiated from the former or research can be expanded due to a research problem in empirics. In spite of the advantages of a mixed-method approach, one critique points to the illegitimate combination of epistemological positions. In this perspective Alan Bryman counters this by saying that “methods are not necessarily associated with particular epistemologies; it is the use that is made of them that is crucial”. In his view it is thus the use of methods which link them to epistemological and ontological issues and not the method(s) per se.

Non approach is free of criticism. The biggest critique made of the qualitative research approach relates to the validity, reliability and objectivity of such empirical work, thus touching on the qualitative dimension of scientific work. It should be noted that the criterion for good scientific work differs between qualitative and quantitative research traditions. While quantitative paradigms rely on objectivity of data collection and interpretation, theory-dependence and statistical generalization of the findings, qualitative research approaches

193 Of course, there exist further epistemological and ontological sets of beliefs (that guide action) which mainly ask for one of these two methodological approaches (or for both). Nevertheless it is not the purpose of this part of the work to present an exhausted list of worldviews with the corresponding research approach but to emphasize the main characteristics of a qualitative frame which is used here. See for further elaborations on the relationship between worldviews and research approaches e.g. Creswell, John W. (2009), pp.5-11.; Flick, Uwe (2010), pp.81-105.
194 See for the notions of openness and closeness Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), pp.19f. and 229f.
197 See Bryman, Alan (2010), pp.522-525; Flick, Uwe (2010), pp.42-54.
focus on the reconstruction of meaning, exploration of cultural practices and rules and in-depth interpretation of single cases. The quantitative tradition developed a standardized variety of procedures elaborating how to validate the findings and thus to keep the work scientific. Notions which are very common with this perspective are the notions of validity, reliability, objectivity and representativeness. Due to the (different) paradigmatic frame of qualitative work (context- and subject-boundedness, focus on interaction and interpretative process) and the variety of methods available for qualitative empirical work, such a standardized catalogue of criteria is hard to record.

Ines Steinke identifies three different camps in the literature reviewing quality criteria of scientific qualitative work. The first camp transfers quantitative criteria on qualitative research by reformulation and reoperationalization of criteria. Uwe Flink speaks in this context of an implicit combination of research methods, thus already a mixed-method approach. The second camp defines its own criteria for qualitative research like ecological validity – the validity due to the natural setting of data collection; the communicative validation – the validity due to re-questioning of the interview partner in order to validate own interpretations; and the triangulation of methods, data and researchers. The third post-modern camp revises any criteria. To revise any criteria bears the danger of arbitrariness. From this perspective one could question the scientific character of qualitative work. To validate my findings, I combine the insights of the first two camps. With this perspective, I use the notions of validity and reliability from the quantitative tradition and nurture them with a qualitative dimension. By doing so, I take up my own criteria of qualitative work. In the next part, I pick up the three quality criteria and transfer their function to the qualitative camp.

In the quantitative tradition, validity is understood as the degree of accuracy with which a certain method explores a focused characteristic. In other words, validity explores the consequential inferences from scores on instruments. Qualitative empirical research sometimes lacks methodological implications. Therefore the critique lies in the lack of reproducibility of the findings. Thus, findings are criticized as having a “Prima-facie” validity. But qualitative validity means also to verify “the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures”. In order to validate my findings and to establish authenticity and credibility, I will use the following procedures. First, by respecting the notions of time and context I will offer a textured description of the settings in order to establish a quasi-natural and real shared experience with the reader. This will help the reader to understand my interpretations. Second, I will triangulate different data sources in order to establish a realistic view of the setting.

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200 See Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.130.
204 See Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.139f.
to be able to examine a coherent justification for the themes.\textsuperscript{208} Third, due to my participation in different conferences and colloquiums, I have shared my findings with other researchers and accommodated different reviews of my findings. This peer debriefing enhanced the accuracy of my findings.\textsuperscript{209}

In the quantitative tradition, \textit{reliability} relates to the stability and the accuracy of research (measurement), the consistent research conditions and the systematic assignation of values.\textsuperscript{210} Hence, it explores the degree of accuracy within which a certain method examines an object. This presumes a certain stability of research conditions. Qualitative research, however, keeps a certain degree of openness during the whole research process. The back and forth between theory, method and data interpretation is the normal way of doing qualitative research. This circularity of research reasoning is an advantage of the qualitative paradigm because it leads the researcher to reflect on the steps of analysis in light of the research question and the other steps in a permanent way.\textsuperscript{211} Because of the non-static characteristic of qualitative work, reliability characteristics from the quantitative tradition are difficult to transfer on to a qualitative frame. Instead of the replication of research conditions, qualitative research builds on the context-boundedness of interpretation. In a qualitative frame, inter-subjectivity is not the result of certain stability conditions (quantitative tradition) but hence attained through context-boundedness. The aim of qualitative work is thus not the reduction of complexity by extracting certain variables but the growth of complexity through the respect of context. I respect the context in a permanent manner by describing the setting relations among all three actors that took place. In the macro-perspective, the context will be slipped in permanently into the description; in the micro-perspective special attention will be paid to the context of a case.

Additionally, I will enforce the inter-subjectivity by the précised description of my method (2.2) which will allow the reader to comprehend my steps in the empirical part of the work. Besides the criterion of intersubjectivity, I will follow a procedural reliability criterion proposed by Graham Gibbs. With this perspective I will make sure that no drifts in the definition of categories, as well as in the meaning of the categories, occur during the process of categorizing. This will be accomplished by the constant comparison of documents and

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\textsuperscript{208} From a constructivist viewpoint triangulation does not necessarily increase the validity of a work. From this view the different (triangulated) perspectives construct own life-worlds which are not necessarily combinable. See Flick, Uwe (2010b). From this perspective it is important to underline that triangulation does only increase the validity of the findings if the triangulated data, researchers, theories or methods focus on the same unit and do not examine different aspects of the subject. In the latter case, triangulation does not increase validity. I argue that the constructivist critique may be valid for the triangulation of researchers, theories and methods. Different researchers, theories and methods have different backgrounds (cultural, epistemological and ontological) and therefore create different world-lives. This can lead to a different aspect investigation within the subject in question. The triangulation of data sources however is aspect bound. Therefore I consider data triangulation to be an excellent procedure in order to increase the validity of the work.


\textsuperscript{210} See Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.149.

\textsuperscript{211} See e.g. Flick, Uwe (2010), pp.123-127.
\end{flushleft}
Finally, the circularity of qualitative research will help to permanently recheck the accuracy of research conditions.

Having clarified the methodological paradigm and implications of a qualitative frame, I turn now to the notion of the method and hence the specific inquiry tool of this work.

2.2.3 Content Analysis

Qualitative empirical work is characterized by a wide methodical range. One may distinguish between case studies, qualitative interviews, group discussions, content analysis, participant observation, qualitative experiments or biographical methods. This work examines the Polish input on norm and identity change in the EU and NATO. Practically, the best way would be to gain access to key decision-making and issue-addressing meetings, in which the agents talk thoroughly about the issues. As those meetings take place behind closed doors I will focus my study on the examination of recorded and published sources. Via the interpretation of these texts – understood as a written protocol of common linguistic communication – I will be able to reconstruct the socialization process through the presented two-step procedure of doing and living. I consider content analysis – understood as the “study of recorded human communication” – as an excellent inquiry tool in order to fulfil the purpose of my work for the following argument,

“Within what people say and write they express their purposes, intentions, interpretations of situations, their knowledge and their tacit assumptions about the environment. These purposes, attitudes etc. are codetermined by the socio-cultural system the speakers and writers are part of and therefore they do not only reflect personal characteristics of the authors but also characteristics of the society – institutionalised values, norms, socially transmitted definitions of situations etc. The analysis of linguistic material allows therefore to infer on individual and societal non-linguistic phenomenons.”

The quote reveals that qualitative content analysis allows examining meanings and significations which lie behind pure linguistic patterns. This observation is of high importance, while reconstructing identities and practices. As the theoretical part of the work has revealed, identities are constructed through actions and interactions of actors in contexts and are based on sets of beliefs, ideas, rules and norms that reflexive selves follow. Thus, identities may be reconstructed through analysis of actions, interactions and communication; thereby identities may be identified behind what is visible. Considering the source of interaction and communication, content analysis offers one great opportunity to study these processes. Accordingly, practices rely on an outside which can be approached by interpreting linguistic material.

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213 This definition goes back to Schütze 1977 cited by Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.447.
216 The selectivity concerning the object of investigation is a core critique made on quantitative content analysis. In this manner it is argued that the latter approach does not examine all of a communication and neglects what lies behind the text. See e.g. Atteslander, Peter (2008), p.188.
In this perspective, content analysis allows to extract purposes, intentions or interests of agents, which on the one hand, relate to the identity of an actor, but on the other hand, shed light on norms and practices. The last remark is of special interest, especially when I reconstruct the deeds of the three agents in the light of practices through the interpretations of documents. Looking behind the purely said allows reconstruction of the doings within the contexts relative to norms. Because respecting what lies behind the linguistic patterns means that the approach respects the context-boundedness of communication. As Klaus Merten puts forward, “content analysis is a method for the inquiry of social reality within which the researcher infers from apparent characteristics of the text to the non-apparent characteristics of the context”\textsuperscript{217}. The notion of context-boundedness thus respects the fact that communication is not produced in a void room but in a specific environment and in a specific situation.\textsuperscript{218} Hence, communication is context bound and always happens in a certain context. So far, it can be seen that content analysis examines the substance of communication, which represents individual and social behaviour or action and tacit background (relying on norms and identity). As the former observations were exposed, content analysis allows looking aside linguistic patterns on what lies behind the visible. In order to account in analytical terms for this distinction, I differentiate between explicit and implicit communication contents.\textsuperscript{219} When I talk about explicit communication contents, I mean linguistic patterns like e.g. nouns and adjectives. Implicit communication contents refer thereby to non-linguistic phenomena. The latter reference builds on the assumption that assertions made in texts led indirectly to the conclusion of the socio-cultural background of reality (also identity) whose products they are by themselves and within, in which they exert their influence. By respecting the context and interpreting what lies behind the text, scientific qualitative content analysis seeks to understand (verstehen) a phenomenon and not only to explain (erklären) it. In other words, content analysis can be described as a scientifically controlled comprehension.

The question of scholarliness is thereby the core critique from the quantitative camp on the method of content analysis. With regard to the inductive procedure, a qualitative strategy follows quantitative working scholars who criticize the findings of a single case, which can hardly be generalized. Qualitative working scholars counter the aim of qualitative work. It is not generalization but typification – understood as the identification of sets of behavioral patterns in a specific field. The latter argument takes two observations into consideration. First, for social reality, it is insignificant how many people behave according to a pattern (quantitative aim of generalization). In other words, social reality exists independently of numerical arguments. Second, qualitative scholars respect the fact that findings or patterns are scientific constructions, which do not necessarily find further counterparts in the empirical world. In other words, the interpretation of texts leads to the understanding of a specific case,


\textsuperscript{218} See Atteslander, Peter (2008), p.182.

\textsuperscript{219} In this regard, Earl Babbie speaks of a manifest and a latent content. By manifest content he means the visible surface content whereby latent content refers to the underlying meaning. See Babbie, Earl (2010), p.338. I prefer the dichotomy of implicit and explicit communication content for the following etymological reason: Latent means that something is hidden and possibly there. The notion of implicit stresses thereby that something is included and can be logically interpreted. Thus, the notion of implicit includes the reality of a socio-cultural background whereby the notion of latent is vaguer and stresses the possibility of the existence of the same. See Kraif, Ursula et al. (2007), pp.443 and 589.
which is, due to the context very singular.\textsuperscript{220} Hence, the aim of typification is the reduction of a complex social reality and the comprehension is the same.\textsuperscript{221} With this perspective, my aim is, on the one hand, to reconstruct the input of a middle-range power on organizations. In this manner, I reduce a complex social reality and try, along this typification, to understand the underlying process. But according to the second purpose of the work, on the other hand, I generalize the findings by constructing a socialization model valid after enlargement with a special focus on middle-range powers. Therefore the critique of scholarliness becomes obsolete in the frame of my work.

Besides the respect of the context and the interpretation of the background (invisible), which are crucial for analyzing the socialization process after enlargement, content analysis offers some further advantages. First, linguistic patterns in the texts, which are interpreted in the process of content analysis, keep everlasting repeatable. Hence, I can return to assertions in cases of doubt and repeat a part of the study, which is not feasible with other methods. This allows the potential correction of errors. Therefore, concerning the outcome it is unimportant if the content of communication is transferred directly (via immediate social contact) or indirectly (via texts) to the recipient.\textsuperscript{222}

A second advantage is that content analysis permits the study of processes taking place over a long period of time. As I examine processes taking place for seven/fourteen/(EU) and nine/thirteen (NATO) years\textsuperscript{223}, content analysis represents an excellent inquiry tool in order to study this phenomenon.

A third advantage is the separation of method and object. In this respect, content analysis does not have any effects on the object studied. Speeches from politicians, documents and articles are already been made and written. Thus I, as the researcher, cannot influence the recorded data. A disadvantage of content analysis is its limitation to the examination of only recorded communication. But on the other hand, the recorded characteristic of the material and also the concreteness of the material allows for enhanced validity and the reliability of the analytical procedure.\textsuperscript{224} It becomes clear that beyond being solely a technique for research, a method does also frame the “data window”\textsuperscript{225}. Content analysis refers to already recorded and written data from which the researcher interprets processes in the light of the visible and invisible. Considering the so far considered documents, articles and review articles offer excellent sources for the investigation and reconstruction of the input of Poland into the norms and identities of the given organizations.

\textsuperscript{220} See Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.465.
\textsuperscript{221} See Kelle, Udo, and Kluge, Susann (2010), p.10.
\textsuperscript{222} See Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.436.
\textsuperscript{223} The numbers relate to the two different analytical time frames. In the case of EU, the first analytical part covers the time between 1990 and 2004, the second analytical part is concerned with the time between 2004 and 2011. In the case of NATO the first analytical part deals with the years from 1990 until 1999 and the second one covers the time from 1999 until 2011.
\textsuperscript{224} See for advantages and disadvantages of content analysis Babbie, Earl (2010), p.344.
In this work, I will follow the analytical approach of Mayring. The method was worked out in the course of a research project.\(^\text{226}\) It offers a methodological toolbox which can be adjusted as a tailored solution for any investigation. The flexibility of the approach offers me the conceptual openness to select those methodological steps, which after the reading of theoretical concepts, became important in order to reconstruct the Polonization process of the EU and NATO. In consequence, I present the following, the analytical road map of Mayring, and adapt it to my research problem.

### 2.2.3.1 Content Analysis of Philipp Mayring

Mayring defines content analysis as “the analysis of material that comes from any type of communication”\(^\text{227}\). However, he underlines that any definition for the method of content analysis is hard to make, since the method does not only explore the content of communication but goes far beyond it. Hence, Mayring respects interpretation through the context-boundness of documents. Mayring puts his approach under the methodological umbrella of qualitative work. However, he uses the advantage of certain quantitative steps and incorporates them in his approach. His purpose is not the construction of a pure qualitative method but of one that stays – due to analytical rules and steps – systematic and interpretable.\(^\text{228}\) As the exact description of analytical steps increases the inter-subjectivity and interconnection of the researcher and the reader and delimits the core critiques of validity and reliability from the quantitative camp, Mayring proposes a ten-step procedure which may be summarized under five categories:

**A. Fixing of the material**

1. Definition of the material
2. Analysis of the context of genesis
3. Formal characteristics of the material

**B. Research question**

4. Direction of analysis (author, socio-cultural background, effect,…)
5. Theory guided differentiation of the research question

**C. Model of analysis**

6. Definition of the adequate technique of analysis (summarization, explication, structuration) or a combination
   - Definition of the course of analysis
   - Definition of the categories
7. Definition of the analytical entities (coding, context and interpretative entities)

**D. Analysis**

8. Analysis (according to the model (summarization, explication and structuration) and using the defined categories)

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\(^{226}\) In the course of a DFG (Germany’s largest research funding organization) – project “cognitive control in crisis situations: unemployment of teachers” researchers conducted open interviews with 75 unemployed teachers. Within a timeframe of one year the unemployed teachers were interviewed seven times. The burden and the handling patterns were reconstructed in a relative way to the biographical experiences of the teachers. See Mayring, Philipp (2010), p.52.

\(^{227}\) [Translated by D.P.-H.] Ibid., p.11.

E. Interpretation and validation

9. Summary of the findings and interpretation in direction to the research question

10. Application of the qualitative criterion

1. Definition of the material: First, the researcher should delimit the total of the material. The data corpus should only be expanded or changed if really necessary. Thereby the researcher collects only those texts which refer directly to the research question. In order to define the correct material it is important to distinguish between the units of analysis and the units of observation. This issue should be made clear “because sample selection depends largely on what the unit of analysis is”231. The purpose of the work is to study Polonization of the EU and NATO; more concretely as the input of Poland into norms and identities (in relation to Ukraine) of the given organizations is understood. Thus, the units of analysis are the doings of the three actors according to Ukraine, which are reflected in the patterns of practice and are very much norm-bound, with the reconstructed identities. The unit of observation is represented on the organizational and the individual level. With this perspective, I will examine three different data sources:

1. Strategic/official papers of the given organizations and Poland (treating the policies towards Ukraine)
2. Speeches from politicians (in charge of the definition of foreign policy)
3. Analyzes from independent institutions (think tanks, scientific works)

The triangulation of this sampling of data will increase the validity of the analysis because all data sources investigate the same object.

2. Analysis of the context of genesis: Mayring emphasizes that the condition under which the material was produced should be specified. In my work, I distinguish between analysis in the macro- and micro-perspective. In the macro-perspective part of analysis, I continuously inform on the context by describing precisely the evolution of relations and by pointing to internal and external developments of the three actors and Ukraine. In the micro-perspective, I pay singular attention to the notion of the singular context. The investigation of case studies offers me the analytical playground for an in-depth consideration of the specific context (which is not feasible for the consideration of a long period of time) and creates, as such, a quasi-shared experience with the reader.

3. Formal characteristics of the material: Within this analytical step, the researcher defines the form of the text for analysis. This can be e.g. a written form or a transcription. My analysis is based on written texts so that additional characteristics like observational comments become insignificant.

230 See Ibid., p.52f.
233 See Ibid., p.53.
4. **Direction of analysis:** In this step of the analytical procedure, the researcher defines the aim of analysis. Analysis can focus on the subject of the text, the author’s intention, the (socio-cultural) background or the effects of the text on the recipients. I further point out that analysis may also focus on the structural background, which is understood as a sub-category of background.

In order to investigate the Polonization of the EU and NATO, the direction of analysis will be generally an intersection of all four analytical directions. The specific purpose of direction will depend on the kind of data and the phase of analysis. I am focusing on the strategic *doing* phase – strategic and official papers of the three actors (Type I of data sources), speeches from politicians (Type II of data sources) and analysis from independent institutions (Type III of data sources). I will focus on three analytical directions, namely the author’s intentions, which is assumed to be based on identity and interests, on the background, which is assumed to be based on practices and norms, and on the subject of the text, which is the relation towards Ukraine in general. Concentrating on the *living* phase, the analysis will focus on all four directions of analysis. Thereby the focus on interests (assumed to inform the author’s intention) becomes obsolete as the attention then lies on the concept of identity. This all said, it refers to the second empirical part where I reconstruct the *doing* and *living* of socialization. The first empirical part is thereby concerned with the reconstruction of norms, identities and practices of the three actors towards Ukraine in the time from 1989 until 2000. This establishes a ‘status quo’ from where to analyze changes. Generally, aims of analysis stay similar whereby no socialization processes are analyzed. Therefore, the aim of analyzing the effects of the text on recipients becomes obsolete.

5. **Theory guided differentiation of the research question:** At this point in research, the scientist ties the research question to theoretical implications already made in a specific field. Mayring stresses that some qualitative working scholars completely refuse a theory guided working style. The requirement from the latter is the net inductive exploration of a theory. But it should be noted that no work is theory-free. Every work builds on assumptions about a version of reality (which is nurtured by the socio-cultural and scientific background of an author) and builds thus to a certain degree on a theoretical preloading. Therefore Mayring proposes to abandon the restricting understanding of theory and to comprehend it as general sentences about an investigated topic or subject. If the research question is then tied on to the known theoretical assumptions, it retains openness for further development.

This work builds on theoretical assumptions on different concepts (socialization, norm, identity, practice, power), which were reviewed and tied to my ideas and my approach. Thus, after reading and working on the concepts, I kept an open mind while analyzing and let the

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235 This aspect is important for this study as norms are understood in a large sense as structures that inform the doings of agents.
236 As Poland did not yet input on the organizational level.
238 March Trachtenberg argues that no work is theory free, thus relies on a general sense for how things are supposed to work. See Trachtenberg, Marc (2007), vii Preface.
empirical part ‘speak’ to my approach. After the first run through the documents, I constructed a socialization model, which is valid after enlargement of an organization.

6. Definition of the adequate technique for analysis: In order to account for accuracy of the method of content analysis, Mayring devises the definition of analytical entities. Babbie adds, with this perspective, that content analysis is mainly a coding operation whereby coding is understood as “the process of transforming raw data into a standardized form”. The core coding parts of Mayring’s approach are categories. These concept groups: happenings, meanings, objects and actions/interactions, are conceptually similar in nature. Therefore, it should be noted that the setting of a category system is a core quantitative step. Within this procedure, characteristics of a text and thus of a communication content are grouped and accordingly transferred into numerical data. Thereby a distinction exists in the manner of the definition of categories relative to a quantitative or a qualitative view on this procedure. From a qualitative stance, categories are features of a text that the researcher extracts through the first reading of the material and that allow description of the text. Thus, categories are generated inductively. From a quantitative standpoint, categories are defined according to a selection criterion that relates to the theory and the research question. In this tradition, categories are defined deductively. Mayring proposes to define categories in the back and forth between theory and material. This implies a combination of a deductive (quantitative) and an inductive (qualitative) procedure.

In this study, I explore the Polonization of the EU and NATO. As the empirical part represents the ‘analytical playground’ to explore the socialization model, categories result from the theoretical part.

For the current study, this means that according to the theoretical part and having in mind the direction of analysis, the following categories are defined:

I. Norm
II. Identity (assumed to stand in a mutually constituting relationship with interests)
III. Practice
IV. Concrete deeds
V. Mechanisms
VI. Power

Peter Atteslander points to the problems of validity and reliability (of categories) which can occur in the coding process. With this perspective, validity asks if the categories measure

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240 See Ibid., p.401.
241 See Ibid., p.401.
243 In this regard, Babbie stresses that both research methods should be combined in the process of the conceptualization and the operationalization. See Babbie, Earl (2010), p.339.
244 Before the first reading of documents I kept an openness for further categories. But no other categories emerged from empirics.
245 The list does not follow a hierarchical order.
what they are intended to examine. Validity depends therefore on the specification of the category system and on the question regarding whether the category system is plausible and suitable for the question in focus. In order to achieve high validity in the coding process, I will continuously recheck my coding entities with the given theory and the question. This procedure reflects a qualitative working style. The reliability of the coding process is a matter of whether the researcher extracts the same coding entities through a repeated application of the coding process to the same material. Reliability is relatively easy to test if research is done in a group. With this perspective, intercoder reliability means the difference of coding of two or more researchers. When research is done alone, intracoder reliability refers to the difference of coding one researcher has while reading the documents twice. In order to achieve a high reliability of the coding process, I rerun the coding process.

After having clarified the categories, an adequate interpretative procedure has to be found. Mayring distinguishes between three types of interpretative procedures: (1) summarization, (2) explication and (3) structuration. He adds that every study asks for a single emphasis of one of these procedures, which relates to the research question. With this in mind, I explain the three interpretative procedures and adjust them to my research.

(1) **Summarization** means the reduction of the material through abstraction to the point that the corpus still represents the basic material. The underlying principle is the definition of a level of abstraction. Through the procedures of omission, generalization, construction, integration, selection and bundling, assertions are made which paraphrase the basic material. These abstract paraphrases are subsumed under certain categories. The procedure of summarization contains the following interpretative rules:

a. **paraphrasing**: elimination of all textual parts which are meaningless like repetitions and clarifications.

b. **generalization** on a level of abstraction: in cases of doubts theoretical presumptions should guide the research.

c. **first reduction**: elimination of paraphrases which are meaningless for the research question and selection of those paraphrases which are central to the study.

d. **second reduction**: bundling and integration (construction) of paraphrases with equal subjects to one paraphrase. In cases of doubt, theoretical presumptions should guide the research.

My research examines a large amount of material. Therefore, I did not analyze the texts with the accuracy described above. Mayring himself proposes in this case a summary of some analytical steps. Thus, I will concentrate on the passages which relate to my research topic and immediately generalize textual parts under a certain category. I will reduce those parts

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247 Reliability however does not ensure correctness. Even if the coding process was reliable and led to the same findings by applying a particular technique repeatedly to the same object, the findings may be false in themselves. See for this bias Babbie, Earl (2010), p.150.
249 See Atteslander, Peter (2008), p.191f.
250 See Mayring, Philipp (2010), p.69.
(one step of reduction) which are meaningless and bundle those which relate to a similar topic.

(2) **Explication** includes the use of additional material in order to deepen the understanding of a textually unclear part, hence to explicate it, and to allow an interpretation. A starting point for explication is the lexical and grammatical definition of the unclear passage. If the author of the text has thereby changed the original meaning, the researcher makes use of the context in order to explicate the passage. Mayring differentiates between a narrow and a wide context analysis. A narrow context analysis allows one to look for additional material related to the unclear expression that can be found in the same text, whereas a wide context analysis looks for additional material beyond the text. Mayring subdivides the interpretative procedure into seven steps, which I describe briefly before I adapt them to my own research.

a. **Definition of the textual part** that asks for further explication.
b. **Lexical and grammatical definition**: Check if the lexical and the grammatical analysis already allows for clear understanding of a part of the text
c. **Definition of additional explicatory material**: This step interrelates with steps d and e. The researcher defines the character of additional material.
d. **Narrow context analysis**: Sampling of all sections of the text that relate to the unclear passage. These can be describing, explanatory, correcting or antithetical parts.
e. **Wider context analysis**: Allows use of further material that goes beyond the text. This can include e.g. further information about the author of the text, information concerning the origin of the text, theoretical assumptions applied in order to explain the passage and the relation of the passage to the entire text.
f. **Summary of the additional material and formulation of a paraphrase**.
g. **Introduction** of the paraphrase in the text and check if the paraphrase fits into the text. If the paraphrase does not fit into the passage the researcher should repeat the whole procedure. This procedure is a highly important step, used in order to clarify uncertain passages and to allow a contextual explanation and comprehension. In cases of unclear parts, I will run through steps a to d. It should be noted that in order to comprehend a switch in the meaning, good knowledge of the language (of the text) is an essential precondition. My documents are written in Polish, German and English. I am used to writing, reading and speaking in all three languages. If the steps a to d will not explicate an unclear passage, I will use the wider context analysis. The kind of material which I will use for the last step depends on the form of the source itself. In a first analytical move, I will put the source into the historical setting and look for a relationship between the unknown passage and the occurrences. In a second step, I will use theoretical assumptions in order to understand the passage. This can be very helpful in regard to the notions of norm and identity reconstruction.

(3) **Structuration** means the detection of a certain structure within the material. Central to this interpretative procedure is the primary designation of categories. The uncovered structure consists then of a certain constellation of categories. The definition of a category system
relates thereby to the research question and the aim of the research. With this perspective, the researcher can structure the text according to the following characteristics:\(^{251}\):

a. **Formal structuration**; explores the inner structure of the material according to formal criteria like syntactical or argumentative characteristics.

b. **Structuration in regard to the content**; extracts, summarizes and structures the material according to specific themes, content and aspects.

c. **Typifying structuration**; groups distinctive features (and patterns) in the text according to different types.

d. **Scaling structuration**; defines textual features according to points on a scale.

In the following, I describe the structuration modes of this work. In the course of analysis, I will make use of three structuration modes: typifying structuration (c), scaling structuration (d) and structuration in regard to the content (b).\(^{252}\) Typifying structuration will help me to reveal the underlying mechanisms through which socialization (Polonization) occurs. Thus I understand types as mechanisms. They will initially be summarized under the category of mechanisms and specified in the course of the structuration procedure. Structuration, in regard to the content, will help me to discover the subjects in focus (norm, identity, practice) in detail and detect a potentially underlying constellation. This will help me to explore the multiple facets of every category and to verify or falsify the Polish input in a given policy area. Finally, scaling structuration will help me to detect effects of the process of Polonization, and as such looks at the depth of the socialization process. The latter structuration mode is part of a quantitative procedure because the results are scaled according to a quantitative dimension into, for example, high, middle and low. I analyze the depth of socialization according to the Europeanization literature as ‘a matter of degree’. Therefore, the scaling structuration fits perfectly with my theoretical assumptions.

To sum up, the technique of analysis of this work will touch on all three interpretative procedures. I do not elect to use one of these procedures a priori but rather let my material (in relation with the research question and the theoretical assumptions) emphasize one or more among them. Hence, I respect the qualitative criterion of openness. This will prevent me from losing sight of the potential complexity and singularity of the material. Due to the inductive mode of work and the open working procedure of the methodological approach, this work will keep a highly qualitative character.

7. **Definition of the coding entities**: The analytical entities are tied to the categories which are defined under point 6 and represent those parts of the documents that relate to those categories. In the model of Mayring, *coding entities* care classified as the minimal entities that can be defined. *Context entities* are defined in contrast the maximal entity that can be summarized under a certain category. *Interpretative (evaluative) entities* represent the textual parts that can be interpreted successively. Due to the huge amount of material, I concentrate on context entities understood as those maximal parts which relate to a certain category.

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\(^{251}\) For a detailed description of the particular structuration modes see Mayring, Philipp (2010), pp.93-109.

\(^{252}\) Formal structuration is too specific for this investigation. Therefore I leave it aside.
8. **Analysis:** I analyze both empirical parts according to the technique of analysis described above by using the categories already defined.

9. **Summary of the findings and interpretation in relation to the research question:** After having reduced the results to a manageable synopsis, I will summarize the interpretations made in steps 6 and 8 and summarize my finding according to the research question and the purpose of this work. With this perspective, I will focus on Polish input within the EU and NATO and the depth of Polonization of both organizations. In regard to the theoretical purpose, I will summarize the mechanisms and the conditions under which socialization according to a middle-range power occurs.

The **critique** made of the approach of Mayring touches on the quantitative dimension of some analytical steps. The critical camp stresses first, that summarization of the eighth analytical step represents a reductive and not an explicative tool. Therefore, action and behavior of the agent are not scientifically reconstructed in the specific whole and single complexity but scaled in categories according to specific features. Mayring counters that in order to grasp the meaning beyond the pure linguistic features, which is an advantage of qualitative work, researchers should (within the process of inductive category building) define the entities in a broad manner.\(^{253}\) Second, the next argument touches on the quantitative dimension in the ninth analytical step. Even if it does not represent a quantitative tool as such, it inheres the essence to work in a quantitative manner.\(^{254}\) A mixed-method approach combines thereby the strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods without undermining the scholarly approach. In fact, it strengthens the ability to investigate a phenomenon in all its complexity. Besides, Mayring does not presume to work in a purely qualitative manner but indicates that he is aware of the quantitative dimension of his model. As he points out, his aim is not to construct a purely qualitative model for content analysis but to work out a method that allows the systematic interpretation of texts.\(^{255}\)

This work follows the approach of Mayring for the following reasons: First, the systematic and rule-guided model proposed by Mayring offers a concrete analytical procedure which allows the reader to follow and understand the analytical steps made. Thereby, I respected the singularity of my work by adjusting the analytical steps of the model to my particular work. Due to the definition of this exact analytical setting of the work, it becomes inter-subjectively comprehensible. Second, the respected procedure of category building (step 6) within the model, which is a core concept of quantitative work, allows the reader to comprehend the analytical mode. Third, the redress to theoretical assumptions (step 5) offers the opportunity to adjust technical shortcomings, vagueness and makes the forth and back between theory and material possible. This corresponds to the qualitative demand for an inductive procedure in theory building. Fourth, context plays a crucial role in my work as I integrate historical occurrences and backgrounds into analysis. Mayring underlines that the text and the analytical

\(^{253}\) See Mayring, Philipp (2010), p.49.
\(^{254}\) See Lamnek, Siegfried (2010), p.480f.
\(^{255}\) See Mayring, Philipp (2010), p.48.
entities have always to be seen in the whole communication context.\textsuperscript{256} The respect of the context in his model (steps 2,4,7,8,9) reflects the characteristics of qualitative work. Sixth, as Flick points out, the biggest advantage of the approach of Mayring is that it permits one to analyze a huge amount of data.\textsuperscript{257} Due to the openness of the approach, it had been possible to adjust the analytical steps to the large volume of documents on which the empirical part is based.

The main focus on the qualitative dimension of the model (though not neglecting quantitative steps which enriches the approach) and the respect of the context, which is particularly important, in order to go beyond the text, makes the approach of Mayring a very useful one in order to examine the Polonization of the EU and NATO. But beyond being a technique to conduct research, methods do also frame the “data window.”\textsuperscript{258} Therefore, I define in the next step the concrete document choice.

\subsection*{2.2.4 Document Choice}

Talking about document choice brings back the notion of the unit of analysis. This issue should be made clear “because sample selection depends largely on what the unit of analysis is.”\textsuperscript{259} As I already made clear, the purpose of the work is two-fold. First, I develop a socialization model which is valid after enlargement of an organization and second, I analyze the input of Poland on norms and identities of the EU and NATO. Both purposes relate to a procedural analysis with qualitative changes at the core. The unit of inquiry is thus a process. In order to capture the process in all its aspects (categories) necessitates the use of different data sources. As Flick argues, single documents represent only a specific version of the reality.\textsuperscript{260} Thus, the diversity of data sources increases the analytical scope for the reconstruction of reality.

Concerning the Polonization of the given organizations, the unit of inquiry relates to a qualitative change of norms and identities. Respecting furthermore the theoretical embedding, further categories are provided by the theoretical approach itself which are then namely: practice, power, concrete deeds and mechanisms. The unit of observation is on the organizational and the individual level. Under A, 1 of the model of Mayring I already defined the general data corpus which is made up of: I. strategic and official papers, II. speeches from politicians and III. analysis from independent institutions. I decided to make use of these data sources as they allow me to study the qualitative changes (unit of inquiry) in light of the different categories. Strategic and official papers are assumed to be based on norms and represent the identity of any actor. Besides these categories, two further data sources are assumed to shed light on practices, power, concrete deeds and mechanisms. I will triangulate this sampling of data (in relation to a certain aspect) in order to increase the validity of this

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{256} See Mayring, Philipp (2010), p.48.  \\
\textsuperscript{257} See Flick, Uwe (2010), p.416.  \\
\textsuperscript{258} Buchanan, David A., and Bryman, Alan (2010), p.1.  \\
\textsuperscript{259} Babbie, Earl (2010), p.335.  \\
\textsuperscript{260} See Flick, Uwe (2010), p.327.
\end{flushleft}
qualitative research. Validity will be maximized because all data sources investigate the same object.
Concretely, I based analysis on the following sources:

1. exposés of the Polish foreign ministers from 1989 until 2011
2. Sejm-discussions on foreign policy matters relative to Ukraine
3. official agreements between Poland and Ukraine
4. official European documents (strategies, statements, press releases)
5. official agreements between the EU and Ukraine
6. official NATO documents
7. official agreements between NATO and Ukraine
8. different analyzes from independent institutions
9. secondary literature dealing with the topic

3. The Foreign Policy-Making Systems of Poland, EU and NATO

This chapter examines the foreign policy-making systems of three actors, namely Poland, the EU and NATO and highlights the legal responsibilities and possibilities and the practical interpretations of rights in foreign policy-making. By doing so, it introduces the actors concerned and operating in the foreign policy field and the changes that occurred from 1989 until 2010. Until now, I referred to Poland, the EU and NATO as actors managing the policies towards Ukraine. But who or what exactly are the agents or instances charged with foreign policy-making at the national and organizational level? Speaking in methodological terms: whose interactions and interpellations are sources for document choice? Treating the Polish input on norms and identity in organizations, the question arises from whom does the input come? In other words, who precisely exercises at the national level the legal rights or acts on a practical interpretation of these to input into the given policy area? At the organizational level, the chapter inspects the legal and practical functioning of foreign policy-making within the framework of the EU and NATO. By providing a description of the institutional framework in which foreign policy-making takes place, this part contextualizes the domain and the structure where the Polish input on norms and identity in relation to the policy towards Ukraine may occur. By describing the persons who are in charge of a position in foreign policy areas, interactions and interpellations from those are considered representative in order to analyze shifts in the very identity and the norms of the given organizations.

The rationale for this chapter is two-fold. First, the chapter serves as a basis to understand the structure, the institutional setting and actors forming the relationships towards Ukraine. As such, it provides an overview of the (institutional) context within which changes occur. Foreign policy represents a sensitive area of action and is marked by particularities according to each of the actors. In the case of Poland, foreign policy-making is a totally new field of action since 1989, and as such it has been hard to build any experience. In the EU, foreign policy is continuously community-based where the final decisions remain on national grounds. Even if NATO is legally concerned with a foreign policy issue, the rights of decision
making are less institutionalized than in the case of the EU. This chapter will show that in the case of Poland, legal provisions and practical interpretations of functions are often distinct. It is important to highlight this distinction as in the conventional constructivist approach the power of change is always bound to a degree of legitimacy. First, legitimacy is provided by a legal ascription of rights, but the chapter will show that the legitimacy of policy-making in Poland was often bound to the interpretation of the rights of some actors. Second, in methodological terms, this part serves as an explanation of document choice. In this perspective, the description of the systems and the persons and the historical changes, it will give access to and explain data sampling. Having both rationales in mind, this chapter represents an intersection between the methodological and empirical parts.

The chapter has three sections, as follows:

First, it documents and analyzes the foreign policy-making system of Poland from 1989 until 2011. It introduces the actors operating in the foreign policy field and highlights those instances that are especially concerned with relations towards Ukraine. Therefore, I will shed light on the distinction between legal rights of actors and the dense interpretation of legal provision in this chapter.

Second, the chapter maps the foreign policy decision-making system of the EU. In the EU, still being an intergovernmental policy area, the rights and the roles of the organs are very diverse. This part of the chapter brings clarity to the structure of foreign policy-making for the time in focus and introduces actors charged within European foreign policy-making. It introduces those actors charged with the doings, as such, and whose interpellations shed light on the living.

Third, it provides an overview of the NATO decision-making system and highlights those instances geared to operate with the policy towards Ukraine. As such, it provides, just as the part concerning the EU, knowledge about those actors forming the doings and reflecting the living part of the theoretical model. The next part starts with a focus on Poland.

### 3.1 The Foreign Policy System of Poland

In the following part I introduce, first, the institutional setting and the changes that took place within Poland that have influenced the making of foreign policy. Second, I introduce the instances and actors involved in foreign policy-making and especially those actors dealing with relations towards Ukraine. Third, I shed light on the application of international agreements in Polish legislation which are important considering a top-down direction of socialization (too).

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261 It should be noted that there hardly exist any description treating the changes in the institutional order of foreign policy in Poland.
3.1.1 Institutional Setting

Foreign policy-making is a relatively young action field in Polish history. Therefore a short historical embedding sheds light on the reasons of the nature of today’s Polish foreign policy-making system that is still equipped with some particularities that have an effect on foreign policy-making in Poland.

Going further back to the time between 1795 and 1899, Poland’s history was marked by dependence and occupation by foreign powers which consequently eliminated the right for autonomy in foreign policy issues. The later dictations on foreign policy issues (and external relations) before becoming fully independent came from Moscow, for about 50 years, making Poland a vassal of the USSR. In spite of the structural dependence, Josef Stalin’s death in 1953 and the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 caused a controlled opening of foreign contacts. Increasing contact with the West allowed for a flow of people, ideas and information. The then-new knowledge of the better economic, social and political situation in Western States increased the Polish feeling of being far behind. This deception caused an evolving growth of society’s expectations which, in return, went hand-in-hand with the communist system’s incapacity to meet them. This tension resulted in a growing spirit of dissent in Poland. Consequently, the first public protests took place in 1976, followed by the strikes in 1980 which led to the emergence of ‘Solidarność’, an independent and self-governing trade union. The deepening of societal forces in Poland and the ever greater role of Solidarność continuously weakened the monopoly of the Communist Party’s power. They later tried to defend the status quo by introducing martial law on 13 December 1981, at a time when the ideological legitimacy of the communist system already laid in ruins. Under martial law, Poland was fully concentrated of the maintenance of the internal structure. It did not have the ability to run foreign policy. Another wave of strikes in 1988 forced the authorities to start talks with Solidarność-leaders. This development led to the ‘Round-Table’-talks from February until April 1989 and resulted in the first partially free elections in September 1989 with the first non-communist Prime Minister in 40 years, Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

Thus, the year 1989 marked a major breakthrough for the nature of the Polish political system. The collapse of the former ideological structures and thus the total change of the context

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262 An exception was the short inner-war time granting Poland with autonomy and sovereignty.
263 The final indicator rendering Poland a satellite state under full command of the USSR was the adoption of the 1952 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL). The agreement over the Constitution happened after long negotiations with Moscow and drafts even included corrections made in Stalin’s own hand. See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.26f.
265 Today, Solidarność represents 722.000 workers coming from a diverse professional background.
266 Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.34.
267 The ‘Round Table’ signifies the talks that took place from the 6 February until the 5 April 1989 and which defined the conditions of transformation for Poland from a socialist to a democratic republic. The actors in the talks were members of Solidarność, members of the Communist Party and members of the Catholic Church. The design of a round table was specially geared to overcome any hierarchy of members but was meant to signify the common nature of the process.
gratified Poland with the establishment of internal independence and full external sovereignty. This development had fundamental consequences on foreign policy in Poland. First and foremost, since 1989, Poland has had the right to act as an autonomous, sovereign actor defining its own foreign policy goals. But second, due to the inexperience in independent foreign policy-making of the newly elected state actors, the direction of foreign policy in Poland has been decided in the first years of sovereign existence and exercised by a small group of people on the elite’s level. Still, in 2001, Ryszard Stemplowski observed that foreign policy-making was not based and accomplished by big public debates but remained an issue mainly reserved to the elite’s level. Third, due to the vague institutional setting, foreign policy suffered on different occasions from coordination problems which resulted in a ‘double foreign policy’. This double interpretation of rights was rooted in the overlapping of competences of president, prime minister and foreign ministry in the system of foreign policy-making in Poland.

The external changes with consequences on foreign policy-making went along with internal changes, namely transition and transformation, taking place in Poland. Consequently, Poland experienced in the 1990s a lot of crucial changes at the constitutional, electoral and personal level. Among the Central and Eastern European States, Poland is the only state that experienced three major constitutional enactments since 1989: the constitutional amendments.

268 As changes of the system developed so quickly, the question from which sources the newly foreign policy goals came from and on whose ideas they relied arises. First, one could think of the democratic opposition as being a source. But the latter, taking over power from September 1989 onwards was not equipped with a ready-made foreign policy program for Poland. This has mainly two reasons. First, as already mentioned, foreign policy-making from 1947 until 1989 laid in the hands of the Soviet(ized) leaders. Thus, defining and making foreign policy was not an evolving process taking place at the national level, but represented an imposed process of acting. Second, Communism’s decline was attended to take decades. Thus, post-Cold War scenario without the division in East and West meant a newly international environment which the Polish foreign policy makers had to analyze, to refer to and to build on.

In spite of these challenges Poland built on two different sources inspiring the new foreign policy: the domestic underground and circles from abroad. Roman Kuźniar identifies three different circles from abroad prepared to define foreign policy. First, there was still the Government-in-Exile in London, tackled with international recognition. Second, there were US-funded centers like Radio Free Europe and the BBC. Third, the main cultural circle occupied with foreign policy issues was the Paris ‘Kultura’ (magazine) circle around Jerzy Giedroyć. The latter had an enormous influence on foreign policy formulation in Poland. The essential idea of the Parisian group opted for a Western direction of foreign policy and believed that Poland would only be able to stay independent if it was surrounded by liberal states around. In this perspective the authors pleaded for an independent Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Concerning the domestic underground, Kuźniar identifies further influential groups. A very prominent input from the domestic came from the Roman Catholic Church with its involvement of circles round the ‘Tygodnik Powszechny’ and ‘Znak’. Besides there existed further underground oppositional groups like the ‘KOR’ (Committee for Social Self-Defence), the ‘ROPCiO’ (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka Obywatela; The Movement of the Defence of Human and Civil Rights), the ‘KPN’ (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej; The Confederation of an Independent Poland), the ‘RMP’ (Ruch Młodej Polski; The Young Polish Movement) and ‘Solidarność’, all equipped with more or less developed thoughts about foreign policy issues. See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), pp.36f. The short historical description is made in order to allow the reader to understand the difficulties (foreign policy-making) in Poland was confronted with at the beginning of regaining independence.


270 During the time of the putsch in 1991 in Moscow for example, the Polish President, Lech Walesa, did not coordinate actions with the Ministry of Defense, neither had the National Security Council, under the supervision of the President, worked out a plan how to manage the situation with Moscow even though the crisis was known fare before. See Gerhardt, Sebastian (2003), pp. 86f.; On another occasion President Walesa’s visit to Washington in 1991 was not at all coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Sanford, George (1999), p.772.
of April and December 1989, the Little Constitution (Mała Konstytucja, LC)\textsuperscript{271} of October 1992 and the Big Constitution (Duża Konstytucja, BC)\textsuperscript{272} of 2 April 1997, with every version touching on regulations of foreign policy-making. In spite of the (legal) fluctuations the same time was marked by a high consensus in foreign policy goals. This is even more surprising while taking into consideration that the political party system was not consolidated at the time and that the political arena was consequently marked by high actor diversity. But the character of Polish foreign policy as being beyond parties, conflicts and election campaigns is an “extremely important [factor] and constitutes one of the elements of the Polish success”\textsuperscript{273}.

The current legal-constitutional framework for foreign policy-making in Poland is the Constitution of 2 April 1997 which came into force on 19 October 1997. In correspondence, today, foreign policy-making in Poland is defined by a joint responsibility shared by the head of state, the president, the head of government, the prime minister\textsuperscript{274} as chairman of the council of ministers, and the foreign ministry with the foreign minister at the top and the Sejm\textsuperscript{275}. In spite of improvements made through the changes to constitutions, there still exists a rivalry and an overlapping of competencies between president, prime minister and foreign ministry. The lack of coordination rests, in the end, not on inconsistencies in the constitution but on a contradiction of constitutional rights and practical interpretation by the actors. The next part takes up the single actors involved in foreign policy-making in Poland and describes foreign policy-making along with legal provisions and practical interpretations.

3.1.2 Decision Makers

3.1.2.1 President and Prime Minister

The talks at the ‘Round Table’ from February that lasted until April 1989 resulted in the amendments of the 7\textsuperscript{th} of April (A7A) and the 29\textsuperscript{th} of December 1989 (A29D) of the Constitution of 1952.\textsuperscript{276} But the amendments of 1989 missed the opportunity to regulate the relationship precisely between legislative, executive and judicial powers. In consequence, the next major constitutional enactment, the LC of October 1992, was established in order to regulate the relationship between those three powers (Article 1, LC). Both legal sources gave the president the right of “supreme representation of the Polish State in internal and international relations” (Article 32, 1 A7A; Article 28, 1 LC) and granted him with the right

\textsuperscript{271} See The Constitutional Act of 17\textsuperscript{th} October 1992.
\textsuperscript{272} See The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2\textsuperscript{nd} April 1997.
\textsuperscript{273} Geremek, Bronisław (2001), p.49.
\textsuperscript{274} In the following I use the notion of Prime Minister in the function as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In this function s/he acts in the foreign policy matters.
\textsuperscript{275} Today, the Sejm is composed of 460 deputies and is besides the Senate the lower but dominant chamber of the Polish parliament. See for the role of the Sejm in foreign policy-making pp.78f.
\textsuperscript{276} Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej [The Polish Constitution], 22 July 1952; Ustawa o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej [Act on the Change of the Polish Constitution], 7 April 1989; Ustawa o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej [Act on the Change of the Polish Constitution], 29 December 1989. The revisions affected the introduction of the Senate as the highest house of the Polish parliament, the change of the state’s official name from Polish People’s Republic into the Republic of Poland, the strengthening of the position of the President and the change of Poland into a democratic state ruled by law. The fall of communism was reflected in the disintegration of the Polish communist party in January 1990 and its self-transformation into a social-democratic party. See Kuźiar, Roman (2009), p.50.
of “general supervision” (Article 32, 1 LC for international relations in general and Article 32, 2 and Article 32f, 4 A7A and Article 34 LC for his role as “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” in special). Articles 32g, 1 A7A and 33, 1 LC laid down that the ‘[p]resident shall ratify and denounce international treaties’. The LC obliged him moreover to “notify the Sejm and the Senate thereof”. In order to improve the coordination between the actors, the LC obliged the president to realize contacts with foreign countries only through the foreign ministry (article 32, 3 LC). In this perspective, the president had no legal right to contact and visit other countries on his own. Nevertheless, both versions of the constitution (respectively the amendments) did not grant the president with the right for directives. The conduct of foreign policy was granted in the LC to the council of ministers (Article 51, 1 LC). In this perspective, the council of ministers ‘conclude[s] treaties with the governments of foreign states and with international organizations’ (Article 52, 2, 7) LC). In spite of the legal division of rights between president and prime minister, foreign policy-making practice on behalf of the LC revealed that the role of the president was largely beyond the constitution. The prime minister’s role was reflected in an executing one.

Even though the LC altered and specified the relationship between the actors, it did not manage to avoid a double interpretation of responsibilities. In this perspective it only attained to strengthen communication and mutual responsibility between the actors.

According to the three legal sources, the president, at the time, had the right of ‘supreme representation of the Polish State in internal and international relations’ and was legitimized to ratify and denounce international treaties. The unusual power assigned in the amendments of April and December 1989 and the LC to the president (in foreign policy matters) seems, at first glance, surprising for a parliamentary republic. An explanation may thereby be found by looking at the context and the legacy of the changes occurring in the mid-80s to the mid-90s in Poland. When talks of the ‘Round Table’ took place, the participants could not agree on the personal designation of key state positions of prime minister and president. A solution was found thanks to an exclamation made by the publicist Adam Michta who played a prominent role in the negotiations of 1989. ‘Your President, Our Prime Minister’, became the guiding principle of the new personal election. The communist party was then fully focused on the strengthening of the rights of the president in order to maintain overall control of key ministries after the first partially free elections in 1989.277

Although specifying the separation of powers, the LC still was criticized for its unclear division of powers and functions of president and prime minister.278 In order to overcome this criticism and the evolving problems in practice, the new constitution of 1997 was mainly concerned with the transfer of powers from president to prime minister. In this perspective the role of the president in international relations was reduced from ‘supervision’ to a ‘representative’ one.279 Therefore, the council of ministers was granted with the task to

277 See Copsey, Nathaniel (2009), p.57. The PZPR maintained five ministries after 1989, including Internal Affairs and Defense.
279 From exercising ‘general supervision in the field of international relations’ according to Article 32,1 LC, the role of the president was denounced ‘as [to] representative of the State in foreign affairs’ (Article 133 BC).
‘exercise general control in the field of relations with other states and international organizations’ (Article 146, 4, 9 BC). Article 133, 3 BC obliges the president to cooperate with the prime minister and the appropriate minister (e.g. foreign minister, defense minister) in foreign policy according to and limited by his own legal competencies. The president has no legal basis to advance his own initiatives on the international arena or to spread standpoints which were not discussed with the parliament in advance. In spite of the growth of the role of the council of ministers in the BC, the president still keeps the right to ratify international treaties or arrangements (Article 133, 1, 1 BC). So, the president may block the implementation of any international accord and display his power. In the same line of legal power, the president may refer to the Constitutional Tribunal with a request to adjudicate on the conformity of a treaty with the Polish Constitution (Article 133, 2 BC). According to Article 154 of the BC, the president nominates the prime minister to the post. However, the nomination process is not dictated by presidential preference, but instead reflects the leader of the party which obtained the most seats in the previous parliamentary election, or the leader agreed upon by a coalition. The president has not right to dismiss the prime minister or other ministers. According to Article 148 of the BC the prime minister shall act as the representative of the cabinet as a whole, delegate its agendas, coordinate the work of ministers, ensure the implementation of policy adopted by the cabinet, and issue regulations. Concerning the government, the role of the president has been reduced to a controlling and rectifying one. All in all, the Constitution of 1997 means a scaling down of presidential powers. Although the BC of 1997 defines more precisely the powers of the actors in foreign policy it “still remains general enough to cover a multiplicity of practice”. Thus, an ambiguity between legal theory and actual practice may still be observed in foreign policy-making in Poland. The relationship between presidents and prime ministers has in the time from 1989 until 2011 been dependent on political preferences and individual personalities among both actors, in turn depending also on the interpretation of rights.

Looking at the personnel structure of presidents in Poland, it reflects a diverse actor scene. After Poland’s last communist President, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who retired in 1990, his successor, Lech Walesa, started to interpret presidential rights very widely. He attributed himself a lot of autonomy in foreign policy-making. This led to different occasions of ambiguity concerning legal provisions and practice which led to the already mentioned coordination problems in foreign policy-making. Those tensions appeared mainly between the president and the foreign ministry. The new President in 1995, Alexander Kwaśniewski, changed the role of president in two ways. First, he brought the critical domestic discussion over the role of the president in relation to the appointment of the foreign minister to an end by renouncing this practice. The renouncement granted Kwaśniewski – paradoxically –

competences were restricted to the ratification and renouncement of international treaties and to the appointment and recall of diplomats and representatives of the Republic of Poland to foreign states and international organizations (Article 133, 1, 2 BC).

This legal basis corresponds to Article 51, clause 1 LC. Clause 2 Article 146 BC still grants the government with the right to ‘conduct the affairs of State not reserved to other State organs of local government’.

Sanford, George (1999), pp. 771f.

Article 62 LC granted the prime minister with the right ‘to appoint the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of National Defence and of Internal Affairs after consultation with the President’. Kwaśniewskis predecessor
with the political legitimacy to deepen his position and role in foreign policy matters as future developments proved. In this respect, Kwaśniewski became, second, the dominant voice of the deepening of a proactive Eastern policy. His actions concerning relations with Ukraine, were largely beyond controlling and amending activities assigned to the president by the constitution.\textsuperscript{283} Especially in the second term of office\textsuperscript{284} (first term 1995-2000, second term 2000-2005) Kwaśniewski took a leading role in establishing good relations with Ukraine. Nathanial Copsey revealed several reasons leading to the pivotal role of Kwaśniewski in relations towards Ukraine and the East. First and foremost, “the relative success of Poland in transition and its ‘beacon’ role in East Central European region” granted the President with the necessary moral grounding to play an important role towards the East. Second, Kwaśniewski’s long tenure in office allowed him building-up deep relations with different key actors in Eastern policy and in relations towards Ukraine. The well-observed special friendly relationship between Kwaśniewski and Leonid Kuchma became visible at different occasions.\textsuperscript{285} Third, Copsey stressed the very personal interest Kwaśniewski had in the development of Ukraine and the strong attachment for peace and regional stability.\textsuperscript{286} Kwaśniewski’s personal interests in a wider Polish political thinking were thereby rooted in Poland’s historical role as ‘bridge builder towards the East’.\textsuperscript{287} This strong heritage of foreign policy-thinking became visible since the first foreign policy program of independent Poland aimed to establish a ‘proactive Eastern policy’.

President Lech Kaczyński, who came into power in 2005, was similarly very active in foreign policy during both the time of presidency with his own Law and Justice-led coalition of 2005-2007 and during the subsequent time, and the Civic Platform-led coalition with Donald Tusk as Prime Minister from 2007 until 2010 when he died in a plane crash. Nevertheless, Kaczyński did not have the same interest in Ukraine as his predecessor.\textsuperscript{288} After the accidental death of Kaczyński, Bronisław Komorowski entered into office as President. The list of Polish presidents is summarized below:

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\textsuperscript{283} See Sanford, George (1999), p.772.
\textsuperscript{284} The elections of 2001 brought President Kwaśniewski’s ideological allies to power, the centre-left Union of Left Democrats or SLD. This strengthened the president’s role in foreign policy.
\textsuperscript{285} See empirical part pp.120ff.
\textsuperscript{286} Copsey, Nathaniel (2009), p.58.
\textsuperscript{287} This idea dates back to the interwar period when Poland lived in independence a short time. General Józef Piłsudski, First Marshal of Poland, was due to his experience of living in the eastern territories of Poland a strong advocate for an independent Ukraine. His concept was not purely based on a Polish interest but aimed to establish peace and stability in the whole region. The idea of an independent Ukraine may thereby be traced back to the Promethean idea in European history and politics. As Bronisław Gemerek points out, Prometheanisms can be reduced to a simple belief, “Poland must support, both for historical and for political reasons, all the countries that want to separate from Russia and to have the same chance as Poland had in 1918.” See Geremek, Bronislaw (2001), pp.52f.
\textsuperscript{288} See Copsey, Nathaniel (2009), p.59.
**President** | **start of term** | **end of term**
--- | --- | ---
Bronisław Komorowski | 6 August 2010 | 6 August 2015
Gregorz Schetyna (provisional) | 8 July 2010 | 6 August 2010
Bogdan Borusewicz (provisional) | 8 July 2010 | 8 July 2010
Bronisław Komorowski (provisional) | 10 April 2010 | 8 July 2010
Lech Kaczyński | 23 December 2005 | 10 April 2010 (†)
Alexander Kwaśniewski | 23 December 1995 | 23 December 2005
Lech Wałęsa | 22 December 1990 | 22 December 1995
Wojciech Jaruzelski | 31 December 1989 | 21 December 1990

source: own description

Considering the structural legitimization and the practical interpretations, document choice will be based on official speeches from presidents and concrete deeds they have performed in relation to Ukraine.

Looking at the personal profile of prime ministers, it also reflects a scene of diverse actors. Traditionally, the prime ministers had not played a pivotal role on the international arena. This changed after entry into the EU as European rules require the prime minister to play an important role at summits. In spite of these changes, the prime ministers did not exert a driving force in foreign policy-making during the period with which this study is concerned. The list of prime minister is summarized as below:

**Prime Minister** | **start of term** | **end of term**
--- | --- | ---
Tadeusz Mazowiecki | 24 August 1989 | 4 January 1991
Jan Krysztof Bielecki | 4 January 1991 | 6 December 1991
Jan Olszewski | 6 December 1991 | 5 June 1992
Waldemar Pawlak | 5 June 1992 | 10 July 1992
Hanna Suchocka | 11 July 1992 | 26 October 1993
Waldemar Pawlak | 26 October 1993 | 7 March 1995
Józef Oleksy | 7 March 1995 | 7 February 1996
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz | 7 February 1996 | 31 October 1997
Jerzy Buzek | 31 October 1997 | 19 October 2001
Leszek Miller | 19 October 2001 | 2 May 2004
Marek Belka | 2 May 2004 | 31 October 2005
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz | 31 October 2005 | 14 July 2006
Jarosław Kaczyński | 14 July 2006 | 16 November 2007
Donald Tusk | 16 November 2007 | 22 September 2014

source: own description

### 3.1.2.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, MSZ) in Poland is a core actor in foreign policy-making. Several legal sources frame the rights on which the foreign ministry, with the foreign minister at the top, acts in foreign policy. The BC of 1997 has granted the foreign ministry with the sole right of maintaining contacts with foreign states and with Poland’s diplomatic corps (Article 32, 3 BC). This regulation aimed to avoid parallel
services as they occurred between the president and the ministry at the beginning of the 1990s. Besides the constitution, the regulation of the Prime Minister of 22 December 2009 grants the minister of foreign affairs with the task of directing branches of government administration of “foreign affairs and the Republic of Poland’s membership of the European Union”\(^{289}\). The Act on branches of government administration of 4 September 1997\(^{290}\) grants the foreign ministry in the branch of foreign affairs: a) maintenance in the Republic of Poland’s relations with other states and international organizations, b) representation and protection of the Republic of Poland’s interests abroad, and c) coordination of the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland. Furthermore, the act obliges the foreign ministry with the definition of the directions and objectives of Poland’s foreign policy. According to the branch of Poland’s membership in the EU, the act gratifies the foreign ministry with the initiation and the preparation of “government documents relative to involvement in the work of the institutions of the European Union of giving opinions thereon in terms of their consistency with that strategy”. According to European law, the foreign ministry is instructed to supervise the consistency of the Polish law system with the law of the EU and to protect the interest of Poland in front of the judicial bodies of the EU. In this perspective the foreign ministry coordinates the “process of transposition of the law of the European Union into the Polish law system”. A third legal basis that defines and specifies the role of the foreign ministry in foreign affairs is the pursuant Act on the Council of Ministers of 8 August 1996.\(^{291}\) This act defines the foreign ministry’s involvement in the establishment of the state’s foreign policy. Furthermore, it grants the foreign ministry with the right to initiate and develop the government’s policy and to submit those initiatives to the Council of Ministers.

Besides other responsibilities, the ministry of foreign affairs “provides guidelines and supervision to the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych; PISM]”\(^{292}\). Since 1996, the latter has played an important role in the review of Polish foreign policy as it provides, under the guidance of the foreign ministry, a reflection and summary of foreign policy issues. These analyzes are representative documents reflecting Polish conceptions in foreign policy.

Concerning its responsibilities, the foreign ministry is thus legally highly involved in foreign policy-making in Poland. Today, the institutional structure is composed of 20 departments and 16 accompanying sections whereby the sections are mainly administrative ones. Between 1989 and 2010 the Ministry has undergone a process of internal transformation for two rationales. First, the aim was a de-communization of the old pre-1989 staff, which was still engaged in foreign policy-making. The replacing of the old staff with non-political civil servants, who needed to be recruited and trained, was a generation-long task.\(^{293}\) Second, the changes took place in order to adjust the institutional setting to the changing priorities in foreign policy, especially within Poland’s membership aspirations to the EU and NATO.

\(^{289}\) See Poland: Ministry: Responsibilities of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

\(^{290}\) See Ibid.

\(^{291}\) See Ibid.

\(^{292}\) See Ibid.

\(^{293}\) See Sanford, George (1999), pp. 771.
Due to the large number of elections taking place in the transition time and immediately after, Poland represents a diverse scene of actors in foreign policy for the time from 1989 until 2010:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Minister</th>
<th>start of term</th>
<th>end of term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radosław Sikorski</td>
<td>16 November 2007</td>
<td>22 September 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Fotyga</td>
<td>9 May 2006</td>
<td>16 November 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefan Meller</td>
<td>31 October 2005</td>
<td>9 May 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Daniel Rotfeld</td>
<td>5 January 2005</td>
<td>31 October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz</td>
<td>19 October 2001</td>
<td>5 January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Władysław Bartoszewski</td>
<td>30 June 2000</td>
<td>19 October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronisław Geremek</td>
<td>31 October 1997</td>
<td>30 June 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dariusz Rosati</td>
<td>29 December 1995</td>
<td>30 October 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Władysław Bartoszewski</td>
<td>7 March 1995</td>
<td>22 December 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrzej Olechowski</td>
<td>26 October 1993</td>
<td>6 March 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krzysztof Skubiszewski</td>
<td>12 September 1989</td>
<td>25 October 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadeusz Olechowski</td>
<td>17 June 1988</td>
<td>12 September 1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: own description

On a yearly basis, the foreign minister reviews Polish foreign policy and informs the government with objectives and directions. Concerning all that has been said previously, it turns out that the foreign ministry with the foreign minister at the top plays an important role in Polish foreign policy-making. Therefore, the yearly exposés are considered highly representative documents to present access to Polish norms and identities in foreign policy.

3.1.2.3 Sejm and Senate

The role of the Polish parliament in foreign policy-making in Poland is not a direct one but is constituted by its influence on different procedures touching on foreign policy-making and provided for in the constitution.

The Polish parliament is constituted by the Sejm, the lower house, and the Senate, the upper house. Since 1989, it has been constituted by 100 senators and 460 deputies (Article 21 a A7D; Article 28 A7D; Article 3 Clauses 1,2 LC; Articles 96, 97 BC). It exerts its role in foreign policy-making by its influence on the election of the government, the debate over the annual review of Polish foreign policy presented by the ministry of foreign affairs, the work in parliamentary working groups and decisions over the budget.

Both, the lower and the upper house are constituted by committees. The role of the committees is to examine and to prepare questions concerning policies, laws and resolutions for consideration by the Sejm. In the case of foreign policy-making, the Foreign Affairs Committee (KSZ – Komitet Spraw Zagranicznych) of the Sejm plays the most important role. The Committee fulfils three main tasks. First, it helps to form the Polish foreign policy by defining priorities and issues of concern. Second, it supervises the functioning of the MSZ.
Third, it plays an informing role by informing itself, the Sejm and the public as well as playing a networking role by shaping policy though contacts with foreign politicians.294

Besides the annual debates concerning the review of Polish foreign policy, debates over the foreign policy of Poland are taking place throughout the year (even though they are infrequent). Additionally, debates on laws and resolutions touch on foreign policy issues, offer further arenas for parliamentary talks and check up on government policies. The main role of the parliament is thus reflected in its role as a discussion forum that allows aggregate and direct public opinion on foreign policy issues.

According to George Stanford, the Polish Sejm, and especially the Foreign Affairs Committee, played an important role in Polish foreign policy-making during the 1990s by its contribution to foreign policy consensus in cooperation with the president, prime minister and foreign minister.295 Nathaniel Copsey, therefore, observed that this role of the parliament is no longer true.296 Reflecting on the Parliament’s rights show that the Parliament’s role has to do with ‘internal’ foreign policy-making and the democratic process of defining foreign policy goals. These are then reflected in the yearly exposés of the foreign ministers. The ministry represents the last instance of defining foreign policy goals, only the exposés are considered as representative documents reflecting the ‘official’ norms and identities of Poland.

3.1.3 Constitution and International Agreements

After having introduced the main actors and the legal rights and practical uses of them, this part clarifies the legal relationship between international agreements and the Polish constitution. The clarification is important for the second empirical part when the work sheds light on the Polish input into organizations without neglecting the input of organizations on Poland. Therefore, the legal basis to examine is the constitution of 1997. The new constitution already creates very favorable legal conditions for the integrative work of Poland and organizations. A reason may be found in the time of conception this version of the constitution was created at a time when Poland was already undertaking concrete talks with NATO297 and had started talks with the EU298. Moreover, there was a general ‘Euro-phoria’ at the elite and the national level which facilitated the creation of favorable legal conditions for integration.

Article 87 Clause 1 BC precisely defines the sources of universally binding law in Poland. They are the Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements and regulations. The conditions under which the ratification of an international agreement shall require prior

295 Ibid., pp. 769-797.
296 The author adds that the only exception is the dominant role of the senate guarding the application of minority rights of Poles living outside national borders. See Copsey, Nathaniel (2009), p.62f.
consent granted by statute are stated in Article 89 Clause 1 BC. If a prior statute is not required for ratification of an international agreement, the Prime Minister informs the Sejm of any intention to submit to the President an international agreement for ratification (Article 89 Clause 2 BC).

Article 90 Clause 1 BC lays down that Poland may “delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters”. The needed statute should be passed by Sejm and Senate by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the deputies and senators. A ratified international treaty (and the incorporated regulations) constitutes part of the Polish legal order and is applied directly after promulgation in the Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) (Article 91 clause 1 BC). An international agreement ratified on prior consent granted by statute has priority over the statute if there exists a conflict between the treaty and the statute (Article 91 Clause 2 BC). The mentioned constitutional regulations make an international treaty part of the national legal order. In this perspective the constitution defines the direct application and the precedence of international treaties over domestic law (Article 91 Clause 3). In this perspective, courts can refuse to apply domestic statutes if they contradict treaty regulations. Of course, the precedence of legal acts only touches on the regulations ratified (and passed through statute) and not over the whole constitution. As far as original law is concerned, there is a clear dominance of constitutional rights over treaty regulations. According to Article 188 Clause 1 BC, the Constitutional Tribunal is granted with the task of controlling the constitutionality of an international agreement. Control of constitutionality can be done before and after ratification. This all reflects the structural limitations and possibilities for changes coming from the organizational level.

Having reflected on the foreign policy-making system of Poland in depth, the next part focuses on the functioning of foreign policy-making at the European level.

### 3.2 The Foreign Policy System of EU

Since the beginning of the history of European integration, the structure and nature of foreign policy-making has experienced a lot of changes. The following section takes up those historical and structural changes and reviews them by focusing on instruments and actors involved. Today, the structure and nature of foreign policy-making at the European level is marked by past and present struggles over the tension between retaining sovereignty and effectiveness of capabilities in this policy field.

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299 They are: 1) peace, alliances, political or military treaties; 2) freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens, as specified in the Constitution; 3) the Republic of Poland’s membership in an international organization; 4) considerable financial responsibilities imposed on the State; 5) matters regulated by statute or those in respect of which the Constitution requires the form of statute. See Article 89 Clause 1 BC The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997.

300 See Safjan, Marek (2001), p.120.

301 See for a critical viewpoint considering the tribunal control over accession treaties Ibid.
3.2.1 Evolution of CFSP

At the beginning of the 1950s, foreign and defense political issues did not play a dominant role in European integration as the project concentrated at the beginning with an economic aspect. In consequence, the Rome Treaty established the European Community in 1958. However, it did not contain any purely politically and security-related foreign policy aims and objectives. Nevertheless, it set out several limited provisions for the conduct of relations of the Community with non-community members. It touched on a Common Commercial Policy (Articles 110-116 Treaty of Rome), economic agreements (Article 235 Treaty of Rome) and possible association agreements with third countries (Article 238 Treaty of Rome). Cooperation in the political sphere of the foreign policy field started in 1970 under the name of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) but it was founded outside of the framework of the Community Treaties. The aim of the EPC was to harmonize national positions in foreign policy matters by means of regulative consultations and – if possible – in consequence to undertake common actions. By speaking with one voice on foreign policy issues, the then member states aimed at strengthening the international weight of the Community. The rationale for the evolution of the EPC was to balance the EC’s economic weight, and hence to further the integration towards a political union.

The importance of cooperation in foreign policy issues was institutionally recognized by, according EPC, giving it its own section in the 1987 Single European Act (SEA). Nevertheless, the section was not incorporated into the European Economic Communities’ (EEC) Treaty because the member states were not ready to apply the Community decision-making process to this area of high politics. As decisions had consequently been taken by consensus, development showed that the member states often could not reach an agreement on international issues. The character of European foreign policy-making as being loose and voluntary changed at the beginning of the 1990s during the Maastricht Treaty (MT) negotiations when the member states discussed improved mechanisms for foreign policymaking. Germany and the Benelux-countries pushed to integrate cooperation in foreign policy matters into the Community pillar, but France and Great Britain vehemently countered that position. Negotiations resulted in the establishment of the Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CFSP) (Article J MT) located institutionally in the second (intergovernmental) pillar of the Union’s setting. Building on the institutionally loose setting of CFSP, some authors argue that there are only minor differences between the EPC and CFSP. Taking a braver look at the provisions of CFSP therefore reveals that it established new possibilities for

302 Consultations relating to security and defense took place within the framework of NATO under US-leadership which was at that time considered to be the defending shield against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. See Giegerich, Bastian, and Wallace, William (2010), p.432.
306 It is remarkable that the talks about CFSP in 1990/1 were conducted very vividly within the foreign ministries of the member states. In contrast, the discussions were very little reflected in press, by politicians outside government, by national parliament and by the public. See Wallace, William (2005), p.438.
European foreign policy-making. Three renewals are significant. First, the incorporation of foreign policy-making into the Community’s institutional setting granted CFSP with an important status. Second, the MT introduced security and defense in the foreign policy field, standing previously outside EPC structures. In this perspective, the preamble of the MT outlines that the member states:

“RESOLVE[D] to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world”308.

Third, the MT introduced instruments to operate in this policy field and to strengthen the coherence in foreign policy-making. According to Article J.2 MT ‘common positions’309 shall be defined by the Council. Furthermore, the Council shall decide and specify ‘joint actions’ to be taken by the member states (Article J.3 MT). According to the MT, member states must adapt their national positions to both types of decision. The MT introduced the procedure of qualitative majority voting (QMV) in foreign policy-making. During the negotiations the member states agreed on a list of objectives for the field of CFSP (Article J.1 Clause 2 MT) which are:

- “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
- to promote international cooperation; and
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”310.

The vagueness and the general character of the objectives is a result of the inability of member states to agree on a definitive list.311 Nevertheless, the pursuit of the objectives by means of practice and repeated proclamation has become one important aspect of the EU’s international identity.312 Karen Smith points out that the opposing process of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ intergovernmentalism occurs when the objectives are practiced. The softer version of intergovernmentalism thereby often applies within the declaratory process whereas the harder version comes into play when it comes to implementing the objectives.313 The gap between rhetoric and practice, then, is often rooted in the (sometimes) divergent interests of member states in foreign policy. In this perspective, decisions in foreign policy often represent the lowest common dominator and rely therefore on a very elusive compromise.

According to Article J.2 MT, the member states should “ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action”. Hence, the treaty itself points to the mutual influence of the member states in foreign policy. The real mutual influence of the member states and the input of the member states on norms and

309 See for the description of the instruments pp.82ff.
313 See Ibid., 237.
identity of foreign policy remain the main questions of this work and are dealt with in the empirical part of the thesis.

The Amsterdam (AT) (1997) and Nice (NT) (2001) Treaties continued to modify foreign policy-making at the European level. Nevertheless, both treaties failed to bring radical reform to the CFSP. Consequently, the AT did not change the intergovernmental character of foreign policy-making at the European level, and is therefore often considered as being an unrealized attempt to provide CFSP with more coherence.\(^{314}\) Provision of Article J4 MT was made in order to allow for better cooperation between Council and Commission. Nevertheless, the provision of the AT was very vague and only laid down that the “Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action” (Article J.4 Clause 4 AT). Additionally, Article J.17 AT laid down that “[t]he Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field”\(^{315}\). However, the Council remained legally the most important actor in European foreign policy-making.

Amsterdam supplemented the CFSP with an important actor. It introduced the position of a ‘High Representative for the CFSP’ (Article J.8 Clause 3 AT) which shall assist the Presidency. In her/his role, the High Representative (HR) contributes to the formulation, preparation and implementation of CFSP decisions (Article J.16 AT). Javier Solana, former secretary-general of NATO, was the first officeholder and stayed in this position for two terms from 1999 until 2009. He provided Europe with a foreign policy face to the outside world.

According to the instruments, the AT provided the CFSP with ‘common strategies’ (Article J.2 AT) to be decided by the Council. QMV was extended to common strategies under Amsterdam but an ‘opting-out’ procedure was introduced. If a member state “declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken” (Article J.13 Clause 2 AT).

Concerning the voting procedure, the AT still insists on the procedure of unanimity in foreign policy matters and making but introduced the clause of ‘constructive abstention’.\(^{316}\) In this perspective one or more states may abstain from the procedure of voting on a decision without blocking the binding character of the decision.\(^{317}\)

The NT brought only very vague provisions. What is worth mentioning is the extension of the procedure of ‘enhanced cooperation’ to CFSP (Article 27a NT).\(^{318}\) In this respect


\(^{315}\)Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1.

\(^{316}\)Karen Smith argues that “[u]nder the Amsterdam Treaty, unanimous voting was to become less the rule and more the exception”. But she relativizes the argument by the reflection of the real use of QMV by saying, “(…) however, QMV has still not been used; the member states insist on consensus”. Smith, Karen E. (2008), p.44.

\(^{317}\)See Wessels, Wolfgang (2008), p.399.

enhanced cooperation was allowed for the implementation of a joint action or a common position. However, matters having military or defense implications were excluded (Article 27b NT). Within the procedure, a group of at least eight states may establish enhanced cooperation by respecting “the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union” (Article 43 NT). The action field and the tasks of the HR were extended and the ‘Political Committee’ was transformed into the ‘Political and Security Committee’ (PSC) which shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative” (Article 25 NT).

The Lisbon Treaty (LT), which was adopted in 2007 and came into force in 2009, transformed the position of the HR into the ‘High Representative of the Union’ (Article 9E LT) and conducted the Union’s common foreign and security policy. The HR of the Union is, at the same time, the external relations commissioner. In order to ensure the consistency of European foreign policy-making, an External Action Service (EAS) with a staff of about 5,000 people was introduced to function as the EU’s diplomatic corps. The EAS should have begun his work in April 2010, but was delayed due to a struggle between Commission and Parliament.

Title V of the Treaty was changed to ‘General provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy’. Whilst the Chapter 1 Title V LT specifies the ‘general provisions on the Union’s external service’, Chapter 2 Title V LT deals with the ‘specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy’. Security and defense merited its own section under the LT and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and was renamed Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), even though the quality of the provisions concerning this policy did not change. According to the LT, CSDP is considered to be an integral part of CFSP functioning (Article 28 LT). Thus, even though the aims of both policy fields remained unchanged, the integration of CFDP into the Treaty provisions changed the legal quality of European foreign policy from purely a civilian power towards a military one.

In the literature, there exists a dominant consensus on the evaluation of the CFSP as having been introduced at a very inopportune time. Its anniversary had consequences for the development of this policy field. The reasons for this inopportune may be found in the context. The war in, and consequent breakup of, Yugoslavia confronted the EU shortly after with its limits in foreign policy acting. The Western European Union (WEU), at the time of Maastricht being the – formally still independent – military arm of the EU, was not ready to provide the EU with the military tools to handle the situation a successful acting. This became obvious as it lacked command and control structures. The very small successes in

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320 Catherine Ashton was the first office-holder and held this position between 2009 and 2014. From 2014 until 2019 Federica Mogherini holds the position.
Yugoslavia were thereby not enough to banish the negative image of the EU, gained due to the legal and practical inability to handle the situation.\textsuperscript{324}

However, the war in Yugoslavia also had a ‘positive’ effect on the evolution of the CFSP. It revealed to the member states that the EU was lacking the military capacity needed in order to conduct foreign policy effectively.\textsuperscript{325} This is also reflected in William Wallace’s analysis of the EU, who attributed to the EU in CFSP and ESDP matters a civilian power status. Wallace concludes that European foreign policy-making is therefore still far beyond representing a field of pure, sovereign state diplomacy but, at the same time, far from being an integrated policy field.\textsuperscript{326} Fraser Cameron, on the other hand, estimates that the evolution of CFSP granted the EU with greater cohesion in foreign policy-making over the years.\textsuperscript{327} In the same way, Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan came to the conclusion that since MT foreign policy-making has been (consequently) institutionalized and formalized at the European level.\textsuperscript{328} Franz Kernic, in his works, deals mainly with the problems of the CFSP and points to the possible marginalization of smaller and newer states and their interests in foreign policy-making.\textsuperscript{329} This thesis is grounded in the last remark and shows that new states are very much apt to conserve their interests at the European level and even to upload them.

As the CFSP is marked by a specific nature, a few concluding remarks aim to define the obstacles and reveal the potential of this policy area.

First, the EU is not provided with the traditional legal and practical resources of a state to run foreign policy. Even though the political dimension of European integration has been growing ever since the beginning, CFSP safeguarded its intergovernmental character, protecting it from supranational domination until recently.\textsuperscript{330} This institutional arrangement reveals that the majority of member states still insist on a nationally-based character of foreign policy-making. Any European foreign policy represents the ‘lowest common dominator’ among the member states.\textsuperscript{331} The policy scope is consequently limited to those areas that do not contradict member states’ interests and do not affront sensitive national issues. This is the reason why cooperation in the military field is the weakest in the EU.\textsuperscript{332} Two declarations affirm that member states still consider the CFSP and the CSDP to be complementary to the states’ foreign policy.\textsuperscript{333} As such the competence to foreign policy effectively remains mainly at the national level.\textsuperscript{334}

Second, even though unanimity is the governing decision-making procedure within the CFSP, the development revealed that on different occasions conflicting ideological orientations

\textsuperscript{324} See Cameron, Fraser (2007), pp.30f.
\textsuperscript{325} See Ibid., p.38.
\textsuperscript{326} See Wallace, William (2005), p.455.
\textsuperscript{327} See Cameron, Fraser (2007), p.38.
\textsuperscript{328} See Keukeleire, Stephan, and MacNaughtan, Jennifer (2008), pp.64f.
\textsuperscript{330} Especially influential states in international relations are reluctant to lose control in foreign policy-making.
\textsuperscript{333} Declaration 13 and 14 concerning CFSP See Streinz, Rudolf, Ohler, Christoph, and Herrmann, Christoph (2008), p.115.
\textsuperscript{334} See Streinz, Rudolf, Ohler, Christoph, and Herrmann, Christoph (2008), p. 115.
hinder a common position. Thereby agreement – be it tacit or explicit – of all member states is needed in order to provide the EU with the considerable weight required to play an important political role on the world scene.

Third, even though the CFSP decisions became binding for the member states over the years, there are not any mechanisms that are enforced. Hence, the Court of Justice does not have any rights to supervise the CFSP matters and neither is the Commission a guardian of foreign and defense policies. Thus, the use of legal resources continues to rely on the willingness of member states to use the instruments and to act on those agreements.

Because of the problems of harmonizing positions, utilizing resources and the lack of the Unions’ legal superiority in this policy field, much of European collective foreign and defense policy potential remains unrealized. This is also the reason why the EU still counts as a ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’-power Union in foreign policy-making.

In opposition to these obstacles, the CFSP bears also a lot of potential. Opponents to the challenging (negative) view of the CFSP point to the everlasting evolution of legal precisions and mechanisms in European foreign policy structure. According to Karen Smith, external and internal stimuli advance the development of ever-closer foreign policy-making in the EU. As external stimuli, interdependence or globalization encourage collective action for three main reasons. First, unilateral action of a state often remains ineffective considering the relative (political) weight of a state. Collective action, therefore, advances the growth of political weight on the international scene. Second, interdependence creates new prospects of action. In the case of an asymmetrical relation, the EU could collectively ‘benefit’ from the vulnerability of a third state to changes in transaction flows (be they in relation to trade, aid, development, security, etc.). In this perspective the EU could influence domestic and external policies of those states. An excellent example is provided by the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) creating a ‘ring of friends’. Third, on some issues, collective European action may be regarded as more legitimate as unilateral acts. These issues may concern, for example, the promotion of human rights, democratization of humanitarian intervention. Concerning internal stimuli for advancing an ever more common foreign and defense policy, Smith identifies, first, the member states’ ‘use’ of the EU to pursue genuine national interests. This ‘use’ can come up in two ways, especially for new member states who try to input on the scope and the domains of European foreign policy and try to advance it in the national interests perspective. Then, states may also hide behind the collective action of the EU. In this perspective, elites may justify European decisions, unpopular on the national level, with the exigency to go along with European partners. A second internal stimulus may come from the national below, thus the domestic level (parliament, public opinion, etc.). A third internal

336 Soft-power is defined as follows, “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it”. Nye, Joseph S., Jr (2004), p.5. Thereby a “civilian power can be defined according to three elements: means (policy instruments); ends (goals, objectives); and use of persuasion. It is ‘an actor which uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends’”. Smith, Karen E. (2008), p.22.
337 This point seems important regarding Poland’s status as a middle-range power.
stimulus may come from the inner structure of the EU itself. In this perspective, EU institutions – mainly the Commission and to a more limited extent also the European Parliament (EP) – may input on the scope and domain of foreign policy-making at the European level. Fourth, Smith points to the process of cooperation as being an internal stimulus. Within this process of institutionalization, sets of identities and interests are created through interaction.\textsuperscript{338}

Although touching on all the aspects mentioned, the investigation of this thesis sticks mainly to the last point. Through interaction in foreign policy identities, rules, norms and interests are reciprocally established. This work clearly concentrates on the input of one state on the European level.

Having clarified the evolution, the domain and the legal provisions of the CFSP, the next part concentrates on the instruments through which foreign policy-making at the European level functions.

3.2.2 Instruments

This part of the chapter focuses on the instruments of CFSP which are at the EU actor’s disposal for conducting European foreign policy. The previous part showed that in the time under investigation (1989 – 2011) a lot of legal changes and treaty-renovations took place. Therefore, I present the instruments also in the light of the whole timeframe with the changes that occurred.

As shown above, the EU has defined in Article J.1 clause 2 the main objectives of CFSP. These objectives had not been changed until the LT. In the AT the EU précised the instruments in order to meet the requirements of the objectives. These instruments are defined in Article J.2 as follows:

- “defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;
- deciding on common strategies;
- adopting joint actions;
- adopting common positions;
- strengthening systemic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy”\textsuperscript{339, 340}.

According to Article J.3 NT the “European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implication”. The article provides the European Council furthermore with the right to define

- “common strategies (…) in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States”\textsuperscript{341}.

\textsuperscript{339} Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1.
\textsuperscript{340} Surprisingly some authors identify only three instruments for CFSP, neglecting the first and the fifth instrument laid down in J.2 AT. See e.g. Cameron, Fraser (2007), p.31; Nugent, Neill (2010), p.385.
\textsuperscript{341} Treaty of Nice, 2001 O.J. C 80/1.
The apparent purpose of common strategies is thus to create a general policy framework in specific areas and to ensure therein coherent and unified CFSP actions. Common strategies had been adopted at the European level in relation to Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean region. \footnote{Common Strategy on Russia, 1999/414/CFSP; Common Strategy on Ukraine 1999/877/CFSP; Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region 2000/458/CFSP.} Hence, common strategies reveal to be geographical in character. But due to its not binding and general provision, common strategies are not highly celebrated. The HR, Solana, published a critical report arguing that common strategies are the most rhetorical and descriptive of the existing instruments. \footnote{Solana, Javier (2001).}

Concerning joint actions the AT lays down in Article J.3 that the

\begin{quote}
“Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation”\footnote{Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1}.\end{quote}

Joint actions cover a broad operational field within the CFSP. They can be established for financial expenditure and transfer, for sending missions (election observers of military personal), to bring about diplomacy, consultations, demarches and conferences. They can even provide the frame for the adoption of legislation or the ratification of international agreements. \footnote{See Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.402.} There is a consensus in the literature estimating joint actions as a very effective instrument within the CFSP tool-box\footnote{See e.g. Keukeleire, Stephan, and MacNaughtan, Jennifer (2008), pp.155f.; Cameron, Fraser (2007), pp.31f.;} granting them even with the character of a ‘key vehicle’ of CFSP\footnote{See Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.401.}. Formally, joint actions are binding on member states even though regulations for an ‘opting-out’ exist. \footnote{See Smith, Karen E. (2004), p.10.}

Common positions are, according to the AT, also defined by the Council. Article J.5 lays down that:

\begin{quote}
“The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions”\footnote{Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1}.\end{quote}

Literature and practice prove that the dividing line between joint actions and common positions is hard to draw. Both legal instruments cover a similar approach by the EU within the CFSP. Nevertheless, a slight distinction can be made by looking for what a common position is not used for. It is not used for forms of operational action. This clearly seems to be reserved for joint actions.\footnote{See Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.403.}

Keukeleire and MacNaughtan argue that the types of instruments seem to be logical as the European Council is the highest authority in the CFSP which defines principles, general guidelines and common strategies. The Council, therefore, defines further steps through joint

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Common Strategy on Russia, 1999/414/CFSP; Common Strategy on Ukraine 1999/877/CFSP; Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region 2000/458/CFSP.}
\footnote{Solana, Javier (2001).}
\footnote{Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1}
\footnote{See Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.402.}
\footnote{See e.g. Keukeleire, Stephan, and MacNaughtan, Jennifer (2008), pp.155f.; Cameron, Fraser (2007), pp.31f.;}
\footnote{See Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.401.}
\footnote{See Smith, Karen E. (2004), p.10.}
\footnote{Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1}
\footnote{See Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.403.}
\end{footnotes}
actions if an operational action is expected and through a common position if a European action has been defined first.\textsuperscript{351} If the Council decides a common position or a joint action based on a common strategy, it does so by qualified majority. Along the evolution of the CFSP, debates about the voting rules in the Council have always existed. Whereas unanimity is considered to safeguard national sovereignty, qualified majority got through as a voting method necessary for effective decision and policy-making.\textsuperscript{352}

Keukeleire and MacNaughtan are right in pointing to the clash between (legal) theory and practice of instruments. In practice, the EU uses the instruments very diffusely. Moreover actors introduce other instruments on an ‘ad-hoc’ basis like: decisions, action plans, strategies and further instruments which are not defined under Article J.2 AT.\textsuperscript{353} Similarly, Karen Smith argues that actors within the frame of the CFSP use mainly diplomatic policy instruments. They include comprehensive declarations, trustful demarches to third states, visits, diplomatic sanctions, political dialogue with third states and other regional groups, as well as proposals for peacebuilding and appointment of special ambassadors.\textsuperscript{354}

Considering the practical side of European foreign policy-making, the five instruments mentioned in the AT and NT may only be considered as an overall method in order to organize and formalize foreign policy-making in the EU.\textsuperscript{355} In order to detect the doings of agents involved in EU foreign-policy making, the empirical part sheds light of the practical demarches of actors. In order to point out whose practices are relevant for document choice, the next part takes a closer look at the actors of EU policy-making.

3.2.3 Actors

This part of the chapter concentrates on the role of the various institutions and agents involved in CFSP-making. Still representing an intergovernmental policy-making field, CFSP policy-making does not share the same policy-making power divisions as the EC’s field.

3.2.3.1 European Council

As the CFSP is still located in the intergovernmental part of EU policy-making, the European Council represents, within this policy field, the highest decision-making organ. Since the MT, the role and the function of the European Council have ever increased. Article J.8 MT lays down that the role of the European Council is to “define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy”. The AT enhanced the position of the European Council by moving the cited article further up the CFSP title. The 1997 reform accredited the European Council, moreover, with the right to decide on common strategies (Article J.3 Clause 2 AT). Having in mind the hard critique by Javier Solana concerning common strategies, the question remains how far the instrument increases the European

\textsuperscript{351} See Keukeleire, Stephan, and MacNaughtan, Jennifer (2008), p.153.
\textsuperscript{352} See Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.405.
\textsuperscript{353} See Keukeleire, Stephan, and MacNaughtan, Jennifer (2008), pp.153f; Eeckhout, Piet (2009), pp.407f.
\textsuperscript{355} See Keukeleire, Stephan, and MacNaughtan, Jennifer (2008), p.154.
Council’s involvement in foreign policy-making. The LT précised the role of the European Council by accrediting to the latter the duty to “identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” (Article 13 LT) relative to the common foreign and security policy. The treaty then also introduced decisions to the instrumental tool-box of the European Council.

3.2.3.2 Council of Ministers

The Council represents the most important actor in European foreign policy-making. Concerning its structure, the Council is not only composed by members of national governments (foreign ministers) but by a host of additional actors who serve the Council in order to execute its function. As the work of the Council is characterized by an administrative structure, the whole process of policy-making in the Council is conducted by diverse actors joining representatives from the states and actors from the inner structure of the EU. These subsections of the Council help to define and implement CFSP “on the basis of general guidelines defined by the European Council” (Article J.3 Clause 3 AT). The administrative holdup is performed by the Council’s General Secretariat, who was introduced by the AT. Before the LT came into force, foreign ministers met in the frame of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC, until 2002 called the General Affairs Council). In order to strengthen the CFSP’s institutional setting, a separate Foreign Affairs Council was created chaired by the HR (Article 9E Clause 3 LT). The Foreign Affairs Council is the main decision-making body in matters of CFSP.

In general, EU institutions are often assisted by committees composed of national representatives in order to ensure European policy-making. In this perspective, CFSP matters are dealt within the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and therein, especially within COREPER II (Permanent Representatives). Taking into account the increasing importance of security and defense matters, there exist three further committees. Concerning the division of powers from a traditional constitutional perspective, the Council exercises legislative and executive rights within the CFSP. Since the MT, the Council defines and implements common positions and joint actions (Articles J.2, J.3 MT). According to Article J.3 Clause 3 AT, the Council “shall recommend common strategies to the European Council”.

In general, the Presidency of the Council is responsible for setting agendas.

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357 Originally called the Political Committee and renamed in the NT the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a committee which meets at the ambassadorial level. Its tasks are to analyze the international situation, to formulate strategies for CFSP and especially CSDP and to prepare and direct a European response to crisis (if authorized by the Council Article 207 EC NT). It is assisted by the highest military body set up within the Council, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). The latter provides the PSC with information and recommendations concerning the military aspects of CSDP. In the same way the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) provides the PSC with information touching on civilian aspects of crisis management. COREPER and PSC function both as bridge-building institutions between the national level of the member states and the European level, especially the Council. Thereby COREPER II deals mainly with internal policy coordination among governments and the PSC deals with the external dimension of foreign policy-making. Besides these committees there exist typically thirty or more working groups on a permanent or an ad hoc basis dealing with CFSP matters. Working groups are composed of senior diplomats from the member states and a Commission representative working on CFSP matters with a topical or geographical focus.
358 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1
circulating position papers and presenting the common view to the outside (Article J.8 AT). In the latter perspective, the Presidency is responsible for the negotiation of international agreements.

3.2.3.3 Commission

Since 1981, the Commission is officially associated with the working structures within the EPC.

But on reading the treaty, the role played by the Commission in CFSP matters seems to be very limited. The MT upgraded the Commission’s role by granting the latter the right to submit proposals concerning common and foreign policy to the Council (Article J.8 Clause 3 MT). To endow its new role with an institutional structure, the Commission divided in early 1993 its Directorate-General (DG) I, until then responsible for external relations, into DG I, responsible for external economic relations and DG IA for external political relations. The MT, AT and NT explicitly laid down that the “Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field” (Article J.9 MT, Article 17 AT; Article 17 NT). The same is said concerning the Commission’s association with the Presidency’s tasks in CFSP matters. But the treaties do not specify how this association should be affected.

In practice, the Commission’s involvement in foreign policy is much greater than the treaties lay down. The strong involvement of the Commission has three main reasons. First, the Commission has, in the form of the DG IA, a large foreign service in Europe where a lot of expertise is located, and therefore considered legitimate to spread expertise. Second, the Commission’s role in external trade relations is much greater than in the intergovernmental policy field. But as trade matters, it may often not be divided from political issues (or at least these are strictly interconnected). The Commission is, in those cases, able to exploit cross-pillar linkages in order to make its voice heard. In this perspective Neill Nugent summarizes: “Consistent external action by the EU is not possible without Commission co-operation”. Third, the Commission is responsible for the implementation of the Union’s budget. The budget is thereby also used for the conduct of CFSP. In this case, the Commission exerts an indirect but effective role.

The role of the Commission in foreign policy-making has been strengthened by the LT. This remains mainly as the function of the External Relations Commissioner in the Foreign Affairs Council. According to the LT, the latter chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and becomes a key foreign policy player. Moreover, the LT lays down that the “European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (Article 9E Clause 1 LT). Thus, the Commission is legally highly involved in the appointment of the HR.

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361 See Ibid., pp.416f.
According to Article 13a LT, the newly created EAS is also composed by staff of the Commission.

The real influence of the Commission in European foreign policy-making in the pre- and post-Lisbon time depends therefore on ‘individual circumstances’ and is highly context-bound.\textsuperscript{362}

In this respect the Commission is able to display an important role if the issue in question demands economic sanctions as the Commission’s competences in external trade are much higher towards political questions. A similar level of influence can be played by the Commission if the Council is in need of specialized information and advice which the Commission is able to deliver. Thereby, the influence is quite weak when the issue in question is a purely political one. Then the Council clearly dominates the making of policy.

Considering what has been said regarding the role of the Commission in foreign policy-making, it is generally limited and not outstanding. As the empirics of this work concentrate on the political side of relations towards Ukraine, the role of the Commission is attended not to play a role.

\textbf{3.2.3.4 European Parliament}

The Rome Treaty accredited the EP only with few formal powers in respect of external relations. Since the SEA of 1987, the EP has had the right to approve association and membership agreements. The EP has some power to block or reject proposed legislation. In the pre-Lisbon time, the AT laid down the Parliament’s role within CFSP:

\begin{quote}
“The Presidency shall conduct the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union’s foreign and security policy.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy”\textsuperscript{363}.
\end{quote}

The above provisions reveal that the Parliament’s role in foreign policy-making is a very limited one. None the less, the Parliament is very active in CFSP matters and the Council follows many of its views and recommendations.\textsuperscript{364} The biggest influence of the Parliament in CFSP is however exercised by the use of its budgetary powers. But, similar to the role played by the Commission, in this respect, the influence on core CFSP-making is a very limited one.

In the LT, the role of the Parliament is still restricted to an advisory, monitoring and holding-to-account role (Article 36 LT). In this respect the EP still does not have the right to initiate legislation in this policy field. It turns out that the role of the EP is a continuously evolving one. As the EP displays a hidden influence on foreign policy-making and as the Council

\textsuperscript{363}\textit{Treaty of Amsterdam}, 1997 O.J. C 340/1
\textsuperscript{364} Eeckhout, Piet (2009), p.417.
follows, many of its views and recommendations, documents from the Parliament may serve as valuable sources to trace back norms and identities at the European level.

The institutional set-up of foreign policy-making at the European level clearly demonstrates that there exists continuity towards more coordination at the EU level in CFSP policy-making. This trend represents a shift from the original wholly intergovernmental structure within EPC to an ever closer and complex ‘Brusselized’ coordination of foreign policy. None the less, reflected in the intergovernmental jacket of CFSP, decision-making remains strongly in the hands of the member states. To what extent and of what nature the real input of states within CFSP can be, will be demonstrated in the case of Poland through the empirical part of this work. Having clarified the making of foreign policy at the European level, the next part sheds light on the policy-making system within the second organization in focus, namely NATO.

3.3 The Foreign Policy System of NATO

This part of the chapter introduces the structure and instances of foreign policy-making within NATO. 365 Being created as a collective defense alliance at the beginning of the Cold War, changes in the external environment led to legal provisions and changes to processes and practices. The following section gives a brief introduction into the evolution of NATO and reflects thereby the nature of NATO. As NATO represents neither a state nor a supranational organization, this reflection sheds light on the process of identity construction within NATO. It turns out that interactions between member states represent the core identity-building process.

At the end, this part will show that the structure and the instances of foreign policy-making in NATO are today a result of past provisions due to macro-level changes and a present dichotomy between political and military actors.

3.3.1 Evolution of NATO

The end of the Second World War changed the worldwide political landscape considerably. In the aftermath, the former Soviet Union and the US started to be locked into a political struggle that could turn into a military conflict at any time. In order to counter the risk of possible Soviet control, extension to other parts of the world and to maintain a secure environment in Western Europe for the development of democracy and economic growth, the National Security Council decided that the US must “help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability” 366. Consequently, the founding treaty of NATO, better known as the Washington Treaty (WT), was officially signed on April 4th 1949, initially by twelve members and came into force on August 24th, 1949. The 14 article long treaty was

365 Instead of speaking of a security making policy system I speak of foreign policy-making on purpose. One could argue that NATO is ‘only’ a collective defense organization or a security community, thus only covering the security and defense characteristics of foreign policy. But according to the Lisbon Security Strategy, crisis management and reforms are detected as core tasks of NATO. These are fare beyond a policy-making which implicate a collective defense but are situated in the broader sense of foreign policy-making.

built on Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter reaffirming the inherent right of independent states to individual or collective defense. The signatory countries agreed that collective defense, defined in Article 5, would be the “heart of the new Alliance”. Article 6 of the WT put geographical limits on this principle. Initially, Article 5 could not be invoked outside of those territorial limits. According to enlargement, Article 10 WT lays down that “[t]he Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty”. Today, NATO counts 28 members. Poland acceded in March 1999 together with Hungary and the Czech Republic. This was the first enlargement round after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO declared that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO in the future.

Provisions that do not touch on the structure, but rather on the objectives of NATO, are done through the Strategic Concepts. Strategic Concepts are official documents which provide the Alliance with an overview over fundamental security tasks, define the Alliance’s understanding of security and guide its future political and military developments. According to the official terminology, Strategic Concepts are defined as “authoritative statements of the Alliance’s objectives” which provides the organization with “the highest level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving these goals”. At the time of writing (2014) NATO operates under its seventh Strategic Concept, which was introduced in June 2010, and defined NATO’s three core tasks as: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security through partnerships. Generally, every Strategic Concept responds to changes in the external environment and adopts NATO’s objectives to the security and defense requirements of the time. Each of them is supplemented by a classified military document (MC) which offers strategic guidance to the Strategic Concept.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) commonly adopts the strategic document. Before approval by the NAC, the document runs through different levels where debate, negotiation


\[368\] Article 6 WT: For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Department of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea of the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. See NATO Office of Information and Press (2001), p.528.

\[369\] These are: Albania (2009), Belgium (1949), Bulgaria (2004), Canada (1949), Croatia (2009), the Czech Republic (1999), Denmark (1949), Estonia (2004), France (1949), Germany (Federal Republic of Germany 1955), Greece(1952), Hungary (1999), Iceland (1949), Italy (1949), Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), Luxembourg (1949), the Netherlands (1949), Norway (1949), Poland (1999), Portugal (1949), Romania (2004), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain(1982), Turkey(1952), the United Kingdom (1949), and the United States (1949).

\[370\] The first Strategic Concept was introduced in December 1949, followed by the second in December 1952. The third Strategic Concept came into force in May 1957 and the fourth in January 1968. The last three Strategic Concepts were laid down in November 1991 (fifth), in 1999 (sixth) and in June 2010 (seventh).

\[371\] An exception occurred in 1968 when the fourth Strategic Concept was adopted by the Defence Planning Committee having the same authority as the NAC in defence matters. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO A-Z: Strategic Concepts.
and drafting takes place. During the Cold War, when a high risk of an armed military attack existed, the Strategic Concept was principally defined by the military for approval by political authorities. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, drafting is clearly done by political authoritives and given approval by the military.\textsuperscript{372}

In the time of the evolution of NATO’s strategic documents three distinct periods can be extracted:

1. the Cold War period
2. the immediate post-Cold War period
3. the security environment since 9/11\textsuperscript{373}

The period from 1949 until 1991 was characterized by the bipolar confrontation between East and West which led to an expensive arms race. This macro-level tension and further environmental changes, like the Korean War, built the context for the definition of the first four Strategic Concepts.\textsuperscript{374} A closer look is now taken at the last three Strategic Concepts covering the second and the third period of NATO’s strategic document evolution and the time of investigation.

The fifth Strategic Concept coming into force in November 1991 adapted NATO’s objectives and security functions to the new environment.\textsuperscript{375} Part I of the 1991 Strategic Concept identified the new strategic environment and security challenges and risks. The drafters stressed the profound political changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 and also touched on security. In this perspective the regain of independence and sovereignty of formerly Sovietized republics marked European geography significantly (Clause 1). In this respect, the Strategic Concept identified the risk to allied security less as a calculated aggression than as coming from ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes on the territories of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (clause 9) which also included the still existing Soviet Union (clause 10). Because of the changed external environment, NATO started to apply a broader approach to security. Since then, the definition of security changed the pure provision of defense, which also covers today political, economic, social and environmental aspects.\textsuperscript{376} This shift entrained also a differentiation of the means by which security should be attained. The 1991 Concept identified the approaches of dialogue, cooperation and maintenance of a collective defense capability (Clause 24). Dialogue had to be seen in the diplomatic liaisons and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Clause 28), whereas cooperation had been reflected in the Partnership for

\textsuperscript{373} See Ibid.
\textsuperscript{374} The first three Strategic Concepts based on the principle of collective defense and the increase of NATO’s military capability. After the French withdrawal from the integrated military structure, the fourth Strategic Concept was inherently flexible, in substance and interpretation, in order to respond to the needs in time. Because of its flexible character it remained valid until the end of the Cold War. Besides the Strategic Concepts two further reports enhanced the evolution of the political role of the Alliance. The first was the Report of the Three Wise Men launched in December 1956 and drafted by three NATO Foreign Ministers (Canada, Italy and Norway) in order to strengthen political consultation between member countries. The second, the Harmel Report of 1967, proposed a dual – political and military – approach to security. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO A-Z: Strategic Concepts.
Peace (PfP) programs tailored in order to express the inseparability of security among European states. The later program was launched in 1994 and created bilateral cooperation agreements with states from Eastern and Central Europe. Although introducing these new approaches, collective defense via military means still remained at the core of the Alliances’ approach to security. The conservation of the military approach, certainly, reflects the uncertainty of the future development of the former Soviet Bloc. Still, the 1991 “Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Clause 57).

In the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary (1999), the Heads of State and Government approved the sixth Strategic Concept. The new Concept refreshed the member states commitment to common defense and peace in a “new Europe of greater integration”. The Alliances’ fundamental task was summed up as the provision of security via the growth of democratic institutions and the mutual promise to peaceful resolution of disputes, consultation, deterrence and defense. In order to fulfill its security task, the concept defined that member states should engage in crisis management and promote partnership (clause 10). Based on a broad approach to security, it identified NATO’s objectives to be obtained via partnership, cooperation and dialogue (Clause 33). The 1999 Strategic Concept stressed NATO’s central role in the Euro-Atlantic security structure and thus highlighted NATO’s indispensability.

Therefore NATO no longer identified one or more powers to be counterbalanced, but the Strategic Concept expanded security risks to “[s]ome countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area (…)” who’s inner “conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighboring countries” (clause 20). Thus, the Strategic Concept of 1999 already introduced the widening of the geographical application of collective defense to territories other than those of member states.

The events of 9/11 were highly challenging for NATO. On the one hand, these events put the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction on the political agenda. On the other hand, Article 5 of the WT was invoked for the first time in history. Additionally, for the first time, the US territory was threatened and not the European territory. Due to the external shock and in order to safeguard the freedom and the security of its members, NATO initiated internal reforms. Consequently, NATO extended its partnerships in order to deepen political relationships and military cooperation to respond to the ever-increasing global threats.377 Building on the changes occurring, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO states declared in May 2002: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives”.378 It turns out that since 9/11, Article 5 may be applied out of the geographical limits of NATO members.379 The above quotation reveals moreover that 9/11 caused a shift in the legitimacy of NATO’s actions. As the remarks on the first Strategic

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379 9/11 did not only change the nature of ‘collective defense’ in terms of geography but also conceptually. Before 9/11 the underlying assumption was that the United States would help Europe to defend itself. 9/11 offered NATO’s first invocation of Article 5 in response to an attack on the territory of the United States.
Concepts showed, former actions of NATO were bound within geographical and legal limits. Since 9/11 actions are legitimized by the objectives which – geographically - may lie beyond NATO membership territory.

A seventh Strategic Concept capturing the changes that occurred was accepted by the Heads of States and Governments in 2010. Today, the strategic context differs significantly from the one of the Cold War. Security threats are in this sense not any more defined by a powerful counterpart and its military possibilities but include, today, internal instability of states and instability between states, ethnic and religious-based conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, competition for natural resources, genocide, mass migration, organized crimes and cyber-attacks (clauses 7-15). Considering all security threats, NATO’s three essential core tasks are defined as: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security (clause 4). The drafters stressed the open door policy of NATO by stating that “enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies” (clause 27) and highlighted also the promotion of partner relationships (clauses 28-35).

Considering the evolution of NATO and taking into account the Strategic Concepts already gives access to the nature of the organization. Created as a collective defense organization which built on a powerful counterpart, the preconditions for definition changed considerably after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the events of 9/11. Besides the dissolution of the geographical limitation by member states, especially the means for action, changed from hard security provisions like deterrence towards preventive means like cooperation and dialogue. I showed that these means changed along a change of the definition of security.

The evolution of NATO, due to changes in the environment and reflected in the Strategic Concepts, reveals that NATO, today, defines itself as a military and political Alliance. But further concepts which touch on the definition of NATO still float around, such as ‘collective defense organization’, ‘alliance of democracies’, ‘security alliance’, ‘security community’ or ‘European security community’. Therefore, the examination of the legal provisions of the treaty points already to some definitions of NATO. First, the preamble of the WT states: “They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. All of those concepts relate to the definition of a democratic state. Thus, NATO is, in its current form, an alliance of democracies.

Second, as I already showed, the purpose of creation and Article 4 WT defined NATO’s role as the safeguard of freedom and security of the member states based on the principle of collective defense. “[C]ollective defense implies that two or more states or groups have agreed to work together in some manner for the benefit of all parties so inclined, and this cooperation is in the field of defense, which usually suggests military operations.” During the Cold War, collective defense was, in practice, mainly achieved by means of deterrence.

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Since the end of the Cold War the principle of collective defense has remained at the heart of the Alliance whereby the means to achieve it has changed.

Third, a common definition of NATO is that of a security community. In comparison to the notion of collective defense the ascription of security community grasps the concept of integrated defense. “Integrated defense captures NATO’s defense planning process in which all members share detailed data on their forces and the planning calls for the integrated use of those forces.” The concept of security community builds moreover on the assumption that the member states share common values, norms and institutions so that peace becomes the normal way of existence.

Fourth, two outstanding factors allow one to consider NATO as a European Security Community. On the one side, the Strategic Concepts of NATO refer primarily to the territory of Europe. On the other side, since the Berlin-Plus-Arrangement of 2003, between the EU and NATO, EU-members have the right to double-head their forces and to use them for NATO or EU operations.

Taking all the above definitions into consideration, Collins comes to the conclusion that “NATO is a complex international organization, and the answer to the question what is NATO depends on both the context of the question and your understanding of NATO”. In his afterword, Brian Collins offers a definition of NATO as “an evolving collective security organization, whose identity is shaped by its members and through their interactions”. The stress on the interactional process of identity construction relates to the theoretical constructivist assumptions underlying this work. Before jumping into an analysis of how NATO’s interactions shape its identity, I shed light in the next part on the structural constraints and possibilities of organizational policy-making.

### 3.3.2 Organization of NATO

The WT gives very little indication of how NATO’s administrative structures should be organized. Article 9 lays down that there should be a council “on which each of them [the member states, author’s note] shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty”. The Article lays down further on that it “shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time”. Under the same Article the council is given authority to “set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary (…)” and create a “defense committee which shall recommend measures for implementation of Articles 3 and 5”.

Today, NATO’s structure is represented by political/civil and military bodies, who direct NATO’s policies and operations. The main bodies are the NAC, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Military Committee (MC). The NAC was created according to Article 9 WT and represents NATO’s senior political decision-making body. Initially, it met at the ministerial level with a rotating chairmanship. As this procedure proved to be difficult in

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383 See e.g. Adler, Emanuel, and Barnett, Michael (eds.) (1998).
385 Ibid., p.138.
practice, the Allies transformed the NAC in 1952 into a permanent institution staffed with permanent representatives of ambassador rank. Today, the NAC meets periodically at the ministerial level and occasionally at the Heads of State and Government level. The latter meet in the frame of summits. Regardless of the constellation of the NAC’s meetings (Permanent Representatives, Ministers, Heads of State and Government), all of the decisions carry the same weight.

A Secretary General (SecGen) is selected in order to chair the NAC on a permanent basis. His tasks are to coordinate NAC activities and to head the International Staff (IS). Established in 1951, in the administrative structure of NATO, the IS’s task is to support the work of the NAC. In this respect it directs the decision-making process of NATO and safeguards the implementation of decisions. Today, about 1,200 civilians work as NATO’s IS in the Headquarters (HQs) in Brussels. Besides the SecGen, the IS consists of seven divisions and some independent offices. The structure of the IS has been changed several times along the evolution of NATO. The latest structural provisions were made after the November 2002 Prague Summit which aimed to enhance the Alliance’s ability to counteract the new security threats.

A Defense Committee mentioned in Article 9 WT was created by the NAC in September 1949. After the French withdrawal from the integrated military command structure, it changed its name in 1966 to Defense Planning Committee (DPC). In June 2010, the Committee was dissolved.

The MC represents NATO’s senior military authority. It consists of each of the Allies’ Chiefs of Defense Staff. Since 1957 the MC operates in permanent sessions. In analogy to the SecGen, a Chairman of the MC is selected for a three-year term. The MC is accompanied by an executive body, the International Military Staff (IMS). The IMS supports the work of the MC by analyzing military issues and papers which are then decided by the MC. It consists of five functional divisions and further branches and support offices. The role of the ISM is characterized as being the essential bridge-builder between the political authorities of the Alliance and NATO’s Strategic Commanders.

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390 These are: NATO Office of Security, NATO Office of Resources, Office of the Financial Controller, International Board of Auditors. See Ibid.
393 These are: Consultation, command and control, The NATO Situation Centre, NATO Office on Gender Perspectives. See Ibid.
The NAC and the MC meet at on a weekly basis, and in times of crisis even more often, in the NATO HQ. Further meetings of lower level staff (committees or working groups) can occur more frequently and are usually open to all Allies.\textsuperscript{394}

This short excursion into the institutional structure of NATO sheds light on the well-structured and well equipped but not supranationalized structure of NATO. The member states remain the final decision making sources. The Allies are thereby institutionally represented through their permanent delegations at NATO’s HQs. A delegation is comparable to an embassy. It is headed by a permanent (national) representative, an ambassador. His or her function is rooted in bridge-building. At the NATO ground level, it represents the views and standpoints of the national governments and impacts on the NATO decision-making process from a national perspective. At the national ground level it reports on NATO decisions and projects.

Throughout every level, each Ally is represented through a member of the national delegation on every NATO committee. Concerning the NAC, the Allies are represented through their ambassador, and as such NATO provides the institutional access of all members to NATO. Through their permanent presence the member states have the constant opportunity to informal and formal consultation. How policy-making and decisions are taken is therefore the focus of the next part of the chapter.

\subsection*{3.3.3 Decision-Making Process}

The WT defines under Article 4 how an issue can be presented to the forum to be discussed, “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”. This shows that ideas and proposals touching on NATO’s activities can come up in a variety of ways: from individual staff members, national delegations or the NAC. However all ideas and proposals have to come out of official NATO channels and cannot be produced from the outside world (like newspapers, peoples). The proposal is then given to a working group or NATO staff section to be worked out and consulted on.

When it comes to the question of how decisions after consultation should be reached the treaty remains silent. Praxis in the early stages of the organization made consensus the communities’ decision-making process. Consensus means that a decision has to be accepted by every member state. Consequently every member state has a veto and can subsequently hinder a decision. In practice, this means that consultations (and discussions) take place until an agreement is reached which is acceptable to all members.\textsuperscript{395} Accordingly, decisions represent (often) the lowest common denominator.

Because consensus is the aim, national delegations are permanently invited to the working groups of NATO sections trying to agree on an issue before it runs through the structural

\textsuperscript{395} See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO A-Z: Consensus decision-making at NATO.
chain. The rationale behind this practice is to achieve an agreement at the lowest level possible. In this perspective, issues start to be discussed at the IS and IMS levels. Both bodies use, for formal coordination, the ‘silence procedure’. This means that the staff member chairing the debate circulates drafts to the national delegations with a deadline for return. If the national delegations ‘remain silent’ towards the draft, the draft moves up the chain. If one delegation therefore ‘breaks the silence’ and opposes to a given version, the draft has to be renegotiated. This bottom-up procedure of decision-making ensures that compromises are worked out at early stages and consensus is often reached. Compromises are made across the range of issues dealing with the work of NATO. Nevertheless, NATO’s emphasis on security limits the opportunity for compromises in other areas, such as political or economic issues.

Generally, about 5,000 NATO meetings take place every year. The HQ in Brussels represents the main meeting place. A view over the policy-making and decision process of NATO reveals that national delegations all formally have the same access to the procedures occurring. But considering all that has been said, it is apparent that NATO is less institutionalized and less equipped with objectives than the EU. The identity and the norms on which NATO relies are thus assumed to come much more out of context and the interplay of interaction and practice than of legislation. Thus, it will be the reconstruction of practices much more than of legal, structural documents which will shed light on the socialization processes from a bottom-up perspective.

4. Reconstruction of Relations between 1989 and 1999

This chapter reconstructs the actor’s identities and norms towards Central and Eastern Europe and especially Ukraine for the time between 1989 and 1999, the year of Poland’s accession to NATO. I chose this analytical timeframe in order to reflect the actors’ foreign policy-making, which occurred prior to Poland’s engagement on an organizational level and, as such, to draw a status quo from where to analyze changes caused by Polish engagement. As such, analysis of the timeframe reflects the actors’ identities and norms towards the region and Ukraine, which were constructed on a purely bilateral basis and which do not represent the result of formal institutional cooperation which would allow Polish input. Besides the reconstruction of norms and identities, this part sheds light on the evolution of practices which are supposed to be the medium through which input occurs. Having in mind the theoretical assumptions, it is of crucial importance to trace the evolution of practices in order not to fall into the same trap as Pouliot, who suggests that practices are already established concepts without précising what they are before they get established. The remaining question for the second empirical part is to then analyze if Poland transmits those practices (which are reflected in and through doings) on organizations and how it comes along. Apart from the structural change which happened in 1999 due to Polish accession to NATO, 1999 also marks an internal turning point, changing Poland’s engagement in Eastern policy. At this time, “Poland felt secure and

self-confident enough to launch a policy of engagement into Eastern affairs.”\textsuperscript{398} Even though the results of Poland’s Eastern policy engagement in 1999 were still reserved, the direction was clearly established.

In order to proceed, I will analyze documents shaping the policy and the steps of the three actors towards the given region with special focus on Ukraine. The reason for the consideration of the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe and then Ukraine lies in the context. Ukraine first became independent in 1991. Consequently, before 1991, policy towards Ukraine was mainly regionally bound. And even though Ukraine frequently proclaimed its Western orientation and its wish to access to Western organizations, the last dozen years, with the recent developments prove the inner controversial camps of the foreign policy direction. As Ukraine still has not accessed to these organizations, the EU and NATO often treat relations with Ukraine as regionally bound.

Agreements between actors represent institutional structures which shape the structural ground for interactions of actors, on a meta-level. They provide access to the conceptions of norms and identities on which the parties base their relations. Speeches, on the contrary, reflect micro-level constructions of norms and identities. Through examination of the relevant documents I will reconstruct identities, norms and practices which dominated relations during the 90s. As I already mentioned in the theoretical part of this thesis, I do not presume a list of norms a priori, but work strongly inductive. Thus, the kind of norms presented come out of an empirical analysis. Reconstruction of identities, norms and practices of the three actors towards Central and Eastern Europe, and especially Ukraine before Polish accession to both organizations, is highly important for analytical and interpretative reasons. First, as already mentioned above, the results provide the knowledge needed to recognize if norms and identities in the analytical time from 2000 until 2010 are genuine Polish or organizational ones. Second, as already argued in the theoretical part of the work, reality constructions are always context- and history-bound. Additionally, taking into account that the methodological aim of this work queues into the qualitative camp, and as such ‘understanding’ and not only ‘explanation’ is the key-word, the reconstruction of concepts before Polish accession to both organizations becomes unavoidable. Thus, analysis of this timeframe will function as the comparative base from which to analyze the Polish input into organizations after enlargement (Chapter VI).

In the case of Poland, identity is reconstructed according to the theoretical part of this dissertation along a ‘self’ and an ‘other’. Organizational identity is thereby built on a ‘we’ categorization of identity. Reconstruction of each identity will be approached by two different blocks of questions. First, how does each actor (Poland, EU and NATO) ‘self-perceive’ towards the East? What attributes and characteristics does it relate to itself? Second, how does each actor see the ‘other’? What attributes and characteristics does it relate to the other? And why is the other seen as the other and not part of oneself? Generally the notion of identity can be established on two characteristics on how to relate things or persons: similarity or difference.\textsuperscript{399} Analysis of the documents will be done related to this dialectical relationship

\textsuperscript{398} Celewicz, Maciej, and Nizioł-Celewicz, Monika (2006), p.79.
\textsuperscript{399} See Brodský, Jiří (2001), pp.21-38.
and will trace back to the evolution of identity. Thereby, identity may evolve continuously or be marked by breaks. The major shift in identity (towards the other) occurs if the vision and the relationship changes towards the other.

Before starting analysis of the first empirical part, I will introduce a few additional remarks in order to clarify the need for the concept of norm and identity while speaking of socialization, and the link between identity and foreign policy. Reminding one of Wendt’s assumption that “an actor cannot know what it wants until he know who he is,” identity is the core concept underlying and, consequently, influencing policy-making. Ilya Prizel précises in this context, that an identity helps to define norms, rules and values and serves thereby as a basis for the ranking of priorities. The lack of a homogeneous identity – especially in an organization – may therefore be a source of malfunctioning. While states and nations basically rely on a kind of identity which comes from a common language, religion, cultural practice, geographic location or customs (rationalist approach), organizations are much more in the task of creating their identity through internal and external interactions (constructivist approach) and thereby the acceptance or rejection of others (definition of the relation(s) with the other(s)). But at the same time, the pursuit of a specific path in foreign policy may bring about a change in the identity of a certain community. Building on the constructivist viewpoint that identities are formed through interaction, one part of identity-building is created by applying a certain policy. In this context, foreign policy plays a crucial role. As Petr Drulák points out: “The key nexus between the privileged self and the threatening other is reproduced by foreign policy, which thus turns into a key identity- (re)producing activity”. Consequently, identity-building and foreign policy-making are mutually constituting processes. Additionally, states and actors ‘use’ identity to define and to legitimize foreign policy actions. Thereby “rapid changes in the internal and external environments [may cause] the development of new definitions of self and the reordering of priorities, which in turn [may] lead to core changes in foreign policy”. This sheds light on the reciprocity of identity-building and foreign policy.

Considering all said, and looking through dense constructivist lenses, I assume that identity is not a pre-given, stable concept but undergoes a constant redefinition and modernization due to alternations in the internal and external environment. In this context, Przemysław Grudziński stresses that “[s]tates constantly define themselves and other states in the changing context of the international environment, and self-definitions and self-perceptions give rise to the motivations of behaviors and actions in the world”. In this reading, the introduction of new aspects or altered worldviews should not be considered as a danger to the prevailing identity but as a reflection of its modernization. Putting the ‘making of’ characteristic of identity to the foreground shifts the analytical view to the interaction of the actors who create identity. Thus,

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402 See Ibid., p.34.
405 See Prizel, Ilya (1998), p.19. The issue of the interconnection between identity and legitimacy is dense and the analytical focus does not lie on this relationship. Nevertheless one should bear in mind this relationship analytically as it underlays the dialectical relationship between identity and foreign policy.
406 Ibid., p.2.
actors play an active role in the ‘making of’ identity. Thus, identity “is ‘made’ rather than ‘discovered’, it is a process, not a state, it is a loose, dynamic set of actions and reactions, patterns and regulations to follow which are in constant mutual interaction, further modified by countless situational circumstances”\textsuperscript{408}. Thereby, identities and norms determine a state’s interest and its actions in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{409} Transmitting this observation to organizations highlights the importance of identities and norms for foreign policy-making.

In the following sections, I will reconstruct through document analysis the ‘making of’ policies, norms and identity of the three actors in relation to Central and Eastern European States for the time ranging from 1989 until 1999 and the underlying evolving practices. Concerning Poland, analysis will reconstruct what one might label as ‘national political identity towards the Eastern regions’ with special attention drawn to Ukraine. Following the theoretical assumptions, identity will be reconstructed through the interpretation of foreign policy aims and actions towards Ukraine. The norms to which I draw attention, are organizing principles (organizing the behavior in bilateral relations) and fundamental norms reflected in political strategies.\textsuperscript{410} It becomes obvious that only three categories are considered within this chapter, namely norm, identity and practice. The three further categories will be reflected within the next chapter (concrete deeds, mechanisms, power).\textsuperscript{411}

Concerning the given organizations, the notion of political identity is more ambiguous. NATO is an international organization with a clear intergovernmental structure. The EU started as an economical project and is still on the way towards a political Union. It maintains a lot of supranational rights in different policy areas but not in foreign policy-making. In this context, I will speak analytically of an ‘organizational political identity towards the Eastern region (especially Ukraine)’ being aware that both organizations do not represent de facto and de jure full political Unions but are concerned with political relations. I start the reconstruction with a view on Polish foreign policy-making and its relation towards Ukraine in the given timeframe. As bilateral relations were very dense, each ‘time-block’ is followed by a short summary, highlighting the results in the categories in question. Having elaborated all these aspects I use additional remarks in order to not only to ‘explain’ but to ‘understand’ relations in the conclusion. Besides, I reconstruct practices. After having reconstructed Polish-Ukrainian relations, in the next step I look into European relations with Ukraine between 1991 and 1999. This part is organized according to the structure of Polish-Ukrainian relations. The third part – relations between NATO and Ukraine – is organized differently as relations between both parties turned out to be in their infancy. Accordingly, this part examines the Eastern dimension (ED) of NATO policy in the time ranging from 1991 until 1999 and then summarizes findings concerning norms, identities and practices. The chapter ends with an overall conclusion drawing a status quo from whence to analyze changes and interpret practices in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{408} Szwed, Robert (2007), p.18.
\textsuperscript{410} See for a classification of norms pp.33f.
\textsuperscript{411} See methodology pp.53f.
4.1 Poland

4.1.1 Poland and its Foreign Policy-Making from 1989 until 2000: Characteristics

This part presents a short overview of Polish foreign policy from the time of regaining of independence and the election of the first non-communist government at the end of 1989 up until 1999, the year of Polish accession to NATO. It contextualizes the evolution of practices and aims to give the reader a first impression of which tradition the actor in focus – Poland – builds its foreign policy-making. It reveals the characteristics of Polish foreign policy-making and actions which were very special due to the substantial internal and external changes being experienced. As this dissertation focuses on Polish-Ukrainian relations, I will pay special attention to the Eastern dimension of Polish foreign policy. Thereby, it should be noted that the term ‘Eastern policy’ is frequently used to describe a part of Polish foreign policy; according to Roman Kuźniar, it is inaccurate in nature for two reasons. First, the genuine roots of the Polish Eastern policy date back to a time where the USSR was the only neighbor in the East. Thus, basically the approach was conceptualized around only one neighbor. Today, Poland does not run ‘one’ Eastern policy towards all neighboring states. The policies towards bordering states differ due to different historical, political, cultural or strategic interconnections with the state in question. Second, at the very beginning of the 90s the USSR still existed. Thus, the Central and Eastern European states regained their independence at different points in history. Speaking about Polish Eastern policy, it becomes clear that it needs a specification of the Eastern state(s) in question.

1989 marks a crucial point in modern Polish history. For the first time in a dozen years, Poland was confronted with the task of defining new policy directions on its own. But internal and external processes challenged the definition of new foreign policy directions at the time. Internally, after nearly 200 years of separations and dependence, Poland regained its sovereignty. Consequently, Poland’s construction of a national identity and its role in the international system remained in the last couple of dozen of years a purely academic question. Especially in the bipolar world structure, Polish efforts in foreign policy matters were all ruled by Moscow. Therefore a foreign policy tradition to rely on did not exist. As Kuźniar précises about the time of foreign policy-making in 1989 and right after, "Finally, it is important that in Poland, as in any democratic state, there were conflicts about foreign policy, about its priorities and about the choices that were made. (...) But at the time there were few good points of reference. Most frequently the models were found in the decidedly outdated examples of the Second Republic (...), however, the ideas and choices around which the conflicts revolved were serious".

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412 This, however, does not mean that I exclude other aspects of foreign policy-making such as security or the Western orientation. But – as already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis – I do not consider external relations which include for example transnational economic relations.
413 Roman Kuźniar has until recently been an adviser of the Polish president for international affairs. See Nałęcz, Kuźniar, Korzeniowski... Komorowski kompletuje doradców [Nałęcz, Kuźniar, Korzeniowski... Komorowski completes his advisors] (16 August 2010). Basically he is professor for international affairs and former director of the PISM.
415 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.84.
416 Poland lived a short time in independence in the interwar time.
Externally, the USSR still existed until 1991. The Republics under the sphere of Soviet influence proceeded in freeing themselves and (re)gained independence. This changed Poland’s geopolitical situation and its strategic interests continually and deeply. Because of the process of internal and external changes, the direction of Polish foreign policy remained very vague in the beginning. According to the personnel structure, the Communists tried to conserve their power by putting their own deputy in the position of foreign minister. Contrarily the independent (non-party) professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski was appointed this post.418

In the first years of independence, the Polish political landscape was very much troubled and underwent a lot of governmental changes. Often, the government ruled without a parliamentary majority.419 From 1989 until 1993, Poland was governed by Solidarność-elites, then from 1993 until 1997 the post-communists (SLD-Democratic Left government) came to power. From 1997 until 2001 the post-communists lost their majority due to delayed reforms and a right-center-grouping, the ‘Solidarity Electoral Action’ (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS), together with the ‘Freedom Union’ (Unia Wolności, UW), a liberal grouping, formed the government. Despite this actor heterogeneity, the same time was marked by a high continuity and consensus in foreign policy matters, which during the first four years of the young Polish Republic can clearly be attributed to the office-holder of Foreign Minister, Skubiszewski. Keeping foreign policy apart from domestic political battles, he managed to maintain a consensus towards the main directions in foreign policy: western orientation and good relations with the East.420 The following section continues the last point and reconstructs the Eastern dimension of policy-making with special focus on Polish-Ukrainian relations. It is divided into three periods, namely from 1989 until 1993, from 1993 until 1995 and finally from 1995 until 1999.

4.1.2 Polish-Ukrainian Relations

4.1.2.1 Polish-Ukrainian Relations from 1989 until 1993 – Taking Impetus

Until 1989, all Central and Eastern European States were put under one and the same political umbrella, ruled by the communist system. The implosion of the Soviet Union which was underway entrained a multitude of consequences for the seceding states. In order to feed the new situation with political substance and to structurally reorganize the inner situation and order, Poland organized from February until April 1989 ‘Round Table Talks’ bringing together the communist faction and the opposition. The main achievement of the talks was the agreement on partially free elections to Sejm and Senate which took place in June 1989. As a

419 The reason for the fragmentation of the Polish party system lies in the will of the Polish government to allow a comprehensive representation of citizens. In this perspective the representatives agreed on that a grouping of at least 15 members could subscribe as a political party in the party law of 1990. This led to an immense amount of political parties. Additionally, the 5% threshold came only into force in 1993. See Münch, Holger (2007), p.54.
420 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.51.
consequence, on 12 September 1989, a new government came into power and the first non-communist Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was elected.

But the collapse of the communist system did not only entail the transformation of Poland’s internal structure but also roused Poland’s neighboring states. When the Soviet Union imploded in December 1991, four new independent states (Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania) were created at Poland’s eastern border. This in turn changed Poland’s geopolitical position and forced Poland to establish policies towards the newly-independent Eastern states. The crucial question after nearly 200 years of dependence, division and occupation was how Poland perceived those states (especially Ukraine) and on what kind of identity concept it would start to base relations. A short historical back view will show the roots of thought in this matter.

Going back in time, the political leaders during the interwar time, Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski, had entirely opposed conceptions about relations with neighboring states and therein Ukraine. Whereby Piłsudski argued that the independence of Ukraine would be the right political goal for which to strive, Dmowski was convinced that dependence of Ukraine on Russia would guarantee a peaceful regional situation. In spite of the opposed conception concerning the neighborhood, internally both leaders identified Poland as a great nation. Polish intellectuals started to revise Poland’s international role since the mid-60s. During this period, for the first time in centuries, Poland started to develop an Eastern European identity. Within this concept, Poles recognized that their independence, freedom and sovereignty could only come along with the process of democratization of its direct neighbors. A very influential concept and vision of Poland’s role and relations in a post bipolar world with its direct neighbors – especially with Ukraine – came at the time of the Paris-based émigré journal ‘Kultura’ and its editor Jerzy Giedroyć. His concept of Poland’s role within the international system was built on a good relationship with Russia, a separation of identity with the Eastern States and the surrender of the vision of Poland as a great power.

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421 Tadeusz Mazowiecki was part of the realist strand in Poland. Those circle, associated with the Catholic Church, assumed that an alliance with the Soviet Union was inevitable and the price to be paid for Moscow’s recognition of Poland’s sovereignty. Adherents proclaimed an affiliation with the Eastern bloc because they all feared a military intervention of the USSR if Poland tried to free itself from the former sphere of domination too fast. See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.39

422 In the short time of Polish independence between both World Wars Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935) and Roman Dmowski (1864-1939) were the dominant personalities on the political scene. Thereby they were strongly opposed characters. Concerning foreign relations the crucial element they based relations on was Poland’s position between Germany and Russia. The approach towards these states dominated also the character of relations with other states. Whereby Dmowski identified Germany as the main source of threat, Piłsudski was convinced that Russia was the main aggressor. Consequently Piłsudski supported Ukrainian independence whereby Dmowski brought along comprehension for Russia and its claims of dependence. See Davies, Norman (2006), pp.118-135.

423 Piłsudski who came to power in 1926 started particularly close cooperation with Ukraine in the sphere of secret military and intelligence cooperation. This cooperation clearly had an anti-Soviet and anti-Russian thrust. See Kłoczowski, Jerzy (2002), p.96.

424 This approach was also supported by the representatives of the church who assumed that Poland’s freedom and independence were strongly interdependent with the situation in the neighboring states. See Prizel, Ilya (1998), pp.94-101.

425 See Ibid., p.94f.
playing the role of ‘antemurale christianitas’ and protecting Europe from Bolshevik influence, Juliusz Mieroszeski – another editor of Kultura – pleaded that Poland should play a bridging-role: connecting Western European states with the Eastern ones, the latter with Russia at the top. The rationale behind this concept was based on the assumption that Russia would always play a greater role for Europe than Poland ever could.

Although the Polish political elite, since regaining independence, was very much influenced by these thoughts, implementing a coherent policy seemed to be a burden. A first practical and symbolic step in building good relations with Russia – the legal successor of the Soviet Union – was Prime Minister Mazowiecki’s visit to Moscow at the end of November 1989 – the first visit by a non-communist head of government of a former allied state. Concerning the overall political approach, newly-appointed Foreign Minister Skubiszewski presented the Polish foreign policy goals in front of the Sejm on 26 April 1990. Within his presentation Skubiszewski mentioned among the main foreign policy priorities close relations with its neighbors and regional cooperation. He declared openly that Poland’s neighborhood had an immediate effect on the Polish situation and security policy. Therefore “Poland needs an Eastern policy with a great vision”. Thereby he stressed that “(...) our European policy cannot be dissociated from our neighborhood policy”. Skubiszewski pointed to the still existing political and economic dangers by saying that “(...) we cannot feel free from any potential political and economic endangering”.

According to Skubiszewski close relations with all neighbors (Russia and the seceding Eastern States) were a main foreign policy priority. Consequently, Poland had, since 1990, started to run a double-track policy. The two tracks meant, on the one hand, maintaining the relations with the USSR which still existed, and on the other hand, to support independence of the seceding Republics by building up bilateral relations with those states. The rationale behind the double-track policy was not to interfere in the USSR’s internal affairs, and at the same time, to support independence, freedom and sovereignty in the Republics.

Considering relations with Ukraine, restoration of bilateral relations was not an easy task. Painful historical memories had to be put aside. These painful historical troubles happened mainly in the 20th century. With regaining independence in 1918, Poland claimed the territory of Eastern Galicia which lies in the west of Ukraine. The battle of Lviv came to an end in 1923, when the League of Nations assigned the territory to Poland. Besides the territorial

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426 Antemurale christianitas represents a political myth through which Poland provides itself an important political and cultural function for the development of the European civilization. In this interpretation of history, Poland protected Europe from Russian orthodox influences and Eastern barbarism with a clear commitment to Christianity. See e.g. Hein, Heide (25 March 2003).
428 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.84.
429 Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, 26 April 1990.
430 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Polsce potrzebna jest polityka wschodnia z szeroką wizją (...).” Ibid.
431 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „(...) nasza polityka europejska nie może być odsuwana od naszej polityki wobec sąsiadów.” Ibid.
432 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „(...) nie możemy czuć się wolni od potencjalnych zagrożeń zarówno politycznych, jak i ekonomicznych”. Ibid.
conflict, the minority issue has, since 1989, especially been an aspect complicating the development of bilateral relations. In 1989 200,000 Ukrainians were still living on Polish soil even though Polish national homogeneity was proclaimed all around. In August 1989, a commission to treat minority issues was created in the Polish Sejm, with the task of continually strengthening the rights of minorities. Consequently, the Ukrainian minority could take part in cultural life since the beginning of the 90s. Thereby the greatest political problem was the Polish handling of the ‘action Vistula’, which took place after the Second World War. In August 1990, the Polish senate passed a resolution officially condemning the resettlement. A further problem hindering warm bilateral relations was a lack of legal treatment of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine and the Greek Catholic Church in Poland.

In spite of these painful memories and challenges Ukrainian nationalists hoped that Poland – after the collapse of the Polish communist regime – would support and help Ukrainian independence. Going back to the exposé of 1990, the first proclamations made by Skubiszewski were very promising. Additionally, the visit of a Solidarność delegation in September 1989 to the biggest opposition in Ukraine, raised hopes of substantial Polish support for Ukrainian independence. This development was supported by a meeting of members of the Polish and Ukrainian parliament discussing the potential of a future Polish-Ukrainian dialogue. It becomes obvious that, since the beginning of Polish independence, Ukrainians considered Poland to be their ‘window towards the west’. But reality turned out to be disappointing. Because at the beginning, Chancellor Helmut Kohl resisted recognizing the Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s eastern border, Mazowiecki and his government explicitly requested the presence of Soviet troops in all Visegrad states. This move indicated to Ukraine that its bilateral relationship with Poland would be subordinated to Poland’s relationships towards Germany and the Soviet Union (and later Russia). Poland’s political stance to strengthen good relations with the Soviet Union at the expense of Ukraine was also reflected in Presidents Walesa’s proposal to build a gas pipeline between Russia and Germany bypassing Ukraine and Lithuania.

In order to formalize relations, on 13th October 1990 Poland and Ukraine signed a ‘Declaration on the Principles and the main Directions of the Development of Polish-Ukrainian Relations’. The ten article long declaration, defined the main principles on which bilateral cooperation should be based. With this perspective, relations were meant to be based on sovereign equality, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and non-interference in

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435 See Fedorowicz, Krzysztof (2004), p.44.
436 In the aftermath of the Second World War, Ukrainian ethnic minorities on Polish soil were persecuted because of their support of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Under the term known as ‘Akcja Wisła’ (action ‘Vistula’) all of them were forced to resettle in 1947 from the Eastern borders towards Northern and Western Poland. See Zięba, Ryszard (2002), pp.217ff.
441 The reason for the Polish request for Soviet troops on its soil lies in the fear of being a buffer zone between Germany and Russia as it had happened in history before. Poles feared the repetition of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
inner political directions and the respect of minorities. Both parties stressed in the first Article their aim to strengthen the construction of the European house through regional cooperation. As such, they consider each other as active and important parts for the construction of the European architecture.

On 27 June 1991, Skubiszewski presented his second exposé in front of the Sejm. He stressed that the Polish foreign policy was built on the raison d’etat and the national interest which were sovereignty, security and Poland’s good position with respect to relations with its neighbors, other states in Europe and the world. Thereby Skubiszewski announced that Poland had redefined the term of security. Since then Poland understands security not only in military terms but also in economic, social and ecological terms. The double-track policy was intended to be continued. Skubiszewski stressed that Poland was transferring practices and norms from the European Council on to Polish territory. This indicated a clear top-down direction of change at the time. The foreign minister finished his exposé by pointing to the fact that Poland was confronted with a lot of problems. In the discussion after the presentation of the exposé, Skubiszewski stressed that Poland was clearly open towards the East and that especially relations with Ukraine lay in Poland’s heart. Skubiszewski justified Poland’s reserved relations with Ukraine in the still strong dependence of Ukraine on Moscow.

Running the double-track policy, Skubiszewski visited Kiev, Minsk and Moscow in October 1991. Bilateral relations with Ukraine were still cautious. This, on the one hand, provoked those forces in Poland which wanted to strengthen relations with Ukraine. On the other hand, other voices warned not to provoke Russia with too-close relations with Ukraine and the seceding republics. On 24 August 1991, right after the Soviet coup d’état, Ukraine declared independence. On the Polish side, the resolution was confirmed by the adoption of the Senate (30 August, 1991) and the Sejm (31 August, 1991). During the adoption, the Sejm expressed the conviction that “independent Ukraine will proceed the way of democratic changes establishing therein conditions for good comprehensive neighborhood relations between Poland and Ukraine”. Bilateral contacts intensified. Already, at the beginning of September 1991, the first Ukrainian delegation came to Warsaw in order to start diplomatic relations. In Ukraine, the declaration of independence was waiting to be confirmed by a referendum held on 1st December 1991. 80% of the votes were in favor of independence. In sum, Ukraine regained independence in a smooth, silent way. Poland was the first state to recognize Ukrainian independence officially on the 2nd December 1991. Nearly

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443 See Deklaracja o zasadach i podstawowych kierunkach rozwoju stosunków polsko-ukraińskich.
445 [Translated by D.P.-H.] “Stosunki z Ukrainą leżą nam bardzo na sercu”. [“Relations with Ukraine are close to our heart”.] Ibid.
446 The Soviet coup d’état was an attempt of hard-liners of the communist party to take away control of Soviet President Gorbachev in order to stop the reform process. But after two days Gorbachev turned back to government.
simultaneously with the declaration of the government, President Wałęsa held an interview with Russian media and proclaimed full Polish support for a federal transformation of the Soviet Union and apologized for the governmental declaration. As such, he supported the plans of Mikhail Gorbachev to reintegrate the Republics. The presidential reasoning was in line with the standing of many Western states, which doubted Ukraine’s independence giving relations with Russia priority. Walesa’s move was a mirror for the dense interpretation of presidential rights and overlapping of competencies in foreign policy issues at a time rooted in the unclear legal division of rights.

Ukrainian independence and the implosion of the Soviet Union on 20 December 1991 put an end to the Polish double-track policy. In consequence, Poland had to revise its foreign policy strategy towards the Eastern states. Immediately after regaining independence, Poland and Ukraine started to intensify contacts in order to complete rules for bilateral relations. First negotiations took place in Kiev on 27 and 28 January 1992, followed by a second round in Warsaw from 9 until 12 March. Complementary contacts between defense ministries took place. Consultations and cooperation at the military level were important in so far as Ukraine refused to return nuclear weapons to Russia, which, in turn, endangered Poland’s security situation.

In his exposé and the following discussion in 1992, Skubiszewski stressed that Poland was not surrounded by any enemies. The three pillars of Poland’s foreign policy were identified at the time as: European direction, Eastern dimension and regional development. Skubiszewski labeled Poland as a ‘pioneer’ in relations with the seceding states of the USSR due to the double-track policy. Skubiszewski stressed Poland’s special role for Ukraine because Poland was the only state to send a parliamentary deputy to Ukraine at a time when Ukraine was freeing itself from the Soviet empire.

On 18 May 1992 Poland and Ukraine signed a treaty in Warsaw on good neighborly and friendly relations and cooperation. The treaty established the structural frame for cooperation in different policy areas. The treaty was based on the bilateral declaration of 1990. In the preface, both states declared to engage into the construction of a fair and friendly Europe and especially Central Europe. Both states label themselves as ‘brother states’. Article 1 laid down that relations should rely on friendship, cooperation, mutual respect, understanding, trust and good neighborhood. Both parties underlined to resign to any territorial claims now and in the future (Article 2). The importance of the treaty was manifested in the date of its signing. It was signed only four days before an equivalent treaty was signed with Russia. This may be seen as a symbolic reflection that Poland supported Ukrainian independence and condemned Russian imperialism. Just a few days after signing, both presidents met in Kiev and signed four further agreements formalizing cooperation. The four arrangements touched on: legal assistance and legal relations, readmission of people illegally crossing the Polish-Ukrainian

451 See Chapter 3 pp.69ff.
452 Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, 8 May 1992.
border, notification in case of nuclear failures and cooperation with regard to nuclear safety and radiological protection and inter-regional cooperation.

But after adoption of the treaty, Polish-Ukrainian relations became silent. Both states concentrated on their own internal political problems. Ukraine was still searching for its own place in Europe. Poland suffered from internal political problems touching on the creation of a new government. At the legal level, the adoption of the LC on 17 October 1992 did not introduce the needed reforms and deepened confusion in Polish foreign policy-making. In spite of the symbolic gesture made by the signing of the treaty and the seceding agreements, it became clear that, at the time, Poland gave relations with Russia priority over relations with its direct neighbors.454

From the beginning of 1993, Polish-Ukrainian relations gained new impetus through a variety of visits from political representatives of both states. In February 1993, Polish and Ukrainian foreign ministers signed an agreement concerning cooperation in the military field.455 A protocol introducing a ‘Consultative Committee of the Polish and Ukrainian President’ was signed on 12 January 1993.456 The Committee was meant to deepen friendly relations and to give bilateral relations a new political impetus. During his visit to Kiev from 24 until 26 of May 1993, President Wałęsa stressed that the positive development of Ukraine was of high interest for Poland and that, from the Polish stance, a lot of areas for possible cooperation existed.457 In order to define each state’s vision of future bilateral cooperation, the ‘Consultative Committee of the Polish and Ukrainian President’ was called. Additionally, two expert teams were created in order to check cooperation in the security field and the solution of the minority problems.

On 29 April 1993 Foreign Minister Skubiszewski presented his yearly exposé. Right at the beginning, even before presenting Poland’s priorities, he stressed Poland’s role as a ‘stabilizer’ in the region. “Poland’s role as a stabilizing force in this part of Europe is for us of high advantage; it provides us with the opportunity to participate and create relations in Central and Eastern Europe and to realize our highest interests”458. Throughout the exposé it turned out that Poland was interested in those cooperation and mechanisms and supported the same, which strengthened the security situation in its nearest surroundings, thus stabilizing the neighborhood. Skubiszewski took up the notion of ‘stabilization’ several times in his exposé. Discussing the policy towards the East European region, Skubiszewski mentioned Poland’s advantageous geopolitical situation and stressed Poland’s ‘historical chance’. Poland’s highest interests were the strengthening and deepening of democratic changes of its Eastern neighbors. He openly interconnected the security situation of the Eastern states with Poland’s independence, democracy and security. “Poland is conducting its policy towards the Eastern

456 The Committee existed for eight years. During this time fifteen meetings took place in which both states discussed key issues such as security, economic and cultural policies. See Siwiec, Marek (2002), p.49.
neighbors by respecting the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, justice and the respect of human and minority rights.\textsuperscript{459} Poland proclaimed to intensify the political, military, economic and cultural cooperation with Ukraine. According to Skubiszewski, the Polish-Ukrainian relationship already built on ‘special historical and cultural’ interconnections. Ukraine was considered as the ‘little brother’. In consequence, Poland considered itself as the ‘big brother’. An analogy in terminology may be found in Polish-US relations. In the exposés especially at the beginning of the 1990s Poland considered the US its big brother and the presence of the US as its security guarantee. In its relationship towards Ukraine, Poland considered itself to be the ‘big brother’ and security guarantee. Skubiszewski finished the exposé by saying that “[w]e must have the awareness of threats and of chances. The success of our transformation will decide what Poland will be in Europe and the world.”\textsuperscript{460} In the Sejm-discussion after the exposé Skubiszewski stressed that the policy towards the East is developmental “because it’s there where we can do something and in the West we come to an already made status and try to get in”\textsuperscript{461}.

In spite of the proclamations made by Skubiszewski and the interactions on the presidential level, surprisingly, the second half of the year 1993 was characterized by silence in bilateral relations. Thereby, one reason for the silence may be found in the power of right-wing and nationalist forces, at least in Poland, at that time.

4.1.2.2 Summary from 1989 until 1993

Considering relations between Poland and Eastern Europe, respectively Ukraine in the time from 1989 through the first half of 1993, reveals that since the beginning of its independence, Poland was highly interested in developing an Eastern policy with a great vision. Respecting the uncertainties of the internal and external situation at the time, Poland was interested in strengthening its newly regained independence by not endangering it through imprudent actions. In foreign policy this standing was reflected in the double-track policy. Throughout the exposés it turned out that Poland was self-aware of its limited possibilities and limited powers. In the first foreign policy exposé, Skubiszewski drew a picture of Poland as a weak actor which could be endangered by different threats. In this context, Skubiszewski underlined Poland’s regional bond for the provision of its security. Interconnecting the political and security situation in the neighborhood, with a direct effect on Poland’s security, constituted Ukraine and other neighboring states as part of the Polish security sphere. In the 1991 exposé, Skubiszewski stressed that Poland was clearly open towards the East and that especially relations with Ukraine lay in Poland’s heart.\textsuperscript{462} Thus, the Foreign Minister pointed to an emotional relation between both states and identified Ukraine as part of a self. The picture drawn from the foreign minister in 1991 did not so much differ from the picture drawn in 1990. In 1991 Skubiszewski pointed to the redefinition of the notion of security which was


\textsuperscript{460} [Translated by D.P.-H.] “Musimy mieć świadomość zarówno zagrożeń, jak i szans. Sukces naszych przeobrażeń zdecyduje o tym, czy Polska będzie w Europie i na świecie”. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{461} [Translated by D.P.-H.] “(...) że polityka na Wschodzie jest rozwojowa, bo tam właśnie możemy coś zrobić, a na Zachodzie przychodzimy do gotowego is staramy się tam dostać.” Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, 30 April 1993.

\textsuperscript{462} See Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, 27 June 1991.
widened to encompass economic, social and ecological aspects. Although, at the time, Poland practiced on the declarative level support for independent Ukraine, equivalent deeds on the action level were less visible until Ukraine regained independence in 1991. The reason for it may be found in Poland’s still formal membership in agreements under Soviet rule and the existing Soviet supremacy over Ukraine. What thereby became obvious was Poland’s identification of Russia as the ‘to-be-respected’ other. On the conceptual level this became obvious through Poland’s double-track policy as Poland did not want to annoy Russia with its bilateral relations with the newly independent states. In another reading of the double-track policy, it may be considered as a support against the neo-imperialistic tendencies of Russia.

After independence, Ukraine welcomed the declarative engagement of Poland for Ukrainian independence and intensified relations with Poland. Ukrainian engagement with Poland may also be seen as a reflection of Ukraine’s protection against the big neighbor in the East: Russia. Thus, both Poland and Ukraine at the time conceptualized Russia as the other from whom to distinguish. As Ryszard Zięba underlines in this context, the ‘Russian factor’ functioned as a “driving force in the background at this ‘get-together’.”

Looking through identity classes reveals that considering Russia as the ‘other’ was one persistent characteristic of Polish-Ukrainian relations at the time. Nevertheless, Poland did not want to displease Russia by its relations with Ukraine and demonstrated the importance of relations with Russia on different occasions. The approach towards Russia therefore differed at the time between the conceptual level and the practical level. The prioritization of Russia was at the time much more evident in declarative practice than in the concrete realization of relations. At the same time Poland tried to demonstrate its close ties with Ukraine if possible. The most evident example was the date of signature on the treaty of good neighborly relations. The quickness of Polish recognition of Ukrainian independence reflected Ukraine’s importance for Poland. The Sejm comment revealed that the Polish government was fully convinced that independence of and democracy in Ukraine was the only right political order in order to ensure security and stability. As such it became evident very quickly that a sovereign and independent Ukraine fully fledged with democracy, was considered by Poland as the highest security guarantee for Poland at the Eastern border. Thus, fundamental norms of sovereignty, independence and democracy played on Polish relations with Ukraine.

Ukraine’s regaining of independence and the implosion of the Soviet Union at the end of December 1991, put an end to the Polish double-track policy. In the subsequent exposé of 1992 Skubiszewski identified Poland as a ‘pioneer’ of the region and as such self-described as a blueprint for other (neighboring) states in transition. Throughout the exposé Skubiszewski attributed Poland a special role for Ukraine and the region. The special relation between both states was conceptually manifested through the agreement of 1992, in which both states labeled themselves as ‘brother states’. Thereby they established a familial relation between themselves. Additionally, besides the explicit lexical conception, the agreement revealed on a meta-level the norms (organizing principles) on which bilateral relations were meant to be based: friendship, cooperation, mutual respect, understanding, trust and good neighborhood.

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In the subsequent exposé of 1993, the foreign minister stressed the stabilizing force of Poland for the region. As such he conceptualized Poland as a Central and Eastern European center and point of reference for a transformation towards stability. The explicit repetition of the lexeme (stability) can be traced back to the pre-dominant importance of the fundamental norm of stability for Poland at the time. In order to protect itself (and thereby establish security and stability in and for Poland) the democratization of independent Ukraine was considered as the only possible process. Skubiszewski justified and thereby legitimized the Polish engagement in Ukraine with the existing historical and cultural bond between both states. Accordingly, Ukraine was conceptualized as being part of Poland’s historical and cultural identity. Within this conception, Poland, self-identified as Ukraine’s ‘big brother’, set an example and tried to input into a transformation ‘à la polonaise’. All this engagement was in close relation with Poland’s claim of power in the Central and Eastern European regions. Considering bilateral relations with Ukraine, the establishment of the Presidential Committee in May 1993 showed that bilateral relations were meant not only to take place at the ministerial and intergovernmental level but also between presidents.

In spite of the partial silence between both states in the time from 1989 until 1993 it became evident that, since the beginning of redefinition of Polish foreign policy towards the East, Ukraine occupied a particular role and was very quickly considered by Poland as part of a self. As such, the independence of Ukraine was considered a guarantee against renewed Russian imperial claims. Poland considered Ukraine to be part of its own identity on different levels (historical, cultural, security and political ties). It became obvious that Poland conceptualized Ukraine on an emotional basis by considering Ukraine to be part of a self-described family. Thereby Poland considered itself to be the big brother, compassionate with the destiny of Ukraine. The threatening other at the time was clearly seen in Russia.

The norms on which relations with Ukraine relied at the time were besides fundamental norms of sovereignty, independence and democracy, human rights and independence also organizing principles of friendship, cooperation, mutual respect, understanding, trust and good neighborhood. It turned out that Poland was convinced that a democratic state order would ensure stability in the state and in the region, and in consequence would establish security in Ukraine and also in Poland.

4.1.2.3 Polish-Ukrainian Relations from 1993 until 1995: One Security Sphere

Generally, in the time from 1993 until 1995, Poland and Ukraine were both concerned with internal political changes, leaving little room for the development of foreign relations. Accordingly, bilateral relations stagnated at that time.

In autumn of 1993, the post-communist ‘Democratic Left Alliance’ (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD)\textsuperscript{464}, together with the ‘Polish People’s Party’ (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL)\textsuperscript{465}, took power in the Polish government. Ukraine’s fears that Russia would become the main Eastern partner for Poland regained (political) ground. This sentiment was

\textsuperscript{464} The SLD is a social-democratic political party in Poland.

\textsuperscript{465} The PSL is a conservative party.
strengthened through the agreement about a Polish-Russian gas pipeline in September 1993.\textsuperscript{466} Until the beginning of 1994, bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine stagnated. The visit by the Ukrainian foreign minister to Poland, in March 1994, was meant to break through the silence and to stimulate relations. During the meeting, both foreign ministers signed a declaration laying down the principles of a Polish-Ukrainian partnership. Both states confirmed therein its mutual strategic importance and underlined the importance of the partnership for the security situation of the whole region. In spite of the structural achievement under way, Poland resisted during the negotiation to speak of a ‘strategic partnership’ but instead favored the notion of ‘close partnership’.\textsuperscript{467} In the aftermath, attempts to turn the declaration into practice were lacking. No further talks concerning the declaration took place until a presidential election in Ukraine took place in autumn, in which Kuchma, took power. He visited Poland for the first time in January 1995.\textsuperscript{468}

After Foreign Minister Skubiszewski left his post as the head of the MSZ in October 1993, his successor Andrzej Olechowski stated, during an interpellation in front of the Sejm in January 1994, that Poland was free of any territorial dangers and existed in a friendly neighborhood. “Poland is not isolated. Poland lives well with its neighbors. Poland is not endangered by wars.”\textsuperscript{469} In order to demonstrate Poland’s role in security matters, Olechowski cited Albright who proclaimed that “the security of Poland and the Central European region has a direct and material importance for the security of the US and NATO”\textsuperscript{470}.

In order to give Polish-Ukrainian relations new impetus, new methods of cooperation were introduced. In this respect Poland opened cultural representations in Kiev and Lvov. Additionally, cooperation in military actions was planned in the frame of the ‘Partnership for Peace’ program. Economic relations were strengthened through a diversity of programs.\textsuperscript{471} Olechowski specified Polish policy intentions towards Ukraine in his May exposé in front of the Sejm. Right at the beginning of his exposé Olechowski stressed Poland’s uniqueness in maintaining good relations with all neighboring states. He labeled Poland a ‘leader’ of the region in reference to political and economic reforms. Towards all neighboring states he proclaimed: “We are ready to become close friends, we strive to establish a network of understanding (…)”.\textsuperscript{472} Concerning the Eastern dimension, Olechowski identified Poland’s task by concentrating on activities, strengthening and deepening the security in the region. Security was, at the time, identified as the main foreign policy goal. Poland was striving towards a ‘close partnership’ with Ukraine. “We are creating conditions for a more intense development of political, economic and cultural relations favoring economic and democratic transformation in Ukraine. We are striving for a greater understanding and help from the West

\textsuperscript{466} See Fedorowicz, Krzysztof (2004).
\textsuperscript{467} See Ibid., pp.131f.
\textsuperscript{468} See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.177.
\textsuperscript{470} [Translated by D.P.-H.] „(…) bezpieczeństwo Polski i regionu Europy Środkowej ma bezpośrednie i materialne znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa Stanów Zjednoczonych i NATO”. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{471} See Fedorowicz, Krzysztof (2004), p.125. Economic relations are not of interest for this study. As a consequence, I renounce looking in detail in Polish-Ukrainian economic relations.
Olechowski openly stressed that Ukraine’s independence had a strategic dimension for Poland. In this manner the foreign minister pointed to Russia’s special status in the region. He spoke out that Poland was worried by the ‘special interests’ and the ‘special role’ Russia aimed to play in its neighboring states. In this context Olechowski stressed that Poland “tries to strengthen the atmosphere of stability and trust in the region”\(^{473}\). Olechowski identified integration into organizations – especially the EU and NATO – as a key towards reforms and development in Poland. Thereby “openness towards compromise, responsibility – are today, highest Sejm, our trump and tomorrow our chance”\(^{475}\). To sum up, Olechowski’s foreign policy program had three main goals: first, Poland tried to regain trust from Central European states and to deepen relations with the states of the region. Second, Poland tried to build on relations with Russia without fading out Russia’s neo-imperial tendencies and third, Poland tried to deepen close relations with Ukraine. Even though the exposé implied Poland’s first Eastern policy program under the title ‘Partnership for Transformation’ it failed to stimulate bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine. In spite of great declarations, the Polish Eastern foreign policy manifested in 1994 more on paper than in real political steps. As Kuźniar comments the Polish political handling, “[a]lthough Warsaw made its ‘strategic partnership’ with Ukraine a principle of its foreign policy, the instruments it had, given the traditional low capacity to turn the ‘strategy’ slogan into a set of ‘strategic’ instruments, were far too poor for such a big challenge”\(^{476}\). At the same time, Poland was troubled by internal political problems which concluded with the dismissal of Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak. The new Foreign Minister in the Józef Oleksy government was Władysław Bartoszewski who presented his vision of Polish foreign policy in spring 1995.

Bartoszewski presented four main policy goals which were: integration into NATO and the EU, friendly relations with the neighbors, regional cooperation and intensification of economic relations within the world system. Thereby Poland strived to “input our plan of the construction of the world relying on the principles of democracy, respect of the law and protection of our common heritage”\(^{477}\). “We want to take up initiatives in bilateral relations at the regional and European level, strengthening the process of missile control, deepening stability, openness and predictability of states in military aspects. We want to work on bilateral and regional mechanisms of trust and security, widening and completing a European understanding.”\(^{478}\) With respect to the Eastern policy, Poland wanted to stay ‘patient’ and ‘consistent’. Bartoszewski stressed that Poland’s European policy towards the West and the


\(^{474}\) [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Poprzez współpracę bilateralną i regionalną staramy się umocnić atmosferę stabilności i zaufania w regionie”. Ibid.

\(^{475}\) [Translated by D.P.-H.] „(...) otwartość na kompromis, odpowiedzialność – są dziś, Wysoki Sejmie, naszym atutem, a jutro naszą szansą.” Ibid.

\(^{476}\) Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.265.


\(^{478}\) [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Zamierzamy podejmować inicjatywy w stosunkach dwustronnych, na płaszczyźnie regionalnej i ogółeuropejskiej, utrwalając proces kontroli zbrojen i rozbrojenia, zwiększania stabilności, otwartości i przewidywalności zachowania państw w sferze wojskowej. Zamierzamy pracować nad dwustronnymi i regionalnymi środkami budowy zaufania i bezpieczeństwa, rozszerzającymi i uzupełniającymi obowiązujące porozumienia ogółeuropejskiego.” Ibid.
East was one policy ‘on two legs’. The foreign minister proclaimed that Poland wanted to cooperate in a constructive way with its Eastern neighbors in order to deepen mutual interests. According to Bartoszewski the high rank attributed towards relations with Ukraine built not only on historical interconnections but on common interests. He stressed thereby that these close relations should serve to establish stability in the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe. Concerning Russia, Bartoszewski stressed in the Sejm discussion after the presentation of the exposé that there did not exist any kind of Russia-phobia in Poland. In the same speech he confirmed self-confidently that Poland did not fear Russia. But he also pointed to the restricted possibilities of Poland in this perspective.

In April 1995, the foreign ministers of both states met and discussed further cooperation modalities, European security problems and especially cooperation of both states considering NATO and the EU. In October 1995 the defense ministries of both states signed an agreement concerning cooperation in defense matters.

4.1.2.4 Summary from 1993 until 1995

By signing the declaration of March 1994, both foreign ministers stressed the mutual strategic importance between both states. Additionally they regionalized the concept of security. Poland repeated the importance of regional security for NATO and, as such, tried declaratively to regionalize security on an organizational level.

The opening of cultural representations in Ukraine reflected the identification as a cultural community relying on a cultural bond between both states. In the exposé of 1994, Olechowski self-identified Poland as the blueprint for a successful transformation and labeled Poland in this perspective as a ‘leader’. Throughout the exposé it became obvious that provision of security was the overall aim. Accordingly, the principle of security steered relations towards the neighboring states. As such, Poland repeated the identification of Ukraine as part of its own security sphere. Olechowski stressed Poland’s engagement for a democratic transformation of Ukraine and clearly manifested its aim to put Ukraine on Western agendas. The foreign minister identified Poland as an active and important part in the region by stating that it “tries to strengthen the atmosphere of stability and trust in the region”. It turned out that democratization of Central and Eastern European states, especially of Ukraine, was considered to be the best guarantee for the region’s stability and security. The foreign minister widened the legitimization for the active support of democratization of Ukraine from historical bonds towards common interests in the political, economic and cultural sphere.

What also became obvious, was Poland’s self-estimation as a middle-range power, whose authority was too limited to impact itself on processes and transformations in its close environment.

What may be seen clearly in the exposé of 1995, in contrast to earlier exposés, is a strengthening of self-confidence. Poland – for the first time – self-identified not only as part

of the region with interests in the region but with interests in the whole world system. In what concerned Europe and the region, Poland strived to play an active part and considered itself as the driving force to establish regional security. Towards Eastern Europe Poland identified like a parent who educated its child with patience and consistency. This demonstrates that Poland put itself in the position of ‘teacher’ or a ‘wiser actor’ than the Eastern states, and attributed itself the responsibility to care for these states. Ukraine was thereby considered not only as the historical other with whom Poland shared several memories, but as part of a self with whom Poland shared common interests. Consequently, the foreign minister conceptualized Ukraine as being part of Poland’s interest pool.

An emancipation of Poland may be seen in its relations with Russia. Russia was not seen any more as the fearful power in the East. Bartoszewski proclaimed that Poland did not fear Russia. Although Russia was still considered the other, Poland gave up considering it the frightening other but started to conceptualize it as an equal other.

At the time, it turned out that provision of security was Poland’s main goal. From this perspective, Poland declaratively tried to regionalize security and, as such, considered Ukraine as part of its own security sphere. In order to secure itself, Poland estimated that democratization of its direct neighbor was the only right way. Thus, it turned out that the fundamental norm of democracy was central in Poland’s approach towards Ukraine. The organizing principles that dominating the considered time were stability and trust.

4.1.2.5 Polish-Ukrainian Relations from 1995 until 1999: A Strategic and Close Partnership

At the end of 1995, Kwaśniewski was elected as the new President of Poland. Due to the personnel change, the future of relations between Poland and Ukraine had the potential to evolve in any possible direction and a freezing of bilateral relations was one possible scenario. The opposite turned out to be the reality. In fact, Kwaśniewski’s election gave a new impulse towards bilateral relations. 1996 was followed by a wide range of bilateral visits on different levels which intensified relations between the two states. The fourth session of the presidential Committee of Poland and Ukraine took place in June 1996. Both states stressed their wish to intensify cooperation in Western organizations, namely the EU and NATO, as well as their mutual support for membership accession in this perspective.\(^{482}\) The Committee also prepared President Kuchma’s visit to Poland at the end of June 1996. During this visit, a document was signed allowing Ukrainians to travel to Poland without a visa – the first state in Central Europe for Ukrainians.\(^{483}\) The agreement on abolishing visas came into force on 18\(^{th}\) October 1997. In his speech in front of the Sejm, Kuchma thanked Poland for its international support and its promotion of Ukraine in international organizations. A deepening of relations could also take place when Ukraine, in 1996, changed its stance towards Polish membership of NATO. Fearing first that Polish membership in NATO would be detrimental for Ukraine, it started to consider that Polish membership in NATO would be beneficial for the security situation of the whole region.\(^{484}\) Bilateral relations started to gain drive. The fruits of the

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484 Draus, Jan (2011), p.60.
awakened partnership were manifested in signatures of seceding accords. In October 1996, both states signed an accord on the mutual supply of weapons, military equipment and technical military services. On 20 May 1997 both governments signed an agreement on cooperation in the areas of culture, science and education.\footnote{See Zięba, Ryszard (2002), p.207.}

Kwaśnieski’s vision of relations towards Ukraine was published in a newspaper (Gazeta Wyborcza) on 22 January 1997. In the interview, he encouraged Europe to discover Ukraine. Ukraine, for its part, could always rely on Polish support. In May 1997, both states formalized cooperation on culture, science and education, followed by an agreement on creating a joint military unit for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, in November of the same year. In 1997, further bilateral meetings on diverse levels took place, strengthening bilateral practices.

One element in favor of the deepening of bilateral relations between both states were internal political developments in Poland. In 1995/96, after a governmental turn-over and new elections, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz became Prime Minister and Dariusz Rosati became Foreign Minister. Rosati presented his exposé in front of the Sejm in May 1996. He identified three main strategic goals: security, social and economic development and construction of a friendly international surrounding. The three main interests were precisely defined as: western integration, good neighborhood relations, regional cooperation.\footnote{Strategic goals are in contrast to interests lying on a higher level. In theoretical terms they are lying on the macro-level whereby interests are located on a micro-level and direct next practical steps.} Rosati stressed that Poland had to do its best in order to be seen by the European and by the Euro-Atlantic institutions as an equal partner and as a state which is not only stable due to the domestic situation but also due to its stabilizing influence in the whole region. The growing number of visits from high ranking politicians was thereby interpreted as a mirror of Poland’s growing role in the world.

Poland attributed high importance towards the development of mechanisms of control, arms control and trust building. Again, Rosati underlined that Poland was running one European policy towards the West and the East. He explained Poland’s interest in the Eastern border as proof of a “feeling of responsibility for the destiny of the region and the whole continent”. Concerning relations with Ukraine, Rosati spoke of a ‘close’ partnership. Poland wanted to support Ukraine through teaching of high-ranking people for administration and economy. Furthermore Poland wanted to deepen the political dialogue with Ukraine. In the military field Rosati underlined the already-taken steps towards a Ukrainian-Polish battalion. In the discussion after the exposé Rosati underlined the great consensus in the neighborhood and regional policy of Poland. Concerning relations with Ukraine Rosati emphasized that there were no delays in contacts with Ukraine. He counted all the different contacts on different levels taking place among both states. “Relations with Ukraine are excellent.” Rosati repeated Poland’s approach towards the East. “Russia is our partner with whom we have very special relations.” “We treat Ukraine, independent Ukraine, as a fundamental part of our

\footnote{Translated by D.P.-H.] “Nasze zainteresowanie stabilizacją sytuacji to naszą wschodnią granicą świadczy o poczuciu odpowiedzialnoś Polski za losy regionu i całego kontynentu.” Rosati, Dariusz, 9 May 1996.}

\footnote{Translated by D.P.-H.] “Stosunki z Ukrainą układają się znakomicie.” Ibid.}

\footnote{Translated by D.P.-H.] “Rosja jest partnerem, z którym mamy bardzo szczególne związki.” Ibid.}
security.” Thereby Rosati clearly stressed that Poland did not want to stay in between Ukraine and Russia. According to him relations towards Ukraine did not bear any kind of anti-Russian sentiments and vice versa, relations towards Russia did not bear any kind of anti-Ukrainian sentiments. Rosati entitled this kind of approach as a ‘policy of equal distance’. The foreign minister repeated the mutual commitment of Poland and Ukraine to support each other in perspective of their membership in international organizations. In this context he pleaded for stronger relations between NATO and Ukraine. This claim was reinforced by President Kwaśniewski at a speech held in London, during which he pleaded for a stronger commitment between Ukraine and NATO. Concerning the Polish position in the world, Rosati underlined that Poland strived to establish itself as a predictable partner on the international arena.

The mutual support to join and act in different organizations was also practiced by the prime ministers. In this perspective, during Cimoszewicz’s visit to Ukraine in October 1996, both governments decided to jointly ask for EU financial help in order to rebuild border infrastructure. Polish diplomacy had success in supporting Ukrainian membership in the Council of Europe. Ukrainian diplomats therefore supported Polish membership in the UN in the years 1996/97 as a non-permanent member. This support may be considered as a great success for the character of the bilateral relationship as Ukraine was afraid of NATO enlargement and Polish membership in the organization because it feared a new division in Europe. Concerning military cooperation, in November 1997 both states created a bilateral Polish-Ukrainian Peace Force Battalion (POLUKRBAT).

In May 1997, Foreign Minister Rosati presented his yearly exposé in front of the Sejm. He repeated the unchanged Polish priorities. Polish diplomacy strived towards strengthening of security and of the Polish position on the international scene. In this perspective, Poland wanted to make use of “the position and the potential of Poland in the region”. Concerning relations with Ukraine, Poland considered independent and democratic Ukraine as a guarantee for security and stability, not only for Poland but for the whole of Europe. Concerning the region, Poland would “actively participate in creating a new picture of Central and Eastern Europe.” Rosati estimated that Poland’s role in the region was ever growing as newly elected presidents of the region paid their first visits to Poland. In the Sejm-discussion after the exposé Rosati added that the first visits of newly elected Presidents of Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria proved that Poland was seen as a partner with whom one should strive to have contacts. According to Rosati, Poland was considered “a regional leader”. For this reason

491 See RadioFreeEurope, 9 October 1996.
493 See e.g. Tereshchenko, Volodymyr (2004), p.194.
494 See Rosati, Dariusz, 9 May 1996.
496 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Polska będzie nadal aktywnie uczestniczyć w tworzeniu nowego obrazu Europy Środkowej.” Ibid.
497 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „I jest postrzegana jako lider regionalny”. Ibid.
Poland was a “respected partner (...) whose support counts in the region”\textsuperscript{498}. Considering the self-image of Poland, it should be presented as a “modern democratic state with a dynamic evolving liberal economy and a rich culture”\textsuperscript{499}. Rosati pointed to the fact that the year 1997 marked a tipping point in Polish history. “Poland and its citizens are becoming legitimate parts of the European society and the euro-Atlantic surroundings”\textsuperscript{500}.

In May 1997, President Kwaśniewski visited Ukraine. The meeting contained a historical moment when both Presidents signed a declaration taking responsibility for all the bloody and tragic moments in bilateral history. The treaty was of high importance especially in consideration to the minority problem. Both states obliged to respect the rights and the development of the respective minority grouping.\textsuperscript{501} Besides legal commitments, Kwaśniewski’s personal interest in Ukraine and his personal strong sympathy with President Kuchma were stressed. In Ukraine, some voices even joked that Kuchma sees Kwaśniewski more often than some of his own ministers.\textsuperscript{502}

Bilateral relations at the presidential level continued to be strengthened in spite of elections in Poland at the end of 1997 and at the beginning of 1998. The next presidential meeting took place in January in Ukraine where both presidents – once again – stressed their willingness to engage in closer cooperation in spite of the difficult and tragic common history.\textsuperscript{503} Although the new coalition in Poland (between AWS and UW) declared to strengthen relations with Ukraine, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek did not conduct his first visit to Ukraine before February 1999.\textsuperscript{504} Thereafter, Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek stressed Ukrainian’s strategic importance for the Polish foreign policy in his exposé in front of the Sejm in March 1998. Geremek pointed out that, besides concrete integration into NATO and starting negotiations with the EU, an important aim of Poland would be the “construction of a new political and strategic position of the state – in Europe and the region”\textsuperscript{505}. The role and the place Poland wanted to save for itself was intended to be manifested through four main goals: first, the inner strengthening, second, the introduction to the Western debate and understanding of Europe’s viability and other historical experiences, third, strengthening of NATO and the EU (not only through the input of the own potential but also through the demonstration of new perspectives and new challenges) and fourth, strengthening and acceleration of democratic processes touching on the reconstruction of the region and the construction of a new order in Europe. The main topic in the 1998 exposé was the accession of Poland into NATO (which took place a year later). In this perspective Geremek underlined that Poland would concentrate on influencing within the frame of its own possibilities on the process of

\textsuperscript{498} Rosati, Dariusz, 9 May 1997.
\textsuperscript{499} [Translated by D.P.-H.] “(...) nowoczesne demokratyczne państwo o dynamicznie rozwijającej się gospodarce wolnorynkowej i o bogatej kulturze”. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{500} [Translated by D.P.-H.] “Polska I jej obywatele stają się pełnoprawnymi uczestnikami otwartego społeczeństwa Europy i obszaru euroatlantyckiego”. Ibid. In December 1997, at the summit in in Luxemburg the EU decided to start accession talks with the first five Central and Eastern European States (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia).
\textsuperscript{503} See Ibid., p.194.
\textsuperscript{504} See Ibid., p.195.
\textsuperscript{505} [Translated by D.P.-H.] “Na wyzwania te nakładac s ię będą zadania zogniskowane na budowaniu nowej pozycji politycznej i strategicznej kraju – w Europie i regionie.” Geremek, Bronisław, 5 March 1998a.
ratification. Moreover Poland wanted to act actively in the forums of NATO in order to “put an accent onto the position of Poland as a key state in order to secure the political-military stabilization in the region of Central and Eastern Europe”.\footnote{506} Thereby Geremek underlined that activities undertaken today will be decisive over the future position of Poland in NATO. With respect towards the EU Geremek underlined that Poland was not trying to access because some Brussels technocrats wanted Poland to do so, but because membership in the EU was very much a genuine Polish interest. Poland strived therefore to deepen the dialog with the EU in what concerned a common foreign and security policy because Poland estimated that this policy area was a key element to build up a common European defense system. Geremek summed up that Poland would do everything possible in the EU and NATO in order to create Eastern borders which were characterized by cooperation and openness towards good neighborhood relations. Geremek underlined that Poland wanted to build up a new position in the region and that the position in the region would decide, in the following years, the importance of the role Poland was going to play in NATO and the EU. With respect to Eastern states, Poland strived towards ‘good neighborhood relations’ with Russia and towards ‘a strategic partnership with Ukraine’. Geremek pointed out that Poland would help Ukraine to enter into Western structures. “Independent Ukraine has a key strategic importance for Poland and its security and for the stabilization of the whole region.”\footnote{507} In the Sejm-discussion Geremek closed by saying, “[a]nd what is good for Poland, is good for the EU and good for the world.”\footnote{508}

The next visit of the foreign minister to Ukraine took place in September 1998. During the meeting Poland stressed that it would do everything to support Ukrainian orientation towards Europe. With the help of Canada and the US, Poland undertook diverse consultations with Ukraine in 1998/99, aiming to provide Ukraine with help in order to carry out reforms building on the Polish example. In October 1998 the Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation (PAUCI) was established, intending to provide Ukraine with training.\footnote{509} Thus, besides Poland, Canada and the US also engaged in order to bring Ukraine closer to the West.

In February 1999, Poland and Ukraine introduced the ‘Permanent Polish-Ukrainian Conference on European Integration’. It was created in order to minimize problems which could arise due to Poland’s future membership of the EU. The conference started its work on 29 March 1999.\footnote{510}

In a Sejm discussion on 8 April 1999 Geremek underlined that Poland would prioritize neither Ukraine nor Russia in its Eastern orientation but that relations with both states were of high importance to Poland. Thereby he stressed that with “Ukraine we are related due to a common

\footnote{506}{Translated by D.P.-H.] “(…) zaakcentowania pozycji Polski jako państwo kluczowego w zapewnieniu polityczno-wojskowej stabilizacji w regionie Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej (…).” Geremek, Bronisław, 5 March 1998a.}

\footnote{507}{Translated by D.P.-H.] “(…) niepodległa Ukraina ma kluczowe, strategiczne znaczenie dla Polski I jej bezpieczeństwa oraz dla stabilności w całym regionie.” Ibid.}

\footnote{508}{Geremek, Bronisław, 5 March 1998b.}

\footnote{509}{See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.179.}

history, in good and in bad, with Ukraine we are related due to a common national and international interest.”

In April 1999, Geremek presented Poland’s main foreign policy directions. Geremek stressed that Poland has had great successes on the international scene and “that is not only our own opinion.” Geremek stressed that the location and position of Poland in Europe and common historical experiences were the reason for a common responsibility for the situation in the region. “We co-construct, in the frame of our possibilities, the conditions for a secure development of our Eastern and Southern neighbors.” Poland must guarantee a holistic integration of Poland into the activities of NATO. Poland was interested in conducting an ever-active policy in order to strengthen its position in the region and to strengthen the role of Ukraine in the East. Geremek underlined that Poland strived for the “strong activity of Poland in international organizations.” “We want and have to get a position among the states in NATO which enables us to co-construct the strategy and policy according to our own interests especially in Central and Eastern Europe.” Geremek clearly stated that Poland had the potential and conditions to get a position between the most important states within NATO. Geremek underlined that Poland’s international authority had grown in recent years. Poland would support and take part in initiatives which would strengthen trust and security in the neighborhood. Geremek stated that the region of Central and Eastern Europe would remain the subject of Poland’s special and growing interest. Poland was aware that the position in the region and its relations with Ukraine and Russia would decide over Poland’s position and importance within the EU and NATO. The dialogue with Russia which Poland wanted to consequently build up, should have intensified the understanding and trust for security in the region. Geremek labeled Ukraine as Poland’s strategic partner of special importance. As such he demanded a transformation in Ukraine before a deepening of relations can take place. Geremek underlined that the impasse in bilateral relations had to be broken through.

In spite of positive bilateral developments and the support of Poland for Ukraine, overlapping in competencies in foreign policy-making still existed in Poland. At the same time that President Kwaśniewski announced in Kiev that Polish-Ukrainian borders would be opened after Poland’s accession to the EU, the head of the Polish Committee of European integration announced that Poland would introduce visas for all Ukrainians in 2002.  

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511 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Natomiast z Ukrainą łączył nas losy historyczny, na dobre i na złe, z Ukrainą łączy nas interes narodowy i międzynarodowy.” Geremek, Bronisław, 8 April 1999b.
513 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Współkształtujemy, w ramach naszych możliwości, warunki bezpiecznego rozwoju wschodnich i południowych sąsiadów.” Ibid.
514 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „(...), silnej aktywności naszego kraju w organizacjach międzynarodowych.” Ibid.
515 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Chcemy i musimy uzyskać w gronie państw sojuszniczych pozycję umożliwiającą faktyczne współkształcenie strategii i polityki Sojuszu w sposób zgodny z naszymi interesami, zwłaszcza w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej.” Ibid.
4.1.2.6 Summary from 1995 until 1999

According to the documents, the normative motivation of mutual support gained formalized ground at a meeting of the Presidential Committee of June 1996. Generally, throughout the time period, the mutual support was constantly deepened and practiced.

Since the beginning of Kwaśniewski’s appointment at the end of 1995, the practice of bilateral visits grew constantly. A deepening of bilateral relations on the conceptual level was achieved at the time through the signing of the declaration of a strategic partnership. Although the signed document was entitled ‘declaration’ the declarative upgrading up to ‘strategic’ relations was important. Even though there does not exist an overall definition of strategic partnership, the latter always lays down and points to more than a special relation between parties. In spite of the official commitment towards the strategic partnership with Ukraine, there existed a different declarative conception of the partnership between the president and the foreign minister. Whereby the president signed the ‘strategic’ partnership, the foreign ministers of the time spoke in their exposés of a ‘close’ partnership with Ukraine. Thus, discords between these political levels did not only exist in practice but also on the declarative level.

The practice of formalizing cooperation in different areas provided a ‘getting in touch’ on different levels. Thereby common doings establish a common art de faire which it is important to identify in the same way. The renewed investment and the deepening of Polish-Ukrainian bilateral relations may thereby be seen through Polish lenses as the aim to maintain and even to strengthen its geopolitical status quo in Central and Eastern Europe by transforming Ukraine and other states according to a Polish blueprint.

Looking at the exposé from 1996 a growing self-identification of Poland as an equal partner with Western European states becomes obvious. Poland attributed to itself a growing important force in the region. The foreign minister stressed that Poland felt responsibility for the region and the continent. Again, Poland identified itself as being in the parental role, and thus attributed itself a key constructing role for the destiny of the region and the continent. The foreign minister in 1996 summarized how Poland constructed Ukraine and Russia verbally in the previous years. Ukraine was seen as part of Poland’s security sphere and Russia was constantly considered as a partner. As such the emancipation from Russia became greater. Russia was continuously seen as ‘another other’ but not as a ‘fearful other’ as in the beginning of the 90s. Besides conceptualizing Ukraine as part of Poland’s security sphere, at the time, both states started to support each other mutually with respect to joining international organizations. With this move, Poland tried to put Ukraine on international agendas and Ukraine conversely underpinned Poland’s role to be Ukraine’s bridge towards the West.

In the exposé of 1997 Rosati discursively reinforced Poland’s leader role in the region. Again, the foreign minister regionalized the importance of democratic and independent Ukraine for the security of the region and the continent. In 1997 Poland clearly identified itself as a regional leader who attributed to itself the power to create the region. Poland saw itself as a new and fashionable state. Besides its influence in the creation of the region, Poland estimated
its position in the world as ever-growing. It became clear that Ukraine did not only play an important part in Polish security provision but in all states of the Eastern European region. This raised the importance of Ukraine at the regional level.

The exposé and the Sejm-discussion 1998 were dominated by Poland’s discursive construction of a new political position and thus the new role of Poland in Europe and in the world. It turned out that Poland perceived itself at the time as an influential, powerful state. Geremek underlined the Polish input on the construction of Europe. Poland’s attribute was thereby perceived as contributing a new view due to its Eastern experience. Poland identified as being a key state of the region and also of the world.

It turned out, through the Sejm discussion of 1999, that in the past Poland identified Ukraine as a historic other; in 1999, it fully considered Ukraine as part of Poland’s interest pool and thus as part of itself. Thereby, in 1999 the dominating foreign policy issue was Poland’s entrance into NATO. In consequence, the 1999 exposé was mainly concerned with how Poland identified itself with NATO. It became evident that Poland wanted to play an important role within international organizations and at the time, especially NATO, to ensure the realization of Polish interests. But at the same time, Poland was aware of its limited potential. Whereas Poland identified itself as being a regional leader, it perceived itself in 1999 as being in the international arena as a middle-range power. What characterized its position as a middle-range power, was the fact that it perceived the realization of its foreign policy goals as ensured and possible, through their membership in international organizations.

Analysis of the identification and conceptualization of Ukraine revealed that there existed a different conceptualization between the level of president and foreign minister. Whereby the president signed the ‘strategic partnership’ with Ukraine which then was in practice underpinned by the friendly relationship between both presidents, the foreign ministers continually conceptualized bilateral relations as a ‘close partnership’. This was additionally reflected in the self-identification of the foreign ministers of Poland as being the teacher or parent of Ukraine. In consequence, whereas the president conceptualized an equal relation between the two states, the foreign ministers identified the relations in an asymmetrical manner. A common Polish feature was the identification of Ukraine as being part of Poland’s family.

Generally, in bilateral relations, the considered time signified a switch from formal towards practical cooperation. Considering the entrance into international organizations, the practice which started to be established was mutual support. Looking in particular at Ukraine, democracy (-building) was still the central fundamental norm in the Polish approach, whereby Poland, on different occasions, also manifested the will to build up trust and understanding of Ukraine, the later to be understood as organizing principles.

4.1.3 Conclusion

The emancipation of Poland and the breakdown of the Soviet Union changed Poland’s geopolitical situation deeply. In consequence, Poland had to set out new foreign policy priorities. It turned out that since the beginning of the 1990s, Poland wanted to participate in the construction of a new Europe which also included the definition of relations with its
Eastern neighbors, wherein Ukraine played the most important role. It turned out that at different moments in relations, the internal and external context had always had an impact on the dynamic of relations.

In sum, the Polish-Ukrainian partnership in the 90s evolved constantly and encompassed declarative and practical steps. Considered through practical lenses, the favorable Polish practice towards Ukraine resulted at the time in bilateral meetings and the formalization of cooperation in legal arrangements. Additionally, both states also practiced mutual support for each other. Moreover, Poland practiced the role of responsible parent for Ukraine.

Relations started dynamically at the beginning of the 90s until 1995. After the regaining of independence in Ukraine, the Polish Foreign Ministers (Skubiszewski 1993 and Olechowski 1994) stressed Ukraine’s importance to Poland. At the time, the foreign ministers identified Ukraine as part of the Polish security sphere. Therefore, independence in Ukraine through transformation à la polonaise towards democracy was considered the only right way. The representatives identified Ukraine at the time as being the ‘little brother’ in need of Poland’s parental role. Poland legitimized its striving for power over Ukraine with cultural and historical bonds. Nevertheless the statements had not been yet fulfilled with concrete political activities. The main reason may be found in the new political role of Poland as an independent state. Therefore, it first needed to find and define its own identity. Consequently, Poland lacked a coherent long-term policy for relations with Ukraine. Both states suffered weaknesses due to their newly regained independence and the huge turnovers taking place. The only aim which turned out to be very important to Poland was its aim to maintain geopolitical pluralism in order to counter any new imperial tendencies of Russia. It turned out that Poland was very interested in democratizing Ukraine in order to feel safer. Stabilization was the key word. Poland identified itself as a stabilizing force and Ukraine was the state that had to be stabilized in order to ensure security in Poland.

Relations were enriched by the friendship between presidents, which had evolved since the election of the Polish President Kwaśniewski in 1995. The new government coming into force in 1995 lacked a long vision of Polish-Ukrainian relations which led to a stagnation in relations. The Presidents’ declaration of 1997 therefore marked a landmark in bilateral relations. The evolution of relations was negatively influenced by the lack of coordination in Polish foreign policy-making. Contradictory signals from the president, the prime minister and the foreign minister hindered the development of coherent policy-making towards Ukraine. The statement of both presidents in 1997 marked the institutionalized dialogue on common history. In spite of these problems, Poland had its strongest political neighbor commitment with Ukraine.

In sum, on different levels, Poland ran a policy strongly supporting Ukraine in its transformation and in its approximation with the Western world. Thus, the claim of support was met in practice with concrete deeds.

It turned out that Poland perceived itself, since the beginning of the 90s, as a regional leader and felt responsible for the destiny of Eastern Europe and especially Ukraine. The proclamation of this feeling of responsibility can be found in nearly every exposé in the 90s.
To feel responsibility for the destiny of another actor is similar to the parental role in which Poland put itself. Responsibility is a feeling that especially parents have for their child. Poland never spoke of an obligation, which may be considered as the ‘same coin from the other side’. Obligation raises the feeling of ‘having to do something’. The terminology of responsibility interconnects with the feeling of being a ‘regional leader’ and with teaching another actor how to do things.

Analyzing Polish conceptions of relations towards Ukraine in the 90s manifests that Poland identified itself as a blueprint for the transformation of Eastern states, especially for Ukraine.

The fundamental norm on which Poland built its relations with Ukraine, was the norm of democracy. The overall aim was to establish security via stabilization in Ukraine, the region and, in turn, in Poland. The organizing principles of the bilateral relations were identified throughout the 90s as: trust, friendship, cooperation, mutual respect, mutual support, understanding and good neighborhood.

As the analysis has shown, Poland identified Ukraine as being within a historical and cultural sphere, in the first place. Then, the common identification had been widened since the mid-90s based on common interests in political and economic spheres. There existed a clash in the identification of Ukraine between the prime ministers and the foreign ministers on the one hand and the presidents on the other hand. Whereby the foreign ministers identified Ukraine as the little brother of Poland and Poland, in the same breath, as the parent helping Ukraine to find its way towards democracy; the practiced friendship between presidents put the states on an equal level.

Considering the exposés, it turns out that 1998 marked a crucial moment when Poland started to feel more self-confident and secure to engage in relations towards Ukraine at the international level. This was strengthened through Poland’s accession to NATO in early 1999. The next part will shed light on bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine in the given framework.

4.2 European Union

4.2.1 European*\textsuperscript{517} ‘Foreign Policy’ towards Eastern Europe from 1989 until 1999

Today, it is common knowledge that the EU’s security and stability is inherently linked to that of Europe as a whole. Speaking of Europe as a whole puts a very basic question in the foreground: where are Europe’s limits? The geographical limits are easily described by looking at the external borders of the current member states. The question of the political limits is much harder to answer. Because of the ‘wing-policy’\textsuperscript{518} of the EU, the political

\\textsuperscript{517} I use the notion of Europe on purpose as it allows me to describe the institutional set of EC and EU under one notion. Until 1993 today’s Union was constituted by three Communities (European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)) which then turned into the European Union with the Treaty of Maastricht.

\textsuperscript{518} By ‘wing-policy’ I am referring to the EU spreading its political wings over states which are not member states. By means of programs and aids the EU practices the use of protective wings over states by which it tries to transform those states according to European directions.
influence of the EU is much wider than its geographical limits. Thus, the questions that appear are those of the very content of European policy towards the rest of Europe (outside the EU) and the evolution of the same. This puts the question of external relations and foreign policy into focus. Reconstruction of the evolution of foreign policy-making towards the East — with a special focus on Ukraine — thus reconstructs the norms and the identity the EC/EU had towards this region and especially Ukraine. According to analysis of the Polish-Ukrainian relation done in the previous part, I will focus on the regional policy of the EC/EU, as approaches towards Ukraine are often bound by regional considerations and strategies. Today, in sum, the EU policy towards Ukraine is a mix of measures building on the assumption that Ukraine is too big to be ignored and too much a barrel of soft security threats due to its geopolitical interconnection with Russia and its internal political evolution. The new developments on the world-scene are a clear reflection of this assertion. In order to reconstruct the pure European relation (and thus the norms and the identity) without Polish input, the following chapter reviews the time from 1989 until 1999. I consider the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) negotiations during 2000, which led to the signing of the NT as the breaking point in Polish input at the EU-level. During these negotiations Poland was already in a position to discuss the ‘left-overs’ of Amsterdam, and thereby formed an active part of policy-making.

The end of the Cold War did not only challenge the internal political structure of states as the previous part of this chapter uncovered, but also forced Western organizations, therein mainly EC/EU and NATO, to redefine their policy towards the Central and Eastern European states. Managing the new political context was a challenging task for organizations. Over the last dozen years, the newly independent states were politically and completely bound to the Soviet Union and, consequently, organizations thought throughout their policies towards the whole region of the Soviet Union. Suddenly, organizations also had the task of defining new concepts and new directions of foreign policy, considering the new world order. The content of the new direction of foreign policy then had to rely – as every kind of policy – on a certain identity towards a state fed by norms. But, at the time of Ukrainian independence, the EC could not rely on a historical identity practiced throughout the last decades. Consequently, the EC had the task of building up completely new structures for bilateral relations. This is the (theoretical) moment where the constructivist approach towards identity comes into play, presupposing interplay between interests, norms and identity as reciprocal entities. In this context, the reconstruction of practiced bilateral relations throughout the 90s gives access to a status quo of identity and norm-construction of Europe towards Ukraine prior to Polish input. Before turning to trace back the formalization of political relations, the following remarks

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519 For reasons of simplicity I speak of foreign policy describing steps in bilateral relations in the following being aware first, that CFSP had not been introduced before 1993 and second, that some steps have an economic focus and are thus part of external relations.  
521 IGCs are called into being by the European Council and are composed by representatives of member states. The Commission and the European Parliament also participate. IGCs are the formal procedure for negotiating amendments of the founding treaties.  
522 See for an overview of the Polish position concerning the IGC negotiations e.g. Wilga, Maciej (2006), pp. 323-350.
shed light on the difficulties and challenges for the EC/EU at the beginning of the 90s for the creation of relations.

At the time, the EC lacked a coherent strategy towards the East and therein Ukraine. Instead of praising the emancipation of Central and Eastern European States, the EC considered the devolution of the USSR as a destabilizing factor as the following observations will show. Until 1991, the EC defined the continuity of the existence of the USSR as the main political interest. According to this line of argumentation, Russia was considered the only powerful state in the region.\textsuperscript{523} Since the independence of Ukraine in December 1991, Ukrainian elites had started to praise Ukraine’s geopolitical position and tried to convince the West and thereby the EC to believe that supporting Ukrainian independence was “too important to fail”\textsuperscript{524}. In spite of declarative attempts, the EC stayed very reserved in its attempts to deepen relations with Ukraine. The EC’s reserved standing may, in part, be traced back to Ukrainian-Russian relations at the time. After regaining independence, Ukraine feared falling back under Russian imperialist power. In this context, under the pen of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, relations towards Russia in the years from 1991 until 1993 were characterized by negation. Negation meant the explicit political distance of Ukraine from Russia and the post-Soviet region.\textsuperscript{525} Besides its hard standing towards Russia and its political newcomer position, Ukraine isolated itself at the time, internationally because of its stubbornness considering denuclearization.\textsuperscript{526} Finally, in January 1994, Ukraine signed together with the US and Russia a document renouncing its nuclear weapons. Accordingly, tensions with Russia came to an end in 1993. Consequently, from 1994 onwards, Ukraine ran a ‘multiple vector foreign policy’. This was reflected in the Ukrainian elite’s attempts to engage in close relations with the West (Euro-Atlantic relations) and Russia. At the same time, in 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a resolution defining the main directions of Ukrainian foreign policy. Until 2004, this document remained the only official document outlining Ukrainian foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the characterization of the document as being a resolution reflects the fact that the document was not considered an official basic document, but rather a temporary paper. Considering the content, the resolution reflected the self-identification of Ukraine as a kind of regional superpower. The creation of close relations with the EU, NATO and the US were given priority and accession to the EC was identified as an explicit strategic goal for the future.\textsuperscript{527} Thus, since the beginning of independence, Ukraine strived explicitly towards close relations with the West.

In spite of the Ukrainian pro-European aspirations, the EU continued to take a reserved stance on Ukraine. In consequence, bilateral relations throughout the 90s came along a bit like a short story. Nevertheless, first steps of formalizing bilateral relations took place, which already disclosed and given access to a European picture of Ukraine. Thereby, the characteristics of bilateral relations shed light on the strong interdependence of European policy on internal developments in Ukraine. Besides, the ‘Russian factor’ played upon

\textsuperscript{524} Gromadzki, Grzegorz et al. (eds.) (2004), p.33.
\textsuperscript{525} See Tereshchenko, Volodymyr (2004), 94f.
\textsuperscript{526} See Fedorowicz, Krzysztof (2004), pp.160f.
\textsuperscript{527} See Ukrainian Map: History of Ukraine. History of Ukraine (1939-2005 years); Tereshchenko, Volodymyr (2004), p.89.
bilateral relations. The next part takes a brief look into bilateral relations during the given timeframe of the 90s, and analyzes identities, norms and practices in bilateral relations. It is divided into three periods, namely from 1991 until 1994, from 1995 until 1998 and finally 1999.

4.2.2 EU/EC-Ukrainian Relations

4.2.2.1 EU-Ukrainian Relations from 1991 until 1994: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the fast process of gaining independence confronted Ukraine with a political, social and economic vacuum. The EC felt the responsibility to assist and to fill this gap very quickly. Although the EC, at the time, doubted Ukraine’s power to fulfil its autonomy on its own, it did not want to risk Ukraine falling back under the Russian sphere of influence. Since the beginning of the resolution of the Soviet Union, the EC started to differentiate between relations towards the newly independent states and CIS-states. For the latter, the EC introduced the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States program (TACIS).\(^\text{528}\) TACIS was built up out of the blue without any a priori experience. Its main objective was to support the countries in transition to market economies and democratic societies using technical and financial help. The program was applied until 1999 and was tailored to each individual state’s demands. Apart from the technical and financial help, a political dimension was not foreseen within this program. This is also reflected in the fact that the program was not integrated in any further (political) strategy.\(^\text{529}\) Ukraine signed the agreement with the EC on TACIS on 11 February 1992.\(^\text{530}\)

Concerning the political dimension of relations, the first phase started after the referendum of Ukrainian independence of 1st of December 1991, when the foreign minister of the Netherlands, representing the EC, officially recognized Ukrainian independence. From that time, Ukraine had the task of announcing its own interests, priorities and instruments in foreign policy-making which, in turn, would provide access to Ukrainian-European relations. This however, turned out to be a challenging task for Ukrainian policy-makers for two reasons. First and foremost, similar to Poland, Ukraine could not rely on a given foreign policy tradition as it had remained under Soviet control for nearly 50 years. Thus, Ukraine could not build its foreign policy approach on already existing sources. Second, Ukraine had been, since the beginning of independence, faced with two major legacy problems, to which Ukrainian elites did not have immediate solutions. The first touched on the effective resolution of the Chernobyl-problem and the second concerned the Soviet legacy of nuclear forces on Ukrainian territory.\(^\text{531}\) As Ukrainian elites remained unanimous, especially on the last question during 1992/93, they put Ukraine in a position of “virtual isolation”.\(^\text{532}\)

\(^{528}\) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a loose association of states which was formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although Ukraine represents one of the three founding states of December 1991, it did not ratify the Charter but participates as associate member.


\(^{530}\) See European Union: EEAS. Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine. *Chronology of Bilateral Relations*.

\(^{531}\) See Tereshchenko, Volodymyr (2004), p.22.

\(^{532}\) Lupiy, Bohdan (1996), p.46.
situation was hardened even more by the ambivalent and ambitious signals concerning the Western orientation of Ukraine. The ambiguity had its roots in the diversity of political force in Ukraine at the time. When independent Ukraine emerged, the state was dominated by two major political groupings, the ‘national Ukrainian’ and the ‘supra-national (imperial) Soviet/East Slavonics’. A third grouping, which included the largest population proportion of about 40 to 50%, was very unsettled in character concerning questions of national and international life. Consequently, the largest group did not rely on a common concept of identity on which newly foreign directions could be constructed. Such an undecided majority was the source of Ukrainian ambivalence at the time.\textsuperscript{533} Due to this internal political ambiguity, the EC in turn remained skeptical and cautious in its approach towards Ukraine. Consequently, political bilateral relations with the EC remained very vague. Nevertheless, the first top-level EU-Ukraine meeting took place on 14 September 1992 bringing together the Ukrainian President Kravchuk and the President of the EC Commission Jacques Delors.\textsuperscript{534}

In 1993/94, the elites in Kiev agreed on the dismantling of nuclear weapons. In this context, in November 1993, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the START-1\textsuperscript{535} agreement. At the end of 1994, Kiev finally adhered to the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty ABM\textsuperscript{536}. The commitment to denuclearization was an important political step for Ukraine as it moved the state towards the West.\textsuperscript{537} In parallel to the evolution of denuclearization, concrete talks considering cooperation between Ukraine and the EC started in March 1993. Two further meeting rounds in June and November 1993 deepened the negotiations on cooperation. Finally, in June 1994, both parties signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)\textsuperscript{538} which replaced the trade agreement of 1989 between the EC and the Soviet Union. Only ten days after signing, on 24 June, the EU signed a comparable document with Russia.\textsuperscript{539} In the preface both parties stressed that their wish for agreement is built on “existing historical links” and “common values”. The agreement should help to “strengthen the political and the economic freedoms which constitute the very basis of the partnership”. The EU’s support for transformation and transition will “contribute to safeguarding of peace and stability in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and on the European Continent as a whole”. Moreover the cooperation should promote “security”. Independent Ukraine would contribute to the “stability of the region”. Both parties declared that they were “CONVINCED of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly those of minorities, the establishment of a multiparty system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market economy”. The last point of the preface enclosed the mutual wish of

\textsuperscript{534}See European Union: EEAS. Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine. *Chronology of Bilateral Relations*.
\textsuperscript{535}Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was a bilateral agreement signed between the US and the USSR in July 1991 and entered into force in December 1994. Its proposal was a reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. The treaty expired in December 2009 and was replaced by a second treaty between the US and Russia signed in 2010.
\textsuperscript{536}The ABM was an agreement signed in 1972 between the US and the Soviet Union in order to defend areas against nuclear weapons. The ABM had a lifetime of 30 years.
\textsuperscript{538}See *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine*, 1998 O.J. L 49/3.
\textsuperscript{539}See Wehrschütz, Christina F. (1999).
“developing regular political dialogue on bilateral and international issues of mutual interest”. The objectives of the PCA were laid down concretely in Article 1 of the agreement which were:

- to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development of close political relations;
- to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties and so to foster their sustainable development;
- to provide a basis for mutually advantageous economic, social, financial, civil scientific technological and cultural co-operation;
- to support Ukrainian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy.”

Concerning the security dimension of the agreement it envisaged “identification of the EU policy towards Ukraine, its separation from the EU policy towards Russia, and support of the European countries and the world community of the strategy of integration of Ukraine with the EU”.

The PCA created several committees charged with cooperation. The most important institution was the Cooperation Council bringing together high ranking ministers at least once a year (Article 85). The Council of Cooperation was charged with the supervision of the implementation of the agreement and the dynamic sampling of EU-Ukrainian relations. The Council was assisted by a Cooperation Committee. A Parliamentary Cooperation Committee was additionally established in order to provide members of the Ukrainian parliament and the EP a place to meet and to exchange views (Article 90).

After signing of the PCA, the EC defined the main guidelines, considering the approach towards Ukraine during the European summit of 1994 taking place in Corfu. The guidelines were:

- “sustained support for the consolidation of democratic institutions, for respect for human rights and for the achievement of market-oriented economic reforms;
- the promotion of good neighbourly relations between Ukraine and its neighbours;
- cooperation with Ukraine in multilateral forums
- support of regional and international stability and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- support for the full implementation of nuclear and conventional disarmament agreements;
- acceptance by Ukraine of internationally accepted nuclear safety standards within an overall energy policy”.

After accession to the ABM in November 1994 the Union proclaimed a ‘common position’ towards Ukraine. The common position defined the following priorities in bilateral relations:

- “[t]o develop a strong political relationship with Ukraine and increase cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union. The European Union will continue to support the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine
- “[t]o support democratic development in Ukraine, through offering advice on legislation and practical assistance in establishing democratic institutions, and through contacts between Ukrainian and European officials, parliamentarians and non-governmental organizations at different levels

• [t]o support economic stabilization and reform (...)
• [t]o continue to provide assistance for the process of nuclear disarmament (...)
• [t]o promote early implementation of the EU/G7 action plan on nuclear safety and reform of the energy sector, which, in particular, would lead to the closure of Chernobyl (...)."542

4.2.2.2 Summary from 1991 until 1994

Until the independence of Ukraine in December 1991, the EC remained reluctant towards establishing political agreements with Ukraine which demonstrates on the one hand, that it considered Ukraine strongly as the other being under Soviet rule. On the other hand, this ignorance clearly indicated the supremacy of EC-Soviet respectively EC-Russian relations of the time. Formalization of bilateral relations started with the signing of TACIS in 1992. The objectives of the program indicated the dimension on which Europe based its relations with Ukraine at the time, namely technical and financial help. By providing this kind of help, it turns out that Europe’s aim in relations with Ukraine was characterized in the beginning by reducing the destabilizing factors coming from Ukraine by the help of transforming the state towards Western standards. Relations were first deepened structurally two years later by signing the PCA. In the meantime, the internal political situation in Ukraine represented a burden so that Europe did not turn intensively toward Ukraine. Thus, the context played on the silent situation between both parties. With the PCA, a political dimension in bilateral relations was structurally established. The document laid down Europe’s main interests and goals towards Ukraine, based profoundly on “political and economic freedom”. The preface of the document showed Europe’s picture of Ukraine at the time. Consequently, the PCA was based on “historical links” and “common values”. As such, the EC conceptualized Ukraine as being part of a historic and value-based collective. This indication, however, is very general in nature. All states within geographic Europe are linked historically due to their close proximity; and no indication is given to the types of common values. Consequently the content of value collective remains undefined. Additionally – as mentioned in the theoretical part of the study – values are individually held principles. Consequently, the definition of the common ground, and, as such, a common identity remains very vague in the PCA. Throughout the preface, it becomes obvious that the EC considered Ukraine as not being part of the EU, but of the region of Central and Eastern Europe. Although the PCA introduced a political dimension for bilateral relations and provided the parties with an “appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development of close political relations” – it remained unsaid what particular closeness was meant. The objectives of the PCA indicate that the agreement was signed in order to provide, promote and support the structural foundation on which to then deepen relations. As the ‘provision, promotion and support’ were meant to be guaranteed by Europe towards Ukraine, the asymmetrical conception of relations between both actors is indicated. The PCA clearly reflects a European demand list for the transformation of Ukraine, so that at the end a partnership and cooperation would become possible. As such, Europe identified Ukraine as the other equipped with deficiencies at the political, economic, social, financial, civil, scientific, technological and cultural levels (see objectives) in order to become Europe’s partner. Concerning the security

dimension of the agreement, what is significant is the declarative demand of a distinctive European approach towards Ukraine without considering the Russian factor. Consequently, at least on the structural level, Ukraine and Russia were conceptualized as distinguished entities.

Generally, the preface and the objective as well as the whole agreement, manifest that strong emphasis on bilateral relations is put on the economic dimension of the bilateral relations and Ukraine’s transition into a democratic and market economy. The foundation of this practice was already laid down by the TACIS program.

The political objective of the PCA is reflected in the security and stability provision of the region through the transition of Ukraine into a democratic state. Thus, in sum, the PCA defined the European demands of Ukraine’s transformation according to Western standards and norms (respect of human rights, minority rights, multi-party system, market economy) and the European support of it. In contrast, Europe did not offer any services in return. Although the agreement marked the end of a period of restrained relations between the EU and Ukraine, it did not at all consider accession or integration of Kiev into European structures. In this context, Robert Pernetta summarizes that “PCA are association agreements without the prospect of accession”.\(^{543}\) Additionally, the agreement lacked a timetable – which clearly had a negative input on the kind of dynamic force of relations. Significant of the still vague relations between both actors, is the time of ratification of the PCA which dates four years later, in 1998.

In the same year of the signing of the PCA, the EU passed the main guidelines concerning its approach towards Ukraine (Corfu). On the one hand, the guidelines reflected and repeated the organizing principles on which the Union based its approach towards Ukraine and, on the other hand showed how the EU characterized relations with Ukraine. The Union mainly based its relations (in the form of organizing principles) on support and cooperation – whereas these principles remained at the time on the declarative level. The only (hard) demand the Union was making, was Ukraine’s acceptance of nuclear safety treaties. The latest guideline also reflected the security-providing character on which the Union based its relation with Ukraine. The main goal the Union tried to achieve was the internal and external security of Ukraine. In this respect, the European Council clearly pronounced its preoccupation with the global issue of nuclear safety in Ukraine and thereby bound Ukraine on the security identity of Europe as a whole.

The common position of November 1994, concerning Ukraine, put the aim of the development of intense political relations on top. On the one hand, the common position added to the motivation of the development of political relations. On the other hand, the common position revealed that the EU was very much interested in stabilizing Ukraine without giving Ukraine the perspective of membership.

Thus, the EU practiced in its relations to Ukraine a certain distance. Considering the structural commitments thus far, reveals that the main organizing principle was reflected in the norm of support. The notion of support reflects an asymmetrical relationship, because the documents reveal only one-sided support, namely the support of the EU towards Ukraine.

Taking into consideration the PCA, the main guidelines and the common position reveals that the EU concentrated its approach towards Ukraine on a step by step approach by means of political dialogue and economic relations in order to stabilize and secure the region and Europe as a whole. As such, the EU identified independently and transformed Ukraine as an important factor for the stability of Europe as a whole. Thus the political dimension was considered as a means and Ukraine was identified as part of Europe’s security and stability. This, in turn, did not conceptualize Ukraine as part of a political identity. The envisaged political dialogue was mainly concerned with the support of democratization and transformation of the political system. Thereby all the proclamations concerning political relations remained on the declarative level and were not yet put into practice.

4.2.2.3 EU-Ukrainian Relations from 1995 until 1998: The Strategy of Integration

All in all, the signing of the PCA marked the beginning of new relations between the EU and Ukraine, as it laid out the structural frame for political dialogue (although it still had not yet been ratified). Previously, only trade was contractually regulated. At this time, the Ukrainian elite clearly and officially strived for integration into Western structures and especially the EU and NATO.544 Both actors started to improve conditions for cooperation. In March 1995, the EU-Ukraine Committee was founded as one of the first institutions of cooperation. During the first meeting, both parties discussed different forms of cooperation, mainly in trade.545 These discussions found contractual basis in a trade agreement signed by both parties in June 1995. Consequently, some of the economic aspects of the PCA already came into force in February 1996. In May 1996, the second meeting of the EU-Ukraine Joint Committee took place. As a result of the talks, in June 1996, the EU recognized Ukraine as a country with an economy in transition.546 Building on the expansion of economic relations, both parties aimed to establish a free trade zone in 1996. Although Ukraine strove to establish such a zone, it lacked economic and institutional groundings at the time. In November 1996, the European Commission adopted the Action Plan (AP) for Ukraine, wherein the EU expressed its readiness to advance political and economic relations with Ukraine.547 According to its own words, the EU had two fundamental objectives with the AP, namely “giving the Ukrainian authorities a political signal of the stepping-up of EU support and exploring ways to improve the development of existing aid and possibilities for strengthening EU and Member State cooperation in this area.”548 The EU proposed to target actions in six areas which were:

- “support for economic reform;
- the transformation of Ukrainian society;
- integration of Ukraine into the European security architecture;
- regional cooperation support;

544 It is worth mentioning that there existed a huge discrepancy between the elites and the people in Ukraine concerning European integration. Until the end of the 90s the people did not support the European choice but instead favored the institutionalization of relations with Russia. Since 2000 integration into EU became more lucrative also on the national level. See Tereshchenko, Volodymyr (2004), pp.218ff.
546 See Ibid.
547 See Ibid.
• forging closer contractual relations;
• energy sector reform”.  

In the AP, the EU “welcome[d] the Ukrainian desire for rapprochement with Europe”. The EU added in the press release, that it had signed the PCA with Ukraine stimulated by Ukraine’s choice for Europe. 

During the third EU-Ukraine Joint Committee meeting both parties concentrated on problems touching on economic relations.

The PCA came into force on 1 March 1998. Although the agreement did not contain any regulation for accession or integration, President Kuchma had already declared, on 15 July 1996, that the integration of Ukraine into the EU, was a strategic goal of Ukraine. In September 1997 the first Ukraine-EU summit took place in Kiev, approving Ukraine’s European choice. In March 1998, Ukraine officially announced its intention to become an EU associate member. Kuchma reinforced on 11 June 1998 the Ukrainian aspiration of integration in a decree. The decree reflected Ukraine’s aspiration of integration into the EU and defined Ukraine’s need for change, taking into account the new geopolitical situation. Integration in the EU was again labeled a strategic goal.

In October 1998, the second Ukraine-EU summit took place in Vienna. During the talks, cooperation in foreign policy and defense was discussed and bilateral relations among parties were characterized as ‘strategic and unique’. 

Apart from the deepening of relations between Ukraine and the EU, Ukraine also improved its relations with Russia. In 1997, both states agreed on the most important problems in bilateral relations, especially the recognition of the Ukrainian border and the division of the Black Sea fleet. The attempts as well as the concrete political steps of rapprochement between both states gave the West the possibility of strengthening relations with Ukraine, without having to fear an affront with Russia. Thereby, the fundamental priority of the EU in the region remained good relations with Russia by recognizing independence and the strategic importance of Ukraine.

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550 Ibid.
552 See Ibid.
4.2.2.4 Summary from 1995 until 1998

It turned out that, during the time from 1995 until 1998, the EU mainly practiced the intensification of economic relations with Ukraine. From 1995 until late 1996 the talks were mainly concerned with trade and economics.

In December 1996, the EU adopted the EU Council of Ministers AP on Ukraine, wherein the EU expressed its readiness to advance political and economic relations with Ukraine. The AP reaffirmed, on the structural level, the European demands on Ukraine in a liberal market economy and democracy. The EU identified Ukraine therein as part of Europe’s security sphere. Thereby, generally, between 1995 and 1997, economic cooperation clearly dominated bilateral relations. Political issues seemed to be waiting to be treated within the frame of the PCA. Although the PCA came into force in March 1998, integration into European structures was only intended by Ukraine and not supported by the EU. Although the EU considered Ukraine as being part of a common security sphere (with underlying economic interests), it did not consider it as being a political part of the Union.

4.2.2.5 EU-Ukrainian Relations in 1999: The European Strategy towards Ukraine

At the Cologne Summit in June 1999, the EU declared qualitatively new successes in relations with Ukraine. Another important signal towards Ukraine, was sent from the EU in July 1999 during the third Ukraine-EU summit taking place in Kiev. Throughout the talks, the EU accorded Ukraine a positive integration course and proclaimed its openness to start preparations for a free trade zone.558

In spite of the repeated and reinforced proclamation of aspiration of integration, the EU remained skeptical towards Ukraine’s accession and remained silent concerning Ukraine’s striving towards European integration. The Ukrainian strategy of integration was first answered by the EU at the summit in Helsinki in December 1999. During these negotiations, the EU passed a ‘common strategy’ towards Ukraine and thereby made use of the new CFSP instrument. As such, the common strategy was the Union’s political answer towards the Ukrainian declarative attempts at integration into the Union. It represents a core document in EU-Ukrainian relations. The common strategy defined the main strategic goals of the EU towards Ukraine which were (Part I, Article 5):

- “to contribute to the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Ukraine, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a stable functioning market economy which will benefit all the people of Ukraine;
- to cooperate with Ukraine in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe and the wider world, and in finding effective responses to common challenges facing the continent;
- to increase economic, political and cultural cooperation with Ukraine as well as cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs.”559

559 European Council: Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine, 1999/877/CFSP.
The principle objectives of the partnership were identified as (Part II):

- “support of the democratic and economic transformation of Ukraine;
- strengthening of stability and security and the
- cooperation in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe.”

In the beginning of the common strategy, the EU praised Ukraine’s determinant position as a regional actor. It attributed Ukraine “excellent relations with all its neighbours” (Article 2) and lauded Ukraine as “a source of regional stability” (Article 2). The EU stressed that the realization of the PCA remained the fundamental instrument on which bilateral relations should rely (Article 7). The common strategy foresaw the creation of EU APs towards Ukraine in a six-month time frame.

In spite of the positive spirit of the document, the EU remained reluctant with regard to the accession prospects of Ukraine. In Part I, Article 6 “[t]he EU acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine's pro-European choice. The EU remains firmly committed to working with Ukraine at national, regional and local levels, in order to support a successful political and economic transformation in Ukraine, which will facilitate Ukraine's further rapprochement with the EU.” Ukrainian officials wanted to integrate the prospect of membership into the document. EU officials, on the contrary, blocked that initiative by pointing to the fact that every state in Europe could apply for membership and in this sense, so could Ukraine. Conversely, this right did not obligate the EU to integrate every state. Before integration was to become possible, the EU officials repeated their demands for transformation in Ukraine. Günther Verheugen, at the time Enlargement Commissioner, even hardened the EU standpoint to keep Ukraine out by drawing a comparison between Ukraine and Mexico, striving to join the US. Having the same kind of bilateral relations with Russia and Ukraine shows that the EU was not ready to let Ukraine in. Ukraine recognized that the EU offered Ukraine and Russia the same prospect of cooperation, without any association or integration aims. Therefore, after Helsinki, Ukrainian elites feared a new division in Europe. The similarity of the European approach towards Russia and Ukraine (even by using a similar choice of words in both documents) made Ukrainian elites feel unsure as Russia has never strived for membership of the EU. Ukraine’s disappointment was manifested in practice by Ukraine’s reorientation towards Russia. Accordingly, the second term of Kuchma’s office (first term: 1994-1999, second term: 1999-2004) was characterized by a strong foreign policy direction towards Russia.

Although turning to Russia, the reluctant and hard standing of the EU was exactly what the post-communist rulers in Ukraine needed. In this context, Oleg Varfolomeyey commented, that “[w]hile pursuing Westernization abroad, [Ukrainian leaders] appear content with political and economic stagnation at home.” Because of the slow transformation at home, it became obvious that Ukrainian politicians wanted to profit from Western benefits but, at the same time, were not ready to really transform the given structures within the state. A group of international experts commented on the situation as follows: “Acknowledging Ukraine as a

561 See Varfolomeyev, Oleg (2002).
562 See Ibid.
potential EU member would be to reward the lack of reform, which would not be desirable. The outcome of this circumstance was that the policies of both actors towards each other were very ambiguous even though the reasons were not the same.

4.2.2.6 Summary of 1999

In 1999, the EU passed the common strategy on Ukraine. The goals and objectives remained very general in nature and repeated Europe’s demands which had already been formulated in former documents. The EU indicated neither how to achieve these goals nor how it interrelated them. Therefore, the common strategy may be interpreted as a very vague formalized document. In spite of all its vagueness, the common strategy provided bilateral relations with a strategic notion, which, at least on the macro-structural level, meant upgrading relations towards Ukraine. Even though, in this document the EU welcomed Ukraine’s ‘European choice’, it did not mention integration into the institutional structures. It only referred to ‘cooperation with, support of and rapprochement with’ Ukraine. Thus, especially the last point – rapprochement with Ukraine – reflects a very vague and general description of a possible institutional connection with or even integration of Ukraine. As such, until 1999, Europe considered Ukraine as the other consisting with deficits at the political and economic level.

In sum, relations between the EU and Ukraine in the 90s may be characterized as attempted. Declarations and agreements made did not find concrete steps in the doings of actors. As such, there existed a huge clash between structural formalizations and practical application. Throughout the 90s, bilateral relations were covered by a ‘European demand list’ for Ukraine. As such Ukraine was not considered an equal in terms of political, economic, scientific, technological and cultural levels but, consequently, identified in all areas as the other. Although Europe defined bilateral cooperation in the PCA on historical links and common values, those indications remained almost declarative. The only joint possession Europe defined with Ukraine, was the identification of Ukraine as part of its own stability and security area. The vague character of bilateral relations may in part be traced back to internal and external contexts. At one moment, Ukraine struggled with internal political problems; in another, Europe did not praise Ukraine’s uniqueness enough and turned, therefore, also to Russia. As Taras Kuzio comments, “confusion, conflicting signals, empty rhetoric and duplicity” have been some of the outcomes of this kind of relation. However, “both sides [seemed to be] happy with the current status quo”.

4.2.3 Conclusion

In sum, there was the huge clash between structural formalizations and the practical application of the goals. At the very beginning of the 90s, the (still) EC turned out to be reluctant towards Ukraine. Concretely, bilateral relations between both actors were non-existent until Ukrainian independence. As Kuzio and Jennifer Moroney commented, “[i]n the

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563 See Gromadzki, Grzegorz et al. (eds.) (2004).
564 See Kuzio, Taras (2003).
early 1990s Ukraine was viewed by the West as an unwelcome addition to the world community of nations.”

Several reasons may be identified for the EU’s reluctant stance towards Ukraine at the beginning of the 90s. First of all, the context played an important role. The dissolution of the Soviet Union came about at a very surprising moment. Russia was the most powerful successor of the Soviet Union and therefore relations towards it were of high importance. Consequently, the EC concentrated on its external relations towards Russia. In this perspective, the EC/EU still considered Ukraine to be part of the Russian sphere of influence and conceptualized the state therefore as being an inferior other. Second, the EU itself had a very full agenda at the time, striving towards deeper integration through the MT. With the creation of the EU, the EC responded to external changes. It turns out, that in this conception, Ukraine, did not present enough of a threat to European security, so that the EC/EU did not pay much attention; as was the case with many other small follower states of the Soviet Union. A third reason came from Ukraine itself. Ukraine was strongly concerned with nation- and state-building and with the finding of its own way. It became obvious that it put reformist attempts aside. Consequently, the EU doubted the ‘European will’ of Ukraine and conceptualized it as the other.

Turning to the formalization of relations, the signing of the PCA in 1994 reflected the mutual commitment to democracy and market economy and defined the objectives for bilateral development. It may be considered as the structural framework of interaction at the time. Thereby it should be considered that the PCA was written by the EU and signed in a second step by both actors. As such, the PCA reflected the EU demands and the EU vision vis-à-vis Ukraine. The PCA defined the strategic aims for bilateral relations in the fields of political dialogue, economic partnership and economic cooperation. It foresaw moreover the development of a regular dialogue on political issues and the establishment of harmonious economic relations. The PCA also mirrored the norms on which the political dialogue should rely, namely the rule of law, the respect of human rights (especially minorities), and the establishment of a multi-party system with free and democratic elections. In sum, the PCA may be seen as a mechanism to harmonize Ukraine with the European ‘lifeworld’. Thereby the PCA suffered from a lack of a rigid timetable. As a consequence, the PCA was able to evolve in any possible direction depending on internal and external developments. In spite of the signing in 1994, it took both actors until 1998 to put the PCA into force. Thus, relations between the two actors remained declarative and attempted and were not lived in practice at the time. This in turn revealed that from a macro-perspective, not only interaction but also non-interaction presented a practice. The EU practice a policy of distance towards Ukraine. Thus, what became obvious is that before 1998 the EC/EU proclaimed its support for Ukraine in its democratic and economic transformations. Thereby, only the economic side of the coin was put into practice. The political side of the medal remained at the declarative level.

In the common strategy of 1999, the European Council recognized Ukrainians’ European aspirations but did not mention any accession prospects. The EU acknowledged Ukraine’s

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566 See for this point also Guicherd, Catherine (2002), p.48.
‘unique position’ in Europe and considered Ukraine as a ‘determinant regional actor’. Therefore, the EU still considered Ukraine as the ‘other’ and not part of the European family as it did not offer Ukraine any accession prospects. The common strategy revealed that, whereas the EU recognized shared values and common interests with Ukraine, it concentrated its one role on cooperation and support of transformation of the state. It recognized Ukraine as part of the ‘stability and security zone’ of Europe and in this context offered only cooperation with the state in order to meet ‘common challenges’. Repeating Ukraine’s importance for the security and stability of Europe as a whole transformed Ukraine into an important strategic ally of the EU, functioning as a buffer zone for European security. Ukraine was thus identified as a strategic ally for the EU.

In the second part of the strategy, the EU laid down its principal objectives. Therein the two dominant organizing principles used by the EU were ‘support’ and ‘cooperation’. Consequently, the EU self-perceived as a ‘helping hand’ of Ukraine. Thereby it lacked concrete steps delineating how to put the declarative attempts into practice. Throughout the strategy, the EU conceptualized Ukraine as being part of a common interest pool, but first and foremost expected from Ukraine its transformation according to European and Western standards. It turned out that the EU demanded the transformation of Ukraine in order to match the norm of stability and security. As such, the EU practiced conditionality without having the legal power to enforce the demands.

Both fundamental documents (PCA and common strategy) reflect the European demands for the transformation of Ukraine but do not offer a strategic commitment to integrate Ukraine.

Generally, the EU’s perception and conception of Ukraine, during the 90s, was strongly dominated by the historical and geopolitical position of Ukraine which was still being considered a part of Russia. Even though the EU started to talk about a partnership, this partnership was not meant in equal terms. The EU demanded from beginning of bilateral relations transformation from Ukraine but did not offer the prospect of membership; Ukraine, in contrast, waited for the prospect of membership. This reflects the strong asymmetric relation between the two actors at the time. The different standing also revealed the different approaches to transformation by the two actors. Whereby the EU may be characterized as a process-oriented institution, Ukraine is a goal-oriented actor. As such, the EU considered that the process of transformation would bring Ukraine closer to the EU. Ukraine, to the contrary, concentrated most on the end of the process, namely membership.567

That the EU considered Ukraine to be outside of the EU may also be confirmed by the fact that the EU upheld a strategic partnership with Ukraine and Russia. The time of signing both documents was very close and may be considered as a conscious move to lump both states together. The declarative attempt from the EU to build up its own approach towards Ukraine was not met in practice. The EU was unable (or unwilling) to outline a coherent strategic objective for Ukraine and to define a place for Ukraine in the European structure.

Although political dialogue was already an objective in the PCA, signed in 1994, the relations between the EC/ EU and Ukraine during the 90s concentrated mainly on economic

567 See also Kuzio, Taras, and Moroney, Jennifer (2001), p.123.
cooperation with the main aim to safeguard security. As such, especially security and regional stability started to form the mantra-like European thought towards Ukraine. Nevertheless, it turned out that the importance of Ukraine for the EU during the 90s was only secondary. The EU had enough on the agenda, considering its internal transformation and the enlargement process underway.

4.3 NATO

4.3.1 NATO Policy towards Eastern Europe from 1991 until 1999

The end of the Cold War, and thus the change of external relations, confronted NATO as well as all other organizations with the redefinition of the very essence of its existence. At the time of the Cold War, the rationale for NATO’s existence was well-defined as a forum for consultation and as an instrument for collective defense against a common enemy – the Soviet Union. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO lost the opponent which previously legitimized its existence. Consequently, NATO was confronted with the task of redefining its self-identity as being the conceptual ground for its existence. As NATO’s main identity conception, based on an external other since its beginning, the reshaping of identity at the beginning of the 90s was determined by an internal process still considering the external situation. In this perspective, the revival of newly-independent states freeing themselves from the Soviet sphere of influence forced NATO to rethink its concept, its aims and its relations towards these states. In the fifth Security Concept (New Security Concept, NSC) adopted in November 1991, NATO changed its definition of security from a purely military definition to a holistic one, also defining security as “calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes” (Article 9). As such, NATO broadened the source of insecurity from purely military to non-military causes. NATO added that these instabilities are “faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe” (Article 9). In part V of the NSC, NATO concluded that the “Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Article 57). Generally, NATO represents a security and defense community, and states that want to be part of it must share the same “identities, values and meanings,”568 underlying the organization. Besides the challenge of redefining the very reason for existence, another question at the beginning of the 90s touched on the cooperation of institutions dealing with security. James Barker, the then American Secretary of State, already proposed in autumn of 1989 the creation of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture comprising NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)569, the EC, the

569 The CSCE origins date back to the early 1970s and the détente phase. With the end of the Cold War the participating states decided to change the Conference into a permanent institution. Consequently, in 1994 CSCE war reshaped to the OSCE (Organization of security and cooperation in Europe with permanent institutions and operational capabilities.
WEU\textsuperscript{570} and the Council of Europe (CoE)\textsuperscript{571}.\textsuperscript{572} NATO confirmed this proposal officially at its Rome summit on 8 November 1991. In the declaration, the Heads of State and Government stated that “the challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America”. Nevertheless, the proclamation remained a policy on paper for a long time.

Besides the internal process dealing with NATO’s reason for existence, NATO had to adapt to the new environment in its external relations. NATO’s reshaping of relations towards Central and Eastern Europe represent a crucial element in NATO’s new identity-building as those states had been under former Soviet rule, NATO’s opponent in the time of the Cold War. In this perspective, relations towards Ukraine played a special role as the geopolitical situation made Ukraine an interest forum for the West (with NATO at the top concerning security matters) and Russia (the largest successor of the Soviet Union). The next part reconstructs the development of bilateral relations between NATO and Ukraine and gives access to the identity construction and norms on which this relation was meant to be built. As Poland adhered to NATO in March 1999, analysis concentrates on the time between the beginning of the 90s and the beginning of 1999.

As relations between Ukraine and NATO were only in their infancy during the 90s the next parts offer only an overall summary with explanations given in the conclusion.

4.3.2 The Eastern Dimension of NATO Policy

At the very beginning of the 90s, NATO lacked a coherent strategy concerning Central and Eastern Europe, and especially Ukraine. To be even more precise, NATO seemed rather unenthusiastic to engage in any form of cooperation or arrangement in security matters with the newly independent states. The NAC held a meeting in London at the beginning of July 1990 where the Heads of State and Government established that “the Atlantic community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our enemies in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship”\textsuperscript{573}. Thereby, the declaration was mainly concerned with the changing role of the alliance and the need for alteration of the definition of security and defense, in order to adapt to the changed security environment.\textsuperscript{574} In spring 1991, Manfred Wörner, the then SecGen of NATO, proclaimed that the Alliance was “in no way indifferent to their security”\textsuperscript{575}. In the final communiqué of the DFC (Defense Planning Committee) and the NPG, chairman Wörner proclaimed that “[t]he process of dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including political and military contacts at all

\textsuperscript{570} The WEU was inaugurated in 1954 as a mutual assistance pact for defense. De facto it remained a political forum for consultation on security matters as it was not equipped with any military capabilities. The WEU was dissolved in 2010.

\textsuperscript{571} The CoE is the continent’s largest human rights organization.

\textsuperscript{572} See Moens, Alexander; and Anstis, Christopher (1994), p.ix.


\textsuperscript{574} See especially Articles 2, 5, 7, 11, 15 and 16 of the London declaration, Ibid.

levels, has now been established and should continue to be expanded.”576 He added that “[w]e welcome the intensified dialogue and cooperation with all countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a promising contribution to increased mutual understanding and trust.”577 These statements demonstrate NATO’s cautious standing towards the newly independent states. In the same line of argumentation, chairman Wörner welcomed in the final communiqué of the Ministerial session of the DPC “[t]he development of a European security identity and defence role (...)”578. In spite of the declarative assertions, no concrete steps on how to achieve these goals were presented.

The meeting of the NAC in November 1991 led to the NSC. It formalized and laid down principles for further consultations and cooperation with Central and Eastern European states. In the first Article, NATO confirmed that the “political division of Europe” as a source for instability, had been overcome. NATO changed the definition in the NSC of security identifying security risks as being “multi-faced” and “multi-directional” (Article 8). Changing the definition of security from purely military aggression coming from an enemy to a multi-faceted crisis, in turn changed the reason for existence of NATO from a conflict-based to a crisis based existence. The purpose of the alliance had still been described,

“to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged “(Article 15).

Throughout the NSC, the main guiding principles for relations with the Central and Eastern states were identified in cooperation and dialogue (Articles 4, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 57, 58). NATO identified crisis, and the resulting instability as the main source for insecurity. At the same moment it identified stability in the new independent states as the main goal.

At the first meeting of the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991, the Foreign Ministers met in Brussels in order “to develop further the process of regular diplomatic liaison and to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe”579. Additionally, the Foreign Ministers “have agreed to build on our existing liaison and to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues”580.

The creation of the NACC was NATO’s first institutional modernization to adapt to the new ‘post Cold War’ security environment in Europe. Ukraine accessed to the NACC formally in March 1992. Thereby, already in January 1992, Ukrainian representatives participated in a meeting of the High Level Working Group of the NACC.581

577 Ibid. [emphasis added].
578 Ibid.
580 Ibid.
581 See Mission of Ukraine to the European Union: NATO.
In February 1992, the SecGen Wörner visited Kiev. In response, the Ukrainian President Kravchuk visited NATO HQ in Brussels in June 1992.\textsuperscript{582} Two years later, in January 1994, Ukraine signed a document renouncing its nuclear weapons, together with the US and Russia. That the US signed the document was a clear proof of the US’ dominant power position concerning the policy directions towards Ukraine in the years 1993/94.\textsuperscript{583} Besides the commitment to denuclearization, Ukraine wanted to prove its willingness to take a place under the Western umbrella through its engagement in regional cooperation. By means of establishing good neighborly relations, Ukraine hoped to convince the Western states and organizations through being a reliable partner respecting the norms and principles of the Western world.\textsuperscript{584}

In the Brussels summit declaration of January 1994, the Heads of State and Government stressed again that the Alliances’ security was “inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe”.\textsuperscript{585} At a meeting of the NAC at the beginning of January 1994, the PfP initiative was launched in order to strengthen relations with the independent and democratic states in the East. In the invitation document the Heads of State and Government stressed that the initiative “goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership – a Partnership for Peace”.\textsuperscript{586} In Article 2 of the framework document, signed on the 11 January 1994, NATO stressed that the “[p]artnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action”.\textsuperscript{587}

The framework document stated the conditions that future participants would have to meet. Besides the recall to respect democratic principles, international law and to renounce any form of coercion,\textsuperscript{588} four main areas were given special attention:

1. “Facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes
2. Ensuring democratic control of defence forces
3. Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE
4. The development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises

Summed up, the main conditions were identified as transparency, democratic control of defense, contribution to operations and readiness for cooperation in planning and contribution of forces. Critiques of the PfP stress the lack of a roadmap and time schedule that would push the enlargement process.\textsuperscript{590} As such, the PfP did not foresee accession as a goal and remained consequently a structural ground for cooperation. Thus, cooperation was the main aim of PfP. NATO tried to establish stability and security through cooperation and common actions.

\textsuperscript{582} See Derhaczow, Oleksandr (1998), pp.59f.
\textsuperscript{583} See Kozakiewicz, Jerzy (1998), p.15.
\textsuperscript{584} See Alexandrova, Olga (1992), p.22.
\textsuperscript{588} See Ibid.
\textsuperscript{589} Article 3, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{590} See e.g. De Deugd, Nienke (2007), p.46.
The signature of Ukraine on 8 February 1994 of the PfP-program reflected on a conceptual level the acceptance of Ukraine into the Western security sphere. Ukraine was the first of the former Soviet Republics to sign the PfP. Bilateral cooperation in the frame of PfP was developed by the so-called ‘presentation document’ which Ukraine submitted to NATO on 25 May 1994.591 In June 1995 Ukraine signed the ‘Individual Partnership Programme’ (IPP).

Other states from Central and Eastern Europe put greater pressure on NATO with regard to the issue of accession. One of those states was Poland with whom NATO wanted to strengthen ties. At the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995, Poland confirmed that its membership in NATO would not happen at the detriment of Ukraine’s interests.592 Even though Ukraine was not opposed to Poland’s accession to NATO, it feared a new dividing line in Europe.

1995 marked a time when the US and Western European states noticed Ukraine’s strategic position in Europe and included the state in their foreign policy agendas. The joint declaration between Ukraine and NATO in 1995, in order to “strengthen cooperation” was perceived in Kiev as an acceptance paper by the Western partners.593 The IPP in the frame of the PfP was officially inaugurated in September 1995.594 In May 1996, both parties signed a further agreement defining relations in joint military enterprises in the frame of the PfP program. Already in spring 1995, Ukraine sent its first officers to NATO HQ in Brussels and to NATO’s center in Mons.595

In May 1997, NATO created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) established to allow for regular consultations between NATO and countries of the former Warsaw Pact. This kind of instrument was warmly accepted by Ukraine as it allowed Ukraine to build on its cooperation with the West without endangering relations with the East.

In its Madrid declaration of July 1997, the Heads of State and Government pointed to the achievements made with respect to the transformation of the Alliance. In the declaration, the representatives pointed to the evolving inclusive European security architecture. “In this spirit, we are building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO.”596 The declaration reflected a cooperative approach towards security which built on an undivided Europe. Concerning Ukraine, the representatives stressed that cooperation with the state would enhance security in the whole region.597

Additionally, at the summit in July 1997 in Madrid, the Heads of State and Government signed the ‘Charter on a Distinctive Partnership’ with Ukraine. The charter of 1997 represents

595 See Derhaczow, Oleksandr (1998), pp.60f.
the basic foundation for bilateral relations, as it specified the instruments and the arenas through which consultation and cooperation should take place. In Article 1 of the charter NATO stressed again the recognition of the fundamental changes of security which have linked the security of the allied states to those of all of Europe. The contracting parties stressed that they are “convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole”. In order to enhance security and stability in the region as well as in all of Europe, both parties wanted to “strengthen mutual trust and cooperation”.\(^\text{598}\) Pursuant to Article 12, the charter created the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) which “directs cooperative activities and provides a forum for consultation between the Allies and Ukraine on security issues of common concern”.\(^\text{599}\) Briefly said, the NUC’s task was defined to ensure proper implementation of the Charter’s provisions. In the frame of NUC, further joint working groups had been established. From this perspective, the Political and Partnerships Committee has the leading role in developing annual national programs and preparing high level-meetings. The Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR), established in 1998, directs consultation and cooperation in defense and security. Besides the technical definition of cooperation, the charter identified the main areas for cooperation and consultation which were: conflict prevention, crisis management, peace support, conflict resolution, disarmament and arms control and combatting drug-trafficking and terrorism.\(^\text{600}\) Concerning peace-support operations, Ukraine had already contributed more than one infantry battalion, one mechanized and a helicopter squadron to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. The same kind of contribution was made to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo. In order to strengthen cooperation in civil emergency planning, a memorandum was signed in 1997. Its key focus was the assistance of Ukraine to prepare for emergencies and manage consequences. Besides the military aspect of cooperation, Ukraine cooperated with NATO in science and environment since 1991 and strengthened ties in this area over the years.\(^\text{601}\)

In accordance with the charter, NATO opened in 1997 an ‘Information and Documentation Center’ in Kiev in order to inform the Ukrainian public about the activities led by NATO. In 1999, a NATO Liaison Office was established in order to enhance the realization of the PIP by liaising with the Ministry of Defense and other Ukrainian agencies.\(^\text{602}\)

Generally, the establishment of the charter reflected NATO’s institutional recognition of independent and democratic Ukraine as a key factor “of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole”.\(^\text{603}\)


\(^{599}\) North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO A-Z: *NATO’s Relations with Ukraine*.

\(^{600}\) Articles 5,6,7,8,9,10, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine*, 9 July 1997.

\(^{601}\) North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO A-Z: *NATO’s Relations with Ukraine*.

\(^{602}\) Ibid.

Bilateral relations between NATO and Ukraine during the 90s were less dense than between the European Union and Ukraine. After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO was forced to change its internal structure and, more profoundly, its very reason for existence. Consequently, it was very much concerned with the creation of a self-identity. Additionally it had to redefine its external relations due to the changing environment. The WT identified NATO as an instrument primarily for collective defense against an enemy (the Soviet Union). Security was then defined in military terms as an armed aggression against the territory of the contracting states. Widening the definition of security towards non-military aspects redefined NATO’s role as a forum for consultation and cooperation. These organizing principles may well be rediscovered in the declarations and documents of the 90s. As such, the norm of cooperation was frequently pronounced and repeated by NATO in its documents concerning Ukraine. Thus cooperation played a pivotal role in bilateral relations during the 90s. But, as it turned out, in analysis there was a huge discrepancy between formalized relations and their realization. Consequently, the norm of cooperation was much more established on the declarative level than practiced in concrete deeds. All in all, NATO practiced a structuring of relations with Ukraine along the norms of cooperation and consultation.

Looking at the concept of identity reveals that, very quickly, NATO considered Ukraine as part of its own security sphere. Ukraine regained its independence at the end of 1991 – in the same month that the Soviet Union was dissolved. In the same year, NATO proclaimed to intensify the dialogue and cooperation with the Eastern states in order to enhance understanding and trust. A switch in NATO’s identity started with the redefinition of the concept of security. As NATO changed the definition of security to a holistic conception on the basis of a cooperative security provision, it was considered indivisible and as such linked to all of Europe, in consequence. Consequently, it considered Ukraine as part of its own security arena. As NATO identified any kind of instability as a risk factor to its security, it concentrated its approach towards the Central and Eastern states on stability building, which became obvious through analysis of the documents.

Since 1991, NATO’s security policy has then been reflected in three elements of “cooperation, dialogue and the maintenance of an effective collective defence capability”. These elements reflect the organizing principles on which NATO based its behavior towards the Central and Eastern states during the 90s. Despite all the assertions, the concepts had not been filled with concrete deeds. Looking into the purpose of the Alliance laid down in the NSC of 1991 reveals that the respect of the fundamental norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law were preconditions for relations.

Intensification of bilateral relations was required to wait until 1994, when both parties signed the PfP. The PfP aimed to go beyond dialogue and cooperation to a real partnership. The PfP laid down further principles on which NATO based its partnership, which were transparency, democracy (democratic control of defense forces) and contribution to operations (with respect to a cooperative defense approach). But again, as PfP lacked a timetable with concrete goals.

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to be achieved, the real partnership remained more a declarative proclamation on the structural level.

Following the signing of the PfP, NATO stressed Ukraine’s importance for the security and stability of the whole region. NATO gave this standing institutional essence by signing the ‘Charter on a Distinctive Partnership’ in 1997. The concept of ‘Partnership for Peace’ was thus transformed in a ‘Distinctive Partnership’ providing the partnership with a declarative upgrading. In the Madrid Declaration, NATO proclaimed the will to build up a ‘European Security and Defense Identity’ also compromising Ukraine. In the declaration, it became obvious to NATO, that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine was only a means to establish stability in the region and so to establish security for all of Europe.

That a stable Ukraine was, for NATO, a means and not a goal per se, is also reflected in NATO’s hard-standing concerning membership. Throughout the 90s, NATO rejected any attempt by Ukraine to become part of NATO. It turns out, on the one hand, that during the 90s, NATO recognized Ukraine’s growing role for peace and stability in the region, but on the other hand, did not consider Ukraine as being part of a self. As a consequence, Ukraine was, at the end of the 90s, considered to be part of NATO’s security sphere. This identification, as part of a self, based thereby on the broadening of the definition of the lexeme security and not on the very conception of the self.

4.3.3 Conclusion

Even though in 1990 NATO proclaimed to extend the ‘hand of friendship’ to the Central and Eastern European states, it did not define a coherent political strategy towards this region at the time. Reasons may be found in internal and external conditions. The environment was in transition with the dissolution of the Soviet Union underway. As a consequence, NATO had to reconsider its own reason for existence.

The motivation for enhanced cooperation with Eastern states was then reflected in the change of NATO’s definition of security and the assumption that the security of one state in Europe is inextricably linked to that of all states. Consequently, the broadening of the definition of security laid the ground to consider Ukraine as part of NATO’s security sphere. This identification was repeated by NATO through different documents during the 90s. Cooperation, consultation and dialogue became the main organizing principles through which NATO tried to achieve its goals, namely the stability of the region and consequently of Europe in its entirety. At the time, NATO practiced the formalization of relations.

In spite of initial contacts between Ukraine and NATO, NATO – similar to the EC –proved to be hesitant in its policy towards Ukraine since the beginning of Ukrainian independence. One reason may be found in the geopolitical newcomer position of Ukraine, making it a possible danger to the West. On the one hand, its location, neighboring Russia, made it worth protecting in order to ensure security, but, on the other hand, left the question how Russia would react if Ukraine were to be fully accepted by the Western states and organizations,
unanswered. A second reason may be found in Ukrainian stubbornness towards denuclearization. Its behavior left the West in a state of fear and led to Ukraine’s isolation in the international arena until the end of 1993. 

Although Ukraine was identified as part of NATO’s security sphere, the reconstruction of relations revealed that, throughout the 90s, bilateral relations were mostly concerned with the formalization of relations constituting the norms on which future relations were meant to take place, namely cooperation and consultation. The reason for this cautious approach may well be traced back to NATO’s total reshaping and the adaptation to the new international situation. Additionally, the West doubted the effective liberalization of Ukraine from Soviet influence.

NATO is often referred to as a community of values. NATO identifies itself as relying on Western values. A look at the considered time reveals that NATO is also a community of norms as it not only relies on Western democratic norms but also strongly promotes the organizational principles of cooperation, consultation and dialogue. The notion of community implies thereby an underlying identity. It turned out that NATO considered Ukraine as kind of hybrid. On the one hand, it considered it as part of its own security sphere. On the other hand, it blocked any Ukrainian accession attempts.

### 4.4 Conclusion and Status Quo

The chapter above traced back bilateral relations between Poland, EU, NATO and Ukraine in the time between 1989 and 1999. In the following I will summarize the findings and draw a status quo from where changes can be analyzed during the time from 2000 until 2011.

Generally, the time from 1989 until 1991 marked for all three actors an extraordinary time caused by the substantial structural changes rooted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union which formally came to an end on 26 December 1991. As such, the context was the driving force and put pressure on the redefinition of concepts. All three actors were then concerned with influential internal and external challenges questioning the self-image of each actor and, consequently, their relations with the outside world. Concerning the self-identity, Poland had the task of totally redefining its self-image; its aims and its foreign policy goals previously being drawn by the Soviet pen. At the time, the EC had to handle the newly changing geopolitical situation and the emergence of newly independent states which had previously been under Soviet control. This change provided the EC with surprising new options concerning further integration and cooperation within Europe. Consequently, in February 1992, the EC signed the treaty of Maastricht which came into force in November 1993. With Maastricht, the EC did not only change the internal structure of the European Communities (providing them with the label of a Union) but also laid the structural ground for further enlargement rounds and integration. NATO was confronted with the largest internal challenge, because the dissolution of the Soviet Union deprived NATO of its legitimacy-

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608 See for the distinction between value and norm p.34.
giving counterpart. Nevertheless, in 1991, NATO adopted its NSC and defined the ground for its future existence.

It transpired that during the 90s Poland had the deepest and most evolved relations with Ukraine compared to the EU and NATO. Generally, declaratively-made assertions were also realized in concrete deeds and practiced. Throughout the 90s, Poland identified with Ukraine on different levels as being part of a self, namely on a historic, cultural, emotional, security level and in the end also a political level, sharing common interests. On different occasions, Poland drew a picture of a compassionate relationship with Ukraine. Since 1989, Poland proclaimed that relations with Ukraine lay in Poland’s heart. In all its conceptions, Poland identified itself as the ‘big brother’ of Ukraine. But even though Poland identified Ukraine as being part of a larger self, Poland presumed an asymmetrical relation defining itself as setting an example of how to transform. This vision corresponded with Poland’s self-identification as a stabilizing force (1993) and leader (1994, 1997) of the region. As such, Poland conceptualized itself as an ‘example state’ for successful transformation in the region. Poland’s deepest identification with Ukraine was made in the security sphere, which was the result of the redefinition of security. From this perspective, Poland tried to regionalize security throughout the 90s and to attach Ukraine’s security importance at the organizational level (NATO). The levels of Poland’s identification with Ukraine were also reflected in the organizing principles on which Poland put relations, namely: friendship, trust, understanding, cooperation and good neighborhood. Especially, since 1995, the norm of friendship was deeply practiced through bilateral visits between the two presidents. Additionally, Poland started to practice with Ukraine a historical dialogue in order to overcome negative memories of the common history. The norm of cooperation found practical reflections through the establishment of arrangements in different areas (economy, culture, security). Although the norm of good neighborhood has been of polish interest since the beginning of independence, it turned out that, in Poland, a clash of conceptions concerning relations with Ukraine existed between foreign ministers and presidents. However, this ‘only’ touched on the notion of relations (strategic vs. close) and not on the direction of relations. One huge driving force of the approach of both states, was the common conception and identification of Russia being ‘the other’. Although Poland manifested its respect towards Russia since its independence mainly through the double-track policy, it had stopped conceptualizing Russia as a ‘fearful other’ since 1995. This redefinition happened in Poland, hand in hand with the growth of self-confidence. One year later, in 1996, Poland even identified with the West as an equal partner. Throughout the 90s, it became obvious that the central fundamental norm on which Poland put relations with Ukraine was democracy. Analyzes showed that Poland estimated that a democratic order in Ukraine would be the only way to provide itself with stability and security. From this perspective, Poland treated the establishment of democracy in Ukraine as an end. Summed up, in the time between 1989 and 1999, Poland not only proclaimed an intensification of relations with Ukraine, but also transformed the declaratively-made assertions into actions. As such, Poland practiced coming closer to Ukraine on the declarative and action levels. Ukraine was thereby defined as part of a family, although Poland identified itself as having a decision-making role.
Following Poland, the EU took second place concerning the intensity of relations with Ukraine during the 90s. Generally, there existed a clash between structural formalization of relations and actions. The deepest identification, with which the EU conceptualized Ukraine, was in the security and stability sphere. Consequently, the EU turned its attention to the norm of stability, with respect to relations with Ukraine. The EU also considered and supported independence and a democratic order in Ukraine, but both norms were not considered as aims per se, rather a means to provide the EU with security. Thus, through the establishment of agreements, the EU proclaimed its will to contribute to the stabilization of the region. Consequently, the EU considered Ukraine as a part of the region. Apart from the European conception of sharing security and economic interests with Ukraine, the state was considered as ‘the other’, very much defined by its historical and geographical location, which the EU considered through a political prism.

In order to provide itself with security, the EU endorsed Ukraine’s independence to formalize relations through agreements and proclamations. Generally, the main practice was reflected in the formalization of agreements. Thereby all the agreements signed by both parties throughout the 90s build on an asymmetrical conception: guidance from the EU and the following of Ukraine. The hard definition of the rule-giving EU and the inferior Ukraine was declaratively and practically reflected in Europe’s reluctance to consider Ukrainian membership, which was not considered at any point throughout the 90s. The asymmetrical conception was then also reflected in the organizing principles on which the EU formalized relations, namely: provision, promotion and support. In sum, the main fundamental norm on which the EU put relations with Ukraine, was the norm of security (provision).

Of all three actors, NATO had the loosest relations with Ukraine in the 90s. Although at the beginning of the 90s NATO proclaimed to pass the ‘hand of friendship’ to Central and Eastern European states, deep forms of cooperation were still waiting to be established at the end of the 90s. In its NSC of 1991, NATO redefined the concept of security and thereby incorporated Ukraine into its security sphere, and, as such, identified Ukraine as being part of its security. Consequently, similar to the EU, Ukraine paid great deal of attention to stabilizing itself by means of cooperation and dialogue. The latest norms were thereby met by NATO on the declarative level without substantial representations in actions. The same observation can be made concerning the central document defining relations through the 90s, namely the PfP. On the declarative level, the real partnership meant a conceptual upgrade for Ukraine, but in practice the document did not change relations much. The next upgrade of a Distinctive Partnership in 1997, again sent a conceptual upgrade towards Ukraine, but did not find manifestations in actions. In sum, relations between NATO and Ukraine during the 90s were mainly concerned with the formalization of relations and thereby the conceptualization of the organizational principles for bilateral relations, namely cooperation and dialogue. The main fundamental norms on which relations with Ukraine were put, were the norms of stability and security. In this perspective, similar to the EU, NATO was interested in democracy in Ukraine. But democracy was in this context considered as a means to provide itself with security and stability. According to the EU, although NATO identified Ukraine as part of its security sphere it did not consider it as a whole self. In this perspective the prospect of membership was never attempted by NATO throughout the 90s.

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Having drawn a status quo of the categories of norm, identity and practice of the three actors in terms of relations with Ukraine, in the next empirical part I will analyze developments for the time between 1999 and 2011.

5. Reconstruction of Relations between 1999 and 2011

Whereby the last chapter reconstructed identities, norms and practices of the three actors in the time between 1989 and 1999 in order to have a status quo from which point to analyze changes, this chapter is concerned with the timeframe between 1999 and 2011. Besides the reconstruction of core categories of identity, norms and practices, this chapter also provides analytical access to the three further categories: concrete deeds, mechanisms and power. Generally, this chapter reconstructs first relations of the three actors and then reflects, in separate parts, the doing and living of the process of Polonization.

Poland’s accession to NATO in March 1999 was a great success for Polish diplomacy, as it realized one of its main foreign policy goals from the regaining of independence; namely integration into the Western sphere of security. Although Poland’s integration into the Western family stood at this time – institutionally – on one leg, concrete accession talks with the EU had already been under way since March 1998. Poland’s accession to the EU became a top priority of foreign policy from 1999 onwards. With entry into the EU in May 2004, Poland realized its last foreign policy goal which had been formulated 10 years before. Already in January 2003, Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz declared in his Sejm exposé from the perspective of EU membership that “[n]ew opportunities have appeared for the achievement of the main goals of our foreign policy. (…) Until recently, we have only been able to share the positions of the European Union. From now on we will co-create them”\(^609\). This proclamation already gives an idea of the active role Poland wanted to play in the EU concerning foreign policy-making. As the theoretical part of the work revealed and the last chapter transpired, identity plays a crucial role while investigating foreign policy-making. Thus, in turn, the engagement in Poland’s foreign policy-making on the organizational level, is interdependent with the identity and as such the opinion an actor has of itself. In order to not only ‘erklären’ but also to ‘verstehen’ the process of Polonization of organizations, it is important at this point to reconstruct Poland’s identity during 1999 and 2011. Consequently, in the next part of the chapter, I will examine the evolution of the Polish self-identity in foreign policy-making from a macro-perspective.\(^610\) I will mainly respect discursive constructions besides the practices in context. The context is thereby drawn by internal developments in Poland and by external (international) alterations. Besides these concepts, this part will also give access to norms which dominated Polish foreign policy-making. After having assessed Poland’s identity construction, I consider in the second part of the chapter Polish-Ukrainian relations during the given timeframe. This will provide an insight into


\(^{610}\) By macro-perspective I mean the view at a long timeframe. The micro-perspective, in contrast, reflects the detailed view on a specific moment in relations, treated in this study in case-studies.
practices, identity construction and norms in a bilateral manner, which impact on Poland’s uploading on the organizational level. The next part of the chapter reconstructs EU-Ukrainian relations from 2000 until 2011, in light of identity-building, norms and practices. It sheds light on Polish input on relations and thus gives access towards the doing of Poland. The next two parts are concerned with an in-depth view on the doing provided by two case studies: the Orange Revolution and the Eastern Dimension (ED). The core aim is not to reconstruct the cases in all their depth but to shed light on the doing of Poland. Having reconstructed EU-Ukrainian relations and the case studies, I will summarize in the following the doing of Poland and the living in the EU. The following part is then concerned with the triangle, Poland-Ukraine-NATO. As transpired in the previous chapter, the character of NATO-Ukrainian relations differs from EU-Ukrainian relations. Accordingly, the structure of this part is organized differently. It first reconstructs NATO-Ukraine relations and, secondly, the Polish role in the enlargement debate in NATO. The part closes with a reflection on the doing of Poland within the context of NATO-Ukrainian relations and reflects the living of NATO.

5.1 Poland

5.1.1 Poland’s Self-Identity from 1999 until 2011

5.1.1.1 Poland’s Self-Identity from 1999 until 2004: The Rebel or the Cornerstone of Self-Confidence

Before formal accession to the Union, Poland had already started to have input on developments taken in the rows of the EU. Polish engagement concerning the negotiations over a new institutional architecture of the Union in Nice marks the most prominent example.\(^{611}\) The Polish government contributed its stance considering the Union’s institutional reform to the Portuguese Presidency on 24 February 2000. Therein, Prime Minister Gemerek presented two central demands of Poland: first, “every member state should retain the right to propose a candidate as a member of the European Commission” and second, “[t]he demographic criterion should remain the principle governing the division of votes in the Council of the European Union”.\(^{612}\) In an exemplary comment on the occasion of the signing of the NT in February 2001, the then Polish President Kwasniewski “noted with satisfaction that the institutional arrangements under the Treaty of Nice are conducive to a

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\(^{611}\) The negotiations on the renewal of the Union’s institutional architecture started in February 2000 and came to an end during the meeting of the Heads of State and Government from the 7th to 10th December 2000 in Nice. The treaty of Nice was then signed on February 2001 by the Heads of State and Government. The negotiations concentrated mainly on voting modalities in the European Council and the appointment of the Commission. Poland vehemently defended the principle of proportioning the number of votes in the Council relative to the demographic criterion of the states. This counting accredited Poland and Spain with 27 votes each, which meant just two votes less than Germany and France. Poland opposed to the system of “double majority”. This voting manner constitutes that decisions should be taken by a majority of member states (more than 50%) and representing at least 60% of the Union’s populations.

\(^{612}\) IGC 2000: Contribution from the government of Poland, 24 February 2000, CONF/VAR 3960/00.
balanced character of a new, enlarged European Union, guided by the principle of solidarity.”

The Polish adherence to the decision-making system, agreed on in Nice, became a burden at the European level during the work on the Convention of the Future of the EU, which met between February 2002 and July 2003. Thereby the Polish stance discloses two elementary Polish characteristics at the time. First, the Polish position reflected internal political developments. At the very end of the 90s, the Polish political scene experienced a change from a spirit of ‘progress through transformation’ into a kind of ‘transformation fatigue’. As a consequence, political parties had difficulty staying in power. Minority governments became normal from 2001 onwards. As a consequence, the governments did not have the power to push through substantial policies and political strategies but were more concerned with staying in power. With this perspective, in autumn 2001, parliamentary elections changed the political constellation severely. The center-right parliamentary coalition (AWS and UW), formed around Prime Minister Buzek, was voted out due to voter disillusionment with the AWS government and internal conflicts within the block. The UW even missed the threshold. The result was a leftist minority government headed by the Alliance of Democratic Left (SLD). The gap in the political party field was filled with populist and nationalist groupings, which influenced the pro-EU spirit of Poland by contributing an EU-critical standing. The most prominent representatives were, on the one hand the ‘League of Polish Families’ (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), being for a long time interconnected with the national-catholic radio station ‘Radio Maria’ and on the other hand, the rural political party ‘Self-defence’ (Samoorbona) around the populist Andrzej Lepper. The weakness of the internal situation started to touch on foreign policy. Defense of national interest was en vogue and was strongly supported by the nationalist and populist parties, besides which the populist and nationalist parties were vehemently concerned with ensuring a strong position for Poland within the EU in order not to lose its national interest at the organizational level. From this perspective, the opposition, at a Sejm debate before the December 2003 EU Summit, used the slogan of ‘Nice or death’. The slogan was then used by different nationalist groupings in order to raise fears among Poles proclaiming that Poland would lose its independence and its identity by entering the EU. As a consequence, Prime Minister Leszek Miller, ruling in the minority government, was so afraid to ‘die’ that he turned the EU December summit into a fiasco. Besides reflecting on internal developments, the vehement Polish standing also showed, the strong Polish wish to play an important and powerful role within the European family. It seemed as if Polish representatives believed that a strong and powerful standing would ensure Poland a powerful place within the community.

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613 Statement by the Polish President, Aleksander Kwasniewski, on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Nice. See Poland: Statement of the President of the Republic of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Nice, 10 October 2010.
614 In December 2001, the European partners agreed to institute a European treaty at a European Council meeting in Laeken. The treaty was supposed to simplify and replace all other treaties. The so called ‘Convention on the Future of the European Union’ under the presidency of former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing met between February 2002 and July 2003. See: McCormick, John (2008), p.65.
616 In this context one should consider that accession to the European Union means that the entire state becomes a member. The membership in the EU is not restricted to a special policy-related obligation but comprehends the whole state system. This in turn is breeding ground for nationalistic and populist argumentation.
It became clear that, at the time, Poland found itself in a time of defining its own place in Europe and in the world. In this matter, Polish Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz stressed in his yearly exposé on 22 January 2003 that “[n]ever before have candidate countries been given such an opportunity. We cannot allow ourselves to be passive, negligent or falsely timid. For us it is about defining Poland’s place in the evolving Europe, a place that reflects our aspirations and protects our identity”\textsuperscript{617}. “(…) we would like to build up an image of Poland as a good and trustful part of the European community”\textsuperscript{618}. Along his exposé, Cimoszewicz stressed that Poland was highly interested in respecting the principles of “freedom, equality and solidarity” and to “strengthen in practice the Union’s activity in democracy and distinctiveness”\textsuperscript{619}. In the same breath, Cimoszewicz underlined that Poland would like to establish an ‘Eastern dimension’ in the EU due to its historical experiences. “We want to be good advocates of the region and of enlargement towards the East”\textsuperscript{620}

Concerning the last point, in 2001 Poland had already tried to upload its own vision of an Eastern approach to the European level by presenting the document ‘The Eastern dimension of the EU after enlargement – the Polish point of view’. Therein Poland proposed a common European approach towards the Eastern neighbors. The document foresaw the membership of Ukraine and other Eastern states for the future, but clearly excluded Russia (see case study for a closer look).

Cimoszewicz renewed the Polish aim to build up an Eastern dimension within CFSP in his exposé on 21 January 2004. “Poland wants to be an active part in the creation of CFSP. (…) Our general aim in CFSP will be the strengthening and dynamization of cooperation of the EU with its neighbors, especially the Eastern neighbors through the establishment of an Eastern Dimension of the EU policy.”\textsuperscript{621} In the same exposé Cimoszewicz proclaimed that “[m]embership in the European Union, (…) will provide Poland with a new role in the world (…)”\textsuperscript{622}. In May 2004, Poland finally officially entered the Union.

In October 2004, Poland – already a formal member of the EU – signed the Constitutional Treaty in Rome jointly with other Heads of State and Government. In his exposé on 21 January 2005 Foreign Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld described the signature under the Constitutional Treaty as “the point of departure for defining our vision of Europe’s future.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{618} [Translated by D.P.-H.] „(…) aby tworzyć w polityce międzynarodowej wizerunek Polski jako dobrego, godnego zaufania uczestnika wspólnoty europejskiej”. Ibid.
\bibitem{619} [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Zależy nam na umocnieniu w praktyce unijnego działania zasad demokratyzmu i przejrzystości”. Ibid.
\bibitem{620} [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Chcemy być dobrymi adwokatami regionu i rozszerzania struktur europejskich na wschód”. Ibid.
\bibitem{621} [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Polska zamierza w aktywny sposób włączyć się do kształtowania Wspolnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, (…) Naszym głównym celem w ramach wspólnej unijnej polityki zagranicznej będzie wzmacnienie i zdynizowanie współpracy Unii z sąsiadami, w tym zwłaszcza ze wschodnimi sąsiadami, poprzez budowę Wschodniego Wymiaru polityki UE.” Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz, 21 January 2004.
\bibitem{622} [Translated by D.P.-H.] “Członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej, rzutujące na nową rolę Polski wi świecie (…)”. Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
(…) From that perspective, further enlargement of the EU eastwards is to the advantage of Poland and the European Union as a whole. (…) We want to be, and are, an active subject of EU policy, with growing influence of the shape of the Union.”

But Rotfeld admitted that “[a] key question is on the agenda – and merits serious discussion: with whom and in what way do we want to pursue our interests inside the European Union?”

Concerning regional activities, Rotfeld summarized that Poland did not want to play the role of a regional leader. “We have other goals: we want to use our prestige and position in the European and Transatlantic family to promote the interests of the region”.625

Generally, strong and dynamic cooperation with its eastern neighbors was a priority for Polish foreign policy in 2005. In this context Poland was most active in discussions on developing the so-called Eastern Dimension of the ENP and supported the development of long-term relations with Ukraine.626

5.1.1.2 Poland’s Self-Identity from 2005 until 2007: The Adolescence or the Kaczyński Era

The Sejm elections in September 2005 did not result in a coalition among ‘Law and Justice’ (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PIS) and the ‘Civic Platform’ (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), but in another minority government headed by the PIS, the LPR and the populist farmer’s party ‘Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland’ (Samoobrona).627 After the parliamentary elections in autumn 2005, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz became Prime Minister.628 In the presidential elections of October 2005 Lech Kaczyński came into power, as the nationalist, conservative PIS candidate. The change on the political scene was enormous as the post-communists of the SLD did not lose only the position of president but also the majority in government.629 Due to the growing discrepancies between the twin-brothers Kaczyński and the Prime Minister, Marcinkiewicz was dismissed from his post and replaced by Jarosław Kaczyński in July 2006.

The foreign and European policy objectives of the PIS were outlined in the 2005 program. The big aim was to “build a strong republic taking up a position in the international arena that is worthy of a great nation”. Thereby PIS pleaded for a “Europe of nations bound by solidarity”.630 Generally, the Kaczyński brothers often invoked patriotic values, national pride and national interest, interlinked with the thought that Poland had a right to pursue a foreign

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624 [Original in English] Ibid.
626 See Banat, Małgorzata, and Pallasz, Urszula (2006), p.56.
628 Marcinkiewicz was appointed for tactical reasons. If Jarosław Kaczyński had been appointed Prime Minister, this would have probably diminished the chances of Lech Kaczyński in the presidential election in late 2005. Additionally, Marcinkiewicz should have established a buffer in the realization of unpopular measures. See Lang, Kai-Olaf (2006), p.1.
629 The reason for the gains of the PIS may be found in the context. Poland adhered to the EU in 2004 and a lot of people did not feel secure because of the global bounding of Poland. This feeling of insecurity got along with a lot of scandals and corruption affairs around the governing SLD. The Kaczyński brothers misused these scandals for their own campaigns. Accordingly, they defined themselves as the genuine hope for the future of Poland and promised a cleansing of the political scene. Relying on a traditional way of defining national interests, they succeeded to convince the electoral. See Vetter, Reinhold (2010), p.2. Thereby it should be considered that the voters turnout met only 41%.
policy that was autonomous and independent. At the time, the governments of Marcinkiewicz and Kaczyński wanted to start a change in foreign policy-making. They did not intend to change the strategic priorities of Poland, but wanted to change the ‘making of policy’ by pleading for a stronger cooperation among EU and NATO. In this sense, both governments supported the evolution of ESDP under the condition that this would not weaken NATO. From this perspective, Prime Minister Kaczyński proposed at his visit to Germany in October 2006, to intensify efforts within ESDP and to establish a European 100,000 strong army. The Kaczyński brothers’ plan focused on placing the army under NATO control.

Due to the strong national-conservative attitude of the Kaczyński twin-brothers, euroskeptical stances started to take over in the ministries. In spite of this evolution on 15 February 2006, Foreign Minister Stefan Meller delivered the most pro-European exposé since regaining independence. “The Union is a successful and – what’s more – unique political project (…).” Besides its pro-European character, Meller described Poland as a strong and powerful member of the European family and of NATO. “Present-day Poland is firmly anchored in NATO and the European Union. (…) The listing of Polish achievements and successes justifies the claim that a modern political culture is being formed in Poland, based on self-confidence and courage, which, in turn, are integrally linked to prudence and knowledge.” Meller described Poland as a “[s]afe and confident” state and added that “(…) Poland is modern, strong and respected in Europe and around the world.” “Poland’s main contribution to such a Union can be our vigor, initiative, and ability to reach compromise and conclude alliances.” Meller pointed to Poland’s know-how routine building Western norms and values, due to its historical experiences. “Our centuries-long tradition of struggle for freedom and independence and, particularly, the experience gained in our successful transformation, constitute a kind of rich political know-how, which predestines Poland to concern itself with human rights, and the right to democracy and free market.” A few sentences further on, Meller adds that “[a]ll in all, you could say that the above plans and actions have imparted on us the role of an advocate of international solidarity, sensitive to the needs of countries in our immediate and more distant proximity, particularly those in which our actions may have actual impact on positive transformations. Poland is a country that is open to others and we want the world to know it.” Meller renewed Poland’s attitude of support of the enlargement of the Union and encouraged its European partners to offer other states (with whom Poland mainly concentrated on Ukraine) “the prospect of membership, however distant it may be.” At the end of the exposé, Meller stressed the Western spirit in Poland. “Poland, from its very beginnings, has been part of the Western world. Today, it integrally belongs to the system of Western institutions, and in its daily practice endorses its values and spirit.”

In spite of his efforts to push his pro-European vision, his position was undermined by other actors in foreign policy, mainly the Kaczyński brothers. The inner political situation started to worsen and Foreign Minister Meller stepped down in May. Poland’s stance towards the EU became very EU-skeptical. Kaczyński’s first steps on the international arena took a bad

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632 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.313.
course. He started to demonstrate Poland’s new image by proclaiming that “[o]ur partners have to face the fact that Poland is going to run a hard foreign policy. Nothing will lead us back to the tracks which certainly drove us towards the EU and NATO, but which do not offer us the realization of our vivid national interests.” 634

When the Dutch and French referenda rejected the Treaty (held on 29 May and 1 June 2005) the European Council pronounced a year-long ‘pause of reflection’. In 2006, the reflection phase was prolonged by another year. At the same time, the Polish government started to criticize the European Treaty ambitions and declared to stick to the existing treaty base. This stance was very much criticized by the European partners and isolated Poland. When it became clear that the European partners would not stick to the voting procedure established in Nice, in 2007, Poland came up with an idea for a new calculation system for vote weighting in the Council which was based on the square root of a given state’s population. 635 The system was clearly meant to strengthen medium-sized states, of which Poland was the most prominent one, among the new members. Poland’s stubbornness to push its initiative through, once again isolated Poland on the European arena. Poland’s stance was perceived as anti-European by its European partners. In order not to further endanger developments within the EU, the European states agreed to start the Nice voting system after 2014. This corresponded with Polish wishes.

In spite of the hard policy-making of the Kaczyński brothers, the foreign ministry conserved a pro-European stance. In her exposé in 2007, Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga drew a picture of a state anchored in the EU while sticking to the principle of solidarity. “Poland is a state well-established in European and transatlantic structures. Empowered by its historical experiences and the spirit of its population, and conscious of its European and global responsibility, contemporary Poland will be an active and responsible state in the international arena. It will not only strive for the realization of its own interests, but be faithful to the principal values, especially the idea of ‘solidarity’ and human rights.” 636 Additionally Fotyga defined Poland as playing an active part in the creation of the Eastern dimension of the Union.

The Kaczyński brothers started the practice of coming close to the US. Thereby the Kaczyński brothers clearly overestimated Poland’s importance to the US. 637 In sum, from 2005 until 2007, the Polish representatives of foreign policy-making missed providing Poland with a clear and common foreign policy profile. Foreign policy relied mainly on the ideological premises of the national conservatives. In early 2007, the internal political situation blocked consensus-finding and ruled out creating any further concepts of Polish participation within the EU.

635 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.311.
5.1.1.3 Poland’s Self-Identity from 2007 until 2011: The Young Adulthood or the Turn to Political Realism

Due to inner political struggles and turnovers, new elections took place in October 2007, bringing Donald Tusk into power from the PO. For the first time since 1989, foreign policy was a significant campaign issue. Tusk promised a (re-)opening towards Europe and a professionalism of Polish foreign policy. Since his election as Prime Minister, Tusk has chaired the Committee for European Integration and the European Committee of the Council of Ministers. Before this, both Committees had been chaired by the foreign minister. This renewal meant a structural shift of responsibility of European coordination tasks from the MSZ to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Until 2010, Tusk had to govern together with Kaczyński as President. Because of the strongly differing conceptions in foreign policy, the time was marked by a lack of cohesion in foreign policy matters. Kaczyński behaved like an opposition leader, making use of his rights and his veto-power as president. No agreement on deep conceptual issues could have been made. Generally, Kaczyński’s foreign policy approach was deeply characterized by the notions of nation, nation-state, independence and sovereignty. From his opinion, the nation-state was the only proper organizational form for the Polish people. He was not opposed to the EU, but, to him, a European identity was characterized by history and not by the constitutionalization and institutionalization processes taking place in Europe. Considering relations with Ukraine, President Kaczyński ran a declaratory foreign policy. In opposition, Tusk and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski were instead interested engaging in a more pragmatic and successful policy (with Kiev). Generally, until 2010, Tusk kept a low profile in foreign policy-making and led the arena to President Kaczyński and Foreign Minister Sikorski. Aside from the different conceptions of foreign policy, the interpretations of rights in foreign policy-making returned to the agenda. Tusk and Kaczyński frequently struggled over who was to head Polish delegations to European Council meetings. In this context, it was also Kaczyński who held a working meeting on 7 and 8 November 2007 with Barroso, the then President of the European Commission. During the meeting, both actors emphasized the solidarity principle in EU external relations. At the time, the institutional dispute hindered Poland in creating a strong foreign policy profile and brought the broader Polish political debate on European policy strategy to a standstill.

Foreign Minister Sikorski presented his exposé to the Sejm on 7 May 2008. What may clearly be recognized therein is a change in attitude towards the EU. Whereby former exposés characterized the EU as ‘the other’, in the sense of being a community (besides the political entity of Poland on its own), Sikorski interlinked discursively the national interest of Poland with membership of the EU. “The European Union is not the endangering ‘They’; Europe and

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640 See for the rights of the president, pp.73ff.
642 The most prominent example was the Georgian conflict when the presence of President Kaczyński was much more evident than that of Prime Minister Tusk. During the time of the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine in early 2009 Tusk led Sikorski to deal with the actors involved.
643 See Kołatek, Radosław (2009), pp.29f.
the Union, that’s us.”\textsuperscript{645} Thus, in Sikorski’s opinion, a strengthening of the Polish position would only be possible by understanding and conceptualizing Poland as an inherent part of the EU. Sikorski openly declared that the former “hard diplomacy” accompanied by “complex loaded words” and an exaggerated rhetoric did not help to build up the Polish position in the EU. Poland would only strengthen its position within the Union in “[o]ne word – [through] consciousness of common aims, professionalism and sustainability”\textsuperscript{646}. Sikorski assigned Poland all the possibilities available in order to be a ‘key actor’ in CFSP. He focused on the Polish Eastern policy to be a policy area where Poland could input on the EU in such a way that the EU Eastern policy would become a “Polish specialty”. In the exposé, the Foreign Minister also delivered a differentiation between “European neighbor’s” and “Europe’s neighbors” including Ukraine in the first grouping.

In spite of the change in the Polish government and the Europhile voices (especially those of the Prime Minster and Foreign Minister), Poland was forced to accept an ascription of being a less powerful state within the family. Especially the elections to the President of the Council in 2009, reflected Poland’s stance. Tusk and other Heads of State and Government of Central and Eastern Europe supported the election of Jean-Claude Juncker for the post. Thereby the decision was made between the main powers in the European family, Germany and France, and was reflected in the recruitment of Herman van Rompuy. In the same year, Sikorski pointed to the fact that Poland became a predictable partner in and for Europe by saying that “[a]s such is today Poland’s foreign policy: reliable and open to cooperation, apt to accept another point of view, but ready to oppose if the vivid national interest is endangered; playing chess and not Russian roulette.”\textsuperscript{647}

In spite of the above-mentioned undermining of the Polish position in practice, in his exposé of 2010, Sikorski continued to strengthen the Polish self-identification as a strong republic within the EU. He defined Poland as a “leading European player (…) in many areas where decisions are taken to determine the policy direction of European institutions. We have become a partner valued by many, a partner whose opinion and counsel is frequently sought. This position is not merely a result of good fortune. Europe needs our country’s active contribution if it is to resolve the problems facing the whole Continent.”\textsuperscript{648} In another point of the exposé Sikorski expresses the Polish identification as Europeans, saying that “[w]e are proud that as Europeans (…)”. At the end of the exposé Sikorski even breaks through the dominant Polish identity-formation as a victim and takes Poland’s destiny in its own hands and admits that “(…) our success will depend on ourselves alone: our ability to innovate, our commitment and dedication”.

\textsuperscript{646} [Translated by D.P.-H.] “Jednym słowem – świadomość wspólnych celów, profesjonalizm i skuteczność.” Ibid.
\textsuperscript{647} [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Taka dziś polska polityka zagraniczna: wiarygodna i otwarta na współpracę, potrafiąca akceptować inny punkt widzenia, ale gotowa do przeciwnawienia się, kiedy w grę wchodzi żywotny interes państwa; grająca w szachy, a nie w rosyjską ruletkę.” Sikorski, Radosław, 2009 [month and day not indicated].
\textsuperscript{648} [Original in English] Sikorski, Radosław, 8 April 2010.
In the subsequent exposé in 2011 Sikorski presented the new slogan of foreign policy in Poland: “Poland – serving; Europe – creating; The world – understanding”. The Polish aim was to be seen as a serious state, a partner with whom other states would want to cooperate. Sikorski underlined that Poland’s task was to recognize its potential and to define realistic goals.

In the second part of 2011, Poland took over the EU presidency. At the time, the EU had a lot of challenges with which to deal. Poland concentrated its engagement on three main issues: European integration as a source of growth (1), European security (2) and Europe profiting from its openness (3). It used the position in order to push on the European level for Ukrainian integration. According to the Polish program for EU presidency, the goals towards Ukraine were defined as the engagement for an association agreement, a free trade zone and a liberalization of the visa regime. In comparison to the Kaczyński and Victor Yushchenko time periods, since 2010, Polish actors started to refrain from vehemently insisting on Ukrainian membership of the EU, recognizing that neither the EU nor Ukraine were able to bring about this process at that time. The main activity at the time of the Polish presidency was the summit of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which took place in Warsaw on 29 and 30 September 2011 (see case study). The summit did not fundamentally change the EU stance towards Ukraine but pushed Ukrainian integration into the European market and a visa-free regime. Poland tried to support the signature under an association agreement with Ukraine before the end of its presidency. This support and the organization of the summit were nevertheless seen critically by other European states and by intellectuals from Ukraine, as the time coincided with internal political developments in Ukraine which endangered the modern democracy.

5.1.1.4 Summary: Identity Construction by Becoming a Family Member

On the one hand, this part provides access to the inner-context which played on the self-identity of Poland and the engagement in organizations resulting from that. On the other hand, this part reveals the self-conceptualization and the image Poland had of itself. It turned out that the process of identity-building concerning Poland’s role within the EU (and also NATO) was characterized from 2000 until 2011 by an inner conflict between internal turnovers with national conservative tendencies and the shaping of a powerful profile within the Union. This characteristic was already established at the beginning of the 2000s when minority governments tried to stay in power and Poland vehemently stuck to the decision-making system agreed on in Nice.

Looking at the internal situation showed that, especially when Kaczyński hold the position of president, there existed a substantial discrepancy concerning the self-image and the opinion towards Europe. Consequently, overlapping in foreign policy-making still dominated and

649 Sikorski, Radosław, 16 March 2011.
650 See e.g. Łada, Agnieszka (2011).
653 See Ibid., p.4.
654 See for a deepening of this aspect Ibid., p.5.
complicated the development of a foreign policy profile. This proves that the establishment of an identity is a complex process. Remembering Wendt that “an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is” becomes complicated if the actor consists of a multitude of aspects, which, at some point, are even contradictory.

Analyzes of the exposés of foreign ministers gave access to the question of how Poland self-perceived concerning the possibility of inputting into organizational levels. Already at the beginning of the 2000s, Poland was aware of the need to define its place in Europe in order to co-create European policy (Cimoszewicz 2003). Poland remarked its potential of playing on the European scene. Thereby, it placed its engagement on the principles of ‘freedom, equality and solidarity’ (Cimoszewicz 2003). Poland wanted to be an active part of EU policy-making (Cimoszewicz 2003, Cimoszewicz 2004, Rotfeld 2005) and legitimized its demand for engagement, citing its experience (Meller 2006). Although Poland self-conceptualized as playing an active part in the EU, it recognized at the same time, that its potential was too narrow to realize its aims on its own (Rotfeld 2005). From this perspective, membership (especially in EU and NATO) was a formal precondition in order to realize its (regional) interests.

When Lech Kaczyński became President in October 2005, the internal context became a burden while displaying Poland’s envisioned active role within the EU. The situation hardened when Jarosław Kaczyński became Prime Minister in July 2006. Generally, President Kaczyński practiced a hard stance in policy-making. The regime style of both Kaczyński brothers was dominated by a huge self-confidence – leading often to overestimation of Poland’s potential. Moreover, as the previous part showed, the time of the Kaczyński regime was dominated by a lack of clear European strategy, and thus a pro-European stance at the presidential and prime minister level. When Tusk stepped on to the political scene at the end of 2007, he started to establish a pragmatic policy style. Nevertheless, until the death of President Kaczyński in 2010, the time was marked by huge overlapping of foreign policy competencies.

In spite of the influence of the internal situation upon an overall identity building from 2005 until Kaczyński’s death in a plane crash in 2010, the foreign ministry followed a coherent path. In 2006, Foreign Minister Meller drew the picture of Poland being a strong and powerful member of EU and NATO, based on its self-confidence and the courage of the state. Meller credited Poland with the ability to compromise and conclude alliances, as well as maintaining rich political know-how which predestined the state to concern itself with a range of political issues. Meller certified Poland to be part of the Western world. This view was confirmed by Foreign Minister Fotyga in the following year. She ascribed Poland to be an active and responsible state on the international arena (Fotyga 2007). Foreign Minister Sikorski made a declarative shift in 2008 by defining Poland as an inherent part of the EU. “(...) Europe and the Union, that’s us.” Thereby he underlined that Poland could only strengthen its position through “consciousness of common aims, professionalism and sustainability”. In the same breath Sikorski pointed to Poland’s potential to play an important role in CFSP and especially

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656 See Andrzej Olechowski in Rotfeld, Adam Daniel et al. (eds.) (2008), p.10.
its Eastern dimension. In 2009, Sikorski ascribed Poland to be a reliable partner, open for cooperation and other point of views without endangering its own national interest. In 2010, Sikorski even defined Poland as a “leading European player”, ascribing to the destiny of Poland’s future in its own hands.

Analyzes of the exposés showed that Poland continued to consider itself a powerful state within the community and on the international arena. In spite of the hard foreign policy stance from the presidential and in part prime minister level, the foreign ministry achieved the preservation of a very pro-European stance. It turned out that since 2000 Poland wanted to play an active and powerful role within international organizations; and Poland at the time considered a hard standing and a great self-estimation as the right way to achieve its goal. Thereby, a substantial shift concerning Poland’s identity occurred from 2008 onwards, at the beginning of the post-Kaczyński era. The foreign minister described Poland as an inherent part of the EU and characterized Poland as a reliable and predictable partner. It seemed as if Poland turned from being a rebel at the beginning of the 2000s, to being a young adult from 2008 onwards.

Besides the discrepancies in identity formation, concerning the different actors in foreign policy-making and the core definition of a powerful state, one main characteristic united all actors: the univocal adherence to the norm of solidarity. This norm was articulated from the level of foreign ministers (Cimoszewic 2003, Meller 2006, Fottyga 2007) and president (Kaczyński 2005, 2007). Although the norm became outspoken very often, Polish engagement for the preservation of the Nice voting system raised the impression that Poland, at the time, ignored the principle of internal solidarity ruling the European community. An alteration of the comprehension of the norm of solidarity underlying the European community seemed to be accompanied by the modernization of Polish identity from 2008 onwards.

5.1.2 Polish-Ukrainian Relations from 1999 until 2011

5.1.2.1 Polish-Ukrainian Relations from 1999 until 2005: Tradition or Renovation?

Since 1999, concerning Central and Eastern Europe, Poland continued to invest the most effort in its relations with Ukraine. Even though Poland relied on a ‘strategic partnership’ with Ukraine it suffered from too “low [a] capacity to turn the “strategy” slogan into a set of “strategic” instruments”. 657 Kuźniar goes on by pointing to the fact that “Poland had to compensate for this lack of power with initiative, hoping that Ukrainians would finally want what Poles thought (…)”658. The comment of Kuźniar shows that, due to its lack of power to push through its own vision for relations with Ukraine at the European level, Poland had to stay active in order to keep its interests alive.

But Poland’s low power profile was not the only factor hindering pushing Ukraine further. The internal political situation in Ukraine also played on a deepening of relations. In his Sejm exposé in April 1999, Minister Geremek pointed out, “We say openly with concern that the situation in Ukraine is not optimistic, that the deadlock needs to be resolved, that the critical

658 Ibid., p.265.
Looking at the situation in Ukraine clarified the challenge. From 2000 on, Ukraine entered a phase of chronic internal crisis which jeopardized democratic standards on different occasions. Three main events are exemplary of the Ukrainian internal situation. First, the presidential election campaign in 1999 was accompanied by massive corruption affairs. This reflected the non-establishment of democratic standards of elections. Second, the Gondadze affair revealed that the freedom of press and the possibility of political opposition were being suppressed. And third, the dismissal of the pro-European Prime Minister Yushchenko in April 2001, was interpreted by the West as a step-back campaign made by communists and oligarchs in parliament. The Western World started to condemn the Ukrainian developments at the time. At a meeting of the Council of Europe in 2001, EU officials criticized the Ukrainian events and especially the overestimation of power by the Ukrainian President. Moreover, members of the EU avoided any meeting with Kuchma. This became evident at the 10th anniversary of Ukrainian independence as no EU representative was present. Kwaśniewski was the only ‘Western’ representative taking part in the celebrations.

Poland continued to verbally support Ukraine and its transformation by means of actions and practical engagement. At the personal level, President Kwaśniewski continued to maintain his personal contact with President Kuchma, who was reelected in 1999. When Kwaśniewski visited Ukraine, it was ongoing praxis that he was surrounded by businessmen and journalists who were seeking new cooperation partners in their respective areas. In 1999 alone, the two presidents met at least seven times during the year on different occasions. Besides the presidential meetings, meetings on other political (prime ministers, foreign ministers, defense ministers, etc.) and non-political (businesspeople, artists, media, etc.) levels took place between the two states. In 2003, a bi-national group of representatives of the Parliaments was even established.

Besides personal meetings, Poland also organized official conferences concerning Ukraine. In March 2001, President Kwaśniewski organized a meeting with President Kuchma and a delegation of the Ukrainian opposition in Kazimierz Dolny, where all actors discussed ways and methods on how to solve political crises in democratic states. Positive internal developments in Ukraine allowed Poland to organize an international conference entitled

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661 See Wolczuk, Roman (2001), pp.176f.
662 See Dębski, Sławomir (2002), 96f.
663 From the geopolitical point of view Poland is situated in the West from the viewpoint of Ukraine.
664 See Dębowski, Sławomir (2002), 96f.
666 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.266.
667 See Ibid., p.268.
‘Ukraine in Europe’ in October 2002 in Warsaw. The conference, created to share thoughts on European integration and the Ukrainian stance towards it, brought together high ranking political officials from Poland (among others: president, ministers, opposition), Ukraine (among others: president, ministers, opposition) and the EU (among others: Javier Solana, Swedish Prime Minister). The conference in 2002 was very fruitful, as Ukraine started to present its Western ambitions – towards EU and NATO – more seriously.

In 2003, President Kwaśniewski visited Ukraine three times and held his personal contact upright. In July 2003, both presidents attended ceremonies to commemorate the victims of the events of 1943-1944.667 In the same year, in October, the first meeting of the Polish-Ukrainian Parliamentary Assembly was held on Poland’s initiative.668

Concerning the self-reflection of role, the Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz declared in his Sejm exposé in January 2004, “Poland has been and will be the advocate of Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the European Union”669. At the time, Polish politicians assessed Polish engagement for Ukraine very positively. As Buzek pointed out in 2003, “We are happy that Polish efforts, especially Polish efforts, already bring good results on this subject [relations towards Ukraine] and that the West is now recognizing the need for a democratic and free market Ukraine and the support for it”670. Concerning the Polish engagement in Ukraine Cimoszewicz added, “We will continue to support Ukraine in its multitude of contacts especially with Western institutions and states, counting on the fact that the Ukrainian side will therein prove its cooperative reliability.”671

Besides personal contacts and the declarative engagement for Ukraine, concrete Polish engagement for the democratic transformation of Ukraine touched on different areas. First, via meetings and training, Poland helped Ukraine to strengthen the self-administration of the state. Second, Poland wanted to support the rule of law by carrying out reforms. Third, Warsaw supported the economic transition and fourth, via training, Poland helped Ukraine to learn how to get money from European funds. Until today, measures had been taken from single departements Poland did not run one single dominant strategy towards Ukraine.672

In spite of the continuation of Polish support for Ukraine, it became obvious that Poland was very much concerned with the characterization of its own role; the role it wanted to play on the international scene (see, for example, the hard standing during the NT negotiations). In the same vein Poland accepted the reintegration of visas for Ukrainian people traveling to Poland.673 Poland had tried to put off the introduction of visas for as long as possible.674 After

668 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.271.
accession to the EU, Poland continued to engage in the liberalization of visas for Ukrainian citizens travelling to the West. Finally, in 2007, a bilateral agreement between Ukraine and the EU was signed, exempting certain Ukrainian citizens from visa fees (e.g. members of official delegations, journalists, students, athletes). On behalf of a Polish initiative the price for visas for all other Ukrainian people was reduced to 35 Euro instead of 70 Euro, as proposed by the EU.

The ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine in November/December 2004 had consequences for bilateral relations with Poland (see case study for a detailed analysis, pp.192-195). The amount of contacts between the two presidents increased to seven times during 2005, growing in the aftermath of the revolution (up to seven times during 2005), and reducing slightly in the following years.

Already then Poland was trying to achieve the spill-over effects of its approach towards Ukraine. It was at this time, that Poland recognized that its potential was too narrow to act alone at the European level (see previous chapter). In this manner, Poland initiated the elaboration of a common standpoint with Germany. On 12 October 2004 both states presented the jointly prepared ‘Draft Elements regarding a European Policy for Ukraine’. The substantial difference between both states was reflected in the fact that while Poland insisted on the prospect of membership for Ukraine in the EU, Germany, at the time, rejected this standpoint.

5.1.2.2 Polish-Ukrainian Relations from 2005 until 2007: the Kaczyński Era

The mantra-like thought that the independence of Poland was highly interconnected and dependent on Ukraine’s independence still continued to dominate the Polish policy approach towards Ukraine. With the Kaczyński-brothers stepping on to the political scene, the development of relations with Ukraine remained uncertain as neither policy-maker had extensive experience in foreign policy-making on which to build. President Kaczyński presented his vision of foreign policy key aspects on two occasions in 2008. In January he expressed his unequivocal support for Ukrainian accession to the EU and NATO in front of the diplomatic corps. A few months later, in September 2008, at a meeting of ambassadors, he defined Ukraine first among Poland’s non-EU and non-NATO partners.

In spite of the declarative support for Ukraine, the twin brothers failed to work out an approach to fulfil the ‘strategic partnership’ with Ukraine, using their own ideas. Accordingly, the Kaczyński era represents a time when relations with Ukraine became rather lukewarm. Bilateral relations seemed to lose their particular character. This may be explained by the lack of experience the Kaczyński brothers had in foreign policy-making (and thus also East European policy) as well as a lack of coordination in foreign policy matters. As a

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679 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.347.
consequence, relations with Ukraine became more declaratory and less strategic.\textsuperscript{681} Nevertheless, Poland was able to organize a conference in Warsaw on 10 and 11 April 2006 entitled ‘Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic policy’. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk met his Polish colleague and the Polish President Kaczyński. The latter clearly signaled Polish readiness for Ukraine to intensify the strategic partnership and to support Ukraine in its efforts to join both Western organizations.\textsuperscript{682} In April 2007, both Presidents, Kaczyński and Yushchenko signed a road map for bilateral relations during 2007-2008. A second road map was signed by both presidents two years later, affirming the renewed will to strengthen cooperation, to deepen the strategic dialogue and to extend mutual support.\textsuperscript{683}

Aside from the declarative support for Ukraine, President Kaczyński continued to keep the historical dialogue with Ukraine alive. In June 2005, both presidents took part in the opening ceremony of the Lwów Eaglets Cemetery. In the following year, in May, both presidents attended a ceremony in Pawlokoma (Poland) to unveil a monument commemorating 366 Ukrainians who died in January 1945 due to Polish underground forces. Finally, in 2007, both presidents took part in a ceremony in Warsaw to remember the Vistula Operation 60 years previously.\textsuperscript{684} In February 2009, both presidents commemorated a pacification action which took place during the World War II in Huta Pienacka village and which brought death to between 600 and 1500 Poles. In September 2009, the travel of both Presidents was planned to take place in Sahryń (Poland), where Ukrainian inhabitants had been killed in 1944. The meeting was canceled because Kaczyński refrained from travelling to Sahryń. The reason for his absence was twofold. On the one hand, Kaczyński was already committed to mustering voters’ support for the elections of 2010. On the other hand, Kaczyński had begun to disapprove of Ukraine’s history policy.\textsuperscript{685} From then on, the historical dialogue and the process of reconciliation worsened.

Besides the less strategic position of the Kaczyński brothers towards Ukraine, the MSZ continued to conceptualize Ukraine as a strategic partner. In the exposé of 2005, at the beginning of his speech, Foreign Minister Rotfeld praised the “democratic breakthrough” of Ukraine. He underlined that Poland would strongly engage so that the successful democratization process would also be recognized by the West. In the following exposé of February 2006, at the beginning of his speech, Minister Meller paid special attention to relations with Ukraine and explicitly mentioned bilateral relations. He said that “our relations [relations with Ukraine] reflect, in a particular way, on our place in Europe and in the world, as well as on our international activity and a truly European, conciliatory identity.” In the same breath, Meller defined Poland as “such an important part of Europe’s Eastern policy” and a “key supporter of Ukrainian democracy or Ukrainian rebirth”. Meller continued to describe Poland as an example which “may serve as inspiration for the activity of the Ukrainian elite and society (…)”. Meller pointed to the continuation of “support [for] the fraternal Ukrainian nation in its difficult movements (…) towards modernity and democracy”. Meller described Ukraine as “becoming a prominent actor on the European political scene”.

\textsuperscript{681} See Priesmeyer-Tkocz, Weronika (2010), p.181.
\textsuperscript{683} See Ukraine: President: News: Road maps signed with Poland.
\textsuperscript{684} See Szeptycki, Andrzej (2010), p.11.
\textsuperscript{685} See Ibid., p.17.
In 2007 Prime Minister Fotyga underlined the role of Ukraine as a Polish ‘strategic partner’. “We are a state that at this time holds a very, very intense political dialogue with Ukraine at every level.” Fotyga praised the relations among both presidents. Fotyga conceptualizes Poland as a strident promoter of Ukraine’s aspirations towards Europe and NATO. She added that “[o]f course in promotion of those aspirations Poland would always be guided by the will of the Ukrainian nation”. A very fundamental change is recognizable in the exposé of 2007: for the first time, Poland did not explicitly mention Ukrainian membership in the EU.

In spite of working on the content of deepening relations, President Kaczyński was more concerned with commenting internal political developments in Ukraine. In spring 2006, Kaczyński openly declared his support for the post-Orange-Revolution. This open commitment complicated relations with the then elected Prime Minister Yanukovych. In 2007, the appointment of Julija Timoschenko as Prime Minister was commended by the Polish President with high satisfaction. President Kaczyński still praised Poland’s engagement with Ukraine by saying in an interview that “[f]or the past years, we have demonstrated that we want to and can campaign for Ukraine’s integration to the EU”. 686

5.1.2.3 Polish-Ukrainian Relations from 2007 until 2011: Tusk

In December 2007, when Tusk became Prime Minister of Poland, he recognized that the Eastern dimension of foreign policy had reached a deadlock. Polish engagement for Ukraine had found itself in a review situation. 687 At first glance, Tusk’s interest towards Ukraine seemed to decrease. In reality, Tusk had started to distance himself from the declarative policy maintained by the previous government and tried to send a signal to Ukraine that Poland takes its relations with Ukraine more seriously. 688 When the Bucharest summit failed to grant Ukraine membership status, Poland started to help Ukraine in adapting to NATO standards. Following the summit, consequently, Poland invited the Ukrainian defense minister. The result of the meeting was an agreement aiming to develop military cooperation until 2010. Within this cooperation, Poland agreed to support Ukraine in its efforts to adapt its armed forces to NATO standards and to define common principles so that Polish and Ukrainian troops could participate in NATO operations. The establishment of a Polish-Ukrainian-Lithuanian battalion until 2011 was also envisioned. 689

It also could be noticed that a change in the handling of Polish relations with Ukraine happened in the foreign ministry. In 2008, in continuation of the emancipation of Poland, the foreign minister expressed that Ukrainian membership depended only on the Ukrainian readiness to join the Western communities. In 2009, the foreign minister added that it was Ukraine itself who would depend the most on a membership. Even though Poland had withdrawn from its engagement to push Ukraine towards the West, it did not abandon its role of advocate. In 2010, Foreign Minister Sikorski declared that “Poland will remain an advocate of the Ukrainian cause if Ukraine so wishes.” In the same exposé, Sikorski made a declarative

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689 See Ibid.,p.155.
turn by not speaking exclusively on Polish-Ukrainian relations but by including questions on relations with Ukraine in the part: Eastern Europe.

In November 2010 in Lublin, Poland organized an international conference aimed to clarify the opportunities and the challenges involved in the implementation of EaP, from a perspective toward the approaching Polish presidency. The conference focused on four main aspects: implementing Eastern Partnership (working mechanisms); economic aspects of the EaP; the role of civil society; energy security.\(^{690}\)

In February 2011, the Polish and Ukrainian presidents signed the next roadmap for cooperation within the timeframe of the next two years. As the document does not appear on any officials’ sites, its importance remains questionable. The same question arises, when considering the newly established bilateral forum for economic, cultural and political cooperation of February 2011. Both states already relied on well-established cooperation forms.\(^{691}\)

In 2011, the foreign minister characterized Ukraine still as a strategic partner and bound Poland’s limited input on the internal situation in Ukraine by saying,

> “Ukraine’s fate broadly lies in the hands of the Ukrainians. Politicians associated with the Orange Revolution have fallen short of expectations. Declarations expressing the willingness to accede to European institutions must be supported by hard-earned reforms. Corruption, a weak legal system and lowered democratic standards make it difficult for Poland to create a European perspective for Ukraine. However, our bilateral cooperation remains stable. We have set up a Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum. We have implemented a local border traffic agreement. Last year, we issued 450 thousand visas in Ukraine – almost as many as all the other Schengen Area countries put together. Despite the crisis, we have opened two new consular offices in Ukraine and established a new seat of the Consulate General in Lviv to reduce visa queues. Ukraine is our strategic partner. Its accession to the EU is in our long-term interest.”\(^{692}\)

Polish efforts to advocate Ukrainian admission to the EU brought results. The EP adopted resolutions twice, taking into account the possibility of Ukraine’s accession (January 2005 and July 2007). Both documents were edited with the help of Polish MEPs.

5.1.2.4 Summary: The Continuity of Support (and Constraints)

Although at the beginning of the 2000s Poland continued its support for Ukraine, it recognized, on the one hand, that its power was too limited to transform Ukraine independently. On the other hand, the internal context in Ukraine affected the development of these relations. In spite of these two limiting factors, Poland continued to support Ukraine on its way to transformation and Western structures. The declarative support was conceptually manifested in Polish engagement for a democratic transformation in Ukraine.

Identity and Norms

In describing itself, Poland continued to define itself as an “advocate of Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the European Union” (Cimoszewic 2004), a “key supporter of Ukrainian

\(^{690}\) See Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Jarosław, and Wojna, Beata (eds.) (2010).

\(^{691}\) See for a critical review concerning the development of bilateral relations from 2010 onwards Klymenko, Lina (2011).

\(^{692}\) Sikorski, Radosław, 16 March 2011.
democracy or Ukrainian rebirth” (Meller 2005), a “promoter of Ukraine’s aspirations towards Europe and NATO” (Fotyga 2007) and an “advocate” of the Ukrainian cause (Sikorski 2010). Whereas during the 90s, Poland and Ukraine ran an emotional relationship whereby Poland identified itself as the “big brother” of Ukraine, being an “advocate” points to a more professional relationship.

When the Kaczyński brothers took over power in Poland, this did not only have consequences for the identity formation of Poland itself, but also on relations with Ukraine. Although President Kaczyński continued declaratively to support Ukraine, he failed to fill the strategic partnership with his own ideas, together with his brother. President Kaczyński has practiced a historical dialogue with Ukraine until he started to disapprove Ukraine’s history policy by the end of 2009. Additionally Kaczyński achieved subscription to two roadmaps with the Ukrainian president. Another roadmap was signed in 2011. But, as all roadmaps failed to bring concrete results, their conceptual input on deepening relations with Ukraine remains questionable.

In spite of the weakened strategic development provided by the Kaczyński brothers, the foreign ministry continued to conceptualize Ukraine as a strategic partner. In 2005, Foreign Minister Meller praised the successful democratization in Ukraine and had already conceptualized Ukraine as becoming a “prominent actor on the European political scene” (Meller 2006). In 2007, Foreign Minister Fotyga still held on to Poland’s promotion of Ukraine. Nevertheless she introduced a condition for this engagement, namely the will of Ukraine itself. Moreover, the Foreign Minister did not explicitly mention Ukrainian membership in the EU. The last two observations reveal a turn in Polish role-conceptualization concerning Ukraine. Whereby former comments reveal that Poland sees Ukrainian admission to the Western community as the only way to conserve its own independence, Poland seemed to feel secure enough on its own.

The Polish-Ukrainian relation throughout the 2000s continued to rely mainly on the same set of norms as established throughout the 90s. The organizing principles turned out to be: friendship, cooperation, understanding (historical dialogue) and good neighborhood. The principle of trust seemed to be in decline as since 2008 Poland had bound a further engagement for Ukrainian membership in organizations on the will of Ukraine. Even though Poland continued its engagement in order to establish stability and security in Ukraine, the fundamental norm remained democracy.

Practices

Poland tried to push the process of the democratization of Ukraine further by means of different practices. President Kwaśniewski continued to hold personal meetings (also jointly with other actors) with the Ukrainian president. This practice provided Ukraine with cooperative partners. Besides meetings on a personal level, Poland organized a couple of conferences to put the Ukrainian question on the agenda and in order to gain an international echo (March 2001, October 2002, April 2006 and November 2010). Additionally, Poland organized trainings for Ukraine to adapt to Western standards. All in all, Poland continued to practice the proclaimed support of Ukraine in different ways.
When Tusk stepped on to the political scene in 2007, the character of bilateral relations started to change. Whereby the Kaczyński brothers built bilateral relations with Ukraine based on geopolitical reasons strongly interconnected with historical ties, Tusk started to run a more pragmatic policy towards Ukraine, based on achievable goals. The foreign ministry continued to condition Ukrainian membership in Western organizations based on the will and readiness of Ukraine (Sikorski 2008, Sikorski 2011). The comment of Foreign Minister Sikorski in 2011, demonstrated that the internal situation in Ukraine was starting to become the greatest burden for the Westernization of the state. This reveals that the inner context in Ukraine had an adverse influence on the development of relations.

Having assessed Polish-Ukrainian relations, the categories which played on relations, namely identity, norms, practices and context, the next part is concerned with EU-Ukrainian relations in the time between 2000 and 2011.

5.2 EU

5.2.1 EU-Ukrainian Relations from 1999 until 2011

As reconstruction of relations between both actors during the 90s revealed, the conception of bilateral relations based on ‘common values’ and a ‘common history’ (as defined in the frame structure of the PCA) without definition of what was really meant by either assertion. The partnership, to which both parties committed through the PCA, was intended to endorse Ukraine’s transition to a consolidated democracy and market economy. The vagueness of the conceptual ground left the future development of relations open. In the following part, I will reconstruct bilateral relations from 2000 until 2011 by placing emphasis on the underlying norms, practices and the EU’s identity construction of Ukraine. I will leave the cases of the Orange Revolution and the in-depth view on the Eastern dimension aside, as they are treated from a micro-perspective within the case studies. Of course, aside from the view on bilateral relations, special attention will be paid to Poland’s role of ‘guiding’ European relations with Ukraine. From a macro-perspective, this gives access to the doing of Poland and the living of the EU. Both of these aspects will, however, be treated in depth, in the next sections of the dissertation.

Bilateral relations during the given timeframe were reviewed through different documents. One way of reconstructing relations would be according to the different groups of documents available. I will therefore continue to reconstruct relations in a chronological order, as the documents are often interdependent and reflect jointly the relations between EU and Ukraine and the idea the EU had of Ukraine.

5.2.1.1 From 1999 until 2005: Stability Goes on

In Ukraine, elections in December 1999 seemed to be promising for bilateral relations as they brought pro-European and pro-reform Yushchenko to the position of Prime Minister. Yushchenko gave his pro-European stance structural ground by launching diverse reforms in

693 Yushchenko was nominated surprisingly by President Kuchma after the parliament failed by one vote to approve the previous candidate, Valeriy Pustovoytenko.
In order to build up the Ukrainian system according to European demands. As a consequence, during the Paris Ukraine-EU summit in September 2000, the EU acknowledged the reforms made by Ukraine, by officially stating that the establishment of a free trade zone would become possible (Article 10) if Ukraine would meet further requirements of the PCA. Generally, the joint statement was characterized as European praise for reforms already done in Ukraine. Thereby, the EU repeatedly underlined the condition for further and deeper cooperation, namely the implementation of the PCA. “Good PCA implementation is the basis for further rapprochement of Ukraine to the EU” (Article 2, joint statement).694 Article 22 of the joint statement revealed the (European) spirit and goal of relations. “We concluded that developing our strategic partnership will contribute substantially to peace, stability and economic prosperity in Europe as a whole and will help us meet our common challenges.”695 Especially the norm of stability appeared throughout the whole document with perspective to the establishment of stability in Ukraine and in its close environment (Russia, Moldova) (Articles 2,6,9,18,19,20). Although in the aftermath of the summit, both parties stated a ‘quality rise’ in bilateral relations696, direct contacts between the EU and Ukraine remained scarce. In the case of the EU, the cautiousness may mainly be explained by the internal development of the EU and the upcoming enlargement round. In this context, anticipating the future ‘door-to-door’ geopolitical situation with Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European countries, the EU had the task of redefining relations with these states. Consequently, the EU became more interested in relations and the inner development of these states. The EU engaged in the inner developments of Ukraine and condemned the disappearance of the Ukrainian journalist Heorhiy Gongadze697 by pointing to the fact that the EU had strongly insisted on democratic liberties within the states, and therefore freedom of speech. Additionally, the EU attributed eight car accidents in Ukraine to ruling authorities which caused the deaths of officials or oppositionists who had fallen into political disfavor.698 As a response to European criticism, Ukraine started to reorient its foreign policy ambitions towards Russia. This reorientation came along with the dismissal of Prime Minister Yushchenko. In 2001, his government was confronted by a non-confidence vote by the parliament, caused by internal struggles between inner-state actors and government members. The new Ukrainian doctrine was then no longer the ‘return to Europe’ but ‘to Europe with Russia’.699 Ukraine had to pay its double-track policy and its slowness in transforming its institutions and laws, with a loss of credibility in the Western sphere of states.700 In spite of the freezing of relations, the EU did not stop to stress Ukraine’s importance for Europe. In a comment to the International Herald Tribune of 22 May 2001 the President of the European

694 European Council: Joint Statement of the EU-Ukraine summit, 15 September 2000, 11241/00 (Presse 312).
695 Ibid.
697 Since his re-election in 1999 President Kuchma had started to be more restrictive towards media and civil society. In September 2000 the founder of Ukraine’s first investigative website, Heorhiy Gongadze disappeared and was murdered. The order of the president to his minister of the interior to ‘deal’ with Gongadze was revealed based on records taken in the presidential office and published by a member of the presidential guard. Eight further car accidents leading to death of officials which had fallen in disfavor have also been associated with Kuchma’s practices. The affairs were highly condemned by the West. See e.g. Wilson, Andrew (2007), p.21; Kuzio, Taras (2010), p.23.
698 See Ibid.
699 See Ibid., p.35.
700 See Pidluska, Inna (2001a).
Commission, Romano Prodi, and the Prime Minister of Sweden, Goran Persson, argued that “Ukraine’s progress should be a priority for all Europe” and that Ukraine is “a key factor in the development and maintenance of stability in the whole of Europe.” Bilateral relations intensified throughout 2001. The EU invited Ukraine to participate in the European Conference in Gothenburg in June 2001. In the presidency conclusion, the EU mentioned Ukraine, for the first time, in the section ‘future’ of the EU instead of in ‘external relations’.

Moreover, the EU acknowledged Ukraine’s “European aspirations” (Article 14) and wanted to give personal weight to the support of transformation throughout the forthcoming visit of the President of the Council. In his subsequent visit to Ukraine, Persson pleaded for closer political cooperation. The European promise to support Ukraine in its transformation to full democracy was officially confirmed during the Ukraine-EU summit in Yalta in September 2001. Even if the conference did not bring about significant progress to the EU-Ukraine dialogue, the EU reaffirmed the political criteria (free and fair elections, freedom of press, fighting corruption) on which it was building its relations. The conference revealed as much as the former one; a European demand list of transformation of Ukraine without offering intensified engagement in the country. In the same year, Solana stressed the mutual dependence of the two states for the “maintenance of stability and prosperity in Europe.” Ukraine – together with Russia and Moldova – were invited in autumn 2001 to take part in the European conference in Brussels discussing topics of international terrorism, border control and countering illegal migration and drugs trafficking. By inviting the three countries jointly, the EU lumped Ukraine together with the other two states. This consideration was enhanced by the European practice to put Russia and Ukraine into one group while considering the question of membership. In May 2002, Romano Prodi, on a visit to Moscow, typically said that “neither Russia nor Ukraine would become EU members in the foreseeable future”.

In May 2001, a meeting concerning security matters took place with the EU defense ministers. The then Polish Defense Minister Bronisław Komorowski proposed to integrate Ukraine into the section of Polish contribution to the ‘European Headline Goals’. This proposition foresaw a contribution of 750 Ukrainian soldiers to the planned 1500 to 2500 Polish ones. Poland tried to involve Ukraine in concrete CFSP activities. Thanks to Polish efforts, the joint battalion POLUKRBAT on the basis of NATO standards and interoperability with the alliance, was established as an important component of the European capability for operation out of area. The battalion already served in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.

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In spite of the regular contacts between the EU and Ukraine, relations did not gain any depth. In order to accelerate relations, a Ukraine-EU summit took place in Copenhagen, on 4 July 2002. But the summit failed to resolve the poor relations.\textsuperscript{709}

The EP summarized its stance towards bilateral relations with Ukraine in its report entitled ‘On the Common Strategy of the European Union on Ukraine’, adopted on 28 February 2001 and praising the future deepening of relations with Ukraine and granting Ukraine with a key role in post-Europe.\textsuperscript{710} The role of Polish parliamentarians on the European level, concerning relations with Ukraine, was growing. Since 2004, Poland is represented with high-ranking Polish politicians who are members of the Polish political elite. From 2004 until 2009, the committee of external relations was led by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski and composed by further Polish members. From 2009, the elected Polish parliamentarians on the European level engaged more profoundly in European matters than in national Polish ones. They count among the decisive advocates for the intensification of contacts with Eastern states and argue that those contacts should lead to membership.\textsuperscript{711} As an example, the Polish representative to the EP, Konrad Szymański, openly declared that without a future enlargement to the East, all Eastern policy would fail in the nearer future.\textsuperscript{712} Thereby, it remains debatable if Polish engagement in the EP concerning the accession of Ukraine into the EU is based on a political calculation in order to build on its role as a regional leader.\textsuperscript{713} Thanks to Polish engagement, the EURO-NEST, a contact forum for European Parliamentarians and Parliamentarians from the Eastern neighborhood, started its work in 2011.\textsuperscript{714}

At the time, the EU was very much concerned with the next large enlargement round, encompassing for the first time a new geopolitical space. Due to this new geopolitical challenge, the EU had the task of redefining on a conceptual level, relations with future new neighbors. The initiative ‘wider Europe’ of early 2002, which was approved by the European Commission in December 2002, furthered the development of relations with Ukraine.\textsuperscript{715} Beforehand, at the request of the GAER Council of April 2002, the HR at the time, Solana, jointly with the High Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Patten, presented a joint letter on 7 August 2002 to the Council of Europe dealing with the topic of relations of future neighboring states. Therein both authors pleaded, with respect to Ukraine, to build up future relations on the basis of PCA and to upgrade the PCA.\textsuperscript{716} In the concept the authors identified Ukraine as the “most immediate challenge for our neighborhood policy”. The objectives of the ENP were identified as “stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law along our borders”.\textsuperscript{717}

\textsuperscript{709} See Kuzio, Taras (2003), p.27.
\textsuperscript{711} See for a critical review concerning the work of Polish representatives in the European Parliament Łada, Agnieszka, and Szczeoanik, Melchior (2012).
\textsuperscript{713} See Lane, David (2006), p.3.
\textsuperscript{714} See Łada, Agnieszka, and Szczeoanik, Melchior (2012), p.4.
\textsuperscript{716} See Joint letter of Christopher Patten and Javier Solana, Wider Europe, 7 August 2002.
\textsuperscript{717} See Ibid.
On the 5 and 6 December 2002 Prodi, at the time President of the European Commission, talked about the Union’s Proximity Policy as the key to stability. Prodi lauded the security and stability which the Union would achieve through enlargement. “The current enlargement is the greatest contribution to sustainable stability and security on the European continent that the EU ever made.” In his speech, Prodi praised mainly stability production as the core European achievement in the close environment. “Lasting and sustainable stability in the European region, has been the crowning achievement of the European Union. This is what we do best, if I may say so.” In the speech Prodi picked up the topic of future relations with neighboring states and repeated his opinion of building up a “ring of friends” with the aim of “shar[ing] everything but institutions”. Although membership was not excluded (in reference to Article 49 Treaty on EU) it was not aimed at by the proximity policy. “Accession is not the only game in town”. Thereby Prodi pointed to the fact that a neighborhood policy would only be successful if it were well-structured and would comprehend obligations on both sides: “But – and this is an important but – these benefits can only be obtained if and when the process is well-structured, when the goals are well-defined and the framework is legally and politically binding. And only if the two sides are clear about the mutual advantages and the mutual obligations”.

Consequently, in March 2003, the European Commission presented ideas for a ‘Wider Europe concept’, defining the conceptual base for relations with neighboring states for the time period after enlargement. The Commission pointed to the fact that it has a ‘duty’ and “must act to promote the regional and subregional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for political stability, economic development (...).” Therefore “the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations”. But “those neighbouring countries (...) do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU”. In June 2003, the Council welcomed the Communication. In July the Commission published a Communication ‘Paving the Way for a New Neighborhood Instrument’ until it finally presented the ‘European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper’ in May 2004. In the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, the objectives of ENP were defined: to “share the EU’s stability, security and prosperity with neighbouring countries, in a way that is distinct from EU membership. The ENP is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe by offering neighbouring countries closer political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.”

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718 The ENP primarily had many labels like ‘Wider Europe’, ‘Proximity Policy’ or ‘Neighborhood Policy’.
719 Commission of the European Communities: Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission: A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, SPEECH/02/619.
Ukraine was meant to take a special place within the concept. On the day of delivering the strategy paper concerning ENP, the Commission presented ‘Country Report Ukraine’ providing an assessment of bilateral relations and the internal situation in Ukraine. The Union reviewed the developments in Ukraine and quality of cooperation largely positively, but still criticized the democratic standards of the elections and media freedom. In the report, the EU pointed to the fact that it was the largest donor to Ukraine including assistance through the TACIS program, macro-financial assistance and humanitarian assistance. The EU stressed that ENP “should facilitate Ukraine's progressive participation in the EU’s internal market and in EU policies and programs, taking into account Ukraine’s strategic goals and priorities.” Thereby, the EU clearly pointed to the fact that ENP was not meant as an instrument for enlargement.

In Ukraine, in contrast, ENP was considered as one step towards membership in the EU. Newly elected President Yushchenko confirmed this view in his speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 25 January 2005, and in his speech to the US Congress on 6 April 2005. The EU reacted very cautiously towards the Ukrainian ambitions, putting interactional emphasis on the AP, worked out within the frame of ENP without raising any hopes for Ukrainian membership. The EU’s cautious reaction considering the membership of Ukraine was condemned by Polish officials as “tentative and ill-disposed”. This, in turn, caused a sharp reaction from Günther Verheugen, who strongly stressed that the prospect of membership was not at any time taken into consideration and that Poland was the only state interested in it.

5.2.1.2 From 2005 until 2007: The Action Plan and Beyond

Ukraine was the first state within the ‘ring of friends’ to sign an AP with the EU. Polish deputies have undertaken considerable efforts to distinguish Ukraine from other ENP states but the EU ignored the tentative approach and accepted on 13 December 2004 the AP for Ukraine ignoring Polish demands. On 13 January 2005, the EP passed a motion concerning the elections in Ukraine, in which it articulated under point 14 to give “a clear European perspective to the country”. Due to the Polish and Lithuanian demands, an annex was added to the AP, which included some of the parliament’s demands of January 2005, but did not mention the prospect of membership. In this context, the AP was extended by further points and signed at a meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council on 21 February 2005, valid for a duration of three years. The AP identified 177 European demands in six areas: (1) political dialogue and reforms, (2) economic and social reforms and development, (3)
trade, market economy and regulation, (4) cooperation in law and home affairs, (5) transport, energy and environment, and (6) social relations. In the introduction, the parties acknowledged that they “are determined to enhance their relations and to promote stability, security and well-being”. They planned to develop a “close relationship, going beyond cooperation, to gradual economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation”. A bit later they admitted that “[t]he approach is founded on shared values, joint ownership and differentiation. It will contribute to the further stepping up of our strategic partnership”. But, where obligations of Ukraine were defined in detail, the declared ‘joint ownership’ manifested for the EU only in the areas of finance, support and intensity of relations.

Especially the exclusion of membership prospects for Ukraine reflects the distinct camps in this question. Whereas Eastern European states, prominently Poland, and the Scandinavian states favored Ukrainian membership, many West European states regarded Ukrainian membership as premature. What is obvious here, is that the criticizing states doubted Ukraine’s ‘Europeanness’, still considering it as part of the Soviet space under the Russian sphere of influence. This opinion reflects the European practice to treat the question of Ukrainian and Russian membership jointly. Besides which, an often-quoted argument in favor of Ukrainian membership is that the accession to the European family would prevent Ukraine from falling back under Russian pressure and losing its independence and sovereignty.

Despite of a lack of a membership prospect for Ukraine in the AP, 2005 was witnessed to be a year of deepening the EU-Ukrainian ‘get-together’. Many of the demands made in the AP were fulfilled by Ukraine. This was officially confirmed at the EU-Ukraine summit on 1 December 2005 in Kiev. This was first such meeting since the election of President Yushchenko. Both parties reviewed the development of bilateral relations very positively in the aftermath of signing the AP. “The EU welcomed Ukraine’s firm commitment to shared values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights (…).” Throughout the joint statement it turned out that EU leaders praised Ukraine’s commitments towards ‘European standards’ and the contribution of Ukraine to ‘regional stability’. Both parties admitted to initiating early consultations on a new enhanced agreement. EU leaders again welcomed in this context Ukraine’s ‘European choice’, but bound the deepening of relations on political progress in Ukraine.

The gas conflict in early 2006, between Russia and Ukraine, had consequences for different European countries. On 4 January 2006 Poland, jointly with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria, already presented a joint position on how to diverge energy supplies in Central and Eastern Europe. In March 2006, Poland presented its concept of a ‘European Energy Security Treaty’ focusing on the solidarity principle amongst its signatories. The concept was meant to unite and solidarize EU and NATO member states in the face of an energy threat. Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz presented the proposal in a letter to NATO’s SecGen of 24 February and on the EU forum at a meeting on 14 March. Both organizations

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734 Commission of the European Communities: Joint statement of the EU-Ukraine summit, Kiev, 1 December 2005.
735 Ibid.
treated the proposal, however, with reserve. Polish success in this perspective was the incorporation of the proposal in a Green Paper and the introduction of the solidarity idea on the EU level.\textsuperscript{737} The Treaty of Lisbon Article 194 (1) says,

“In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (…)”\textsuperscript{738}

Although the principle has thus been officially incorporated, the meaning of solidarity was not specified. With respect to migration policy, Poland participated actively in the definition of fees corresponding to administration costs of processing Schengen visa applications reducing fees from 70 Euros to 35 Euros. The EU Council adopted a document concerning visa regulations on 1 June 2006.\textsuperscript{739} Thanks to Polish efforts, a waiver option in relation to third countries was successfully negotiated\textsuperscript{740} and in December 2007 the EU signed with Ukraine an agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas for short term stays. Therein the parties acknowledge,

“WITH A VIEW to further developing friendly relations between the Contracting Parties and desiring to facilitate people to people contacts as an important condition for a steady development of economic, humanitarian, cultural, scientific and other ties (…)”\textsuperscript{741}

In December 2006, the Commission presented an ‘ENP Progress Report Ukraine’\textsuperscript{742} reviewing the progress made on the implementation of the AP. In the report, the EU evaluated the parliamentary elections of 2006 ‘largely’ positively. The Commission stated that“(…) Ukraine consolidated the breakthrough in conducting a democratic election process that began with the Orange Revolution and which is also a key element of the Action Plan”.\textsuperscript{743} Further on, the EU praised the intensified political dialogue (in the form of an increased number of meetings on different levels), the increased cooperation within CFSP and trade, the cooperation in energy matters and the progress in exchange programs especially in higher education. At the same time, the EU criticized the endemic corruption and lack of a truly independent judiciary.

On 27 October 2006, the 10\textsuperscript{th} EU-Ukraine-Summit took place in Helsinki. The summit represented the first high-level meeting after the parliamentary election in March 2006. In the joint press statement both parties stressed “the crucial importance of political and economic

\textsuperscript{737} See Banat-Adamiuk, Małgorzata (2007), p.48.
\textsuperscript{739} Council Decision 2006/440/EC amending Annex 12 to the Common Consular Instructions and Annex 14a to the Common Manual on the fees to be charged corresponding to the administrative costs of processing visa applications, 2006 O.J. L 175/177.
\textsuperscript{740} See Banat-Adamiuk, Małgorzata (2007), p.53.
\textsuperscript{741} Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the Facilitation of the Issuance of visas. 18 December 2007 O.J. L 332/6.
\textsuperscript{743} Ibid.
reforms in Ukraine”. At the summit, both parties agreed that the PCA would be automatically renewed each year, until a new contractual agreement enters into force. As the PCA was about to expire in 2008, the new agreement was meant to deepen cooperation in the spirit of the PCA and to go beyond. In March 2007, negotiations about an ‘Enhanced Agreement’ were meant to start, which would bring EU-Ukrainian relations to a new level and define concrete steps to be taken by Ukraine for their integration into European structures. The Council adopted the negotiating directives for the agreement in January 2007, which were proposed ex ante by the Commission. The talks started formally one month later in February, at a meeting of the Troika in Kiev. The agreement envisaged to establish a Free Trade Area and to go ‘beyond and above’ PCA. Different working groups had the task of defining concrete aspects of a further integration. Besides the establishment of a Free Trade Area, the ‘Enhanced Agreement’ aimed to strengthen cooperation in further fields, such as energy, environment, education and also foreign, security and defense policies, as well as in the areas of freedom, security and justice. Financially, the agreement was meant to be supported through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

5.2.1.3 From 2007 until 2011: The EaP and Beyond

In March 2007, the Commission adopted the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Ukraine for the period of 2007-2013. It provided a comprehensive overview of future EC assistance priorities, covering all instruments and programs, and following the structure of the joint EU-Ukraine AP. In this plan, the EU renewed its stance that assistance towards Ukraine “will principally be provided under the new ENPI which is being established to promote the development of an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness between the European Union and the partner countries covered by the ENP”. The EU renewed its appraisal for the parliamentary elections as a “milestone in the country’s democratic development”. The EU praised the positive developments in Ukraine which led to an improvement of relations between the EU and the US. The EU summarized the principal objective of cooperation to implement a “close[r], deeper political cooperation”. A bit later the EU acknowledged that “[a]s the largest donor to Ukraine, the EU has the leverage necessary to make a major contribution to the reform process.” Generally, the EU identified that the “principal objective of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine at this stage is to develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond past levels of cooperation to gradual economic integration and deeper political cooperation, including on foreign and security policy”.

As the report did not mention accession of Ukraine, Poland, anticipating the content, had already published in September 2006, a non-paper on the development of ENP in the East.

744 European Council: Joint Press Statement of the EU-Ukraine summit, Helsinki, 27 October 2006, 14604/06 (Presse 297).
745 In the case of Ukraine the agreement was labeled ‘enhanced’ and not ‘neighborhood agreement’ because Ukrainian authorities did not want the label of ‘neighborhood’ to be officially codified.
The Polish initiative clearly pleaded for membership of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{750} The EU standpoint not to offer Ukraine any prospect of membership reflects, in this aspect the opinions of Council and Commission. The EP, to the contrary, had been open towards Ukrainian membership as assertions already made had shown. On 12 July 2007, in a recommendation to the Council, the EP stated that the current negotiations with Ukraine “should result in the conclusion of an association agreement which contributes efficiently and credibly to Ukraine’s prospects in Europe and initiates the corresponding process, including the possibility of EU membership”\textsuperscript{751}.

As compared to the CSP, the National Indicative Program (NIP) for 2007-2010 defined in greater detail the focus of operations under the national envelope of the new ENPI. The NIP aimed to guide planning and project identification by defining a limited number of priority areas, together with the objectives and results to be achieved. The NIP identified three priority areas for Ukraine:

Priority Area 1: Support for Democratic Development and Good Governance

Priority Area 2: Support for Regulatory Reform and Administrative Capacity Building

Priority Area 3: Support for Infrastructure Development\textsuperscript{752}

In mid-September 2007, the joint EU-Ukraine summit took place in Kiev. In the joint statement both parties reaffirmed strong and sustained ties. They pointed to the fact that further developments in Ukraine towards consolidation of democracy, strengthening of the rule of law and respect of human rights would reinforce those ties. The leaders of the EU and Ukraine emphasized the development of an “advanced level of relations (…) based on the principles of close and privileged political links and deeper economic integration”\textsuperscript{753}. At the end of the joint statement, EU leaders “welcomed Ukraine's European choice and emphasized that further internal reforms and introduction of European standards would bring Ukraine closer to the EU”.

In the joint Progress Report from September 2007, dealing with the negotiations on the EU-Ukraine New Enhanced Agreement, both parties praised the increase in mutual relations provided by the AP. Concerning the new agreement, the EU proclaimed that the NEA should bring “Ukraine as close as possible to the EU but would not prejudge possible future developments in EU-Ukraine relations”.\textsuperscript{754} In the 2\textsuperscript{nd} joint Progress Report both sides admitted that negotiations had proceeded well in 2007/08, leading to joint understatements of the text of an Association Agreement.\textsuperscript{755} The term ‘Association Agreement’ was jointly defined in September 2008 at the Paris Summit between French President Nicolas Sarkozy in

\textsuperscript{750} See Kempe, Iris (2008), pp.259f.
\textsuperscript{753} European Council: Joint Statement of the EU-Ukraine Summit, Kiev, 14 September 2007, 12927/07 (Presse 199).
\textsuperscript{755} Ibid.
the role of the President of the European Council and the Ukrainian President Yushchenko. The term of ‘association’ was thereby adopted due to Ukrainian desire but had only a symbolical value and did not represent the prospect for membership. In the joint press statement both presidents underlined the “strategic importance of the relationship between the European Union and Ukraine”. Later on both presidents “recognized that Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and common values with the countries of the European Union”. Moreover “[t]he EU acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice”. “The presidents acknowledge that gradual convergence of Ukraine with the EU in political, economic and legal areas will contribute to further progress in EU-Ukraine relations.”

The development and the positive path of Ukraine towards Europe were reaffirmed in the joint statement after the EU-Ukraine Summit of 4 December 2009 which took place in Kiev. “Recognizing that Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and common values with the countries of the European Union, acknowledging the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcoming its European choice, the presidents welcomed the substantial advances made in EU-Ukraine relations in the past year in all areas of mutual interest including through cooperation on foreign policy and security policy issues.” The same comment was made in the joint press statement that followed.

Although the new agreement lacked the prospect of membership, it granted Ukraine with a special relationship with the EU which differentiated it from other ENP states.

In 2007, Ukraine had to handle the next internal crisis, accompanied by social manifestations when the president dissolved the parliament and premature elections were planned for September 2007. As a consequence, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament adopted a report about restarting negotiations with Ukraine, which would include concrete steps to pave the way for Ukrainian membership. The report was written by a Polish deputy (Michał Kaminski). As compared to Commission and Council, in a resolution of 15 November 2007 on strengthening ENP, the EP admitted that

“democratic neighbours which are clearly identifiable as European countries and which respect the rule of law may in principle apply, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union for membership of the EU, and that the pace and depth of a common European process should correspond as closely as possible to the abilities to implement the appropriate reforms and meet conditions (Copenhagen criteria) in the partner countries and in the EU.”

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758 See Commission of the European Communities: Joint Statement of the EU-Ukraine Summit, Kiev, 4 December 2009, 17145/09 (Presse 366).
759 See Commission of the European Communities: 14th EU-Ukraine Summit joint Press Statement, Brussels, 22 November 2010, MEMO/10/600.
In the press statement following the EU-Ukraine summit of 9 September 2008, the EU reviewed the elections positively, witnessing Ukraine’s progress in implementing democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{762}

Besides the evolution of relations on a bilateral level, 2008 marked the beginning of new relations with Ukraine on a European meta-conceptual level. The European Council of 18/19 June 2008 asked the Commission to work out a proposal for an EaP which built on a Polish-Swedish initiative (see case study). Therein both states asked the Commission to work out concrete suggestions for an agreement with Ukraine, by spring of 2009. Because of the military conflict in August 2008 in the Caucasus, the Commission presented its suggestions concerning a deepening of relations with the Eastern partners by December 2008. In the document presented to the Council and the EP in early December 2008, the Commission pointed first to the changing context, enhancing a differentiated approach towards the six countries involved. The Commission started its proposal by saying that “[t]he European Union has a vital interest in seeing stability, better governance and economic development at its Eastern borders”. Afterwards, the Commission added the EU support for reforms “serves the stability, security and prosperity of the EU”\textsuperscript{763}. Generally, the EaP “should bring a lasting political message of EU solidarity, alongside additional, tangible support for their democratic and market-oriented reforms and the consolidation of their statehood and territorial integrity”. The EaP foresaw to establish Association Agreements with partner states and to work out the ‘joint ownership’ in a bilateral and a multilateral track.

After the launch of the Association Agreement with Ukraine at the Paris summit in September 2008, intensive negotiations were conducted during 2009. In November 2009, both parties adopted the Association Agenda (AAg) in order to prepare the Association Agreement. According to the words of both parties the AAg was “a practical, focused and living document based on the principles of joint responsibility and joint ownership”\textsuperscript{764}. In the Association Agenda, both parties reviewed bilateral relations. Therein they identified a “dynamic relationship (...) which arose from a shared understanding that the prosperity, stability and security of both the European Union and Ukraine could be significantly enhanced by close partnership”\textsuperscript{765}. The parties acknowledged that a history of bilateral relations may be drawn from ‘declarations towards intensive collaboration’. The guiding principles were meant to take place in the spirit of the overall goal of “achieving political association and greater economic integration of Ukraine to the European Union”\textsuperscript{766}. The AAg formally replaced the AP. In the Joint Staff Working Paper of May 2011, the EU reviewed the AAg as “the most advanced and ambitious approach to the Eastern Partnership”.\textsuperscript{767} In 2010,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{762} See European Council: \textit{Joint Declaration of the EU-Ukraine Summit}, Paris, 9 September 2008, 12812/08 (Presse 247).
  \item \textsuperscript{764} Joint Report Regarding Progress in Implementation of the Joint Committee at Senior Official Level of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, Brussels/Kiev, June 2010.
  \item \textsuperscript{765} Commission of the European Communities: \textit{EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to Prepare and Facilitate the Implementation of the Association Agreement}.
  \item \textsuperscript{766} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{767} See Commission of the European Communities: \textit{Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A new Response to a Changing Neighborhood}, Brussels, 25 May 2011, COM(2011)303 final; Commission of the European Communities
the EU labeled the AA again as “a practical, focused and living document based on the principles of joint responsibility and joint ownership”\textsuperscript{768}. The overall goal defined in the AA was “political association and economic integration of Ukraine to the European Union”\textsuperscript{769}. The EU defined ‘political association’ as a “strengthened commitment to common values of rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (…) and democratic standards; a comprehensive and inclusive constitutional reform; adoption of an election law which meets European standards; comprehensive reform of the judiciary to guarantee fair, impartial and independent processes, and the fight against corruption.”\textsuperscript{770}

Within the same document, which reviewed the progress in implementing the EU-Ukraine AA in 2010, the EU criticized the deterioration of respect for fundamental freedoms, particularly the freedom of media, freedom of assembly and democratic standards.\textsuperscript{771}

After the launch of the EaP, bilateral relations between EU and Ukraine developed progressively and were considered highly positive in the following years.\textsuperscript{772} Several negotiation rounds took place in Brussels and Kiev. Internal developments in Ukraine risked a new impasse in bilateral relations. At the EU-Ukraine summit in December 2009, both parties discussed the Ukrainian presidential elections, which were conducted on 17 January 2010, as well as the implementation of Ukraine’s ongoing reform agenda. In the joint statement, both parties “emphasized the crucial importance of these elections being conducted in accordance with European and international standards for democratic elections. They stressed “the need for political and economic stabilisation (…)”\textsuperscript{773}. The then elected President Yanukovych visited Brussels after his election in order to demonstrate his pro-European attitude. But back in Ukraine, he signed a treaty with Russia concerning new conditions for gas distribution which allowed Ukraine to relax commitments with the EU in this sphere.\textsuperscript{774} Additionally, Yanukovych started to bring all state institutions and media under his control. Moreover, he restricted the freedom of political rivalry and generally abused his power. At the 14\textsuperscript{th} EU-Ukraine summit, which took place on 22 November 2010 in Brussels, both parties noted at the

\textsuperscript{768} 4th Joint Progress Report. Negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, Brussels/Kiev, 8 November 2010.
\textsuperscript{769} 2nd Joint Report of the Joint Committee of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council. Implementation of the Association Agenda, Kiev/Brussels, 20 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{772} See Commission of the European Communities: Joint Statement of the EU-Ukraine Summit, Kiev, 4 December 2009, 17145/09 (Presse 366).
\textsuperscript{773} Ochmann, Cornelius (2010), p.4.
beginning of the joint statement that “the depth of the EU-Ukraine relationship will be
determined by the implementation of reforms and by further consolidation of common values.”

Poland started with its own initiatives and statements, especially considering the multilateral
platform of democracy, good governance and stability. From this perspective, in November
2010, Polish authorities organized a workshop on cooperation between the national anti-
corruption authorities and civil society in parallel with the Panel of the Council of Europe
considering the fight against corruption taking place in Warsaw. In October Poland proposed
a project on police cooperation which received broad support.

Besides the launch of the initiative, Poland organized an international conference entitled
“The Eastern Partnership Conference: Towards a European Community of Democracy,
Prosperity and a Stronger Civil Society” on 29 September 2011 in Warsaw. The conference
was an event accompanying the 2nd EaP summit held in Warsaw on 29/30 September 2011.
The aim was to develop recommendations for the inclusion of civil society activities within
EaP. During the conference, Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski stressed the EaP’s goal by
saying that “[t]he Eastern Partnership – our joint project – carries the promise of building a
community of security, democracy and prosperity spanning from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Caspian Sea.” The foreign minister stressed the still-existing Polish demand of the political
integration of states. He pointed out that, “[m]ost importantly, the declaration will consist of a
strong message supporting the integration of partner countries with the European Union.”
The opinion of the EU expressed by Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement
and Neighborhood Policy at the time, was much less progressive concerning future
membership. He clearly distinguished between a political and economic integration by saying
that “[d]eep reforms bring ever closer political association and deeper economic integration
with the European Union within reach.” In the context of the conference, Buzek, President
of the EP, stressed the importance of (personal) contacts in building relations with Eastern
European countries. “This dialogue and day-to-day cooperation is at the heart of what we call
our ‘community method’.”

Ukraine and Moldova started visa liberalization negotiations with EU member states and
joined the European Energy Community in 2010 (Moldova) and in 2011 (Ukraine). In 2011
negotiations were finalized on the Association Agreement, also including the establishment of
a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). Implementation of visa facilitation still
continued in 2011 and went on in a constructive atmosphere. At the 15th EU-Ukraine summit,
both parties announced that they had achieved a common understanding of the full text of the

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775 European Council: Joint Press Statement of the EU-Ukraine Summit, Brussels, 22 November 2010.
776 Ibid.
777 Sikorski, Radoslaw (2011, September): Speech hold at The Eastern Partnership Conference: Towards a
European Community of Democracy, Prosperity and a Stronger Civil Society, Warsaw.
778 Ibid.
779 Füle, Štefan (2011, September): Speech hold at The Eastern Partnership Conference: Towards a
European Community of Democracy, Prosperity and a Stronger Civil Society, Warsaw.
780 Buzek, Jerzy (2011, September): Speech hold at The Eastern Partnership Conference: Towards a
European Community of Democracy, Prosperity and a Stronger Civil Society, Warsaw.
In the joint statement, both parties praised the development of relations. Both parties recognized the importance of the Association Agreement which “would include a comprehensive process of convergence and approximation of Ukraine to European Union values, standards and norms in all areas of cooperation”. Moreover the “leaders recognized that Ukraine as a European country with European identity shares a common history and common values with the countries of the European Union and acknowledged that gradual convergence of Ukraine with the EU in political, economic and legal areas would contribute to further progress in EU-Ukraine relations”.

In the joint declaration of the EaP summit, the participants reviewed the progress done in the field of EaP as highly positive and renewed their commitment to the objectives of EaP. In the declaration, the participants repeated that the “Partnership is based on a community of values and principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”

5.2.2 European Norms and Identity Construction from 1999 until 2011

Reconstruction of relations between the EU and Ukraine in the 2000s showed that the relationship had suffered from a strong asymmetry and remained in the tradition of PCA. Whereas the EU continued to demand transformation in a lot of well-defined areas, it had been poor in offering a strong commitment to include Ukraine in the European family. The declared ‘joint’ ownership or ‘common’ values revealed, in the deeper conceptualization to be European demands on Ukraine.

The reconstruction of relations revealed access to some essential concepts which are important when looking at the process of Polonization, namely norm and identity embedded in practices and the context. In the following, I will highlight the concepts and summarize these findings.

5.2.2.2 The Norm of Stability and Democracy

Concerning EU-Ukraine relations, contacts between the two actors remained rare after the elections of the end of 1999. At the beginning of 2000, the EU remained unclear on what it wanted Ukraine to become, and, as a consequence, did not offer a concrete timetable for the transformation process and adaptation to the European structures (with the prospect of membership). In contrast, it stuck to its practice of urging Ukraine to radical transformation and adaptation to European norms and standards. By requiring implementation of the PCA for the deepening of their relations, the EU stuck to the practice of conditionality for the development of further relations. The EU underlined that the strategic partnership would contribute to peace, stability and economic prosperity in all Europe (September 2000). It became obvious that the norm of stability was of central importance in the European approach towards Ukraine. In nearly every document touching on bilateral relations stability was

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explicitly mentioned as a core aim. This was already emphasized by Prodi in 2001, when he labeled Ukraine a ‘key factor’ for stability.

It became apparent that the EU put emphasis on the development of democratic standards. From 2000 until 2004, the EU condemned, on different occasions, the non-establishment of democratic standards (condemnation of internal political events at the beginning of the 2000s, Country Report Ukraine 2004) and, starting in 2005, to practice praising positive achievements in the establishment of democratic standards (AP 2005, ENP Progress Report Ukraine 2006, CSP 2007). The frequency of the outspoken norm of stability was striking. It became obvious that, although democracy-building was at the heart of many documents, it served in the European approach towards Ukraine as a means to establish stability in Ukraine. Democracy-building served then to establish stability in Ukraine and to construct a security zone in the EU-neighboring region. The EU put a strong emphasis on economic aspects of integration, assuming that this approach would also entrain political and constitutional changes. As such, the EU hoped to achieve spill-over effects from economics towards politics.

Looking at the internal situation in Ukraine proves completely the opposite. The recent abuse of power of the Ukrainian president did not prove a ‘spill-over effect’ from economics to politics, but is an imprint of a revival of authoritarian tendencies and a limited democracy. This, in turn, led to the assumption that the European approach towards Ukraine was accompanied by a miscalculation or even misunderstanding of the state of Ukraine. The comment of Oleksander Sushko at the beginning of the 2000s still seems to be valid; he identified that,

“(…) the real problem in the EU attitude towards Ukraine is the psychological, historic, geopolitical break lying on its western border in the eyes of the EU’s political and bureaucratic elite. In spite of years of independence, they still identify Ukraine as a part of the Russian world, linked with Russia by language, history, economy, political and administrative culture, etc.”

In 2008, the introduction of EaP revealed the norms on which the EU based relations with Ukraine. As analysis showed, stability, security and prosperity were the core task words. And the EU identified itself as having the task of supporting the Ukrainian transformation towards political democracy and economic prosperity. In spite of the declarative support for Ukraine, the EU seemed to be happy with the status quo as it bound a further deepening on reforms in Ukraine without offering further rapprochement ex ante.

5.2.2.2 Context

Analyzing relations, it became apparent that the practical side of transformation and therein deepening of relations was strongly influenced and conditioned by the context. The reconstruction showed that especially the internal context in Ukraine often represented an impediment to deepening relations. If the external context came into play (e.g. Caucasus) it functioned contrarily as an impetus for the development of relations, also giving other states the possibility of accelerating the deepening of relations.

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But the EU had no hard sanction mechanisms at hand to push implementation further. It could only rely on Ukraine’s willingness.

The Ukrainian willingness to transform, according to European standards, crumbled at the beginning of the 2000s. The disrespect of democratic standards was then strongly condemned by the EU. In spite of the Ukrainian difficulties, the EU stuck to its hard demand of transformation. It seemed as if this practice allowed the EU to continue to distance itself from Ukraine. Ukraine, in consequence, reoriented its foreign policy ambitions towards Russia, which were structurally accompanied by the dismissal of Prime Minister Yushchenko. First, the dismissal proved that, in spite of its proclamation to join the European family, Ukraine suffered from a high discrepancy between the proclaimed European course and the unwillingness to undertake domestic reforms. Second, the dismissal demonstrated the constantly shifting objectives in foreign policy.

Two events in 2004 changed relations between Ukraine and the EU drastically. First, the Orange Revolution resulted in Ukraine’s commitment towards democratic standards. Second, the large enlargement round forced the EU to rethink its conceptual relations with the new neighboring states. As such, the context played on the change of doings of the EU. The case study provides an in depth view of the Orange Revolution.

Due to enlargement, the EU put Ukraine under the conceptual umbrella of ENP, belonging then to a ‘ring of friends’. One should consider that ENP (without membership prospect) suffered from the weakness that the EU did not have the right to impose any sanctions if the state in question did not meet the conditions. Thus, with ENP, the EU institutionalized possible interaction areas with the ‘ring of friends’, but, at the same time, institutionally prevented Ukraine from any accession prospects.

The next two years were a quiet time in EU-Ukrainian relations. Relations in 2007 started to take a declarative character again. Generally, both parties evaluated relations well but they did not define a list for ‘closer and deeper’ relations. But in the same year, negotiations started concerning an ‘Enhanced Agreement’ between the EU and Ukraine. Although the EU aimed to go ‘above and beyond’ the PCA, the agreement lacked a clear definition of what ‘enhanced’ really meant. This, in turn, reflected the lack of consensus within the EU as to how relations towards Ukraine should be defined.785

In 2008, the new conceptual treatment in the frame of EaP was introduced. As the case study will show, Poland played a major role in the establishment of EaP. Thereby, as analysis showed, the external context (happenings in the Caucasus) had a major impact on the acceleration and development of EaP. In addition, the conflict also enhanced the willingness of other EU states, which were not directly interested in the target region of EaP states, to take an interest in and finally sign the EaP. But, aside from the positive effect of the acceleration of relations, the presentation of the program in December 2008 also had a relativizing effect on the conception the EU had of Ukraine. Wherein the EU identified Ukraine through the AA as an associated partner, which granted Ukraine with a special treatment, EaP foresaw association agreements with five further Eastern partners (Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Armenia,

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785 See also Hillion, Christophe (2007), p.174.
Azerbaijan and Georgia). As such, the EU experienced a setback in its conception of Ukraine from uniqueness at the beginning towards group-treating without the prospect of membership in the end.

In 2010, the internal context of Ukraine played on bilateral relations and challenged the deepening of relations as newly-elected President Yanukovych obviously turned towards Russia. As such, Ukraine provided the EU with reasons against the deepening of relations.

### 5.2.2.3 Identity

Concerning identity construction at the time, the EU still considered Ukraine as the other. Although the EU put Ukraine after the Gothenburg summit in 2001 in the section of ‘future of the EU’ instead of ‘external affairs’ this categorization reflected only a vague quality rise without any obligations from the EU-level. This treatment was matched at the meta-structural level with the integration of Ukraine into the concept of ENP. As the documents revealed, the overall aim of ENP was to create ‘political stability’ and ‘economic development’ in the states concerned and thereby to establish a zone of prosperity and friendly neighborhood. ENP offered the ‘ring of friends’ ‘everything but institutions’. Conceptualizing Ukraine as a friend with no prospect of membership suspended Ukraine from being part of the ‘European family’.

A friend is somebody you can invite on some occasions (e.g. summit in Brussels in 2001) without being obliged to always offer him a place at the table at (familial) meetings. In this sense, and by means of this concept, the EU conceptualized Ukraine on the ‘meta-level’ as ‘the other’ with no prospect of membership. The EU spoke of a “privileged relationship (…) [in order to build] on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect of human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations and the principles of market economy and sustainable development”786. It turned out that the ‘mutual commitment’ was meant towards European values and standards.

Until ENP came into force, it turned out that the EU always considered Ukraine together with Russia. The categorization of Ukraine as being part of Russia was met in Ukraine by the ambivalent identity (and directions towards the East and the West) and the support of the European or Russian path depending on different occasions. Ukraine’s non-reformist character at the time seemed highly convenient for the EU, as it allowed the EU to keep Ukraine outside of Europe by pointing to the non-will of adaptation towards the EU and the Ukrainian slogan of ‘to Europe with Russia’. One should consider from this perspective, that the Ukrainian slogan reflects only a halfhearted desire to join the European Community. As such Ukraine itself offered the EU reasons to put it in the same bracket as Russia and to consider it beyond Europe.

But even after the Orange Revolution, and Ukrainian proclamation of the will to become a European member, the EU did not raise any hopes for membership, but, in contrast, in February 2005 approved the AP which was explicitly designed for states outside the EU. Thereby, documents revealed that there existed a clash concerning the question of

membership of Ukraine between Council and Commission, on the one hand, and Parliament on the other. The first two actors were not willing to give Ukraine the prospect of membership, the EP was favorable in this concern.

Taking this conceptualization into account, the AP was then an institutionalized means for the EU to safeguard a safe distance regarding Ukraine. In addition, the AP obliged Ukraine to make different changes without offering any specific obligations from the EU-part, although Prodi, in his speech on ENP, stressed the ‘mutual obligations’ of both parties. Consequently, the AP may be interpreted as a further conditional approach towards Ukraine. In the tool-box of the EU, conditionality approved to be the most important practice to ‘encourage’ states to adapt to European standards. Concerning the AP, Poland had the power to include an annex to the already existing AP and thus to participate on the organizational level.

This conceptualization then precludes any prospect of membership for Ukraine. Besides the heterogeneity concerning the labelling of bilateral relations, the EU with its different organs, was not unanimous about the question of Ukraine’s possible future membership thereof. Whereby Council and Commission continue in their tradition not to oppose Ukrainian membership, but do not openly declare the prospect of membership, the EP openly declares its pro-membership attitude. Unfortunately, the EP may only provide the Commission and the Council with recommendations. Its opinion is therefore not binding.

5.2.3 Case Studies

5.2.3.1 Orange Revolution

5.2.3.1.1 The Context

In autumn 2004, presidential elections took place in Ukraine. In total, 24 candidates were aspiring to take office. According to the constitution, President Kuchma was not allowed to assume the office of President for an additional period. Consequently, Prime Minister Yanukovych became the candidate for the ‘Party of the Regions’, supported by Kuchma and Vladimir Putin. His biggest counterpart from the opposition was Yushchenko from the people’s union ‘Our Ukraine’. Generally, both candidates ran the same program in spite of the difference in approach to foreign policy matters. Whereas Yanukovych pleaded to continue the double-track foreign policy towards Russia and the West, candidate Yushchenko strongly supported the integration of Ukraine into European structures. With the first ballot on 31 October 2004, no candidate gained the absolute majority of 50% of votes. Yushchenko, with a voters’ support of 39.87%, and Yanukovych, with a share of 39.32% of votes, were the strongest candidates. In order to push elections in his direction, Yanukovych helped himself to undemocratic measures. In this sense, he made use of public funds, blocked the election campaign (the opposition had no free access to the media), falsified the voters list and manipulated it on different occasions.\footnote{The efforts to manipulate the outcome had already started six month before election. In addition, on 6 September Yushchenko started to suffer from a mysterious sickness, weakening his body and scarring his face gravely. His physical state forced him to renounce for about one month from the electoral campaign. Later tests confirmed that he was poisoned. The government ruled media spread that Yushchenko contracted the disease himself. See Karatnycky, Adrian (2005), p.2.} On 21 November 2004, the second ballot took place.
on the same day, nonpartisan exit polls had proclaimed Yushchenko the commanding lead with 52%, in comparison to Yanukovych receiving 43% of votes. On 24 November, the official result came in, announcing Yanukovych as the new president with a vote advantage of 2.5%. Russia was quick to accept the result and congratulated Yanukovych, who was supported personally by Putin. In contrast, the Western world, especially the US and the EU, did not accept the result and demanded a complete rerun of the election.  

In Ukraine, on the evening of November 22, hundreds of thousands of people started protests against the electoral fraud, accusing Yanukovych and his supporters of the fraud. This was the beginning of the ‘Orange Revolution’, a nationwide nonviolent protest lasting 17 days and under the symbolic color of the Yushchenko’s campaign, orange. A lot of politicians from the opposition – included among them Julija Timoschenko – supported the protests. In a short session of the parliament on November 22, Yushchenko declared himself president. This caused perpetuation. Yushchenko and his supporters realized that a successful civic coup could serve as an example for future people-driven protests politics, which would lead to institutional instability. So, he recognized the need for international support. Deputies from the former Kuchma camp started to support Yushchenko. On 27 November the parliament met and declared the second ballot invalid. The outcome of the third ballot taking place on 26th December resulted in a victory of Yushchenko with 52% of votes and a defeat of Yanukovych with 44% of voters’ support.

5.2.3.1.2 Poland’s Engagement - Doing

After the elections of 31 October 2004 and 21 November 2004, Ukraine found itself in a national crisis, which risked, at the time, becoming an international burden. After the first round of elections, the EU was still behaving very reservedly concerning Ukrainian matters. Poland, contrarily, anticipated that leaving Ukraine alone would create negative consequences in the long run. Therefore, Poland tried to raise the interest of other states in Ukraine during the European Council summit in Brussels on 4/5 November 2004. In the presidency conclusion, the Council acknowledged Ukraine as a ‘key neighbor and partner”, but, in the same breath, condemned the course of the presidential election on 31 October, which did not meet international standards (Article 42). Besides placing Ukraine on the agenda of the EU, Poland also encouraged states from the Visegrad Group to send observers to Ukraine.

On 23 November 2004, the still-in-office President Kuchma, as well as Yushchenko, asked the Polish President Kwaśniewski and the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus for support. President Kwaśniewski immediately called the High Commissioner of CFSP, Solana, the Dutch President of the European Council, Jan-Peter Balkende, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the French President Jacques Chirac and also the US President George W. Bush and asked for their support. Additionally, he called further European representatives. By doing so, Poland tried to garner international support for its mission in Ukraine and thus to

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788 See Karatnycky, Adrian (2005).
789 See Ibid., p.35f.
793 See Barburska, Olga (2006), p.34.
internalize the conflict. Whereby European representatives did not want to engage directly in the conflict and reacted cautiously, Solana decided to engage the EU in the conflict. Simultaneously to Solana’s engagement in the frame of CFSP, the EU organized on 25 November an EU-Russia summit to discuss the situation in Ukraine. By doing so, the EU avoided officially promoting one of the states.

In addition to President Kwaśniewski, former Polish President Walesa came at the request of Yushchenko to Ukraine, in order to help manage the crisis. His reputation was still based on his role as ‘solidarity-legend’. However his engagement did not bring any results. Kwaśniewski, on the contrary, proposed to organize, as already announced, ‘round table talks’ in order to solve the crisis. The negotiations, taking place on 26 November between Ukrainian representatives, the Russian speaker of the Duma, Boris Gryslow, the General Secretary of OSCE Jan Kubiš, President Kwaśniewski, President Adamkus and Solana, resulted in three main goals:

1. A judicial examination of the poll and the recognition of the court’s decision
2. The renunciation of violence
3. Initiation of political dialogue

The results met and mirrored the Polish demands on how to handle the crisis, which Kwaśniewski communicated to the Polish media and the Ukrainian Foreign Minister before the negotiations took place. On 1 December, the next negotiations meeting took place, during which the Polish Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz took part, as representative of the European Council. During the talks, the members agreed on the acceleration of reforms concerning the constitution and the division of powers between president and parliament. Moreover President Kwaśniewski presented a ‘five-point-program’ which aimed to repeat elections on the 19 and 26 December.

The EP also reacted to the crisis in Ukraine. In September 2004, the EP appointed a delegation (headed by two Poles) which had the task of observing relations between the EU and Ukraine. Its first task was to observe presidential elections in Ukraine. On 17 November 2004, the EP adopted a resolution confirming Ukraine’s status as a key neighbor for the EU. On 2 December 2004 the EP passed a resolution demanding the repetition of the elections and supporting the initiatives made by the Polish and Lithuanian Presidents. Mainly Polish parliamentarians worked on the creation of the resolution. All the proposals condemned the Russian influence on the state. Solely the drafts of the fractions of the

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795 See Barburska, Olga (2006), p.34.
797 Because of the international pressure and the condemnation of the Ukrainian elections Russia had to revise its stance and to renounce to its acceptance of the elections.
799 See Ibid., p.280.
European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) did not contain any such input. This may be explained by the fact that both groupings were not represented by Polish members. Apart from the resolution, a special debate was held in early December in the EP, during which the Polish parliamentarian Buzek presented four EP conditions to be met, namely “solving the crisis without recourse to violence, maintenance of territorial integrity of Ukraine, repetition of the second round of the elections, ensuring equal access to media for both candidates”.

The Polish attempt to upload its vision of Eastern policy on the European level was tried again by Polish representatives in the EP. On 13 January 2005, the EP accepted another resolution, which touched on the Ukrainian elections. Initiated by Polish representatives and supported by further representatives of Central and Eastern European states, the EP voted with a majority of more than 60% of votes that the Commission should take into account the political changes in the APs towards Ukraine. The resolution also contained the option of Ukrainian association and membership. As a consequence, the Council implemented the changes in the AP, but did not give Ukraine a prospect of membership.

The Polish government also tried to directly input its vision concerning Ukraine at the European level. At a meeting of the European Council on 8 December 2004, Polish representatives (the substituting Defense Minister Jan Truszczyński, the Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka and the Polish Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz) promoted in their speeches the importance of Ukraine for the EU. Because of their insistence, the European Council included in an annex of the concluding remarks of 16/17 December, stating that:

“The European Union stresses that Ukraine is an important neighbor and partner of the EU with a high strategic importance. The European Union and Ukraine have a common interest in further reinforcing their political, economic and cultural ties. The European Council therefore underlines that the EU aims at an enhanced and distinctive relationship by making full use of the new opportunities offered by the European Neighborhood Policy.”

During the time of the revolution, the roles of Sejm and Senate remained restrained. After the first ballot, the Sejm condemned the lack of respect of democratic standards, but it did not succeed in sending a representative to Ukraine. The Senate thereby sent two officials to Ukraine. After the second ballot, both chambers sent a multitude of parliamentarians to Ukraine.

5.2.3.2 Eastern Dimension of the EU

5.2.3.2.1 The Context

Analysis of Poland’s foreign policy-making during the 90s, revealed that, since regaining independence, the Eastern dimension was top-priority in foreign policy. It became obvious that the Polish engagement for a consolidated, independent, democratic Ukraine was, on the
one hand, inherently linked with the Polish wish to establish security in the neighborhood. On the other hand, the engagement was built on the self-identity of regional power, which Poland established throughout the 90s.

However, it also became obvious that the exemplary transformation, the entry into NATO and the starting of accession talks with the EU, provided Poland with enough self-confidence so that it not only want to lobby for a democratic Ukraine. It also wanted to put its own vision and conception towards the region, and especially Ukraine, on the EU’s agenda. Since regaining independence, support for the transformation of Ukraine had been a main focus of Polish foreign policy engagement. As analysis showed, Poland recognized itself as advocate for Ukraine on the organizational level and big brother on the bilateral level. Concerning relations with Eastern states, Poland tried to upload its vision on the European level in 2001 by means of a non-paper (concerning the future Eastern dimension of the European policy towards Central and Eastern Europe). The established Neighborhood Policy was again put on the agenda in 2007, in order to adjust it to the new context. The situation in the Caucasus in April 2008 pushed intensification of the concept. In 2008, Poland, jointly with Sweden, presented the concept of an Eastern dimension on the European level, which was institutionally introduced as the concept of EaP.

5.2.3.2.2 Poland’s Engagement - Doing

Poland’s attempts to contribute to the Eastern dimension of the Union’s foreign policy dimension were already put forward when Poland started its accession talks with the EU in 1998. At that time, Poland wanted to counterbalance the northern, southern and Balkan-strategy by an Eastern dimension. Thereby Warsaw built on the historical experiences it had towards the Eastern region.\(^{806}\) In 2001, Poland presented a non-paper to the EU, where Polish experts on foreign policy (Marek Cichocki, Aleksander Smolar and Paweł Kowal) worked out a Polish report on the then called ‘Eastern dimension of the European Union’. The Polish proposal was distributed to high-level EU officials and national diplomats. To the outside, the paper made the impression that it was only a ‘political statement’\(^{807}\) and not a clear strategy.

In December 2002, at the Copenhagen summit, the final version of the Eastern Dimension (ED) was presented to the EU. The program was entitled: *Non-paper with Polish Propositions concerning the Future Shape of the Enlarged EU Politics towards the new Eastern Neighbors*. In its geographic scope, the program encompassed four countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia. It was designed as a regional action strategy towards new EU neighbors in the East. The aim of the program was two-fold. First, the concept was designed to coordinate EU activities in the East. In this sense, the proposal built on three integrating paths: a community path, a governmental (bilateral and multilateral) and a non-governmental path. Secondly, it envisaged to overcome a new separation in Europe after enlargement.\(^{808}\) Especially the second demand was a core Polish aim. In a speech given at an international conference in Warsaw in February 2003, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cimoszewicz, stressed Poland’s desire to soon be “directly participating in shaping the

\(^{806}\) See Legucka, Agnieszka (2009), p.61.

\(^{807}\) See Pomorska, Karolina (2006), p.75.

\(^{808}\) A new separation was especially feared by Ukraine.
Union’s external policies. The most important task would be to prevent the establishment of new dividing lines with the East. As Cimoszewicz stressed, due to culture, history, tradition and science, “Europe does not end at the EU’s Eastern borders”. The foreign minister pointed to the need for enhancement of the political dialogue “including human and minority rights, democratic reforms, resolution of regional tensions and conflicts in accordance with international standards”. Thereby Cimoszewicz pointed to the strengthening of the social and human dimension of EU cooperation with the Eastern European states. In this spirit, the proposal built on five areas of cooperation: enhanced political dialogue, assistance in the transformation process, development of economic cooperation and cooperation in justice and home affairs. The central element of the ED was therefore a prospect for membership for those states, which adapted European reforms and met the conditions for accession.

The Polish proposal also foresaw the creation of a ‘European Democratic Fund’ and a ‘European Freedom Fund’ enabling the creation of aid programs managed by NGO’s in each individual country. The idea behind these programs was the promotion of democratic values through the transfer of knowledge. As an analysis of events during the 90s has already shown, the norm of democracy and the establishment of the same in Ukraine was a core Polish aim.

After enlargement, the EU responded to the challenge of defining relations with neighboring states with its ENP concept, which was preceded by a document from Patten and Solana. Both documents differed from the Polish proposal in three essential elements. First, the European concepts differed strongly in their territorial aspect as they considered all neighboring states from the East as well as from the South. Second, they did not offer neighboring states the prospect of membership and third, they put the norms of (political) stability and (economic) prosperity over the norm of democracy.

As 5.1.2.2 revealed, the shift of power to PiS, starting in 2005, entrained a break with former foreign policy-making practices. As already discussed, the visible turn can be explained mainly by the Kaczyński brothers’ inexperience in foreign policy-making. The character of foreign policy-making of the Kaczyński brothers was criticized by the great majority of Poles and also led to the defeat of PiS in 2007.

The ineffectiveness of ENP forced EU member states to reform it. ENP was put back on the EU agenda during the German presidency during the first half of 2007. Germany proposed to establish a group of ‘EU’s European Neighbors’ (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) within ENP, which was strongly supported by Poland. At the December 2007 European Council meeting, Poland suggested jointly with Lithuania, the enhancement of

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811 See pp.174ff.
812 The democratization processes which started in Ukraine and Georgia ended in chaos. Other ENP countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova) did not implement essential reforms towards democratization and political stabilization.
813 See Adamczyk, Artur (2010), pp.198f.
multilateral cooperation in the frame of ENP. From this perspective, reinforced cooperation between the Visegrad countries and the Baltic States was proposed, before each European summit, in order to come up with joint statements concerning Eastern European states.\footnote{See Cianciara, Agnieszka K. (2008), pp.10f.}

Poland made a major attempt to input traditional Polish objectives into the European level in 2008 by the joint Polish-Swedish initiative concerning the EaP. Poland informed the German Foreign Minister, Frank Steinmeier, during a private visit to Warsaw in April 2008 about its initiative.\footnote{See Ochmann, Cornelius (2010), p.2.} The initiative was presented at a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers. On 19/20 June, the initiative was then presented at a Council meeting.\footnote{See EurActiv: Polen und Schweden verteidigen ’Initiative für den Osten’, 26 May 2008.} The Polish-Swedish initiative was launched at a moment when the regionalization of ENP was starting to be promoted. In this context, Nicolas Sarkozy officially presented in August 2008 the Union for the Mediterranean. Germany reacted with reserve to the French initiative.

While EaP was accepted at the first EU-EaP summit in Prague on 7 May 2009, the President of France and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, Italy and Spain were absent.\footnote{See Żurawski vel Grajewski, Przemysław (2009), p.41; Lippert, Barbara (2009), p.170.} It seemed as if the spirit of EU-wide interest in the region, caused during the Caucasus conflict, was over. Contrary to the listed traditional European countries, Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel participated at the meeting and pushed with support from the Netherlands that the states in question would not be called ‘European partners’ but ‘Eastern-European partners’. This precision was made in order to avoid an interpretation of future membership prospective for the states in question.\footnote{See Ibid., p.41.} EaP was strongly supported by the three Baltic States, the Scandinavian states and the Czech Republic. In her speech concerning the new approach, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, pointed to the fact that within EaP, the EU would continue to stick to the practice of first demanding transformation from the states before offering further accommodations. “We can only make real progress on Free Trade Agreements with economies that are genuinely ready to open up to competition. And we can only offer visa facilitation to countries which have secure travel documents, properly run borders and arrangements for readmission of returnees”. Thus, the EU conditioned a further deepening of relations on the transformation of states. Thereby the EU introduced the principle of conditionality. This principle was also laid down in Article 1 of the joint declaration of the first EaP summit held in Prague. Therein the contracting partners state that EaP “will be governed by the principles of differentiation and conditionality”\footnote{European Council: Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May, 8435/09 (Presse 78).}

In its territorial scope, the EaP covers six countries: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In detail, EaP offers the partner countries in a bilateral dimension:
1. Association Agreements
2. Establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area between the EU and particular countries
3. Comprehensive institution-building
4. Support of mobility of citizens and visa liberalization
5. Cooperation in the field of energy security

Thereby the concept established the generation of individual forms of cooperation with the single countries, according to four thematic platforms:

1. Democracy, good governance and stability
2. Economic integration and convergence with EU policies
3. Energy security
4. Contacts between people

Additionally, relations were meant to develop through so-called flagship initiatives “that will give additional momentum, concrete substance and visibility to the Eastern Partnership”.

The territorial scope of the initiative clearly reflects Polish priorities. The integration of the six states into individual initiatives came along with the separation of those states from the concept of ‘ring of friends’, which reflected a core Polish attempt. The diversification of the programs in relation to each individual country also reflects the Polish perspective, which was already proclaimed in the non-paper of early 2000. This Polish requirement built on the consideration that Ukraine was the most advanced country. A clear change in the concept of the initiative of EaP is reflected in the development of mechanisms of multilateral cooperation, enhancing contacts and working mechanisms in a horizontal dimension.

What clearly distinguishes EaP from other initiatives is the establishment of multilateral dialogues on different levels. In this perspective, the initiative foresees meetings of Heads of State and Government in a two-year cycle, annual meetings of foreign ministers and, in case of demand, meetings of high-ranking officials concerned with one or more thematic platforms.

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820 See Articles 4 to 8, European Council: Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May, 8435/09 (Presse 78).
821 See Article 11, Ibid.
822 In 2009 five flagship initiatives were approved: The integrated border Management flagship; the Small and Medium Enterprise flagship; the Regional Electricity Markets; The Prevention of, Preparedness for and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters; the Environmental Governance.
823 Article 13, European Council: Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May, 8435/09 (Presse 78).
A fundamental Polish demand within EaP has been the perspective of a visa-free regime between the EU and EaP States. As reconstructed in 5.1.1.1, Poland had to introduce visa requirements for its Eastern neighbors and also within Ukraine when it entered the EU. The administrative burden and the high costs deteriorated travel accommodations for Ukrainian people. As Poland, during the 90s and 2000s required an opening of interpersonal contacts, visa requirements clearly prevented this demand.

Great importance within the concept is attached to the development of a civil society. The EaP foresaw the creation of a Civil Society Forum (CSF) organized in working groups which has been successfully established. Poland strongly supported the development of civil society in order to build up democracy from below. On the contrary, the EU considered the development of civil society as the involvement of the people without being a member of the EU.\textsuperscript{824}

EaP called for the establishment of free trade with the states involved. This aim, however, was not new as it had already been introduced into the PAC agreements. The repetition, however, moved the aim further towards implementation.

5.2.4 Doing and Living in the EU

5.2.4.1 Doing in the EU

As the theoretical part of this dissertation disclosed, an analytical difference exists when looking at Polish \textit{doings} from a macro-perspective or from a micro-perspective. Whereas analyzes from a macro-perspective catch the \textit{doings} as a long process, analyzes from a micro-perspective (case studies) look precisely into the interactions of actors and respect the context in detail. Therefore, case studies provide much more insight into the \textit{doing}.

In the given timeframe, on different occasions, Poland inputted on the organizational level concerning relations with Ukraine. I will reflect first the Polish \textit{doings} as considered from the micro-perspective, and then secondly, I will turn to the review of the macro-perspective and the Polish \textit{doings} within. I start with the case of the ED of the EU as it covers a long time period (from 2001 until 2009) and turn then to the reflection of the Orange Revolution. The other \textit{doings} are then embedded in that time.

Considering its identity since the beginning of accession talks, Poland has wanted to play a prominent part in developing EU policy. A first asset made during the Nice-Treaty negotiations seemed to stimulate Polish engagement. As the case study concerning the ED of the EU showed, already at the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s, Poland openly declared its will to play an active part in the development of the European Eastern policy. At the time, the utility of the Polish engagement has strongly been interconnected with the wish of playing an important and strong role within the EU. The declarative attempt and the inherent identification of a state which can achieve the goal on its own were underpinned in practice by the presentation of the Polish non-paper for the ED. The ED reflected core Polish demands concerning relations with Eastern States and impeding a new separation in Europe.

\textsuperscript{824} See Ochmann, Cornelius (2010), p.4.
At the end, the proposal was written to pave Ukraine’s path towards membership of the EU. The EU responded at the time with the ENP concept differing essentially from the Polish proposal. It turned out that, at the same time when the Polish initiative aimed to achieve the perspective of membership for Ukraine, the EU concentrated on the establishment of a security zone based on stability and the amelioration of economic relations. This corresponded to the norms and the identity construction the EU held at the time (see living part). Thus, the Polish concept at the time went unheard on the European level and ended in failure. One reason for the European ignorance of the initiative may be found in the way Poland presented the initiative. Poland presented the initiative on its own, counting on its experiences, its historical links with Eastern States and its mutual commitment with Ukraine to support each other on organizational levels. At the time, Poland resigned consciously or unconsciously consulting other states in the preparation time of the document. Thus, Poland failed to upload its vision. The tactic ‘doing on its own’ failed. Additionally, as Poland had at the time not been an integral part of the EU, it lacked also a legitimacy giving power to input officially on the development of the EU in CFSP-matters.

In spite of the European ignorance of Poland’s proposal, Poland did not stop to engage in the development of relations with Central and Eastern European states. Especially in the exposés at the beginning of the 2000s, the foreign ministers frequently pointed to the Polish engagement within CFSP and especially in relations with Ukraine. The reason for Polish engagement in this area was the attractiveness of the topic in Polish circles. As Paweł Kowal comments, “(...) if there was any new and fresh subject discussed in Polish circles it was the subject of Europe and the East”825. A next joint proposal followed in this perspective. The Polish-Swedish EaP initiative was presented in June 2008 and inaugurated at the first EU-EaP summit in Prague on 7 May 2009. As analysis of the case study revealed, EaP reflected some core Polish priorities and especially the diversification of the program towards each country. With EaP, Poland tried to bring Ukraine closer to Europe and to offer new opportunities for cooperation until prospective membership.

The initiative was largely evaluated as a success.826 What clearly distinguishes the Polish initiative from the ED initiative is Poland’s way of inputting. While in early 2000 Poland ran an initiative on its own without consulting partners ex ante, this initiative differed. First, it was jointly elaborated with neutral Sweden. The support of Sweden, which apart from its more developed public administration did also have more experience in the ‘way of doing European stuff’, definitely contributed to the success. Thus, the tactic of ‘doing jointly with another actor’ was successful. Second, Poland circulated the proposal to its partners before officially presenting it at the European level. Although Poland stayed in its traditional practice (and as such strategy) to bring Ukraine closer to the EU, the tactic differed. Poland presented its proposal to conform to European rules and structures. This proves that the success of the doing depended on a strong representational aspect, namely the structure of doing European ‘stuff’ and Poland’s role within the EU, namely this of a middle-range power. Presenting the ED at the beginning of the 90s, Poland seemed to ignore the practice of doing European stuff which changed with the presentation of EaP. Moreover, Poland changed its practice in the

cases of ED and EaP according to its change of self-identity. Whereas, in the beginning of the 90s Poland self-identified as a strong actor, it has relativized its strength from 2004 onwards.

Turning to the second case study (Orange Revolution) represents another successful Polish doing.

Already at the European Council summit in Brussels on 4/5 November 2004, Poland tried to raise interest for Ukraine. Poland continued this doing at the end of November 2004 when President Kwaśniewski asked at a European level for engagement in the conflict. In the same spirit, President Kwaśniewski proposed to organize ‘round table talks’, bringing together diverse actors in order to solve the crisis. By raising international support, Poland, on the one hand offered the EU (and other actors) a prominent position in the game with Ukraine, and, on the other hand, reinforced political ties between Ukraine and other European actors. Suddenly, the EU was no longer only concerned with security and stability building in Ukraine, but was part of promoting the establishment of democratic standards in the state. As such, Poland changed its tactic of supporting Ukraine from ‘doing on its own’ towards ‘doing jointly with other actors’. Playing the game according to its range as a middle-range power, which Poland recognized at the time, provided Poland with the power to upload successfully its vision how to handle the crisis. The results which were achieved during the negotiations reflected namely the propositions of Kwaśniewski. As such, Poland did not only want to solve the crisis in Ukraine, but ‘used’ the international support to push through its own vision.

In sum, Poland played an important role during the Orange Revolution, trying to upload its vision on how to handle the crisis on the European level and succeeded in implementing its own demands on the European level.

Kai-Olaf Lang, an expert on Poland, comments on Polish engagement in Ukraine as follows,

“With the engagement in the Ukrainian crisis Poland not only achieved success in its foreign and Eastern policy, but also paved the way for the future of CFSP827.

Solana was attributed as playing an important mediating role, contributing to the positive development of relations between the EU and Ukraine.828 Thereby, the results which were secured during the negotiations mainly reflected Polish demands. Nevertheless, Poland had also to accept a European conception of the AP in December 2004 without the prospect of membership for Ukraine.

Both case studies prove that Poland had been successful in its doing when it adjusted its tactics to conform to European rules and its range as a middle-range power. In both cases Poland has been successful by uploading jointly with other actors. In the case of EaP the joint character is self-evident. In the case of the Orange Revolution, Poland provoked a joint proceeding by internationalization of the crisis. During the time of the Orange Revolution Poland moreover recognized its scope as a middle-range power. This recognition provided Poland with the power to successfully upload its own ideas which also influenced the uploading in 2008.

827 See Lang, Kai-Olaf (2007).
Poland used its tactic to act jointly with other actors at different moments during the 2000s. Already in 2004 Poland recognized that its power was too limited to input on evolutions on its own. Consequently, in October 2004, Poland presented jointly with Germany a paper ‘Draft elements regarding a European policy for Ukraine’. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Poland and Lithuania jointly put forward an annex to the AP. This was a success as no other country in the range of ENP had added an annex to the AP. The first part of this chapter showed, that the time of the Kaczyński-regime (2005-2007) was characterized by a low profile in foreign policy-making. Consequently, no Polish initiatives with other states happened. When Tusk came to power, Poland again started to engage on the European level concerning relations with Central and Eastern states. Already in December 2007, Poland and Lithuania pleaded jointly for the enhancement of multilateral cooperation concerning ENP. In 2009, 2010 and 2011, Foreign Minister Sikorski concluded that Poland wanted to be seen as a serious partner with whom other states in Europe would want to cooperate. Thus, Poland’s tactic corresponded with the change of identity from great power towards middle-range power.

During the 2000s Poland has continued its practice of organizing conferences and meetings to lobby for Ukraine. Already at the beginning of the 2000s Poland organized conferences bringing together Ukrainian, European and Polish actors discussing Ukraine’s future in Europe. In bilateral relations Poland also continued to keep this practice alive in order to provide the declarative support with concrete results. After the launch of EaP, Poland started to organize international conferences (2010/2011) in order to integrate partner countries (most prominently Ukraine) by ‘dialogue and day-to-day cooperation’ with the EU. As analyzes have shown, in its approach towards Ukraine, Poland already relied on a long tradition of organizing conferences in order to turn its political strategies into reality. As such, Poland implemented its practice which had already been established between Poland and Ukraine (at the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s) on the European level.

In 2006, the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine stimulated Poland to push forward a European Energy Security Treaty. Although Poland was not successful in uploading the treaty and former attempts, it was successful in introducing the norm of solidarity on the European level. As the identity construction in Poland has disclosed, the organizing principle of solidarity has been fundamental in Polish foreign policy-making.

Concerning the topic of visas for Ukrainian people, Poland had already been active before formal accession to the EU. At the time, however, it had no legitimacy to avoid the introduction of visas for Ukrainian people travelling to Poland. In the aftermath of accession, Poland wanted to reduce costs for visas for Ukrainian people. It was successful in 2006 by introducing a waiver option for some third countries travelling to the EU. In 2007, the EU and Ukraine signed a bilateral agreement excluding some groups of people from obtaining a visa. The insistence that visa costs be reduced for Ukrainian people shows that Poland wanted to push the coming-together of European and Ukrainian people. The implementation of visa facilitation still continued in 2011.

In the EP, Poland was much more successful in bringing in its vision concerning relations with Ukraine. Polish parliamentarians frequently pleaded for Ukrainian membership and
during the whole timeframe engaged for a coming-closer with Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European states. Thanks to Polish engagement, the EURO-NEST, a contact forum for European Parliamentarians and Parliamentarians from the Eastern neighborhood, started its work in 2011. Poland was successful in introducing its practice of ‘coming together’ (through conferences) at the European level.

### 5.2.4.2 Living in EU

As Polish *doings* revealed, Poland continued to lobby (mechanism) for Ukrainian membership by declarative and operational actions during the whole decade of the 2000s. Poland continued its practices, based on conceptions of norms and identities, having been established during the 90s. Poland had been successful in uploading after it had changed its way of inputting to conform with its role of middle-range power. Simultaneously, the EU went on to develop relations further based on the conceptions of the 90s. Consequently, the EU continued to practice an asymmetrical relation based mainly on the norm of stability. In spite of the European tradition, Poland was successful in uploading its own conceptions. I will detect in the following the effects of the Polish input and unfold the conditions which played upon the European *living*. In analogy to the *doing* part, I will start with a reflection on the case studies and turn then to the cases from a macro-perspective.

Focusing on the Eastern Dimension of European policy and Polish input reveals that Poland had first been successful in uploading its vision in 2008, even though it had previously tried, since 2001 to create this policy. Although the *context*, in the cases of ED and EaP, has at both times been favorable for change, only in 2008 had Polish efforts been successful. Three *causes* may be extracted in explaining how Polonization in 2008 had been successful. First and foremost, in 2008, Poland *changed the handling* of input through a change of *tactic*. In this respect it acted conform to its role as a middle-range power which needed other states to push initiatives through. A change in the Polish identity played crucially upon the change of handling. As analyzes of the exposés have shown, from 2004 on, Poland realized that its potential was too narrow to guide European policy on its own. Through the change of identity and consequently through professionalizing the manner in which to input on the organizational level, Poland had finally been successful in uploading its vision. Then it also acted to conform to European rules and respected the European game of policy-making. Besides the know-how of *doing* European stuff, the case of EaP reveals that Poland as a middle-range power will depend on the support of other states if it wants to successfully upload visions. This dependence correlates then, third, with the *power* of Poland which had an influence on the uploading. For sure, this low *power* to act on its own depends on the one hand on the financial resources of Poland which are still very modest. Żurawski vel Grajewski correctly commented on the Polish attitude as follows, “We [Poland] have an idea, and you [net payers to the EU budget] should pay for its implementation”829. This low capacity in financial resources reduces thus the force with which Poland could push political ideas through to the EU agenda on its own. But on the other hand EaP showed that the power depended also on legitimacy. In 2008, Poland had the *full legitimacy* to be part of policymaking. In 2001 Poland had not yet been member of the EU which first came with its

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829 Żurawski vel Grajewski, Przemysław (2009), p.47.
accession in 2004. In 2008, Poland’s power to input had been greater than in 2001 as the conception did not differ essentially from the European path. As analysis detected, EaP relied mainly on the norms of stability, security and prosperity. This and the pressurizing world-context may explain the speed with which the EU accepted the Polish-Swedish initiative.

The effects on the European level differ in relation to the different aspects of EaP. The territorial scope of the initiative clearly reflects Polish priorities. The integration of the six states into one initiative came along with the separation of these states from the concept of the ‘ring of friends’ which reflected a core Polish attempt. The diversification of the programs in relation to each individual country had already been attempted by Poland in the non-paper of the early 2000s. This Polish requirement built on the consideration that Ukraine was the most advanced country and consequently further arrangements could lead to membership. By accepting the territorial diversification, the EU transformed its position in this matter. Concerning its behavior, the EU quickly (December 2009) signed the AA towards ‘political association’. Even though the Polish aim of Ukrainian membership in EU had not yet been achieved, the way has been paved towards considering Ukraine as part of a self (with membership on top) through political association.

A clear change in the concept of the initiative of EaP is reflected in the development of mechanisms of multilateral cooperation enhancing contacts and working mechanisms in a horizontal dimension. In this respect, the initiative foresaw a two-year cycle of meetings of the Heads of State and Government, annual meetings of foreign ministers and, in case of demand, meetings of high-ranking officials concerned with one or more thematic platforms. Reconstruction of relations showed that since the 1990s, Poland had already practiced these mechanisms in order to democratize Ukraine. As the EU officially incorporated these mechanisms in a strategy for the first time, the incorporation reflects a transformation in this matter. Regarding normative effects, Poland, as European partner and in charge of the Presidency in 2011, started to organize conferences and meetings. Thereby, further meetings would take place according to the demands made in EaP. What clearly distinguishes EaP from other initiatives is the establishment of multilateral dialogues on different levels.

A very fundamental Polish demand within EaP has been the perspective of a visa-free regime between the EU and EaP states. As reconstructed in the previous chapters, Poland was obliged to introduce visas for Ukraine when it entered the EU. The administrative burden and the high costs deteriorated travel for Ukrainian people. As Poland during the 1990s and also the 2000s required an opening of interpersonal contacts, visa requirements clearly prevented this demand. As the EU had already made concessions in this matter in 2007, the demand reflects absorption by the EU as it did not fundamentally changed the EU behavior. The EU concessions revealed a further change in the European practice towards Ukraine. Beforehand, the EU strictly required a transformation of Ukraine at all levels before a deepening of relations could take place. The normative effects are hard to detect, as in 2011 bilateral talks about a visa-free regime still continued.

Great importance within the concept of EaP is attached to the development of Civil Society. The EaP foresaw the creation of a CSF which has been established successfully. While Poland has strongly supported the development of Civil Society in order to build up democracy from
below, the EU’s view of the development of civil society has been reflected in the idea that a stronger involvement of the people in EaP should give them the feeling of belonging to the European family without being a member of the EU.\footnote{See Ochmann, Cornelius (2010), p.4.}

EaP called for the establishment of a free trade zone with the concerned states. This aim, however was not new as it had already been introduced in the PAC agreements. The repetition, however, furthered the aim towards implementation.

Turning to the case of the Orange Revolution reveals some more results for the living part. First and foremost, it turned out that the context (internal context in Ukraine) played a crucial role in the development of the crisis. The pressure coming from the internal situation in Ukraine and the invitation from the Ukrainian side, provided Poland with the legitimacy and thus power to play an active role in the crisis. Then, and this is an important then, for the success of the Polish uploading, Poland did not act as Ukraine’s ‘big brother’ or ‘parent’, on which it had previously based its relations, but acted as Ukraine’s ‘advocate’, bringing further actors in the courtroom. This move had its roots in a change of Polish identity towards Ukraine which started in 2003. As analyzes of the exposés have shown, Poland changed its identity by not identifying itself anymore as the big brother but by professionalizing its support by being Ukraine’s advocate. Moreover, during the OR Poland did not play the role of advocate on its own, but internationalized the crisis by inviting other actors to handle the situation. The internationalization of the crisis provided Poland with the legitimacy to play an active part in the whole process. As such, the change of the identity-conception influenced the Polish handling of the crisis.

Within the international group, Poland was successful in uploading its vision on how to handle the crisis. But besides uploading the agenda, one further effect was predominant in the frame of the Orange Revolution: the involvement of the EU in the democratization process in Ukraine. Previously, EU-Ukrainian relations relied only on the fundamental norms of security and stability. Thus, through the back door, Poland also put the democratization of Ukraine on the EU agenda by making the EU an inherent part in the solving of the crisis. This means a fundamental transformation of the European approach towards Ukraine. Thereby, analysis of the normative effects shows that constitutive effects had to wait. In the aftermath of the crisis, although the EU praised the ‘democratic breakthrough’, the introduction of the development of democracy in Ukraine was first established with EaP. Thus again, a Polish engagement and uploading pushed the norm of democracy on to EU agenda. In many statements, stability and security as fundamental norms still dominated until 2011. This proves that normative effects of Polonization reflect a long time period.

Considering the EU’s Energy Policy reveals that again, the context and the pressure coming from the historical moment was beneficial for the Polish uploading. Although the Polish attempt at the Energy Treaty was not accepted at the European level (Inertia), Poland was able to upload one of its fundamental organizing principles, namely solidarity. This uploading corresponded to transformation at the EU level. The principle of solidarity in energy matters was then introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon in Article 194. Thereby, the treaty did not give
any indication of how the EU understood the norm of solidarity. Additionally, Article 194 TEUL refers to a ‘spirit of solidarity’ which is a very vague claim for solidarity.

The case of all Ukrainian people being able to obtain visas, proves that insisting on its promise, which Poland gave to Ukraine before accession to the EU, resulted finally in adoption on the European level. When the EU signed a bilateral agreement with Ukraine in 2007, the EU transformed its standing in this matter. Before accession to the EU, Poland still had to reintroduce the idea of visas for Ukrainian people due to the demand and pressure from the EU. The EU continued talks with Ukraine to deepen the visa-free regime in 2011 and, as such, this practice has manifested a change in the very identity of the EU.

Reviewing the processes of Polonization on the EU level shows that the conceptions (norms, identity and practices) which were established along the 90s turned out to be very stable. Generally, the Polish and European conceptions of relations with Ukraine diverged. Whereas Poland had already tried to democratize Ukraine during the 90s, the EU, in contrast, had still been interested in establishing security and stability. Only through the back-door was Poland able to involve the EU in the democratization process in Ukraine. The involvement of the EU in the OR nevertheless did not have immediate constitutive effects. During the 1990s Poland had already turned out to be very active concerning its cooperation and rapprochement to Ukraine. On the EU level Poland had to accept steps back as its power turned out to be too small to affect European policy-conceptions on its own. Poland’s uploading had been conditioned by its power and by the contexts (historical setting and internal situation in Ukraine). Before reviewing the process of doing and living in greater depth in the conclusion of the dissertation, I will now reconstruct relations between NATO and Ukraine from 1999 until 2011 and the Polish role within.

5.3 NATO

5.3.1. NATO-Ukrainian Relations from 1999 until 2011

As the previous chapter has already shown, the story of relations in the triangle Poland-NATO-Ukraine, as compared to the story of relations in the triangle Poland-EU-Ukraine is short. This originates from the different structures of the organizations, their different political scopes and the scope of binding organizational decisions. Whereas the EU, with its supranational infrastructure, covers a bright political scope and offers political and financial help in the respective areas, NATO is ‘only’ concerned with the topic of security and institutionally organized as an intergovernmental organization. In spite of the broadening of the definition of security, which widened NATO’s activity field, compared to the EU, NATO’s direct influence on states remains minor. As the depth and scope of relations between EU-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine diverges, the next part is organized differently from the previous section. It will first offer a review of NATO-Ukrainian relations between 1999 and 2011 and then, second, it will reflect on the Polish role in NATO with special focus on the topic of enlargement. As such, it will offer a case study as considered from a macro-perspective. Consistent with the EU-Ukraine part, I will follow a chronological order in

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831 This is topic for a further work, investigating the ‘meaning of use’ of the norm of solidarity in the EU context.
832 See Chapter 3, pp.94ff.
reconstructing relations. I do not highlight in depth internal evolvements in Ukraine as they have already been reflected in former parts.

As the last chapter already showed, the widening of the concept of security redefined NATO’s role as a forum for consultation and cooperation. Consequently, cooperation and consultation became the organizing principles for structuring relations between NATO and Ukraine during the 90s. In the documents of PfP NATO established the norms of democracy and transparency as the basis for future development and deepening of relations. Additionally, the demand of contribution to operations, with respect to a cooperative defense approach, was established. It became obvious that NATO wanted to establish stability in the region through an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine. The membership of Ukraine had not been on NATO’s agenda during the 90s.

On 24 April 1999, the Heads of State and Government met in Washington, in the frame of a NUC summit, in order to review the implementation of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. The allies,

“reaffirmed their support for Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole.”

During the next NUC meeting, which took place at the level of foreign ministers in December 1999, the parties stressed their mutual commitment to make further progress in enhancing the cooperation. NATO praised Ukraine’s engagement for closer “involvement in the process of developing the European security and defence identity”. At the NUC meeting at the ambassadorial level on 1 March 2000, the Commission underlined that NATO-Russia cooperation played a crucial role for European security. Additionally, the participants reviewed cooperation done at the last time, which mainly included information mechanisms of NATO with respect to military structures and implementation. On 30 May 2001, at a NUC meeting at the level of foreign ministers, the participants welcomed the continuing qualitative development of the distinctive partnership. The ministers positively assessed ongoing progress in Ukraine towards NATO standards on different levels. It seemed as if Ukraine had been on a good path towards convergence to all NATO standards.

In May 2002, Ukrainian President Kuchma announced Ukraine’s aim to fully access to NATO. On 21 and 22 November 2002, the same year, a NATO summit took place. It was surrounded by a diplomatic scandal caused by Ukrainian President Kuchma. As Ukraine, at the time, was suspected to have sold to Hussein’s Iraq Kolchuga radar systems in contravention of UN sanctions of summer 2000, Kuchma, was not invited to the summit. This, however, did not prevent Kuchma from travelling to Prague and taking part in the

In order to repair the damage caused by the Kolchuga scandal, Ukraine sent 2,000 troops to Iraq during the summer 2003. They served in the Polish-led sector between Baghdad and Basra. Additionally, in the same year, Ukraine unconditionally supported the Alliance and the US, by opening up its airspace for overflight by US aircraft. In the same year, NATO-Ukraine relations improved noticeably. Special improvements were attained in the JWGDR and labeled as a ‘substantial progress’.

In spite of the scandal, at the NUC meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Prague on 22 November 2002, the parties adopted the NATO-Ukraine AP. The purpose was “to identify clearly Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities in pursuit of its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures”. The AP built on “jointly agreed principles and objectives” covering political and economic issues (section I), security, defense and military issues (section II), information protection and security (Section III), legal issues (section IV) and mechanisms of implementation (section V). The AP was followed by Annual Target Plans (ATP), the latter specifying Ukraine’s tasks to adjust rules and operations to NATO standards. The ATPs specified targets which were to be met through internal actions by Ukraine, or by joint NATO-Ukraine actions and cooperation. On 24 March 2003, the first ATP was published. The first 26 actions outlined in the ATP, dealt with the strengthening of democratic and electoral institutions as well as with strengthening judicial authority and independence, strengthening the rule of law, promoting fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens, ensuring religious freedom, ensuring freedom of assembly and completion of the administrative reform before the actions turned to focus on the security sector.

In the next ATPs of 2004 and 2005, actions followed the same order. Although the AP was established and the ATPs followed, it was already known in 2003 that a deepening towards a Membership Action Plan (MAP) would first be envisaged after Kuchma had left his post. The reputation he enjoyed among Western representatives was too small.

After the Orange Revolution, the allies invited newly-elected President Yushchenko to a summit meeting on 22 February 2005 in Brussels. They jointly expressed support for his ambitious reform plans and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. “NATO is ready to work with you,” NATO SecGen Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said at a joint press conference with President Yushchenko. The SecGen also paid tribute to the people of Ukraine, saying they had shown the way to democracy. In order to enhance cooperation not only discursively but by means of action, NATO launched a project to help Ukraine deal with the dangerous legacy of old ammunitions, small arms and light weapons stockpiles. The 25-million euro initiative

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838 See Ibid., pp.39f.
was the largest of its kind ever undertaken in the world.\textsuperscript{844} In April, at a NUC meeting at the level of foreign ministers, both parties launched the Intensified Dialogue (ID) on Ukraine’s aspiration to NATO membership.\textsuperscript{845} In October of the same year, talks had already taken place in Kiev in order to fill the ID with concrete steps.\textsuperscript{846} Focusing on the ID, already in April 2005, NUC agreed on short-term actions in order to enhance Ukraine’s reform priorities. The actions covered the following fields: strengthening democratic institutions, renewing political dialogue, reinvigorating cooperation in defense and security sector reform, enhancing and targeting public diplomacy efforts, enhancing support to address the socio-economic impact of defense reform.\textsuperscript{847}

In March 2006, NATO’s SecGen Jaap de Hoop Scheffer welcomed the conduct of free and fair parliamentary elections which would, according to his words, contribute to the “consolidation of democracy in Ukraine”\textsuperscript{848}. One month later, foreign ministers and the SecGen met in Sofia for informal consultations in order to take stock of the ID. With respect to Ukraine’s membership ambitions, the SecGen stressed that this was a “performance-based process”, which depended on the progress of reforms in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{849} Visiting NATO HQ on 14 September, the new Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yanukovych, said there was “no alternative today for the strategy that Ukraine has chosen in its relations with NATO,” and that Ukraine was “now in the next stage of improvement of our relations…of closer relations with the Alliance”\textsuperscript{850}. With respect to MAP, Yanukovych added that, because of the situation in Ukraine, “we will now have to take a pause, but the time will come when the decision will be made.”\textsuperscript{851} It was about convincing the society that membership in NATO and the policy of good relations with Russia were not juxtaposing policies, and finding a way to bring both of these positions together.

On 9 July 2007, the NUC organized a meeting to celebrate the tenth anniversary of signing the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. In the opening remark, NATO SecGen Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted,

“Over the past ten years, NATO and Ukraine have steadily intensified their cooperation in strengthening security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, and we have achieved concrete results. (…) Our doors, as we have said many times, remain open. But decisions about the future of our Distinctive Partnership are very much in the hands of Ukraine’s people and their elected leaders.”\textsuperscript{852}

\begin{itemize}
\item See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO Update: \textit{Alliance ready to deepen partnership with Ukraine}, 22 February 2005.
\item North Atlantic Treaty Organization: \textit{Statement by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the elections in Ukraine}, 27 March 2006.
\item North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Remarks by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the signing ceremony for the letter of intent for the nations expressing their support for the NATO-Ukraine partnership network for civil society expertise development, 5 October 2006.
\end{itemize}
The SecGen praised Ukraine as the only partner that had contributed to all ongoing operations which has been “a very important contribution to our common security.”853 During that whole year, Ukraine participated in and contributed to a wide range of NATO-led operations. At a meeting of foreign ministers in December 2007, the Allies expressed particular appreciation for Ukraine's active support for ongoing operations.854 When Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko visited NATO’s HQ for the first time on 29 January 2008, the SecGen repeated NATO's continued support for Ukraine's efforts to pursue reforms and move closer to the Euro-Atlantic Community.855 At the Bucharest NUC meeting in April 2008, the Allies decided to begin “a period of intensive engagement with Ukraine at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to its MAP application.”856 Furthermore the parties acknowledged that “(...) we agreed to further enhance the political dialogue and practical cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance, which will help advance Ukraine’s democratic transformation, reform goals and fulfilment of its international obligations. We recalled our conviction that Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are key factors for ensuring stability in Europe.”857

In order to deepen the political dialogue and cooperation and to underpin Ukraine's efforts to strengthen its political, economic, and defense-related reforms with the goal of membership in NATO, both parties signed on 29 August 2009 a ‘Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine’.858 At the NUC meeting in December 2009, the foreign ministers praised the high-level political dialogue between the two parties and discussed further deepening of relations.859 In early 2010, presidential elections took place in Ukraine, bringing Yanukovych into power. NATO assessed the elections as fair and free. In the aftermath of the election, Yanukovych said in an interview with Russia’s Channel One that “[t]here is no question of Ukraine joining NATO. Ukraine is interested today in the development of a project to create a system of collective European security. We are ready to take part in this and support the initiative of Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev,” he went on, with a clear signal that he wanted to restore ties with Russia.860

When the Heads of State and Government gathered in Lisbon on 20 November 2010 to define NATO’s future course, they confirmed that a “stable, democratic and economically

858 Ibid.
861 See http://www.globalresearch.ca/yanukovych-confirms-no-plans-to-take-ukraine-into-nato/17595
prosperous Ukraine is an important factor for Euro-Atlantic security.” The Allies officially respected Ukraine’s choice of non-bloc status and recalled that NATO’s door remained open as declared in Bucharest.\textsuperscript{862}

In February 2011, the SecGen visited Kiev. During the meeting, President Yanukovych expressed the commitment to furthering active political dialogue and practical cooperation.\textsuperscript{863}

On 15 April 2011, the NUC met at the level of foreign ministers in Berlin in order to discuss priorities and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. The ministers emphasized the importance of Ukraine and reaffirmed “that an independent, democratic and prosperous Ukraine is key to Euro-Atlantic security”\textsuperscript{864}. They agreed that the NUC and the AP, based on common values, would continue to play a central role in relations. The ministers welcomed the comprehensive reforms in the sphere of strengthening democracy and were “looking forward to their effective implementation”\textsuperscript{865}.

On 24 May 2011 the JWGDR met to discuss developments in the security and defense sector and to discuss visions for further work in the respective sectors. The members agreed, among other things, to continue to consult and provide advice, on Ukraine's request, on the formulation of the security and defence reform-related objectives in its Annual National Programme, as well as [to] support the implementation of these aspects” and to “provide a forum for consultations and the provision of advice to Ukraine on the implementation of its key strategic defence and security documents\textsuperscript{866}.

\textbf{5.3.2 Summary}

At the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO had already clearly indicated its main aim with respect to Ukraine, namely that a sovereign, independent and democratic Ukraine with a prosperous economy would contribute to stability and security in Central and Eastern European states and the rest of the continent. The intensified cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe was praised at many occasions (e.g. SecGen 2007, summit 2010). It became obvious that stability and security still represented the pivotal norms in NATO’s approach towards Ukraine which resulted from NATO’s nature as a security and defense organization. It nevertheless turned out that NATO engaged through its programs in democracy-building in Ukraine. A shift from consultation and cooperation towards a list of concrete deeds was established in 2002, through the signing of the AP. The AP and the succeeding ATPs disclosed that NATO wanted to establish security and stability through core democratic standards, namely the strengthening of democratic and electoral institutions as well as strengthening judicial authority and independence, strengthening the rule of law, promoting fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens, ensuring religious freedom,

\textsuperscript{862} North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 20 November 2010.

\textsuperscript{863} See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Joint statement at the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers in Berlin, 15 April 2011.

\textsuperscript{864} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{865} North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Joint statement at the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers in Berlin, 15 April 2011.

\textsuperscript{866} North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 9th Senior Level Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, 24 May 2011.
ensuring freedom of assembly and completion of the administrative reform before the actions turned to focus on the security sector – as outlined specifically and in detail in the ATPs. It became obvious that whereas NATO’s political scope focused on stability and security, the means by which to achieve it was democracy-building.

Already in 1999 NATO praised Ukraine in being in the process of taking over a European security and defense identity. Nevertheless, internal developments in Ukraine had on different occasions been an impediment to the deepening of relations (2006, 2010). Despite these tendencies, NATO continued to repeat its open-door policy. Thus it was ready to consider Ukraine as a ‘common-we’.

The intensification of cooperation proved not only to be in NATO’s hands but was dependent on the internal context of Ukraine. The time in focus proved to be a time in which internal struggles in Ukraine impeded the dynamization of relations.

5.3.3 Case Study: Poland and Enlargement of NATO

When Poland entered NATO in 1999, the international security environment experienced some significant changes. The Kosovo conflict entered a new phase, terrorism determined by a fundamentalist version of Islam and the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction influenced the new global security situation. In spite of these great changes in the context, Poland has continued to praise the Alliance’s open door policy since the beginning of its membership. At the Washington summit in April 1999 President Kwaśniewski identified Poland discursively as a major advocate of this policy. The idea to vouch for enlargement was the Polish mantra-like thought, that Polish security was very much dependent on the security and independent situation in Ukraine. Consequently, Poland tried to actively participate in the NUC which was intended to become – to use the words of Professor Gemerek – “a sort of a Polish specialty in NATO”. Although at the time Poland put great emphasis on the input of the evolution of relations between NATO and Ukraine, it participated at the same time actively in the NATO-Russia cooperation. The idea behind this ‘new’ double-track policy was Poland’s desire to prevent that a stronger NATO-Russia partnership would lead to a lower security interest in Ukraine. In March 2000, the NUC met in Kiev – the first time in history outside NATO member states. The meeting happened on the eve of the Russian presidential elections, bringing the Russian nationalist Putin into power.

In the exposé of 2000, Polish Foreign Minister Geremek described Poland as a secure state due to its membership in NATO. He announced that Poland was a “confident and solid member of NATO”. During 2000, one of Poland’s main activities would be to “actively...

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868 See chapter 5.1, pp.156-172.
869 Geremek, Bronislaw cited by Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.244.
870 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.244.
contribute to the process of strengthening NATO”873. In a further reflection of his exposé, Geremek even specified the content of Polish contribution. “We may contribute by our knowledge about Eastern Europe and the already made experiences through contacts,”874 One year later, in 2001, Foreign Minister Bartoszewski stressed that with respect to Poland’s role in NATO, the major tasks would be its “active engagement in all ongoing operations, shaping its strategy; realization of the declared undertakings adapting its military structures on NATO standards”875. Bartoszewski specified that for Poland, the establishment of security was highly interconnected with the enlargement of the stability and security zone. Therefore, Poland strongly supported the ‘open door’ policy of NATO which included the Polish conception of prospective membership for Ukraine. The desire to open up the Alliance was repeated ten days later at the visit of Bush on 15 June 2001 by President Kwaśniewski with the words, “We are among the designers of a better world. And – what is obvious for us – we share responsibility with our partners and allies.”876

That Poland stuck to the hard security provisions, with which the US was able to provide Poland and all of Europe, became globally obvious after 9/11, when Poland, jointly with other Central and Eastern European states, signed the letter of the eight.877 The role of the strong American ally was already externally underlined by a speech given by Bush at the University of Warsaw on 15 June 2001, when he stressed Poland’s role as a ‘trustful ally’.878 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in September 2001, Poland organized an international conference in November 2001 in order to counter terrorism and thereby stressed its role as a regional leader.879 Polish sympathy for the leading nation in NATO became increasingly obvious in 2002. During the war in Afghanistan, the common way for NATO member states to manage their troops was under UN mandate. Poland, in contrast, put its troops under direct American command.880 The rationale behind Poland’s engagement in the war against terrorism under direct control of the US, was the hope of ever closer ties between the two states. As a consequence, Poland hoped to count on US military aid and access to Iraqi oil. When Poland recognized that its engagement did not bring the desired results, Poland became less enthusiastic about the American concept of NATO. This became obvious at the November 2006 NATO summit in Riga, when Poland did not warmly support the concept of a ‘global partnership’ with the Americans.

On 27 February 2001, on his visit to Brussels, Bartoszewski presented the Polish position towards NATO relations with Ukraine within the frame of NUC.881 From a Polish viewpoint, a further enlargement would be the only possible logic in order to increase the sphere of

874 [Translated by D.P.-H.] „Wnieść do niej możemy naszą znajomość Europy Wschodniej i nagromadzone doświadczenia kontaktów.” Ibid.
879 See Ibid., p.72.
880 See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.335.
881 See Kronika stosunków międzynarodowych Polski w 2001r., p.512.
“democracy, stability and security”. Membership of Ukraine “would introduce a complete new quality from the Polish point of view, and its security towards the East”. Additionally, Poland estimated that a further enlargement would not only signify the “solidarity of democratic states based on common values and the willingness to transform NATO” but that it would also be a proof of “internal integrity and solidarity in action”. Poland’s main contribution towards enlargement would be reflected by military cooperation with candidate states.

At the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO wanted to decide on the second round of enlargement. In his exposé of 2002, Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz stressed that Poland already actively engaged in the organization of the summit. Furthermore, he added that “[w]e are especially interested that during the summit an invitation of subsequent candidate states for membership would be attained.” In spite of the scandal which surrounded the summit, Poland valued the summit as a considerable success for NATO. In accordance, it reflected the AP as a starting point for a major transformation of NATO. “NATO finds a new identity as an active political part of regional security (…)”. In the subsequent exposé of 2003 Cimoszewicz said, “From now on we will be concerned that the door of NATO remains open”. Cimoszewicz even précised that Poland paid special attention to Ukrainian accession: “Our aim is to achieve a full liquidation of former geopolitical divisions.”

In 2003, Poland identified itself as an integral part of forthcoming changes in NATO. Poland aimed to influence the evolution of NATO towards a globalization of the organization so that the Alliance would feel responsible for the security of territories which were not yet full members. This idea was promoted with a special look at Ukraine.

In January 2004, Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz stressed in his exposé that “Poland has been and will be the spokesman of Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU.” As on many other occasions, Cimoszewicz underlined that NATO’s door should remain open, especially for Ukraine. In this context, he particularly emphasized the successes of the Ukrainian transformation. Cimoszewicz pointed out his wish, that the subsequent summit in Istanbul would be “a source for a strong impulse for a next rapprochement of NATO and Ukraine” and in the same breath added “also a developing of a pragmatic cooperation between NATO and

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884 See Wągrowska, Maria (2002), p.430.
886 [Translated by D.P.-H.] “NATO odnajduję nową tożsamość jako polityczny czynnik bezpieczeństwa regionalnego (...).” Ibid.
889 See Kupiecki,Robert (2003), pp.49-51.
Russia”. Poland strongly supported the idea of inviting Ukraine to the Istanbul summit at the end of June 2004. The Alliance permitted Ukraine’s attendance not without pointing to the still existing democratic deficits in the state. A key role for the admission of Ukraine was played by informal NATO-Ukraine consultations at the defense minister level, which were organized by Poland and held in Warsaw on 6 and 7 June. Poland’s political activities in NATO coincided at the time with minor military presence in allied missions. This, in turn, posed the threat of reducing Poland’s power in the political dimension of the alliance.

At the end of 2004, Ukraine’s political landscape was troubled by the Orange Revolution. Although NATO did not contribute directly to the management of the Orange Revolution, the events represented a caesura in relations between Ukraine and NATO. Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert argue in this context, that in spite of the lack of a direct contribution to the Orange Revolution, the introduction of the AP helped democratic forces in the state to break through. After the Orange Revolution, newly elected President Yushchenko finished the multi-vectorial direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy path and officially declared Ukraine’s accession to EU and NATO a top-priority in foreign policy. As a consequence, cooperation between Ukraine and NATO intensified. On 20 and 21 February 2005, Kwaśniewski together with Yushchenko, participated in the NATO summit in Brussels. During the whole year of 2005, Poland’s main activity within NATO was to put Ukraine on the agenda and to try to strengthen ties between NATO and Ukraine. Thanks to Polish efforts, NATO decided to start the negotiations of an ID with Ukraine. Already in April 2005, NATO invited Ukraine to the ID, which was introduced in 2006. Usually, such a dialogue precedes the signing of a MAP. However, no timetable for a MAP was offered at the time. Reforms carried out in the ID in order to bring Ukraine towards a MAP included measures to strengthen democratic institutions, reinforce political dialogue, and reinvigorate cooperation in defense and security sector reform. Ministers also agreed to enhance public diplomacy efforts in order to improve the understanding of NATO in Ukraine. Thereby, the ID focused on two main topics: introduction of civil control over the military and introduction of liberal market conditions in the armaments industry. Since 2007, Ukraine has disposed of enough civil staff to carry out civil control over the military. Concerning the armaments industry, some essential reforms...
were already achieved. In 2005, the state monopoly of the armament industry was dismissed and since 2007, the parliament had raised the budget for the modernization of armaments.\textsuperscript{901}

In the exposés of 2005 and 2006, Poland repeated its support of NATO’s open door policy and its support of Ukrainian membership.\textsuperscript{902} On 27 and 28 April 2006, Foreign Minister Meller attended an informal meeting of NATO at the level of foreign ministers in Sofia to which Ukraine and Russia were invited. One of the top-three topics was the enlargement of NATO.\textsuperscript{903} In its tradition, Poland stuck to NATO’s ‘open-door’ policy and estimated enlargement as the main mechanism to increase the area of stability, predictability, common values and joint interests. Although still supporting Ukraine, Poland had to step back. On his visit to NATO HQ in September 2006, Premier Yanukovych proclaimed that Ukraine was to stop engaging in any further MAP-preparing actions and to renounce eventual membership. Additionally, since 2005 Ukraine had started to neglect further engagement in regional cooperation initiated by Poland.\textsuperscript{904} This political development may be a sign of the weakness of the ‘strategic partnership’ between the two states at the time.

In 2007, the conditions of Poland’s engagement to push Ukraine into NATO were less favorable than during the previous years. The reason resulted primarily from the political situation in Ukraine. Elected Prime Minister Yanukovych formed a government in opposition to his political rival President Yushchenko. Because of the rivalry between the two political counterparts, political transformation was deeply undermined. In 2007, NATO did not treat the topic of enlargement with high enthusiasm. Poland, in contrast, still supported the ‘open door’ policy and was especially interested in bringing Ukraine, together with Georgia, closer to the Alliance.\textsuperscript{905} In talks between Polish and Ukrainian representatives, the topic of MAP was not openly referred to due to the ambiguous position of Ukrainian leaders on that topic.\textsuperscript{906} Generally, in 2007, Poland continued to strengthen its position within NATO and to increase the solidarity within the organization.\textsuperscript{907}

In his yearly exposé, Foreign Minister Sikorski displayed the strengthening and consolidation of Poland’s role within NATO as the second Polish priority. Sikorski stressed that Poland wanted to be an active part of the creation of a new strategic concept for NATO. The integral part of such a new strategy should be enlargement and within it the formalization of Ukraine and Georgia as future members.\textsuperscript{908}

On 5 and 6 March 2008, Foreign Minister Sikorski attended a meeting in Brussels during which the participants discussed the topic of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. Some days later, on 14 March, at a meeting between Kaczyński and Yushchenko in Warsaw, the Polish President reaffirmed Poland’s support of Ukrainian accession to the Alliance.\textsuperscript{909} At the

\textsuperscript{901} See Melnykovska, Inna, and Schweickert, Rainer (2009), p.60.
\textsuperscript{902} See Rotfeld, Adam Daniel, 21 January 2005; Meller, Stefan, 15 February 2006.
\textsuperscript{904} See Kuźniar, Roman (2009), p.350.
\textsuperscript{905} See Madej, Marek (2008), p.66.
\textsuperscript{906} See Ibid., fn 41 p.67.
\textsuperscript{907} See Ibid., p.73.
\textsuperscript{908} See Sikorski, Radosław, 7 May 2008.
\textsuperscript{909} See Tarngorski, Rafał (2008), pp.317 and 336.
Bucharest summit in April 2008, the Heads of State and Government were still divided on the question of the prospect of membership for Ukraine. Due to efforts by the Polish delegation, especially President Kaczyński and Foreign Minister Sikorski, the summit declaration officially contained a promise of future membership for Ukraine. Additionally, it enclosed a promise that progress made in Ukraine would be reviewed during the December meeting.\textsuperscript{910} The decision providing Ukraine with the status of membership was thereby postponed to the meeting at the level of foreign ministers in December 2008. The postponement was especially the result of fears of France and Germany concerning Russia’s reactions. Thereby, on the same day of the NUC meeting in Bucharest, NATO also met with Russia in Bucharest in the frame of NRC.\textsuperscript{911}

The Georgian conflict, in which hostilities commenced on 8 August, was answered by NATO with condemnation of the uneven and aggressive steps taken by Russia.\textsuperscript{912} The Russian-Georgian conflict displayed its greatest impact on the enlargement decision of NATO – especially towards Georgia and Ukraine. Considering Ukraine, many NATO member states recognized through the conflict, that membership in NATO would increase the stability at the Eastern borders and at the same time prevent Russia from interfering in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries. At the same time, NATO officials were aware that a further enlargement to CIS countries could provoke Russian countermeasures and thus provide NATO with more troubles than benefits.\textsuperscript{913} While the organizational readiness for Ukrainian membership grew, internal developments in Ukraine started to hinder accession. Ukraine entered a new phase of internal political instability. The pro-NATO camp was in decline, including President Yushchenko. Besides the drop of interests at the elite’s level, the society’s attitude considering NATO accession remained unsupportive.\textsuperscript{914} Besides the internal developments in Ukraine, the role of the US President started to weaken. This was of such importance that the US President had until then been the principal spokesman for a further enlargement including Ukraine and Georgia. In light of these developments, in the second half of the year, Poland concentrated its efforts (in contrast to a strong push for a MAP for Ukraine) into a prevention of slowing down Ukraine’s integration in the structure of NATO. At speeches on this perspective, given at Columbia University in New York on 25 September 2008 and at the Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 19 November 2008, Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski proposed a “politically binding declaration, in which NATO would assume the role of a quasi-guarantor of the inviolability of borders in Europe (…) and oblige itself to react when such a violation occurs”\textsuperscript{915}. Considering all these circumstances, the results of the December NUC summit, consisting of an expansion of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, may be seen as a success. Structurally, the summit introduced an Annual National-Plan (ANP) for Ukraine and Georgia, precisely defining internal reforms and

\textsuperscript{910} See Madej, Marek, and Terlikowski, Marcin (2009), p.47.
\textsuperscript{911} See North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Chairman’s statement Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Heads of State and Government held in Bucharest, 4 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{912} See Madej, Marek (2009), p.2.
\textsuperscript{913} See Ibid., p.3.
\textsuperscript{914} One has to consider in this context that during the Cold War NATO was in the Soviet Union clearly conceptualized as the enemy. This conception as the ‘bad other’ is still present in the people’s heads.
\textsuperscript{915} Madej, Marek (2009), p.6.
cooperation with NATO.916 In the case of Ukraine, the ANP did not signify a meaningful achievement as cooperation with NATO was already based on ATPs.

On 20 February 2009, an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers took place in Cracow, Poland, where the participants discussed, among other things, a future enlargement of the Alliance.917 Generally, in 2009, the Polish elite’s approach towards Ukraine still built on the aim to establish a stable and democratic state. Thereby, disappointment concerning the internal situation in Ukraine started to grow within Polish circles, leading to a kind of crisis of confidence. As a consequence, visits between the two states were still steady but less intense. Still, Poland engaged in keeping the Alliance interested in cooperation with Ukraine. In order to keep Ukraine on NATO’s agenda and to demonstrate its support for the state, Poland organized the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine JWGDR on 13 May 2009 in Warsaw. This was the first time such a meeting was held outside Brussels. A further demonstration of Poland’s open door practice and the demonstration of its support of Ukraine, was the takeover in August of Polish diplomat Marcin Koziel as head of the NATO Liaison Office in Kiev.918

Poland promised to support Ukraine in its approach towards NATO standards after the failure of the Bucharest summit and effects of military cooperation started to become evident. On 1 November 2009 in Brussels, both states signed a letter of intent on the establishment of a Polish-Ukrainian brigade.919 Outside of the structures of NATO, Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania signed a letter of intent on the establishment of a joint brigade, located in Lublin, Poland. The brigade was intended to be used for peacekeeping missions under the control of NATO, EU or UN.920

The discrepancy between the Polish aim to build up a democratic and stable state in Ukraine and the political chaos demonstrates clearly that Poland itself lacked an adequate set of instruments in order to influence the process in Ukraine.

In a speech given at the third annual international conference on NATO and international security on 12 March 2010 in Warsaw, Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski stressed with respect to the development of NATO and the relation towards Russia that “Central Europe wants NATO to develop relations with its Russian partner pragmatically and with full respect to the legitimate security concern of both sides. The precondition of this cooperation is primarily respect for common values uniting the Euro-Atlantic family, to which we hope Russia also subscribes.”921

919 See Adamski, Łukasz (2010), pp.147-150.
920 See Madej, Marek (2010a), pp.57.
5.3.4. Doing and Living in NATO

5.3.4.1 Doing in NATO

As the comparative analyzes have shown, relations between NATO and Ukraine were much less intense than EU-Ukrainian ones. The reason may be traced back to the political scope of the organization and the significant international turnovers challenging the internal structure of NATO. Looking at the Polish engagement for Ukrainian accession provided a case study considered from a macro-perspective, as the question of Ukraine’s accession to NATO has been on NATO’s schedule during the whole course of the 2000s. At different moments, Poland inputted on the organizational policy-making which resulted in diverse effects.

In 1999 it had already become clear that Poland identified as the advocate of Ukraine’s accession towards NATO which was repeated on different occasions throughout the 2000s (Cimoszewicz 2002, 2004, Rotfeld 2005, Meller 2006). Throughout the considered time period, Poland did not get tired of vouching declaratively for Ukrainian membership and also engaging actively for the incorporation of Ukraine into NATO structures (mechanisms). Poland estimated that it could input on the policy by using its knowledge of and experience with Eastern European states. According to the words of Foreign Minister Bartoszewski in 2001, Ukraine’s accession was interrelated with the enlargement of the security and stability zone and the establishment of democracy in Ukraine. The declarative supportive assertions were met in practice through Poland’s involvement in the organization of the Prague summit in November 2002. Additionally, Poland’s organization of a conference on defense minister level on the 6 and 7 June 2004 strongly influenced NATO’s decision to invite Ukraine to the Istanbul meeting at the end of the month. During the whole year of 2005, Poland had been politically active in order to put Ukraine on NATO’s agenda and to strengthen ties between both actors. Thanks to these efforts, NATO started an ID with Ukraine, which usually precedes a MAP. Between 2004 and 2007, Poland continued to vehemently insist on Ukrainian accession to NATO on nearly every occasion. Poland’s declarative practice finally brought results at the Bucharest meeting in 2008. The Polish President and the Polish Foreign Minister vehemently supported Ukrainian membership and the decision to provide Ukraine with membership status. The decision was then taken to the level of foreign minister in December the same year. Although the context provided by the Georgian conflict was favorable to push a MAP further, the inner context in Ukraine complicated the implementation. In spite of the internal burden, Poland continued to keep the Ukrainian case alive. First, in September 2008, Poland pleaded that NATO should bring a politically binding declaration to Ukraine as a guarantee for the inviolability of borders. Second, in February 2009, Poland organized a meeting at the level of defense minister where the participants discussed the case of enlargement. Thereupon, Poland organized a meeting of JWGDR in May 2009 in Warsaw. In order to also give the declarative support a practical dimension, at the end of 2009, both states signed a letter of intent to establish a Polish-Ukrainian brigade. It became obvious that due to the constant engagement for Ukraine through the perpetual organization of conferences and meetings to push the Ukrainian case further, Poland had been successful in lobbying for Ukrainian membership.
5.3.4.2 Living in NATO

As reconstruction of relations transpired, the approach of NATO and Poland towards Ukraine did not diverge, essentially being based on a similar frame of reference. As a consequence, first Poland had to exert much less effort to lobby for Ukraine than in the case of Poland-EU-Ukraine. Second, the fundamental norm of democracy and the approach to base relations on this norm had not been contested.

Already in 1999, NATO praised Ukraine’s process in developing a European defense and security identity. Although NATO praised the intensified cooperation to strengthen stability and security throughout the 2000s, it started to engage very early in democracy-building in Ukraine through the introduction of the AP in 2002 and the succeeding ATPs. On many occasions during the considered time period, it became evident, through declaratively made assertions within the programs (ID, MAP), that the establishment of democracy was essential in the transformation approach of NATO. As compared to the 90s, this reflected a change in NATO’s conception of relations with Ukraine. Poland in contrast, during the 90s, had already based relations with Ukraine on the norm of democracy. In this regard, it is hard to ascribe the change in NATO’s conception to Polish efforts. NATO understands itself as a community of consolidated democracies. After having formalized relations with Ukraine throughout the 90s and after having accomplished its enlargement round in 1999, it seemed natural that NATO would engage in democracy-building in further states. Thus, the apparent conformity towards the Polish norm had not been preceded by a Polish uploading. As a consequence, socialization mechanisms were not effective.

That NATO was generally open to Ukrainian membership had already become obvious through the adoption of the AP as it was meant to identify Ukraine’s objectives and priorities towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures. Polish lobbying for Ukrainian membership brought concrete results at the organizational level through the establishment of ID in 2005. As NATO had not been opposed to this development, the Polish success meant absorption on the organizational level. Moreover Poland did not have to display a strong power because NATO’s and Poland’s norms and policy-conceptions converged at the time.

The consultations at the level of defense ministers in Warsaw in 2004 organized by Poland, resulted in the invitation of Ukraine to the summit in June 2004. Although NATO continued to criticize the democratic deficits in Ukraine, it permitted Ukraine’s attendance. That the inner context in Ukraine impeded the deepening of relations towards membership at the end became obvious in 2006 through the words of Yanukovych and in 2010, in Yanukovych’s interview with Russia’s Channel One. Despite the internal situation, NATO continued to reaffirm its open-door policy with a decline in its engagement in 2007. Despite the lowering of NATO’s engagement, Poland continued to lobby for Ukraine’s membership tirelessly through personal engagement from the president and foreign minister. Polish support resulted in 2008 in NATO’s official promise of Ukrainian membership. The pressure coming from the external context (Georgian conflict) provided Poland with the power necessary to push the promise through. And again – as NATO has not been opposed to membership – the admissions meant absorption because NATO did not change fundamentally.
Finally, Poland’s constant engagement and lobbying for Ukraine through the perpetual organization of conferences and meetings and through personal engagement from the president and foreign minister did not change NATO’s conception of relations fundamentally. However, Poland had been successful in accelerating the process of the accession of Ukraine. NATO praised Ukraine’s development of a European security identity already in 1999 and started to pave the way towards membership in 2002 through the AP. Moreover it continually proclaimed its open-door policy. This, in the final analysis, shows that it built relations on an assumed ‘common-we’. Thus, NATO accredited Ukraine ex ante with an advanced ‘common-we’. It turned out that the inner context in Ukraine caused at different moments the slowdown of a further deepening.

6. The Polonization of the EU and NATO

Polonization happens. The purpose of this dissertation was two-fold, namely to reveal the Polish input (as a middle-range power) on foreign policy-making of EU and NATO towards Ukraine and to develop a new approach towards socialization in order to grasp the process of socialization after accession to an organization. Considering the latter purpose I developed within the theoretical part a Polonization model based on doing and living in order to reshape the analytical focus toward the practices of actors and then to take account of the effects. As this thesis has unveiled Poland, as a middle-range power, had been able to upload its ideas and interests on organizational levels on different occasions, changing the organizational interplay between norms, identities and practices. But the guiding question of this thesis carried the analysis further by focusing on causes and conditions of the process. Respecting the latter allows one to answer how Polonization has been possible. My thesis disclosed that Polonization had been possible constrained by, and dependent on, different factors, namely: firstly the power of the actor, secondly the internal and external context and thirdly the constancy of practices. Furthermore, the dissertation elucidated that Polonization had been successful when Poland changed its tactics in the patterns of practice. Lastly, the thesis made socialization employable for investigations after accession of states. In the following section, I will first review the constraining and conditioning factors as they appeared in the empirical part. Then, second, I will summarize the tactics of Poland which allowed the uploading of a middle-range power in the patterns of practice at the organizational level. Finally, I will review the results for the socialization literature.

The empirical parts disclosed that Polonization depends, firstly and foremost, on the power which a middle-range power is able to display. As analyzes indicated, Poland as a middle-range power has not been able to guide changes and policies according to its own time-schedule in the EU context. On the contrary, it had to wait until the power to input had been accredited to it by the context or by other actors. During the Orange Revolution, the crisis situation together with the personal demands of the still-in-office President Kuchma and candidate Yushchenko, provided Poland with the power to act on behalf of Ukraine in supporting its democratization. Thus, the personal demands and the pressing context provided Poland with the power to upload its already established norms (during the 1990s) in supporting Ukraine towards democratization on the organizational level. In the case of the
EaP, Poland had finally been successful in uploading its vision in 2008, since it had learned over the years to play according to European rules. From this perspective, both actors circulated their ideas to important European actors beforehand. At the beginning of the 2000s, in the case of ED, Poland had still presented its ideas before consulting European partners ex ante. The initiative ended in failure. Additionally, in 2008, Poland did not present the vision on its own, only counting on its experience with Eastern European states and consequently accrediting itself with the power to guide questions in this respect. On the contrary, it acted jointly with neutral Sweden that, on the one hand, had more experiences in doing European things, and, on the other hand, increased Poland’s weight acting in the European arena. In the same manner, Poland had also been successful in uploading an annex to the AP jointly with Lithuania in 2005. In the same vein, Poland presented its position on Ukraine jointly with Germany in 2005. In 2006, Poland, jointly with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria, presented their joint position on how to diverge energy supplies in Central and Eastern Europe.

As the empirical part of this thesis has disclosed, Poland had been much more successful in bringing in its vision concerning relations with Ukraine in the EP. But as chapter 3 unfolded, it was clear that the role and the rights of the EP in foreign policy-making are still a very limited. Even though Poland had the power to play upon the developments in the EP, the power of the EP was too limited to bring Polish influence any further. Furthermore, analyzes showed that Poland had been successful in uploading when it concerned Polish core activities of foreign policy-making, namely its engagement on behalf of Ukraine. This was also the field where Poland had been most active. In contrast, it had been less successful when the policy scope lay outside traditional Polish engagement, namely energy- and visa-regulations.

In the case of NATO, Poland seemed to be equipped with much more power to guide organizational practices as NATO seemed at first glance to have adopted Polish concepts in the early 2000s. But as analyzes showed, Polish practices were based on a certain norm and identity conception which coincided with NATO’s openness towards Ukraine’s membership which had already been made clear at a meeting of foreign ministers in November 2002. NATO pursued this path by launching the ID in 2005 and the decision made at the Bucharest NUC meeting in 2008. Furthermore, both actors principally conceptualized relations on democracy-building in Ukraine. Thus, Poland had not had the need to transfer its core norm conception with respect to Ukraine on the organizational level. In the case of EU, it became obvious that the EU had built relations principally on the norm of stability and security. Because of the clash in the norms’ conception, Poland did not have the ‘natural power’ to input on organizational practices. This indicates that the input a middle-range power is able to contribute to organizations depends also upon the similarity or difference of norms conception. If the conceptions diverge, then interdependence exists between middle-range powers’ input and the concept of power. This proves additionally, that it is not the institutional order of an organization which favors or disadvantages the input of a middle-range power. The input interdepends with the similarity or difference of the frame of reference and thus the ‘meaning of use’ of norms conception between organization and middle-range power.
Then, secondly, Polonization depends on the internal and external context. The context, affecting the self-identity constructions of actors, influenced the success of Polish doings. Thereby, the internal context covered the internal situation in Poland and in Ukraine. In Poland, despite the constitutional changes during the 90s, overlappings in foreign policy-making have still continued. The distention of rights in foreign policy-making became especially evident during the Kaczyński-era. Especially President Kaczyński did not only overestimate Poland’s potential within the world-system, but also failed to offer a clear strategy in foreign policy. Besides the overlapping in rights, between 2005 and 2010, there existed in Poland a substantial discrepancy in the conception and making of foreign-policy. The foreign ministry – comparable to the time of the 90s – successfully followed a coherent path in the making of foreign policy from 1999 until 2011. Despite this coherence in foreign policy-making, it also overestimated Poland’s role in the EU at the beginning of the 2000s when minority-governments became the normal political grouping. Since 2005, the foreign ministry had started to relativize Poland’s range in EU. From 2006 onwards, the foreign ministry identified it as an integral part of the Western world. Analyzes showed that Poland had been able to input its great visions on the organizational level when the political actors at stake (and equipped with power) conceptualized Poland’s potential as relative to its status as a middle-range power. Thus, the internal political context, while overestimating Poland’s role and the still-existing overlapping of competencies, influenced Poland’s potential to upload its own interests at the EU’s organizational level, for better or for worse.

In the case of NATO, Poland also identified itself as being a strong ally at the beginning of the 2000s. In comparison to the EU, at the time, it had already been member of the alliance. This, at least from the institutional point of view, legitimized Poland to play a role in the development of relations. Although its self-confident standing did not have an influence on its engagement for Ukraine, Poland did overestimate its importance to the dominant ally, namely the US. It seemed that, as the conceptions for relations between NATO and Poland principally coincided, the inner-context of Poland did not have an influence on its doings concerning Ukraine.

In similarity with Poland, Ukraine also had to handle some internal turnovers which influenced foreign policy-making. Thereby, especially its ever changing path between Europe and Russia became a burden on deepening relations on different occasions. Thus, the internal political context in Ukraine functioned as an external factor on the process of Polonization. Already in 1999 Poland commented on the deficient response of the Ukrainian society to Polish support. As analyzes show, Poland had been dependent, considering its success on the doings of Ukraine’s internal situation, as its power was too limited to steer developments on its own. In the case of NATO, Yanukoych’s announcement to take a ‘pause’ in the coming-closer with NATO in 2006, was on the one hand, a sign of the weakness of the strategic partners at the time. On the other hand, it disclosed that middle-range powers’ potential is too limited to steer developments on their own. Although Poland identified as Ukraine’s advocate during the whole time, it again started to bind a further deepening of relations with the EU on the situation in, and the will of, Ukraine from 2008 onward. This, in turn, created a growth of self-confidence in Poland. It seemed that the mantra-like thought, that the independence and security of Ukraine was the only security-guarantee for Poland, had been over. In theoretical
terms this means that the utility of Ukraine’s independence for the Polish security situation had been over. One could also speak of a Polish ‘supporting-fatigue’ in the case of EU, caused by Ukraine’s ever-changing course and Poland’s growth of self-confidence. At the time, Poland had become a young adult and it seemed as if its juvenile engagement for Ukraine had suppressed the consolidation of its own situation. Thus, the internal situation in Ukraine had, on different occasions, been an external factor functioning as an impediment to Polish support. This, in turn, had been interconnected with the limited power Poland with which was endowed, and the internal situation within Poland itself.

Thirdly, and finally, the constancy of organizational practices played in the case of the EU was a burden for successful Polish uploading. During the 90s, the EU’s main practice towards Ukraine was reflected in the formalization of agreements building on the norm of stability. The agreements then built on an asymmetrical relationship, demanding transformation in Ukraine without offering a political coming closer. Thereby, the overall aim was to establish a secure Ukraine through stability. Beside this ‘policy on distance’ the EU did not fill words like ‘historical links’ and ‘common values’ with content. The EU identified Ukraine as ‘the other’ based on its historical and geographical location. Poland, in contrast, during the 90s had already identified Ukraine as part of a self on different levels (historic, cultural, emotional, security) and practiced a coming closer with Ukraine in the respected areas. In this respect, Poland practiced cooperation with Ukraine on different levels. All Polish efforts aimed, in the end, to establish a stable order in Ukraine, built on democracy. At the beginning of the 2000s, the EU continued its practice of urging Ukraine toward radical transformation and adaptation to European norms and standards. The norm of stability remained pivotal. When Poland uploaded its vision during the OR and invited the EU to engage directly in democracy-building in Ukraine by the back door, the EU also started to praise positive achievements in Ukraine during the following years. This reflected a change in European practice. But even though the EU provided Ukraine with a declarative upgrading at different occasions, it recurrently treated Ukraine outside the EU and even handled issues concerning Ukraine in the region-bound context jointly with Russia. But, as already mentioned, the internal context in Ukraine influenced the perceptions and this treatment. Besides, the EU stuck to its practice of conditionality. This confirms that practices which rely on norms and identity-constructions are very stable manifestations. Even though socialization after enlargement happens at the level of practices of actors, this input then enters an ‘arena of proof’ where it has to compete with already established practices.

In the case of NATO during the 2000s, the conception of norms and identity towards Ukraine did not diverge drastically from the Polish ones. Consequently, Poland was not forced to break through practices relying on completely varying conceptions. Nevertheless, also in the case of NATO, Poland had provided input. Every input which causes change consequently changes the established stability of a system. The quickness and the depth of transformation then depends on further structural factors and is not caused by the influence a middle-range power is able to display. Thus, every uploading by Poland has played in a way on the organizational policy towards Ukraine. The effects turned out to be less tangible than in processes of top-down socialization. This, in turn, interdepends with the power of Poland within organizations and the conception of the organizations themselves. In comparison to
top-down socialization, Poland cannot display its power and condition the envisaged transformation by hard demands and restrictions.

In spite of the constraining and conditioning factors on the process of Polonization, Poland had been successful in inputting at the organizational level on different occasions. The input had been embedded in the practices of Poland. This proved that Polonization comes out of practices and is embedded within. As the theoretical chapter disclosed, tactics were then the creative moment to change practices well-established as strategies. As analysis during the 90s transpired, Poland practiced a major support for newly independent Ukraine. Its engagement for a democratic transformation in Ukraine touched on different levels and manifested in different practices, namely in cooperation and the establishment of arrangements in different areas (economy, culture, security) and through the practiced friendship between both presidents which definitely enriched the coming closer with a personal notion. During that time, Poland identified Ukraine as part of a self on a historical, cultural, emotional and security level. Because of the identification of a self, the utility of the Polish handling of relations had been a growth of its own geopolitical security and stability. This identification then played on its engagement for, and practices with, Ukraine. At the beginning of the 2000s, Poland tried to upload its ED in the patterns of the established practice, namely in supporting Ukraine on its own. At the beginning of the 2000s this failed because Poland’s practice of relying on a certain set of norms and identity-construction diverged radically from the European conception. Additionally, Poland overestimated its role within the EU as the Nice-treaty negotiations had already reflected. Thus, Polish engagement correlated in the beginning of the 1990s with the Polish wish to maximize its role on the world-scene. In theoretical terms this means that Poland’s utility relied on a strong rationalist account which corresponds to the identity construction at the time. In contrast to Poland, during the 1990s the EU identified Ukraine as the other, very much defined by its historical and geographical location. It seemed as if Ukraine’s location was much too far away to concern the political order/situation in the EU. The EU was only interested in establishing stability in Ukraine in order to guarantee security in the state and the region. Therefore it practiced a formalization of agreements with the aim of stability in order to provision, promote and support a transformation of the state according to European norms and rules. In spite of the organizing principles, the EU failed to fulfil the words with concrete deeds. Thus, the formalization of practices had been the main practice and not the support (which was not fulfilled with deeds). Analyzes of the second time-period disclosed that, at the beginning of the 2000s, the EU remained in its traditional practice of urging Ukraine to radical transformation identifying the state as the other. Because of the radically diverging conceptions and the already discussed low power profile, Poland had not been successful in uploading its vision.

During the 2000s Poland continued its practice of supporting Ukraine in democratization. Yet, Poland professionalized its practice through a change of identity. It has not identified itself any more as Ukraine’s big brother but, since 2004, as its advocate. Additionally, from 2007 on, Poland conditioned its support by the Ukrainian will and thus the internal situation in Ukraine. Poland continued to practice its friendship with Ukraine through personal meetings. It underpinned its support of Ukraine by a couple of conferences at the beginning of the 2000s and in 2010 and 2011. Analyzes showed that, even though Poland had changed its tactics
within its practices (influenced by the constraining and conditioning factors) it continued its overall practice of a coming closer with Ukraine.

Throughout the 2000s it became obvious that the EU continued to consider Ukraine mostly as the other even though, at different moments, it started to upgrade Ukraine declaratively (e.g. Gothenburg 2001, ENP). Reminding that ‘saying is doing’, reflects the progress in the identity-construction. Additionally, Ukraine was the first state out of the ‘ring of friends’ which signed an AP with the EU. In the CSP of 2007-2013 both parties praised the ‘close relations’ and in the following Progress Report of 2007 they stated their aim to ‘bring relations as close as possible’. As membership has never been mentioned by the EU, this reflects the cautious approach of Europe towards Ukraine. The EU continued a conditional approach towards Ukraine building on the norm of stability. The practice of conditionality and the harsh critiques for membership of Ukraine on different occasions reflect only a half-hearted desire of the EU to engage into the transformation of Ukraine. This underpins the constancy of practices and identity-constructions. In spite of these constancies, as analyzes have shown, Poland has been successful in bursting European practices and continually playing on the identity construction.

In the case of NATO, Poland had been successful in its uploading through its constant engagement in advocacy for Ukrainian membership.

All considered, this confirms that successful Polonization depends on the tactics which correlate with the self-identity and the power of actors. This shows that Poland as a middle-range power depends not only on membership in organizations to display its influence but that its power to input is then constrained by further factors. The case study of the Orange Revolution, the EaP and the successful incorporation of the annex to the AP revealed that Poland had the power to upload its practice (of bringing Ukraine closer towards organizations based on democratization of the state) when its changed its tactic from ‘doing on its own’ towards ‘doing jointly with other actors’. This corresponded also with a change of self-identity. From 2004 on (exposés of Foreign Ministers Cimoszewicz and Rotfeld922), Poland recognized that its potential was too narrow to realize its aims in foreign policy-making. Even at the beginning of the 2000s, nationalist tendencies in Poland were still lowering the pro-European spirit of the 1990s. On the one hand, this led to a strong defense of national interest and, on the other hand, to an overestimation of Poland’s potential at the organizational level. At the time, Poland’s engagement for Ukraine relied on a strategic formulation in order to maximize its own role. This corresponded to a hard-power approach, which can be explained by the nationalist tendencies at the time. From 2004 on, Poland changed its identity-construction (at the level of the Foreign Ministry) which corresponded to the status of a middle-range power within organizations. Consequently, Poland had the power to upload its vision. Contrarily, when the Polish political actors during the Kaczyński-era started to overestimate Poland’s potential, Poland deprived itself of the power to input (considering Ukraine) at the organizational level. At this time, in 2006, it had been able to introduce the solidarity principle on the European level concerning the European Energy Security Treaty and to introduce a waiver option for third countries travelling to the EU. No further

922 See p.159.
engagement happened on the levels of president and prime minister. When the political scene changed at the end of 2007, Poland again started to regain the power to input on the organizational level as Prime Minister Tusk reshaped the character of foreign policy-making to a pragmatic style. And again, not overestimating Poland’s range, it had the power to input on the organizational level with EaP. All that has been said confirms that Poland as a middle-range power has not only been dependent on membership in the EU to exert an influence, but that it had additionally been dependent on joint actions in order to input on the big questions.

Thus, speaking of a successful Polonization, the bottom-up socialization of organizations due to the input of a middle-range power, showed that the process happens much more smoothly than top-down socialization. This, as the thesis has revealed, depends on the constraining and conditioning factors. The input of a middle-range power within organizations is comparable to the process of seeding grains in (the organizational) gardens. If and when plants start to grow, depends on the discussed factors. Poland, as a middle-range power, has tried to prettify the organizational garden with its own composition of plants and to plant seeds on different occasions. Organizations, in contrast, equipped with a lot of power, already have the possibility to transplant fully-grown plants in member states’ gardens. In this respect, if states are in the process of accession to organizations, the socialization literature shows that the organizations then have the power either to ‘encourage’ states to prepare their land for the organizational plants, or to plant already fully-grown plants in the respective gardens. This is how top-down socialization occurs. However, this investigation does not take into account the constancy of practices, as they appeared to be pivotal in considering the process of socialization in the long-term. Thus, as the thesis has shown, short-term effects (at the EU level) competed with the constancy of practices. In the case of NATO, long-term effects correlated with the organizational self-identity. The investigation of bottom-up socialization in doing and living has been fruitful, as it not only invested the effects of Polonization but uncovered the causes and conditions of the process. Especially the part of doing reshaped the focus to the level where input is made constantly, namely in between structure and agent. Even though the effects of Polonization had been less concentrated than in the case of top-down socialization, it is important to reflect on this process. According to the commonly known ‘butterfly-effect’ in which a small change in one state of a system can result in large differences in a later state, Polonization has a more long-term effect. Considering the nature of every change, one may make an educated guess that long-term effects will turn out to be more everlasting. This opens up the scope for possible scenarios and turns the view from considering ‘what has happened’ (which is inspected in the traditional socialization literature) towards the view of ‘what may happen’. In comparison to the traditional socialization approach, Polonization covers both, namely the investigation of already established changes and the forward-looking process. Thus, future scientific works drawing on the concept of Polonization can inspect the input of (future) middle-range powers in organizations in order to anticipate scarring scenarios. That this input is constrained by diverse factors has been shown in this thesis. That it is happening, too.

923 Prior to enlargement Poland had on some occasions been called a potential US ‘Trojan Horse’ in Europe. See Zaborowski, Marcin, and Longhurst, Kerry (2003).
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