THE ‘INTERNAL OPPOSITION EFFECT’ OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS

INSIGHTS FROM BURUNDI, ZIMBABWE AND A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress (South Africa)</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<td>ARD</td>
<td>Authoritarian Regime Dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South African Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Constitutional Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Front pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODIES</td>
<td>Comité pour la Défense des Intérêts Économiques et Sociaux (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Causal-process tracing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CsQCA</td>
<td>Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUD</td>
<td>Coalition for Unity and Democracy (Ethiopia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Forces Armées Burundaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fbu</td>
<td>Franc burundais</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Front pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces Nationales de Libération (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTLR</td>
<td>Fast-track land reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity (Zimbabwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement (Zimbabwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFHPOL</td>
<td>Inverted Freedom House and Polity IV scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INUS</td>
<td>Insufficient but necessary part of a combination that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for explaining the outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOMB</td>
<td>International Observers Mission to Burundi</td>
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<td>ITEKA</td>
<td>La Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l'Homme</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOMIC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC-M</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy (Zambia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MvQCA</td>
<td>Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>NANGO</td>
<td>National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTU</td>
<td>Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARENA</td>
<td>Parti pour le Redressement National (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>Parti Démocratique Chrétien (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAU</td>
<td>Research and Advocacy Unit (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional economic community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSCC</td>
<td>Regional Sanctions Coordination Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAD</td>
<td>Social Conflict in Africa dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIES</td>
<td>Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>TQCA</td>
<td>Temporal Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Zimbabwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party (Zambia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOB</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union pour le Progrès National (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YLT</td>
<td>Youth Leadership Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZCC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZFTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIDERAC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNLWVA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUM</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Unity Movement Almost three</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

“For sanctions to be successful, the economic pressure must be sufficient to unleash domestic political pressure (...)” (Losman 1979, 128)

Almost three decades after Losman stressed the importance of domestic pressure on the targeted states for sanctions to be successful, studying internal dynamics of contention in regimes under sanctions remains as relevant as it is challenging. Seen as the middle road between ‘words and wars’ (Wallensteen and Staibano 2005), sanctions are one of the most popular foreign policy instruments for addressing violent conflicts, electoral misconduct, human rights abuses, and authoritarian rule. Altogether, the key sanctions senders – namely, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the United States (US) – imposed more than 120 sanctions episodes between 1990 and 2013. If sanctions imposed by regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), which have discovered them as a means to maintain order in their neighbourhood, are also counted, this number rises to over 150. Beyond ‘traditional’ trade embargos, sanctions senders have increasingly implemented so-called smart sanctions, including asset freezes and travel restrictions that target individuals.

However, the effectiveness of sanctions is widely challenged. According to Hufbauer et al. (2007), sanctions are only considered successful in one-third of all cases. Arguably, this rate is even lower if higher standards for the conceptualization and measurement of success are set (Pape 1997, 1998). US sanctions against Cuba (1960-present) and EU measures against the Assad regime in Syria, for example, have been described as outright failures (Eriksson and Giumelli 2011; Sanchez 2003) whereas the record of the UN embargo against Apartheid South Africa (1977-1994) appears to be more mixed (inter alia Crawford and Klotz 1999). While research on sanctions has made significant advances in explaining how the measures’ design affects their success or failure, it has only begun to explore how sanctions affect domestic political dynamics. This holds particularly true for authoritarian regimes, which not only constitute the great majority of targeted regimes, but where internal processes are also more opaque than in democracies. In particular, scholars and policy makers alike still struggle to explain under which circumstances sanctions trigger or strengthen opposition to the targeted regimes – be it in an authoritarian context or the small number of democracies that also face sanctions.
This dissertation tackles the question with a novel theoretical and methodological approach that opens the black box of domestic dynamics of contention in regimes under sanctions. To account for these processes, the work brings the literature on social movements to the study of international and regional sanctions. This bridges the divide between research on international sanctions and domestic politics and will serve to answer the overall research question of how and under which conditions domestic opposition movements are enabled by international sanctions.

1.2. Relevance

The research is highly relevant both from a scholarly and from a policy perspective. Sanctions research has increasingly left behind the broad issue of general success and began to examine the more fruitful question of the conditions under which sanctions are effective. Theoretically, insights into opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions contribute to identifying crucial links between sanctions pressure and target compliance that go beyond an overly simplified pain-gain logic, i.e. the greater the costs inflicted upon the target state, the greater the political gain understood as the target’s behavioral change (for a critique, see Biersteker et al. 2016: 11). Tostensen and Bull (2002, 397) once noted that if such a ‘transmission mechanism’ indeed exists, ‘it works in convoluted ways that the sanctioners only partially understand’. The present work argues that opposition mobilization is an important piece in the puzzle (see first section of chapter 2). Economic sanctions are believed to intensify antigovernment activity through increasing civilian pain (for example, Weiss 1997), but the causal mechanism – or even mechanisms – behind this phenomenon are presumably more complex (see also Allen 2008). Among other factors, the signaling impact of sanctions on domestic contestation is insufficiently reflected in both theorizing and empirical analysis (for notable exceptions, albeit not with respect to the impact of sanctions signals on domestic contestation, see Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b; Giumelli 2011). By disentangling how sanctions enable (or constrain) domestic opposition to the regime, this dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature examining the domestic ‘micro-foundations of (...) sanctions’ (Kirshner 1997, 32).

Examining how external pressure in the form of international sanctions shapes domestic dynamics of contention also adds to social movement theory. This strand of research has asserted that third party advocacy on behalf on (social) movements increases their leverage (McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Schock 2004). Yet, how exactly outside support translates into heightened motivation, activity, cohesion and the like on the part of domestic movements
requires further research (chapter 2, page 21-24). In contrast to sanctions research, which has hypothesized a transmission mechanism based on the ‘tangible’ economic costs of sanctions social movement theory has stressed the role of outside signals of support as sources of legitimacy and psychological encouragement (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Klotz 2006). However, third party advocacy in the form of international sanctions may have very concrete material repercussions for domestic social movements even in today’s era of so-called targeted measures. This is insufficiently reflected in the current literature.

Ultimately, this work will further policy makers’ understanding of the ‘convoluted’ impact of sanctions on domestic dynamics of contention. Senders often impose sanctions with the (implicit or explicit) aim to promote democratization (von Soest and Wahman 2015a). To achieve this goal, designing sanctions that increase domestic pressure rather than stabilize authoritarian regimes is an important endeavor (on the latter, see Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). Conversely, more detailed insights into when sanctions fail to increase the leverage of domestic opposition movements should help to minimize the tool’s adverse effects.

1.3. Scope conditions, theoretical approach and methodology

The dissertation develops an integrated theoretical approach in an attempt to open the black box of internal opposition against the backdrop of international sanctions. The framework introduced below is then applied to a comprehensive multi-method empirical study, which includes a Qualitative Comparative Analysis based on a new dataset (chapter 3) and comprehensive case studies based on three field research stays (chapter 4, 5 and 6). This was only feasible by restricting the temporal and geographic scope. Consequently, the study examines the impact of sanctions on domestic opposition movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. For a number of interlinked reasons, Africa South of the Sahara is highly susceptible to sanctions’ economic pressure as well as the norms and discourses that sanctions’ senders promote. Accordingly, this region assembles a number of likely cases for sanctions to shape domestic politics. Temporally, the inquiry is confined to the post-Cold War period, which is characterized by new sanctions tools, practices and geopolitical constellations.

The dissertation adopts a theoretical framework that integrates sanctions research and social movement theory. It departs from the central premise that domestic politics may be fundamentally affected by developments in the international political arena. Vice versa, it is assumed that domestic structures and institutional settings influence the impact and
1. Introduction

perception of foreign policy instruments like sanctions. Consequently, such an approach seeks to bridge one of the major divides of political science, namely the division into the subfields of International Relations and Comparative Politics including area studies (for a critique of this divide, see Schmitter 2009). Sanctions, and that is the second key assumption, are not only conceived as a tool of economic statecraft, but also as a signaling device (Bentall 2016; inter alia Giumelli 2010, 2011). In other words, the messages conveyed by sanctions signal foreign policy preferences, but they also influence domestic discourses outside the sender state. The economic repercussions of sanctions are also taken into consideration.

Based on these propositions, an integrated theoretical framework for the study of opposition movements in regimes under sanctions is developed in chapter 2, section 3: In addition to the ‘conventional’ political opportunity and grievance-based explanations of opposition mobilization, which posit how domestic institutions and political structures as well as the socio-economic consequences of sanctions affect opposition politics, a third, novel mechanism is introduced. Taking the signaling dimension of sanctions seriously, the dissertation argues that messages of regime disapproval and opposition support conveyed by sanctions create perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent. The effect should be particularly pronounced if communicative linkage between the sender state and the target state’s society ensures the transmission of sanctions signals. In contrast to earlier works (Allen 2008b), these approaches, namely a deprivation perspective, a political opportunity approach and a signaling view, are understood as interlinked rather than competing.

Methodologically, the divide between case-based and quantitative research has hampered the study of opposition movements and their mobilization in regimes under sanctions. A number of case studies that sought to understand the success or failure of particular sanctions regimes also offered – in passing – anecdotal evidence of how the respective sanctions regimes affected domestic contestation. Regrettably, these insights have never been compared or even tested against a larger universe of cases. In response, a multi-method research design is pursued that carefully integrates medium-N comparison and process tracing. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of all 75 sanctions regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa systematically analyzes the conditions under which sanctions enable opposition mobilization. However, it is challenging to establish the link between domestic political outcomes and sanctions as a very ‘blunt’ foreign policy instrument (Allen and Lektzian 2013). Process tracing thus serves to provide an in-depth analysis of the micro-foundations of opposition politics in regimes under sanctions.
The application of process tracing and QCA\(^1\) is motivated by its appropriateness for addressing the research question, also with respect to the two approaches’ underlying premises. Qualitative Comparative Analysis rests on the assumption of causal complexity and treats cases as multifaceted configurations of conditions rather than disaggregating them into variables (Ragin 1987; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). QCA also stresses equifinality, meaning that various possible paths can lead to the same outcome (Bennett and Elman 2006). Such an understanding is essential for a study that conceives different theoretical approaches as complementary. A QCA approach to generalization is thus contingent and pays attention to individual cases as well as the context. Causal-process tracing (Blatter and Haverland 2012), which seeks to explain how a multitude of factors work together to produce the outcome of interest, bears strong resemblance with the configurational thinking advanced by QCA. Accordingly, the formulation of more general findings takes into consideration the study’s temporal and spatial context conditions.

On this basis, the research design sketched here implies more than just following the recent trend towards multi-method approaches. Rather, it rests on the fundamental conviction that the identification of patterns beyond the single case is, possible, desirable and adds to our understanding of opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions. Yet, it can only further our knowledge in a meaningful way if it digs deeper into the processes behind these patterns, which requires a complex, context-sensitive and methodologically pluralist approach to causal inquiry (see Kurki 2008).

1.4. Definitions

Past work on international sanctions and domestic contestation has not only suffered from a divide between quantitative and qualitative approaches that this dissertation attempts to overcome, but also from conceptual confusion. While the understanding of sanctions and opposition movements will be developed in more depth in the following chapters, the key concepts shall be briefly introduced here.

There are almost as many definitions of international sanctions as there are studies on the issue. Already the adjective ‘international’ is somewhat misleading. It has often been used to differentiate sanctions in the realm of International Relations from the more conventional use

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\(^1\) Both approaches have diversified to such an extent that they now rather resemble a family of techniques. The following clarifications hence only apply to the variant of medium-N fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and causal-process tracing employed in the dissertation.
of the term to describe punishment in interpersonal relations and in domestic (criminal) law. However, the adjective “external” would be more adequate to allow the incorporation of the growing number of regional sanctions. The types of measures subsumed under the label ‘sanctions’ also varies. Sanctions research was – and quantitative sanctions research continues to be – characterized by a clear propensity towards economic sanctions (for example Losman 1979; Ang and Peksen 2007; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990). This type of scholarship basically equates sanctions to the use of economic statecraft (for example Baldwin 1985; Drezner 1999; Drury and Peksen 2012). More recently, this exclusive focus on measures that bear economic consequences for the sender and/or target has been weakened.

The shift towards seemingly less costly targeted – or ‘smart’ – sanctions and the debate about the signaling dimension of sanctions has moved measures such as the interruption of diplomatic relations or black-list based constraints for individuals and firms to the forefront. Their arrival was meant to herald a new era when the debate about unintended consequences had discredited ‘old-fashioned’ (comprehensive trade) embargos (for a summary, see Drezner 2011). Senders such as the EU sought to stress the carefully tailored and minimal-harm nature of sanctions by referring to ‘restrictive’ and ‘adequate’ measures. Moreover, insights from related subfields, such as the study of aid and democratization (for example Crawford 2001), have shown that the rationale behind aid cuts and sanctions is similar with respect to signaling and the economic repercussions (Charron 2011; Portela 2010a). Consequently, so-called ‘aid sanctions’ are included in this study.\(^2\)

Building upon on this discussion, sanctions are defined as government-led\(^3\) restrictions implemented to promote political objectives vis-à-vis other states (for more details, see chapter 3). For the purpose of this dissertation, the terms ‘external sanctions’, ‘international’ sanctions or just ‘sanctions’ are used interchangeably to describe sanctions in the realm of international relations. The more specific terms ‘embargo’ and ‘restrictive measures’ are only applied when referring to comprehensive trade embargoes (in the case study on Burundi) or sanctions that their senders officially describe as ‘restrictive measures’ (in the case study on Zimbabwe). Describing sanctions as restrictive, however, does not imply any judgment on whether these measures in fact had only limited economic consequences for the target state.

\(^2\)In contrast, trade disputes and sanctions against non-state actors are excluded as such measures follow different logics (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014; von Soest and Wahman 2015a).

\(^3\)Government-led in that sense differentiates the measures from interpersonal sanctions. It also incorporates sanctions that are imposed by multiple governments under the auspices of a regional or international organization such as the African Union or the United Nations.
Domestic opposition movements and their activities are by no means easier to define. When describing activities that challenge the regime, the incumbent government and/or its policies, the literature employs terms as diverse as mobilization, protest, resistance or contestation (Beinin and Vairel 2013; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Schock 2013). Oftentimes, these activities are then further specified as (non-)violent, civic, mass, large-scale, popular or simply anti-regime (for example Bratton and Van de Walle 1992; Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Hibbs 1973). While, at first sight, this appears to describe different kinds of activity these terms in fact often reflect the underlying research interest and the subfield in which the researcher positions herself or himself rather than different means of questioning and challenging those in power. Departing from a more actor-centric perspective, the terminological variety is equally confusing. Scholars label these actors, inter alia, as civil society and social movement activists, dissidents or opposition actors and movements (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1999; Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013).

These concepts reflect a divide between activity-based and actor-centric understandings of the opposition. The former predominantly relies on event datasets (Banks and Wilson 2012; inter alia Salehyan et al. 2012), and hence highlights the activity of challenging the regime. The latter, in contrast, is more interested in the evolution and trajectory of configurations of regime critical actors over time (for example LeBas 2006; Maguire 1995). The dissertation integrates both approaches. The QCA focuses on opposition mobilization rather than the trajectory of various opposition movements. Such an approach renders the study of 75 sanctions regimes feasible as it can be based on existing event datasets. Opposition mobilization is thereby understood as collective action that opposes certain policies of the government or the regime as such (Dudouet 2006; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003).

The case studies, in turn, allow tracing the development of key opposition movements and their activities over time. As the reference to ‘movements’ implies, the understanding of ‘opposition actors’ followed here goes beyond political parties and draws heavily on social movement theory. This is, however, not to deny that opposition parties are oftentimes closely associated with or even emerge from civil society and social movements (LeBas 2011; Tordoff and Young 2005). Based on Kaufman (2011) and Albrecht (2005), opposition movements are understood as coalitions of organizations, groups and individuals formed to mobilize against political issues with the intention to affect a fundamental change of the current political regime or its policies.
1.5. Structure

The research is divided into three major parts. The first one is theoretical and develops an integrated theoretical framework for examining the impact of sanctions on opposition movements and their activity. The second and third parts then contain the empirical analyses, which are preceded by an introduction to the methodological approach. The second part presents the results of the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The third and final part consists of the two case studies and their comparison.

The next chapter introduces the theoretical framework. Based on a comprehensive literature review, it argues that we still lack a clear understanding of how sanctions affect opposition movements in targeted regimes. Sanctions research has increasingly taken into consideration how targeted regimes respond to and are affected by international sanctions, but it fails to systematically theorize the multifaceted repercussion for domestic opposition as a political actor in its own right. Bringing social movement theory to the study of sanctions can close this gap. In addition to traditional grievance/deprivation-based\(^4\) and political opportunity approaches to the study of domestic dynamics of contention, it particularly highlights how signals of outside support create perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent. In contrast to earlier studies, the seven theoretical expectations derived from this framework highlight the interplay of these explanatory approaches.

Chapter 3 opens the multi-method analysis by presenting the Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Following an outline of its core characteristics, namely a focus on configuration instead of correlations, causal complexity and equifinality, the sample is introduced. It constitutes the first comprehensive database of its kind detailing all European Union (EU), United States (US), United Nations (UN) and regional sanctions imposed against Sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2012. The chapter then describes the operationalization of the explanatory conditions and the outcome. Subsequently, it presents and discusses the findings. Four combinations of conditions leading to an increase in anti-government activity in regimes under sanctions are identified, which highlight the importance of coherent sanctions signals, but also stress that they only encourage regime critical activity in conjunction with other factors. The analysis passes five fundamental robustness checks that strongly confirm the quality of the results. Lastly, this chapter serves to justify the selection of the case studies, Zimbabwe and Burundi.

\(^4\) On the differences between both concepts, see chapter 2.
In the third part, Chapter 4, 5 and 6 present these case studies. Before introducing the first case, the fourth chapter outlines the methodological premises. Based on a broad and pluralist understanding of causality, causal-process tracing is proposed as the adequate approach. In addition, the methodological section outlines how the primary data was collected during field research in the two countries, reflects on challenges that arose during this procedure and sketches how the interviews, focus groups and documents were analyzed by means of an adjusted qualitative content analysis. The subsequent case studies follow the same analytical grid. After familiarizing the reader with the historical context, outside attempts to address the crises just prior to the imposition of sanctions and the domestic actor constellation at that time are sketched. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the two major dimensions explaining the trajectory of the opposition movements according to the QCA, deprivation-based explanations and signaling approaches.

Chapter 5 confirms that signals of opposition support and – especially – regime disapproval encourage anti-regime actors domestically in the case of Burundi. This process, however, was confined to the major opposition parties and the armed rebellion. The lack of communicative linkage prevented the sanctions signals from reaching a broader audience. Sanctions failed to create popular mobilization through the creation of socio-economic hardship. The regime shielded its key supporters from the sanctions’ adverse effects, rural subsistence farmers hardly noticed the embargo’s economic repercussions, and the entire population lacked the political opportunities for voicing dissatisfaction. Chapter 6 on Zimbabwe also corroborates that the sanctions’ signal of support for protestors and the major opposition party MDC motivated regime-critical actors in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the process-tracing analysis provides novel insights into deprivation-/grievance-induced opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions: Instead of the ‘objective’ socio-economic consequences, how both the opposition and the regime framed them and integrated them into their respective narratives turned out to be crucial.

Chapter 6 contrasts these findings by means of a structured, focused comparison. The analysis builds on a discussion of how one can (not) compare the trajectories of opposition movements against the backdrop of sanctions in the two cases. In addition to differences in deprivation/grievance-induced large-scale mobilization and communicative linkage noted earlier, this chapter shows how the power-sharing agreements signed both in Zimbabwe and Burundi affected the sanctions’ signaling dimensions. Most importantly, power-sharing
agreements, (re-)legitimized the incumbent regime and triggered discussions about the continued political usefulness of maintaining sanctions. This undermined the ability of sanctions senders and domestic opposition movements to speak with a unified voice and to continue sending coherent signals of regime disapproval.

Chapter 7 synthesizes and re-visits the empirical findings. Based on a discussion of the generalizability of the result, it underlines the achievements of the complex multi-method research design for the study of opposition movements and their mobilization in regimes under sanctions. Finally, it highlights the contribution to related scholarly debates, the avenues for further research and the policy implications of the dissertation.
2. TOWARDS A THEORY OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN REGIMES UNDER SANCTIONS

Before delving into the Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the case studies, this chapter serves to further develop the research question that was already sketched in the introduction and to outline the theoretical framework for addressing it. The chapter is hence divided into three sections. In the first section, a discussion of the state of the art on sanctions and opposition will serve to outline a gap in the literature that shall be addressed in this work, namely a systematic analysis of the ‘internal opposition effect’ of international sanctions (Lopez and Cortright 1997, 10). As sanctions research and social movement theory have both touched upon the issue of anti-government mobilization in regimes facing external pressure these two strands of research will be reviewed. Sanctions research has increasingly taken into consideration the domestic characteristics of targeted regimes, but it has hardly addressed domestic opposition as a political actor in its own right. Regime critical actors and their activity can be understood through the lens of social movement theory, which has developed a plethora of approaches that seek to explain domestic mobilization. Despite the revived discussion about the importance of international factors, these studies have mostly ignored the potential effect of international sanctions in that respect. Based on the review of these two debates the research question is established: how and under which conditions is domestic opposition enabled by international sanctions? Subsequently, the most important concept for this research, the notion of opposition movements, will be problematized and defined in the second section before turning to the theoretical framework.

In the third section, the theoretical framework for examining opposition movements in regimes under sanctions will be introduced, based on the insights derived from the literature review. Both sanctions studies and social movement approaches have dealt with opposition in regimes under sanctions, albeit in isolation of each other and from different, supplementary perspectives. For the theoretical framework, these strands of research will be systematically

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5 This discussion of the state of the art not only scrutinizes the relevant quantitative and comparative literature on sanctions and their impact on domestic contestation, but also draws on the plethora of highly insightful case studies. However, this does not imply that each and every case study that touches the issue of sanctions (at the margin) is reviewed. A number of articles and books on the peacebuilding endeavors in Sierra Leone, for instance, glance at the UN sanctions during the civil war, without making this a key component of their analysis. Case studies of this type have been omitted.
integrated. Building on their combination, I will propose a novel framework for analyzing how the interaction of domestic and international factors determines the effects of sanctions on regime critical actors and their activity. In addition to conventional deprivation-based and political opportunity explanations of opposition politics in regimes under sanctions, I hypothesize that signals conveyed by sanctions created perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent. In total, seven theoretical expectations are outlined, which — in contrast to earlier studies seeking to identify which single mechanism account for opposition mobilization against the backdrop of external sanctions (Allen 2008) — highlight the interplay between these approaches.

2.1. What do we know about the impact of sanctions on domestic opposition?

Generations of researchers have denounced international sanctions for their inability to bring about the desired political change (inter alia Doxey 1980; Haass 1997; Pape 1997; Whang 2010). Yet policy makers have continuously — and even increasingly — employed this instrument ‘between wars and words’ (Wallensteen and Staibano 2005). When trying to understand the alleged ineffectiveness of sanctions, both scholars and practitioners have pointed to the failure of coercive instruments to empower regime critical actors domestically: In pointed terms, Weiss (1999, 500) traces flaws in the efficacy of sanctions back to a ‘not strong enough internal opposition’. In contrast, the United States General Accounting Office has suggested that ‘sanctions can strengthen this opposition and improve the likelihood of a positive political response to the sanctions’ (quoted after Minear, Cortright, Wagler, Lopez, et al. 1998, 47 emphasis added). These two statements reveal a degree of uncertainty about how sanctions affect domestic opposition. In the following, what we do (and do not) know about sanctions and opposition will be discussed to serve as a basis for the formulation of the research question.

2.1.1. The international dimensions of social movement mobilization

Departing from the very general insight that changes in the international environment can influence domestic processes of and prospects for domestic mobilization (Kriesi 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003), social movement theory and the study of non-violent
resistance have increasingly sought to understand the international dimension of political contention. This has partially occurred in response to vocal critique that the international context of social movement activity was woefully under-theorized, especially with respect to how international allies influence political opportunity structures in non-democratic regimes (Schock 1999).

This international dimension of social movement activism has been approached differently. A number of studies examine the internationalization of the movements themselves. For instance, Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) explore transnational collective action as a new type of social movements activity as well as the link between such international and national campaigns. While opposition in regimes under sanctions could potentially experience such an evolution that transcends national borders, it appears to be the exception rather than the norm for domestically grounded political opposition to a regime (for more details on the type of opposition that is examined, see section two below). Instead, two other perspectives allow drawing interferences on how sanctions as a form of external support as well as the norms and discourses their senders promote influence domestic dynamics of contention, namely specific outside support and more generally supportive discourses.

According to the first of these perspectives, third party advocacy on behalf on the movements appears to increase their leverage (McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Schock 2004). External pressure can expand domestic political opportunities and lead to institutional or legal openings that enable regime critical actors to voice their criticism and mobilize. Moreover, external political and financial support constitutes an important resource for social movements. Interestingly, early social movement theorists refer to domestic actors or structures outside the movement itself when conceptualizing and empirically examining external political opportunities or external allies providing key resources (McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Zald and Berger 1978). It has only been relatively recently that ‘external’ refers to something ‘outside

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Both strands of research are characterized by notable differences: Social movement theory tends to be more oriented towards academia, has traditionally emphasized the study of structural factors and its influence on repertoires of contention rather than the outcome of mobilization and mostly focuses on issue-specific social movements in the Global North. In contrast, civil resistance studies stress the importance of linking theory and practice, including the strategic use of specific actions, not least in civil conflicts predominantly occurring in non-Western conflicts (Schock 2013, 279–282). Nevertheless, they deal with similar questions of how and under which circumstances social movements respectively civil resistance emerges.
the national borders’. Examining the trade union’s fight for democracy in Nigeria⁷, Obono (2011) exemplarily shows how demands for political liberalization came from two key sources simultaneously, namely international actors and the domestic society. Further specifying the type of outside support that domestic movements enjoy, a number of studies have inter alia traced the impact of diplomatic activity in favor of regime critical actors and the mobilization of transnational networks (Layton 2000; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003)⁸.

In addition to such direct interventions on behalf of certain movements, the second perspective concerns internationally promoted discourses, which also shape the environment in which domestic movements argue. More specifically, global human rights discourses can empower regime critical actors domestically as certain concepts derived from the international discourse are applied by local groups to justify their claims-making vis-à-vis the regime and to legitimate their activities (Klotz 2006). Such international discourses do not only influence the degree, but also the content of the demands and the forms of mobilization (Thomas 2001, 173).

Support from outside is not only passively received, but also actively encouraged by groups that challenge the state. Domestic opposition movements purposefully exert pressure on the government by activating or strengthening ties to transnational movements that mobilize international pressure against the target state to help them achieve political change at home (Schock 2004, 17). International human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often actively seek the attention of foreign powers to support their demands and pro-democracy movements use their ties to regional organizations to advance their cause domestically (Murdie and Peksen 2013; Pevehouse 2005).

While these studies have contributed to understanding the international dimension of domestic contention, the – very general – conclusion that third party support is a powerful enabling factor for social movements and (non-violent) resistance is oftentimes based on a problematically narrow operationalization of international engagement, for example as an activity by the diaspora on behalf of the domestic opposition (for example, Asal, Legault, Szekely, and Wilkenfeld 2013).

⁷ Even though classical social movement theory originally emerged as an approach to examine single unified actors in democratic regimes, thereby providing little guidance for the study of movements in authoritarian regimes outside the OECD world (Boudreau 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 19), it has increasingly and successfully been applied to the study of contention in other regions and under less democratic circumstances (for example Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003).

⁸ With respect to civil wars, it was also shown that third parties do not only influence the outcome, but also the duration and dynamics of intra-state conflict (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004).
Moreover, influential international allies and the discourses that they promote are sometimes unable to affect domestic dynamics of contention in a decisive manner. Studying twenty-four cases of mobilization in non-democratic states, Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003) came to the conclusion that the movements’ transnational networks did not significantly alter the likelihood or extent of mobilization. In contrast to their expectation that external support would legitimize and thereby empower civil resistance, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) likewise found no support that it increases the probability or success of non-violent resistance campaigns in their large-N analysis. In fact, steady outside pressure on the challenged government can also be counterproductive by hurting the legitimacy of protestors themselves or their demands (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, 123; Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010, 42; Kriesi 2004). One prominent example is support for democracy movements in the global South, which tends to link them to Western interests in the public perception and thereby potentially makes them appear less legitimate (Poulson 2009, 40). In a similar vein, receiving financial support from Western donors was shown to have negative repercussions for opposition parties (Mathisen and Svåsand 2002; Teshome 2009).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, this pattern of outside (Western) support encouraging domestic dissent but at times also delegitimizing it has become visible in a pronounced fashion. Changes in the international environment, particularly the mass demonstrations in the former Soviet Union, East Germany, China and Algeria as well as donor pressure for democratization almost certainly influenced the discourses, timing and form of protest in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992). Professionals, intellectuals and other groups that criticized existing regimes and demanded political liberalization often received – at least tactic – support and protection from outside (Clapham 1997). More often than not, these events outside the respective countries helped to release domestic protest. While this changing international landscape was hence conducive for wide-spread calls for liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s, external funding also lay opposition elements open to nationalistic attacks from internal opponents (Olukoshi 1998, 41).

At its core, social movement research suggests that external support – broadly understood as direct intervention on behalf of social movements, their transnational networks and even discourses that fit the demands raised domestically – enables domestic opposition by changing the political opportunity structures in their favor, by mobilizing international resources and by legitimizing their claims-making. Nevertheless, various studies also stress the unintended
negative consequences of open support for pro-democracy movements in the Global South. In other words, actions of international allies and like-minded umbrella organizations can both constrain and enable actions undertaken by local groups (Meyer 2003, 23). Hence, understanding how movements are nested in larger international contexts is crucial. But most studies on protest and social movements have ignored international sanctions as a crucial source of outside support (for a notable exception see Stephan and Chenoweth 2008) despite the fact that they are one of the key Western foreign policy tools to stop the suppression of internal opposition and to instigate democratization more generally (von Soest and Wahman 2015a).

2.1.2. The inner working of regimes under sanctions
The end of the Cold War led to a new willingness among the permanent Security Council members to make use of economic coercion during the so-called ‘sanctions decade’ of the 1990s (Cortright and Lopez 2000). After a relatively short-lived period of ‘sanctions fatigue’ (Elliott and Hufbauer 1999, 407), the idea of targeted sanctions revived the interest of key stakeholders in the international system in the 2000s (Drezner 2011, 99). Most recently, sanctions imposed by regional organizations against their member states have been on the rise (Grauvogel, Newbery, and von Soest 2013; Hellquist 2014; Witt 2012a).

Each of these waves of sanctioning practices was closely related to advances in the study of international sanctions, which have directly or indirectly shed light on domestic dynamics of contention in the targeted regimes, but also raised new questions. The early years of sanctions research were dominated by in-depth case studies, which sought to explain why sanctions succeeded or failed under these particular circumstances (for example Doxey 1972; Nossal 1989; Saint Brides 1980). Some of these also touched upon the role of regime-critical actors and thereby offered insightful yet rather anecdotal insights into opposition politics in regimes under sanctions (for example Galtung 1967). Following the explosion of UN-mandated measures in the 1990s, research increasingly aimed at understanding patterns of sanctions outcomes more generally. In addition to comparative qualitative studies (inter alia Cortright and Lopez 2000; Heine-Ellison 2001; Jentleson 2000), the first comprehensive dataset on economic sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990) sparked a wave of large-N research on their effectiveness. In contrast to the early case studies taking into account the domestic political contention, many of these studies have focused on sender-target relations, the types of senders and their goals (for instance Bonetti 1998; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997;
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Drezner 1999; Drury 1998; Hart 2000; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 45–47). Yet at the same time, attempts to assess the most prominent cases prevailed in order to deepen knowledge about which domestic actors were (economically) hit by sanctions (inter alia Gibbons 1999; Woodward 1995).

Among these cases, the oil embargo and related measures imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 were not only the most comprehensive, but also the most intensely debated sanctions regime of the 1990s (inter alia Cordesman 1999; Dowty 1994; Mazaheri 2010), sparking two new stands of inquiry. On the one hand, attention almost immediately turned towards the humanitarian consequences of international sanctions (Allen and Lektzian 2013; Crawford 1997; Weiss 1999). Examining negative domestic externalities of sanctions more broadly, scholars also started to look at the unintended effects of international sanctions on human rights, repression and democracy (Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2010; Wood 2008). While this research has addressed important context conditions for the voicing and enacting of domestic dissent – respect for human rights, state violence and political freedom – it has not explored the consequences for opposition in regimes under sanctions.

On the other hand, the ‘microfoundations of economic sanctions’ (Kirshner 1997; see also Mastanduno 1999) have been re-visited, also by quantitative research (Allen 2005; Brooks 2002). Political economy approaches have analyzed the distributional effects of economic sanctions on different actors within the targeted state, especially the regime and its key supporters (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999, 2000). The integration of insights from the study of authoritarian regimes has further contributed to understanding how the impact of sanctions is mediated by the regime type of the targeted country (Escribà-Folch 2011; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010) and how different kinds of authoritarian regimes manage to withstand the pressure from sanctions (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014), without specifying the role of domestic opposition in that context. Summing up, most previous work examining the effect of sanctions on the inner working of targeted regimes has only considered opposition movements in one of two ways: as helpless victims or as important due to their relation with the regime in power. Hence, the issue of how sanctions affect opposition movements conceived as an independent political actor remains little explored.

2.1.3. Domestic opposition and the effectiveness of international sanctions

In line with demands to acquire a deeper knowledge of internal dynamics of target states (Tostensen and Bull 2002, 378), both qualitative and quantitative sanctions research has –
increasingly – acknowledged that individuals and groups that are not part of the regime are affected by the decision to impose sanctions. Internal dissent has been repeatedly identified as a key factor influencing the effectiveness of international sanctions in two major ways. In short, certain studies suggest that a reasonably developed opposition movement is a crucial precondition for sanctions to work whereas others rather stress that external pressure is more effective if it increases domestic dissent.

Following the first line on reasoning, the presence of a ‘worthy’ (Kaplan 2007, 74), ‘strong enough’ (Weiss 1999, 500) or at least ‘reasonable strong’ (2004, 29) internal opposition prior to the imposition of sanctions was found to influence whether sanctions succeed. Accordingly, Kaempfer et al. (2004, 29) have included ‘the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups’ as an important component in their model of how dictators respond to economic sanctions. In that view, a transmission mechanism from economic pressure to political change is only operable if domestic opposition to the targeted regime exists (Jentleson 2000). Moreover, sanction senders are assumed to make use of previously existing dissent between the targeted regime and its opponents (Olson 1979). In their comparative case studies, Blanchard and Ripsman (1999) show how the success of the Arab sanctions against Canada to prevent it from moving its Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 1979 as well as India’s use of economic sanctions between 1989 and 1990 to distance Nepal from closer ties with China in 1889/1990 crucially depended on pre-existing opposition to the regime. Hence, Wallensteen (2000) discusses the existence of strong enough domestic anti-regime movements as a prerequisite to achieve what he terms the ‘double grid’, consisting of internal pressure and outside isolation. Conversely, flaws in the efficacy of sanctions were attributed to a lack of internal opposition (Hufbauer and Oegg 2001 on Cuba; Weiss 1999).

A second strand of research shows that sanctions can create new opposition to the regime by activating dissatisfied but previously uncommitted and passive elements of the population (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999, 48–51). This points to a further relation between international opposition and the effectiveness of international sanctions. The outcome of coercive measures is not only affected by the strength of opposition movements before the imposition of sanctions but also by the likelihood that sanctions enable further mobilization. In other words, researchers need to account for the impact of sanctions both on the actual and the potential opposition (see also Minear, Cortright, Wagler, Lopez, and Weiss 1998). Losman (1979, 128, emphasis added) noted that ‘for sanctions to be successful, the
economic pressure must be sufficient to *unleash* domestic political pressure that will either topple an intransigent regime or bring about the adoption of new policies more in accord with the norms of the boycotting nation’. Sanctions may enable new groups to emerge or old groups to use different tactics and mobilize new segments of the society.

If sanctions should lead to concessions on the part of the target, policy makers are thus well advised to aim at strengthening regime critical actors within the country under sanctions. Accordingly, EU sanctions regularly aim at generating domestic dissent and ending governments’ repression of opposition groups and the civilian population more generally (Portela 2005). Despite these numerous accounts stressing the importance of domestic opposition – be it pre-existing or emerging after the imposition of sanctions – the literature largely focused on how international sanctions affect the targeted regime, as outlined in the following section. This holds especially true for the quantitative literature on economic sanctions, but also for the great majority of case studies. To the extent that they touch upon the issue of how sanctions affect the opposition, this aspect rather constitutes a side note the more central question of explaining the sanctions senders’ strategy or their impact on the incumbent regime (for example de Vries on sanctions against former Yugoslavia).

‘RALLY-ROUND-THE-FLAG’ EFFECT
Contradicting sanctions senders’ intention to strengthen domestic opposition to the regime, international sanctions can constitute a political or economic asset for the targeted government. In his seminal work, Galtung (1967) describes how sanctions increased the White population’s loyalty with the Ian Smith government in former Rhodesia. The ruling elite exploited sanctions in order to spur nationalist sentiments, to enhance the population’s feeling of solidarity with the regime and to strengthen internal cohesion (see also Kaplan 2007 on how Kim Jong-il further cultivated nationalism with reference to the international sanctions). Sanctions constitute a possibility to pinpoint to clear external threat, which can be used as a focal point of the leader to unify the state. In a similar manner, regimes denounced aid conditional as unjust foreign interference undermining their sovereignty to garner support domestically (Sørensen 1995, 396). These findings (implicitly) use the notion of rally-round-the-flag effects, which has been initially developed to characterize increased popular support of the US President during periods of international crisis or war (Mueller 1970).

According to the most recent analyses of UN targeted sanctions, such measures unintentionally strengthen authoritarian rule in 35 percent of the sanctions episodes and lead
to rally effects in 13 percent (Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 26). Scholars sought to disentangle this rally-round-the-flag effect. Studying the restrictive measures against Iran triggered by the nuclear crisis, Amuzegar (1997a, 34) shows how the external threat of sanctions psychologically created a ‘siege mentality’ among the population. The storyline that the US sanctions would threaten Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity gained widespread resonance among the population. While the Iranian case illustrates how measures that – at least initially – only had limited economic consequences for the general population lead to a rally-round-the-flag effect, Tostensen and Bull (2002, 376) propose that this effect is even greater if sanctions inflict financial damage upon the broader civilian population. Economically costly sanctions allow the targeted regimes to stress the measures’ inhumane nature, which should increase sympathy for the victim of such unjust measures, namely the government under sanctions. Incumbents do not only portray themselves as heroic fighters against unjust external intervention but also justify the oppression of political opponents with reference to sanctions, arguing that all political differences need to be put aside in such a situation (Miyagawa 1992, 84ff; Schreiber 1973, 404). Most recently, rally effects have been explained with reference to the use of sanctions as legitimation devices. Rulers manage to successfully demonize external sanctions and use them as a political asset if their rule is based on strong claims to legitimacy (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014).

Even though sanctions are supposed to constrain the targeted regime financially, they can also provide it with economic opportunities. In his study on sanctions against former Yugoslavia, Andreas (2005, 335–336) has shown that such measures privilege those best positioned in the economy, which tends to be the incumbent regime. Governments benefit from sanctions economically if they succeeded in capturing rents from the trade with then limited resources (Haass 1998; Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). A UN study from 1997 shows how governments and their supporters have profited from black-market activities that sprung up in the wake of sanctions (Browne 2011). For example, individuals in Libya with international connections and access to foreign currency – most of them being supportive of the Gadhafi regime – were suddenly in a position of privilege (Niblock 2001). The control of scarce resources coming in and out of the state can ultimately allow the targeted regime to consolidate its rule when economic disruptions created by sanctions are employed as a tool to redistribute resources in a way that benefits core supporters (Cortright and Lopez 2000; Gibbons 1999; Peksen and Drury 2010). Milosevic employed such a strategy in Yugoslavia when he made access to sanctions rents contingent on support for the regime (Woodward 1995).
Furthermore, sanctions permit regimes to bolster their authority and control over society by shifting the economic pressure to political opponents (Hufbauer and Oegg 2001). As a result, sanctions ‘can harm those in opposition’ (Crawford and Klotz 1999, 206). When sanctions’ costs are redistributed, they tend to disproportionately fall on weak parts of population (Haass 1998, 202–203). For example, the Iraqi regime redirected sanctions’ costs towards the opposition by depriving the mostly regime-critical Kurds from any access to the limited medical supplies (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999, 228). In a similar fashion, unemployment during the trade embargo against Rhodesia only rose among the black opposition as the white population, which constituted Ian Smith’s key constituency, was carefully shielded from the sanctions’ economic consequences (McKinnell 1969). As a consequence, opposition movements may be unable to organize effectively due to a lack crucial resources (see McCarthy and Zald 1977, 2001 for a resource-focused account of social movement mobilization). By impoverishing the middle class, comprehensive sanctions handicap particularly likely agents of change and hence weaken potential sources of opposition to the regime (Brooks 2002). Finally, regimes tend to use sanctions as scape goats for economic problems which they would needed to explain to a dissatisfied population otherwise and thereby undermine the chances of the opposition to criticize the status quo (Nincic 2005; Allen 2005; Haass 1998; Green 1983; Grebe 2010).

‘INTERNAL OPPOSITION’ EFFECT
Despite the manifold ways of how targeted regimes can turn sanctions into a political and economic asset, sanctions have repeatedly succeeded in undermining their stability – either by encouraging defections from the ruling coalition or by increasing opposition mobilization. Put differently, sanctions can “foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both” (Olson 1979, 474). If sanctions reduce the ability of incumbents to provide resources to supporters, the likelihood of defections from the ruling coalition increases (Wood 2008, 493). Moreover, sanctions can empower regime critical actors, rendering more effective their opposition to objectionable policies or the regime as such and increasing the likelihood of political change – famously characterized as an ‘internal opposition effect’ (Lopez and Cortright 1997, 10).

In some cases, support for the opposition was or became an explicit goal of the sanctions regime. The measures implemented against the Milosevic regime in response to its role in Kosovo between 1998 and 2000, for example, were characterized by a number of exemptions that were supposed to strengthen the opposition (de Vries 2002): The flight ban did not include
Montenegro Airlines to support the opposition of the Montenegrin government to the regime in Belgrade. Moreover, oil and electricity was supplied to cities governed by the opposition under the so-called Energy for Democracy initiative despite an overall energy embargo. Yet, this highly insightful case study does not examine whether and how these exemptions ultimately influenced the leverage of the opposition.

A number of case studies propose that opposition movements profited from the imposition of sanctions, which enabled them to sustain or even increase their challenge to the incumbent. For example, sanctions first bolstered the socialist revolutionary movement Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua during the 1970s (Kirkpatrick 1979) and later, when the FSLN had come to power, helped the conservative opposition as the promise of better relations with the United States was a major source of electoral support (Levitsky and Way 2010, 49). Most prominently, a number of studies have touched upon the impact of the sanctions against South Africa on anti-apartheid activists (Arya 2008; Crawford 1997, 58; Crawford and Klotz 1999; Klotz 1996; Lodge 1989, 47). Seemingly, the ANC gained legitimacy and political momentum from international solidarity expressed through sanctions (Crawford and Klotz 1999; Minear, Cortright, Wagler, Lopez, and Weiss 1998) even though the regime was able to mitigate the measures’ financial impact (Arya 2008; Crawford 1997, 58; Lodge 1989, 47). One reason appears to be that in order to incite the sanctions senders to lift the measures, the apartheid regime entered into negotiations with the ANC (Klotz 1996).

Confirming this case evidence, Allen (2008b) and Wood (2008) demonstrate that sanctions led to an increase in anti-government activity in their large-N studies. According to Wood, both US and UN sanctions raise the likelihood of dissent measured as a yearly count of anti-government protests, riots, and strikes, even though this effect is stronger for UN sanctions. Likewise, Allen’s study suggests that economic sanctions positively affect the probability of anti-government protest, albeit only in democracies. Opposition movements can also benefit from sanctions economically via cross-border smuggling and black markets, especially if they control certain parts of the territory or sectors of the economy (Brooks 2002; Escribà-Folch 2012; Rowe 2001).

In short, sanctions research, especially case-based one, has acquired a certain understanding of how the incumbent regime can be affected by external pressure and how it potentially uses external sanctions to foster a rally-round-the-flag effect. In contrast, we still lack in depth knowledge about the processes leading to a so-called internal opposition effect, as I argue in the next section summarizing the research question.
2. Towards a Theory of Opposition Politics in Regimes under Sanctions

2.1.4. Research question

For a long time, the debate about opposition in countries under sanctions was significantly influenced by the landmark case of the British and later international embargo against Rhodesia, where both a rally-round-the-flag and an internal opposition effect had been observed (Galtung 1967; Minter and Schmidt 1988). Likewise, Tostensen and Bull (2002, 397) noted that internal opposition may be either weakened or strengthened by international sanctions during the early 2000s.

Since then, however, new studies have increasingly provided evidence that – overall – sanctions rather encourage and facilitate domestic opposition in targeted countries than undermining it. The only two large-N studies to date show that anti-government protest increases after the imposition of sanctions, at least in the case of sanctions against democracies and multilateral sanctions, as outlined above (Allen 2008, Wood 2008). Likewise, most case studies either point to conflicting outcomes like in the case of Rhodesia, or suggest that sanctions emboldened the opposition, like in the case of measures targeting the former Apartheid regime in South Africa, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Desi Bouterse in Suriname, Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, and various governments in Laos (inter alia Elliott 1998; Klotz 2006). In contrast, only very few cases – namely North Korea and Cuba (Kaplan 2007; Sanchez 2003) – have unequivocally indicated that sanctions successfully constrained the internal opposition.

Moreover, stopping the suppression of internal opposition groups and thereby increasing their political leverage is the implicit or explicit goal of most sanctions regimes (for example, Portela 2005 on EU sanctions; Seekins 2005 on US sanctions) so that it also appears instrumental from a policy perspective to focus on this desired outcome of international pressure. For example, a Congressional proposal called for the United States to stop all aid to Kenya until the country freed political prisoners and implements democratic freedoms in response to the arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and their supporters on 7 July 1990 (Kennedy 1990, 15–16). Two years later, the US suspended all non-humanitarian bilateral assistance to denounce the arrest of Chakufwa Chihana, a well-known activist of the underground opposition movement United Front for Multiparty Democracy in Malawi (Brown 2004, 710; Newell 1995, 254–255). Likewise,

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9 This is not to deny that regimes are able to sustain or even stabilize their rule despite of or thanks to international sanctions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Grauvogel and von Soest 2014), but they may achieve this in the face of heightening domestic pressure, meaning that these studies do not allow drawing conclusions about the impact of sanctions on internal opposition to the regime.
Towards a Theory of Opposition Politics in Regimes under Sanctions

The EU explicitly referred to the intimidation and suppression of political opponents when implementing sanctions against Togo in 1992/1993 (Ebeku 2005, 9–10) and called for the release of the arrested members of the opposition in the Common Position on restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea (Council of the European Union 2009). In a more indirect manner, US sanctions against senior Eritrean officials, for instance, reacted to the regime’s attack on democratic institutions and gross human rights abuses (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2013), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) denounced the change in the government as a coup when suspending Madagascar’s membership (BBC 2009).

Yet we still lack a more systematic understanding of what exactly leads to the ‘internal opposition’ effect, i.e. in which ways opposition movements may ‘benefit’ from international sanctions. In other words, the ‘how’ of this internal opposition effect needs to be uncovered. In response, the thesis seeks to address the question of how and under which conditions is domestic opposition enabled by international sanctions?

With respect to this research question, two specifications are required. First, the overview on the state of the art on sanctions and opposition should have made sufficiently clear that – despite recent research suggesting an ‘internal opposition’ rather than a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect of sanctions within the targeted regimes – it is by no means clear than domestic opposition movements will always benefit from external political and/or economic pressure. Hence, developments which potentially undermine the positive impact than sanctions (signals) may have on the leverage of opposition forces – like a regime’s ability to garner popular support in the view of sanctions depicted as an external threat or its capacity to benefit from trade restrictions economically – will be fully taken into account.

Second, the focus on how opposition movements are enabled by sanctions certainly does not imply a normative judgment that this is always a desirable outcome. Those forces opposing the regimes in power are clearly not perceived to be not inherently ‘good’ (see also Klotz 2006, 168). While they mobilize against authoritarian regimes in most of the cases examined, they oftentimes fall short of adhering to democratic and human rights standards, too. Few cases are as seemingly clear cut as Zimbabwe, where the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a broad alliance of trade unions, human rights activists and regime critics was formed to oust the notoriously authoritarian president Mugabe – yet even this movement’s democratic credentials can be challenged in many respects (for example Christiansen 2010; Hoekman...
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2013). In that vein, underlining that sanctions senders oftentimes aim at strengthening anti-regime forces, as I did above, does not suggest that this goal shall be supported (or is successful), but is rather meant to underline the policy relevance of the research question.

By addressing the question of how and under which conditions domestic opposition is enabled by international sanctions, I treat opposition movements as political actors in their own right. This is an innovative approach, as most previous work examining the effect of sanctions on domestic groups has either ignored them entirely or considered them in a rather limited fashion. The emerging scholarship on the inner working of sanctions within the targeted regimes mostly focused on the regime side of the equation. To the extent that actors outside the regime were taken into account, they were hardly treated as autonomous actors, but rather as helpless victims (Allen and Lektzian 2013; Crawford 1997; Weiss 1999).

For addressing the research question, Wood (2008) makes a useful distinction between factors that are endogenous to sanctions and factors being idiosyncratic to (pre-sanctions) domestic conditions. While previous sanctions studies have identified a number of factors endogenous to such measures that affect opposition activity in targeted regimes, sanctions research is – quite naturally – less suited to identify factors that are idiosyncratic to the pre-sanctions domestic conditions. Insights from social movement theory, which have been mostly neglected by sanctions scholars, can contribute to filling this gap. Social movement scholars have developed a detailed understanding of factors conducive for anti-regime mobilization, on which I draw in the following. But before outlining the theoretical framework of analysis, the question of what constitutes an opposition movement will be addressed.

2.2. What constitutes an opposition movement?

The puzzle outlined above raises the question of whether and to what extent we can expect to see enhanced opposition activity and strengthened opposition movements in countries under sanctions, the overwhelming majority of which are governed by non-democratic regimes (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). In contrast to earlier works dealing specifically with opposition groups, which focus on Western democracies (Parry 1997, 457), newer research on opposition has increasingly examined the conditions under which opposition movements emerge, develop, and are sustained in non-democratic regimes, where opposition tends to be continuously delegitimized. Such issues have become increasingly important as Ionescu’s and De Madariaga’s (1968) category of ‘opposition-less states’ has virtually disappeared.
But how do these types of opposition look like? Are certain modes of contention, certain organizational forms or certain groups of ‘participants’ in anti-government protest particularly relevant for the study of opposition in regimes under sanctions? This question can be approached either from an actor-centric perspective or by focusing on the different forms of contentious activity. While certain actors tend to choose particular modes of contention – for example, one could intuitively argue that political opposition parties rarely engage in violent resistance against the regime – the organizational form is not simply an outflow of the type of contention. In the following, I will thus first introduce a general distinction between three different modes of regime critical activity. Subsequently, I will discuss how prominent actor-centered concepts, particularly opposition parties and social movements, relate to these types of political contestation. In that context, their interplay and the relation to dissent emerging from within the ruling elite will also be addressed. Third, I propose a definition of opposition that will serve as a basis for the empirical analysis.

Based on a number of related approaches for classifying regime-critical activity, I suggest that we can differentiate three different types, namely conventional opposition politics, contentious politics and violent resistance. Following Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013), conventional politics takes place within the defined modes of political participation whereas contentious politics describes unarmed civil power using non-violent methods, but outside the accepted channels. In a similar manner, Albrecht (2005) distinguishes between dissent, opposition and resistance. According to the three-fold typology, dissent – which can also be expressed by the ruling elites – forms an integral part of the everyday politics. The second category, opposition, can be subdivided into tolerated opposition, which is characterized by competitive interaction with the regime, yet based on a certain degree of mutual recognition and anti-systematic opposition, which questions the regime more fundamentally. Lastly, resistance refers to challenging the regime in violent terms. The distinction made between opposition and resistance/dissidence – with opposition taking place within the defined rules of the game whereas resistance/dissidence uses unconventional means of opposing the regime or its policies – is also taken up by Daase and Deitelhoff (2014).

However, the distinction between ‘the regime’ and ‘the opposition’ is far from always being clear-cut. As discussed above, dissent may also be voiced from within the ruling elite. Svolik, (2012) for example, differentiates threats from the general population (the ‘problem of authoritarian control’) and threats from within the ruling coalition (the ‘problem of
2. Towards a Theory of Opposition Politics in Regimes under Sanctions

Authoritarian power-sharing’). Yet, what constitutes this inner circle and hence what is considered as a threat from within or outside may also change. Research on winning coalitions (for example Geddes 2003; Svolik 2009) or selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2005) has shown that these groups do not only vary according to the authoritarian subtype, but also that they can expand or shrink over time.

The different forms of anti-regime activity can be both organized and spontaneous (Salehyan et al. 2012). Conrad (2011) exemplarily distinguishes non-formalized and different types of institutionalized opposition, and shows how the differences in organization also affect their demands and means of contention. This emphasis on highly institutionalized versus (potentially) more diverse and fluid forms of opposition closely resembles the differentiation made between ‘opposition movements’ and ‘opposition parties’ (Maguire 1995). In that context, opposition parties are understood as ‘partisan political institutions’ that are intentionally designed to temper the ruling party’s excesses (Dolo 2006, emphasis added). In contrast, the term ‘opposition movement’ has been hardly defined. Empirical applications (for example, Brodsgaard 1981; Kostiner 1996; Riethof 2004) encompass the whole range of non-conventional political activity that can also be found in the literature on social movements.

Going beyond these rather structural accounts of opposition activity, the question of which actors sustain such movements and which organizational structures they adopt will be addressed in the following. Social and political phenomena as diverse as religious groupings, revolutions, political organizations, or single-issue campaigns have been characterized as social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988, 695). Paralleling the debate about opposition movements as opposed to formally institutionalized opposition parties, social movements are

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10 While social movement theory tends to focus on clearly identifiable groups with a stable structure, or at least assumes a ‘life cycle, from spontaneous crowd action to more organized forms of contention’ (McCarthy and Zald 2001), more spontaneous events such as riots, demonstrations, and political strikes were studied under the label of contention (Hibbs 1973).

11 With respect to opposition politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, scholars initially focused on political parties when they studied popular mobilization in Africa (for example Schachter 1961). Following the so called third wave of democratization in the early 1990s, studies of political contention and opposition have shifted their attention towards the broader category of civil society (Dorman 2002; Olukoshi 1998). Most recently, opposition parties have gained increasing attention. Despite the fact that their importance for processes of democratization and democratic consolidation is widely acknowledged (for example Rakner and Van de Walle 2009; Teshome 2009), we still lack a detailed understanding of what explains their emergence and persistence, but also their interaction with other, less institutionalized forms of contention.

12 For example, Eisinger (1973) focuses on riots, whereas others also include different forms of disruptive action (Button 1978; Cloward and Piven 1979), ranging from demonstrations to strikes and political violence (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003; Tarrow 1994).
also distinguished from purely institutional behavior by some authors (for example, Tilly 1978), whereas others pay greater action to their organization structure and the role of movement leaders with prior political experience (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Despite this heterogeneity, some common elements exist (Diani 1992): Firstly, social movements are linked by a ‘collective identity’ with respect to the internal and external apperception, albeit not to an extent that it precludes fractional conflicts. Nevertheless, it allows observers – and researchers – to assign a common meaning to activities that might otherwise be regarded as unrelated protest events. Secondly, social movements are characterized by collective activity on conflictual issues, which renders them visible. Thirdly, social movements consist of several different actors including individuals as well as formal and informal groups, which form (loose) networks. This distinguishes social movements from political organizations, including opposition parties.

Departing from a certain research tradition (and certain normative underpinnings), most studies on opposition in a social movement tradition focus on actors rooted in civil society. In other words, they tend to identify anti-regime activity with a limited range of non-institutional actors (Koopmans and Statham 1999), thereby ignoring both institutionalized opposition, i.e. political parties, and dissent of (former) regime elites. Such a perspective prioritizes ‘collective action opposing state policies by participants drawn from non-elite or repressed segments of society’ (Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003, 611; see also Dudouet 2006, 6). In contrast, studies on the resilience and breakdown of authoritarian rule, have – arguably from a very different perspective – highlighted that opposition to regimes can emerge from within the ruling elite (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999; Goldstone 2001). Even regime-critical social movements that primarily draw their participants from the non-elite population regularly also aim at making inroads among the elites (Kriesi 2004). More generally speaking, cooperation between elites started to oppose the regime and subaltern movements from outside the formal structures is not uncommon, as very divergent opposition forces can be united by common patterns of resistance (Scott 2008).

Opposition parties and opposition movements – understood as those types of social movements that fundamentally criticize or even challenge the regime – interact. Opposition parties regularly draw on social movement networks, which provide them with social capital and legitimacy (Tordoff and Young 2005). Oftentimes, this interaction is characterized as being temporally sequenced. LeBas (2011, 29–30) has famously described a progressive evolution from spontaneous forms of dissent to institutionalized opposition and argues that only opposition
parties that emerged out of social movements have the power to challenge incumbent regimes. Such an understanding of opposition movements turning into a coalition capable of seeking political power is also visible elsewhere (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992).

However, there are other cases where social movements, civil society activism and opposition politics do not go hand in hand. For example, certain opposition parties being tolerated by (non-democratic) regimes shy away from cooperating with regime-critical movements for the fear of losing their limited privileges (Lust-Okar 2004). These studies highlight the need to explore opposition parties and opposition movements as two closely related, yet distinct phenomena. While the operationalization that will be proposed for the Qualitative Comparative Analysis can only trace the visible activity of such actors, namely popular mobilization, street protest, riots and other forms of non-violent and violent non-routine politics, the case studies allow disentangling the diverse actors, their activities and linkages in more detail. In that vein, Kitschelt (2000) shows in an exemplary manner how the study of what he calls political opposition movements – understood in the broad sense introduced above – contributes to research on political parties and vice versa.

My understanding of opposition movements is based on these considerations about the modes of contention, the different actors involved and their interaction. In addition, I specifically draw on two notions of opposition developed previously. Albrecht (2005, 379) proposes a broad understanding of opposition as ‘competitive interactions in political systems between the incumbents of government positions (in the following referred to as the ‘regime’) and its counterparts’ and Kaufmann (2011, 167) defines opposition movements as ‘a form of group action composed of a network of individuals, groups or organizations (...), formed to protest against social and political issues with the intention to effect change, or to prevent on-going changes’\textsuperscript{13}. Following them, I comprehend opposition movements as coalitions of organizations, groups and individuals formed to mobilize against political issues with the intention to effect a fundamental change of the current political regime or its policies. Such an understanding of opposition movements excludes strongly culture-oriented social movements that rarely mobilize in the political sphere. In line with other studies, mobilization is considered to be an aggregate category that includes the wide range of activities in which dissidents engage, from demonstrations, to strikes, riots and political violence (Jenkins 1995; Kriesi 1995; McAdam 1982;

\begin{footnote} 
\textsuperscript{13} Kaufman (2011) only incorporates movements „rooted in civil society (i.e. not the state) in her analysis, but I depart from this approach due to the reasons stated above. 
\end{footnote}
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Tilly 1995). With reference to Tilly (2009), such opposition movements’ activity is characterized by three key features, which allows to study them empirically: they are characterized by public efforts of making collective claims towards target authorities, they use different forms of political action including public meetings, demonstrations and rallies, and this public representation of the movement creates its recognition and visibility.

Nevertheless, a few words of caution are in order. As described above, it may not always be possible to draw a sharp line between ‘the regime’ and ‘the opposition’. First, the circle of those still considered forming part of the ruling elite, and thus also those perceived as being opposition, can change. Second, the definition requires opposition movements to seek a fundamental change of the current political regime or its policies. The distinction between fundamental changes and less fundamental ones may be blurred. While opposition that aims at democratic openings of an authoritarian regime or the introduction of market mechanisms in a state-directed economy clearly strives for fundamental changes, whether a demand to replace political figures of the regime counts as a fundamental change is less clear and depends on regime-specific factors. For example, the goal to oust Zimbabwe’s president Mugabe, who has been the central figures of the ZANU-PF regime since independence, characterizes a demand for fundamental change whereas the replacement of a prime minister may not constitute a fundamental shift. Accordingly, opposition movements were identified as such in line with the above-introduced definition based on case specific knowledge (see chapter 3, page 85-90). Third, the definition fails to incorporate a temporal dimension. Sanctions may enable pre-existing opposition movements or generate new dissent as described above. Yet, this aspect, which is crucial for the operationalization of the outcome of interest rather than for the definition of opposition movements, is reflected both in the QCA and the case studies.

In summary, this research deals with opposition in a broader sense than political party opposition and also considers the possibility that opposition to the regime emerges from within the ruling elite, while carefully distinguishing such forms of anti-regime mobilization from routine politics on the one hand and apolitical violence on the other hand. In doing so, both organized and more spontaneous forms of political contention from a variety of actors

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14 On whether opposition movements can be still considered to be part of the anti-regime forces when they join a power-sharing government, see chapter 7, section 3.
including civil society organizations, opposition party, the general population and (former) members of the elite are taken into account.

2.3. Explaining opposition politics in regimes under sanctions

Sanctions research has been dominated by quantitative studies and single case studies which both failed to come up with coherent explanatory approaches regarding how sanctions work (for exceptions, see Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005; Kirshner 1997). Despite this lack of broader theories on sanctions’ effectiveness and their impact on targeted regimes, sanctions research offers insight into how their design and their distributional effects influence opposition movements. Against this backdrop, social movement theory can further contribute to understanding domestic dynamics of contention in targeted regimes. In the following section, two conventional approaches for explaining political contention will be applied to the study of opposition politics under sanctions, namely grievance- and deprivation-based explanations and the notion of political opportunity structures. To these, I will add a third one, which focuses on how external displays of support create perceived opportunities for challenging the regime domestically and outline the conditions under which sanctions signals create such perceived opportunities. Finally, I will argue that some sort of grievances or deprivation must occur in conjunction with either political or perceived opportunities in order to stimulate anti-government activity.

2.3.1. Grievance- and deprivation based explanations

According to the conventional ‘punishment theory’ (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007, 850), sanctions’ economic costs translate into political pressure as they induce citizens to challenge the regime. The targeted society only acquiesces to the hardship caused by economic sanctions up to a certain threshold above which it reacts with protest. This argument bears strong resemblance to relative deprivation or respectively grievance-based theories of protest. Since the publication of ‘Why men rebel’, where Ted Gurr (1970) explored the importance of popular discontent as a root source of political violence, the notion of relative deprivation has become an amorphous catch-all term describing a plethora of relationships between different kinds of grievances and various forms of contention. These will be disentangled to allow for a more

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15 While the deprivation approach was initially used as an explanatory variable in numerous social movement studies (for example, Morrison 1971; Newton, Mann, and Geary 1980; Opp 1988), it later fell into disfavor (Gurney and Tierney 1982) and made way to a new focus on resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 2001).
nuanced understanding of how they are affected by sanctions and may, in turn, influence opposition mobilization in targeted regimes.

In a first step, grievance and deprivation need to be distinguished. While Gurr (1970) himself, who coined the notion of relative deprivation, also used the term grievances in his later writings when talking about almost identical situations (Gurr 1993), and contemporary conflict theory normally associates grievances with relative deprivation theory (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014), grievances and feelings of deprivation can and should be differentiated. Relative deprivation is defined as ‘actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping’ (Gurr 1970, 24). In other words, relative deprivation refers to the perceived disparity between aspirations and achievements. Deprivation is a psychological process where judgment is made relative not necessarily to others within a society but to one’s own expectations (Cramer 2005; Davies 1962). Hence, a feeling of deprivation may even occur in societies with a fairly even distribution of political or economic goods, assets and opportunities if an individual’s expectations are not met. In contrast, grievances describe an actual or supposed circumstance that is regarded as a just cause for complaint. Grievances are born out of deprivation (Regan and Norton 2005), but feelings of relative deprivation are not the only source of grievances. They may also stem from processes of (political) polarization and horizontal inequalities (Bavinck, Pellegrini, and Mostert 2014; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009; Stewart 2000). In other words, grievances may be related to group-based exclusion from national politics as well as systematic differences in socio-economic opportunities across culturally-defined or constructed groups (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014).

Departing from the assumption that ‘shrinking economic opportunities and exclusionary patterns of reward are a recipe for social unrest’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1994, 460), a number of authors find that mass uprisings respond to economic depression (Haggard and Kaufman 1997) or, even more specifically, that revolutions occur during period of low growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Kricheli and Livne 2011). By contrast, growth, as a basic form of public good provision, decreases the likelihood of revolutionary events and other incidents of

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16 In contrast to vertical inequalities among individuals, horizontal inequalities are those that coincide with culturally defined (or constructed) group identities (Langer 2005; Østby 2008; Stewart 2000).
dissent (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Accordingly, it was shown that regimes tend to respond to their vulnerability during economic crises with different types of political concessions, including political liberalization (Conrad 2011; Howard and Roessler 2006).

With reference to very similar explanations, but within a different research tradition, scholars studying civil wars have long discussed to which extent these can be explained by grievances. Here, political and economic discrimination, particularly of certain ethnic groups, has been linked to mass political violence (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Petersen 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002). A number of cross-national studies suggest that civil wars are more likely when economic and political grievances exist (inter alia Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Murshed 2002), particularly in secessionist conflicts (Ross 2006). Without going further into detail, it suffices to say that this focus on grievances later shifted toward the identification of factors that make armed rebellion feasible (for example Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2008; Hegre and Sambanis 2006) in a development that remarkably parallels the shift from deprivation-based explanations to opportunity structure approaches for explaining the emergence and persistence of social movements (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010).

Yet, violent resistance is only one of the possible responses to grievances. Social movements have frequently reacted with (more) civil ways of voicing and enacting dissent (Schock 2004, 15–17; Regan and Norton 2005). For example, Cunningham (2013) finds that civil – i.e. non-violent resistance increases when groups face economic discrimination. Economic conditions also have a significant impact of opposition party mobilization, as for example shown by Arriola (2003) in his account of how the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the major political opposition formation in Ethiopia, gained considerable support in relatively poor districts during the 2005 elections. In short, grievance-based approaches suggest that anti-regime behavior is more likely in times of economic downturn or increasing socio-economic inequalities – be they attributable fully fledged crises, a socio-economic development that does not live up to the population’s expectations or political discrimination. Moreover, the resulting forms of opposition activity may include everything from routine acts such as voting for the opposition to mass revolutions and civil wars.

It makes intuitive sense that economic downturns, which potentially exacerbate grievances, may be triggered both domestically and externally – and this is where sanctions come into play. Traditional approaches suggest that the purpose of sanctions is to bring about policy change through the imposition of economic harm. Higher costs are supposed to place stronger
pressure on the target’s government (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2013; Hart 2000). If leaders of the targeted regime act on the basis of rational cost benefit analyses, they should ‘find it harder to justify resisting the sender’s pressure as the costs of the sanction go up’ (Nooruddin 2002, 69; McGillivray and Stam 2004, see also).

Following rational choice approaches, the economic pain inflicted upon the target has indeed been identified one of the most reliable predictors of sanctions success. Hufbauer et al. (1990, 47–48) found that high costs to the target – operationalized as a percentage of the GDP – are positively correlated with sanctions effectiveness, which was confirmed in subsequent large-N research (Drury 1998; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Nooruddin 2002; for diverging findings, see Tsebelis 1990; Marinov 2005). In an attempt to quantify the impact of the financial consequences on sanctions success, Morgan et al. (2009) estimate the success rate of sanctions, which stands at 38 per cent when costs are minor, to increase to 94 per cent when the costs to the target are severe. Likewise, Allen (2005) shows that comprehensive sanctions reduce the time period after which the target concedes compared to less severe measures. Further specifying these insights, scholars argue that the economic leverage of the sender rather than the cost to the target as such increases the effectiveness of sanctions (Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2013). In that context, the degree to which a target previously relied on the sanctions sender for imports appears to affect its vulnerability (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Hart 2000). In contrast, third-party assistance from so called black knights reduces the exposure to external pressure (Drury 1998; Early 2009, 2011; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 45–46; McLean and Whang 2010). Finally, economically health targets are less susceptible to international sanctions (Drury 1998; Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003).

What follows from insights about an increase in contentious politics in times of socio-economic problems on the one hand and findings that costly sanctions are more effective on the other hand? Based on the assumption that popular protest constitutes the most important transmission belt from economic suffering to target concessions, a grievance-/deprivation-based perspective links these two insights. Conventional wisdom holds that financially costly sanctions can lead to the desired behavioral changes by inflicting pain on targeted public, who in turn will pressure their government to act in accordance with the senders demands (Lindsay 1986; Nossal 1989). While it is extremely difficult to attribute all anti-government protest that occurs in regimes under sanctions to these measures, a deprivation-based approach suggests that one will observe an increase in regime-critical behavior as a result of the socio-economic
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hardship that the population experiences (Allen 2008b). Among other cases, sanctions against Iran were designed in line with this assumption that financial pain would demoralize the population and turn it against the regime (Amuzegar 1997a).

More precisely, two causal links between the economic impact of sanctions and heightened regime critical activity are proposed. The economic harm caused by severe sanctions is thought to bring about political disintegration because the targeted society is only willing to bear the financial damage up to a certain level (Kerr and Gaisford 1994). Economically costly sanctions may increase feelings of deprivation because they tend to result in more unemployment and inflation (see discussion above). Discussing the sanctions against Iraq, Libya and Sudan, Niblock (2001) highlights another way how resource shortage resulting from international embargos may embolden opposition against the regime. He shows that economic shortages caused community structures to break down, which decreased identification with the state. This may in turn raise the population’s willingness to act against a state that appears unable of providing goods of primary necessity.

In addition, sanctions may increase grievances resulting from an increasingly uneven distribution of economic resources and opportunities. As outlined previously, grievances are critically linked to processes of comparison, meaning that certain groups feel marginalized compared to other societal groups. Under the condition of economies of scarcity that comprehensive sanctions create, such feelings intensify if the financial burden is unequally spread. The sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa exemplarily showed that attempts to shield key regime supporter from the economic pressure, in this case the white minority population, exacerbated already existing inequalities. In both countries, black unemployment rose or was at least not actively prevented from rising as a result of economic troubles that can at least partially be linked to sanctions and most importantly the redistributive measures that the targeted regimes put into place (Curtin 1969; Katzen 1982, 98; Lansing and Kuruvilla 1988; McKinnell 1969, 564). Such redirection of economic pressure from sanctions may ultimately increase tensions and the willingness of the population to rise against the regime (Cortright and Lopez 2000; Gibbons 1999; Weiss 1997, 1999).

Finally, sanction scholars have not only addressed the distributional effects of sanctions and their impact on opposition dynamics in the respective regimes, but also explored the varying

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17 This may also apply to more targeted measures, as outlined by Eriksson (2016, 213).
effect of different types of more or less economically costly sanctions. Minear et al. (1998, xxvi) suggest – citing the example of South Africa and the ANC – that smart sanctions can minimize a rally-around-the-flag effect by simultaneously isolating the leader and empowering the opposition. As targeted sanctions, at least theoretically, do not cause humanitarian harm they should not affect the opposition negatively in ways detailed above. In line with this argumentation, financial and other types of so-called smart sanctions, which directly target the assets and movement of elites, should have the greatest effect on autocratic leaders (Brooks 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2007). But if authoritarian regimes are destabilized by targeted sanctions because they ‘work by mobilizing internal opposition by key constituencies’ (Brooks 2002, 28) is not empirically tested; the studies’ depended variable is the success or failure of sanctions as such and not their impact on opposition mobilization.

This lead to two expectations about how the economic impact of sanctions may affect opposition movements:\textsuperscript{18}

1. Based on a deprivation-based explanation, an overall economic downturn in the country under sanctions should lead to an increase in opposition mobilization.

2. Following a grievance-based approach, increased socio-economic differences across certain groups or their augmented political discrimination should lead to heightened opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions.

While details on the operationalization of these two related, yet distinct concepts of deprivation and grievances will be provided in the following chapters, some initial thoughts of clarification shall be sketched here. In line with the previous discussion, it is assumed that socio-economic grievances result from existing or increasing group-related socio-economic inequalities. Feelings of socio-economic deprivation, in contrast, describe the potential (individual) reaction to a worsening socio-economic situation. The former requires detailed insights into which groups are affected by the sanctions’ economic consequences, and will thus be addressed in the case studies and their comparison whereas the more macro-level QCA can hardly account for it. Socio-economic deprivation, in contrast, can be captured via a proxy that accounts for the respective country’s overall socio-economic development in the Qualitative

\textsuperscript{18} Just like the following hypotheses, they are based on the ceteris paribus assumption. In other words, it is assumed that only the factor sanctions changes, while the context conditions remain constant. However, this strict assumption is relaxed in the case studies, which allow taking into account potential changes in the political, economic and societal context.
Comparative Analysis. Yet, the notion of deprivation will also be examined in the case studies, which allows specifying insights on deprivation-induced mobilization derived from the QCA.

Despite their intuitive appeal, however, grievance-and deprivation based explanations of opposition in regimes under sanctions have only received mixed empirical evidence. While some studies have suggested that inequality breeds political violence, others have not identified any statistically significant relationship (inter alia Lichbach 1989, 1998, 286ff; Schock 1996; Zimmermann 2011). Hence, sanctions do not necessarily fail because they exerted no economic pressure. Quite the contrary, ineffective sanctions often had a significant economic impact, which, however, failed to translate into political pressure (Kirshner 1997). Moreover, previous studies which did not find a relationship between sanctions’ economic cost to the target and outcomes such as leadership change (Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003; Marinov 2005) also call into question over-simplistic grievance- and deprivation-based explanations of how financial costs translate into political outcomes. Most prominently, Allen (2008b, 938) argues that the increase in anti-regime activity after the imposition of sanctions is much more pronounced in politically open regimes, which she interprets as evidence ‘most closely support[ing] the Political Opportunity Hypothesis’. In a similar vein, social movement scholars and conflict researchers alike have highlighted that sources of discontent are too common to reliably distinguish different patterns in the emergence of anti-government activity and identify the relatively small number of cases of mass mobilization (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Tilly 1978).

2.3.2. Political opportunity
The notion of political opportunity structures and political process theory were developed as a corrective to approaches that focused on the internal organization and strategies of movements while assuming that the political environment remains (relatively) stable. Political opportunity approaches could be characterized as supply-side explanations of political protest (Koopmans and Muis 2009), which are concerned with explaining variance in the timing, content and outcome of mobilization over time across different institutional contexts (Meyer 2004). They refer to exogenous factors that inhibit or enhance prospects for mobilization and thereby conceptualize the costs, possibilities and likely rewards of collective

19 While authors including Goodwin and Jasper (2003) treat political opportunity structure approaches and political process theory as two different yet related strands of research that both address the (political) environment that shapes mobilization, others (inter alia Kriesi 2004) regard political opportunity structures as a key concept of the more general political process approach.
activities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). In the following, I will first introduce the notion of political opportunity structure. In that context, I will show how the original concept was first expanded, and then again narrowed down in an attempt to clearly define this amorphous catchall term. Subsequently, theoretical propositions and empirical evidence of how political opportunity structures influence opposition mobilization will be sketched and applied to the study of opposition movements in regimes under sanctions, before finally presenting the theoretical expectations deduced from this.

The first to explicitly bring up the concept of political opportunity structures was Eisinger (1973). In his seminal study on why some American cities witnessed extensive riots addressing questions of race and poverty whereas others did not, he found that the ‘incident of protest [...] related to the nature of a city’s political opportunity structure’ (Eisinger 1973, 25). Building on Eisinger’s insights, Tilly (1978) offered a comprehensive theoretical framework according to which people generally abstain from protesting if routine avenues of access to the political system offer cheaper yet meaningful ways of influence or if state repression severely constrains movements in their capacity development. In contrast, limited, albeit existent spaces of toleration should result in widespread protest (see also Tilly 1995). This essentially describes the same curvilinear development of protest across different degrees of political freedom that Eisinger (1973) had observed.

The political process theory models likewise emphasize the interaction of social movements with their environment, but addresses social, organizational and cultural factors as part of this wider context. The pioneering study by McAdam (1982) examining the development of US black insurgency positions political process theory as an improvement vis-à-vis previous explanations of social movement mobilization that had stressed collective behavior and resource mobilization. At the same time, McAdam (1982, viii–xii) seeks to overcome what he describes as a problematic structuralist bias of political opportunity approaches. Despite these differences, both political opportunity approaches and political process theory conform in their delineation from resource- and deprivation-based explanations of social mobilization, as forcefully articulated by Tarrow (1994, 16–17, emphasis added): ‘people join in movements in response to political opportunities ... [E]ven groups with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in the movement’.

Departing from a relatively narrow understanding of political opportunity as being determined by the institutional setting, an increasing number of dimensions were added to the concept.
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Just to name a few examples, Oberschall (2000) considers the regime’s legitimacy as part of the political opportunity structure and Kriesi et al. (1995) include informal strategies and prevailing procedures of how to deal with challengers in their study. Further, Rucht’s (1996) conceptualization also comprises a state’s policy implementation capacity (for an overview of how different studies operationalize political opportunity structures, see McAdam 1996, 27). Such an expansion of the concept risks turning political opportunities into an amorphous catchall term, which ‘soaks up all aspects of the social movement environment [and] threatens to become and all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action’ (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 275; see also Sartori 1991). If political opportunity refers to an ever expanding list of factors influencing the chance for people to act together, the assertion that social movements emerge and persist if there are political opportunities available becomes tautological (Goodwin and Jasper 2003, 6).

In an attempt to overcome this conceptual vagueness, McAdam proposed a list of what in his view are ‘highly consensual’ elements of political opportunity, namely (a) the openness/closure of the institutionalized political system, (b) the (in-)stability of elite alignments, (c) the presence or absence of elite allies and (d) the state capacity and propensity for repression. The fact that this understanding of political opportunity is not even consistently employed in the edited volume where it is proposed, however, illustrates the failure to establish a consensual definition in an exemplary manner. As a consequence, one can only be ‘explicit about which dependent variable we are seeking to explain and which dimensions of political opportunity are germane to that explanation’ (McAdam 1996, 31 emphasis in the original). Accordingly, the understanding of political as it is applied in this study shall be sketched in the following.

Generally, scholars interested in cross-sectional or cross-national comparison have developed more restrictive models of political opportunity that emphasize stable and formal political structures (for example Della Porta 2006; Kitschelt 1986). Understood in this way, political opportunity structures are mostly institutional and slowly changing. Analysts conducting longitudinal studies of a specific movement, in contrast, have focused on more volatile aspects such as shifting degrees of elite support (for example McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994). Based on this differentiation, two slightly different conceptualizations of political opportunity will be mobilized for the QCA contrasting processes of mobilization in different countries on the one hand, and – more informal – power configurations among the elite on the other hand.

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20 In a very similar manner, Tarrow (1998) understands political opportunity structures are being determined by the political openness of the state and its capacity or willingness to repress on the one hand, and – more informal – power configurations among the elite on the other hand.
hand and the two case studies that attempt to understand variance in the degree and type of anti-government mobilization over time on the other hand. The fsQCA employs a narrow structuralist understanding of political opportunity limited to a political system’s degree of openness, which has been described as one of the ‘core elements of political opportunity’ (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1462; see also Kriesi 2004; Tilly 2009 who stresses that the form of oppositional discourse, practice and organization is shaped by the political institutions and regime in which it takes place). The case studies, in contrast, allow tracing more volatile elements such as shifts in elite alignments.

Regardless of how political opportunity is defined, it is as essential as difficult to specify the processes through which changes in opportunity presumably translate into mobilization (Goodwin and Jasper 2003, 11; Meyer 2004). As a result, political opportunity approaches often serve a heuristic function rather than offering causal explanations (Kriesi 2004). Nonetheless, certain ways of how political opportunity influence prospects for opposition movements may be specified. First, one needs to distinguish opportunities for mobilization from opportunities for influence (Meyer 2004). In line with the research question outline above, namely how sanctions enable or constrain opposition (and not how sanctions affect the ability of opposition movements to influence policy outcomes), I focus on political opportunities for mobilization. Second, Kriesi et al. (1995) remind us that the state can invite action by facilitating access, but it can also provoke action by threatening to constrain the leverage for social movement activity, thereby raising the future costs of present inaction. Mobilization may thus also occur in response to contracting rather than expanding opportunities (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). A case in point is democratization, which provides actors with new access but also take away energy from social networks (Roberts 1997, 139).

Most prominently, a state repression has been discussed as both inhibiting and encouraging mobilization. Intuitively, repression should have a negative impact on dissent (Hibbs 1973). It has the potential to reduce protest by rising the costs of participation for potential protestors, which should in turn reduce the population’s willingness to become engaged in movement activities (DeNardo 1985; Koopmans 1997; Muller and Weede 1990). Accordingly, reduced repression was shown to facilitate social movement initiation and activity (McAdam 1982; Skocpol 1979, 133–143). Alternatively, mass opposition may emerge despite or even in response to (increasing) repression. Repressive states are more vulnerable to civil resistance than it appears, as scholars tend to underestimate the ability of challenging groups to protest despite
heavy repression (Ackerman and Rodal 2008; Morris 2000). State-sponsored violence against dissidents may also radicalize individuals (Hirsch 1990; Opp and Roehl 1990) and thus backfire because it generates or facilitates large-scale mobilization (Hess and Martin 2006).

While some empirical studies find a curvilinear relationship between repression and political mobilization (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Muller 1985; Weede 1987) similar to the link between political openness and protest inter alia found by Eisinger (1973), others suggest that the impact of repression on protest may be both negative and positive (Rasler 1996), or non-existent (Gurr and Moore 1997). This is presumably because the discouraging impact of increased costs for the protestors is balanced out by the radicalization effect described above (Koopmans 1997). Going beyond this very blunt repression-protest nexus, a number of scholars have also examined how protestors change their tactics from violent to non-violent means when confronted with large scale repression (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998) and have explored the interdependent nature of protest and repression, arguing that ‘where protest leads to repression, repression also leads to protest and vice versa’ (Carey 2006, 9)

What does this mean for studying political opportunities for opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions? Paralleling the emphasis on political institutions and their openness in social movement research, sanctions scholars have increasingly acknowledged that the response to sanctions is moderated by the target state’s political context (Kirshner 1997). Most importantly, it appears that democracies are more likely to concede to external pressure (Allen 2005; Nooruddin 2002; for a diverging finding, see Hart 2000). Going beyond the link between sanctions effectiveness and regime type, some studies show how authoritarian and democratic leaders respond differently to pressures induced by various types of sanctions instruments: economically punishing sanctions such as comprehensive trade embargos are less likely to succeed against non-democracies, but appear to be effective against democracies. In contrast, targets sanctions like asset freezes and travel appear to work against authoritarian leaders (Brooks 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2007). With respect to protest, patterns of anti-government mobilization in regimes under sanctions appear to confirm classical political opportunity approaches: the predicted likelihood of demonstrations after the imposition of sanctions is smaller for authoritarian and democratic compared to hybrid regimes (Allen 2008b, 931). Lastly,

21 Studying the 1985 Columbia University divestment protest, Hirsch (Hirsch 1990, 244) confirmed previous assumptions that ‘protesters often respond to threats and repression by developing a greater willingness to ignore personal costs in favor of the collective struggle’.
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repression and human rights infringements appear to increase after the implementation of restrictive measures (Drury and Peksen 2012; Peksen 2009; Wood 2008).

Taking these insights about how political opportunity structures, particularly dimensions such as political openness and state repression affect social movements, how sanctions influence state-sponsored violence against political opponents and the varying degree of sanctions effectiveness when imposed on democracies and autocracies together, a nuanced picture of the political opportunity for opposition movements in regimes under sanctions emerges: First, both opportunity approaches stressing the positive role of political freedom on social movement activity and sanctions research about the greater effectiveness of sanctions imposed on democracies suggest the following theoretical hypotheses:

3. **Opposition movements in regimes under sanctions should rather be able to mobilize when enjoying a minimum degree of political openness.**

4. **State repression in regimes under sanctions can both successfully curtail and spur up opposition mobilization.**

In line with studies stressing the dynamic relationship between repression and protest (Carey 2006, 2009), both how regimes and movements adapt to international sanctions as well as the increase in state repression that they trigger needs to be traced over time. In addition, one should not only expect changes in the level of activity, but also changing tactics in response to varying degrees of political openness in regimes under sanctions.

Finally, the interplay between grievances and political opportunity is crucial. In contrast to past studies, which have treated political opportunity approaches and grievance-based explanations as two competing theories\(^{22}\), I propose to focus on the interplay of political opportunity structures and grievance-based mobilization in order to better understand opposition dynamics in regimes under sanctions. In doing so, I build on Schock (1996) who has also proposed a ‘conjunctural model of political conflict’ that examines how regime structures and political institutions moderate the translation of grievances into anti-government protest. In a similar vein, Van Dyke (2003) has found that political opportunity theory is useful for explaining student activism, but only when grievances are understood as elements of political

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\(^{22}\) Even Allen (2008, 938), who finds that the extent to which deprivation in regimes under sanctions triggers protest is mediated by political opportunity structures, ultimately considers deprivation and political opportunities as two distinct rather than complementary mechanisms for explaining protest in targeted regimes.
opportunity. The importance of grievances for explaining protest thus potentially complements rather than contradicts political opportunity approaches (Meyer 2004). This leads me to my fifth theoretical expectation, which – in contrast to the previous four hypotheses – formulates the conditions under which grievances/deprivation translate into opposition mobilization. This joint hypothesis hence reads as follows:

5. **Hence, the impact of sanctions on opposition mobilization should be most pronounced when such measures exacerbate or create grievances or feelings of relative deprivation in regimes where a minimum degree of political freedom exists.**

Despite the ability of political opportunity approaches to provide a framework for grasping contentious politics that sheds light at how regimes’ attempts to open or close the political space affects domestic opposition, the explanatory power of the political opportunity approach is limited. Rather than influencing mobilization because changes in institutional opening allow on-going mobilization efforts to proceed further, changing elite alignments, which have also been characterized as an important part of political opportunity structures as outlined above, may crucially affect mobilization through what has been described as a signaling effect (Tarrow 1996). Looking at people power movements, Tarrow (1994) convincingly argues that the political environment provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure. In that context, changing elite alliances and alignments send visible signals to potential protestors which ‘may have greater symbolic than substantive importance’ (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1467). Put differently, changes in the domestic or international environment, such as support by key domestic elites or international actors, may encourage previously uncommitted, but regime-critical citizens to use the political opportunities available for mobilization rather than creating institutional openings. Conceptualizing this as a mechanism of mobilization in its own right, Koopmans and Stratham (1999, 228) develop the notion of ‘discursive opportunity structures’ that influence the prospects for mobilization. In a similar manner, Hirshleifer (1995, 2001, 27ff) adds a third possible cause of mobilization to the predominant opportunity versus motive dichotomy. Such a distinction between structurally understood political opportunities and people’s perceptions of these opportunities (McAdam 1996, 25–26) points to a third potential mechanism of mobilization in regimes under sanctions.
2.3.3. Sanctions signals and the creation of perceived opportunities

Another strand of more qualitatively oriented research, which has developed predominantly, yet not exclusively, in isolation of the quantitative studies’ emphasis on the financial pain inflicted upon the targets, highlights the sanctions’ ‘symbolic’ (Doxey 1980, 10; Shambaugh 1999, 13), ‘signaling’ (Hart 2000, 280; Giumelli 2011) or ‘expressive’ (Galtung 1967, 412) properties and purposes as well as the ‘normative signals’ they convey (Biersteker 2016). The signals sent by sanctions may at times even be their most important objective (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Lopez and Cortright 1997; Cortright and Lopez 1995). Building upon these insights, Giumelli (2010, 2011) develops a three-fold typology, which distinguishes between sanctions coercing, constraining and signaling function. Signaling thereby describes the process of ‘sending a message to one or more targets’ both in the domestic and the international sphere (Giumelli 2011, 35). In addition to pleasing domestic audiences within the sender state, sending signals to the government, leadership or its family as well as key regime supporters in the target state or testing regional or global constituencies’ reaction to the messages conveyed by sanctions (Bentall 2016, 53), sanctions often serve as a tangible signal of support for opposition forces or withdrawal of support to the target state (Elliott 1998).

In contrast to past accounts of sanctions symbolism (Lindsay 1986; Morgan and Schwebach 1997), which are (implicitly) based on a problematic distinction between instrumental and signaling purposes of sanctions (see also Baldwin 1999, 102), Giumelli (2011, 35), acknowledges that sending a message can induce the target to change its behavior. This ‘symbolic or signaling purposes of sanctions may be less measurable (...), but they can be important to achieving the senders’ goals’ (Cortright and Lopez 2002, 16). In other words, the effects of naming and shaming through sanctioning are more than purely symbolic, but may have tangible impact on the target states’ polices (Biersteker 2012). International norms are key for signaling (Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 23). But how are the targets’ behavioral changes brought about, if not through incentivizing a regime to make concessions in order to avoid the material costs of sanctions?

Several case studies indicate that signals conveyed by sanctions may encourage the voicing and enacting of dissent (Baldwin 1985, 193; Crawford and Klotz 1999; Minear, Cortright, Wagler, 23

23 Interestingly, signaling is a particularly likely primary purpose of UN targeted sanctions that have the primary objective of democracy support and good governance (Bentall 2016, 54).

24 Moreover, past categories of different sanctions tended to confuse different levels of analysis by combining purposes (signaling versus coercing) with different means of influencing the targeted regime (for a pointed critique of these older classifications, see Bentall 2016, 42).
Lopez, and Weiss 1998). For example, the boycotts against Iran are said to have brought mental comfort to the discontented but passive groups inside Iran (Amuzegar 1997a). Likewise, the principal effect of the sanctions against South Africa was allegedly a psychological one of visibly displaying international support for respectively condemnation of various domestic actors (Levy 1999). While many studies claim that sanctions have encourage anti-regime activists, this potential mechanism of how sanctions work has not yet been sufficiently explored (see Grauvogel 2015 for the regime side of the equation). In the following, I propose a framework for exploring how messages sent by sanctions strengthen opposition movements, drawing on the notion of perceived opportunities.

At the most basic level, sanctions send important signal of political support to the opposition while simultaneously isolating the regime discursively (Taylor and Williams 2002, 555). This highly symbolic international action can reassure the domestic opposition. Rather than leading to concrete interventions into domestic conflicts on behalf of the opposition that influence the ‘objective’ possibility of success, sanctions enable opposition by creating perceived opportunities for anti-government mobilization. One of the key factors influencing citizens’ decision to engage in collective action is their perceived possibility of success or, on a more general level, the perceived usefulness of their activity (cf. Ginkel and Smith 1999). Sanctions influence these perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent in a two-fold way.

First, international sanctions are an opportunity for opposition movements to mobilize domestically because they can point to a potential ally. This line of reasoning asserts that sanctions signal opposition groups that other states seek policy change from the target (Peksen and Drury 2010). Anti-regime activist regularly interpret third party advocacy as providing additional legitimacy for their demands and activity (Schock 2004; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). International sanctions that convey signals of regime disapproval or opposition support constitute a highly visible form of third party advocacy or regime condemnation, which most targets prefer to avoid (Wallensteen 2016, 254). This may serve as an international stamp of approval for (would-be) protestors. Perceptions of opportunity created by displays of international support and attention may even trigger collective protest in the absence of the favorable structural conditions that the opposition can experience in regimes under sanctions. For instance, citizens took to the streets in Iran in 1977 because they saw greater opportunities
for successful protest than before, even though the monarchical regime at that time was in no way structurally more vulnerable (Kurzman 1996).

Second, and perhaps even more fundamentally, sanctions show that the international community has taken note of a certain situation. Sanctions draw attention to norm-violating states; a process that empowers and mobilizes protestors by showing that there is an – international – audience for their demands. ‘Movement activists are media junkies’ (Gamson 1995, 85), who deeply care about (international) reporting and attention. The importance of international conscious-raising for domestic opposition is also attested by the fact that international non-governmental organizations working on human rights often attempt to influence foreign countries to pay attention to their cause (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Murdie and Peksen 2013). If the imposition of sanctions is justified with reference to the same issues that anti-government activists criticize, this shows (potential) protesters that the international community perceives the very situation that they seek to address as problematic and thereby makes continued efforts at mobilization appear more meaningful.

However, sanctions signals have flopped in the past. For example, Grebe (2010) argues that the EU failed to communicate its objectives for sanctioning Zimbabwe to the population, which he attributes to the imposition documents’ vague wording. Likewise, Amuzegar (1997a) claims that the sanctions against the Iran failed because they were not universal, consistent, comprehensive and credible. Going beyond this anecdotal evidence, I integrate research on the effectiveness of signaling (Biersteker 2012; Giumelli 2011; Crawford and Klotz 1999) as well as the research on framing and social movements (Benford and Snow 2000) to explore when such signaling is more effective.

First, the signals conveyed by sanctions need to be convincing and strong. This is affected by the consistency of the message and the empirical credibility of the signal (Benford and Snow 2000; Biersteker 2012; Crawford and Klotz 1999; Giumelli 2011). Consistency describes the message’s internal congruency, which depends on the clarity of the implementation document(s) and particularly the justification for the measures given (Benford and Snow 2000, 620; Biersteker 2012; Doxey 1980). In addition, whether sanctions take immediate effect and whether follow up action such as benchmarks, expert panels and sanctions committees are implemented is key (Amuzegar 1997a; Bader and Faust 2014; Biersteker 2012).
The message’s *empirical credibility* refers to its resonance with the experiences and beliefs of the targeted audience. In framing research, it has been argued that certain signals – or frames in this case – rather convince the audience if they resonate with broader cognitive frames or ‘metanarratives’ (Benford and Snow 2000). In other words, there are broader discourses that enable particular arguments to be put forward in the sense that they provide a context of meaning that makes such arguments possible. Thus, sanctions signals would have to be consistent with broader assumptions and worldviews held by the targeted audiences. A sender’s rationale for implementing sanctions that entirely contradicts the population’s understanding of the realities in their country will most likely enjoy very limited resonance whereas sanctions signals should induce protest more effectively if ‘the opposition in the target state feels a *sense of common cause* (however vague) with the sender state’ (Allen 2008b, 919, emphasis added). Similarly, opposition support for sanctions is also discussed as having a positive impact on their ability to mobilize regime-critical actors (Weiss 1999, 502).

Taking these insights together leads me to the sixth theoretical expectation:

6. *I hypothesize that sanctions sending signals of regime disapproval as well as opposition support and/or addressing the same issues that (would-be) protestors are concerned with encourage opposition mobilization.*

In addition, sanctions signals can only shape dynamics of contention in the targeted regime if they reach their intended audiences. This requires the availability of communication channels between sender and target states below the level of the state. Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003) have forcefully argued the targeted regimes must be characterized by a minimum degree of political openness. Without freedom of speech and open media, signaling becomes less effective (Choi and James 2007). Beyond these broad structural preconditions, established social linkages may also help the sender to effectively transmit its message. (Quantitative) sanctions research has found that prior friendly political and economic relations between sanction senders and the targeted regimes increase the effectiveness of sanctions (Allen 2005; Drezner 1999; Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003) not least because the moral condemnation of the targeted regimes is more difficult to dismiss if the population strongly identifies with the sanctions sender (Galtung 1967, 399). Weak ties, in contrast, make it easier for a regime to

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25 The following reasoning has been also presented in the article ‘Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes’ (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014).
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discredit the senders and ultimately also the sanctions as such (Takeyh and Maloney 2011). This leads me to my seventh theoretical expectations:

7. Accordingly, sanctions signals should rather increase opposition mobilization if a certain degree of social linkage to the sender state(s) and/or political freedom exists.

The theory of opposition politics in regimes under sanctions has drawn on three basic approaches in the literature, namely the premises that grievances as well as deprivation increase protest, the idea that mobilization is shaped by political opportunity structures and the finding that third party signals affect the perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent. As a result, seven theoretical expectations were delineated, which will be further explored in the following chapters.

2.4. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, dispersed insights from both qualitative and quantitative sanctions research, which has not yet come up with consistent theorizing on how sanctions influence domestic opposition politics in the targeted regimes, has been combined with social movement theory to develop a framework for assessing how international sanctions affect opposition mobilization (see table 1 below).

Sanctions can affect domestic dynamics of contention through increasing grievances or by creating perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent if they send strong and convincing signals of opposition support and regime disapproval. Based on an understanding of these approaches as being complementary rather than competing, two conjunctural hypotheses have been formulated. Firstly, the impact of sanctions on opposition mobilization should be most pronounced when such measures exacerbate or create grievances or feelings of relative deprivation, albeit only in regimes characterized by a certain degree of political freedom. Secondly, the messages conveyed by sanctions only encourage opposition mobilization if a certain degree of political freedom and/or social linkage between the sender and target’s society allows for the signals to reach the intended audiences.

The theoretical framework developed here serves to structure the empirical analysis in the following chapters. As both parts of the empirical analysis differ with respect to the depths and widths with which the hypotheses are addressed, their operationalization is discussed
separately for the two parts. More precisely, the QCA relies on an operationalization of aspects deemed important for opposition politics in regimes under sanctions that allows covering all sanctions cases in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2011. In order to analyze the theoretical assumptions introduced above, political freedom, deprivation/grievances, the sanctions’ potential economic costliness as well as the signals they convey and the social linkage between the sanctions sender(s) and the targeted regimes’ society will be operationalized on the basis of existing datasets and additional coding efforts. This will serve to present general insights into the conditions under which sanctions enable opposition mobilization. In contrast, the case studies will serve to further analyze how very broad explanatory approaches such as perceived opportunities and deprivation/grievances influenced opposition mobilization against the backdrop of sanctions. In doing so, the case studies allow, for example, to understand how exactly the interplay between different conditions affects opposition mobilization and whether, for instance, an overall economic downturn in the country or increased socio-economic inequalities were crucial for deprivation/grievance related opposition mobilization.

Using a multi-method research design, the hypotheses will first be tested by means of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis in the next chapter, with special emphasis being paid to their conjunctural nature. Subsequently, a process-tracing analysis will be carried out for two case studies to be identified on the basis of the QCA. Based on interviews and other primary sources, how sanctions affected opposition movements in these particular countries will be reconstructed. While the focus will lie on contrasting results of the QCA with the evidence collected during field research, the case studies also serve to identify additional conditions that are crucial for understanding opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions.
Table 1: Summary of theoretical framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grievance-and deprivation based explanations</th>
<th>State of the art</th>
<th>Theoretical expectations</th>
<th>Social movement theory</th>
<th>Political opportunity structure concept</th>
<th>Signaling approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions research:</td>
<td>Costly sanctions are more effective</td>
<td>H1: An overall economic downturn in the country under sanctions should lead to an increase in opposition mobilization.</td>
<td>Socio-economic inequality leads to mobilization.</td>
<td>Sanctions are more successful against democracies.</td>
<td>Sanctions send signals of opposition support and regime disapproval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted regimes shield key supporters from sanctions' financial consequences.</td>
<td>H2: Increased socio-economic differences across certain groups or their augmented political discrimination should lead to heightened opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions.</td>
<td>Relative deprivation encourages protest.</td>
<td>Regimes under sanctions increase repression.</td>
<td>H3: Opposition movements in regimes under sanctions should rather be able to mobilize when enjoying a minimum degree of political openness.</td>
<td>Third party support creates perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movement theory:</td>
<td></td>
<td>H5: The impact of sanctions on opposition mobilization should be most pronounced when such measures exacerbate or create grievances or feelings of relative deprivation in regimes where a minimum degree of political freedom exists.</td>
<td></td>
<td>H4: State repression in regimes under sanctions can both successfully curtail and spur up opposition mobilization.</td>
<td>Movement activists care about (international) attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political opportunity structure concept</td>
<td>Sanctions research:</td>
<td>H6: Sanctions sending signals of regime disapproval as well as opposition support and/or addressing the same issues that (would-be) protestors are concerned with encourages opposition mobilization.</td>
<td>The institutional setting affects the degree and type of social movement activity.</td>
<td>H7: Sanctions signals should rather increase opposition mobilization if a certain degree of social linkage to the sender state(s) and/or political freedom exists.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions are more successful against democracies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Repression can both contain and increase political violence.</td>
<td>Sanctions send signals of opposition support and regime disapproval.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes under sanctions increase repression.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctions psychologically strengthen protestors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3. FUZZY-SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOBILIZATION UNDER SANCTIONS

A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) will be used to examine if opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions is attributable to socio-economic deprivation, political opportunities and/or the creation of perceived opportunities through sanctions signals. Following an overview of this comparably novel approach and its core characteristics, the operationalization of the theoretical propositions will be described in the second section of this chapter. This entails the introduction of a new dataset on sanctions against regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa and the calibration of the explanatory conditions. The third section will then present the results, which pass five fundamental robustness checks presented in the fourth section. Finally, two case studies will be selected on the basis of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

3.1. Introducing fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

When Charles Ragin introduced Qualitative Comparative Analysis with ‘The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies’ (1987), his intention, clearly stated in the title, was to bridge the divide between case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches that had shaped social science research over the past decades (Ragin 1987, 84).26 His ambitious goal to steer a middle path rested on two central pillars. On the one hand, QCA was introduced as an essentially case-based method. Each case is treated as a holistic entity characterized by a unique combination of different properties. Consequently, the whole case would change its features if one attribute was altered (Ragin 2000, 39). As a result, QCA focuses on the combination of attributes of the cases instead of looking at patterns of correlation between single variables (Ragin 2008). On the other hand, QCA is ‘concerned with the systematic matching and contrasting of cases to establish common causal relationships by eliminating all other possibilities’ (Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, and Ragin 2009, 2). QCA allows structuring the kind of interpretive dialogue between theory and evidence typically found in

26 Later, Ragin positioned himself more explicitly within the qualitative camp. The title of his second major QCA volume ‘Redesigning Social Inquiry’ (Ragin 2008) alludes to the seminal work ‘Designing Social Inquiry’ (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 3) that had become famous for claiming that qualitative and quantitative research shares the same ‘logic of inference’. In contrast, Ragin (2008) provides a substantive critique of this standard approach to social research – namely assessing the relative importance of single variables drawn from competing theories.
qualitative research through combining verbal statements with logical relationships (Fiss 2007). By extending Boolean algebra from the realm of logic to the task of causal interference, QCA formalizes the comparison of cases (Seawright 2005). In doing so, QCA enables the researcher to assess more than a couple of cases and to come up with more parsimonious explanations, which is rarely feasible in case-based studies (Rihoux and Marx 2013).

After its introduction in the late 1980s, QCA has diversified so that today it constitutes a family of tools rather than a single approach. Following Rihoux and Ragin (2009) as well as Schneider and Wagemann (2007), three different types can be distinguished: csQCA (with the ‘cs’ standing for crisp set) refers to the ‘original’ version based on a dichotomous operationalization of the conditions and the outcome developed by Charles Ragin (1987). Yet it has decreased in importance because it fails to adequately capture non-dichotomous conditions. The second type, mvQCA (with ‘mv’ being short for multi-value), stands for the approach that is based on multiple-category conditions. However, it has never become fully accepted because some argue that it is at odds with the set-theoretical nature of QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 260).

Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, in short fsQCA, describes the fuzzy-set variant. It is used in this dissertation because it allows for a more fine-grained operationalization of the conditions (for more details, see the section on the calibration of the conditions and the outcome below). As many researched phenomena and the indicators used to operationalize them do not fit into a dichotomous scheme, Ragin (2000) suggested using a more fine-grained, or what he called fuzzy, calibration to reflect their continuous nature. Thereby, it addresses the concern that csQCA falls short of adequately capturing more detailed information that is often available (Goldthorpe 1997). As set-theoretical relationships between fuzzy conditions are rarely perfect (Mahoney 2008), Ragin (2000) introduced the concepts of quasi-necessity and quasi-sufficiency to describe the relation between the (configurations of) conditions and the outcome.

This diversification of techniques notwithstanding, all types of QCA seek to integrate close-range studies building upon a proper classification of the cases with an algorithm-based analysis that identifies conditions leading to the outcome, thereby being less general than grand theories but possessing a higher degree of generalizability than idiosyncratic case studies (Lacey and Fiss 2009). This approach leads to a particular research process that will be shortly introduced in the following section. Special attention will be paid to steps of the
analysis that differ from logistic regression or case-based studies in order to familiarize the reader with the specific characteristics of QCA.

3.1.1. The three step process of conducting a Qualitative Comparative Analysis

After developing a theoretical framework, which is often narrowed down to ‘directional expectations’ rather than hypotheses (for example, Vis 2011), the analysis consists of three major steps, which are common to all three variants of QCA. Firstly, the data has to be transformed into set membership scores to be depicted in a data table. As outlined previously, each case displays a specific combination of attributes expressed as the set membership for each condition. This procedure of operationalizing the conditions, referred to as calibration in QCA, differs significantly according to the raw data and the number of cases. If qualitative information is used, the process may involve extensive coding work (Romme 1995) while the direct or indirect method of transforming this data into set membership values can be fruitfully applied if interval-scaled data is available (Emmenegger 2011). Regardless of the precise approach, ‘the calibration of (...) sets is a key operation, to be performed with great care’ (Ragin 2009, 93), particularly against the backdrop of the debate about the alleged coding sensitivities of QCA (Hug 2009; Lieberson 2004; Seawright 2005; Stockemer 2013; see Skaaning 2011 for a constrasting view)

Secondly, the data table is transformed into the so-called truth table containing one row for each logically possible combination of conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 103). Each case is then assigned to the row in which it has the highest membership. Such a truth table row may cover one, several or no empirically observable case(s). This procedure of constructing the truth table and solving possible contradictions that may arise, which was been described as a ‘back and forth between ideas and evidence’ (Ragin 1987, 93), synthesizes the data. In an analysis with 50 cases and 4 conditions, for example, a data table containing 50 rows would be reduced to a truth table of 16 rows containing all logically possible combinations of conditions.

Thirdly, the Boolean minimization of the previously compiled truth table is performed. Using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, the truth table is collapsed into a minimal formula explaining the outcome that is logically equivalent to the original truth table. Described less technically, a long expression of all possible combinations leading to the outcome is reduced to a more parsimonious one through the following procedure: if two expressions differ with respect to one condition but lead to the same outcome, then this divergent condition is considered to be
logically irrelevant for producing the outcome and will be eliminated (Ragin 1987, 93). For example, if two countries under financial sanctions aiming at democratization experience regime breakdown, but only one of them has dense trade ties to the sender of the sanctions, these economic linkages are considered to be logically irrelevant for explaining the outcome and hence do not become a part of the final solution formula.

3.1.2. Core characteristics and usefulness for research question
QCA is based on the idea that social science theory is better expressed in terms of set relations and set membership (Ragin 1987), which epistemologically and ontologically differentiates it from regression analyses that are based on a paradigm of singular causation and linear relationships (Mahoney 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; for a contrasting perspective, see Rohwer 2010). Rather than establishing the net effect of a single variable, QCA enables the researcher to identify complex and even seemingly contradictory patterns of causation (Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, and Ragin 2009; Ragin 2008, 176–190). QCA also reveals equifinality, meaning that various possible paths can lead to the outcome observed (Bennett and Elman 2006). In contrast to linear regression, QCA is particularly attuned to causal asymmetry (Thiem 2011), meaning that ‘variables found to be causally related in one configuration may be unrelated or even inversely related in another’ (Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings 1993, 1178).

Moreover, QCA allows identifying necessary and sufficient and well as INUS\(^{27}\) conditions based on its set-theoretical nature. A specific condition is necessary for outcome if the outcome does not occur without the presence of the condition, but the condition alone does not produce the outcome. Expressed in set-theoretical terms, a necessary condition is a superset of the outcome. In contrast, conditions are considered to be sufficient for the outcome if they are always present when the outcome occurs while other conditions may also produce the same outcome. Set-theoretically speaking, a sufficient relation means that the condition is a subset of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 56–65). QCA features nicely with standard political science intuitions about causal interference, which are often based on (implicit) statements about necessary or sufficient conditions (Goertz 2006) even though ideas of ‘sufficiency’ and ‘necessity’ cannot be captured using linear regression (Fiss 2007, 1183; Grofman and Schneider 2009, 662).

\(^{27}\) INUS conditions are an ‘insufficient but necessary part of a combination that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for explaining the outcome’ (Mackie 1965, 246).
Finally, QCA forces the researcher to explicitly address limited diversity, which constitutes one of the most understudied methodological challenges in social sciences (Schneider and Wagemann 2013). Theoretically possible but empirically not observable combinations of conditions, the so-called ‘logical remainders’, are explicitly detected with QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 151–160). Furthermore, the intermediate solution allows the researcher to address limited diversity with counterfactual reasoning that is based on theoretically-guided assumptions (Ragin 2008). This differs from both quantitative approaches, where unknown data is estimated or omitted and Mill’s method of difference or similarity, where not all logically possible combinations of conditions are captured in the analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 73-77; Vis 2012).

Despite vocal criticism (inter alia Braumoeller and Goertz 2000; Hug 2009; Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009), QCA has established itself as a viable method. Both the number of journals publishing QCA applications and the total number of QCA analyses appearing in peer reviewed journals, monographs and edited volumes has increased over the past 25 years (Rihoux, Álamas-Concha, Bol, Marx, et al. 2013). This expansion has indeed been so significant as to suggest that QCA has developed from a ‘niche to mainstream method’ (Rihoux, Álamas-Concha, Bol, Marx, and Rezöhazy 2013, 17). Beyond constituting a meaningful alternative for analyzing a medium to moderately large-N sample28, QCA is particularly suitable for addressing the previously developed research question on sanctions for three major reasons.

First, QCA develops a conception of causality that leaves room for complexity and seemingly contradictory patterns of causation (Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, and Ragin 2009; Rihoux 2003), which fits well with the theoretical expectations developed previously. With QCA, one can address the interplay between different conditions, which is oftentimes underexposed in comparative research (for example Schmitter 2009). While Allen’s (2008) research highlights

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28 In contrast to some justifications for using QCA based on the sample size (for example Vüllers 2013, 83), this should not be the most important concern when selecting a method (Vis 2012, 170). Initially, QCA was designed to analyze small to medium-N samples (Careja 2011; Ragin 2008) and also used almost exclusively for small universes of cases (Cooper and Glaesser 2010). However, the underlying notion of causality and the respective study’s approach to explanation should be crucial for making the decision to use QCA. A theory that is based on set-theoretical relationships cannot be measured against statements about correlations and vice versa (Ragin 2006; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Against this backdrop, the fact that the application of QCA increasingly encompasses ‘moderately large-N’ analysis (Vis 2012, 168) and even samples consisting of more than 500 cases (for example Lacey and Fiss 2009) shows that criteria other than the sample size are of key importance.
how sanctions and political openness of a target regime jointly lead to increased protest, regression analysis can hardly go beyond these two (or potentially three) way interactions, which are then also difficult to interpret (Fiss, Sharapov, and Cronqvist 2013; West and Aiken 1991; Wooldridge 2002, 190–191). Moreover, fsQCA allows assessing equifinality, meaning that various possible configurations can lead to the outcome observed. In contrast, sanctions research has often focused on the identification of a single condition, which has tended to ‘blind researchers and policymakers to the possibility that there can be substitutable causal processes at work’ (Allen 2005, 135).

Second, QCA also helps to understand multilevel phenomena by allowing for the possibility that conditions on one level, for instance the domestic one, may have a unique effect depending on their interplay with conditions at another level such as the international one. Research on the failure of sanctions to instigate democratization, which found that the nature of sanctions, sender-target relations and domestic features of the targeted regime interact (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014), suggests that such multilevel phenomena ‘can only be truly understood in relation to each other’ (Lacey and Fiss 2009, 25). One of the major advantages of QCA is that it is automatically creates fully interactive models (Lacey and Fiss 2009) that inter alia do justice to the fact that domestic and international conditions for explaining anti-regime activity in states under sanctions affect each other.

Third, QCA is a useful method for case selection as part of a nested research design. Despite assumptions about associations found with QCA to imply causation (Seawright 2005, 23) and the related reference to attributes of the cases as ‘causal conditions’ (inter alia Ragin 2000, 2013), QCA encounters the same problem as regression analysis: it cannot properly distinguish mere associations from causal relations (Cooper and Glaesser 2010). Hence, Maat (2011) and others suggest to further examine patterns identified with QCA by using process tracing or causal narratives. Scholars are encouraged not to become ‘QCA monomanic’ by proponents of the method (Ragin and Rihoux 2004, 6) and recent trends in QCA applications indeed point towards an increasing integration of QCA into multi-method research designs (Rihoux and Marx 2013). The goal of a configurational analysis is to help researchers make sense of their cases and hence does not disaggregate them into analytically separate variables. QCA analyses usually result in complex explanations and account for the individual cases under study (Vis 2012). By assigning cases to the configurations of conditions, crucial cases and combinations of conditions can be identified for more detailed follow-up studies (Romme 1995).
3.2. Operationalization

One of the major strengths of QCA is that it requires the researcher to carefully reflect and openly discuss any step of the operationalization procedure (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 20). In line with standards of good practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), the following sections will first introduce the compilation of the sample, before turning to the calibration of the conditions and the outcome.

3.2.1. The sample: A new dataset of sanctions against Sub-Saharan countries

The choice of the sample should be guided by the research question instead of being performed in a mechanistic fashion, for example through random sampling (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 23). Hence, the inclusion of every case – or more generally the criteria for the selection of (larger) samples – should be theoretically justified rather than being fixed in advanced (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). While certain categories such as states appear institutionally given, their precise delineation may nevertheless pose questions and thus needs to be justified (Ragin 2004) as it will become clear in the subsequent discussion about sanctions. In the case of conducting a QCA, the case selection is of particular importance for two major reasons: First, the choice of the sample requires particular attention because QCA as a case-driven approach tends to react sensible to the inclusion or exclusion of certain cases (for a good summary and response, see De Meur, Rihoux, and Yamasaki 2009, 155–157). Second, QCA results are usually only interpreted for the sample reviewed and may or may not be generalizable for a larger universe of cases.

The sample for this dissertation consists of all episodes of sanctions by the EU, the US, the UN and (sub-)regional organizations against countries in Sub-Saharan Africa implemented during the period between 1990 and 2011 (for more details on the temporal and regional scope, see below). In order to compile the sample, the empirically and theoretically contested concept of sanctions will be defined in a first step. The next section addresses the question why the analysis is limited to sanctions against countries in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2011. Finally, key features of the sample will be sketched.

SANCTIONS

Most scholars working on sanctions struggle to define them. The UN Charter defines sanctions as ‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ (UN Charter Art. 41). Examples given in that particular article include the ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations’. These
examples point to the type of sanctions that feature most prominently in research, namely economic coercion. In their seminal book, Hufbauer et al. (1990, 2) accordingly define economic sanctions as ‘the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal of customary trade or financial relations’. Their understanding of sanctions has profoundly influenced the literature (Eriksson 2011, 13), but more recent developments in the policy realm as well as advances in the study of sanctions suggest the need to reconsider certain elements of this standard definition. Generally speaking, I take into accounts all types of both economic and non-economic restrictive measures usually defined as sanctions while excluding threats, as I will explain in the following.

Taking into account the debate about the symbolic meaning of sanctions, the focus on economic coercion – through the reduction or termination of trade and financial relations – is questionable. From the onset, sanctions research has not only analyzed the financial pain inflicted upon the target (for example, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990 who estimate the cost to the target), but also suggested that the international disapproval of the regime conveyed through sanctions plays a key role (for example, Galtung 1967). More recently, the debate about the signals sent by sanctions has regained salience. Cortright and Lopez (2002, 16) highlight that ‘the symbolic or signaling purposes of sanctions may be less measurable than instrumental goals, but they can be important to achieving the sender’s goals and may even contribute to instrumental objectives’. Subsequently, Giumelli (2010, 2011) developed the analytical framework for assessing the signaling function of sanctions described above. He stresses that in addition to coercing a target into compliance or constraining it, sanctions send a message to targets and audiences without necessarily causing direct material damage. Taking these insights together, sanctions that may convey a powerful message, but potentially have limited economic impact, such as the suspension of membership in an international or regional organization as well as diplomatic sanctions29, will be included in the sample.

Being closely related to the question of which measures should be regarded as international sanctions, the concept of aid sanctions deserves further consideration. Aid sanctions denote the withholding or suspension of development assistance ‘in situations of perceived violations of human rights, lack of progress towards democratization or state corruption’ (Crawford 1997, 70; see also Hansen and Borchgrevink 2006). The research on aid sanctions (Crawford 2001;
Crawford 1997; Hansen and Borchgrevink 2006; Knack 2004; Nielsen 2013) points to the real world importance of this phenomena. Moreover, and even more importantly, the rationale behind development aid suspension is very similar to that of sanctions, including the attempt to convey a signal of public condemnation regarding the target state’s political leadership (Portela 2010a, 33). Therefore, the withholding or suspension of development aid in response to an undesired behavior of the targeted state will be considered as an instance of international sanctions.

Relatedly, it remains controversial whether measures imposed in the same issue area that they seek to address, especially the suspension of preferential access to domestic markets in response to trade disputes and the like, fall under the convention ‘political science’ notion of sanctions. While certain datasets comprise such trade disputes (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014; Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009), there are also good reasons to exclude them (von Soest and Wahman 2015a) as they follow different logics. Lastly, the question of who can be the target of such measures has gained importance with the increasing use of such measures against non-state terrorist groups to deprive them of funding and freedom of movement (Dashti-Gibson and Lopez 2000). Without neglecting their importance, they are excluded from the sample because measures that do not seek to punish the regime but instead target, for example, terrorist groups, should have different repercussions for domestic opposition movements. In addition, most quantitative datasets exclude them as they allegedly follow a somewhat different logic (for example Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014).

The Hufbauer et al. (1990) definition underlines that sanctions may also include the threat to withdraw or withhold trade and financial relations. A number of studies do not only highlight that different dynamics are at play when sanctions are being threatened (Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Morgan 2012; Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005; Parker 1999), but also suggest that sanctions are more likely to succeed at the threat stage (Lacy and Niou 2004; Drezner 2003). Hence, a ‘satisfactory data set should also include cases where sanctions were threatened but were not imposed’ (Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005, 483). In order to account for the importance of sanction threats, which had previously been treated as non-events, Morgan et al. (2006) compiled the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset (TIES). However, gathering information of sanction threats is extremely challenging. The first version of the TIES dataset, for example, did not contain any episode level information on threats, but merged them into a country case format, which was considered to be less mistake-prone (Morgan,
Krustev, and Bapat 2006). While the new, extended version of the TIES dataset has corrected many of the former shortcomings (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014), the difficulty to identity all threats remains. For instance, TIES does not report any sanction threats against Zimbabwe after 1986, whereas both US sanctions and EU sanctions implemented in 2001/2002 were clearly preceded by threats issued by high-ranking officials of the US, the EU and individual member countries30. As QCA relies on a carefully sampled universe of cases as well as good case knowledge (Vüllers 2013, 92), which cannot not be ensured in the case of sanctions threats, it was decided that episodes of sanction threats will not be included in the sample.

Moreover, sanction threats may be less relevant from a theoretical and empirical perspective than suggested by the studies indicating a higher probability of success for imposed as opposed to threatened sanctions. Hovi and Sprinz (2005, 284–285) convincingly argue that for sanctions threats to exercise any meaningful impact, they must meet three criteria: First, the threat must be perceived as credible by the targeted regime. Second, it must be deemed sufficiently potent. Third, it has to be considered non-contingent, meaning that it must go together with a convincing promise that the threatened sanctions will be imposed if the target complies. Based on case specific evidence as well as the information about sanction threats obtained from the TIES dataset, it appears highly unlikely that these conditions are met. Thus, it appears permissible to exclude threats from the sample based on considerations about its theoretical and empirical relevance and practical issues about the lack of reliable data.

Building upon on these considerations, sanctions are defined as government-led restrictions implemented to promote political objectives vis-à-vis other states. Government-led, in this context, is understood in broad terms to also include sanctions that are imposed by multiple governments under the auspices of (sub-)regional or international organizations. Following this definition, certain events do not form part of the sample. Sanctions directed towards non-state actors in civil wars, terrorists or other individuals and entities not associated with a

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30 Before the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) eventually came into effect on 21 December 2001, it had been debated in Congress for over half a year. When the US Senate passed ZIDERA on 1 August 2001, with the approval of the House of Representatives still uncertain, Mugabe reacted angrily to this sanction threat (Panapress 2001). Likewise, the European Union issued various threats to impose restrictive measures on Zimbabwe before the sanctions were actually implemented. These threats became increasingly precise both with respect to the measures threatened and the behavioral changes aimed at. In October 2001, the EU warned the ZANU-PF regime to stop the harassment of the political opposition and allow the EU election observer mission. Shortly afterwards, a EU foreign ministers meeting specified that the potential measures would include travel bans and aid cuts (BBC 2002; The Telegraph 2002).
government are excluded (see also Portela and von Soest 2012). In a similar manner, sanctions against states where the central authority had completely collapsed prior to the application of sanctions are not included\(^{31}\), but the sample includes episodes in which central state authority was exercised at the time of imposition and only collapsed later (US sanctions against Somalia that began in 1989). Information on whether a minimum level of effective government existed at the time of sanctions imposition is obtained from the *State Fragility Index* (Marshall and Cole 2011). Moreover, measures of commercial defense imposed under the WTO framework are excluded, as the imposition of these measures follows a trade policy rather than a political rationale (for a different approach, see Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009). Finally, the focus on *restrictions* excludes so-called positive sanctions. Rewards such as, for example, development cooperation conditioned upon certain democratic governance or economic reforms can also be applied to incentivize a certain behavioral change on behalf of the target. However, the exclusion of positive sanctions from the definition and dataset is fully in line with the conceptualization of other major datasets, which are also confined to negative sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan et al. 2014).

**INTRODUCING THE DATASET**

I will focus on sanctions issued by the EU, the US, the UN, and (sub-)regional organizations. The EU and US are taken into account because – despite the increase in regional sanctions – they still constitute the most important sanctions senders for this region: 46 out of 75 sanctions episodes were initiated by these bilateral and plurilateral senders as opposed to only 29 multilateral sanctions episodes. In the 1990s, the US and its allies became far more assertive in actively promoting democracy at the global level (Burnell 2000; Carothers 1999). In doing so, the EU and the US have increasingly implemented sanctions to promote human rights and good governance (Cox and Drury 2006)\(^{32}\). Moreover, sanctions have become a major foreign policy tool of regional organizations. In addition to the UN still being the most important multilateral sanctions sender, the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs), namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC, increasingly impose sanctions within the emerging framework of cooperation in peace and security issues on the continent (Charron and Portela 2016; Eriksson 2010; Magliveras 2011).

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31 This applies for UN sanctions against Somalia that were imposed in 1992.
32 As other Western sanctions senders such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Switzerland usually follow the lead of the US and EU both in terms of timing and the measures imposed (see dataset described by Morgan et al. 2014), these sanctions senders are not incorporated separately.
Regional sanctions regularly focus on the unconstitutional accession of power (Charron and Portela 2016, 108; Witt 2012a, 2012b). Taken together, these countries and organizations constitute the most important senders of sanctions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Based on these criteria, the sample was compiled as follows: A new dataset of EU, US and UN sanctions against non-democratic regimes between 1990 and 2010 (Portela and von Soest 2012) was used as the point of departure. It has made major advances over existing datasets because (a) the goals of the sanctions senders are defined explicitly and (b) the beginning and end of the sanctions episode was cross-validated with the help of different sources (von Soest and Wahman 2015a). Subsequently, information on UN, EU and US sanctions against democratic regimes, sanctions that began in 2011 and regional sanctions was added to the Portela and von Soest dataset to arrive at a complete sample of all EU, UN, US and regional sanctions between 1990 and 2011 for the fsQCA. In accordance with the new dataset’s codebook, data about these episodes was obtained from the websites of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, the US State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the European Union External Action Service. This was complemented by information contained in the Hufbauer et al. (2007) and the TIES datasets (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014)33. Further bibliographic sources include Charron (2011), Crawford (2001; 1997), Portela (2010a), Reynolds and Wan (2012) and Taylor (2010). Regional sanctions were identified on the basis of key publications (Charron 2013; Grauvogel, Newbery, and von Soest 2013; Magliveras 2011). The final sample consists of 75 sanction episodes (see Table 2 below).

REGIONAL AND TEMPORAL SCOPE
The analysis is geographically confined to Sub-Saharan Africa. QCA requires intimate case knowledge (Schneider and Wagemann 2010) or at least a sufficient familiarity with the different types of cases (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 24–25), which is more likely to be attained if the cases are located in a single region that is characterized by certain similarities with respect to the characteristics of sanction episodes (Charron 2013). Beyond such practical considerations, the focus on Sub-Saharan Africa is a promising avenue of research for the following reason: While more direct means of influence such as democracy promotion (Burnell 2000; Levitsky and Way 2006) and more indirect mechanisms such as diffusion and contagion

33 Unfortunately, the databases compiled by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (see Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho 2016) were not yet available when work on this dissertation began.
(inter alia Brinks and Coppelged 2006; Elkink 2011; Gleditsch and Ward 2006) play a role globally, the political space in Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly shaped by international actors’ interventions as well as the norms and discourses they promote, not least due to its aid-dependency (Young 1996). Accordingly, opposition parties and regime-critical movements are confronted with multiple external influences, with international sanctions being an increasingly important factor after the end of the Cold War (Cortright and Lopez 2000).

Furthermore, the fsQCA is temporally confined to the period from 1990 to 2011. After the end of the Cold War, both the frequency with which sanctions are used and their design has changed significantly (see also von Soest and Wahman 2015a). Due to the dramatic increase in the implementation of international sanctions, the 1990s were described as the ‘sanctions decade’ (Cortright and Lopez 2000). In response to the devastating humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions, especially those against Iraq (1990-2003), the instrument of targeted sanctions was then increasingly applied (Drezner 2011; Eckert, Biersteker, and Tourinho 2016, 2).

A series of international conferences (Interlaken 1998/99, Bonn-Berlin 1999/2000, Stockholm 2002) dealt with the opportunities of so-called smart sanctions (for an overview, see Biersteker, Eckert, Halegua, and Romaniuk 2005; Eckert, Biersteker, and Tourinho 2016, 4). Such targeted or smart sanctions are based on the assumption that specific individuals or groups of individuals can be targeted by tailor-made instruments (Major and McGann 2005), which requires identifying the strategically relevant groups and to focus on the internal power relations within the targeted regimes (Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). The extended use and development of different sanctions instruments results in a focus on the particularly interesting period from 1990 to 2011.

UN, EU, US AND UN SANCTIONS AGAINST SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES 1990-2011

The sample (see Table 2 below) consists of 75 sanction episodes. An episode is characterized by the same sender and goals, i.e. if the sender or the stated goal completely changes this would constitute a new episode (Portela and von Soest 2012)\(^3\). It ends when sanctions are lifted or the

\(^3\) A new episode based on a changed goal would have only been calibrated when the new goal was entirely different, but not when further goals were added to an existing sanctions regime. Due to this high threshold, sanctions episodes were effectively not differentiated on the basis of changed goals for the regional sub-sample covered here whereas the von Soest and Portela dataset (2012) in fact subdivides some sanctions regimes into different episodes on the basis of changed goals, for example the one against Yugoslavia. This approach hence diverges from Eriksson (2011), where new episodes are identified on the basis of changes in sanctions’ purposes, types, targets or contexts and are thus more fine-grained. The EU measures against Zimbabwe, for instance, are subdivided into a total of nine
goal changes. 17 episodes or almost a quarter where initiated by regional organizations, with all but 3 episodes taking place in the 2000s. The UN has implemented 12 sanction regimes against Sub-Saharan countries, whereas the EU and US account for 23 sanction episodes each. Two thirds of all EU restrictive measures were stand-alone aid sanctions. In contrast, the US only used aid sanctions as a single tool in four cases, and usually employs a wider range of measures simultaneously, including the interruption of military cooperation, aid sanctions, flight bans, visa restrictions and asset freezes. UN sanctions usually consist of an arms embargo, later often followed by measures against individuals including travel bans and asset freezes (see also Charron 2013).

Table 2: Sample of sanctions episodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Goal(s)</th>
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episodes. Such an understanding of episodes, however, would have inflated the sample (too much) for the QCA. Moreover, there are many continuities across episodes within country cases (Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 18). Using the more fine grained measures suggested by Eriksson and applied by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium would have entailed problems for the purpose of this analysis, as many episodes are not independent of each other (Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 18), which would have artificially boosted the QCA goodness of fit measures. 35 As different sanction goals were shown to profoundly affect the impact of sanctions on targeted regimes (von Soest and Wahman 2015a), it appears insightful to distinguish between different episodes implemented by the same sender, but aiming a different goals.
3. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Anti-Government Mobilization under Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
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### Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Anti-Government Mobilization under Sanctions

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Furthermore, the sanction episodes are characterized by a varying duration. While regional sanctions tend to be relatively short-lived, with an average duration of less than three years, which is still disproportionately driven by two longer episodes of sanctions against Sierra Leone and Liberia, some of the UN, US and EU measures were maintained significantly longer. Whilst the EU restrictive measures issues against Equatorial Guinea in 1992, which are still ongoing, constitute an upper outliner, durations of several years or even more than a decade, like in the case of Zimbabwe, are fairly common.

Finally, the episodes also differ in terms of the goals pursued by the sanction senders. The pattern that sanctions in the post-Cold War period increasingly aim at democratization (von Soest and Wahman 2015a) also proves true for Sub-Saharan Africa. In 34 episodes, or more than half of the cases, the major goal is a return to constitutional rule or democratization (inter alia expressed through demands for greater respect for political rights, good governance and the conduct of free and fair elections). The EU, US and regional organizations initiated almost all episodes of sanctions aiming at democratization as the UN shall not ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ according to article 2 of the Charter.

3.2.2. Calibration of the conditions and the outcome
In the following, I will introduce the five conditions that were identified to examine the theoretical propositions on opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions introduced in the previous chapter. The sanctions’ intensity and a condition capturing the country’s socio-economic situation serve to examine deprivation-based explanations. As detailed in the theory chapter, both increases in group-based grievances and individual socio-economic deprivation may enhance anti-regime mobilization in countries under sanctions. Yet, examining the former mechanism requires detailed information on how sanctions precisely affect the socio-economic well being of different politically salient groups within the targeted state, which is not available for all countries examined here. In consequence, the fsQCA will focus on socio-economic deprivation that can be operationalized via information of the respective country’s overall economic development in the way described below. Two further conditions depicting the coherence of the messages conveyed by sanctions as well as the communicative linkage between the sanctions sender and the targeted regime’s society address the signaling impact of sanctions while a fifth and final condition captures political freedom as an intervening factor.
Before discussing the operationalization of the individual conditions and the outcome, the general approach towards calibration will be sketched. Calibration describes the procedure of transforming information into measures that are directly interpretable. As highlighted previously, transforming the available data into set memberships is crucial in Qualitative Comparative Analysis. This study uses fuzzy sets, which were introduced to social sciences by Smithson (1987). A fuzzy set has qualitative boundaries like a crisp set, but variation between these two end points by scaling the degree of membership in the interval from 0 to 1 (Verkuilen 2005). The calibration of fuzzy sets is based on qualitative anchor points (Ragin 2008, 90), with 0 denoting full non-membership (or exclusion from a set), 1 indicating full membership (or inclusion), and 0.5 marking the cross-over point, which distinguishes cases that are more in the subset from those that are more out (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 14). Below, I employ a four-value scheme using the numerical values 1, 0.66, 0.33 and 0, which stand for ‘fully out’, ‘more out than in’, ‘more in than out’, and ‘fully in’, respectively (Ragin 2009).

If interval-scaled data is available, I employ indirect method of calibration, which represent significant progress with respect to the creation and calibration of sets (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 36). The technical details, which I sketch in the following, are provided in Ragin (2008). Most importantly, the method is still driven by qualitatively locating the anchors in order to avoid the temptation to use the software packages in a mechanistic fashion (Emmenegger 2011). This does not only require setting the threshold for the cross-over point 0.5 on the basis of theoretical and case specific knowledge as well as empirically observable specificities (Emmenegger 2011; Freitag and Schlicht 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2006), but may also involve the adjustment of thresholds (Verkuilen 2005). When meanings differ across contexts, for example because the notion of a low, medium and high income varies in different regions, some kind of expert adjustment becomes necessary (Teune and Przeworski 1970).

Despite major advances, the direct method of calibration still suffers from a number of shortcomings: The procedure suggested by Ragin for calibrating the membership scores and applied in this analysis is mathematically incapable for producing scores of exactly 1 or 0, as this would require positive or negative infinity. Accordingly, scores greater than 0.95 can be considered as full membership and those below 0.05 as full non-membership (Ragin 2007). Moreover, the choice of the logistic function used for assigning the scores was criticized as being insufficiently justified, with other forms appearing equally plausible (Thiem 2010).
However, the resulting differences in membership scores are negligible and fsQCA results are robust with respect to such minor changes in the calibration (Emmenegger 2011). Finally, it is important to bear in mind that this procedure produces very fine-grained values indicating a level of precision that may beyond empirically observable information (Emmenegger 2011). Fuzzy values should thus be interpreted in line with qualitative criteria for set memberships established previously. For each of the conditions, the operationalization of the concept they capture, the data used for calibration and the assignment of fuzzy membership scores will be outlined in the following.

SANCTIONS INTENSITY (SINTENSITY)
In line with traditional theories of economic sanctions, the pain inflicted upon the target state translates into political pressure because a certain level of deprivation induces citizens to challenge the regime (Kerr and Gaisford 1994). Large-N research on sanctions has indeed consistently identified the economic costs of sanctions as one of the most important factors explaining their effectiveness (for example, see Allen 2005; Drury 1998; Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007; Nooruddin 2002). The operationalization takes into account the strength of measures and whether a specific measure is implemented in conjunction with other ones. While this essentially means that an input measure, namely sanctions intensity, is used to capture an output, i.e. the sanctions impact of popular deprivation, this approach is not only in line with previous sanctions research discussed above, but its is also supplemented by another output measure introduced below, namely GDP growth.

Based on the extended version of the new global dataset of sanctions against authoritarian regimes introduced earlier, the calibration distinguishes between comprehensive and targeted sanctions to determine the crossover point of 0.5. Targeted sanctions comprise those measures that focus on a specific group of individuals or a particular economic sector, including all blacklist based sanctions (visa bans, asset freezes), diplomatic sanctions and sanctions targeting the military sector (arms embargos, interruption of military cooperation). In contrast, comprehensive sanctions target the economy as a whole, consisting of measures such as flight bans, financial sanctions, commodity embargos as well as comprehensive trade embargos and aid sanctions (expect for a few cases which are explicitly discussed as only having a weak overall impact in the literature, see Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007 on Guinea-Bissau; Portela 2010b, 132–142 on Guinea and Comoros).
3. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Anti-Government Mobilization under Sanctions

All types of targeted sanctions constitute full non-membership. Accordingly, asset freezes, visa bans and other individual-based travel restrictions, diplomatic sanctions as well as interruption of military co-operation were assigned the membership score zero\textsuperscript{36}. Arms embargos, which possibly also affect other sectors of the economy, are calibrated as 0.2. Arms embargo jointly imposed with other targeted measures and the few instances of weak aid sanctions described above are calibrated as 0.4. A comprehensive trade embargo or a commodity embargo is interpreted as full membership. In addition, aid sanctions (calibrated as 0.6) as well as flight bans and financial sanctions (calibrated as 0.8) are assigned to the high membership subset (see Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 27 for a similar understanding of the degree of discrimination ranging from individual sanctions over diplomatic measures, arms embargos, commodity sanctions, flight bans and financial sanctions to comprehensive trade embargos).

34 sanction episodes belong to the high intensity subset while 41 sanction episodes are characterized by a comparably lower intensity (see Appendix C). In terms of extreme scores, 16 episodes are attributed a fuzzy set value of 0 whereas only 6 episodes have a fuzzy score of 1, with 5 of them stemming from the 1990s (Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan). This shows that the calibration adequately reflects the tendency to move away from comprehensive trade embargos towards targeted measures, which are less devastating for the population or economy as a whole (Lopez and Cortright 2002).

COHERENT SIGNALS (GOALS)
The message transmitted by sanctions plays an important role. Generally, sanctions effectiveness was found to depend on the demands voiced by the sender, with success being less likely for sanctions requesting major policy change (Cooper Drury and Li 2006; Drezner 1998, 1999; Hart 2000; Lektzian and Souva 2003). In relation to opposition movements, the signal sent by sanctions rather than the size of the demand is crucial. Sanctions that communicate regime disapproval (Baldwin 1999; Schwebach 2000) and opposition support (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992) send more coherent messages of encouragement to opposition actors, which should increase the effectiveness of the ‘communication factor’ of sanctions (Doxey 1972, 535). It seems plausible that opposition movements are empowered when the goals of the senders and those of domestic opposition movements are compatible, as this would make for a more effective signal.

\textsuperscript{36}In line with the necessity to adjust thresholds to make them adequate for the sample under review described above, zero should thus not be interpreted as constituting no sanctions, but represents the lowest empirically observable intensity within the sample.
I use the new sanction dataset’s information on the goals of the senders of sanctions and code the movements’ goals as specified in more detail below. The condition assesses whether the goals of the sanction senders and those of the major opposition movements overlap. According to the updated and extended version of the new dataset on sanctions (Portela and von Soest 2012), the following goals of sanction sender are differentiated: restoration of the constitutional order (CO), democratization (DM), human rights support (HR), fight against narcotics (NR), end or reduce nuclear proliferation (NW), termination of armed conflict and/or the establishment of peace agreements (PC), and fight against terrorism (TR). The nature of the goals is recorded as formulated by the senders in the imposing documents and relevant statements.

Subsequently, the goals of opposition movements in the targeted regimes have to be identified. The goals of opposition movements were coded following the scheme applied for the sanction sender goals, but as domestic opposition movements’ claims making is based on different rationales, some categories were added to accommodate for all major goals identified. This gave the following list of opposition movement goals: restoration of the constitutional order (CO), control over resources (CR), democratization (DM), human rights support (HR), military victory (MV), termination of armed conflict and/or the establishment of peace agreements (PC), and policy changes (P), regime change (RC). The question then arises which opposition movements’ goals should be identified. Domestic dynamics of contention are oftentimes characterized by different and not necessarily coherent claims making by different groups opposed to the government, including opposition parties, civil society movements, rebel groups or other types of actors. Hence, ‘major opposition movements’ had to be identified in a first step, as these are the most likely actors to serve as a focal point for the

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37 These are Common Positions or decisions according to article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement in the case of EU sanctions, Security Council resolutions for UN sanctions, executive orders respectively Congressional legislation in the case of US sanctions as well as decisions by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU) or the heads of states and governments (EOWAS and SADC sanctions).

38 As the theoretical section of the dissertation will contain a longer section that problematizes the notion of ‘opposition movements’, the discussion here focuses on the operationalization for the fsQCA, which is necessarily limited in its ability to reflect complex domestic dynamics in 75 cases. Crucial regime-critical actors beyond the ‘major opposition movements’ identified for the QCA are addressed in the case studies.
mobilization of anti-regime activity. This was done on the basis of a systematic review of the Africa Yearbooks and secondary literature (see Appendix A).

Second, the major opposition movements’ goals were coded on the basis of information contained in the Hufbauer et al. (2007) dataset, the Africa Yearbooks and country specific literature (see Appendix A). The low subset comprises cases characterized by a low overlap of goals either because the goals are incompatible, for instance when an armed opposition movement aims at regime change through a military victory whereas the sanction’s goal is to immediately terminate bellicosities or because they seek to achieve entirely different issues (fight against narcotics vs. democratization). In contrast, the high subset includes the universe of episodes in which the goals of the sender and the opposition movements converge, for example because the movement aims at improving the rights for a specific group while the sanction senders demand an improvement of the overall human rights record, or are identical, which leads to the following set memberships:

- 0 = contradictory goals
- 0.33 = different, but not necessarily contradictory goals
- 0.66 = predominantly compatible goals
- 1 = same goal(s)

Based on this calibration (see Appendix A), 52 cases are characterized by entirely identical or very similar goals of the major sanction senders and opposition movements. In addition to this being driven by regional sanctions, which predominantly aim at a restoration of constitutional order and whose overwhelming majority was implemented after coups (Witt 2012a, 2012b) – a situation in which the opposition usually also demands the holding of free and fair elections and/or a return to the constitutional order – this also highlights the important interplay between messages convey by sanction senders and domestic claims-making.

COMMUNICATIVE LINKAGE (CLINKAGE)
Specifying the impact of signals conveyed by sanctions on domestic dynamics of contention, Galtung (1967) already suggested more than four decades ago that a regime’s moral condemnation is more difficult to dismiss if a strong identification with the sender of sanctions exists. Likewise, Levitsky and Way (2006, 2010) show that linkage – understood as the density

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39 While this may appear rather problematic in theory, the Africa Yearbooks clearly points to major groups challenging the regime or its policies so that the identification of major opposition groups based on empirical information is feasible.
of ties and cross-border flows between two parties – increases the prospects of democracy promotion effects. While their suggested operationalization includes economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational relations between the respective countries or regions, the aspect of social linkage appears to be most relevant to capture Galtung’s (1967) notion of identification and communication with the sanction sender. Theoretically, a number of different – and potentially more viable – indicators could be combined to reflect the degree of social linkage between the sender of sanctions and its target, including the presence of a diaspora population in the sender state, outbound educational mobility to the sender state and the number of citizens from the target and sender state visiting the other country, which would also be hard to operationalize in the case of multilateral sanctions. Unfortunately, this data is only available for some of the countries included in the sample. In response, social linkage was conceptualized as potential cross-border communication (Levitsky and Way 2010, 374), measured as the average internet access per 1,000 inhabitants in the period from 1995 to 2012 (see also Grauvogel and von Soest 2014).

According to the World Development Indicators, 1995 is the first year when Internet access was reported for a meaningful number of countries. The average of the entire period was used in order to reduce a potential bias for sanction episodes during the early 1990s, when Internet access was low to non-existent and these cases would hence also receive a low score for communicative linkage if only the sanctioned period was taken into account. Generally, cases that receive high linkage scores using the Internet access per 1000 inhabitants as a proxy for linkage would also receive high values in the early 1990s if other means of communicative linkage such as cross-border postal services were used as the basis for calibrating linkage. For example, Kenya and Zimbabwe, which both receive some of the sample’s highest linkage scores using internet users as a proxy, would also exceed almost all countries from the sample (including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia and Malawi) if landlines per 100 inhabitants as a potentially more viable proxy for the 1990s was used (World Bank 2011). The insight that proxies for communicative linkage are not very volatile is fully in line with Levitsky and Way who also operationalize linkage as a rather static category (Levitsky and Way 2010, 372–375). Hence, it appears sufficiently precise to use the average Internet access per 1,000 inhabitants in the period from 1995 to 2011.

40 In 1994, an Internet access of more than 0.01 was only reported for South Africa.
The direct calibration is based on the following three qualitative anchors: an average of 5 inhabitants per 1000 having internet access during the specified period constitutes full membership (based on a gap in the raw data), and average of 1 determines the cross-over point (based on another noticeable gap in the empirical data) and average of 0.5 defines full non-membership (clearly placing cases such as Guinea and the DRC that are characterized by a low degree of overall social linkage to the senders of sanctions below the threshold. As a result, 33 cases belong to the high linkage and 42 cases to the low linkage subset. Even though this contradicts insights from Levitsky and Way (2010, 374ff) that Sub-Saharan Africa generally possesses a low degree of linkage to the senders of sanctions, it fully complies with the necessity to adjust calibration thresholds for certain samples if meaningful sub-differentiation should be achieved (Teune and Przeworski 1970; Verkuilen 2005).

**ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION (GDPGROWTH)**

Some traditional theories of political violence suggest that citizens who lash out at the government are motivated by a sense of (relative) deprivation (Gurr 1970; Muller and Weede 1994). Sanctions should hence enable protest activity because they result in economic hardship which the targeted society is only willing to bear up to a certain level (Kerr and Gaisford 1994). Gurr (1970) discusses a range of economic indicators that are related to and could thus be used as proxies for economic deprivation. Among those, inflation and growth rates of gross national product were found to be positively related to his measure of turmoil, which incorporates demonstrations, strikes, riots and other forms of political protest (see also Urdal and Hoelscher 2012 on low economic growth being related to nonviolent actions in major African and Asian cities). Moreover, deprivation should be operationalized in a way that reflects the development rather than the static size of the economy because a sense of deprivation may also increase if a comparable wealthy country experiences a crisis (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Ginkel and Smith 1999). I settled on GDP growth as a proxy of economic deprivation, which reflects the overall development of the economy.\(^{41}\) In line with the calibration of all other conditions

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\(^{41}\) Other potential indicators were discarded for the following reasons: First, there is no consistent evidence that high inflation rates harm economic growth and thereby increase feeling of economic deprivation or grievances. In contrast, higher inflation was found to be associated with moderate gains in GDP growth, especially in low and middle income countries (for example Pollin and Zhu 2006). Moreover, inflation tends to be higher during post-conflict recovery (inter alia, Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 2008), which also calls into question its usefulness as a proxy for feelings of economic deprivation. Another potential indicator, unemployment rates, is not very indicative in Sub-Saharan Africa because the large size of the informal sector (for an overview, see Gerxhani 2004) leads to conceptual and statistical problems (for example Bienefeld and Godfrey 1975; Frey and Pommerehne 1984). As the informal sector is estimated to account for approximately 60% of urban employment in
where interval-scaled data is available, the direct method of calibration is employed. Again, the average of the sanctioned period is taken and for ongoing sanctions 2011 is used as the final year.

Generally, the calibration differentiates between countries where the population experiences increasing socio-economic dissatisfaction (low subset) and those with a general economic situation that should, overall, result in decreasing sense of deprivation (high subset). The qualitative anchors are located at an average GDP growth of 7 percent (constituting full membership), 3.2 percent (cross-over point) and 0 percent (constituting full non-membership), respectively (World Bank 2011). An average of 7 percent GDP does not only represent a significant gap in the raw data, but also assigns development success stories such as Ethiopia (Clemens, Kenny, and Moss 2007) and cases where ‘humanitarian conditions [were] steadily improving’ after the end of the conflict like in post-conflict Liberia (Cook 2007, 19) a set membership value of 1. The crossover point at an average of 3.2 percent annual growth represents another gap in the raw data, while also being clearly above the average population growth of 2.2 percent (World Bank 2011), which ensures that the GDP growth is not absorbed by the population increase. Full non-membership is assigned to cases with a negative growth rate.

This calibration leads to the following picture: 21 cases are assigned the set membership value of 0 and altogether 47 cases belong to the low subset, a calibration that reflects the sanction sender’s tendency to single out economically weak targets (von Soest and Wahman 2015b). In contrast, only 6 cases have full set membership, constituting countries that underwent successful post-conflict economic reconstruction, oil abundant economies such as Equatorial Guinea, and development miracles like Ethiopia.

**POLITICAL OPENNESS (IFHPOL)**

Theories of political opportunity suggest that political institutions influence the choice and intensity of protest strategies (Kitschelt 1986, 58; Kriesi 2004; Schock 2004). In his seminal study, Eisinger (1973) found that the openness of the political system shapes political contention, with mass protest being most likely in hybrid rather than very open or closed societies. Political openness for this study is assessed on the basis of the Authoritarian Regime Africa and more than 90 percent of new jobs in urban areas will be most likely be created in the informal sector during the next decade (Kessides 2007, 470), official statistics on formal employment provide little insightful information on an economy’s prosperity.
3. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Anti-Government Mobilization under Sanctions

Dataset (ARD) (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013), which is based on a combined and inverted Freedom House and Polity IV measure.

Two major aspects make it particularly suitable for the analysis: First, the dataset takes into account the institutional setup of the respective regime (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013). Second, political openness is understood as a matter of degree (or a continuum) rather than a dichotomy between democracies and authoritarian regimes. An alternative would be to come up with a crisp calibration (which is permissible for single conditions even within a fuzzy set framework) that differentiates between democracies and autocracies. However, an overwhelming majority of the sanctioned regimes do not qualify as democracies according to the ARD or other typologies (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2009; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2011). Without an adjustment of the thresholds, all cases would be calibrated as having zero membership in the high subset ‘politically open’. Under such circumstances, the definition of the ideal case should not equal the ‘best’ empirical case worldwide, but the best imaginable case in the context of the study that is socially possible (Basurto and Speer 2012, 166; Ragin 2000, 165–171). Moreover, a dichotomous operationalization would not to justice to the gradual differences in political openness and changes thereof that occur in authoritarian contexts (Elkins 2000; Verkuilen and Munck 2002).

For the calibration, the average value for the sanctioned period is used; for ongoing sanctions 2011 is used as the final year. The calibration is based on the distinction between hybrid and ‘fully’ authoritarian regimes (Bogaards 2009; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Morlino 2009). As I can draw on interval-scales data, the direct method of calibration is used, which means that the three qualitative anchors for non-membership (0), the crossover point (0.5) and full membership (1) must be defined. The threshold for full membership is set at a value of 5.0 of the combined and inverted Freedom House and Polity IV scale (ifhpol). This does not only make use of a significant gap in the raw data, but also places countries such as South Africa above the threshold. In line with the procedure for determining the point of indifference inter alia employed by Emmenegger (2011), the 0.5 anchor is located at a value of 4 on the ifhpol-scale because it constitutes a notable gap in the empirical data. Finally, full non-membership begins with an ifhpol value of 2, thereby encompassing the most repressive regimes of the sample including Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, and Rwanda during the genocide.
Based on this calibration, 23 cases are assigned to the subset that represents a certain degree of political openness (without necessarily being democratic) whereas 52 cases belong to the low subset. This unequal distribution of cases between the subsets mirrors the political realities on the ground in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of the political regimes is still characterized as ‘not free’ (for example Bratton and Chang 2006).

OUTCOME
The outcome is operationalized as the development of anti-government mobilization, i.e. sustained collective action that opposes certain policies of the government or the regime as such (Dudouet 2006; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003)\(^{42}\). I draw on Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS), often referred to as the Banks dataset, which is one of the most widely used data source for domestic conflicts (inter alia Allen 2008b; Bank, Richter, and Sunik 2015; Davenport 1996). To reflect different ways of voicing dissent, the calibration was based on the ‘domestic9’ variable, which encompasses and weights information on anti-regime activity such as strikes, riots, revolutions, and non-violent anti-government demonstrations with more than 100 participants (Banks and Wilson 2012). While bearing the risk of missing crucial small-scale action, this serves to reduce measurement biases across different countries for which news coverage about minor protest events in foreign newspapers varies.

The calibration is based on a comparison between the average value of the ‘domestic9’ variable for the entire period and the average during the sanctioned period in order to capture how anti-government action evolves under external pressure in the form of sanctions rather than depicting whether there is a high tendency to publicly express dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime or its policies in general. The direct method of calibration is based on the following qualitatively defined anchors: The cross-over points is defined as a situation where the extent of domestic protest and other activity directed against the regime is neither larger nor smaller than during the entire period of the sample (1990-2011). Full set-membership is defined as an increase of 2000 points during the sanction period compared to the entire time span, based on the value that South Africa and Togo receive. Both cases have been described as instances where the anti-apartheid movement (Black 1999; Klotz 1995) respectively the political opposition (Cornwell 2005, 50; Ebeku 2005, 6ff) clearly benefitted from the external

\(^{42}\) This section describes the precise operationalization of the outcome. Subsequently, descriptions such as anti-regime activity, anti-government mobilization, collective action, protest as well as the voicing and enacting of dissent will be used interchangeably to describe any visible activity that opposes the incumbent government, parts of it or its policies.
pressure of sanctions. A decrease of more than 1000 points of the domestic scale constitutes full non-membership, based on the scores for countries such as Sudan, where sanctions doubtlessly failed to generate more anti-regime activity (Niblock 2001, 199–216).

Consequently, the calibration looks as follows: 21 cases in which anti-regime activity decreased under sanctions belong to the low subset compared to 54 cases where opposition activity somewhat or significantly increased after the implementation of sanctions. This imbalance adequately reflects previous research suggesting that, on average, the voicing of dissent increases in response to the imposition of sanctions (Allen 2008b). Moreover, a number of individual calibrations also validate the calibration choices made. For example, Zimbabwe is almost located at the cross-over point, which is in line with anecdotal evidence indicating that the impact of sanctions on domestic dynamics of contention in Zimbabwe is highly ambivalent (Masaka 2012). Looking at the temporal dimensions insufficiently reflected in fsQCA, the CNTS data suggests that immediately after the imposition of sanctions, anti-regime activity in Zimbabwe increased whereas at later stages the voicing of dissent declined, which is in line with the development of opposition and government approval rates following the imposition of sanctions (Afrobarometer 2010).

The Social Conflict in Africa (SCAD) database potentially constitutes a viable alternative to CNTS, not least because it contains information on a wider range of small-scale opposition activities. However, this greater depth of reporting appears to be achieved at the expense of equal coverage across all countries. The fact that according to the dataset Nigeria (977) and South Africa (845) saw the most social conflict events between 1990 and 2010 whereas only 112 were reported for Ethiopia, a country with twice the population of South Africa – while also attributable to specific domestic dynamics of contention in the respective countries – illustrates that certain countries are better covered by the foreign news agencies Associated Press (AP) and Agence France Presse (AFP) used to compile the SCAD dataset. The tendency that additional low-key events are disproportionally identified for a small number of relatively well-covered countries is also supported by the following figures: SCAD identified 10 times more riots in Nigeria than the CNTS dataset while the entire SCAD dataset only contains seven times more riots than the CNTS dataset, with similar differences also being observable for anti-government demonstrations (Salehyan et al. 2012, 510). Moreover, secondary literature supports the calibration resulting from the CNTS dataset instead of SCAD. A direct calibration of the outcome based on SCAD – with the anchors for full membership, the cross over point and full non-membership being 5, 0 and -2, respectively based on noticeable gaps in the raw data yields different results for a couple of countries. Building upon a careful examination of these cases with reference to secondary literature on the impact of sanctions, SCAD was discarded. For example, CNTS identifies Kenya and South Africa as cases were anti-regime activity increased under sanctions, whereas SCAD suggests that sanctions rather undermined such action in these countries, with the former clearly being more in line with research indicating that sanctions strengthened domestic mobilization against the regime (for example, Black 1999; Lodge 1989 on South Africa; Osaghae 1999, 13 on Kenya).

To what extent this unfolding of opposition activity under sanctions can be attributed to the external pressure has to be analyzed in more detail in the case studies.
3. Results

Following Schneider and Wagemann (2010, 8), who stress that the identification of the necessary and the sufficient conditions requires separate analysis, I will first discuss the minimization results for potential necessary conditions and then turn to sufficient (combinations of) conditions in the following section.

3.3.1. Necessary conditions for explaining the outcome

The combined analysis of several conditions is possible if these are considered to be functional equivalents. As this is not the case, all potential necessary conditions were assessed separately. For necessary conditions, a minimum consistency of at least 0.9 is suggested (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 213). A consistency value of 1 indicates a perfect consistency while values lower than 1 suggests deviations from such a perfect set-relationship. According to the analysis (see Table 3 below), only one of these conditions, linkage, reaches a consistency level of more than 0.9. Following the logic of necessary conditions, this means that whenever there is an increase in domestic mobilization in the sanctioned regime, a medium to high communicative linkage to the sender of sanctions exists.

The coverage indicated in the last column of Table 3 describes the empirical relevance of the respective necessary condition (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 144–147). Low coverage values express the empirical trivialness of a condition, meaning that the condition (nearly) always occurs irrespective of whether the outcome is observable or not (Goertz 2006). For example, air to breath would be an empirically trivial necessary condition, as is it not only always present when we see an increase in protest, but also constitutes a necessary condition for every human action. In contrast, linkage appears to be an empirically relevant necessary condition, as shown by the high coverage of 0.961167.

Provided that Internet access is a valid proxy for communicative linkage, this finding confirms past research, which indirectly suggests that linkage is a necessary condition for external pressure to instigate democratization. Levitsky and Way (2010) propose a theoretical framework for analyzing how linkage and leverage – understood as the direct influence that a (Western) power has over the targeted regime – condition the impact of external pressure on authoritarian regimes. High linkage is assumed to lead to democratization even in the absence of leverage, whereas in the reverse case external democratization pressure will only be partially effective (Levitsky and Way 2010, 351). While an increase in anti-government activity is
theoretically and empirically distinct from successful democratization, the fsQCA systematically confirms the importance of cross-border communication for sanctions to exert influence within the targeted regimes. More specifically, it can be interpreted as highlighting the importance of ‘transmission channels’ – in this case internet access – if signals of opposition encouragement sent by sanctions should reach the population and opposition movements in the countries under sanctions.

Table 3: Necessary conditions for explaining the outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SINTENSITY45</td>
<td>0.600147</td>
<td>0.755083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sintensity</td>
<td>0.668218</td>
<td>0.641514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOALS</td>
<td>0.458619</td>
<td>0.657885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goals</td>
<td>0.721107</td>
<td>0.632925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLINKAGE</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.961167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clinkage</td>
<td>0.434623</td>
<td>0.545986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPGROWTH</td>
<td>0.596474</td>
<td>0.742683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdpgrowth</td>
<td>0.707395</td>
<td>0.684597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFHPOL</td>
<td>0.505877</td>
<td>0.767459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ifhpol</td>
<td>0.708864</td>
<td>0.602121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One sanction episode considered as an example of successful democracy promotion, at least with respect to the initial transition phase (Crawford 1997, 75), underlines the importance of transmission mechanisms if pressure from sanctions should influence the targeted regime. In Kenya, both NGOs and the political opposition saw sanctions as a means to attract international attention for the regime’s increasingly authoritarian conduct (Ndegwa 1994), and thereby encourage a similar development like in South Africa. For example, Gison Kamau Kuria, a prominent Kenyan human rights lawyer, suggested ‘from my understanding of the situation in Kenya and much of Africa, the dictators are not going to respond to reason. Therefore, the United States and other Western governments should impose the kind of economic sanctions

45 Note that uppercase letters denote the presence of a condition whereas lowercase letters denote its absence.
which forced South Africa to take the first steps toward democracy’ and which – in his view – pressured the international community into paying attention (Howe 1990).

All other conditions are not necessary for enabling anti-government mobilization in countries under sanctions. Socio-economic deprivation, which is frequently mentioned in the literature as an important trigger of protest, fail to meet the standard with a consistency of approximately 0.7. Intense sanctions alone are no necessary condition for an increase in anti-regime activity either, which confirms the expectation that sanctions only contribute to enabling anti-government activity against the backdrop of other favorable domestic and/or international conditions.

3.3.2. Sufficient conditions for explaining the outcome

In the analysis, 5 conditions lead to 32 possible combinations (see Appendix C). Variation also occurs between episodes that concern the same country, which confirms the decision to examine sanction episodes rather than country cases as the unit of analysis. The truth table includes eight logical remainders, i.e. theoretically possible combinations of conditions for which no empirical cases exist (see Appendix C). The comparably low number of empirical remainders leads to a limited difference between the complex, the intermediate and the parsimonious solution (see section on robustness checks below).

**Figure 1: Sufficient conditions for explaining the outcome**
Hence, I present the complex solution, which has the advantage of not relying on counterfactual reasoning for the logical remainders used for deriving the parsimonious and intermediate solution. The following four pathways were identified: (1) high communicative linkage, but incoherent goals, (2) high communicative linkage and low sanctions intensity, (3) incoherent goals and socio-economic deprivation in conjunction with little political openness and (4) intense sanctions and socio-economic deprivation in conjunction with a certain degree of political openness (see Figure 1 above). For the analysis, a frequency cut-off of one empirical case and a consistency cutoff of 0.8 were used. A consistency cutoff of approximately 0.75 is viewed as a minimum requirement, and I raise the threshold to 0.8 in line with suggestions to only include cases with a slightly higher raw consistency if the sample reaches a certain size (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 279).

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATIVE LINKAGE
The analysis of sufficient conditions generally underlines the importance of cross-border communicative ties, with one path consisting of the interplay between high communicative linkage as well as incoherent goals and the other of one high communicative linkage and low sanctions intensity. This finding of course rests on the assumption that Internet access is a relevant indicator for communicative linkage, and needs to be further corroborated in the case studies. Against this backdrop, the two paths highlight different aspects. The first configuration (goals*CLINKAGE) appears to confirm Levitsky and Way’s finding that high linkage enhances the likelihood of democracy promotion effects or, in this analysis, increases the prospects of anti-government protest. However, communicative linkage seems to enable dissent regardless of the precise nature of sanctions (which do not appear as a condition in the path) and despite incoherent goals on part of the sanction senders and protestors. Hence, the close integration of the country into cross-border communicative networks rather than the message of sanctions being transmitted via functioning communication channels apparently provide anti-regime activists with room for maneuver in these cases.

The second path, in contrast, can be interpreted as showing the importance of communicative linkage against the backdrop of the imposition of low intensity sanctions. This path brings together insights from the research on sanctions about the importance of close sender-target relations, democratization studies’ emphasis on linkage on the one hand and previous research about the role of media access, information flows and social networks from social movement theory on the other hand, which have not been related to each other thus far. Sanctions
research has shown that amicable political and economic relations between target and sender increase the overall effectiveness of sanctions (Allen 2005; Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003). The extent of pre-sanction bilateral trade relations is positively correlated with sanction's success (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 64–65) and sanctions imposed by the major trading partner are more effective in inducing behavioral change (McLean and Whang 2010). Case studies also suggest that a regime's 'moral condemnation' (and the related support for regime critical actors) expressed through sanctions are more difficult to dismiss if a strong identification with the sender of sanctions exists (Galtung 1967, 399).

Going beyond previous medium- to large-N studies confirming the importance of cross-border flows and ties for successfully exerting external pressure (Elkink 2011; Levitsky and Way 2006), this analysis seems to indicate the importance of communicative linkage. Among the factors crucial for mobilization, social movement research has pointed to the importance of media access and informational flows (Osa and Corduneau-Huci 2003, 612). In their analysis of twenty-four cases of occurrence/nonoccurrence of mobilization in non-democratic states, Osa and Corduneau-Huci (2003, 620) found that mobilization in the absence of media access that ensured the flow of information only took place when distribution of information (and other resources) occurred within social networks. Put differently, communication channels – be they virtual or through physically established networks – appear to be of crucial importance for anti-regime mobilization. While close trade relations, geographic proximity and regular diplomatic exchange may be important for democracy promotion efforts more generally, the signaling impact of sanctions on opposition movements' activity particularly depends on the communication and information exchange between the sender of sanctions and the targeted society. In other words, the signal of opposition encouragement oftentimes sent by sanctions may only exert an impact if it has the potential to reach the targeted country’s population.

Such communication channels can also guarantee protestors that their anti-government activity is being listened to. As highlighted previously, ‘movement activists are media junkies’ (Gamson 1996, 85) who care about the media attention and reporting. The fact that human rights International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) often attempt to influence foreign countries to pay attention to their domestic cause underlines the importance of international consciousness raising for regime critical activity (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Murdie and Peksen 2013). Hence, available communication channels motivate opposition movements
to engage in anti-government activity because they increase the likelihood that their activity will be reported and documented elsewhere.

Finally, the second path suggests that communicative linkage is particularly important in the case of low intensity sanctions. As outlined previously, such sanctions of minor economic impact cannot be expected to enable the voicing of discontent by deepening feelings of socioeconomic deprivation. Accordingly, the signals of regime condemnation regularly conveyed by sanctions appear crucial to enable opposition movements, which – as illustrated previously – only influence domestic dynamics of contention if they reach the targeted regime’s society via functioning communication channels.

Table 4: Cases covering the paths sufficient for explaining the outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions episodes</th>
<th>Intensity goals</th>
<th>Clingage</th>
<th>GDPgrowth</th>
<th>Popeness</th>
<th>Number of episodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU_MRT_05, EU_RWA_94, UN_RWA_94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU_GMQ_92, US_GNB_03, AU_MRT_05, AU_MRT_08, EU_MRT_08, EU_RWA_94, UN_RWA_94, UN_ZAF_77, EU_TGO_92, AU_TGO_05, ECOWAS_TGO_05</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Episodes are given a code that indicate: (1) the sender (abbreviated as AU, EU, ECOWAS, OAU, UN or US); (2) the identity of the target (abbreviated with the three letter country code derived from ISO alpha-3), and (3) the year of the imposition of sanctions featuring the last two digits of it (Portela and von Soest 2012). Dark grey represents the presence of a condition whereas light grey denotes its opposite.
The question whether such communicative linkages, which are imperfectly calibrated as internet access due to the lack of other data, actually serve to ensure that the signals sent by sanctions are being heard and taken up as a sign of encouragement for regime-critical actors can be further explored with the help of case illustrations. Hence, the tentative findings presented above will be discussed with reference to some of the cases that fall into the respective paths (see Table 4 above).

Following the ‘principle of maximum set membership’ developed by Schneider and Rohlfing (2013b, 5), the case of South Africa is particularly insightful in that respect because it is characterized by one of the highest set membership values. International sanctions were imposed with the goal to end institutionalized racial discrimination in South Africa and the regime eventually responded to the senders demands despite their ability to at least partially circumvent their economic impact (Klotz 1996). Even though it is difficult to unravel causality with respect to the highly over determined outcome, scholars maintain that ‘waves of black political euphoria have been stimulated by external events’ (Lodge 1989, 47) and that ‘sanctions nourished antiapartheid resistance’ (Crawford 1997, 58). By imposing sanctions, the senders recognized the African National Congress (ANC) and enhanced its normative power, thereby strengthening the ANC’s position in the negotiating process with the incumbent regime (Black 1999). Moreover, the ANC’s role in spearheading the international pro-sanctions campaign enhanced its standing domestically (Black 1999). These signals of opposition endorsement could, however, only affect anti-regime behavior because the message reached the targeted society. Osa and Corduneanu-Huci (2003, 620) argue that without either networks or media access, mobilization would not have occurred in South Africa. Each step of sanctions extension constituted a discursive victory for the ANC, which was accordingly communicated in South Africa by the ANC (Black 1999, 99) and thereby provided an additional push for the anti-apartheid movement (Adam and Moodley 1993).

However, one word of caution is in order: The tightening of sanctions did not occur exogenously, but was clearly influenced by developments in South Africa. An expansion of the measures was repeatedly decided in response to domestic dynamics of mobilization and repression (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998; Wood 2001). A quantitative study tracing the unfolding of sanctions episodes finds a strong correlation between the number and intensity of sanctions and the rise in oppositional political activity, operationalized as the number of black workers participating in strikes (Kaempfer, Mocan, and Topyan 1995, 23). Rather than
suggesting an inverse causality (also rejected by Allen 2008b), I would argue that such developments highlight the entangled nature of sanctions – perceived as an international stamp of approval for anti-regime activity if transmitted through functioning communication channels – and domestic dynamics of contention. As Mandela claimed, sanctions showed that ‘the [apartheid] state is practically isolated from the rest of the world’ (cited after Thomas 1996, 8–9), thereby giving renewed impetus for anti-apartheid activity.

Communicative linkage contributes to enabling anti-regime activity in countries under sanctions for two major reasons. One the one hand, cross-border informational ties increase the likelihood that regime-critical actors receive sanctions’ signals of opposition encouragement. On the other hand, communication channels encourage opposition movements because engaging in protest or other visible and potentially costly forms of dissent appears more beneficial if news about such activities may reach potential external supporters, regardless of the nature or message convey by sanctions.

DEPRIVATION AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY
The fourth path, indicating that intense sanctions induce anti-regime activity if the population is motivated by economic deprivation and enjoys a certain degree of political freedom46, largely confirms previous research about protest activity in regimes under sanctions in a two-fold way. First, it shows that economically costly sanctions affect domestic dynamics of contention in favor of regime-critical actors. From the onset of sanctions research, scholars hypothesized that sanctions are more likely to succeed if they are more economically costly (Barber 1979; Doxey 1980) and the economic pain inflicted upon the target has indeed been identified one of the most reliable predictors of sanctions success. In the first large-N study on sanctions, Hufbauer et al. (1990, 47–48) found that high costs to the target are positively correlated with sanctions effectiveness. In an attempt to quantify the impact of the economic costs inflicted upon the target on sanctions success, Morgan et al. (2009) estimate the success rate of sanctions, which stands at 38 percent when costs are minor, to increase to 94 percent when the costs to the

46 This path and the following one do not include linkage as a condition even though it has been identified as a necessary condition previously. This may be explained by the fact that based on the consistency value of both the overall solution formula and the respective paths, the analysis only reveals quasi-sufficiency (Ragin 2000), ‘only’ meaning ‘across all cases, set membership is smaller than or equal to each case’s membership’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 333). The first two paths that come closer to being a perfect necessary condition accordingly also contain linkage, whereas the other two (which are also marked by low unique coverage values) do not encompass it (see also Pennings 2003, 557 on quasi necessary solution paths not containing a condition that has been previously identified as necessary).
target are severe (see also Drury 1998; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Nooruddin 2002; Tsebelis 1990 for a divergent finding). Further specifying this insight, Allen (2005) shows that comprehensive sanctions reduce the time period after which the target concedes compared to less severe sanctions. Moreover, Whang (2010, 569) finds that in contrast to costly sanctions, weak sanctions slightly reduce compliance.

These insights on the relation between the financial costs of sanctions and their probability to succeed can be theoretically and empirically linked to anti-regime activity. According what has been described as the ‘punishment theory’ (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007, 850), the economic harm caused by sanctions translates into political pressure because a certain level of deprivation induces citizens to challenge the regime (Kerr and Gaisford 1994). For costly sanctions to succeed, the financial pain must translate into political pressure, and anti-regime mobilization is one of the most viable transmission belts (Hufbauer and Oegg 2001; Losman 1979; Wallensteen 2000; Weiss 1999). In contrast to Allen (2008b), who finds no connection between the sanctions’ financial impact on ordinary citizens and a rise in domestic protests, this path confirms the previously developed hypothesis that sanctions causing economic hardship for the entire population, such as trade embargos, will encourage mobilization against the regime (see also Selden 1999).

Going beyond the equation that costly sanctions exacerbating or causing economic deprivation will succeed due to an increase in collective mobilization, this path shows that comprehensive sanctions only lead to an increase in mobilization if the targeted regimes are characterized by a certain degree of political freedom. Otherwise, three major features may act as barriers to collective action: the prohibition of political activity, the fact that mass media are under state control, and a lack of guarantees of individual citizen rights (cf. Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003). This supports previous findings from social movement theory that mobilization varies with the degree of political openness of the political system (Tarrow, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996): in very open systems, reform may occur without pressure from below whereas in extremely close ones, repression is too great (Kriesi 2004). Accordingly, this path highlights that economic deprivation – potentially caused or enhanced by intense sanctions – only translates into anti-regime mobilization if a minimum degree of political openness allows for the voicing of dissent.

The path covers, inter alia, the sanctions against South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire in 1999 and Zambia out of seven episodes. As the South African case was discussed above, I will sketch the
developments in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia to shed light on the sanction’s impact on domestic contention in the respective countries. In 1990, the first multi-party elections took place in Côte d’Ivoire, which saw the long-standing president Houphouët-Boigny being re-elected. After his death in office in 1993, he left behind a highly indebted country, in which economic decline intensified the struggle for power, characterized by a politicization of the citizenship question as well as an increasing militarization of the state and society (Banégas 2011, 457). A successful coup in 1999 led to the overthrow of Houphouët-Boigny’s successor Bedié and the installation of Robert Guéï. The US and EU immediately suspended all remaining non-humanitarian aid, parts of which had already been frozen in 1998 due to allegations of fraud and corruption. Likewise, the IMF cancelled all bilateral assistance until the return to constitutional rule (Olonisakin 2004). With almost a third of the national budget coming from international assistance, the country was hit hard by the sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007, case description on Côte d’Ivoire). The junta soon promised to restore democracy, and scheduled presidential elections for September 2000. When preliminary results indicated a lead for Guéï’s opponent Gbagbo in the elections boycotted by two major opposition parties, Guéï disbanded the electoral committee and declared himself the winner. Following a period of intense domestic negotiations and demonstrations, all parties eventually participated in municipal elections (Daddieh 2001). Subsequently, the EU announced a gradual resumption of aid in view of the peaceful and fair conduct of the local elections and other measures taken by the Ivorian government, including a dialogue with all political parties (Council of the European Union 2001).

This is not to suggest that sanctions alone paved the way for the presidential and legislative elections or that the increase in demonstrations and other forms of dissent can be attributed to deprivation resulting from the fact that foreign aid dried up since the coup. Instead, at least some of the increase in protest observable in the time period analyzed is linked to fights between mostly southern Christian supporters of Gbagbo and northern Muslim followers of the presidential candidate Ouattara who had been banned from participating in the elections (Bassett 2003; Cornwell 2000). Nevertheless, the sanction episode highlights the interplay between socio-economic deprivation exacerbated by costly sanctions, and the possibility of voicing discontent if the political system is characterized by a certain degree of freedom, but does not accommodate different positions through the conduct of free and fair elections.
The aid cuts implemented against Zambia are another example. When Western countries froze their assistance in 1996, the country had already experienced half a decade of economic liberalization programs and opposition to it (Larmer 2005; Simutanyi 1996). After his election in 1991, President Frederick Chiluba had announced an ambitious structural adjustment program. Even though it succeeded to enhance macro-economic stability, economic stabilization failed to stimulate the economy. According to the World Development Indicators, per capita GDP declined by more than 15% between 1991 and 1996 (World Bank 2011). Against the backdrop of this deteriorating economic conditions and government corruption scandals, a coalition of opposition parties led by former president Kenneth Kaunda put pressure on the government (Ihonvbere 1996). In response, the regime introduced controversial constitutional amendments in early 1996, which inter alia required candidates and their parents to be of Zambian origin and thereby effectively blocked Kaunda, whose parents were Malawians, from standing in the elections (Burnell 1997, 408). Zambian opposition parties immediately started calling on donors and neighboring Southern African states to impose sanctions (Chilaizya 1996). All major donors progressively cancelled or reduced their assistance in the following months, which dropped from approximately 1.6 billion in 1995 to less than 300 million US$ in 1996 (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007, database case description).

In the run-up to the elections to be held under the new constitutional framework, the opposition continued their protest (Baylies and Szeftel 1997, 122–123; van Donge 1998, 93–97). The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MDD) won the elections, which were boycotted by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and other major opposition parties, with 69.5 percent of the vote. Those who did not vote for the incumbent government were heavily influenced by their dissatisfaction with the economic situation, which they judged to be worse than in the early 1990s (Posner and Simon 2002). The economic crisis was at the very least exacerbated by sanctions. The cut of international balance-of-payments support was met by domestic borrowings, which further constrained the economy (Rakner 2003, 74). In response to public and diplomatic pressure, the Zambian government sought to re-establish its democratic credentials after the elections: The bill that required all media institutions to register with the state was discarded and watchdog institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission were established or gained greater independence from the executive. Moreover, the regime initiated talks with the National Patriotic Coalition, an umbrella opposition movement, as dialogue with the opposition constituted one of the donor’s major conditions for resuming development assistance (Rakner 2003, 110–11).
As indicated by the QCA, these developments occurred in a regime where a certain degree of political freedom still existed despite harassment of critical voices, including the press and NGOs. Even though the government interfered with the opposition party’s campaign by arresting a number of prominent leaders of the major opposition party (van Donge 1998, 92), certain political liberties were preserved. In the early to mid 1990s, watchdog NGOs and civil society organizations had effectively ‘pressed the government to widen the political space, to respect independent criticism and provide a more level playing field for political opposition’ and they continued to be active before the 1996 elections (Burnell 2011, 257).

These developments in Zambia in 1996 suggest a two-fold impact of the aid freezes on domestic dynamics of contention, which illustrates the interplay between relative political openness, comprehensive sanctions and deprivation. On the one hand, the economic impact of the aid cuts forced president Chiluba to consider concession vis-à-vis domestic contenders, which were internationally supported by the major donors. On the other hand, the case highlights that the socio-economic crisis, which nurtured the protest, preceded the sanctions. Against this backdrop, however, international sanctions became part of the domestic discourses. While the aid cuts exacerbated economic problems, which motivated anti-regime activities and encouraged citizens to vote for the opposition, sanctions also served to legitimize the local struggle (van Donge 1998, 97). In the words of Baylies and Szeftel, (1997, 127 emphasis added) ‘[i]t is probable that the critical stance of donors served to encourage opposition elements and local civic organizations in their protest’. Interestingly, the signal of international support expressed through sanctions appears to have contributed to sustaining the protest activities beyond their mere economic impact.

In short, this path shows that opposition movements mobilize based on a sense of deprivation, which is exacerbated rather than caused by sanctions, in hybrid regimes offering a minimum degree of political freedom. In contrast to previous studies discussing opportunity structures and deprivation as two distinct explanatory mechanisms for collective action against a regime under sanctions (Allen 2008b), this points at the interplay between both aspects, thereby highlighting the ability of QCA to shed light on interactions between various conditions.

DEPRIVATION AND PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY
The fourth path indicates that a combination of deprivation and external support for the major opposition movements’ goals leads to an increase in anti-regime activity despite limited political freedom. How can this constellation be interpreted? First, the path confirms common
wisdom that socio-economic downturn is a fairly good predictor of protest (Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013; Urdal and Hoelscher 2012). Building upon these findings, sanctions generate anti-regime activity because they impose costs on the population of the targeted state. Given that costs of sanctions tend to be unevenly spread (Brooks 2002; Niblock 2001; Rowe 2001), such measures should intensify feelings of deprivation among the population and thereby stimulate opposition movements, especially if they are more comprehensive. However, the costs of sanctions did not obtain statistical significance in past studies analyzing the impact of economic coercion on protest. While Allen (2008b, 932–933) interprets this as a lack consistent support for the deprivation approach to explaining protest in regimes facing international sanctions, I argue that such socio-economic dissatisfaction must not necessarily stem from sanctions, as illustrated by the third path: In more than half of the episodes covered by this path, targeted sanctions were implemented, which usually do not affect the economy as a whole to the same extent like comprehensive sanctions. Nonetheless, all episodes are characterized by a worsening on the economic situation, which appears to have contributed to the observable increase in anti-regime activity.

In contrast to previous studies suggesting ‘that opportunity is more influential than deprivation’ (Allen 2008b, 935), this path shows that economic downturns lead to an increase in anti-government mobilization despite a lack of political opportunity, but only if the most important opposition movements and the senders of sanctions share similar goals. Such coherent signals of opposition encouragement create perceived opportunities that encourage collective mobilization even in the absence of ‘real’ political opportunities. International sanctions, seen as external influences, can fundamentally change the perceived room for maneuver of opposition movement. Research on social movements has increasingly acknowledged that international forces shape the structure of domestic political opportunities available to challenging groups (McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Tarrow, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Influential international allies (Meyer 2003; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003) and international pressure (Layton 2000; McAdam and Tarrow 2000) encourage social movements. In a similar manner, sanctions communicate regime disapproval (Baldwin 1999; Schwebach 2000) as well as a foreign country’s support for opposition movements (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992).

But how do such signals of support translate into anti-regime activity? One of the key factors influencing citizens’ decision to engage in protest is their perception about the probability of
success (Ginkel and Smith 1999). Actions from third actors can influence the people’s assessment of their opportunities for successfully engaging in anti-government activity (Goldstone 2001). External intervention such as sanctions can provide additional legitimacy (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 22). The activists’ perception of opportunity may even trigger collective protest in the absence of favorable structural conditions (Gamson 1996). In Iran, for example, citizens took to the streets in 1977 because they saw greater opportunities for successful mobilization, even though the monarchical regime was not structurally vulnerable according to several measures (Kurzman 1996). Moreover, signals hostile to the government, for example sent by sanctions, cause the opposition to extend their demands based on greater perceived opportunities (Thyne 2006).

Sanctions must send powerful signals to significantly alter the perceived opportunity of citizens and thus increase their willingness to engage in costly anti-regime activities. Biersteker (2012) argues that this ‘communication factor’ inter alia depends on the coherence of the message, which is particularly strong if the goals of sanctions senders and those of the regime critical forces converge. A short glimpse at one of the cases covered by this path, Zimbabwe, helps to further illustrate the mechanism47: The fact that the Movement for Democratic Change – unlike previous opposition parties – enjoyed the endorsement of the international community (Alao 2012, 104), which was inter alia expressed through sanctions and relating them to repression against opposition politicians and demonstrators (Eriksson 2007, 30) helped to further the cohesion and development of the opposition at that time (Chingono 2010). In summary, opposition movements tend to spur anti-regime activity if motivated by deprivation and coherent signals of third party support that increase their perceived opportunity, even if the de facto openness of the political system is very limited.

### 3.3.3. Necessary conditions for explaining the absence of the outcome

The following section will present the Qualitative Comparative Analysis conducted for explaining under which conditions sanctions fail to instigate an increase in mobilization against the incumbent regime. Before presenting the fsQCA, one caveat is in order. QCA is based on the notion of causal asymmetry, meaning that presence and the absence of an outcome require different explanations. The solution for the presence of the outcome is not necessarily the negation of the solution for its absence and vice versa. In other words, the opposite of the conditions under which sanctions enable the voicing and enacting dissent does

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47 As the case will be extensively discussed in Chapter 5, it is only briefly sketched here.
not automatically explain the absence of anti-regime activity. As this dissertation seeks to identify conditions under which sanctions facilitate anti-regime activity, however, I refrained from calibrating additional conditions that may be more apt for explaining when sanctions constrain opposition movements in regimes under sanctions. Accordingly, the discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions for explaining the absence of the outcome should be understood as being useful for interpreting the previous results rather than providing a fully-fledged explanation of when sanctions fall short of encouraging anti-regime mobilization.

Table 5: Necessary conditions for explaining the absence of the outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SINTENSITY</td>
<td>0.553571</td>
<td>0.582563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sintensity</td>
<td>0.767272</td>
<td>0.616126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOALS</td>
<td>0.500000</td>
<td>0.599930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goals</td>
<td>0.714871</td>
<td>0.524823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLINKAGE</td>
<td>0.567916</td>
<td>0.456578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linkage</td>
<td>0.951698</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPGROWTH</td>
<td>0.610363</td>
<td>0.635671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdpgrowth</td>
<td>0.752927</td>
<td>0.609479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFHPOL</td>
<td>0.439988</td>
<td>0.558321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ifhpol</td>
<td>0.816745</td>
<td>0.580283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Against this backdrop, the analysis of potential necessary conditions for explaining the absence of the outcome is in line with the intuition derived from the identification of necessary conditions for explaining an increase in anti-regime activity. Only one of the conditions, the absence of linkage, reaches the minimum consistency requirement of 0.9 for necessary conditions (see Table 5 above). Again, the coverage of 1.0 indicates the non-trivialness of the finding. Confirming previous research on the importance of cross-border ties and flows for successfully supporting democracy promotion from outside (Levitsky and Way 2006, 2010) as well the evidence presented above concerning the importance of communicative linkage if the signal of opposition encouragement sent by sanctions should reach the targeted state, this
result shows that in the absence of communicative linkage, anti-government activity in regimes under sanctions does not proliferate.

The only other condition that comes close to being necessary for explaining the failure of sanctions to instigate opposition activity, without researching the threshold for being considered as a necessary condition, is a lack of political openness. This strongly supports previous research: While political openness contributes to explaining anti-government activity according to the third path, it becomes dispensable if opposition movements mobilizing on the basis of socio-economic deprivation are encouraged by third party advocates, namely sanctioners that share their goals. Under such circumstances, the perceived opportunity enhanced through external support can make up for limited domestic opportunities in terms of institutional openness, as shown above.

3.3.4. Sufficient conditions for explaining the absence of the outcome
Using a frequency cutoff of one empirical case and a rather conservative consistency cutoff of 0.859106, four combinations of conditions under which no increase in anti-government activity was observable in regimes under sanctions were identified (see Figure 2 below). The solution coverage of 0.872658 and solution consistency 0.973229 reach the benchmark of a minimum consistency of 0.75 and a comparable coverage introduced earlier. The following paths were identified as leading to a decrease in opposition activity in regimes under sanctions: (1) incoherent goals and little communicative linkage, but a certain degree of political freedom, (2) the interplay of low intensity sanctions, little communicative linkage and no political freedom, (3) intense sanctions and socio-economic deprivation, but little communicative linkage, and (4) low intensity sanctions characterized by coherent goals in conjunction with socio-economic deprivation and a certain degree of political freedom.

The first and second paths clearly support the fsQCA results found for the presence of the outcome. Both low intensity sanctions as well as sanctions implemented by senders that pursue other goals than the major opposition movements implemented against the background of limited linkage fall short of instigating anti-regime activity. The third path confirms that a lack of linkage is key for explaining the failure of external pressure, even if the sanctions are intense. Interestingly, the cases are also characterized by a flagging economic situation, which should increase feelings of deprivation and thus the willingness of people to take action against the regime. In line with causal asymmetry, this highlights that while a lack
of socio-economic development is a good predictor for protest, it may also lead to a decrease in anti-regime activity.

**Figure 2: Sufficient conditions for explaining the absence of the outcome**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal pathways</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>goals<em>clinkage</em>IFHPOL +</td>
<td>0.588700</td>
<td>0.036885</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sintensity<em>clinkage</em>ifhpol +</td>
<td>0.614461</td>
<td>0.105679</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINTENSITY<em>clinkage</em>gdpgrowth +</td>
<td>0.453454</td>
<td>0.064696</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sintensity<em>GOALS</em>IFHPOL*gdpgrowth</td>
<td>0.187939</td>
<td>0.039520</td>
<td>0.886740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several plausible reasons for this relationship. First, socio-economic deprivation (potentially associated with sanctions) can be exploited by the regime for a rally effect (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). Sanctions reduce rather than increase anti-government mobilization if the ruling elite exploits them to enhance the population's feeling of solidarity with the regime and to strengthen internal cohesion. When perceived as an attack from outside on the whole group – in particular if the identification with the sender of sanctions is rather limited (Galtung 1967: 389 on Rhodesia) – sanctions can psychologically create a ‘siege mentality’ (Amuzegar 1997b on Iran; Schreiber 1973 on Cuba). Some regimes strategically stock nationalist feelings to shift blame for economic hardship and political crisis on the sender of sanctions (Allen 2005; Grebe 2010, 24 on Zimbabwe; Green 1983; Haass 1998; Wood 2008). The indiscriminate impact of comprehensive sanctions in particular creates a siege mentality and hence leads to rally-round-the flag reactions (Lindsay 1986, 162) instead of encouraging anti-regime protest.

Second, comprehensive sanctions may deprive a potentially already marginalized opposition by further reducing the resources available to them (Peksen and Drury 2010), thereby rendering an uprising of dissatisfied forces even less feasibly (Kaplan 2007, 77). Originally formulated as a
critique of deprivation-based explanations of social movement activity, which failed to explain why movement activity proliferated in some cases but not in others against the backdrop of similar dissatisfaction, resource mobilization approaches underline the crucial role of financial, administrative and organizational resources for sustained collective action (McCarthy and Zald 2001). Comprehensive sanctions gravely affecting a regime’s economy may deprive a movement of it access to crucial resources for mobilizing collective action against the regime (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 20).

The last path frustrates any straightforward interpretation, as one would expect to see an increase in anti-government activity under such a constellation, which is the combination of not very intense sanctions, an overlap of the goals, a certain degree of political freedom and a decrease of the GDP. However, the extremely limited degree of coverage may hint at very specific constellations during which additional factors not covered by the fsQCA help to explain the oppositions’ inactivity. Indeed, the only two cases that represent this path, namely the AU and EU sanctions against Comoros, appear to be highly over-determined. A short look at the developments in 2007/2008 – when Colonel Mohammed Bacar attempted to legitimize his unconstitutional assumption of power in 2001 at the island of Anjouan with a popular vote that was rejected as illegal by the Comoros federal government and the African Union, followed by a AU mission that seized rebel-held Anjouan (Africa Yearbook 2009) – suggests that the military intervention rather than the sanctions influenced the domestic dynamics of contention.

These findings regarding the sufficient conditions for explaining the absence of the outcome underscore the importance of key conditions such as communicative linkage, coherent goals and a minimum degree of political openness for sanctions to induce anti-regime mobilization. While this already confirms the previous results to a certain extent, their robustness will be further scrutinized in the following section.

3.4. Robustness of results

The following discussion of the findings’ robustness refers to the sufficient combinations of conditions for explaining the outcome, as this constitutes the focus of the study. The solution

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48 The following debate is partially based on a less detailed discussion of fsQCA robustness checks presented in the article ‘Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes’ (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014).
term has a coverage of 0.946131, which expresses its empirical relevance. In other words, in almost 95 percent of the cases the combinations of conditions that are identified in the solution formula account for the outcome (Ragin 2006). The consistency, which specifies the degree to which the empirical observations are in accordance with the postulated set relations (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 324), is 0.882393, thereby clearly exceeding the commonly accepted requirements for significant solutions (Ragin 2008).

In the past, QCA was criticized for its limited ability to deal with some of the most common errors in social sciences such as measurement mistakes. Scholars mostly coming from the quantitative camp argued that QCA results are extremely sensitive to the researcher’s discriminatory power in assigning a case a crisp value of 0 or 1 (Goldthorpe 1997; Lieberson 2004; Seawright 2005). Even though the development of fuzzy set QCA has reduced calibration-sensitiveness, demands for approaches that allow analyzing the solution’s sensitivity to calibration errors and sample choices persisted. Problems of calibration in QCA tend to be smaller when the researchers possess a substantive knowledge of each case and when the number of observations is small (Bank and Richter 2013). In contrast, analyzing a solution’s robustness in the case of medium and large-N samples required specific (technical) innovations. In the following section, five fundamental checks, which strongly confirm the robustness of the results, will be introduced and discussed. These innovations respond to a debate about the validity of the explanatory models developed with QCA and addresses potential problems stemming from the sensitivity of results to calibration and sampling (Rihoux and Marx 2013, 170).

First, differences between the complex, the intermediate and the parsimonious solution help to shed light on the sensitivity of the different causal pathways to simplifying assumptions (see Table 6 below). Simplifying assumptions are employed to reduce the complexity of the solution formula. While the complex solution leaves aside any assumptions about the logical remainders, the intermediate solution makes use of theoretically guided counterfactual reasoning for the rows of the truth table without empirically observable cases. Lastly, the parsimonious solution also incorporates difficult counterfactuals in the minimization process. These insights allow us to distinguish core causal conditions – which are part of both the parsimonious and intermediate solution – from causally peripheral ones (Fiss 2011), thereby coming up with models that are more stable and differentiated. In my study, the path stating that a combination of coherent goals and socio-economic deprivation leads to an increase in
anti-regime activity in countries under sanctions despite limited political openness remains present in the intermediate and parsimonious solution. This again highlights the importance of analyzing the interplay between grievances potentially created or exacerbated by international sanctions and the discursive signals sent by such measures for enabling anti-government activity. Moreover, the two paths containing linkage as one causal condition are relapsed into a single path only consisting of this condition, which once more underlines the importance of cross-border communication channels to enable opposition movements. Finally, the parsimonious solution shows that – in line with previous research – relative political openness also constitutes a core causal condition for enabling anti-regime activity in the case of intense sanctions.

**Table 6: Differences between complex, intermediate and parsimonious solution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex solution</th>
<th>Intermediate solution</th>
<th>Parsimonious solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Consistency cutoff: 0.817536)</td>
<td>(Consistency cutoff: 0.817536)</td>
<td>(Consistency cutoff: 0.817536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goals<em>CLINKAGE intensity</em>CLINKAGE GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>ifhpol INTENSITY<em>IFHPOL</em>gdpgrowth</td>
<td>CLINKAGE GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>ifhpol INTENSITY<em>IFHPOL</em>gdpgrowth</td>
<td>CLINKAGE GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>ifhpol INTENSITY*IFHPOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage: 0.946131</td>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000</td>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.882393</td>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.885324</td>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.884557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, researchers need to balance the number of conditions with the size of their dataset (Marx 2010; Marx and Dusa 2011). This case-condition ratio has an impact on the degree to which QCA can reduce complexity in the minimization process. In addition, and even more importantly, there is an upper-limit to the number of conditions, which can be meaningfully included in the analysis. Above this benchmark, the QCA could produce explanatory models without contradictions on the basis of random data, as Marx (2010) showed for csQCA applications. According to best practices, models should be specified, i.e. the ratio of conditions to cases should be chosen in such a way that contradictions should be ever-present or occur in
at least 90% of the cases for random samples (Marx and Dusa 2011). Consequently, a condition-to-case ration of no more than 0.33 for small- and medium-N samples and at most 0.20 for large-N QCA applications is suggested, with which the analysis clearly complies with a ratio of 0.07. Furthermore, an upper limit of seven or eight conditions is proposed, as the emergence of many unique paths would otherwise severely limit the extent to which QCA may reduce complexity. With the inclusion of five conditions, the analysis also fulfills this requirement.49

Table 7: Robustness checks I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original model specification</th>
<th>Different consistency cutoff point</th>
<th>Different frequency cutoff point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistency cutoff: 0.817536 Frequency cutoff: 1.000000</td>
<td>Consistency cutoff: 0.868006 Frequency cutoff: 1.000000</td>
<td>Consistency cutoff: 0.868006 Frequency cutoff: 2.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) CLINKAGE</td>
<td>1) LINKAGE</td>
<td>1) LINKAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>ifhpol</td>
<td>2) GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>ifhpol</td>
<td>2) GOALS<em>gdpgroth</em>ifhpol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) SINTENSITY<em>ifhpol</em>gdpgrowth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000 Solution consistency: 0.885324</td>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000 Solution consistency: 0.917546</td>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000 Solution consistency: 0.917546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, infrequently combinations of conditions potentially stemming from calibration or measurement errors may influence the solution formula. Usually, one empirical instance is found to be enough to consider the configuration empirically and/or theoretically relevant. Using a higher frequency threshold to determine which configurations of conditions are included in the minimization process helps to detect potential deviant case errors. As stated above, I used a frequency cut-off of one empirically observable case. For large-N samples of more than 50 cases, a frequency threshold of two cases was proposed to cross-validate the robustness of the findings (Maggetti and Levi-Faur 2013, 203; Skaaning 2011, 402)50. Excluding such rare configurations reduces sensitivity to case-based errors. In my analysis, a frequency

49 Even though these benchmarks were developed for csQCA, they are also applicable to fsQCA, where problems of limited diversity also exist (Maggetti and Levi-Faur 2013).
50 For instance, Glaesser (2008) utilizes a frequency cutoff of 3 cases in her analysis containing 1004 observations.
cutoff of two cases leads to a very similar solution formula. Two of the three paths of the intermediate solution remain identical, which confirms the importance of linkage and the interplay of socio-economic-deprivation and coherent goals discussed previously (see Table 7 above; in line with recent suggestions (Schneider and Wagemann 2013, 175), the intermediate solution terms are reported).

Fourth, results may be influenced by the cut-off point for raw consistencies (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 18). As discussed earlier, the minimum raw consistency of 0.8 used for the analysis is fully in line with conventional benchmarks. Nevertheless, QCA applications may react sensitively to different raw consistency cut-off points. Hence, the analysis was repeated with a higher minimum raw consistency of 0.85. In my study, the two paths stressing the importance of communicative ties as well as the combination of coherent goals and deprivation remain unchanged. This again strongly confirms the robustness of these results.

Table 8: Robustness checks II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original model specification</th>
<th>Changed sample I (without civil war cases)</th>
<th>Changed sample II (without cases until 1995)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistency cutoff: 0.817536</td>
<td>Consistency cutoff: 0.819703</td>
<td>Consistency cutoff: 0.803822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency cutoff: 1.000000</td>
<td>Frequency cutoff: 1.000000</td>
<td>Frequency cutoff: 1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) CLINKAGE</td>
<td>1) LINKAGE</td>
<td>1) CLINKAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>ifhpol</td>
<td>2a) GOALS*ifhpol</td>
<td>2) GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>ifhpol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) SINTENSITY<em>ifhpol</em>gdpgrowth</td>
<td>2b) GOALS<em>gdpgrowth</em>sintensity</td>
<td>3) SINTENSITY*ifhpol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000</td>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000</td>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.885324</td>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.809357</td>
<td>Solution consistency: 0.868087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fifth, solution terms may be driven by the choice of the sample. In statistical analysis, it is common to assess the robustness of results via changes in the universe of cases included (Skaaning 2011). Even though this is rarely considered in the current debates about how to address measurement errors in QCA, changing the sample indeed constitutes a crucial
robustness check (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). In order to come up with a theoretically meaningful way of changing the sample, all sanction episodes implemented during ongoing civil wars according to the Armed Conflict dataset (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011) were omitted, as such cases may be characterized by entirely different domestic dynamics of contention (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992). Excluding the respective 18 sanction episodes yields remarkably stable results. Even though this reduces the sample by almost a quarter, the solution paths are either identical or at least very similar to the baseline result. The first path is the same, whereas two separate paths now represent the second path, highlighting the interplay between socioeconomic deprivation and coherent goals on the one hand, and between coherent goals and limited political freedom on the other hand. Moreover, a change of the sample could also be used to control for potentially omitted variables. One key challenge of QCA is that it does not allow the researcher to include further control variable in the analysis (Seawright 2005). This raises the question whether omitted variables are in fact driving the results, especially in the case of medium- to large-N analysis when the research does not possess the same familiarity with the cases like in small-N QCA (Fiss, Sharapov, and Cronqvist 2013, 195). In the present case, the results may be driven by particular developments in the early 1990s. In Sub-Saharan Africa, there was a significant domestic and international pressure to democratize in the early 1990s and a number of – sometimes somewhat precarious democratization processes – occurred (for a summary see Van de Walle 2002). Regimes were pressed into allowing opposition parties as well as competitive elections and increasing freedom of speech, which has potentially shaped domestic dynamics of contention in the targeted regimes regardless of sanctions. While QCA does not allow for including an early 1990s dummy to control for the impact of this global and regional trend, altering the sample by excluding certain cases from the analysis constitutes a viable alternative of ‘controlling’ for potentially omitted variables in fsQCA. In the present case, all episodes of sanctions that ended between 1990 and 1995 were deleted from the sample, with the result remaining remarkable stable (see Table above).

In addition, it was suggested to repeat the analysis with a slightly altered calibration of all conditions (Ragin 2009; Skaaning 2011). Despite careful theoretical and/or empirical justification of the choices made during the calibration, this process may introduce some degree of arbitrariness. Exploring the similarity of findings across different reasonable breakpoints would be a possibility to address this potential sensitivity. Changing the
calibration is not feasible, however, for all conditions included in the fsQCA. The suggestion refers to the indirect method of calibration performed with interval-scaled data. In contrast, both the calibration of the sanctions’ intensity and the coherence of sanction sender and opposition movement goals are based on a qualitative assessment of carefully assembled case-specific information. In that case, a re-calibration is ruled out (Vüllers 2013, 159). Instead, intimate knowledge of theory and cases minimizes the potential problem (Ragin and Rihoux 2004; Schneider and Wagemann 2010; see also Vüllers 2013, 159), but the fact that a different calibration may have produced slightly different results remains one of QCA’s limitations.

However, it is possible to qualitatively re-calibrate these conditions. As the robustness of the results has been extensively shown above, such a re-calibration was only performed if additional insights could be expected. Against this backdrop, the question arises whether the type(s) of sanctions imposed (instead of their intensity and the goals that their senders communicate) also affect the voicing and enacting of dissent in the targeted regimes. Since fsQCA does not allow for the inclusion of multiple-category conditions, a particular type of sanctions that would most likely affect opposition movements had to be identified in order to test this supposition: Aid sanctions are not only the most frequent stand-alone type of sanctions (see Table 2), but are also highly meaningful from a theoretical perspective. The rationale behind aid is usually to convey a signal of public condemnation regarding the target state’s political leadership and their attempt to limit civil and political freedoms (Portela 2010a, 33), which should encourage protestors more consistently than other types of sanctions imposed for reasons that are less related to domestic dynamics of contention. Moreover, aid sanctions are regularly described as economically harmful (for example Grauvogel and von Soest 2014) and could thus motivate anti-regime activity as a result of deepened feelings of deprivation.

An fsQCA in which sanctions intensity is replaced by a crisp measure for aid sanctions (calibrated as one if aid sanctions were imposed and zero for all other types of sanctions) does not only confirm the overall robustness of the results, but also the expectation that aid sanctions are particularly prone to enable opposition activity. The two key insights that communicative linkage and perceived opportunity coupled with economic deprivation enables opposition activity in sanctioned regimes remains intact despite this drastically re-calibration of this condition. Interestingly, aid sanctions appear in one additional path compared to the
solution formula of the baseline model (see Figure 3 below), suggesting that this particular type of sanctions indeed enables anti-regime activity.

**Figure 3: Sufficient conditions for explaining the outcome including aid sanctions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLINKAGE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDSANCTIONS<em>GOALS</em> ifhpol*gdpgrowth</td>
<td>→ Outcome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution consistency</td>
<td>0.927760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, triangulation is a common approach to support the robustness of the empirical results (Skaaning 2011). Triangulation refers to the use of different methodological approaches in a study, for example by combining methods aiming at generalization such as statistical analysis with more case-oriented methods like as process tracing in a nested analysis (Lieberman 2005; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a). As outlined previously, QCA is particularly apt in that respect, and new insights derived from the analysis will be further scrutinized in the next chapters. This process-tracing analysis of two cases arguably does not only constitute the most important robustness check, but also allows to unravel the mechanisms at play that can only be superficially sketched with the fsQCA.

### 3.5. Choice of the case studies

Even when the sample size increases, fsQCA remains an essentially case-based methodology, which conceptualizes each case as a unique combination of attributes rather than disaggregating it into variables (Fiss 2007, 1181). FsQCA hence lends itself nicely to serving as a basis for choosing cases for in-depth studies, but there are surprisingly few guidelines of how to combine QCA and qualitative case studies into a meaningful multi-method research design (for exceptions, see Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a, 2013b). Most generally, two approaches to post-QCA case selection, that is the choice of case studies after the analysis of the truth table with Boolean algebra, exist (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a, 3): Cases can be selected for comparative studies that seek to address the puzzles behind deviant cases in order to improve or refine theoretical explanations. A second possibility is to make use of knowledge about a
**typical case** to further discern causal mechanisms leading to the outcome identified in the formalized Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

To a certain extent, QCA-based small-N comparison mirrors the well-known method of agreement and method of difference (Mahoney 2000), sometimes also referred to as most-dissimilar and most-similar comparisons (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1997). Upon closer inspection, however, there is no legitimate place for the method of agreement (or most dissimilar systems design), as this would replicate the QCA analysis. Put differently, the cases to be compared should represent the same path or be covered by paths that differ from each other in only one condition (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a). As a result, two types of most-similar-systems comparisons suggest themselves: (1) a comparative analysis of a typical case with a deviant case regarding the consistency, that is a case that covers the same path, but does not display the outcome, or (2) a comparison of a deviant case for coverage (that displays the outcome, but has no membership in one of the causal pathways identified) with individually irrelevant cases that does not display the outcome, but belongs to same truth table row (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a).

Lastly, a paired comparison of two typical cases is also promising. Even single case studies are often based on implicit comparison with other typical cases, as insights gained from the first case may be enhanced by performing process tracing for yet another typical case (Goertz 2006; Lieberman 2005). The causal pathway established by the third combination of conditions in the complex solution goes beyond previous empirical findings and theoretical explanations for two major reasons. First, it constitutes the first medium- to large-N study systematically establishing the impact of sanctions signals on opposition movements in regimes under sanctions. Second, it highlights the interplay between this signaling effect of sanctions and socio-economic downturn (against the backdrop of very limited political freedom), which have thus far been threated as alternative mechanisms explaining the mobilization of dissent (for example, Allen 2008b). Therefore, I chose to select two typical cases that cover this configuration for further analysis, as it would be difficult to discern the reason(s) for the deviance of an outlier in the way detailed above without intimate knowledge of the processes operative in a typical case (George and Bennett 2005, chap. 8).
Altogether, 23 episodes with a positive outcome represent this path (see Table 9 below). The process-tracing analysis will assess developments over time and identify critical junctures, thereby addressing one of the major shortcomings of QCA, namely its inability to reflect the temporal dimension of developments. Six of the country cases (Angola, Cameroon, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria) were ruled out because at least one of the episodes started in the first half of the 1990s, which would render any case study based on interviews with contemporary witnesses and political decision makers of that time extremely difficult.

The choice of the final case studies was based on the three criteria for selecting a typical case after a QCA aimed at detecting sufficient conditions developed by Schneider and Rohlfing (2013a). While basic principles of post-QCA case selection are applicable for fsQCA and csQCA, fuzzy-set analyses enable the researcher to make use of the more fine-grained measurement approach when selecting the case(s). Case selection based on fsQCA should take differences in the degree of set membership into account. Based on the ‘principle of maximum set membership’ (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a, 5), one should choose cases with a maximum set membership as typical cases. This criterion points to Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, which all have a membership score above 0.9 in the third path.

The distinction between uniquely and jointly covered cases further contributes to minimizing the universe of potential cases. Cases that have unique membership in a solution term are the preferred choice to unravel the causal processes for this path (George and Bennett 2005, 252). Cases being jointly covered by several potential causal pathways, in contrast, render within case analysis extremely complex because the outcome is empirically over determined (Gerring 2007b, 240–241; Seawright and Gerring 2007). In this fsQCA, the episodes of sanctions against Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe comply with this ‘principle of unique membership’ (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a, 8).

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51 In order to select cases on the basis of the most detailed information available after the fsQCA, case selection was based on the complex rather than intermediate solution.
52 Temporal Qualitative Comparative Analysis (tQCA) has been suggested to capture the temporality of interactions by using a combination of hybrid of Boolean algebra and sequence analysis (Caren und Panofsky 2005), but it has not yet been applied empirically due to technical limitations.
53 As it was unfeasible to conduct three case studies within the scope of this project, and field research in Côte d’Ivoire is still complicated by the civil war’s legacies, it was not included in the final choice of case studies.
Table 9: Cases covered by third path

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Path 1</th>
<th>Path 2</th>
<th>Path 3</th>
<th>Path 4</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US_AGO_86</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU_BDI_96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_BDI_96</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU_BDI_96</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_CMR_92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU_CIV_10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS_CIV_10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_GMB_94</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_KEN_90</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU_MWI_92</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_MWI_92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU_MRT_08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_MRT_08</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU_MRT_08</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU_TGO_92</td>
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<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU_TGO_05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS_TGO_05</td>
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<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU_ZWE_02</td>
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<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_ZWE_02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, Burundi also adheres to principle of differences in degree to be established among cases that are similar in kind (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a, 5). In fsQCA, two cases are considered to be similar in kind if their fuzzy-set membership falls on the same side of the qualitative anchor (Ragin 2000, 159). In addition to displaying such similarities or differences in kind, fuzzy sets also establish differences of degree among cases that are on the same side of the crossover point. For example, all episodes of sanctions against Burundi have a membership above 0.5 in the third path, but the EU sanction episode displays a membership score of 0.93, whereas the US and regional sender episodes only have a membership score of 0.65 and 0.66, respectively. This allows analyzing whether higher path membership scores – which are derived from varying degrees of coherence between the sanctions sender and opposition movement goals – had any impact on the outcome.

Due to time and resource constrains, only two in-depth case studies including field research were feasible. Beyond the criteria established previously, two of the cases also lend themselves nicely to a cross-case comparison, namely Zimbabwe and Burundi. Both instances of sanctions targeted a regime that came to power (Buyoya) or maintained power (Mugabe) unconstitutionally and the sanction senders conditioned the lifting of sanctions on improvements of the democratic governance. The senders implemented rather intense measures (financial and aid sanctions in the case of Zimbabwe, and a comprehensive trade embargo in the case of Burundi) and socio-economic problems – be it as a result of the economic coercion or not – exacerbated after the imposition of sanctions. Perhaps most interestingly, both major opposition parties entered into a power-sharing agreement with the incumbent regime a few years after the imposition of sanctions, which requested them to launch initiatives for the lifting of sanctions. On the other hand, the cases also differ with respect to a number of important issues not necessarily included in the fsQCA – regional engagement versus quiet diplomacy, a civil war versus an increasingly authoritarian regime that claimed legitimacy based on the liberation war it had fought – which make process tracing beyond the limited number of factors included in the QCA potentially insightful. In that respect, the fact that the key actors implementing the sanctions differed – African regional neighbors (together with Western senders that imposed aid sanctions) vs. the EU and US – stands out and will be explored in greater depth in the case studies and the comparative chapter.
Both cases are also theoretically and empirically meaningful. Sanctions against the former Rhodesia were one of the first empirical cases where a rally-round-the flag effect, that is increased solidarity of at least parts of the population with the ruling elite, was described (Galtung 1967). The potential signaling effect of sanctions has also been illustrated with respect to the EU and US measures against the incumbent regime in Zimbabwe, albeit only in relation to the ruling elite and not the opposition (Grebe 2010; Tendi 2010). Despite its longevity, regional repercussions and domestic salience, sanctions against Zimbabwe have mostly been addressed in the context of regional mediation attempts and/or the ruling elites strategy (Adelmann 2004; Alden 2010; Graham 2006). The embargo against Burundi, one of the first instances of regionally coordinated sanctions, has generally received little scholarly attention. The great majority of publications focus on the humanitarian consequences of the trade restrictions (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997; International Crisis Group 1998; Mthembu-Salter 1999; Wohlgemuth 2005), thereby ignoring their impact of domestic power struggles and regional repercussions (for exceptions, see Eriksson 2007; Wodrig 2014).

In the following four chapters, the domestic dynamics of contention that occurred in Burundi between 1996 and 1999 and in Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2013 against the backdrop of regional and international sanctions, respectively, will be examined. In doing so, the results of the fsQCA will be juxtaposed with insights that emerged on the basis of extensive field research conducted for each of the two cases. While the fourth chapter sketches the methodology and the fifth and sixth chapters address Burundi and Zimbabwe separately, the seventh chapter will contrast how the external economic and political pressure affected opposition politics and activism in both cases.

54 The deviation from the period of analysis for the fsQCA will be explained in the case study chapter.
4. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

The study at hand employs a multi-method research design. Multi-method is understood as the application of a diversity of research techniques (Collier and Elman 2010, 780; Snape and Spencer 2011, 15). Without neglecting potential differences in the underlying philosophical foundations (Jackson 2011), the choice of methods is motivated by its appropriateness for addressing specific research questions (Seale 1999). According to the fsQCA, increased opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions can be explained by different configurations, which expose the importance of communicative linkage, the interplay of deprivation and political opportunity as well as the combined effect of deprivation and sanctions signals. The former two paths, which highlight the importance of linkage and the interplay of deprivation and political opportunities, confirm previous knowledge on the impact of external pressure on domestic dynamics of contention. In contrast, the last one, which combines sanctions signals and deprivation, sheds new light on opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions. To account for the causal processes behind this interplay of conditions and relate them to the observed outcome, a process-tracing analysis will be conducted.

In the following, process tracing will be introduced. Based on a discussion of underlying assumptions regarding the conduct of inquiry, causal-process tracing is proposed as the adequate approach. The second section then describes the process of data collection during field research. To make this as transparent as possible, challenges that arose during the on-site research in the post-conflict and authoritarian contexts that Zimbabwe and Burundi represented will be critically reflected. Lastly, the procedure of analyzing the collected material will be outlined.

4.1. Process tracing

The two case studies serve to reconstruct how the interplay of the conditions identified in the fsQCA is linked to the outcome of interest, i.e. opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions.

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55 Collier and Elman in fact differentiate between three understandings of multi-method research designs: (1) the integration of different qualitative methods, (2) the application of qualitative as well as quantitative techniques and (3) the combination of positivist and interpretivist approaches. Depending on whether one perceives QCA as a purely qualitative approach or one blurring the line between qualitative and quantitative research, this dissertation employs a multi-method design in the sense of the first and the second understanding proposed by Collier and Elman.
sanctions. Case studies are good at taking into account the interplay of both internal and external factors (Hall 2003). As a result, case studies are particularly well suited for considering explanatory frameworks that draw on different sub-disciplines as they enable the researcher to acquire the complex set of information to account for theoretically diverse approaches (Blatter and Haverland 2012, chapter 1). This is important for the present work combining social movement theory and sanctions research. Moreover, case studies enable the research to better understand the attitudes, beliefs and motivations of crucial political actors (Blatter and Haverland 2012; Tansey 2007, 766). With their ability to grasp the actors’ thought and perceptions, case studies allow shedding light at discourses and ideas that potentially play an important role when examining sanctions signals.

The case study analyses will be carried out by means of process tracing, which has become increasingly popular over the past decade. Regrettably, process tracing has also turned into a vague catch-all term for all kinds of qualitative analyses, and the method is ‘frequently ... neither adequately understood nor rigorously applied’ (Collier 2011, 823; see also Kittel and Kuehn 2013). Furthermore, the process tracing itself is oftentimes conducted in a rather informal and obscure manner (Bennett and Checkel 2015; Mahoney 2015). In other words, process-tracing analyses often lacked clarity with respect to the underlying philosophy of science foundations and its concrete application. These aspects will thus be elaborated in the following in order to provide an adequate basis for the subsequent empirical analysis.

Process tracing as initially formulated by Alexander George is characterized as a within-case study method whereby the researcher can get closer to the ‘mechanisms or micro-foundations behind observed phenomena’ (George and Bennett 2005, 149). Elsewhere, George and Bennett (2005, 206) define process tracing in a slightly different manner as ‘attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (cause) and the outcome of the dependent variable’ (see also Beach and Pedersen 2013, 3). Still others have described process tracing as relating a sequence of events to a specific outcome (Rohlfing 2013; Venesson 2010). What unites these definitions is the ambition to (causally) link certain phenomena to a particular outcome.

At first sight, this suggests a positivist understanding within the philosophy of science, to which many proponents of process tracing effectively adhere (Gerring 2007a; inter alia Hall 2013). Yet, a new generation of process tracing scholars has made a case for a non-fundamentalist approach to process tracing. For example, Bennet and Checkel (2015, 21)
propose a pluralist take on process tracing, arguing that it serves both to reconstruct hypothesized causal processes and shed light on ‘structural-discursive contexts’ (see also Blatter and Haverland 2012). They draw inspiration from ‘pragmatist’ or ‘pluralist’ understandings of causality (Elster 2007; Kurki 2008; see also Sil and Katzenstein 2010). In that sense, causal analysis should be ‘epistemologically reflective, methodologically pluralist and complexity-sensitive’ (Kurki 2006, 190). Such a broad take on causality implies taking into account agency-centered as well as structural explanations drawing on ideational as well as material factors (Kurki 2008, 218–230).

This spirit of eclecticism found its expression in the increasing overlap of positivist and more interpretative methods (Collier and Elman 2010, 780) as well as attempts to question the explaining/understanding divide (see also Methmann, Rothe, and Stephan 2013, 6–10; Wight 2002). Even Hall (2013, 24), who defends a strictly positivist notion of process tracing, acknowledges that ‘the dividing line between this type of positivist enquiry and interpretation is never entirely sharp’ and that ‘[r]egardless of the methods they deploy, political scientists are ultimately painting portraits of the world’. Without rejecting the goal to establish causality, I follow Blatter and Haverland (2012, 13), who advocate a ‘broad conception of causality, including both materialist and ideationalist accounts’. Such an understanding is ultimately imperative when addressing how both very ‘concrete’ economic consequences of external sanctions as well as the signals they send and discourses they sustain affect opposition mobilization in the targeted regimes. Hence, digging deeper into the causal processes and underlying mechanisms also entails analyzing the perceptions of key actors and the discursive context in which they act and argue.

A number of recent publications attempt to distinguish these different takes on process tracing as well as case study research more generally not only by reflecting their underlying foundations, but also by differentiating their diverging applications. Beach and Pedersen (2013, 9–22) develop a three-fold typology of theory-testing, ‘theory-building’ and ‘explaining outcome’ process tracing, whereas Blatter and Haverland (2012) distinguish co-variational analysis, causal-process tracing and congruence analysis. Among these, causal-process tracing (CPT) proposed by Blatter and Haverland (2012), which partially resembles Beach and Pedersen’s (2013) ‘explaining outcome’ process tracing, has inspired the approach pursued here.
Causal-process tracing constitutes a specific approach that is based on a configurational logic and the identification of temporally contingent development as ontological and epistemological cornerstones. At its core, causal-process tracing asks which factors lead to a particular outcome. Research thereby builds on the fundamental assumption that ‘a plurality of factors work together to produce the outcome of interest’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 24). Consequently, the identification of combinations of causal conditions lies at the heart of this approach, which seeks to uncover the details behind causal ‘pathways’ or ‘configurations’ that lead to the respective outcome. Causal-process tracing is thus characterized by a clear affinity with ‘configurational thinking’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 12), which makes it particularly suitable to be combined with QCA in a multi-method research design. Furthermore, it takes equifinality seriously by accounting for potential alternative causal pathways (see also Bennett and Checkel 2015, 21).

According to the CPT approach proposed by Blatter, one searches for all relevant information about the temporal unfolding of the outcome of interest to establish what they call a ‘comprehensive storyline with a sequence of causal steps’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 30). Critical times and phases of transformation, in particular, require a ‘dense’ description. In a second step, causal conjunctions and/or causal chains are extracted from the comprehensive story lines; in other words, the thick description of crucial situations allows providing strong evidence for a relation between certain causes and the outcome of interest. In that context, the identification of so-called smoking guns (i.e. central pieces of evidence within a cluster of information) and confessions by major actors about their perceptions and motivations serves to underline the plausibility of the comprehensive storyline. These ‘condensed empirical information’ are related to theoretical reasoning on how these causal configurations work.

What does this mean in more practical terms? In line with Blatter and Haverland, the case studies’ major purpose is to provide a condensed empirical description, or comprehensive storyline, of the temporal unfolding of events. Following their suggestion to scrutinize all potentially relevant information, data from interviews, original documents and secondary literature is triangulated. While not explicitly referred to as ‘smoking guns’ or ‘confessions’ for the sake of readability of the case studies, statements by key actors about their interests and understanding of a particular situation as well as central pieces of evidence from original documents, interviews or secondary literature constitute key components of the storyline. According to the CPT approach by Blatter and Haverland sketched above, the causal
conjunctions and chains that make up the comprehensive storyline are then confronted with the theoretical expectations developed in the second and refined in the third chapter.

Despite the usefulness of distinguishing different approaches to case study research and sticking to causal-process tracing in the present analysis, the framework suggested by Blatter and Haverland is however not meant to put a straightjacket on the researcher. The two scholars themselves stress that a combination of different approaches can be beneficial (Blatter and Haverland 2012, chapter 5). In line with their proposition, the subsequent cases studies also entail elements of congruence analysis as they do not only seek to explain the specific dynamics in Zimbabwe and Burundi, but also to systematically elaborate on ex-ante formulated theoretical propositions (on congruence analysis, see Blatter and Haverland 2012, chapter 4). Congruence analysis typically includes different theoretical explanations for the outcome of interest – just like the framework presented in the second chapter – and attempts to establish how well their propositions fit the cases examined. In doing so, cleavages between causal theorizing in a narrow sense and a more constitutive/interpretative understanding of explaining phenomena may be bridged (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 161). This interpretation of case studies also concurs with the underlying philosophy of science understanding formulated before.

Following Schneider and Rohlfing (2013a) as well as Blatter and Haverland (2012, 231), an analysis of typical cases identified by the QCA will be performed. Causal-process tracing should establish a ‘comprehensive storyline’ in which the temporal unfolding of the causal process is presented in a narrative style (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 112). This thick description is ideally based on field research, as Wood (2009) argues. In addition to archival data and secondary sources, interviews are highly relevant for process-tracing approaches to case study research (George and Bennett 2005): ‘When interviewees have been significant players, when their memories are strong, and when they are willing to disclose their knowledge of events in an impartial manner, elite interviews will arguably be the most important instrument in the process tracer’s data collection toolkit’ (Tansey 2007, 767). The following section will hence sketch how interviewing was applied alongside other approaches during data generation in the field.
4.2. Field research

In each of the two cases, elite interviews with policy-makers, diplomats, military personnel, business people, journalists and academics were conducted. Whilst the focus of the analysis lies on opposition politics, the range of interviewees was extended beyond opposition politicians, as they clearly do not act in a political vacuum. Interviews with members of the ruling elite, journalists, the business community and even academics were crucial for understanding the political opportunity structures for the voicing and enacting of dissent as well as the mutually dependent relationship between the incumbent regime and the respective opposition movement(s).

In Burundi, a total of 35 interviews were conducted in August and September 2013; one additional interview took place via Skype before the field research. In Zimbabwe, a total of 44 interviews were conducted during two stays in January and November 2014, which both lasted for about two and a half weeks. The decision for two relatively short stays in Zimbabwe was taken in response to the precarious situation for conducting on-site research. In addition to the regime’s general mistrust vis-à-vis foreign researchers, sanctions constitute a highly contentious issue so that it proved to be impossible to receive the – theoretically mandatory – research permit. The overwhelming majority of these elite interviews were conducted in the capitals Bujumbura and Harare. In addition, I visited one locality outside the capital that was of major importance for opposition politics in the period of analysis in both countries. In Burundi, I spent a few days in Ngozi, one of the hotspots of rebellion against the Buyoya government. In addition, interviews with NGO employees who lived in rural areas during the time of the embargo allowed me to gain an understanding of how the issue of sanctions was debated and perceived in the politically marginalized countryside. In Zimbabwe, I interviewed opposition politicians in the country’s second largest city, Bulawayo, which was and continues to be the stronghold of the major opposition party.

The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that they followed a framework of themes to be explored (see Appendix D and E). More specifically, an interview guide with groups of questions was prepared before field research, but the order in which these topics were addressed could vary. Moreover, new questions were asked in response to what the interviewees said (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2007, 92). This freedom enabled me to tailor the conversations to the respective context, the situation and the person I interviewed. A theoretical sampling technique, also referred to as purposive non-randomized sampling, was applied (Bayard de
Volo and Schatz 2004; Goldstein 2002; Tansey 2007, 770). Potential respondents were selected based on the research interest. In doing so, preference was given to senior level elites with direct access to the process (Davies 2001; Tansey 2007). However, the volatile and highly politicized setting, especially in Zimbabwe, did not always allow for this targeting technique, so that it was supplemented by snowballing. Through snowballing, additional respondents that had a reputation of having been influential in the political process of interest could be identified. Using purposive sampling based on the potential interviewees (formal) position as a basis for snowballing is in fact not only widely-used (Clark 2006) but also recommended (Tansey 2007). Snowball sampling is particularly suitable in difficult environments such as post-conflict countries or authoritarian regimes (Cohen and Arieli 2011; Vlassenroot 2006). The process was continued until the sample was deemed large enough for the purposes of the study.

One of the major strengths of (elite) interviews for the method of process tracing is that the researcher obtains first-hand accounts from witnesses of the event that is being studied (Tansey 2007). Archival documents and other written sources provide detailed information, but this can rarely replace talking to those that were involved. Semi-structured interviews are also ‘particularly useful for understanding (…) mobilization from the perspective of movement actors or audiences’ (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2007, 92). They shed light on how politicians and political activists see their participation in certain events, i.e. how they make sense of and justify their practices (see for example Jenness and Broad 1997). Lastly, interviews also allow the researcher to scrutinize how certain messages were received by members of a specific political group (Gamson and Meyer 1996).

Document analyses added to the semi-structured interviews. Press releases from political parties and sympathizer groups as well as official documents collected in Zimbabwe and Burundi were used to supplement the analysis whenever they were available. Unfortunately for the latter, many documents were lost during the civil war in Burundi. These included potentially useful sources for reconstructing the discursive struggle about the embargo such as the major opposition’s party magazine l’Aube de la Démocratie as well press releases by the

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56 Interestingly, interview partners in Burundi were surprisingly eager to set up interviews with political opponents ‘to help me understand that other people perceived the situation differently’, whereas in Zimbabwe opposition politicians suggested speaking to fellow anti-regime activists and regime supporters provide me with access to other regime supporters.
regime-affiliated press agency Net Press. Conversely, most documents existed in Zimbabwe, but the possibility of gaining access to official archives without a research permit is very limited. Hence, interviews also served to compensate for the lack of documentary material (Davies 2001; Tansey 2007).

Lastly, albeit to a significantly lesser degree, focus group discussions were carried out in Zimbabwe. Focus groups are ‘a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher’ (Morgan 1997, 6). In contrast to in-depth interviews, where the interviewer-interviewee relationship shapes the conversation, data is created through the communication and interaction of the participants (Finch, Lewis, and Turley 2011, 2012; Morgan 1996; Söderström 2011). They respond to what others have said, thereby further developing and refining their own position over the course of the discussion. During a Youth Leadership Training (YLT) in Zimbabwe, I led a series of three discussions on sanctions. This allowed me to organize a de facto focus group discussion in a country where the tense political situation would otherwise impede such an approach.

Clearly, this also entailed diverging from the textbook structure of focus group discussions (Finch, Lewis, and Turley 2011; Söderström 2011, 152) in several respects: The group was considerably larger than the six to ten participants usually recommended and instead of me one of the participants presented the opening topic. In focus groups, participants expose their views to the others. While this can be problematic in authoritarian regimes (see Söderström 2011, 147 on the related issue of trusting other participants during focus groups in post-conflict settings), participants of the YLT had succeeded in building an atmosphere of trust over the course of the on-going training that greatly facilitated open exchange during the debate on sanctions. The setting, while not conforming to an ideal type focus group, enabled me to collect valuable data on how the participants perceived the issue of sanctions and defended respectively denounced the measures vis-à-vis their peers during the discussion.

57 Focus groups were not planned from the onset; the possibility to conduct them rather occurred by chance. But as gaining access to interview partners in Zimbabwe was generally more difficult than in Burundi (see reflections on field research below), I decided to take advantage of this opportunity.  
58 The YLT was organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a German political foundation, and assembled approximately sixty young people from different political parties, the trade unions, local NGOs, churches and youths working in the private sector. The participants were aged between 20 and 35; they were selected on the basis of their political and social interests. In the various workshops, groups of approximately twenty participants discussed issues such as democratic governance, economic development, and gender relations in an attempt to understand each other’s perspectives and find common ground across partisan lines.
4. Case Study Methodology

Triangulation of data from different sources (interviews, documents, and focus groups in the case of Zimbabwe) provided in-depth material on opposition politics under sanctions in Zimbabwe and Burundi. This also helped improving the reliability and validity of the case studies (Brewer and Hunter 1989; Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991; Leuffen, Shikano, and Walter 2013) despite the limitations for conducting on-site research in authoritarian regimes, which will be reflected in the following section.

4.3. Reflections on the field research

Field research clearly did not take place under ideal conditions. Over the past years, the number of books reflecting on the challenges of conducting on-site research in post-conflict countries, (violently) divided societies or otherwise difficult contexts has proliferated (for example Smyth and Robinson 2001; Sriram, King, Mertus, Martin-Ortega, et al. 2009; Thomson, Ansoms, and Murison 2013)\(^{59}\). This includes asking questions such as to whom the interviewees speak, for what purpose and in which context (George and Bennett 2005, 90), which circumstances potentially affected the validity as well as the reliability of the qualitative results and how these challenges were handled. Such a reflection also contributes to rendering decisions that affect issues of access and ethics during on-site research transparent. Accordingly, the conditions for on-site research in Burundi and Zimbabwe and the choices made during field research will be briefly sketched in the following without, however, crossing the line of overemphasizing the ‘reflection of the self’ (Zanker 2015, 64).

Three aspects were of major importance in that respect, namely my position as a female Western academic, questions of timing and the related issue of access. First, the fact that I am a young, female researcher unquestionably affected the way that I was perceived. My gender and age made access to the political and societal elite difficult at times, but once I passed the interviewees’ ‘test’\(^{60}\) of my previous knowledge, I was generally considered as a worthwhile conversation partner. Being deemed relatively ‘naive’ also helped me to gather information that the interview partners would have potentially not revealed vis-à-vis a more senior scholar (see also Autesserre 2014, 286), and which tended to be particularly reliable because they did not construct a narrative for a potentially ‘threatening’ researcher. In an attempt to capitalize

\(^{59}\) In contrast, conducting field research in authoritarian regimes has received comparably less attention (for a notable exception, albeit geographically confined to the Middle East, see Clark 2006).

\(^{60}\) This ‘test’ usually consisted of dropping names or dates and checking whether I knew about these events or personalities.
these advantages and deal with the disadvantages, I chose to downplay or upscale my role depending on what appeared to be the more fruitful strategy. While I have never left any doubt about my role as a researcher (see also Armakolas 2001, 169), I introduced myself as a PhD student rather than as a research fellow to government officials in Zimbabwe where foreign researchers seem suspicious. On the contrary, I emphasized being a research fellow at one of the largest German centers for African Studies in interviews with Burundians or Zimbabweans who mentioned my lack of seniority.

Relatedly, my nationality affected my position in both countries, albeit in very different ways. In Burundi, coming from one of the country’s major donors facilitated gaining access, which I used to my advantage without creating unrealistic hopes. In a number of instances, I became the addressee of concerns and inquiries that did not directly relate to my research. This rarely took the form of explicit demands to provide (information on) funds for non-profit organizations or job opportunities in Germany (see Clark 2006 for different experiences in the Middle East), but I was often told to ‘let my government know’ how certain problems affected Burundians. Such discourses of everyday hardship were mobilized to ask for help, contacts and funds in a more indirect way (see also Autesserre 2014, 107ff; Hirschy 2015 on Burundi). By contrast, in Zimbabwe, being from one of the European sanctions senders handicapped the possibilities to gain access, as potential interview partners were suspicious about my true intentions. Yet the fact that I do not come from Great Britain (GB), Zimbabwe’s former colonial power, which I emphasized in a pronounced fashion, helped to cushion this mistrust to a certain extent.

A final aspect that concerned my position as a researcher was the question of neutrality. As described above, I attempted to listen to all sides and to remain neutral. However, to refrain from voicing my position proved to be challenging. On the one hand, I was sometimes asked to take a stand. In addition to giving back the question to my interview partners, I usually replied that I still lacked information for a proper assessment if the interviewees insisted. On the other hand, I could not leave explanations uncommented when I had doubts about somebody’s responses. Instead of directly challenging what had been said, I usually referred to a third source which had presented the events differently (see Berry 2002 for such an approach). This

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61 In a number of instances, they second-guessed that I would use my insights to help European governments to make their sanctions more painful.
was of tremendous importance as the different interview partners’ accounts of certain events and developments often diverged noticeably.

Second, the timing of the interviews also influenced the responses that I received. In Burundi, the events that I enquired date back almost two decades. Resulting memory lapses potentially limit the usefulness of the interviewees’ accounts (Kramer, Allyn, Blight, and Welche 1990). However, the embargo constitutes an integral part of the country’s contemporary historical narrative(s) that is remembered in great detail. For instance, a taxi driver provided me with an in-depth account of how the sanctions had affected the national post service where he had formerly worked when he discovered the purpose of my stay in Bujumbura. Likewise, many interviewees still remembered in which situation they found about the imposition of sanctions and similar details (see also Zanker 2015 on memories as a useful point of entry). Moreover, former political elites who are no longer in office were able to speak more openly about past events than they could have done at the time when the sanctions were in place (see also Vorrath 2012). This actually constituted a major advantage, as it allowed me to interview the leading decisions makers, including the President under sanctions Buyoya and his predecessor Ntibantunganya from the major opposition party.

The situation in Zimbabwe constituted the exact flipside of this challenge related to timing. Asking people while the sanctions were still in place guaranteed a more immediate reaction than the interviews conducted many years later in Burundi (see also Beach and Pedersen 2013, 135). Yet, people were also more open to reveal their position on this extremely controversial issue. Accordingly, most interview partners in Burundi waived anonymity whereas in Zimbabwe, an overwhelming majority insisted on it. The most effective way of dealing with the topic’s contentious nature in Zimbabwe hence consisted of guaranteeing anonymity in an absolutely credible way. The interviewees’ different degrees of openness clearly pose a challenge to the comparability of the results (that was mitigated by triangulation as much as possible), but they also highlight the advantages and disadvantages of conducting interviews with (or without) a certain time lag.

This hints at the third key aspect that shaped field research in both countries, i.e. a diverging access to key elites. The lists of interviewees (see Appendix F and G) illustrate this in a pointed manner. While I interviewed former presidents, ministers and high-ranking military personnel in Burundi, the possibility to speak to these key political decision makers was clearly more limited in Zimbabwe. In line with these differences, responses to interview requests also
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varied. The (former) Burundian political elites were eager to engage with a foreign researcher in order to present their version of the story whereas Zimbabweans sometimes feared speaking their mind. Potential interview partners in Zimbabwe hung up phone calls when they found out the topic of my research or claimed that they did not know anything about the sanctions even though they held political positions that clearly suggest otherwise. Going beyond the crucial issue of timing, this also reflects varying degrees of political openness at the time when I conducted the interviews. Interview partners in Zimbabwe were more afraid of state-sponsored violence and the security apparatus than their counterparts in Burundi. Without neglecting valid criticism of the index, Freedom House captures this differences by categorizing Burundi as partly free and Zimbabwe as not free for the year of my field research (Freedom House 2013, 2014). This challenge of uneven access cannot be ‘solved’ if one conducts comparative research in authoritarian settings, but two on-site stays in Zimbabwe, trust building measures that allowed interview partners there to open up (see description below) and triangulation of sources served to minimize the differences via-à-vis the more ‘accessible’ Burundi.

In addition to being guided by the practical necessity to keep my on-site research in Zimbabwe as short as possible in order to minimize potential risks for my local partners and colleagues, the resulting two stays allowed me to re-visit the country. Consequently, I could re-think the preliminary conclusions drawn after the first stay. On the downside, this also meant conducting interviews at two different moments: The first stay was relatively close to the 2013 elections from which ZANU-PF emerged victorious and which shaped much of the public debate whereas the second stay occurred at a time that was dominated inter alia by discussions about intra-oppositional and intra-regime struggles. Yet, this also put me in a unique position to experience how the sanctions debate evolved on the ground rather than following the discourse’s evolution from afar, which was particularly valuable with respect to a sanctions regime that lasted for over a decade and underwent significant changes.

The process of gaining access was not completed when the interview began. Rather, there was a prevailing need to engage in trust building during the interviews given the high risk associated with speaking openly about political issues, especially in Zimbabwe. Gaining the interviewees’ trust was often a function of his or her perception of whether we agreed on a certain issue (see also Clark 2006, 420). To imply agreement, I chose reactions ranging from silence to nodding, echoing and active consent even if I disagreed with – or was even disgusted
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by – some of the positions voiced. In spite of all these limitations as regards conducting ‘textbook’ field research in a post-conflict and – at the same time – authoritarian context, great emphasis has been put on ensuring balanced research, the comparability of the results as well as the reliability and validity of the findings in the ways described above.

4.4. Analysis of the material

Interviews and focus groups were analyzed with the help of a coding framework that combined concept-based and data-driven categories. This process resembled a qualitative content analysis, without, however, strictly following the approach due to the nature of the interview material that was obtained during field research. Qualitative content analysis was introduced by Kracauer (1952). In his seminal article on ‘[t]he challenge of qualitative content analysis’, he emphasized the need to take the complex and context-depended nature of utterances into account (see also Holsti 1969). Qualitative content analysis serves to describe and assess the meaning the qualitative data (Scheufele 2008; Schreier 2014). By forcing the researcher to focus on the aspects of the material that relate to the research question, it synthesizes material in a systematic, yet flexible fashion (Schreier 2014). This (necessary) reduction in complexity notwithstanding, qualitative content analysis still aims at providing ‘a detailed description of the material under analysis’ (Schreier 2014, 173) and hence ideally serves the purpose of developing a comprehensive storyline or what is sometimes referred to as a ‘thick description’ of the cases.

At the heart of any qualitative content analysis lies the coding scheme. Usually, several fine-grained codes are sorted into broader categories (Hsieh and Shannon 2005), which should be both mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Cho and Lee 2014; Hsieh and Shannon 2005). This process includes developing the structure of the coding frame, defining the categories, expanding the analysis and lastly ensuring consistency by conducting two rounds of coding (Schreier 2014). Due to the nature of the data and practical considerations, this procedure was applied in a more flexible manner. Qualitative content analysis is normally used to work with written text generated through the transcription in the case of interview or focus group discussion material (Cho and Lee 2014; inter alia Scheufele 2008). Yet, interviews in Zimbabwe could not be recorded in the majority of the cases due to reservations of the interview partners. Hence, I took notes during the conversations instead of taping the interviews, which clearly constitutes a different point of departure in terms of the material available. In addition, following an excessively ridged coding procedure in a work that combines fsQCA with two field
research-based case studies would not be feasible within the temporal scope of this project. Instead, a coding scheme that accounts for clusters of information (for example the economic consequences of sanctions) rather than the exact wording was developed (see Appendix I) and then applied to the interview notes and transcripts.

In qualitative content analysis, data is structured through a concept- and/or data-driven categories (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Schreier 2014, 176). This ‘the flexibility of using inductive or deductive approaches or a combination of both approaches in data analysis’ (Cho and Lee 2014, 4) is one of its distinct characteristics. Concept-driven categories may build on theories, prior (own) research, interview guides or a combination thereof. Key conditions or variables can also be used as categories for the coding process. Data-driven categories, as the name suggests, are generated from the interviews or documents analyzed through subsumption and progressive summarization (Mayring and Fenzl 2014; Schreier 2014). More specifically, this entails to subsume specific argumentations under broader categories or to progressively summarize new aspects into more general schemes if they do not fit previously established categories. In the present case, the concept-driven categories were derived from a combination of the fsQCA results and the interview guide, which in turn were guided by the theoretical framework. Other aspects identified as crucial during the analysis, which are italicized in the coding scheme in Appendix I, supplemented them. For example, a significant number of interviewees mentioned the anti-sanctions petition in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, it was incorporated into the coding scheme as an anti-sanctions propaganda tool and previously analyzed interviews were re-read to account for this novel piece of information.

The combined concept- and data-driven analysis of the interviews can then serve as a starting point to further assess patterns and relations between different categories (Gibbs 2007). In the present analysis, special attention was paid to the interplay of the two key conditions identified in the fsQCA and traced in more detail in the case studies, namely statements that point to deprivation- (or grievance-)induced anti-regime mobilization and the role of sanctions signals. Consequently, interview material could be assigned to more than one category in the coding scheme. This holds especially true for statements that establish a connection between the sanctions’ political message and their economic consequences. If an interviewee, for example, argued that sanctions did not have an economic effect because they only served to

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62 The method’s extremely time consuming nature has indeed been described as one of its major shortcomings (Cho and Lee 2014).
highlight individuals’ responsibility for human rights violations, this narrative related both to the assessment of the measures’ socio-economic impact and their signaling dimensions. While the coding scheme (see Appendix I) at first sights looks as if it draws a line between these two dimensions, this practice of assigning statements to several categories if applicable – which deviates from the classical qualitative content analysis focus on mutually exclusive categories – allowed analyzing the interplay between sanctions signals and (the framing of) their economic impact.

Proponents of qualitative content analysis have not proposed a detailed set of criteria for evaluation the findings’ quality, but strategies such as triangulation and the discussion of representative quotations have been debated (Cho and Lee 2014) and were employed. In other words, key argumentations and concepts are illustrated by characteristic verbatim quotations from the interviews so that the reader himself or herself can review the interpretation. Moreover, the interviews are supplemented with document analysis and – in the case of Zimbabwe – focus groups. Moreover, the case studies are integrated into a multi-method research design, which brings together fsQCA, process-tracing analysis and the structured, focused comparison of the two cases.

4.5. Concluding remarks

This section has set out to describe how the case studies were conducted. Based on a broad notion of scientific causal inquiry, causal-process tracing – in combination with some elements of congruence analysis – was introduced as an adequate tool for digging deeper into the combinations of conditions identified in the fsQCA. Causal-process tracing serves to undercover how the interplay of numerous conditions is related to the outcome of interest by means of a thick description of the temporal unfolding of events. To achieve this goal, material from semi-structured interviews and focus groups as well as documents is examined. This analysis is guided by a coding scheme that integrates concept-based and data-driven categories in the vein of qualitative content analysis. The careful choice of interview partners, a transparent reflection of potentially detrimental conditions during field research and the triangulation of different sources helped to ensure the quality of the results and their intersubjective accessibility.
5. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Burundi (1996-1999)

While in the past Burundi tended to be forgotten, particularly in Anglophone African Studies (Watt 2008, ix), ‘Rwanda’s false twin’ has increasingly been ‘discovered’ by area studies specialists and conflict scholars alike. Just to name a few examples, recent studies on Burundi have addressed the ambiguities of regional and international peacebuilding efforts (Curtis 2013; Murithi 2008; Street, Mollett, and Smith 2008; Wodrig 2014), (local) power sharing (Lemarchand 2007; Simons, Zanker, Mehler, and Tull 2013; Vandegeinst 2009; Zanker, Simons, and Mehler 2015), and the conflict’s ethnic dimension (Bundervoet 2009; Daley 2007; Samii 2013a). Despite this new wave of Burundi-related literature, one development that profoundly affected domestic dynamics of contention has only been addressed at the margins and if so, mostly in terms of its humanitarian rather than political repercussions: the regional sanctions that lasted from 1996 to 1999.

In response to the former president Buyoya’s assumption of power in 1996 in a bloodless coup d’état, the neighboring countries implemented a comprehensive embargo. At the same time, the US and EU imposed aid sanctions. According to contemporary witnesses and scholars alike, these measures significantly contributed to rendering possible the Arusha peace process which started in 1998 as they forced the government to negotiate with more openness and according to the conditions set by the sanctions senders (Grauvogel 2015; Khadiagala 2003; Lemarchand 2001; Maundi 2003; Ndikumana 2000). To what extent and, even more importantly, how sanctions influenced opposition politics during that period, however, remains unclear.

To address this question, this chapter will first provide an overview of Burundi’s conflict ridden history and the events that led to the 1996 putsch preceding the embargo. In doing so, it will discuss the domestic power struggle before the coup and how external actors – both from the region and beyond – attempted to address the unfolding crises. Subsequently, the two

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63 Both the regional embargo and the aid sanctions influenced the leverage of anti-regime actors, as the subsequent analysis will show. Nevertheless, the former was more detrimental in economic terms and also received the lion’s share of domestic attention. Hence, the analysis will focus on the regional measures and only refer to the EU and US measures when this adds to understanding of the unfolding of events in a meaningful way.
5. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Burundi (1996-1999)

Theoretical approaches to explaining opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions that were confirmed for the case of Burundi in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis will be examined in the second section. To recall the fsQCA, the interplay of socio-economic deprivation and external support for the major opposition movements’ goals should explain the increase in anti-regime activity in Burundi between 1996 and 1999 despite limited political opportunities. As regards the former, the chapter will show how the regional trade restrictions and aid sanctions pressured the government into concessions that it would not have made otherwise and that indirectly benefited the opposition. Critically, revisiting the theoretical assumptions, it will also detail why the comprehensive trade restrictions nevertheless failed to trigger popular mobilization. With respect to the signaling dimension, the fact that the sanctions denied the putschist government legitimacy will be identified as crucial for enhancing the political leverage of regime critical actors. Finally, the explanatory power of these two approaches will be contrasted with other important factors for assessing opposition activity in Burundi identified in the analysis, namely the repercussions of the 1998 power-sharing agreement.

5.1. Setting the historical context

Historical accounts have been frequently used to develop and re-enforce political myths in manifold ways in the Great Lakes region (Vansina 1998). In Burundi, the assassination of independence hero Rwagasore in 1962, the 1972 and 1988 outbreak of large-scale ethnic violence, and the murder of president Ndadaye in 1993 constitute politically defining moments of its post-independence history. These events have been characterized, explained and assessed in radically different terms. Even seemingly factual data or recurrently employed terminology is used in widely varying ways, which often occurs along ethnic lines. For example, Tutsi accounts generally refer to those responsible for the massacres following the death of Ndadaye in 1993 when talking about ‘génocidaires’, whereas Hutu ones generally describe these events as ‘la petite colère populaire’, i.e. the small popular anger (Vandeginste 2010, 30). In contrast, Hutu versions describe the mass killings of 1965, 1972 and 1988 as genocides.

64 Taking into account the human suffering that occurred during these years, the term ‘event’ appears entirely inappropriate, but it very much reflects the way the Burundians I met spoke about these tragic ‘événements’ (Vandeginste 2010, 15).

65 In Burundi, Hutu comprise about 85 percent of the population according to a frequently population census and Tutsi about 14 percent with the remaining one percent consists of the group called Twa. Interestingly, these widely cited statistics go back to a poll of the 1930s. Even though many Burundians have both Hutu and Tutsi among their grandparents or parents, they generally self-identify as either Hutu or Tutsi according to their fathers’ status (Mann 2006, 430–431).
(Dupont 1997). Based on these cleavages, scholars have likewise accused each other’s interpretations of being pro-Tutsi or pro-Hutu (inter alia Chrétien 1990b; Lemarchand 1989a; Reyntjens 1990). In the following, I will sketch why it is of tremendous importance to reflect on the notion of ethnicity in the Burundian context before outlining historical development preceding the regional sanctions.

The diverging interpretations of events have provided a blueprint against which Burundians have tried to make sense of subsequent political and societal developments. Rather than comprehending the Burundian civil war and previous incidents of mass violence as the result of century-old ethnic rivalry, ethnicity must hence be understood as having ‘its own history’ (Fuhlrott 2008, 55), which has not only been used by the political leadership in their struggle to control the state, but has also influenced identity formation beyond the elite level (Daley 2006; Uvin 1999). While one cannot explain Burundi’s history on the basis of primordialist arguments about the inherently conflictive nature of Hutu-Tutsi relations, it would be equally inadequate to deny that Burundians have fundamentally different views on the conflict, which has paved the way for reductivist ethnic explanations (see also Barltrop 2008; Stamnes and Wyn Jones 2000, 47). Even if such ethnic distinctions do not have an ‘objective’ basis, as both groups share the same language, religion, tradition, and customs, perceived differences have had very concrete and extremely deadly consequences throughout Burundi’s (post-)colonial history. Ethnicity constitutes an important category of self-identification and shapes the perception of others, their arguments and behavior. In other words, ethnicity is a social construct, yet inseparably tied to very ‘real’ political and social developments in Burundi (Laely 1997).

This insight has shaped my research on Burundi in two fundamental and closely related ways. Firstly, it has profoundly affected how I have addressed ethnic questions throughout the research process. Avoiding the danger of reinforcing simplistic ethnic interpretations of the conflict without neglecting the people’s (ethnic) self-identification constituted a tremendous challenge. While I carefully attempted not to turn ethnicity as a category of practice that shapes every day and political life into a category of analysis (Brubaker 2002, 2006), I could at the same time not deny the importance of ‘the ethnic’ during my field research. Nevertheless, I deliberately chose not to ask my interview partners about their ethnicity in order not to forestall ethnically biased interpretations of political developments.66 More often than not,

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66 However, I generally knew about my interview partners’ ethnic affiliation before the interviews, as this is an established fact for public figures in Burundi.
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However, my interview partners referred to their ethnic self-identification when detailing their standpoints (BDI2; BDI5; BDI15; BDI17; BDI21; BDI29; BDI33).

Second, it soon became clear that understanding Burundi’s more recent political developments requires profound knowledge of past events and how they have contributed to the politicization of said ethnic identities. Once again, the interviews illustrate this in a significant way. Most Burundians I spoke to extensively referred to historical events that occurred decades before my period of analysis and what it meant for them (as Hutu or Tutsi) without me explicitly asking about it when reflecting regime and opposition politics during the time of the embargo (inter alia BDI2; BDI17; BDI18; BDI21; BDI26; BDI27; BDI30; BDI33; BDI34). It is for these reasons that this chapter will provide a rather detailed overview on Burundi’s post-colonial history, with a particular emphasis on the making (and unmaking) of intertwined political and ethnic identities. In doing so, different and oftentimes contradicting interpretations of the unfolding of ethno-political strife will be sketched rather than trying the impossible, that is to provide a universally accepted account of Burundi’s history (see also Vandeginste 2010, 15). Hopefully, this will contribute to raising awareness about how careful the notion of ethnicity must be employed, but also to understand the political salience of these categories.

5.1.1. (Post-)colonial authoritarian legacies

Burundi is a small land-locked country in the Great Lakes region in Eastern Africa, which borders Tanzania, DRC, Rwanda and the Lac Tanganyika. It is situated just south of the equator and has a superficies of 27,830 sq. km and a population of approximately 10 million inhabitants (CIA Factbook 2015a), making it one of the most densely populated countries in the entire world. Burundi’s territory is hilly, with the shores of the lake Tanganyika at approximately 800 meters above the sea level being its lowest parts and mountains rising up to 2600 meters constituting the highest elevations. The economy is predominantly agricultural; 90 percent of the population lives from subsistence farming. Coffee and tea are the major cash crops that account for over 90 percent of the foreign exchange earnings (ibid.).

Pre-colonial Urundi – today’s Burundi – was a kingdom organized through a political and social system that build on complex and interrelated clan, regional and ethnic group organization. At that time, Burundi unlike other African countries was characterized by stable boundaries and a fairly well-established political system, i.e. a feudal system headed by a Tutsi king (Nsanze

67 Interviews are referenced as BDI1-35; the interviewees’ full name (if they waived anonymity) and their function are indicated in Appendix G.
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2003, 11–17). Burundi and neighboring Rwanda were incorporated into German East Africa at the end of the 19th century (Abrams 1995; Gahama 2001): During the Berlin Conference of 1885, Germany claimed Burundi as part of its sphere of interest and in 1899, Rwanda-Urundi became a German military district. In 1916, Belgium troops occupied the area. Five years later, in 1923, the League of Nations officially mandated Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium. Following World War II, the two countries became a United Nations Trust Territory under Belgian administrative authority.

The Germans and Belgians administered the territory through indirect rule, building on the already existing Tutsi-dominated aristocratic hierarchy and the ubugabire system of socio-ethnic stratification (Daley 2006). Believing the Tutsi to be more capable, they favored them into state positions, thereby exacerbating the political importance of ethnic differences (Gahama 2001; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Stamnes and Wyn Jones 2000). This constituted a significant departure from pre-colonial understandings of Hutu and Tutsi as being a status that was open to change and social mobility (Eller 2002, 202–206; Scherrer 1999; Watt 2008, 27) and intensified the potential for conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, but also between different Tutsi dynasties (Lemarchand 1994a, 42).

Ruanda-Urundi gained independence as two separate entities, with Burundi becoming a constitutional monarchy ruled by a government of mixed ethnic origins in July 1962. The independence movement was led by the cross-ethnic nationalist Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA, Union for National Progress), which won the legislative elections on 8 September 1961 with approximately 80 percent of the votes cast. Its leader Prince Louis Rwagasore became prime minister, but was shot to death only two weeks later (Mukuri 2013, 204–215; Nsanze 2003, 56–59). His assassination was most probably organized by the rival Parti Démocratique Chrétien (PCD, Christian Democratic Party); available evidence suggests that this move was ‘actively encouraged’ by the Belgium administration (Lemarchand 1994a, 55).

The following years were characterized by endemic political instability and ethnic polarization. Political turmoil and ethnic strive were especially shaped by two developments, UPRONA’s leadership struggle in Burundi and the increasingly ethicized conflict in neighboring Rwanda. In

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68 Even though colonial rule certainly fixed and politicized ethnic identities, it is commonly agreed that they existed – albeit as a social status – previously. Notwithstanding these developments, the Burundian society was surprisingly free of violent Hutu-Tutsi tensions until the early 1960s (Lemarchand 1989a) and many Burundians did not pay much attention to their ethnic identity even until the 1972 massacres (Watt 2008, for more details see below).
terms of the leadership struggle in Burundi, the death of liberation hero Rwagasore, who had promoted an inter-ethnic struggle for national independence, lead to a power struggle over his succession. Two fractions within UPRONA, the Monrovia and the Casablanca group, which were named after two informal groups of African states with different political visions of the future of the continent, fought for supremacy. They were often described in ethnic terms as the party’s Hutu and Tutsi wings (Lemarchand 1994a, 65; Nugent 2012, 116), but in fact also separated by their respective capitalist and socialist political vision (see Vandeginste 2010, 19ff for a more detailed account).

When the Casablanca group gained the upper hand, UPRONA eventually became an ethnic Tutsi party, further aided by the influx of politically very active Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. Their flight was caused by developments in Rwanda that had a profound impact on the situation in Burundi, even beyond the influx of Rwandese Tutsi. During the so-called Social Revolution that occurred in Rwanda between 1959 and 1961, Tutsi were subject to mass murder by the new Hutu-led regime. Headed by the Hutu Grégoire Kayibanda, the new Rwandan government had assumed power after a small insurgency of Hutu peasants against the rule of Tutsi chiefs. On the one hand, this created fear of suffering similar atrocities like the Rwandese Tutsi among Burundian Tutsis. On the other hand, the dominated Hutu government in Rwanda nurtured ambitions to establish an own majority-led government on the side of Burundian Hutu, who were at the same time anxious about preventive repression by the Tutsi (Fuhlrott 2008, 57; Mehler 1995; Uvin 1999).

Between 1962 and 1966, six prime ministers, two of whom fell victim to political murder, failed to stabilize the constitutional monarchy (Loft 1988). Social and political unrest in Burundi peaked in 1965, which also marked the end of Hutu participation in politics for the following decades (Reyntjens 1994, 223–236). On 15 January 1965, Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe was assassinated. This, together with the king’s refusal to appoint a Hutu as his successor, set in motion a series of Hutu uprisings, which were brutally repressed by the Tutsi-dominated government. On 15 December 1965, Tutsi soldiers killed many of the Hutu members of the government during a reprisal effort to stop a coup by Hutu gendarmerie and army officers (Mukuri 2013, 303). The monarchy, which had lost its legitimacy by that time, was finally overthrown by the young Tutsi army captain Michel Micombero who seized power on 28 November 1966 and declared a republic (Lemarchand 1994a, 59ff). He abolished the parliament, transformed UPRONA into the regime’s unitary party and ruled the de facto
military regime through a National Revolutionary Council (Nsanze 2003, 128-130). Micombero headed a clique of ruling Hima, a Tutsi subgroup originating from southern Burundi. This ruling elite represented a very narrow social base and thus relied heavily on repression to secure its position (Horowitz 1994; Uvin 1999). Similar to 1965, rumors of Hutu military officers and civilians plotting to overthrow Micombero again prompted the arrest and execution of key Hutu political and military figures in 1969 (Weinstein 1976, 20).

The rise of Tutsi-Hima under Micombero pitted them against the traditionally higher-ranked Tutsi-Banyaruguru, who allegedly planned to overthrow Micombero and to bring back the king in 1971 (Lemarchand 1994a, 76–105). In an attempt to exploit these developments, some Hutu staged a rebellion in the southern part of the country on 29 April 1972. According to missionary sources, approximately thousand Tutsi lost their lives during the uprising (Chrétien and Dupaquier 2007, 196). This was met by an army response ‘so brutal as to qualify as genocide’ (International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi 2002, paragraph 85). Initially, the assessment of the events varied: While Chrétien (1990a) described the ‘events’ as a Hutu slaughter, others qualified the mass killings of Hutu as a (selective) genocide (Des Forges 1994; Lemarchand and Martin 1974). Over the years, however, insights into about the large-scale massacres increased and today, hardly any scholar doubts their character as a genocide (see Chrétien and Dupaquier 2007, 9).

According to different estimates, between 100,000 and 300,000 Hutu were killed and 150,000 more fled the country (Lemarchand 2008, 2) while an unknown number of Tutsi also lost their lives because they were considered as too moderate or tried to protect Hutu neighbors. After killing army officers and gendarmes, the Tutsi-controlled army and militant youths began targeting all educated Hutu; almost all secondary school teachers were reported missing by June 1972 (Lemarchand 2008, 5). Despite the prior occurrence of purges described above, the 1972 outbreak of ethnic violence constitutes the ‘watershed’ event for the re-construction of ethnic identities in Burundi based on the attempted extinction of Hutu identity by Tutsi and the dehumanization of Tutsi in the Hutu collective memory (Lemarchand 1994a, 76, 1994b). As such, it has become the most deeply engrained reference point for Burundians and constitutes a collective trauma until today (Fuhlrott 2008, 59; Ndikumana 2000; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000). Rather than exclusively understanding 1972 as the inevitable consequence of steadily growing inter-ethnic enmities fueled by the Tutsi monopolization of state power, however, one
must also take into account that the immediate unfolding of events was also influenced by intra-Tutsi cleavages.

In 1976, Tutsi Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza took over in a bloodless coup d’état. In contrast to his predecessor, he denied Hutu-Tutsi differences in order to prevent demands for ethnic power sharing, and coopted the few Hutu willing to join the government with 1972 still fresh in mind into the government (Des Forges 1994). In accordance with Bagaza’s policy to ban public references to ethnic origins, the Burundian historian Mworoha, one of the regime’s key figures, argued that the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage had been entirely made up by the colonial powers (Lemarchand 1994a, 108). In addition, Bagaza embarked on a discourse of development and promoted economic reforms. The public service was re-organized and large infrastructure projects were initiated. Coupled with the reestablishment of order in the public sphere, this secured Bagaza a certain popularity at the beginning of his rule (BDI24; Cornwell and de Beer 1999, 84; Manirakiza 2007). On the other hand, his regime became well-known for suppressing political opponents and a conflict with the church, who he suspected of stirring Hutu resistance (Cornwell and de Beer 1999; Manirakiza 2007, 7–10; Nsanze 2003). Major Pierre Buyoya eventually overthrew Bagaza in 1987.

5.1.2. Failed transition to democracy

In August 1988, a Hutu-led insurrection in the northern provinces of Ntega and Marangara, during which several thousand Tutsi lost their lives, once again provoked brutal revenge attacks by the military. According to Amnesty International estimates up to 20,000 Hutu were killed by the army, which used helicopters and armored vehicles to chase the victims (Des Forges 1994)69. In contrast to the 1972 genocide, the 1988 massacres received broad international attention, not least because Hutu movements established throughout the country and well-connected to the outside world were able to spread information (Watt 2008, 41). The resulting international outcry forced Buyoya to embark on a transition process.

In a first reaction to the unprecedented international media coverage, a national consultative commission for studying the question of national unity was set up, which comprised 12 Hutu and 12 Tutsi (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1988). The Commission initiated countrywide symposia and drafted a Charter providing recommendations on how to address the ethnic

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69 Interpretations of the 1988 events differ significantly (Vandeginste 2010, 26): according to (predominantly Tutsi) accounts, it was caused by Hutu tribalism, whereas others (Hutu) characterize it as a pre-emptive rise against plans to finish the 1972 massacre.
cleavage. This proposal was approved by 89 percent of the population in a national referendum in 1991 (Lemarchand 1989b). At the same time, Buyoya slowly began to open up the system of minority rule that had constituted the defining feature of Burundian politics since the abolition of the monarchy in 1966. The newly appointed cabinet was ethnically balanced and headed by a Hutu Prime Minister (Reyntjens 1993, 564). In 1992, a new constitution introducing multi-party democracy was approved in another country-wide referendum (République du Burundi 1992). It stipulated the participation of all components of the Burundian society at all levels of the state (for details, see Reyntjens 1992).

Based on the new constitution, legislative and presidential elections were held in 1993. UPRONA’s main contender was the newly legalized Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU, English: Front for Democracy in Burundi), which been created from the disbanded Burundi Workers’ Party in 1986. Melchior Ndadaye became the party’s presidential candidate. Contrary to Buyoya’s expectation to secure an easy victory based on favorable projections by the state-owned media as well as the assessment of international outlets and diplomatic missions in Bujumbura (Palmans 2004; Reyntjens 1993, 586; Sullivan 2005; Young 1996), Buyoya was defeated. While Buyoya had expected to be rewarded by the population for having opened the political space, he only received 32.39 percent of the votes as opposed to 64.75 percent for Ndadaye during the elections, which were judged as free and fair by national and international observers (Reyntjens 1993, 569). The results for UPRONA were even worse during the following parliamentary elections; the party only gained a meager 21.43 percent as opposed to FRODEBU’s 71.4 percent. This outcome constituted ‘a virtual political earthquake’ (Reyntjens 1993, 573) after almost three decades of ethno-regional Tutsi minority rule. In addition to suffering from a misled electoral campaign failing to target the rural population like FRODEBU did (Vorrath 2008), UPRONA in fact enjoyed little popular support as a truly national party (Reyntjens 1993, 573). Ruling president Buyoya accepted defeat and handed over power to Ndadaye, which earned him the reputation as a good student of democracy (Uvin 1999).

The new government celebrated their electoral victory carefully in an attempt to gain the Tutsi minority’s trust. It also made attempts at coalition building with the former ruling elite by appointing a Tutsi prime minister as well as an ethnically balanced cabinet (Cornwell and de Beer 1999; Des Forges 1994; Dupont 1997). While the power sharing stipulated in the

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70 Until October 1988, fourteen ministers (out of 19) and twelve provincial governors (out of fifteen) were Tutsi. Likewise, Tutsi dominated other institutions including the party and judiciary (95 percent Tutsi), the University of Bujumbura (88 percent of the faculty staff) and the army (approximately 99 percent).
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The constitution was well respected at the top level, ethno-political favoritism at the lower levels created dissatisfaction. A significant number of Hutu entered civil service – a process referred to as ‘Frodebisation’ (Reyntjens 2000, 13). The new government also set out to re-distribute the country’s resources. Investment into the agricultural sector was drastically increased to 50 percent of the national budget (compared to 20 percent under the previous regimes) in order to capacitate the 90 percent of the population living in rural areas (Reyntjens 1993; Sullivan 2005; Uvin 1999). This shift in government spending signaled a clear departure from the former regime, which had been biased towards urban, predominantly Tutsi interests. Finally, Tutsi insecurities were also nurtured by the government’s promised guarantee to return for the refugees that had left the country in 1965, 1972 and 1988 (Prunier 1994) and by an amnesty law, which was meant to shield Hutu involved in violence against Tutsi from potential criminal persecution (Nsanje 2003, 317). At the same time, Tutsi preserved their control over the security forces, which they considered as a life insurance (Young 1996; Sullivan 2005). As a result, the army became an important veto player in domestic politics and hampered democratic gains (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Lemarchand 1994b; Reyntjens 1993).

The democratic transition was halted only four months after the election. On 21 October 1993, Tutsi officers assassinated Ndadaye and the entire line of succession, i.e. the president and vice-president of the National Assembly who would have been constitutionally entitled to take over his position (Des Forges 1994, Prunier 1994). This severely weakened FRODEBU. Moreover, Ndadaye’s death resulted in a definite realignment along ethnic lines. FRODEBU members and the Hutu population generally responded violently, killing as many as 25,000 Tutsi, who were held responsible for Ndadaye’s assassination in what has been characterized as a genocide (International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi 2002, paragraph 486; Vandeginste 2009). The Tutsi-dominated army carried out vengeance acts against the Hutu population in a so-called ‘pacification campaign’, killing a similar number of Hutu and forcing several hundred thousand into exile (Cornwell and de Beer 1999; Evans 1997, 51).

The attempted takeover by the army – which collapsed after two days – was later described as ‘one of the most successful failed coups in history’ (Reyntjens 1995, 16). Subsequently, UPRONA successfully exploited FRODEBU’s fear to completely lose control over the country, recovering

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71 In contrast, the report of a May 1994 preparatory UN fact-finding mission to Burundi concluded that the massacres were not part of ‘any premeditated plan for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group by the Hutu’, but rather the consequences of the coup and the political assassinations of 21 October 1993 (United Nations 1995, 33).
much of the power lost during the 1993 elections (Cornwell and de Beer 1999; Reyntjens 2005, 117). After several rounds of negotiations known as the Kigobe and Kajaga talks, the 1992 constitution was amended. This paved the way for the election of Ndadaye’s successor by the National Assembly (Ould-Abdallah 2000). The new government was supposed to solidify a political compromise: Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Hutu, but considered a moderate in Ndadaye’s tradition, became president whereas Anatole Kanyenkiko, an UPRONA figure, was made prime minister. But power over the state in reality shifted back into the hands of the Tutsi-controlled military as the National Security Council dominated by Tutsi controlled government affairs (Lemarchand 1994a, xx). Burundi hence became a prime example of a deeply flawed transition during which a new government comes into power through elections, but the underlying system of governance does not change and the former elites continue to control key institutions (Lemarchand 1994b).

Ntaryamira, who died in the same plane crash as Rwanda’s president Habyarimana (said to spark a genocide in the neighboring country), was succeeded by the parliamentary spokesperson Sylvestre Ntibantunganya on the basis of a ‘Convention of Government’ signed by ten political parties on 10 September 1994. It codified the successive political compromise between FRODEBU and UPRONA (Ould-Abdallah 2000, 67–76). Taking the idea of power sharing to its extreme – even the embassies’ personnel was carefully divided – the agreement soon turned out to be dysfunctional (Lemarchand 2007). Continuous infighting and a relationship between Ntibantunganya and prime minister Antoine Nduwayo characterized by deep mutual mistrust paralyzed the coalition government (Manirakiza 2007, 43; Zacarias 1996).

With a government unable to address the deteriorating security situation, the country was increasingly drawn into a civil war, which claimed an estimated 300,000 lives from a total population of around 6.7 million in 2000. New Hutu-dominated rebel movements like the Front pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD, English: Front for the Defence of Democracy) emerged, which was created on 20 March 1994 in an attempt to unite all popular resistance under a common banner (Ndikumana 2000). At the same time, FRODEBU split over disagreement whether to fight the perpetrators of the failed coup that led to Ndadaye’s death. The break-away fraction led by Léonard Nyangoma eventually became the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD, National Council for the Defense of Democracy) in

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72 Some estimates put the death toll as high as 500,000 (Mwakikagile 2013, 130), but the most widely cited figure are 300,000 victims (for example Fuhlrott 2007, 325; Lemarchand 2007, 11; Samii 2013b, 4).
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September 1994 (Nindorera 2012). In addition, long-standing Hutu extremist movements such as Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu, English: Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) fought the Tutsi-controlled national army with renewed determination (Piombo 2010). The conflict in Burundi that began in 1993 is oftentimes viewed as an ethnic conflict between the historically disadvantaged Hutu majority and the politically, economically, and militarily dominant Tutsi minority. Nonetheless, viewing the conflict exclusively through an ethnic lens fails to capture many of the important nuances in Burundi’s history and social structure sketched above. Ethnicity was a critical element, which has certainly been used as a tool for exclusion and mobilization, but other factors such as the nature of the state, regional and urban–rural divisions, a politicized military and the political developments in neighboring countries also played a crucial role. In the next sections, I will shed further light at these domestic dynamics, and how they were shaped by regional and international peacemaking efforts.

5.1.3. Regional and international peacemaking efforts

When examining the impact of sanctions on opposition mobilization, understanding the interplay between external attempts to address the crisis and domestic dynamics of contention is crucial. Accordingly, how regional as well as international peacebuilding preceding the embargo (1996-1999) developed against the backdrop of a violent power struggle within Burundi will be sketched in the following two sections as to provide the necessary background.

Alarmed by the widespread violence that followed the death of president Ndadaye in 1993, the United Nations at first considered a military intervention. Because of Western powers’ rejection to contribute personal and financial resources to such a large mission, the Security Council instead welcomed the Secretary General’s decision to dispatch a Special Envoy (UN Security Council 1993a, 1993b). The then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, who established a small diplomatic mission in November 1993, the United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB). It was tasked to restore the democratic institutions abrogated by the failed coup, to establish a commission of inquiry into the events surrounding the putsch as well as the subsequent mass violence, and to ensure dialogue between the key actors of the crisis in close collaboration with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Jackson 2006, 5). Ould-Abdallah was indeed instrumental in facilitating the election of Ntaryamira as the new president after Ndadaye’s assassination and paving the way for the 1994 Convention
of Government following Ntaryamira’s death (Dupont 1997; see also Ould-Abdallah 2000 for a certainly biased, but self-critical reflection of his good offices). Following disagreement within the United Nations about the future strategy to address the crisis in Burundi, Ould-Abdallah resigned in 1995 and was replaced by the Canadian diplomat Marc Fanguy.

At the same time, regional efforts to peacemaking proliferated. Soon after attending the first regional summit in Kigali held after the 1993 coup, the OAU decided to dispatch a military force in Burundi to protect the FRODEBU-led government. Following violent demonstrations against this plan in Bujumbura, the OAU mission was downscaled to a couple of observers (Ould-Abdallah 2000, 50). In addition to deploying this modest International Observers Mission to Burundi (IOMB), the OAU supported the mediation initiative that former US president Jimmy Carter undertook in 1995 (Bizimana 1999, 59). This determination to continue to peacemaking efforts in Burundi after initial setbacks also reflected the will not to repeat the same mistakes that had been made in Rwanda. At a meeting of the member countries of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes, which took place in Cairo in November 1995, the presidents of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire announced a sub-regional initiative for a negotiated peace in Burundi (henceforth referred to as Regional Initiative) (Economic Community of the Great Lakes 1995). Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere served as a chief facilitator and was formally endorsed in that function during a subsequent meeting on 18 March 1996 in Tunis (Economic Community of the Great Lakes 1996). Based on his knowledge of Burundi and his international stature, he was regarded to be the ideal candidate for this task (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996b). With Uganda as chair and Nyerere in the role of regional facilitator, a first round of talks involving UPRONA, FRODEBU and eleven other Burundian parties took place in Nyerere’s hometown Mwanza in April and early June 1996 without any major achievements (Barltrop 2008).

Moreover, track-two diplomacy by various NGOs played an increasingly important role. In an attempt to mainstream their efforts, the Great Lakes Policy Forum – sometimes also referred to as Burundi Policy Forum – was established in 1995 in Washington under the auspices of several organizations including ‘Search for Common Ground’, the ‘Council on Foreign Relations’ and ‘Refugees International’. Simultaneously, ‘International Alert’ held a series of meetings in Europe (Search for Common Ground 2015; Rubin and Hara 1997). Consequently, an ever rising number of actors sought to mediate the conflict at the end of 1995: the United Nations and its special envoy Faguy, Nyerere, the European Union that had designated Aldo Ajello as a special
Due to the deteriorating security situation, the US and EU froze all non-emergency aid in May 1996\textsuperscript{73} – thereby unintentionally meeting the demand of Hutu rebels to impose an economic embargo on Burundi (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996b). While this move at first was a pragmatic response to the lack of safety for the personal of European development agencies on the ground, the continuation turned these measures into more politically charged aid sanctions. As they were frustrated by the negotiation’s slow pace, the regional heads of states increased pressure at a summit convened in Arusha on 31 June 1996, which ultimately lead to the re- establishment of the technical commission designated to evaluate the possibility of military assistance\textsuperscript{74}. Different accounts regarding who initially proposed this step exist, but it appears clear that FRODEBU supported the suggestion. UPRONA’s Prime Minister Antoine Nduwayo eventually joined president Ntibantunganya in requesting a regional intervention force (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c), which he later renounced (Manirakiza 2007; Watt 2008, 61)\textsuperscript{75}. During an opposition rally, Nduwayo accused FRODEBU of requesting military assistance under a secret plan to neutralize the Burundian army (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c). In addition to Tutsi officers, who rejected the plans to dispatch an intervention force as they feared they would lose control over the army considered to be the most important safeguard against a Rwanda-like genocide, Hutu rebels who aimed at winning the war also resisted the presence of a regional military mission (Brachet and Wolpe 2005; Omach 2000).

This controversial request for regional assistance as well as developments surrounding the president’s attendance of a funeral of 341 people of Tutsi origin massacred by Hutu militia, where he was attacked with stones by an angry crowd and then fled to the US embassy

\textsuperscript{73} While this move at first constituted a rather pragmatic response to the lack of safety for the personal of European development agencies on the ground, the continuation of aid freezes after the coup turned these measures into more politically charged aid sanctions in the public perception.

\textsuperscript{74} On 16 February 1996, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali had already proposed the deployment of a stand by force of 25,0000 in Burundi (Dupont 1997; Neethling 2005). This was turned down by the Security Council in Resolution 1049, which instead expressed preference for an intensification of the regional attempts to address the crisis in Burundi (UN Security Council 1996b).

\textsuperscript{75} While Ntibantunganya maintained during an interview with the author that Nduwayo had only pretended that he would agree from the onset (BDI26), other accounts suggest that Nduwayo himself was surprised by the degree of criticism voiced once he was back in Bujumbura, and hence decided to revoke his initial agreement.
(Bruderlein 1998; The New York Times 1996), marked the final breakdown of his authority. On 25 July 1996, the army installed Buyoya in a bloodless coup d'état (Nsanze 2003, 423). Showcasing his willingness to continue ethnic power sharing after the coup (Cornwell and de Beer 1999), Buyoya appointed Pascal-Firmin Ndimara, a Hutu member of UPRONA, as Prime Minister and a cabinet also that included Hutu from both FRODEBU and UPRONA (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1996c, 1996d). But before examining the domestic dynamics of contention after the imposition of sanctions, the constellation of key domestic actors shall briefly be highlighted.

5.1.4. **Key domestic actors**

Before turning to the implementation of regional sanctions, the complex struggle between various political and military actors at that time shall be briefly summarized. Burundi’s national army, the Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB) and the armed Hutu-led rebel movements CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Front pour la Défense de la Démocratie, English: National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy), FNL (Forces Nationales de Liberation, English: National Liberation Forces), and FROLINA (Front de Libération Nationale, English: National Liberation Front) fought in a civil war that lasted until 2004. Despite this continued struggle between Hutu-dominated rebel movements on the one hand and Tutsi militia as well as the Tutsi-dominated army on the other hand, it would be misleading to imagine a country being entirely at war. In many regions, normality prevailed to an astonishing degree, with coffee and other crops being harvested, the national brewery doing business and infrastructure projects continuing (BDI7; BDI22; BDI23; BDI28). Political activity did not cease either. For example, a joint delegation of UPRONA and FRODEBU prepared the National Debate foreseen in Article 52 of the Convention of Government (Ould-Abdallah 2000, 79). The conflict took place both in the military and in the political scene, with political parties struggling alongside armed groups and vice versa. This entanglement of armed groups and parties shaped domestic dynamics of contention during the time of the embargo and later became ‘a distinguishing feature of the Arusha peace process’ (Lindholt 2000, 15).

But who were these political groups and their armed counterparts? The key political parties at that time were FRODEBU and UPRONA. FRODEBU was initially set up clandestinely in 1986 and distinguished itself from the most important Hutu movement of that time, Palipehutu, in two major ways. Not only did the FRODEBU leadership choose political competition over armed
struggle, but it also had a broader regional base. As a result, FRODEBU became the largest Hutu movement by the end of the 1980s, and even managed to recruit Tutsi elites who were disenfranchised by the old regime (Cornwell and de Beer 1999), decisively contributing to its 1993 electoral victory. After the army’s failed coup in 1993 however, FRODEBU struggled to uphold control over the state vis-à-vis the military. Consequently, several Tutsi parties and organizations sought to undo the constitutional process of the 1990s and FRODEBU’s electoral victory of June 1993 in what has been described as a ‘creeping coup’ (Reyntjens 2000, 14).

FRODEBU’s authorities, who had sought refuge at the Hotel du Lac in Bujumbura after the coup attempt in October 1996, disagreed over how to confront the situation. The internal wing sought to avoid the complete unmaking of the 1993 election results through various power-sharing arrangements brokered by the UN Special Envoy. The Kigobe Accord stipulated that the prime minister had to come from a political party other than FRODEBU, and from another ethnic group, while the following Kajaga Accord also guaranteed that 40 percent of ministers, provincial governors and communal administrators should be Tutsi. Following Ntaryamira’s death, UPRONA claimed further government posts during the so-called Novotel negotiations, but repeatedly postponed the redistribution of positions within the army aspired by FRODEBU. FRODEBU’s attempts to accommodate the ever increasing demands of the Tutsi elite drastically reduced its autonomy to the point that observers characterize the situation as the restoration of the control of the former Tutsi elite under a Hutu president (Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach 2010).

Another faction within the party was unwilling to share power and decided to resist the creeping coup with violent means. Leonard Nyangoma, one of the party’s founders and minister of the Ndadaye cabinet, led their efforts, which were fueled by the UN decision not to intervene militarily to support the FRODEBU-led government. Many Hutu and erstwhile supporters of FRODEBU rejected the power-sharing deals with the former ruling elite based on ‘ever more embarrassing concessions’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c, 35) and agreed with Nyangoma’s assessment that armed struggle was necessary to force the army to accept the 1993 election results (Burihabwa 2014; Cornwell and de Beer 1999; Nindorera 2012). According to their perception, the party represented the idea of a peaceful transition of power, which had already failed in 1993/1994 with the abortive coup d’état. Increasingly displeased by

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76 In March 1994, Léonard Nyangoma who was opposed to the political compromise brokered by the UN special envoy Ould-Abdallah left Burundi (Ould-Abdallah 2000, 51).
FRODEBU’s policy of appeasement vis-à-vis the Tutsi-dominated army (Jackson 2006), parts of the party eventually broke off when the convention of government was signed in September 1994. This fraction, often referred to as the external wing because most members lived in exile, officially formed the CNDD on 24 September 1994. CNDD’s executive committee, which initially maintained close ties to FRODEBU, then became completely independent from the party in 1996.

In addition, a number of Hutu-dominated rebel movements were active at the time when sanctions were imposed in 1996 (for a good summary, see Lansford 2015, 211–215). The consisted of groups formed in exile during the 1980s and self-defense militia created after the assassination of Ndadaye in 1993. The most powerful, the FDD was established on 20 May 1994 in an attempt to unite the ongoing popular resistance. A former FDD fighter exemplarily summarized their reasoning: ‘Hutu had seen that the leader of the country needed a protective force. The existing security forced represented the main obstacle to gaining control of state institutions’ (quoted after Nindorera 2012, 13). The FDD was later integrated into the CNDD as its military wing (Burihabwa 2014). The other major armed rebel force was the Palipehutu (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu, English: Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People), which experienced various internal ruptures. In 1980, exiled Hutu founded Palipehutu in refugee camps in Tanzania and Rwanda. Following the endorsement of armed struggle against Tutsi domination, its armed wing FNL was formed in 1985 and split away as Palipehutu-FNL in the early 1990s (Ould-Abdallah 2000, 34). The smallest among the Hutu rebel groups, FROLINA, was another Palipehutu spin-off. Its leader Joseph Karumba coordinated its armed wing, the so-called People’s Armed Forces, from his exile in Tanzania.

The Tutsi-dominated actors, consisting of UPRONA, a number of small radical Tutsi parties and the army, were on no account more unified. While UPRONA officially joined the 1994 Convention of Government in 1994, the party’s leader Charles Mukasi remained outside the government. He headed the party’s radical wing, which called for the ousting of Ntibantunganya and the repudiation of the power-sharing agreement between UPRONA and FRODEBU (Reyntjens 1999, 9). In addition to these cleavages within the biggest Tutsi-dominated party, a number of smaller parties who were radically anti-Hutu emerged. Among them, the Parti pour le Redressement National (PARENA, Party for National Recovery), which was formed in May 1994 by the former president Bagaza, became the most influential. Allegedly linked to a number of Tutsi militia, PARENA refused to sign the 1994 Convention of
5. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Burundi (1996-1999)

Government based on its rejection to collaborate with FRODEBU politicians made responsible for the 1993 massacres of Tutsi (ibid.). Complementing the spectrum of militant Tutsi formations, radical youth gangs known as ‘Sans Échec’ and ‘Sans Défit’ (literally: without failure and without challenge) terrorized Hutu residents of Bujumbura, especially between 1993 and 1996 (Ndabiseruye 2009, 58; UN Commission on Human Rights 1995).

In short, the political scene was characterized by two key developments before the coup d’État in 1996. First, FRODEBU had increasingly lost control over the government vis-à-vis the attempts of radical Tutsis to unmake FRODEBU’s electoral victory on 1993. Second, the radicalization of different actors accelerated. Since the inauguration of the Hutu-led government, Tutsis feared revenge for their previous (oftentimes violent) domination of political life in Burundi and turned to the still Tutsi-controlled military as their safeguard. On the other hand, Hutus began to doubt their political leader’s strategy of compromise and appeasement as to maintain a certain degree of influence over the political development and turned to Hutu rebel movements such as the CNDD-FDD.

5.2. The sanctions against Burundi

Only six days after the coup on 25 July 1996 and the installation of Buyoya as President by the army, the heads of state of Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia met in Arusha. Using the framework of the Regional Initiative, they strongly condemned the coup and imposed sanctions to achieve a return to constitutional order, the restoration of political parties and ‘immediate and unconditional negotiations with all parties to the conflict’ (Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conflict 1996), which later also became the single most important condition for lifting the embargo. The sanction senders’ demands painted a vision of good governance and democratic rule for the region (Wodrig 2014; Wodrig and Grauvogel 2016). When reflecting on the decision to impose sanctions, Nyerere justified it in pointed terms: ‘These leaders who met in Arusha were really saying to the military regime in Burundi we can no longer accept military rule on our borders’ (interview with Hunter-Gault 1996).

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77 The Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front led the Rwandan government. In an attempt not to be accused of ethnic favoritism vis-à-vis the Tutsi president Buyoya in Burundi, without, at the same time, imposing further economic burdens on him, Rwanda officially supported the embargo but only reluctantly monitored it.
Nyerere, who had already suggested sanctions against Burundi before the coup in 1996 and felt that the military takeover undermined his mediation efforts, forcefully articulated the pro-sanctions case when Buyoya assumed power (BDI10; BDI12; BDI30; see also Wolpe 2011). The regional leaders affirmed his approach as they feared a further spill-over of the conflict, which had already led to an influx of Burundian refugees to the neighboring countries (BDI2; BDI10; BDI33; BDI34; Nimubona 2007). In addition, most heads of state had grown impatient with the former (Tutsi) elite’s reliance on unconstitutional means to hold on to power (Wodrig 2014; Wolpe 2011).

Despite the common declaration to impose a regional embargo, each country implemented the trade restrictions on a unilateral basis. The process was thus initially characterized by a stark lack of consultation, which not only complicated the use of sanctions as a tool to reward or penalize subsequent political activities by the Buyoya government, but also the cross-country coordination of humanitarian exceptions (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997). In response, a regional sanctions coordinating committee (RSCC) was established in September 1996 to monitor the sanctions’ effects and humanitarian impact (Regional Foreign Ministers Meeting 1996).

The international community at first welcomed the Regional Initiative and supported the sanctions by suspending all bilateral assistance (for an overview Prunier 1997, 16). Both the US and the EU expressed ‘support for the regional leaders’ (European Union 1996) and cancelled their financial assistance to the post-coup government (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005, 53–54).

In line with preceding international endorsements of the regional attempts to address the crisis in Burundi, the UN Security Council expressed ‘its strong support for the efforts of the regional leaders’ (UN Security Council 1996a). However, the resolution adopted on 30 August 1996 did not explicitly approve the imposition of sanctions. Given that the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Burundi had previously encouraged the international community to ‘envisage collective sanctions’ if Burundians authorities would not comply with the agreement on a military mission reached in Arusha (United Nations 1996), the Security Council resolution was interpreted as a rather “timid” endorsement of sanctions against the Buyoya regime (BDI21). According to deliberations behind closed doors that later became public, the members of the Security Council could not agree on authorizing sanctions in accordance with article 53 (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997). Two major concerns led to this hesitant position. First, there were fears that a comprehensive embargo would jeopardize the working conditions for relief agencies (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997). Moreover, the
international community’s declared priority was to avoid a second Rwanda, so that it favored relative stability over a prompt return to democratic rule (Dupont 1997; Ould-Abdallah 2000; Weissman 1998, 19–20).

France and Belgium in particular emphasized Buyoya’s past democratic credentials and the fact that he had initiated a process of national unification after the 1988 massacres. Buyoya’s reputation as a moderate – in their view – made him ‘the least of all evils’ in the words of Belgium’s foreign minister Eric Derycke and a viable alternative at a time when ‘peace and the search for national reconciliation overrides everything else’ as a French press statement put it (IRIN 1996). This cautious endorsement of Buyoya was also widespread amongst the expat community living in Bujumbura at that time and hence continuously communicated back to the respective countries of origin (BDI4). In that vein, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher also urged the regional governments to relax the trade restrictions in an attempt to strengthen Buyoya’s stance vis-à-vis Tutsi radicals during his visit to the region in fall 1996 (Weissmann 1997).

The imposition of the embargo was followed by on-going domestic and international negotiations and mediation attempts. While they will be addressed in much more detail below, key events shall be briefly introduced as to facilitate the understanding of the subsequent analysis. The sanctions lasted from 1996 to 1999. Until 1997, major humanitarian exemptions were in place and virtually all goods were available again, albeit much more expensive, as a result of smuggling. The regional sanctions senders major demands were the restoration of all constitutionally guaranteed institutions, namely political parties and the parliament and – even more importantly – unconditional peace negotiations with all parties to the conflict under the auspices of the regional mediation. Buyoya responded to the first set of demands by re-opening the National Assembly and allowing political parties in fall 1996, but simultaneously restricted their political leverage. Shortly afterwards, he entered into secret negotiations with the Hutu rebel movement CNDD-FDD, which, however, collapsed in spring 1997. Following continued pressure by the regional sanction senders, he initiated internal negotiations with FRODEBU at the beginning of 1998, which were concluded with a partnership agreement in June of this year. The embargo was eventually lifted in January 1999 after the Buyoya regime had made irrevocable commitments to the regionally sponsored Arusha peace process, including both FRODEDU and a number of Hutu rebel movements alongside other Tutsi and Hutu-dominated parties.
To recall the theoretical argument before delving into the analysis of the sanctions regime, I presented three potential explanations of how sanctions enable opposition movements in chapter two, namely deprivation-based approaches to anti-regime mobilization, changes in the political opportunity structures for voicing and enacting dissent, as well as signals of opposition approval creating perceived opportunities. The fsQCA conducted in the following chapter suggested that sanctions inter alia encourage anti-regime mobilization if they both increase feelings of deprivation and enhance perceived opportunities. This combination of conditions also characterizes the case of Burundi. More specifically, the fsQCA suggests that the interplay of socio-economic deprivation and external support for the major opposition movements’ goals led to an increase in anti-regime activity in Burundi between 1996 and 1999 despite limited political opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent. One word of caution is, however, in order: In contrast to the second case that will be examined in the case studies, namely Zimbabwe, anti-regime mobilization in Burundi was coded to be above the threshold for the higher subset, but far from overwhelming, receiving fuzzy values between 0.71 and 0.88 for the three sanctions episodes, namely the regional embargo as well as the EU and US aid sanctions.

As opposed to the other causal pathways identified in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this combination of factors constitutes a novel approach to explaining opposition politics in regimes under sanctions. It highlights the interplay of sanctions signals and their economic consequences in enabling opposition movements and thereby goes beyond previous research that either sees sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft or of symbolic politics. This path also comprising Burundi will hence be further examined in the case studies. As described in the theory chapter above, the analysis will be expanded beyond the deprivation mechanism insofar as the process-tracing analysis also allows examining the emergence or increase of group-related socio-economic grievances in Burundi after the imposition of sanctions. While this detailed information on how the sanctions’ economic consequences precisely affected certain politically salient groups was not available for all countries included in the fsQCA, the case study sheds light at this aspect. Moreover, the case study will also take into account the possibility that additional explanations for the trajectory of opposition mobilization in regimes

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78 For the other paths leading to the outcome, which point to the importance of social linkage previously highlighted by Levitsky and Way (2006, 2010) and importance of political opportunities and deprivation already stressed by Allen (2008), see chapter three.

79 The other two combinations of conditions point to well-known linkage and political opportunities/deprivation mechanisms (see chapter three).
confronting sanctions may be identified. Following the conjunctural logic of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, opposition mobilization can only be understood when accounting for the joint effect of both conditions, i.e. socio-economic deprivation and perceived opportunities created by sanctions signals. To enhance the analytical clarity of the case study, however, they will first be examined separately. In addition to discussing their interplay throughout each designated section, how both conditions interact in producing the outcome will then be addressed in detail in the concluding remarks.

5.2.1. Sanctions, grievances and deprivation
In order to reconstruct how the sanctions’ economic consequences affected anti-regime mobilization at that time, a nuanced understanding of how the regional embargo actually influenced Burundi’s socio-economic development is required. Most of the secondary literature offers generalizations ranging from ‘sanctions had a devastating effect’ (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 399; see also Oketch and Polzer 2002) to ‘[t]he economic embargo (...) was not effective’ (Daley 2007, 339). Going beyond such blunt statements, the sanctions’ varying spatial and temporal impact will be traced in the first step. In a second step, how this affected deprivation- and grievance-based anti-regime mobilization will be analyzed. The third section then offers an alternative view on how the financial constraints posed by the sanctions translated into increasing leverage for the opposition, while the final section outlines how a purely economic assessment falls short of capturing opposition politics under the embargo and thereby leads over to the subchapter addressing the signaling dimension.

INITIAL HARSH IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AND SUBSEQUENT EASING OF PRESSURE
Burundi’s geographic location, its close economic ties with the sanctions senders and its dependency on bi- and multilateral aid made it very vulnerable to external economic pressure. While being partially self-sufficient in food production, Burundi relied on imports for almost all other goods. As Burundi is landlocked, these were shipped through the port of the Tanzanian capital Dar es Salaam and, to a lesser extent, through the Kenyan port of Mombasa. Furthermore, Burundi depended heavily on official development assistance, which accounted for approximately 250 million US$ annually or almost 30 percent of its gross national income during the three years preceding the sanctions (World Bank 1996). In addition to technical assistance and project-based aid in the areas of rural and infrastructure development, water

80 Parts of this section are an extended and revised version of the discussion presented in the article ‘Regional Sanctions against Burundi: The Regime’s Argumentative Self-entrapment’ (Grauvogel 2015).
and sanitation, health, education etc., Burundi received loans made on concessional terms and grants by official agencies, multilateral institutions and individual countries to supports its general budget (ibid.).

The embargo’s initial effect on Burundi was indeed harsh; it further paralyzed the already war-torn economy (for summaries, see Kamungi, Oketch, and Huggins 2005; Khadiagala 2003). International financial assistance declined by approximately two-third to about 75 million US$ received annually between 1996 and 1999 (International Crisis Group 2003). Dwindling revenues from the blocked export of Burundi’s major cash crops, coffee and tea, also limited the government’s financial room for maneuver (Banque de la République du Burundi 1996). In August 1996, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimated that ‘reserves are falling by 10 million US$ per month’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c, 34). The country’s positive balance of payments in 1995 hence turned into a huge deficit of 87 million US$ in 1996 (Oketch and Polzer 2002, 109). Due to the limited possibility to acquire foreign exchange through exports, the government was forced to exhaust it foreign exchange reserves (Bossuyt 2000). On a micro-economic level, certain goods that had to be imported ran short. As a result, key supplies such as gasoline became very expensive (BDI15; BDI23; BDI28; BDI29; BDI31). According to a survey carried out in the capital Bujumbura, the ‘cost of living (…) clearly rose, especially during the last two trimesters, due to the economic blockade imposed on Burundi since the 31 July 1996 (…)’81 (Banque de la République du Burundi 1996, 31). The combined impact of the sanctions and the ongoing civil war led to a 36% increase in the general price index during the first year after their imposition; over the three years of the embargo, costs of living rose by approximately 50 percent (Kamungi, Oketch, and Huggins 2005).

Sanctions especially affected sectors of the economy that depended on the import of primary material, inter alia construction and the chemical industry (BDI28; BDI17; Banque de la République du Burundi 1996; Weiss 1996). A study by the Burundian economist Nyamoya and his colleagues conducted in Bujumbura in 1997 suggested that unemployment in these sectors rose by approximately 11 percent (Nyamoya, Ndenzako, and Mabushi 1997; also: BDI17; BDI24). Moreover, importers of perishable products were harshly hit as their freight was stuck abroad (BDI18; BDI33; BDI20). Even the agricultural production was hit, albeit only to a certain degree.

81 ‘[L]e cout de la vie, mesuré par des enquêtes dans la ville de Bujumbura, s’est nettement renchéri, particulièrement au cours des deux derniers trimestres de 1996 en raison du blocus économique imposé au Burundi depuis le 31 juillet 1996 (…).’ The interviews were conducted in French. All quotes are translations by the author. For verbatim quotes, the French original is provided in the footnotes.
A report from the World Food Program stated that ‘there is little doubt that the economic embargo on Burundi has exacerbated the adverse effects of civil strife in the country and resulted in a further lowering of the agricultural production and incomes and a deteriorated food supply’ ("FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment", Section 5(4) (1997), cited after Bossuyt 2000). Given the humanitarian agencies’ reliance on good relations with the regime as well as limited capacity to actually grasp the situation in the countryside where most relief organizations were no longer active, this assessment must be taken with a pinch of salt. Yet the agricultural sector was certainly disrupted by the limited supply of seeds and fertilizers at the beginning of the rain season when planting usually begins (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997, 46–47). Nonetheless, assessments regarding the extent to which the agricultural sector was affected vary: Khadiagala (2007, 127) speaks of a 30 percent decline in food production whereas other sources estimate that the overall production dropped by 5 to 8 percent in 1996 (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c, 1997b).

In the long run, however, the regime managed to withstand the embargo’s harsh pressure through the combined effect of a campaign successfully lobbying for humanitarian exemptions, sanctions busting activities and domestic adaptation measures. First, the regime launched a campaign against the embargo targeting both domestic and international constituencies that has been characterized as highly dynamic, aggressive, and fairly effective (Bunting, Mwansasu, and Bugoya 1999). Members of the government and other individuals close to the regime lobbied neighboring and Western countries as well as the international organizations to ease the economic pressure (BDI10; BDI12; BDI25; BDI30; BDI31). For example, Buyoya’s former cabinet member Gilbert Midende, who was rector of the University of Burundi at that time, was sent on a visit to Tanzania to lobby for the removal of sanctions (BDI17). In a similar manner, a female delegation – put together to emphasize how sanctions affected mothers – met Museveni to convince him of lifting the embargo (BDI21).

In Bujumbura, the city’s major coordinated the efforts under the slogan “the capacity to resist is everlasting”82 (BDI33). It was soon supported by various groups affected by the sanctions, particularly the business community as well as relief organizations (Bentley and Southall 2005; Khadiagala 2007, 126). For example, the Burundian League for Human Rights (La Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l’Homme ITEKA) demanded the lifting of sanctions (BDI28). While humanitarian agencies such as the Burundian branch of the UNDP first and foremost called for

82 “[L]a capacité de résistance est éternel.”
humanitarian exceptions (BDI22), the business community questioned the sanctions more generally (BDI33). During a meeting at the Novotel in Bujumbura, the Committee for the Defense of Economic and Social Interests (CODIES – Comité pour la Défense des Intérêts Économiques et Sociaux), which comprised crucial economic actors including the Chamber of Commerce, the Belgian-Burundian and Franco-Burundian chambers of trade, various unions, and the Association of Burundian Banks, was founded to initiative and coordinate their activities (BDI20; CODIES 1996). The CODIES proposed filing a case before the International Court of Justice and presenting official complaints at the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization. To support these efforts, the group argued that the staff at the permanent missions in Geneva, New York, and Brussels should be expanded and provided with argumentative guidelines regarding the sanctions illegal and unjustifiable nature (Chambre de Commerce d’Industrie, d’Agriculture et d’Artisanat du Burundi 1996b). In addition, ways of exporting coffee and tea despite the embargo were outlined (Chambre de Commerce d’Industrie, d’Agriculture et d’Artisanat du Burundi 1996a).

The regime also appealed to the interests of businessmen in neighboring countries (BDI33). An ICG Report on Burundi estimated that the loss to the Tanzania economy that resulted from the non-utilization of the Dar es Salaam and Kigoma ports as well as the Tanzanian railways and roads approximated tens of million US $ over the course of the embargo (International Crisis Group 1999b). The officially recorded import through the port of Dar es Salaam, for example, dropped from a pre-sanctions level of roughly 130,000 tons in 1995 to approximately 30,000 tons in 1997 and 1998, the first two years entirely passed under the embargo (“Report on Cargo Handled Through Dar es Salaam Port, 1990-2005”, cited after Ameir 2009, 75). Hence, parts of the Tanzanian business community soon began to vocally criticize the trade restrictions (BDI30).

Moreover, the Buyoya government stressed the adverse humanitarian impact of the sanctions. Sanctions were depicted as disproportionately hitting the poor and leading to a “shortage of essential elements for the[ir] survival”83 (BDI31). Similarly, Buyoya maintains until today that “the embargo only hit the most vulnerable parts of the population”84 (BDI25). The regime’s anti-sanctions campaign emphasized the embargo’s impact on the broader population, stressing that “FRODEBU claimed to represent eighty per cent, but these eighty per cent were

83 “[M]anques des éléments essentiels pour le suivi de la population”

84 “[Ç]a frappait les couples les plus vulnérables.”
suffering from [their] sanctions”85 (BDI10). In that context, the regime especially stressed that even medicine was initially prevented from entering the country, without acknowledging that medical supplies were among the very first products added to the list of humanitarian exemptions (BDI10; BDI7; BDI14; BDI20; BDI24; BDI25). In line with this strategy, a state-controlled NGO, the Association for the Preservation of Peace in Burundi, filed a case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights denouncing the sanctions’ lack of proportionality (Olinga 2005).

The regime’s campaign denouncing the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, echoed by international organizations and local NGOs, did not fall on deaf ears. Following a first round of exemptions including medicine and food for Rwandese refugees living in Burundi that was granted on 6 August, the list of items was gradually expanded. From 26 September 1996 onwards, humanitarian agencies were allowed to import essential food products, medical supplies, emergency relief items, and limited amounts of water and sanitation equipment as well as plastic shelters. A month later, on 24 October 24, seeds and limited amounts of gasoline were also added to the list created by the Regional Sanctions Coordination Committee (RSCC), which once again acted in response to demands by the humanitarian community (Regional Sanctions Coordination Committee 1996). At that point it became apparent how difficult it was to distinguish the humanitarian usage of certain supplies from ordinary consumption, as the Chamber of Commerce regularly distributed petrol imported for humanitarian purposes to commercial firms (BDI20). Notwithstanding this abuse, the humanitarian exemptions were further expanded to then also include all types of food and medicine, construction and education material as well as primary goods necessary for agriculture on 16 April 1997 (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997). With the unofficial procedure for clearing goods under the humanitarian exemption regulations on a case-by-case basis becoming institutionalized, they ‘no longer caused serious humanitarian distress among vulnerable groups in Burundi or major constraints to aid operations’ by the end of 1997 (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997, 1). Moreover, multilateral assistance continued under the banner of humanitarian aid thanks to careful re-packaging of their official purpose. Many programs on paper shifted their focus from development aid towards emergency assistance in order to continue their work (BDI9; BDI22). The World Bank channeled its funds through domestic NGOs such as Twitezimbere (BDI1; BDI28).

85 “Aujourd’hui le FRODEBU disait on est élu par 80% de la population du pays. Mais c’était 80% qui souffraient pour le FRODEBU, à cause du FRODEBU.”
The debate about the humanitarian impact of the embargo affected the stance of the international community vis-à-vis the continuation of sanctions and thereby led to a gradual resumption of bilateral and multilateral assistance. A first fissure in the international pro-sanctions front already became visible in December 1996, when the Francophone Summit held in Ouagadougou refrained from criticizing the new regime too harshly and instead urged the sanctions senders to take measures to reduce the embargo’s impact on the general population (Manirakiza 2007). This position was later confirmed by the Association of French Speaking Parliamentarians, which underlined in a press statement following their meeting on 9 July 1998, that ‘the embargo has no consequence, apart from inflicting supplementary sufferings on the people of Burundi’ (quoted after Bossuyt 2000, 24). Then French president Jacques Chirac was the first Western head of state to publicly question the usefulness of sanctions during the said summit in Ouagadougou (BDI10). In addition to France, which maintained its critical stance on the embargo from the onset, the United Kingdom and the European Union’s special representative for the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello, started to publicly speak out against sanctions in spring 1998 (Bossuyt 2000). The UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Burundi, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, also echoed concerns about the disastrous effect of the sanctions on the general population in his report to the Commission on Human Rights (UN Commission on Human Rights 1997). His assessment was backed by an OCHA Report published in December 1998 (Bruderlein 1998).

As the international community began to voice doubts about the embargo’s ability to positively affect the situation in Burundi (Daley 2007; Wolpe 2011), regular development assistance recommenced with the sanctions officially still in place. One of the first initiatives was the signing of an agreement between the government and the UNDP in May 1998, which allocated approximately 900,000 USD to activities aims at promoting reconciliation, and capacity building targeting civil society organizations and the National Assembly (BDI7). With the revival of the Arusha peace process in mid-1998, international support to maintain sanctions completely ceased. The main donors, including the EU, France, Belgium, and the UNDP publicly expressed their willingness to resume cooperation with the Burundian government (Lindholt 2000). In the words of the UNDP Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator in Burundi, the embargo ‘imposed on Burundi was a blunt instrument that had a disproportionate impact on the poor and most vulnerable segments of that country’s population’ and stressed the need to find less harmful ways of pushing the conflict parties to carry on the peace process (UNDP Resident Representative 1998). In
December 1998, several UN Agencies launched a joint appeal to raise a total of 86 million US$ considered necessary for the immediate activity in Burundi (Lindholt 2000). Subsequently, the OAU conflict resolution committee and the United Nations Security Council also demanded to lift the sanctions (Bossuyt 2000; Mthembu-Salter 2002).

Sanctions busting activities, oftentimes making use of pre-existing smuggling structures (Oketch and Polzer 2002, 108) increasingly reduced the effectiveness of the trade restrictions. Due to insufficient capacity as well as an increasing lack of political will, the RSCC did not efficiently monitor let alone enforce the sanctions regime (International Crisis Group 1998). To coordinate the sanction busting efforts, the Buyoya government created a commission tasked with identifying ways to circumvent the embargo that was attached to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism (Buyoya 2011, 147). Air corridors were established between Bujumbura and other African countries as well as Belgium with the help of the administration, which endowed Air Burundi with the right to explore the possibilities for a clandestine service (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1997a). In terms of passenger air transport, planes departing from Charleroi in Belgium officially destined to Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in fact landed in Bujumbura (BDI7; BDI1; BDI20; BDI33). From mid-1997, African Airline International, a private Kenyan airline, also served Bujumbura on a regular basis (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997). The ‘café-carburant’ (coffee for fuel) initiative was launched to secure the supply of petrol and the export of Burundi’s most important source of foreign revenues. Coffee was flown out on the air route via Libreville or South Africa by planes loaded with flextanks used for the clandestine export of coffee and the illegal import of petrol on the way back (BDI9; BDI15; BDI23; BDI26; BDI31; BDI33), with the Hamburg-based company ‘Rohlfoss’ being one of the major purchasers of that coffee (BDI20). These air corridors were supplemented by a significant amount of cross-border smuggling with neighboring countries (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997; Mthembu-Salter 1999). Goods were falsely declared with the help of shadow enterprises registered in DRC, Zambia and Tanzania (BDI18). In addition to such large-scale sanctions busting activities, ordinary people also engaged in smuggling, for instance by loading cars filled with clergy men, less subject to border controls, with gas canisters (BDI13). Finally, Burundi continued its trade with non-COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) states.

Clandestine trade was facilitated by the fact that the different neighboring countries pursued very different sanctions policies. Tanzanian officials maintained a stringent stance (BDI22;
5. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Burundi (1996-1999)

BDI27; Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997) whereas the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia were less strict (BDI1; BDI7; BDI12; BDI14; BDI20; BDI25; BDI30; BDI33). The DRC practically lifted sanctions when Kabila took office on 17 May 1997, arguing that it was unwilling to close its borders in the view of the Burundian population’s dire situation (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997). Kenya likewise resumed trade with Burundi in 1997, allowing commercial flights and especially the transport of fuel from 27 June (ReliefWeb 1997), and Eritrea restarted trade with Burundi in the same year (Bentley and Southall 2005; Khadiagala 2007). The Rwandan government also chose to ignore trucks passing through the country in violation of the trade restrictions (Bentley and Southall 2005). The readiness to enforce the remaining sanctions further decreased when a decision by the regional foreign ministers to end the sanctions was overruled at a meeting of the regional heads of state in Kampala, Uganda, on 21 February 1998, albeit in an opaque process. According to the rumors, the decision was only taken when those heads of state critical of the embargo had already left (Wohlgemuth 2005, 135).

In consequence, the export of key cash crops resumed, the supply of imported goods was secured so that virtually everything was available again by 1997, and the price increase of illegally imported goods slowed down (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997; IRIN 1997a). In that respect, the price charged for smuggled petrol provided a fairly reliable indicator for the effectiveness of sanctions busting activities. It initially rose from 500 to 700 Franc burundais (FBu) – as opposed to 190 FBu for rationed petrol legally imported for humanitarian purposes in early in September – to well over 1000 FBu in early October, and then dropped to 300 to 400 FBu by the end of that month thanks to illegal supply from Rwanda and Tanzania (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c; Weiss 1996). Likewise, the coffee parastatal Ocibu reported that it had successfully exported more than 90 percent of the 1996/97 harvest of 25,000 tons in the fall of 1997 (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997a).

Lastly, the administration introduced a bunch of adaptation policies, including a shift towards local plants in agricultural production (BDI7; BDI23; BDI25). Moreover, a ‘solidarity fund’ was set up to generate alternative revenues to sustain the regime’s war efforts. Alimented through a mandatory income tax (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1996b) and levies on certain goods, for example petrol (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1996e), it was used for the purchase of petrol and arms in the face of foreign exchange shortages (BDI11; BDI10; BDI18; BDI19; BDI21; BDI25; BDI31; Buyoya 2011, 147). The money was channeled through an account at the Central Bank (BDI7). The Central Bank also created a list of prioritized items to be pursued with the limited amount
5. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Burundi (1996-1999)

of foreign exchange available (BDI31; Banque de la République du Burundi 1996, 60). This list was later amended to include selected enterprises of national interest such as the fuel-trading Société Interpetrol (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1997b). Private Banks were obligated to transfer all remaining foreign exchange to the Central Bank (Banque de la République du Burundi 1996: 60). Finally, then Minister of Finance Astère Girukwigomba ordered to suspend serving the external debts in response to the growing budget deficit (BDI7).

**MASS MOBILIZATION AS A RESULT OF THE SANCTIONS’ ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES?**

Following deprivation-based explanations of protest, I argued that sanctions enable opposition movements in the targeted regimes if they enhance (individual) feelings of socio-economic deprivation. A similar effect should occur if sanctions increase inequalities and thereby enhance (group-related) grievances. The adjustment measures taken by the government, which diverted resources towards the military, as well as the smuggling activities benefitting only a small fraction of the population indeed increased the already drastic inequalities: “Some of the last of petrol was reserved for us”[86], meaning the country’s elite, as former president Ntibantunganya put it (BDI26). However, rural subsistence farmers constituting the great majority of the population were only marginally affected by the embargo – as notably confirmed both by members of the former Buyoya government and the opposition as well as employees of international organizations and NGOs that were active in Burundi during that period (BDI2; BDI21; BDI22; BDI28, BDI35). Development worker Helge Hartmann who lived in the central province Muramvya at that time and Anschaire Nikoyagize who was a student in the southern province Rutana recalled that the rural population hardly noticed the imposition of the trade restrictions (BDI1; BDI23). While the prices of certain import product such as salt and soap rose, daily life continued almost as usual. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) still financed projects in the agricultural sector (BDI7), which – in addition to replacing previously imported seeds and fertilizers with local alternatives (BDI22) – helped to sustain agricultural production after the initial downturn.

This partially explains why the sanctions’ economic impact did not trigger large-scale protest against the Burundian government as anticipated by the sanction senders. While some argue that people joined the rebellion due to the economic impact of sanctions (BDI30), mass mobilization as a direct result of sanctions could not be observed. Buyoya’s chief military advisor recalls this during our conversation: “The regional heads of states imposed the

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[86] “[U]ne dernière goutte de carburant ce sera pour nous.”
embargo because it would weigh heavily on the population and they expected that the population would rise against the government. But they failed. The Burundian population remained very, very calm.”

Even high-ranking FRODEBU cadres who acknowledged the embargo’s impact on the population did not claim that this led to large-scale anti-regime protests (BDI13; BDI15; BDI29). How can this be explained?

In an attempt to prevent to rural population from supporting the rebels and in order to facilitate the FAB’s own military operations, the Buyoya administration began to relocate many peasants into camps in 1996, particularly in provinces with heightened FDD activity. According to different estimates (see Vorrath 2008), between 350,000 to 600,000 predominantly Hutu peasants were forced to live in these so-called protection sites, ostensibly for their own safety. The camps were kept under close surveillance by the Burundian army, who also made residents prepare their food, carry water and produce charcoal (Longman 1998, 48). Consequently, for those who were forced to live in these ‘champs de regroupement’ (for detailed summaries, see Longman 1998 who has based his extensive report on several Human Rights Watch visits to different camps; Martin 2005; Martin and Hiddleston 2006; Vorrath 2008), anti-government protests were neither feasible nor a key concern. In addition to strict controls inhibiting any free movement let alone political expressions (Martin and Hiddleston 2006), living conditions were so dire as to prevent any motivation to consider organizing political expressions and activities. There were frequent reports of food shortages and appalling or inexistent sanitation facilities. Given that many thousands lived together, this led to the spread of infectious diseases. If all this should not sufficiently explain why those living in the camps refrained from taking any action against the regime, frequent disappearance of civilians who were accused of cooperating with anti-government forces ultimately succeeded in discouraging the voicing or enacting of dissent.

Moreover, two important enabling factors for the mobilization of discontent were absent during this period, namely a certain degree of political openness and organizational structures

87 “Les chefs d’états de la sous-région le faisaient, d’abord pour dire l’embargo va peser lourd sur la population, et la population va se révolter contre le gouvernement. Mais là eux aussi ils ont échoué. La population burundaise est restée très, très calme.”

88 Absurdly enough, Buyoya blamed international community for not supporting the camps (Longman 1998, 42-43). Forced with the ethical dilemma of wanting to provide humanitarian assistance to the people even though the devastating situation in the camps was clearly the government’s responsibility, UNICEF later echoed this narrative by blaming the sanctions for the spread of diseases and malnutrition in the camps (United Nations Children’s Fund, Michel Sidibè, The women and children of Burundi: hostages to conflict, UNICEF March 1997).
facilitating political empowerment. First, Burundi lacked an important pre-condition for the voicing and enacting of dissent: a minimum degree of political openness at the time when the regional embargo against the Buyoya government was imposed. Based on the political opportunity structure literature and insights about the varying effectiveness of sanctions imposed on autocracies and democracies, I have suggested in the theoretical chapter that opposition in regimes under sanctions should rather be able to mobilize when enjoying a minimum degree of political openness, especially with respect to the institutional setting. While the fsQCA suggests that anti-regime mobilization in Burundi occurred despite the lack of political openness, qualitative evidence points to the importance of this factor. While the National Assembly was reopened and political parties could resume their activity in September 1996, the leverage of these reinstated institutions remained extremely limited by restrictive legislation (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997, 75–77, for more details see p. 34). Moreover, harassment of political opponents became endemic. A number of FRODEBU deputies went into exile in Tanzania immediately after the coup fearing attacks by Tutsi militia or legal persecution (IRIN 1997b). For instance, the spokesperson of the National Assembly and vice-president of FRODEBU, Léonce Ngendakumana, was being subjected to legal investigations for his alleged participation in the 1993 massacres of Tutsi (International Crisis Group 2000). Former president Ntibantunganya, who was afraid of repressive acts against his person, remained in the US Embassy until July 1997. In addition, the rural population was repeatedly affected by army repression and increasingly feared further reprisals (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 378). This lack of political openness also discouraged ordinary Burundians from anti-regime activism (BDI12).

But perhaps even more importantly, mass protest in the countryside failed to materialize due to the lack of organizational structures. To recall, most sanctions scholars assume that anti-regime mobilization in targeted regimes builds on a previously existing, strong enough domestic opposition (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999; Kaplan 2007; Olson 1979; Tostensen and Bull 2002; Weiss 1996). At that time, the political opposition in Burundi was extremely weak (Ndikumana 2000). FRODEBU had lost influence over the rural, predominantly Hutu population, which only three years ago had contributed to the crushing election victory. Disappointed by FRODEBU’s policy of accommodation based on an ever rising number of compromises with the Tutsi-dominated army and the former ruling elite, many had joined the armed rebellion by that time, as detailed above (Burihabwa 2014; Cornwell and de Beer 1999; Nindorera 2012). Organized forms of local resistance in Burundi were also complicated by the
fact that Burundi did not have a strong associational tradition in rural areas. Burundians did not only live scattered in the countryside (and continue to do so), but their experience with negative forms of local collective action such as ethnic youth militia had also made them highly skeptic of associational life (Vervisch and Titeca 2010). To put it in the words of Laely (1997), ‘most peasants remained (...) politically weak’.

A more likely group than the disenfranchised rural Hutu population to rise up against the economically painful embargo was the urban Tutsi elite, which in theory should have suffered more from sanctions than subsistence farmers (BDI33). But Tutsi protest against the sanctions’ financial consequences and/or the regime responsible for the embargo did not occur for a number of reasons. First, Buyoya carefully shielded his constituency from the sanctions’ financial consequences in order to avoid large-scale discontent. Staff at the National Assembly dominated by FRODEBU, for example, were sacked when the government’s financial room of maneuver decreased whereas most other – oftentimes Tutsi – civil servants were spared or only received their salary late (BDI11; Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c). The political and military elite, which was prima facie most vulnerable due to their reliance on imported goods and warfare material, managed to sustain their living standard while passing on most of the hardship to those ordinary Burundians living in the cities and depending on imported goods (Oketch and Polzer 2002). Moreover, the market in Bujumbura was distorted in favor of luxury goods from Dubai, which could be smuggled more easily and provided greater profit margins than the clandestine import of food stuff, seeds and other agricultural products (Jooma 2005).

The disruption of the economy and the widespread smuggling resulting from sanctions facilitated the restoration of clientelist networks of which Buyoya had already made extensive use during his first rule from 1987 to 1993. Rather than suffering from the adverse effect of the sanctions, the predominantly Tutsi business community in fact benefitted from it (BDI6; BDI18; BDI27; BDI28; see also Daley 2007, 339). After 1996, Burundian businessmen, in particular those who were close to the Buyoya regime, gained economic opportunities through the sanctions busting activities described above (BDI33; Calmeyn, Musabyimana, and Reyychler 2000, 89; Daley 2007). For example, certain entrepreneurs established a monopoly over the then illegal import of fuel, which lasted way beyond the embargo (International Crisis Group 1998). Many of the private firms involved in smuggling belonged to (former) high-ranking civil servants and members of the military (BDI20; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000), and some evidence also pointed to the participation of cabinet ministers (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997b). This
included the highest ranks, with Buyoya’s wife being implicated in a sugar import scandal that
became public when it was addressed by a parliamentary commission of inquiry in 2001
(Oketch and Polzer 2002, 109).

Sanctions also constituted a useful scapegoat for the Burundian regime, with economic
difficulties being blamed on the regional trade restrictions rather than the administrations’
own failures. Sanctions were made responsible for all economic and social difficulties in an
attempt to divert attention away from the regime’s mismanagement (Hoskins, Nutt, and
Watson Jr 1997), a military budget that absorbed about half of the government’s revenues and
the disastrous effects of the civil war (Banque de la République du Burundi 1998; Economist
Intelligence Unit 1998). Moreover, the new government denounced the sanctions as an unjust
punishment and appealed to the Burundians’ national solidarity and pride. For example, it
defiantly nicknamed a new boulevard constructed in the capital during this period “avenue de
l’embargo” (BDI25).

In addition, the regime’s official campaign denouncing sanctions succeeded insofar as most
Burundians blamed the Regional Initiative rather than Buyoya’s coup – which had triggered
them in the first place – for the implementation of sanctions. The embargo was depicted as a
predominantly Tanzania and Ugandan affair. Their leaders who ‘have appropriated the right of
guardianship over the country’ allegedly pursued a secret agenda of ‘making Burundi a satellite
state [in order to] eventually annex it’89 (Nyamoya 1997). Especially Tanzania was perceived as
the key aggressor and Burundi’s most determined enemy, not least because it adhered to the
trade restrictions with the greatest consequence. In the view of Buyoya’s supporters, Tanzania
headed “a regional conspiracy against Burundi”90 (BDI24) in order to further its own economic
interests in the country (BDI10). In response, the Regional Initiative sought the Western
governments’ support to demonstrate the broad international approval of the embargo
(Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conflict 1996). Likewise, FRODEBU activists and other
proponents of the embargo stressed its genuinely regional nature (BDI5; BDI15; BDI18) and the
fact that “the region could not have taken the decision [to impose sanctions] without the
support of the United Nations”91 (BDI3).

89 “[S]e sont arrogé un droit de tutelle sur le pays” [pour] “faire du Burundi un satellite et éventuellement
de l’annexer.”
90 “[U]n complot régional contre le Burundi”
91 “[A]u niveau de la sous-région on ne peut pas prendre des mesures qui ne sont pas approuvées par les
Nations-Unies.”
Summing up, one could – at least to a certain degree – observe a classical rally-round-the-flag effect amongst elite Tutsi in Burundi. As argued in the second chapter, targeted regimes can turn sanctions into a political and/or economic asset, thereby countervailing the positive impact that sanctions potentially have on the leverage of opposition forces. The Buyoya administration indeed managed to create a siege mentality vis-à-vis the external pressure among the business community, as exemplified by the creation of CODIES. In addition, the government successfully exploited the economic opportunities provided by economy of scarcity to reward key supporters and to punish political opponents. However, this ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect was limited to the urban Tutsi population. The rural population did not rise up against the regime as a result of sanctions, but this should not be mistaken for increased sympathy for the Buyoya regime – the majority of Hutu certainly did not feel a renewed sense of national unity (BDI1; BDI6; BDI23; BDI28). Instead, the lack of mass (Hutu) mobilization is attributable to three key developments. First, rural subsistence farmers were hardly affected by the sanctions and also lacked the freedom to mobilize, especially those who were detained in the so-called resettlement camps. Moreover, two facilitating conditions for anti-government mobilization were lacking, namely an organizational structure and a minimum degree of institutional openness. The case of Burundi hence sheds new light at the interplay between a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ and an ‘internal opposition’ effect: Even though the regime enhanced the feelings of solidarity, this only applied to a small (ethnic) minority and thus did not entirely undermine the opposition forces’ ability to benefit from the regional embargo politically, militarily and psychologically, as I will describe in the next section.

INDIRECT STRENGTHENING OF THE OPPOSITION THROUGH ECONOMIC PRESSURE

Despite the sanctions’ failure to stir large-scale protest by the general population against the Buyoya government, it indirectly enabled anti government forces by increasing the regime’s willingness to make certain concessions. Conscious of the country’s precarious financial situation, Buyoya announced an ‘action plan’ consisting of re-opening the National Assembly and lifting the ban on political parties before the first review of economic sanctions in Arusha in mid-October 1996 – reportedly in an attempt to convince the regional leaders of easing the measures (Bruderlein and Erhardy 1997; Khadiagala 2007; Mthembu-Salter 1999). However, this step did not increase political leverage for the opposition; the political significance of these

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92 Some of the empirical material and assessments presented here have already been sketched in the article ‘Regional Sanctions against Burundi: The Regime’s Argumentative Self-entrapment’ (Grauvogel 2015).
reinstated institutions remained extremely limited. Political parties, which were still forbidden to hold public meetings and rallies, were only allowed under the vague requirement that they positively contribute to Burundi's development (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1996a). This gave Buyoya the freedom to outlaw them as he pleased. For example, FRODEBU’s secretary general, Augustin Nzojibwami, was arrested in February 1997 for criticizing the government’s policy of regrouping Hutu in camps because these public statements were seen as a violation of this requirement (BDI29; Economist Intelligence Unit 1997b). Moreover, the Assemblée Nationale lacked clearly defined legislative powers in the absence of the constitution, which had been suspended after the coup. Security concerns also discouraged the elected members of parliament from attending, so that only 36 out of 81 deputies were present during the first session after the coup (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997, 76). With 20 deputies killed and 34 exiled, FRODEBU, which was disproportionately hit, had in fact lost its majority in the re-opened Assemblé Nationale (Cornwell and de Beer 1999).

Sanctions also put pressure on the regime to enter into negotiations with the deposed political forces: “The economy and the regime were not viable with the embargo. It’s for this reason that they were forced to make concessions, to negotiate”93 (BDI16; also BDI30; BDI33). While some argue that the paralyzed economy merely accelerated negotiations (BDI19) or put pressure on the regime to negotiate with more openness (BDI33), other members or supporters of the regime suggest that without sanctions, Buyoya would not have agreed to first share and later hand over power at all (BDI8; BDI14; BDI24). According to a Tutsi businessman “if there had not been an embargo, there would not have been negotiations”94 (BDI19). Even Buyoya himself – who had repeatedly stressed his willingness to negotiate after the coup regardless of any international pressure (Buyoya 2011)95 – acknowledged retrospectively that “the embargo was one of the factors that obliged the government to negotiate”96 during our conversation (BDI25).

The ‘uncomfortable economic situation pushed Buyoya to launch secret talks in Sant’Egidio’ with the CNDD-FDD (Manirakiza 2007, 62). These negotiations with the rebel movement under the mediation of the Italian Catholic organization Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome at the

93 “L’économie et le régime n’était pas viable avec l’embargo. C’est pour cette raison qu’ils étaient condamnés à faire des concessions, à négocier.”
94 “[S]’il n’y avait pas eu l’embargo, il n’aurait eu les négociations.”
95 This was also emphasized by some of his confidants (BDI7; BDI21).
96 “[L’]embargo a été un des facteurs qui a obligé le gouvernement à négocier.”
end of 1996 were meant to fulfill the third and most important requirement of the regional sanctions senders for lifting the embargo, namely peace negotiations. Attributing this to the economic pressure of the embargo, Nijimirer (2001, 2) argues that ‘strangled by the embargo, the president took the initiative to discretely engage in negotiations in November 1996’. In order to prove that it was prepared to advance a negotiated settlement of the conflict, the government leaked information about secret talks with the CNDD in Sant’Egidio (Dupont 1997; Wolpe 2011). The Buyoya administration circulated the agenda, which included agenda items on the restoration of the constitutional order, a ceasefire, and the involvement of other political parties than FRODEBU in the negotiations process (BDI25; BDI34). Most scholars agree that sanctions ultimately played a major role in pressuring the Buyoya government into negotiations due to their severe costs. Ndikumana (2000, 435) exemplarily attributes the sanctions’ success to ‘mounting domestic frustration with deteriorating economic conditions’ (see also Lemarchand 2001, 92; Maundi 2003, 341).

The embargo hence constituted an important building block of the diverse anti-Buyoya forces’ strategies. Instead of mobilizing larger parts of the population, the Tutsi political parties and rebel movements hoped to ‘suffocate the regime’ (Ould-Abdallah 2000, 103). They expected that sanctions would undermine the regime’s ability to govern the country and thereby force it into peace talks (BDI2; BDI3; BDI15; BDI29; BDI34). FRODEBU, for instance, anticipated that the financial constraints posed by sanctions would increase Buyoya’s willingness to negotiate and – potentially – their leverage to raise demands during such talks. Former president Ntibantunganya summarized this reasoning in pointed terms: FRODEBU said that “the pressure on the government that came to power through the coup had to be maintained so that they would accept negotiations that included FRODEBU”98 (BDI26). More precisely, FRODEBU hoped that the Regional Initiative’s demands to negotiate with all parties to the conflict would also handicap Buyoya’s attempt to only negotiate with the CNDD, which was viewed as another building block of his strategy to entirely marginalize FRODEBU, “because they [the Regional Initiative] felt that the secret negotiations in Sant’Egidio risked to

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97 The talks subsequently collapsed due to pressure from the Tutsi elites on the regime after the information had become public. As a consequence, the CNDD-FDD felt that it had no choice other than to intensify armed struggle when the talks collapsed (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997c).
98 “Le FRODEBU disait qu’il fallait maintenir cette pression jusqu’à ce qu’il soit constaté que le pouvoir ici, issu du coup d’état, accepte de négocier en impliquant le FRODEBU.”
undermine the participation of the region in the search for a solution\(^99\) (BDI26). The sanctions thus emboldened opposition activity without triggering mass protest. Instead, the measures’ (perceived) financial costs increased FRODEBU’s hope that Buyoya would have to start negotiating rather sooner than later. This points to the important interplay between the economic consequences of sanctions – which in the case of Burundi, however, led to regime concessions rather than popular mobilization – and the sanctions-induced creation of perceived opportunities for opposition movements identified in the fsQCA, which is further discussed below.

Accordingly, all anti-regime forces supported the economic pressure as a means to force the regime into negotiations. In an open letter published on 29 August 1996 in the Burundian journal ‘Azania’, the opposition parties demanded a strengthening of the sanction with the aim to bring down Buyoya (Dupont 1997, 17; Weiss 1996)\(^100\). Initiatives to convince the international community to maintain the sanctions included visits to the neighboring countries, Europe and the United Nations (BDI5; BDI26). Being one of the first non-state delegations to speak in front of the Security Council, exiled Hutu politicians advanced the pro-sanctions case there (BDI5).

The predominantly Hutu diaspora also welcomed the sanctions as a means to achieve a return to democracy and accordingly played a key role in lobbying Western governments to refrain from easing the economic pressure (BDI2; BDI3; BDI6). They inter alia came together for so-called Burundi days, the largest of which took place on 7 March 1998 in Denmark (BDI2; BDI3: see also Lindholt 2000, 23). In Germany, the so-called Burundi Büro, financed by the German non-profit organization Aktion Courage\(^101\), coordinated the pro-sanctions lobbying efforts (BDI2; BDI3). Its Burundi news bulletin, issued weekly, frequently criticized the irregular nature of Buyoya’s rule and emphasized the need for sustained international pressure, including sanctions (for example Burundi Büro 1997).

In addition to welcoming sanctions as a means to pressure the government into negotiations, the CNDD-FDD saw them as an instrument to weaken the regime’s military capacity. Being

\(^{99}\) “(...) parce qu’ils [l’initiative régional] sentaient que cette négociation à Sant’Edigio, secrète, visait à contourner l’implication de la région dans la recherche d’une solution ici.”

\(^{100}\) As CNDD and FRODEBU refused to sign a common version of the appeal, two identical versions were finally published and signed (Dupont 1997). Interestingly, extremist Tutsi actors, most notable Parena, also signed the letter.

\(^{101}\) Aktion Courage is an association with charitable status, supported financially by the federal German government and the European Union, which was established in 1992 and promotes the active participation of foreign nationals in German community life (http://www.aktioncourage.org/wir-ueber-uns/).
largely based outside of Bujumbura, the CNDD-FDD was only marginally affected by the sanctions, but expected in turn that the embargo’s economic impact would enable them to achieve a military victory against the army (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997; Oketch and Polzer 2002). The rebel movement therefore particularly supported the embargo because they believed it had the potential to disrupt the regime’s financial abilities to buy key supplies for the continued military efforts, namely petrol and weapons (BDI34). From mid-1996 onwards, the CNDD-FDD even increasingly targeted vehicles transporting goods into Bujumbura and other cities in an attempt to undermine economic activities and thereby magnify the sanctions’ impact (Longman 1998, 86).

This points to an important interplay between the sanctions anticipated economic consequences, and how the expectations that sanctions would hurt the target regime emboldened the rebel movements regardless of the measures’ ‘true’ economic impact. While the petrol shortage did indeed affect the army despite its secret stocks and contacts all over the region (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996a), the effect on arms supply was less evident. It soon became clear that a large stock from before the embargo and relatively easy arms smuggling kept up the provision of ammunition for the FAB (BDI21; BDI26). According to a report ‘Stoking the Fires’ commissioned by Human Rights Watch (Austin and Hiltermann 1997), France, North-Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, the US, Germany and Zaire were all implicated in arms smuggling to Burundi, which benefitted both the regime and the rebels. As regards Germany, the Ministry of Justice initiated a lawsuit against the company ‘Fahrzeugwerke Neubrandenburg’ due to the illegal arms trade to Burundi (Weiss 1996). Nevertheless, the armed Hutu movements continued to see the embargo as a means to put pressure on the regime. When the international community’s skepticism about sanctions grew, the CNDD-FDD asked the European Union Council of Ministers to reject the removal of sanctions, arguing that this would benefit the military which continued to massacre civilians (IRIN 1998, 559).

Even though the embargo did not financially bring the Buyoya regime to its knees, it limited the government’s economic leverage and its ability to finance the war efforts, particularly before the proliferation of humanitarian exemptions and sanctions busting activities. During this phase, the decision to re-open the National Assembly and to re-instate political parties did not only occur in response to the political isolation, but also based on the expectation that the sanctions senders would ease the economic pressure. However, and as I have shown elsewhere (Grauvogel 2015), regime concessions at later stages, especially during the regionally-sponsored
peace talks in Arusha from mid-1998 onwards, occurred at a time when the economy had slowly started to recover thanks to the bypassing and adaptation strategies described above. After the nation’s GDP decreased sharply in 1996 due to the sanctions and the civil war, it remained stagnant in 1997 and grew by 7.4% in the following year (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997; Kamungi, Oketch, and Huggins 2005). Economic development ‘improved, notably as regards internal production and public finances and [...] inflation decreased remarkably thanks to the regular provision of goods of primary necessity’102 (Banque de la République du Burundi 1998, X). The fact that the regime agreed to some to the most meaningful concessions to the political opposition and/or armed opposition when the sanctions’ economic impact had started to decrease casts doubt on a purely economic interpretation of how the sanctions weakened the regime while strengthening the political and armed opposition. But before exploring the second factor suggested in the fsQCA, namely the creation of perceived opportunities for anti-regime activity through signals conveyed by sanctions, the insights of a deprivation- and grievance-based perspective on opposition politics during the Burundian embargo will be summarized.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Chapter 2, I proposed that sanctions would enable opposition movements through instigating popular protest against the regime made responsible for the measure’s socio-economic consequences. Contrary to the expectations of opposition actors and sanction senders alike, this transmission mechanism from economic to political pressure was not set into motion in Burundi. In addition to the fact that subsistence farmers, constituting the large majority of the population, were hardly affected, Buyoya managed to shield the urban elite from the sanctions’ adverse effects and even provided them with economic opportunities through clandestine trade.

Nevertheless, the initial harsh financial impact increased the anti-regime forces room for maneuver, albeit in a way not anticipated in the theoretical chapter: The real danger that the government would run out of foreign exchange forced Buyoya into making certain concessions, most notably the re-opening of the National Assembly and the unbanning of political parties. These institutions only gave the opposition parties very limited political leverage, but Buyoya’s initial concessions set in motion a process, which helped them raise additional demands and

102 “[L]es résultats enregistrés sont dans l’ensemble améliorés notamment en ce qui concerne la production intérieure et les finances publiques (...) Suite à un approvisionnement régulier des produits de première nécessité, le taux d’inflation a sensiblement fléchi.”
oblige him into further concessions during the on-going negotiations that will be described below (see also Grauvogel 2015).

5.2.2. Perceived opportunities
Hoskins et al. (1997, 81), Ndikumana (2000) and Khadiagala (2007, 124) all suggest that the symbolic and political aspects of the sanctions against Burundi have played a crucial role, without, however, spelling out how this development may have enabled anti-government mobilization. As the signaling dimension of the regional embargo has received little detailed scholarly attention thus far, the following section extensively draws on interview material and other documents collected in Burundi.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ENCOURAGEMENT THROUGH REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF BUYOYA
In line with the theoretical argument developed in the second chapter, sanctions should enable anti-government mobilization because the signals of regime disapproval and opposition support conveyed by such measures provide psychological comfort and encouragement to regime critical forces. To what extent this could be observed in the case of Burundi shall be examined in this section. Mthembu-Salter (1999, 9; see also Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 399) suggests that ‘what has most frustrated the Burundian government and Mr Buyoya in particular about sanctions (...) is that they have denied them legitimacy’. Their imposition took Buyoya and his supporters, who had relied on Buyoya’s international reputation for having paved the way to multiparty democracy, by surprise (BDI12; BDI7; BDI21). In line with the normative shift towards the non-acceptance of military take overs that was vocally propagated by Nyerere (see, for example, the interview with Hunter-Gault 1996), the Regional Initiative refuse to recognize Buyoya as the legitimate president and referred to the new government as the ‘Buyoya regime’ rather than talking about the Burundian government (Second Regional Summit on the Burundi Conflict 1996; Sixth Regional Summit on the Burundi Conflict 1998). This message of regime disapproval showed that “politically, the Burundian president was not recognized by his regional fathers,”103 thereby severely undermining the new regime’s standing (BDI21). Western governments likewise condemned the coup d’état. US Department of State spokesman Nicholas Burns stressed that his government would ‘work to isolate any government that emerges in Bujumbura by extra-constitutional means’ (Inter Press Service

103 “[A]u niveau politique, le Président burundais n’était pas reconnu par ses pères de la région.”
Accordingly, the United States refused to recognize the new government (Lomasney and Halperin 1998).

After the coup, Burundian embassies in several countries, including Germany and Tanzania, did not accept Buyoya as a new president – a move that was supported by their hosts (BDI3; BDI5). For example, the Burundian ambassador in Germany at that time, Albert Mbonerane, refused to leave the country when he was supposed to be replaced with a new ambassador hand-picked by Buyoya and – supported by a group of German MPs104 – instead continued to serve in his function until 1997, when it became impossible to administer the embassy without receiving funds from the new Burundian regime (BDI3; BDI4). Another visible sign of Burundi’s international pariah status was that even the former colonial power Belgium refrained from keeping an ambassador in Burundi after the coup and instead stayed with only a ‘chargé d’affaires’ during most of the embargo.

In addition to denouncing the new government for its unconstitutional assumption of power, the sanctions constituted – in the words of mediator Nyerere – a signal that the regions ‘supports a democratically elected government’105 (Kiesel 1996). In that context, FRODEBU particularly benefitted from Nyerere’s ‘appreciation for the basis of its claim of government – namely its crushing election victories of 1993’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997d). In contrast, Buyoya criticized the measures for de facto supporting the opposition (Buyoya 2011, 149) and potentially shifting the ‘international balance of sympathy’ (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 399).

This gave heart to the opposition. When the regional embargo was imposed, FRODEBU was weakened both by losing grip on the frustrated Hutu population, which instead supported the armed rebellion, and the military’s strategy to unmake the electoral victory of 1993, which was successfully completed with the 1996 coup. In this situation, sanctions constituted an important component in its “struggle for survival”106, as former president Ntibantunganya characterized the party’s situation after the putsch (BDI26). The regional embargo did not only provide psychological comfort but more importantly appeared to be one of the few means left to put pressure on the regime by forcing the regime to justify itself vis-à-vis the regional and

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104 This circle of friends of Burundi in the German parliament, headed by Brigitte Erler, also closely cooperated with the Burundi Büro, which even ‘proof-read’ parliamentary declarations on the situation in Burundi.
105 “Nous soutiendrons un gouvernement démocratiquement élu.”
106 “[L]utte pur la suivie”
international community (BDI2). FRODEBU politicians welcomed the measures as a sign that ‘Nyerere shared their realism about how to deal with Burundi’s Tutsi elite’ (Mthembu-Salter 2002) and hence lobbied for the sanctions’ imposition and later for their maintenance in the ways described above. During this process, exiled FRODEBU politicians in Tanzania had a significant impact on the position taken by Nyerere (BDI5).

Nevertheless, FRODEBU could only partially profit from the regional and international displays of support – not least due to internal divisions. Shortly after the putsch, on 3 September 1996, 22 FRODEBU deputies fled into Kenyan and Tanzania exile and announced their support for the CNDD president Nyangoma (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c). Together with previous defections and another 16 exiled parliamentarians also declaring that they would join Nyangoma’s CNDD on 10 September 1996, total number of dissidents reached 41 (ibid.). In addition, the initial unanimous signals of regime disapproval conveyed by the sanctions senders soon began to soften. The Regional Initiative, for the first time since Buyoya’s assumption of power, invited him to their meeting on 16 April 1997, and honored Buyoya by addressing him as Burundi’s president (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997c). This step constituted a significant deviation from previous statements, which denounced the Buyoya administration as an illegal regime, stoking fears on the part of FRODEBU that the regional embargo would soon be lifted. Nevertheless, following the vocal regional and international campaign for keeping the measures described above and Buyoya’s last minute withdrawal from the talks, the Regional Initiative decided to prolong the embargo on 16 August 1997 (Dupont 1997).

The imposition of sanctions did not only encourage FRODEBU, but also sent signals that gave heart to the Hutu rebels movements. The CNDD-FDD supported the trade restrictions (BDI32; BDI34). One day after the imposition, president Nyangoma issued a statement that the ‘CNDD is satisfied with the decision taken at the Arusha summit on 31 July by the regional heads of states to impose economic sanctions’ (quoted after Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997, 82). The senders’ demand that Buyoya should initiate negotiations with all parties involved in the civil war, namely also the armed rebels, constituted a de facto recognition of the CNDD-FDD as an important political actor in Burundi (Khadiagala 2007, 125). Consequently, the CNDD-FDD ‘felt legitimized by the sanctions’ (Oketch and Polzer 2002, 114). In the words of an exiled CNDD-FDD activist during the time of the embargo, “[t]his helped so that the voices of those who
were fighting him [Buyoya] could be heard”\(^{107}\) (BDI32). This de facto recognition of the CNDD-FDD as a crucial domestic force did not happen accidentally. The sanctions senders envisaged to create a domestic balance of power between CNDD’s leader Nyangoma, who only enjoyed limited support in Burundi, but was regionally recognized and Buyoya, who was domestically strong, but regionally isolated in order to facilitate the acknowledgement that negotiations were the only way forward (Khadiagala 2007, 127).

The prolonged diplomatic isolation expressed through the regional embargo appears to have constituted an important incentive for political concessions made in 1996, namely the reopening of the National Assembly and the re-admission of political parties (BDI17; BDI21). The Buyoya government sought to address the challenge to its legitimacy posed by the justification given for the embargo – namely the sanction senders’ determination to punish a government that had assumed power unconstitutionally – by questioning the measure’s legality. Buyoya recalled that his administration “engaged in huge diplomatic efforts in Burundi to show Africa and the rest of the world that this embargo is an illegal embargo”\(^{108}\) (BDI25). The process of deciding and implementing the embargo was condemned as a breach of international law because “only the United Nations can impose sanctions”\(^{109}\) (BDI30, also: BDI10; BDI20; BDI25).

Furthermore, the justification given for the implementation was questioned. Buyoya’s supporters argued that the previous president’s flight to the US embassy had created a power vacuum, which left the stumbling nation without political leadership in a deepening security crisis (BDI16) to justify the regime’s assumption of power. In such a situation, Buyoya assumed his responsibility as an experienced statesman in a “political change that was dictated by the events”\(^{110}\) (BDI25) and guided by “humanitarian reasons”\(^{111}\) (BDI21) to prevent a takeover by Bagaza and other more extremist elements in the Tutsi community. In short, the regime disputed that the takeover of power could be characterized as a coup d’état that justified sanctions.

Finally, the continuation of sanctions was criticized as lacking any foundations as the Buyoya government had fulfilled all key demands (BDI7; BDI25). After reopening the National Assembly, the regime stressed its willingness to engage in peace talks (Buyoya 2011, 142–143),

\(^{107}\) “Ça a aidé pour que les voix d’eux qui étaient en train de lui combattre puisse être entendue.”  
\(^{108}\) “Nous avons engagé une grande action diplomatique au Burundi pour montrer à l’Afrique et le reste du monde que cet embargo est un embargo illégal.”  
\(^{109}\) “[S]eulement l’UNO peut imposer un embargo.”  
\(^{110}\) “[C]hangement politique qui était dicté par les événements”  
\(^{111}\) [R]aisons humanitaires
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but this rhetoric commitment did not impress the Regional Initiative. At the end of its meeting in Kampala on 18 August 1997, then Tanzanian foreign affairs minister Jakaya Kikwete announced that the sanctions would remain in place until they achieved their aim of fully restoring democratic rule in Burundi (Inter Press Service 1997).

In summary, the message of regime disapproval and recognition of the opposition transmitted by the sanctions encouraged both FRODEBU and the CNDD-FDD. For FRODEBU, the embargo constituted a straw of hope in an extremely difficult situation, creating the perception that Burundi’s situation was monitored and that the party’s cause was internationally supported. For the CNDD-FDD, the sanction senders’ demand of inclusive negotiations with all parties to the conflict was seen as legitimizing their struggle. Finally, the diplomatic isolation also helped to pressure the Buyoya government into political concessions made in 1996.

THE LACK OF A UNIFIED OPPOSITION VOICE AFTER THE 1998 PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
As I have shown in the previous section, sanctions psychologically encouraged regime critical actors. Based on the theoretical reasoning that this effect depends on the coherence of the sanctions senders’ and the opposition movements’ demand, I will now examine whether and – if so – to what extent the condition was met over the course of the embargo.

The government initiated a National Debate at the beginning of 1998 to ease the regional pressure (Maundi 2003, 341). This search for an internal political solution reflected Buyoya’s preference for a domestic peace process (Brachet and Wolpe 2005). The National Debate consisted of 15 presidential meetings and round tables for representatives of the political parties, members of parliament, public officials, the army, the police, and civilian groups. At the beginning of 1998, the internal debate led to the conclusion of a partnership agreement that stipulated the enlargement of the National Assembly from 81 to 121 members under a new constitution and the reshuffling of the government, with FRODEBU’s Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira to become prime minister (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998c). The cabinet was reduced in size from 22 to 16 ministers equally allocated to FRODEBU and UPRONA, which formed the new the Government of National Unity (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998d). Lastly, a Wiseman Committee for National Unity and Reconciliation was established (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998a).

The enlarged Assemblé Nationale approved the new constitution on 4 June 1998. Two days later, Léonce Ngendakumana, leading figure of FRODEBU’s internal wing and president of the
National Assembly, signed the so called Agreement on a Political Platform for the Transitional Regime (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998a) together with Buyoya, who was sworn in as president on 11 June 1998. The new constitution reflected FRODEBU’s influence insofar as ethnic and regional imbalances were denounced – but it only stated that they should be addressed on a voluntary basis (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998b). This can at least partially be explained by FRODEBU’s fear that the Buyoya regime would exploit the end of the mandate given to the General Assembly in the 1993 to its advantage (BDI26) and hence negotiated the partnership agreement from a position of relative weakness.

The formalized agreement between FRODEBU and Buyoya bestowed his government with constitutional legitimacy, which the discourse surrounding the imposition and continuation of sanctions successfully undermining the regime’s credibility as a moderate caretaker government had denied him until then. After entering into the so-called ‘partenariat’, which codified Buyoya’s endorsement as a president by FRODEBU’s internal wing, the political benefit that FRODEBU had gained from the embargo ceased. As I have proposed in the theoretical framework, sanctions are especially efficient in strengthening internal opposition to the regime if the domestic opposition forces support them. This need for sanctions that coherently reflect the demands of regime-critical forces has been subsequently established in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis in chapter 3. The case of Burundi confirms this finding in a powerful way. In pointed terms, Mthembu-Salter (1999, 28) summarizes that this ‘basic requirement of sanctions (...) that they require the political support of a significant internal political grouping in the country to which they are being directed’ came to an end in 1998 – at least with respect to FRODEBU as I would add.

The 1998 partnership manifested the de facto split between the exiled faction of FRODEBU and those who had remained in Burundi after the coup (International Crisis Group 1999). The diverging positions on the sanctions, even though not the trigger, became one of the most visible manifestation of FRODEBU’s division. Following the inauguration of the new government, Ntibantunganya embarked on a journey to Europe during which he praised the new cooperation between Buyoya and his party and called for lifting the sanctions. He inter alia argued that the Burundian people had suffered enough (BDI26; BDI29) – thus ironically reproducing Buyoya’s narrative for ending the embargo. But attempts by FRODEBU’s internal wing to convince the exiled fraction of that renewed policy of cooperation with Buyoya and the need to end the regional sanctions failed.
According to the assessment one of the great beneficiaries of the partnership agreement, the new first vice president, the external fraction failed to quickly grasp the new realities (BDI15). In contrast, FRODEBU’s external wing headed by the then still party president Jean Minani accused the internal wing of having no real say in the new government (BDI2). The exiled fraction was hence strictly opposed to loosening the trade restrictions as a means to exert continued pressure on Buyoya. They claimed that “even those who were in the government on behalf of FRODEBU told us to continue with the pressure”\(^{112}\) (BDI2). In their view, a resumption of cooperation would have ‘legitimised Buyoya’s position’ whereas they could claim that Buyoya was not recognized internationally or regionally and that ‘his proposed solutions to Burundi’s problems are inadequate’ as long as trade and development cooperation officially remained suspended (International Crisis Group 1999a, 9). According to this position, the sanctions had to be maintained, “until there was a peace accord, above all to prevent another putschist movement”\(^{113}\) (BDI3). This “duality of views”\(^{115}\) (BDI12) undermined FRODEBU’s credibility in the view of its domestic adversary and the international community. As a result, FRODEBU was not able to support the sanction regime to their full potential, supporting the theoretical argument for a unified opposition in order to improve the effectiveness of sanction.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The signals of regime disapproval and the resulting (indirect) encouragement of the opposition played a vital role for regime critical forces. The members of the FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD that I interviewed almost unanimously underlined that sanctions gave them hope and encouragement – in the case of FRODEBU this was at a time when the party actually struggled for political survival (BDI2; BDI3; BDI29; BDI26; BDI32; BDI34). However, this perceived increase in support – and hence ultimately also in opportunities for voicing and enacting dissent – was ultimately a combination of the signals sent by sanctions and their anticipated economic impact on the regime. This confirms the interplay between both aspects suggested by the fsQCA. The above-mentioned interviewees, who reflected on how the regional embargo encouraged them because it supported their cause, also emphasized that it put (economic) pressure on the regime (BDI2; BDI3; BDI29; BDI32; BDI34). Buyoya’s spokesperson for peace and

\(^{112}\) “[M]ême ceux qui étaient au gouvernement du FRODEBU nous disaient de continuer à faire la pression.”

\(^{113}\) “[J]usqu’à ce qu’il y ait un accord de paix, surtout pour éviter qu’il y ait encore des mouvements putschistes.”

\(^{114}\) In addition to FRODEBU’s external wing, the CNDD and the heads of states of Uganda and Tanzania still defended the measures at that time (Mthembo-Salter 1999).

\(^{115}\) “Dualité de points de vue”.

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security questions summarizes this two-fold impact of sanctions: “(...) the rebellion has profited from the embargo. First of all, the country was economically weakened. And secondly, Buyoya accepted negotiations because in a way he was in a way forced [to do so].” (BDI30, emphasis added). Rather than trying to disentangle the consequences of the political messages transmitted by sanctions and their financial consequences, future research should hence aim at understanding how both aspects are inseparable intertwined and influence each other.

The case of the regional embargo against Burundi further highlights three aspects that go beyond a very general acknowledgement of the importance of sanctions symbolism that could be found in the literature – also regarding the regional sanctions against Burundi (Hoskins, Nutt, and Watson Jr 1997, 81; Khadiagala 2007, 124; Ndikumana 2000). First, the precise message transmitted by the sanctions senders is crucial. FRODEBU repeatedly stressed that the Regional Initiative demanded inclusive negotiations with all parties to the conflict when Buyoya attempted to sideline the party by holding secret peace talks in Sant’Egidio with the CNDD-FDD (BDI26). In a similar manner, the CNDD-FDD referred to the sanction senders’ key demand of inclusive negotiations with all parties to the conflict to argue that they had been recognized as an important political actor.

This points to a second insight. While FRODEBU at least initially benefitted from sanctions, it appears that the CNDD-FDD gained more. FRODEBU was both regionally and internationally a recognized political actor when Buyoya assumed power. In contrast, the CNDD-FDD just began to climb the political stage. Military advances certainly contributed to its increased visibility and recognition (see for example Burihabwa 2014), but even members of the movement retrospectively confirm that sanctions also played a role in their increased visibility, as they were seen as providing them with legitimacy (BDI32; BDI34). Facing continued sanctions even after Buyoya had re-established the National Assembly and allowed political parties again because he had made no progress with respect to the third demand of inclusive peace negotiations, Buyoya chose to initiate the secret talks under the auspices of the Italian community Sant’Egidio. This talks – which had not been on his agenda from the onset according to most contemporary witnesses (BDI17, BDI29; BDI30) – constituted an important step for the CNDD-FDD. For the first time, negotiations with the armed rebellion were no longer ruled out.

116 “(...) la rébellion a quand même beaucoup profité de l’embargo. Parce-que d’abord, économiquement le pays s’affaiblissait. Et deuxièmement, Buyoya a accepté de négocier parce qu’il a été quelque part forcé.”
Third, the case study confirms in a powerful manner that sanctions signals can only strengthen opposition movements if the demands by the sanctions senders and those of the regime critical forces are coherent. With the signature of the 1998 partnership agreement, FRODEBU’s internal wing constitutionally recognized Buyoya as president and began lobbying for the removal of the regional measures. Even though the sanctions’ front – and also the messages of regime condemnation conveyed by their senders – had already been far from unanimous at that time, this constituted the final blow. Subsequently, sanctions not only became a visible sign of disagreement between FRODEBU’s external and internal wing, but they also ceased to be a symbol for the Buyoya regime’s illegitimate nature. Put differently, sanctions could only empower the opposition as long as their demands and those of the regional sanction senders overlapped.

5.3. Conclusion

According to the fsQCA, the regional embargo led to an ‘internal opposition’ effect in Burundi for two major reasons: The measures increased socio-economic deprivation leading to anti-regime mobilization, and the signals of regime disapproval and opposition encouragement conveyed by the Regional Initiative gave heart to anti-government forces. The case study analysis has partially confirmed, but also qualified this proposed causal mechanism. Before summarizing how the field-research based reconstruction of the regional embargo sheds additional light on the proposed causal pathway, two specific points are in order.

First, the case of Burundi highlights the diversity of opposition forces in Burundi. As discussed in the third chapter, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis lumps all types of anti-government activity together. In doing so, political protest and activities of the armed rebels cannot be differentiated. In contrast, the case study allows distinguishing which forces within the anti-Buyoya spectrum were affected by the regional embargo in which ways. Two formations are of particular interest in that respect, namely FRODEBU and the CNDD-FDD. As detailed above, FRODEBU gained leverage through the imposition of sanctions insofar as these measures constituted a signal of regional and international support after Buyoya’s assumption of power. Nevertheless, it appears that this regional and international display of recognition had even stronger repercussions for the CNDD-FDD, which had been neglected during previous mediation attempts (see Ould-Abdallah 2000). Moreover, the sanctions’ economic impact failed to create mass protest against the regime (and in favor of FRODEBU) for the reasons described above, whereas CNDD-FDD could benefit militarily from the financial constraints
5. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Burundi (1996-1999)

placed on the regime – and hence also its ability to finance the on-going war effort against the rebels – at least to a limited degree. Unsurprisingly, contemporary witnesses across the entire spectrum, including (former) CNDD-FDD activists, members of Buyoya’s administration and FRODEBU politicians argue that the armed rebellion rather than the political opposition to Buyoya gained more leverage during the embargo (BDI2; BDI5; BDI12; BDI17; BDI30).

Secondly, the case study shows how the embargo affected opposition forces over time. One of the major shortcomings of an fsQCA is that it cannot cover temporal dynamics (for an exception see Caren and Panofsky 2005). In contrast, the process-tracing analysis reveals how the sanctions’ impact changed during the embargo. Briefly summarizing the insight presented in this chapter, the embargo at first isolated the regime politically and also had economic implications, thereby leading to political concessions which could have potentially increased FRODEBU’s political leverage, namely to re-open the parliament and suspend the ban of political parties (on why these measures fell short of actually enabling FRODEBU, see above). Subsequently, however, the Buyoya regime managed to not only adapt to the economic constraints set by the embargo, but also even to turn them into an economic and political asset. This not only confirms the theoretical argument that financially costly sanctions may benefit a targeted regime economically and ultimately also politically rather than solely leading to deprivation-induced mass protest against the regime, but also specifies the timing of such developments.

But what does the analysis tell us about the sanctions’ impact on opposition movements? According to the fsQCA, the measures should have facilitated the voicing and enacting of dissent because they sent signals of regime disapproval and exacerbated economic turmoil. The case study indeed confirms the importance of the signaling dimensions of sanctions. The regional embargo – and the Western aid sanctions, as long as they were in place – denied the regime legitimacy, which became an important component of the anti-regime forces’ discursive strategy. Yet, the message of regime disapproval and opposition support sent by the Regional Initiative and the international community encouraged the political elite instead of the general population. While those living in rural areas, which constitute the overwhelming majority of Burundi’s population, hardly took note of the sanctions (BDI1; BDI6; BDI23; BDI28), FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD members closely followed the statements by the regional and international heads of states. The messages’ impact on the ‘ordinary people’ was undermined by the lack of a transmission channel to the general population. In the theoretical chapter, I
have argued that sanctions signals can only create perceived opportunities for voicing and enacting dissent if they reach the intended audience. In the case of Burundi, where the rural population remained politically weak, the sanction sender’s key audience was the regime critical elite.

As regards their ‘tangible’ costs, the sanctions against Burundi failed to trigger large-scale protest against the regime. On the one hand, the comprehensive trade restrictions and aid sanctions, though presumably very costly, did not enhance feelings of deprivation on the part of potential protestors. While Buyoya managed to shield the urban middle class from the measures’ adverse consequences, the rural population continued subsistence farming and thus hardly noticed that sanctions were imposed. Rather than the sanctions’ net costs, the question of which societal groups are affected thus appears crucial for explaining how they affect anti-regime mobilization. On the other hand, the population lacked even a minimum degree of political freedom: People were living in camps; there was political oppression and no organizational structure. Seemingly, this was more detrimental to mass mobilization than posited by the fsQCA. The anti-government mobilization that happened according to the quantitative measures used in the fsQCA instead occurred on the part of the CNDD-FDD rebels. However, this does not mean that the trade restrictions’ economic consequences were politically meaningless. Rather than affecting domestic dynamics of contention through mass mobilization, the risk of running out of foreign reserves directly pressured the regime into negotiations as re-constructed in the respective sub-chapter.

To sum up, sanctions emboldened opposition forces through their combined economic and signaling impact. But both aspects – the financial constraints created by the comprehensive trade embargo and the continued display of disproval of the putschist regime – influenced the reasoning and the strategies of the political elite and the armed rebellion rather than shaping the motivation of the broader population to rise against the Buyoya government politically. Whether this phenomenon that sanctions mostly affected political contestation and military strategies at the elite level is a Burundian peculiarity or should lead to rethinking the assumed transmission mechanism from economic pain to popular protest more generally will be scrutinized in the next chapter, which deals with the sanctions against Zimbabwe (2001-2013).
6. THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS IN ZIMBABWE (2001-2013)

When the EU and the US imposed so-called restrictive measures against Zimbabwe in 2001/2003 and 2002 respectively, the country already looked back at a long history of sanctions. In response to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of the Rhodesian white minority government in 1965, Great Britain enacted sanctions against its former colony. Three years later, the United Nations Security Council also imposed trade restrictions against the UDI regime (UN Security Council 1968), which lasted for more than a decade. With evidence both pointing to severe long-term economic consequences and successful sanctions busting, the embargo’s effectiveness was widely contested. Scholars like Doxey (1980), Strack (1978) and Alao (2012, 18) argue that the sanction’s impact was very limited whereas Baldwin (1985), Hufbauer et al. (1990), Saint Brides (1980) and Mlambo (2014, 169) described the sanctions as successful, at least in the long run. More than a decade later, the focus of the debate has shifted from the questions whether sanctions work to the more fruitful one ‘of the conditions under which different tactics will represent the most effective policy choices’ (Kirshner 1997, 32). One factor already debated in the case of the sanctions against Rhodesia was whether outside pressure reinforced opposition to the regime or rather promoted support for the ruling elite (Galtung 1967; Minter and Schmidt 1988).

This puzzle has not lost any of its relevance. Despite the upsurge of literature dealing with the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe in the 2000s (for example, Eriksson 2007; Grebe 2010), we still lack any systematic analyses of how these measures affected opposition politics in the new millennium. To address this research gap, the case study will introduce the context of the events that led to the imposition EU and US sanctions in a first section. In addition to providing a short outline of Zimbabwe’s post-independence history, special emphasis will be paid to developments that later became important reference points during the domestic debates about sanctions, namely the embargo against the UDI regime in the 1960s, Zimbabwe’s economic decline, land redistribution and the question of democratic governance illustrated by opposition politics. This first section finally sketches the domestic political scene and external attempts to address the Zimbabwean crisis just before the imposition of sanctions. In the second section, two major approaches explaining opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions that emerged from the Qualitative Comparative Analysis will be discussed. These are
the deprivation-based explanations and a signaling perspective, and will be analyzed on the basis of semi-structured interviews conducted during field research and additional secondary literature. This second section then concludes by contrasting the explanatory power of these approaches with additional insights that emerge from the case study.

6.1. Setting the historical context

Zimbabwe’s post-independence political trajectory and the country’s development after independence have been highly contested (on the latter, see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009, 1141). Among many controversial issues, the debate about the re-distribution of land features most prominently, not least because it ‘is as much about the nature of the Zimbabwean state as it is about land’ (Southall 2011, 84; see also Helliker 2011; Tendi 2010). In a similar manner, issues such as the country’s economic trajectory and the constitutional reform have been the subjects of heated disputes. While I seek to provide a balanced account of these developments, it is beyond the scope of this case study to provide answers to many, fundamentally unresolved questions. Instead, I aim to depict the polarized and highly politicized discourse on the land, the economy and democratic governance to the extent that it is necessary for understanding Zimbabwe’s domestic debate on sanctions after 2001.

Issues such as the quest for democratic reform in the late 1990s, the economy’s drastic decline and the so-called fast-track land reform (FTLR) indeed became inseparably intertwined with the controversies following the imposition of EU and US targeted sanctions. For instance, a great majority of the politicians, civil society activists, journalists, international staff and academics that I interviewed referred to the land question in the context of sanctions before I explicitly asked about it. A significant number of interviewees also brought up the issue of democratic governance and human rights, oftentimes in the context of the constitutional reform attempts that led to the 2000 referendum in relation to the sanctions debate. In a similar manner, Great Britain’s sanctions, imposed after Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, were repeatedly invoked, albeit in a slightly less polarized manner. Hence, special emphasis will be

117 ZWE2; ZWE3; ZWE5; ZWE6; ZWE9; ZWE10; ZWE12; ZWE13; ZWE14; ZWE15; ZWE17; ZWE18; ZWE19; ZWE21; ZWE23; ZWE27; ZWE28; ZWE30; ZWE31; ZWE34; ZWE35; ZWE37; ZWE40; ZWE41; ZWE43. The interviews are referenced as ZWE1-44 and focus groups as ZWE_FG1-3; details on the interviewees and the focus groups are indicated in Appendix H.

118 ZWE1; ZWE2; ZWE4; ZWE5; ZWE6; ZWE7; ZWE8; ZWE9; ZWE10; ZWE13; ZWE15; ZWE17; ZWE19; ZWE20; ZWE23; ZWE24; ZWE25; ZWE27; ZWE28; ZWE32; ZWE34; ZWE37; ZWE40; ZWE43.

119 ZWE_FG2; ZWE4; ZWE6; ZWE8; ZWE10; ZWE15; ZWE16; ZWE19; ZWE23.
6. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013)

6.1. From UDI to independence

Zimbabwe is a land-locked country in southern Africa, bordering Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia. Its major urban centers are the capital Harare with about 1.5 million inhabitants and Bulawayo with approximately 700,000 inhabitants, but out of the population of 13 million approximately 70 percent still live in rural areas (CIA Factbook 2015b). Zimbabwe is rich in mineral resources, including gold, nickel, copper, iron ore, chromium ore, and platinum (ibid.). The ethno-linguistic Shona, including their diverse sub-groups, account for about 80 percent of the population. The ethno-linguistic Ndebele, who emerged out of a successful rebellion against the then ruling king in the 1820s and settled in the area known today as Matabeleland (Mlambo 2014, xv), comprise about 16 percent of the population. The remaining four percent are other groups (Alao 2012, 13; Mlambo 2014, 3).

In 1889, the British colonialist Cecil Rhodes, after whom the colony was later named, obtained a royal charter for his British South African Company (BSAC) to colonize the territory that makes up today’s Zimbabwe (for an overview of Zimbabwe’s colonial history, see Bourne 2011, chapter 2). During the 1890s, a Ndebele uprising in 1893 and a Ndebele-Shona rebellion in 1896/97, which was later celebrated as the first Chimurenga\(^\text{120}\), were brutally repressed by the settler army (Alao 2012, 14; Mlambo 2014, 61–67; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011, 47). As a consequence, the BSAC successfully lobbied for the mass settlement of Europeans to strengthen its grip on the territory. The newly arriving settlers acquired huge amounts of fertile farmland. The resulting unequal distribution was later codified by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which restricted the black population’s access to land (Chikuhwa 2006, 3–4; Mlambo 2014, 61–67)\(^\text{121}\). Only in 1977 did the Land Tenure Amendment Act legally remove the restrictions on black land ownership, but this hardly affected its de facto distribution (Chikuhwa 2006, 5; Englert 2001, 59; Peel and Ranger 1983, 77).

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\(^{120}\) Chimurenga is a Shona word that roughly translates into ‘revolutionary struggle’. It is used to describe the said Shona and Ndebele insurrection against the BSAC administration (First Chimurenga) as well as the national liberation war during the 1970s (Second Chimurenga).

\(^{121}\) Under the UDI regime, sanctions made it more difficult for white commercial farmers to export their products. Consequently they shifted back to the domestic market where they competed with the predominantly black small-scale farms (Palmer 1990). This further intensified competition over land, which would later become a key issue during the peace negotiations in 1979.
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Following a whites only referendum in 1922, the territory became a so-called independent colony in 1923 (Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009; Mlambo 2014, 5). Over the years, black resistance to colonial rule grew and led to the creation of the nationalist movement known as the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). ZAPU was created by Joshua Nkomo when its predecessor National Democratic Party (NDP) was banned by the Rhodesian government in 1961 (Alao 2012, 16; Laakso 2003). Disenchanted with Nkomo’s leadership style and his decision to create a government in exile rather than focusing on resistance within Zimbabwe, a group of high ranking former ZAPU cadres set up the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963 (Alao 2012, 16; Laakso 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011, 67). Later attempts to reunite both groups failed, not least because ZANU refused to accept Nkomo as the movement’s overall leader, despite the fact he was more senior than ZANU’s head Robert Mugabe (ibid). During that period, any advocacy for democracy was criminalized and banned as terrorism. This authoritarian colonial legacy later undermined pro-democracy activism after independence, when the repressive colonial legislature still in place was used to silence opposition voices (Kagoro 2005; Moyo 1993; Weitzer 1984). In the words of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004, 111) the ruling party ‘failed to de-militarise itself as a militarised liberation movement, not only in practice, but also in attitude and style of management of civilian institutions and the state at larger’.

Negotiations over independence on the basis of a majority rule constitution broke down in 1965 under the uncompromising stance of Ian Smith, who had become prime minister when his predecessor resigned in April 1964. Following his electoral victory in 1965, he unilaterally declared Rhodesia’s independence on the basis of white minority rule on 11 November (Mlambo 2014, 150–151). In response, the GB imposed selective sanctions on Rhodesia and recommended the international community to limit financial and commercial relations with the Smith regime (Brides 1980; Minter and Schmidt 1988). The United Nations Security Council eventually enacted voluntary trade restrictions on 20 November 1965 (UN Security Council 1965), but it took until 16 December 1966 to impose mandatory measures including an arms embargo (UN Security Council 1966). Two years later, these were expanded into a comprehensive sanctions regime that lasted until 1979, aiming to establish majority rule in Rhodesia (UN Security Council 1968).

122 While ZAPU eventually became a predominantly Ndebele and ZANU a predominantly Shona movement, its split up was motivated by strategic rather than ethnic considerations (Alao 2012, 1).
Despite a 40 percent decrease of Rhodesia’s exports (Mlambo 2014, 158), the Smith government managed to counter the sanctions’ effect during the initial years to an extent that it could turn down British negotiation offers in 1966 and 1968 (Brides 1980; Mlambo 2014, 152–160). Between 1966 and 1974, the economy even grew thanks to increased domestic buying power and import substitution industrialization (Bond 2009; Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 5). Exchange controls prevented capital flight and led to a significant, yet unsustainable hothouse effect (Seidman 1987, 64–76). Rhodesia could also count on key allies: South Africa and Mozambique still provided oil in violation of the UN sanctions, Zambia continued to purchase Zimbabwean coal, and Malawian workers remained in Zimbabwe (Alao 2012, 18; Bond and Manyanya 2002, chapter 1; Brides 1980; Minter and Schmidt 1988; Mlambo 2014, 153). Moreover, the country received considerable loans despite the UN-mandated financial sanctions. Western countries still traded with Zimbabwe and the Byrd Amendment from 1971 allowed the US to import Zimbabwean chrome until it was partially repelled in 1977 (ibid.). In the long run, however, foreign reserve shortage became increasingly problematic and import substitution reached its limit (Minter and Schmidt 1988). The trade restrictions’ effectiveness further increased when South Africa, which shifted its foreign policy preferences from supporting the white minority regime to favoring a stable black government (Brides 1980; Minter and Schmidt 1988) and restricted its oil supplies (Brides 1980; Minter and Schmidt 1988) and Zambia as well as Mozambique closed their borders (Mlambo 2014, 160).

Over the years, armed resistance against the white minority regime intensified. The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU’s military wing, and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), ZAPU’s military wing, both fought the settler army. In spite of the common goal, their relationship was characterized by inner tensions (Alao 2012, 29; Mlambo 2014, 164; Mudyanadzo 2011, 24) so that the loose umbrella Patriotic Front (PF) established in 1976 failed in achieving a true integration of both movements (Chigora and Guzura 2011).

Towards the end of the 1970s, Ian Smith began searching for a domestic solution to the conflict. To what extent the British and UN sanctions contributed to pressuring the Rhodesian government into the following compromises remains contested. Doxey (1980, 1) claims that their efficacy was ‘revealed as limited’ and attributed the concessions to the same developments pointed out by Lord Saint Brides (1980), namely the regime’s military inferiority and Western diplomatic pressure. In contrast, Minter and Schmidt (1988, 208; see also Baldwin 1985) maintain that ‘sanctions were a major factor in forcing the Smith regime to negotiate a
transition to majority rule', not least because their economic impact undermined the regime’s war efforts against the Patriotic Front. Moreover, they argue that the external pressure ‘reinforced opposition to the regime rather than promoting support for it’, which also contributed to its destabilization (Minter and Schmidt 1988, 230).

In 1978, elections for a transitional government in line with Smith’s internal settlement proposal took place and were won by the oppositional United African National Congress, but ZANU and ZAPU boycotted the polls and instead intensified their armed struggle (Alao 2012, 30; Chigora and Guzura 2011; Mudyanadzo 2011, 38–39; Sithole and Makumbe 1997). Subsequently, the British government brokered negotiations over a peace agreement. These all-party talks took place at Lancaster House in London and covered pre-independence provisions, a ceasefire and the independence constitution. Under this new constitution, 20 per cent of the seats in the country’s parliament were to be reserved for whites according to article 10 while the rest was openly contested. The elections for the first post-independence government took place in February 1980. Robert Mugabe won and thereby became Prime Minister upon Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980.

As part of the Lancaster House negotiations, Robert Mugabe and his supporters had been pressured into a compromise on the land issue, which was supposed to last until 1990. It broadly consisted of a Zimbabwean guarantee for existing property rights in exchange for the British commitment to financially contribute to resettlement (for an overview of the negotiations, see Stedman 1991). GB should cover half of the costs of this program, which was based on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ principle, with the other half being matched by the Zimbabwean government. At that time, 6,000 white farmers owned about 40 percent of the agricultural land (Palmer 1990). The government’s first target to relocate 18,000 black households to newly acquired farm land was subsequently raised to 162,000 households to be resettled by 1985 (Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009; Chikuhwa 2006, 6; Palmer 1990).

Initially, there was indeed a boom of transfer of land to black Zimbabweans (Palmer 1990), but this process was increasingly controlled by the new elite so that farms changed into their hands (Southall 2011). The redistribution then slowed down because Zimbabwe could no longer match the British contributions in 1983. It became clear that the stability provided by the agreement had led to a rise in the price for farm land and thus made the willing buyer approach extremely costly (Palmer 1990; Southall 2011). As a result, only 52,000 households were resettled until 1989, which nonetheless meant that white ownership of land decreased to
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approximately 30 percent by 1989 (Kriger 2007). When the ten year period for the compromised land redistribution scheme codified at Lancaster House expired, Mugabe began to address the land issue with renewed impetus (Palmer 1990). Two constitutional amendments passed in 1990 enabled the government to set the prices for the compensation of owners, but re-distribution did not speed up significantly (Chikuhwa 2006, 8). In addition to reacting to the decrease in land distribution and disagreement with Great Britain over the future of the program that found its expression in the failure of the ‘Land Policy in Zimbabwe after Lancaster’ conference in 1989, the resurgence of the land issue at the end of the 1980s has been interpreted as a response of the Mugabe regime to its decreasing popularity due to several corruption scandals (Palmer 1990). The questions of land (re-)distribution, economic development and the prospect to turn the colonial state into a democratic regime continued to be of major importance after independence and thus shaped post-1980 dynamics of contention and opposition politics, as I will show in the subsequent section.

6.1.2. Post-independence dynamics of contention

This case study seeks to understand the trajectories of opposition politics against the backdrop of EU and US sanctions, i.e. since the beginning of the 2000s. Yet, these developments are inseparably linked not only to the emergence of an unprecedented anti-regime movement in the late 1990s, but also to opposition politics since independence as well as the states’ responses to these ‘dissidents’ over the years. Hence, this section will sketch democratic governance and post-independence opposition politics in Zimbabwe to provide the basis for understanding its contingent development. In doing so, two phases will be distinguished, namely ZANU-PF’s path towards establishing a de facto one-party state, which culminated in its almost uncontested 1995 electoral victory, and the emergence of labor-related and human rights-centered activism since the mid-1990s, which led to the establishment of a new party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This overview will capture key events, such as the merger of the two liberation movements in 1987, the start of the structural adjustment program in 1991 and Mugabe’s first electoral defeat in the 2000 referendum and introduce the key political actors including the ZANU-PF, the umbrella trade union organization Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the constitutional movement called National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). Due to its outstanding importance for the analysis, the emergence and development of ZANU-PF’s key contender during the period of the sanctions, the MDC, will be separately reconstructed in the subsequent section.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DE FACTO ONE-PARTY STATE

ZAPU leader Samuel Nkomo had expected to attract a significant proportion of the votes during the first free elections in 1980 based on his image as ‘father Zimbabwe’, his experience as a trade unionist and his reputation as a senior figure of the armed struggle (Laakso 2003). Yet, Mugabe’s ZANU won 57 seats as opposed to only 20 seats for ZAPU. In an attempt to bridge the divide between the two independence movements, Mugabe included ZAPU figures such as Nkomo into the government, albeit with insignificant portfolios and on a very restricted basis (ibid.). Two years later, Nkomo was dismissed from the cabinet based on allegations of having plotted a coup against Mugabe when security personal discovered arms caches on ZAPU properties (Alao 2012, 76–81; Chigora and Guzura 2011). Outraged by Nkomo’s expulsion from the government, former ZIPRA cadres started to wage a violent campaign against the government in the Matabeleland province, Nkomo’s region of origin (Mlambo 2014, 196).

In response to their activities, the state waged a violent counter-insurgency campaign (Kagoro 2005; Weitzer 1984). The Fifth Brigade, consisting of North Korean-trained and Shona-dominated soldiers, detained dissidents and alleged supporters of ZAPU, many of whom counted towards the disappeared (Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009; Eppel 2009; Sithole and Makumbe 1997; Weitzer 1984). Up to 20,000 people in Matabeleland died during this period euphemistically referred to as Gukurahundi (‘the early rain that washes away the chaff before the spring rains’) in Shona (Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991; Shaw 1986). While both government soldiers and dissidents were responsible for gross human rights violations, most people fell victim to the brutality of the Fifth Brigade (Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000, 217; Mlambo 2014, 198). At the same time, ZAPU once again lost the 1985 national elections marred by the massive intimidation of their voters (Dorman 2005; Kriger 2005). Subsequently, ZAPU was forced to agree to a unity accord with ZANU, which Nkomo’s only accepted out of fear of a continued massacre against his Ndebele people (Tekere 2007). This merger of ZANU and ZAPU, which brought both parties together under the name ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front), was hence characterized as ‘a case of ‘unity from above’ (Sachikonye 2002, 16), which further blurred the lines between the state and the government (Laakso 2003).

Following the merger with ZAPU in 1987, ZANU aspired to formalize its domination through the creation of a one party state and by removing any term limits for Mugabe (Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009; Kagoro 2005). However, a mobilization in defense of the multiparty system took
place in the late 1980s. University students and staff, NGOs and the ZCTU that explicitly backed multi-party democracy (Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009) staged demonstrations in 1988/89, which the scholar Alexander (2000, 386) characterized as the ‘first mass movement against the government’ (Hodgkinson 2013, 871; see also Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991; Raftopoulos 1992). Political dissent also manifested itself in a new party. Mugabe’s former ally during the liberation struggle, Edgar Tekere, who had been expelled from ZANU in 1989 over his rivalry with Mugabe and his vocal criticism of the party’s corruption scandals, formed the populist Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) just before the 1990 elections (Kagoro 2005; Laakso 2003; Sithole and Makumbe 1997). The new party criticized the endemic corruption and ZANU’s attempt to establish a one-party state (Chigora, Guzura, and Mutumburanzou 2011). In the 1990 elections, ZUM obtained 18 percent of the votes despite the difficult conditions – the newly-founded party lacked organizational capacity and suffered violent attacks from ZANU-PF – which has been interpreted as a signal that the population opposed the attempted formation of a one-party state (Laakso 2003). Consequently, ZANU-PF abandoned plans for creating a de jure one party state after the elections (Dansereau 2003; Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991; Sithole and Makumbe 1997).

Yet the new party was short lived – differences surfaced quickly and only two years after the elections, a split marked the beginning of its end. After ZUM’s disintegration, 55 constituencies were not contested during the 1995 elections due to a lack of opposition candidates and the vote obtained by opposition parties declined to one percent (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000; Sylvester 1995). At the same time, voter turnout dropped to an all-time low after independence of 57 percent (ibid.). Opposition to the regime was not dead, but shifted to the then relatively new phenomenon of independent candidates – which, however, failed to secure any seat – and increasingly manifested itself through extra-parliamentary channels (Dansereau 2003; Laakso 1996; Sithole and Makumbe 1997) as the next section will show.

LABOR-RELATED AND HUMAN RIGHTS-CENTERED ACTIVISM
The 1990s were characterized by economic decline and political turmoil. Against the backdrop of failed attempts to revitalize the economy, political contestation became increasingly polarized. The origins of the crisis were multidimensional. Mugabe-centric explanations of the developments in the late 1990s and early 2000s centered on the shift in his personal conviction from stressing reconciliation with the white minority population and cooperation with Great Britain to a more confrontational approach (Chan 2003; Compagnon 2011; Meredith 2009). Yet,
these fall short of fully capturing a crisis that was caused by a number of interlinked and mutually re-enforcing factors including the uneven distribution of resources, a specific exclusionary construction of the nation and citizenship as well as the persistent use of violence as a means of political contestation (Bond and Manyanya 2002; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Hammar, Raftopolous, and Jensen 2003; Raftopoulos and Savage 2004).

After independence, Zimbabwe’s economy was thriving, its industry was highly diversified and the country became the region’s bread basket (Chikuhwa 2006, 45; Sachikonye 2002). In line with the socialist development strategy outlined in the ‘Growth with Equity’ policy program in 1981, the government significantly improved the provision of health services and basic education (Bond and Manyanya 2002). To the extent that civil society organizations existed at that time, most of them supported the regime’s developmental policies (Saki and Katema 2011). But strained state finances, stagnating exports, low foreign direct investment (FDI) and growing unemployment rates increasingly put the state-focused development model into question (Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009). In response, the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) was launched in 1991 with ‘considerable enthusiasm’ by Mugabe (Bond and Saunders 2005, 43).

However, it negatively affected the economy rather than reviving it. The GDP decreased by 10 percent in the first year, manufacturing output decreased by 40 percent from 1991 to 1995 and the Zimbabwe dollar exchange rate fell drastically (Bond and Manyanya 2002; Bond and Saunders 2005). This downturn also affected the general population. The average real income sharply decreased by more than 60 percent between the introduction of the ESAP in 1991 and 1997 (Alexander 2000). Unemployment rose from 30 to 50 percent under ESAP as opposed to the creation of 100,000 new jobs that had been promised (Sachikonye 2002). In addition, social welfare and subsidies were drastically reduced (Bond 1991, 1998). The program, whose first phase the World Bank (1995, 23) still evaluated as ‘highly satisfactory’ in 1995, in fact ‘provided the momentum for the economy to become uncompetitive in key industrial sectors’ (Bracking 2005, 344). By 1999 even World Bank officials finally admitted that the program did not achieve the foreseen results (Chikuhwa 2006, 52). The resulting economic crises, coupled with rampant corruption and mismanagement, affected the regime’s legitimacy (Raftopoulos 2000).
The labor union reacted to this socio-economic recession. The Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, which had been close to the regime upon its formation\(^{123}\), began to cautiously assert its independence from the mid-1980s onwards (Alexander 2000; Schiphorst 2001, 76). In response to the structural adjustment program, the ZCTU accused the government of using ESAP as a means to weaken the independent unions (Dansereau 2003). The first march against ESAP in 1992 was still poorly attended, but ZCTU subsequently developed its organizations capacity and launched a wave of strikes, which started in the banking sector in 1994 (Alexander 2000). In 1996, prolonged strikes were organized in the public sector, followed by over 100 smaller strikes in 1997 as well as general strikes in 1997 and in 1998 (Alexander 2000; Dansereau 2003; Matombo and Sachikonye 2010)\(^{124}\). Approximately 90 percent of the formally employed workers participated in the stay-away on 3 and 4 March 1997 and again in December 1997, when more than one million workers, civil servants and informal sector merchants took to streets to protest new levies imposed to finance the war veteran pensions (Bond and Saunders 2005; LeBas 2006; Van der Walt 1998). The year 2000 then saw another round of protests in response to the increase of the petrol, milk and maize meal prices (Moore 2001, 254).

Strike accomplishments such as the sacking of tax increases boosted ZCTU’s membership (Alexander 2000). The stay-away strike actions addressed immediate socio-economic concerns such as price increases, real wage decreases, the phase-out of basic commodity subsidies and new taxes, but increasingly also transported political messages (LeBas 2006). In an attempt to limit ZCTU’s influence, the ruling party created the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) as a rival organization in 1998, but the new umbrella union failed to attract a large number of members (Matombo and Sachikonye 2010). At the same time, ZCTU’s activity developed into what has been described as ‘social movement unionism’, which was based on close cooperation with other pressure groups (Dansereau 2003; Matombo and Sachikonye 2010).

But which were these other groups? Not only the labor movement took advantage of popular discontent, but ‘civil society organization expanded in quantitative and qualitative terms’ under ESAP (Sachikonye 2002, 16; see also LeBas 2006). Paralleling the development of the unions, they first mainly addressed socio-economic issues whereas questions of human rights

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\(^{123}\) The president’s half-brother Albert Mugabe served as ZCTU’s first Secretary General and half of ZCTU’s first executive committee were staunch ZANU-PF supporters (Schiphorst 2001, 60).

\(^{124}\) An attempt to organize a national strike in 1996 could not be realized because the government threatened to deploy the military (Dansereau 2003).
promotion and the rule of law became increasingly important over the course of the decade (ibid.). For instance, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, which was formed in 1998 to assist those that had suffered from government repression during the demonstrations, later began to address human rights issues more generally (Shaw 2003). Lastly, the private media also expanded during that period (Thondhlana 2011).

In addition to socio-economic grievances, a second key area of contestation was a potential reform of the constitution. In 1997, a group of more than 100 organizations including NGOs\(^{125}\), the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), human rights groups, academics, lawyers and the ZCTU founded the NCA to campaign for a democratic constitutional reform (Dansereau 2003; Laakso 2003; Sithole 2001; Tendi 2010, chapter 3). The NCA criticized both the legacies in the constitution from the Lancaster House Agreement and subsequent amendments made by ZANU-PF to strengthen its control of the state (Dorman 2003). Despite its common goal, the NCA was a very diverse movement. Some actors envisaged it to be the first step towards the formation of an opposition party whereas others aspired to cooperate with the regime in order to bring about the desired constitutional reform (LeBas 2006). Financially, the NCA received aid from Western donors\(^{126}\), which made it easy for the Mugabe regime to discredit the movement as Western funded puppet project aiming to protect the colonial Lancaster House Agreement (Dorman 2003; Tendi 2010, 18).

To regain control over the constitutional reform process, ZANU-PF initiated its own Constitutional Commission (CC) in 2000 and invited churches and NGOs to join. While many organizations declined the offer, others chose be re-incorporated into the states-sponsored process, which created divisions within the emerging opposition movement. The ZCC, for example, sided with the CC and the Archbishop of Harare became its chairman (Dansereau 2003). In addition, the CC was made up of private sector actors and representatives from those NGOs that were close to the regime (Sithole 2001). Sidelineing the attempts of the NCA to prepare a new constitution on the basis of inclusive public deliberations, the CC presented its constitution proposal to be approved in a referendum in February 2000. Together with the government, the CC campaigned for a yes vote and denounced a “no” vote as support for the

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\(^{125}\) This is not to suggest that all NGOs in Zimbabwe were critical of the regime. A number of NGOs cooperated with the (local) government or at least unintentionally contributed to stabilizing the regime through their service provision and development work (Bornstein 2005).

\(^{126}\) Initial funding was provided by the German political foundation Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung; later, the NCA received contributions from a donor consortium that included the Dutch HIVOs foundation, USAID, SIDA from Sweden and the Danish DANIDA (Dansereau 2003; Sithole 2001).
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The constitutional referendum held on 16 and 17 February 2000 was interpreted as a proxy vote on Mugabe’s legitimacy (Bond 2000; Compagnon 2000). A majority of 53.2 percent rejected the government’s constitutional proposal. Mugabe’s first electoral defeat created expectations that the MDC could sustain this momentum in the June parliamentary elections (Sithole 2001). Prior to these elections, opinion polls indeed showed that a majority of the population desired a change of the head of state (Compagnon 2000). During the 2000 parliamentary elections, the MDC then won 57 seats as opposed to 62 for ZANU-PF. Only widespread vote rigging and manipulations of the electoral laws secured ZANU-PF’s narrow victory (Bush and Szeftel 2002; Makumbe 2002), which constituted a remarkable achievement for the opposition party that had only existed for a little more than 15 months (Alexander 2000). For the first time after independence, the regime’s grip of power was curtailed and organizations and ideas outside the ZANU-PF hegemony appeared legitimate. This prompted violent government action, which eventually led to the implementation of EU and US sanctions. But before examining Zimbabwe’s domestic dynamics of contention against the backdrop of Western sanctions, the relation between key domestic actors just before the imposition of these measures and attempts to address the ensuing crisis preceding the sanctions shall be sketched.

6.1.3. Key domestic actors

With their sanctions, the Western senders reacted to an increasingly violent competition for power in Zimbabwe, which intensified after the referendum. For the first time in Zimbabwe’s post-independence history, ZANU-PF faced the real risk of being deposed by a strong opposition party, the MDC. Hence, it appears crucial to examine this relatively new actor in the political scene and ZANU-PF’s reaction to its emergence as to provide a background for understanding their contestation after the imposition of sanctions.

The MDC came into being at the National Working People’s Convention (NWPC) held in Harare on 26 to 28 October 1999. Leading figures of the constitutional reform movement and trade union activists, which became the new party’s backbones, as well as members of the churches and NGOs were present (Alexander 2000; Kagoro 2005; Raftopoulos 2007, 125). The convention adopted a declaration that called for the establishment of a ‘democratic political movement for
change’ ("Declaration of the National Working Peoples Convention" (1999), cited after Alexander 2000) and proposed a left-leaning socio-economic agenda, which was later replaced by a slightly less leftist manifesto. The relationship between ZCTU and MDC was very close and there were even debates about formally aligning both organizations (Matombo and Sachikonye 2010). The ZCTU was tasked with the further development of the new party’s structure and program. Whilst a fully-fledged integration was never realized, ZCTU leaders wanting to join the new party instead officially left the ZCTU, which nominally de-linked both organizations (Kagoro 2003). During the MDC party congress on 29 and 30 January 2000, the former ZCTU Secretary General Morgan Tsvangirai was elected as the party’s first president.

In addition to labor unionists, human rights activists associated with the NCA such as law professor Welshman Ncube from the University of Zimbabwe and human rights lawyer David Coltart constituted a crucial group within the newly-founded party (Alexander 2000; Dansereau 2003). The party’s diversity further expanded when white farmers joined the MDC after the violent land acquisitions in 2000 (Dansereau 2003; Kagoro 2003). The party’s heterogeneous members, who were primarily united by their desire to oust Mugabe, failed to agree on a coherent program (Chigora, Guzura, and Mutumburanzou 2011). Most importantly, divisions between leftist and neo-liberal economic orientations became increasingly visible (Alexander 2000; Bond and Saunders 2005). Yet, the variety of positions and members also constituted one of MDC’s strengths as it allowed to party to address a wide range of potential voters (Sachikonye 2002) and to cooperate closely with diverse civil society organizations (LeBas 2011, chapter 5 and 7). Among MDC’s key electorate were young Zimbabweans who had not experienced the liberation struggle, the so-called born-free (Chikwanha, Sithole, and Bratton 2004; Laakso 2003; Wilkins 2013). Moreover, the MDC generally won the urban areas during the 2000 elections whereas the ZANU-PF secured the majority in the countryside (on the roots of the tension between the nationalist liberation project and organized labor, see Scarnecchia 2008). Finally, the MDC gained widespread support among the Ndebele, even though the 2000 election outcomes points to an electorate that clearly transcended ethnic boundaries (Alao 2012, 103; Sithole 2001).

127 The fact that the MDC did not distance itself from the financial support provided by the white farmer’s association later turned into a significant liability (Kagoro 2003).
128 To construct a straightforward dichotomy between the MDC being the urban party and ZANU-PF being the rural one, however, would be misleading (Sithole 2001).
6. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013)

Until the mid-1990s, ZANU-PF had effectively come close to successfully establishing what Kriger (2003a, 72–76) has called a ‘party-nation’ and a ‘party-state’. Challenged by the new powerful opposition movement, the regime responded by a militarization of political life and a politicization of the state’s institutions. Between the lost referendum in February and the June 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU-PF resorted to ‘shock therapy’, which included the massive use of violence (Sithole 2001, 165). War veterans attacked potential MDC stronghold district councils and called for the dismissal of officials suspected of supporting the opposition (Kriger 2003b; McGregor 2002). Professional state functionaries were replaced by state security agents and paramilitaries, which increasingly blurred the distinction between party, state and military (inter alia Chitiyo 2009; Mapuva 2010b; Maroleng 2005). The heads of the Electoral Supervisory Commission, the Grain Marketing Board, and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, just to name a few examples, were progressively replaced by military personnel (Mapuva 2010b; Maroleng 2005). Simultaneously, the army and police, but also civil institutions such as the Attorney General’s office were increasingly politicized (McGregor 2002; Verheul 2013).

Beyond resorting to repression, the regime also advanced a carefully tailored legitimation strategy, which built on its key role during Zimbabwe’s liberation history. In that context, the narrative of ‘patriotic history’ (Kriger 2006; Ranger 2004) gained salience. Patriotic history was propelled as a sophisticated interpretation of Zimbabwe’s past, which served to legitimize ZANU-PF’s hold on power (Tendi 2010). As part of this discourse, the regime invoked land grievances as well as race questions and advocated a pronounced dichotomy between nationalists as well as war veterans on the one hand and sell-outs as well as enemies of the nation on the other hand (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a). Only those who participated in the liberation struggle could truly claim to represent the people of Zimbabwe according to this logic. Lastly, Mugabe fiercely rejected any form of external interference with Zimbabwe’s continuous struggle for self-determination (Tendi 2010; Alexander and McGregor 2001, 511; Chitando 2005). Building upon the identification of uprisings against the British South Africa Company in the late 1890s as the First Chimurenga and the independence struggle as the Second Chimurenga, the regime’s determination to ‘resist’ Western interference in the 2000s was accordingly framed as the Third Chimurenga (Chan and Patel 2007, 3; inter alia Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009; Tendi 2010, 2013b, 964–965).

Taken together, these storylines allowed the ZANU-PF government to delegitimize the NCA as a Western-funded puppet group that aimed at sustaining neocolonial elements inscribed into
Zimbabwe’s constitution as a result of the Lancaster House Agreement and to denounce the MDC, which was allegedly sponsored by the ‘old enemy’ Great Britain, as an agent of Western imperialism (Chigora, Guzura, and Mutumburanzou 2011; Tendi 2010). In line with this narrative, MDC supporters were branded as ‘traitors’ who sought to restore the colonial status quo ante and to undermine national sovereignty as well as self-determination (Bratton and Masunungure 2008; Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009). The discourse was so widely disseminated that Tendi (2010, 4) speaks of a ‘blitzkrieg of patriotic history in the state-controlled media since 2000’. In other words, the regime sought to destroy MDC at nascent stage under the disguise of nationalism, patriotism, and defense of state sovereignty (Chigora, Guzura, and Mutumburanzou 2011) while regime-critical civil society actors were likewise demonized as unpatriotic (Tendi 2010, 22).

Moreover, emphasis was put on potential strategies to remedy the economic crisis. The regime attributed the rejection of the constitutional proposal to the economic downturn, which it proposed to address through the so-called fast-track land reform as expressed in the 2000 elections slogan ‘The land is the economy and the economy is land’ (Sithole 2001). Land acquisitions, during which the war veterans129 played a critical role, gathered pace after the 2000 constitutional referendum (Kriger 2003b; Tordoff and Young 2005; Zamchiya 2013, 941). White farm owners, but also their black farm workers were violently chased off the land if they did not leave it voluntarily. Even though it is impossible to fully understand the events between the referendum in February 2000 and the subsequent parliamentary elections in June of the same year, compelling evidence exists of the state’s direct involvement in the invasions (Alao 2012, 100; Eriksson 2007, 15; Meredith 2002, 167): Reports point to the use of government vehicles, the participation of the army as well as party officials and state-funded daily payments to the occupiers. The government officially launched its ‘Fast Track Resettlement Program’ on 1 July, and pushed the Land Acquisition Act through parliament in November of the same year (Southall 2011).

In the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections, the crisis hit its preliminary peak. The Mugabe regime further intensified its attacks on the opposition and its supporters, both physically and discursively. Independent national and international reporting was banned, so that only state-controlled radio and newspapers were available in rural areas (Bracking 2005; Bush and Szeftel 2002). Unemployed youths erected road blockades and beat MDC activists and other people

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129 Their role in Zimbabwean politics will be addressed in more detail below.
who could not produce ZANU-PF membership cards (Dorman 2005, 163; Ranger 2002). Taken together, these developments effectively prevented the MDC from campaigning in rural areas. Furthermore, independent election observation bodies such as the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the Electoral Institute of South Africa, the Commonwealth, the European Union, and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions were denied access (Bush and Szeftel 2002). Without having to fear their reports, the regime resorted to manifold malpractices in order to ensure its victory (for summaries, see Bush and Szeftel 2002; Dorman 2005; Makumbe 2002): Police and military voted early under the supervision of high commanders while approximately 2 million exiled Zimbabweans, many of them assumed to support the opposition, could only participate in the polls if they were in the military service. Ballot boxes, especially those in remote rural areas where the MDC was denied supervision of the electoral process, were stuffed with false votes. At the same time, the number of polling stations in Harare and other urban areas was drastically reduced compared to the 2000 parliamentary elections, and people queuing at these stations faced harassment. In the end, there was a significant difference between the vote figures announced on television on 31 March by a ZEC official, and the aggregated totals for the candidates announced on 1 April 2005 (Bracking 2005). The MDC claimed victory, but SADC approved the official election results that favored a victory for ZANU-PF. These developments already hint at the importance of regional – and arguably also international – endeavors to address the ensuring crisis in Zimbabwe. These will be critically reviewed in the next section as to outline the context in which the Western countries themselves sought to influence the trajectory of Zimbabwe.

6.1.4. Regional and international attempts to address the crisis
While the violent 2002 elections, which led to the imposition of sanctions, magnified regional and international attention, multiple actors with diverging and oftentimes competing interests had already sought to address the developments in Zimbabwe prior to this. This increasing ‘internationalization of the Zimbabwe crisis’ (Masunungure and Badza 2010, 207) will be sketched in the following section as to situate the EU and US measures in the broader context of regional and international crisis mediation attempts.

Initial irritation in the relationship between Zimbabwe and ‘the West’ materialized over Mugabe’s involvement in the DRC war and led to a partial suspension of development aid from 1998 onwards (Chung 2010; Peters-Berries 2002). In 1998, a UNDP donor conference, which constituted another attempt to address the land crises, failed to provide new impetus for a
constructive solution (Sachikonye 2003; Taylor and Williams 2002). Zimbabwe’s relationship with its Western donors further deteriorated when the forced land acquisitions began in 2000. Great Britain, which has been traditionally protective of white farmers’ interests, was particularly concerned with the violent land occupation and lobbied the EU to send a clear signal that this constituted the crossing of a red line (Taylor and Williams 2002). While European donors suspended parts of their development aid in response to the fast track land reform (Peters-Berries 2002), the EU reaction to the Zimbabwean crisis in general and the 2000 elections in particular was generally characterized by lethargy and the absence of a united position (Taylor and Williams 2002). Yet Great Britain’s vocal criticism at least partially succeeded in shaping the Commonwealth policy towards Zimbabwe (ZWE12). Commonwealth observers declared that both the 2000 and the 2002 elections were neither free nor fair (Commonwealth Observer Group 2000, 2002). Based on the Singapore and Harare declarations, which set out democracy as one of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values (The Commonwealth 1971, 1991), Zimbabwe was subsequently suspended from the Council of the Commonwealth on 19 March 2002 in response to the high level of politically motivated violence during the elections (The Commonwealth 2002)130.

In contrast, South Africa’s efforts to address the ensuing crisis in Zimbabwe can be best described by the catchphrase ‘quiet diplomacy’. This refers both to the style of engagement, which prioritized direct contact between high-ranking government members over public statements, and the preference for diplomatic means over economic pressure or military engagement (Adelmann 2004; Alden 2010; Graham 2006; Lipton 2009). In addition, South Africa explicitly advocated a Pan-Africanist and multilateral approach (Graham 2006; Lipton 2009; Nathan 2005). To what extent the South African government also questioned certain choices made by the Mugabe regime has been debated. Some authors suggest that Mugabe enjoyed South Africa’s uninterrupted support at least until 2008 (Hamill and Hoffman 2009) whereas other stress that Mbeki also met with the MDC and emphasized the protestors’ democratic rights (Graham 2006). For example, discussions about a large scale aid package from South Africa failed to materialize due to the democratic conditionalities which would have been attached (Prys 2012, 87). This varying degree of critique vis-à-vis the Mugabe regime in fact reflects different positions within South Africa. The ANC, for instance, welcomed the

130 Notably this was the first suspension of a Commonwealth membership that was not preceded by a military coup (Masunungure and Badza 2010).
2000 elections as sign of democratization, whereas the South African trade unions criticized their violent conduct (Taylor and Williams 2002).

South Africa’s hesitant approach towards condemning the Mugabe regime for its human rights violations can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, the two liberation movements turned political parties ZANU-PF and ANC have historic ties, which were forged during their reciprocal support in the struggle for majority rule (Graham 2006; Hamill and Hoffman 2009; Schoeman and Alden 2003). Second, South Africa had relinquished its unilateral foreign policy initiates in defense of human rights after much criticism from the region (Graham 2006; Hamill and Hoffman 2009; Raftopoulos 2010, 2013a). The intensification of the Zimbabwean crises from 2000 onwards coincided with Mbeki’s promotion of his vision of an Africa Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Its success depended on the cooperation of other African nations so that South Africa carefully avoided alienating them over a harsh criticism of Zimbabwe (Freeman 2005; Graham 2006). Third, South Africa feared that it would lose its credibility in the eyes of the Zimbabwean government and hence also its potential influence if it aligned itself too closely with the West. The fact that Mbeki was immediately labeled as a Western agent when he criticized Mugabe in 2001 exemplified this danger (Graham 2006). Fourth, South Africa faced a number of domestic problems that overlapped with the Zimbabwean situation. Most importantly, South Africa was confronted with similar questions of land distribution and was thus reluctant to criticize the way Mugabe handled the issue too vocally (Hamill and Hoffman 2009; Lipton 2009, 340; Mamdani 2009). Against the backdrop of an increasing number of Zimbabwean refugees and xenophobic tendencies in South Africa, the government was also determined to prevent an complete implosion of its northern neighbor (Graham 2006). Lastly, South Africa lacked any real alternative of approaching the Zimbabwean crises. While some Zimbabwean civil society groups called for a humanitarian intervention, there was no majority to take action in the framework of the responsibility to protect, neither in South Africa nor regionally (Hamill and Hoffman 2009; Howard-Hassmann 2010). Taken together, these concerns amounted to a South African policy towards Zimbabwe that was characterized by general support; cautious criticism behind closed doors and attempts to find a united, regional position.

131 This should not obscure the fact that the two country’s bilateral relations were not free from tensions. They both sought to protect their respective industries and struggled for regional dominance. In addition, personal conflict between the more senior Mugabe and Mandela existed (Adelmann 2004).
The SADC position was thus shaped by South Africa, but also by the regional economic community’s own development. SADC was formally established in 1992, but its origins date back to 1980s, when neighboring countries worked together in their liberation struggle (Alden 2010). Despite its growing institutionalization as well as economic integration, SADC continued to respond to political crises on an ad hoc basis (Grauvogel, Newbery, and von Soest 2013; Pallotti 2013). In 1996, Mugabe became the first chairman of SADC’s newly created Organ on Politics, Defense and Security and solidified SADC’s prioritization of economic integration over a pronounced human rights agenda (Pallotti 2013). Based on this legacy, SADC did not condemn the violent conduct of the 2000 elections. At the 2000 SADC Summit, which took place in Victoria Falls on 21 April, the heads of states instead backed Mugabe diplomatically and expressed support for his land reform (Adelmann 2004).

Over the following years, SADC continued to generally endorse the Zimbabwean government, only voicing cautious criticism. For example, SADC asked Zimbabwe to respect human rights, allow election monitors, and ensure the independence of judiciary and transfer of lands to legal owners in a communiqué adopted by the extraordinary summit in January 2002 (Peters-Berries 2002)\(^{132}\), but later approved the 2002 elections results despite a conduct that belied these demands. According to SADC, the election process had largely conformed to its guidelines, and ‘reflect[ed] the will of the people’ (Mdladlana 2005). Mugabe was recognized as the old and new president, while he was simultaneously pressure to accept negotiations with the MDC, which, however, soon broke down as both parties were unwilling to compromise (Adelmann 2004). Consequently, SADC also criticized Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth, which Mbeki denounced as an act of white supremacy (Pallotti 2013; Taylor and Williams 2002). Relatedly, the AU condemned GB for mobilizing Western countries to isolate Zimbabwe in 2001 (Taylor and Williams 2002).

Similar to the reasons given for South Africa’s quiet diplomacy, the SADC reaction was described as an attempt to keep the issue of land out of regional politics\(^{133}\) and its fear of a destabilized Zimbabwe, as Mugabe had made clear that he was not prepared to hand over power. This was coupled with a resentment against Western interference in SADC countries due to their own experiences with aid conditionality and a common political socialization of

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\(^{132}\) Zimbabwe already signed the Abuja agreement for peaceful resolution of the crisis in 2001, but with little tangible results (Taylor and Williams 2002).

\(^{133}\) This distribution of land was also a pressing issue in Malawi as well as Namibia and thus influenced the wider SADC position (Peters-Berries 2002).
SADC leaders during the respective countries’ liberation struggles (Peters-Berries 2002). In contrast to the general SADC spirit, however, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia repeatedly attacked the Mugabe regime for its human rights violations (Alden 2010; Howard-Hassmann 2010).

The region’s focus on constructive engagement led to controversies with ‘the West’. On the one hand, the US and Germany appreciated that it kept open the channels of communication and supported South Africa’s way of handling the crises, at least until 2001 (Schoeman and Alden 2003). On the other hand, South Africa’s quiet diplomacy was denounced as a non-policy due to its very limited public visibility (Graham 2006; Peters-Berries 2002). The (Western) public and NGOS such as Amnesty International increasingly criticized the way that South Africa handled the crisis and demanded a show of resolve against the backdrop of violent farm invasions and elections (Aberle 2004; Deutscher Bundestag 2003; Peters-Berries 2002). Accordingly, the Western countries chose an approach that stood in sharp contrast to South Africa’s quite diplomacy by imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. This process will be first introduced in the next section before analyzing in depth how these measures shaped opposition mobilization in Zimbabwe.

6.2. The sanctions against Zimbabwe

In the following, I will focus on US and EU sanctions that were imposed in Zimbabwe from 2001 onwards. As I argued in the theory chapter, EU as well as US sanctions – and UN measures, which, however, did not materialize in the case of Zimbabwe – constitute the most visible and thus also the most influential signal as regards domestic dynamics on contention in the regimes under sanctions. On 21 December 2001, the US Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in response to the democratic and economic decline in the country. It precludes the American government from approving new financial support to Zimbabwe from international financial institutions. More specifically, it instructs the US executive directors of these institutions to oppose and vote against any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit or guarantee for Zimbabwe (United States Congress 2001). Throughout 2002, the US State Department threatened additional measures including visa bans (for example News24 2002, 24). These threats eventually materialized when U.S. President George W. Bush signed an executive order to impose travel restrictions and financial sanctions against individuals from the government and ZANU-PF on 7 March
Due to its specific framework for implementing so-called restrictive measures in the realm of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU process of imposing sanctions differed from the US one. The Cotonou agreement, named after the place where it was signed, is a framework for EU cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. This agreement recognizes human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law as key components of the partnership. If one of the parties to the agreement violates these key principles, consultations in line with the provisions laid down in article 96 are initiated. If no agreement is reached, so called appropriate measures may be adopted by a decision of the Council of the European Union. This de facto constitutes the most common framework in which the EU decides on sanctions. In October 2001, the Cotonou Agreement Council formally opened consultations with Zimbabwe pursuant to Article 96 in light of escalating human rights violations, particularly those that had accompanied the 2000 elections (The Commission of the European Union 2001). During these talks, the EU set out requirements for the subsequent general elections to be considered as reasonable free and fair and stated that if these conditions were not met, targeted sanctions would be implemented (Council of the European Union 2002a). The failure of an attempted but abortive election observation mission eventually triggered the imposition of the so-called restrictive measures in 2002. On 18 February 2002, the head of the EU mission, Pierre Schori was denied access to Zimbabwe (Council of the European Union 2002b). In response, the EU adopted an arms embargo, issued visa bans for a number of high-ranking individuals and froze their assets (Council of the European Union 2002b)\textsuperscript{134}.

Notably, UN or regional sanctions never complemented these Western measures. South Africa used its presence as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council between 2006 and 2008 to block any attempt to adopt multilateral sanctions. According to the South African government, the situation in Zimbabwe was not an appropriate matter to bring before the Council and should rather be addressed by the region (Hamill and Hoffman 2009; Howard-Hassmann 2010). Following the unprecedented violence during the 2008 elections, the Western countries renewed their attempts to seek international support for their targeted

\textsuperscript{134} Australia, Canada as well as New Zealand followed the EU example and introduced their own targeted sanctions lists over the course of the year (Chan and Patel 2007, 10; Eriksson 2007). But as these measures only played a marginal role within the Zimbabwean debate on sanctions, the main reference point will be the EU and US measures.
measures against Zimbabwe, but a resolution introduced to the Security Council to impose mandatory UN sanctions on Zimbabwe was vetoed by China and Russia on 11 July 2008, which emphasize the Zimbabwean government’s sovereign right to address the situation domestically (UN Security Council 2008). Simultaneously, South Africa brokered a power-sharing agreement between the ruling party and the opposition, the so-called Global Political Agreement (GPA), which laid the foundation for the coalition government. In the GPA, all parties committed to working together in ending the sanctions, which eventually led to a gradual suspension of the EU measures. Especially after the largely peaceful 2013 elections, the EU gradually replaced its concern for democracy with short term worries about stability in the sub-region (Moore 2014) and consequently lifted its remaining sanctions. In contrast, the US targeted sanctions and ZIDERA remained in force.

While a number of studies have looked at the sanctions’ impact on the ZANU-PF regime (for example Chingono 2010; Eriksson 2007; Grebe 2010), their effect on the political opposition has – if at all – only been addressed indirectly. In the following, this question will be examined on the basis of the pathway established in the fsQCA in chapter three, which suggests that an increase in socio-economic deprivation in conjunction with the message of regime disapproval and opposition support conveyed by sanctions led to an increase in anti-regime mobilization in Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2011 despite limited political openness during the said period. Accordingly, the impact of the Western measures’ economic consequences and the significance of sanctions signals for the voicing and enacting of dissent against the backdrop of restricted political freedoms will be traced. While both aspects, the sanctions’ economic effects and their signaling dimension, will be examined separately for the sake of analytical clarity, their interplay will be addressed throughout the chapter, thereby doing justice to QCA as an approach that highlights the combination of conditions. In contrast to the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, which ends in 2011 due to data constraints, the case study will examine domestic dynamics of contention in Zimbabwe in the context of EU and US sanctions until the end of 2013. This allows shedding light at the entire term of the power-sharing government (2009-2013) and first developments after the 2013 general elections during which sanctions played a major role.

135 Even though ZIDERA remains in place until today and some individuals as well as companies are still on the US blacklists, the case study terminates in 2013 when all major EU measures where lifted and the sanctions discourse within Zimbabwe almost completely lost its salience.
6. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013)

6.2.1. Sanctions, grievances and deprivation
In the theory chapter, I proposed that external sanctions should enable the voicing and enacting of dissent if the sanctions’ economic consequences lead to an overall economic downturn, which increases feelings of deprivation and/or if attempts by the ruling elite to deal with the measures’ financial consequences increase economic inequalities and thereby enhance grievances. The fsQCA lend support to this proposition by suggesting that the increase in opposition mobilization in Zimbabwe during the sanctions regime can be inter alia attributed to the country’s socio-economic downturn. In order to reconstruct how the EU and US measures affected anti-regime mobilization in Zimbabwe, a nuanced understanding of how the sanctions precisely influenced the country’s socio-economic development is necessary. In addition to accounting for the population’s feelings of socio-economic deprivation related to the country’s overall economic crises, the case study serves to shed light on how sanctions affected group-related socio-economic grievances. The sanctions’ socio-economic consequences were in fact one of the most controversial aspects of the Zimbabwean sanctions debate, if not the single most contested issue. While it is tremendously difficult if not impossible to assess or even quantify the restrictive measures’ ‘true’ economic effect, this section will start off by attempting to provide a nuanced account of their consequences for the country’s economic development and the socio-economic wellbeing of the population.

Subsequently, the second subsection will reconstruct the polarized debate about the sanctions’ economic consequences within Zimbabwe. Building upon the differentiated account of the sanctions’ economic consequences on the one hand and the controversy regarding this issue on the other hand, the third subsection will explore how this affected anti-regime mobilization. As most of the US and EU sanctions were in place for no less than thirteen years (2001-2013), this time span will be sub-divided into two phases that were characterized by rather different dynamics with respect to deprivation/grievance-based anti-regime mobilization, namely the rise of the MDC (2001-2008), and the time of the so-called Government of National Unity (GNU, 2009-2013). Finally, concluding remarks are presented in the last section, which also addresses the question of whether sanctions indirectly strengthened the opposition by financially constraining the regime to an extent that it was forced to make concessions – an issue that was of major importance in the case of Burundi. While this aspect proved to be of less importance in the case of Zimbabwe, the chapter will show that each side used sanctions narratives to garner popular support in different ways.
6. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013)

A nuanced view on the EU and US measures’ socio-economic impact

First of all, it is important to note that Zimbabwe’s economic decline preceded the imposition of Western sanctions. The country’s economic crisis began with the Economic Structural Adjustment Program that was introduced during the early 1990s with the consequences described above and further accelerated from 1997 onwards due to three key developments, namely Zimbabwe’s participation in the Congo War, unbudgeted payouts for war veterans and the crash of the overvalued currency. Confronted with increasing pressure from the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) under its new chairman Chenjerai Hunzvi, Mugabe approved unbudgeted pension fund pay-outs to the veterans of the liberation war on 27 August 1997 (Bond 2000; Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 40; Moore 2001): In addition to a lump sum of approximately 4,000 US dollar, they were granted a monthly pension of about 150 US$. Second, the overvalued stock exchanged crashed in September 1997, followed by a massive devaluation on the Zimbabwe dollar. On 14 November 1997, known as the black Friday, the currency lost more than 70 percent of its value when foreign currency speculators divested their reserves in response to the payoffs granted to the war veterans (Bond 2000; Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 40). As a result, the budget deficit skyrocketed from 6 percent in 1998 to 18 percent by the end of 2000 (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 42). Lastly, one and a half years of military support for DRC’s President Kabila between 1998 and 1999 produced immense costs, which further constrained the crisis-ridden state budget. According to different estimations, Zimbabwe spent almost 30 million US dollar monthly, i.e. ten times more than the publicly declared 3 million US dollar (Alao 2012, 155; Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 40; Maclean 2002; Sachikonye 2002).

Moreover, the American sanctions program ZIDER came into force on 21 December 2001 and thus after Zimbabwe was no longer able to access balance of payments support from the IMF in September 2001, owing chiefly to its failure to service outstanding arrears (International Monetary Fund 2001). Relatedly, Western donors had started to gradually withdraw from Zimbabwe when the Mugabe regime entered into the DRC conflict in 1998 - long before the EU and US imposed their restrictive measures (Chung 2010). This general macroeconomic downturn, which clearly preceded the sanctions, also affected the general population (see Bond and Manyanya 2002, chapter 2; Mlambo 2014, chapter 8 for an overview). The percentage

136 In 1989, war veterans had founded the ZNLWVA to defend their own interests which had not been the key focus of the regime during the 1980s (Mlambo 2014, 201).
of people living below the poverty line already rose from 40 percent in 1990 to 75 percent in 1999 (Sachikonye 2002, 15), that is before the imposition of sanctions. Taking these multiple insights together, it appears implausible to attribute the economic decline to sanctions alone ‘when the descent into crisis is explored in historical, chronological order’ (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 43).

Nevertheless, the sanctions affected the Zimbabwean economy and further exacerbated its downturn in several ways. First, the relationship between Zimbabwe and its development partners, which had already turned sour as a result of the violent land expropriations and Mugabe’s support for Kabila during the DRC war, further deteriorated with the imposition of sanctions. Donor contributions collapsed from constituting approximately 16 percent of the state budget in 1994 to zero by 2007, which harshly hit the donor dependent country (World Bank 2008). Yet the precise trajectory of donor engagement is more nuanced than these numbers suggest. Small NGOs were still generously funded from abroad as stressed by various civil society activists (ZWE_FG1; ZWE31; ZWE43). In addition to this scattered aid, Zimbabwe also continued to receive humanitarian assistance on a large scale: The European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection provided a total of almost 181 million Euros between 2002 and 2012, and the US as the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe provided over 130 million US dollar to Zimbabwe for health services, agricultural development, humanitarian assistance, and support for democratic governance in 2013 alone (Embassy of the United States in Zimbabwe 2015; Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013; Gomes Porto 2013, 123; The Commission of the European Union 2014).

Second, the targeted measures against certain people – and later, a limited number of companies – also interfered with Zimbabwe’s economic development due to the blurred boundaries between the party, the economy and the state. As many parastatals were headed by key figures of the regime, the fact that they were included in the EU and US blacklists had an impact beyond constraining the individual person (ZWE_FG1; ZWE_FG2; ZWE_FG3; ZWE17; ZWE19; ZWE29; ZWE31). For instance, it is impossible to separate the effect of listing a single mining company from the effect on the economy as such, to which the mining sector contributed significantly (ZWE10). The head of the regime-critical NGO Bulawayo Agenda, who has no personal interest in exaggerating the economic impact of sanctions, summarized this as follows: “If you have imposed sanctions on politicians by default you have also imposed sanctions on business as business and politics are the same in this country” (ZWE36).
Third, the sanctions further worsened Zimbabwe’s already low credit rating (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 41; Masaka 2012). More precisely, sanctions affected the country risk premium so that access to financial funds for doing business with Zimbabwe was charged at a higher interest rate (ZWE9; ZWE29; ZWE38; ZWE44). Going beyond the issue of risk premiums, sanctions led to a “bad reputation, which of course had an influence on trade relations” (ZWE2). Moreover, while it is extremely difficult to quantify investments that were not realized due to Western companies’ corporate social responsibility considerations (ZWE26), a number of instances when firms shied away from doing business in Zimbabwe because they were attacked for engaging with a pariah regime were made public (ZWE7; ZWE29). Sanctions also constituted a psychological barrier to invest because it was unclear how the EU targeted sanctions on the one hand and the broader US measures on the other hand would exactly affect financial transactions (ZWE7). Sanctions “have pained an unfavorable picture of the Zimbabwean economy”, so that investors became skeptical about conducting business in the country (ZWE19; also ZWE29; ZWE44). But then again, this negative image was also affected by government polices unrelated to sanctions, such as the 2008 Indigenization Act (ZWE29), which stipulated that over 50 percent of all foreign-controlled firms in the country should be transferred into local African hands and thereby created severe uncertainties for international companies still operating in Zimbabwe.

Among the types of sanctions in place, the US financial sanctions proved to be one of the most costly measures because they augmented transaction costs for business operations. Zimbabwean companies could only receive payments for services or goods delivered through bank accounts in countries other than the United States (ZWE_FG1; ZWE44) while foreigners living in Zimbabwe as well as Zimbabweans were unable to pay for their purchases or receive salaries in US dollars (ZWE2; ZWE16). This included, for instance, any transaction via the widely used US-based money transfer service PayPal (ZWE_FG1). Finally, the export of certain products was complicated. Gold and diamond trade is a case in point as the Zimbabwe Mining Cooperation and other key players in the sector were included in the EU and US blacklists (Council of the European Union 2011; US Office for Foreign Asset Control 2009). Zimbabwe managed to trade precious metals and gemstones, but earnings from their clandestine export were significantly lower than world market prices (ZWE_FG1; ZWE2; ZWE7). For example, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) increased its yields of auctioning diamonds from the Marange field by almost 50 percent after its delisting (ZWE2; ZWE7).
When assessing the impact of sanctions on the economy, but especially on certain groups within the country, the regimes’ efforts to mitigate their effect must also be taken into account. In an attempt to explore new markets as well as new sources of investment and aid, the government introduced its ‘Look East’ policy in 2003 (see Chan and Patel 2006). In the words of deputy foreign minister Chris Mutsvangwa, Zimbabwe “looked for new friends and China became very important” (ZWE18). Yet, this strategic alliance produced political loyalty rather than large-scale resource inflow. While China protected Zimbabwe in the UN Security Council, Zimbabwe only received a meager 6 million US dollars from the Chinese government instead of the massive aid package the government had asked for (Maroleng 2005; Tull 2006, 473). Instead of supporting Zimbabwe with aid packages, China rather saw its political support as gateway towards future investment in the potentially profitable mining and agricultural sector. Zimbabweans who had long standing business relationships with Western countries were very critical about shifting their focus to the East, not least because they perceived their business culture to be closer to their European than to their Middle Eastern and Asian counterparts (ZWE19; ZWE25). Moreover, the Russians, Indians and especially Chinese were accused of resource looting (Alden 2005; ZWE6; ZWE19; ZWE25). A local newspaper entitled ‘Zimbabwe’s New Colonialists: Robert Mugabe begins selling off his country to curry favor with the Chinese’ epitomized this feeling.

Due to the ‘Look East’ policy’s mixed record, further measures were introduced to mitigate Zimbabwe’s economic and financial isolation. Zimbabwe sought to adapt the structure of its economy, with tobacco becoming an increasingly important source of foreign exchange earnings (ZWE18; ZWE21). The government also adopted price controls and opened foreign exchange licensed retail shops in an attempt to harness the foreign currency circulating in the country and to improve the availability of basic commodities (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 46). In that context, the operation Murambatsvina, the government-led violent crackdown of several hundred thousand small-scale informal businesses, also served to seize foreign exchange from the informal sector (Bratton and Masunungure 2007, 25). Besides, the 2010 Indigenization Empowerment Act, which obliges foreign firms to provide 51 percent of their company’s ownership to indigenous Zimbabweans, has also been interpreted as a counter measure to sanctions (Raftopoulos 2013a, 22; ZWE14).

137 In contrast, the Russian support for Zimbabwe in the UN Security Council was motivated by the Russian emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention into domestic affairs rather than economic interests, as I have sketched above.
While these measures aimed at addressing the sanction’s economic consequences, their financial impact on individuals and companies was predominantly limited by a mismanaged implementation process and loopholes created by a lack of effective monitoring. Many politicians who were included in the EU and US blacklists were able to shift their bank accounts to other countries before the measures took effect (Schoeman and Alden 2003) as the previous announcement of asset freezes gave people time move their money to safe havens (ZWE_FG3; ZWE16; ZWE34). For example, former politburo member Simba Makoni recalled how he was warned by a well-informed source in Brussels before he was put on the sanctions list (ZWE23).

In a similar manner, targeted individuals were able to avoid the travel restrictions thanks to a lack of coordination among the implementing countries and by changing their children’s name, which would have been subject to visa bans otherwise (ZWE_FG3; ZWE16).

In sum, Zimbabwe’s major economic downturn clearly preceded the sanctions. As for the sanctions, despite their targeted nature, adaptation measures and implementation problems, they affected the economy insofar as they complicated business transactions, undermined foreign direct investment and reduced development cooperation to humanitarian aid and contributions channeled through NGOs. Even though it is impossible to quantify this impact, the EU and US measures provided a basis on which one could argue that that Zimbabwe would have done better without sanctions. Nonetheless, the debate about the magnitude of the economic harm created by sanctions is highly polarized, as the next section will show in detail.

A POLARIZED DISCOURSE ON THE EU AND US MEASURES’ SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
The preceding section has detailed how the EU and US measure have – or have not – affected the Zimbabwean economy as well the socio-economic situation of the population. Notwithstanding this attempt to provide a balanced picture, what came out most clearly from the interviews was the polarized debate about the sanctions’ economic impact. One incident summarizes this in a pointed manner: During a focus group discussion, the flipchart of the participant who was asked to introduce the debate on sanctions bore the heading “bipolarity” (ZWE_FG2). Even among the business council of Zimbabwe’s nine different chambers of commerce, views concerning the importance of sanctions and their real impact diverged significantly (ZWE19). As this is crucial for understanding how the sanctions’ perceived economic impact has affected opposition mobilization, the discursive struggle about their alleged economic consequences will be reconstructed in the following before turning to the
question of deprivation-/grievance-induced opposition mobilization in Zimbabwe under sanctions.

On the one hand, the sanctions have been blamed for Zimbabwe’s entire economic downturn. The ZANU-PF’s propaganda deployed domestically and internationally linked every single problem to the EU and US measures (for summaries, see for example Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004; Tarisayi 2009, 14). Former ZANU-PF spokesperson Rugare Gumbo claimed that “the various institutions of government were affected as well as the banks and the industries” (ZWE21). Sanctions were accused of violating second-generation human rights, including the right to employment (ZWE27). Importantly, the regime and its supporters stressed that sanctions hurt the ordinary Zimbabweans (ZWE14; ZWE18; ZWE21). This discourse was echoed by public intellectuals in Zimbabwe and beyond: Moyo and Yeros, for instance, made the ‘Western imperialist sanctions’ responsible for the crisis that crippled Zimbabwe at the beginning of the new millennium (Moyo and Yeros 2007, 106).

On the other hand, the opposition claimed that the sanctions, which were referred to as targeted measures, only affected those individuals who were on the EU and US blacklists (ZWE20; ZWE24; ZWE28; ZWE37). The MDC, the trade unions (ZWE8) and “the independent media has always insisted that these were targeted and travel sanctions” (ZWE16). Key opposition politicians accordingly highlighted – both during the interviews and in public discourse – that trade between Western countries and Zimbabwe even increased during the said period (Tsvangirai 2011, 417; ZWE6; ZWE8; ZWE16; ZWE23). In line with this argumentation, the fact that the EU and the US continued to provide large-scale humanitarian assistance was also emphasized (ZWE5; ZWE8; ZWE16; ZWE35). The European Union Delegation to the Republic of Zimbabwe went to considerable lengths to communicate that “the measures [did] not have any influence on the country” (ZWE2). Instead, the lack of macroeconomic prudence and political incapacity, exemplified inter alia by the inconsistent application of the subsequent economic policy frameworks, were named as the major reasons for the crisis (ZWE8; ZWE19). The regime’s inability to steer the economy was also highlighted with reference to Zimbabwe’s history as “UDI sanctions were much harsher than the sanctions Zimbabwe faces now, but the regime still managed to build a strong economy” (ZWE_FG2; also ZWE15; ZWE16; ZWE32).

The media re-produced this polarized debate. In the words of a freelance journalist, the “hegemonic battle (...) manifest[ed] itself in the manner how the private and public media
frame the issue of sanctions” (ZWE13). In summary, the economic impact of the EU and US measures was assessed in radically different terms by the Mugabe regime and the opposition forces. While the ZANU-PF stressed the disastrous consequences of the sanctions for the population’s well being, regime critical actors made the regime itself responsible for the economic downturn. To what extent these narratives were mobilized to garner support and whether these attempts found resonance among the population will be explored in the next section.

**6.2.2. Grievance- and deprivation-induced mass mobilization**

According to the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, ZIDERA was designed to make Zimbabwe’s economy ‘scream’ and thereby separate the people from the government (Alao 2012, 183). In a similar vein, the MDC hoped that people would start protesting if sanctions squeezed the economy (ZWE4; ZWE10; ZWE14; ZWE40, ZWE41). In the words of former ZANU-PF information officer Wellington Zimbowa, the West and the opposition “wanted to use the politics of the belly, because a hungry man is an angry man” (ZWE14; also ZWE27). Yet, the MDC’s strategy to mobilize the population with reference to economic grievances proved to be of varying success over the years.

**Until 2008:** The economic downturn was indeed a major theme in the domestic political debate between 2002 and 2008. Since its creation, the MDC attacked Zanu-PF for its economic policies that – according to the opposition narrative – were responsible for the unemployment rate of 70 per cent and for the rampant corruption (Sachikonye 2002). The MDC slogan of ‘change’ (or ‘chinja’ in Shona) was presented as opposed to the socio-economic ‘hardship’ created by the government (Alexander 2000). The opposition accordingly promised economic prosperity in the 2002 election campaign (Ranger 2002). The 2004 program ‘Restart – Our Path to Social Justice: The MDC’s Economic Programme for Reconstruction, Stabilisation, Recovery and Transformation’ likewise started by describing the economic crises Zimbabwe was facing and stressed that ‘only the MDC [...] is capable of reversing this tragedy and turning Zimbabwe into the success story it should be’ (MDC 2004, emphasis added).

As part of the MDC’s strategy to end the economic decline, re-engaging the international community played a crucial role. Throughout its 2004 manifesto, the MDC highlighted that international resources both in terms of private investment and donor assistance were important for reviving the Zimbabwean economy and would allow the country to attain its targets much faster. A whole subchapter was entitled ‘External Prerequisites: Export Growth
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and International Assistance’ (MDC 2004, 23) and altogether, international partners, assistance and cooperation are mentioned no fewer than 33 times (as opposed to, for example, only four references to the rule of law). In that context, the MDC stressed that the international community was ‘willing to give considerable financial support’ but only to the ‘properly articulated five-year programme of stabilisation and recovery’ that it proposed (MDC 2004, 24).

In its 2005 election manifesto, the MDC equally promised to ‘mobilise international donor support to ensure that no Zimbabwean goes hungry’ as one of the key five steps to be taken during the first 100 days of an MDC-led government to make life easier for all Zimbabweans (MDC 2005, 4). More generally, references to international financial assistance and debt relief to be negotiated with the international community feature prominently throughout the program (MDC 2005, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11).

The economic crises also played a crucial role during the 2008 elections. The MDC depicted ZANU-PF as unable to re-vitalize the economy during its campaign and condensed its vision in the slogans of a ‘New Zimbabwe’ and ‘New Beginning’ (MDC 2008). The opposition again stressed that ‘once a new legitimate, democratic government is elected that exhibits its intention to restore human and political rights, economic fundamentals and the rule of law, the international community will assist with this programme [of economic recovery]’ (MDC 2008, 48). In an attempt to specifically address its key constituency, namely urban workers, the manifesto outlined how the manufacturing sector should be resuscitated through the mobilization of substantial international resources (MDC 2008, 76–82). Following this approach, the MDC’s public campaign also emphasized the MDC’s ability to rebuild the economy through “re-engag[ing] international financial institutions to open lines of credit” (Mtomba 2008).

In contrast to the opposition, which immediately saw sanctions as a means to mobilize support by incorporating them into its ‘economic revival’ narrative, the regime was initially not too concerned with the issue (ZWE10; ZWE21; ZWE34; ZWE41). The Mugabe government only realized little by little that “there was political capital to be gained from sanctions” (ZWE4; also ZWE41) or, to put it in the words of former ZANU-PF spokesperson Rugare Gumbo, that the regime needed to “educate [its] people about sanctions” and the disastrous effects they had in order to prevent them from believing the sanctions senders’ and the opposition’s narrative (ZWE21; also ZWE18).
The regime then used sanctions as a convenient scapegoat for the economic downturn, the lack of public service delivery, bad governance and many other problems – an aspect of the government discourse that was criticized in almost every interview with the MDC and other regime critical actors as well as international actors that I conducted (ZWE 2; ZWE3; ZWE6; ZWE7; ZWE8; ZWE9; ZWE10; ZWE16; ZWE17; ZWE20; ZWE22; ZWE25; ZWE31; ZWE35, ZWE41; ZWE42). Contrariwise, ZANU-PF members and supporters of the regime consistently uphold this narrative of the sanctions as a scapegoat (ZWE13; ZWE18; ZWE21; ZWE27). For instance, Former ZANU-PF spokesperson Rugare Gumbo argued that “before sanctions we were such an honest country, the people and the police were efficient and friendly, but now we are plagued with corruption because of the shortages that we had” (ZWE21).

In the run-up to the 2005 elections, the Mugabe regime intensified its patriotic history discourse to delegitimize the MDC and other civil society groups as British puppets who wanted to reverse the gains of the revolution (Chitando 2005). Against this backdrop, the MDC was accused of having invited the sanctions and attacked for seeking ‘the vote of the very same people it is punishing with sanctions’ (Zanu-PF 2005, 6). In addition, ‘declared and undeclared sanctions’ were made responsible for the decline of the economy in general and the manufacturing sector in particular (Zanu-PF 2005, 12). In line with this narrative, prominent headlines in the state controlled media stated that Zimbabweans should vote for ZANU-PF to ensure an end to racist withholding of commodities (see Bracking 2005). The regime casted the polls as anti-Blair elections (Chan and Patel 2007, 3), and hence as a possibility to oppose ‘racist factory closures’ and ‘politically motivated price increases’ (Vasagar and Meldrum 2005).

During the 2008 election campaign, ZANU-PF again picked up these issues with its theme ‘Defending our Land and National Sovereignty: Building Prosperity through Empowerment’. The manifesto’s message centered on the party’s leadership of the 1970s liberation struggle, improvement of social service provision in the 1980s, and land redistribution in the 2000s. Among the twelve key areas identified for future action, sanctions busting to end the measure’s alleged economic impact featured prominently (ZANU-PF 2008). Furthermore, the regime made clear that it would ‘punish and forever silence puppet sanctions mongers’ (Alexander and Tendi 2008, 5).

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138 Since the Blair government’s decision not to prolong the funding of the redistribution of land in Zimbabwe when the designated funds were exhausted, he holds a particular symbolic relevance for the Mugabe regime (inter alia Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).
This clearly shows that both the opposition and the regime sought to incorporate the sanctions’ economic consequences into their respective discourses as to generate (electoral) support. But how did this resonate with the population? Initially, people hoped that the MDC would embark on a more people-centered development approach (Kamete 2007, 45–46). Especially the youth expressed their expectation that the MDC would address their socio-economic needs as a hitherto unrecognized group (ibid.). The Afrobarometer survey, which measures public attitudes on political, economic and social matters, allows shedding light at whether people bought into the opposition narrative. From 1999 onwards, six survey rounds, albeit with changing questionnaires, have been completed. The first wave that included a question item on the EU and US targeted measures was round two carried out in 2004. It suggests that people believed that the regime’s mismanagement rather than sanctions were responsible for the country’s socio-economic decline. Only 24 percent of the respondents attributed the country’s economic situation to sanctions and Western countries behavior more generally whereas 53 percent believed that the ZANU-PF government was responsible (Mass Public Opinion Institute 2005).

Moreover, anti-regime activism boomed in the face of a deteriorating economic and social situation (Laakso 2003). Zimbabwe experienced an almost unprecedented wave of mass action, including a countrywide strike in 2001 and numerous demonstrations in downtown Harare and beyond throughout 2002 (Dansereau 2003). Subsequently, a series of stay-aways was organized by ZCTU in conjunction with civil society organizations and parts of the MDC in 2003 and 2004. The protestors attacked ‘the regime’s claims of having delivered “national justice” through the economically disastrous and politically chaotic land redistribution program’ and thereby posed a continued challenge to the ruling party (Bond and Saunders 2005, 50).

The suffering of citizens increased the population’s levels of mistrust in the government and ultimately undermined ZANU-PF’s appeal to the electorate during the 2008 elections (Masaka 2012). Some authors go as far as suggesting that this was a crucial factor which accounted for the ruling party’s defeat in the parliamentary elections (Chingono 2010, 207). The ZANU-PF asked Zimbabweans to defend the country’s sovereignty vis-à-vis external interference during the elections, but its slogan ‘Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again’ lost its salience in the face of socio-economic problems (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). Put differently, ZANU-PF’s ‘attempt to feed hungry Zimbabweans on history and memory alone’ generated serious discontent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a, 78). In contrast, the MDC election campaign’s emphasis on
economic recovery widely resonated among the electorate (Alexander and Tendi 2008). The slogans of a ‘New Zimbabwe’ and ‘New Beginning’ became particularly popular among the urban population and youths (Ndlou-Gatsheni 2011a, 2011c). In a focus group discussion carried out before the elections to understand the voters’ motivations, a participant praised that the MDC’s ‘priority will be to fix the economy (…)’ (Chingwete Ndapwadza and Muchena 2009, 39). Another respondent believed that the MDC would be able to deliver this promise as Tsvangirai ‘is still young and has the chance to run around in search for foreign aid’ (Chingwete Ndapwadza and Muchena 2009, 37, emphasis added). Relatedly, MDC supporters believed that the party would bring back multinational companies that left Zimbabwe due to rampant political violence (Wilkins 2013, 894). The MDC skillfully tied its long-standing image of being capable to resolve the economic crises to the increasingly important sanctions issue.

In line with the fsQCA, this mobilization of electoral support for the opposition and street protest against the regime occurred despite limited political freedom for the voicing and enacting of dissent. As outlined above, ZANU-PF had increasingly closed the political space since the lost 2000 referendum. In addition to a progressive militarization of state institutions and political violence against alleged opposition supporters described above, the government carried out the Operation Murambatsvina, also known as Operation Restore Order, in 2005. This large-scale government campaign to forcibly clear slums in urban areas across the country began shortly after Zimbabwe’s parliamentary election of March 2005, and ‘[b]ecause this election confirmed that political opposition was centred in urban areas, there is reason to suppose that the crackdown constituted a form of collective punishment’ for opposition supporters (Bratton and Masunungure 2007, 35; see also Bracking 2005; McGregor 2013). But as the range of those affected was extremely diverse, it appears equally plausible that security apparatus cracked on all likely recruits for anti-state protest, (Bratton and Masunungure 2007; Wilkins 2013). However, the campaign turned against the regime. In line with the theoretical expectation that repression can spur up regime destabilizing protest rather than constraining it, Operation Murambatsvina fortified the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition. According to a national probability sample survey carried out in October 2005, trust in ZANU-PF fell from 44

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139 Already during the 2000 elections, people had voted for the opposition to protest the economic downturn presided over by the ZANU-PF. In semi-structured interviews with workers in Harare, MDC supporters cited the economic downturn as one of the major reasons for their MDC support. In that context, many expressed fear that the Mugabe regime ‘was scaring away investors and causing a shortage of foreign currency; in other words, that he was threatening their own futures’ (Alexander 2000, 398).
percent in 2004 to 31 percent 18 months later, with the key intervening events being the violent cleansing of the urban slum areas (Bratton and Masunungure 2007, 39–41). In contrast, the MDC gained support among victims of the Operation Murambatsvina, who were three times more likely to back the opposition rather than the ruling party afterwards (ibid.).

Moreover, the opposition adapted to the constant intimidation to a certain extent. Under the regime’s repression, its organizational capacity was severely affected; parts of the MDC’s formal institutions collapsed over the course of the year 2000 (Bond and Saunders 2005; LeBas 2006). In consequence, the MDC created more flexible, but also more radical action committees. This parallel structure within the party allowed the leadership to by-pass the formal set-up that could easily be attacked by the regime (LeBas 2006; Raftopoulos 2007, 131). Nevertheless, constant pressure on the opposition also left its traces. The move towards underground structures undermined inner-party democracy, which in turn intensified intra-party cleavages. These found their visible expression in the struggle between the party’s president Tsvangirai and its secretary general Welshman Ncube (Raftopoulos 2007, 132). In 2005, the MDC then split along ethnic lines over the decision whether to participate in the 2005 Senatorial elections in a fraction led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and a new wing under Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). This division was formalized in 2006 (Raftopoulos 2006, 143–150).

What on surface looked like a disagreement over the participation in electoral politics in fact revealed deeper tensions within the incoherent coalition of leftists and neoliberals, ethnic Shona and Ndebele as well as trade unionists and intellectuals that had formed the MDC (Bond and Saunders 2005; Raftopoulos 2006).

In short, it appears that the economy’s crisis increased opposition to the ZANU-PF and support for the MDC until 2008 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 186) not least because it was successfully integrated in the opposition’s narrative that the MDC alone was capable of rebuilding the economy. Even the former ZANU-PF spokesperson Rugare Gumbo retrospectively admitted that “people voted with their stomachs [in the 2008 elections]” as the regime’s message on sanctions did not sink (ZWE21). During the 2008 parliamentary elections, the MDC-T won 99 seats as opposed to ZANU-PF’s 97 and defeated ZANU-PF in its rural strongholds of Manicaland and Masvingo provinces, which has been interpreted as a ‘loss of popular support due to the post-1997 land acquisition milieu which had no clear pro-poor rural development strategy’ (Cameron and Rich Dorman 2009, 13). While the MDC was able to transform the discontent into anti-regime activity and electoral support, the horrendous state-sponsored violence
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prevented the opposition from translating it into state power during and after the 2008 elections.

2009-2013: After a controversial recount (for details, see Masunungure 2009a), the Electoral Commission announced on 2 May 2008 that MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai won the first round of the presidential elections with 47.9 percent compared to 43.2 percent for Mugabe. However, Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off on 22 June due to increasing electoral violence. He claimed that attacks on MDC rallies, the beating of independent journalists and the harassment of election observers, which forced them to flee, had shown that the country lacked the conditions for free and fair elections (Glendinning and Jones 2008). As a result of Tsvangirai’s pullout, Mugabe secured an overwhelmingly majority in the second round and was sworn in as president on 29 June 2008. With reference to the electoral violence, the EU and US imposed additional sanctions (Council of the European Union 2008), but a resolution introduced to the UN Security Council was vetoed by China and Russia on 11 July 2008 (UN Security Council 2008).

Subsequent negotiations between the regime and the two opposition fractions to address the post-election standoff were mediated by South Africa under its president Thabo Mbeki. During the negotiations, the EU advised the MDC to take a hard stance and only join the Government of National Unity if Mugabe was genuine about power sharing and if the process would lead to a people-driven constitutional reform (Hoekman 2013; Raftopoulos 2013b). A lack of agreement between the West and South Africa on these issues led to persistent contestation also with respect to the continuation of sanctions (Hoekman 2013; Nyakudya 2013). Chiefly owing to South Africa’s sustained pressure on both the regime and the opposition (Hoekman 2013; Masunungure and Badza 2010, 207), ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M signed the Global Political Agreement GPA on 15 September 2008. According to Article 4 of the GPA the parties committed ‘themselves to working together in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end the country’s international isolation’ (Global Political Agreement 2008). Despite continuous disagreement among the signatories, the GNU was formed on 13 February 2009, followed by the inauguration of Morgan Tsvangirai as prime minister. In spite of the Western skepticism about the agreement, the MDC-T had high expectations of the EU and US assistance that it would receive after joining the government. This partially explains the party’s acceptance of a disadvantageous ministerial allocation that left them largely with ministries in
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charge of service delivery (Hoekman 2013). If successful in receiving international aid, this strategy could have enabled the MDC to deliver on its electoral promises of social change.

Yet during the GNU, the MDC was eventually “beaten by the issue of sanctions” (ZWE15; also ZWE37). How did that happen? First, sanctions undermined the MDC’s ability to deliver on its promise to revive the economy. One major resource that the MDC-T brought to the GPA effectively was the population’s hope for economic recovery (also Raftopoulos 2013a, 21). Now that opposition had become part of the government, it was forced to deliver. Initially, the MDC indeed appeared to be able to do so. For example, former MDC Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development suggested that the MDC increased tax collection and renewed the external aid flow (ZWE35). In his words, the “international community warmed up again and began assisting Zimbabwe” (ibid.). Furthermore, dollarization of the economy implemented by MDC’s financial minister Tendai Biti brought some economic stability, from which the MDC-T gained political capital at the beginning of the GNU (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011; Muzondidya 2013, 44).

In the long run, however, sanctions frustrated the ability of the opposition to follow up of electoral promise of economic revival and social change (Kriger 2012; ZWE30). One key factor in that context was ZANU-PF’s refusal to carry out important reforms as long as sanctions were still in place. The MDC had agreed on working towards an end of the sanctions in the GPA and confirmed its willingness address the issue of sanctions as a means to bring economic stability to Zimbabwe in the GNU’s Memorandum of Understanding (Zondi 2013, 65). In line with these stipulations, MDC ministers participated in trips to Europe to bid for a suspension of the EU restrictive measures (ZWE28; ZWE35; ZWE40). To further these efforts, a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) set up a sub-committee dealing with sanctions, which the MDC fractions also joined. Yet many of these activities and statements were half-hearted (ZWE34; ZWE35; ZWE39). For example, former minister Nkomo recalled how colleagues were obliged to join the delegation’s visits to the European Union, but effectively “talked with false tongues” (ZWE35). Parts of the MDC did not believe that lifting the sanctions was in their party’s best interest as it would deprive the MDC of a means to exert pressure on the ZANU-PF both economically and discursively.

As a result, ZANU-PF claimed that the MDC did not do enough for Zimbabwe to get rid of sanctions and used this as an excuse to refuse the adaptation of key reforms until the restrictive measures were removed. This refusal by the ZANU-PF has been cited as a chief
reason for the GNU’s inability to implement the reform agenda detailed in the GPA (Masunungure and Badza 2010; Masunungure and Shumba 2012, 147; Ndlouv-Gatsheni 2013, 163; Nyakudya 2013, 172; Zondi 2013, 73). Put differently, sanctions became one of Mugabe’s preferred ‘weapons of choice’ in his efforts to block the realization of the GPA (Gomes Porto 2013, 125). In doing so, the Mugabe regime could rely on its continued dominance over the economy and the state that it had not only carefully inscribed in the GPA (Muzondidya 2013, 45–49). ZANU-PF inter alia controlled the Reserve Bank, which determined the budget available for the ministers and used his power to channel resources to ZANU-PF (Matyszak 2010, 81–83; Welz 2010). In an attempt to counterbalance the influence of the Governor of the Reserve Bank Gideon Gono, the MDC appointed the donor darling Tendai Biti as Minister of Finance (ZWE30), but his attempts to get rid of Gono ultimately failed (Welz 2010). The resulting problems, including the further shrinking formal employment, especially affected MDC’s traditional support base, the organized labor unions (Muzondidya 2013, 58; Raftopoulos 2007).

Second, sanctions tend to create ‘an economic opportunity structure that privileges those best positioned in the underground economy, enhancing the value of their smuggling skills and connections’ (Andreas 2005, 335–336). In the case of Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Mines and Mine Development as well as other actors legitimized their attempts to obscure the process of sanctions busting and the revenues from these clandestine trade activities with reference to necessities created by sanctions (Rupiya 2013, 14). This opaqueness surrounding the trade of precious metals enabled the regime to channel earnings from the Marange diamond field to key elites in the security sector (Muzondidya 2013, 44; Rupiya 2013, 9; Towriss 2013). The official budget was allegedly bypassed to fund a parallel government to the GNU (Mazarire 2013, 103; Raftopoulos 2013a, 20).140 More generally, the ZANU-PF used its control over key sectors of the state and the economy to direct resources to crucial domestic support groups and deprive political opponents (Alexander and McGregor 2013; Chingono 2010, 202; Masunungure 2009b, 69). This patronage network was sustained inter alia by the redistribution of the land seized from 2001 onwards (Southall 2013). In addition, food relief, which supported more than 75 percent of the population by 2009, was withheld from alleged MDC supporters (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 52; Chingono 2010, 204; Howard-Hassmann 2010).

140 According to an MDC source, which has to of course be treated carefully, these secret funds also allowed ZANU-PF to spend over 100 million US dollar on its electoral victory in 2013 (Moore 2014).
Third, the continued existence of US and EU sanctions frustrated the GPA government’s efforts to attract FDI (Nyakudya 2013, 188), negatively affected bilateral donor funding crucial for revitalizing the economy (African Development Bank 2010), and limited the country’s access to credits in the ways outlined above. The donors’ willingness to assist the new government also depended on it progress in implementing the GPA (Hoekman 2013), which ZANU-PF thwarted with reference to the MDC’s failure to lift sanctions as described previously. In other words, sanctions undermined the MDC’s efforts to attract the much-needed international capital – not as regards emergency aid, but with respect to budget support and private direct investment. MDC financial minister Tendai Biti admitted the sanctions’ negative impact on the Zimbabwean economy in his statement to the Parliament on 29 January 2009 and repeatedly demanded their lifting on a number of subsequent occasions (Chronicle 2012; Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011, 46; Mazarire 2013; Nyambabvu 2012; The Sunday Mail 2012). In the words of the program coordinator of a political foundation, “there was the realization [on part of the MDC] that there was no way of delivering under sanctions” (ZWE17). However, the MDC was also reluctant to let go of sanctions as a means to put pressure on its political rival ZANU-PF (Masaka 2012, 64). Former minister Gordon Moyo summarized this dilemma during an interview in pointed terms: “We were in a government that needed resources to function, but at the same time we could not ask the world to lift sanctions, which were a hindrance to full economic recovery” (ZWE37).

The ZANU-PF strategically boosted the discourse that MDC-instigated sanctions prevented the economy from recovering: “From 2009 to 2013 there was a major campaign in the rural areas explaining that we were suffering because of the MDC, and people started understanding the message” (ZWE21; also ZWE10). In other words, Mugabe tried to convince the population that MDC’s continued support of sanctions undermined the people’s socio-economic wellbeing (Masaka 2012, 62). The ‘infelicitous coincidence’ of EU measures and Zimbabwe’s further economic deterioration unfortunately lend a certain degree of credibility to this narrative (EU Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2011, 25). Sanctions hence became a convenient scapegoat to draw attention away from ZANU-PF’s destructive role in the GNU (ZWE6). In line with this strategy, ZANU-PF sued the European Union for an alleged sanctions-related loss of 42 billion Euros at the European Court of Justice in 2011 (The Herald 2011a; ZWE_FG1; ZWE7) and continuously framed sanctions as a Western policy ‘to deny Zimbabwean’s the right to be in charge of their economy’ (Raftopoulos 2013b, 22). ZANU-PF’s proposed remedy, the indigenization of the economy found some resonance among the almost
50 percent unemployed youth in urban areas (Raftopoulos 2013c, 983), particularly, as discussed above, in light of the disappointing performance of the MDCs in the ‘inclusive government’.

In a nutshell, sanctions undermined the MDC’s ability to deliver the promised economic revival both directly and indirectly. The MDC was faced with the economic constraints posed by sanctions, namely reduced international budget support and the lack of foreign direct investment. Perhaps even more importantly, the ZANU-PF regime used the resulting shadow economy to bypass the official budget and undermined any reform in the new government with reference to the fact that the MDC had not fulfilled its obligation under article 4 of the GPA. Taken together, these problems damaged the former opposition’s image as the force of economic recovery and social change in the period between 2009 and 2011.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the second chapter introducing the theoretical framework, I outlined a grievance-/deprivation-based approach to explaining an increase in opposition activity in regimes under sanctions: An overall economic downturn in the country under sanctions and/or increased socio-economic differences across certain groups should lead to heightened opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions. The fsQCA conducted in the third chapter, where a decreasing GDP served as a proxy for socio-economic deprivation, suggested that such a development actually played a crucial role in the case of Zimbabwe. This rather general finding could be confirmed in a much more nuanced manner by the case study. The population’s widespread dissatisfaction with the rampant economic crises did not only contribute to the formation of the MDC in 1999, but also helped to sustain its support after the implementation of sanctions in the 2000s.

Yet the causal mechanism proposed, namely that economically costly sanctions instigate popular protest against the regime held accountable for the measure’s socio-economic consequences must be refined and partially adjusted on the basis of the analysis presented here. Whilst many people blamed the regime for the country’s economic downturn and, as a result, joined the opposition, the sanction’s economic consequences (initially) only affected this development at the margin. Despite hampering Zimbabwe’s economy through reducing FDI and donor assistance, the overall economic impact of sanctions was limited. Instead, the MDC managed to gain political capital from the EU and US measures through carefully integrating them into their discourse of being the only force within Zimbabwe able to revitalize the
The opposition party continuously stressed that in order to rebuild the Zimbabwean economy, international assistance was needed, which would only be provided to an MDC-led government. This narrative found widespread resonance among the population, especially during the 2008 elections. Subsequently, however, the regime increasingly invested into its own anti-sanctions discourse and managed to at least partially convince Zimbabweans that the MDC had willingly accepted the population’s suffering by inviting costly sanctions. This points to the important interplay between sanctions’ economic consequences and the way that both the opposition and the regime framed them in order to turn them into a political asset. In other words, the economic and financial consequences of sanctions are not just something ‘out there’ that needs to be quantified as precisely as possible to understand how it affects opposition politics. Rather, the discursive struggle about the alleged and perceived economic impact of sanctions shaped domestic dynamics of contention beyond measurable economic consequences.

In contrast to Burundi, where the comprehensive trade embargo drastically undermined the regime’s financial leverage, the restrictive measures against Zimbabwe did not decisively limit the ZANU-PF regime’s room for maneuver in such ways that it complied with the sanction senders’ demands. Accordingly, none of the politicians interviewed, neither from the regime nor from the opposition, claimed that the compromise that followed the violent 2008 elections and led to the creation of the GNU was in any way linked to the economic pressure created by the Western sanctions. Instead, the SADC mediation headed by South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki was instrumental (inter alia Hoekman 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Raftopoulos 2010). In addition, China and Russia declared that they would not necessarily protect Zimbabwe from UN measures in the future, which put pressure on the Mugabe regime to continue the negotiations with Tsvangirai (Alden 2010).

Having said that, the sanction’s financial consequences exerted a limited economic pressure on the regime. This – among many other factors – contributed to its destabilization without leading to its downfall. The economic decline undercut ZANU-PF’s ability to maintain its traditional patronage system and thereby secure the support of key constituencies. In the resulting ‘economy of plunder’, the regime’s economic beneficiaries were reduced to small group of cronies (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 46). In that context, the blacklisting of an increasing number of parastatals, such as the ZIDCI holding controlled by regime (Chikuhwa 2006, 71), also reduced the flow of resources available to the government. Moreover, there is
evidence that some senior members of the ZANU-PF wanted Mugabe to go so that the targeted measures imposed on them would be lifted (International Crisis Group 2007a). Many companies controlled by key figures of the regime were included in the US and EU blacklists, which indeed bothered them (ZWE23). But taken together, these financial constraints posed by the sanctions and the way that they affected inter-elite support and solidarity were only a side note to the more central socio-economic dissatisfaction of the general population and the debate about the role that sanctions played in that respect. This major finding that the framing of the sanctions’ economic consequences matters holds relevance for the signaling component of sanctions addressed in the next section.

6.2.3. Perceived opportunities

While the International Crisis Group dismissed the EU targeted sanctions as ‘largely symbolic’ (International Crisis Group 2007b, i), one can assume that sanctions signals played a key role in Zimbabwe’s domestic dynamics of contention, which have been characterized as an ‘[i]deologically driven battle in which ideas mattered’ (Alexander and Tendi 2008, 12). In such a context, a struggle over symbols and vocabulary gains tremendous importance (see also Eriksson 2007, 45). In the theory chapter, I suggested that sanctions enable the voicing and enacting of dissent because the messages of regime disapproval and opposition support conveyed by such measures provide psychological comfort and encouragement to regime critical forces. Opposition movements do not only feel legitimized by sanctions, but also refer to them in order to highlight the targeted government’s human rights violations or other types of state misconduct and thereby discredit the regime in the eyes of the population. Lastly, sanctions signal international attention and potentially lead to the expectation that regime critical activism will be supported internationally, thus creating perceived opportunities for the voicing and enacting of dissent. The fsQCA supported this theorizing by identifying the sanctions’ senders’ signals as a crucial factor that enabled the voicing and enacting of dissent in Zimbabwe despite limited political freedom – but in conjunction with the issues of deprivation and grievances discussed previously. To what extent this can be traced in the case of Zimbabwe will be reconstructed in the next section, which will again subdivide into the analysis of a first phase until 2008 and a second phase covering the GNU (2009-2013) as well as the subsequent 2013 election.
6. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013)

PSYCHOLOGICAL ENCOURAGEMENT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL

Following the proposed mechanisms, the precise signals sent by the sanctions senders will be uncovered in a first step before examining how they affected opposition politics. While the US and EU measures aim at improving the human rights situation and promoting democratic elections more generally (Grebe 2010), the sanctions senders also explicitly referred to the role of the political opposition. The Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act passed by the US Congress in 2001 aimed at “support[ing] the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the rule of law” (United States Congress 2001, emphasis added). Likewise, the EU imposed visa bans and asset freezes for certain individuals as well as an arms embargo before the 2002 presidential elections in response to “its serious concern about the situation in Zimbabwe, in particular the recent escalation of violence and intimidation of political opponents and the harassment of the independent press” (Council of the European Union 2002b, emphasis added, see also 2004). This signal fitted well with previous statements by the EU, which had criticized the human rights violations committed by the Mugabe regime (Eriksson 2007, 30).

Subsequently, the EU repeatedly linked its expansion of sanctions to concrete human rights violations and to the abuse of opposition politicians (see Figure 4 below).

In response to the forcible demolition and displacement of urban dwellers in the MDC strongholds in 2005, for example, new individuals ‘responsible for the current human rights violations known under the name ‘Operation Murambatsvina’’ were added to the blacklist (Council of the European Union 2005). The 2007 expansion of sanctions was also justified with reference to ‘the recent brutality by the Government of Zimbabwe against opposition supporters’ (Council of the European Union 2007). The targeted measures were cast as a punishment against the regime for its use of political violence, human rights abuses, and violation of the rule of law, media and judiciary freedom (MacDermott 2009). The MDC and other regime critical actors hence welcomed sanctions as a means to highlight the regime’s gross human rights abuses as well as the violation of democratic principles and to thereby challenge its legitimacy (ZWE8; ZWE9; ZWE20; ZWE23; ZWE28; ZWE30; ZWE32; ZWE34; ZWE35; ZWE37; ZWE43). In the words of RAU activist Tony Reeler, the “fact that there was no adherence to the rule of law, human rights and democracy was recognized in ZIDERA and the article 96 process” (ZWE43). Relatedly, MDC founding member David Coltart particularly referred to the “rampant intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters” as a reason for the implementation of the so-called restrictive measures (ZWE34). In that context, the
opposition also highlighted that sanctions were only targeting those responsible for the human rights violations (ZWE20; ZWE34) – an aspect that was also underlined by the sanctions senders (Masaka 2012).

**Figure 4: EU and US targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe**

As hypothesized in the theoretical chapter, the fact that sanctions drew attention to the regime’s norm-violating behavior empowered the opposition by revealing an international audience for their demands. In the words of an MDC MP, the EU and US restrictive measures served as a “flag marker”, which highlighted the regime’s misconduct (ZWE28) and according to former student leader Itai Zimunya, they showed the people of Zimbabwe that Mugabe could not run away from international scrutiny (ZWE3). This reasoning also informed one of Tsvangirai’s much-cited statements after the 2002 elections, in which he stressed that a return to legitimacy in Zimbabwe could ‘only be achieved through fresh presidential elections, under free and fair conditions and supervised and monitored by the region, the continent and the international community’ (Tsvangirai, 2002, cited after Raftopoulos 2010, 712–713). This statement exemplarily shows how the international community was depicted as the key guardian of democratic rule and the authority to judge whether the regime adhered to such norms (see Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 23 on the key role of international norms for sanctions’ signaling dimension).
The signals of regime disapproval and opposition support were particularly effective in the case of Zimbabwe because of the communication channels that existed between the sanctions senders and the targeted country’s population. In the theoretical chapter, I argued that sanctions signals rather increase opposition mobilization if a certain degree of social linkage to the sender state(s) exists. While not identified as a key factor explaining the trajectory of opposition mobilization in Zimbabwe under sanctions in the fsQCA, the case study points to the importance of this factor. Even small local NGOs like the Bulawayo-based Habakkuk Trust, which potentially lack the networks of big international NGOs, were well connected to civil society and politicians in the sender states. Referring to this connection, they even claimed that their goals and needs shaped the Western foreign policy towards Zimbabwe (ZWE31). Despite state control over major newspapers and the entire radio broadcasting landscape, the opposition also managed to amplify the illegitimacy of the regime through a media campaign that has been characterized as a ‘media blitz on human rights violations’ (Ncube 2013, 106). The private newspapers, which predominantly sympathized with the opposition, reflected this discourse and portrayed sanctions as a means to foster attention to the wrongs that the Mugabe regime committed (ZWE15). Taken together, these signals of regime condemnation, opposition support and international attention “created an enabling environment for political opposition parties” in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s (ZWE25) and thereby contributed to the further development of the MDC (Chingono 2010). In a pointed manner, Ncube (2013, 105) maintains that ‘the rights discourse helped to mobilize masses against the regime and garner the international community’s (Western government and their local constituencies) sympathy against the regime in the face of gross human rights violations and abuses’.

The regime, however, reacted to this challenge to its legitimacy by propounding an aggressive anti-sanctions narrative, which amounted to a ‘life insurance’ in the time of economic downturn (Ranger 2004). This discourse consisted of several elements. First, the regime characterized the sanctions as unlawful because they were not imposed by the UN and not supported by regional actors (ZWE18; Zanu-PF 2005). The fact that neither SADC nor the AU endorsed the measures enabled the regime to denounce them as a Western, neo-imperialist policy while the regime depicted itself as the victim of this Western imperialism to generate South-South solidarity (Bush and Szeftel 2002; Miti 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b). Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the EU and US sanctions were condemned as illegal means to affect regime change (ZWE14) and to undermine the government’s attempts to give the people back their land under the disguise of a human rights agenda (Tendi 2010, 25–26; also ZWE_FG3;
6. The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013)

In addition to framing sanctions as a reaction to the regime’s human rights violations, Great Britain indeed also presented them as a signal to Zimbabwe not to cross the red line of seizing white-owned farm land violently and without financial compensation (Eriksson 2007, 16; MacDermott 2009). Together with a discourse in the Western media that stressed the suffering of white farmers (Schoeman and Alden 2003), this played in the hand of the ZANU-PF narrative.

Third, the emphasis on the rule of law and human rights was delegitimized with reference to the West’s own inconsistent behavior. In addition to highlighting that the US-led invasion into Iraq violated international law (Tendi 2010, 28), the fact that other dictators know for notoriously violating human rights were not subject to sanctions served to denounce their discriminatory use (ZWE2; ZWE_FG1141). In that context, the selective targeting of government members also weakened the EU’s ability to send a coherent signal of regime disapproval. Initially, not all government ministers were subject to travel restrictions and asset freezes in an attempt to intensify frictions among the ruling elite (Eriksson 2007, 22), but this strategy was not without risk as regards its symbolic dimension.

The state controlled media widely disseminated ZANU-PF’s anti-sanctions discourse. A former ZANU-PF information officer referred to its “duty to protect national interests and thus created a national warfare” (ZWE14). This indeed constituted a discursive problem, not only for the sanctions senders, but also for other international organizations wanting to express solidarity with the marginalized groups within Zimbabwe (Bracking 2005). However, it was not until the signing of the Global Political Agreement and the formation of the Government of National Unity that sanctions really turned into a liability for the opposition, as my interview partners have consistently stressed (ZWE6; ZWE9; ZWE10; ZWE17; ZWE34; ZWE39) and as I will show in the next section.

A LACK OF A UNIFIED VOICE OF REGIME CRITICAL FORCES AFTER THE FORMATION OF THE GNU

As outlined above, the MDC signed the GPA and joined power-sharing government after highly contested negotiations under the auspices of South African president Mbeki. During these

141 On a related, yet different note, some of my interview partners in Bulawayo also rejected the EU and US measures on the basis of the fact that no international action had been taken in response to the Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s (ZWE33; ZWE31). To put it in the words of Bulawayo Agenda director Frederick Fayayo (ZWE33), “the international community looked away when people at this site were butchered, but it imposed sanctions when five or six settlers were killed.”
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talks, the MDC distanced itself from the Western governments’ advice to refuse signing the agreement unless certain conditions were met. Instead, the party publicly displayed their close cooperation with the regional mediator Mbeki, presumably in an attempt to fight the impression that the party was an agent of the West (Hoekman 2013).

Under the GNU, the MDC lost the discursive battle on sanctions for several reasons. Firstly, the MDC-T itself was divided on its strategy of how to handle the sensitive issue of sanctions. Several high-ranking diplomats described the MDC position as unclear, with Tsvangirai changing his opinion on an almost daily basis (ZWE1; ZWE2; ZWE7; ZWE12). This ambiguity became public with the Wikileaks release of US embassy documents\(^\text{142}\) and severely undermined the credibility of the party’s claim that “the MDC has no say in [the lifting of sanctions]” (Deutsche Welle 2014; ZWE20). Tsvangirai statement that ‘if’ necessary (…) he and Mutambara can quietly meet with Western leadership to develop a plan on the issue of sanctions’ (The Guardian 2010) was in stark contrast to Financial Minister Biti’s repeated calls for lifting the sanctions\(^\text{143}\). This ambiguity between public statements calling for the suspension of the targeted measures and private conversations with Western diplomats saying they must be kept in place (ZWE1; ZWE2; ZWE7; ZWE12; ZWE43) undermined the MDC’s authority in the sanctions debate (Nyakudya 2013; ZWE11; ZWE31; ZWE39).

Secondly, the two MDC fractions also disagreed on the usefulness of sanction. In contrast to the MDT-T, which partially still supported the measures, at least behind closed doors, the MDC-M doubted their political utility. The party’s president Arthur Mutambara had already clarified his anti-sanctions stance when the two MDCs formally split in 2006, saying that ‘we are anti-imperialist, driven by national interest and informed by Pan African ideals. I do not believe in sanctions’ (Sibanda 2006). Several high-ranking MDC-M members, including Mutambara and Minister for Education, Sport, Arts and Culture David Coltart consequently stressed that sanctions stopped being useful during their time in the GNU (ZWE34; ZWE39). They also lamented the lost opportunity to begin suspending the measures on the basis of clear benchmarks tied to the implementation of the GPA with the inauguration of the GNU (ibid.).

\(^\text{142}\) Since 2010, more than 250,000 internal assessments and reports from US embassies all over the world are available on the Internet platform Wikileaks, whose goal its is to bring important original material to the public.

\(^\text{143}\) Likewise, Tendai Biti was later accused of “working with the West on sanctions” (The Herald 2011b), when GB cables made public by Wikileaks stating that he only demanded to lift sanctions on eight parastatals (The Telegraph 2011).
These insights point to a further stepping stone for the MDC related to sanctions during the GNU period, namely the unclear EU policy about lifting the measures (see Figure 4 above). While the EU had already encountered problems in clearly communicating what it really expected of the Zimbabwean government besides some vague provisions on democratic elections before the formation of the GNU (Eriksson 2007, 53), this problem exacerbated after the 2008 elections. It actually took the EU until 2013 to appreciate the necessity to carefully frame the message conveyed by its restrictive measures in the light of the high degree of suspicion on that issue prevalent in Zimbabwe (EU Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2013). Moreover, the EU never agreed on a timeline for removing the measures that was closely tied to achievements of the GNU against the backdrop of struggles among members states (Grauvogel and von Soest 2015). The Netherlands and Belgium promoted a swift suspension of the measures, with the latter especially advocating the removal of the diamond companies from the black list whereas Great Britain insisted on keeping the sanctions (ZWE1; ZWE2; ZWE5). As a result, the gradual dismantling of the sanctions regime reflected compromises between the EU member states rather than a reward for progress made by the GNU.

Fourthly, Zimbabwean civil society was also divided on the issue of sanctions. Some organizations, including the Harare-based Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), the Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association and the London-based Zimbabwe Vigil, argued that sanctions should be retained (Research and Advocacy Unit 2015; ZWE33; Zimbabwe Vigil 2014). They maintained that lifting the measures would be inadequate in the view of on-going human rights violations and that it would provide the regime with too much leeway. Other NGOs such as Bulawayo Agenda suggested removing sanctions as a way to deprive the government of a scapegoat for its misconduct (ZWE36). This division amongst NGOs mirrors the usage of the narratives by the regime respectively the opposition. Both sides also experienced significant pressure with respect to their position. NGOs critical of the Western measures feared a decline in external funding should they openly express this sentiment at a time when the EU still maintained its targeted sanctions (ZWE31). Conversely, the pro-sanctions fraction claimed that they were asked to tone down their position at a time when the EU began to seek re-engagement with the Mugabe regime (ZWE43). This divide also ran through the NGO umbrella organization NANGO, the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ZWE35). While NANGO had still distanced itself from its treasurer’s statement that it was determined to ‘engage relevant powers towards the
scrapping of the sanctions’ (Zimbabwe Situation 2013), NANGO then called for the lifting of sanction not even half a year later (Moyo 2014).

In the view of these disagreements, the Mugabe regime managed to capitalize on the issue of sanctions. All elements of the ZANU-PF anti-sanctions discourse described previously, especially the narrative that the MDC had invited these neo-colonial measures and was unwilling to work of their removal to strengthen its position in the GNU, were repeated on a daily basis in the state media. In line with the strategy of depicting itself as the only party of the GNU seriously asking the EU and US to lift the measures, the government launched a popular petition against the sanctions (inter alia The Herald 2011c, 2011d). The ordinary population was then encouraged – or rather forced – to sign it as a way to express its rejection of the Western measures. The regime later interpreted the fact that the petition “was signed by over two million people” as an approval of its policies (ZWE21). In addition to providing the government with a potential narrative to rally for support, sanctions also appeared to have contributed to a renewed sense of solidarity among the ruling elite (Eriksson 2007, 43). Tendi (2013a, 4) goes as far as suggesting that the confrontational Western foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, including the issue of sanction, was ‘instrumental in the growth of a siege mentality in the military command’. In contrast, if people were delisted, they could easily be denounced as traitors as “there was a feeling that if you were removed, you must have sold out” (ZWE23; also ZWE3; ZWE12).

The regime’s anti-sanctions discourse reached its climax in the run-up to the 2013 general elections (ZWE22). The ‘illegal sanctions’ were mentioned no less than 40 times in the ZANU-PF election manifesto (ZANU-PF 2013). During the 2013 election campaign, the Mugabe regime’s versions of the trajectory of the GNU and events including the Western sanctions dominated the media (Southall 2013). This is especially true for the rural areas, where the only source of information were the state-controlled radio and the often the freely distributed state-controlled daily ‘The Herald’ (ZWE8; ZWE15; ZWE19; ZWE22; ZWE42). In the words of former politburo member and presidential candidate Makoni, “[t]he government discourse about sanctions was primarily a propaganda tool, but a line repeated so often became believable” (ZWE23). In contrast, Tsvangirai largely neglected the topic of sanctions this time in contrast to

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144 However, ordinary Zimbabweans and journalists reported that they were forced to sign the petition even though they felt that they were not affected by the measures (NewsDay 2011; ZWE_FG1).
earlier periods (Zamchiya 2013), which allowed the Mugabe regime to propagate its narrative without a word of disagreement.

Mugabe ultimately won the elections, which were held in Zimbabwe on 31 July 2013, with 61.09 percent as opposed to only 34.94 percent for Tsvangirai. The ZANU-PF also secured a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly – an outcome that came as a shock to the opposition. In addition to sophisticated electioneering and open repression, the ruling party had also managed to address key concerns of the population in ‘The People’s Manifesto 2013’, especially with its promise to create jobs (Southall 2013). SADC, COMESA, and the AU recognized the elections results (African Union 2013; COMESA 2013; SADC 2013) whereas the MDC and the West denounced them as fraudulent (Raftopoulos 2013c). Some MDC members also claimed that participating in the polls was a mistake as it provided the process with a certain stamp of approval (Moore 2014). From the new position of weakness, the MDC once again called for external sanctions and urged the international community not to relend its pressure on the Mugabe regime (ZWE12; ZWE20; ZWE28; ZWE30). The EU, however, suspended the remaining measures with reference to adaptation of a new constitution before the elections and the peaceful conduct of the elections themselves (Commission of the European Union 2013; Council of the European Union 2013) and showed no interest in reversing this decision – not least because they lacked any alternative political partner after the MDC’s clear electoral defeat (Grauvogel and von Soest 2015).

Following the elections, ZANU-PF moved to restore its control, not only of the state but also of public discourse. One example is the statement of the former constitutional movement NCA, which announced that it wanted to have nothing to do with the West any longer when it transformed itself into a political party, and which has been interpreted as a clear sign that ZANU-PF again defines ‘what is considered an acceptable oppositional discourse’ without much contestation (Raftopolous 2013). Against this backdrop, the struggle between the newly created MDC Renewal under former finance minister Tendai Biti and the Tsvangirai fraction does not help much to unite the opposition and restore the population’s confidence.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The case of Zimbabwe suggests that the signals conveyed by the sanctions initially enabled the opposition movement in the way suggested in the theoretical chapter. The MDC felt encouraged by the message of opposition support conveyed by the West and referred to the sanctions as a means to denounce the regime’s human rights violations and thus to
delegitimize Mugabe. Moreover, the international attention worked as a stamp of approval. Taken together, these aspects appear to have created a perceived window of opportunity for the voicing and enacting of dissent despite increasingly restricted political freedoms in Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2008. The MDC thought of sanctions as part of its final push strategy, consisting of mass action and international assistance (ZWE6). But when Tsvangirai withdrew from the presidential election’s run-off in 2008 and later entered into the GNU, sanctions turned into “an albatross around [the opposition’s] neck” (ZWE_FG3; Raftopoulos 2010). To say it in the words of the scholar Gomes Porto, ‘if the most powerful effect of targeted sanctions is said to be a function of their symbolism, Mugabe’s masterly transmutation of the intended “stigmatization” into “victimization” (...) dealt a severe blow to the symbolic power of targeted sanctions’ (Gomes Porto 2013, 107). The opposition ultimately lost the propaganda war about sanctions, not least because ZANU-PF persuaded the MDC to ‘sing from the same hymnbook on the issue of sanction’ during the GNU (Mazarire 2013, 110).

Anti-regime forces attempted to challenge the government narrative with limited success. To a certain extent, they managed to deconstruct the ‘sell-outs who had incited the sanctions’ versus ‘patriots fighting for Zimbabwe’s sovereignty’ distinction, but they failed to disentangle the human rights discourse from its close association with the West (Tendi 2010, 45). In the end, the opposition narrative on human rights and economic revival did ‘not amount to an alternative historical narrative capable of displacing patriotic history’ (Ranger 2004, 233), which the regime skillfully tied to the issue of sanctions. Against this backdrop, the disagreement within the MDC-T, between the various MDC fractions and among different NGOs whether sanctions were still necessary to denounce the Mugabe regime’s democratic misconduct after the formation of the GNU was particularly harmful. It prevented the opposition from speaking with a unified voice – not only on the issue of sanctions, but more generally on a number of issues that concerned the role of external actors in denouncing human rights violations in Zimbabwe.

In addition to domestic opposition’s failure to communicate its position of the prolonged sanctions regime, the EU did not manage to communicate to the Zimbabwean population ‘what it [was] trying to accomplish with its signal’ (Eriksson 2007, 45). Instead of gradually suspending the measures based on accomplishments with respect to the implementation of the GPA, the removal of individuals and forms from the list rather resulted from intra-EU bargaining processes and steps taken in early 2013 came too late to reward successes of the
GNU and provide the MDC with an opportunity to gain political capital from having ended the sanctions.

6.3. Conclusion

According to the fsQCA, the EU and US restrictive measures led to an ‘internal opposition’ effect in Zimbabwe as a combined result of two developments: Their socio-economic impact led to deprivation-induced anti-regime mobilization, and the signals of regime disapproval and opposition support they conveyed encouraged the opposition. The trajectory of opposition politics in Zimbabwe against the backdrop of Western sanctions has confirmed, but also further qualified this proposed pathway. The opposition indeed benefitted from large-scale socio-economic discontent. The MDC recruited large sections of its rank and file as well as key leadership figures from the ZCTU already in their formation phase, which had gained strength in the 1990s as a credible force denouncing the people’s economic misery. Subsequently, people cited their expectation that the new party would be able to revitalize Zimbabwe’s economy as a major reason for supporting the MDC in the 2002, 2005 and 2008 elections. As I have shown above, this economic decline was only marginally linked to the sanctions, with ZIDERA being the sole measure that presumably had a significant impact on the economy at large. Nevertheless, the sanction’s alleged economic impact created opportunities for the MDC as it skillfully integrated the promise to re-engage the international community into its larger ‘economic recovery’ narrative.

The regime, in contrast, initially ignored the issue of sanctions. It took a while until ZANU-PF publicly denounced them as an illegal means to undermine the land reform and even longer until the EU and US measures were presented as a scapegoat for the economy’s downturn. This narrative was then forcefully articulated in the state-controlled media, especially in the run-up to the 2013 elections. In line with the pending lawsuit against the EU, the measures were made responsible for a USD42 billion economic loss in the 2013 election manifesto. In addition, the MDC was discredited for having willingly accepted the population’s suffering by inviting the sanctions. This discursive offensive bore fruits: while the majority blamed the government for the economic crisis according to an Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2005, a total of 63 percent strongly or very strongly agreed with the statement that ‘international economic sanctions are hurting ordinary Zimbabweans and should be removed’ in 2010 (Afrobarometer 2010).
This development shows how the sanction’s economic impact and the way that both the opposition forces and the regime integrated it into their quest for legitimacy were intrinsically linked. Hence, it is the way that sanction’s economic consequences were framed and the extent to which these frames resonate with the population rather than their ‘objective’ impact, which helps us to appreciate how sanctions-related grievances and feelings of deprivation enabled and/or constrained the opposition. Going beyond the case of Zimbabwe, this finding calls into question attempts to estimate the precise costs of international sanctions (for example Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990) and contributes to our understanding of why international sanctions have sparked antigovernment protest before or without hurting the targeted country economically on a large-scale (Arya 2008; Blanchard and Ripsman 1999). In other words, the expectation that sanctions enable anti-government protest if they are costly and thus increase socio-economic grievances must be qualified as follows: Based on the case of Zimbabwe, I would now argue that sanctions produce grievance-induced anti-regime mobilization if people make sense of economic crises in a way that attributes blame on the government and/or comes to appreciate the opposition as the political force able to address the crisis. Such a development may be both the result of group-related grievances – for instance by manufacturing workers in Zimbabwe – and individual feelings of deprivation, as for example captured by the Afrobarometer surveys.

Going beyond the interplay between the sanctions economic consequences and how they were framed, the signals of regime disapproval and opposition support conveyed by the EU and US measures shaped domestic dynamics of contention as anticipated. The MDC felt encouraged by the international pressure and attention, while pointing to the reasons provided for their imposition to discredit the regime based on its human rights abuses and undemocratic conduct of elections. In line with the result of the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the sanctions gave heart to the opposition despite very limited political freedom. Following the lost 2000 referendum, the regime enforced the militarization of political life, and the MDC had to abandon parts of its organizational structure that it had initially created (LeBas 2006). Nevertheless, these developments could not entirely reverse the expansion of civil society and the media landscape that had occurred in the late 1990s. The remainder of this was still sufficient to ensure certain communication channels between regime critical actors and the sanctions senders, so that their message of opposition support and regime disapproval could be heard within Zimbabwe. Even though this dimension was not identified as crucial for the case of Zimbabwe in the fsQCA, the importance of communicative linkage between the
sanctions senders and the society of the targeted regime for the transmission of sanctions signals was highlighted in the case study. The close ties between regime critical actors in Zimbabwe and the sanctions senders facilitated the transmission of signals of regime disapproval and opposition support sent by the sanctions. However, they also contributed to the fact that the disagreement among EU members states about the continuation of its restrictive measures after the formation of the GNU were registered within Zimbabwe, which allowed the ZANU-PF to denounce the sanctions senders’ inconsistent policy.

Paralleling the debate about the economic consequences of sanctions, which the Mugabe government initially ‘overslept’, it took the regime a while to realize that there was political capital to be gained from the symbolic dimension of sanctions. The ZANU-PF then reacted to this challenge to its legitimacy by denouncing the sanctions as a means to undermine its people-driven land reform instead of a genuine expression of Western concern for human rights in Zimbabwe. In that way, sanctions became a ‘leading theme’ of the regime’s patriotic history narrative, which stressed the need to defend Zimbabwe’s sovereignty against the West’s neo-colonial ambitions and their MDC puppets (Tendi 2010, 271). In other words, the EU and US measures helped to sustain authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe because they were successfully integrated into the regime’s legitimation narrative (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014).

Lastly, the case study highlights the difference between opposition mobilization and regime breakdown. Even though the MDC at least initially gained political capital from the signals conveyed by sanctions and the way that they framed the economic crisis occurring against the backdrop of the restrictive measures, ZANU-PF managed to sustain its rule. This is, of course, not only attributable to how the regime handled the issue of sanctions in the long run. Instead, careful electioneering, repression and a legitimation strategy that transcended the issue of sanctions played a crucial role. At the same time, the opposition was weakened by a number of factors largely unrelated to sanctions, including its weak organizational capacity, a leadership problem, the lack of a coherent program and repeated internal divisions (inter alia Matombo and Sachikonye 2010; Raftopoulos 2007). Notwithstanding this complex interplay between opposition mobilization in Zimbabwe, sanctions, and other factors that shaped the country’s domestic dynamics, the case study clearly shows that the MDC’s trajectory was crucially influenced by how both the regime and the opposition framed the issue of sanctions as a means to gain political leverage.
7. THE TRAJECTORY OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS IN
ZIMBABWE AND BURUNDI

According to the fsQCA, the sanctions’ impact on opposition movements in Zimbabwe and Burundi can be explained by the complex interplay between socio-economic deprivation/grievances and the fact that the sanctions’ coherent signals of outside support encouraged anti-regime forces in both countries. Yet the two case study analyses also provide rich material for comparing and contrasting opposition trajectories in the two African countries beyond these conditions – not least because they were characterized by remarkably similar developments, namely the conclusion of a power-sharing agreement in the midst of the sanctions regime. Nevertheless, both cases also differ with respect to many other important context dimensions.

In the first section, I will propose to contrast the developments in Burundi and Zimbabwe by means of a structured, focused comparison instead of comparing the two cases in the form of a most-similar or most different systems design. This section accordingly introduces structured, focused comparison as an epistemological foundation – rather than as a toolbox – to approach the two cases. I will then discuss how one can or cannot compare the trajectories of opposition movements in Zimbabwe and Burundi against the backdrop of external sanctions. In short, this section synthesizes the more detailed account of pre-sanctions opposition politics and the sanctions themselves provided in the two case study chapters. The third section explores how the power-sharing literature highlights certain aspects of contestation in regimes under sanctions in a pronounced fashion. Based on this framework, the trajectories of opposition movements under sanctions in Burundi and Zimbabwe are compared and contrasted in the final section.

7.1. Structured, focused comparison

The term structured, focused comparison was coined by Alexander George in a book chapter on case studies and theory development (George 1979). It was proposed to develop case study research in foreign policy analysis in a way that would be conducive to generalizations beyond the single case. The method is structured insofar as the researcher addresses a general set of questions in each of the case studies. This research objective guides the selection and analysis
of the cases. The case study selection and data collection follow ‘standardized’ procedures, which facilitates the systematic accumulation and comparison of findings generated for the individual cases. Moreover, the method is focused because the cases are examined with respect to the dimensions of interest rather than in their entirety (George and Bennett 2005, chapter 3). In other words, the case studies are undertaken with a specific research question and theoretical framework in mind that guides the research process. Complex (historical) cases are hence narrowed down to the study of one particular phenomenon, for example alliance formation, deterrence, or, in this case, opposition politics in regimes under sanctions.

Structured, focused comparison is particularly apt to contrast opposition mobilization in Burundi and Zimbabwe for three main reasons. First, it was explicitly developed as a comparative method to address complex, historical developments that go beyond certain events (George 1979). Accordingly, scholars using structured, focused comparison have repeatedly stressed the need to take the specific historical context into account (for example, Lijn 2006, 37). This fits well with the highly contingent development of opposition politics in Zimbabwe and Burundi that was presented in the two preceding chapters. Second, George argues that case study research following this approach can be useful in developing generalizations on ‘the variety of different causal patterns that can occur for the phenomena in question’ and ‘the conditions under which each distinctive type of causal patterns occurs’ (George 1979, 60, emphasis added). Such an understanding of comparison results in less restrictive assumptions than Mill’s method of agreement or difference and thus fits the comparison of two cases that are characterized by both striking similarities and noticeable differences as sketched above.

Moreover, the emphasis on equifinality (Bennett 2007) and causal complexity that becomes apparent in the reference to a ‘variety of causal patterns’ is highly consistent with the basic premises of QCA as spelled out by Ragin (1987) and others. Third, the method has been endorsed by political scientists from a broad spectrum of philosophy of science approaches. For example, King, Keohane and Verba (1994) advocate the method in their seminal work on positivist descriptive and causal inference in qualitative research whereas others argued that structured, focused comparison is particularly suitable for constructivists (inter alia Carlsnaes 1992). It is thus ideal to capture the signaling impact of sanctions on anti-regime mobilization and the more ‘tangible’ economic consequences as well as the interplay of both dimensions.
This advantage of structured, focused comparison notwithstanding, over the past decades it has almost become an innocuously sounding term that researchers employ to characterize their comparative work. Understood this way structured, focused comparison is a useful idea to approach case studies rather than providing researchers with a precise toolbox. More recently, however, Bennett (2007) has sought to provide a slightly more detailed instruction on how to carry out structured, focused comparison. In the following, I will thus shortly describe to what extent I follow its specific steps and how I depart from his ‘template’. According to Bennett (2007), the research process consists of five steps in which the researcher specifies the research question, defines the dependent, independent as well as intervening variables, choses the cases, decides on how to capture them best and then formulates a standard set of questions. In line with the requirement to choose cases that belong to the same class, but differ in their specificities, I examine two cases that are covered by the same fsQCA path, but vary with respect to certain developments, as the individual analysis of each of the cases has revealed. In contrast to the research process proposed here, which borrows from statistical analyses as regards the notion of variables, I treat cases as configurations of conditions that do not exist independent of each other. Accordingly, I have formulated theoretical expectations that pay special attention to the interplay of these conditions. They have guided the fsQCA and subsequent case study analyses and which will hence be also addressed in the structured, focused comparison.

The procedure described by George (1979) is theoretically very useful to maximize the comparability of the cases, but it also entails the danger of oversimplification. A detailed account of the particular historical developments is necessarily lost in the process of contrasting and comparing, but one should also avoid between ‘getting trapped in the pitfall of oversimplification’ (Lijn 2006, 47). An exclusive focus on the pre-defined set of research questions or dimensions under scrutiny bears the risk of overlooking important factors. Accordingly, I will address the differences between opposition mobilization in Zimbabwe and Burundi as much as the similarities. Each case study has revealed a certain degree of deviation from the explanation suggested by the fsQCA, which must be taken into account. In that way, their comparison allows refining the proposed mechanisms, sheds light at the conditions under which this path identified in the macro-comparative analysis occurs and may lead to the identification of variations in the pattern.
7. The Trajectory of Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe and Burundi

As emphasized before, the method is structured in that a set of standardized questions is asked of each case, which should be grounded in the theoretical perspective chosen to address the research objective. This set of standardized questions is based on the theoretical framework introduced in the second chapter, but especially takes into account the findings from the subsequent fsQCA and process-tracing analyses (for more details on what is precisely contrasted, see the introduction to the actual comparison below). The next section will thus summarize how and to what extent we can or cannot contrast the trajectories of opposition movements in Zimbabwe and Burundi.

7.2. What we can (not) compare with respect to opposition politics in Zimbabwe and Burundi under sanctions

The context for opposition politics in Zimbabwe and Burundi differs in many respects, from its colonial legacies to the degree of centralism and the country’s economic situation. Burundi is a highly centralized nation, whose existence as a unitary state dates back to pre-colonial times. Ethno-political competition, fostered during the German and Belgium rule and exacerbated after independence, has shaped domestic contestation until the early 2000s (for an overview, see Watt 2008). The development of opposition politics beyond ethnic struggle has been inter alia hampered by a lack of organizational structures outside the capital Bujumbura. Against the backdrop of the people’s daily struggle for survival in one of the world’s poorest countries, questions of political affiliation and associational life have oftentimes taken a backseat. This is not to deny that people have engaged in political debates and activities throughout Burundi’s post independence history, but this was generally confined to a small, mostly urban elite while excluding the great majority of peasants (Laely 1997).

Zimbabwe, in contrast, was no unified state that encompassed today’s territory before the occupation by the British South Africa Company even though several highly developed trading states had previously existed there. The struggle for independence, often framed in terms of three successive Chimurengas (uprisings), namely the rebellion against the BSAC rule in the 1890s, the liberation war until 1980 and the fight against alleged neocolonial attempts to undermine Zimbabwe’s sovereignty in the 2000s, constitutes an integral component of Zimbabwe’s nation-building process (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). While ethnic undertones also affected political competition, especially between the two liberation movements ZANU and ZAPU, domestic dynamics of contention were predominantly shaped by questions of race, class and ideology (for an overview, see Mlambo 2014). These political debates and activities were
not limited to Harare. Instead, organized political life has also takes place in other urban centers such a Bulawayo as well as in rural areas. Zimbabwe's remarkable economic development and the expansion of social services, at least until the early 1990s (Bond and Manyanya 2002), created a relatively well-educated and politically conscious middle class.

Going beyond these different contexts, the sanctions regimes were also characterized by a number of differences. First, the measures against Zimbabwe and Burundi were imposed in response to different developments. In the case of Burundi, the Regional Initiative reacted to a military coup, which occurred against the backdrop of a civil war (Regional Foreign Ministers Meeting 1996). In contrast, the West adopted targeted measures against Zimbabwe in response to the regime's gross human rights violations, and the deterioration of democratic governance. More specifically, an abortive election observation mission and the regime's manifest unwillingness to enable free and fair elections triggered the decision to impose sanctions (Council of the European Union 2002b). Second, the two sanctions regimes were initiated and maintained by different main senders. While Western nations spearheaded the efforts implement restrictive measures against the Mugabe regime, their aid sanctions against Burundi played a marginal role compared to the Regional Initiative's comprehensive trade embargo. European countries and the US subsequently even denounced the regional measures against Burundi long before the East African countries decided to suspend the embargo (Bossuyt 2000). In contrast, SADC, the regional counterpart in Southern Africa, did not support the US and EU. Instead, South Africa and other countries in the region repeatedly criticized the Western approach as misguided (inter alia Graham 2006; Peters-Berries 2002).

Third, the measures imposed against Burundi and Zimbabwe differed. Burundi's regional neighbors decided to implement a comprehensive trade embargo, which entirely cut off the small, land-locked nation at first whereas Zimbabwe faced more targeted sanctions from Western governments. Fourth, the development of the sanctions regimes diverged over time. Burundi was initially confronted with comprehensive trade restrictions, which were later eased by several rounds of humanitarian exemptions. In contrast, sanctions against Zimbabwe were tightened repeatedly as new individuals and companies were added to the black lists (on the fact that targeted sanctions are more adaptable and can thus be calibrated better, see Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho 2016, 14–15). The EU measures actually reached their climax after the extremely violent 2008 elections, i.e. more than six years after their first

145 To what extent this resulted in different sanctions costs will be discussed in more detail below.
implementation. Altogether, the sanctions against Zimbabwe lasted over twelve years (2001/2002-2014) as opposed to the three-year regional embargo and aid sanctions against Burundi (1996-1999), making their duration the fifth noticeable difference.

Despite these differences, it is worthwhile to compare both cases for a number of reasons. First, both regimes were characterized by a (de facto) one party rule. In Burundi, the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA came to power in 1961 and served as an instrument to safeguard the power of three successive authoritarian rulers until 1993 (Lemarchand 1994a, 59ff). While sanctions were imposed after the return to multi-party rule in 1993, the coup that triggered their imposition in fact marked the return of former President Buyoya, who had ruled the country with the help of UPRONA in an authoritarian manner from 1987 to 1993. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF failed to formally establish a one party-state in the early 1990s, but has nevertheless de facto dominated political life ever since independence (Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991). Opposition to Mugabe, such as the one stemming from the other liberation movement ZAPU, and the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) was relatively short-lived until the MDC entered the political scene.

The prevalence of one party rule in both countries also implied that power sharing potentially constituted a substantially new approach – at least if it would have led to a ‘true’ division of access to state power (on this question, see more in section 3 below). While Zimbabwe had theoretically experienced a coalition government between the two former liberation movements ZANU and ZAPU from 1982 to 1982, its fragile ‘unity’ soon fell apart and ZANU clearly kept the upper hand (Chigora and Guzura 2011). Likewise, Buyoya had open up the system of Tutsi minority rule in 1988 by appointing an ethnically balanced cabinet and a Hutu Prime Minister, without, however, relinquishing his tight control of the state (Reyntjens 1993).

Furthermore, opposition movements in both countries were silenced in similarly brutal ways. Before the formation of the MDC, the most serious challenge to ZANU and Mugabe had arguably stemmed from the other influential liberation movement ZAPU led by Samuel Nkomo. Confronted with the more senior independence war hero Nkomo, Mugabe first excluded him from government and later crushed his regional power base during the infamous Matabeleland massacres, which cost more than 20,000 predominantly Ndebele lives during the 1980s (Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000). Large-scale (ethno-political) violence was likewise used as a means to safeguard political power in Burundi. Several massacres including the 1972 genocide, which brutally ended the ambitions of the (well-educated) Hutu to have a
say in the country’s political and economic development (inter alia Chrétien and Dupaquier 2007a; Lemarchand 2008), claimed the lives of thousands of Hutu and Tutsi. In both countries, manifestations of (ethno-) political violence have shaped – or one should better say undermined – political competition over decades.

What also unites both cases was the emergence of a relatively new opposition force before the imposition of sanctions, which posed a real challenge to the ruling elite. In Burundi, FRODEBU was formed in 1986 and then legalized as a political party five years later. FRODEBU won the 1993 elections and thereby disposed the long-ruling UPRONA, but subsequently failed to secure its rule vis-à-vis the old elite trying to unmake the change of power (Des Forges 1994). Buyoya’s take-over of power in 1996 consolidated this development, so that FRODEBU was essentially ‘back in the opposition’ against the former regime when sanctions against the putschist Buyoya government were imposed. In Zimbabwe, the MDC was founded just shortly before the 2000 parliamentary elections. Whilst the MDC has never managed to dispose Mugabe from power in a series of rigged elections, it has effectively undermined ZANU-PF’s hegemony. FRODEBU and the MDC hence faced a similar situation of challenging the long ruling, omnipresent yet weakened regime when sanctions against the Burundian and Zimbabwean government were imposed in 1996 and 2001/2002, respectively.

To what extent the impact of sanctions on FRODEBU’s and the MDC’s subsequent trajectories differed or diverged will be scrutinized in this chapter. In doing so, the focus lies on those factors that shaped opposition mobilization in both countries according to the fsQCA and that were accordingly examined in greater depth in the case studies: socio-economic deprivation as well as the messages of regime disapproval and opposition support that sanctions conveyed. As the case studies pointed to the importance of sanctions signals in both cases, but diverging developments with respect to deprivation-induced mobilization, both similarities and differences will be examined. Moreover, additional insights from the two process-tracing analyses will be factored into the comparison. In that context, one remarkable analogy deserves further analysis. Both in Zimbabwe and Burundi, the major opposition party eventually signed a power-sharing agreement. The formation of these coalition governments highlights certain aspects of the domestic sanctions debate in the two countries. The importance of the adaptation of power-sharing agreements in Zimbabwe and Burundi only became visible in the case studies and has hence not been reflected theoretically so far. The
next section will thus attempt to close this gap by discussing relevant aspects of the literature on power sharing.

7.3. Power sharing, sanctions and opposition politics

Whilst it appears dispensable to go into all details of the power-sharing literature to trace these developments, a general understanding of the concept, purpose, types and potential effects of power sharing is required. The notion of power sharing originated from Lijphart’s (1969, 1977) work on ‘consociational democracy’, in which he argues that sharing power enables divided societies to manage tensions and improve the quality of democracy. Today, power sharing is a contested concept used to describe a variety of meanings (for a summary, see Binningsbø 2013). For example, Norris (2008) analyses consensus democracy relying on broad-based and inclusive political institutions (see also Mukherjee 2006a). In a slightly different manner, Reilly (2006), Roeder (2005) and Schneckener (2002) focus on power sharing that includes ethnic or ethno-political groups in governmental decision-making whereas Walter (2002) as well as Tull and Mehler (2005) comprehend power sharing as the inclusion of former rebels in peace agreements. In spite of these differences, most approaches can be subsumed under the broad definition of power sharing as a governing system that includes various actors with conflicting interests or identities in decision making (Norris 2008).

This is not necessarily confined to the division of political power. Following the distinctions introduced by Walter (2002) as well as Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007), we can speak of political, military, territorial and economic power sharing. What does this mean for the two cases examined? Burundi’s 1998 partnership agreement between Buyoya and the major political opposition party FRODEBU facilitated by the regional embargo was a political power-sharing deal. This also applies to the 2008 Global Political Agreement between the two MDC fractions and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. More specifically, both power-sharing deals can be characterized as personalized power-sharing arrangements that distribute cabinet posts based on negotiated elite pacts (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015).

Power sharing – be it political, territorial, economic or military – has been used as an instrument to end violent conflict and to achieve (a return to) stable democracy (Binningsbø 2013). Accordingly, the two major strands of research have examined the impact of power sharing on sustainable peace (inter alia Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mukherjee 2006b; Tull and Mehler 2005; Walter 2002) and on democratization or the quality
of democracy (for example Lijphart 1977; Norris 2008). The two power-sharing agreements in question were a means to alleviate the political struggle between MDC and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe as well as between the Buyoya government and FRODEBU in Burundi. Whilst ending Burundi’s civil war was an underlying aim of all negotiations during that period, the violent conflict was primarily addressed in the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.

Lastly, the term power sharing should not conceal that fundamental structures of domination and dissent often remain untouched (Simons, Zanker, Mehler, and Tull 2013 on the local level; Spears 2002). Conceived this way, power-sharing agreements constitute one – unquestionable influential – development during a continuous power struggle rather than an ever-lasting game changer. Accordingly, one can still speak of an opposition movement/party – as the power sharing literature does – even if it has joined a coalition government in the framework of a power-sharing agreement. While this understanding may be contested in some cases146, it holds true in the case of Zimbabwe and, albeit to a lesser extent, Burundi. Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF managed to carefully inscribe its continued dominance over the state in the Global Political Agreement (inter alia Muzondidya 2013, 45–49). Instead of paving the way towards a more leveled playing field in subsequent elections, the GPA ultimately gave ZANU-PF time to sustain its grip on power. In Burundi, Buyoya eventually had to relinquish power, but this was the result of the 2000 Arusha Peace Accord and not of the 1998 partnership agreement with FRODEBU.

Taken together, the power-sharing agreements in Zimbabwe and Burundi were both personalized political agreements that served to address a political struggle rather than a violent conflict. Even though the literature on power sharing has not addressed sanctions as an intervening factor, it highlights a few aspects that merit special attention in the structured, focused comparison of opposition politics in both countries. These will be sketched in the following as to further refine the analytical grid derived from the theory chapter and the fsQCA. First, the political economy of power sharing potentially affects grievance-based opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions. Power sharing provides the former rebels – or in this case: the former opposition party – with access to the state resources, which it can

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146 For example, power sharing appears to have been more attractive to opposition actors – not least because it potentially led to more fundamental changes – in the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire, who expected to gain significant access to state power (Mehler 2009; Tull and Mehler 2005).
use to address the socio-economic grievances of its supporters. For instance, former opposition political Jean-Pierre Bemba used his control over a certain share of the government’s resources to steer them to his core constituencies (Wolters and Kaiser 2013; see also Ferrer 2012 on a similar development in the Filipino region of Mindanao). This effect should be particularly pronounced if the state receives a great share of fungible income, be it from natural resources or budget aid (Svensson 2000; Torvik 2002). Conversely, the opposition turned government member is usually held accountable for feelings of socio-economic deprivation and grievances to a larger extent than before joining a coalition government, when economic troubles could be easily blamed on the regime (for example Habib and Taylor 2001 on South Africa).

Second, power-sharing arrangements convey certain messages that may affect the signaling dimension of sanctions. Such accords seek to turn political opponents into partners (Schneckener 2002). In pointed terms, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003, 303) argue that ‘important and credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies (...) are made through the process of implementation’. Whilst power-sharing agreements oftentimes fail to overcome deeply entrenched divisions, the mere fact that contestants form part of the same government makes it difficult for the former rebels or opposition parties to continue contesting the regime’s legitimacy in a very general manner. In other words, the opposition will find it less easy to fundamentally denounce its new partner in government, not only because the two parties must find a modus operandi for working together, but also because the former incumbent agreed to dealing with differences through negotiations and non-violent bargains. However, power-sharing agreements are also based on recognizing the former opposition/rebel movement as an (equal) party to the negotiation process and thus provide these actors with unprecedented legitimacy. It goes without saying that this should have a profound impact on the way that the messages of regime disapproval and opposition support sent by sanctions affect domestic dynamics of contention.

The relationship between sanctions and power sharing is also an interesting and potentially uneasy one because their underlying logics possibly diverge to a certain extent. Power sharing is an inherently selective practice, which seeks to buy-in certain salient actors with disproportionate concessions while others might only participate inadequately (Mehler 2009). For example, Burundi’s 1998 internal partnership agreement was signed between Buyoya and FRODEBU, even though the party’s political relevance was shaky and armed rebels movements had gained in importance. In contrast, comprehensive trade restrictions that indiscriminately
target the entire economy such as the regional embargo against Burundi are less selective. However, the selective logic and practice of targeted sanctions and power sharing may also be amplified through their simultaneous application. The interplay between both instruments can create both tensions and mutually reinforcing dynamics, which will be explored in more detail below.

7.4. Comparison

In the following, the trajectory of opposition movement in Zimbabwe and Burundi against the backdrop of sanctions will be compared and contrasted. The analysis is based on the process tracing of the developments in Burundi and Zimbabwe. Accordingly, it also takes into account the propositions developed in the preceding theoretical framework, which were supported by the fsQCA and structured the subsequent process-tracing analyses. This is in addition to further insights that emerged from the in-depth case studies. In other words, deprivation- and grievance-induced mobilization and the impact of the sanctions signals will be revisited while also taking into consideration how actors depicted the issues of sanctions and whether they spoke with a unified voice – aspects that were identified as crucial in the case studies.

As the power-sharing agreements implemented in both countries potentially affected these dynamics in the ways just described, the analysis will be subdivided in two parts. The first one addresses the impact of sanctions on opposition movements before the adoption of the power-sharing agreement whereas the second one examines the developments after the formation of the coalition governments in the two countries. Nevertheless, this structure should not be mistaken for de facto establishing four cases. Despite the power-sharing agreements, power dynamics in Burundi and Zimbabwe were not fundamentally altered: The MDC and FRODEBU clearly remained marginalized in the coalition governments in the sense that could neither control the security apparatus nor key sectors of the economy (Grauvogel and Wodrig forthcoming; Raftopoulos 2013a; Welz 2013). Accordingly, their position should be conceived as ‘opposition parties (taking part in the government)’ rather than as ‘junior partners’ so that the fundamental question of how sanctions affect anti-government actors continues to be valid.

As described above, a set of standardized issues will be addressed. This generally draws on the mechanisms for opposition mobilization introduced in the theoretical chapter, but is particularly based on the fsQCA and the case studies. Following the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, anti-regime activity in Zimbabwe and Burundi under sanctions is
attributable to feelings of socio-economic deprivation and the effectiveness of signals of regime disapproval and opposition support conveyed by the sanctions. Accordingly, these two aspects, deprivation and sanctions signals, will guide the comparison. Lastly, additional aspects such as the importance of communicative linkage and political openness, which did not decisively shape opposition mobilization in the two countries according to the fsQCA, but played a role according to the case studies, will be factored into the analysis.

7.4.1. First period: Before the power-sharing agreement
Before turning to the trajectory of opposition movements in Burundi and Zimbabwe after the imposition of sanctions, the preconditions for anti-regime mobilization just prior to the implementation will be briefly sketched. Broadly speaking, the political opposition in Zimbabwe could count on unprecedented popular support whereas the political opposition in Burundi went through an extremely difficult phase, at the end of which it was no longer perceived as the key actor defending the rights of the (formerly) marginalized Hutu. FRODEBU was increasingly weakened by attempts of the military to undo its 1993 electoral victory and highly unpopular compromises with the former ruling elite (Des Forges 1994; Ould-Abdallah 2000). During the abortive 1993 coup, the democratically elected president Ndadaye and almost the entire FRODEBU leadership circle had been killed. This did not only weaken the party in terms of key figures, but also discredited the idea of a peaceful transition to power for which FRODEBU stood. In the meantime, the key rebel movements CNDD-FDD and FNL consolidated their grip on the rural territory and obtained popular credit for their armed struggle (Burihabwa 2014; Nindorera 2012).

In Zimbabwe, the situation was different. The MDC established itself as a serious challenge to Mugabe at the beginning of the new century and was responsible for his very first electoral defeat since independence in 2000 when the population turned down the government proposal for a constitutional reform, which was also rejected by the MDC. This was characterized as a litmus test for the Mugabe regime (Bond 2000; Compagnon 2000) and hence came to symbolize its decreasing popularity.

Lastly, the opposition movements in Zimbabwe and Burundi as well as their potential supporters had unevenly dense ties and communication networks to the West, which should become a key sanctions sender in both cases. In the case of Zimbabwe, the MDC as well as other regime critical actors, even small local NGOs, had well-established relations to the US and EU, from where they received tangible support (inter alia Dorman 2002; Dansereau 2003;
Sithole 2001). More generally, the well-educated and mobile Zimbabwean middle class, who constituted a greater share of the general population than in Burundi, was well-connected not only to the region but also to (selected) Western countries. In contrast, both FRODEBU and the rebel movements in Burundi generally possessed relatively weak ties to Western nations compared to the Buyoya regime (for example BDI4), and the oftentimes-illiterate rural population did not have any noticeable connections beyond the immediate neighboring countries. Taken together, these pre-sanctions developments amounted to a rather different point of departure for the major political opposition parties in Zimbabwe and Burundi during the sanctions period, while ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and the CNDD-FDD in Burundi were in a rather similar position as regards popular support.

But what happened to opposition politics after the imposition of sanctions? To reconstruct the sanctions’ impact on deprivation- and grievance-induced mobilization, their precise economic consequences must be understood at first. The types of measures imposed on Zimbabwe and Burundi provide a useful starting point. The two cases incarnate the shift from comprehensive trade restrictions towards targeted sanctions that has occurred during the 1990s in response to the former measures’ devastating humanitarian consequences and their limited effectiveness (Cortright and Lopez 2000; Tostensen and Bull 2002). Burundi was still confronted with an ‘old-fashioned’ comprehensive trade embargo when its neighboring states decided to entirely cut-off their economic relations with the small land-locked country. At the same time, international donors reduced their non-humanitarian assistance to zero. In a development that accurately mirrored the trajectory of other comprehensive trade embargos (for example Alnasrawi 2001; Cortright and Lopez 1999), humanitarian concerns later prompted the adoption of hard-to-control humanitarian exemptions, which de facto eased the sanctions’ pressure. Zimbabwe, by contrast, faced ‘modern’ targeted sanctions that focus on specific groups or a particular economic sector. In addition to financial sanctions imposed by the US, the largest share of measures consisted of blacklist-based sanctions against individuals and companies.

These differences translated into different degrees of economic costs inflicted upon the target. Burundi suffered severely from the trade restrictions, and while quantifications of the damage caused varied, no one disputed their destructive nature (Banque de la République du Burundi 1996; Bossuyt 2000; Khadiagala 2007; Mthembu-Salter 1999; Oketch and Polzer 2002). This is in stark contrast to the case of Zimbabwe, where the Western sanctions’ economic impact was
hotly debated. The comprehensive analysis of primary and secondary sources in the sixth chapter showed that the EU and US measures affected certain aspects of economic life (FDI, donor assistance, trade of precious metals) without having been the key trigger of the crises (see also Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara, and Martens 2011). Yet both cases also illustrate the difficulty to disentangle the sanctions’ economic consequences from other causes of economic turmoil. In Burundi, the consequences of the costly sanctions and the civil war are hard to disentangle (see also Banque de la République du Burundi 1998; Economist Intelligence Unit 1998). Likewise, the exacerbation of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe coincided with the implementation of EU and US measures so that one can hardly tell apart the contribution of domestic mismanagement and external sanctions to this development.

In the theory chapter, I proposed that increased socio-economic differences across certain groups and/or an overall economic downturn, which makes it more unlikely that individual value expectations are met, should lead to heightened opposition mobilization in sanctioned countries. Following the conventional wisdom of sanctions research, such developments should rather be observed in the case of costly, i.e. comprehensive sanctions (see also Allen 2008). In contrast to this expectation, however, the regime in Zimbabwe, which was ‘only’ subject to targeted measures, faced more deprivation- and grievance-related anti-government mobilization than Buyoya in Burundi.

This telling difference helps us to appreciate the micro-foundations of opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions related to their socio-economic consequences. As described in the case study on Zimbabwe in more detail, the MDC initially benefitted from sanctions because it managed to carefully integrate them – and their potential negative impact on foreign direct investment and donor aid – into the party’s ‘economic revival narrative’. In each and every manifesto and public campaign, the opposition emphasized its ability to bring back economic stability to Zimbabwe, not least by re-engaging the much needed international assistance and by restoring the confidence of potential private investors (inter alia Alexander 2000; MDC 2004, 2005, 2008). This discourse found wide-spread resonance in the population (for example Alexander and Tendi 2008; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Chingwete Ndapwadza and Muchena 2009, 39). In Burundi, deprivation- and grievance-related opposition mobilization failed to materialize even though sanctions senders and Burundian opposition politicians had voiced such expectations. Despite the sanctions’ general harsh impact on the economy, the great majority of subsistence farmers were hardly affected and Buyoya managed to shield the urban
elite from their worst effects so that they also refrained from demonstrating (Calmeyn, Musabyimana, and Reychler 2000; Daley 2007 and many interviews).

Furthermore, Burundi lacked key preconditions for the mobilization of dissent, especially organizational structures and a minimum degree of political openness. Unlike Zimbabwe, where government repression intensified rather than weakened anti-regime mobilization (Bratton and Masunungure 2007; LeBas 2006), measures such as resettling parts of the rural population into camps controlled by the army effectively undermined the population’s ability to engage in regime critical activity (inter alia Longman 1998), which in this case would have presumably meant to join the rebel movements. Instead of triggering deprivation-induced mobilization of the population at large, the sanctions’ economic effect indirectly increased the opposition’s leverage by pressuring Buyoya into compromises with FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD that he would not have accepted otherwise, as confirmed in numerous interviews with both opposition politicians and supporters of Buyoya (Buyoya 2011; BDI16; BDI25; BDI30; BDI33). In summary, the two case studies clearly show that the extent of grievance-based mobilization in regimes under sanctions is not a function of the measures’ costs, but crucially depends on their framing as well as intervening factors such as political freedom and the opposition’s organizational capacity.

The second key mechanism of how sanctions shape opposition mobilization suggested in the theoretical chapter, confirmed in the fsQCA and further explored in the case studies concerns the signaling function of sanctions. This has often been dismissed as ‘cheap talk’, but I show in the fsQCA and case studies how third-party advocacy offers encouragement that has very tangible results: Protestors interpret sanctions as a source of legitimacy for their anti-regime activity. External support thereby creates perceived opportunities to challenge the regime domestically.

What comes out clearly in the two case studies is that the precise signals convoyed by the sanctions senders are crucial in that respect. Despite a different context – a coup against the backdrop of a civil war in Burundi and political violence as well as election rigging in Zimbabwe – the two sanctions regimes fundamentally sought to achieve the same goal, namely to reverse the authoritarian rollback that occurred in both countries. In Burundi, this entailed the return to constitutional order and the re-establishment of democratic institutions such as the parliament and political parties, which had been closed and banned respectively after the
In Zimbabwe, addressing the increasingly authoritarian nature of the state boiled down to ensuring the free and fair conduct of elections. In both cases, the sanctions senders did not only criticize the undemocratic behavior of the regime (and its unconstitutional assumption of power in the case of Burundi), but also endorsed the political opposition. The EU explicitly referred to the intimidation of dissidents in its justification given for the implementation of sanctions against Zimbabwe (Council of the European Union 2002b) and subsequently tightened its measures in response to state-sponsored abuses of opposition politicians and supporters (inter alia Council of the European Union 2004, 2007). Likewise, the Regional Initiative's demand to re-legalize political parties (Regional Foreign Ministers Meeting 1996) was meant as concrete support of the major political opposition party FRODEBU.

The interviews conducted during field research clearly demonstrate that these signals of opposition support were of great importance for anti-regime forces in Zimbabwe and Burundi, as I have elaborated in more detail in the case studies. In Burundi, the regional embargo was welcomed as a crucial source of external support for FRODEBU and pressure on the regime at a time when the party struggled to survive, as confirmed by the former president Ntibantunganya inter alia (BDI26). Similarly, the MDC in Zimbabwe welcomed sanctions as a means to delegitimize the regime and incorporated them into their final push strategy consisting of external pressure and internal mobilization against the ZANU-PF government (for example, ZWE3; ZWE6).

In spite of this consistent confirmation of the importance of sanctions signals for the mobilization of regime critical actors, one key difference is worth mentioning. The sanctions signals reached different audiences due to uneven availability of communication channels between the sanctions senders and the target states’ population that I already sketched above. In the case of Burundi, the message of regime disapproval and opposition support sent by the Regional Initiative and initially also Western countries mainly gave heart to regime critical forces at the elite level. While FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD politicians referred to the sanctions as an important source of encouragement, members of local branches of NGOs that I interviewed insisted that the comprehensive trade restrictions did not affect their perception of the situation or strategies vis-à-vis the regime – except for the limited constraints in terms of the import of goods that they initially faced (BDI1; BDI13; BDI6; BDI28). In contrast, the message of

147 Besides, the Regional Initiative also sought to revive the peace process, which was more related to the civil war than the coup.
regime condemnation and opposition encouragement communicated by the Western sanctions against Zimbabwe found resonance beyond the capital Harare. While the political situation in Zimbabwe prevented me from doing research in rural areas, this can at least be confirmed for small NGOS in Bulawayo such as the Habakkuk Trust, whose employees took detailed note of the sanctions and – at least initially – saw them as an important signal that the international community would no longer tolerate the regime’s human rights abuses (ZWE31).

In addition to reflecting varying degrees of centralization of political life in Zimbabwe and Burundi, these differences in who was reached by the sanctions’ signals are attributable to a mediating factor introduced in the theoretical chapter: the communicative linkage between the sanctions sender and the targeted country’s society. This condition does not feature prominently in the fsQCA solution path that comprises Zimbabwe and Burundi, but the variation in how the sanctions’ signals were received in in the two countries in fact underlines this condition’s importance. Hence, it comes as no surprise that Zimbabwe, where the Western sanctions message trickled down to small NGOs outside the capital, is characterized by high communicative linkage with a fuzzy score of 0.97 whereas Burundi, where the sanctions signals were predominantly ‘heard’ by the regionally and internationally well-connected political elite receives one of the lowest calibrations for communicative linkage in the entire sample (0.03).

In summary, the two cases consistently confirm the importance of sanctions signals for the mobilization of domestic dissent, as they allowed the opposition movements to delegitimize the regime with reference to the reasons why the sanctions were imposed, communicated support and revealed an international audience for the regime-critical actors’ demands. A comparison of the two cases furthermore hints at important context conditions for such signals to reach the intended audience, particularly communicative linkage between the sanctions sender(s) and the target’s society. A comparison of the developments in Zimbabwe and Burundi also sheds light on the sanctions’ economic impact on opposition mobilization. It shows that not the costs of sanctions as such, but the way they are incorporated into the opposition movements’ strategy – and whether context conditions including political freedom and organizational structures allow for the mobilization of deprivation-based dissent – are crucial.
7.4.2. Second period: After the power-sharing agreement

Before delving into the analysis of how domestic contestation evolved after the signing of the power-sharing agreements, their genesis and content will be briefly sketched. Burundi’s 1998 partnership agreement was supposed to address the political deadlock between FRODEBU and Buyoya (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998a). In principle, it was therefore relatively similar to the Global Political Agreement between ZANU-PF and the two MDC fractions that dealt with the stalemate that developed in Zimbabwe after the 2008 elections (Global Political Agreement 2008). Both accords provided the basis for a coalition between the former opposition and the incumbent that should overcome the domestic impasse. What set them apart was not their goal, but rather how they materialized. The so-called ‘partenariat’ inBurundi, on the one hand, was the result of domestic negotiations, which Buyoya advanced in an attempt to sideline the regionally-led peace negotiations under the auspices of the chief facilitator Nyerere (Maundi 2003, 341). Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement, on the other hand, was brokered by South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki, whose pressure was instrumental in bringing all factions to the negotiation table (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Raftopoulos 2010).

The outcome of these different processes, however, was fairly similar. In both countries, the political opponents agreed to a deal that divided political power between the former ruling party and the major opposition. The GPA determined that Mugabe remained President, the opposition Tsvangirai became Prime Minister and the two Deputy Prime Ministers came from the MDC-T and MDC-M. Moreover, it codified that fifteen ministers would be nominated by ZANU PF, thirteen by MDC-T and three by MDC-M, albeit without specifying their portfolios (Global Political Agreement 2008, article 20). Likewise, the ‘Accord sur la plate-forme politique du régime de transition’ created the position of the Vice President of the Republic of Burundi (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998a, article 4.3), which should come from the ranks of the opposition according to the agreement between Buyoya and FRODEBU (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998c). The precise division of ministries, which was negotiated subsequently, also reflected the spirit of power sharing as minister from the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA, confidants of Buyoya and FRODEBU politicians were nominated in a balanced manner (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998d). Yet both accords could hardly conceal the profound cleavages between the parties to the agreement, so that the ‘unity’ governments’ working relationship was characterized by profound mistrust and attempts to sabotage previously agreed reforms. The obligation of all parties to the agreement to work for the lifting of sanctions became a constant
issue of contestation in that respect. Interestingly, both FRODEBU and the MDC-T committed themselves to strive for the end of sanctions imposed on their countries in the respective agreements (Bulletin Officiel du Burundi 1998a, annex; Global Political Agreement 2008, article 4) despite having previously benefitted from the international pressure – an obligation that affected opposition mobilization in the context of and with reference to sanctions, as I will show in the next sections.

**Deprivation- and grievance-induced mobilization:** The extent to which sanctions resulted in deprivation- and grievance-induced anti-regime mobilization differed significantly in Zimbabwe and Burundi both before and after the power-sharing agreement. As shown above, the regional embargo did not lead to large-scale popular unrest in Burundi, which did not change with the ‘partenariat’. Even though the new coalition government slowly began to dissolve the resettlement camps (for example Martin and Hiddleston 2006), so that the previously detained peasants enjoyed renewed freedom, structural factors inhibiting broader mobilization such as the lack of organizational structures in the rural areas prevailed (Vervisch and Titeca 2010). Simultaneously, the financial pressure on the regime, which had indirectly increased opposition leverage as it had forced the Buyoya government into certain concessions, decreased significantly. Yet, this was attributable to the combined effect of sanctions busting, adaptation measures and humanitarian exemptions and hence unrelated to the power-sharing agreement. Moreover, the Western governments’ unwillingness to uphold the aid sanctions increased after the power-sharing agreement, which was – at least on paper – ‘inclusive’ (Bossuyt 2000; Bruderlein 1998). Repeated demands by all parties to the government, including the new FRODEBU Vice-President Ntibantunganya (BDI26; BDI29) to lift the measures, contributed to this resurgence of development assistance.

Unlike in Burundi, where deprivation- and/or grievance-induced mass mobilization neither played a substantial role before nor after the implementation of the power-sharing agreement, the GPA and the subsequent inauguration of the so-called Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe affected dynamics of grievance-related mobilization. The MDC’s ability to deliver its promise to revitalize the economy, inter alia by bringing back foreign investors and development aid, was strained by a number of factors that were related to both the maintenance of Western sanctions and the power-sharing agreement. First, ZANU-PF blocked crucial reforms with reference to the MDC-T’s failure to meet its obligation under article 4 of the GPA. ZANU-PF claimed that it could not be compelled to implement key reforms as long as
the MDC-T failed on its obligation to achieve a lifting of the sanctions (ZWE4; also Masunungure and Badza 2010; Masunungure and Shumba 2012, 147; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 163; Nyakudya 2013, 172; Zondi 2013, 73). Second, the EU and US measures were quoted as the chief reason why earnings from the trade of diamonds did not appear in the official budget, as the blacklisting of mining companies allegedly necessitated clandestine trade (Rupiya 2013, 14). The resulting shadow economy allowed ZANU-PF to fund a parallel structure to the GNU and thereby undermine the MDC’s access to state resources (Mazarire 2013, 103; Raftopoulos 2013a, 20). Third, the continuation of sanctions, no matter how targeted they were, affected the MDC’s ability to realize its pre-electoral program of attracting FDI and re-engaging the international community, at least to a certain extent. Taken together, these aspects created a situation where ZANU-PF rather than the MDC was able to garner the population’s support with reference to (sanctions-related) socio-economic problems. The MDC was increasingly held accountable for the state’s performance after joining the collation government and failed to ‘prove that it could turn around the economy’ after 2008 (ZWE17).

In contrast to the literature on the political economy of power sharing cited above, according to which both the previous incumbent and the former opposition can secure their share of the state budget and redirect it to its key constituencies (Wolters and Kaiser 2013; Ferrer 2012), ZANU-PF’s and the MDC’s access to state resources in the GNU was highly unbalanced. ZANU-PF still controlled the large share of government resources, inter alia via its influence over the Federal Reserve Bank as well as key ministries (Muzondidya 2013; Welz 2010) and strategically used it to reward crucial supporters (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 52; Chingono 2010, 204; Howard-Hassmann 2010). To the extent that the MDC also established similar patronage networks, this rather discredited the party. Its vision of a ‘New Zimbabwe’ had also entailed the fight against corruption (MDC 2008; Sachikonye 2002), and the MDC was measured against this promise by the electorate (for example ZWE25).

In summary, the power-sharing agreement shaped grievance-related opposition mobilization in varying ways. In Burundi, where this aspect was of minor importance from the onset, little changed. In Zimbabwe, the MDC failed to deliver on its promise of economic recovery through ending the country’s international isolation while it was now held responsible for socio-economic problems in an unprecedented way. Rather than being an ‘objective’ result of the political economy of power sharing and sanctions, however, the MDC’s loss of popularity
resulted from a changing discourse on (the economic implications of) sanctions, which ZANU-PF increasingly controlled, as shown in the next section.

**Signals:** Power-sharing arrangements convey the message that former opponents attempt to work together as political partners. Such a highly symbolic agreement does not leave another prominent signaling device in international relations, sanctions, unaffected. In both cases, the sanctions sent strong signals of regime disapproval before the power-sharing agreement as demonstrated above. Opposition movements in Zimbabwe and Burundi consistently referred to the fact that the sanctions senders denounced the regimes’ human rights violations and their undemocratic behavior as a means to delegitimize Buyoya/Mugabe both domestically and internationally. In Zimbabwe and Burundi, the interviewees uniformly stressed that sanctions constituted a useful flag marker for highlighting the regime’s democratic misconduct. Scholars even suggest that this denial of legitimacy communicated through sanctions was the aspect that frustrated Buyoya most about the regional embargo (Mthembu-Salter 1999, 9; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 399).

With the conclusion of the power-sharing agreement, this signaling function of the sanctions can be severely undermined as power-sharing arrangements tend to confer some sort of legitimacy to the ruling party (Meredith 2013). In other words, a regionally and/or internationally supported power-sharing agreement that recognizes not only opposition but also the incumbent regime as a legitimate or at least as a crucial actor in domestic politics fundamentally contradicts the signaling dimension of sanctions if such measures are supposed to convey a message of regime disapproval. In Burundi, the inauguration of the new government based on the ‘Accord sur la plate-forme politique du régime de transition’ marked the end of two years during with Buyoya had only ruled on the basis of decrees. The accord between FRODEBU and Buyoya bestowed the latter with (constitutional) legitimacy that the justification given for the regional embargo had denied him until then. As a result, FRODEBU could no longer refer to sanctions as a constant reminder of the regime’s illegal assumption of power. Relatedly, the creation of the so-called Government of National Unity helped Mugabe to rehabilitate his reputation to a certain extent (Mapuva 2010a), which severely affected the MDC’s ability to depict the regime as the sanctioned ‘other’ (Ncube 2014). While such othering labels existed with respect to members of the ZANU-PF government, which were inter alia depicted as ‘violent thugs’ prior to the signing the GPA, they disappeared or were at least
employed less vocally after the formation of the GNU. It was for this very reason that NGOs such as RAU and the ZCTU opposed the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe (ZWE32; ZWE43).

Going beyond the issue of re-legitimating the incumbent, the signaling dimension of sanctions also lost its effectiveness because the opposition party as such, domestic anti-regime regime forces and international actors were no longer speaking with a coherent voice. Already in 1972, Doxey (1972, 535) underlined that the clarity, coherence, and credibility of the signal conveyed by sanctions crucially affects the strength of their ‘communication factor’. Following this insight and drawing on the literature on framing and the effectiveness of sanctions signals (inter alia Benford and Snow 2000; Biersteker 2012; Giumelli 2011), I suggested that sanctions signals are particularly powerful if the messages conveyed by the sanctions senders, especially through their publicly-stated goals, and those of the domestic opposition movements are consistent. This was subsequently confirmed as a key factor in the fsQCA and the case studies.

With the formation of the coalition governments, this coherency crumbled away in what was a remarkably similar development in Zimbabwe and Burundi. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Western sanctions senders were extremely skeptical as regards the GPA’s ability to bring about ‘true’ democratization and accordingly advised the MDC not to join the coalition government unless certain conditions – which eventually failed to materialize – were met (Hoekman 2013). Consequently, the EU and US maintained their restrictive measures after the inauguration of the so-called Government of National Unity even though their former ally in Zimbabwe, the MDC, publicly called for the lifting of sanctions. These inconsistencies effectively foiled all attempts to maintain a coherent sanctions narrative that would still serve to delegitimize Mugabe after the formation of the GNU. Similarly, the Regional Initiative stuck to the trade embargo against Burundi despite FRODEBU’s repeated calls for lifting the measures.

In addition to confirming the importance of a high degree of overlap between the sanctions senders’ message and goals of domestic opposition movements, the case studies drew attention to the lack of a unified domestic voice. More specifically, both cases point to disagreement within the major opposition party, among the different opposition forces and among the sanctions senders as regards the usefulness to maintain the measures after the formation of the coalition government. In Burundi, FRODEBU’s internal wing, which joined the government based on the provisions laid down in the ‘partenariat’, lobbied for the removal of sanctions. In doing so, it clearly distanced itself from the party’s external wing, which claimed that continued pressure on Buyoya in the form of the regional embargo and international aid
sanctions was still necessary as shown in the case study based on numerous interviews (see also International Crisis Group 1999a, 9). FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD likewise disagreed on whether the regional measures had lost their significance. The CNDD-FDD asked the European Union Council of Ministers to reject the removal of sanctions (IRIN 1998, 559) at a time when FRODEBU’s internal wing encouraged the international community’s re-engagement with Burundi. Lastly, there was visible dispute among the major donors and among the members of the Regional Initiative, but also between these two groups about whether the trade and aid restrictions should be maintained after the adoption of the partnership agreement (Bossuyt 2000; Bruderlein 1998; Wohlgemuth 2005, 135). Altogether, these skirmishes clearly prevented sanctions senders and domestic opposition forces from being able to still present the sanctions as a coherent signal of disapproval of the Buyoya regime after the conclusion of the 1998 power-sharing accord.

The same holds true for Zimbabwe, where the MDC-T itself, MDC-T and MDC-M, the broader range of regime critical forces as well as the European sanctions senders failed to maintain a common stance on sanctions after 2008. The MDC-T was uncertain and discordant concerning how to handle the sensitive issue of sanctions after the inauguration of the GNU; key politicians changed their position on a constant basis and many government ministers only half-heartedly supported initiatives to end the measures (see chapter 7 for more details). As in Burundi, disagreement on sanctions – while not having caused the opposition to split – made internal divisions visible (on Burundi International Crisis Group 1999b). The MDC wing headed by Arthur Mutambara, the MDC-M, was very vocal in denouncing the Western sanctions, already before but especially during the power-sharing government. In doing so, it clearly distanced itself from those within the MDC-T who still felt that the measures were useful as they performed a signaling function and constrained ZANU-PF.

In a similar manner, sanctions did not bring about, but exacerbated disunity among the civil society organizations in Zimbabwe after the formation of the coalition government. A number of organizations felt that sanctions had outlived their political utility because they were increasingly used as a scapegoat by ZANU-PF. Accordingly, they suggested that the West should lift its measures in order not to provide Mugabe with an excuse for bad governance and to free the MDC from this discursive liability (ZWE6; ZWE10; ZWE33; ZWE36). However, other organizations argued that it would be premature to suspend sanctions in the view of ZANU-PF’s continued human rights violations, as this would send the signal of approving the way
how Mugabe had maintained his grip on power through violent means during the 2008 elections (Research and Advocacy Unit 2015; ZWE33; Zimbabwe Vigil 2014). Lastly, the European sanctions sender themselves struggled to maintain a common position on the future of the sanctions as various European diplomats revealed during the interviews (see also Grauvogel and von Soest 2015). This effectively prevented them from sending a clear message to the regime, the opposition, and ultimately also to Zimbabwe’s population.

Whilst the lack of a unified voice on the issue of sanctions after the adoption of the power-sharing agreements turned the sanctions discourse against the MDC and FRODEBU, opposition movements discursively benefitted from the power-sharing agreements in one particular way. As suggested by the power-sharing literature, such an agreement does not only lend renewed credibility to the incumbent, but also recognizes the former rebels/opposition as a politically meaningful actor – a development that could also be observed in Zimbabwe and Burundi. In the case of Burundi, the Regional Initiative insisted on negotiations with all parties to the conflict, which strengthened FRODEBU and provided the CNDD-FDD as a hitherto stigmatized actor with political legitimacy (BDI32; BDI34). The ‘partenariat’ between Buyoya and FRODEBU in 1998 also constituted a source of recognition for FRODEBU at a time when rebels’ military successes increasingly marginalized the political opposition (see for example Burihabwa 2014). In the case of Zimbabwe, the international community had already recognized the MDC as the key opposition force before the GPA (Alao 2012, 104). The power-sharing agreement rather made a difference for the MDC-M: With its right to appoint one of the two Deputy Prime Ministers and three Ministers (Global Political Agreement 2008, article 20), it gained political significance that clearly exceeded its 2008 election result.

In short, the power-sharing agreements undercut the sanctions’ signaling function for two major reasons. On the one hand, they served to (re-)legitimize regimes that the sanctions had sought to discredit as unlawful, repressive and undemocratic. On the other hand, the two accords intensified disagreement among the regime critical forces and the sanctions senders on whether the external pressure was still useful. The fact that both power-sharing agreements contained a provision that forced the former opposition to work for the suspension of sanctions was particularly harmful in that respect because it left them with a

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148 Due to FRODEBU’s weak position described above, the CNDD-FDD ultimately benefitted more from subsequent power-sharing deals and the recognition that they provided for the rebel movement turned political actor, but this rather applies for the 2003 Agreement between the then government and the CNDD-FDD.
choice between the devil and the deep blue sea: MDT-T and FRODEBU could either become a true broker for the suspension of sanctions even though the measures had helped them in the past or privately ask for their continuation and thereby face the danger of being marked as dishonest in how they handle the power-sharing agreements’ obligations.

7.5. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I set out to contrast and compare the trajectories of opposition mobilization in Burundi and Zimbabwe against the backdrop of sanctions. Both cases differ with respect to many key context conditions for opposition movements and their mobilization, the type of sanctions regimes as well as the precise mechanisms how the sanctions’ economic consequences affected opposition politics. But they also offered interesting points of departure for a comparison, particularly as regards the consequences of sanctions signals for domestic contestation. Hence, I suggested relying on structured, focused comparison as a useful approach to address complex, historically contingent developments in a systematic manner by posing the same set of questions on the importance of deprivation, sanctions signals and power sharing to both cases.

Structured, focused comparison relies on a theoretically grounded framework. Consequently, I summarized the propositions made in the second chapter and insights from the fsQCA, which guided the subsequent case studies. Moreover, this chapter reviewed an additional strand of literature deemed relevant. As opposition politics in the two countries was characterized by a remarkable similarity, namely that Zimbabwe’s MDC and Burundi’s FRODEBU entered into a coalition government with the incumbent regime, the power-sharing literature was taken into account. Studies suggest that power-sharing agreements may enable the former opposition to control a significant share of the state resources, but also show that the former opposition is held accountable for the country’s socio-economic trajectory in an unprecedented way if joining a coalition government. As regards their political dimension, power-sharing agreements may lend legitimacy both to the incumbent and the opposition – a development that should clearly affect the signaling dimension of sanctions.

In the final section of this chapter, I have carried out the structured, focused comparison by asking how deprivation- and grievance-induced mobilization and the signaling impact of sanctions developed before and after the power-sharing agreements in Zimbabwe and Burundi. Contrasting both cases highlights four aspects upon which I already touched in the
case studies, but which came out much clearer in the comparison. Firstly, the extent to which the economic impact of sanctions leads to deprivation-related anti-regime activity is not the direct outcome of the sanctions’ costs, but it is shaped by how the sanctions’ economic consequences are framed and how mobilization is influenced by intervening factors such as the political system’s openness and the organizational capacity of regime critical actors. Second, opposition movements face greater risks of losing the ‘discursive’ battle about sanctions’ economic consequences if they join a coalition government and are subsequently held accountable for their country’s economic trajectory in an unprecedented way, as the case of Zimbabwe shows.

Third, sanctions signals are not ‘cheap talk’; they fundamentally shape domestic contestation by encouraging the voicing and enacting of dissent as the two very different cases of Zimbabwe and Burundi exemplify. The audiences of sanctions’ messages of regime disapproval and opposition support may vary, but even in countries characterized by a low degrees of linkage to sanctions senders such as Burundi at least the political elites appears to pick up such signals. Fourth, the two cases suggest that power-sharing agreements potentially thwart this signaling impact of sanctions for two major reasons. On the one hand they (re-)legitimize the incumbent regime, thereby undermining signals of regime disapproval conveyed by sanctions. On the other hand, the developments in Burundi and Zimbabwe illustrate how changed domestic constellations may spark debates about the continued usefulness of sanctions. If sanctions senders and domestic opposition movements then fail to speak with a coherent voice, this also endangers the signaling mechanism.
8. Conclusion: The ‘Internal Opposition Effect’ of International Sanctions

8. CONCLUSION: THE ‘INTERNAL OPPOSITION EFFECT’ OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS

With the imposition of Western restrictive measures on Russia and debates about an end of the US embargo against Cuba, the issue of sanctions has again made the headlines and once more raised the question of whether sanctions work. Going beyond this arguably very general discussion still dominating public discourse, sanctions research has analyzed under which conditions this form of external pressure has an impact. Among the aspects recurrently mentioned yet insufficiently analyzed in a systematic fashion is the role of opposition movements in the targeted countries. Domestic opposition movements can potentially act as ‘transmission belts’ by translating economic pain into the political gain (Jentleson 2000). Accordingly, Mastanduno (1999, 297–298, emphasis added) proposed to get ‘underneath the formal political structure to assess the impact of sanctions on particular domestic actors and on the relationships among the state, its supporters, and its opponents’ in his article outlining a promising research agenda on international sanctions. As little progress on this issue has been made (see also Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016a, 276), this dissertation has set out to answer the question of how and under which conditions external sanctions enable domestic opposition movements.

This conclusion will summarize the dissertation’s major results, highlight policy implications, and sketch avenues for further research. In the first section, the empirical findings as well as the theoretical and methodological contributions will be synthesized. Subsequently, the second and third sections discuss their generalizability and limits. In a next step, policy implications will be drawn. The final sections of the conclusion then venture to broaden the outlook by asking how the dissertation potentially contributes to related scholarly debates, and which questions were left open for future research.

8.1. Theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions to the study of opposition movements in regimes under sanctions

The theoretical framework is based on two strands of literature, which have mostly developed separately thus far (for an exception, see Klotz 2006). Sanctions studies, on the one hand, have increasingly taken into account the inner workings of targeted regimes. They provide evidence
that sanctions affect democratic and authoritarian regimes differently (inter alia Hart 2000; Lektzian and Souva 2007) and suggest that non-democratic regimes manage to defy sanctions through repression, cooptation and tailored legitimation strategies (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Grauvogel and von Soest 2014; Peksen and Drury 2009). What remains largely absent from this research, however, are studies that treat regime-critical actors as political forces in their own right rather than as vulnerable victims of regime survival strategies and of sanctions’ humanitarian consequences (Allen and Lektzian 2013; on the latter, see Weiss 1999). In addition, the few existing systematic analyses of anti-government activity in regimes under sanctions almost exclusively focus on the economic consequences of sanctions (Allen 2008b), thereby failing to account for the signaling dimension of external pressure on domestic contestation. Social movement theory, on the other hand, has contributed to our understanding of how outside support legitimates and motivates the domestic voicing and enacting of dissent (Klotz 2006; Kriesi 2004; McAdam and Tarrow 2000; Schock 2004). Unfortunately, external sanctions – arguably one of the most common forms of third party advocacy in the 21st century – are largely absent from this strand of research.

To address these gaps in the literature, the dissertation has developed a theoretical framework that integrates insights from both sanctions studies and social movement research. The approach developed in the second chapter sketches a grievance/deprivation-based explanation of anti-regime activity and a political opportunity approach. In addition to these two ‘conventional’ explanations of domestic contestation, a third mechanism is proposed, which delineates how sanctions signals can create perceived opportunities for the voicing of dissent. More specifically, sanctions should enable opposition movements and should thus be associated with an increase in opposition activity if: (1) their economic consequences or the regimes’ attempts to address them enhance group-related grievances and/or feelings of deprivation (hypotheses 1 and 2); (2) if regime repression leads to radicalization on the part of regime opponents and/or if opposition movements enjoy a minimum degree of political openness (hypotheses 3 and 5); and (3) if sanctions send signals of opposition support and regime disapproval that encourage anti-regime actors (hypothesis 6).

Even more importantly, and in contrast to earlier studies, the framework accounts for the interplay of these explanatory approaches. Deprivation/grievance-induced mobilization should rather occur if a minimum degree of political openness exists (hypothesis 5). While the general logic behind this is clear – the voicing of dissent requires political opportunities – another
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Dimension is crucial for the signaling dimension of sanctions to enable anti-regime actors. The sanctions’ messages of regime disapproval and opposition support should only encourage opposition mobilization if they reach the intended audiences. To shed light on this aspect in a more fine-grained manner, another conditional factor was introduced, namely communicative linkage between the targeted regimes’ society and the sender states (hypothesis 7).

These hypotheses were tested with the help of a multi-method research design. In the first step, a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of all 75 EU, UN, US and regional sanctions regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2011 was conducted in the third chapter. To account for the theoretical expectations, five conditions (sanctions signals, sanctions comprehensiveness, deprivation, political openness, and communicative linkage) were operationalized on the basis of pre-existing datasets and my own coding efforts. The fsQCA identified four configurations of conditions leading to the outcome of interest (also referred to as solution paths in the QCA language), which were summarized into three major findings. First, communicative linkages enable the voicing and enacting of dissent according to path 1 and 2, which confirms hypothesis 7. Second, sanctions induce anti-regime activity if socio-economic deprivation occurs and if the population enjoys at least a minimum degree of political freedom to express its dissatisfaction according to path 3. This corroborates the deprivation-based and political opportunity explanations of opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions (hypothesis 1 to 4), but especially their interplay suggested in hypothesis 5.

The fsQCA hence confirms Allen’s (2008) finding that external sanctions can indeed lead to an increase in antigovernment activity if the context conditions are conducive. Taking into account that we still know relatively little about the ‘internal opposition effect’ of international sanctions (Lopez and Cortright 1997, 10), this result using a different geographical as well as temporal sample and another methodological approach is insightful in itself. Some of the more detailed findings, including the importance of social linkage for external pressure to succeed (Levitsky and Way 2006, 2010) and the interplay of deprivation and political opportunity (Allen 2008b) also confirm previous research.

Lastly, the combined impact of deprivation and sanctions signaling external support for the major opposition movements’ goals was shown to result in an increase in opposition mobilization despite limited political freedom according to path 4. This interplay of deprivation and signaling was not hypothesized in the theoretical framework and thus constitutes a novel
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finding. It is particularly remarkable insofar as the signaling dimension of sanctions and their (potential) socio-economic repercussions have been mostly discussed in isolation of each other in the past. In contrast, the fsQCA result highlights the interplay of both aspects of external sanctions. It thus fundamentally calls into question the differentiation between sanctions as symbolic politics and sanctions as economic statecraft (see also Bentall 2016, 49–54 on how the three purposes of sanctions – coercing, constraining and signaling – are often pursued simultaneously) and proposes a new mechanism of how various dimensions of sanctions shape domestic contestation jointly.

In its last section, the third chapter sets a precedent for assessing the robustness of the Qualitative Comparative Analyses. Based on a systematic review of the emerging literature on the possibilities to validate QCA results, four robustness checks are applied. Specifically, (1) negligible differences between the complex, intermediate and parsimonious solution, (2) an adequate case-condition ratio, (3) almost identical solutions in the case of a more demanding raw consistency cutoff point, and (4) a higher threshold of two empirical cases all strongly confirm the results. In addition, this dissertation introduces a new and innovative approach for examining the robustness of QCA, namely to adjust the sample in theoretically meaningful ways. This test again corroborates the robustness of the analysis. Taken together, the robustness checks presented in the third chapter underscore the ability of QCA to produce very stable results in general as well as the quality of this dissertation’s findings.

In the next step, process tracing analyses of two typical cases identified in the fsQCA, Zimbabwe and Burundi, served to reconstruct the micro-foundations of the novel fourth mechanism, i.e. the interplay between sanctions signals and deprivation. Causal-process tracing (Blatter and Haverland 2012) was proposed as the adequate approach to complement a QCA in chapter 4. As argued in the methodological chapter and substantiated in the case studies, this variant of process tracing was particularly suitable because it is characterized by a clear affinity with the configurational logic that also lies at the heart of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The study of causal configurations was based on a broad understanding of causality that incorporates both materialist and ideational accounts. Such a conception proved vital for addressing how sanctions’ tangible socio-economic repercussions as well as the discourses they shape affect opposition mobilization in the targeted regimes. In short, the chapter adds to the literature on multi-method research designs by developing a framework
that integrates process tracing, structured-focused comparison and QCA in an epistemologically coherent way.

Based on substantive field research in the two countries, the findings of the fsQCA were specified in chapter 5 and 6. In Burundi (chapter 5), both the armed rebels and the political opposition felt encouraged by the sanctions’ signals as proposed in the theoretical framework and validated in the QCA. In contrast to the expectations, however, the comprehensive trade embargo’s harsh economic effects did not lead to large-scale anti-government protest for two major reasons. Firstly, the urban elite, a likely group to mobilize against Buyoya in response to the sanctions’ financial consequences, was carefully shielded from the embargo’s adverse effects whilst the great majority of subsistence farmers hardly noticed the regional trade restrictions. Secondly, forces critical of the regime lacked the organizational structures and the necessary political freedom for mobilization, not least because of the rural populations’ political marginalization. Instead, the sanctions’ financial consequences and, even more importantly, the fact that they constantly delegitimized the regime, indirectly enabled the opposition by forcing the Buyoya government into political concessions that it would not have considered otherwise (see also Grauvogel 2015).

In Zimbabwe (chapter 6), the EU and US restrictive measures likewise gave heart to the major opposition party MDC. The case of Zimbabwe again questions the simple translation of economic deprivation into political gain for the opposition. The regime-critical forces could only profit from the population’s socio-economic discontent as long as they managed to shape the domestic debate about sanctions. Until 2008, the opposition successfully integrated the sanctions into its economic revival narrative and claimed that only the MDC was capable of bringing back the much-needed international aid and foreign investment. When the MDC entered the so-called Government of National Unity in 2009, it was increasingly accused of accepting the population’s suffering to further its own political goals. Accordingly, the causal mechanism proposed in the theoretical framework, namely that economically costly sanctions instigate popular protest, must be partially adjusted on the basis of the case study. How the sanctions’ economic repercussions were framed rather than their ‘tangible’ socio-economic effect was crucial. As regards the signaling dimension, the chapter showed that the message of regime disproval conveyed by the sanctions initially enabled the opposition movement in the way suggested in the theoretical chapter. The MDC indeed referred to the sanctions as a means
to denounce the regime’s human rights violations. Yet, in the long run, the MDC lost the domestic battle about sanctions, which turned into a discursive liability.

In short, the two process-tracing analyses underscore that sanctions’ signals of regime disapproval and opposition support encourage domestic opposition movement in line with hypothesis 6 and thereby validate the fsQCA results for this solution path. In contrast, both case studies only partially confirm the deprivation/grievance-based hypotheses. Following these insights, explanations of opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions that are based on such measures’ socio-economic repercussions need to be refined. The case of Burundi suggests that costly trade embargos may indirectly empower the opposition by pressuring the government into political compromises rather than instigating large-scale anti-regime protest. In a different manner, the Zimbabwe case study highlights that sanctions – and their (alleged) economic consequences – can indeed contribute to enabling domestic opposition movements, but only as long as the opposition holds the upper hand in the domestic debate about sanctions and their socio-economic consequences.

In the third and final step of the empirical analysis, the process-tracing case studies were contrasted by means of a structured, focused comparison in chapter 7. In addition to the aspects highlighted previously, this chapter highlighted the importance of communicative linkage for sanctions signals to encourage opposition mobilization as suggested in the theoretical framework. Whilst sanctions succeeded in encouraging the broader population in Zimbabwe, where strong societal ties to the sanctions senders existed, the message of regime disapproval and opposition support only reached the well-connected political elite in Burundi. Moreover, the comparison revealed how the power-sharing agreements between the government and the opposition affected both the economic and signaling dimension of sanctions against the two countries. On the one hand, the major opposition parties were held accountable for the (sanctions-related) socio-economic difficulties after joining the government, which they had previously criticized to mobilize anti-regime sentiments. On the other hand, and even more significantly, the opposition movements could no longer refer to sanctions as a symbol of the regimes’ illegitimate nature once they had joined the government. The power-sharing agreements accordingly re-legitimized the incumbent government and thereby thwarted the sanctions’ signals of regime disapproval. The ensuing disagreement amongst opposition movements and sanctions senders over the continued political utility of sanctions after the formation of coalition governments further undermined the coherence of
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the sanctions signals. In conclusion, the fact that power-sharing agreements convey messages of regime recognition that can be diametrically opposed to the signals of regime disapproval sent by sanctions constitutes an instructive result of the comparative analysis, which adds to our understanding of how the messages conveyed by different foreign policy instruments do (not) fit together.

8.2. Generalizability of the findings

What do these findings and theoretical implications tell us about opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions in other world regions or future sanctions regimes? This question of generalization arises both with respect to the fsQCA and the case studies. In the following, both approaches’ views on generalization and the implications for the interpretation of the results will be discussed.

Whilst the QCA literature offers some reflection on the issue of generalizing results beyond the sample analyzed, its emphasis on causal complexity supports the individualization of cases rather than their generalization (Balthasar 2006; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 89). Nevertheless, QCA is also interested in what Hall and Tarrow (2001, 98) called ‘portable truths’, i.e. findings that transcend the cases at hand (Befani 2013). More specifically, QCA aims at what has been characterized as ‘modest generalizations’ (Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, and Ragin 2009, 12) that is, the formulation of (theoretical) propositions that can be tested against similar cases in the future (see also Ragin 1987, 31 on what he calls “limited historical generalization”). In other words, generalizations based on QCA are always contingent (see also Rihoux 2006). As QCA – at least as it is understood and applied here – remains an essentially case-driven method, ‘the robustness of a generalization will strongly depend on the quality of the empirical dataset constructed by the researcher’ (Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, and Ragin 2009, 12).

Two major implications arise from this. Firstly, modest and contingent generalizations can be drawn from QCA, but these should ultimately be tested against further cases. More specifically, the findings that (1) communicative linkage, (2) the combined effect of deprivation and political opportunity and (3) the interplay of deprivation and sanctions signals are related to opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions first and foremost apply to the cases that are covered by the respective solution path. However, one can expect that, for example, a similar configuration of sanctions conveying signals of regime disapproval and heightened feelings of
deprivation will lead to anti-regime mobilization in regimes other than those covered by the fsQCA. A very cursory review of the sanctions against Iran, for instance, suggests that the domestic debate about their economic consequences as well as the damage to Iran’s image they created increased the leverage for government critics (Amuzegar 1997b; Borszik and Ebert 2013). Secondly, the careful choice of the sample, the thorough calibration of the conditions, the neat conduct of the fsQCA and the fact that the analysis passed all key robustness checks enhances the validity of the findings and their theoretical implications presented above.

QCA and the type of process tracing performed here share certain underlying methodological premises and also concur in their understanding of the possibility to generalize. Process tracing predominantly serves to conduct case-based analysis so that generalization may be challenging (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 13). The kind of causal-process tracing that has guided the case studies, however, strives for what has been called ‘possibilistic generalization’ regarding the interaction of the conditions analyzed (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 82). Closely following the notion of contingent generalization, such a view on generalization pays close attention to temporal and spatial scope conditions (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 12). If process tracing uncovers causal relations that lend themselves to such contingent generalization, its explanatory power again depends on the quality of the analysis.

What does this mean for the case studies’ findings? Taking into account key scope conditions, possibilistic generalization is permissible. As Burundi and Zimbabwe were selected on the basis of the fsQCA, the findings should also hold true for the other cases that are covered by the same path, as these are characterized by the same interaction of conditions. Going beyond the universe of cases included in the QCA is more challenging. Certain context conditions – the susceptibility to external pressure, a relatively low level of socio-economic development, etc. – are characteristic for all Sub-Saharan cases included in the fsQCA, but opposition mobilization under sanctions in other world regions is potentially confronted with different parameters.

Furthermore, even sanctions scholars, who are very sympathetic to the creation of quantitative databases and analyses, have ultimately highlighted that each sanctions regime is unique (Eckert, Biersteker, and Tourinho 2016, 9). Hence, the potential to generalize from the case studies ultimately depends on the findings’ level of abstraction. The discursive battle over the sanctions’ economic consequences in Zimbabwe, for instance, was clearly shaped by particular circumstances including the debate about the structural adjustment program from the mid-
1990s onwards, the emphasis on economic self-determination being a legacy from the liberation struggle and the outstanding importance of the unresolved land question. The finding that the framing of sanctions’ economic impact rather than their ‘objective’ socio-economic consequences were crucial for the mobilization of dissent, however, transcends the case of Zimbabwe and encourages us to reconsider the debate about sanctions’ economic pain versus their political gain more generally.

Finally, the question arises as to what extent the structured-focused comparison can be generalized. Comparative work, at least to a certain extent, necessarily entails some sort of generalization (George and Bennett 2005, 113) – otherwise, contrasting two or more cases would not be feasible. Its validity again depends on the criteria already established for process tracing, that is, the consistency of available data and proposed explanations in addition to ‘the precision and completeness with which the class of cases has been defined and the degree to which the case exemplifies the class’ (George and Bennett 2005, 110). In the structured-focused comparison, the extent to which Burundi and Zimbabwe belong to the same class of cases has been carefully discussed. Their most remarkable similarity constitutes the completion of a power-sharing agreement in the midst of the sanctions regime. As a result, the finding that such agreements undermined the signaling dimension of sanctions in both countries lends itself to generalization beyond the two cases. In other countries where external actors simultaneously support regime discrediting sanctions and regime legitimizing power-sharing agreements, similar countervailing processes should be expected.

8.3. Limitations of the dissertation

In addition to the constraints concerning the generalizability of results that were discussed in the previous section, even the careful multi-method research design employed could not solve all methodological challenges and leaves certain theoretical and empirical challenges unresolved. In particular, limitations with regards to the availability of data, the operationalization of certain concepts, the methodological approach and the scope of the results will be critically reflected in this section.

Firstly, the findings of the fsQCA clearly depend on the validity of the indicators. Great care has been taken to ensure that the operationalization of the conditions appropriately reflects the underlying concepts. This included the calibration of two conditions: (1) the sanctions comprehensiveness and (2) the coherence of the sanctions signals, based on primary sources.
Nevertheless, better data would be desirable for one condition in particular, namely, communicative linkages. As detailed in chapter 3, Internet access was chosen as a proxy because potentially more suitable indicators such as educational mobility, cross-border visits or postal exchange were not available for all countries included in the sample.

Secondly, QCA has clear advantages, but also shortcomings. As described in more depth in chapter 2, the method is characterized by configurational thinking. In other words, QCA is ideal for uncovering the interplay of different conditions in producing the outcome of interest. As the hypotheses introduced in the second chapter are also configurational in nature, this approach suited the theoretical framework. Nevertheless, it must be clear that – unlike statistical analyses – QCA cannot uncover the relative importance of single conditions. In the light of the debate about sanctions symbolism versus sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft, this would be potentially insightful. Yet both the fsQCA and the case studies in fact underline the interplay of both mechanisms so that isolating their relative importance appeared less pertinent.

Thirdly, field research in authoritarian contexts such as Burundi and Zimbabwe was challenging, as discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Among the obstacles described, access to key policy makers for conducting interviews on a highly contentious issue like sanctions stood out. Interviews with the Prime Minister from the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai, or the MDC financial minister in the power-sharing government, Tendai Biti, would have been desirable. Nevertheless, research in Burundi and Zimbabwe has also shown that some of the most relevant insights can be gained in interviews with the second tier of political elites and that – regardless of whether one is able to interview each key decision maker – document analyses can hardly replace the insights gained during such elite interviews.

Finally, the results are limited in terms of their temporal and geographical scope as already sketched in the previous sections. This dissertation examines opposition mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2012, as this region is particularly susceptible to pressure from (Western) sanctions senders as well as the norms and discourses they promote. Accordingly, a geographic extension would be desirable. Having said that, limiting the analysis to the post-Cold War era and Sub-Saharan Africa also had advantages. On the one hand, the restricted time frame enabled me to examine the specific characteristics of sanctions regimes during this period in greater depth than a larger time span with more episodes would have allowed for. On the other hand, the regional restriction paved the way for fsQCA as a method
that requires a certain familiarity with the cases, which are treated in their entirety rather than being split up into variables. Put differently, the discussion of the fsQCA results based on case illustrations in chapter 3 would not have been possible without this limitation of the geographical scope.

Hence, without denying the dissertation’s limitations, the choices that informed these restrictions were based on a thorough and transparent consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical and methodological premises as well as the empirical realities. This renders the results intersubjectively accessible and allows the reader to draw his or her own informed conclusions.

8.4. Policy implications

Sanctions studies have traditionally been inclined to address real world problems as exemplified by a multiplicity of case studies that dealt with pressing practical questions (for example Doxey 1972 on Rhodesia; Cortright and Lopez 1999 on Iraq; Eriksson and Giumelli 2011 on Syria). In addition, research has fed into policy advice in several ways: One of the largest datasets was compiled under the auspices of a major US think tank (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990). Most recently, the ‘Targeted Sanctions Consortium’ has involved policy makers from the onset, thereby ensuring that policy advice did not turn into a one-way street from scholars to practitioners and developed the SanctionsApp, a smartphone application that provides real time access to the project’s findings (Eckert, Biersteker, and Tourinho 2016, 5–8).

The dissertation at hand is no exception to this rule. The finding that sanctions signals shape political contestation does not only add to the scholarly debate on sanctions symbolism, but also entails very practical implications. In the past, sanctions’ clear objectives have already been highlighted as a means to increase their effectiveness (Giumelli 2013, chapter 10; Giumelli and Ivan 2013). The fsQCA, which introduced the coherence between the major oppositions’ and the sanctions senders’ goals as a novel condition, showed that the precise justification given for the adoption of sanctions – and not only whether it is sufficiently clear – is of key importance. This underscores the need for sanctions senders to pay attention to the rationale provided for the imposition of sanctions. In the case of Zimbabwe, the EU indeed referred to the situation of protestors and the political opposition in the imposition documents. In addition, changes to the blacklists of targeted individuals and firms were supposed to
immediately reflect political developments in Zimbabwe in what has been promoted as a real-time approach (see Figure 4 in chapter 7), but EU officials failed to communicate this to the broader population. As exposed in the case study, it took them several years to realize the necessity to disseminate their reasoning within Zimbabwe (EU Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2013). Policy makers should thus invest considerable efforts to reflect on the precise justification provided for the imposition of sanctions prior to their implementation and carefully develop communication strategies to explain the imposition of restrictive measures and their extension respectively suspension once they are in place (on the latter, see also Giumelli and Ivan 2013).

In that context, the analysis also points to the importance of sender coordination (see also Boucher and Clement 2016). The relevance of multilateral sanctions has been stressed previously (Drezner 2000; Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009), but novel insights on the impact of sanctions signals further add to this policy advice. Insufficient sender coordination not only undermines the measures’ economic bite, but also the sanctioners’ ability to convey coherent signals of regime disapproval. The sanctions against Burundi constitute an instructive example. When ‘the West’ began to voice doubts about the trade restrictions’ political usefulness, the Regional Initiative found it increasingly difficult to depict sanctions as a signal that the entire international community did not tolerate the coup. In a slightly different manner, EU officials could not convincingly argue that their measures only targeted those in Zimbabwe responsible for the gross human rights violations as long as the broader US financial restrictions were maintained (see also Grauvogel and von Soest 2015).

Moreover, this dissertation underlines the need to keep open communication channels below the level of the state leadership even – or especially – at a time when sanctions are in place that aim at politically isolating a regime. Despite sanctions, exchange between Zimbabwe’s civil society on the one side and civil society of the sanctions senders (as well as their governments) on the other side has never ceased. Manifold joint events in different countries, regular exchanges, delegation visits and the like illustrate this. However, over the course of the sanctions regimes the sanctions senders’ ability to spread information to the broader population increasingly suffered in Zimbabwe – and even more so in the case of Burundi – with detrimental effects on the sanctions’ signaling dimension.
Another policy implication related to the signaling dimension of sanctions concerns the monitoring of existing sanctions regimes. While countless studies have underlined the need for better monitoring (Giumelli 2011, 150–151), it is mostly understood as a means to increase the effectiveness of travel, trade and other restrictions and to identify potential loopholes. The case of Zimbabwe, however, shows that sanctions senders should also monitor the domestic discourse on sanctions within the target state. While regime critical forces initially benefitted from the sanctions’ signals of regime disapproval, the domestic debate later shifted so decisively that the measures became a discursive liability for anti-Mugabe actors. Careful observation of the sanctions debate in Zimbabwe would have helped to readily detect these changes and could have contributed to adjusting the EU and US sanctions or at least the related communication strategy accordingly.

To complete the signaling-related policy dimension, this dissertation also highlights the necessity to strive for coherent signals across different (foreign) policy instruments. Past work has already stressed that sanctions are not imposed in a political vacuum, but are oftentimes accompanied by other strategies (Bentall 2016; Doxey 1996; Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007). Policy coordination has also become an almost inevitable buzzword in terms of sanctions studies’ practical implications (see Giumelli and Ivan 2013; Wallensteen 2016, 264–265 on the need to coordinate sanctions and other foreign policy tools such as diplomacy and the use of force), but the analysis shows its relevance with respect to the hitherto neglected interplay of sanctions and power-sharing agreements. The former tend to signal regime disapproval while the latter usually lend a certain degree of legitimacy to the incumbent regime – two signals that are clearly at odds with each other. Put differently, the parallel endorsement of a power-sharing government tends to undermine the signaling dimensions of sanctions as shown with respect to Zimbabwe and Burundi in chapter 7 and should thus be avoided or at least carefully reviewed.

However, this is easier said than done, as various actors with diverging interests, perceptions and agendas might be involved. In the case of Zimbabwe, SADC and South Africa were key in bringing about the so-called Government of National Unity in 2009 whereas the EU warned the MDC of joining it as long as certain conditions were not met (Hoekman 2013; Raftopoulos 2013b). Accordingly, the decision to maintain sanctions was consistent from an EU point of view, but the fact that the region (re-)legitimized Mugabe after he joined the GNU, whilst the EU continued to depict him as an illegitimate regime, nonetheless sent inconsistent signals. In
short, this underscores the need for coordination to convey coherent signals – not only among sanctions senders, but also among different external actors attempting to address the same crisis with different foreign policy instruments.

Going beyond the issue of sanctions signals, this dissertation also highlights the pitfalls of such measures’ economic consequences. Even though the sanctions senders attempted to only include Zimbabwean individuals and firms directly accountable for political violence in the blacklists, the resulting pariah image created repercussions for the economy at large. This clearly shows that sanctioners should strive to continue revising and improving their instruments despite significant advances already made during more than two decades of smart sanctions debates and practices (inter alia Brzoska 2001; Drezner 2011; Tostensen and Bull 2002). The secondary effects of measures that appear narrowly targeted at first sight – such as the listing of individual firms – need to be fully taken into account.

Lastly, this dissertation also helps to adequately appreciate the possibilities and limits of policy advice with regard to the issue of sanctions. Whilst the thorough discussion of the sanctions’ economic consequences for Burundi and Zimbabwe, for example, shows that it is possible to discern different degrees of economic loss inflicted upon the target, it also highlights the difficulty of drawing causal inferences that directly link certain economic developments and sanctions. In more general terms, the work asks policy makers to mistrust any oversimplified analyses that do not take the complexity and multidimensional nature of sanctions outcomes into account (see also Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016a, 274). Without further deconstructing the results, this study of opposition movements and their mobilization in regimes under sanctions has tangible repercussions for practitioners. Going beyond the issue of opposition politics in regimes under sanctions, the dissertation also touches upon related scholarly debates and opens avenues for further research, which will be presented in the final two sections of this conclusion.

8.5. Contribution to related scholarly debates

As the summary of the main results in the first section of the conclusion illustrated, this dissertation contributes to sanctions research in a variety of ways. Overall, it illuminates the micro-foundations of how sanctions affect opposition mobilization in the targeted regimes on the basis of in-depth case studies while at the same time systematically showing how the
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signaling dimension of sanctions motivates anti-regime activity (in conjunction with other conditions) on the basis of the fsQCA. In doing so, it opens the black box of external sanctions and accounts for a mechanism that has been extensively discussed yet insufficiently analyzed, i.e. what Cortright and Lopez (1997, 10) once called the ‘internal opposition effect’ of international sanctions. Going beyond sanctions studies, the dissertation also speaks to broader scholarly debates.

As noted in the second chapter, the overwhelming majority of sanctions target non-democratic regimes (see also Elliott 2016, 181). Many of these sanctions directly or indirectly seek to promote democratic governance alongside other goals (von Soest and Wahman 2015a). Consequently, this dissertation also contributes to the growing body of literature examining the so-called ‘international dimension of authoritarian rule’ (Erdmann, Bank, Hoffmann, and Richter 2013; von Soest 2015). Current scholarship analyzes how international factors fundamentally affect the persistence of non-democratic regimes (for a summary, see Art 2012). Moreover, those working on democratization have started to examine authoritarian rollbacks that undermine democracy promotion efforts (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Carothers 2009). The findings presented here add to this research by highlighting that international factors, in this case sanctions, can indeed undermine the persistence of authoritarian rule if they manage to enable opposition mobilization. Yet, the present work also sheds light on the pitfalls of democracy promotion by means of external sanctions. The inconsistent use of sanctions vis-à-vis regimes characterized by similar levels of repression and human rights violations appears to undermine their credibility of sanctions and their signaling function. More specifically, government politicians in Zimbabwe and Burundi challenged sanctions as a trustworthy indicator of the regime’s authoritarian misconduct based on the fact that comparably authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia never faced Western sanctions (see also Wallensteen 2016, 260).

The dissertation illuminates processes of anti-regime protest in authoritarian contexts, thereby adding to two further strands of research. On the one hand, the Colored Revolutions and the Arab Spring have renewed interest in the ability of mass mobilization to effectively bring down authoritarian regimes (for example Beinin and Vairel 2013; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Tucker 2007; Weyland 2012). On the other hand, the ‘normality’ of protest in non-democratic policies has received heightened attention. Online and street protests that do not challenge the regime as such are oftentimes tolerated as they provide authoritarian regimes with valuable
information on societal discontent and constitute an outlet for popular dissatisfaction (inter alia Bondes and Schucher 2014; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Tanner 2004). Protest in regimes under sanctions effectively oscillates between these two poles. This dissertation focuses on sanctions enabling or enhancing large-scale mobilization that challenges the regime in its very foundation. The process-tracing analyses reconstruct how sanctions created political leverage for the opposition in Burundi and Zimbabwe, but also how the latter ultimately failed to replace Mugabe. Yet further analysis is required as to what extent popular discontent expressed on the issue of sanctions also serves as a useful outlet for popular dissatisfaction that prevents general challenges to the regime.

Lastly, the dissertation also contributes to the growing literature on power sharing. Most studies in this field attempt to establish a causal relationship between different types of power sharing and one of the two major outcomes of interest, namely democratization or sustainable peace. Hence, power sharing is treated as an ‘independent variable’ (for example Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mukherjee 2006a; Tull and Mehler 2005). The spread of power sharing as a tool for conflict-management and democratization (Binningsbø 2013), however, renders it likely that it is employed alongside other instruments to address authoritarian rule and civil wars such as diplomatic pressure, sanctions or development aid. The comparative chapter highlights that power sharing can undermine the message of regime disapproval and opposition support conveyed by sanctions. In other words, supporting power sharing and imposing sanctions on a power-sharing government at the same time appears to send confusing signals.

8.6. Avenues for future research

Despite the comprehensiveness of this study, a number of questions remain open. In addition to the issue of expanding the geographic, and arguably also temporal scope discussed in the section on limitations, the dissertation calls attention to substantive issues that could be explored in future studies. To begin with, it would be insightful to compare the signaling dimension of sanctions to other types of signaling mechanisms in foreign policy. For example, UN targeted sanctions are employed alongside diplomatic efforts in 97 percent of the episodes (Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 30). One could contrast cases where high-ranking officials verbally condemn a certain regime with cases where these messages of regime disapproval are conveyed via sanctions (see also Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert 2016b, 20–21
on the interplay of verbal condemnation and sanctions signals). This would require identifying and potentially coding these other forms of signaling regime disapproval, and then re-running the fsQCA with an extended sample that also includes such cases.

The case studies also point to cross-border diffusion of anti-government mobilization strategies. The process-tracing analysis of Zimbabwe demonstrates how sanctions encouraged opposition activists because they drew parallels to past sanctions regimes – especially the embargo against South Africa – where such measures had helped anti-regime actors in their struggle against Apartheid. Previous research on the diffusion of anti-regime protest has pointed to the importance of such processes (Bellin 2012; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Koesel and Bunce 2013). This raises the question of whether opposition movements actively learn from each other how to encourage the imposition of external sanctions – if they deem them useful – and how to turn them into a beneficial rather than self-defeating tool once they are imposed. A cursory review of the material collected in Zimbabwe and Burundi suggests that opposition movements overrated the sanctions’ contribution to regime changes in the past and underestimated the potential of detrimental ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effects. In other words, they were more inclined to learn from past successes than from past failures, and thus overestimated their odds of success (see also Weyland 2010). To what extent this constitutes a systematic bias and how such misperceptions potentially affect opposition mobilization in regimes under sanctions remains to be examined.

The other side of the coin – the collaboration of authoritarian regimes under sanctions – also requires further analysis. The existing literature has focused on sanctions busting activities as a means to circumvent the economic constraints imposed by trade restrictions (Early 2009; McLean and Whang 2010). The case of Zimbabwe, however, suggests that strategic alliances between authoritarian regimes in the face of external sanctions tend to produce political loyalty rather than large-scale economic aid or cooperation. Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy, for example, only led to a meager US$ 6 million Chinese aid package, but China successfully protected Zimbabwe against UN sanctions (Tull 2006). Subsequently, Zimbabwe’s environmental minister visited Crimea after the Russian occupation (AllAfrica 2014) in what could be interpreted as an expression of political support in exchange for the Russia veto on mandatory Security Council sanctions against Zimbabwe. Future work could address the forms of such collaboration, their extent, and their consequences in a more systematic fashion.
Furthermore, this dissertation highlights the different mechanisms of how sanctions work, from constraining a regime financially to signaling its disapproval. While these mechanisms have been explored in depth as regards their domestic repercussions for target states in this dissertation, it remains unclear to what extent sanctions senders are aware of the sanctions’ different functions (Giumelli 2011) and whether they critically review the ‘mix’ that they employ. For example, one could ask if it was a conscious choice of the Regional Initiative to coerce the Buyoya regime into concessions via a fully-fledged trade embargo, or if the sanctions’ extremely comprehensive nature also resulted from the intention to send a particularly strong signal of disapproval to the putschist regime. Likewise, this dissertation has not examined whether the EU took the different functions of sanctions against Zimbabwe into consideration when developing its sanctions regime. To learn more about the senders’ perceptions of sanctions and to what extent they strategically craft the mix of different strategies would require more detailed interviews with and document analyses of the sender side (see Eriksson 2011). This would also provide insights into how the relevant institutions – the EU External Action Service, the respective Embassies etc. – understand and design the communication factor of sanctions.

Lastly, the issue of suspending or ending sanctions came up as a crucial, but understudied aspect during field research in Zimbabwe. To date, research has predominately focused on the implementation of sanctions and their consequences. The suspension of such measures has received little attention (Andreas 2005); only in the context of why costly sanctions are maintained despite limited success (Bonetti 1994; McGillivray and Stam 2004). As I have argued elsewhere (Grauvogel and von Soest 2015), the termination of sanctions also sends crucial signals that affect domestic dynamics of contention, but the causes, processes, and effects are still insufficiently analyzed. Notwithstanding these open questions, the combination of QCA, two process-tracing analyses and a structured-focused comparison of these cases enabled significant advances in the study of the internal opposition effect of international sanctions.
## APPENDIX

### Appendix A: Calibration of goals

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Time-frame</th>
<th>Main goal(s)</th>
<th>Opposition 1</th>
<th>Opposition 2</th>
<th>Opposition 3</th>
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Note: DM = Demilitarization, PC = Peace talks, MV = Military withdrawal, CR = Civilian rule, RC = Regional cooperation, HR = Human rights monitoring.
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### Appendix D: Calibration rules for conditions and outcome

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<th>Source</th>
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<td><strong>SANCTIONS INTENSITY</strong></td>
<td>For the intensity measure, I assess the formal strength of the measure and if a measure is implemented in conjunction with others.</td>
<td>0 = all targeted sanctions (AF, VB/TB, DS/MS)</td>
<td>Updated and extended dataset on sanctions against authoritarian regimes (Portela and von Soest 2014)</td>
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<td><strong>Formal intensity in ascending order:</strong></td>
<td>0.2 = sanctions directed towards the military (AE, IM)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1. Targeted sanctions (visa/travel bans, freezing of financial assets of individuals, diplomatic and membership sanctions)</td>
<td>0.4 = sanctions directed towards the military (AE, IM) imposed in conjunction with other targeted measures and weak aid sanctions</td>
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<td>2. Sanctions directed towards the military (arms embargo and interruption of military cooperation)</td>
<td>0.6 = aid sanctions (also if imposed in conjunction with sanctions from less intense categories)</td>
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<td>3. Aid sanctions</td>
<td>0.8 = flight bans and financial sanctions (also if imposed in conjunction with sanctions from less intense categories)</td>
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<td>4. Flight bans or financial sanctions</td>
<td>1 = commodity embargos and comprehensive trade embargos</td>
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<td>5. Commodity embargos</td>
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<td>6. Comprehensive trade embargos</td>
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<td><strong>COHERENT SIGNALS</strong></td>
<td>This condition assesses whether the goals of the sanction senders and those of the major opposition movements are contradictory or different.</td>
<td>0 = contradictory goals</td>
<td>Goals of sanctions senders: Updated and</td>
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<td>0.33 = different, but not necessarily</td>
<td>0.33 = different, but not necessarily</td>
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<td>compatible</td>
<td>The following goals of sanction senders are identified:</td>
<td>contradictory goals</td>
<td>extended dataset on sanctions against authoritarian regimes (Portela and von Soest 2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CO = restoration of the constitutional order</td>
<td>0.66 = predominantly compatible goals</td>
<td>Identification of opposition movements and their goals: own calibration based on systematic assessment of</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• DM = democratization</td>
<td>1 = same goal(s)</td>
<td>1. Hufbauer et al. dataset (2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• HR = human rights support</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Africa Yearbooks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• NR = fight against narcotics</td>
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<td>3. Country specific literature</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NW = end or reduce nuclear proliferation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• PC = termination of armed conflict and/or the establishment of peace agreements</td>
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<td>• TR = fight against terrorism</td>
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<td>The following goals of opposition movements are identified</td>
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<td>• DM = democratization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• CO = restoration of the constitutional order</td>
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<td>• CR = control over recourses</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• HR = human rights support</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• MV = military victory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• PC = termination of armed conflict and/or the establishment of peace agreements</td>
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<td>• P = policy change</td>
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<td>• RC = regime change (RC)</td>
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<td>COMMUNICATIVE LINKAGE</td>
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<td>Internet access per 100 inhabitants (World Bank Development Indicators)</td>
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<td>This is operationalized as the average internet access per 1000 inhabitants 1995-2005. (This time span rather than the internet</td>
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<td>ACCESS</td>
<td>access during the sanctioned period is used because otherwise there would be a bias of greater linkage for the more recent cases, as internet access generally and disproportionately expanded over time.</td>
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<td>ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION</td>
<td>Deprivation is operationalized on the basis of GDP growth rather than GDP per capita as this reflects the overall development of the economy and feelings of deprivation may also occur if a comparable rich economy experiences a crisis</td>
<td>1 = 7</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Indicators</td>
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<td>0.5 = 3.2</td>
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<td>Authoritarian Regime Dataset (Wahman et al. 2013)</td>
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<td>OUTCOME</td>
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<td>0 = -1000</td>
<td>Cross-National Time Series Data Archive (2013)</td>
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<td>Comparison between average of entire period and average of sanctioned period (to rule of bias due to more likely protest culture in general)</td>
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Appendix E: Questionnaire Burundi

Informations professionnelles
- Parcours professionnel : Emplois actuel et antérieurs
- Affiliations politiques
- Le cas échéant : description de l’organisation

Les sanctions
1) Imposition
- Pourquoi est-ce que les pays de la sous-région et le bailleur du fonds on imposé l’embargo sur Burundi en 1996 ?
- Quels types de sanctions ont été imposées selon votre connaissance, et pourquoi ?
  - (De quelle manière) est-ce que ces mesures ont changé ?
- Comment est-ce que vous décriviez les objectifs principaux des pays qu’ont imposés les sanctions à court/longue terme ? Y avait-il des objectifs cachés ?
  - (De quelle manière) est-ce que ces objectifs ont changé ?
- Comment est-ce que vous caractérisiez la décision de réaliser l’embargo, plutôt spontané ou bien planifié ?
- Avez-vous approuvez l’imposition de sanctions ? Pourquoi ?
  - (De quelle manière) est-ce que vous avez changé cette évaluation ?

2) Relations avec la communauté internationale après l’imposition
- (Comment) est-ce que l’imposition de sanctions a changé les relations du Burundi avec les organisations internationale et régionales/ les bailleurs du fonds / les pays de la (sous-)région/les autres partenaires ?
  - Si applicable : Différenciation entre les gouvernements et relation d’oppositions à ces acteurs
  - (De quelle manière) est-ce que les relations ont changé ?
- Comment) est-ce que Burundi a réagit vis-à-vis les organisations internationale et régionales/ les bailleurs du fonds / les pays de la région/les autres partenaires ?
  - Si applicable : Différenciation entre les gouvernements et relation d’oppositions à ces acteurs
  - (De quelle manière) est-ce que les réactions ont changé ?
- (Comment) est-ce que l’embargo a changé la perception des médiateurs régionaux et internationaux ?

3) Les effets domestiques de sanctions
- Conséquences immédiates pour le parti/groupement politique/organisation ?
  - (Comment est-ce) les sanctions ont changé la situation économique pour votre parti/groupement politique/organisation ?
  - Est-ce qu’il a aussi changé vos stratégies et demandes politiques etc. ?
    Est-ce que vous avez essayé d’utiliser l’embargo pour vos objectifs / buts, et comment ?
- Les conséquences économiques
  - (De quelle manière) est-ce que sanctions ont affectés l’économie ?
- Est-ce que certains groupes ont été touchés plus / moins grave ? Lesquels ?
- (Comment) est-ce que les sanctions ont changé les politiques économiques du gouvernement ?

• Les conséquences politiques
  - Comment est-ce que les sanctions ont changé la relation du gouvernement avec l’opposition politique/ la rébellion/ la société civile / la population dans son ensemble ?
  - Comment est-ce que les sanctions ont changé la relation de l’opposition politique/la rébellion avec le gouvernement / la société civile/ la population dans son ensemble ?
  - (Comment) ont-ils changé les relations entre le gouvernement au pouvoir / l’opposition politique/ la rébellion ?
    o Est-ce qu’il y avait de l’accord ou des discussions comment réagir au niveau national et/ou international ?

• Le processus de paix
  - Comment est-ce que les sanctions ont changé la relation de pouvoir entre le régime de Buyoya, FRODEBU, les autres partis des forces pour le changement démocratique et CNDD par rapport aux négociations de paix/ aux élections domestiques ?

• Selon votre perception, ce que pensaient les citoyens de sanctions ?
  - Comment est-ce qu’ils ont perçues les conséquences économiques ?
  - Est-ce qu’ils ont pensé que les mesures étaient (politiquement) justifiées ? Pourquoi (pas) ?
  - Qui / quoi a influencé leur perception ?
  - (Comment) est-ce que l’embargo a changé la perception/acceptation du gouvernement de Buyoya/ de l’opposition politique/ de la rébellion ?

• (Comment) est-ce que le gouvernement / l’opposition politique/ la rébellion/ la société civile communiquer sur la question des sanctions au pays ?
  - Quels étaient les messages principaux ?
  - Qui étaient les auditoires clés de ces discours ?
  - Est-ce-que les discours ont changé, en si oui en réponse auxquels événements ou développements ?

4) Levée des sanctions partielles en Juin 1998 et totale en 1999 : Que diriez vous...
  - Quels étaient les raisons pour lever l’embargo partiellement en 1998 et complément en 1999 ? Est-ce qu’il y avait des événements décisifs ?
  - (Comment) est-ce que la levée de l’embargo a changé la relation du gouvernement de Buyoya avec l’opposition et la rébellion ?
  - Est-ce que vous pensiez que la levée était justifiée ? Pourquoi (pas) ?

5) Est-ce vous aimer ajouter quelque chose important concernant l’embargo ou le travail du gouvernant/dans l’opposition que je n’ai pas demandé ?
Appendix F: Interview guide Zimbabwe

Professional background

- Career: current and prior positions
- Political affiliation
- If applicable: description of the organization

Sanctions

1) Imposition of sanctions

- Why were sanctions imposed? What were the main long-term developments and short-term triggers?
- Which types of sanctions were imposed, and why were these forms of sanctions imposed?
  - (In which ways) have these measures changed over time?
- How would you describe the process of imposing sanctions (spontaneous, well planned, etc.)?
- What do you think were the main goals according to the sanctions sender? Were there other hidden goals?
  - (In which ways) have these goals changed over time?
- Did you approve or disapprove of the imposition of sanctions? Why?
  - (In which ways) have you changed this assessment?

2) Relationship with the international community

- (How) has the imposition of sanctions affected Zimbabwe’s relation with the sanctions senders/ international and regional organizations/ donors/ countries in the region/other key actors?
  - If applicable: Differentiation between government’s and opposition’s relation to these actors
  - (In which ways) have these relations changed over time?
- What were the main reactions of Zimbabwe vis-à-vis international and regional organizations/donors/ countries in the region/ other key actors?
  - If applicable: Differentiation between government’s and opposition’s response to these actors
  - (In which ways) have these reactions changed over time?

3) Domestic effects of sanctions

- Impact on the respective party/organization/government of the interviewee?
  - (In which ways) have sanctions affected your party/ organization/ government economically?
  - Have they also changed your political strategies, demands etc.? And if so, in which ways?
- Economic consequences
  - (In which ways) have sanctions affected the country’s economy?
- Were certain groups affected most/least severe? Which ones?
- (How) have the sanctions changed the government’s economic policies?

**Political consequences**
- (How) have sanctions changed the government’s relationship to the opposition/civil society/the population as a whole?
- (How) have sanctions changed the opposition’s relationship to the government/civil society/the population as a whole?
- (How) have they changed the relations among the ruling government/the opposition?
  - Has there been (dis-) agreement how to respond to the sanctions domestically and/or internationally?

**According to your assessment, what do citizens think about sanctions?**
- How do they perceive economic consequences?
- Do they think they are (politically) justified? Why (not)?
- Who/what has shaped their perception?
- (How) have the sanctions affected the popularity/legitimacy/perception of the government/the opposition?

**(How) have the government/the opposition/civil society communicated on the issue of sanctions domestically?**
- What were the main messages?
- Who were the audiences of these discourses?
- Has this changed, and if so, in response to which events/developments?

4) **(Partial) suspension of sanctions**
- Why were the sanctions (partially) suspended?
- (How) has the (partial) suspension of the sanctions affected the domestic political struggle?
- Do you that that the (partial) suspension was justified, and why (not)?

5) Is there anything what would you would like to add regarding sanctions and the work of your organization/party/government?
### Appendix G: Interviewees Burundi

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<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helge Hartmann: Pastor in Muramvya from November 1997 to January 1999&lt;sup&gt;149&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>31 July 2013</td>
<td>Germany (via Skype)</td>
<td>BDI1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alois Misago: Lecturer at the University of Burundi, editorial journalist at the Burundi-Bureau (Burundi Office) from 1996 to 1999</td>
<td>9 August 2013</td>
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<td>BDI2</td>
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<td>Albert Mbonerane: Ambassador to Germany from 1993 to 1997; member of the Burundi-Büro from 1997 to 1999</td>
<td>10 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Former employee of the German embassy</td>
<td>11 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie Ngendahayo: Minister of communications and government spokesman 1993; worked for the FRODEBU in exile from 1995 to 1998</td>
<td>12 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bosco Nintunze: Priest and secretary-general of Caritas; worked as economist for the Bujumbura diocese during the embargo</td>
<td>12 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astère Girukwigomba: Member of UPRONA’s executive committee and finance minister from January 1998 to 1999</td>
<td>13 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Claude Kavumbagu: Journalist and head of Net Press news agency</td>
<td>14 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melchior Mukuri: Professor of political science at the Université du Burundi</td>
<td>14 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sébastien Ntahuga: Former ambassador to Germany and France, diplomatic advisor to President Buyoya from 1996 to 2003, and member of the sub-commission on democracy and governance during the Arusha negotiations</td>
<td>14 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Salathiel Mununutwiwe: Professor of political science at the Université du Burundi</td>
<td>16 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Ndayisaba: Professor of political science at the Université du Burundi, Minister of basic education and alphabetization from 1997 to 1998</td>
<td>16 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI12</td>
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<sup>149</sup> Except for the interviewees whose identity is not disclosed here, all other interview partners waived their anonymity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clergyman</th>
<th>17 August 2013</th>
<th>Ngozi</th>
<th>BDI13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean Rigi: Director of Protocol of the State from 1996 to 1999</td>
<td>19 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira: First vice president of Burundi from 11 June 1998 to 1 November 2001</td>
<td>19 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emile Mviron: Deputy of the Assemblé Nationale from 1998 to 2005</td>
<td>19 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert Midende: Rector of the Université du Burundi from 1996 to 2001</td>
<td>20 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoit Ndorimana: Administrative general director of the SOGEAR insurance company</td>
<td>20 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Nyamoya: Economist and independent consultant</td>
<td>20 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundian businessman</td>
<td>21 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Léonidas Nijimbere: Former colonel and principal advisor to the president for military issues from 1996 to 2003</td>
<td>21 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Nduwimana: Employee at UNDP during the embargo</td>
<td>22 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anshaire Nikoyagize: President of the school club of Burundi’s first human rights organization, ITEKA</td>
<td>22 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeon Baurumwete: Lecturer for political science at the University of Burundi</td>
<td>25 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvestre Ntibantunganya: President of the Republic of Burundi from 1994 to 1996</td>
<td>26 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundian historian</td>
<td>27 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Joseph Nyandwi: Burundian NGO Conseil pour l’Education et le Développement (COPED)</td>
<td>27 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustin Nzobwama: Secretary-general of FRODEBU from 1995 to 1999</td>
<td>28 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprien Mbonimpa: Minister for foreign affairs from 1987 to 1992, advisor to the Ministry for the Peace Process and government spokesperson for peace and security questions during the Arusha</td>
<td>30 August 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations from 1996 to 2001</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grégoire Banyiyezako: Governor of la Banque de la République du Burundi during the embargo</td>
<td>2 September 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exiled CNDD-FDD activist during the time of the embargo</td>
<td>2 September 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donatien Bihute: President of the Chamber of Commerce from 1988 to 1997</td>
<td>2 September 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jérôme Ndiho: Spokesperson of the CDNN until 2010</td>
<td>2 September 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cécile Nsabinama: Student at the Université du Burundi during the embargo</td>
<td>3 September 2013</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>BDI35</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Appendix H: Interviewees Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of an international NGO</td>
<td>14 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European diplomat</td>
<td>15 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itai Zimunya: Former vice president of the national students union in</td>
<td>17 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher and Policy Advisor</td>
<td>17 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasu Patel: Professor at the University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>17 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussion 1</td>
<td>18 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE_FG1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussion 2</td>
<td>18 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE_FG2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eldred Masunungure: Director of the Mass Public Opinion Institute</td>
<td>20 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European ambassador</td>
<td>20 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading ZCTU figure</td>
<td>20 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Kanyenze: Director of the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ)</td>
<td>20 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kurebwa: Commissioner at the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) and Senior Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>21 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovemore Madhuka: Chairman of National Constitutional Assembly</td>
<td>21 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western ambassador</td>
<td>21 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussion 3</td>
<td>22 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE_FG3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance journalist</td>
<td>23 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibson Nyikadzino: Former information officer at the ZANU-PF headquarters</td>
<td>23 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance journalist writing for ‘The Herald’ and independent newspapers</td>
<td>23 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnabas Thondhlana: Editor of the</td>
<td>23 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>independent newspaper ‘The Observer’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program coordinator of an international NGO</td>
<td>23 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Mutsvangwa: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>24 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior economic analyst at the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>27 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas T. Mwonzora: Former spokesperson of the MDC</td>
<td>27 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of the office of an international NGO</td>
<td>28 January 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance journalist</td>
<td>11 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibson Chigumira: Director of the Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU)</td>
<td>11 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity Manyeruke: Former chairperson of the Political and Administrative Studies Department at the University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>12 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC MP</td>
<td>12 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist at the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries</td>
<td>13 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddie Cross: Founding member of the MDC, designated Minister of State Enterprise and Parastatals in 2009 (but later dropped from the cabinet list), MP</td>
<td>17 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>ZWE30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumisani Nkomo</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer of the Habakkuk Trust</td>
<td>17 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee at the Bulawayo regional office</td>
<td>of the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions (ZCTU)</td>
<td>17 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodrick Fayayo</td>
<td>Director of Bulawayo Progressive Residents</td>
<td>17 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Coltart</td>
<td>Founding member of the MDC and Minister for Education, Sports, Arts and Culture (2009-2013)</td>
<td>18 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Nkomo</td>
<td>Former MDC Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, founding member of MDC-Renewal</td>
<td>18 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mmeli Dube</td>
<td>Acting director of Bulawayo Agenda</td>
<td>18 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Moyo</td>
<td>Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office (2009-2010), Minister of State Enterprise and Parastatals (2010-2013)</td>
<td>20 November 2014</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee at tour operator in Victoria Falls</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 November 2014</td>
<td>Victoria Falls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Mutumbara</td>
<td>President of the MDC-T, Deputy Prime Minister (2009-2013)</td>
<td>25 November 2014</td>
<td>Via phone from Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Chimanihire</td>
<td>Lecturer at the Political and Administrative Studies Department at the University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>25 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kudakwashe Chitsike</td>
<td>Executive director of the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU)</td>
<td>28 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Reeler</td>
<td>Analyst at the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU)</td>
<td>28 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibson Chigumira: Director of the Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU)</td>
<td>28 November 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>ZWE44</td>
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</table>
Appendix I: Coding scheme

Domestic assessment of sanctions' socio-economic impact

No negative socio-economic impact

War

Mismanagement & corruption

Parallel to sanctions

Preceding sanctions

ZWE: ESAP

Other reasons for economic crises

Adaptation

Other trading partners

Different goods

Domestic assessment of sanctions' socio-economic impact

Negative socio-economic impact

Comprehensive sanctions

Population affected

Humanitarian crises

Reduction of/ no international aid

Foreign exchange shortage

Decrease in FDI

Key industries

ZWE: Mining

BDI: Agriculture

Indiscriminate

Economy affected

Ordinary people = main victims

Political opponents singled out

Elite benefitted from sanctions

And/or: Elite shielded from adverse effects

Discriminate

Other trading partners

Different goods

Individual black-list based measures

Adaptation

War

Mismanagement & corruption

Parallel to sanctions

Preceding sanctions

ZWE: ESAP

Other reasons for economic crises
Domestic perception of sanctions (signals)

Justified response

- Flag marker for government misconduct
  - Human rights violations
  - Political violence
  - Election rigging
  - Unified voice of international community

- International scrutiny
  - Expansion of measures in response to new wrongs
  - Suspension after advances

- Other opposition movements supported in the past
  - ANC in South Africa
  - Similarly authoritarian regimes not sanctioned
  - Similar misconduct not sanctioned in the past

- Unequal standards
  - Regime change
  - ZWE: Punishment for land reform

- Hidden agenda
  - Only UN should impose sanctions
  - ZWE: Region must support sanctions

- ‘Wrong’ sanctions senders
  - ZWE: Anti-sanctions petition
  - BDI: Solidarity fund & CODIES

- Population rejected measures
  - Suspension dubious
  - Out of economic self-interest
REFERENCES


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References


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References


References


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References


References


References


References


References


References


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SHORT SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION

External sanctions are one of the most commonly used foreign policy tools to confront states’ undesired behavior and to support democracy as well as human rights. The literature has recurrently identified the impact of sanctions on domestic opposition movements as crucial for such measures’ effectiveness. Yet, sanctions research still lacks a detailed understanding of the processes leading to the so-called internal opposition effect of international sanctions. Accordingly, this dissertation examines how and under which conditions domestic opposition is enabled by external sanctions.

To address this question, a theoretical framework that integrates insights from two strands of literature that have not been systematically brought together thus far, sanctions research and social movement theory, is developed. In addition to traditional deprivation-based and political opportunity approaches for studying domestic contestation, it highlights how sanctions’ signals of regime disapproval and opposition support create perceived opportunities for the voicing of dissent, particularly if communicative linkages between the sanctions senders and the targeted states’ societies exist. In contrast to earlier studies, the hypotheses delineate the interplay of these explanatory approaches instead of understanding them as competitive.

Empirically, the dissertation employs a multi-method research design that integrates fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), process tracing and structured, focused comparison in an epistemologically coherent way. First, an fsQCA is conducted on the basis of a comprehensive database that covers all 75 EU, US, UN and regional sanctions regimes imposed on Sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2012. Four combinations of conditions that lead to an increase in anti-government activity in regimes under sanctions are identified. In addition to confirming previous knowledge about the importance of deprivation, linkage, and a minimum degree of political openness for anti-regime mobilization, a novel mechanism highlighting the interplay of sanctions’ socio-economic consequences and signals is identified. The analysis passes five fundamental robustness checks.

Second, two process-tracing analyses serve to reconstruct the causal mechanisms behind the novel configuration, which inter alia explains the trajectory of the opposition movements in Burundi and Zimbabwe according to the fsQCA. The case studies are based on a total of 79 elite interviews conducted during field research in both countries and additional document analyses. The case of Burundi confirms that signals of regime disapproval encourage anti-
regime actors domestically. However, sanctions failed to instigate popular mobilization through the creation of socio-economic hardship because regime-critical forces lacked organizational capacities and key constituencies were shielded from the embargo’s adverse financial consequences. The Zimbabwe case study also shows that the sanctions’ signals of support for protestors and the major opposition party MDC motivated regime-critical actors. As regards the deprivation-based explanation, how the opposition framed the sanctions’ socio-economic repercussions rather than their ‘tangible’ effects appear to be the crucial mechanism.

Third, the two case studies are contrasted through a structured, focused comparison, which demonstrates how the power-sharing agreements signed both in Zimbabwe and Burundi affected the sanctions’ signaling dimension. Most importantly, power-sharing agreements (re-)legitimize the incumbent regime and thereby undermined the signals of regime disapproval conveyed by sanctions. Moreover, sanctions succeeded in encouraging the broader population in Zimbabwe, where strong societal ties to the sanctions senders exist, whereas the message of regime disapproval and opposition support only reached the well-connected political elite in Burundi.

The dissertation concludes by critically reflecting its limits and the findings’ generalizability. Finally, policy implications are sketched. To convey coherent signals, coordination among sanctions senders as well as between different foreign policy instruments and monitoring the domestic sanctions discourse within the targeted regime are of key importance.
Kurzzusammenfassung der Dissertation

**KURZZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER DISSERTATION**


Drittens werden die beiden Fallstudien auf der Grundlage eines strukturiert-fokussierenden Vergleichs kontrastiert. Dieser zeigt, wie Machtteilungsabkommen in beiden Ländern die Signalwirkung der Sanktionen unterminierten. Solche Abkommen legitimieren das herrschende Regime und konterkarieren so die durch Sanktionen gesendeten Signale der Missbilligung. Außerdem zeigt der Vergleich, dass die Sanktionssignale nur in Simbabwe die breitere Bevölkerung erreichten, da enge soziale Bedingungen und Kommunikationskanäle zu den Sanktionssendern existierten, während in Burundi lediglich die gut vernetzte politische Elite erreicht wurde.

Die Zusammenfassung reflektiert Grenzen der Forschungserkenntnisse und die Generalisierbarkeit der Ergebnisse kritisch. Abschließend werden Politikempfehlungen skizziert. Um kohärente Sanktionssignale zu senden, sind die Koordination verschiedener Sanktionssender, die Abstimmung zwischen verschiedenen Politikinstrumenten sowie ein genaues Monitoring der Sanktionsdebatte im Zielland entscheidend.


