

The Survival Politics of Three Tai Nüa Polities
in the Upper Mekong Basin during the
eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries: A Study
of Relations between Mainland Southeast Asia
and China

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Abbreviations and Symbols

APAC	The British Library: Asia, Pacific, and African Collections
BCE	Before the Common Era
BMFAO	British Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office
BYZ	[The Chronicle of Baiyi] (<i>Baiyi zhuan</i> 《百夷傳》)
CCP	Communist Party of China
CE	Common Era
Ch.	Chinese (中文)
CMC	[The Chiang Mai Chronicle] (<i>Tamnan phün müang Chiang Mai</i> ตำนานพื้นเมืองเชียงใหม่)
CPPCC	The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (<i>Zhongguo renmin zhengshi xieshang huiyi</i> 中國人民政治協商會議)
CS	Chulasakarat (“Little Era” = Common Era minus 638). Era widely used in Mainland Southeast Asia including many Tai ethnic groups.
CTSC	The Kengtung (Chiang Tung) State Chronicle
DNZL	[The Brief Gazetteer of Southern Yunnan] (<i>Diannan zhilue</i> 《滇南志略》)
DYLNZ	[The History of Yunnan over the years] (<i>Dianyun linian zhuan</i> 《滇雲歷年傳》)
<i>Gaitu guiliu</i>	The policy of abolishing the rule of local <i>tusi</i> (土司) and replacing (<i>gai</i> 改) them with “mainstream” (<i>liu</i> 流) direct administration. The replacement of native officials with rotating officials (<i>liuguan</i>); pinyin: <i>Gaitu guiliu</i> 改土歸流
GJDC	[The Classical Ancient Manuscripts of the Gengma Dai Peoples] (<i>Gengma Daizu lishi guji diancang</i> 《耿馬傣族歷史古籍典藏》)
GMGJBM	[A Synopsis of Dai Old Manuscripts in Gengma County of Yunnan, China] (<i>Zhongguo Yunnan Gengma Daiwen guji bianmu</i> 《中國雲南耿馬傣文古籍編目》)
GMLSDC	[The Data of the Social History of the Dai Peoples in Yunnan Province — Gengma District] (<i>Yunnan sheng Daizu shehui lishi diaocha cailiao — Gengma diqu</i> 《雲南省傣族社會歷史調查材料—耿馬地區》)
GMXZ	[Local Gazetteer of the Autonomous County of Gengma Dai and Wa Peoples] (<i>Gengma Daizu Wazu zizhixian xianzhi</i> 《耿馬傣族佯族自治縣縣志》)

- GXYNTZG [Draft of a Gazetteer of Yunnan in the Guangxu period] (Guangxu Yunnan tongzhi gao 《光緒雲南通志稿》)
- GZZP [Imperial edicts with vermillion notes] (*Zhupi Yuzhi* 《朱批諭旨》)
- Jimi The *Jimi* system was a model of indirect rule under loose-control administrative units (*Jimi fuzhou zhi* 羈縻府州制)
- JGTSSX [Jinggu *tusi* Genealogy] (*Jinggu tusi shixi* 《景谷土司世系》)
- JGXZ [Local Gazetteer of Autonomous County of Jinggu Dai and Yi peoples] (*Jinggu Daizu Yizu zizhi xian xianzhi* 《景穀傣族彝族自治州縣縣誌》)
- JTSC The Pādæng Chronicle and the Jengtung State Chronicle Translated. Ann Arbor: Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies.
- KMT Kuomintang of China
- MLCL1 “Moeng Laem Chronicle” (*Lik Phuen Chao Hò Kham Moeng Laem*), That is a Lik script version 1, the so-called: ลีคพื้นเจ้าหอคำเมืองแลม in Thai.
- MLCL2 “Moeng Laem Chronicle” (*Lik Phuen Moeng Moeng Laem*). That is a Lik script version 2, the so-called: ลีคพื้นเมือง เมืองแลม in Thai.
- MLCT 1 “Forces of Moeng Laem” (*Chüe Khlang (kamlang) Möeng Laem*). That is a Tham manuscript, the so-called: ชื่อคลัง (กำลัง) เมืองแลม in Thai.
- MLCT 2 “The Chronicle of Moeng Laem Royal Family” (*Moeng Laem Luang Hò Kham*). That is a Tham manuscript, the so-called: เมืองแลมหลวงหอคำ in Thai.
- MLGK [An overview of the Menglian Dai, Lahu, and Wa Autonomous County] (*Menglian Daizu Lahuzu Wazu zizhixian gaikuang* 《孟連傣族拉祜族佤族自治州縣概況》)
- MLXFS [History of the Menglian Pacification Commission] (*Menglian xuanfu shi* 《孟連宣撫史》)
- MLXZ [Local Gazetteer of the Autonomous County of the Menglian Dai and Lahu and Wa peoples] (*Menglian Daizu Lahuzu Wazu zizhixian xianzhi* 《孟連傣族拉祜族佤族自治州縣縣誌》)
- MLXZ 1978 - 2010 [Local Gazetteer of the Autonomous County of the Menglian Dai and Lahu and Wa peoples 1978–2010] (*Menglian Daizu Lahuzu Wazu zizhixian xianzhi* 《孟連傣族拉祜族佤族自治州縣縣誌 1978–2010》)
- MS [The History of the Ming Dynasty] (Mingshi 《明史》)
- MSL [Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty] (Ming shi lu 《明實錄》)
- PEFZXZ [A Selection of the Local Gazetteer of Pu’er Prefecture of the Qing period with Annotations] (*Qingdai Pu’er fuzhi xuanzhu* 《清代普洱府誌選注》)

PRC	People' s Republic of China
QSL	Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty (<i>Qing shi lu</i> 《清實錄》)
QSG	Draft of History of the Qing Dynasty (<i>Qing shi gao</i> 《清史稿》)
ROC	The Republic of China (specifically, mainland China in the period 1912–1949)
SMNJ	[Compilation Committee of Local History of Simao Prefecture] (<i>Simao Nianjian</i> 《思茅年鑒》)
Th.	Modern Thai
TGDB	[Stub-books of <i>tuguan</i> • The aboriginal commissions of Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture] (<i>Tuguan dibo Weiyuan Zhou zhizhou</i> 《土官底薄威遠州知州》)
TQDZ	[A treatise on Yunnan of the Tianqi period] (<i>[Tianqi] Dianzhi</i> 《[天啟]滇志》)
WJSL	[Historical Sources of the Late Qing China's Diplomacy] (<i>Qingji waijiao shiliao</i> 《清季外交史料》)
WR	Warry's Report
WY TZ	[The Annotation of Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture Gazetteer] (<i>Wei Yuan tingzhi xuanzhu</i> 《威遠廳志選注》)
XZYNTZ	[New Compilation of Gazetteer of Yunnan] (<i>Xinzuan Yunnan tongzhi</i> 《新纂雲南通志》)
YNTZ	[Gazetteer of Yunnan] (<i>Yunnan tongzhi</i> 《雲南通志》)
YNZL	[Brief Gazetteer of Yunnan] (<i>Yunnan zhilue</i> 《雲南志略》)
YNZ	[Yunnan Gazetteer] (<i>Yunnan Zhi</i> 《雲南志》)
YS	[Yuan History] (<i>Yuanshi</i> 《元史》)


The following symbols have been used:


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() Author's explanations

[] Additions to the quotation text by the author

Author’s Note and the Transliteration

Tai Nüa (Thai: ไทเหนือ or  script, or also written in Tai Nuea, Tai Nüa hereafter), also spelled Noe or Nuea, namely by Chinese Shan, or Tai Yai.

Tai Lü (Thai: ไทลื้อ or  script, or also written in Tai Lue, Tai Lü hereafter), also spelt Lü or Le, namely, in Sipsòng Panna Tai.

The calendrical system used in this thesis have four different types: the Buddhist era (Pali: Sāsana Sakaraj, mainly used in Southeast Asia)¹; the Burmese era (or Tai or minor era, Pali: Culāsakaraj)²; the Chinese lunar era (mainly used in ancient China)³; and the Common era (CE in abbr., i.e., year notations for the Gregorian calendar).

Regarding the use of the term “polity”, I am aware of the breadth and imprecision of this term (Wade 2015, 2). For the sake of clarification, “polity” is used in this thesis as a referent for “state”, “empire”, “country”, or “chiefdom”. Wade borrows Tilly’s definition of the state: “coercion-wielding organisations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise a clear priority in some respects over all other organisations within the substantial territory” (ibid, 25). In this regard, a polity is an organised society and a state as a political entity.

The terminology “civilise” or “Sinicise” is adopted in the context of previous Chinese textual expressions. Tai groups are highly civilised ethnic groups, in the sense that they possess a highly stratified and complex social, political, and military organisation. They never needed to undergo any civilising process. In the context of Tai Nüa areas, I prefer to speak of an “integration policy” rather than a “civilising process”.

Barbarian (*man* 蠻), aboriginals (*turen* 土人), native, chieftain or Yi (夷) will be translated from the original text. Yi literally means barbarian or non-Han peoples. In the Chinese historical records of Southwest Yunnan, it refers to local ethnic groups. In present day, the Yi people (彝族), also known as the Nuosu people, are an ethnic group in Southern China belonging to the Sino-Tibetan linguistic family. In this thesis, the major topic of discussion will be Yi (夷). *Yi hua* (夷化) refers to the process of blending into the Yi (夷) ethnic group.

A number of official imperial Chinese titles were used in Tai areas. In this work, *Zhanguan si* 長官司 is translated as “chieftain’s office”; *zhangguan* 長官 is translated as “chieftain”. *Xuanwei si* 宣慰司 is translated as “pacification office”; *Xuanwei shi*

¹ In order to obtain the Gregorian date, it is necessary to deduct 544 (in Burma) or 543 (in Thailand) from the Buddhist calendar.

² In order to obtain the Gregorian date, it is necessary to plus 638 from the Burmese calendar. This calendar is widely used in Tai areas.

³ Years of the ancient Chinese era are expressed according to the title of an emperor’s reign. Months and dates are expressed according to the Chinese era and the Chinese lunar year.

宣慰使 becomes “pacification official”.

The terms Mang⁴ Fei (莽匪 means Mang bandit) or Mang Zi (莽子 means Mang group) or Mang Qiu (莽酋 means Mang chief) are used in Qing Chinese texts in reference to the kings of the Konbaung dynasty of Burma.

Regarding the traditional and simplified Chinese characters used in this thesis, following mainland China’s decision to simplify traditional Chinese characters in 1956 – except when reproducing a small number of manuscripts – Chinese works of literature currently published in mainland China all use simplified Chinese characters. For consistency, I choose traditional characters. Furthermore, pinyin is used for the transliteration of Chinese names and terms, except for long accepted names, such as Kuomintang (KMT).

Today, bilingual geographic names are still used for the for Yunnan’s Tai districts (i.e., autonomous Dai prefectures and counties): one is from the pinyin system⁵; the other is from the local dialect. For example, Jinggu is pinyin while Moeng Bó is a local Tai Nüa dialect. In order to avoid confusion and ensure consistency, I have used the local dialect names, but I also indicate the pinyin for the geographic name of Tai Nüa districts in the present territory of China.⁶

The abbreviations for the various visual and written elements, such as maps, pictures, inscriptions, manuscripts, tables, and diagrams, shall be as follows: map (M), picture (P), inscription (I), manuscript (Manu.), table (T), Horizontally Inscribed Board (H) and diagram (D). The numbering adheres to the chronological sequence in which the thesis is read.

The first part of the thesis contains a synopsis of the original publications in Chinese, English, Tai and Thai, with a view to condensing their substantial content. Nevertheless, several significant primary texts are retained within the main body to facilitate comprehension of both the context and the central argument. The original texts, together with their respective translations, are provided in the Appendices, arranged according to chapters. Parentheses within quotations denote my annotations, while square brackets are used to provide additional information for the sake of maintaining the original text’s comprehensiveness.

⁴ From the Shan/Dai “Man” which probably is derived from the Burmese word Mran မြန်. Thanks to Prof. Sun Laichen for adding this part.

⁵ The present Pinyin system of transcriptions is based on the dialect of Beijing. Also known as Mandarin, it has been the official standard spoken language of China since 1921.

⁶ System of romanisation of Chinese.

Acknowledgements

You may wonder about the path that brought me from Guangxi to Yunnan and then Germany, and you ask why I chose this particular research?

I was born in Guangxi Province into a tiny Tai-Kadai linguistic group under the branch of Kam-Sui languages, named Mulam (*Mulao*: 仫佬族). I completed a bachelor's degree in the Mathematics Department of Guangxi University and a master's degree in the History Department of Yunnan University. I worked as a local history lecturer at Pu'er University, located in Southwest Yunnan, close to the Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos borders. I began to study Tai in 2008, which led me to Germany in 2015 to do my PhD research.

Some may ask, why go to Germany for research on Southeast Asian History? The answer is Prof. Dr Volker Grabowsky. In fact, I already had the topic in mind when I first met my doctoral father in the glorious and historic city of Chiang Mai in Northern Thailand. Prof. Grabowsky showed great interest and encouragement when I explained the intention and main ideas of my research. I decided to pursue my studies under his supervision.

So, you see, it is destiny that has guided me to this remarkable research and to which I have committed my energy and enthusiasm.

It would not have been possible without the input of a number of people. I am grateful to my doctoral father, Prof. Dr Volker Grabowsky, who continues to support and encourage me. His dedication, diligence, and rigorous academic research are a beacon for my own research. I would also like to thank my other supervisor, Prof. Dr. Christian Daniels, who is widely considered one of the most outstanding scholars studying Tai ethnic groups in Southwest Yunnan and their ties to Southeast Asia's mainland. He supplied me with a lot of detailed and practical supervision during the last two years. Young scholars, like me, are fortunate to have him as a mentor. Many thanks to my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Sun Laichen, who not only gives me a number of recommendations for the entire thesis and the Gwe (Kui) people but also provides a lot of remarks on the thesis's weak parts. Special thanks go to Prof. Dr. Jörg Thomas Engelbert, who, as defence chair, provided many valuable comments on this thesis during the defence.

I owe special thanks to Jettana Wannasai-Grabowsky, Pananrai Büchmann, and Dr Liew-Herres Foon Ming. Like old friends, they gave me many valuable comments and offered emotional support. In particular, Dr Liew helped me a lot, not least in polishing my English translations. Pananrai helped me with the Thai language study and translation. Thanks to the assistance of Dr. Direk Injan, a Northern Thai scholar affiliated

with Chiang Mai Rajabhat University, who assisted me in translating the Lik manuscript (MLCL2, see Chapter One) into modern Thai.⁷ Also Thanks to Achan Chaichün Khamdaengyodtai, a Shan scholar from Chiang Mai, who assisted me in translating and summarising the Lik manuscript (MLCL2, see Chapter One) into modern Thai. I am particularly grateful to Dr Silpsupa Jaengsawang and Ms Sutheera Satayaphan, two excellent Tham script scholars, who helped me translate the Tham manuscripts and inscriptions. David Wharton gave me comments on the Lik script and Ma Jianxiong gave me a few remarks on the Lahu people. The Tai Lü linguists, Ms Yiwangdi and Mr. Ainuola assisted me in identifying various Tai Lü words. Thanks, Dr. Zhu Di, for sharing with me some valuable Chinese manuscripts that she got from the Gengma Archives Office. Ms. Dong Chen provides with me her fieldwork observations on Gengma (Küng Ma). Ms Anna Yeadell has polished up my English.

I am very grateful for the financial support I have received from the CSC (Chinese Scholarship Council) and the University of Hamburg's Merit Scholarship over the last few years. Without this help, I would not have been able to focus on my research.

I am also thankful for the *Wochenendbetreuung* that I have received from the *Studierendenwerk Hamburg AÖR* for the last few years. When my daughter and I live in Germany, this weekend's childcare support for my daughter has been invaluable.

Moreover, I would like to thank my Chinese, Thai, Lao, Vietnamese, and Indonesian colleagues and friends: Joyce; Joy; Amnuayvit; Peera; Am; Aoub; Ploy; Khamvone; Dung; Liem; Minh; Hue; and Alan, who are always encouraging and sharing ideas with me. I am also grateful for the support from my Chinese colleagues, who helped me grow and gave me confidence: the dean of my institution Cheng Wenzhang; Yu Ganqian gave me much-needed support; and Qin Shucui, Dao Chenghua, Rao Ruiying, Zhou Ya, Huang Lingfei, Li Lian, Xue Jingmei, Yang Lu, Zhang Fei, etc., have been a constant source of help and encouragement.

Many thanks to my Chinese friends in Hamburg: Bao Zhuo; Liu Zongrui; Wei Dongsheng; Yan Kai; Liao Nannan; and Chen Dacheng, who always try to be there for me when I need them.

Finally, I want to show appreciation to my family, especially my daughter Seven-up (Zhang Linzhou), provide me with constant love and support. Without them, I would never have come through what, at times, has been a lonely and difficult process.

⁷ Dr. Direk Injan collaborates with Achan Sang Kham, who lives in Chiang Mai, to transcribe the Tai Nü2e (Lik) text into modern Shan writing and then into modern Thai.

Preface

I began my fieldwork in 2008, in Moeng Bò (Jinggu 景穀 or Weiyuan 威遠 in classic Chinese records)⁸, one of the Tai Nüa areas of the Upper Mekong River. I started in Moeng Bò and subsequently expanded my research to other, smaller Tai Nüa polities, namely, Moeng Laem (Menglian 孟連)⁹ and Kūng Ma (Keng Ma or Gengma 耿馬)¹⁰. I gradually came to understand the significance of the three Tai Nüa polities situated in the Upper Mekong Basin, whose written language was carried out using the Tham and Lik scripts. All of their Tai Nüa predecessors originated from the Moeng Mao (Meng Mao) federation¹¹.

Most of the Tai population of those three polities is affiliated with the Tai Nüa subgroup of the Tai-speaking ethnic groups. “Nüa” in the local Tai language means “upper part”, and in this case, it refers to the upper part of the Mekong River. The Tai Nüa people migrated from the Mao Shan Federation to Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò in the thirteenth century. These three polities were thus strongly influenced by the Mao Shan Federation (present-day Dehong¹²). However, because of their geographical proximity to Sipsòng Panna (Xishuang Banna)¹³, they were also influenced by Tai Lü power. In the case of Moeng Laem, the influence was political and cultural; Kūng Ma and Moeng Bò were mainly – but not absolutely – influenced culturally by the Tai Lü.

Moreover, since Moeng Bò was closer to inland China, rich in salt and an essential passage to Southwest Yunnan, Moeng Bò attracted the Yongzheng emperor’s (r. 1722–

⁸ Thai: เมืองบ่อ, Moeng Bò. In Tai, *moeng* or *müang* means polity or city (*meng* is the Chinese pinyin translation; *moeng* hereafter); *Bò* means mine and refers to the area being rich in salt, see JGTSSX (1990, 1). Weiyuan literally means “Mighty and Far-reaching” or “Imposing and Far-reaching.” To facilitate understanding, *Moeng Bò* will be used as the Tai name of Jinggu, a direct translation of the local dialect. *Moeng* is used to indicate the Tai name, whereas *meng* is used only for the Chinese pinyin. Moeng Bò hereafter.

⁹ Thai: เมืองแลม, Moeng Laem. *Laem* means a place, where it was found (by the Tai Nüa ancestor). Moeng Laem means a city discovered by the ancestors of Tai Nüa, see Zhang Haizhen (2004, 9). Moeng Laem hereafter.

¹⁰ Thai: เก่งม้า (Kūng Ma). *Kūng* means “city” in the Wa language and *ma* is Tai for “horse,” i.e., the place which was found by a horse. For more details, see Zhu Depu (1997, 58). The Tai name for Kūng Ma is Moeng (Mäng) Kūng (Chinese name: Gengma 耿馬 or Kūng maa; Burmese name: Kaingma, ကိုင်မာ or ကိုင်မာ့ in Burmese script). According to Gong Suzheng 龔肅政, *Kūng* means bridle, including the reins (轡頭). *Ma* means horse. Many thanks to Prof. Dr. Christian Daniels for supplementing this part. Kūng Ma hereafter.

¹¹ Namely, the Mao Shan Federation, which had its core area in present-day Dehong Prefecture.

¹² In Tai: Taikong, lit.: “[land] below the Kong (Salween) River.” Also named Daikong, the core of the Mao Shan Kin Ethnic group, a social group or category of the population that, in wider society, is set apart and bound together by common ties of race, language, nationality, culture, and kingdom. For more details, see Santasombat (2008, 2).

¹³ 西雙版納 in Ch. The centre of Tai Lü, also named Moeng Lü in local Tai peoples and Cheli in Chinese classical records. Modern Thai: สิบสองปันนา, Sipsòng Panna in Tai, Xishuang Banna in Mandarin. Sipsòng Panna hereafter.

1735) attention. Indeed, in 1724, the emperor abolished the system of native officials and replaced it with an administration staffed by regular imperial officials. Following long and fierce resistance, from the mid-eighteenth century until the late eighteenth century, Moeng Bò was integrated into inland China. While the integration of Moeng Laem can be pinpointed to the demarcation that took place in 1894, Kūng Ma was actually inclined to keep close relationships with Chinese dynasties before its territory was ceded to the Qing court in 1894.¹⁴ The further historical development of the three Tai polities provides us with a picture of how the borders of Southwest China and upper Mainland Southeast Asia were formed.¹⁵ Gaining insight into the procedural aspects and underlying rationale of this process can facilitate our comprehension of the historical progression of Tai Nüa political entities in Mainland Southeast Asia and, moreover, enhance our understanding of the Qing court's integration of the borderlands of Southwest Yunnan.

The primary objective of this thesis is to analyse the dynamics of interaction among the Tai Nüa polities, Mainland Southeast Asia powers, and Chinese dynasties. My task is to figure, how could the Tai Nüa polities have survived in such a complicated political landscape?

Therefore, the thesis structure aims at achieving this goal. Chapters One and Two provide an introductory exploration of the historical context of Tai Nüa polities, theoretical considerations, and methodological approaches. Chapter Three offers a concise account of the three Tai Nüa polities. Chapter Four focuses on the integration of borderlands vis à vis various Tai polities, the Chinese Empire, and Mainland Southeast Asian polities, as well as the connection between Tai Nüa polities and inter-ethnic relationships. Chapter Five examines the internal tensions that arose between the rulers of Moeng Laem Tai and the Lahu community. Chapter Six of the study focuses on the delineation of boundaries between the Tai Nüa polities in Yunnan and the British Burma region. Chapter Seven serves as the concluding section of the text.

I was born and grew up in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, PRC, and I am a Mulam, an ethnic group which belongs to the Tai-Kadai language family group.¹⁶ Given this special background, I not only want to avoid Sinocentrism, but I also seek

¹⁴ Because of the political competition with Moeng Ting, for more details, see Chapters Three and Four.

¹⁵ "Southwest" is relative to the Central Plains (*Zhongyuan*), although this has Sinocentric overtone (Yang Bin 2009, 9, has a detailed and different definition). Southwest China here refers to Yunnan.

¹⁶ The Mulam or Mulaò people belong to a northern branch of the Tai-Kadai languages ethnolinguistic group (specifically, it is a minor branch of the Kam-Sui languages; for more details, see Baker 2002, 5), the so-called hundred Yue (百越) in ancient Chinese records. The hundred Yue refers to aboriginal people who inhabited the "south-eastern coast which was destroyed in 334 BC as the Han Chinese moved across the Yangzi into the south" (ibid: 4). The hundred Yue comprised several southeastern ethnic groups who had a close relationship with the Tai-Kadai languages groups. As Baker (2002, 1) points out: "A school of historians in both China and Thailand links the Tai to the peoples in sub-Yangzi China which early Chinese texts generically call Yue (Ye, Yueh, Yüeh, etc)."

to provide an alternative perspective to the Western academic standpoint. To this end, I cite the history of the Tai Nüa district within the historical development of the entire Chinese Empire and the polities of Mainland Southeast Asia. In addition to providing a different perspective, this thesis aims to explore the deep yet detached interaction between Tai and highland ethnic groups, Han migrants, and the authorities of Chinese dynasties and the polities of Mainland Southeast Asia.¹⁷ Although research on the three Tai Nüa polities has been profitable so far, this thesis is the first attempt to integrate these characteristics in the context of Mainland Southeast Asia and Southwest Yunnan during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.


Guided by my doctoral father, Prof. Dr. Volker Grabowsky, I mastered modern Thai. I translated MLCL2 into English (The modern Thai translation of MLCL2 is the result of the translation and summary of Dr. Direk Injan and Achan Chaichün Khamdaenglyodtai) despite my very limited ability to read Tham, Lik, and Shan scripts. Dr Silpsupa Jaengsawang, and Ms Sutteera Satayaphan assisted me in translating the manuscripts inscriptions written in Tham script into modern Thai script, allowing me to comprehend the local chronicles and inscriptions. The English documents used for this research were found in the British Library and the Cambridge University Library.

The primary Chinese sources are written in classical Chinese. I have focused primarily on MSL, MSG, and MS from the Ming dynasty and QSL, QSG, WJSL, and WYTZ from the Qing dynasty. Other first-hand documents include local gazetteers, journals (diaries), or correspondences and reports. For the writings of Chinese officials and special terminology, I have mainly followed the translations of C.O. Hucker (1985).

Of course, this dissertation is only the beginning of the study of the small Tai Nüa areas in Mainland Southeast Asia. I believe that, before long, many scholars will pay attention to these fascinating places.

¹⁷ An overemphasis on the independence of these ethnic groups from Chinese influence may lead us to ignore the undeniable role of Chinese authorities in the historical development of Yunnan. As Duan Zhidan points out (2015, 7): “scholars whose effort eliminates Chinese-centered language sometimes can lead to an ethnic-centered approach that over stresses the independence of the ethnic minorities from the Chinese influence.”

M0: Distribution and Migration Route of Tai-Kadai




Source from: Gerner (2013, 390).

Manu. 0: Image of Tai Nüa people from a Chinese manuscript



Translation of the Chinese text: There is a kind of Han (漢 means the Chinese) Baiyi (the so-called Tai Nüa). They live in the mountains. They are very hard-working. The men's clothes fall below the knee. The women wear handkerchiefs in their pulled-up hair and their clothes are made from five colours of silk ribbon. They inhabit the Kaihua and Pu'er Prefectures (Source: Bo Lin (1818, vol.2, 28), a nineteenth-century Chinese manuscript).

Manu. 00: Example of a classical Chinese manuscript



The cover of “*Tusi* Han Huaji of Gengma Sub-Pacification Commission’s biography, resume, and household registration criteria.” Photograph taken by Dr Zhu Di on 25 September 2015.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Historical Background

1.1.1 General Background

Yunnan is a province situated in the southwestern part of the People's Republic of China (hereafter, PRC). The present territory of Yunnan borders the provinces of Guizhou, Guangxi, Sichuan, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region. It shares international borders with the Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar (hereafter, Burma).¹

The name Yunnan derives from the phrase “south of the clouds” (Caiyun zhinan 彩雲之南). Yunnan, whose ancient name was Dian 滇, has always been a region inhabited by various ethnic groups, among which are belonging to the Tai-Kadai, Tibeto-Burman, and Mon-Khmer ethno-linguistic families. These groups have interacted with peoples in Southeast Asia, China proper, and Tibet since ancient times. Many polities have been established in Yunnan. The larger polities were the Kingdom of Dian (Dianguo 滇國 (277–115 BCE), founded by a general of the State of Chu, Zhuang Qiao 莊騫 (277–256 BCE), which lasted for about 162 years, and the Nanzhao (*r.* 728–902), Dali (*r.* 937–1094), and Later Dali (*r.* 1096–1253) kingdoms, which were independent from the Tang (*r.* 618–907) until the Song dynasties.²

The Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms isolated Yunnan from the Central Plains dynasties. Communication with China was severed during the wars between Nanzhao and the Tang court (“Tianbao Wars” in the Chinese records) during the years 750–785, 829–830, and 859–870.³ Later, the Song court wanted to avoid conflict with the Dali kingdom, the successor of Nanzhao, and so ceased all official connections with this new kingdom. Song emperors believed that the wars with Nanzhao caused the demise of the Tang dynasty.⁴ After the Mongol-Yuan conquered the Dali Kingdom in 1253/4, Yunnan became a province of the Yuan Empire in 1274.⁵ The Ming and Qing dynasties

¹ The military government changed the official English name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, since Burma was the British name; however, this thesis uses Burma because this is the name utilised in historical works before 1989.

² Including the Northern Song (*r.* 960–1127) and Southern Song dynasties (*r.* 1127–1279). For more details, see Liew-Herres and Grabowsky (2008, 90) and Mote (1999, 452–453).

³ For more details, see Liang Yongjia (2018, 79–98) or Liang Yongjia (2011, 11–12).

⁴ For more details, see Lin Chaomin et al. (eds.) (2006, 240–241). Another piece of archaeological evidence comes from the First Longest Couplet in The Grand View Tower of Kunming, which states that Song Taizu (the first emperor of the Northern Song, *r.* 960–976) carried a jade axe and faced the map, drawing the southwest out of boundaries. The original text is written as: “宋揮玉斧。”

⁵ Lin Chaomin (2006, 150) believes that Yunnan was first promoted as a province under the jurisdiction of a dynasty

promoted the gradual expansion of administrative control over non-Han peoples in Yunnan. This impressive historical background has been crucial in shaping Yunnan's diversity and peculiarity. As FitzGerald (1972, 8) points out, Yunnan is a distinctive case in Chinese cultural and political expansion. Indeed, it may be the model for future growth, if politically feasible, or for stretching the limits of Chinese expansion of a non-Chinese region.

Recently, some scholars, i.e., Baker (2002: 1–26), hypothesis that Yunnan was the region of origin of the Tai-Kadai ethnolinguistic family. Furthermore, historically, Yunnan maintained close ethnic and cultural ties with Southeast Asia and is regarded as a bridge between China and Mainland Southeast Asia. Therefore, Yunnan is an appropriate place to study ethnic groups that had cultural and political connections with Mainland Southeast Asia between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries. This thesis discusses the history of the social transformation of a particular Tai ethnic group in Yunnan, namely, the Tai Nüa. Three Tai Nüa polities influenced the formation of the modern national borderlines of China and Burma from the eighteenth to the late nineteenth centuries when they tried to balance the tributary relationship between Chinese dynasties and the great powers of Mainland Southeast Asia in the context of the survival politics of small polities at the fringes of the major power centres.

The Tai Nüa district situated along the Upper Mekong in Southwest Yunnan contains three small Tai polities: Moeng Bò; Kūng Ma; and Moeng Laem. These can be divided further with Moeng Bò located on the upper part of the Mekong River (the east bank of the Mekong River, see M2) and Kūng Ma⁶ and Moeng Laem on the lower part of the Mekong River (the west bank of Mekong River), the latter being close to the Chinese border with Burma (Myanmar, see M1).

in 1274, according to the New History of Yuan, edited by Ke Shaomin (柯劭忞 in Ch., *b.* 1850–1933), who was an officer and historian during the later Qing dynasty and the early ROC. Mongols conquered Yunnan in 1253, and the era of independent kingdoms ended (for more details, see Mote 1999, 441). Despite this, Mote (*ibid.*, 703) points out that Yunnan was only formally recognised as a province in 1382 when it was governed directly by a Chinese regional authority for the first time.


⁶ Kūng Ma currently covers the former Moeng Ting Prefecture and the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission.

M 1: Present-day Yunnan



Source from: Maps Online ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National University (<http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/china-yunnan-province-0>, accessed on 22 February 2022).

M 2: The Tai States of the Upper Mekong before the twenty-first century



The Upper Mekong region covers a wide geographical area, including Kūng Ma (Gengma), Moeng Laem, Moeng Bò (Jinggu), Sipsòng Panna, Upper Burma (Ava), Northern Thailand (Lan Na), and the northern parts of Laos (Luang Prabang). Source: The Australian National University: <https://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/maponline/base-maps/upper-mekong>, accessed on 2 December 2020.

The population of these three Tai Nüa polities predominantly belongs to an ethnolinguistic group (Ch. *minzhu* 民族) classified as Dai by the Chinese government

and Tai by Western linguists and anthropologists.⁷ Weera Ostapirat (2005, 128) suggests that the Tai Kadai people should be divided into Northern Kra-Sui and Southern Kra-Dai groups. Norquest (2007, 16) adopts Ostapirat's proposal and applies the acronym Kra-Dai to refer to the whole language family. Later, Gerner (2014, 158, see M0) creates a map to illustrate the migration and distribution of the Tai Kadai language family, which has three main branches: the Northern Branch, the Central Branch, and the Southwestern Branch, each corresponding to a specific geographical region.⁸

The group studied in this thesis, the Tai Nüa, is part of the Southwestern Tai-speaking groups that identify themselves as distinct sub-groups. Chamberlain (1975, 49–60) indicates that the Southwestern Tai consists of two groupings based on their dialects: P and PH. The P has sub-groups such as Tse Fang, Tai Mao, Muang Ka, Black Tai, Red Tai, White Tai, Lue (Lü), Shan, Yuan, Ahom, and others. The PH possesses several subgroups, including Siamese, Phu Tai, Neua (Nüa), Phuan etc., Lao, and Southern Thai. According to my fieldwork in Yunnan during last ten years, some sub-groups inhabiting in Southwest China for centuries are: The Tai Lü predominantly lived in Sipsòng Panna. The Tai Nüa resided mainly in Dehong, Kùng Ma, Moeng Bò, and Moeng Laem. The Tai Khün (from Chiang Tung) inhabited mainly in Dehong, Kùng Ma, and Moeng Laem. The Shan primarily lived in Dehong, the Tai Yai in Moeng Zhong (now Yuanjiang), and the Tai Dón in Honghe and Yuanjiang.⁹

The present Chinese government classifies them all as Dai (傣), but, in reality, there are differences between the various Southwestern Tai-speaking groups. The Chinese government identified different ethnic groups from 1950 until 1987. These are the so-called *minzu* (民族 in Chinese or nations in English) who inhabit the territory of present-day China. The Tai sub-groups are distinguished according to their ethnicity, such as languages, scripts, religions, etc. However, they cannot be simply identified as one *minzu*. In fact, such a classification does not reflect the self-identification of these groups. Specifically, the definitions of ethnic groups and the concept of nation differ because the nation has political meaning. Thus, the academic classification of ethnic groups differs from that of the Chinese government. Therefore, this study will primarily

⁷ Tai is written as ʔn, while Thai is written as ʔnθ. In the local Tai language, Tai means people. The consonant n is pronounced as /t/ in many Tai dialects nowadays (Tai Lü, Shan, Lan Na, etc.). The Chinese pronunciation of the consonant letter n as /d/ reflects its pronunciation in Proto-Tai, whereas in most modern Tai languages in upper Mainland Southeast Asia and south-western China it is pronounced /t/ (i.e., with an unvoiced and not aspirated dental), while in (central) Thai and Lao the pronunciation is /th/ (i.e., an unvoiced and aspirated dental), such as in “Thai” (ʔnθ). For this reason, modern Chinese sources write Tai as Dai. Thus, I use the transcription of “Tai” to “Dai” throughout my thesis when I cite the Chinese sources. See Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, Author’s Note) and Fang Guoyu (1958, 45–46) for further details about Tai and Thai.

⁸ The Northern branch, for more details, see Luo Yongxian (1996, 66–96).

⁹ For more details, see Jiang Yingliang (1984, 1–8) and Gao Lishi (1999, 47–49).

focus on the political structures of the Tai Nüa ethnic group in the Upper Mekong Basin, rather than addressing the concept of a “nation.”¹⁰

Although the three polities maintained connections with their neighbours, the autonomous Dai prefectures of Dehong and Xishuang Banna, the autonomous counties of Moeng Bò (Jinggu in mandarin) and Moeng Laem (Menglian in mandarin) in Pu'er Prefecture,¹¹ and Kūng Ma (Gengma in mandarin) in Lincang Prefecture, enjoy a less privileged status than Sipsòng Panna and Dehong. Certainly, the two latter areas have received much less scholarly and public attention. In contrast, the Tai Lü kingdom of Sipsòng Panna¹² and the Tai Nüa or Shan (Th.: ᨧᩢ᩠ᨦ) Federation of Moeng Mao have been the subject of relatively prominent scholarship by Chinese and international scholars.

It is perhaps no coincidence that the manuscript cultures of these smaller polities – though predominantly inhabited by Tai Nüa – use both the Lik script¹³ of the Mao Shan and the Tai Lü variant of the Tham script,¹⁴ which originated in Lan Na in present-day Northern Thailand. These small polities of Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò are situated at the crossroads between the political and cultural centres of the Tai Lü and the Tai Nüa ethnic groups. The Tai Nüa polities are thus an excellent case for studying the survival politics of small polities and the interactions of minor Tai polities with Southeast Asian polities and the empires of China at the borderlands.

Based on an interdisciplinary approach that combines history and ethnology, I hope to contribute to regional and local understandings of Tai Nüa political strategy vis-à-vis the Chinese Empire and Mainland Southeast Asian polities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as the field of ethnohistory in general, all of which have come to receive more scholarly attention within China during the past two decades. This thesis employs three kinds of language sources – Chinese, English, and Tai – to investigate the history of these Tai Nüa polities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It sets out to clarify the regional Tai Nüa history of Southwest Yunnan by studying the survival politics of these three small polities, which were both part of the

¹⁰ As Anderson (2006, 6) points out, a nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” However, an extensive discussion on the broader topic is beyond the scope of this thesis.

¹¹ Its formal name was Simao. It changed to Pu'er in 2007.

¹² About the history of Sipsòng Panna, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012).

¹³ Daniels (2012, 147–176) argues that the Lik script has borrowed heavily from the Burmese script and has a different origin from the Tham script, which is derived from Mon. David Wharton questions this, even though it is a variant of the Lik script and almost identical to the one used by the Lü; see Wharton (2018, 39–40).

¹⁴ Tham is the Tai phonetic rendering of the *Pali* language as Dhamma, indicating that this script was originally used for the writing of Buddhist scriptures. Iijima (2009, 15–32) points out Tham is “one of the Southeast Asian scripts of Indian origin and has been widely used in the northern part of Mainland Southeast Asia”. For more details, see Grabowsky (2017, 25–33).

native official system¹⁵ of the Chinese Empire and subject to the Mandala system of Mainland Southeast Asia.

1.1.2 Selecting Moeng Bò as One Coordinate of the Tai Nüa Polities

Moeng Bò is a small Tai Nüa-dominated area that has attracted scant academic research compared to Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem, both of which have been the subject of scholarly interest in recent decades. However, Moeng Bò played a significant role in the Chinese territorial expansion to Southwest Yunnan during the late Qing dynasty. There were four main reasons for selecting Moeng Bò as one of the coordinates of the Tai Nüa polities:

The **first reason** concerns Moeng Bò's geopolitical location. The polity has held a prominent position in Southwestern Yunnan since the Nanzhao Kingdom (seventh to ninth centuries). This kingdom established Kainan Prefecture (開南府) and sought control of Southwestern Yunnan and Northern Laos via Simao/Sipsòng Panna. Subsequently, Moeng Bò was established as Weiyuan Prefecture (威遠城, see WYTZ 2016, 72) and was administered by Yuanjiang Prefecture (元江府), with its capital at present-day Kunming during the Yuan dynasty. Moeng Bò therefore has had a strategically important location between Northern Thailand, Laos, and the Gulf of Bengal since the Nanzhao period.¹⁶

The **second reason** is that Moeng Bò is regarded as the main route connecting the Tai Nüa and Tai Lü polities. In other words, Moeng Bò (like Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem) is situated at the interstice between the Tai Nüa and Tai Lü polities and cultures. Moreover, Moeng Bò is the last stop for Tai Nüa people migrating from Dehong further north. The Tai Nüa people are also Theravada Buddhists.

This brings us, then, to the **third reason**: Moeng Bò was the northernmost area where the Lan Na-style form of Theravada Buddhism was spread.

¹⁵ The so-called native official administration system was later named the *tusi* system (*tusi* was the local ruler, the name of *tusi* first appeared in 1542; for more details, see Daniels (2018, 201–243)). *Tusi* is the pronunciation in Mandarin (土司), which means Aboriginal Office. This term was used in the Chinese historiographical records after 1542. The native official system is a unique administrative structure within Imperial China, first implemented by the Chinese dynasties during the Yuan dynasty. Simply put, the Chinese dynasties (here, the Yuan, Ming, and Qing courts) appointed the local ruler as the *tuguan* (aboriginal officials) or *tusi* (Aboriginal Office), who indeed ruled their region. This will be elaborated on in the following sections. Moreover, the local rulers were called *tuguan* or *tusi*, the Mandarin pronunciation in the historical periods in question. Both terms appear in the Chinese historiographical records. As Daniels (ibid.) points out: “The term for native officials during the Yuan and early Ming was *tuguan* 土官. The earliest appearance of the term *tusi* 土司, which was used extensively during the Qing period, was in an entry for 1542 (Jiajing 21) in the Shizong Shilu 世宗實錄.” For more details, see also Bai Yaotian (1999, 27–32). In order to avoid any confusion, I adopt the term “native official system” instead of the *tusi* system. However, I use *tusi* or *tusi* system in cases of direct translation from the texts.

¹⁶ Fang Guoyu et al. (ed.), vol. 3 (1998, 220).

Finally, the **fourth reason** for selecting Moeng Bò is because it is rich in minerals – it is exceptionally rich in salt – and in tea. During the Yuan and Ming dynasties, Moeng Bò was repeatedly invaded by the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao and Moeng Lü because of its strategic location and blessed mineral resources. In 1724, the Yongzheng Emperor initiated the highly influential *gaitu guiliu* policy; this movement began in Moeng Bò because of its economic assets.¹⁷

As already remarked, Moeng Bò has received little scholarly attention to date compared to Sipsòng Panna and Dehong, and even to Küng Ma and Moeng Laem. Since 2015, however, the local government has tried to raise awareness regarding Moeng Bò's unique aspects. For instance, a number of the Buddha's footprints, handprints, and sitting prints, which are found in Moeng Bò district, are mentioned in a book entitled *Buddha's Travels Around the World* (ตำนานพระเจ้าเลียบโลก in Thai). Moeng Bò is home to twenty-three places that have one of the Buddha's prints, and local people believe that the real number is even more significant.¹⁸ Consequently, various studies about the Buddha's travels in Moeng Bò have been published since 2015. Few research works have been devoted to the history of Moeng Bò, however.

Moreover, the Chinese literature that mentions Moeng Bò lacks details and is often inaccurate. For example, Zhang Gongjin and Wang Feng (2002, 74) claim that places such as Jinggu (Moeng Bò), Küng Ma, Shuangjiang, Zhenkang, and Cangyuan were all inhabited by Tai Nüa, originating from Dehong, who only used the Lik script of the Tai Nüa of Dehong, also called Lik Tou Ngok or Lik Tai Mao. This assumption is not accurate as we can demonstrate that the people of several of these “Tai Nüa districts” used two different kinds of scripts at the same time, the so-called Lik¹⁹ and Tham scripts. During my fieldwork in Moeng Bò over the last ten years, local scribes informed me that Lik is used for secular records or narrative stories and medical texts as well as religious texts. Tham (as mentioned, from the Pali term “Dhamma”), by contrast, is mostly used for Buddhist scriptures, but also for astrological treatises,

¹⁷ Ma Jianxiong (2007, 553–602).

¹⁸ I conducted fieldwork in Moeng Bò for a decade. I visited at least five Buddha prints and interviewed several local *Achan* (local scribes). I was told that an increasing number of Buddha foot prints are being found as reflected in “The Chronicle of the Buddha's Journey Around the World,” the so-called *Phrachao liap lok* in Tai, which is popular in the Tai Theravada Buddhism world, e.g., in Southwest Yunnan, Northern Thailand, and Laos (for more details, see Aroonrut 2000, 122–138 and Ho 2018, 360–61). Currently, twenty-six Buddha's prints have been found. For more details about the Buddha's foot prints in Moeng Bò, see a local travel guide: *The Buddha's Prints of Jinggu*, which was compiled by the local government and printed by Shenzhen Chizhe Culture Communication Co., Ltd.

¹⁹ From the Sanskrit verb root *likh*, meaning “to write.” For more details about the interpretation of *likh*, see the online Sanskrit dictionary:

https://spokensanskrit.org/index.php?mode=3&script=hk&tran_input=Likh&direct=au&anz=100, accessed on 15 June 2020.

divination texts, and medical treatises. The use of these two different scripts is much more complex than previously assumed by scholars.²⁰

Moeng Bò is a small Tai Nüa district in Southwest Yunnan. According to a local government survey of 2017, the territory of Moeng Bò comprises about 8,000 square kilometres. A census taken at the end of 2019 records the district as having a population of around 310,000 inhabitants, most of whom are Han Chinese, followed by Tai and Yi (彝族, i.e., Tibeto-Burman) people.²¹ Since the Ming dynasty, the Imperial Court was formally responsible for administering the native official system in Moeng Bò. The first *cao fa*, Dao Suandang, was captured and subsequently released by the ruler of Moeng Lü,²² Dao Xianda (Tao Sida Kham), who was fearful of the Ming power.

The local ruler of Moeng Bò started to realise what he perceived was the only way that his small polity and its people could be protected: to remain close to a reliable power and ask for protection, especially if the Chinese dynasties could not control its polity directly. This is the reason why Dao Gaihan and his mother sided with the Ming court and sent troops to resist Luchuan's (Moeng Mao) invasion during the Luchuan Pingmian campaigns.²³

During the reign of the Yongzheng Emperor, Moeng Bò had to face the Qing court, which was not satisfied with the nominal governing of the ethnic areas and sought to strengthen the centralisation and to collect taxes. This meant, willingly or not, Moeng Bò and other ethnic areas were caught up in this battle. Inland migrants of diverse origins²⁴ and Han culture were introduced into the trouble areas, which were dominated by non-Han ethnic groups such as the Tai and the Wa. Even Moeng Laem and Moeng Ting (now a township in Kūng Ma county) paid tribute to Burma, and as their relationship to Mainland Southeast Asia is very close, the Chinese culture was only partially integrated into the local society.²⁵

²⁰ However, Wharton (2017, 41) points out: “since the Lik literature is largely religious in content and conversely it is the more secular subjects which are written in the Tham script in the lay scribal tradition. The Tai Nüa themselves do not distinguish manuscript content in such terms and most texts which are found in both Tham and Lik versions share very similar content, although occasionally with differences in title.” For the usage and scope of Tham and Lik, see Wharton (2017, 39–41, 175). Furthermore, Grabowsky (2011, 16) claims: “the Dhamma script (*tua aksòn tham*) was either used for writing religious texts (thus the script's name) or became the only script for religious as well as secular texts.” Chapter Three, fn. 136 also provides more details about the usage of Lik script family groups (i.e., variation of Lik) in Moeng Bò.

²¹ The population of non-Han ethnic groups comprises up to 156,900 people: the minority accounted for more than 49.3 per cent of the total population in 2020. For more details, see the local website of Pu'er Jinggu Dai and Yi Autonomous County Unified Media Centre: <http://www.ynpejg.com/jgk.asp>, accessed on 18 October 2023.

²² It is named Cheli in ancient Chinese texts; its current official Chinese name is Xishuang Banna (Sipsòng Panna).

²³ See JGTSSX (1990, 21–31), MS: chapter. 44, pp. 6. and Liew (1996, 162–203).

²⁴ Inland migrants were from different ethnic groups, such as Miao/Yao, Muslim, Mongols etc. However, most of them were Han; for more details, see Lee (2012, 99–100).

²⁵ Evidence will be presented in Chapter Four.

1.1.3 Similarities and Differences between Tai Nüa Polities

To date, no comparative or comprehensive study of Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò, as significant polities in the re-building of China's Southwestern border with Southeast Asia, has been published in Chinese or any other language. These three Tai polities share a similar ethno-linguistic, cultural, and historical background. Their ancestors all came from the Tai Nüa federation of Moeng Mao²⁶ during the thirteenth century when Moeng Mao was still a stable polity in early Ming China. After the fall of the Tai federation of Moeng Mao, the Ming court tried to divide its territory into several smaller polities, which led to the Moeng Ting Prefecture and the Weiyuan (Moeng Bò) sub-prefecture being established in 1402, as well as Moeng Laem's Chieftain's Office in 1406.

However, there are distinct differences between these three Tai polities. Moeng Laem had a close relationship with Chiang Tung,²⁷ not only politically, but also in terms of intermarriages. Moreover, when the Toungoo dynasty in the late sixteenth century rose and expanded its influence over Tai Lü and Tai Nüa districts, Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem had to pay tribute to both China and Burma.²⁸ These were the so-called Chinese-Burmese Condominiums.²⁹ Despite its history being strongly influenced by the border policies of the Ming and Qing dynasties, even Kūng Ma also had to send gifts and horses³⁰ to the Burmese court in order to maintain a good relationship with this strong Mainland Southeast Asian power from the sixteenth until the nineteenth centuries.

Concerning Moeng Bò, the case is more distinct, due to its geographical location, Moeng Bò is situated closer to hinterland Yunnan, which resulted in it becoming the first of the three polities to be put under direct administration by the Qing dynasty. In the early eighteenth century, the *gaitu guiliu* policy was promoted, which means the abolition of native officials and the replacement of rotating regular officials (*liuguan*).³¹ This resulted in the extension of direct bureaucratic control over formerly autonomous frontier areas, and the incorporation of native rulers' territories into the regular administrative sphere. Thus, Moeng Bò came under the direct control of the Qing court in the early eighteenth century.³²

²⁶ In Chinese historical records, it is also known as the Tai Federation of Luchuan. For more details, see Liew (1996, 162–203).

²⁷ Keng Tung in Burmese, Moeng Khün in Tai, Chiang Tung hereafter.

²⁸ Under the Konbaung dynasty (*r.* 1752–1885), it was the continuation of the Toungoo dynasty's practice.

²⁹ For more details, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 49–56).

³⁰ The so-called *huamali* in Chinese. For more details, see Yang Yuda and Yang Huifang (2004, 72–80).

³¹ So-called *liuguan* 流官 or rotating officials, see Fang Tie and Fang Hui (2017, 1–5) for more details.

³² Rebellions and chaos occurred sporadically until the nineteenth century, see Chapter 2.

Nevertheless, to ensure stability in the border areas of Yunnan, Emperor Yongzheng decided to reform only the polities located on the east bank of the Lancang (Mekong) River. In contrast, other Tai polities on the west bank of the Mekong Valley retained the existing native official system.³³ This meant that Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma kept their original native official system, whereas Moeng Bò's native official system was abolished.

1.2 Literature Review

Current studies of the Tai in Yunnan, those in the Chinese language but also in Thai and Western languages, mainly focus on Sipsòng Panna and Dehong. Major studies include Hsieh (1989); Davis (1909); Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012), in English; Wichaikhatkha and Dōkbūakāo (eds.) (1993); Thao Kwangsang and Ai Kham (comp.) (2001); Chiranakorn (2001) and Apiradee (2003), in Thai; Fang Guoyu (1958); and Zhang Gongjin and Wang Feng (2004), in Chinese.

The aforementioned books from different languages mostly center on the historical, ethnic, cultural, and societal aspects of Sipsòng Panna, serving as a means to comprehend the Tai Lü areas. By directing their attention towards these facets, researchers may get a thorough comprehension of Sipsòng Panna as a Tai Lü location, delving into its distinctive attributes, historical paths, and present-day intricacies. The use of this comprehensive strategy promotes inter-disciplinary communication and enhances the overall academic comprehension of the region's importance within the framework of Southeast Asia and other related areas.

Dehong's history and the culture of Tai Nüa or Tai Yai are analysed by: Christian Daniels (2000, 2005, 2013, 2018, and 2020) and Santasombat (2008), in English; by Taitumkaen and Lertluemsai (1998); Chao Yan (2001); Chiranakorn (2005) in Thai; and by The Editorial Board of Compiling the History and Gazetteer of Dehong Sub-prefecture (ed. comp.) (1989); Jiang Yingliang (2003); and Yin Shaoting and Christian Daniels (comp. ed.) (2002), in Chinese and Tai scripts (Tham and Lik).

The above-mentioned books offer distinct perspectives on Dehong, a territory

³³ This policy is stated in E. Ertai's (鄂爾泰: 1680–1745, for his biography, see ECCPI, pp. 601–603) memorial: 江內宜流不宜土, 江外宜土不宜流 (*Jiangnei yiliu bu yitu, Jiangwai yitu bu yiliu*). It means: "Appoint native officers to within the river (to the west of the Upper Mekong); while appointing regular officers beyond the river (to the east of the Upper Mekong)." However, Liu Benjun (2001, 130–134) points out that this policy was never implemented as the actual situation was more complicated than expected. The Qing court had to adjust its approach according to local circumstances in most cases. In the Tai Nüa district, however, Moeng Bò (Weiyuan in Chinese ancient records) abolished its *tusi* system (i.e., the native officers and regular officers coexisted in Moeng Bò from the Qianlong regime after a number of local rebellions – this will be explained further in Chapter Four fn.186). In contrast, Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem maintained their *tusi* systems.

inside the Tai Nüa that held significant influence within the Moeng Mao Federation. This federation posed a challenge to the Chinese dynasties throughout the Ming period. The research conducted by Christian Daniels is expected to offer significant contributions to the understanding of the Moeng Mao Federation and its engagements with Chinese dynasties in the Tai Nüa region of Dehong during the Yuan and Ming dynasties. Furthermore, his creative studies are expected to provide a valuable contribution to larger scholarly conversations around ethnic identity, state formation, and cross-cultural connections in southwestern China during the Ming period. This is achieved via the offering of a nuanced knowledge of the Moeng Mao Federation and its intricate relationship with Chinese dynasties.

Besides, Dao Sirui's (2023) work utilises primary materials and scholarly studies to examine the journeys and research conducted in the borderlands between Yunnan and Burma. Dao aims to provide the viewpoint of Western missionaries and a detailed account of the Upper Mekong Basin, Sipsòng Panna, Chiang Tung, and Chiang Khaeng regions.

Baker's article (2002, 1–26) examines the origins of the Tai people and their sub-groups, a subject of study within the field of general Tai studies. The research conducted by Condominas (1990) examined the domain of Thai-Yunnan and it addresses the social and political framework, positing that a connection existed between the Proto-Tai and Mon-Khmer prior to the dispersal of the Tai sub-groups.

All the works mentioned provide outstanding research on Sipsòng Panna and Dehong, and an overview of the Tai groups, focusing on their origins, historical background, cultural practices, and socio-economic characteristics. The Tai groups, also known as the Tai or Shan, are an ethnic group primarily residing in Southwestern China, as well as in neighbouring countries in Mainland Southeast Asia, i.e., Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. Even though the surrounding Tai districts are also mentioned in this scholarship, no details are provided about Tai Nüa polities, i.e., Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò.

Regarding a comprehensive history of Mainland Southeast Asia, encompassing both macro and micro perspectives, Lieberman (2003 and 2009) offers a comprehensive analysis of the historical trajectory and incorporation of Mainland Southeast Asia within the larger framework of Eurasian history. The first volume integrates primary sources, indigenous surveys, and macro studies to examine the historical dynamics of the three main lowland corridors in the Indochina Peninsula. He posits that these corridors have undergone a recurring process of enhanced integration and sporadic fragmentation throughout history. This pattern is not limited to Southeast Asian land corridors but exhibits synchronicity with similar

developments in other regions of Eurasia.³⁴

Liebermann's ground-breaking work delves into comparative analysis of Southeast Asia with Russia, France, and Japan throughout the period of 800–1830. It aims to elucidate the reasons behind the fragmentation of the remaining regions of Eurasia, as opposed to the prevailing trend of integration.

Liebermann points out endeavours to integrate Southeast Asia into the broader context of global history and evaluate Eurasia's pre-modern history by employing meticulous case studies and macro-theoretical frameworks.³⁵ He asserts that Southeast Asia, Europe, Japan, China, and South Asia collectively exemplify evolutionary processes within the Eurasian continent, giving rise to intricate political and cultural frameworks. Liebermann sets Southeast Asia in the context of world history, reinterpreting the regional history of Southeast Asia from 800–1830 by investigating persistent trends of political, cultural, and commercial integration.³⁶ According to Lieberman, integration has been the prevailing trend in the historical context of Southeast Asia. The aforementioned principle also holds true for the compact Tai polities.

Woodside (1988) offers an initial comprehensive analysis of the governance systems in two traditional East Asian cultures, focusing on the comparison of civilian governments from an institutional standpoint. The author elucidates the manner in which the Vietnamese assimilated certain aspects of their political framework from the Chinese and then employed it in the governance of their customary interactions with Siam, Laos, and Cambodia. His work serves as an illustrative case study of the political system prevalent in Mainland Southeast Asia.

Overall, up until now, there have not been numerous scholarly publications on the three Tai Nüa polities in the Chinese language, and even fewer in English or Thai. This section will provide an introduction to the research status of Moeng Laem/ Kūng Ma and Moeng Bò. The collective investigation of the three Tai polities remains unexplored in academic inquiry. In this analysis, I will present the latest advancements in research pertaining to each of the three political entities individually.

1.2.1 Moeng Laem: Primary Sources and Secondary Sources

Moeng Laem is a Tai Nüa polity located on Yunnan's southern border. According to the local Tai chronicle,³⁷ written in Tham script, the Tai Nüa ancestors of Moeng Laem

³⁴ Liebermann (2003, i).

³⁵ Lieberman (2009, Preface).

³⁶ Lieberman (2003, 20).

³⁷ Dao Yongming (1986) and (1989).

came from the federation of Moeng Mao in the thirteenth century. Moeng Laem has close relations with the Shan States in Burma³⁸ and Sipsòng Panna since it is near these two places and has been influenced by their population, culture, languages, scripts, and religions.

Chinese historical sources of Moeng Laem can be found in local gazetteers or local geographical records. Moeng Laem, for instance, was first mentioned in the Chinese historical records as Mang Tianlian (Ch. 芒天連) in The Tang Era Yunnan Zhi (“Annals of Yunnan”) or “*Manshu*” by Fan Chuo (r. 862–863). Relevant geographical records include Yuan History Geographical Chronicle; A Glance at the General Geography of Great Yuan–Yunnan Province; and A Brief Gazetteer of Yunnan from the Yuan dynasty.³⁹

Information on the geography of Moeng Laem and the submission of tribute to Imperial China by local rulers was recorded in *Ming Shigao* (Draft of the History of the Ming Dynasty. Geography 5. Yunnan and Guizhou Vol. 22, MSG in abbreviation) by Wang Hongxu (1645–1723); *Mingshi* (History of the Ming Dynasty. Geography. Moeng Laem Chief’s Office, MS to abbreviation) by Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (b.1672–1755), et al., completed in 1736; and *Da Ming Huidian* (Collected Statutes of the Great Ming Vol. 113), edited by Li Dongyang and Shen Shixing (1497–1502).

History of the Ming Dynasty (i.e., *Mingshi*, MS for abbreviation), vol. 313. Biography 210: Yunnan *tusi* 1, 2 and 3 provide information about the relationships between Moeng Laem, the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao, and other Tai polities. Again, the *Ming Shilu* (Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty) of the Ming dynasty and *Yunnan Tongzhi* (A General Gazetteer of Yunnan) provide accurate and detailed information on a variety of subjects, such as geography, tributary history, history, and contemporary⁴⁰ relationships with surrounding polities (Cheli/Sipsòng Panna and Ava) and taxation.⁴¹

³⁸ The Shan States were under the jurisdiction of the British colonial government. Moreover, “the single Shan State within the Union of Burma, including the former Wa States, was formed in 1948.” For more details, see Maring and Maring (1973, 223–224). The term “Shan States” will be used in this thesis, because this term relates to the administrative and political context during the time of British jurisdiction.

³⁹ I.e., ‘Yuan History Geographical Chronicle’ (*Yuanshi dili zhi*, 元史•地理志); ‘A Glance at the General Geography of Great Yuan–Yunnan Province’ (*Da Yuan hunyi fangyu shenglan* (混一方輿勝覽 that is the Complete conspectus of [imperial] territory compiled by order of Kublai Khan in the Great Yuan>); and ‘A Brief Gazetteer of Yunnan from the Yuan dynasty’ (*Yunnan zhilue*, 雲南志略). Most of the manuscripts of the Yuan dynasty, which are related to the Tai in Yunnan, are collected and annotated in Fang Guoyu et al., ed. vol.3 (1998, 65–132) and Fang Guoyu (1958).

⁴⁰ This book was written in the 1720s by Jing Daomo who was the governor of Yaozhou, Yunnan in 1723.

⁴¹ See Chinese Text Project online library:

<https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=67772&page=83&remap=gb#%E5%AD%9F%E8%BF%9E>, accessed on 19 January 2021.

In Draft of the History of the Qing, the catalogue of geography and *tusi* briefly describes the geography and aboriginal rulers of Moeng Laem. The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 112 and 155 and 667 and 672 and 757 and Zhang Yunsui's Memorial⁴² record the internal and external conflicts among the Moeng Laem *tusi*, including the headman Guijia Gongliyan (Burmese: Gonglayin or Gwe *b.?* – 1762)⁴³. Fighting (1800–1803) between the Moeng Laem *cao fa* (*tusi*) and the Lahu headman is recorded in Xinzuan Yunnan Tongzhi (The New Compilation of General Gazetteer of Yunnan – Chapter 94, Volume 173/4 Textual Criticism on *tusi* 1/2). Gong Yin (1985, 551) briefly summarises the genealogy of the Moeng Laem *tusi* and the history of Moeng Laem under the jurisdiction of the Shunning Prefecture.

All the aforementioned Chinese materials are derived from Chinese official documents. Scholars may consider it as trustworthy information for comprehending the history of Moeng Laem. Yet, all those documents are biased towards the Chinese dynasties, leading to unavoidable Sinocentrism. When quoting Chinese texts, scholars must be cautious and compare them with chronicles written in Tham or Lik scripts.

A descendant of the Moeng Ma (located in Moeng Laem) *cao fa* named Zhang Haizhen (2004, her Tai name is Cao Kham Nuon) published a book about the history of Moeng Laem. She is a well-known Tai scholar of the history of Moeng Laem. However, her book cannot be strictly regarded as an accurate history of Moeng Laem because it is replete with unverifiable stories, fanciful tales, and even romantic love stories.

The local Tai perspective is reflected in various Tai script versions of the Moeng Laem Chronicle. I do not know when the Tai of Moeng Laem composed the earliest history of this small principality. However, when William Warry (1889) made his reconnaissance trip to Yunnan in the late 1880s, he found it worth mentioning that the Tai of Moeng Laem “possess[ed] a written history of their State, from which Mr Daly

⁴² Zhang Yunsui (張允隨, *r.* 1693–1751) was a judiciary and civil affairs official of Yunnan. He worked in Yunnan for thirty years and was thus familiar with the situation in the province.

⁴³ In the Chinese sources: Guijia Gongli yan (桂家宮裡雁 *b.?* – 1762) was a headman of one of the Gui groups. Gongli yan was not Burmese; he was a descendant of the Ming court migrants who arrived in Burma with the last Ming emperor, Yongli, according to QSG. As QSG Vol. 528 Biographies 315, Subordinations 3 records: “貴家者，隨永明入緬之官族也，其子孫自相署曰‘貴家’，據波龍廠采銀” (The Gui ethnic group officially came to Burma with Emperor Yongli. Its descendants named themselves “Gui group”, and they occupied Bolong Chang to mine silver). The original text can also be found in the online library: The Chinese Text Project: <https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=en&file=17858&page=43>, accessed on 14 June 2023. Therefore, based on the Qing Shigao (QSG), the Qing court believed that Gonglayin was originally descended from the followers of the last Ming emperor who fled to Burma in 1659/60. Alternatively, he could be from the hill tribes of Upper Burma, for more detailed information can be found in, e.g., Brailley (1970, 33–47). In the personal discussion with Wechat, Prof. Dr Laichen Sun also points both the claim of the Chinese accounts as Han Chinese or Yongli's descendants and that of Brailley as Karen are wrong. However, discussing the ethnicity of Gonglayin is beyond this thesis.

had kindly furnished me with some extracts.”⁴⁴ The Tai people have a specific tradition of recording their history, culture, and religion in texts called *tamnan* (ตำนาน) or *phün/pün* (พื้น), which can be rendered into English as “chronicle.”⁴⁵ Additionally, it was observed that the local populace possesses a limited number of relevant materials.

Four versions of the Moeng Laem Chronicles have been collected by Professor Volker Grabowsky. There are two Tham (Dhamma) versions and two Lik versions. The first one, which I have named MLCT1, is the Tham manuscript named “Forces of Moeng Laem” (*Chü Khlang (kamlang) Moeng Laem: ชื่อคลัง (กำลัง) เมืองแลม* in Thai), which Grabowsky translated into modern Thai. The second version, which I have named MLCT2, has been translated into Chinese by the local Tai scholar Dao Yongming (1986) (abbreviated to MLXFS). This manuscript is the so-called “The Chronicle of Moeng Laem Royal Family” (*Moeng Laem Luang Hò Kham: เมืองแลมหลวงหอคำ* in Thai).

In terms of the Lik materials, the first one, which I have named MLCL1, was transcribed by local scribes and collected in Yin Lun and Tang Li (Christian Daniels) and Zheng Jing (2010) (MLGJBM in abbreviation). This manuscript titled “The Chronicle of Moeng Laem *Cao Fa*”⁴⁶ (*Lik Phün Chao Hò Kham Moeng Laem: ลีคพื้นเจ้าหอคำเมืองแลม* in Thai) records the important events and history of Moeng Laem. I call the second version, also written in Lik script, MLCL2. It is known as “The History of Moeng Laem” (*Lik Phün Moeng Moeng Laem: ลีคพื้นเมือง เมืองแลม* in Thai). I collected it together with Prof. Dr. Volker Grabowsky on 25 December 2018, in Moeng Ma, which is in the western part of Moeng Laem close to the border to Myanmar. It has been translated into modern Thai by Northern Thai scholar Dr. Direk Injan who is affiliated with Chiang Mai Rajabhat University. The contents of these two Lik script manuscripts differ. The former gives an outline of Moeng Laem’s history, while the latter affords more detail on key events, such as conflicts between the Lahu people and Tai Nüa rulers.

⁴⁴ “From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 9, dated Bhamā, the 15th June 1891,” in Warry’s Report to Dehong [Mss Eur Photo Eur 284].

⁴⁵ *Tamnan* also means stories, myths, and legends in Tai. Wyatt (1976, 109) gives a detailed and concrete explanation: “The ‘earliest’ chronicle traditions indigenous to Siam are the *tamnān* (stories, legends) associated with the localities and principalities of northern Siam and generally (but not exclusively) with the predecessors of the major Buddhist kingdoms of Sukhothai, Lānā Thai (Chiang Mai), and Ayudhyā.”

⁴⁶ The collector and oral translator is Bo San (Tai: Po Saeng Sam), a prolific scribe in Moeng Laem. As Grabowsky (Goldston 2019, 311–312) transcribes, “Po Saeng Sam wrote his short biography on a sheet of mulberry paper, the traditional writing material, on the first day of the Buddhist New Year: ‘In 1948, [I] was ordained as a novice until 1955. I married in 1959 and became a local administrative official in 1981. I started to work for the Buddhist religion in 1985. And then, I made up my mind to transmit [these scripts] to the generations of my children and grandchildren.’ Throughout the Tai minority areas, Po Saeng Sam possesses one of the largest private collections of manuscripts, the vast majority of which he wrote himself.” The manuscript is written in the Tai Lü version of the Tham script on mulberry (*sa*) paper. This manuscript records historical events from the year 1488 CE until 2001. The manuscript, copied in 2006, comprises twenty-two folios. This manuscript has also been collected in MLGJBM.

Other chronicles, such as the Chiang Mai Chronicle (ตำนานพื้นเมืองเชียงใหม่ CMC in abbreviation) records the wars between Moeng Laem and Chiang Tung.⁴⁷ The wars and relations between Chiang Tung and Moeng Laem are also recorded in manuscripts written in local scripts (i.e., Tham and Lik),⁴⁸ including the Kengtung (Chiang Tung) State Chronicle (CTSC in abbreviation).⁴⁹ The Chronicle of Sipsòng Panna mentions Moeng Laem many times. This is unsurprising given the close relationship between both Tai polities.⁵⁰

However, it is important to note that all of these narratives in the four versions are also influenced by the perspectives of the authors, who might be connected to the Tai elites. This suggests that the Tai perceived other people living in mountainous areas as Kha, a type of dependency, and believed that their social status was inferior compared with that of the Tai. Moreover, given that the local chronicles of Tai consist of a blend of folklore, scholars need to take caution while reading them and, whenever possible, combine them with sources from other languages. A comprehensive assessment will be conducted on all the four versions Tai chronicle previously stated, and only the pertinent content will be selected. Considering this, MLCT2 and MLCL2 are directly relevant to the main subject of this thesis. Therefore, the translation of these two texts into English and their subsequent analysis will be conducted.

Furthermore, I have collected two Tham script inscriptions pertaining to the establishment of two monastic structures in Moeng Laem. These inscriptions might be regarded as indications of Tai Nüa cultures.

William Warry (1889) compiled detailed records of reconnaissance investigations in Southwest Yunnan, including the situation of Moeng Laem, Chiang Rung in Sipsòng Panna, and other places along the frontier, providing valuable insights into the political, social, and geographical aspects of the region during that period. Scott (1891) and the Scott Collection (1750–1910)⁵¹ provide valuable first-hand data from the nineteenth century, recorded during his travels to the Southwest frontier of China, including Moeng Laem. German historian and Tai specialist Grabowsky (2008, 1–54) has also written about Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna’s tributary relationships with China and Burma, the so-called “Chinese-Burmese condominium.”

With respect to secondary literature in the Chinese language, several Chinese

⁴⁷ Aroonrut and Waytt (2000, 176, 178, 190).

⁴⁸ Such as one Tham script version, which was translated into modern Thai by Professor Grabowsky.

⁴⁹ Namely Sao Sāimōng Mangrāi’s work which was published in 1981. See Sāimōng Mangrāi (1981).

⁵⁰ Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 16–18, 39, 41, 48–49, 52–62, 92, 128, 134–140, 146, 188–189, 196–197, 239, 243, 244, 248, 250–251, 291–292, 308, 336).

⁵¹ The Scott Collections is kept at Cambridge University Library. It contains Scott’s private collections and is rich in primary documents relating to Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma. I visited Cambridge University Library during 14–19 July 2022 and collected many relevant documents. Some of them will be used in this thesis.

scholars, such as Lu Hong (2005, 19–25), He Shengda (2002, 73–80), Yang Yuda and Yang Huifang (2004, 72–80), and Huang Zuwen (1988, 87–95) have written on Moeng Laem’s native official system and its relationship with Chinese dynasties and the war with Burma (Sino-Burmese War 1765–1769). By reading these literatures, scholars are able to acquire further knowledge on Moeng Laem. However, the Chinese secondary works may have a tendency to adopt a Sinocentric perspective; hence, academics should exercise caution while adopting this perspective.

1.2.2 Kūng Ma: Primary Sources and Secondary Sources

Kūng Ma is another Tai Nüa polity in the southwest of Yunnan that today comes under the jurisdiction of Lincang Prefecture. Their ancestors also came from the federation of Moeng Mao. Kūng Ma is near Burma (Myanmar) and, like Moeng Laem, it has been influenced by Burmese religion and culture, such as Theravada Buddhism, as well as its scripts and building styles.

In his translation and study of the Moeng Khòn (Mangshi) Chronicle, Christian Daniels points out that during the De’ang Tai wars in Mangshi, in the period 1816–1818, the Tai fled as far away as Mäng: (Moeng) Ting (Moeng Ting), Kūngma (Kūng Ma), Mäng: Khaa: (Khasi village in Changning County 昌寧縣卡斯村), Mäng: Yaa: (Wandian 灣甸; Changning County Wandian Xiang 昌寧縣灣甸鄉), and Mäng: Khëng (Zhenkang 鎮康).⁵² This conflict resulted in an influx of Tai Dehong into these areas during the early nineteenth century. The Kūng Ma Pacification Commission was set up during the late sixteenth century by the Ming dynasty. Prior to this, it belonged to Moeng Ting Prefecture. Before the fourteenth century, Moeng Ting was populated predominantly by Wa (Mon-Khmer speakers).⁵³

The first-hand Chinese manuscripts about Kūng Ma are mainly kept in the Kūng Ma Archives Office. These manuscripts record information concerning Chinese procedures for a *tusi*’s succession, confidential orders from the Chinese authority, such as: “The *tusi* Han Huaji of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission’s biography, resume, and household registration criteria”; “The *Tusi* Han Huaji of Gengma Sub-Pacification Commission’s biography, resume, and household registration criteria; and the “Confidential Order to Suppress the Rebellion of Yunnan Zhenbian fuyi zhili Prefecture.”

⁵² For more details, see Daniels (2013, 133–170).

⁵³ See Daniels (2005 and 2000, 60–66). He points out that Mon-Khmer polities were centred in the early Ming in Shunning Prefecture, where their polities Qingdian were located. The Chinese name for these Mon-Khmers was Pu Man. Jiang Yingliang has identified that this term refers to today’s Wa, Bulang, and De’ang peoples. Though not mentioned in Yuan and early Ming sources, scholars seem to connect the Wa of Cangyuan with the Qingdian Mon-Khmers.

It may be said that the first two manuscripts set up the criteria for the succession of Kūng Ma *tusi*. The final document was from the Qing court, which had issued an order to the Kūng Ma to suppress the Lahu people's rebellion. This material is authentic and pertains to the relationship that existed between the Qing court and Kūng Ma. It may be considered a first-hand source for the study of the disputes that occurred between the Qing court, Kūng Ma, and the Lahu people during the late Qing dynasty. Despite this, there are a few idioms or names for mountainous groupings that date back to the Qing dynasty that tend to differentiate meaning.

A local history of Kūng Ma was written in Chinese during the Republican period⁵⁴ and was included in *The First Draft of the Shunning County Gazetteer Vol. 10* (Shunning xianzhi chugao). Fang Guoyu's (2008, 125–155) "An Investigation of Western Yunnan Frontier" (Dianxi bianqu kaocha ji) provides an accurate description of the local society of Kūng Ma, Moeng Ting, and Moeng Laem. Moreover, the details regarding Moeng Ting during the Republican period are outlined in Zhou Guangzhuo's diary (republished in 2015).

The *Chronicle of Sipsòng Panna* (Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo 2012, 18, 188, 195, 291) records that Tai Lü nobles and officials always fled to Kūng Ma when wars and chaos broke out. The reference to Tai Lü lords and officials seeking shelter in Kūng Ma during periods of conflict and disorder highlights the intricate interplay of authority, sanctuary, and endurance in the historical narrative of Sipsòng Panna, therefore enhancing our comprehensive comprehension of the socio-political environment in the region.

Ms. Nan Guixiang (2013), a local Tai Nüa intellectual, provides a detailed and comprehensive introduction to Kūng Ma, which can be used as a first-hand source. The Thai scholar Chaophaya et al. (2001)⁵⁵ covers Tai Nüa and Tai Yai's history from the seventeenth until the twentieth centuries. Scholars and the local government of Kūng Ma have collected and translated parts of some local chronicles, which are written in Lik and Tham scripts. Yin Shaoting and Christian Daniels (Tang Li) (2005) provide a synopsis and other data concerning these sources.

Nagase-Reimer and Kim (eds.) (2013, 91) describe the distribution of mines in Kūng Ma. Kūng Ma is mentioned in the research of Ma Jianxiong (2021, 184), which points out that the formation of borderlines was partly decided by the dowries of chieftains' daughters in Southwest Yunnan. Some of the above research focuses mainly on Kūng Ma, while other studies mention Kūng Ma in the broader context.

Zhu Di (2016) made a creative argument in her master's thesis regarding Kūng Ma's borderland integration, i.e., how Kūng Ma balanced the relationships between

⁵⁴ ROC, 1911–1949 and 1949–to date in Taiwan, hereafter it refers to 1911–1949.

⁵⁵ His Thai name is: เจ้าพญาธรรมมาดี.

China and Burma and gained the most benefit from its development. Long Xiaoyan (2018, 22–33) shows how Kūng Ma was integrated into Chinese dynasties via the Mandala and tributary systems.

However, those works on Kūng Ma are not integrated with other Tai Nüa polities when it pertains to the Tai Nüa historical description in the Upper Mekong region. Moreover, “The pluralistic unity of the Chinese nation” (*duoyuan yiti* 多元一體), proposed by Fei Xiaotong (1999, 13), has largely impacted the majority of works concerning ethnic groups and the boundary in mainland China.⁵⁶

1.2.3 Moeng Bò: Primary Sources and Secondary Sources

Moeng Bò was known as Weiyuan in ancient Chinese records. As previously mentioned, Moeng Bò is the Tai name and Jinggu is the present Chinese official name. Bò means “mine” or “well” in the Tai language. Moeng Bò has four townships, which are mainly populated by Tai peoples: Moeng Luo (民樂村: Minle village); Moeng Ka (永平鎮: Yongping town); Moeng Pan (猛班村: Mengban village); and Moeng Bò (威遠鎮: Weiyuan town).

With respect to first-hand sources, the local Tai chronicle, entitled “The Royal Genealogy of the Moeng Bò”, is the only local chronicle written in a Tai script (Lik) and was discovered decades ago. This manuscript is called หนังสือพื้นเมืองเมืองบ่อช่ออุบปะละละ (*Nangsü pün moeng moeng bò chü kup pa la ta*) in modern Thai.⁵⁷ It was translated into modern Chinese and annotated by the local scribe Dao Yongming in the 1990s. It is a unique and valuable primary source, dealing mainly with the heritage of the local rulers and the history of Moeng Bò from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. Written in the Tai Nüa language and Lik script and Chinese, the Wat Moeng Bò (Th. วัดเมืองบ่อ, Moeng Bò Temple 2009: unpublished) is a bilingual record (Lik and Chinese), which is composed by local cultural associations of the Tai in Moeng Bò.

Moreover, I collected two inscriptions and one horizontally engraved Chinese character on a board (see Chapter 4) as examples to show my points (i.e., the cultural diversity and the borderland integration of the Qing court etc.). These were acquired over the course of the last several years of conducting fieldwork in Moeng Bò. There was one inscription that was written in two different scripts (i.e., traditional Chinese and Tham script), and another that was written in three different scripts (traditional Chinese, Lik and Tham scripts). When academics are promoting the study of Tai Nüa histories and cultures, the use of inscriptions and boards that are engraved horizontally

⁵⁶ This is a political idea that alludes to the unity of the Chinese people, despite their diverse ethnic lineages, cultures, and backgrounds.

⁵⁷ Many thanks go to the Lik script specialist Dr. David Wharton who translated this title written in the Lik script into modern Thai for me.

is not as prevalent as it is in other types of research. One may argue that this is a valid argument that this thesis makes.

Scattered records of Moeng Bò can be found in Chinese primary sources, but no monographs or systematic studies on the area have been published so far, except for a few papers on its history and the native officials' lineage. Moeng Bò did not leave many traces in Chinese historical records, but it is nonetheless mentioned in some Chinese classical texts. The most significant Chinese primary source was written in 1837 by Xie Tiren (2016 republished.), namely, “the Gazetteer of Weiyuan (Moeng Bò) Sub-prefecture (abbreviated to WYTZ)”. It provides comprehensive details on the local affairs of Moeng Bò. Taking Stub-Books of *Tusi* of the Ming Dynasty as the primary reference and a wealth of ancient materials as supplementary sources, Gong Yin (1985) made a brief introduction to the seats of local government, ethnicity, and administrative records, also providing a valuable chronology of events in the “Aboriginal Commissions” of Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture and Moeng Ka, as well as those of Moeng Pan. In addition, some books, such as JGXZ (1993) offer an overview of the local history and ethnography compiled by the local government of Moeng Bò.

Once more, the official writings of the classical Chinese language will always employ certain discriminatory phrases to designate the ethnic group mentioned. When the local people are viewed from the perspective of the imperial court, there is an unavoidable problem of Sinocentrism that arises.

Although he does not directly mention the history of Moeng Bò, Fang Guoyu (1958) provides some interesting analysis of the ethnic origins of Kainan Prefecture (including Weiyuan district). Moreover, Fang analyses Moeng Bò's geographical advantages in the Mongol-Yuan period. He holds the opinion that the Cangigu mentioned in The Travels of Marco Polo is Moeng Bò (Jinggu).⁵⁸ Jiang Yingliang (1983) discusses Moeng Bò (Jinggu) briefly without providing a thorough historical analysis. Based on the Gazetteer of Pu'er Prefecture, the Gazetteer of Weiyuan Sub-prefecture etc, the recent publication entitled The History of Pu'er Prefecture offers a comprehensive overview of the development of Pu'er Prefecture, including some mentions of Moeng Bò (Jinggu), namely, its historical scenery, well-known *tusi*, and the introduction of the Gazetteer of Weiyuan Sub-prefecture.⁵⁹ These sources provide us with basic information on Moeng Bò.

Furthermore, Grabowsky (2008, 9) points out that the “Tai Nüa of Müang Sing originate from Chiang Ku (Moeng Bò) and Müang Lò (Minle, part of Moeng Bò) in the Szemao (Simao Prefecture).” The Chronicle of Sipsòng Panna (Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo 2012, 35, 141, 151, 195, 279, 291) records that Sipsòng Panna

⁵⁸ See Fang Guoyu et al. (eds.) vol.3 (1998, 220).

⁵⁹ PPCC of Pu'er (2020, 88–92; 202–203; 303; 521).

annexed the territory of Moeng Bò. The nobles used to flee to Moeng Bò and then to Kūng Ma whenever there was social unrest in Sipsòng Panna. These sporadic records in English translations indicate that Moeng Bò had frequent interactions with other Tai polities.

Regarding the secondary sources, only a few studies on the local history of Moeng Bò have been published. Foon Ming Liew (1996) mentions the Luchuan (Moeng Mao) invasion of Chinese territory where there were predominantly Tai people, such as Ching-Tung (Jingdong) and Yongchang (in today's Baoshan), etc. Moeng Bò was also invaded by Hso Wen Hpa (Chau-ngan-Pha) in 1441, when the second Luchuan-Pingmian campaign was launched. Afterwards, Moeng Bò was bestowed an award by the Ming court for its resistance to Luchuan's invasion.

One notable exception is an outstanding study by the American historian and sinologist Giersch (2001, 67–94 and 2006, 131), who takes Moeng Bò (Jinggu/Weiyuan) as a middle ground to prove his view about social change and the shape of the modern frontier in Southwest Yunnan from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. However, Giersch relies mainly on Chinese sources and does not utilise the Moeng Bò chronicles or epigraphical written in local Tai (i.e., Tham and Lik) scripts.

In brief, no comprehensive study of the three Tai polities of Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò currently exists. Only Giersch (2001, 67–94) noticed the vital role of Moeng Bò in the transformation of China's southwest frontier. This research focuses on the survival politics of the Tai Nüa people living in this particular district of the frontier regions of present-day Southwest China, in order to shed light on their complex relations with the Chinese Empire, various Southeast Asian polities, other ethnic groups such as the Wa and Lahu, as well as the intricate interrelationships that evolved during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This study aims to enhance comprehension of several fundamental elements in a more comprehensive manner, which aims to understand the societal structures, customs, and everyday lives of the Tai Nüa people by examining their historical and cultural context. First this research examines the interconnections and affiliations between the Tai Nüa ethnic group and other ethnic groups, including the Wa and Lahu. It focuses on the cooperation and disputes that influence the region's dynamics. Second, it focuses on analyzing the policies and administrative measures of the Qing dynasty towards its southwest frontier, specifically the Tai Nüa and other local populations.

And then it aims to understand how these policies impacted the stability and governance of the region. That means examining the expansionist actions of Burma towards the Tai polities of Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma, as well as the impact of these invasions on the local Tai Nüa populations and their political strategy. Fourth, I

evaluate the overall historical influence of different interactions and policies on the progress of Tai Nüa cultures. This thesis offers valuable insights into their ability to withstand challenges, adapt, and change over time. Finally, the research endeavors to further our understanding of the Tai Nüa people and their historical importance in the wider context of Southeast Asian and Chinese frontier history by examining these specific features.

1.2.4 Main Sources used regarding the Boundary Demarcation Issue between China and Great Britain

1.2.4.1 British Archival Documents and Western Literature

The demarcation of the frontier between Yunnan and Burma is another important issue of this thesis. There are three main sources with respect to the demarcation issue between China (Tai polities of Yunnan) and Great Britain (demarcation issue hereafter): the British and Chinese archival documents and the very few local Tai records. There are many first-hand sources, however, the most relevant being Warry's Report on Dehong in 1889.⁶⁰ The British National Archives describes William Warry in the catalogue: Photocopies of Selected Official and Private Papers of William Warry (1854–1936). In addition, some other relevant archives are kept in the British Library, such as Tract Vol. 606⁶¹ and Tracts Vol. 727.⁶² A few notes about the Chinese frontier districts, such as Moeng Laem, Chiang Rung (Sipsong Panna) and Chen Pien (Zhenbian), are recorded in the Supplement to Report of the Intelligence Officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96. Furthermore, Peter Warry (2014, unpublished), who is William Warry's grandson, gave me a valuable biographic document and several pictures of William Warry.

Other intelligence documents are kept in the British Library with the Shelf Mark: Mss Eur F278/88/89/90 is the so-called Sir George Scott Correspondence on the Burma-Chinese Boundary during 1894–1896. The intelligence agent C.E.K. Macquoid, (1869–1945) contributes to the intelligence of India. Quarter Master General's Department. Intelligence Branch. Burma Division.⁶³ The Yunnan-Burmese frontier

⁶⁰ The full name of this confidential document kept in the British Library is: "Photocopies of selected official. And private papers of William Warry (1854–1936), acting assistant Chinese secretary, Peking 1881–82, special service, Government of India from 1885, political officer, Bhamo, Mandalay and Shwegu 1887–89, adviser to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, on Chinese affairs 1890–1904; including photocopies of maps of the Trans-Salween section of the Burmo-Chinese frontier." For the sake of convenience, I refer to this document simply as "Warry's report."

⁶¹ Direct Commerce with The Shan States and West of China.

⁶² Diary of Events of Military Interest in Burma for January 1894 Bhamo and the North.

⁶³ The British Library, Shelf mark (s): Asia, Pacific & Africa W 2280.

report in the “Appendix to Memorandum on Questions of Chief Importance in the American and Chinese Department” was extracted from “British Documents on Foreign Affairs.”⁶⁴ Francis (republished in 1996) describes the Tai districts in Laos and Yunnan, which he visited it during 1866–1868.

Other relevant secondary literature in English is also of high importance for this study. For instance, James Scott’s (2009) work has been referred to as the standard research pattern on the states of the highland of Southeast Asia, although not uncontroversial. Thongchai (1994) uses the concept of “geo-body” to explain the Siamese perspective on the borderlines between Siam and Burma, which can be seen as a pattern for studying the influences of the Mandala system in Mainland Southeast Asia. Baldanza (2016) examines the boundaries and relationships between Vietnam and China.

Regarding the China-Burma border issue, Syatauw (1961, 122–123) mentions that no mission was ever sent to investigate the situation in Upper Burma after the “Burma Terms,” which were signed in Guangxu Year 12 (24 July 1886) in Beijing. He was probably not aware of Warry’s report kept in the India Records Office of the British Library. Sadan (2008) uses British archival materials on Burma to deduce the principle of adopting crucial bits of intelligence in making diplomatic policies.

Secondary sources that explicitly mention Warry’s report include Hughes (1999) and Li Yi (2016), both of whom point out that Warry was an expert on Chinese affairs. Theoretical concepts of tributary relations have been developed by Takeshi (1999) and Higgins (1992), and their ideas aid in clarifying the tributary system in ancient China. Concerning the concept of “frontier” in Mainland Southeast Asia, Thongchai (1994), Walker (2009), as well as Horstmann and Wadley (2009) have developed profound ideas about frontier issues on the Indo-China Peninsula.

1.2.4.2 Chinese Archival Documents and Literature

The Chinese Correspondence

First-hand documents and archival material in Chinese are the most significant materials for the demarcation issue. Journals (diaries) and memorials written by diplomatic officers who were directly involved in the negotiation with the British are the most reliable sources. A good example of this would be Zeng Jize (1885) and Xue Fucheng (1894, 1975, and 1985), two outstanding diplomatic officers who participated in the delineation of the boundary between Yunnan and Burma with the British. Other official records and secondary literature are also employed. These sources are analysed and compared to help us render a more accurate representation of the historical record.

⁶⁴ British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series E, and Volume 23.

The Chinese Correspondence comprises memorials and journals related to the demarcation of borders between China and Britain during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One important work is “The Historical Materials of Diplomacy of the Late Qing Dynasty”,⁶⁵ compiled from the archives of the Grand Council and the Foreign Office. The WJSL was initiated by the grandfather Wang Yanwei (王彥威),⁶⁶ finished by the son Wang Liang (王亮),⁶⁷ and proofread by the grandson Wang Jingli (王敬立).⁶⁸ It was officially published in 1934, comprising six parts and 269 volumes. It is an important historical document for the study of foreign relations during the reign of Guangxu (*r.* 1875–1908) and Xuantong (*r.* 1909–1912). It is regarded as the first and most comprehensive historical record of foreign diplomacy in the late Qing period. Many memorials were written by ministers who dealt with frontier issues, for instance, Zeng Jizhe (*b.* 1839–1890) and Xue Fucheng (*b.* 1838–1894). Zeng was the ambassador to Britain and France from 1878 to 1885. His successor Xue Fucheng was the ambassador to Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium from 1889 to 1894. Both men were directly involved in frontier negotiations with Britain. Most of their memorials can be found in WJSL. Some of Xue Fucheng’s memorials can be found in his literature, such as *The Journal of the Mission to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium*⁶⁹ and *The Delimitation of Yunnan and Burma*.⁷⁰ Memorials of other ministers, such as Cen Yuying (1829–1889), can be found in *The Collections of Cen Yuying*.⁷¹

The demarcation of borders between the Qing and Britain, which involved Moeng Laem, was mentioned in the *Draft of the History of the Qing• Diplomatic Annals• Britain* (Vol. 154, Annals 129) (Qing shigao• bangjiao zhi• ying jili: juan yibai wushisi zhi yibai ershiji). The collections of Zeng’s Telegrams, as well as those of Xue Fucheng (1887–1894), Yao (1892), and Xue Fucheng (comp.) (1902 and 1975: 22–23)⁷² outline the strategic importance of Moeng Laem as a frontier for guarding the borders of the Qing court.

All these officials were directly involved in the border negotiations and their documents provide details concerning the situation along the border. In terms of official records, Wang Yanwei et al. (1987) edited the historical data pertaining to the diplomatic activities during the Qing dynasty and these records should be considered

⁶⁵ In Chinese 清季外交史料: Qingji Waijiao shiliao, abbr. WJSL.

⁶⁶ 王彥威: 1842–1904, the Minister of the Grand Council.

⁶⁷ 王亮: 1880–1966, who served as an official in the Foreign Office of the Qing court.

⁶⁸ For more details, see: Li Yumin (2015, 13–24) and Yan Zhenfei (1991, 278–280).

⁶⁹ *Chushi Ying Fa Yi Bi siguo riji* (出使英法義比四國日記) by Yuelu Press in 1985, abbr. CSRJ.

⁷⁰ *Dianmian huajie tushuo* (滇緬劃界圖說): by Chengwen Publishing House in 1902, abbr. HJTS.

⁷¹ *Cen yuying ji* (岑毓英集) by Guangxi Minzu Press in 2005, abbr. CYYJ.

⁷² That is: “The Memorial of taking back of the whole Cheli and Menglian (On 27, month seventh, Guangxu Years 19).”

as crucial primary sources.

The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty (QSL) and The Draft of History of the Qing Dynasty (QSG)

There are several official records of the Qing dynasty, but not all of them are considered reliable. The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty (*Qing Shilu*, QSL hereafter) is an authentic record that details the emperors' daily life during the Qing dynasty.⁷³ Liew-Herres and Grabowsky (2008, 12–13) provides a detailed and clear explanation of the Veritable Records:

As a rule, the “Standard History” (*zhengshi* 正史) of a dynasty of Imperial China was compiled after the fall of the dynasty by its successor, i.e., ... It was the sacred duty of the new dynasty to compile the official history of the defunct dynasty. This was the tradition of Imperial China since the great historian Sima Qian 司馬遷 (born in c. 145 BC) of the Han period (Western Han, BC 206–AD 8; Eastern Han, AD 25–220) had set the example in his epoch-making work, the *Shiji* 史記 (Historical Records).

The main sources of a standard dynastic history are the “Veritable Records”, called the *Shilu*. The “Veritable Records” of a reign were compiled after the death of each emperor by order of his successor and the main sources on which the “Veritable Records” are based are the “Diaries of Activity and Repose”, called the *Qiju zhu* 起居注, which are the “Audience Records”. However, the *Qiju zhu* dating before the Ming period did not survive; only the *Qiju zhu* of 357 days in AD 618 of the founder the Tang dynasty (618–907), Li Yuan 李淵 (*r.* 618–626), has been preserved. The *Qiju zhu*, not written for publication, might have been burnt after the compilation of the “Veritable Records” of the reign of an emperor.

QSL is compiled from the records in the *Qiju zhu* (“Diaries of Activity and Repose”). They are the daily record of the officials who attended to the emperor’s daily life. The *Qiju zhu* were assembled into volumes known as *Qiju zhuce*.⁷⁴ The annalistic style of writing was used in the *Qiju zhu*. One or two volumes of these diaries were compiled per month. Diaries would be recorded on the same day, compiled every month, and finalised in the early part of the next year. They were labelled with the temple name.⁷⁵ Therefore, the *Qiju zhuce* were produced earlier than the *Shilu* and thus are more valuable.⁷⁶ Moreover, the *Qiju zhu* were not always burnt after the death of the emperor. As Liew-Herres (Ibid, 12–13) explains, it is through this process that the *Qiju zhuce* of several emperors were preserved.

⁷³ The original document is now kept in The National Palace Museum of Taipei. Treaties and Maps that defined the Qing’s Southwest Boundaries. Exhibition Room North Yard Gallery 104.

⁷⁴ Zhuang Jifa (1979, 189–209).

⁷⁵ The temple name is *miaohao* (廟號) in Chinese; briefly, it is the “posthumous title of an emperor,” according to an explanation from a Han dictionary. See the online dictionary link: <https://www.zdic.net/hans/%E5%BA%99%E5%8F%B7>, accessed on 29 April 2021.

⁷⁶ Feng Erkang (2004, 27–33).

Usually, the emperor would appoint a trusted minister or grand secretary to oversee the compilation. Based on *Qiju zhuce*, QSL has 4,363 volumes. Two versions have been published – the Taiwan version and the Zhonghua Shuju–Bashu Shushe version.⁷⁷ It is a significant primary source when studying the Qing dynasty.

Another official record is called The Draft of History of the Qing Dynasty (*Qing Shi Gao*, QSG hereafter). It was compiled using the traditional Chinese chronological writing system and is slightly different from QSL. The QSG is a draft history of the Qing dynasty. It is called a draft because it was not complete when it was published in 1928. As mentioned before, the history of the former dynasty was written by its successor. However, after the demise of the Qing dynasty, the ROC was not an effective centralised government, thus a standard history of the Qing was never completed.⁷⁸

The office for the compilation of Qing history (*Qing shiguan*) was established in 1914 by the ex-president Yuan Shikai (b. 1859–1916), who was also a powerful minister in the late Qing dynasty.⁷⁹ The editors were former high-ranking officials in the Qing court, who were in no position to give objective evaluations, so one must read the QSG with great caution.

As Feng Erkang (2004, 45–48) states, the dean Zhao Erxun (b. 1844–1927) was the viceroy of three northern provinces in the late Qing dynasty. His successors include Ke Shaomin (b. 1848–1933), Liao Quansun (b. 1844–1919), and Wang Shuqiao (b. 1851–1936). Over 300 scholars participated in this project and contributed their viewpoints to the compilation. However, some remained loyal to the Qing court and attacked the government of ROC, while others took the opposite approach. As a result, the Qing court's former official, who harbored a dislike for the ROC, penned the QSG from a variety of perspectives.

Moreover, the editors seemingly collected random writings without any discernible selection mechanism. Mistakes were likely introduced. The QSG was first done in 1920, finalised in 1927, and published in 1928. Although the QSG is partial to mistakes and biased viewpoints, it also contains a lot of solid materials and a detailed index, all of which are highly beneficial to the academic world (Feng Erkang 2004, 45–48). One memorial from Xue Fucheng noted in QSG is adopted as an essential argument for this chapter. In short, although both QSL and QSG are used, QSG is deemed to have less credibility as a reliable source.

Chinese Secondary Literature

Chinese studies on the Sino-Burma frontier issue abound since the early twentieth

⁷⁷ Feng Erkang (2003, 325–336).

⁷⁸ The government comprised of different factions and China was embroiled in conflict between competing warlords. For more details, see Zhang Xin (2005, 210).

⁷⁹ Feng Erkang (2004, 45).

century. Two key contrasting opinions have been expressed regarding Xue Fucheng's negotiations with the British and the resultant treaty clauses between China and Britain. Authors such as Zhang Chengsun, Yin Mingde, Fang Guoyu, and Yu Dingbang have strongly criticised Xue Fucheng as a traitor following the rise of Chinese nationalism after the establishment of the ROC and PRC. They predominantly blame Xue Fucheng for losing hundreds of square miles of the southwestern territories.

On the other hand, others, such as Lü Yiran (1995, 57–72) and Zhang Zijian (2007, 108–116), praise Xue Fucheng's efforts. Zhu Shaohua (2007, 43–51), for instance, argues that Xue Fucheng did his best in the southwestern territories by taking back Cheli (Sipsòng Panna) and Moeng Laem, retaining Kokang (old Bhamo, Ch: 果敢), and even managed to expand the southwest territory of Yunnan. The articles and books praising Xue Fucheng's efforts were mostly published after the 1990s and based on numerous primary Chinese and English sources. These are essential pieces of recent scholarship regarding Yunnan-Burma frontier issues.

1.2.4.3 Local Records in Tai and Burmese

The voices of local polities will be compared with the English and Chinese texts to reveal the connections between these sources. Wang Mingke (1997, 337–338) has observed that most historical studies of ethnic groups in China have relied only on Chinese texts and neglected non-Chinese texts.⁸⁰ However, Chinese records are heavily biased towards politics and pay little attention to topics that are not related to governance. Local records on religions, social customs, and linguistics can help trace the origin of ethnic groups, and hence help us reconstruct historical events in the area chronologically. It is the most effective way to delve into their intertwining Chinese and local histories.

The indigenous Tai records mainly exist in the form of chronicles. The Tai people have a specific tradition of recording their history, culture, and religion. As mentioned before, it is called *tamnan* (ตำนาน) or *phün/pün* (พิน), which can be rendered into English as “chronicle.” I also found that relevant materials kept by the local population are scarce.

For Tham script materials, some were transcribed into modern Thai by my supervisor: Prof. Dr. Volker Grabowsky, while others were translated into Chinese by local scribes who participated in the project “A Synopsis of Dai Old Manuscripts in Menglian County of Yunnan, China” (Zhongguo Yunnan Menglian Daiwen guji bianmu,

⁸⁰ Concerning the study of modern ethnology in China, English texts are likely used as the ethnology theoretical principles. However, the theory of ethnology actually originated from Germany in the mid-eighteenth century (for more details, see Yuan Tongkai and Yuan Zhaoyu 2016, 25–40).

MLGJBM in abbreviation), published in 2010. One of the manuscripts titled “Historical events in Moeng Laem”⁸¹ (Lik Phün Chao Hò Kham Moeng Laem: ลឹกพุ้นเจ้าหอคำเมืองแลม in Tai) records some relevant description of the border issues. It briefly stated: “In 1885, the British occupied Mandalay.” Later, it noted: “In 1890, the British came to Moeng Laem and stayed in the Mang Jing. In 1896, a British aeroplane landed in Na Lai Ang.”⁸² Lastly, “in 1898, the British came to Moeng Laem and surveyed the boundary, from Nan Ka River to Lai Sanmeng (the borders of Moeng Laem, Chiang Rung and Moeng Yang).”

In Kūng Ma, historical events were mainly written in Lik script. The life story of Kūng Ma *cao fa* Han Futing, as well as works on local geography and history are all valuable first-hand accounts of the area. Some works have been translated into Chinese. “The collection of The Classical Ancient Manuscripts of Gengma Dai People” (GJDC in abbreviation), published in 2012, contains letters between local rulers of Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem. It also covers the regulations of etiquette and tax in Kūng Ma. Unfortunately, no mention of British-Chinese border issues could be found so far. The collection “A Synopsis of Old Dai Manuscripts in Gengma County” (GJBM in abbreviation) contains only a few notes on border issues.

Upon the arrival of Western colonial powers in Southwest China, Moeng Bò had already been integrated into inland China, and it was therefore not involved in borderline issues. The *gaitu guiliu* policy was promoted in Moeng Bò in 1724 and the *cao fa* of Moeng Bò, named Dao Guanghuan, was cashiered and exiled to Jiangxi province. After dozens of years of suppression, the Tai elites were integrated into China.⁸³ Hence there are rarely any local scripts about the borderline issue in Moeng Bò.

Comparatively, overall, Moeng Laem left more records regarding borderline issues than Kūng Ma, while hardly anything relevant can be found in Moeng Bò. However, another reliable source is from Kengtung (Chiang Tung), whose State Chronicle provided another brief glimpse into the borderline issues. The chronicle was edited and translated into English by Sao Sāimōng Mangrāi (1981, 277).

Regarding relevant documents in the Burmese language, some translations can be found in Chinese, but none in English so far. In “The Collections of Cen Yuying” (Cen Yuying ji), several Burmese petitions related to its tributary relationship with China from 1874 until 1886 are recorded. However, there is no denying that the lack of

⁸¹ About the collector, see Chapter One, fn. 43.

⁸² There is no more reliable evidence beyond the Tai script about whether the airplane appeared in Moeng Laem in 1896. I assume the manuscript may have made a mistake vis-à-vis the specific date, which is a commonplace occurrence in Tai chronicles.

⁸³ See Ma Jianxiong (2007, 592).

Burmese sources is the weakest link in Chapter Six.

1.3 Research Purpose

To the best of my knowledge, the historical transformation of Tai Nüa areas located in the Upper Mekong region and their interaction and relationships between Yunnan and Mainland Southeast Asia have not yet been seriously studied by Tai scholars in Yunnan or by scholars in Southeast Asia and Western countries. Even though there are some short summaries about it, they lack detail. The lack of scholarly interest might be partially related to the fact that the Tai people of these three places have not founded viable and powerful polities in the past, such as the Tai Lü of Sipsòng Panna and the Tai Nüa of Dehong, the latter even able to build up the powerful Tai confederation of Moeng Mao Long, which challenged the Chinese authorities in Yunnan during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. All this explains why so few scholars have paid attention to the historical development of the Tai Nüa areas.

The example of the Tai Nüa areas is essential to shedding new light on the local history of the Tai Nüa polities in southwestern China, especially the time when the Sipsòng Panna (Cheli) and Moeng Laem paid tribute to both Burma and the Ming China.⁸⁴ In the eighteenth century, the *gaitu guiliu* was promoted in southwestern Yunnan. The inland Tai vassal kingdoms, located in close proximity to the imperial realm or serving as the frontier gateway of the Chinese Empire, were incorporated into the territorial domain of the Qing Empire. In contrast, other Tai vassal states (such as Chiang Tung and part of present-day Laos), further away from the hinterland Qing empire, were annexed into Southeast Asia, especially after the arrival of Western colonial powers. For example, Moeng U (Yot Ou district in Laos) and U De (today located in the modern part of Phongsaly province, Laos), of the twelve Pannas of Sipsòng Panna,⁸⁵ were taken by France in 1895.

Scholars who study the border areas of Mainland Southeast Asia and Yunnan prefer to focus on Chinese and English sources. However, this thesis will also use Tai manuscripts to trace the Tai elites' reaction to Burma and China when both parties imposed military or political influence on them. Their strategies to balance and deal with the relationships between China and Burma will reveal the strategy for the political survival of these small Tai Nüa polities.

Therefore, the main purposes of this research first centre on: clarifying the historical and social transformation of these three Tai Nüa polities during the eighteenth to the late nineteenth century; clarifying the relationship between Tai Nüa polities, the

⁸⁴ See Grabowsky (2008).

⁸⁵ *Panna* means one thousand *mu* (a unit of area, one *mu* = 0.0667 hectares).

Qing Empire, and Mainland Southeast Asian polities; and understanding the relationships of highland ethnic groups (Wa and Lahu) and the local Tai Nüa.

Secondly, I will explore the reasons for the borderline demarcation in Southwest China considering the arrival of Western colonial powers; furthermore, I trace the borderline demarcation of Southwest China in the Tai Nüa polities (Küing Ma and Moeng Laem) and evaluate the demarcation clause.

Thirdly, I will analyse the policies of the Chinese Empire and Burma towards the three Tai Nüa polities and elucidate how those polities reacted to and balanced their relationships with these two big powers. The clarification of the history of the Tai Nüa district will provide a suitable case study for scholars who intend to undertake further research on Southwest Yunnan and Mainland Southeast Asia. This study is not only relevant for scholars who want to understand the nature of the Southwest frontier of China, but also for maintaining the cultural heritage of the local society. For these purposes, it is imperative to delineate historical changes in these Tai districts.

It must be noted that these objectives are not only significant for expert researchers studying the Tai Nüa polities of the Upper Mekong but also for the local people, who are the true owners of the history of the region.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Research Method

This research follows an interdisciplinary approach, combining historical methodology with ethnography. It aspires to reconstruct the history of the Tai Nüa district and examine the relationship of the Tai with the Yunnan government and northern Mainland Southeast Asia polities within the context of the situation from the mid-eighteenth to late-nineteenth centuries.

First, historical methods were applied to collect relevant Tai, Chinese, and English sources. Tai and Chinese sources are summarised and translated into English. This research involves analysing, categorising, and comparing relevant sources in order to identify the relationships between them.

The ethnographical methodology is adopted to analyse the origins and ethnicity of Tai-speaking groups and their relationships with Mon-Khmer and Tibeto-Burman groups.

In recent years, Tai specialists, not only local scribes and Western scholars but also Chinese scholars, have paid increasing attention to Tai manuscripts.⁸⁶ Therefore, the

⁸⁶ There are two waves of translating the Tai manuscripts into Chinese. The first wave arose in the 1980s. The Office for the Planning, Publication and Collation of Old Manuscripts of the Committee for Nationalities in the Yunnan provincial government, which was led by Dao Yongming etc., collected, edited, and translated several local

interpretation and transcription of local written and oral records are significant steps in studying the history of ethnic groups. Furthermore, the reconstruction of a reliable chronology of historical events remains a prerequisite to determining the origin of the Tai ethnic group in a particularity of places, such as Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò. Combining Tai manuscripts, Chinese historiographies, Thai sources, and English archives is a feasible method for seeking the hidden truth behind different historical events.

1.4.2 Scope of the Research

Scope of Fieldwork

My fieldwork focuses on Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò. A comparative analysis of the relationships between the Tai polities of Moeng Mao, Moeng Lü, and the Qing Empire has also been conducted. Those parts of northern Laos that are inhabited by Tai Lü and Tai Nüa, moreover, are also envisaged as part of this research, because Moeng Ka (one of the townships of Moeng Bò, Ka means seedling of wet rice in local Tai language) has had a close relationship with northern Laos over the last 150 years,⁸⁷ while Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem maintained a close relationship with Burma.⁸⁸

Scope of Chinese, Tai, English and Thai sources

This thesis is based on four types of sources – Tai, Thai, English, and Chinese – which will provide different perspectives for digesting the history of the Tai Nüa polities and their role in the historical transformation from the mid-eighteenth until the late nineteenth century.

The Chinese records indicate that the Tai Nüa polities were either tributary or frontier states of the Chinese Empire, with a leaning towards central Sinocentrism in their perspectives and descriptions. However, the Chinese official records are authentic and detailed and thus can be seen as reliable sources, such as QSL, QSG, and WJSL.⁸⁹

chronicles of Tai polities in 1980s (see JGTSSX and MLXFS); the second wave has occurred since the 2000s. Yin Shaoting, Daniels, and Yin Lun have collected, edited, and translated several Tai manuscripts in Dehong, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Laem (see Yin Shaoting and Daniels et al. (eds.) 2002 and 2005; Yin Lun and Daniels et al. (eds.) 2010). Moreover, the Palm Leaf Manuscripts centre of Yunnan University worked with the local government of Sipsòng Panna to collect and publish *The Complete Works of Palm Leaf in China (100 Volumes)*, see the editorial committee of *The Complete Works of Palm Leaf in China* 2010. Furthermore, the Autonomous County of Kūng Ma Dai and Wa Nationalities edited and published *The Classical Ancient Manuscripts of Kūng Ma Dai People* (abbr. GJDC, 2012).

⁸⁷ See Grabowsky and Renoo (2008, 9).

⁸⁸ See Htin Aung (1967, 84–103).

⁸⁹ QSL is an abbreviation of *Qing Shilu*, the so-called *Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty*, QSG is an abbreviation of *Qing Shigao*, the so-called *The Draft of History of the Qing Dynasty*. WJSL is an abbreviation of *Waijiao Shiliao*, the so-called *Historical Materials of Diplomacy of Late Qing Dynasty*.

Secondly, in order to rebuild the history of the locality properly, it is crucial to do so from the perspective of the locals. I mainly adopt the Tai sources, such as indigenous Tai manuscripts and several inscriptions.⁹⁰ The primary Tai sources are historical texts, which were reproduced (i.e., handwriting copies) either before the 1950s or after the early 1980s. Many local scribes still reproduce and preserve a number of Tai manuscripts in Tham Lü, Tham Khün, and Lik scripts in Moeng Laem.⁹¹ The manuscripts culture in the Tai Nüa areas is still alive and worth studying. Several chronicles of Moeng Laem are found to be written in the Tham and Lik scripts. So far, four versions of the Chronicle of Moeng Laem have been found by Grabowsky. However, there is also the issue that the Tai manuscripts contain some legends and fairy tales, which renders them less reliable compared to the Chinese and English records.

Third, the description of the Tai Nüa polities from the English correspondences, reports, and confidential intelligence can provide more data on the internal workings of Tai societies. The English sources provide mainly first-hand information from journals, confidential reports, or correspondence written by Western scholars, intelligence officers, and explorers who visited Southwest China or Southeast Asia during the nineteenth century. This dissertation, for instance, examines revealing correspondence written by two British intelligence officers, namely, Sir James George Scott (1851–1935) and William Warry (1854–1936). Furthermore, English books written by scholars in the field of Tai, and Southeast Asia studies are also studied.

Finally, modern Thai sources also help to obtain further information from the Siamese perspective. The modern Thai sources are mainly the CMC (Chiang Mai Chronicle) and CTSC (Chiang Tung State Chronicle), which are translated into modern Thai. Both can be regarded as a first-hand source. Moreover, Thai scholars' studies of the Tai Nüa people also inform the data used in this thesis, in particular, Thammātē (2001) describes the history of Tai Nüa or Chinese Shan during the Qing regime (1644–1912).

Thus, the comparison of all four types of sources can help us to reconstruct the local history and interrelationships between the different parties: Tai Nüa; the Mainland Southeast Asia polities (Burma and Chiang Tung); Chinese authorities; and inner ethnic groups (Wa and Lahu).

⁹⁰ The first inscription is written in three scripts (Tham, Lik, and Chinese) and two languages (Tai and Chinese). It is located in Wat (monastery) Pata Ruikung, Moeng Ka, Moeng Bò; the second is written in two scripts (Tham and Chinese) and two languages (Tai and Chinese). It is located in Heping village, Yizhi town, Moeng Bò. The third inscription is written in Tham script and is located in the Wat (monastery) Moeng Ma in Moeng Laem.

⁹¹ For more details, see Grabowsky and Apiradee (2013, 11–54), see also Veidlinger (2006, 103–132).

1.5 Research Questions and Structure of the Dissertation

I begin by laying out the main issues addressed in the seven chapters of this thesis. First, I study the three Tai Nüa polities of Moeng Laem, Küng Ma, and Moeng Bò collectively, and not individually as has been done by scholars both inside and outside China. By analysing these three polities as an organic whole, I aim to show how the history of Tai Nüa polities evolved within the wider regional context of Yunnan and Mainland Southeast Asia.

Second, Sinocentrism has led some scholars to overlook the local characteristics and unique individuality of Tai polities in Yunnan. Conversely, in attempting to emphasise the uniqueness of Tai polities, other scholars have neglected the historically close relationship these three Tai Nüa polities maintained with both Mainland Southeast Asian polities and Chinese dynasties. To avoid the pitfall of Sinocentrism, I adopt a local perspective and pay close attention to the interactions and relationships with Chinese dynasties and indigenous and colonial powers in Southeast Asia, which simultaneously had an impact on the three Tai Nüa polities.

Furthermore, in my fieldwork, I have uncovered numerous Chinese and Tai primary sources about these three polities. Of particular importance are the Tai historical manuscripts that I have located. Reading and comparing Tai sources written in multiple scripts and languages is essential for understanding ethnic histories. I have collected and digested Chinese, Tai, English and Thai (Siamese) materials to explore the history and social development of the Tai Nüa districts in the Upper Mekong region.

The introduction in Chapter One contains three sections detailing the background, literature review, and research aims. Chapter Two analyses the theoretical framework of this research. Chapter Three mainly focuses on the historical development of, and relationships between, small Tai polities in Southwest Yunnan and upper Mainland Southeast Asia during the second half of the eighteenth century.

Chapter Four and Five examine the balance between Tai Nüa polities and Chinese dynasties in the nineteenth century. They also analyse the interrelationships between Tai Nüa rulers and other borderland ethnic groups, such as the Wa and Lahu. The chapters also examine political and social developments among Tai groups and their external relations with Han migrants, the Lahu, and the Wa. These chapters highlight the survival politics and political strategies of Tai Nüa districts, impacting both locals⁹² and the elite.⁹³

Chapter Six examines how the borders of the Tai Nüa districts changed during

⁹² Non-Han peoples were influenced by the lifestyles, worldviews, and value systems of those Han people who migrated to the Tai, Lahu, and Wa areas.

⁹³ For instance, stemming from the political and educational influences of the Qing court.

the late nineteenth century. It details the formation of the borderline between Southwest China and Upper Burma, especially following the arrival of Western colonial powers in the nineteenth century. Chapter Seven, the conclusion, provides an overview delineating crucial periods in the history of Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma and Moeng Bò. I then outline the significance of these three polities as case studies vis-à-vis the formation of the borderline between Yunnan and Upper Burma.

The next chapter will discuss the theoretical consideration and structure of this thesis.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Consideration

In Chapter One, I introduced the three Tai Nüa polities and reviewed existing studies on them in order to provide readers with some historical background. In this chapter, I will discuss the theoretical approach I adopt towards the main issues addressed in this thesis.

2.1 Theoretical Considerations

2.1.1 The Native Official (*tusi*) / Pacification Commission System

Native Official System

The native official (*tuguan*) system or the native office (*tusi*) system, also known as the Pacification Commission system, was officially established during the Yuan period (1271–1368) and continued through the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1636–1911) dynasties. The jurisdictions of native officials were populated predominantly by non-Han Chinese ethnic groups. In Yunnan and upper Mainland Southeast Asia, local rulers and princes were called *cao fa* or *cao móm* in the local Tai languages. In Chinese sources, their names were prefixed with *zhao* 召 (Th. เจ้า: ruler, lord) or *dao* 刀 or *tao* 陶 (Th. ท้าว: King or ruler).

Liew-Herres and Grabowsky provide the following brief introduction to the Chinese native official system:

The *tusi* system can be traced back to the so-called “prefecture under loose reins” (*jimi fuzhou* 羈縻府州) established during the Tang (618–907) and Song periods (960–1279), to integrate the “foreigners or barbarians” (*yi* 夷 or *man* 蠻), namely tribal peoples, of the southern border regions into the Chinese system of rule.¹

It is from this brief explanation that we are able to comprehend that the native official system was initially referred to as the *jimi* system and that it was established throughout the Tang and Song dynasties. In order to handle the remote southern regions in a nominal capacity, the rulers of the Yuan dynasty adopted this system and changed its name to the native official system thereafter. To be more specific, the local administration was not under the jurisdiction of the province governors, which enabled the Tai *cao fa* to rule under their traditions and sentence individuals to death without having to disclose their actions to the Chinese dynasties. However, the complexity of the native official system cannot be fully explained in a few sentences. Since the

¹ Liew-Herres and Grabowsky (2008, 26)

twentieth century, many scholars have tried to interpret how this system functioned. It is an intriguing, but also controversial issue for scholars.

Zhu Di (2016, 10) has concisely summarised the development of the native official system and addressed the reason for its creation.² Imperial Chinese dynasties were obsessed with the issue of how to effectively manage the Southern, Western, and Southwestern borderlands and how best to guard their core territories. The *Jimi* fuzhou zhi (羈縻府州制), or “prefecture under loose reins”³ system, was in place (i.e., South and Southwest China) from the Qin dynasty (BCE 221–BCE 206) to the Song dynasty (CE 960–1279). The *tusi* zhidu (土司制度), or “native official system,” began during the Yuan dynasty (CE 1271–1368) and continued onwards. Both systems were utilized throughout the history of Chinese dynasties until the end of the Republic of China period on mainland China (1912–1949).

The native official system was much more mature than the *Jimi* system.⁴ It proved to be not only an effective strategy for Chinese dynasties but also, to a large extent, a practical one for the Tai polities as well. Tai rulers paid tribute to the Chinese courts and governed their people in their own territories. They were able to live their lives without much interference from the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. Even when local rulers revolted, if they repented and resumed paying tribute they would be rewarded, because sometimes (sometimes they did not have other options), the Chinese dynasties wanted to show their mercy to the tributary states.⁵ In this case, the native official system provided both sides with a win-win strategy. The native official system was not only an essential strategy for Chinese dynasties to manage the local populations of remote border areas, which they could not directly administer on a day-to-day basis, but it also gave local rulers flexibility in governing their own jurisdictions. On the one hand, local rulers wanted protection from Chinese dynasties;⁶ on the other hand, they did not want to be directly governed by them (see D1).


² In 1908, the famous KMT senior statesman, Li Genyuan (*b.* 1879–1965), from Tengchong in Yunnan, published an article on “The *Tusi* of Yunnan.” This article can be regarded as a pioneer study of the *tusi* of China.

³ The term “*Jimi*” refers to a system of governance known as indirect rule, characterised by a relatively lenient approach to governing. The *Jimi* system (羈縻制度), often known as the system of reigning without governing, refers to the official native office system. The system employed in China throughout the period spanning from the seventh to the eleventh centuries was designed to effectively govern and oversee self-governing administrative and political entities. See Peng Jianying (2004, 104–108).

⁴ For more details, see Gong Yin (1992, 1–18).

⁵ Xie Shizhong (1997, 232).

⁶ Because a *cao fa* could consider Chinese dynasties as his super protector (Ibid., 233).



D1: A Spatial-historical diagram derived by me to illustrate relations between China and border areas during the Qing dynasty.

The native official system gives us a more precise understanding of how Chinese dynasties gradually annexed the non-Han parts of what are now Southern and Southwestern China. It also helps us comprehend how today's borderlines were delineated, how Chinese dynasties practised integration on Yunnan's southwestern borderlands, and how the Tai Nüa polities reacted. The following two studies aid us in understanding the evolution of the native official system.

First, Gong Yin (1992, 22–168) argues that the native official system was formally set up in the Yuan dynasty and completed in the Ming dynasty. According to the information given in the preface of *The Tusi Biography* in the Ming History:

Until the Ming [dynasty] the old [administrative systems] of the Yuan [dynasty] were reinstated and further developed. Various [administrative divisions, such as] office/bureau (*si*), Commandery/Prefecture (*jun*), Sub-prefecture (*zhou*), and County (*xian*), [were organised] and land taxes (*fu*) and requisitioned corvée (*yi*) were raised. [The natives were to] obey the commands of us. (i.e., the Ming court). Hence, the laws were perfected. However, the principle lay in “control under loose reins” (*jimi*). Those [local] great families monopolised [the region] and accumulated their power and influence from generation to generation. However, they coveted our official titles (*jue*) and remuneration. We indulged them with their name and rank so that they were easy to be ruled and reigned. Hence, they would work and listen to our order [...] According to our investigation, during the early Hongwu [reign], the southwestern barbarians (*yi*) who pledged their allegiance [to the Ming court] were appointed to the original posts. The titles and designations of the aboriginal officials (*tuguan*) were: the Pacification Commission of Proclaiming

Consolation;⁷ the Pacification Commission of Proclaiming Appeasement;⁸ the Pacification and Suppression Commission (*Zhaotao Si*); the Commission of Appeasement (*Anfu Si*, third in rank); and the Office of the Chief Officer Commission (*Zhangguan Si*, lowest in rank) [...] any inheritance or replacement of [the aboriginal offices] was done by order of [the Ming] court. Even if they were ten thousand li away, they had to travel to the [Ming] court [personally] to receive the appointment. [...] During that period, at times they rebelled; at times they submitted. Hence, execution and reward were both practised.⁹

迨有明踵元故事，大為恢拓，分別司、郡、州、縣，額以賦役，聽我驅調，而法始備矣。然其道在於羈縻，彼大姓相擅，世積威約，而必假我爵祿，寵以名號，乃易為統攝，故奔走惟命。……嘗考洪武初，西南夷來歸者，即用原官授之。其土官銜號曰宣慰司，曰宣撫司，曰招討司，曰安撫司，曰長官司。……襲替必奉朝命，雖在萬裡外，皆赴闕受職。……其間叛服不常，誅賞互見。

This passage reveals that the Ming court adopted the native official system from the Yuan court to stabilise remote areas. The Ming court inherited the territory of Southwest China from the Yuan dynasty. The Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms governed Yunnan from the early eighth century to the mid-thirteenth century. They were independent of Chinese dynasties for 700 years and Yunnan only became a province (*sheng* 省) of China in 1274.¹⁰

The Ming court continued to administer Yunnan as a province and took care of its governance of non-Han peoples, adopting a policy of “*rebus sic stantibus*.”¹¹ To normalise the implementation of the native official system and to facilitate the governance of Southwest China, the Ming court drew up detailed and strict regulations for controlling native officials from the outset. For instance, the early Ming court ordered that all native officials must come to the capital in person to receive their appointments. This requirement, however, proved hard to implement, especially after the Tianshun period (1457–1464), so successors no longer had to travel to the capital, and only had to obtain approval for succession as native officials from the three

⁷ *Xuanwei Si*, also named Pacification Commission, first in rank.

⁸ *Xuanfu Si*, also named Sub-Pacification Commission, second in rank.


⁹ Cited from *Mingshi*, chapter 310, the section on Biography, chapter 189, on the preface to the Aboriginal Commission. (《明史卷 310·列傳卷 198·土司·序》). Also, see the online library: <https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=en&file=143024&page=4&remap=gb>, accessed on 30 October 2023. I am grateful to Dr Liew-Herres for helping with the translation of these ancient Chinese official positions.

¹⁰ For more details, see Chapter One, fn. 5.

¹¹ *Rebus sic stantibus* is a Latin phrase that means “things thus standing.” It can be explained as the legal doctrine allowing for a contract or a treaty to become inapplicable because of a fundamental change of circumstances. In public international law, the doctrine essentially serves as an “escape clause” to the general rule of *pacta sunt servanda* (promises must be kept). For more details, see Árnadóttir (2016, 94–111).

departments¹² or the local governors and the Surveillance Commissions.¹³

Second, the Qing Empire established an integrated native official system encompassing every aspect of control. The Chinese manuscript pictured below (see Manu.1) provides a written example detailing a template of the *tusi* hereditary petition of the Kūng Ma *tusi*. This manuscript is titled: The Format of Resume Written in Status of Kūng Ma Sub-pacification Commission.



Manu.1: The Format of Resume Written in Status of Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission: 耿馬宣撫司親供宗圖冊結例志章程. This manuscript is preserved in the Archives of the Office of Kūng Ma County. Original photograph by Dr Zhu Di, 25 September 2015.

In addition, the following Table (T1), compiled from Gong Yin (1992, 22–144), illustrates the historical development of the native official system.

¹² Three departments: 三司 (*Sansi*). This refers to the following three administrative departments in the Ming dynasty: 布政司 (*Buzheng si*: Provincial Administration Commission); 按察司 (*Ancha si*: Surveillance Commission); and 都指揮使司 (*Du zhihui shisi*: Regional Military Commission).

¹³ For more details, see Gong Yin (1992, 74–75). The original Chinese record reads: “天順八年，令土官告襲，勘明會奏，就彼冠帶。”《明會典》卷 121《兵部》四《銓選》四《土夷襲替》條，pp. 1744, The photolithographic Version of Taiwan Xinwenfeng Press.

T1: The Historical Development of the Native Official System

Dynasty	Tributary duration and number of people in the mission	Number of Native Officers	Promotion and punishment	Tax and military service
Yuan (1271 – 1368)	<p>1. Tributary missions: anyone could be sent, for two or three years depending on the geographical location.</p> <p>2. Limited to a few people per mission.</p> <p>3. Inheritance: Direct descendant, wife or brothers.¹⁴</p>	<p>Military native officers: Unclear</p> <p>Civil native officers: Unclear, but the native officers of Shunyuan Pacification Commission (順元宣慰司)¹⁵ numbered up to 351 people.</p> <p>It is estimated that the total number during the Ming and Qing dynasties exceeded this figure.</p>	<p>Promotion: 1. Every three years, every aboriginal official would receive an upgrade according to his rank, or he would be bestowed with regular office and rewards as appropriate.</p> <p>Punishment: 2. No penalty for rebellion against the Qing Empire, but pacification measures were issued by imperial decree.</p>	<p>1. Tax regulations were established in the areas under the supervision of native officers (<i>tusi</i>) since the Yuan dynasty.</p> <p>2. A household register system was set up.</p> <p>3. Tax was collected in the developed ethnic area.</p> <p>4. To provide the military with supplies.</p>
Ming (1368 – 1644)	<p>1. Tributary Missions: Once every three years</p> <p>2. Limited to two or three people per.</p> <p>3. Inheritance: Son or brothers; clansman; wives and daughters.</p>	<p>Military native officers: 960;</p> <p>Civil native officers: 648</p>	<p>Promotion: 1. Great military deeds; 2. Loyalty and hard work; 3. Provide provisions to the local military as a tribute; 4. Present valuable items as a tribute to the Court. Their promotion was the same as for regular officials.</p> <p>Punishment: 5. Rebellions were not tolerated; when they arose, the aboriginal officials were executed; 6. Imperial law applied to the aboriginal officials as well; Penalties included dismissal or demotion or exile. Aboriginal officials could earn forgiveness by showing remorse for committing a misdemeanour.</p>	<p>1. Household registration;</p> <p>2. Pay taxes but deviated from inland standard rates; 3. Taxes of vassal states were lower than the standard inland rate;</p> <p>4. Tax-free in times of disaster and when great military deeds were accomplished;</p> <p>5. Silver and gold could replace the provision of other materials¹⁶;</p> <p>6. Obligation to provide military support to the Court.</p>

¹⁴ It means the positions in the mission were hereditary.

¹⁵ Today in Guizhou Province.

¹⁶ It means officials could pay their taxes using silver/gold instead of other materials.

Qing (1644–1912)	<p>1. Tributary missions: Once every two, three or five years according to the appropriate relationship.</p> <p>2. Numbers in Mission: Not mentioned</p> <p>3. Inheritance: According to the closeness of the clans, lineage descent or legitimate descent. Must be above 15 years old to inherit the role.</p>	<p>Military native officers: 1311;</p> <p>Civil native officers: 468</p>	<p>Promotion: 1. Certain ranks could be promoted; 2. The title or nominal title could be bestowed by the emperor; 3. The <i>guanpin dingdai</i> (官品頂戴) : the official cap; the precious stone on top revealed the wearer's rank; generally for the regular officials) could be granted to the <i>tusi</i> if an outstanding contribution was made.</p> <p>Punishments: demotion; exile; stopping of salary; being put in chains; flogging with sticks.</p>	<p>1. Taxes paid, including the provision of money to the Qing Empire and regular officials. Taxes that the <i>tusi</i> were required to submit to the Qing Empire were not very much but were very steep for regular officials;</p> <p>2. Obligation to provide military support to the Court.</p>
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The Ming court inherited the political system and territories of the Yuan dynasty. The native official system comprised a significant part of the Yuan dynasty's political heritage; it helped the Ming court gradually annex the remote southern and western districts of present-day Yunnan. Thus, when the Qing authority seized power, it was hard for Yunnan province to avoid integration.

The native official system was implemented in the following seven provinces: Sichuan; Yunnan; Guangxi; Hunan; Guizhou; Guangdong; and Shanxi. The Ming court honed the native official system and attempted to replace the native officials with regular bureaucrats in instances of rebellion or error, in order to extend its dominance over the southern and southwest regions.¹⁷ Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi were incorporated into the Qing Empire through this initiative. However, how to integrate the non-Han areas of Yunnan remained an unresolved issue until the mid-Qing period, because Yunnan was a remote province far from the imperial capital. The native official system declined in prevalence after the *gaitu guiliu* policy was promoted after the 1720s.

The succession of native officials, their ranks, punishment of them, and conferral of titles, relief, and rewards as well as abolishment of native officials had to follow the specific regulations stipulated in the “Great Code of the Guangxu Emperor” (《光緒會典》•卷 47 Guangxu Huidian juan 47):

In general, [the regulations on] *tusi*, [such as], the succession of *tusi*, discussion of ranks, discussion of penalty, of conferment and gift-giving, relief and rewards are similar to those for the civil officials (*wenguan*).¹⁸ [The post of *tusi*] [includes ranks] such as Military Commander (*zhihui*), Pacification Commissioner (*Xuanwei*), Sub-Pacification Commissioner (*Xuanfu*), Commissioner of Appeasement (*Anfu*), Pacification and Suppression

¹⁷ An exemplary case of the *gaitu guiliu* during the Ming dynasty, which represents the Ming court's intentions, see Taniguchi Fusao (1982: 65–84).

¹⁸ The native Officials were divided into civil native officials appointed by the Ministry of Personnel and military native officials appointed by the Military Department.

Commissioner (*Zhaofu*), according to their specialisms [...] All the chieftains (*zhang*) [i.e., *Cao Fa*] were appointed to the post of Commissioner [...] All the posts of Native officers were hereditary. [After] an aboriginal official had resigned from his post, he would be replaced by a circular official (*liuguan*) and an [sinecure] official title (*zhixian*) of Company Commander (*qianzong*) or Squad Leader (*bazong*) would be conferred on him. All the [resigned chieftains] would be granted the imperial letters patent (*chishu*) of appointment and the titles were permitted to be hereditary.¹⁹

凡土司，土司承襲、議敘、議處、封贈、恤賞之例，並同文官，曰指揮，曰宣慰，曰宣撫，曰安撫，曰招撫，各以其長為使……凡土職皆世其襲。土司辭職，改土歸流，給千總、把總職銜，均頒給敕書，准其世襲。

However, the Qing court's military control of the *tusi*'s territory remained the most serious issue. Consequently, Emperor Yongzheng (*r.* 1722–1735) issued the *gaitu guiliu* policy in Southwest Yunnan, which caused frequent rebellions in the Upper Mekong Basin²⁰ that could not be pacified. Emperor Qianlong (*r.* 1735–1796) appointed native military officers to appease (or to counterbalance) local forces. Table T1 indicates a rise in the quantity of military officers across China, alongside a decline in the number of civil officials from the Ming dynasty to the Qing dynasty. To be specific, while around 960 native military officers and 648 native civil officers were counted during the Ming dynasty,²¹ there were around 1311 native military officers and 468 native civil officers under the Qing dynasty.²² The numerical changes were probably related to the previous rebellions of the “native officials,”²³ which happened much more frequently during the Ming dynasty than after the 1720s, when the Yongzheng promoted the *gaitu guiliu* policy.

The Chinese Empire had diverse functional ties and obligations with each local office, which were influenced by the native official system that awarded varying positions to local rulers. In general, the level of connection and responsibility to the Chinese dynasties decreases as the place becomes more remote. Consequently, integration and annexation took place gradually throughout several dynasties, progressively expanding to the furthest territories. This implies that the native official system successfully integrated regions in non-Han areas, predominantly situated in the southern and western parts of contemporary China.

¹⁹ Manuscript: *Guangxu Huidian Bingbu*, chapter 47, pp 78–79. For the whole text see also the online library: <https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=91290&page=78&remap=gb>, accessed on 30 October 2023.

²⁰ Around the Pu'er Prefecture, mainly in Moeng Bò and Zhenyuan.

²¹ For more details, see Gong Yin (1992, 57–61).

²² *Ibid.*, 113–115.

²³ For instance, Emperor Yongzheng abolished the native official of Weiyuan (Moeng Bò) in 1724 and a regular bureaucrat was appointed to administer Zhenyuan and Weiyuan. This resulted in a wave of rebellions led by native officials who came from areas of the upper Mekong Basin, such as Weiyuan, Zhenyuan and Simao. See Chapter Four for more details.

Demographic Change in Native Office (*tusi*) Territory

Clarifying the composition of the Han and ethnic populations may help in understanding social changes in the southwest. Fang Guoyu (1984, 320), You Zhong (1994, 352/368), and Lin Chaomin (2005, 111) claim that the Han population came to exceed the ethnic population for the first time during the mid-Ming dynasty.²⁴ Xie Guoxian (1996, 29) argues, however, that, according to the official records of the Ming dynasty, ethnic groups comprised sixty or seventy percent of the population in the southwest for the entirety of the Ming dynasty. More recently, Gu Yongji (2016, 132) has also sharply criticised the assertions of Fang Guoyu, You Zhong, and Lin Chaomin.

Regardless of the actual composition of the population, the ethnic groups of Yunnan still had to contend with an influx of Han migrants from the early Ming dynasty until the late Qing dynasty. A significant difference is that, initially, the Han migrants were mainly military personnel and officials and their families; later, more civilians came for economic reasons to seek a better life, especially after the population explosion that occurred during the mid-Qing dynasty.²⁵

As Liang Fangzhong (1980, 253) quotes from QSL (Xuanzong *Shilu* chapter. 261): “In 1834 (Daoguang 14), the population of the whole empire including adults, children, men and women numbered 401,003,574.” It was roughly one third of the world’s population at that time.²⁶ Due to this population explosion, the cultivable land could not sustain the growing population, especially in years of poor crop yields. As a result, the ever-increasing population needed to settle and cultivate barren lands in sparsely populated areas. Migrating to Yunnan was therefore an appealing choice. Local ethnic society was profoundly influenced by the influx of Han migrants.

The WYTZ (2016, 138) records on population for 1837 (Daoguang 17) help to explain these two phenomena:

In Weiyuan Sub-prefecture (Moeng Bò), there are 3,541 households of aboriginal peoples, among them are 9,316 young and big able-bodied males (counting unit: *ding*). In Weiyuan Sub-prefecture, there are 5,094 households in the indigenous civil farming colony (*tuzhu tunmin*), and among them are 13,395 young and mature able-bodied males (*ding*). In Weiyuan Sub-

²⁴ This point has been challenged over the last few decades in China. Whether it is an accepted view or not, the number of Han migrants increased rapidly during the Ming and Qing dynasties.

²⁵ Frank’s (1998, 169) estimates of global population growth from 1000 CE to 1850 CE show that China’s population had grown from 70 million to 430 million. This demographic increase caused people to migrate in search of a better life. He later quotes Chaudhuri’s review (Ibid, 212): “There are numerous references in our sources which show that in all parts of India and China at a time of commercial depressions, the unemployed industrial worker turned to agricultural work such as helping with the harvest in order to earn a wage.” Indeed, the migrants from the inland comprised the principal labour force in the mineral districts and the wasteland (or desolate land) of the southwest.

²⁶ According to Frank (Ibid.), the global population at that time was 1,163 million, and China (major) accounted for almost two fifths of the world population.

prefecture, there are 432 households of people registered as guest peoples (*keji minren*), and among them are a total of 1,091 young and big able-bodied males (*ding*), non-adult males and women under 16 years old (*kou*).

威遠廳土著人民三千五百四十一戶，內大小男丁九千三百一十六丁；
威遠廳土著屯民五千零九十四戶，內大小男丁一萬三千三百九十五丁；
威遠廳客籍民人四百三十二戶，內大小男婦一千零九十一丁口。

Tuzhu (土著) *renmin* refers to indigenous people, in this case a reference to local ethnic groups. *Tuzhu tunmin* indicates indigenous farming civilians, those allegedly related to military migration since the Ming dynasty. *Keji minren* designates guest peoples, supposedly referring to more recent Han migrants from inland China, who mainly migrated to Moeng Bò to make a living. The counting unit *ding* refers to men between the ages of 16 and 60 years old who were obliged to pay tax. Typically, women and children were not included in the *ding*. If a person is counted as a *ding*, then that person had to pay tax, as described in the Precedents of the Great Code of the Great Qing:

An order [was given in which it is stated that] every household [is to fill in the household register of] his own family according to the formula. [...] When compiling the [household] registers, civilians above 60 years old are to be deleted [from the registers] and those above 16 years old are to be added.²⁷

令人戶將本戶人丁依式開寫，……造冊時，民年六十歲以上者開除，十六歲以上者增注。

In the WYTZ passage cited above, in the figures for guest peoples, women are counted as *kou* (mouths) and men as *ding*. This is an interesting point. It likely means that most of the guest people had to pay taxes. Borderland policy in this regard was quite strict for Han economic migrants. It is clear, moreover, that the ethnic peoples also had to pay taxes. These facts indicate that Moeng Bò was already placed under direct administration by regular bureaucrats by 1837 at the latest, though it may have been earlier because the Qing abolished the *tusi* system of Moeng Bò in 1724.

In conclusion, Geoff Wade argues that the native official system functioned as a non-deliberate national territory expansionist system, meaning that the adoption of this system of indirect control resulted in an expansion of the territory of the Chinese Empire, though that was not its original purpose.²⁸ Nevertheless, in my view, Wade overlooks an important point: the native official system was not only an expansionist system, but also a flexible and practical way for Chinese dynasties to deal with autonomous ethnic groups.

Furthermore, what were the reasons behind the Tai aboriginal people's rapid acceptance of the native official system? Presumably, the Tai people had already

²⁷ Kun Gang, 昆岡, et al. (eds.). Recopied in 1882. *Precedents of the Great Code of the Great Qing Vol. 157. Ministry of Revenue. Compilation of the Census.* (欽定大清會典事例卷 157.戶部.戶口編審). Beijing: Beijing University Library.

²⁸ For more details, see Wade (2015, 69–87).

embraced the notion of the Mandala system prior to the Chinese dynasties advocating for the indigenous official system, which has certain resemblances to it. The Tai consider the Chinese dynasties to be an additional superintendency. The subsequent section will furnish further information on the Mandala system.

In all, the native official system encountered many challenges at all stages of its history, from the initial efforts of the state to integrate non-Han people until the eighteenth century when large numbers of non-governmental, sponsored Han migrants began to enter the jurisdictions of native officials. In this dissertation, an analysis of the native official system and its function among these three Tai polities is vital for understanding the reaction of Tai Nüa polities to Chinese dynastic policies with regard to borderlands. Moreover, both parties had to adjust their strategies according to the other party's response.

2.1.2 The Mandala System and the Tributary System

Mandala (Maṇḍala in Sanskrit, Thai: *monthon* มณฑล) is a Sanskrit word that literally means “circle.” In the Hindu-Buddhist world, the cosmos has an axis named Mount Meru, where the Gods and the Buddhas reside. From the perspective of the Buddhist cosmos, Mount Meru is surrounded by four continents: Pūrva-videha; Jambudīpa; Aparā-godānīya; and Úttara-kuru, which are inhabited by all living beings and ruled by the four Chakravarti Kings, respectively. Úttara-kuru is generally regarded as the earth. The periphery areas of Mount Meru are surrounded by several circular seas and mountains, around which the sun, moon, and stars revolve.²⁹

Thus, a Mandala has many core and peripheral areas; the influence of one Mandala, for instance, might reach the periphery of other Mandala circles. The Moeng system is also affected by the Mandala system. Every *moeng* could build a Mandala system, as long as they obeyed the principles of the system, such as paying tribute to superior centres (or cores). This sometimes led to precarious political situations. Oliver Wolters, a historian and sinologist, first introduced and conceptualised the Mandala system as a model for early state formation in Southeast Asia. He explains (1982, 17) that in practice, the Mandala reflected an unpredictable political scenario in a geographical area without permanent boundaries, where smaller centers sought protection in all directions. A Mandala would grow concertina-style. The tributary rulers of each centre would sometimes reject their vassal status and endeavour to expand their own vassal network.

The Mandala system is derived from Hindu-Buddhist cosmography. That is to say, the Mandala system was a religious-political structure employed in Southeast

²⁹ See Lü Zhengang (2017, 31) and Grabowsky (2004, 9–13.)

Asian polities after the spread of Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and utilised in the pre-modern period or before the pre-modern period. Rosita (2003, 1) contends that the Mandala system is not only political but also carries a religious meaning. He describes those Southeast Asian states that differed greatly from Chinese and European ideas of a territoriality defined state with fixed borders and a bureaucratic infrastructure. The polity was characterised by its centre rather than its periphery and might include many tributary polities without administrative unity.

The Chinese scholar Lü Zhengang (2017, 35) further explains that the structure of the Mandala system comprises three parts: the core circle; the control circle; and the tributary circle. The core circle controls the control and tributary circles.³⁰ The core circle refers to areas that were ruled and managed directly by the king, who ruled as a monarch in this area. The control circle refers to local political leaders, often noblemen or chief officers. Sometimes, one of these local leaders superseded the monarchy and formed a new core circle. The tributary circle, also known as the periphery areas, was threatened by force and required to pay solemn tribute to the core circle. Thus, the Mandala system allowed for overlapping political jurisdictions and borders between the circles were often unclear.

The Mandala system was utilised in Tai polities to allow for local autonomy. According to Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 51), the seal of King Bayinnaung, bestowed on the ruler of Chiang Rung, was made from ivory and “had a diameter of three inches” and was carved with a picture of “Mount Meru surrounded by seven mountain chains.” The description continues: “Below Mount Meru, the seal shows an ocean in which two ānanda fish were swimming, while above the mountain there was the image of a palace, the sun and the moon.”³¹

The notion of a Mandala system therefore exerted a profound influence on the politics of Tai and Mainland Southeast Asian polities during the pre-modern period. That is to say, the Mandala system was integral to the political structure of Tai and Mainland Southeast Asian political organizations. As Stuart-Fox (1998, 107) elucidates, all Tai people had this political structure, so they were uniquely free to run their local affairs in exchange for allegiance, tribute, and human resources in wartime, thus supporting the religious-symbolic, economic, and military bases of the Mandala’s central power.

Diagram 2 and Diagram 3 (abbreviation for D2 and D3) show a Mandala world from a Buddhist perspective. The centre is a square with the Rakta Yamari embracing

³⁰ That means the local nobles, officials or rulers of the control circles, whose titles are bestowed or appointed by the core circle; however, in many cases, the core circle cannot manage the local affairs.

³¹ Liew Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 51) further points out that the *cao fa* office kept this seal along with the seal issued by the Chinese emperor until 1950s.

Vajra Vetali, surrounded by four deities in the four corners. A circle of fire protects the four deities and the core. The image represents various worlds, which are said to number over 3,000. The Mandala circle is a specific visualisation of the Mandala philosophy, i.e., the deities, the circle of fire, and over 3,000 worlds surrounding the core. In this sense, the tributary system can be partly understood as a physical manifestation of this philosophy; the Mandala system is a “galactic polity.”³²



D2: The Mandala system in the Buddhist world. Description: Painted seventeenth-century Tibetan “Five Deity Mandala.” In the centre is Rakta Yamari (the Red Enemy of Death) embracing his consort Vajra Vetali; in the corners are the Red, Green, White, and Yellow Yamari. (Source: Rubin Museum of Art, New York, USA.)

A comparison of D1 (see the last section) with D2 (which is the inner circle of the Mandala system) makes clear that the Mandala system cannot be regarded as part of the Chinese tributary system. On the contrary, it is independent of the Chinese tributary system and has its own standards and regulations. That said, the two systems share some common attributes. As mentioned, a Mandala system has many different centres, which results in multiple nominal periphery areas or overlapping “dominions.”³³ The influence of the centre on the surrounding territories depends on the strength of the centre and, indeed, the distance between the centre and the periphery.

³² For more details, see Stanley (1977, 69–97), and also see Grabowsky (2004, 12–13).

³³ In many cases, the “dominions” means the subordinate area only paying tributary or gifts; the centre did not rule the local directly.

Of course, in practice, the centre always – and increasingly – tries to influence the periphery, but it is difficult to do so successfully. Communications between regions was hindered by the limitations of pre-modern technology. Moreover, the centre is not static but constantly changing, in some cases due to the centre declining and the subordinate area becoming stronger. For instance, when the Mao (Maw) Shan Federation was powerful during the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, the surrounding polities paid tribute to the federation; however, when Mao Shan declined, some of them switched their allegiance to Ming China (Moeng Bò), Chiang Tung (Moeng Ting etc.), Burma, or Sipsòng Panna (Moeng Laem, etc.).

From the Chinese perspective, the emperor and his court were the only centres in the world and neighbouring “Yi”³⁴ had to come to pay tribute to him.³⁵ Even if this was sometimes not the case, Chinese officials tried to portray the emperor as the sole centre of an “imagined norm.” For example, Chinese officials often translated petitions brought by tributary missions and altered the wording to suit Chinese sensibilities to ensure that it was acceptable and pleasing to the Chinese emperor.³⁶

Hence, the Mandala system cannot be simply regarded as a part of a Chinese tributary system, even though both systems applied the tributary approach to establishing “contact” with their peripheries or their subordinations.³⁷ The tribute system functioned as a “symbolic power”³⁸ system, in which Chinese dynasties displayed their power and mercy without attempting to directly control tributary states.³⁹ The Mandala system was a circular and hierarchical system,⁴⁰ possessing

³⁴ Yi (夷) literally means “foreigners” or “barbarians.” In the Chinese historical records of Southwest Yunnan, it refers to the local ethnic groups. To avoid Sinocentrism, this thesis will utilise the term “Yi” to refer to ethnic groups from the southwestern region while translating or referring from the Chinese original text.

³⁵ This comes from ancient Chinese philosophy: “anciently, the defences of the sons of Heaven were the rude tribes on every side of the Kingdom;” for more details, see Chapter Six.

³⁶ Zhuang Guotu (2005, 1–9) points out that the Ming and Qing dynasties’ tributary relationships with Southeast Asia were illusionary. The illusion of the Ming and Qing dynasties is not the only case in Southeast Asia as it might also exist in some Tai polities in the Upper Mekong region.

³⁷ The core circle continually strives to make its peripheries truly subordinate.

³⁸ The notion of “symbolic power” was first introduced by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 208). Here, it refers to the Chinese dynasties not interfering or influencing the internal politics of their tributary states, such as Siam, Burma, etc. From the tributary states’ perspective, i.e., Siam and Burma, etc., the Chinese Empire was a remote and big core at the heart of the Mandala system, which could be an intermediary, an ally, or a capable power (See Lü Zhenggang 2017, 37).

³⁹ The Chinese dynasties expanded their territories through the *tusi* system and displayed their power and mercy via the tributary system. The *tusi* system is a part of the tributary system. Nevertheless, in my view, the *tusi* system was an administrative institution for managing remote Yi areas close to imperial territory while the tributary system functioned as a means of displaying “symbolic power” towards remote tributary states, such as Siam, Burma, and Maritime Southeast Asia.

⁴⁰ For instance, as Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 17) point out, Tai rulers in Moeng Laem administered hill peoples through twelve *khwaen* (Th: แกว่น means tributary). Nine *khwaen* of them “were divided into three

many different core circles, whereas the Chinese Empire was the sole centre of the Chinese tribute system. In addition, in terms of political administration, the Chinese tribute system was more systematic than the Mandala system. For example, the *jimi* system demonstrates that its peripheral control was more effective than the Mandala system.

From the perspective of local Tai polities, both the Chinese tribute system and the Mandala system served the same function, i.e., providing protection in return for submitting tribute. Hence, Tai polities on the Yunnan borderlands paid tribute to both Chinese dynasties and large Burmese/Tai polities in order to ensure their survival. I conceptualise this pattern of obtaining political shelter from multiple higher suzerains as survival politics. In Mainland Southeast Asia, many Tai polities adopted the Mandala system and applied it within their specific cultural contexts. In Southwest Yunnan, some Tai polities adopted the Mandala system and the Chinese tribute system, and this arrangement created diplomatic issues in the late nineteenth century when the Western colonial powers arrived in Mainland Southeast Asia.

As Thongchai (1994, 82) and Wolters (1982, 17) explain, since centres within mandalas may overlap with the circle or periphery area of stronger polities, they may need to submit tribute to several stronger powers. Thus, the phenomena of multiple sovereignties and blurred boundaries were commonplace in Mainland Southeast Asia. As Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 49) point out, the Sipsong Panna and Moeng Laem (Moeng Laem) polities paid tribute to both China and Burma from the sixteenth century until the late nineteenth centuries (this will be further explored in Chapter Six).

inner districts, closely supervised by Tai rulers, and another six ‘outer districts’ (*khwaen nòk*) on the periphery.” The relationships between Tai and hill people reflect tributary relations just like those that the Tai maintained with Chinese dynasties. Thus, *khwaen* means district or the ethnic groups in the Tai language. It refers to an administrative unit within a Tai polity where hill people reside. Sipsong Panna divided the regions inhabited by the hill tribes into twelve administrative units known as *ho khwaen* (lit. head districts) each headed by a *balong* (Phaya Luang) whose responsibilities were to raise taxes and provide labour for the ruler. See Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 223–24, fn. 685).

The Mandala of Socially Engaged Buddhism



The inner circle of the mandala represents the potential "fields of engagement" for dharma activists. At different times in our life, we may feel drawn to different kinds of actions. The outer circle represents qualities of Buddhist social action, which can permeate whatever action we undertake. Please see reverse for more details and ideas.

This mandala is based on a group conversation from a Buddhist Peace Fellowship retreat in April 2003.

D3: The inner circle of the Mandala system. (Source from: <https://jizochronicles.com/2010/06/03/mandala-of-socially-engaged-buddhism/>)

2.1.3 The *moeng* or *müang*

Moeng and muban

The basic unit of a Tai polity is a village, called *muban* (Th. หมู่บ้าน, Tai/Lao: *ban*) in Thai. It literally means a “group of houses” that form a village. A *muban* is the smallest administrative unit in every single *moeng*. A number of *muban* can constitute a *moeng*,⁴¹ and, in turn, several *moeng* can be included in a Mandala circle. This is the special Tai society structure.

In the Tai Lü and Tai Nüa languages, the word *moeng* refers to a city, nation-state, country, or township. It is written *müang* (เมือง) in Thai, Lao, and also Northern Thai (Lan Na). It is written as *müang*, *moeng*, or *muong* in different Tai languages and is transliterated in Chinese as *meng* (勐 or 猛).⁴² The word *moeng* is frequently used in Tai languages. It may initially derive from geographical concepts, but its meaning then expanded into social and political fields. As Afanassieva (1998, 27) writes: “this word (*moeng*) is used not only with geographical connotations but also has a broad spectrum of socio-political meanings.” Similarly, Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 13)

⁴¹ For more details, see Keyes (1987, 28).

⁴² It can be Romanised as *moeng*, *müang*, *mueang*, *muong*. The names of the three Tai Nüa polities are written as Moeng Laem, Moeng Bò etc. in this dissertation. For consistency, I use *moeng* rather than *müang*. However, no matter whether Romanised by differently anywhere as *moeng*, *müang*, *mueang*, or *muong*, all these variants have the same meaning in the Tai language.

point out that *müang* may refer to a form of “political and social organisation” in Tai society. Thus, *müang* represents a special and typical political and social organisation of Tai society. The explanations of the administrative scope of *moeng* refer “to the administrative, ‘urban’ centre of a polity, but at the same time, it also includes the rural inland and can even designate the polity as a whole” (Ibid.).

The relationships between the core *moeng* and the satellite *moeng* were not always close and the core *moeng* frequently changed according to circumstances. For instance, when the Moeng Mao Federation was strong, the satellite *moeng* had to join the Moeng Mao Tai Federation and pay tribute regularly, but when the federation was dismantled by the Ming court,⁴³ the satellite *moeng* chose to ally themselves with other powerful polities.⁴⁴

Moreover, it is impossible for every *moeng* to have a clear borderline. As Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 13) pointed out, the *müang* has watersheds and mountain ranges as natural boundary zones, but no distinct borderlines that meet modern European border standards. It can also include lesser units like “subordinate *müang*” (*müang khün*) or “satellite *müang*” (*müang bòriwan*), which are replicas of the superior *müang*.

Therefore, different *moeng* had notional borders, but there were no fixed borderlines. In the jungles and mountainous areas, especially in wastelands, a specific borderline was very hard to define. Fixed borderlines, moreover, were more critical to nation-states than the local people living on the frontier, who felt no need to demarcate boundaries between states. Local rulers welcomed foreign labourers because Mainland Southeast Asian polities suffered from a perennial shortage of manpower. Indeed, many wars were waged to attack “weaker neighbours in order to seize large parts of the population and to resettle the war captives in their realm.”⁴⁵

Clear borderlines were therefore not regarded as essential in Mainland Southeast Asia. This is in sharp contrast to notions of sovereignty as understood by Western colonial powers, which gradually accepted the idea of nation-states comprising exclusive internal control within recognised borders following The Peace of Westphalia of 1648. As Croxton (1999, 571) elucidates, the concept of sovereignty “was historically constructed and then applied, sovereignty emerges as a historical fact that was gradually recognized by statesmen and eventually acknowledged as reality.”

Undoubtedly, the traditions and lifestyles of Mainland Southeast Asia were challenged by the arrival of the Western colonial powers in the nineteenth century.

⁴³ Due to the four Luchuan Campaigns during the fifteenth century; for more details, see Liew (1996, 162–203).

⁴⁴ Another reason is that the Ming court adopted a “divide and rule” policy. For more details, see Sun Laichen (2000, 83–84).

⁴⁵ See Grabowsky (1999, 45).

When a state was annexed, Western powers would force the different parties to make a series of treaties to deal with problematic issues such as recognised borders. These included, for instance, the Siam-Burma Border Treaty, the China-Indochina (present-day Laos) Treaty, the China-Vietnam Treaty, and the China-Burma Treaty. As the Thai historian Thongchai (1990, 63) elaborates, Burney was in Bangkok in late 1825 and early 1826 when the Western frontier of Siam was questioned. British and Siamese definitions of “boundary” were similar but different. The Siamese Court questioned the significance of the boundary controversy, as it should have been a local affair, not a Bangkok issue. Burney eventually convinced the Court to agree on a broad boundary demarcation.

King Chulalongkorn of Siam once comforted himself after losing the left (west) bank territories of the Mekong, arguing:

The loss of those margins along the border of the *phraratcha-anachak* [the royal kingdom], which we could not look after anyway, was like the loss of our fingertips. They are distant from our heart and torso, and it is these we must protect to our utmost ability” (Ibid, 134).

In summary, the traditional relationships between different moeng were ambiguous. As such, it was unnecessary to demarcate fixed borders until Western colonial powers forced Southeast Asians to accept the notion of sovereignty and the modern nation-state.

The Cao Fa or Chao Phaendin

The words *cao fa* (เจ้าฟ้า), *cao phaendin* (เจ้าแผ่นดิน), and *cao lum fa* (เจ้าลุ่มฟ้า) are Tai terms. *Cao* (เจ้า) means lord, while *fa* (ฟ้า) means heaven. *Phaendin* (แผ่นดิน) means land, country, or kingdom. *Lum* (ลุ่ม) means low-lying. Therefore, *cao fa* means “the Lord of the heaven” and *cao phaendin* means “the lord of the land.” *Cao lum fa* means “the Lord under Heaven.” Every *müang* has its own *cao fa* or *cao phaendin* or *cao lum fa*. The *cao fa* or *cao phaendin* or *cao lum fa* was the king or ruler of a *moeng*, even though smaller *moeng/müang* were required to pay tribute to larger *müang*.

In practice, the *cao fa* was still a monarch who notionally held absolute power within his own realm. Therefore, the *cao fa* held great prestige and power in local society. As Yos (2001, 88) points out, “[he] lived apart from the world in his sacred palace. He lived a life of luxury and indolence surrounded by a vast harem of wives and concubines.” Furthermore, strict prohibitions were imposed on any behaviour considered taboo in order to uphold the authority and sacredness of the *cao fa*. Though the palace and lifestyles of a *cao fa* were not as luxurious as those of Chinese emperors, their privileged and extravagant way of life set them apart from their subjects, as Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 19) describe:

[There was a] distinct difference between the *cao fa* and his subjects whose houses had to differ in size, décor, and furniture from the “golden palaces” (*hò*

kham) of the *cao fa*. No one was allowed to ride in front of the back door of the royal residence; neither animal cadavers nor human corpses could pass the compound of the *hò kham*.

Cao fa used sumptuary and other regulations to sanctify and legitimise their position as rulers. However, rules concerning succession were not strict, and conflicts over the succession of the *cao fa* were a common occurrence throughout history, resulting in the outbreak of civil war and the disintegration of many *moeng*. Normally, the eldest son of the principal wife of the *cao fa* would succeed to the throne, but this was not absolute. In the case of Sipsòng Panna, half of the *cao fa* were not the sons of their predecessors in the period from 1180 until 1950; “succession from elder to younger brother, from uncle to nephew, or from cousin to cousin was relatively common.”⁴⁶

No matter whether someone was called *cao fa*, *cao phaendin*, or *cao lum fa*, they all ruled their polities as absolute monarchs and with power over the life and death of their subjects (Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 18/25)) further indicate that the society of Sipsòng Panna “was divided into four major social classes, namely the hereditary aristocracy (Th. *Chüa cao* เชื้อเจ้า), the lower nobility and officials (*tao khun*, Th. ท้าวขุน or *tao phaya*, Th. ท้าวพระยา), the commoners, and the serfs or “slaves” (Tr. *Khòì* ซ้อย⁴⁷).” The first two classes were the ruling elites, and the latter two classes were commoners and slaves.

2.2 Conceptions of Territorial Sovereignty and Boundaries

The concepts of sovereignty and boundaries are essential for understanding the demarcation of borderlines between the Qing court and Burma, which are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. In this section, I explain the terms sovereignty, boundary, and frontier in the context of Mainland Southeast Asia and the Chinese Empire as background to their use in the following chapters.

2.2.1 Territorial Sovereignty

Sovereignty generally refers to exclusive control over the territories, politics, economy, military, jurisdiction, diplomacy, citizens, and so forth, which belong to a nation-state. Pre-modern empires or dynasties, however, cannot be regarded as nation-states.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁷ The *Khòì* is also spelt as *Kui*. Chapter Five will provide more details.

⁴⁸ “Nation-state” is a modern term. Wimmer and Yuval (2010, 764–790) provide the following definition: “The French and American revolutions of the late-eighteenth century gave birth to the idea of the modern nation-state—an independent state with a written constitution, ruled in the name of a nation of equal citizens.” Therefore, Chinese dynasties cannot be regarded as a nation-state but as an empire state. The context examined in this thesis is Qing

Thus, in this thesis, sovereignty predominantly refers to territorial control (which may not be exclusive or cannot be totally achieved in a remote area) in an empire and, furthermore, to the fact that the degree of control might vary in different parts of a particular country.⁴⁹ In ancient China, Sovereign control of centralised areas, for instance, is more stringent in the capital than in peripheral areas. Chinese empires were vast and populous, and it was not unusual for the government to struggle to control their frontier regions.

The efforts of centralised governments to control frontier regions occurred in many pre-modern nations around the world. As German political economist and sociologist Max Weber once pointed out: “In a hereditary bureaucratic system, the situation ‘heaven is high, and the emperor is far away’⁵⁰ is bound to happen. The further away from the ruler, the lesser the ruler’s influence; not any administrative, managerial, or technological means can stop this from happening.”⁵¹

Pre-modern states lacked efficient means of transportation. In other words, there was no efficient means of transport, thereby enabling the force and administration of government to reach remote areas quickly. This impediment posed a significant obstacle to governments exercising full sovereignty over all their territories, especially in frontier regions. For the sake of maintaining nominal rule over the frontiers, therefore, the emperors of China needed to recognise the legitimacy of local rulers and the customs and traditions of these societies. Through this strategy, the Qing court increased its influence in remote areas.

As Xu Yong (2015, 59–60) elaborates, China started national integration via military-political powers, unlike Western countries, which used economic power. Under the central authorities’ jurisdiction, frontier areas were individually managed according to local customary laws and maintained their original economic, cultural, and social structures.

This situation fostered a “single central authority”⁵² (i.e., the authorities who

China.

⁴⁹ Sovereignty has different meanings throughout the history of various disciplines. For example, in international law: “Sovereign authority is exercised within borders, but also, by definition, concerning outsiders, who may not interfere with the sovereign’s governance.” For more details, see Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/>, accessed on 22/01/2021.

⁵⁰ This sentence means that the central authorities have little influence over local affairs.

⁵¹ First published in 1922, translated into Chinese and published in 1997, Weber (1997, 375).

⁵² The authorities of the Central Plain in ancient China cannot be defined as ruling over a nation-state. Therefore, I adopt the word “authority” instead of “country.” The historical authorities of the Central Plain were first centred on the Huanghe River, and then sometimes centred on the Changjiang River (Yangtze River, such as East Jin [CE 317–420], Southern Song [1127–1279], and early Ming dynasty [1368–1421]). Ancient Chinese people believed that whoever controlled the Central Plain would be the true *Tianzi* (Son of Heaven), and therefore possessed the right to unify the *Tianxia* (the entire geographical world or the metaphysical realm of mortals). For more details,

control the Central Plain) multiple systems” structure evident throughout the history of the Chinese empires, particularly during the Qing dynasty. One example of this was the native official system, which was implemented in Southwest China from the Yuan dynasty (CE 1271–CE 1368) and lasted until the CCP took power in the 1950s.⁵³

The scope of a sovereign state is defined by its recognised boundaries; hence, border demarcation is significant. State borders constitute an essential part of the concept of a modern nation-state. This is markedly different from the traditional Chinese view whereby “the defences of (the sons of Heaven) were the rude tribes on every side of the Kingdom.”

Chinese dynasties since the Eastern Zhou (770–256 BCE) have embraced the notion of China as the centre of the world. This Sinocentrism led China to base its diplomacy on the lord-vassal principle, which required non-Han and foreign states to submit tribute to “the Celestial Empire.” Even when Emperor Kangxi (*r.* 1661–1722) signed the first international treaty in Chinese history, the Treaty of Nerchinsk,⁵⁴ with Russia in 1689, and when Emperor Qianlong waged war against the Burmese Konbaung dynasty during 1765–1769, tribute remained the fundamental issue in foreign relations.

The turning point was the Sino-Burmese War, when Qing China gradually began to comprehend the difference between “outside” and “inside,” a process that was facilitated by the negotiation of border treaties with Burma. The Qing’s relinquishment of Moeng Phòng,⁵⁵ in particular, marked the onset of clearly distinguishing between “inside” and “outside” China.

After 1840, Western colonial powers forced the Qing government to sign a number of unequal treaties. Under intense military, political, and cultural pressure from Western colonial powers, members of the Qing intelligentsia, such as Xue Fucheng, gradually realised the importance of modern concepts pertaining to borders, countries, and nationalities. National borders determined the boundaries of China and other countries through formal legal documents, i.e., border treaties. The formalisation of borders facilitated the transition of the ancient Chinese Empire into a modern nation-state, which no longer relied on the tribute system and its concomitant vague borders.

see Puranen (2020, 84).

⁵³ The demise of the *tusi* system began in the ROC period, and it was not abolished until the 1950s when the CPP gained complete control over Southwest China

⁵⁴ For the original text of the treaty, see Weiers ed. (1979).

⁵⁵ The Northern Shan State, also known as Theinni in Burmese, in Chinese as Mubang 木邦.

2.2.2 From Frontier to Border: The Transformation of Tributary States into National Territories

The frontier is called *bianjiang* or *bianchui* (邊疆 or 邊陲) in Chinese. *Bian* means edge, *jiang* means border, and *chui* refers to places close to borders. An American historian of China Purdue (2001, 287) defines the term “frontier” as having many meanings, however, there are two traditions of analysis: the European tradition emphasises permanent borders between states (the French named them *frontières*), while the North American tradition alludes to vast regions of cultural exchange. *Bianjiang*, the modern Chinese word for frontier, combines the meanings of *bian*, territory, and *jiang*, meaning border. Imperial expansion accompanied both phases of Chinese dynasties.

Purdue’s definition fails to clearly differentiate between frontier and border, despite making an excellent contribution to the dynamics pertaining to the integration of societies on the frontier. The notion of “frontier” and “border” are two different concepts when it comes to the specific sovereignty of a nation-state.

In this thesis, I use the term “frontier” to refer to the boundary area of the pre-modern state, and “border” to refer to the edge of the modern state. The difference between the two is that the former has an unclear borderline, whereas the latter is clearly demarcated. Giddens (1987, 49–50) pointed out that traditional states owned their frontiers (*bianchui* 邊陲) but did not establish clearly delineated borders (*bianjie* 邊界).

Giddens precisely defines the process of national integration in Southwest China. Borders delineate the territorial sovereignty of a nation-state. However, in pre-modern times, the Chinese Empire did not have clearly demarcated borders. It is the “frontiers” that are the peripheral areas. Traditional Chinese philosophy positioned China at the centre of the world with core layers of territory encircling the central plains, which, in turn, were surrounded by various layers of peripheral areas on the outside. Its administrative system maintained the empire through concepts of “inside” – or core – areas of control and the tribute or native official system, which loosely governed the “outside” or frontier areas. As such, Chinese dynasties regarded clear borders as unnecessary.

Scholar Xie Shizhong (1997, 225) explains that Chinese emperors and people believed that China was the whole world, divided into Han or Hua (compliant with Confucian beliefs) and non-Han (foreigners or barbarians) Yi (foreigners or barbarians). The Kingdom of Sipsòng Panna remained independent for more than 700 years in the context of the Sinocentric worldview, when Chinese imperial dynasties categorized China between Han and non-Han groups.

The case of Sipsòng Panna mirrored other Tai polities, choosing to pay tribute to Chinese dynasties to avoid being directly governed by them. When native officials allow Chinese dynasties to have influence, they become vassals; when they refuse this influence, they are rulers in their own territory.⁵⁶ In other words, Tai polities were functionally, or internally, independent of foreign powers even though they submitted tribute to them, often paying tribute to several powers at the same time. For instance, after the Burmese Toungoo dynasty expanded into northern mainland Southwest Asia in the mid-sixteenth century, Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem paid tribute to both China and Burma.⁵⁷

The Qing court started to realise the difference between being “inside” and “outside” China following the 1766–1769 Sino-Burmese war, but they were still immersed in Sinocentrism, considering all other states as tribute-bearing “Sons of the Heavenly Court.” The arrival of Western colonial powers prompted the Qing court to rethink its traditional diplomatic policies. From frontier to border, the Qing court suffered a long and challenging transition. Invasion by Western colonial powers taught them a torrid lesson – that they were not the centre of the world. This issue will be discussed in Chapter Six.

⁵⁶ To quote a Chinese saying, “Open the door and you are a subject; close the door and you are an emperor.” (開門是臣子，關門是皇帝).

⁵⁷ For more details, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 49–56).

Chapter Three: The Historical background of Tai Nüa

Polities: History and Society

3.1 An Overview

The first and second chapters provided an overview of the three Tai polities: Moeng Laem (Menglian), Kūng Ma (Gengma), and Moeng Bò (Jinggu). More historical details will be introduced in this chapter. The Tai Nüa, a subgroup of the Southwestern Tai, are the politically and socially dominant ethnic group in the three Tai polities, which are located in the Upper Mekong Basin. When connected by three straight lines, these three polities form an almost equilateral triangle. Nominally, the areas were administered by the Chinese Empire since the times of the Yuan dynasty.¹ How did these three Tai Nüa polities come into being? To answer this question, we must also examine how Chinese historiographies and local Tai chronicles record their formation, and how Tai Nüa society and administration functioned. In this chapter, I explore the historical and cultural context of the three polities under study. It will be shown that the historical and social upheavals in the Tai Nüa areas in the eighteenth century were a turning point.

¹ That is Chinese dynasties without the presence of physical garrisons and jurisdiction over the non-Han areas.

3.2 A Brief Introduction to the History of the Tai Nüa Polities

Tai Nüa is a subgroup of the Tai people who live in Mainland Southeast Asia. They are primarily found in Southwest Yunnan (China), Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. As mentioned in Chapter One, the Tai Nüa language is spoken by the Tai people who reside in the northern or Upper Mekong River region.² In the thirteenth century, when the Luchuan Kingdom (Tai Mao Federation) rose to power, they rose from Dehong and migrated to various locations, including Moeng Laem, Kung Ma (Moeng Ting), and Moeng Bò, where they established Tai polities and created their own unique histories, cultures, and communities.³

3.2.1 Moeng Laem

3.2.1.1 An Overview of Moeng Laem

Previously, Moeng Laem bordered to the east the territory of Moeng Cae, the westernmost district of Sipsong Panna, and to the south the territory of Chiang Tung. However, due to territorial losses in the nineteenth century, Moeng Laem no longer shares a common border with Sipsong Panna.⁴ The present status of Moeng Laem (Chinese: Meng Lian) is that of an autonomous county that belongs to the prefecture of Pu'er (previously named Simao).

Based on the most recent statistical data from December 2004 and 2010, it is observed that the Tai population constitutes 26,000 individuals out of a total of 114,000 persons residing in Moeng Laem County, which spans an area of 1,894 square kilometres. The Lahu population exceeds that of the subject group by 33,000 individuals, while the Wa population 28,000 individuals. The remaining portion of the population is comprised of 17,000 individuals of Chinese descent, 8,000 individuals belonging to the Hani ethnic group, and 2,000 individuals representing various smaller ethnic groupings.⁵ According to demographic data from 2010, the Tai population accounted for 25,555 individuals out of a total of 135,538 inhabitants. Additionally, the Lahu population comprised 38,132 individuals, while the Wa population

² For more details, see Schliesinger (2015, 230–237).

³ For more details, see Daniels (2021, 211–213).

⁴ In a confidential report of 23 March 1891, W. Warry states: “The original dimensions of the State of Meung Lem have shrunk greatly over the past 30 or 40 years, owing partly to internal dissensions, followed [...] by encroachments on the part of neighbouring wild tribes, and partly to the recent establishment of the new Chinese border district of Chênpien, which comprises territory that was formerly an integral part of Meung Lem.” In: Warry 1888–1895.

⁵ Data provided by Zhang Yun Wiang (Tai name: Sam Weng), an official working in the People’s and Religious Department (*Ming Zong Ju*) of Moeng Laem. Interview of Professor Grabowsky (together with Renoo Wichasin and Foon Ming Liew) with Zhang Yun Wiang, Moeng Laem, 4 April 2005.

constituted 27,527 individuals.⁶

According to the local historian Cao Kham Nuan (Chinese name: Zhang Haizhen), author of a Chinese-language monograph on the history and culture of Moeng Laem,⁷ the Tai population was initially composed of four different groups:⁸

(1) The original Tai people who had lived in Moeng Laem since ancient times. Many of the early Tai died of diseases or fled to other places. Some returned and were resettled in Müang Ma (เมืองมา), literally, “the *müang* [of the people who] came [back].” It is difficult to say how many Tai villages belong to this group of early Tai inhabitants. In Müang Nga only one village survived, i.e., Wang Kang = remnants of the village.

(2) The Tai settlers from Müang Mao, also called the Tai Nüa, who inhabit 66 of 83 Tai villages, form the majority of the Tai people of Moeng Laem. The Tai Nüa migration took place during the thirteenth century, the Yuan dynasty (1280–1368). According to local legend, two brothers called Cao Mani Kham and Cao Mani Can were rivals for the throne of Moeng Mao. Cao Mani Can, the younger brother, fled with his followers to the southeast region close to the Burmese sphere of influence and founded Moeng Laem.⁹

(3) The Tai Khün migrants from Chiang Tung. They arrived later than the second group mentioned above. There are currently thirteen Tai Khün villages in Müang Nga and Müang So (เมืองโซ).

(4) The Tai Pòng (Shan proper) from Mubang (Moeng Pòng) arrived after the end of the Cultural Revolution, i.e., in the late 1970s. There are currently three Tai Pòng villages in Moeng Laem.

(5) Tai Lü from Sipsòng Panna. They came as later immigrants, and they settled as minorities throughout Moeng Laem.

It needs to be stressed that, until the mid-nineteenth century, the territory under the control of the Moeng Laem *cao fa* was significantly larger than the present autonomous county. As British intelligence officer Lieutenant Daly observed in 1890, the original territory of Moeng Laem “shrunk greatly during the past 30 or 40 years, owing partly to internal dissensions, followed [...] by encroachments on the part of neighbouring wild tribes, and partly to the recent establishment of the new Chinese

⁶ MLXZ 1978–2010 (2019, 58–59).

⁷ Zhang Haizhen (Cao Kham Nuan) 张海珍. 2004. *Nayun daiwang mishi* 娜允傣王秘史 [The Secret History. of the Genealogy of the Na Yun Tai King (in Moeng Laem)]. Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe.

⁸ Prof. Volker Grabowsky interview with the local Tai Nüa historian Cao Kham Nuan (Pu'er University), Moeng Laem, 4 April 2005.

⁹ The dispute between the two Moeng Mao princes is recorded in the *Moeng Laem Chronicle* (Long Cao Pan-Ban Yang version, ff° 8–9), a copy of which Professor Grabowsky obtained this manuscript during his field trip to Moeng Laem in April 2005. The chronicle argues that the two princes relied on outside military support. Whereas Cao Mani Kham, the elder brother, gained Chinese support, his younger brother was supported by the Burmese. This scenario seems highly improbable for the thirteenth century. The story, however, could be a retrospective reflection of a much later Burmese Chinese rivalry.

border district of Chênpien, which comprises territory that was formerly an integral part of Meung Lem.”¹⁰ Though population figures prior to the twentieth century are not available, we have at least some indications of the relative demographic strength of Moeng Laem in comparison to the neighbouring Tai polities. The Chiang Tung Chronicle reports that, in CS 1182 (AD 1820), the Tai vassal rulers of Burma reported the following numbers of men liable for military service to the Council of Ministers at the Court of Ava: 2,500 men for Sipsòng Panna; 1,500 men for Chiang Tung; 750 men for Moeng Laem; and 375 for Chiang Khaeng. Thus, Moeng Laem’s demographic strength was considered less than that of Chiang Tung but more than that of Chiang Khaeng.¹¹

Situated to the east of Moeng Lü or Sipsòng Panna with which it once shared direct borders and north of Chiang Tung, the ruling house of Moeng Laem maintained close family ties with the ruling houses of these two more powerful Tai polities, but also with Chiang Khaeng, which had become a vassal of Chiang Tung by the mid-nineteenth century.¹² Such dynastic relations are well documented in the Chronicle of Sipsòng Panna, the Chiang Tung Chronicle, as well as in a peace treaty between the Chiang Rung, Moeng Laem, and Chiang Tung, signed in the presence of the Chinese and Burmese courts in 1839.¹³ Unlike Chiang Tung and Sipsòng Panna, Moeng Laem was generally beyond the operational reach of the armies of Chiang Mai and Nan, who frequently raided the Tai Khün and Tai Lü inhabited areas of the Upper Mekong Valley during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. War captives from Moeng Laem are at least not reported in the Lan Na Chronicles.¹⁴

Regarding the languages spoken in the area, the dialect spoken in Moeng Kang (Chinese: Na Yun Zhen), the capital of Moeng Laem, seems to be a lingua franca containing Tai Khün elements. The Tai Khün dialect is much more comprehensible to speakers of Tai Lü and Tai Yuan (from Lan Na) than the Tai Nüa dialects spoken in Dehong. The hybrid character of “Tai Laem” was pointed out by the American missionary Clifton Dodd, who lived for four years in Chiang Tung in the early twentieth century (Dodd 1996/1923, 207). Though the Tai language – nowadays spoken everywhere in Moeng Laem – is basically a Tai Nüa dialect, it contains many

¹⁰ Daly’s report from 12 June 1891, p. 2 (in Warry 1888–1895).

¹¹ Sao Sāimöng Mangrāi (1981, 267).

¹² For the relations between Chiang Khaeng and Chiang Tung, see Grabowsky and Renoo (2008, 32–35).

¹³ See Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 197), See also Lamun (2004, 104–107). For a local Tai Laem account of that agreement, see Moeng Laem Chronicle (version 2), p. 31.

¹⁴ While the *Nan Chronicle* does not report any raids against Moeng Laem during that period, the *Chiang Mai Chronicle* states that an army from Chiang Mai pursued pro-Burmese forces, who had withdrawn by the way of Moeng Laem (Wyatt and Aroonrut 1998, 183). The *Chiang Saen Chronicle* states that King Kawila of Chiang Mai launched a military campaign against “Müang Khemmarat (Chiang Tung), Sipsòng Panna, [and Moeng] Laem” (Sarassawadee 2005, 257).

loan words from the dialects of the Tai Khün and Tai Lü. The religious, as well as secular manuscripts are almost entirely written in the Dharma script, used by the two latter groups, and not in Tai Nüa script. In any case, Captain McLeod, the first Western visitor to Sipsòng Panna on record, states in early 1837 that the Tai language spoken in Moeng Laem was “said to be a dialect between the Shan of this country (i.e., Sipsòng Panna) and that of Moné (Moeng Nai)” (Grabowsky and Turton 2003, 388). In contrast to the Tai Nüa heartland of Moeng Mao, the Tai of Moeng Laem not only used the Lik script (Lik Hto Ngouk), but also, and even predominantly, the Dhamma script in its Tai Khün variant.¹⁵

3.2.1.2 The History of Moeng Laem in Light of Chinese Historiography before the eighteenth Century

In this section, I examine Moeng Laem’s pre-nineteenth-century history and its relationship with the Chinese Empire and the Burmese kingdom using official Chinese historical records and Tai local chronicles, the so-called *tamnan* (ตำนาน) or *phün/pün* (พูน). The location of Moeng Laem according to the records of the Qing dynasty is given in the Atlas of Chinese History Territory (see M3 and M4).¹⁶ Ming historical texts compiled and edited by the Qing court describe the territory of the Chief’s Office of Moeng Laem¹⁷ (see also M5) as separated from Weiyuan (Moeng Bò) by the Mekong River in the northeast, bordered by Sipsòng Panna in the southeast, and extending to Moeng Khün Prefecture (Chiang Tung in the eastern of Shan State) in the south. It is bordered by the Salween River and Mubang (Moeng Phòng hereafter) Pacification Commission and lies adjacent to Moeng Ting and Moeng Mien (Mien Ning) Prefecture in the north.¹⁸


¹⁵ Scott (1991, 37) writes: “The written character of the Len is exactly the same as that used by the Hkeun (Khün) of Kyaingtôn (Chiang Tung).” For the development and spread of Tai scripts in the Tai and Shan areas, see Sai Kam Mong (2004).

¹⁶ Tan Qixiang ed. vol. 8 (1987, 48–49).

¹⁷ MSG, namely Ming Shigao (<The Draft of the History of the Ming Dynasty>), was written by Wang Hongxu (王鴻緒 1645–1723) in Yongzheng year 1 (1723). Then, the Qing court organised the scholars (the leading official was Zhang Tingyu) to revise Ming Shigao in Qianlong year 4 (1739). That was the final version of MSG, the so-called Ming Shi (<Ming History>). The popular version of MS was compiled by Zhang Tingyu. Here, I use Wang’s version of MSG. Regarding the different versions, for more details, see Fang Guoyu et al. (eds.) (1998), vol. 3, pp. 359.

¹⁸ The Chieftain Office of Moeng Laem borders the Pacification Office of Sipsòng Panna, Chiang Tung Prefecture, Theinni and Moeng Bò Sub-prefecture. From the northeast Chieftain Office to Yunnan Province and then to the capital (Nanjing or Beijing) is a 23-stage route. Ancient Moeng Laem was savage. Moeng Laem finally submitted to the Ming court after Moeng Mao was pacified during the Zhengtong period (1436–1499). Thus, the Moeng Laem Chieftain Office was created. Summarised from *The History of the Ming Dynasty*, chapter 46, Treatises 22, Geography 7. (明史卷 46.志第二十二.地理七)

M 5: Moeng Laem and Küng Ma in the late nineteenth century




Source from: Map to accompany Mr Warry's Letter No. 9, 15 June 1891, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.82. Cambridge University Library.

W. Warry (1854–1936), a top-notch British intelligence officer in the late nineteenth century, must have drawn map M5.¹⁹ The map he produced shows the territory of Moeng Laem and its surrounding areas, such as Chen Pien Ting (Zhenbian Prefecture), Küng Ma, Moeng Ting, Moeng Bò, and Sipsòng Panna, in great detail. Moreover, Moeng Laem and its surroundings are depicted on the map in a way that is consistent with Chinese historical records. It is noteworthy that, on the map, Warry mentions “Lahu country (under Chen Pien Ting) most of which has submitted to the Chinese, though the southern portions are not yet actually occupied.” As a result, the majority of the Lahu population in Zhenbian Prefecture was already under Chinese supervision.²⁰

¹⁹ The role of Warry in the delineation of the current China-Myanmar border will be covered in more detail in Chapter Six.

²⁰ More details about the Lahu people will be provided in Chapter Five.

M6: Map of Moeng Laem in the late of nineteenth century



Source from: Map of Mg Lem and Gold Tract (?), GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.76. Cambridge University Library. I have made revisions in red.

Nowadays, the Moeng Laem (Menglian) Dai/Lahu and Wa Autonomous County (孟連傣族拉祜族佤族自治縣) is under the administration of Pu'er Prefecture (普洱府). During the late nineteenth century, the territory of Moeng Laem was much bigger than it is today (see M6).

The earliest record of Moeng Laem in Chinese historiography is by Fan Chuo,²¹

²¹ Fan Chuo (r. ?? –late ninth century), this book was finished in 863 CE.

who recorded it as being occupied by the “Mang barbarians,” who dwelt in Kainan. As Fan Chuo describes:

The tribe of the Mang barbarians belongs to the mixed race of Kainan barbarians. Mang is the title of the ruler and the Mang barbarians called their ruler Zhao (Cao). From the south of Yongchang city, first passing Tang Feng (today’s Fengqing County, Dali Prefecture), then to Feng Lanrong (today’s Lincang Prefecture), then to Mang Tianlian (today’s Moeng Laem), [...] all belong to the same ethnic group. [They] live in elevated houses and [their towns] do not have walled cities. Some of them paint their teeth black. [...] The women wear colourful sarongs.²² [...] Peacocks build their nests on the trees of the local people. [...] The natives have the habit of rearing elephants to cultivate their rice fields.²³

茫蠻部落，並是開南雜種也。茫是其君之號。蠻呼茫詔。從永昌城南，先過唐封（今鳳慶），以至鳳蘭茸（今臨滄），以次茫天連……樓居，無城郭，或漆齒。……婦人披五色娑羅籠。孔雀巢人家樹上……土俗養象以耕田。

Fang Guoyu (1958, 38–9) concludes that the term “Mang barbarians” was another name for the Tai, and Mang most likely meant *müang* (*moeng*).²⁴ Furthermore, Fang Guoyu (1987, 476) identifies Feng Lanrong as located in Kung Ma, Lincang Prefecture and Mang Tian Lian in Moeng Laem, and he argues that all these places were inhabited by different “Mang barbarians.” This can be considered the earliest record of Moeng Laem. According to Fang Guoyu’s interpretation, this record indicates that the Tai ethnic group had dwelt in Moeng Laem since the Tang dynasty. However, Fang’s hypothesis has recently been criticised by Daniels (2021, 188–213).²⁵ It is certainly the case that there is a lack of sufficient and convincing evidence that Mang Man was the ancestor of the Tai.

As mentioned in Chapter One, Chinese dynasties did not exert much influence

²² A long piece of cloth wrapped around the body.

²³ Cited from *Annals of Yunnan*, chapter 6. I have chosen to utilise the edition sourced from Wang Taiyue ed. 1777: Qinding Siku Quanshu (《欽定四庫全書·史部九·載記類》), specifically the section titled “Complete Library of the Four Treasuries during the Qing Dynasty. Historiography 9. Chronicles.” As this imperial four treasuries edition was more comprehensive and reliable.

²⁴ *Mang* means “king” in Burmese; in Northern Thai, it is written as มัง, e.g., Mang Rai. *Moeng* means “polity”, therefore this is something different from ethnic groups. Fang’s conclusion became influential and accepted by many scholars, however, it is still unproven. Nevertheless, such discussion is beyond this thesis and my capacity. Also see the author’s note about *Man* or *Mang*.

²⁵ Daniels (2021, 188–213) refutes Fang Guoyu’s hypothesis that the Mang Man / Heichi / Jinchi were all of Tai ethno-linguistic stock organized into basin polities. Fang classified the Heichi / Jinchi in Yongchang and the Upper Ayeyarwady as Tai Nüa, which literally translates as “upper Tai,” and the Mang Man in the Upper Mekong as Tai Lü. This equivalence superimposes thirteenth/fourteenth century settlement patterns on eighth/ninth century data. It presupposes the arrival of the Tai in the Upper Mekong by this time and assumes a historical continuum in their distribution from the eighth century onwards, yet no evidence has been found to verify the arrival of the Tai in this area this early; see (Ibid: 208–211). The interpretation of Fang Guoyu can be regarded as the earliest record of Moeng Laem; however, whether the Mang Man were the ancestor of Tai remains unproven.

on Yunnan between the eighth and the thirteenth centuries when the Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms administered the province. The connection between Yunnan and the Chinese Empire was interrupted roughly for five centuries, and very few historical records about Yunnan have survived from the Nanzhao and the Dali Kingdom periods (CE 738–1253).²⁶

The Mongol-Yuan conquered Yunnan in CE 1253–1254 and established Yunnan as a province in 1276. The Dali Kingdom was gradually absorbed into China.²⁷ In Zhiyuan year 26 (1289), the Mulian Lu (Moeng Laem) Military cum Civilian Prefecture (Mulian Lu Junmin Fu: 木連路軍民府 in Ch.) was established, and Han Bafa (罕把法 in Chinese) was appointed as the military and civilian commander. Mulian Lu was first under the administration of the Dali Golden Teeth Pacification Commission (Dali Jinchi Xuanfu Si: 大理金齒宣撫司 in Ch.). In Tianli year 2 (1329), Mulian Lu and Yinsha Luodian Pacification Commission (Yinsha Luodian Xuanfu Si)²⁸ separated from the Dali Golden Teeth Pacification Commission, and another Yinsha Luodian was set up, Yinsha Luodian in the north, and Mulian Lu in the south.²⁹ The territory of Mulian Lu consisted of Meng Lei Dian (today, Mu Nai in Lang Cang County), E Ma Dian (today's Mengsuo, Ximeng County), Mu Suo Dian (today's Moeng Ma, Moeng Laem) and Na Yun (the town of present-day Moeng Laem). The Yuan dynasty established the Moeng Laem native official (*tusi*) system in this way.

The reunification of the Chinese Empire was an essential task for the first Ming emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang.³⁰ The Ming conquered Yunnan in 1381–1382. Initially, Moeng Laem was controlled by Luchuan (Tai Federation of Moeng Mao) until the three Luchuan Pingmian Campaigns of 1439–1448. Moeng Laem sent tribute to the Ming court for the first time in 1406.³¹

During the early Ming period, the jurisdiction of Moeng Laem was placed under the Luchuan Pacification Commission and then under the Moeng Ting Prefecture. However, the rulers of Moeng Ting and Moeng Laem owed allegiance to Luchuan. Moeng Laem was unwilling to come under the jurisdiction of Moeng Ting. The Ming therefore placed Moeng Laem under the Yunnan Regional Military Commission (Yunnan *dusi* 雲南都司 in Ch.). It was recorded as follows (I punctuated it) :

²⁶ For more details, see Liang Youjia (2010, 1–18) and Lloyd (2003, 37–38).

²⁷ For more details, see Mote (1999, 452–3).

²⁸ That is 銀沙羅甸: today Shuangjiang County and Lancang County, the predominant territory of which was the border zone between Moeng Ting Prefecture and Moeng Laem Lu. It was a place of contention for Moeng Ting and Moeng Laem *tusi* (for more details, see Fang Guoyu 1987, 881).

²⁹ According to Fang Guoyu (1958, 63–4), the Ming court abolished Yin Sha Luo (Dian) Prefecture and its land was first merged into Moeng Ting, then, later, it was incorporated into Moeng Laem and Küng Ma.

³⁰ For more details, see Mote (1999, 531–2).

³¹ For more details, see Liew (1996, 162–203).

The Chieftain Office³² of Menglian³³ was established in Yongle 4, the fourth month (1406). At that time, the headman of Moeng Laem, Dao Pai Song, sent his son [Dao] Huai Han to go to [the Ming court] and said:

Moeng Laem was previously subordinate to the Luchuan-Pingmian Pacification Commission (viz. Moeng Mao in Ruili), but later it was placed under the command of Moeng Ting Prefecture.³⁴ However, the tribal Prefect of Moeng Ting, Dao Ming-Kang, was also a headman of the former Pingmian. Heretofore, they had been of equal status in the past and it is difficult to place Moeng Laem under the jurisdiction of [Moeng Ting]. [We] entreat for a transfer of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Chieftain Commission of Moeng Laem was established and placed under the direct command of the Yunnan Regional Military Commission. Dao Pai-song was appointed the Chieftain, headgear, belt, and seal was bestowed on him, and his son was given a feast.³⁵

孟璉長官司，永樂四年四月設。時孟璉頭目刀派送，遣子壞罕來言。孟璉舊屬麓川平緬宣慰司，後隸孟定府。而孟定知府刀名扛，亦故平緬頭目，素與同儕，難隸管屬，乞改隸。遂設長官司，隸雲南都司。命刀派送為長官，賜官帶印章，並賜其子宴。

Adopting a “divide and rule” policy – separating Moeng Laem from Luchuan – was an effective strategy for the Ming court to diminish the power of the Tai federation. Not only Moeng Laem but also Moeng Bò and Moeng Ting, along with other smaller Tai polities, were separated from the Tai federation of Luchuan during the fifteenth century. However, Luchuan still waged war with the Ming court. In the middle of the Ming dynasty (1439–1448), the Luchuan Pacification Commission rebelled four times while Moeng Laem and other small Tai polities were put in a fragile position between the Tai federation of Luchuan and the Ming court, as is reflected in the following record:

In the year Zhengtong 4 (1439), Si Renfa (Cao Ngam Fa or Thonganbwa) revolted and sent troops to conquer Moeng Laem. Consequently, the Chieftain [of Moeng Laem] surrendered to Luchuan, which was defeated by the Pacification Commissioner of Moeng Phòng, Han Gaifa. In the year [Zhengtong] 7 (1442), the Supreme Commander, Wang Ji (*b.* 1378–1460), fought against Luchuan. He pacified and persuaded the chieftains of Moeng Laem, Yi-bao, and other stockades, to capitulate [...] During the Jiajing reign (1522–1566), Moeng Laem, Moeng Yang, Moeng Mit and various tribes fought wars of vengeance for more than a decade. The Chieftain Office was abolished. It was not until Wanli 13 (1585) when Luchuan was pacified, that the Chieftain Office of Moeng Laem was restored.³⁶

正統四年。思任發反。以兵破孟璉長官司。其長官遂降於麓川。為木

³² *Zhangguan si*, a chieftain command, lower in rank than the three pacification commissions (*xuanwei si*, *xuanfu si*, and *anfu si*), was bestowed on the chieftain or *cao fa* of a petty *müang/moeng* (polity).

³³ Here, this term corresponds to the Nationalities of Dai, Lahu and Wa Autonomous County of Moeng Laem, the Nationality of Lahu Autonomous County of Lancang, and the Nationality of Wa Autonomous County of Ximeng, in the West of Cheli (Chiang Rung).

³⁴ In Küng Ma, located between Ruili and Moeng Laem.

³⁵ MS, chapter 315, *liezhuan* 203, Yunnan *tusi* 3, p. 8142.

³⁶ MSG, chapter 284, *liezuahn*, 189, Yunnan *tusi*, 3, p. 15.

邦宣慰罕蓋發所征敗。七年，總督王驥征麓川，招降孟璉長官司。亦保等寨。[……] 嘉靖中，孟璉與孟養孟密諸部。相仇殺者數十年。司廢。至萬曆十三年。隴川平，復設猛臉長官司。

According to this source, Luchuan conquered Moeng Laem once again. The ambitions of the Luchuan ruler, Soe (Süa) Wen Fa, endangered Ming control in Yunnan. In 1439, the military commander Mu Sheng (in office in Yunnan from 1398–1439) was sent to carry out a punitive expedition against Luchuan, but he failed. Then, the military commander of Yunnan, Wang Ji,³⁷ was dispatched to launch a punitive expedition against Luchuan again, and he finally won the war. The Luchuan campaign lasted for nine years. Though the Ming court was victorious, it had paid a high price. Some scholars believe that the Luchuan campaign caused the Ming court to lose the war against the Mongols³⁸ and resulted in the capture of Emperor Ming Yingzong (*r.* 1435–1449 and 1457–1464).³⁹

The Manchus took Beijing, the Ming court's capital, in 1644, and became the new ruling elite of the Chinese Empire. Yunnan was captured in 1659 by Wu Sangui, a former Ming military commander who betrayed the Ming dynasty and submitted to the Qing emperor. All tributary states and polities, including Moeng Laem in Southwest Yunnan, had to pay tribute to the Qing court. The Qing court promoted the *tusi* system in Moeng Laem until its demise in 1911. According to the QSG:

The Sub-Pacification Commission of Moeng Laem [...] In the year Kangxi year 48 (1709) of the Qing [dynasty], Diao Pai Ding offered elephants as tribute. [Hence, he] submitted [and pledged allegiance] [to the Qing court] and was conferred the hereditary post of Sub-Pacification Commission. [...] The inheritance of the post was passed down to Diao Pai Xin. Owing to the land of [Moeng Laem] was located at the extreme frontier and [its] border was adjacent to foreign territories, the [aboriginal post] of Sub-Pacification Commission [with the prefix] “Manage and Control was assigned to him. Seal, letters patent, and tally coupons were granted. In the year Qianlong 29 (1764), it was placed under the administration of Shunning Prefecture.⁴⁰

孟連宣撫司，……清康熙四十八年，刁派鼎貢象，歸附，授宣撫司世職。……至刁派新，因地處極邊，界連外域，定為經制宣撫司，頒給印信號紙。乾隆二十九年，改隸順寧府。

According to Chinese sources, the Qing court upgraded the *tusi* system in Moeng Laem in 1709 when *tusi* Dao Pai Ding submitted his subordinate and sent elephants as tribute. The QSG further notes that Moeng Laem was located on the border and was surrounded by foreign states. For this reason, the Qing court granted Moeng Laem the title of a “manage and control” Sub-Pacification Commission (經制宣撫司: Jingzhi

³⁷ 王驥 (1378–1460) was a military officer of the Ming court; he once led Luchuan Pingmian Campaign. For more details, see DMB II, 1349–51.

³⁸ That is the *Tumu* crisis of 1449, known as *Tumu zhibian* (土木之變) in Chinese.

³⁹ For more details, see Liu Xiangxue (1997, 86–89) and Liew Foon Ming (1996, 162–203).

⁴⁰ QSG, chapter. 514, pp. 14266.

Xuanfu si).

3.2.1.3 The Chronicle of Moeng Laem in Tai Language and Script before the Mid-nineteenth Century

As mentioned in Chapter One, I have identified four extant versions of the Moeng Laem Chronicle written in Tai scripts (Tham and Lik) that record the history of Moeng Laem from an indigenous Tai point of view. For the sake of convenience, they are abbreviated as MLCT1, MLCT2, MLCL1, and MLCL2.⁴¹ MLCT1 is more detailed than the other three versions with respect to the origins of Moeng Laem and the genealogy of Moeng Laem native officials. It is considered an essential primary source for studying the history of Moeng Laem. This version has four parts: The first part deals with various significant events in Moeng Laem; the second part records the genealogy of native officials of Moeng Laem; the third part is a brief introduction to Moeng Mao; the fourth part concerns the history of Tai migration to Moeng Laem. The fifth part pertains to Chinese dynastic history during the Ming and Qing dynasties; and records some regulations for the local society.

As for the second, third, and fourth parts, Dao Yongming (1986) first translated the original Tai text into Chinese and then compared it with the Chinese classical records while providing detailed annotations. According to the Tai and the Chinese annotations, the second part of MLXFS starts in CE 1402 (Yongle 2) (MLXFS 1986: 4), the third part in CE 1267 (Zhiyuan 13, *ibid*: 30), and the fourth part in the CS 1032 (CE 1670, *ibid*, 65). The first part is a general introduction to and a brief history of Moeng Laem, which was translated into modern Chinese.

The first folio can be summarised as:⁴² Moeng Mao was a prosperous city from the reign of the Moeng Ge Zhan Bi (Kosambi) king to the reign of the king of Moeng Mao. As the population grew, people sought alternative living places, leading to the cultivation of Moeng A, Moeng Ma, Moeng Suo, Moeng Laem, and Moeng Lang (now Lancang). The neighbouring Chiang Rung, known as Wi Long (วิหฺลวง in Thai), was a significant threat to Moeng Laem. The King of Chiang Rung sent troops to spy on Moeng Laem, leading to a war and the abduction of parts of the population. Moeng Laem's young ruler and his grandmother, ruled over the city, urging officials and ordinary people to resist the invasion. The Chiang Rung military, aware of Moeng Laem's preparedness, withdrew their troops and returned to Chiang Rung, ceding the Upper Wiang and Lower Wiang territories to Moeng Laem. Moeng Laem became

⁴¹ For more details, see Chapter One, 1.2.1

⁴² The title is: The Development of Moeng Laem and the Jurisdiction of Upper Wiang (Shangyun) and Lower Wiang (Xiayun).


prosperous, and the people lived happily.

It is safe to assume that the majority of the local population accepts this general description of how the Tai Nüa people developed Moeng Laem's territory. Evidently, the Tai people of Moeng Laem originated from Moeng Mao. Notably, Chiang Rung attempted to rule Moeng Laem through military means. However, since the *cao fa*'s grandmother was exceptionally intelligent, Moeng Laem organised resistance against the Chiang Rung invasion from the start. Chiang Rung was compelled to retreat and even had to send Upper and Lower Wiang as a present to Moeng Laem. This explains why, previously, the *cao fa* of Moeng Laem had dominated the Upper and Lower Wiang, which encompasses the majority of the current Lancang (瀾滄) County region. The drawback of this brief account is that it offers no specific dates.

The MLCL2 version, named “Lik Phün Moeng Laem” (see Manu.2), often known as the Chronicle of Moeng Laem, provides more information regarding the history of Moeng Laem from a local perspective. The manuscript contains one of the primary and most vital historical records of Moeng Laem. According to the colophon, the scribe, a man of non-aristocratic background, finished the writing of the text (copied from an older manuscript) “on the tenth waxing day of the eighth lunar month, CS 1318,” which corresponds to Saturday, 19 May 1956 (1318 Jyestha 10). The text is initially written in Lik script with one line written in Tham script on the cover page. The colophon on the title page is translated into English and transcribed into modern Thai as follows:

“The manuscript entitled History of Moeng Laem,” has been written at the Hò Sanam (i.e., the ruler's advisory council) by a commoner (*phrai*) on the tenth day of the waxing moon, in the eighth lunar month, [CS] 1318 (Thursday, 10 May 1956).

“หน้าทัพยาเยล้า ลิกพึ้นเมือง เมืองแลม” ตั้มไว้กับหอสนามไก่อ (โพร) เมื่อ ๑๑๑๘ ตัวเดือน ๘ แรม ๑๐ คำตั้ม”



Manu. 2: The cover of the Chronicle of the Moeng Laem native official (*cao fa* or *cao phaendin*), i.e., MLCL2.

MLCL2 is about the history of the *cao fa* or rulers of Moeng Laem. It runs over 156 pages and is written in Lik script. The earliest historical record of MLCL2, it can be dated to Chula Sakarat 1160,⁴³ which is the “Minor” or Burmese era and is widely used in Tai areas to date events. The second, fourth, and fifth pages contain the following content:⁴⁴

[Now we] talk about the King or Cao Phaendin [of] Moeng Laem.

At that time, there was a city named “Nakhon Moeng Ngoen,” which was covered by clouds and mist. [It] is located to the north of the Mekong River, close to the Chinese border. It is called “Moeng Mo (Moeng Bò),” [it] is a city with plenty of rice fields (agriculture). The lord of this big city is the ruler of the “Kui” tribe⁴⁵ having a military force of one thousand who are skilled in using the crossbow (That is a weapon used by hunters to hunt animals and shoot people). [We] have no idea why [they fought] against [us]. The result was that the Kui people caused much violence. [They] were ready to fight with the ruler of Moeng Laem, an economic trading centre.

In the *poek sanga* year, Chula Sakkarat 1160 (corresponding to CE 1798), the Kui people fled to the vast forest, [and then they] gathered again to resist [the enemies] which caused heavy fighting. In the *kat met* year (CS 1161), the Kui people seized Moeng Khrüa and Moeng Khwam.

⁴³ That is CE 1798, which was during the Qianlong period of the Qing dynasty.

⁴⁴ It summarised in modern Thai by Chaichün, and I have translated it into English.

⁴⁵ That is กูย in Th. Also known as Kuy or Kuay or maybe Gwe. If the Kui were Gui, this event might refer to the Gongliyan or Gonglayin losing the war with Shan and Moeng Laem. See Chapter Five for more details.

กล่าวถึง พระมหากษัตริย์ หรือ พระเจ้าแผ่นดิน เมืองแลม

ในห้วงเวลานั้น มีเมืองชื่อว่า “นครเมืองเงิน” ซึ่งเป็นเมืองหมอกเมฆปกคลุม ตั้งอยู่ตอนเหนือแม่น้ำแม่ของ (น้ำแม่โจง) ติดกับดินแดนจีน เรียกชื่อว่า “เมืองหม้อ (เมืองบ่อ)” ที่เป็น เมืองอู่ข้าวอู่น้ำ เจ้าแห่งนครนี้ เป็นเจ้าปกครองชนเผ่า “กูย” กาลหนึ่งพัน ซึ่งชานาญวิหาการใช้หน้าไม้ ไม่ทราบว่ พวกเขาเกิดการปฏิบัติสิ่งใดกัน ก่อให้เกิด ชาวกูยพรานป่าก่อการร้าย พร้อมหน้ากันต่อต้านและเข้ารบ พระองค์ที่ครอง (เมืองแลม ซึ่งเป็น) เมืองท่าชุมทางเศรษฐกิจ

ในปี “ปีกสีหง่า” จ.ศ. 1160 ชาวกูยที่หลบหนีไปอยู่ในป่าทั่วไป รวมตัวกันกลับมาต่อต้าน ก่อเกิดการสู้รบอย่างหนัก กับพระองค์อีก ปี “กาดเม็ค” ชาวกูยยึดได้ เมืองเกรือ และ เมืองควัม

The MLCL2 edition pays special attention to the confrontations with the Kui and Lahu, as well as those with Chiang Tung and Chiang Rung. Compared to the previous three versions, MLCL2 focuses on the conflicts between Moeng Laem and interior ethnic groups (such as the Kui and Lahu) and external polities (i.e., Chiang Tung, Chiang Rung, Mang Lön and Moeng Yang, etc.).

Early on (p. 17), MLCL2 records the battle between Moeng Laem and Chiang Tung as follows:

When the battle [happened] at the capital of Moeng Laem, the Cao Luang Khum Müang (ruler) and Cao Namawongsa [of Moeng Laem] led troops and chased the enemy towards Moeng Yong, which was their territory, seizing many elephants and horses. Then [the King] kept chasing the Tai Lü, who fled across the Mekong River. All the enemies returned to Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung).

ครั้งศึกฝ่ายนครหลวงเมืองแลม มีเจ้าหลวงกุมเมืองและเจ้านามะวงศา นำน้ำศึกไล่ตาม ไปถึงเมืองของ ถิ่นของเขา ยึดได้ช้างและม้าของเขาเป็นอันมาก แล้วไล่ตามชาวลื้อต่อไป ชาวลื้อหนีข้ามแม่น้ำของ (น้ำแม่โจง) ไป สุดที่นั่นศึกทั้งหลายก็กลับกันไปยังเมืองจีน (เชียงตุง)

This is only a small sample of the conflicts between Moeng Laem and Chiang Tung recorded in MLCL2. In Chapters Four and Five, the ongoing conflicts between Moeng Laem and other ethnic groups, as well as with neighbouring states, will be examined in depth. In this section, my focus is on the history of Moeng Laem in the Tai chronicles. A comparison with Chinese records reveals that some important events were written down by both sides (Moeng Laem and the Ming/Qing courts, see below). The differences and similarities of both records will be examined in Chapters Four and Five.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Following the MLXFS, I have drawn a table (See T1) listing the *Cao Fa* (*tuguan* or *tusi* in Ch.) of Moeng Laem.

T2: The Genealogy of Moeng Laem Pacification Commissioners

Data sources: MLXFS (4–27), MS, QSG, QSL, MLXZ, Fang Guoyu vol.13 (2001) and Zhang Haizhen (2008, 13)

No.	The name of <i>tusi</i> in Chinese record	Regime (CE)	Remarks
1	Han Ba Fa 罕把法	1289– 1341	The Tai manuscript states that the first ruler emerged in 1402 (Yongle 2), which is not correct. According to the Chinese record, the first ruler lived in the 1350s. The Chinese records state that Han-Ba-Fa is Mon-Khmer. However, the Tai people of Moeng Laem all believe that Han Bafa was not Wa but belonged to the Tai people.
2	Dao Han Hen	1342– 1362	No official record
3	Dao Pai Song 刀派送	1363– 1406	The Moeng Laem Chief Office was officially established in 1406.
4	Dao Huai Han 刀懷罕	1407– 1446	Both the Tai and Chinese records show that the Ming court and Moeng Laem started to have a closer relationship.
5	Dao Pai Le (刀派樂); Tai: Cao Kuan He Kham	1447– 1465	The fourth ruler, Dao Pai Han (Dao Huai Han), died in 1446; his son, Dao Pai Le, became ruler in 1447. ⁴⁷ Dao Pai Le is named Dao Pai Xian in the Tai chronicle.
6	Dao Pai Luan (刀派攔)	1466– 1481	The remarks of the sixth ruler: Dao Pailuan was the successor to Dao-Pai-Le. This means that he was the same person as Dao Paixie, who is recorded in the Tai chronicle.
7	Dao Pai Nue (刀派虐)	1482– 1492	On the 4th day of Month 8 in Chenghua year 18 (19 September 1482), Dao Pai Nue sent his people to pay tribute to the Ming court in the form of horses and silver utensils. In return, they were given clothes and silk satins. ⁴⁸
8	Dao Pai Zhan (刀派沾)	1493– 1514	Dao Pai Zhan was the vice-ruler of Moeng Laem; he was the supervisor of official seals. According to the Tai chronicle, Dao Pai Jin was the <i>cao fa</i> .
9	Dao Pai Lan (刀派攔)	1515– 1547	On the 3rd day of Month 2 in Zhengde year 10 (28. March 1515), Dao Pai Lan paid tribute to the Ming court in the form of horses and silver utensils. The Ming court held a feast for the envoys and gave them silk satins. ⁴⁹
10	Dao Pai Hang (刀派航)	1548– 1560	Dai Pai Hang should be Dao Pai Han. Hang, Kham, or Han (surname) has the same spelling in the Tai.
11	Dao Pai Zhen (刀派真)	1561– 1587	According to the XZYNTZ, the <i>cao fa</i> of Moeng Laem was appointed as Pacification Commissioner by the Kangxi emperor of the Qing dynasty; before that, they were appointed to the Chief's Office.
12	Dao Pai Han (刀派漢)	1588– 1595	He killed his nephew and seized the throne.
13	Dao Pai Jin	1595–	In XZYNTZ: Dao Pai Xing was Dao Pai Jin, which is recorded in textual criticism on

⁴⁷ MS, Vol. 150, pp. 3.

⁴⁸ MS chapter. 230, pp. 1.

⁴⁹ MS [Wuzong Zhengde veritable records] Vol. 121, pp. 2.

	(刀派金)	1603	<i>tusi</i> .
14	Dao Pai Zhong (刀派忠)	1604– 1661	No records
15	Dao Pai Qian 刀派謙	1662– 1708	He did not hold a great seal. After his death, no one could succeed to the throne. Thus, the local officials held a meeting to discuss who would be a suitable successor.
16	Dao Pai Ding (刀派鼎)	1709– 1730	Moeng Laem was granted the rank of Xuafu Si after Dao Pai Ding surrendered to the Qing court. This was followed by a reduction of the silver tax by one half. ⁵⁰
Acting <i>tusi</i>	Dao Pai Yi (刀派彝)	1730–?	Yi or Yu in the Tai language, which means “the second child.” Dao Pai Yi is probably the younger brother of Dao Pai Ding. Furthermore, Dao Pai Yi was the acting <i>tusi</i> , the silver tax was reduced by half, and Dao Pai Ding died in Yongzheng year 8 (1730). Dao Pai Yi was killed by Zhao He Bai (Dao Pai You), but it is not known in which year.
Usurp the throne	Zhao He Bai (召賀白)	?–1738	In QSG Zhao He Bai’s Tai name is recorded as Dao Pai You. He was deliberately provocative for many years (he killed Dao Pai Yi and seized the throne) and was put into prison first in Kunming and then in Pu’ er in 1738 – 1739. ⁵¹
17	Dao Pai Chun (刀派春)	1738– 1762	According to the Chinese records, during Dao Pai Chun’ s regime, Gui groups (桂家, 貴家 or 鬼家 in Ch.) managed the Bolong silver mine. ⁵² According to the QSL, Nangzhan ⁵³ burnt the Xuan-fu palace in Qianlong year 27 and fled back to Ava.
18	Dao Pai Yong (刀派勇)	1762–?	Originating from Moeng Lang (today Lancang County), he was appointed as an acting <i>tusi</i> by the Qing court after Dao Pai Chun was killed.
19	Dao Pai Xian (刀派先)	1766– 1768	In 1766, the so-called Sino-Burma War (1765 – 1769) broke out between Burma and the Qing court, over the succession to the throne in Chiang Tung.
20	Dao Pai Xin (刀派新)	1769– 1791	In February of Qianlong year 56 (CE 1791), Dao Pai Gong succeeded his father Dao Pai Xin, who was resting due to sickness. ⁵⁴ According to the Tai chronicle (MLCT1), he died in 1793.
21	Dao Pai Gong (刀派功)	1791– 1805	During his reign, the Lahu rebelled, and Dao Pai Gong went to Chiang Tung to ask for help, but was killed in Moeng Yang and the official seal was lost. ⁵⁵
22	Dao Pai Shang (刀派尚)	1805– 1813	Dao Pai Yu succeeded to the throne; however, he died on the way to Moeng Laem. Dao Pai Shang succeeded to the throne. ⁵⁶
23	Dao Pai Ming (刀派明)	1814– 1826	The <i>tusi</i> of Sipsong Panna, Dao Sheng Wu, was the younger cousin of Dao Pai Ming. The violent conflict between the Lahu and the Tai was pacified; however, the dispute between the Burmese Konbaung dynasty and the Chao Chet Ton dynasty of Lan Na ⁵⁷ continued. Moeng Laem and Sipsong Panna were the buffer zones and thus constantly

⁵⁰ Fang Guoyu et al. (eds), vol.13 (2001, 296/7).

⁵¹ QSL Qing-Gao-zong, chapter. 112, pp. 15.

⁵² The origin of Gongli Yan will be discussed in Chapter Four fn. 5.

⁵³ Nangzhan was a Tai princess who came from Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung).

⁵⁴ QSL (Qing Gaozong), chapter. 1373, pp. 11.

⁵⁵ More details will be discussed in Chapter Five.

⁵⁶ MLCT1, pp. 27.

⁵⁷ Chao Chet Ton dynasty: เจริญคน in Thai, namely dynasty of King Kawila of Chiang Mai (r. 1782–1816). For more details, see Aroonrut and Wyatt (2004, 31,147–159).

			involved in the conflicts between the Burmese Konbaung dynasty and the Chao Chet Ton dynasty of Lan Na. ⁵⁸
Acting <i>tusi</i>	Dao Pai Sheng (刀派勝)	1827– 1847	During the reign of Dao Pai Sheng, Tai and Lahu and Wa rebelled and refused to pay taxes. ⁵⁹
24	Dao Pai Quan (刀派圈)	1848– 1879	Dao Pai Quan was the nephew of Dao Pai Sheng who was unwilling to return to the throne; he asked for help from Burma. However, the Burmese army was defeated and driven out of Moeng Laem. Pai Quan ascended to the throne and governed Moeng Laem in a reasonable manner. He also built the Moeng Laem Pacification Commission Palace. ⁶⁰
25	Dao Pai Hua (刀派華)	1880– 1893	Pai Han, Pai Hua, and Pai Han were the same person. According to the “Moeng Laem A Ha-La Moeng” (Significant local events), in CS 1244 (Guangxu year 8, 1882), the headman of Moeng Khün summoned Moeng Yang and Moeng Lei to invade Moeng Laem. Dao Pai Hua defeated them, and they had to retreat. ⁶¹
26	Dao Pai Yong (刀派勇)	1894– 1930	During Dao Pai Yong’s regime, Moeng Laem became a target of Western colonial expansion. (Moeng Laem A Ha-La Moeng). In CS 1260 (CE 1898), the British determined the borderline of Moeng Laem and Cheli and Moeng Yang, marking it with 36 boundary monuments. ⁶²
27	Dao Pai Hong (刀派洪)	1931– 1949	Dao Pai Hong was the last <i>tusi</i> of Moeng Laem, he fled to his father-in-law who lived in Mang Lön ⁶³ when the CCP took over Yunnan in 1950. ⁶⁴

The Genealogy of Moeng Laem Pacification Commissioners (see T2) shows the main deeds of thirty *cao fa* (including acting and usurper *cao fa*) in Moeng Laem.⁶⁵ The first Moeng Laem *cao fa* emerged in the late Yuan and early Ming dynasties. The Tai chronicles might have made a mistake here. It is not unusual for Tai chronicles to confuse specific dates; therefore, scholars need to compare their contents with different records, particularly Chinese sources. It is necessary to list the entire genealogy of Moeng Laem here because the rulers of this polity were the key figures in its history. A review of the events that occurred during the reigns of different *cao fa* reveals a more accurate picture of Moeng Laem’s history, especially of the turning points.

The first turning point came during the reign of Dao Pai Chun (CE 1739–1762), who was killed by the main wife of Gonglayin (Gongli yan 宮裡雁 in Ch.) in CE 1762. This event was reported to the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, Wu Dashan

⁵⁸ For more details, see Zhang Haizhen (2004, 250–255).

⁵⁹ For more details, see Zhang Haizhen (2004, 258–261).

⁶⁰ Today, the Historical Museum of Moeng Laem.

⁶¹ MLXZ (1999, 224),

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Northern Shan State of present-day Myanmar.

⁶⁴ Zhang Haizhen (2004, 334/5).

⁶⁵ The name featuring the word *Han* 罕 does not signify the Han (Ch: 漢族) Chinese or Han migrants; rather, it is the Chinese transliteration of *Kham* (Th: ကာမ္မဂ်) meaning “gold” or “precious” in Tai. For more details, see Appendix Chapter Three, T2.

(吳達善). Wu ordered the native officials of Kūng Ma and Moeng Moeng to capture Gonglayin. The Kūng Ma native official reacted positively and quickly; he caught Gonglayin and sent him to Kunming where he was decapitated. His wife, Nang Zhan, fled to Moeng Yang after killing Dao Pai Chun and burning his palace. This event caused a decline in the authority of Moeng Laem rulers, and the collapse of Gonglayin's power resulted in the loss of a buffer zone between the Konbaung dynasty and the Qing court.

The Konbaung dynasty had ambitions to expand its territory to the Tai polities of Southwest Yunnan. After the end of the Sino-Burmese wars, which lasted from 1762 until 1769, both sides made an agreement, because Burma was not able to conquer Tai polities in Southwest Yunnan and the Qing court could not afford long-term warfare.⁶⁶ It was in this context that the Southwestern Tai polities located between Burma and the Qing court paid tribute to both sides to ensure their safety. With this geopolitical arrangement, such polities might be called “Chinese-Burmese condominiums.”⁶⁷ They had to balance the relationship between both sides. The Mandala system was extensively embraced in Mainland Southeast Asia, facilitating the occurrence of the condominium phenomenon inside Tai polities.

Nevertheless, the arrival of Western colonial powers prompted the establishment of the modern borderlines of a nation-state. The southwestern boundary demarcation between Great Britain and the Qing court finally confirmed the sovereignty of Tai Nüa polities. This significant academic controversy will be discussed in Chapter Six.

3.2.2 Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting

Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting in Chinese Historiography (From the seventeenth to the Early twentieth Centuries)

At present, the Kūng Ma Dai and Wa Autonomous County (耿馬傣族佤族自治縣), which was established on 16 October 1955 by the CCP government, is under the jurisdiction of Lincang Prefecture. In 2018, the population was around 291,000.⁶⁸ According to the 2012 census, ethnic minorities account for 158,600 persons, 59,400

⁶⁶ Huang Zuwen (1988, 87–95) argues that this was due to climate factors.

⁶⁷ Condominiums were territories over which two or more sovereign powers shared sovereignty. Here, it refers to Moeng Laem and Cheli, who had to pay tribute to both China and Burma. For more details, see also Grabowsky (2008, 41–42).

⁶⁸ According to the government's public information, the population of Kūng Ma was 291,000 in 2018. See the government's website: <http://www.yngm.gov.cn/gengmaxian/zjgm44/gmgk91/158328/index.html>, accessed on 30 July 2020.

of whom are Tai.⁶⁹ The Tai mainly inhabit six townships: Moeng Ting;⁷⁰ Kūng Ma; Hepai; Mengsa; Moeng Yong; and Mengjian. Today's Kūng Ma County is made up of nine townships; a Huaqiao (overseas Chinese) settlement region; two collective farms – Moeng Ting and Meng Sa – and eighty-five villages.⁷¹

Nan Guixiang (2013, 1) points out Kūng Ma, known as “Sindhvartha” in Sanskrit,⁷² means a place that, according to local tradition, the ancestors of the Tai had discovered by following a white horse. The local people named Kūng Ma “Moeng Chiang Kūng Kham,” which means the city with gold and gems.⁷³

As mentioned, the formal native official districts of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting are in the territory of Gengma (Kūng Ma) Dai and Wa Autonomous County. Historically, Moeng Ting Prefecture was established earlier than Kūng Ma. Gu Zuyu (1692)⁷⁴ describes Moeng Ting Prefecture as an ancient barbarian land, originally called Jingma Dian. The prefecture, comprised of two flatlands (*dian*), was under the Military-cum-Civilian Route Command of Moeng Ting in CE 1279, during the Yuan period. The Moeng Ting Military-cum-Civilian Route Command became the Moeng Ting Route in 1382. In 1585, the jurisdiction of the preceding Kūng Ma Pacification Commissions was brought under its purview. The administrative structure of Moeng Ting entailed the division of households into five villages, with each village including 110 dwellings. The Aboriginal Prefect's surname was *Cao* (*Diao* in Chinese), but it became Kham after 1436–1449. The Tai Federation of Moeng Mao rebelled and conquered Moeng Ting during 1436–1449.

The Moeng Ting Prefect, Diao Lumeng, deserted his land and fled. The lesser headman of Moeng Phòng, Kham Ge, earned credit by participating in the military

⁶⁹ As mentioned in Chapter One, the Chinese authorities define the different Tai groups as Dai *minzu* (傣民族), no matter if they are Tai Lü, Tai Nüa, or Tai Yai (for the definition of ethnic groups in China, see Fei Xiaotong 1992: 601–613). The Tai branch in Kūng Ma is rather complicated. During my fieldwork on 10, September 2012, a local Tai Nüa told the following story: the main Tai group is Tai Nüa, who migrated from Tai Kong (Dehong). They should, therefore, be called Tai Khong: Tai = below, transliterated as *de* 德 in Chinese, and Khong = Salween River. Note that Khong is pronounced as hong, therefore it becomes *hong* 宏, and *Dehong*: ได้ดง in Thai. The Chinese *Dehong* literally means “below the Salween River.” Of the other Tai groups, the Tai Khün migrated from Chiang Tung and the Tai Yuan from Chiang Mai. Some central Thai migrated from Thailand (for more details, see GMLSDC 1963, 6, and Nan Guixiang 2013, 26).

⁷⁰ Historically, Moeng Ting was another large and long-established polity (before Kūng Ma), with a bigger territory and stronger political position than Kūng Ma. I will elaborate on Moeng Ting later in this thesis.

⁷¹ Nan Guixiang (2013, 1).

⁷² The Chinese transliteration of Kūng Ma's name in Tai manuscript is Sin Thu Wa Na Ta. (Ibid) believes that the Tai name of Kūng Ma is from the Pali language. This is incorrect. I am grateful to Ms Sutteera Satayaphan for helping me to identify Sindhvartha (सिन्धुवर्ध), which means “horse city” in Sanskrit (*Vartha* is from Sanskrit).

⁷³ Gong Suzheng (龔肅政) has a different explanation, i.e., that “Kūng Ma” (Burmese name Kaingma) means a horse's bridle. *Kūng* means bridle, including the reins (Ch. 轡頭) and *ma* means horse.

⁷⁴ The following contents are summarised from Fang Guoyu et al., ed. vol. 5 (1998, 792). The original text sees Appendix Chapter Three, No.1.

war against Moeng Mao. Thus, he became the acting ruler of Moeng Ting. The leader of Moeng Phòng, Kham Lie, took the seal of Moeng Ting and ruled the area from 1522–1566. He appointed Kham Qing, a *sheren*⁷⁵ from Moeng Phòng, to administer the area, known as Kūng Ma. The *sheren* of the headman Kham Qian rebelled and joined Burma in CE 1582. The Ming army defeated Burma the following year, restoring Kūng Ma. Kham He, a descendant of Kham Ge, became Kūng Ma Prefect.⁷⁶

The *cao fa* of both Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting came from Moeng Phòng. The rulers of those three parties shared the same blood lineage. The relationship among the three polities goes beyond a kind of subordination or one of equal status polities. As explained in Chapter Two, according to the Mandala system, a powerful *moeng* (*müang*) has the right to receive tribute from other, smaller *moeng* (*müang*) as proof of subordination. Moeng Phòng was a powerful state in the eyes of Moeng Ting and Kūng Ma, whose rulers had been appointed by Moeng Phòng. The genealogy of *cao fa*, known as Pathamamula in Pali, was adopted into the local chronicle of Moeng Ting.⁷⁷

The Pacification Commissioners' Genealogy (Xuanwei Pudie 宣慰譜牒), translated into Chinese by local scribes, was compiled and published by Professor Yin Shaoting and Professor Daniels in 2005. It notes (2005, 595) that, in 1369, Kham Gailun's third son, Kham Guan, was designated Cao Moeng, a headman to lead the population in developing Moeng Ting. They were to establish the city south of the settlement in Moeng Chin. Kham Guan remained in Sēn.wii/Saenwi (Moeng Phòng, literally 100,000 banana trees) and did not arrive in Moeng Ting.⁷⁸ In 1407, troops from the Ming court conquered Moeng Mao. Ha Ba and Kham Gan, residents of Pacification Commission Moeng Phòng, fled to the Ming court and surrendered to Chinese troops. They agreed to submit their land and communities to the Chinese court. Then, the Ming emperor gave Moeng Ting considerable territory on the Salween, entitled the Lucky Hereditary⁷⁹ Left Area Command of Moeng Ting. In 1409, Kham Guan Fa left Saenwi for Moeng Ting to become an official.

⁷⁵ Prof. Dr. Christian Daniels explained the meaning of *sheren* to me on 15 March 2021: "The family members in hereditary officer households (*sheren* 舍人=housemen) – people within the military structure, who were not liable for military service because they were second, third or other sons of Chinese civil or military officials (not including the eldest son who was heir to his father's post). *Sheren* do not inherit their father's position. Here they use *sheren* to refer to the non-eldest sons of Tai *Tuguan*."

⁷⁶ This text summarised from Fang Guoyu et al., ed. vol. 5 (1998, 792). The original text sees Appendix Chapter Three, No.1.

⁷⁷ The Chinese transliteration of this Pali expression is Ba Ta Ma Mu Na Wu Ba Die (Yin Shaoting and Daniels 2005, 587). It means the first origin or root in the Pali language. Thanks to Sanskrit specialist Ms Sutteera Stayaphan for making this clarification and giving me the correct spelling.

⁷⁸ Hsenwi, namely Moeng Phòng in Tai, Mubang in Chinese. Moeng Phòng hereafter.

⁷⁹ *jili shixi* (吉利世袭 in Ch.). *Jili* is the Chinese transliteration; it is *Siri* in the Pali language.

Nan Guixiang states (2013, 25) that the Tai of Kūng Ma, Moeng Ting, and Moeng Laem had migrated from Moeng Mao since the tenth century which means since the period of the Dali Kingdom.⁸⁰ In CE 1348 (Zhizheng year 8), Luchuan invaded Moeng Ting (Ibid.). The Tai federation of Luchuan grew stronger and annexed the smaller Tai polities in Southwest Yunnan. In response, the Ming court tried to divide Luchuan's territory and set up different prefectures (the aforementioned "divide and rule" policy). Thus, Moeng Ting Lu was established in 1382. Later, the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission was created. For a long time, Kūng Ma was placed under the administration of Moeng Ting. MS records the founding of Kūng Ma as follows:

In CE 1585 (Wanli 13), the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission was established by dividing the land of Mengding. In the west is the mountain Sanjian and in the south is the Zhali River (Salween River), which is the border of Mengding, in the north to the [Mengding] Prefecture is a hundred miles.⁸¹

耿馬安撫司，萬曆十三年析孟定地置。西有三尖山，南有喳哩江，與孟定分界。北距府百里。

Moeng Ting Prefecture came under the rule of Moeng Phòng and Kūng Ma became part of Moeng Ting Prefecture. Kūng Ma was finally established as the Sub-Pacification Commission for a legitimate reason: the rebellion of its local ruler, Kham Qian.⁸² From this point, the Ming court understood that obedient and loyal rulers were crucial for controlling Southwest Yunnan, which is situated far away from the Chinese dynasties but close to Burma and other Tai polities. Thus, the emperor ordered the succession of Kham Ge, who was loyal and made a tremendous military contribution to the Ming court. The Ming court granted and pacified the native officials who contributed to military affairs and caused less trouble.

Gu Yanwu provides us with a description of the geographical location, relationships, and founding history between Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting.⁸³ According to the Gu's description, we can know that Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission and Moeng Ting Prefecture share the Chali River (Salween River) between Moeng Ting in the south and Kūng Ma in the north.⁸⁴ Sub-Pacification Commissioners were not

⁸⁰ Nan Guixiang's statement is based on local legend. However, it is a controversial topic since there is no specific record of the official documents and no archaeological evidence.

⁸¹ Manuscript: MS Chapter. 46, Chronicle. 22, Geo. 7, Yunnan, pp. 38. For the whole texts, see the online library: <https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=142936&page=38&remap=gb#%E8%80%BF%E9%A9%AC%E5%AE%89%E6%8A%9A%E5%8F%B8>, accessed on 25/10/2023.

⁸² Han Qian in Chinese. Han is a direct translation of the Chinese pronunciation. Han should be *Kham*, which means "gold" in Tai. Hereafter, the Kūng Ma *tusi*'s family name is rendered as "Kham."

⁸³ Gu Yanwu (*r.* 1613–1682) collected various materials from the local Gazetteer and official records (i.e., MSL) of the Ming Empire in order to write *Tianxia junguo libing shu* 天下郡國利病書 (On Benefit and Faults of the Empire's Local Administration). This manuscript was initially published in 1662. The aforementioned quotation is from page 16, Volume 45, of the 1906 manuscript, which pertains to the regions of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Jiaozhi. For the original text, see the Appendix Chapter Three, No. 3.

⁸⁴ In fact, according to the map of Yunnan, it is the Nanding River 南定河, which is a tributary of the Chali River

previously constituted in Kūng Ma. During the Jiajing emperor's regime (1522–1566), Moeng Phòng seized Moeng Ting, and Kham Qing was given the area as his fiefdom. Kham Qing's son, Men Kham, was weak and inept. By contrast, all four of Kham Qian's sons were agile and brave. Thus, he planned for his four sons to marry the four daughters from the four sub-prefectures and then allied with Burma in order to take Moeng Ting. In 1583, Kūng Ma surrendered to Burma, exiled Kham Jinzhong, and defeated first Shidian (present-day Baoshan, east of the upper Salween River). In the following month, Kham Qian and Burma invaded Yaoguan (now Chuxiong City). In February/March 1584, Ming imperial troops captured and beheaded Kham Qian and his sons. The Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commissioner was created, and Men Kham was appointed Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commissioner by the Ming court. The Sub-Pacification Commission of Kūng Ma received its seal in 1587. After Men Kham died, his younger brother Men Hanjin was given the seal, which he routinely used to pay tribute to the Ming emperor.

Moeng Phòng annexed Moeng Ting and its ruler exercised authority continuously over this prefecture. As a neighbour of Moeng Ting, Kūng Ma could not avoid interference from Moeng Phòng or Burma. Previously, when the ruler of Kūng Ma had become over-reliant on Burma, the southwestern and northern parts of Yunnan became unstable. Therefore, the Ming court established the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission in order to pacify and control the area, thereby protecting the empire's southwestern border.

In the early Qing dynasty, Yunnan was pacified and Kūng Ma was granted a Commission of Appeasement (*An fusi* 安撫司). Kūng Ma kept its political status because the *cao fa* Kham Mendi, instantly submitted his allegiance. In Kangxi year 22, Kūng Ma was promoted to Sub-Pacification Commission.⁸⁵ It remained under the jurisdiction of Shunning Prefecture until the mid-Qing dynasty. The QSG records:

Shunning Prefecture: [...] In the early Shunzhi [reign] (1643–1661), the system of the Ming [court] (the native official system) was adopted [by the Qing court] [...] The Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission was under the direct jurisdiction (zhili) [of the Qing court] [...] After the Qing [troops] had pacified Dian (Yunnan), Han Mendi tendered his allegiance [to the Qing court], thus [he was] still appointed [the native official of the Kūng Ma] Sub-Pacification Commission, which was hereditary. In Qianlong 29 (CE 1764), [Kūng Ma] was transferred under the jurisdiction of Shunning Prefecture, [the post of which] was hereditary.⁸⁶

順寧府：……順治初，沿明制。……直隸耿馬宣撫司……清平滇，罕悶鋹歸附，仍授宣撫司，承襲。乾隆二十九年，改隸順寧府，世襲。

(Salween).

⁸⁵ Nan Guixiang (2013, 40).

⁸⁶ QSG, chapter.74, Treatise. (*zhi*) 49, on Geography (*dili*) 21.

The tax regulations of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission and Moeng Laem Chief Office were extensively documented in the Daqing Huidian (The Great Code of the Great Qing), commonly referred to as the Kangxi Huidian. This compilation was initially created by Emperor Kangxi in 1684 and then updated and reproduced by successive Qing emperors.

The Precedents of the Great Code of the Great Qing (Daqing Huidian 《欽定大清會典事例》), which describes the appointment of Kūng Ma *tusi* and Moeng Laem *tusi*, was revised and recopied in 1882. After Yunnan was conquered, Men Diu was nominated for the Aboriginal Commission (*tusi*) of the Sub-Pacification of Kūng Ma, which came under the authority of Shunning Prefecture. He was granted an official seal, letters patent, and tally credentials (also known as coupons) so that he could exercise control in Kūng Ma and Moeng Moeng (now Shuangjiang). Land taxes on husked rice were collected annually by commuting 25 taels (*liang*) of silver and 30 taels in lieu of labour duty. A seal, letters patent, and tally coupons⁸⁷ were granted to Diao Paiyi, the chieftain of Moeng Laem Chief Office in 1729. He was removed from office in 1764. Diao Paijin became Moeng Laem's Sub-Pacification Commissioner in 1774, receiving the necessary seal, letter, and tally coupon. Miners in Moeng Laem paid 300 silver taels in tax annually.⁸⁸

It is clear that Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem had been incorporated into the imperial administrative system and therefore needed to pay symbolic taxes to the Chinese emperors during the Qing dynasty.⁸⁹ The taxation of dozens and hundreds of taels per year is of purely symbolic value. Moeng Laem was initially ordered to pay 600 taels, but Emperor Yongzheng later reduced this by half to show his mercy towards Moeng Laem (more details can be found below).

However, nominal taxation was not sufficient to maintain the status of the southwest frontier under the nominal and *de facto* control of the Qing dynasty. The execution of Gonglayin resulted in the territory expansion of the Konbaung dynasty⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Tally coupon (different credentials according to the official ranking): In the Ming and Qing dynasties, the court issued a decree recording the titles, descent, and inheritance years of the native officials; this legal letter from the attorney is called *haozhi* in Chinese. Dr Liew-Herres Foon Ming provided me with a further explanation in a personal email dated 31 March 2021: “*Yin xin hao zhi* 印信號紙 as official seals (*yin* 印), credentials or letters patent (*xinfu* 信符) and tally documents (*haozhi* 號紙) with serial numbers, granted by China to the appointed aboriginal officials. The tally documents were used to prove the identity of the tribute envoys when they entered China proper. We need passports and visas nowadays. These were all the official documents granted by the Ming or Qing court to their aboriginal officials.”

⁸⁸ Summarised from the *Kun Gang* manuscript. (1882) roll 588. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Three No. 4.

⁸⁹ About the revenue and taxes of Kūng ma, see T8.

⁹⁰ According to the archives of the Qing court, Gonglayin was a source of constant conflict with the Burmese. For instance, Huang Hongshou rep. (1986, 227) in Qianlong year 19 (1754) *tusi* Gonglayin (Guijia) and Moeng Phòng (Mubang) fought against the Burmese for many years, despite the fact that many *tusi* submitted to King Alaungpaya

in Burma and the elimination of a buffer zone between Burma and Southwestern Yunnan. This presumably led directly to the seven-year Qing-Burma war (1762–1769). In *The Record of Pacifying Burma*, Sun Shiyi (1989, 83)⁹¹ wrote the following about the disputes between Burma/Küing Ma and Moeng Laem: after Gonglayin died, in 1762, the Burmese King grew even more indifferent. He conspired with Moeng Phòng Kham Hei to harass Küing Ma in Yunnan and required Küing Ma to pay them (Tai rulers or *cao fa*) paper money annually. Burmese headman Pu Labu sent his warriors to Küing Ma for money. They marched to Moeng Ting and arrested the *cao fa* Kham Daxing. The army reached Mao Long silver mine.⁹² Tian Yunzhong, the Yongshun town military officer, personally led his soldiers to destroy the Burmese. The governor of Yunnan and Guizhou Province, Wu Dashan, ordered him to lead his forces back to Küing Ma for recklessness, while *tusi* Kham Guokai defended his land outside the Shi Niu mine.⁹³

Following the death of Gonglayin, the buffer zone between Burma and the territories of the Southwestern Tai *tusi* disappeared, and hereafter the Burmese united with the Moeng Phòng *tusi* to blackmail Küing Ma and Moeng Ting for money and goods. Moeng Ting *tusi* was caught while the Küing Ma *tusi* routed the Burmese out of Shi Niuchang (石牛廠). An unpublished internal reference, GMLSDC,⁹⁴ points out that Shi Niuchang is located in the east of Ximeng,⁹⁵ close to Lake Longtan (龍潭) (1963, 8).

According to Yang Yuda (2004, 75), the Burmese captured the Moeng Ting *tusi* while the Küing Ma *tusi* kept fighting against the Burmese. The Qing court needed the Tai polities to guard its border and, viewed from this standpoint, Küing Ma proved more reliable than Moeng Ting. In the following years, Küing Ma's political status increasingly became a matter of concern and remained so until the fall of the Qing dynasty. Nan Guixiang (2016, 40/44) describes that In CE 1764, the jurisdiction of Küing Ma was transferred to Shunning Prefecture. In CE 1783, the Küing Ma *tusi* Kham Chaoyuan ordered his people to extract silver from the Xiyi mine. Simultaneously,

once he recaptured the Burmese capital. The original text reads: “十九年， 囊籍牙既恢復國都， 諸土司相率降服， 惟貴家與木邦二土司抵抗累歲。” Moreover, Zhao Lian rep. (1997, 119), the civil affairs official (*Buzheng shi*) Yao Yongtai reported to Emperor Qianlong that Yan (Gonglayin) would cause trouble for the Burmese if he were allowed to survive. The original text reads: “布政使姚永泰曰：……今若留雁， 可以為緬酋之忌憚。”

⁹¹ Sun Shiyi (1720–1796), an official in the Qianlong regime. He was secretary to the Fuheng (the general in charge of pacifying Burma) during his Burmese expedition in 1769. He then wrote *The Record of Pacifying Burma* (《緹緬紀事》), which was compiled in the *Historical and Treatise Data of Dehong* (《德宏史志資料》) and published in 1989.

⁹² In today's Cangyuan Wa Autonomous County, Lincang Prefecture.

⁹³ Summarised from Sun Shiyi (1983, 83). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Three, No. 5.

⁹⁴ I.e., Material obtained from the survey of social history of the Tai peoples in Yunnan Province, vol. 7.

⁹⁵ Wa district, today one of the counties of Pu'er Prefecture.

Kham Chaoyuan divided Kūng Ma into nine Mengs (Ch.: 勛 or 孟; Tai: *moeng*) and thirteen Quans (Ch.: 圈 Tai: *khwaen*).⁹⁶ Moreover, he appointed headmen to raise land taxes and draft labour services.

The native office system was abolished after the founding of the PRC in 1950. As Nan Guixiang (2016, 40) stresses, the *gaitu guiliu* policy was implemented in 1940 under ROC government, however, the native offices made the actual decisions about local affairs; regular officials only had nominal power over local affairs. The native office system was abolished entirely when the CCP took over Kūng Ma in 1950.

To this day, Kūng Ma is part of Lincang City, which includes the former native office districts of Moeng Ting and Kūng Ma. Ultimately, in the political competition between Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting, Kūng Ma got the upper hand because its native offices remained loyal to the Ming and Qing courts.

3.2.3 Moeng Bò

3.2.3.1 The Founding of Moeng Bò

The eleven prefaces in the Weiyuan (Moeng Bò) Sub-Prefecture Gazetteer (Wei Yuan Ting Zhi: 威遠廳志, abbr. WYTZ) all characterise Weiyuan as a remote frontier region (WYTZ rep. 2016, 1–24). Before 1828, Moeng Bò was indeed a frontier region, which the Qing court had only just begun to control. As mentioned in Chapter One, Moeng Bò was *gaitu guiliu* by the Yongzheng Emperor in 1724, and the ongoing rebellions lasted over half a century until the Qianlong period. Before the *gaitu guiliu*, Moeng Bò is rarely mentioned in Chinese historical records.

Today's Jinggu (Moeng Bò) Dai and Yi Autonomous County (景穀傣族彝族自治州) is located in the southwestern part of Yunnan Province and is administratively under the jurisdiction of Pu'er Prefecture (see M7). Moeng Bò has three different historical names mentioned in Chinese classical texts: Meng Wo (Moeng Bò), Weiyuan, and Jinggu. As JGXZ states (1993, 12 and 481), before the ROC (1912–1949 on the mainland), it was officially called Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture. Its establishment began in BCE 109 (Yuanfeng 2 in the Western Han dynasty) when it belonged to Yizhou County in the Ailao area. The Nanzhao kingdom established Weiyuan City (Weiyuan Cheng: 威遠城) in CE 765 (Yongtai 1) and it was under the jurisdiction of the Yinsheng Jiedu (銀生節度).⁹⁷ The YS⁹⁸ states that Kainan Prefecture (開南府) used to be inhabited by the Pu and He Ni⁹⁹ people until the

⁹⁶ For more details see Chapter Two, fn. 40.

⁹⁷ Yinsheng: today Jingdong County. *Jiedu* was a military officer during the Tang dynasty.

⁹⁸ Namely, *History of the Yuan Dynasty*, vol. 61. Geographical Treatises 13 Geography 4 (<元史卷 61 地理志第十三地理四>).

⁹⁹ Pu and He Ni: 濮, 和泥. They are the ancestors of the Bulang and Hani people during the Tang and Song dynasties.

Nanzhao Kingdom conquered Kainain Prefecture and established another walled city called Yingsheng (銀生城) as its administrative centre. Later, this administrative centre was occupied by the Jinchi and Baiyi¹⁰⁰ during the late eighth century and the Nanzhao Kingdom moved the administrative centre to Weichu (威楚), which was developed into a county. Thereafter, wild barbarians (Sheng Man 生蠻 in Ch.) occupied Kainan, and from then until the thirteenth century, there are no records about Moeng Bò in Chinese historiography.¹⁰¹ Fan Chuo¹⁰² reports that:

Yinsheng City (today Jingdong, Pu'er Prefecture) is situated in the south of Pudan¹⁰³ and a ten-day march away from Longwei City (today Xiaguan, Dali Prefecture) [...] The marketplace holds many treasures; gold and musk are expensive products (in the market). [Yinsheng City] has Puzi and Changzong and dozens of other kinds of barbarians. Kainan lies to the south of Longwei city, and [from Longwei to Kainan] is an eleven-day march. Weicheng (Moeng Bò)/Fengyi City (Ning'er, Pu'er Prefecture today) and Lirun City (today, Iwu, Moeng La) have over one hundred salt wells. The Black Teeth and other groups are subordinated to Mangnai Dao (today's Chiang Rung).¹⁰⁴

銀生城在撲賧之南去龍尾城十日程……交易之處，多諸珍寶，以黃金、麝香為貴貨，有撲子、長鬃等數十種蠻。又開南在龍尾城南十一日程，管柳追和都督城。又威遠城、奉逸城、利潤城、內有鹽井一百來所。茫乃道並黑齒等類部落皆屬焉。

Weiyuan Prefecture was established in CE 1275 (Zhiyuan 12) under the jurisdiction of Weichu Lu.¹⁰⁵ According to JGXZ, this occurred in CE 1250 (Lizong emperor 10 of the South Song). Later, Azhibu (阿止步) led troops of Jinchi Baiman people to conquer Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture. Azhibu surrendered to the Yuan dynasty

¹⁰⁰ *Jinchi Baiyi* in mandarin: 金齒白夷 or *Jinchi Baiman*: 金齒白蠻. *Jinchi* means gold-coloured teeth; Baiyi was the name for this ethnic group. Fang argues that they were the ancestors of the Tai Nüa (see Fang Guoyu 1958, 29), however, this has not been proven. Further, Jiang Yingliang (1962, 25–32) holds the point that baiyi were ancestors of Tai, he further asserts that the Bo (樊夷 Boyi) people during the Yuan dynasty may be identified as the progenitors of the Tai people. This assertion is supported by an analysis of Chinese archives since the Tang era. But Daniels argues (2021, 208–211) that Jinchi Baiyi were the ancestors of the Mon-Khmer.

¹⁰¹ The lack of official records regarding the history of Yunnan was normal since Nanzhao fought against the Tang dynasty three times: AD 750–785; 829–830; 859–870. The Tang court lost the wars and control over the whole territory of Yunnan. Therefore, the official connection between Yunnan and the central authorities was suspended until the Mongol-Yuan Dynasty conquered Yunnan in 1254. For more details, see Liang Youjia (2010, 1–18).

¹⁰² Fan Chuo (Tang dynasty): He was the military official of the An Nan Du Hu Fu (安南都護府, what the Tang court named the Protectorate General to Pacify the South, located today in Hanoi, Vietnam), who lived in the ninth century; his book was finished around AD 863. His work is an important reference for studying the history of Yunnan.

¹⁰³ Pudan may be found to the southeast of modern-day Weishan County, within the borders of modern-day Nanjian County, and reaching as far west as the banks of the Salween River. For more details, see Tan Qixiang, vol. 5 (1982, 80–81).

¹⁰⁴ *Annals of Yunnan*, chapter 6. Wang Taiyue ed. 1777: Historiography 9. Chronicles.

¹⁰⁵ The Administrative Organisation of the Yuan dynasty was organised as follows: Road (*lu* 路) / Office (*fu* 府) / Prefecture (*zhou* 州) / County (*xian* 縣). Lu was the second highest administration system during the Yuan Dynasty. Weichu is currently in Chuxiong Prefecture (楚雄府).

in CE 1262 (Zhongtong 3). This shows that A Zhibu occupied Weiyuan in 1250 and surrendered to the Mongol-Yuan dynasty in 1262. The native official system started during the Yuan dynasty, and A Zhibu was directly appointed as a ruler of Weiyuan. Nevertheless, there are no traces of A Zhibu or his descendants in Chinese historiography for the period from 1262 until the first year of the Ming dynasty (1368).¹⁰⁶

M7: Moeng Bò Map of the 1990s



Source: JGXZ (1993: Preface)

JGXZ (1993, 7–8 and 481–482) records that, in 1355, the Pingmian (平緬)

¹⁰⁶ Records about Weiyuan in the History of Yuan state that twelve wharf's tribes, such as Buri (步日) and Simo (思麼) were ceded to Weiyuan, and that Yuanjiang Road was established in Yuan year 25 (BC 1289). The twelve tribes inhabited the areas of the Yuanjiang River, Mojiang River, Jiangcheng, Pu'er, Simao, and western Sipsòng Panna. Weiyuan's Gu Bao (谷保) occupied Mu Luodian (木羅甸) (Moeng Lo or Minle town today) and the right-hand Prime Minister (You cheng 右丞) Suanzhierwei (算只兒威) went to Weiyuan to suppress the chaos. Despite this, he started an attack after bribes by Gu Bao and was defeated. Summarised from Song Lian. 1370. History of Yuan dynasty chapter. 23. Imperial biographies 23. Wuzong (Külüg Khan) 2 (元史卷 23 本紀第 23 武宗 2).

Pacification Commissioner, Hso Kip Hpa (Si Kefa 思可法), conquered Weiyuan. In the Hongwu year 15 (CE 1382), Dao Fanglun (禱放論), the ruler of Weiyuan, surrendered to the Ming dynasty and changed his name to Dao Xiang (刀相), because the emperor incorrectly thought that his title, Cao, was his surname.¹⁰⁷ Subsequently, the Weiyuan Aboriginal Sub-Prefecture was established under the jurisdiction of Chuxiong Prefecture. In CE 1384 (Hongwu 17), it was promoted to Weiyuan Aboriginal Sub-Prefecture. In CE 1385 (Hongwu 18), Hso Long Hpa (Si Lunfa 思倫發) commanded his Zhaolu¹⁰⁸ (招魯), Dao Suandang, to take possession of Weiyuan and rule over it. In 1398 (Hongwu 31), Dao Suandang surrendered to the Ming dynasty.

According to Gong Yin (1992, 601), Dao Suandang came from Moeng Bò and was the Zhaolu of Hso Long Hpa. In 1398, Dao Suandang surrendered to the Ming dynasty under Gold Teeth's (Jinchi) commission and was appointed military officer chief of Moeng Bò.¹⁰⁹ According to The Local Gazetteer of Yunnan Written in the Dao Guang period,¹¹⁰ Dao Suandang was the self-appointed native chief of Weiyuan and led the prefecture during the Yuan dynasty; he first surrendered to the Ming dynasty in the Hongwu years. Both DGYNZ and ZGTSZD¹¹¹ consider Dao Suandang to be the first in line of the native office genealogy in Weiyuan, so we can conclude, in turn, that Dao Suandang might be the first Tai ruler in Moeng Bò. This raises the question of whether Dao Suandang came from Moeng Mao or from Moeng Bò. JGTSSX and JGXZ record contradictory information concerning his place of origin; in other words, the Tai and Chinese records disagree on this matter.

In CE 1724, after the introduction of the *gaitu guiliu* policy, Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture was put under the jurisdiction of Zhenyuan Prefecture. Later, in 1770 (Qianlong 35), this changed again, and Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture was put under the jurisdiction of Pu'er Prefecture. In 1912, its name was changed to Weiyuan County; however, because there was already a Weiyuan County in Sichuan Province, the name was changed to Jinggu County in 1914.

3.2.3.2 The Origins of the Tai Ethnic Groups in Moeng Bò

According to JGTSSX (1990, 1–5), the rulers of the local society in Moeng Bò were the two sons of the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang. Internal

¹⁰⁷ Due to the similarity in pronunciation of *Cao* (曹), *Zhao* (召), *Dao* (刀), and *Tao* (陶), the word *Cao* is often mispronounced as one of these other characters by the Chinese authorities.

¹⁰⁸ Military Officer, commanding 10,000 soldiers, who was the Pacification Commissioner of Pingmian.

¹⁰⁹ The original record reads: 刀算黨，孟波人，思倫發招魯。明洪武三十一年（1398年），在金齒司歸附，先蒙總兵官就令回去到任孟波百戶。 See *Tuguan Dibo* (manuscripts reprinted by Shangwu Press, 1937), pp. 78–79.

¹¹⁰ Namely, *Daoguang Yunnan zhichao* <道光雲南志抄>, abbreviated to DGYNZ.

¹¹¹ Namely, *The Chinese Tusi System* (Zhongguo tusi zhidu 《中國土司制度》).

struggles about who would take the throne forced them to flee to Moeng Mao where they gained the *caofa*'s trust. In fact, he married his two daughters to these brothers.¹¹² Later, the brothers led their troops to Moeng Bò where they fought with and, ultimately, subdued the local ethnic groups, the Men (悶) and La (臘) people.¹¹³ The younger brother remained in Moeng Bò as the ruler, and the older one went to Lincang (臨滄)¹¹⁴ to be the ruler there. The first part of the account is fictitious, but the last part, about leading their troops from Moeng Mao to Moeng Bò, is probably authentic. In his *Annals of Yunnan*,¹¹⁵ Fan Chuo says that the Mang Man lived in Kainan. According to Fang Guoyu's (1958, 39) research, Kainan Prefecture was mostly inhabited by Mang Man, who are identified as the ancestors of the Tai Lü. However, the *Annals of Geography of Yuan History* says that Kainan Prefecture used to be inhabited by Pu and He Ni. Thus, questions remain regarding who lived in the Weiyuan during the Yuan and early Ming dynasties. According to YS:

Kainan Prefecture was previously inhabited by Pu and He Ni barbarians. After the rise of the House of the Meng (namely, the rulers of Nanzhao) Yinsheng Prefecture (fu) was established, which was later annexed by the Jinchi and Baiman. The seat (zhi) of Yinsheng Prefecture was then transferred to Chuwei. Thus, Kainan was occupied by the Wild Barbarians (Sheng Man). From the Nanzhao [Kingdom] to the House of the Duan (Dali Kingdom), the territory was regarded as desolate land beyond the frontier.¹¹⁶

開南州，昔樸、和泥二蠻所居也，至蒙氏興，立銀生府。後為金齒白蠻所陷，移府治于威楚，開南遂為生蠻所據。自南詔至段氏，皆為徼外荒僻之地。

Pu and He Ni are the ancestors of the Hani people, tribes who lived in the mountainous areas. When the Nanzhao Kingdom was founded, Kainan was conquered by the Jinchi and Baiyi. Kainan Prefecture may have been inhabited by the Sheng

¹¹² The older brother is Zhao Ai, and the younger brother is Zhao Yi.

¹¹³ JGTSSX offers the following notes on the Men and La people: "The Men are one branch of ancestors of Tai people. Their descendants are in Lincang now. They are called 'Shandaizu,' namely, the Tai people living in the mountain area. They live and intermarry together with La people. According to more recent research, La people are ancestors of the Wa people, as Tai living in Lincang still call the Wa 'La.' However, on page 83 the book conjectures that the Men people and La people were ancestors of the Bulang and De'ang people" (JGTSSX 1990, 13–83).

¹¹⁴ Lincang is called Moeng Mian (Mǎng Měn) in Moeng Bò. According to Gong Suzheng (2003), *měn* means (1) something protruding, (2) the name of an ethnic group. It also refers to Chinese toponyms (1) Tengchong 騰衝 and (2) Lincang 臨滄 formerly Mianning (緬寧). The following story is told according to an active scribe in Moeng Bò, based on an interview with the Dao Zhongbang, the youngest son of the last *tusi* of Weiyuan: when the elder brother Zhao Ai arrived in Lincang, he taught the locals to speak the Dai Language. But the locals' "thick tongues" meant they could not speak it well. Consequently, they called Lincang "Moeng Mian" (Mǎng Měn), which means "thick tongues." Many thanks to Prof. Dr Christian Daniels for pointing out Gong Suzheng's explanation of the toponyms.

¹¹⁵ Yunnan Zhi: 《雲南志》, also known as Manshu. abbr. YNZ.

¹¹⁶ Song Lian, 1370, *History of the Yuan Dynasty*, chapter. 61. Geographical Treatises 13 Geography 4 Kainan Prefecture (<元史卷 61 地理志第十三地理四開南州>).

Man¹¹⁷ during the Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms. Notably, there are no further records concerning Moeng Bò from the seventh century until the early thirteenth century. The YS records that:

The Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture was previously inhabited by the Pu and Heni. Not until the rise of the House of Meng (Nanzhao Kingdom) was the Weichu Sub-Prefecture established, which inaugurated the administration of the Sub-Prefecture. Later, the chieftain of the Jinchi and Baiman, [known as] A Zhibu, and others conquered its territory.¹¹⁸

威遠州，昔樸和泥二蠻所居，至蒙氏興，開威楚為郡，而州治始通。
後金齒白蠻酋阿只步等奪其地。

The Heni (Akha or Hani) people lived in Weiyuan (Moeng Bò) until the era of the Nanzhao Kingdom. Then, Moeng Bò started to forge an official connection with the courts of the Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms. In the late Dali Kingdom, Jinchi Baiman conquered Moeng Bò. The appointment of the local ruler, the chief of Jinchi Baiman, A Zhibu, as the native official of Moeng Bò, established the formal native official system in Moeng Bò from the Yuan dynasty onwards. As mentioned, the Zhaolu of Hso Long Hpa, named Dao Suandang, conquered Moeng Bò and later surrendered to the Ming court in 1398. This allowed the Tai Nüa rulers to establish their regime.¹¹⁹

In my view, the aboriginal people who settled in Weiyuan were probably hill tribes, perhaps Wa or De'ang, the people whom the Tai called the De'ang Tai Loi or proto-Tai. Condominas (1990, 29–91) argued that, before splitting up into subgroups like the Tai Lü, Tai Nüa, Tai Khün, etc., the proto-Tai lived alongside the Mon-Khmer people.¹²⁰ After the arrival of Tai Nüa migrants from Dehong, some parts of the mountainous Tai, Wa and De'ang were conquered and integrated into the Tai Nüa area. The reason is that the Tai Nüa from Dehong had been the politically and socially dominant ethnic group in Weiyuan since the early Ming dynasty. The hill tribes who

¹¹⁷ *Sheng Man*: “Wild barbarians”, 生蠻, was a scornful term for the ethnic groups in the south who were not registered and who did not dwell within the prefectures under the jurisdiction of the Qing Empire. See the Han dictionary: <https://www.zdic.net/hans/%E7%94%9F%E8%9B%AE>, accessed on 31/03/2021.

¹¹⁸ Song Lian, 1370, *History of the Yuan Dynasty*, chapter. 61. Geographical Treatises 13 Geography 4 Weiyuan Prefecture (<元史卷 61 地理志第十三地理四威遠州>).

¹¹⁹ I will not draw any firm conclusions on Jinchi Baiman's racial background in this context because there is some disagreement. Most Tai academics in mainland China agree with the conclusion reached by Fang Guoyu (1958, 29) that the Jinchi Baiman were the forefathers of the Tai Nüa. Daniels (2021, 188–213) offers a novel and provocative theory that the Jinchi Baiman were the progenitors of Northern Mon-Khmer; nevertheless, there is no evidence of a Tai people identified as the Baiyi living in Yunnan between the early eighth and mid-ninth centuries. While I acknowledge and appreciate Professor Daniels's argument, I am unable to provide the necessary clarity on Fang's hypothesis at this time. In light of this controversy, Dao Suandang should be the first Tai Nüa ruler of Moeng Bò, that much is evident.

¹²⁰ Cf. Daniels for more on the history of interactions between Upland and Tai polities in Southwestern Yunnan (2014, 133–170).

could not be integrated into the Tai social and political may be the ancestors of the Tibeto-Burman groups or Mon-Khmer ethnic groups.

3.2.3.4 The Native Official Lineage of Moeng Bò

The following table shows the native official genealogy of Moeng Bò during the Ming and Qing dynasties. It provides details from two different records: from the Tai and Chinese manuscripts.

T3: The genealogy of the native officials in Moeng Bò

(Data sources: JGTSSX, MSL, TGDB (Gong 1992: 601–602), DGZC, MS)

Chinese/Tai name	Regime/relationship with the last ruler	Remarks
Dao Suandang 刀算黨 Dao Shunduan	1398–1424	In Chinese historiography: Dao Suandang was the first native official of Moeng Bò to surrender to the Ming dynasty, in 1398 CE. In the Tai narrative, Dao Shunduan was the son of the Ming emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang, who arrived in Moeng Mao knowing he could not inherit the throne. He became the son-in-law of Moeng Mao's monarch, and then travelled to Moeng Bò with his army where he became the first ruler.
Dao Qinghan (刀慶罕) Zhao Hanlian	1424–1430 Son	In Chinese historiography: Dao Qinghan succeeded to the throne and came to the Ming court to pay tribute in CE1424. In the Tai chronicles: Dao Qinghan later married the daughter of the ruler Kūng Ma.
Zhao Nangmeng (招囊猛) Nan Yafa	Unclear/Wife	In Chinese historiography: Zhao Nangmeng led the army against the invasion of Luchuan Hso Wen Hpa (Si Renfa) in CE 1441. Consequently, the Ming court appointed her Tai Yiren ¹²¹ and promoted her son to the fifth official rank. In the Tai chronicles: she drove her enemies to Burma.
Dao Gaihan (刀蓋罕) Zhao Hangan	1430–1464 son	In Chinese historiography: Dao Gaihan sent a memorial to the emperor, indicating that Moeng Bò was adjacent to Cheli and frequently robbed. He sent a headman, Dao Zai, to the court in 1449 and paid tribute to the Ming court in 1455. In the Tai chronicles: Dao Gaihan never went to Moeng Mao to visit his relatives; this angered Moeng Mao's ruler so much that he led his troops to invade Moeng Bò. His mother fought the enemies and chased them to the Irrawaddy River. Finally, he succeeded to the throne and established the native official system, which was endorsed by the Ming court.
Dao Shuohan (刀朔罕) Dao Shunsheng	1464–? son	In Chinese historiography: Dao Shuohan sent a headman to the court to pay tribute in 1465. In the Tai chronicles: Nan Hexiang was the daughter of Zhao Han (ruler) of Kūng Ma, who acted on Dao Shunsheng's behalf in Moeng Bò after his death. As Nan Hexiang was childless, she was succeeded by Dao Tai.
No records Dao Tai	No records	In Chinese historiography: Nothing else is recorded except that Dao Tai had a son, Dao Xiansun. In the Tai chronicles: Unknown
Dao Xiansun	Unknown/son	No records. Dai Xiansun's chief wife had no child; his concubine's son succeeded to the tusi throne.
Dao Xunhan (刀遜罕) Dao Shun	1488–1503 Unknown	In Chinese historiography: Dao Xunhan succeeded to the throne in CE 1498. He died in 1513. In the Tai chronicles: Dao Shun was at odds with Zhao Famao, who escaped to Moeng Lü and asked for the troops to attack Moeng Bò. Dao Shun sent troops to intercept him and negotiated with the ruler of Moeng Lü for peace. The ruler agreed on the reconciliation through marriages with surrounding polities.
Dao Ning (刀寧) Zhao Yi	1503–1517 Son	In Chinese historiography: Dao Ning, the concubines' first son out of wedlock, succeeded in 1513 and died in 1517. In the Tai chronicles: Zhao Yi married the princess of Moeng Wiang (today Lancang County, Pu'er Prefecture).
Dao Neng	1517–?	In Chinese historiography: Dao Neng succeeded in Zhengde year 12 (1517). After his succession, Zhao Yizhong reconstructed the wall gates, ordered inscriptions upon them, and left them for posterity.

¹²¹ *Tai Yiren*: 太宜人 in Chinese. A title given to female nobility who were the mother or grandmother of fifth-rank officials during the Ming and Qing dynasties.

(刀能) Zhao Yizhong	Son	
Dao Suo	No records Unknown	In the Tai chronicles: Dao Suo was Dao Xue's elder brother. Because he was sent away to study from a young age, his brother dealt with official affairs on his behalf. Later, he went to Moeng Zhong (Yuanjiang County), and his brother took over his position. He married the princess of Moeng Zhong.
Dao Xue (刀學)	Unknown Brothers	In the Tai chronicles: Dao Xue passed his throne to Dao Hanchen, his concubine's son. A Sami came from the south to do missionary work in Moeng Bò. Dao Xue built the first temple, namely Mangfei Temple. Buddhism became popular in Moeng Bò at that time.
Ya Fazong	Unknown wife	In the Tai chronicles: Dao Xue's main wife, Ya Fazong, took charge of official affairs on his behalf for a while.
Dao Hanchen (刀漢臣) Dao Hansheng	Around 1660 Stepson	In Chinese historiography: Dao Hanchen built the Moeng Bò Temple with his wife (princess of Kūng Ma) in 1660.
Dao Guodong (刀國棟) Dao Guodong	son	In the Tai chronicles: Dao Hanchen left his position to his son, Dao Guodong. Dao Guodong built many temples. He married his daughter to the son of Zhao Meng of Kūng Ma.
Dao Guanghuan (刀光煥) Dao Gang	1712–1724 son ¹²²	In Chinese historiography: Dao Guanghuan was deposed for hiding renegades in 1724. He was exiled to Jiangxi Province but died on his way there. Later, the native official system was abolished, and the regular officials' system was adopted in Moeng Bò.

The reigns of four prominent rulers of Moeng Bò – Dao Suandang, Dao Gaihan, Dao Hanchen, and Dao Guanghuan – can be considered “milestones” in the history of Moeng Bò from the Ming times until the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu* policy. In fact, according to JGTSSX, a total of sixteen local rulers were recorded for Moeng Bò from the early Ming dynasty until the Yongzheng emperor issued the *gaitu guiliu* in Southwest China.

The first ruler, Dao Suandang, had started to pay tribute to the Ming court. The fourth ruler, Dao Gaihan, stayed with his mother and resisted the invasion of the Tai federation of Luchuan (Moeng Mao). As the conflict between the Tai federation of Luchuan and the Ming court escalated, they were rewarded by the Ming Yingzong in 1441 in recognition of their efforts in fighting against Luchuan. The fifth ruler, Dao Hanchen, built the Moeng Bò temple. He and his wife, who was a princess of the Kūng Ma ruler, were both Theravada Buddhists. The last ruler, Dao Guanghuan, was exiled to Jiangxi province for assisting renegades, but died on the way there. There are hardly any documents on Dao Guanghuan, with the exception of one Tai chronicle written in Lik script and the Tai Nüa language, which mentioned him.

¹²² There is no clear record, but Dao Guanghuan was deposed in 1724. According to JGTSSX, he reigned for twelve years, indicating he succeeded in 1712.

As the above table shows, the Chinese records believe that Dao Suandang was a native, while the Tai chronicle states that Dao Suandang came from the Tai federation of Moeng Mao. Remarkably, at least three of Moeng Bò's native officials married princesses from Kūng Ma in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. It seems that they had closer relations with each other than with other districts. Moreover, Moeng Bò was invaded by Sipsòng Panna and the Tai federation of Moeng Mao.

3.3 Differences and Similarities between Moeng Bò/Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem

3.3.1 Differences between Moeng Bò/Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem

To date, there has been no comparative and comprehensive study of Moeng Bò, Moeng Laem, and Kūng Ma as significant polities in the re-building of China's southwestern border with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Gao Jinhe (2012, 1–6) has underlined the significance of the research on the Tai and Wa (Mon-Khmer) inter-ethnic relations in the Le Hong area.¹²³ Viewing Moeng Bò, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Laem as a one entity enables us to better understand the historical development of these polities in the Upper Mekong Basin. However, scholars cannot get a complete historical picture of the Tai Nüa districts if Moeng Bò, Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem are excluded from the research target. The key is to consider these three Tai polities as a triangle located east of the Salween River (Nu River in China) and the Upper Mekong Basin (Lancang River in China).

The differences among these Tai polities are manifold. Moeng Laem has had frequent contact (i.e., marriages and conflicts) with Chiang Tung, and Kūng Ma's history has been strongly influenced by the border policies of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Moreover, the native official system was retained in Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma but was abolished in Moeng Bò.¹²⁴

In the following section, I will analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the integration of the Tai people living in the Tai Nüa districts and reveal their relationships with Southeast Asian polities during the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries in the context of this process of borderland integration of the Qing court. It is hoped that such

¹²³ Gao Jinhe (2012, 1–2) defines the Le (le is pinyin which should be Lü) Hong area as the *dai* of the federation of the Moeng Mao Kingdom, who migrated to the upper part of the Nu River (Salween River). He clarifies (Ibid.) that *le* means “up” and *hong* means “Nu River.” Le Hong therefore means the upper part of the Nu River, which is to the east of the Nu River, an area containing the present-day Lincang and Pu'er prefectures. The core district of Le Hong includes the Kūng Ma district (including Kūng Ma County/Cangyuan County/Shuangjiang County and north of Ava Mountain) and Moeng Laem district (Moeng Laem County/Lancang County/ Ximeng County and south of Ava Mountain).

¹²⁴ However, Liu Benjun (2001, 130–134) argues that the principle of “Replacing Aboriginal Officials by Circulating Officials (*gaitu guiliu*)” depends on the peaceful coexistence of the native officers and local ethnic groups.

historical lessons may contribute to a deeper understanding of governance in Southwest China and the impact of frontier policies on the development of frontier societies.

3.3.2 The Similarities between Moeng Bò/Küing Ma, and Moeng Laem

3.3.2.1 The Tai people of the Three Polities

As mentioned in Chapter One, the three Tai polities have in common that their ancestors all migrated from the Tai Nüa federation of Moeng Mao (Luchuan) during the early Ming, in the fourteenth century, as Moeng Mao was an unstable polity.

JGTSSX records that the first rulers of Moeng Bò were two sons of the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang. They reputedly escaped to Moeng Mao (Tai Nüa Federation of Moeng Mao) because of struggles between the royal family and the Ming court, and they gained the Moeng Mao ruler's trust, who married his two daughters to these brothers. Later, because of the suspicions of the ruler of the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao, the two brothers had to lead their troops to Moeng Bò to settle down and cultivate the land. They fought against local ethnic peoples, the Men and the La (Wa), and defeated them. Then, the younger brother stayed in Moeng Bò as a ruler and the elder one went to Lincang to rule there.

This abridged version of the Moeng Bò local chronicle was written in Lik script and translated into Chinese in the 1980s. It is a great pity that the manuscripts containing detailed information were burned during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and no copy could be traced during the last few decades. Fortunately, the brief version provides a complete story of the migration of the Tai Nüa, though the narrative lacks detail. By following this narrative, I hope to identify the historical veracity of those legends.

Firstly, it is interesting to note that the local legends describe the Tai founding ruler as a descendant of Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang (*r.* 1368–1398), who was the first ruler of the Ming court. Secondly, the conflicts between the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao and their ancestors were the main reason for the migration to Moeng Bò. The first part of the chronicle is a fabrication, but the last part, describing how the Tai ruler led his troops to Moeng Bò, is probably genuine. The construction of local Moeng Bò history by claiming close connections with Chinese dynasties was unique when compared to the local histories of the Tai Nüa people in Moeng Laem and Küing Ma. The Tai Nüa of Moeng Bò chose to identify with the Ming imperial family when constructing their local history.

The creation of local history and collective memories was influenced by powerful ethnic groups. The anthropologist Wang Mingke (1997, 4) points out that: “Losing the right to interpret one's ethnic origin or accepting the memory of ethnic origin given by

a powerful ethnic group often occurs among many disadvantaged ethnic groups.” The Tai Nüa history of Moeng Bò was not constructed by the Ming court. Yet, the Tai Nüa still regarded their first ruler to be the son of the first Ming emperor, and this scenario can be interpreted as a small polity trying to obtain legitimacy and authority to rule its own land from the supreme ruler. This way of creating local history also reflects the gradual increase of Chinese dynastic influence in Southwest Yunnan.

There is no controversy about the Tai Nüa of Moeng Laem, Küng Ma, and Moeng Bò originally coming from the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao during the fourteenth century. Local chronicles recorded the ruler of the Tai Nüa settling in Moeng Laem: by marrying the daughter of the ruler of the Wa (Mon-Khmer). In the local legends, the event is described as an agreement between the intruders and the indigenous peoples: The Tai inhabited the plains, while the Wa dwelt in the mountains.¹²⁵ This agreement helped the Tai Nüa from the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao to settle down in Moeng Laem quickly and legally. Further analysis will be provided in Chapter Five.

As Grabowsky observes, apart from the dominant Tai Nüa, four other Tai groups inhabit Moeng Laem: the proto-Tai; the Tai Khün; the Tai Lü; and the Tai Pòng (Shan proper). Since antiquity, the proto-Tai have inhabited Moeng Laem. The Tai Khün originated in Chiang Tung and arrived after the Tai Nüa. Moeng Laem has thirteen villages inhabited by Tai Khün. The Tai Lü originated in Sipsòng Panna and eventually migrated to Moeng Laem as a minority group. The Tai Pòng migrated from Moeng Phòng (Mubang) in the late 1970s, after the Cultural Revolution ended. Currently, there are three Tai Pòng villages in Moeng Laem.¹²⁶

There is no doubt that the Tai Nüa of Küng Ma also migrated from the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao from the Yuan period onwards. According to Zhu Di statement (2016, 20): Historically, the Küng Ma Tai inhabited the “plain areas” and were surrounded by the various ethnic groups in the mountainous area. The territory of Küng Ma is divided into “Nine *moeng* [and] thirteen *khwaen*.” *Moeng* denotes the “plains of the basins,” which constituted the core areas inhabited by the Tai, and *khwaen* refers to the at mid-altitude on the mountain areas. In other words, Küng Ma has nine Tai and thirteen non-Tai districts. The Tai *cao fa* also appointed the heads of various ethnic groups as “*khwaen* officers,” who administered the hill peoples.

Nan Guixiang (2013, 32) has also made an argument concerning the branches of Tai groups in Küng Ma. She examined the Tai De (Tai Lü), who settled in the lower

¹²⁵ In scholarship relating to the relationships between the lowland and upland people of the Tai polities, upland peoples are always described as indigenous. For instance, in Northern Thailand, the Lua (Lawa) “were the indigenous people of this area and they have had a long and durable relationship with the Tai Yuan” (Aroonrut 2000, 122–138). For more details about the lowland and upland relationships of Moeng Laem, see Chapter Five; see also Yin Shaoting and Daniels (2010, 168–169); Zhang Haizhen (2004, 27–32).

¹²⁶ For more details, see Grabowsky (2008, 21–22).

part of the Mekong River, close to the Shan States, as well as the Tai Nüa who live in the upper part of the Mekong River. Nan points out that the Tai Lü are a marginalised group who have been discriminated against by locals because the local noblemen and the elites are Tai Nüa.

Based on local legends and Chinese official records, it can be concluded that the Tai Nüa of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting also came from the Tai federation of Moeng Mao.¹²⁷ However, the Tai groups of the Kūng Ma region are quite different from other Tai polities. The Tai group mostly includes Tai Nüa, but some Tai De (Lü) migrated from Sipsòng Panna to Kūng Ma. Part of the Tai branch includes mountain-dwelling non-Tai ethnic groups such as the Bulang, who have adopted Theravada Buddhism from the Tai and are known by the Tai as Tai Lòi (or Dòi, literally Hill Tai) due to cultural proximity. Moeng Bò also had Tai Loi who are said to be indigenous peoples. However, the mountain Tai Loi might have already been integrated into Tai or other ethnic groups.

3.3.2.2 Administration

Tai Nüa society was mutually beneficial and well-organised. It had a complex social structure and hierarchy that was developed over hundreds of years prior to the establishment of the native official system and the issuance of the *gaitu guiliu* in those places. In this section, I will discuss the political structures of the three Tai Nüa polities.

As mentioned in Chapter One, Tai society was ruled by an absolute monarch, the ruler known as the *cao fa* or *cao phaendin*, which literally means the “lord of the heaven” and “lord of the land,” respectively.¹²⁸ After the death of the *cao fa*, the eldest son of the *maha tewi* – principal wife (มหาราชินี in Thai) – would succeed to the throne. If the principal wife did not have a son, another son born from a minor wife could succeed to the throne. If the son was too young to rule by himself, the principal wife would hold the seal of the *cao fa* until he became of age. The *cao fa* of Moeng Bò was Dao Hangan’s mother, Nan Yafa. She was granted her official title of *Tai yiren* by the Ming court, and she led troops against the invading Luchuan army¹²⁹ (see T2). However, contenders for the throne could emerge from members of the royal family, frequently giving rise to succession struggles. For instance, Dao Pai Yi, the acting *tusi* of Moeng Laem, was killed by Dao Pai You, who caused a civil war and was subsequently imprisoned in Kunming and later in Pu’er by the Qing court (see T1).

The administrative structure of the Tai Nüa polities was nearly identical to that of

¹²⁷ See Nan Guixiang (2013, 10–14).

¹²⁸ However, Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 20/1) point out that even though “the political power base of the *cao fa* of Sipsòng Panna was fragile, it does not imply that he lacked the real power.” The *cao fa* still holds the highest rank and exclusive rights in the local society.

¹²⁹ About *Tai yiren* see Chapter three, fn. 121.

Sipsòng Panna. Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 18–25) introduce the administrative system of Sipsòng Panna in which the highest rank/most superior in rank was held by the *cao fa* or *cao phaendin*; the second rank *na saen long* (*saen* = 100,000)¹³⁰ was bestowed on the *Upalaca* (*Uparacha*, *vice-saenwi fa*); the third rank *na mün long* (*mün* = 10,000) was for the relatives of the *cao fa*; and the lowest-ranking officials were *na ha* (*ha* = five). But how did the Tai Polities organise their state? How did the administrative system work? I will first characterise the administration system of Sipòng Panna as described by Liew, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012), followed by the administrative system of Moeng Laem as described in a Tham manuscript.

Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Wichasin (2012, 18–25) list the structure of institutions: the most important institutions of the central government were the *noe* (*nüa*) *sanam nai* and the *noe* (*nüa*) *sanam nõk*. The first one was the so-called Inner Council of Nobles, which was directly subordinate to the *cao fa*. Members of this council remained permanently at the royal court; however, their duties were not limited to the court. They also took charge of defence and tax collection for the state, and supervised governance of the provinces. However, the most crucial political functions were undertaken by four leading officials, namely:

- *Cao Mòm Upalaca* (*Uparacha*): viceroy, deputy of the *cao fa* in charge of military affairs;
- *Cao Long Phasat* (*Luang Prasat*): minister in charge of the security of the palace (*hò kham*);
- *Cao Long Na Paen*: minister in charge of the *cao fa*'s work, his official duties, schedule, and itinerary and responsible for important state ceremonies.
- *Cao Long Na Khwa* (lit., “great *cao* of the right-hand rice field”): minister in charge of the ruler’s bodyguard and the reception of foreign guests; exercised control over activities in the countryside.

Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (Ibid.) provide additional information about the *Noe* (*nüa*) *Sanam nõk*, also known as the Outer Council of Nobles. This institution has “four chief ministers” in addition to the president or *Cao Chiang Ha*:

- *Cao Hòi Dang Ban Òt* (*Tu Long Kao* or *Thu Luang Khao*): the vice president of the *noe sanam nõk* and minister of finance;
- *Cao Hòi Dang Ban Khum*: minister responsible for demographic and judicial affairs;
- *Cao Hòi Dang Còm Wang*: minister responsible for recruitment of labour and armies.
- *Cao Na Kat* (*Cao Hòi Dang Kat*): minister responsible for finance matters and the organisation of the markets and economy.

Obviously, these ministers were also responsible for “many subordinate officials, including provincial governors” (Ibid.). The representatives of the nobility (*noe sanam*) also needed officials to liaise with each *mu ban* (village), and these were

¹³⁰ *Na*: rice field.

named *pò lam*.¹³¹ There were three categories of *pò lam*:

- *Pò lam müang*: These officials, elected by a poll of *tao khun* members of the *noe sanam nõk*, were the representatives of the *cao fa* and his government in the more than thirty *müang* in the country.
- *Pò lam ban*: They represented the government at the village level and closely cooperated with the village elders.
- *Pò lam khwaen* or *pò lam mòn*: These officials, who were generally Tai Lü, were assigned to supervise the highland villages that were divided into twelve districts (*khwaen*),¹³² to give a voice to the non-Tai ethnic groups in the *noe sanam*.

The *luk lam* came under the supervision of the *pò lam*, the name evokes the image of a child tied to its parent (with a rope). Even though the *pò lam* did not directly control the *luk lam*, they had the right to obtain manpower from them and could grant them rewards. The *luk lam* were subject to the control of governors and village chiefs.¹³³

In Sipsòng Panna, the “inner council” and “outer council” were common administrative structures. Since Sipsòng Panna is a particularly large Tai polity, its administrative system might also be different from and more complicated than that of other small polities. Grabowsky and Renoo (2008, 14) claim that “an ‘outside council’ did not exist in a much smaller and more controllable polity than Sipsòng Panna.” Hence, the administrative organisation of Sipsòng Panna could not serve as a model for other, smaller Tai polities.

The Moeng Laem manuscript titled *The King Resides in a Hò Kham* (Golden Palace) (see Yin Lun, Tang Li and Zheng Jing eds. 2010, 227, Thai: อาชญาเจ้าหอคำอยู่ที่บูรเหนือเมือง) describes the governmental organisation of Moeng Laem, which differs from that of Sipsòng Panna: Moeng Laem was divided into nine *gen*, twelve *zhao lang*, and thirteen *fan moeng*. The seventh *cao fa*, Dao Pai Qin, appointed: Cao Pian Nan to manage the water resources; Cao Pian Li to manage the land; Cao Huo Sheng and Cao Gen Moeng as his assistants; Cao An Ma (renamed Sa Di Long Fan Moeng) to manage the Council Chamber; Bu Moeng Wei Wa Cao Fan San to manage the military; Cao Moeng Wei Xiang Long Zhong Bu to manage religious affairs; and Fa Ting Moeng to supervise the officers. These eight officials and *cao fa* constituted the core authorities of Moeng Laem, and they also took significant decisions jointly.

It can be extrapolated that Moeng Laem, Küng Ma, and Moeng Bò had a nearly

¹³¹ Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 23) point out that *Pò* (*Phò* in Siamese) means father in Tai. “*Lam* is used in modern Thai mainly for ‘translator’ (i.e., as a noun); its primary meaning ‘to tie (with a rope)’ is still known in modern Thai but is the general meaning in Tai Lü and other Tai dialects.”

¹³² For more details about *Khwaen*, see Chapter Two, fn. 40.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 24.

identical administrative system, with the titles of official positions possibly differing somewhat.

3.3.2.3 The Tai Manuscript Culture in the Tai Nüa Polities

Moeng Bò

The first time I encountered Tham and Lik scripts was in 2008 while conducting fieldwork in Moeng Bò. I was astounded by the scripts and manuscript culture of the enthralling Tai people. Since then, I have realised that the history and culture of the Tai Nüa merit additional examination.

The Tai manuscripts in Moeng Bò were mainly written in two different scripts: Tham and Lik. Since both Sipsòng Panna and Dehong influenced the Tai Nüa districts culturally and politically, it is not surprising that two writing systems were used simultaneously in Moeng Bò/Küng Ma and Moeng Laem: one based on Tham script, the other on the Lik script.¹³⁴ In the Tai language, Tham means the scripture of Buddhism and it is also known as Dhamma script (Dhamma means the teachings of the Buddha). Thus, the script arrived with Buddhism and was mainly, although not exclusively, used for writing Buddhist texts. “Lik,” from the Sanskrit *likh*, means “to write” or “to inscribe”. It was introduced by the Dehong people and mainly, but not exclusively, used for secular records, recording all aspects of daily life. However, in order that more believers would be able to chant and understand the scriptures, various local scribes, proficient in Tham and Lik, preferred to translate the Tham manuscripts into Lik, not vice versa. According to Achan Tao Huazhong (陶華忠), Tò Pòng¹³⁵ –

¹³⁴ Quoted from a fieldwork note written on 15 July 2011 by Dong Chen (董辰): only eighteen Burmese-style temples (Mian si) use the Lik script. Pòng scripts are used in Moeng Ting town (Küng Ma County) close to the Burmese border.

¹³⁵ Tò means script in the local Tai Nüa language. According to Gong Suzheng 龔肅政, Lik Tay: Pòng; *lik* refers to writing in Tay by the Paa: Lōng; (the Te’ang 德昂 or Tä. aang: in Tai). Another informant claims that it refers to a sub-group of the Tai: Pòng. Tò is not exclusive to the Tai Nüa, but a common Shan word. The “round script” or Tay (Shan) script of Burma is generally known as Lik Tò Mon.

scriptures in Pòng script¹³⁶ – were brought from Upper Wiang (上允)¹³⁷ to the Qiannuo temple in Moeng Ka more than 200 years ago.

When they migrated to Moeng Bò, the Tai Nüa people used Buddhist scriptures. In my fieldwork,¹³⁸ I found that Tham (Buddhist) scriptures in Moeng Bò are divided into Tham Suat (ซั่มมส์วาค) and Tham Thet (ซั่มมส์เทศน์). Tham Suat is a Pali liturgical text written in Tai Lü script, only used for chanting by Buddhist monks and hardly understood by laypeople. Tham Suat texts include ‘Sada Tham Suat’ in ‘Samyutta Nikāya’ and ‘Kammavaca.’¹³⁹ Tham Suat can be chanted in two tones. One is ‘Tham Suat He’; the term *he* means a dragging accent in the Tai Nüa language. ‘Tham Suat He’ can be chanted with high pitch (Sung, Th. สูง) and low pitch (Thong, Th. ต่ำ). The other is ‘Tham Suat Biang;’ the term *biang* means “monotonic,” as in speaking and reading.

Tham Thet is another genre of texts written in Tham, which can generally be read by people who know Tham. Tham Thet can be chanted with three different tones. The first one is called ‘Tham Nikaya.’ The term ‘Nikaya’ encompasses all standard scriptures, including ‘Pāramī.’¹⁴⁰ The second one is ‘Tham Vo’; an exemplary text is Sut Cao Wen Na (White Cow Scripture),” which was written in Tham and has seven

¹³⁶ Pòng script is a round-shaped Shan script and originated from Tai Ya, which was mainly used in Chiang Tung, Dehong, Kūng Ma, and the Northeast Shan state before the 1950s. It is called อักษรไทใหญ่ in Thai and ອັກສະວິ່: in Shan script. Sai Kam Mong (2004, 82 and 119–120 and 207) makes a detailed description of Lik Tou Moan (Lik To Mon), better known as Lik Tai Kao (Lik Hto Ngouk the earliest Shan writings), which is Pòng script. David Wharton pointed out to me in an email of 22 March 2021: “This script (Lik To Mon) has been used by Tai Noe and other groups in Myanmar for some time and then influenced those groups in parts of Yunnan which are close to Myanmar. So, this is also the main kind of script that was used in Dehong before the mid twentieth century reforms, but it did not reach Moeng Bò, where the few examples I’ve seen were brought from Kengtung.” For more details, see Wharton (2017, 160–240). The collection of Chinese ethnic scripts has a brief introduction. See web: <https://web.archive.org/web/20080922233618/http://iea.cass.cn/mzwz/07.htm>, accessed on 27 August 2020. The manuscript details how to comply with Buddhist disciplines (precepts) and is written in the same dialect as Lik texts. During fieldwork on 13 November 2009, I interviewed Achan Tao Huazhong, who said the manuscript came from Shang Yun (Moeng Wiang) more than 200 years ago, but it is badly damaged with pages missing. Tai Pòng is used for the Baiduo Buddhist branch, which is found in Moeng Ting and is used by the Tai De people (Nan Guixiang 2013, 261).

¹³⁷ Namely, Moeng Wiang (勐允), a part of Yin Sha Luo Dian (銀沙羅甸地) during the Yuan dynasty, was transferred to the jurisdiction of Moeng Ting Prefecture, then to Xuanfusi of Moeng Laeng in the Ming dynasty, and later to Lancang during the Qing dynasty.

¹³⁸ On 18–23 October 2011.

¹³⁹ *Kammavaca* is a Pali text to be recited by a monk candidate at a monkhood ordination ceremony. However, the local scribe of Moeng Bò explained that *Kammavaca* is a Tham Sut scripture to be chanted on the first and fifteenth day of every lunar month. For more details, see Falconer (1998, 126). I am grateful to Dr Silpsupa Jaengsawang for helping me to clarify the Buddhist scriptures of Moeng Bò.

¹⁴⁰ *Pāramī* explains the Perfections of Buddha, or the noble character qualities generally associated with enlightened beings.

volumes in total.¹⁴¹ The third one is *Tham Chang* (White Elephant Scripture) or ‘*Vessantara*’; it is also called *Jakata* and includes thirteen chapters in total, pertaining to the most recent Buddha’s previous life.¹⁴²

According to an interview conducted on 22 September 2010 with Mr Tao Huazhong, who was the Achan (teacher or master) of Moeng Ka during my fieldwork research, Lik can be divided into two categories. One is “*Suat Duan*,” which is mainly used for records when making donations (Tai: *lu³ taan² Ch: Danfo*¹⁴³). The other is “*Lik Vo Luang*,” which is used for records when *Dan Bainiu*¹⁴⁴ is conducted.

The *Tham* script spread along with Buddhism to Moeng Bò from Sipsòng Panna in the seventeenth century. The question of when the Lik script was introduced plays a significant role in clarifying the migration history of Moeng Bò’s Tai group and Moeng Bò’s historical relationship with Sipsòng Panna and Dehong. Many scribes in Moeng Bò believe that the Lik was brought by their ancestors from Dehong and, later, migrants spread the script further afield.

The earliest known Tai (Shan) writing in Lik script appears on a Ming dynasty scroll dated 1407 (Yongle 5), which depicts the miracle-working Tibetan Lama, *De-bzin-gsegs-pa* (1384–1415), performing benedictory services for the deceased parents of the Yongle emperor (*r.* 1402–1424) at the contemporary capital, Nanjing. Daniels (2012, 147–176) has identified the 1407 Tai script as resembling the Ahom script more than the Lik Tho Ngòk script, and, based on this similarity, he concludes that Lik tho ngòk was not the progenitor of Tay (Tai) scripts, as previously thought, and that the Ahom script preceded it. According to Daniels, this script was used in Moeng Mao at the time, but this raises the question of when the Tai of Moeng Mao began to use it?

According to Wharton (2019, 1–9), a Lik specialist, the oldest known dated reference to Lik Tai literature is found in the *Bai-Yi Zhuan* (BYZ abbreviation), an account of two envoys from the Ming court who visited the polity of Lu-Chuan, or Moeng Maw, in CE 1396. The first dated specimen of a Lik Tai script dates from 1407 and is located on a fifty-metre-long Ming dynasty scroll now housed in the Tibet Museum.¹⁴⁵ Scholars are still debating the earliest potential date for Lik’s appearance.

¹⁴¹ However, the local scribes also transcribed this manuscript into Lik, for the people who do not understand *Tham*. Tai Nüa in Moeng Bò always adopts Lik to write *Tham* manuscripts as it is easier to chant and understand. There are several *Tham* manuscripts written in Lik, such as *Tham Vo* (White cow scriptures). The Lik script was introduced by the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao via migrants or political influence. Thus, Lik was first used for secular writing. Given that it is mainly used for writing down secular records, stories, poems, or religious verses, etc., I believe that Lik should be classified differently; this needs to be supplemented in future research.

¹⁴² Part of *Jātaka*, the life of Buddha.

¹⁴³ 賸佛 in Chinese. A ceremony at a monastery in which believers make merit and pray to the Buddha for auspiciousness.

¹⁴⁴ 賸白牛 in Chinese, namely, to worship artificial white cows, which is a typical Buddhist activity in Moeng Bò.

¹⁴⁵ He further points out (2019, 1–9) that: “Other early examples of this early ‘Baiyi’ Lik Tai script are also found in

This open research question may be solved in the future when new evidence can be found.

According to YNZL, written by a Chinese official, Li Jing (李京), of the Yuan dynasty, Jinchi and Baiman read and memorised unimportant information by carving it into the wood instead of writing. Li Jing came to Yunnan on the emperor's order in 1301, and his text demonstrates that the Tai in Moeng Mao did not develop a script of their own in the early fourteenth century. According to the BYZ, written by Qian Guxun and Li Sicong, who were sent to Moeng Mao (Tai federation of Luchuan) as representatives of the Ming dynasty in 1395/96, the situation had changed (Qian Guxun manus. 1396):

[The Tai] do not [use] Chinese characters. For trivial matters, they engraved them in bamboo or wood; for essential matters, they write in Mian (means Burmese script literally) writing. The [Burmese] words are written horizontally. [...] According to their customs, there is no ancestral worship, and worshipping Buddha; nor do they have monks or Taoist priests.

無中國文字，小事刻竹木，大事作緬書，皆旁行為記……其俗，不祀先，不奉佛，亦無僧道。

As Jiang Yingliang (1980, 80–81) explained, “Mian writing (緬書)” refers not to Burmese but to Tai script.¹⁴⁶ Burmese and Tai scripts are both alphabetic writing systems that developed via the South Indian Pallava script and were introduced along with Indian religions. A Study of the Bureau of the Foreigners From the Four Corners (of the Empire) (see Wang Jun, 1924) records that the Baiyi office specialised in translating foreign scripts in all the Tai Nüa districts: Moeng Phòng (木邦) /Moeng Yang (猛養) /Moeng Ting (孟定) /Nandian (南甸) /Longchuan (隴川) /Weiyuan (威遠) /Wandian (灣甸) /Zhenkang (鎮康) /Dahou (大侯) /Mangshi (芒市) /Jingdong (景東) /Zhele (者樂¹⁴⁷), and others.

Given that Qian Guxun arrived in Moeng Mao in 1396, and the Baiyi office was established in CE 1407 (Yongle 2), we can deduce two things: one is that Lik was used after the mid-fourteenth century, before Theravada Buddhism had been introduced to the Tai Nüa areas; the other is that Tai Nüa scripts were used in Moeng Phòng and Moeng Bò after the fifteenth century. Lik was not introduced by the A Zhibu group

Chinese sources dating to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: the Hua Yi yi yu or ‘Sino-Barbarian Dictionary’ compiled by a bureau of translators established by the Ming emperor, and the Xiyu tongwen biao wen or ‘Bilingual Memorials of Western Regions,’ a collection of short memorials of tribute offerings to the Ming court by local rulers, first made in local languages and then translated into Chinese by the bureau of translators. For Tai sources, the earliest examples are found in Assam State, India, in the Tai Ahom script, dating from the early to mid-sixteenth century: the Sadiya Snake Pillar inscription and coins made during the reign of Suklengmuang. No earlier dated examples of Tai Ahom or other Lik Tai inscriptions or manuscripts have yet been discovered.”

¹⁴⁶ I assume that the *Mian Book* might have been written on palm leaf, however, I do not have any evidence to support this.

¹⁴⁷ Located in Zhenyuan [鎮沅] County, which lies north of Moeng Bò.

from Moeng Mao in the fourteenth century, but rather by the later migrants from Moeng Mao, though the specific time is yet to be proved.¹⁴⁸

The secular devotee Dao Zhongbang (刀忠邦) is the youngest son of the last cao fa of Moeng Bò; he is proficient in both scripts. He has explained to me: the Tham script cannot be changed easily, as it has regular spelling and intonation. On the other hand, Lik has twenty letters, including eight vowels and twelve consonants. The Tai Nüa language has six tones; however, the traditional Lik script does not have tone markers, and the pronunciation of a syllable in the right tone is determined by its context.¹⁴⁹ Lik has some differences in orthography depending on locality, while the Tham script originates from the Tham (Dhamma) script of Lan Na.¹⁵⁰ Regardless of which scripts came first, there is little question that Tham and Lik are clearly related. However, Daniels (2012, 147–176) points out that the earliest extant examples of Tham script appeared later than Lik.¹⁵¹

Sai Kam Mong (2004, 120) claims that Lik Tou Moan (a round-shaped script), a variation of Lik Tho Ngòk (the so-called beansprout script), consists of eighteen consonants with incomplete tone marks.¹⁵² Thus, the accurate reading and understanding of Lik Tou Moan texts requires a wide-ranging knowledge of the particular context and relevant vocabulary. I suppose that the Lik used in Moeng Bò is the traditional Lik script called Lik Tho Ngòk. Wharton also believes that the traditional Lik Tho Ngòk is widely used in Moeng Bò/Küng Ma and Moeng Laem,¹⁵³ while the Tham script dominates in the public sphere.

Currently, the corpus of extant indigenous Tai manuscripts of Moeng Bò can be

¹⁴⁸ Zhou Hanli makes a detailed argument (2013, 25–27).

¹⁴⁹ Indeed, the traditional Lik script does not have modern tone markers (Wharton 2017, 187–190) also notes this point), at least I have never found any tone markers in Lik manuscripts in Moeng Bò. However, Daniels (2012, 160–161) points out that the old Tay (Tai) script uses the high tone marker: ⁽⁵⁵⁾ with the initial consonants *kh*, *t*, *p*, *m* and *w* in the earliest known Tai script of 1407 from Meng Mao. This was borrowed from Burmese orthography. Furthermore, some old Tai scripts from Dehong have a full stop under a final consonant to indicate falling tones. More discussion is beyond this thesis, further study will be conducted in future research.

¹⁵⁰ Grabowsky (2011, 16–32) assumes that the “Tham script spread from Lan Na to Chiang Tung and Chiang Rung (Sipsòng Panna) no later than the mid-fifteenth century.” He regards the “Lan Na and Tai Lü versions of the Dhamma script” as “very similar.”

¹⁵¹ As mentioned, the earliest extant example of Lik dates to 1407. He also states: “The oldest known example of Tham (Dharma) script writing appears in a palm leaf manuscript dating from 1471.” For more details, see Daniels (2012, 147–176). However, according to *The Travels of Buddha* (as mentioned before, this is called *Phracao Tiao Khun* in the local Tai language and *Phracao Liap Lok*: พระเจ้าสิบโลก in Sipsòng Panna and Northern Thailand), many older local people in Moeng Bò believe that the Buddha came to Moeng Bò to spread the religion more than 2,000 years ago. It is believed that the Tham writing was introduced by the Buddha, whereas the Lik script was brought by migrants at a later time.

¹⁵² Daniels (2012, 147–176) argues that Lik borrowed heavily from Burmese script and has a different origin from the Tham script, which is derived from Mon.

¹⁵³ For more details, see Wharton’s doctoral thesis (2017, 175–177).

classified into three groups. First, a complete corpus of palm-leaf manuscripts and mulberry paper folding books (about astronomy, divination, and religion) are kept in the Mangdao monastery in the town of Yongping (Moeng Ka in Tai). Also, in Yongping, the Qiannuo monastery houses a sutra manuscript written in Pòng script,¹⁵⁴ as well as many Tham and Lik manuscripts, as does Moeng Bò's official temple, which is in Weiyuan town.

Second, one bilingual inscription was kept in Yizhi and later transported to Yongping.¹⁵⁵ Three inscriptions (two in Lik script and one in Chinese) are kept at the Meng Mi (Moeng Mit in Tai) monastery, far from Yongping town. Another inscription (see I6), at Leiguang in Yongping town, is the most wholly preserved epigraph of the Qing dynasty with still legible characters. Qian Gang monastery also has two inscriptions, dating from the late Ming and early Qing dynasties (seventeenth century). An inscription kept at the Mang Duo Buddha Footprint Monastery¹⁵⁶ states that, around the tenth century CE, the *cao fa* of Moeng Bò recorded the origin of this Buddha's footprint on this inscription. Yunnan was under the reign of the Nanzhao Kingdom from the tenth century but a lack of Chinese historical records from that period means that we cannot conclude that Buddhism arrived in Moeng Bò in the tenth century.

Moreover, JGTSSX records that the first ruler of Moeng Bò came from Moeng Mao. Furthermore, the Yuan Shi records¹⁵⁷ that the first Tai ruler was named A Zhibu in Chinese and that he came from the Tai federation of Moeng Mao. Therefore, the aforementioned inscription differs from both the Chinese and Tai records, thus questioning its veracity.¹⁵⁸

Above all, an accurate clarification of the local history and lineage of native officials in Moeng Bò entails a comparison of ancient sources written in Chinese and Tai characters. To date, however, Moeng Bò has not been so “academically attractive” as other Tai polities, because the Tai people of Moeng Bò are not as typical as Sipsòng Panna or Dehong, having been significantly influenced by Han culture and not representing an independent Tai polity. Wharton states that Moeng Bò was culturally relatively homogenous when he started his fieldwork there in May 2012. In my opinion, the case of Moeng Bò is more complicated than one may first assume, as it

¹⁵⁴ See Chapter Three fn. 136 on Pòng script. This manuscript talks about how to obey Buddhist disciplines and uses the same dialect that is found in Lik texts. According to Mr. Tao Huazhong, it came from Upper Wiang more than 200 years ago, but it is badly damaged and there are pages missing.

¹⁵⁵ In Tham script and Chinese, see I1, I2, and I3.

¹⁵⁶ According to records of this inscription, this monastery dated from the Tang dynasty (tenth century).

¹⁵⁷ See *Yuan History Geographical Chronicle*, Chapter Two.

¹⁵⁸ Finally, some local people and scribes have private collections of Tham or Lik manuscripts. It would be very worthwhile to catalogue and digitise the existing manuscripts in Moeng Bò.

has a somewhat “mixed” cultural and historical background, which will be elaborated on below.

Moeng Laem

The manuscript culture of Moeng Laem must be considered an outstanding achievement of the Tai people. Parts of the manuscripts were produced by local scribes who wrote in both Lik and Tham scripts. Lik means “script” in the local Tai language context. Therefore, for the various Tai Nüa areas, where even the dialects are slightly different (mainly in intonation), the local people can still use their dialect to chant and understand Lik manuscripts.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, texts written in Lik script reflect the spoken language; it is easier for people without high levels of education to understand. Some texts written in Tham script were transcribed into Lik script for local people who could not read Tham script.

As mentioned before, the Tham script, which derives from the Pali term “Dhamma,” was employed to propagate Theravada Buddhism during the ascendancy of the Lan Na kingdom. According to Grabowsky (2011, 98–112), the regions where the Tham script is prevalent are identified as the “Dhamma Script Cultural Domain” (DSCD). He traces the origins and spread of the Tham script, noting its potential development from the Mon alphabet of Hariphunchai and its first appearance in 1376. The earliest known use of the Dhamma script for writing in the Northern Thai vernacular is documented on the pedestal of a Buddha statue at Wat Chiang Man in Chiang Mai, dated to 1465.

He continues to state (Ibid., 99): “Based on our present state of knowledge, we may assume that the script spread from Lan Na to Chiang Tung and Chiang Rung (Sipsong Panna) no later than the mid-fifteenth century.” The Tham script was probably introduced from Chiang Tung to Moeng Laem around the mid-fifteenth century with the spread of Theravada Buddhism. Initially, then, Tham was used for religious purposes. Today, the Tham script is only used in the political sphere.

Subsequently, the use of Lik and Tham depended entirely on the local scribes, who used them for their own purposes. However, as Grabowsky (Ibid.) points out, the diffusion of the Tham script in the Upper Mekong River needs to be studied thoroughly.


Küng Ma and Moeng Ting

As mentioned in the previous section, the Tai people have used two or three different scripts to write about their culture, history, and religion: Tham, Lik, and Pòng scripts. There are very few manuscripts that were written in the Tai Pòng script. Tham and Lik are the mainstream script cultures in the Tai society of Küng Ma. According to Nan’s

¹⁵⁹ For more details, see Wharton (2017, 53–54)

investigation¹⁶⁰ and analysis, many documents were written in Lik script.¹⁶¹

According to my fieldwork, there are parts of Buddhist scriptures that are written in both the Tham and Lik script.¹⁶² For instance, Putthanusati (Pali: buddhānussati)¹⁶³ is written in Tham, but this same scripture was also written in Lik in Moeng Bò and Kūng Ma (see Manu. 3). Wharton documents this research, providing specific details, in his doctoral thesis.¹⁶⁴ The following scripture may have been used for religious purposes:



Manu. 3: Lik manuscript (the cover is Tham script, and the contents are Lik script) of a Kammathan manuscript. (Photograph taken by Hanli Zhou on 4 September 2012.)

The cover of this manuscript reads as follows:

Front cover, Kammathan manuscript, this fascicle was inscribed in the year [...].

หน้าพับขั้มมี้ กรรรมฐาน ผูกนี้แต่่มในศักราช

Kammathan means meditation. *Kammathan* texts are used for the ordination of monks and novices. This manuscript was written in Lik script, but the cover is in Tham script. Lik is more popular than Tham in Kūng Ma as it is closer to the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao and, historically, was under the influence of Moeng Mao for a long time.

3.3.2.4 Demographical Changes and Han migration

The Tai migrations to Moeng Laem, Moeng Bò, and Kūng Ma share another common feature. As mentioned before, the aboriginal people of the Tai Nūa polities might have

¹⁶⁰ Nan Guixiang (2013, 65).

¹⁶¹ Such as: political history; astronomical calendar; literary stories; Buddhist scriptures; divination and medicine; intellectual history.

¹⁶² Interview conducted by author on 4 September 2012 in the official monastery of Kūng Ma.

¹⁶³ *The Recollection of the Buddha*. For more details, see Wharton's doctoral thesis (2017, 27).

¹⁶⁴ See Wharton (2017, 175–177).

been mountainous Tai-nized groups e.g., Tai Lòi/Dòi, before the arrival of Tai Nüa. Their Tai Nüa ancestors came from Dehong: the former Tai federation of Moeng Mao since the fourteenth century, as mentioned in Chapter One.

Moreover, when rebellions occurred in Moeng Khòn (Mangshi) in the early nineteenth century, some Tai fled in the direction of the Mekong region because some of them had collaborated with highland peoples (i.e., De’ang). After the highland peoples lost the wars, these Tai “betrayers” were afraid of revenge and so fled to different areas. Thus, the connections between Dehong Tai and the Tai Nüa continued until the nineteenth century. The Tai people fled as far away as Kùng Ma and Moeng Ting during the De’ang Tai wars in Moeng Khòn in the 1816–1818 period (for details, see Chapter One). There was another influx of Tai from Dehong during the early nineteenth century.

When the Tai Nüa people established authority in each polity, they settled as wet-rice cultivators in the plains, while mountain dwellers lived in the mountains. Before the onset of the arrival of the Han migrants, the Tai Nüa and hill people had nearly reached political equilibrium following a series of conflicts. Even though there were periodic skirmishes and battles, the Tai Nüa *cao fa* remained the core authority in the entire district, and this was acknowledged by the mountain people. Moreover, intermarriages between the royal families of both sides were very common. This equilibrium helped the Tai Nüa *cao fa* in their dealings with the Chinese dynasties and powers in Mainland Southeast Asia. When the numerous Han people relocated to these regions, however, the “balance” was disrupted, and a new political ecosystem had to be constructed. The disagreements and violence would occur once more.

The primary reason why Han Chinese migrants chose to settle in the three Tai Nüa polities was the abundant mineral or natural resources there. Moeng Bò had a large number of salt wells, and Kùng Ma and Moeng Laem had silver and metal mines. Indeed, the majority of mine workers were inland Han Chinese who immigrated from various provinces during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Han people settled and grew in numbers over the generations, which led to the population census of Kùng Ma recording higher numbers for Han than for other ethnic groups after the CCP took power as the principal inhabitants of Kùng Ma, the Tai and Wa together accounted for more than forty percent of the population. This movement of people caused a fundamental demographic change.

The Tai and other ethnic groups ceased to be the main populations of Kùng Ma following the influx of Han migrants. Peng Gui’e (1998, 483), who visited Kùng Ma in 1937, described the population of Kùng Ma as follows: “From the census of the whole territory of over 10,000 households and over 40,000 inhabitants, [only] 20% to 30% of the population are Tai people. The majority [of the population] are Han-

Chinese and they are densely populated around the Nanding River.” According to this report, the Han migrants, most of whom were mineral workers,¹⁶⁵ represented more than seventy percent of Kūng Ma’s population. However, this would mean that only 20–30 percent of the population was Tai. In fact, Peng probably meant that 70–80 percent were Han and other ethnic groups. More realistic figures can be found in the GMXZ (1995, 129–135), which records the Han population as 38.44 percent in 1954 (see T4) and 44.62 percent in 2018, based on the latest data from the government website (see T5).¹⁶⁶

T4: The ethnic composition of the population of Kūng Ma district in 1954

(Source: GMXZ 1995: 131)

Unit: person

Ethnic Groups	Gengxuan (Kūng Ma and Xuanhua)	Moeng Ting	Moeng Sa	Sipai (mountains)	Moeng Yong	Total			%
						Male	Female	Total	
Tai	5336	8078	2335	539	663	8107	8844	16,951	26.32
Wa	2888	1491	1021	6193	298	5724	6167	11,891	18.46
Lahu	2199	1376	1486	649	1871	3786	3795	7581	11.77
Jingpo	171	632				385	418	803	1.25
Lisu	742	255				502	495	997	1.55
Yi	265		40			157	148	305	0.48
Bulang	67	6	15	356	284	320	408	728	1.13
De’ang	23	219				120	122	242	0.38
Hui	32	19	74			74	51	125	0.19
Bai	18					18		18	0.03
Han	5962	3496	9005	1843	4458	12,941	11,823	24,764	38.44
Total	17,703	15,572	13,976	9580	7574	32,134	32,271	64,405	100

¹⁶⁵ It refers to the vagrant.

¹⁶⁶ The lack of an earlier population date hinders my ability to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the demographic issues in the three Tai Nüa polities, a shortcoming I hope to address soon.

T5: The ethnic composition of the population of Kūng Ma in 2018

(Source: Government website: http://www.yngm.gov.cn/Kūng_Maxian/zjgm44/jjshjs65/177385/index.html, accessed on 3 April 2020)

Unit: person

Ethnic Groups	Population	%	Remarks
Tai	60,676	20.57	The population increased but the percentage decreased in comparison with 1954
Wa	49,304	16.72	Ditto
Lahu	25,611	8.68	Ditto
Yi	11,865	4.02	The population and rate increased in comparison with 1954
Bulang	5143	1.74	Ditto
Lisu	3175	1.08	Ditto
Baizu	2242	0.76	New immigrants from Dali
De'ang	1322	0.45	The population and rate increased in comparison with 1954
Jingpo	1018	0.35	The population increased but the rate decreased in comparison with 1954
Hui	1084	0.37	The population and rate increased in comparison with 1954
Han	131,579	44.62	Ditto
Other ethnic groups	1186	0.4	No records
Total	294,905	100	The total population increased by almost five times

In 1954, the Han migrants of Kūng Ma accounted for 38.44 percent of the whole population. Moreover, according to the most recent demographic data, the Han people accounted for 44.62 percent in 2018.¹⁶⁷ Thus, it is impossible for there to have been 70–80 percent Han immigrants in 1937. Perhaps all non-Tai was categorised as “Han,” or the other ethnic groups were simply ignored in 1937. However, there is another possibility, which might explain this anomaly in recording the number of Han migrants in Kūng Ma society: Peng might have identified all those Tai living in Han communities as Han people. However, Han migrants only started to settle in Kūng Ma once the mines began to be exploited in the mid-Qing dynasty, around the mid-eighteenth century. As Yong Bao, the provincial governor of Yunnan (*r.* 1801–1808), stated in Jiaqing year 8 (1805):

Along the frontier region, the [various] foreign people (*yi min*) live

¹⁶⁷ The reason for the decrease in the population rate of Dai, Wa, Lahu, and Jingpo is the increase in the Han and other ethnic groups population, which diluted the increased Dai, Wa, Lahu, and Jingpo population.

intermingled with each other. Beyond the common boundary the foreign people (*yi*) and the Han people (Chinese) have regular social intercourse. It is due to a long period of peace that China and beyond China have [been amalgamated with each other to] become a family. There are people (*minren*) who travel to a foreign land to cultivate; there are also foreign people (*yiren*) that depend on the Han people (Chinese). They commute [from their land] to the interior [region] to live and engage in business. There are intermarriages, their clothes and headgear are of mixed [fashions] and their languages are lingua franca. The foreign people (*yi*) and the Han (Chinese) cannot be distinguished from one another at once.¹⁶⁸

“沿邊一帶夷民雜處，交界之外，夷漢時相往來，蓋因承平日久，中外一家，有民人就往夷地耕種，亦有夷人依附漢人，來往內地貿易居住，彼此結親、衣冠相混、語言相從，一時斷不能區別夷漢。”

The integration of the Yi and Han of the Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem Native office territories would be a rewarding scholarly topic. Ma Jianxiong (2018, 62–63) produced a profound and comprehensive study that inspired scholars to pay more attention (see Chapter Four for more details). No matter whether the percentage was 70–80% or 38.44%, today, the Han constitute the most significant population in the Kūng Ma area.

JGXZ (84–90) includes seven pages of data on the ethnic make-up of Moeng Bò's population; however, there is a lack of specific data on Tai, Yi, Hani, Lahu, Hui, Bulang, and other ethnic groups in 1964 and 1982. This is despite regular censuses of ethnic groups. The percentage of non-Han increased steadily over the years. This is the result of the PRC initiating a policy of birth control for Han Chinese. All ethnic groups (fifty-five categories of ethnic groups or *shaoshu minzu*, except the Han) are allowed to have a second child, which was different from the “one-child policy” for the Han people. The “one-child policy” was abolished entirely in 2016 and this is reflected in the demographic changes of recent years.¹⁶⁹

Han migrants have constituted the main proportion of Moeng Bò's population since the mid-Qing dynasty (1836). According to WYTZ (2016, 138), there were 3541 indigenous households, and the Han civilian state farmers who had become localised amounted to 5094 households. There were 432 households of “guest people”. Moreover, in the year Daoguang 3 (1823), the governor-general of Yunnan, Yi Libu (伊里布 *r.* 1835–1839), and the provincial governor¹⁷⁰ of Yunnan, He Xuan (何煊 *r.* 1835–1837), wrote a memorial in Daoguang 3 (1823) stating: “These kinds of vagrants (*liumin*) are to be found mostly in the three provinces of Kaihua, Guangnan, and Pu'er.”¹⁷¹ According to an investigation by local authorities, the vagrants counted over

¹⁶⁸ GZZP: 04-01-31-1754-05, the Yongbao memorial (北京故宮檔案，宮中檔朱批縮微，04-01-31-1754-05, 永保奏摺，嘉慶八年六月四日)。

¹⁶⁹ For more details, see Zhang Cuiling and Liu Hongyan (2016, 40–56) and Hu Youze and Min Zhenhai (2016, 50–54).

¹⁷⁰ Hucker (1985, 2731).

¹⁷¹ WYTZ (2016, 138). The original text reads: “此等流民于开化、广南、普洱三府为最多。”

24,000 households in Kaihua and over 22,000 households in Guangnan. Pu'er, Guangnan, and Kaihua were the three districts with the largest number of vagrants.¹⁷² Han migrants and vagrants made up half of the total population of Weiyuan when the CCP seized control of Yunnan and the PRC was founded, and the new government conducted regular demographic surveys (See T6). I have summarised the data from JGXZ in the following chart:

T6: The ethnic population of Moeng Bò in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s

Year and percent Ethnic Group	1964	%	1982	%	1990	%	Remarks
Dai	no record		no record		51,905	18.64	Tai is the second largest ethnic group of Moeng Bò.
Yi	no record		no record		58,150	20.88	Yi is the biggest ethnic group of Moeng Bò.
Han	92,985	56.05	142,577	55.93	150,103	53.9	The proportion declined. The most likely reason is the “one-child” policy. However, the Han have constituted the leading group of Moeng Bò’s population since the mid-nineteenth century. ¹⁷³
Lahu	no record		no record		11,423	4.1	
Hani	no record		no record		2696	0.97	
Hui	no record		no record		1790	0.64	
Bulang					1145	0.41	
Other ethnic groups <1000 people	no record		no record		1,277	0.46	
Ethnic groups >1000 people	72,909	43.95	112,338	44.07	128,386	46.1	The proportion of ethnic groups increased every year.
Total	165,894	100	254,915	100	278,489	100	

Moeng Laem’s population structure is another particular case. Tai, Lahu, and Wa constitute the largest ethnic groups of Moeng Laem. The combined proportion of

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ WYZ (2016, 138–140). Chapter One also explains this clearly.

these three ethnic groups reached over seventy percent in 1955 and 1990; in 1982, their percentage peaked at over eighty percent. The original chart includes an error, however: the total number of inhabitants was 91,150 in 1982, while the chart states a number of 81,150. The proportion of Tai and Wa declined when compared to the data from 1955.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, the proportion of the Han increased annually. See chart T7 (MLXZ 1999, 43–46):

¹⁷⁴ As mentioned in fn. 166 of this chapter, I do not have more demographic data, which is why the analyses are not strong. Prior to the eighteenth century, the domains of the three Tai Nüa polities were quite different from the present-day administrative districts. This is especially true for Moeng Laem, which lost much of its territory during the nineteenth century.

T7: The ethnic population of Moeng Laem in the 1950s, 1980s, and 1990s

Year and percent Ethnic group	1955	%	1982	%	1990	%	Remarks
Dai	12,842	28.78	18,801	20.63	22,075	21.49	The percentage declined at first and later increased only slightly.
Lahu	13,859	31.06	34,393	37.73	31,384	30.56	Increase first, followed by a decline
Wa	13,199	29.58	22,302	24.47	26,451	25.76	The percentage declined first and later only increased slightly.
Han	1071	2.4	8572	9.4	13,643	13.28	The percentage increased. ¹⁷⁵
Hani	2386	5.3	4974	5.46	6502	6.33	A slight increase
Yi	23	0.05	798	0.88	1614	1.58	The percentage increased.
Lisu	460	1.03	204	0.22	274	0.27	The percentage declined.
Jingpo	275	0.62	97	0.11	127	0.12	The percentage declined.
Hui	21	0.04	159	0.17	229	0.22	The percentage increased.
Bai	9	0.02	91	0.10	194	0.19	The percentage increased.
Zhuang			8	0.009	45	0.044	Labour migration
Bulang			23	0.025	38	0.037	Labour migration
Buyi			4	0.0004	15	0.015	Labour migration
Miao			21	0.023	37	0.036	Migration for work or business. A bit different from labour migration.
Naxi			10	0.001	11	0.011	Labour migration
Zang (Tibetan)			5	0.0005	10	0.01	Labour migration
Lao Mianren (Tibeto- Burman)	471	1.06	631	0.69	Counting in Lahu		Lao Mianren could be a branch of the Tibeto-Burman family. The Chinese authorities defined them as Lahu in August 1990. ¹⁷⁶
Others			51	0.056	57	0.056	
Total	44,616	100	91,150	100	102,700	100	

According to MLXZ (1999, 46), the relative numerical strength of Tai and Wa declined from 1955 until 1990, and both groups constitute the main population of Moeng Laem. The reasons are the “Great Leap Forward” (Da yuejin: 大躍進, 1958–

¹⁷⁵ I can only calculate the year given in the local gazetteer; annual statistics are extremely difficult to obtain.

¹⁷⁶ For more details, see Luo Chengsong (2012, 90–94) and MLXZ (1999, 45).

1960)” and the “Cultural Revolution,” which caused Tai and Wa people to migrate to Burma or Thailand before the 1980s. After the Reform and Opening-Up policies,¹⁷⁷ some ethnic groups living along the border who had overseas connections, migrated overseas (mainly to Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand) primarily for economic reasons.

The case of another ethnic group, the Lahu, is noteworthy. The proportion of Lahu people was 31.06 percent in 1955 and then it increased to 37.73 percent in 1982. By 1990, it had declined to 30.56 percent. This can probably be explained by the CCP introducing an ethnic identification policy in the 1950s, which resulted in many mountainous ethnic groups being identified as the Lahu people. This would explain why the Lahu population increased to 37.73 percent in 1982.

Moreover, MLGK (2008, 6) mentions that a significant number of people from Lancang migrated to Moeng Laem in the late 1970s. This is a possible reason for the increased Lahu population in the 1980s. As for the population decline in the 1990s, it may be because of the Lancang earthquake in 1988. The earthquake caused casualties and may also have caused the population to move away from Moeng Laem. However, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to support this hypothesis.¹⁷⁸ This issue needs to be studied in the future.

Today, the Han represent the fourth largest group in Moeng Laem. Nevertheless, their proportion was only 2.4 percent in 1955, increasing to 9.4 percent in 1982 and 13.28 percent in 1990. This is because more and more Han migrants settled in Moeng Laem due to the Chinese government’s attractive border policy.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, overall, the percentage of Han people remains relatively low. Moeng Laem continues to be a frontier region with Tai, Wa, and Lahu as the main population centres.

3.4 Summary

Moeng Laem, Küng Ma, and Moeng Bò are Tai Nüa polities in the Upper Mekong Basin. Currently, all three polities are under the superintendency of the Chinese government. Historically – prior to the introduction of the *gaitu guiliu* policy in 1724, Weiyuan (Moeng Bò) was a remote and inaccessible area. Moeng Bò was not under the direct jurisdiction of the Qing court until the early eighteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, the Qing court had already garrisoned troops in Weiyuan (see P1,

¹⁷⁷ That is *Gaige kaifang*: 改革開放, 1978–until now, also known as the “Opening of China.”

¹⁷⁸ I have consulted Dr. Ma Jianxiong, an expert on the Lahu, from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, regarding the demographic changes with respect to the Lahu ethnic group. In an email dated 2 April 2021, he said: “The Lahu largely migrated to Burma during 1950 and 1961, and some of them returned after 1963. I interviewed Prof. Ma Yao in 2003, and he told me that he tried to call the Lahu village heads back to Moeng Laem in 1963.” This, then, may be another reason why the Lahu population increased in the 1980s.

¹⁷⁹ For more details, see MLGK (2008, 88).

which shows the Qing court's official seals of the frontier commander).

As the Qing court expanded into Southwest Yunnan, Moeng Bò undoubtedly became a crucial route for entering the Lower Mekong Basin and the export of Moeng Bò's abundant tea and salt resources. Moeng Bò's was the main source of salt supplies to the Mekong Basin's lower reaches and the western Mekong Basin, which is close to the Burmese border. Given that salt is essential for daily life, to control the salt provision means to control basic life necessities. Consequently, the areas that relied on Moeng Bò's tea and salt also had to rely, to some extent, on the authority that controlled the salt wells and tea mountains.

As Ma Jianxiong (2018, 59) points out, the Qing government gained control over the area's salt wells and tea mountains after the introduction of *gaitu guiliu* in the 1720s. However, salt was also supplied to Kūng Ma, Moeng Phòng, Moeng Laem, and other *tusi* jurisdictions by the excellent salt factory in the Weiyuan River Basin. Moreover, on the Burmese side, the political separation between Upper and Lower Burma resulted in a long-term inability to supply sea salt from Lower Burma to the Upper Burma mountains. Thus, the reliance on the Weiyuan salt production was a crucial reason why the native official areas west of the Mekong River were politically tied to the Ming and Qing dynasties.

Ma's view touches on a controversial topic. He further claims that the Qing court's control of the salt wells resulted in a lack of salt in the west of the Mekong basin (Kūng Ma/Moeng Laem and Moeng Phòng), which caused chaos in the mineral areas of Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma in the early nineteenth century.¹⁸⁰


However, the Qing court did not realise that their control of the salt wells would lead to unrest in the mining areas on the border. The Qing court's primary intention was to expand political control to Southwest Yunnan and only then to benefit from the trade in salt and tea. They were unaware that the salt issue would mean Kūng Ma/Moeng Phòng and Moeng Laem were "politically attached" to the Qing court.

Kūng Ma was a different case. Kūng Ma was separated from Moeng Ting by the Chinese authority in the late Ming dynasty (CE 1587); it was part of the territory of Moeng Ting Prefecture. Consequently, Kūng Ma had to confront threats from Moeng Ting and Burma, and, in this situation, Kūng Ma chose to side with the Chinese dynasties in order to gain political support, which would help them get the upper hand in the competition with Moeng Ting and Moeng Phòng. Moreover, as an area rich in mineral resources, Kūng Ma attracted many Han migrants, especially after the Qing court killed Gonglayin because the buffer zone between Burma and Southwest Yunnan had been removed. Moeng Laem was unable to rid itself of Burma's control in both political and military terms. It was entirely reliant on support from the Chinese

¹⁸⁰ For more details, see Ma Jianxiong (2018, 54–99).

authorities to maintain its *tusi* status.

Nevertheless, Moeng Laem became an integral part of the Qing Empire after the “Yunnan and Burma” boundary demarcation. This political identity continued until after the 1950s, when the CCP took over China, while the cultural identity has continued to this day. This can be seen in the struggle between the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and Zhang Fuguo, the local Lahu people’s leader (Luohei). In Chapter Five, I will analyse the choices made by Moeng Laem’s *cao fa* when dealing with relations with Burma, the Lahu people, and the Qing court, and I will discuss the historical reasons behind this choice and its consequences.



P1: The Official bilingual Seal of the Frontier Commander of Weiyuan Division, Yunnan (It was cast in May, Jiaqing year 12 [1807]). These two original seals were made of bronze and are now kept in Pu'er Museum. Source: Pu'er CPPCC (2020, 19).

Chapter Four: The Politics of Survival of Tai Nüa Polities

4.1 An Overview

Chapter Three discussed the historical background and society of Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò. This historical transition took place from the eighteenth until the early nineteenth century. As addressed in Chapter One, the Qing court pursued a more aggressive policy (borderland integration policy, e.g., the *gaitu guiliu*) in Southwest Yunnan between the early eighteenth century and the early twentieth. However, when the *gaitu guiliu* was initially imposed on Moeng Bò, the political and military power of the Qing court did not extend to areas on the right (i.e., west) bank of the Mekong River; thus, Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma were able to maintain their semi-independent political status.

Moeng Bò was the first Tai Nüa district integrated into the Chinese Empire under the *gaitu guiliu*. During the early eighteenth century, few Han migrants had reached Moeng Bò because tropical diseases in the hot and humid climate of the lowland Tai areas had deterred them from settling. Moreover, public transportation barely existed in Southwest Yunnan,¹ which made Moeng Bò difficult to access. The Qing court first suppressed the rebellions, then appointed rotating officials (*liuguan* 流官), and later adopted Confucian ideology to integrate the local people, especially the Tai elites, which resulted in Moeng Bò being politically incorporated into the Qing state. Below, I will discuss this process from different angles.

During the nineteenth century, the Qing court controlled the tea and salt trade in the Upper Mekong region (Moeng Bò). As mentioned in Chapter Three, due to the need of tea and salt, Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma had to maintain close relations with the Qing court. The Qing court did not anticipate that the control of the salt and tea trade of Moeng Bò would strengthen its influence in the frontier mining areas.² It happened by accident and ended up intensifying the borderland integration process.

The Qing court's control of Yunnan can be viewed as an effort to uphold the prestige of the empire and, later, to increase its power (i.e., economics, Confucian culture, politics, and the military, otherwise known as the borderland policy). As a result, the Qing court encouraged the extraction of minerals and salt, which became Yunnan's principal source of income and supported its stability and growth. When these mineral supplies were exhausted, Yunnan would become involved in various and ongoing rebellions.³ Ma Jianxiong argues (2018, 54–99) that competition for natural

¹ For details on the transportation system of Yunnan, see Lee (2012, 71–84).

² For more details, see Ma Jianxiong (2018, 54–99).

³ During the 1800s, the “Salt Case” rebellion occurred in the prefectures of Dali, Chuxiong, and Lijiang; the rebellion

resources led to the outbreak of the Yunnanese Hui Muslim rebellion or uprising (1856–1873),⁴ which, in turn, contributed to the weakening of Qing control and the economic decline of Yunnan.

Moreover, the execution of Gongli yan (Gonglayin or Gonnaeim, the leader of the Guijia ethnic group⁵) meant that there was no longer a buffer zone between Burma and the Tai polities in Southwest Yunnan. The Sino-Burmese War (1762–1769) broke out in the mid-eighteenth century as a result of Burmese territorial ambitions toward the Tai polities and the rise of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885). How did these three Tai Nüa polities react to this new turning point?

The Tai polities attempt to strike a balance between the powerful Southeast Asian polities and the Chinese dynasties likewise failed. To interact with the Qing court and the Han people, the Tai elites studied and applied Chinese culture. At the same time, because of intermarriage with local Tai women, Han migrants who had assimilated into Tai society became the ideal persons to deal with the Qing officials. Hence, in the face of the Qing court's border integration programme and the Kongbaung dynasty's territorial ambitions, the Tai elites were continually looking for a better way to survive.

of Lahu people took place in the prefecture of Mianning; and the Lahu people's rebellion, commanded by Zhang Fuguo, took place in Moeng Laem Prefecture. For more details, see Xie Benshu et al. (eds), (1993, 8/15–18).

⁴ Nineteenth-century British sources referred to the Hui in Yunnan as Panthay, from the Burmese term *pa-ti* or *Phasi* (ဖာဆီ). It is the phonetic rendering of “Farsi,” the dominant language and ethnic group in Persia or Iran. Here, Phasi referred to Yunnanese Hui Muslims, many of them of Persian and Turkish origin. The rebellion in question is the Du Wenxiu Rebellion (*Du Wenxiu qi yi*: 杜文秀起義) in Chinese. see Atwill (2003, 1079–1108). Panthay, therefore, is an exonym used in a specific historical context, not an autonym. The Hui in Yunnan do not refer to themselves as Panthay, nor is this term widely known in the English scholarly world, apart from Atwill's book. I refer to them as Yunnanese Hui Muslims in accordance with their own usage. They rebelled against the Qing dynasty, 1856–1873 in an event known as the Yunnanese Hui Muslim rebellion or uprising. For more details on Muslim Revolts, see J. K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (ed.). 1989. *The Cambridge History of China*, Volume 11, Part 2, pp. 211–214; 235–243.

⁵ Regarding the origins of the Gonglayin, Chinese historiographies and the majority of Chinese scholars (e.g., Ma Jianxiong 2023, 5–36) believe that the Gonglayin (Ch: Guijia 桂家) were descendants of the followers of the Yongli Emperor (*r.* 1646–1662), last emperor of the Ming dynasty. Despite this, some scholars believe that the Gwe may be Gwe Karen (Brailey 1970, 33–47). On 26 September 2023, in a personal email, Prof. Sun Laichen pointed out that Gonglayin/Gonnaeim's attire resembled that of the Wa (a Mon-Khmer speaking group on the Sino-Burma border). Still, not the Burmese (Tai, Moeng Laem, I think) original translated into Chinese is 似緬非緬, 似佤非佤. So, this was a Tai Moeng Laem perception of the Gwe people. This is an extremely precious account, as it demonstrates the appearance and attire of the Gwe people: somewhat similar to but not completely the Burmans and the Wa. The appearance implies that the Gwe were somewhat like the Wa were dark-skinned, and the Mon-Khmer speaking Kuy fits this case. Another point rules out the Gwe were Lahu: The Tai in Moeng Laem had lived with the Lahu for so many years that if the Gwe were Lahu, they would have directly stated so, but they did not). Gong had lengthy, ear-ringed ears. This ethnic community has received scant attention from academics. I believe the Gwe were descended from upland people and Han migrants who had migrated to Upper Burma. Under ethnic integration, they may be considered as a type of highland ethnic community (the southern Gwe group should be identified with the Mon-Khmer speaking Southern Kuy living in eastern Thailand and northern Cambodia).

Taking Yunnan's period of decline and rebels as a context, this chapter will analyse the Qing court's borderland policy strategy in the three Tai Nüa polities and examine how these polities balanced their relationships with China and Southeast Asian mainland powers.

4.2. Tributary Relationships and Condominiums

4.2.1 Tributary Relationships and Condominium in Moeng Laem, according to Chinese Records

Chapter Three already discussed the history of Moeng Laem before the mid-nineteenth century, examining the hereditary structure of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. This section will focus on the relationships between Moeng Laem and related superpowers, i.e., China and Burma.

Even Moeng Laem *cao fa* accepted the conferee (conferring an official title upon him) from the Ming court and thus came under the supervision of the imperial authorities. The Ming court exerted little political influence in the remote Tai polities, except through the tributary relationship. The Moeng Laem native officials paid tribute to the Ming court regularly. MSL records Moeng Laem's events and history with reliable and detailed descriptions, especially concerning tributary events and conflicts. The intervals between the tributary events became increasingly short. Since 1438, Moeng Laem paid tribute regularly; for instance, MSL records the following entry:

Zhengtong 3, 9th lunar month, *yisi* day (12. Oct. 1438), [...] the Moeng Laem Chieftain Office in Yunnan, sent their headmen (Cao Móm), Dao Kengmeng (Cao Kham Moeng) and others, to [the Ming] Court to pay tribute. They presented memorials and offered tribute horses, elephant tusks (ivory), horns of rhinoceros and various local products. A feast was given for them and each of them was conferred a varying amount of variegated fine silk woven with gold threads and other gifts.⁶

正統三年九月乙巳……雲南孟璉長官司遣頭目招剛刀坑孟等各來朝貢，奉表貢馬及象牙、犀角等方物，賜宴並賜織金文綺等物有差。

Twenty-eight years later, On 5 December 1466, Moeng Laem's Chief Officer, Dao Pailuan, paid tribute and was granted gifts again. Sixteen years later, on 8 August 1482, Moeng Laem's Chief Officer sent his headmen Malang and others to pay tribute to the Ming court and was granted a variety of coloured silks and paper money as well. Six years later, on 8 August 1486, the headmen Malang and others were sent to pay tribute to the Ming court again.⁷

In response to Moeng Laem's tribute, the Ming court gave different gifts to Moeng Laem's native officials and their wives. The value of the return gifts generally

⁶ MSL, Yingzong *shilu*, chapter 46, pp. 898.

⁷ Zhongyang yanjiu yuan 1964, Xian-zong Shi-lu: vol. 35. 8b, chapter 40, pp. 704; Xian-zong Shi-lu: vol. 230.1a–b, chapter 48, pp. 3931–3932; Xian-zong Shi-lu, vol. 280.2b, chapter 50, pp. 4718. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan.

exceeded the value of the tributary products. This was the custom of the Ming court, which strove to show its wealth and kindness. As the Collected Statutes of the Great Ming records:

[The Ming court] granted the Chieftain of Moeng Laem three rolls of ramie silk, two rolls of silk gauze and four rolls of fine silk. His wife was given two rolls of ramie silk and two rolls of silk gauze.⁸

孟璉，給賜土官、紵絲紗三匹、羅二匹、絹四匹。妻、紵絲羅各二匹。

The first tributary mission from Moeng Laem was sent to the Ming court in 1438, the second was sent in 1466, the third in 1482, and the fourth in 1488.⁹ The intervals between them were twenty-eight, sixteen, and six years, respectively. Based on these regular tributary events, it is clear that the relationship between Moeng Laem and the Ming court was becoming closer over the course of the fifteenth century.

Why did Moeng Laem pay tribute so frequently from the 1440s until the 1480s? The MSL gives us an answer: the Luchuan Pingmian Campaign in 1439, 1441, 1442, and 1448.¹⁰ Moeng Laem and other small Tai polities were involved in the fighting between the Ming court and Luchuan. Moeng Laem chose the Ming court as a backup to resist military pressure from Luchuan. Alternatively, they must also have had a “Plan B”: to make sure not to offend anyone and gain political and economic benefits from both sides. The Tai polities (Moeng Ting/Moeng Laem and Longchuan, and so forth) were successful in resisting Luchuan and were rewarded considerably by Emperor Yingzong. The MSL records that, on 7 March 1447, Han (Kham) Gaifa, the Pacification Commissioner of the Mubang (Moeng Phòng) Military-cum-Civilian Pacification Commission (木邦路軍民總管府) in Yunnan, received an imperial order to deliver the head of the rebellious Luchuan bandit Si Renfa to Beijing. A memorial requested an exemption from the annual silver ingot charge of eight ingots. Special three-year tax exemptions were granted. Dao Feng Song was appointed chief of Moeng Laem. Aboriginal officials and their wives received colourful silks and other presents from the Ming dynasty.¹¹

Even the regular and frequent tributary relationship could not maintain the solid long-lasting relationship with the Ming court, especially when Moeng Mao (Luchuan) and Burma were strong and exerted their influence on those small polities. Moeng Laem and other small Tai polities continued to seek the support of strong powers (such

⁸ *Da Ming Huidian*, chapter 113, edited by Li Dongyang and Shen Shixing (1497–1502). For the whole text, see the Chinese Text Project, which is an ancient manuscripts online library: <https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=139379&page=5&remap=gb#%E5%AD%9F%E7%90%8E>, accessed on 5 January 2021.

⁹ The tributary missions of Moeng Laem, already mentioned in Chapter Three.

¹⁰ The record from MSL. Also see Liew (1996, 162–203).

¹¹ Summarised from Ying-zong Shi-lu: vol. 150.7a-8a, chapter 29, pp. 2947–2949. The original text and English translation, see the Appendix Chapter Four, No.1.

as the Ming court) to counterbalance the threat from Luchuan (later Burma). Thus, Moeng Laem and other Tai polities can be classified as condominiums, managed jointly by the Ming/Qing courts and Moeng Mao (later Burma).¹²

The dual over-lordship was a common geopolitical configuration among the Tai polities during the Ming and Qing dynasties.¹³ After the decline of Luchuan and with the rise of Burma, the Tai polities became embroiled in the conflicts between Burma and the Chinese dynasties again. When the Luchuan Confederation disintegrated, Burma rose (First and Restored Taungoo dynasty 1531–1752). The Burmese invaded Yongchang Prefecture (Baoshan Prefecture today) in 1582 and those Tai polities were forced to send their troops to fight against the Ming court. The MS records that Burma invaded Yongchang and Tengyue in Wanli 10, Winter (1582). During that period, Sipsòng Panna, Lan Na, Moeng Yang, Moeng Phòng, Moeng Khün, Moeng Mit, and Bhamo deployed troops to support the troops in Burma. Consequently, the Burmese gained power. Interestingly, Liu Ting (1552–1669)¹⁴ arrived with an army, boosting morale. He then besieged Moeng Laem and captured the ringleader alive. Subsequently, Yunnan calmed down, and the Moeng Mit Commission of Appeasement was raised to Pacification Commission, and two more Commissions of Appeasement were established – at Bhamo and Küng Ma – and two more Chieftain’s Offices – at Moeng Laem and Moeng Yang.¹⁵

After the Ming court had defeated Burma, Moeng Laem and other Tai polities surrendered to the Ming court and Yunnan was pacified. The Ming court quickly forgave Moeng Laem, and the native official, Dao Pai Zhen, paid tribute in 1586. Moeng Laem escaped punishment from the Ming court. Finally, Moeng Laem presented a petition to the Ming court asking for permission to submit. Moeng Laem was turned into a Native Chief Office again. Although the Ming court knew that the rebellion of native officials (*tusi* or *tuguan*) in Southwest Yunnan posed a constant challenge, the Ming court could only turn a blind eye and accept the current state of the southwestern boundary “condominium” on the premise that it was unable to fully control the territories of the native officials in the southwest.

¹² Condominium means “a country that is governed by two or more foreign powers,” according to the Cambridge Dictionary. See the link: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/condominium>, accessed on 16 January 2020; see also Grabowsky (2008, 11–63).

¹³ For more details about the concept condominium in relative to the Tai polities, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 49–56).

¹⁴ Liu Ting was an army commander during the late Ming Dynasty. For more details on Liu Ting, see *Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368–1644*, edited by L. Carrington Goodrich and Fang Chaoying (1976, 964–68).

¹⁵ Summarised from *Mingshi*, Chapter 247, Biography of Liu Ting, 135, *Mingshi*, pp. 6389–390. To see the whole text, please see the online manuscript Library Chinese Text Project: <https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=en&file=143002&page=3>, accessed on 13 June 2023. For the original text and English translation, see the Appendix Chapter Four, No. 2.

As long as a native official continued to pay tribute, his previous betrayal could be forgiven. The MSL records that, on 26 April 1586, the Burmese chieftain usurped its title and Pegu annexed other tribes' territory. The Native Chieftain Office of Moeng Laem was granted a seal and letter patents by the Ming court. Their annual labour service was converted to silver. After the Burmese chieftain became aggressive, Moeng Laem became submissive to Burma. The seal-holder Dao Paizhen, a relative of the Aboriginal Official, pledged allegiance to the Ming court and offered tribute and he was ordered to defend the outside vassal nations.¹⁶

The wars between the Ming court and Burma and the Tai polities endured until the Ming court was superseded by the Manchu regime (1644–1912). The above documents demonstrate the ongoing rebellions and subordinations between Moeng Laem and the Ming court. To maintain its relative “independence” or safety as a minor state, Moeng Laem had to be cautious in its dealings with the Ming court, the Tai Federation of Luchuan, and Burma. Throughout the duration of the Ming dynasty, Moeng Laem submitted first to the Tai Federation of Moeng Mao (Luchuan), and later to both the Ming court and Burma.¹⁷

The majority of rebellions were connected to throne succession. Burma supported certain Tai rulers (*cao fa*), while the Ming court nominated those whose legitimacy was contested by others.¹⁸ The Tai Federation of Moeng Mao (Luchuan) and Burma requested material or military assistance from Moeng Laem, but the Ming court demanded nominal and official subordination. The reason was that the Ming court was unable to intervene in Moeng Laem's political predicament.

According to the TQDZ record: Moeng Laem, also known as Hawa, was a fierce native people who had no tribute relationship with China. During the Zhengtong reign, Moeng Laem submitted and pledged allegiance to China. Dao Paihan killed the heir apparent and seized the throne. In 1584, Dao Paihan led Cheli's envoys to pay tribute to the Ming court. Dao Pai Jin succeeded to the throne. In 1622, Ava defeated Moeng Laem, however when Tongwu (Toungoo dynasty) attacked, and Ava was forced to retreat. Moeng Laem paid 200 taels (*liang*)¹⁹ in silver in lieu of labour service for the Ming court. Dao Pai Han, the uncle of Dao Pai Zhen, married a princess from Sipsòng Panna; he clashed with Sipsòng Panna and assassinated his nephew Dao Pai Zhen for ascending to the throne. However, he convinced Sipsòng Panna and Burma to pay

¹⁶ Summarised from MSL Shen-zong: vol. 172.7b, chapter 103, pp. 3130, Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiu yuan. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No.3.

¹⁷ See MS, chapter 315, *liezhuan* 203, Yunnan *tusi* 3, pp. 8142. And also see the Appendix Chapter Four, No.9.

¹⁸ I.e., other royal family members or the Burmese side.

¹⁹ “*Liang*” tael was the currency in ancient China –16 tael is one *jin* (Catty, one *jin*=11/3 English pound). In the Ming dynasty, 1 *liang* weighed 37.3 grams of silver, 200 *liang* weighed 7460 grams of silver.

tribute to the Ming court, and the Ming court did not find him guilty of wrongdoing.²⁰

The Ming court did not care who ascended the throne. In addition, only rebellions and conflicts between polities would have intervened to maintain the stability of the remote areas and keep them tamed. Nevertheless, this tale is inaccurate as it claims that Ava attacked Moeng Laem, despite the fact that the Ava dynasty existed from 1364 CE to 1555 CE. Therefore, it is improbable that Ava successfully penetrated Moeng Laem in 1622.²¹ Zhang Haizhen (2004, 171) states that Anaukpetlun (*r.* 1606–1628)²² was the descendant of Bayinnaung (*r.* 1551–1581)²³, who successfully captured Moeng Laem in 1622. Nevertheless, the insurgents encircled Ava, compelling Anaukpetlun to withdraw from Moeng Laem.

The relationship between Moeng Laem, the Ming court, and Luchuan and then Burma was always changing. As a small polity, the priority for Moeng Laem was to survive in a “cruel world,” surrounded by strong powers, instead of pursuing any unrealistic illusions of independence or exclusive subordination to any single power. Thus, it was essential for the ruling elite of Moeng Laem that stable relationships be maintained between the Ming court, Luchuan, and Burma, which would help Moeng Laem to get and preserve more privileges. In addition, the Chinese record shows that, as a result of the Luchuan and Burmese threats, ties between Moeng Laem and the Ming court grew closer.

The following documents detail the events and tributary matters pertinent to Moeng Laem. According to these records, the Qing court and Moeng Laem had a stronger connection than during the Ming dynasty. Furthermore, when the Qing court began to pay more attention to Southwest Yunnan, Moeng Laem found itself stuck between Burma and China, susceptible to pressure from both sides, notably Burmese military and political animosity. Moeng Laem opted to have strong links with the Qing court in order to defy Burmese pressure and inter-ethnic disputes (i.e., the Lahu uprising).

As QSL records report for 6 November 1730, Governor-General E’ertai²⁴ reported to the Qing court that: The Aboriginal Office of Moeng Laem, situated at the extreme Yongchang border, had no diplomatic relations with China since ancient times.

²⁰ Summarised from *A Treatise on Yunnan of the Tianqi Period*. vol. 30, Jimi Gazetteer chapter. 12, by Liu. Wenzheng (1555–1626) and others, completed in 1625. Cited from Gu Yongji (1991, 992). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 4.

²¹ Ava was the capital of Burma at that time, not a dynasty. Chinese sources that tend to designate the capital as a dynasty.

²² Anaukpetlun was the sixth king of Taungoo Burma.

²³ Bayinnaung was the fourth king of Taungoo Burma.

²⁴ O-er-tai, or E-er-tai (*b.* 1680–1745), the governor-general of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). See ECCP II, pp. 601–603.

E-er-tai educated and indoctrinated the Moeng Laem, promoting submissiveness, loyalty to the Qing court, tribute, and gradual integration. They agreed to pay 600 *liang* of silver per annum for mining taxes, but Emperor Yongzheng cut them in half to show compassion.²⁵

This record shows that the tax policy for Southwest Yunnan was rather flexible. The borderland policy of the Qing court had its focus on pacification. The Qing court took “one Imperial administration system and multiple native systems”²⁶ to rule this empire of many languages, cultures, and a vast population. The flexible and adaptable principles were issued and demanded in order to rule such a vast territory inhabited by many different ethnic groups.

When the Qing court proclaimed its intention to centralise power and bring the southwestern native officers under its direct control (i.e., the *gaitu guiliu*), E’ertai was more flexible when dealing with the native officers on the west bank of the Mekong River. He submitted a memorial to Emperor Yongzheng after the *gaitu guiliu* policy was promoted in 1728: “Our troops have entered Moeng Yang, Youle, Ganlanba (Moeng Han), Jiulong River (Mekong River), and others. A survey of six tea hills was proposed, with brigades for defence. If near Burma, the indirect rule should be used, with the Native Official of Sipsong Panna remaining for borderland defence”.²⁷

E’ertai’s memorial reveals that the Qing court’s border strategy aimed to use the west bank of the Mekong River as a buffer zone to prevent invasion from the Burmese and ensure the safety of the empire. As already mentioned, in 1730, E’ertai suggested that the tax on the Moeng Laem silver mine should be halved to demonstrate the court’s concern. After the 1730s, the Munai silver mine developed rapidly and strengthened the economy of the surrounding area. It can be argued that E’ertai’s policies had long represented the Qing court’s position vis-à-vis native officials on the west bank of the Mekong River. Regarding the borderland policy of the Qing court, Ma Jianxiong (2018, 54–99) contends that the Qing court approached this policy when it handled the contradictions between the elites of the Lahu and Tai people in Moeng Laem during the Emperor Jiaqing period (*r.* 1796–1820).

The rebellious Zhao Hebai (Tai name: Cao Phrai Yu) was a permanent source of unrest during the reign of Emperor Qianlong. This event also recorded in detail in QSL. In 1740, the governor-general of Yunnan Qingfu (慶復 *r.* 1737–1741) sent a memorial

²⁵ Summarised from *Qing Shizong shilu*, chapter 159. For the whole text see the online library: The Chinese Text Project: <https://ctext.org/dictionary.pl>, accessed on 02/12/2023. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 5.

²⁶ For more details, see Xu Yong (2015, 59–60).

²⁷ *Complete Library of the Four Treasuries during the Qing Dynasty. Confidential Memorials with Vermillion Notes Vol. 125. E’ertai Memorials with Vermillion Notes 125–369a* (欽定四庫全書, 硃批諭旨卷一百二十五, 硃批鄂爾泰奏摺: 125–369a). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 6.

to emperor, stating that Zhao Hebai, the headman of Moeng Laem, who had caused trouble for years and should be sent to Pu'er Prefecture. Emperor Qianlong ordered his release and sentencing to Pu'er jail. If native official Dao Pai Chun was unchallengeable in Moeng Laem, Zhao Hebai should be imprisoned in Pu'er. If Dao Pai Chun could not soothe rebels, Zhao Hebai should be arrested in Kunming to break their ties.²⁸

Zhao Hebai (r.? –1738) was a native official who had usurped the throne of Moeng Laem (See Chapter Three T1). In order to seize power, he allied with Moeng Phòng. He killed the legitimate native official Dao Pai Lie, who was the uncle of Dao Pai Chun. Dao Pai Chun ascended the throne with the support of the Qing court. Such events occurred frequently in the Tai territories. The Qing court and Burma supported rival candidates competing for the position of native officials. Maintaining stability and guarding the borders was the fundamental policy of the Qing court. It was immensely crucial, therefore, for the Qing court to choose a native official who was pro-China rather than pro-Burma.

At the time the Moeng Laem native official was formally appointed by China, Moeng Laem was regarded as one of the border guardian stations for the Chinese dynasties. The imperial court's prime concern was the stability and submission of Moeng Laem. It did not care who the ruler of Moeng Laem was, let alone what its political organisation, religion, or social structure was. This policy ensured that Moeng Laem paid tribute and did not cause any trouble, such as colluding with foreign powers to invade the hinterland.

China was not interested in punishing Moeng Laem. The emperor even forgave Moeng Laem when the polity allied with Burma, and on the occasions when it turned against the imperial court. As long as Moeng Laem's rulers showed contrition and reaffirmed their loyalty to the emperor then all was forgiven. The local elites skilfully took advantage of the weaknesses of super-sovereignty to obtain their best interests. They were "adapting to ever-mutating circumstances and their dexterity in manipulating state institutions and policies to their advantage."²⁹

4.2.2 The Relationship between Moeng Laem and the Surrounding Polities from the Local Perspective

In 1762, Nan Zhan (Gonglayin's³⁰ main wife) killed the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Pai

²⁸ Summarised from QSL: Qing Gaozong, chapter 112, p. 15. For the original texts, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 7.

²⁹ See Daniels and Ma Jianxiong (eds), (2020, 1).

³⁰ As mentioned in Chapter Three, the existence and force of Gonglinya was daunting for the Burmese and the Qing court. Indeed, when Gonglinya controlled significant parts of the Shan State, the Burmese and Qing courts were

Chun, and burned his palace to the ground, as Nan Zhan could no longer bear his insults (taking Nan Zhan and her daughter as his minor wives). Later, the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces sent representatives to Kūng Ma to supervise the *cao fa* and to escort Gonglayin to Kunming. The governor explained the situation to Emperor Qianlong, resulting in the eventual decapitation of Gonglayin.

After Gonglayin's death, the Moeng Phòng (Hsienwi 木邦) *cao fa*, who had been aligned with Gonglayin's forces, was left isolated and helpless. As a result, the *cao fa* could only rely on the Burmese for support. There was no buffer zone between Burma and the territory of the *cao fa* in Yunnan, so it was easy for the Burmese to invade Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna. The Burmese invaded Moeng Laem, Sipsòng Panna, and Kūng Ma via Moeng Phòng. In 1769, the two warring parties agreed to a truce: both parties needed to recuperate.

In CS 1166 (1804), “Kawila”³¹ had a dispute with Chiang Tung.³² The ruler of Chiang Tung asked the *cao fa* of Moeng Laem to send troops for assistance. At that time, the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Pai Gong, was greedy for profit. He privately carried the tally coupon and led the soldiers out of his territory. As a result, due to the collusion between Kawila and the Moeng Yang *cao fa*, Dao Pai Gong was killed while passing through Moeng Yang territory, and the tally coupon was lost, which was a serious political event. Without the tally coupon, the succeeding *cao fa* did not have the necessary Chinese permission to take the throne. This event is also recorded in MLCL1.³³ The original Lik script text was transcribed and summarised into modern Thai by Chaichūn Khamdaengyodtai (MLCL2),³⁴ and the relevant passage in this text reads:

In a *kap cai* year, CS 1166 (CE 1804), (corresponding to) the eighteenth year of the reign of King Cakhin or King Müang Chūn, he, without cautions, persuaded Thao Phrai Kung³⁵ to observe the city and took a number of Müang

cautious about crossing the border. The territories controlled by Gonglinya can be seen as a buffer zone between the Qing Empire and Burma.

³¹ The Chinese named the north of Thailand (Lan Na) Jai Yu La (the phonetic rendering of Kawila: พระเจ้ากาวิละ in Th.). The Phra Chao Kawila was the ruler from 1782 to 1816 of northern Thailand; he was also known as Phra Boromrachathibodi (พระบรมราชาธิบดี in Th.), here, it refers to Northern Thailand. For more details, see Penth (2001, 64) and Sarassawadee (2005, 139). Further, as Grabowsky (1999, 47) explains: “The liberator of Chiang Mai, Phaya (King) Kawila (r. 1782–1816) launched numerous campaigns against various petty Shan states to the North deporting large parts of their populations and resettling them in Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Lampang.” Hence, the various Tai polities considered Kawila to be the ruler of an aggressive state, and if any polity from Northern Thailand were to invade them, especially with the intention to capture and resettle prisoners-of-war, they would record it as Kawila. For further information, please refer to Grabowsky (1999, 45–86).

³² The northeast Shan States, for more details, see Wyatt and Aroonrut (1998, 178–179).

³³ The so-called *The Title of the Chronicle of Dhamma* (Chū Phūn Tham). It is translated and edited in Yin Lun and Daniels et al. (eds), (2010, 13–14). Also see Chapter One.

³⁴ The so-called *The History of Moeng Laem* (หน้าพิพายเกล้า ลึกพื้นเมือง เมืองแลม). See Chapter One.

³⁵ Dai Pai Gong, the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, whose reign was from 1791–1805.

Laem people to accompany him to inspect the enemies at Müang Yang. As soon as having arrived at the border, they were assassinated //7//36 by Tai Khün (Chiang Tung) bandits. Their royal families, government officials, and relatives thus lamented in misery.

ปีกาบใจ จ.ศ. 1166 (ตรงกับ) รัชสมัยพระเจ้า จาจิน ปีที่ 18 พระเจ้าเมืองขึ้น ชวนเอา ท้าวไพร่กูงไปคูบ้านเมืองโดยไม่ได้คิดพิจารณาสิ่งใด ขอเอาไพร่พล (จากเมืองแลม) จำนวนหนึ่งไปด้วย เพื่อแอบไปคูข้าศึกด้านเมืองยาง เวลาไปถึงเขตแดน ก็ถูกผู้ก่อการร้ายฝ่าย ชาวจีน//7//ลอบสังหาร พระเจ้าทั้งสองที่นั่น ทาให้ราชเครือญาติ อามาศย์ และญาติมิตร ทั้งหลาย ร้องไห้ราพันด้วยความโศกเศร้าเสียใจกันมาก

This Tai text document corresponds with its Chinese counterpart. Dao Pai Gong was murdered in Moeng Yang and the tally coupon was lost. The following record describes the circumstances under which the Burmese-backed Mòm Can was taking the throne of Sipsòng Panna. Mòm Can also cooperated with Northern Thailand to invade Moeng Laem. Moeng Laem first surrendered and then defeated “Kawila”, i.e., the invading troops from Northern Thailand or Lan Na. The following original Lik text, i.e., Folios 6/2–6/15, Folios 7/1–7/16, Folios 7/16–8/16, Folios 9/5–10/14 and Folios 10/14–11/7 was translated into modern Thai by Dr. Direk Injan. In CS (1168=CE1806), see the original translation Folios 6/2–6/15 on the MLCL2³⁷:

At that time, Khun Mang Cao Maha Fa Sat Khai Fa (i.e., the Burmese king) promoted Mòm Can to be the ruler of Chiang Hung and issued a decree to appoint a person named Na Nò who came from a local military family to be a military commander. In his capacity as a military commander, he led troops to Moeng Laem. The ruler of Moeng Laem surrendered and gave the throne to Mòm Can to rule over the müang. Then the Tai Lü of Sipsòng Panna joined hands with the troops of Phraya Kawila³⁸ to attack us (Müang Laem). At that time Sipsòng Panna was amidst the preparations for an imminent great war. Their ruler led troops to “Kae Mang Ngo”. [...] Our troops under the leadership of the ruler of the golden palace of Moeng Laem marched to “Kae Mang Ngo” where they attacked (the enemy). Na Nò, the military commander of the Moeng Laem troops, and many officers fought against the Tai Lü who died in large numbers. The troops of Cao Kawila had arrived at the eastern bank. Our soldiers attacked them promptly, and Kawila’s troops were defeated fleeing in all directions.

ยามนั้น “ขุนนาง เจ้ามหาฟ้าชาด (ปราสาท?) ไร่ฟ้า” พระราชทาน “หม่อมจัน” มาเป็น เจ้าเชียงรุ่ง ปลงอาชญาลงมา พระราชทานให้คนหนึ่งเป็นหัวหน้า ชื่อว่า หน้าหน่อ (หน้าหน่อ?) ขุนหาญใจกล้า เป็นตระกูลนครบประจำเมือง ได้เป็นหัวหน้าพาทหารออกเดินทางไปถึงเมืองแลม เมื่อไปถึง ก็ให้เจ้าเมืองแลมยกเอาหม่อมจัน ขึ้นเป็นเจ้าผู้ปกครอง ยามนั้น (เมื่อ) ถึงลือสิบสองพันนา พวกเขาชวนกันเอากองทัพพระยาภาวโละ มาต่อสู้กับเรา (ช่วงนั้น) เมืองลือสิบสองพันนากำลังเตรียมรับศึกใหญ่ ที่จะมาถึง เจ้าเมืองเขาก็พากันมา ถึงที่ “แก่มังโง่” ตั้งแถวจนถึง... ยามนั้น ทหารกล้าฝ่ายเรา เจ้าหอคำเมืองแลม ชวนกันไป “แก่มังโง่” เมื่อไปถึงก็ต่อสู้กัน เมื่อนั้น หน้าหน่อ นายทหารผู้บังคับบัญชา ฝ่ายเหนือเมืองแลมหลายนาย สู้กับชาวลือจนตายกันมาก พากัน กองทหารเจ้าภาวโละมาอยู่ฝั่งตะวันออก

³⁶ The sign //7// indicates the seventh page in the original Lik manuscript.

³⁷ At the beginning of the text, two-thirds of the first line is faded and indistinct.

³⁸ These troops probably came from Chiang Mai or from other parts of Northern Thailand (Lan Na), not necessarily commanded by Kawila of Chiang Mai (r. 1782–1816).

ออก ขณะนั้น ทหารฝ่าย เราตามฟันอย่างรวดเร็วกองทัพกาวิละแตกพุ่งออกกระจัด
กระจาย (หนีเข้าไป)

The description indicates that Moeng Laem initially submitted to Mò m Can.³⁹ And when the Kawila joined the fight, Moeng Laem defeated them both. Tai Lü suffered significant losses, and the forces were forced to retreat. The Lan Na troops captured the eastern portion of the city before being forced to flee. Frequent conflicts existed between Moeng Laem and other larger, more powerful polities. The original translation (Folios 7/1–7/16) details the ongoing conflict between Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna:

They were afraid to die and fled to found “Müang Nok”, a town situated in a remote area. At that time our soldiers were commanded by Cao Khai Fa, the ruler of Moeng Laem Long. Our troops confiscated cows and buffaloes in large numbers and they also caught numerous enemies. They returned with 300 Tai Lü prisoners of war, along with cows, buffaloes and elephants being led through forests to Müang [Laem]. The King of Müang Laem did not harm the Chiang Hung military men; on the contrary, he released them allowing them to return to their country in the *moeng mao* year, CS 1169 (1807). Not long thereafter, Na (“younger uncle”) Nò, the military commander, together with government officials of Müang Laem, took Mò m Can to be enthroned as the ruler of Müang Saen Yi Fa. Not long thereafter, the Lord of the White Elephant, Kawila, who was on the eastern bank withdrew and returned to his country. At that time, Maha Wangsa Fa [and] Cao Mò m Bun Hüang fled *hò kham* (i.e., the palace) and returned to their own country. and allied with Burma and China. [Mò m Can] fled to ally himself with the Burmese and Chinese to rule as “Cao Saenwifa” (vassal ruler).

เขาก็กลัวตาย หนีไปสร้าง “เมืองนก” ที่อยู่ห่างแสนไกล ๆ เมื่อนั้น ทหารฝ่ายเรา อันมี
เจ้าไขฟ้า ผู้ปกครอง เมืองแลมหลวง พลศึกของพวกเรา ได้ยึดเอาวัวควาย มาเป็นจำนวน
มาก / ทั้ง..... พลศึกเราก็นำมาเป็นจำนวนมาก แล้วก็กลับไป (กวาดต้อนมา) 300 คน
เลยทีเดียว พร้อมทั้งวัว ควาย ช้าง เอาลัดป่าเข้าสู่เมือง / พวกใครพวกมัน กองทหารทุก หมู่
ทุกคน ได้รับเอาเครื่องครวลิ้อ แล้วก็กลับไปสู่เรือนของตน ส่วนคนฝ่ายฟ้าเชียงรุ่งทั้งหลาย
อันเป็นคนที่เรา (เมืองแลม) เอามา ก็ไม่ประหารชีวิตสักคน ขุนหลวงหอกคำ
ปลงอาชญาให้ปล่อยเขากลับคืนบ้านเมือง ไม่ได้ประหารสักคน ละเว้นชีวิตเสีย / เมื่อถึง
เวลาเวียนครบปีเมืองหม้า มาถึง ศักราช 1169 ตัว ไม่นานนัก ยามนั้น ขุนหาญ เจ้าน้ำหน่อ
เป็นผู้บังคับบัญชา มหาเสนาฟ้าอำมาตย์ “หลายหน่อ”เมืองแลม จึงมาพร้อมกันส่งเอา
เจ้าหม่อมจัน ใจหวาน ไปถึงเมืองหลวงแสนยี่ ฟ้า / ให้ไปเป็นหอกคำ (ผู้ปกครอง) อยู่มาได้
ไม่นาน เจ้าพลายขาว (ช้างเผือก?) กาวิละ ฝ่ายตะวันออก ก็หนีกลับไปแล้ว เมื่อนั้น
มหาวังสะฟ้าเจ้าหม่อมบุญเรือง หนีออกจากหอกคำมาสู่เมืองคน มั่นขุน หนีไปเข้ากับ ขุน
นางพม่าและเงินทันที จึงได้เป็น “เจ้าแสนยี่ฟ้า” ครองเมืองมา

The Tai chronicle of Moeng Laem quoted above makes the explicit claim that

³⁹ He might be Tao Thai Khang or Cao Mò m Maha Wang (*r.* 1802–1817). Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 65) mention that, in CS 1169, Northern Thailand launched a military campaign against Sipsòng Panna; the troops from Lampang “attacked Sipsòng Panna again and deported a number of Lü family to Lampang and Chiang Mai.” Tao Thai Khang was first appointed Regent Pacification Commissioner by the Qing court and then conferred as *cao fa* by Burma. However, his nephew, Tao Sunwu (Dao Shengwu) or Cao Maha Nò i (*r.* 1802–1833), was considered the official ruler of Sipsòng Panna; this matter later caused a throne war (1819–1834). For more details, see *Ibid.* (82, 180, 185, 186, 189, 326).

Moeng Laem destroyed Sipsòng Panna in 1807. Furthermore, Moeng Laem collaborated with Sipsòng Panna’s military commander to install Mòm Can as king. It appears that Mòm Can subsequently became ungrateful and betrayed Moeng Laem, colluding first with “Kawila” and later with Burma and China. Mòm Can represented Burma, received backing from Burma, and battled alongside his nephew for the crown.⁴⁰

Why did the *cao fa* of Moeng Laem, Dao Pai Gong, wish to ask for help from Moeng Yang? As conflicts arose between the Tai and Lahu in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Chapter Five will offer further information. However, he was too impetuous and then was killed by the Tai Khün “bandits en route to Moeng Yang”.⁴¹ It is worth noting that the MLCL2 version of the manuscript chronicle does not mention the fact that the tally coupon was lost because, according to the native officials’ regulations of the Qing court, this would have meant that subsequent native officials could not have succeeded to the throne. The governor of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, named Bolin (伯麟 *r.* 1804–1820), later sent a note to Burma and Siam asking them to recover the tally coupon.

In 1806, the ruler of Kawila (Chiang Mai) returned Moeng Laem’s tally coupon.⁴² According to the MLCL1,⁴³ in CS 1186 (1824), the Wa ruler of Manleng (Mang Lön, see Chapter Six) infiltrated Moeng Laem territory several times with troops. He sought to occupy the Munai silver mine. However, the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Pai Min, expelled them all. Based on Achan Chaichün’s summary and transcription, MLCL2 (Folios 9) records this occurrence as follows:

In a *kap san* year, CS 1183 (CE1821), a ruler of a large city named Mang Loen (Müang Loen or Manglön) stirred up people [...] The enemy troops were defeated; our troops chased and fought against them (i.e., the hill people) [...] The king of Müang Laem then assigned Prince Luang who was a smart person to lead the army of Cao (nobleman) Nga Ma [...] The enemy were killed with swords and spears [...] The enemy troops could not resist our force and eventually were crushed. They crossed the Khong River (Salween River) to escape to distant places, but our troops followed and killed them at the river [...] After haven taken an oath of allegiance, he (Prince Luang) took all the captives back to the müang (Müang Laem). Accordingly, several city rulers greatly respected us, and Müang Laem became more pleasant than other müang.

ปีกบสัน จ.ศ.1183 เจ้าปกครองถิ่นกว้าง ชื่อว่า มังเลน (เมืองเลน) ก่อความไม่สงบขึ้น...ศึกเขาแตกกระจาย ศึกเราไล่ตามรบ...พระเจ้าหลวงเมืองแลม จึงมีคำสั่ง ให้เจ้าชายหลวง ผู้หลักแหลม จลาต นาเอกกลุ่มศึก เจ้างมัว ...ใช้ดาบฆ่าฟันกัน ใช้หอกฆ่าแทงกัน...ศึกฝ่ายเขาสู้ ทนไม่ได้ แตกกระจายกัน หนีข้ามแม่น้ำคง (แม่น้ำสาละวิน) ไป

⁴⁰ For more details, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 62).

⁴¹ See Appendix Chapter Three, T3 for a detailed description of this process.

⁴² MLXFS, 26.

⁴³ That is *The History of the Tai people in Moeng Laem*. See Yin Lun and Daniels et al. (2010, 15).

ไกล สึกฝายเรา ไล่ฆ่าพันถึงฝั่งแม่น้ำคง...หลังจากพวกเขาให้ความปฏิกูญามแล้ว พระองค์ (เจ้าชายหลวง) กวาดต้อนเอาข้าศึกทั้งหมด กลับถึงพระนคร (เมืองแถม) ผล ทำให้ เจ้าเมืองหลายหัวเมือง ก็มีสัมมาคารวะกับเรามาก ทำให้เมืองแถม เป็นเมืองน่าอยู่ กว่าดินหัวเมืองอื่น

I assume that the scribe made a mistake concerning the year CS 1183. It should be the year CS 1186. The original manuscript of the last page (before the year CS 1183) mentions a year CS 1185. According to the customs of chronicle writing, historical events are written in chronological order. The scribe might have documented these incorrectly. This record pertains to the fighting between Moeng Laem and Mang Lön; however, at this time, they still regularly engaged in intermarriages.⁴⁴ The army from Mang Lön were killed with the swords and spears by the troop led by the Prince of Moeng Laem.

This was a relatively typical model of relations between the polities in Mainland Southeast Asia. This kind of competition for land and resources while simultaneously maintaining relationships through intermarriage was a common practice during the entire era of a system based on personal relations rather than bureaucratic structure. Competition for land and human resources was due to the greed of local rulers. Intermarriage between groups was more or less a result of kinship and religious and cultural commonalities.⁴⁵ This kind of intimate and contradictory relationship is an aspect that cannot be bypassed when studying Tai polities in Mainland Southeast Asia.

In the Chiang Tung Chronicle, Moeng Laem and other Tai polities had maintained a close relationship with Chiang Tung since the seventeenth century. As the JTSC Sāimöng Mangrāi (1981, 249) records:

In the year Rongpau [Sakkarāja 963], the southerners were coming to war, but at Jengdau, Nared [Nares ?] fell from an elephant and died, and they ran away. [...] At that time Lü, Laem (Moeng Laem), Mengbong, and Ava each came to attend the consecration ceremony of the title Dhammikarājā because Saturn was uccā; Venus was the fertile field. The Mangtarā adopted [Dhammikarājā] as a son, loving him more than all lords and princes.

Sakkarāja or “Sakkhād” refers here to the Burmese calendar, also called the “minor era” or Culasararāja (CS), which starts with 639 CE as year 1.⁴⁶ Therefore, the year Sakkarāja 963 should be added to 638 to determine the CE year, which is 1601. This document indicates that the Tai Lü (Sipsòng Panna) and Moeng Laem attended the consecration ceremony of a son of the Mangtara (a generic term used for Burmese kings), called Dhammikarājā.⁴⁷ It can be seen as evidence of Chiang Tung and Moeng

⁴⁴ Manleng in Chinese records. See Chapter Five for the relationship between Moeng Laem and Mang Lön.

⁴⁵ As Li Jing (*b.* 1251–?) addressed in YNZL, cited in Lin Chaomin (2005, 106–113). The last section of this chapter will provide more details.

⁴⁶ For more details, see Sao Sāimöng (1981, 4–12).

⁴⁷ It is written as ဝိဇ္ဇာ-ရာဇာ in Burmese and means “lord” or “ruler.” I thank Mr. Ai’sheng, a Burmese language specialist at Honghe University, for this explanation.

Laem's intimate relationship.

According to the records of “Moeng Laem Ahalameng,”⁴⁸ in the year CS 1244 (1882), the ruler of Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung) gathered armed forces from Moeng Yang and Moeng Lei to invade Moeng Laem. The Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Pai Hua, sent troops to intercept them in an area along the southern border. The war was waged intermittently until CS 1246 (1884), when Moeng Khün was defeated and forced to retreat, finally ending the war. Later, on 16 October 1890, a British expedition set off from Mandalay and went to Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna to investigate the situation there. On the way, they bribed the ruler of Mang Lön and persuaded him to join forces with the British to investigate Moeng Laem.⁴⁹ The more complex historical relationship between Mang Lön and Moeng Laem will be discussed in Chapter Five.

Moeng Laem was officially supported by the Qing court. Indeed, the Qing court's strategy regarding the territories on the west bank of the Mekong River revolved around Moeng Laem, Sipsòng Panna, and Kүng Ma. The Qing court needed to guard these border areas to ensure the safety of the hinterland under the complete control of the Qing court. Therefore, politically, the Qing court showed more tolerance towards native officers on the frontiers and granted them wide-ranging autonomous powers, which basically meant not interfering in their internal affairs. The court also intended to “teach” them through the propagation of Confucianism. The frontier native officers were only required to resist when the Burmese invaded.

The Qing court even acquiesced in an unwritten provision that the *cao fa* of Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna were simultaneously approved by both the Burmese and the Qing court (for details, see Chapter Five). These instances can be called, as described in the last section: “Chinese-Burmese condominiums.”⁵⁰ They continued until the British occupied Burma in its entirety following three Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1885) and Burma became a province of British India. Therefore, Moeng Laem survived, caught between Burma and the Qing court, culturally and politically influenced by the Burmese, while concomitantly engaged in a tributary relationship with the Qing court.

The Qing court also acted as a mediator of Moeng Laem's internal ethnic conflicts and protected it from external forces. In brief, the Qing court was responsible for protecting Moeng Laem's borders and ensuring its security. Nonetheless, the influence of the Qing court and its attempts at integrating Moeng Laem were not as significant at this stage as in Kүng Ma and Moeng Bò, especially in terms of cultural education. Later, Moeng Laem was gradually influenced by Han culture after the communist

⁴⁸ Significant local events in Moeng Laem. This manuscript was mentioned in MLXZ (1999, 224).

⁴⁹ MLXZ (1999, 224).

⁵⁰ Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 49). See also Grabowsky (1998, 41–49).

takeover of Yunnan in the 1950s.

4.2.3 The Relationship between Küng Ma/Moeng Ting/China and Southeast Asia

The relationship between Moeng Laem/Küng Ma/Moeng Ting/China and Southeast Asia has a long history dating back to the Ming dynasty period. We need to look through the Chinese historical records and the Tai manuscript records to summarise the connection between those polities and trace the historical events. Therefore, to examine the relationship between the regions, we must not only explain the historical development context from a micro-perspective but also from a macro-perspective, to understand local history from the perspective of the Qing court's borderland integration policies and the relations among the states.

Initially, Moeng Ting and Moeng Laem were under the control of Luchuan. They were robbed and invaded by Luchuan forces regularly. According to MS, when Si Renfa⁵¹ became even more unruly and aggressive. He invaded Jingdong (today Pu'er Prefecture), killed the Sub-prefect of Dahou (大侯知州), Dao Feng Han and others, a total of over one thousand people, and defeated Menglai and various villages. The Aboriginal Offices, such as the Moeng Laem Chief's Office surrendered to him.⁵²

From the Ming court's perspective, the Chinese tried to pacify all the old tributary regions of Luchuan. The relationship between Moeng Laem/Moeng Ting/Luchuan and the Ming court was like a seesaw. The Ming court acted as an arbiter for the Tai polities who were constantly in conflict with each other.

These historical relationships were explained in MS: During the Ming dynasty, Moeng Laem and Moeng Ting were all Luchuan-owned domains, but they were feuding due to annexation of each other's lands. Emperor Xuande ordered the Duke of Mu Sheng (木晟 *b.* 1368–1439) to pacify Moeng Laem and Moeng Ting and return annexed lands. However, during the 1436–1449 Luchuan revolt, Moeng Ting's aboriginal prefect (土知府) Dao Lu Meng absconded, and the native official of Moeng Phòng, Kham Ge, gained merit after joining the campaign against Luchuan. Supreme Commander Wang Ji (*b.* 1378–1460) requested that Moeng Ting's land be granted as a fiefdom to Kham Ge of Moeng Phòng. This marked a significant shift in the Ming dynasty's history.⁵³

From the mid-sixteenth until the seventeenth century, the relationship between these two Tai polities remained tense. Conflicts and wars happened regularly. The

⁵¹ Hso Wen Hpa in Tai; Tho Ngan Bwa in Burmese.

⁵² Summarised from Mingshi, chapter. 314, *liezhuan* 202, Yunnan *tusi*, 2, and chapter. 27, pp. 8117. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 8.

⁵³ Summarised from Mingshi, vol. 313, *liezhuan* 210, Yunnan *tusi* 1, pp. 8082. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 9.

Ming Shi (MS) records that: during the Ming dynasty, Kham Lie of Moeng Phòng conquered Kūng Ma and seized its agricultural products. In 1584, Kham Ge became prefect and Moeng Ting Prefecture was given an official seal by the Ming court. After Chongzhen's reign (1628–1644), Moeng Ting rebelled and surrendered to Burma. In 1584, the Ming court included Kūng Ma as a Pacification Commission, with Men Kham as its Pacification Commissioner. After Men Kham's death, his younger brother Kham Jin held the seal and was praised by the Ming court. The *cao fa* Sili of Moeng Phòng invaded Wandian (Moeng Ya, present-day Baoshan City) and Zhengkang with Kham Jin's help. Burmese forces were diverted to attack Kham Jin, who bribed them. Later, Kūng Ma and Moeng Phòng fought constantly.⁵⁴

Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma were rich in mineral resources, and they possessed fertile land, which made them attractive to great powers such as Burma and China. From the mid-Ming until the Qing dynasty, Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna not only paid tribute to the Chinese imperial court, but also had to pay tribute to Burma. Kūng Ma paid tribute to the Ming and Qing courts and taxes to Burma. These taxes, so-called *huamali* (花馬禮) in Chinese, were gifts of flowers and horses.

Moreover, the *cao fa* successors of Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna had been approved by Burma as well. As Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 49) point out, Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna were influenced by Burma and the Chinese dynasties for centuries, and the “Chinese-Burmese condominiums” lasted for over three centuries. According to a local Tai metaphor in Moeng Laem, China was regarded as father and Burma as mother.⁵⁵

The “Chinese-Burmese condominiums” lasted until Burma was completely conquered by the British and the country became part of British India. Southwest Yunnan, which was close to the Burmese sphere of influence, was mainly influenced politically and culturally by the Burmese. The Qing court knew that several native officials had paid tribute to Burma, but they could not stop these activities as their military influence was limited in Southwest Yunnan.⁵⁶ The Qing court had no alternative but to recognise Burma's influence in these areas and agreed to the “condominium system,” as the Qing court lacked sufficient means to enforce exclusive suzerainty over the Tai polities.⁵⁷

According to QSG, the Shunning Prefecture of Moeng Ting, Moeng Laem, Kūng

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ For more details on this metaphor, see Grabowsky (2008, 31).

⁵⁶ For more details, see Yang Yuda and Yang Huifang (2004, 72–80).

⁵⁷ Myint-U (2006, 100–103) describes this situation: Many tiny Native Officials (chieftainships) and principalities in Southwest Province were eager to maintain “de facto independence from Kunming and the Burmese kingdom on the other side.” They were obliged to pay tribute to both sides because they needed to survive under these two great powers.

Ma, and Pu'er of Cheli (Sipsòng Panna), along with the Bolong (De'ang), Yangzi (Karen), Yeren (Kachin), Gendu (?), Kawa (Wa), and Puyi (?) tribes, were represented by diverse native officials. The individuals cohabited and did not possess Burmese. Many individuals were reliant on the Burmese. The Native Officials gave the traditional Hua Ma Li (tributes of rice and money) as a tribute to Burma. This ritual was abolished because of Burmese domestic strife. Alaungpaya (spelt in Chinese Wengjiya (甕藉牙, *r.* 1753–1760) and his son (Xin Biaoxin, namely Hsinbyushin, *r.* 1763–1776) wanted to revive the tributes from those small polities.⁵⁸ Various native officials ignored it. Weng Jiya sent troops to harass those polities, starting with Pu'er. The Burmese first sent Dao Paixin, the elder brother of Dao Paixian, who returned from Ava to Moeng Laem, to lobby for money and supplies in the winter of 1764. Furthermore, the headman of Moeng Phòng, Bubula, along with Kham Hei, were summoned to Kūng Ma in order to address and rectify their conduct. E'ertai persuaded Sipsòng Panna to submit in 1729. After the territory was surrendered, the Pu'er prefecture was founded, and Sipsòng Panna was under its supervision. Previously, the Burmese sought rice, or property, taxes, and tribute.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, Kūng Ma was treated differently from Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna, although it still had to pay taxes like Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna. The failure of E'ertai's attempt to annex Sipsòng Panna, abolish the *cao fa*, and appoint regular imperial officials as administrators is one reason that the Burmese continued to exact "rice" from the Sipsòng Panna rulers during the eighteenth century.⁶⁰

However, the *cao fa* successors of Kūng Ma were not officially approved by Burma. In this case, Kūng Ma was more independent from Burma than Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna. Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna exercised less autonomy, as their polities were controlled by Burma to a certain extent. However, during the Qing dynasty, only the *cao fa* of Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem still paid annual tributes and taxes to Burma. In 1762, Burma attacked Kūng Ma, and the Kūng Ma *cao fa* Kham Guo Kai claimed: "Previously we went abroad to purchase and transport elephants, we did give Burma silk and horses as presents. This is a normal etiquette of social intercourse, but now the practice has been discontinued for many years."⁶¹

⁵⁸ Woodside (2002, 264) also mentioned that: "In 1765–1766 King Hsinbyushin of Burma demanded tribute from a trans-Salween Shan state whose hereditary native officer (t'u-ssu) was currently serving Ch'ing, but which had a past history of vassalage to Burma." This event directly triggered the Sino-Burmese War.

⁵⁹ Summarised from *Qing shigao*, vol. 528, liezhuan 315, shuguo, 3, pp. 14,663 (Beijing: Zhongguo shuju 1976). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 10.

⁶⁰ For E'ertai's failure to annex Sipsòng Panna, see Daniels "Upland Peoples and the 1729 Qing Annexation of the Tai Polity of Sipsong Panna, Yunnan: Disintegration from the Periphery," in Geoff Wade and James K. Chin (eds), *China and Southeast Asia: Historical Interactions* (London and New York, 2019), pp. 188–217.

⁶¹ National Palace Museum of Taiwan. ed. 1987 repr. *Palace Midrange Rescript Memorials of Qianlong Regime*, vol. 17, on 3 Month 3, Qianlong year 28, "The memorials from the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou Wu Dashan

Therefore, for Kūng Ma, the political significance of Hua Ma Li was weaker than for Sipsòng Panna and other places. Hua Ma Li was a special tax that Kūng Ma had to submit to Burma at regular intervals. Even the political implications of the annual taxes seemed to have been weaker than for Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem, and the Hua Ma Li was relatively burdensome for Kūng Ma. The Rites and Taxes Stub-Books of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission were written in Lik script, originally on Gongchuan paper (a material made from bamboo) and recopied in 1921. However, it is unknown in which year they were first created. The eleventh article of this manuscript records in detail the tributary gifts to Burma.⁶² Moreover, Kūng Ma also had to pay tribute to the Chinese Empire. The tributary taxes were taken as labour taxes and mineral taxes. As recorded in twelfth article of The Rites and Taxes Stub-Books of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission, the tributary taxes were taken in the form of labour and minerals.⁶³ The total numbers submitted to Burma and China can be seen below in table T8.⁶⁴

T8: Taxes paid to Burma and China by Kūng Ma's *cao fa*

GJDC (2012, 123, 310–311)

Unit: *liang*

Each year	Burma	China
Gold	24.2	None
Silver	91.2	39.2
Products	Many different products whose price cannot be calculated	None
Extra taxes	No record	Silver Mine: 504
Total (Silver)	284.8+Products	543.2
Remarks	Silver <i>liang</i> =gold*8, therefore: 24.2*8+91.2	in the low taxes range

According to this table, we can make a rough estimate of the taxes that Kūng Ma had to pay to Burma and China. The tribute paid is relatively high: for China, it was 543.2 *liang* per year; for Burma, it was 284.8 *liang* per year plus many different products, which may have been even more expensive than the silver tribute. In total, Kūng Ma roughly paid over 1000 *liang* per year to the Qing court and Burma. This

and the Viceroy of Yunnan Liu Zao.” The original text is as follows: “從前因往外域辦解象只，有送緬甸鍛馬禮物，此乃酬酢常情，現已停止多年。”

⁶² GJDC (2012, 123 and 310). For the original text, see Appendix, Chapter Four, No. 11.

⁶³ GJDC (2012, 311). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 12. Besides, it is a regular occurrence. The specific timing is not mentioned in the original text.

⁶⁴ The data is summarised from GJDC (2012, 123, 310–311).

might account for around one-tenth or one-ninth of Kūng Ma's income. As The Stub-Book of Etiquettes and Taxes of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission⁶⁵ records: the 9 *moeng* of Kūng Ma had to pay a silver tax of 3190 *liang* in total, exclusive of provisions. As to the other products, the number was around 9000 *liang*, excluding provisions. The 9 *moeng* and 13 *khwaen*, as well as the Wa, Tai, Han and other ethnic groups, had to pay taxes of 12,280 *liang* in total. I still feel that Kūng Ma's tribute to Burma and the Qing court burdened Kūng Ma to some extent since the value of the products sent to Burma cannot be precisely measured.

Nevertheless, tribute from native officials was seen as symbolic when compared to the substantial expenses incurred by the Qing court in Yunnan. The cost of governance in the remote border areas was much higher than the taxes that the court collected from other parts of Yunnan.⁶⁶ Therefore, as a semi-independent polity, Kūng Ma enjoyed political preferences without paying a high economic price. To obtain more political support and to take the initiative in the fight against Moeng Ting, Kūng Ma tried to serve as a mediator between China and Burma. The Qing court's attitude, as documented in Chinese archives, displayed a rather Sinocentric perspective. Nevertheless, the Burmese disagreed. Kung Ma acted as a mediator between Burma and China to arrange a situation where the Burmese side seemed to be paying tribute.

The QSG records that following the end of the Sino-Burmese War (1765–1769), in 1787, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* forwarded a memorial from Burma to the Qing court in Qianlong pointing out that Moeng Phòng is on the opposite bank of the Kunlong River and that King Bodawpaya (*r.* 1782–1819) of Burma had requested permission to pay tribute. The memorial states that Bodawpaya recognised the wrongdoing of his father and son, and now he wanted to pledge loyalty and pay tribute. However, tensions with Siam and the transfer and construction of the new city left him no time for tribute concerns. Now that Burma was tranquil, King Bodawpaya sent his headmen with a memorial to pay tribute, as was customary. The king was officially conferred as Burmese king by the Qing court in 1789 on the condition that tribute was sent once every ten years. Consequently, the Burmese did not cause any trouble in the southwest.⁶⁷

This record shows that Burma wanted to repair its relationship with China,⁶⁸ and they chose Kūng Ma as the intermediary. The Kūng Ma *cao fa* was willing to serve as a mediator because it would strengthen his political status in the eyes of both Burma

⁶⁵ Namely *Kūng Ma Xuanfu Si Liyi Kefu Dibo*: 耿馬宣撫司禮儀課賦底簿. GJDC (2012, 296).

⁶⁶ For more details, see the following section.

⁶⁷ Summarised from *QSG* (1976, chapter 528, p. 14680). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 13.

⁶⁸ Since Burma did not want to fight against Siam and China simultaneously. For more details, see Dai Yingcong (2004, 145–189).

and China. In this case, Moeng Ting was not mentioned. Concerning the many conflicts between Burma and China that occurred before, the Moeng Ting *cao fa* either ran away or responded negatively, and even united with Moeng Phòng's *cao fa* to fight against China. It can be seen that the Moeng Ting *cao fa* was not very enthusiastic about engaging relations with China. This negative attitude of the Moeng Ting *cao fa* strengthened the position of the Kūng Ma *cao fa*.

4.2.4 The Relationship between Moeng Bò and China

As mentioned above, the Jinggu (Moeng Bò) Dai and Yi Autonomous County is administratively attached to Pu'er Prefecture, Yunnan Province. Geographically, Moeng Bò is located between Sipsòng Panna and Dehong and is also situated between Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem. The Tai polity of Luchuan was situated farther to the north. In addition, Moeng Bò/Kūng Ma and Shuangjiang are located at almost the same latitude (see M1).

The official Chinese name of Moeng Bò was Weiyuan (威遠), which literally means “projecting imperial might far and wide.”⁶⁹ It is evident that Moeng Bò was a remote place when the Yuan ruler conquered Yunnan, a place to which the emperor wanted to extend his power. However, the regular tributary relationship between Moeng Bò and the court started in the Ming dynasty. Moeng Bò is another Tai Nüa settlement area in Yunnan province, and it has held a favourable location since the time of the Nanzhao Kingdom. The Nanzhao Kingdom had once established Kainan Prefecture with the intention to control Southwestern Yunnan (Simao/Sipsòng Panna) and northern Laos. In the Yuan dynasty, Moeng Bò was established as Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture and was administered by Yuanjiang Prefecture, as Kunming was the capital of Yunnan Province since the Yuan dynasty. Therefore, Moeng Bò has been an essential crossroads between Xieng-Mai (Chiang Mai), Laos, and Bangala⁷⁰ since the Nanzhao period.⁷¹

Moreover, the ambitions of the Tai Federation of Luchuan (Moeng Mao) resulted in its territorial expansion in Yunnan, when it tried to control Moeng Bò and other small Tai polities. In this context, for its own safety, Moeng Bò chose to stand with the Ming court against the Tai Federation of Luchuan. As the Ming court could not control Moeng Bò directly but could afford the political support for Moeng Bò against their

⁶⁹ WYTZ (2016, preface, 5).

⁷⁰ The so-called *Ban jiaci* or *Guci* in Chinese. Fang Guoyu et al. (eds), vol.3 (1998, 139) believed that Bangala is Pegu and was located in Talang. However, Antoine Henry Joseph Charignon (his Chinese name is Sha Haiang [沙海昂]) believed Bangala should be placed in Pagan. For more details, see Marco Polo, Antoine Joseph Henri Charignon annotated, and Feng Chengjun translated (1999, 460).

⁷¹ Fang Guoyu et al. (eds.), vol.3 (1998, 220)

enemies. Hence, the Ming court was a better choice for Moeng Bò.

Moeng Bò was regarded as the central route connecting Tai Nüa and the Tai Lü districts. As a fertile place and offering an essential corridor to Southwestern Yunnan and northern Laos, Moeng Bò had a complicated relationship with adjacent places. Nevertheless, Moeng Bò started being integrated by the Chinese dynasties in the mid-Qing dynasty after the *gaitu guiliu* policy. WYTZ (2016, 1–24) clearly states that Weiyuan was an extreme border area, but also a military fort, which was inhabited by different ethnic groups.

4.3 The Impact of Chinese Borderland Policy

4.3.1 The Concept of Borderland Integration

As described in Chapter One, the Chinese dynasties first advocated the *jimi* system and later the native official (*tuguan/tusi*) system, which was a policy imposed by the imperial authorities on the borderlands, to control the non-Han areas (ethnic districts) more efficiently. During the Qing dynasty, the Qing court began to expand its power in mineral-rich and remote regions because of the economic benefits. As a result of the Green Standard Army's⁷² inability to adapt to the climate on the west bank of the Mekong River, the Qing court was eventually compelled to abandon stations on the west bank of the Mekong River (Sipsòng Panna, Moeng Laem, etc.). Nevertheless, the Qing court made attempts to unite them through so-called borderland integration (i.e., the education, military, and administrative system).

Borderland integration means a process in which frontier ethnic groups gradually become orientated towards the Chinese inland in terms of politics, economy, and culture.⁷³ It refers to the process whereby the inland of the Chinese Empire actively and directly influenced ethnic areas.⁷⁴ Moreover, borderland integration comprised a Qing court administrative method that tried to unify the border areas through political, economic, and cultural integration. Judging from the historical changes that occurred in the Tai Nüa polities during the late Qing dynasty, the administration tended to be unified among the Tai polities. The elites of ethnic groups gradually participated in the Chinese imperial administrative system.

The Yuan court adopted the Pacification Commission (native officials, the so-called *tuguan*) system to manage the control over remote areas. The Ming and Qing courts also retained their system and refined it to pacify non-Han areas. Moreover, to integrate the ethnic groups and annex the territory of the borderlands, the Ming and

⁷² A military system established in the Qing dynasty. The following section will provide more details.

⁷³ See Su De (2001, 1–12).

⁷⁴ See Zhou Qiong (2008, 75–82).

Qing tried to abolish the positions of native officers (*tusi*) who made mistakes or replace them with regular Chinese officers. As a consequence, a number of military and cultural policies were implemented in pre-native official areas, which, taken together, constituted the so-called process of borderland integration. This means the rulers believed that the “*Siyi*”⁷⁵ areas that entered the administrative division of Chinese dynasties were incorporated in “China.”

From the perspectives of the Ming and Qing dynasties, Yunnan should be under the Chinese dynasties’ jurisdiction. To this end, both dynasties tried to integrate Yunnan, especially the remote region in the southwest, into the inland. Such as the three Tai Nüa polities of the Upper Mekong River–Moeng Laem/Küing Ma and Moeng Bò. However, we must notice that the religious (Theravada Buddhist) culture of the Tai Nüa polities was still heavily influenced by Burma and Northern Thailand (Lan Na).

The next part will talk about the borderland policies that the Chinese dynasties pushed on Tai Nüa polities and how Tai Nüa polities responded, namely, how the Tai polities attempted to obtain “benefits” amid a conundrum.

4.3.2 The Borderland Integration in Moeng Laem

Demographic Changes

Moeng Laem’s border integration was weak compared to that of Moeng Bò and Küing Ma. This remained the case even after Moeng Laem’s rapid vow of fealty to the Qing court upon its conquest of Yunnan. Yet, the Qing court did not fully claim Moeng Laem, either administratively or culturally, until the southern stretch of the Yunnan-Burma boundary was established (see Chapter Six). This section will examine the evolution of the interaction between the region and the Chinese dynasties in order to shed light on Moeng Laem’s process of borderland integration.

British intelligence William Warry (1854–1936), who was sent to Upper Burma and Southwest Yunnan during the late nineteenth century, described the Chinese influence in Moeng Laem as follows:

We found Chinese soldiers helping the Lems (i.e., the Tai of Moeng Laem) on the frontier itself; there were Chinese settlers or visitors at many of the villages; the architecture of the Buddhist temples and of the Sawbwa’s⁷⁶ palace was Chinese in design; Chinese tables and stools and many other household appliances were in general use; and the currency in the Meunglem (Moeng Laem) bazaar was silver sycee as in China, rupees being accepted only by weight. On all hands there was something to remind one of China, and there was scarcely a trace of Burmese influence in the State [...] so overpowering

⁷⁵ *Siyi*: the “barbarians” from the four corners of the Chinese imperial territory. For further interpretation, see Chapter Six: *Tian zi shou zai si yi*.

⁷⁶ A Burmese term, it is called *cao fa* in Tai, which means the local ruler.

was the Chinese atmosphere at Meunglem that at our first interview with the Sawbwa my Chinese clerk in reply to the usual polite question promptly gave a false name and address [...].⁷⁷

In his report, Warry documents that Moeng Laem was under the influence of Chinese authorities and Chinese culture. He does so by describing the Chinese soldiers guarding Moeng Laem's frontiers, Chinese visitors, and Chinese settlers already residing in many villages in Moeng Laem. From the perspective of a Western colonial intelligence officer, Warry's description seems to be reasonable. We cannot deny that Moeng Laem was under the control of the Qing court, and there were a number of Chinese visitors and settlers living there. However, it has come to my attention, based on my fieldwork conducted in the years 2012, 2017, 2018, and 2023, that the cultural manifestation of the Tai community in Moeng Laem suggests a lesser degree of influence from Chinese culture than is implied by Warry's report. Second, the *cao fa* was still considered the true ruler of Moeng Laem, even after the power of the ROC had extended to Moeng Laem in the twentieth century.

Therefore, I surmise that Warry accidentally visited villages that were inhabited by significant numbers of Han migrants. Second, I tentatively suggest that Han migrants to Moeng Laem might have acculturated into local society adopting the culture of the Tai or other people, while also imparting aspects of Han culture that influenced Tai culture, too. That means both cultures influenced each other in the region that Warry visited.

Moreover, the *gaitu guiliu* was never implemented in Moeng Laem. This is why there are fewer horizontal inscribed boards in Moeng Laem than in Moeng Bò (see next two sections). Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the Chinese authorities already considered Moeng Laem as part of Chinese territory from the late nineteenth century. Here, for instance, the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, Cen Yuying (r. 1884–1889), submits a request (on 16 March 1887) to the emperor to protect Cheli and other frontier regions from foreign incursions:

(Guangxu 13, the 2nd lunar month, 22nd days), there were Europeans who wanted to send troops to invade Menggen (Chiang Tung), Menglian (Moeng Laem), Zhengqian (Chiang Khaeng) and Cheli (Sipsong Panna), the four places, and so forth. [...] [A memorial was] forwarded [to the Qing court] imploring [His Majesty] to send troops to defend Cheli so as to suppress and strengthen the frontiers, and other matters were mentioned.⁷⁸

(光緒十三年二月二十二日), 有洋人要發兵來占猛艮、孟連、整欠、車里四處等語。..... 懇請派兵防守車里, 以資鎮壓而固邊圉等情前來。

This could explain why Warry saw Chinese soldiers guarding Moeng Laem's

⁷⁷ From W. Warry, Esp., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, -No. 9, dated Bhamo, the 15th June 1891.

⁷⁸ Cen Yuying (2005, 411).

frontiers in 1891, as Cen Yuying made his request for troops in 1887.⁷⁹ This dispatch of soldiers was an attempt by the Qing dynasty to prevent Western colonial powers from invading the southwestern frontier. It was also an attempt by the Qing court to integrate the military into the Western regions of the Mekong River, including Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna. However, with the further weakening of the Qing dynasty due to internal and external unrest, such measures could not truly realise the integration of border areas. The *cao fa* of Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna were still the *de facto* rulers of their local societies.

Furthermore, a record in the Tai manuscript elucidated upon the numbers of Han migrants already integrated into the local society, specifying that the total number of Han households was so small an amount that they were bracketed in the blanket category of “other” ethnic groups. This revelation provides ground for further research.

The local Gazetteer records document and tracks population fluctuations over the past decade or thereabouts. In 2004, the Tai people’s population accounted for a total population of around 22.4 percent, Lahu was 28.7 percent, Wa was 24.4 percent, Han was 14.8 percent, and other ethnic groups were 0.7 percent.⁸⁰ The latest data was from 2010 when the Tai people’s population accounted for a total population of around 18.85 percent, Lahu was 28.13 percent, Wa was 20.31 percent, Han was 20.99 percent, and other ethnic groups were 11.72 percent.⁸¹ Between the years 2004 and 2010, the whole population of Moeng Laem witnessed a growth of around 9000 individuals, with half of this rise attributed to the Han Chinese demographic. Therefore, even though the proportion of population of Tai and Wa is decreasing, their actual number are increasing. The number of Han is increasing due to Han Chinese migrating to Moeng Laem for business, work, or resettlement.⁸² It should be noted that it is challenging to find demographic data recording the number of Han Chinese living in Moeng Laem before the 1950s.

Nonetheless, I assume that: first, the demographic weight of Han Chinese was lower than in present times; and secondly, Han migrants were integrated into the local society. Prior to the 1950s, the demographic data of other ethnic groups were listed in Tai documents. The demographic data of other ethnic groups according to the Statistics of the Household (only for taxpayers) of Moeng Laem Sub-Pacification Commission, so-called: เมืองแลมเจ้าหอคำ มีกำหื้อหลังเรือนหนึ่ง and เมืองแลมเจ้าหอคำ มีกำหื้อหลังเรือนสอง (*Müang Laem Cao Hò Kham Mi Ka Hü Lang Rüan Nüing and Müang Laem Cao Hò*

⁷⁹ Another possible explanation is that the Qing court sent the troops to assist Moeng Laem in suppressing Lahu rebellions during the nineteenth century. For more details see Chapter Five.

⁸⁰ This data is summarised from MLGK (2008, 6).

⁸¹ This data is summarised from MLXZ 1978–2010 (2019, 59–60).

⁸² *Ibid.*, 56–66.

Kham Mi Ka Hü Lang Rüan Sòng) extracted from the original Tham script manuscripts are outlined in the T9 and T10 below.⁸³

T9: Demographic Data of Moeng Laem in the 1920s from Tai manuscript

Unit: Household

Unit People	Households	%	Remarks
Tai	4386	92.24%	These statistics were created for the Moeng Laem <i>cao fa</i> to collect taxes. The surveyed areas were controlled by the Moeng Laem <i>cao fa</i> , most of which were inhabited by Tai people.
Kha	At least 369	7.76%	The number of Kha should be higher, as the demography for Moeng Ma (989 households) and Moeng Nga (482 households) counts both Kha and Tai together in this manuscript. If Moeng Ma and Moeng Nga had the same statistics or less Kha than in 1943, the Kha should count at least around 20%.
Total	4755	100%	The majority of the household registration focuses on the Tai and certain Kha residing in the same regions as the Tai. It is worth mentioning that the Han Chinese population is not encompassed within this register, but rather accounted for separately.

The summary of the population statistics of Moeng Laem shows the total number of households in seventy-five villages and larger clusters of villages. It seems that these settlements were mostly inhabited by Tai. In fifteen cases, the number of households is specified by providing the additional numbers of ethnic “Kha” households; in three cases, the “generic” term Kha (for non-Tai hill people) is specified (e.g., Musoe/Lahu and Ruya). If we add up all households listed in the census, we arrive at 4386 Tai and at least 369 Kha households, i.e., a total of 4755 households. If we assume an average of four to five persons per household, the total number of inhabitants might have been as high as 20–25,000. This number does not include the predominantly non-Tai (Lahu, Wa, etc.) populations in the more distant hill areas at the periphery of Moeng Laem.

⁸³ The original Tham script manuscript that is the source for T9 is kept at Moeng Laem Palace Museum. This manuscript was translated from Tham script into modern Thai and English by Prof. Volker Grabowsky and Ms. Sutheera Satayaphan. For the whole text and translation, please see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 22. T10 is extracted from Yin Lun and Daniels et al. (2010, 194–197).

T10: Demographic data in 1943 from Tai manuscript

Unit: Household

Unit People	Households	%	Remarks
Tai	3613	64.25%	The number of Tai households accounts for 65.3% of the total number of households in Tai inhabited villages. The reason is that the statistical areas are mainly Tai villages.
Kha and other non-Tai groups	2010	35.75%	Households of other ethnic groups accounted for 34.7% of total households, i.e., about one third. This is not an insignificant number, which means Moeng Laem was a multi-ethnic area twenty years later.
Total	5623	100%	There was an increase of 868 households in Moeng Laem compared to 1920. However, the proportion of Tai households decreased by almost 20–30%. The reason for these changes was probably an increase in the migration of various groups, such as Han, Lahu, etc.

According to the household statistics of Moeng Nga (Yin Lun and Daniels et al. 2010, 207–218), it was estimated every household might comprise an average of five people, including women. Thus, the population of Moeng Laem registered in official documents might have numbered 28,160 people in 1943. There was still a minimal number of Han migrants, but we cannot find enough reliable data to even estimate specific numbers. Nonetheless, from the above estimate, the borderland integration of Moeng Laem was relatively superficial even in the early twentieth. At the beginning of the twentieth, the management of the Yunnan Frontier⁸⁴ was slowly advancing, but cultural penetration had not really yet begun.

Inscriptions in Moeng Laem

The inscriptions of Moeng Bò are typically bi- or multilingual, such as Chinese and Tai languages, written with Chinese and Lik scripts, Chinese and Tham scripts, or Chinese, Lik, and Tham scripts (see the following section). In contrast, most of the inscriptions in Küng Ma are written exclusively in Lik script. However, the extant inscriptions in Moeng Laem are Tham script writing and less numerous or quite difficult to read. There is only one well-preserved inscription in Moeng Ma, Moeng Laem, close to the Burmese frontier (see I1, the highlighted part is illegible).

Here is the text in English translation and modern Thai transcription:

In the greatest auspice, Si Visuddhisakyamuttago [...] Nidhineyya [...]

⁸⁴ See Ma Jianxiong (2012, 87–122).

Pannorājā (perhaps the name of the city ruler) [...], [somebody] is venerated by the people throughout Müang Ma. This year falls in the *kot san* year, CS 12xx (CE 1860–1920) [...] The glory [...] gold [...]

ศรีสุขสวัสดิ์ ศรีวิสุทธิศักดิ์ขามุดโค [...] นิธิโนยยะ [...] ป็นโนราชา [...] ประนมทั้งเมืองมา ปีนี้ปรากฏเกิดมีในปีกคสัน จุลศักราชได้พันสองร้อย [...] พุทธยจำเริญ [...]. คำ [...]


Even though it is unclear and barely legible, the year is readable as “a *kot san* year, CS 12xx (CS 1222 or CS 1282).” This inscription stipulates that the construction date was the year CE 1860 or 1920.⁸⁵ It records the date of doing something auspicious. There are also some Tham carvings in Tham characters on the wall of a monastery of Moeng Laem.



11. The inscription of the Heha monastery, Moeng Ma district, Moeng Laem. Photo by the local official on 22 September 2020.

⁸⁵ The first line says: lesser Era 12xx, perhaps 1222, which possibly equates to 1860.

The second inscription was carved on a marble stone. See I2 below:



I2. The marble carving with the Tham script in the Official Monastery of Moeng Ma, Moeng Laem. Photo taken by the author on 8 September 2012.

Photo I2, taken in the Official Monastery of Moeng Ma depicts an inscription that is dated CS 1367 (2005 CE). Recounting the history of the monastery's construction, it mentions different buildings at the monastery (for instance, the main hall, vihara, gate, stupas, etc.) and their date of construction. The inscription of Moeng Laem is worthy of further exploration. The English translation and transcription into modern Thai are as follows:

Wat Müang Ma Ban Luang

Wat Müang Ma Ban Luang [was constructed] in CE 1642 corresponding to CS 1004. This monastery includes the great gate, the vihāra, the ordination hall, the pavilion, the high stupa, the based pagoda, and the angle-shaped pagoda (the number of pagodas is supposed to be here). In the past, this monastery had three thousand *fün fang*, which was very splendid, and it was regarded as the meritorious place of Müang Ma. In front of the vihāra there are *phai wat tok* and *phai wat tòk*. The wall of the vihāra is four-sided. The pillar of the vihāra is decorated with flowers [etching or painting]; the internal was painted with cinnabar and [...] This grand monastery is really the meritorious place of Müang Ma. In CS 1367 (CE 2006), a *dap rao* year, in the third lunar month,

at Müang Laem, the ancient Müang Ai field, which used to be crowded, was demarcated with four-sided walls and nine humps, causing complete darkness blocking the sight of citizens' households.

วัดเมืองมาบ้านหลวง

วัดเมืองมาบ้านหลวง เหตุเมื่อศักราชได้ 1642 ปีนั้น จุลศักราช 1004 ตัว วัดหลังนี้เอา ศิลกรรมนานซอนสาจอปู่แจ้ว วัดหลังนี้มีประตูหลวง มีวิหาร มีอุโบสถ มีโรง. มีธาตุสูง มีกุฏิเชิงคู่มุม หลัง ลินเทือกวัดหลังนี้มี 3000 ฟืนฝิมิ ในวัดหลังนี้ เป็นที่หลี่ ที่งาม ที่นักแห้ว เป็นที่ของศิลของธรรมในเมืองมา ที่ฝ้องเมืองคูบ้าน หน้าวิหารมีพลาวันตค มีพายวันตอ ในวิหารหลังนี้ ตำฝาแปงทั้งสี่หน้ามมเมือง เสาววิหารมีดอกมิชุก ในชั้นวิหารแต่มีชาดทา [...] วัดหลังนี้เป็นที่ของศิลของธรรม อันหลี่อันแจ็ดนั้น ปีดับเร้า 1367 ตัว เดือน 3 เมืองแลม สนามเมืองอ้ายหือเป็นที่ชุก อันเก่าเมื่อหึ่งนั้น ได้คั่นกำแพงทั้งสี่หน้า นอกคั่นกำแพงไว้ 9 มีค่นิด บ่หือเห็นเรือน บ่อนุญาติหือเห็นเรือนสุแล

Wat Muang Ma Ban Luang was constructed in the year CS 1004 (CE 1642). In this inscription, CS 1367 (CE 2005) represents a significant period, commonly referred to as a *dap rao* year, occurring during the third lunar month. This particular year is associated with either the construction of a vihāra or the development of the Müang Ai field. It is plausible that the year of this marble carving coincides with the aforementioned year in the inscription.

Wat Müang Ma Ban Luang's historical and architectural features highlight its importance as a center for religious and cultural activities in Müang Ma. The detailed portrayal of its elements emphasis the complex structure and deep religious significance of the site. The ongoing demarcation projects at Müang Laem highlight the enduring worries about safeguarding cultural resources and the impact of these projects on the neighboring communities. Wat Müang Ma Ban Luang is a physical manifestation of the rich cultural and religious legacy of the Tai people in the Upper Mekong Basin.

The two inscriptions presented here serve as a monument to the historical significance of the monastery and its contribution to the development of Buddhism in the Moeng Laem region. The Moeng Laem Tai Nüa district has clear evidence of the continued presence and vibrancy of the Tham writing culture and Buddhism religion. In comparison to Moeng Bò, Moeng Laem and Küng Ma had relatively diminished degrees of Han cultural influence and borderland integration. Moreover, the borderland integration initiatives implemented by the Qing dynasty exhibited a lesser degree of prominence in these specific locations, notably in Moeng Laem.

4.3.3 The Borderland Integration of Küng Ma and Moeng Ting

As Küng Ma was not included in the original *gaitu guiliu* plan of E'ertai, it proved even more challenging to carry out *gaitu guiliu* in Küng Ma. This was especially the case after the Sino-Burma War (1762–1769) broke out, when the Qing court needed stable frontier regions for the sake of strategic depth. Conveniently, Küng Ma cooperated with the Qing court to actively fight against the Burmese invasion during

the war in order to consolidate its political position. Moeng Ting's⁸⁶ ambiguous position meant that it would not relinquish its *tusi* system, though it was not pro-Qing. The Qing court reprimanded Moeng Ting for its support of Moeng Phòng, i.e., against China, thereby increasing support in the Qing court for Kūng Ma.

In brief, the borderland integration of Moeng Bò commenced with *gaitu guiliu*, whereas the borderland integration of Kūng Ma began for two reasons: first, Kūng Ma consciously approached the Ming and Qing dynasties; second, an increase in Han migrants impacted local social life.

Previously, Moeng Ting had always maintained a distance from the Chinese dynasties, and its borderland integration commenced with an increase in Han migrants to the mining areas. Thus, in this section, we mainly analyse the degree of borderland integration between Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting before the Sino-British agreement demarcating borders at the end of the nineteenth century. This section will discuss the borderland integration of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting from the following perspectives: The Chinese dynasties' strategy, the increase of Han migrants, and the migrants' influences on the daily life of the aboriginal people.

4.3.3.1 The Strategy of Chinese Dynasties

The Strategy of the Chinese Dynasties towards Kūng Ma

Ming and Qing strategy towards Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting depended on their perceived loyalty to the court. From the perspective of the centralisation of power and strengthening its position in the frontier regions, Chinese dynasties did not like to see Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting having a close relationship. Since, in a situation like this, both of these parties would become gradually politically reliant on the Chinese dynasties. In order to weaken the power of the Luchuan Federation, Moeng Ting was separated from the territory of Luchuan during the Ming dynasty as part of a divide and rule policy.⁸⁷ By the end of the Ming dynasty, Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting were administratively separated from each other. As an independent *tusi* under the jurisdiction of Chinese dynasties, according to local legend, Kūng Ma did not associate itself with Moeng Ting. Instead, the story goes, the ancestors of Kūng Ma originated in Moeng Mao (Luchuan) or Moeng Phòng.

According to GMXZ (1995, 103), the first ancestors of the Kūng Ma *cao fa*, Kham (Han) Shua and Kham (Han) Xie, led their people from their homeland to escape a civil war in Moeng Mao. They first settled in Moeng Phòng and then moved to Awa Mountain a few years later. They settled in a place named Mengjiao (Moeng

⁸⁶ Kūng Ma's territory was a part of Moeng Ting. Today, Moeng Ting is a town of present-day Kūng Ma County. On the relationship between Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting, see Chapters One and Two and Three.

⁸⁷ For more details, see Sun Laichen (2000, 83).

Kaw, see M6) in the dry season of CS 742 (1380). However, as the population increased, on 19 May CS 759 (1397), the ancestors of the Kūng Ma Tai people followed a white horse, which led them to Kūng Ma. Therefore, from the construction of Mengjiao to the 1950s, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* had a recorded history of over 570 years. Kūng Ma's legal and orthodox rulers had twenty-three hereditary positions, excluding three regents and three usurped rulers. The last *cao fa* of Kūng Ma, Kham Futing (r. 1933–1950)⁸⁸, addressed the International Neutral Committee when he participated in the Sino-British Demarcation on 4 April 1936 (GJBM 2012, 25). When the CCP conquered Yunnan in 1950, he fled to Taiwan and died there in 1979.

The Chronicle of the Kūng Ma *Cao Fa* (Thai: สือเมืองเก่งม้า) was written during the Tongzhi period of the Qing dynasty, around 1862–1874. The manuscript was included in GJBM (2012, 9). It claims that the ancestor (patriarch) of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* was a pioneer who came from Moeng Phòng. It does not say that he came from Moeng Mao (present-day Dehong).

No matter where the ancestors of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* originated, it is undeniable that the Kūng Ma *cao fa* maintained a close relationship with Moeng Phòng. In fact, Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting were under the jurisdiction of Moeng Phòng prior to the mid-sixteenth century. Since the *cao fa* of Kūng Ma assisted the Ming court in combatting the Burmese, he obtained the official seal⁸⁹ of approval from the Ming dynasty in Wanli year 13 (CE 1585). The Kūng Ma *cao fa* assisted Yongchang's generals, Liu Zhen and Deng Zilong, in resisting the Burmese invasion and pacifying the civil war. As a result, he won official recognition from the Ming court. As a reward, the Ming court allocated the *cao fa* land for several villages above the Nangong River in Moeng Ting Prefecture, allowing the establishment of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission. From then on, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* became independent from Moeng Ting Prefecture.

In Kangxi year 22 (1683), Kūng Ma was promoted to the status of Sub-Pacification Commission (about this aboriginal offices' rank, see Chapter One), with the Zhili Yunnan Chief Secretary (*Zhili*: governing directly). Moeng Ting was still an Aboriginal Prefecture and its territory only comprised part of its traditional territory.⁹⁰ In Qianlong, year 29 (CE 1764), the jurisdiction of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission was transferred to Shunning Prefecture, and it was divided into administrative units of nine (Tai) *moeng* and thirteen (non-Tai or “Kha”) *khwaen*. In

⁸⁸ For his picture, see: The Digital Archives of Taiwan: <https://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/11/e5/46.html>, Han Futing in Tai Nüa dress, Photo taken by Yong Shiheng in January 1936.

⁸⁹ The official seal is a recognition of the local ruler by the Chinese dynasties.

⁹⁰ Please see the Territorial Map of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission in the late Qing Dynasty. GMXZ (1995, 109).

Guangxu year 13 (CE 1887), part of the territory of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission named Mengdong became independent from Kūng Ma, and had its own *cao fa*, who was appointed as a hereditary *tusi* (*cao fa*) (GMXZ 1995, 3/103).

As such, Kūng Ma's integration began with assisting the Ming court in countering perceived Burmese aggression, a behaviour that won the court's commendation and led to the *cao fa* obtaining the court's official seal of approval. Following this, Kūng Ma's political power grew, and Kūng Ma's loyalty to the Chinese dynasties became stronger than that of Moeng Ting. Indeed, during several borderland crises, Kūng Ma actively cooperated with the Qing court and, as a result, obtained political support. Kūng Ma's territory also continued to expand until the end of the Qing dynasty. Kūng Ma's territory was connected to the town of Zhenkang Aboriginal Prefecture in the north, Moeng Ting Prefecture in the south, Zhenbian (Pacifying Border) Sub-prefecture in the southeast, Mianning (east Lincang) in the east, and British Kokang in the northwest.⁹¹ The territory was slightly reduced during the ROC period but still comprises 5,816 square kilometres today.⁹²


Kham Huaji (*r.* 1897–1915; see P2 and Manu. 4 with the yellow outline) was the nineteenth *cao fa* of Kūng Ma, recorded officially in: “the Xuanfu si (*cao fa*) Han Huaji of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission's biography, resume, and household registration and territory criteria” (《耿馬宣撫司應襲罕華基親頂輩宗圖出身年貌履歷親供戶口疆界清冊》). This document also clearly states that several villages near Moeng Ting were assigned to Kūng Ma's jurisdiction (see Manu.4 with the red line):

[The emperor] granted a native official seal letter to the Kūng Ma Sub-pacification Commission, and several villages around Moeng Ting were assigned to Kūng Ma for management to reward its loyalty and the diligence of the *tusi* of Kūng Ma and the guardian of Kūng Ma [territory], to care for the native people, and to govern the whole place under the governance of the VI *tusi*, Han Menkan.

恩賜耿馬宣撫司土職印信一封，將孟定附近耿馬數村撥給管理，以勵忠勤，世守耿馬撫恤土民，並將六世祖罕悶坎遵領管理地方所有。

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Please see Territorial Map of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission in ROC Year 33 (CE 1944). GMXZ (1995, 110).



Manu.4: “The *tusi* Han Huaji of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission’s biography, resume, and household registration criteria” are preserved in the Archives Office of Kūng Ma. Dr Zhu Di took this picture on 25 September 2015. (Her effort is highly appreciated.)




耿马宣抚司二十一世土司罕华基

P2: The Xuanfu si, Kham Huaji, of the Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission. Source: GMXZ (1995, 107).

In addition, the official hereditary genealogy of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* was systematically documented during the Qing dynasty. Judging from the current texts in the Kūng Ma County Archives Office collection, the hereditary succession of *tusi* in Kūng Ma entailed a rigorous and formal political process. Each new generation of

hereditary *cao fa* needed to list the names and positions of the previous *cao fa*. Generally, this involved recording the birth date, age, appearance, and resume of the previous *tusi*, alongside the number of registered households and the details of Kūng Ma's territories at the time (see Manu. 5).



Manu. 5: The cover of “The *Tusi* Han Huaji of Gengma Sub-Pacification Commission’s biography, resume, and household registration criteria” (耿馬宣撫司應襲罕華基親頂輩宗圖出身年貌履歷親供戶口疆界清冊). Photograph by Dr Zhu Di, taken on 25 September 2015.

However, until the late nineteenth century, the Qing court had no effective control over Zhenbian Prefecture,⁹³ as became clear during the Lahu rebellions in 1903, which caused significant trouble for the Qing authorities (see Chapter Five for more details).

In conclusion, the Qing dynasty’s policy with respect to governing the

⁹³ The territory of Moeng Laem and Moeng Moeng *cao fa*, the establishment of Zhenbian Prefecture because neither *cao fa* could control the Luohei mountain, see Fang Guoyu (2008, 110).

mountainous areas was “to rely on one Yi in order to overwhelm another Yi. (以夷制夷)” When its power failed to permeate the highlands, the court had to rely on the *Tai cao fa* to deal with the affairs and chaos in the mountains. In this context, a loyal *Tai cao fa* was important for the court.

The Integration Strategy of the Imperial Court towards Moeng Ting

In ancient Chinese texts, Moeng Ting is named Jing Ma. Moeng and the Tai and Lao cognate *müang* signify the traditional Tai polity. Ting in the local Tai language means a kind of musical instrument, called a *qin* in Mandarin and *khim* in Thai (กิม). It means that the shape of the territory of Moeng Ting resembled a classical Tai musical instrument. The GMXZ (1995, 99) explains that, according to legend, “Ting” was the name of a thirty-two-string instrument given to the first king of Moeng Ting, Cao Wuding, by the gods. Moeng Ting, thus, means the city where King Cao Wuding lived.

In Chinese texts, the history of the Moeng Ting *cao fa* was not recorded reliably before the Song dynasty. Moreover, there is no record of Ming and Qing political strategy concerning the integration of Moeng Ting before the Yuan dynasty. From the Yuan dynasty (CE 1287) to the Republic of China (ROC) year 39 (1950), the Moeng Ting *cao fa* has a recorded history of 663 years. The line of Kham *cao fa* ruled for twenty-four generations. The last *cao fa* was named Kham Wanxian (*r.* 1943–1950, see P4).

In 1287, Ansao was appointed to the office of the Gold Teeth of Moeng Ting. In 1289, Moeng Ting Road (*lu* 路 in Ch.) was established, and the court began to take on the official administration of Moeng Ting. In Zhizheng year 8 of the Yuan dynasty (1348), King Hso Kip Hpa (Si Kefa 思可法 in Ch., *r.* 1284–1368) of the Luchuan federation annexed Moeng Ting, placing it under the jurisdiction of the Luchuan federation. In 1382, during the early Ming era, Moeng Ting was separated from the jurisdiction of Luchuan, and the court established the Moeng Ting Yuyi (means barbarian pacification) Prefecture, which included Moeng Laem as part of its jurisdiction. In CE 1406, Moeng Laem was separated from Moeng Ting, and the Moeng Laem Chief Office was established.

In CE 1454, the Ming court established Moeng Ting Zuodu Du Prefecture⁹⁴ and issued the prefectural seal. In the middle period of Emperor Jiajing’s reign (*c.* 1540s), the Moeng Phòng ruler, Kham Lie, occupied Moeng Ting’s territory, took its seal, and annexed it.⁹⁵ Kham Lie then stationed a headman, Kham Qing, in Moeng Ting, and Moeng Phòng annexed Kung Ma at the same time. After the death of Kham Qing, the

⁹⁴ Ch. 孟定左都督府. It named Moeng Ting Left Chief Military Commission in the Ming dynasty. See Hucker (1985, No.7314).

⁹⁵ Moeng Phòng was stronger than Moeng Ting. The native official of Moeng Ting had no choice but to accept.

leader of his tribe, Kham Qian, seized the seal and allied with the polity in Burma.

In 1585, the Ming government allocated several villages in Moeng Ting to set up the Kūng Ma Commission of Appeasement (Kūng Ma Anfu Si). However, Kūng Ma was still under the jurisdiction of Moeng Ting at the time.

In 1585, Kūng Ma was separated from Moeng Ting. In 1762, Moeng Phòng invaded Moeng Ting. The Moeng Ting *cao fa* Kham Daxing, neither resisted the enemies nor informed his neighbours. The Qing dynasty then dismissed Kham Daxing.⁹⁶ Moreover, he and his family were exiled to Nanjing, the capital of Jiangning Province. The ruler of Moeng Ting was replaced by Kham Daxing's younger brother Kham Daliang. In the same year, the Kūng Ma *cao fa*, Kham Guokai, deported Gonglayin under escort and sent troops to defeat the Burmese soldiers and take other measures. Thus, eventually, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* had gained a higher status than his Moeng Ting counterpart and, during the conflict with Moeng Ting, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* had the upper hand.

In 1681, the Qing court granted Moeng Ting Kham Zhen the title of the hereditary native official of Moeng Ting Prefecture, which, at that time, was under the jurisdiction of Yongchang Prefecture. In 1764, the Qing court placed Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission under the jurisdiction of Shunning Prefecture. However, the Native Prefecture of Moeng Ting was still under the jurisdiction of Yongchang Prefecture (GMXZ 1995, 97). In the late Qing period, Moeng Ting started to implement a more flexible and conciliatory strategy towards the court. In 1891, the Yunnan governor, Cen Yuying, asked the emperor to promote the *cao fa* of Moeng Ting, Kham Zhongbang, to the third rank. In 1891, the native prefect of Moeng Ting Prefecture, Kham Zhongbang, and others, were ordered to open roads and demarcate borders to permanently settle the conflicts. All issues were resolved and both sides agreed to follow the agreement. Peace returned shortly thereafter. Kham Zhongbang, the native prefect of Moeng Ting, was named Pacification Official of the Native Office for his efforts. The headman of Moeng Laem and Moeng Wiang, Dao Jinhua, received the title of native squad leader. Hereditary titles and offices were allowed.⁹⁷

It is clear that as long as the Moeng Ting *cao fa* demonstrated their loyalty to the court, they would be rewarded and promoted by the court. Rewarding loyalty was a significant and effective way to govern the southwestern *cao fa* during the Ming and Qing dynasties. The ROC abolished the native official of Moeng Ting in the early 1940s, and the native official was appointed as the local principal official. Moeng Ting

⁹⁶ Quoted from the Kūng Ma Literature and History Information Committee: "Kūng Ma Literature and History Materials," second series, 1992, first edition, pp. 44.

⁹⁷ Summarised from *The Sequel Draft of the General Gazetteer of Yunnan* Vol.1–11 (《續雲南通志稿 卷 1–11》), pp. 361. For the original text and translation, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 15.

was then subordinated to and designated the sixth district of Zhenkang County. The *cao fa*, Kham Zhongxing (see P3), was also appointed as the headman of Moeng Ting. At that time, the total population of Moeng Ting counted 1697 households comprising: 3,449 men, 3,660 women, and 7,109 Dingkou (able bodies).



孟定土司府二十三世土司罕忠兴

P3: The Twenty-Third Tusi, Kham Zhongxing, of Moeng Ting, Moeng Ting Native Prefecture. Source: GMXZ (1995, 107).

In the year 29 of the ROC (1940), Kūng Ma established the governance bureau. Moeng Ting, however, was unwilling to be attached to Kūng Ma. Therefore, Moeng Ting remained under Zhenkang County. It was known as the town of Moeng Ting in Zhenkang County and the *tusi*, Kham Wanxian, was appointed as mayor (GMXZ 1995, 101).



孟定土司府二十四世应袭土司罕万贤

P4: The Twenty-Fourth *Tusi*, Kham Wanxian, of Moeng Ting Aboriginal Prefecture. Source: GMXZ (1995, 107).

It is evident that the Moeng Ting *cao fa* controlled a vast amount of territory from prior to the Yuan until the mid-Ming dynasties. However, the Moeng Ting *cao fa* did not always acquiesce to requests from the Chinese court and did not actively resist Burmese incursions. Indeed, the Moeng Ting *cao fa* sometimes acted contrary to the interests of Chinese dynasties. As a result, comparatively loyal Kūng Ma had more resources (i.e., territory or political status) allocated to it than Moeng Ting. This is why the Chinese court continuously divided the territories of Moeng Ting between Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Banhong (Wa territory, present-day Cangyuan county, Yunnan, China); a part of Moeng Ting was even occupied regularly by the Moeng Phòng *cao fa*.⁹⁸

In brief, Moeng Ting's political status declined, and its territory gradually diminished, as the Chinese court increasingly came to support Kūng Ma. This change in court policy gradually became disadvantageous for Moeng Ting vis-à-vis its competition with Kūng Ma.

4.3.3.2 Han Migrants

After the Ming dynasty began to establish military state farms (*juntun* 軍屯) and civilian state farms (*mintun* 民屯),⁹⁹ a large number of Han people migrated to Yunnan. The extent of the migration was such that some Yunnan scholars posit that the Han population outnumbered the indigenous people by the middle to late Ming dynasty.¹⁰⁰ However, Lee (2012, 95) mentions that some Han migrants in the southwest were not registered, whereas others were registered as indigenous people, so it is difficult to obtain comprehensive and accurate migrant data.¹⁰¹

Nonetheless, the continuous influx of Han migrants arriving from inland provinces substantially contributed to the borderland integration of the southwestern frontier (Ibid., 99). Migrants from other ethnic groups also strengthened the cultural diversity of the southwestern region (Ibid., 119).

According to Nan Guixiang (2013, 72), the Kūng Ma Tai people called the Han

⁹⁸ Please see the Territorial Map of Moeng Ting and its Surrounding Districts in the Late Qing dynasty. GMXZ (1995, 108).

⁹⁹ Military state farms refer to the Chinese Imperial court sending the military to be stationed in the southwest. Soldiers cultivated the land; however, if war or rebellions occurred, they would be recruited as soldiers. Civilian state farms were Han civilians who were organised to settle down in the southwest according to the imperial order. Landless farmers were recruited by the government to collectively cultivate official land or wasteland and pay taxes in accordance with regulations. Usually, Civilian state farms served to supply grain to the military. For more details on *juntun* and *mintun*, see an Encyclopaedia on Chinese History, Literature and Art, the Chinese knowledge website: <http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Terms/tuntian.html>, accessed on 27/07/2020.

¹⁰⁰ Lin Chaomin et al. (2006, 136)

¹⁰¹ The specific changes in the migrants' population have already been discussed in Chapter Three. This is a controversial topic but cannot be elaborated on here due to space constraints.

people khe³ heE (it is pronounced colloquially as se³, seE). A large number of Han people settled in Kūng Ma during the mid-to-late Qing dynasty. Many landless farmers from Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu provinces migrated to Kūng Ma to work in the silver mines. Nan Guixiang claims (Ibid.) that the number of workers exceeded 10,000 at the time. However, I surmise this number may have doubled when these workers brought their families with them.

During the Yunnanese Hui Muslim rebellion led by Du Wenxiu (1852–1873) in 1855, moreover, many migrants (not only Han people) migrated from central northern Yunnan to the Kūng Ma area to avoid social and political chaos. Later, the Second Sino-Japanese War¹⁰² required the construction of the Yunnan-Burma Highway, and a number of construction workers and anti-Japanese KMT officers and soldiers fled to Kūng Ma as the Japanese troops occupied half of China. This influx of Han migrants changed the demographics and cultural diversity of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting. Fang Guoyu describes the Han migrants in Moeng Ting: “near the native office are seven or eight Guangdong merchant houses. At first, there were more than twenty merchant houses in Canton (Guangdong). However, each year, they died and fewer people were registered as resident. On the road from Moeng Ting to Nanla, there were several Cantonese cemeteries, but after six or seven years, there were more Cantonese tombs. People from Canton lived in thached houses on the street like the locals, but their style is more inland.”¹⁰³ There were already a certain number of Han people living in Moeng Ting during the 1930s.

4.3.3.3 The Influence of Han migrants

Throughout the Ming and Qing dynasties, inland Han migrants relocated to the region, intensifying competition for resources and conflicts between the migrants and local ethnic groups. It also promoted cultural diversity and the economic development of the Kūng Ma district.

During the Ming dynasty, the establishment of military and civilian agro colonies resulted in an increase in the number of Han migrants. The Qing dynasty, moreover, implemented the *gaitu guliu* in parts of Southwest Yunnan. As a result of the establishment of mines in the region, a large number of Han migrants settled in the Kūng Ma district and, concomitantly, introduced new production methods, tools from the inland plains, and cultural habits.

Moreover, the Han migrants led to changes in the social and cultural aspects of

¹⁰² The War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in China, 1937–1945.

¹⁰³ The original text reads: 自土署過河數百步即為街子，有廣東商民七八戶。聞初至二十餘戶，卒年死亡，戶口減少；自孟定赴南臘途中，有廣東墓地，不過六七年而土墳累累也，廣人沿街而居，亦草舍，惟其式如內地。Fang Guoyu (reprinted. 2008, 130).

the Tai people's life. For example, the *cao fa* set up private schools for learning Chinese, and the Tai people who lived alongside the Han people learned Chinese. Furthermore, the Kūng Ma Tai people celebrate the Spring Festival and Dragon Boat Festival, just like the Han.¹⁰⁴

In general, the presence of Han migrants accelerated the borderland integration of Kūng Ma. These migrants had an effect on the modes of daily life and production of all ethnic groups in Kūng Ma. They also influenced Kūng Ma's local culture. The advent of additional migrants meant that resources and living space had to be reallocated, which could lead to inter-communal strife. More information will be provided in Chapter Five.

4.3.3.4 Summary

There was a political power circle within the governing structures of the Kūng Ma polity. The Kham family *cao fa* of Kūng Ma were from the Tai Nūa group, which constituted the core of the Kūng Ma district in terms of power. In the surrounding areas, the *cao fa* of Kūng Ma family was then followed, hierarchically, by the Tai Lü and Han migrants under the rule of the Kham *cao fa* and, finally, the mountain peoples at the periphery, such as the Mon-Khmer (the Wa and De'ang peoples), constituting a form of a tributary system.¹⁰⁵

In the political ecosystem of Kūng Ma, Han migrants were also subject to the Tai rulers. Han migrants needed to be integrated into the Tai life circle. At the same time, the lifestyle and production methods introduced by Han migrants also brought cultural diversity to the local people.

The Ming and Qing courts were unable to enter this circle of power. Before the borders of the southwest were formally demarcated with Great Britain in the late nineteenth century, it was difficult for Chinese authorities to influence this circle of power in the Kūng Ma districts. The native official could only be tasked as an agent or employed as a vassal state to guard the southwestern border of the Qing Empire. The *cao fa* of Kūng Ma, in accordance with the Chinese imperial rule, operated within the confines of the native official system. However, it is important to note that the Ming and Qing governments held a nominal level of control over Kūng Ma, without the ability to intervene in specific management strategies. Furthermore, the court could mediate or make decisions only when there was a conflict between the *cao fa* or a war with the Burmese.

With the help of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* Kham family, the empire instituted its rule over the remote areas around Kūng Ma. Although the relationship between the Chinese

¹⁰⁴ Nan Guixiang (2013, 71).

¹⁰⁵ For more details, see Zhu Di (2016, 22).

dynasties and the Kūng Ma *cao fa* was not very close, it completed the construction of the political ecosystem vis-à-vis the marginal areas of the Chinese Empire and gradually allowed the empire's politics, economy, and culture to penetrate all aspects of life in Kūng Ma by official and private means.

Nonetheless, until the ROC period, there was a political vacuum surrounding Kūng Ma's governance. This is the reason why esteemed scholars Fang Guoyu (reprinted in 2008) and Zhou Guangzhuo (reprinted in 2015) undertook a journey to Kūng Ma in 1935. The primary aim of their study was to do a thorough investigation into the demarcation matter between Burma and Yunnan, while simultaneously collecting relevant data. The factors stated above include the categorisation of ethnic groups, the administration by indigenous authorities, and the interactions within the local community, all of which pertain to the frontier governance of the ROC.

4.3.4 The Borderland Integration of Moeng Bò

4.3.4.1 The Beginning of Borderland Integration: The Implementation of the *Gaitu Guiliu* Policy

As mentioned above, Moeng Bò was a remote borderland area, which was not only rich in salt and tea, but was also an essential passage from Dali (the formal capital of Nanzhao and Dali Kingdom) to Mainland Southeast Asia. Moeng Bò is one of the various Tai Nüa areas in Yunnan province, and it has held a favourable location since the time of the Naozhao Kingdom. The Nanzhao Kingdom set up Kainan Prefecture and wanted to control Southwestern Yunnan (Simao/Sipsòng Panna) and northern Laos. Moeng Bò was then established as Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture administered by Yuanjiang Prefecture because the capital was located in Kunming during the Yuan dynasty.

As Fang Guoyu et al. (eds.) point out (1998, vol. 3, 139/149 and 220), the Cangigu mentioned by Marco Polo was Moeng Bò and it has been an essential corridor to Xieng Mai (Chiang Mai), Laos, and Bangala¹⁰⁶ since the Nanzhao period.¹⁰⁷ There is a considerable ongoing scholarly discourse surrounding this issue, yet the significance of Moeng Bò's geographical position remains noteworthy. Moeng Bò lay between the Tai Lü and Tai Nüa heartlands, so, during the Yuan and Ming dynasties, it was repeatedly invaded by the Moeng Mao (Dehong) and Moeng Lü federation (Sipsòng Panna), because of its privileged location and abundant mineral resources, primarily salt but also tea.

¹⁰⁶ However, it is important to note that the current body of data is insufficient to support the assertion that Cangigu can be definitively identified as Jinggu. It might be in the centre of Tonking, namely the present-day Vietnam. For more details, see Pelliot (1959, 39).

¹⁰⁷ Fang Guoyu et al. (eds), vol.3 (1998, 139)

Taking strategically located Moeng Bò as a case study, the following sections will show how it gradually became integrated as a part of China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The *gaitu guiliu* policy contributed significantly to the integration of Moeng Bò.

From the early Ming until the mid-Qing dynasty, Moeng Bò chose to pay tribute to the Chinese imperial court. The Ming and Qing courts tried to integrate frontier ethnic groups through a mixture of administrative measures, violence, and cultural assimilation. Pertinently, the *gaitu guiliu* policy was implemented in 1724¹⁰⁸. Following several rebellions and ongoing instability, the Qing court decided to “civilise” the local people by imposing Chinese culture and Confucianism (WYTZ, 102 and 112).

As PEFZZX (Deng Qihua et al. (eds), 2007, 263) recorded: “In October of Yongzheng year 1 (1723), the bandit leaders in Yuanjiang Prefecture (today’s Xiping County 新平) named Fang Jingming 方景明 and Pu Youcai 普有才 killed the headman of a ‘barbarian’ named Shi Heshang 施和尚, the governor Gao Qizhuo 高其倬 sent troops to Yuanjiang Prefecture, Fang Jingming surrendered, while Pu Youcai fled.” Later, Dao Guanghuan who was the native official of Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture, spoke with the Chinese official of Weiyuan, Liu Hongdu, about Pu Youcai’s case: “This prisoner might flee to Burma, Weiyuan inhabitants go to Burma often, I am a native official who dares not do anything [unless told to do so], if I receive a ‘call to arms,’ then I will investigate [this case] secretly and professionally.”¹⁰⁹

However, Liu believed Dao first hid Pu and then sent him to Burma. Thus, he reported it to the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces Gao Qizhuo (r. 1722–1723 and 1731–1733), who then reported to Emperor Yongzheng:

The territory under the Native Official Sub-prefecture of Weiyuan [...] was always the swampy land [den/lair] for the wild thieves to escape. The wild thieves dare to be arrogant and wanton [...] It was because there was Weiyuan to where they could flee, and the Native Official of Weiyuan, upon whom they could rely. The Native Sub-prefect Dao Guanghuan was normally harsh and full of plots. The barbarian people suffered hardships. They harboured wild thieves. [...] The Native Sub-prefecture of Weiyuan was transformed from appointing a Native official to a rotating official as requested. In his land, a Sub-prefectural Magistrate was to be appointed to pacify the barbarians and supervise the salt wells. [...] be in charge of Anban, Baomu and salt wells in various places.¹¹⁰

威遠土州之地……歷來為野賊逋逃之藪。野賊敢於恣肆者……有此威遠一路可逃，及威遠土司可恃也。威遠土州刀光燦，平日苛索多端，夷民

¹⁰⁸ The first regular official of Weiyuan Sub-prefecture from the Qing court was Liu Hongdu.

¹⁰⁹ The original text reads: “此犯或逃入緬，威人亦時有往緬者，我土官不敢多事，若有一檄見及，便可專屬密查矣。” DYLNZ (Li Yan ed. 1992, 577).

¹¹⁰ Fang Guoyu et al., (eds), vol. 8 (2001, 444).

苦累，此次又隱藏野賊……威遠土州，應請改土歸流……其地請設撫夷同知一員，監管鹽井……分管按板、抱母及各處土井。

Therefore, Weiyuan Native Sub-prefecture,¹¹¹ rich in salt and tea, had become a region in which the Qing dynasty promoted the *gaitu guiliu* policy. Yongzheng took the opportunity to exile Dao Guanghuan to Jiangxi province in the following year, and the Weiyuan native official waived his hereditary claims. The position of Weiyuan Native Sub-prefecture was changed to Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture Responsible for Pacifying Yi and Providing Correct Accounts,¹¹² under the administration of Zhenyuan Prefecture and Liu Hongdu was appointed as a regular officer. The salt wells of Weiyuan and Zhenyuan became the property of the Qing court, and imperial officers took charge of Weiyuan *tusi* Dao Guoxiang, whose position was changed to *tu qianzong*.¹¹³

Later, some local imperial officials also actively promoted the *gaitu guiliu*, not only to accumulate political capital for themselves, but also to obtain a large number of economic benefits.¹¹⁴ With the precedent set by Weiyuan's change of status, some officials of the Qing court also began to respond to *gaitu guiliu* actively. The Yunnan governor E'ertai submitted a memorial in 1724. This statement offered an approach to manage the west bank of Mekong River, he believed that the troubles in Yunnan and Guizhou are compared to those caused by Miao and Man peoples. To appease Yi people, Native Officials should be replaced with Circulating Officials. Indigenous people live near the Mekong River, and concerns about collusion with foreign lands arise. The resolution is to use Native Officials outside the west bank of Mekong River.¹¹⁵

This statement satisfied the Yongzheng Emperor. He immediately approved the *gaitu guiliu* of the border areas, and he appointed E'ertai as the governor of the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi to implement the *gaitu guiliu* policy. In 1727, E'ertai issued the abolition of the hereditary position of the Zhenyuan native official named Dao Han and appointed Liu Hongdu as the magistrate of Zhenyuan

¹¹¹ Please see Map of Weiyuan Prefecture in PUFZXZ (2007, 22).

¹¹² It was named *Weiyuan ting fuyi qingxiang tongzhi* 威遠廳撫夷清響同知: known as the Vice Magistrate of Pacification.

¹¹³ The establishment of the Green Standard Army (*Lüying*: 綠營) in the Qing dynasty was a special case. The military system of the Qing court in Yunnan adopted The Green Standard Army to garrison Yunnan. Since Yunnan had a certain number *tusi* areas, which the court could not control it directly. The Qing court issued a special military system to govern Yunnan. Such as: *Ying* and *xun* (military system), which led by military officer named *Qianzong* and *Bazong*, therefore, the *tu qianzong* (土千總) called aboriginal Company Commander, the *tu bazong* (土把總) called aboriginal squad leader. The “*Ying Qianzong*” was the military official rank 6, *Bazong* was the military official rank 7 (For more details, see Luo Ergang 1984, 221).

¹¹⁴ Ma Jianxiong (2007, 564).

¹¹⁵ Summarised from QSG. vol. 288, Biography 75, pp. 10 230. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 16.

Prefecture. Thus, the abolition of the native official of Zhenyuan inevitably exerted a considerable impact on local society. This was the beginning of the borderland integration of Moeng Bò, which entailed a lengthy and painful process, lasting until rebellions ended and cultural integration was achieved.

Borderland integration was promoted in Moeng Bò from the Ming dynasty until the late Qing dynasty. It eventually transformed Moeng Bò into an area more akin to inland China. Moeng Bò does not share any frontiers with Mainland Southeast Asia.

4.3.4.2 Approaches to Borderland Integration in Moeng Bò: Rebellion, Suppression, and Cultural Integration

Rebellion and Suppression

The Qing court promoted the *gaitu guiliu* policy in order to strengthen its control over ethnic minority areas so that they would accept the court's rule as "legitimate," in order to consolidate the Qing court's territory. The imperial officials wanted to accumulate political support and obtain economic benefits through *gaitu guiliu*, which caused a severe problem in Moeng Bò where imperial officials extorted the local people.¹¹⁶ The local people could not stand the exploitation by imperial officials, and the local elites were chaffed by being deprived of their political power. Thus, given the circumstances, there was a convergence of interests, and the native elites mobilised the local people to resist the court.¹¹⁷

The non-Han ethnic groups not only suffered from exploitation by local rulers, but also from more severe oppression by corrupt officials of the Qing court. In 1726, Liu Hongdu became the Vice Sub-prefectural Magistrate (*tongzhi* 同知) of Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture. He detained Dao Guanghuan and killed Dao Han, measures that brought him substantial political power and economic benefits. Liu not only extorted land from the native official using the *gaitu guiliu* as a pretext, but he also detained and sold those who did not bribe him. Moreover, he embarrassed his servants and made them bully and oppress the indigenous people. While having to perform their duties, native officials also had to pay the state's taxes and satisfy the insatiable greed of Liu. In such a situation, it was only a matter of time before people of all ethnic groups would become angry and revolt.

On 17 January 1727, the family clan of the Zhenyuan native official, Dao Ruzhen,

¹¹⁶ For more details on the corruption of imperial officials, see Sun Laichen (2000, 4–6).

¹¹⁷ Looking at the corruption of Chinese officials, Jiang Yingliang (2003, 430) points out the following: "The frontier officials all harbored the hope of making a fortune. It was not the new hoax played in the present-day officialdom but was the official rule that was already established 500 years ago."

and the Moeng Bò Lahu headman, Hei Laopang, led Woni,¹¹⁸ Luohei,¹¹⁹ Luobai,¹²⁰ Baiyi,¹²¹ and other ethnic groups attacked and burnt Liu's home. E'ertai was shocked and sent troops to quell the rebellion. Dao Ruzhen surrendered and argued that the Yi peoples were suffering under Liu's rule, while the Lahu headman, Hei Laopang, and his followers first hid in the Ailao mountains, and then fled to Moeng Laem territory on the west bank of the Mekong River where they continued resisting the Qing court. Later, they settled in the territory of Moeng Laem and fought for the Tai Nüa rulers. The following story was described by Ma Jianxiong (2007, 553–600), who provides an in-depth and detailed analysis and description of the ethnic identification and migration of the Lahu people.

The uprising shocked the Qing court and was an alarming sign for the Qing court's *gaitu guiliu* policy. E'ertai immediately pointed out that the native official's revenge was the main reason for the uprising, and Liu's strict regulations also gave the Yi people justification for their actions.¹²² The Yongzheng Emperor hoped that "after this incident, it will turn misfortune into prosperity so that local officials also know how to do self-criticism."¹²³

As QSG records: In 1728, E'ertai ordered the exile and resettlement of native officials and headmen in Weiyuan Sub-prefecture. The Lahu rebelled and killed Prefect Liu Hongdu, leading to the exile and elimination of Weiyuan and Xiping's Lahu gangs. To eradicate Moeng Yang and Tea Mountain Yi, armies marched to the left bank of the Mekong River. Yi Peoples believed that "since ancient times the Chinese troops had never come here."¹²⁴ E'ertai directed Sipsòng Panna's forces to cut off passages beyond the river, and only land beyond the Upper Mekong River (west bank) was returned to Sipsòng Panna. Garrison soldiers and officials were sent to Simao and Ganlanba (Moeng Han) to control the Burma and Laos gates. The Qing court received the Silver Mine Factory from Moeng Laem native official (ruler of

¹¹⁸ Woni: Hani people.

¹¹⁹ Luohei: Lahu people.

¹²⁰ Luobai: Lao sub-branch of the Tai.

¹²¹ Baiyi: They might be the Tai speaking groups. But Daniels (2021, 208–211) points out that Jinchi might refer to the northern branch of Mon-Khmer speakers.

¹²² ZPYZ of *Qing shizong* (Yongzheng Emperor), vol.125/3, E'ertai memorialised to Yongzheng Emperor on 12 Month 3, Yongzheng year 5 (1727).

¹²³ The original Chinese text is: 經此一事，乃轉禍為祥，使地方微員亦自知檢束，ZPYZ of *Qing shizong*: Vol.125/3, Yongzheng Emperor decreed to E Ertai on 12 Month 3, Yongzheng year 5. For the whole content of ZPYZ, see the online Chinese manuscript Library: The Chinese Text Project: <https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=en&res=6365&remap=gb>, accessed on 29 December 2020.

¹²⁴ Since the general Wang Ji (b. 1378–1460) of the Ming dynasty has conducted a 12,000-troop punitive assault against Moeng Yang.

Moeng Laem).¹²⁵

In order to stabilise the situation along the border and strengthen the Qing court's control over this region, the Qing established Pu'er Prefecture in 1729. This was one of the fourteen prefectures under the jurisdiction of Yunnan Province during the Qing dynasty. It comprised three sub-prefectures and one Pacification Commission district,¹²⁶ of which were probably equivalent areas to most of today's Pu'er and Sipsong Panna. In 1735, the governance of Pu'er Prefecture was located in Ning'er County. The territory under its jurisdiction included most of present-day Pu'er and Sipsong Panna, as well as parts of present-day Lao territory.

However, the establishment of Pu'er Prefecture did not stop the ongoing rebellions in the area, because the fate of Liu had not taught the Chinese officials any lessons vis-à-vis their exploitative practices, but instead worsened the situation, inciting the local people to repeatedly rebel. In July 1732, another rebellion broke out in Simao: The Prefect Tong Shiyin wanted to travel across the hills to gather grain provisions. The local headman Dao Xingguo took off his headgear, bowed and said: "The Regional Commander attempts to cultivate the people. However, the strength of the people is exhausted. Please postpone it to the coming year. As a rule, the 'barbarian' people are reluctant to sell their children; moreover, the tea trade has already been taken over by the government, and ways of borrowing or taking a loan are exhausted." Dong Shiyin disagreed with him and chased him out. Xingguo was exasperated and handed his official attire to Prefect Dong Shiyin and said: "This attire is useless after death." Then, Xingguo plundered and besieged the city of Simao.¹²⁷

It is precisely because of the insatiable greed of the Chinese officials that the oppression of the Yi people led to continuous rebellion. Dao Xingguo robbed and besieged Simao City with the cooperation of the Kucong people (a branch of the Lahu). The rebellion continued to grow. The court found the entire situation troubling. Governor Gao Qizhuo stated sorrowfully: "The civil officials love money but do not dare to die and the military officers love money and are not afraid to die, so how could Yunnan be peaceful?"¹²⁸

The Qing court learned a valuable lesson from the continuous rebellions: that is, the appointment of regular imperial officials was essential to ensure the stability of the

¹²⁵ Summarised from QSG. *tusi* 3. Yunnan (vol. 514 Biography 310, pp. 14,257–258). 《清史稿·卷五百十四，列傳三百一，土司三》，p. 14,257–258. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 17.

¹²⁶ Ning'er County, Simao Sub-Prefecture, Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture, Talang Sub-Prefecture (Mojiang County today), and Cheli Pacification Commission.

¹²⁷ Summarised from PEFZXZ: Deng Qihua et al. (eds), (2007, 267). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 17. For more details on this incident, see Daniels (2019, 188–217) in Geoff Wade and James K. Chin (eds) (2019) (London and New York).

¹²⁸ The original text reads: "文官愛錢不怕死，武官怕死又愛錢，雲南豈能太平乎?" PEFZXZ (2007, 271).

frontier. Another effective strategy, the court found, was to “civilise” the elites of the ethnic groups (for example: the Tai Nüa) and make them accept the Chinese worldview in order to integrate them. Thus, borderland integration was not only achieved through political measures but also by utilising the Confucian education system. Therefore, we can see evidence of the spread of the Chinese script and Chinese culture, including the proliferation of many ancient inscriptions (epitaphs) which are preserved in Moeng Bò. More details of this process will be discussed in the following section.

“Cultural Civilisation” and Migration

Education

The so-called “Confucian civilising mission”¹²⁹ was initiated by the Qing court after the *gaitu guiliu* had been implemented in Moeng Bò. Before the arrival of Chinese officials, the most influential groups were members of the Tai elites. Indeed, there was no presence of Han Chinese, let alone Han Chinese culture. However, there are many inscriptions in Chinese from the eighteenth century onwards. This was a result of the introduction of Han culture into local society in the mid-eighteenth century. The arrival of Chinese officials also brought Confucian education. As WYTZ addresses (2016, 112):

At the beginning of the developing Weiyuan, all the places belonged to foreign people. The native officials as usual did not learn to read and write (i.e., they were illiterate in Chinese). Occasionally there were Chinese sojourning there, but they hardly could read and write [quasi-literate in Chinese] [...] In the year Yongzheng 2 (1724), only when the [policy of] replacing native officials with circulating officials [was implemented] was Chinese personnel appearing in Weiyuan. At that time Weiyuan was under the jurisdiction of Zhenyuan Prefecture [...] In the year Qianlong 2 (1737), an examination hall¹³⁰ was established in Jingdong, [so that exam candidates] could travel to the nearer Jingdong to sit the examination.

威遠初闢，盡屬夷人。土司素不學文，間有漢人寄跡，亦少誦讀。……雍正二年改土歸流，威遠始設漢員，斯時威遠系鎮沅府管轄。……乾隆二年，景東設立試院，就近赴景東考試。

The first Confucian school, Baomu Zhongjing Jingtuan, was established in 1728. The most prominent college Fengshan Shuyuan (Fengshan College) was built by the Chinese regular official Weiyuan Prefect Zhao Gongxi in 1776. It was located southeast of the seat of Weiyuan. The local gentry paid its daily expenses. In addition, over ten free schools (where one did not have to pay fees) were founded in Weiyuan during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the following¹³¹:

1. Baomu Zhongjing Jingtuan, was founded in 1728 (抱母中井經管).

¹²⁹ Harrell (1994, 4–7).

¹³⁰ The so-called *Gongyuan* (貢院) for selecting intellectuals who were to be involved in the new bureaucratic system and participate in Imperial China since the Sui dynasty (CE 581–618).

¹³¹ WYTZ (2016, 117–118).

2. Weiyuan Jingguan Yixue, founded in 1732 (威遠經館義學一所).
3. Mengban (Moeng Pan) Mengxue Yixue Yisuo, founded in 1734 (猛班蒙學義學一所).
4. Haikai Xiang Mengguan Yixue Yisuo, founded in 1734 (海凱鄉蒙館義學一所).
5. Xuanhua Xiang Mengguan Yixue Yisuo, founded in 1734 (宣化鄉蒙館義學一所).
6. Baomu Dongtou Jing Mengguan Yisuo, founded in 1735 (抱母東頭井蒙館一所).
7. Baomu Weijing Mengguan Yisuo, founded in 1736 (抱母尾井蒙館一所).
8. Manxi Jing Mengguan Yixue Yisuo, founded in 1736 (蠻習井蒙館義學一所).
9. Baomu Xitou Jing Mengguan Yisuo, founded in 1820 (抱母西頭井蒙館一所).
10. Mengga Xiang (Moeng Ka) Mengguan Yixue Yisuo, founded in 1822 (猛嘎鄉蒙館義學一所).

The free schools were mainly located in Weiyuan Town, Moeng Pan Town, Moeng Ka Town, and Fengshan Town. These prosperous towns had salt wells and were serviced with convenient transportation. They also had government offices, acting as a conduit for national power into local society. Moreover, they were also the preferred settlements of Han migrants. The local officers ran the Confucian schools from 1728 until 1822, for around one century.¹³² A peculiar cultural phenomenon of Moeng Bò is the presence of several inscriptions in two or even three different scripts. Thus, nowadays, we can reconstruct the levels of borderland integration in Moeng Bò much more accurately than in other districts, according to the documentary records and epigraphical evidence.

Customs

With their arrival, Han migrants and imperial officials also brought Han culture and customs. According to the records of WYTZ (2016, 129–133), the customs of Weiyuan have many similarities with the Han culture. Until today, the current customs of Moeng Bò are strongly influenced by Han culture. As WYTZ states (Ibid., 129), Weiyuan customs blended Han and local ethnic groups' cultures. Some Han Chinese came to Weiyuan to pursue business and they eventually become naturalised, while others were banished soldiers who stayed there. Their smart kids learned to read and write quickly with half the work and double the results. Yi people learned to read and write since they respected Chinese civilisation. Many of their children attended rural schools. In capping ceremonies, marriages, burials, sacrifices, and annual or seasonal festivals,

¹³² However, there is no more details regarding the actual operation of these schools, textbooks, student body, teachers, etc.

the manners and coaches were the same. They admired Confucian intellectuals and Confucianism.¹³³

This record shows that Han migrants strongly influenced the aboriginal people's customs, especially in terms of education and culture. Many of the natives sent the young generation to Chinese schools. Thus, the native elites increasingly accepted Chinese culture. Indeed, their funerals, sacrifices, handicrafts, agriculture, planting and capping ceremonies, as well as other ceremonies like weddings and engagement, are the same as those of the Han people. Moreover, other festivals of local society, such as the Spring Festival, Spring Day, the Lantern Festival, Tomb-Sweeping Day, Phi Ta Khon Festival, the Dragon Boat Festival, the Torch Festival of the Yi people, Magpie Festival, Ghost Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival, Chongyang Festival, Laba Festival, and others are very similar to those in Han culture (Ibid., 130–132).

The writing of the WYTZ began in 1825 and finished in 1837 (WYTZ 2016, 3–4). Its description of the customs of Moeng Bò shows that they are almost the same as the Han, except for the Torch Festival of the Yi people. It can thus be seen that Confucian education was successful in integrating the natives of Moeng Bò into Chinese culture. After a century, Confucian schools and colleges, and the Han culture they imparted, had a profound impact on local society. Therefore, it can be concluded that cultural inculcation through education is the most effective way to integrate different ethnic societies. The borderland integration of Moeng Bò into China was eventually completed via education.

Migration

The Han had been migrating to Yunnan since the Han dynasty¹³⁴. As more and more Han migrants arrived, the differences between “Han” and “non-Han” could be seen, for example, in the household registration system (*Huji zhidu*: 戶籍制度).¹³⁵ However, before the eighteenth century, Han migrants mainly inhabited walled cities or towns, situated at transportation thoroughfares or functioning as military outposts. In Southwest Yunnan, multi-ethnic groups had settled alongside the Mekong River for hundreds of years. It was a remote region with few Han migrants. The turning point occurred in the eighteenth century after the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu*. Through

¹³³ For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 19.

¹³⁴ Here, the term “Han migrants” does not simply refer to people whose ethnicity is Han. It refers to immigrants from various provinces of China between the Han and the Qing dynasties. There are many different ethnic groups from various provinces, especially the southern provinces who were not Han. However, they lived in ancient Chinese territory, were ruled by Chinese dynasties, and gradually established ethnic identities in the process of ethnic integration. Due to the limitations of space, this thesis will not distinguish the differences between ethnic migrants during the Qing dynasty. It refers to migrants from other provinces collectively as Han. For more details about Han migrants of Southwest Yunnan, see Lee (1982, 279–304) and Giersch (2006, 148–149).

¹³⁵ For more details, see Lin Chaomin (2006, 113–114).

this policy, southwestern areas had become easier to access for Chinese from China proper, but it was illegal for civilians to move away from their household registration place and migrate to other places, i.e., Yunnan.¹³⁶ Out of a desire for improved living conditions and new opportunities, a large number of Han migrants entered the border areas of Yunnan in search of a better life.

The Qing court worried about illegal Han migrants. Giersch (2001, 64–94) gives two examples of Han migrants rebelling against the court to illustrate the “traitor” problem that disturbed the Qing court.¹³⁷ Therefore, in the beginning, the Qing court took strict measures to restrict Han migrants, yet it could not stop their inflow. Shifts in the demographics confirm this social change. According to records for Weiyuan in Daoguang year 17 (1837), Han migrants (*Keji minren*: 客籍民人) made up 4.6 percent of the total population, the local *tunmin*¹³⁸ accounted for 56.3 percent, whereas natives only comprised 39.1 percent of the population.¹³⁹ It can be concluded that legal and illegal immigrants accounted for over sixty percent of the whole population of Weiyuan. The sharp increase in the number of Han migrants alerted the Qing court to the fact that the increasing proportion of illegal Han migrants also signalled a potential increase in tax revenue. If they did not investigate the number of illegal Han migrants present, the state would lose substantial amounts of taxes. An investigation to ascertain the specific numbers of illegal Han migrants in the area was conducted in Daoguang year 16 (1836).

As the WYTZ states (reprinted 2016, 138–139), after obtaining orders from the Qing court, the vagrant census and registers were made in Daoguang 16, the twelfth month (Dec. 1832–early 1833). Someone reported to the emperor that Yunnan has vast, dense forests and undeveloped areas. Poor men came from Hubei, Sichuan, and Guizhou provinces, and migrants have built shacks there. These vagrants live largely in Kaihua, Guangnan, and Pu’er Prefectures. As per regulations, they should be organised into the *baojia* 保甲 (system for mutual supervision).¹⁴⁰ Kaihua and the other three prefectures are on Yunnan Province’s extreme border (as China’s farthest boundary is located in Yunnan). Numerous vagrants from different places coexist. Without

¹³⁶ This could be seen as the household system of the Qing court. People are not allowed to migrate to other places according to the law.

¹³⁷ Han “traitors” refers to Han migrants who allied with the local power holders and rebelled against Chinese dynasties. The Qing ruling class defined them as the “*Hanjian*, a cultural criminal and a political traitor.” For more details, see Giersch (2001, 67–94).

¹³⁸ Native *tunmin* were legal Han migrants who were sent to the frontier by the court. *Tunmin* was a special group which appeared after *gaitu guiliu*. In Qianlong year 17 (1752), the Qing court set up *tunmin* for cultivating the waste land and guard the borders. They are soldiers in wartime and civilians in peacetime, which is meant by the term *tunmin*. For more details on the definition of *tunmin*, see Gao Wende (1998, 283).

¹³⁹ For more details, see Chapter Two.

¹⁴⁰ Mutual responsibility groups of ten households were organised into a *jia* and ten *jia* formed one *bao*. For more details, see Harris (2013, 517–557).

investigation and registration, they may become crafty bandits and dirty the place. The situations should be considered to issue tablets according to their shacks and organise them into *bao* and *jia*.

Migrants were able to move into mountainous areas by cultivating maize and potatoes to ensure adequate supplies of food.¹⁴¹ The extensive planting of maize further deepened the borderland integration of Yunnan. The extensive planting of maize and potatoes solved the problem of food supply, which gradually led to a further increase in Han migrants, and also deepened the fears of the Qing court. Before the Daoguang Emperor ascended to the throne, it was illegal for vagrant people to come to Yunnan, and they had to be repatriated. After 1833, the Qing court gradually became aware that a political approach could not solve this problem and began to adopt conventional methods to manage and control vagrant people. This was the so-called *Baojia* system, which helped the court obtain information about vagrant people and collect taxes from them. Thus, vagrant people have become legal residents since 1836, and this led to increasing numbers of Han migrants settling in Southwest Yunnan.

The problem of Han migrants in Yunnan during the late Qing dynasty went through two processes, before and after the Yunnanese Hui Muslim rebellion, an uprising led by Du Wenxiu. This rebellion was rooted more in competition over land resources than in ethnic hatred. Over the seventeen years of the uprising, the population plummeted, and after 1873 the Qing government had to encourage migration to Southwest Yunnan.¹⁴² A large number of migrants entered Yunnan, which had a significant impact on the ethnic composition of the population and the historical development of Yunnan.

The constant influx of Han migrants was a crucial factor in the borderland integration of Moeng Bò and the cultural integration of the indigenous people into Chinese culture. Han migrants brought their culture, lifestyle, modes and tools of production, among other things; simultaneously, they also integrated into the local society and adopted its customs, for instance, through intermarriage. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.6.

4.3.4.3 The Result of Borderland Integration in Moeng Bò: Cultural Diversity

The borderland integration imposed on Moeng Bò by the Qing court, along with the cultural influences introduced by Han migrants, resulted in significant changes over the course of more than a century. Moeng Bò underwent direct administrative control during the eighteenth century, resulting in the incorporation of several elements of Chinese culture enforced by the Qing court. A striking example of this influence may

¹⁴¹ See Zhou Qiong (2007, 213–232)

¹⁴² For more details, see Xie Benshu (1993, 147).

be observed in the presence of Horizontal Inscribed Boards, with Chinese characters, within Theravada Buddhist monasteries belonging to the Tai Nüa community. The presence of Han culture was prominently observed at Moeng Bò, as evidenced by the stone inscriptions and horizontal boards found in the monasteries. Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight that Tai Nüa society continued to uphold its own culture, philosophy, and rituals. The verification of this fact is evidenced by the presence of bilingual and trilingual scripts inscribed in Moeng Bò.

A Bilingual Inscription

The inscriptions discovered in the Moeng Bò district provide evidence of the cultural diversity prevalent within the local community. An intriguing inscription denoted as I1 and I3, was discovered within an ancient monastery by a collective of Xihuan people residing in Heping village, located in Yizhi town.¹⁴³

As the Chinese characters (I3) on the stone inscription are hard to recognise, local archaeologists re-inscribed the Chinese characters on a new stone monument,¹⁴⁴ which is now exhibited on the side of the road not far from where the original was buried.

¹⁴³ It is: 景谷縣益智鄉和平村昔環村民小組 (for location, see M7), the location of which is about 100 kilometres southwest of Moeng Bò and on the bank of the Mekong River. The inscription was found during the implementation of the Nuozhadu (糯紫渡) hydropower station construction and relocation project in 2012. Before its discovery, this inscription was buried and ruined during the banditry of the 1940s and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. More than half a century later, it was discovered. It documents some of the Tai people's folk customs during the Qing dynasty. Since the construction of the Nuozhadu hydropower station, the local people had to migrate to Yongping (Moeng Ka), and they brought one of the Tham script inscriptions to their new residence.

¹⁴⁴ See I2: I will use the copied version to analyse its contents as it is clearer than the original. At present, the new inscription with clearly legible characters in Chinese has been moved by the local government to a pavilion on the side of the highway to preserve it for visitors. However, the original one (see I1 and I3), hand-carved inscriptions comprising faint characters in Tham and Chinese, was moved to Yongping (Moeng Ka) town by migrants forced to relocate as a result of the construction of Nuozhadu hydropower station.



I3: The inscription at Heping Village (the side featuring Chinese characters). Local people took this picture when this inscription was found in 2012.

The original inscription (the front side and the backside, see I3 and I5), on a rectangular slab of red sandstone, is similar in shape to the local Han-style tombstones. This slab measures about 90 cm high, 51.2 cm wide, and 9 cm thick. The whole inscription is relatively well preserved. The text on one side of the inscription is still clearly visible, whereas the text on the other side is faded and difficult to read. Writing is inscribed on both sides of the stele, with Chinese characters on one side and Tham script on the other.

There are four principal Chinese characters “永遠遵守”¹⁴⁵ on the top and no text on the bottom. The text of this inscription is all in Chinese standard script, about 330 words, and divided into four parts. The first part is the date and location: namely on

¹⁴⁵ *Yongyuan zunshou*, literally means “forever obey” which are recognisable, other parts of the text are illegible. See the yellow highlight in I2.

26, Month 5 Daoguang year 3 (1823), when the Xihuan Jiexiang public inscription was present in every village¹⁴⁶.

The second part explains the formal provisions of the contract, which consist of ten articles (see I4 with the black line). Here are the English translation and Chinese original text:

Prohibition of harbouring the ringleaders of bandits [and culprits] would be reported to officials and prosecuted. Prohibition of demolishing walls and digging graves [and culprits] would be prosecuted according to village regulations. Prohibition of stealing cows and horses [and culprits] would be prosecuted according to village regulations. Prohibition of looking for excuses to take revenge [and culprits] would be prosecuted according to village regulations. Prohibition of beating or scolding [one's] parents [and culprits] would be reported to officials and prosecuted. Prohibition of searching the gardens or orchards of other people [and culprits] would be prosecuted according to the village regulations. Prohibition of stealing chickens and dogs [and culprits] would be prosecuted according to the laws of village regulations. Prohibition of drinking and fighting [and culprits] would be prosecuted according to laws of the village regulations. Prohibition of communication at night [and culprits] would be prosecuted according to the laws of the village regulations. Prohibition of loitering in gambling dens [and culprits] would be reported to officials and prosecuted.

一禁窩藏匪頭稟官究治，一禁拆牆挖墓以鄉規究辦。一禁偷牛盜馬以鄉規究辦，一禁藉故報復鄉規究辦，一禁打罵父母稟官究治，一禁搜園摸圃以鄉規憲究辦。一禁偷雞盜狗以鄉規憲究辦，一禁酗酒打架以鄉規憲究辦，一禁黑夜往來以鄉規憲究辦，一禁閒逛賭博稟官究治。

The mentioned articles offer insight into the dominant traditions of the day and illustrate a system of village governance grounded in local tradition and overarching legal frameworks during the nineteenth century. These restrictions, addressing transgressions such as harbouring criminals, property destruction, theft, and family disrespect, distinctly reflect social moral and social objectives. Their clear and comprehensible language facilitated understanding and enforcement among community members, fostering collective responsibility and social togetherness. Furthermore, other words retain practical relevance today, especially those related to property respect, community resource preservation, and the prioritisation of familial obligations. This consistency demonstrates the profound entrenchment of these principles in both historical and contemporary Tai society. The amalgamation of cultural norms with formal legal repercussions in the articles illustrates a complex system of self-regulation, wherein local practices were formalised in writing form to direct conduct and facilitate conflict resolution.

¹⁴⁶ The original text reads: (大清道光三年五月二十六日習環家鄉各村公立石). See the I4 with the red highlight.

This convergence of custom and law highlights the evolving characteristics of legal systems in Tai cultures during the Qing dynasty. The documenting of these articles in inscriptions and other documents underscores the significance of written legislation in maintaining cultural legacy while also adjusting to the community's shifting demands. Consequently, these publications not only mirror historical practices but also facilitate a continuous discourse regarding governance, social structure, and collective identity.


The third part is drawn by the green line, which comprises concluding remarks: it first comprises a proclamation for Xihuan Village announced by Officer Zhou Changran¹⁴⁷ who requires that “the above signatures [which were signed by the people] should be carried out following the rules. Anyone who deliberately violates the rules will be charged.” It details that the village is one of the thirteen villages of Weiyuan.

The fourth section, marked by the blue highlight, addresses the underlying rationale for establishing these village regulations and customary agreements. The text references instances where several villagers were harmed or even killed by individuals engaging in disruptive or harmful behaviour. Consequently, the regulations emphasise the necessity for all community members to adhere to the ten outlined provisions, ensuring order and protection for the inhabitants.¹⁴⁸


Based on a translation by local Tai scribes, Liang Li and Liu Jun (2013, 131) state that the contents of the Tai script text are the same as that of the Chinese text. I viewed the original inscription on three different occasions (28 September 2016; 3 May 2020; 5 July 2020) and confirm that the explanation of the contents of the Chinese text is correct. On the other hand, the contents of the Tham script text are quite different in meaning. The following part will give more details.

¹⁴⁷ 周常燃 in Ch.. He worked in the Weiyuan Sub-Prefectural Administrative Office during the Daoguang Emperor's regime (*r.* 1820–1850). The original text reads: 行署威遠府周常燃出示曉詞.

¹⁴⁸ The handwriting in this section of the inscription is quite indistinct and challenging to decipher, hence I have only provided a general summary of its meaning.




I5: The inscription from Heping village (the Tham script side). Photo taken by author on 5 July 2020.



สิริ or *siri* comes from Pali-Sanskrit and means “fortune”.

โวย or *vuḍhi* comes from Pali-Sanskrit and means “prosperity, growth”.



ศรี means “three”.

โวย means “fast”.

English translation

[...] was built for [...] Vinaya Dhamma¹⁴⁹ [...] in the Lesser Era (Chulasakkarat) [...] 1238 (CE 1876)¹⁵⁰ [...] the Buddhist religion has passed [many years] [...]. In the future the Buddhist religion (of the new Buddha) comes [...] in [...] on the tenth day of the waxing moon, a *tao si* day¹⁵¹ [...] [Somebody] built this vihāra [monastery] [...] two¹⁵² [...] the city [...] the principal initiator [to build the monastery] [...] [The inner group or *sattha phai nai* was led by] the Venerable monk in one great group [...] The outer group or *sattha phai nòk* (i.e., the lay persons) was led by a royal member who is a great one and faithful in Sangha [monks] [...] indeed [...] all [Triple] Gems¹⁵³ [...] to be [...] for all of us [...] [We come from all through the region located] at the entrance, the inner part and the border [of the city]. The central area is inhabited by the Great Tham Sasi¹⁵⁴ from Ban Phaeo¹⁵⁵ [Phaeo village] who was the principal initiator always with the other sponsors [to build this temple hall] [...] in the region [...] everybody who lives in Ban Kang Sop¹⁵⁶ [Kang Sop village] [...] We all from the whole region jointly built the great new temple hall (Vihan) together in order to [...] deities, angels, God Indra, Brahma

¹⁴⁹ This is part of the Buddhist canon. The Buddhist canon (*Tipiṭaka*) includes *Vinaya*, *Suttanta*, and *Abhidhamma*.

¹⁵⁰ This corresponds to CE 1876.

¹⁵¹ Calculating a day in the sixty-year cycle in the Tai traditional calendar.

¹⁵² This “two” can mean the two groups of sponsors. Specifically, this monastery was built by two groups of sponsors: the *inner* or monastic group – *sattha phai nai* (monks, novices) – and the *outer* or lay group – *sattha phai nòk* (laypeople). The collaboration of two groups to construct a religious building is a common occurrence.

¹⁵³ The Triple Gems mean Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha.

¹⁵⁴ A personal name.

¹⁵⁵ Or “Ban Kaeo.”

¹⁵⁶ We can also speculate that *Ban Kang Sop* may also be *Ban Phang Sop*, *Ban Kang Sip*, and *Ban Phang Sip*.

[...] Lord of Death, the Four Guardians of Four Directions, Nāga and Goddess of Earth [...] [May] all [the aforementioned] spirits witness [our meritorious deed of building the temple hall] [...] [May] the great results derived from this merit we collaboratively made [...] [to be inscribed in] the golden inscription¹⁵⁷. May this inscription be free from water and fire and protected well by [the aforementioned] deities. [...] [May we] escape from suffering and be full of happiness in our next lives until whenever we reincarnate in the period of Buddha Metteyya who would be reborn as our great precious teacher in this world. May all of us, both the inner monk group and outer lay group of sponsors, [...] the great Buddha [Metteyya] [...] then we altogether practice [the Dhamma, maybe] [...].

Thai translation

[...]สร้างแปงให้ [...]วินัยธรรม [...]ศักราชได้ [...]๑๒๓๘ [...]โชดกศาสนาข้าม
 ล่วงพัน [...]แลอนาคตศาสนาพระเจ้าอันจักมาภายหน้า [...]ใน [...]ขึ้นสิบค่ำพร้าได้วัน
 เต่าสี่ [...]สร้างวิหารหลังนี้ [...]สอง [...]เมืองในนั้น [...]เคล้ากายได้มี [...]มหาเถร
 เจ้าเป็นอันฝ่ายหลวง [...]ทั้งหลายภายนอกมีพระยาราชศรีทราสังฆเจ้าคนเป็นเจ้าจมน
 หนึ่ง [...]แท้อจริงแล [...]แก้วเจ้าทั้งมวล [...]เป็น [...]แก้วข้าทั้งหลาย [...]ปากแก้ว
 ห้อยในนอกภายในมีผู้หลวงธัมมัสสะศรีบ้านแพ้ว¹⁵⁸ เจ้าอันเป็นเคล้ากว่าลิกขม [...]ใน
 แคว้น [...]ขุนายใหญ่ผู้อยู่ยังในบ้านกางสบ¹⁵⁹ [...]ผู้ข้าทั้งหลายในนั้นพร้อมกับพร้อม
 กันมาสร้างวิหารใหม่หลวงนี้เป็น [...]เทวนบุตรเทวดาพระยอินทร์พรหม [...]ยม
 มหาราชทั่วจตุโลกทั้งสี่นาคครุฑศรี [...]เจ้าทั้งหลายเป็นธรรมสักชี [...]กุศลมหานา
 บุญผู้ข้าทั้งหลายสร้าง [...]ไว้ในสุวรรณจาริกลานคำ ตกน้ำอย่าไหลตกไฟอย่าไหม้หือ
 เทพให้คำชู [...]พันทุกขถึงสุขในชาติหน้าตราบต่อเท่าพระศรีอริยเมตไตรยเจ้าลงมาเป็น
 ครูแก้วแก่โลกเมื่อใดขอศรีทราข้าทั้งหลายในนอก [...]สัพพัญญูพระเจ้าตนนั้นหือ [...]
 แล้วพร้อมกันปฏิบัติเข้า [...]

Therefore, the front side (in Chinese characters) was written by the Qing regular official for the purpose of managing the local people, whereas the back side (in Tham script) recounts the wishes of the donors to make merit. Moreover, the date on the side of the Chinese characters is recorded as CE 1823. However, the date of the Tham script is recorded as CS 1238 (CE 1876). This marks a time gap of fifty-three years. This begs the question, why were two different dates recorded on one inscription? Maybe it was written on two distinct occasions for different reasons. This subject necessitates greater investigation and clarification.

First, this inscription provides evidence that Qing administrative influence extended into this remote area, rich in salt and tea. Secondly, Tham script text is not a translation of the Chinese text, it does not record any of the contents detailed in the Chinese inscription. We may conclude that the Tham script text was intended to be

¹⁵⁷ สุวรรณจาริกลานคำ *Suwanna carēk lan kham* means the Suwanna gold inscription. Such an inscription is believed to be on a gold plate recording the merit that a person has made though out their life. The golden plate will be read by the Lord of Death, so that he can judge whether the dead spirit should be destined for the hells or the heavens. When one makes merit, they believe that their merit will be recorded on the golden plate that will be delivered to the Lord of Death. People, therefore, wish that the golden plate is well protected until it reaches the Lord of Death.

¹⁵⁸ Or “บ้านแก้ว.”

¹⁵⁹ This บ้านกางสบ can also be speculated in other different words: “บ้านพางสบ,” “บ้านกางสิบ,” and “บ้านพางสิบ.”

different from that of the Chinese. The contents of the Tham script text are typical for a Tai cultural expression and replete with Tai worldview, religion, and spirituality. Tai culture was deeply entrenched in local society, even when local Tai people were required to confront the encroachment of Han culture, they tried to retain their own cultural and religious practices. As Giersch (2001, 70) notes, “diverse frontier people have neither given up the ghost nor disappeared from the Chinese political and cultural landscape.”

Chinese administrative power could only barely reach the truly remote and inaccessible districts.¹⁶⁰ Local authorities had to rely on local society to organise local laws to regulate the behaviour of villagers because they lacked an effective primary administrative system. This kind of social organisation, i.e., with the *moeng* (*müang*) as the principal administrative unit which took responsibility for supervising the local people was common. Such regulations and official inscriptions in the local Tai Nüa society, simultaneously written in two or three scripts,¹⁶¹ are rare in Yunnan. These have outstanding historical value as they show that the Han and Tai cultures interacted in remote areas.

A Three Scripts Inscription

Photo I6 shows the three scripts of Moeng Bò. That is a typical inscription in Moeng Bò showcasing a multicultural crossroads. The inscription is from Leiguang Foji monastery, which is located next to Yongping town (Moeng Ka) in Moeng Bò.¹⁶²

This multi-layered inscription was written in three scripts: the left side of the text was written in Tham script; the right side in Lik script; and the middle and the margins were written in ancient Chinese. The Chinese part provides details pertaining to the temple’s date of construction and explanations of various Buddhist concepts. The Chinese characters outlined in red read: “大皈依光生就西彌”, which means: to be a Buddhist who will arrive in paradise. The Chinese characters highlighted in the yellow


¹⁶⁰ China has controlled this vast territory since the Qin dynasty’s unification (BCE 2). The conflicts between central and local authorities are not a new story and continue to be an issue even today. The concept of rural autonomy is widely invoked in modern China and has also caused many issues, thereby attracting academic scrutiny. For more details, see Li Huayin (2019, 73–81).

¹⁶¹ Tham and Chinese or, sometimes, even three scripts, Tham, Lik, and Chinese, see I4.

¹⁶² Structurally, the monastery has a main hall with double eaves and multiple roof ridges. It was called the Holy Land of Buddhism in Southeast Asia. In sterling silver, it costs 110, 000 liang; the engraving of the epigraph alone costs 3666 liang. In the Lik script on the right, it is written that all of the gods came to worship here after the temple was completed. Twelve places in the province pay homage to it, including Moeng Luo, Xiao Jinggu, Moeng Wiang, Moeng Pin, Kūng Ma, Shuangjiang, Moeng Bò, Moeng Pan, and Moeng Zhu. Only devout pilgrims could reach the Daxianrenfojjiao monastery on Leiguang Mountain. On arrival, they were supposed to wash their faces and hands in the spring of Dishuiyan, light a candle, and then worship the Buddha, so that they could purge the sins of generations. Afterwards, they would enjoy good luck, for instance, regarding fertility and wealth, and live a long and safe life (SMNJ 2006, 466).

boxes have two sides (from the left to the right side): “不是一凡苦行未知何處覓仙跡;若非百計躊躇那得斯地有名山” The first line (on the left-hand side) means: “If you have not experienced asceticism, you cannot find the fairyland”; the second line (on the right) means: “If you did not try your best to stay here, how would you know that there is a famous mountain”. The Chinese characters in the middle, situated within the black box, concern the construction date: “乾隆五十年丙午住持護朝瞻鼎，孟春月款旦立.” This means: “In Binwu Qianlong year 50 (1785), the abbot Zhanding blessed [the monastery], Meng Chunyue built [this inscription]”.

The first line of the title is written in Tham script, whereas the second line outlined in red comprises Chinese characters. The date is recorded in Tham script on the left, according to CS 1147, which is equivalent to the year 1733 of the Gregorian calendar.



I6: Inscription at Leiguang Foji monastery, Moeng Ka, Moeng Bò. It is dated CE 1785; Left: Tham script; right: Lik script. The middle and margins are written in classical Chinese characters. Photo taken by author on 4 September 2010.

The left part between the two ancient Chinese scripts is written in Tham script. Here are her translations:

In the *dap sai* year, on the sixth waxing moon day of the seventh lunar month, on the sixth day of the week, which is called a *dap sai* day as the Tai say, in CS 1147,¹⁶³ I, called Phra Khru (teacher-monk) Canthepa, departed from Thutharatha Ratchaburi city, and arrived [here] with the religious faith together with all monks in the city to discover the Buddha's footprint here on Mount Karapattakhaem in Moeng Ka. [The Buddha's footprint] is to be venerated by all citizens in every city, monks, Brahmans and faithful laypeople including the royal siblings *Cao Fa* (prince) Luang Kham Wong and *cao fa* (prince) Luang Kham Khuat who are the principal initiators [from] the two (*songsan* – unclear meaning) [and] three [*müang*] for anyone who lives in all *pak* (district)¹⁶⁴ and all *khwaen*¹⁶⁵ in all *müang* and all villages, for all females and all male, for all adults and all children. [They] together collaborated in the monastic construction of abode, pavilion and ordination hall and arranged the area of the Buddha's footprint to be venerated by deities, human beings, God Indra, God Brahma, Garuda, Nāga, Kumbhakāśa¹⁶⁶ and Khon Than¹⁶⁷ until the period of the future Buddha Metteyya. May [all aforementioned creatures] gather and sustain the Buddha's footprint for the benefit of all beings in accordance with the proper way of religious traditions. May [the merit derived from the construction] be a factor leading us, who are internal donors (Sangha) and external donors (laypeople), to reach Nibbāna. The construction started in the *dap sai* year and was completed in the *dap mao* year. To witness the construction, please take eight big flowers (ดอกหลวง Dòk Luang) in the Tai weight measurement of 111,000 [to show the veneration].

นโมพุทธาย

ปีดับสี่ ในสำเดือน ๗ ได้เข้า ๖ คำ พร้าได้วัน ๖ ไทยภาษาว่าวันดับสี่ ยามอุทธรังราชาสกราค¹⁶⁸ได้พันปลาย ร้อยปลาย สิบ ๗ ตัว เรียกตัว ๑ ข้าตนชื่อพระครูจันเทปา ลูกแต่พุทธเจ้ามา มาโขงกับด้วยพระสงฆ์ เจ้าทั้งเมือง มาปิดไข¹⁶⁹บาทพระบาทเจ้า ในดอยกรปัดเขม¹⁷⁰ เมืองกล้าที่นี้ หือปรากฏเป็นที่ไหว้แก่รัฐเทศ เขตอาณาทุกทิศ ทั้งสมณพราหมณ์ และศรัทธาทั้งหลาย มีขัตติยราชตระกูล เจ้าฟ้าหลวงคำวงศ์ เจ้าฟ้าหลวง

¹⁶³ 1147 Vaisakha 6 = Thursday, 14 April 1785. This day, however, was a *dap mao* day.

¹⁶⁴ *Pak* (ปาก) actually means “hundred” in the Tai Nüa language, and *pak na*, lit. “one hundred rice fields,” signifies an administrative unit below the *panna* level. See Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 28–29).

¹⁶⁵ See Chapter Two fn. 40.

¹⁶⁶ An ogre who is the son of Thotsakan's sister in the classical literature Ramakian.

¹⁶⁷ Non-human creature playing with a musical instrument.

¹⁶⁸ Dr Jaengsawang assumes that the word “ยามอุทธรังราชาสกราค” means Chulasakkarat.

¹⁶⁹ The word ปิด means “to open” in the northeastern Thai dialect. The word ไข means “to solve.” So, the phrase ปิดไข means “to discover.”

¹⁷⁰ The word ดอยกรปัดเขม is a mountain (ดอย) named “กรปัดเขม (*ka-ra-pat-ta-khaem*).” There is a mountain called *Karapattakhaem* and others that sound similar.

คำควด เจ้าพี่น้องเป็นเกล้ากว่าท้าวขุนมูลศรัทธาสองสงสานสาม[เมือง]ทุกปาก ทุกแคว้น
 ทุกบ้าน ทุกช่อง ทุกหญิง ทุกชาย ใหญ่่น้อย มาพร้อมกันสร้างแต่งกุฎิวิหารอาราม
 แวดวัง¹⁷¹ ก่อ¹⁷²ปลูกชำ¹⁷³ พระบาทเจ้าศรีพระองค์นี้ ไว้เป็นที่สักการบูชาแก่เทพ มนุษย์
 อินทร์ พรหม ครุฑ นาค กุมภกาศ คนธรรพ์ ไหว่นบกรบยา ต่อเท่าถึง พระเมตไต่ยเจ้า
 ของมบวรมวล แลย้าพระบาทเจ้าไว้ แก่สรรพสัตว์โลกทั้งมวล ตามพุทธประเพณีแด
 ขอหือเป็นบัจจย นำผู้ชำทั้งหลายในนอก พลันรอดนิพพานเจ้าแด ปัดบไต้ ตั้งแต่สร้างมา
 ถึงปัดบหม้า ด้วยวัตถุทาน จงนำแปดดอกหลวง เสี่ยงแสนปลายหมั้น ปลายพันน้ำหนัก
 เมืองไต่ ไว้เป็นสักขีแด

The orally transmitted local legend of the Leiguang Foji Si monastery, conversely, is recounted as follows: There was a living Buddha called Zhanding in Cangyuan (Lincang Prefecture today). He came to Moeng Ka through Küng Ma and Shuangjiang (again, present-day Lincang Prefecture). After sunset, he saw Buddha’s white light shining in the forest on Lei Guanhan Mountain (where Sakyamuni’s footprints lie), so he went to investigate the forest alone and eventually discovered the immortal footprint. After waking up, he recounted this experience to the Moeng Ka native official *tusi*, the two brothers Hulongkongge and Hulongkongwo. They decided to build a monastery in that location. Following negotiations, it was decided that Zhanding would be in charge of the endeavour and the two brothers be in charge of raising funds. They organised labour to build the Daxianrenjiao monastery started in 1733; it was completed fifty-two years later in 1785.

The local oral legend is a bit different from the contents of the Tham script text. The Tham script text consists of an account of the author, a monk who came from Thutharatha Ratchaburi city.¹⁷⁴ He states why he came here and where found the Buddha’s footprint. He also appealed that all the people of Moeng Ka, including the royal family, should collaborate to construct the monastery while awaiting the arrival of future Buddha Metteyya.

The presence of both bilingual and trilingual inscriptions serves as evident documentation of the influence of Han culture on the local Tai Nüa society, as well as its role in upholding social order within the community. There are differences in the substance of the Tham script between I3 and I4. I4 provides an account from the author, whereas I3 features an inscription that includes a salutation or a benediction. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that both inscriptions feature salutations that persistently mirror the enduring philosophical principles of the indigenous community.

A Horizontally Inscribed Board

¹⁷¹ The word แวดวัง sounds like “area” because แวดล้อม in central Thai means “surrounding.” The word *กม* means “pavilion.” Thus, แวดวังกม means “the area of the pavilion.”

¹⁷² The word ก่อ means “to build”, “to construct.”

¹⁷³ The word ปลูกชำ means “to plant.”

¹⁷⁴ I cannot find more detail about this city. it may be a Pali name for a real city in the real world. This Pali name, I assume it may be a fairy land in the Buddhist world.

In a similar vein, there is one horizontally inscribed board preserved in the Maomi official monastery, in Moeng Ka, Moeng Bò.¹⁷⁵ This one is 兜率綏邊 (Dou shuai sui bian, see H1). It means “Tusita comfort the borders.”¹⁷⁶ The date of this horizontally inscribed board was written as Guangxu Year 13 (1877). Even though this is a Theravada Buddhist monastery – that is to say, not a monastery dedicated to Chinese Buddhism – the horizontal boards of the main hall are marked with classical Chinese characters. This is further evidence that Han culture had penetrated deeply into such remote areas.



H1: Horizontally Inscribed Board at the Maomi Official Monastery (Constructed 1877). Photo taken by author on 5 September 2012.

Maomi was a salt trade market. Mao seems to be the phonetic rendering of the Tai word *bò* (ᐅᐅ), which means “mine” in the local dialect as well as other Tai languages.¹⁷⁷ Mi might be the phonetic rendering of *maek*, which could possibly be a


¹⁷⁵ It is about 90 kilometres southwest Weiyuan town.

¹⁷⁶ Tusita is a Pali word, and it is the heavenly abode where the future Buddha Metteyya is believed to reside.

¹⁷⁷ However, in Dehong Tai *mo¹¹* (*mò*) means “mineral” 礦; 礦井 and *mi⁵⁵* means wealthy : rich 富; 富裕; 富足; 富有. For more details, see Meng Zunxian’s Dictionary (2007, 1252 & 1268). Therefore, *Mo¹¹ mi⁵⁵* looks closer to the Chinese *maomi* than *bò maek*. Therefore, a less forced and more plausible explanation would be “rich in mines” indicating many mines. Also, in Dehong Tai, the usual word for salt mine is *mo¹¹* (*mò*) *kä³³* = 鹽井. In Dehong Tai, *maek* does not mean salt. The Moeng Ka dialect might be influenced by the Tai Lü language. For more details, see

local word for salt. Therefore, Maomi means salt.

A local scribe wrote this in the Tham script, namely, บ่อแมก in Thai (*bò maek*, for location, see M7), which means salt well or salt mine (see P5). Maomi was a vital transport route for salt and tea to the west bank of the Mekong River. The Qing court's regular officials were sent to pacify the local people and manage the local salt mines. The business was prosperous and led to the arrival of a variety of people involved in the industry, i.e., tea, salt, and maybe opium trade. This is the reason why this remote monastery has an inscription discouraging the use of opium in three scripts: Tham, Lik, and classical Chinese.



P5: Tham Script Writing of Maomi. A local scribe wrote down the Tham script for me on 5th May 2020.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, Moeng Bò is geographically located in the Tai Mao and Tai Lü federation kingdom (*r.* ?1256–1444, Dehong).¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the northern section of Moeng Bò is close to the inland Han. Historically, the Tai Mao and the Tai Lü federation Kingdoms exerted political and cultural influence on Moeng Bò. The Chinese dynasties, however, wanted to expand into the Mekong Basin, which started with political and military pacification, before proceeding to cultural integration. As a result of these competing cultural influences, bilingualism is a common phenomenon in Tai-inhabited districts.

Even though the local Tai people are familiar with Chinese characters, my investigation of Moeng Bò, through the examination of such inscriptions and

Ibid. (2007, 1268).

¹⁷⁸ According to the Gong Suzheng trans. (1988, 19–24, 33–41) and the *Hsenwi State Chronicle*, which was translated or comprised by Scott (1967: 18), the ruler of Tai Mao was Khun Hpang Hkam, whose reign started in 1156. However, Fang Guoyu vol. 3 (2001, 532–559) believed that Khun Hpang Hkam succeeded to the throne 100 years later, which would be 1256. Moreover, Daniels points out that the earliest records for it come from the 1330s and the Tai Lü Federation Kingdom (*r.* 1180–1950, Sipsòng Panna). For more details, see Daniels (2000, 51–52), Daniels (2006, 28), Daniels (2012, 147–176), and Kirigaya (2015, 235–268).

interviews with local people, shows that the Tai Nüa people never gave up their worldview and religious faith. It could thus be concluded that while Moeng Bò has been under the political control of the Qing court since the *gaitu guiliu* and, moreover, Han influences have gradually permeated the local society. However, the core ideology of the Tai Nüa is still alive today.

4.3.4.4 Summary

The purpose of *gaitu guiliu* and the establishment of Pu'er Prefecture was to strengthen the Qing court's control over the border areas. On the one hand, this was done to collect revenue from the tea and salt trade to subsidise the deficit of Yunnan's fiscal expenditures, which exceeded Yunnan's tax revenue (see T11, T12 and T13). On the other hand, Yunnan is situated far from the political centre of Beijing. Transportation was insufficient and little information reached the capital. This led Chinese officials to dare deceive the court. Therefore, the self-regulation of local officials alone could not achieve long-term security for the border. These officials broke the law, bullied native officials, and oppressed the local people, in the name of the authority. This eventually resulted in ongoing rebellions on the part of the Yi, a not altogether surprising outcome given the circumstances. The *cao fa* (native official or *tusi*), moreover, were stripped of their powers and associated benefits after the *gaitu guiliu*. Angry *cao fa* were the first to lead the resistance against the Qing court.

Since the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu*, ethnic groups continuously resisted the rule of Chinese officials under the leadership of native officials. Such resistance caused the court tremendous difficulties in managing the border areas and brought great disaster to the local people.

Gaitu guiliu seems to have been inevitable. Nevertheless, the fundamental purpose of the change was to extract economic benefits from the border areas. Inevitably, this wrought great harm on the (already economically deprived) local people, predominantly consisting of ethnic groups and some *cao fa*. The local people and *cao fa* eventually united to kill the regular officials and turn against the Qing court, in what seems, historically, to have been an act of necessity. To this end, the need to appease the abolished *tusi* system and local people became a fundamental issue through the *gaitu guiliu* process.

In addition, most of the polities had complicated relations with other powers in Mainland Southeast Asia, notably the Tai polities of the frontiers. Thus, once the inner conflicts happened, it was easy for them to appeal for help from other Tai polities or Burma, all of which were hugely detrimental to the security and stability of the Qing court's borderland policy.

For example, in 1802, the ruler of Moeng Long Tao Yung Khò (Dao Yonghe or

Cao Fa Can in Ch.) colluded with “Kawila”¹⁷⁹ to invade Chiang Rung.¹⁸⁰ In 1822, the headman of Sipsòng Panna named Tao Thai Khang (Dao Taikang in Ch.), and his nephew engaged in a feud, thereby providing Chiang Mai with a pretext to intervene in Sipsòng Panna’s internal affairs.¹⁸¹ In 1847, the second son of Cao Maha Nòi (Tao Sunwu or Dao Shengwu in Ch.) and a headman Dao Zhunchen, successively invaded Sipsòng Panna and its subordinate areas.

Analysing the experiences and lessons of the borderland integration of Moeng Bò in the Qing dynasty may provide us with some historical references for a better understanding of the conflicts and symbiotic relationships among borderland ethnic groups of China.

4.3.5 The Qing court’s Integration Strategy in the Upper Mekong Region

4.3.5.1 The Qing Court’s Governance of Yunnan

At the beginning of the Qing dynasty, as Yunnan had not yet been pacified, the last emperor of the Southern Ming dynasty, Emperor Yongli (*r.* 1646–1662), and his followers fled to Yunnan.¹⁸² Later, Wu Sangui rebelled against the Qing using Yunnan as an operational base. The Qing government tried to stabilise the situation on the southwestern frontier. The Qing regime had no previous experience in governing border areas in the southwest, so it continued Ming policy and made no changes to the native official system (Giersch 2006, 22). Qing strategy indeed achieved significant results and various southwest native officials submitted their allegiance to the court. The Qing court suppressed the resistance of the Southern Ming regime and the “The Revolt of the Three Feudatories”¹⁸³ from 1673 to 1681 through its native official vassals.

After the Qing court consolidated its position, it augmented the native official *tusi* system that it had inherited from the Ming. Though the provincial-level Pacification Commissions were already introduced during the Yuan dynasty, the native official system was fully established during the Ming dynasty.¹⁸⁴ The Qing court engaged native officers to guard the borders, thereby ensuring the security of the

¹⁷⁹ Kawila was subordinate to Siam. For more details about Kawila see Chapter Four fn. 31.

¹⁸⁰ Tao Yung Khò first joined Lan Na troops in 1806, and then he was appointed as *saenwi fa* (Pacification Commissioner) by Burma but rejected by China. Later, he travelled to Ava to ask for help returning to Sipsòng Panna, where he was willing to present six *panna* to the west of Mekong River to Burma. For more details, see Liew, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 65, 185–186).

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁸² For more details, see Mote (1999, 824–827).

¹⁸³ Ch. 三藩之乱: *Sanfan zhiluan*, see *Ibid.*, 844–848.

¹⁸⁴ See *Ibid.*, 485.

border areas of the empire at a minimal cost.¹⁸⁵ Through the *gaitu guiliu* policy, a series of military and administrative measures gradually facilitated the Qing court's governance of the border areas. A key part of this reform was the deliberate dissemination of Confucian education. Through this measure, the Tai were formally integrated into the Chinese administrative system step by step. As a result of such borderland integration policies, the boundaries of the empire continuously expanded.

The Qing encountered much resistance when strengthening its power in border area through the *gaitu guiliu* policy. In addition to the corruption of regular officials, which exacerbated problems with local society, the implementation of *gaitu guiliu* – which involved integrating the Tai elites by stripping them of their titles and powers – also created unrest. The insatiable oppression of Chinese officials also meant that the lives of everyday people, who were already beset by many hardships, became unbearable. In consequence, the Tai people had no choice but to unite with the Tai elites to resist the Qing changes to local administration. Resistance gradually subsided during the Qianlong period. In order to appease the local Tai elites in Moeng Bò, Emperor Qianlong followed a usual policy of appointing successors who were hereditary descendants of the native official.¹⁸⁶

Conversely, the *gaitu guiliu* policy was not promoted in Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem as Chinese power did not extend to remote and malaria-prone areas lacking transportation and medical facilities at the time.¹⁸⁷ The Qing court was also more cautious in handling frontier affairs because of the war with Burma in the late Qianlong period.¹⁸⁸ In order to maintain reliable support from the native officials on the frontiers, the Qing court had to acquiesce to the status quo of native officials' control in Southwest Yunnan¹⁸⁹ from the time of the Jiaqing Emperor (Jiaqing year 8, or CE 1803). The monarchs of the Qing court maintained a conservative style and adopted loose policies on the southwestern frontier until the arrival of Western colonial powers.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ Giersch (2006, 13).

¹⁸⁶ The headman Dao Xijin was appointed Weiyuan *tu qianzong* (the native military officer, the official rank was sub-six class) as Dao Xijin contributed to the Sino-Burmese war during the 1764–1765 (JGXZ 1993, 10).

¹⁸⁷ The Qing court once tried to send the military to the west bank of the Mekong River (namely Sipsòng Panna) in Qianlong year 30 (1765). However, the soldiers could not stand the climate and the tropical disease, such as malaria. As QSG chapter. 528, B. 315, S3 records: “Last year the outer of Jiulong River (the west bank of Mekong River) [our] soldiers and horses were dead under the countless number because of malaria, most of [our] officers and labours also were dead.” The original text reads: “上年九龍江外兵馬以瘴死者不可勝數，官弁夫役死亦大半。”

¹⁸⁸ For more details regarding public transportation in Yunnan, see Lee (2012, 71–84).

¹⁸⁹ The Qing court actually accepted “Chinese-Burmese condominiums” (Liew-Herres and Grabowsky and Renoo 2012, 49).

¹⁹⁰ For an explanation of the rationales underpinning such an approach, see Ma Jianxiong (2018, 54–99). This will also be discussed further section.

Frontier governance has always been an enormous challenge for an empire extending over a vast territory. The political centre of an empire is always far away from the frontiers. In the pre-modernisation period, it was difficult for Chinese military forces to garrison the frontiers for extended periods of time. In the case of China, the armies from the central plains had to cope with the climate and general environment of the southwestern frontier, because they are so different from the Central Plains. This meant that the empire's military power had no way to penetrate the frontier from the early to the late Qing dynasty. Without the support of the military, it was difficult for administrative representatives of the court, such as regular officials, to enforce Chinese policy. As a result, rebellions and chaos could occur frequently. Under such circumstances, it became imperative for the empire to choose proper and loyal agents who could manage the frontier and guard its borders. The officials of the Qing court knew this well.

Cai Yurong (b.? –1699), the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces in Kangxi year 21 (1682) submitted a memorial to Emperor Kangxi proposing ten strategies for rebuilding Yunnan after the defeat of Wu Sangui.¹⁹¹ He made some creative and influential suggestions, some of which led to conflict between the Qing court and native officials. Strategy number two pertained to the governance of “indigenous people” in the frontier areas, and it became the primary strategy for dealing with the southwestern native officials during the Qing dynasty.

Cai suggests that the Yunnanese were the most difficult to rule due to the coexistence of indigenous peoples and Han Chinese in Yunnan province. The past policy was to control Yi under Yi (以夷制夷). The native officials often fought for hegemony and vendettas as they are inherited. Thus, their descendants should attend Confucian Schools to study rituals and inheritance of Confucian culture. The lineage's ambitious progeny should sit for prefecture and county exams with Han Chinese candidates and tour China to become famous. The worthless should be demoted or expelled, while the righteous should receive rank or official clothes. Cai has invested that Modern native officials differ from those from peaceful, war-free days, and careful research and planning can help combine Yi barbaric habits with Qing norms.¹⁹²

Therefore, in the early Qing dynasty, the first strategy was to govern the ethnic peoples through the native office system. By granting the native officials' privileges and power, it would be possible to win over their loyalty and pacify the border areas. At the same time, it was only an admonition from the court without exile or

¹⁹¹ Ch. 《籌滇十議疏》: *Chou Dian Shi Yi Shu*.

¹⁹² Summarised from Fang Guoyu et al. (eds), vol.8 (2001, 425–427). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Four, No. 21.

decapitating those who made mistakes. The second strategy was to “civilise”¹⁹³ the native office system via Confucian education, the dissemination of Chinese rituals. Ambitious native officials would also be allowed to sit the Imperial Examination¹⁹⁴ and finally become scholar-bureaucrats (Shi Daifu: 士大夫) in the Qing court. The Qing court believed that this would encourage non-Han elites to search for fame and pursue an official career. The aim of this was to integrate ethnic groups through Chinese ways.

The Yongzheng Emperor started *gaitu guiliu* in order to strengthen imperial power and increase taxation in Yunnan. This started in Moeng Bò where imperial officials were stationed to govern the former territories of native officials. *Gaitu guiliu* caused the Tai and Lahu people to unite in opposition against the court for decades. The Qing court learned a lesson from those rebellions and adopted more lenient policies in the areas where the native office system had not yet been abolished. It was the best course of action to guarantee stability on the southwestern border. This integration was a gradual process; after all, “Rome was not built in one day.” Indeed, it takes several generations for any country or region in the world to integrate ethnic groups.

4.3.5.2 Taxation Policy in Southwest Yunnan

The rulers of the Ming and Qing dynasties mainly used political and military approaches vis-à-vis the integration of Yunnan. In order to gain the support of the indigenous people, both dynasties adopted measures of non-taxation or less taxation in native official areas and the indigenous people. Lee’s research shows that the deficit of fiscal expenditure and revenue (taxes and native official tributes) in Yunnan was huge during the Ming and Qing dynasties. See T11 below:

¹⁹³ As I point out in the Preface, the Tai people were already highly civilised before the arrival of the imperial power. They do not need any power to “civilise” them. The Qing court wanted to “civilise” them, because they are different from the mainstream culture of the court (Han culture). They have their own culture, language, script, religion, philosophy, and so forth. The Qing court intended to assimilate them. The word “civilise” is used as this was the Qing court’s expression, however, the double quotation marks demonstrate that the present author does not agree with the imperial court’s views.

¹⁹⁴ This is the so-called: *Ke ju kao shi* (科举考试), which lasted for over 1300 years since the Sui dynasty (581 AD–618 AD). The system was a significant strategy to select intellectual candidates for the Imperial court’s bureaucracy. Asian countries which were influenced by the Chinese Han culture also adopted this system for a while, for example, in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. For more details, see Wang Rui (2013, 3).

T11: Aboriginal Tribute (Taxes and Labour) of Yunnan in the Ming Dynasty

(Source: Lee (2012, 50))

Types of Tribute \ Year	1580	1625
Gold (<i>liang</i>)	16	66 (66*8=528 silver <i>liang</i>)
Domestic animals (<i>tou</i>)	121	121
Cotton (<i>duan</i>)	1700	1700
Piebald Bamboo Silver (<i>liang</i>)		1639
Silver (<i>liang</i>)	8487	9455
Cereal (<i>shi</i>)	9163	8,191 (8,191*0.6=4915 <i>liang</i>) (Ibid., 56)
cowrie Money (<i>mei</i>)	21,790,160	16,190,224 (16,190,224/7500=2159 silver <i>liang</i>) (Ibid.)
Total (estimate in the number in silver <i>liang</i>)	cannot estimate	Around 20,000 silver <i>liang</i>

The Qing dynasty inherited the native official system from the Ming dynasty and retained many of their policies for governing the southwest. As a new conqueror though, the Qing government needed to establish a mass popular base. Thus, the Qing dynasty adopted a very pro-people policy.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, even if the amount of native official tribute collected by the Qing was not any less than that collected by the Ming. I estimate that the Qing collected the equivalent of 20,000 silver *liang* in native official tribute: 2,000 silver *liang*, the silver, gold, and money cowrie totaling 18,000 silver *liang*. Next, we turn to the amount of tax collected by the Qing court. Lee's study, rendered in T12 below, provides excellent statistics:

¹⁹⁵ See Mote (1999, 820) and Lee (2012, 42).

T12: Table of Tax Sources of Yunnan Province during Ming and Qing Dynasties

[Data sourced from (ibid, 54)]

Unit: *liang* and *shi*

period Description of Taxes	Ming	Qing
Land taxes (<i>liang</i>)	125,000	125,000
Land taxes (<i>shi</i>)	500,000	220,000
Salt taxes (<i>liang</i>)	50,000	300,000
Silver taxes (<i>liang</i>)	75,000	50,000
Copper taxes (<i>liang</i>)	17,000	250,000
Profits of money casting (<i>liang</i>)	---	60,000
Business taxes (<i>liang</i>)	20,000	50,000
Labour taxes (<i>liang</i>)	100,000	100,000
Aboriginal tribute (<i>liang</i>)	17,000	Unknown
Total	404,000	935,000

Combining native official tribute and taxation, income from Yunnan during the Qing period, therefore, was around 955,000 *liang*. However, the enormous fiscal expenditures required in the southwest during the Ming and Qing periods – for civil affairs and military expenditures – meant that they struggled to make it balanced. This situation put the Ming and Qing courts under tremendous financial pressure. The totals of figures in Tables 11 and 12 show that it was challenging to meet the expenditures listed in Table 13 below:

T13: The Table of Recurrent Expenditure of Yunnan in Ming and Qing Dynasties

[Data sourced from (ibid, 52)]

Unit: *liang*

Period Description of Expenses	Ming Dynasty	Qing Dynasty
Civil administration expenses	Unknown	300,000
Military expenses	Unknown	800,000
Commissariat	130,000	170,000
Total	130,000	1,270,000

T13 shows the total expenses for the Qing dynasty amounted to around 1,270,000 *liang* whereas total revenue was only 955,000 *liang*, leaving a deficit of 315,000 silver *liang*. It is obvious that Qing financial expenditure in Yunnan was huge, especially in the case of wars; military expenditures were calculated in millions of *liang*.¹⁹⁶ Yunnan's fiscal revenue not only failed to meet daily demands, but the Ming and Qing courts were left with a budget deficit. In order to make up for this deficit, the Ming and Qing dynasties both adopted open-source methods. For example, the Ming dynasty increased its fiscal revenue through the reclamation of barren land in military and civilian state farms (*juntun* and *mintun*).¹⁹⁷ The Qing dynasty, in contrast, worked to develop commerce and significantly increase production in the mining industry. The Yongzheng Emperor adopted the *gaitu guiliu* policy in Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture: first, to strengthen the Qing court's control over the frontiers; and second, moreover, to commandeer the tea and salt trade in Moeng Bò,¹⁹⁸ thereby increasing Imperial revenue. Qing soldiers, however, failed to adapt to the tropical climate and malaria-prone regions, so the Qing court was unable to directly control the area west of the Mekong River until the late nineteenth century.

4.3.5.3 Summary

The process of the borderland integration of the Tai Nüa polities was quite different. In Moeng Bò, the result of the *gaitu guiliu* was local rebellion and Chinese suppression. The rebels in Moeng Bò, however, taught the Qing court a profound lesson. Under the Qianlong regime, the policy regarding the southwest native officials changed and there was a decrease in violent suppression of local resistance, and the number of cases of unrest fell. The Qing dynasty reappointed the descendants of the original local native officials as native military commanders. Co-opting the Tai elites achieved the goal of stabilising local society. Nonetheless, there were still hill tribes who refused to submit to Qing rule. They migrated to the west of the Mekong River and settled in the territory of the Moeng Laem. This triggered a long-term conflict between the Moeng Laem Tai and the Lahu people. This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

Moeng Bò was the first Tai polity to be integrated into the Qing court. The Kūng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission was established by the court with the aim of weakening Moeng Ting. The court wanted a loyal frontier native official to guard the empire's border. Kūng Ma was a reliable partner that competed with Moeng Ting for political support; to compete Kūng Ma needed the help of the Qing court. Although the court did not directly rule in Kūng Ma and its Confucian values had little influence

¹⁹⁶ See Lee (2012, 38).

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 40–42.

¹⁹⁸ See Ma Jianxiong (2007, 553–600).

there, Kūng Ma never rebelled against the court. Although Moeng Ting did not directly disobey orders from the Chinese court, it was sometimes indifferent to them. This made the political support of the court more inclined towards Kūng Ma. Kūng Ma seized the opportunity for development and even grew to the equal stature of Moeng Ting.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to emphasise that borderland integration in Moeng Bò did not mean the ethnic groups were wholly integrated into Chinese culture during this period. It shows that the ethnic groups accepted parts of Chinese culture appropriate to their needs; that is, they absorbed some Chinese cultural aspects at both the ideological and material levels. Their territories were under the administrative jurisdiction and military control of the Qing. In this context, ethnic groups continued to retain the core parts of local culture and identity, for instance, the language, culture, philosophy and religious beliefs which distinguish them from other groups. Therefore, it is important to recognise cultural diversity among Yunnan's ethnic groups, which will provide fertile ground for further academic research.

4.3.6 Acculturation of Han Migrants: Intermarriages/Integration and Local People

When the term “integration” is mentioned, we should note that processes of integration and acculturation interact with each other. The borderland integration of the Qing court with the indigenous population of Moeng Bò was more comprehensive than the local ethnic groups in Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem. Conversely, the extent to which Han migrants acculturated to the local society of Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem is more substantive than Han migrants in Moeng Bò.

After the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu* policy, Han people migrated to the area east of the Mekong River. Moeng Bò, which was rich in tea and salt resources, was the first choice for Han migrants. The discovery of the Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma silver mines also attracted large numbers of Han migrants. They migrated to these places with the intention of cultivating the wasteland and settling in the mining areas to make a living. As such, it was inevitable that they would come into contact with the local inhabitants.

Han migration's acculturation and borderland integration were very different processes to the Qing court's coercive means such as those utilised in Moeng Bò. The migration of the Han occurred mostly spontaneously, driven by economic interests and faced with increasing pressures to survive. Following the traditional agricultural idea of being “attached to the land and unwilling to move,”¹⁹⁹ their behaviour was not

¹⁹⁹ Ch. 安土重遷: *An tu zhong qian*. In the traditional agricultural society, men wanted to rely on their home places to make a living. They were unwilling to move elsewhere to start a new life. For more explanations see the online

sanctioned by Chinese dynasties. In fact, mobility was regarded as a factor contributing to instability and rebellion. As such, the Qing court opposed such migrants and attempted to suppress them.²⁰⁰ Such migrants were labelled “vagrant” (*liumin*, 流民 in Ch.), i.e., “[a] person without a settled home or regular work who wanders from place to place and lives by begging.”²⁰¹ “Vagrants” were regarded as significant troublemakers by every dynasty. This was especially the case during the Ming dynasty when rebellions carried out by inland refugees caused the demise of the Ming court.²⁰²

Therefore, the Qing court decidedly acted against inland vagrants and always took preventive and suppressive measures to prevent their movement. As such, inland vagrants tried to avoid contact with local imperial officials.²⁰³ The Han migrants aimed to survive and settle in the local society as quickly as possible, they had to be assimilated by ethnic groups and make themselves look like the local people. Therefore, marrying into local families and thereby actively integrating into the local society was a wise choice when striving for living space and resources. In the following section, I will analyse and explain the acculturation of Han migrants.

Han acculturation in Yunnan is referred to by a number of different terms in academic writing. From the perspective of Fang Guoyu (1987, 1132) and Lin Chaomin (2005, 105–113), for instance, such acculturation is understood as the transformation of Han people into “Yi” (*Yihua*: 夷化), whereas a more recent definition by Ma Jianxiong (2007), working within Chinese academia, refers to this process as “localisation” (*zai dihua*: 在地化). Fang Guoyu (1987, 1132) was the first to put forward the view that Yunnan “no community maintaining Han characteristics had ever existed for a long time prior to the Yuan period.”²⁰⁴

This view influenced later research on Han people turning into “Yi” in Yunnan. Lin Chaomin, a most influential scholar in this field, believes that before the Ming dynasty, Han people changed into “Yi”.²⁰⁵ After the Ming dynasty, it became a process of borderland integration. The establishment of military and civilian farms in the Ming, allowed the immigrants to migrate with their families, and this policy reduced the possibility of intermarriages between Han migrants and “Yi.” This fundamentally

dictionary: https://www.chinesethought.cn/EN/shuyu_show.aspx?shuyu_id=2227, accessed on 24 September 2020.

²⁰⁰ As mentioned before, that is why, Emperor Daoguang ordered a census of the number of inland vagrants present and the registration of households to increase tax revenue in 1836. See WYTZ (2016, 138–139).

²⁰¹ This definition is from Oxford Dictionary, see <https://www.lexico.com/definition/vagrant>, accessed on 12 October 2020.

²⁰² Mote (1999, 795–801).

²⁰³ WYTZ (2016, 138–139).

²⁰⁴ The original text reads: 元代以前并未出现长期保持汉族特征之人们共同体.

²⁰⁵ Lin Chaomin (2005, 105–113).

impeded the acculturation of the Han people.

There have been two recurring approaches facilitating ethnic integration throughout Chinese history: war and intermarriage. Intermarriage is the most peaceful and fastest way. Intermarriage, furthermore, was an effective means to build a close relationship between different ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic marriages promoted integration.

The Qing court further deepened this integration process with three methods after the mid-Qing period. First, was the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu* policy. This brought native official areas in the southwest border regions under the direct rule of the Qing court.

Second, in Yunnan, the Green Standard Army (*lüying*: 綠營) system was adopted. The Green Standard Army system actually originated during the Ming dynasty; its purpose was to defend the frontier system (*zhenshu*: 鎮戍制度). The soldiers were heavily armed to guard the frontier, and though small in numbers, they were effective. The Qing court governed the Han and other ethnic groups through the Green Standard Army.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, as highlighted by Qin Shucai and Tian Zhiyong (2004, 37), many soldiers from other provinces were brought when the Yunnan Green Standard Army was stationed in Yunnan. Some already had spouses, so for the welfare of these soldiers, their families were moved to Yunnan. This measure fundamentally impeded the tendency of Han Chinese soldiers who were stationed in Yunnan to become acculturated to local society.

Third, cultural integration measures were implemented by the court, including the promotion of Confucian academies and the encouragement of the Tai elites to participate in the Imperial examination system. For example, Moeng Bò was gradually influenced by Confucianism in terms of culture after the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu*. However, not all ethnic areas were affected by the Chinese dynasties' integration measures. First, transportation was inconvenient. The more marginal areas far away from the administrative centre and centres of borderland integration were hard to reach for Imperial administrative and military power. As a result, Han people who migrated here chose to become “barbarians” and settled down as soon as possible as this was the fastest and most effective way to obtain access to social resources.

As Giersch (2006, 14–15) has pointed out frontiers were often “borderlands” or territories without clear political boundaries where many expansion powers battled for resources and indigenous allies. They were also “middle ground” regions of fluid cultural and economic exchange where local variables determined acculturation and hybrid political structures.

Consequently, the Han migrants who were not affiliated with the government and

²⁰⁶ See Luo Er'gang (1984, 13–14).

moved on their own landed in these border regions, and they were prone to assimilate into the local culture. As Li Jing described: Chinese migrants often enjoyed wandering in Yunnan so that they forgot to return to their homelands. Once they were familiar with the native peoples and the place, they chose their neighbours and settled down. Hence, they married the daughters of indigenous peoples. When the sons and grandsons of the Chinese were young, they learned the indigenous customs and languages of their mothers. Hence, in the process of growing up they all turned into indigenous people.²⁰⁷

4.4 Conclusion

These three Tai Nüa states in the upper Mekong region are not only strategically located, but they also have abundant salt, tea, and mineral resources. It has also become a point of contention for all parties, i.e., Sipsòng Panna, the Tai Mao Federation, and, later, the Burmese and Chinese dynasties. As a minor polity, surviving in a harsh world, it was a significant challenge for them. Thus, they attempted to strike a balance between surrounding powerful polities for political support, i.e., recognition of the legitimacy of the *cao fa* regime, recognition of the expansion of territories, and obtaining support during conflicts with other polities. Simultaneously, the Ming and Qing intended to integrate Tai Nüa polities and expand into Southwest Yunnan. Borderland integration was promoted in order to expand imperial sway in the native official districts.

Due to the expanding number of Han immigrants who were acculturated and assimilated into the local culture, a phenomenon known as acculturation, became the norm. Between the borderland integration and acculturation, Tai Nüa polities developed their own survival approach: to choose a more beneficial way of dealing with surrounding powerful polities and to try to keep their own cultural identification.

Integration

Migration led to further borderland integration of the indigenous people in Yunnan. Moeng Bò is a case worthy of an in-depth study. Among the three smaller Tai Nüa polities in Yunnan, Moeng Bò exhibits the most comprehensive levels of borderland integration. This is because it was the first Tai Nüa area to be ruled by the Chinese dynasty. In addition, due to continuous rebellions, and the equally continuous suppression of the Tai Nüa people, the military and political power of the court

²⁰⁷ The original text reads: 往往流落忘返。人地既熟，擇鄰而處，遂娶土人之女為婚，漢人之子孫小時，母教及習染無一非土俗、土語，故子孫長大盡成土人也。YNZL by Li Jing (Yuan period), cited in Lin Chaomin (2005, 106–113). The acculturation of Han migrants is interesting to investigate; nonetheless, I must apologise for not collecting enough data. Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 until the end of 2022, fieldwork in the local society was limited. I am hoping that I can try again in the near future.

continued to intensify in it. At the same time, in order to integrate the Tai Nüa elites, there was a concerted effort undertaken to strengthen Confucian culture and education in Moeng Bò. This further accelerated the borderland integration of it into inland China. The degree of borderland integration also determined the degree to which local ethnic groups identified with the Chinese culture of the three polities.

Nevertheless, scholars will notice that, even if it was politically controlled by the Chinese dynasty and, culturally, it was influenced by Han culture, the Tai Nüa people still kept trying to preserve their own culture, i.e., scripts (Tham and Lik), manuscripts (the handwriting is still popular in local society), and religion (Theravada Buddhism).

Although Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem are both situated on the frontier, Kūng Ma had experienced an even deeper degree of borderland integration result of its positive attitude toward Chinese dynasties. Between Burma and the Chinese dynasties (Ming and Qing), Kūng Ma chose to side with the Chinese courts. This was largely due to political rivalry between Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting; it also displayed, however, the political astuteness of the Kūng Ma *cao fa*, who utilised his cordial relations with the Qing to strengthen and consolidate its dominant position vis-à-vis Moeng Laem. The close relationship between the Moeng Ting and the Moeng Phòng *cao fa* determined that the former could not get completely rid themselves of the influence of Moeng Phòng and thus could not entirely support the Chinese dynasties.

Kūng Ma is a different case. It does not directly border Moeng Phòng, and the relationship with Moeng Phòng is not as close as that with Moeng Ting. Therefore, Kūng Ma was able to choose the side most beneficial to it. As a result, Kūng Ma's identification with the Chinese dynasties was more reflected politically, albeit, to a lesser degree, it was still affected culturally.

Therefore, it can be said that, although Kūng Ma's initial purpose was to seek political alliance, during history, however, it was eventually integrated by Chinese dynastic power. As for Moeng Laem, it enjoyed exercising sovereignty over its internal affairs. It superficially followed offers of amnesty from the Ming and Qing, while, in fact, continuing to maintain a close relationship with Burma.

There are three reasons for this. First, the protection of the Chinese military could not reach Moeng Laem, so it still needed to directly confront Burmese military threat; secondly, the Lahu people constantly challenged the power of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. Although for the purpose of mediation the Imperial army once entered Moeng Laem, it could not be stationed there for a long time due to the difficulties in coping with the climate challenge. Therefore, Qing mediation could not wholly resolve the dispute between the Tai and the Lahu people. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for Moeng Laem to come under the direct jurisdiction of the court. Thirdly, in the pre-modern period, whether it was the result of the inadequacies of military or political

forces, the Qing court was unable to penetrate deep into Moeng Laem due to the poor transportation system. This is the reason why Moeng Laem was more independent of the Chinese dynasties than Moeng Bò and Kūng Ma. Therefore, with regard to the integration process, Moeng Laem was not really affected by it until Burma was occupied by the British and the borders between Yunnan and Burma borderlines delineated. The influence of Han culture on Moeng Laem would not be noticeable until after the CCP seized full control over Yunnan in early 1950.

Acculturation

The non-governmental and spontaneously moving Han migrants living in marginal areas were more likely to become “Yi.” That is to say, Han migrants in mining areas also tended to be acculturated. In joint labour production, Han migrants and the indigenous people formed a community with common interests. This community was based on the common economic interests of the Han and the indigenous peoples, with the religious culture of the local indigenous people as the carrier, and the name of the indigenous ethnic group as the shell.²⁰⁸ This “motley throng,” including the Luhei (Lahu), Han, the local Wa ethnic group, and other hill tribes, later became the Lahu ethnic group.²⁰⁹ Therefore, it is difficult to say that such a community underwent a process of “Borderland integration of Yi peoples.” Defining it as “the Han people became Yi” is not entirely true. Rather, it should be defined as a new ethnic community formed by the fusion of various groups coming and living together, thereby sharing, and exchanging some of their customs and cultural habits.

Thus, it can be concluded from the above data that officially sanctioned immigration, such as the dispatch of garrison soldiers or officials, required that family members migrate too. As a result, it was harder for those Han migrants to acculturate and become “Yi.” Furthermore, the potential to acculturate was also impeded by the establishment of garrisons and the presence of government offices staffed by the court’s regular officials located in the main traffic arteries and tea-horse trading posts. As such,

²⁰⁸ Ma Jianxiong (2018, 54–99).

²⁰⁹ Ma Jianxiong (2013, 97–98) argues that the Luohei (Lahu) Mountain’s west of the Mekong River were the political centre of this religious movement, led by Han Chinese Buddhist monks. Based on the central monastery at Nanzha village, the Five Buddha Districts system rallied and organised hundreds of Lahu and Wa villages over a broad territory to form a regional independent political entity outside the Qing state. From the 1790s to the 1890s, this movement flourished, but by the 1920s, the Qing and Republican governments gradually dismantled the centralised political system. After that, political changes severely influenced Lahu society, and the religious-based communal rule was abolished in the 1950s. Since then, state-appointed local cadres have replaced political leaders over kinship groups as a communal administration layer. After 1980, the family cropland redistribution system dominated daily life. Thus, kinship-based social integration has returned to Lahu society. In this context, he further points (ibid, 127–128) out that after the Qing army crossed the Mekong River, powerful “Lahuised” Han families were appointed chieftains to collaborate with the commanders of Zhenbian Military County and Marriage and Land Property County.

these areas were basically “integrated” into the inland, and while the transportation was blocking areas, such as the mountainous areas, the unofficial Han migrants in the mining areas were basically “became Yi.”

The prerequisite for the Han people’s “becoming Yi” is that they intermarried with the local natives and the children and grandchildren were raised as “Yi” by the maternal line. Most of the Han people who spontaneously migrated were poor workers. It was difficult for them to bring family members. Many had no dependants when they came to Yunnan to cultivate the wasteland. These Han migrants often intermarried with local natives after arriving at their destination. Under such circumstances, the acculturation of the Han people was substantial. Ma Jianxiong (2018, 62–63) points out that the government took over control of the significant salt wells in Weiyuan after the 1820s. However, the supply of salt was never affected, and the local officials never interfered with the salt trade. The indigenous people and Han migrants engaged in agriculture, salt production and mining together, and that was difficult to distinguish which group they came from.

In this case, the Han people’s “becoming Yi” was inevitable. Therefore, the Han migrants and the hill tribes in the mining areas formed a new identity and community of interests in the process of working together, thus completing the process of acculturation. As James Scott argues, in many cases hill tribes were founded by refugees from the lowlands who wanted to escape state power. Later, Scott uses the Lahu as an example of his “escape culture,” since they are a highland-swiddening (clearing ground for farming) tribe with their stronghold in Yunnan’s southwest region. He believes that the Lahu are an egalitarian society with little or no political coherence beyond the hamlet level and that there is no persuasive authority even inside the hamlet.²¹⁰

In other areas where the Chinese imperial power had not yet fully reached, there were also cases of Han Chinese turning into indigenous people. This was the kind of acculturation that Han migrants actively accepted. At the same time, it reveals a very profound problem. Poor Han migrants became “Yi,” while the Qing court incorporated the indigenous elites. As Giersch (2001, 67–94) explains, the Qing officials repeatedly tried to regulate and civilise frontier indigenes and Chinese migrants, despite the common belief that they were partners working together to transform them. They rarely succeeded, and officials disapproved when indigenous tribes adopted migrant or vice versa habits instead of privileged imperial ones. Yet these acculturation trends indicated major popular changes. As each side developed strategies of coping with the other, the crescent became a meeting area or “middle ground” where social boundaries and cultural practices changed.

Just as Ma Jianxiong (2012, 93) points out, more Han migrants continued to cross

²¹⁰ For more details, see Scott (2009, 9/22–23/135/289).

the Mekong River and move deep into the Luohei Mountains, becoming part of the Luohei or other ethnic groups and converting their ethnic identity to “Yi.” Thus, Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò Han migrants experienced different conditions contributing to “became Yi.”

First, a typical case of Han migrants in Moeng Bò is the *cao fa* of the Zhou family in Maomi, Moeng Ka (Yongping) town. According to my field interview on 5 May 2020, the abbot of Maomi, named Zhou Yulong, mentioned that the Zhou family originated from Jiangxi Province and came to Maomi – a post on the Tea Horse Road – after fleeing in the late Qing dynasty. Zhou’s family had settled down here and finally became the ruler of this place because of their family’s prestige and growth. After the *gaitu guiliu* policy was promoted, the Zhou family still enjoyed a higher social status in Maomi. For instance, Buddhist festivals are organised by his family, further aiding them to cement their higher social status in this rural autonomous area.²¹¹

An example from Moeng Laem involves a colleague of mine, Zhang Haizhen (Tai name: Cao Kham Nuan), who is the author of the book “The Secret History of the Tai King of Nayun” (Zhang Haizhen 2008), as well as the former director of the Moeng Laem History Museum. She once mentioned that her father was the Han Chinese origin. Zhang used her Tai name before going to school. When she went to school, however, the teacher gave her a Chinese name, Zhang Haizhen, which was based on her father’s last name. Therefore, the name on her ID card is her Han Chinese name. However, her ethnic identification is Tai, and her psychological identity is also Tai from Moeng Laem. One of her parents is Tai, and the other is Han. This type of situation is relatively common in the sub-district where Zhang Haizhen lives (Moeng Ma, Moeng Laem). Basically, once there is a marriage between Han and Tai in Moeng Laem, the Han person will gradually become Tai, and the next generation will be raised as Tai.

Based on arguments elaborated above, I conclude that the acculturation of official migrants was not very frequent, while the acculturation of non-governmental Han migrants was more common, especially in areas with small Han populations. The fundamental reason is that economic interests drove private migrants, so these people tended to become acculturated in order to obtain resources. A small migrant population also makes it difficult to form a clustered community and thus it was easier to be integrated by the surrounding environment. Officially dispatched migrants were mainly driven by political interests and allowed to bring family members, which fundamentally eliminated the possibility of forming blood ties with the local community and thereby being acculturated. Nevertheless, we should also note that the acculturation of Han migrants in different regions varied in terms of intensity. Han migrants in Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma were strongly acculturated. Conversely, in Moeng Bò where the Qing

²¹¹ Fieldwork notes on 5 May 2020. More genealogy materials will need to be collected in the near future.

court directly administered the territory, the degree to which Han migrants acculturated to the local setting was relatively shallow.

It is also important to note that not all Han people in marginal regions²¹² or mining areas were acculturated. Similarly, not all “Yi” in the areas where they had been converted to Chinese values were “integrated into Imperial China.” My fieldwork in Moeng Bò revealed that, close to the town, in the villages of the Weiyuan Native Official office, there were many Han migrants who were became “Yi”, such as my host family: the Zhang Jichun family. Their ancestors were originally Han migrants; however, the whole family now identify as Tai. Nevertheless, in Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma, there are also some cases of “Yi” people who were “integrated into Imperial China.”

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²¹² Recalling the idea of marginal regions are not absolute as each marginal region is relative to its central area.

²¹³ This will be an upcoming subject in the near future.

Chapter Five: Relations between the Tai Nüa Polities, China, and the Mainland Southeast Asian Powers and Upland Peoples

5.1 Review

In the Upper Mekong River Valley, the relations between, on one side, the Tai Nüa polities and, on the other side, China, the major Mainland Southeast Asian powers – i.e., Burma, Chiang Tung, and Moeng Phòng – and upland ethnic groups were somewhat volatile. After the Sino-Burma War of 1765–1769, the Tai Native Offices of Moeng Küng Ma, Moeng Laem, and Sipsòng Panna strengthened their relations with China under the Qing court (*r.* 1644–1911). Meanwhile, Moeng Ting continued to keep a distance from the Qing dynasty as it had closer ties to Moeng Phòng (Mupang).

As described in Chapter Four, after the implementation of *gaitu guiliu*,¹ Moeng Bò began to be incorporated into the Chinese empire, and, consequently, the Tai Nüa in that area had few ties with Tai polities in Mainland Southeast Asia, with the exception of those Tai Nüa commoners who migrated to Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Sing (present-day Luang Namtha Province, Laos)² for economic reasons. The special case of Küng Ma was discussed in Chapter Three. The Ming court had separated Küng Ma from Moeng Ting territory, and, arguably, this meant Küng Ma needed to maintain close relations with the Chinese court, and, moreover, gain its political support, in order to win the struggle with Moeng Ting for more resources (i.e., territory, political status, etc.).

The core of this chapter pertains to the conflicts between Tai Nüa rulers and the Lahu people. The growing influx of Han migrants and increased competition for the control of resources in the mining areas posed new challenges for local Tai rulers as well as upland peoples, such as the Wa (Mon-Khmer) or Lahu (Tibeto-Burman), who had to rebuild new villages. The Han people who migrated to Moeng Laem and Küng Ma to work in the mines formed ethnic coalitions with upland peoples to regulate the joint exploitation of these mines and to secure their political rights vis-à-vis the Tai ruling class.

Serious political and economic conflict arose between the Tai and the upland peoples (Lahu and Wa) in Moeng Laem during the nineteenth century. Initially, the

¹ The abolition of native officials and the implementation of direct administration by rotating or regular officials (*liuguan*) is the so-called *tusi* system, known as *gaitu guiliu* 改土歸流.

² The Tai Nüa from Moeng Bò migrated to Moeng Sing in the mid-nineteenth century due to the Du Wenxiu rebellion. For more details about the Tai Nüa migrants in Moeng Sing, see Grabowsky and Renoo (2008, 8–10).

Moeng Laem *cao fa* sought help from the Mubang (Moeng Phòng) *cao fa* but he was eventually forced to request the Qing court to intervene militarily. Consequently, Qing influence intensified in Moeng Laem. With the arrival of the British (in the 1890s), the five influential Lahu groups and the Wa attempted to collaborate with the British to oppose the Qing court and one Lahu group (see the Shan script letter Manu. 10).

This chapter sets out to clarify the interaction (compromise and conflicts) between the Tai Nüa polities, China, the Tai polities of Chiang Tung and Moeng Phòng, and the Konbaung court. I consider this interaction within the context of the Qing court's borderland integration policies and a Burmese military threat, which endured until the British annexation of Upper Burma and the Shan states in 1886. I also seek to explain and analyse lowland/upland integration and conflicts within Tai Nüa polities prior to the arrival of British colonial officials on the Southwestern Yunnan border.

However, since the historical records are written from different perspectives, descriptions of lowland and upland peoples differ considerably. Historical records by the Tai Nüa of Moeng Laem always portray the Lahu with prejudice, while the Chinese sources describe Lahu chiefs as obedient to the Chinese authorities. I therefore adopt a multi-perspective approach, comparing indigenous Tai sources from extant mulberry paper manuscripts with official Chinese records.

5.2 Relations between China, Burma, and Tai Nüa Polities

5.2.1 An Overview

Konbaung Burma had to recognise the Qing court's control of the *cao fa* territory in Western Yunnan as Qing influence gradually penetrated the region. In addition to growing Qing power in the region, other complicating factors included the rise of the Konbaung dynasty's territorial ambitions, the increase in Han migrants, and the competition for resources in the mining areas. These factors represented new challenges for the Tai Nüa, Wa, and Lahu hill peoples, who were now forced to find new spaces to live. Negotiating ethnic relations and conflicts within Moeng Bò, Kùng Ma, and Moeng Laem was a major theme in the period before the British annexation of the Shan states in 1886, an event that marked the beginning of significant historical transformation in the Upper Mekong region.

5.2.2 Historical Relations in Tai Nüa Polities during the Eighteenth Century

Intermarriages reveal the connections between Tai Nüa polities. According to the Tai chronicles (JGTSSX and MLXFS, see Chapter Three, Tables T2 and T3), the rulers of Moeng Bò regularly intermarried with the Kùng Ma royal family. However, T2 makes no mention of the fact that Moeng Bò had any ruling elite intermarriages with Moeng

Laem. According to the work of Cao Kham Nuan (Zhang Haizhen 2008), the Moeng Laem royal family intermarried frequently with Sipsòng Panna (Cheli), Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung), and Ava (Burma). Inter-marriage was the crucial element for balancing the political power of Tai rulers. Ma Jianxiong (2020, 32) remarked that “the *tusi* of the Shan and Dai areas shared rule through matrimonial ties, exchanging dowry for imbalances. Marriage became a political tool, forming allies and establishing genealogical links between *tusi*.”

Moeng Laem had few intermarriages with Kūng Ma and Moeng Bò, while Kūng Ma and Moeng Bò intermarried among themselves more than with Moeng Laem. Moreover, they maintained regular contact through Theravada Buddhism and political affairs.³ I suppose that Moeng Laem did not need to intermarry with Moeng Bò and Kūng Ma because it was strategically beneficial to intermarry with Sipsòng Panna, Chiang Tung, Moeng Phòng, and Konbaung Burma. Historically, Moeng Laem had a close kin relationship with those powers.⁴

Furthermore, by putting Moeng Bò, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Laem into the historical context of the mid-Qing dynasty and Mainland Southeast Asia, scholars may get a clearer picture of the historical development of the three Tai Nüa polities. After the Qing court adopted the *gaitu guiliu* policy and controlled the tea and salt trade in the Moeng Bò area, it turned to strengthening its political and military presence on the west bank of the Mekong River. During the Sino-Burma War (1765–1769), the Tai *cao fa* in Western Yunnan and the *cao fa* of Kūng Ma, Moeng Laem, and Sipsòng Panna were forced to strengthen their relations with the Qing court. At the same time, Burma waged war with Ayutthaya (1765–1767), and King Taksin of Thonburi (*r.* 1767–1782) eventually drove the remaining Burmese troops out of Siamese territory in 1770.⁵ Finally, Burma was forced to make a compromise with the Qing court because it was unable to fight on two fronts simultaneously.

Both parties conceded or redistributed their control over the Shan/Tai region in the southwest. The contents of the treaty remain unknown because the original treaty has not been preserved, and both two parties kept separate documents.

According to the Qing court’s records, the Chinese logic was that Burma should pay tribute to the Qing court regularly. It should therefore release all Qing captives and promise never to cross the border again.⁶ However, the Qing did not define the exact borderlines. By contrast, according to the Burmese documents, the following four

³ See Zhang Haizhen (2008, 132–133).

⁴ So far, I do not have enough data to digest the intermarriage issue, therefore, I will study this topic further in the near future.

⁵ For more details, see Wyatt and Aroonrut (1998, 122).

⁶ QSG, vol. 327, Biographies 114.

clauses formed the terms of this treaty:⁷

1. The Chinese would surrender all the *sawbwas* (the *cao fa* in Tai) and other rebels and fugitives from Burma who had taken shelter in Chinese territory.
2. The Chinese would undertake to respect Burmese sovereignty over those Shan states that had historically been part of Burma.
3. All prisoners of war would be released.
4. The emperor of China and the king of Burma would resume friendly relations, with their ambassadors regularly exchanging letters of good will and presents.

Consequently, the Qing court began to abandon tribute agreements with parts of Upper Burma. According to Warry,⁸ Chinese texts referred to these areas as the San Fu 三府 (Three States),⁹ which became part of Burma with the rise of the Konbaung dynasty. Warry notes the following:¹⁰

[...] I think that the above notices, taken from a very unfavourable source, are sufficient by themselves to show that the Chinese during this period (between the year 1300 and 1662 A.D., noted by me) exercised very considerable authority in Upper Burma. Many other proofs could be adduced from Chinese sources.

But the Chinese authority was destined in the end to fall before the power of a strong Burmese dynasty. In 1753, according to Burmese historians, the *sawbwas* of Momeik Mogaung sent messages of submission. This seems to have been the beginning of the downfall of the Chinese power in these regions; the end came some 20 years later, in the reign of Alompra's (Alaungpaya, noted by me) son; when the Chinese were forced to recognise the Burmese claim to the greater portion of the Three States.

Mogaung is in Kachin State. This statement clearly shows that Chinese authority once exercised control over Upper Burma; however, after the rise of the Konbaung dynasty in the eighteenth century, Chinese influence declined, especially after the Sino-Burmese war (1765–1769) when the Qing steadily lost its influence over the Shan states, whether actively or passively.

Before the arrival of the Tai Nüa, the indigenous population in Moeng Bò were upland peoples, as recorded in JGTSSX.¹¹ The mountainous areas of Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem were under the control of the mighty Wa (Mon-Khmer) polities. In order to quickly obtain resources and space for development, the latecomers formed alliances with the local Wa peoples. For example, the head of the Moeng Laem Tai Nüa married the daughter of the ruler Wa after arriving in Moeng Laem.¹² The two parties had a

⁷ For more details, see Htin Aung (1967, 180–183).

⁸ William Warry (b.1854–1936) was a senior intelligence officer of the British. For more details about Warry, see Chapter Six.

⁹ Warry indicates that the Three States are Mengyang (Mohnyin or Moeng Yang), Mengting (Moeng Ting), and Mupang (Moeng Phòng). W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Mandalay, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, —No.11, dated 15 July 1888.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ For more details, please refer to the discussion in Chapter Three.

¹² The Wa were the original inhabitants and thus can be regarded as the first spirit of Moeng Laem. The Tai were

blood alliance and maintained a long-term relationship underpinned by intermarriage.

Gao Jinhe (2012, 1–6) and Zhao Mingsheng (2006, 16–19) have both studied the historical relationship between the Moeng Laem Tai and Wa ethnic groups in Moeng Laem, so I will not repeat the details here. In this section, I will shed light on the disputes that occurred in the history between Moeng Laem and other ethnic groups, such as the Lahu people.¹³

In Moeng Bò, the implementation of direct administration by Qing officials and the arrival of Han migrants altered inter-ethnic relations. In the fierce competition for resources, the Tai Nüa and the Lahu had been deprived of their political power and economic advantages, joined forces to resist the Qing court by its officials. Eventually, the Qing established firmer control over the Tai Nüa elites, and some Lahu surrendered and settled in the Niujian mountainous area (Minle town, Jinggu County today). Qing military forces drove the Lahu, who were unwilling to submit to the court, into the upland area west of the Mekong River, which was under the jurisdiction of the Moeng Laem ruler. After that, conflicts with the Moeng Laem ruler inevitably occurred in the scramble for resources needed to survive.

The Han groups who migrated to Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma hoping to benefit from mining resources formed a new ethnic coalition with the local Lahu and Wa to regulate issues of joint production and labour. To obtain more resources, they intended to fight against the Moeng Laem ruler for the recognition of political rights.¹⁴

To balance the political power in the Moeng Laem area, local Qing officials supported the head of the Lahu and mediated conflicts between the Lahu and the Moeng Laem ruler; however, the Jiaqing emperor relied on the Moeng Laem ruler to guard the frontier and had no intention of supporting groups opposing the ruler of Moeng Laem, because it would bring instability to the border area. Consequently, the outcome of the struggle between the Lahu and the Tai was almost a foregone conclusion. The struggle also became a process through which the Lahu achieved ethnic mobilisation.¹⁵ Tai Nüa historical records always portrayed the Lahu negatively. The Lahu even tried to ally themselves with the British against the Qing court and the Moeng Laem ruler. I will discuss this in more detail in the following section.

However, looking at the history of Kūng Ma, one finds that the relations between

newcomers. For more details, see Zhang Haizhen (2008, 17–32).

¹³ The Lahu is named *Luohei* in Chinese historiographies and *Musoe* in Tai manuscripts. The ethnic term “Lahu” was initially provided by the community itself and then formally adopted by the CCP. According to Warry’s account, the term “Lahu” denotes a “happy family.” For more details, see W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 9, dated Bhamo, the 15th, June 1891, 10. As *Luohei* has a discriminatory connotation, I will use Lahu when referring to this ethnic group.

¹⁴ For more details, see Ma Jianxiang (2013, 218)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.

the Tai Nüa and the Wa were not sufficiently confrontational to affect the overall situation and attract the attention of the Qing court. While in Kūng Ma, conflicts occasionally arose between the Tai Nüa and the Wa, they did not substantially disrupt the political balance in the area.

Next, I will focus on the historical relationship between the Tai Nüa of Moeng Laem and the Lahu and describe the ethnic relationships between Moeng Bò and Kūng Ma.

5.2.3 The Inter-Ethnic Relations in Moeng Bò after *Gaitu guiliu*

In the early eighteenth century, after the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu* policy, the Qing court quickly took over the tea and salt trade in Moeng Bò and declared a government monopoly of salt production. Many Han migrated into the areas constituting the main traffic arteries of the tea and salt trade. This change upset the “dynamically balanced ethnic relationship”¹⁶ in that area. Coupled with the corruption of Qing officials, the Tai Nüa elites, whose economic interests had been severely damaged, decided to unite with the Lahu to resist the oppression of Qing officials and violently fight against the deepening influence of the Qing. Above, I have already detailed the joint resistance of the Tai and Lahu and their rebellion after the *gaitu guiliu* of Moeng Bò.

The Qing strategy of gradual and long-term pacification of Tai elites from the mid-to-late seventeenth century, drove them to resist violently but, ultimately, they could not compete with Qing military forces, so the Tai elite chose to reconcile with the imperial court. This turn of events resulted in the gradual collapse of joint resistance by the Tai and Lahu.

Ma Jianxiong (2013, 53–55) argues that this resistance in the early eighteenth century stemmed from unified opposition by ethnic groups in the Ailao Mountains against the *gaitu guiliu*. During this wave of resistance, initially, the Tai people undoubtedly assumed leadership in opposing suppression by the Qing court. From the late eighteenth century until the early nineteenth century, however, the leading participants of the rebellion were the Lahu people, as the Tai elites had already surrendered to the Qing court and become the court’s agents. It was not only the local headmen of the Tai and indigenous soldiers who suppressed the rebellion, but also some Han migrants. These people had been incorporated into the Qing administrative structure to serve its political ends.

Ma Jianxiong (Ibid.) has written on this subject at length. He argues that the Luohei (Lahu) were an indigenous group living near the salt wells in the Zhenyuan and

¹⁶ Ibid., 62.

Weiyuan Mountains and that following the resistance of the Yongzheng period (*r.* 1722–1735) they once again became involved in the local politics of conflict with the government in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Tai Nüa officials were sent to suppress the Luohei. Some Luohei surrendered to the Qing, while others were forced to migrate to the west bank of the Mekong River.

Ma Jianxiong (*Ibid.*) argues that the policy of the Qing army at that time was to drive the Lahu people across the Mekong River into the territory of the Moeng Moeng (勐勐 in Chinese, it was the subordination of Kūng Ma, the present-day Moeng Moeng township, Shuangjiang County) and Moeng Laem *tusi*. Qing army commanders believed they could put an end to the Lahu rebellions by preventing the Lahu people from returning to Moeng Bò.

Three conclusions can be drawn from Ma Jianxiong's research. First, from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the alliance between the Tai Nüa of Moeng Bò and the Lahu, which stemmed from the dissatisfaction with the *gaitu guiliu* in Moeng Bò, no longer existed, because the Qing had managed to incorporate the Tai elite into the imperial administrative structures. This change helped the Qing suppress the Lahu, who were still refusing to submit to imperial rule. Second, some of the Lahu who surrendered merged with local ethnic groups. Subsequently, they would fall under the jurisdiction of the Qing court. Third, the Lahu who refused to integrate with local ethnic groups were forced to migrate to the territory of the Moeng Laem and Moeng Moeng *cao fa* on the west bank of the Mekong River; this migration caused continuous conflict between the Moeng Laem Tai Nüa and the Lahu (Luohei) ethnic group over resources, such as land and minerals.

5.2.4 The Inter-Ethnic Relations in Kūng Ma

Ethnic relations within the jurisdiction of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* were more complicated than those in Moeng Bò and slightly more straightforward than those of Moeng Laem. The Tai peoples' relationships with other ethnic groups under the jurisdiction of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* were primarily with the upland Wa ethnic group. In this ecological circle of ethnic relations, the Tai Nüa *cao fa* of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting constructed an administrative division of the “nine moeng (*müang*) and thirteen *khwaen*” (九猛十三圈). They ruled over the Tai living in the “moeng (*müang*)” and over those living under the rule characterised by the Mandala system (Nan 2013, 65).

Zhu Di (2016, 21–22) also highlights the following: “The Kūng Ma Baiyi (Tai) *tusi* historically had ruled over other ethnic groups such as Tai and De'ang, mainly distributed in mountainous areas called ‘circles’ (*khwaen*).” She further concludes that people from Tai Nüa and Tai Lü surrounded the Kūng Ma *cao fa*, which served as the centre of the society. The most marginal ethnic groups, such as the De'ang and other

upland peoples, were governed like *jimi* or the haltered-and-bridled prefectures during the Tang and Song dynasties.

Throughout history, the relationship between the Tai Nüa of Kūng Ma, as latecomers, and the upland peoples evolved into a symbiotic one, through intermarriage, the division of spheres of influence, and economic complementarity. The Tai Nüa in Kūng Ma regarded the Wa as the original inhabitants of the region. The Tai Nüa creation myth mentions *Shang Guofa* (Shang is probably Saang or Brahma), *La Guohe* (*Laa* is a term for the name Wa) in the Tai language, which means the god Hunshang (this should be Khun Saang). Saang or Brahma is for the one who created the sky, and the Wa cultivated the land.¹⁷

However, during the process of Tai migration, the Tai *cao fa* continued to subjugate the local Wa and rule over Kūng Ma. There are two legends about this process in the history of the local Tai people (GMLSDC 1963, 10): The emperor summoned the headmen of the Wa and Tai together and set up two seats, one clean and the other covered with dirty tiger skins. Whoever sits on a tiger-skin cushion, will be appointed as the native official. The Tai ruler took the clean seat; the Wa headman had to sit on the dirty one. Therefore, the emperor gave the native official seal to the Wa headman. Receiving the seal meant that the Wa headman had the right to deploy forces and collect taxes. Later, the Tai ruler with the Chinese surname Han 罕 (Tai: *kham*, meaning gold)¹⁸ used trickery to obtain the official seal from the Wa headman: he married the Wa princess and won the right to transfer troops and levy taxes in the Kūng Ma district.

This legend clearly shows that the Wa people were the first to obtain an official seal from the Chinese emperor, indicating that the earliest ruler of Kūng Ma was Wa. However, a Tai leader gained control of Kūng Ma by marrying the Wa princess. The interesting point in this legend is that the Chinese emperor issued a golden seal, which imbued the recipient with the power to rule, and Tai eventually obtained a governance.¹⁹

There are similar legends from Moeng Bò. According to JGTSSX, the first *cao fa* of Moeng Bò was the son of Zhu Yuanzhang (*r.* 1368–1398), the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty. These legends are, of course, not credible and have no actual historical basis, but they show that the ancestors of the Tai Nüa in Moeng Bò and Kūng Ma used the prestige of the Chinese dynasties to legitimise their rule. They were all eager to obtain more political resources to strengthen the legitimacy of their rule. Thus, in the history of ethnogenesis (the formation of an ethnic group),²⁰ the Tai of Kūng Ma

¹⁷ Nan Guixiang (2013, 66).

¹⁸ Here, “Han” is just the phonetic rendering of the Tai word “Kham” and has nothing to do with Han-Chinese ethnicity.

¹⁹ This phenomenon resembles the myths of other Tai *moeng*, such as Sipsòng Panna, Moeng Yòng, Moeng Bò, and others.

²⁰ For an explanation of ethno-genesis, see Webster’s Dictionary:

and Moeng Bò created a fictional relationship with the Chinese dynasties.

The following legend shows that, after several struggles between the Tai and the Wa, it was difficult to determine who was the winner or loser. Finally, through negotiation, the Wa retreated to the mountains, while the Tai remained on the plains in the basin. The division of settlement areas shows that the two parties finally achieved a balance of ethnic relations after armed conflict. The demarcation of settlement areas was one reason why there was no large-scale armed conflict between the Tai and Wa in Kūng Ma.

These two legends clearly show that the earliest ruling elite of Kūng Ma was from the Wa ethnic group. After the Tai Nūa ruler and the Wa royal family intermarried, the former obtained the golden seal through deception. However, the relationship between the Tai and upland peoples in Southwest Yunnan was more complicated than has often been assumed in academic circles, mostly vis-à-vis the historical context of the Qing court's annexation of the area in the 1730s. Daniels (2018, 188–217) has shown that though upland people in Southwest Yunnan had peripheral status within Tai polities, the Tai rulers' mismanagement of them could disrupt basin society. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Tai elite in the tiny polity of Māng Khön (Mangshi in Dehong) mobilised two upland peoples, the Jingpo (Tai: Khaang) and the Ta'aang (Tai: Pa löng/Pö löng, Ch.: De'ang 德昂) to fight for two rival Tai factions in a civil war. In this case, mismanagement led to a four-decade war, which caused havoc and destruction and brought normal administration to a halt, highlighting the fact that the stability of basin society depended on the legitimacy of the Tai ruler and his good governance of the uplands.

From the legends outlined above, we can conclude that the Tai and the Wa peoples previously competed for the right to local rule. In this process, the Tai Nūa of Kūng Ma did not rely on the support of the Luchuan Federation to obtain legitimacy. Rather, they chose the Chinese “Celestial Empire”²¹ to bestow legitimacy on their rule. Although the Tai Nūa in Kūng Ma did not initially obtain the golden seal of the Chinese dynasties, the head of the Tai eventually obtained it and secured Tai rule over the Kūng Ma district. This legend can be understood as a clear reflection of the early struggles between the

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethnogenesis>, accessed on 30/12/2020.

²¹ To avoid the term Sinocentrism, the author uses the term “Celestial Empire” in scare? quotes. “Celestial Empire” is an old name for Imperial China. During the historical dynasties, the emperors used to describe their dynasty as *tianchao* (The Empire of Heaven). This term is Sinocentric; however, in modern internet slang, it can also be employed in an ironic way. For the meaning of “Celestial”, see Webster dictionary: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/celestial?show=0&t=1309572943>; accessed on 11/12/2020. For an explanation of why China was called the Celestial Empire, the Chinese Session blog: <https://chinesesession.wordpress.com/2008/06/23/why-china-is-also-called-celestial-empire/>; accessed on 11/12/2020. But the Tai chronicles do use similar titles for Chinese emperors, indicating the Tais borrowed the term Tianchao.

Tai and Wa for the right to rule Kūng Ma.

Zhu Di's analysis (2016, 23) of this legend deserves our attention: The “golden seal” represented the central authority's power in the locality and the court recognised the ethnic leader holding it as a legitimate *tuguan/tusi*. In other words, ethnic leaders knew how to use the power of the state to obtain legitimacy to rule. Zhu Di's views are based on local historical records and the results of many fieldwork surveys. According to local historical records and oral stories, the ancestors of the Kūng Ma Tai rulers gained legitimacy to rule by taking advantage of the prestige bestowed by Chinese dynasties, which could not interfere in their internal affairs. This also explains why, in its long historical development, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* repeatedly chose to take the side of the Chinese dynasties during conflicts with other Mainland Southeast Asian powers (e.g., Moeng Phòng/Chiang Tung, Ava, or Burma). This profoundly reflects the political wisdom of the Tai Nūa *cao fa* of Kūng Ma.

Politically, first, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* achieved legitimacy with support from the Chinese imperial court; second, they used the *jimi* policy to rule over other ethnic groups; third, the relationship between Tai and Wa was strengthened through Tai and Wa ruling elites' intermarriages.

It is also essential to emphasise the complementary or symbiotic economic relationship between the Tai and the upland peoples. The Tai practised wet-rice cultivation in river valley basins and had plentiful supplies of agricultural produce, while the Wa inhabited mountainous and semi-mountainous areas where they planted buckwheat and collected herbs and fruits. Whenever there was a market, the Tai and Wa, Bulang, De'ang, Lahu, and other mountain tribes would barter goods or exchange money for their needs, thereby forming reciprocal economic ties.²² The formation of this complementary economic relationship allowed the ties between the two parties to stabilise over time, despite occasional disputes.


Finally, under the influence of Tai religious culture, many Wa and Bulang converted to Theravada Buddhism, and, in turn, utilised the Tai language and script for the writing of religious texts. Generally, through political, economic, religious, and cultural measures, Kūng Ma's ethnic relations were generally balanced in pre-modern times.²³

In Guangxu 29 eighth lunar month (CE 1903), the court had to order Kham Huazong, the younger brother of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* Kham Huaji (the twenty-first *cao fa*, see P2) to suppress a Kaguò (Lahu) rebellion. Relying on loyal Tai *cao fa* to manage

²² Nan Guixiang (2013, 69).

²³ For more details, see 《天啟滇志》 [Tianqi *Dian* Gazetteer], Gu Yongji annotated (1991, 111). This page only includes Jingdong which is relevant but says nothing about Kūng Ma and other Tai Nūa polities.

the Ava Mountain,²⁴ a method still used by the Qing court to govern the border areas in the early twentieth century (See Manu. 7, Manu. 8 and Manu. 9).



Manu. 6: The cover of the “Confidential Order to Suppress the Rebellion of Yunnan Zhenbian *fuyi zhili* Prefecture” (*Yunnan Zhenbian fuyi zhili Ting Pingpan Miling* 雲南鎮邊撫彝直隸廳平叛密令), photo by Dr Zhu Di on 25/09/2015.

The manuscript (see Manu. 6) titled “Confidential Order to Suppress the Rebellion of Yunnan Zhenbian *fuyi zhili* Prefecture” has nine pages (including the cover page) with handwriting and official seals. Here, I use only three pages as an example; specifically, page 2 (see Manu. 7), page 4 (see Manu. 8), and page 5 (see Manu. 9), which are part of the confidential order from the Qing court. Below is a transcription


²⁴ Fang Guoyu (2008, 4–5) defined the Ava Mountain as the region inhabited by the Kha Wa or Wa people. He further divides Ava Mountain into two sections based on the territory of the local Tai *cao fa*. The eastern portion includes Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem, while the western portion includes Moeng Phòng, Chiang Tung.

of extracts from the primary texts containing some critical information from the original manuscript. (I have added punctuation.):

On Guangxu 29 seventh lunar month, 29th day (1903), Zhenbian *zhili fuyi* Prefecture [...] the subordinates of the prefecture are Mengdong, Mengjiao, and Mengsheng [...] [The court] investigated the former *tusi* Han Ronggao, who abandoned the city and fled. The court repeatedly ordered him to return [but] he refused [...] It is challenging for him to do the job [...] Since [the imperial court] found that the Kūng Ma *tusi*, Han Huaaji's younger brother Han Huazong, fought (bravely) this time and the Yi were pleased [with him], they appointed him as the temporary agent [...].

光緒二十九年七月二十九，鎮邊直隸撫彝府……府屬之猛董猛角猛勝……查前土司罕榮高棄城而逃，屢調不還……實難勝任……因查耿馬土司罕華基之弟罕華宗此次從征尚能奮（勇），夷民悅服，暫委代辦……

Due to the lack of effective governance in the Mon-Khmer inhabited area, especially between the territory of Ava Mountain and the Tai *cao fa* (*tusi*), the Qing court had to dismiss the Tai *cao fa*, who did not obey their orders, and appoint the loyal *cao fa* as the agent to deal with the rebellions in the territory of Zhenbian Prefecture.




Manu. 7 The first page of the “Confidential Order to Suppress the Rebellion of Yunnan Zhenbian *fuyi zhili* Prefecture.” It clearly mentions that the court ordered Han (Kham) Huazong to suppress the rebellion. Photograph taken by Dr Zhu Di on 25/09/2015.

Page 4 of the document records unintentionally records strategic details about how to suppress the Lahu’s rebellion (see the manuscript, records in Manu. 8 and Manu. 9):

On Guangxu 29, 8th lunar month, 8th day (CE 1903) [...] Kaguo (The Mon-

Khmer, the original text has incorrectly written the character for Ka) rebelled and ravaged the villages [...] [The Qing court orders] the agent *tusi* to investigate [the rebellion] secretly and seize [the Kago] [...] no need to disclose this order [...] the agent Meng Dong *tusi* Han Huaji.


光緒二十九年八月初八……狝²⁵獠反叛地方，蹂躪各村寨……該代辦密查誘擒……毋得透漏消息……代辦猛董土司罕華基。



The rebellion of Kago (Lahu)

Manu. 8 The Confidential Order of Investigation on the Lahu's Rebellion

²⁵ The scribe should have written *kago* as 佻獠. However, he probably looked down on mountainous ethnic groups, so he wrote 佻 as 狝. This character does not exist 狝. I suppose Kago may be Lahu people, and the scribe might be referring to Luohei (倮黑) in this text. The reason is that the Lahu people rebelled during the late Qing dynasty. For sure this Kago should refer to Lahu, this dog radical+卡 was a common practice during the Ming and Qing times for the Han to belittle the non-Han people, meaning the non-Han were animal-like.



Manu. 9 The Confidential Order of Inquiry on the Kaguo's rebellion, with the official seal.

In my opinion, this manuscript clearly pertains to the Lahu rebellion in Zhenbian Prefecture. The Qing court ordered its agent, Han (Kham) Huaji, to deal strategically with this rebellion. The Chinese manuscripts use the characters 佻 and 猓 to describe the Lahu because the Qing court looked down on upland ethnic groups. The left part of the character 猓 is written with “the dog radical” (*fan quan pang* 反犬旁). It usually relates to dogs or beasts. This indicates that the Qing regarded upland ethnic groups as “barbarians.” During the late Qing dynasty and in the early years of the ROC (1911–1949), there was a proposal to abolish these discriminatory terms. However, they were officially abolished in 1939 as the ROC government sought to avoid being accused of Han chauvinism. Thus, the government ordered a correction to the way “the names of southwestern ethnic minorities” were written. These discriminatory terms were formally abolished.²⁶

5.2.5 The Relationship between Küng Ma and Moeng Ting

As mentioned in the first part, the political relationship between Küng Ma and Moeng Ting was competitive. According to the local chronicle (GMLSDC, 4–6), the Tai of Küng Ma and Moeng Ting both migrated here from Moeng Mao and were described as

²⁶ For more details, see Yang Siji (2014, 76–93+125).

brothers.²⁷ The regular intermarriages between the rulers of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting ensured the continuance of close personal relationships.²⁸ GJDC (2012, 277) has collected many letters written by the Kūng Ma *cao fa*; one letter sent to Moeng Ting described how Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting are tied by kinship, which is different from other *moeng*. Moreover, Fang Guoyu (2008, 129) mentions that the first wife of Moeng Ting *cao fa* was the older sister of Kūng Ma *cao fa*.

Since the Ming dynasty, the process of borderland integration has been a long one and it has not always advanced smoothly. From a macro-historical point of view, the borderland integration of the Kūng Ma *cao fa* is indeed a long historical process, not least because the Kūng Ma *cao fa* was both interdependent of the Moeng Ting *cao fa* and competed with him. To obtain more political support, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* had to manage their relationship with the Chinese dynasties, something that was apparently easier to do than in the case of Moeng Ting. In the process of constructing local history, Moeng Ting and Kūng Ma's distinct political decisions led to disparities in the political resources obtained.²⁹

Two subsequent events illustrate the essence of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting's relationship. First, during the Kangxi emperor period, a court official was killed by a tiger in the upper Moeng Ting territory. The Moeng Ting *cao fa* was terrified and he reported that the officer had died in Kūng Ma territory. Then, the Kūng Ma *cao fa* admitted to this incident and bribed the official investigators. Later, half of the Moeng Ting territory became part of the territory of Kūng Ma with the Nan Gong River forming the divide.³⁰

Secondly, in CE 1902, the “Bo Bian Ya accident” caused direct conflict between Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting. Bo Bian Ya, the son of a Moeng Ting nobleman, robbed the trade caravan of Kūng Ma and demanded a ransom. The Kūng Ma *cao fa* agreed to pay him 3000 silver yuan. However, the agent Nan Yuecai lost the money while gambling. When the ransom failed to arrive in time, Bo Bian Ya became incredibly angry and ordered the Moeng Ting *cao fa* to attack Kūng Ma. Finally, Shunning Prefecture and Yongchang Prefecture sentenced Bo Bian Ya to death and Nan Yuecai was sentenced to life imprisonment, although he was later released.³¹ That is why the Moeng Ting *tusi*

²⁷ GJDC (2012, 277).

²⁸ Ma Jianxiong (2020, 19–32) makes a detailed and profound statement on the role of intermarriages among the Shan-Dai *tusi* districts during the Ming and Qing dynasties. He posits that the intermarriages “made it impossible for the *tusis* to exercise centralised rule over any given area, thus ensuring the long-term rule over these areas by the state.” Furthermore, he further points to the matrimonial ties that balanced the interests of the Shan-Dai *tusis*.

²⁹ I.e., in terms of political support when conflicts occurred, official canonization and promotion with respect to political status.

³⁰ Moeng Ting and Kūng Ma in this accident did not have any deal, but Kūng Ma is more flexible to deal with the Chinese court. Zhu Di (2016, 26–27) and Fang Guoyu (1987, 874–875).

³¹ Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting were from different prefectures. In the late nineteenth century, Kūng Ma was under the

was established first and then given a promotion. However, Kūng Ma received more political benefits from the Chinese authorities, mainly because it demonstrated greater loyalty to the Qing court.³²

After 1728,³³ *The Code of the Qing Dynasty* recorded a total of 157 local and aboriginal officials in Yunnan. Among them, the Pacification Commissions included Kūng Ma *Kham* (the surname *Han* 罕 in Chinese sources), the *cao* of Moeng Laem (the surname, *Dao* 刀 in Chinese sources), and aboriginal prefectures, including the *cao* of Moeng Ting.³⁴ Both were sub-fourth rank in the Qing bureaucratic system.³⁵ However, the Pacification Commissioner was a military official who resided outside of the capital, and the aboriginal prefecture was represented by a civilian official.³⁶ The differences between Kūng Ma's and Moeng Ting's official positions also indicate that the two were continually diverging on many issues. On the other hand, they are evidence that the Kūng Ma's political status rose consistently.

Kūng Ma was not only confronted with the rivalry with Moeng Ting, but it also had to deal with its relationships with other small polities. Kūng Ma territory was shrinking by the time the British arrived in Burma. In 1828, the territory of the Aboriginal Office of Kūng Ma was sub-divided to establish the Aboriginal Offices of Mengjiao (Moeng Kaw, see M6) and of Mengdong (Moeng Dum in Tai). Moreover, they had been fighting for land resources over successive years. Moeng Kaw and Moeng Dum exercised power over the tribes in the southern part of the Ava Mountain. After the British occupied Burma in 1885, the Qing government was forced to cede Ma Liba (the centre of Kokang) in the West under Kūng Ma to the British in 1897. The territory of Kūng Ma further dwindled and retracted to the east.³⁷

I therefore arrive at the following conclusion: On the one hand, the earliest rulers of Kūng Ma and Moeng Ting were descendants of the Moeng Phòng royal house. Initially, Moeng Ting was more powerful, and its territory was larger than that of Kūng Ma. Kūng Ma was a dependent *moeng* of Moeng Ting. The turning point occurred in 1583 (Wanli year 11, Ming dynasty) when the Kūng Ma ruler Kham Qian rebelled against the Ming, and an obedient and loyal *tusi*, Men Kham, was appointed as the new ruler by the imperial court. Subsequently, Kūng Ma acquired greater political status and

administration of Shunning Prefecture and Moeng Ting was under the administration of Yongchang Prefecture. Both the Shunning Prefecture and Yongchang Prefecture dealt with this event together. Nan Yuecai's release can be interpreted as the Kūng Ma ultimately winning this conflict.

³² For more details, see Zhu Di (2016, 26–27).

³³ After the Yongzheng emperor initiated the *gaitu guiliu* policy.

³⁴ Jiang Yingliang (1983, 373).

³⁵ Qing court officials were ranked from 1 to 9, with 1 being the highest rank.

³⁶ Native officials were *tuguan* and *tusi*. More comprehensive analysis of the differences between the *tuguan* and the *tusi* can be found in Chapter One fn. 13.

³⁷ Summarised and translated from GMLSDC (1963, 8).

administrative control over the large territories in Southwest Yunnan. To obtain yet more benefits (territory and political status), Kūng Ma navigated its relationships with the Chinese dynasties (Ming and Qing courts), Moeng Ting, and Burma. When it got the chance to annex the territory of Moeng Ting, Kūng Ma did this without any hesitation.³⁸

On the other hand, Kūng Ma had to confront the threat posed by Moeng Ting, one reason being that Kūng Ma's territory was split from Moeng Ting. Kūng Ma's political status increased upon receiving the independent native official title from the imperial court. In other words, Kūng Ma had no choice but to ally itself with Chinese dynasties to obtain more powerful support. Thus, when Kūng Ma had conflicts with Moeng Ting, the imperial court would support Kūng Ma.

However, since Kūng Ma faced challenges from other *müang*, such as Moeng Kaw and Moeng Dūm, which fought against Kūng Ma and came to dominate the southern part of the Ava mountains, Kūng Ma had to maintain a close relationship with Moeng Ting. This is the main reason for the regular intermarriages and contacts, which kept them both intimately connected. As Fang Guoyu (2008, 129) notices, the intermarriages continued up until the ROC period, with the first wife of Moeng Ting coming from the Kūng Ma royal family.³⁹

5.2.6 The Relationships between Moeng Laem and Other Polities

The inter-ethnic relations in Moeng Laem were the most complicated and conflictual among the three Tai Nüa polities under examination. Throughout history, the Tai polity of Moeng Laem not only experienced internal ethnic conflicts but also disputes with other Tai polities. The relationship between Moeng Laem and external Tai polities lasted for a long time in the Ming dynasty. At a time when the Luchuan Federation was strong, Moeng Laem was under its control and therefore it had many disputes with its neighbours, such as Moeng Ting. Towards the end of the Luchuan regime, Moeng Laem was often engaged in conflict with Moeng Khün, too. Furthermore, after the rise of the Konbaung dynasty, Moeng Laem had to pay tribute to both the Qing court and the Konbaung dynasty at the same time.⁴⁰

Like in Moeng Bò and Kūng Ma, the Tai Nüa were latecomers in Moeng Laem. When the Tai Nüa migrated to Moeng Laem, a powerful Wa polity had already been

³⁸ For more details, see Zhu Di's master's thesis (2016) and Long Xiaoyan (2018, 22–33).

³⁹ This is another vivid example of the Chinese court's divide and rule policy. Geoff Wade (2008, 578–638) has used the term “atomization” to describe this situation. He points out: “the Ming push into the Tai polities of ‘Yun-nan,’ and the divide-and-rule policies pursued throughout the fifteenth century, obviously played a major role in the atomization of Tai power.”

⁴⁰ Concerning the practice of dual sovereignty, see Grabowsky (2008, 11–23).

established. To settle in the Moeng Laem basin without conflict, the headman of the Tai Nüa tried to marry into the Wa royal family and delineate spheres of influence between the two entities. The Tai Nüa lived on the plain (*bazi* in Yunnanese) and the Wa inhabited the mountainous and semi-mountainous areas. The two sides exchanged goods through the market, forming a complementary economic system, as described above. A relatively stable political balance emerged in Moeng Laem. However, the rise of the Lahu (Luohei) ethnic group and the growing number of Han migrants threatened this equilibrium, resulting in decades of internal conflicts. In the following section, I analyse the official records of the Qing dynasty and Tai Nüa manuscripts in Moeng Laem to examine these conflicts.

The relations between Moeng Laem and other polities were often characterised by political conflicts inherited from the Ming dynasty era. Regular tributary relations were established. Moeng Laem paid tribute to China from Yongle year 4 (CE 1406, see Chapter Three) of the Ming dynasty. However, in Xuande year 6 (CE 1431), Moeng Ting Prefecture and Moeng Laem Chief's Office invaded each other's territory, killing people and plundering. Officials of the Ming court were sent to mediate and instructed the native officials to return to the status quo ante. Two years later, in 1433, the Moeng Laem Chief Office submitted a memorial stating that Moeng Ting Prefecture had attacked and occupied its territory. The Ming court instructed the two parties to maintain the status quo. These kinds of adjustment measures only had a temporary effect though, and disputes between Moeng Laem and Moeng Ting continued to erupt at irregular intervals. During the Luchuan Campaign (1436–1449), Moeng Laem first sided with the Luchuan and then surrendered to the Ming court in 1442.⁴¹ In this way, Moeng Laem was able to rid itself of Luchuan control.

As Moeng Laem and Moeng Ting were perpetually involved in conflict with each other, the Ming court sent officials to regulate their relations and ordered the rivals to return the properties and land that they had grabbed from each other. At this time, relations between the Ming court and Moeng Laem were growing closer, and the court tried to “Sinicise” Moeng Laem. As MSL records:

In the year Hongzhi 6, 9th month, dingyou day (Oct. 15, 1493), Dao Pailuo, a kinsman of the Aboriginal Official (*tuguan*) of the Chieftain Office of Moeng Laem in Yunnan, passed away. At that time his wife Zhao Nangmeng was 25 years old, and she maintained her chastity for 28 years without blemish. The Regional Military Commissioner of Yunnan submitted a memorial and reported the matter. [...]. According to the foreign situation, forthwith she was awarded [a certificate of] accolade. The emperor said, “Your Majesty considers that all under the Heaven is a [big] family and [Your Majesty] only wants to spread [our] great cultures to change the foreign customs. Those who stand for our etiquettes and righteousness must be eulogised. Dao Pailuo's wife Zhao Nangmeng is

⁴¹ For more details, see Liew (1996, 162–203).

virtuous and praiseworthy.”⁴²

弘治六年九月丁酉，雲南孟璉長官司土官舍人刀派羅死，時其妻招曩猛年二十五守節，二十八年無玷。雲南都指揮使司奏其事……即與旌表以順夷情。上曰，“朕以天下為家，方思弘名教，以變夷俗，其有趨於禮義者，惡可不加獎勵，孟璉刀派羅妻招曩猛貞節既可嘉。

The Ming court tried to transform the Tai people of Moeng Laem through “education” and replace their customs with Chinese culture, albeit with little success. In Jiajing year 7 (CE 1528), conflict erupted again: for decades between Burma, Moeng Phòng, Longchuan, Moeng Mit, Moeng Laem, and Moeng Ting, with aboriginal people (hill and Tai people) in particular victimised.⁴³ As always, the Ming court attempted to mediate these conflicts while also trying concomitantly to “civilise” (that is to say, integrate, 教化, *jiāohuà* in Ch.) them. However, Chinese control over Moeng Laem was always limited, especially when the court was in turmoil and in competition with Burmese power. Moeng Laem continued to have disputes with other Tai polities and the Ming court.

Still, the fact that the Ming dynasty managed a relatively stable tributary relationship with Moeng Laem allowed the Qing dynasty to maintain a stable tributary relationship with Moeng Laem during its rule in Yunnan. Furthermore, the *gaitu guiliu* policy did not involve Moeng Laem; thus, Moeng Laem and Küng Ma were able to keep their ruling system, and their tributary relationship with the Qing court continued as before. Since the Toungoo dynasty (*r.* 1531–1753) in the sixteenth century, who forced Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna to pay tribute to both the Qing dynasty and Burma at the same time. This arrangement continued until Burma became a province of British India. At this juncture, dual tributes constituted a fundamental reason for the British demand that Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna cede to Burma (this will be discussed further in Chapter Six).

The following section will discuss the relationship between the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and the Lahu after the end of the eighteenth century. Among the manuscripts of local historical material Prof. Grabowsky and I collected, which date as far back as CS 1156 (CE 1794), the materials before the eighteenth century were mainly recorded in Tham or Lik script; since the 1980s, they have been translated into Chinese. In the following section, Chinese records are compared with evidence in Tai manuscripts pertaining to events occurring from the early nineteenth century.

⁴² Xiaozong: vol. 80.1b, Ming shilu, chapter 54, pp. 1522, Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiu yuan.

⁴³ Shizong: vol. 93.17a–18b, Ming shilu, chapter 75, pp. 2165–2168, Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiu yuan.

5.3 The Relationship between the Lahu and the Moeng Laem *Cao Fa* as Reflected in Chinese Historiography and Tai Manuscripts

5.3.1 An overview

Before the pre-modern period, inter-ethnic conflicts⁴⁴ and integration schemes⁴⁵ were a trigger for borderland transformation in Upper Mainland Southeast Asian polities. As a small Tai polity, sandwiched between two great powers (Burma and China), Moeng Laem had to seek a strategy for political survival for several centuries, significantly when the Konbaung dynasty rose suddenly in Burma and the Qing court promoted borderland integration during the early and mid-eighteenth century. The polity of Moeng Laem is called Moeng Laem (also spelt Meng Lien) in Chinese documents and Mainlingyi in Burmese sources. H. Daly mentions Moeng Laem as one of nine “native sawbuships” (i.e., polities ruled by a Tai *cao fa*, lit., “lord of heaven”) in the “last published Chinese official list of Native Tributary States on the south and south-west borders of Yunnan.”⁴⁶

The Chinese sources before the mid-Qing dynasty have fewer mentions of ethnic conflicts within the jurisdiction of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. From an official perspective, ethnic conflicts in Moeng Laem were only documented in the mid-to-late Qing dynasty. There are two explanations for this. First, even if there were internal conflicts between ethnic groups, these were not continuous, or they were not so severe as to require the Chinese court to intervene as a mediator. Second, after the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu* policy, the power of the Qing court only extended to the east bank of the Mekong River; the west bank of the river was still beyond reach. Even if there were ethnic conflicts in the area, the court might not have been able to obtain timely or accurate reports. Therefore, it was not always easy to ensure that events in the Moeng Laem *cao fa* territory across the river were quickly and accurately delivered to the desk of the emperor in Beijing.

During the mid-eighteenth century, the Lahu people and the arrival of Han migrants confronted Moeng Laem with new challenges. Both parties formed alliances and then struggled with local Tai *cao fa* for the control of land and the products derived from that land. This broke the social and political balance of lowland and highland areas in the “territories” under the jurisdiction of the *cao fa* of Moeng Laem, which also included a variety of upland and lowland ethnic groups. The Qing court pursued

⁴⁴ Here, this mainly refers to the conflicts between the Tai Nüa *cao fa* and the Lahu people in Moeng Laem.

⁴⁵ I.e., integration into Chinese dynasties or Burma. For example, Qing China exercised political and military influence on Moeng Laem. Burma, on its part, tried to annex Moeng Laem and incorporate it into its political and administrative structure, but also culturally.

⁴⁶ Daly’s report from 12 June 1891, pp. 1 (in Warry 1888–1895).

different strategies for managing these groups and placed them under different administrative categories, namely, the native official system, the headman system of upland ethnic groups, and the tribal system (Dulong ethnic group). Simultaneously, based on its ambitions to expand its territory, Burma tried to intervene in the Tai areas. Trapped between Burma and the Qing imperial court, these sparsely populated “Zomia areas”⁴⁷ were hardly known by foreigners in the mid-eighteenth century.

Next, and offering a new approach, I will examine the relationship between lowland and highland inhabitants and investigate how the political entity of Moeng Laem managed to endure during pre-modern periods. Firstly, I will introduce the historical background of the Tai polity of Moeng Laem; secondly, I examine Chinese sources concerning Moeng Laem, a Tai chronicle in Lik script, and nineteenth-century English documents regarding the conflicts between the Lahu and Moeng Laem *cao fa*; and thirdly, I analyse the attitude of the Qing court.

This part makes use of documents from three actors, which are written in three languages, namely, Chinese, Tai, and English. The Chinese sources are mainly culled from *The New Compilation of General Gazetteer of Yunnan*, Vol. 94 (Research on Aboriginal Offices, 1 and 2).⁴⁸

The local Tai perspective is reflected in various versions of the *Moeng Laem Chronicle*. We do not know when the Tai of Moeng Laem composed the earliest history of their small principality. However, when Warry made his reconnaissance trip to Yunnan in the late 1880s he found it worth mentioning that the Tai of Moeng Laem “possess[ed] a written history of their State, from which Mr Daly had kindly furnished me with some extracts.”⁴⁹

As mentioned in Chapter One, in December 2018, my supervisor, Prof. Grabowsky, and I were able to collect a Lik script version of the *Moeng Laem Chronicle* kept in a monastery in Moeng Ma, a neighbouring district of Moeng Laem situated on the border with Myanmar. This mulberry paper manuscript is titled “The History of Moeng Laem”

⁴⁷ Political scholar Scott (2009, 14–16) introduced Zomia as a geographical concept that refers to places that are ungoverned by states. He contends that national power cannot permeate into the highlands of Mainland Southeast Asia. However, the upland and lowland relationship is not always antagonistic; indeed, it is usually complementary. Scott’s argument oversimplifies and generalises the historical relationship between the highland and lowland peoples vis-à-vis Moeng Laem and Küng Ma. Scott ignores the symbiotic relationship between the Tai Nüa and Wa in Moeng Laem and Küng Ma. Moreover, in my view, his argument cannot explain the Lahu problem on the Moeng Laem *cao fa*’s territory during the late Qing dynasty. When the Lahu people conflicted with the Tai Nüa *tusi*, they asked the Qing court to mediate. Scott’s argument has limitations due to the complexity of the relationship between the highland peoples and lowland peoples in Yunnan. Nevertheless, his arguments are always controversial and attractive to scholars who study the relationship between highland and lowland peoples in Mainland Southeast Asia.

⁴⁸ Zhou Zhongyue and Zhao Shiming eds. (1949).

⁴⁹ “From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, –No. 9, dated. Bhamo, the 15th of June 1891”, in Warry’s Report to Dehong [Mss Eur Photo Eur 284].

(หน้าท้าวพวยเกล้า ลีกพื้นเมือง เมืองแลม), which I have named MLCL2. Three other mulberry paper manuscripts deal with the history of Moeng Laem; one manuscript is in the possession of Pò Saeng Sam, a local scholar and scribe from Moeng Laem, it is a version of the *Moeng Laem Chronicle* written in the Dhamma script. Prof. Grabowsky transcribed the text into modern Thai from a manuscript that the scribe produced in 1991 on industrial paper.⁵⁰ Due to the fact that the Lik version describes valuable details on the conflicts between Moeng Laem and the Lahu people, this version, which is from Moeng Ma, can be regarded as the most relevant version for this study.

English sources have been found in the India Office of the British Library and the Public Record Office and the Library of Cambridge University. Of special interest are the Scott papers, the Warry report, and other reconnaissance reports of British officials who travelled widely in the Upper Mekong Valley in the 1880s and 1890s. Furthermore, the *Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States* (Scott 1900–1) is a mine of information on the geography, ethnography, economy, and history of various Tai and non-Tai polities of a region contested by Britain, Burma, and China.

5.3.2 Historical Background

The Lahu people, originally from “the Himalayan ranges to the north and north-west,” are of Tibeto-Burman stock.⁵¹ In 2003, their population numbered around 470,000 and they inhabit the mountainous country of Yunnan Province bordering Burma, Laos, and Northern Thailand.⁵² The Lahu people were named Muhso (which means tiger, Thai: *süa* (เสือ), Tai: *soe.*) by the Tai and Luohei (倮黑) or Kucong (苦聰) or Kaluo (佯僇) by various Chinese dynasties.⁵³ They were driven to the west bank of the Mekong River due to the so-called *Gaitu guiliu* policy, promoted by the Qing court in 1724 in Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture,⁵⁴ and also because of incessant rebellions in the Upper Mekong region from the 1720s to the 1750s. They settled in mountainous areas seeking new ethnic mobilisation and ethnogenesis, political status, and economic benefits.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ The manuscript, running over 63 pages, is an interesting combination of traditional historiography and modern scholarship. The first section (pp. 1–7) contains detailed lists of districts, sub-districts, and villages in Moeng Laem. This section is followed by a dynastic chronicle of 28 rulers of Moeng Laem from its founding in the early twelfth century down to the communist victory in 1949 (pp. 8–54). The final section (pp. 55–63) comprises lists of traditional ranks and a list of deaths – of Chinese people as well as those of other warring nations – during the two World Wars. The second part, which makes up the bulk of the manuscript, provides valuable information pertaining to Moeng Laem’s relationship with neighbouring Tai polities, including Sipsòng Panna. They can be used for cross-checking the Moeng Lü Chronicle.

⁵¹ For more details, see Davies (1909, 337, 362–363 and 392–393).

⁵² For more details, see Ma Jianxiong (2013, 1). Ma points out that, according to Anthony R. Walker’s estimation, there are about 700,000 Lahu people worldwide (Ibid., 8).

⁵³ Ibid., 9–10.

⁵⁴ Present-day Jinggu; Moeng Bò is the Tai name.

⁵⁵ For more details, see Ma Jianxiong (2013, 21–30).

This kind of intervention inevitably upset the original balance of ethnic relations in Moeng Laem and led to decades of conflict prompting the Qing court to mediate.

When a former monk named Zhang Fuguo (張輔國)⁵⁶ led the Lahu people to fight against Moeng Laem *cao fa*, both parties needed a prestigious mediator. Moeng Laem *cao fa* Dao Paigong (刀派功) sought help from Moeng Phòng; however, the Lahu people turned to the Qing authorities for help. Nevertheless, the Qing officials in Yunnan and the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796–1820) held different positions with respect to the demands of Lahu headmen. Local officials supported the demands of Lahu headmen who wanted to manage upland affairs in areas under the jurisdiction of the Moeng Laem *cao fa* – an economical and trouble-free strategy. However, Emperor Jiaqing was unconvinced about the strategy of supporting a headman and allowing him to challenge the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. He considered that this would lead to chaos on the southwestern frontier and displease the Moeng Laem *cao fa*.⁵⁷ Therefore, the demands of the Lahu headmen were never approved. As a result, the Lahu people tried to attain the support of the British colonial government to further their economic and political aspirations.⁵⁸

The relationships between the Tai Nüa people and other local ethnic groups in the middle and late Qing period can be considered “academically attractive” as they were rather complicated. As previously discussed, the Lahu people in Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture, who refused to yield to the Qing court’s borderland integration measures, were driven to the west bank of the Mekong River.

Emperor Jiaqing had no interest in sponsoring a rival to the Moeng Laem *cao fa* because he believed that this would cause disorder on the southwestern frontier and force the Moeng Laem *cao fa* to embrace the Burmese.

5.3.3 The Account in Chinese Sources

A serious dispute between the Lahu and Moeng Laem *cao fa* began during the reign of Emperor Jiaqing. Chinese sources show that the root cause of the dispute between the two parties lay in competing economic interests. The governor of Yunnan Yongbao (永保), and the provincial military commander, Wu Dajing (烏大經), clearly outlined the incident in a memorial to the emperor in Jiaqing year 8 (CE 1803). This memorial is long and detailed. To this end, to facilitate its understanding, the following dialogue will be presented and analysed in segments. The first part is summarised as follows: A memorial submitted by Yongbao and Wu to the throne aimed to investigate border

⁵⁶ His Buddhist name is rendered Tongjin (銅金).

⁵⁷ For more details, see [The memorial was reviewed by the emperor with a cinnabar red pen] (Zhupi Yuzhi 朱批諭旨, GZZP in abbreviation): Beijing, Forbidden City Archives, Miscellaneous Zhu Biography in the Palace, 04–01–1754–15, Yongbao Memorial (14 September, Jiaqing Year 8).

⁵⁸ See the following section.

disputes between the Moeng Laem *cao fa* Dao Paigong and Mahayana Buddhist monk Tongjin. Tongjin started his journey in the seventh lunar month, crossing the Mekong River. The regional commander of Pu'er⁵⁹ (普洱鎮總兵), Shu Cheng (書成), the prefect of Shunning Prefecture (順甯府知府), Fu Sang'a (福桑阿), the sub-prefectural magistrate of Weiyuan (威遠同知), Liu Dading (劉大鼎), to wait for Tongjin at Moeng Ka (a town in present-day Jinggu, Chinese name township Yongping 永平). According to the report, Tongjin's words on arrival were rather humble. Thereupon, he was questioned about the reasons why he occupied the borderland of Moeng Laem.⁶⁰

We can infer the following details from the descriptions of Yong and Wu: In the eyes of the local officials, Tongjin had a more submissive attitude and, even in the rainy season, which was not conducive to travel, he tried to rush to the mediation site in Moeng Ka, Moeng Bò, as soon as possible. The mediators were composed of the military chief of Pu'er, the prefect of Shunning, and local officials in Weiyuan. The reason was that the military chief of Pu'er was in charge of border security, the Moeng Laem Pacification Commission was administratively under the jurisdiction of Shunning Prefecture, and the mediation place was in Moeng Ka. Hence the presence of the military and political leaders of the three parties concerned. Let us take a closer look at Tongjin's justification: Tongjin, a monk, initially resided in Nanxing (南興) where he disciplined and instructed the Yi people (it might be Lahu). After three years of peace, the Yi people obeyed Tongjin's control and did not provoke the Moeng Laem *tusi*. However, the Moeng Laem *tusi* was not good at pacification and he imposed heavy taxes on the Yi people, leading to disgruntlement and disobedience. Tongjin tried to dissuade and threaten the Yi people, and, consequently, they did not cause trouble. Tongjin is considered the acting headman of the Yi people in Moeng Laem, and if there are any irregularities, he will plead guilty.⁶¹

Tongjin's defence does not match the description in the *Moeng Laem Chronicle* (MLCL2). The description of conflicts between the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and Tongjin (chief of the Lahu people) is not surprising given that it originates from a different standpoint. Tongjin's remarks reflected his great need for the support of the Qing court and their recognition of his political status. Of course, the officials of the Qing court did not just listen to one party. The heads of the “*san meng wu quan* (三猛五圈 three *moeng* and five *khwaen*)”⁶² who were placed under the jurisdiction of Tongjin were also summoned to appeal. Let us take a look at what these chiefs had to say: The headmen

⁵⁹ Tai name: Moeng Maen.

⁶⁰ This memorial is recorded in Zhou Zhongyue and Long Yun (1949, vol. 176, *tusi kao* 4, *shiguan* 1, section 13, pp. 185–186). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Five, No.1.

⁶¹ This memorial is recorded in Zhou Zhongyue and Long Yun (1949, vol. 176, *tusi kao* 4, *shiguan* 1, section 13, pp. 185–186). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Five, No.2.

⁶² See Chapter Two, fn. 40.

of *meng* (*moeng*) and *quan* (*khwaen*) crossed the Mekong River and questioned the Yi people, who were subjects of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. They argued that the Yi people were afraid of being controlled by the *cao fa* and that Tongjin treated everyone equally. The Qing officials interrogated the Yi people over their alleged betrayal of the Moeng Laem *tusi* due to the burdensome taxation imposed by the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. The headmen argued that the Yi people were fooling them and that they would obey the instructions. They agreed to pay taxes to the local governor or transmit taxes to the *tusi* through the local government.⁶³

Judging from the statements made, the heads of the *san meng wu quan* were not betraying the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. They explained why they supported Tongjin: first, the harshness of the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and the heavy taxes imposed on them; secondly, Tongjin was fair in dealing with taxation issues vis-à-vis upland people. Tongjin had therefore won the hearts of more than 20,000 Yi people. Qing court officials also admonished the leaders for not paying taxes as they lived in the territory of Moeng Laem. Later, the Yunnan governor, Yongbao, and the provincial military commander, Wu Dajing, admonished the leader of the Yi people in their testimonials saying: The prefecture and county officials and other places were instructed to give land taxes converted to money to the Moeng Laem *cao fa*.

Though grateful for the instruction from the Qing official, the Yi people were frightened by the idea of delivering the land taxes personally to the *tusi* (as Moeng Laem *tusi* imposed heavy taxes on them). They were willing to be placed under the control of Tongjin who would pay the taxes for them. Tongjin lived in the area and was granted permission to leave the monkhood and resume secular life. He was given a seal of authority and could write a letter to the Moeng Laem *cao fa* if trouble arose. The Luohei people agreed to deliver their taxes to Tongjin, who would then forward the total amount to the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. However, the Moeng Laem *tusi* did not show up for this meeting, which was unreasonable.⁶⁴

The memorials of Governor Yong and military officer Wu provide detailed descriptions of the conflicts between the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and the Lahu people. According to the records, the local imperial officers made a special and impartial investigation of the three parties, namely, Tongjin, the headmen of *San meng wu quan*, and the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. However, the Moeng Laem *cao fa*'s failure to show up made the wrong impression on the local Qing officers. Moreover, due to the different religious beliefs of the Moeng Laem *cao fa* (Theravada Buddhist), the local officers

⁶³ This memorial is recorded in Zhou Zhongyue and Long Yun (1949, vol. 176, *tusi kao* 4, *shiguan* 1, section 13, pp. 185–186). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Five, No.3.

⁶⁴ This memorial is recorded in Zhou Zhongyue and Long Yun (1949, vol. 176, *tusi kao* 4, *shiguan* 1, section 13, pp. 185–186). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Five, No. 4.

were inclined to let Tongjin manage the upland territory that came under the jurisdiction of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. Finally, Tongjin, a Yi who came from Moeng Moeng, and later became the leader of the mountainous areas,⁶⁵ was given verbal promises by the local Qing officials; however, the Lahu people still had to pay taxes to the Moeng Laem *cao fa* as they lived under his jurisdiction.

We know that the Lahu people opposed the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Paigong, in Jiaqing year 5 (CE 1800). The Qing court mediated the disputes between the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and the Lahu people in Jiaqing year 8 (CE 1803). The headman of the Lahu people was Tongjin, who resumed a secular life and used a secular Chinese name, Zhang Fuguo, in order to serve as the headman of the Lahu people. He was subordinate to the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. Furthermore, we can clearly see that the Qing officials supported Tongjin. Although Tongjin had not been given formal political recognition, Qing officials recognised Tongjin's leadership over the Yi people in the uplands.

However, his leadership needed to be approved by the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. At the same time, Tongjin and his followers were required to pay taxes to the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. It shows that Qing officials still feared that excessive interference in Moeng Laem's internal political and economic issues would displease the Moeng Laem *cao fa*.

After the end of the Sino-Burma War (1765–1769), the Qing court had no intention of provoking conflict again. Supporting an agent with the potential to disrupt the southwestern border would represent a tremendous security threat. Therefore, the Jiaqing emperor agreed to the policy of pacification proposed by Tongjin. However, he was very cautious and reluctant in his handling of the Tongjin incident and was not willing to grant Tongjin an official position because he believed that: “[You] can only give [him] rewards, but [you] cannot assign positions [to him]. This person will ultimately be untrustworthy. Later, he will be the trouble of snake feet” (this means he will cause big troubles).⁶⁶

Nevertheless, Tongjin controlled the Munai silver mine on the Moeng Laem *cao fa*'s territory, thus augmenting his power. This weakened the financial base of the Moeng Laem *cao fa* who had to pay tribute, not only to the Qing court, but also to Burma. In this case, Moeng Laem was financially stretched and had to increase taxes on the upland peoples. The incumbent *cao fa*, Dao Paigong, was forced to seek the help

⁶⁵ According to Ma Jianxiong, Tongjin's teacher, Yang Deyuan, was born in Chongqing, Sichuan, grew up in Jizu mountain (present-day Binchuan, Dali), and was exiled to Moeng Phòng by the Qianlong emperor. He later rose to prominence as a powerful monk and the mountainous headman of the Mekong River's west bank. Tongjin, as one of his four disciples, inherited his political legacy and began to expand his authority. Tongjin was a Yi from Moeng Moeng (present-day Lincang Prefecture). For more details, see Ma Jianxiong (2020, 64–66).

⁶⁶ GZZP, Beijing, Forbidden City Archives. 04–01–31–1754–6 [2 April of Jiaqing Year 9]. The original words of Emperor Jiaqing were: “只可加赏，不可授职，此人终不可信用，后必为蛇足之患。”（北京，故宫档案，宫中朱批缩微，04–01–31–1754–6（嘉庆九年四月初二日）。

of his mother's homeland, Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung or Kengtung), even while the brother of the Moeng Khün *cao fa* was imprisoned in the Siamese capital (Bangkok). Moreover, the Moeng Khün *cao fa* owed allegiance to the Konbaung dynasty of Burma. Thus, the Moeng Khün *cao fa* could not even protect himself, let alone help the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Paigong. However, Dao Paigong was not aware of this situation. He mobilised 300 soldiers and led them to Moeng Yang to ask for help.⁶⁷ However, the Moeng Yang *cao fa* had already taken refuge in Siam since the early nineteenth century. Dao Paigong was killed in Moeng Yang territory where his official seal of office was also lost.⁶⁸

5.3.4 The Local Tai Chronicles Perspective

The accounts in the *Moeng Laem Chronicle* and the Chinese sources have differing perspectives. First, this Tai chronicle, though less reliable with regard to the chronology of events, confirms the role of upland populations in the political administration of Moeng Laem. The Dhamma script version of the chronicle, copied by Pò Saeng Sam (MLCT1, as mentioned in Chapter One), confirms the division of Moeng Laem into lowland districts (*moeng*) of the Tai and upland districts (*khwaen*) inhabited by hill peoples. The Tai chronicle records the names of thirteen *moeng* and nine *khwaen*. The latter are divided into two groups, namely, four “inner districts” (*khwaen nai*) and five “outer districts” (*khwaen nòk*), probably reflecting the closer supervision of the first group by Tai liaison officers called *lam*, appointed by the *cao fa*.⁶⁹

So, what was the Moeng Laem perspective? The chronicle entitled MLCL2⁷⁰ offers a different description. Zhang Fuguo, the headman of the Musoe (Lahu) people, formed an alliance with the Kha Kui group and engaged in conflict with Moeng Laem. Moeng Laem was unable to effectively manage the aforementioned event and so decided to report the situation to provincial officials in today's Kunming and seek assistance from them. The passage (Folios 7/16–8/16) in the Lik manuscript statement has been translated into modern Thai:

In the *huang met* year, CS 1173 (CE 1811), the seventeenth year of the Chinese emperor Ca Khin, Cao Maha Khanan led numerous troops, counting one hundred thousand, and the courageous Tai Khün troops via Moeng Mang Yan, situated far away, finally arriving in Moeng Laem. They instigated large

⁶⁷ Indeed, some Tai manuscripts recorded that Dao Paigong sallied forth with his soldiers to aid the Moeng Yang *cao fa*.

⁶⁸ Ibid. and MLXFS (1986, 25–26).

⁶⁹ MLCT1, pp. 22–28

⁷⁰ The original document was written in Lik script; Dr. Direk Injan translated a portion of it into modern Thai, and Achan Chaichün assisted me in translating and summarizing it. This thesis contains seven quotations: two from Achan Chaichün's summary, and five from Dr. Direk's translations. As a result, I have to mix translations and summary. The original translation will be used when it is published.

numbers of Kha Musoe (i.e., the Lahu people) to join their troops in attacking Moeng Laem and Moeng Peng. Without saying anything, they burnt and pillaged these places and afterwards returned to their land. They withdrew with all their troops to their land. In a *tao san* year,⁷¹ a man named Saen Tha Ye who lived in Ho Mò (*Hua Bò*, lit. “Head of [Moeng] Bò, perhaps refers to a village located in Moeng Bò) aimed at gathering all the Kha Kui as well as the Musoe people. A man named Cang Fung Kò (Zhang Fuguo, namely, Tongjin) led the Musoe people to join them. This news reached the ruler of Müang Laem. [As for] the royal decree (*phra atya*) of Müang La, the minister of the king of Moeng Ti named Maha Wongsā, led all ministers and councillors of all the *moeng* ruled by *cao fa* to jointly send the message to the *cao lam* (liaison officers) who [in turn] would have to send it to Liu Ta Lao Ye. The message demanded that he immediately go [to visit] the Cong Tu (*Zongdu*: the governor-general) at Müang Sae (Kunming).

ถึงปีร้างเม็ด ลำดับตามถึง ศักราช 1173 กล่าวถึง ฟ้าร้องจำขึ้น ครอบเมือง 17 ปี เมื่อนั้น เจ้าไขฟ้าขุนหาญ ผู้ที่คั้นทั้งหลายนับแสน เรียกชื่อ มั่นว่า เจ้ามหาจะหนาน / ตัวมันนำเอาพลศึก มาล้อมเป็นหมู่อีกด้วยศึก เขาชั้น... เดินทาง มาตั้งเมืองมาขาน? เป็นสถานที่ไกล เมื่อถึงเมืองแลมอย่างรวดเร็ว / มั่นขุนยัง ชวนเอา พวกข้า มูเซอแสน นาย ได้พากันต่อต้าน เตรียมทัพสู้ศึกเมืองแลม / มั่นก็ไม่มีปากพูด กับหมูนั่น และเข้าสู่กับเมืองแลม พังเสียหาย ส่วนเมือง เปงนั้น พวกเขาเอาไฟเผาเสียจนมอดไหม้ / มั่นก็ควรมาเล่าอย่างนั้น พอว่าได้แล้ว ก็กลับ คืบบ้านเมือง เอาทหารกลับไปยัง (เมื่อรบชนะแล้ว ก็กลับคืบบ้านเมือง พาทหารกลับไปยัง) ที่อยู่ที่อยู่อาศัยของเขา / เมื่อนั้นครบรอบ ปีชื่อว่าปีเต่าสัน จะบอกกล่าวเนื้อความแต่ละอัน ยามนั้น ยังมีคนหนึ่งชื่อว่า สิ้นค่าเย มั่นมาอยู่หัวจ้าก เป็นขอกสองแถม มั่นก็อยากจะชวนเอาพวกข้าทุกทั้งหมัด รวมถึงพวกกลุ่มมูเซอ ไปรวมกัน ผู้ที่เป็นหัวหน้า ชื่อว่า จางฝุงก้อ เมื่อนั้นข่าวคราวนี้รู้ไปถึงเจ้าไขฟ้า ตนปกครองเมืองแลมหลวง และอาญาเมืองแลม หน่อเครือโหง เป็นคั้น ทั้งขุนเมืองเจ้าตีหลวงเสนา คนที่ได้ชื่อเจ้า มหาวงสา มีดังนี้ ทุกเจ้าฟ้าเสนาพรองเมือง จึงมาชวนกัน ... (ส่งสาส์นไป) ... ถึงเหนือเตียง เจ้าลุ่ม ไปถึงเมืองเขาชื่อ โสนหลนขุนพู เล่าบอ ผู้ชื่อลั่วตาเล่าเย ผู้ปกครองเมืองเพินพู เจ้าไขฟ้าก็รับได้ และไปเมืองแส ความถึงเมืองจงตูผู้เข่น

The available evidence indicates that, during Zhang Fuguo’s tenure, the Lahu people actively participated in the Kha Kui army, which was under the command of San Daye (Saen Tha Ye). An assault was initiated against the settlements of Müang La and Müang Piang. Subsequently, the Moeng Laem *cao fa* requested that the interpreter transmit information about the Lahu assault on Moeng Laem to the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou. Qing military forces were mobilised and converged upon Moeng Laem, where they joined Tai troops to fight the Lahu united armies. This original account records in MLCL2 Folios 9/5–10/14:

Having been readily prepared, all Chinese and Tai troops established their forces to fight ferociously against the Kha Kui forces. The battle started at dawn in the morning with the loud, resounding noise of guns and cannons and foggy smoke covering the sky. The battle noise could be heard everywhere in the country up to the sky. Both sides were mobilising their forces and fighting through the night until the next morning. The soldiers of both sides were very brave. They fought one another with swords. The Kui army was also unprepared

⁷¹ This should be the year CS 1174 (CE 1812).

to resist the enemies with crossbows in their hands. The Chinese troops were very brave. They fought with crossbows and swords in their hands. The Tai troops also fought most bravely against the enemies with swords in their hands. [The battle] lasted like this every day over months. After a while of taking a rest both sides prepared to resume fighting. We feared to face some difficulties. Waiting for the right moment both sides were shooting signals with guns and canons. The bullets did not hit the Kha and Musoe making them shouting curses against us. The Kha Kui shouted out loudly to the Chinese troops asking them to return home: “Never expect that Saen Tha Ye will surrender. You all will die and become rotten corpses. We, the Kui, inhabit this area and have never attacked or seized your country. Your wives are holding your children, waiting for you. We feel pity for your wives, who will soon lose their husbands and have nobody to plough the rice fields. Now, go back to your homes! The Musoe are shouting and laughing this way, but we feel just pity for you. The Chinese will be going to die in a land where we live.”

พอเตรียมพร้อมกัน ทุกหมู่ ทั้งกองทัพจีน และกองทัพไต ได้ร่วมกันขึ้นไปต่อสู้ฆ่าฟันด้วยความโกรธแค้น / เริ่มตั้งแต่เช้าถึงเที่ยง ต่อสู้กับพวกข่ากุย / เสียงปืน เสียงปืนใหญ่ ดังก้องไปทั่วทุกที่ กลุ่มเขา ร่วมมือร่วมใจ พร้อมกันต่อสู้อย่างไม่หือ เสียงปืน เสียงปืนใหญ่ ดังขึ้นก้องทั่วชั้นฟ้าอากาศ ทั่วเมือง ทุกฝ่ายระดมยิงสู้กัน ตลอดทั้งคืนจนถึงเช้า ก็เอาดาบยาว โไล่ฟันกันอย่างไม่ลดละ มองดูพวกเขา โห้ร้องอย่างไม่มีย้อหือ / ทุกผู้ทุกคนในมือจับหน้าไม้ ขึ้นสาย เตรียมยิง มองดูกองทัพฝ่ายฟ้าเมืองจีน ก็เข้มแข็งกล้าหาญ มองดูฝ่ายเรา เจ้าขุนไตทุกหมู่ ทุกฝ่ายทุกคน มือถือดาบกล้า วิ่งเข้าฟัน ดังนี้ ทุกฝ่ายล้วนมีความกล้าหาญ แต่ละคนก็ต่อสู้ฟันมุเซออย่างไม่รู้จักเหน็ดเหนื่อย มองดูกลุ่มเขา เจ้าน้อยมุเซอ ก็ไม่ย้อหือ / ทุกด้านทุกอัน ยกหน้าไม้ ธนู ปืน ตั้งรอไว้ / ทุกเมื่อทุกวัน พอถึงเดือนค้ำ ก็ตามกันกลับคืน รอคอยใด วันใด ให้เข้า ให้เขาค่อยหายเหนื่อย ทุกฝ่ายค่อยพร้อมกันเตรียมศึกสู้อีก / เดือนหนึ่งผ่านไปแล้ว เดือนหนึ่งใหม่มาแทน เกรงว่าเมืองเราจะได้รับความลำบาก รอคอยว่าวันใดก็เป็นแบบนั้น ทุกฝ่ายส่งสัญญาณเสียงปืน เสียงปืนใหญ่ ยิ่งก้องดังสนั่น / เล็งตรงที่อยู่ของ พวกข่า มุเซอ ก็ยิงไม่โดนพวกข่า มุเซอ ทำให้พวกเขาร้องเสียงดัง พวกกุยก็ด่าพวกข่ากว่า สูอยากจะได้ สิ้นถ่าเหย่เจ้าตุ้ แต่สงสารพวกสุเมืองแบ่ จะเนาตาย ทั้งกลุ่มเจ้าขุนไตก็อย่า พวกข่าก็อาศัยอยู่แถวนี้ ไม่ได้ไปแย่งชิงเมือง ของพวกท่าน จึงได้กลับไปโดยไว พวกข้าสงสาร เมียท่านที่รอคอยเฝ้าดูพวกท่าน มุเซอกล่าวความว่าดังนี้ ข้อหนึ่ง พวกเราสงสารพวกข่า แบ่ พวกกุย ร้องด่าว่าหลายครั้ง พวกเราสงสารเมียท่าน ไม่มีคนที่จะไถนาให้ มุเซอพูดความนี้ด้วยเสียงดังและหัวเราะ / แต่พวกเรานั้นสงสารตัวท่าน คนจีนจะมาดาบบนแผ่นดินที่พวกเราอาศัยอยู่

In this account, the Qing court dispatched military forces to assist the Tai soldiers from Moeng Laem in fighting the Lahu and Kha Kui factions. The Lahu warriors exhibited heightened apprehension towards the potential involvement of Chinese soldiers in the ongoing conflict between the Lahu and Tai factions. The Chinese soldiers were successfully convinced to withdraw. The allied army of Lahu and Kha Kui argued that the Lahu community had not engaged in any acts of aggression or territorial encroachment against the Chinese region. Consequently, they implored the Qing military personnel to refrain from intervening in their affairs. The original translation in MLCL2, Folios 10/14–11/7 records as:

The Kha Kui shouted out, cursed, ridiculed. Thus our army fought with them all day and night without the slightest fears. They responded quickly and with a lot of noise without realising which time they would fall soaked in blood. From the preparations of troops, moving them into the battle, this took quite a

long time, this all lasted almost two full years. When the first lunar month had passed the dew had disappeared from the country. In the seventh lunar month⁷², we succeeded in defeating all the Kha Kui. Saen Tha Ye was taken as a captive and taken back to Müang Maen. Having been beheaded by the ruler of Müang Maen, Saen Tha Ye's head was sent to the ruler of Müang Sae who ruled over Vitheha.⁷³ All the men in the troops returned to their own country and lived their happily.

ดังนี้ พวกข้ากษัตริย์ ร้องคำ ถ้อเถียนและหัวเราะ ใจนงกองทัพเราได้สู้รบเขาทั้งวันทั้งคืนไม่เกรงกลัวสักนิด มันตอบกลับอย่างรวดเร็วด้วยเสียงดัง /ไม่รู้ว่าเมื่อใดจะล้ม เลือดอาบ บนแผ่นดินสักวัน /ตั้งแต่เมื่อเตรียมกองทัพและ เดินทางไปสู้รบเป็นเวลานาน จนได้สองปีเต็ม นั้น เมื่อถึงเดือนหนึ่งสว่างเลยไป น้ำค้างหายจากเมือง และเดือนเจ็ดมาต่อ / เราก็จะสู้ชนะทุกขัณฑ์ได้ / ส่วน สิ้นถ้าเย ก็ได้ตัวมัน และ เอาตัวมันไปตั้งเมืองแมน ขุนหลวงประหารชีวิตมัน และเอาหัวขึ้นถวายถึงเจ้าผู้ปกครอง วิเทหะ เมืองแส // ขณะนั้น เมืองฝายฟ้า ทุกหนแห่ง กลับคืน (บ้านเมือง) ของตนเอง แล้วอยู่กันอย่างสุขสบาย

According to this account, the Qing soldiers and Tai troops jointly defeated the Lahu tribe and captured and executed San Daye, the leader of the rebellion. The Qing troops then returned to the garrison, and the Tai people lived in peace again. From the Tai historical record, we can ascertain a different perspective. In the eyes of the Tai of Moeng Laem, no one doubted that the bandits who burned, killed, plundered, and looted came from the Lahu and Kha Kui allied armies. Moreover, the chronicle does not mention the heavy taxes imposed by the Moeng Laem *cao fa* on the upland population. It only mentions that the Lahu people united with the hill people, such as the Kha Kui people,⁷⁴ to attack the territory of Moeng Laem. Hence, according to the local Tai

⁷² According to the Tai Lü calendar, the first lunar month begins in November. Thus, the six or seven lunar months should be the months of April and May.

⁷³ Moeng Sae is in Kunming. Here refers to The Governor-general Yunnan and Guizhou (雲貴總督), namely the two governors: the first Wu Lantai (r. 1799-1802) and the successor Yong Bao (r. 1802-1807).

⁷⁴ In the Tai language, Kha means “subject,” “servant,” or “slave” and refers to hill people in general. Kui is the name (possibly an autonym) of an ethnic group that lives in Northern Cambodia, primarily in the provinces of Preah Vihear and Kompong Thom, but also in lower parts of Northeast Thailand, particularly in Surin and Sisaket provinces. Suai is an exonym of Kui, which means “those who pay tribute” to the lower land rulers, i.e., Tai polities, as the Suai/Kui used to deliver forest goods to the court of Bangkok. Schliesinger (2000, 41–45) believes that this tribe is originally Mon-Khmer and lives in Mainland Southeast Asia. These Kui speak Mon-Khmer and are culturally similar to the Khmer of Northern Cambodia. More information can be found in Burusphat (1990, 223–231) and Oranuch (1984, 1). However, according to Grabowsky, the ethnonym Kui is also used in Tai writings to refer to highland people in Northern Laos and nearby places in the Shan states and Yunnan. Though “Kha” is the Tai general term for hill tribes, “Kui” may also apply to groups other than the first in the Thai-Cambodian borderlands. According to my understanding, this may not necessarily apply to a Mon-Khmer speaking population, and thus a reference to the Lahu or a sub-group of the Lahu is feasible, particularly given the Tai Nüa local description in their writings. For more details, see Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 291). As a result, I believe Kha Kui refers to either a distinct ethnic group in the Moeng Laem region or is a generic term denoting multiple ethnic groups in the highlands. As Prof. Sun Laichen told me Kui might have some connections with Gonglayin (the headman of Gui group, 桂家 in Ch.) or it might be Gui group. As I mentioned, there are two groups of Kuy: Northern Kuy (Sino-Tibetan speaking Lahu, specifically Lahu Ni or Yellow Lahu) and Southern Kuy (the Mon-Khmer speaking people in modern Thailand, Cambodia and southern Laos). The alliance of the Lahu and the Kui was actually an alliance of different Lahu groups,

perspective, the disputes between the Tai and Lahu groups should be attributed to the aggressive and acquisitive behaviour of the Lahu group.

At that time, the Moeng Laem *cao fa* reported the attack by the Lahu tribe to the Qing court. The Qing court sent troops to support the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and defeated Zhang Fuguo, the Lahu headman, who was eventually beheaded on the orders of the Qing court.⁷⁵ Moreover, the Tai chronicle states that Moeng Laem asked for help from the Qing court with an underlying tone that suggests they believed they were a commensurate power.⁷⁶ It seems evident, therefore, that, from the local Tai perspective, the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and the Qing court were considered as having equal status.

This incident was also recorded in the *Zhupi Yuzhi*⁷⁷ in the Jiaqing period. From Jiaqing years 16 and 17 (CE 1811–1812), Zhang Fuguo convened leaders of the Luhei (Lahu) villages from various places and organised the army to intensively occupy the territory of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Moeng Wian,⁷⁸ and other places. In the winter of Jiaqing year 17 (CE 1812), the Moeng Laem *cao fa*'s request was endorsed by Emperor Jiaqing and the Yunnan government. The court sent troops across the Mekong River to take the Nanxing Fortress, and Zhang Fuguo fled to Nanzha (南柵). In Jiaqing 18 second lunar month (CE 1813), the Qing army captured Zhang Fuguo and several members of his entourage in Nanzha and beheaded him.⁷⁹ Zhang Fuguo's death significantly weakened the power of the Luohei. Thereafter, it became more difficult for the Lahu to launch large-scale attacks on Moeng Laem. However, the mobilisation and ethnogenesis of the Lahu ethnic group continued.⁸⁰

Later, Qing court officials adopted three measures when dealing with the Lahu ethnic group. First, in Guangxu 13 (1887), Cen Yuying (岑毓英) suggested that the Qing court set up Zhenbian Prefecture (鎮邊府 Chenpien Ting in Warry's report and Scott's collection).⁸¹ *Zhenbian* literally means "pacification of the boundary"; its

Red Lahu, Yellow Lahu, etc. The two Kuys belong to totally different ethnic groups and should not be confused. The Gwe in eighteenth century Burma led by Gonanein in northern Burma, which belonged to the Mon-Khmer speaking Southern Kuy, did flee to Moeng Laem, but their remnants were sent to Xinjiang. They had nothing to do with Lahu kuy or Yellow Lahu. It's very complicated, but based on my research, the Southern and Northern Kuys were and are two different groups. In Mainland Southeast Asia, there are cases that two different ethnic groups happen to have the same name.

⁷⁵ Beijing, Forbidden City Archives, GZZP in the Palace, 3–165–7894–30; Zhang Fuguo's confession, cf. Ma Jianxiong (2018, 54–99).

⁷⁶ MLCL2 Folios 9/5–10/14.

⁷⁷ Abbreviated as GZZP: "The memorial reviewed by the emperor with a cinnabar red pen."

⁷⁸ Including Shang Mengyun (upper Moeng Wian) and Xia Mengyun (lower Moeng Wian), present-day Lancang County.

⁷⁹ Beijing, Forbidden City Archives, GZZP in the Palace, 3–165–7894–30; Zhang Fuguo's confession, cf. Ma Jianxiong (2018, 54–99).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ See Cen Yuying (2005, 412).

territory included the territories of the Moeng Laem and Moeng Moeng *cao fa* and Luohei (Lahu) mountain. Fang Guoyu (2008, 110) contends that Zhenbian Prefecture was established because the rulers of Moeng Laem and Moeng Moeng were unable to control Luohei Mountain. Secondly, in the same year, Cen Yuying also memorialised Emperor Guangxu for permission to grant a native official title to Li Xianchun (李先春), the headman of Lahu, who had submitted and shown loyalty to the Qing court.⁸² Lastly, in Guangxu year 14 (1888), Cen Yuying suggested a crackdown on the Lahu people who were causing trouble in Zhenbian Prefecture.⁸³

The unrest created by the Lahu was by no means restricted to Moeng Laem and spread all over the Tai-dominated areas in the Upper Mekong Valley. The *Chronicle of Sipsòng Panna*, for example, records fighting against the Musoe and other hill people in 1838.⁸⁴ By the end of the nineteenth century, British intelligence officers, including W. Archer, reported Musoe/Lahu population movements as far south as the uninhabited uplands near Chiang Saen.⁸⁵

5.3.5 Impression from Records Translated into English

Until the late nineteenth century, the conflicts between lowland Tai *cao fa* and highland Lahu still posed a huge challenge for both parties. The Lahu people even tried to ally with the British against the Tai *cao fa* and China. The intentions of the Lahu people are reflected in the appendices of the letters of the Scott Collections archived in the British Library and at Cambridge University Library. The appendix attached to Scott's report includes three letters related to local affairs which have been translated into English – two from Shan and one from Chinese.⁸⁶

The first one, Letter A, was written by the *cao fa* of Moeng Laem –*sawbwa* in Burmese, which means God of the Heaven – and sent to the ruler of Taküt,⁸⁷ a Wa area in the northern Shan states on the east of Mang Lün:

Letter A handed to Superintendent, Northern Shan States, on 20th February 1896.

⁸² Ibid.: 413.

⁸³ Ibid, 414–415.

⁸⁴ Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 195–96).

⁸⁵ “Mr. Archer to the Government of India,” 6 February 1891, in: Public Record Office, document FO 422/32.

⁸⁶ The property of the Government of India. Issued by the Intelligence Branch, Q.M.G.'s Department. This report is transmitted for the personal information of the Chief Secretary Chief Commissioner Burma by direction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India and is to be considered Confidential. Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96.

⁸⁷ Scott (1900, 278) mentions that Taküt was situated near Kat Maw, an area abundant with minerals. For more descriptions of Taküt, see Couchman (1897) “Report of the Intelligence Officer Northern Shan States,” on the bookshelf: W 2172, British Library. Under the title: Intelligence Branch-Burma Division: Route No. C. From Taküt 5,450 feet: long. 98°56'E., lat, 22°13' N. To Loi Nung 6,050 feet: long. 99°14'E., lat. 22°21' N. Military District-Mandalay. Civil District-East Mang Lun, North Shan States.

(In Shan characters.)

MONG LEM SAWBWA MALA WANG SA writes to Taküt Sawbwa: “Sao Ta Yun with troops will attack La Was on Takoo Lahsan limit; get Hkam Pen Sing; ex-Myoza of MongHsaw [Moeng Suo, Ximeng county today] is head of La Was; will run away and enter Taküt country. Do not receive him. Arrest him and put on Hpang Naga (a traditional Chinese chain, named *Jiasuo*: 枷锁) and hand over to Sao Ta Tun, who will be graciously inclined to you, if you do so. Remember this. Write and say if you are going to do this.”

Note – The La Was referred to are Was (Wa: Mon-Khmer) near Mong Hka [Ximeng County today] and Mong Hsaw.⁸⁸

According to MLXFS,⁸⁹ Mala Wang Sa or Sao Ta Yun was the *Cao fa* of Moeng Laem, known as Dao Paiyong (刀派勇, *r.* 1887–1926) in Chinese. “La Wa” is a generic term that refers to various Mon-Khmer groups who inhabited the uplands bordering Moeng Laem, Lancang, and Ximeng County today.⁹⁰ In this letter, the *cao fa* of Moeng Laem asked the *cao fa* of Taküt to capture and hand over Hkam Pen Sing if he was found guilty of entering Taküt’s territory. It clearly shows the nature of the conflicts between the Tai *cao fa* and Mon-Khmer groups during the late nineteenth century.

It is noteworthy that the wording of the letter provided in the English translation remained faithful to the original, suggesting that this was an order instead of a request. Chinese historiographies also show that Taküt was subordinate to Moeng Laem. The first record in *The Manuscript of Local Gazetteer of Yunnan of the Daoguang Period: The Annals of Standing Officers in the Daoguang Period* (*r.* 1821–1850) states:

One hundred eighty kilometres to the east [of Moeng Laem] lies the Nan-lang River, which is the border with Mengzhe; 80 km to the south lies the Bin-hai mountains, the border with Moeng Yang (Mohnyin); 120 km to the west lies the Nan-hua River (Nan Ka River), the border with Ka-wa barbarians (Mangleng, namely Mang Lün); and 420 km to the north lies the La-suan River,⁹¹ the border with Moeng Moeng (today’s Shuangjiang County, under the jurisdiction of Lincang Prefecture).⁹²

“東至南朗河壹百八十裏與猛遮交界，南至丙海山（昂朗山）八十裏與猛養交界，西至南化河（南卡江）壹百二十裏與卡瓦野夷（莽冷）交界，北至辣蒜江（小黑江）四百二十裏與猛猛交界。”

Further descriptions of Mang Lün can be found in the later *Draft of the General Treatise of Yunnan* in the Guangxu period.⁹³ This gazetteer recorded that Mang Lün had been subordinate to the Qing court for some time, suggesting that Mang Lün might have

⁸⁸ Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96.

⁸⁹ MLXFS (1986, 28).

⁹⁰ Lawa/Lua are the indigenous people of Northern Thailand (Lan Na). To say Lua is in northern Thailand is not wrong, but Lawa is just another name of Wa, even in the JGTSSX (1990, 13), there is a “La” people who also belonged to the Wa. For more details, see Aroonrut (2000, 122–138).

⁹¹ Xiaohei River is located on the northern bank of the Mekong River, originating in Küng Ma and flowing through, Cangyuan, Shuangjiang, Lancang, and Moeng Bò.

⁹² Du Yunzhong and Liu Jingmao annotated (2011, 228). (杜允中注，刘景毛点校《道光雲南通志·秩官誌》)

⁹³ *Guangxu Yunnan tongzhi gao*: 光緒雲南通志稿. GXYNTZG in abbr.

been under the control of Moeng Laem. GXYNTZ states:

Mangleng is also known as Menglun ... inhabited by various Kawa (Kha Wa) and Bengzi (Bulang) tribes. [Their] terrain is rough, and their customs are fierce. In the reign of Qianlong, the area was subordinated [to us]. Later, since it was far from the inland, the officials were afraid of miasma and rarely went there. They (Kha Wa and Bulang) then leverage their rough terrain to be independent; submit neither to the Chinese nor to Burma. They have gathered other tribes and inhabited the border between the two countries. To date, it is not possible to know whether they are subordinate [to us] or not.⁹⁴

“莽冷亦作孟倫……為卡瓦、繃子諸種類所居，土地險惡，習俗強悍，乾隆間曾內附，後以距內地遠，官牟畏瘴罕至，遂負其險阻，倔強自雄，既不屬華，也不屬緬，聚其族類，介居兩國邊境，迄今叛服年月已無從考也。”

Li Zhengting (2008, 51) claims that Mang Lün was under the control of Moeng Laem until the Qianlong period (*r.* 1736–1796). Even thereafter, Moeng Laem and Mang Lün retained a close relationship. The main wife of the last ruler of Moeng Laem was the daughter (Chao Nam Kham Long, *b.* 1921–2014) of the Wa ruler who lived in Mang Lün.⁹⁵ This might explain the tone in which Letter A was written. Furthermore, this record mentions that Mang Lün gathered additional tribes and settled them along the boundary between the two countries. However, it does not mention the names of the additional tribes and there is not enough data to prove that it happened.⁹⁶

Letter A also mentions Chinese military outposts in Moeng Ping,⁹⁷ Moeng Lan, and Mong Hsaw (Moeng Sò). It thus demonstrates that Chinese influences had already permeated into the areas around Moeng Laem in the late nineteenth century. See the following description:

Sao Ta Yun is from Mong Ping and Mong Lan. Mong Lem is three marches to Mong Ping, which is one march east of Mong Lan, which is one hard march of Mong Hsaw. Mong Ping and Mong Lan are Chinese posts. The Chinese also have a post at Mong Hsaw. Two months ago Chinese troops from Mong Lan attacked Mong Hka. Muhsos resisted and defeated the Chinese, who retired to their posts, Hkam Pen Sing is a Shan of Mong Hsaw. He writes as follows to Taküt: –Hsaw. Two months ago, Chinese troops from Mong Lan attacked Mong Hka. The Mu-Mong Ping and Mong Lan are Chinese posts.⁹⁸

According to the version in MLCL2, the conflicts between Moeng Laem *cao fa* and the Lahu people allowed the Qing court to send their military forces to Moeng Laem. This is why Letter A describes several Chinese posts in Moeng Laem, namely, Moeng Ping, Moeng Lan, and Moeng Hsaw. The Chinese troops of Moeng Lan attacked the Lahu people of Moeng Hka; however, the Chinese were defeated and forced to

⁹⁴ GXYNTZ Vol.73, Frontier 3: pp. 7. (《光绪云南通志稿》73册，边界3，页7)

⁹⁵ Information from the fieldwork notes was recorded on 25/12/2018 in the Historical Museum of Moeng Laem.

⁹⁶ I assume that, in addition to Mon-Khmer groups, there were Kui or Musoe. However, I do not have enough data and further research is required.

⁹⁷ Meng Bin 勐濱, today's Lancang County.

⁹⁸ Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96.

withdraw their forces to Moeng Lan. From this description, it might be concluded that the Chinese troops intended to expand their post through wars. Thus, the posts might not be permanent stations, which would be changed due to the conflicts.

The second letter was also written in Shan characters. It is a petition from a local ruler on behalf of five Wa and five Lahu influential headmen asking Ton Hsang (*r.* 1892–1919), the *cao fa* of Moeng Lün,⁹⁹ for assistance in resisting one of the Lahu headmen, Hpa Long, the “Ta Lao Yeh (headmen)” of Mong Hka (maybe Kha), who would not allow anyone to receive “Kalas” (British) to enter Mong Hka. The English translation of the letter reads:

Letter B in Shan characters handed to Superintendent on 28th February 1896.

“I, with five influential Wa headmen and five influential Muhso [Lahu] headmen, have agreed to petition the *sawbwa* (Ton Hsang Sawbwa of Mong Lun) that we are the essential headmen and ask the *sawbwa* to back us up. Hpa Long, the Ta Lao Yeh¹⁰⁰ of Mong Hka, the head Muhso (Lahu) headman, has obtained Chinese troops and is starting a post and city a Mong Hka with 500 or 600 men and waiting for the Kalas* to come. Hpa Lang will not keep anybody who is willing to receive the Kalas into the country. All the Muhsos have bolted into the jungle. Please help us at once and arrange that the Superintendent should come up at once and settle matters.”

Lao Lon (Muhso) of Ho Cha or Nan Cha brings letters from Ho Cha, Tong Chien, and Shang Kai Hsom.

*The Natives of India, foreigners in general: refers here to British.¹⁰¹

The writer of Letter B is not mentioned in the Appendix of Scott’s report. There is no doubt that the writer was a headman of the hill group. He and the other “five influential Wa headmen and five influential Muhso” had chosen to support the British against a Lahu force in Mong Hka that was sponsored and stationed by Chinese troops. The fact that they sent this petition to Mang Lün (or Mang Lön) *cao fa* is evidence that the leader of Mong Hka had already allowed Chinese troops (500–600 men) to build a post and prepare for a war against the British, who were planning to invade. Certainly, at least one Lahu tribe supported the Chinese, and several Lahu and Wa factions had tight ties with Mang Lün and pro-Kala (British).

In addition to this document, which indicates the relationship between Moeng Laem, Lahu, the surrounding polities, and China, there is also an abundance of correspondence and other archival material pertaining to their interactions in the late nineteenth century. There is another pertinent letter written in Shan script from the Scott Collections at Cambridge University Library (see Manu. 10). This document is

⁹⁹ Meng Lun, Mang Lün, Mang Lon, or Mang Lön (referred to as 莽冷 in Chinese records), the state of the northern Shan State, Burma. It was formally considered a semi-independent “Wa State”. See Young (2011, 44).

¹⁰⁰ Da Lao Ye, 大老爷 in Chinese, meaning the head of the officer.

¹⁰¹ Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96.

preserved in the Scott Collection, which was donated to Cambridge University Library before Scott died in 1934 by his sister-in-law.¹⁰² This lengthy letter is worth including in its entirety to assist our comprehension.¹⁰³

*Huru huru*¹⁰⁴ from the territory of Mūang Campuret (Great Britain) to rule Moeng Mang Lün Long (Mang Lün)

Deep in my heart. Cao Fa Long who is the elder brother of the ruler of Moeng Mang Lün Long at present had a nicely worded royal order sent to Hulu¹⁰⁵, an ally of Kosambi. (Siriyattha) The ruler of Moeng Saenwi Long, the great ministers and councillors and the military commanders (*senabòdi*) of all southern provinces learned of one or two events. For example, in the eastern provinces Cao Maha Mangci, the high commissioner (Kha long)¹⁰⁶ who was appointed by the British with the authority to order all the ministers councillors and military commanders to come to Moeng Mang Lün, Moeng Laem, Moeng Chiang Rung, and Moeng Pung Tao. “Do not fight against each other. Do not quarrel with each other.” Cao Maha Mangci, the military commander, proceeded according to this agreement. In the year [Chula] Sakarat 1253 (CE 1891), the viceroy Kaem Moeng¹⁰⁷ of Moeng Laem led Chinese soldiers to destroy, harm and kill the Musoe until they perished in large numbers, crushing them almost completely. Thus, we invited people to make investigations in the field. But we were not able to restrain them, we just gave them a warning. Each of the parties could not be restrained, all 14–15 persons (5 Musoe, 5 Phu, 5 Kaen).The Cao Fa Long of Mang Lün asked the high commissioner (Kha Long) who had been appointed by the British to announce that the Musoe came under the administration of Moeng Mang Lün. “Do not behave in that way. Do not abandon the Musoe people (Lahu people). Please go on in this way.” Our ministers and councillors returned to their [respective] places entirely. The Musoe, however, events happened, and the Cao Fa of Mang Lün urged the inhabitants to surrender both the young children, the youth, and the property that was in the treasury, whom the Chinese had killed were Ca Tü Fa, Cao Cün Daeng, and Sapphathaye. These three officials were killed by the Chinese. Numerous inhabitants were injured or died. It was like this. The four high-ranking officials, the judges, and the royal envoys took the sealed royal order and sent it to the chief ministers of the outer provinces to present it to Cao Maha Mangci of Moeng Lasiao quickly to inform him (about the events) and beg for mercy and compassion for all Musoe to save their lives.¹⁰⁸ This is the

¹⁰² For more details about Scott Collections, see Chapter Six.

¹⁰³ The Shan script scholar Dr Direk Injan from Chiang Mai Rajatha University, who helped me to translate this text into modern Thai, and then, I translated it into English, but there are many ancient Tai Nüa words that I do not understand. Professor Grabowsky helped me to improve and revise this translation. Finally, Ms Sutteera Satayaphan proofread the final version. I thank them all for their help.

¹⁰⁴ In the local Tai Nüa language, a *huru* was the kind of person who was once a monk in the Upper Burma and Tai Nüa Polities.

¹⁰⁵ It may refer to the Hulu Kingdom, namely, Banhong (班洪), Banlao (班老) and Yongbang (永邦), and Bankuang (班况).

¹⁰⁶ This term may refer to the British Superintendent of Northern Shan States at Lashio.

¹⁰⁷ It is this term *kēm; mǎng*. Kyemmong=heir apparent or eldest son of a *cao fa*.

¹⁰⁸ This looks like Lashio, where Daly/Scott were stationed as Superintendent of Northern Shan States; if so, Maha

story at my heart. Cao Fa Long, the ruler of Mang Lün thus sent this royal order to Moeng Kosambi, in the territory of Moeng Saenwi Long. The military commanders ruling the country, the ministers and the councillors were informed about this story at once as well. (Written with pencil) After the end of the fighting, the Cao Fa of Moeng Chiang Rung fled to China. The investigators yielded such this. In (the year Chula Sakarat) 1253 (CE 1891), on the ninth waning day of the first lunar month, this letter was written.¹⁰⁹ Cao Maha Mangci, the ruler of Moeng Mang Loen Long had the intention to send this royal letter which had been sealed royal letter to the ministers and councillors of all provinces to inform them thoroughly.

Cao Fa Mang Lön sent a royal letter to Moeng Saenwi. It tells the story of Chinese soldiers killing the Musoe people.

Thus, Cao Fa Mang Lön went to inspect and forbid listening, but no one obeyed. Chao Fa Mang Lön thus requested the ruler of Saenwi to take this royal letter to the British High Commissioner at Lashio, because the Musoe region was under the jurisdiction of Moeng Mang Loen.

หฺรู เมืองหว่างจ่าปุเรคแดง สิ่งเมืองม้งเลนโหลง

(หฺรู หฺรู) จากแคว้นเมืองจ่าปุเรค ปกครองเมืองม้งเลนหลง

(1) ใจเก่าเจ้า เจ้าฟ้าโหลงโต้นเป็นปีเจ้าสิ่งเมืองม้งเลนโหลงจ้งนี้ ได้มีก้าอะม้งต่อลิกก้า ลายหลี่สำมะวจา ยื่นฮอดส่อดถึงฮูตูเปื่อหว่าง¹¹⁰ ก่อสำปีโนใจของข้าพเจ้า เจ้าฟ้าหลวงตน เป็นพี่ของเจ้าสิ่งเมืองม้งเลนหลงในตอนนี้ ได้มีราชสาส์นอันเป็นถ้อยคำอ่อนหวาน ส่งถึง ฮูตู พันธมิตรของเมืองโกสัมพี¹¹¹ (2) สิวิยค์ดำแดงสิ่งเมือง ป็อง¹¹² แสนหฺวีโหลง ปู่ฟ้า พองเมืองโหลงอะมาตซุก โหเมืองปะจານ¹¹³ ให้ป้อไล่แจ้งแลง อะจองก่าหนึ่งสองก่า//จาบ (สิริยค์ละ) ผู้ปกครอง เมืองแสนหฺวีหลวง เสนาอามาตย์ใหญ่ เสนาบตี หัวเมืองทางใต้ ได้ ทราบเรื่องราว สักหนึ่งเรื่องสองเรื่อง (3) หน่งหน้าเมืองวันออกยามหน่น เจ้ามะหามังจีอะ เยแปง¹¹⁴ กาลา อิกปู่ฟ้าพองเมืองอะมาตซุกตั้งหลายเขา มาม้งเลน โดยตั้งหลายเข้ามา ม้งเลน เมืองแลม เกงสูง ปุง คังซ่น ที่หัวเมืองตะวันออก เจ้ามะหามังจี ข้าหลวงที่ ได้รับ บัญชาจากอังกฤษ (ประกาศ) ให้เสนาอามาตย์ เสนาบตีทั้งหลายได้มาเมืองม้งเลน มาเมือง ม้งเลน เมืองแลม เมืองเชียงรุ่ง เมืองปุงด้าว (4) ด้าว อย่าให้เฮดเหตึกเฮดเสื่อพันกัน อย่าให้ มีอะอยู่ เจ้ามะหามังจี อะเยแปง อุปะเต¹¹⁵ ปาไว้หน่งไหน ถึงมาศักเลด 1253 คุอย่าได้ทำ การศีกคู่กัณ อย่าได้ฝิดข้องกัน เจ้ามะหามังจี เสนาบตี ได้ดำเนินตามข้อตกลงที่วางไว้ เช่นนี้ ครันเมื่อ (จุล) ศักราช 1253 (ตัว) (5) แกมเมืองขม่อม เมืองแลม จิงซ่มคินเมื่อ เอาศีกแ่งลงมา เหม่หล่าน ยะพ่ยักฆ่าเค่น มูเชือซุมก้อยเสนกว่า พู้กว่า (ผุ) ลู้แหลกว่า สิ่งๆเข้า เขาจ้งไล่ค อุปราชชื่อขม่อม เมืองแลม ได้นำทหารจีนลงมาทำลาย ทำร้ายขู่เข็ญ และฆ่า พวกมูเชือนลี้ภัยตายจากไปมากมาย เกือบจะทั้งหมด เราจึงได้ (6) นเอาสำ ตะหม่านขุนเฮาจั้นหาหลูโดย ฮัมตบชิตา (ตักเตือน) ขุนสองปาขุนสองปาขุนป็อง ลิบลี ลิบห้า ฮัมซิมหม่าไล่ ก้าเป็นมูเชือ 5 พู้ 5 แกนก็ชวนผู้คนไปตรวจสอบในพื้นที่ แต่ไม่ สามารถห้ามปราม ได้แค่ตักเตือน ต่างฝ่ายต่างห้ามกันไม่ได้ ทั้ง 14–15 คน (มูเชือ 5....

Mangci could refer to Scott.

¹⁰⁹ This date corresponds to Friday, 25 December 1891 of Gregorian calendar.

¹¹⁰ เปื่อหว่าง means พันธมิตร: ally.

¹¹¹ ก่อสำปี (โกสัมพี) means เมืองแสนหฺวี: Moeng Hsenwi. Kor Sampi (Kosambi) – Moeng Hsenwi (Theinni), northern Shan State in present-day Myanmar. This is the so-called Moeng Phòng or Mubang in Chinese historical records.

¹¹² ป็อง means บัญชาการ: commander.

¹¹³ ปะจาน means ปัจจันต์ (เขตชายแดน): border area.

¹¹⁴ อะเยแปง means นักกฎหมาย ผู้ปกครอง: commissioner.

¹¹⁵ อุปะเต means อุปเทห์: method, trickery.

แก่น 5...) (7).....(8) เจ้าฟ้าโหลงมังเลนเกือหลี่¹¹⁶ เจ้าอะเยแบ่ง มหามังจิ
กาลาก็ เสามุเชื้อให้ไล่เกือหลี่จอมมังเลนโล่อย่าให้ไล่เป็นเจ้าฟ้าหลวงมังเลน ขอให้
ข้าหลวงที่ได้รับแต่งตั้งจากอังกฤษ (รับรอง/ประกาศ) ให้พวกมุเชื้อ ได้อยู่ในการปกครอง
ของเมืองมังเลน อย่าให้ไต่เป็น (ไปอย่างนั้น) (9) ข้ามุเชื้อเสกัม มีมาหนึ่งไหนอะหม่าน
เฮ้า ขุนเสากนเฮาป้อกเปียนคีนมาฮอดแหวซ้อกเหล่า ก้าหนึ่งจะลง ขุนโหลงมุเชื้อ อย่าได้
ทอดทิ้งชาวมุเชื้อเสีย ขอให้เป็นคังที่กล่าวไว้นี้เถิด เสนาอามาตย์ของเราที่ได้กลับมาถึงถิ่นที่
อยู่แล้ว ครอบคลุมจำนวน ๆ พวกมุเชื้อ (10) ก้าอันแซไล่เอาตายเสนนัน จาคือฟ้าขุนหนึ่ง
จันจันแลงขุนหนึ่ง สับปะลายขุนหนึ่ง สามขุนไน่ แซ่เอาตายเสैया ข้าเมืองลูใหญ่ชุมหนา
โหลงๆกลางๆ เข้ามี่หนึ่งไหนที่ชาวจีนได้ฆ่าตายนั้น ได้แก่ จาคือฟ้า ๑ จันจันแลง ๑ สัพพ
ถาย ๑ ๆ ขุนนาง 3 คนนี้ ถูกคนจีนฆ่าตายเสียแล้ว ชาวเมืองบาดเจ็บล้มตายจำนวนมาก
เป็นดังนี้ (11) หนึ่งก้าอะจองมีหนึ่งหือเสกั เจ้าข้าเมืองมังเลนจึงไล่คานเอาข้ามาคนหลี่
ขุน ลูกอ่อน จายโหลง ผ่านคำใจ ในอ่าง ในหุขุนป้อกเหตุการณ้อย่างไรก็แล้วแต่ เจ้า
ฟ้ามังเลนได้ชักชวนให้ชาวเมืองที่ยอมสวามิภักดิ์ ทั้งเด็กเล็ก หนุ่มสาว ทรัพย์สินที่มีในคลัง
(12) สี่ก้อ จับจอมขุนเซส้อกจีแลคหย่า ปาเอาสัมมะหว่าจอะมิงต่อ ผืนจุ่ม ไล่สับลิกหลี่
ลายหม่านออกเมื่อให้ไล่สอดถึงปู้ฟ้า อะมขุนนาง 4 ตำแหน่ง ผู้พิพากษา ราชทูต นำเอกราช
สาสน์ประทับตรา ได้ส่งไปถึงอำมาตย์ใหญ่ (13) ดซุกโหมเมืองปะจาน ให้ไล่เอาจันต่าง
จันเล่าเจ้าหม่ามิงจะเยแบ่งเวียงลาเข้าป็นขันๆ ใวๆเสก้าโล่ให้ไล่ยอน ไล่คองข้ามอะอยู่หัว
เมืองรอบนอก ให้ได้นำไปถวายเจ้าหม่ามิง เมืองล่าเสียวโดยเร็ว เพื่อแจ้งให้ทราบ และขอ
ความเมตตา (14) ต่อฮักคิด อิดคหลูเวเนยะ ข้าขุนมุเชื้อใหญ่ๆหนาๆ หนึ่งหือตักหมาไล่ผู้
ป๋ายกเสก้าโล่ อะจองมีหนึ่งไหน ใจคำเฮาเจ้าฟ้าโหลงเป็นเอ็นดูสงสารเวไนยสัตว์ ไพร
บ้านคนมุเชื้อทั้งหลาย เพื่อที่จะไม่ให้ (พวกมุเชื้อ) เสียหาย เรื่องราวเป็นอย่างไร ในใจข้า
เจ้าฟ้าหลวง (15) เจ้าเมืองมังเลน จึงไล่มีก้าอะมิงต่อหม่าจ่า ลิกก้าลายหลี่สัมมะหว่าจ่า
ยื่นสอดจ้อดถึง กอสัมปี่ สี่วียะแดงปกครองมังเลน จึงได้ส่งราชสาสน์นี้มาถึงเมืองโกสัมพี
(สิริย) เขตแคว้น (16) สิ่งเมืองป้อกแสนหวีโหลง ปู้ฟ้าพองเมืองโหลง อะมาดซุกให้ป้อไล่
แจ้งแลง อะจองขันๆเจวๆก้าหนึ่งสองก้าเมืองแสนหวีหลวง เสนาบตีปกครองบ้านเมือง
เสนาอามาตย์ ได้รับรู้เรื่องราวโดยพลันด้วยเถิด (17) (เขียนด้วยดินสอ) เจ้าฟ้าแกงสูง ก็เข้า
มันลับแบ็ดมัน โดมันปัยกว่าจู่เมืองแซ่ซ้อฮอ ทอกลานไล่ผู้ ไล่ยอนหนึ่งไหนเข้าเข้าเจ้าฟ้า
เมืองเชียงรุ่ง หลังจากทำศึกแล้ว ได้หนีไปอยู่เมืองจัน สายสืบได้สืบทราบมาอย่างนี้ (18)
1253จุ เหลือนเจ้ง ล่อง 9 คำ เต็มลิก(จุลศักราช) 1253 เดือนเจียง (1) แรม 9 คำ ได้
เขียนหนังสือนี้

(19) เจ้าหม่ามิงจะเยสิ่งเมืองมังเลนโหลง
เจ้าหม่ามิงจิ ปกครองเมืองมังเลนหลวงใจคำเฮาเจ้าฟ้าโหลงโต้นเป็นเจ้ามีก้าอะมิงต่อ มี
เจตนาดี ได้ส่งราชสาสน์ลิกใหญ่ลายโหลง ผืนจุ่มยื่นจ้อดสอดถึง อะมาที่ประทับตราฉบับ
นี้ ดซุกโหมเมืองปะจานให้ไล่แจ้งแลงก้าหนึ่งก้าหลี่เข้าถึงเสนาอามาตย์ ทัวหัวเมือง ให้ได้
ทราบโดยทั่วถึงกัน
เจ้าฟ้ามังเลน ส่งราชสาสน์ไปเมืองแสนหวี เล่าเรื่องราวจีนมาฆ่าฟันชาวมุเชื้อ
เจ้าฟ้ามังเลน จึงไปตรวจสอบและห้ามฟังแต่ไม่มีใครเชื่อฟัง
เจ้าฟ้าเมืองเลน จึงขอให้เจ้าเมืองแสนหวีนำราชสาสน์ไปมอบข้าหลวงใหญ่ที่ได้รับแต่งตั้ง
จากอังกฤษ ที่ล่าเสียวขอให้เขตมุเชื้อมาอยู่ในการปกครองของเมืองมังเลน


The *cao fa* of Mang Lün wrote this letter in Shan script in 1891. Mang Lün sent a royal letter to Moeng Saenwi, who then asked the ruler of Saenwi to deliver the letter to the British authorities in Lashio. The Pali name for Moeng Saenwi was Kosambi, which is present-day Moeng Hsenwi (Theinni), the northern part of Shan State.

The fundamental point of this letter is that the author supported the Musoe (the Lahu people). They wanted the British to mediate the conflict between Moeng Laem or

¹¹⁶ เกือหลี่ means ขอให้: to give.

Chiang Rung and the Lahu. The author also charges the Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung with requesting China to kill Musoe people and burn their homes. Mang Lün *cao fa* also wanted to rule the Musoe region. The Mang Lün *cao fa* appears to have been particularly sympathetic to the Lahu people. However, the ruler of Mang Lün requested permission from the British superintendent of Northern Shan States at Lashio to bring the Lahu region under its jurisdiction, which could be seen as Mang Lün's main goal: he intended to use the conflict between the Tai polities of Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung and the Lahu to gain control of the Lahu region.

In addition, readers may learn from this letter that Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung had a close relationship with China. Both sides utilised the Chinese military to combat Musoe (Lahu). Moeng Laem had long engaged in conflict with the Lahu, as described in the preceding three sections. This letter also indicates that the local Tai *cao fa* had already allowed Chinese forces to enter its territory and had chosen to side with China, while other polities of Mainland Southeast Asia sided with Great Britain. Moeng Laem and Chiang Tung were subject to increasing Chinese influence, whereas Mang Lün and Moeng Hsenwi had already acknowledged the British as their sovereign prior to the demarcation of the border.



Manu. 10: The Shan script letter. Source: The Burmese beatitudes, 1877, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.5. Cambridge University Library.

Reading between the lines of these three letters, we can perceive how the borderline issue impacted local polities. First, it is evident from Letter A that the local ruler of Moeng Laem did not care about the background and identity of his new overlords, be it China, Burma, or Great Britain. He was more concerned with local affairs, such as conflicts with upland peoples like the Lahu. Under the *mandala* and *moeng* systems adopted by Mainland Southeast Asian states,¹¹⁷ each *moeng* was expected to maintain its territory while paying tribute to higher-ranking *moeng*. Dual or even triple suzerainties, reflecting overlapping spheres of influence of neighbouring *mandala*, were the geopolitical norm in Mainland Southeast Asia in pre-modern times.¹¹⁸ This may be the reason why the frontier issues between China and Britain did

¹¹⁷ On the *Mandala* and *moeng* systems, see Chapter One.

¹¹⁸ In the nineteenth century, the Lao and Cambodian kingdoms also paid tribute to both Siam and Vietnam. As Scott

not pose much of a concern for the ruler of Moeng Laem. It is also possible that Moeng Laem had started to be integrated into China.

Second, it is evident from Letter B that some Wa and Lahu groups were willing to maintain close relationships with Mang Lün and the British. Moreover, the third letter, translated from Chinese by Scott's assistants, presents information relevant to Letter B. Subsequently, it was probably transcribed by a British intelligence officer, along with his comments.

Letter C in Chinese characters.

(The above from Ho Cha and Shang Kai Hsom.)

The Muhsos of the above places complain that their country has been ruined for the last ten years and they have been looking to the government for help for six years.¹¹⁹ The Tong Chien people present a similar petition saying Chinese are devastating their country and they are looking to us for assistance. The Tong Chien people also present a second petition to the effect that: "they originally came from (?); they had a *pôngyi* [the Burmese, which means Monk] who would not eat meat or drink liquor. Nyim Tai (Tigh) and Nyim Nen subject to Mong Lem. Mong Lem took Rs. 500 for this from the Muhsos and divided the money among Nyim Tai, Nyim Nen, Mong Ping, and Mong Lan. The Muhsos and Mong Lem were bad friends after this. Nyim Tai headman Khim Seng tore off *pôngyi*'s clothes. Altogether the Muhsos lost Rs.5 00."¹²⁰

Letter C records that the Muhsos¹²¹ appealed to the British for support against the Qing court. The Lahu had resisted the Qing court for over ten years, so it is not hard to believe that they had sympathies with the British, as recorded in Letter B. Not only were some Lahu groups on bad terms with the Chinese, but they were also "bad friends"¹²² with Moeng Laem, according to Letter C.

At the end of Letter C, there is a short statement, which mentions that Maha Na

(2009, 61) points out: "outside the central kingdom, dual or multiple sovereignty or especially at higher elevations, no sovereignty, was less an anomaly than the norm. Thus Chiang Khaeng, a small town near the current borders of Laos, Burma, and China, was tributary to Chiang Mai and Nan (in turn, tributary to Siam) and to Chiang Tung/Keng Tung (in turn, tributary to Burma). The situation was common enough that small kingdoms were often identified as 'under two lords' or 'under three lords' in the Thai language and its Lao dialect, and a 'two-headed bird' in the case of nineteenth-century Cambodia's tributary relationship to both Siam and Dai Nan (Vietnam)."

¹¹⁹ It should be the word "govern". The translation might be wrong.

¹²⁰ Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96.

¹²¹ Lahu, originally from Tibet, (see Davies: 1909, 578) and Tong Chien (possibly a Burmese group).

¹²² Letter C is an English translation version, which is kept in the British Library. The original Chinese version might not keep it as an appendix, because I did not find it when I collected the data in the British Library. I suppose that "bad friend" here means enemy.

Lao,¹²³ also known as Sao Maha Na Lao,¹²⁴ rebelled against the British superintendent at Lashio (Moeng Phòng). Maha Na Lao brought 100 followers to visit and induced Moeng Laem, and the Wa states of Molit, Matet, and Ngek Ting (see M5 and M8) to fight against the British. The original text, quoted here at length, provides details:

A short account of local politics in Man H pang; given me on my arrival by the two Amatgyis¹²⁵ I found there.

About five years ago, when the Superintendent came from Lashio, Maha Na Lao (San Maha) intended to rebel against the Superintendent, but he went to Mong Lem and thence to Molit (Motlè!), Matet, and Ngek Ting with a following of about 100 men. Promising his band the plunder of East and West Mong Lun if he should be successful in again taking these places, he had induced the inhabitants of the above three districts to side with him. Some of the people of these places, however, do not approve of Maha Na Lao and his proceedings. Maha Na Lao wants to take Man H pang. His force is about 2000 men, of whom 1,000 have guns, the remainder are armed with bows, which shoot poisoned arrows. [...] Maha Na Lao is a rebel; when he hears the troops are coming about the country he leaves the three districts, but no sooner do the soldiers go away than he comes back. At present Mothai people are in a state of unrest and never know what may happen.

1. Rumour has it that Sau-Maha, who formerly possessed land in West Monglun and who refused to obey the orders of the Superintendent, crossed over into Chinese territory and tried to get assistance from the Chinese Deputy Commissioners in the shape of Chinese troops, or at any rate cannon and rifles. The Chinese must have put him off, for it is certain that we encountered no Chinese troops, nor did the Was who opposed us possess any cannon or rifles; they only had flint lock and cheek guns.

2. The future movements of our columns on arrival at Mong Hka will depend upon the action of the Chinese, who are reported to have crossed the Nam Hka stream.¹²⁶

This brief account provides insight into how the British controlled the Shan states in the early years, it was probably written sometime between the years 1890 and 1891. Some local leaders notified the British authorities in the Shan states and provided

¹²³ Maha Na Lao was one of the brothers of the ruler of Manglun (Mong Lün) named Sao Teung Sang who was a member of the Wa ethnic group. He “was inclined to favour the Wa area more than the Shan.” So, he divided the territory between his “three remaining brothers, Sao Seng Kyaw, Sao Maha (later known as Sao Maha Na Lao), and Sao Ratana. Sao Ratana died soon after the decision to allot each brother an area was made, and Sao Seng Kyaw, who was politically very ambitious, attempted to oust Sao Maha but was defeated and fled to Hsenwi. After the rebellion, Sao Teung Sang retained southern Manglun for himself but gave the whole of the cis-Salween tract to Sao Maha, an area of eighteen districts without a single Wa village. This decision led to the formation of Manglün East and Manglün West, the former with Takut as its capital and the latter at Na Lao.” For more details, see Young (2011, 40).

¹²⁴ Sao Maha, a Shan chief in West Manglun, was on friendly terms with Mong Hsu State’s chief, who had accepted British rule. For more details, see Young (2011, 41).

¹²⁵ Burmese, means state ministers, see Simms (2017, 165).

¹²⁶ Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96.

vital information about the rebels, such as the number of troops, the types of weaponry carried by the forces, and the number of states that sided with the rebels. This account makes it abundantly clear that the British had to contend with some insurgents during the 1890s and could not exercise complete control over the Shan states, years after *the Convention Relative to Burma and Thibet between China and Great Britain* was signed on Guangxu 12 sixth lunar month, 23rd day (24 July 1886) in Beijing.¹²⁷

The elusive behaviour of Sao Maha is confirmed in several sources. He rebelled against the British superintendent and tried crossing into the Chinese territory to solicit help from the Chinese deputy commissioners. The effort ended in vain. In contrast to the chief of Mong Hsu, Sao Maha was identified by the British as a “troublemaker.”¹²⁸ The superintendent hoped Sao Maha would submit without delay, which proved unhelpful. Sao Maha remained indifferent for two years. In 1889, he promised to submit to Lashio, the new government seat, but never did. In January 1891, Mr. H. Daly, the new superintendent, visited Na Lao. On the hearing of the official visit, Sao Maha fled again.¹²⁹

As Daly’s successor, J. G. Scott intended to meet Sao Maha, but he fled repeatedly. His attempts were recorded in detail (Young 2011, 41–42). Young describes (Ibid., 43) Sao Maha, a troublemaker influenced by Sao Weng, split ancient Hsenwi into North and South states. He joined the other side during Mang Lün’s conflict with Moeng Laem, inciting districts to rise against his brother. His activities were considered treason against Mang Lün and the new government, as he instigated rebellion against his brother and his neighbour in China. Therefore, Young further elaborates (Ibid.) that this “troublemaker” was not only a threat to the British government, but also convinced other polities to never submit to the British.

We can gauge local attitudes towards the British from the translated texts in Scott’s report. For instance, Mang Lün preferred British protection to paying tribute to Moeng Laem and China, because they did not want to be treated as subordinates. Moeng Laem, however, continued to recognise the suzerainty of China by asking for support to fight the Wa people. The Wa way of life did not seem to be affected by the new “suzerain.” Both *cao fa* Sao Maha of West Mang Lün and Sao Weng of Lawk Sawk strongly resisted the British.¹³⁰ Sao Maha was constantly on the move evading the British, while Sao Weng hid in Sipsòng Panna, probably because Sipsòng Panna was inclined towards China.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Chapter Six will provide more information.


¹²⁸ See Young (2011, 42–43).

¹²⁹ See Ibid., 41.

¹³⁰ See Simms (2017, 337).

¹³¹ Zhu Shaohua (2007, 203) states that many nobles from northern Tai polities fled to Sipsòng Panna when the domestic situation descended into chaos in 1886. Sipsòng Panna had a tradition of offering shelter to their

The British paid particular attention to Mang Lün because it was once subordinate to Moeng Laem. Later, it was turned into a buffer zone inhabited by upland Mon-Khmer peoples, and independent from both China and Burma. Given Mang Lün's close relationship with Moeng Laem, which was ceded to China, as well as with Sipsòng Panna, the British wanted to curb the Chinese influence in the area. Therefore, great effort was made to record the situation in these areas for the purpose of establishing a stable and effective governing system.



M8 (in standard English works, “Figure 8” is used): The Map of Sgt. C.E. Magnoliid (?) Liend (?). 1 Laneer (?) N.C. Attaché Intelligence Branch 1st June 96. Quoted from: Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96, British Library, Mss Eur F278/90.

M8 is a short description of borderlines on the left-hand side of this map, which mentions the undefined borderlines between British and Chinese territory. This undefined area was less well-known and was located on the yellow line, which the author had crossed in June 1896. The original wording is as follows:

neighbouring polities.

The frontier between England and China is approximate only, not yet defined. East of the R. Salween up to the Mekong River and between latitudes 22 and 24 the country is very little known, and parts are entirely so yellow line country traversed by self.

All the places mentioned above in the letter were drawn on this map, i.e., Mothai (present-day Mong Nai in South Shan State) and Mong Lem (Moeng Laem). According to this map, the red line is the border with England, the yellow line is the border with China, the blue line is the border with France, and the green line is the border of the intelligence officers' proposed extension. This map was considered sensitive as it contained information about the British demarcation policy. This issue will be further discussed in Chapter Six.

Four conclusions can be drawn from the above three letters, translated into English from Shan and Chinese: First, even in the late nineteenth century, Chinese military posts were already established in some Lahu-inhabited areas of Moeng Laem; second, the Lahu people who occupied different locations were not all anti-China and pro-British. At least Mong Hka was pro-China, according to Letter B; Third, certain Lahu clans were still at odds with Moeng Laem in the late nineteenth century. Lastly, Mang Lün had a period of conflict with Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung; they wanted to acquire the Lahu region's territory and sought British mediation to achieve this objective. As a result, the intelligence reported in letters A, B, C, and the Shan letter, is worthy of additional investigation.

5.3.6 The Qing Court's Attitude Concerning Conflicts Between Tai Polities

Through the *gaitu guiliu*, the Qing government gradually promoted borderland integration and pushed the frontier line to the east bank of the Mekong River. As they continued advancing towards the border, they encountered climate challenges (the sources refer to malaria) and resistance from the local *cao fa*. By the middle of the Qing dynasty, the Qing emperors had basically abandoned their policy of continual expansion due to financial exigencies, especially after the Jiaqing period (1796–1820).¹³²

At that time, the Qing court's border policies faced numerous difficulties. Nonetheless, as long as the Tai *cao fa* helped the Qing court guard the border, ensure the stability of the frontier lands, and prevent Burmese incursions on the southwest border, the Qing court preferred not to interfere in the local affairs of the *cao fa*.

Therefore, the Qing court's attitude towards ethnic conflicts in the southwestern frontier region was always relatively straightforward; it tried to avoid getting directly involved. As long as local conflicts did not affect border security or the stability of the Tai ruler regimes, the Qing court did not intervene.

¹³² Lee (2012, 46–47).

However, if there was an incident that threatened border stability – for instance, the Lahu attack on the territory of the Moeng Laem *cao fa* – the Qing court intervened militarily. As clearly stated in the Jiaqing emperor's decree issued in Jiaqing year 17 (CE 1812), the Qing court's attitude towards ethnic disputes within the jurisdiction of the Tai *cao fa* was characterised by a high degree of caution and reluctance. The Jiaqing emperor once admonished officials in Yunnan for their eagerness to intervene in local affairs:¹³³

The Yi people (here, refers to Tai Nüa) who inhabit the territory of the Mengding *tusi*, had debt trouble with the Yi people who are from Huipin (回聘).¹³⁴ This *tusi* fabricated a report designed to scare [us]. Wang Xuzai, the [official] of this prefecture (Shunning Prefecture) did not check the truth and led troops forward to [Mengding] without ascertaining whether the report was true or not ... Investigations reveal that the capital of Mengding had not been burned, all the Yi have admitted to their wrongdoings and are content with their calling, and the border is quiet ... [this event] is a subtle accident, but [you] have to order [the Moeng Ting] *tusi* to investigate and handle it by himself. Officials in Yunnan should not question it.¹³⁵

孟定土司所屬夷民與回聘夷人錢債構釁，該土司捏詞稟報、希圖聳听。該府王旭載不察虛實，率行帶兵前往…茲查明孟定城內並未被焚、各夷人均伏罪安業，邊境寧謐……本屬細微，但當責令該土司自行查辦，內地官員即不應置問。

In this decree, Emperor Jiaqing reprimanded local officials for overreacting to incidents that occurred within the *cao fa* jurisdictions. He expressed his dissatisfaction with Wang Xuzai sending troops to the territory of the Moeng Ting *cao fa*. Finally, local officials were ordered not to get involved with minor problems in the areas under the jurisdiction of the *cao fa* because it was the responsibility of the *cao fa* to investigate those matters. This imperial decree reflected the non-interference attitude of the Qing court towards ethnic disputes within the territory of Tai *cao fa* in the middle-to-late Qing dynasty.

5.4 Conclusions

Finally, I discuss the three conclusions that I have drawn from the above data.

Symbiotic Inter-Ethnic Relations

The relationships between Tai *cao fa* and upland peoples are complex. However, it can be summed up as the more symbiotic the inter-ethnic relations, the more harmonious society is. Any kind of harmonious inter-ethnic relationship may be considered

¹³³ See Dao Yongming (1989, 764).

¹³⁴ There is a lack of information available on Huipin. It may be located in Moeng Ting.

¹³⁵ QSL, Renzong *shilu*, vol. 256. pp. 1–2. (《仁宗實錄》卷 256, 頁 1–2).

essentially symbiotic. If two different ethnic groups need each other, whether economically or politically, the possibility of frequent disputes between them would be significantly reduced. Takahiro and Badenoch (2013, 29–67), who have studied the relationship between Tai and other ethnic groups in Müang Sing in northern Laos, contend that Chiang Khaeng polity's power structure was shaped by symbiotic relationships between Tai Lü, the politically dominant Tai group, and upland peoples, who provided valuable resources and labour.

Therefore, if there is competition for resources between two ethnic groups, then disputes are inevitable. In the eighteenth century, the Lahu people had migrated to Moeng Laem *cao fa*'s territory due to repression by Qing officials in Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture. As the Lahu entered the local resource distribution network, they inevitably interacted with ethnic groups who already inhabited the land. The Lahu sought to obtain legitimacy for governing the upland areas under the jurisdiction of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, as well as to gain official support for their political status, through allegiance to the Qing court.

Although local Qing officials believed that the Lahu chief was a reliable agent who could help the court manage the uplands, the border policies of the Jiaqing emperor were relatively cautious. He was convinced that the Moeng Laem *cao fa* was the legitimate ruler of this region. To stabilise the Moeng Laem polity and ensure that the *cao fa* remained loyal, Emperor Jiaqing refused to bequeath official approval to the Lahu chiefs. Ultimately, the Lahu were the losers in this struggle between Tai and the Lahu.

After the arrival of the British, the Lahu still thought they could prevail with the support of the British colonial forces.¹³⁶ The Lahu people were described as enemies and bandits in Tai's historical records. To fight against this enemy, the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Paigong, even sought the assistance of the Moeng Yang *cao fa*. He was eventually killed by the Moeng Yang *cao fa* and Siamese forces. Finally, the successor to the position of *cao fa* in Moeng Laem had sought military support from the Qing court, which took advantage of the situation to militarily enter Moeng Laem.

The “Chinese-Burmese Condominium”

Moeng Laem is situated on the frontier between Burma and China. For four centuries, from the mid-Ming until the Qing dynasty, Moeng Laem had to pay tribute to these two big powers. Moreover, the *cao fa* successors of Moeng Laem had to be recognized by the Burmese court. This shows that Moeng Laem was a kind of “Chinese-Burmese condominium,” as was the Tai Lü polity of Sipsòng Panna from the 1570s. As Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo point out (2012, 49), Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna

¹³⁶ For more details, see Zhou and Grabowsky (2020, 301–350).

had been under the influence of Burma and the Chinese Empire for centuries, and a “Chinese-Burmese condominium” at least until the mid-nineteenth century, i.e., over a period of roughly three centuries. A local Tai metaphor in Moeng Laem compares China to the Tai polity’s father and Burma to her mother. This was a stock diplomatic phrase not only in Moeng Laem but also in Sipsòng Panna and other polities, which recognised dual suzerainty and overlapping sovereignty.¹³⁷

The “Chinese-Burmese condominium” lasted until Burma was conquered by the British and Burma became a part of British India. Southwest Yunnan, which was close to the Burmese sphere of influence, was mainly influenced in political terms by the Burmese. The Qing court knew that several Tai *cao fa* paid tribute to Burma, but they were unable to stop these activities as their military influence in Southwest Yunnan was limited.¹³⁸ Therefore, the Qing court could only recognise Burma’s influence in these areas and defaulted to the “condominium system.” As the QSG points out, the Burmese also demanded taxes from Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna.¹³⁹

The polity of Moeng Laem was controlled by Burma to a certain extent. Moreover, Moeng Laem was closer to the Burmese, especially the Burmese-controlled Shan states of Moeng Phòng (i.e., Theinni or Mubang, present-day Lashio). The reason is, firstly, the protection of the Chinese imperial military could not reach Moeng Laem, thus Moeng Laem still needed to directly confront military threats from Burma; secondly, the Lahu people constantly challenged the authority of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*. Due to the struggle between the Tai and Lahu for resources, specifically land and mines, the mediation efforts undertaken by the court were unable to completely resolve the conflict between the two parties.

After Chinese imperial troops entered Moeng Laem, they could not be stationed there permanently due to difficulties with the sub-tropical climate, especially malaria.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ For more details on this metaphor, see Grabowsky (2008, 31). See also Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 49–50). A similar metaphor was used to rationalise Cambodia’s tributary relationship with Siam (“father”) and Vietnam (“mother”) during the first half of the nineteenth century.

¹³⁸ For more details, see Yang Yuda and Yang Huifang (2004, 72–80).

¹³⁹ QSG, chapter 528, Liezhuan 315, Shuguo, 3, pp. 14,663 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 1976 edition). (QSG 1976, 14663)

¹⁴⁰ The climate of southwest Yunnan is hot and humid in the rainy season and dry in the dry season. It was common to suffer from tropical diseases, such as malaria and dengue, in the rainy season. Moeng Bò, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Laem were all traditional malaria-prone areas. Why did the Chinese military and the Han migrants have no problem in Moeng Bò while suffering from malaria on the west bank of the Mekong River? I suppose that, first, malaria mainly exists in forest and jungle areas. When an increasing number of migrants cultivated the land, malaria may have gradually disappeared, leading to environmental changes. In Moeng Bò, Han migrants and the imperial military were much more numerous than in Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem, which might be why the environment of Moeng Bò underwent more radical changes than Kūng Ma Moeng Laem. As Yang Bin (2010, 163–192) explains, “*zhang* (malaria) would retreat from the traditional malaria areas as the environment was changed. Imperial texts recorded that the *zhang* occurred most frequently in recently conquered frontiers but retreated further south as these frontiers

Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the Qing to directly administrate Moeng Laem. Moeng Laem was not really controlled by China until the British occupied Burma and the borders between Yunnan and Burma were delineated during the early 1890s.¹⁴¹

However, the rise of the Lahu people required political legitimacy and economic benefits from the territory of Moeng Laem. The gradual strengthening of the Moeng Laem *cao fa* forced the Lahu people to seek aid when the British annexed Burma as a province of India and permeated into Southwest Yunnan. Initially, the Moeng Laem *cao fa* hoped to obtain the support of Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung) before requesting help from Moeng Yang. However, both polities were controlled by Siam and Burma and could not offer any help to Moeng Laem. The Moeng Yang *cao fa* even colluded with the Siamese to kill the Moeng Laem *cao fa*, Dao Paigong. From then on, Moeng Laem sought help from the Qing court when it was attacked by the Lahu and other hill groups. This, in turn, provided a welcome opportunity for the Qing to further intervene in the internal affairs of Moeng Laem.

Furthermore, when the British arrived, they demanded a clearly demarcated boundary line. After a long period of negotiations between China and Britain, China retained Sipsòng Panna, Moeng Laem, and Kūng Ma. Though Moeng Laem politically became an integral part of China, culturally it still belonged to Mainland Southeast Asia.

Cultural Diversity in Moeng Bò/Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem

The three Tai Nüa polities in the Upper Mekong region were geographically located between the Mao Shan Federation and the Moeng Lü Federation of Sipsòng Panna. Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem were located on the west bank of the Mekong River, and Moeng Bò was on its east bank. In the process of Qing expansion towards the southwestern frontier, Moeng Bò was the first to bear the brunt of Qing control and be culturally integrated. Therefore, Moeng Bò, located at the intersection of different cultures, became the most culturally diverse place of the three polities.

In Moeng Bò, the Tai people used Tham and Lik scripts (and even Pòng script or Lik To Moan in some areas) for writings about their culture, religion, and history. They wrote these on mulberry (*sa*) paper or palm leaf, stone inscriptions, a horizontally inscribed wooden board. With the implementation of *gaitu guiliu*, the Qing also

became firmly colonised by the Chinese.” Moreover, for unofficial Han migrants, malaria-prone areas were the “happy lands” for migrants who were hungry for land, and they likely tried every approach to adapt to the environment (Ibid.). Conversely, official migrants or the military probably preferred to settle down or be gazetted in areas without malaria. Yang also points out (Ibid.) that the *zhang* limited the colonial expansion of the Qianlong emperor in Southwest Yunnan during the Sino-Burmese War (1765–1769). I have not studied this issue in depth, but I hope that more convincing arguments can be brought forward and studied further in the future.

¹⁴¹ For more details, see Zhou Hanli and Grabowsky (2020, 301–350).

implemented measures to “civilise” the indigenous people. Many Confucian schools were subsequently opened in Moeng Bò, a locality that, moreover, produced large quantities of tea and mineral salt. This promotion of Han culture gradually influenced Moeng Bò’s Tai elites. Today, Moeng Bò has some stone inscriptions and horizontally inscribed boards with Chinese characters. It can therefore be argued that Moeng Bò is culturally the most diverse of the three Tai Nüa polities investigated in this dissertation.

Although the *gaitu guiliu* policy pushed the frontiers of direct Chinese control to the east of the Mekong River, Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma remained in the frontier regions beyond the control of the Qing during the mid-to-late Qing dynasty. However, the *gaitu guiliu* was never implemented in Kūng Ma, meaning that Chinese imperial forces never truly reached Kūng Ma in the pre-modern era. Han culture, and its attendant influences, were mostly brought to Kūng Ma by Han migrants. Due to the lack of the Qing court’s official advance, stone inscriptions or horizontally inscribed wooden boards carved with Chinese characters dating from before the twentieth century have been found so far. It should be noted, however, that as Kūng Ma is geographically closer to Dehong, the Tai people use the Lik script more for writing records, while the Tham script is reserved for writing Theravada Buddhist scriptures.

Moreover, since Kūng Ma is situated close to the Shan states of Upper Burma, Kūng Ma was strongly influenced by Burmese culture. Kūng Ma was also not far from Siam. I conducted fieldwork in Kūng Ma from 4–6 September 2012, and the local guide took me to a village where Thai immigrants resided.¹⁴² In general, Kūng Ma is located between the two major Tai prefectures of Dehong and Sipsòng Panna and lies not far from Burma and Siam.

Kūng Ma initially needed to seek the political approval of the Ming and Qing courts because of its innate rivalry with Moeng Ting. In the process, it formed an early identification with Chinese culture and authority. The situation in Moeng Laem was different from that in Moeng Bò and Kūng Ma. Moeng Laem tried to maintain its semi-independence from the Chinese dynasties and, at the same time, continued to pursue the policy of “Chinese-Burmese condominiums.”¹⁴³

Before the arrival of Western colonial powers, the Qing court successfully integrated Moeng Bò into China proper and extended the boundary of its direct control to the east bank of the Mekong River. As Ma Jianxiong (2012, 87–122) points out, due to more and more Han migrants settling in the Southwest Mekong River, a society dominated by inland Han migrants based in Shunning Prefecture (now Fengqing County, Lincang Prefecture) gradually formed since the Ming Dynasty. With this

¹⁴² Fieldwork notes taken on 05/09/2012. I will continue to collect specific field data in the near future.

¹⁴³ Liew-Herres, Grabowsky and Renoo (2012, 49).

change, the originally vague borders¹⁴⁴ between Yunnan and Burma gradually became more clearly defined.

When the British arrived on the scene, they demanded clearly demarcated boundary lines. After a long period of negotiations between China and Britain, clear international boundary lines for Sipsòng Panna, Moeng Laem, and Kūng Ma were drawn, and the territories of these three *cao fa* were integrated into China. This included the introduction of political control, the extension of imperial administrative power, and the promotion of local people's identification as Chinese subjects. In Chapter Six, I will explain the reasons, processes, and results of the final determination of the southwestern border of the Tai regions in Yunnan based on primary data.

¹⁴⁴ The territory of Kūng Ma, Moeng Moeng, Moeng Laem, Sipsòng Panna, and the Wa and Luohei mountains. For more details, see Ma Jianxiong (2012, 87–122).

Chapter 6: Demarcation of Borders in the Tai Nüa Polities in the Late Nineteenth century

6.1 Review

The demarcation of borders was one of the most significant processes in the late Qing dynasty. Besides Burma, the Qing court also negotiated with British India, French Indochina (present-day Vietnam and Laos),¹ Russia, and Japanese-occupied Korea to delimit their shared borders. However, the Qing court needed to pay special attention to the Yunnan-Burma borderline because the Sino-Burma tributary relationship prior to British colonisation was not as clearly defined as that of Vietnam or Korea. The region in question was inhabited by a variety of ethnic groups who resided in both the uplands (i.e., Wa and Lahu) and lowlands (i.e., Tai Nüa, Tai Lü and Tai Khün etc.). The Qing court pursued different strategies for managing these groups and placed them under separate administrative categories. There were also sparsely populated and little-known Zomia areas² under discussion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In 1885, after their victory in the last of three Anglo-Burmese Wars,³ the British annexed Burma as part of British India. The British government then urged the Qing court to sign a treaty recognising its sovereignty. Nevertheless, colonial control did not manage to penetrate the upland areas along the northern and eastern frontier zones of the now defunct Burmese empire, meaning that states like Shan and Kayah maintained *de facto* autonomy. Several Tai principalities in Southwestern Yunnan, especially Moeng Laem, Küng Ma, and Sipsòng Panna, which were subject to a joint Sino-Burmese overlordship, continued to follow the prior arrangement. In the hope of curbing Chinese influence in the region, the British sent a request to the Qing court to

¹ The Vietnamese and Chinese relationship was quite complicated before the 1870s (before France occupied Indochina). Jiaozhi/Annan was ruled by the Chinese dynasties from the Han dynasty until the Song dynasty. Then, Dai Viet was briefly ruled by the Ming dynasty during 1407–1427. After independence from the direct government of the Ming court, Dai Viet became a vassal state of Chinese dynasties. Therefore, when the French arrived in Indochina, demarcation was the first task to be tackled with the Qing court. For more details, see Baldanza (2016, 1–11) and Neis (1998, VII). However, Woodside (1988, 20) points out that some Vietnamese historians found the “faith in Vietnamese equality with China fundamental,” which could be seen as the Vietnamese perspective. Dai Viet was not used until after the tenth century.

² As political scholar Scott (2009, 14–16) stresses, Zomia is a modern geographical concept. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the relationship between highland and lowland peoples is beyond our imagination and cannot be simplified into one or two patterns. Chapter Five, fn. 47 makes a detailed argument.

³ In 1885, only the remaining upper part of Burma was annexed while the coastal areas were already annexed by the British in 1826 and 1852. For more details, see Marshall (2001, 74–76).

delimit the more than 2,000 kilometres of shared border via a treaty. The Chinese Minister in London (1882–1885), Zeng Jize, was tasked with demarcating the border between Yunnan and Burma. Although the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office (BMFAO) primarily accepted his suggestion, the proposed borderline was not added to the Sino-British treaty signed in 1886 in Beijing. With the issue unresolved, in 1889, the British government secretly dispatched William Warry, a top intelligence officer, on a fact-finding mission to investigate the border areas between Upper Burma and Southwestern Yunnan.

While never published, Warry's Report⁴ is an original archival source of historical significance. The document is now kept in the Asian and African Studies Section⁵ of the British Library under the shelf mark "Mss Eur Photo Eur 384, (1878–1903)" in the European Manuscript Private Papers section. This unique first-hand report has not garnered much attention from Western scholars in the field, let alone Chinese historians. Warry's report carried great weight vis-à-vis negotiations over the China-Burma border, which began in 1894. It provides rare accounts of the political, social, ethnographical, and economic situation in Upper Burma and Tai polities of Southwest Yunnan during the critical period of the late 1880s and early 1890s, just before the current border was defined in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The British and the Qing court signed the Yunnan-Burma Frontier Treaty after Warry returned from his journey.

The Tai Nüa polities, i.e., Moeng Laem, Küng Ma, and Moeng Ting caught between China and Burma before the arrival of Western colonial powers, tried to find a way to survive in the current circumstances. However, the demarcation between the Qing court and Great Britain was crucial for the Tai polities, which faced the threat of integration into China or Burma. As small polities, they tried to survive in a cruel world; nevertheless, the delineation of modern boundaries pushed them into different nation-states.

In this chapter, I first discuss and interpret the report of British intelligence officer William Warry regarding Southwest Yunnan, mainly related to Moeng Laem, Moeng Ting, Küng Ma, and Sipsòng Panna. Secondly, I examine the practical problems stemming from the demarcation of borders between China and Burma in the late nineteenth century. Finally, taking the frontier issues of Southwest Yunnan as a case

⁴ The full name of this confidential document kept in the British Library is: "Photocopies of selected official and private papers of William Warry (1854–1936), acting assistant Chinese secretary, Peking 1881–82, special service, Government of India from 1885, political officer, Bhamo, Mandalay and Shwegu 1887–89, adviser to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, on Chinese affairs 1890–1904; including photocopies of maps of the Trans-Salween section of the Burmo-Chinese frontier." For the sake of convenience, I refer to this document as "Warry's report."

⁵ Previously known as Oriental and India Office Library, or The British Library: Asia, Pacific and African Collections [APAC].

study, I will explore how the modern concept of a nation-state was forged in China amid the colonial ambitions of Western powers. Various original archival materials are compared in order to provide a critical evaluation of Warry's report in the context of contemporary (at that time) Chinese sources. The concluding section balances these dissenting voices to draw a more comprehensive picture of the border negotiations in the hope of providing a more accurate representation of the historical record.

6.2 Western Missions and Warry's Excursion

6.2.1 Western Missions Before Warry's Survey

Western missions sent to Yunnan before Warry mainly focused on the facilitation of practical commercial routes from Mainland Southeast Asia to Yunnan and beyond. In 1866, the British Chamber of Commerce urged the British Government to investigate Upper Burma and Western Yunnan as soon as possible. Pertinently, memorials Nos. 32 and 33 states:

No. 32 ... The British government to "take all necessary measures for a survey of the country between Rangoon and Kiang-Hung (Chiang Rung), namely Sipsong Panna, with a view to the opening of a practical and direct commercial route to Western China."

No. 33 ... That your Lordship's will please forthwith to authorise and direct a proper official survey, by a competent civil engineer of this country, of the best route for railway communication from Rangoon, via Kiang-Tung and Kiang-Hung, to the south-Western provinces of China.⁶

Kiang Tung and Kiang Hung are variant spellings of Chiang Tung and Chiang Rung, respectively. After emerging victorious in the Sino-French War (1883–1885), France conquered north and central Vietnam. As a result, the British worried that the French would exploit this for commercial benefits in Mainland Southeast Asia and China at the expense of Britain. The officer R.G. pressed the British government to act immediately; otherwise, "the Frenchman would make a way to China for us."⁷

The French sent several missions to Mainland Southeast Asia via Yunnan, most notably the mission by Captain Francis Garnier and "Captain R****"⁸ in 1867. The primary purpose of this mission was to find a practical commercial route from Saigon

⁶ Tract Vol. 606, Direct Commerce with The Shan States and West of China, By Railway from Rangoon to Kiang Hung, on the upper Kamboja River, on the South-west Frontier of China. Memorial No. 48 Thereon. From the Wakefield Chamber of Commerce (To the Lords of her majesty's treasury, 15th of November 1868, London: 1869. Parliamentary Paper, "Rangoon & Western China", 28, A. Sess. 1866, Pa. 12 and 14.)

⁷ Tract vol. 606. Overland Communication with Western China. A Brief Statement of how the matter stands at present by R.G with a map Liverpool: Webb, Hunt & Ridings, 9, Castle Street. Overland communication with China. The Chambers of Liverpool and Manchester.

⁸ The document does not mention the real name of the captain. There is only Captain R**** on the cover. The document was compiled in Tracts 606.

to Yunnan. They departed from Luang Prabang on 25 May 1867. On 18 September 1867, the mission departed from Muong (Moeng) You to Muong (Moeng) Long, which was their next stop in the direction of Xieng Hong (Chiang Rung) and then Se-mao (Simao). They arrived at Chiang Rung on 1 October 1867 and then in Simao on 18 October 1867. The records of Garnier (1996, 92–93) are quite instructive:

Vagrants from the neighbouring regions mingled in great numbers with the locals. Among them, we noticed another type of Thais, the Thai Neua or Northern Thais, whom the war of the Phasi (Du Wenxiu Rebellion) had hounded from their native land, the country of Kochampri (here it refers to the present-day Dehong) from where the Phong also originated.

From Garnier's description, it seems that Tai Nüa had migrated to the Tai Lü area because of the rebellion led by the Yunnanese Hui Muslim leader Du Wenxiu 杜文秀 (r. 1856–1873).⁹ The Tai Nüa was said to have migrated from the country of Kochambi,¹⁰ from whence the Phòng also originated. As mentioned before, Phòng or Pòng is assumed to refer to Moeng Phòng.¹¹ The Tai Nüa might have come from Dehong via Chiang Rung and migrated to Northern Laos in Moeng Sing and the southern part of Yunnan.¹² It is assumed that the Tai Nüa had inhabited the Upper Mekong River for hundreds of years. However, wars, famine, and economic reasons might have prompted migration.

The French dispatched another expeditionary mission to Yunnan in 1873. The results of this mission were documented in the British Library and compiled into Tracts 606. The primary purpose of this mission was to develop a commercial trade route via the Chinese frontier into the inland. The French intended to take the opportunity to penetrate into China via Mainland Southeast Asia and Yunnan. That is clearly shown in their mission report. The English translation is as follows:¹³

The marine captain Francis Garnier ... concluded that this route (i.e., via the Red River) was the true direction for penetrating into China ... The essential goal of a colony is to open commerce with the largest possible number of nations. It was necessary for us – if we were not to be confined to leading a shadowy existence in the Mekong Delta, which would lead to nothing – to search for another way to get access to the Chinese frontier until now closed to jealous foreigners.¹⁴

⁹ About this Muslim rebellion, see the Chapter Four fn.4.

¹⁰ Kochampri or Kosambi. Garnier suggests that Kochampri is Moeng Mao Kingdom (Dehong today), but He Ping (2001, 247–258) argues the Kochampri refers to the north of Shan State. For more details, see He Ping (2001, 247–258).

¹¹ For more details, see He Ping (2001, 91–92).

¹² Grabowsky and Renoo (2008, 9) contend that the Tai Nüa in the plain of Moeng Sing originated from Chiangku (Jinggu or Moeng Bò) and Simao. Garnier's description is mainly based on formal knowledge of Jinggu, which was then a part of the Moeng Mao Federation.

¹³ As I cannot read French, the following quotation was translated by Prof. Volker Grabowsky. Many thanks to him for his help.

¹⁴ *Journal des Sciences militaire*, Novembre 1884 / *Journal of Military Sciences*, November 1884, 24.

According to this statement, we can conclude that, after the Mekong expedition, the French realised that it was easier to navigate the Red River than the Mekong River. The French decided to abandon their plans to use the Mekong River as a commercial route to Yunnan and adopted the Red River instead, believing the latter to be more viable. Competition for access to the China market ended after the British gained full control of Burma, and the French had annexed Indochina (present-day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) by 1887. Consequently, the French realised it made no sense to continue sending missions to investigate possible commercial routes via Yunnan to inland China.

As for the British, three missions were sent in 1882 led by Cameron (Tract Vol. 606), Colquhoun and Charles Wahad (Ibid.), respectively. On 23 July 1882, Cameron was stopped at Seumao (Simao, today Pu'er Prefecture) because the local authorities refused to issue a permit to go through Kiang Hung (Chiang Rung).¹⁵ Meanwhile, the Colquhoun and Charles Wahad expedition yielded fruitful results. They departed from Canton (Guangdong today) on 5 February 1882, went through Pe-se (present-day Baise, Guangxi Province) to South Yunnan via Kwang-nan (Guangnan), Linan (Lin'an), and Puerh (Ning'er County today) to Sao-mao (Simao). However, instability in Chiang Rung meant they had to depart from Simao to Dali.¹⁶ The following records their journey:

... [We] traversed the whole of South Yun-nan by ... Puerh to Ssu-mao, the last south-Western military and administrative centre of the Chinese Government in Yun-nan. ... From Ssu-mao it was intended to pass through the Laos countries, either east or west of the Mekong to Zimme or Xieng-mai (Chiang Mai), and thence to South-Eastern Burmah. ... The neighbouring state of Xieng-hong was in a disturbed condition, and civil war reigned there owing to a question of succession. ... Mr. Colquhoun did not consider it prudent to enter the Xieng-hong (Chiang Rung) territory. ... I-bang is a Laos district tributary to China, situated seven stages south-east of Ssu-mao, and supplies most of the so-called Puerh tea; hence it is a Laos and not a China tea.

It is evident from these reports that, before the Third Anglo-Burmese War, British missions were primarily sent to open a practical commercial route to China. The purpose of missions after the Third Anglo-Burmese War switched to surveying the frontier to obtain more accurate information for negotiating the borderline.

6.2.2 Warry's Missions

In 1889, British intelligence officer William Warry (1854–1936, see P6)¹⁷ was sent to

¹⁵ "From our own correspondent." Cameron was refused passage by the local authorities (Simao government) because the French Mekong expedition, which had previously arrived at Kiang Hung, tried to pass Simao by using threats. The local authorities believed it was too "intractable" (Tract Vol. 606).

¹⁶ Tracts vol. 606, Overland China Mail, 7 March 1882. *The Times of India*, 8 August 1882.

¹⁷ Warry's grandson Peter Warry, sent me a biography (unpublished) and three pictures of Warry in a private email dated 18 July 2021. It mentions that Warry died on 9 February 1937. Many thanks to Peter Warry for his contribution.

Upper Burma and Southwestern Yunnan to carry out a thorough investigation of these areas. The purpose was to provide a factual basis for future border negotiations between the governments in London and Beijing. A short biography of Warry can be found in the British Library's Asian and African Studies Catalogue:¹⁸ "William Warry (1854–1936), acting assistant Chinese secretary, Peking 1881–82, special service, Government of India from 1885, political officer, Bhamo, Mandalay and Schwegu (the northernmost town in the Kachin State) 1887–89, adviser to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, on Chinese affairs 1890–1904; including photocopies of maps of the Trans-Salween Section of the Burmo-Chinese frontier by Warry." Grabowsky (2006, 573–593) also provides biographical details about Warry.



P6: William Warry. Photo shared by Peter Warry, from a family album.

In 1999, American gemmologist and award-winning author Hughes (1999, 15–35), widely known as an authority on corundum, rubies, and sapphires, quoted from Crosthwaite (1912, 355): "W. Warry was the expedition's advisor on Chinese affairs; he could speak Chinese very well and understood that difficult people as well an

¹⁸ The British National Archives describes William Warry in the Catalogue: Photocopies of selected official and private papers of William Warry (1854–1936). The official website is <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/76ae707b-3a1c-4323-b5b3-1dd5a956b58f>, accessed on 30/12/2020.

Englishman can. He was on most friendly terms with the Chinese in Burma and could trust himself to them without fear.” Later, in 2016, Li Yi (2016, 135–154) notes that Warry “obtained first-hand knowledge of China and the Chinese people, along with Chinese-language skills, from his work in the Chinese Consular Service.” He had been an advisor on Chinese affairs who had “joined the frontier missions in India, Tibet, Burma and China” since 1885. From these snippets of information, we can conclude that Warry was an excellent intelligence officer regarding the issue of the Yunnan-Burma border.

I am fortunate to have obtained more details about Warry’s personal life¹⁹ and published biographical notes from Warry’s grandson Peter Warry.²⁰ Aside from personal details, this includes information about Warry’s mission in East Asia 1878–1904 (Peter Warry 2014, 1) and it reveals why he was sent to investigate Upper Burma and Yunnan during the late nineteenth century. According to British Library records, Warry was born on 4 April 1854 and received his education in Dorset and later at Oxford from 1873–1877. He then passed the competitive exam of the Foreign Office and worked as a student interpreter in Peking (Beijing) from 15 April 1878. After two years of Chinese language study, he first worked for the British consul in Shanghai. He was then promoted to Acting Assistant Chinese Secretary on 5 October 1881.

This biography (Peter Warry 2014, 7) mentions that Warry was assigned this mission because of his good relationship with the Viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces,²¹ and further explains (Ibid., 8) that Warry never mentioned this relationship because the mission was confidential and top secret. Peter Warry also sent me a photograph of the Chinese silk banner (See P7) that Warry was given by a Chinese officer. I assume this banner might be from Song Fan, who wrote it for Warry. Below is the text in Chinese script and English translation:


The official of Great Britain, Warry, is a kind and loyal [person]. [He] had outstanding achievements when he was young. [He] is accomplished with both

¹⁹ I obtained Warry’s personal family letters from the British Library on 10 October 2018; however, all of the letters are handwritten and very difficult to read.

²⁰ As Peter Warry explains (Peter Warry 2014, 1), this biography is based on: “23 surviving letters home, although most of these relate to 1878/9 with only six letters sent from the Far East covering the next 25 years. There is a private diary for 1879 but nothing later. An incomplete archive of 32 printed reports produced by Warry in the period 1888–1895 plus one from 1903 survives as do two manuscript reports from 1886. There are also letters to Warry from officials: three from British Ministers in Peking, four from Viceroys of India and two from their private secretaries and one from the Chief Clerk to the Government of Burma. In addition, there is a minute of a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister and two subsequent telegrams.” The printed reports were collected by Prof. Volker Grabowsky and I in the British Library, and some personal handwritten letters were also copied by myself when I visited the British Library in 2018.

²¹ I suppose the viceroy may be Song Fan (崧藩) who was the viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces between 1895–1900, because Warry once mentioned that Song Fan was friendly to the British. They might have had a private connection.

the pen and the sword.²² [He] concentrates on his studies (learning Chinese), and he [always] introspected himself even when he was young. [He] is known for his intelligence through the (?). [He] accompanied the imperial envoy [of Great Britain] to come to our China, [he] cultivated scholarly friends (senior officials) at the capital, and [his] reputation is growing. [He] is good at Chinese. 大英巴公衛理，爲人性和藹，篤忠孝，弱冠登賢，書嫻武備兼習聖理，與地讀學，少年省，才智之譽晨[?]。隨欽差大臣入我中華，京師廣交士大夫，聲望日起。精通漢。



P7: A Chinese Banner. (Source: Peter Warry's personal collection.)

These are compliments to Warry. If these words were from Viceroy Song Fan of Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces, we can infer that Warry's relationship with Yunnan officials was harmonious. Peter Warry later sent me fifteen photographs of the Chinese

²² This means that Warry is good at civil and military functions; he is a perfect person.

silk banners and calligraphy on paper. There is nothing but praise for Warry from Chinese officers. As a result of these connections with local high officials, the British government dispatched Warry to Southwest Yunnan and Upper Burma to conduct boundary investigations.

On 28 November 1885, the British Minister in Peking (Beijing), Sir Nicholas O'Connor (*b.* 1843–1908),²³ wrote a letter to Warry to persuade him to undertake a secret mission to Tibet. Warry also was informed that he should not tell anyone where he was going or the purpose of his mission. The fewer people who knew about this mission, the more likely China was to yield to British demands. On 10 February 1887, Warry was appointed as a Political Officer on Special Duty in Burma.²⁴

In 1888, Warry conducted an investigation into Burmese Jade mines. He “continued to operate in Upper Burma throughout 1888 and wrote a number of reports on topics as varied as trade, tribal practices and ancient Chinese seals.”²⁵ Warry stayed in Burma from 1889 until 1891 and was awarded the “Burma War Medal for active service with troops, an unusual honor for a civilian in 1889.”²⁶

Following a seventeen-month vacation in England, Warry “returned to Burma on 1st May 1893 and by November of that year was on an expedition that was to last around four months seeking to define the Burma-Chinese border. He was accompanied by 50 Indian troops and Chinese Deputies from Yunnan” (see P8).²⁷ At this point, it was necessary to cross the border into Yunnan.

²³ His Chinese name is Ou Gena 歐格納. Sir Nicholas Nicklas O'Connor worked as a British envoy from 19 November 1892–September 1895.

²⁴ Burma was officially annexed by the British on 1 January 1886; however, “jungle warfare continued for the next three years before control was fully established.” Cited from Peter Warry (2014, 4).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.



P8: Warry with Chinese Deputy and Indian and Chinese troops (Peter Warry 2014, 8)

Based on his several expeditions from 1888 until 1895, Warry's Report is a valuable primary source vis-à-vis the study of Upper Burma and Southwest Yunnan in the late nineteenth century. Since the report was never published, very few scholars know of its existence. However, it came to the attention of Volker Grabowsky in the early 1990s, when he was doing postdoctoral research on the history of Lan Na (Northern Thailand) in the British Library. Upon careful examination, he was stunned by its accurate and sensitive description of the politics, society, economy, and ethnic make-up of Yunnan.

It is for these reasons that I adopt Warry's Report as the main British source for this chapter. As an excellent intelligence agent, Warry kept a thorough record of his investigations during the mission to Upper Burma in 1888. His investigation of Upper Burma and Western Yunnan was an admirable feat, which culminated in the submission of a detailed and reliable report. I have obtained detailed information on Upper Burma and Southwest Yunnan from Warry's thorough confidential report. Not only does he describe the local history and society of different ethnic groups, but also the attitudes of Chinese authorities towards Southwest Yunnan border issues.

All these confidential insights helped the British government in its negotiations with the Qing court. To an extent, Warry's suggestions may have been adopted by the British Government for "The Resumption Treaty of China-Britain about Yunnan-Burma's Border and Trade in services of the clauses," signed on 1 March 1894

(Guangzhu 20, first lunar month, 24th day) in London. The under-researched Warry Report is thus a valuable primary source that can help us understand the background and evolution of the formation of the Yunnan-Burma frontier. Furthermore, it can be considered an ethnography of Upper Burma and Southwest Yunnan.

After Warry had completed his first mission in 1889, he accompanied Scott on his expedition. Tracts Vol. 727 (Diary of Events of Military Interest in Burma for January 1894 Bhamo and the North) records the following: “Captain Davies was after all permitted to accompany Mr Warry to Manwaing. On January 8th (1894), Mr Warry, accompanied by Captain Davies and a small escort of a corporal and four men of the Yorkshire Regiment, left Namkham (Nankan) with the Chinese officials.”

Together, they recorded the details of a Chinese military fort and Chinese attitudes towards foreigners. It was reported that Song Fan 崧蕃, the Viceroy of Yunnan was very amicable and favourably inclined towards the British.

Warry’s mission highly recommended that the British government push the frontier forward to Puerh (Ning’er County, administrated by Pu’er Prefecture today) and Simao (Pu’er Prefecture today), that is to claim Mong Lem (Moeng Laem) and Keng Hung (Chiang Rung) for commercial gains. Moreover, they also investigated some military posts in Chinese territory. This was a brilliant manoeuvre on the part of the British government to obtain as much useful information as possible before signing the border treaty with China on 1 March 1894. Unlike imperial China, Britain was savvy vis-à-vis frontier negotiations and had plenty of experience. Meanwhile, the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces, Wang Wenshao (王文韶 in Ch., in office. 1889–1895), only sent a geographer, Yao Wendong, to investigate the border area of Yunnan in 1891.²⁸ The Qing court had limited information on the border area of Yunnan. Consequently, China was left in a defensive position during border negotiations in the 1890s.

In 1892–1896, Scott (Warry’s colleague) and his mission visited the northern Shan states²⁹ and the Burma-Yunnan border.³⁰ He reported detailed and crucial information about the northern Shan states and the border between Burma and Yunnan. A member of the mission, Captain Davies, reported that the Hanlong Gate³¹ was discovered on 6 January, 6.5 miles south-west of Namkhan, near the Mongwi Road.³²

This record suggests that Warry’s and Scott’s missions were sent to Upper Burma consecutively. It can be assumed that both worked for British intelligence investigating

²⁸ For more details, see Ma Jianxiong ed. (2013, 3).

²⁹ The Shan State, see Chapter One fn. 36.

³⁰ Sir George Scott’s correspondence on the Burma-Chinese Boundary during 1894–1896. The documents are kept in the British Library under the Shelf Mark: Mss Eur F278/88/89/90.

³¹ Hanlong Gate is located in the southern border of Ruili, today in Burmese territory.

³² Tracts 727: Diary of Events of Military Interest in Burma for the Month of January 1894 Bhamo and the North.

the Shan states and the Burma-Yunnan frontiers. M9 shows the North Shan states as drawn by Macquoid, a member of Scott's mission. This map clearly marks the Chinese and British borderlines. Both Mong Lem (Moeng Laem) and Keng Hung (Chiang Rung) were attributed to China (see the pink line). The smaller states, such as Chen Pien (Zhenbian) and other wild Wa areas (Mon-Khmer), were approximately mapped, shown here by the green line.³³



M9: Skeleton Map of Country. Source: Report of the Intelligence Office on Tour with Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96 (Author: C. E. K. Macquoid, 1869–1945. Contributor: India. Quarter Master General's Department. Intelligence Branch. Burma

³³ As Warry noted under the map: "The green boundaries of the various states are approximate only, as the colon did not succeed in penetrating far enough into the country to define them with any exact lines."

Division. The British Library, Shelf mark (s): Asia, Pacific & Africa W 2280).

Correspondence was frequent and detailed, so much so that it was a challenge for British intelligence to keep abreast of things. As Sadan (2008, 11–13) observes, all correspondence delivered to the colonial Government of Burma was dealt with in two ways. It was categorised and submitted step by step. Only “the most significant correspondence was chosen to be forwarded to London, where it would be registered in the correspondence files of the appropriate department” (Ibid., 12). It was in this manner that Warry’s report and Scott’s papers, as well as the correspondence of other missions, were used by the British government for reference when formulating foreign policies.

6.2.3 The Scott Collection

As explained in Chapter Five, the Scott Collection contains the personal documents of Sir (James) George Scott (*b.* 1851–1934) and is kept at Cambridge University Library. Scott served as the Chief Executive of the Shan States in British Burma and Deputy Commissioner of Burma. Apart from documents held by Cambridge University Library, the British Library also preserves the intelligence reports that Scott submitted to the British Foreign Office, which facilitated the formulation of foreign policies at that time. This part of the collection is mainly printed on modern paper, i.e., Scott, James George. & Hardiman, J. P., 1900, *Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States* / compiled from official papers by J. George Scott assisted by J.P. Hardiman. Printed by the Superintendent, Govt. Print., Burma Rangoon. However, his private collection is mainly kept in the Manuscripts Department of Cambridge University Library: Scott Collection, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James). Cambridge University Library.


It is worth noting that the Scott Collection at Cambridge University Library contains original manuscripts, including Buddhist scriptures, meeting memorandums, telegrams, letters, memorials, petitions, and so on. The manuscripts are in English, Chinese, Shan, Burmese, Thai, Tham, and Lik and are written on modern paper, *sa* (mulberry) paper, and even on palm-leaf.³⁴

The Scott Collection contains documents in Shan, Burmese, and English related to the demarcation of the border between China and Burma. The English-language documents relevant to the demarcation issues include LL9.8.1, LL9.8.2, LL9.8.3, and LL9.8.4, handwritten documents concerning the Anglo-French Commission, 15

³⁴ In addition, the collections also include the Theravada Buddhist *sutras* on palm-leaf and wood, silk banners, hand-painted maps, printed maps, telegrams, letters between officials, etc. Prof. Grabowsky and I visited the British Library and the Cambridge University Library in mid-July 2022. We found that the richness and detail of Scott’s Collections at both institutions, but particularly at Cambridge University Library, amazing and astonishing.

January 1895. Much of the handwriting is illegible, but it seems that both parties discussed the demarcation issue of Yunnan, Burma, and Indochina (present-day Laos).³⁵

Furthermore, LL9.82 is a map of Moeng Laem and Kung Ma, already shown in Chapter Three, which details the borders and territories of both parties. LL9.83 (see M10) is a map of the Wa Country that also includes the surrounding polities, such as Moeng Ting, Kung Ma, Moeng Laem, Zhenbian Prefecture, Chiang Rung, and Muhseu (Lahu) tribes. LL9.116 comprises three Chinese handwritten letters to the Superintendent of Shan States; this may be Scott. On the envelope, it states: “Chinese document with handwritten letter to Mr. Warry, 1893. These letters were forwarded to Warry in 1893.” In my opinion, Warry was proficient in Chinese and he was a highly capable intelligence officer who would have been able to analyse these three letters and offer a proper response. Clearly, this is why Scott forwarded these letters to Warry.



M10: Appendix No. 3, The “Wa Country”, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.83. Cambridge University Library.

³⁵ The bookshelf is the First meeting, Anglo-French Commission, 15 Jan. 1895, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.8.1., Cambridge University Library. The Second meeting, Anglo-French Commission, 15 Jan. 1895, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.8.2, Cambridge University Library. The Third meeting, Anglo-French Commission, 15 Jan. 1895, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.8.3, Cambridge University Library. The Fourth meeting, Anglo-French Commission, 15 Jan. 1895, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.8.4, Cambridge University Library.

An interesting document relates to a protest from Zhefang (Chêfang) *Xuanfu si* when the British invaded and burnt Bangda (Pang Tap, present-day Mangshi). This letter was written on letter paper (see Manu. 11) known as *Xuetao jian*,³⁶ which is decorated with red blossoms. The characters and flowers are added when the paper is made. The letter does not specify a date but based on previous Chinese letters and Warry's English translations of this letter, his response was written in January or February 1893. Another Chinese letter was written in February 1891 (Guangxu 19, first lunar month). The English translations and the comments date to February 1893. Below is the Chinese script and English translation:³⁷

Letter from the Hereditary Zhefang Pacification Commission subordinate to Longling Sub-Prefecture, Yongchang Prefecture to:

His Excellency the British Official

China and your country are neighbours and have been trading with each other for many years without any ulterior motive (means without any troubles). [I] have heard that British officials came with hundreds of people to burn Bangda (Pang Tap). What is the reason for this? Bangda is situated within our borders, why did [your officials and people] cross [our] border? You and I are friendly neighbours and each of us has our frontiers to protect. It is best that you withdraw [your] troops as soon as the letter is received.

Respectfully, Duo Maoxiu, Hereditary Pacification Commission Vice Commissioner of Zhefang, bestowed with the Second rank Wei Hualing (Seal: *Xuetao jian*. Seal: *Yi*. Seal: Unclear)

雲南永昌府龍陵聽世襲遮放宣撫司致函：

英官大人 足下


竊惟我中國與貴國係屬鄰邦，彼此通商多年，並無他意。茲聞英官帶領數百人前來燒殺邦達，事為那件？邦達是我界內，何得越界？尔我友誼鄰邦，各疆各界保守各之疆土，見字速將兵馬撤回是為幸甚。

欽賜二品衛花翎世襲遮放宣撫副使司多懋修領拜 (印：薛涛牋。印：

義，印：(模糊))

³⁶ Xue Tao (born around 768–832) was a renowned courtesan and poet during the mid-Tang dynasty. She was a versatile and accomplished woman who designed a type of paper with a moderate length and width, which was suitable for writing poetry. This paper was first printed on plum blossom paper and used for poetry, but it was gradually used for letter writing and even official state journals.

³⁷ As classical Chinese does not have punctuation, I have added it where appropriate.



Manu.11: The Letter to the Superintendent of Shan States. (Cited from Chinese letter, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) LL9.116.1. Cambridge University Library.)

Zhefang is located in today's Mangshi, Dehong City, near section C (see M12). Section C was a relatively uncontroversial area (further information is provided in the following section). In my opinion, this letter demonstrates that Section C already had established borders, hence the Zhefang Pacification Commissioner's protests against the British troops' harassment of Bangda (Pang Tap), which was within Zhefang's territory. The only evidence of a British government response is a petition sent to the Zhefang Pacification Commissioner. This letter was kept together with a printed document and the bookshelf number is UL1.146.³⁸ However, this letter bears no relation to the event mentioned by the Zhefang *cao fa* in the previous Chinese letter.

³⁸ Official Documents, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) UL1.51-160. Cambridge University Library.

Here is the letter from this document:

English Translation of letter in Chinese sent to Chêfang Sawbwa
To the Chêfang Sawbwa. (To the Zhefang Pacification Commission)

It has been brought to our notice that 200 Chinese and Chinese robbers residing in your territory raided Man Hai, a village situated in the State of Ming Ko and under British control, on the 28th of the month of Tabaung, and have since returned to your State, taking with them as captives the whole population of Man Hai, and, further, despoiling the inhabitants of their goods and chattels. As the marauders are your subjects you are therefore requested to liberate the said captives and return all property taken in the raid.

Based on the context, it is likely that this letter was written in mid-March 1893. The letter alleged that the 200 Chinese “robbers” from Zhefang raided Man Hai, which was under British administration, capturing the population and looting their valuables. Because the Chinese “robbers” were Zhefang’s subjects, the British requested that the detainees and their goods be released.

Scott commented on the Pang Tap problem. He believed that the burning of Pang Tap put paid to any of Naw Hseng’s³⁹ fears and he subsequently resumed his activities. The settlement of this section of the country was contingent on the arrangements made for the administration of the Kachins. Scott noted that this subject would be covered in the report on that question, and he suggested that British officers consult the current Commissioner of the Northern Division, Mr. H. T. White, who was well-versed in Shan state concerns. He requested that no action be taken in the Shan states by the Civil Officer at Nam Hkam without first consulting with him and Mr. White.⁴⁰


The document (UL 1.146) is all about the charge of the Chinese “robbers” and the rebellions occurring in Kachin and the “Chinese Shan States”, i.e., Zhefang and Nam Hkam, etc. I hypothesise that British troops first harassed Pang Tap in January or February 1893 without Scott’s permission; or he knew about this action but did not stop it or provide a prompt response to reassure Zhefang *cao fa*. Then, the *cao fa* of Zhefang protested the British military action but received no response or explanation. In mid-March, the *cao fa* may have privately supported anti-British and pro-Burmese royal family troops or a Chinese military contingent to attack Man Hai in retaliation. It was difficult to avoid conflict in this region once events had reached a crisis point. Four months later, in July, Scott had to order British officers to consult with him and Mr. White before taking any further action. As a Burmese and Shan scholar, Scott was adept at addressing the diverse problems of Upper Burma. He had also learnt some valuable

³⁹ He was the ex-Adu (maybe it is a Shan term for an official position) of Mang Hang and was represented by the officers of Bhamo. See Official Documents, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) UL 1.146. Cambridge University Library: From J. G. Scott, Esq., C.I.E., Superintendent, Northern Shan States, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, —No. 232, dated the 22nd of July 1893, pp. 2.

⁴⁰ Ibid.: From D. W. Rae, Esq., Civil Officer, Namkham Column, to the Deputy Commissioner, Bhamo, —No.4, dated the 16th of May 1893.

lessons during his time in charge, particularly those pertaining to the Shan states.

UL1.40 is a bilingual (classical Chinese and English) map for the Yunnan-Burma boundary mission. The title of this map is The Yunnan-Burma Boundary Middle Section (滇緬中段界線畧圖 in Ch.) and it was drawn after the 1899 demarcation. The middle section is the controversial Section D. It was controversial because the mountainous regions had been inhabited by numerous different ethnic groups (i.e. Wa, Kui or Gwe, and wild Kha, etc.) for centuries. For details, see map M11:



M11: The Yunnan-Burma Boundary Middle Section. (Source from Summary of the proceedings of the conference, [Burma].[China].[Boundary].[Commission]., Nos. 1Â 11, 1899–1900, GBR/0012/MS Scott (James) UL1.40. Cambridge University Library.)

Other documents written in English were recorded after the second demarcation,

including UL1.8 and UL1.42, which are all the notes and records from 1899–1900.

6.3 Reasons for Demarcation

The China-Burma frontier negotiations between China and Britain were prompted by the collapse of the traditional tributary system following the arrival of Western colonial powers. Even though the tributary system, in the form of Pacification Commissions (or the so-called *tusi* system 土司制度),⁴¹ was an effective way to guard and maintain the Chinese empire, the lack of clear demarcation lines with the various vassal states became a significant problem when the power of the central court declined. The issue of unstable and unclear borders between China and Burma became a severe problem only after Western colonial powers sought to obtain economic access to inland China via the Indochinese Peninsula.

The European powers, notably Britain and France, had internalised a concept of clearly defined borderlines separating the undivided and undisputed sovereignties of states since the Westphalian Treaty of 1648.⁴² This Western concept of a modern nation-state was transplanted to areas outside of Europe, including Asia, by European colonial powers in the late nineteenth century, the heyday of Western imperialism. Such a concept was very different from indigenous Asian concepts regarding frontiers and borders, which were grounded in the historical experience of the people in East and Southeast Asia. The imposition of the idea of a modern nation-state on these premodern empires therefore constituted a big challenge to Asian countries, especially China, as the European powers refuted the idea of shared and multiple sovereignties and overlapping frontier zones.⁴³

6.3.1 The Concept of “Frontier”

At the outset, it is essential to define the term “frontier”. This begs the question: “What is considered the frontier of a nation-state?” Zhu Shaohua (2007, 1) argues that a frontier can be seen as a symbol of a nation-state and is essential to maintaining sovereignty. A frontier is regarded as the lines of demarcation separating different

⁴¹ See Chapter Two for a detailed explanation of the *tusi* system.

⁴² The Westphalian system of sovereign states is “a system of states or international society comprising sovereign state entities possessing the monopoly of force within their mutually recognized territories,” which arose in 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years’ War. See the Oxford Reference, Oxford Handbooks Online, Oxford Scholarship Online: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803121924198#:~:text=Term%20used%20in%20international%20relations,within%20their%20mutually%20recognized%20territories>, accessed on 10 September 2023.

⁴³ The clash of European and indigenous Southeast Asian concepts of sovereignty and border has been elucidated by Thongchai (1994, 81–96), using the case of Siam (Thailand).

countries and states. The concept of a frontier emerged when the idea of the nation-state became more widespread in Asia from the early nineteenth century. For Giersch (2006, 14), a more appropriate way to define a frontier is “as a territory or zone in which multiple people meet; at least one group is intrusive, the others indigenous.” Just like Giersch’s observation, most parts of the Chinese frontier – be it imperial China or the modern PRC – are inhabited by non-Han ethnic groups. This is particularly true in Yunnan Province, where ethnic groups such as the Tai, Mon-Khmer (i.e., De’ang, Bulang, and Wa), and Tibeto-Burman (i.e., Lahu, Yi and Hani) have been living along the frontier for hundreds of years.⁴⁴ In this context, they can be seen as indigenous groups intruded on by Han migrants. The integration of these areas became an important issue for the Qing court, which wanted to have a stable and safe frontier.

With respect to Southeast Asia, Thongchai (1994, 17) puts forward the concept of “geo-body.” He argues that the embodiment of a nation does not equate merely to a nation’s territory. It also includes the mental and visual representation of a nation’s territory – represented through maps and images, thus making it recognisable and imaginable – in the minds of its citizens. This image of the nation’s territory is a principal source for “pride, loyalty, love, passion, bias, hatred, reason, unreason” among members of that nation (Ibid.). Thongchai developed his concept with Siam as a case study.

To keep the sovereignty of its core area, Siam had to give up distant districts, which were difficult to administrate. To an extent, due to the prevalence of the Mandala system, Siam did not see its borderline as a fixed, independent entity in the same way that Western countries viewed their borders in the nineteenth century. After ceding the trans-Mekong territories in present-day Laos to France in 1893, King Chulalongkorn remarked those losses were not the most important for things Siam (Ibid., 134).

Horstmann & Wadley (2009, 3) provide another perspective: Today, when social groupings constantly redefine social and physical space, boundaries and territoriality are vital. By being outside the nation-state, people dispute its monopoly on identity and thus challenge nationalism. Frequent international border crossings affect our understanding of society and cultural spatial and social organisation.

There is no doubt that the conceptions of borders are essential for the functioning of a modern state. Without clear borders to protect, a modern state will struggle to exert its undivided and undisputed sovereignty over its citizens. As many frontier areas are inhabited by diverse multi-ethnic populations – of which the modern state often possessed little knowledge – many newly emerging nation-states were eager to acquire ethnographic knowledge about such people in order to secure and strengthen their “geo-

⁴⁴ For details on ethnic groups in Yunnan, see Ma Jianxiong (2014, 25–51); Jonathan (1997, 67–76); and Michaud (2009, 25–49).

bodies.”

In general, a frontier can be defined as the national boundaries and a place inhabited by different ethnic groups. A typical example is Southwest China, which is inhabited by various indigenous people. Even though borderlines would often change through intermarriage and conflict among local rulers, the tributary system was still a useful strategy for the Qing court to guard its southwestern territories (Giersch 2006: 13).

6.3.2 Chinese Tributary System

Chapter Two provides a detailed explanation of the Chinese tributary system, and Liew-Herres and Grabowsky (2008, 26) describe the Chinese *tusi* system, which can be traced back to the so-called “prefecture under loose reins” (established during the seventh to thirteenth centuries, i.e. the Tang and Song dynasties), which was designed to integrate the “foreigners or barbarians,” or tribal people of the southern border regions into Chinese governance.⁴⁵

The *tusi* system, or so-called Pacification Commissions, was established in the Yuan period (1271–1368) and lasted until the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1636–1911) periods. *Tusi*-administrated areas were inhabited predominantly by non-Han Chinese, the ethnic people, the so-called *shaoshu minzu* or minority peoples (少数民族) in Chinese. In Yunnan and upper Mainland Southeast Asia, the local rulers and princes were called *cao fa* or *cao mòm* in the local Tai language. In Chinese sources, their names were prefixed with *zhao*, *dao*, or *tao*. Liew-Herres and Grabowsky (Ibid.) further point out the important fact that Qing officials did not directly control local society under the jurisdiction of *tusi*. The Tai *cao fa* administrated according to their customs. For example, they could execute their subjects without reporting to the Ming court’s Ministry of Justice.

The *tusi* system was an effective way for the Chinese empire to govern the southwest frontier zone. However, it also meant that the Chinese empire lacked a sense of modern frontier. The Chinese empire mainly relied on the tributary system to administrate ethnic areas in the southwest, primarily inhabited by non-Han people. As Higgins (1992, 30) emphasises, the tributary system was a traditional Chinese system for managing foreign relations with neighbouring subordinate polities. The tributary system, the origins of which may be traced to the Han dynasty (202 BC–220 CE), has been called a “system of ritualized interstate relations” by Mote (1999, 383), in which

⁴⁵ The *tusi* system was not an exclusive administrative method restricted to China’s empire; it also extended to Mainland Southeast Asian countries. The so-called Mandala (See Long Xiaoyan 2018, 22–33) system was also implemented in Siam and Burma. The system can be traced back to the Han dynasty and endured for thousands of years, albeit under different names. Chapter Two provides a detailed description.

ancient China was believed to be the centre of the world. To secure the safety of its central plains (comprising the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River), the Chinese empire needed the provinces, vassal states, tributary states, as well as neighbouring countries, to pay their local products as a tribute and thereby maintain a stable “hierarchical” relationship.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the Chinese dynasties were expected to bestow official titles on the rulers of subordinate polities and give them valuable gifts, the value of which had to exceed that of the local products provided by these polities. China thus sent silk, tea, paper money, and other goods to their tributary states, as appropriate.⁴⁷

Since the Tang dynasty (618–907), the tributary system had been transformed into an economic relationship. Scholars of Chinese history believe that the tributary system constituted an essential administrative feature of the Chinese empire. Takeshi Hamashita (1999, 31), a famous Japanese sinologist, points out that the tributary system is an extension of the relationship between the central government and local administration. He defines the chain of government as follows: Central Government—Prefectures—*tusi* or aboriginal officials—Vassal States—Tributary States—mutual trade relationships. This hierarchical system was an organic whole.

The Chinese empire had a centralised political and administrative authority: of predominant importance was local governance in the Chinese core areas, followed by the *tusi* system in the non-Han areas, and, finally, by the tributary system aimed at governing semi-independent states via mutual trade to maintain good relationships with these countries. The Chinese empire was considered to be at the centre of the world, surrounded by a myriad of inner and outer provinces, vassal and tributary states, as well as other foreign countries. Within this structure of intra-state relations, the *tusi* was part of the tributary system. Since intermarriage, conflicts, wars, and the changing of tributary relationships could regularly cause the border to change, there were no fixed and stable frontiers separating the different polities.⁴⁸ Even though several maps of the

⁴⁶ Regarding the hierarchical relationship of the tributary system, Perdue (2015, 1001–1014) provides an inspiring and unique statement, arguing that: “The concept of a ‘tributary system’ regulating China’s relationships with foreign countries has held a tenacious grip on analysts and critics. Even though no Chinese dynasty ever used this term to describe its own strategic thinking, and well-informed historians have repeatedly denied that such a system ever existed, it somehow still irresistibly attracts scholars and journalists seeking to explain the PRC’s foreign policy today.” He further criticises Mark Mancall’s (1968) description of the concept as clearly self-contradictory (Ibid., 1005). Mancall argues that the Son of Heaven believed that he was “the top member of a human hierarchy to which all others had to be subordinated”; therefore, from Chinese emperors’ perspective, their “superiority as the centre of a cosmologically ordered social structure” and was the reason why they “saw the outside world as the hierarchical terms (even if the outside world may not accept it)” (Mancall 1968, 63–89). However, Mancall further admits that “tributary system is an English word” and thus is self-contradictory. For more details, see Chapter One.

⁴⁷ For more details, see Liew-Herres and Grabowsky (2008, 28–40).

⁴⁸ For more details on intermarriages among the Tai *tusi*, see Ma Jianxiong (2020, 19–32).

Qing dynasty clearly show the borderlines between China and Burma, the demarcation had not been defined under international law (see M9 and M10).

6.3.3 Arrival of Western Colonial Powers

After its victory in the last of three Anglo-Burmese Wars (in 1885), the British government urged the Qing court to sign a treaty agreeing that Burma proper should become a colony and part of British India. However, the British were still unable to exercise control over the whole country, especially the Shan states and the hill areas inhabited by Karen and Kachin in the north and east, for a number of years. The outer zones of Burma, such as the vassal states in the Red Karen (Kayah) and Shan areas, were given the special status of protectorates and were under indirect rule, while inner Burma was under direct colonial rule. Moreover, most of the indigenous soldiers of the British colonial army in Burma were Shan, Karen, Chin, and Kachin. Some of these territories had retained a tributary relationship between the Shan princes and the Chinese dynasties. The British were afraid that the Chinese might interfere by claiming these territories under the pretext of these pre-existing tributary arrangements.

To incentivise the Chinese government, the British Foreign Office offered concessions as leverage for negotiations over a durable borderline and trade relations. In 1885, Zeng Jize (1839–1890), the permanent Chinese minister in London wrote a memorial proposing a solution to the Yunnan-Burma border issue. However, this concession did not find its way into the so-called *Burma Terms*. All these potential concessions remained in Zeng's memorial, which Xue Fucheng (1838–1894) (comp. 1902, 9) made public when he took over Zeng's position as Chinese ambassador to London on 5 March 1891 (Guangxu year 17, 25th day of the first lunar month).

The third convention of the Burma Terms stipulates that “the frontier between Burmah and China [is] to be marked by a Delimitation Commission” (British and Foreign State Papers (1885–1886), Vol. 77, 123). As mentioned above, Warry's mission was sent to Upper Burma. Three years later, Yao Wendong (1853–1929) was sent to Southwest Yunnan according to terms of the same convention, known in China as the Peking Convention (*Beijing Tiaoyue* 北京條約).

The convention specified that the China-Burma borderline should be fixed after a survey of the boundary by both sides. This was the main objective of Warry's mission. This crucial background is reflected in Warry's report, which emphasises:

It would no doubt be inconvenient to admit China to be the sole possession of a country affording so excellent a base for intrigue and indirect operations against us. We should be undertaking a heavy task and incurring a large responsibility. We should have to maintain order, to punish aggression, and to protect, single-handed, several trade routes leading from Burma to China. The Kachins are a savage race of mountaineers, without civilisation or law, recognising no common Chief, turbulent and warlike by nature, and living to a

large extent by plunder and blackmail levied on trading caravans. They need to be sternly repressed, and they will only be kept in order by constant pressure both from the Chinese and the Burmese side.⁴⁹

Furthermore, Warry acknowledged Chinese influence in these parts of Upper Burma, dating from the Yuan dynasty (CE 1271–1368). A considerable tract of the Shan country appeared to have been acknowledged as being under the suzerainty of the Chinese empire for several centuries. These Shan or Tai polities were named Moeng Ting, Moeng Yang, and Moeng Phòng, respectively.⁵⁰ However, Warry also noted that Chinese influence in the region had declined since the middle of the Qing dynasty, i.e., since the late eighteenth century.⁵¹ Thus, the primary purposes of Warry's mission were to investigate the local history and society, issues pertaining to the rubber trade, and to gauge Chinese influence in the area. His report aimed at providing the British government with vital information so that it could devise better strategies for asserting control over Upper Burma and negotiating the Yunnan-Burma frontier with China.

6.4 Demarcation Negotiations

6.4.1 Qing Court's Standpoint

From the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, Yunnan faced border conflicts with both Burma and Vietnam, including parts of present-day Laos, as the indigenous ethnic groups did not integrate well into the province. The disputed area between Yunnan and Burma was mainly located in the *tusi* territory, which was inhabited primarily by the Tai and Mon-Khmer. With the tributary system being in place, the Qing court felt it was unnecessary to define a clear borderline. This attitude reflected the traditional diplomatic policy of imperial China, translated by Legge (1939, 700) as “anciently, the defences of the sons of Heaven were the rude tribes on every side of the Kingdom” (*Guzhe, Tianzi shou zai siyi* 古者，天子守在四夷),⁵² which means “all *tusi* and vassal states were considered properties of the son of heaven (*Tianzi* 天子).”⁵³

Simply put, the Qing court expected its vassal states to guard the country for them, even though the vassal states might only have maintained the tributary relationship out of formality. Such a Sino-centric mentality played an essential role in the Qing court's diplomatic strategy towards the Yunnan-Burma frontier issue. With this background in

⁴⁹ Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Burmo (Burma) -Chinese Boundary, dated the 14th of May 1888.

⁵⁰ Moeng Ting: Moeng Ting Tribal Prefecture (Mengding yuyi fu 孟定禦夷府) was established in 1382 during the Ming dynasty. The area had previously been called Mengding Lu (the same rank as prefecture), which was established in 1294 during the Yuan dynasty. For details, see Dao Yongming (1989, 271–78).

⁵¹ Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Burmo-Chinese Boundary, dated the 14th of May 1888.

⁵² Zuo Zhuan, Lord Zhao Year 23 (左傳，昭公 23 年). Also see the translation from Durrant et al. trans. 2016.

⁵³ Zhu Shaohua (2007, 26).

mind, it can be understood that even though the Qing court produced a map of Yunnan Province in 1864 (see M12), the borderline drawn by no means denoted the genuine frontier.



M12: Yunnan Province in 1864 (Tongzhi Year 3) (Source: Library of Congress of USA).

Two major historical events contributed to the Yunnan-Burma frontier dispute. First, after the Luchuan-Pingmian campaigns,⁵⁴ the Ming court established eight barrier gates alongside Kachin State.⁵⁵ The four barrier gates located on the upper banks of the Daying River (Taping River or Ta Hkaw Hka in Kachin) were Wanren (萬仞), Shenhu (神戶), Jushi (巨石), and Tongbi (銅壁), which fall in today's Yingjiang County, Dehong Dai, and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture. The other four – Tiebi (鐵壁), Huju (虎踞), Tianma (天馬), and Hanlong (漢龍) – were located along the banks of the lower reaches of the Daying River (The Taping River, known as Ta Hkaw Hka in Kachin), most of which was demarcated as the Kachin State of Burma in 1960. However, as Zhang Chengsun (1937, 23) perceptively remarked:

Concerning the eight passes, they are to control the various indigenous

⁵⁴ See Liew (1996, 162–203).

⁵⁵ The Ming Court set up three Sub-Pacification Commissions and six Pacification Commissions (三宣六慰) around Southwest Yunnan, Upper Burma, and northern parts of Thailand and Laos. The three Sub-Pacification Commissions were named Nandian, Longchuan, and Ganya, while the six Pacification Commissions were called Cheli, Miandian, Mubang, Babai Dadian, Moeng Yang, and Laowo.

commissions beyond the passes. They were established to prevent the Burmese from invading the inland regions. They were not regarded as the borderlines between Dian (Yunnan) and Burma.

“八關者，以控制關外諸土司，防緬內侵，非所以為滇緬之界也。”

Secondly, following the end of the Sino-Burmese War (1765–1769) during the reign of Qianlong, an agreement was reluctantly concluded to the disappointment of both sides.⁵⁶ While the Qing court was displeased with Burma's cessation of tribute, Burma was dissatisfied that the Qing court had only ceded the control of the *tusi* of Möng Kawng (Mogaung in Burmese) and maintained its hold over the *tusi* of Theinni (Moeng Phòng) and Bhamo (Bamo).⁵⁷ However, both sides could not afford to resume fighting.⁵⁸ The situation continued until April 1788, when Burma resumed paying tribute to the Qing court to counterbalance the rise of Siam. To return the gesture, Qianlong bestowed the seals of Theinni and Bhamo on the Burmese King. This could be interpreted as ceding the three *tusi* territories to Burma; however, Li Genyuan (1879–1965) argues:

[The Qing court] let the three Commissions be under Burmese control without any concerns. That was because Burma had already submitted [to us]. It would remain loyal and obedient for generations to come. These territories (the three *tusi* – Chiang Tung, Theinni and Bhamo, as well as Meng Yang and Meng Gong) became vassals of Burma, and by association, vassals of ours as well.⁵⁹

“置三司于不問，任緬處置，猶得曰，緬已世世臣服，恭順無二，養拱諸地雖屬緬仍屬於我然。”

M13 is a modern map of Yunnan with my annotations and hatched lines to show the un-demarcated area for precise comparison. The areas in sections A, B, and C were barriers alongside the Tai and Mon-Khmer area, while sections D and E were the Moeng Ting Prefecture, Cheli Pacification Commission, and Moeng Laem Sub-Pacification Commission. The Qing court began to lose control of these distant places in the early nineteenth century. The areas now belong to Shan State in Burma, predominantly inhabited by the Wa people.

⁵⁶ Burma started the war because of what it viewed as dissatisfactory tributary relationships with Moeng Ting, Kūng Ma, Moeng Laem, and Sipsòng Panna (see Zhang Chengsun 1937, 77–80). However, the underlining reason for the war lay in the territorial ambitions of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885) vis-à-vis Siam. Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem were important polities on the trade routes for providing commodities to places south of PK (See Harvey 1925, 241–253–261 and Giersch 2006, 4–6).

⁵⁷ For more details, see Dai Yingcong (2004, 145–89).

⁵⁸ Burma was involved in the Burma-Siam war, whereas the Qing soldiers could not bear the subtropical climate.

⁵⁹ Lu Weixian and Yang Wenhui eds. (2001, 12).



M13. Yunnan Provincial Administration. (Source: Xingqiu Map ed. 2009)

The QSL records on Guangxu year 10, 14th day of 12th lunar month (29 January 1885):

[The emperor issued a decree to] the military subjects: Zeng Jize memorialised on telegraph ‘The Burmese King is fatuous, and his country is plunged into chaos, there are some Chinese having taken possession of Bhamo city [...] If [they] are conspirators, it seems better to pacify these Chinese. Therefore, Yunnan’s border [should] expand to reach the [Salween] River, which flows into the ocean so that an advanced border would be created. It is better to negotiate with Britain on the issue of border expansion at an early date’.⁶⁰

“諭軍機大臣等、曾紀澤電奏、緬甸王昏國亂。有華人據八募城。[...] 儻係亂民。似宜招降該華人。因拓雲南界。據通海之江。以固幸而防患。拓界事、亦宜早商英廷等語。”

However, the Qing court refused this suggestion and advocated in favour of a more cautious approach instead:

⁶⁰ QSL, *Dezong shilu* vol. 10/12/14, chapter 54: 837 a-b.

[The emperor reissued the decree]: To telegraph Zeng Jize: [His] telegraphy is already known [to me]. [Our] court has never made any effort to strategise for the affairs of distant [countries].⁶¹ Is not it, therefore, preposterous to dispatch [our] army for the sole sake of broadening [our] territory? [...] If the British department refers to this matter, reply according to the court's intention—telegraph.⁶²

“又諭、電寄曾紀澤來電已悉。朝廷不勤遠略。豈有派兵拓界之事。……如英部談及此事。即本此意酬答。電檔”

A few months later, on Guangxu 11, ninth lunar month, 14th day (21 October 1885), Zeng wrote again advocating a more aggressive stance regarding the westward expansion of the borderline:

The British have occupied southern Burma for a long time, now [they] concoct to get its [Burma] north, to prevent the area from being seized by France [...] [We should] take Bhamo and establish a station on the upper reaches of the Nu River (Salween River) to conduct trade. Do not allow the British to come close to our border...⁶³

“英久占南緬。今圖其北，防法取也。……取八幕，據怒江上遊以通商，勿使英人近我界。”

Later, Cen Yuying (1829–1889), the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces during the periods 1873–1875 and 1881–1889, issued a memorial on Guangxu year 12, 5th lunar month, 4th day (5 June 1886):

In the 4th lunar Month, 2nd day, Burma ... claimed the British had taken the capital of Burma unrighteously. The Burmese were displaced. [They] beg [me] to draw up a memorial for the Heavenly court to send troops to rescue [them] or send ministers to mediate with Britain; to [help them] sustain the Burmese King's lineage. – If [they] cannot save their country, [they] would lead their people to submit to [us]. They beg to be registered as the Chinese population. [I] have checked [the] translations of the statement, and it corresponds with their Burmese petition ...⁶⁴

“四月初二日，緬甸……稱英人詐取緬都，緬民失所，懇乞代奏天朝，發兵救援，或簡派大臣前往英國調處，俾存緬祀。……如萬不能自存，只有各率子女來歸，乞為中國編氓等語。譯驗來文相符。……。”

From these Chinese intelligence communications, we can ascertain that, despite the military's defeat, the Burmese population at large still resented the British occupation. Indeed, a widespread resistance against British rule could break out. Hence Chinese authorities were prompted to consider expanding their sphere of influence in Burma to push the British back as far south as possible. One month later, Cen Yuying submitted another memorial, on Guangxu 12, the sixth lunar month, 4th day (5 July 1886), stating that: “on fourth lunar Month, 23rd day, Mubang⁶⁵ *tusi* Zhong Wenyan

⁶¹ This means that an invasion was never on the imperial court's agenda.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 838 a.

⁶³ Wang Yanwei et al. (1987, vol. 61, 16).

⁶⁴ Cen Yuying (2005, 368).

⁶⁵ Burmese: Theinni, in the northern Shan states.

asserts that Burma now controls Mubang, which was originally under China. However, Burma is no longer ruled by a king and so Zhong Wenyuan has decided to be a Chinese subordinate, on the condition that China protects their border. I [Cen Yuying] can confirm that the Burmese public resents the British occupation of the capital. It appears they will not be able to pacify the country soon. Mubang is a northern Burmese strategic pass bordering Yunnan's Zhefang *tusi*, a former *Jimi*⁶⁶ prefecture of the Ming dynasty. It then became the Pacification Commission. Ultimately, it came under Burma's control. In Qianlong, Year 31 (1766), its chieftain, Kham Songfa, led his people to surrender and join Burma. Consequently, Chinese and British relations improved. Thus, heeding *tusi* Zhong Wenyuan's request may raise suspicion. But, to reject him could lead to his people surrendering to the British, posing a threat to our boundaries."⁶⁷

A later decree to the Ministers of the Council of State (*Junji Dachen* 軍機大臣) was issued on Guangxu year 12, on the 7th day of the 3rd lunar month (2 August 1886) by the Qing emperor: The Chinese and British maintained a cordial relationship for years, we are unwilling to provoke any frontier disputes. This *tusi* should not tempt us again. Kindly pacify them, and *Jimi* can continue. Thus, showing rejection or discussing subordination is inappropriate.⁶⁸

Earlier, on 14 June 1884, Chen Jinzhong⁶⁹ advised the Chinese deputy in Singapore, Zheng Guanying, that if the British destroy Burma, Yunnan would be in unmanageable upheaval. As a Chinese officer, you must examine all options and plan accordingly.⁷⁰

It was not in the interest of Siam to allow Britain to continue to expand its colonial possessions. Chen even warned Zheng that, after they had seized Upper Burma, the British could then quickly enter Yunnan and inland China. As a Siamese consulate official, Chen was aware of British territorial ambitions vis-à-vis Burma and Southwest Yunnan, which would, in turn, trigger a boundary crisis. However, the Qing court stood firm regarding its traditional diplomatic strategies.

To sum up, the Qing court did not pay much attention to the affairs of these distant areas, whose main purpose was deemed as nothing more than guarding the inland. The Qing court even passed over a great opportunity to expand its borders by taking Bhamo and the Shan states. According to Zhu's study, if the Qing court had taken advantage of

⁶⁶ About *Jimi*, see Chapter Two, fn.3. Also see Peng Jianying (2004, 104–108).

⁶⁷ Cen Yuying (2005, 369–370). For the whole original text and English translations, see the Appendix Chapter Six, no.1.

⁶⁸ QSL, *Dezong shilu* vol. 12/7/3, chapter 55: 99 a–b. For the whole original text and English translation, see Appendix Chapter Six, no.2.

⁶⁹ A Siamese consulate officer of Chinese ancestry in Singapore.

⁷⁰ Xia Dongyuan ed. (1982, 977), the original text reads: “緬亡，則中國雲南恐不可收拾矣。君為中國官，當熟籌而深計也。”

the situation and secured Chinese control in Bhamo in 1884–1885, the British would have allowed it to do so. This is because the British commander in charge of Burma, Major Adamson, received orders not to seize Bhamo if it was already taken by the Chinese.⁷¹ Although some Qing officers had adopted a proactive stance, the court remained reluctant to potentially antagonise the British.

It was not long until the Qing court's traditional diplomatic stratagems were challenged by the growing presence of Western colonial powers. After its defeat in the Sino-French War of December 1883 to April 1885, the Qing court gradually realised the severity of the situation on its southwest frontier, to the point that it was forced to abandon its tributary relations with the whole of Vietnam in 1885. Without these tributary areas as buffers, there was no way to prevent the French from entering China via Tonkin (present-day northern Vietnam). This is why the Qing court insisted that Burma should continue to pay tribute. It wanted to keep the tributary relationship to save face and to maintain the southwest frontier as before. Neither Cen's nor Zeng's proposals could persuade the court to change its mind.

6.4.2 Britain's Standpoint

With the stance of the Qing court clarified, we can then compare it with that of Britain, which can be traced through the reports of Scott and Warry. They also drew M14 and M15. I begin with an extract from Warry's report.⁷² He writes that only Mainglingyi (Burmese for Moeng Laem Long, hereafter, Moeng Laem), Kiangtung (hereafter, Chiang Tung), and Kianghung (hereafter, Chiang Rung) have a border with Yunnan on the Trans-Salween stretch (see M16) of the Bhamo-Chinese frontier of the thirteen Shan states. Before tracing the boundary line, he briefly describes these three states' connections with China. First, Moeng Laem had been under Chinese influence since the nineteenth century. This small Shan district is one- or two-days march from Kengma (Küing Ma), which lies to its southeast. Whatever the case, the Chinese did not interfere in Moeng Laem's affairs for at least a century.

However, Moeng Laem had recently come under Chiang Tung's control after Chiang Tung had paid tribute to Burma; the current *sawbwa* (hereafter, *cao fa*) had been selected by King Mindon, thus Warry considered this state a Burmese dependency. Second, Chiang Tung was a Burmese tributary. Burmese kings marched to its capital in troubled times and appointed its chiefs. Therefore, there is no doubt that Chiang Tung was under the control of Burma. Third, Warry thought that Chiang Rung was most

⁷¹ Zhu Shaohua (2007, 82).

⁷² The original text of Warry's report has many grammar mistakes, and some of his expressions are confusing. I suppose Warry's report is only a draft, and he wrote it as a journal without any proofreading. To keep his report authentic, I will not correct any grammatical or other errors that he made.


likely to come under scrutiny during any delimitation discussions.

In the past, Burmese troops invaded Western Chiang Rung, requiring temporary recognition of Burmese suzerainty. In 1878, Burma nominated a *cao fa* for Chiang Rung. From 1730, Chiang Rung was under the direct administration of the Chinese prefect at Pu-er. Recently, Chiang Rung had become almost independent. Its *cao fa* had a high-sounding Chinese title dating from 1387 A.D. and referred important issues to Ssu-mao (hereafter, Simao) and the arbitration official there. Moreover, according to Mr. Bourne, who visited Simao in the winter of 1885, the Chinese sub-prefect there still exercised concurrent jurisdiction over the eastern parts of their state.⁷³


According to both Chinese records and Warry's reports, it was inevitable that Moeng Laem, Chiang Tung, and Chiang Rung paid tribute to Burma, which had even occupied Chiang Tung several times. Warry also mentions that Chiang Rung benefited from its allegiance to China in terms of support against the Burmese or Siamese invasion. As Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 49) point out, Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung were influenced by China and Burma for centuries. The "Chinese-Burmese condominiums were established since the sixteenth century and prevailed until the late nineteenth century." It was not easy for imperial China to tolerate its vassal states paying tribute to Burma. However, as Burmese influence increased in this area where the influence of the Qing court remained limited, they had to make a compromise with Burma and the frontier polities.⁷⁴ This historical background must be taken into consideration when discussing the demarcation of borders between China and Burma.

⁷³ Summarised from: Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Trans-Salween section of the Burmo-Chinese frontier, dated Mandalay, 12 September 1888. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Six, No.3.


⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 49–56.



M14. Map accompanying Warry's letter No. 9 of 15 June 1891. (Source: From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, -No. 9, dated Bhamo, the 15th of June 1891).



M15. Map accompanying Warry's letter No. 9 of 15 June 1891. (Source: From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, -No. 9, dated Bhamo, the 15th of June 1891).



M16: The Trans-Salween States (from Mitton 1936, 138).


Lieutenant H. Daly, Warry's colleague, further reveals:⁷⁵ In both Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung, the diplomatic phrase "China is our father and Burma our mother" was in use long before King Mindon's death. More concretely, no chief of either state was considered duly and finally installed until Burma and China had confirmed him. There was no reason to include border states that are loyal to China within our (British India-Burma) borders.

Describing Chinese influence in the region, Warry elucidates that the Chinese, or Burmese agents of the Chinese, dominated the rubber trade in the north of Kamaing.⁷⁶ He was worried that Chinese influence not only related to the rubber trade, but also extended throughout considerable swathes of the Shan states, which acknowledged the suzerainty of China (see P9). Warry tells us that these districts were known as the Three Prefectures (San Fu 三府) under the Ming dynasty and the current Chinese dynasty.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Summarised from: Warry's report: From Lieutenant H. Daly, Superintendent, Northern Shan States, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, -No. 6F., dated Bombay, the 12th of June 1891. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Six, No. 4.

⁷⁶ From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, - No. 15, dated Shwegu, eighteenth May 1890.

⁷⁷ From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Mandalay, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, - No.11, dated 15 July 1888.



P9: 世襲木邦宣慰司鈴記 (The hereditary wooden seal of the Mubang Pacification Commission. Some seals issued by the Chinese imperial court are still hidden away in Upper Burma.) Source: Semi-official letter from W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma – dated the 14th of October 1888.

Nevertheless, he was also aware of the dwindling Chinese influence after the Qing-Burma wars at the end of the eighteenth century. At the cessation of hostilities, the Mubang (Moeng Phòng) districts were absorbed into the Burmese kingdom and the Chinese influence diminished.⁷⁸

Warry describes in considerable detail how the *cao fa* of the Shan states complained about the greed of Chinese officials and how the *cao fa* were keen to stamp out property extortion (financial blackmail) by Chinese officers. The Shan states' relations with China were neither close nor friendly. As Warry describes it: In recent years, the Chinese have prioritised their frontier dependencies, leading *cao fa* to struggle with funding demands from Chinese officers. The Shan states longed for the days when they were independent of Chinese influence.⁷⁹

It was impossible for the Chinese to promote their influence on the Shan states. Warry then believed that the Shan states could be delimited and subsumed within India-Burma territory. In his correspondence, Warry first reminds the British government that claiming any part of Chiang Rung on the far east bank of the Mekong would be strongly resisted by the Chinese. He highlights that extending their territory like this would bring the British into direct contact with the frontier of Tongquin (Tonkin, present-day Vietnam), the borders of which were thought to adjoin those of present-day eastern Chiang Rung. However, he suggested ceding Moeng Laem because it paid tribute to Burma, as did Chiang Rung. Second, he writes that Chiang Tung was undoubtedly a

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Summarised from: Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Trans-Salween section of the Burmo-Chinese frontier, —dated Mandalay, 20 September 1888. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Six, No. 5.

tributary state of Burma, and the Burmese appointed its chiefs. Burmese military forces also guarded its capital on many occasions.

Historically, Chiang Rung paid tribute to both Burma and China. Warry addresses the status of Chiang Rung, which would certainly arise during any delimitation talks. In recent times, Warry explains, Chiang Rung was practically independent, despite having strong leanings towards China (Ibid.). Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (2012, 55) note that these Tai polities “had the advantage of playing ‘father’ (China) and the ‘mother’ (Burma) against each other and of gaining a maximum amount of autonomy.” In some cases, the “father” and the “mother” were able to agree on certain matters. As Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, and Renoo (Ibid.) observe in 1838, for instance, both sides reached an agreement forcing these Tai polities – Chiang Rung, Chiang Tung, and Moeng Laem – to accept a peace treaty. In a traditional patriarchal family, the father is deemed superior to the mother in terms of authority. Therefore, as the “father,” the Chinese spoke louder than the Burmese.

6.4.3. Disputed Areas

Why did Zeng Jize fail to come to terms with the British Foreign Office before handing over his duty and going back to China on 20 April 1886 (Guangxu year 12, nineteenth day of the 3rd lunar month)? His suggestions never made their way into the Burma Terms proclaimed on 24 July 1886. The first reason was that the Qing court was not concerned about whether the ruler of Burma was Burmese or British, as long as Burma paid tribute every ten years; unsurprisingly, the British had reservations vis-à-vis this stipulation.⁸⁰ As such, this condition cost the Qing court its best opportunity to negotiate favourable terms with Britain.⁸¹ The second reason was the fact that Zeng Jize had mistaken the Nu River (Salween River) for the Lu River (Irrawaddy River). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing dynasty ordered him to correct this mistake before negotiating with Britain again.⁸² At that time, the priority of the Qing court was to deal with the Yunnan-Vietnam frontier issue instead.

Later, when Xue Fucheng (1838–1894) became the new Chinese minister in London (1890–1894), he was responsible for negotiating with the British, who, by this stage, already had full control over Burma. He also set out to understand the situation in Burma over the past six years. Following his memorials, we can trace China’s territorial ambitions. Xue Fucheng was an educated intellectual who clearly knew that the Yunnan-Burma frontier issue would endanger the inland if the British kept expanding their influence in southwest China.

⁸⁰ Wang Yanwei et al., vol. 62, (1987, 1137).

⁸¹ Zhu Shaohua (2007, 51–62).

⁸² Wang Yanwei et al., vol. 64, (1987, 1169).

On 5 March 1891 (Guangxu 17, first lunar month, 25th day), Xue wrote a memorial suggesting that the emperor should pursue the demarcation of the Yunnan-Burma frontier in cooperation with the British. Furthermore, he highlighted the benefits China would reap after settling the border issue with Britain: The British proposed the east bank of the Lu River (Salween River) to us. Taking Nan Zhang (Lan Sang, present-day Luang Prabang) and Shan State as our subordinates or borders would allow us to calm the minorities and protect our boundaries. According to the latest Western map, Siam has taken over Laos. Simply accepting the British offer does not guarantee true authority over these territories. We should identify Laos as a separate state, one that has not fallen to Siam. We can then decide whether to accept the British offer.⁸³

Xue further points out that Shan State is subservient to Burma and larger than Laos. It is autonomous and follows Chinese pacification (i.e., it is more “Sinicised” than Laos). If we seize Shan State, Pu’er and Shunning will have stronger borders. Zeng Jize requested the Bhamo territory, but the British declined to release it. They did, however, give a tacit agreement for us to acquire the old Bhamo area (Kokang, Shan State), which leads to Da Jinsha Jiang (Irrawaddy River). Xue explained five issues would arise if we failed to fight for these areas in the future, summarised as follows:

- First, I have heard that Burma used its military might to occupy Yunnan-ruled territories near the border during the Qianlong Period. The southwest boundary has always been uncertain. We may let Britain invade if we do not expand.
- Second, we must leave a buffer, or they will build a railway to Yunnan. The scope of our action is limited anyway.
- Third, the Upper Yangtze River originates from the upper Irrawaddy River. The source is in Tibet and flows towards Yunnan, which is near our border. Expanding to grab the Irrawaddy River will keep Britain slightly away from our border. Otherwise, they may try to sail boats to the Yangtze River for profit.
- Fourth, The British run commercial ports well. If we widen our border, we can establish a customs post and collect taxes in Burma to flourish with the British. If we do not expand, Yunnan would be an international business place. If the British desire a concession or consulate in Yunnan, local affairs will be affected.
- Finally, if the British enter Yunnan, they will discover its vast mineral wealth, which may turn them evil.

Since Zeng Jize’s prior proposal to designate Nan Zhang as a customs station and Bhamo as a buffer zone was rejected by the British, the Shan State and Irrawaddy River were designated public lands.⁸⁴

Xue Fucheng clearly explained that Britain’s offer of Nan Zhang and the Shan State (present-day northeast Burma) to the Qing court carried little weight, as Siam and Burma controlled these areas at that time, not the British. He also points out that the

⁸³ Summarised from: Xue Fucheng vol. 1, (1894, 73). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Six, No.6.

⁸⁴ Summarised from: QSG,1977, vol. 48: 14686–7 [chapter. 528 Biography 315 Subordinate States 3: Burma, Siam, Nan Zhang (Luang Prabang, present-day Laos), Su Lu (Saltanah Sulu)]. For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Six, No.7.

frontier in the southwest region had always been unclear. Xue Fucheng further explains that if the Qing court did not seek to expand, the territory would be taken by the British, and the situation could get out of hand. The Qing court would then be put in a defensive position. In this memorial, he strongly suggests that the Qing court actively engage in negotiations with the British over the official demarcation of the frontier. At the same time, investigators were sent to scout the borderline areas according to Xue Fucheng's suggestion.

The goal was to persuade the local rulers in the border areas to defend the Qing court and keep the Western colonial powers away from the inland. Xue Fucheng had suggested establishing customs point at Bhamo to collect taxes and open up the Irrawaddy River for public use (mainly for the benefit of the Qing court). According to Zhu's study and Xue Fucheng's journal, the Qing court merely wanted to extend its frontier to create buffer zones. It is also evident that Xue Fucheng intended to garner more leverage to bargain with the British. He knew that it was impossible to ask the British to follow the arrangements proposed by Zeng Jize and agreed upon six years earlier because the British had already taken control of Upper Burma. Consequently, Xue Fucheng wanted to demand more concessions from the British to gain the upper hand in the negotiations.⁸⁵

On 10 July 1892, Xue Fucheng was sent to negotiate the Yunnan-Burma frontier and a trade agreement with the British Foreign Office. According to two of Xue's memorials written on the same day, on 7 September 1893 (Guangxu year 19, 27th day of 7th lunar month), negotiations did not go smoothly. The first one is titled "Memorial of the Summary of the Demarcation on Yunnan-Burma Frontier" (<滇緬分界大概情形疏>). Here is the summary: The British troops violated our country last year while investigating the Yunnan border. Zeng Jize suggested to the British Foreign Office that the Irrawaddy River be the border and that Yunnan dominate the east bank. However, the British rejected [this] I awaited an appropriate opportunity to present our territorial expansion arguments. The British Foreign Office supposedly agreed with the Indian government to make Moeng Ting and Southwest Ganlanba, namely Kokang, a 750-square-mile Chinese concession between the Salween and Nan Ding rivers (a branch of Salween River). Draw a straight line from Moeng Mao's border, encompassing Han Long Guan (now in Burma), eastward to the Salween River and Mali Ba (Kokang's capital), and China will receive 800 square miles.⁸⁶ Cheli and Moeng Laem occupy a large territory and are attached to Yunnan. Recently, we constructed a Moeng Laem-derived border pacification prefecture (Zhenbian Prefecture). However, the British used Moeng Laem and Cheli's payment to Burma as evidence for their request to jointly

⁸⁵ Zhu Shaohua (2007, 70–74) and Xue Fucheng (1985, 585).

⁸⁶ Total area is around 1,550 sq miles. See areas A/D and E in M13.

administer these lands. But they have now decided to grant us full sovereignty via treaty and will not dispute it again.⁸⁷

Three main points are highlighted in this memorial: first, Zeng's previous proposal was repudiated by the British; second, Xue Fucheng strongly recommended the Qing court to expand its territory; third, Britain recognised the full sovereignty of the Qing court over Cheli and Moeng Laem. Xue Fucheng then supplemented this first memorial with a second one titled "Memorial of Taking Back the Full Sovereignty of Cheli and Moeng Laem" (<收回車裏、孟連兩土司全權片>). Here is the summary: Cheli and Moeng Laem are the two largest *tusi* in Southeast Yunnan. Recently, Zhen Bian Prefecture was founded to pacify Moeng Laem's northern border. The territories of Cheli and Moeng Laem are equal to four or five inland sub-prefectures. The British Foreign Office used the fact that Cheli and Moeng Laem had paid tribute to Burma to claim ownership of Yeren Mountain (Kachin Hill) when we contested its status. They proposed a new prefecture and shared areas with the two *tusi*. A vice sub-prefectural magistrate has been appointed to the new prefecture. If we suddenly share these areas with Great Britain, we do not have this administrative framework, therefore we must stick to our guns. If we calm and control Cheli and Moeng Laem, they will defend our border and prevent British, French, and Siamese spies. Additionally, Lin'an, Pu'er, Simao, and Yuanjiang prefectures could be stabilised.

Unfortunately, the French arrived after British difficulties were resolved. The French have recently compelled Siam to cede the east bank of the Mekong River, where most of Cheli is. France has often demanded that we demarcate our border. They claim not to occupy Yunnan, but if they learn about the British conversation, they may follow suit. The British have merely asked about it with empty words and gained no real benefits. I am negotiating the treaty with the British, stating that Cheli and Moeng Laem belong to China and not the British. After the treaty is signed, I will ask the British to testify that Cheli and Moeng Laem are part of China.⁸⁸

As Warry suggested in his report, ceding Sipsòng Panna (Cheli) might provoke a strong reaction from the Qing court. Thus, he asked the British government to handle the issue with great caution. Moreover, Chiang Rung could act as a buffer area since the French had already taken Tonkin.⁸⁹ Hence, the British did not object when Xue Fucheng demanded full sovereignty over Cheli and Moeng Laem. However, the British were afraid that the French would annex Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem. As a result, there was a condition written into this clause that the Qing court was not allowed to

⁸⁷ Summarised from: Xue Fucheng, vol.2, (1894, 22). For the whole text, see Appendix Chapter Six, No. 8.

⁸⁸ Summarised from: Xue Fucheng (reprinted 1975, 22–23). For the whole text, see Appendix Chapter Six, No.9.

⁸⁹ This will be discussed in later sections. Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Trans-Salween. section of the Bhamo-Chinese frontier, --dated Mandalay, 12th September 1888.

cede Chiang Rung and Moeng Laem to a third country. This clause ended up causing a series of problems, which I will discuss later.

To regain control over Moeng Laem and Cheli was a remarkable achievement during Xue Fucheng's diplomatic career. The Qing court praised him. However, several twentieth-century scholars have criticised his efforts as they believed that Moeng Laem and Cheli were territories forming an integral part of China. Nevertheless, today many of Xue Fucheng's views resonate with scholars in mainland China. Although Cheli and Moeng Laem had paid tribute to the Qing court for a long time, they were far from the inland and thus it was difficult to send troops to defend and control them. Xue Fucheng tried his best to bargain with the British and persuade them to recognise China's full sovereignty over Cheli and Moeng Laem. With the eastern borderline between China, Burma, and Laos clarified, the area became better organised and fewer disputes occurred. Moreover, Britain and France then had a "buffer" separating their domains. Xue Fucheng was pivotal in achieving this balance of power.


To recapitulate, Zeng Jize proposed: (1) the expansion of Chinese borders to include Nan Zhang (Lan Sang)⁹⁰ and the Shan states, which are located outside Pu'er Prefecture; (2) the designation of Da Jinsha Jiang (Irrawaddy River) as a public area available to both sides for trade; and (3) the establishment of a Chinese customs point near Bamo (Bhamo) for the collection of taxes.

While his three suggestions sound reasonable, Zeng's downfall resulted from the fact that he had mistaken the Irrawaddy River for the Salween River. The Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Zongli yamen* 總理衙門, MFA) then lost faith in Zeng Jize because he did not seem to have sufficient knowledge about Yunnan. Consequently, he was ordered to be extra careful before reaching a final agreement with the British Foreign Office. Today, only a few records on this matter can be found in the British envoy's foreign office documents. The British envoy remarked that the three suggestions were not dealt with and thus could not be part of the Burma Terms. The Qing court missed the opportunity to make the best deal.

Xue Fucheng, the successor to Zeng Jize, knew it was not possible to continue pursuing Zeng Jize's suggestions. He then tried his best to negotiate the following demands: (1) make the east bank of the Irrawaddy River the border with Yunnan; (2)

⁹⁰ Between 1707 and 1713, the Lao kingdom of Lan Sang (literally, "[the kingdom of] one million elephants") had split into the three kingdoms of Luang Prabang in the North, Vientiane in the Centre, and Champassak in the South, each of which claimed to be the successor state of Lan Sang. After 1778/79, all three Lao kingdoms fell under Siamese suzerainty and became vassal states of Siam. Following the ruthless suppression of a failed attempt by King Anu, the vassal ruler of Vientiane, to restore Lao independence in 1826–28, only Luang Prabang, which had remained loyal to Bangkok during the rebellion, survived as a semi-autonomous vassal kingdom. Whenever Chinese sources refer to Nan Zhang or Lan Sang, in fact Luang Prabang was the actual power and it acknowledged Chinese overlordship. For more details, see Stuart-Fox (1998, xiv, xii, 101, 102–105, 112–117, 125–129, 194).

cede Kokang, an area of about 800 square miles in the territory of Menggen (Moeng Khün, i.e., Chiang Tung), to China; (3) the western border should include part of the Yeren Shan (Kachin Hill);⁹¹ (4) recognise Chinese sovereignty of Cheli (Sipsòng Panna) and Menglian (Moeng Laem); (5) send Burmese officials to pay tribute to China regularly; and (6) let China establish a customs office in Bhamo for the collection of taxes. In exchange, the Qing court would cede control over Chiang Tung and Moeng Phòng (Mupang) (M17).⁹²



M17 Treaties and Maps that Defined the Qing's Southwest Boundaries (Source: The National Palace Museum of Taipei. Exhibition Room North Yard Gallery 104)

6.4.4 Reactions of Local Polities

⁹¹ Kachin Hill belonged to both Burma and China. According to international conventions, Britain and China were entitled to equal sovereignty.

⁹² This map was probably used by Xue Fucheng, the Qing envoy to Britain, as a point of reference while negotiating the border demarcation between Yunnan and Burma with British foreign secretary Archibald Philip Primrose, 5th Earl of Rosebery (1847–1929).

6.4.4.1 Impression from Local Tai Records

It is reasonable to assume that the border negotiations between Britain and China should have left some traces in the collective memory of the Tai ethnic groups living on both sides of the border in British Burma and the Chinese province of Yunnan, respectively. One might expect some reflections on these negotiations in the indigenous historiography of Moeng Laem and Chiang Tung, the two Tai polities most severely affected by the border agreement.

The *Chiang Khaeng Chronicle*, composed in 1905, gives prominence to the Anglo-French Border Treaty of 1896, which led to the division of the small Tai Lü principality of Chiang Khaeng (with its capital at present-day Müang Sing) situated along the course of the Mekong River. The chronicle describes in detail the strategies employed by the local elites to prevent the treaty. It also documents local reactions to the final disintegration of the Chiang Khaeng polity.⁹³

Looking at the various extant versions of the *Moeng Laem Chronicle*, transmitted via mulberry paper manuscripts by Pò Saeng Sam, a prolific scribe from Moeng Laem with connections to the former Tai ruler's court, we find no mention of the Anglo-Chinese border negotiations of the 1890s. The *Moeng Laem Chronicle* relating to the second half of the nineteenth century deals with the conflicts occurring from the 1880s between the lowland Tai and intrusions by the upland Lahu (Muhso), which caused considerable political and social unrest in this small Tai polity (see Chapter Three). In the 1880s, Moeng Laem was menaced by military intervention from Chiang Tung (*soek khuen*), which aimed to enforce the extradition of a prince from Chiang Rung to Chiang Tung in 1882. Moeng Laem was also affected by the fighting between its ally, Chiang Rung, and the rebellious district (*panna*) of Moeng Cae in 1888. Nowhere are the British mentioned as a political player influencing the security of the local Tai polity in Moeng Laem.

The historiography of Chiang Tung provides a different picture, however. The *Kengtung (Chiang Tung) State Chronicle (CTSC)*, translated and edited by Sāimöng Mangrāi (1981), pays great attention to the British victory over Burma in 1885. The Burmese defeat is described with some satisfaction because it brought Chiang Tung some relief from Burmese military pressure, which had increased in the previous years. The British conquest of Upper Burma caused a temporary power vacuum in the Shan areas, enabling Chiang Tung to establish itself as a de facto independent polity from 1885–1890, thus expanding its political influence deep into areas on the west bank of the Salween River.

⁹³ Grabowsky and Renoo (2008, 43–46).

This situation abruptly ended in 1890 when “the Gāla Ingalik entered the state,” as the CTSC records in a very brief entry for the year CS 1252 (AD 1890/91). Though the British now considered Chiang Tung as a protectorate, the CTSC gives the impression of Chiang Tung as a small kingdom, reflected by the ostentatious Sanskrit-derived title of Prince Kònkao, who ascended to the throne of the Tai Khün polity in 1896. Two years later, in early 1899, the boundary between China and the British protectorate of Chiang Tung was concluded. The chronicle describes these negotiations in a way that gives the Chiang Tung ruler and his officials, who were part of the British delegation, disproportionate prominence:

In the year 1260, Month Three (Dec. 1898/Jan. 1899), the prince, accompanying the commissioner [of Burma], went out to demarcate the boundary with China. On the Chinese side there were Taudhāy, as the head, and Denpīn. [The boundary line] began from the Namhlak, Hlabhuk, along the boundary of Mōngphaen, Mōngyāng, to Dā-āng, down to Latīp, going out to Bānnōy, Kāngbengnāng, Moengva, Jengkāng, Bānjhō, Bānfāy, Mōnglōy, along the Namña until the Mekhong was reached. On the British side there were the commissioner and the prince heading the officials; on the Chinese side there were Taudhāy and the Prince of Svaenhvīfā heading the officials, and they went to have a conference at Mōnglōng [a substate of Jengtung]. When that had been done the prince returned to Jengtung City during Month Eight of the year 1261 (May/June 1899).⁹⁴

It is evident from this quotation that the Tai Khün elite of Chiang Tung did not consider the Anglo-Chinese boundary demarcation of 1899 as detrimental to its interests. The fact that the local ruler and his high-ranking officials were allowed to become part of the British delegation refurbished its image as a local actor in the borderlands of upper Mainland Southeast Asia. Also evident in this passage is the influence of the Mandala system. The local rulers, moreover, did not consider it problematic to shift allegiance to a new “core circle.” As the Mandala system allows for overlapping political jurisdictions, it was possible to attain local autonomy. Local autonomy would not be undermined no matter who was at its new, higher core.

6.4.4.2 Impressions from Burmese Records Translated into Chinese

A Burmese petition was translated and submitted to the Qing court on 7 July 1886 (Guangxu year 12, 4th day of the 5th lunar month). The Burmese asked for military help to resist the British invaders. The Viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou, Cen Yuying, reported the Burmese request to the emperor. This petition was written in Burmese and translated into Chinese.

Here is a summary: The Burmese had been Chinese vassals for aeons and loyal to the Celestial Empire. Unfortunately, last winter, the British tricked us and took the

⁹⁴ Sāimōng Mangrāi (1981, 277).

Burmese King (Thibaw Min *r.* 1878–1885) to Britain. Since then, they have occupied Ava City and the riverside cities (Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers), putting British authorities in charge of national affairs. The local headmen and *tusi* fought the holy war to save our land.

However, the British ships and artillery were too formidable to win. We are holding down the land routes, but we fear we cannot last. Two representatives have requested troops from China. We are apprehensive because the Celestial Empire has not instructed us. We implore the Great Emperor of Heaven to send reinforcements and assist us in retaking our land or to send a minister to Great Britain for mediation and instal another Burmese King. We will pay rent and interest to the British annually. If the British disagree, we must fight for our lives. If we win, there may be a change; if we lose, our wonderful men and women will succumb to the Celestial Empire and live forever as Chinese subjects. If our petition is granted, Burma will survive thanks to the Great Court of Heaven.⁹⁵

By 1886, a considerable part of the land and mountainous areas were still resisting the British. The headmen and *cao fa* of these areas did not surrender. They sent representatives to Tengyue to appeal to Cen Yuying, Viceroy of Yunnan, to ask the Qing court either to send reinforcements to help protect the country or to act as a mediator with the British to discuss the possibility of restoring a Burmese king under British control. The petition was eloquent, but the Qing court ultimately refused their appeal.

Certainly, the Qing court was reluctant to become embroiled in conflict with the British. This shows a change in the Qing court's frontier policy in the late nineteenth century. It had learned a valuable lesson from the war in Vietnam (i.e., Sino-French War 1884–1885), namely, that intervening in the internal affairs of subordinate areas would damage friendly relations with Western colonial powers, thus placing further burdens on the already crumbling Qing court.⁹⁶ Moreover, the relationship between the Qing court and Burma was not as close as that of China and Vietnam. Indeed, as illustrated in the previous sections, the Qing court did not fully trust the Burmese. There was, therefore, no reason for the Qing court to become enemies of the British by supporting the Burmese.

6.5 The China-Burma Border before the Founding of the ROC

6.5.1 The Final Treaty

There were no objections from either China or Britain concerning Mupang (Moeng Phòng or Theinni), Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung), and Manmo (Bhamo) being absorbed

⁹⁵ Summarised from: Huang and Bai punctuated (2005, 368). For the whole text, see Appendix Chapter Six, no. 10.

⁹⁶ For more details, see Davis (2014, 59–91).

into British Burma. The controversial aspects of the frontier negotiations remained the territories of Yeren Mountain (Kachin Hill and named Moeng Yang), Moeng Laem, Cheli, and Kokang, as well as access to the Upper Irrawaddy River. On 26 January 1894 (Guangxu year 19, the 12th lunar month, 20th day), Xue Fucheng presented his final proposal (M18): China would cede the territories on the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy River in exchange for an expansion of the original frontier by an extra twenty miles. The northern section of the frontier would be demarcated temporarily, but Cheli (Sipsong Panna) and Moeng Laem would become recognised as a part of Chinese territory. A straight line would be drawn from Moeng Mao (Nam Hkam) to Maliba (Kokang), with the east and north sides belonging to China (Xue Fucheng 1894, 74).



M18: This map was the final demarcation report in Xue Fucheng’s memorial in 1894. It is taken from Xue Fucheng (1887–1894).

Instead of twenty miles, however, Britain only agreed to an expansion of five miles. In addition, there was a clause forbidding Moeng Laem and Cheli being ceded to a third party (i.e., the French). The “Resumption Treaty of China-Britain about Yunnan-

Burma's Border and Trade in Services of the Clauses" (*Zhongying xuyi Dianmian jiewu shangwu tiaokuan*: <中英續議滇緬界商務條款>) was finally signed in London on 1 March 1894 (Guangxu 20, the first lunar month, 24th day). The treaty contained nineteen 19 clauses. As a Chinese record emphasises:

Guangxu 20 (1894), the first lunar month, [we are] making a new Dian-Mian (Yunnan and Burma) treaty. This new treaty has a total of 19 stipulations, [the new border] is designated to reach in the north the Jianga Mountain (Teng Chong), in the Southwest it runs from Jianghong (Chiang Rung, the south of Sipsong Panna) to Mei Jiang (Mekong River) as the border. It allows Chinese ships to sail in the Irrawaddy River at any time, but the issue of establishing a customs station in Bhamo is deleted. That is all.⁹⁷

“二十年正月，訂滇緬新約十九條，劃定自尖高山起，向西南行至江洪抵湄江之界線，大金沙江許中國任便行船，刪去八募設關壹條。於是緬事粗”。

The treaty defined the middle and southern frontiers of Yunnan-Burma, but the northern border was defined as undetermined. The territories of the twelve *panna* (districts) of Sipsong Panna, as well as of Moeng Laem and Moeng Ting, were demarcated. Xue did an excellent job negotiating for China. This treaty not only kept Cheli and Moeng Laem under Chinese control, but it also slightly expanded the southwestern territory. Nevertheless, Zhang Chengsun (1937), Liu Bokui (1946), and Yu Dingbang (2000) are highly critical of Xue Fucheng, arguing that he failed to prevent the loss of numerous territories, such as Bhamo, Mubang, and Chiang Tung. However, Zhu Shaohua (2004) holds that Xue Fucheng tried his best to hold onto the southwest territories by recovering Cheli and Moeng Laem, retaining Kokang (old Bhamo), and expanding Yunnan's southwestern territory. The British also considered the treaty a success as it gave Britain what it wanted, i.e., a clearly demarcated border and full sovereignty of the Shan states and Upper Burma. The English version of the "1894 Convention between Britain and China" illustrates the agreed-upon frontier (M19) and corresponds perfectly with the Chinese version. At this point, the first stage of negotiations regarding the Yunnan-Burma frontier issues had been concluded.

... leaving to China the State of Kokang ... and Meng Ting which belongs to China ... It will still continue to follow the frontier between those two districts, which is locally well known ... and will then follow the line of water-parting (the watershed) between the tributaries of the Salween and the Mekong Rivers ... leaving to China the Tsawbwaships (lordship) of Keng Ma, Mengtung, and Mengko ... leaving Munglem to China, and Manglün to Britain. It will then follow the boundary between Munglem and Kiang Hong, which is locally well known. It will then follow the boundary between Kiang Tong and Kiang Hung ... His Majesty the Emperor of China shall not, without previously coming to an agreement with Her Britannic Majesty, cede either Munglem or

⁹⁷ QSG, 1977, vol. 48, pp. 14689 [chapter 528 Biography 315 Subordinate States 3: Burma, Siam, Nan Zhang (Luang Prabang, present day Laos), Su. Lu (Saltanah Sulu)].

Kiang Hung, or any portion thereof, to any other nation.⁹⁸

This treaty states clearly that Kokang, Moeng Ting, Kung Ma, Moeng Tung, Moeng Ka, and Moeng Laem will stay within China and the boundary will be demarcated between Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung. If we revert to M12, we can see that of sections A, B, C, D, and E, only sections B and E were settled, with a clause stipulating that Sipsong Panna and Moeng Laem (section E) could not be ceded to a third country. Section C (Moeng Mao) became a perpetual lease area, while sections A and D are designated as undemarcated areas.

⁹⁸ Treaty Series. No. 19. 1894, pp. 4–7.



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M19 The map illustrating the Convention of 1 March 1894 (Treaty Series. No.19. 1894)

6.5.2 Evaluation of the Clause

I assess that Zhu Shaohua's (2004) evaluation of the treaty is sound and objective. Even if China had obtained more territory through this treaty, it would not have been able to guard it because the country was too weak at that time. China had lost the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, for instance, marking the failure of the Westernisation Movement

(*Yangwu yundong* 洋務運動) in the country. China was viewed as an old and weak empire, vulnerable to powerful countries looking to exploit it. Moreover, Moeng Phòng, Bhamo, and Chiang Tung had been subordinated to Burma for over a century meaning that there was little Chinese influence left in these areas. It was therefore considered impractical to ask for the return of these areas.

China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war compelled it to cede Moeng Vu (U) and U De (U-Tai) to France in 1897 (M20). On 17 April 1895, after the Sino-Japanese “Treaty of Shimonoseki” was signed, France forced Japan to return Liaoning Province (northeast China) to China and, as a reward, it then demanded from China to cede one of the twelve *panna*, Moeng Vu (U) and U De (U-Tai), situated in the northern part of Phongsaly Province in present-day Laos.



M20: Demarcation on Moeng Vu (U) and U De (U-Tai). Annotated from Tan Qixiang (1982 et al.).

France’s demand, however, forced China to violate the treaty it had signed with Britain. Consequently, Scott led a new mission to Upper Burma and Southwest Yunnan in a bid to secure a supplemental agreement with China that would garner additional trade benefits. In 1895–1896, Scott’s mission submitted another confidential report in which it was argued:

We should be only a few miles distant from Puerh and Sumao, two of the most important towns in the south-west corner of Yunnan ... If the retention of Mong Lem and Kèng Hung be a commercial advantage to us in the race, then let us keep these provinces ... France regards Yunnan as the “natural Inland” to her Tonkin possessions, and she will sooner or later make a bid for a further advance

northward. Should this ever come to pass and Mong Lem (Moeng Laem), Keng Hung (Chiang Rung), and Chen Pien (Zhenbian) remain Chinese territory, there will be a tongue of China between us and the French which, in the event of an alliance between the two powers ever becoming *au fait accompli*, would bring their forces very close to the Salween ... On the Mekong we should be far more favourably situated, for we should then be on the direct flank of the French in the event of any further extension on their part taking place towards the north.⁹⁹

Scott strongly recommended that the British government push the frontier forward to include Pu'er (Ning'er County, administrated by Pu'er Prefecture today) and Simao (Pu'er Prefecture today). The goal would then be to annex Mong Lem (Moeng Laem) and Keng Hung (Chiang Rung) if it was possible to generate commercial benefits there. On the other hand, Scott was worried about British Burma sharing a direct border with France. Hence, this confidential report suggests that the British government carefully consider if expanding its territory towards Pu'er was worthwhile.

The British were also cautious about triggering military conflicts because they believed "the Yunnanese probably possess higher fighting qualities than the Chinese who inhabit the sea-board and dwell in the valleys of the great waterways. They are well-armed and, if properly led, it is not improbable that they would fight well" (Ibid.). They therefore hesitated to claim Moeng Laem and Cheli.

Zhu Shaohua (2007, 99) stresses that there were two reasons why the British government insisted on compensation for the treaty breach: first, Britain felt offended; second, Britain was afraid that France would take advantage of the commercial and strategic competition in the Upper Mekong Basin and enter inland China via Yunnan. Analysing the original document *Siam, France, and China. British Document on Foreign Affairs*,¹⁰⁰ Zhu also contends that Moeng U and U Tai did not mean much to the British.¹⁰¹ She reveals that the British asked for less territory in the Yeren Mountain area as their focus was on opening a commercial port in Xi Jiang (西江).¹⁰²

For this reason, when the Qing court refused to cede Cheli and Moeng Laem the British did not insist. As the MFA informed the emperor on 30 December 1895 (Guangxu 21, the 11th lunar month, 15th day):

[I] have looked upon opening a commercial port in Xi Jiang, although there will be a loss in the *lijin*,¹⁰³ the customs taxes could offset [the loss]. Yeren Mountain is the barrier of Yunnan. Moreover, the British Foreign Department claimed not

⁹⁹ The property of the Government of India. Issued by the Intelligence Branch, Q.M.G.'s Department. This report. is transmitted for the personal information of the Chief Secretary Chief Commissioner Burma by direction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India and is to be considered Confidential. Supplement to Report of the intelligence officer on Tour with the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, 1895–96. P3.

¹⁰⁰ Part I, Series E, Volume 26, 159.

¹⁰¹ Zhu Shaohua (2007, 101).

¹⁰² Its origins from Yunnan to Guizhou/Guangxi and then Guangdong, the western tributary of the Pearl River in Southern China.

¹⁰³ *Lijin* refers to a local business tax that was utilised during the late Qing dynasty.

only the Yeren Mountain but also the Southwest [Yunnan] and sought to extend [the border] to Cheli, [Yunnan would] thus lose the [barrier] terrain. [...] [We] have discussed together secretly, and plan to approve the opening of the commercial port in Xi Jiang, and the frontier of Yeren Mountain would be negotiated [with Britain] with strength.¹⁰⁴

“查西江通商雖於厘金有損，尚有洋稅抵補，野入山地則系雲南屏障，且照英外部所索又不止野人山地，竟將包絡西南延及車裏土司壹帶，形勢全失。...臣等共同密酌，擬將西江通商允準，而野人山界事仍與實力磋商”

“The Renewed Burmese Treaty between China and Britain” (中英續議緬甸條約) was finally signed on 4 February 1897. The British were willing to give up Kegan (Kokang) but, in the end, they retained Kokang and the north of Danni (Theinni, part of Mupang) in exchange for being able to establish a new commercial port in Xi Jiang. These were the last official negotiations between China and Britain over the Yunnan-Burma border, and they brought an end to the dispute.

For a decade, the two powers had tested each other's bottom lines to maximise their own gains. Both were looking for ways to garner trade benefits amid the demarcation of the Yunnan-Burma boundary. It is difficult to discern which side received better dividends. Britain had to abandon its territorial claims on Cheli and Moeng Laem, while China also had to give up some of its historical territories, albeit they were only tributary territories.

Sun Laichen points out (2000, 4–5) that Sinocentric scholars (mainly in China) used to “consider all the lands under the native chieftains in modern Yunnan and Mainland Southeast Asia as Ming China's territory.” In doing so, they confused the conceptions of modern territory, historical territory, and “the historical spatial boundaries of China.” Modern territory refers to the territories under the exclusive jurisdiction of a nation-state. According to this perspective, a sovereign nation-state has sole and exclusive sovereignty within a specific geographic space. “Historical territory” refers to various tributary states, which had a close relationship with the Chinese imperial courts or were under the indirect control of the court. For instance, they paid tribute regularly and were bestowed with gifts and official ranks as appropriate in return. Some Chinese scholars, however, regard these tributary states as historical territories.¹⁰⁵

In addition, Qin Shucai and Ma Yana (2021, 122–133) define “the spatial boundaries of China in history” as comprising the various ethnic groups and their ancestors in contemporary China, including those who created Chinese history and assimilated into other ethnic groups and were involved in the stable scope of activities that laid the foundations of contemporary Chinese territory. The historical spatial scope

¹⁰⁴ Wang Yanwei et al., vol.119 (1987, 5).

¹⁰⁵ For more details, see Perdue (2015, 1012).

of China exceeds its current territorial breadth.¹⁰⁶

This definition of “the spatial boundaries of China in history” exhibits a particularly Sinocentric viewpoint and thus is open to scholarly criticism. Qin and Ma further advocate against the use of the spatial boundaries of China in history as the basis for territorial claims. Such claims would potentially compromise the territorial integrity of those nation-states that share common borders with contemporary China. As such, scholars of mainland China now seek to avoid Sinocentric attitudes. However, Qin and Ma’s statement is based on the political context of the “Great Unification” and “Ethnic Solidarity” of China. Therefore, they are unable to thoroughly critique the connotations associated with the ideas of “historical territory” and “the spatial boundaries of China in history.”.

From the late nineteenth century until the demise of the Qing dynasty, China was confronted with a growing number of severe boundary crises. Consequently, the Qing court was prompted to retire its traditional diplomatic strategy and embrace the concept of being a part of the modern world – a world that China was no longer at the centre of. It was a bitter pill to swallow. Hence, many scholars in the early or mid-twentieth century regarded Xue Fucheng as an incompetent traitor who sold out many of the historical territories of China.

6.6 Final Remarks

William Warry was a British intelligence officer who led a mission to investigate Upper Burma and Southwest Yunnan from 1889 to 1891. The primary purpose of the mission was to gather information about these areas – such as ethnic groups, topography, and border delineations – to provide the British government with valuable insights. This, in turn, would aid the British pursue their interests in the region, for instance, in their approach to the rubber trade, expanding its business peacefully with India, Burma, and China, ensuring a positive outcome to its frontier negotiations with the Qing court. Notably, Warry also promoted the idea of a railway extension from Burma to Yunnan. This was the historical background to and motive behind Warry’s mission. Currently, there is not enough information available to judge the extent to which the British government adopted Warry’s suggestions, but the government in London did conclude a treaty with the Qing court a few years later. The treaty defined the border between Southwest Yunnan and Burma. On 1 March 1894, both sides signed a treaty comprising twenty clauses, including recognition of China’s sole sovereignty over Moeng Laem and Chiang Rung, as a part of Cheli, as, indeed, Warry had suggested.

In the final days of the Qing dynasty in the late nineteenth century, the Qing court

¹⁰⁶ My translation into English from the original Chinese text.

was confronted with several severe frontier crises following the collapse of the tributary system. These crises were fuelled by the international expansionist designs of Western colonial powers, which brought them into contact with the Chinese frontier, coupled with the domestic rise of Chinese nationalism. Imperial China needed to adjust to a rapidly changing world dominated by the West. As Ma Jianxiong (2012, 87–122) explains: in the context of local history, the “British and French” from outside China’s boundaries and the “barbarians” inside them comprised the two essential elements that concomitantly contributed to the emergence of the “national boundaries” of modern China as a nation-state.

It is true that, in pre-modern times, China did not have clear boundaries in its northeastern, northwestern, western, and southwestern areas. The arrival of Western colonialists pacified the conflicts in these regions and broke down the barriers between the Han and Yi people. Indeed, colonial expansion united the Han and Yi in the face of external aggression, which, in turn, facilitated their mutual integration. In other words, the outsiders (Western colonial powers) and insiders (non-Han ethnic groups) ultimately shaped the formation of China’s borders and facilitated China’s emergence as an integrated, multi-ethnic state. Ultimately, the southern frontier was defined in March 1907 before the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1912. Moeng Laem was ceded to China (see I7).

Thailand (Siam) had a different response to the changing geopolitical situation. Thongchai (1994) suggests that border issues were primarily a British concern; the Siamese did not perceive the existing border as a problem that needed to be acted upon. In this case, Western colonial powers invaded the countries of Mainland Southeast Asia, thereby causing much turmoil vis-à-vis frontier demarcations.

The traditional tributary system, which some Western scholars have used to describe the Mandala system of Southeast Asian polities (see Chapter One), was challenged by a new international system, largely determined by the Western colonial powers (the sovereign nation-states). China could not avoid being drawn into this new international system. Subsequently, most Asian countries were forced to accept the rules of this new system formulated by the major Western powers. By giving up distant, multi-ethnic areas at the periphery of their empires but keeping their core area intact, China and Siam were able to survive. The geo-body of a modern nation-state emerged as a result of this process. States like China and Siam became aware that the multi-ethnic areas situated along their borders posed a challenge to a modern administration and that they needed to integrate them into mainstream society. For China, for instance, sacrificing these less important places and preserving sovereignty over core Chinese, i.e., the nation’s main body, proved to be a wise strategy given the country’s comparative weakness vis-à-vis the colonial powers during this period.

The only difference between China and Siam was that China continued to hold onto the idea that it was the centre of the world until the early twentieth century. It was afraid of losing face in the Yunnan-Burma frontier negotiations with Britain. For this reason, China insisted on maintaining its traditional tributary system, at the expense of giving up many practical benefits. By contrast, the Siamese adopted a more flexible and pragmatic policy. As King Rama IV (King Mongkut) argued, the crucial goal was to save and protect the Siamese empire and to prevent it from being colonised. His successor, King Rama V (King Chulalongkorn) continued his father's policy. He ensured that Siam would stay out of the colonial politics of Western imperialist powers.¹⁰⁷

Moreover, the concept of borders allows a nation-state to distinguish itself from other sovereign authorities. In many cases, however, for the local people who lived in the newly demarcated areas, these borderlines only existed on a map, not in their minds. Given their geographical proximity, people in the border areas continued to maintain intimate economic or emotional relationships across national borders, especially when they originated from the same ethnic group and shared the same language, culture, and even identity.

On 25 December 2008, I conducted fieldwork in Yuesong town, Ximeng County, which is inhabited by the Wa (of Mon-Khmer stock) and the Tai ethnic groups. The county is in the northwest of Moeng Laem on the east side of the Salween River. The territory of Ximeng borders the Burmese Wa State, which is marked as section D on M12, to the south of the un-demarcated line. On 1 October 1960, “The Frontier Convention between China and Burma” (Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Mian Dian Lian Bang Bian Jie Tiao Yue: <中華人民共和國和緬甸聯邦邊界條約>) was signed. This agreement finally resolved the borderline dispute between China and Burma, which had lasted for 70 years. The territory of Ava Mountain was split into two: one part belonging to China, the other to Burma.¹⁰⁸ Thus, the Wa people became one of the main trans-border ethnic groups. Wa national awareness is an interesting case study that has attracted scholars' interest since the 1960s.¹⁰⁹ To this day, the Wa people living on both sides of the border retain a close relationship. I interviewed several Wa from Burma, who admitted that they frequently crossed the border to visit their relatives. As such, the national border may denote administrative boundaries, but it cannot partition the interactions of people of the same ethnicity. The Wa people here represent a commonplace social phenomenon in Southwest Yunnan and probably also Mainland

¹⁰⁷ For more details, see Larsson (2008, 1–28).


¹⁰⁸ For details regarding The Frontier Convention between China and Burma in 1960s, see Feng Yue and Qi Pengfei (2006, 55–60).

¹⁰⁹ Guo Yue (2012, 20–28).

Southeast Asia. Yunnan, which is inhabited by many ethnic minorities, is one of the most complex regions in China. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why Warry was tasked with investigating Upper Burma and Southwest Yunnan personally.

Multi-ethnic groups have lived somewhat independently for hundreds of years in the areas between Burmese territory and inland China, along the Upper Mekong and Irrawaddy rivers. However, the rise of British colonial ambitions and China's growing awareness about frontiers changed the destiny of these distant, multi-ethnic regions.

Most borderlines between Yunnan and British Burma were formally demarcated following intense negotiations between China and Britain. For Britain, it marked its successful expansion into the Indochinese peninsula; for China, it was an immense challenge to its century-old diplomatic strategy for dealing with "barbarian polities" at its southern periphery; for local polities, it was a life-changing event that had been decided for them with little local involvement.



I7: The No. 15th Inscription of the frontier between Yunnan and Burma (The original Chinese text is: 滇緬交界第十五號). Dated January–March 1907, it was originally located in Meng’a, Moeng Laem; today, it is kept in the Historical Museum of Moeng Laem. (I took this picture on 25 December 2018 at the Historical Museum of Moeng Laem.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions

7.1 Summary of Research Findings

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One offers a concise introduction and review of Tai Nüa political entities in the Upper Mekong Region. This chapter also provides a literature review of Tai studies and the Tai Nüa polities. Within the methods section, I establish the specific time frame, subject of study, and sources utilised in my thesis. Chapter Two provides a comprehensive overview of the organisation and theoretical basis of the dissertation. I also examine the conceptions of the Mandala system and the Native Official (*tusi*) system¹, both of which were utilised by the polities of Mainland Southeast Asia and Chinese dynasties to effectively govern their political administration throughout history. Chapter Three chronicles the historical background and geographical locations of the “Tai Nüa polities” before the nineteenth century. Each of these three chapters serves as the theoretical foundation and background for the research conducted in this thesis. The primary focus and bulk of this thesis revolve around the subsequent three chapters.

Chapter Four addresses the political survival of Tai Nüa polities during the Qing court’s borderland (i.e., Southwest, Northwest, North and West) integration and the Burmese expansionist policy promoted in Southwest Yunnan under the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885). Notwithstanding the variant geographical locations and historical backgrounds of the Tai Nüa polities of Moeng Laem, Kung Ma, and Moeng Bò, all three of them confronted the same problems, namely: i) the integration policies of the Qing court; ii) the impact of Han migration (i.e. the cultural influences from the Han people and the acculturation of the Han migrants and settlers (specifically, the Han adopted Tai customs, etc., see Chapter Four); and iii) Burmese territorial ambitions. These problems led to different reactions from the Tai Nüa polities, resulting in other consequences and implications for each of them. For instance, Moeng Bò finally completed its transition from a frontier district to an inland community. Under the Burmese military threat and the pressure of contesting territory with Moeng Ting, the relationship between Kung Ma and the Qing court intensified. Owing to the Lahu rebellion in Moeng Laem, the relationship between Moeng Laem and the Qing court gradually became closer.

¹ The Mandala system is a political power distribution mechanism that has historically been employed in Southeast Asia. The *tusi* system was a political governance system used in the border regions of Chinese dynasties throughout the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. For more details, see Chapter Two.

Chapter Five clarifies a core issue, namely, the conflicts between the Tai Nüa rulers and upland ethnic groups, such as the Wa and Lahu. The Upper Mekong River Valley was a volatile region during the nineteenth century. The Tai *cao fa* of Kūng Ma, Moeng Laem, and Sipsòng Panna strengthened their relations with China under the Qing court. After the implementation of the *gaitu guiliu* policy (i.e., to abolish to native officials and replaced by the Chinese imperial officials), Moeng Bò began to be incorporated into the Chinese empire, an act that reduced its ties to Mainland Southeast Asia. The Tai Nüa *cao fa* struggled with the Lahu people, who migrated to the mining areas of Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma to work there. Moreover, the increasing influx of Lahu's co-workers since the late of eighteenth century, namely, the Han migrants, and competition for natural resources in mining areas posed new challenges to local Tai rulers and mountainous peoples. The conflict between the Tai and Lahu lasted over a century and ended only in the first half of the twentieth century. This fifth chapter seeks to clarify the interaction between the Tai Nüa polities, China, Moeng Phòng, and Chiang Tung in the context of the Qing court's borderland integration policies and the Burmese military threat.

Chapter Six discusses the arrival of Western colonial powers in the border zones of Yunnan after they had colonised parts of Mainland Southeast Asia. The chapter details the conflicting interests of the Western powers with the Qing court, which jeopardised the Qing emperor's own efforts to integrate these border areas. However, the demarcation of the borderlines between imperial China and the Western colonial powers opened new opportunities for integrating Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem into China proper. The chapter starts with a general background of the period (from the 1860s to the 1900s). Then, it identifies the root causes of the border disputes, the differences in the Chinese and British conceptions vis-à-vis the idea of a frontier, the negotiation processes between the two parties, and the final results of the demarcation enshrined in a treaty. The historical process of boundary demarcation negotiated by China and Britain reshaped relations between Kūng Ma, Moeng Laem, and the Qing court in Beijing.

The local authorities of the three Tai Nüa polities exhibited divergent strategies in their engagement with the Qing court, demonstrating either active or passive inclinations towards proximity or distance. Irrespective of the trajectory pursued, each of the Tai polities mentioned above was ultimately integrated into China subsequent to demarcation by Britain and the Qing dynasty. Nonetheless, the contemporary expressions of Tai culture (i.e., the cultural diversity of Tai Nüa society) have been significantly impacted by specific historical factors (i.e., the influence of the surrounding great polities), which also played a pivotal role in shaping the history and societies of these three Tai Nüa polities. Today, politically, the three Tai Nüa polities

belong to China; however, their culture is distinguished by its diversity; it encompasses elements common to that of neighbouring Tai groups such as the Tai Lü, Tai Yün of Lan Na,² and even elements borrowed from China and Burma.

7.2 The Influences of the Sino-Burmese War

As mentioned, the Qing court targeted Moeng Bò due to its location and lucrative trade and forced it to submit to the *gaitu guiliu* policy.³ Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem were located on the fringes of the Qing empire, with climate and infrastructure obstacles halting the Qing court on the west bank of the Mekong River.⁴ However, the Sino-Burmese war and the conflicts between Tai and Lahu provided a chance for the Qing court to expand its influence in Kūng Ma and Moeng Laem.

Moeng Bò's historical turning point occurred during the CE 1724 as the *gaitu guiliu* was promoted. In contrast, the death of Gonglinya in 1762 was a watershed moment for Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma. It resulted in the removal of a buffer zone between Burma and Yunnan.⁵ Consequently, the Konbaung dynasty in Burma, driven by territorial ambitions, extended its dominion into the Southwest Yunnan. In response, the Qing court faced the imperative of maintaining its authority in these regions, ultimately – and inevitably – leading to armed conflict between China and Burma.

At the same time, Burma waged war with Ayutthaya (1765–1767) and the Thai King Taksin (*r.* 1767–1782), who eventually expelled the remaining Burmese troops in 1770.⁶ In the denouement, Burma was forced to compromise with the Qing court because it was unable to fight on two fronts at once. Burma could not conquer Southwest Yunnan, and the Qing court could not afford these long-term wars,⁷ circumstances that pushed both sides to agree to a ceasefire. Burma recognised the Qing court's control of the *cao fa* territory in Western Yunnan at a time when Qing power was gradually penetrating the region.

Moreover, Burmese influence in Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna may have been strengthened by the Burmese military forces stationed in Chiang Saen from the mid-sixteenth century until the early nineteenth century. The Burmese military presence in Northern Thailand and their control of Lan Na disconnected Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem from Lan Na, making it impossible for Lan Na and Siam to exert influence over

² For more details about Tai Yün, see also Dodd (1923, 250).

³ See Wang Wenguang et al. (2009, 74 and 83).

⁴ See Chapter Five, fn. 138.

⁵ Gonglinya (*Gongli yan* 宮裡雁 in Chinese) was a daunting force for the Burmese and the Qing court. Therefore, when Gonglinya controlled the Shan states, the Burmese and Qing court did not dare to cross the border quickly; for more details, see Chapter Three.

⁶ For more details, see Wyatt and Aroonrut (1998, 122).

⁷ One reason is the climate issue. For more details, see Huang Zuwen (1988, 87–95).

the Tai polities in the Yunnan border area. When Siam attempted to expand into Laos and then into the Tai areas west of the Salween River in the 1880s, its ambitions were thwarted by the British annexation of the Shan states. The British annexation also prevented Siam's expansion into Tai areas north of Lan Na.

The Sino-Burmese War (1765–1769) affected Tai polities in Yunnan and northern Mainland Southeast Asia in a number of ways. First, it did not result in the collapse of the “Chinese-Burmese condominium” arrangement, which continued until the British annexation of Upper Burma and the Shan states in 1886. Second, Kūng Ma served as an intermediary, aggressively facilitating diplomatic connections between Burma and the Qing court and it used this position to garner accolades from the Qing court and enhance its political standing.⁸ Thirdly, the Qing court hoped the Tai *cao fa* would keep the peace and not cause or provoke any conflict on the Southwestern Yunnan border. To some extent, the Qing court tried to avoid angering the Moeng Laem *cao fa* and was unwilling to bestow any official titles on the Lahu headman Zhang Fuguo, even though local officials were more inclined towards him. Later, the Qing court even aided Moeng Laem in its conflict with the Lahu people.⁹

Both the Qing and Konbaung dynasties were disappointed with the agreement that they reluctantly concluded in 1769.¹⁰ While the Qing court was dissatisfied with Burma's cessation of tribute, Burma was unhappy because the Qing court only ceded the control of Mong Kawng (Moeng Kòng) to them and maintained its hold over Moeng Phòng/Hsenwi and Bhamo.¹¹ However, both sides could not afford to fight again.¹² The situation continued until April 1788, when Burma resumed paying tribute to the Qing court to counterbalance the rise of Siam. To return the gesture, Qianlong bestowed the seals of Moeng Phòng (Hsenwi), Chiang Tung, and Bhamo on the Burmese King. This could be interpreted as ceding the three polities territories to Burma. The Yunnan-Burma boundary was first established after the war, but the precise demarcation of Moeng Laem, Sipsòng Panna, and Moeng Ting had to wait until the arrival of the British.

7.3 Inter-ethnic relations between Tai and non-Tai and the Condominium system

The Inter-ethnic relations

⁸ Summarised from QSG (1976, 14680). For the original text, see Appendix Chapter Seven, no.1.

⁹ For more details, see Chapter Five.

¹⁰ This agreement was signed on 13 December 1769. For more details, see Htin Aung (1967, 180–183). Burma started the war because of what it viewed as dissatisfactory tributary relationships with Moeng Ting, Kūng Ma, Moeng Laem, and Cheli (see Zhang Chengsun 1937, 77–80). However, the underlying reason its wariness lay in the territorial ambitions of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885) vis-à-vis Siam. Cheli and Moeng Laem were important passages for the general provision of materials (See Harvey 1925, 241–253–261 and Giersch 2006, 4–6).

¹¹ For more details, see Dai Yingcong (2004, 145–89).

¹² Burma was involved in the Burma-Siam war, whereas the Qing soldiers could not bear the subtropical climate.

In a complex history of migrations, the Tai people became dispersed all-over Southwestern Yunnan. In addition to Sipsòng Panna (Tai Lü) and Dehong (Tai Nüa; Moeng Mao), which were the two major Tai polities, there were also smaller Tai polities, such as Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò. Moreover, other upland ethnic groups (or “hill tribes”) lived under the jurisdiction of Tai rulers (*cao fa*). Thus, throughout the history of the Tai people in Yunnan, the *Cao (Dao)* or the *Tao* (royal Tai) not only had to deal with other Tai polities, with the Chinese empire, and with Mainland Southeast Asian powers (Chiang Tung, Moeng Phòng/Hsenwi, and Burma), but it also had to deal with the hill peoples within their jurisdiction.

In the complicated relationship between Tai *cao fa* and upland peoples, their disputes revolved around land, taxation, mining, and other living resources. Symbiotic inter-ethnic interactions, on the other hand, helped to prevent conflicts. The symbiotic connections between Mon-Khmer and Tai were characterized by a reciprocal dependence on one other for essential products and resources necessary for their daily lives, thereby maintaining a balanced relationship. However, throughout the eighteenth century, the rise of Lahu and Han vagrants provoked confrontations with the Tai due to the strain on resources. Nonetheless, the conflict between Tai and Lahu allowed the Qing court to increase its power on the west bank of the Mekong. Moeng Laem sought help from the Qing court when it was attacked by the Lahu and other hill groups, providing an opportunity for the Qing to intervene in the internal affairs of this Tai polity. The Qing court utilised the opportunity to execute its borderland integration policy.

Upon Warry’s arrival in the 1890s, it became evident that Moeng Laem had undergone significant influence from Chinese culture and official Chinese authority in several aspects of life, society, demographic change, and even politics.¹³ This impact played a crucial role in establishing a strong basis for the demarcation of Moeng Laem to China in 1894.

The Condominium system

Caught between China and Mainland Southeast Asian polities (i.e., Chiang Tung, Moeng Phòng, and Burma), the Tai Nüa polities not only had to confront the military threat posed by Burma, but also the borderland integration policy of China. Before the arrival of the Western colonial powers, the Qing dynasty had reached a crucial stage in the implementation of its borderland integration policy,¹⁴ following the integration of

¹³ From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, -No. 9, dated Bhamo, the 15th June 1891.

¹⁴ Nevertheless, this integration process was interrupted by the arrival of the Western colonial powers. The Qing court not only faced the expansion of the Western colonial powers, but also had to deal with internal rebellions. In this context, the Zhenbian Prefecture (it means Guarding the Borders, 鎮邊府 in Ch.) was established by the Qing

Moeng Bò. Qing control had advanced to the east bank of the Mekong River. The large number of Han people migrants in the mining area who allied with the Lahu created conflict in the procuring of resources from the Tai Nüa *cao fa* of Moeng Laem, which led to the outbreak of armed conflict with Zhang Fuguo. This conflict showed that Moeng Laem was still wavering between Burma and China.

When comparing the distant Qing court with Konbaung Burma, it is evident that the latter presented a greater potential risk for Moeng Laem. In addition, the Konbaung court had established strong connections with Chiang Tung, Moeng Phòng, and Mang (Moeng) Lün, primarily through marriages. Consequently, Moeng Laem did not need to build stronger ties with the Qing court in order to acquire political resources.¹⁵ If a capable *cao fa* were in office, he would manoeuvre the relationship with the Qing court to achieve better living conditions in the buffer zone between China and Burma. Equally, if a pro-Burmese *cao fa* were reigning, it would make it difficult to manage the relationship with the Qing court. In contrast, Kūng Ma actively sought backing from the Qing court in response to its internal political issues with Moeng Ting.

With the rise of Burmese power during the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), the Qing dynasty could not exercise sufficient control over Moeng Laem and Kūng Ma. It was difficult for the Qing court to station troops on the west bank of the Mekong River as the Han soldiers did not adapt well to the local climate. The Qing dynasty had to accept that Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna paid tribute to Burma, while Kūng Ma made gifts of flowers and horses (*Huama Li*) to Burma. Later, in 1885, the last king of Burma was exiled to India, and Burma became a British colony.¹⁶ The Sino-British demarcation of the boundary provided a legal basis for governance.

Historically, smaller Tai Nüa polities, such as Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò, not only survived between the two larger Tai powers of Moeng Mao and Sipsòng Panna, but also had to balance the relationship with the successive Chinese dynasties and the polities of Mainland Southeast Asia, such as Chiang Tung, Moeng Phòng, and the Wa States. A degree of political wisdom or wit was needed to ensure their survival and maximise their benefits. They adapted their approach based on the prevailing circumstances, and their policies evolved as the situation changed. Furthermore, the Qing court did not possess exclusive authority in formulating policies. Instead, this dominant entity (the Chinese dynasties) adapted its policies following the acts of the Tai polities, intending to skilfully establish interdependent relationships.

Moeng Laem, situated on the frontier between Burma and China, was a “Chinese-

court in Yunnan in Guangxu year 13 (1887). For more details, see Chapter Four.

¹⁵ Kūng Ma actively sought backing from the Qing court in response to its internal political issues with Moeng Ting.

¹⁶ During the Sino-British border negotiations, Kūng Ma was demarcated in the middle. Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna, located in the southern border region, were included within the borderline, which is recognised by international law. See Chapter Six.

Burmese condominium” for centuries, thus accepting the notion of dual (or sometimes even triple) suzerainties in the condominium model due to the influence exerted by the Mandala system. The Qing court recognised Burma’s influence in these areas and defaulted to the “condominium system” until the British occupied Burma. British control of Upper Burma and the Shan states became firm during the 1890s, and it affected Southwest Yunnan. Upon the British invasion, they insisted on well-defined demarcated borders. Following an extensive negotiation process between China and Britain, the latter agreed to cede Sipsòng Panna, Moeng Laem, and Moeng Ting to China.

The three Tai Nüa polities were finally incorporated into Chinese territory, while other Tai polities became a part of British India-Burma, and then Myanmar, so the condominium system ceased to exist in this region. However, these Tai polities were ceded to China, which led to the emergence of the Pan-Tai movement in Siam (Thailand) in the twentieth century.¹⁷ This topic is not directly relevant to the subject of this thesis, however, and any further discussion is for future studies.

7.4 Final Remarks

This dissertation is the first time to approach the three Tai Nüa polities in the Upper Mekong region as one research project, expertly combining historical data from indigenous perspectives, such as priceless manuscripts and historical inscriptions, to provide us with a vivid and revealing historical picture: the historical transformation of the three Tai Nüa polities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

It is easy to ignore the history and role of small polities in the big narrative of history. Scholars have recently recognised the significant role played by historical developments in the Tai Nüa polities in shaping the formation of nation-states and borders in Mainland Southeast Asia and Yunnan. Historians commonly pose questions about the impact of Burma in Mainland Southeast Asia or how Chinese dynasties affected Yunnan. Small polities’ societies, history, and cultures are frequently neglected in big tales or impossible to depict in full.

However, in microhistory,¹⁸ minor polities play an essential role and have the same worth as great powers. The value of this thesis is that it reveals the historical development of small polities. In this process, the response of small polities to the great

¹⁷ Dodd (1923, 1–19) posited that the Chinese were regarded as the younger brother of the Tai race, originating from the Altai Mountains in Mongolia. In the twentieth century, this viewpoint gained significant traction in Thailand, especially during World War II, when Thailand chose to align with Japan and assert its control over the previously Tai territories in China. For more details, see Reynolds (2004, 99–134) and Zhou Hanli’s master’s thesis (2007).

¹⁸ Microhistory is a branch of history that studies small groups of things, like an event, a town, a person, or a city. However, microhistory is different from a simple case study because it aims to “[ask] large questions in small places”, according to the definition given by C. W. Joyner (1999, 1).

powers may resemble the butterfly effect: a small change can affect the development of things. When the butterfly's wings flap, they can set off a chain reaction that impacts the evolution of history. This work is unique because it is the first to examine the three Tai Nüa polities using manuscripts in three different languages, namely, indigenous Tai (Tham and Lik scripts), English, and Chinese. This thesis might serve as an example to inspire other researchers to devote further attention and interest to this subject. In sum, this study hopes to serve as a valuable addition to existing studies of Mainland Southeast Asian polities.

Finally, I would like to present several issues for further research: first, there is still a lack of in-depth research on the acculturation and integration of Han migrants. How did the Han migrants become successfully integrated into local society? Under what circumstances did the “acculturation” and integration take place? Why and how did some of them become the local rulers? Did these Han Chinese who became the rulers of the “indigenous” peoples influence the historical development of the local area or the historical development of the entire Tai Nüa area? How did Han migrants interact with the various local ethnic groups and the Tai Nüa *cao fa*, and vice versa; how did Han migrants interact with the Mainland Southeast Asian polities and with the Chinese empire? Did the Chinese culture introduced by the Han migrants have a positive or negative influence at the beginning of the “acculturation” of the Tai people? These are important questions that could serve as excellent topics for further research.

Secondly, the climatic factor played a significant role in the southward migration of the Han Chinese, Mongols, and Manchus and the expansion of the territory of the Qing court in Southwest Yunnan. The climate has been mentioned as a factor that limited the southward expansion of the Qing court. However, I did not delve into the specific impacts of the climatic factor on migrations and the territorial expansion of the Qing court. Moreover, tropical diseases, such as malaria, were common in the subtropical climate of Moeng Bò, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Laem. Nevertheless, Moeng Bò was finally placed under the control of the Qing court. However, the presence of such diseases meant that not only could the military not station any troops there, but Qing officials could only stay in Moeng Bò for a short time. As a result, the influence of the Qing court was confined to the east bank of the Mekong River, and the *gaitu guiliu* policy was never implemented in Kūng Ma, Moeng Laem, and most parts of Sipsòng Panna. Yang Bin argues that malaria would have retreated from the traditional tropical disease areas if more and more Han migrants had settled there. He also points out that some migrants from the north became immune to malaria after having been infected several times.¹⁹ This, then, is another intriguing issue worthy of further and in-depth study.

¹⁹ See Yang Bin (2010, 163–192).

As a result of the limitations on the length of this thesis and data gathering process involved in my field work, I have not delved into the process of acculturation among the Han migrants, the impact of tropical illnesses, and the significance of the Scott Collections. Thus, I would like to propose the following topics for future study: 1) the “acculturation” of Han migrants in the *Tai cao fa* region of southwest Yunnan during the late nineteenth century; 2) the influence of tropical diseases on the expansion strategy of Chinese dynasties and the Han migrants during the Qing dynasty; and 3) using documents in indigenous Southeast Asian languages kept in the Scott Collection to study the history of Upper Burma and Southwestern Yunnan.

Appendix Chapter Three

T2: The *cao fa* Genealogy of Moeng Bò¹

Tai name	Chinese name	Regency / relationship with the previous ruler	Records in Chinese texts	Records in Tai manuscripts
Dao Shunduan	Dao Suandang (刀算黨)	1398–1424 Unknown	Dao Suandang surrendered to the Ming dynasty in Hongwu year 31 (CE 1398); he was appointed as magistrate of Weiyuan in Hongwu year 35 (1403). He was captured by Dao Xianda, ruler of Cheli, who, fearing Ming's power, later returned the official seals and Dao Suandang in Yongle year 2 (1404) and paid a tribute with local specialities like elephants and horses in May, Yongle year 3 (1405); later he sent messengers to pay tribute with horses and give thanks in June, Yongle year 4 (1406). The missionary attended a dinner given by the emperor (Ming Chengzu) as ambassador in July, Yongle year 4.	Dao Shunduan, son of Zhu Yuanzhang, came to Moeng Mao knowing that he could not inherit the throne and became the son-in-law of Moeng Mao's emperor, and later came to Moeng Bò with his troops and became the first ruler.
Zhao Hanlian	Dao Qinghan (刀慶罕)	1424–1430 Father and son	Dao Qinghan succeeded to the <i>tusi</i> throne and came to the Court to pay tribute with horses and other local specialities in Yongle year 22 (1424); he sent the headman Zhao Gang to pay a tribute with local specialities in May, Xuande year 3 (1428).	Dao Qinghan succeeded to the <i>cao fa</i> throne and later married the daughter of the ruler Küng Ma.
Nan Yafa	Zhao Nangmeng (招囊猛)	Husband and wife	In Zhengtong year 6 (1441), the king of the Tai Federation of Luchuan, named Hso Wen Hpa, attacked Weiyuan. Zhao Nangmeng, adhering to a sense of honour, bravely fought the invaders and killed hundreds of them. The emperor of Ming (Ming Yingzong) appointed her as Tai Yiren ² and promoted her son to the fifth official rank and conferred upon her son the Silver Belt as well as silk fabrics and paper money.	Moeng Mao invaded Moeng Bò. Zhao Nangmeng led the troops and beat the enemies. She drove the enemies to Burma, where they were then reconciled. Zhao agreed to retreat and split the ivory into two parts, with one left in Ava Burma and the other being the tribute to Ming's emperor. Consequently, she received awards and <i>Saisisaiwo</i> (the Silver Belt in the Tai language) from the emperor and was exempted from taxes.
Zhao Hangan	Dao Gaihan (刀蓋罕)	1430–1464 Mother and	Dao Gaihan memorialised the emperor, indicating that Jinggu was adjacent to	Dao Gaihan was the only son of Zhao Nangmeng, who never went to Moeng

¹ Data sources: JGTSSX, MSL, TGDB (Gong Yin 1992, 601–602), DGZC, MS.

² See Chapter Three, fn.121.

	son		Cheli and was frequently robbed. Bò Moeng ³ was a fortress and thus needed an agency of patrol and inspection, of which Liu Xi was the administrator in Xuande year 8 (CE 1443). Dao Gaihan sent the mission to pay tribute with horses and silverware in Zhengtong year 2 (1437); he was conferred a piece of Golden Belt ⁴ by the emperor of Ming (Ming Yingzong) who ordered him to suppress a revolt by using Luchuan troops in Zhengtong year 6 (1441); he sent a headman Dao Zai, to the Court in Zhengtong year 14 (1449) and paid tribute to the Court in Jingtai year 6 (1455).	Mao to visit his family. Moeng Mao's ruler was so angry that he led his troops to invade Moeng Bò. Dao Nangmeng fought the enemies and chased them to the Irrawaddy River. She then went to the Court, asking for a record of their deed. Finally, she passed down her throne to Dao Gaihan, establishing the native official system, which was endorsed by the Court.
Dao Shunsheng	Dao Shuohan (刀朔罕)	1464–? Father and son	Dao Shuohan sent a headman, Dao Xi'en, to the Court to pay tribute with elephants and horses, as well as gold and silver ornaments in Chenghua year 1 (1465).	Nan Hexiang was the daughter of Zhao Han (ruler) of Kūng Ma, who acted on Dao Shunsheng's behalf in Moeng Bò after his death. As she had no child, Dao Tai succeeded the throne from her. ⁵
Dao Tai	No records	No records	Nothing else is recorded except that Dao Tai had a son, Dao Xiansun.	Unknown
Dao Xiansun	yet to be investigated	No records in the History of Ming Father and son	No records	Dai Xiansun's chief wife had no child; his concubine's son succeeded to the <i>tusi</i> throne.
Dao Shun	Dao Xunhan (刀遜罕)	1488–1503 Unknown	Dao Xunhan, Dao Shuohan's first son, succeeded the throne in January, Hongzhi year 1 (CE 1498). He died in October, Hongzhi year 16 (1513).	Dao Shun was at odds with Zhao Famao, who escaped to Moeng Lü and asked for the troops to attack Moeng Bò. Dao Shun sent troops to intercept him and negotiated with the ruler of Moeng Lü for peace. The ruler agreed on the reconciliation and married a princess to Zhao Famao. Dao Xiansun gave Moeng Phan to his brother. "Phan" means giving in local Tai. ⁶
Zhao Yi	Dao Ning (刀寧)	1503–1517 Father and Son	Dao Ning, the concubine's first son out of wedlock, succeeded in Hongzhi year 16 (1513) and died in Zhengde year 12 (1517).	Zhao Yi married the princess of Moeng Wiang (today Lancang county, Pu'er Prefecture).

³ Bò Moeng: Baomu (抱母); Baomu was rich in salt and was famous for a salt well in Moeng Bò.

⁴ Golden Plague Belt: *Jin guandai* 金冠帶 in Chinese. An accessory and symbol of officials in ancient China.

⁵ I believe Dao Tai was probably a junior clan member.

⁶ It needs further investigation –and MS records war between Moeng Lü and Moeng Bò only in the first year of the Ming dynasty. However, the *Lü Chronicle* did not mention this war during the regime of Dao Xianda and during the 1458–1497 (See Li Fuyi 1947, 7–8 and 16–17).

Zhao Yizhong	Dao Neng (刀能)	1517–? Father and Son	Dao Neng succeeded in Zhengde year 12 (1517).	After his succession, Zhao Yizhong reconstructed the wall gates, inscribed upon them, and left them to (his) posterity.
Dao Suo	yet to be investigated	No records Unknown	No records	Dao Suan was Dao Xue's elder brother. Because he was young, he was sent away to study and his brother dealt with official affairs on his behalf. Later, he went to Moeng Zhong (Yuan Jiang County) to teach and let his brother take over his position. He married the daughter of the <i>cao fa</i> of Moeng Zhong.
Dao Xue	Dao Xue (刀學)	Unknown Brothers	Dao Xue passed his throne to Dao Hanchen, his concubine's son.	A preaching Sami came from the south to do missionary work in Moeng Bò. Dao Xue built the first temple, Mangfei Temple. Buddhism was booming in Moeng Bò at that time.
Ya Fazong	yet to be investigated	Unknown Husband and wife	No records	Dao Xue's main wife, Ya Fazong, took charge of official affairs on his behalf for a while.
Dao Hansheng	Dao Hanchen (刀漢臣)	Undetermined stepson	Dao Hanchen built the Moeng Bò Temple in 1660, indicating he succeeded to power at that time. Wu Sangui led the Qing Army into Yunnan, while Dao remained on his throne. Wu invaded Yunnan in Shunzhi year 16 (1659), indicating that Dao succeeded before 1659.	Dao Hanchen was the son of Dao Xue's concubine. He succeeded because Dao Xue's chief wife had no child. He married Nan Xiangmeng of Kūng Ma. The couple both believed in Buddhism and built temples and pagodas.
Dao Guodong	Dao Guodong (刀國棟)	Father and son	Dao Hanchen left his position to his son, Dao Guodong.	Dao Guodong built many temples. He married his daughter to the son of Zhao Meng of Kūng Ma.
Dao Gang	Dao Guanghuan (刀光煥)	1712–1724 Father and son ⁷	Dao Guanghuan was deposed for hiding renegades in Yongzheng year 2 (CE 1724). He was sent to Jiangxi Province but died en route. Later, the native office system was abolished, and the regular officials' system was adopted.	Dao Gang unfortunately died after 12 years of regency.

⁷ See Chapter Three fn. 122.

T3: The *cao fa* Genealogy of Moeng Laem⁸

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
The first <i>cao fa</i> was Han Bafa , in Yongle year 2 (1404)	1289– 1341	According to the record of YNTZ: Xuanfu Si of Moeng Laem was Dao Paiquan, his ancestor’s name was Kham Bafa, [he] was originally Ha-wa Man (Mon-Khmer). [He] summoned Yi peoples to cultivate the wasteland. [He] guarded [his] territory and handed [his throne] down to the coming generations. The name of [this wasteland] was changed to Moeng Laem.
The remarks of the first <i>cao fa</i> : The Tai manuscript states that the first ruler regime was in Yongle year 2 (1404), which is not correct. According to the Chinese record, the first ruler lived in the 1350s. The Chinese records state that Han-Ba-Fa is Mon-Khmer. However, the Tai peoples of Moeng Laem all know that Han Bafa is not Wa; he belongs to the Tai people.		
The second <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Hanhen .	1342– 1362	No official record
The third <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Hansong .	1363– 1406	The ruler of Moeng Laem Dao Paisong sent his son Dao Huaihan to pay tribute to the Ming court and stated that: “Initially, Moeng Laem was subordinate to Lu-Chuan Ping Mian Pacification Commission, and then it was ruled by Moeng Ting Prefecture. However, the magistrate of Moeng Ting Prefecture, Dao Minggang, was also the leader of Ping Mian, and I have always been of equal standing with him. Therefore, it is hard to administer. I beg Your Majesty to change our jurisdiction relationship.” Then, Moeng Laem was created by Zhangguan Si (the Chief’s Office) and administered by the Yunnan Regional Military Commission. Moeng Laem was bestowed headgear and belts (Guandai 冠帶) and official seals (Yin Zhang 印章) by the Ming court. ⁹
The remarks of the third <i>cao fa</i> : The Moeng Laem ruler was officially established by the Ming court in 1406.		
The fourth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paihan who paid a tribute of elephants and sterling silver of 48 liang to Zhao Wangsangle (the Ming court). The emperor of Ming granted the official seals and ordered him to administer Moeng Laem. The name of the official seal is Pacification Commission of the Commander. ¹⁰ The proclamation of the official seals and appointment letter was stuck on the capital’s gate. From then on, our rulers could dress in the yellow dragon robe, and he was given the	1407– 1446	On the 20th day of month 6 in Xuande year 3 (1428), the eunuchs Hong Zhaisheng and Xu Liang and others were sent to take the imperial orders to Moeng Laem, Babai Dadian (Lan Na), Mu Pang, and other places and bestow gifts as deemed appropriate. The reward to Moeng Laem was for the tribute paid by Dao Gaihan. ¹¹ On the 24th day of month 4 in Xuande year 6 (1431), the Auxiliary Ministry of War stated: “The <i>tuguan</i> Han Yanfa of Moeng Ting and the <i>tuguan</i> Dao Huaihan have been invading each other’s territory, killing people and pillaging.” The emperor ordered the Marquis to pacify the west, Mu Sheng (沐晟), and the three offices of Yunnan to send some officials to admonish both of them and require them to return what they had invaded and occupied, carry out their duty, and do nothing that would make one regretful. ¹² Seven years later, Moeng Laem paid tribute again.

⁸ Data sources: MLXFS (4–27), YNTZ, and Zhang Haizhen (2008)

⁹ MS, chapter. 42, pp. 3–4.

¹⁰ The so-called *Jingzhi Xuanfu Si*: 經制宣撫司 in Chinese.

¹¹ MS, chapter. 44, pp. 6.

¹² MS, chapter. 82, pp. 9.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
hereditary title of <i>chao moeng</i> .		
The remarks of the fourth <i>cao fa</i> : These records show that the Ming court and Moeng Laem had a close relationship. That should be wrong in the Tai chronicle: The Ming court granted the official seals for the <i>Jingzhi Xuanfu Si</i> . We should use the name that is mentioned for Zhangguan Si (Chief's Office) in MS.		
The fifth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paixian ; he was named <i>Zhaoquan Hehan</i> in Tai (i.e., Chief Officer).	1447–1465	On the 7th day of month 12 in Zhengtong year 11 (04. January 1447), the ruler of Moeng Laem dispatched a native official who paid a tribute of horses and silver utensils to the Ming court, where he was given dinner and rolls of variegated silks, as deemed appropriate. ¹³ On the 21 st day of month 2 in Zhengtong year 12 (1447), Dao Paile, the son of Dao Paihan, the deceased native official of Moeng Laem Chief's Office and Taomeng Nangdie, the <i>tuguan</i> of Mang Lün, were granted variegated silks and other goods, as were their wives. In return, they were ordered to send envoys to pay tribute to the Ming court. ¹⁴
The remarks of the fifth <i>cao fa</i> : Dao Paihan is another transliteration of Dao Huaihan. Dao Paihan died in 1446; his son became ruler in 1447. Dao Paixian, as he was recorded in the Tai chronicle, should be Dao Paile, as recorded in MS.		
The sixth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paixie .	1466–1481	On the 28th day of month 10 in Chenghua year 2 (10. December 1466), the Moeng Laem <i>tuguan</i> , Dao Pailuan, sent the headmen of Ban Tai to pay a tribute of horses and local products to the Ming court. They were bestowed clothes and silk satins, based on their official ranks. ¹⁵
The remarks of the sixth <i>cao fa</i> : Dao Pailuan was the successor of Dao-Pai-Le. Therefore, he was the Dao Paixie who was recorded in the Tai chronicle. <i>Xie</i> in the Tai language means “the eighth.”		
The seventh <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paiding .	1482–1492	On the 4 th day of month 8 in Chenghua year 18 (19. September 1482), Dao Painue, the ruler of Moeng Laem, sent his people to pay a tribute of horses and silver utensils to the Ming court, where they were given clothes and silk satins, based on their official rank. ¹⁶
The remarks of the seventh <i>cao fa</i> : Dao Painue should be Dao Paiding. <i>Nue</i> means “fifth” in the Tai language. <i>Ding</i> means “succession” in the Tai language.		
The eighth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paijin , who paid a tribute of elephants to the Ming court, and then he was bestowed official seals and the appointment paper. His official rank was higher than [those bestowed] in other places at that time.	1493–1514	On the 10 th day of month 11 in Hongzhi year 6 (22 December 1493), Dao Paihan, the supervisor of official seals of Meng Li, sent the headmen of Moeng Long to pay a tribute of local products to the Ming court. They were bestowed clothes and silk satins, based on their official rank. ¹⁷
The remarks of the eighth <i>cao fa</i> : Dao Paizhan was the vice-ruler of Moeng Laem. He is called <i>Peng-moeng</i> in the Tai language, namely, the supervisor of official seals. Dao Paizhan was a subordinate official of Dao Paijin. <i>Moeng-long</i> is <i>Me Me-moeng</i> in the Tai language, which means “official clerk.”		

¹³ MS, chapter. 147, pp. 3.

¹⁴ MS, chapter. 150, pp. 3.

¹⁵ MS, chapter. 35, pp. 10.

¹⁶ MS, chapter. 230, pp. 1.

¹⁷ MS, chapter. 83, pp. 3.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
The ninth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paifa , who succeeded the throne after Dao Paifa.	1515– 1547	On the 3 rd day of month 2 in Zhengde year 10 (28. March 1515), the <i>tuguan</i> 's mother, Zhao Nangmeng, and the <i>tusi</i> Dao Pailan paid a tribute of horses and silver utensils to the Ming court. The Ming court granted a feast and silk satins to the envoys. The <i>tuguan</i> 's mother was bestowed with ramie fibres and gauze in varying amounts. ¹⁸
The remarks of the ninth <i>cao fa</i> : Dao Paifa should be Dao Pailan.		
The tenth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paihang , who rode an elephant on his accession to Moeng Laem's throne.	1548– 1560	According to the XZYNTZ, ¹⁹ Paihan had killed Paizhen before Long Chuan was yielded to the Ming court, i.e. before Wanli year 13. While, according to MS, Dao Paihan was appointed as Zhangguan Si in Wanli year 14, it is shown that Paihan took the throne first and then Paizhen was appointed as Zhangguan Si. Therefore, it is credible that the tenth <i>tusi</i> was Dao Paihang and the eleventh <i>tusi</i> was Dao Paizhong (i.e. Dao Paizhen). However, the XZYNTZ wrongly recorded that Paijin succeeded the throne after Paihan was dead.
The remarks of the tenth <i>cao fa</i> : Dai Paihang should be Dao Paihan. Hang, Kham, or Han [surname] all have the same spelling in Tai scripts.		
The eleventh <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paizhong (Zhen) . He was ordered to send the army to support ²⁰ at night. However, Dao Paizhong was criticised and his great seal of <i>cao fa</i> was removed by the Yunnan Kunming because Moeng Laem did not do what the provincial official had asked for. The <i>cao fa</i> felt very uneasy and then he was dismissed.	1561– 1587	On the 8 th day of month 3 in Wanli year 14 (1. May 1586), the Ministry of War and the Grand Defender Liu Shi-Zeng stated that the Mang "chieftain" (Nandabayin) overstepped his authority and annexed the territory of various Yi (ethnic group) places. Afterwards, Nandabayin and his army were beaten by [us], while Lancang [present-day Laos], Baiba (Lan Na), Moeng Gen (Chiang Tung), and Moeng Laem waited to see what would happen. The <i>Zhangguan Si</i> (Chief's Office) of Moeng Laem was originally Yi, and was granted official seals, and paid tribute and taxes to us every year. Later, Moeng Laem yielded to Burma after it rose [to power]. Now, the <i>tusi</i> Dao Paizhen who supervised the official seal regretted his mistakes and paid allegiance to [us] again. He sent the headmen to pay a tribute of two elephants to us. Therefore, we should bestow them with a high reward. And then we could check the right lineage of Moeng Laem's <i>tusi</i> and order the <i>tusi</i> to the border. The emperor approved that. Dao Paizhen and Regional Vice Commander Deng Zilong were granted silver in varying amounts. ²¹
The remarks of the eleventh <i>cao fa</i> : According to (the) XZYNTZ, the <i>tusi</i> of Moeng Laem was appointed as Pacification Commissioner by the Kangxi emperor of the Qing dynasty; before that, they were appointed as <i>Zhangguan Si</i> (Chief's Office). This is incorrect: Dao Paizhong was Pacification Commissioner, as was recorded in the Tai chronicle. Dao Paizhong should be Dao Paizhen. <i>Zhong</i> and <i>Zhen</i> are the same word in Tai scripts.		

¹⁸ MS, chapter. 121, pp. 2.

¹⁹ The New Compilation of Yunnan Gazetteer. Vol 94 textual criticism on *tusi* 3 (*Xinzuan Yunnan Tongzhi Juan 94 tusikao* 3: 新纂云南通志• Vol. 94 土司考3), see Zhou Zhongyue and Zhao Shiming eds. 1949.

²⁰ The chronicle makes no mention of support for whom or where it was needed. I believe that Dao Paizhong had to support the Burmese.

²¹ MS, chapter. 172, bottom of pp. 9.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
The twelfth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paihan who killed his nephew and took the throne.	1588– 1595	According to XZYNTZ: In the middle of Jiajing, Moeng Laem, Moeng Yang, and Moeng Mit had long vendettas and commissions were abolished. In Wanli year 13, Long Chuan was pacified and the native official system of Moeng Laem was re-established. Moeng Laem was one of eighteen <i>tusi</i> in the border areas. From Paile to Paizhen, Paizhen’s uncle, Paihan, asked for troop(s) to kill Paizhen. Long Chuan was not pacified at that time. After Paihan became the <i>tusi</i> of Moeng Laem, he led Cheli to pay tribute to the Ming court. In Wanli year 19 (1591), Paihan persuaded Burma to pay tribute to the Ming court. The Ming court absolved Paihan’s guilt about usurping the throne. After Paihan was dead, his younger brother Paijin succeeded to the throne. Paijin passed the throne to Paiding.
The thirteenth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paixing , who succeeded to the throne after Zhao Hehan (i.e., Dao Paizhong) was dismissed and died. Dao Paixing did not have a big seal, but he ruled Moeng Laem. He did not have ambition, he rather spent time with his wives and children. He always went to fish and hunt. Therefore, fishing and hunting were prevalent in Moeng Laem at that time.	1595– 1603	In XZYNTZ: Dao Paixing was Dao Paijin. <i>Xing</i> and <i>Jin</i> are the same word in Tai scripts.
Dao Paizhong	1604– 1661	No records
The fifteenth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paiqian or Dao Paiqin , who succeeded the throne after Dao Paixing died. However, he still did not have a great seal. After Dao Paiqian was dead, no one could succeed to the throne. Thus, the local officials held a meeting to discuss who would succeed to the throne.	1662– 1708	No records
The sixteenth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paiding , who worked together with his ministers to deal with many local affairs. He was a lucky man who found a silver mine in the remote mountains. They founded the Mumai silvering factory ²² in Lü Na Fa	1709– 1730	According to DNZL: The Pacification Commissioner of Moeng Laem was under the jurisdiction of Yongchang Prefecture. In Qianlong year 29 (1764), Shunning Prefecture ²³ took charge of Moeng Laem. In Kangxi year 48 (1709), Dao Paiding paid a tribute with elephants to surrender to our Court. And then he was granted a hereditary <i>Xuanfu</i> . ²⁴

²² Mumai is in present-day Lancang County. Mumai is Tai, *mu* (*bò*) means “well” or “factory”; *Nai* (*nòì*) means small, i.e., a small silvering factory.

²³ Shunning Prefecture comprised Fengqing County, Changning County, and Yun County, which is Dali today.

²⁴ DNZL, vol. 57, pp. 71.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>(i.e., Na Fa Shan). The Munai silvering factory was founded when Dao Pading was young. Many people in business came to Moeng Laem to trade because the silvering factory's fame spread quickly and to many places. After provincial officials learned of the silvering manufacture of Moeng Laem, they sent an agent to check. The envoy said that Moeng Laem has to pay 600 liang of silvering tax and 48 liang of cutting tax every year. At that time, Moeng Laem was under the jurisdiction of Yongchang Prefecture.²⁵ Therefore, the silvering tax was sent with an escort by Yongchang Prefecture. From now on, Moeng Laem was established as a hereditary <i>Xuanfu Si</i> and was given the <i>Xuanfu Si</i> seal. Thus, the <i>cao fa</i> of Moeng Laem ruled more places than before. From the regime Dao Pading, Moeng Laem became prosperous again. Dao Pading was called Zhao Lü Ren because he had exploited the silvering mine. However, there were many brigands at that time. They were guilty of arson, murder, and robbery. The brigands' name was Wen Gan; they came from Yunnan to rob. They came to Ta Lang [today, Mojiang County, Pu'er Prefecture), Jie Lao, Moeng Tong, and Moeng Gu (today in Jinggu), Moeng Man, Nan Po, Moeng Ka (today in Moeng Bò²⁶), the borderline of Moeng Bò and Cheli. Some places were robbed, and its people murdered by Han brigands. These actions, unfortunately, spread everywhere, even to the Yunnan Kunming. It was a hard time for the Tai peoples because of the invasion of the brigands. The brigands were all from Lahu and Han peoples. The Kunming ordered all eighteen <i>cao fa</i>, including Tai and Lahu, to exterminate the brigands; if anyone or any Moeng came across the brigands, they should annihilate them all. To anyone who decapitates the headman Wen Gan and sends the head to the Kunming, we will offer a great reward, one that is higher than the local Tai [award].</p> <p>When the brigands left Chiang Tung and came to the riverbank of Lamai (today Lancang), the Wen Gan intended to attack Munai and Lianlian. The news (was) spread everywhere, and Dao Pading and Dao Pailie (<i>cao fa</i> of Moeng Lang) felt very anxious when they got the news. They decided to join forces to exterminate all the brigands and take Wen Gan's head. They hatched a plot to lie in ambush, waiting for the brigands. Finally, they beat the brigands and delivered Wen Gan's head to the Kunming. However, Dao Pading and Dao Pailie did not want to have a promotion; they asked for a reduction of the silvering tax. The Kunming agreed to their appeal. From then on, Moeng Laem only had to pay 48 liang of silvering tax.</p>		
<p>The remarks of the sixteenth <i>cao fa</i>: Moeng Laem was granted <i>Xuanfu Si</i> after Dao Pading surrendered to the Qing court. A reduction of the silver tax by half took place. Subsequently, Dao Pading died; he had one wife and seven sons and a couple of girls, most of whom died; only one young son and two daughters were alive. One daughter married Dao Paiyong, who was the <i>cao fa</i> of Moeng Lang, and the other daughter married Dao Paiyun, who came from Upper Wiang.</p>		
<p>The seventeenth acting <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Pailie. After Dao Pading died, his son could not succeed him because the son (Dao Paichun) was still very young. They reported this situation to the Kunming and the governor decided to appoint Dao Pailie as acting <i>tusi</i> who stayed in Meng Lang.</p>	<p>1730– ?</p>	<p>According to QSG, in Kangxi year 48 (CE 1709), Dao Pading paid a tribute of elephants to the Court. Then he was granted hereditary <i>Xuanfu Si</i>. After Pading was dead, as his son Dao Paichun was too young to succeed to the throne, Dao Paichun's great uncle Dao Pailie took care of him and acted as <i>tusi</i>. However, Diaopai murdered Dao Pailie and usurped the official seal.²⁷</p> <p>YNTZ: In Yongzheng year 8 (1730), Dao Paiyi received an imperial decree to reduce its silver tax by half.²⁸</p> <p>DYLNZ records: In Yongzheng year 11 (CE 1733), Dao Paiyi brought silver from the Munai silvering factory to the Court... E Ertai receives an imperial decree to reduce it by half in order to show the mercy of the Yongzheng emperor.²⁹</p>

²⁵ In Daoguang year 2 (1822), Yongchang Prefecture comprised Baoshan, Luxi, Bhamo, Chiang Tung, and a part of Lincang.

²⁶ It means the *cao fa* of silvering mountains in local Tai.

²⁷ QSG, chapter. 514, pp. 14266.

²⁸ Gazetteer of Yunnan, YNTZ in abbr., Chapter. 245, *tusi* 5, 1987, 23.

²⁹ The Calendar Year Gazetteer of Yunnan (Dian Yun Li Nian Zhuan: 滇雲歷年傳, DYLNZ in abbr.), Li Yan annotated, vol.12 (1992: 50).

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>The remarks of the seventeenth <i>cao fa</i>: The records of Qing History and the Tai chronicle correspond. However, Diao should be Dao, In the Tai language, <i>Yi</i> means “the second child.” Dao Paiyi should be the younger brother of Dao Paiding. Furthermore, Dao Paiyi should be Dao Pailie. Thus, Dao Pailie was the acting <i>tusi</i>, the silvering tax was reduced by half, and Dao Paiding was dead in Yongzheng year 8 (1730). Dao Pailie was killed by Dao Paiyou, but in which year is unknown.</p>		
<p>The eighteenth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paiyou. His home was in He-Bai-Zhan-Song, he bribed a trusted follower who is Tai and came from Meng Yang to usurp the throne. He ordered his followers to murder Dao Pailie. The evil-hearted people killed Dao Pailie, then the common people knew that Dao Paiyou usurped the throne.</p> <p>Dao Pailie’s son and Dao Paiding’s son came to Yongchang Prefecture to file a suit. When the official had understood the situation, he reported this event to the governor. The governor sent a petition to the emperor. The emperor decreed to put Dao Paiyou in prison. From now on, the history of Moeng Laem is clarified.</p>	<p>1738</p>	<p>QSL: In month 3 of Qianlong year 5, the governor of Yunnan Gongqing stated again that the headman Zhaohe of Moeng Laem deliberately caused provocation for many years... Zhaohe Bai was imprisoned for a year...With every passing day, they are more and more peaceful. The reason is that Zhaohe Han’s mother... misses her son, so she implored the headman Quanmao to pay allegiance to us and release Zhaohe Han. Dao Paichun also reported that each headman shows their submission... I sent Zhaohe-Han to Pu’er town and because it is near Moeng Laem... Then we can solve the crucial problem and make our borderline peaceful. The emperor approved.³⁰ According to the Tai and Chinese records, Zhaohe Bai should be Dao Paiyou. Zhaohe Bai was imprisoned in Kunming between the end of the third year of Qianlong (1738) and the beginning of the fourth year of Qianlong (1739). Dao Pailie was killed before this time, and Dao Paichun succeeded to the throne before Dao Paiyou was imprisoned in Kunming.</p> <p>Therefore, we know that Dao Paiyou or Zhao-He-Bai was imprisoned in Pu’er in Qianlong year 6.</p>
<p>The nineteenth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paichun, who was appointed as <i>Xuanfu Si</i> by the emperor. He was Dao-pai-ding’s son. The <i>Xuanfu Si</i> named Daoxiang Paichun governed Moeng Laem. Dao Paiyong and Dao Paiyun were acting of the <i>cao fa</i>. Dao Paiyong administered Moeng Lang, and Dao Paiyun administered Moeng Wiang. The three <i>cao fa</i> administered Moeng Laem together. In the Year of the Horse, in CS 1124 (CE 1762), everyone was anxious in every place; there was a man named Gonglayin, he was an evil Burmese.³¹ He beat the <i>cao fa</i> of Ava-Burma [the capital of Burma], who had been the King of Ava for three months. On the other</p>	<p>1739–1762</p>	<p>In month 7, Qianlong year 27 (CE 1762), the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou, Wu Dashan, stated: The borderline of Southwest Yunnan was Burma. The internal conflicts rose from everywhere for many years. Gui Jia Gongliyan and Luo jiao killed each other. Gongliyan had to escape to Moeng Khün [Chiang Tung] with his followers. The silver and properties of Moeng Laem attracted his followers.</p> <p>Dao Paichun also forced them to surrender. The Guijia group was furious, and on the 14th of May, they burnt the <i>Xuanfu</i> palace and killed 26 members of the <i>tusi</i>’s family and 63 guards. The following day, they ran away to Moeng Yang and Moeng Khün to disperse and hide.</p> <p>I investigated the situation of the Moeng Laem <i>tusi</i> who bullied GuiJia group; it resulted in the bandits being angry and killing them all. This event was not about foreigners invading our frontier arbitrarily to pillage and kill.</p> <p>However, Gongliyan has always fought with Burma. Now, he started the war in Moeng Laem. Bad things must have happened for him to remain in our territory. I ordered the prefecture of Yong Shun Zhen to urge the <i>tusis</i> of Küng Ma and Meng Meng to investigate the place where Gongliyan stays.</p> <p>They managed to catch Gongliyan, his concubines and vassals in Shiniu</p>

³⁰ QSL, chapter. 112, pp. 15.

³¹ On Gongliyan, see Chapter One, fn. 40.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>side, there are some Burmese who rose against him. He could not stand his ground and he had to escape from Ava with his army. He had 6,000 soldiers. They came to the borderline of Ava, to Moeng Nai, La Ha, Moeng Khün, Xi Bo, and Moeng Nian Pacification Commission. They have been in Big Greensward [a place] for three years. They built a city there, and then they left this city. They moved into Küng Ma and Lei Nong directly. They arrived in Lei Yun, Mu Wan, and Moeng Ka [today Lancang] and built defence facilities. They intended to pillage Upper Wiang and Lower Wiang.</p> <p>When the news reached Upper Wiang and Lower Wiang, they had already become Buddhists. They have Bhikkhū and Huwa.³² Moeng Wiang is a “civilised” place, and all the people are very polite. They will never let the invaders occupy their land, so they prepared for the war. However, the invaders never occupied Moeng Wiang since the Buddha blesses them. The invaders had internal conflicts; this meant they did not have the opportunity to pillage Moeng Wiang.</p> <p>The bandit’s headman was Gonglayin whose power was diminishing. However, they pretended they were still dominant. They kept fighting among themselves. Somebody said: We sent you to Moeng Wiang to pillage. Why did you not get anything from Moeng Wiang? The headman was very angry, and then he went to Xiniu Mountain and lived together with Han peoples. Afterwards, the news reached everywhere, even to the central Han. The Han officials and</p>		<p>[located in Küng Ma], nine people in all. Gongliyan and his followers were escorted to Küng Ma on 6 July and waited for escorting to the Kunming.</p> <p>The emperor ordered: Very good. The <i>tusis</i> should be rewarded as deemed appropriate for their great efforts.</p> <p>In month 10 of Qianlong year 27, the Grand State Councillors discussed the reply to the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou Wu Dashan’s appeal: “To try a separate case with respect to the chieftain Gongliyan’s wife Nang Zhan and her followers who burnt the <i>Xuanfu</i> palace and killed Dao Paichun.” Gongliyan was the headman of Burma who always fights with Mushu [Kongbaung dynasty] Yong Jiza [Alaunghpaya].</p> <p>However, Gongliyan failed in the fighting with Mushu and escaped to our borderline. Dao Paichun was recruiting deserters at that time. Gongliyan hesitated, thus he ordered his wife Nang-Zhan and the headman Sa-la-duo to surrender first, and then he took his concubines and vassals to stay in Shiniu temporarily.</p> <p>Saladuo was angry because of Dao Paichun’s greed. Then he assembled his followers to burn the <i>Xuanfu</i> palace, kill the whole family of Dao Paichun, and escape with Nangzhan. When we interrogated Gongliyan’s followers A Jiu and A Zhan, they confessed that Gongliyan was ignorant. However, Gongliyan ordered his wife and subordinates to surrender while he hides in a lonely place because his power was weak; this decision resulted in Saladuo’s guilt. As the Governor of Yunnan and Guizhou said, he ought to be punished and he deserved it.</p> <p>Gongliyan should be decapitated immediately, and his head pilloried. A Jiu and A Zhan were pilloried customarily for three months and then kept as slaves, to be given as a reward to meritorious politicians. We should seriously order Burma to apprehend the runaway people Saladuo and Nangzhan and others. Dao Paichun’s son Dao Paixian is still underage, it is better to choose a headman of their clan to look after him and be in charge of Moeng Laem temporarily. The emperor approved.</p>

³² *Huwa* (หฺรูบ) (*Kruba*) in Thai) is a very high rank of Theravada Buddhist monks.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>Küing Ma officials came to offer an amnesty to the headman. The headman surrendered and was escorted to Kunming. The governor of Yunnan condemned him. The officials of Gonglayin were quartered at Mu Ka.</p>		
<p>The news reached Mengyun, and they knew that Gonglayin's troops were still quartered there. Dao Paiyun, on the one hand, submitted a letter to the capital of Yunnan; on the other hand, he wrote letters to Moeng Laem Dao Paichun and Moeng Lang Dao Paiyong. Both of them assembled forces as quickly as they could. Thirteen Moeng and nine Khwaen³³ gathered and went to Moeng Wiang, not to fight with them but only to have peace talks with the official of Gonglayin. The conditions were: they should surrender and turn in all their weapons. They should shave their heads and turn over a new leaf. They were escorted to Moeng Laem as slaves. In Qianlong year 28³⁴ they came to Moeng Laem as slaves; one day, they killed Dao Paichun and burnt down the <i>Xuanfu</i> palace. Dao Paichun's wives and children were all killed, and they escaped.</p>		
<p>The news reached Wa peoples who lived in Haidong [today, Moeng Laem County, Lalei district, Haidong village]. Wa peoples built a barrier. When Gonglayin's army arrived in Moeng Laem they were [already] beaten. His army had to retreat to Moeng Bin, Moeng Lang; they prepared to retreat to Mu Nai.</p>		
<p>When the news reached Moeng</p>		

³³ Moeng is the administrative unit of the Tai, *khwaen* is the organisational unit of hill peoples. For more details, see Chapter Two, fn. 40.

³⁴ AD 1763, which equates to Qianlong year 27.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
Wiang, their armies were assembled in Mu Nai. They built a barrier and determinedly eliminated all the bandits. When they encountered them at the Nan Lang River, these bandits were all killed.		

The remarks of the nineteenth *cao fa*: According to the above records, Dao Paichuan had succeeded to the throne around Qianlong year 4. The official seal was conferred formally in Qianlong year 6. Gonglayin managed the Bo-long silver factory and was called Guijia (桂家, 貴家 or 鬼家) in the Chinese history books. According to the QSL, Nang Zhan³⁵ burnt *cao fa* palace in Qianlong year 27, not in Qianlong year 28, as was recorded in the Tai chronicle. The reason is that, in the Tai calendar, July is the first month, which equates to the middle of April according to the Gregorian calendar, namely, 12 April. Nangzhan burnt *cao fa* palace on the 14th of an intercalary May.

The acting <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paiyong . There were two girls and one son left of the Moeng Laem Pacification Commissioner after the palace was burnt. The officials of Moeng Laem reported this situation to Han officials. The superior appointed Dao Paiyong (who came from Moeng Lang) as acting <i>cao fa</i> . There are two brothers; the younger brother is Zhaosan, the older brother is Zhaobin, who fought for the throne in Moeng Khüng. Zhaosan (the third son) came to Ava to ask for the Burmese king to send the army to attack his older brother Zhaobin. Zhaobin said: I am a man, the descendant of the royal family. Therefore, I will never surrender to him. If he wants to fight, [I will accept the battle]. Zhaosan reported this to	1762–1765	On the 20th day of Month 2 in Qianlong year 31 (16. March 1766), the emperor informs the grand councillor of state: that the Moeng Khün <i>tusi</i> 's cousin Zhaosan and his son, Zhaobin, are in conflict. Zhaosan persuaded Mangzi (Burmese) to catch Meng Meng Rong and go after Zhaobin. This is the reason for Mang bandit's provocation. Zhaosan is the chief culprit. In month 3, the Grand Secretary Yang Yingju is in charge of the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou Yang Yingju, he states: "Mang zi has some kind of bandits who always slip into the borderlands of the ruler. Last year, they divided into two parts: one is coming in from the left, from Moeng Na, crossing [the] Xiao Moeng Lun Gan Lan Ba; they broke through Jiulong River [Mekong River] and spread out to Moeng Hun; the other came in from the right, from Da Luo, to break through Moeng Chae and join the left part. They burnt the villages of Moeng Chae and Zheng Kong. All of this is because of the legal <i>tusi</i> of Moeng Khün, Zhaobin's cousin Zhaosan, who surrounded the territory of Moeng Kun. Zhaosan colluded with Mangzi to break through Moeng Khün; Zhaobin had to escape to Nan Zhang [today, Laos] and hide in the outback of Moeng Chae. The formal Jingti Zhentong asked for troops to be dispatched. However, Liuzao made an ambiguous decision. He only ordered the nearby military officer of a local place to go to Moeng Chae. Subsequently, Mang bandits became increasingly rampant. Then they had to retreat from Simao to Pu'er. Now, the Can Jiang Peng Chuxiong and others have captured and recovered Moeng Long and Moeng Hun; the Zongbing ³⁷ Hua Feng captured and recovered Moeng Chae. The whole boundary of enclosed <i>tusi</i> has been wiped out. Our troops have already passed the borderline and exterminated the bandits who stayed in Moeng Khün and Chiang Xian and other places. Zongbing Liu Decheng broke through the foreign places Moeng Xie and Moeng Kan, now we urged them to seize the opportunity to drive straight on to the bandits' den and exterminate all of them. They were prevented from staying there overnight because of malaria."
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³⁵ Nangzhan was a Tai princess who came from Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung).

³⁷ A kind of military officer of the Qing dynasty, i.e., the chieftain military officer; a higher rank than Can Jiang.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>the Burmese king. However, Zhao-bin asked for help from the Kunming. The superior of the Kunming submitted a memorial to the Qianlong emperor. In Qianlong year 32, the army of the empire came to Moeng Khün. Their soldiers were as many as the running water. The leader of this army was master Ha. The army was divided into two parts. One part descended the ridge from Hejiu and Guangdong; master Minggong led the other part. They came to Sanghuang and fought with the Burmese army. Burma was beaten, and then master Ha pursued and attacked the enemy. Both sides had casualties. However, Burma's were worse than ours. They had to retreat to Ava.</p> <p>After they fought against the Burmese military forces, master Ha told Dao Paiyong that Moeng Yang would be the subordinate of Moeng Laem, [however,] Moeng Khün would be given to Zhaobin. From then on, this place has been peaceful and tranquil; ordinary people live and work peacefully here; the businessmen do not need to worry about the war. Master Ha went back to Beijing. In the Year of the Pig³⁶, month 10 of CS 1129 (CE 1767), June of the Rooster</p>		<p>They got the emperor's order: You will reach the critical point when you enter their boundary. Thus, our actions will be successful. In this month, the grand secretary, who is in charge of the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou Yang Yingju, stated again: According to Zong Bing Huafeng's report, our troops launched a raid in the Ma Si mountains of Moeng La. Our military killed the remaining bandits. Furthermore, Can Jiang Ha Guoxing led our soldiers and ordered the headmen of Zhao-bin to intercept and kill the bandits in Da Moeng Yang. The military officer of the native <i>tusi</i> attacked the bandits from the back of Moeng Yang. There are over three hundred Mang Zi stationed in Da Moeng Zha. They had to retreat to Moeng Kun after they were beaten. The small and big headmen of Da Moeng Yang were the subordinates of Zhaobin. Now they are leaving and seeking refuge with Zhao-bin. We confirmed that there are 23 <i>Zhai</i> [stockade villages], 23 headmen, and over 1200 Yi people, including women and men. We ordered Zhaobin to check the Yi peoples ... We checked that Da Moeng Yang belongs to Zhaobin.</p> <p>Nevertheless, Zhaosan occupied it. Now, Zhaobin is recruiting the army. We should have it surrender to Zhaobin. If some Yi peoples were the followers of Zhaosan and did wrong things at the border, such as burning and robbing Yi peoples' houses and possessions and fighting against to our troops, we do not accept their capitulation. We ordered Zhaobin to find out the facts and punish them. Moreover, we ordered Huafeng to suppress Moeng Khün's bandits drastically and arrest the chief bandits Zhaosan, Wuding Ruidong, and Zhaomeng Liewuhuo.³⁸</p>
<p>Year according to the Tai Lü, an event happened in Tai places. The Kahebeng (their hair is unkempt), namely Ava, invaded Tai places again. They invaded along the Nu River to Sipsòng Panna. No power could stop their aggression. The news reached Moeng Laem; Zhaohe Han was shocked. When the news reached the Kunming and the provincial governor, Dao Paiyun beat back the invaders. Dao Paiyun assembled the soldiers of two Wiangs to be stationed in Munai when he got the order from the Kunming. They prepared to beat back the invaders. Munai was in flames, dead bodies were lying around everywhere, and blood flowed in the rivers. The Tai places were burnt and killed by the invaders all over. D-Yun rode the horse and led the soldiers to retreat to Upper Wiang. However, he had a heart attack and died on the way.</p> <p>The news reached Moeng Wiang, people all knew that Dao-Pai-Yun had died on the way. The Burmese soldiers drove into Upper Wiang when his remains were cremated and took him to Upper Wiang. The houses and temples were all burnt, and the ordinary people escaped into the jungle; some of them escaped into three Moeng and three Khwaens of the inland; some crossed the</p>		

³⁶ It is called Elephant Year in Sipsòng Panna.

³⁸ QSL, chapter. 755, pp. 25–28.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>Mekong River and escaped into Han places. This place was laid waste again, and people were suffering from hunger. This disaster was the first of its kind in history.</p> <p>Dao Paihan recorded this phase of Moeng Laem history ... The Burmese soldiers invaded Moeng Wiang, Moeng Moeng, Kung Ma, and Dehong and then went back to Ava.</p>		
<p>The remarks of the acting <i>cao fa</i>: Zong Bin Huafeng was the front commander of the crusade against Zhaosan; thus, his words are reliable. Therefore, the Tai chronicle is wrong when it states that the Han military went to Moeng Khün in Qianlong year 32 (CE 1767). The QSL are more reliable than other sources. Master Ha should be the Can Jiang³⁹ Ha Guoxing.</p> <p>Annotation of the QSL: In month 3 of Qianlong year 32 (CE 1767), according to Tang Pin's report, Mian bandits scuttled off into Moeng Khün and occupied Zheng Mai and Chiang Xian.⁴⁰</p> <p>In April, Tang Pin stated that Zong Bin Hua Feng and Ning Zhu stayed peacefully in Pu'er and did not take additional defence measures. When Burmese bandits made trouble in Moeng Khün, they did not come to the Moeng Khün personally to stop and kill those bandits. It resulted in the bandits availing themselves of the opportunity to get into the inland. You Ji (a kind of military officer, lower than Can Jiang), Quan Su and Si Bang Zhi, Dou Si (a kind of military officer), Gan Qi Zhuo and Shou Bei (a kind of military officer) Pan Hong Chen waited and observed the situation when bandits invaded Da Le and Moeng Khün. They even retreated when bandits were coming. They killed several bandits to fake a report. Please expel and punish them.⁴¹</p> <p>Translator's annotation: This invasion of the dynasty caused severe damage to Tai peoples because this group invaded Tai places only for robbing. The Tai districts have presented a picture of desolation, brokenness, exile, and death. The book <i>A Journal of Conquering Burma</i> written by Wu Kai (Qing dynasty), mentioned that: The <i>tusi's</i> place was occupied by bandits again, which had been summoned to us to surrender before. The <i>tusi</i>, headmen, and Yi peoples, a group of thousands, were all exiled. Some of them, along with troops, attach themselves to hereditary <i>tusi</i>. Nevertheless, Mang bandits are a great evil. Our frontier has become more and more dangerous.</p> <p>Thus, the Tai chronicle is in line with Chinese records. In Qianlong year 32 (CE 1767), the General Ming Rui was ordered to conquer Burma on a large scale. The armies of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan comprised 5,000 soldiers; they were assembled in Yong Chang to fight against with Burma. This war lasted for three years. In the spring of Qianlong year 35 (CE 1770), these troops returned after negotiating peace with Burma.</p>		
<p>The twentieth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paixian. After Dao Paichun was dead, his son Dao Paixin and Dao-Paixian were growing up. The acting <i>cao fa</i> Dao Paiyong rules Moeng Laem. Their living standards were improving gradually. Then Dao Paiyong abdicated the throne, and Dao Paixian succeeded to the <i>cao fa</i> throne. Dao Paixin went to Lower Wiang as a <i>cao fa</i>,</p>	<p>1766–1768</p>	<p>“The throne is succeeded by Dao Paixin. Moeng Laem is located at an extreme borderline, and it is connected to a foreign place. Thus, Moeng Laem is set as <i>Jing Zhi Xuan Fu Si</i> and granted an official seal and ordered paper.”⁴²</p> <p><i>The Ancient History of Tai Peoples</i>, written by Jiang Ying Liang, recorded that: the Moeng Laem <i>Zhang Guan si</i> (Chief's Office) surrendered to the Qing dynasty in Kangxi year 48 (CE 1709). It was granted hereditary <i>Xuan Fu Si</i>. In Qianlong year 39 (CE 1774), it was granted the status of <i>Jing Zhi Xuan Fu Si</i> because it is located at the extreme borderline and is connected to the foreign (Burma) place.⁴³</p>

³⁹ Can Jiang was a military officer who guarded the borderlines in the Ming and Qing dynasties. A chief officer of the *Ying*.

⁴⁰ QSL, chapter. 781, pp. 7.

⁴¹ QSL, chapter. 782, pp. 12.

⁴² QSG, chapter. 514, pp. 14266.

⁴³ Jiang Yingliang Vol. 1 (1983, 50).

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>and his sister married Dao Paihan, who was the <i>cao fa</i> of Upper Wiang.</p> <p>Three years later, something happened. The <i>Jingmai Chashan</i>⁴⁴ reported to the Kunming, and Kunming ordered Dao Paixian to settle this problem. That was just what he said. So, he was taking an act of revenge against Nong Yong's <i>Fang Gui</i>.⁴⁵ He was dead when he was on the way of Moeng Laem. He has reigned Moeng Laem for three years.</p>		
<p>The remarks of the twentieth <i>cao fa</i>: Dao Paixin should be Dao Paixan. He succeeded the throne in 1774. He was thirteen years old at that time. Dao Paixin was the under-age son of Dao Paichun, who was killed by Nangzhan in the twenty-seventh year of Qianlong (CE 1762). Dao Paixin and Dao Paixian and Dao Paixin are the same names in Tai language. Dao Paixian died three years ago (CE 1996) following his reign in Moeng Laem. He was only sixteen years old.</p>		
<p>The twenty-first <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paixin. The acting <i>tusi</i> Dao Paiyong</p>	<p>1769–1790</p>	<p>In February of Qianlong year 56 (CE 1791), Dao Paigong succeeded his father Dao Paixin, who was convalescing due to sickness.⁴⁶</p>
<p>recommended that Moeng Wiang <i>cao fa</i> Dao Paixin succeed to the throne. When Dao Paixin succeeded to the throne, Moeng Laem not only owed a tribute of silver to Burma, but also owed a tribute of silver to the Qing court. Burma dunned the tribute of silver by the end of the year; it was obligatory for every household had to pay <i>Ha Man</i>.⁴⁷ Dao Paixin died in Qianlong year 58 (CE 1793).</p>		
<p>The remarks of the twentieth <i>cao fa</i>: According to QSL, we know that two years later, after the death of his father, Dao Paigong succeeded his father on the throne. This record mentions Dao Paixin. He was the ruler of Lower Wiang. He succeeded to the throne in Qianlong year 40 (CE 1775) and has reigned Moeng Laem for sixteen years.</p>		

⁴⁴ Jingmai Tea Mountain: 景邁茶山 in Ch. it is called Sun long in Tai language.

⁴⁵ Nong Yong's *Fang Gui*: a kind of curse summoning evil to harm people you hate.

⁴⁶ QSL: chapter. 1373, pp. 11.

⁴⁷ *Ha Man* means five *qian* of silver, i.e., half a *liang* in local Tai.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
The twenty-second <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paigong . Dao Paixin was dead. This bad news reached the superior and the superior appointed Dao Paigong to succeed to the throne. Dao Paigong was in a difficult situation, and then	1791–1805	In February of Qianlong year 56 (1791), Dao Pai Gong succeeded his father Dao Paixin, who was convalescing because of sickness. ⁴⁸ In the Jiaqing period, the Lahu peoples who lived in the Lancang district always fought against authority.
<p>he went to Moeng Yang and asked for help. He appealed to Moeng Khün <i>cao fa</i> Zhaomeng Zhen and Moeng Yang <i>cao fa</i> to send an army into battle to exterminate the Lahu bandits. They beat the Lahu peoples and distributed the three Moeng anew. He rode an elephant and brought the cavalry and presents to Moeng Yang. He stayed in Moeng Yang for three nights and four days. He sent his soldiers to another place and was alone in his room. In the deep of the night, Gatu Gami La⁴⁹ came to kill him. When he heard the gunshots, he was killed in his sleep. He had fallen prey to a plot. The presents and official seal, and his possessions, were all robbed. The news reached Moeng Laem; the people knew that their <i>cao fa</i> had been killed and his possessions robbed. Zhao Moeng, the Cheli Pacification Commissioner, was killed by Moeng Zhan, who wanted to usurp the throne. However, the people did not want to recommend him as Pacification Commissioner. He had to leave Yunpakan⁵⁰ and go to the north. His name is Moeng Zhan Dao Yongguo. He wanted to go to Ava to ask for help. At that time, the troops of [the] Moeng Tai [Northern Thailand] invaded Keng Tung from the west. Keng Tung was very dangerous. Hun Sang⁵¹ was caught and was sent to Ayuetyayunduan [North Thailand] [where he was held] under house arrest. He was also ordered to handle affairs. Both <i>cao fa</i> of Chiang Rung and Keng Tung went to ask for help. All places were severely destroyed except Moeng Laem. Later, Dao Paigong believes that Moeng Laem still has difficulties. The local bandits are called “Mian Xie Monks”;⁵² they robbed the people and occupied three Moeng and five Khwaens.</p> <p>From then on, the Moeng Yang Tai peoples and Bulang peoples were increasing their power and offending Moeng Laem. Moeng Lang Dao Paishang heard the news that Moeng Laem was robbed. It had been in poor condition since he was planning to reconstruct their villages. He intended to send a petition to the Kunming, but he did not have the great seal because it was robbed by bandits. Finally, he had to ask for help from his younger brother Upper Wiang <i>cao fa</i> Dao Paihan. In Jiaqing year 1, he was in Beijing when Emperor Jiaqing had ascended the throne. Therefore, he was familiar with the Jiaqing emperor; if he could come by himself, the Jiaqing emperor would trust him, even if he did not have the great seal. If Dao Paihan could go to the provincial governor, he would not go to Beijing; instead, his younger brother could send a petition. No one could do this except his younger brother.</p> <p>The Kunming has the <i>Xi Dao</i>⁵³ Dao Paihan order his people to hold the conference. He wrote the petition himself and gave it to his younger brother Dao Paiyu (Zhao Gang), who rode the horse day and night to Moeng Mian Yun Long Jia Dang [today, Lin Cang]. Dao Paiyu reported the specific situation to the high-ranking official and then he submitted the petition. A high-ranking officer granted Dao Paiyu’s request and reported this event to the provincial governor.</p>		
<p>The remarks of the twenty-second <i>cao fa</i>: Dao Paigong succeeded to the throne in 1791 AD. Therefore, we know that the Lahu peoples went against Moeng Laem <i>cao fa</i> Dao Paigong in Jiaqing year 5 (CE 1800). The Qing court mediated the issues of Moeng Laem <i>cao fa</i> and Lahu peoples in Jiaqing year 8 (CE 1803). The headman of the Lahu peoples was Zhang Fuguo, who resumed a secular life. He was subordinate to the Moeng Laem <i>cao fa</i>.</p>		

⁴⁸ QSL, chapter. 1373, pp. 11.

⁴⁹ Gatu Gami La: Bulang ethnic group in local Tai.

⁵⁰ Yunpakan: the street of Pacification Commission.

⁵¹ The third younger brother of the Pacification Commissioner of Keng Tung (Chiang Tung).

⁵² Namely, the monks of the Lahu peoples (Tibeto-Burman) in local Tai.

⁵³ It means four officials from the Kunming who oversee the military, administration, etc.

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
The twenty-third <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paishang . Because Dao Paigong was under-age, Dao Paishang (or Dao Paichang, the <i>cao fa</i> of Upper Wiang) was appointed as acting <i>cao fa</i> Moeng Laem. In Jiaqing year ten (CE 1805), both Sipsòng Panna and Chiang Tung were aware of this event. The governor accepted the petition, and he knew that Moeng Laem was occupied, and that an official seal was robbed, and that Dao Paigong has been killed, and his two sons had survived. The governor reported this event to the Jiaqing emperor. The emperor knew that the borderline had been invaded. He was angry. Then he instructed the governor and Xi Dao ⁵⁴ to grant another great seal	1805– 1813	In Jiaqing year 8 (1802 AD), Dao Taihe died. His son Dao Shengwu succeeded the Cheli Pacification Commissioner. Dao Shengwu was only two years old. His uncle Dao Taikang was appointed as the acting <i>tusi</i> of Cheli by the Qing dynasty. In the following year, the soldiers of Jing Mai were called “Jia Yu La”; ⁵⁵ they invaded Meng Bie and Meng Nan and were stationed in Da Luo. Sa Ya, the headman of Jing Mai guided Yong Jiya and his troops entered Sipsòng Panna and fought against Jia Yu La. From Jiaqing year 8 (CE 1803) to Jiaqing year 13 (CE 1808), the troops of Yong Jiya fought with the troops of Jia Yu La in Keng Tung, Jing Yong, Moeng Laem, Zheng Qian, Moeng Yong, and other places. Those places were severely destroyed. In many villages, there was nothing left. The people escaped to Kūng Ma, Moeng Ka, Moeng Pan, Jiao Zhi [today, Vietnam], and Laos. Furthermore, they also moved into Simao, Pu’er, and other places to avoid the chaos of the war. Some people who could not escape were taken to Chiang Mai and Moeng Nan by Jia Yu La’s troops or taken to Burma by Yong Ji Ya’s troops. At that time, there was much desolation in Jing Hong district. ⁵⁶
to Moeng Laem. The governor received the instruction and then ordered to make the great seal immediately. He also wrote an appointment letter and ordered Dao Paiyu to take it back to Moeng Laem. He appointed Dao Paishang as the Vice Pacification Commissioner.		
The remarks of the twenty-third <i>cao fa</i> : Dao Paiyu succeeded to the throne; however, he died on the way to Moeng Laem. Dao Paishang succeeded to the throne formally. Upper Wiang Dao Paihua, namely, Paihan, Paihua, and Paihan were the same person. Dao Paishang soon ascended the throne.		
The twenty-fourth <i>cao fa</i> was named Dao Paiming . Dao Paichang decided to return the throne to Dao	1814– 1826	No specific records
Paiming, who was the oldest son of Dao Paigong. According to MLXS, in Daoguang year 4, CS1186 (CE 1824), Manleng ⁵⁷ invaded Moeng Laem and desired the silver mine. Dao Paiming drove them out.		
The remarks of the twenty-fourth <i>cao fa</i> : The <i>cao fa</i> of Sipsòng Panna Dao Shengwu was the younger cousin of Dao Paiming. The conflicts between Lahu and Tai were pacified; however, the dispute between the Konbaung dynasty and the Chet Ton dynasty ⁵⁸ endured. As the buffer zones, Moeng Laem and Sipsòng Panna were always involved in the conflicts between the Burmese Konbaung dynasty and the Chao Chet Ton dynasty of Lan Na. ⁵⁹		
The acting <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paisheng . He imposed heavy taxes on his	1827– 1847	No specific records

⁵⁴ Meaning the Government Secretariats.

⁵⁵ Ja Yu la refers to Kawila. For more details about Kawila, see Chapter Four, fn. 31.

⁵⁶ Jiang Yingliang vol. I (1983, 32).

⁵⁷ Meng Lün, Manglun, Mang Lon, or Manglön (referred to as 莽冷 in Ch.), the areas in the northern Shan State, Burma. It was formally considered as a semi-independent “Wa State.” See Young (2011, 44).

⁵⁸ See Chapter Three fn. 57.

⁵⁹ For more details, see Zhang Haizhen (2004: 250–255).

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
people. In 1832, the Lahu peoples rebelled again.		
The remarks of the acting <i>cao fa</i> : During the regime of Dao Paisheng, Tai and Lahu and Wa refused to pay the taxes and rebelled. ⁶⁰		
The twenty-fifth <i>cao fa</i> Dao Paiquan was the nephew of Dao Paisheng. Dao Paisheng was unwilling to return the	1848–1879	No specific records
throne; he asked for help from Burma. However, the Burmese army was defeated and driven out to Moeng Laem. Dao Paiquan got the throne and governed Moeng Laem reasonably. He also built the Moeng Laem Pacification Commission Palace.		
The remarks of the twenty-fifth <i>cao fa</i> : Historically, the acting <i>cao fa</i> always caused civil war when they had to return the throne.		
The twenty-sixth <i>cao fa</i> was Upper Wiang Dao Paihua . Dao Paihua built the hereditary <i>cao fa</i> of the Moeng Laem Pacification Commissioner, which lasted from <i>Han bafa</i> to the present time. Dao Paihua was proficient in history and he wrote the history of Moeng Laem's hereditary <i>cao fa</i> . He had an assistant who was a knowledgeable person from the court palace. He did not want to show his name because he was a shy	1880–1893	According to MLXZ (1999:224), Zhang Chengyu's ⁶¹ report: On the 16 th day of month 10, 1890, the British expedition, which included military personnel, started marching from Ava [Mandalay] to Moeng Laem and Cheli. The Man Leng <i>tusi</i> invaded Moeng Laem. The British military bribed the Manleng <i>tusi</i> (Moeng Lün) to stand with them. The Moeng Laem <i>tusi</i> welcomed the British expedition outside the city gate. The British persuaded Moeng Laem <i>tusi</i> to become an ally. The British monitored the army of Moeng Laem. When they heard that the Can Jiang of Zhen Bian Sub-Prefecture would visit Moeng Laem, they left and marched to Cheli. MLXZ (Ibid.) continues to state that this event was also recorded in <i>Moeng Laem A Hala Moeng</i> [significant local events].
person. Therefore, Dao Paihua recorded it via dictation. He wrote down the history according to their oral history. This chronicle must have some mistakes. If anyone is a knowledgeable person, please correct it. The author's name is Kang Lang Gang Yun. The <i>cao fa</i> genealogy of Moeng Laem and the emperor genealogy are recorded by Dao Paihan who had the manuscripts.		
The remarks of the twenty-sixth <i>cao fa</i> : Namely, Paihan, Paihua, and Paihan were the same people. According to the <i>Moeng Laem A Hala Moeng</i> , in CS 1244 (Guangxu year 8, 1882), the headman of Moeng Khün summoned Moeng Yang and Moeng Lei to invade Moeng Laem. Dao Paihua defeated them, and they had to retreat.		
The twenty-seventh <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paiyong who was the oldest son of Dao Paihua. According to the	1894–1930	MLXZ (Ibid.) states that the ruling <i>tusi</i> was kept when the ROC was founded. Dao Paiyong was elected as the <i>tusi</i> special commissioner of Moeng Laem.
<i>Moeng Laem A Hala Moeng</i> during his regime, in CS 1260 (CE 1898), the British defined the borderline of Moeng Laem and Cheli and Moeng Yang, and they built 36 boundary monuments along it. Dao Paiyong was a <i>cao fa</i> who endured for two eras, from the Qing dynasty to the ROC (Zhang Haizhen 2004: 295–307).		
The remarks of the twenty-seventh <i>cao fa</i> : During Dao Paiyong's regime, Moeng Laem was involved in the Western colonial		

⁶⁰ For more details, see Zhang Haizhen (2004, 258–261).

⁶¹ Zhang Chengyu 1891: *The Journal of the East of Low Lu River (Salween River) to the Jiulong River (Mekong River)*, see MLXZ (1999, 224).

Tai Chronicle records	Reign	Chinese records (summary)
<p>expansion.</p> <p>The twenty-eighth <i>cao fa</i> was Dao Paihong who represented the last royal lineage of Moeng Laem. He fled to his father-in-law who lived in Manleng when the CCP took over Yunnan.</p>	<p>1931–1949</p>	<p>The last reign of Moeng Laem <i>cao fa</i> Dao Pai Hong, who initially accepted the nomination of the PRC and then fled to Burma.</p>
<p>The remarks of the twenty-eighth <i>cao fa</i>: Dao Paihong fled to Burma because the political atmosphere was increasingly tense during the late 1950s.</p>		

No.1

Moeng Ting Prefecture: It was the barbarian land in ancient times. Originally, it was known as Jingma *dian* (Jingma flatlands). In CE 1279 (Zhiyuan 16) of the Yuan period, the Military-cum-Civilian Route Command (*zongguan fu*) of Moeng Ting was established, and under [its] command were two pieces of flat land (*dian*). In CE 1382 (Hongwu 15) of the Ming Dynasty, [Mengding Military-cum-Civilian Route Command] was renamed Mengding Route. In CE 1585 (Wanli 13), the Pacification Commissions were also placed under its jurisdiction. The families were organised into five villages (*li*, each village comprising 110 households). The surname of Aboriginal Prefect (*Tu zhifu*) was Diao (i.e. Cao), [but] after the Zhengtong reign (CE 1436–1449) Han (Kham) was used as their surname. In *Tonggao* (Biographical Notes) it states: During the Zhengtong period (CE 1436–1449), Luchuan (Tai federation of Moeng Mao) rebelled and invaded Mengding. The Prefect of [Moeng Ting], Diao Lumeng, abandoned his land and fled far away. The *shemu* (lesser headman) of Moeng Phòng, Han Ge, joined the military campaign against Luchuan and gained merit. As a result, he was appointed as acting ruler of the land of [Moeng Ting]. During the Jiajing reign (1522–1566), Han Lie, the chieftain of Moeng Phòng, seized [the seal of Moeng Ting] and occupied the land. He gave the order [to entrust] a *sheren* of [Mong Phòng], Han Qing, to rule the land and this was called Kūng Ma.

In CE 1582 (Wanli 10), the *sheren* [of the headman] Han Qian rebelled and adhered to Mian (Burma). In the following year, the Ming army defeated the Mian; the territory of (Kūng Ma) was restored. Hence, the descendant of Han Ge, Han He was reinstated as Prefect [of Kūng Ma].⁶²

孟定府：古蠻夷地，本名景麻甸，元至元十六年，立孟定路軍民總管府，領二甸。明朝洪武十五年改孟定路，萬曆十三年，兼領安撫司一。編戶五里。土知府刁姓，正統以後罕姓。《通考》：正統中，麓川叛侵孟定，知府刁祿孟棄地遠竄，木邦舍目罕葛從征麓川有功，因代領其地。嘉靖中，木邦酋罕烈奪據之，令舍人罕慶管治，是為耿馬。萬曆十年，耿馬舍人罕虔叛附緬，明年，官軍破緬，收其地，於是復立罕葛之後罕合知府事。

No.2

In CE 1369 (Hongwu 2, CS 731), *Cao Fa Long* Han Guan (the third son of

⁶² Fang Guoyu et al. (eds.), vol. 5 (1998, 792).

Han Gailun, the Moeng Phòng *tusi*) appointed a headman (*toumu*) (i.e. *Cao Moeng*) to lead the common people to develop Moeng Ting. [They] were to build the city in the south of the village in the land of Meng Jing (Moeng Chin) ... However, Han Guan had not arrived in Moeng Ting, [he] still lived in Sën.wii/ Saenwi (literally, 100,000 banana trees).⁶³ In the fifth year of Ming Chengzu (Yongle 5), the [Ming] Court sent troops to attack Zhelan of Moeng Mao (Tai federation of Luchuan) and defeated Zhelan. Ha Ba and Han Gan, who lived in Pacification Commission Saenwi (Moeng Phòng), absconded and surrendered to the Chinese troops of the [Ming] court. They were willing to submit the land and villages under their jurisdiction to the court of China ... The emperor [of the Ming] court was indeed benevolent. [His Majesty] conferred on us Moeng Ting the extensive land on the banks of the Nujiang River (Salween). The title was called the Sri (Vijaya) Hereditary (*jili shixi*)⁶⁴ Left Area Command (*dudu fu*) of Moeng Ting ... Later, in CE 1409 (Yongle 7) of Emperor Chengzu of Ming, Han Guan Fa then left the land of Saenwi (Moeng Phòng) for Moeng Ting to be appointed as an official.

洪武二年（1369年，傣历731年），召法弄罕贯（木邦土司罕盖伦第三子）指派头目带领百姓来开辟孟定，把城建在村寨南面叫猛景的地方……但是罕贯还未到达孟定，仍居住在宣慰（木邦）。明成祖永乐五年，朝廷发兵来打猛卯遮兰（麓川王国），把遮兰打垮了，住在宣慰的罕把罕贯两兄弟就来投顺朝廷汉兵，愿把土地村寨归顺中国朝廷管辖……皇帝也确有恩有情，就封赏我们孟定管理怒江两岸广阔地方，头衔叫做吉利世袭孟定左都督府。……后来到明朝成祖永乐七年，罕贯法才离开宣慰地方抵达孟定当官。

No.3

Küng Ma Sub-Pacification Commission and Moeng Ting Prefecture share the same river. [They] live on the opposite side of the Chali River (Salween River); Moeng Ting is located in the south and Küng Ma in the north.⁶⁵ In the past no Sub-Pacification Commissioner was established [in Küng Ma]. During the Jiajing period (1522–1566), Mubang (Moeng Phòng) annexed Moeng Ting and Han Qing was given the land of [Moeng Ting] as his fiefdom. The son of [Han Qing], Men Han was weak and incompetent. All four sons of the clansman Han Qian were nimble and brave. [He] planned for [his four sons] to marry the four daughters from the four sub-prefectures and then adhered to Burma to seize the Land [of Mengding]. In Wanli 11 (CE 1583), [Küng Ma] yielded to Burma, exiled Han

⁶³ See Chapter Three fn. 78

⁶⁴ See Chapter Three fn. 79.

⁶⁵ See Chapter Three fn. 84.

Jinzhong, and defeated Shidian (today's Baoshan). In month 11 [of Wanli 11], [Han Qian] colluded with Burma to invade Yaoguan [in today's Chuxiong Prefecture]. In the year [Wanli] 12, first month [1584, February/March], the [Ming] imperial troops seized and decapitated [Han] Qian and his sons. A memorial was submitted to the [Ming court] for the establishment of a Sub-Pacification Commissioner [of Kūng Ma]. A Sub-Pacification Commission was set up [by the Court]. Men Han was ordered as the Sub-Pacification Commissioner [of Kūng Ma]. In [Wanli] year 15 [1587], the [Sub-Pacification Commission of Kūng Ma] was bestowed the seal of the Sub-Pacification Commission. By then, Men Han was dead, and [his younger brother] Men Hanjin keep the seal. With [the seal he] regularly offered tribute to [the Ming] court.⁶⁶

耿馬宣撫司 與孟定府同川，隔喳哩江而居，孟定居其南，耿馬居其北。舊無宣撫，嘉靖間木邦兼孟定，以罕慶食其地，子們罕弱，不振。族舍罕虔四子皆剽悍，謀配四女於四州，遂附緬奪其地。萬曆十一年，從緬，逐罕進忠，破施甸。十一月，又勾緬犯姚關，官兵敗之于攀枝花。十二年正月，官兵擒虔父子斬之，奏設宣撫司，以們罕為宣撫。十五年領宣撫司印。今們罕物故，弟們罕金護印，屢奉貢來庭。

No.4

As for the appointments to [the post of] Aboriginal Commission (*tusi*), Men Diu was appointed to be the Sub-Pacification of Kūng Ma, which was under the jurisdiction of Shunning Prefecture in Yunnan, [only] after the conquest of Yunnan by our dynasty. [He] was bestowed an official seal, letter patent, and tally credentials and was entrusted to rule Kūng Ma as well as the Mengmeng districts [in today's Shuangjiang]. Every year, land taxes in the form of husked rice were collected by commuting to 25 taels (liang) of silver; in addition, 30 taels of silver were collected in lieu of labour service (*chaifa yin*). Diao Paiyi was appointed the chieftain to Moeng Laem Chief Office (*zhangguan si*) in CE 1729 (Yongzheng 7) and bestowed an official seal, letter patent, and tally coupons.⁶⁷ In CE 1764 (Qianlong 29), [he] was removed [from office]. In CE 1774 (Qianlong 39) Diao Paijin was appointed as the Sub-Pacification Commissioner (*Xuanfu si*) [of Moeng Laem] and was granted an official seal, letter and tally-coupon (credentials). An annual tax of 300 taels of silver was collected from mining in [Moeng Laem].⁶⁸

土司授職 雲南順甯府所屬耿馬宣撫司悶丟，國朝平滇授職，給有印信

⁶⁶ Gu Yanwu. First released in 1662 and recopied in 1906. *Tianxia jinguo libing shu* 天下郡國利病書 [On Benefit and Faults of the Empire's Local Administration]. Kunshan: Preserved by the Kunshan Library, Vol.45, pp.16.

⁶⁷ See Chapter Three fn. 87.

⁶⁸ Kun Gang manuscript (1882). Roll 588. Ministry of War. *Tusi*. Ordination of *tusi* Three

號紙，管轄耿馬兼猛猛地方，歲征米折銀二十五兩零，又差發銀三十兩。孟連長官司刁派夷，雍正七年授職，給有印信號紙，乾隆二十九年裁，三十九年刁派金改授宣撫使，頒給印信號紙，歲征廠課銀三百兩。

No.5

[In Qianlong year 27 1762] as Gonglayin had already passed away, and the Burmese chieftain [king] became even more lacking concern. [He] colluded with Mubang Han Hei to harass Kūng Ma, which was in inland (Yunnan).⁶⁹ [Burma] also demanded [Kūng Ma] pay them [paper] money every year. The Burmese headman Pu Labu led his soldiers to [Kūng Ma] to demand [the money]. [They] marched to Moeng Ting and arrested the *tusi* [of Moeng Ting] Han Daxing. The troops arrived at the Mao Long silver mine.⁷⁰ [The military officer of] Yongshun town, Tian Yunzhong, personally led his forces and marched to exterminate [the Burmese]. Wu Dashan (the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou Province) reprimanded him for being reckless and ordered him to lead his troops back to Kūng Ma; *tusi* Han Guokai defended [his land] outside the Shi Niu mine.

(乾隆 27 年 1762) 宮裡雁已死，緬酋益無所忌，結木邦罕黑擾內地之耿馬，於緬亦又歲幣，緬目普拉布率兵來索，入孟定，執土司罕大興，兵及茂隆廠，永順鎮田允中親率兵進剿，吳達善責其輕率，令還師耿馬，土司罕國楷禦于石牛廠外。⁷¹

⁶⁹ The term “inland” indicates that Kūng Ma was the part of the Qing court.

⁷⁰ In today's Cangyuan Wa autonomous county, Lincang Prefecture.

⁷¹ Sun Shiyi (1983, 83).

Appendix Chapter Four

No.1

In the year Zhengtong 12, 2nd month, on *guichao* day (7 March 1447), an imperial order was directed to Han Gaifa, the Pacification Commissioner of the Mu Pang Military-cum-Civilian Pacification Commission in Yunnan, which read: “Previously, owing to the bandit of Luchuan Si Renfa was rebellious, ... you presented the land and delivered the bandit (Si Renfa) head to the capital (Beijing). Your Majesty (*zhen*) was extremely pleased. [...] You submitted a memorial requesting for exemption from the annual levy of eight ingots (*ding*) of silver. A special favour of exempting three year-taxes [was granted]. [...] Dao Fengsong were to be the chief of Moeng Laem. [...] [The Ming court] granted the various [aboriginal] officials and their wives variegated silks and other gifts.⁷²

正統 12 年 2 月癸丑，敕諭雲南木邦軍民宣慰使司宣慰使罕蓋法曰：曩因麓賊思任發悖逆，……爾復捐地方取賊首級解京。朕深嘉悅……爾奏請免歲辦銀八錠，特免三年，……刀奉送，孟璉長官司。……及頒賜各官，並其妻彩幣等物。英宗實錄卷一百五十

No.2

In Wanli 10 (1582), Winter, Burma invaded Yongchang and Tengyue. [...] At that time, Cheli (Sipsóng Panna), Babai (Lan Na), Mengyang (Moeng Ying, Kachin State), Mubang (Moeng Pòng, the Eastern Shan states), Menggen (Moeng Khün, or Chiang Tung), Mengmi (Moeng Mit, the Northern Shan states), and Manmo (Bhamo) all sent troops to support the bandits (Burma). The power of the bandits grew stronger. Incidentally, [Liu] Ting⁷³ arrived with the troops and the morale of the troops was greatly boosted. [...] Again, [Liu Ting] transferred his troops to besiege Moeng Laem and arrested the ringleader alive. Yunnan was pacified. [...] Hence, the Mengmi Commission of Appeasement was promoted to Pacification Commission; two additional Commission of Appeasement were established, [one] was Manmo, [the other] was Kūng Ma; two more Chieftain Offices [were established], [one] was Moeng Laem, [and the other] was Mengyang.⁷⁴

⁷² Ying-zong: Juan 150.7a-8a Zhong-yang Yan-jiu yuan Ming Shi-lu, Chapter. 29, pp. 2947–2949.

⁷³ Liu Ting (b. 1558–1619) was an army commander during the late Ming dynasty. For more details on Liu Ting, see *Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368–1644*, edited by L. Carrington Goodrich and Fang Chaoying (1976, 964–68).

⁷⁴ MS: Chapter 247, Biography of Liu Ting, pp. 6389–390. (<明史, 卷二四七, 劉綎傳>, pp. 6389–390)

[萬曆] 十年冬，緬甸犯永昌、騰越。[...]當是時，車里、八百、孟養、木邦孟艮、孟密、蠻莫皆以兵助賊，賊勢益盛。[...] 會[劉]綰至軍，軍大振。[...] 復移師圍孟璉，生擒其魁。雲南平，[...] 乃改孟密安撫司為宣撫，增設安撫司二，曰蠻莫，曰耿馬，長官司二，曰孟璉，曰孟養。

No.3

In the year Wanli 14, 3rd month, *guimao* day (26 April 1586), the Ministry of War submitted a memorial [to the throne, in which it states]: “The Provost Marshal (*zhenfu guan*) of Yunnan, Liu Shizeng (*b.* 1531–?) and others submitted a memorial, in which it is stated: The Burmese chieftain (*mang qiu*) has usurped the title and Baigu (Pegu) has annexed [the land of] various foreign tribes (Yi). [...] Originally the Chieftain Office of Moeng Laem belonged to foreign tribes (Yi). They have been granted a seal and letter patent. Every year they pay labour service commuted into silver (*chai fa*). Later, the Burmese Chieftain became reckless and unrestrained; hence [Moeng Laem] was attached to the outsider and paid allegiance to [foreign Burma]. Now, the seal-holder Dao Paizhen, who is a kinsman of the Aboriginal Official, has repented of [his] mistakes and tendered his allegiance [to the Ming court]. He has offered elephants in tribute, begged for surrender, and wants to be a tribute [land]. [He] requests that officials are to be appointed to present the two elephants in tribute [to the Ming court] on his behalf. As to the aboriginal kinsman Dao Paizhen, he is to be rewarded richly. The rightful heir [to the Aboriginal Office] is to be traced and appointed so that the protection of the outer vassal states is strengthened. [...] The emperor approved the proposals. Consequently, Dao Paizhen and Deng Zilong were rewarded with silver in varying amounts. (Shen-zong: Juan 172.7b Zhong-yang Yan-jiu yuan MSL, volume 103, pp. 3130.)

萬曆十四年(西元 1586 年)三月癸卯，兵部題：雲南撫鎮官劉世曾等題稱。莽酋僭號。擺古併吞諸夷。……孟璉長官司原系屬夷，頒有印信，歲輸差發。後因莽酋猖獗，遂爾外附。今護印土舍刀派真悔過歸順，進象乞降稱貢。乞將所貢象二隻，差官代進。土舍刀派真加以厚賞。查立應襲之人，以堅外藩。……上從之，賞刀派真、鄧子龍銀有差。神宗實錄卷一百七十。

No.4

Moeng Laem Chieftain Office [...] In [Moeng Laem] there is Mo'nai Mine, which produces minerals. The profits were monopolised by [Moeng Laem] for generations; hence Moeng Laem became wealthy. The barbarian (native) name of [Moeng Laem] is Hawa. [The people] are nimble and fierce; they love robbery. In ancient times they had no [tribute] relation with China (Zhonghua). During the

Zhengtong reign (1436-1449), only [after] Luchuan had been pacified, did [Moeng Laem] submit [and pledged allegiance to] [China]. During the Wanli reign (1573–1620), the heir apparent of the chieftain [of Moeng Laem] with the name Dao Paizhen had an uncle [named] Dao Paihan, who married [a princess of] Cheli (Moeng Lue). Therefore, [Dao Paihan] made use of Cheli to kill [the heir apparent Dao] Paizhen and seize his [nephew's Aboriginal] Office. In the year [Wanli] 12 (1584), [Dao Paihan] led [the envoys of] Cheli to pay the tribute [to the Ming court]. Moreover, in the year [Wanli] 19 (1591), he persuaded Burma to pay tribute [to the Ming court]. By then [Dao] Paihan had passed away and his younger brother [Dao] Paijin succeeded [to the aboriginal post]. In the year Tianqi 2, 3rd month (1622, April/May), Ava defeated [Moeng Laem], Not long after, Tongwu (Toungoo dynasty: 1531–1752) attacked Ava [and forced] Ava to retreat. The silver paid in lieu of labour service by [Moeng Laem] amounted to 200 taels (liang)⁷⁵ [per year].⁷⁶

孟連長官司 ……部內有莫乃場，出礦，世專其利，以致殷富。蠻名哈瓦。剽悍好劫。古不通中華。正統間，平麓川，始來歸。萬曆間，酋長嫡嗣曰刀派真，有叔刀派漢，娶于車里，因以車里殺派真而奪其官。十二年，率車里來貢。十九年，又勸緬來貢。今派漢故，弟派金嗣。天啟二年三月，阿瓦破之。會洞吾伐瓦，瓦乃退。其差發，額銀二百兩。

No.5

雍正八年九月壬辰，雲貴廣西總督鄂爾泰奏報。永昌府邊外孟連土司，每年願納廠課。……孟連地方 地處極邊，自古未通中國。總督鄂爾泰化導有方。俾各輸誠效順。任土作貢。虔心向化。甚屬可嘉。其孟連土司廠課每年六百兩。為數太多。著減半收納。以昭柔懷至意。《清世宗實錄》卷159

In the year Yongzheng 8, 9th month, on *renchen* days (6 November, 730), the governor-general of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi, E-er-tai (or O-er-tai, 1680–1745)⁷⁷ to the Qing court], in which [he] reported: The Aboriginal Office of Menglian, which is located beyond the frontier of Yongchang Prefecture, is willing to pay mining taxes every year. […/ The land of Menglian, located at the extreme remote border [of China], had no [diplomatic] relation with China since ancient times. The Governor-general E-er-tai had his methods of educating and inducing

⁷⁵ See Chapter Four fn. 19.

⁷⁶ *A Treatise on Yunnan of the Tianqi Period. Vol. 30, Jimi Gazetteer Vol. 12*, by Liu Wenzheng (1555–1626) and others, completed in 1625 (Gu annotated 1991, 992).

⁷⁷ On E-er-tai, see Hummel (1991, 601–603).

them so that they were submissive, pledged allegiance [to the Qing court], offered in tribute whatever they produced locally, and were inclined to gradual assimilation piously. It was indeed praiseworthy. The mining taxes of the Aboriginal Office of Menglian was 600 taels (liang) [of silver] per annum. The amount [taxes raised] was too much and ought to be reduced by half so as to express the utmost compassion that we harboured.⁷⁸

No.6

At present, generals have penetrated Mengyang, Youle, Ganlanba, and Jiulong Rivers (Mekong River), and other places. Your subject (I) would like to conduct a survey of all the land of the six tea hills, a total of over one thousand *li*⁷⁹ and brigades (*ying* 營) were to be erected for defence. Regardless of whether inside the Mekong River or beyond it,⁸⁰ for those who were close to a foreign land (Burma) an indirect rule under loose reins (*jimi*) ought to be employed. The native Official of Cheli (Sipsòng Panna) should still be maintained for the defence of the borderland.⁸¹

現在，孟養、攸樂、橄欖壩、九龍江等處，各將皆已深入。臣必欲將六茶山千餘里地盡行查勘，安設營防。[...] 不論江內江外，其逼近外國、應示羈縻之地。仍著落車里土司，以備藩籬。

No.7

Now Zhao Hebai was released and moved to Pu'er in the prison. There is no difference between whether he is imprisoned in Pu'er or Kunming [...] If Dao Pai Chun wields authority in Moeng Laem no one could challenge his authority [...] [Then we] should better release Zhao Hebai. If Dao Paichun could not appease these rebels and the headman Quan Mao would state that the followers of Zhao Hebai incite them, then [we] ought to imprison Zhao Hebai in Kunming to prohibit the connection between them.⁸²

乾隆五年三月丙辰，雲南總督公慶復奏。孟連頭目召賀白滋釁。結訟多年。夷方不靖。.....因將召賀白交普洱鎮。就近羈管。.....可以永靖。得旨.....該督既以釋放召賀白。恐生事端。則遷禁普洱。與拘禁省城無異。.....如果刀派春漸能成立。夷人懾服。.....則竟宜將召賀白釋回。倘刀派春不克樹立。其頭目圈冒等具呈。或即系召賀白餘黨指使。應仍收

⁷⁸ QSL *Shizong shilu*, Chapter 159. For the whole text, see the online library Chinese Text Project: <https://ctext.org/dictionary.pl>, accessed on 02/012/2023.

⁷⁹ One Chinese *li* is one third of an English mile; 1,000 *li* is about 536 km.

⁸⁰ I.e., to the left and right of the Upper Mekong, respectively.

⁸¹ Li Genyuan (2001, 2382).

⁸² QSL, chapter. 112, pp. 15.

禁省城。以杜滋事。

No.8

At that time [Si] Renfa⁸³ became even more unruly and aggressive/fierce. [He] invaded Jingdong, killed the sub-prefect (*zhizhou*) of Dahou, Dao Fenghan and others, a total of over one thousand people, defeated Menglai and various stocked (*Zhai*) [villages]. The Aboriginal Official of the Office (*zhangguan si*) and other places surrendered to [Si Renfa]. Moeng Laem and other Chief's Offices surrendered.⁸⁴

時[思]任發兵愈橫，犯景東，剽孟定，殺大侯知州刀奉漢等千餘人，破孟賴諸寨，孟璉長官司諸處皆降之。

No.9

At the beginning, the domains under Moeng Laem and Moeng Ting were all the land belonging to Luchuan, and the aboriginal headmen (*tu mu*) previously were all of equal rank. [However, they] loathed to be related to one another (*e xiang shu* 惡相屬). Later, Moeng Laem was transferred under the [direct] jurisdiction of [the seat of] Yunnan. [They] fought to seek vengeance mostly because of annexing each other lands. In the year Xuande 6 (1431), the Aboriginal Prefect (*tu zhifu*) Han Yanfa presented his suggestion. [Consequently, Emperor Xuande] directed a decree to the Duke of Qianguo (Qianguo gong) Mu Sheng (1368–1439) ordering [the duke] to send officials to pacify them and order [them to stop fighting], so that what had been annexed were all to be reverted to the respective owner. During the Zhengtong reign (1436–1449), Luchuan revolted. The prefect (*zhifu*) of Moeng Ting Dao Lumeng absconded. The aboriginal official (*tuguan*) of Mubang, Han Ge, had gained merit owing to his joining the campaign [against Luchuan]. Supreme Commander (*zongdu*) Wang Ji (1378–1460) submitted a memorial to [the Ming court] requesting that the land of Moeng Ting was to be granted a fiefdom of [Han Ge of Mubang].

During the Jiajing reign (1522–1566), Han Lie of Mubang occupied the land and seized the seal [of the aboriginal official]. [He] ordered an aboriginal kinsman Hang Qing to guard the land and named the land Kūng Ma. The produce of the land was all to be for Mubang. In the year Wanli 12 (1584), the government troops (*guanbing*, i.e. Ming troops) captured Longchuan and pacified the previous land

⁸³ See Chapter Four, fn. 51.

⁸⁴ *Mingshi*, chapter 314, Liezhuan 202, Yunnan *tusi*, 2. 1974, vol. 27, pp. 8117. 《明史·卷三百十四·列傳第二百二·雲南土司二》。

of Moeng Ting and appointed Han Ge as prefect (*zhifu*). In the year Wanli 15 (1587), [the Ming court] issued the seal to Moeng Ting Prefecture. At the end of the Chongzhen reign (1628–1644), Moeng Ting revolted and surrendered to Burma. [As to the location of] its land [Moeng Ting], from the south to the Yao Pass (Moeng Long, Baoshan) is a journey of eight-day stages, to the west it joins to Longchuan (Moeng Wan, Dehong), to the east it joins to Moeng Laem Moeng Laem), and in the south is Mubang (Moeng Pòng, Shan State in Burma), and to the North is Zhengkang (in today's Lincang). The land [of Moeng Ting] is not fertile and the population is sparse. There is a fortified city known as Ma Yuan Cheng. Under its jurisdiction is one Pacification Commission (*anfu si*) called Kūng Ma, which was established in the year Wanli 12 (1584). Meng Han was appointed the Pacification Commissioner (*anfu shi*) [of Kūng Ma]. The Zhali River is the border between Moeng Ting [and Kūng Ma]; Moeng Ting is in the south and Kūng Ma in the north. After the death of [Men] Han his younger brother Han Jin was the seal holder. [He] paid tribute to [the Ming court] repeatedly. During that time Si Li of Mubang created troubles. Depending on the support of Han Jin, [he] invaded Wandian (Moeng Ya, Baoshan) and Zhengkang. In the year Tianqi 2 (1622), the Burmese attacked Mengnai (Moeng Nai) and Menggen (Chiang Tung). Han Jin intended to rescue them. The Burmese transferred the troops to attack [Han] Jin [instead]. [After Han] Jin had bribed them heavily [the Burmese troops] retreated. As it is said, later [Kūng Ma] and Han Zheng of Mubang created troubles with one another relentlessly.⁸⁵

初，孟璉與孟定皆麓川地，其土目皆故等夷，惡相屬；後改孟璉隸雲南，多以互侵土地仇殺。宣德六年，土知府罕顏法以為言，勅黔國公沐晟遣官撫諭，俾各歸侵掠。正統中，麓川叛，孟定知府刀祿孟遁走。木邦土官罕葛從征有功，總督王驥奏令食孟定之土。嘉靖間，木邦罕烈據地奪印，令土舍罕慶守之，名為耿馬；地之所入，悉歸木邦。萬曆十二年，官兵取隴川，平孟定故地，以罕葛之後為知府。十五年，頒孟定府印。崇禎末，孟定叛，降於緬甸。其地，自姚關南八日程，西接隴川，東連孟璉，南木邦，北鎮康。土瘠人稀，有馬援城在焉。領安撫司一，曰耿馬。萬曆十二年置，以們罕為安撫使。與孟定隔喳哩江。孟定居南，耿馬居北。罕死，弟們罕金護印，屢奉朝貢。時木邦思禮作亂，侵灣甸、鎮康，倚罕金為聲援。天啟二年，緬人攻猛乃、孟良，罕金欲救之。緬移兵攻金，金厚賂之，乃解。後與木邦罕正構難不絕云。

⁸⁵ *Mingshi* Chapter 313, *liezhuan* 210, *Yunnan tusi* 1. 1974, pp. 8082. 《明史·卷三百十三·列傳第二百一·雲南土司一》

The Zhanda, Longchuan, Mengmao, Mangshi, and Zhefang of Yongchang and the Moeng Ting, Moeng Laem, Kung Ma, and Pu'er of Cheli, apart from the [above mentioned] several aboriginal offices (*tusi*), there are Bolong, Yangzi, Yeren, Gendu, Kawa, and Puyi [tribes]. They live mixed with one another and are not Burmese. However, most of them are dependent on the Burmese. The aboriginal [officials of] the office (*tusi*) also gave some presents, the so-called "Hua Ma Li 花馬禮" (Dappled Horse Present), which was a time-honoured tradition. Until the Burmese had domestic unrest/civil war (*nei hong*), the custom was abolished. Weng Jiya (Alaungpaya *r.* 1753–1760) and his son wanted to restore the old custom. The [officials] of the various Aboriginal Offices (*tusi*) did not respond to it. [Thus, Weng Jiya] sent troops to harass their lands, and Puer was the first to be harassed. In the year Qianlong 28 (1763) Liu Zao was the provincial governor (*xunfu*) of Yunnan and E-er-ge-tu (*b.?*–1763) was appointed provincial military commander (*tidu*). In the winter of the same year (1600), the Burmese first sent Dao Paixin, the elder brother of Dao Paixian, who returned from Ava to Moeng Laem, to raise and demand money and goods. Furthermore, [he sent] the headman (*toumu*) Bubula and Han Hei of Mubang to Kung Ma to admonish their manner (責其禮). As to the Thirteen Banna of Puer, originally, they were land belonging to Cheli (Sipsong Panna). In the year Yongzheng 7 (1729), E-er-tai (O-er-tai, 1680–1745), the governor-general/*zongdu*) of Yunnan, persuaded them to submit. It was only then that the land was ceded to establish the prefecture. Until then the Burmese also came to demand rice. The regional commander (*zongbing*) of Yongshun, Tian Yunzhong, the regional commander of Puer, Liu Decheng, and the prefect (*zhifu*) Da Chengya dispatched an order to various [officials of] the aboriginal offices (*tusi*) and each of them was to lead troops to defend against them (Burmese). The headman Bubula was killed; Zhao Hanbiao and others, [including] the rest of the people dispersed and fled.⁸⁶

永昌之蓋達、隴川、猛卯、芒市、遮放，順甯之孟定、孟連、耿馬，普洱之車里，數土司外，又有波龍、養子、野人、根都、什伍、濮夷雜錯而居，非緬類，然多役於緬。土司亦稍致饋遺，謂之"花馬禮"，由來久矣。暨緬人內訌，禮遂廢。甯藉牙父子欲復其舊，諸土司弗應，乃遣兵擾其地，而普洱獨先有事。[乾隆]二十八年，劉藻為雲南巡撫，額爾格圖為提督。是年冬，緬人先遣刀派先之兄刀派新自阿瓦還至孟連，徵索幣貨，又遣頭目卜布拉、木邦罕黑至耿馬責其禮。普洱之十三板納者，本車里土司地。雍正七年，鄂爾泰總督雲南，招降之，始割其地置府。至是，緬人亦來索

⁸⁶ QSG, chapter 528, 14663.

米。永順鎮總兵田允中、普洱鎮總兵劉德成、知府達成阿檄土司各率兵禦之，殺其頭目蔔布拉、召罕標等，餘眾潰走。（〔民國〕趙爾巽纂：《清史稿》，卷五百二十八，列傳三百十三，屬國二，中華書局，1976年第1版，第14663頁。）

No.11

Two branches of golden flowers, each branch containing twelve gold flowers, weighing 3.2 taels;⁸⁷ two branches of silver flowers, each branch containing twelve silver flowers, weighing 3.2 taels; forty-two *Ban-ma-yin-pao* (silver *pao*)⁸⁸, weighing 3.2 taels; thirty-two *Ma-an bei-ru-zi jin-pao*,⁸⁹ weighing one tael; two bolts⁹⁰ of silk-satin, two horses, one hundred pieces of felts with patterns, three bags of needles, and one hundred bundles of dried persimmon cakes. These are the tribute gifts for the king.

Two branches of golden flowers, each branch contains six gold flowers and weighs 1.3 taels. Two branches of the silver flowers, each one containing six silver flowers, and weighting 1.6 taels; a set of twenty-one *Ban-ma jin pao* (golden *pao*), weighing 1.6 taels; twenty-one *Ban-ma yin-pao* (silver *pao*), weighing 1.6 taels; ten pairs of frog-head embroidered shoes, one bolt of silk-satin, and one horse. These are the tribute gifts for the king's mother.

One branch of golden flowers, with three golden flowers, weighing 0.8 taels; one branch of silver flowers, with three silver flowers, weighing 0.8 taels. Sixteen *Pan-ma yin-pao*, weighing 0.8 taels, one bolt of silk-satin, and one horse. These are the tribute gifts for the crown prince.

Gifts presented to the king for asking for permission to reside in a place: Four bolts of silk-satin, four horses, pure gold sixteen taels, and four big elephants; if no elephant is available 20 taels of silver is to be paid in lieu of each one.⁹¹

金花兩枝，每枝十二朵金花，重量三兩二錢；銀花兩枝，每枝十二朵銀花，重量三兩二錢；拌馬銀泡四十二個，重量三兩二錢；馬按背褥子金泡三十二個，重量一兩；綢緞二匹，馬二匹，花氈一百床，針三包，乾柿餅一百紮。這些是貢給國王。

⁸⁷ 3 *liang* 2 *qian*. One *liang* of gold is around 8 *liang* of silver; 1 *liang* of silver is approximately 37.3g in the Qing dynasty; therefore, 1 *liang* of gold is about $37.3 \times 8 = 298.4$ g of silver.

⁸⁸ *Pao* was a kind of unit of measurement, but I cannot find any further information about it.

⁸⁹ A type of cushion with gold used with a saddle.

⁹⁰ *Pi* is the measurement unit in ancient China. 1 *pi* is around 33.3 metres.

⁹¹ GJDC (2012, 123 and 310).

金花兩枝，一隻六朵金花，重一兩六錢；銀花兩枝，一枝六朵銀花，重一兩六錢；拌馬金泡一套共二十一個，重一兩六錢；拌馬銀泡二十一個，重量一兩六錢；蛙頭繡花鞋十雙，綢緞一匹，馬一匹。這些是貢給王太后。

金花一枝，有三朵金花，重八錢；銀花一枝，有三朵銀花，重八錢；拌馬銀泡十六個，重八錢；綢緞一匹，馬一匹。這些貢給王太子。

請求居住地盤向國王呈送禮品：綢緞四匹，馬四匹，黃金十六兩，大象四頭，無象每頭折銀二十兩。

No.12

The annual tribute raised is 30 taels of silver paid in lieu of corvee, 3.6 taels of silver for the fees of *zouping*, 2.52 taels of silver for the fees of *huohao*, 2 taels of silver for the fees of *pishou*, 0.58 tael of silver for the fees of *chefe*, and 0.8 taels of silver for the land taxes converted to silver. Every year only this amount of tax is raised.

Taxes raised from the Xiyi mine is 400 taels of good quality silver. 40 taels of silver (of which 2 per cent to 3 per cent of the silver are 90 per cent silver) is for the food and lodging of the regional office, 32 taels of silver is for the food and lodging of the prefecture, 24 taels of silver is for delivery fees; 8 taels of silver is the fees for labour services. If [the taxes commuted to silver] is to be delivered to the seat of the province (Kunming) by themselves (i.e. by the respective native officials), then it is unnecessary to deliver the transportation fees to the seat of the province.

每年納貢：差發銀兩三十兩，奏平銀三兩六錢，火耗銀二兩五錢二分，批收銀二兩，冊費五錢八分，永折糧八錢，每年就納這麼多了。

悉宜長課銀四百兩好銀，藩司房飯食銀四十兩（九成銀占二三），府房飯食銀三十二兩，解費二十四兩，差費八兩，若自解到布政（省），其解費不必交給府。

No.13

In the year Qianlong 52 (1787), the native Official of Gengma Han Chaoyuan [submitted a memorial] in which he reported: “On the opposite bank of the Gunnong [River] is Mubang of Burma (Moeng Pòng). The Burmese chieftain Meng Yun⁹² has pleaded to [be given permission] to pay tribute. [According to the

⁹² Namely Bodawpaya, the sixth king of the Konbaung dynasty of Burma, (r.1745–1819).

memorial] translated, [...] Meng Yun is well aware that what the father and son had done was wrong. [...] Hence, he repeatedly wants to tender his allegiance and pay tribute. However, because of the conflicts with Xianluo (Siam) and the transfer and construction of city and moat he has no time to prepare [for the matters on paying tribute].⁹³ Now that Burma is peaceful, he takes the opportunity to send his headmen to pay tribute and present a memorial, which is according to ancient etiquette.” [...] In the year [Qianlong] 54 (1789). [...] [Meng Yu] was conferred as the King of Burma [...] It is set that tribute is to be paid once in every ten years. Since then, the Burmese have not created trouble in the Southwest.⁹⁴

五十二年，耿馬土司罕朝瑗報言：“滾弄隔岸即緬甸木邦，緬酋孟雲……懇求進貢。譯其文，稱……孟雲深知父子行事錯謬，……屢欲投誠進貢，因與暹羅構釁，且移建城池，未暇備辦。今緬甸安寧，特差頭目遵照古禮進表納貢。”……五十四年封為緬甸國王……定十年一貢。自是西南無緬患。

No.14

The Zhanda, Longchuan, Mengmao, Mangshi, and Zhefang of Yongchang and the Moeng Ting, Moeng Laem, Küng Ma, and Pu'er of Cheli, apart from the [above mentioned] several aboriginal Offices (*tusi*), there are Bolong, Yangzi, Yeren, Gendu, Kawa, and Puyi [tribes]. They live mixed with one another and are not Burmese. However, most of them are dependent on the Burmese. The aboriginal [officials of] the office (*tusi*) also gave some presents, the so-called “*Hua Ma Li* 花馬禮” (Dappled Horse Present), which was a time-honoured tradition until the Burmese had domestic unrest/civil war (*nei hong*), when the custom was abolished. Weng Jiya (Alaungpaya *r.* 1753–1760) and his son wanted to restore the old custom. The [officials] of the various Aboriginal Offices (*tusi*) did not respond to it. [Thus, Weng Jiya] sent troops to harass their lands, and Puer was the first to be harassed. In the year Qianlong 28 (1763) Liu Zao was the provincial governor (*xunfu*) of Yunnan and E-er-ge-tu (*b.* ?–1763) was appointed provincial military commander (*tidu*). In the winter of the same year (1600), the Burmese first sent Dao Paixin, the elder brother of Dao Paixian, who returned from Ava to Moeng Laem, to raise and demand money and goods. Furthermore, he sent the headman (*toumu*) Bubula and Han Hei of Mubang to Küng Ma to admonish their manner (責其禮). As to the Thirteen Banna of Puer, the land originally belonged to Cheli (Sipsòng Panna). In the year Yongzheng 7 (1729), E-er-tai (or O-er-tai, *r.* 1680–1745), the governor-general/*zongdu*) of Yunnan,

⁹³ The Burmese conquered Ayutthaya in 1767.

⁹⁴ QSG, chapter 528, 14680.

persuaded them to submit. It was only then the land was ceded to establish the prefecture. Until then, the Burmese also came to demand rice. The regional commander (*zongbing*) of Yongshun Tian Yunzhong, the regional commander of Pu'er. Liu Decheng, and the prefect (*zhifu*) Da Chengya dispatched an order to various [officials of] the aboriginal offices (*tusi*) and each of them was to lead troops to defend against them (Burmese). The headman Bubula was killed; Zhao Hanbiao and others, [including] the rest of the people dispersed and fled.⁹⁵

永昌之盞達、隴川、猛卯、芒市、遮放，順甯之孟定、孟連、耿馬，普洱之車里，數土司外，又有波龍、養子、野人、根都、什佉、濮夷雜錯而居，非緬類，然多役於緬。土司亦稍致饋遺，謂之“花馬禮”，由來久矣。暨緬人內訌，禮遂廢。甕藉牙父子欲復其舊，諸土司弗應，乃遣兵擾其地，而普洱獨先有事。[乾隆]二十八年，劉藻為雲南巡撫，額爾格圖為提督。是年冬，緬人先遣刀派先之兄刀派新自阿瓦還至孟連，徵索幣貨，又遣頭目卜布拉、木邦罕黑至耿馬責其禮。普洱之十三板納者，本車里土司地。雍正七年，鄂爾泰總督雲南，招降之，始割其地置府。至是，緬人亦來索米。永順鎮總兵田允中、普洱鎮總兵劉德成、知府達成阿檄土司各率兵禦之，殺其頭目蔔布拉、召罕標等，餘眾潰走。[民國]趙爾巽纂：《清史稿》，卷五百二十八，列傳三百十三，屬國二，中華書局，1976年第1版，第14663頁。)

No.15

In the year [Guangxu] 17, 7th month (1891, August/September), the native prefect of Moeng Ting Prefecture, Han Zhongbang, and others were commissioned to open the roads and demarcate the borders so that the disputes could be permanently settled. Both parties ought to abide by the agreement and all the matters were concluded. The matters were dealt with rather satisfactorily, and peace was restored immediately. The Native Prefect of Moeng Ting, Han Zhongbang, who worked hard on the matter, was rewarded the title of Pacification Official of the Native Office. ... the native moeng of Menglian and the native headman of Mengyun Dao Jinhua were rewarded [the title of] native squad leader. [The titles and posts] were allowed to be hereditary. [The order] was directed to the native headman of Mengyun as a token of encouragement.⁹⁶

[光緒]十七年七月：委孟定土知府罕忠邦等前往開道割定界限，永杜爭端。兩造遵依，具結完壞，辦理尚赫，安速所有，在事出力之孟定土知府

⁹⁵ QSG, chapter 528, 14663.

⁹⁶ *The Sequel Draft of the General Gazetteer of Yunnan* vol.1–11 See also the online Chinese Text Project (中國哲學書電子化計畫): <https://ctext.org/dictionary.pl>, accessed on 24/06/2020.

罕忠邦著賞給宣撫司銜。[...] 孟連土猛、猛允土目刀金華著賞給土把總，准其世襲下猛允土目以示鼓勵。（《續雲南通志稿 卷 1-11》，pp. 361.）

No.16

[...] An imperial edict was directed to E-er-tai (b.1680–1745) to consult [with him about the matter]. In the year [Yongzheng] 4 (1726), [E-er-tai] submitted a memorial [in which he] said: “The great troubles in [the provinces of] Yunnan and Guizhou cannot be compared with that created by the Miao and the Man barbarians. [If we] want to pacify the people [we] must pacify the Yi barbarians. If we want to pacify the Yi barbarians [we have to implement the policy of] “replacing Native Officials with circulating officials. The Lancang River (Upper Mekong) is the boundary of Southwest Yunnan. Beyond the river, [to the right bank], are the various domains under Cheli (Moeng Lü or Sipsòng Panna), Miandian (Burma), and Laowo (Laos), and in the inside [on the left bank of the Upper Mekong] are Zhenyuan, Weiyuan, Yuanjiang, Xiping, Pu’er, and Chashan, [inhabited by] various *yi* barbarians. Their nests and dens are deep and remote. [The natives] haunt the region between Lukui and Ailao. In times of no incident (i.e. no trouble from outside) [we are] worried [because they are near to our heartland]; in times of troubles (i.e. a foreign incursion), [we are] worried that they might collude with foreign lands.⁹⁷ The decision made after discussion is: “Native officials (*tusi*) and not circulating officials (*liuguan*) should be used beyond the Upper Mekong River [right bank]; circulating officials and not native officials (*tuguan*) should be appointed on its’ inside [left bank].” This is the suitable way of controlling the *yi* on the frontier of Yunnan frontier.”⁹⁸

.... 詔諮鄂爾泰。[雍正] 四年春，疏言：“雲、貴大患無如苗、蠻。欲安民必制夷，欲制夷必改土歸流。……滇邊西南界以瀾滄江，江外為車里、緬甸、老撾諸境，其江內鎮沅、威遠、元江、新平、普洱、茶山諸夷，巢穴深邃，出沒魯魁、哀牢間，無事近患腹心，有事遠通外國。論者謂江外宜土不宜流，江內宜流不宜土。此雲南宜治之邊夷也。”

No.17

In the year [Yongzheng] 6 (1728) E-er-tai was the governor-general of the three provinces (Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan). The native sub-prefect, An Yufan, the native official prefect of Zhenyuan, Diao Han, as well as the chieftain and the native official of Zhele, the various headmen of Weiyuan Sub-Prefecture

⁹⁷ It means they are dangerous for the court because of the close distance.

⁹⁸ QSG. chapter. 288, 10230.

and Guangnan Prefecture, were dismissed one after another. However, incited by the clansmen and the headmen of the Diao clan, the Heiluo (Lahu) of Weiyuan rebelled again and killed Prefect Liu Hongdu. Hence, all the expelled native officials and headmen were sent into exile and resettled in other provinces. Moreover, the various recalcitrant gang of Luo (Lahu) in Weiyuan and Xinping were searched and extirpated. Furthermore, [troops] marched to the left bank of the Mekong River to exterminate the local Yi barbarians in Mengyang and Chashan. The military campaign is reminiscent of the great punitive campaign of 12,000 troops launched by Wang Ji (b. 1378–1460) of the Ming [dynasty against Mengyang]. The various barbarians considered that “since ancient times the Chinese troops had never come here”⁹⁹ [...] E Er-tai first sent a written call to arms to Cheli ordering the local soldiers to sever [the routes leading] beyond the river. The official troops armed with axes and spades opened up routes, burnt the fences, flooded the ditches, and captured the strategic passes one after another, and marched straight to Mengying (Moeng Yin) [...] Only the land beyond the Upper Mekong River (right bank) was returned to Cheli, and the land inside the river (left bank) was changed to be administered by circulating officials. Pu’er was elevated to [Pu’er] Prefecture and the Regional Vice Commander Xie was stationed there (at Pu’er) [...] Officials were appointed, and garrison soldiers were sent to Simao and Ganlanba to control the gates to Mengmain (Burma) and Laowo (Laos) [...] The native official of Menglian presented the Silver Mine Factory [to the Qing court] and the wild barbarians of Nujiang delivered hides and money. As to the two lands, Laowo (Laos) and Jingmai (Chiang Mai), they came to offer in tribute elephants. Miandian (Burma) was shocked.¹⁰⁰

[雍正] 六年，鄂爾泰總督三省，其土州安於蕃、鎮沅土府刁澣，及赭樂長官土司、威遠州、廣南府各土目，先後劾黜。惟刁氏之族舍土目煽糾威遠黑保復反，戕知府劉洪度。于是盡徙已革土司土目他省安置，並搜剿黨逆之威遠、新平諸保。……又進剿瀾滄江內孟養、茶山土夷，即明王驥兵十二萬，大舉再征，諸蠻驚謂“自古漢兵所未至者”也。鄂爾泰先檄車里土兵截諸江外，官兵持斧鋤開路，焚柵淹溝，連破險隘，直抵孟養。……惟江外歸車里土司，江內地全改流。升普洱為府；移沅江協副將駐之。于思茅、橄欖壩各設官戍兵，以扼蒙緬、老撾門戶。……孟連土司獻銀廠，怒江野蠻輸皮幣，而老撾、景邁二國皆來貢象，緬甸震焉。（《清史稿：卷五百十四，列傳三百一，土司三，p. 14,257–258》）

⁹⁹ For more details, see Liew (1996, 162–203).

¹⁰⁰ QSG, chapter 514, 14,257–258.

No.18

The regional commander (*zongbing*), Li Zongying, had just toured and inspected the frontiers (*xun bian*). [He] made a report complaining about the [shortages of grain] supplies [and said that] the problem was getting more and more complex, and the people suffered from it. The prefect (*zhifu*) Tong Shiyin wanted to travel across the hills to gather the grain provisions (*liang*) [...] Xingguo took off his headgear (*guan*), bowed and said: “The regional commander [attempts] to cultivate the people (*feng xing cao yan*). However, the strength of the people is exhausted. Please postpone it to the coming year. As a rule, the “foreign” people (*yiren*) are reluctant to sell their children; moreover, the tea [trade] has already been taken over by the government, and ways of borrowing or taking a loan are exhausted.” [Dong] Shiyin disagreed with him and chased [Xingguo] out. Xingguo was exasperated (*da nu*) and handed (*di*) his official attire [to the Prefect Dong Shiyin and said: “This attire is useless after death” [...] [He] plundered and besieged the city of Simao.¹⁰¹

總兵李宗應方巡邊責供，曰甚繁而民苦之。知府佟世蔭復欲過山聚糧……興國免冠頓首曰：“總兵風行草偃，民力已竭，請待之明年，夷人例不肯賣鬻兒女，茶又歸官，借貸路絕。”世蔭不然而斥逐之。興國大怒，褫其補服曰：“死耳，烏用此為”……劫之且圍思茅城。

No.19

The customs of Weiyuan were a mixture of the Han and Yi cultures. It was not easy to rule them all alike. [...] As for the Han Chinese, some of them came [to Weiyuan] to do business and became naturalised; some of them were [officials] exiled as soldiers [to this remote frontier and eventually settled in Weiyuan]. [Their] intelligent offspring mostly learned to read and write [easily] with half the effort but twice the results. Gradually the *yi* barbarians admired Chinese culture and learned to read and write. Many of their children were admitted to village schools. As regards capping ceremonies, marriages, funerals, and sacrifices as well as the annual or seasonal festivals their etiquette and coaches were the same in various places. They revered Confucian scholars and Confucianism.¹⁰²

威俗即雜以漢夷，而齊其政不易，……漢人有因商賈而來入籍者，有因謫戍而來入籍者，子弟聰穎者多讀書，事半功倍。夷人漸摩華風，亦知誦

¹⁰¹ Deng Qihua et al. (eds.) (2007, 267).

¹⁰² WYTZ (2016, 129)

讀。子弟多有入庠序者，至於冠婚葬祭以及歲時之禮輿各處同，崇儒重教。

No.20

In the year Daoguang 16, in the 12th month (Dec. 1832–early 1833) upon receiving orders [from the Qing court] the census of the vagrant people was made, and registers were compiled [...] The emperor decreed: “Someone submitted a report [to His Majesty] saying that the land of Yunnan is extensive. There are deep and dense forests as well as regions that are not yet developed. Many poor people have migrated there from Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Guizhou and constructed shacks to live in [...] These vagrant peoples are mostly found in the three prefectures, Kaihua, Guangnan, and Pu’er. Following the regulations, they are to be organised into the *baojia* 保甲 [system of mutual surveillance].¹⁰³ Yunnan is located in the extreme frontier region [of China]. Moreover, the three prefectures, Kaihua and others, are located on the extreme frontier of [Yunnan] Province. Great numbers of vagrant people from different places live intermingled with one another. If not investigated and [registered], they might become cunning bandits and the place muddy and dirty [...] The circumstances should be taken into consideration so that tablets (*pai*) can be issued according to their shacks and they can be organised into *bao* and *jia*.

道光十六年十二月奉文稽查流民造冊。……上諭，有人奏雲南地方遼闊，深山密菁未經開墾之區，多有湖南湖北四川貴州窮民往搭寮棚居住，……此等流民于開化、廣南、普洱三府為最多。請仿照保甲之例，一體編查等語。雲南地處邊陲，開化等三府又系該省極邊之境，異鄉流民紛紛雜處，若不設法稽查或致奸匪涵跡。……並著體察情形，應如何按寮給牌，編立保甲之處。

No.21

The second memorial submitted for the plan of controlling the local people of Yunnan:

“In Yunnan Province the indigenous peoples and the Chinese (Han) are intermingled. It is most difficult to rule them. The one who rules Yunnan has to first control rule the indigenous peoples. When the indigenous peoples have been pacified, then it is easy to rule the people of Yunnan. Therefore, past policy has been to use barbarians to control barbarians. Native officials have their own land and people [...] They often fight for hegemony and pursue vendettas against one another. [...] The [posts of] native officials are hereditary, and not elected. The

¹⁰³ See Chapter Four fn.139.

power of grandfathers passes on to their offspring [...] They do not know what [the four classics] on poetry, history, rites and ritual are about. [They are accustomed to] cheating their superiors and ill-treating their inferiors [...] [They should be] ordered to attend Confucian Schools to learn ritual, and inheritance [of the position of native official] should be recommended directly by the Confucian School. The ambitious offspring of the lineage who aspire to further their careers should be permitted to sit for the [examinations together with [the Han Chinese candidates] at the prefecture and county level. They should be given the opportunity to go sightseeing in China proper so as to encourage them on the path of achieving fame via officialdom [...] The unworthy should be demoted or expelled depending on the situation, while the virtuous should given a rank or granted official attire. However, the present-day native official is not the same as the native officials of time times when peace had prevailed for a long time and there had been no wars. I have investigated the situation thoroughly and planned cautiously [...] [In this way] the yi barbarian customs [of the native officials] can be joined [with the Qing standards].”¹⁰⁴

籌滇第二疏 制土人

滇省漢土交錯，最稱難治。治滇省者，先治土人，土人安而滇人不足治矣。……故從來以夷治夷。……土司各有土地、人民。……往往爭為雄長，互相仇殺。……土官以世系承襲，不由選舉，其祖父勢利相傳，其子弟。……不知詩書禮儀為何物，罔上虐下。……令赴儒學習禮，即由儒學起送承襲，其族屬子弟有志上進者，准就郡邑一體應試，俾得觀光上國，以鼓舞於功名之途。……不肖者降革有差，賢者增其秩或賜之袍服。……總之，今日之土司，非尤夫承平日久之土司，臣熟察情形，悉心籌劃。……而夷俗之身心交戩矣。

¹⁰⁴ Fang Guoyu et al. (eds.), vol. 8 (2001, 425–427).

No.22

English translation:

Moeng Laem Census of 1920s

Place (Romanised)	Place (transcribed)	Number of households	Kha households
Wiang Luang	เวียงหลวง	77 households	
Moeng Wai	เมืองหวาย	24 households	
Thoencha	เทินชา	20 households	
Wiang Tai	เวียงใต้	102 households	
Lum Tai	ลุมใต้	11 households	
Lum Nüa	ลุมเหนือ	9 households	
Hua Kat	หัวกาด	32 households	
Ban Khang Ban Sa	บ้านข้างบ้านสา	27 households	
Hang Wiang	ห้างเวียง	11 households	
Wat Luang	วัดหลวง	23 households	
Ban Khòì	บ้านขอย	37 households	
Hò Kham	หอคำ	70 households	
Wiang Kaeo Tai	เวียงแก้วใต้	21 households	
Wiang Kaeo Nüa	เวียงแก้วเหนือ	20 households	
Ban Kuai	บ้านก้วย	20 households	
Khwaen Mai	แคว้นใหม่	16 households	
Ban Khuang	บ้านขวง/ขวาง/ขว้าง	21 households	
Chiang Khoeng	เชียงเค็ง	22 households	
Chum Nüa	ชุมเหนือ	33 households	
Ka Laeng	กาแล้ง	12 households	
Hua La	หัวละ	20 households	6 Kha households
Moeng Pit Tai	เมืองปิดไท	22 households	35 Kha households

Lang Tai	lang tai	12 households	
Lang Nua	lang nua	43 households	39 Kha households
Ban Noi	ban noi	6 households	
Ban Kat	ban kat	30 households	
Pha Tang Nua	pha tang nua	34 households	
Pha Tang Tai	pha tang tai	12 households	
Ban Lao	ban lao	15 households	
Ban Chang	ban chang	30 households	
Ban Yang	ban yang	30 households	
Ban Cang	ban cang	52 households	
Hua Cit (2 villages)	hua cit	24 households	
Ban Pang (2 villages)	ban pang	27 households	
Pung Phiang	pung phiang	17 households	91 Kha households
Nam Noi	nam noi	10 households	
Ban Hin	ban hin	30 households	8 Kha households
Wiang Yon Pha Khiao	wiang yon pha khiao	21 households	3 Kha households
Huai Ok	huai ok	13 households	4 Kha households
Huai Kut	huai kut	8 households	5 Kha households
Ban Ching	ban ching	15 households	3 Kha households
Ban Phaem	ban phaem	11 households	
Ban Kai	ban kai	83 households	11 Kha households
Khwaen Chiang Hin (3 villages)	khwaen chiang hin	78 households	104 Kha households
Khwaen Chiang Mai, incl. Moeng Yen	khwaen chiang mai	90 households	
Ka Laeng Nam Kaep Pak	ka laeng nam kaep pak		36 Kha households
Nam To	nam to	82 households	
Khwaen Rai Pak	khwaen rai pak	74 households	
Ngon Luang (3 villages)	ngon luang	360 households	

Nam Chan Pakut	น้ำชันปากุด	86 households	
Khwaen Luang Hai Tòng	แคว้นหลวงหายตอง	142 households	
Khwaen Thanga	แคว้นธงา	60 households	
Pha Bak	ผาบัก	20 households	4 Musoe households
Khwaen Tai	แคว้นใต้	386 households	
Khwaen Pang Sun	แคว้นปางสุน	30 households	14 Ruya households 6 Kha Ya households
Hua Ya	ห้วยยา	32 households	
Pang Taeng	ปางแตง	24 households	
Huai Haeng	ห้วยแฮ้ง	10 households	
Sam Nga	สามงา	26 households	
Khong Ang	ขงอาง	32 households	
Pha Haen	พาแฮน	12 households	
Ban Luang Chang Lao	บ้านหลวงช่างเหล้า	40 households	
Khang Chum Nua	ขางชุมเหนือ	7 households	
Thong Chang Ban Nòng	ทองช้างบ้านหนอง	20 households	
Hua Ngae	ห้วยแ่ง	20 households	
Hok Wiang Sang	หอกเวียงซาง	103 households	
Nòng Chai	หนองไช	8 households	
Moeng Ma (Tai and Kha)	เมืองมาทั้งเข้าทั้งไท	989 households	
Moeng Nga (Tai and Kha)	เมืองง่า ทั้งไททั้งเข้า	482 households	

Modern Thai transcription:

Moeng Laem Census of 1920s

- เส้นล่างเรินเมืองมีหนี่แล 11 เข้าขุน เวียงหลวง 77 เริน || เมืองหาย 24 เริน

เทินซา 20 เรินแล

-
2. เจ้าขุนเวียงไต้ ปากปาย 2 เริน || คนลุมไต้ 11 เริน || คนลุมเหนือ 9 เริน แล
 3. หัวภาค 32 เริน || บ้านข้างบ้านสา 27 เริน || ห้างเวียง 11 เริน || วัดหลวง 23 เริน
 4. บ้านขอย 37 เริน || ขุนลูกออนชายหอคำ 70 เริน || เวียงแก้วไต้ 21 เริน || เวียงแก้วเหนือ 20 เริน
 5. บ้านก้วย 20 เริน || แคว้นใหม่ 16 เริน || บ้านขวง 21 เริน

ลูกออนชายเชียงเค็ง 22 เริน

6. ชุมเหนือ 33 เริน || กาแล้ง 12 เริน || หัวละ 20 เริน || เม็งปิดไท 22 เริน || ลางไต้ 13 (?) เริน
7. ลางเหนือ 43 เริน || บ้านน้อย 6 เริน || บ้านภาค 30 เริน ผาตั้งเหนือ 34 เริน || ผาตั้งไต้ 12 เริน
8. บ้านเลา 15 เริน || บ้านข้าง 30 เริน || บ้านยาง 30 เริน || บ้านจ้าง 52 เริน || หัวจิต 2 บ้าน 24 เริน
9. บ้านปาง 2 บ้าน 27 เริน || ปุงเพียง 17 เริน || น้ำน้อย 10 เริน || บ้านหริน 30 เริน || ข้า 8 เริน
10. เวียงขอนแก่น 21 เริน ข้า 3 เริน || หัวยอก 13 เริน ข้า 4 เริน || หัวยอกุด 8 เริน ข้า 5 เริน || บ้านชิง

15 เริน

11. ข้า 3 เริน || บ้านแกม 11 เริน || บ้านกาข 83 เริน ข้า 11 เริน || แคว้นเชียงหริน 3 บ้าน 78 เริน
12. แคว้นเชียงใหม่หังเมงเขน (?) 90 เริน || ข้าเชียงหรินปากปาย 4 เริน || ข้าเม็งปิด 35 เริน
13. ข้าล้างเหนือ 39 เริน || ข้าหัวละ 6 เริน || ข้ากาแล้งน้ำแกบปาก 36 เริน น้ำตอ (?) 82 เรินแล
14. ข้าแคว้นรายปาก 74 เริน || จอนหลวงหังมวน 3 ปาก 60 เริน || น้ำชันปากกุด 86 เริน || ข้าปุงเพียง 91

เริน

15. แคว้นหลวงหายตองปาก 42 เริน || แคว้นรงา 60 เริน || ผาบัก 20 เริน || มูเซอ 4 เริน ||
16. แคว้นไต้หังมวน 3 ปาก 86 เริน || แคว้นปางสุน 30 เริน || รุยา 14 เริน || ข้ายา 6 เริน
17. หัวยา 32 เริน || ปางแดง 24 เริน || หัวยแห่ง 10 เริน || สามงา 26 เริน || ขงอง 32 เริน
18. พาแหน 12 เริน || บ้านถ่วงช่างเหล่า 40 เริน || ขางชุมเหนือ 7 เริน || ทงข้างบ้านหนอง 20 เริน || หัวแง
19. 20 เริน || ข้าหกเวียงขางปากปาย 3 เริน || หนองไซ 8 เรินแล เม็งงาทิงข้าทิงไท 9 ปาก 89 เรินแล
20. เม็งง่า หังไทหังข้า 482 เริน แล ||

Appendix Chapter Five

No.1

A memorial was submitted by a certain Yong and a certain Wu [to the throne], in which it is stated: To find out the situation of the border disputes between Moeng Laem *tusi* Dao Paigong and Tongjin (Zhang Fuguo, a Mahayana Buddhist monk) so that a decision could be made based on the evidence [...] On the order of dispatching Tongjin [started his journey] in the 7th month on the 20th day to come [...] On the 8th and the 17th day [...] [He] hurried to cross the river, and finally crossed the river (Mekong). [We, Your officials] forthwith entrusted the regional commander (*zongbing*) of Pu'er (Moeng Maen), Shu Cheng, the prefect of Shunning Prefecture, Fu Sang'a, the sub-prefectural magistrate of Weiyuan [Sub-Prefecture], Liu Dading, to wait for [Tongjin] at Mengjia (Moeng Ka, Moeng Bò). When Tongjin arrived his words and actions, according to the report, were rather humble. Thereupon, he was questioned about the reasons why he occupied the borderland of Moeng Laem.¹⁰⁵

永某、烏某奏摺，為查明孟連土司刀派功與銅金爭界實在情形、據情斷結……銅金於七月二十日間始遵調來……八月十七日……即趕渡過江，臣等即令普洱鎮總兵書成、順甯府知府福桑阿、威遠同知劉大鼎，在猛戛等候……嗣銅金到來，言語動作，俱報恭順，隨訊其因何佔據孟連地界緣由。

No.2

Allegedly, Tongjin was originally a monk. He was not in any association and did not have any adherents; he was also not affiliated with outsiders. How could such a matter as fighting for, grabbing, and occupying the land of the aboriginal official happen? The reason is that Tongjin was initially living in the region of Nanxing. In the year Jiaqing 5 (CE 1800), the Luohei (Lahu people) caused troubles. On the admonition of Master Shu (Shu Cheng), [Tongjin] was advised to discipline and advise the Yi peoples there. Previously, [the Yi peoples] still obeyed Tongjin. Thus, they listened to the control and advice of [Tongjin]. For three years no trouble was created. All people obeyed law and order and were peaceful. During the past three years, everyone maintained peace, and no one provoked [the Moeng Laem *tusi*]. Concerning these Yi people, the Moeng Laem *tusi* is not good at pacification; moreover, [he] imposes heavy taxes on these Yi people. It caused the Yi to feel disgruntled and disobey the [Moeng Laem *tusi*'s] order; they are reluctant to pay money and send grain to the Moeng Laem *tusi* and are unwilling to pay the labour tax. These Yi people almost broke the law,

¹⁰⁵ Zhou Zhongyue and Long Yun (1949, Vol. 176, *tusi kao* 4, shiguan 1, section 13, pp. 185–186).

[fortunately], Tongjin tried his best to dissuade and threaten them. [The Yi people] have not caused trouble [since then].

Moreover, Tongjin lives in Moeng Laem, he is the acting headman who governs these Yi people. Namely, he is like the headmen of the subordinate of Moeng Laem. That is why he is esteemed in Moeng Laem [by the *tusi*] and has received the petitions [from the Moeng Laem *tusi*]. There is not any infringement [of the land]. [You] can ask the Moeng Laem *tusi* and the headmen of the three Meng (*moeng*) and five Quan (*khawen*); if Tongjin's behaviour has any irregularity, he will plead guilty.

據稱：銅金本系僧人，並無黨羽，亦無外人附會，豈有爭搶佔據土司人地之事。緣銅金本在南興一帶居住，嘉慶五年（1800）猓黑滋事，奉書大人諭，令勸化約束彼處夷人，向日尚信服銅金，故即聽從約束勸化，至今三年以來，實無一人滋事，俱各安靜守法。至該處夷人，因孟連土司不善撫綏，兼多派累，以致該處夷人等，人心難棄，所有應交土司之山水錢糧，不肯交納，亦不服其差派，幾欲不法，銅金亦曾經極力恐嚇，飭阻，未致滋事。況銅金既在孟連地方居住，代為約束其人，即同孟連屬下之土目無異，故于孟連處，向日亦甚尊他，給他稟帖，並無強霸之事，只求問孟連土司、並三猛五圈之頭人，銅金如有不法，情甘認罪等語。

No.3

The headmen of three Mengs (*moeng*) and five Quans (*khwaen*) followed [our] orders and crossed the [Mekong] river. [We] questioned them one by one. [The headmen's replies are the following]: The Yi people were the subordinates of the Moeng Laem *tusi*. Nevertheless, the Moeng Laem *tusi*, Dao Paigong, imposes heavy taxes on [us]. If we paid the taxes [, we would] pay over 100 liang of silver. [However], if the *tusi* increases the taxes exceeding 1000 *liang* of silver, [we are] afraid of his control. Since Tongjin has been appointed to administer us, [he] treats [everyone] equally, everyone recognises his superiority. [Therefore,] he did not encroach on [our land]. Besides, he is alone, and we have over 20,000 Yi people. How could he force us to obey him? Indeed, we are willing to live peacefully; we obey him. We are peaceful and honest; we are afraid of betraying the Moeng Laem *tusi*.

[We (the Qing officials)] questioned them (the Yi people) again: [You] did not betray the Moeng Laem *tusi*. [You] are only scared [by] the heavy taxes imposed by the Moeng Laem *tusi*. Although [you] disagree with the harsh taxes, the taxes of the mountain and rivers which [you] should pay. [If you] live in the territory [of Moeng Laem], [and] are unwilling to pay the taxes, it means [you] betray the *tusi*.

[The headmen's replies are as follow is]: We are fooling the Yi people; we do

not know this principle. Now we get [your] instruction, and we will obey it. All the taxes which we ought to pay, if [we] still have to pay them to the Moeng Laem [tusi] directly, he will still blackmail us. Now [we] are willing to pay them to the local governor or transmit taxes to the Moeng Laem [tusi] through the local government, because we are the subjects of the Imperial court. Then our party will not be affected.

其所傳之三猛五圈各頭人，亦俱遵調，陸續過江前來，復一一訊問，據稱：夷人等本系孟連土司所屬之人，實因孟連土司刀派功連年苛派逼甚，即如每年我們應交錢糧，不過一百餘兩，土司每年要加收至一千餘兩，實在眾人怕歸土司管束，自委銅金管束我們以來，實在公道，眾人心服，是以情願聽他管束，並無強逼霸佔之事。況銅金孤身一人，我們眾裸有二萬多人，他如何能把我們強逼歸他，實在是我們都情願各圖安靜度日，是以歸他管教，我們這項人內，並無再有生事的，我們實在並未敢叛離孟連土司等語，復訊以爾等既未叛離土司，不過是土司苛派逼甚懼怕，雖不聽其苛派，而每年應交之山水錢糧，豈可意不交土司收納；居其地，而不交錢糧，即以叛出無異。據稱：我們愚蠢夷人，實在不知此理。今即明白曉示，我們豈敢不遵，所有山水錢糧，原是該交的，若仍在孟連處上納，他仍是勒索受累我們，既以歸天朝，情願將錢糧交與內地地方官，或轉發孟連，我們方不致受累。

No.4

The [officials of] the township (*Zhen*), prefecture (*fu*), and other places received a decree (*yu*), and they were instructed that the amount of land taxes (*fu*) [commuted] to money that was raised ought to be given to the Moeng Laem *tusi*. If the [land taxed commuted to cash] raised [from various places] were to be collected by inland [officials]. Does this mean that the inland officials have to collect the money instead of land taxes on behalf of Moeng Laem? It is even more against the principle. All of you still need to reflect on the matter again.

Considering these replies of the various headmen (*turen*) [to the instruction], all the Yi people are very grateful. However, in the future, if we are to deliver the land taxes converted to money personally to the *tusi* we are indeed frightened. We are willing to be placed under the control of Tongjin [so that] we could pay the land taxes converted to money to Tongjin instead of paying it to the Moeng Laem *tusi*. Tongjin was to deliver the taxes to the *tusi* [for us]. In this case, we could avoid being incriminated.

[We] enquired after Tongjin and learned that Tongjin, in fact, lived here. The various Luoyi (lit. Ape-Barbarians, i.e. Wu-man, lit. Black-Barbarians) ought to pay the *tusi* land taxes converted to money, but Tongjin has to pay [the tariffs]. Besides, since he controls the people, he should be treated equally to the *tusi* and

aboriginal headmen (*tumu*). Thus, [he] always respects the [Moeng Laem] *tusi*. Moreover, [he has been] granted the favour to leave monkhood and resume secular life. [His] name is changed to Zhang Fuguo. [He has been] given a seal [of authority] (*chuoji*). In case of an incident, he could write a letter to the Moeng Laem *tusi*¹⁰⁶, using the formality of submitting a subordinate report to a superior (*bingtie*). He addresses himself as aboriginal headman Zhang Fuguo. Hence, he is considered subordinate to Moeng Laem and concedes the matter of land taxes converted to the money of his region, and he has to deal with it. Now, all the Luohei (Lahu) peoples want to deliver their taxes to Zhang Fuguo to be forwarded to the Moeng Laem *tusi*. Zhang Fuguo is willing to collect the taxes and then forward the total amount to Moeng Laem. Checked and received, and other words will be stated.

Zhang Fuguo and the various headmen forthwith agreed to the instruction and signed the (mediation) paper ... Moreover, after repeatedly being urged to turn up to the meeting, the Moeng Laem *tusi* did not show up, which is unreasonable ... In Moeng Laem, the *tusi* and others have always obeyed Burmese monks (Theravada Buddhism) and do not obey Chinese monks (Mahayana Buddhism). In the past, [the monks] were chased away by the *tusi*, and the temple was demolished. After the death of Gai Xin [a Mahayana Buddhist monk], his disciple Tongjin lived at the border region of Nan Zha and He Zha, and other places under the jurisdiction of Moeng Laem.

臣等復令。鎮府等諭以此項錢糧，是孟連土司所應收，若內地收納，豈非內地代孟連收徵錢糧，更非體制，爾等尚須再斟酌。

復據各頭人儉，稱如此吩咐，夷人無不感激，但以後錢糧，夷人意去交納土司，實在害怕。我們既願聽銅金管束，我們應交土司的錢糧，即交銅金轉交土司，庶免眾人受累等語。

詢問銅金，據稱銅金既在此居住，不特眾猓夷應交土司的錢糧，即銅金亦應交納。況如今管束其人，即與該土司土目無異，是以向來亦甚敬土司，況今已蒙施恩准令還俗，更名張輔國，曾給又戳記，遇有事件，給孟連土司信，都用稟帖，自稱土目張輔國，如今既算孟連所屬，其該處錢糧事，即說不得不管，今眾猓黑既如此說，要在張輔國處轉交，張輔國情願收齊每年如數轉送土司查收等語。張輔國並眾頭人，當即各具甘結遵依呈遞。…況孟連土司，屢傳並不到案，已屬無理。…孟連地方，該土司等向服緬僧，不服漢僧，從前經土司折廟驅逐，改心故後，其徒銅金，即在孟連所屬邊界南乍等賀乍等處居住。

¹⁰⁶ That means Zhang Fuguo admits that he is the subordinate of the Moeng Laem *cao fa*.

Appendix Chapter Six

No.1

[...] According to the report of the [Tengyue] (today Tengchong) Regional Commander Ding Huai and Daoyuan Wu Qizhen: on the 23rd day of month 4 [...] Mubang *tusi* (Burmese: Theinni, in the northern part of the Shan states) from the outside the border named Zhong Wenyuan who came from Moeng Mao (Moeng Mao) to beg to see [the leading officials]. [He] claims that [Mubang] was once subordinate to China, [but] it has fallen into the hands of Burma. [He] rules 49 *moeng* (*müang*). Every *moeng* has 2,000–3,000 households (*hu*). [They] choose one able-bodied person from each household; thus, they could raise over 10,000 [soldiers]. Now, Burma does not have a king [any longer]. [They] decided to be [our] subordinates. If they were granted the chance to be subjects of China, they would serve as guardians of [our] borderline [...] [I] (Cen Yuying) has confirmed that though the British have occupied the Burmese capital, [they] are resented by the population. It looks like [they] will not be able to pacify the country in any time short. Mubang is a strategic passage in northern Burma. [It] shares a boundary with the Zhefang *tusi* situated in the territory of Yunnan. [It] was a former *Jimi*¹⁰⁷ aboriginal prefecture in the Ming dynasty. [Then it] was transformed to be a Pacification Commission. Finally, it was conquered by Burma. In the Qianlong Year 31 (1766), its chieftain Han Songfa led his people to surrender and then integrate into Burma. Now, the Chinese and British have a good relationship. [Thus,] if we heed the request of *tusi* Zhong Wenyuan, [it will] probably create suspicion. Suppose we reject, [it is] worrying that [he] may lead his people to surrender to others, which would eventually become a threat to [our] borderline [...] [I] beg Empress and Emperor to instruct [me].¹⁰⁸

“…… 據總兵丁槐、道員吳其楨稟稱：四月二十三日，關外木邦土司鐘文源由猛卯前來求見。據稱該土司曾屬中華，淪陷於緬，所管四十九猛，每猛煙戶二三千家，按戶挑派壯丁，可得眾萬余，緬國無主，決計來投，如蒙中華收恤，自當效力邊陲等語。…… 臣查英人占踞緬都，民心未服，其勢驟難安輯。木邦為緬甸東路咽喉，與滇境遮放土司連界，前明為羈康土府，又改宣慰使司，後為緬甸所滅。國朝乾隆三十一年，其頭目罕宋法舉眾內附，後仍淪入千緬。目下中英和好，若許該土司鐘文源之請，恐啟猜嫌；拒之不納，又慮率眾別投，轉為邊關之患。……伏乞皇太后、皇上聖鑒訓示。

¹⁰⁷ See Chapter Two fn. 3.

¹⁰⁸ Cen Yuying (2005, 369–370).

謹奏。”

No.2

Cen Yujing issued a memorial (to the emperor) about the Renzuo *tusi*'s call for being rescued by [our] troops [...] The governor (Cen Yuying) memorialised that the Mubang *tusi* is asking to be (our) subordinate [...] The Renzuo [*tusi*] previously asked for military support, now Mubang is asking to be [our (the Qing court)] subordination. They are treading a dangerous path out of desperation. [They] sway between rebellion and subordination [...] Now, [I] have issued a decree to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conclude a new treaty with the British envoys, there is absolutely no reason to raise conflicts just because of one or two *tusi* [...] If any Burmese come to appeal for the same issue in the future [...] refer to decree: “The Chinese and British have retained a good relationship for years, [we] are unwilling to spark any frontier disputes” [...] These *tusis* should not appeal to [us] again. Pacify [them] with kind words, and the *Jimi* would not cease. All in all [...] it is, of course, not appropriate to display apparent rejection, nor it is to discuss subordination.¹⁰⁹

“諭軍機大臣等、岑毓英奏、稔祚土司請發兵救援壹摺。……茲據該督奏、木邦土司、呈請內附等語。……前稔祚請發兵。今木邦請內附。所謂鋌而走險。叛服無常。……現已飭總理各國事務衙門、與英使訂立新約。斷無為壹二土司、另生枝節之理。……嗣後緬人再有籲請如上項情事。……諭以中英和好有年。不肯輕開邊釁。……該土司等勿得瀆陳。撫以善言。羈縻弗絕。總之……固不宜顯示拒絕。亦不可輕議招懷。”

No.3

First, on the Trans-Salween section [see M15] of the Bhamo-Chinese frontier of the thirteen Trans-Salween Shan states, three only, namely, Mainglingyi, Kiangtung, and Kianghung, have a frontier facing that of Yunnan. Before proceeding to trace the boundary line, it will be useful to give a short account of the relations of these three States to China.

(1) Mainglingyi (Moeng Laem): Mainglingyi has been influenced by China since nineteenth century [...] This small Shan district, usually called Myenlyin, lies a march or two to south-east of Kengma (Küng Ma). But be this as it may, it is clear that the Chinese have exercised no interference whatever the affairs of Mainglingyi for at least a century. On the other hand, Mainglingyi has in recent times often been under the authority of Kiangtung when Kiangtung paid tribute to

¹⁰⁹ QSL, Dezhong *shilu* 12/7/3, 55: 99 a–b.

Burma; the present *sawbwa*¹¹⁰ of Mainglingyi was appointed by King Mindon and this state may be properly classed among Burmese dependencies.

(2) Kiangtung (Chiang Tung). –This state was undoubtedly tributary to Burma. Its chiefs were appointed by Burma, and in turbulent times the Burmese kings had a military presence in its capital.

(3) Kianghung (Chiang Rung). It is in respect of Kianghung that questions are most likely to arise when the question of delimitation is under discussion. Historically, [...] troops from Burma or Kiangtung have occasionally invaded Western Kianghung and compelled a temporary recognition of Burmese suzerainty; and that on one occasion at least (1878) a *sawbwa* of Kianghung was nominated by Burma [...] from 1730 onwards for many years Kianghung was under the direct administration of the Chinese Prefect at Pu-erh. In more recent times, Kianghung has been practically independent [...] Its *sawbwas* hold a high-sounding Chinese title the institution of which dates from the year 1387 AD; they refer essential questions to the Ssu-mao (Simao) official from arbitration; and according to Mr Bourne, who visited Ssu-mao in the winter of 1885, they still suffer the Chinese sub-prefect at that place to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the eastern portions of their State.¹¹¹

No.4

In both Meung Lem and Kaing Hung, the expression “China is our father and Burma our mother” is a stock diplomatic phrase, and it appears certain that, for a considerable period prior to King Mindon’s death, no chief of either state was regarded as duly and finally installed until he had been confirmed in his position by both Burma and China. So far as I am aware, there are no reasons for advocating the inclusion within our limits of any of the border states that owe undivided allegiance to China.¹¹²

No.5

For the last eight or nine years, however, the Chinese have devoted much more attention to their frontier dependencies, and all the *sawbwas* (*cao fa*, the Lord of the Heaven) now complain that they cannot raise enough money to meet the

¹¹⁰ Tai: *Cao fa*, literally: “Ruler of Heaven”.

¹¹¹ Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Trans-Salween section of the Burmo-Chinese frontier, dated Mandalay, 12 September 1888.

¹¹² From W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Mandalay, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, — No.11, dated 15 July 1888.

demands made upon them (Chinese officers) ... he longed for the old times when the states were free from Chinese inference.¹¹³

No. 6

The British claimed [they] could offer [us] the east bank of the Lu River [...] if we could take Nan Zhang (Lan Sang, notably the northern parts of present-day Laos) and the Shan [State] as [our] subordinate or let it be [our] frontier, [then we are in] an excellent position to pacify the minorities and guard [our] border [...] I have seen the latest Western map; it seems that Laowo (present-day Laos) had been ceded to Siam. If we merely accept this faux offering from the British, it does not mean we can genuinely control these territories [...] [We] should investigate if any polities in Laos remained independent instead of succumbing to Siam. [Only then can we] decide to accept [the British offer] or not.¹¹⁴

“英人所稱原讓潞東之地，…… 果能將南掌與拈人收為屬國，或列為甌脫之地，誠系綏邊保小之良圖。…… 臣閱外洋最新圖說，似老撾已歸屬暹羅。若徒受英人之虛惠，終不能實有其地…… 宜先查明南掌入暹羅之外，是否尚有自立之國，以定受與不受。”

No.7

The Shan State that was subordinated to Burma has a territory larger than that of Nanzhang (present-day Laos). It is somehow autonomous and does obey the pacification of China (Note: it is thus more “Sinicised” than Laos). If we take Shan State, then the border of Pu’er Prefecture and then Shun Ning Prefecture would be reinforced. As for the Bhamo area that Zeng Jize asked for, although the British did not want to release it, they did give tacit approval for [us to take the] old Bhamo area (Kokang, in Shan State), which leads to Da Jinsha Jiang (Irrawaddy River). If we do not fight for these areas in the future, or if we fight and fail, five concerns will arise. Under any circumstances, the person who does not gain loses. The discussion on border expansion was not done to enlarge the territory of China. I have heard that Burma leveraged its military strength and could not be pacified during the Qianlong Period; it annexed various regions near the border headed by rulers in Yunnan. [We have no idea about] the situation in Tengyue on the outer side of the eight barriers. The border at the Southwest corner [of Yunnan] has always been unclear. If we do not seek expansion, we might have let them [Britain]

¹¹³ Note by W. Warry, Esq., Political Officer, Bhamo, on the Trans-Salween section of the Burmo-Chinese frontier, – dated Mandalay, 20 September 1888.

¹¹⁴ Xue Fucheng vol. 1, (1894, 73).

invade [us]. This is the first concern. If we do not leave a bit of a buffer, they will certainly construct a railway that leads to the Yunnan border. Whatever happens, our action would be limited. This is the second concern. The upper Chang Jiang River (Yangtze River) originates from the small Jin Sha Jiang (Jinsha River). The source lies in Tibet and runs towards Yunnan, which is close to [our] border. The Western map called it Yangzi River. If we expand to take Big Jinsha Jiang (Irrawaddy River), we can still keep them (Britain) slightly away from our border. If we stand still on our current border, they can notice that the river source is close. [They] might try to [induce] overflow to sailboats into the Chang Jiang River to strive for commercial profits. This is the third concern. The British are good at running commercial ports. If we expand [our] border, then the business will be conducted in Burma. We can set up a custom point and collect tax in Burma to prosper together [with the British]. If we do not expand, then the business will be conducted in Yunnan. If they request to set up a concession, or consulate [in Yunnan], it will be hard for local affairs not to be affected. This is the fourth concern [...] Once they enter Yunnan, [they will] learn of Yunnan's rich mineral resources, which might bring out their devious side. This is the fifth concern [...] Since the British did not agree to Zeng's proposal of making Nan Zhang (the northern parts of present-day Laos), Shan State, and Da Jinsha Jiang (Irrawaddy River) designated public areas for both buffer zones and making Bhamo a custom station. [Vol. 528 Biography 315 Subordinate States 3: Burma, Siam, Nan Zhang (Laos), Su Lu (Saltanah Sulu)].¹¹⁵

“其向附缅甸之拈人，地实大于南掌，稍能自立，且素服中国之化。若收为我属，则普洱、顺宁等府边徼皆可巩固矣。至曾纪泽所索八募之地，虽为英人所不肯舍，其曾经默许之旧八募者，亦可为通至大金沙江张本。若将来竟不与争，或争而不得，窃有五虑焉。夫天下事不进则退。从前展拓边界之论，非谓足增中国之大也。臣闻乾隆年间，缅甸特强不靖，吞灭滇边诸土司，腾越八关之外，形势不全。西南壹隅，本多不甚清晰之界，若我不求展出，彼或反将勘入。壹虑也。我不于边外稍留余地，彼必筑铁路直接滇边，壹遇有事，动受要挟。二虑也。长江上源为小金沙江，最上之源由藏入滇，距边甚近，洋图即谓之扬子江。我若进分大金沙江之利，尚可使彼离边稍远。万壹能守故界，则彼窥知江源伊迳，或浸图行船，径入长江以争通商之利。三虑也。夫英人经营商埠，是其长技。我稍展界，则通商在缅甸，设关收税，亦可与之俱旺。我不展界，则通商在滇境，将来彼且来择租界、设领事，地方诸务不能不受其牵制。四虑也。……既入滇境，窥知矿产之富，或且渐生狡谋。五虑也。……既而英人不认允曾纪泽三端之说，谓普洱外边南掌、拈人诸地，及大金沙江为公用之江，与八募设关也。”

No. 8

¹¹⁵ QSG, chapter. 48, 14686–7.

Britain repudiated the previous agreement (with Zeng). Although they explained [the repudiation] based on the international treaty (the Burma Terms), the real reason is that the situation has changed [...] Last year the British army patrolled along the border of Yunnan to investigate the border and violated our territory [...] Zeng Jize once proposed to the British Foreign Office to make Da Jinsha Jiang (Irrawaddy River) the border, with the territories on the east bank put under the control of Yunnan. However, the British refused [...] I waited for a suitable time to raise our arguments for territorial expansion [...] [Britain] allegedly had agreed with the Indian government to make Mengding and Southwest Ganlanba, namely, Kokang, a Chinese concession, which is located between the Salween River and the Nan Ding River with a total acreage of 750 square miles. Then draw a straight line from the border of Meng Mao, including (the custom point of) Han Long Guan (now in Burma) eastward until the Salween River and Mali Ba (today the capital of Kokang), The area will be ceded to China, about 800 square miles. Then there are Cheli and Menglian, which is a large area that has always belonged to Yunnan. [We] recently have established a new prefecture, derived from Menglian, for the pacification of the border. The British [however] leveraged the fact the Menglian and Cheli have paid tribute to Burma to ask these be made shared territories. However, now they agreed to let us have full sovereignty via a treaty and will not raise any questions on it again. [Vol. 528 Biography 315 Subordinate States 3: Burma, Siam, Nan Zhang (Laos), Su Lu (Saltanah Sulu)].¹¹⁶

“英人自翻前議，雖以公法為解，實亦時勢使然。……前歲英兵遊弋滇邊，以查界為名，闖入界內。……曾紀澤曾照會外部，請以大金沙江為界，江東之境，均歸滇屬，英人堅拒不納。……臣相機理論，稍就範圍，……據稱已與印督商定於孟定橄欖壩西南邊外讓我壹地曰科幹，在南丁河與潞河中間，蓋即孟根土司舊壤，計七百五十英方裏。又自孟卯土司邊外包括漢龍關在內，作壹直線，東抵潞江麻栗壩之對岸止，悉劃歸中國，約計八百英方裏。¹¹⁷又有車裏、孟連土司，轄境甚廣，向隸雲南版圖，近有新設鎮邊壹廳，系從孟連屬境分出。英人以兩土司昔嘗入貢於緬，並此壹廳爭為兩屬，今亦原以全權讓我，訂定約章，永不過問。……”¹¹⁸

No.9

In the southeast of Yunnan, in the *Jimi* areas, the two biggest *tusi* are Cheli and Menglian. In recent years, a new prefecture named Zhen Bian was established to

¹¹⁶ Xue Fucheng, vol.2, (1894, 22).

¹¹⁷ In total it is over 1500 square miles.

¹¹⁸ QSG, chapter 48, 14686–7.

pacify the northern border of Menglian. There is only this one prefecture. The areas of Cheli and Menglian are equal (territory size) to four or five sub-prefectures in the inland. When the British officials and I debated on the status of Yeren mountain (Kachin Hill), the British Foreign Office leveraged the fact that Cheli and Menglian had paid tribute to Burma to claim control. They wanted to establish a new prefecture and designate it and the two *tusi* to be shared territories. I have looked upon the *Huidian* (Code of Great the Qing dynasty), and *Yitong Yutu* (Atlas of the Qing dynasty), Cheli, and Menglian have been parts of Yunnan for a long time. The new prefecture has just been established, and its vice sub-prefectural magistrate appointed. If we suddenly make these territories shared by both sides (the Qing court and Great Britain), [we do not have] this [administrative] system to put in place, so we have to stand firm on our stance. A moment later, the British Foreign Office convinced themselves to let China have full sovereignty over Cheli and Menglian. If [we] pacify and control [them] (Cheli and Menglian) suitably, [they would] guard [our] borderline and prevent spies from Britain, France, and Siam.

Moreover, Lin'an and Pu'er, the Simao and Yuanjiang prefectures could then be stabilised. Unfortunately, as soon as issues with the British were settled, here come the French. Recently, the French have forced Siam to cede the east bank of the Mekong River, and most parts of Cheli are situated there. The French have requested several times to demarcate the border with us. Although they claimed to have no intention to occupy Yunnan, if they knew about the talk made by the British, there is no guarantee that they will not follow suit. The British currently have only asked about it with empty words, and they have not gained any real benefits. Now, I am negotiating the treaty with the British, claiming Cheli and Menglian belong solely to China with nothing to do with the British. Once the treaty is signed, [I] will go as far as asking the British to be our witness to prove [that Cheli and Menglian are part of China]. The French always fear the powerful and prey on the weak. When they heard about how we spared no effort in fighting with the Russian for Pamir and the Yeren Mountain (Kachin Hill) with the British, it is hoped that they will proceed with the negotiation of demarcation peacefully with no arguments. Then the issue can be easily solved without much drama. Here is my memorial, Your Majesty.¹¹⁹

“再滇屬東南，羈縻之境，以車裏、孟連兩土司為最大。近年，新設鎮邊直隸廳，撫理孟連北境，計此壹廳，兩土司之地約可抵內省四五府。當臣與英廷爭論野人山地之時，英外部以車裏、孟連曾經入貢緬甸，亦堅索兩土

¹¹⁹ Xue Fucheng (reprinted 1975, 22–23).

司及新設壹廳，作為兩屬，以相抵制。臣查會典及壹統輿圖，車裏、孟連隸滇已久，鎮邊新設直隸廳同知壹官，若忽改為兩屬，尤屬無此體制，不得不盡力堅持。厥後，外部遂自轉圈，願以全權仍歸中國。果使撫馭得宜，固守封域，可以支格英法暹羅三國之窺伺，而臨安、普洱、思茅、元江諸府廳州當皆恃以無虞。不意英事甫定，法謀又起，近來法人迫脅暹羅割其湄江東岸之地，而車裏轄境之大半亦在湄江以東。法人疊次以分界為請。雖據稱並無侵占滇地之意，彼知英人饒舌於先，未必不思效尤於後。然英究僅有索問之空言，並未獲絲毫之實利。臣今正與英廷互商條約，聲明車裏全屬中國與英毫無干涉。約章壹定不吝借英助我作證。法人素性畏強侮弱。彼聞中國與俄爭帕米爾，與英爭野人山皆不遺余力，倘竟知難而退，僅請分化界限，以杜爭端，則和平互商自易辦理，不茲口舌，不起風波，尤善之善者也，理合附片具陳伏乞，聖鑒謹奏。”

No.10

Dear Sirs, we Burmese have been loyal to the Celestial Empire for generations and had been a Chinese vassal state. Unfortunately, last winter, the British played a ruse on us, captured our King and sent him to the United Kingdom. [Since then] they have occupied Ava city and the cities along the river (Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers), putting British officials in charge of national affairs. Therefore, the local headmen and the *tusi* joined forces to fight the righteous war to protect [our country]. [We have] fought several times. Nevertheless, the British ships and cannons are powerful, [we] cannot win. We are now holding down the land routes, but [we are] afraid that [we] cannot hold it for long. The situation has become critical, and we are helpless.

“敬稟者：我緬國恭順天朝數十代，原為藩屬。惟自去年冬，英人用兵詐將小王擒去，送往英國；占住瓦城並沿江各城，設有英官管理國政。是以各坐把土司會盟同起義兵，齊心固守，屢次打仗。因英國船炮皆利，不能取勝；陸路我等堅守，恐亦難久支，勢在危急，無可奈何。

Twice we have sent a representative to the Celestial Empire to ask for reinforcements. We have yet to hear any instructions [from the Celestial Empire], [we are] very anxious. Therefore, [we] are sending Amayi to go to Tengyue again. Please kindly [we] appeal to the Great Emperor of Heaven to send reinforcements and help us take back [our country]; or we beg [the Celestial Empire] to send a minister to the [Great] Britain for mediation, appoint another Burmese King to govern and pacify the people. Even though [we know that] the British have already occupied the waterway and will not retreat, we still hope to choose a Burmese King for the territory that we have not surrendered.

“前曾兩次專人前赴天朝求發救兵，至今未蒙指示，實深焦急。茲特復遣阿麻已等再赴騰越，務懇轉奏天朝大皇帝發兵救援，代為恢復；或懇求簡派大臣前往英國調和，另立緬君管政，安撫百姓。縱英國已占水路之地不肯退還。即將我等未降陸路之地擇立緬主，亦所至願。

Even if it means we have to pay rent and interest to the British every year, we will follow suit. If the British do not agree, we can only fight hard with our lives. If [we] win, there might be a chance for a change; if [we] lose, our good men and women are willing to submit to the Celestial Empire and live forever as a subject [of China]. We will not stand to be shamed by the British. We sincerely hope that Your Excellencies show sympathy for our broken country and deceased king. Our people have no one to turn to. The British frequently attack, we are in deep waters. Please kindly send a memorial to the Great Emperor as soon as possible; to send either reinforcements to take back [our country] or a minister to mediate [with the British]. If our appeal is answered, allowing the [country of] Burma to survive, that is all because of the grace of the Great Court of Heaven. We Burmese will be grateful for such mercy for thousands of generations.¹²⁰

即每年納與英國租息些須，亦無不遵。如英國皆不應允，則唯有拌命一戰，勝則或有轉機，不勝則我等男女情願投奔中華，永為子民，誓不受英人凌虐。萬望各位大人念我等國破君亡，百姓無依，英兵時常攻打，如在水火之中，即速奏明大皇帝，或發兵救援恢復，或派大臣前往議和，如蒙允准，俾緬祀得存，皆天朝錫（賜）予，我等緬民感恩戴德萬代矣。謹稟。”

¹²⁰ Huang and Bai punctuated (2005, 368).

Appendix Chapter Seven

No.1

[In Qianlong year] 52, the Gengma *tusi* Han Chaoyuan reported: On the opposite bank of Gunnong [River] is Mubang of Burma, Mengyun of Burma (namely Bodawpaya, the sixth king of the Konbaung Dynasty of Burma, *r.* 1745–1819) [...] pleaded for paying a tribute. [I] have translated his petition letter, it claims that Mengyun is the fourth son of Yong Jiya (Alaungpaya, the founder of Konbaung Dynasty). He was a monk when he was young. Mongbo is his older brother. Mengbo is dead, [his] son Zhui Jiayao (Singu Min, the second son of Alaungpaya) succeeded to the [throne]. Mengyun's second brother Menglu has taken the oath of Yong Jiya of "Agnatic seniority." Mongbo is dead and his son succeeded to [the throne] which was against the decree of [Yong Jiya]. Then, [he] killed Zhui Jiaoya and intended to take the throne. The ordinary people did not obey and killed Menglu, [the ordinary people] supported Mengyun to take the throne. Mengyun knows that his father and brothers made mistakes, [he] is appreciated by the great emperor's grace, [he] desires to pay tribute time and again. Due to the conflicts with Siam, and the moving and building of the city, [he] did not have time to prepare. Now that Burma is peaceful, [he] sent the headman to pay tribute according to the ancient etiquette." Governor Fu Gang and others have heard that the emperor agreed to this petition [...] [The emperor] set an interval of every ten years for one tribute. Since then, the Southwest has had not to be interfered with by the Burmese.¹²¹

五十二年，耿馬土司罕朝瑗報言：“滾弄隔岸即緬甸木邦，緬酋孟雲……懇求進貢。譯其文，稱孟雲乃甕藉牙第四子，幼為僧，憎駁其長兄也。憎駁死，子贅角牙立。孟雲次兄孟魯，以甕藉牙有兄終弟及之諭，憎駁死而子襲，非約，乃戕殺贅角牙，欲自立，國人不服，亦殺孟魯，迎孟雲立之。孟雲深知父子行事錯謬，感大皇帝恩德，屢欲投誠進貢，因與暹羅構釁，且移建城池，未暇備辦。今緬甸安寧，特差頭目遵照古禮進表納貢。”總督富綱等以聞，帝允所請……定十年一貢。自是西南無緬患。

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<https://ctext.org/ens> (the Chinese Text Project, which is an ancient manuscripts online library with a large number of digital classic texts)

<https://qingarchives.npm.edu.tw/index.php?act=Archive> (Qing Dynasty Archives Retrieval System)

<https://play.google.com/books/> (google e-books)

<https://archive.org/> (Internet Archive is a non-profit library of millions of free books, movies, software, music, websites, and more)

Abstract

This study constitutes a scholarly addition to the historical understanding of three Tai Nüa (alternatively known as Tai Noe) groups residing in the border region separating the mainland of Southeast Asia from southwestern China. The Tai Nüa, similar to the Thai and Lao, are part of the south-western group within the extensive Tai-Kadai language family. Their habitation is spread throughout the Malay Peninsula, southern China, northern Vietnam, and northeast India. Presently, the Tai Nüa predominantly reside in the remote southwestern region of the Chinese province of Yunnan, as well as in adjacent territories in Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos.

Starting in the late 14th century, the Tai Nüa, also known as the “Chinese Shan” in literature, relocated from their original region of Moeng Mao (now Dehong Prefecture) to southern areas. They established smaller communities like Moeng Laem, Kūng Ma, and Moeng Bò, which were greatly influenced by other Tai communities such as Sipsòng Panna (Tai Lü), Chiang Tung (Tai Khün), and Lan Na (Tai Yuan). The utilization of the Dhamma script, originating from northern Thailand, for Buddhist writings was indicative of this phenomenon.

This research investigates the historical, social, and cultural evolution of the three Tai Nüa communities mentioned above. It focuses on indigenous Tai and Chinese sources to analyze their interactions with one another and with neighboring Tai states, as well as the significant regional powers China and Burma (Myanmar). In the case of Moeng Laem, there was a temporary exercise of dual supremacy, characterized by overlapping sovereignties. Since the early 18th century, Moeng Bò (Jinggu), the northernmost region, has been politically and culturally connected to the Chinese heartland as a result of the territorial expansion of the Qing dynasty. Moeng Laem's integration into the Chinese Empire, however, can only be attributed to the division between Yunnan and Burma in 1894. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that Kūng Ma (Gengma) had established strong connections with Chinese dynasties prior to the transfer of this region to China as stipulated in the Anglo-Chinese boundary agreement of 1894.

In recent decades, there has been a notable emphasis on Western, Chinese, and Thai studies on the Tai areas of Dehong and Sipsòng Panna. However, there has been a noticeable lack of attention given to the three Tai Nüa villages that are the focal point of this dissertation. Hence, a key inquiry to be examined in this thesis pertains to the strategies employed by the Tai Nüa to sustain its autonomy as a political entity within the intricate political landscape influenced by the prevailing neighboring major powers of Burma and China throughout the pre-modern era. The objective of this study is to offer a thorough examination of the historical progression and interconnectedness between Burma and China throughout the 18th and 19th century. It is important to conduct a

comprehensive analysis of the dynamics between the Tai Nüa polities, the powers on the Southeast Asian mainland, and the Chinese dynasties in order to effectively evaluate their interconnections. Examining the subsequent historical progression of the three Tai polities offers valuable perspectives on the establishment of contemporary political demarcations between Southwest China and Mainland Southeast Asia. This dissertation makes a valuable contribution to the examination of political and social dynamics in a region characterized by the historical convergence of Southeast Asian empires and China over an extended period of time. Nevertheless, the analysis of these processes predominantly focuses on the viewpoint of the Tai communities themselves, rather than the people involved.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Arbeit ist ein Beitrag zur Geschichte dreier Gemeinwesen der Tai Nüa (auch: Tai Noe), die in der Grenzzone zwischen dem südostasiatischen Festland und dem südwestlichen China leben. Die Tai Nüa gehören wie die Thai und Lao zur südwestlichen Gruppe der großen Tai-Kadai-Sprachfamilie, deren Siedlungsgebiete sich von der malaiischen Halbinsel bis nach Südchina und von Nordvietnam bis nach Nordostindien erstrecken. Der größere Teil der Tai Nüa lebt heute im äußersten Südwesten der chinesischen Provinz Yunnan sowie in angrenzenden Gebieten in Myanmar, Thailand und Laos.

Seit Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts wanderten die Tai Nüa, die in der Literatur zuweilen auch als "chinesische Shan" bezeichnet werden, aus ihrem Kerngebiet von Moeng Mao (heute: Präfektur Dehong) in südlicher gelegene Gebiete aus, wo sie kleinere Gemeinwesen bildeten, wie Moeng Laem, Küng Ma und Moeng Bò, und dort stark von anderen Gemeinwesen der Tai wie Sipsòng Panna (Tai Lü), Chiang Tung (Tai Khün) und Lan Na (Tai Yuan) beeinflusst wurden, was sich u.a. in der Verwendung der ursprünglich aus Nordthailand stammenden Dhamma-Schrift für buddhisische Texte niederschlug.

Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die historische, gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung der o.g. drei Gemeinwesen der Tai Nüa anhand einheimischer Tai- wie auch chinesischer Quellen, ihre Beziehungen untereinander sowie zu benachbarten Tai-Staaten und den großen regionalen Mächten China und Burma (Myanmar), die im Falle Moeng Laems zumindest zeitweise eine duale Oberherrschaft im Sinne einander überlappender Souveränitäten ausübten. Das am weitesten nach Norden vorgeschobene Moeng Bò (Jinggu) war im Zuge der territorialen Ausdehnung der Qing-Regierung schon seit dem frühen 18. Jahrhundert politisch und kulturell mit dem chinesischen Kernland verbunden. Die Eingliederung von Moeng Laem in das Chinesische Reich kann hingegen erst auf die Demarkation zwischen Yunnan und Burma im Jahr 1894 zurückgeführt werden. Es ist jedoch anzumerken, dass Küng Ma (Gengma) schon vor der Abtretung dieses Gebiets an China im Rahmen des anglo-chinesischen Grenzabkommens von 1894 enge Verbindungen zu chinesischen Dynastien pflegte.

Während die westliche, chinesische und thailändische Forschung sich in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten stärker den Tai-Regionen von Dehong und Sipsòng Panna widmete, wurde den drei Gemeinwesen der Tai Nüa, die im Zentrum dieser Dissertation kaum Beachtung geschenkt. Daher soll die vorliegende Arbeit u.a. der Frage nachgehen, wie es den Tai Nüa gelang, inmitten des komplexen politischen Umfelds der dominierenden benachbarten Großmächte Burma und China in vormoderner Zeit als eigenständige politische Gebilde zu überleben. Es ist das Ziel, eine umfassende Analyse

der historischen Entwicklung und der Verflechtungen zwischen Birma und China im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert zu leisten. Um die Interaktionen zwischen den Gemeinwesen der Tai Nüa, den Mächten auf dem südostasiatischen Festland und den chinesischen Dynastien zu untersuchen, ist es notwendig, diese Dynamik detailliert zu analysieren. Die Untersuchung der späteren historischen Entwicklung der drei Tai-Gemeinwesen bietet Einblicke in die Entstehung der heutigen politischen Grenzen zwischen Südwestchina und Festland-Südostasien. Die Dissertation leistet somit einen Beitrag zur Erforschung politischen und gesellschaftlichen Prozesse in einer Region, in der seit vielen Jahrhunderten sich die Einflusszonen südostasiatischer Reiche und Chinas überlappten. Dieser Prozesse werden aber vorwiegend nicht aus der Sicht dieser Akteure, sondern aus der Perspektive der Tai-Gemeinwesen selbst untersucht.

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Declaration of Oath

Hereby, I follow §7 Paragraph 4 of the “The doctorate regulations for the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Hamburg.”

I confirm that I wrote the dissertation on my own, without using any other than the declared sources, references and tools. All passages included from other works, whether verbatim or in content, have been identified as such. The content of the presented dissertation has not been used as a whole for another scientific work or publication so far. If own publications have been included partially, they have been identified as such.

Lebenslauf

„Lebenslauf entfällt aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen“