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The formation of National Role Conceptions in regional institutions: the case of Brazil in MERCOSUR and Germany in the EU

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THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS IN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF BRAZIL IN MERCOSUR AND GERMANY IN THE EU

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whose life was cherished, and whose presence we miss.

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List of abbreviations

ALBA	Aliança Bolivariana para os Povos da Nossa América
ASEAN	Southeast Asian Nations
ASPA	Cúpula América do Sul-Países Árabes
BASIC	Brasil, África do Sul, Índia, China
BNDES	Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAMEX	Câmara de Comércio Exterior
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CASA	Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe
CET	Common External Tariff
CEU	Council of the EU
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMC	Council of the Common Market
CMG	Common Market Group
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EMBRAPA	Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	European Monetary Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESCF	Economic-Social Consultative Forum
EU	European Union
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community

FCC	Federal Constitutional Court
Fiocruz	Fundação Oswaldo Cruz
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IIRSA	Iniciativa para a Integração da Infraestrutura Regional Sul-Americana
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JPC	Joint Parliamentary Commission
MAS	MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat
MDIC	Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti
MTC	MERCOSUR Trade Commission
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SEA	Single European Act
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

*MERCOSUR is our home and we will take good care of it.*¹

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 2008

*History tells us countries that have a common currency never wage war against each other. That is why the Euro is much more than just a currency. Euro is the guarantor of a united Europe. Or in another words, if the Euro fails, Europe fails.*²

Angela Merkel, 2011

The quotes that open this doctoral thesis were declared by the president and by the chancellor of two of the most important countries in South America and Europe, Brazil and Germany. From these declarations, one can note how regional integration went beyond the usual aspects of material components and encompassed socially constructed notions. Regional institutions, from the words of Lula and Merkel, denoted aspects such as belonging - from the allegory of maintaining and cultivating a home -, and symbolic unification - from the claim that the Euro is not only a currency, but it prevents the outbreak of armed conflicts. MERCOSUR and the EU are amongst the largest regional trade agreements in the world, and the words of Lula and Merkel show how they are discursively represented in ways beyond economic aspects.

The beginning of the 1990s witnessed a series of initiatives of regional integration after the end of the bipolar order and the subsequent emergence of globalization. The then newly-found multipolar order enabled the formation of clusters of regional governance, either as the result of a long process, or as an enterprise of recently democratized political regimes. In this context, regions gained a new importance in the literature of International Relations. They can be thought in territorial, political, economic, military, and social terms. To restrain oneself to only one of those parameters could seem rather simplistic, as regions are dynamic entities that

¹ O Estado de São Paulo. Mercosul é estratégico para América Latina, diz Lula. December 23rd, 2008. Available at <https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,mercosul-e-estrategico-para-america-latina-diz-lula,298234>, accessed on October 23rd, 2019.

² BBC News. Merkel: "If the euro fails, Europe fails". September 7th, 2011. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-14827834/merkel-if-the-euro-fails-europe-fails>, accessed on October 23rd, 2019.

resulted from long periods of political endeavours. They are not only limited to geographical boundaries but, most and foremost, are intertwined by regional agreements.

We must not take the region as a cohesive unit and the regional institution as a static entity, but we must “unpack the region” (Van Langenhove 2012). Regions are the fertile ground in which regional institutions are created, what came to be known as regionalism. It is the top-down process of formalization of regional cooperation agreements, as states willingly create institutions and are formally bound to them. And as the institutions develop and gain more institutionalized features, they end up constraining the behaviour of states. This is the paradox of regionalism.

The understanding of regional integration in the last decade needs to account for the importance of ideational components that go beyond the usual realist accounts of power and self-interest, as the words from Lula and Merkel show. Studies on regionalism must also include the importance of elements such as ideas, values, and identity. While being socially constructed, the regional integration scheme is influenced by elements like history and culture, and it is thus transformed into a communal entity or an “imagined community” (Anderson 2006).

Furthermore, we must look at regionalism from the perspective of its foundational agents – the states – and how the perspectives of policymakers influence political decisions regarding regionalism. States can either create, shape, join (and exit) an organization as they “use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly” (Koremenos et al. 2001, p.762). Countries can foster the evolution of regional institutions, as they can act as leaders or “region-builders” (Van Langenhove 2011). It all depends on their domestic political and economic conditions, on their foreign policy goals, and on the agenda of the political party in command at the higher office. At the same time, the regional institution (structure) affects and it is affected by states (agents), in a process of co-constitution.

A part of the literature has delved on the intersection between regionalism and the analysis of individual (or hegemonic) states, such as Moravcsik (1993), Mattli (1999), Pedersen (2002), Bulmer and Joseph (2016), and Hulse (2016). Yet, their approaches differ from what is pursued here, either regarding the selected cases and the theoretical and methodological approaches, as it will be explained further.

1.1 Formulation of the research puzzle

From the universe of cases of regional institutions, according to the World Trade Organization (2017, p.147) the largest trading blocs are the European Union (EU), the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). If we take these five institutions and analyse the intra-regional relations concerning power struggles and potential leadership, we find the following scenario: in NAFTA, the United States plays the uncontested role of leader; in ASEAN, the ultimate influence comes from outside of the region, as China exercises a large influence; and South Africa portrays the undisputed role of regional leader of SADC. But in MERCOSUR and in the EU lies a thought-provoking puzzle: there are power polarities in each regional integration, with Brazil and Argentina in South America, and Germany and France in Europe. Argentina does not employ an active foreign policy towards MERCOSUR, and most of the time it acts as a counteractor to Brazil, whereas France is recognized as a leader and acts as such.

An assessment of the literature shows that Brazil and Germany present a contrast in their approach to the region and, therefore, an interesting puzzle: Brazil claims to be a leader as a “consensual hegemon” (Burgess 2008), however this classification has been contested by its neighbours; Germany shies away from the leader categorization and acts as the “reluctant hegemon” (Paterson 2011), even though its neighbours often claim for German leadership in times of crises. ***Simply put, Brazil and Germany face a question of self-recognition on leadership: one wants it, but cannot have it; the other has it, but does not want it.*** No other countries in Latin America nor in Europe face the same conundrum³.

Lula and Merkel, in contrast to their predecessors, put forward a more active foreign policy towards regional institutions. They both have endorsed political discourses that valued the importance of regional integration, as well as have played a major role in promoting the advancement of those institutions⁴. Equally, the rises of Lula and of Merkel demonstrate an alteration in the domestic political scenario, with different political parties rising to power⁵, and

³ This discussion is developed in Chapter 2, section 2.7, *Leadership and hegemony*.

⁴ In Brazil, the previous president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, put forward a foreign policy that was aligned with the neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus. The goal was to integrate Brazil into the international system by participating in international fora, what Vigevani et al. (2003) called “autonomy by integration”. In Germany, the previous chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder portrayed a more “realist” European foreign policy, concerned with preserving German interests. As Daehnhardt (2011, p.39) claims, “Schröder argued for a lessening of Berlin’s financial contribution to the Common Agricultural Policy [and] a delimitation of the powers of EU institutions”. The Foreign Minister of that period, Joschka Fischer, on the other hand, propelled a pro-European discourse (Bulmer 2010). One must not forget, however, that the focus of this doctoral research is on presidents and chancellors.

⁵ In the Brazilian political landscape, in the presidential elections of 2002 the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB) gave room to the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT). In Germany, the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) chancellorship was replaced by the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU). In both countries, governments are formed by coalition cabinets, although in a different manner: in Brazil, the coalitions are formed during elections and in Germany after elections.

better economic conditions than previously. Thus, their mandates represented periods of significant change.

Lula's rise to power was the first time a left-wing candidate won a presidential election since Brazil's re-democratization in the late 1980s. Domestically, a significant part of his political actions focused on income distribution programmes (*Bolsa Família*, *Fome Zero*), primarily designed to the country's least developed region, the Northeast, where Lula comes from. Internationally, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Itamaraty*) aimed to demonstrate to the international community that the country possessed the necessary requisites to become a global player. Lula's foreign policy has been categorized by the literature as "autonomist", as it promotes the reduction of economic asymmetries between developed and underdeveloped countries, while it seeks to diversify trade partnerships, to evoke for multilateralism and to foster the growth of the domestic economy (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2009; Saraiva 2010; Burges 2016). Lula's foreign policy had a clear intention to gain a more prominent role in the international system (Flemes, Saraiva 2014), adopting a different tone than his predecessors. Brazil had the appropriate momentum due to a stronger economy, to a rise in human development indexes, and to the discovery of an underneath source of oil and gas (*Pré-sal*). After a decade of high inflation and sluggish economic growth, Brazilian foreign policy under Lula had a clear intention to lead.

Merkel became Chancellor in 2005, a time when Germany found itself in a better scenario than in the previous decade. If the 1950s and 1960s were a period of reconstruction from the Second World War, the 1990s were the age of unification from the end of the Cold War. The country had to politically, economically, and socially reunite the two Germanys, and the burden fell on chancellor Helmut Kohl's shoulders, a CDU politician who governed for sixteen years. In 1998, Gerhard Schröder from SPD became Chancellor and had to govern in a difficult socio-economic situation, since gross domestic product rates were low and unemployment indicators were high. During Merkel, those indicators rose, and Germany managed to become the leading economy in Europe. At the same time, its foreign policy kept congruent to the role of "civilian power" (Mauß 1990) played by the country since the end of World War II, as it promotes pacifism, democracy, and non-intervention. A country that was once named "the sick man of the euro"⁶ was now at the centre-stage of the EU.

As it was claimed previously, to explain regional integration processes we must first understand the internal dynamics. Analysing what motivates and sustains the regional policies of key-states, such as Brazil and Germany, is a way to better explain the mechanisms of

⁶ *The Economist* (1999). The sick man of the euro. Available at <https://www.economist.com/special/1999/06/03/the-sick-man-of-the-euro>, accessed on November 9th, 2018.

MERCOSUR and of the EU during the selected timeframes. Additionally, the present study concentrates on first mandates because, as explained in the previous two paragraphs, Lula and Merkel rose to power in different political and economic conditions than their predecessors. Likewise, they both endorsed discourses regarding regional integration that contrasted from previous administrations. Therefore, as the research puzzle indicates, the cases of Brazil and Germany are paradigmatic. By understanding how these regional behaviours came to be, one can better explain the outcomes in regional institutions. The next section will further clarify this argument.

1.2 Research question

When analysing regional institutions, one must be attentive to the role of states, especially those that exercise leadership. Despite much debate in the literature, a regional leader is here understood as the country that possesses the largest ideational and material capabilities, and it is at the same time willing to further the regional integration process. This discussion on leadership will be explained in more details in Chapter 2.

National Role Conceptions are an interesting tool when one is interested in understanding the motivations behind a policymakers' decisions. As Wish (1980, p.533) defines it, "national role conceptions delineate the range of foreign policy choices decision-makers consider appropriate and suitable for the country they represent. They set limits on which foreign policy decisions policy-makers regard as feasible and therefore allow drawing conclusions about the broad direction of a country's foreign policy".

National Role Conceptions will be applied to regionalism, an approach still understudied in Political Science and IR. ***The research question lies on how were shaped the National Role Conceptions of Lula (2003-2006) and Merkel (2005-2009) towards MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively.*** This will be achieved with the theoretical apparatus of Role Theory, which encompass the concept of National Role Conceptions. Role is primarily understood as a behaviour, which comprises the decisions and actions of a particular social actor. This will be explained later in section 1.4, as well in further detail in Chapter 3.

The model proposed here is the National Role Conception flowchart created by Breuning (2011, p.26) in which the author divided two large segments: ideational components (identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience) and material components (capability and opportunity to act), which converge into the National Role Conception. The cases of Brazil under Lula towards MERCOSUR and Germany under Merkel towards the EU will be applied to this model. This will be further elaborated in section 1.4 and in Chapter 3.

Therefore, the research question applied here is based on a theoretical model. The goal here is not to analyse which roles both countries play regionally, but to take a step back and verify how the National Role Conceptions were formed, as the research question indicates. National Role Conceptions serve as roadmaps that culminate in role enactment (i.e. behaviour). Thus, by applying it we can better understand and explain Brazil's and Germany's regional behaviour, and gain more insight in the inner workings of MERCOSUR and of the EU. How these were selected will be explained in the next section.

1.3 Justification for case selection

Analysing in the same study two different countries and two regional organizations, which are at a varied degree of institutionalization, can be thought-provoking. On the one hand, Brazil is a developing country, with large territory and population, and important natural strategic resources. Nonetheless, its room for manoeuvre regionally and globally is still limited, mostly due to its unstable economy and oftentimes its lack of political will. On the other hand, Germany is a developed country, with medium-size territory and population. It does not possess many strategic natural resources as Brazil, but its stable economy and export-led industry enable it to perform significantly at the international level.

In spite of differences, Brazil and Germany are the paymasters and most powerful countries in their region, possessing material capabilities, such as economic, populational and territorial resources. Brazil was the third largest exporter of agricultural goods in the world, with a value of 77 billion dollars in 2016 (World Trade Organization 2017, p.112). Germany is the largest exporter of goods in the EU, with more than 1 trillion dollars in the same year (ibidem, p.49). They were the originators of MERCOSUR and of the EU and also have been, throughout time, crucial actors towards understanding the institutional advancement of those organizations. Nowadays, it is almost impossible to talk about such institutions without mentioning Brazil and Germany.

When it comes to regional institutions, the differences persist and must be acknowledged. The EU is formed, in its majority, by once-colonizer countries which share a belligerent past. MERCOSUR is a group of once-colonized countries with a past of military dictatorships. The EU is a monetary union, while MERCOSUR is an imperfect customs union⁷. The European Parliament is a traditional institution in the EU⁸, whereas *Parlasur* still does not

⁷ The term "imperfect" is used in the literature referring to the disparate application of the Common External Tariff (CET) among member-states. More on this is available in Chapter 5.

⁸ Traditional in the sense that it has been active for a long time, and it is now considered one of the most important organizations of the EU.

show signs of relevance. The EU is the most advanced experience of regional integration ever witnessed. Yet, it will not be taken here as an “example to be followed” nor as a model that should be adapted to different regions. Neither is MERCOSUR seen here as an incohesive or inferior regional institution in relation to the EU. Each and every regional integration is the result of many different social mechanisms (historical, political, cultural, economic) and material capabilities in their idiosyncratic ways.

Regardless of institutional and developmental differences, MERCOSUR and the EU are two of the largest trade organizations in the world: in 2016, the merchandise trade of MERCOSUR was in total 283.2 billion dollars, whereas the EU it summed up to 5373.5 billion dollars (World Trade Organization 2017, p.146). Hence, their importance to the global economy is essential.

The case selection proceeded in the following interpretive reasoning: first, it was established that the criterion for regional organizations would be based on trade. Despite a few existing variants - such as institutions that focus on promoting political dialogue, development cooperation, and military ties - regional economic institutions are the prevalent form. Second, the data on the largest regional trade organizations according to the WTO was collected, as explained in previous paragraphs. Third, the performances of leadership on said institutions were examined, in which it was concluded that Brazil and Germany exhibited outstanding conditions⁹, as the research puzzle demonstrates.

In this way, as argued previously, we must adopt an agent perspective analysis to regional institutions in order to better understand them. This can be accomplished by verifying the power relations in a region or, in other words, the behaviour of regional leaders. One theoretical approach that can help to achieve that is Role Theory, since through the development of the National Role Conceptions one can analyse how national preferences towards the regional institutions were shaped. But before explaining which roles Brazil and Germany play in their region, we must analyse how their National Role Conceptions were shaped, which is exactly what this doctoral thesis proposes.

By bringing the analysis to the level of states, we can comprehend the drivers of regionalism and, ultimately, gain a deeper perspective of them. With a constructivist-interpretivist approach, we can account for the ideational aspects of regional integration

⁹ One could wonder why UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) was not considered, since it was created in 2008 and it received strong incentives from Brazil. UNASUR was not a part of the universe of cases because it is not a regional trade organization, nor was it created during the selected timeframe (2003-2006 for Lula and 2005-2009 for Merkel).

processes, which are often neglected. This is the framework in which is present research is based.

The following sections will provide an overview of the remaining aspects of the research design (theory, methods, and data selection), but each one of them will be elucidated in Chapter 3 and 4, respectively.

1.4 Theoretical framework

The theoretical apparatus chosen for this doctoral thesis is Role Theory, which is concerned with how roles are constituted and performed, within an agent-structure relationship. The theoretical and analytical framework here draws heavily from Harnisch, Frank and Maull (2011a) part on the conceptualization and instrumentalization of Role Theory. To them, Role Theory “offers a promising avenue for resolving one of IR theory’s most intractable problems, the relationship between actors and the system in international relations” (ibidem, p.1). It must be noted that, here, the level of analysis constitutes states as actors and regional institutions as the (sub-)systems. Or, more specifically, Brazil and Germany as the actors and MERCOSUR and the EU as the (sub-)systems. This will be elucidated in Chapters 5 and 6.

Therefore, choosing Role Theory is justified because it provides the possibility to focus and structures in regional institutions. When examining power asymmetries, it offers the chance to investigate other forms of capabilities that go beyond the material ones. Ideational components are well-suited to explain the roles of Brazil and of Germany, since they do not rely exclusively on traditional forms of power. In this sense, perspectives that value traditional forms of power, such as realist and rationalist approaches, do not suffice.

Furthermore, roles are important for understanding state behaviour in a given setting. ***Instead of examining which roles Brazil and Germany portray, it is proposed here to take a step back in order to verify how the National Role Conceptions of each state were shaped under Lula and Merkel.*** In this way, one can better grasp how their approach to the region was conceived and, ultimately, how their behaviour came to fruition. And, as argued in the Introduction, by bringing the level of analysis onto states, one can better understand the drivers of regional integration.

“A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment”. This is how K.J. Holsti, one of the

proponents of Role Theory in the field of Political Science and IR, defined the concept in the seminal work “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” (Holsti 1970, p.245).

The research question will be answered by applying the National Role Conception flowchart originally conceived by Breuning (2011, p.26). It is safe to argue that there are no indications in the original text that it would aspire to become an analytical template. For all intents and purposes, Marijke Breuning created it to serve as an explanation of how National Role Conceptions are conceived¹⁰. ***Nonetheless, this present research brings the novel idea to test it as a theoretical model for the creation of National Role Conceptions.*** If the flowchart proves to be an effective way for combining National Role Conceptions in regional institutions, then it could be introduced as a new analytical tool to Role Theory. In the flowchart, the ideational and material features merge into the National Role Conception. Each one is divided in sub-categories – identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience comprise the ideational aspect; and capability and opportunity to act are part of the material aspect. Chapter 3 will explain this in more detail.

In a similar vein, as it will be argued in Chapter 3, roles are not determined by specific mandates, but can be portrayed throughout different times. Yet, National Role Conceptions can be prone to change, as the focus lies on the perceptions of decision makers. This is why it is crucial to focus on first mandates, as a way to verify Lula’s and Merkel’s perceptions of their countries in regard to MERCOSUR and the EU, correspondingly. As it will be discussed on the third chapter, the National Role Conception is derived, among other mechanisms, from the afforded circumstances, or the opportunities to act, in the selected timeframe. Therefore, one National Role Conception can be different in the first term and in the second term, for example. Analysing the first term makes it possible to account for the novelty aspect, which fades away in the second mandate (or, in the case of Merkel, third and fourth).

Furthermore, studies on Role Theory regarding Brazil in MERCOSUR and Germany in the EU are still underrepresented in the literature, particularly the ones that focus on Lula and Merkel during their first mandates. Likewise, the majority of studies on Role Theory focus on the constitution of the self in regard to the other. Analyses that consider the development of the Self based solely on internal mechanisms are still lacking. This doctoral research proposes to fill this gap.

¹⁰ This research maintains the term “National Role Conception” rather than “role conception”, which is used by a part of the literature, to be congruent with the scheme originally proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26).

1.5 Methodological framework

This doctoral thesis is based on a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology. As a result, ontologically the central tenets supported here are that agents and structures are mutually constituted in a socially constructed reality. As explained previously, here member-states are considered as agents and regional institutions as structures, in a co-constituted way – i.e. states create institutions and end up being affected by them. Epistemologically, knowledge is here understood under the auspices of the Interpretivist tradition, which considers contextuality, historicity, and the search for meaning as the ultimate guiding forces in a research.

This constructivist-interpretivist approach affected how the research was overall conducted – starting by how the research question was framed and by how the data was collected, selected, and analysed. As elucidated before, the starting point for this research was the perception of a puzzle that came from the literature: regionally, Brazil and Germany display conflicting roles and expectations regarding leadership – earning for it and actually having it. Then, the research question was formulated based on the theoretical framework of Role Theory. It was argued that National Role Conceptions are a better tool for examining the development of a leadership role, which can explain better the disparate enactments and expectations of leadership roles by both countries. This whole analysis had an Interpretivist background – analysing case by case scenarios, while paying attention to context and history. In this realm, the ultimate goal is to verify the meaning produced by both agents (Brazil and Germany) while being participants of regional structures (MERCOSUR and the EU).

Along the same lines, the ontological and epistemological approach applied here also influenced how the methodological framework was chosen and applied. Hence, ***Narrative Analysis*** will be used here for verifying which ***identity narratives*** were propelled by Lula and Merkel during the selected timeframe, in order to fulfil the *Identity* component of the National Role Conception proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26). In a nutshell, narratives are the stories people tell to make sense of their realities, i.e. which stories Lula and Merkel propelled in their speeches regarding the identities of their respective countries and regional institutions. More on this will be explained in Chapter 3 and 4. The remaining components of the National Role Concepts flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26) will be fulfilled according to pre-selected criteria, as Chapter 3 will show.

As it deals with two cases, this research proposes an ***interpretivist comparison***, one that is not based on selected variables that aim to create generalizability and causal inference. The objective here is to advance a comparative approach (but not a comparative research

design) that seeks to understand the *produced meanings* of the agents (Brazil and Germany) performed by the actors (Lula and Merkel) under a given structure (MERCOSUR and the EU).

This interpretivist comparison focuses on the results that come out of the data rather than on previous set of established conditions. Additionally, the focus lies on the ideational aspects of both cases, such as identity and identity narratives, and the meanings they produce. As studies that employ an interpretivist comparison are still underrepresented in the literature, this doctoral thesis hopes to advance a new methodological perspective to the field of Interpretivist epistemology. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed account of the interpretivist comparison put forward by this research.

In this sense, this present doctoral thesis does not try to establish similar and generalizable patterns among Brazil and Germany, but it sees both cases from their singular, unique, and historical conditions. The research design established herein is not, by all means, a comparative design¹¹. If this present research follows the interpretivist epistemological tradition, it would be illogical to apply positivists assumptions and goals that aim at falsifiable and predictive results. To put it simply, this doctoral thesis falls on the interpretive camp and pursuing any research goals outside of it would be unreasonable.

In this regard, the collection, selection, and analysis of the data was also tied to the constructivist-epistemological approach. The data was collected from the official government websites of Brazil and Germany. The speeches given by Lula and Merkel, in national and international spheres, were selected based on the timeframe and on specific key words. ***In total, 174 documents were selected as the final data*** – 70 for the case of Brazil and 104 for the case of Germany. The processes for data selection and data analysis were conducted under interpretivist guidance, without the help of any software programmes, as to preserve a more intuitive analysis by the researcher. How the processes for selection and analysis of the data were conducted will be expanded in Chapter 4. Additionally, the Annex provides detailed lists of the speeches analysed here.

The level of analysis falls on states and regional institutions, and the units of analysis are Brazil and Germany. The goal of this present analysis is not to take Lula and Merkel's personality traits, biographies, nor styles of governing. This is not a study of personal leaders - that would fit better in a research in the field of Political Psychology¹². More specifically, the unit of analysis is Brazil *under* Lula and Germany *under* Merkel. The president and the

¹¹ A comparative research design would, for example, employ methods such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) or Process Tracing, which differs enormously from what is proposed here.

¹² This is usually done so with approaches such as Operational Code Analysis and Leader Trait Analysis. For more on how the styles and personalities of leaders affect policymaking, see Hermann (1980), Hermann and Hermann (1989), and Schafer and Walker (2006). I thank Leslie Wehner for raising this issue.

Chancellor are the political representation of their respective countries, in a rather “enmeshed” way. Brazil and Germany exist in an anarchical international system that is ruled by hierarchies of power (Lake 2006; Zakarol 2017), and changes within this order are difficult to achieve¹³. However, the same country governed by different policymakers presents diverse political contours throughout the mandates – goals, party preferences, and domestic conditions that are distinct from one period to the other, as different groups come to power.

In this way, it makes sense to segment the analysis by administrations, as they provide clearer indicators of the state of affairs of one particular cabinet. This methodological choice could be contested and labelled as rather restrictive, because foreign policy is an amalgamation of various actors (leaders of agriculture, business, and trade union sectors) and public bureaucracies (ministries of economics, trade, and foreign affairs). Nonetheless, the focus here is on the agents, and the ultimate political agents in the present cases are the president and chancellor.

In this sense, this present analysis is case-oriented. A case is understood as a “spatially delimited phenomenon [a unit] observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring 2007, p.19). The case selection was based on unequal power relations in regional institutions and consequent leadership performances. In this way, the cases of Brazil and Germany are paradigmatic, as explained before.

Yet, this doctoral thesis is not invested in establishing designs of most similar or different cases, nor does it aim to create generalizable patterns or replicable experiments, as many case studies do (Bennett, Elman 2007). It is applied here a constructivist-interpretivist approach that is not positivist in any shape or form. This creates an analytical procedure in which “interpretive researchers ‘read’ evidence analytically from a variety of sources ‘across’ the experienced reality of the situation under study [...] to assess meaning-making around a particular idea, concept, or controversy” (Schwartz-Shea, Yanow 2012, p.86).

For these reasons, this is not a hypotheses-testing type of research. Hypotheses would be counterintuitive to the theory and methods chosen for this academic endeavour. As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, p.3) explain, “most treatments of research design across the social sciences [...] take a variables-based, hypothesis-testing, (quasi-) experimental approach to the topic”. Thus, positivist analyses are “[...] quite different from the word-based, abductive, field and archival research approach common to interpretive empirical work” (ibidem).

¹³ Changes to the international system occur with great shocks – for example, the change from a bipolar system to a multipolar one with the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, interpretivist research follows a different rationale than positivist research, as it does not stipulate prior “formal hypothesis that is then ‘tested’ against field ‘realities’”. Researchers in interpretive modes more commonly begin their work with what might be called informed ‘hunches’ or puzzles [...] grounded in the research literature and [...] in some prior knowledge” (Yanow, Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. xvi). This thesis is more interested in examining how the ideational and material components converge into the National Role Conceptions in the selected cases than testing presupposed explanations or controlling variables. ***As hypotheses do not serve the purpose of this research, they were not chosen as an auxiliary tool.***

Thus, methodological framework is a direct consequence of the ontological and epistemological background espoused by this research. It affected how the puzzle was originally observed, how the cases were chosen, how the data was collected, selected, and ultimately analysed, and how the method was applied. Chapter 4 will explain how this whole process unfolded.

1.6 Main contributions of this research

This doctoral thesis aims to contribute to the broad field of Political Science and International Relations – and, more specifically, to the areas of Foreign Policy Analysis and Regionalism, since this research relates to the formation of external behaviour of countries (hence, foreign policies) in regional institutions (therefore, regionalism).

In the same vein, this academic endeavour positions itself in the literature of Role Theory and hopes to contribute to the dialogue about the characterization of National Role Conceptions, especially towards regional institutions. In the same way, it tests the flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011p. 26) of how National Role Conceptions are conceived. Originally, it did not present itself as an analytical scheme. However, this present research brings the novel idea of testing it as a theoretical model. If effective, then it could become one more analytical tool pertaining to the Role Theory realm.

Likewise, this present study proposes an interpretivist comparison of the two cases. In this way, this research intends to strengthen the use of this methodological tool in Interpretive epistemology.

1.7 Division of chapters

This doctoral thesis is comprised of ten chapters and an Annex.

Chapter 1, this present Introduction, presented the cases of Brazil and Germany, as well as the justifications for studying their National Role Conceptions towards MERCOSUR and the EU. This chapter also briefly introduced how the theoretical and methodological frameworks will be applied throughout the thesis.

Chapter 2 refers to the conceptual framework that will be applied throughout this doctoral thesis. In this way, it becomes necessary to explain how certain definitions are understood and applied here. In this way, the notions of region, regionalism, theories of regional integration, regional governance, power, and leadership and hegemony will be elucidated.

Chapter 3 explains the theoretical framework employed here, which is Role Theory. The chapter will explain the major concepts associated with it, such as National Role Conceptions, role change, and role contestation, as well as it will provide a state of the art on Role Theory. Additionally, the analytical flowchart created by Breuning (2011, p.26) regarding the shape of the National Role Conception, which will be applied to the cases of Brazil and Germany, will be clarified.

Chapter 4 concerns the methodological framework adopted by this doctoral thesis, which has a constructivist-interpretivist approach. The main method applied is Narrative Analysis, which will also be elucidated in the same chapter.

Chapter 5 regards the structures considered here, MERCOSUR and the EU. The chapter provides an overview of each of these regional institutions, and how were the state of affairs throughout Lula's (2003-2006) and Merkel's (2005-2009) first mandates.

Chapter 6 provides a discussion on the role of agents, here understood as states. This chapter serves as a bridge between the previous chapter and the subsequent two, which are individually devoted to the case studies.

Chapter 7 refers to the first case study, Brazil. It provides an analysis of the foreign policy actions in Lula's first mandate, from 2003 until 2006. This chapter also applies the National Role Conception flowchart created by Breuning (2011, p.26), in which each component is employed to the case of Brazil towards MERCOSUR. The goal of this chapter is to answer the research question, i.e. how the National Role Conception of Brazil towards MERCOSUR was shaped during Lula's first term.

Chapter 8 concerns the second case, Germany. The same *modus operandi* that was practised in the previous chapter will be implemented in Chapter 8. The chapter will provide an overlook of the major foreign policy actions during Merkel's first term (2005-2009), as well as apply the National Role Conception flowchart designed by Breuning (2011, p.26) towards the EU. The objective of this chapter is to answer the research question proposed by this doctoral thesis, i.e. how the National Role Conception of Germany under Merkel was shaped during Merkel's first mandate.

Chapter 9 serves as a way to connect the results obtained by the previous two chapters (respectively, on Brazil and on Germany) and to contrast and compare them. As mentioned in this Introduction, the analysis implemented by this research has an interpretivist vein, and it is not akin to the traditional comparative approaches, usually fostered by positivist strands. The chapter will explain the amalgamation between this method and episteme - therefore creating an interpretivist comparison - and how this combined approach will be applied to the selected cases.

Chapter 10 comprises the conclusion of this academic endeavour. It discusses the findings and provides roadmaps for future research.

The Annex offers a full list of the data used here - Lula's and Merkel's speeches concerning MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively.

Chapter 2 – Literature review of the conceptual framework

Since this doctoral thesis deals with many concepts, the goal of this chapter is to elucidate the most important ones which will help explain the selected cases. The idea is not to create an exhaustive list, but to shed light on the most significant debates around the definitions and instrumentalizations of said concepts. Thus, this chapter is responsible for creating a conceptual framework that is necessary for understanding the overall analytical framework¹⁴. While providing a discussion on these concepts, this chapter will also directly relate them to the case studies, which is in line with the interpretivist tradition of contextuality and situated knowledge.

The concepts presented here are highly contested in the literature. The objective is not to dispute nor to redefine them, but to show how these definitions are understood within the present analytical framework. This chapter is invested in providing an overview of key concepts, while at the same time offering a literature review. All of the concepts explained here will be referenced throughout the doctoral thesis, making imperative to have them clarified in this chapter.

Aligned with the interpretivist epistemological perspective adopted here, Schaffer (2016, p.21) argues that “rather than seeing a particular concept as a variable to be constructed, interpretivism invites us to think of it as a social creation to be elucidated”. The author also reinforces the importance of defining concepts when he affirms that “social reality cannot be understood apart from the language people use to operate in it” (ibidem, p.6). At the same time, concepts interfere in how researchers formulate questions and interpret the answers (ibidem, p.xiii), which is the guiding principle behind this chapter.

Thus, in accordance with the interpretivist tradition, it becomes necessary to situate the reader in how the researcher interprets and understands the concepts pertaining to the analytical framework implemented here. Depending on which strand the researcher adopts, it ends up affecting the interpretation criteria and, hence, the results. For example, region is the starting point of analysis in this research, but it is also a contested term among scholars of Regionalism. The same goes for power, a very debated topic in the Social Sciences. For instance, how the researcher conceptualizes the notion of region, either in geographical, economical, or political terms, affects the approach that will be adopted in the research. Or a study that focuses on the material aspects of power differs enormously from a study that concentrates on the ideational features of power.

¹⁴ The analytical framework refers to the National Role Conception flowchart, available in Chapter 3, Figure 1.

In this way, the following concepts, which are intrinsically related to the selected cases, will be discussed: regions; the formation of South America and Europe as regions; regionalism; theories of regional integration; regional governance; power; and leadership and hegemony. The definitions are divided in segments for clarity, even though they can be intertwined. Some final remarks conclude the chapter.

2.1 Regions

Regions were once thought primarily in territorial terms, as states that shared contiguous borders would belong to a given region. However, the literature has developed a broader definition of regions, taking into account their economic (Powers and Goertz 2011), ideational (Söderbaum 2013) and security capacities (Adler, Barnett 1998), although not dismissing the geographical element completely (Fawn 2009). The study of regions turned into a substantial topic in the literature of International Relations, to the degree that some authors classified the international system as a “world of regions” (Katzenstein 2005)¹⁵. Still, this has not turned the topic into a consensus in the literature.

More or less, a region is generally understood as a contiguous territorial space in which a set of actors are bounded by political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. According to Van Langenhove (2013, p.482) a region “[...] on the one hand, it aims at supporting states in coping with the forces of globalisation and localisation and on the other hand, it also aims at acquiring autonomy from the states involved in its creation”.

To the author (2011, p.65), states and other societal actors can act as “region-builders”, in the sense that while they use the discourse of regions, they end up institutionalizing the very idea of regions: “it is because they are being talked about that they started existing”, according to the author. This social constructivist approach of discourse is one of the many elements of region-building, in which states are the core participants. Building a region, then, would be a socially constructed process that includes language, practice, and norms. Then, a region would become a region by the recognition of the participating actors, mostly through discourse. The parlance about a region, or the “integration speak” (ibidem, p.74) as Van Langenhove puts it, reifies the region in itself.

To Hettne and Söderbaum (2000), a region can have more or less “regionness”, “the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject

¹⁵ The goal of this section is to elucidate the concept of region under the IR discipline and not on Geography studies, which sees “region” under a different light since it focuses more on spatial and sub-national levels. For more on this, see Varró and Lagendijk (2013).

capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region” (ibidem, p.461). “Regionness”, to the authors, is a factor that denotes the cohesion of social and ideational structures in a region. Based on it, a region is not naturally given; it becomes one. With this background, the authors claim that there are five stages into a region *becoming* itself - regional space, regional complex, regional society, regional community, and region-state. Each stage would show growing levels of regionness and social cohesion, with multiple networks of state and non-state actors. In the final levels, the region would become more of an active actor in international affairs, going beyond its borders and turning into an independent entity.

Schmitt-Egner (2002, p.183) argues that the conceptualization of a region should contain aspects such as structure (autonomy), programme (aims, means and rules), actors (groups or institutions), and environment (relations among individuals at national and supranational levels). Although the author’s classification acknowledges the importance of individual actors, it does not focus exclusively on states, but on the collective social actors in a region.

In this way, the literature has evolved the concept of region beyond the traditional economic and political ties, for it incorporated social and cultural aspects that can pertain to a region. Yet, a large part of the literature on regions has been disengaged from the importance of the analysis at the state-level, in which “regions are seen as spaces in their own right rather than as either aggregations or subdivisions of states” (Keating 2011, p.4). A larger portion of the literature focuses more on regions becoming itself, which would run the risk of taking regions as cohesive units – and regions differ internally in significant ways.

A region is here understood as a territorial contiguous space which has been historically shaped by political, social, economic, and cultural elements. Within a region, countries form regional agreements, which themselves create regional institutions (more on this in this chapter). A region is, then, a space which enables the constitution of regional institutions and the establishment of communal political and social ties.

2.2 The formation of South American and Europe as regions

If analysed in hindsight, there are remarkable differences in how South America and Europe were developed as regions in conceptual terms. In the first case, it still lacks a definite verdict if Latin America and South America are symbiotic or exclusionary terms. In the second case, Europe is sometimes used as a synonym of European Union, a sign that the regional organization has developed beyond the confines of institutionalized borders.

“Latin America” was a term coined by intellectuals during the Napoleon III administration (1848-1870), as a way of assembling peoples who shared similar linguistic, cultural, and historical values – the “Latin people”. This would shield the region against the imperialism of the United States, leaving room for the influence of France in the continent (Bethell 2010).

One of the terminological issues is that the region, itself, is not cohesive. The processes of colonization pursued mostly by Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom presented similar traits in the *modus operandi* – the exploration of natural resources, political domination, disrespect for the indigenous population, and enforcement of religious and cultural standards. As a result, colonization created diverging areas that evolved into unique independent states. Homogenising such a vast continent with the simplistic label of “Latin America” was an attempt to equalize the unequal.

When it comes to South America, exclusively, there are some differences among Brazil and its neighbours. Being the only country in South America that was colonized by Portugal, Brazil does not share the same linguistic and cultural qualities as the Spaniard part of the continent. This is not to say that Hispanic countries in the region are the same. Nevertheless, throughout history they have been politically bounded in ways that did not include Brazil, nor Brazil intended to be included, either by policymakers or intellectuals (Bethell 2010).

In the Brazilian diplomatic history, there has been a tendency of using either pan-americanism or south-americanism, depending on the political intention. When distancing themselves from the United States, the countries in the region preferred to use the first concept, thus creating a separation between two poles. When the Brazilian diplomacy intended on presenting itself as a leader, it would choose the second concept, especially during the Baron of Rio Branco’s mandate in *Itamaraty* (1902-1912), in which a clear leadership project was put into practice (Santos 2005).

During Lula, the dichotomy between Latin America and South America was instrumentalized as a foreign policy tool. This was mainly due to the construction of a hegemonic identity, which was imbedded in a project of firming leadership in the region as a stepping-stone to become a global power (Galvão 2009). This becomes clear by the examination of the inauguration speech of Lula’s first term, in 2003, when he stated that “the biggest foreign policy priority of my government will be the creation of a politically stable, prosperous and united South America, based on democratic ideals and social justice” (see Annex, 01-01-2003).

Unlike the Latin American case, the development of a European region is not attached to colonization and decolonization processes, but rather to a long-held unfolding of events –

empires, revolutions, wars, annexations - throughout centuries. Depicting the history of Europe would mean describing the history of Western civilization. The modern system of sovereign states of Westphalia made possible the existence of the international system as we know it, based on the rule of law and on non-interference principles. Yet, creating a unified region has proven to be a challenge for Europe, for it has faced many crises in the past few years. Developing a common identity is still an ongoing path¹⁶, which events such as the rise of Eurosceptic political parties and the Brexit can attest.

In this sense, Manners (2010) attempts to understand the creation of the EU by compiling the mythology around the construction and evolution of Europe. According to the author, there would be six myths used to define the evolution of Europe as a region and a global power. The first one is the bull myth, based on a Greek lore that portrays Europe as a maiden carried by the god Zeus on a bull. The second myth is the “third force myth”, that would symbolise the moment the region gained a more independent role in world politics, primarily during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969). The third myth would describe the “civilian power” capacity of Europe, regarding its economic power and its preference for non-military use of force. The fourth myth is the “normative power”, a topic Manners (2002) has devoted to before, which argues that the European Union has the capacity to spread its norms, values and identity to world politics. The fifth myth is the “gender myth”, which would represent Europe as Venus, feminine, soft, and non-militaristic, and the United States as Mars, masculine, hard, bellicose. The sixth and final myth, the “multipolar myth”, relates to Europe’s role in a globalized and inter-dependent world. It characterizes Europe as an elephant, large but unthreatening. It would have to compete with new players, such as the BRIC countries, and the other traditional powers, such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom.

Besides allegorical representations, the consolidation of Europe as a unified region was only made possible with the genesis of the European Union after the Second World War. It created a body of institutions that tied the countries politically and economically, thus lessening the risk of an armed conflict among its superpowers. Yet, the European experience of integration is not picture-perfect. The EU has faced many challenges and constraints in the recent past. Crises (the Euro, the Greek, and the refugees), confrontations with Russia (over Ukraine), and dismemberment (Brexit). Even with all of its problems, the EU has managed to become the most advanced example of regionalism ever witnessed - to the extent that sometimes the term “European Union” is mistaken for “Europe”, even though the institution does not compass the whole continent. This issue will be analysed more profoundly in the next subsection.

¹⁶ Many academic studies have tackled the identity issues in the EU, such as Fossum (2001), Risse (2005), and Eder (2009).

This section showed that the creation of South America and Europe as regions were filled with quests for independence and regional disputes. A historical and critical perspective demonstrates how both regions are far from being homogeneous and are not, in themselves, unattached from the role of states. Herein, I propose a step back towards understanding regions and propose a study of unitary actors, the ones capable of pushing forward processes of regional integration.

2.3 Regionalism

Regionalism is understood as the political and economic agreements established by states in a given region, with the aim of deepening ties of cooperation. It is a top-down, purposefully oriented initiative. It should be differentiated from regionalisation, which is the bottom-up creation of initiatives within a region, usually done by markets or segments of the civil society, however organically and without formal ties (Börzel, Risse 2016). As this research implements a state-centric perspective, only the first variant will be under scrutiny.

Fawcett (2004, p.433) subdivides regionalism as “[...] promoting a sense of regional awareness or community (soft regionalism), through consolidating regional groups and networks, to pan- or subregional groups formalized by interstate arrangements and organizations (hard regionalism)”. To extend on the author’s proposition, herein the focus is on hard regionalism, as states are the originators and conductors of regional integration processes. Nonetheless, this research does not exclude the importance of soft regionalism, as the reified practices of creating a region, usually done so by language and the establishment of communal symbols (flags, passports, etc), ultimately foster a regional identity.

Most studies on regional integration processes do not ignore the importance of markets and business in a region. After all, trade is usually the “logic of regional integration” Mattli (1999) that originates regional agreements. In his homonymous book, the author points out the importance of markets as initiators of regional schemes, as they “stand to reap large gains from transacting in increasingly integrated economies” (ibidem, p.190). The demands from markets alone would not suffice, and it would also require the disposition from policymakers to aggregate external needs and to provide rules and regulations. Likewise, in certain cases it would become necessary to have “*the presence of an undisputed regional leader that can serve as a focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations, and policies, and is able to ease distributional tensions by acting as regional paymaster*” (ibidem, emphasis mine). This point raised by Mattli (1999) is key in this present research, as it focuses on the importance of key member-states in regional institutions.

In the realm of an economic development of regional integration, Balassa (1961) typifies this process into five stages that are understood in a progressive path. The first stage is the formation of free trade agreements, which aims at abolishing tariffs. The second stage is a customs union that creates a common external tariff. The third stage is a common market, on which there is free movement of people and services. The fourth stage is an economic union, that implements joint policies and rules on trade. The fifth and final stage is a monetary union, which settles a shared currency.

In an institutional perspective, there are three main strands in the literature that interpret qualitatively the evolution of regionalism. All of them, more or less, agree that regionalism is a state-led process, highly influenced by trade but open to the influence of other factors. Nevertheless, they diverge on the classification of how regional integration developments should be named or timed – either by waves or generations, or as old and new. They will be discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.

Mansfield and Milner (1999) categorize regionalism in four different waves. The first would have taken place in the 19th century, based mostly on a European liberal trading scheme. A second wave would have occurred post-First World War among the major superpowers of that time, with the United States arising as a major commercial player in the continent. The third would have arisen in the 1950s until 1970s in developing countries, influenced by the unfolding of decolonization and the Cold War (Mansfield, Solingen 2010).

Van Langenhove and Costea (2005) adopt a generational dimension to the study of regionalism, dividing the process into three generations. The first one would comprise the aforementioned development of economic cooperation agreements as described by Balassa (1961), starting as a free trade area and progressing to a monetary union. The second one would reflect the elements that form a region which go beyond trade, such as culture, security, and identity. The third one would perfectly exemplify the EU, since this generation is about the capacity to perform as a global actor. The regional institution would, therefore, act as a unison in international fora, promote inter-regional initiatives elsewhere, and be more prone to multilateralism and to act in UN missions.

New Regionalism literature put forward by authors such as Söderbaum (2003) and Hettne (2005) claims that the “old” regionalism took place in a Cold War environment, with agreements being typically motivated by security and trade. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world enabled the New Regionalism to encompass themes related to a globalized international system. In this strand, regionalism would count with the participation of non-state and societal actors, and new themes would be a part of its agenda, such as cultural and social issues (Hettne, 2003).

Regionalism is a wide-spread phenomenon, and in every continent there are examples of regional institutions at varied paces of institutionalization. Still, regional agreements can exist as long as they are effective¹⁷. If they persist, they could eventually develop turn into regional institutions, in a long path of advances, stagnation and setbacks, as it was the case with MERCOSUR and the EU. Both were institutionally formalized in the beginning of the 1990's, although with the European case the story goes back to the 1950's. The origin of cooperation was, certainly, economic. Yet, the logic of integration rested on values such as democracy, for MERCOSUR, and peace, for the EU. More on this can be found in Chapter 5.

Hence, most studies on regionalism recognize the importance of states on the creation of regional institutions. However, most of them emphasize an economic outlook, when they put markets and trade agreements as the originators or facilitators of regional institutions. Despite the unquestionable importance of trade, it still lacks an account on regionalism that focuses not only on material conditions, but also on ideational conditions, such as identity and political narratives. This is exactly what this doctoral thesis proposes.

2.4 Theories of regional integration

There are some applied theories specifically designed to explain the trajectories of regional integration processes. Whereas the South American case is undertheorized, the European case is overtheorized. In this section, the open regionalism and post-hegemonic regionalism will be discussed related to the South American case; and federalism and (neo) functionalism will be analysed in relation to the European case. Intergovernmentalism will be applied to both cases.

According to Saraiva (2015), other approaches concerning the Latin American case can be found in the literature, such as post-liberal regionalism (Veiga and Rios 2007), fourth wave regionalism (Dabène 2012), multi-level regionalism and segmented sub-regionalisms (Malamud and Gardini 2012), multifaceted regionalism (Barbosa 2015), and modular regionalism (Gardini 2015). Although with many terminologies, regionalism in Latin America and, more specifically, in South America, has been overall distinguished by two large events: a) the need to promote the region as a cohesive body after the re-democratization processes

¹⁷ Some organizations are created to substitute others, such as ALADI (Latin American Integration Association/ *Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración*) that replaced ALALC (Latin American Free Trade Association/*Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio*), in 1980. Others end in the negotiation phase, due to uninterest by the countries involved, such as ALCA (Free Trade Area of the Americas/*Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas*).

of late 1980s; and b) the necessity to have some “independence” from the United States, to create a “shield” against globalization, or to integrate the region into the global economy.

In this sense, open regionalism comprises the liberalization of economic barriers and the increase of economic interdependence among countries in the region. This would rise the competitiveness capacity of Latin America in the world, benefiting the area (Corazza 2006). This approach was reinforced by CEPAL (*Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe*/ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), which had published important critical studies in the 1950s through the 1970s¹⁸. Open regionalism would be characterized by interregionalism between regional blocs, improved by the openness of trade and commercial relations and by the industrial improvement of local firms. In the open regionalism scheme, states are not the central actors. They coordinate policies and networks in order to facilitate the transfer of information between markets and companies (de Oliveira, 2014).

To Riggiozzi and Tussie (2012), post-hegemonic regionalism refers to the upsurge of regional organizations in South America that are driven by left-wing presidencies in the beginning of the 2000s. Or, as the authors define it, the “regional structures characterized by hybrid practices as a result of a partial displacement of dominant forms of US-led neoliberal governance in the acknowledgement of other political forms of organization and economic management of regional (common) goods” (ibidem, p.12). They named ALBA (*Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America*), UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), and projects like IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America) as examples. This type of regionalism would have a socialist background that focused on economic and social development as opposed to the capitalist and globalized regionalism. Despite post-hegemonic regionalism not being a well-suited theory to explain the origins of MERCOSUR, this theoretical attempt took note of an important political phenomenon in South America – the rise to power of left-wing ideologies in the early 2000s.

For the European case, its experience proposes different challenges and outcomes. To Kelemen (2003, p.185), federalism embraces three criteria: I) state and central governments share authority; II) these actors have the prerogative to deliver the final decision in some areas; III) a higher court of justice verdicts disputes related to federalism. In theory, with these three principles alone, the EU would be considered a federation, according to the author. Although with many “State-like” qualities, such as judicial system and a common currency, in practice matters are more complicated. States are not willing to relinquish sovereignty in order to form a federal union. The failure of agreeing on a Constitution for the

¹⁸ Such as on the centre-periphery structural dynamics by Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado, and the dependency theory by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto.

EU, in 2005, is an example – and constitutionalism is an essential feature of a federation. Therefore, the value of federalism principles fostered by policymakers like Altiero Spinelli has not yet been completely fulfilled.

Another noteworthy strand in European theory of integration is functionalism, being first put forward by David Mitrany. Its central tenet is the adaptability and variance of everyday events. Simply put, change would be constant. This would demand that “the design of institutional solutions has to be an open-minded and flexible process” (Rosamond 2000, p.34). Its variant, neofunctionalism, which was mostly developed by Ernst Haas, provided important concepts such as spillover. It would occur when integration in a given field “pressured” another, in the sense that it supplied the necessary resources for integration in another area. To neofunctionalists, in an integration setting, the process itself is more meaningful than the outcomes, and it would eventually lead to the creation of supranational institutions. Regionalism would be a scenario in which states pursue their own interests and, at the same time, protect democratic values (Rosamond 2000, p.55;73).

One important feature that has been accomplished by the EU - and that has not been found in any other regional institution in the world – is the enactment of supranationalism. It entails the transfer of authority to a higher body, whose decision-making process is above the will of the states, and its decisions are binding. In the case of the EU, some examples are the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Justice. In supranationalism, states are not the central actors, and in there lies the main difference from intergovernmentalism.

Besides different regional theories and experiences, intergovernmentalism is an appropriate framework that applies to both MERCOSUR and to the EU. While it was a counter-reaction to neofunctionalism (Hoffmann 1966) and it is mostly found in EU studies, its purposes can be transferred to South American regionalism studies, since intergovernmentalism presupposes that states are the central actors in regionalism processes. This characteristic perfectly describes the experiences in that region. To this school of thought, regionalism is a state-centric phenomenon: states are the ones that form alliances with other states, that are formally represented in the institution, and that can decide to leave the organization or to terminate it. Even the growing importance of non-state actors has not endangered the relevance of member-states.

With this background in mind, Moravcsik (1993) advanced the studies on intergovernmentalism and delved on what he called liberal intergovernmentalism. To the author, member-states in the EU act based on domestic interests in mind, to which they either cooperate or not. The formation of national preferences and how they are negotiated and accomplished would shape the outcomes of foreign policy. Liberal intergovernmentalism

devotes little attention to supranational institutions, since it postulates that bargaining power is a central component. States with more strategic capabilities would have more leverage and, therefore, more available means to negotiate its interests.

From this section, one can infer that intergovernmentalism is better suited to explain the importance of key member-states in regional institutions. Yet, it oftentimes plays excessive attention to material conditions. A theoretical approach that combines both material and ideational components, such as Role Theory, would be the ideal framework to grasp the development of key countries toward regional institutions, thus presenting a better understanding of regional integration processes. A discussion on Role Theory is available in Chapter 3.

2.5 Regional governance

Regional governance has to do with the creation of norms, rules, and discourses in different segments of a regional integration process, which is then instrumentalized for solving common problems and for attaining common objectives (Nolte 2016, p.6). Regional governance is mostly understood in intergovernmental terms. Thus, it can be correlated to the power struggles and asymmetries between states in a regionalized context or in terms of contrasts of “hegemonic projects” (Bulmer, Joseph 2016). Hence, it is important to discuss this concept when one is analysing a regional institution through its intra-dimension.

In this sense, there are in Latin America, at the moment, a large number of economic and political organizations¹⁹. Four of them are classified as customs unions²⁰, and a plethora of trade agreements and preferential trade agreements are also found in the region. Then, it could be argued that the spread of regional institutions in Latin America is a dispersing rather than unifying factor. To Malamud and Gardini (2012, p.117), the many regional organizations that the area has experienced was responsible for “disintegrating the conceptual Latin American space at the same time as it has sought to integrate subregions”, and the practices of regional integration in the continent have been showed “exhaustion of its potential”. Nolte (2014, p.28) counterargues that the amount of regional organizations can develop a “cooperative regional governance”, and not an adverse experience of integration.

¹⁹ Examples such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the Pacific Alliance are present in the region.

²⁰ They are the Andean Community, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Central American Common Market (CACM) and MERCOSUR. Information available at http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp, Organization of American States, Foreign Trade Information System. Accessed on May 14th, 2018.

To Riggiozzi (2012), there are two competing integration projects in Latin America: one that is based on economic and trade pursuits, such as NAFTA, Andean Community and MERCOSUR, and another that seeks socialist alternatives to integration, like ALBA²¹. Those projects are based on presidential intents²² and are, more or less, contiguous to the political will of those in charge. Medeiros (2008) defends that subnational state actors affect the regional governance in MERCOSUR, yet with limited scope for action because of the centrality that characterizes the integration process. In the Brazilian case, for example, only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the prerogative to conduct foreign policy activities. However, there is the possibility for national states to influence its course, by approximating themselves with institution-like organs in another countries.

In Europe, regional governance can be understood in a different light, since it contains supranational entities – such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice -, with intergovernmental instances - like the Council of the European Union and the European Council. Then, it would be safe to correlate the national influence of member-states to the overall policy-making in the EU. But while policymakers can affect outcomes, they are also tied up to the EU's institutional constraints. Hooghe et al (2001) emphasize this point when they argue for the EU's multi-level governance capacity. To the authors, governance in the EU is an entangled process comprising of cooperation among local, national, and supranational levels. Then, authority in the EU is delegated in a much more complex way, which is an understandable feature in a highly developed regional integration. Values as subsidiarity and transparency are also important components in this regard, which add to the overall functioning of the EU system.

Regional governance is an analytical concept that reaffirms the need of questioning which entity is responsible for governing, i.e. solving collective problems and propelling the regional institution. Here, the regional governance falls on the shoulders of member-states, without losing sight of the importance of supranational bodies in delegating and exercising power.

One can summarize the regional governance capacity of MERCOSUR as intergovernmental and of the EU as both supranational and intergovernmental. However, one can question if the regional governance capacity of an institution can be influenced by key-member states, at least in the intergovernmental realm. Said reflection will be present in this doctoral thesis.

²¹ Spanish acronym for *Alianza Bolivariana para América*, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America.

²² Or what Malamud (2003) calls inter-presidential dynamics on regional institutions.

2.6 Power

Power is one of the most important and often referred concepts in Political Science. As an elusive term, its use is not devoid of contestation. Uphoff (1989, p.296) characterizes power as “a central concern for political scientists because it appears both as ends and means in politics”. This doctoral thesis deals with power asymmetries in regional institutions, hence it becomes necessary to provide an overview of the main usages of the notion of power in the literature. The following paragraphs should not be taken as an exhaustive list, since the debate on power is a lengthy endeavour that is beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis.

One of the earliest conceptualizations of power was developed by Max Weber, although it was entangled with the notion of authority and domination (*Herrschaft*). He defined power as the “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1947 p.152). Weber’s analysis had a bureaucratic perspective, in which power is exercised in group settings that are part of modern states, in a legitimized sense. Inevitably, his categorization leads to the inclusion of elements such as domination and the use of force, in which power is understood in a causal chain where the behaviour of A affects the conduct of B, in a command-obedience dichotomy (Guzzini 2017, p.102-103).

Building up on what had been developed by Weber, Dahl (1957, p.202) defines power as a situation in which “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. To Dahl, power is essentially interpersonal and, somehow, coercive. To the author, while analysing power in different social settings, one must take it as a comparable entity, being able to amalgamate “scope, number of respondents, and change in probabilities” as variables (ibidem, p.206).

Another noteworthy theoretical interpretation of power was provided by Lukes (2005). To the author, power is “value-dependent” and “inextricably tied to a given set of (probably unacknowledged) value-assumptions which predetermine the range of its empirical application” (ibidem, p.30). The author is critical of pluralist views on power, which he calls one-dimensional (based on behaviour, decision-making, observable overt conflict, subjective interests) and two-dimensional (decision-making and nondecision--making, issues and potential issues, observable overt and covert conflict, and subjective interest) views on power. He then proposes a three-dimension approach, based on “decision-making and control over political agenda; [...] issues and potential issues; observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict; subjective and real interests” (ibidem, p.29).

Yet, those notions do not suffice to explain the cases of Brazil and Germany. They are based on realist notions of power – i.e. visions that privilege the individualistic gains derived

from material capabilities in an environment of dispute and competition, and that characterize politics as a “struggle for power” (Schmidt 2005, p.524). Brazil and Germany are not military and nuclear powers, nor employ hard power measures in their foreign policies. The characterization of both countries as the “consensual hegemon” (Burgess 2008) and as the “civilian power” (Maull 1990), correspondingly, demonstrate how they prefer to employ ideational power when acting regionally and internationally. Thus, other approaches to the study of power are more suitable to the Brazilian and German cases, ones that reflect on the importance of ideational components, such as narratives, practices, values, collective memories, and identities (Carstensen, Schmidt 2016, p.322).

Therefore, it must be noted that this present research adopts a constructivist ontological approach. Power is here conceptually understood and applied on the grounds of its ideational capacity, without losing sight of the effects of the material elements of power (such as financial and strategic resources).

To Guzzini (2017, p.23), a Constructivist analysis of power is more concerned with questioning “what the concept of power ‘does’”. Since Constructivism focuses on the ontological construction of the social world, the conceptualization of power will naturally be based on the same mindset. The author juxtaposes the constructivist metatheory with positivist approaches, arguing that “constructivist theories tend to understand power as both agential and intersubjective [...], and they are also more attuned to questions of open or taken-for-granted and ‘naturalised’ legitimization processes” (ibidem, p.31). Constructivist studies usually account for how ideas and values affect the display of power, and the author also highlights the importance of language and political discourse and the “theory-dependent meaning of concepts, the performative effects some concepts can have [...] and the historical and social context of the conventions which underlie this effect” (ibidem, p.39).

In this vein of non-coercive forms of power, Nye (2004) emphasizes how a country can attract others through its ideas, culture, values, and ideals, which the author denominates as soft power. It is based on the capacity to alter the preference of others through attraction rather than imposition. It is a direct contrast to hard power, in which material and especially military capabilities are used in order to attain a goal. To Saraiva (2016), occurrences of soft power have been present throughout Brazil’s diplomatic history. During Lula, soft power was used alongside the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, such as FOCEM, which was dedicated to improving infrastructure in MERCOSUR, and via investments made by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) in neighbouring countries. According to Kappel (2014), Germany’s soft power manifests itself in the country’s ability to solve financial and economic crises in the EU.

In sum, one could use power as a synonym for influence, domination, or coercion, all depending on which theoretical view is applied. Because Constructivism pays special attention to the historical and social interplays and on how the notion of power is socially constructed, it acquires a different meaning, not only circumscribed by domination or coercion. While it is not delimited only by materialistic accounts, it acknowledges the usefulness of ideational components. Therefore, this understanding of power is a better fit the present analysis, since the power exercised by Brazil and by Germany not only rest on material capabilities, but also on ideational ones.

2.7 Leadership and hegemony

As claimed in the Introduction, the puzzle that guided this research originated from an assessment of the literature. The observation of conflicting performances of Brazil and Germany led to the present research question, which is how the National Role Conceptions were shaped under Lula's and Merkel's first mandates. There is substantial debate if Brazil and Germany can be considered as leaders, and this doctoral thesis does not delve on that question. It sustains that both countries are key states in the region, as they possess more economic and material capabilities than their counterparts, and are pivotal states in the creation and development of regional institutions.

Nonetheless, this section will provide a general overview of the definitions regarding leadership and hegemony. They are contested terms in the Social Sciences and IR in particular, and be often found as synonyms, without clear distinctions between their conceptual framework²³. In the latter part of the section, the debate in the literature regarding leadership roles portrayed by Brazil and Germany, which originated the guiding research question, will be elucidated.

One of the earliest definitions of leadership was brought by Burns (1979), which states that "leadership over human beings is exercised when person with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with other, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers" (ibidem, p.18). The author divides this notion into two categories, transactional and transforming leaderships. The first one occurs when one person starts a bilateral contact, in which there is a transaction of psychological, economic, or political goods. A relation of followership is not

²³ Prys (2010) has introduced a typology for the study of regional powers, which considers self-perception, regional perception, exercise of power, and type of goods. These indicators would be analysed under what the author called regional detached powers, regional hegemons, and regional dominators.

intrinsic to transactional leadership. The second type ensues when the bilateral contact is for the sake of a higher good or for a common cause. A strong bonding is then formed between leader and follower in the transforming type of leadership, according to Burns.

Young (1991) presents a slightly different explanation of leadership that rests on institutional bargaining or in the collective problem-solving process in international institutions. To the author, leadership “refers to the actions of individuals who endeavour to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining” (ibidem p.285). He created a categorization that is divided in three types - structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual leadership. The first category comprises individuals who speak on behalf of a political party and whose leadership capabilities are based on material resources; the second category is about how persons speaking in the name of stakeholders use negotiation skills to find a common ground among diverging parties; the third and last category pertains individuals who use ideas to influence fellow participants and therefore to shape outcomes.

Keohane (2010, p.19) defines leadership based on the capacity to solve collective problems. According to the author, a leader is someone capable of “providing solutions to common problems or offering ideas about how to accomplish collective purposes, and mobilizing the energies of others to follow these courses of action”.

Parallel to the notion of leadership comes the concept of hegemony. It was first developed by Gramsci in “Prison Notebooks” (2011), who was influenced by the Marxist tradition of structure and superstructure when he analysed the civil society and the political society in a time of totalitarianism. According to Bates (1975, p.354), “to Gramsci’s theory, hegemony and dictatorship are mutually dependent phenomena”. The definition of hegemony has been conceptually transferred to the field of IR. While still imbued with a systemic notion, it maintains the unit of analysis not on societal terms, but on the international world order. Most of the studies carried on hegemony delved on political and economic order of the afterwar period.

One example is the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), which presupposes that economic and political stability is more likely to occur when one state dominates the system (Kindleberger 1973; Webb, Krasner 1989). According to HST, the hegemon “facilitates international cooperation and prevents defection from the rules of the regime through side payments (bribes), sanctions, and/or other means” (Gilpin 2001, p.97). It has been argued that the United States played a pivotal role in the international system, hence the only state able to act as a hegemon or a “superpower” (Huntington 1999).

Realists perspectives on hegemony often focus on hard power capacities. One example is Pedersen (2002), who proposed a category of cooperative hegemony, a Realist-based approach that pays attention to how power and security drive regionalist initiatives, especially in their formative years. Cooperative hegemony particularly focuses on the strategies of big powers through power aggregation, power-sharing and commitment capacities in institutions.

Liberal accounts such as Keohane (1984) focuses on cooperation between states in interdependent regimes rather than domination of one country individually. Authors such as Acharya (2017) share the vision that we live in a post-hegemonic world, and this same notion is backed by those who argue that the rise of new regional powers, like India and China, could counteract hegemonic practices²⁴. The study of hegemony has given room to the strand of the literature that emphasizes the importance of different regions to the current configuration of the international order, as elucidated in the first and second sections.

In this way, it could be argued that both leader and hegemon have material and economic capacity to make their interests prevail. However, according to Destradi (2010, p.921), “while the hegemon aims to realise its own self-interested goals by presenting them as common with those of subordinate states, the leader guides – ‘leads’ – a group of states in order to realise or facilitate the realisation of their common objectives”.

Against this backdrop, a part of the literature recognizes Brazil’s quest to consolidate its regional role and to gain more prominence in the international stage, particular during Lula’s presidential terms. To Lima and Hirst (2006), the need for Brazil to claim its power as a resourceful and strategic country to the international arena has been present in the foreign policy agenda of *Itamaraty*. But with the Lula administration, according to the authors, the biggest innovations were the awareness of social inequalities, the revision of discrepancies in international fora, and the strengthening of the South-South cooperation. To the authors, Lula’s government became “more explicit about its desire and its determination to move rapidly towards South American leadership” (ibidem, p.30).

Saraiva (2013) emphasizes that the rise of Lula to power encompassed a new wave of policymakers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were guided by principles of autonomy. Among the autonomists, or *autonomistas*, were Brazilian scholars and members of the Worker’s Party who were invested in issues such as the reformulation of international institutions, the North-South division in the international system, and the strong relation between regionalism and economic development. According to the author, the main goal of

²⁴ Hopewell (2015) argues that the new regional powers like Brazil, India, and China have change the status quo at the World Trade Organization, albeit in different forms and not exclusively determined by economic means.

the autonomist strand was building up the necessary conditions for Brazil to be a regional leader and, eventually, a global power. As examples, she refers to the Brazilian participation in the financial G-20, the Brazilian influence as a mediator alongside Turkey in the nuclear treaty with Iran, the creation of CASA, and the financing of enterprises abroad via the Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES).

However, another part of this debate revolves around the unsuccessful initiatives due to lack of followership or by scepticism from Brazil's neighbours. Burges (2008) references Brazil as a "consensual hegemon" as it "position the country's propositions and prerogatives as the central unifying factor of a potential South American region" (ibidem, p.75). Hence, Brazil sought to promote democracy, economic growth, regional development with new initiatives such as CASA, infrastructure improvements with IIRSA, external financing through BNDES, and participation in UN peacekeeping operations like MINUSTAH in Haiti, as a way to bolster its regional leadership. Yet, to the author, this strategy was not entirely successful, as neighbours often contested Brazil's approach. Consensual hegemony, then, is a concept that is strongly associated with soft power rather than with forms of domination.

Contestation was another issue according to Malamud (2011), which labelled Brazil as a "leader without followers", at least on the regional level. On the one hand, Brazilian's quest for leadership failed regionally, given the disengagement from neighbours on the country's global aspirations, such as a seat on the United Nations Security Council and the support for the Brazilian candidate for the WTO. An uncertain relationship with Argentina, direct confrontations with Ecuador and Bolivia related to the operation of Brazilian companies in their territories (the nationalization of Petrobras in the first, the malfunctioning of Odebrecht in the second) added to the overall difficult scenario for Brazilian regional leadership. On the other hand, Brazil gained more prominence internationally, as it was originally included in global groupings such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), G-20 group of the WTO, and it was invited to a G-8 Meeting. Additionally, Brazil and the EU signed a strategic partnership in 2007. To the author, "by playing the regional card to achieve global aims, Brazil has ended up in an unexpected situation: while its regional leadership has grown on paper, in practice it has met growing resistance. Yet the country has gained increasing global recognition" (ibidem, p.19).

In the German case, the debate on leadership is also present, and it is often intertwined with the uneasiness among European countries of Germany becoming a dominant power given its history. Maull (1990) is one of forefathers of this debate, as he labelled Germany a "civilian power" and analysed how this country and Japan were integrated into a bipolar and militarized system headed by the United States after the World War II. The transformations

that took place after the end of the Cold War made possible for the two countries to represent this new order, which is based on non-military and non-coercive means.

Another significant contribution was Katzenstein's (1997) classification of Germany as a "tamed power". As the country's identity turned more enmeshed into the EU in the 1990s, Germany's power became "institutionalized" (ibidem, p.4) and its room for manoeuvre became limited.

From the beginning of the 2000s when the EU developed into a more institutionalized framework, especially after the Treaty of Lisbon, while Germany's economic capabilities increased particularly when Merkel came to power, more scholarly attention has been paid to the issue of German leadership. The difference is that now, after crises and setbacks, Germany's interest to lead has been questioned.

As stated by Morisse-Schilbach (2011), Germany acted as a "benign hegemon", with the "a preponderance of material resources in world economic affairs, on the one hand, and the political will to lead in a benevolent way, on the other" (ibidem, p.4) during the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS)²⁵. To the author, the country acted this role when it formed a multilateral organization in detriment to the pursue of its own national interests, while paying the costs of this decision. Nevertheless, in the Greek and Euro crises Germany did not reproduce the role of benign hegemon, and instead Merkel delayed a financial rescue to Greece, for example. This led to the "normalization" of Germany, as a state that acts unilaterally, to consequently make its neighbours to "not take its leadership in monetary and economic affairs for granted anymore" (ibidem, p.36).

Paterson (2011) argued that, during the first phase of Merkel's term, Germany stayed congruent to its "European vocation" (Paterson 2010), as it portrayed a leading role towards salvaging the Treaty of Lisbon. Even so, during the Eurozone crisis, Germany shied away from being a leader due to the Chancellor's style of hesitating to be at the forefront, a contestation towards European policies at the national level, and an unwillingness of bearing the costs of leadership. To the author, then, Germany acted as a "reluctant hegemon".

The Eurozone crisis is also pointed out by Bulmer (2014) as the turning point of Germany's hegemonic role. During that period, in the words of the author, "national interests and assertiveness have become more evident in policy practice. Ordo-liberal medicine is prescribed for the debtor countries, while pro-integrationism has lost importance both as a freestanding goal and as an accompanying set of ideas" (ibidem, p.1249). The capacity of

²⁵ The EMS was a mechanism created in the 1970s to create financial stability, which eventually led to the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), that made possible the creation of the Euro. For more on this, see Höpner and Spielau (2018).

Germany for leadership is also conditioned to domestic conditions, like the public opinion and the Federal Constitutional Court. To the author, this makes Germany “caught between hegemony and domestic politics” (ibidem, p.1259), and a way to satisfy both external and internal expectations was to apply ordoliberal principles, which is formed by a principle of stability – something often needed in times of crises.

As we can see, the same foreign policy actions can be seen by different interpretations in the literature as either incentives or deterrents for regional leadership²⁶. This mismatch between discourse and practice by Brazil and Germany regarding leadership is what led to the research question, as explained previously.

From this section, one can observe the conceptual fuzziness regarding leadership and hegemony. As we know, a state can perform many roles at regional and international levels. Then, the study of roles (and, hence, of National Role Conceptions) provides a more stable template, one that concentrates on the internal dynamics of key-states, and does not focus solely on material capabilities of regional governance and power. To understand if a state is a leader one must first examine the components that could develop into a leadership role. This doctoral thesis is invested in doing so.

2.8 Final remarks

The goal of this chapter was to create a conceptual framework that serves as a background for the analytical framework, comprised of a constructivist-interpretivist approach and theoretically conceptualized by Role Theory. As there are many definitions encompassing those concepts, an overview of those definitions was provided, while offering a state of the art on the literature regarding those terms.

In this present study, a region is understood in two ways: first, as the territorial borders that define a certain area and, second, as the social construction that certain actors make of that area – and, specifically, how region-builders, as defined by Van Langenhove (2011), help develop that region. In this way, South America and Europe are seen under a historical perspective that culminated in MERCOSUR and in the EU. While it reckons that regions are socially constructed, this research focuses on how states socially construct regions – and, therefore, are able to hinder or advance regional integration processes.

²⁶ Which does not present an issue, for different arguments and dialogues are necessary and important processes in the academic scholarship.

Regionalism is the top-down process of creating regional institutions. As much as this research acknowledges how the social aspect is intertwined in this process, it adopts first and foremost a state-centric perspective. In this regard, regional governance is conducted only by states, as it is the result of different forces and voices within the bureaucracy, such as Ministries of Finances and of Foreign Affairs. As explained in Chapter 4, the focus here is on countries being personified by their respective presidents and chancellors.

This chapter demonstrated how theories of regional integration concerning the European Union abound, but they are lacking when it comes to the Latin American experience. This puts at risk using European theories to other parts of the world, thus generalizing the European experience and also incurring in Eurocentrism. Hence, the study of roles and their cognates can fill this void. Role Theory provides an understanding on the behaviour of states, which can lead to an explanation of the functioning of regional institutions that are themselves amalgamated by states. This theoretical approach can be easily applied to any region.

Lastly, three concepts that are intertwined – power, leadership, and hegemony – are central for this doctoral research. The usual understanding of power – making someone do something they otherwise would not do – does not translate well to regional institutions, as it is more difficult to concert unilateral decisions among many member-states, especially in supranational instances. Power is seen here without the exclusive focus on material capacities, as ideational ones are also acknowledged. Thus, Brazil and Germany are one of the most powerful states in the region because they a) dispose of material and strategic capabilities such as natural and economic resources, large population and territory; b) are invested in furthering the regional integration based on the political narratives they display.

As demonstrated in this chapter, the issue regarding leadership on Brazil and Germany is controversial. On the one hand, the literature shows that Brazil pursues a leadership role in the region that is contested among its neighbours. On the other hand, Germany is called to act as a leader, but it shies away from that role. This puzzle guides this research and it shows that the quest for regional leadership is a controversial and non-consensual path. What is proposed here is to untangle this by applying National Role Conceptions, as they can serve as guidelines for ultimately understanding the behaviour of states. This will be explained in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 - Theoretical framework

The theoretical apparatus chosen for this doctoral thesis is Role Theory, which is concerned with how roles are constituted and performed, within an agent-structure relationship. The theoretical and analytical framework here draws heavily from Harnisch, Frank and Maull (2011a) part on the conceptualization and instrumentalization of Role Theory. To them, Role Theory “offers a promising avenue for resolving one of IR theory's most intractable problems, the relationship between actors and the system in international relations” (ibidem, p.1). It must be noted that, here, the level of analysis constitutes states as actors and regional institutions as the (sub-)systems. Or, more specifically, Brazil and Germany as the actors and MERCOSUR and the EU as the (sub-)systems. This will be elucidated in Chapters 5 and 6.

Therefore, choosing Role Theory is justified because it provides the possibility to focus and structures in regional institutions. Additionally, when examining power asymmetries, it offers the chance to investigate other forms of capabilities that go beyond the material ones. Ideational components are well-suited to explain the roles of Brazil and of Germany, since they do not rely exclusively on traditional forms of power. As explained in Chapter 2, perspectives that value traditional forms of power, such as realist and rationalist approaches, do not suffice.

In this context, as Walker (1987, p.02) defends, Role Theory provides a template for analysis in three ways, through its descriptive, organizational, and explanatory power. The level of analysis can fall either on the national, individual, and systemic levels. Methodologically, it could adopt either a structure or process standpoint. Role Theory has a Constructivist basis, for it agrees with the agent and structure constitutive entanglement, as elucidated in the works of Wendt (1992, 1994), but it also debates “its emphasis on the systems level of analysis” (Breuning, 2011, p.25). Role Theory and Constructivism also utilize identity in IR studies – but in the first case, it is a part of the ideational component that converges into the National Role Conception, and not as a case study or a variable as often found in the second case.

Role Theory is rooted in social psychology and allies itself with much of the Constructivist ontology and methodology, however challenging it on the applicability of the concept of identity. Role theorists usually take the construction of identity as an interplay between Self and Other(s). To them, identity is not an isolated element and it does not produce action by itself; roles would be, then, how identity is instrumentalized to generate behaviour (Wehner, Thies 2014). How the concept of identity is understood and employed by this research will be clarified under the sub-section 3.5.1.2.

Many studies apply Role Theory as a means of analysing foreign policy. The goal here is to intersect the areas of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Regionalism, as a way to verify the shaping of National Role Conceptions during Lula and Merkel towards MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively. Any external behaviour of a country falls on the category of foreign policy, and regionalism is akin to it – a regional behaviour is a foreign behaviour, after all. Therefore, Role Theory can be applied to Regionalism, albeit studies that conflate them are still missing from the literature.

In this sense, roles are important for understanding state behaviour in a given setting. ***But instead of examining which roles Brazil and Germany portray, it is proposed here to take a step back in order to verify how the National Role Conceptions of each state were shaped under Lula and Merkel.*** In this way, one can better grasp how their approach to the region was conceived and, ultimately, how their behaviour came to fruition. And, as argued in the Introduction, by bringing the level of analysis onto states, one can better understand the drivers of regional integration. To properly reflect on the research puzzle explained in Chapter 1 – one wants it, but cannot have it; the other has it, but does not want it”, one must not delve on roles, as they would bring insufficient explanations derived from their narrowness of scope. ***Focusing on the formation of National Role Conceptions, particularly with the scheme proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26), one can examine how the many elements involved in the conceiving of a role, rather than solely on the role itself.*** A definition on National Role Conceptions is available in section 3.3, an explanation of how it will be applied herein can be found in section 3.4, and an analysis of the analytical diagram is available in section 3.5.

As Chapter 4 will explain, institutions, in the cases presented here, are formal regional institutions. This posits a duality – states purposefully create institutions, but are at the same time constrained and shaped by them (even more so in the case of the EU with the supranational institutions). Nonetheless, regional institutions are neither static nor deterministic; they evolve according to the needs and visions of the member-states. This is not to say that roles are constantly being discarded in favour of new ones, nor that role expectations set upon a certain actor, either by itself or others, do not hold value (Aggestam 2006). In regional institutions, the structure creates stability, but leaves room for the creation and adaptation of roles, based on a set of elements, which will be discussed in this chapter.

As section 3.1 will show, studies that combine Role Theory and Regionalism are scant, especially those that apply the notion of National Role Conceptions. This research will test the analytical template created by Breuning (2011, p.26) as a theoretical model for the formation of National Role Conceptions of the selected cases towards regional institutions, as section 3.5 will explain.

This chapter is arranged as follows: the first section analyses the state of the art on Role Theory and how this present study positions itself in the literature; the second section is devoted to briefly elucidating the conceptual definitions pertaining to Role Theory, which are important to the overall understanding of theory, for those definitions can be understood in a continuous and self-perpetuating dynamics; the third section is dedicated to explaining the concept of National Role Conceptions and the fourth section is concerned with how it will be applied to the present cases; the fifth section examines the criteria of the National Role Conception flowchart created by Breuning (2011, p.26), and how it will be applied herein. The sixth and last section is dedicated to the final remarks of this chapter.

3.1 State of the art on Role Theory

The goal of this section is to provide a state of the art on Role Theory. In this realm, case studies are a good methodological strategy, for Role Theory provides a template that enables specific attention to agents. As so, this explains why most of the studies referenced in the following paragraphs chose said strategy. Studies that employ Role Theory encompass most geographical areas of the world, including South America and Europe, and Brazil and Germany in particular. However, there has not been a study which combines the formation of National Role Conceptions of Brazil and Germany towards MERCOSUR and the EU.

One of the first studies regarding National Role Conceptions was put forward by Wish (1980), which provided a content analysis national role conception of seventeen countries by examining the speeches of key decision-makers. The author concluded that there was a strong correlation between the National Role Conception and the foreign policy behaviour of certain countries. Those who, for example, domestically professed a dominant role for their country tended to project the same mind-set internationally. In the study, the analysis for Brazil was absent, but Germany was present, although divided at the time. In conclusion, during the mandates of the first three chancellors in West Germany verified by the author – Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, Kurt Georg Kiesinger – the country's behaviour fell on the cooperative spectrum, and for East Germany, during the mandate of Walter Ulbricht (1959-1968), it was classified on the axis of competitive behaviour.

The intersection between institutions and role conception on Middle East was explored by Barnett (1993). The author claimed that institutions offer stability and, as states usually pertain to a variety of them, each one has their own role expectations. This would lead to role conflict for states, since they perform differently in each institution. This happened to countries in Middle East, as pan-Arabism designated opposing roles and expectations to member-states.

Krotz (2002) examined France's and Germany's foreign policy practices from 1950 until 1990 through the lenses of National Role Conceptions in areas such as defence and security. The author argues that the foreign policy actions of those countries followed a path of continuity. Yet, in the German case, it presented higher chances of adapting to the new circumstances presented, when compared to France.

Beneš and Harnish (2014) use Role Theory combined with the symbolic interactionism approach, which is based on the configuration of self and other, to the cases of Czech Republic and Germany in regard to the EU. The historical perception of the self and the historical alterity, portrayed by rivalries, play a significant part on the development of the National Role Conception in an institutional setting, according to the authors. In the case of Germany, a self-restrained perception was replaced by the exportation of German values to the EU instances. In the Czech case, it remains a sceptical view of the EU as the other, being it represented as a dominant great power. The authors claim that the National Role Conceptions on both cases lead towards a "contingent Europeanism", not sustained on the long-run in the German case, and a more autonomous perspective on the Czech case.

Thies's articles on Israel (2012) and Venezuela (2014) addressed socialization and typology creation, respectively. Interestingly, a common aspect on both studies was the influence of the United States. While it de-socialized Israel's role enactment as a regional leader, it indirectly helped shape one of Hugo Chávez's National Role Conceptions as a liberator from the American domination, according to the author.

Wehner focused on the expectations of others in relation to regional powers, specifically on the Brazilian (2014) and Chilean (2016) cases. The author concluded that, on the one hand, there is usually an acceptance on the master role portrayed by Brazil by auxiliary secondary powers (Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela), however if only exercised in tandem and within regional institutions. On the other hand, Brazil would be willing to seek consensus among its neighbours. When Brazil portrays a more "selfish" role, there would be contestation by the secondary powers in South America. By the same token, Chile recognizes the importance of Brazil to the region, despite showing preference to relations with Argentina, according to the author.

Role Theory is also present in studies that cover Africa and Asia, like Adigbuo (2007) and He (2018), respectively. The first author employed the National Role Conceptions to the case of Nigeria's foreign policy, while the second author combined Role Theory and institutional balancing theory to create the "balance of roles" approach, as a way to investigate the performances of Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States after the financial crisis. What both studies have in common is the attempt to test and redefine certain

aspects of Role Theory, either by applying it to a case in the developing world or by amalgamating other theoretical perspectives into it.

While the literature has looked at different countries and the potential development of regional roles, from this section one can conclude that there is still room available for analyses which conflate Role Theory and Regionalism. Furthermore, studies on Role Theory regarding Brazil in MERCOSUR and Germany in the EU are still underrepresented in the literature. No other study has paid particular attention to the formation of National Role Conceptions of Brazil and Germany towards regional institutions. Likewise, the majority of studies on Role Theory focus on the constitution of the self in regard to the other, and analyses that consider the development of the Self based solely on internal mechanisms are still lacking. This doctoral research proposes to fill these gaps. The next section will provide an overview on the concept of role and its variations, an important part of the Role Theory framework.

3.2 The definition of role and its variants: role change, role contestation, and role enactment

Role Theory amalgamates some definitions that are related to the broad conceptualization of “roles”. Despite the fact that the focus here lies on the formation of National Role Conceptions, it becomes necessary to briefly describe some important concepts that pertain to Role Theory. It is necessary to note, however, that this present thesis does not apply the notions of role change, role contestation, and role enactment to the selected cases. But since they are part of the conceptual framework of Role Theory, they will be explained in this section. The next section will dwell on the definition of National Role Conception, and the subsequent one on its application to the selected cases.

K.J. Holsti’s “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” (1970) became a guiding reference to role theorists. The author created a seventeen-type model²⁷ to explain the foreign policy behaviour of states, and it covered most of the relevant countries to the international system of that period. Brazil and Germany are present in his study, as the first being portrayed from 1967 to 1970 as the regional subsystem collaborator and internal development, and West Germany from 1966 until 1968 as the mediator, integrator, regional subsystem collaborator, developer, bridge, and faithful ally.

²⁷ The typology created by Holsti (1970) consisted of the subsequent archetypes: bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist agent, defender of the faith, mediator-integrator, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development, isolate, and protectee.

In this sense, *Role* is primarily understood as a behaviour which comprises the decisions and actions of a particular social actor. According to Aggestam (2006, p.13), "it simplifies, provides guidance and predisposes an actor towards one purposive behaviour rather than another". It differs from *role prescription*, that are the norms and expectations being attached to a specific position by cultures, institutions, societies, and groups. Thus, Role Theory covers the dynamics between role prescription and role performance of a given social actor (Holsti 1970, p.239). Another important element is the *role conception*, that is created around the actor's own image of itself or, in other words, its ego component. Then, "the perceptions, values, and attitudes of the actor occupying a position thus become the crucial independent variables in explaining role performance" (ibidem). This definition will be expanded in the next section.

Roles, however, are not a natural and given condition, but socially constructed. As such, roles can be changed and adapted throughout time. According to Harnisch (2011, p.9-12), roles can be transformed by adaptation and learning. In the first case, there are changes on the strategies and instruments while the actor performs a role, but the goal of doing so remains the same. Learning is the result of the change in beliefs or the creation of new beliefs that come as a consequence of experiences. In this regard, according to the author, normative persuasion takes place when actors take part in a linguistic interaction to verify if roles, in a situation of crises, are appropriate, as to reach an agreement in negotiations. And socialization, another key-factor, occurs when an outside actor internalizes the rules already established by a group of inside actors.

Against this backdrop, a role can be altered depending on the circumstances, which would entail a *role change*. Harnisch et al (2011b, p.249) identify three possibilities of role change: role adaptation, in which the instruments and strategies are altered through socialization by social influence; role learning, in that the goals of foreign policy change due to the socialization via normative persuasion; and the role transformation, in which identity and interests change via identity reformation and socialization via internalization.

One can argue that these processes do not occur rapidly or organically. The alteration of roles is the result of a varied combination of elements, either with the change in internal or external conditions. When the role (conception or performance) does not encounter consensus, it could lead to *role contestation*. In this sense, it would only make sense to argue that *role enactment*, or "the behaviour of an actor when performing a role" (Harnisch 2011, p.7), could lead to divergences from domestic and international sources. When there is an unbalance between the role played by a state and the expectation of national actors, it usually leads to role contestation.

In this context, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) advocate for considering how elites, public opinion, and political parties can challenge the role conception, as they are not passive agents in the formation of the National Role Conception. The authors classify the contestation of national roles in two ways: in vertical and in horizontal forms. The first one stems from elites and masses towards the government, and the second one is among governing elites and parties of opposition. To the authors, “[...] attention to contested roles would allow role theorists to explain changes and inconsistencies in roles and foreign policy behavior, no matter how quickly or slowly they may change” (ibidem, p.16).

In the same vein, Brummer and Thies (2015) analysed how the role envisioned by Germany of a faithful ally, during the afterwar years, was disputed among political parties of the opposition. Still, according to the authors, Konrad Adenauer unilaterally defended that role, even if that meant doing so without the support of his colligates. This shows that the selection of a role is not always a harmonized development, but the elected politician (in this case, the chancellor) has the prerogative to put forward his or her vision of the National Role Conception – but, in the case of contestation, they will encounter more barriers to the consecution of said role.

Although the focus of this research is on the formation of National Role Conceptions, it was important to briefly discuss the concepts pertaining to Role Theory. This serves to demonstrate that National Role Conceptions and consequent formation of roles are not a consensus. They encompass a multitude of visions and roles for the country, which can often clash among policymakers, elites, and the public. At the same time, a National Role Conception can lead to the formation of many roles, which are specific to context and area.

Thus, as explained previously, the focus here is on how the National Role Conceptions were shaped under Lula (2003-2006) and Merkel (2005-2009) in regard to MERCOSUR and to the EU, correspondingly. In this way, this research acknowledges that since the level of analysis lies exclusively on the perceptions of the president and chancellor regarding regional integration, the National Role Conceptions can be prone to contestation by other segments of the society, and their development or alteration do not constitute a harmonic process. These factors will be taken into consideration in this present study. The next section is dedicated to explaining the definition of National Role Conception.

3.3 Defining National Role Conceptions

One can observe that Role Theory is based on a set of different but symbiotic strands – the perception and enactment of oneself, the perception of others, and the place in which

they occur. As Holsti (1970, p.246) summarizes, Role Theory “offers a framework for describing national role performance and role conceptions and for exploring the sources of those role conceptions”. In this realm, “a national role conception includes the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment” (ibidem, p.245).

Marijke Breuning (2011, p.26) expanded the definition of National Role Conceptions provided by Holsti (1970) by compiling the different aspects pointed out by the literature that would affect the conceiving of National Role Conceptions. In this way, the conceptualization provided by Breuning (2011, p. 26) includes ideational and material elements that converge into the role conception and, then, to role enactment. As it will be explained in the following sections 3.4 and 3.5, the scheme of formation of a National Role Conception provided by Breuning (2011, p.26) will be applied to the cases of Brazil and Germany and tested as a theoretical model.

To Breuning (2011, p.26), the National Role Conceptions framework

[...] seeks to understand how actors fashion their role in the international system, navigating between domestic sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advantage of the material resources at their disposal, circumnavigating as best as possible the obstacles imposed by their position in the international structure. More importantly, it accommodates both domestic and international sources of national role conceptions by adopting a cognitive perspective: decision makers form their conceptions of their state's role on the basis of both their understanding of the state's identity and cultural heritage, and their perception of their state's place and possibilities within the international system.

In a similar vein, Wish (1980, p.533) relates National Role Conceptions to the actors involved in the decision-making process. According to the author, “the focus is on those who wield the greatest authority in making foreign policy decisions. [...] National role conceptions are defined as foreign policy makers' perceptions of their nations' positions in the international system. They include perceptions of the general kinds of decisions, rules, commitments, and long-term functions associated with these international positions. National role conceptions

provide norms, guidelines, and standards which affect many aspects of decision making". Likewise, "the opportunities and risks perceived by decision makers are highly contingent upon the ideational "baggage" they bring to their assessment of the situation" (Breuning 2011, p.27).

Nonetheless, it is important to highlight, as already mention in Chapter 1, that the focus here is not on the psychological traits of Lula and Merkel that led to the formation of National Role Conceptions. As Chapter 4 will elucidate, here the focus lies on Brazil *under* Lula and Germany *under* Merkel. Despite being the ultimate deciders, have representational aspects that are surpassed by the histories, cultural heritages, and identities of both countries.

As summarized by Wish (1980, p.535), "role theorists suggest that role conceptions provide guidelines for a great variety of behaviors. Therefore, this study contends ***that national role conceptions, if systematically categorized, can provide the researcher with a powerful tool for explaining variations in many types of foreign policy behavior***" (emphasis mine). Thus, as consistently mentioned throughout this thesis, ***rather than defining specific roles for Brazil and Germany in MERCOSUR and in the EU, the goal of this present study is to determine the formation of the National Role Conception of both countries towards said regional institutions.***

In this sense, as Krotz (2002, p.31) argues, National Role Conceptions "shape national interests and foreign policies. They are internal reference systems which affect what states want and do, and what they do not want and do not do; they prescribe, proscribe, and induce certain processual preferences". As delineated in the previous section, roles are not static nor single. States can develop multiple roles that can be also specific to an issue area, as they can be adapted and changed. In a similar way, National Role Conceptions are also prone to change and specific to issues or areas. Thus, it is important to define specifically the actors, areas, and timelines related to the formation of a National Role Conception. The elements (or variables, in positivist parlance) of its development could change from one government to the other, or from one area to another. Therefore, generalization cannot be applied to the establishment of a role conception. As explained in Chapter 1, the results generated by this study concern Brazil during Lula's first mandate and Germany in Merkel's first mandate towards MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively.

Therefore, National Role Conceptions are an appropriate tool for examining the behaviour of key-states, as it focuses on the elements and circumstances that led to a certain role enactment. Here, National Role Conceptions will serve as a template that map the ideational and material conditions involved in the conception of state behaviour in regional institutions, with the theoretical model provided by Breuning (2011, p.26). These arguments will be expanded in the next two sections.

3.4 Instrumentalizing National Role Conceptions to regional institutions

With the results found by the National Role Conception flowchart, one will be capable of explaining the behaviour of Brazil in MERCOSUR and Germany in the EU. And, as elucidated in Chapter 1, one must bring the level of analysis to states as a way to better understand the functioning of regional institutions – for states create them and end up being constrained by their own creation. ***Rather than labelling a state based on its role, the formation of a National Role Conception shows how a behaviour came to be, based on the amalgamation of ideational and material components, which encompass the main factors that influence decision-making.*** This is particularly important in regard to regional institutions, as they circumscribe different actors, demands, and circumstances. Then, National Role Conceptions show

In the same vein, as explained by Breuning (2011, p.23), “National role conceptions, in other words, delineate the scope of foreign policy behaviors that decision makers can imagine and perceive as appropriate for the state to undertake”. Thus, the notion of role conception is a useful tool for understanding the performance of a state in a given issue or area. In this present research, the National Role Conception is instrumentalized for understanding the behaviour of key-states in regional institutions.

Here, Lula and by Merkel are the objects of analysis, as they conduct the foreign policy actions and carry the responsibility for their successes and failures. In the same way, Brazil is represented by a presidential system, and Germany often is characterized by a *Kanzlerdemokratie*²⁸, both of each have the higher office leaders as the central element. Lula and Merkel act on behalf of Brazil and Germany, and equalizing their actions during their administration is a way of better understanding the formation of roles of those countries in the regional and global scenarios. As explained in Chapter 1, in matters of regionalism one must analyse the dynamics of key member-states, for they can act as propellers of regional institutions. Consequently, by understanding the National Role Conceptions of Brazil and Germany towards MERCOSUR and the EU, one can ultimately understand the hidden mechanisms of said institutions.

As argued by Breuning (2011, p.32), “role theory easily incorporates the notion that decision makers hold multiple national role conceptions that guide the foreign policy behavior of the state in distinct issue areas”. As a result, National Role Conceptions can be multiple. One would not be able to extrapolate it for different circumstances or mandates. Because of

²⁸ For more on this, see Niclauß (2015).

the epistemological approach adopted here, this would not be a problem – Interpretivism accounts for contextuality and non-generalizability, anyway.

Thus, one of the pitfalls of National Role Conception flowchart is that its results are bounded to a set of specific conditions. Therefore, the results generated by this research are only valid for the selected timeframe. For a different timeline or for different agents, it would become necessary to create a new National Role Conceptions flowchart by fulfilling new information. On the bright side, this analytical scheme gives a specific explanation for state behaviour, as claimed previously.

Much of the work on Role Theory take into consideration the importance of the Other(s). In the context of regional integration, the Other(s) would refer to Argentina and France. But, as argued in Chapter 1, Argentina does not claim regional leadership, and France recognizes itself as a leader and acts as such. In contrast, Brazil and Germany show a puzzling behaviour regarding leadership – one wants it, but cannot have it; the other has it, but does not want it. Additionally, National Role Conceptions focus on internal mechanisms, and the role of others lies outside of this scheme. This argument will be expanded further in sub-section 3.5.1.2 *Identity*.²⁹

As section 3.1 showed, studies that focus on the formation of National Role Conceptions of key member-states in regional institutions are lacking, especially those dedicated to Brazil in MERCOSUR and Germany in the EU. Therefore, this is a novel study that aims to contribute to the literature of Role Theory and Regionalism.

The next section is devoted to explaining each component of the National Role Conception flowchart, included the selected data and criteria for analysis.

3.5 Analytical scheme: the National Role Conception flowchart

The flowchart provided by Breuning (2011, p.26) will serve as an analytical guide and theoretical model. It is safe to argue that there are no indications in the original text that it would aspire to become an analytical template. For all intents and purposes, Marijke Breuning

²⁹ A possible avenue for future research could be to apply the National Role Conceptions flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) to the cases of Argentina and France during the same timeline, and contrast the results with the findings generated by this present doctoral thesis. But with Argentina and France the puzzle regarding leadership is not as interesting: one does not want it and does not have it; the other has it and wants it.

created it to serve as an explanation of how National Role Conceptions are conceived³⁰. ***Nonetheless, this present research brings the novel idea to test it as a theoretical model for the creation of National Role Conceptions.*** If the flowchart proves to be an effective method for combining National Role Conceptions in regional institutions, then it could be introduced as a new analytical tool to Role Theory.

In the flowchart, the ideational and material features merge into the National Role Conception, as Figure 1 shows. They are divided in sub-categories – identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience comprise the ideational aspect; and capability and opportunity to act are part of the material aspect. Originally, after the creation of the National Role Conception, it would converge into role performance, i.e. the foreign policy actions of a particular country. Role performance will not be the focus here, since this present study is interested in the process that led to the formation of National Role Conceptions. Thus, the flowchart was adapted³¹.

The two components adopted – ideational and material aspects – are significantly useful for this doctoral thesis, specially the first one, as history and culture play a central part in the behaviour of both countries. As Brazil and Germany do not postulate hard power capabilities in their foreign policy actions, material components do not occupy a central part of the thesis. But they are, nonetheless, relevant to any analysis on regional power and cannot be excluded from the analysis.

Against this backdrop, according to Breuning (2011, p.23-24), the National Role Conception is also dependent on the socialization process the policymaker has acquired, since it leaves them to act on pre-established social roles, which suggests historical and continuity of behaviour. Constituencies are also a noteworthy part of the formation of National Role Conceptions, because a new political party in charge could represent a different segment of society that has a new voice. Thus, the National Role Conception is prone to change and continuity and contingent to issue area. Therefore, one cannot generalize one National Role Conception to every domain, as explained before.

Despite being taken from Breuning (2011, p.26), the sub-components of the flowchart gained the own interpretation of this research, as the author does not establish pre-defined criteria for analysis. Thus, each sub-component will be filled out with what this thesis considers

³⁰ This research maintains the term “National Role Conception” rather than “role conception”, which is used by a part of the literature, to be congruent with the scheme originally proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26).

³¹ The analysis of role performance is an interesting avenue for future research, which should be applied to specific cases on both institutions, but it is beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis.

to have influenced it, either taken from the literature or by own analysis of its scope. This process is analogous to selecting variables, sub-variables, and indicators in a positivist study. Whenever the sub-component is present in the selected data (see Annex), it will be also considered, which is justified as to maximize the use of the data³². Likewise, this thesis included the analysis of identity narratives in the Identity segment, as it will be explained later in this chapter.

This section now turns to the explanation of each sub-component of the National Role Conception flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26, adapted). Each component will be explained according to the definition proposed by the author or by the new established criteria adopted by this research, as explained in the previous paragraph. In the same manner, the data used for analysis will be clarified as well. The components include identity, cultural heritage, and domestic audience (ideational components), and capability and opportunity to act (material components). Subsequently, Figure 1 illustrates the flowchart adopted here.

3.5.1 Ideational components

The ideational section of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) amalgamates identity, cultural heritage, and domestic audience, and they will be examined below.

3.5.1.2 Identity

Identity is one of the most debated topics in the Social Sciences and IR in particular³³, and it suffices to provide how identity is understood within this present analytical framework. Congruent with the Constructivist tradition, identity is here taken as the “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992, p.397). Specifically, I adopt herein the definition provided by Checkel and Katzenstein (2009, p.4), in which “identities refer to shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. They consist also of collective beliefs

³² For example, there were many references to “cultural heritage” in Merkel’s speeches, which will be analysed in Chapter 8. However, the same did not occur in the data regarding Lula, as the president did not reference it regarding Brazil and MERCOSUR in his speeches. Therefore, in this case the sub-component was only filled out with the available state of the art.

³³ Providing a literature review on the many uses and instrumentalizations of the concept of identity is beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis. For more on this, see Brubaker and Cooper (2000), Bucher and Jasper (2017), Lebow (2008), and Zehfuss (2001).

about the definition of the group and its membership that are shared by most group members. We understand identities to be revealed by social practices as well by political attitudes, shaped by social and geographical structures and national contexts”.

In the same vein, state identities “are observed in the way policymakers (therefore, persons) conceive of them, while they think they are acting as an agent of their state” (Ashizawa 2008, p.575). In other words, “we can still assume the existence of state identity, not as a property of a state, but in the form of a concept perceived by individuals involved in foreign policymaking; that is a concept of what their country is and what it represents” (ibidem, p.576). Therefore, those definitions provide the conceptual framework concerning state identity, which will be applied in chapters 7 and 8 to the cases of Brazil and Germany, respectively.

Although it is a concept borrowed from the field of Psychology, identity is viewed here under a state-centric perspective, meaning the selfhood of a country. It has, thus, a social and political meaning. The behaviour of a state is largely influenced by its identity. However, it is not the only condition that affects a state behaviour, as material and situational circumstances can also affect outcomes, according to the National Role Conception flowchart (see Figure 1). Identities are not immutable (Oelsner 2013), but certain elements give it a perennial quality. The identity of the state is strongly affected by its history, its culture, and its symbolic elements (such as reverberated political narratives).

Within this context, the goal is to analyse which narratives portray how Lula sees the identity of Brazil and the identity of MERCOSUR itself. Likewise, which narratives Merkel represents the identity of Germany and the identity of the EU. This will be done with the use of narrative analysis, which will be explained in Chapter 4.

The process of constructing the self can be enmeshed with the perception of the other(s), which is also an important element in Role Theory. As Harnish (2011, p.39) explains, “the ‘me’ pertains to our self-image when we look at ourselves through the eyes of the other – that is, when we import into our conduct the ‘perceived’ attitudes of the other”. In the present cases, the roles of the “Other” could fall on Argentina and France, historical rivals of Brazil and Germany, respectively, and potentials candidates for regional hegemony.

Nonetheless, as Klotz and Lynch (2015, p.81) argue, the role of the Other does not necessarily have to be another state, since “the most relevant Other may be a person's or a country's past”. In this present research, the alterity component is of secondary importance, as the focus is on the development of the self regarding internal conditions. Likewise, the literature concerning identity adopted here partakes of the same approach, the ones that focus on the internal level. Therefore, the emphasis herein lies on the national identity, one that privileges domestic mechanisms that led to the construction and formation of the identity of the

state – in detriment to approaches that value a collective identity which would unavoidably need to consider the role of the other(s).

3.5.1.3 Cultural heritage

Cultural heritage will consider the larger picture, i.e. the historical developments that led to the present positioning of the country in the international system. In the case of Brazil, being a colony that eventually became a republic, then from a military dictatorship that turned into a democratic regime in the late 1980s, will be taken as the main characteristics that affected its cultural heritage. In the case of Germany, its militarized past and subsequent division and occupation, to the new-found reintegration and democracy will be the central tenets of Germany's cultural heritage.

3.5.1.4 Domestic audience

Domestic audience entails how civil society and the public opinion were responsive to the regional integration. The data provided by the Latinobarómetro and the Eurobarometer on opinion polling in Brazil regarding regional integration in South America and in Germany concerning regional integration in Europe will be considered.

3.5.2 Material components

The material section of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) integrates capability and opportunity to act, and they will be examined in the following two sub-sections.

3.5.2.1 Capability

Capability in the words of Breuning (2011, p.26) is the “usable power resources”. This is understood here as the strategic resources at the disposal of Brazil and Germany, i.e. economic indicators and natural resources, in comparison to neighbouring states. This will be done mostly from data provided by the database of the World Bank, which will be applied to both countries.

3.5.2.2 Opportunity to act


According to Breuning (2011, p.26), opportunities to act are the “possibilities afforded by circumstances, whether temporary or enduring”. This conceptualization leaves an open room for the researcher to select the criteria that he or she deems necessary. Here, opportunity to act will ascribe for the political and economic events that had a strong impact domestically and regionally during the selected timeframe. Those events are considered as opportunities that could deepen or hinder the institutional development of MERCOSUR and of the EU.

Figure 1 below illustrates how this scheme is operated, according to Breuning (2011, p.26). The original diagram placed role enactment (or role performance), i.e. the behaviour of a state, as resulting from the National Role Conception. As explained earlier, the role enactment section was removed because the focus of this research is to investigate how the National Role Conception was formed, rather than analysing the conduct of the selected cases.

As also explained before, there are no signs in the original scheme that it ambitioned to become a theoretical model. However, this doctoral thesis innovates by testing it as a theoretical model for the formation of National Role Conceptions, especially in the case of countries in a regional institutional setting. If proved to be an adequate model, the flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26) could be introduced as a new analytical model in the scope of Role Theory.

The next section reflects on the final remarks concerning the theoretical framework adopted by this research.

Figure 1: The formation of a National Role Conception according to agent-structure dynamics (Breuning 2011, p.26, adapted)



3.6 Final remarks

This chapter has justified choosing Role Theory as a way to answer the research puzzle indicated in Chapter 1. Rather than focusing solely on roles, which would not be an appropriate way to examine said puzzle because of the narrow scope of roles, concentrating on the formation of National Roles Conceptions enables the researcher to investigate the many elements (or variables, in positivist jargon) that influenced the behaviour of a state (its role enactment/performance). Additionally, the flowchart adopted here, originally proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26) combines ideational and material elements, which enlarges the scope for analysis of how the National Role Conception, and consequently a role, came to be.

This chapter has demonstrated how studies that combine Role Theory and Regionalism are still limited, especially those concerning MERCOSUR and the EU. Moreover, most of them focus on the performance of roles rather than on the development of National Role Conceptions. No other study has delved on the formation of National Role Conceptions of Brazil and Germany towards the aforementioned regional institutions. In this lies the novelty potential of this present study.

The added value of this doctoral thesis, besides its novel approach mentioned above, is the test of a new potential theoretical model that could be added to the literature of Role Theory, the diagram proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26). Additionally, this thesis proposes an interpretivist comparison of the selected cases, which will be explained in the next chapter, devoted to the methodological framework.

Chapter 4 – Methodological framework

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodological framework. First, it becomes necessary to provide a summary of the ontological and epistemological positioning of this research. This doctoral thesis adopts a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology, and they will be elucidated in the first two sections. Neither Constructivism nor Interpretivism are methods *per se*, of course. But they are present in this chapter because ontologies and epistemologies can end up affecting how available methods are chosen. Thus, there is the need to clarify how this research positions itself and applies the constructivist-interpretivist approach as a background.

Second, the methodological framework is presented, in which the methodological selection is justified. It is followed by an overview on the use and implications of Narrative Analysis, present in the fourth and fifth sections of this chapter. The sixth section is devoted to explaining the interpretivist comparison proposed by this research. The seventh and final section explains the processes regarding data selection and data analysis.

4.1 Constructivism as an ontological approach

The term “Constructivism” was first introduced into International Relations literature by Onuf (1989), who named a new trend that attempted to provide non-rationalist answers to the challenges of the global order after the end of the Cold War (Reus-Smit 2005). The ontology of Constructivism is based on the premise that the world is socially constructed. Its main principle is that agents and structures are co-constituted, in an interactive process. Or, in other words, “what people do and how societies shape their actions” (Klotz, Lynch 2015, p.7), as Constructivists are interested in those processes and interactions (ibidem, p.10).

A central tenet regarding this school of thought is that “[...] people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. [...] It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions” (Wendt 1992, p.396-397). It is through meanings that states form identities, which by its turn affect their interests, their roles and, ultimately, their behaviour (Haas, Haas 2002). How the social identity of agents shapes the formation of interests is a crucial topic in Constructivist work, often overlooked by rationalist approaches (Reus-Smit 2005).

At the core of Constructivism lies the following beliefs, according to Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p.392): “(a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not

simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors”. This explains why Constructivist studies usually focus on the importance of ideas (Goldstein, Keohane 1993), norms and values (Wiener, 2018), and language and discourse (Risse 2000), within human experience.

Despite these commonalities, Constructivism in IR is not monolithic, and it allows for multiple approaches and methodologies. It can be sub-divided in different strands, which diverge in regard to epistemological and methodological choices. Hopf (1998) divides this realm in conventional and critical for both claim, for example: the context-driven and situated usage of data; the concept of anarchy as socially constructed; and the material and discursive properties of power, identities and interests of states being considered as variables. Yet, according to the author, the general difference lies in how “conventional constructivism does not accept critical theory’s ideas about its own role in producing change and maintains a fundamentally different understanding of power” (Hopf 1998, p.185). Power, then, becomes an ontological divide among conventional and critical constructivists. A discussion on the concept of power is available in Chapter 2.

Similarly, Fearson and Wendt (1992) organized different strands in Constructivism according to their epistemological positioning, i.e. positivist, interpretivist, and postmodern. This division was made based on how each category answers the subsequent questions: “whether knowledge claims about social life can be given any warrant other than the discursive power of the putative knower” and “whether causal explanations are appropriate in social inquiry” (Fearson, Wendt 2002, p.57). To the authors, a Constructivist of the positivist strand would answer “yes” to both questions; an interpretivist would answer positively to the first question and negatively to the second; and a postmodern would answer “no” to both questions. This suggests a variety of positionings and approaches within the field, to the point of the authors advocating for Constructivism to be taken in a plural form.

Thus, there is a variety of research designs within Constructivism(s). In this present research, I adopt a constructivist ontology, as this section has explained, and an interpretivist epistemology, which will be elucidated in the next section. In this sense, the choice of Constructivism as an ontological framework lies on its ability to consider the social construction of world politics, the agent-structure dichotomy (here applied to states and regional institutions), and its interest in other sources of understanding power.

Thus, Constructivism brings more analytical options rather than the exclusive focus on material elements. Since Brazil and Germany are not military powers, ideational components are better suited. In this sense, Constructivism offers the possibility to view power as “the ability to reconstruct discourses and shape practices”, which enables a “framework for assessing how

meaning condition identities and actions, why some dominate other, and when these patterns shift” (Klotz, Lynch 2015, p.11).

In this realm, Constructivism defines state socialization as the “[...] *ongoing and ubiquitous* cognitive and social processes by which international interaction constitutes state identities and interests” (Alderson 2001, p.417, emphasis in original). Thus, states can be socialized into performing certain roles in the international system, embodied by the “patterns of behaviour and role expectations which characterize the groups in which they interact” (ibidem, p.416). As this study is rooted on the formation of National Role Conceptions, state socialization becomes a fundamental base for reasoning, grounded on constructivist ontology.

In the same vein, studies on Constructivism usually examine the importance of ideas, norms, and language. As mentioned previously, they do not take material capabilities as the sole variables as other approaches might – such as Realism, for example –, as ideas and norms are seen as capable of shaping and influencing political outcomes (Wiener 2006). As explained by Wendt (1999, p.1), social theories are usually embedded on the notions that “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces [...] and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature”.

For this to occur, ideas must be “embedded in a historical context and need an institutional support to be effective” (Guzzini 2000, p.148). To Constructivism, institutions are the amalgamation of social practices performed by actors in a social realm. Then, institutions could be taken as the informal practices executed by human behaviour, such as the patriarchy (Hay 2016). Nonetheless, institutions are understood here in a formal sense, as the arrangements between states in order to formalise cooperation agreements. Here, institutions are the ones with constitutional treaties, headquarters, budgets, and employees.

Constructivism is applied herein as the “lenses” through which the objects of analysis are interpreted. I share with this intellectual tradition the belief that the world is, first and foremost, a social construction, and this paradigm guides this present academic endeavour. As it adopts a state-centric approach, this research perceives states as the result from a long process, being influenced by history, identity, and social action. Constructivism, then, provides a well-suited analytical framework because it takes into account the co-constitution of agents and structures (states and regional institutions) and ideational components (discourse, history, culture) as influencing political action.

Studies that converge Constructivism and Regionalism are still underexplored in IR literature, for the Liberal tradition has been more predominant. Most studies that have undergone such endeavour usually examine topics such as norm diffusion, socialization,

learning, and identity. A Constructivist perspective on regional integration has been applied to the cases of Europe (Checkel 2006; Koslowski 1999; Risse 2004), South America (Caballero Santos 2013; Fabbri 2005), and South Asia (Acharya 2004; Busse 1999), just to name a few.

Some strands of Constructivism reject generalizability and the claim for universal knowledge. Instead, it favours meaning-making, contextual interpretation, and understating socially constructed narratives (Klotz, Lynch 2015). Constructivist approaches, thus, are congruent to interpretivist analyses, which focus on the construction of meaning through mutually constituted entities. It will be explained in the following section.

4.2 Interpretivism as an epistemological stance

Interpretivism generally emphasizes the search for meaning that affects actions and institutions, through beliefs, ideas, and discourses (Bevir, Rhodes 2010; Yanow 2000). Interpretivism is not devoted to establishing causal links through the data available in an external reality. Rather, its focus is on contextual meaning. As Schwartz-Sea and Yanow (2012, p.46) elucidate, “the *sine qua non* of interpretive research – the sensibility that is its hallmark and which makes it distinctive in comparison with other research approaches – is its focus on meaning-making: it seeks knowledge about how human beings, scholars included, make individual and collective sense of their particular worlds”.

Unlike Positivism, which is concerned with requirements such as validity, replicability, falsifiability, and generalizability, Interpretivism has a logic of inquiry that is guided by the search of meaning (Schwartz-Shea, Yanow 2012). Consequently, this meaning-making component affects knowledge claims and methodological choices. Interpretivist researchers acknowledge the existence of multiple social realities, and they position themselves in the field in order to understand how this reality is socially constructed by the actors (Schwartz-Shea, Yanow 2012). There are many possibilities for the researcher to look for meaning, because “meaning they are after is that made by the members of the [researched] situation” (Yanow 2006, p.19).

Interpretivism is, first and foremost, about human experience. For instance, explaining an event through necessary and sufficient conditions, like positivists accounts usually do, is incongruent to the interpretive approach (Lynch 2014, p.13). Instead, it focuses on how the context of said event was developed and which meaning it produced. In this way, “one of the main objectives of much interpretive research in IR [...] is to denaturalize dominant explanations, exposing them not as truth but as narratives that are discursively constructed,

assigned particular meanings, and reproduced from partial or limited evidence and with particular stakes or purposes in mind” (ibidem, p.14).

In the same vein, Interpretivism is not interested in formulating universal laws, for the nature of reality is socially constructed and subject to a particular situation. To this tradition, the nature of research cannot be objective, as human behaviour cannot be predetermined. Instead of general laws, interpretivists “describe a theme solely in terms of the content of the particular objects that exhibit that theme” (Bevir 2006, p.286). Thus, interpretivists view data through context and history (Willis 2007). By the same token, interpretive Political Science is concerned with relations of power³⁴, since it can provide an insight on “actions and practices by reference to contestable beliefs that emerge out of contingent historical contexts” (Bevir 2010, p.xxxv).

The search for meaning is highly dependent on the interpretation followed by the researcher, as he or she must be invested in reconstructing it, according to Wagennar (2011, p.46). To the author, this is achieved by “the assumptions are that some collective understanding of a social phenomenon exists in the world that we study, that it is not immediately obvious to the outside observer, and that this collective understanding or meaning can be reconstructed by gaining access to the multiple individual subjective meanings that make up the aggregate collective understanding”. Meaning must, then, be situated in a specific context (ibidem, p.47), and thus not generalizable.

As Wagenaar (2011, p.22) explains, the *modus operandi* of an interpretivist research is summarized in how “we preselect, we unknowingly accept our subject's self-interpretations, we tacitly ascribe meanings to what we see, simply to be able to distinguish signal from noise, to make our objects of observation and analysis stand out from the context in which they are embedded”. It should be noted that the type of interpretive research conducted here searches for meaning expressed in the selected data and in the political events that occurred. In this way, this type of interpretation comes from the analysis of the data and is highly dependent on the researcher's frames and sense-making (Yanow 2006). The goal is to search for the meaning allocated to MERCOSUR and to the EU by the Brazilian and German governments, respectively. This will be achieved by searching for the political narratives portrayed by Lula and Merkel when it comes to the identity of their respective states and of the aforementioned regional institutions.

Along the same lines, Lynch (2014, p.22) categorizes six elements concerning Interpretivism, particularly in IR studies: a) the awareness of meaning as undetermined and the importance of contextuality, for both can contribute to the understanding of causality; b)

³⁴ A discussion on the concept of power is available in Chapter 2.

fact and value as closely related, as there are many “truths” available in the social world, rather than a “universal truth”; c) the relevance of language when understanding meaning; d) the positioning of the researcher and e) his/her reflexivity in the research process; and, ultimately, e) the scrutiny of power in all of the previous elements. All of those elements will be considered in this present study.

More specifically to items d) and e), a note on reflexivity becomes necessary. It is one of the central tenets of interpretivist approaches, and it refers to “a researcher's active consideration of and engagement with the ways in which his own sense-making and the particular circumstances that might have affected it, throughout all phases of the research process, relate to the knowledge claims he ultimately advances in written form” (Schwartz-Shea, Yanow 2012, p.100). Despite not engaging in ethnographic methods and not having direct contact with policymakers during the research, my positioning as a researcher is valid to mention. My research is about Brazilian and German politics. I am a Brazilian who is being financed by the European Commission to earn a PhD in Germany and in Belgium. Aligned with the interpretivist tradition, I am aware of potential biases and prejudices that this condition might entail. However, as explained in the Introduction of this doctoral thesis, the EU is not seen as an example to be followed, neither is MERCOSUR taken as of subordinate value. Each one is seen, according to the presuppositions of Interpretivism, contextual and historical perspectives.

4.3 Methodological framework

The research question lies on how the National Role Conceptions in Brazil and in Germany during the first mandates of Lula and Merkel were shaped. In order to answer this question, a constructivist-interpretivist approach was chosen. Methodologically, Constructivists studies usually apply interpretive and historical methods (Pouliot 2007). As explained by Klotz and Lynch (2007, p.106), “because constructivist ontology rejects the notion of an objective reality against which analysts test the accuracy of interpretations, ‘falsifiability’ cannot be the goal. Researchers can do no more than contrast interpretations against other interpretations”.

Role Theory is not methodologically constrained, allowing for the researcher to combine different methods, which usually rely on speeches and historical documents (Hudson 1999). Each component pertaining to National Role Conception flowchart, as detailed by Breuning (2011, p.26), will be applied to the chosen case studies as an analytical template. In the flowchart, the ideational components (identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience) and

material components (capability and opportunity to act) converge into the National Role Conception. It suffices to mention them here, but each component was explained in Chapter 3 in more detail. Specifically, the element “identity” will count on the auxiliary method of Narrative Analysis, which will be explained later in this chapter.

The level of analysis falls on states and regional institutions, and the units of analysis are Brazil and Germany. The goal of this present analysis is not to take Lula and Merkel’s personality traits, biographies, nor styles of governing. This is not a study of personal leaders; that would fit better in a research in the field of Political Psychology³⁵. More specifically, the unit of analysis is Brazil *under* Lula and Germany *under* Merkel. The president and the Chancellor are the political representation of their respective countries, in a rather “enmeshed” way. Brazil and Germany exist in an anarchical international system that is ruled by hierarchies of power (Lake 2006; Zakarol 2017), and changes within this order are difficult to achieve³⁶. However, the same country governed by different policymakers presents diverse political contours throughout the mandates – goals, party preferences, and domestic conditions that are distinct from one period to the other, as different groups come to power.

In this way, it makes sense to segment the analysis by administrations, as they provide clearer indicators of the state of affairs of one particular cabinet. This methodological choice could be contested and labelled as rather restrictive, because foreign policy is an amalgamation of various actors (leaders of agriculture, business, and trade union sectors) and public bureaucracies (ministries of economics, trade, and foreign affairs). Nonetheless, the focus here is on the agents, and the ultimate political agents in the present cases are the president and chancellor³⁷.

Thus, Lula and by Merkel are the objects of analysis, as they conduct the foreign policy actions and carry the responsibility for their successes and failures. In the same way, Brazil is represented by a presidential system, and Germany often is characterized by a

³⁵ This is usually done so with approaches such as Operational Code Analysis and Leader Trait Analysis. For more on how the styles and personalities of leaders affect policymaking, see Hermann (1980), Hermann and Hermann (1989), and Schafer and Walker (2006). I thank Leslie Wehner for raising this issue.

³⁶ Changes to the international system occur with great shocks – for example, the change from a bipolar system to a multipolar one with the end of the Cold War.

³⁷ An interesting avenue for future research would be to assess the different voices concerning foreign policy, how they differ and affect policy outcomes. In the case of Brazil, three bureaucrats influenced the design for foreign policy actions: Celso Amorim (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (General Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Marco Aurélio Garcia (Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs). In the case of Germany, it would be interesting to investigate the importance of policymakers such as Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Wolfgang Schäuble (Minister of Interior).

*Kanzlerdemokratie*³⁸, both of each have the higher office leaders as the central element. Lula and Merkel act on behalf of Brazil and Germany, and equalizing their actions during their administration is a way of better understanding the roles of those countries in the regional and global scenarios.

Because the timeframe for analysis starts fifteen years ago, this research is classified as contemporary history and, as such, it benefits from hindsight. However, it also presents some disadvantages. Some key policymakers of that time have passed away or are unreachable³⁹, so interviews were not of upmost concern. Archival fieldwork did not present itself as a justifiable and necessary requirement, as official documents are available online⁴⁰.

The differences regarding regional institutions and domestic political features affected the available data. In MERCOSUR, given its intergovernmental quality, it is customary for presidents to deliver speeches and press conferences during high summits. This is not the case for the EU, in which usually the representatives of supranational institutions give official speeches and declarations. In Brazil, the president does not deliver regular explanations to Congress, except for the inauguration speech. The opposite occurs in Germany, where the Chancellor often gives *Regierungserklärungen* to the *Bundestag*.

Thus, the selection of data was based on the declarations and speeches given by Lula at a national level, during events or visits of foreign policymakers, and at the regional level, during the high summits of MERCOSUR, both in his first mandate (2003-2006). The data regarding Merkel was the speeches and the *Regierungserklärungen* given during her first cabinet (2005-2009) that contained any reference to the EU. The last section of this chapter provides a more detailed description of the selection criteria and data analysis. The Annex offers the detailed lists of selected data for each country.

This will be done without the help of software programmes. Although more labour-intensive, as the number of selected documents is significant, the exemption from technological devices is justified by the epistemological approaches undertaken here. It makes

³⁸ For more on this, see Niclauß (2015).

³⁹ Guido Westerwelle, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the second mandate of Merkel's, died in 2016. Marco Aurélio Garcia, the special advisor for foreign affairs in Brazil, died in 2017. At the time of writing this chapter, Lula was in prison facing corruption charges; Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Foreign Minister at Merkel's first mandate, is now the president of Germany; and Merkel still holds the Chancellorship. For those who are still with us, it is less than likely that I would be able to reach them for an interview.

⁴⁰ Even if archival work were to be conducted, it would face some obstacles: some types of archival documents in Germany are protected under confidentiality law and, hence, unavailable to the public for a period of 30 years.

possible a more thorough scrutiny by the researcher, in an attempt to preserve an authentic interpretive perspective in the search for meaning.

4.4 Narrative Analysis

In the words of Patterson and Monroe (1998, p.315), narrative “refers to the ways in which we construct disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our reality”. Narratives mean the stories that are reiterated about the origin and development of a nation, which provide purpose and a sense of unison (ibidem, p.322). Stories, according to Wagenaar (2011, p.215) “are carefully constructed cultural conventions”, that “enlarge our understanding of the human world”, as they “provide actors with the reasons for acting and with intimations about the courses of action”. Above all, narratives are here understood as the representational capacity of political discourses.

To Narrative Analysis, the agent is the central component. This method can also serve the purpose of discovering notions of the Self through the perspective of agents. In a similar vein, Narrative Analysis is useful for those interested in identity-related topics (Patterson, Monroe 1998, p.316-317), since representation, meaning, and framing are its core tenets. Thus, narratives can “explain actions and practices by reference to the beliefs and desires of actors” (Bevir 2006, p.285).

Narratives must be situated within a historical continuum (Ruback 2010), as they should portrait the events, times, actors, locations and points of view (Bal 2009). It is woven with events in a sequential order (Patterson, Monroe 1998), and the process of compiling diachronic data into a story, or emplotment, serves the purpose of understanding human action (Polkinghorne 1995). In the same vein, “the purpose of narrative analysis is to produce stories as the outcome of the research. The data elements required for this production are diachronic descriptions of events and happenings. Narrative analysis composes these elements into a story” (ibidem, p.15).

Against this backdrop, Somers and Gibson (1993, p.30-33) delineate four different kinds of narrative: i) ontological narrative, which relates to the identity portrayed by the agent, i.e. how social actors make sense of their own reality and their sense of Self. This would, by its turn, generate social action; ii) public narratives are constituted of cultural and institutional configurations, either in micro or macro settings, propelled by individuals or the government as to explain occurrences in social spheres; iii) conceptual narratives, the ones crafted by researchers in order to develop explanations and to define concepts. Hence, they create a vocabulary with the purpose of describing ontological and public narratives of actors

throughout time; and iv) metanarratives are the narratives in which individuals are participants as social actors of contemporary events. As examples, the authors cite, *inter alia*, capitalism *versus* communism, individual *versus* society, barbarism *versus* civility (ibidem, p.33). Because they are entrenched in our collective living experience, and prone to being abstract, it could be difficult to delineate them conceptually – which would then make conceptual narratives a useful instrument. In this context, this research is invested in examining with ontological and public narratives emerge from the data, according to the classification delineated by Somers and Gibson (1993). More of this will be explained in the next section.

According to Shenhav (2015, p.15), a strand within Narrative Analysis is social narratives, which is concerned with the “narratives that are embraced by a group and also tell, in one way or another, something about that group”. As it extends to any social group, it can also include governments or cabinets, which are the focus here. To the author, the central elements to social analysis are the story (events in a sequential order), the text (how the story is carried), and the narration (the communication of the story in the text)⁴¹. This last component comprises the narrator, or who tells the story, which is central to the analysis employed by this research, for it investigates which narratives are conveyed by Lula and by Merkel.

As explained in the previous section, foreign policy initiatives towards regional institutions result from a series of involved actors and bureaucracies. Yet, the focus here is on the ultimate political agents of democratic regimes: the president and the chancellor. It is their perspective that prevails, despite a multitude of voices speaking in the background. As Shenhav (2006, p.248) explains, “it therefore seems inescapable that the concept of narrative is by definition dependent on a particular perspective. Even if certain political narratives join together a number of viewpoints, the resulting narrative, nevertheless, has a perspective of its own”.

Additionally, the researcher must seek to understand how political narrators are located, as the context in which those speeches took place is also relevant. For this reason, Chapter 5 provides an overview of the political and economic situations of MERCOSUR and of the EU during the selected timeframe. Similarly, when analysing political narratives, the researcher must be attentive in a narrative to repetitions or variation of certain events within a political discourse and how they were represented by the political actor (Shenhav 2006).

It is appropriate to associate Narrative Analysis with Qualitative Historical Analysis, which privileges the use of primary and secondary materials (Thies 2002). This method often employs the examination of political speeches and official documents, and they will be applied

⁴¹ The author also adds a fourth element, multiplicity, or “the process of repetition and variation through which narratives are reproduced at the societal level” (Shenhav 2015, p.66). However, this will not be considered here.

here as well. Historical analysis usually rely on an interpretive approach from the researcher (Thies 2002), and that is important because it helps to “make methodological sense of the purposive political act of conceiving of and performing roles in external relations through actors’ ruling narrations—wherein goals, interests and behaviour become salient in an emergent present or at the nexus of dilemma–tradition” (Wehner 2018, p.13).

In this way, Narrative Analysis is congruent with Role Theory, as it uses “secondary, official documents and spontaneous press declarations to find *yardsticks* for specific narrations containing the roles enacted by states in different settings as well as the divergence/convergence in the making of the role” (Wehner, Thies 2014, p.421, emphasis in original). An explanation on Role Theory was provided in the previous chapter. The next section explains how the selected method will be employed to the cases of Brazil and Germany.

4.5 Applying Narrative Analysis to the selected cases

As summarized by Patterson and Monroe (1998, p.316), “(a) narrative generally requires agency. It involves human beings as characters or actors. These human beings have a place in the plot, a role in the story. [...] (b) Narrative suggests the speakers view of what is canonical. What is ordinary and right is discussed as the matter of fact. [...] c) Narrative requires some sequential ordering of events, but the events themselves need not be real. [...] How the speaker organizes events to give meaning to them is what becomes important, for it is the process of organization that reveals much about the speaker’s mind. [...] (d) Narrative requires the narrator’s perspective. It cannot be voiceless”.

In a similar vein, as Shenhav (2006, p.248) puts it, “political narratives are constructed and shaped”. This is exactly the research goal by employing Narrative Analysis: to verify which narratives regarding MERCOSUR and the EU were portrayed in Lula’s and Merkel’s speeches, accordingly. Said narratives will not be put against other dominant or prevalent narratives from different actors or political instances. The aim is to see which narratives come out of the available data (see Annex), in congruence with the interpretivist approach undertaken here.

More specifically, Narrative Analysis will help to understand the identity component of the National Role Conception flowchart (see Chapter 3, Figure 1), as an instrument to verify how were shaped the identity of Brazil in regards to its selfhood

and to MERCOSUR, and Germany in relation to its selfhood and to the EU⁴². Narratives are a capable instrument to understand identity, as they “draw attention to how people think about the characteristics, roles, status, and functions that comprise group identities” (Klotz, Lynch 2007, p.73). Furthermore, as claimed by Patterson and Monroe (1998, p.316), “narrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker’s concept of self, for it is the self that is located at the center of the narrative, whether as active agent, passive experiencer, or tool of destiny”. Put simply, the goal is to verify, by employing Narrative Analysis, how Brazil saw itself as a country (selfhood) and MERCOSUR’s identity, and how Germany identified itself as a country (selfhood) and the EU’s identity, in the selected data. Therefore, this research employs Narrative Analysis as a methodological guidance towards discovering what is here called **identity narratives⁴³** – in the sense of what Somers and Gibson (1993) referred as “ontological” and “public” narratives, which were explained previously.

Generally, Narrative Analysis that account for identity usually considered the stories portrayed by human beings about their personal lives. Here, the goal is to dissect the data in order to understand how two political leaders define the *identity of particular states and of specific regional institutions*. At a first sight it may seem odd to search for the identity of an inanimate entity, rather than of human beings⁴⁴. Nonetheless, as explained in Chapter 3, identity is here understood as “shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. They consist also of collective beliefs about the definition of the group and its membership that are shared by most group members” (Checkel, Katzenstein 2009, p.4). Hence, states have identity and they are often present in political discourse, as a way to promote a sense of togetherness or to inflate patriotic sentiments. Accounting for how they are represented through identity narratives – or ontological and public narratives, as defined by Somer and Gibson (1993) – is an intriguing endeavour that should not be neglected in Political Science, particularly by studies that utilize narratives as methodological tools.

⁴² The remaining elements of the National Role Conception flowchart, as explained in Chapter 3, did not require a specific method. They were fulfilled by pre-established criteria in a descriptive way, as explained in the same chapter.

⁴³ The literature conventionally uses the term “narrative identity”. In this research, this term is slightly modified because the focus is on the identity of states and not on personal identities. In this way, this alteration signifies a different take on the use of Narrative Analysis, one that does not conflate identity with personhood, but rather statehood.

⁴⁴ For accounts on how narratives regarding identity are applied to persons, which are usually carried out in the field of Psychology, see Smith and Sparkes (2008) and Bamberg (2011).

Against this backdrop, the following scheme for analysing the narrative component of Lula's and Merkel's speeches has been established, which will be applied in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively (see Table 1).

Table 1: Mapping the construction of narratives according to the selected data

Criteria	Brazil	Germany
<i>Events</i>	Institutional developments at MERCOSUR	Institutional developments at the EU
<i>Timeframes</i>	2003-2006	2005-2009
<i>Actors (or narrators)</i>	Lula	Merkel
<i>Locations</i>	Nationally and regionally, but referring to South America	Nationally and regionally, but referring to Europe
<i>Points of view (or perspectives)</i>	Representational and politically legitimate (as president)	Representational and politically legitimate (as chancellor)

Table created by the author, with selected criteria based on Bal (2009).

The criteria and information available in Table 1 will serve as the background for the analysis and interpretation of the data. The "events" criterion, in particular, are understood in a broad way, for it relates to the development in the institutional framework of MERCOSUR and the EU during Lula's and Merkel's first mandates and not to specific occurrences in those institutions. Hence, these five criteria are considered here as roadmaps. As defined by Patterson and Monroe (1998, p.317), when analysing narratives "our interest in interpretation may be less technical, focusing primarily on how people conceive of themselves and of themselves in relation to others".

For instance, as Chapter 7 will show, one of the identity narratives often reverberated by Lula was "we have reconstructed MERCOSUR". The prefix "re" indicates that something must be done again, i.e. to construct again. From this, one can gather that, in the president's words, MERCOSUR was before in a fragilized state (nobody reconstructs something that is in perfect condition). In this sense, the narrative of "we must reconstruct MERCOSUR" becomes part of its identity, while it seems on the surface to be a call for joint political action. If the member-states manage to actually revitalize/recover/reconstruct the institution, then it becomes part of its new identity. With the interpretivist outlook, the meaning collected from the data was that, to Lula, "to reconstruct" meant to have member-states have confidence in the

benefits provided by MERCOSUR. The data shows that to Lula, reconstructing MERCOSUR meant consolidating its intergovernmental basis.

In the case of Germany, as Chapter 8 will demonstrate, one of the identity narratives most propelled by Merkel was “tolerance as the soul of Europe”. Intolerance has, *inter alia*, led Europe to armed conflicts among neighbours and it led Germany, in particular, to a Nazi regime. Therefore, being tolerant was a required component toward creating the European integration, and it nowadays remains a crucial factor when dealing with impasses or crises in the institution. When Merkel alludes to “tolerance” at its core being, she is indicating that the EU is prone to dealing with adversities that stem from alterity. In a nutshell, to say someone is tolerant implies that said person is resilient towards what is “different” – in the case of the EU, different countries, different opinions, different people.

Moreover, it is important to note to which audiences the narratives are being projected. Just in the case of locations, as Table 1 indicates, the audiences are national and regional. Interestingly, an examination of the data revealed there were not differences in how narratives were portrayed – they remained the same in either national or international terrains, either being delivery to audiences consisted of politicians or laypeople. For a full display of ceremonies in which Lula and Merkel gave official speeches, see Annex.

In this realm, Narrative Analysis is somewhat related to the large field of Discourse Analysis, which by itself comprises a multitude of perspectives and interpretations. Although they share some similarities, such as the examination of the social construction of language and its derived meaning, they differ in a crucial way: Narrative Analysis is focused on the stories people tell and how they make sense of them, rather than on the structures of language and its sociological implications, as studies on discourse analysis often do⁴⁵.

Therefore, Narrative Analysis is an appropriate methodological tool because it supports the interpretive analysis of the identity narratives propelled by Lula and Merkel - in other words, the stories both leaders tell about their respective countries and about the regional institutions.

4.6 Proposing an interpretivist comparison of cases

The comparison between cases is not of main concern here. One could argue that, by applying the same analytical framework to two cases, this would be somehow a comparative study. That is a reasonable and valid claim. However, the majority of comparative studies rely on positivist reasoning to establish comparative research designs that focus mainly on creating generalizable patterns. Interpretivists approaches have different logics of inquiry, as justified

⁴⁵ For more on Discourse Analysis, see Schiffrin et al. (2001).

in a previous section. As Yanow (2014, p.143) explains, “comparison, from an interpretive perspective, cannot begin by presuming equivalences between or among polities”, as usually established by positivist methods. In the same vein, “the need for a comparative research design that stipulates *a priori* points of comparison appears to be driven by the desire to generalize findings across cases; and the need to generalize entails establishing causal relationships of a particular, mechanistic sort. All of these are conceptually and methodologically problematic from the perspective of interpretive research” (ibidem, p.148).

Still according to Yanow (2014, p.144), contextuality and historicity are key components to interpretive research, for “interpretive research refuses to lose the local or historical specificities from which concepts emerge”. In this way, aligned with the interpretivist tradition, each case is seen as a unique occurrence in the world, bounded to historical circumstances, political processes, and social contexts. Thus, “contextuality” (Schwartz-Shea; Yanow 2012) is a central point of departure.

In this sense, this present doctoral thesis does not try to establish similar and generalizable patterns among Brazil and Germany, but it sees both cases from their singular, unique, and historical conditions. The research design established herein is not, by all means, a comparative design⁴⁶. If this present research follows the interpretivist epistemological tradition, it would be illogical to apply positivists assumptions and goals that aim at falsifiable and predictive results. Put simply, this doctoral thesis falls on the interpretive camp and pursuing any research goals outside of it would be unreasonable.

Thus, this doctoral thesis proposes an *interpretivist comparative analysis*, one that values the context-driven importance of interpretivist research and, therefore, does not seek to establish generalizable patterns. As explained by Yanow (2014, p.149), “[...] pursuing an abductive logic of inquiry, the interpretive comparative policy (or other) analyst would look for additional settings relevant to the policy element being tracked which might shed further light on the initial ‘surprise’, showing further, even unanticipated, dimensions of the subject of study”. Therefore, an interpretive comparison denotes a different kind of comparison than the one put forth by positivist studies, one that should account for the individualities of the case, its contextuality, and the meanings produced by it. In the same vein, as argued by Boswell et al. (2019, p.145), “typically, when interpretivists compare they do so implicitly. They draw parallels or analogies between cases to help them understand their case”.

Thus, this study proposes a comparison based on the produced meanings of the agents (Brazil and Germany) performed by the actors (Lula and Merkel) under a given structure (MERCOSUR and the EU). This interpretivist comparison focuses on the results

⁴⁶ A comparative research design would, for example, employ methods such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) or Process Tracing, which differs enormously from what is proposed here.

that come out of the data rather than on previous set of established conditions. Additionally, the focus lies on the ideational aspects of both cases, such as identity and identity narratives, and the meanings they produce.

Attempts to engage interpretive epistemology with comparative methodology have been done before, although they remain scarce. Boswell et. al (2019) have urged interpretivist scholars to engage with comparison – and as they call it, a comparative interpretive analysis. To the authors, “interpretive research offers a distinctive approach to channelling the comparative intuition because it consciously offers interpretations of interpretations. It concentrates on meanings, beliefs and discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, correlations between social categories, or deductive models” (ibidem, p.15). The chief tenet of the interpretive comparison approach propelled by the authors are the dilemmas that are generated by agents in a social setting. Dilemmas, according to the authors, are new ideas that compete with current traditions or social practices. Therefore, one could argue that this comparative interpretive approach focuses on how old and new dilemmas are socially confronted by individuals. Then, the comparison would be instrumentalized after “having identified these dilemmas in particular contexts, we then see whether they share a family resemblance with other actors in different circumstances” (ibidem, p.148). By doing so, the authors argue, it would be possible to “creatively explain similarities and differences between even the most unlikely of actors and situations, rendering the exotic familiar and the familiar exotic” (ibidem).

Although dilemmas will not be the focus of the interpretive comparison proposed here, the lines of interpretive comparison suggested by Boswell et. al (2019) served as a general guide. The authors do not suggest a fixed template for comparison, but the attention is turned towards *thematic* rather than contextual arrangements, in which “the writing is organised in recurring themes across the field research, with the nuances of different cases coming and going across the broader narrative” (ibidem, p.120). In the same vein, the writing of the findings will follow in a *linear style* (ibidem, p.122), while presenting *thick description* that aims at analytical depth (ibidem).

As studies that employ an interpretivist comparison are still underrepresented in the literature, especially in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis and Regionalism, this doctoral thesis hopes to advance a new methodological perspective within the realms of interpretive philosophy of science.

4.7 The data selection process

The process of data selection, which resulted in 174 speeches, proceeded as follows:

1. The selected data refers to the speeches given by Lula and Merkel in regard to MERCOSUR and to the EU, respectively. The data will help verify which narratives were propelled by both policymakers towards those regional institutions. This will be integrated in the identity component of the National Role Conception flowchart. More on this is available in Chapters 3 and 4.
2. Because of differences in those institutions, the selection was based on the following: in MERCOSUR, it is common during the high summits for presidents to deliver speeches. In this way, the ones given by Lula were considered. The same does not apply to the European Union, where usually the presidents of the supranational institutions give speeches, and not the representatives of member-states. The only exception is the case of the president of the Council of the European Union, when the one delivered by Merkel, when Germany held its presidency in 2007, was examined;
3. The presidents of Brazil do not deliver speeches to the National Congress, only on the first day of their mandates as the inauguration speeches. In Germany, it is common for the *Bundeskanzler* to give regular *Regierungserklärungen* to the Bundestag, in which the outline of current and future policy actions is presented. That is why the *Regierungserklärungen* delivered by Merkel were selected;
4. The search engine for these documents in the Brazilian case was to type “Lula” and “MERCOSUL” at the official website of the Library of the Presidency of the Brazilian Republic, available at <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/>. The configurations of the website do not allow to select for date nor type of document. Exactly 924 items resulted from this search. It included all types of material that contain those keywords (e.g. interviews, photoshoots, travel reports, press releases, messages to Congress). Then, a screening process was applied, in which only official speeches (in Portuguese, “discurso” or “palavras”) were considered, either at national and international levels. Interviews, press conferences and press releases were excluded. Consequently, the number of documents resulted in 76 speeches. Afterwards, each one of the resulted items was inspected, in a process divided by year. If a speech just mentioned MERCOSUR *en passant*, then it was discarded. The goal was to prioritize speeches in which Lula situated MERCOSUR within a context, in order to verify which narratives regarding the institution he propelled. **As a consequence, 70 documents were selected as the final data**, and they are available in the ensuing list. Figure 8 provides

a screenshot of the process of data selection in the Brazilian government official website;

5. The same procedure was applied for the German case at the official website of the *Bundesregierung*, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/>. The website offers Bulletins containing both speeches (“Reden”) at national and international levels, and policy statements at the *Bundestag* (“Regierungserklärungen”) from 1987 onwards. The criteria were applied according to the date of her first mandate (from 22.11.2005 until 27.10.2009) and to keywords (“Merkel”, “Europäische Union”, “Europäischen Union”). The results accounted for 202 items. Each one of them was screened, to verify how the EU was contextualized in the words of Merkel. If she mentioned the institution superficially, then the speech was discarded. Interviews, press conferences, and press releases were not considered. **Consequently, 104 items led to the selected data**, which can be consulted in the subsequent list. Figure 9 showcases with a screenshot the selection process in the German government official website;
6. The first mandate of Lula began on **01.01.2003** and ended on **31.12.2006**. The first cabinet mandate of Merkel started on **25.11.2005** and it was concluded on **27.10.2009**. Thus, those were the timeframes adopted for the selection of the respective documents;
7. The collection of data was conducted in January of 2019 and in May of 2019. The files were saved as pdfs in my private computer. Any changes that occur in the government websites that may cause removal of data are not of my responsibility;
8. The analyses of documents exclude any forms of computer software. Albeit laborious, this decision safeguards a more thorough inspection by the researcher, aligned with the interpretivist tradition of searching for meaning.
9. There is a discrepancy in the amount of selected data regarding the two cases. The justification lies on the institutional development of MERCOSUR and of the EU. In the latter case, for it is a political, economic, and monetary union, the decisions made in Brussels affect the everyday lives of EU citizens - and, consequently, of Merkel’s constituents. It is clear, then, that she would often refer to the EU in her speeches. Likewise, the larger amount of data in the year 2007 is explained because that was when the Chancellor held the presidency of the Council of the European Union and, coincidentally, when the Treaty of Lisbon was being drafted. Therefore, a lot of discussions concerning the EU were taking place.

In the case of MERCOSUR, it is characterized as a customs union, which does not directly affect the lives of its citizens. In Brazil, MERCOSUR is seen as a distant entity. It is usually not part of the everyday discussions among Brazilian people, and it is more frequently mentioned by policymakers in debates during presidential elections. In this way, it would make sense that the institution does not constitute a large portion of Lula's speeches.

Nonetheless, it is not the amount of available data (nor its comparability) that matters. The focus here is on contextual meaning, rather than the balanced quantity of data among the cases;

10. Excerpts from the data, when directly quoted throughout the doctoral thesis, were translated from Portuguese and German to English. Any errors incurred in the translation are my own.

Figure 8: Screenshot of the selection of documents at the Brazilian government official website (22.05.2019)




Figure 9: Screenshot of the selection of documents at the German government official website (22.05.2019)

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/bulletin-2000-bis-2009?f=974436%3A992732%3AdateRangeFrom_20.... The page header includes the logo of the German Federal Government (Die Bundesregierung) and navigation links for English, Français, Kontakt, and Datenschutzhinweis. A menu bar shows 'Menü | Bulletin'. Below this, there are links for 'Bulletin 2010 - 2018', 'Bulletin 2000 - 2009' (highlighted), 'Bulletin 1990 - 1999', and 'Bulletin 1987 - 1989'. A search bar labeled 'Suche' contains two input fields with the text 'europäische union' and 'europäischen union', followed by a search button. Below the search bar, there are filters for the date range '25.11.2005 - 27.10.2009' and the name 'Angela Merkel'. The results section shows '202 Ergebnisse' sorted by 'Datum absteigend'. The first result is titled '95-1 Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel' and includes a description: 'zur Eröffnung der 63. Internationalen Automobil-Ausstellung am 17. September 2009 in Frankfurt am Main: Bulletin 95-1 vom 17.9.2009 – Angela Merkel'. The Windows taskbar at the bottom shows the time as 13:15 on 22/05/2019.

Bundesregierung | Bulletin 2000 - x

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (BPA) [DE] | https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/bulletin-2000-bis-2009?f=974436%3A992732%3AdateRangeFrom_20...

Die Bundesregierung

ENGLISH FRANÇAIS KONTAKT DATENSCHUTZHINWEIS

Menü | Bulletin

Bulletin 2010 - 2018 **Bulletin 2000 - 2009** Bulletin 1990 - 1999 Bulletin 1987 - 1989

Suche

europäische union x europäischen union x Suchbegriff hinzufügen

25.11.2005 - 27.10.2009 v Angela Merkel v

202 Ergebnisse sortiert nach **Datum absteigend** v

95-1
Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel
zur Eröffnung der 63. Internationalen Automobil-Ausstellung am 17. September 2009 in Frankfurt am Main:
Bulletin 95-1 vom 17.9.2009 – Angela Merkel

13:15
22/05/2019

4.8 The data analysis process

After the data selection procedure was finalized, the analysis of the data proceeded according to the subsequent stages:

1. Examine each speech in order to identify which identity narratives were present;
2. Collect the results from the previous step;
3. Verify which narratives and policy goals appeared most often in the data;
4. Create tables to summarize the results of the previous step (Table 5 for Brazil and Table 6 for Germany), which are available in Chapters 7 and 8;
5. Integrate results to the empirical chapters;
6. The data analysis was carried out aligned with the Interpretivist orientation of contextuality and historicity in the search for meaning. In this sense, this final step is intuitive, as it did not follow a specific requirement or framework.

The resulting data was divided in two segments: *Identity narratives* and *Political goals*. The initial goal was to search for the narratives related to identity, as explained earlier. However, an examination of the data revealed that political goals were often present in the speeches - not an unusual circumstance in political discourse, of course. Thus, it became imperative to employ a differentiation that is frequently propelled by interpretivist epistemology: to interpret the data being attuned to contextuality, symbolic differences, and idiosyncrasies. Then, it turned necessary to distinguish between identity narratives from political goals.

Usually, in an identity narrative the verb “to be” is often used in its different tenses (“we are”, “we were”, etc). With political goals, the modal verbs “must” and “should”, and verbs “to want” and “to need” (in different tenses) are frequently used. Thus, by analysing identity narratives, one can understand how the actor defined what an object *is*; with political goals, one can understand how the actor defined what an object *ought to be*. As Chapter 7 will show, sometimes this distinction is not entirely clear, and it is up to the researcher to capture the nuances. With Interpretivism, this does not pose a problem, as the singularity of events is understood as of utmost importance. *Interpreting* the data, in the realm of interpretivist epistemology, gains a whole new meaning, thus helping to capture nuanced differences in political discourse.

4.9 Final remarks

Therefore, the methodological framework proposed by this doctoral thesis has a constructivist-interpretivist approach, which is the grand pillar that sustains this research. Thus, this ontological and epistemological perspective affected how the chosen method, Narrative Analysis, was employed. The method is applied here concomitant to the concept of identity of states, i.e. statehood. The goal is to verify which identity narratives were propelled by Lula and Merkel regarding MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively.

The data resulted in 174 documents, and the selection process was based on a thorough analysis of speeches given by Lula and Merkel in the selected timeframe in the respective governments official websites. The interpretation of the data, in accordance with the epistemological position of this doctoral thesis, will focus on the meaning produced by the agents in a given structure – which, by its turn, references the ontological perspective adopted here.

As it accounts for two cases, this research proposes an interpretivist comparison of them – not focusing on pre-established criteria nor variables, but one that sheds light on the meaning produced by Lula and Merkel towards MERCOSUR and the EU, correspondingly. Likewise, this comparison will consider the balance between ideational and material elements.

Then, it will be possible to uncover which identity narratives were propelled by Lula and Merkel in the selected timeframe, which is the first component of the National Role Conception flowchart adopted here. The next chapter will explain how MERCOSUR and the EU, herein understood as structures, were historically developed and how were the institutional conditions (trade, membership enlargement) during Lula's and Merkel's first mandates.

Chapter 5 – Structures – MERCOSUR and the EU

The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the two regional institutions under analysis, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the European Union (EU). It is necessary to illustrate how both institutions have developed and their main institutional features. By doing so, it lays the foundation for chapters 7 and 8, which analyse the respective cases of Brazil and Germany (the agents) within said regional institutions (the structures). In this way, one can better explain how the co-constitution processes have unfolded over time – or, in other words, how the agents (members-states) create structure (institutions) but are, at the same time, affected by them.

The relationship between agents and structures is one of the largest debates in the Social Sciences. The main issue lies on the dissensus on the level of analysis and on how agents and structures affect each other (Carlsnaes 1992). Each area in the Social Sciences has developed its own account of the agent-structure relationship (Wendt 1987). Within a sociological approach, which is in part adopted here, four main definitions of structure can be delineated: as the “patterns of aggregate behavior that are stable over time; lawlike regularities that govern the behavior of social facts; systems of human relationships among social positions; [and] collective rules and resources that structure behaviour” (Porpora 1989, p.195). Thus, one can note that structures are not necessarily physical entities, but patterns of conduct that affect individuals and society.

To the strand of IR in particular, Realism and World-system Theory have devoted more interest to the structural dimension of international politics. The first branch of the discipline associates structures to the distribution of capabilities, with a constraining effect on states. The second one is more concerned with the underlying capitalist foundation of structures, in a reiterating structural effect on states (Wendt 1987). In this realm, the arguments put forward by Waltz (1979) affected this discussion for he divided theories based on the level of analysis - the state level (reductionist) and the international level (systemic) -, and how the component levels interacted (Wight 2006).

Despite the long debate on agents and structures, the definition of structure employed here is two-fold: a) the legal framework created by the organs pertaining to the regional institutions (decisions, resolutions, directives, recommendations) that determine the overall functioning of a regional institution; b) the social practices that constitute the regional institution and that create a sense of identity, of unity or “we-ness”, such as reiterative verbal affirmations (“we are MERCOSUR”, “I am a member of the EU”) and symbols (flags, passports, unified vehicle registration plates). In this way, structure is here understood as both *physical elements* and *symbolically elements*.

Aligned with the Constructivist tradition, Wendt (1999, p.39) argues that “the structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions, interests, and ideas”. Depending on the philosophical position of the researcher, he or she will give different proportions to each condition. Wendt also reiterates the co-constitution characteristic of the agent-structure relationship, as “structure exist, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their practices” (ibidem, p.185). To the author, structures are always in a process and agents are socially constructed. In a nutshell, Constructivism sees co-constitution as the process of how structure and agents mutually affect each other (Hurd 2008).

Therefore, this research applies the co-constitution notion to the mechanism of regional institutions. This is more apparent in the case of the EU because of the supranational institutions because authority is delegated to a higher instance, above the member-states. States, then, are tied by the regulations and determinations of those supranational institutions. For example, the European Central Bank dictates the financial and monetary policies within the Eurozone, and the European Court of Justice is responsible for the application of EU law. Regulations and decisions are binding and, thus, mandatory to member-states. In this way, it is interesting to see how states willingly create entities to which they are ultimately constrained by.

The same mind-set can be applied to MERCOSUR, albeit to a lesser degree. Given the architectural development of the institution, the constraining element plays out, in its majority, on trade agreements. On the one hand, member-states of MERCOSUR cannot sign free trade agreements with third parties, as they must be negotiated and signed by the group as a whole (Decision CMC 32/00). On the other hand, for example, MERCOSUR cannot sign a free trade agreement with China because Paraguay recognizes Taiwan. In the first case, a norm created by states, that became institutionalized, restrained the state’s capacity to act unilaterally; in the second case, the political choices made by one state reduced the realm of trade partners that could be available to the institution.

As explained in previous chapters, using the agent/structure approach is congruent to the theoretical apparatus of Role Theory. Roles cannot be performed in a vacuum; they must be situated within a given structure, which can limit or define behaviour. Usually, role theorists are divided among those who “emphasizes cognitive or institutional structures as causes for certain roles, and the other which posits that roles are 'embedded' in certain social orders or arrangements, which in turn give meaning and reasons for specific action” (Harnisch 2011, p.6).

With Role Theory, structure can be seen as capable of “shaping and determining the role to be selected and enacted” (Wehner, Thies 2014, p.414). According to Barnett (1993, p.290), “institutions promote stability not only by encouraging a stable set of expectations but

also by helping to shape state interest". In this way, regional institutions, seen as structures, provide a limit on how states can act and which roles are expected from their members.

This holds true to the cases under analysis here: Brazil is the leader of MERCOSUR and it has the capacity to forward the development of the institution, as explained in the Introduction. However, MERCOSUR integrates eleven countries, among full and associated members, besides Brazil. The capacity for Brazil to act is inhibited by the legal requirements of the institution and by the interest and actions of other members. The same is valid for Germany, as the EU contains twenty-eight states in total and supranational institutions, which by themselves pose their restrictions on the room for manoeuvre for the states. Regional leaders can advocate for the development of the institution and be key elements in understanding the process of integration, as argued in the Introduction. Nonetheless, they are not the only members pertaining to those institutions, and it would be irrational to argue that leaders alone can change everything.

Therefore, this chapter is necessary to situate the research within the structure realm of those two theories and to understand the institutional apparatus in which Brazil and Germany act. The following sections are divided as follows: the first one is dedicated to the descriptive accounts of the historical and institutional developments of MERCOSUR. The same procedure is applied in the second section to the case of the EU.

5.1 The institutional development of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)

The second half of the 1980s were a pivotal time in South America, as military dictatorships came to an end, leading towards a path of democratization that consolidated throughout the 1990s. This process was concomitant with the creation of initiatives of regional integration after the end of the bipolar order and the consequent increase in the interdependence among regions.

In this regard, understanding the relationship between Brazil and Argentina is central towards analysing MERCOSUR. Throughout time, however, the bilateral relationship was not congenial nor cooperative. They have come a long way from armed conflict rivals, for instance in the Cisplatine and Platine Wars during the 19th century, to strategic partners in the 21st century.

In the late 1980s, the approximation between the governments of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) in Argentina and José Sarney (1985-1990) in Brazil was the first step towards the creation of a regional integration scheme. The Declaration of Iguazú was signed in 1985, which

acknowledged the mutual understanding in various fields and the desire to strengthen the cooperation in the areas of trade, science and technology, and infrastructure. The Argentine-Brazilian Economic Integration Program was established in the following year, with the aim of promoting the bilateral trade (Manzetti 1993). In that same period, a bilateral declaration on nuclear energy was signed, a symbol of strategic independence in a Cold War environment characterized by the domination of superpowers (Vargas 1997).

The subsequent presidents Carlos Menem (1989-1999) of Argentina and Fernando Collor de Mello (1989-1992) of Brazil internally adopted similar policies of neo-liberalization and, externally, were vocal about the need for further regional integration (Manzetti 1993, p.104). In 1990, they engaged in the Buenos Aires Act, which propelled the creation of a common market. Later on, Paraguay and Uruguay also joined and became signatories of the document (*ibidem*).

When the idea of creating a trade alliance in the area was being envisioned, Alfonsín and Sarney had very similar foreign policy goals, such as the quest for a more autonomous insertion in the international scene, and were enduring the same challenges, such as the payment of foreign debt (Saraiva, Almeida 1999). According to Gardini (2007), whereas with Alfonsín and Sarney integration was used as a way to secure democracy, with Menem and Collor the goal was to instrumentalize integration as a means to insert both countries into the interdependent economy of the newly globalized world.

In 1991, MERCOSUR was officially formalized with the Treaty of Asunción. It determined the creation of a common market, free movement of goods, services and factors of production. It also established the constitution of a rules of origin regime, a dispute resolution system and safeguard clauses. It also established the creation of two organs of higher level, the Council of the Common Market (CMC), responsible for setting up the political policies and is comprised of the ministers of finance and foreign affairs of each member-state, and the Common Market Group (CMG), an executive branch consisting of presidents, ministers of finance, foreign affairs, and of central banks. It is accountable for safeguarding the application of the Treaty and of the decisions held by the Council, as well as by setting up macroeconomic policies and advancing the trade liberalization.⁴⁷ Figure 2 provides a chart on the institutional framework of MERCOSUR, which is formed in an intergovernmental basis with presidents and ministers from each participating country.

⁴⁷ The full document is available, in Portuguese, at the official website of MERCOSUR: <https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documento/tratado-de-assuncao-para-a-constituicao-de-um-mercado-comum/>. Accessed on February 5th, 2019.

The Treaty of Asunción stipulated the formalization of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which came into force in 1994 and advanced the institutional architecture of MERCOSUR⁴⁸. It established four new organs: the MERCOSUR Trade Commission (MTC), which main goal is to verify and supervise the application of the trade policies; the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC) responsible for the legislative harmonization of institutional laws and it consists of parliament officials of each member-state; the Economic-Social Consultative Forum (ESCF), consultation forum on economic and social issues from each member-states; and the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat (MAS), in charge of administrative duties and based in the headquarters of the institution, in Montevideo, Uruguay.

In 1998, the Protocol of Ushuaia was conceived as a way to safeguard democratic regimes in member-states. Essentially, the document declares that any rupture to democracy will result in the suspension of the affected member-state. It was signed by the four signatories of MERCOSUR as well as by Bolivia and Chile⁴⁹. This clause was used to ban Paraguay from the institution during the impeachment of Fernando Lugo in 2012 (MercoPress, 2012). This clause was also applied in 2017 as an argument to suspend Venezuela from MERCOSUR, as the economic and political crises during Nicolás Maduro's mandate persisted⁵⁰.

The institutional development of MERCOSUR was also extended to the area of dispute settlement in matters of trade. For this, the Protocol of Olivos came into force in 2002, which established the Permanent Review Tribunal. It consists of five arbitrators nominated by each member-state. As concluded by Arnold and Rittberger (2013), the creation of a dispute settlement system in MERCOSUR was the result from pressures by the two smaller member-states, Uruguay and Paraguay, as a way to avoid being dominated by the two larger member-states, Brazil and Argentina. Another explanation pointed out by the authors is that Uruguay and Paraguay present higher numbers of intraregional trade, thus benefiting more from an institutionalized dispute mechanism. In the same vein, a dispute settlement system "signal to transnational economic actors and international capital owners that their investments in the region would be legally secure and profitable" (ibidem, p.124).

⁴⁸ The Protocol of Ouro Preto is available in Portuguese at the official website of MERCOSUR <https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documento/protocolo-de-ouro-preto-adicional-ao-tratado-de-assuncao-sobre-a-estrutura-institucional-do-mercosul/>, and also in English at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/ourop_e.asp. Both were accessed on February 12th, 2019.

⁴⁹ The Protocol of Ushuaia is available at the official website of MERCOSUR, at <https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documento/protocolo-de-ushuaia-sobre-compromisso-democratico-no-mercosul-bolivia-e-chile/>. Accessed on February 12th, 2019.

⁵⁰ MERCOSUR Official Website. Decisión sobre la suspensión de Venezuela en el MERCOSUR. August 5th, 2017. Available at <https://www.mercosur.int/suspension-de-venezuela-en-el-mercosur/>, accessed on February 12th, 2019.

The evolution of the institutional framework was also extended to the legislative body. In 2005, the Parliament of MERCOSUR, known as Parlasur, was designed to assemble deputies originated from each member-state, and who should be elected directly. The founding treaty conceives Parlasur as a way of securing democracy, human rights, freedom, and peace in the region. The Parliament can propose reports, consult, and provide opinions in matters related to integration⁵¹. According to Malamud and Dri (2013), Parlasur does not possess legislation and control capabilities, nor do its decisions have binding effects. Still, it can be used as an instrument for bringing societal actors closer together.

In this sense, as noted by Ribeiro Hoffmann et al. (2008), despite the institutional evolution, the legislative framework of MERCOSUR preserved its main characteristic, i.e. the mandatory decision-making procedures based on consensus. However, the internalization process remains tied to the jurisdiction of each member-state. To the authors, the trade aspect set the tone of the integration development during that period.

As stated by Malamud (2005, p.426), the central accomplishments of MERCOSUR were in terms of high politics, as it “has turned an area of low mutual confidence and historical rivalries into an area where inter-state violence has been ruled out, international cooperation has become the norm and high-tension controversies have ceased to exist. Today, the Mercosur region is a nuclear-free zone with no arms race threat”. According to the author, the democratic clauses of MERCOSUR created a “democratic umbrella” which has sheltered the region against authoritarianism (ibidem, p.427).

⁵¹ The Protocol Establishing the MERCOSUR Parliament is available in Portuguese at the official website of MERCOSUR, at <https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documento/protocolo-constitutivo-do-parlamento-mercotel>. Accessed on February 14, 2019.

Figure 2: Simplified version of the institutional framework of MERCOSUR




Chart created by the author, with information provided by the official website of MERCOSUR, under <https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/institucional/organograma-mercosul/>. Accessed on April 9th, 2019.

In conclusion, from its inauguration in 1991 until the end of Lula’s first mandate in 2006, MERCOSUR developed significantly. It managed to formalize the trade aspects of the institution, as well as to create an organ dedicated to dispute settlement and a legislative body. The next subsection will concentrate on the enmeshed analysis of Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula and the developments of MERCOSUR.

5.2 MERCOSUR during Lula (2003-2006)

The focus of the previous section was on the historical evolution of MERCOSUR, as it gave an overview of the major developments of institution-building mechanisms that promoted the advancement of its institutional architecture – or, in other words, the foundational documents that have been created throughout time. During the timeframe that coincided with Lula’s first mandate, between 2003 and 2006, some important milestones were achieved in MERCOSUR. The effort of this sub-section is to highlight the accomplishments on fields such as trade partnerships, infrastructure, and membership enlargement. The goal is to examine said milestones in relation to the foreign policy of Brazil towards MERCOSUR – without, however, implying that the country was the sole culprit of their (un)-successes.

According to Saraiva (2010, p.152), Lula’s rise to power made possible for the autonomist group in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the *Itamaraty*, to flourish. The diplomats

and members of the Worker's Party belonging to this variant believed in a "more self-directed and active projection for the country in the international arena". This meant diversifying international partnerships, and to form alliances with other countries of the Global South. To the autonomists, MERCOSUR should be extended to areas beyond trade, in order to encompass the social and cultural realms. This regional institution would be, then, a platform for Brazilian leadership.

Internationally, at that time South America had a fertile ground for regional integration initiatives to blossom. This was due to the fact that the United States were practicing geopolitical strategies in other regions - the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), headed by the USA, were slowly losing momentum, and after the occurrences of 9/11 the Middle East replaced much of the foreign policy agenda of the White House. This left the countries of South America with an auspicious terrain to shape regional institutions according to their own preferences, without the "hoovering" from the US.

In the meantime, Lula's victory in 2002 symbolized a period of "firsts": it was the first time a left-wing candidate won the presidential elections since the redemocratization in 1989, and it was also the first time a union leader became president. The rise of the Worker's Party to power in 2003 was the beginning of a period that would last until 2016, with the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.

Domestically, in the case of Brazil, as much as Lula and the Workers' Party were interested in strengthening regional ties, certain segments of the civil society still needed some convincing. Business sectors, notably, preferred to prioritize relations with the United States and the European Union (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007). Even so, consolidating regional integration schemes was one of the guiding lights of the Lula administration. In 2004, the Declaration of Cusco inaugurated the South American Community of Nations (CASA)⁵², which gave way to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008, an institution would encompass social and cultural policies. Nonetheless, to the Brazilian government MERCOSUR maintained the high status of trade branch amongst other regional integration possibilities.

Regionally, concomitant with Lula's rise to presidency, a wave of left-wing parties took power in South America: Argentina (Néstor Kichner, 2003); Bolivia (Evo Morales, 2006); Chile (Michelle Bachelet, 2006); Ecuador (Rafael Correa, 2007); Paraguay (Fernando Lugo, 2008); Uruguay (Pepe Mujica, 2010); and Venezuela (Hugo Chávez, 1999). This would differ from when MERCOSUR was first formalized, with regionalism being constituted in a neoliberalist, open market mentality – the so called "open regionalism" (more on this concept in Chapter 2).

⁵² It is interesting to note how the original acronym stands for CASA, a word that in Portuguese and Spanish means "home".

Generally, left-wing parties are more skeptical to liberalization and prefer to instrumentalize trade in order to bring national development. To Doctor (2013), this view eventually resulted in protectionist policies among member-states.

In this context, the following segments aim to provide an overview of the state of affairs of MERCOSUR during the selected timeframe (2003-2006). As explained in the beginning of this chapter, a descriptive account is necessary in order to provide a better frame of analysis of the structures (MERCOSUR and the EU). An analysis of the related agents are available in Chapter 7 (Brazil) and Chapter 8 (Germany).

5.2.1 Trade

Naturally, trade is the cornerstone of MERCOSUR. As explained before, it is the reason why member-states joined in the first place and why MERCOSUR still exists. The regional institution has evolved into other areas, such as social and human rights⁵³, but its core remains the customs union.

In the late 1990s, some countries in South America experienced economic and financial crises, notably the great Argentinian depression of 1998 and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999. This, of course, affected the commercial relations amongst members of MERCOSUR. But in 2002, both countries seemed to be on the path to recovery. As one can observe from Table 1 below, the volume of intra-trade grew expressively during the selected timeframe.

Table 2: Merchandise imports and exports of MERCOSUR (2003-2006)

	2003	2004	2005	2006
Imports (millions of dollars)	13.055	17.929	22.091	26.415
Exports (millions of dollars)	12.614	17.113	21.138	25.794

Table created by the author, with compiled data provided by World Trade Organization (2004; 2005; 2006; 2007).

In this realm, Brazil is one of the world's largest exporters of agricultural goods and, according to Doctor (2007, p.525), it prefers to tie itself to the global market and to use

⁵³ The Social Institute of MERCOSUR was created in 2007 and the Institute of Public Policies and Human Rights in 2009. They are not analysed here as their origin dates lie outside of the selected timeframe.

MERCOSUR “[...] as a stage for enhancing its clout in global trade negotiations and boosting its global competitiveness with an eye to the long-run”. According to the author, the three-remaining member-states used MERCOSUR as a means of entering the Brazilian market. The following Table 3 reinforces this argument, as it demonstrates that Brazil had the largest participation in the exports volume of intra-trade. Throughout the selected timeframe, the country’s participation on imports declined, whereas in exports the indicators rose. Argentina came as the second contender.

Table 3: Individual participation in intra-trade relations in MERCOSUR (2003-2006)

	Imports (%)				Exports (%)			
	<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Paraguay</i>	<i>Uruguay</i>	<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Paraguay</i>	<i>Uruguay</i>
2003	7.5	8.3	1.7	1.5	5.2	5.4	0.7	0.6
2004	8.7	7.2	1.7	1.5	4.9	6.6	0.6	0.6
2005	10.2	6.6	1.3	1.5	4.7	7.2	0.6	0.5
2006	9.4	6.4	1.4	1.6	5.2	7.4	0.5	0.5

Table created by the author, with compiled data provided by World Trade Organization (2004; 2005; 2006; 2007).

The socio-economic asymmetries between members-states were the reason for the disagreement on the application of the Common External Tariff (CET). The least developed countries of the institution, Paraguay and Uruguay, were given more products on the exemption list of inputs to be tarified on CET grounds (Kume, Piani 2011). This demonstrates that, despite the uneven level of socio-economic development between MERCOSUR’s member-states, the largest countries were aware of disparities and provide mechanisms for reducing the issue⁵⁴.

Between 2003 and 2006, MERCOSUR formed new trade partnerships, mostly with countries in Latin America⁵⁵. The preferential trade agreement with India was signed in 2004,

⁵⁴ If we further this argument, one could claim that smaller member-states should use this leverage for obtaining political gains. However, the data analysed here does not support this argument. As it will be shown in Chapter 7, Lula put forward narratives that understood Brazil as responsible for helping smaller member-states, given the country’s continental size and more prosperous economic situation than its neighbours.

⁵⁵ This information is available in the following official website, in Portuguese: Ministry of Foreign Relations. Acordos extrarregionais do Mercosul. Available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/diplomacia-economica-comercial-e-financeira/695-acordos-extrarregionais-do-mercosul>, accessed on February 15, 2019.

and the economic complementation agreement with Cuba took place in 2006. Two new intra-regional complementation agreements were established, such as the one with Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, signed in 2003, and the one with Peru signed in 2005.

According to the Brazilian newspaper *O Globo* (2007), these new partnerships result from requests made by Uruguay. In a meeting with the CMC, the Uruguayan chancellor Reinaldo Gargano asked for permission to negotiate free trade agreements outside of the scope of MERCOSUR, which is forbidden. Undoubtedly, the formation of new trade partnerships leads to new markets being available, which could benefit the smaller member-states. And, as shown above, Paraguay and Uruguay enjoy some advantages regarding the application of the CET. Yet, with Uruguay's concerns one could question if the legal apparatus regarding trade is appealing to every member of MERCOSUR.

Likewise, divergences related to trade are not that uncommon to the MERCOSUR experience, as shown by Gómez-Mera (2009). Argentina and Brazil had frictions especially in the automobile and footwear industries in the 1990s. As demonstrated in the first section, countries dispose in MERCOSUR of dispute settlement mechanisms, such as the CMC and the CMG. But as explained by Malamud (2005), any diplomatic crises in MERCOSUR are resolved in an intergovernmental basis, to which the author refers as "presidential diplomacy". On the bright side, it reduces the amount of bureaucratic procedures as disputes are solved bilaterally. One of its perils, though, is that disputes are conditioned to political will and, therefore, more prone to slow-moving solutions (or no solutions at all).

In this section, it was demonstrated how trade remained the backbone of MERCOSUR during Lula's first mandate. Table 2 revealed that the merchandised trade of the institution grew significantly from 2003 to 2006. And Table 3 indicated how Brazil had the largest share of export participation in MERCOSUR in the selected timeframe, and Argentina was the runner-up – but in terms of import share, it was the front-runner.

Ministry of Economy, Industry, Foreign Trade, and Services (MDIC). Mercosul - Cuba (ACE-62), available at <http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/comercio-exterior/negociacoes-internacionais/132-acordos-dos-quais-o-brasil-e-parte/1830-acordos-mercotel-cuba-ace-62>, accessed on February 15th, 2019.

Ministry of Economy, Industry, Foreign Trade, and Services (MDIC). Mercosul - Colômbia, Equador e Venezuela (ACE-59), available at <http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/comercio-exterior/negociacoes-internacionais/132-acordos-dos-quais-o-brasil-e-parte/1826-acordos-mercotel-colombia-equador-e-venezuela-ace-59>, accessed on February 15th, 2019.

Ministry of Economy, Industry, Foreign Trade, and Services (MDIC). Mercosul - Peru (ACE-58), available at <http://www.mdic.gov.br/index.php/comercio-exterior/negociacoes-internacionais/132-acordos-dos-quais-o-brasil-e-parte/1825-acordos-mercotel-peru-ace-58>, accessed on February 15th, 2019.

5.2.2 Infrastructure

Physical and technological development is a crucial topic among MERCOSUR members. Given that they are still characterized as developing countries, an inefficient network for the movement of goods can be a hindrance to economic progress. In a nutshell, when roads, harbours, and airports are well-equipped, goods are transported in less time and, therefore, costs are reduced and the possibility for profit is higher.

In this way, it became imperative for regional integration schemes to be entangled with infrastructure development. Some initiatives on this front were undertaken in South America. The first one, the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA)⁵⁶, was launched in 2000. It was originated by countries in South America and not intended to be under the guise of a regional institution. However, it eventually was incorporated into the realms of UNASUR.

Within MERCOSUR, the Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM) was created in 2004 and started operating in 2007. It aims to finance programmes which “promote structural convergence, develop competitiveness and social cohesion”⁵⁷. Paraguay and Uruguay are the largest recipients of the Fund, which reiterates the *leitmotif* of the policies in MERCOSUR of attempting to reduce asymmetries. Over forty projects have been approved since the beginning of the Fund⁵⁸.

Brazil is the largest donator of the Fund with 70%, followed by Argentina with 27%. The Minister of Foreign Affairs during Lula’s administration, Celso Amorim (2005), justified Brazil’s role of paymaster⁵⁹ when he stated

Conscious of its geographical position and the weight of its economy in intra-regional transactions, Brazil recognizes that its role in this integration process entails costs and supposes a 'generous' vision, so that we can compensate for the imbalances in the different degrees of development of the countries in the region. Generosity, in this case, is

⁵⁶ For more on IIRSA, see Costa and Gonzalez (2014), in Portuguese.

⁵⁷ Quoted from the official website of FOCEM, translated from Portuguese. Available at <http://www.mercosul.gov.br/fundo-para-a-convergencia-estrutural-do-mercopol-focem>, accessed on February 22nd, 2019.

⁵⁸ MERCOSUL. Fundo para a Convergência Estrutural do MERCOSUL (FOCEM). Available at <http://www.mercosul.gov.br/fundo-para-a-convergencia-estrutural-do-mercopol-focem>, accessed on February 22nd, 2019.

⁵⁹ Paymaster is the country that finances the largest share of regional integration projects.

nothing more than the ability to put long-term interests above immediate goals.

In this way, throughout Lula's first mandate policies regarding infrastructure were envisaged and, eventually, put into practice. Those were, also, a safe arena for Brazil to perform regional leadership.

5.2.3 Membership enlargement

When it comes to enlargement policies, during the selected timeframe new members were admitted as associated to the institution: Peru (2003), Colombia (2004), and Ecuador (2004). The negotiations for the inclusion of Venezuela to MERCOSUR as a full member started in 2005 and were concluded in 2012, albeit in a rather controversial situation⁶⁰.

At the beginning of his first mandate, Lula gave indications that cohesiveness was an important issue, when he declared "we have to consolidate Mercosur [...] Mercosur should be seen as a homogeneous bloc in order to facilitate negotiations with the EU and other potential partners"⁶¹. One month after the end of his first mandate, he stated that "the biggest challenge of Mercosur is to accept diversity among member-states [...] we will only consolidate the integration when we realize that countries in Latin and South America cannot develop alone"⁶². Again, the issue of cohesiveness appeared. From this quote alone, one could argue that for Lula development is consonant with solidarity.

From his words, one could infer that enlargement is a way of consolidating the integration process. With more members encompassed by MERCOSUR, it translates the institution as an amalgamation of South America's interests and political unison. After all, more members mean more political leverage in the international scene, as more voices are speaking in consonance (even if some of those voices are of associated members).

⁶⁰ The inclusion of Venezuela as a full-member took place when Paraguay, the only country opposing it, was suspended from MERCOSUR.

⁶¹ Folha de São Paulo (2003b). Lula quer consolidar o Mercosul para desenvolver as relações com a UE. July 10th, 2003. Available at <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u51094.shtml>, accessed on February 26th, 2019.

⁶² O Estado de São Paulo (2007). Lula: desafio do Mercosul é aceitar diversidade dos países. January 18th, 2007. Available at <https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lula-desafio-do-mercopol-e-aceitar-diversidade-dos-paises,20070118p19096>, accessed on February 26th, 2019.

Then, MERCOSUR comprised almost of the entire South America⁶³, with full and associate members. Naturally, with more members more markets become available for regional trade. More members could also mean the strengthening of the political ties of MERCOSUR, as it encompassed nearly the whole region, thus aligning it to the South American identity.

5.3 The European Union (EU)

After two World Wars, the option of legally binding states into regional institutions in order to safeguard peace and stability proved to be the best choice. The European Union as it is witnessed today is the culmination of a long process of institutional development.

It started in the post-war years, as in 1950 the Schuman Declaration proposed that France and West Germany should be under the same legal framework for coal and steel. In the following year, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created by the Treaty of Paris, and four other countries joined the institution⁶⁴. According to Krotz et al. (2012, p.179), “sublimating the Franco-German rivalry, not balancing the Soviet Union, was the key motive behind the early moves toward European integration following World War II”. With this reasoning, one could argue why high politics was absent from the early institutional designs of the European integration. It preferred to focus on inward regional development and to eschew the bipolar rivalry.

In 1957, the Treaty of Rome, nowadays known as Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, established the European Economic Community (EEC). *Inter alia*, it was responsible for inaugurating the common market, the customs union, the reduction of customs duties, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which created a legal framework for nuclear power.

The period between the 1960s and 1980s came to be known as “Eurosclerosis”, given the lack of institutional achievements, in some sort of developmental inertia. The 1960s were a period of steady economic growth for most European countries, a result of the trade liberalization established by the EEC. This was not, however, without its disagreements among member-states. One example was the “empty chair crisis” of 1965, when president Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from participating in the EEC meetings over budgetary divergences

⁶³ Guyana and Suriname joined in 2013. French Guyana is the exception, as it is an overseas department of France and, thus, cannot join MERCOSUR.

⁶⁴ Besides France and West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were members of the ECSC.

on the application of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This shows that the European road to “success” was not without perils – especially if the Gaullist geopolitical approach is considered, one that focused on military and nuclear means, on a political diversion with the United States, and on the end of the East-West cleavage (Moravcsik 1998).

This scenario of institutional inertia changed in 1986 with the Single European Act (SEA), which revised the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and foresaw the creation of a single market by 1992 – which would allow for the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. It also provided the European Commission with more jurisdiction, and a qualified majority in the voting system of the Council.

The decade of the 1990s was one of major progress in the institutional architecture, and the early 2000s followed suit. The Treaty of Maastricht, which formalized the European Union, was signed in 1992 and started in 1993. It provided much of the framework that exists today, either by bringing innovation (European citizenship and the Euro) or as by strengthening previously existing organs (the European Parliament). The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the three pillars of the EU, divided as the European Communities, a common foreign and security policies, and justice and home affairs, respectively. It also established the creation of the European Central Bank⁶⁵.

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was created and entered into force two years later. It made substantive amendments to the previous Treaty notably regarding the European Parliament. It would now share legislative responsibilities with the Council and have the prerogative to approve the president of the European Commission⁶⁶.

The Treaty of Nice was established in 2001 and came to force in 2003. Its main concern was membership enlargement and, as such, the EU institutions were adapted accordingly. For example, the number of deputies in the European Parliament increased, and the judicial system was reinforced⁶⁷.

After the debacle of the proposition for a constitutional treaty for the EU in 2004, as the referendums were rejected in France and in the Netherlands, a new proposition needed to be installed. In this way, the negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon were initiated. The whole procedure was not, however, without discord. Many concerns were raised by members such

⁶⁵ The Treaty of Maastricht in its entirety is available at the official website of the EU, at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0026&from=EN>, accessed on March 5th, 2019.

⁶⁶ The full Treaty of Amsterdam is available at the official website of the EU, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>, accessed on March 5th, 2019.

⁶⁷ The Treaty of Nice can be reached at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12001C/TXT&from=EN>, accessed on March 5th, 2019.

as Poland and the United Kingdom over the content of the document, which needed to be ratified by all member-states. This demonstrates how national preferences and intergovernmental bargaining are crucial elements of treaty negotiations (Carbone 2009), specifically in the case of the EU, which accounted for a large number of members.

Interestingly enough, at least for the purpose of this doctoral thesis, the beginning of negotiations coincided with the presidency of Germany in the Council of the European Union. It was vital for the Inter-Governmental Conference to reach an agreement in an environment of conflicting voices and demands, and Merkel “played a key role in acting as a broker, drawing upon her more pragmatic approach” (Bulmer 2010, p.63). The Declaration of Berlin was issued in Merkel’s presidency, in commemoration to the fifty years of the Treaty of Rome, and it reinforced the common goals of peace, solidarity, prosperity, and democracy. This will be discussed in depth in Chapter 8.

The Treaty of Lisbon⁶⁸ was eventually signed in 2007 and became effective in 2009. It somewhat maintained the outline proposed by the failed constitutional treaty. It brought, however, important innovations, such as an increase in the number of deputies in the European Parliament, as well as turned the organ into a co-legislative in matters of trade. Likewise, the qualified majority voting system was introduced to the Council, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) highlighted the civilian and military capacities (Laursen 2011). The Treaty of Lisbon also endowed the EU with legal personality, formalized the position of President of the European Council for a longer mandate, and assigned the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as the vice-president of the European Commission. It also put forward the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Treaty of Lisbon obliterated the pillars system and introduced the provision of withdrawing from the institution, which eventually became necessary a decade later.

The Treaty of Lisbon also enacted the scheme of competences, which clarifies the enactment of the EU among exclusive competences (customs union, monetary policy, common commercial policy, international agreements); shared competences with member-states (such as the internal market, social policies, transport, energy), and the supporting competences of support and consultation (such as culture, tourism, education)⁶⁹.

⁶⁸ The Treaty of Lisbon is available at the official website of the EU, under <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF>, accessed on March 8th, 2019.

⁶⁹ European Union, EUR-Lex. Division of competences within the European Union. Available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Aai0020>, accessed on April 10th, 2019.

The EU has managed to build a sophisticated architectural framework, as the chart in Figure 3 illustrates, which entails intergovernmental and supranational institutional bodies. The European Commission, chaired by appointed bureaucrats, the European Parliament, formed by voted legislators from each member-state, and the Council of the European Union, comprised of heads of executive governments, form the triad for law-making in the EU. Alongside them, however responsible for setting up the political agenda, is the European Council. It is constituted by heads of state or government of the member-states, the president of the European Council, and the president of the European Commission⁷⁰.

Other important organs are worth mentioning, like the European Central Bank, which is responsible for monetary policies related to the Eurozone, and the Court of Justice, that accounts for judiciary matters as it interprets and safeguards EU law.

Figure 3: Simplified version of institutional framework of the EU




Chart created by the author, with information provided by the official website of the European Union, at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en. Accessed on April 9th, 2019.

In this way, the EU managed to develop a regional institution with an entangled architecture of intergovernmental and supranational entities. Its success is surely

⁷⁰ For studies on the role of the European Commission, see Bauer and Becker (2014) and Becker et al. (2016). For a study on the European Parliament, see Hix et al. (2006). For an examination of the bargaining power of the European Council, see Tallberg (2008). For an analysis of the importance of the Council and the European Council in economic governance, see Puetter (2012).

unprecedented. Nonetheless, it remains rather difficult to define its *sui generis* character – or what former president of the EU Commission Jacques Delors (1985) once classified as “unidentified political object”. This is because the EU is not a federation, but it has federation-like qualities - such as common foreign and security policies, joint legislation, collective organizations, and a unified currency (although not extended to all members) - while member-states maintain their sovereignty and independence.

Against this background, the next section will give an overview of the state of affairs of the EU during Merkel's first mandate. It will consider the elements more prone to institutional change, namely trade and membership enlargement.

5.4 The EU during Merkel (2005-2009)

Angela Merkel came to power in 2005 after a somewhat difficult election period. The previous *Bundeskanzler* Gerhard Schröder used the manoeuvre of calling for the failure of the no confidence vote, thus resulting in the President Horst Köhler dissolving the Bundestag and elections being held a year earlier. Despite narrowly winning on the ballots, CDU could not form a majority in the *Bundestag*, and a coalition with SPD had to be negotiated (Brown, Miller and Taylor 2005).

Somehow like Lula, Merkel was also a candidate of “firsts”: she was the first woman to become Chancellor and the first that grew up in East Germany. Also, she has a few characteristics that distinguishes her from the mainstream – she had an academic background in Chemistry before joining politics and she is a Protestant that belongs to a mostly Catholic political party (Packer 2014).

As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, Merkel came to power in a much more stable scenario, when considered political and economic terms. She did not have to overcome the difficulties that past administrations faced – post-war scenarios, reunification, sluggish economy, and high levels of unemployment. Yet, Merkel had to face serious crises in the EU – every single one of her cabinets dealt with urgencies, some of which Germany was called to action. In the first cabinet (2005-2009), as explained previously, the failure of the constitutional treaty occurred, but without serious repercussions. In her second cabinet (2009-2013), the Euro- and Greek crises took place. In her third cabinet (2013-2018), the refugee crisis overwhelmed Europe. And as this doctoral thesis is being written, Merkel is in her fourth cabinet (2018-) and the negotiations for the Brexit took place. For Merkel, it is not Germany who brings tough choices, but the EU.

Germany's history, from the post-war years, has been entangled with the history of the EU. In this way, European foreign policy has been an essential item on the *Bundesregierung's* agenda throughout the years, albeit characterized by different crises and driven by idiosyncratic demands.

Given Germany's militarised past, its potential hegemony in the continent and, consequently, dominance over others have been a concern that permeated European politics. It has influenced the *modus operandi* of Germany's foreign affairs, so much to the point of German leaders employing "policies of reconciliation" with France, Israel, Poland, and the Czech Republic (Gardner-Feldman 2012). One solution was to entwine the country to Europe. In this way, it reduced the likelihood of Germany becoming an overpowering country by formally tying it to institutions.

In this context, Europeanisation is understood as a two-way interaction - either as a process in which national policies of member-states are affected by the EU's framework, in a top-down process referenced by the literature as download; or as when national preferences of member-states end up shaping EU's institutions and regulations, in a bottom-up mechanism called upload (Ruano 2013). According to Daehnhardt (2011), the upload component is more present in the German case, in which the country has influenced the European Monetary Union (EMU), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and the enlargement towards European countries. To the author, Germany remains an "Euro-enthusiast".

This issue can be traced back to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). During the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), there was a foreign policy preference for tightening Germany to multilateral institutions, as a way to secure national interests through Europeanisation (Bulmer et al. 2010). As physically divided and fragilized by the war as the country was, the option included West Germany in the European sub-system of political power – or, in simpler words, inserted West Germany in the "political game". Willy Brandt (1969-1974) diverged from predecessors when he opted for the *Ostpolitik* of rapprochement with East Germany (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik*, DDR), unlike the previous Hallstein Doctrine (1955-1970) of distancing from the DDR. The pro-European initiatives of Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) had to operate concomitant to reuniting both Germanys, and Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) focused on securing Germany's national interests in a much more realist way (Bulmer, Paterson 2019).

However, the download aspect of Europeanisation could be affected by what Harnisch (2009, p.455) calls the "domestication of Germany's foreign policy", in which certain features have "limited and shaped Germany's ability to delegate authority internationally". Concerning Germany's European foreign policy, the author acknowledges the Article 23 of the German

Constitution, which safeguards the right of the German states, the *Länder*, to participate in matters related to the EU; and the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), that ruled the *Solange* decision of 1974 establishing human and citizen rights as prerequisite for the country's participation in the EU. Regarding the FCC, Steinbach (2010) argues that, even though the court has decided on the compatibility of the Treaty of Lisbon and German law, it ruled that certain aspects must be preserved, such as those related to individual and fundamental rights. Protecting national sovereignty is a contentious topic among member-states, and it would not be different with Germany.

If the focus of the previous section was on providing an overview of the institutional development of the EU, the goal of this section is to offer the state of affairs of the EU during Merkel's first mandate. As infrastructure is not a major issue in the EU as it is in MERCOSUR – which is portrayed as a hindrance towards economic development –, this topic will not be considered here. Trade and membership enlargement were chosen as the issues that matter the most for the institutional development of the EU, as the institution-building policies were already discussed.

5.4.1 Trade

The EU is the largest existent trading bloc, comprising some of the main agricultural and manufacturing producers in the world. Trade policy was the foundational reason to establish the European common market. Today it is an exclusive competence of the EU and one of its core topics. As Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006) claim, the power of the EU is exercised *in* trade and *through* trade. Respectively, it refers to the EU's nature of trade capacities to export goods, capital, and services – the “in” element of access to foreign markets –, and its ability to export standards and norms – the “through” part of imposing standards and externalizing values such as democracy when setting bilateral trade agreements.

Despite being a trading power, this issue raises concern in the region. Namely, the political legitimacy of the EU has been contested by organized groups in civil society. The EU being has been labelled an “elitist” project organized in Brussels that does not consider the demands of the peoples or how liberalization could affect the common good (Meunier 2003). Hence, the democratic deficit of the EU became a noteworthy topic for debate, since trade in this institution involves diverse actors at EU and member-states levels, such as lobbying firms, trade unions, and agriculture sectors. The EU has also been accused of “trying to safeguard European rules from challenges under international trade rules” (Young 2007, p.797) and of

paying insufficient attention to environmental concerns when establishing the common market (Duina 2006).

During the selected timeframe, some associations and stabilisation agreements were either signed (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia) or entered into force (Algeria, Chile, Lebanon)⁷¹. From this, one could argue that the EU prefers to formalize agreements with developing countries, especially those pertaining to the European continent. However, according to Woolcock (2007), the EU does not follow a specific model when formalizing trade or association agreements, but it applies a case-by-case strategy⁷².

In the year Merkel came to power, Europe was experiencing low levels of economic growth, specifically in the Eurozone and in the UK. And “as almost three-quarters of Europe’s merchandise exports are destined to other European countries, the sluggish economy resulted in poor overall trade growth” (World Trade Organization 2006, p.7). Intra-trade is a crucial part of the overall trading pattern of the EU, despite eventual setbacks on economic growth.

In this context, Table 4 below provides an overview of the volume of the intra-trade during Merkel’s first mandate. One can see that internal trade exchange among member-states remained on a range with low variation throughout the years. Germany’s share in the intra-trade volume of the EU increased significantly in 2007, and it reduced expressively in 2009. This would be expected in a post-economic and financial crises scenario, as the table demonstrates that it also occurred with Italy and the UK. Still, the figures regarding Germany were substantially higher in comparison to key exporters in the EU, such as France, Italy, and the UK.

Table 4: Intra-trade balance between the members of the EU and selected countries (2006-2009) in millions of Euros

	*2006	2007	2008	2009
<i>EU (28)</i>	82.151	67.187	74.176	65.796
<i>Germany</i>	103.046	128.590	112.062	73.457
<i>France</i>	-39.599	-52.063	-64.372	-63.129

⁷¹ This information can be found at the official website of the EU for Trade, under <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements>. Accessed on March 27th, 2019.

⁷² Interestingly, the MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement was signed in June of 2019, while this thesis was being written.

<i>Italy</i>	1.355	8.129	10.171	-1.911
<i>The UK</i>	-49.336	-63.504	-51.170	-44.077

* Since Merkel's mandate started at the end of 2005, the data started from 2006 onwards.

Table created by the author, with information provided by Eurostat, the official statistics website of the EU. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tet00047>, accessed on March 12th, 2019.

In this way, despite initial low economic growth among member-states and fluctuating intra-trade levels, Germany managed to allocate a large part of the trade volume when compared to key-member states. This fact should not be overlooked when analyzing Germany's political capital in the EU.

5.4.2 Membership enlargement

Another central topic concerning the EU is membership enlargement. In their own words, "[enlargement] makes Europe a safer and more prosperous place, in particular through its promotion of democracy and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the single market" (European Commission, 2015, p.3). All membership accession is negotiated by the European Commission and it is not affected by one existing member-state in particular⁷³.

The institution has gradually encompassed new members along the way, and enlargement can be presented in waves⁷⁴. The EU has surely come a long way, from six members in 1951 with the ECSC to twenty-eight in 2019 – which eventually became twenty-seven with the Brexit in 2020. This shows how the reverse trend of enlargement, and possibly one of its kind, is a member-state exiting the EU.

According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), EU enlargement can be understood through the lenses of rational and constructivist institutionalisms. To the first strand, the applicant country calculates the costs and benefits that it would gain from joining the institution. The same calculation would occur to the other member-states, as this new membership would also entail transaction costs, such as infrastructure and communication,

⁷³ This section is not inferring that the Merkel administration had any influence on EU enlargement. As explained before, the section provides an account of the state of affairs of the EU during 2005 until 2009, as a way to understand the structure component (i.e. the EU).

⁷⁴ More on this can be found on European Commission. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/from-6-to-27-members_en, accessed on August 18th, 2020.

and adaptation of existing institutional framework for the newcomer member. To the second strand, enlargement is influenced by ideational and cultural elements, through collective identities and shared beliefs. The difference between both perspectives is that rationalism focuses on material conditions and consequences, whereas constructivism presupposes the social and normative dimensions of enlargement.

In the previous year of the beginning of Merkel I cabinet, a large wave of new membership took place, with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia joining. According to Smith (2005, p.758), this new wave that incorporated Eastern countries “created an immediate need to ensure that the wider neighbourhood was stable, to avoid the risk of instability spilling over into the larger EU”. Within this context, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was created as “an attempt to create good neighbours: namely, the kind who conform not only to ‘EU values’ generally speaking, but also to EU standards and laws in specific economic and social areas” (ibidem, p.763)⁷⁵. During Merkel’s first term, Bulgaria and Romania officially joined the EU in 2007, after many years of negotiation at the EU level and adaptation at the national levels.

Thus, when Merkel came to power, the EU was more diverse in the variety of its members, bringing more voices to participate in the democratic process of the EU and the possibility of opening up the range of available consuming markets. Likewise, the EU also initiated a course of enlarging its influence towards the vicinity of EU borders, with the effort of securing peace and stability. Consequently, the EU enlargement in the selected timeframe can be understood as either institutionally (by adding more members) or influentially (by employing the ENP).

⁷⁵ For more on the ENP, see Kelley (2006).

5.5 Final remarks

The overview provided by this chapter made clear that MERCOSUR was going through major differences in the time that coincided with Lula's first mandate. The largest economies in the institution, namely Argentina and Brazil, were recovering from difficult economic and financial crises. From 2003, the situation improved considerably and the trade between the four full-members grew substantially.

One of the issues of major concern, infrastructure, was a part of the agenda, and initiatives in this regard were established. MERCOSUR also managed to further its institutional architecture by embracing new members. Therefore, the Lula administration enjoyed a positive scenario for its project for regional leadership and MERCOSUR had beneficial conditions for furthering the integration.

During the first mandate of Merkel, the EU was under a period of culmination of accession rates, with a significant increase in the number of participants. Thus, the EU managed to expand its impact in Europe and its political capital in the world by having more voices comprised under the same institutional umbrella. Economically, despite a poor growth rate that coincided with the beginning of Merkel's term, the overall internal trade exchange in the EU remained at a stable level.

The only severe hardship faced by the EU between the years of 2005 and 2009 was the failure of the attempt for a constitutional treaty. Nonetheless, the situation was overcome by the Treaty of Lisbon, one of the most important components of EU law, settled in 2007. And, as mentioned by this chapter, it counted with a substantial input of Germany on reaching an agreement.

Thus, this chapter demonstrates that MERCOSUR and the EU were under significant periods of change during the selected timeframe, either in economic and trade areas, and in institutional development. In this sense, the agents had to perform within a structure that was maturing and evolving, despite difficulties and setbacks.

Chapter 6 – A discussion on agents

The purpose of this chapter is to, first, elucidate the notion of agency in IR literature and, more specifically, to clarify the role of agents within a structure of regional institutions. Second, this chapter serves as a “bridge” between the previous chapter on structures and the following two chapters - namely, Chapter 7 on Brazil and Chapter 8 on Germany. This explains its rather small length, as it opens up a discussion that will be deepened in the following two chapters. Third, if Chapter 5 is dedicated to analysing the structures (i.e. regional institutions), then it is expected to have a chapter devoted to the agents (i.e. states) – otherwise the analysis would be one-sided.

As explained in Chapter 5, the relationship between agent and structure is one of the largest debates in the Social Sciences and IR in particular. Given the lack of consensus on the appropriate use of the notions of agent and structure, as they are highly context-dependent, it suffices to provide a brief account of the literature debate to later determine how agents are understood in this present research. The goal here is not to question the nature of states and of structures in the international system⁷⁶. In the context of this doctoral thesis, states are taken as the agents which are situated within a structure of regional institutions⁷⁷.

In IR, most studies that focus on agents and structures are either in the strands of realism or world-system theory. As claimed by Wendt (1987, p.338), those two schools of thought are respectively, interested in “properties both of states (powers, interests) and of system structures (polarity, relations of unequal exchange) to explain state behavior”. The author argues further that “neorealists reduce the structure of the state system to the properties and interactions of its constituent elements, states, while world-system theorists reduce state (and class) agents to effects of the reproduction requirements of the capitalist world system” (ibidem, p.339). Despite this ontological debate, agent is here understood as “an entity that can act in a specific context”, and agency as “corresponding ability to act” (Braun et al. 2018, p.788).

As much as states can be considered as structures depending on the level and focus of analysis, states can act as agents in the international system because of two conditions:

⁷⁶ For an ontological study of agents and structures in IR, see Wight (2006).

⁷⁷ It is necessary to establish a distinction between the concepts of agent and actor. This present analysis partakes in the definition provided by Braun et al. (2018, p.788), which establishes an actor as “an identifiably human or collective subject that in principle can gain agency and thus become an agent in the context in question”. In this way, in this research the agents are Brazil and Germany, and the actors are Lula and Merkel. However, as already explained in Chapter 4, here the countries are equalized with their respective leaders. Thus, a clear separation between an “agent” and an “actor” is not of main importance.

states are sovereign⁷⁸ and the international system is anarchic⁷⁹. Despite a body of literature that recognizes the growing importance of non-state actors in the international system (see Keck, Sikkink 1998; Ahmed, Potter 2006), states maintain their position as the most relevant players. As Wendt argues (1987, p.339), “the organizing principles of the state system constitute states as individual choice-making units which are responsible for their actions”. Some could argue this is a rather realist account of a state’s role in the system. However, this research acknowledges how the notion of a state can be socially constructed through the collective idea of a nation and its social practices (Ting 2008), and how states can also be socialized into the international system when they “internalize patterns of behaviour and role expectations” (Alderson 2001, p.416).

The ontology of the state has been extensively debated in Political Science (see Hay 2014, Hobbes 1996, Ringmar 1996, Weber 2004), and this discussion is beyond the scope of this present research. In a few words, the state is considered here as the amalgamation of bureaucratic and institutional apparatuses, represented by the legislative, judicial, and executive bodies, in which the latter exercises the highest authority. As Wight (2006, p.217) points out, “we cannot observe [the state], though we can experience its power through the activities of its officials”.

The state is a sovereign entity that controls its budget, borders, and international relations, while it also holds the monopoly of legitimate use of physical violence (Weber 2004). Those are the material elements that encompass the state. Yet, the state is also comprised of ideational elements that affect how it sees itself and, ultimately, its behavior, such as identity, culture, and history. Thus, the state is a social construction made of everyday practices and discourses or what Ringmar (1996, p.452) calls the “narrative concept of the state”: the state is “necessarily at the mercy of the interpretations given to it through the stories in which it features” (ibidem).

In this sense, and as discussed in Chapter 2, section i, states can socially construct a region and, therefore, a regional institution. This mostly occurs by the use of language and discourse. For example, during his second mandate, Lula declared: “MERCOSUR is our home and we will take good care of it” (Estadão 2008). By this declaration, one can notice how the president related the regional institution to something welcoming, affectionate, and communal⁸⁰. This demonstrates the capacity of agents to create or reinforce a structure

⁷⁸ For more on the concept of sovereignty, see Biersteker and Weber (1996) and Krasner (2001).

⁷⁹ For more on the anarchic aspect of the international system, see Milner (1991) and Wendt (1992).

⁸⁰ An alternate interpretation could be that owners of a home have the prerogative to decide who enters and who leaves their property. This could indicate a willingness to strengthen the bonds between South Americans against external interference (mostly of the United States).

through social practices, ideas, and communication. This aspect will be examined in Chapters 7 and 8 through political narratives concerning regional integration, as explained in Chapter 4.

This is not to imply that the state is, by all means, a harmonious entity. It encompasses many diverging groups, like political parties, business and trade union leaderships, and the civil society. As discussed in Chapter 4, foreign policy actions (which include participation in regional institutions) are the result of demands from different segments within a state. How to better handle this domestic contestation depends on the abilities of the incumbent head of the executive. Yet, this is not a condition of the state *per se*, as governments are transitory, but the state is enduring.

As explained in previous chapters, it is adopted here the Constructivist premise of co-constitution of agents and structures. In this way, states are taken as the agents and regional institutions as the structures, a novel approach in the area of Regionalism. Agents and structures are mutually constituted in the sense that states create regional institutions which, in the end, end up constraining the behavior of member-states. As elucidated in Chapter 5, this is more clearly found in regional institutions in which the degree of institutionalization is higher, as the dictates of supranational bodies are above the will of member-states. This is evidently the case of the EU, as already shown. This also holds true to regional institutions that are intergovernmental, such as MERCOSUR, as the communal treaties, norms, and regulations determine the joint policies of member-states in trade and foreign policy. This was also clarified in the preceding chapter.

This observation of the co-constitution between agents (member-states) and structures (regional institutions) was the primary guide of this research. Reflecting on how countries can create regional institutions and yet be constrained by them is an intriguing puzzle. This led to the question of how certain key-actors have the capacity to affect or influence outcomes in regional institutions, as already explained in Chapter 1.

One could argue that it would be unreasonable to assume that one single state can force its interests upon a group that comprises many states – in the case of MERCOSUR, twelve states among full and associate members, and in the EU, twenty-seven members. This would only be considered if the intergovernmental aspect of both regional institutions; if we added the supranational level to the analysis, this transformative capacity of individual states would be even harder to grasp. Nonetheless, as it has been extensively argued throughout the chapters, if we want to fully understand regional integration processes, we must adopt a micro perspective that focuses on the state-level.

A region is not a cohesive unit, but an amalgamation of countries that present economic, political, and social disparities. It would be even more unreasonable to assume that,

for example, Romania has more leverage in the EU than, say, France, or that Paraguay plays a larger role in MERCOSUR than Argentina. Any region comprises political and economic asymmetries, and we must pay attention to what Venables (2003) calls the “winners and losers from regional integration agreements”.

As explained in Chapter 1, it is by understanding the behavior of key countries, the ones that have the capacity to foster or hinder a regional institution, that we can fully comprehend its inner workings - or what Van Langenhove (2011) classifies as “region-builders”.

Although said classification is not limited to states⁸¹, this present research considers region-builders as the most powerful states in a region, the ones that hold more strategic competencies when in comparison to fellow member-states⁸². They are the ones who have also propelled political discourses in favor of the integration and are key elements when it comes to solving regional and institutional crises. As they have more ideational and material power, their roles in the regional institution cannot be underestimated. Brazil and Germany are the perfect examples of region-builders, as previously elucidated in Chapter 1.

It is against this backdrop that the present analysis will be applied. The approach proposed here is to verify the shaping of the National Role Conceptions of Brazil and Germany as a means of explaining their behavior in MERCOSUR and in the EU. It proposes to look backwards as to verify how those role conceptions were shaped, in order to understand how certain mechanisms affect their conduct towards those regional institutions.

The following two chapters are dedicated to the analysis of the cases. Chapter 7 applies the theoretical framework to the case of Brazil, and chapter 8 proceeds in the same way to the case of Germany.

⁸¹ The author includes citizens, think-tanks, global institutions, and regions themselves as region-builders (Van Langenhove 2011, p.4).

⁸² In this realm, Moravcsik (1991) has examined the importance of the largest states in the EU, namely France, Germany, and Britain, in the development of its institutional architecture, specifically in the Single European Act of 1986. The author defends that an intergovernmentalist approach is a good way of understanding the intrinsic character of EU politics, since it “affirms that the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels” (ibidem, p.56).

Chapter 7 – The National Role Conception of Brazil towards MERCOSUR during Lula

The presidential elections of 2002 brought a novelty to the Brazilian political scenario. It was the first time a left-wing party, the Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT*), won an election for the highest position in the Executive office. Founded in 1980 in the state of São Paulo, initially it aligned itself with sectors of the radical left and, throughout time, the party managed to increase its electoral power by increased victories in municipal, state, and federal elections (Goirand 2014). The trajectory of PT, however, could be characterized as a sinuous path, either by facing significant defeats in the south of Brazil (Louault 2011) or by formulating an effective strategy of proliferating party branches in the northeast (van Dyck 2014). Regardless, the party accomplished to hold higher office for thirteen consecutive years. This period started when Luis Inácio Lula da Silva became president in 2003, and ended with the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016.

It is impossible to dissociate Lula from PT. He was one of its founders and, gradually, had his image combined to the identity of the party. Lula was a trade union leader who came from humble beginnings in the Northeast, one of Brazil's least developed areas. References to his personal story can often be found in his speeches, as well as it contours the social policies his government put forward, such as conditional cash transfer programmes like *Bolsa Família*⁸³. Lula was a candidate in every presidential elections since 1989, and his victory in 2002 was seen as long overdue.

In the early 2000s, Brazil was facing better economic and political prospects than in previous decades. The 1990s was a time of reconfiguration of the political system, as the country was adapting to the redemocratization process, which came after twenty-one years of military dictatorship (1964-1985). In the late 1980s, the new constitution was being drafted, the first direct elections were being held, and the economy was in dire conditions. The Real Plan (*Plano Real*) of 1994 managed to stabilize the economy and to create a new currency, the *Real*, leaving behind a *status quo* of many short-term currencies and high inflation levels.

⁸³ *Bolsa Família* (Family Stipend) was a social welfare initiative launched in 2003 aimed toward low-income families. They received a monthly stipend only if the children were vaccinated and attending school, and only if pregnant women in the family received medical assistance throughout the period of pregnancy and breastfeeding. There is no consensus in the literature on the political instrumentalization and electoral effects of *Bolsa Família* on Lula's re-election in 2006. While some classify it as a new-found clientelist move which strongly influenced Lula's re-election (Hunter and Power 2007), others emphasize its merits of promoting social and economic development (Bohn 2011). *Bolsa Família* was a part of another important social welfare programme created during Lula, *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger), which goal was to increase food security and nutrition in the least developed areas of Brazil.

The neoliberal agenda put forward by Lula's predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), was based on the guidelines of the Washington Consensus. It proposed to reduce welfare, to privatize Brazilian companies in strategic sectors such as telecommunications and metallurgy, and to control public spending. It had some successes like the above-mentioned stabilization of the *Real*, and a few setbacks such as unemployment and the currency devaluation of 1999 that led to a serious economic crisis. It was also a result from prior crises in Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 that ended up affecting the prices of Brazilian commodities. The largest issue of the Cardoso Era was, according to Cervo (2002, p.8), that Cardoso "mistook democracy for market imperialism, competitiveness for economic openness, and development for monetary stability".

The Brazilian foreign policy under Cardoso aimed to increase the participation of the country in international institutions, namely in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Overall, the Cardoso administration focused on a globalising perspective, which envisioned turning Brazil into a global player (Vizentini 2005). It projected the strengthening of MERCOSUR as part of this strategy (Vigevani et al., 2003), which was difficult in the face of many crises in the region. Cardoso was not as vocal as Lula about Brazil being a regional leader, as according to the former president leadership should be exercised and not vocalized (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007).

Yet, with Lula, the country had to face many challenges, either at the national level – such as unemployment rates and social inequalities – and at the international level, such as the foreign debt. The situation of surrounding countries and members of MERCOSUR was not less problematic⁸⁴. But the motto of Lula's new government was change (*mudança*), which was mentioned in his inauguration speech seven times⁸⁵. This could explain why he won 61% of the votes in the second round of elections. Despite some initial apprehension in the financial markets in the private sector and especially in the White House of a left-wing politician holding the presidency (Spektor 2014), the feeling of *mudança* among certain sectors of the population was tangible⁸⁶.

Brazil's regional role has been labelled as "consensual hegemon" (Burgess 2008) and "leader without followers" (Malamud 2011). ***This doctoral thesis is not interested in adding one more categorization to that ensemble. As explained in previous chapters, the focus***

⁸⁴ For an analysis of the conditions of MERCOSUR under Lula's first term, see chapter 5.

⁸⁵ This is not a study on lexicology. This number was used just to illustrate the high frequency it appeared in the data.

⁸⁶ Aligned with the interpretivist tradition of entanglement between researcher and object, that was the perception that I had of the Brazilian scenario, as I was living there during that time.

here is to examine how the National Role Conception of Brazil under Lula (2003-2006) came to be.

From the results generated by the National Role Conception flowchart applied here (Breuning 2011, p.26), one can examine which role a country portrays (or the role enactment, see Chapter 3). Therefore, the emphasis here is on the process of formation of a role, rather than on the role itself. As explained in Chapter 1, the **research puzzle** that guided this research was based on the observation of performance of regional leadership (***Brazil wants it, but cannot have it***). As elucidated in previous chapters, by applying the National Role Conception framework one can better understand said conundrum, based on ideational and material elements provided by this analytical scheme.

This chapter is divided in three large sections. The first one is devoted to an overall analysis of the foreign policy conduct of the Lula administration during the selected timeframe⁸⁷. The second section applies the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011) to the case of Brazil and examines each mechanism. The third and last section is dedicated to the final remarks of the chapter.

7.1 Lula's foreign policy towards South America and the world (2003-2006)

As explained in Chapter 1 and 3, Role Theory is oftentimes applied to analyses that investigate the foreign policy behaviour of states. The goal here is to intersect the areas of Foreign Policy Analysis and Regionalism, for this present study encompasses regional institutions - and the regional conduct of a country is, after all, in the realm of its foreign affairs guidelines. For this reason, the present section presents an overview of the foreign policy behaviour of Brazil during Lula's first mandate as a way to understand the positioning of the country towards the region and elsewhere. This section does not equate the bilateral behaviour propelled by Brazil with different countries in the world, but provides an understanding of its foreign policy standards as a way to provide a contextual analysis of its foreign policy actions – and, ultimately, of its regional policies.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, often called *Itamaraty* in a reference to the palace that is located, has had the monopoly of conducting foreign affairs in a rather autonomous way (Zilla 2017), somehow not being depended upon other ministries or

⁸⁷ This doctoral thesis draws exclusively from Lula's first mandate (2003-2006). Certain occurrences that took place in his second mandate (2007-2010), for example Brazil's role in environmental global governance (see Visentini and Silva 2010), will not be considered as not to compromise the analytical flowchart of National Role Conceptions and its results.

associated with segments of the civil society. However, according to Cason and Power (2009), this characteristic progressively changed during Cardoso and Lula, for both presidents conducted a presidential diplomacy that also linked *Itamaraty* to other ministries and strengthened the roles of governmental agencies in the foreign policy making⁸⁸.

Thus, *Itamaraty* is somehow a different kind of ministry, as it comprises a highly qualified body of diplomats trained at the Institute of Rio Branco, the academic branch of the ministry. It is named after José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco and forefather of Brazilian diplomacy, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1902 until 1912. Rio Branco's goal was to improve the prestige and good image of Brazil in the international scenario and to put forward policies based on principles of non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes (Bueno 2012). Those values became the guidelines for Brazil's external actions throughout its diplomatic history.

In the words of Celso Amorim, the Minister of Foreign Affairs during Lula's term, "Brazil's international credibility stems, to a large extent, from the principles that guide her foreign policy" (Amorim 2010, p.214)⁸⁹, the same principles that have led the country's external actions, which originated from Rio Branco. In this way, according to the Minister, "we are a peaceful country, one that abides by international law and respects other countries' sovereign rights. We choose to settle our disputes diplomatically - and we encourage others to act in the same way. We see multilateralism as the primary means of solving conflicts and making decisions internationally" (ibidem). More specifically to the Lula administration, Amorim argues that "we uphold Brazilian interests with pragmatism, without renouncing our principles and values" (ibidem).

Those principles were present during Lula's administration not only globally, but especially towards the region. In speeches in international fora, the president reiterated the importance of not interfering in crises in other countries, but at the same time not ignoring them – which he referred to as the doctrine of "non-indifference" (Spektor 2010, p.194). This principle was put into practice when the Brazilian army led the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the peace keeping operation that ran from 2004 to 2017⁹⁰, for example. Yet, non-indifference was not only applied to military interventions, but to the former Minister

⁸⁸ The ministries include the Chamber for Foreign Trade (*Câmara de Comércio Exterior*, CAMEX) and the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade (*Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior*, MDIC), according to Cason and Power (2009, p.121). Specific to the case of Lula, this process was influenced by how the Worker's Party understood foreign affairs, as it has a secretary for international relations.

⁸⁹ In the article, the Minister refers to Brazil as "her" rather than "it".

⁹⁰ For an overall analysis of Brazil's participation in peacekeeping operations, and for MINUSTAH in particular, see Santos and Cravo (2014).

of Foreign Affairs, the principle also served to alleviate the consequences of poverty elsewhere. Non-indifference, then, gained a new meaning under Lula, as it became synonymous with solidarity. Thus, according to Amorim (2010, p.225), “we are convinced that in the long run an attitude based on a sense of humanity that favours the promotion of development of the poorest and most vulnerable will not only be good to peace and prosperity around the world. It will bring benefits to Brazil herself, in political as well as economic terms. This dialectic relation between national interest and the exercise of solidarity has been a fundamental aspect of President Lula’s foreign policy”.

In this realm, Lula claimed from the early beginning of his presidential mandate that the foreign policy actions of his cabinet would propel an active stance, aimed at fostering social development. In his inaugural speech, he stated:

Our foreign policy will also reflect the longing for change that has been present in the streets. In my government, the diplomatic action will be oriented by a humanist perspective and it will be, above all, an instrument for national development. Through trade, the advancement of technological capabilities, and the search for productive investments, Brazil's foreign affairs will contribute to the improvement of life conditions of Brazilian women and men, elevating the levels of income, and generating dignified jobs. (Lula da Silva, 2003, p.9, own translation).

This conveyed the idea of using foreign policy as a means towards achieving national socio-political development. In the same vein, the cash transfer policies and hunger alleviation measures adopted domestically combined with the willingness to help countries in need served to increase Brazil’s image in the global scenario, according to Zilla (2017, p.19). To the author, it “raised its profile as a ‘model example’ and an ‘emerging donor’ vis-à-vis other developing and emerging countries”.

As briefly mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the main difference between the Cardoso and Lula administrations in the foreign policy realm is the quest for autonomy. Despite it being a common thread in the overall diplomatic history of Brazil (Pinheiro, Lima 2008), this has been called by the literature as an *autonomy by integration* (Vigevani et. al, 2003) during

Cardoso and an *autonomy by diversification* (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007) with Lula⁹¹. As explained in the previous section, the Cardoso administration was concerned with integrating Brazil into the international system by searching a more active role for the country in international fora, putting Brazil as a global player and a global trader. MERCOSUR was seen as part of this strategy and integrated within the dimension of open regionalism⁹², which propels the liberalization of trade and the interdependence of markets.

Unlike Cardoso, Lula aimed to insert Brazil in the international system by a revisionist rather than an adaptive stance. According to Hurrell (2010a, p.61), Lula “has both reflected and reinforced a broader set of changes in the global order”. This was accompanied by power changes in the international system that favoured the emergent countries having a larger voice. In the words of the author, “Lula’s Brazil has not been radically revisionist, but it has broadly opposed the status quo. Insisting on a role nearer the center of global multilateral bodies is perfectly compatible with a willingness to challenge the status quo, reject US-favored positions, and call for new forms of international governance” (ibidem, p.62). To Zilla (2017), Lula had a discourse that, while it preferred an adjustment of the status quo in international fora such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it did not represent an anti-systemic quality since it proposed changes from within the system. Examples of this revisionist approach will be referenced throughout this section.

In this realm, the foreign policy orientation on Lula’s first mandate was not only to maintain the traditional ties with the developed world, namely the United States and the EU, but to strengthen ties with the developing world. Brazil then sought to diversify economic and political bilateral partnerships, particularly with countries in the Global South, and to foster a special relationship with Africa. While incumbent head of *Itamaraty*, Celso Amorim was very vocal about how the Brazilian foreign policy would be “active and proud” (“*ativa e altiva*”). Active in a way that is not a bystander in the international arena, but purposefully seeks to participate in international fora and to propose solutions to common issues⁹³; and proud in the sense of not being subjugated to the wills of more powerful countries, e.g. the United States.

At the time Lula came to higher office, the United States were engaged in the Iraq War (2003-2011), which made the White House orient the majority of its foreign policy actions towards the Middle East. Consequently, it did not engage with Latin America as strongly as

⁹¹ Saraiva (2010) classifies the foreign policy of the Cardoso era as “pragmatic institutionalists”, being more focused on liberalization programmes, and the Lula era as “autonomists”, more inclined towards developmentalist strategies.

⁹² More on the concept of open regionalism is available in Chapter 2.

⁹³ An example of this was the Brazilian mediation, alongside Turkey, for the nuclear programme of Iran in 2010.

before. This created an open space for countries in the region to foster their own initiatives without the shadow of the United States looming in the back, so to speak. The United States have, throughout centuries, exercised a hegemonic role in the continent and have, to a certain degree, influenced political outcomes in South American countries. The failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a regional agreement that would encompass the whole continent and that would be headed by the United States, is a sign of the exhaustion of the USA-led model of contemporaneous imperialism of Latin America.

In this context, states that were against the Iraq war began to apply what Pape (2005, p.10) calls a strategy of soft-balancing that “do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements”. According to Flemes (2010), Brazil under Lula conducted soft balancing measures specially in regard to IBSA, a group formed in 2003 in Brasília by India, Brazil, and South Africa as a dialogue forum to promote cooperation and development in areas such as agriculture, trade, and defence. To the author, the coalition had a revisionist approach since “IBSA leaders use international organizations as platforms to challenge the legitimacy of the present international order and to change existent dominant norms” (Flemes 2010, p.99)⁹⁴.

This idea of revisionism of the international system, aligned with an attempt to lessen the cleavages between North and South, was a substantial part of the diplomatic orientation of the Lula administration. To this end, Brazil strengthened ties with the Global South and particularly with Africa. According to Visentini (2010), the motives of the Lula government can be summarized in symbolic and economic variants. To the author, the Brazilian diplomacy formalized ties with the African continent, especially with countries in which Portuguese is spoken, given the historical and cultural bonds that both regions share. Through the 16th and 19th centuries, millions of enslaved people were brought from Africa to Brazil, which was then a colony of Portugal. Therefore, African culture is deeply enrooted in Brazilian identity. For this, Lula once declared that consolidating Africa as a bilateral partner was a “political, moral, and historical obligation”⁹⁵.

⁹⁴ With this framework of forming global coalitions, Brazil also participated in BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), both created in 2009. The first was aimed at creating a united front in environment protection and climate change, and the second in revising international institutions, mostly the financial and economic ones, and in promoting development. As they were established in the second mandate of Lula, they were not included in the analysis.

⁹⁵ Quoted in Folha de São Paulo. Brasil quer desenvolver e fortalecer seus laços com a África, diz Lula. November 8th, 2003. Available at <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u55232.shtml>, accessed on June 28th, 2019.

To Visentini (2010), putting Africa in the diplomatic agenda of Brazil, in a more intensive way than in previous governments, was part of the country's quest to gain more viability and legitimacy as a global player. The "African turn" had also been felt in international affairs, as China started to invest more forcefully in the region. The Brazilian strategy was, then, to use national enterprises, such as the mining company Vale do Rio Doce, the oil company Petrobras, and the construction company Odebrecht, to establish projects in Africa⁹⁶.

In this regard, Lula made official visits to Africa in every year of his first mandate. The number of embassies in Africa doubled during his presidential term (Amorim 2010). Contacts with African members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*, CPLP) were also intensified. According to Sombra Saraiva (2010), the Africa-led initiatives propelled by the government were well received in the Brazilian society, which was inclined towards deeper ties with Africa, notably in certain areas of Congress, in universities, and in social advocacy groups. With this auspicious environment, in the words of Stolte (2015, p.151), "the engagement in Africa has enabled Brazil to strengthen its profile as a rising soft power and prove its credentials as a candidate for Great Power status".

Within this globalist approach, *Itamaraty* also paid attention to the Middle East. Lula was the first Brazilian president to make an official visit to the region (Amorim 2010). In this first mandate, the Summit of South American-Arab Countries (*Cúpula América do Sul-Países Árabes*, ASPA) was created, a forum in which twelve countries from South America and twenty-two of the Arab world could establish a common dialogue (Zilla 2017). This demonstrated how the Lula administration attempted to cover the most important geopolitical areas, while preserving a special diplomatic treatment to developing regions.

Much of the Brazilian international orientation was guided by what Cervo (2010) calls "reciprocal multilateralism", a concept created in reference to a declaration made by Lula in 2003, in which he stated, "we want free trade, but free trade characterized by reciprocity" (quoted in Cervo 2010, p.11). Reciprocity, in this sense, would mean the formation of an international order that benefits every nation, and a multilateral order in which the dictates of developed countries do not prevail. This is imbued in the aforementioned revisionist perspective adopted by Brazil at the time, which sought to revise the international institutions in order to lessen asymmetries among countries. Within the notion of reciprocal multilateralism, Cervo (2010) outlines some initiatives that will be elucidated in the following paragraphs.

⁹⁶ In Lula's second mandate, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) also launched expertise cooperation with African countries, as well as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), a public health research institution that established a pharmaceutical facility in Mozambique.

In this realm of reciprocity, *Itamaraty* pursued a strategy of interdependence, framed by active participation in negotiations in international fora, and of internationalization of Brazilian companies (Cervo 2010). For example, Brazil played a key role in the commercial G-20, a group within the WTO that pursued a common strategy among developing countries of safeguarding their interests and preventing final solutions that benefited the developed countries unilaterally⁹⁷. The reciprocity mentality was found in Brazil's propositions at the G-20 of the end of agricultural subsidies in northern countries, particularly the United States and the EU, and resulting objection of concessions on manufactured products if this disparity was not handled. The lack of reciprocity was also one of the reasons for the failure of the negotiations for the aforementioned FTAA and for the MERCOSUR-EU Trade Agreement during that period⁹⁸ (Cervo 2010).

This idea of reciprocity was also present in how the Brazilian diplomacy envisioned the United Nations and, in particular, its Security Council (UNSC). Despite this plea not being recent in the country's diplomatic history, to the Lula administration the UNSC was reflective of the old bipolar order, in which the major powers had permanent seats and veto powers. Together with Germany, India, and Japan, Brazil formed in 2004 the G-4, a group that vocalized discontent with the *status quo* of the unequal membership divisions of the UNSC⁹⁹. Therefore, the Brazilian diplomacy under Lula instrumentalized the UNSC as it urged for "the democratization of decisions at the Security Council as another way of achieving reciprocity in the multilateral order" (Cervo 2010, p.17).

In this way, this section has demonstrated how some important new features appeared in the foreign policy making of Lula's first mandate. The president sought, through a presidential diplomacy, to strengthen ties with the Global South, based on a humanist perspective. A revisionist approach to the international system was also present, although one that does not jeopardize the good relations of Brazil with the developed world. Regionally, Lula advocated for the social and economic development of South America, and at the same time the president proposed a regional independence through the formation of regional coalitions. Lula labelled Brazil's foreign policy as active and proud, which raises the question of how said categorization came to be. The following section answers this question in regard to

⁹⁷ It is necessary to establish a difference between the *commercial* G-20 and the *financial* G-20, the latter being a forum created in 1999 to propose solutions to international financial crises.

⁹⁸ The negotiations for the MERCOSUR-EU Trade Agreement were concluded when this doctoral thesis was being written, in June of 2019.

⁹⁹ The issue of the reform of the UNSC was one topic of dissensus among Brazil and Argentina, as the latter was against a Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat. Argentina, then, participated in the opposing group called "United for Consensus" (often referred to as "Coffee Club"), composed of countries that disputed the G-4 for permanent seats. For more on this issue regarding Brazil and Argentina, see Valle (2005).

MERCOSUR through the application of the National Role Conception flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26).

7.2 Application of the National Role Conception flowchart

The following subsections are devoted to the application of the National Role Conception flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26). As explained in previous chapters, the objective of this doctoral thesis is not to tackle which roles Brazil and Germany play in their respective region, but to discover which aspects and mechanisms shaped the National Role Conceptions under Lula and Merkel in regard to MERCOSUR and to the EU, respectively.

This doctoral thesis applies an agent-structure approach, as also before. In the flowchart examined below, the agent is Brazil under Lula and the structure is MERCOSUR, both in the same timeframe (2003-2006). To each mechanism of the National Role Conception flowchart, the analysis will focus on domestic conditions and, most importantly, on the circumstances of the agent towards the structure.

The subsequent sections are two-fold. The first one comprises the ideational components – identity, cultural heritage, and domestic audience -, and the second one encompasses the material components, such as capability and opportunity to act. The goal of each section is to apply each component of the National Role Conception scheme to the case of Brazil. The findings are analysed in the final remarks in the third section.

7.2.1 Ideational components

The ideational section of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) amalgamates identity, cultural heritage, and domestic audience. They will be examined below and applied to the case of Brazil during the selected timeframe.

7.2.1.1 Identity

As previously explained in Chapter 3, this doctoral thesis partakes in Checkel and Katzenstein's (2010, p.4) definition of identity. It comprises

shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. [...] We understand identities to be revealed by social practices as well by political attitudes, shaped by social and geographical structures and national contexts.

In this way, identity is here understood within the realms of history, culture, language, and politics in order to grasp the “understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992, p.397) of a particular state. Thus, the identity of a country can be shaped by elements such as history, founding fathers, myths and concepts, culture, literature and the arts, political regimes, and reiterated social discourses. It is important to emphasize that the focus lie on the identity of *the state as a social construct*, and not on the collective identities of particular groups. In this sense, nationalism is discarded here as an affecting element in the identity of the state¹⁰⁰. Naturally, the peoples are part and parcel of said social construction of states; it is difficult to dissociate the identity of the people from the identity of the state, and how certain individuals ended up affecting said state’s identity. However, the attempt is to isolate the state, since it is a *permanent* entity, with *temporary* governments, as a better way to understand the elements that influence the identity of Brazil under the selected timeframe.

In the case of Brazil, identity is strongly related to contrasting issues of dependence and autonomy. This is understandable and, somehow, expected to a country that was colonized for over three centuries (1500-1822). To this end, the early beginnings of what came to be the Brazilian identity was contingent on the political dictates of the metropole, Portugal. This is a key issue toward comprehending how the ensuing political regimes propelled ideational discourses and how Brazilians came to see themselves as a people.

In this sense, specialists such as Gilberto Freyre (1986), Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1936), and Darcy Ribeiro (1995) emphasized in seminal works, *inter alia*, the importance of two factors - the consequences of the Portuguese model of colonization and miscegenation in the construction of the Brazilian identity. Those authors are, of course, not the only ones that undertook the ambitious yet fascinating task of understanding the origins of Brazil’s identity. Thus, the next paragraphs are not to be understood as an exhaustive account. However, those authors are the most regarded in the literature for their contributions, and they will be briefly explained in the following paragraphs.

Freyre in “The Masters and the Slaves” (1986, originally *Casa-Grande & Senzala*, [1933]) underlined how the miscegenation of the indigenous people (*índios*), the African

¹⁰⁰ For a study on nations and nationalism, see Hobsbawm (1990).

enslaved peoples, and the white Portuguese were responsible for creating the uniqueness of the Brazilian ethnicity, culture, and society. Freyre advocated that miscegenation (*miscigenação*) was a positive trait of Brazilian identity, as the author “simply counter negative racist determinism and argue that Brazilians were not irrevocably cursed by racial taint; rather, he holds that they have benefited by the race mixing natural to Brazil's particular slave society, which, despite its corruptions, had its own splendour” (Needell 1995, p.67).

Buarque de Holanda in “Roots of Brazil” (2012, originally *Raízes do Brasil*, [1936]) proposes a political and social analysis of the constitution of the Brazilian state. The author, as the name of the book indicates, retraces the Brazilian history to the Colonization period, analysing how pivotal moments, such as the abolition of slavery, contributed to said process. For the purposes of this present analysis, it is noteworthy to emphasize two concepts put forward by Buarque de Holanda: the imagery of the “cordial man” (“*homem cordial*”), and the concept of patrimonialism (*patrimonialismo*). The first refers to how the Brazilians are known for their politeness, gentleness, and hospitality. However, according to Buarque de Hollanda, those traits that might seem virtues from the outside, are actually a way of masking the real feelings and perceptions of the individuals. It is by acting as a “cordial man” that the person can seek intimacy through interpersonal relations that are based on informality. The second concept, patrimonialism, is the undistinguished entanglement between the public and the private sphere, in which agents that work for the state pursue to guarantee their private interests through governmental contracts. This is one of the many possible explanations for the chronic problem of state corruption in Brazil.

Ribeiro in “The Brazilian People” (2000, originally *O Povo Brasileiro: a formação e o sentido do Brasil*, [1995]) applies the same aspects as the two previous works, colonization and miscegenation, albeit Ribeiro’s work is more focused on the geographical and cultural subdivisions within Brazil (or the many “Brazils”) and the social stratification derived from the colonial past as the largest division within the country. Said division would not be based on the many ethnicities and groups that formed it, but on a division of social classes (Balée 2003).

In this way, one can gather from these publications that the historical conditioning of colonization and miscegenation were key factors in determining the identity-building process of Brazil¹⁰¹. The first influenced the political aspects to a higher degree, and the latter formed what is known as the “Brazilianity” (*brasilidade*) of its people. With time, this *brasilidade* came

¹⁰¹ It is important to underline that in the past few decades, the scholarship on anthropology and sociology has argued that miscegenation was not a peaceful nor voluntary process. It resulted from sexual violence perpetrated by European colonizers against enslaved black women and indigenous women. For more on the social roles of African females during the colonial period, see Gonzales (1984) and Saffioti (2013), both in Portuguese.

to encompass other migration groups that settled in Brazil in the 19th and 20th centuries, such as Italians, Spanish, Germans, Japanese, and Arabs, that ended up bringing their own cultural traditions and influencing the “melting pot” of the Brazilian culture.

Nonetheless, it is clear that colonization and miscegenation strongly shaped the Brazilian identity, according to the literature. It should be noted, however, that identity can also be shaped by elements such as the arts, literature, sports, and heroic symbols (Fiorin 2009). Identity must not, then, be excluded from the concept of culture¹⁰². As explained previously, the focus here is on the identity of the state and, therefore, the emphasis is on political and historical conditioning.

In the present case, one can call attention to how the quest for independence - either in its formal version from the Portuguese metropole, either from its informal variant of economic dependence from great powers – determined the contours of Brazil’s policy-making¹⁰³. To Lafer (2000), different factors accounted for Brazil’s international identity, among other factors: its continental size, originated from Portuguese maritime quest and in part maintained by Rio Branco’s policies of peaceful settlement of borders; its political condition that, even after independence in 1822, remained as a monarchy surrounded by republics, differentiating itself from its neighbours; its plea, in the early 1960s, for the end of colonialism at the UN General Assembly with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Afonso Arinos and subsequently the policy of “Three D’s” (decolonization, development, and disarmament) with the then incumbent of *Itamaraty*, Araújo Castro; its belief that Brazil has its own vision of how the world should function, while it is characterized in the international system as a middle-power with regional relevance that seeks consensual solutions to common problems.

In this sense, throughout its history, Brazil had to deal with issues based on the consequences of colonialism, such as the quest for independence and autonomy, but also issues such as racism and social inequalities, which will be discussed in the following subsection. After centuries of being a colony, Brazil’s quest for autonomy became a corollary of its foreign policy. Yet, there were times in which the country had to align with traditional powers – first, England during the post-independence years, then United States in the beginning of the 1900s – to either attain economic goals, or to receive unilateral geopolitical

¹⁰² One could mention, although not in an exhaustive manner, the following names that culturally influenced this process: in the arts, Tom Jobim and Chico Buarque; in literature, José de Alencar with “The Guarani” (*O Guarani*) of 1857 and Machado de Assis with “Dom Casmurro” of 1899; in the sports, Pelé and Ayrton Senna; and heroic symbols, Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, known as Tiradentes, who participated in the Independence wars, and Zumbi dos Palmares, a leader of the abolitionist movement.

¹⁰³ It is important to note that the Independence did not come out as a revolutionary act. It was proclaimed by Dom Pedro I, the son of the King of Portugal, Dom João IV. Then, Brazil was maintained as a monarchical regime despite being politically independent. That was an exception in South America, as the former Spanish colonies became republics after the independence processes.

protection. Either way, Brazil had to maintain itself economically dependent to great powers, given its condition in the international division of labour of exporter of primary goods.

Derived from the concept of dependency, the notion of autonomy has permeated the foreign policy orientation of Brazil since the 1950s. It proposes to create protective measures against the political and economic effects of an international system in which Brazil plays a dependent role (Spektor 2014). In the same vein, the vision of autonomy affects the identity of Brazil in three ways: i) it stands that Brazil should have more authority in the international system the more it participates in international fora; ii) it claims that Brazil is a *sui generis* case of a Western country, for the miscegenation and religious syncretism makes it a different case yet adaptive to Northern countries; iii) it advocates for the “Brazilian exceptionalism” as it is the only Portuguese-speaking nation of the region, it has a peaceful relationship with its neighbours, and it is not a nuclear power (Spektor 2014, p.27). Therefore, “in the autonomist project, this identity contributes in a way that national elites aspire to a privileged position in the international system” (ibidem, p.28).

As mentioned in the beginning of the first section, autonomy under Lula was classified by Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) as “autonomy through diversification”. Its main characteristics are seeking closer ties with the Global South and forming alliances with diverse regions, while at the same time reducing the asymmetries with the traditional loci of international power (Vigevani, Cepaluni 2007, p.1313). Autonomy, under Lula, became an imperative attribute of the identity of the Brazilian state.

From this, it is possible to affirm that the identity of the Brazilian state is characterized by the fearfulness toward dependency and the consequent search for autonomy, and pride of being a multicultural and multi-ethnic country, both elements derived from migration and miscegenation. Those elements are part of the background in which the identity of the state is exercised, for they work as some sort of template. They are solid components of the identity of the Brazilian state, and changes to how said identity is portrayed can be propelled by presidents as a means of attaining foreign policy goals.

Hence, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lula administration (Amorim 2010, p.214), “structural transformations” that took place in Brazil led the country to adapt its international identity as a consequence. This new identity would, then, lead to a new role for Brazil in the international system, “while remaining faithful to the basic principles that have guided our foreign relations”, says Amorim (2010, p.215), in a reference to the principles of Rio Branco that were explained previously. This new identity would incorporate Brazil playing a larger role in the international system, with an assertive but compromising attitude, one that sought solidarity through non-indifference and humanitarian assistance, and that preferred multilateral solutions to common problems. In this sense, to Minister Amorim identity is

analogous to behaviour rather than a combination of traits or long-carried characteristics that end up affecting behaviour.

According to Burges (2005, p.1134), Brazil acquired a new self-esteem during Lula, at least towards the Global South, as the president put forward a “psychologically transformative foreign policy agenda”, in which “the goal is not to overturn or delink from the existing international political and economic system, but to prompt a change in how developing countries are inserted into and view the system”. To the author, this new self-esteem would be represented by searching for national options for economic development rather than exclusively relying on external financial aid; the assuredness that Brazil possessed the necessary requirements to attain a position of strength in the international system; the recognition that Brazil has social and economic issues yet valuing the country’s positive traits; and a revisionist approach to the economic global order, by forming preferential trade agreements with southern countries. To Burges (2005), this change of a mindset was also targeted to Brazilian companies, as an attempt of internationalizing them.

In this way, the literature argues that a new identity emerged under Lula. This leaves room to question how the institutional identity of MERCOSUR was developed. To Oelsner (2013, p.119), it was based on three dimensions: the political one, with the aim of creating the institutions as a way to safeguard democracy in the region; the economic one, with the goal of creating a common way as a means to prevent underdevelopment; and lastly, the external one, since MERCOSUR as a bloc could be used as a “protective shield” against becoming obsolete in the international scene. To the author, those dimensions were more prominent in the founding years of the institutions, and they were not consolidated throughout the decades, given that the domestic conditions of each member-state changed considerably. Consequently, to the author, the identity of MERCOSUR presents a “weak notion of the Self” (ibidem, p.125), which led to an identity crisis of the bloc.

In this way, how was the Brazilian state identity under Lula performed towards MERCOSUR? Which were the narratives about the identity and roles of MERCOSUR in the words of Lula? Those questions will be tackled in the following sub-section.

7.2.1.2 Identity narratives: the identity of Brazil and of MERCOSUR in Lula’s words

The goal of this subsection is to identify the elements pertaining to the identity of Brazil as a state in relation to MERCOSUR, i.e. how Brazil sees itself as a country (its selfhood) within the institution, as well as the identity of MERCOSUR itself, in the selected data. As explained previously, identity is one of the mechanisms that belong to the National Role

Conception flowchart created by Breuning (2011, p.26). Although the author does not specify narrative analysis as a tool to analyse identity, it can be often expressed through language, as explained in Chapter 4. With official speeches one can analyse the narratives policymakers express about a certain topic or issue.

In congruence with narrative analysis, as explained in Chapter 4, one must separate certain analytical categories in which the narratives were created. They are the following: i) events: institutional developments of MERCOSUR; ii) timeframes: from 2003 until 2006; iii) actors: in the present case, Lula; iv) location: nationally and internationally; and v) points of view: representational, as the president of Brazil. The screening process narrowed the speeches in which MERCOSUR is mentioned, and the ones in which Lula mentioned the institution *en passant* were not considered. An explication of the selection process is available in Chapter 4 and the lists of data can be found in the Annex.

Besides identity narratives, this sub-section also considers political goals. But it should be noted that, unlike identity narratives, political goals were not a pre-selected criteria for analysis. Rather, they (fortunately) came out of the data and became a useful tool. In this context, ***by analysing identity narratives, one can understand how the actor defined what an object is; with political goals, one can understand how the actor defined what an object ought to be***. This is why it was important to make such a distinction in the process of analysing the data. Additionally, political goals will be used as complement data in the remaining sub-sections.

As Table 5 shows, dividing it in years was a way to better organize and examine the data, but the results of the analysis are understood as a whole. Table 5 indicates which political goals appeared most often in the data. Therefore, it is not an exhaustive account because goals that appeared once or twice were discarded. However, in regard to the identity narratives, they are shown as entirely as they appeared in the data, which can give a better understanding of how Lula defined Brazil's and MERCOSUR's identities in his official discourses. The identity narratives that were most frequently found in the data will be examined in this sub-section.

In this sense, the inauguration speech of a leader is always an interesting analytical point of departure because it provides the outline of future policies. Moreover, in this particular circumstance the president is speaking towards his constituency. His words will reverberate nationally and, to a small extent, to foreign audiences. Nonetheless, the focus lies on the domestic sphere rather than, say, a speech at the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, it was his first official speech as elected president, certainly an important moment with high-stakes.

Lula's speech of 2003 gives important insights on how his conduct towards MERCOSUR would be, at least on a rhetorical level. He claimed for fairer rules in international trade that would consider Brazil's condition as a developing nation, which is in congruence with the previously mentioned principle of revisionism in his foreign policy. Lula also claimed for the construction of a stable, prosperous, and united South America, whose foundational principles would be democracy and social justice. To this end, "a revitalization of MERCOSUR" would be necessary, which according to Lula had been weakened by "narrow and selfish views on the meaning of integration". This "revitalization" aspect is crucial towards understanding the president's narratives of MERCOSUR, and it would appear again in his speeches. Lula also asserts, in the same speech, that MERCOSUR is a "political project" that has trade and economic bases that must be "rethought". Integration must encompass, in his words, social, cultural, and scientific grounds.

Further on, the president claimed in his inaugural address, "we will support the necessary institutional arrangements so that a true identity of MERCOSUR and of South America can flourish". As argued by Oelsner (2013, p.124) in relation to the identity of regional institutions, "at times, the different fates regional organizations may run relate to how well developed and consolidated their institutional identity is. The clearer it is, the less traumatic adaptation and change result. The more fragile it is, the more confusing it is for institutions to re-find and redefine their central, enduring, distinguishing, and cohesive attributes and use them as the basis for structuring their institutional interests and behaviour". From Lula's words, we can infer that his administration was willing to strengthen the regional identity of MERCOSUR and to portray it internationally, possibly to foster its institutional development.

Therefore, the inaugural address gave significant initial insights of how Lula would portray the identities of Brazil and of MERCOSUR. Most of the aforementioned elements were also found in the selected data.

In this sense, when examining the data, one must be careful about the distinction between what can be considered as a narrative that denotes identity from a call for political action, as explained in the beginning of this sub-section (see Table 5). Usually, in an identity narrative the verb "to be" is often used in its different tenses ("we are", "we were", etc). With political goals, the modal verbs "must" and "should", and verbs "to want" and "to need" (in different tenses) are frequently used.

Sometimes that separation is not so clear, and here is where the interpretivist tradition thrives. The data indicates that narratives that portray identity are, at a first glance, an urge for political action. Nonetheless, the interpretation from the researcher makes it possible to convey said distinction.

For example, the data shows that the president often declared that MERCOSUR must be revitalized/recovered/reconstructed, which could be considered as a political goal. The prefix “re” means to do something over again (revitalize again, construct again). When a person says those words, they are demonstrating that something is actually weakened/divided/destroyed. In this context, Lula’s words make evident that, to the president, MERCOSUR in its previous stage was deteriorated. In this sense, the narrative of “we must reconstruct MERCOSUR” becomes part of its identity, while it seems on the surface to be a call for joint political action. If the member-states manage to actually revitalize/recover/reconstruct the institution, then it becomes part of its new identity.

Interestingly, in 2004, just one year after the beginning of his mandate, Lula claimed “we have recovered MERCOSUR”, which also appears in the data from 2005 and 2006, in speeches both to national and international audiences. Studies on narrative analysis should not be invested in verifying if a narrative is true¹⁰⁴. ***What is noteworthy is to explore, in accordance with the Interpretivist school, the meaning of said narrative. The data shows that to Lula, reconstructing MERCOSUR meant consolidating its intergovernmental basis.*** To the president, gaining the mutual trust from presidents that MERCOSUR could bring economic gains was the first step: “it was necessary to strengthen the political relations, to reduce the differences between the countries that are a part of MERCOSUR, and to contribute so the economies of the member-states could have internal and external credibility”. In the same occasion, he claimed that “there has never been a relation so sincere and so strong among MERCOSUR members as there is today” (27-01-2004). To Lula, “to reconstruct” and its variants was meant in a *political* sense, i.e. to intensify political bonds among presidents of MERCOSUR and of the rest of South America.

Said “recovery” of MERCOSUR must, to Lula, first and foremost encompass the improvement of the Brazilian and Argentinian domestic economies (24-08-2004). The importance of this bilateral relation for the well-functioning of MERCOSUR has been reverberated by the president in his first mandate (see Table 5). Additionally, “confidence” and “credibility” appeared often throughout the data in different years and locations (both nationally and internationally). The meaning of those words refers to fortification of political ties among members and consequent positive international image. Thus, to the president MERCOSUR needed to consolidate its internal mechanisms (i.e. interpresidential relations), in order to appear as a united front to the international community.

¹⁰⁴ Point raised during a presentation in the seminar “Narratives and Negotiations” at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) on August 29th, 2019. It was further claimed that a narrative must be persuasive and appealing to a group identity. Chatham House rules were applied in the seminar.

Similarly, in 2003 Lula claimed that MERCOSUR must regain the credibility among civil society (14-01-2003), and that member-states must regain confidence in the institution (04-09-2003). Likewise, he proclaimed “only from a strong presence of MERCOSUR and South America in the world will we be respected” (18-12-2003). ***This implies that, to the president, MERCOSUR was once discredited among the member-states and their nations, as well as in the international scene.¹⁰⁵ Managing to restore said credibility becomes part of a new identity of the regional institution.*** Likewise, Lula said that “nowadays, MERCOSUR is recognized as a relevant international actor” (16-12-2003), which suggests that beforehand the institution did not have the same prominence.

Another example of a narrative that denotes identity is related to membership in the institution. ***The data shows that in every year of his first mandate Lula referred to the relations between Brazil and Argentina as the cornerstone of MERCOSUR and as a vital condition for its well-functioning (see Table 5).*** The president also often mentioned membership enlargement, and recurrently proclaimed that the institution should encompass the entire South America in order to “make a strong MERCOSUR” (20-11-2003). This argument is recurrently found throughout the data. Membership enlargement is seen as strengthening the institution, even if the new members are not in a fast pace of economic and social development. More members speaking in unison would bring more political leverage to international negotiations, thus enabling the possibility for allocation of economic gains via the establishment of trade agreements.

With the claim for encompassing more areas to the integration, the president argued that “the common institutions of social, educational, and cultural policies” were necessary so the “true identity of MERCOSUR could flourish” (18-06-2003), which also appeared in his inauguration speech, as explained before. This goes hand in hand with the previously mentioned political goal of reuniting all of South America under the umbrella of MERCOSUR. It serves the purpose, furthermore, of creating a common front when negotiating trade agreements with third parties - or with “the rich blocs”, as Lula once referred them (25-08-2004).

In the same vein, in his speeches Lula represented the capacity of Brazil of being the paymaster of the institution, as the data shows that he often claimed for the necessity of helping smaller members, especially with funding from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). Paymaster is the state responsible for financing the largest share of integration costs. This illustrates the willingness of Brazil to act as a leader, at least

¹⁰⁵ The numbers in the parentheses indicate the date of the speech, whose details are available in the Annex. This systematization only occurs when there is a direct quote from the president, or when an idea was only present once. If an argument was often found throughout the data, this schematization will not appear, as to not exhaust the reader.

on economic terms. In 2004, the president demonstrated similar goals when he stated “the prosperity of Brazil has to mean the prosperity of our partners in the region” (08-07-2004). The president even claimed that MERCOSUR was a “stepping-stone” for inserting Brazil into the international scene: “it was necessary for Brazil to have a political action starting from MERCOSUR, to rebuild a strong relationship with South America, and from there to build a strong relationship with the rest of the world” (24-08-2004). Thus, by labelling itself as the paymaster of the institution, Brazil put forward a **discursive leadership**, one that claims for being a regional leader, as the data regarding identity narratives shows (see Table 5).

As discussed in the previous section, a large part of the state identity of Brazil is the quest for autonomy given its colonial past. History, then, plays a large role. An evidence of this is when Lula claimed, “we [from MERCOSUR] want to establish agreements with every country in the world, but we also want our sovereignty to be respected [...] that our countries have the sovereignty to decide when and with whom, to serve our own interests [...] it has been two centuries that we have not been a colony, *and we do not want to go back to being one*” (21-07-06, b, emphasis mine). **Therefore, this is an evidence that to Lula Brazil must seek its autonomy as a means of protecting its interests. From Lula’s words, one can infer that the country (and consequently MERCOSUR) would prefer to establish bilateral partnerships that did not endanger its autonomous status, even when firming agreements with Northern countries.** As an example, the data shows that Lula often referred to the importance of the MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement, but one which respected the agricultural and industrial businesses of Southern countries. Being economically dependent on a foreign country (or on a financial institution, as shall be discussed later) means being informally dependent – and dependency is, by all means, a condition to be avoided. Full sovereignty, then, implies economic independence.

It is important to remember that the question guiding the examination of the data was two-fold: the identity of Brazil in regard to MERCOSUR, and the institutional identity of MERCOSUR in the words of president Lula (for a detailed account on the data selection process, see Annex). **Overall, the data shows that Lula’s narratives concerning MERCOSUR were consistent throughout his first mandate, since there were no significant differences in the narratives nor in the political goals. Equally, different locations (and therefore, different audiences) did not represent changes in the narratives, as they remained the same either in national or international scenarios.**

Thus, when it comes to the state identity of Brazil in relation to MERCOSUR, the data shows traits that were in the origin of its foundation, such as dependency, autonomy, and a multiculturally ethnic background. This is specifically expressed when Lula stated, “we do not want to go back to being a colony”. The data shows that, with

Lula, those characteristics persisted, and in addition elements such as a self-confident and a benefactor feature appeared. This partially confirms the argument put forward by Burges (2005) of an increased representation of self-esteem of Lula's foreign policy. It was expressed, regarding MERCOSUR, with the narrative of needing to create confidence among member-states as to express credibility to the international arena. This narrative was reverberated throughout his first mandate (see Table 5). In the data, Lula expressed narratives that embodied revisionism, assertiveness, and multilateralism, which reinforces the arguments made by the literature and explained previously. Likewise, Brazil was portrayed as a benefactor towards smaller economies that would receive financial benefits from BNDES, and MERCOSUR as a necessary component of Brazil's insertion to the international scene as a global player.

Regarding the institutional identity of MERCOSUR, the data shows elements that are also found in the Brazilian state identity, such as autonomy and sovereignty. Above anything else, the narrative that was the most often propelled by Lula was the reconstruction (and its variants, recovery and revitalization) of MERCOSUR. In the words of Lula, MERCOSUR in its previous stage was fragilized and "a failure". Reconstruction, to him, meant strengthening the political ties among presidents of the member-states, and demonstrating to regional markets and civil society that MERCOSUR could bring social and economic gains. In this way, the institution could create confidence among member-states and amass credibility with foreign countries, as explained in the previous paragraph. This "strengthened" and "revitalized" MERCOSUR would encompass all of South America as a way to gain more political leverage, as elucidated in this section.

The political goals propelled by Lula, as Table 5 indicates, foster the deepening and furthering of MERCOSUR beyond the scope of trade, encompassing social, cultural, scientific, and agricultural realms. Among other things, Lula similarly conveyed the development of infrastructural conditions of member-states, as to create a channel capable of entangling the production chains, and also of FOCEM. The strengthening of the institutional architecture of MERCOSUR was likewise present in Lula's speeches, as he pushed for the creation of the MERCOSUR Parliament, as well as for the inclusion of new member-states. These political goals are aligned with the identity narratives of revitalization of MERCOSUR put forward by Lula.

In conclusion, the narratives concerning the Brazilian state identity in regard to MERCOSUR under Lula can be summarized as an autonomous and benefactor state. In relation to the regional institution itself, the majority of the narratives portrayed it as a revitalized, confident, and credible economic bloc. The data shows that Lula once declared,

“MERCOSUR is more than an option, but a destination” (17-12-2004). This phrase summarizes the political will towards strengthening the institution, and it is congruent to the identity narratives propelled by the president.

Table 5: Identity narratives and political goals in Lula's speeches (2003-2006)

	2003	2004	2005	2006
<i>Identity narratives about Brazil and the MERCOSUR present in Lula's speeches</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Revitalization/reconstruction/recovery of MERCOSUR; ▪ MERCOSUR recognized by international community as relevant; ▪ Relationship between Brazil and Argentina as the cornerstone of MERCOSUR and necessary for its well-functioning; ▪ Confidence and credibility must be built among member-states; ▪ MERCOSUR should cover the entire South America; membership expansion seen as strengthening the institution; ▪ Brazil as a paymaster with funding coming from BNDES; ▪ Collective identity flourishing through social, educational, and cultural policies in the institution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ "We have recovered/consolidated/strengthened MERCOSUR"; ▪ Mutual trust among presidents of South America; ▪ MERCOSUR as more than an option, but as a destination; ▪ South American seen as "solid, with leaders committed to the integration"; ▪ Relations between Brazil and Argentina as vital for the well-functioning of MERCOSUR; ▪ MERCOSUR as a "stepping-stone" of Brazil's insertion in the international scene; ▪ Recover MERCOSUR's credibility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reconstruction/strengthening of MERCOSUR, which in its previous stage had "failed"; ▪ Brazil-Argentina relations as the basis for the success of the integration; ▪ MERCOSUR as a united front in international trade negotiations; ▪ MERCOSUR as a vehicle for political and institutional stability in member-states; ▪ "There is no individual solution for countries in South America". ▪ MERCOSUR as a common destination. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthening of MERCOSUR; ▪ Relations between Brazil and Argentina as developing vehicles of MERCOSUR; ▪ "There is no individual solution for countries in South America"; ▪ Gaining self-respect to then be respected by traditional powers; ▪ Autonomy from Northern countries and respect for sovereignty: "We do not want to go back to being a colony"; ▪ MERCOSUR as an instrument for individual capacities of insertion in the international scene; ▪ Regional identity coming through citizenship participation ▪ Brazil is conscientious of its role as the larger economy and it must, thus, care for the development of smaller members.

<p><i>Political goals for MERCOSUL present in Lula's speeches</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Integration should go beyond the trade aspects and incorporate social, cultural, scientific, and agricultural aspects; ▪ Integration that encompasses citizenship, democracy, and social justice dimensions; ▪ Better infrastructure as a means to further integration; ▪ Creation of a MERCOSUR Parliament; ▪ Consolidation of the trade union and creation of solid grounds for the common market; ▪ Creation of a Social Institute of MERCOSUR. ▪ More attention must be paid to smaller members; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Citizen dimension of integration (justice, health, education systems); ▪ Broaden and deepen MERCOSUR in all levels; ▪ MERCOSUR now covers all of South America and, thus, it is stronger to negotiate trade agreements with third parties; ▪ Physical integration as in harbours, airports, roads, energy; ▪ Permanent Review Tribunal of MERCOSUR; ▪ Andean Community, South Africa, and India; ▪ Creation of MERCOSUR Parliament; ▪ MERCOSUR as a way to achieve economic development; ▪ Consolidation of the customs union and creation of common market; ▪ MERCOSUR as a space for peace and democracy; ▪ "New commercial geography": new players, especially those in the Global South, negotiating trade agreements; ▪ Deeper institutionalization: "the solutions to problems of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Membership enlargement (including Venezuela) ▪ Construction of CASA; ▪ Citizenship dimension of the integration; Parliament of MERCOSUR; ▪ MERCOSUR must involve governments, private sector, trade unions; ▪ Social and cultural dimensions of the integration process; ▪ There are still challenges to be overcome, such as deepening the institutional structure, investments and common integration of production, consolidation of the trade union, infrastructure, job creation; ▪ Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM); ▪ Trade agreement between MERCOSUR-SICA; ▪ MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement ▪ New associate-members (Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia); ▪ Cooperation agreement with the Andean Community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Deeper institutionalization: "more MERCOSUR"; ▪ "New commercial geography": new players, especially those in the Global South, negotiating trade agreements; ▪ MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement; ▪ Special attention to the smaller economies of the bloc; ▪ Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM); ▪ Eliminate double taxation of CET; ▪ Projects of industrial, technological, and infrastructure; ▪ Cooperation in science, technology, and energy; ▪ Citizenship and social dimension of integration; ▪ Legitimacy among population and bringing it closer to the integration process; ▪ Strengthening of the Secretariat of MERCOSUR; ▪ MERCOSUR Parliament; ▪ Admission of Venezuela as a full-member; ▪ Reduce asymmetries among members; ▪ Deepening of institutional apparatus; ▪ CASA; ▪ Integration of productive chains;
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		MERCOSUR is more MERCOSUR”.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Free movement of persons; ▪ Equal distribution of the benefits of regional integration; ▪ Agreement of Residency of MERCOSUR.
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7.2.1.3 Cultural heritage

As defined by Breuning (2011, p.26) in the National Role Conception flowchart adopted here, cultural heritage refers to "ego aspects from the state's history that are, or have been, makers of identity". The elements pertaining to this mechanism herein underlined are those which are considered to affect political outcomes, particularly when it comes to foreign policy. This subsection is directly linked to the previous one, as identity and cultural heritage have in common elements like history and culture. In this way, many characteristics of this mechanism will be analysed as a continuation from the discussions raised above. Although many people like to argue that "history is not destiny", in this present research it has great significance.

It should be noted that "cultural heritage" is a broad term, and its interpretation depends on the scope and orientation taken by the researcher. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), cultural heritage refers to, among other things, tangible goods (paintings, manuscripts, archaeological sites, etc), and intangible goods (performing arts, rituals, oral traditions)¹⁰⁶. Here, the focus is on the cultural aspects that define policymaking, such as historical events, narratives, and idioms.

The data for analysis in this subsection is the same applied to previous sections on *Identity* and *Identity narratives* – the selected speeches given by the president during the selected timeframe, which are summarized in Table 5.

Defining Brazilian culture is an ambitious task because it is such a vast phenomenon. As explained in the previous section, it was mainly influenced by the indigenous, European, and African cultures. The migration waves that started in the 1980s also had an impact in what came to be the Brazilian culture. Given the continental dimension of Brazil, its cultural aspects end up not being homogenous, as in each sub-region there are many expressions of local culture.

In this sense, one of the most reverberated expressions in Brazil is the "***mongrel complex***" ("*complexo de vira-lata*")¹⁰⁷. In the late 1950s, the playwright Nelson Rodrigues coined this term in reference to the inferiority Brazilians felt in relation to foreigners, which was

¹⁰⁶ UNESCO Official Website. Available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/unesco-database-of-national-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-asked-questions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/>, accessed on August 21st, 2019.

¹⁰⁷ It is applied here the translation provided by Larry Rohter in an article at the New York Times (available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/weekinreview/if-brazil-wants-to-scare-the-world-its-succeeding.html>, accessed on August 20th, 2019). However, "vira-lata" can also be translated as "mutt" or "mixed-breed dog", a type of canine race that is very popular in Brazil.

written based on a football match. Soon enough, the term gained popularity and, to this day, it can be heard in daily conversations, in the media, and in political speeches¹⁰⁸.

All in all, the “mongrel complex” has to do with self-perception and how it is translated into foreign behaviour. It could be argued that this “mongrel complex” is also derived from colonization, since for over three centuries an external metropole determined the political and economic manoeuvres that would take place in the colony. The perspectives of the Other, in this case a foreign country, mattered. This has somehow lingered in Brazilian society, and its remedy lied on the independence/autonomy combination explained earlier.

The “mongrel complex” is adjacent to the previously discussed issue of self-esteem, in which it was argued that the Lula administration undertook a new meaning to it, as it propelled narratives of self-confidence, self-determination, and autonomy. In the last year of his second mandate, in 2010, Lula claimed that Brazil had a different behaviour in the international scene, more assertive in comparison to previous governments. He justified this new approach because “for a long time we were induced to a mongrel complex. It was important to be a nobody”¹⁰⁹. In 2013, Lula used this allegory to refer to the Brazilian elite which, according to him, did not want to be compared to foreign elites given their feeling of inferiority. In the same occasion, the president also argued that before he was elected Brazil was not respected in the international scene, a situation that was altered while he was in office¹¹⁰.

Burges (2017) claims that elements of the Brazilian culture – or what the author calls the **“Brazilian way”** - ended up guiding its foreign policy behaviour. Thus, characteristics pertaining to the Brazilian people, such as the prevalence of seeking communal arrangements and the conflict avoidance strategy, were transferred to the relationships with foreign countries, particularly in international negotiations and in groups of variable geometry. Thus, actions such as avoiding mindless opposition, collectivization of interests, consensus creation, technocratic speak, building new organizations, propagating new thinking, and principled presidential righteousness could be found in the Brazilian diplomatic history, according to Burges (2017, p.52-62).

¹⁰⁸ The full essay by Nelson Rodrigues can be accessed at <http://www.ufrgs.br/cdrom/rodrigues03/rodrigues3.pdf>, on August 20th, 2019 (in Portuguese).

¹⁰⁹ BBC News. Política externa brasileira desperta 'ciúmes', diz Lula. April 20th, 2010. Available at https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2010/04/100420_brasil_lula_externa_fa_np, accessed on August 20th, 2019.

¹¹⁰ O Estado de São Paulo. Lula diz que "parte da elite tinha complexo de vira-latas" antes de seu governo. July 18th, 2013. Available at <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lula-diz-que-parte-da-elite-tinha-complexo-de-vira-latas-antes-de-seu-governo,1054844>, accessed on August 20th, 2019.

Against this backdrop, one of the traits of Brazilian history that became part of its heritage is the quest for social and economic development. It could be argued that it holds true to any developing country in the world, but the Brazilian case presents a peculiarity. In Brazil, there is a mindset that the country will, eventually, catch up and become a developed nation. It is a longing, a manifested dream, and a metaphor among the population, the elites, and the bureaucrats. As an example of this, the phrase "**Brazil, a country of the future**" (*Brasil, país do futuro*) has often been reverberated by individuals, politicians, and the media. It is in reference to Stefan Zweig's (2006) homonymous book published in 1941, which enumerated the qualities and positive characteristics of the country and its people.

In order to achieve said "future", one of the often-employed economic strategies by Brazilian governments was the economic tradition of national developmentalism. In essence, it propels that the state is the principal developer of economy planning, industrialization, and investments as a means to achieve economic development. This strategy was put forward in Brazil during the presidencies of Getúlio Vargas (1934-1945; 1951-1954) and Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961). It was supported by academics under the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (*Comissão Econômica para a América Latina e o Caribe*, CEPAL), a United Nations commission aimed to foster cooperation in the region, as already mentioned in Chapter 2. At the beginning of the 2000s, national developmentalism gained new contours in South America given that many left-wing parties rose to higher office during that period.

Thus, this approach, commonly referenced as **new developmentalism**, as referred by Bresser-Pereira (2011, p.113), "it is the set of ideas that enables developing nations to reject rich nations' proposals and pressures for reform and economic policy, like capital account liberalization and growth with foreign savings. It is the means by which businessmen, government officials, workers and intellectuals can stand together as a true nation to promote economic development". This was applied during the Lula administration and served as a template for his economic and foreign policies. The latter was used as an instrument to reach development goals, as Brazil was "seen as vulnerable because of its internal inequalities, social cleavages, and incomplete development" (Hurrell 2010b, p.135). As explained in the previous section, this was used by *Itamaraty* as a way to put forward an active and proud foreign policy.

Further aspects of cultural heritage worth mentioning are the consequences of colonization that still linger in the country. As Skidmore (2004, p.139) defines it, "slavery, like the aristocratic Portuguese culture, was antithetical to the culture of merit, and reinforced the patrimonial and personalistic social system". Racism is one of the many consequences of the

horrifying enslavement of Africans, who were brought to Brazil under dire circumstances, and who did not receive the right treatment by the authorities even after the abolition of slavery. Back then, there were not public policies of reparation or social inclusion that covered the newly-freed individuals, so they could have proper access to formal education or high-paying jobs. This created a stratified society that had to face severe consequences of racism and economic inequalities.¹¹¹

Another consequence of colonization that still persists is social inequality, especially in the region that was first colonized, the Northeast (and where Lula comes from). To address social inequalities in Brazil is such a complex issue that would demand a thesis of its own. However, it suffices to say that the colonization created various strands of economic disparities, as the colony was used for the Portuguese crown to amass as much wealth as possible – either by extracting mineral resources or by settling high-rate taxes. The model of colonization also created social stratifications based on income, as the owners of sugar plantations (*senhores de engenho*) possessed the control of resources, families, and slaves. As clarified at the beginning of this chapter, the bulk of Lula's political programme was aimed at poverty alleviation through cash transfer programmes such as *Bolsa Família* (Family Stipend) and *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger), as an attempt to reduce said social inequalities¹¹².

Positive aspects of the Brazilian cultural heritage should be outlined as well. Brazilians seem themselves as a hospitable and welcoming people, and ***multiculturalism and multiethnicity*** are key aspect of its culture, since it is a country that was founded by immigrants. The natural resources and landscapes of Brazil are also matters that Brazilians are proud of, such as the Amazon rainforest, the Pantanal wetland, and the Iguazu Falls. In the same vein, Brazil has managed to keep peaceful relationships with its neighbours. The last regional conflict that Brazil was involved was the Paraguayan War, in 1870. Those elements have been highlighted by Lula in his inaugural address (01-01-2003).

This way, the cultural heritage mechanism under the selected timeframe is twofold. First, the elements inherited from the past, such as a stratified society, the pride of natural resources, multi- cultural and ethnic society, provided the template in which the Brazilian culture is exercised and applied to any government (the Lula administration included). Second, the president gave indications of willingness to surpass some of the obstacles created by the cultural heritage, especially in its socio-economic variant – as this sub-section has shown,

¹¹¹ For more on race and racism in Brazil, see Telles (2004).

¹¹² The level of income and consumption in the lower strands of society increased during Lula's second mandate (2007-2010), in what came to be known as "the new middle class". For more on this, see Neri (2015).

Lula longed for overcoming the social and economic inequalities to actually become “the country of the future”. Similarly, this sub-section has demonstrated that Lula gave indications of wanting to surpass the label of the “mongrel complex”, combined with a new-found self-esteem (analysed in the previous section). Therefore, it could be argued that Lula performed within the cultural heritage that he was given, but added a new meaning to the elements pertaining to it.

7.2.1.4 Domestic audience

Breuning (2011, p.26) does not give any directions on how domestic audience should be analysed under the National Role Conception flowchart. But suffice it to say that it refers to how civil society responds to a given issue or area. Analysing domestic audiences becomes prominent particularly during election periods, as constituents respond to plans and propositions suggested by candidates. In a nutshell, here domestic audience equates to the population of a country, and how they are interested in regional institutions. This will be measured by opinion polls and surveys. ***Thus, this sub-section investigates how receptive the population of Brazil was towards regional integration, at large, and towards MERCOSUR, in particular, during the selected timeframe (2003-2006).*** The data will be provided by Latinobarómetro and explained in the following paragraphs.

In this context, the relation between public opinion and foreign policy has received scholarly attention (for example, Eichenberg 1989, Holsti 2004, Goldsmith et al. 2005). To Almeida (2016, p.30), to the public opinion a country’s external relations can be “quite rational, consistent, and relatively stable, even among ill-informed persons”. Similarly, the author claims that governments, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and the media are “the sources of those representations and exert influence upon the public’s perceptions. They provide cognitive shortcuts that allow uninformed people to form their opinions” (ibidem).

As explained in Chapter 3, this sub-section draws heavily from data survey collection to identify the preferences of the Brazilian population regarding regional integration and foreign policy. Generally, issues of foreign affairs are not the most debated topic among people in Brazil. Surely, those topics are covered by the national media, and there are plenty of research institutes and universities that offer International Relations as a degree. However, the day-to-day conversation leaves little room for external issues.

The data analysed here is provided by Latinobarómetro, a non-profit organization based in Chile that runs opinion polls all over Latin America. They interview 1200 people in

2003 and 1204 people for each of the remaining years, over 16 years of age, 88% of which live in urban areas. The study accounts for an 2.8% error, according to a report released in 2007 by the organization¹¹³.

Beforehand, the data provided by Latinobarómetro is here analysed for each year of Lula's mandate (from 2003 until 2006). In this process, the opinion polls that related to regional integration/institutions were selected¹¹⁴. One of the problems with their methodology was that the questionnaire did not remain the same in the timeframe chosen for this doctoral thesis. In this way, in the range between 2003 and 2006 there is no consistency when it comes to the questions being asked about regionalism and regional institutions. Thus, a thorough comparison of the data from each year cannot be established. Likewise, in the data for the year 2004, under the "regional integration" label there was not a mention of MERCOSUR, but only questions regarding a trade agreement with the United States. This type of data does not fit into the analysis and it was not included.

The bar graphs shown below demonstrated that, initially, Brazilians were not strongly invested in regional integration or did not know much about it. In 2003, to the question "How much does Brazil benefit from regional integration?", 33.5% of respondents said it benefits little (see Graph 1). When asked to rate MERCOSUR, 37.5% answered that they do not know/have not heard about the institution (see Graph 2).

However, in the succeeding years the situation improved. In 2005, 40.3% of respondents said they were somewhat in favour of regional integration (see Graph 3). In 2006, when asked if it were better for Brazil to form partnerships or to go its own path, 59.9% of respondents answered that it would be better to seek agreements together (see Graph 4). In the same year, when asked which Latin American country it would be best to form agreements with, 34.9% answered "with everyone" and 38.5% opted for the option "does not know" (see Graph 5).

From the data, one can affirm that the Brazilian population, overall, does not know much about MERCOSUR or the benefits derived from it (Graphs 1 and 2). This is understandable because, to the Brazilian population, MERCOSUR is seen as just a common

¹¹³ For more details on the methodology adopted by the Latinobarómetro, the report is available at <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>, accessed on August 28th, 2019 (in Spanish).

¹¹⁴ The Latinobarómetro website is available at <http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp>, and it was accessed on August 22nd and 23rd, 2019. The bar graphs that I use here are the same as provided by the organization. I translated the questions and the answers from Spanish to English, and any incurred errors in this process remain my own.

market that does not influence their daily lives¹¹⁵. Surely the institution is present in newspapers and news broadcasting, and it is oftentimes referred to during presidential debates in periods of national elections. However, as MERCOSUR does not have a direct impact on the day-to-day lives of common folk – unlike the EU, with its many directives that rule from food to telecommunications –, it is seen as a far away entity, one of the many intricacies of macroeconomic policies.

Nonetheless, the data from 2005 and 2006 show a more optimistic scenario, as people are inclined to favour the formation of regional agreements (Graphs 3, 4, and 5).


In this sense, there is still room for policymakers to create public policies that educate people about regional institutions and the gains they can bring. Even to an institution such as MERCOSUR, that does not present complex levels of institutionalization, this would create a notion of benefiting from the regional institution and a sense of belonging to South America.

In this way, one can conclude that the general population in Brazil was not well-informed about MERCOSUR and the potential gains from integration. Nevertheless, an examination from the data provided by Latinobarómetro reveals that the population was also receptive towards the establishment of regional agreements. As previous sections have shown, Lula indicated the need for deepening regional institutions. As far as the domestic audience is concerned, the government would find a fertile ground. Thus, the government would find a positive reception from the population to create or strengthen MERCOSUR and institutions alike.

The graphs mentioned in this sub-section are available in the following pages.


¹¹⁵ Aligned with the Interpretivist tradition, as a Brazilian citizen who was living in the country during the analysed timeframe, this is the impression that I had of the societal response towards MERCOSUR.

Graph 1: How much does Brazil benefit from regional integration? (2003)




Source: Latinobarómetro

Graph 2: Rating of MERCOSUR (2003)




Source: Latinobarómetro

Graph 3: In favour or against the economic integration of Brazil with other countries from Latin America (2005)




Source: Latinobarómetro

Graph 4: What is best for Brazil: to firm agreements with other Latin American countries or to follow its own path? (2006)



Source: Latinobarómetro

Graph 5: Which Latin American country would you prefer that Brazil formed economic integration agreements? (2006)



Source: Latinobarómetro

7.2.2 Material Components

The material section of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) integrates capability and opportunity to act. They will be examined in the following two sub-sections and applied to the case of Brazil during the selected timeframe.

7.2.2.1 Capability

Breuning (2011, p.26) defines capability in the National Role Conception flowchart as the “usable power resources, relative to revelant [sic] other states”. “Usable power resources” can be an elusive term, but here it is considered elements such as economy, strategic resources, and military spending as conditions that affected the capability mechanism. The data for analysis will be provided by the World Bank, which database offers the necessary material to be examined in this sub-section¹¹⁶. The chosen criteria are illustrated by Figure 4.

In Lula’s first mandate, the economic situation was better than in previous years. As explained in Chapter 5, in the late 1990s countries in South America were facing difficult economic crises, such as the Argentinian crisis that started in 1997, and the Brazilian crisis that took place in 1999. Brazil faced high rates of unemployment and inflation. As Figure 4 shows, both of those indicators improved during Lula’s first mandate.

The literature regarding Lula’s macroeconomic policies largely differs. Some authors credit this economic improvement to a better economy condition in the world (Filgueiras, Gonçalves 2007), while others affirm that the attempts made by the president to improve the economic scenario were concomitant with overall improvement in economic terms in the international scene (Morais, Saad-Filho 2011). Despite divergence in the literature, as Figure 4 shows, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose significantly during his first term, especially in 2004. Those figures slightly declined in the following years, albeit there were higher than in 2003. The exports of goods and services decreased strongly, while the imports of the same category increased exponentially. Indicators such as unemployment and inflation decreased during Lula’s first term, as Figure 4 evinces. ***Therefore, the data provided by the World Bank demonstrates a general recovery of domestic economic indicators.***

¹¹⁶ The World Bank. Databank – World Development Indicators. Available at <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&country=BRA#>, accessed on August 30th, 2019.

Additionally, in 2005 Brazil anticipated the full payment of the foreign debt with the IMF, in a total amount of US\$ 15,5 billions¹¹⁷. The IMF provided a loan to the previous government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), in the midst of the national and international financial crises of the late 1990s. The full payment of the debt came as a novelty, and it can be understood as a reflection of an element that is recurrent in Lula's policymaking, which was explained previously: dependency. Brazil would now be "freed" from the dictates of an international financial organization, ending a period of informal dependency of foreign funding. Consequently, the self-esteem of Brazil increased, making it possible to lessen the "mongrel complex" discussed earlier. This was also concomitant with the increase of the foreign exchange reserves and of interest rates (Amann, Baer 2009). Overall, Brazil was going through a good momentum when considering its engagement with foreign actors. In this way, its economic capabilities increased during Lula's first term.

This better economic scenario made it possible to advance social policies, which were reference in the beginning of this chapter. Disserting if these policies were successful is beyond the scope of this present doctoral thesis (for this, see Azzoni et al. 2009). But according to the data provided by the World Bank, the poverty gap and the poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day both decreased significantly (see Figure 4). Based exclusively on those two indicators, one can conclude that those social policies had positive results. Additionally, there was a rise in the middle-class strand during Lula's two mandates due to improvement in the rates of employment, according to Neri (2008). And the country eventually left the Hunger Map of the United Nations World Food Programme¹¹⁸.

When it comes to items such as population, surface area, and forest area (see Figure 4), the Brazilian indicators are larger than any other country in South America – and Lula, in his inaugural address, exhorted the greatness of the country in relation to population and territorial size. Brazil also has a very long coastline, with a territorial sea of twelve nautical miles¹¹⁹, which can offer good business opportunities for the fishing and shipping industries. Naturally, those items hold value, as having large population and territory can bring status to a country (e.g. China, India, Mexico, Russia). Simply put, a big country is

¹¹⁷ UOL Economia. Brasil paga dívida com FMI mas mantém política econômica austera. January 10th, 2006. Available at <https://noticias.uol.com.br/economia/ultnot/2006/01/10/ult1767u58456.jhtm>, accessed on August 28th, 2019.

¹¹⁸ Agência Brasil, September 12th, 2019. Hunger drops in Brazil in ten years, UN report shows. Available at <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/geral/noticia/2018-09/hunger-drops-brazil-ten-years-un-report-shows>, accessed on September 2nd, 2019.

¹¹⁹ This information was provided by the Brazilian Ministry for the Environment, available at <https://www.mma.gov.br/biodiversidade/biodiversidade-aquatica/zona-costeira-e-marinha.html> (in Portuguese) accessed on August 29th, 2019.

a country whose opinion is heard, at least regionally. Those attributes are often associated with power, in a symbolic and discursive way. This “greatness” becomes part of the imagery and of the identity of a country, both nationally and internationally. However, having large population and territory can become empty denominators, as by themselves they do not bring political gains. However, if well instrumentalized, those capabilities can be a great asset for Brazil, and they are worth mentioning here.

One novel strategic resource that was discovered during the selected timeframe was the pre-salt layer of oil and gas, in 2006. This meant an important material capability for Petrobras, the Brazilian semi-public company responsible for the exploration and acquisition of petroleum. Brazil gained the self-sufficiency in the production of oil¹²⁰, which is a substantial improvement to its overall capability resources. However, the excavation of the pre-salt layer only started in 2008, in Lula’s second mandate. Thus, the examination of the effects and consequences of this new capability lie outside of the timeframe of this doctoral thesis, and therefore they will not be added to the analysis.

Another innovative capability introduced by the Lula administration was ethanol as an alternative source of fuel. In an editorial at The Guardian, the president associated the use of ethanol with sustainable development. In the statement, Lula claimed that “Brazil is actively preparing itself for a new development paradigm that will meet the environmental and social challenges of the coming decades. Ethanol and biodiesel are the key components of our approach, and we are determined to ‘plant the oil of the future’”¹²¹. This was an important pledge made by the Brazilian government that started at the end of his first mandate and became stronger during his second mandate¹²². As this doctoral thesis draws exclusively on Lula’s first mandate, ethanol will not be considered as a mechanism in the material capability segment¹²³.

Therefore, the potential for capabilities can be divided in two segments: the enduring capabilities, i.e. physical entities that cannot be changed – large territory and coastline - and novel capabilities created by the Lula government – better economic prospects, independence from loan payments to international financial institutions, the reduction of poverty and

¹²⁰ UOL Economia, May 28th, 2018. Se o Brasil é autossuficiente em petróleo, por que importa tanto combustível? Available at <https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2018/05/28/preco-gasolina-cara-petrobras-autossuficiencia-petroleo.htm>, accessed on September 12th, 2019.

¹²¹ The Guardian. Join Brazil in planting oil. March 7th, 2006. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/07/brazil.oil>, accessed on September 23rd, 2019.

¹²² For more on the Brazilian politics of ethanol, see Martines-Filho et al. (2006) and Hall et al. (2009).

¹²³ An interesting avenue for future research would be to incorporate ethanol as a material capability in the National Role Conception flowchart in an analysis of Lula’s second mandate (2007-2010).

consequent expansion of the middle class strand in his second mandate, which led to a new social configuration. These were the national capabilities that made it possible for Brazil to better perform in MERCOSUR, such as proposing its revitalization as discussed in the previous section, because the domestic environment was in an auspicious state.

Figure 4: Selected indicators of Brazil during Lula's first mandate (2003-2006)

	2003	2004	2005	2006
Population, total	181,809,246.0	184,006,481.0	186,127,103.0	188,167,356.0
Surface area (sq. km)	8,515,770.0	8,515,770.0	8,515,770.0	8,515,770.0
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	71.3	71.7	72.0	72.4
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate)	10.0	9.1	9.6	8.6
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	14.7	6.6	6.9	4.2
Forest area (sq. km)	5,125,500.0	5,096,420.0	5,067,340.0	5,050,788.1
GDP growth (annual %)	1.1	5.8	3.2	4.0
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)	11.0	14.5	9.6	4.8
Imports of goods and services (annual % growth)	-0.5	10.4	7.5	17.8
Poverty gap at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)	4.3	3.6	3.2	2.7
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)	11.1	9.7	8.6	7.2
Military expenditure (% of general government expenditure)	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8

Source: The World Bank Database.

7.2.2.2 Opportunity to act

Breuning (2011, p.26) defines opportunity to act as “possibilities afforded by circumstances, whether temporary or enduring”. This conceptualization leaves an open room for the researcher to select the criteria that she or he deems necessary. Herein, it is considered the political and economic events that had a strong impact domestically and regionally during the selected timeframe. Those events are considered as opportunities that could deepen or hinder the institutional development of MERCOSUR.

The first component lies outside of the region, but it was indirectly affected by it. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States put forward policies towards the rest of the continent that sought to fortify its hegemonic role, such as the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904. George W. Bush’s “War on Terror”, as the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 onwards became known, diverted the lion’s share of the country’s foreign policy actions towards the Middle East. While in South America, there was an upsurge of left-wing parties reaching Executive positions¹²⁴, which usually have a certain disdain for White House interference in the region. The failure of the FTAA is collateral to this process. According to Leogrande (2007, p.385), “the fundamental failing of George W. Bush in Latin America was not that his administration did egregiously bad things (though it did some), but rather that he was bereft of fresh ideas on how to respond to Latin America’s growing demand for social justice”. ***In this way, the lack of interest from the United States created an “open space” in the region, therefore countries in Latin America, and MERCOSUR specifically, had the opportunity to act in their own initiatives without influence or input from the regional hegemon, which was more concerned with furthering its geopolitical goals in the Middle East.***

During the selected timeframe, one of the largest political crises of MERCOSUR involved Argentina and Uruguay, to what became known as “***papelera crisis***”. In 2005, Uruguay allowed the installation of cellulose factories in the Uruguay River, in the border between both countries. The bilateral treaty regulates that Argentina and Uruguay need to consensually agree on any structural change being made in the area of the river. Argentina opposed the construction of the cellulose factories, and a long period of disagreements ensued. Environmental groups in the region of Gualeguayachú, in Argentina blocked the access to a bridge that connects both countries, as a way to protest against the settlement of the cellulose factories. The Uruguayan presidency called for a litigious solution via the institutional

¹²⁴ Those countries were, in chronological order: Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.

channels of MERCOSUR, arguing that Article 1 of the Treaty of Asunción promulgates the open access of people and goods (Medeiros; Saraiva 2009). According to Medeiros and Saraiva (2009), this decision by the Uruguayan diplomacy signalled the willingness to use the regional institution as a litigation mechanism, but also as a way to solve the asymmetries among member-states. To the authors, the lack of solutions to the controversy by MERCOSUR strengthened in Uruguay those who were against the regional institution and those who favoured the establishment of other trade partnerships.

The “*papeleras crisis*” was a bilateral issue, and it was proposed by one of the parts for it to be resolved by MERCOSUR. This would give Brazil the perfect opportunity to act as a mediator, or at least to vocally express the necessity of resolving the issue. Instead, Lula kept quiet about the issue. From the database of his speeches¹²⁵, he only mentioned the conflict once, during a meeting of the Community of South-American Nations (CASA), when he declared that it had been prohibited to talk about the matter, as “we always want to respect each other's sensitivity”¹²⁶. On one hand, this diplomatic stance could be understood as aligned with the Brazilian tradition of non-intervention. ***To the Brazilian diplomacy, the papeleras question was a matter between Argentina and Uruguay, and it should be solved between them. On the other hand, acting as a mediator could bring Brazil symbolic benefits of being seen as a country willing to preserve peace and cooperation in the region, while proposing the institutional capacity of MERCOSUR of solving regional disputes.***

Nonetheless, Folha de São Paulo, one of the largest newspapers in Brazil, claimed that the Foreign Minister Celso Amorim talked to the involved authorities behind the scenes as a way to unravel the problem¹²⁷. Still according to the publication, the Brazilian diplomacy was more in favour of the Uruguayan side, since they feared a lack of investments from the cellulose factories would make Uruguay search for investments elsewhere, particularly in the United States, and not in Brazil. The Argentinian newspaper Clarín claims the opposite, as it argues that behind the scenes Brazil was tending towards the side of Argentina because of

¹²⁵ Biblioteca da Presidência da República, available at <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/>. Accessed on September 5th, 2019.

¹²⁶ The full speech is available in Portuguese, at <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/1o-mandato/2006/09-12-2006-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-na-reuniao-dos-chefes-de-estado-e-de-governo-dos-paises-da-comunidade-sul-americana-de-nacoes-casa/view>, accessed on September 5th, 2019.

¹²⁷ Folha de São Paulo, April 16th, 2006. Brasil intervém na "guerra das papeleiras". Available at <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1604200608.htm>, accessed on September 5th, 2019.

the traditional partnership between the two countries¹²⁸. Regardless, not being vocal about the issue made Brazil lose the opportunity to act as a proponent of peaceful settlement of disputes in MERCOSUR and as a mediator of regional diplomatic conflicts.

Another political quarrel involving MERCOSUR was with an associate member of the institution, Bolivia. It began in 2006 when the country decided to nationalize the domain of its oil reserves, which directly affected the Brazilian oil company Petrobras. Brazil is the number one importer of Bolivian natural gas (Kaup 2010), and Petrobras largely invested and operated in Bolivia. Brazil did not seek a reactive response, whether in diplomatic or juristic realms. Lula claimed that it was Bolivia's right to declare the hydrocarbon nationalization, as it was a matter of the Bolivian sovereignty¹²⁹, since the nationalization was a promise made during Evo Morales's campaign and, as such, it should be fulfilled. ***This could be considered as a rather passive response on the Brazilian side. However, if one examines the issue through the lenses of the country's diplomatic history, one can conclude that Lula's answer was congruent with the principle of non-interference. Also, to the Brazilian president, Bolivia had the prerogative to claim the ownership of its natural resources. As the data shows, this was in accordance with the principle of sovereignty that Lula exhorted (see Table 5).***

Another pivotal moment for MERCOSUR started in 2006 with the admission process of Venezuela to the institution, which entered into force six years later under controversy¹³⁰. To Briceño-Ruiz (2010), this process can be understood within the left-wing wave that took the region. In the words of the author, the MERCOSUR member-states saw the inclusion of Venezuela as a political decision and not as a "European Union style of evaluation of Venezuela's preparedness to join the regional bloc" (ibidem, p.78, own translation). To the author, there were some benefits brought by including the country to the institution: Venezuela would bring to the institution the expansion of MERCOSUR's reach to the Caribbean Sea; the

¹²⁸ BBC Brasil, with information provided by Clarín, April 20th, 2006. Available at https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2006/04/060420_pressreview.shtml, accessed on September 5th, 2019.

¹²⁹ O Estado de São Paulo, May 2nd, 2006. Lula reconhece soberania da Bolívia em nacionalizar reservas. Available at <https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lula-reconhece-soberania-da-bolivia-em-nacionalizar-reservas,20060502p34960>, accessed on September 6th, 2019.

¹³⁰ Paraguay had opposed the membership protocol, unlike Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in 2006. In 2012, the country was suspended from MERCOSUR when president Fernando Lugo was impeached, which was considered as a breach of the democratic clause of the institution. Then, Venezuela joined MERCOSUR as the congress from the other three full-members had already voted favourably for the membership protocol. Therefore, the entrance of Venezuela to MERCOSUR resulted from a political manoeuvre. Surely, Paraguay was suspended from the institution, but it remained a member. Its opinion on the matter should be considered, regardless.

country is an important producer of oil and gas, which favours an energetic dimension to MERCOSUR; the Venezuelan funds made available to the institution and the products from MERCOSUR that would find in the country a diversified market were a beneficial economic aspects to the remaining MERCOSUR member-states (ibidem).

Still according to the author, the inclusion of Venezuela as a full-member of MERCOSUR should be analysed in light of Hugo Chávez's foreign policy orientation, that refused unipolarity, imperialism, neoliberalism, and capitalism. Ironically, Venezuela was suspended from MERCOSUR in 2017 with the allegation of rupture of the democratic order by the government of Nicolás Maduro¹³¹.

As Table 5 displays, Venezuela becoming a full-member appeared as a political goal for MERCOSUR in Lula's speeches. At first glance, it presented itself as a beneficial opportunity for Brazil to act in order to fulfil this narrative. However, it came as a "double-edged sword". On the one hand, Venezuela is a strategic partner due to its reserves of oil and gas, and its newly inclusion to MERCOSUR as a full-member is congruent with Lula's narrative of the institution amalgamating the whole region. On the other hand, Hugo Chávez contentious relationship with the United States and his own perspective on the functioning of regional integration schemes of Bolivarianism, as explained by the "post-hegemonic regionalism" in Chapter 2, could hinder this process. ***Venezuela appeared as a required addition to MERCOSUR at least in 2006, as it gave a positive opportunity to act for MERCOSUR to expand its membership and to attain an important political and strategic ally. Still, as time has proven, the political costs of its affiliation and latter suspension show that it was not worthwhile.***


A large part of this sub-section was devoted to the opportunity to act for Brazil within MERCOSUR. But it is noteworthy to also point out the domestic circumstances that affected Lula's opportunity to act nationally. The largest political scandal during the Lula administration was what became known as *Mensalão*, a corruption scheme in which congressmen allegedly received monthly payments in order to vote favourably for legislation from the Worker's Party. There is no indication that *Mensalão* affected Brazil's capacity to act regionally and internationally. In spite of this, it was a striking element of Lula's presidency. As it came to light in 2005, *Mensalão* had a significant impact in the domestic political scenario and in the image of the Worker's Party. Still, Lula managed to get re-elected in 2006, and Dilma Rousseff, also from the same party, won the elections in 2010 and 2014, and implemented a more austere programme for fighting corruption. In this sense, to Balán (2014, p.87), "the Brazilian

¹³¹ Reuters, August 5th, 2017. Mercosur suspends Venezuela, urges immediate transition. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-mercosur/mercosur-suspends-venezuela-urges-immediate-transition-idUSKBN1AL0IB>, accessed on September 13th, 2019.

case shows that corruption allegations and protests may both have limited consequences for individual politicians; nevertheless, corruption seems to undermine the credibility of the overall system, which may be the most important negative consequence for democracy”.

Thus, one can note how even though there was an “open space” for South American countries to instil their own initiatives given the foreign policy redirection of the White House to the Middle East, challenges in the region still arose. Brazil had the opportunity to act as a mediator in the case of the “*papeleras* crisis”, but it decided not to. If Brazil was interested in pursuing a leadership role in the region, then it must be willing to act first as a mediator. This would give the country the opportunity to be seen as the one prepared to step up in times of crises or, better yet, as the one that brings compromise and solutions to common problems. The problem with the nationalization of Bolivian oil and gas was another example of the passivity of the Brazilian diplomacy. As argued in this section, the Brazilian stance can be seen as aligned with the country’s tradition of non-interference and the defence of sovereignty. However, if the Lula administration intended to play the leadership role, then it must be prepared to use some Realist-type of policymaking, i.e. fearlessly defending its resources and national enterprises. Additionally, if the entrance of Venezuela in MERCOSUR seemed enticing in 2006, it did not pay off in the long haul.

Figure 5: Role Theory according to agent-structure dynamics (Breuning, 2011, p.26, adapted) applied to Brazil in MERCOSUR (2003-2006)



7.3 Final remarks

This chapter provided an overview of Lula's first mandate when it comes to foreign policy, as it also considered how elements such as domestic conditions, history, and diplomatic traditions affected the Brazilian overall foreign policymaking, which can enlarge the understanding of its positioning towards MERCOSUR. This chapter also applied the National Role Conception flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26) to the case of Brazil as an agent in the structure of MERCOSUR and its results.

The application of the chart created by Breuning (2011, p.26) to the case of Brazil toward MERCOSUR in Lula's first mandate resulted in a National Role Conception that portrays the country as autonomous, willing to reconstruct MERCOSUR and with new-found capabilities. Along the same lines, it was also shown that Brazil was undesiring to mediate or interfere in regional disputes. Therefore, the role conception of Brazil towards MERCOSUR in the selected timeframe does not fully support the role of regional leader. As the role conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) demonstrated, despite some auspicious individual elements for exercising leadership - namely identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience, and capability – the opportunity to act did showed that Brazil lacked the necessary requirements for exercising regional leadership. Thus, the elements raised by this analytical scheme explain the research puzzle, rather than the role conception alone.

Thus, this chapter has shown that the identity of Brazil is highly influenced by issues derived from colonization. Therefore, independence and autonomy have been continuously present in its diplomatic history. With Lula, autonomy presented the meaning of not abiding by the rules of industrialized countries. Autonomy was associated with elements such as self-esteem, i.e. developing its own capabilities in order to not need the assistance from Northern countries or financial institutions.

Likewise, Brazil under Lula acknowledged the burdens carried by its cultural heritage, such as the "mongrel complex", but was willing to overcome it. Throughout time, the "country of the future" allegory has permeated the Brazil's quest for social and economic development, given its condition of social inequalities. Those were the mechanisms under which the Lula administration would portray its role in regard to regional integration processes.

The data show that Brazil vocalized political narratives of the reconstruction and revitalization of MERCOSUR. This significantly impacted the configuration of the National Role Conception, for it showed that to Lula MERCOSUR was previously in a weakened state. Within the Interpretivist approach, the search for the meaning in the data must be the ultimate goal. From this, the conclusion drawn from the data was that to Lula reconstructing MERCOSUR

meant reinforcing its political ties, first and foremost. Another often propelled identity narrative was that it should be built stronger ties among member-states in order to create internal confidence and consequent external credibility in the institution.

The data also reveals that Lula often propelled identity narratives regarding Brazil's importance to MERCOSUR, framing the country as a benefactor, given its size and larger economic capabilities, and therefore conscious of the need to help smaller member-states. In the data, Lula referred to Brazil as acting as a paymaster in the region with funds provided by BNDES. Thus, Brazil under Lula put forward a ***discursive leadership***, which valued the country's capacity to relocate funds to its neighbours and consequently helping to promote the economic development of the region.

In the same vein, the political goals that appeared in the data indicate that Lula pushed for the development of the architectural framework of MERCOSUR, with the creation of organs related to themes outside of trade, for instance in the realms of social, cultural, scientific, and agricultural initiatives. The data demonstrates that, for Lula, this would also help the establishment of a South American and Mercosulian identity. The president also furthered the development of a better and more integrated infrastructure, as well as the strengthening of existing organs in MERCOSUR in a context of deepening the institutionalization process.

As this chapter has shown, the country possessed capabilities such as better economic and social prospects, that would enable a leadership role. Paying the foreign debt and the reduction of poverty indicators were positive elements of the Lula administration. The domestic audience, although unacquainted with the importance of regional institutions, was positively inclined to the creating of regional schemes.

In this context, the results obtained by the National Role Concept flowchart exhibit that, when it comes to leadership, Brazil under Lula shows some forms of passivity – either in the unwillingness to act as a mediator in the case of *papeleras*, either in the lack of firmness to deal with the nationalization of the Bolivian natural gas. As it has been argued, the country's behaviour in those two situations are congruent with its diplomatic tradition. Yet, if Brazil wants to be a regional leader and global actor, as it has been argued by the literature and shown by the data, then it must be determined to deal with the burden of leadership – being assertive and running the risk of possibly displeasing neighbouring countries. A leader is the one capable of resolving or mediating regional crises and defending its national companies, responsibilities which Brazil was reluctant to act upon.

In conclusion, the main findings generated by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) help to explain the research puzzle introduced in Chapter 1. The results obtained reveal that, despite having favourable conditions for leadership - *identity* and *cultural*

heritage that propelled autonomy, a *domestic audience* that was overall uninformed about regional integration schemes but positive toward creating them, increased socio-economic *capabilities* – the *opportunities to act* showed passivity rather than willingness to lead. Therefore, the results from the National Role Conception (Breuning 2011, p.26) reveal that the willingness to act as a leader were present in the official discourse through the identity narratives. But when the opportunity to act as a leader came up, the Lula administration preferred to shy away from that role.

As explained in previous chapters, in future research one can apply the results obtained here by the National Role Conception flowchart to specific cases in order to define which role the country portrays – or, in other words, one will be able to thus characterize the foreign policy behaviour of Brazil in MERCOSUR during the selected timeframe. But the largest added value of this research lies on the capacity of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) of explaining the research puzzle.

Thus, the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) demonstrated that Brazil had the favourable elements for exercising regional leadership (identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience, and capabilities) – except for the opportunity to act, in which it performed passively given the circumstances.

Consequently, this explains the puzzle of why in matters of regional leadership, Brazil wants it, but cannot have it. It cannot have because it is unwilling to act assertively when the opportunities to act arise.

Chapter 8 – The National Role Conception of Germany during Merkel

The federal elections of 2005 occurred under unusual circumstances. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder lost the confidence vote in the *Bundestag*, which would allow for the Parliament to be dissolved. President Horst Köhler had the prerogative to do so and ask for a general election¹³², which can only happen after the president and the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) revise the procedure of the confidence vote (Proksch, Slapin 2006). It has been argued that Schröder deliberately made this move given the lack of support to the domestic reforms proposed by him in the Agenda 2010¹³³. A re-election would bring him the endorsement by his constituents, as he once declared: “for the continuation of the reforms, I believe clear support by the majority of Germans is essential”¹³⁴.

However, counting solely on a win proved to be a wrong move for Schröder. Angela Merkel ended up winning the elections. The CDU obtained 35.2% of the popular votes (1% more than the SPD)¹³⁵ and 397 out of 611 votes in the Parliament¹³⁶. Afterwards, a grand-coalition with the SPD was formed between the two largest parties of the country¹³⁷. Somehow similar to Lula, Merkel also was a candidate of firsts: she was the first woman to be chancellor and also the first chancellor to have grown in East Germany. She was a bit of an “outsider”,

¹³² Deutsche Welle. Schröder loses confidence vote. July 1st, 2005. Available at <https://www.dw.com/en/schr%C3%B6der-loses-confidence-vote/a-1636332>, accessed on January 27th, 2020.

¹³³ The Irish Times (2005). Schroeder loses confidence vote as planned. July 1st, 2005. Available at <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/schroeder-loses-confidence-vote-as-planned-1.1179455>, accessed on January 27th, 2020.

¹³⁴ Der Spiegel (2005). Chancellor Schroeder calls for early elections. May 23th, 2005. Available at <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany-s-political-crisis-chancellor-schroeder-calls-for-early-elections-a-357175.html>, accessed on January 27th, 2020.

¹³⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica. Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany. Available at <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Angela-Merkel/Chancellorship>, accessed on August 17th, 2020.

¹³⁶ Deutsche Welle (2005b). Angela Merkel sworn in as German chancellor. November 22nd, 2005. Available at <https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-sworn-in-as-german-chancellor/a-1786512>, accessed on January 27th, 2020.

¹³⁷ For more details on how the elections were developed, see Hough (2006) and Pulzer (2006).

being Lutheran in a predominately Catholic political party and having a background as an academic¹³⁸.

When Merkel came to power, in 2005, the country was under a much better political and economic situation than previously. The 1990s was a period of political, economic, and social adaptation to the reunification. Merkel did not have to deal with the same challenges as her predecessors. However, in each of her mandates - she is in her fourth one as this doctoral thesis is being drawn - she had to face serious issues related to the EU¹³⁹.

As this chapter is being written, Germany enjoys a privileged position in the EU. Stable levels of economic growth, good indicators of employment, and mammoth export levels paint a picture of a stable country. From this picture alone, it is hard to imagine how Germany was once called “the sick man of the Euro”¹⁴⁰, in a reference to its difficult economic and social situation during the 1990s.

History plays an important part in German politics, even long after the end of the two world wars. Because of its militarized and genocide Nazi past, Germany has had to demonstrate to the international community that it values democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In this way, the reverberation of narratives such as “never again war” – related to a non-repetition of world conflicts – and “never alone” – referring to multilateralism – have permeated the conduction of foreign and security policies in the post-war years (Maull 2000).

Thus, after World War II Germany employed policies of reconciliation and reparation (Gardner-Feldman 2012), which are firmly built on collective memory¹⁴¹. For these reasons, the country’s role in the post-war years has been labelled as a “civilian power” (Maull 1991) and as a “tamed power” (Katzenstein 1997)¹⁴². The first classification, which was also extended by the author to Japan, refers to Germany’s preference for non-militarizing means of conducting politics, in a “civilizing” way. The second classification relates to how the European

¹³⁸ A full profile on Merkel is available at Packer (2014). Studies of how Merkel came to power, which consider her biography and CDU’s political structure, are provided by Thompson and Lennartz (2006), Wiliarty (2008), and Yoder (2011).

¹³⁹ In her first mandate (2005-2009), there was the fail for the creation of an EU Constitution, which eventually became the Treaty of Lisbon. In her second mandate (2009-2013), the Eurozone crisis and the Greek crisis occurred. In her third mandate (2013-2018), the Crimea crisis and the refugee crisis ensued. In her fourth mandate (2018-2021), the discussions and the procedures for the Brexit took place. Just by the amount of times that the word “crisis” has appeared, one can note how difficult the situation was in the EU - and, given the position that Germany occupies today, the burden largely fell on Merkel’s shoulders.

¹⁴⁰ *The Economist* (1999). The sick man of the euro. Available at <https://www.economist.com/special/1999/06/03/the-sick-man-of-the-euro>, accessed on October 7th, 2020.

¹⁴¹ More on how collective memory influences Germany’s foreign policy will be developed in this chapter.

¹⁴² Both of these classifications are discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.7 *Leadership and hegemony*.

institutions have reduced Germany's capacity to exercise hard power, as it willingly gave away its power in order to participate in EU institutions, particularly after the country's reunification.

Germany had to prove to the international community that it would not become a militarized superpower and, therefore, it would not repeat the mistakes from the past. To put it simply, the country had to show good comradery and not evoke distrust from its peers. In this sense, Germany's role in the EU had been conditioned to the preference of non-militarized means in its foreign policy given the historical burden that fell on its shoulders. With reunification, it has been argued that the country's foreign policy became "normalized" - more willing to apply hard power methods, to act unilaterally, and to accept more responsibility in the international arena (Gordon 1994). This eventually raised questions about Germany's role as a civilian power.

According to Yoder (2017a, p.197), in the post-Cold War era Germany is "no longer at pains to convince its neighbours or the world of its trustworthiness and democratic values". The evolution of the institutional architecture of the EU was concomitant with Germany becoming an "indispensable nation" (Sikorski 2011). With its economic prowess, as it ranks on the top of EU exports charts, the country enjoys a privileged position and has, with time, become a key-player in dealing with crises in the institution.

Germany's role in the EU has been classified in a number of ways: as a reluctant hegemon (Paterson 2011), benign hegemon (Morisse-Schilbach 2011), geo-economic power (Kundnani 2015), sleep-walking giant (Hyde-Price 2015), and shaper nation (Stelzenmüller 2016). ***This doctoral thesis is not interested in adding one more categorization to that ensemble. As explained in previous chapters, the focus here is to examine how the National Role Conception of Germany under Merkel (2005-2009) came to be.***

From the results generated by the National Role Conception flowchart applied here (Breuning 2011, p.26), one can examine which role a country portrays (or the role enactment, see Chapter 3). Therefore, the emphasis here is on the *process of formation of a role*, rather than on the role itself. As explained in Chapter 1, the **research puzzle** that guided this research was based on the observation of performance of regional leadership (***Germany has it, but does not want it***). As elucidated in previous chapters, by applying the National Role Conception framework one can better understand said conundrum, based on ideational and material elements provided by this analytical scheme.

This chapter is divided in three sections. The first part is devoted to Merkel's foreign policy actions during her first mandate, which ran from 2005 until 2009. The second part applies the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) to the same timeframe. The third and last part is dedicated to the final remarks.

8.1 Merkel's foreign policy towards Europe and the world (2005-2009)

As explained in Chapter 1 and 3, Role Theory is oftentimes applied to analyses that investigate the foreign policy behaviour of states. The goal here is to intersect the areas of Foreign Policy Analysis and Regionalism, for this present study encompasses regional institutions - and the regional conduct of a country is, after all, in the realm of its foreign affairs guidelines. For this reason, the present section presents an overview of the foreign policy behaviour of Germany during Merkel's first mandate as a way to understand the positioning of the country towards the region and elsewhere. This section does not equate the bilateral behaviour propelled by Germany with different countries in the world, but provides an understanding of its foreign policy standards as a way to provide a contextual analysis of its foreign policy actions – and, ultimately, of its regional policies.

According to Janes and Szabo (2007, p.108), given the difficulty in reaching an agreement on domestic reforms, especially on social security reform, Merkel has “turned to foreign policy as her main stage”. To the authors, unlike her predecessor who centralized this area under the chancellorship more easily because of the coalition with the Green party, Merkel had to compromise with the Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier from the SPD. As a result, “this means there are far greater checks on Merkel's power than on any chancellor over the past three decades” (ibidem). In this sense, as Patterson (2010b, p.499) explains,

grand coalitions are different. Here the parties are in a marriage of convenience and are looking for ways to overtake their governmental partner at the next election. [...] The stakes are also higher for the chancellor. With increasing interdependence public perception of a chancellor is increasingly formed by the perception of them as international leaders. Positioning on foreign policy is less risky to the stability of the coalition since unlike domestic policy it does not normally involve the mobilisation of interest groups and the associated danger of forming irreconcilable positions. Tension in the foreign policy area is thus to some extent pre-programmed in a grand coalition.

Traditionally, in the post-reunification years Germany's foreign policy has been divided along three axis: the relations with Europe, especially with France, the transatlantic relations with the United States, and the strategic relations with Russia. With time, the spectrum of foreign policy initiatives has been extended to the Middle East and to China. But its foreign

policymaking has not always been so diverse, as it formerly was tied to geopolitical constraints and by regional institutional order.

In the context of the Cold War, the former West Germany was a founding member of the EU. At the same time, it also benefited from the structure offered by the institution, as “integration provided important political and economic support to West Germany” (Bulmer 2019, online). With reunification and the beginning of the multipolar system, concomitant with the strengthening of the importance of Germany to the EU – and *vice versa* –, the debate of whether Germany became “Europeanised” grew stronger. Europeanisation is understood as the process in which EU policies end up changing national policies (known as “top-down” or “downloading”) and when domestic policies of member-states are capable of affecting EU’s policymaking (known as “bottom-up” or “uploading”)¹⁴³.

To Daehnhardt (2012), Germany has been influenced by the Europeanisation process since the end of the World War II and the country’s subsequent division. To the author, this development can be attested in three areas, namely in the country’s identity realm, which lacked an international identity, and benefited from combining it with the identity from the EU; its institutional congruence, by delegating powers to the EU and consequently being able to have a larger voice in the international scenario; and its policy implementation of foreign affairs, making the German ideas and the European values diplomatically enmeshed. With Merkel, according to the author, the chancellor “galvanized European policy to ensure that the EU is capable of action, but not at the price of sidelining Germany’s own interests” (Daehnhardt 2012, p.39).

This argument is shared by Green et al. (2008, p.147) when they argue that “Angela Merkel sought to reposition Germany as a consensus-builder withing the EU on issues such as the Constitutional Treaty, environment policy and transatlantic trade. Reoccupying the middle ground has seen Germany regain influence in Brussels, but it continues to be more confident about stating its national interest when German preferences are threatened”. Therefore, the literature points out to a more confident and self-assured Germany during Merkel’s administration.

The following paragraphs will provide an overview of Germany’s bilateral relations with specific countries, for instance France, the United States, Russia, China, India, and Israel. This is justifiable because this analysis will present how the country positioned itself in the world, which explains its actions, overall approach, and mindset to foreign policymaking.

¹⁴³ For more on this, see Hix and Goetz (2000).

One of the tenets of Germany's diplomatic tradition has been the relations with France. Historically, the Franco-German relations have been the backbone of the institutional consolidation of the EU. An example is the Schuman Plan of 1950, which led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the EU. Put simply, peace between both countries meant stability for the continent. When Nicolas Sarkozy became the French president in 2007, the bilateral relationships with Germany were instrumental in dealing with the institution's major crises¹⁴⁴, particularly the Eurozone crisis (Guérot, Klaus 2012). The same pattern of bilateral relationships was not carried with the subsequent French president, François Hollande. Regardless, the Franco-German partnership has been crucial for the institutional development of the EU.

Another pillar of Germany's foreign policy is the relations with the United States. Merkel had to adopt an approach that would revitalize the transatlantic relations, as Schröder was against the invasion of Iraq - at the time, this signified a strong stance by the German diplomacy that could destabilize the bilateral relations. To Rudolf (2005, p.135), the "War on Terror" and the dissensus of values between both parties has "made it more difficult for Germany to balance its basic orientation as a civilian power with the imperative of preserving the transatlantic link". To restore the transatlantic relations, Merkel adopted a discursive approach that valued the relations with the United States and its importance to the peaceful post-Cold War years, while also highlighting Germany's significant role at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), according to Mushaben 2009. In practice, however, the chancellor refused to send troops to Afghanistan and was displeased with the plan for creating a missile plan in Poland, proposed by the White House (ibidem). This evinces how Merkel's discourse propels rapprochement, but her actions show that her chancellorship was against the reinforcement of militarization.

If with the United States Merkel had to gather discursive forces to repair the bilateral relations, with Russia the situation was different. Former chancellor Schröder established very close relations with Russia, to a point of agreeing to a pipeline in Poland during his term and receiving a job position in the state-owned gas company Gazprom after retirement. In this way, Merkel had to demonstrate that Germany's alignment with Russia would not be automatic, but it would preserve its strategic aspects¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁴ This tandem was even dubbed "Merkozy" by the international press, given the symbiotic perception that the two leaders exhaled.

¹⁴⁵ Relations between Germany and Russia during the Cold War could be characterized as rather unstable. The Hallstein Doctrine, which ran from 1955 until 1969 by FDR, imposed the estrangement with Russia as a way to isolate East Germany. The *Ostpolitik* proposed by Willy Brandt (1969-1974) claimed the approximation with East Germany and, therefore, more closeness with the Soviet bloc. For more on this, see von Dannenberg (2008).

According to Rahr (2007), on the one hand Merkel was keen on disapproving the democratic and human rights situation in Russia, despite at the same time not propelling any sanctions. On the other hand, the chancellor fostered the deepening of bilateral ties in the economic and energy sectors. The previous strategic relationship with Russia was maintained under Merkel during her first term¹⁴⁶, and one of the explanations highlighted by Forsberg (2016) was that the Foreign Minister was a member of the SPD, since Frank-Walter Steinmeier was known for advocating an *Ostpolitik*, as the author suggests. Merkel, then, had to combine disagreeing with Russia's policies while preserving the core of the strategic relationship.

In matters of foreign policy, much of the diplomatic relationships of Germany with other parts of the world fall under the umbrella of the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), especially with Latin America and Africa. In this way, Germany's foreign policymaking is performed under the goals and values set by the EU, which are aligned with Germany's own discursive behaviour: democracy, peace, and human rights. Special attention has been paid to the so-called rising powers¹⁴⁷, which were crystalized from Merkel's second term (2009-2013) onwards.

With China and India, specifically, the increased volume of trade was first made possible by the economic liberalization undergone by the two countries (Heiduk 2015). Merkel also acknowledged how they were competitive against German products in foreign markets (ibidem). With China, the initial approach was marked by a diplomatic conundrum, for the chancellor met with Dalai Lama in 2007, the first German chancellor to ever do so, which led to a small boycott by the Chinese government (Paterson 2010b).

This is where the German relations with China and India diverge in substance, as Heiduk (2015) argues. Germany followed an economic-based relations with both countries – but with India there was a symmetry of values and ideas, such as democracy and human rights, which did not occur with China. This is an example for what Malici (2006) proposes as culture of reticence (*Kultur der Zurückhaltung*), in which ideational factors had an increased importance in Germany's foreign policymaking in the years after the end of the Cold War. To the author, this culture comprises, among other factors, “fundamental beliefs of German society as a whole and German political elites in particular” (ibidem, p.38).

¹⁴⁶ The German-Russian relations later deteriorated, as the Crimea episode of 2014 came to show. For more on this, see Forsberg (2016).

¹⁴⁷ In 2012, the Foreign Ministry launched the “*Gestaltungsmaechtekonzep*” as a way to foster relations with the largest countries of the Global South. Dieter Dettke, “Germany: The Geopolitical Uncertainties of a Geo-Economic Power”. Available at <https://www.aicgs.org/2014/10/germany-the-geopolitical-uncertainties-of-a-geo-economic-power/>, accessed on July 27th, 2020.

One sensible topic in Germany's diplomatic history has been relations with Israel. Because of the atrocities committed against the Jewish people by the Nazi regime, in the after-war years German chancellors put forward a "foreign policy of reconciliation", which was also extended to Poland, the Czech Republic, and France (Gardner-Feldman 2012). In 2008, Merkel was the first chancellor to speak before the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament¹⁴⁸. In the occasion, she claimed that Germany "would never leave Israel" and that "the Shoah [the Holocaust] is a source of great shame to Germans" (ibidem). In this way, according to Wittlinger (2008, p.15), the Germany-Israel relations are characterized by a "fundamental acknowledgement that these relations are 'special' and 'unique'. There is no indication to suggest that any kind of 'normalization' of these relations would be desirable". Then, to the author, collective memory has been used as a way to legitimize policies chosen by Merkel – and, in the case with Israel, to foster bilateral relations.

When it comes to other areas of the world, the Merkel chancellery has propelled the creation of strategic partnerships¹⁴⁹. To Narlikar and Plagemann (2016, p.3), those have been first formed by economic interests. Nonetheless, "when reflecting upon issue areas beyond economics, objectives such as the rule of law and human rights in partner countries, regional peace and stability, climate change mitigation, and the unobstructed dispensation of development aid figure prominently on the German side of the negotiating table". This argument is congruent with the aforementioned perspective of Germany establishing bilateral partnerships that value principles beyond trade aspects, as it was the case with India and China.

In this way, one can notice how the literature stresses the significance of ideational factors in Germany's foreign policy, or what Wolff (2013) calls "value-oriented foreign policy". More specifically, the author underlines how the country has put forward democracy promotion as part of its civilian power role. This is not to say that economic goals are left aside. As the author suggests, "instruments such as the 'critical dialogue' or 'modernisation partnerships', accompanied by the nongovernmental activities of the political foundations, usually enable Germany to stick to its value-orientation while pursuing the interests of its export sector" (Wolff 2013, p.488). As Merkel herself has said, "interest-based foreign policy must also be values-driven foreign policy" (quoted in Gardner-Feldman 2012, p.63).

¹⁴⁸ Der Spiegel (2008). Merkel in the Knesset: "We would never abandon Israel". March 18th, 2008. Available at <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/merkel-in-the-knesset-we-would-never-abandon-israel-a-542311.html>, accessed on March 2nd, 2020.

¹⁴⁹ Germany has established strategic partnerships with Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates (Narlikar, Plagemann 2016).

Stating that Germany employs foreign policy initiatives with ideational components is not to equalize it with a lack of military means. A question that has permeated the literature regarding Germany's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been if the country will go through a process of "normalization". In simple words, a "normal" state acts based on its national interests and does not shy away from employing military means to achieve them – just like the traditional Great Powers often do¹⁵⁰. Given the increased German economic capabilities and its rising importance to the EU, the role expectations from other countries would be of a "normal" Germany, which would clash with the inherited role of "civilian power" portrayed by Germany, according to Brummer and Oppermann (2016). During Merkel's first mandate, signs of said "normalization" did not appear significantly, as the chancellor often eschewed from a leadership role, in the traditional sense.

Yet, the militaristic aspect is present in Germany's foreign policy, although not in the same manner as with the EU counterparts. The *Bundeswehr* participates in operations abroad, but they mostly present a multilateral aspect, being operated under mandates of the EU, NATO, and the UN. In 2006, the White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr* claimed that "deployments abroad were already part of the 'normal' *modus operandi* of the German Armed Forces at the time", according to Glatz et al. (2018, p.11). The document also stated that the goals of the *Bundeswehr* missions were the "international conflict prevention and crisis management including the fight against terrorism in first place, followed by supporting allies, protecting Germany and its citizens, rescue and evacuation, and subsidiary forms of assistance" (ibidem).

In this realm, to Daehnhardt (2013), Germany's foreign security policy is still influenced by the *Kultur der Zurückhaltung* (culture of restraint) when using military means. This is due to the country's history, as an intense militarized policy would bring resentment from the past. To the author, this would prevent Germany from employing similar security policies as the traditional Great Powers. Despite of this, Schröder and Merkel initiated a "more utilitarian use of foreign and security policies", which would be unlikely to be withdrawn (ibidem, p.154, own translation).

During Merkel's first term, from 2005 until 2009, three operations in which the *Bundeswehr* was employed were initiated: the UNAMID in Darfur, the UNIFIL in Lebanon, and the EU NAVFOR Atalanta in the Horn of Africa (Daehnhardt 2013, p.148). When visiting the African continent in 2007, Merkel pledged for stronger ties between the EU and the region, based on "shared values, such as the respect for universal human rights, democracy and

¹⁵⁰ Brummer and Oppermann (2016, p.1) go beyond and define a normal state as "one who assumes international responsibility in accordance with its international stature and whose involvement in international affairs is not—or to a lesser degree than during the Cold War—circumscribed by its past".

constitutionalism". This is another example of the preferred foreign policy approach of valuing democratic principles as a guiding force, which was explained in previous paragraphs. At the same time, the chancellor also claimed "the central responsibility for peace, stability and security lies within Africa itself"¹⁵¹, which suggests in this case non-interference as a leading diplomatic principle.

The preference for multilateralism is one of the key-tenets of Germany's foreign policy. Alongside Brazil, India, and Japan, Germany is a member of G-4, a group created in 2004 that advocates for the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). According to Roos et al. (2008), Germany's claim for the reform as valid has become more difficult, since the country's donations to the UN had been decreasing, and its participation in UN-led missions is modest. In 2007 at the UN General Assembly, Merkel reiterated the claim made by the group that the current configuration of the UNSC is not reflective of the present global politics¹⁵². But the proposal advanced by the G-4 created a schism in the EU, as not all countries support it¹⁵³. Germany's claim that a seat for the country would mean a seat for the EU brought scepticism by the other member-states (Brummer, Oppermann 2016), as if Germany would speak for the rest and thus have a leadership role. As time has shown, the requests made by the G-4 has not made any real progress.

Therefore, the goal of this section was to provide an overview of the foreign policy directives taken during the first cabinet of Angela Merkel. As one can note, Germany's foreign affairs are still affected by elements such as history and values. A more assertive (and, therefore, militarized) Germany would bring angst from the past. In this way, the country had to perform under a more cautious and restrained way. With Merkel, contours of a normalization of Germany's foreign policy (i.e. employing military means based on the national interest) are not prominent.

This can be seen at a discursive level when the chancellor propels the formation of bilateral relationships that are firstly based on economic aspects, but that also consider democracy and human rights, as explained previously in this section. The central pillars of the German foreign policy were maintained (the relations with the EU, with the United States, and with Russia). However, Merkel had to adapt to certain specific circumstances, such as

¹⁵¹ Deutsche Welle (2007). *Merkel promotes human rights and pledges support in Ethiopia*. October 5th, 2007. Available at <https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-promotes-human-rights-and-pledges-support-in-ethiopia/a-2808883-0>, accessed on March 3rd, 2020.

¹⁵² Merkel's full speech can be found at the United Nation's official website, under <https://undocs.org/en/A/62/PV.5>, accessed on March 3rd, 2020.

¹⁵³ According to Roos et al. (2008), the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Portugal and Slovakia support the G-4, whereas Cyprus, Italy, Malta, The Netherlands, Spain and Sweden are against it.

regaining trust in the transatlantic relations with the U.S. and counterbalancing the relations with Russia in the post-Schroeder years.

Thus, this was the background in which Merkel operated when it comes to Germany's foreign policy, one that valued principles of democracy and human right, as well it embraced multilateralism. As shown by this section, the "normalization" was not a prominent aspect of Germany's foreign policy initiatives, and the "civilian power" archetype remained. The traditional alliances were maintained during the selected timeframe, (e.g. with the USA and Russia), while the formalization of partnerships based on values were developed (e.g. India and China).

Against this backdrop, the next section is dedicated to the application of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26), in which each component will be evaluated in order to determine the National Role Conception of Germany in regard to the EU during Merkel's first mandate (2005-2009).

8.2 Application of the National Role Conception flowchart

The following subsections are devoted to the application of the National Role Conception flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26). As explained in Chapter 3, the objective of this doctoral thesis is not to tackle which roles Brazil and Germany play in their respective region, but to discover which aspects and mechanisms shaped the National Role Conceptions under Lula and Merkel in regard to MERCOSUR and to the EU, respectively.

This doctoral thesis applies an agent-structure approach, as described in previous chapters. In the flowchart examined below, the agent is Germany under Merkel, and the structure is the EU, both in the same timeframe (2005-2009). To each mechanism of the National Role Conception flowchart, the analysis will focus on domestic conditions and, most importantly, on the circumstances of the agent towards the structure.

The subsequent sections are two-fold. The first one comprises the ideational components – identity, cultural heritage, and domestic audience -, and the second one encompasses the material components, namely capability and opportunity to act. The findings are analysed in the final remarks in the third section.

8.2.1 Ideational components

The ideational section of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) amalgamates identity, cultural heritage, and domestic audience. They will be examined below and applied to the case of Germany during the selected timeframe.

8.2.1.1 Identity

As previously explained in Chapter 3, this doctoral thesis partakes in Checkel and Katzenstein's (2010, p.4) definition of identity. It comprises

shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. [...] We understand identities to be revealed by social practices as well by political attitudes, shaped by social and geographical structures and national contexts.

In this way, identity is here understood within the realms of history, culture, language, and politics in order to grasp the “understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992, p.397) of a state. Thus, the identity of a country can be shaped by elements such as: history, founding fathers, myths and concepts; culture, literature and the arts; political regimes; and reiterated social discourses. It is important to emphasize that the focus lie on the identity of *the state as a social construct*, and not on the collective identities of particular groups. For this reason, nationalism is discarded here as an affecting element in the identity of the state¹⁵⁴. Naturally, the peoples are part and parcel of said social construction of states; oftentimes it is difficult to dissociate the identity of the people from the identity of the state or how certain individuals ended up affecting said state's identity. However, here it will be attempted to isolate the state, since it is a *permanent* entity with *temporary* governments – and each government has idiosyncratic elements and factors.

¹⁵⁴ For a study on nations and nationalism, see Hobsbawm (1990).

It should be noted, however, that identity can also be shaped by elements such as the arts, literature, sports, and heroic symbols (Fiorin 2009)¹⁵⁵. Identity must not, then, be excluded from the concept of culture. As explained previously, the focus here is on the identity of the state and, therefore, the emphasis is on political and historical conditioning.

Similar to the case of Brazil, the identity of the German state is intrinsically linked to history. But unlike the South American country, which was under the domain of a European power for two centuries, the case of Germany is characterized by fragmentation and (re)unification. From the German tribes to the Holy Roman Empire, from the Napoleon domination to the creation of the German Empire by Otto von Bismarck in 1871, from the Weimar Republic to the Nazi Regime, from the division in the Cold War to the re-unification in 1989, Germany has a long history of domination, separation, and reintegration.

To Kitchen (2006, p.01), when it comes to the identity formation of the German state,

a somewhat vague notion of a German national identity was first articulated in the eighteenth century and was centered on the linguistic and cultural peculiarities of the German-speaking world. It was abstract, humanistic, cosmopolitan, philosophically rarefied, and apolitical. The intense hatred of the French, caused by the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, along with the unacceptable behavior of the French occupying troops, soured this early nationalism. Cosmopolitanism turned into an arrogant feeling of cultural superiority. The apolitical became a reactionary obsession with a mythological German past. The rarefied was distilled into an impenetrable, but intoxicating obscurity. The new nationalists hoped that when the wars were over a powerful united Germany would emerge, but their hopes were dashed at the Congress of Vienna when they were overridden by the imperatives of the great European powers.

In this sense, if autonomy and dependency largely influenced the identity formation of Brazil, as analysed in the previous chapter, the ideal concepts of *Humanität*, *Bildung* and *Kultur*

¹⁵⁵ One could mention, although not in an exhaustive manner, the following names that culturally influenced this process: in classical music, Johann Sebastian Bach and Ludwig van Beethoven; in the literature, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe; in religion, Martin Luther; and in science, Albert Einstein.

were the “civilising values” (Robertson 2018) of Germany. They will be briefly examined in the following paragraphs.

Humanität was a conceptual framework put forward by Herder in “Ideas for a philosophy of the History of mankind” of 1784 , in which “the organic world forms a great unity, powered by a single vital energy, with no sharp distinction between spirit and matter, mind and body, humans and animals” (Robertson 2018, p.21). *Humanität* would encompass seven attributes to be fully achieved, namely peacefulness, sexual urges, sympathy, maternal love, a sense of fairness, decency of appearance, and religion (ibidem).

Bildung became known world-wide as a philosophical and pedagogical concept. It “presented itself as a cosmopolitan and universalist ideal that was associated with the ideas of individual autonomy and self-determination and with the image of an integral individual endowed with an aesthetically harmonious personality. In an idealistic key, this conception of education also echoed the ideals of pure and disinterested knowledge, unrelated to external purposes and utilitarian objectives” (Alves 2019, p.09). One of the greatest proponents of this concept can be found in the works of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe, and Schiller (Robertson 2018). Despite being largely theoretically and literally spread, “*Bildung* was a possession of many individuals, and sometimes primarily a sign of social status” (ibidem, p.28).

Kultur, the last concept here underlined, refers to “positively valorized habits, attitudes, and properties” (Geuss 1996, p.153). To Vogt (1996, p.132), the concept of *Kultur* was initially used as analogous to the concept of *Zivilisation*, in the sense of the Enlightenment understanding of human development. The two notions became to be known separately in a context of social division, as the members of the *intelligentsia* were not part of the administrative bureaucracy. In this way, “it was left to the small, politically powerless middle-class intelligentsia to create models of what was specifically German, and thus to establish at least intellectually a German unity which did not yet seem politically realizable. This is where the notion of *Kultur* would emerge” (ibidem). The territorial fragility and the lack of a unified language were also elements that affected the notion of *Kultur* and, consequently, of the identity formation of Germany. *Kultur* served as an important ideological construct of the nascent German state, as an “unifier” in an ideational way, as explained by Vogt (1996, p.136):

the concept of Kultur can be seen as a reflection of a self-conscious nation, always seeking new boundaries and wondering about its own identity. With no institutionalized framework in place to hold together the German people, they were constantly in danger of losing the distinctiveness of their culture while being assimilated into others. [...]

Germans saw themselves as being in danger of losing their culture. It is then that the notion of Kultur began to play an important role.

One can note how these three concepts focus on the individual and do not present political contours. This could be explained by the fact that the formation of a unified German state came late when compared to other European states, as the German empire was only formed in the later part of the 19th century. Thus, the emphasis was on the people rather than on the state, since “what was important was the ‘organic’ cultural, linguistic, or racial community (*Volksgemeinschaft*)” (Vogt 1996, p.137). An individual could pursue his/her own *Bildung* and fulfil his/her own *Humanität* without the jurisdiction of a state, while at the same time enjoying the same *Kultur* as their peers.

Despite these three concepts being the foundation of Germany’s national identity, naturally throughout time the identity of the German state changed as the types of regime and government changed. According to Kitchen (2006, p.58), with the creation of the German Confederation in 1815 “a search began for a national identity”. This took place mostly through the arts and religion¹⁵⁶. The issue of territorial unification, as already mentioned in this subsection, is a key-component toward understanding the formation of the identity of the German state.

In this regard, as claimed by Elias (1997), process of development of the German nation-state is necessary for understanding the habitus¹⁵⁷ of the German people. To the author, this process was influenced by the position of the tribes that spoke Germanic languages, which were located between the Elbe and the Alpes, surrounded by the tribes that spoke Latin and Slavic languages. For centuries, each group had to fight to protect the borders of their respective tribe. As argued by the author, “the state formation process among the Germans was deeply influenced by its position as an intermediate bloc in the configuration of these three

¹⁵⁶ As the author defines it, “architects built in the ‘German’ style, but there was some uncertainty whether this should be gothic or Romanesque. Painters churned out canvases of Germany’s heroic past and writers penned historical novels. Monuments were erected to all manner of figures from Hermann to Gutenberg and Mozart. Luther was seen as a uniquely German figure, and Protestants claimed that their religion was the only one appropriate for a true German. Ludwig I of Bavaria built Walhalla as a Germanic pantheon of the great figures of the past. In 1842 Frederick William IV ordered a magnificent celebration to mark the beginning of the final phase of the building of Cologne cathedral, one of the great monuments to Germany’s former glory” (Kitchen 2006, p.58).

¹⁵⁷ As defined by Sapiro (2015, p.485): “in his work, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation* (1937), translated into English as *The Civilizing Process*, Elias evokes the ‘psychological habitus of civilized peoples,’ with respect to the discussion of notions of culture and civilization, through which French and German customs and traditions came to distinguish themselves from one another. In *The Society of Individuals* (1939), Elias employs the term ‘habitus’ to designate the way in which a particular form of ‘behavior-control’ crystallized into a ‘character’ or a ‘psychological individual habitus’”.

blocs of peoples. The Latinized and Slovak groups felt repeatedly threatened by the populous Germanic group. And just as often, representatives of the nascent German state felt threatened from several sides at the same time" (ibidem, p.17, own translation). Hence, territorial protection was an issue present even before the creation of Germany as a nation-state, and it endured throughout the country's history.

A second element outlined by Elias (1997) that contributed to the creation of the German state and affected its habitus was the fragility characterized by long periods of war, alternated with moments of heyday and downfall. Consequently, "the structural fragility of the German state, which foreign troops from neighbouring countries constantly tried to invade, produced a reaction among the Germans that led to military conduct and warlike actions to be highly respected and, often, idealized" (ibidem, p.20, own translation). Militarization was seen as a way for Germany to catch up to the other European power, as it was a late-comer in the creation of a nation-state.

A third element highlighted by the author was the fact that Germany's history is described by "ruptures" and "discontinuities" (ibidem, p.21, own translation), making it difficult to create a unified centre for political, cultural and social movements to thrive, such as in London and Paris. A fourth element brought by the author was the conflicting relations between the middle class and the aristocracy in Germany, as the former did not have access to the political and military areas as the latter did. With time, certain sectors of the middle class were aligning to the militaristic ideals proposed by the aristocracy, which eventually paved the way for the establishment of national-socialism (ibidem).

With the unification of the territory and consequently formation of the German empire in 1871, an official nation-state was created. In this sense, the state identity could be tied to the geographical area and to the common language of the people. With Nazi regime (1933-1945), the identity of the German state was taken to extremes and associated to totalitarianism, militarism, eugenics, and xenophobia. With the end of the Second World War (1939-1945) and the subsequent division into two Germanys (1949-1990), the identity of East Germany was confined to the dictates of the USSR, while the identity of West Germany was attached to multilateral institutions, such as the incipient EU and NATO, and to the influence of the European and American powers.

As outlined by Wittlinger (2010, p.04), during the Bonn Republic (1949-1990) "German collective identity was to be based on a commitment to the democratic principles, values and institutions that had developed after and, to some extent, because of Auschwitz". From this, one can gather how collective memory, which will be discussed in section 8.2.1.3, affected Germany's foreign policymaking in the post-war years. The country needed to show to the international community that it would not display a unilateral - i.e. interventionist and militarized

- approach in foreign affairs, as not to revive its Nazi past. In simple words, Germany could not be seen as threat. For this, the country opted for participating in multilateral institutions and for intertwining its policies to the EU. Thus, its international identity, a “post-national identity which subscribed to cosmopolitanism” (Wittlinger 2010, p.04), was attached to the Great Powers and to the European regional integration system.

With the end of the Cold War, there was the question if the recently reunified Germany would be a “normal” state, as discussed in the previous section, or if it would avoid conflict and put itself as a “harmless” state, as West Germany did previously. Wittlinger (2010) argues that during the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl (1982-1998), Germany did not alter the identity portrayed during the Bonn Republic. Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) initiated a path of change when he argued for a new role for Germany in international affairs, following the Kosovo war in which Germany participated alongside NATO¹⁵⁸.

With Merkel, still according to Wittlinger (2010, p.40), Germany followed the path initiated by Schröder when it comes to forging a new identity. To the author, Merkel did not try to “normalize” Germany, but the chancellor acknowledged the past and decided to move forward: “in her view, Germany’s Nazi past is irrevocably part of German memory and identity and it is only through a full acceptance of this past that the future can be shaped”. The ensuing sub-section 8.2.1.2 will verify if this can be identified in Merkel’s speeches concerning the EU.

Within the framework of an interpretive comparison proposed here and explained in Chapter 4, some contrasts can be assessed. In the case of Brazil, the identity formation was largely influenced by the dichotomy of dependency/autonomy, derived from the Portuguese colonization, which persisted throughout time with different contours in each political era. The Brazilian society was originated in a stratified way, with large social disparities and a central government (in this case, the Portuguese crown), which also affected its identity of a developing country. Factors such as immigration, miscegenation, and the ability of conviviality among different ethnic groups created the sense of “Brazilianity” that is a reason for pride among Brazilians, and essential to Brazil’s national identity.

In the case of Germany, the lack of unity in central aspects – territory, government, and language – created an identity that focused on the individual and not on the state. The *Humanität-Bildung-Kultur* triad created by an *intelligentsia* that did not partake in the political elite helped foster a national identity among the people. As the German nation-state was a late-comer among its neighbours, an attempt for a state identity after 1871 was a product of territorial unification and militarism. During the Nazi regime, the identity was taken to an extreme, as it was combined with a totalitarian state. After the Second World War and the

¹⁵⁸ For more on this, see Hyde-Price (2001).

subsequent division of Germany, each state had their identity assigned to opposing sides of the bipolar world order. With the reunified Germany, its identity was shaped by the quest for accepting the past and moving on.

In this realm, how was Germany's identity defined on Merkel's official discourse? Which were the narratives represented regarding Germany in the EU in Merkel's speeches? These questions will be tackled in the next subsection.

8.2.1.2 Identity narratives: the identity of Germany and of the EU in Merkel's words

As explained in previous chapters, one of the goals of this doctoral thesis is to identify the elements pertaining to the identity of Germany as a state in relation to the EU, i.e. how Germany sees itself as a country (its selfhood) and how it portrays the identity of the EU. This is one of the mechanisms that belong to the National Role Conception flowchart created by Breuning (2011, p.26). By analysing official speeches one can detect and understand the narratives policymakers express about a certain topic or issue. Although the author does not specify narrative analysis as a tool to analyse identity in the flowchart, as explained in Chapter 4 identity can be often expressed through language. This justifies the use of this methodological tool by this doctoral research.

In congruence with Narrative Analysis, as explained in Chapter 4, one must separate certain analytical categories in which the narratives were created. They are the following: i) events: institutional developments of the EU; ii) timeframes: from 2005 until 2009; iii) actors: in the present case, Merkel; iv) location: nationally and internationally; and iv) points of view: representational, as the chancellor of Germany. The screening process narrowed the speeches in which the EU is mentioned, and the ones in which Merkel mentioned the institution *en passant* were not considered. For an explication of the processes of selection and analysis of the data, see Chapter 4, sections 4.7 and 4.8. The complete lists of data are available in the Annex.

When examining the data, one must be careful about the distinction between what can be considered as a narrative that denotes identity from a call for political action (see Table 6). Usually, in an identity narrative the verb "to be" is often used in its different tenses ("we are", "we were", etc). With political goals, the modal verbs "must" and "should", and verbs "to want" and "to need" (in different tenses) are frequently used.

It should be noted that, unlike identity narratives, political goals were not a pre-selected criteria for analysis. Rather, they (fortunately) came out of the data and became a useful tool. In this context, **by analysing identity narratives, one can understand how the actor**

defined what an object is; with political goals, one can understand how the actor defined what an object ought to be. This is why it was important to make such a distinction in the process of analysing the data. Additionally, political goals will be used as complement data in the remaining sub-sections.

As Table 6 shows, dividing it in years was a way to better organize and examine the data, but the results of the analysis are understood as a whole. Table 6 indicates which political goals appeared most often in the data. Therefore, it is not an exhaustive account; goals that appeared once or twice were discarded. However, in regard to the identity narratives, they are shown as entirely as they appeared in the data, which can give a better understanding of how Merkel defined Germany's and the EU's identities in her official discourses. The identity narratives that were most prominent in the data will be discussed in this subsection.

In this context, the inauguration speech of a leader is always an interesting analytical point of departure because it provides the outline of future policies. Moreover, in this particular circumstance the chancellor is speaking towards her constituency. Her words will reverberate nationally and, to a small extent, to foreign audiences. Nonetheless, the focus of an inauguration speech lies on the domestic sphere rather than, say, a speech at the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, it was her first official speech as elected chancellor, certainly a high-stakes moment.

Interestingly enough, two interrelated elements that stand out from her speech are the frequent allusion to history and the use of the word "freedom". Merkel declares that Germany must show solidarity because the country received it from others in the past - "we have experienced the power of the community that can arise from charity". She also references the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent reunification as reasons for stay optimistic about the future of the country. While politicians sometimes allude to memory and historical events as rhetorical instruments, this pattern is recurrent among speeches given by Merkel, according to Yoder (2017b). To the author, Merkel uses this "to emphasize her country's responsibility to learn from the past and act to safeguard democratic values as well as to prescribe a leadership role for Germany" (ibidem, p.2). At least in her inauguration speech, Merkel gives indication that her cabinet was ready to move on: "let the battles of the past rest. The battles are beaten".

The mentions of freedom are frequent: Merkel uses the word *Freiheit* ten times, but in different contexts¹⁵⁹. Statements such as "the biggest surprise of my life is freedom", and "let us dare more freedom" are particularly related to Germany's past. This indicates that having

¹⁵⁹ This is not a study on lexicology. This number was used just to illustrate the high frequency it appeared in the data. A quantitative account of the words used by Merkel is not the focus of this research, but rather their meaning and narrational aspects are central here.

grown up in a divided Germany and specifically in the *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (DDR) is an attribute that affects her political identity-building process. One could argue, however limited to the inauguration speech, that freedom and democracy are two congruent values that were envisioned for Merkel's foreign policy. This same issue returned later on her speech, when she stated that "Germany has never been so safe and free as it is today". But matters such as "terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, decaying states, extreme poverty, epidemics and environmental destruction" are a thread to said peacefulness, in the words of the chancellor.

Next, Merkel made a prediction that remarkably turned out to be true: "in ten years, Germany will be along the top three in Europe". Nowadays, Germany presents high levels of economic growth and it is the paymaster of the European Union. She also referenced the country to develop into "the motor of Europe" and as an "exporter power", two categorizations that are also now true. In 2016, Germany had a 21% share of the total EU gross domestic product (GDP), being followed by the United Kingdom with 16% and France with 15%. When considered the Euro area only, Germany had 29% and France 20% of the GDP. In 2017, Germany had 28% of the total share of exports in the EU. France, the United Kingdom and Italy had each around 10%¹⁶⁰. It might have taken ten years, but Merkel's promise turned out even better. Germany is not only in the top three, it ranks number one in the EU.

The *Bundeskanzlerin* then touches upon an issue that, later on, would become imperative for the European Union: the management of crises. She declares that "crises in Europe are based on the lack of mutual trust". She then mentions the role of Germany in said predicaments, "I believe that Germany's task is also due to its geographical location. It should be a mediator and a balancing factor". The country has not been at the middle, but at the forefront position of solving or mitigating all of the recent crises the EU has been through, the Euro-, Greek-, and refugee crises. Merkel's phrasing also reveals something extra: the unwillingness to appear as a leader, although most of the times performing that role. In 2015, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier¹⁶¹, proclaimed that Germany should act as a "chief facilitating officer" in the EU. This is consistent to what Merkel mentioned a decade earlier.

¹⁶⁰ This information is available at Eurostat, an official data website by the European Commission. *Share of Member States in EU GDP*, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1>, and *Share of exports by Member State* <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/BubbleChart/?lg=en#tableCode=tet00055-2>. Both were accessed on March 11th, 2020.

¹⁶¹ Steinmeier, F.A. (2015). Save our trans-atlantic order. *The New York Times*, March 11th, 2015. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/opinion/save-our-trans-atlantic-order.html>. Accessed on March 11th, 2020.

Subsequently, Merkel moves on to more abstract points, but still related to the EU. She claims that “without a self-image of its own, Europe is not possible” and it would not be viable “without the support and trust of its citizens”. Later on, she reiterates this idea by maintaining that there must be a “self-confident Europe”.

Thus, the inaugural address gave indications of how *values* would become a predominant factor of the identity narratives regarding Germany and the EU during Merkel’s first mandate. In her inauguration speech, the chancellor stated, “German foreign and European policy is based on values and is a policy of interests”. ***As Table 6 illustrates, the chancellor has defined commonality of values as the foundation of the European and, in her own words, “it is a common understanding of fundamental values that holds Europe together at its core” (08-11-2006).*** Sharing the same values is also a necessary component to consider when forming international partnerships by the EU, as the chancellor has argued (22-09-2006).^{162 163}

Alluding to values has been repeatedly found throughout the data. To illustrate, the word “values” (*Werte/Werten*) appeared 91 times, which shows the prominence in which they were portrayed in Merkel’s official discourse¹⁶⁴. As examples, the following excerpts can be highlighted: “we are a community of values” (10-11-2006); “in such a world it is a question of asking again and again what keeps Europe together in our century, what constitutes its identity. For me, the answer is clear: Europe’s self-image is based on common, fundamental values - this holds Europe together” (25-03-2007); “only a Europe that is committed to its values will be able to continue on its path successfully. Germany will continue to assume its special responsibility for a Europe in this spirit” (12-12-2007); and “value is the foundation on which politics can become credible” (18-02-2008).

Thus, the data indicates that Merkel continually propelled a narrative of how values are the foundation of the EU and fundamental to its functioning. Specifically, the

¹⁶² The numbers in the parentheses indicate the date of the speech, whose details are available in the Annex. This systematization only occurs when there is a direct quote from the chancellor, or when an idea was only present once. If an argument was often found throughout the data, this schematization will not appear, as to not exhaust the reader.

¹⁶³ It is important to note that this doctoral thesis is not a study of how values influence decision-making and consequently affect policymaking. “Values” as an element pertaining to the EU is considered here because it came out of the data as part of the identity narratives propelled by Merkel. Studies on the realm of political psychology, such as (Schwartz 1994; Kertzer et al. 2014), explore how values in individuals and in society affect decisions by leaders in domestic and foreign policies, which is not the focus of this present research.

¹⁶⁴ The number was used just to illustrate the high frequency it appeared in the data. A quantitative account of the words used by Merkel is not the focus of this research, but rather their meaning and narrational aspects.

data reveals that said values were – according to the chancellor - freedom, democracy, rule of law, international law, human rights, justice, and solidarity (see Table 6).

One could argue that they can be considered as universal values, as freedom and human rights are present in the Charter of the United Nations¹⁶⁵. Nonetheless, in line with the interpretivist approach, one must cautiously acknowledge contextuality and meaning. In the case of Germany, history has large importance. Given the two world wars and the territorial divide, it would make sense the reference of such values by the chancellor. And, as explained in the beginning of this subsection, to the chancellor freedom has a historical meaning – and this argument can be extended to the other values mentioned by her. Furthermore, placing values as the foundation of the EU is a way of homogenizing the unequals - it is the same as claiming “we can be different, but at least we have values in common”. It also brings a discursively sense of unison, something that is much needed in regional institutions with many members.

One particular value that is related to the EU’s identity, in Merkel’s words, is tolerance. The data reveals that the chancellor claimed tolerance to be “the soul of Europe” in at least four different speeches throughout her first mandate, and the word “tolerance” (*Toleranz*) appeared 25 times in the data¹⁶⁶. In her words, “I also believe that we should always think about the quality that also defines the soul of Europe for me: tolerance. Only a Europe that knows this soul and is aware of its values can set the right course for the future” (27-05-2009). Not to partake in religious nor philosophical debates, but the meaning of the word “tolerance” can be associated with the most basal aspect of a character, its constitution, its essence. When Merkel alludes to “tolerance” at its core being, she is indicating that the EU is prone to dealing with adversities that stem from alterity. In a nutshell, to say someone is tolerant implies that said person is resilient towards what is “different” – in the case of the EU, different countries, different opinions, different people. Particularly, this is useful during periods of crises – and the EU has ha many, as exemplified before.

¹⁶⁵ More specifically, on Chapter I, article 1: “1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends”. Available at the UN official website, <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>, accessed on June 12th, 2020.

¹⁶⁶ This number is just to illustrate how frequently the word appeared in the data. This is not a study on lexicology.

Again, history has a unique meaning. Intolerance has, *inter alia*, led Europe to armed conflicts among neighbours and it led Germany, in particular, to a Nazi regime. Therefore, being tolerant was a required component toward creating the European integration, and it nowadays remains a crucial factor when dealing with impasses or crises in the institution. As the chancellor has claimed, “tolerance is a painstakingly learned ability in Europe to see the world through the eyes of others, through the eyes of other peoples and cultures, and thus to respect the diversity of our continent and to understand this diversity not as a burden, but as our European wealth” (14-04-2008).

Another identity narrative that was found repeatedly in the data concerned Germany’s responsibility regionally and internationally. In the data, Germany’s responsibility in the EU is related to its economical prowess, as it is the largest economy in the institution. As explained in previous chapters, when Merkel came to power Germany was enjoying better economic conditions. Thus, the strengthening of Germany’s economic levels increased the country’s capacity in relation to its neighbours. The data shows that Merkel was cognizant of this, and the chancellor often made references regarding the increased responsibility of Germany given its economic capabilities, such as: “we also know about Germany’s responsibility in the European Union. We are the largest economy. We have the task of being part of the engine of the European Union. Now in the presidency of the Federal Republic of Germany, we are feeling how the member states are also looking at us and saying: please, do not let up” (23-01-2007); and “I know that Germany, as the largest economy in the European Union, has a great responsibility here. Because without an economically strong Germany, Europe can hardly prosper economically” (24-01-2007).

It is important to note, however, that responsibility does not equate to leadership. ***Unlike with the case of Brazil, there were not found any references to Germany being a regional leader in Merkel’s speeches. Therefore, the selected data reveals that Merkel did not exercise discursive leadership, as it was the case with Brazil.***

The data also revealed that Merkel refers to responsibility in relation to Germany’s history. Since the country managed to find peace and stability, it had the duty to help other nations do the same: “Because since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany it has been clear: we have a responsibility before history - before German history and European history - a history of centuries of struggles, a history of inheritance disputes, wars, political failure and nationalism” (06-09-2006). Merkel also extended said responsibility to the EU, given the continent’s history, to encourage the institution to help manage conflict in other areas of the world (see Table 6 under “Political goals”). Likewise, the chancellor also stated: “Based on my experience and the experience of millions of Europeans, we have an obligation to ensure that we exist in regions where conflicts that still seem almost insurmountable today, use all our

strength to overcome these conflicts. What we have achieved in Europe after the Second World War, that is, that we are no longer at war with each other, can - I am convinced - also succeed in other parts of the world” (05-02-2007).

Another identity narrative portrayed by Merkel referring to the EU’s capacity to act internationally was the decreased share of European population in relation to the world. In the words of the chancellor, “if you realize that in 1900, 26 percent of the world’s population was European - today it is 13 or 14 percent, and by the end of the 21st century it will be 6 percent - we know how well we are doing about it to further develop this common ground in the interests of our interests” (23-01-2007). A significant demographic reduction, when compared to other areas, would mean a lesser European influence in world affairs. To Merkel, the EU would need to cooperate further in order to defend its interests and values worldwide.

The data reveals that Merkel represented the social market economy as one of the pillars of Germany in the vast majority of the speeches in the selected data¹⁶⁷. To the chancellor, the principles of social market economy should be transferred to the EU and to the world. Specifically in the data of the year 2009, Merkel evoked them to be the one of the mechanisms that would help alleviate the consequences of the global financial crisis¹⁶⁸: “I think we have learned in recent months that the social market economy as our social order is the right foundation of values for a sustainable economy. It gives us the yardsticks and opportunities to make further developments within the framework of this social market economy and to respond to the challenges of the 21st century” (08-09-2009). Similarly, this economy model was created as a way to cope with the financial crises of the late 1920s and early 1930s, as Merkel stated in one of her speeches (25-06-2009).

¹⁶⁷ According to Muresan (2014, p. 159-166), social market economy “is similar to a construction sustained by three main pillars: market economy, social order and ecology or the environment [...] The market economy is the first pillar and is given the highest importance. By ‘market economy’ we mean the sphere of social life where the national wealth is produced, ideally without interventions of the state institutions within the economic process. National wealth is seen primarily as the accumulation of material goods, personal property and assets able to bring financial profit in the strictest and most financial sense of the word. Other areas of wealth may belong to what is considered national wealth, but these rather are in an indirect manner. [...] Within the social order, there is an expected minimum degree of socialisation. This refers, for instance, to the reintegration in professional life of entrepreneurs who have failed and had to close their businesses, to the protection of workers and the unemployed against abuses and unbearable and limitless exploitation by their employers, i.e. against employers’ greed for profit. [...] [the third] pillar has become more and more important since the enactment of the first environmental protection laws of 1971 and at least since 1983, when the Greens gained seats and entered the conservative milieu of the German Bundestag by overhauling the electoral threshold of 5 %”.

¹⁶⁸ More on the global financial crisis of 2007 will be analysed under the section *Material capabilities*, available later in this chapter.

As clarified before, in the context of this research an identity narrative reveals what an object is, and a political goal indicates what an object should be. In the data, and as illustrated by Table 6, Merkel forwarded goals for the EU for better regulation (less red tape), more efficient, transparency, and for it to become closer to the population (so individuals could better understand the benefits derived from the institution). The chancellor also praised for the principles of discontinuity¹⁶⁹ and subsidiary¹⁷⁰ to be deeper incorporated to the institution. With this, the EU's ability to act (*Handlungsfähigkeit*) would improve both at the internal and external levels.

Aligned with the interpretivist tradition that seeks for the meaning produced by the actors, from the political goals expressed by Merkel one can gather that, for the chancellor, the EU is an entity that produces excessive bureaucratic procedures that are not clearly defined to citizens. From the data, the overall meaning in this matter was that Merkel wished for the EU to be simpler and more concise. This is corroborated by her claims for the principles of discontinuity and subsidiary to be applied more often.

Overall, just like with the case of Brazil analysed in the previous chapter, the data shows that Merkel's identity narratives concerning Germany and the EU were consistent throughout her first mandate, since there were no significant differences in the narratives nor in the political goals. Equally, different locations (and therefore, different audiences) did not represent changes in the narratives, as they remained the same either in national or international scenarios.

Thus, the data reveals that the identity narratives regarding Germany and the EU were the importance of values as the foundation of the EU, tolerance as the "soul" of Europe, and an increased responsibility from Germany to the EU and worldwide, and an unified voice of

¹⁶⁹ The discontinuity principle establishes that, when a new Commission takes office, the legislative proposals that were not approved in the previous mandate would be automatically dismissed. According to Politico, this created a divergence between Merkel and José Manuel Barroso, then president of the EU Commission. Available in <https://www.politico.eu/article/defusing-discontinuity/>, accessed on October 9th, 2020. For more on the discontinuity principle, see König (2007).

¹⁷⁰ As the chancellor herself defines it, the principle of subsidiarity "means nothing other than that the lower level takes precedence over the upper level whenever it can do the job properly" (24-04-2008). In the words of the EU, "in areas in which the European Union does not have exclusive competence, the principle of subsidiarity seeks to safeguard the ability of the Member States to take decisions and action and authorises intervention by the Union when the objectives of an action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, 'by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action'. The purpose of including a reference to the principle in the EU Treaties is also to ensure that powers are exercised as close to the citizen as possible, in accordance with the proximity principle referred to in Article 10(3) of the TEU". European Parliament, Fact sheets on the European Union. The principle of subsidiarity. Available at <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-principle-of-subsidiarity>, accessed on July 14th, 2020.

Europe to the international community given its decreased population. As explored by this subsection, history is an undisputable component of Germany's identity in the narratives conveyed by Merkel during her first mandate.

The following Table 6 shows the identity narratives and political goals that came from the data.

Table 6: Identity narratives and political goals in Merkel's speeches (2005-2009)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<p><i>Identity narratives about Germany and the EU present in Merkel's speeches</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Germany should have solidarity with others, given its history ▪ Freedom related to history: "Germany is not as free and safe as it is today" ▪ "Germany is a world-export master" ▪ Germany can become a strong partner in Europe and in the world again ▪ German foreign and European policies are value- and interest-driven, which rely on 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Germany is willing to increase its responsibility in the international scene: "I believe that as the Federal Republic of Germany we play an active part and we want to continue playing it in the future" ▪ Freedom related to history ▪ Common values which are the foundation of the EU: "freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights"; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ "Europa gelingt gemeinsam" ▪ Decrease of European population in relation to world's population ▪ Freedom ▪ Tolerance as the basis of EU's identity and its "soul" ▪ Germany's increased responsibility as the largest economy in the EU ▪ EU's responsibility in managing international conflicts, given its history ▪ Mutual dependency among member-states, togetherness and cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The EU must continue fighting for peace internationally as it has managed to find peace regionally ▪ Values as the basis of the EU that need to be preserved in an era of globalization (balance, solidarity, justice, and freedom) ▪ Social market economy ▪ Decrease of European population in relation to world's population ▪ Increasing citizen's participation in the EU ▪ German foreign policy being based on values and interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social market economy ▪ More responsibility of Germany in solving international security challenges ▪ More responsibility of Germany in dealing with the crisis in the EU as the largest economy in the bloc ▪ EU is held together because of common values ▪ Tolerance as the "soul" of Europe ▪ Germany greatly benefitting from the EU (in historical terms, i.e. reaching

	<p>alliances and cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The crisis on the constitution treaty comes out of lack of mutual trust ▪ Germany should be a “mediator and a balancing factor” because of its geographical location ▪ Willingness to compromise but at the same time protect German interests at EU summits ▪ Self-confident Europe, through security, peace, and human rights 	<p>“it is a common understanding of fundamental values that holds Europe together at its core”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Self-confidence in the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ European values as the foundation of the EU (freedom, democracy, human rights, solidarity, rule of law) and what keep member-states together and what constitutes its identity ▪ Social market economy ▪ Acceptance of the past as a lesson and willingness to move forward ▪ The EU as a union that has to be reinforced continuously 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EU's strength lies on its capacity to cooperate ▪ More responsibility of Germany in the EU and in the international stage ▪ Tolerance as the "soul of Europe" ▪ Common values as uniting Europe and the Council of Europe as the guardian ▪ Europe as the "common destiny" ▪ Human rights, democracy, and international law as "inalienable values and basic principles" 	<p>peace, and in economic terms)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Treaty of Lisbon as bringing the EU closer to citizens and as a means to distinguish competencies
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “Let the battles of the past rest” 				
<p><i>Political goals for the EU present in Merkel’s speeches</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reaching an agreement with the constitutional treaty ▪ Expansion in membership is conditioned upon countries reaching previously established criteria and standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Better regulation, (efficiency, transparency, and reduction of bureaucracy in the EU) ▪ Need for a constitutional treaty ▪ Germany to be in the top 3 in Europe in growth, employment, and innovation ▪ Expansion in membership is conditioned upon countries reaching previously established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Need for a constitutional treaty ▪ Resolution of conflicts in the Balkans (especially in Kosovo), in Afghanistan, and in the Middle East, Israel, Palestine; ▪ Deepening of EU-USA relations; ▪ Strengthening of EU-Russia relations; ▪ Special attention to EU-Africa relations; ▪ Energy policy; ▪ Climate protection; ▪ Better regulation (reduction of red tape); ▪ Discontinuity principle; ▪ Principle of subsidiarity; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conclusion of the Doha Round ▪ EU-NATO relations ▪ Missions abroad (Afghanistan, Balkans, Middle East, Israel, Palestine); ▪ Climate protection (reduction of CO2) ▪ Bringing EU closer to people (more democratic value with the Parliament) ▪ Ability to act (<i>Handlungsfähigkeit</i>) ▪ Human rights ▪ Energy policy ▪ Fight against terrorism ▪ Principle of subsidiarity ▪ Intellectual property 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New regulation for financial markets and international standards; ▪ Coordinated approach/framework to help deal with the financial crisis; ▪ The EU to be the "voice" of social market economy in the international order; ▪ Sustainable economy/finance/business (i.e. living within means); ▪ Package of economic measures to alleviate the crisis (Germany alone gave 80 billion Euros, the largest contributor);

		<p>criteria and standards</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support to science, research, and education ▪ Support to energy policy and environment protection ▪ Discontinuity principle ▪ Deepening of the common market ▪ Economic success in the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Deepening of the internal market, of global free trade, and success of the Doha Round; ▪ More investments to research, innovation, creativity and technology; ▪ Protection of intellectual property and patents; ▪ Demonstrating to citizens the importance of the EU to their daily lives (especially in its capacity to promote prosperity and quality of life) ▪ Dynamism, creation of jobs and increase of competitiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Partnership with the USA ▪ Cooperation with Russia ▪ Regulation for broadband connection in the EU ▪ Setting the Treaty of Lisbon into place ▪ Strengthening of financial markets ▪ Bringing more prosperity to the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ "Getting out of the crisis with more than we went into it" (i.e. learning from the crisis and deriving opportunities from it); ▪ Germany as supporter for the European Stability and Growth Pact as a guideline for the country and for the EU; ▪ Conclusion of the Doha Round; ▪ Cooperation between EU and NATO; ▪ EU involved in helping issues of international security (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Palestine); ▪ Partnership EU-Russia; ▪ Climate protection;
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ More ability to act (<i>Handlungsfähigkeit</i>) ▪ Clear division of competencies and responsibilities between member-state and the EU; ▪ More responsibility of the EU in the international scene; 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy; ▪ United voice of the EU in the international scene, especially concerning energy and climate policies; ▪ A constitution for the international financial markets and more transparency; ▪ Reducing procyclical effects of Basel II; ▪ Preserving the independence of the European Central Bank; ▪ Social market economy as a foundational value of Germany, to be exported to the EU and worldwide;
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8.2.1.3 Cultural heritage

As defined by Breuning (2011, p.26) in the National Role Conception flowchart adopted here, cultural heritage refers to "ego aspects from the state's history that are, or have been, makers of identity". The elements pertaining to this mechanism herein underlined are those which are considered to affect political outcomes, particularly when it comes to foreign policy. This subsection is directly linked to the previous one, as identity and cultural heritage have in common elements like history and culture. In this way, many characteristics of this mechanism will be analysed as a continuation from the discussions raised above. "History is not destiny", as many like to argue. However, in this present case it has great significance.

It should be noted that "cultural heritage" is a broad term, and its interpretation depends on the scope and orientation taken by the researcher. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), cultural heritage refers to, *inter alia*, tangible goods (paintings, manuscripts, archaeological sites, etc), and intangible goods (performing arts, rituals, oral traditions)¹⁷¹. Here, the focus is on the cultural aspects that define policymaking, such as historical events, narratives, and idioms.

The data for analysis in this subsection is the same applied to previous sections on *Identity* and *Identity narratives* – the selected speeches given by the chancellor during the selected timeframe, which are summarized in Table 6.

When considering cultural heritage (i.e. the history of a country) and its effects on policymaking, one cannot discard the effects of Germany's Nazi past. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the possibility of Germany becoming once again a militarized power (*Machtpolitik*) has raised suspicion in the international community in the post-war years, thus resulting in (West) Germany's culture of restraint. This strand can be associated with the "civilian power" paradigm explained earlier in this chapter, since "it holds that, in light of the disastrous consequences of German militarism during the Nazi period, a stable anti-militarist political culture has evolved in Germany" (Baumann, Hellmann 2001, p.62). This "culture of restraint" is antagonistic to the normalization paradigm, with was also explained previously in this chapter, as it proposes that a "normal" country would employ militaristic means in its foreign policy.

The "culture of restraint" *versus* "normalization" clash of paradigm has, more or less, permeated the history of Germany's foreign policy since 1945 and especially after 1990 with

¹⁷¹ UNESCO Official Website. Available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/unesco-database-of-national-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-asked-questions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/>, accessed on June 15th, 2020.

the reunification. The “civilian power” concept has been questioned given the employment of the *Bundeswehr* in military incursions abroad, namely the Kosovo war of 1999 during the Gerhard Schröder cabinet (1998-2005). According to Hyde-Price (2001, p.31), the Kosovo war made Germany face the questions of the utility of military force and whether it should be employed in case of violations of human rights. To the author,

Given their traumatic history and their post-war identity as a civilian power, the Germans have been confronted with the moral and political dilemmas these two questions pose more starkly than many of their NATO allies. Most importantly, the German debate on Kosovo should reassure those who fear that Germany is seeking to escape from its past and emerge as a ‘normal’ great power. The German debate demonstrated a maturity and seriousness found in very few other countries – and certainly contrasted favourably with the public debate in the USA or the UK. This reflects a learning process over many decades during which Germans have sought to address the moral and political questions raised by the use of military force. German post-war history has witnessed intense debates about rearmament, Wehrmacht war crimes, ‘out-of-area’ missions, missile deployments and humanitarian intervention. The cumulative impact of these debates has been to shape a German public discourse and political identity which is deeply conscious of the need to avoid simple answers to complex moral and political dilemmas.

During Merkel, said “clash” continued, as it is a feature of Germany’s culture heritage when it comes to foreign policymaking. ***The data reveals that the chancellor, during her first cabinet, proposed that the EU would get more involved in dealing with international conflicts, especially in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, Lebanon, the Middle East, Israel and Palestine (see Table 6 under Political goals).*** Merkel also suggested a closer cooperation between the EU and NATO and for the resolution of the nuclear situation in Iran, as the data reveals, as well as for measures against terrorism and international crime (see Table 6 under *Political goals*). ***From the data, the meaning Merkel attributed to the resolution of international conflicts related to the exportation of EU values – such as peace and democracy – was more aligned to the “civilian power” label rather than the “normal” model, which would employ hard power capabilities.***

As an example, Merkel declared: “We want to promote freedom and development in the world. In our Berlin Declaration, we expressly commit to continuing to promote democracy, stability and prosperity beyond the borders of the European Union. It is a confession that cannot be overestimated in meaning - a confession that becomes concrete very quickly” (25-03-2007). Noetzel and Schreer (2008, p.211) argue that Germany’s “political culture still promotes an aversion to involvement in war-fighting”. The authors go further and suggest that the participation of the country in the NATO mission in Afghanistan of 2001 has made aware that “international expectations may be growing, but societal restraints have led the Merkel government towards a policy that emphasizes the non-combative elements of counterinsurgency: reconstruction aid and military assistance” (ibidem, p.220). Thus, one could argue that during Merkel’s first cabinet, the cultural heritage of “civilian power” versus “normalized power” led to the prevalence of the first paradigm, despite acknowledgement by the chancellor of the importance of bringing peace and stability outside of EU-borders.

Besides this clash of paradigms, there were two interpretations of how Germany should behave in the international scene, both related to the history of the country and mentioned in the introduction of this chapter: the first one, “never again war”, portrayed pacifist contours as it denounced any attempts of militarized involved by Germany, and bestowed upon the country a responsibility for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, both characteristics because of its belligerent past. The second one, “never again alone”, reflected on Germany’s capacity for multilateralism, especially binding to Western powers, as a way of detaining any resurgence of a totalitarian regime. According to Dalgaard-Nielsen (2005, p.344),

though the adherents of these two schools clashed on several occasions during the postwar era, the political mainstream gradually converged on a set of assumptions and policies that honoured both precepts: a strong urge to seek partnership and cooperation, emphasis on creating trust between Germany and her partners and neighbours, renunciation of national nuclear weapons, an emphasis on the need to demilitarize international affairs, and a defensive military posture, with the role of the Bundeswehr circumscribed to territorial defence of Germany and its NATO partners.

The data reveals that Merkel was aligned with both of those precepts during her first cabinet, and she also applied them to the EU. As explained in the previous section, one of the identity narratives propelled was related to Germany’s responsibility to bring peace and

security to conflicting areas in the world, given the country's history. The chancellor extended said responsibility to the EU (see Table 6). To the chancellor, "that means peace in the world must be fought for further. We have to keep working on that. We Europeans are a hopeful example in that, after centuries of struggle, we have managed to live in peace with one another. But we should be patient with others around the world who are still fighting for it. Because it took us centuries to get this far" (31-01-2008).

The concept of "never going alone" has also remained during the selected timeframe, as Merkel claimed for strengthening the cooperation with the United States and Russia as political goals for the EU (see Table 6 under *Political goals*). However, this notion gained new contours, as the chancellor often linked the EU to Germany's history, for the institution brought political and social benefits to Germany. In her words, "we should be aware that all good turning points in German post-war history are inextricably linked to Europe. Whether it is reintegration into the European Union or German unity, we owe European integration an unprecedented period of peace, freedom and prosperity" (11-05-2006). Likewise, Merkel also often argued for deepening the EU, especially its constitutional framework with the Treaty of Lisbon¹⁷² and the common market, as the data shows (see Table 6 under *Political goals*). To the chancellor, as the data indicates,

We have learned, partly from difficult experiences: where Europe does not speak with one voice and where Europe is divided, we have little or no weight; that is, we cannot even assert our European interests there. [...] It is always better if two do something than only one does. A union of common interests is better than a two-way alliance. A continent appearing together is better than that individual regions act differently (10-02-2007).

Thus, the cultural heritage of "never again war" was maintained during Merkel's first cabinet, and the "never going alone" idea was updated to encompass the EU, as the data reveals.

In this context, another aspect of cultural heritage that has affected foreign policymaking of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-) are the policies of reconciliation and reparation (Gardner-Feldman 2012) with countries affected by the Nazi regime, as explained

¹⁷² The Treaty of Lisbon will be examined under the subsection 8.2.2.2 *Opportunities to act*.

previously in this chapter. Throughout Germany's post-war years and reunification period, there have been attempts by chancellors to create public policies devoted to remembrance of Holocaust victims, such as memorial sites and school curricula¹⁷³. According to Wittlinger (2008, p.14), Merkel acknowledged the historical responsibility of the Nazi past without trying to "normalize" it, as well as recognized the suffering caused to the German population by the National Socialist regime.

When it comes to Germany, one cannot just forget about the past. ***The data suggests that Merkel prefers to acknowledge the past, learn from its lessons, and move on:*** "we should remember that today peace and democracy unite us and that wars that have been common in Germany and Europe for centuries no longer take place. But that is the past. It is important; we must not lose sight of them" (14-05-2007). Likewise, she made declarations such as, "there will be no reinterpretation of history by Germany" (16-03-2007). The chancellor also made references to never believing she would one day find freedom before her retirement years, having grown up in East Germany.

The chancellor also gives indications that she is proud of EU's accomplishments (e.g. reaching peace and institutional development), which was usually signalled when there are reminiscences in her official speeches: "viewed from the outside, the European Union is a historical success story without any example. The European Union is one of the most impressive works of peace on planet Earth. The peoples of Europe have been very lucky with European unification. It ensures their freedom and enables them to prosper" (17-01-2007).

Thus, the cultural heritage that has influenced Germany's policymaking can be traced back to the Nazi past and the applied policies in order to alleviate its horrific consequences: the "civilian power" behaviour in the international sphere, the politics of remembrance put forward by West Germany, and the clash of paradigms between the "culture of restraint" and normalization. The data indicates that Merkel maintained the main features of the civilian power way of conduct during her first mandate. Equally, the chancellor acknowledged the tragic costs of Nazism, but gave indications that Germany's policymaking mindset was willing to learn from the past and move forward. The data suggests that Merkel started to leave the implications made by the "culture of restraint", as she put as a political goal more involvement from the EU in peacefully resolving international conflicts abroad. This does not indicate a full turn toward normalization, but it seemed as an incipient attempt.

¹⁷³ As outlined by Langenbacher (2014, p.57), some examples of these remembrance policies can be: the establishment of days of observance such as January 27th (liberation of Auschwitz) and May 8th (end of war in Europe), the creation of the Documentation Centre where once the Nuremberg Party Rally was held, and the Topography of Terror museum which was settled in the former Third Reich Gestapo and S.S. headquarters.

8.2.1.4 Domestic audience

Breuning (2011, p.26) does not give any directions on how domestic audience should be analysed under the National Role Conception flowchart. But suffice it to say that it refers to how civil society responds to a given issue or area. Analysing domestic audiences becomes prominent particularly during election periods, as constituents respond to plans and propositions suggested by candidates. In a nutshell, here domestic audience equates to the population of a country, and how they are interested in regional institutions. This will be measured by opinion polls and surveys. ***Thus, this sub-section investigates how receptive the population of Germany was towards regional integration, at large, and towards the EU, in particular, during the selected timeframe (2005-2009).*** The data will be provided by Eurobarometer and explained in the following paragraphs.

In this context, the relation between public opinion and foreign policy has received scholarly attention (for example, Eichenberg 1989, Holsti 2004, Goldsmith et al. 2005). To Almeida (2016, p.30), to the public opinion a country's external relations can be "quite rational, consistent, and relatively stable, even among ill-informed persons". Similarly, the author claims that governments, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and the media are "the sources of those representations and exert influence upon the public's perceptions. They provide cognitive shortcuts that allow uninformed people to form their opinions" (ibidem).

The data used here was provided by Eurobarometer, the European Commission's official service for public opinion surveys. In its website, the reports released in the selected timeframe (2005-2009) were analysed. Upon examination, the reports were chosen if they satisfied the following criteria:

- Fieldwork was conducted during Merkel's first mandate (2005-2009);
- The questions posed were related to how interviewees identified with the institution, its functioning, usage, and benefits for their country and/or population;
- In the data, countries were divided individually, which made it easier to distinguish the results for Germany.

These criteria were determined as a way to better determine if the domestic audience at the time was more in favour or against measures of deepening or furthering EU's institutional capabilities.

The data analysis chosen for this subsection is two-fold. The first one is available at the Eurobarometer official website¹⁷⁴, in which questions were selected based on the aforementioned criteria. The questions were under the categories of “Image of the European Union”, “Meaning of the EU”, and “Membership to the EU”. This data covers the entire range of the adopted timeframe. They are represented by Graphs 6, 7, and 8, which can be found below.

Secondly, the document “Future of Europe” (European Commission 2006) was designated as a complementary source of data analysis for this subsection, as it also satisfies the abovementioned criteria¹⁷⁵. The selected questions and results can be found in Table 7. The conducted survey interviewed 1526 respondents in February and March of 2006, therefore at the beginning of Merkel’s first mandate. This gives an illustration of how the German population was receptive or sceptical of the EU during the origins of the Merkel Era. Additionally, the results in France and in the United Kingdom were chosen for comparison as they were the two other most influential countries in the EU. Belgium was selected in order to give an extra - and interesting - parameter for comparison, since the core EU institutions are based in Brussels¹⁷⁶.

The analysis of the data reveals that the domestic audience was in favour of the EU, but in a slight majority. Graph 6, which indicates which image respondents had of the EU, reveals higher percentages under the categories of “fairly positive” (in a range of 36-41%) and “neutral” (in a range of 33-41%). The remaining categories presented low ranges, namely “very positive” (4-10%), “fairly negative” (9-16%), and “very negative” (1-4%). Additionally, the top three indicators of personal meaning to respondents were peace (53% in 2005), freedom to travel, study, and work anywhere in the EU (58% in 2005), and the Euro (53% in 2007) as Graph 7 illustrates.

¹⁷⁴ European Commission. Department/Executive Agencies. Public Opinion. Eurobarometer Interactive. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>, accessed on June 24th, 2020.

¹⁷⁵ European Commission. Departments/Executive Agencies. Public Opinion. Eurobarometer <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&yearFrom=2006&yearTo=2009> accessed on June 23rd, 2020.

¹⁷⁶ It is important to underline a political phenomenon that is parallel to the institutional developmental of the EU, that is Euroscepticism – as the name suggests, the disbelief in the social, political, and economic gains brought by the EU. This can be found amongst citizens and, particularly, as the founding principle or guiding light of certain political parties, some of which are represented in the European Parliament. There is a vast literature on Euroscepticism, but one can cite Leconte (2010), Usherwood and Startin (2013) as examples.

The majority of respondents said the membership of Germany to the EU is a good thing, and this number peaked in 2007 at 65% (see Graph 8).

Table 7 gives us more information on this for the year 2006, as well as it provides a comparison with three other EU member-states. It reveals that only 36% of respondents said things are going in the right direction at the EU. Between the four countries, Belgium ranked the highest with 44%. The number was slightly superior when asking the same question but in relation to Germany (36%). When it comes to the word "inefficient" describing the EU, 53% said it describes well. Paradoxically, 52% described the membership of Germany to the EU as "a good thing". 55% of respondents said that a lot/a fair amount has been achieved in the EU, and 52% declared they would be in favour of a harmonisation of social welfare systems. This found similar results in France (60%) and in the UK (49%), against a large majority of 72% in Belgium.

Surprisingly, 80% of respondents agreed that further enlargement would increase problems in the national job market. The figures were also high for France (72%) and Belgium (74%), and lower results were found in the UK (64%). Likewise, only 30% of interviewees report that products have become cheaper because of EU enlargement, which had similar results in France, the UK, and Belgium (on a range from 20 to 36%).

"Comparable living standards" was cited by the majority of interviewees in the three countries as the most helpful element for the future of the EU (48% in Germany alone). When answering the same question, 17% of respondents in the UK said a common Constitution would be the second most helpful for the future of the EU, against 32% in Germany, 29% in France, and 36% in Belgium.

In matters of issues being solved at national *versus* European levels, the results in Germany showed the majority of respondents opted for more European decision-making in key areas such as: fight against unemployment (56%), protection of social rights (59%), ensuring economic growth (60%), ensuring food safety (65%), protection of the environment (73%), and promotion of democracy and peace in the world (80%). ***The data indicates that the domestic audience would be in favour of "more EU" but, again, not for the vast majority on issues concerning employment and economy. For international issues, such as protection of the environment and peace and democracy promotion, the interviewees supported more EU decision-making in higher numbers.*** For the four

countries compared here, Belgium had the highest numbers on the six categories and the UK, unsurprisingly, the lowest¹⁷⁷.


Concerning if the domestic audience discusses political matters with their relatives and peers, the data shows that 55% of respondents discuss national matters and 60% discuss European matters both in occasional situations. The results for Germany were higher in comparison to France, the UK, and Belgium, which all ranged from 42% to 49%, both at national and European levels. Debating political matters frequently can lead to more political engagement – and to potentially having a more critical view of the EU. The data reveals that the domestic audience was prone to debating political matters, at least sporadically.

As the graphs show, throughout Merkel's first mandate the domestic audience in Germany had a either positive or neutral image toward the EU, understood its benefits as bringing peace, enabling the free movement of people, and with an association to the Euro. Most of the interviewees saw the EU as a "good thing" in the selected timeframe. Therefore, the data provided by Eurobarometer concerning citizen identification with the EU reveals that, during Merkel's first mandate, the domestic audience in Germany was in favour of the EU, but only slightly. Generally, the numbers presented in the following graphs and table had a range of 40-60% of approval. The other EU members taken as parameters for comparison also portrayed similar ranges, except for the UK.

In this sense, one can argue that the domestic audience in Germany was pro-EU, but to some extent. Thus, as Table 6 shows, Merkel was clever when she posed as a political goal to EU leaders more efforts to convince citizens that the institution brings benefits to their daily lives. More convincing still needed to be done.

¹⁷⁷ Unsurprisingly in the sense that the UK had always a distant stance toward the EU, despite being one of its largest members. Likewise, the UK did not participate in the Eurozone and it formally left the institution (Brexit) in 2020.

Graph 6: Image of the EU to Germany's domestic audience (2005-2009)




Source: Eurobarometer. Available at

<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart/themeKy/19/groupKy/102/savFile/196>,

accessed on June 24th, 2020.


Graph 7: Personal meaning of the EU to Germany's domestic audience (2005-2009)



Source: Eurobarometer. Available at

<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart/themeKy/33/groupKy/190/savFile/54>,
accessed on June 24th, 2020.

Graph 8: Membership of Germany to the EU according to Germany's domestic audience (2005-2009)



Source: Eurobarometer. Available at

<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart//themeKy/3/groupKy/3/savFile/47>, accessed on June 24th, 2020.

Table 7: Extracted questions from the survey “The Future of Europe” (2006, p.7-57), Eurobarometer

Questions extracted from the survey	Germany	France	The UK	Belgium
<i>Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. Option: You are happy living in (OUR COUNTRY): Answer: Agree</i>	84%	94%	91%	93%
<i>At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in...? Option: OUR COUNTRY. Answer: Things are going in the right direction</i>	36%	19%	38%	38%
<i>At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in...? Option: the European Union. Answer: Things are going in the right direction</i>	38%	29%	34%	44%
<i>Please tell for each of the following words if it describes very well, fairly well, fairly badly or very badly the idea you might have of the European Union. Option: Inefficient. Answer: Describes well</i>	53%	41%	55%	46%
<i>When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about...? Option: National political matters. Answer: Occasionally</i>	55%	48%	45%	49%
<i>When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about...? Option: European political matters. Answer: Occasionally</i>	60%	45%	42%	46%
<i>Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...? Answer: A good thing</i>	52%	44%	33%	60%
<i>For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level. Option: Fight against unemployment. Answer: More decision making at a European level</i>	56%	50%	25%	65%
<i>For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place</i>	59%	52%	34%	68%

<i>at a European level. Option: The protection of social rights. Answer: More decision making at a European level</i>				
<i>For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level. Option: Ensuring economic growth. Answer: More decision making at a European level</i>	60%	61%	37%	72%
<i>For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level. Option: Ensuring food safety. Answer: More decision making at a European level</i>	65%	74%	52%	79%
<i>For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level. Option: The protection of the environment. Answer: More decision making at a European level</i>	73%	79%	61%	82%
<i>For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level. Option: The promotion of democracy and peace in the world. Answer: More decision making at a European level</i>	80%	84%	63%	87%
<i>For each of the following areas, please tell me if you think that for... Option: political unification of Europe. Answers: A lot + A fair amount has been achieved so far</i>	55%	32%	33%	44%
<i>Which two of the following would you consider to be most helpful if anything, for the future of Europe? Answer: Comparable living standards</i>	48%	53%	47%	46%
<i>Which two of the following would you consider to be most helpful if anything, for the future of Europe? Answer: a common Constitution</i>	32%	29%	17%	36%
<i>Today, each European Union Member State is responsible for its own social welfare system. To what extent would you be in favour or opposed to the harmonisation of social welfare systems within the European Union? Answer: In favour</i>	52%	60%	49%	72%
<i>Using a scale from 1 to 10, how likely would you be to participate in the following? '1' means that you "would definitely not partake" and '10' means that you "would be very likely to partake".</i>	34%	41%	29%	31%

<i>Voting in referenda organised on the same day in all European Member States on European issues. Answer: 10 is very likely to partake</i>				
<i>Could you tell me to what extend you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Option: Overall, the enlargement of the European Union is something positive. Answer: Agree</i>	52%	42%	49%	64%
<i>Could you tell me to what extend you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Further European Union enlargement would increase problems on the (NATIONALITY) job market. Answer: Agree</i>	80%	72%	64%	74%
<i>Could you tell me to what extend you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Option: due to the enlargement of the European Union, many products have become cheaper. Answer: Agree</i>	30%	21%	36%	20%

8.2.2 Material components

The material section of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) integrates capability and opportunity to act. They will be examined in the following two subsections and applied to the case of Germany during the selected timeframe.

8.2.2.1 Capability

Breuning (2011, p.26) defines capability in the National Role Conception flowchart as the “usable power resources, relative to relevant [sic] other states”. “Power resources” can be an elusive term, but here it is considered elements such as economy, strategic resources, and military spending as conditions that affected the capability mechanism (which were also applied to the case of Brazil in Chapter 7). Figure 6, provided by the database of the World Bank, offers the necessary data to be examined in this subsection¹⁷⁸.

The data shows that unemployment decreased in a constant flow in the selected timeframe, from 11.2% in 2005 to 7.7% in 2009. As explained before in this chapter, this was a serious socio-economic issue in Germany throughout the 1990s. The situation started to improve during the Schröder administration (1998-2005), and Merkel’s first mandate started off with this pre-existing economic benefit. Likewise, the growth domestic product (GDP) increased significantly, for in 2005 it rated 0.7% of annual growth and in 2006 it reached 3.8% of annual growth. In the following years, the GDP suffered a significant reduction, reaching - 5.7% in 2009. Furthermore, other macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation, presented a short growth in 2007 and 2008, but dropped considerably in the following year (0.3%), as Figure 6 shows.

This can be explained by the global financial crisis of 2007, which affected the world trade, and consequently had a significant impact on the German economy because of its export-led characteristic (Dauderstädt 2013, p.11). In terms of GDP, the global financial crisis affected Germany more than in other countries, which led “to the deepest recession of the German economy since the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949” (Zohlnhöfer 2014, p.159).

¹⁷⁸ The World Bank. World Development Indicators. Available at <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&country=BRA#advancedDownloadOptions>, accessed on June 29th, 2020.

The relief from the crisis came from above. The situation with the credit crunch of the larger banks was improved with the governmental bailout (Dauderstädt 2013, p.11)¹⁷⁹. Additionally, the government sought to restore confidence in the population towards the banking system, for instance by safeguarding private savings' accounts (Zohlnhöfer 2014, p.159). Thus, Merkel's first mandate gave indications that Germany was starting a path of economic strengthening, despite the global financial crisis, since the "German situation rather results from international contagion than from domestic developments" (Bleuel 2009, p.26). Despite the difficult situation, Germany managed to get through, mostly due to governmental help.

An examination of the data reveals that Merkel proposed the regulation and transparency of financial markets as one of the political goals to be achieved for the EU, for it was a lesson to learn from the financial crisis (see Table 6). She also added the narrative about the social market economy, which was explained in the section *Identity narratives*, as one of the guiding solutions for the financial crisis. In parallel, the chancellor put the Euro as one of the anchors of mitigating the crisis: "we should only imagine what would have happened to us in the financial crisis if we had not had a common currency like the euro - we cannot imagine it" (08-09-2009). In one of her speeches, Merkel also acknowledged Germany's responsibility in salvaging EU's economy, as the largest economy in the bloc (09-02-2009). The narrative about Germany's responsibility was often reverberated in the data, as it was explained in the section *Identity narratives*.

With time, the country became the leading economy in the EU. The days of being called a "sick man of the Euro"¹⁸⁰ seemed to be left behind. According to Dustman et al. (2014, p.168), the economic improvement experienced by Germany throughout Merkel's three cabinets were the results of the legislative labour market reforms adopted in previous years, the so-called "Hartz reforms", and Germany's positive trade balance in the Eurozone.

Undoubtedly, Germany's largest capability is its economic prowess – to the point of being called a "geo-economic power" by Kundnani (2011). He argues that the imbalance in the Eurozone have created a fertile ground for Germany's trade surplus. Thus, "it appears, however, that Germany is not only increasingly defining its national interest in economic terms, but also increasingly using its economic power to impose its own preferences on others in the

¹⁷⁹ For more on the impact of the global financial crisis in Germany's banking system and the consequences of the government bailout, see Dietrich and Vollmer (2012).

¹⁸⁰ *The Economist* (1999). The sick man of the euro. Available at <https://www.economist.com/special/1999/06/03/the-sick-man-of-the-euro>, accessed on July 1st, 2020.

context of a perceived zero—sum competition within the eurozone, rather than to promote greater cooperation in a perceived win—win situation” (ibidem, p.37)¹⁸¹.

Therefore, much of this economic success is due to Germany’s capacity to be an export leader. One of the identity narratives propelled by Merkel was of Germany being an “world-export master”, as Table 6 shows: “as an export nation in Germany, we naturally want to keep our status as export world champions” (20-07-2007). As Figure 6 demonstrates, the percentage of exports of goods and services almost doubled in comparison from 2005 (6.7%) to the following year (12.3%). This number declined significantly in the following years, reaching a point of -14.3% in 2009. Imports also had an important annual growth in 2006 when compared to the previous year, going from 5.9% to 11.1%. The annual growth of imports reduced considerably for the rest of Merkel's first mandate, reaching a low of -9.7% in 2009.

Chapter 5 showed how important Germany is for the EU, particularly in intra-trade relations (see Table 4). Likewise, Germany is the largest contributor of the EU budget. In 2006, Germany accounted for 20.1% of the EU’s budget, followed by France (17.6%), Italy (13.7%), UK (11.3%), and Spain (9.9%)¹⁸². This is directly related to Germany’s economy, since the principle of budget participation is attached to a country’s economic size. In the same way, Germany also benefits from EU’s budget, as it was one of the large recipients of EU funds (over 12 billion Euros in 2006), for it is one of the most populous country in the area¹⁸³.

This would be another positive capability for Germany, as well as having a central geographic position in the continent. Yet, one crucial disadvantage is the large share of elderly population and low birth rates, which could bring consequences to Germany’s fiscal, pension, and health care systems in the long term. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the life expectancy in the selected timeframe was of 79 years, and birth rates in the country were low, in an average of 1.35 fertility rate per women during the same period, according to the World Bank Database¹⁸⁴. However, Germany had the highest rate of economically active population (sum of employed

¹⁸¹ The author suggests that this is more noticeable during the financial crisis, thus in Merkel’s second mandate. In the first mandate, which is analysed in this doctoral thesis, there is no evidence of such a stark economic behaviour by Germany.

¹⁸² European Commission. Press release. 24/09/2007. Budget 2006: Improvement in quality of EU spending is confirmed. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_07_1380, accessed on July 3rd, 2020.

¹⁸³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸⁴ The World Bank Database. Fertility rate, total (births per woman) - Germany. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?end=2010&locations=DE&start=2005>, accessed on July 2nd, 2020.

and unemployed people) in the EU, in an average of forty thousand people for each year of the selected timeframe¹⁸⁵.

The percentage of general government expenditure in the military is considered low - 2.9% for the selected timeframe, as Figure 6 displays. For a comparison, in 2008 this rate was of 4.2% in France and 5.5% in the UK¹⁸⁶. Granted, France and the UK were traditional colonizers and are UNSC permanent members, so it is expected that they would allocate more to military budget. However, this percentage by Germany is congruent to a country that has portrayed the “civilian power” behaviour during most of its post-war history. As explained before in this chapter, Germany shies away from hard power capabilities, but Merkel alluded in her speeches to more involvement by Germany and by the EU in resolving international conflicts (see Table 6). If this were to become true, then more military expenditure would need to be employed.

Therefore, Germany’s major capabilities during Merkel’s first mandate were the strong macroeconomic indicators, as the database from the World Bank indicates. Unemployment was no longer a large social issue, as it had been in the 1990s. With Merkel, economic stability, mostly brought by high exports levels, made possible for the country to eventually become the EU’s paymaster and a key figure in the institution.

¹⁸⁵ European Commission. Eurostat. Active population, aged 15-64 - annual averages. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tipsIm15/default/line?lang=en>, accessed on July 3rd, 2020.

¹⁸⁶ The World Bank Database. Military expenditure (% of general government expenditure) - Germany, France, United Kingdom. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.ZS?end=2009&locations=DE-FR-GB&start=2005>, accessed on July 2nd, 2020.

Figure 6: Selected indicators of Germany during Merkel's first mandate (2005-2009)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Population, total	82,469,422.0	82,376,451.0	82,266,372.0	82,110,097.0	81,902,307.0
Surface area (sq. km)	357,090.0	357,100.0	357,100.0	357,110.0	357,120.0
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	78.9	79.1	79.5	79.7	79.8
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate)	11.2	10.3	8.7	7.5	7.7
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	1.5	1.6	2.3	2.6	0.3
Forest area (sq. km)	113,840.0	113,890.0	113,940.0	113,990.0	114,040.0
GDP growth (annual %)	0.7	3.8	3.0	1.0	-5.7
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)	6.7	12.3	8.9	1.9	-14.3
Imports of goods and services (annual % growth)	5.9	11.1	6.2	2.3	-9.7
Poverty gap at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Military expenditure (% of general government expenditure)	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.9

Source: The World Bank Database.

8.2.2.2 Opportunity to act

Breuning (2011, p.26) defines opportunity to act as “possibilities afforded by circumstances, whether temporary or enduring”. This conceptualization leaves an open room for the researcher to select the criteria that he or she deems necessary. Herein, it is considered the political and economic events that had a strong impact in the EU during the selected timeframe (2005-2009). Those events are considered as opportunities that could deepen or hinder its institutional development. From this, one opportunity to act stand out: the German presidency of the Council of the EU (herein CEU) in 2007, in which the Treaty of Lisbon was negotiated and eventually signed.¹⁸⁷

The CEU is part of the co-decision-making body of the EU in an intergovernmental basis, alongside the Parliament and the European Commission. It negotiates and adopts EU laws, coordinates member-states’ policies, develops the EU’s common foreign and security policy, concludes international agreements, and adopts the EU budget¹⁸⁸. The CEU is constituted by each member-states’ representatives from a ministerial level, and each country holds the presidency for a 6-month term¹⁸⁹. Germany held the presidency of the CEU in January of 2007, which coincided with the negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon, with the motto “Europe succeeds together” (*“Europa gelingt gemeinsam”*).

After the failure of the referenda for an EU constitution, which was rejected in France and in the Netherlands¹⁹⁰, it became necessary to revise the institution’s legal framework. As Chapter 5 has shown, EU’s history is permeated by treaty revisions - Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice. In this sense, the Treaty of Lisbon was negotiated in intergovernmental conferences, in which inter-state bargaining was driven either by domestic concerns, the pre-existence of a document draft, or the willingness to put an end to the institutional predicament, according to

¹⁸⁷ The other moment that would fit in Breuning’s (2011, p.26) definition of opportunity to act would be the Eurozone financial crisis. It began in December of 2009, which does not coincide with Merkel’s first mandate, which ended in October of 2009. For this reason, the Eurozone crisis is not considered here because it would extrapolate the selected timeframe. For the importance of Germany in the Eurozone crisis, see Young, Semmler (2011) and Bulmer (2014).

¹⁸⁸ The Council of the European Union Official website. Available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/>, accessed on July 8th, 2020.

¹⁸⁹ The Council of the European Union Official website. Council configurations. Available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/>, accessed on July 8th, 2020.

¹⁹⁰ Hobolt and Brouard (2011) suggest that the “no” response by the electorate in these countries were the due to specific concerns made during the national campaigns, instead of Euroscepticism or protest voting. For the specific case of France, see Jérôme and Vaillant (2005), and for the case of the Netherlands see Schuck and De Vreese (2008).

Carbone (2009, p.54). The Treaty of Lisbon was eventually signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009¹⁹¹.

The Berlin Declaration of 2007, which celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, was the starting point of the German presidency of the CEU. The document reinforces the values propelled by the EU (peace, freedom, democracy, rule of law), while it acknowledges the challenges faced by the institution and the international community (such as terrorism and xenophobia). It concludes with the idea that it must “renew the political shape of Europe in keeping with the times”¹⁹².

A balance sheet prepared by the *Bundesregierung* after the end of the German CEU presidency states that “the main challenge facing us at the start of our Presidency was to regain and strengthen the confidence of ordinary Europeans in the European Union’s ability to shape events and thus safeguard its viability”¹⁹³. The document also declares that the major achievements of the German presidency were on the areas of treaty reform (Treaty of Lisbon), climate and energy policy (targets of CO2 reduction and energy efficiency), competitiveness and social dimension (Single European Payments Area), justice and home affairs (restrict illegal immigration, terrorism, organized crime), and EU's external relations (ENP, Russia)¹⁹⁴.

The data reveals that in the selected timeframe Merkel extensively reiterated the need to establish a constitutional treaty (Verfassungsvertrag) as a political goal for the EU (see Table 6). Thus, the chancellor repeatedly called for the importance of the constitutional treaty especially during the negotiations and signature phases in 2007, same year of Germany’s presidency of the CEU. The data suggests that the meaning allocated by Merkel to the Treaty of Lisbon was four-fold: i) to draw citizens closer to the institution by allocating competencies, i.e. showing which instance is responsible for specific domains, therefore creating more accountability; ii) the treaty would help bring more ability to act (*Handlungsfähigkeit*) to the EU, which in her own words “means that we are both capable of acting institutionally and that we have transferred the tasks to Europe that can only be solved at European level (14-05-2007)”; iii) the Treaty of Lisbon would bring more democratic

¹⁹¹ For more on the Treaty of Lisbon, see Chapter 5.

¹⁹² The Berlin Declaration of 2007 is available at https://europa.eu/50/docs/berlin_declaration_en.pdf, accessed on July 24th, 2020.

¹⁹³ Bundesregierung, 2007. "Europe - succeeding together". Taking stock of Germany's EU presidency. Available at <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/998440/779498/46b8ddcc16204b3e1f1f5b8360854a45/2007-06-27-bilanz-der-deutschen-eu-ratspraesidentschaft-data.pdf?download=1>, accessed on July 24th, 2020.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

capacities to the EU, for it assigned more powers to the European Parliament; iv) Merkel tied the constitutional treaty to Europe's common values. As explained previously, the identity narrative of the EU being brought together by its common values was recurrently propelled by the chancellor.

According to Bulmer (2010, p.52 emphasis mine), during the CEU presidency it was time for "[...] brokering a solution to the complex political situation of a treaty rejected by two states, approved by many but 'on hold' in some others. The Merkel government was concerned to try and salvage as much as possible and its presidency was successful in achieving that goal. *The German government's role was vital to the emergence of the Lisbon Treaty*". To Maurer (2008, p.53; 56; 57), defining priorities from early on, coordinating effectively with the prior Finnish CEU presidency, having large personnel and administrative resources, being neutral and a credible broker, and the willingness to compromise on other areas in order to guarantee the Treaty of Lisbon were contributors factors for the success of the German presidency.

Therefore, the opportunity to act at the EU level was favourable for Germany, if it wanted to act as a leader. It had both the appropriate circumstances as president of the CEU (if only for a period of six months) and the supportive political narratives of the importance of a constitutional treaty, as the data reveals. The literature supports the argument that the chancellor was a key figure in the negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon. Based on this, Merkel exercised a ***de facto leadership***, stepping up when the opportunity to act (i.e. a crisis) occurred.

Despite significant scope for action, Germany's opportunity to act is contingent to domestic instances, such as the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC, *Bundesverfassungsgericht*), the Lower House of the German Parliament (*Bundestag*), and the federated states (*Länder*), as they have input on how EU policies are applied to the national level. This phenomenon has been called by Harnisch (2009) as the "domestication of German foreign policy", as explained in Chapter 5, in which Germany's ability to act internationally is constrained by such entities. A detailed analysis of these institutions is beyond the objective of this doctoral research. Hence, the goal of the following paragraphs is to briefly reflect on how these said instances could hinder Germany's room for manoeuvre during potential opportunities to act.

The FCC has ruled in favour of the Treaty of Lisbon, but it determined that certain key-areas - for example criminal law, social policies, and the educational system - must be preserved in order to guarantee Germany's sovereignty (Tomuschat 2009, p.1260). To Schorkopf (2009, p.1220), this represents the understanding by the FCC that "combined

democratic theory with a modern understanding of sovereignty". This was not a novice decision regarding the EU, for the FCC had previously ruled on the validity of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Then, as much as the FCC understands the EU as an essential institution, it also safeguarded Germany's legal capacities to decide on vital areas.

There are no institutional ties between the EU and the national parliaments of member-states. Yet, the domestic legislative bodies have the prerogative to debate EU matters, as they discuss, *inter alia*, the implementation of EU-law and the overall goals and policies of the government within the EU (Wendler 2011). In the *Bundestag*, according to Auel and Rittberger (2006, p.135), parliamentarians usually cooperate with the government as to bolster the country's negotiation capabilities in EU organs¹⁹⁵. Rauh (2015) analysed almost 1400 plenary debates in the *Bundestag* between 1991 and 2013 and the results indicate an upsurge in its communicative performance¹⁹⁶ and consequently more authority being delegated to the supranational level. However, this is not a guarantee that there will not be contestation in the *Bundestag* regarding the EU.

A study conducted by Wendler (2011) suggests that there is more approval among *Bundestag* members on issues related to the functioning of the EU (e.g. Treaty of Lisbon, climate and foreign policies) than on issues related to domestic aspects (e.g. how the EU policies affect Germany internally and how the country positions itself in the institution)¹⁹⁷. For this reason, notwithstanding the eventual positions of contestation by parliamentarians and the *Bundestag* legal capacity to ratify or reject EU law domestically, the overall literature suggests a positive relationship between the German Lower House and the EU in the selected

¹⁹⁵ During the federal elections of 2005, the composition of the *Bundestag* resulted in 222 seats for the SPD, 180 for the CDU, 46 for the CSU, 51 for the Greens, 61 for the FDP, and 54 for the Left Party (Der Bundeswahlleiter. Bundestagswahl 2005. Wahl zum 16. Deutschen Bundestag am 18. September 2005. Available at <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2005.html>, accessed on July 21st, 2020).

¹⁹⁶ The author defines communicative performance as the capacity to inform citizens of relevant matters in order to aggregate preferences during elections and to discuss issues internally among parliamentarians as to discuss the collective will (Rauh 2015, p.188). He argues further that "the communicative performance of national parliaments in EU affairs is directly related to the often discussed democratic deficits of supranational governance: if MPs raise European issues, they offer a remedy to the otherwise opaque procedures, the overwhelming complexity, and the difficult attribution of political responsibility in decision-making beyond the nation state. Only where parliamentary activity makes the relevance and alternative interpretations of supranational decisions visible, the subsequent exercise of parliamentary control functions completes the link between domestic electorates and executive decisions in Brussels" (ibidem).

¹⁹⁷ The selected timeframe precedes the creation of the political party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in 2013, which puts forward a Eurosceptic agenda.

timeframe. This is confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which was approved in the *Bundestag* with 515 votes in favour and 58 against¹⁹⁸ – a landslide victory.

The German Basic Law on article 23 guarantees the participation of the *Länder* concerning EU policies¹⁹⁹. According to Suszycka-Jasch and Jasch (2009, p.1253), “general experience seems to suggest that the cooperation between the *Länder* governments and the federal government in formulating German EU-policy has so far generally been rather constructive”²⁰⁰. It is important to note that the EU has a dedicated organ to local and regional levels, which has a say in EU-law-making through consultations, groups, and networks - the Committee of the Regions²⁰¹. And in the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, it gave sub-national levels in EU member-states more participation in the policymaking process as the document, *inter alia*, recognized the existence and importance of regional authorities within the EU (Eppler 2008, p.7). It also promoted a clear differentiation of EU competencies, a request made specifically by the *Länder* (ibidem). The sixteen German *Länder* are represented in the *Bundesrat*, which combined with the *Bundestag* constitute the legislative branch of the federal government. Thus, regions at the national level have been given the capacity to interfere in EU matters. The literature indicates a rather affirmative relation between the *Länder* and the EU, one of cooperation and input in the formulation of the Treaty of Lisbon.

In this realm, the data shows that Merkel put the necessity of the principle of subsidiarity as a political goal for the EU (see Table 6), as discussed previously. The data suggests that the meaning given by Merkel in reference to this principle would be to bring citizens closer to the EU and to dismantle some of the administrative burdens created by the institution (i.e. reduction of bureaucracy), which were themselves two other political goals set out by the chancellor (see Table 6). This is corroborated by phrases such as “[...] the Lisbon Treaty is certainly a treaty with which we have learned from past mistakes in the European

¹⁹⁸ Deutsche Welle. Germany's Bundestag Ratifies the Treaty of Lisbon. April 24th, 2008. Available at <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-bundestag-ratifies-the-treaty-of-lisbon/a-3290334>, accessed on October 13th, 2020.

¹⁹⁹ “(2) The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the *Länder* shall participate in matters concerning the European Union. The Federal Government shall notify the Bundestag of such matters comprehensively and as early as possible” (Deutscher Bundestag 2019, p.28).

²⁰⁰ Despite positive outcomes, to the authors the participation of the *Länder* in EU policy-making could end up “reducing democratic accountability on the whole since it becomes more and more difficult for citizens to attribute executive decisions to the *Länder* or to the federal level. The mechanisms of co-operation described above also facilitate informal arrangements and package-deals between the federal government and the *Länder* which remain beyond public and democratic control” (Suszycka-Jasch, Jasch 2009, p.1254).

²⁰¹ For more on the subnational influence on the EU, see Cole (2005).

Union too, which creates more subsidiarity, which gives national parliaments a greater say, and which better ensures that competences be divided up in such a way that *only that which really belongs to Europe migrates to Europe and that what can be better solved or closer to people at the local or national level remains there*" (20-10-2008, emphasis mine).


This serves to show that Merkel forwarded political goals that valued the importance of national capacity to regulate EU by resolving issues domestically. On the one hand, this could create a breeding ground for national institutions, such as the ones discussed in previous paragraphs, to evaluate the benefits brought by the EU. On the other hand, setting a division between the national *versus* the supranational serves to ease the concerns of those afraid of losing national sovereignty to a "super" EU.

Therefore, the national institutions that could eventually hinder the Treaty of Lisbon, namely the FCC, the *Bundestag*, and the *Länder*, did not create obstacles for its ratification. In this context, the FCC safeguarded key-areas in which Germany would remain sovereign, the vast majority of *Bundestag* voted in favour of the treaty, and the *Länder* were consulted in the drafting of the treaty and they gained more powers under it.

Thus, despite having national instances which could exert constraints, the opportunity to act, namely presiding the Council of the EU during the negotiation for the Treaty of Lisbon, was a favourable leadership opportunity for Germany. The literature corroborates that the German presidency was a key element in facilitating the agreement on the Treaty of Lisbon. Moreover, the data reveals that Merkel propelled narratives and political goals that appraised the need for a constitutional treaty, which broadened Germany's scope for action.

Figure 7 below illustrates the results generated by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26). The main findings will be discussed in the next section.

Figure 7: Role Theory according to agent-structure dynamics (Breuning, 2011, p.26, adapted) applied to Germany in the EU (2005-2009)



8.3 Final remarks

This chapter provided an overview of Merkel's first mandate when it comes to foreign policy, as it also considered how elements such as domestic conditions, history, and diplomatic traditions affected the German policymaking towards the EU. It applied the National Role Conception flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26) to the case of Germany as an agent in the structure of the EU and its results.

The National Role Conception of Germany toward the EU under Merkel's first mandate is one of acknowledgment of its increased responsibility in the EU, given its material capabilities. Merkel understood the past and its consequences, but propelled narratives that prized the need for moving forward. For the chancellor, the EU is, above all, a community of values – and they are basilar to the EU's identity and for the functioning of the institution. Yet, the role conception of Germany towards the EU in the selected timeframe does not fully support the role of leadership, as the identity narratives propelled by the chancellor confirm. As the formation of the role conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) shows, Germany had the necessary prerequisites for exercising regional leadership (domestic audience, capability, and opportunity to act), but lacked in the ideational components (identity and cultural heritage). Thus, the elements raised by this analytical scheme explain the research puzzle, rather than the role conception alone.

In this context, this chapter has shown that Germany's state identity was highly influenced by historical conditioning such as separation and reintegration of its territory. Therefore, the formation of the nation-state was a late phenomenon, which shifted the focus of identity-building process on the individual rather than on the state, guided by constructs such as *Humanität*, *Bildung* and *Kultur*. After the Second World War, Germany's state identity was tied to multilateral institutions, characterized by the "culture of restraint" and the "civilian power" archetype, as means of suppressing any potential of evoking its ultra-nationalist and bellicose past. After reunification, many questioned if Germany would begin to "normalize" its foreign policy and start behaving like its European counterparts.

The data demonstrated, under the section *Identity narratives*, that Merkel put values at the core of EU's identity and a fundamental aspect to the functioning of the institution. The values that were detected in the data were, *inter alia*, freedom, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. From those, tolerance stood out, as the chancellor reiterated the narrative that tolerance was "the soul of Europe". Aligned with the interpretivist tradition, the meaning gathered from this is that, to the chancellor, the identity of the EU is still ingrained with historical experience. In the past, the lack of tolerance led European countries to many wars; nowadays, tolerance is key towards dealing with the crises and challenges imposed by

the integration. Likewise, the values placed by Merkel as the foundation of the EU – democracy, human rights, rule of law – are the by-product of a region which found itself through centuries in armed conflicts. In the same manner, when the chancellor claims that values are the foundation of the EU, it is a homogenization of unequals – EU members are diverse, but at least they have values in common as a uniting aspect.

The data also revealed identity narratives related to the increased responsibility for Germany in the EU given the country's size and economy, but there were no references to regional leadership. It is important to note that, for the role of a leader, self-image is a crucial component – i.e. it is necessary for a country to see itself in this way. And, consequently, to convey messages for being in charge or, at least, of wanting to. No such case was found in the selected data. Thus, it can be concluded that Merkel did not exercise discursive leadership in the selected timeframe.

In the same vein, Merkel propelled narratives of how the demographic reduction of European population, when compared to world's population, meant that the EU need a more cohesive approach in foreign affairs, as to speak in unison when defending common interests and values worldwide. Merkel also had conveyed narratives placing the social market economy as the baseline for Germany's economic success. To the chancellor, the EU should apply this economic model especially in times of crises.

This chapter has analysed in the section *Cultural Heritage* a clash of paradigms between the "culture of restraint" *versus* the "normalization" in foreign policy. During Merkel's first cabinet, the data indicates that the first paradigm prevailed, despite the chancellor acknowledging the importance of the EU in bringing peace and stability to conflicting areas in the world. The data also suggests that the narratives of "never again war" and "never again alone", traditional to Germany's foreign policy, were discursively transferred to the EU, claiming for the institution's pacifist quality (derived from its history of armed conflicts) as well as promoting the bilateral cooperation of the EU with traditional partners, such as the United States and Russia. Thus, the overall meaning one could gather from the data was that Merkel accepted the past, learnt from its lessons, and moved on.

The data provided by the Eurobarometer indicated that Germany's *domestic audience* was generally receptive towards the EU, but not to a large majority. This is corroborated by the results of the opinion polls, which were in a range of 50-60% of approval, which does not constitute a vast majority. Although negative attributes by respondents generally ranked low, one rather surprising indicator was that 80% of individuals agreed that further enlargement would increase problems in the national job market. This is a significant number to consider in matters of potential xenophobia or Euroscepticism. Overall, the domestic audience in Merkel's first mandate had an either positive or neutral image toward the EU, as the data reveals. The

respondents understood the EU's benefits as bringing peace, enabling the free movement of people, goods, and services, and they associated the institution with the Euro.

The section *Capability* analysed the data provided by the World Bank. It showed that Germany had better macroeconomic indicators, despite the global financial crisis. Moreover, in her first mandate Merkel benefited from more a more stable scenario than in the 1990s, a decade in which policymakers had to deal with the socio-political demands and consequences of the reunification. Germany was no longer "the sick man of the Euro". Being one of the top economies in the EU brought Germany the necessary symbolic advantage and political capital to push forward EU's institutional development. Hence, the material capabilities positively enabled the country to perform regional leadership, if it so wished.

The best *opportunity to act* in the EU during the selected timeframe was Germany presiding the Council of the EU during the negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon. The literature indicates how crucial Merkel was in regard to brokering and mediating the discussions. The data gathered by this research reveals that the chancellor reiterated narratives about the importance of approving the Treaty. Specifically, the allocated meaning in Merkel's speeches was, *inter alia*, that the Treaty would made clear divisions between EU competencies, which would bring citizens closer to the institution and strengthen the principle of subsidiarity; the Treaty would make the EU more democratic, as it gave more powers to the European Parliament; and Merkel connected the document to EU's core common values. Therefore, this opportunity to act presented both the scope for leadership action and the repeated narratives to substantiate the approval of the Treaty of Lisbon. Thus, the chancellor performed a *de facto leadership*, exercising leadership during a time of crisis.

In conclusion, the results obtained by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) help to explain the research puzzle presented in Chapter 1. The main findings reveal that despite favourable circumstances for regional leadership – a *domestic audience* that was overall pro-EU, increased economic *capabilities*, and optimal *opportunity to act* as being the president of the Council of the EU during the negotiation for the Treaty of Lisbon – the *identity* and the *cultural heritage* of Germany do not comply with the role of a regional leader. Both elements were still subject to historical conditioning. As this chapter has shown, the identity narratives propelled by Merkel put values (and specifically, tolerance) as the basilar component of the EU.

In the same manner, in the selected timeframe the cultural heritage still influenced Germany's foreign policymaking, the archetype of "civilian power" and the precepts of "culture of restraint" and "never again war" remained. Although Merkel propelled for a new-found responsibility of Germany, given its size and economic capabilities, the chancellor was not vocal about Germany's role as a leader – any references of being a regional leader were not

present in the data. Therefore, Germany's identity and cultural heritage in the selected timeframe were not encouraging for performing the role of regional leader.

As explained in previous chapters, in future research one can apply the results obtained here by the role conception to specific cases in order to define which role the country portrays – or, in other words, one will be able to thus characterize the foreign policy behaviour of Germany in the EU during the selected timeframe. But the largest added value of this research lies on the flowchart capacity to explain the research puzzle.

Thus, the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) demonstrated that Germany had the favourable elements for exercising regional leadership (domestic audience, capability, and opportunity to act) – except for identity and cultural heritage, which remain tied to historical conditioning of restraint and of civilizing international affairs.

Consequently, this explains the puzzle of why in matters of regional leadership, Germany has it, but does not want it. It does not want it because it is not aligned with its state identity and cultural heritage.

Chapter 9 – Proposing an interpretivist comparison

After the previous two empirical chapters, this present chapter comes as a way to unite the results obtained by each individual case and, consequently, to compare them. As explained in Chapters 1 and 4, the comparison advanced by this research is not akin to the usual comparative designs in the positivist camp. Said comparative research designs would, for example, employ methods such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) or Process Tracing, which differs enormously from what is proposed here.

Because this present doctoral thesis is fostered by an interpretivist epistemology, this research proposes an ***interpretivist comparison***, one that is not based on selected variables that aim to create generalizability and causal inference. ***The objective here is to advance a comparative approach (but not a comparative research design) that seeks to understand the produced meanings of the agents (Brazil and Germany) performed by the actors (Lula and Merkel) under a given structure (MERCOSUR and the EU).***

In this sense, this present doctoral thesis does not try to establish similar and generalizable patterns among Brazil and Germany, but it sees both cases from their singular, unique, and historical conditions. Therefore, the comparison postulated here follows the precepts established by Interpretivism – contextuality, historicity, and the search for meaning. As this present research follows the interpretivist epistemological tradition, it would be illogical to apply positivists assumptions and goals that aim at falsifiable and predictive results. To put it simply, this doctoral thesis falls on the interpretive camp and pursuing any research goals outside of it would be unreasonable.

Thus, this interpretivist comparison²⁰² focuses on the results that come out of the data rather than on previous set of established conditions. Additionally, the focus lies on the ideational aspects of both cases, such as identity and identity narratives, and the meanings they produce. Likewise, this interpretivist comparison will also be applied to the role conceptions of both countries, which resulted from the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26). A discussion (with a comparative vein) on discursive leadership and *de facto* leadership, which were results from the data, is also available in this chapter.

As studies that employ an interpretivist comparison are still underrepresented in the literature, this doctoral thesis hopes to advance a new methodological approach to the field of Interpretivist epistemology. Furthermore, it serves to show that comparisons can be drawn outside of the positivist realm – thus, without having to rely on a fixed set of conditions formed at the beginning of the research, but rather to compare based on the results generated by the

²⁰² Herein, “interpretive” and “interpretivist” are used interchangeably.

data; without creating research designs that privilege similarities or differences, but to foster a comparison that values the complexity of the human condition, therefore knowing that similarities or differences are intrinsic parts of the social world and cannot be duplicated; without having to resort to conditions that create results aimed at generalizability, but one that understands and encourages the value of contextuality.

This chapter is divided in three sections. The first section comprises the dialogue between interpretivist epistemology and the comparative method, while it explains the interpretivist comparative approach proposed here. The second section applies said approach to the cases of Brazil and Germany, and it is subdivided in five categories: the first three related to the similar results obtained by both cases (autonomy, self-confidence, and responsibility); the fourth one compares the National Role Conceptions of the cases, and the fifth and final sub-section interpretively compares discursive leadership and *de facto* leadership, which were obtained by the data. The third section is devoted to the final remarks of this chapter.

9.1 Interpretivist epistemology and comparison

Much of this has been debated in Chapter 4, but it becomes necessary to reiterate certain arguments. Usually, studies that rely on interpretivist epistemology do not place comparison as a central method. As Yanow (2014, p.143) explains, “comparison, from an interpretive perspective, cannot begin by presuming equivalences between or among polities”. In the same vein, “the need for a comparative research design that stipulates *a priori* points of comparison appears to be driven by the desire to generalize findings across cases; and the need to generalize entails establishing causal relationships of a particular, mechanistic sort. All of these are conceptually and methodologically problematic from the perspective of interpretive research” (ibidem, p.148).

Still according to Yanow (ibidem, p.144), contextuality and historicity are key components to interpretive research, for “interpretive research refuses to lose the local or historical specificities from which concepts emerge”. In this way, aligned with the interpretivist tradition, each case is seen as a unique occurrence in the world, bounded to historical circumstances, political processes, and social contexts. Thus, “contextuality” (Schwartz-Shea; Yanow 2012) is a central point of departure.

Thus, this doctoral thesis proposes an ***interpretivist comparative analysis***, one that values the context-driven importance of interpretivist research and, therefore, does not seek to establish generalizable patterns. As explained by Yanow (2014, p.149), “[...] pursuing an abductive logic of inquiry, the interpretive comparative policy (or other) analyst would look for additional settings relevant to the policy element being tracked which might shed further light

on the initial 'surprise', showing further, even unanticipated, dimensions of the subject of study". Therefore, an interpretive comparison denotes a different kind of comparison than the one put forth by positivist studies, one that should account for the individualities of the case and the meanings produced by it. In the same vein, as argued by Boswell et al. (2019, p.145), "typically, when interpretivists compare they do so implicitly. They draw parallels or analogies between cases to help them understand their case".

Attempts to engage interpretive epistemology with comparative methodology have been done before, although they remain scarce. Boswell et. al (2019) have urged interpretivist scholars to engage with comparison – and as they call it, a "comparative interpretive analysis". To the authors, "interpretive research offers a distinctive approach to channelling the comparative intuition because it consciously offers interpretations of interpretations. It concentrates on meanings, beliefs and discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, correlations between social categories, or deductive models" (ibidem, p.15). The chief tenet of the interpretive comparison approach propelled by the authors are the dilemmas that are generated by agents in a social setting. Dilemmas, according to the authors, are new ideas that compete with current traditions or social practices.

Therefore, one could argue that this comparative interpretive approach focuses on how old and new dilemmas are socially confronted by individuals. Then, the comparison would be instrumentalized after "having identified these dilemmas in particular contexts, we then see whether they share a family resemblance with other actors in different circumstances" (ibidem, p.148). By doing so, the authors argue, it would be possible to "creatively explain similarities and differences between even the most unlikely of actors and situations, rendering the exotic familiar and the familiar exotic" (ibidem).

Although comparing dilemmas is not the best fit for this present research, as it would entail analysing previous governments, the lines of interpretive comparison suggested by Boswell et. al (2019) served as a general guide. The authors do not suggest a fixed template for comparison, but the attention is turned towards *thematic* rather than contextual arrangements, in which "the writing is organised in recurring themes across the field research, with the nuances of different cases coming and going across the broader narrative" (ibidem, p.120). In the same vein, the writing of the findings will follow in a *linear style* (ibidem, p.122), while presenting *thick description* that aims at analytical depth (ibidem). This served as a guideline for the interpretivist comparison propelled here, as the following sections will show.

From this, one can gather that the traditional model of comparison used by positivists cannot be applied to interpretivists studies because the epistemological tenets are utterly dissimilar. Hence, it becomes necessary to promote a comparative approach that is aligned with the interpretivist episteme. This is one of the research goals of this doctoral thesis.

9.2 Applying an interpretivist comparison

The goal of this section is to analyse the comparison that can be drawn from the cases of Brazil and Germany. In accordance with the epistemological stance adopted here, this comparison is focused on the meaning generated by the actors and not on models that postulate previously chosen criteria in order to produce generalizable results. Hence, an interpretivist comparison is advanced here. It espouses one of the core tenets of Interpretivism, which is that contextuality is essential to the analysis. Thus, the cases of Brazil and Germany are not reproducible nor transferrable to different political contexts, but exclusive to the selected timeframe and institutional scope. The results gathered by this research cannot even be equated to Lula's and Merkel's second mandates, as the circumstances (and thus generated meaning) would be different.

In this regard, some parallels can be made between the cases of Brazil and Germany. Three common topics appeared in the data, namely under the section *Identity* of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26): autonomy, self-confidence, and responsibility. It is surprising that the same characteristics related to state identity would appear to countries that are so different, albeit played in unique ways. And, in the end, these three elements are linked and they constitute the lion's share of Brazil's and Germany's identity. To both cases, the narratives remained the same, regardless if they were present in speeches given to national or international audiences. These qualities will be discussed in the following sub-sections.

9.2.1 Autonomy

In the case of Brazil, autonomy appeared frequently in the data as political narratives propelled by Lula. It concerns the cultural heritage of being a colony and then economically interdependent to traditional powers (e.g. the United States). The president often reiterated the identity narrative that Brazil should be autonomous – in the sense of being independent – from foreign interference in national affairs, as a way to promote its own vision of foreign policy. Lula also transferred this concept of autonomy to how South America, in general, should conduct its foreign policymaking.

In the case of Germany, the word “autonomy” did not appear in the data, but its meaning can be inferred. The chancellor often made references to Germany's past – either to the world wars and to the country's division – and of how Germany can now enjoy freedom,

peace, and democracy. Thus, the meaning of autonomy can be juxtaposed to the concept of “liberty”.

9.2.2 Self-confidence

Another interesting common feature to appear in the data for both countries was the issue of self-confidence. The identity narrative depicted by Lula was that Brazil should be self-confident (in the sense of being conscientious) of its capacity to be a significant global player. To the president, the country possesses the necessary requirements for such role. Self-confidence would also be required among MERCOSUR members, according to the president. Fellow countries would need confidence in the ability of the institution to bring economic and political benefits. To Lula, this Mercosulian self-confidence among members would consequently make international markets have credibility in MERCOSUR.

In the data, self-confidence was represented in Merkel's speeches in the EU's awareness of its positive traits (security, peace, human rights, education, democratic resolution of conflicts, social market economy), but especially in the institution's capacity to surpass difficult times. Said self-confidence would either be held by member-states or by citizens. A similar mindset was reference to Germany's self-confidence in Merkel's discourse.

9.2.3 Responsibility

The third and final common feature to appear in Lula's and Merkel's speeches, which can be associated with regional leadership, is responsibility. The president and the chancellor were aware of the larger capabilities of their respective countries and how it should translate to being supportive (or even generous) to fellow member-states. In the case of Brazil, this benefactor role would be performed via payments from the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) to less-developed countries in MERCOSUR. Thus, Lula claimed for the country to act as a paymaster, which is an open declaration of leadership. As explained, the discursive leadership did not translate to *de facto* leadership.

In the case of Germany, Merkel recognized the increased responsibility of Germany in the EU. But the chancellor did not make any references to the country being a leader. As elucidated, Germany's *de facto* leadership was not based on a discursive leadership. In this realm, Merkel referenced the EU's responsibility in bringing peace and stability to conflicting areas in the world, given the region's past. Thus, the governments of Brazil and Germany in

the selected timeframes were aware of the responsibility bestowed upon them in the institutional settings of MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively. But this discursive responsibility was transferred differently to actual behaviour, as clarified before.

In this sense, Brazil and Germany shared common aspects in regard to state identity. Additionally, Lula and Merkel have represented MERCOSUR and the EU with the same attribute – as a destination. The data reveals that the Brazilian president declared, “MERCOSUR is more than an option, but a destination” (17-12-2004). Similarly, Merkel used the same analogy: “Europe is our common destiny and our common future” (14-04-2008). One could argue that this is an allegorical reference often used by policymakers. However, MERCOSUR and the EU are the results of long periods of institutional trial and error. They have survived times of stagnation, crises, and reconfiguration. Discursively yearning for the institutions to reach its final “destination” means that Lula and Merkel desired institutional development. Fulfilling its “common destiny” is to reach a stage where institutional blockages no longer need to be overcome. Therefore, the meaning inferred from this analogy is of institutional development, a common characteristic to the president’s and chancellor’s speeches.

9.2.4 Comparison of national role conceptions

Furthermore, an interpretive comparison of the National Role Conceptions of Brazil and Germany should also be presented here. With the help of the flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26), the role conceptions were defined as follows: Brazil saw itself as an autonomous country and willing to reconstruct MERCOSUR, with new-found capabilities but undesiring to mediate and interfere in regional conflicts. Germany saw itself with new responsibilities in the EU because of the country's capabilities. The country acknowledged its past and understood the EU as a community of values.

As explained previously, both countries shared the same trait of a new-found responsibility given the greater capabilities they possess, when compared to neighbours. In the same vein, this analytical scheme was responsible for explaining the research puzzle. Brazil does not have regional leadership because it does not exercise it when necessary, as the component *Opportunity to act* has demonstrated. And Germany does not want regional leadership because it is not congruent to the country’s *identity* and *cultural heritage*, as the namesake components of the flowchart have shown.

9.2.5 Discursive leadership versus *de facto* leadership

Thus, it can be established a parallel between identity and behaviour concerning regional leadership based on the results obtained by this present research. As the cases of Brazil and Germany show, there should be a combination between the discourse of being a leader, which includes self-awareness and self-proclamation of such a role, and the *de facto* performance of leadership, which encompasses stepping up in times of crises. Both Brazil and Germany did not present a combination of these two traits. Brazil only reproduced a discursive leadership, lacking in *de facto* leadership; and Germany only performed a *de facto* leadership and lacked in discursive leadership.

Each one of these categories brings benefits to a regional institution, although the second definition propels for actual results. The cases analysed here showed that Lula often advocated for the improvement and institutional development of MERCOSUR. This is beneficial to any regional institution, especially the ones which are still in developmental phases. Reiterating the need for change during summits or bilateral encounters between presidents of MERCOSUR creates common goals and fosters a political agenda for the institution. But as the proverbial “talk is cheap” indicates, only raising an issue during a speech does not lead to actual results. Therefore, a *discursive leadership* should be united to a *de facto leadership*.

As much as a *de facto* leadership brings tangible results, a country that only acts as a leader but does not see itself as such runs the risk of employing a passive foreign policy. A mismatch between discourse and action could lead to initiatives that only err on the side of caution. Germany could start changing its identity and propelling narratives that put the country at the forefront, which would not instigate scepticism or resentment from its peers. The EU went through challenging times in the past fifteen years, and having a country which presents itself as a rescuer (in intergovernmental fora) alleviates tension. As the main findings here suggest, Germany had all the necessary components for exercising leadership – domestic audience, capabilities, and opportunities to act. All it needed was seeing itself as a leader and representing this role in its identity narratives, thus performing a *de facto leadership* combined with a *discursive leadership*.

9.3 Final remarks

This doctoral thesis put forward an interpretivist comparison that focuses on the meanings produced by the agents. The interpretive comparison fostered here has, above all, a representational aspect, i.e. an emphasis on how agents represent the issues that come from the data. In the present cases, the representations were construed on the self-perception of states and of regional institutions. This interpretivist comparison primarily respects contextuality and, consequently, does not adopt models of most different/most similar research designs, as it does not intent on creating generalizable patterns.

Thus, the interpretivist comparison advanced by this research focuses on the results gathered by the data and not on a set of previously established variables or conditions. In this sense, this comparative approach is intuitive, which is vital for understanding the meaning that is present in the data.

What one can learn from the interpretivist comparative approach promoted here is that there are alternatives for comparison that do not necessarily need to postulate positivist tenets. A comparison can focus on meaning generated by the actors, after a careful analysis of the data. With this approach, the framework for comparison should not be established *a priori*, instead being guided by the affordable circumstances for comparison enabled by the results.

Thus, the efforts brought by this research bring a new alternative for methodological approaches in the realm of Interpretivist epistemology. Future research can apply the framework adopted here to different case studies and combining it with different methodologies, thus strengthening its comparative potential.

Chapter 10 – Conclusion

This present research was motivated by the observation of a thought-provoking puzzle, which came from the examination of the literature concerning the regional leadership roles of Brazil and Germany. In this regard, Brazil was often classified as a “consensual hegemon” (Burgess 2008) and a “leader without followers” (Malamud 2011). In its turn, the literature labelled Germany as a “reluctant hegemon” (Paterson 2011) and as a “benign hegemon” (Morisse-Schilbach 2011).

In this context, authors argued that Brazil claimed for being a leader in South America, but failed to count on the support of its neighbours. According to a large part of the literature, Germany was asked by its European peers to act as a leader, but eschewed from recognizing itself as one. Hence, the research puzzle came to fruition - in matters of being a regional leader, a contrast was found between Brazil and Germany that no other countries in their respective region presented: Brazil wanted it, but could not have it; Germany had it, but did not want it. Thus, the quest for explaining this puzzle guided this doctoral thesis.

But rather than focusing exclusively on which role(s) both countries played in their region or even disputing the existing categories of roles created by the literature, this research delved on examining the elements that influence the development of potential role(s). For this, concentrating on role conceptions proved to be the best approach. The framework created by Breuning (2011, p.26) considered ideational and material components, which converge into the role conception, which is “defined by [the] decision maker and relevant to issue area and geographic domain” (*ibidem*).

In this sense, the research question presented here is of how National Role Conceptions were developed in relation to regional institutions during the mandates of Lula (2003-2006) and Merkel (2005-2009). The study of role conceptions is embedded in the framework of Role Theory, and the flowchart originally conceived by Breuning (2011, p.26) was tested here as a theoretical model.

As this research concentrates on regional leadership, the selection of regional institutions became necessary in order to narrow the scope of analysis and the process of data collection. In South America, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) is the largest trade bloc, and in Europe the European Union (EU) presents the most advanced case of institutionalization. Both institutions are amongst the leading trade blocs in the world, and they are also traditional bilateral partners. In this realm, this study has argued that one should bring the level of analysis to key member-states, as they can push or hinder the development of

regional integration processes. By doing so, one can understand the hidden drivers of regionalism, as states create institutions but end up being restrained by them – which is the paradox of regionalism.

From observing this paradox, this research noted that states and regional institutions are co-constituted, which is an approach often employed by Constructivism in the realm of International Relations. In the context of this study, states are the agents and regional institutions are the structures. This research also espouses the constructivist notion of reality being socially constructed.

Therefore, this doctoral thesis is founded on constructivist ontology, and it also adopts an interpretivist epistemology. To this tradition, finding the meaning generated by the actors is of outmost importance. Likewise, interpretivist scholarship does not search for generalizable results, nor it is focused on creating grand comparable schemes. Contextuality is the guiding principle of Interpretivism. Thus, this research employed a constructivist-interpretivist approach, which influenced how this academic endeavour was conducted – from the initial observation of the research puzzle to the selection and analysis of the data.

In this sense, based on the analytical scheme of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) under the section “Identity”, the official speeches of Lula and Merkel were selected in order to verify how they portrayed the identities of their respective countries and regional institutions. The speeches were available in the Brazilian and German official government websites. They were screened in regard to the respective timeframes, collected, and analysed in the realm of Narrative Analysis. As a result, 174 speeches were selected as the final data for the “Identity” element alone. For the other elements of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26), data from the World Bank, Latinobarómetro, and Eurobarometer were applied.

In lieu of a comparative design, this doctoral thesis proposed an interpretive comparison, one that focused on the meanings generated by the actors in a given structure rather than on pre-established criteria in a comparative research design.

The next sections will discuss these aspects in more detail.

10.1 Contributions to the field

This present academic endeavour adds to the overall literature of Foreign Policy Analysis and Regionalism. Specifically, it is a novel contribution to studies in the area of Role Theory in International Relations, for most studies focused on the performance of roles rather

than on how said roles were constituted. This doctoral thesis was devoted to the formation of role conceptions of key-countries in regional institutions, an approach that had not been adopted before. Additionally, this research contributes to the area of South American and European studies.

In this sense, this doctoral thesis provides a narrative analysis of a large set of speeches given by Lula (70 documents) and Angela Merkel (104 documents) during their first mandates. This method was employed in the analysis of the sections *Identity*, *Cultural heritage*, and *Opportunity to act* established by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26). The sections *Domestic audience* and *Capabilities* had the auxiliary data provided by Latinobarómetro, Eurobarometer, and the World Bank. Thus, each component of the role conception diagram offers interesting analysis. Together, all components form the National Role Conception, which serves as a framework in which Brazil and Germany operated in relation to MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively. Thus, this doctoral thesis brings an analytical option for understanding how roles were conceived and, ultimately, performed in regional institutions.

In this regard, this present research tested the analytical scheme for the creation of national role conceptions proposed originally by Breuning (2011, p.26) as a theoretical model. Here, this model proved to be effective because it explained the research puzzle. More testing would need to be reproduced by future research in order to strengthen its viability. Nonetheless, this study brings the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) as a viable analytical option for the examination of role conceptions.

Finally, this doctoral thesis applied an interpretivist comparison to the selected cases, an approach that has not received enough scholarly attention. This type of comparison focuses on the meaning generated by the agents rather than on specific pre-established criteria. Therefore, this present study offers a methodological choice for studies within the realm of Interpretive epistemology.

10.2 Results, main findings, and implications

The goal of this present research was to examine how the role conception of Brazil and Germany towards MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively, were developed during the mandates of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006) and Angela Merkel (2005-2009). It was argued here that the best approach to explain the research puzzle was through the development of role conceptions rather than focusing on roles exclusively.

The results generated by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) are an interesting tool towards understanding the behaviour of states toward certain issues or areas. This analytical scheme considers ideational and material components that converge into the role conception, which works as an “image” held by the policymaker of how the country should perform in an international environment. As defined by Breuning (ibidem), “the national role conception framework places its emphasis here: it seeks to understand how actors fashion their role in the international system, navigating between domestic sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advantage of the material resources at their disposal, circumnavigating as best as possible the obstacles imposed by their position in the international structure”. In the same vein, “decision makers form their conceptions of their state's role on the basis of both their understanding of the state's identity and cultural heritage, and their perception of their state's place and possibilities within the international system” (ibidem).

As it will be discussed in the following two sub-sections, the mechanisms proposed by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) can help explain the research puzzle. At the same time, the end results obtained by applying the flowchart, more specifically the role conceptions of Brazil and Germany, do not fully support the role of regional leaders. Thus, the research puzzle was explained by the *process of formation* of the role conception (the individual mechanisms of the flowchart) rather than the role conception alone. This is the added value of the analytical framework proposed by Marijke Breuning, which will be discussed more in depth in section 9.4.

In this context, the results can be divided in two categories: the ones that arose from each category established by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26), which on their own bring important data that can also be used separately in future research; and the general role conception produced by the conjunction of the same categories. They will be analysed in detail in sub-sections 9.2.1 (for the case of Brazil) and 9.2.2 (for the case of Germany).

Usually, studies on Role Theory create “catchy-terms” to refer to the certain roles enacted by countries – which could be, for example, “the defender”, “the auxiliary”, “the subjugator”. As Chapters 7 and 8 have shown, this was not be the case with the role conceptions in the selected cases. Here, role conceptions were taken as conceptual and analytical scheme that explains the formation of roles. Therefore, role conceptions have more explanatory rather than descriptive power, and cannot be summarized by a single word, like roles usually can.

In this sense, both strands of results regarding Brazil and Germany will be discussed in the ensuing two-subsections. Each sub-section will also take into consideration the implication of the results for MERCOSUR and for the EU, respectively.

10.2.1 Brazil

As mentioned before, each individual component of the National Role Concept proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26) showcase significant results.

By analysing the 70 selected speeches given by Lula during the selected timeframe and with the help of Narrative Analysis, it was discovered that the *Identity* of Brazil was, according to the president, of an autonomous country with a new-found self-esteem, which was willing to act in MERCOSUR as a paymaster to the benefit of smaller member-states. In this regard, the main findings indicate that, for the president, MERCOSUR needed to be reconstructed. Aligned with the interpretivist tradition, the meaning gathered from the data was that, for Lula, MERCOSUR in its previous stages was deteriorated, and this can be concluded by his choice of words – only something that is destroyed needs to be reconstructed. Similarly, this narrative can be understood as a criticism to preceding governments for not supporting MERCOSUR in regard to its institutional development.

Furthermore, for the president reconstructing MERCOSUR meant gathering confidence from fellow members that the institution brings socio-economic and political benefits. Thus, reconstruction meant earning confidence in MERCOSUR utility. Said confidence would then be transferred to countries outside of the region, which would elevate MERCOSUR's political capital and attract foreign investments.

The *Cultural heritage* that the Lula administration inherited depicted Brazil as a socially economic stratified society, with high levels of social inequality and racial prejudice derived from the colonization period. In a similar vein, the cultural heritage represented Brazil as miscegenated country, in which there is peaceful conviviality among multiple ethnicities. The data, the same used for the identity narratives, reveal that to Lula those characteristics were present in his official discourse as markers of state identity. Moreover, the president indicated that he would like for Brazil to surpass the archetype of the “mongrel complex”, which denotes inferiority, to become the “country of the future”, which signifies progress.

With data provided by Latinobarómetro, it was disclosed that the *Domestic audience* during the selected timeframe was not well-acquainted with the formation of regional integration schemes. This is understandable because regional institutions at large and MERCOSUR in particular do not influence the everyday lives of citizens in South America – unlike the EU, which has a direct affect in all areas and therefore exercises more symbolic representation. Yet, the data showed that respondents were open towards the formation of regional institutions, which would give the Lula administration fertile ground for fostering existing regional institutions and for creating new ones.

By applying the database from the World Bank, it was shown that Brazil improved the socio-economic *capabilities* during Lula's first mandate by increasing its macroeconomic indicators. The country also managed to repay the foreign debt from the IMF in the same timeframe. Naturally, a state that is struggling economically will not consider regional leadership. Thus, these improved capabilities gave ample room for Brazil to perform a leadership role in MERCOSUR, if it was so inclined.

The *Opportunity to act* revealed that, despite having an open space left by the USA (which was more attentive towards the Middle East), Lula did not exercise a leadership role when the opportunities arose, namely in the "papeleras crisis" and in the nationalization of gas in Bolivia, an associate member of MERCOSUR. In the former, Brazil had the chance to act as a mediator, but refrained from doing so. In the latter, it showed passivity rather than assertiveness. As it has been argued by this doctoral thesis, a leader must be willing to pay the cost of leadership – to claim its interests and to run the risk of dissatisfying others. Brazil under Lula was unwilling to burden such a cost.

In this sense, the National Role Conception of Brazil towards MERCOSUR portrays the country as autonomous, willing to reconstruct the institution, with new-found capabilities, but undesiring to mediate or interfere in regional conflicts. Thus, the role conception of Brazil towards MERCOSUR was not fully congruent to the role of regional leader.

Additionally, the results derived from the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) also shows that, notwithstanding auspicious elements for exercising leadership - identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience, capabilities - the country was undesiring to act as a mediator in regional disputes nor to actively defend its interests, which was revealed by the flowchart component *Opportunity to act*. The Lula administration was unwilling to pay the costs of leadership and to step up in times of need. Therefore, this explains the research puzzle regarding regional leadership - "Brazil wants it, but cannot have it". It cannot have it because it does not step up when opportunities to act arise.

This also suggests that regional leadership is not only exercised discursively, but conditional to the factual performance of leadership in times of crises. To illustrate, the data reveals that Lula often claimed that Brazil would act as a leader in South America and would perform as a paymaster in MERCOSUR. In reality, as the results derived from the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) demonstrate, said discourse about leadership did not transfer to actual leadership when the opportunities called for it.

It is important to reflect on the implications of the National Role Conception of Brazil for MERCOSUR. The main findings revealed by this research denote the country as a propeller of autonomy and self-confidence, as well as an advocate for the reconstruction of

MERCOSUR, yet uninterested in neither mediating nor leading the resolution of internal conflicts. Consequently, the implications of this to MERCOSUR are two-fold. First, it is advantageous for any regional institution to have countries who discursively propel institutional advancement while are also inclined to pay the costs of such, as it was the case of Brazil. For MERCOSUR in particular, it had the favourable circumstances for institutional development, as the United States were more involved in the Middle East and the left-wing wave of presidencies coming to power in South America was being initiated. Thus, having a large and powerful country as Brazil driving the improvement of MERCOSUR was a significant political bonus.

Second, if the largest and most powerful country in a region is not willing to resolve internal conflicts or even discursively proposing for its peaceful resolution, it could become a weakened area for the institution. As it was shown by this research, Brazil did not mediate in the “papeleras crisis” and it was passive towards Bolivia in the nationalization of gas episode. Institutions which are in intergovernmental basis require for comradery between members. On the one hand, having an unbiased third party, which is prone to helping solve issues, is a viable option. On the other hand, not having a third party can be a positive aspect, for it urges member-states to transfer the resolution of the conflict to designated courts belonging to the institution. It was not the case with the “papeleras crisis”, which was initially dealt with an ad hoc court in MERCOSUR, but it was eventually settled by outside actors. Thus, Brazil could have used the opportunity to act as a mediator, meeting with both parties and settling the issue, or at least on a rhetorical level, as discursively claiming for the resolution of the conflict in MERCOSUR’s designated instances. The Lula administration did neither, as the data shows. The president just claimed that the issue should be solved between Uruguay and Argentina.

In the end, it was beneficial for MERCOSUR to have Brazil with such a National Role Conception. It carried with it a symbolic value of pushing the integration forward and creating a sense of unison among member-states - which was much needed after the plateau it found itself during the 1990s, a time when no significant institutional development occurred. As time showed, during the two consecutive mandates of Lula MERCOSUR managed to institutionally develop to arenas outside of trade, especially in the social and cultural areas. Thus, Brazil in the selected timeframe acted as a propeller of institutional development, even if it did not exercise *de facto* leadership.

10.2.2 Germany

As elucidated previously, each component of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) provides noteworthy results for analysis.

The analysis of 104 speeches given by Angela Merkel during her first mandate (2005-2009) gave significant insights of how the chancellor portrayed Germany's and the EU's respective identities. By employing the method of Narrative Analysis, the *Identity* element of the flowchart can be summarized as Germany having a new-found responsibility regionally and internationally, given its economic prowess. Interestingly, this self-awareness did not come with the claim of being a leader or, at least, a paymaster (as it was the case with Brazil). Responsibility is not equal to leadership. Therefore, the discursive component of leadership (seeing itself as a leader and claiming it to others) was not found in the data. In regard to EU's identity, the chancellor put values as the core of the institution, which is a consequent of the region's belligerent past and an attempt to homogenize differing members – EU members are significantly different, but at least rhetorically they have the same values in common. From those values in particular, tolerance was placed as the “soul of Europe” in the words of the chancellor. Historically, intolerance led Europe to many armed conflicts. Nowadays, tolerance is necessary for dealing with the challenges and crises that arise in the institution. Thus, tolerance has a historical meaning that remains significant and it is adapted to the present.

The *Cultural heritage* of Germany still shaped Germany's foreign policymaking during Merkel's first mandate, albeit with new contours. As the data showed, the country maintained the main features of the “civilian power” archetype, but there were incipient signs of exiting the “culture of restraint” towards the path of normalization. This is corroborated by the narratives put forward by the chancellor of EU's responsibility in bringing peace and stability to conflicting areas in the world. Another interesting facet of the narratives put forward by Merkel was that the traditional hallmarks of Germany's foreign policy, the narratives of “never again war” and “never again alone”, were discursively transferred to the EU. The data reveals that Merkel exalted EU's pacifist quality as well as promoted the bilateral cooperation of the EU with traditional partners, such as the United States and Russia. Therefore, cultural heritage at large and history in particular play a significant role in how the chancellor understands and behaves towards the EU. Yet, the meaning gathered from the data was that Merkel was ready to learn the lessons from the past and to move forward, a claim that is supported by the new interpretation she gave to the aforementioned traditional foreign policy narratives.

The *domestic audience* during the selected timeframe was overall positive towards the EU, but not to a vast majority. The data provided by the Eurobarometer shows that the range of receptive answers towards the institution was of 50-60%. One result in particular was

concerning: 80% of respondents agreed that further enlargement would cause problems in the national job market. This is a significant factor to consider when one is attentive to issues of xenophobia or Euroscepticism. Altogether, the domestic audience in Germany during Merkel's first mandate had an either positive or neutral image of the EU, according to the data provided by Eurobarometer. The respondents understood the EU's benefits as bringing peace, enabling the free movement of people, goods, and services, and they associated the institution with the Euro. This evinces that Merkel would not encounter large opposition to the EU from the German constituents, enabling a favourable scenario for furthering EU policies.

With data provided by the World Bank, it was demonstrated how Germany's *capabilities* improved significantly during the selected timeframe. Despite the financial global crisis, which originated in the United States and ended up affecting EU markets, Germany's macroeconomic indicators had a general increase in the selected timeframe. The country's past as the "sick man of the Euro" was left behind, and it eventually became the leading economy in the EU. This gave Germany the symbolic power (derived from its image) and political capital to push forward, in both discourse and action, the institutional development of the EU. Thus, the material capabilities in the selected timeframe created a favourable environment for exercising leadership.

Concerning the *opportunity to act* in the selected timeframe, the literature highlights the leading role Germany performed during its presidency of the Council of the European Union when the Treaty of Lisbon was being negotiated. This is also evinced by the data analysed here, in which Merkel repeatedly propelled for a successful outcome of the document. The data revealed that, oftentimes, Merkel reverberated in her speeches the benefits that the Treaty of Lisbon would bring – *inter alia*, more democratic principles and more closeness between the institution and citizens. She also aligned the document to the EU aforementioned common values, connecting it to EU's identity. Thus, the opportunity to act afforded by the Treaty of Lisbon was the perfect conjunction between discourse and practice for regional leadership.

Thus, the results obtained by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) create a role conception of Germany seeing itself with new responsibilities in the EU because of the country's capabilities. Germany acknowledged its past and understood the EU as a community of values. Identity narratives do not support the leadership role, even when a *de facto* leadership is exercised. In this way, this role conception is not congruent to the role of a regional leader.

Moreover, the results obtained by each mechanism of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) help to explain the research puzzle presented in Chapter 1. The main findings reveal that, despite having the favourable elements for the performance of

regional leadership - a *domestic audience* that was overall pro-EU, increased economic *capabilities*, and optimal *opportunity to act* as being the president of the Council of the EU during the negotiation for the Treaty of Lisbon – the *identity* and the *cultural heritage* of Germany do not comply with the role of a regional leader. Thus, regarding regional leadership, Germany has it, but does not want it. It does not want it because it is not a part of its identity. A change in state's identity is possible, but it often takes time and political effort. Additionally, the cultural heritage of Germany does not support leadership, given its historical conditioning – and Merkel only gave incipient signs that her cabinet was willing to surpass it. This particular case reveals that identity is a large component in a state's behaviour. Despite acting as a *de facto* leader, if this role is not congruent to a country's identity, then it is not concerned in claiming it.

It becomes necessary to ponder on the implications of Germany's National Role Conception for the EU. As the main findings indicate, Germany saw itself with new responsibilities in the EU because of the country's capabilities. Germany acknowledged its past and understood the EU as a community of values. The identity narratives do not support the leadership role, even when a *de facto* leadership is exercised. Based on this, some considerations can be drawn.

It should be noted that the EU's supranational capacity limits the scope for action (and, therefore, change) that one individual country can achieve, when in comparison with institutions that have an intergovernmental basis. Still, in the case of the EU countries have the realm for gathering and advocating for their needs and proposing solutions. This is especially important during critical times. Thus, one cannot underestimate the significance of key member-states in fostering institutional development.

For instance, the EU has been through many crises, as recent events have shown. The first one of them coincided with Merkel's first mandate - the negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon. During crises, it is important to have a leading state, which can rearrange the demands and provisions made by states and lessen the dependence on the Commission for providing solutions. This situation was certainly the case with the Treaty of Lisbon, as this doctoral thesis has demonstrated. More research should investigate if this was the case during the Greek crisis and the refugee crisis, but initial assumptions indicate the central role Germany played in those cases.

Moreover, as this doctoral thesis has demonstrated, Germany did not propel identity narratives of being a leader. Therefore, there was a mismatch between discourse and practice. It was present in the data narratives regarding Germany's new-found responsibility given its large capabilities. But responsibility does not equate to leadership. In this sense, one could argue that discursively claiming to be a leader could raise suspicions from fellow members of

the EU, given Germany's history. But, as Merkel herself has claimed, the past must be put to rest. Claiming to be a leader and acting as such would not bring harm to Germany's bilateral relations – European countries know that Germany's scope of action is restrained by the EU's supranational characteristic. Thus, there is no risk of Germany becoming a "super leader" capable of engulfing its neighbours and destroying the institution. Having a self-image of leadership would not bring bad consequences for Germany. Since it behaves as a leader, then its discourse should match its behaviour. Germany should employ the proverbial "talk the talk and walk the walk" in the realm of the EU.

10.3 The National Role Conception flowchart as a theoretical model

It is safe to argue that in the conceptualization made by Marijke Breuning (2011, p.26), the National Role Conception flowchart served as an analytical scheme in order to explain how role conceptions were formed. In its original version, the diagram did not intent to become a theoretical model. Nonetheless, this present research proposed the novel idea of testing it as such.

Theoretical model is here used as synonymous to analytical framework. It is theoretical because it is based on a theory (Role Theory) and a model because it is a way of structuring and organizing certain elements that generate an explanation (in this case, how national role conceptions are created). If proved to be effective, this model can be integrated as a new methodological tool for studies based on Role Theory.

In the original scheme, the National Role Conception is a product of the ideational and material components. The role conception then converges into the role enactment (or role performance), delineated by the author as the "foreign policy behaviour" (ibidem). The role enactment/performance is the role itself, which can be often be labelled in different forms – for instance, "leader", "saviour", "mediator". It is important to note, however, that not every single behaviour of a country can be considered as role enactment, for role enactment is a by-product of the role conception, as postulated by the model adopted here. As this study concentrates on the development of role conceptions, the section of role enactment/performance part was discarded and the flowchart proposed by Marijke Breuning (2011, p.26) was adapted.

Based on the results obtained here, the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) would benefit from merging two mechanisms into one, as identity and cultural heritage share similar traits. The item "history" could be added, thus creating a triad of "history, identity, and cultural heritage", a useful and necessary factor in compiling the effects of ideational mechanisms. The flowchart would also gain more insight from a sole mechanism

that reflects upon political narratives, which are useful towards understanding the reasoning behind the creation of regional integration policies. In the same way, the use of narratives was helpful in every component of the chart. Thus, this method is an applicable tool for those interested in applying the role conception flowchart.

Therefore, the flowchart proposed by the author comes as an interesting tool for understanding how the role conception of a country was shaped. The analysis here transferred this model to the role conception of key countries in regional institutions, an adaptation that was not prescribed in its original form. Marijke Breuning's analytical chart proved to be effective, as its main findings explained the research puzzle. Thus, the efforts made here offer the flowchart as an option of theoretical model for researchers in the field of Role Theory, accumulating on the previous work put forward by the author (Breuning 2011, p.26). Certainly, more empirical studies with different approaches would need to be conducted in order to reinforce its validity as a theoretical model.

10.4 Avenues for future research

The purpose of this doctoral thesis was not to tackle which roles Brazil and Germany played in their respective region, but to discover which aspects and mechanisms shaped the National Role Conceptions under Lula and Merkel in regard to MERCOSUR and to the EU, respectively. By doing so, future research can apply the results obtained here by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) to specific events, in order to investigate the role enactment of both countries in those institutions and thus to create a typology of roles related to those situations. Therefore, the role conceptions of Brazil towards MERCOSUR and Germany in relation to the EU can serve as templates to be applied in future research.

In the same vein, the results generated by each component proposed by the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) can be used individually, especially in studies that employ Discourse Analysis and Narrative Analysis. Specifically, the elements *Identity*, *Cultural heritage*, and *Opportunity to act* relied heavily on the latter method.

This doctoral thesis adopted an endogenous perspective towards the development of roles conceptions. Future research should consider exogeneous actors, i.e. the positions of Other(s) – either key policymakers or different key countries in regional institutions.

For instance, the focus of this research lied on how Brazil's president and Germany's chancellor depicted the role conception of their respective country. An interesting avenue for future research would be to assess the different voices concerning foreign policy, how they

differ and affect policy outcomes. In the case of Brazil, three bureaucrats influenced the design for foreign policy actions: Celso Amorim (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (General Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Marco Aurélio Garcia (Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs). In the case of Germany, it would be interesting to investigate the importance of policymakers such as Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Wolfgang Schäuble (Minister of Interior).

Likewise, this present research analysed how the role conceptions of Brazil and Germany were shaped. It would be interesting to devote further research to the cases of Argentina and France by positioning them vis-à-vis the results obtained here, as contrasting the Self versus the Other(s). This would bring an outside factor to the conceptualization of the National Role Conception flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26), which was not present in its original version nor adopted in this present analysis.

Another possible avenue for future research could be to apply the National Role Conceptions flowchart (Breuning 2011, p.26) to the cases of Argentina and France during the same timeline and contrast the results with the findings generated by this present doctoral thesis. But with Argentina and France there is no puzzle regarding leadership: one does not want it and does not have it; the other has it and wants it. In the end, the puzzle regarding Brazil and Germany remain the most captivating.

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Annex – Overview

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Annex 1: Lists of the selected speeches by Lula and Merkel

Data for analysis: Brazil (2003-2006)

2003

01-01-2003 - Pronunciamento à nação do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, após a cerimônia de posse Parlatório do Palácio do Planalto

14-01-2003 - Palavras do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na visita do Presidente da Argentina, Eduardo Duhalde

24-01-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no III Fórum Social Mundial

10-03-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de abertura da IX Feira Internacional do Plástico

24-03-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no jantar em homenagem à rainha Beatrix, dos Países Baixos

21-04-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na solenidade comemorativa ao Dia de Tiradentes

02-06-2003 - Discurso do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva durante sessão especial da 91ª Conferência Internacional do Trabalho – OIT

18-06-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na reunião de Cúpula do Mercosul

04-09-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na reunião do Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social

27-09-2003 - Palavras do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no encontro com estudantes brasileiros Residência de Protocolo do Conselho de Estado “La Mansión”

05-10-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na abertura da 4ª Bienal de Artes Visuais do Mercosul

16-10-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão do Parlamento argentino em homenagem ao Brasil

20-10-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão inaugural do Encontro Parlamentar sobre a ALCA – O Papel dos Legisladores na ALCA

05-11-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no jantar oferecido pelo Presidente de Moçambique, Joaquim Chissano

20-11-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião do almoço oferecido pelo governador Ronaldo Lessa

07-12-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de inauguração da “Semana do Brasil em Dubai” e Encontro de Negócios Brasil-Emirados Árabes Unidos

16-12-2003 - Palavras do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na abertura da XXV Reunião do Conselho do Mercado Comum – Mercosul

16-12-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de entrega das chaves da cidade de Montevideú

18-12-2003 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no Ato de Prestação de Contas do Ano de 2003

2004

27-01-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no encontro com lideranças empresariais indianas, co-patrocinado pela Confederação das Indústrias Indianas (CII) e pela Federação das Câmaras de Comércio e Indústria Indianas (FICCI)

28-01-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no lançamento do Fórum Empresarial Brasil/Índia

29-01-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no Seminário para Investidores Estrangeiros no Brasil

30-04-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da visita à Agrishow 2004 – Feira Internacional de Tecnologia Agrícola em Ação

23-06-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante almoço com investidores estrangeiros em Nova Iorque

07-07-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante visita ao Brasil do Presidente do México, Vicente Fox

08-07-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Reunião de Cúpula do Mercosul

13-08-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na instalação do Tribunal Permanente de Revisão do Mercosul

24-08-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de inauguração do seminário “Como Fazer Negócios com o Brasil”

24-08-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no jantar em sua honra, oferecido pelo Presidente do Equador, Lucio Gutierrez

25-08-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no almoço empresarial oferecido pelo Presidente do Equador

21-09-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na 59ª Assembléia-Geral da ONU

02-11-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na 8ª Conferência Ibero-Americana de Cortes Supremas e Tribunais Superiores

08-11-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na solenidade de posse da Diretoria da Fiesp

16-11-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no jantar em homenagem ao Presidente da Coreia do Sul, Roh Moo-Hyun

02-12-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na abertura da Conferência Internacional Democracia na América Latina

08-12-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião do encerramento da 3ª Reunião de Presidentes da América do Sul

17-12-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da reunião de Cúpula do Mercosul

17-12-2004 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no encerramento da reunião de Cúpula do Mercosul

2005

27-01-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na conferência “Chamada Global para a Ação Contra a Pobreza”, no Fórum Social Mundial

15-02-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão especial da Assembléia Nacional da Guiana

16-02-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de abertura da 16ª Conferência de Chefes de Governo da Comunidade do Caribe – Caricom

22-02-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de assinatura do Termo de Implantação do Pólo Minero-Siderúrgico de Corumbá

24-02-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de início das obras do novo terminal do Aeroporto Internacional de Vitória

02-03-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de inauguração da maltaria da Ambev

18-03-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de celebração dos 150 anos da cidade de Aracaju e assinatura de atos entre o governo federal e a prefeitura de Aracaju

01-04-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de assinatura de atos, por ocasião da visita de Estado do presidente do Uruguai, Tabaré Vázquez

08-04-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República em exercício, José Alencar, na cerimônia de inauguração do Terminal Marítimo

26-05-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante visita ao Parlamento

20-06-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na reunião do Conselho de Cúpula do Mercosul

02-07-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no ato político de celebração aos 15 anos do Foro de São Paulo

13-07-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na abertura do Colóquio “Brasil: Ator Global”

01-09-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de formatura da Turma de 2002 do Programa de Formação e Aperfeiçoamento do Instituto Rio Branco

13-09-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de encerramento da reunião dos Chefes de Estado e de Governo dos países do Sistema de Integração Centro-Americana (Sica) e do Brasil

30-09-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na abertura da Primeira Reunião de Chefes de Estado da Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações (Casa)

30-09-2005 - Discurso do presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no encerramento da reunião de Chefes de Estado da Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações (Casa)

20-10-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de abertura do 11º Congresso Nacional do PCdoB – Brasília-DF

05-11-2005 - Intervenção do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na Segunda Sessão da IV Cúpula das Américas

07-12-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de posse da nova Executiva Nacional do PSB

09-12-2005 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na Reunião de Cúpula do Mercosul

2006

18-01-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da visita de Estado do Presidente da Argentina, Néstor Kirchner

17-02-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante almoço com agricultores

16-03-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da visita do Presidente do Uruguai, Tabaré Vasquez

31-05-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da visita do presidente da Comissão Europeia, José Manuel Durão Barroso

04-07-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de assinatura do Protocolo de Adesão da Venezuela como Membro-Pleno do Mercosul

21-07-2006 (a) - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião do Diálogo Aberto dos Presidentes na Cúpula do Mercosul

21-07-2006 (b) - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião do encerramento da XXX Cúpula dos Chefes de Estado do Mercosul

09-08-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da visita ao Brasil do primeiro-ministro de Portugal, José Sócrates

19-09-2006 - Discurso do presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na abertura do Debate Geral da 61ª Assembléia Geral das Nações Unidas

08-12-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de abertura da II Reunião de Chefes de Estado e de Governo dos Países da Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações (CASA)

14-12-2006 - Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de constituição do Parlamento do Mercosul

Data for analysis: Germany (2005-2009)

2005

30-11-2005 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel

2006

25-01-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Weltwirtschaftsforum in Davos

05-02-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der 42. Münchner Konferenz für Sicherheitspolitik am 4. Februar 2006 in München

29-03-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel in der Debatte zum Haushaltsgesetz 2006 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag

09-05-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem WDR Europa-Forum in Berlin

11-05-2006 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Europapolitik

25-05-2006 - Ansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum 96. Katholikentag in Saarbrücken

21-06-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Einweihung des neuen Bürogebäudes der KPMG in Berlin

19-07-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Festakt zum 50-jährigen Bestehen des Forschungszentrums Karlsruhe in Karlsruhe

06-09-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel in der Debatte zum Haushaltsgesetz 2007 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Berlin

08-09-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Verleihung des M100-Sanssouci-Medienpreises in Potsdam

22-09-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Eröffnung des Internationalen Bertelsmann Forums „Die Zukunft der Europäischen Union“ in Berlin

27-10-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor der Nieuwspoort-Stiftung in Den Haag

07-11-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Arbeitgebertag der Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände in Berlin

08-11-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel im Rahmen einer Vortragsveranstaltung der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Berlin

10-11-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Tagung „Impulse 21 – Berliner Forum Sicherheitspolitik“ des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung und des Tagesspiegel in Berlin

17-11-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem European Banking Congress in Frankfurt/Main

22-11-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Konferenz „Globalisierung fair gestalten“ in Berlin

22-11-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Haushaltsgesetz 2007 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag

06-12-2006 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor dem Gespräch mit Vertretern der Bürgergesellschaft zur deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft in Berlin

14-12-2006 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Europäischen Rat in Brüssel am 14./15. Dezember und zur bevorstehenden deutschen Präsidentschaft im Rat der Europäischen Union und in der G8

2007

01-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Festakt zum 50-jährigen Bestehen des Bundeslandes Saarland in Saarbrücken

17-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg

18-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Eröffnung der 72. Internationalen Grünen Woche in Berlin

22-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Jahreseröffnung der Deutschen Börse in Frankfurt/Main

23-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Jahresempfang des BDI in Berlin

23-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der zwölften Landkreisversammlung des Deutschen Landkreistages in Berlin

24-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Eröffnung des World Economic Forum in Davos

30-01-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Europatag der Deutschen Wirtschaft in Berlin

01-02-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Jahresempfang für das Diplomatische Corps in Berlin

05-02-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel im „Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research“ in Abu Dhabi

06-02-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Deutsch-Kuwaitischen Wirtschaftsforum in Kuwait

09-02-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel bei der 463. Schaffermahlzeit in Bremen

10-02-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der 43. Münchner Konferenz für Sicherheitspolitik in München

13-02-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg

16-02-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft vor dem Bundesrat in Berlin

01-03-2007 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Europäischen Rat in Brüssel am 8./9. März 2007

10-03-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Eröffnung des Europäisch-Israelischen Dialogs in Berlin

13-03-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Europäischen Sozialstaatskongress des DGB in Berlin

14-03-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Eröffnung der CeBIT in Hannover

16-03-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel an der Universität Warschau in Warschau

25-03-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Festakt zum 50. Jahrestag der Unterzeichnung der Römischen Verträge in Berlin

28-03-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Brüssel

18-04-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem „European Patent Forum“ des Europäischen Patentamtes in München

30-04-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Veranstaltung von U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Business Europe und BDI „The Way Forward: Strengthening the Transatlantic Partnership“ in Washington

02-05-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Europäischen Konferenz „Die künftige Meerespolitik der EU: Eine europäische Vision für Ozean und Meere“ in Bremen

11-05-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem SEECP-Gipfel in Zagreb

14-05-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Konferenz der Vertreter der Europa-Ausschüsse der nationalen Parlamente der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union sowie des Europäischen Parlaments in Berlin

23-05-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der 34. Hauptversammlung des Deutschen Städtetages in München

14-06-2007 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Europäischen Rat in Brüssel am 21./ 22. Juni 2007

27-06-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Bilanz der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Brüssel

08-07-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Festakt „60 Jahre Evangelische Akademie Tutzing“ in Tutzing

20-07-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor der Deutsch-Griechischen Industrie- und Handelskammer in Athen

21-08-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Besuch der Andr ssy Gyula Deutschsprachigen Universit t Budapest

31-08-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Symposium „Deutschland und Japan – in gemeinsamer Verantwortung f r die Zukunft“ der Inamori-Stiftung und der Zeitung „Mainichi-Shinbun“ in Kyoto

16-11-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel im Rahmen der VDZ-Zeitschriftentage 2007 in Berlin

19-11-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel bei der Festveranstaltung der American Academy zum 60. Jahrestag des Marshallplans in Berlin

28-11-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Haushaltsgesetz 2008 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Berlin

05-12-2007 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Journalisten-Symposium des „Konvents f r Deutschland“ in Berlin

12-12-2007 - Regierungserkl rung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Unterzeichnung des Vertrages von Lissabon am 13. Dezember und zum Europ ischen Rat am 14. Dezember 2007

2008

31-01-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Verleihung des Preises „Nueva Econom a F rum 2008“ f r soziale Koh sion und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Palma de Mallorca

18-02-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Neujahrsempfang f r das Diplomatische Corps in Berlin

19-02-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Verleihung des Deutschen Staatsb rgerpreises an den luxemburgischen Premierminister Jean-Claude Juncker in Berlin

03-03-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Er ffnung der CeBIT in Hannover

10-03-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der 41. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Berlin

14-04-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem „National Forum on Europe“ in Dublin

15-04-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats in Straßburg

24-04-2008 Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum EU-Reformvertrag vor dem Deutschen Bundestag

01-05-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Verleihung des Internationalen Karlspreises zu Aachen in Aachen

15-05-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem EU-Lateinamerika-Wirtschaftsgipfel in Lima

26-05-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Frühjahrstagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der NATO in Berlin

19-06-2008 Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Europäischen Rat in Brüssel

26-08-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel im Rahmen ihres Besuchs in Estland in Tallinn

10-09-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel im Rahmen der Veranstaltungsreihe „Menschen in Europa“ in Passau

17-09-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Haushaltsgesetz 2009 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Berlin

24-09-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Verleihung der Ehrendoktorwürde durch die Technische Universität Breslau in Breslau

20-10-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel an der Karls-Universität in Prag

17-11-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem achten Jahreskongress des Rates für Nachhaltige Entwicklung in Berlin

25-11-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem vierten Branchentag des Deutschen Hotel- und Gaststättenverbands e.V. (DEHOGA Bundesverband) in Berlin

26-11-2008 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Haushaltsgesetz 2009 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Berlin

04-12-2008 Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Europäischen Rat in Brüssel am 11./12. Dezember 2008

2009

08-01-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Kolloquium „Neue Welt, neuer Kapitalismus“ in Paris

14-01-2009 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zu den Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung von Wachstum und Beschäftigung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag

30-01-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Weltwirtschaftsforum in Davos

07-02-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der 45. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz in München

09-02-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Empfang für das Diplomatische Corps in Berlin

27-02-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Matthiae-Mahlzeit in Hamburg

04-03-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Festveranstaltung zum 60-jährigen Bestehen des Bundesverbandes der Freien Berufe in Berlin

19-03-2009 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Europäischen Rat am 19./20. März 2009 in Brüssel und zum G20-Gipfel am 2. April 2009 in London

26-03-2009 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Nato-Gipfel

08-05-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Jubiläumsveranstaltung „Vor 20 Jahren – Am Vorabend der friedlichen Revolution“ in Berlin

26-05-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Deutschen Kommunalkongress in Berlin

27-05-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Jahrestagung des Markenverbands in Berlin

27-05-2009 - „Humboldt-Rede zu Europa“ von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel in Berlin

02-06-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf der Veranstaltung der Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft „Erfolg mit Verantwortung – made in Germany: die Soziale Marktwirtschaft“ in Berlin

24-06-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Föderalismus-Symposium in Völklingen

24-06-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Kongress des Bundesverbandes der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e.V.(BDEW) in Berlin

25-06-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Verleihung des Eric-M.-Warburg-Preises in Washington

01-07-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel auf dem Deutschen Bauerntag in Stuttgart

02-07-2009 - Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum G8-Weltwirtschaftsgipfel vom 8. bis 10. Juli 2009 in L'Aquila

22-08-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim „Tag der Heimat“ des Bundes der Vertriebenen in Berlin

08-09-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel in der Debatte zur Situation in Deutschland vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Berlin

17-09-2009 - Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Eröffnung der 63. Internationalen Automobil-Ausstellung in Frankfurt am Mai

Annex 2: Abstract

This present research was driven by the observation of a thought-provoking puzzle, which came from the examination of the literature concerning the regional leadership roles of Brazil and Germany. In this regard, Brazil was often classified as a “consensual hegemon” (Burgess 2008) and a “leader without followers” (Malamud 2011). In its turn, the literature labelled Germany as a “reluctant hegemon” (Paterson 2011) and as a “benign hegemon” (Morisse-Schilbach 2011). In this context, authors argued that Brazil claimed for being a leader in South America, but failed to count on the support of its neighbours. According to a large part of the literature, Germany was asked by its European peers to act as a leader, but eschewed from recognizing itself as one. Hence, the research puzzle came to fruition - in matters of being a regional leader, a contrast was found between Brazil and Germany that no other countries in their respective region presented: Brazil wanted it, but could not have it; Germany had it, but did not want it. Thus, the quest for explaining this puzzle guided this doctoral thesis. But rather than focusing exclusively on which role(s) both countries played in their region or even disputing the existing categories of roles created by the literature, this research delved on examining the elements that influence the development of potential role(s) by examining the creation of national role conceptions. In this sense, the research question presented here is of how National Role Conceptions were developed in relation to MERCOSUR and the EU during the mandates of Lula (2003-2006) and Merkel (2005-2009), respectively. The study of role conceptions is embedded in the framework of Role Theory, and the national role conception flowchart originally conceived by Breuning (2011, p.26) was tested by this research as a theoretical model. Adopting a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology, this research assessed with the help of Narrative Analysis 70 speeches delivered by Lula and 104 speeches given by Merkel during the selected timeframes, in order to investigate identity narratives concerning their respective countries and regional institutions. Database from Latinobarómetro, Eurobarometer, and the World Bank were also employed. The results obtained by this research when applying the analytical flowchart proposed by Breuning (2011, p.26) explain the research puzzle: Brazil cannot have regional leadership because it does not perform it when the opportunities to act arise; and Germany does not want regional leadership because it is not aligned with its identity and cultural heritage. Furthermore, the main findings reveal that Brazil performed a discursive leadership, while Germany enacted a *de facto* leadership. Neither country combined both types of leadership when acting regionally.

Zusammenfassung

Diese vorliegende Forschung wurde durch die Beobachtung eines zum Nachdenken anregenden Puzzles motiviert, das sich aus der Untersuchung der Literatur zu den regionalen Führungsrollen Brasiliens und Deutschlands ergab. In dieser Hinsicht wurde Brasilien häufig als „eivernehmlicher Hegemon“ (Burgess 2008) und als „Leiter ohne Begleiter“ (Malamud 2011) eingestuft. In der Literatur wurde Deutschland wiederum als „widerstrebender Hegemon“ (Paterson 2011) und als „gutartiger Hegemon“ (Morisse-Schilbach 2011) bezeichnet. In diesem Zusammenhang argumentierten die Autoren, dass Brasilien behauptete, in Südamerika führend zu sein, aber nicht auf die Unterstützung seiner Nachbarn zählen zu können. Nach einem großen Teil der Literatur wurde Deutschland von seinen europäischen Kollegen gebeten, als Anleiter zu agieren, aber es wurde vermieden, sich als einer zu erkennen. Daher wurde das Forschungsrätsel verwirklicht - in Bezug auf die regionale Führung wurde ein Kontrast zwischen Brasilien und Deutschland festgestellt, den kein anderes Land in seiner jeweiligen Region präsentierte: Brasilien wollte es, konnte es aber nicht haben; Deutschland hatte es, wollte es aber nicht. Die Suche nach Erklärungen für dieses Rätsel leitete daher diese Doktorarbeit. Anstatt sich ausschließlich auf die Rolle (n) beider Länder in ihrer Region zu konzentrieren oder sogar die bestehenden Kategorien von Rollen zu bestreiten, die durch die Literatur geschaffen wurden, befasste sich diese Forschung mit der Untersuchung der Elemente, die die Entwicklung potenzieller Rollen beeinflussen, indem sie die Schaffung nationaler Rollenkonzepte. In diesem Sinne geht es hier um die Frage, wie nationale Rollenkonzepte in Bezug auf MERCOSUR und die EU während der Mandate von Lula (2003-2006) bzw. Merkel (2005-2009) entwickelt wurden. Die Untersuchung von Rollenkonzepten ist in den Rahmen der Rollentheorie eingebettet, und das ursprünglich von Breuning (2011, S. 26) konzipierte Flussdiagramm für nationale Rollenkonzepte wurde von dieser Forschung als theoretisches Modell getestet. Diese Studie basiert auf einer konstruktivistischen Ontologie und einer interpretivistischen Erkenntnistheorie und bewertete mit Hilfe der Narrative Analysis 70 Reden von Lula und 104 Reden von Merkel während des ausgewählten Zeitraums, um Identitätserzählungen in Bezug auf ihre jeweiligen Länder und regionalen Institutionen zu untersuchen. Eine Datenbank von Latinobarómetro, Eurobarometer und der Weltbank wurden ebenfalls verwendet. Die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung bei Anwendung des von Breuning (2011, S. 26) vorgeschlagenen analytischen Flussdiagramms erklären das Forschungsrätsel: Brasilien kann keine königliche Führung haben, weil es diese nicht ausführt, wenn sich Handlungsmöglichkeiten ergeben; und Deutschland will keine regionale Führung, weil es nicht mit seiner Identität und seinem kulturellen Erbe in Einklang steht. Darüber hinaus zeigen die wichtigsten Ergebnisse, dass

Brasilien eine diskursive Führung innehatte, während Deutschland de facto eine Führung übernahm. Kein Land kombinierte beide Arten von Führung, wenn es regional handelte.

*

No related publications have ensued from this doctoral thesis.

*

Affidavit:

I, Jessica Luciano Gomes, hereby declare under oath that I wrote the dissertation titled

“The formation of National Role Conceptions in regional institutions: the case of Brazil in

MERCOSUR and Germany in the EU”

myself and in case of cooperation with other researchers
pursuant to the enclosed statements in accordance with Section 6 subsection 3 of the
Doctoral Degree Regulations of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences dated
18 January 2017. I have used no aids other than those indicated.

Place, date

Doctoral candidate's signature