

**STATE-MAKING,
NATION-BUILDING AND
THE CIVIL SOCIETY;
NIGERIA, 1960 – 1999**

Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades des Doktors der Philosophie im
Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft der Universität Hamburg.

Vorgelegt von

FABIAN C. IHEKWEME

aus Ikenanzizi, Obowo

Hamburg 2000

CONTENTS

Contents.....	2
Acknowledgements.....	8
Facts about Nigeria.....	11
Abbreviations.....	15
Tables.....	17
Abstract.....	18
Chapter One.....	20
Theory:Bringing ,a new state and a new nation’ into existence in Nigeria.	
State-making and nation-building: a conceptual framework.....	25
Introduction.....	25
State-making and nation building.....	25
(i) Method of eliminating differences.....	25
(ii) Method of managing differences.....	25
Ethnicity, state and nation-building.....	29
Military and nation-building.....	34
(i) Models of control.....	36
(ii) Types of military regimes.....	37
Nigeria as a case study for state and nation-building.....	38
Introduction.....	36
Concept of nation-building.....	39
Forging nations models.....	42
Analytical limitations and actors.....	44

(i)Analytical limitations.....	44
(ii)Actors.....	45
Methods and material.....	45
Aim	48
Verification of intentions.....	49
Definitions.....	51
Nation-Building in Nigeria: Intentions and Assumptions.....	54
Introduction.....	54
Nation-building Intentions.....	55
British nation-building intentions in Nigeria.....	55
Nation-building assumptions.....	56
Conclusion.....	59
Chapter Two.....	60
Social and ethnic foundation of Nigeria.....	60
Religion.....	63
(i) Christianity.....	64
(ii) Indigenous beliefs.....	66
Ethnicity.....	69
Ethnic relations.....	72
Hausa.....	75
(i) Classes of Muslim North.....	77
(ii) Religion.....	79
(iii) Education.....	80
Yoruba.....	81
(i) Religion.....	82
Ibo.....	82
(i) Religion and worship.....	88
(ii) Non-Traditional religion and worship.....	89

Fulani	90
(i) Religion and education.....	91
Chapter Three.....	92
Political Regimes and Party System in Nigeria.....	92
The First Republic.....	92
(i) The 1966 coups, and Civil war.....	97
The Second Republic, 1979-83.....	107
(i) Nigerian General Election, 1983.....	113
(ii) Buhari regime.....	116
(iii) Babangida government.....	118
The Third Republic.....	121
The Fourth Republic.....	129
Chapter	
Four.....	133
Economy.....	133
Oil Exports, Nigeria vs. OPEC.....	146
Nigerian Oil and Gas	149
(i) Electric power.....	151
Oil revenue in Nigeria.....	152
Oil boom period.....	155
Oil boom and domestic supply constraints.....	157
Budget.....	160
Forms of Budget.....	162
Overview of the Nigerian budgetary economy 1999.....	164
Policy thrust for the year 2000 budget.....	165
(i) Aims.....	165

(ii) Strategies for realisation of aims.....	166
Revenue outlook for 2000.....	167
Federal government retained revenue.....	167
Expenditure estimates.....	168
Recurrent expenditure.....	168
Capital expenditure.....	169
States and local government finances.....	170
Indebtedness of state government.....	170
Breakdown of the year 2000 Appropriation bill.....	171
.	
Chapter Five.....	182
Civil Society, Concept and Role.....	182
Concept of civil society.....	182
Role of civil society.....	187
State and civil society.....	190
The Idea of the state.....	192
Civil society and the military.....	194
.	
Chapter Six.....	197
Corruption in Nigeria:Socio-political and economic effects.....	197
Definitions of Corruption.....	201
Criteria for measuring standards of behaviour.....	203
(a) Public-office-centred definition.....	203
(b) Legal definition.....	204
(c) Public-Interest-centred definition.....	205

Categories of corruption.....	206
(a) Petty corruption.....	206
(b) Routine corruption.....	206
(c) Aggravated corruption.....	206
Causes of Corruption.....	207
Various locuses of causation in Africa.....	207
Cases of corrupt practices.in Nigeria.....	213
(i) Case 1: Nigerian Cement Scandal.....	213
(ii) Case 2: the \$12.2 billion oil money.....	215
(iii) The deviant case: the frugality of government	216
Interpretation of result.....	222
Effects of corruption on economic development.....	223
Anti-Corruption Commission and Bill.....	225
The role of civil society in anti-corruption reforms.....	226
Consequences of corruption.....	229
Conclusion.....	230
Chapter Seven.....	232
The beginning of a new political era: the emergence of Obasanjo....	232
Formation of political parties and Public Commentaries.....	243
Elections.....	269
Obasanjo’s Inuaguration speech.....	272
Obasanjo’s (regime’s) Programme.....	273
Problems inherited by the new (Obasanjo) regime.....	276
Sustainability of democracy.....	280
Conclusion.....	285

Appendix.....	292
Bibliography.....	294
Corruption Perception Index.....	307
Ministerial Appointments, 1999.....	309
New Service Chiefs, 1999.....	310
Lebenslauf.....	311

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Few Social science researchers today would dream of researching Nigerian politics without giving considerable weight on the role of civil society and corruption in the nation's political processes. As for ordinary Nigerians, they have grown inured to (which is not the same as being uncritical of) the prevalence of corruption. Surprise has gone out of news about huge embezzlement of state funds even if the shock remains. Today nobody can teach, talk or even think about Nigeria and its politics without at the same time taking into account the problem of corruption and the difficulties the civil society is facing. This is therefore a contribution to the ways in which scholars have tried to understand and analyse political processes within Nigeria. This study is premised on the assumption that corruption inevitably contributes to the underdevelopment in Nigeria.

For the very fact that human motivation is a more complex business than any single explanation can account for, I inject a cautionary note on corruption as the basis for explaining the failure of nation-building and the inability to develop a viable civil society in Nigeria. While I certainly accept that the investigation of corruption is extremely useful in understanding the political processes of the Nigerian State, one should note the risk in seeing corruption as a 'total truth' which excludes other sorts of explanation. The implication of such exclusion would appear to be that all or most political actors are involved purely to maximise their personal, usually material, gains. While it would be unduly naïve to see political leaders as constantly pursuing the common good in a totally altruistic manner, it will however, be unduly cynical, and analytically not useful, to assume that the reverse is always the case. This is the basis of my neo-patrimonial mode of explaining within a political economy framework which subsumes several other explanations.

This analytical framework enables me to examine and discuss in a systematic way the major components of Nigeria's political economy and society. In turn, the arguments contained in the analysis are used to explain the dynamics of the Nigerian socio-political system. Essentially, the study provides an analysis of Nigeria's political organisation, practices and operations within the context of three basic themes. First, that corruption leads to the failure of building a nation and a viable civil society in Nigeria; and, second, that corruption leads to underdevelopment in Nigeria; and, third, that corruption in Nigeria is related to the neo-patrimonial nature of the state. In probing these themes, the study seeks to highlight not only corruption as an important aspect of Nigeria's underdevelopment, but also to show neo-patrimonialism tendencies of the system. Within such a system in which political power is also the principal source of wealth, and combined with the continued economic centrality of state

power, this has engendered a vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment which in turn, has rendered the civil society unworkable and slowed down the process of nation-building in Nigeria.

The reason of this study is that I find the topic not only intellectually interesting and highly relevant in development policy, but I also take it seriously and relate it systematically to the problem of development and underdevelopment. As a Nigerian and as a scholar, the blatant corruption in my country has continued to strike my eye. As Nigeria also is the largest country in of sub-Sahara Africa, she continues to be visible in mass media discourse around the world and one cannot help being affected by the negative image that is constantly projected as a result of corruption. Further, I carried out this research in order to understand the reasons why, despite the fact that Nigeria has an ample base of resources, the average welfare of her population has rather been decreasing than increasing in the recent decades.

Ever since my child hood, the quest for knowledge and understanding of my country - Nigeria, has been an important part of my life. Its political institutions and system has been of great interest to me coupled with the political realities. It was my dream to conduct an extensive study on these aspects and help my fellow countrymen and those who admire Nigeria in understanding the stark political realities that exist in Nigeria.

Finally, I believe the systematic investigation of corruption and civil society in Africa, particularly in Nigeria is overdue. So far as I know no general study of the scale and economic effects of corruption has been undertaken. Consequently, this research has been prompted by the insufficiency of many a previous theory or theory sketch to help understand and explain Nigerian nation-building process, development and underdevelopment, instability of governments and corruption, and the dispossession and destitution of the bulk of ordinary citizens (civil society) in my country.

I would feel my effort has succeeded if this work contributes to a better appreciation of the relationship between nation-building and civil society on the one hand and between corruption and underdevelopment on the other hand.

The data assembled in this work is the end product of countless interviews, extensive travels and observations, and the use of many centres of documentation in Nigeria, the united kingdom, Germany, India and the united states. In situation like this, it is impossible to mention and thank by name all individuals, both in Nigeria, Germany and elsewhere, who have assisted me in one way or the other during my entire course of work.

I have benefited from many people's comments, criticism and suggestions, I wish to express my profound dept to my supervisor professor Dr. Rainer Tezlaff, Professor of political science , University of Hamburg, for his encouragement,

valuable comments, insightful criticism and helpful suggestions. Professor Tetzlaff helped me at several crucial junctures to shape my focus when I tended to chase around new ideas. I am immensely indebted to him for being a constant source of inspiration, in the completion of this work.

I thankfully acknowledge the cooperation extended to me by Professor Peter Lösche, professor of political science, University of Göttingen, Germany

I cannot stop without putting into record the assistance given to me by my lecturer and life friend, Dr. A. Subramanian, Reader, Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, India. I am immensely indebted to him for being a constant source of inspiration and encouragement, in the completion of this work.

I am also thankful to my entire family for supporting me throughout this study. I am thankful for the support shown to me by my Aunt Mrs. Eva Okere and her husband, Mr. Emeka Okere in the completion of this work. I must also thank my father for his love and affections throughout the course of work. My hearty thanks to my uncle Mr. Marcel Ihekwe for helping me right from the onset. I must express my sincere gratitude to my Cousin Rev. Fr. Austin Ihekwe for his support throughout the course of work. My special thanks to my Nephew, Uzor for the immeasurable assistance he rendered to me right from the beginning of this work till the end. I am deeply indebted to him.

I will be failing if I don't thank my friends for their support. I am grateful to Miss Sonja Krause for her support and constant encouragement throughout my course of work. Special thanks to Francis Madueke, who at all times made valuable criticisms and provided me with contemporary details to back his criticisms. I am deeply indebted to him. I am also grateful to the services rendered to me by Oliver Onwusonye and Dr.- Ing. -Theodore Onyeche and other friends and scholars who supported me in one way or the other and those who read all or part of the manuscript in various stages and contributed many helpful comments and suggestions for which I am most grateful.

Table 1:FACTS ABOUT NIGERIA

Official Language	The Federal Republic of Nigeria
Area	356,669 miles ² (923,768 km ²), roughly twice the size of California
Population	105,300,000 (est.1995)
Date of Independence	October 1, 1960
Capital	Abuja (pop. 305,900, est. 1995)
Major Cities	Lagos (pop. 10,287,000 ,est.1995), Ibadan (1,295,000, est. 1995), Kano (699,900, est. 1993), Ogbomosho (660,600, est. 1993), Enugu (500,000, est. 1993).
Geographical Features	Nigeria is situated in the tropics with an average temperature of 90° F (32° C). Annual rainfall varies from 98" (2.5 m) in the southeast to 24" (0.6 m) in the north. Coastal forest cover the southern regions, giving way to savana in the north. The Niger River flows from the northwest to join the Benue River in central Nigeria, then turns south form a fertile delta as it empties into the Gulf of Guinea. 35.6% of the land is arable and 12.4% is wooded
Official Language	English
Other Major Languages	Hausa (20.9%), Yoruba (20.3%), Igbo (16.6%), Fulani (8.6%)
Major Subsistence Resources	Rice, maize (corn), taro, yams,

	cassava, sorghum, and millet
Major Commercial Resources	Sub-Sahara Africa's leading producer of oil, which accounted for 97.9% of total export earnings in 1997. Cash crops include cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, and rubber.
Gross National product (GNP)	US\$29 billion (0.45% of US) in 1995. Ranked 3 rd in Africa behind Algeria and Egypt.
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita	US\$1540 (6% of US) 1995. Nigeria ranks 21 st in Africa, 17 th in sub-Sahara Africa
Total external debt	US\$32.5 billion in 1998 (112% of GNP). Debt service costs were equal to 29% of the value of goods and services exports (1997).
Human Development Index (1)	0.400 (US=0.940), ranked 137 (US=2) of 174 countries.
Status of women	Gender-Related Development Index (2) = 0.380 (US=0.923), ranked 108 (US=4) of 137 countries. Women comprise approximately 36% of the wage-earning labor force.
Education Profile	School is compulsory for pupils 6-11 years old up to junior secondary school. In 1992, 76% of children attended primary school and 23% attended secondary school. Adult literacy rate 54%; male literacy 64.7%; female literacy 43.8% (1994). A once distinguished university system has deteriorated due to repression and underfunding.
Name of Currency	Naira (N1.= 42 DM, Year 2000)

Health Profile	Life expectancy is 52.2 years for women and 49.0 years for men (1995). Infant mortality is 84 per 1,000 live births (1995), under five mortality is 191 per 1,000 (1996), maternal mortality is 10 per 1,000 (1996). 36% of children under the age of 5 are malnourished. There is one doctor per 5,882 people (1988-1997). Public expenditure on health in 1995 was equivalent to 1.2% of GDP
Religious Affiliations	Muslims 47.2% (mostly in the north and west), Christian 34.5% (predominantly in the south; 50% Catholic, 50% Protestant), 18% traditional religions.

It must be noted that the population data for Nigeria's cities are estimates; most are likely to be low, given that urban areas have grown rapidly in recent years.

The Human Development index (HDI) has been developed by the United Nations Development Programme to assess a country's achievement in developing the basic human capabilities of its citizens. It incorporates a number of social indicators related to health, education and standard of living. It is an average figure and does not reveal distributional inequalities within a particular country.

The Gender-Related Development Index is similar to the HDI, but it takes account of inequalities in achievement between women and men. As a result, GDI falls if either the achievement levels of both women and men decline, or if the disparity between women and men increases.

Table 2: ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Allaince for Democracy
APP	All Peoples Party
ACB	African Continental Bank
AEO	Assistant Executive Officer
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AG	Action Group
BCCI	Bank of Credit and Commerce International
CBC	Colombia Broadcasting Service
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CDC	Constitution Drafting Committee
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FEDECO	Federal Electoral Commission
GNP	Gross National Product
GNPP	Great Nigerian People's Party
HDI	Human Development Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JMB	Johnson Matthey Bank
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NEPU	Northern Elements People's Union
NET	Nigerian External Telecommunication
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPE	New Political Economy
NPN	National party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigerian People's Party
NRC	National Republican Party
NSDA	Nigerian Steel Development Authority
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEMG	Presidential Election Monitoring Group

PRP	People's Rdemption Party
PDP	People's Democratic Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SMC	Supreme Military Council
TI	Transparency International
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
WAI	War Against Indiscipline
WWW	World Wide Web
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Tables:

Table 1: Facts about Nigeria.....	11
Table 2: Abbreviations.....	15
Table 3: Nigerian presidential election, 1979.....	111
Table 4: Presidential election, 1999.....	129
Table 5: National Assembly elections, 1999.....	130
Table 6: Gubernatorial elections, 1999.....	131
Table 7: Income per capita.....	144
Table 8: Nigerian budget deficits, 1989-2000.....	162
Table 9: Breakdown of the year 2000 appropriation bill.....	170
Table 10: Bribery and corruption: Crimes Known to the Police.....	220
Table 11: Results of the PDP primaries.....	266
Table 12: Corruption perception index, 1998.....	302
Table 13 : Ministerial appointments, 1999.....	303
Table 14: New service chiefs, 1999.....	306

Abstract

Nation-building, a central theme of nationalism, has been viewed by politicians, administrators and activists as highly desirable, if not an imperative, goal over the last two centuries. At times, nation-building was believed to be an easy and automatic process, following universal patterns which originated in the West.

Created at the beginning of the 1920's by the British, Nigeria was a state within which both British administrators and indigeneous Nigerian rulers expressed their desire to create a "Nigerian nation "out of the new state's heterogeneous population, along the lines of Western 'model'. The heterogeneous character of the country's population, however, has constituted a challenge to the idea of homogenisation, since the division of Nigerian Society, that is to say the Moslem dominated Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri-Tiv communities, the Oduduwa descendant of the Western part (Yoruba) and the Christian dominated East region (Ibo) nationality has been viewed as incompatible with national unity and has thus weakened social and political cohesion. The army, the spearhead of modernisation by technological necessity, was expected to function as a model-institution producing loyal ,disciplined, receptive and industrious subjects. Loyalty to the army, the state and the nation was to be an integral part of individuals' behaviour.

The mode of thinking behind this study is the proposition that if, in a giving state, official nation-building intentions determine actual nation-building policies, the nation achieved is then a direct effect of these policies. The aim of this study is to probe whether the actual policies connected with selected events, were guided by the actors' officially declared intentions of creating a nation in Nigeria. And to what extent corruption has played a role in the process of nation-building and the development of a viable civil society in Nigeria.

This study examines the process of nation-building by describing the intentions and assumptions of nation-building and the ways in which corruption has contributed to development or underdevelopment in the society. It analyses Nigeria's economic and socio-political failures vis-à-vis the generic problem of underdevelopment and the pervasive nature of corruption. The study also discusses and uses aspects of previous theory building in formulating an explicit assumption: the assumption that corruption in Nigeria leads to the failure of nation-building, underdevelopment and that the neo-patrimonial nature of society is at the root of endemic and systemic corruption in Nigeria.

The problem of corruption cannot be understood without considering the context in which it occurs. Consequently, the examination of corruption in this study is in the context of the legitimacy of the state, the patterns of political power and the engagement of civil society. This calls for a reflection on the role and place of the state and its apparatus in economic and socio-political development of the country. To capture the central role played by the state in the economic and political life of the nation, the study evaluates state practices and based on concrete data, explains the mechanisms for the painful paradox of Nigeria's 'self-imposed poverty.'

Finally, the study ends not only with a conclusion and a re-interpretation of the use of the military, which highlights the incongruity between the intentions and the assumptions of nation-building and specific nation-building policies but also with a consideration of transforming the system into a permanent stable constitutional democracy of empowerment. Only a stable democracy of empowerment define a workable political conception for the fulfilment of development in all its facets.

Keywords: State-making, nation-making, civil society, corruption, military, coups, nationalism, African unity, democracy, Nigeria, Great Britain, Moslems, Christians, neo-patrimonialism, predation, state, development, underdevelopment, Germany, Dictatorship, Elections.

CHAPTER SIX

Corruption in Nigeria: socio-political and economic effects.

Corruption is a phenomenon that has often been compared with poverty, human right abuses and of course drug abuses because the problem of corruption is not limited to the developing countries.¹ Though, seen as a global phenomenon but it is more devastating to the developing economies of the so called “Third World”.

The movement and war against corruption has received a very strong support worldwide especially in countries like Japan or Italy² where corrupt governments were often forced to resign or even thrown out through parliamentary democratic coup (vote of no-confidence).

Somany African countries are taking steps to introducing laws against corruption. Several of them in the sub-Sahara Africa (Nigeria, Togo, Ghana etc.) have already passed laws outlawing corruption. This is a step in the right direction according to ‘Samuel Adekunle’, “Director of good governance programme, GERDDES-Africa, who argued that enforcing anti-corruption laws require a responsible, democratic and literate government.

According to a bulletin released by the “London school of Social Sciences” on the 23 September, 2000 , titled ‘Africa on the Cross Road’, revealed that the fight against corruption in most African countries are only on paper manifestation.³ The Buletin stressed that even in Nigeria where the Anti-Corruption Bill was reluctantly passed, there has not been any serious directive to wage a credible war against this menace.

In societies around the world, a keen observer is bound to find all manner of tales of corruption. These tales are often thinly veiled caricatures of corruption or they express an extreme form of popular outrage over corruption in these societies. Some of these tales depict instances of callous politicians and bureaucrats willing to abandon the course of their nations for their own private interests. These tales, apart from being a mirror that society holds to itself to reflect entrenched problems, also reminds us that corruption is nothing new, nor is it confined to any particular corner of the world.

1. Cord, Jakobkeit. Korruption in Africa – Erscheinungsformen, Ursachen, Konsequenzen und Gegenstrategien. 1993, pp.46

2. Jakobkeit, 1993, pp. 46

3. London School of Social Sciences: 23 September, 2000. pp.11-14

Therefore, the aim of this review of classic literature is to explore how this capture the conceptualisation and understanding of corruption both in the past and present the world over and the contention by the Zambia's Amendment Act 1992 Sec.12©, that considers corruption as detrimental to society's development. The Corrupt Practices Amendment Act makes provision for a legal practice to disclose privileged information, communication, book or document relating to the transfer by a client of any money out of Zambia or his investment outside Zambia. Under Section 10(i)(a) of the Hong Kong Ordinance, a person could be charged for maintaining a standard of living above that which is commensurate with his official emoluments during the charge period. And given the research aims of the present study, the review also analyses at length literature that also consider corruption to be detrimental to nation's progress. In order to substantiate the contention of this study that corruption contributes invariably to a nation's underdevelopment, the works and writers like Syed Hussein Alatas, Robin Theobald, M. McMullan, Robert Williams and Stanislaw Andreski are used to buttress the argumentation of this study.

Corruption is a deep rooted human behaviour which is conspicuous in every society. There is no accurate statistics to show the real level of corruption in the public life. It is a topic that is often seen as a Tabu, which makes any meaningful discussion on it hard. The only agreement among social scientists and politicians is that corruption cannot be eradicated under strict conditions.⁴ Faced with this scourge, the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and several other multilateral institutions have, in the last twenty (20) years, concluded agreements and adopted resolutions concerning transparency in international commercial transactions.⁵ The international chamber of commerce consequently developed a set rules in 1994, to combat corruption. Corruption in Africa is so high that it becomes logically difficult to mobilise a reasonable percentage of the majority poverty stricken against corruption. Though by Transparency International is on grand corruption, it is necessary to address the fold of petty corruption as prelude to the general curtailment of corruption, including grand corruption. This cannot be achieved unless the abject poverty in African societies is addressed.

Corruption as used in this study goes beyond giving and or receiving of bribe. It encompasses any use of power by anybody in government for capricious or arbitrary purpose or any other purpose foreign to which it is meant. It is pertinent to state that corruption could take different forms, namely, bribe, acceptance of favour, succumbing to undue influence, yielding to intimidation from superior body, etc.

4. Jakobeit, Jahrbuch 1993, pp. 46-47

5. Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in West Africa: Summary Report of a Seminar organised by Africa Leadership Forum in Cotonou September, 1994. pp.18-20.

It is a matter of great notoriety that of all the multifaceted daunting problems that have stunted and are still stunting the development and democratization process in Nigeria and of course the whole of African continent, the most intractable is corruption. Nigeria and the rest of Africa has been impoverished and destabilised by the kleptocracy of its elite in both business and government circles. It has been alleged by “Cyprian Dike” who worked as world bank top adviser for 14 years that three hundred Nigerians own over 30 billion US Dollars in European and North American Banks.⁶ Similar cases of mind-boggling foreign accounts belonging to other African citizens abound. It is also an open secret that there are some African Heads of state, past or present whose assets in various parts of the globe, if valued would be more than the yearly earnings of their respective countries. Whereas the citizens of developed countries (like Germany, USA, France etc.) regard leadership in government and business circles as a means of offering selfless and meritorious services to their countries, their African counterparts regard same as the shortest and surest route to gratifying and satiating their lust for wealth acquisition.⁷

The scourge of corruption has not only robbed the continent of Africa of unascertainable sums of money, it has also dis-incentivised foreign investment in the continent. The United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Walter C. Carrington speaking on corruption as disincentive to foreign investment in the Guardian Newspaper of 29th December 1993 had this to say:

“One of the problems is that investors are worried about being able to invest in Nigeria. They are worried because of corruption; they are worried because of so many 419 (a notorious means of dupping) scams, so they do not know who is legitimate and who is not legitimate; and there is a very psychological problem that you have in this country”.⁸

6. Summary Report of a Seminar organised by Africa Leadership Forum in Cotonou September 1994: Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in West Africa. pp.94-96

7. Summary Report of a Seminar organised by ALF in Cotonou September 1994. pp. 96

8. Guardian Newspaper; 29th December 1993. pp.9

Corruption kills the development spirit. Nothing is as destructive to a society as the rush for quick and easy money which makes fools of those who can work honestly and constructively. By this, the notion of corruption takes a general etymological dimension: that is proliferation. The economic reforms referred to as *Structural Adjustment* being campaigned, the advocated model should be that of a market economy built around the law and a strong state that does not allow a free ride for uncivilised capitalism aimed at immediate benefit at all cost. Examples from some East African countries in transition where market economy became synonymous with bestiality, corruption became inevitable.⁹

An economy consumed in corruption is repulsive to potential foreign investors and to sponsors of public projects. It is common knowledge that countries that need financial flows should attract such finances because success is attractive to funds. Wastages, failure and chaos is repugnant to it (see Serge Michailof: 23).

Corruption damages social and economic development in a variety of ways. The implementation of the process of sustainable development is contingent upon the presence of a number of features. First, it demands prudent, rational and far-sighted decision-making. Second, it requires the best use being made of available resources. Third, it needs a principled leadership which enjoys the understanding and support of the people.¹⁰

Corruption strikes at these three elements: First, irrational and short-sighted decisions are taken which are motivated by greed, not by need. Second, resources are squandered as projects are approved not on the basis of sustainability, but on the returns which they may yield to decision-makers. Third, a corrupt administration quickly loses the confidence of its people, who are then gripped by cynicism and rendered immune to exhortations by the leadership.

Constructing a definition of corruption presents several difficulties, because like many other forms of behaviour, it is an elusive and complex phenomenon. One of the difficulties is constructing a definition of corruption which is not dependent on the moral or normative judgements of the observer. This has sometimes elicited a tendency to condemn, which has impeded objective analysis. This explains why some writers deliberately avoid defining it.¹¹ Another is the fact that a definition of corruption which is clearly ethical is also subjective and a discussion of causes and consequences would require prior agreement amongst all participants about the relevant of normative values.

9. Jakobet, Cord; *Korruption in Afrika – Erscheinungsformen, Ursachen, Konsequenzen und Gegenstrategien*; Afrika-Jahrbuch 1993, pp. 47

10. *Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in West Africa: Seminar Report 1994* org. by ALF. in Cotonou. pp.25

11. Williams, Robert. 1997. *Political Corruption in Africa*. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishers, pp.43. See also Khan, Mushtaq H. 1996. "A Typology of Corruption. pp.173

Various Definitions of Corruption

Corruption is usually defined in most social science discussions in terms of deviations from legal norms which are objectively observable, without questioning the morality or legitimacy of the legal norms themselves.¹² This norm-based definition has tended, however, to allow discussion to take place at the cost of ruling out some important activities which in everyday sense would be considered as corrupt.

Though this norm-based definition allows a clear identification of corruption, it is nevertheless problematic for the very reason that legal norms change over time and vary between countries. Therefore, what is required is an investigation of specific practices which have been specified as corrupt. An economist, for example, finding that the ruling party of a new nation through its minister of public works exacts 5 to 10 per cent in graft on each contract it awards might want to know how this affects the society's rate of savings, its investment decisions, its pattern of income distribution, or its ability to carry out a five-year development plan. An anthropologist, on the other hand, noticing that a peasant who gets a favourable decision in the local criminal court will express his gratitude by delivering a goat to the judge's house the next morning, would be interested to know how community values foster or inhibit this sort of corruption, how cultural beliefs about this practice have evolved, or how corruption serves to maintain or disrupt existing social bonds.

Since we are not concerned with legal acts in general (corruption usually refers only to illegal decisions made by individuals in positions of public authority), we must establish a working definition that will encompass much of the behaviour we commonly have in mind when we use the term. A few observations are in place here. First, the lack of a clear definition of the concept has led to the fact that different persons have different ideas and opinions of what corruption really is. What may be corrupt to one citizen, scholar, or public official may be 'just politics' to another, 'indiscretion' to a third. Second, in the efforts to clarify the ways in which the concept is frequently defined, it is necessary, if slightly invidious, to suggest that the importance of defining the term should not be misunderstood or exaggerated. Since no all-purpose definition is available or possible, there should be no presumption that a specific and irrevocable choice needs to be made about which meaning of corruption to employ. How corruption is defined is partly a function of the kinds of questions analysts pose and what it is they wish to understand and the choice of definition is intimately related to the direction in which we wish our analysis to go. However, our choice need not exclude considerations of aspects of corruption central to other definitions.

12. "Corrupt Transaction in Developing Countries". IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1996): pp.12

The consensus now is that there is no single cause of corruption: corruption is a complex social phenomenon; usually, it is a reflection of prevailing political, economic and socio-cultural values and different political and economic systems facilitate or impede the growth of corruption in different ways. As the World Bank admits in its report on *Governance and Development*,¹³ the causes of corruption are rooted in the particular political and economic conditions of each country and as such, its causes are as complex as the types of corruption are varied. While corruption is part of the streetcorner, corridor, canteen or office conversations of ordinary people, journalists, public servants and development practitioners, the secrecy involved in corrupt transactions and the expediencies of institutional diplomacy make difficult to tackle explicitly and directly and also make remedial efforts difficult.

From the above analysis, it seems unlikely that even the most careful research (this included) can ever resolve the debate about the definitions in favour of any single approach.

Some definitions are appropriate for different families of questions and Some may work well in policy analysis and comparative research, while other approaches may be better suited for discussion of more general political consequences of corruption. Therefore , there is no reason why we cannot employ several definitions of corruption appropriate to different levels of social activity and judgement.

Literature review reveals varied and ramified definitions of corruption which accounts for the fact that, empirically, as Heidenheimer notes, corruption “has been neither measured nor illuminated by much highly visible scholarship.”¹⁴

A general definition of corruption is offered by Senturia (1960 P.392): “Corruption is the misuse of public power for private benefits.”

Social science students in search of an unambiguous and clear definition of corruption can resort to dictionary ones which offer different meanings that appeal to different scholars. It is no doubt unrealistic to expect a unanimity of approach, but it is useful to note the roles different meanings play in analysing corruption. Three basic meaning are attributed to the concept by dictionary definitions:

- a) organic or biological corruption;
- b) moral corruption;
- c) Legal or public office corruption.

13. Scott, James. 1992. *Comparative Political Corruption*. Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. pp.271-72. See also, World Bank, 1992: *World Development Report 1992*. Washington, DC.

14. World Bank. 1992. *World Development Report 1992*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Word Menu Dictionary (1992) defines corruption as the “use of political influence for personal gain... inducement to or engagement in improper or wrongful acts.”¹⁵ The Oxford English Dictionary identifies nine meanings of corruption. These, roughly grouped together, with the first referring to the process of physical decay, disintegration and decomposition with associated unwholesomeness and putrefaction. Secondly, corruption signifies moral deterioration and decay; a loss of innocence or decline from a condition of purity. The third aspect specifically relates to the sphere of government and administration, to the discharge of public duties. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1971) corruption is “the perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour.”¹⁶

The Webster dictionary defines corruption as “induce (as of a political official) by means of improper considerations (as bribery) to commit a violation of duty. The selling of political favours or other improper political or legal transactions or arrangements.”

These dictionary definitions explicitly include bribery and encompass both the giving and receiving of bribes. They focus on corruption as a particular form of disloyalty and as a breach of faith and trust. But they are less specific about embezzlement and other forms of corruption. The assumption of all these dictionary definitions is that corruption involves deviation from certain standard of behaviour.¹⁷

This, however, poses several methodological questions. The most important of these is what criteria shall we use to establish those standards? Broadly speaking, there are several criteria from which to choose but for the purpose of this study, I shall concentrate on three popular criteria. They are: the public office; legal norms; and the public interest.¹⁸

Criteria for Measuring Standards of Behaviour

A) Public-Office-centred-Definitions.

In advanced modern industrial societies, the bureaucratic principle – the tenden

15. Scott 1992. pp.275. See also Word Menu Dictionary, 1992

16 Heidenheimer (ed.) Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. pp. 43-44. See also Oxford English Dictionary, 1971

17. Senturia, J. R. (1991, revised version) “Corruption, Political.” Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. IV, pp. 448-452.

18. Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition. 1989. Vol., pp. 566-67. See Dias on Jurisprudence, 1996. pp.695

for human affairs to be organised more and more along bureaucratic lines – is well advanced. This administrative system first emerged in the state apparatus and was followed by the development of the nation-state in the nineteenth century which resulted in the consolidation of this form of administration: the appearance of the career public servant who allegedly makes decisions on the basis of neutral, universal criteria and scrupulously segregates public affairs from personal interests.¹⁹

Discussions of corruption cannot help being informed or influenced, one way or another by this conception.

Public-office definitions of corruption assume the existence of a public domain which is recognisably separate from the private sphere. The conception of public office is strongly influenced by Marx Weber's ideal type of rational-legal bureaucracy.²⁰ The core characteristics of this type of bureaucracy are impartiality, impersonality and the strict separation of incumbent and office. In the ideal type, the bureaucracy is run by hierarchical ordered corps of officials who are recruited and promoted according to objective criteria (merit), such as educational qualifications and professional experience; who are paid a regular salary which is graded according to rank and qualifications; and who are allocated fixed jurisdictional areas governed by clearly laid down rules and procedures.

B) Legal Definitions.

As a way out of the cumulative difficulties associated with other definitions of corruption, it has been suggested (by Serge Michailof:143) that we define corruption as the illegal use of public office for private gain. The assumptions of legal definitions of corruption is that political behaviour is corrupt when it violates some formal standard or rule of behaviour set by a political system for its public officials. Under this assumption, the problems are discussed in terms of legal rules (laws and regulations in which the official aims and attitudes are set out), certified in statute books or provided by court decisions. This means that corruption is said to occur when some code of behaviour or law regarding public office has been transgressed, typically with an abuse of public trust for private gain. Thus James Bryce saw behaviour to be either permissible or corrupt in accordance with the criteria established by legislators and judges.²¹

Corruption may be taken to include those modes of employing money to attain private ends by political means which are criminal or at least illegal, because they induce persons charge with a public duty to transgress from that duty and misuse the functions assigned to them.

19. Theobald, R. (1990). *Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan. pp. 73-74

20. Weber, Marx. 1968. *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster Press. 3 vols.

21. Bryce, James. 1991. *Modern Democracies*, 2 vols, New York: St. Martin's. pp.239

A person is guilty of corruption who, *Being... a public servant, accepts, or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatsoever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act... or for rendering or attempting to render, any service or disservice to any person (Indian penal code).*

C). Public-Interest-Centred Definition.

This approach has been suggested in the light of perceived weaknesses of the public office/legal conception of corruption.

These definitions are mainly represented in the writings of Friedrich, Lasswell and others. These differ from public-office centred definitions in the sense that they emphasise abuse of power and public trust to serve clientele, cleavage, communal and other interest group objectives. These definitions significantly broaden the range of behaviour that is being investigated. In this view, corruption is a behaviour which is inimical to the public interest and involves the subversion of the public interest for private private ends. In other words, corruption is said to exist if the public trust or good is betrayed whether or not a violation of legal codes occurs. Consider the definition proposed by Arnold Rogow and Harold Lasswell:²²

A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system of public or civil order and is in fact incompatible (destructive of any system). A system of public or civil order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt.

Another definition of corruption based on notions of the public interest is that offered by Carl Friedrich:²³ The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing things, i.e. who is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for induced to take actions which favour whosoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests.

However, despite the important analytical merits of the legal/public office definitions, corruption, as defined in legal terms, forms only part of the broader pattern or style of political behaviour in Africa. Corruption can be properly understood if it is isolated and abstracted from the context in which it occurs. To prevent fully the nature, scope and incidence of corruption in African settings, it is necessary to go beyond the confines of the formal legal/public office framework to a broader treatment of the character and nature of the African state.

22. Rogow, Arnold and Lasswell, Harold. (1985). "The Definition of Corruption", in Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.) Political Corruption: Reading in Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehar and Winston, Inc. pp.321

23. Friedrich, Carl. (1996). "Political Pathology". Political Quarterly 37, pp. 70-85

Categories of Corruption

For easy identification and analysis, Heidenheimer grouped corrupt behaviours into three categories: those involving “petty”, “routine” and “aggravated” corruption.²⁴

Petty Corruption: The bending of official rules in favour of friends, as especially manifested in the somewhat untruthful reporting of details, the ignoring of cut-off dates, the ‘fixing’ of packing tickets, even the issuance of death certificates to a healthy person, and so on. Although it is not standard practice in the civic-culture town, but it occurs widely in most developing countries.

Routine Corruption: In civic-culture communities, some of the practices listed in the category of routine corruption do occur, but only in forms where they are sanitised. Thus campaign contributors to political parties may win some degree of preference as contract bidders or appointive office candidates.

On the other hand, in the boss-patronage communities, most of these practices were either standard or widely practised operating procedures. Through favouritism, wealth is accumulated by individuals and the unequal access of the boss makes it relatively easier to use patronage powers to ‘pay his colleagues for obeying his orders... and to bribe elected officials to follow his policy lead.’²⁵

In the traditional patron-client settings the receiving of gifts by public officials is more of a standard practice than clearly relating to specific obligations. Thus the strong and determined Okonkwo in Chinua Achebe’s novel, *Things Fall Apart*, goes to the ‘great man’ of his Ibo village to ask a favour. He seeks the loan of yam seeds to plant a first harvest of his own, and brings a cock, a pot of palm-wine, a kola-nut, and an alligator pepper. Offering them he says “Our father, I have brought you this little cola. As our people say, a man who pays respect to the great paves the way for his own greatness. I have come to pay you my respects and also to ask a favour”.²⁶ In this setting, these practices which are standard procedures and are deeply rooted in more general social relationships and obligations would be considered ‘routine corruption’ by Western standards. All these practices are also standard procedure in a moral familist communities because families here are more nuclear rather than extended and exchanges are more specific because of the absence of a mediating patron.

Aggravated Corruption: While instances of aggravated corruption is a rarity in the civilised literate community, its occurrence is the distinguishing feature of the boss-patronage-based communities. In comparison with the above two

24 .Wilson, James Q.. (1989) “Corruption : The Shame of the States”, in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. pp.348

25. Heidenheimer 1989. pp. 354

26 .Achebe, Chinua. (1959), *Things Fall Apart*. Greenwich edn. P. 73, See, also reversed edition, (1989), pp.124

societies, there are two noticeable differences in the incidence pattern of aggravated corruption in the patron-client society. In the first place it differs from the boss-patronage community in that the properly connected client can use it to tap a wider variety of services. Second, it appears this setting differs from the familist society in that some of the techniques of aggravated corruption are less widely used.

The causes of corruption

The debate in the literature on corruption is a debate basically between those who emphasise the individual as the locus of causation and responsibility and those who consider the external situation, the social structure, or extenuating circumstances, as the more decisive.²⁷ While the causes of corruption based on individual explanations ultimately reduce the phenomenon to the individual personality, the social explanation seeks the causes of corruption outside the individual personality in cultural institutions, poverty, temptation, fundamental political change, war, non-payment or late payment of salaries and imperfect system of law. Now if the causes of corruption are taken to be the consequences of a particular social structure, all these influences extraneous to the individual are considered to be the decisive causes of corruption. Therefore, the bottlenecks created in the administrative sectors will invariably become a source of corruption.²⁸

It is beyond the scope of this research to provide detailed analysis of the causes of corruption world-wide but for the sake of brevity, an inquiry into the causes of corruption in Africa (with special reference to Nigeria) is important.

Various locuses of causation in Africa

A) Colonial heritage and corruption: the main factor contributing to the prevalence of corruption was colonial rule (Nicephore Soglo, ALF:25). Apart from the fact that there was corruption in the colonial administration, it was also further increased by the indirect effect of nationalist agitation against the government. Soglo maintained that the divide and rule policy of the imperial powers is the central point that eluded African Nationalism and Patriotism which has given rise to social problems like ethnic conflict and corruption.

It is of importance to note the historical connection between the public services of African countries and the colonial service of, for example the United Kingdom and France. Although an account of the colonial service's rationale, recruitment and record are beyond the terms of preference of this study, it is necessary to take notice in passing of its former presence and policies.

27. Bryce 1991; pp.288

28. Williams 1997; pp. 67

In the case of Nigeria, the very nature of its immediate past has led to the traditions, structure, training and 'esprit' of the Nigerian public services being by and large modelled on the British pattern. As a consequence of its colonial history, Nigeria emerged as a state with new systems of government and administration, a legal-rational ethic that was transplanted on to the predominantly traditional setting. This modern government that served as the colonial bureaucracy in Nigeria was alien to it in obvious ways: it was controlled from a distance, and the controllers were subject to pressures and had aims often quite unrelated to the situation in Nigeria; and its key men were foreigners, often with little understanding of the indigenous languages; only its junior officers were recruited from the indigenous peoples, struggling to find a balance between their alien masters and the demands of their own people. This led to a disharmony between the governments and the traditional society on which it was imposed and which it sought to change. The following could actually be said of any African or Asian country that was colonized. According to Alatas:²⁹ In India, for instance, during the days of British imperialism, cheating the government was popularly regarded as patriotic. Removing light bulbs and other fittings from train compartments, protecting offenders from the police, income tax evasion, all these were supposed to prevent the colonial government from grabbing Indian money. After independence in 1947, the habit of cheating the government continued.

B). Literate Government in an illiterate society: The phenomenon of literate government in a predominantly uneducated society has been historically cited as a cause of corruption (Atlas:112-115). Atlas maintained that colonial rule in Nigeria (even for that matter, contemporary rule) was and still is the rule of an illiterate society by a literate government. The government operates in accordance with and by means of written rules and regulations. No one who cannot read and write can hope to occupy effectively any position in the public service. Entry into even the lowest grades is only for those who can read and write. Appointment to administrative class is by open competition, which consists of a written examination, psychological and aptitude tests, a full-scale interview administered by the civil service commission, which is responsible for all civil service recruitment.³⁰ Though the phenomenon of literate government in an illiterate society arose in Nigeria (as in the rest of Africa) with the imposition of colonial rule, it would be foolhardy to expect that this was radically reversed with the coming of independence. In fact, the independent governments of these countries were and still are quite committed to literate government (in Nigeria for example,

29. Alatas, Syed Hussein. (1990). *Corruption: its nature, causes and functions*. Avebury, Gower Publishing co. Ltd. England, pp. 112

30. Price, R. (1987). "Politics and Culture in Contemporary Ghana: the Big-Man Small-Boy Syndrome" *Journal of African Studies*, pp.43

literacy and understanding English are almost synonymous) as was the colonial regime.³¹ But as Victor LeVine observes:

Colonialism introduced not corruption, but sets institutions, technologies, norms, and values alien to Africa. In the process of contact, the traditional definitions of political resources altered to incorporate, in a rather piecemeal, chaotic fashion, the political goods brought in by the colonial powers. Amid the complexities of this process of redefinition, incorporation, and adjustment... traditionally "august" figures became, very often, brokers in and manipulators of the new political resources, i.e., patronage, offices, loans, scholarships, and contracts. Their traditional clients, in return, gave them continued support, traditional legitimacy, perhaps taxes, and often votes where electoral systems were introduced. The magnates of Northern Nigeria played this role, as did, with more or less success, the ganwa in Burundi; the sheikhs in Senegal, the saza chiefs of Buganda, as well as a number of traditional chiefs in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Niger, and Upper Volta..."In the hands of ambitious traditional notables or more recently, politicians, these patterns of deference, these expectations about traditional reciprocities could be exploited to create networks of informal relationships" (Lane Davis 1993:342-349).

C). Another factor contributing to the prevalence of corruption was the **rapid increase in the number of civil servants**, resulting in chronic low pay. The structure and remuneration for this public servants never took into consideration the traditional obligations of the family "bread winner". As a result of this, the need for a second income was made necessary. This idea that rampant corruption in some developing countries, especially African states, is due to the low pay of civil service is true, but it should be viewed in its wider context. My observation is that low pay is brought about by corruption and ill-conceived planning based on the prospects of corruption.

Also providing a fertile soil for corruption was the rapid increase in the number of government offices, the rapid extension of the power and opportunities of the bureaucracy, coupled with the weakness of supervision from the top, and the influence of the new nationalists parties.³²

There are some other minor causes of corruption in Africa and other parts of the third world that have mostly been emphasised are: the institution of gift giving, the obligation to serve one's family and the institution of the extended family structure.³³

31. LeVine, Victor. 1987. "Political Corruption: The Ghana Case." Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. pp.23

32. LeVine 1987; pp. 23-29

33. Utibe 1994; pp.8-12. See also LeVine 1987; pp. 28

D). Gift-giving and corruption: In considering the relationship between corruption and traditional society in Africa, many features of the traditional way of life are contributing to the prevalence of corruption. Observers often isolate the customary exchange of gift as the element in traditional life which has led to the growth of corruption in modern times. The basic assumption here is that corruption in Africa (Nigeria) is the long, unbroken continuity of African traditional gift-giving practices. In the traditional society the giving of gifts was an integral part of the social structure. It was embedded in a complex network of social alliances and status differences. Persons who held positions of leadership (e.g, the chiefs) were often obliged, as patrons, out of appreciation and hospitality, to make gifts to their power clientele or to their community as a whole. In return, as a demonstration of their support, the poorer clients were expected to make token offerings to their patrons or leaders. Now, the emphasis placed on the exchange of gifts in this traditional social setting is taken as a particularly significant key to the understanding of contemporary corruption in africa.

E) Kinship ties, extended family structure, communal obligations and corruption:

In explaining corruption in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, the importance of kinship ties play a big role. The vertical solidarities of tribalism or, at least, of the extended family structure remain intact almost every where in Africa, sustaining nepotism and favouritism in bureaucracies. That makes governments ill-qualified to act as economic agents and arbitrators. The argument is usually based on the belief that in traditional society, the first obligation of a person is to his close kin and then to lineage, clan, or ethnic group. This obligation would, for example, induce a public official to “give first preference” to his brother over others for a clerical post or service even though this relative may infact be incompetent or unqualified for the post or service. In this assumptiuon, it is the emphasis placed on the exchange of gifts in traditional social relations that is a particularly significant key to the meaning of the contemporary corruption in Africa.¹

Hoselitz, in an essay entitled *Tradition and Economic growth*, discussed different types of usage in a four-fold scheme of habit, usage, norm and ideology. He pointed to a group of usage which is pertinent to the present problem: An important group of usage is made up of those which are related to certain features of social structure, or which reinforce a given pattern of social action. Though this usage may not be sanctioned in the breach, they often show a high degree of persistence; and conformance with the usage is almost universal, though there seems to exist no compelling normative reason why this should be so.

34. Ekpo, Monday U. (1991). *Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Sahara Africa: Toward a Search for Causes and Consequences*: NY:University Press . pp 54

There is a strong feeling that among the important conditions and causes of corruption is the level of morality in a given society. Though this cannot be quantified, a society whose elites' morality is essentially based on the neo-patrimonial ethos – nepotism, prebendalism, tribalism, ethnicity, and bigmanism – would certainly intensify the corrosive process that has already undermined the foundation of public morality in a corrupt society.

Nigeria's inability to manage its economy and to formulate a credible fiscal economic policy, has been identified (World Bank Report, 1996: Global economic prospects for the developing countries) as the main problem hampering development. The World Bank pointed out that corruption has put every development movement in Nigeria at a stop.

Like many other low income countries, Nigeria has been characterised by instability, both political and economic. But unlike many other African nations, it is blessed with abundant natural and human resources. Yet, palpably missing is the ability to convert these resources to the development of the country. Infact, the country has recently joined the group of the poorest nations in the world. Underdevelopment generates inequality, which in turn intensifies poverty because of the stagnation or backwardness of the economy. As a social pathology, it cannot permit progress in any sector of the society.³⁵

Nigeria's underdevelopment is identifiable in structural, institutional, policy and welfare areas. To facilitate their elucidation and solution, this broad superstructural deformities should be reduced to specific dimensions. The major dimensions of underdevelopment will, therefore, be analysed vis-à-vis the generic problem of political instability, pervasive abuse of office, poor political institutionalisation and the welfare problem of relative political and economic deprivation.

Everyone knows that Nigeria's malaise, like the rest of Africa's, is substantially not only of its making. It is a function of the world capitalist crisis in which the Third World as a whole is the main victim.³⁶ But in the case of Nigeria, there is much more to it. The internal processes of development, such as they are, have ground to a halt and the advance of democracy promised by independence has been aborted, often by those who made the promises. There have been parliaments, elections, pluralist party systems, a degree of press freedom, and even a limited amount of freedom of political action, yet the promised development of the society remains a distant dream.

35. Hoogvelt, A.. M. M. 1988. *The Sociology of Developing Societies*, Second Edition. London. pp.172-173

36. Turok, Ben. 1987. *Africa: What can be done?* London: Zed Books ltd. pp.23-24

Most studies directed at the issue of corruption in Africa have focused on the influence of colonialism and the consequences of that legacy. This is anchored to the theorising about the lasting impact of colonial rule. And the consequences of this on the character and function of the post-colonial state. The argument is that the manner in which the colonial masters sewed together traditionally warring tribes and peoples in a country like Nigeria is responsible for the lack of unity of purpose among the political leaders.³⁷ Consequently, that lack of unity of purpose that is needed to combat social, economic and political problems has contributed to the underdevelopment of the country.

In addition, the structural roots of this social problem (corruption) in Nigeria, for that matter, Africa, is further anchored primarily to the relations of exploitation of Africa's valuable resources for the development of colonial countries. Infact, Basil Davidson (1992:56) perceives the African crisis of corruption and development as a continental crisis of institution.

Africa's real problems are those of a period of major transition from systems of development viable in the pre-colonial past to other systems, similarly viable, which can face the challenges of the future. According to William Robert (1997)

“The crisis which arises is, therefore, one of institutions, Those of the past have lost their containing power. Those of the present offer little save confusion. Those of the future have yet to appear. And it is this that gives all these societies...their essential unity of situation”.

Cases of corrupt practices in Nigeria

On independence day in 1960, Nigeria never looked more promising. Giving the ambitions, nationalist promises, the freedom to manage one's affairs, and above all the nation's status as a country rich in natural resources, especially the 'black gold', oil, the euphoria during independence was quite understandable. The future did not only seem promising, infact by 1975, the promise seemed to be materialising. This was the period of oil boom. As a result of the high revenues from the oil sector, “yielding revenues at a level of \$29 billion a year”,³⁸ the economy was strong despite the civil war of 1967-1970 that ravaged the country. The strenght of its economy earned it the phrase, “Giant of Africa”. By contrast, from the 1980s onwards, the economy began facing acute and chronic problems: the educational system began to collapse, schools lacked

37. Umez, Bedford, N., (1995). African Lifestyles and Problems of Development. The Nigerian Example. Texas: Department of Government, Baytown pp.210

38. Beenstock, Michael. (1990). “Corruption and Development”. World Development, Vol. 7, pp. 15-24

books, chalks, furniture and habitable classrooms, and salaries of government workers, especially teachers remained unpaid for months in this once rich nation; basic infrastructures such as roads, water supply, and electricity have all but crumbled, and health care centres lack even the most rudimentary equipment, basic drugs and skilled and competent staff as many continue to vote with their feet to fulfil themselves elsewhere.

From 1979 through 1983, scandals involving billions of dollars dominated headlines. These included the illicit auction of much of the \$2.5 million annual allocation of import licences, the arrest of several top officials of the Federal Capital Development Authority in Abuja over an alleged \$20 million fraud, and the revelation by a federal minister that Nigeria was losing \$50 million a month to ghost workers and other forms of payroll fraud.³⁹

The enormity of the problems confronting African countries (especially Nigeria) and the apparent failure of some 39 years of independence in the case of Nigeria to make a decisive difference to better the lives of most Nigerians have led to writers like Basil Davidson to conclude that that African crisis is little more than a crisis of institutions borne out of what he describes as the particular nation-statism of the post-colonial years.

Case 1: The Nigerian Cement Scandal

The cement scandal of 1975 illustrates how the costs and wastage involved in the import sector contributed not only to general economic problems but also to the scandal that undermined the regime of Yakubu Gowon. The basic outline of this case demonstrates the contention of this study: that rampant corruption is devastating to every economy.

In the wake of the reconstruction after the civil war coupled with the oil boom, rapid economic expansion, particularly in the area of building and infrastructure inevitably produced shortages, bottlenecks and other problems of financial planning, co-ordination and control. Preceding this 1975 scandal was the anxiety about cement supplies. There was actually a genuine fear that Nigeria might experience a serious cement shortage.⁴⁰

39. Beenstock, 1990. pp.27

40. Beenstock, 1990. pp. 30

In 1975, General Yakubu Gowon (military head of state) ordered over 20 million metric tonnes (Mt.) of cement. A few elements made this case very illustrative of the inconsistencies of priorities of development under an atmosphere of corruption. First, the order was ten times more than the amount indicated in the Third Development Plan (1975-1980). Second, this order was so massive that it outstripped the cement exporting capacity of Western Europe and the then Soviet Union. Third, the irony was that even though the sheer size of the order was too much for the combined Nigerian port complexes to handle, approximately half the merchant ships in the world which were suitable for carrying cement became involved in supplying Nigeria. By November 1975, there were more than 360 ships lying off Lagos waiting to be unloaded.⁴¹

Apart from the above elements, there were a lot of duplicate tonnage on order and other irregularities involved. Among these irregularities in the types of contract entered into by the various ministries concerned, was the price the state was paying for cement, freight and demurrage. In 1975, the price of cement was about \$25 a tonne and freight was \$15 a tonne for a normal 60-day voyage from Europe to Nigeria. However, for those who secured contracts, the Ministry of Defence offered to pay around \$55 a tonne, cost and freight. This amounted to fifteen dollars a tonne over the going price for buying and shipping cement to Nigeria. Further, on top of the above favourable rate offered by the suppliers, the Ministry of Defence, which was responsible for ordering no less than sixteen million tonnes of cement, agreed to pay demurrage rates of 40 cents per tonne per day (t/d) when rates were nearer 25 cents.⁴²

This case reveals the network and pattern of relationships between the government official, Nigerian middleman and foreign supplier or seller. At this level, corruption is basically different from the sort of simple, direct transaction between two people that was noticeable in petty corruption. To understand the importance of the cement scandal in the study of corruption in Nigeria, it is important to note those who were involved in the racket and how it worked.

41. African Development, Jan. 1976. pp.19-20

42. African Development, Jan. 1976. pp. 20

Those who were directly involved and were beneficiaries were prominent members of the Ministry of Defence, senior diplomats, high ranking officials of the Central bank. Outside this categories were the ‘Big Five’ Nigerian cement dealers, the ship owners and hirers and the foreign cement suppliers.⁴³

From this, it remains no more a secret that corruption operated in two stages. In the first instance, corrupt transaction surrounded the awarding of contracts, since in keeping with the prevailing practice, contract awards were placed with Nigerian middlemen acting as agents on behalf of foreign suppliers. In this way, those who benefited most from this high contract price were those awarding and receiving such contracts.

The cement scandal of 1975 helped bring about the fall of the Gowon administration. At the end of the investigation by the Belgore Tribunal, these deals were described in an official understatement as ‘so indefensibly unorthodox that they defied prudence and international usage’.⁴⁴ Among those dismissed, as a result of the Belgore tribunal findings, were nine people, including Malam Ibrahim Dancida, the Nigerian High Commissioner in London, Alhaji Othma Ahmadu-Suka, high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Defence and Housing and two army officers. The conclusion of the tribunal was that it had found:

“Disturbing evidence of administrative, financial and other irresponsibilities on the part of some public officers, middlemen, foreign contractors and businessmen”.⁴⁵

Case 2: The \$12.2b Oil Money

This case is based on the findings of the panel on the reform and reorganisation of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The panel’s terms of reference was the investigation of how \$571.78 million additional revenue from crude oil sales during the nine month Gulf War crisis and the \$12.4 billion which the country earned in oil sales between september 1988 and June 1994, was spent. The money came from increases in crude oil prices in the global oil market following a shortfall in supplies to the market with the absence of Iraq and Kuwait.⁴⁶

43. Africa Guide, 1991. England: Africa Guide Company. pp. 9-10

44. Williams, Robert. 1989. pp.79

45. Williams, Robert. 1989. pp.85-88

46. African Guide. 1991. pp. 12

Unlike other oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria and Venezuela which promptly declared their earnings and directed the moneys into visible projects with benefits to their citizens, no account of the windfall was given by the Nigerian government. In fact, the CBN released an official government account for 1990 and 1991 which showed the government incurred a deficit for the two years. The deficit was N21.681 billion in 1990 and N35.31 in 1991. Actual government receipts were given as \$7.789 billion in 1990 and \$11.348 billion in 1991. Thus, the figures showed a decline of about \$500 million from the budget estimates.⁴⁷

However, the panel discovered that the windfall amounted to \$12.4 billion at the official exchange rate of \$1 to N22. The panel also discovered that the money was not paid into the federal account as required by law but into special dedicated accounts. Those who had access to the funds were Babangida, the country's ruler until August 26, 1993, and Abdulkadir Ahmed, the governor of the CBN until September 1993. The panel's chairman, Pius Okigbo, reported to General Sani Abacha, the Head of State, that of this amount, \$12.2 billion was spent on non-priority items and without proper accounting. Okigbo concluded that:

“They were spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine high priority nor truly regenerative investment; that neither the president nor the governor (of the CBN) accounted to anyone for this massive extra-budgetary expenditures; that these disbursement were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling with crushing external debt overhead. According to Akin Donyin, a Lagos based financial analyst, Gen.Sani Abacha used over \$6 billion to consolidate his grip on power. These represent a gross abuse of public trust.⁴⁸

The cases and instances of corruption in Nigeria involves questions of accountability and transparency. Each society is based on some sort of public morality. In Machiavelli's *The Prince*, morality was described as the belief in and practice of a set of rules or beliefs. Those who share these moral rules but do not practice them become hypocrites, especially where the deviation is recognised. Those who do not even have these beliefs are amoral. Public trust and the requirements of accountability are standards and conventions, that over the years have been ostensibly enshrined in Nigeria's constitutions. But as should already be evident in the analysis so far, and especially as the present case shows, public trust and accountability in Nigeria have always been subverted in principle and practice by the very leaders who profess to be the repository of the general good.⁴⁹

47. Newswatch, October 24, 1994.

48. Newswatch, January 16, 1995.

49. Newsweek, Dec. 25, 1995. pp. 8., See, also Newsweek, Jan. 1, 1996. pp.17-18

There are numerous imaginable and unimaginable cases of corrupt practices by top government officials and military officers in Nigeria. Nigerian economic demise can be attributed to random and systematic corruption by the top and lower ranking officers of previous regimes in Nigeria. This has further brought the nation into a total collapse and pushed it away from the international arena as a nation with destiny. It has also brought to a still the process of economic development.

The Deviant Case: the Frugality of Government.

To properly grasp the impact of corruption on nation's level of progress, it is prudent to search for an example of a state where the problem of corruption can be ignored or relegated to an aside, as a problem which is both politically unimportant and economically insignificant. A recent text book on African politics has noted the 'unusual features' of the South African state of Botswana. Among these unusual features was a noticeable 'frugality of government'.⁵⁰ As L.H. Gann and P. Duignan note:

The country generally ran its affairs in a spirit of fiscal responsibility reminiscent of those Scottish missionaries who first preached the gospel in Botswana during Queen Victoria's reign. Government offices were modest, even ministerial cars were modest..... in Botswana, as in most other countries, there was some graft, especially at the lower levels of government, but the senior civil servants' scrupulous integrity... commonly came as a surprise to those businessmen used to the way of Zambia, Congo (Zaire), or Nigeria.

In the beginning of the 1990s, World Bank published in its annual financial report for developing countries that the fastest growing developing country over the recent past was not an East Asian super exporter but a land-locked South African state – Botswana. The surprise has been in Botswana's miraculous achievement in moving from a position as one of the world's poorest states at independence in 1966 to its current status as one of the sub-Saharan Africa's middle-income economies.⁵¹ Compared to the spectacularly corrupt Nigerian state, Botswana's frugality, with its attendant low level of corruption, seems comparatively interesting as a point of analysis in this study

50. Gann L. H. and Duignan P. (1995). "Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland", in P. Duignan and R. H. Jackson (eds.), *Politics and Government in African States*, (1985)... London and Sydney: Croom Helm .pp.86

51. Charlton, Roger. (1993). "Exploring the byways of African Political corruption: Botswana and deviant case analysis". *Corruption and Reform* 5: pp.1-27. See also World Bank Report 1990: Sec.23/16. pp.37

This digression into brief comparative analysis is informed by the fact that all analysis of the impact of corruption are inevitably faced with the lack of an adequate point of reference for comparison. This will then require some focused case studies of what African states might be like in the absence – relative not absolute – of significant levels of political corruption. Without such studies, it will be difficult to either accurately measure the impact and importance of the phenomenon and to formulate rational strategies for its control or reform.⁵²

To forestall a misunderstanding: in an ideal situation a measure of the effect of corruption would be understood as the difference between a context of no political corruption and the context of states replete with this phenomenon. Unfortunately, this is not possible as no contemporary or historical state could be claimed to be absolutely free of corruption. The only meaningful approach will be to search for comparisons between cases broadly comparable on most cultural, socio-economic and political indicators but that tends to deviate markedly in terms of the impact of corruption. In his classic study of corruption in Morocco, John Waterbury rejects as ‘illusory’ the possibility that we might ‘actually measure the costs and benefits of corruption’⁵³. It is very difficult to suggest what the costs and benefits of some hypothetical process might be. The only way out of this bind would be to find (or simulate) two or more governmental systems sharing the same cultural environment and basic socio-economic configurations and political regimes, of which one is ‘corrupt’ and the other ‘clean’ and then compare the functioning of the two systems in terms of costs and benefits.⁵⁴

Though it is clear that the present case of corruption in Nigeria cannot be completely compared to that of Botswana, however, it will advance our knowledge to bring into consideration a state like Botswana that exhibits a relative absence of corruption. One can therefore agree with Charlton, that since Botswana’s political regime is, apart from its relative absence of corruption, broadly similar to those which exist in a number of other African states, Botswana can meaningfully be compared and contrasted with these. According to Charlton, the combination of unusual political features that stands out Botswana among other African countries includes: a continuous history of successful competitive party politics since independence; an absence of recorded military coup attempts; and, the absence of a significant increase in the incidence of political corruption or significant declines in bureaucratic effectiveness:

52. Charlton. 1993, pp.7

53. Charlton. 1993, pp.10. See also John Waterbury 1993; pp. 212

54. Waterbury 1993, pp.212-218

Charlton particularly stresses the Contrast with Nigeria, given the fact that Nigeria's political corruption tended to have been fuelled more by oil-wealth, whereas Botswana's own remarkable post-independence diamond-based economic boom, in contrast, has fuelled more clearly collective purposes and has involved significant infrastructural investments.

The question then arises, how has Botswana succeeded in maintaining this comparative and relative absence of corruption in its central or sub-national government, among politicians or among administrators? As Morris Szeftel notes, what Botswana lacks is political graft: the diversion of public resources for personal gains. This absence of graft has meant that Botswana has been able to avoid graft's attendant spoils system: a system of politics which regards the state as 'national cake' thereby relies on state patronage for personal gain and clientelistic projects. This is not to argue that patronage does not exist in Botswana. It is actually a key feature in the achievement of both political stability and the entrenchment of elite political control.⁵⁵ The difference is that this patronage strategy is based on targeting most material benefits to all constituencies alike – irrespective of their political leanings. Another area where Botswana differs radically from other African states, especially Nigeria, is in the uncharacteristically modest life-styles and moderate personal consumption patterns of Botswana's political and administrative elite. As Charlton reminds us, "Botswana's politico-administrative elite maintains a reputation almost unique among African states for remaining financially 'clean' and free from personalised political graft".⁵⁶

To answer the above query, the role of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in Botswana contemporary political process will be very instructive. In his political essay: *"Exploring the byways of African Political Corruption: Botswana and deviant case analysis"*, Roger Charlton (1998:352) acknowledges the overall success of the BDP, especially with reference to its comprehensive winning of every national election held since their inauguration a year before independence in 1965".⁵⁷ Of significance here is the fact that political patronage has been a key feature in the entrenchment of elite political control through the medium of this party.

55. Szeftel, Morris. (1992). Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia: The State as a Resource in Itself'. Review of African Political Economy. No.24. pp.341

56. Charlton, (1993). pp.10

57. Charlton, (1993). pp.11-14

However, the attendant clientelist inducement of such patronage are tightly rationed by the BDP's leadership. Its form of patronage politics is a sort of centralised clientelism but its unique characteristic is a system of patronage distribution that is very even handed. Like other political parties across Africa, the BDP's electoral politics is based on a pattern of spoils politics. Like these other parties, the BDP throughout its history has consistently singled out its party activists – both supporters and opponents – for specific particularistic inducements. Inducements/rewards in the form of jobs and contracts at the local level are made available to the supporters, while for activists from opposition parties, similar and sometimes greater incentives are given in return for either a formal change of allegiance or for informal co-operation.⁵⁸

It is obvious that the centralisation of political resources and the decentralisation of (limited) political competition, evidenced by this controlled and rationed politics of patronage in Botswana's electoral process is not very much different from the Nigerian neo-patrimonial process based on Northern elite hegemony in collaboration with their Southern satellite elite. Where it departs is in its ability to successfully control the individual appetites of its political-administrative elite and even though the BDP maintains a position of almost complete dominance and therefore effective one-party control over the resources of patronage, its even-handedness has helped Botswana's progress, both politically and economically. Apart from this prudent role of BDP, other factors behind Botswana's 'extraordinary economic record' point to issues of "economic management, including policy-making processes and institutions, since the choice of policies and exploitation of opportunities depended on the process of policy-formulation."⁵⁹ In this connection, a cursory look at the literature reveals a number of rather distinctive and developmentally salient features of Botswana's policy-making institutions and processes. Three key aspects of these processes need to be highlighted. The first of these is the 'particular prominent role' played by 'senior bureaucrats' in policy-making in Botswana. The second is Botswana's outstanding technical ability in both policy design and implementation. The third is Botswana's proven 'capacity to take pre-emptive policy action and generally pursue policies in the long-term interest of the country'.⁶⁰

58. Charlton, (1993). p.23 and Holm, J. 1991. "Elections in botswana", in F. M. Hayward (ed.), *Elections in Independent Africa*. Boulder and London: Westview Press. pp.17

59. Lewis, Peter. (1996). "From Prebendalism to Predation: the Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34 (1) (March), pp. 79-103.

60. Charlton, (1993). pp. 27

No wonder Botswana ranks very high in sub-Africa not only in income *per capita*, but also in such indicators of human development as public expenditure on health and education. For example, 1992 Botswana ranked fifth behind Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, and Gabon in income per capita, and held the same position on the UNHDP's (United Nations Human Development Index) (whereas, Nigeria ranked 20th in the same index) which, as we have seen, takes progress on public health and education into account.⁶¹

The Botswana case underlines the fact that mineral boom does not necessarily lead to corruption and the spoils politics of Nigeria. The case further proves the point that corruption and graft at the lower levels of government will not escalate upwards and out of control if the elite curtail their graft-related activities. We notice that as well as Nigeria, Botswana's public sector has absorbed a disproportionate share of the fruits of mineral wealth. The contrast is that whilst the mass of the population in Nigeria can be said to have seen comparatively little, at least in income, infrastructures and social services, on the other hand, the state of Botswana has decidedly 'not squandered the expanding national income so as to generate a public disrespect for a corrupt leadership'⁶²

Finally, the danger of using selected cases of illustrating forms of corruption is that it might be assumed that other, related forms are unimportant or non-existent. This would be gravely misleading in Nigeria. Other kinds of corruption and related forms that are generally practised in Nigeria are smuggling, product theft, and evasion of petroleum regulations. For instance, on February 23, 1984, Professor Tam David-West, a former Nigerian oil minister, asserted that, during the first four years of the Second Republic under Shehu Shagari 1979-1983, Nigeria had lost over sixteen billion dollars (\$16 billion) in oil income or twenty per cent of the revenue the government should have received from the industry.⁶³ Infact at every stage from production to sales and administration, the oil industry in Nigeria is characterised by corruption and absence of transparency. Among oil producing countries, Nigeria has the highest cost of production, put at \$6 per barrel. In most other oil producing countries, the range is \$2.5 to \$4.00. The cost is made up of \$3.50 as technical cost and \$2.5 as cost of net investments and operator's profit margin. Sources at the oil industry have hinted that corruption and fraud account for this high cost.

61. United Nations Human Development Report., (1992). pp.13-14

62. Holm, (1991). pp.199

63. New African, April, (1991). pp.11. Aso see Williams ,(1990), p.72

According to the World Bank Report 1994, oil contracts in Nigeria remain unusually high. In a publication on the 12th September 1994, “*Adjustments in Africa, Lessons from Country Case Studies*”, stated that the cost of constructing a new export terminal at Bonny for new Port Harcourt refinery put at \$340 million was too high and could be cut by two-thirds.⁶⁴ Therefore, the attempt has not been to present an exhaustive compendium of corrupt practices and cases but to outline and illustrate the ways in which the neo-patrimonial structure of Nigeria shapes corrupt transactions and effects of corruption on the nation’s progress.

INTERPRETATION OF RESULT

As the case above has shown, corruption constitutes the greatest waste of human and natural resources in Nigeria. Nye stressed this point. The capital accumulated by corruption that ends up in Swiss banks is a net loss for the development of the nation.⁶⁵ To paraphrase Dr. Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor “Then of course, you have other countries that have resources... with vast amount of money vanishing in the pockets of individuals. The Swiss banks are full of money stolen by African leaders...”. Public money that is diverted to private use constitute a big loss of money for providing public goods and services.⁶⁶

George Moody-Stuart, a recently retired senior executive in an international corporation, has suggested a simple arithmetic of bribes, which vary from country to country:

*5 percent of \$200,000 will be of interest to a senior official below the top rank;
5 percent of \$2 million is the top official area;
5 percent of \$20 million is real money for a minister and key staff;
5 percent of \$200 million justifies the serious attention of the head of state
(Quoted in Obasanjo, 1995: p.18).⁶⁷*

64. Ukim, Utibe. (1994). “Where is the Money?” Newswatch, October 24, 1994. pp.8

65. Nye, J. S. (1995), “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, June, pp. 417-427

66. Tell, January 27, 1992. pp.12

67. Moody-Stuart, George “article titled: Bribery and Corruption in Nigeria” published in the Guardian on 6th March, 1992. pp.14

Effects of Corruption on Economic Development

If general welfare is the standard for evaluating the costs and consequences of corruption in Nigeria, then poverty, widened socio-economic inequalities, ambivalence toward governmental institutions and the systematic maladministration that has become the hallmarks of the country have proved to be the main reason of the dysfunctional effects of corruption on development and operational policies and of course strategies.⁶⁸ The cases presented have shown enough evidence that corruption slows down economic growth through a wide range of channels.

The cement scandal case provided evidence of corruption in the import-export sector of the economy. The case indicated the illegal purchase of import licences, under-invoicing and over-invoicing of imports/exports. There were the offers of substantial material inducements of government personnel who were in a position to award contracts, concessions and the like. Those who secured contracts in this way were offered fifteen dollars a tonne over the going price for buying and shipping cement to Nigeria. On top of this, the state paid demurrage of 40 cents per tonne per day (t/d) when the rates were nearer 25 cents. Since on average a tonne of cement remained a minimum of 150 days at sea outside Lagos, incurring \$60 demurrage, it was estimated that at least \$240 million in demurrage was paid on the 4Mt.⁶⁹ cement loaded for the ministry of defence. Thus, it has been estimated that the Nigerian state paid out some \$115 per tonne of cement or \$75 per tonne more than necessary. For example, it was calculated that the Nigerian middlemen-cement supplier partnership profited by the \$0.15 million difference between the inflated payment on a ten thousand ton order and the going rates: ($\$0.55 \text{ million} - (\$0.25 + \$0.15 \text{ million}) = \0.15 million).⁷⁰

Assessing the overall effects this had on the Nigerian economy is difficult, but that substantial gains were made by the Nigerian public officials and middlemen involved in this huge over-ordering of cement is in no doubt.

68. Obasanjo, Olusegun. (1995). "Corruption Blocks Development". *The African Communist*, Third Quarter. pp.19

69. *Financial Times*, may 12 1997, pp.13-14

70. Obasanjo, Olusegun. (1995). "Corruption Blocks Development". *The African Communist*, Third Quarter 1995. pp. 21

The costs and wastage involved in the cement scandal, the case of the \$12.2 billion oil money, and other group and individual cases of corruption, has kept Nigerians into a state of shock and has created an economic loophole that is haunting Nigeria today.⁷¹

The end result, with regard to African nations, is reflected in the recent report from Swiss banking sources which estimates that the amount being held in Swiss banks on behalf of African leaders alone is in excess of US\$20 billion.⁷² Taken together the two cases presented and other examples throughout this study illustrate the negative effect of corruption on development

The table below shows all categories of crimes and other related corrupt practices in Nigeria compiled by the Transparency International during a fourteen year period, between 1985-1999.

Table 10: BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION: 1985-1999

Year	Figures	Annual per cent change
1985	300	14,8
1986	350	16,6
1987	355	1,4
1988	386	8,7
1989	471	22,0
1990	592	25,7
1991	673	13,7
1992	748	11.1
1993	818	9.4
1994	1,068	30.6
1995	1,191	11.6
1996	1,325	12.7
1997	1,720	14.5
1998	1,890	15.4
1999	2,354	27.8

Source: Transparency International (Lagos, 1999: 14).

71. Transparency International 1999. pp.14

72. Swiss Bank Report on Developing countries, 1998

Anti-Corruption Commission and Bill, 1999

The new democratic government of Olusegun Obasanjo which came into power on the 21 May, 1999 swung into impressive action of corruption eradication. The first step taken by the government was the formation of Anti-Corruption Commission which was to look into all accusations of corruption in Nigeria⁷³. The Commission was empowered to investigate and advise the government on the corrupt activities of the past regimes. Although, the commission received very limited cooperation, but it was able to establish concrete details about the flow of money and other corrupt activities of a number of top government officers (some of them still occupying important positions till today). The findings of the Anti-Corruption Commission sent cold waves across Nigeria and beyond. The report published in all leading Nigerian newspapers disclosed in some cases how top military leaders collaborated with the Central Bank of Nigeria to have deliberately looted public money⁷⁴. The report also established how stolen money had been channelled out of the country. The trilling revelations by the commission on how Abacha and his loyalists looted the economy sparked criticisms by politicians who benefited from the Abacha's brutal era. The Abacha political figures, critical of the Commission, accused it of being biased in its findings. They argued that the Commission designed much of their work to discredit the dead Abacha's regime whereas there was no much emphasis made on the corrupt practices done by other military regimes especially, the regime of Ibrahim Babangida.

In effect, the Commission criticised and blamed past regimes in Nigeria for abating and condoning corruption. Based on the report of the Anti-Corruption Commission, President Obasanjo appealed to the world community to cooperate with him in his bid to recover stolen money stashed abroad by the members of the past regimes.

As followup to the findings of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo started lobbying to get the Anti-Corruption Bill passed. The bill was first introduced on the Senate floor by Senator Arthur Nzeribe PDP, who raised the hope of Nigerians that the bill would be passed soonest. According to Senator Nzeribe, his 16-page motion entitled, "Corruption: Probe Recovery and Punish", was meant to complement President Obasanjo's Anti-Corruption Bill. But things began to change when Senator Arthur Nzeribe published in July 4, 1999, names of nearly 1000 Nigerians that should be probed under this law⁷⁵.

73. The Vanguard, June 28, 1999. pp.1-3

74. The Vanguard, June 28, 1999. pp. 3

75. The vanguard, July 4, 1999. pp. 9

This publication prompted a wave of outcry and tends to discredit the real intention of Senator Nzeribe because he deliberately excluded his good friend Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and other people close to him who are believed to have amassed wealth through dubious means. The confusion over the bill was too deep that Senator Nzeribe and his supporters questioned the seriousness of Obasanjo regarding the bill. The confusion resulted to the delay by the National Assembly to pass the bill.

Another excuse by the opponents of the Anti-Corruption Bill was that it's in conflict with the existing laws on corruption and also in conflict with some other commissions like the Code of Conduct Bureau.⁷⁶ While some lawmakers argued that the existing laws should be eliminated to pave the way for laws that embrace real democratic principles. Even the chairman of the Senate Committee on Local and Foreign Debt, Senator Idris Abubakar maintained that Obasanjo's Anti-Corruption Bill was totally unnecessary for the development of the country. So many opponents of this bill both in and outside the National Assembly worked against getting the bill passed because of its grave consequences of a seven year term for offenders. Some of the officials who opposed the bill citing complexity were actually afraid that their past corrupt records would be subjected to probity.⁷⁷

As a result of tremendous pressure from different groups, and of course external pressure, the bill was reluctantly passed in July 2000. The passage of the bill heralded yet another era in the history of political development in Nigeria.

The Role of Civil Society in Anti-Corruption Reforms

The civil society encompasses the expertise and networks needed to address issues of common concern, including corruption and other social problems because a viable civil society is in position to define its destiny against a possible imposition of rules by a dictator and since most of the corruption in a society involves two principal actors, the government and the private sector, civil society is therefore, the major victim.⁷⁸ An autonomous and interactive civil society both demands and supplies better governance, which can lead to control of corruption.

76. The Daily Times, July 5, 2000, pp.12. See also Vanguard, July 5, 2000. pp.6

77. Vanguard, July 5, 2000, pp. 16

78. Sanchez, Oscar Arias. (1996), 'Forward', in National Integrity Systems : The TI Source Book, ed. by Jeremy Pope. pp.52-53

The ability of the civil society to monitor, detect and reverse the activities of the public officials in their midst is enhanced by proximity and familiarity with local issues. As power devolves from the centre to local authorities, opportunities for corruption shift downwards towards new actors who are in more direct contact with civil society. In this way, civil society serves as a training ground for non-corrupt behaviour as it teaches the distinction between civic (interactive) and communal (appropriate) conduct.⁷⁹

Therefore, civil society to be effective in contributing to development in general and anti-corruption campaign in particular, government has a duty to provide a legal and regulatory framework which allows the necessary space for civil society to operate including freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom to establish non-governmental entities. Laws governing the formal constitution of a civil society organisation or association should be clearly understood, accessible, consistent with international norms, and not unnecessarily restrictive or cumbersome. In order to avoid bureaucratic discrimination against certain organisations that may have divergent views from their, decisions regarding registration requirements should be made by a court or other independent body.

Corruption is a world-wide phenomenon and events all over the world attest to this assertion. However, in Nigeria it seems to go on unabated and it even seems to increase by leaps and bounds, moreso, with its cancer-like spread going into the private sector of the economy.

Grand corruption encourages massive capital flight not only in Nigeria but all through Africa which is doubly debilitating. While any form of corruption in any society is disabling, grand corruption at the high political level is particularly oppressive on the society because while the act of corruption may not be in the open, rumours normally circulate widely. In consequences, this increases fear and insecurity in the mind of the ruler and through manipulation and the use of power and money, such leaders normally commit more atrocities maintaining iron-clad hold on power and the governed, thereby becoming increasingly dictatorial, unreasonable, ruthless and more avaricious.

Corruption damages social and economic development in a variety of ways. The implementation of the process of sustainable development is contingent upon the presence of a number of features. First, it demands prudent, rational and far-sighted decision-making. Second, it requires the best use being made of available resources. Third, it needs a principled leadership which enjoys the understanding and the support of the people.

79. Sanchez, Oskar Arias. (1996), pp. 53

Corruption strikes at these three elements. First, decisions are taken which are irrational, short-sighted and motivated by greed, not by need. Second, resources are squandered as projects are approved not on the basis of suitability, but on the returns which they may yield to decision makers. Third, a corrupt administration quickly loses the confidence of its people, who are then gripped by cynicism and rendered immune to exhortations by the leadership.

In the context of development, recent events have established without question the distortion and waste induced by corruption. On several occasions, the wrong development decisions have been made and resources squandered and very often long-term indebtedness incurred, which the world's most poor will be expected to pay- and all because the criteria applied has been "*What is in it for me?*" rather than "*what's best for the country and its people?*" Social, environmental and economic degradation are all aggravated by corruption, which erodes the very core of sustainable development.

Corruption flourishes in situations of non-accountability, relative anonymity and it is exacerbated by absolute discretion. A corrupt regime is the one most likely to abuse human rights in order to repress the accountability and transparency which would reveal the dishonesty of the culprits. As regimes become more corrupt, so do the stakes rise and levels repression with them. What is more, its pernicious effects are more debilitating, more oppressive, more corrosive, and more of hinderance, human rights, good governance and development in Nigeria and elsewhere.

Definitely, Nigerians have to regain their values, they have to stem the damage which corruption inflicts on the progress and economic well-being of Nigerians. Corruption could be reduced if appropriate steps are taken. In an interview with Gerald Ibe, former member of the Imo state House of Assembly in the Second Republic, Mr. Ibe reacted on the question of distribution and consumption process in Nigeria, "that official (governmental) attempt must be made to discourage ostentatious consumption in public and private lives." He added that "moral persuasion and public enlightenment in the form of National Orientation Movement should be adopted and an efficient tax system aimed at combating fraud should be put in place." A bit of coercion is necessary and desirable. The law-enforcement agencies must be improved and international cooperation and assistance to reduce fraud should be sought.

CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION:

There is an emergence of belief system that corruption is inevitable in any business, social and political transactions. Corruption in the Nigerian society is largely seen as a necessary and a harmless social exchange. Clinche like *Nothing goes for nothing* is used as a justification of corrupt practices. In addition, it has encouraged otherwise honest people to be corrupt or has prevented them from fighting corruption.

There is now a misconception that Nigerian poverty can be quickly reduced through corruption rather than through hard work, dedication and patience. This misconception has developed within a social environment; that accords recognition to known and proven corrupt leaders. At individual levels most Nigerians are losing hope in the virtue of honesty, integrity and hard work.

Abandoned projects are visible throughout the country, the resources wasted on them could have been used for more profitable projects. Most abandoned projects were really abandoned from the beginning because of the in built fraud in their planning and execution.

Domestic and external debts of Nigeria, and probably that of other African countries, have arisen not from genuine ignorance in project planning and implementation but also from the corrupt practices of those in the authority. The burden of external debts on Nigerian economy is too well known to require further elaboration .It is important however to note that most of these debts are private turned sovereign debts.

In a face to face interview with Chike Eleke, a post graduate student of the University of Abia, he maintained that political instability results directly from economic and political corruption. The involvement of the military in politics has ruined Nigeria's ability to become an economic super power in the region he maintained. He added that it is well known that the military has not been successful anywhere in Africa in managing itself let alone managing well the national resources at its disposal.

As a result of political instability, foreign investments have not been coming to Nigeria as expected. In spite of great natural resources in Nigeria, the is becoming poorer and poorer.

A phenomenon popularly termed "brain drain" is gripping Nigeria. The human resources needed for development are lost to other countries. Citizens are generally no longer proud to serve their country selflessly. Many have accepted the mercenary objective of leaders.

As a result of political instability in Nigeria and to protect their ill-gotten wealth, Nigerian leaders keep their money in foreign countries, some of which give Nigeria aid and loans for its development.

The magnitude of fraud in the banking sector has contributed to the lack of confidence both internally and externally, in the financial sector of the economy, and the reluctance of banks to finance profitable projects on a long term basis. Technological transfer has been hindered because leaders negotiating development projects have always been satisfied with second-best arrangement arising from their genuine ignorance or intentional and well planned fraud.

Conclusion:

The President of the republic of Benin, Nicephore Soglo pointed out in his address before the African Leadership Forum held in Cotonou on the 24th September 1994 that billions of dollars are lifted from Africa's staggering economy into the already developed Western economies for safe keeping. If the West could not accept the stolen wealth from Africa, they would remain in Africa and as part of the resources of the continent, which could be drawn upon in whatever means for whatever use by the continent possibly of someday recovering such wealth. This could eventually reduce the pressure on state resources as there would be no safe haven for such wealth.

On the approach to be adopted in treating corruption in Africa, there is need to understand the peculiarities of African societies as the basis for any measure(s) to be recommended to fight corruption. Treating specific cases could be the only concrete steps to turn up the tap of corruption in Africa. For a more positive result, the International Headquarters of IT should liaise with its local chapters and other concerned NGO's to encourage and assist private investigation and prosecution of cases of corruption.

For many years Nigeria has been referred to as the sleeping giant of Africa. This derogatory reference has gained some legitimacy over the past decade due to the progressive decay of the nation's infrastructural base and the crumbling of its once booming economy. With a population of close to 120 million people, Nigeria enjoys the singular honour of being the most densely populated setting of black people in the world. Its multi-cultural and multi-ethnic groups have generated comparison to the United States of America. Indeed, with nearly 250 different ethnic groups, Nigeria is one of the most multi-ethnic nations in the world. It is a country that is so immensely endowed with oil and other natural resources, that it is literally the envy of much of the world. Nigeria also boasts of one of the educated and active intelligentsia of any nation. Unfortunately, despite its natural and human endowments, corrupt and inept leadership has plagued Nigeria for many years. Despite enormous earnings from vast holdings in oil and other natural resources, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented

decline in quality of life and an infrastructural decay over the past 15 years as its economic lifeblood is literally sucked away by a corrupt and greedy upper-class.

Finally, contemporary corruption in Nigeria cannot be adequately appreciated unless attention is given to how it is sustained. Therefore, the explanations of corruptions in Nigeria must incorporate both the norms and values of the Nigerian elite and other structural elements. In the end, though there is no doubt that corruption existed in Nigeria before independence and its extent difficult to determine, but it did not become the salient issue, as it is today, because it was not as wide spread, rampant and highly personalised.

Evidently, somany developing countries are having enormous problems in developing a structural economic programme, like in Cameroon, where the government is incapable of managing the economy well. In the case of Nigeria, the country is not only fighting rampant criminal economic activities which state officials are believed to be abating but also fighting against massive inflation, repressive regimes and institutionalized corruption. This has hindered the growth and development of the economy.⁸⁰

Any successful crusade against corruption would require the involvement and commitment of both the leaders and the people. A total and successful war against corruption in Africa can only be inspired by a moral revolution. Such a revolution would be an enduring one only if it is firmly rooted within the basic social unit – that is the family and also focused on a re-orientation toward those fundamental value concepts that form the character and personality of an individual. This catalytic role of the family underscores the special relevance of women in such a revolution in view of the centrality of female realities.

Africans must rise up to the challenges of evolving a lasting democratic culture by resisting military rule or any other repressive form of government which have with consistency been the architects of the pollution of not only the traditional values of leadership but also responsible for the disintegration of African societies. Democracy is the only system of governance that gives the people effective power to define character of leadership. Mobilise the women and educate them about their political strenghts and rights.

Finally, the United Nations should modify the convention on Human Rights and accept that corruption is a part of the violation of human rights. Transparency International should in addition to serving as a pressure group for this purpose, also liaise with other human rights pressure groups in Africa whose efforts are most often limited to the funds and assistance they can obtain from abroad, now unfortunately drastically dwindling.

80. Ferdowsi Mir, A. / Kappel, Robert / Matthies, Volker / Nuscheler, Franz / Tetzlaff, Rainer /Waller, Peter, pp. (1998) „Afrika Zwischen Agonie und Aufbruch. pp.10

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrams, Philip, 1988, "Notes on the difficulty of studying the state", *Journal of historical Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 58-89

Achebe, Chinua. 1959. *Things Fall Apart*. Greenwich edn.

Achebe, Chinua. 1983. *The Trouble with Nigeria*. London, Nairobi: Heineman Educational Books Ltd.

Adamolekun, Ladipo. 1984. *The fall of the Second Republic*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.

Adejumobi, Said and Abubakar Momoh, eds. *The Political Economy of Nigeria under Military rule (1984-1998)*. Harare: SAPES Books, 1999 (available from African Books Collective, Oxford, UK). pp. 359. Paperback ISBN 1-77905-036-4. Wide-ranging collection of articles by fourteen Nigerian scholars based inside the country.

African Development, May 1974

African Confidential 23 May 1997

African news service; (London: oxford university press, 1992) p. 14

African recovery, July 1997

Ake, Claude. 1981. *Presidential Address to the Nigerian Political Science Association*. West

Africa. 25 May, 1981

Aka, Claude. 1985. "The Nigerian State: Antinomies of a Periphery Formation", in Claude

Ake (ed.), *Political Economy of Nigeria*. London and Lagos: Longman Group Limited.

Amali, S. O. O., (1996) "Ibos and their Fellow Nigerians " (Ibadan :1996)

Burns, Alan; *History of Nigerian Democracy*, 1989, pp.32

Allan, cowell, “ In Nigeria vote, old leaders come out fighting”, (the New York times, 3rd May 1993, pp.3

Anderson, Benedict 1983, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso Editions and New Left Books;

Armstrong, R. G., “The Issues at stake, Nigeria 1994” (Ibadan, 1994) pp.78

Ayittey, George. 1992. *Africa Betrayed*. New York: St. Martin’s.

Azarya, Victor. 1994. “Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa”, in J. Harbeson, D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (ed.), *Civil Society and the State in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Reiner.

Asika, Anthony Ukpabia; 1972. *No Victors, No Vanquished*, (Lagos, 1971) pp. 94

Asika, Anthony Ukpabia, 1974. pp.95

Awolowo, Obafemi, (1981) « Path to Nigerian Freedom » (London : Faber) pp. 31-32

Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1993. « The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. New York: Longman Publishing.

Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1986. « Civil Society in Africa », in Patrick Chabal, ed. *Political Domination in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Balogun, Ola. “Towards an Alternative Political System”, *The Guardian*, 26 July 1993, pp.7

Bendix, Reinhard. *State and Society*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (1987). pp.41

Bendix, Reinhard 1964, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. *Studies of our Changing Social Order*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., pp. 1

Bergstresser, Heinrich, 1992: *Zum Demokratisierungsprozeß in Nigeria: Die Gouverneurswahlen 1991*, in: *Afrika-Spektrum* 1992/1, pp. 81-88

Bergstresser, Heinrich, (1984) S.164

Berry, Jason. "Economic Development Policies" (Princeton University Press, 1997) pp. 31

Bienen, Henry, *Military and Economic Development*. (Harvard University Press:1990) pp.125

Bienen, Henry, ed. *The Military Intervenes*: New York: Rusell Sage (1992) p.25
British Journal of Modern Law and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1978.

Callaghy, Thomas. 1984. *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Calboun, John C. "A Disquisition on Government" (New York: The Liberal Arts pPress, Inc. 1983) pp.23

Clarke, Michael. 1983. "Introduction", in Michael Clarke (ed.), *Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Control*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Coleman, James. *Background to Nationalism* (University of California Press.) pp. 52-53

Collis, Robert, " Nigeria and its Economic Crisis" (Secker and Warburg, London, 1993) pp.54

Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland,1964, pp.12

Coup and the Future of Nigeria, "African Report" 21th april 1988. pp.8

Daily Times, January 12, 1995.

Daily Times, July 5, 2000; pp.12

Dar- Es Salam, "The Nigerian – Biafran Crisis" (Lagos: University of Lagos Press. 1973) pp.13

Dahl, Robert A. *Regimes and Oppositions*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press (1989) ,pp. 123

Davidson, Basil. 1974. *can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth Without Development*. Toronto: Little Brown and Co.

Davis, Lane. "The Cost of Realism, Contemporary Restatements of Democracy

Diamond, Larry. 1988. *Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: the failure of the First Republic*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.

Diamond, Larry (1994), *Journal of democracy*, (vol. 5, No.5), pp. 54

Deutsch, Karl W. 1961; idem 1966, *Nationalism and Social Communication*. New York: MIT Press; *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*.

Diamond, Larry. 1991. "Nigeria's Third Quest for Democracy". *Current history* (May 1991): pp. 203

Dobel, Patrick. 1978. "the Corruption of a State". *American political Science Review*, Vol. 72, No. 3, (September 1978).

Dollard, John. "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," P. 18-19

Dudley, B. J. *Politics and Crisis in Nigeria*, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1997) pp.90

Dudley, Bill; *Instability and Political Order in Nigeria*. (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press,1989) pp.61

Dudley, B. J. (1990) "The Military and Development" pp. 13

Dent, Martin, " The Military and Political Process in Nigeria" (Oxford University Press London.1991) pp.12

Dunn, John 1990, *Interpreting Political Responsibility*. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 1

Edevbaro, Daniel. 1996. "Issues in the Implementation of Education and Social Policy in Nigeria", *Research in Progress*. Helsinki: United Nations University/WIDER.

Eckstein, Harry. *Division and Cohesion in Democracy*: Princeton University Press, (1986), pp.43

Ekpo, Monday U. 1970. *Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Sahara Africa: Toward a Search for causes and consequences*. New York: University of Press of America

Egbuna, Obi B, "The Murder of Nigeria" (London, 1993) pp. 43

Financial Times, May 12, 1991

Financial Times, May 12, 1997

Financial Times, June 23 1997

Ferdowsi, Mir, A./ Kappel, Robert/ Matthies, Volker/ Nuscheler, Franz/ Tetzlaff, Rainer/ Waller, Peter P. (1998) „Afrika Zwischen Agonie und Aufbruch. pp.100, 151.

Harrison, Dick. Understanding the Nigerian Crisis (Benin 1995) pp. 34

Gaithey, J. K. military vs. Democracy in Nigeria, (New York: city publishing co. 1994) pp.139

Gamble, Andrew (1992), “An Introduction to Modern Social and Political thought”. London: Macmillan Education LTD. pp. 55

Gellner, Ernst 1983, Nations and Nationalism.

Gouldner, Alvin. 1980. The two Marxism. London: Macmilan.

Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Crime and the Quality of life in Nigeria (Lagos, 1999), pp.14

Graf William, D. 1979. Lagos: the Daily Times of Nig. Ltd.

Graf William, D. 1988. The Nigerian State. London: Heinemann.

Helleiner, G. K., (1991) „Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin 1991)

Herskovits, Jean. (1983) „To Ease Nigeria’s Debt Crisis“ New York Times (October 5, 1983), pp. 58. See also “Dateline Nigeria: Democracy Down But Not Out”. Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984)

Heidenheimer, Arnold J. 1970. (ed.) Political Corruption: readings in Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Himes, Joseph S. ”A Theory of Racial Conflict” , Social Forces vol. 3 (september 1988) pp. 54

Hoetink, H. “Resource Competition, Corruption and Sociaracial Diversity”(harvard University Press, 1978) pp. 10

Human Rights Watch/Africa, Nigeria–“Permanent Transition”: Current Violations of Human Rights in Nigeria. New York : HRW/Africa, September 1996. pp.52.

Huntington; Political Order in Changing Societies, 1996, pp.123

Huntington, Samuel P. 1970. Political order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

IDS Bulletin 1993

IDS Bulletin, April 1996

IDS Policy Briefing, Issue 2, Feb. 1995.

Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1996. „Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria”. The journal of Modern African Studies, 34,2 (1996), pp. 193-225

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; The Economic Development of Nigeria (Baltimore Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1975) pp.666

Jakobeit, Cord (1996): Militärs und Demokraten. Der Einfluß des Militärs auf Demokratisierungs- und Staatserfallsprozesse, in: Afrika-Jahrbuch 1995, Opladen, pp. 62-72

Jakobeit, Cord (1993): Korruption in Afrika – Erscheinungsformen, Ursachen, Konsequenzen und Gegenstrategien: Afrika-Jahrbuch 1993, pp. 46-56

Joseph, Richard. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

John De St.Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, 1971, pp.93

Joseph, Richard A. “Affluence and Underdevelopment: the Nigerian Experience,” Journal of Modern African Studies (1998), pp.23.

Joseph, Richard A. (1981) “Nigeria at the Crossroads”. Havard International Review 4. 3. See also, “The Overthrow of Nigeria’s First Republic”. pp.491

Jemibewon, “Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria”, vol.1. 1998, pp.109

Kano, Amino, "Politics and Administration in Post-War Nigeria" (Iagos, 1983) pp. 23

Khan, Mustaq H. (1996). "Typology of Corruption", pp. 74-79

Kennedy, Post and George, Jenkins, (1973, revised edition, 1996), *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 242-243

Kilby, Peter. "Industrialization in an Open Economy" *Nigeria 1975 – 1980* (London: Cambridge University Press (1981) pp. 139

Kirk-Greene, Anthony and Rimmer, Douglas. 1981 (ed.) *Nigeria Since 1970: A Political and Economic outline*. New York: Holmes and Meier (London: Hodder & Stoughton). pp. 167-168

Kasfir, Nelson. *The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in Nigerian Politics*. Berkeley and Los Angeles. University of California Press. (1978) pp.54

Leff, N. H. 1989. "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption". *American Behavioral Scientist*. pp. 8-14.

Lemarchand, Rene, "Political Clientelism and Religion in Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXVI, No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 68-90

LeVine, Victor. (1987), *Political Corruption: The Ghana Case*. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. pp.23

Lloyd, P.C. "Political and Social Structure." (University of Ibadan Press, 1991), pp.23

Lloyd, P. C. "Africa in Social Change" (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1987) pp. 288 – 303

Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (Harvard University Press. 1990) pp. 120

Luckham, A. Robin, "The Nigerian Military, 1960-1967: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt (Cambridge University Press, London, 1971)

Mackintosh, John P, (1970) "The Action Group: The Crisis of 1962 and its Aftermath". *Nigerian Government and Politics*. pp.421

Mackintosh, John P., "Military Government and politics" (Allen and Unwin, London, 1990) pp.86

Mann, Michael 1986 "The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results", in States in History, pp. 1109-138.

Melsen, Robert and Wolpe, Howard, "Religion and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV (December 1980), pp. 1112-1130.

Mikesell, Marvin W. 1983, "The Myth of the Nation State", Journal of Geography, Vol. 82, No.6, pp. 257-260

Mill, James. An Essay on Government. Indiana and New York: (1988) pp.75

National Concord, 15 July 1983.

National Concord, 6, January 1984

National concord, 15 August 1983

Nielsson, Gunnar P. 1985, „State and „nation-groups“: a global taxonomy’, in New Nationalisms of the Developing West. Edited by E. A. Tiryakian & R. Rogowski. London: Allen & Unwin, as quoted in Taylor, Peter 1989, Political Geography.pp. 188-191

National Newsreel, May 31, 1999

National Newsreel, June 30, 1999

Newswatch, Dec. 7, 1987

Newswatch, October 24, 1994.

Newswatch, January 16, 1995

Newswatch, Febuary 9, 1998

New African, May 1983

Newsweek, 1992

Newsweek, Dec. 25, 1995/Jan. 1, 1996.

Nigeria TODAY July 1996. Lagos: Government Printer.

News Watch,"Crisis of Nationhood in Nigeria, (London: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp.7

New Breed; A Nation in Distress; october 4, 1995, pp.10

Nordlinger, Eric, "Soldiers in Mufty:" The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the non-Wester

Nnoli, Okwudiba, (1994) "Religion and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria" pp.278-79

Nwokedi, Emeka, (1993a): Civil Society and Democratic Transition in Africa: The Mechanism of the National Conference, hrsg. Von der Afrika Studiengruppe an der Universität Bremen. Afrika Diskussionspapier, Nr.2

Nwokedi, Emeka, (1994) pp.57

Nwokedi, Emeka, (1995): "Principles of Democratic Federalism", pp.6

Obasanjo, Olusegun, (1995) "Corruption Blocks Development", The African Communist, Third Quarter. pp.19

Odetola, Theophilus O. (1997), 'Military Politics in Nigeria' Transaction Books New Brunswick, New Jersey. pp.10

Onogwu, Jacob Amuta. "Nigeria's Return to Democratic Rule", (University of Ibadan Press. 1999) pp. 78

Olowo, Dele. 1987. "Bureaucratic Decay and the Prospects for Regeneration in Nigeria". Corruption and Reform Vol. 2, No. 3, 1987: pp. 215-234.

Othma, Shehu. 1984. "Classes, Crisis and Coup: the demise of Shagari's regime". African Affairs, 83 (333), Oct.

Otonti, Nduka. (1993). "Western Education and the Nigerian Cultural Background". Ibadan: Oxford University Press.

Owen, Roger 1978, "The role of the army in Africa" pp.63-81

Palmer and Perkins, "International Politics" (New Delhi;cbs Publishers, 1985) pp. 502

Perlmutter, Amos "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievement," World Politics, 33, No. 1 (October 1980), pp.99

Parsons, Talcott; "The Theory of social and Economic Organisation" (London: Collier-macmillan, 1984) pp.43

Parker, Morris. Instability in Nigeria, a Study (Washington D.C: Public Affairs Press, 1970) pp.178

Panter, S. K. "From Military Rule to Civil War" 1994 p. 82

Pennock, Roland .J. "Self – Government in Modernizing Nations" (1993) p.22

Plotnicov, Leonard. An Early Nigerian Civil Disturbances; 1992, pp.21

Price, R. 1977. "Politics and Culture in Contemporary Ghana: the Big-Man Small-Boy Syndrome". Journal of African Studies, 1 (2), Summer 1974.

Raymond, T. World of Uncertainty in Nigeria, (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1977) pp.39 – 40

Richel, Jean. Democracy in Africa, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1992) pp. 42

Rimmer, Douglas "Development in Nigeria: an Overview", 1993. pp.24

Rothschil, Donald. Politics of Separatism, (Journals Int. affairs) 1974, pp.25

Samuel, Michael A., ed., "The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict" (Center for Strategic International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, 1980)

Schatz, Sayre. (1991). "Pirate Capitalism and the Inert Economy of Nigeria". Journal of Modern African Studies 22, no., 1: pp. 45-57

Summary Report of a Seminar organised by Africa Leadership Forum in Cotonou September, 1994: Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in West Africa. pp.96-100

Smith, Gorson. "Nigerian Scene Since 1992", (Berkeley: university of california press, 1990) pp. 89

Spov, Daniel. "Contemporary International Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp. 129 – 130

Skar, Richard L."Nigerian Politics: The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo, 1979", pp.9

Schumpeter; Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy .1990, pp.272

Senturia, J. R. 1931. "Corruption, Political". Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. IV, pp. 448-452

Soyinka,Wole. 1996. "The National Question in Africa: Internal Imperatives". Development and Change, Vol. 27, (1996): pp. 279-300

Soyinka, Wole, The Open Sore of a Continent: A personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, (1997), pp. 170. Hardback. ISBN 0-19-510557-5. The Nobel Laureate and political activist's passionate analysis and reflections on nationhood in Africa and the world.

Tetzlaff, Rainer. 1994. "Democcracy and development as Universally valid Standard? Opportunities and Risks of Democratization in non-European Countries after the end of the East-West Conflict. Vol. 49/50. pp.34

Tetzlaff, 1994. "Law and State ", Vol. 49/50. pp. 34

Toyo, Escor. Nigerian Soldier, Peace and Future; (Ibadan, 1970) pp.14

Tinker, H. 1981, "The nation-state in Asia", in the Nation-State: The Formation of the Modern Politics. Edited by L. Tivey. Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 104-121.

Theobald, R. 1990. Corruption, development and Underdevelopment. London: Macmilan.

Turok, Ben. 1987. Africa: What can be done? London: Zed Books Ltd.

Uwanaka, Charles. New Nigeria, (Lagos Publishing House, 1963) pp. 26

The Vanguard; June 28,1999; pp.1-3

The Vanguard; July 4, 1999; pp.9

The Vanguard; July 5, 2000; pp.16

Transparency International , 1999: pp.14

Whitaker, Sylvester. "The Unfinished State of Nigeria," Worldview, vol. 27, No.3

Weber, Max. 1968. Economy and society. New York: Bedminster Press. 3 Vols.

West Africa, jan. 5, 1976

West Africa, 7 June 1982.

West Africa, 9 Jan. 1984

West Africa, 26 March 1984

West Africa, 29 May – 4 June, 1998

West Africa, 29 May 1995

Williams, Colin H. 1986, “The Question of National Congruence”, in *A World in Crisis? Geographical Perspectives*. Edited by R. J. Johnson & P. J. Taylor. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 196-230

William, Robert, (1997), *Political Corruption in Africa*. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishers .pp. 326

White, Gordon. 1994. “Civil Society, Democratisation and Development (1): Clearing the Analytical Ground”. *Democratisation*, Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 375-390

Word Menu. 1992. New York: Random House.

World Bank (1996): *Global economic prospects for the developing countries 1996*, Washington, D.C.

World Bank. 1988a. *Sub-Sahara Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington, DC: World Bank

World Bank. 1989. *Sub-Sahara Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington, DC: World Bank

World Bank. 1991. *World development report 1991*. Washington, DC: World bank.

World Bank. 1992. *World development report 1992*. Washington, DC: World bank.

World Bank. 1995. *Nigeria: Social Sectors Strategy, Report No. 11781*. Washington, DC.

World Bank. 1996. *African Development Indicators, 1996*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Table 12 : CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 1998

Rank	TI Int.Corrupt. Perception Index.	Score 1998 (max 10.00)	Score 1997 (max 10.10)	Number of survey sused In 1998	Variance in 1998 betw- een surveys
1	Denmark	9, 94	9, 33	6	0,54
2	Finland	9, 48	9, 05	6	0,30
3	Sweden	9,35	9, 08	6	0,27
4	NewZealand	9, 23	9, 43	6	0,58
5	Canada	9, 10	8, 96	5	0,27
6	Netherlands	9, 03	8, 71	6	0,23
7	Norway	8, 92	8, 87	6	0,51
8	Australia	8, 86	8, 60	5	0,44
9	Singapore	8, 66	8, 80	6	2,32
10	Luxemburg	8, 61	-	4	1,13
11	Switzerland	8, 61	8, 76	6	0,26
12	Ireland	8, 28	8, 45	6	1,53
13	Germany	8, 23	8, 27	6	0,40
14	UK	8, 22	8, 44	6	1,43
15	Isreal	7, 97	7, 71	5	0,12
16	USA	7, 61	7, 66	5	0,15
17	Austria	7, 61	7, 59	5	0,59
18	Hong Kong	7, 28	7, 01	7	2,63
19	Portugal	6, 97	6, 53	5	1,02
20	France	6, 66	6, 96	5	0,60
21	Japan	6, 57	7, 05	7	1,09
22	Costa Rica	6, 45	-	4	1,73
23	Chile	6, 05	6, 80	6	0,51
24	Spain	5, 90	4, 31	6	1,82
25	Greece	5, 35	5, 01	6	2,42
26	Belgium	5, 25	6, 84	6	3,28
27	Czech Rep.	5, 20	5, 37	5	0,22
28	Hungary	5, 18	4, 86	6	1,66
29	Poland	5, 08	5, 57	5	2,13
30	Italy	5, 03	3, 42	6	2,07
31	Taiwan	5, 02	4, 98	7	0,76
32	Malaysia	5, 01	5, 32	6	0,50
33	S. Africa	4, 95	5, 68	6	3,08
34	South Korea	4, 29	5, 02	7	2,76
35	Uruguay	4, 14	-	4	0,63
36	Brazil	4, 56	2, 96	6	0,49
37	Romania	3, 44	-	4	0,07
38	Turkey	3, 21	3, 54	6	1,21

39	Thailand	3, 06	3, 33	6	0,14
40	Philippines	3, 05	2, 69	6	0,51
41	China	2, 88	2, 43	6	0,82
42	Argentina	2, 81	3, 41	6	1,24
43	Vietnam	2, 79	-	4	0,26
44	Venezuela	2, 77	2, 50	5	0,51
45	India	2, 75	2, 63	7	0,23
46	Indonesia	2, 72	2, 65	6	0,18
47	Mexico	2, 66	3, 30	5	1,18
48	Pakistan	2, 53	1,00	4	0,47
49	Russia	2, 27	2, 58	6	0,87
50	Colombia	2, 23	2, 73	6	0,61
51	Bolivia	2, 05	3, 40	4	0,86
52	Nigeria	1, 76	0, 69	4	0,16

Source: Transparency International: WWW. Transparency.de/press/1998

Table 13: Ministerial Appointments, 1999:

Name	Portfolio
Ojo Madueke	Culture & Tourism
Hassan Adamu	Environment
Adamu Ciroma	Finance
Prof. Iyorchia Ayu	Industry
Alhaji Mohammed Arzika	Communications
Chief S. M. Afolabi	Internal Affairs
Kanu Godwin	Justice
Chief Tony Anenih	Works and Housing
Prof. Tunde Adeniran	Education
Alhaji Sani Zango Daura	Agriculture and Rural Development
Alhaji Sule Lamido	Foreign Affairs
Dr. Tim Menakaya	Health
Bola Ige	Power & Steel
Lt. Gen. Theophilus Danjuma	Defence
Dr. Segun Agagu	Aviation
Dapo Sarumi	Information
Chief Tonye Graham-Douglas	Labour and Productivity
Mustapha Bello	Commerce
Major-Gen. David Jemibewon	Police Affairs
Damisi Sango	Sports and Social Development
Ibrahim Bunu	FCT
Jubril Martins Kuye	Transport
Mohammed Bello	Water Resources
Chief Ebitima Banigo	Science and Technology
Alhaji Musa	Solid Minerals

Source: Ministry of Information, Abuja, (many thanks to Francis Madueke, for his assistance in making the official appointment statistics available to me). See, also 1999 P.M. News. Distributed via Africa News Online (www. Africanews. Org).

Table 14: New Service Chiefs, 1999

Name	Portfolio
Rear Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi	Chief of Defence Staff
Major General Victor Malu	Chief of Army Staff
Rear Admiral Victor Ombu	Chief of Naval Staff
Air Vice Marshal Isaac Alfa	Chief of Air Staff
Alhaji Musiliu Smith	Inspector-General of Police
Chief Joseph Sanusi	CBN Governor
Mr. U. J. Ekaete	Secretary to the Federal Government
Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman	Presidential Adviser on Petroleum and Energy
Professor A. B. C. Nwosu	Political Adviser
General Aliyu Mohammed	National Security Adviser
General Abdullahi Mohammed	Chief of Staff in the Presidency
Mr. J. E. Gaius-Obaseki	Group Managing Director, NNPC

Source: Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja.

LEBENS LAUF

NAME: Ihekweme

VORNAME: Fabian

GEBURTSDATUM,- ORT: 04: 03: 1969 in Obowo

ELTERN: Herr Sebastain Ihekweme (Pensioniert)
Frau Louisa Ihekweme (Verstorben)

WOHNORT: No. 9 Ajasa street, Onikan,
Victoria Island, Lagos - Nigeria

GESCHWISTERN: 1. Frau Imma Obasi, 32 (Bank angestellte, Aba)
2. Vivian Ihekweme, 23 (Studentin, Lagos)
3. Lawrence Ihekweme, 21 (Student, Lagos)
4. Ibeawuchi Ihekweme, 17 (Schuler, Aba)

STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEIT: Nigerianisch

SCHULISCHER WERDEGANG

1976 – 1982: Grundschule in Obowo, Nigeria

1982 – 1987: Gymnasium in Obowo, Nigeria

1988 – 1989: Hochschule in Madras, Indien

UNIVERSITÄT

1989 – 1992: B.A. (Political science), Universität
Madras, Indien

1992 – 1994: M.A. (Political science), Universität
Madras, Indien

1996: Deutsch Kurs: Grundstufe 1-3
Mittelstufe: 1-2

1997-1998:

Lektorat Deutsch Als Fremdsprache
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
(Mittelstufe 3)

VERSCHIEDENES

1991 – 1993:

Schatzmeister der Nigerianischen
Studentenvereinigung, Indien

1993 –1994 :

Vorsitzender aller Indisch-
Afrikanischen Studenten
Komitees in Indien

1993 – 1995:

Präsident der Nigerianischen
Studentenvereinigung, Indien

Seit März 1999:

Präsident der Nigerianischen
Gemeinde Göttingen

Seit Juli 1999:

Vorsitzender und Gründungsmitglied
von International Charity Foundation
Göttingen e.V.

30 Oktober, 2000