

**The Concept of Religious Tolerance in Nahdhatul Ulama (NU):**  
*Study on the Responses of NU to the Government's Policies on Islamic Affairs  
in Indonesia based on the Perspective of Tolerance (1984-1999)*

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## Abstract

This dissertation is entitled “The Concept of Religious Tolerance in Nahdhatul Ulama (NU): Study on the Responses of NU to the Government’s Policies on Islamic Affairs in Indonesia on the Perspective of Tolerance (1984-1999)”.

The choosing of time period from 1984 to 1999 is based on the fact that NU’s socio-cultural condition in this period indicates that the degree of tolerance at the elite level were more striking than in previous years.

Meanwhile, NU was established on January 31, 1926 in socio-political and socio-cultural conditions, which demanded internal religious tolerance in the Islamic community. The awareness of this demand for tolerance made NU as a religious and social organization able to adapt itself to various existing social and political demands. Therefore, based on its high tolerance, in responding to various policies of the government, NU sometimes acted and thought moderately, so that the organization was seen being too accommodative and opportunistic.

The research is intended to reveal scientific facts concerning NU’s tolerance to the government’s policies on Islamic affairs, especially when it was under the leadership of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur: 1984-1999) by not ignoring its previous periods to gain complete comprehension on the examined subject matter. In addition, correlations are expected to be found between ideas at the elite level and their comprehensions at the grassroots level by finding the underlying thoughts accompanying the correlations.

Based on this consideration, I carried out the research by using some approaches such as gathering relevant written data contained in books, important documents, and articles in printed media. In addition, observations and interviews were carried out by taking samples in two locations of research (Jombang-East Java and Tasikmalaya-West Java). To describe the findings of the research, I used the comparative method and, mainly, analytical-descriptive method.

In general, the results of this research indicate that: *First*, the need for tolerance in a pluralistic society is confirmed by the fact that NU is not the only religious social organization in Indonesia facing socio-political realities, which were not in accordance with its religious traditions. *Second*, the trend towards accommodative and moderate attitudes, which originated the high tolerance on the part of NU when it faced the government’s policies on Islamic affairs, cannot be separated from the historical reality, which served as background for religious concept and characters of NU’s *ulamas*. *Third*, by considering NU’s community, it could be concluded that one’s high level of religious comprehension probably lead to a high level of tolerance, so that one’s low level of formal education does not necessarily indicate a low level of tolerance if he/she has a high level of religious comprehension.

## Abstrakt

Der Titel der vorliegenden Dissertation lautet: „Das Konzept der religiösen Toleranz in der Nadhatul Ulama (NU): Studie über die Antworten der NU auf die islamischen politischen Maßnahmen der Regierung in Indonesien nach der Perspektive von der Toleranz (1984-1999)“.

Die Wahl des Zeitraums von 1984-1999 beruht darauf, dass sich die NU in dieser Periode sozio-kulturell in einem Zustand befand, in dem das Ausmaß der Toleranz auf ihrer Führungsebene stärker zum Vorschein trat als in den Jahren zuvor.

Währenddessen war die NU am 31. Januar 1926 in einer sozio-politischen und sozio-kulturellen Lage gegründet worden, die eine religiöse Toleranz innerhalb der islamischen Gemeinschaft erforderte. Im Bewusstsein der Notwendigkeit von Toleranz wurde die NU zu einer religiös-sozialen Organisation, die sich durch ihre Anpassungsfähigkeit an verschiedene politische und soziale Forderungen kennzeichnet. Aufgrund ihrer großen Toleranz bezog die NU gelegentlich eine moderate Position gegenüber der Regierungspolitik, wodurch sie mitunter als gefällig-opportunistisch angesehen wurde.

Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist die Darlegung wissenschaftlicher Fakten bezüglich der Toleranz der NU gegenüber der Islam-Politik der Regierung, insbesondere in der Zeit der NU-Führung durch K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur: 1984-1999), ohne jedoch frühere Perioden außer Acht zu lassen, um ein vollständiges Bild des behandelten Problems zu erhalten. Desweiteren sollen Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Ideen auf der Führungsebene und dem Verständnis auf den unteren Ebenen der Organisation offengelegt werden, wobei versucht wird, sie beeinflussende Faktoren und ihnen zugrundeliegende Vorstellungen aufzudecken.

Auf diesen Überlegungen beruhend, folgt meine Forschung verschiedenen Ansätzen durch die Auswertung von Literatur in Form von Büchern, wichtigen Dokumenten und Artikeln in Print-Medien. Darüber hinaus habe ich Beobachtungen und Interviews durchgeführt. Hierzu wurden Stichproben an zwei Orten erhoben. Zur Darstellung der Forschungsergebnisse verwende ich die vergleichende Methode und, hauptsächlich, die analytisch-deskriptive Methode.

Ganz allgemein zeigen die Ergebnisse meiner Forschung: *Erstens*, die Notwendigkeit der Toleranz in einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft bestätigte sich, als die NU als eine von mehreren religiösen sozialen Organisationen in Indonesien mit sozio-politischen Gegebenheiten konfrontiert war, die nicht im Einklang standen mit den von ihr verfolgten religiösen Traditionen. *Zweitens*, die Tendenz zu entgegenkommenden und moderaten Haltungen, die die große Toleranz der NU gegenüber der Islam-Politik der Regierung bedingte, ist nicht getrennt von der historischen Realität zu sehen, die den Hintergrund für das religiöse Konzept und die Charaktere der NU-Ulamas bildete. *Drittens*, eine neue These herausgefunden ist, dass ein hoher Grad religiösen Verständnisses ein hohes Toleranzmaß fördert, sodass ein niedriger formeller Bildungsgrad nicht notwendigerweise eine intolerante Haltung bedingt, wenn gleichzeitig ein hoher Grad religiösen Verständnisses vorliegt.

## Preface

Firstly, I thank Allāh, the Merciful, since it is due to His blessing that this work was completed on time based on the schedule planned at the beginning, which would be in Winter Semester (October 2005-March 2006).

This work is aimed as the main requirement to complete the Promotion Program in Islamic Studies, Middle East History and Culture Department (*Seminar für Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients*), Universität Hamburg. But I realize that work is far from being a perfect one. Therefore, I sincerely wait for advice and critiques from all parties for improvements in the future.

This work is dedicated to all persons whom I love very much: my mother, Atikah Maryanah, my father, S.M. Sudjana, who have given me their deepest Love, and also my son and wife —Rafa Fadhilah Marjani and Lia Yuliati— who always accompany me in all situations and give happy smiles whenever I go home so that my tired feeling is lost at once.

I cannot imagine that this study will be completed without the scholarship given by the Germany government by means of DAAD (*Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst*, German Academic Exchange Service) since the expenditure for studying in Germany and for carrying out a field research in Indonesia is very high. Only after receiving the scholarship could I focus on completing this study without facing very difficult financial problems in a four-year period (April 2002-March 2006).

At last, with all sincerity I would like to express my gratitude to all parties supporting me in completing this promotion program. First, I would like to express my deepest thanks to Prof. Dr. Gernot Rotter, Prof. Dr. Olaf Schumann, and Dr. Klaus Pätzold who had given me early recommendations to propose request for scholarship to DAAD. Furthermore, I would like also to express my deepest thanks to Prof. Dr. Gernot Rotter and Prof. Dr. Olaf Schumann as my *Doktorvater I* and *II* who have been “patiently” directing and guiding me in writing this work, although in the process of completing this work, Prof. Dr. Gernot Rotter, due to medical reasons, could not guide me intensively any longer,

so that he recommended me to seek the guidance of Prof. Dr. Lawrence I. Conrad who was also his successor for the position of the Director of *Islamwissenschaft* (Islamic Studies) Department. Later, Prof. Dr. Lawrence I. Conrad, who was willing to be my next *Doktorvater I*, gave me his crucial guidance and directions to work in the process of completing this dissertation. With the all sincerity I also would like to express my deepest thanks for all his “patient” directions and guidance given to me.

The scholarship given by the Germany’s government by means of DAAD was so large in amount so that I cannot repay the assistance except by using the scholarship appropriately for completing this study. Therefore, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and thanks to all of the management and staff of DAAD and especially to Mrs. Barbara Schwarz Bergmann as a correspondent who always graciously answers my questions concerning the scholarship and gives me important information.

Furthermore, I would like also to express my gratitude to the IAIN Bandung who had given me permission to complete this study, and also to Prof. Dr. H. Dadang Kahmad, M. Si., and Drs. Tatang Zakarya who since the beginning had supported me in my efforts toward studying in Europe. Also very much thanks to Drs. H. Toha Hamim, M.A., Ph.D. and my colleagues in Indonesia who had assisted me in conducting my field research, I cannot write all their name in this limited space. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to all *kiais* who had permitted me to interview them, namely: K.H. Abdul Chobir, M.T., K.H. Cholil Dahlan, K.H. Dimiyati Romli, K.H. Agus H.M. Irfan Sholeh CH, and K.H. Asrori Alfa M.Ag. Besides, of course I should also thank very much to Mr. Bomen Guillermo, my best colleague from Filipina, who had spent his time for editing the language of this dissertation.

As a closing remark, I can only pray to Allāh, the Merciful, which all who had supported me and were involved in completing this work will have His blessing and mercy.

Hamburg, October 17, 2005

## Transliteration

Arabic words and names are written by means of Arabic-English transliteration referring to a standard used in “The Encyclopaedia of Islam-New Edition”, (Gibb etc.: 1960), edited by Prof. Dr. Lawrence I. Conrad (Uni-Hamburg). The exception among others are in writing some Arabic words which had become correct words in Indonesian such as names of persons, organization, and formal institutions such as *Hasjim Asj’ari*, not *Hashim Ash’ari*, *Nahdhatul Wathan*, not *Nahdatul Waṭan*, and *Madrasah* not *Madrasa*, by referring to the Guidance of Arabic-Latin Transliteration released by the Minister of Religious Affairs based on Common Decision of Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Culture and Education number 158/1987 and number 0643/b/U/1987, (Haidar: 1994). Arabic, Indonesian and other foreign words are written in Italics, whereas the plural forms of the Arabic and Indonesian words are made by adding an s, such as *madhhabs*, *Imāms*, *pesantrens*, *kiais*, etc.

Meanwhile, some Indonesian terms and names of Indonesians are written by referring to Indonesian spelling standard in force when the terms were appearing for the first time or when the persons were born (written in Indonesian Spelling standard before it was improved), for example *u* is written as *oe* in word *Boedi Oetomo*, the names of the two first presidents of Indonesia are written as *Soekarno* and *Soeharto*, and *J* is written as *Dj* in word *Piagam Djakarta* (The Jakarta Charter). Names of cities, however, are written based on Improved Indonesian Spelling 1972 (August 16, 1972), for examples: *Jakarta* not *Djakarta*, or *Yogyakarta* not *Jogjakarta*

Differences in writing some letters before and after Improved Indonesian Spelling 1972 are in force among others:

Before 1972	After has been improved in 1972
dj	j
j	y
sj	sy
nj	ny

ch	kh
tj	c
oe	u

The list of Transliterations:  
Arabic English Indonesian

Arabic	English	Indonesian	Arabic	English	Indonesian
ا	'	'	ض	ḍ	dl/dh
ب	b	b	ط	ṭ	th
ت	t	t	ظ	ẓ	zh
ث	th	ts	ع	'	'
ج	dj	j	غ	gh	gh
ح	ḥ	h	ف	f	f
خ	kh	kh	ق	q	q
د	d	d	ك	k	k
ذ	dh	dz	ل	l	l
ر	r	r	م	m	m
ز	z	z	ن	n	n
س	s	s	و	w	w
ش	sh	sy	ه	h	h
ص	ṣ	sh	ي	y	y

Long vowels

ا	ā
و	ū
ي	ī

Diphthongs

او	aw
اي	ay

Short Vowels

ا	a
و	u
ي	i

ة a; at

ال (article), al- and 'l- (even before the antero-palatals)



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## Chapter I: Introduction

There is a tight correlation between the terms tolerance and plurality. Plurality demands the comprehension and implementation of tolerance. Plurality or diversity exists in various human aspects such as ethnic, race, social status, tribe, religion, philosophy, and so on. The existence of human plurality is confirmed by the recognition of human institutions,<sup>1</sup> which consists of humans with different aspects and which had been announced by God's revelations in many holy books.<sup>2</sup>

Because of these pluralities, a very popular notion called "pluralism" (an ideology or belief regarding plurality) has been proposed. In a general encyclopaedia, pluralism is defined as follows:

Pluralism (Latin: *Pluralis* = more than one) is a philosophy which believes that reality consists of various foundations which separate from each other; that reality consists of various elementary aspects of different natures. A prominent supporter of pluralism is Leibniz. The contrary of pluralism are monism and dualism.<sup>3</sup>

By tracing its historical aspect, we find that pluralism has a deeper meaning, which is in close connection with theology. This term had philosophical and theological roots in Western history and civilization. It is a highly religious term since John Hick in *Encyclopaedia of Religions* defines "Religious Pluralism" as follows:

Philosophically, however, the term refers to a particular theory of the relations between these traditions, with their different and competing claims. With this theory the great world religions constitute variant conceptions and perceptions of, and responses to, the one ultimate, mysterious divine reality... explicit pluralism aspects of the more radical position implied by inclusivism: the view that the great world faiths embody different

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<sup>1</sup> The slogan of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in diversity) as one of Indonesia's philosophical slogans is a true recognition of the state to the plurality. The recognition of this plurality was also developed by religious institutions such as the Catholic Roman Church in Vatican Council II in the earlier period of 1960s which dared to recognize that salvations may exist outside of the church, although the church still claimed that the final salvation still rests upon it.

<sup>2</sup> Plurality is informed in some *sūras* and verses of the Muslims holy book, Qur'ān, such as *Al-Hudjurāt* (49: 13): *O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other...*, *Al-Māida* (5: 48): *...if Allah had so willed, he would have made you a single people...*, and *Yūnus* (10: 99): *If it had been thy Lord's Will, they would all have believed, all who are on earth!...*

<sup>3</sup> See, Hasan Sadili, *Ensiklopedi Indonesia: Edisi Khusus Jilid 5*, (Jakarta: PT. Inter Masa, 1990), p. 2727.

perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real or the Ultimate, and that each of them independently transports human existence from self centeredness to reality-centeredness is taking place. Thus, the great religious traditions are to be regarded as alternative stereological “space” within which—or “ways” along which—men and women can find salvation, liberation, and fulfilment.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, tolerance is derived from “*Tolerare*” (Latin), which mean to bear or to endure. In a socio-political perspective, tolerance means “the attitude of one in allowing others to have different beliefs and accept this reality since he recognizes the freedom of everyone’s rights in their mind. In a pluralistic society consisting of various faiths and religions, tolerance is a requirement for a peaceful and harmonious together living. Tolerance may show itself in form of restraining oneself and permitting (passive), appreciating adherents of other faiths, although not accepting the teachings of the other faiths, and appreciating religious elements and implementation of other religions, an attitude that may help in understanding one’s own faith. The bases of this tolerance are recognition to the basic right of human being, and an appreciation given to his inner feeling to make a decision to adhere a faith”.<sup>5</sup>

In its development, other terms were found in connection with this term of tolerance, for example, “Repressive Tolerance”, a hard-to-define term since there is no clear boundary between common tolerance and repressive tolerance. This term was developed in countries which adhered to the bases of modern Western democratic life, in which different opinions were allowed in order to prevent displeasures and threats, but whenever protests arise (in intangible forms) to achieve goals, then the actions would be repressed by violence. The term “Repressive Tolerance” was used to indicate that situation.<sup>6</sup>

In a recent theory, tolerance was defined in a simple way by Vogt (1997:1), “Tolerance is putting up with something you do not like-often in order to get along better with others”. Furthermore, Vogt also proposed a more detailed

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<sup>4</sup> The definition of pluralism quoted by John Hick is taken from Hidayatullah magazine, online edition; for further information this reference may be seen in the writer’s archive or in the following website:

<http://www.hidayatullah.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=881&Itemid=0>

<sup>5</sup> See, Sadili, *op.cit.*, *Jilid 6*, p. 3588.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*

definition of tolerance, “Tolerance is intentional self-restraint in the face of something one dislikes, objects to, finds threatening, or otherwise has a negative attitude toward—usually in order to maintain a social or political group or to promote harmony in a group”.<sup>7</sup>

If plurality were an inevitable reality, then tolerance based on this reality would be a requirement to create harmony in a pluralistic society. Therefore, in connection with pluralities, tolerance was required due to the pluralistic reality. In more simple words, tolerance is based on differences and diversities.

In relation to tolerance, human history noted various concepts and formulations to manage relations among humans in order to create tolerance accepted by all parties. For example, after wars of religion among Protestants, Jews, and Catholics had taken place for a very long time in 16<sup>th</sup> century in Europe, to stop the long continuous conflict and intolerance, “The Edict of Nantes” was enacted in France in 1598,<sup>8</sup> and “Toleration of Act” in the United Kingdom in 1689. Meanwhile, the Declaration on Human Rights<sup>9</sup> released in 1948 as one of the main charters of United Nations, and the Medina Charter<sup>10</sup> released in the earlier period of Islam were other examples of the phenomenon.

Principally, the Medina Charter recognized all inhabitants of Medina City—apart from religious and tribal differences they had—as one society having common rights and duties. Therefore, the civic society shown in this period in Medina was not a society with personal power supremacy but a civilized and fully

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<sup>7</sup> See, W. Paul Vogt, *Tolerance and Education: Learning to Live with Diversity and Difference*, (California: SAGE Publication, 1997), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> See, Antony Alcock, *A History of the Protection of Regional Cultural Minorities in Europe: From the Edict of Nantes to the Present Day*, (New York: St. Martin Press, LLC, 2000), pp. 5-11.

<sup>9</sup> The Declaration of Universal Human Rights inspired two declarations of human rights in the Islamic community of the world. “The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights” formulated by European Islamic Council in 1981 and “Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam” adopted by Islamic Conference Organization in August 1990 as a reference to human rights in Islam are two clear proofs on this.

<sup>10</sup> The Medina Charter was formulated by the Prophet Muḥammad in Medina City in the first and second Hidjriyya year or before and after the Battle of *Badar* for creating tolerance among pluralistic Medina communities which consisted of different races and religions. The Prophet Muḥammad moved from Mecca to Medina with Abū Bakar, one of his close friends; they departed from Mecca on Rabi‘ I 1, and arrived at Medina on Rabi‘ I 12, AH 1 after some Arabic *Mushrikān* (polytheists) had planned to kill him. The Medina Charter contained rights and duties of the government and the citizens. For more information regarding the contents of the Medina Charter see the appendixes!

tolerant society. The tolerance modelled by the Prophet Muḥammad, however, was different from the tolerance developed in Europe, especially from that which was introduced in the United Kingdom and applied in some fractions of Anglican Church, while Catholicism and Unitarianism were still regarded as illegal.<sup>11</sup>

In the late period of the 1970s in Indonesia, the government through the Minister of Religious Affairs (Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara: 1979-1983) proposed an idea of three concepts of tolerance, “Trilogy of Tolerances”, which consisted of tolerance of internal religion, tolerance of inter-religious communities, and tolerance between the religious community and the Government.<sup>12</sup> This was also another contemporary proof that humans always develop the concept of tolerance.

The tolerance, which will be discussed in this dissertation, is the concept of tolerance developed by Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) in their behaviour and thoughts, which is based on Islamic values. The main focus will be the tolerance of NU to the government’s policies on Islamic affairs in the period when K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (more popularly known as Gus Dur) held the position as chairman of PBNU (1984-1999). In other words, the tolerance meant here is the tolerance mentioned in the *Trilogy of Tolerances* proposed by the government. Meanwhile, the government’s policies regarding Islamic affairs that are here referred to are the government’s policies in managing matters on Islam or subjects in connection with Islam and the Islamic community in Indonesia.

In another theory, Vogt (1997: 67-69), stated that education is a factor determining someone’s level of tolerance, the higher his level of education, the

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<sup>11</sup> See, Nurcholis Madjid (Cak Nur), “Toleransi Masih Pada Tataran Prosedural”, in *Kompas*, online edition: <http://www.kompas.com/kompas%2Dcetak/9901/30nasional/cakn03.htm>

<sup>12</sup> The recognition of existences of various categories, ideologies, and groups in a religion was developed due to the comprehension and interpretation of religious doctrines. These differences should not be sources of disputes and conflicts. Furthermore, in a wider context the differences of religions and faiths should not be sources of conflicts among inter-religious communities. Meanwhile, principally the government may not interfere in religious affairs especially religious doctrines, but in order to achieve harmony among inter-religious communities, the government implements various policies which needs to be trusted by religious community so a mutual understanding developed between the two that what had been carried out by the government in turn is for a larger common interest, therefore cooperation between religious community and the government is expected (to happen). See the explanation of this trilogy of tolerances in Dr. H.



higher his level of tolerance probably will be. In similar terms, Shihab (1998; 189), stated that education is not only an instrument to comprehend other communities, but also an instrument to learn to really live and work together as faithful communities.

The fact shows, however, that the formal education level of NU members on average is under that of the urban communities. One of the key factors causing this is that the NU's grassroots are traditional communities, farmers or anglers in rural areas with an economical level<sup>13</sup> that disallows them access to higher formal education. Therefore, these communities prefer to choose alternative education in the form of *pesantrens* (rural Qur'ānic schools relatively similar in some aspects to religious schools in Catholic 'monasteries') or *madrasahs* (reformed Islamic schools) they can afford rather than formal education managed by the government or private institutions. This fact seems to contradict Vogt's theory mentioned earlier, which arouses our interest to analyse the level of tolerance of the NU community to face the reality of a pluralistic society and especially to face the government's policies on Islamic affairs.

NU is a modern organization, meaning that it has a management board, members, organizational structure, and regulations in the form of rules and statutes. On the other hand, it is the largest cultural Islamic organization in Indonesia. To use of the terms "elite" and "grassroots" in this dissertation is relevant since the differences between the two are obvious in the organization. The term elite here is used to refer the intellectual, a minority that leads and determines NU's policies. Meanwhile, the grassroots are NU members as the largest group in NU community, which is the rural and traditional community.

The differentiation the elite from the grassroots will make easy to achieve the goals of writing this dissertation. The elite in the NU may be categorized furthermore into: 1) the organisational elite is composed of the leaders of the organisation's structures, and 2) non-organisational elite, or elite outside of the

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Tarmizi Taher, *Aspiring for the Middle Path: Religious Harmony in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: CENSIS, 1997), p. 42-43.

organisational structures, among these are religious figures, *kiais*,<sup>14</sup> leaders of *pesantrens*, and Indonesian Muslim intellectuals within NU's environment.

### **A. Importance of the Study**

It is noteworthy that Indonesia has quantitatively the largest Islamic community in the world and that population even exceeds the population of Muslims in the Arabic World.<sup>15</sup> At present, Indonesia consists of more than 200 million persons, among them 87.21% are Muslims, 6.04% Protestants, 3.58% Catholics, 1.83% Hindu, 1.03% Buddhists, and 0.31% Animists.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, any study regarding Islam in the region will be important and useful for social, political interests, and especially for scientific interest.

Besides that, Indonesia itself is a pluralistic country having five major religions formally recognized by the government. Furthermore, Indonesia consists of communities using more than 500 languages and dialects,<sup>17</sup> having about 17.800 large and small islands, 6000 of them are inhabited.

Therefore, that Indonesian society should become aware of tolerance is very important for national integrity. In accordance with that importance, the Indonesian government implements the policy of "Trilogy of Tolerances" as one of the aspects of religious development in GBHN (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*, Guidelines on State Policy) decreed by MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People Consultative Assembly) once every five years.

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<sup>13</sup> See, Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh, "Nahdatul Ulama dalam Era 1990-an", in Zaenal Arifin Thoha and M. Aman Mustofa (eds.), *Membangun Budaya Kerakyatan: Kepemimpinan Gus Dur dan Gerakan Sosial NU*, (Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press, 1997), p. 33.

<sup>14</sup> *Kiai* is a term used to call religious scholar/teacher or rural orthodox teachers in Java. This term sometimes has similar meaning with *ulama* (theologian), but in another term for *kiai* is *keris* (creese) or *Harimau* (tiger) in Javanese tradition.

<sup>15</sup> See, Alwi Shihab, *Membendung Arus: Respons Muhammadiyah terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1998), p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> The description of adherents of religions' percentages is based on data gained in 1990s. See, Taher, *Aspiring for...*, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*

NU is one of the largest religious, social, and cultural organizations and, as the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, even in the world.<sup>18</sup> It plays an important role in creating stability and harmony in Indonesian pluralistic society. Any study regarding NU may be useful to anyone interested in deepening his/her knowledge about Islam in Indonesia. This kind of study in turn may be a significant contribution to social science especially in the fields of religious and Indonesian affairs.

Meanwhile, this study tries to find the answer to an important question in this dissertation, which is: What are the contributions of NU —as the largest cultural organization in Indonesia— in effort towards creating harmonious living in Indonesia in connection with the “Trilogy of Tolerances” as implemented by the government?. In order to answer that question, the study will be focused on NU’s responses to the government’s policies regarding Islamic affairs on the perspective of tolerance; in addition, it will also review NU’s tolerance in facing various Islamic groups and other religious communities in Indonesia.

The position of the chairperson of the organization held by Gus Dur during 1984-1999 indicated some interesting aspects. Some of these were highly progressive developments experienced by NU especially in the aspect of scientific thought. Gus Dur himself is regarded by Barton (1999: 22), as a representative of “Indonesian Islamic Neo-Modernists”. It is assumed that there was a contradiction between his thoughts and the understandings of the majority of members of the organization he led.<sup>19</sup>

Considering these aspects, the other important question of this study appears: Have the neo-modernist thoughts of Gus Dur and thoughts of other NU elites concerning tolerance been interpreted and implemented accurately by the

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<sup>18</sup> Based on estimations that NU consisted of more than 30 million or even more than 40 million members, according to some experts (such as Zainal Arifin Thoha and M. Aman Mustofa) estimated that NU had about 40 million members, not including the larger Islamic community which culturally affiliates with norms of teachings developed by NU *ulamas* which also shows the largeness of this community.

<sup>19</sup> In fact, in addition to the majority of farmers and fishermen communities in rural areas, NU also has members who are politicians, businessmen, NGO (nongovernmental organizations) activists, groups of students, youths, and women, liberal and conservative *ulamas*, and *santris* (student/pupil of a *pesantren*).

majority of traditional NU members. This study is also expected to reveal how deep the ideas of the NU elites influence the traditional grassroots and to reveal the background of these thoughts.

Meanwhile, studies conducted by Indonesian or foreign scholars so far generally focused on the political steps carried out by NU. Until this research was conducted, only a few scholars have focused themselves on studying one aspect of the NU societal attitudes in implementing its cultural movements. One of the attitudes is “tolerance”, which is a foundation for achieving harmony in Indonesian society. Therefore, the writer regards as important that this study of NU is focused on one of its societal attitudes. Furthermore, this study will try to investigate that tolerance by using samples to be analysed taken from NU areas in Jombang (East Java) and Tasikmalaya (West Java). Choosing a theme of the study, which had not been investigated deeply by other researchers, may guarantee the originality of the study as another crucial aspect of a scientific study for which the researcher should be responsible.

## **B. Scope of the Study**

The main five steps taken in this study in order to achieve the expected result are:

1. Analysing the establishment of NU as a cultural movement and the socio-political and socio-religious contexts accompanying it. This discussion will also be focused on the aims of the establishment.
2. Analysing the government’s policies on Islamic affairs, and how NU responded to it in the perspective of tolerance.
3. Analysing thoughts, which developed in the NU elite regarding the concept of religious tolerance particularly on the period when Gus Dur held the position of the Chairman of PBNU (1984-1999) and the decisions of *Muktamars* (Conferences) of NU in the period.
4. Furthermore, surveying the acceptance level of the ideas of NU’s elites in the daily life of NU’s grassroots by taking samples from NU’s enclaves in East Java and West Java.

5. At the level of practice, this study is expected to reveal the traditional community's comprehension regarding the meaning of religious tolerance in daily life. It is subsequently expected that a sample can be taken as a model to create a harmonious communal order.

### **C. Hypothesis of the Study**

To focus this study, the writer proposes three hypotheses, which are as follows:

1. Living in harmony among religious communities in Indonesia and between the Islamic community and the government was enabled among others by the tolerance of NU as the largest Islamic social organization with its various contributions in keeping Indonesian national integrity.
2. NU's tolerance was shown more obviously at the elite level during the period when Gus Dur held the position as the chairman of PBNU with his progressive Islamic thoughts.
3. There is an inconformity between Gus Dur's thoughts —the chairman of NU and also a representative of the neo-modernist group— with the ideas of traditional NU members which caused some divergence between ideas he developed and their implementations in the grassroots.

### **D. Review of Literature**

Relevant works on NU done by Indonesian or foreign researchers of Indonesian Islam among others are:

1. Chorul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Pergerakan Nahdatul Ulama* (1985), traces NU's history from its establishment until the Conference at Situbondo by putting an emphasis on continuities in NU's policies.
2. Einar Martahan Sitompul, *Nahdatul Ulama dan Pancasila: Sejarah dan Pemahaman NU dalam Perjuangan Umat Islam di Indonesia dalam Penerimaan Pancasila sebagai Satu-satunya Asas* (1989), to analyse the religious arguments of NU in accepting Pancasila as the sole national ideological foundation. This work studies the development and religious

thoughts of NU from its establishment in 1926 to the time when it accepted Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of the nation.

3. M. Ali Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik* (1994), a dissertation which explains the background of NU's establishment and its historical development, internal conflicts in NU and the *ulamas* roles in the conflicts, and NU's roles in Indonesian politics.
4. Martin van Bruinessen, *NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru*, (1994), a critical study that analyses aspects of power relations as the background of changes taking place in NU.
5. Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and Ideology of Tolerance* (1996), an analysis to comprehend discourses upon politics in Indonesia and its connection with Pancasila; in one of its chapters, it analyses Gus Dur's opinion regarding relations between Islam and the state and his other political thoughts as well.
6. Laode Ida, *Anatomi Konflik: NU, Elit Islam dan Negara* (1996), by using a political perspective, puts emphasis on tensions and conflicts in NU, both because of internal conflicts of interests of NU figures themselves and because of interactions with the Islamic elite outside of NU and political actors playing important roles at the state level.
7. Andrée Feillard, *NU vis-à-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi Bentuk dan Makna* (1999), a book which comprehensively analyses interactions between the Islamic community and the state in the period of the New Order and movements of NU political elites in their efforts to find their identities, and their connections with the government.
8. Greg Barton, *Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia: Pemikiran Neo-Modernisme Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendy, Ahmad Wahib, dan Abdurrahman Wahid* (1999), this book does not specifically discuss NU but focuses on the movements and thoughts of four influential Islamic figures in Indonesia from the late 1960s to the 1990s as the ideological initiator of Islamic liberal-progressive movements. Barton calls them neo-modernist movements brought about by Islamic traditionalist and modern thoughts.

Besides, there are other important works regarding NU among other literatures such as Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Radical Traditionalism of The Nahdatul Ulama* (1981), Zamachsari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren* (1982), K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim, *Mengapa Memilih NU?: Konsepsi tentang Agama, Pendidikan dan Politik*, (1985), Hiroko Horikoshi, *Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial*, (1987), Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds.), *Traditionalisme Radikal: Persinggungan Nahdlatul Ulama-Negara*, (1996), and Ellyasa KH. Dharwis (ed.), *Gus Dur NU dan Masyarakat Sipil*, (1997).

### **E. Resource and Method of Research**

In this study, the writer will use some approaches, first analysing the history of NU's movements; second, analysing the government's policies regarding Islamic affairs in the colonial period and the two later periods, the "Old Order" and the "New Order"; third, analysing works of various experts regarding those policies as primary sources of this study.

Furthermore, the writer will analyse important events accompanying the establishment of NU and its development by focusing on the period of Gus Dur's leadership, by studying articles and other works written by Gus Dur himself and, by reviewing related books written by Indonesian and abroad scholars. In order to make more accurate the analysis of ideas developed by NU elites, the writer also investigates other elites' works and thoughts and primary sources written by this class.

As the next step, the data gathered will be examined by using scientific approach<sup>20</sup> in order to find out how the progressive thoughts of NU elites were realized in the grassroots consisting of traditional and rural communities. In connection with this step, the writer took samples and made interviews and observations in NU enclaves in Jombang (East Java) and Tasikmalaya (West

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<sup>20</sup> Scientific analysis is an analysis which can be accountable scientifically. A scientific study is a study which uses the scientific method consisting two main criteria: "1) consistent with previous theories to prevent contradictions in scientific theories as a whole, 2) in accordance with empirical facts, since however consistent a theory might be, if not supported by empirical verification, the truth of that theory can be accepted scientifically". See, Jujun S. Suryasumantri, *Filsafat Ilmu Sebuah Pengantar Populer*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994), p. 124.

Java). This step is one of the key phases in this research that will be conducted to answer the questions of the research and to verify one of the hypotheses proposed previously.

Another important method used in this research is the survey method, since a survey can provide data in the form of behaviours, feelings, actions, knowledge, ownerships, personal characteristics, and other descriptive aspects. Instruments used for this research were questionnaires consisting of closed questions complemented by multiple choices. In conducting this survey, the writer also determined population and samples<sup>21</sup> in two locations of research as mentioned before.

Based on those approaches, the writer regards this study, as is a combination of literature- and field research.

Furthermore, the data was analysed by using the comparative method to examine the result of this research and by using the analytical descriptive method so that the result will be carefully explained.

## **F. Structure**

This dissertation consists of six chapters, which are as follows: Chapter I, is an introduction explaining the general direction, aim, and goals of this study. Chapter II is a general description of the background consisting of the situation that surrounded the establishment of NU and its process of establishment. The description of the research object was intended to find out the process of establishing of NU so that a clear description of the aim and goals of NU and roles it played later will be provided.

Chapter III consists of a complete description of NU's responses to the government's policies on Islamic affairs in order to comprehend NU's tolerance to the government's policies on Islamic affairs in more recent periods. Meanwhile, Chapter IV is the main discussion part of this dissertation, which discusses NU's responses to the government's policies on Islamic affairs under



the leadership of Gus Dur (1984-1999) and other important discourses developed by Gus Dur and other key figures in connection with religious tolerance.

Chapter V is the other main part of this dissertation consisting of the analysis of how thoughts developed by NU elites especially under the leadership of Gus Dur were implemented in the grassroots. Objective data gained by field researches conducted in two NU enclaves, Jombang (East Java), and Tasikmalaya (West Java) will be discussed here.

Finally, Chapter VI will consist of conclusions as the results of this research and remarks for further research.

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<sup>21</sup> Population here is as means by Ronald E. Walpole the whole thing which we observe. Meanwhile, sample here means a part of the population. See, Ronald E. Walpole: *Pengantar Statistika*, 3rd edition, (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1995), p. 7.

## Chapter II

### Historical Background

#### A. Indonesia's Image before the Establishment of NU

In contemporary discourse,<sup>22</sup> at least, three arguments might be considered as basic assumptions on the origin of Islam in Indonesia in the form of three major theories. *The first theory* claims that Islam came directly from Arabia and Egypt where the Shāfi'ī School of law was dominant. This theory seems to be supported by the account provided by the Moroccan traveller, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who on his way to and from China in 1345 and 1346, found out that the ruler in Samudra Pasai was a follower of the Shāfi'ī School of law (Azra, 1999: 31). *The second theory* maintains that Islam in Indonesia came from Bangladesh. This theory is based on the assumption that Islam first penetrated Indonesia from the Eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula (Azra, 1999: 32). *The third theory* argues that Islam came to Indonesia through traders from Gujarat in Northwest India and Dacca in South India. This theory is based on a research report written by Ricklefs (1981: 11), where he notes, "Gujerati influence is suggested by the fact that the tombstone of Malik Ibrahim (d.1419) at Gresik and several stones at Pasai are believed to have been imported from Cambay in Gujerat."

Whereas, the exact time of arrival of Islam in Indonesia is still unknown, a recent assumption proposes some arguments, which are, directly or not, against the notion that Islam was first brought by Arab merchants. This theory at least is based on four researches: *the first*, S.Q. Fatimi on *Islam come to Malaysia* (Singapore: 1963), proved that the coming of Islam was caused by efforts of Islamic mystic missionaries from Bengal. It was said that this conforms more to the fact of Islamic development in this region in which the religion absorbed an indigenous mystic character deriving from the pre-Hindu age. *The second* is the argument from the research conducted by O.W. Wolters on *Early Indonesian Commerce* (New York: 1967) which proved that the class of merchants who

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<sup>22</sup> See, Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 10.

dominated the territory of ocean commerce in Ceylon and China during the sixth century AD were Malayan merchants who enjoyed the peak of the Sriwijaya Kingdom's glory two centuries later. This argument denies the supposition that the Arab merchants came here to spread the religion by intermarriage. Meanwhile, they themselves came to this region in the tenth century AD, not in the sixth century. *The third* is a result of the historical reconstruction made by Van Leur stating that the indigenous dynasty of Sriwijaya brought in religious experts from India to confirm their claim to legitimacy to the throne during the Buddha age. This argument is in accordance with the possibility that mystic missionaries were invited to legalize the indigenous dynasty's claim to power after the downfall of Majapahit Empire. *The last* is Al-Sairafi's opinion stating that there was an Islamic society in this region in the third century of *Hidjriyya* (Islamic Calendar). This is also an argumentation proving that the Arab merchants had not brought in Islam for the first time. Instead, this argumentation implies that they came after Islam had already spread in the islands of archipelago.<sup>23</sup>

In this writer's opinion, the analyses that are presented by some researchers above in connection with the first coming of Islam in Indonesia may be true; furthermore, the significant role of Arab society in spreading Islam in Indonesia by marriage and by trading is subject to questioning. It can be proved that there were many groups of Arab origin who had been Indonesian (East Indies) citizens. Even, the reformation of Islam that happened in the Middle East later was influenced by Arabian descendants who had been Indonesian citizen together with the Indonesian citizens themselves who had made direct contact with the Middle East in the *Hadjdj* (Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca as a religious duty) together with the people who lived there.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>See, Abdurahman Wahid, "Pesantren sebagai Subkultur", in M. Dawam Rahardjo (ed.), *Pesantren dan Pembaharuan*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988), p. 44; Hary J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 12.

<sup>24</sup> See, A.V.E. Kover, *Sarekat Islam Gerakan Ratu Adil?* (Jakarta: Percetakan PT. Temprint, 1985), pp. 3-4.

The spread of Islam in the first period in Indonesia took place through the efforts made by Muslim teachers, preachers, and traders, and, as the most important factor, the efforts made by Islamic *Ṣūfi* teachers (well known in Java as the *Wali Songo* or the Nine Saints). The following names of *Wali Songo* would be found in the manuscripts: Sunan Ngampel Denta, Sunan Kudus, Sunan Murya, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Giri, Sunan Kalijaga, Sunan Sitijenar, Sunan Gunungjati and Sunan Walilanang. The other famous *Wali*, Sunan Bayat, is also often found.<sup>25</sup> They tolerated the amalgamation between Islam and the local culture, with its strong roots in the Hindu-Buddhist tradition. Many *Ṣūfi* teachers used the local tradition and customs as a medium by which the messages of the new religion could be transmitted to the wider population where the Hindu-Buddhist tradition had already been strongly rooted in the society. This method of Islamisation partly served as the basis for the development of a variant of Islam with high religious tolerance and accommodation to local culture and custom<sup>26</sup>.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Islam in Indonesia later developed into several kinds of social, cultural or even political organizations responding to the challenges of that time. Some of the organizations are *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU), *Sjarekat Islam* (SI), and *Muhammadiyah*.

NU as an organization represented by *kaum tua* or the old group<sup>27</sup> is the Islamic organization in Indonesia, which was predicted to be influenced by mystic missionaries who were invited by the administration of that time, and the *Ṣūfi* teachers who tolerated local culture, customs, and tradition as explained before. Furthermore, some other Islamic organizations were also established before the establishment of NU as an organisation.<sup>28</sup> These were reform organizations as we

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<sup>25</sup> See, M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the Present*, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> See, Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian...*, pp. 11-2.

<sup>27</sup> See, Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islam Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia*. (New York: Cornell University Ithaca, 1970), p. 45.

<sup>28</sup> NU can be differentiated into NU as organization which was formally established by the *ulamas* (Islamic scholars or theologians) and NU as culture which had existed in the first period of Islam in Indonesia. Indonesian Muslim society generally follows the religious traditions taught by the *ulamas*.

will see in this chapter, responding to development of Islam in Indonesia that was considered to have a mystical influence.

In order to get the entire understanding about the process of NU's birth as an organization, the first thing we have to understand is the situation of the Indonesian Muslims of that time in light of the previous organizations. We shall therefore look to the *Boedi Oetomo*, the first modern organization<sup>29</sup> in Indonesia that was established in the nineteenth century because of the social conditions<sup>30</sup> of that time. It will also be described later how two Islamic reform organizations in Indonesia, *Sjarekat Islam* and *Muhammadiyah* were established as results of the social situations categorized in a socio-religious context which have correlations with the background of NU's birth.

## 1. The socio-political Context

For the Indonesian people, the nineteenth century was a terrifying and tiring century because of the Dutch colonial government's policy. That was seen in the decline of the society's economy, which was in serious condition.<sup>31</sup>

In the efforts to support domestic needs suffering from a financial deficit caused by budgeting the war against Pangeran Dipenogoro (1825-1830), and by the withdrawal of Belgium from The Great Holland,<sup>32</sup> the Dutch colonial government applied a policy forcing Indonesian farmers to cultivate crops for export, which was called *Cultuur Stelsel* (the forced cultivation system: 1830-1870).<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> In the context of organization which has fixed management, members, target and also work planning based on the rules agreed (known in Indonesian term as ADRT, *Anggaran Dasar Anggaran Rumah Tangga*).

<sup>30</sup> See, A.K. Pringgodigdo, *Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 1970), p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Benda, *The Crescent...*, pp. 32-6.

<sup>32</sup> See, Akira Nagazumi, *Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia Boedi Oetomo 1908-1918* (Jakarta: PT. Temprint, 1999), p. 13.

<sup>33</sup> See, Robert Van Niel, *The Emergency of Modern Indonesian Elite*, (the Hague: Van Hoeve, 1970), p. 25.

During the century a capital structure was formed. *Nederlandsche Handels Maatschappij* (NHM); *Javasche bank*; the appearance of European industrialists to manage their factories and their plantations; and to import goods produced by Holland industries into Indonesia, were indications of this fact. This situation was followed by the liberalization of the economy and the importation of consumption goods causing a decline in the Indonesian farmer's economy since they were unable to be compete against the big industrialists.<sup>34</sup>

The situation also brought about disintegration and restlessness in almost all parts of the Indonesian archipelago, furthermore, that aroused the awareness of Indonesians to fight against oppression. The occurrences of people's resistances such as *Perang Paderi* (1821-1837), *Perang Diponegoro* (1825-1830), *Perang Aceh* (1873-1903), and *Pemberontakan Petani Banten* or according to Aqib Suminto it was called *Peristiwa Cilegon* (Cilegon affair: 1888),<sup>35</sup> were forms of these phenomena. Although almost all the people's resistances could be extinguished by the colonial military, the seeds of the farmers' dissatisfaction grew fertile.

Because of this unrest, attitudes of anti *kāfir* (infidel/unbeliever) and anti foreign government grew after getting legitimacy from the *Ulama* (Islamic scholar) leadership. This dissatisfaction expressing an anti-foreign government attitude became a big force, which produced trouble for the Dutch Colonial Government. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch government's political policy changed by applying the Ethical Policy considered as the response to this problem. This policy was inspired by the Christian spirit as seen in the speech of Dutch Queen on September 1901 who was convinced that the matters regarded the "ethical obligation and moral responsibility of the East Indies" and would be a milestone of the beginning of that Policy.<sup>36</sup> The policy fostered public education by opening schools for the indigenou, rehabilitating infrastructures,

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<sup>34</sup> See, Edi Cahyo, "Perburuhan dari Masa ke Masa: Jaman Colonial Hindia Belanda sampai Orde Baru (Indonesia-1998)", in:

<http://www.geocities.com/ypenebar/essays/kronikperburuhanina.html#jbergerak>

<sup>35</sup> Aqib Sumanto, *Islam di Indonesia: Politik Hindia Belanda*, (Singapura: Pustaka Nasional, 1985), p. 66.

rehabilitating economic facilities, and giving regional autonomy to indigenous regions.<sup>37</sup>

For the Indonesian people this policy caused a positive effect. It was seen in the emergence of indigenous intellectuals produced by the modern education provided by the government. Not all indigenous classes, however, could have the chance to enjoy this modern education. Only the children from a certain class (*priyayi*)<sup>38</sup> could enjoy this educational system.

Furthermore, to understand the term *priyayi* we could consider the term proposed by Palmier: “*priyayi* is the regents and their descendants (and the descendants of people with status similar to or better than that of regents). In their way of life they modelled themselves on the princely courts, and before the development of modern communications, their rule, subject to Dutch *overlordship*, was as autocratic as that of the rulers in the principalities”.<sup>39</sup>

From this point of view, Sartono Kartodirdjo classifies this kind of *priyayi* into two forms of *priyayis*: *priyayi luhur* (upper *priyayi*) and *priyayi kecil* (lower *priyayi*). A *priyayi luhur* is a great *priyayi*; this can be seen in aspects such as his father’s occupation, the ancestors of his mother, and the origin of his wife. Meanwhile, *priyayi kecil* is a *priyayi* because of his occupation in the government administration; the other differences can be seen in his house, his clothes, and his life style.<sup>40</sup>

Whereas, *priyayi* according to the latter perception were the civil servants before World War II. In addition, this *priyayi* was classified into two classes,

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<sup>36</sup> Van Niel, *The Emergency of...*, p. 32.

<sup>37</sup> Benda, *The Crescent and...*, p. 34.

<sup>38</sup> For the term of *priyayi* we can see such term used by Niel (1970: 23-30): “*Priyayi* as a social class in around 1900 was an elite class, that was those who stands on the common people class, *Priyayi* in several cases has social roles to lead, to give influence, to manage, and to give guidance to the people. The administration, the civil servants and the educated people had better positions, and they were from *priyayi*. This elite were descendants of past kings or descendants of the adventurers who have been successful so that they can run their political authorities in parts of Java island and played role as a *priyayi* for the people”

<sup>39</sup> Leslie H. Palmier, *Social Status and Power in Java*, (London: University of London, 1960), p. 39.

<sup>40</sup> See, Sartono Kartodirdjo cs, *Perkembangan Peradaban Priyayi*, (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1987), p. 7.

namely *priyayi pangreh praja*<sup>41</sup> (*priyayi luhur*, upper class *priyayi*) that was the highest prestige of *priyayi* because of their authority, occupation, and their aristocracy they had, and *priyayi non pangreh praja* (*priyayi cilik*, lower class *priyayi*) which was the class of *priyayi* of educated people from various villages who had been successfully reached the position of civil servants, and who were not *priyayi* who got that status from the nobility of their ascendants. Traditionally the society gave salutation to the status of *priyayi* by giving a title placed before their name, and their occupation. The upper class *priyayi* generally was given title *Raden* and the lower class *priyayi* was given the title *Mas*.<sup>42</sup>

#### **a. Boedi Oetomo**

Afterwards, the *priyayis* (students of STOVIA, *School Tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen* or School for Training Native Doctors) brought forth *Boedi Oetomo* (Society for Good) in May 20, 1908, in Jakarta<sup>43</sup>, which was imbued with the ideas of Dr. Wahidin Soedirohoesodo from Yogyakarta. Previously, Dr. Wahidin had been an editor of a Javanese magazine “Retno Dumilah” in 1901. He saw that education in Indonesia of that time was left behind compared with education in other countries. It happened because there were only few educational institutions and the cost of education was expensive. Concerning this problem, therefore, in 1906-1907 he established scholarships, although this effort was failure it had a positive effect to inspire the establishment of an organization later known as Boedi Oetomo.<sup>44</sup> The figures who established this organization were Soewardi Soerjaningrat, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Dr. Soetomo, who were well known as *Tiga serangkai* (the *Trium Virste*).<sup>45</sup>

Boedi Oetomo as a cultural organisation also concerned educational matters was similar with reformist ideas of Muḥammad ‘Abduh on Islam, who

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<sup>41</sup> *Pangreh Praja* is the term used for local authority in the era of the Dutch colonial government to control its colonized region, quoted from Departement Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia*, (Jakarta; Balai Pustaka, 1989), p. 645.

<sup>42</sup> The term proposed by Kuntjaraningrat, in Kartodirdjo, *Perkembangan...*, p. 11.

<sup>43</sup> Nagazumi, *Bangkitnya Nasionalisme...*, p. 62.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>45</sup> See, Einar Martahan Sitompul M.Th, *NU dan Pancasila*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989), p. 43.



believed that the main key to attain development was the improvement of education and mastering of western modern knowledge.

This organisation had followers aside from students of STOVIA also from the other institutions such as from the circles of education of higher position in Java, the circles of lower civil servants, and some Regents having advanced ideas. The scope of this organization was limited to Java, Madura,<sup>46</sup> Bali and Lombok, which were regions with Javanese culture.<sup>47</sup>

The first congress conducted in Yogyakarta on October 5, 1908 which was directly led by Dr. Wahidin,<sup>48</sup> came to some decisions among others such as the appointment of R.T. Tirtokoesoemo, the regent of Karang Anyar, as a leader of the executive board, and determining the objectives of the organization such as the harmonious development of the country and nation by improving education, agriculture, animal husbandry, trading, engineering, industry, and also culture (art and science).<sup>49</sup>

In his thesis, *NU dan Pancasila*, Einar Martahan Sitompul considered Boedi Oetomo an organization based on culture, as was acknowledged by the Dutch Colonial Government.<sup>50</sup> He was possibly right, at least, if based on one point of view, but it seemed that Sitompul did not analyze this organization more deeply. That situation at that time forced Boedi Oetomo to enter the political world. This was proved by considering that in August 5-6, 1915 on its meeting in Bandung, Boedi Oetomo proposed its manoeuvre:

We need to have a militia for the Indonesian nation, but this has to be the parliament's decision, which has the right to make the law. (This parliament did not exist at that time), The House of Representatives should exist first.<sup>51</sup>

This argumentation was also strengthened by Korver (1985: 5), stating that after 1905 Boedi Oetomo was also entering into the political world and began to

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<sup>46</sup> See, Korver, *Sarekat Islam...*, p. 5.

<sup>47</sup> See, Pringgogigdo, *Sejarah Pergerakan...*, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> See, Sutrisno Kutoyo, *Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan dan Persyarikatan Muhamadiyah*, (Jakarta; Balai Pustaka, 1998), p. 59.

<sup>49</sup> Pringgogigdo, *Sejarah Pergerakan...*, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Sitompul, *NU dan...*, p. 45.

<sup>51</sup> See, Pringgogigdo, *Sejarah Pergerakan...*, p. 2.

propose demands for its own government.

In addition, Dwidjosewojo in the Committee of Indie Weerbaar represented the participation of Boedi Oetomo in July 23, 1916, which was delegated to meet the Dutch Queen to propose the demands on defence aid of Netherlands East Indies in relation to World War I (1914-1918). The proposal succeeded in establishing the National Committee that stood for the leaders of big organizations in Indonesia. The National Committee carried out a meeting in Jakarta in July 1917 to determine its objectives and to select the members of *Volksraad*.<sup>52</sup> All these evidences showed that Boedi Oetomo, which previously was a cultural movement later, engaged in political matters, although this organization did not state directly that it was a political party.

## 2. The Socio-religious Context

It has been discussed above that the first organized movement in Indonesia was Boedi Oetomo, which was the pioneer for other organized movements significantly inspired by it and simultaneously with other factors such as the influence of the reformation from the Middle East on Indonesian society, especially upon Islamic society.

Two Islamic organizations were established in the next decade, namely *Sjarekat Islam* (SI, Islamic Union) and Muhammadiyah. Both of these organizations were supposed to have correlations with the birth of Nahdatul Ulama. SI was a kind of Islamic organization, which later expressed the demands of political Islam<sup>53</sup> and to accommodate all Islamic groups.<sup>54</sup> It was different from the Muhammadiyah, which was considered by some scientists as a movement of

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<sup>52</sup> *Volksraad* was the People Assembly on Dutch Colonial era, the proposal to form the *Volksraad* was on initiative of Colonial Minister Plekste, and it was generally approved by all of the political parties. See, Robert Van Niel, *The emergency of Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1970), p. 102.

<sup>53</sup> It was the first political organization based on Islam in Indonesia. See, Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam...*, p. 84.

<sup>54</sup> In the terms of accommodating the young group (reformist) and the old generation (conservative), it can be seen that there were some figures like Suryopranoto and K.H. Fakhruddin from Muhammadiyah (The young group), and also the centralist figure K.H. Ahmad Dahlan himself, meanwhile from the old group there were some figures like K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbulah and K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari. See, Kutoyo, *Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan...*, p. 59.

*kaum muda* (young group) and often criticized Islam in Indonesia that was represented by the *kaum tua* (old group). In addition, Muhammadiyah emphasized the reform of education.

Some reformation movements in the Islamic context occurred in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. These reformations occurred in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Turkey, and India starting from different socio-political and socio-cultural backgrounds but with the similar assumption that Islam was left behind by the West because of lack of education. The awareness of socio-political issues inspired by their contacts with the advanced western culture made them more critical in observing the realities of the Muslim societies in their countries.

In Egypt, the reformation started from the awareness which appeared because of the Muslim setback after seeing directly the western development when Napoleon Bonaparte's troops from France in 1798, successfully defeated Egypt within less than one month owing to their modern weapons which could not be countered by the traditional weapons of the Mamālik governing that time.<sup>55</sup>

The inevitability of cultural contacts between the Eastern World, which connotes the Islamic world, and the Western, which was represented by Europe (French), inspired the consciousness of Muslims that they had been left behind by the Europeans. This awareness among others can be seen on the illustration explained by Nasution (1987: 9), who quoted M.Q. Al-Baqli Al-Mukhtar Tarikh Al-Djabarti:

‘Abdul Al-Rahmān Al-Djabarti, a Muslim theologian of Al-Azhar, a historical writer, after visiting the laboratories and scientific institutions in France, stated that he had seen things and peculiar researches difficult to be understood by his thought. That was also impression of the educated Muslims community of that era to the developments of Europe.

Generally, researchers of Egyptian reformers consider that Muḥammad ‘Abduh was the first reformer in the country at that time, but this is somewhat

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<sup>55</sup> See, Harun Nasution, *Muhammad Abduh dan Teologi Rasional Mu'tazilah*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1987), p. 7.

different from this writer's opinion. On one aspect, 'Abduh cannot be seen as the first figure. This can be proved by the efforts of Muḥammad 'Alī (the ruler of Egypt: 1805-1849), after France left Egypt, to send some students to study in Europe and especially in Paris. He established some schools in Cairo such as a military school in 1827, a technical school in 1816, a school of medicine in 1827, a mining School in 1834, and an agriculture school and translating school in 1836.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, this writer confesses that it could not be enough to claim that Muḥammad 'Abduh is the first reformer in the area of Islamic taught in this country.

Factually, the beginning of Islamic reformation happened in the Arabian Peninsula with the appearance of a popular revolutionary movement of *Wahhābiyya* founded by Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb (1703-1787), from Nadjeb, the Middle of Arabia. He had analyzed the books written by Taqi Ad-din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1323), an Arabian expert of Islamic law and a follower of *Ḥanbaliyya*. He also read many books written by Ibn Taymiyya's student (Ibn Qayyim al-Djauzia: 1291-1350).<sup>57</sup> Therefore, it is more accurate to say that Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb systematically was a formulator of this religious notion, whereas the originator was Ibn Taimiyya.

Ibn Taymiyya considered only the Qur'ān and Sunna of the Prophet as the bases of Islam. Meanwhile, *idjmā'* (consensus of the *Ulamas*) was only confessed in the era of the four Caliphs. Another effort conducted by Ibn Taymiyya was the purification of Islam from *bid'a* (novelty, innovation-action or practice deviating from true teachings of the faith).

Due to the character and attitude that appeared from the perception that the doctrine of Islam had deviated because of the influence of Sufism, the *Wahhābiyya* movement is more accurately considered a movement of Islamic purification. The main idea of this movement was to encourage the spirit of *idjtihād* (independent interpretation) to resist *bid'a* and *khurāfat* which have influenced the Islamic way of thinking.

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<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

Muḥammad ‘Abduh was born in AH 1265 or AD 1849 in Al-Gharbīyah the village of Maḥallat Nashr. He was a figure among the reformers of Islam and his idea was similar with Muḥammad ‘Alī’s idea stressing that Muslims should master knowledge and the sciences. However, his father’s background<sup>57</sup> whom firmly opposed Muḥammad ‘Alī’s policies has to be considered. Although, in reality ‘Abduh didn’t live in the era of Muḥammad ‘Alī’s government, in one aspect his idea was similar with *Wahhābiyya* who resisted deviations in the practice of religious duties.

Another Islamic reformer, Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-1897) was a prominent reformer of Islam from Afghanistan who came to Egypt in 1870, establishing a *Salafīyya* movement in 1883, which tried to keep maintaining *Sunna* (the tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad). He had an opinion that the decline of Islam after the era of Imām Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) was caused by the rigidity of Islamic teachings due to *taqlīd* (accepting the already established *fatwā* and practices as final and authoritatively binding).<sup>58</sup> Muḥammad ‘Abduh and his friends studied some subjects under him, such as philosophy, mathematics, and theology. However, he faced some resistance from *ulamas* and Al-Azhar’s students who had the opinion that studying philosophy and *‘Ilm al-Kalām* (theology) may disturb the faith.<sup>60</sup>

Although Muḥammad ‘Abduh was a student of Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī who had the same vision concerning Islam, he had a great difference in the idea of reformation compared to his teacher. Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī emphasized political reformation (notion of Pan-Islamism),<sup>61</sup> meanwhile, Muḥammad ‘Abduh put emphasis on education; he said that the Muslims should master western modern knowledge.

Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s well-known follower was Sayyid Muḥammad

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<sup>57</sup> See, Yusuf Abdullah Puar, *Perjuangan dan Pengabdian Muhammadiyah*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1989), pp. 1-2.

<sup>58</sup> See, Nasution, *Muhammad Abduh...*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>59</sup> See, Puar, *Perjuangan dan...*, p. 3.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p.13.

<sup>61</sup> Classically, Pan-Islamism has meaning to unity the Islamic world under one political and religion authority led by Caliph. See, Suminto, *Islam di...*, p. 80.

Rashid Riḍā from Syria, who first published *Al-Manār* (the Lighthouse) magazine in March 17, 1898-7?, that aimed:

To struggle for changing the social, economic, religious situation in order to prove that Islam is the proper religion of this era, to eliminate *bid'a*, and the faith out of Islam, to abolish the false lessons, the veneration to the pious leaders and their cemeteries, *ṭarīqa* practices, and mysticism.<sup>62</sup>

Whereas, the idea of reformation in Turkey in particular happened in political area which led by Muṣṭafā Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) who brought to an end the rule of the 'Uthmānī (Ottoman) Caliph and changed the governmental system from sultanate into a republican system complying with the spirit of nationality.<sup>63</sup> As President for 15 years, 1923 until his death in 1938, Muṣṭafā Kemal Atatürk introduced a broad range of swift and sweeping reforms—in the political, social, legal, economic, and cultural spheres—virtually unparalleled in any other country.<sup>64</sup>

Meanwhile, Korver (1985: 5) stated that Islamic reform arrived from the Middle East to Indonesia in three ways, namely: *The first*, through the Arab community in Indonesia composed of about 18.000 people who lived in Indonesia in 1900, most of them coming from Ḥaḍramawt, and some Muslims from India whom they used to call *Orang Arab* (The Arabians) who were mostly merchants. Acculturation among them with the Indonesian people happened by marriage. However, this acculturation did not mean that they broke their relationship with their native country; instead, they still made contacts and read newspapers and magazines from their native country. By these reading materials, they absorbed the influence of Islamic reform happening in the Middle East. The aim of this reform was to propose solutions for the decline of the Muslims in various fields of life compared with the Western people, who are non-Muslim, by improving education together with reforming religious rituals.

*The second*, the idea of Islamic reform came from the indigenous society itself. Firstly, this was seen in Minangkabau (West Sumatra), especially from

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<sup>62</sup> See, Puar, *Perjuangan dan...*, p. 4.

<sup>63</sup> See, Slamet Effendy Yusuf cs., *Dinamika Kaum Santri : Menelusuri Jejak dan Pergerakan Internal NU*, (Jakarta : C.V Rajawali,1983), p. 7.

<sup>64</sup> For more information about Atatürk can be downloaded in, <http://www.ataturk.com>

certain persons who had spent their lives in the Middle East and Malaysia. One of the famous reformists from Minangkabau was Sheikh Taher Djalaloedin.

In truth, seven well-known Islamic missionaries from West Sumatra gave significant influences with their modern teachings in the Wahhābiyya and Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s approach at the end of the nineteenth century such as Sheikh Taher Djalaloedin, Sheikh Muhammad Khatib, Sheikh Muhammad Djamil Djabek, Abdul Karim Amirullah, Haji Abdoellah Ahmad, Sheikh Ibrahim Musa, and Zainuddin Labai Al-Junusi.<sup>65</sup>

*The third way* of Islamic reformation arrived from Middle East to Indonesia through the ideas developed by *Sjarekat Islam* (SI) and Muhammadiyah.

There was an organization developed in 1905 in Jakarta by the Arab community named *Djamiat Chair* (Association for Good) which established an elementary school for the Arab community<sup>66</sup> indicated that the first way is reasonable. Another place was in Minangkabau, where Haji Abdoellah Ahmad, who was influenced by his senior Djalaloeddin after he came back from Mecca in 1905, established an elementary school in Padang named “*Abadiyah* School”. Similar to *Djamiat* Elementary school in Jakarta; *Abadiyah* School was also a kind of modern school.<sup>67</sup>

The reason why the idea of Islamic reform from the Middle East came to Indonesia through the two organizations mentioned above, (SI and Muhammadiyah) will be described in brief below.

#### **a. Sjarekat Islam (SI)**

So far, no data found in some of the relevant literatures have exactly established the exact time when *Sjarekat Islam* (SI, Islamic Union) was founded. It is only known that SI was established about the end of the year 1911 or in the beginning of the year 1912 in Surakarta. It is generally accepted that SI was

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<sup>65</sup> See, Laode Ida, *Anatomi Konflik: NU Elit Islam dan Negara*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996), p. 3.

<sup>66</sup> See, Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 56-69.

established by Haji Samanhoedi, a batik industrialist from Lawean, Solo.<sup>68</sup> This statement is supported by Korver (1985: 11), explaining that:

European researchers stated that SI was established in the beginning of the year 1912; Rinkes stated that the date to establish of SI was no longer than February 1912 (Van der Wal, 1967: 86-87). Resident of Surakarta on his first report of SI in 11<sup>th</sup> of August 1912 wrote that this movement established several months before that (Van der Wal, 1967: 35). On his further report, he stated at glance that SI had been existing in April 1912, (idem; 86). The other writer such as Van Niel (1970: 90) and Noer (1973:102) stated that the year 1911 was the establishment year of SI. There was a discussion conducted about 1950s to discuss about this matter in Indonesia. The certain Islamic group stated that October, 16, 1908 was the date of SI establishment. The main target was to make SI an older organization than Boedi Oetomo, so that the idea of emancipation in Indonesia 'started' by the first organization not by the later one.

Some literatures stated that the establishment of SI was a reaction against Chinese activities in batik trading,<sup>69</sup> because of replacing indigenous textiles with imported clothes materials brought in by batik workers from the Chinese. In other words, all of the batik industries were taken over by the Chinese. It was also stated that batik traders firmly united to defend themselves against the practices of the Chinese by establishing SI in 1911.<sup>70</sup>

Concerning these opinions, some objections were proposed by Korver (1985: 14-15), such as:

- 1.Chinese producers of batik in Surakarta, at the end of 1920s were smaller than Javanese batik producers.
- 2.The Chinese people had dominated the trading of batik materials long before 1890.
- 3.There was a significant fact that does not confirm the information that Sjurekat Islam was established because of economic factors, according to a research conducted on the batik solo industry in 1920, generally there was a good understanding between the suppliers of batik materials who were Chinese and the producers of batik who were Indonesian. This fact shows that there was no proof of tough competition between Indonesian producers and the Chinese people.

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<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>68</sup> Pringgodigdo, *Sejarah Pergerakan...* , p. 4.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, see also, Sitompul, *NU dan...* , p. 52.



In addition, we saw that the aim to establish of SI was not based only on economical factors. Principally, it was aimed to form cooperative shops, not to oppose against the Chinese traders; at the most, the shop owners benefited from this action.<sup>71</sup>

Whereas, Pringgodigdo (1970: 4), proposes three reasons for the establishment of SI as quoted below:

- 1.The Chinese trading was an obstacle for Indonesian traders (monopoly of batik material); furthermore, the attitudes of Chinese people after the revolution in China were arrogant.
- 2.The progress of the Christianity movement and the statements in the Dutch parliament, which were considered humiliating for the beliefs of Indonesians.
- 3.The old custom way, which was still used in some regions of Javanese kingdoms, later was considered a kind of humiliation to certain classes of Javanese people.

Using the term proposed by Korver, SI is a *Ratu Adil* (messiah) movement and one of its targets was opposing feudalism and the old manners (such as the etiquette to pay certain salutations to noblemen and officials, which are considered humiliating to certain human being's level due to their lower position and lower occupation).<sup>72</sup> Feudalism and old manners were considered to be the opposite of Islamic teachings, that emphasizes equality of human being's status and the dignity that becomes the spirit of SI.

The general aim in establishing this organization was to arrange Muslim society in order to live together as brothers. To motivate the heart of the Muslim society so that they able to unify and to help one another in the context of State's rule, to make any effort to raise up the people level in order to have tranquillity and prosperity in their motherland.<sup>73</sup>

Although it has been mentioned that one of the aims was to unify Muslim communities as brothers of each other, in its actual implementation, SI was active

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<sup>70</sup> See, Robert Van Niel, *The Emergency of Modern Indonesian Elite*, (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1970), pp. 88-9.

<sup>71</sup> See, Korver, *Sarekat Islam...*, p. 5.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 46-9.

in the middle and lower class society only. On the other side, this organization was different from Boedi Otomo, which was established by Priyayi, and most of its members were *Priyayi* (the educated people and aristocrats). SI was, since the beginning, established for the common people. That was seen from the prohibition that the executive board's members should not consist of civil servants.<sup>74</sup>

In one of its documented histories, SI noted that Haji Samanhoedi was the first member of the executive board and H.O.S. Cokroaminoto was a commissioner. The first congress of the SI conducted on January 26, 1913, in Surabaya was led by H.O.S. Cokroaminoto. He emphasized on his speech that SI was not a political party and had no intention to oppose the Dutch government.<sup>75</sup>

It can be assumed on this phenomenon, that SI actually tried to manage its political role in such a way that it would not get re-suspended as had happened to *Sjarekat Dagang Islam* (SDI, Islamic Commercial Union),<sup>76</sup> or perhaps it made efforts in order not to be dismissed by Dutch Government, in connection with the prohibition against political organizations at that time. Truthfully, the other important reason of unwillingness of the Dutch East Indies to acknowledge SI in the beginning, based on assumption that the figures of SI were uneducated people who could not be able to run well the organization.

In its second congress held in Solo, SI once again declared that this organization was open to all Indonesian people but it was closed off for government officials. This declaration showed the existence of SI as a people's organization.

Furthermore, the third congress of SI directly led by H.O.S Cokroaminoto, in Bandung, in June 17-24, 1916 was the first national congress, and attended by 360.000 delegates from 80 regional branches. The total numbers from 80 regional branches were about 800.000. According to Pringgogidgo (1970: 6):

The use of *national* term by SI was aimed to try to achieve a firm unity for all Indonesian

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<sup>73</sup> See, Kutoyo, *Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan...*, p. 60.

<sup>74</sup> Pringgogidgo, *Sejarah Pergerakan...*, p. 5.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>76</sup> Pringgogidgo noted that the resident of Surakarta, because of being worried that SDI would be an organization opposing the government, suspended it in August, 12, 1912. It was prohibited to

groups, which had to be brought as high as the *Natie* level. By evolution, it tried to attain its own government and at last, Indonesians could take a part in Indonesian government.

These branches functioned actively in many parts of Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi. In the years after, between 1917 and 1921, SI was under the influence of the Dutch and Indonesian Marxists. In the early 1920s, while the communists and anti-communists fought for the control of SI branches, the government intervened increasingly to prevent contacts between the urban leaders of the organisation and the peasantry. For this reason and others, many of the SI branches disappeared.<sup>77</sup>

The nationalism that SI brought about into its movement was different from the nationalism in Boedi Oetomo fashion. Although both of them started with different spirits, they had the same attitude opposing the Netherlands East Indies government. Boedi Oetomo opposed the Dutch by its nationalist awareness that the Netherlands East Indies government was a foreign government governing the indigenous society. Meanwhile, SI with the spirit of Islam<sup>78</sup> viewed the Netherlands East Indies not only as a foreign government but also, as the most important thing, a *kāfir* government which should not be obeyed and followed by the Indonesian society of which 90% were Muslims that time.

### **b. Muhammadiyah**

This organization was established by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923), in Dhūlḥidjja 8, AH 1330/November 18, AD 1912 in the village of Kauman, Yogyakarta.<sup>79</sup> Since he was motivated by curiosity to study organizational matters, before he established Muhammadiyah he had joined Boedi Oetomo, and

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accept new members and to carry out meetings, yet there was no sign of movement opposing the government, so that the suspension was withdrawn in August, 26. *Ibid.* p. 4.

<sup>77</sup> See, Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 4.

<sup>78</sup> See, Clifford Geertz, *The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker*, (The Hague: Mouton Publisher, 1960), p. 244.

<sup>79</sup> See, Tim Pembina Al-Islam dan Kemuhammadiyah, *Muhammadiyah, Sejarah, Pemikiran, dan Amal Usaha*, (Yogyakarta: PT. Tiara Kencana, 1990), pp. 3-4.

after the SI was established, he also joined that organization.<sup>80</sup>

Nevertheless, it could not be denied that K.H. Ahmad Dahlan joined Boedi Oetomo not only for the reason of studying organization but there was also a more important reason as described by Noer (1973: 75), “with the intention of giving religious lectures to its members. He hoped through the contact he had made with Budi Utomo members, who in general were employed of various government schools and offices, to be able to give religious instruction in the schools. He also cherished the hope that the teachers themselves who had followed his lectures would pass on the contents of his talks to their own pupils.”

Indeed, the idea to establish Muhammadiyah emerged perhaps due to K.H. Ahmad Dahlan is feeling that both organizations (Boedi Oetomo and SI) could not be able to fulfil the criteria to increase *da'wa* (religious propagation) activities and the education he wished for.<sup>81</sup> In addition, the most important reason was influenced by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan's comprehension of Al-Qur'ān *sūra Āl-i-Imrān* verse 104 meaning “let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: they are the ones to attain felicity.”<sup>82</sup>

It could not be denied that there were some other considerations of K.H. Ahmad Dahlan to establish this organization while seeing the situation of the Indonesian Muslim society in general and in Yogyakarta in particular, such as:

1. The Indonesian Islamic society did not rigorously follow the Al-Qur'ān and Sunna.
2. There was no well-organized unity in Islamic society.
3. The poverty in Islamic society, most of the poor was farmers and unskilled labourers.
4. The education for children was neglected.
5. Polytheism and superstitions grew very rapidly.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>80</sup>See, Jainuri, *Muhammadiyah: Gerakan Reformasi Islam di Jawa pada Awal Abad Keduapuluhan*, (Surabaya: PT. Bina Ilmu, 1991), p. 34.

<sup>81</sup> Jainuri, *Muhammadiyah: ...*, p. 35.

<sup>82</sup> Puar, *Perjuangan dan...*, p. 34.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 32-3.

According to Mukti Ali, in his paper entitled “Interpretasi tentang Amalan Muhammadiyah”,<sup>84</sup> there were some other factors inspiring the establishment of Muhammadiyah. These were:

1. Deviation in Islamic practices and the complicated conditions experienced by Islam in Indonesia.
2. Inefficiencies in various Islamic education institutions.
3. Activities of Catholic and Protestant missionaries.
4. Attitudes of certain intellectual groups, which sometimes looked down upon Islam.

These four factors forced Muhammadiyah to show its good efforts and its activities aimed towards:

1. Cleaning Islam in Indonesia from the influence of non- Islamic values.
2. Reforming the Islamic doctrines with modern thought.
3. Reforming the teachings of Islamic education.
4. Defending Islam from the influence and cultural penetration coming from outside.

Whereas, Shihab (1998: 126), mentions that the more important factors influencing the establishment of Muhammadiyah was the activity of Christianisation in Indonesia and the big effect caused by it. This opinion strengthens the opinions of Mukti Ali, which was mentioned earlier.

The Muhammadiyah teachings proposed by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan to emphasize the idea that Islamic society should return to the teachings mentioned in Qur’ān and Sunna, whereas all matters out of these two main resources should be left behind.

He said that the Islamic society at that time was under the influence of earlier religions or beliefs (Hindu, Buddha, Animism, and Dynamism). Islam came to this archipelago as a new religion relatively peacefully and interacted with cultures and religions, which had existed before. By the flexibility of well-known Islamic missionaries called *Wali Songo*, Islam tolerated good values and

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<sup>84</sup> See, A. Mukti Ali, *Interpretasi tentang Amalan-amalan Muhammadiyah*, (Jakarta: Pemuda Muhammadiyah, 1958)

good culture (as long as that they were not in contradiction with the Islamic principles) and let the cultures keep growing in society, yet Islam tried to colour and inspire them. By this process way, Islam was accepted and easily spread in the whole archipelago relatively without blood shed.

The first figures who were registered as the members of executive boards of Muhammadiyah were as following:

1. K.H. Ahmad Dahlan (*Ketib Amin*: General Secretary)
2. Abdullah Siradj (*Penghulu*: Secretary)
3. Haji Ahmad (*Ketib Cendana*: vice-Secretary)
4. Haji Abdurrahman
5. R. Haji Sarkawi
6. Haji Muhammad
7. R.H. Djaelani
8. Haji Anis
9. Haji Muhammad Pakih (*Carik*)<sup>85</sup>

The further step taken by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan after establishing this Muhammadiyah organization was to propose a recommendation letter of *rechtperson* (legalisation) to the Governor General in Jakarta signed by *vorzitter* (leader), K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, and his secretary, Haji Abdullah Siradj.<sup>86</sup> The recommendation letter was approved in August 22, 1914, with the decision letter of Government *Besluit* no. 81 by August 22, 1918. That recommendation letter was valid only for 29 years in Yogyakarta city.<sup>87</sup>

Because of requests and demands to establish branches in some regions in all of Java's regions were getting stronger, in 1920, the statute of Muhammadiyah was changed, and the movement was not only in Yogyakarta but also in all of Java's regions, then one year later, the statute changed to all of Indonesia.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Jainuri, *Muhammadiyah: Gerakan...*, p. 36.

<sup>86</sup> See, Abdul Munir Mulkan, *Pemikiran K.H. Ahmad Dahlan dan Muhammadiyah dalam Perspektif Perubahan Sosial*. (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 1990), p. 94.

<sup>87</sup> Jainuri, *Op.Cit.*, p. 36; See also, Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*, (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1989), pp. 153-54.

<sup>88</sup> See, Noer, *The Modernist Muslim...*, p. 76.

Hence, the idea of Islamic reform in the Middle East arrived in Indonesia through two big organizations<sup>89</sup>, which were born in the socio-political context in Indonesian society at the beginning of the twentieth century beside other Islam reform organizations like *Jamiat Khair*, *Al-Irsyad*, and *Persis* whose roles are not discussed on this study.

It could be said that SI represented the idea and thought of the Indonesian Islamic society, a kind of modernization of Islam in Indonesian's context through political channels. Although SI was not as radical as the Pan-Islamism proposed by Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (the notion of Muslims unification in whole world under one leadership), it had an idea similar with the later organization's idea, that Islamic reform should be conducted by using political channels. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah carried out its reformation by putting more emphasis on the reform of educational channels. Muhammadiyah's activities were so relevant with the idea of Muḥammad 'Abduh yet in practice it was expanding to focus on purifying Islam and to make inner corrections (meaning to correct certain deviating Islamic practices in Indonesia which were considered *bid'a*).

## **B. The Birth of NU**

The birth of NU was coloured by tensions among the Indonesian Muslims themselves. Different concepts in interpreting Islamic teachings, which were reflected in Islamic religious practices, created a certain dichotomy among Indonesian Muslims at that time. Two terms appeared in this connection, they were *kaum muda* (the young group) or the reformists and *kaum tua* (the old group) consisting of factions of *ulama* (Islamic scholars or theologians) and their followers who held tightly to principles of orthodox Islamic schools and traditions. This situation raised concerns especially from groups in *Sjarekat Islam* (SI, Islamic Union). The idea to discuss with the old group in a meeting called Islamic Congress was a part of this matter. On initiative of Branata, a prominent

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<sup>89</sup> This thesis was strengthened by Alfian stated that the ideas of K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, in several sectors to be influenced by the Muḥammad 'Abduh. See Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political...*, pp.150-52.

of SI Cirebon, the first Al-Islam Congress was held in 1921 in Cirebon-West Java.<sup>90</sup>

The further progress was not as smooth as it was hoped for by the ones who brought up the idea. Instead, the Islamic Congress, which aimed to decrease tensions, changed into a squabbling arena to argue and to make silly talk and later there were even more serious tensions between the two groups. Certain events happening later abroad, especially in the Middle East, also influenced Muslim communities in Indonesia. The first Al-Islam Congress produced CCI (Central Committee Al-Islam) which later became CCC (*Central Committee Chilafat*) taking an action on behalf of the Muslim Community of Indonesia in The World Islamic Congress. Although in fact, the CCC was only a representation of the young group. Dissatisfaction concerning it forced some of the *ulamas* to establish *Komite Hijaz* (Ḥidjāz Committee), a committee aimed at submitting the old group's messages to the new authority of Ḥidjāz.

The following description will reveal the efforts made by the *ulamas* from Al-Islam Congress until *Komite Hijaz* and the initial steps taken by NU after it had been established as an organization aiming at accommodating the ideas of the *ulamas*.

### **1. From Al-Islam Congress to Komite Hijaz**

Various socio-political and religious factors existing at that time forced some *ulamas* as representatives of the old group to establish a committee representing themselves and to withdraw from the committee established by the Congress of Islamic community of Indonesia. This committee was later known as the *Komite Hijaz* (Ḥidjāz Committee).<sup>91</sup> It was established to propose religious tolerance from King Ibn Sa'ūd, the new authority of Ḥidjāz, in order that the

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<sup>90</sup> See, Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, pp. 44-5

<sup>91</sup> According to Haidar (1994: 114), quoted from K.H. Abdul Halim, the name of this committee was written as *Hijaaj* (*hidjādj*), but it should be written as *Hijaj* (*hidjadj*) without *maddah* (mean: long vowel of a), because it is the plural form of the word *hajj* (*hadjdj*). But in other documents it was written as *Hijaz* (Ḥidjāz), the name of a place in the Arabian Peninsula where Mecca and Medina cities are located (a region of western Saudi Arabia, along the mountainous Red Sea coast of the Arabian Peninsula from Jordan on the north to Asir region on the south).



traditional Islamic practices may be continued. The tolerance to traditional Islamic practices, which were established by the four *Imām Madhhabs* (Great Muslim Jurists: al-Imām Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad bin Idrīs Al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Imām Mālik bin Anas, al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa al-Nu‘mān bin Thābit, and al-Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal), who have the concept *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā‘a*, was the main intention of establishing this organization.<sup>92</sup>

The King Ibn Sa‘ūd (c.1880-1953) with a *Wahhābiyya* theology background, was influenced by the spirit and idea of reformation which had been proclaimed by Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhāb (1703-1787) in running his government. This was proved by one of his efforts such as to renovate four cemeteries of the four Great Muslim Jurists located near Ka‘ba. This action worried some *ulamas*,<sup>93</sup> the followers of traditional teachings, who were afraid that there would be no longer tolerance on the freedom to perform Islamic practices in accordance with the traditional teachings of any one of the four Great Muslim Jurists.

Principally, this *Wahhābiyya* as it was mentioned before was aimed to purify the Islamic teachings from the influence of *Ṣūfism*, which was supposed to result in the decline of certain Islamic teachings, which had deviated, from the mainstream of Islamic doctrines. This movement opposed certain teachings of *Madhhab* (Islamic school) which were considered as *bid‘a* (novel, innovative actions or practices deviating from true teachings of the faith), which were not relevant or even not taught in the Qur’ān and Sunna. *Wahhābiyya* also opposed certain practices such as *taqlid* (accepting the already established *fatwā* and practices as final and authoritatively binding), *lafaz niyya* (pronouncing intent), visiting cemeteries, reading *Barzandjī* (chant recounting Muḥammad’s life), *talqīn* (guidance to the dead body just buried), ceremonial meal for commemorating the

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<sup>92</sup> See, Yusuf, *Dinamika Kaum...*, p. 20.

<sup>93</sup> Ibn Sa‘ūd founded a militantly religious tribal organization known as the *Ikhwān* (Brethren) which has a taught that all non-*Wahhābī* Muslims were infidels. Although the *Ikhwān*, the fanatics whom he himself had trained, were crushed by Ibn Sa‘ūd himself at the Battle of *Sibilla* on March 29, 1929. See, “Ibn Sa‘ūd” Britannica Student Encyclopedia, from *Encyclopaedia Britannica 2003 Ultimate Reference Suite CD-ROM*. Copyright © 1994-2002 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. May 30, 2002.

one who has passed away, et cetera.<sup>94</sup> In addition, *Wahhābiyya* stressed the important of *idjtihād* (interpretations according to one's opinion).

The third Al-Islam Congress in Surabaya on December 24-26, 1924 discussed and successfully appointed representatives to be sent to The World Islamic Congress in Cairo. The representatives were K.H. Fachruddin (Muhammadiyah), Surjopranoto (SI), K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (chief of religions groups in Surabaya), Tjokroaminoto, and Ahmad Soerkati. Due to a political change happening in Egypt<sup>95</sup> at that time, however, the later congress was cancelled indefinitely.

A significant development later happening in the Middle East was the victory of Ibn Sa'ūd in snatching Ḥidjāz from Sharīf 'Alī in 1925, after he had defeated and isolated Sharīf 'Alī's father (Sharīf Ḥusayn) in 1924 who could not defend Ḥidjāz. After gaining victory, 1925, in addition to proclaiming him self king of Ḥidjāz (Western Saudi Arabia) and Nedjd (Central Saudi Arabia),<sup>96</sup> Ibn Sa'ūd also announced directly his plan to the world to conduct "The World Islamic Congress" a year later, on June 1, 1926.<sup>97</sup> The invitations were circulated to the whole world, one of them was delivered to the Central Committee *Chilafat* (CCC) which was established on the initiative of SI in Surabaya in 1924 and had been instrumental in accommodating the representatives of the Indonesian Muslim communities and their organizations to be sent to "The World Islamic Congress" in Cairo. CCC was formerly named Central Committee of Al-Islam (CCI). Its name was changed because that body could not keep a harmonious

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<sup>94</sup> Ida, *Anatomi Konflik: ...*, p. 2.

<sup>95</sup> The political chance happened such as: unwillingness of Sudan to separate from Egypt, the killing of the British commander in chief over the Egyptian army, and Sa'd Zaghūl Pasha becoming the Prime Minister. See, "Zaghūl, Sa'd." Britannica Student Encyclopedia, from *Encyclopaedia Britannica 2003 Ultimate Reference Suite CD-ROM*. Copyright © 1994-2002 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. May 30, 2002., see also, Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*, (Sala: Jatayu, 1985), p. 48., see also, [http://i-cias.com/e.o/zaghlul\\_s.htm](http://i-cias.com/e.o/zaghlul_s.htm)

<sup>96</sup> After consolidating his power over most the Arabian Peninsula, in 1932 Ibn Sa'ūd changed the name of his kingdom to Saudi Arabia.

<sup>97</sup> See, Ricklefs, *A History of...*, p. 168.

relationship with certain SI figures due to frictions about *khilāfiyya* (uncertain and debatable matters) among the groups of this committee.<sup>98</sup>

The victory of the *Wahhābism* movement in Ḥidjāz that time gave a new spirit for the reformists in Indonesia to spread their teachings to batter down certain practices considered as *bid'a*. Whereas on the perception of the *ulamas* those things considered as *bid'a* were only *khilāfiyya*, and these were only insignificant matters in *fiqh* (jurist) and were called *furū'* (branches). The dispute occurring due to different perceptions sometimes appeared not only in the forms of debate and argument, but also physically. This period has been described by G.F. Pijper quoted by M. Ali Haidar, as “A pond which is calm on its surface but is occasionally rippled.”<sup>99</sup> Concern felt by the major figures of SI regarding the disputes between the old and the young groups forced them to try to find ways to bridge the clash between these two groups. A serious clash could destroy a more important thing, opposing colonial tyranny. This concern was the reason behind the conduct of the first AI-Islam Congress. The target to be reached by this congress was to bond various Islamic groups and to decrease disputes about *khilāfiyya* matters. Later, the second AI-Islam Congress was also conducted in Garut in 1922, but the representatives of traditional *ulamas* did not attend it.<sup>100</sup>

Three years after, CCC led by Wondoamiseno held the 4th AI-Islam Congress in Yogyakarta in August 21-27, 1925. On that occasion, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah on behalf of the *ulamas* in front of the congress proposed a message to the new authority of Ḥidjāz that the authority should give freedom to perform Islamic obligations based on the teachings of any of the four Islamic schools.<sup>101</sup> This proposal was not responded to positively by the figures of CCC such as Wondoamiseno, K.H. Mas Mansyur, and H.O.S Tjokroaminoto (the

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<sup>98</sup> CCI was established on the first AI-Islam Congress in Cirebon, West- Java in 1921. It was lead by Tjokroaminoto and assisted by H.Agus Salim. See, Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 4.

<sup>99</sup> See, M. Ali Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama, 1994), p. 5.

<sup>100</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 45.

<sup>101</sup> Whereas, Adnan (1982: 12), stated that K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah walked out on the time to join the 5<sup>th</sup> AI-Islam Congress on February in Bandung, because his message was not be responded by the young group, then established a committee named 'Komite Hijaz'. That opinion

representatives of the young group). The young group's refusal to accept the old group's proposal was logical for them because this demand was not in accordance with the principles they had developed (Islam reform).

Due to this dispute, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and his companions walked out from the congress. On the initiative of K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary, they tried to form another committee by themselves which was supported by the leading *ulamas*<sup>102</sup> from some regions, such as from Surabaya, Semarang, Pasuruan, Lasem, and Pati and even from Madura. At a meeting in Kertopaten, Surabaya, in the residence of K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah in January 31, 1926, they stated that they had formed the committee themselves named "*Komite Hijaz*".

In truth, the peak of the clash between these two groups appeared on the 5<sup>th</sup> Al-Islam Congress in Bandung in February 1926. Here the conflict of interests in the body of Al-Islam Congress was clearer by seeing the number of the participants attending the congress, which was not balanced between the reformists and the traditionalists. The young group's domination resulted in the non-accommodation of the interests of the old group. The congress which had actually been planned a month before in Cianjur, on January 8-10, 1926, agreed to a decision that only representatives of the reformists would be sent as the delegation to the *khilāfa* conference in Mecca on the behalf of their own faction, they were Tjokroaminoto from SI, and H. Mas Mansyur from Muhammadiyah.<sup>103</sup>

Considering this situation, it is understandable that it was one of the old group's most important reasons for establishing *Komite Hijaz* was because of differences among the old group's methods and the young group's in interpreting the Islamic doctrines.

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could not be accepted because the 'Komite Hijaz' was established in January 31, 1926, and the congress was conducted on February.

<sup>102</sup> The *ulamas* referred to Anam were K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari Tebu Ireng Jombang, K.H. Bisri Sjansuri Denanyar-Jombang, K.H. Asnawi Kudus, K.H. Nawawi Pasuruan, K.H. Ridwan Semarang, K.H. Maksum Lasem, K.H. Nahrawi Malang, H. Ngoro Munthaha (son-in-law of K.H. Kholil) Bangkalan Madura, K.H. Abdul Hamid Faqih Sedayu-Gresik, K.H. Abdul Halim Leuwimunding-Cirebon, K.H. Ridwan Abdullah, K.H. Mas Alwi, K.H. Abdul Ubaid Surabaya, Syaikh Ahmad Ghana'im al-Mishri Egypt, see Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p.1.

<sup>103</sup> See, Yusuf cs., *Dinamika Kaum Santri: ...*, p. 18.

*Komite Hijaz* was meant as a means to submit the aspirations of the *ulamas* directly to the new authority of Saudi Arabia (Ḥidjāz). This committee consisted of some names as follows: H. Hasan Gipo (Chairman), H. Syaleh Syamil (Vice chairman), Moh. Shadiq (Secretary) assisted by K.H. Abdul Halim, whereas K.H. Wahab Hasbullah himself was an elected as advisor assisted by K.H. Masyhuri and K. Khalil (Lasem). The main tasks of this committee were to formulate the attitudes of the *ulamas*, which were to be submitted to the new authority of Ḥidjāz and to prepare the delegations to be sent.<sup>104</sup> This committee decided later that the delegation to the King Sa'ūd was consist of K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and Syaikh Ahmad Ghana'im Al-Mishry. The King accepted this delegation on June 13, 1928.<sup>105</sup>

The demands brought by the *Komite Hijaz* were systematically categorized into the following four points: 1) The freedom from Arab authority to do the religious practices according to any of the four great Islamic jurists, 2) The maintenance of the heirloom places having historical values, 3) The regulation of the *Hadjdj* management including the determination of the official tariff (cost of *Hadjdj*), and 4) Official law guarantee based on the law on Ḥidjāz to handle the disputes among the Islamic communities in terms of *furū'*. These four demands were not granted except the freedom to perform religious practices according to any of the four schools. The King gave his answer in letters and he promised that he would like to give the freedom to Islamic communities in general to perform their belief and to practice religious teachings except the things considered sinful by God, the things which are not supported by argumentation based on Qur'ān and the prophet's Sunna and also the things which are not found in any of the four schools.<sup>106</sup>

The establishment date of *Komite Hijaz* was used as the date of the organization's birth. Based on an initiative of Mas Alwi bin Abdul Azis,<sup>107</sup> this

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<sup>104</sup> See, Haji Abdul Basit Adnan, *Kemelut di NU: Antara Kyai dan Politisi*, (Solo: C.V. Mayasari, 1982), pp. 12-3.

<sup>105</sup> Noer, *The Modernist...*, p. 225.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid*, p. 226.

<sup>107</sup> Adnan, *Kemelut di NU...*, p. 13.

organisation was named *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU, The Renaissance of the *ulamas*), although this renaissance is considered to have happened long before the establishment of the committee.

That renaissance of the *ulamas* had long occurred is explained and proved in some ways. *Firstly*, it has been proved in the account at the beginning of the previous chapter. In addition, before Boedi Oetomo was established, there were resistances from society such as Diponegoro's war 1825-1830, Aceh's war 1873-1903, and the peasant rebellion in Banten (1888) which were significant historical proofs that the roles of *ulamas* were important. Generally, almost all civil resistances were led by the *ulamas*. Battles like these were the real actions of the *ulamas* in response to colonial tyranny, and if viewed by other perspective these wars could be considered as actions to block the penetration of western culture, especially to resist the Christianisation mission of the Dutch. This resistance was reaching its peak when the Dutch government carried out the practice of *Kristening Politiek* (Christianisation Policy) a kind of policy for supporting the successful Christianisation mission in Indonesia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the Governor General A.W.F. Indenburg (1909-1916)<sup>108</sup> was in power. This policy made the *ulamas* angry, so they led resistance movements and tried to protect their communities from the influence of European culture and its Christianisation mission. Later, however, they realized that efforts to struggle by physical ways such as war and rebellion had always failed, so that in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the *ulamas* changed their strategy from physical ways to political ways, using organizations.

*Secondly*, the establishment of the various *pesantrens* (traditional Islamic School), whose number grew rapidly in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. For example, K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary built a building of 10m2 (ten meter square) in width in the village of Tebuireng, Cukir, the district of Diwak, about 8 kilometres from Jombang, East Java. This building was known later as *Pesantren of Tebuireng*. In 1907, K.H. Tubagus Muhammad Falak established a *Pesantren al-Falak* in the village of Pagentongan-Gunung Batu, the district of Ciomas, about 9 (nine)

kilometres from the downtown of Bogor, West Java. This *pesantren* was pioneering and it inspired the establishment of other *pesantrens* in Bogor. Then, in 1917, K.H. Bisri Sjansuri established *Manbaul Ma'arif Pesantren* in Denanyar-Jombang and K.H. Syamsul Arifin in 1919 established *Salafiah Pesantren* in Sukorejo, district of Asembagus Regency of Situbondo.<sup>109</sup>

Nahdatul Ulama as an organization did not appear suddenly, but its establishment was influenced by various events that resulted in the establishment of *Komite Hijaz*. There was a correlation among these organizations with each other. The establishment of SI in 1911-1912 motivated the youth who were studying in the Middle East such as Abdul Hahab Hasbullah, Muhammad Dahlan, Asnawi and Abbas to establish a branch of SI in Mecca, although later the branch was not developing well due to the World War II. This war then forced them back to Indonesia. However, their strong will —, which they had had when they had been in Middle East — to establish an organization, still remained on their minds. K.H. Wahab Hasbullah, after coming back from Mecca in 1916,<sup>110</sup> established an education and mission organization called *Nahdhatul Wathan*<sup>111</sup> (Renaissance of Motherland). The first major concrete thing done by this organization was building up a *madrasah* (reformed Islamic school) with its storied building in Surabaya. The educators of this *madrasah* were K.H. Wahab Hasbullah himself together with K.H. Mas Mansyur, and Kyai Ridwan Abdullah.<sup>112</sup> The director was Abdul Kahar, a rich merchant from Kawatan, a village in the southern Tugu Pahlawan Surabaya, East Java.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> See, Suminto, *Islam di Indonesia...*, pp. 22-4.

<sup>109</sup> See, Anam *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 4-15. For the complete understanding about *pesantren*, see, Andy Muarly Sunrawa and Abd. Halim Hasan (eds.), *Direktori Pesantren I*, (Jakarta: P3M, 1986).

<sup>110</sup> Haidar (1994: 42), stated that *Nahdhatul Wathan* actually had been pioneered about 1914, with the assumption that 2 or 3 years of time was needed to prepare for the establishment but the writer mentioning the year 1916 as the establishment year of *Nahdhatul Wathan* based on the approval year from the Dutch Government 1916 as quoted by Feillard, (1999: 8), who based this year on his reference *Hari-Hari Sekitar Lahirnya NU*, by H. Umar Burhan in AULA, no.1, 3<sup>rd</sup> year, 1981.

<sup>111</sup> Whereas, Yusuf cs. (1983: 7), stated that the first school established by *Nahdhatul Wathan* was *Khitabul Wathan* (Rostrum of Motherland), but the writer in this thesis refers to Haidar (1994: 42) and Feillard (1999: 8) stating that the name of the school was *Nahdhatul Wathan*.

<sup>112</sup> See, Andree Feillard, *NU vis a Vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), p. 8.

<sup>113</sup> See, Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan...*, p. 42.

Due to the efforts of the *Nahdhatul Wathan* founders, in the first five years some branches of *Nahdhatul Wathan* were established, although they used different names, such as *Ahlul Wathan* (Family of Motherland) for the Islamic school in Wonokromo, *Far'ul Wathan* (The Branch of Motherland) in Gresik, and *Hidayatul Wathan* (The Guidance of Motherland) in Jombang.<sup>114</sup> In addition, there were also similar schools in some other places such as Semarang, Lawang, Sidoarjo, Pasuruan, and some other places in Surabaya.<sup>115</sup>

There is an interesting point in giving names for these *Nahdhatul Wathan* branches, since they always used word *Wathan* (Motherland). This name showed us that the spirit of nationalism had existed in the youth of *pesantren* that time. Love of motherland had grown in their minds.

Besides that, in 1918, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah also succeeded in establishing the Commerce Cooperative *Nahdhatul Tujjar* (renaissance of the economy) after consulting with K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary who later gave his approval. K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary later was appointed to chairman position, and K.H. Wahab Hasbullah himself was appointed to be manager running that cooperative.

In 1918, also in Surabaya, *Tashwirul Afkar* (the portrait of thought) was established by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan,<sup>116</sup> K.H. Mas Mansyur, K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, and Mangun.<sup>117</sup> *Tashwirul Afkar* was a discussion club to discuss social and religious matters, consisting of *ulamas*. Further development showed that in 1919 the club had changed its status into an Islamic school called "*Tashwirul Afkar*" located near Ampel mosque in Surabaya.<sup>118</sup>

The development of these organizations, *Nahdhatul Wathan*, as a political movement in education; *Nahdhatul Tujjar*, as a movement symbolizing village economy; and *Tashwirul Afkar*, as a movement for culture and knowledge, found its culmination when the *Komite Hijaz* became an organization called *Nahdhatul*

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<sup>114</sup> See, Yusuf es., *Dinamika...*, p. 7.

<sup>115</sup> Feillard, *NU vis a Vis...*, p. 9.

<sup>116</sup> K.H. Ahmad Dahlan intended here is not K.H. Ahmad Dahlan (the founder of Muhammadiyah) from Kauman Yogyakarta, but the owner of *Pesantren* in Kebon Dalem, Surabaya.

<sup>117</sup> Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan...*, p. 43.

<sup>118</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 27.



Ulama (NU), functioning as a means to accommodate the aspirations of the *ulamas* and as an organization aimed to give mandate to *Komite Hijaz*. Therefore, the NU was established with three main pillars: a) *Nahdhatul Wathan* with the concept of nationality, b) *Nahdhatut Tujjar* with concept of society and economy, and c) *Tashwirul Afkar* with the concept of culture and knowledge.

The *ulamas* soon formed the complete boards of management after the name of the organization was agreed. It consisted of *Syuriah* (Board of Legislative) and *Tanfidziyah* (Board of Executive) with its structure below:

*Syuriah*:

*Rois Akbar* (the General Chairman): K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary from Jombang

Vice of Chairman: K.H. A. Dahlan Achyat from Kebon Dalem Surabaya

*Katib* (Secretary): K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah from Kertopaten Surabaya.

*Naibul- Katib* (Vice Secretary): K.H. Abdul Halim from Surabaya

*A'wan* (members):

K.H. Mas Alwi bin Abdul Azis from Surabaya

K.H. Ridwan Abdullah from Surabaya

K.H. Amin Abdus Syukur from Surabaya

K.H. Amin (Praban) from Surabaya

K.H. Sa'id from Surabaya

H. Nahrawi Thahir from Malang

K.H. Hasbullah from (Plampitan) Surabaya

K.H. Syarif from Surabaya

KH. Yasin from Surabaya

KH. Nawawi Amin from Surabaya

K.H. Bisri Sjansuri from Jombang

K.H. Abdul Hamid from Jombang  
K.H. Abdulllah Ubsid from Surabaya  
K.H. Dahlan Abdul Kahar from Mojokerto  
K. Abdul Majid from Surabaya  
K.H. Masyhuri from Lasem

Musytasar (Advisor):

K.H. Moh. Zubair from Gresik  
K.H. Raden Munthaha from Madura  
K.H. Mas Nawawi from Pasuruan  
K.H. Rirwan Mujahid from Semarang  
K.H. R. Asnawi from Kudus  
K.H. Hambali from Kudus  
Syaikh Ahmad Ghana'im from Surabaya (Egyptian)

Tanfidziyah:

Chairman: H. Hasan Gipo from Surabaya  
Vice of Ch.: H. Saleh Syamsil from Surabaya  
Secretary: Moh. Shadiq from (Sugeng) Surabaya  
Vice of Sc.: H. Nawawi from Surabaya  
Treasurer: H. Muhammad Burhan from Surabaya  
H. Ja'far from Surabaya

Commissioner:

K. Nahrawi from Surabaya  
K. Ahzab from Surabaya  
K. Usman from Surabaya  
M. Saleh from Surabaya  
Abdul Hakim from Surabaya  
Usman (Ampel) from Surabaya  
K. Zein Surabaya  
H. Dahlan (Bubutan) from Surabaya

H. Ghazali from Surabaya

H. Sidik from Surabaya

Muhammad Mangun from Surabaya

H. Abdul Kahar (Board of Executive advisor) from Surabaya

H. Ibrahim (Board of Executive advisor) from Surabaya.<sup>119</sup>

From the description of the NU establishment above, there are two major assumptions that may serve as bases in drawing conclusions on the background in the establishment of NU. *First* assumption, viewed from theological point of view, NU existed as a response to the political development in Middle East, especially in Ḥijāz land being coloured by the victory of Islamic reform in the Middle East, which incarnated into various Islamic organizations in Indonesia. *Second* assumption, viewed from a socio-cultural point of view, NU existed in the framework to save Islamic society from negative influences of western modernization, especially from the Dutch. In other words, NU existed to block western cultural penetration. Nevertheless, the most important background beside those is concerning the demand for tolerance of Islamic practice according to the teaching of four schools in the society of Islam traditionalist.

## **2. A Social and Religious Movement.**

The NU statute was later made in a congress held in 1928 in order to have the official approval of the Dutch government, which was then given in September 5, 1929. *Pengurus Besar Nahdatul Ulama* (PBNU, head quarter of Nahdatul Ulama) gave the task to K.H. Said, H. Hasan Gipo and Muhammad Shadliq Sugeng Judiwirjo to propose a *Rechtsperson* (legalisation) to the governor general of the Netherlands East Indies. The *Rechtsperson* was approved in February 6, 1930 in *Besluit Rechtsperson* (legalisation document) No. IX for limited time of 29 years<sup>120</sup> and it was undersigned by an *Algemeene Secretaris* (General Secretary), G.R. Erdbrink.<sup>121</sup> Afterwards, NU determined that it was an

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<sup>119</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, pp. 69-70; Adnan, *Kemelut di NU:...*, p. 13.

<sup>120</sup> Anam, *Ibid.*, p.79.

<sup>121</sup> See, Apendixes.

organization intended for *ulamas*, who would like to do something for the benefit of the Islamic Society. In order to reach that purpose, it made the following efforts:

1. To improve relations with 'Oelama-Oelama' who follow any one of the four Islamic jurists.
2. To verify the previous books used in teaching, in order to find out whether those books containing teachings of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* or teachings of *Ahl Bid'a*.
3. To spread Islam based on any of the four schools with good method.
4. To make efforts to increase Islamic schools.
5. To keep on maintaining *mesjid-mesjid* (mosques), *surau-surau* (houses of worship) and *pesantren-pesantren* (traditional Islamic schools) and to care of the orphan and the indigent.
6. To establish organizations which serve to develop agriculture and commerce and to establish companies not forbidden by Islamic teaching.<sup>122</sup>

Further developments, noted that NU changed its statute in 1961 and 1979. However, the organization still used *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* as the base of the movement. The term of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* is not mentioned explicitly in NU's 1961 statute, but this organization stated its purpose that: It is to perform Islamic law based on one of the four schools. Then, the term reappeared in the NU's 1979 statute, as the result of the NU's 26<sup>th</sup> congress in Semarang, which determined that the purpose of NU was "To uphold the *fiqh* based on *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a*, *Ahl al-Madhāhib al-Arba'a*". Then, in the 27<sup>th</sup> congress in Situbondo, in 1984, NU determined that *Pancasila* (the five principles) is the foundation of the organization and then made regulations concerning that decision. Besides, it was also added that (in an article in the regulations) the form of faith adopted by NU is *Djam'iyya Dīniyya Islāmiyya* (Islamic religious organisation) faith of Islam based on *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* concepts, following one of the four Islamic jurists: *Ḥanafīyya*, *Mālikīyya*, *Shāfi'iyya*, and *Hanbaliyya*.<sup>123</sup>

After the organization of NU was established, the first step to do was to send a delegation to the new authority of Ḥidjāz. After the delegation of *Komite*

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<sup>122</sup> *Statuen Perkoempoelan Nahdatoel Oelama 1926: 3* (Archives of NU Gresik), on Feillard, *NU vis a vis...*, pp. 12-3.

<sup>123</sup> Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan...*, p. 69.

*Hijaz* came back on June 27, 1928 or Muharam 18, AH 1346, they were appointed to attend The World Islamic Congress, but they missed the ship to Middle East, so they could not participate in the congress. Later, that committee intended to meet King Sa'ūd to propose the demand of *ulamas* to get tolerance from the king to perform practices of religious obligations in accordance with the teachings of any of the four great Islamic jurists.

Furthermore, NU conducted its first congress in Rabi' I 14-16, AH 1346/September 21-28, 1926, at the Muslimin Hotel on Jalan Peneleh, Surabaya. That congress was attended by 93 *ulamas* from Java and Madura and also *ulama* from Palembang (South Sumatra) and 2 *ulamas* from Martapura (South Kalimantan). That congress was successful in determining 21 important points especially about the obligation to follow the *madhhab* in order to realise *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* teachings. The congress also gave report that new branches of Nahdatul Wathan were opened in some regions and that *Jam'iyah Nashihin* (preachers club) was established.<sup>124</sup>

The first seven year period from the establishment of NU (1926–1933) was a period to consolidate the organization in order to increase the number of NU branches in other places, for example: The third congress of NU in September 28-29, 1928 or Rabi' II 23-25, AH 1347, successfully formed a *Lajnah Nashihin* commission. It was a commission of propaganda consisting of 9 members including *Hadratus Syaikh* K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary. The task of this commission was to establish new branches of NU in other places inside and outside Java. The significant result of propaganda by this commission appeared in the number of delegations from regional branches, which attended congresses, which increased from one congress to another. This success in increasing the number of NU branches in some regions was analogised by Anam (1985: 81), as “the mushrooms appearing rapidly during a rainy season”.

These efforts to establish the branches were aimed to actualize the mandate of this organization, which was summarized in the six main purposes of

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<sup>124</sup> *Swara Nahdlatul Ulama* (no. 2. th 1, Shafar, 1346 H) in Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, pp. 74-5.

the NU founding. In this period, it seemed as if NU was only paying attention to the relationships among the *ulamas* by opening more branches. In fact, however, the other main purposes of this organization were still receiving attention. The problems of society, education, and the conduct of *da'wa* (religious propagation) remained the main priorities of the organization. It was reported that in the first year there was a branch named "*Madrasah Nahdhatul Wathan*".<sup>125</sup> In 1929, this Islamic school succeeded in developing its educational system by opening classes consisting of six levels in order to develop the quality of education of Islamic schools. In addition, an afternoon class for the poor and the orphan was also opened.<sup>126</sup>

In the social sector, the youth of NU also participated and contributed their ideas by establishing "*Shubbanul Wathan*" and "*Da'watus Shubban*". Previously, *Jam'iyah Nashihin* was also opened as a training centre for the youth of NU to prepare for qualified preachers. *Da'watus Shubban* was formed as a means for the youth oriented to Islamic propagation. Whereas *Shubbanul Watan* was, a mean for the youth oriented the nationalist movement.

A cooperative (*Coperasi Kaum Moeslim – CKM*), in Surabaya was then established in 1929 by K.H. Abdul Halim as the second cooperative established by the *ulamas* after *Nahdhatul Tujjar* established before the establishment of NU. This cooperative ran on a commercial basis, using a profit sharing system for its members. All efforts mentioned above in social, educational, and Islamic propagation were efforts to actualize the purposes of the NU establishment in the first period.

### **3. Maintaining Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a**

Almost all religious movements have their own concepts as guidelines in conducting their activities, so does NU as a social religious organization. *Aswaja*

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<sup>125</sup> It is noted that until 1939 the branches of *Nahdhatul Wathan* for the region of Surabaya had 18 *madrasahs* as filial of *Nahdhatul Wathan*. Almost every branch of NU established their own *madrasahs*, not only in East Java but also in West Java, Central Java, Semarang etc., *Swara Nahdlatul Ulama* (no. 7, th. 2, 1347 and no. 6, th.2, 1347 H), in Anam, *Ibid*, p. 85.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84.

(*Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a*)<sup>127</sup> is a religious concept embraced by NU which was stated for the first time by the founding father of NU, K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary, in his speech on the third congress of NU in Surabaya. According to Dhofir (1982: 148), *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* in general means the followers of prophet Muḥammad's traditions and *Idjmā'*. By declaring themselves as the followers of the prophet's traditions and *Idjmā'*, the *kiais* explicitly differentiated themselves from the modernists who only profess the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth and refuse the *Idjmā'*.

The evidence that *kiais* are the followers of *Aswaja* can be seen in the teaching of various subjects in *pesantren* and the books used in lessons. Many of them used the books of *Shāfi'iyya* teachings and his followers and the *taṣawwuf* books.

*Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* or Sunnite community is the biggest of Islamic community in the world. In general, Islamic communities in the world are classified into two the biggest communities: Sunnite and Shiite. The first, *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a*, appeared as reaction to the *Mu'tazila* concept.<sup>128</sup> The *Mu'tazila* concept, in practice, puts emphasis on the purity of ratio, suggesting freedom to think, free will, and free act, and does not profess Sunna and its traditions. It does not mean that they do not believe in Prophet Muḥammad's traditions and his disciples, but they are unsure about the originality of Ḥadīth. Therefore, they do not adhere tightly.

Meanwhile, *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* is a community who adhere tightly to the Sunna. The figure who made the *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* concept was Abu al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī born in Basra in AD 873 (AH 260) and

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<sup>127</sup> Etymologically, *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* is constructed by following words: *ahl*, means confessors or the school of law followers, if it is connected with the concept of schools of law, but if the word *ahl* is *badal al nisba* and connected to al-Sunna it means the one hold Sunnite; *al-Sunna* means *Ḥadīth*, it also means *al-ṭarīqa* (way). Therefore, the word *Ahl al-Sunna* means the way of the prophet's disciples and *tābi'in* (the successor of the companion of the prophet/ṣaḥaba). The word *al-Djamā'a* means a group of people which has a destination. See, Sudarno Shobron, *Muhammadiyah dan Nahdatul ulama dalam Pentas Politik Nasional*, (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2003), p. 52.

<sup>128</sup> In present time the *Mu'tazila* community might be not exist anymore but as the method of thinking in the Islamic community influenced the modernist- and the neo-modernist group. One

passed away in Baghdad in AD 935. He was a follower of *Mu'tazila* for about 40 years, and became a student of Al-Djubbā'ī, a prominent figure of *Mu'tazila*. Later he had doubts and unsatisfied with the teachings of *Mu'tazila*. Therefore, when *Mu'tazila* declined, he decided to establish a new theology which adhered tightly to prophet's Sunna. His concept is also well known as *Ash'ariyya*.

Another founder of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* is Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Maḥmud al-Māturīdī, who was born in Samarqand in the second middle of ninth century; he passed away in AD 944. His concept is popularly known as the *Māturīdiyya* concept. As a follower of Abū Ḥanīfa who put emphasis on using ratio in his perspective on religions and put emphasis on intelligence on his system of theology, makes his theology different from Al-*Ash'ariyya*'s concept. Both of the two concepts, however, appeared as reactions to the *Mu'tazila* thought, and the two figures adhered to any one of the four Islamic jurists.

Furthermore, *Aswaja* for the *ulamas* in Java has narrower meaning. It does not merely differ from the *Shī'a*, but also differs from the modernists. For the first time, the term of *Aswaja* in its simple meaning was formulated by K.H. Hasjim Asj'ary. The simple meaning is obeying any one of the four Islamic jurists, namely: *Ḥanaḥiyya*, *Mālikiyya*, *Shāfi'iyya*, and *Ḥanbaliyya*. According to his opinion, we should not be so obsessive regarding the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth, because it is only possible for the one who has qualification as a *Mudjtahid*<sup>129</sup> (the Islamic

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identified using this approach in Indonesia for example Prof. Dr. Harun Nasution (Professor of IAIN Jakarta) and his many graduated Scholars.

<sup>129</sup> The criteria of *Mudjtahid* as it was explained by Al-Ghāzalī: ...a *Mudjtahid* should have two criteria. *The first*, he should master *Sharī'a* resources (the books, sunna, *idjma* and *aql*), *the second*, he should be a fair person, avoid doing sinful and unfair acts. Whereas, the criteria of *ulama* are formulated as following: 1). To master Arabic and its parts, like the grammar of Arabic and the traditions and the Arabian conversation, those requirements are needed because Al-Qur'ān and Ḥadīth are spoken and written in lovely and highly attractive Arabic, 2). To understand *al-asbāb al-nuḥūl* (causing of appearance) of Al-Qur'ān verses, 3). To understand *mantiq* (logical) science needed to understand Al-Qur'ān and Sunna, 4). To understand *uṣūl fiqh* (the basic of Islamic law) which contains subject matter to be understood or to be mastered by the *mudjtahid* before taking the law from Al-Qur'ān and Sunna to decide on general matters, specific matters, *nāsikh*, *mansūkh*, *muṭlaq*; this science also contains how to understand God commands and forbiddances, such as whether the commands are obligatory or not, 5). To understand *ridjal* science, which is a science on biographies of Ḥadīth writers; the main focus of this science is to understand honesty and devotion of the Ḥadīth writers in order to determine reliability certain Ḥadīth, whether that ḥadīth is *ṣaḥih*, *ḥasan*, *ḍa'if*, et cetera, 6). To master *'Ulum al-Ḥadīth* or



law discover or one who practice *idjtihād*). To the *Aswaja* followers in general following one of the four Islamic traditional schools of law is an obligation, as K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari stated:

And it needs to know! That a *Mukallaf* (a Muslim who has grown up and a healthy mind) who is not a *mudjtahid*, absolutely has to follow one of the four Islamic jurists and may not for him to make *idjtihād* by using the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth as he likes... Well, it is forbidden to the one whose status is a *mudjtahid* to take *taqlid* in matters for which actually he is able to make *ijihad*, because his ability to make *idjtihād* would be a reference to the ones who make *taqlīd*.<sup>130</sup>

Here, it seemed that K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari defended the ways used by NU's traditional community to perform religious duties, which were not in accordance with Islamic reformers or modernists. In the preamble of statute of Nahdhatul Ulama, it is stated that:

O... the *ulamas* of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā'a*, the follower of the four schools! You know that you have taken the knowledge from the people before you and the people before you had taken it from the people before them with the continuing *sanad* (link), and you also have been carefully to see from whom you take your religions. So, you are now the storage of the knowledge and also you are the door, Those who comes into the house without passing by the door, they would be called a thief.<sup>131</sup>

The preface from K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari above was a base for the *Nahdhiyin* (NU's members) to take more steps in following the *Aswaja* conception. That preface also shows examples of how the transformation of science happened in NU. The *kiai* and teacher are illustrated as the door and the key of that door. The ones who would like to search for knowledge should pass by that door; that is *Kiai* and the teacher or the *ulama*. This view gradually created a kind of tradition in NU in the form of *ta'zīm* or respect to the teachers or *Kiais*, which was inherent with *taqlīd*<sup>132</sup> attitude in conducting religious activities.

Later, the definition of *Aswaja* became more specific in the theological definition and *taṣawwuf*. The definition was formulated by K.H. Bisyr Musthafa in his book, *Risalah Ahlusunnah Wal-Jama'ah*, Menara Kudus, 1967. *Ahl al-*

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*Mustala al-Ḥadīth*, that is The Prophet Muhammad's spokens, actions, and his approvals which have been recorded in some Ḥadīth books, 7). To master Tafsīr Al-Qur'ān (exegesis). See, Husein Al Kaff, "Ijtihad:... Antara Haram dan Wajib", in *Al Huda*, vol. I, no.2. 2000 .

<sup>130</sup> See, Shohibul Fadhillah, *Tiga Penyelamat, Qanun Asasi-Pidato-Nasehat Penting*, (Jombang: Tebu Ireng, 1984), p. 32.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22.

*Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* refers to that of Muslims who hold onto the following traditions:

1. In Islamic law, they follow one of the four Great Muslim Jurists, i.e.; *Ḥanafīyya*, *Mālikīyya*, *Shāfi'īyya*, and *Ḥanbaliyya*. In practice, most of Indonesian traditionalist Muslims follow the *Shāfi'īyya*.
2. In theology, they follow the teachings of Imam Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī.
3. In *taṣawwuf*, they follow the basic teachings of Imām al-Ghazālī and Imām Abū Qāsim al-Junayd.<sup>133</sup>

Al-Ghazālī was born in 1058 and passed away in 1111; he was also the follower of Al-Ash'arī who had great influence and importance for Islam with his *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* concept. All the movements of NU is based on interpretations of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* concept, including making policies or conducting their working programs. From this point of view, this thesis would examine how consistent NU was in responding to various policies of government in Indonesia on Islamic affairs.

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<sup>132</sup> *taqlīd* is accepting (adopting) the already established *fatwā* and practices as final and authoritatively binding.

<sup>133</sup> See, Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pemahaman Hidup Kyai*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), p. 149.

### **Chapter III**

#### **Responses of NU to the Government's Policies on Islamic Affairs Prior to the 1980s**

In this chapter, this study will focus on NU's responses towards the government's policies on Islamic affairs in Indonesia. The policies meant here are the government's policies in managing matters on Islam or subjects in connection with Islam and the Islamic community in Indonesia. Not all policies on Islam will be discussed here, but more specifically only the policies, which have significant impacts for Muslim communities so that NU considered them.

This study is also focused on the period from the beginning of the founding of NU (1926) to the year 1980s (before K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid was appointed to lead NU as a Chief of *Tanfidziyah*). Generally, there were two periods of government in Indonesia: *first*, the period of colonial government, from Dutch times when NU was established to 1942 and the time of Japanese occupation (1942-1945); *second*, the period of independence consisting of the "Old Order" government (1945-1966), and the time of "New Order" government (1966-1999).

The following chapters will discuss how NU responded to the policies dealing with Islam by proposing some questions to limit the problems, such as how was the policy formulated?, what was/were the backgrounds?, who formulated it?, and what would be its impact?, then how NU responded and how NU contributed to that government policy on Islam?. Further, it would also be examined on what basis NU responded or contributed to that policy?

#### **A. Responses of NU to the Government's Policies on Islamic Affairs during the Colonial Period (1926-1945)**

The period of the Dutch colonisation in Indonesia ended in 1942, sixteen years after the establishment of NU (1926), that period was then followed by a three-year period of Japanese colonisation (1942-1945). During these periods, as a Muslim organization NU responded to the governments' policies which

influenced Muslim community<sup>1</sup>, and the relation of NU *vis 'a vis* the colonial governments. In the first period, NU played its role in society as a social religious organization after determining its aims and goals stated in its statute.

In those periods, NU did not show open opposition against the ruling governments. This policy can be seen in its statute stating that NU was not a political organization that aimed for the independence of Indonesia,<sup>2</sup> but it did not mean that in fact NU did not do any efforts to achieve the independence of the country. Those efforts can be seen among other in the following descriptions. First, the steps taken by K.H. Wahab Hasbullah before NU was established, in his involvement in SI, *Indonesische Studieclub*, *Nahdatul Wathan*, *Tashwirul Afkar*, *Syubanul Wathan*, et cetera. His involvements were mainly aimed at building up the spirit of nationalism for Indonesians as citizens of a colonized nation. Second, one day before NU was established, Kiai Abdul Halim asked, “Did the establishment of the *Ulama* organization have something to do with demand for Indonesia’s independence?” Kiai Wahab answered:

Of course, that is the first goal, the Islamic society leads to that way, and the Islamic society will feel insecure before our country gets its freedom.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, as it has been mentioned in chapter II, the establishment of NU was influenced by efforts of the *ulamas* to free their country from the colonial government by political means (through organization) after they became aware that they have not had sufficient weapons to struggle physically, hence they were easily defeated by the Dutch. NU has also stated that the final intention was Indonesia’s freedom in a further dialogue where Kiai Abdul Halim asked:

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<sup>1</sup> Some policies of the Governments influenced Muslim community in the form of positive and negative effects so these became a consideration of the NU to respond it.

<sup>2</sup> NU’s 1926 statute paragraph 1 stated that “the aim of this organization is to hold tight to one of the four *madhhabs* (schools of law) established by al-Imām Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad bin Idrīs Al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Imām Mālik bin Anas, al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa al-Nu‘mān bin Thābit, and al-Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal respectively, and to do anything for the benefit of the Islamic religion”. Compare that with NU’s statute after it became a political party, stating in paragraph 2: “(Concerning) the base and the target, NU is based on Islam and has the following targets: a) to maintain *sharī‘a* (Islamic Law) followed one of four Schools: *Hanaḥfiyya*, *Mālikiyya*, *Shāfi‘iyya*, and *Ḥanbaliyya*, and b) to conduct the Islamic law on the society “. See, H. Aboebakar, *Sejarah Hidup K.H Wahid Hasyim dan Karangan Tersiar*, (Jakarta: Poniya Buku Peringatan Alm K.H. A. Wahid Hasyim, 1957), pp. 503-10.

<sup>3</sup> Chairul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdathul Ulama*, (Sala: Jatayu, 1985), p. 32.

Could we demand freedom by this effort? After hearing that question, Kiai Wahab directly took a piece of match and lighted it, and then he said: This could destroy the war building; we may not be hopeless, we must be sure to reach the freedom of the country.<sup>4</sup>

The further development showed us that as a big organization ready to face a dynamic era, NU's struggling movements began to change its form. During the 10 years since it was established in 1926, NU focused on social and religious affairs. However, in the end of the 1930s, or the beginning period of the second ten years, NU started to build up awareness of Indonesian Muslim society regarding how important the togetherness and nationalism among the Muslims was. In the opening of an NU congress held in Banjarmasin in 1936, *Hadhratus Syeikh* Hasjim Asj'ari,<sup>5</sup> encouraged all Indonesian Muslim communities to make a solid unity and to stop disputes on uncertain matters (*khilāfiyya*) to arrive at the same vision in facing the same enemy. Such a unity was formed in the forum MIAI (*Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia*, Supreme Council of Indonesian Muslims) in 1937, at K.H. Wahab Hasbullah's house. Those descriptions above show that NU changed its struggling method into focusing on political affairs and its demand on Indonesia's independence.

Concerning the subject matter we are discussing, it is interesting to examine responses and tolerances given by NU toward colonial government's policies on Islamic affairs, which were regarded as having negative impacts on Indonesian Muslim society.

### **1. Dutch Colonial Period (1926-1942)**

The Dutch East Indies policy in managing Islamic affairs in Indonesia was begun with the first instruction of the Dutch Government to establish an advisory of policy in 1899, although the office for the Islamic advisory was not established until 1918 and named *Het Kantoor Voor Inlandsche Zaken* or Office of Religious Affairs.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 94-7.

<sup>6</sup> See, Aqib Suminto, *Islam di Indonesia: Politik Hindia Belanda*, (Singapura: Pustaka Nasional, 1985), p. 6.

That instruction referred to an 1855 Holland regulation stating that the Dutch government would be neutral concerning religions.<sup>7</sup> From this point of view, it is interesting to evaluate whether the Dutch was actually implementing the law, which was neutral to religions, or there was some reason that created deviations in implementing that rule.

#### **a. Formulation of the Dutch Government's Policy on Islamic Affairs**

The Dutch Government worried that Islamic reform in the Middle East would influence Islamic society in Indonesia, therefore looked for ways to handle that problem. One of those ways was by attempting to limit the influence on Islamic communities of direct contacts with the Middle East. Limitations on the amount of pilgrims who were given permission to go to Mecca were regarded as the best solution for the government. Therefore, *Hadjdj ordonantie* (*Hadjdj* ordinance) was enacted. This ordinance was supposed by the Muslims as to make it difficult to perform *Hadjdj* (Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca as a religious duty) and to decrease amount of people who are able to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca.

The *Hadjdj* ordinance was released by the government on July 6, 1859 in order to manage matters concerning *Hadjdj* more tightly than before. The major reason for this *Hadjdj* ordinance were concerns on the part of the government that Islamic society in Indonesia would rebel, as it had happened in India against the England government in 1857.<sup>8</sup>

That *Hadjdj Ordonantie* consisted of rules to make it difficult for Muslim who wanted to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. The rules were as follow:

1. Examinations performed by the Dutch government on the ones who want to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca on the knowledge of requirements to perform the *Hadjdj* religious duty; these requirements were meant to decrease amount of the people who wanted to be pilgrims to Mecca.

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<sup>7</sup> *Reglement op het des regeering un Ned.* 1854, p. 28, verse 119 RR: "each citizen is free to confess their religions, not to lose their protection of society and their members or to violate general rules of religion law". See, Suminto, *Ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Suminto, *Op.Cit.*, p. 28.

2. Rule of *Hadjdj penningen* or *Hadjdj* money, which was a requirement that the would-be pilgrims should have a minimum amount of money in order that they would lack money while in Mecca. This regulation was applied at the harbour before the passengers leave.
3. Obligation for the would-be pilgrims to have roundtrip (return) tickets.
4. Obligation for the pilgrims to have *Hadjdj* certificate after coming from Mecca to prevent false *Haji* (the title used by someone after coming back from *Hadjdj*).<sup>9</sup>

To handle this potential rebellion problem, the Dutch government also appointed Snouck Hurgronje to go to Middle East disguised as a Muslim to observe Islamic developments there and their influence on Indonesian Muslims who performed *Hadjdj* and who were regarded as able to threaten the continuity of colonization. Later, Snouck Hurgronje was also involved as an advisor of the government on policies on Islam and Muslims in Indonesia.

Then in 1889, Snouck Hurgronje was appointed by the Dutch East Indies government as an advisor on Arabic and Indigenous matters.<sup>10</sup> In 1890, Snouck Hurgronje returned from the Middle East and upon his advice to the Dutch government, he categorized Islamic matters into three sectors: 1) the pure religion or religious service sector, 2) social service sector, and 3) political sector. Each sector has different way of solving its own problem. Based on this categorization, the Dutch government began to formulate a policy on Islam and Muslims. This policy was later known as Dutch East Indies policy on Islam and consisted of the following:

On pure religious or religious service sector, the colonial government gave the freedom to the Islamic community to perform the teaching of their religion, as long as it did not disturb the authority of the Dutch government, by utilizing existing customs and traditions. They are encouraged to approach the Dutch government; or even the government itself helped the society who wanted to do their activities. In the civic sector, however, the government had to prevent any kind of efforts that could bring the society into fanaticism and Pan-Islamism.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> See, Mr. Hamid Algadri, *C Snouck Hurgronje, Politik Belanda terhadap Islam dan Keturunan Arab*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984), pp. 126-27.

<sup>10</sup> Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and The Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, (The Hague Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1958), p. 20.

<sup>11</sup> Suminto, *Islam di Indonesia: ...*, p. 12.

Then the other targets successfully formulated by Hurgronje regarding Islam in Indonesia (Netherlands East Indies) were: 1) concerning the dogma and the pure law order of the religion, the government should be neutral, 2) matters regarding marriage and inheritance in Islam should be honoured, 3) there is no form of Pan-Islamism, which may be accepted by European authority).<sup>12</sup>

Whereas, Shihab (1998: 85-86), stated that generally the Islamic policy advised by Snouck Hurgronje was based on three main principles:

1. Concerning all religious worships and duties, Indonesian people are free to implement them.
2. Concerning social aspects based on Islam such as economy, inheritance, donation, or other social relationships, the government should allow their existence and respect them.
3. Concerning political affairs, as a very important aspect, it was suggested to the government to tolerate any kind of activity conducted by the Islamic society, which did not cause them to proclaim Pan-Islamism or to make political or armed resistance against the Dutch government.

To implement these three programs, Snouck Hurgronje advised that Indonesians should assimilate western culture and there should be an acceptable mode of western education in Indonesia to help the Dutch government in restraining the Islamic influence in Indonesia. The policy suggested resulted in Ethical Policy in 1901, which referred to the Dutch Queen's message to the parliament that "as a Christian power the Netherlands is obligated in the East Indies Archipelago, to better regulate the legal position of native Christians, to lend support on a firm basis to Christian mission and to imbue the whole conduct of the government with the consciousness that the Netherlands has moral duty to fulfil with respect to the people of those regions".<sup>13</sup> The two basic principles of Ethical Policy are education and emancipation for Indonesian people. In other words, Ethical Policy gave the opportunity to indigenous children to have western education.

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.



Assimilation between Islamic cultures in Indonesia and western culture was prepared by the Dutch as a process in a transition era toward modern Indonesia. The term of modern Indonesia was defined by Snouck Hurgronje as follows, “Since a modern Indonesia by definition, could not be an Islamic Indonesia nor an Indonesia ruled by *Adat*, it would have to be a Westernized Indonesia.”<sup>14</sup>

Later, the coming of Snouck Hurgronje to Indonesia (East Indies) changed the common opinion of the government, which was afraid that the pilgrims to Mecca would be influenced by the Pan-Islamic ideas being spread in the Middle East. According to Snouck Hurgronje, they should not be afraid of Muslims in Indonesia who go pilgrimage to Mecca, because after they return to Indonesia from Mecca, they would as stupid as before.<sup>15</sup>

However, before Snouck Hurgronje became an advisor for Indigenous affairs, the Netherlands East Indies government had implemented some ordinances as parts of their policies on Islamic affairs. This will be described in the next discussion.

#### **i. Teacher and Wild School Ordonantie**

Although *Hadjdj Ordonantie* had been implemented, it did not mean that the Dutch government felt safe. Suspicion regarding the activities of the religious teachers who contributed to the spread of the Pan-Islamic idea could not be hidden anymore. To handle this problem, in 1905, it implemented the *Guru Ordonantie* (teacher ordinance), a rule that obliged the Islamic religion teachers to have permission before teaching religion of order that the government can

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<sup>13</sup> Edward J.M Schutzer, *Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in Indonesia 1927-1931*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), pp. 14-18.

<sup>14</sup> See, Benda, *The Crescent and...*, p. 26.

<sup>15</sup> See, Alwi Shihab, *Membendung Arus: Respon Muhammdiyah terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia*, (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), p. 83; See also, Rohani Abdul Rahim, *Muslim in Indonesia and the Notion of an Islamic State*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991), pp. 3-6.

control them. This regulation was applied in all areas of Indonesia.<sup>16</sup> The teachers were also obliged to report data on students who joined the lessons periodically.<sup>17</sup>

This teacher ordinance disappointed the *kiais* since this regulation-tightened administration in various schools, including *pesantren* (traditional Islamic School) which they thought should be supported and should not be restricted. That ordinance threatened schools which were irregularly managed especially *pesantren*, which were traditionally managed.<sup>18</sup> This policy made it difficult for the religion teachers who did not understand administration and many of them could not even read and write.<sup>19</sup>

Reaction against the 1905 *Ordonnantie* came from SI, although it was not directly stated on Al-Islam Congress until 1922. In 1917, however, the discussion on the matter had been started on an internal organizational level; SI stated that the government should abolish that rule because it complicated Islam's development in society.<sup>20</sup> In addition, the *Ulamas* from Minangkabau and the *Ulamas* from Java who were not organized in NU yet also opposed that rule. Later, the anti government sentiment was getting stronger in the Muslim community.<sup>21</sup>

In 1923, the stipulation regarding the ordinance was issued by the Dutch government, not targeted at the teachers but at the administrators of education. According to Aqib Suminto, the ordinance is *Ordinantie Sekolah Liar* (ordinance for irregular schools). The fact that many educational institutions managed by Islamic or national organizations like Boedi Oetomo grew rapidly made the Dutch government worried and they thought that the institutions should be in tighter control. In their opinion, these educational institutions were illegal. In September

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<sup>16</sup> See, Mc Riehlefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 169; Suminto, *Islam di Indonesia: ...*, p. 20.

<sup>17</sup> See, Deliar Noor, *The Modernist Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 175.

<sup>18</sup> In the meaning, that *pesantren* was not managed modernly such as there are accounting and job descriptions of officials stating in the Statute. Etymologically *pesantren* means "the place for *santri*" where the "*santris*" (students) from different ages live and to get the Islamic sciences from *kiais* and *ulamas*. See, Manfred Ziemek, *Pesantren, Traditionelle islamische Bildung und sozialer Wandel in Indonesien*, (Frankfurt: Verlag interkulturelle Kommunikation, 1986), p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> Noor, *The Modernist...*, p. 175

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, p. 176.

17, 1932, the government issued *Toezicht Ordonnantie Particulier Onderwijs or Wilden Scholen Ordonnantie* (Wild Schools Ordinance). This rule became effective on October 1, 1932 and this ordinance was not valid for religious educations.<sup>22</sup>

That ordinance brought about strong opposing reactions, such as on the part of education board of *Permi* (*Persatuan Muslim Indonesia*, Association of Indonesian Muslim) in West Sumatra December 26-27, 1932 which stated that the *Ordonnantie* was in contradiction with Islamic and general principles and limited freedom for Indonesians to manage and develop education.<sup>23</sup>

The leading *ulamas* of Minangkabau expressed their anger and rejected this ordinance by forming an action committee (*Comite perlucutan Guru Ordonantie dan ordonantie toezicht Particulier Onderwijs*, or Committee for freedom of *Guru Ordonantie*) led by H. Rasul. Boedi Oetomo also rejected this ordinance and intended to withdraw their members from various educational institutions, if the ordinance for irregular school was not withdrawn in March 31, 1932 at the latest and they even intended to close their schools and to give financial help to the victims of this passive resistance. In an emergency conference carried out in Yogyakarta, November 18-19, 1932, Muhammadiyah finally refused this irregular school *Ordonnantie*.<sup>24</sup>

The new regulation was indeed regarded as affecting most of the organizations having educational institutions. Therefore, opposing reactions came from organizations such as PSII, Permi, Muhammadiyah, Taman Siswa, Boedi Oetomo, PNI, PARTINDO and Istri Sedar. They demanded that the government review its policy. Finally, their struggles resulted in a positive response from the government, which later withdrew that ordinance in 1933.<sup>25</sup>

That the reactions of the Islamic society of Indonesia in opposing that policy of the Dutch government on education affairs were so tough could be seen in the 1930s. For example, although NU was not as prominent as certain Islamic

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<sup>21</sup> Ricleleft, *A Historyo of ...*, p. 169.

<sup>22</sup> Suminto, *Islam di...*, p. 6; Benda, *the Crescent...*, p. 74.

<sup>23</sup> *Suara Umum*, 27 Januari 1933; IPO 1933, p. 79 in Suminto, *Ibid*, p. 62.

<sup>24</sup> Suminto, *Ibid*, p. 63.

or national organizations, it did not mean that NU as an organization did not respond to this matter. NU began to respond to this matter (*Guru Ordonantie 1905 and Ordinantie Sekolah Liar 1923*) in its second congress 14-16 Rabī‘ II, 1346 AH/October 9-11, 1927 AD in Surabaya, one year after it was established. NU proposed to the Dutch government that the education of Islamic religion be included into general schools in all areas of Java and Madura since most of the inhabitants were Muslims. According to NU, if the state mostly consisting of Muslims does not teach Islamic sciences, it is the same as encouraging superstition and leaving Islam.<sup>26</sup> This response was intended as a suggestion to the government and not as a protest or resistance.

## **ii. Religious Subsidy and Inheritance**

The involvement of the government in managing society had gone too far, and the government's intervention in any religious aspect could no longer be avoided. The disproportionate amount of subsidy given to the Islamic community was regarded as discriminative, because Islam is the biggest religion adhered to by most of the people. The schools established by the churches were increased by up to 40% in 1909-1912, and they were given bigger subsidies from the government; teachers in schools established by the church were also given subsidies, which increased until 300%.<sup>27</sup> These subsidies were much bigger than subsidies given to Islamic schools and their teachers. This policy was regarded as a part of the Christianization mission or "*Kristening Politik*", the government's policy to Christianize Indonesia at the beginning of XX century. This idea appeared when the governor general of Dutch on duty was by A.W.F Indenburg (1909-1916 M).<sup>28</sup> Later, this situation brought opposing reactions from the Islamic society in Indonesia, for example in 1937 NU and Muhammadiyah demanded the government to crease the subsidy for the Muslim community, because subsidies given to Muslim community were disproportionately small compared to the

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>26</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, pp. 75-6.

<sup>27</sup> Algadri, *C Snouck Hurgronje...*, p. 44; Suminto, *Islam di...*, pp. 33-6.

<sup>28</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 21.

subsidies given to the Christian community.<sup>29</sup> The demands of NU and Muhammadiyah, however, did not result in any positive response from the government. The imbalances are showed in the table below:

<i>Staatblad Van Nederlandsch Indie</i>	Protestant	Catholic	Islam
1936. No. 355 (p.25-26)	f.686.100	f.268.500	f.7.500
1937. No. 410 (p.25-26)	f.683.200	f.290.700	f.7.500
1938. No. 511 (p.27-28)	f.696.100	f.296.400	f.7.500
1939. No. 593 (p.23)	f.844.000	f.335.700	f.7.500

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The government also intervened in matters on inheritance and attempted to withdraw these subjects from the authority of the religious courts and to re-implement customary laws in Java, Madura and South Kalimantan.<sup>31</sup> This policy invoked anger and dissatisfaction on the part of *ulama* community. In 1931, the NU expressed its objection that inheritance law regulating distribution of inheritances be based on *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) would be replaced with customary law.

The government's intervention on inheritance law resulted in great concern from the *ulamas*. In the 12<sup>th</sup> congress in June 20-24, 1937 in Malang, this intervention was one of the main subject matters for discussion. The objection of the *ulama* on the transferring of authority on inheritance matters from Raad Agama (religious court) into *Pengadilan Negeri* (state court) was based on the argumentation that the transfer means that inheritance matters was not be settled based on Islamic law but based on customary law, meanwhile it is clear in Islam that inheritance matters must be regulated by Islamic law. In addition, NU

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p. 23.

<sup>30</sup> Harry J Benda, *Continuity and Change in South East Asia*, (New Heaven, 1972), p. 263.

<sup>31</sup> See, Andree Feillard, *NU vis-a-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi Bentuk dan Makna*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), p. 16.

expressed its objection to the Bill of Marriage. These two policies were strongly rejected by NU and that rejection was stated in the congress.<sup>32</sup>

### iii. Marriage Affairs

The government also intervened in marriage affairs and gave its legalisation to underage marriages as was stated in Bill of Marriage. *Ulamas* of NU were angry about this intervention and declared that the legalisation was against Islamic law.

As a response to the intervention, NU rejected the Bill of Marriage and demanded that the officials in charge of Islamic community affairs should be controlled.<sup>33</sup> In addition, NU gave criticisms and suggestions to the government regarding their dissatisfaction with the government's policy.

NU's resistance against the Bill of Marriage may be found by reviewing the history of NU. In the NU's second congress it was stated that matters regarding *madhhab* (school of law) should not be debated about; instead, the congress should discuss social matters. The congress made important decisions concerning among others the underage marriage legitimized by the Netherlands East Indies government but regarded by the congress as a deviance from *fiqh*. Therefore, NU demanded the government to take tight control of this matter especially regarding *wali* (male relative legally responsible for a bride) and *penghulu* or *naib* (deputy registrar of marriage). NU demanded that the one appointed a *penghulu* or a *naib* should have the approval of the local *Ulama*, on condition that the *penghulu* should be an adherent of one of the four schools.<sup>34</sup> The NU's policy made by the second congress showed that NU explicitly did not tolerate a *penghulu* not embracing one of the four schools. There was also a strong group fanaticism that someone who was in higher position but not a member of their group would be regarded as a threat for their interests.

In the congress, NU also proposed flexible argumentation in responding to a question of regarding the law of dressing like the Dutch, such as wearing a hat,

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<sup>32</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 94.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 74-79.

tie, trousers and shoes. The congress also successfully formulated how the *ulamas* of NU tolerate wearing shirts based on perspective of Islamic law as follows:

If one wears the cloth to copy the unbelievers and to make happy their unbeliever fellows, of course then one would be unbeliever too. If one celebrates feast day without remembering his/her unbeliever fellows, he would not be an unbeliever but it is sinful, but if one has not any tendency to copy them at all, then he/she is allowed to wear that cloth.<sup>35</sup>

The congress stated that it is sinful if the dressing is meant to boast or to copy the unbelievers but if one dresses only for fashion then he/she is allowed to do that as long as he/she doesn't break the limitations of 'awra determined by Islam.<sup>36</sup>

Also concerning Marriage Act, 10 years after the first NU's response in the second congress, in a congress held in Banjarmasin in 1936, NU proposed a motion to the government to disallow the registration of marriage between ones without marriage rights determined by Islamic law because that registration would be against Islamic law.

Since the Dutch government intervened too far in many Islamic affairs, the Muslim society becoming member of PSII (*Partei Sjarekat Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Union Party) in its decision made by a congress held in Bandung in July 1937 stated and claimed that all matters pertaining to Islam should be decided and implemented by the Muslim society themselves.<sup>37</sup>

## **b. Nationalism and Integrity**

One of the important policies made by NU which influenced Islamic society especially the traditionalists was applying Sunnite traditions for the first time to respond and to legitimate the existing government by giving tolerance for the colonial government by naming its territory as *Dār al-Islām* (in the context that the Islamic community was able to conduct its religious practices under the government). This policy showed that NU might also be moderate and tolerant; on the other hand, it also had a positive effect for the Dutch government because the

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>35</sup> See, K.H. Abdul Azis Masyhuri, *Masalah Keagamaan: Hasil Mukhtamar dan Munas Ulama Nahdhatul Ulama*, (Surabaya: Dinamika Press, 1977), p. 24.

<sup>36</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 76.

government's attitude toward the traditionalists was more tolerant. According to Deliar Noor, the attitude of the Dutch Netherlands government was as follows:

The Dutch attitude toward the traditionalists, as compared with their attitude towards the modernists, was more tolerant, since they concerned themselves mainly with purely religious questions. Those having little or no political overtones, their *divide et impera* policy demanded that certain groups should be more favoured, moreover traditionalist leadership in religion was preferred by the Dutch who recognized that the traditionalists group did not mind maintaining the political status quo.<sup>38</sup>

From the political perspective, the Dutch government's tolerance was part of the government's tactic to make the relationship between the traditionalists and the modernists not harmonic, which would benefit the government. But in fact, NU's 11<sup>th</sup> congress in Banjarmasin, Rabi' I 11, AH 1355 or June 9, AD 1936, stated that the Javanese region (*Ardu Jawa*, in the context of the whole Archipelago/Indonesia) has been a "*dār al-Islām*" with an argumentation that Indonesia had ever been occupied by Islam even later it was occupied by the unbelievers.<sup>39</sup> According to Watt, however, *dār al-Islām* is "A territory where the ruler is a Muslim and the life of the people is based on *Sharī'a* constitution, the 'Sphere of War' or *dār al ḥarb*, these concepts are closely associated with that of *djihād* or holy war".<sup>40</sup> The policy probably was NU's admittance toward Java or Archipelago based on the "*dār al-Ṣulḥ*"<sup>41</sup> perspective, but more important was that the policy applied Sunnite traditions to legitimate the government.<sup>42</sup> The concept was based on *uṣūl fiqh: dar' al-mafāsīd muqaddam 'alā djalb al-maṣālih*, to prevent danger is more important than to do a good action.<sup>43</sup>

According to references of Shāfi'ī's books, NU differentiates the forms of the nations into three forms, namely: *dār al-Islām* (Islamic country), *dār al-Ṣulḥ*

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<sup>37</sup> Noer, *The Modernist Movement...*, p. 152; Suminto, *Islam di:...*, pp. 27-37.

<sup>38</sup> Noer, *Ibid*, p.134.

<sup>39</sup> Masyhuri, *Masalah Keagamaan:...*, p. 139.

<sup>40</sup> See, W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought: The Basic Concept*, (Eidenburgh: Eidenburgh University Press, 1968), p. 91.

<sup>41</sup> See, Einar Martahan Sitompul M.th., *NU dan Pancasila*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989), p. 9.

<sup>42</sup> Some Sunnite thinkers in the middle age tried to harmonize the political theory with reality of that era to protect Islam's political rights. Their argumentation was "riot was more dangerous than unfairness", see, Feillard, *NU vis-à-vis...*, p. 18.

<sup>43</sup> Kyai Chobir analogized that after the fall of Saddam Husein government by the United States of America, instabilities and riots happened in all of Iraq's regions, this is a realistic example which



(peace country) and *dār al-Ḥarb* (war country). On this opinion, *dār al-Islām* must be defended from foreign aggressions and the main characteristic of this country is that the life of people is based on the *Sharī‘a* constitution. Concerning *dār al- Ḥarb*, it must be fought for because the continuity of *Sharī‘a* is endangered meanwhile *dār al-Ṣulḥ* must be defended because the *Sharī‘a* can be realized although without the legal constitution of the state.<sup>44</sup>

As has been mentioned before, tensions happened in the 1920s among the Muslim community themselves which were caused by *khilāfiyya* (differences), which resulted in a dichotomy in the form of two groups of Muslims opposing each other, traditionalists on the one hand and modernists on the other. Actually, the two groups attempted to negotiate in order to bring about reconciliation but they never succeeded. On the contrary, the conflict later worsened since each of the two groups thought they themselves were the most correct one on this matter of *khilāfiyya*.

Later, in the 1930s leaders of the two groups thought it clearer and more rational not to put too much emphasis on different opinions pertaining religious matters regarded as *khilāfiyya*. This effort of reconciliation was pioneered by K.H. Hasjim Asj’ary who requested all Muslim communities to unite by eliminating the differences in order to think about the greater importance, which was the independence of Indonesia. K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari on his speech in front of the congress held in Banjarmasin demanded that they had to unite and to discard the disagreements on *khilāfiyya* in order to face anyone opposing Islam:

It has been coming to me the news that all of you are still showing hostility to, slandering, and clashing with each other.

O... all of you *ulama* who confessed to any schools or *qawl ulama*! (Recommendation of the *ulama*), leave your dogmas on matters pertaining *furū‘* (branches). About them, there are two opinions: first, every *mudjtahid* is right, second, the right one is only one, but the wrong one still gets reward.

Therefore, leave your dogmas, leave your bad desires, hold tight your religion, and struggle against anyone who intends to disparage Al-Qur’ān and Allāh, and to the ones who distributed the false knowledge and the false belief.

And your dogmas regarding *furū‘* of religion and your activities in confessing to the people for only one *madhhab* and *qawl ulama*, Allāh would not accept them, and the

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relevant to the concept of *dar’ al-mafāsīd muqaddam ‘alā djalb al-maṣālih*, (Interview with Drs. K. H. Abdul Chobir MT. in December 14, 2003).

<sup>44</sup> Ridwan M.Ag., *Paradigma Politik NU: Relasi Sunni-NU dalam Pemikiran Politik*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), p. 209.

prophet would not give his bestow .... If any of you see persons conducted a good deed based on somebody' *fatwā* that it is allowed to conduct according to any of the great leaders of schools ... if you do not agree, you may not take serious action to them. Give your moderate advice! And if they don't want to follow your advice you may not make enemy of them because that action is similar like to building a city but ruining its castle ...Hasjim Asj'ary, *al-Mawaidh*.<sup>45</sup>

In 1936, the *ulamas* of NU tolerated their differences with Muhammadiyah and a year later, they invited Muhammadiyah and SI to establish MIAI (*Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia*, or supreme council of Indonesia Muslims). In 1937, they changed their strategy by focusing more on struggling in a larger scope. NU based this change on an argumentation that all Islamic groups in the archipelago should be united in the organization for national interest. Focusing on this bigger target, the leading figures of NU urged all of the Islamic communities to unite and to leave internal clashes among Islamic communities pertaining to *furū'iyya* (branches) matters. Based on the idea of K.H. Wahab Hasbullah in Radjab 12-15, AH 1356/September 18-21, AD 1937 four figures namely K.H. Wahab Hasbullah, K.H. Akhmad Dahlan, K.H. Mas Mansyur (Muhammadiyah) and W. Wondo Amiseno (SI) held a meeting resulting in an agreement to establish a federation of Islamic councils named MIAI.<sup>46</sup>

MIAI was established based on an idea of Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and its chairperson was Wahid Hasjim. This organization had targets as follows: 1) to unite all Islamic community groups to cooperate, 2) to try to settle any conflict among Islamic communities, 3) to strengthen the relationship with overseas Islamic communities, 4) to try to develop Islam, 5) to hold an Indonesian Muslim's congress.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, MIAI was established as an Islamic community organization and as a political organization for the Muslim community. Although NU gave tolerance to other Islamic groups in Indonesia, this organization refused the "Lahore Ahmadiyya" to join them. The leading Islamic scholars refused the Lahore Ahmadiyya and were supported by groups of SI. Later, NU also proposed to change the name of Al Islam Congress into

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<sup>45</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, pp. 94-5.

<sup>46</sup> See, Sudarno Shobron, *Muhammadiyah dan Nahdhatul Ulama, dalam Pentas Politik Nasional*, (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2003), p. 83.

<sup>47</sup> See, Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, pp. 97-101.

Indonesia's Muslim Congress but the *Ulamas* as an organization did not join it until 1939.<sup>48</sup>

When the Second World War broke out,<sup>49</sup> in order to keep on occupying Indonesia, the Dutch government requested assistances from Indonesians. In responding the request, NU had opinion that as long as Indonesia —mostly consisted of Muslims— was still under the Dutch colonization, it did not have any obligation to support the Dutch in the war. For NU, dead is a serious thing but dead for the colonialists is useless.<sup>50</sup> Dutch also asked for the help for Indonesian people to donate their blood voluntarily (blood transfusion) but this request was refused by NU, which also released a *fatwā* that helping the Dutch against the Japanese was *haram* (sinful). This legal *fatwā* was released by a leading figure of NU, K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari.<sup>51</sup>

It is clear that in some cases previously mentioned the Dutch applied double standard (dualism). On one side, the government was neutral on religion affairs, but on the other side, the Dutch government applied tight administration for the safety and the continuity of the government itself. Furthermore, *Zending Mission* demanded that the government should be no longer neutral. Through the establishment of the Institution of religion, 1882, was the end of the government's policy of neutral on religion affairs. The government's intervention towards Islamic matters was clear especially in education affairs. Indeed, the neutral policy had been left behind when the *Hadjdj* ordinance was released in 1859, two years after the government declared its attitude regarding Islamic affairs. Furthermore, it

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<sup>48</sup> Noer, *The modernist...*, p. 262.

<sup>49</sup> The Second World War broke out in the beginning of the year 1940's, at that time the domination of Japanese military successfully defeated western colonialists. The Second World War was the beginning of the decolonization in the Asia's countries especially in South East Asia. Because of struggles of many countries in Asia including the rebellion of the Indonesia society in defending independence, the period was called the revolution era. In 1945 France also retreated from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In July 4, 1946 the Philippines proclaimed its independence from the United States of America. In 1947, not long after England released India and Pakistan it also released Burma and Ceylon, meanwhile Malaysia got its independence from England in 1957. See, John Bastian and Harry J. Benda: *A History of Modern South East Asia*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall-Inc., 1968), pp. 153-59.

<sup>50</sup> Sitompul, *NU dan...*, p. 87.

<sup>51</sup> See, Solichin Salam, *K.H. Hasyim Asy' ary Ulama Besar Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Djaya Moerni, 1963), p. 47.

was more obvious in 1882 that the Dutch government had really ended its neutral policy.

The ambivalence of the Dutch government in implementing its policy regarding Islamic matters in Indonesia was stated by Deliar Noer as follows:

On the other hand, they viewed it as religion toward which they claimed to be neutral on the other hand they discriminated against it and favoured Christian missions by giving them financial aid. They prohibited the entry of Muslim missionaries in any mystic areas, while opening them to Christian missionaries.<sup>52</sup>

The Dutch policy in Indonesia was supposed to be aimed at weakening Islam in that country.

Considering some ordinances served to manage the Islamic affairs in era of the Dutch colonial government, it can be concluded that there were some government interventions in such forms as follows:

1. Regulation regarding religious court since 1882.
2. Appointment of *Penghulu* as the advisor of the general court.
3. Supervision toward marriage and divorce for Muslim people since 1905.
4. Marriage ordinance in Java and Madura effective since 1929 later was changed in 1931.
5. Ordinance for areas outside of Java in 1932.
6. Control over Islamic education
7. Control over mosques finance, since 1893.
8. Control over conduct of *Hadjdj*.<sup>53</sup>

All the government's interventions caused strong opposing reactions from the Islamic society from all groups and organization including NU. As an organization of Islamic scholars, NU's roles in responding to policies of the government on Islamic affairs drew the serious attention of researchers and analysts of Islam in Indonesia. In the following discussion, NU's reactions and responses to the Japanese government's policy on Islamic affairs will be described.

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<sup>52</sup> Noer, *The Modernist...*, p. 313.

<sup>53</sup> See, Suminto, *Islam di...*, p. 30.

## 2. Japanese Colonial Period (1942-1945)

The occupation of Indonesia by Japan had begun since the landing of an airplane with General Imamura as one of its passengers at night on February 28, 1942. One week after the landing, March 8, 1942, KNIL handed over its authority to Japan.<sup>54</sup> KNIL commander, General Ter Poorten, eventually announced unconditional surrender after being forced and threatened that Japan would bombard Bandung if the Dutch government would not surrender. The surrender of the Dutch government to Japan was announced by NIROM, the Dutch government's radio located in Bandung at Monday, 07:45 a.m., March 8, 1942. The event ending the Dutch period happened in Kalijati-Subang, a small town located north of Bandung.<sup>55</sup> Japan brought with it propaganda and hopes of independence for the nations it occupied. With the slogan "Liberating Asia's People",<sup>56</sup> also known as "three As" (Japan is Asia's light, Japan is Asia's leader, Japan is Asia's defender), this country succeeded in making Asian countries colonized by Europeans sympathize with it. Due to hopes of independence given by Japan, the colonized countries, especially Indonesia, trusted it, so that they were willing to cooperate with Japan, which had just come and had succeeded in forcing the previous governments, out of their countries.

Later, the despotism of the Japanese government resulted in antipathy on the part of Indonesian people. Demands to give salutation to the Japanese Emperor by bowing in his direction at certain times began to result in rejections especially of *kyais* and *ulamas*. Due to this resistance, K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari was imprisoned for about four months by the Japanese government.<sup>57</sup> The exact date of when this imprisonment started was unknown, but suddenly on August 18, 1942, he was released from jail.<sup>58</sup> This imprisonment resulted in great anger on

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<sup>54</sup> See L. De Jong, *Pendudukan Jepang di Indonesia: Suatu Ungkapan Berdasarkan Dokumentasi Pemerintah Belanda*, (Jakarta: Kesaint Blanc, 1991), p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> See, Onghokhan, *Runtuhnya Hindia Belanda*, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1989), p. 263.

<sup>56</sup> See, Mitsuo Nakamura, *Jenderal Imamura dan Periode Awal Pendudukan Jepang*, dalam Akira Nagazumi (ed), *Pemberontakan Indonesia Pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1988), p. 3.

<sup>57</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 114.

<sup>58</sup> See, Salam, *K.H. Hasyim Asy' ary...*, p. 49.

the part of Islamic communities, especially in the NU community, which felt that their dignity was treated arbitrarily by the Japanese government by that action.

Realizing that this action endangered the stability of the Japanese government, it later apologized to the Muslim society. Later, due to honourable status given to the *ulamas*, NU became willing to cooperate with the government.

In handling social and state affairs the Japanese government referred to general guide on governance in occupied territories, which was made by the highest government executing body in Tokyo, the Consultative Council (*Contractraad*), in Liaison Conference on November 20, 1941 before Japan invaded the countries.<sup>59</sup> One of the general guide's items mentioned "Natives will have to reconcile themselves to such pressure as is unavoidably involved in our acquisition of resources. One significant note of caution was struck: we must avoid giving rise to any premature independence movement".<sup>60</sup> In order to raise this trust of the natives, the main slogan "Liberating Asia Peoples" was applied and policies concerning native's affairs were formulated by still referring to the spirit of building trust in cooperating with the government.

#### **a. Educational Policy**

Some policies applied to Indonesia concerning Muslim affairs by the Japanese government referred to the assumption that injecting Nippon's cultural influence should be done by means of short but effective educational programs for the *ulamas* and *kiais*. Through them, the cultural influences were hoped to reach the society quickly and resulted in the achievement of cooperation between the Japanese government and the indigenous communities.<sup>61</sup> Hence, this policy was politicization of *ulamas* and *kiais* meaning that they were used as instruments for the Japanese government's interest.

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<sup>59</sup> Willard H. Elsbree, *Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements 1940 to 1945*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 18.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, p.19.

<sup>61</sup> See, Benda, *The Crescent...*, p. 133.

“Training for *Kiais*” held in July 1943 in Jakarta as a realization of this policy<sup>62</sup> was attended by 60 leading *kiais* and *ulamas* almost from nationwide. Similar programs were held again in August and November in the same year with important subjects such as Japan’s history and language. The first training on July 1 was opened by Col. Kawasaki, a representative of *Gunseikan*.<sup>63</sup> On the occasion, Col. Horie, the head of *Shumubu* and head of the training, explained that the training was meant to sharpen and increase the *ulamas* and *kiais*’ understanding on the world’s situation and to rise up spirit of cooperating with the Japanese government in facing the common enemy, west colonial countries.<sup>64</sup>

This short education program was not only given to *kiais* and *ulamas* but also to common people especially the youth. This was done by the Japanese government by opening a special school located at a building, ex Hotel Schomper in the Dutch period, in Menteng Raya number 13. This school was named “*Ashrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia*” (Indonesian Young Generation’s Boarding School),<sup>65</sup> *Ashrama* or Boarding School here means “political education centre.” Only young persons with a minimal education of Senior High School or similar were to be accepted in this school. The teaching staffs were prominent figures in Indonesia that time such as Soekarno, Bung Hatta, Mr. Ahmad Subardjo, and Mr. Amir Syarifuddin together with some professors from Japan. Subjects taught were Political Science, International Law Science, State Science, Sociology, Psychology and Eastern Philosophy, Islamic Religion, History, Indonesian Language and Literature, Geopolitical Science, Japanese Language, and General Knowledge.<sup>66</sup>

This educational program for the youth was mainly for the Japanese government’s interest itself as was a similar program for those *kiais* and *ulamas*

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<sup>62</sup> The using of Indonesian language in Pesantren Bahrul Ulum under the leadership of Kiai Abdul Fattah and also the Japanese language come in curriculum of *pesantren* under the guidance of H. Abdur Rahim, one of the participant of ‘Training for Kiai’ is an example of implantation of programme, see Trio Tien, Neld Isfa and Eva (ed.), *Senyum*, (Jombang: CF. Tabah, 1994), p. 31.

<sup>63</sup> *Gunseikan* is the head government of Dai Nippon army that rules Indonesia on that time

<sup>64</sup> See, Benda, *The Crescent and...* , pp. 134-5.

<sup>65</sup> See, Drs. Khalid Rasyidi, *Pengalaman Perjuangan Jaman Jepang Sampai Proklamasi*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1979), p. 12.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 13-4.

mentioned above, but in reality the youth realized that results from this educational program should be used as a supporting means for Indonesia's struggle. The young persons used the *Ashrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia* as home base for an underground movement whose final goal was the independence of Indonesia.

The politicization of Islam by the Japanese government was seen in the flag for Peta (*Pembela Tanah Air*, or Homeland Defendants) which did not use red and white colours but a crescent, as a symbol of Islam, above a rising sun, as a symbol of Dai Nippon or Japan.<sup>67</sup> Based on an assumption that western imperialism was the enemy of Islam, the Japanese government used the Islamic community and persuaded them to fight the West together.

#### **b. Shumubu and Shumuka Offices**

Establishment of a department specially intended for handling Islamic affairs was a main priority in the Japanese government's policy in order to create a well-ordered Indonesian community at that time. For that purpose, *Shumubu*, an Islamic affairs office was established in March 1944. Meanwhile, for supporting the effectiveness of administration concerning religious affairs, the *Kantor Urusan Agama* (KUA, or Office of Religious Affairs) was established in each *Keresidenan* (*Shumuka* or district), so that the Islamic courts reached the villages. These two institutions, *Shumubu* and *Shumuka*, were seeds of the department of religious affairs after the independence of Indonesia. NU had an important role in this department, this role was interesting from the point of view of scientific study, and that will be discussed later.

On next occasion, in August 1944, after he had been released K.H Hasjim Asj'ari was given high honours by the Japanese government by appointing him to be *Shumobutyo*,<sup>68</sup> or head of the *Shumubu*, to handle religious affairs in Indonesia. According to Barton (2003: 34-35), this honour was a form of compensation given by the Japanese government for the previous imprisonment. In practice,

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<sup>67</sup> See, Benda, *The Crescent and...*, p. 141.



based on reasons that he was too old for that task and that he was needed in Jombang to manage *pesantren*'s activities, he proposed that his son, K.H. Wahid Hasjim, be appointed his representative. When the Japanese government accepted that proposal, this experience made K.H. Wahid Wasjim's scope of interactions wider due to his strategic position in Jakarta. Later, he interacted and joined other national figures such as Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, and even Tan Malaka.<sup>69</sup> In turn, this policy benefited NU in appearing in national scope as an important capital to move in the future.

### **c. The Establishment of Masjumi**

In October 1943, the government dissolved MIAI and replaced it with the *Madjlis Sjura Muslimin Indonesia* (Masjumi, or Indonesian Muslims Consultative Council) which stated that it was ready to assist the Japanese government. Only two organisations were allowed to join this institution, NU and Muhammadiyah. This was a form of de-politicization at that time since the activities of this institution was only allowed to cover religious affairs, but in practice this Masjumi's activities were also covering political matters. Due to the establishment of the Masjumi, the government easily controlled almost all non-political activities of Islamic organizations. This success of the Japanese government in limiting the activities of Islamic organization in Indonesia was viewed as Japan's victory over the Islam community so that Japan able to restrain Islamic movements having their own political will.<sup>70</sup>

Masjumi was used by Japan for political purposes; this can be seen for example when in 1944 the Shumubu office was reorganized among others by placing Masjumi figures. The appointment of K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari as the leader assisted by his son Wahid Hasjim and Abdul Kahir Muzakir (Muhammadiyah) as counsellor<sup>71</sup> was a part of this politicization.

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<sup>68</sup> Salam, *K.H. Hasyim Asy'ary...*, p. 57.

<sup>69</sup> See, Greg Barton, *Biografi Gus Dur, The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*, (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2003), pp. 34-5.

<sup>70</sup> See, Sobron, *Muhammadiyah dan...*, p. 86.

#### **d. Military Education**

In the same year, after K.H. Wahid Hasjim, son of K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari, had established *Hisbullah* and *Sabilillah* organizations as military wings of *santri* (religious students) community that were intended as means to defend and secure Indonesian people, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese government to help give military training for the two organizations.<sup>72</sup>

Meanwhile, the nationalistic group, which is more known as “*Netral Agama*” (Religion Neutral) succeeded in forming a National Army, *Peta* (*Pembela Tanah Air*, or Defender of Fatherland), in September 1943. The presence of Mr. Kasman Singodimejo, a religious teacher and a Muhammadiyah leader, as a senior Peta member who had ever acknowledged corps loyalty to Dai Nippon on February 8, 1944,<sup>73</sup> made the “Religion Neutral” categorization for this group not very correct. However, it should be noted that from these events the crystallization of two national-scope “Islamist versus Nationalist” groups began to get stronger.

There were similar patterns applied by the Dutch government and Japanese government respectively in connection with cultural associations. The Dutch government, based on a proposal of a brilliant drafter on policies on Islam in colonized country, Snouck Hurgronje, applied the idea of an educational way to achieve the cultural association later resulting in the Ethical Policy. In a similar way, the Japanese government by means of “*Training for Kiais*” and “*Ashrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia*” used short educational program model in efforts to achieve that purpose.

The two patterns applied by these two colonial governments had positive impacts for Indonesian citizen. The positive impact of the Ethical Policy was the emergence of founding figures of well-ordered organizations which later became anti-colonialist organizations such as Boedi Oetomo, SI (*Sjarekat Islam*), Muhammadiyah, NU (*Nahdhatul Ulama*) and others which were appearing a lot

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, p. 87.

<sup>72</sup> See, Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in The 1990s*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 169.

<sup>73</sup> Benda, *The Crescent...*, p. 139.

in the early period of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, while policy pattern of the Japanese government resulted in figures preparing the independence of Indonesia both from nationalist groups and Islamist groups which were struggling for the one common goal which was an independent and sovereign Indonesia.

## **B. Responses of NU to the Government's Policies on Islamic Affairs during the Period of Independence**

The new period of the independent Indonesia was a final goal and had been a waited for and struggled for by means of thinking, assets, blood, and life of all of Indonesia's peoples after having experienced life under the tyrannies of colonial governments for about 350 years. August 17, 1945 was a beginning period for independent Indonesia to regulate itself and to decide its own bright future without interferences from abroad.

Liddle (1978: 172), divided political histories of Indonesia from its period of proclamation of independence to period before the fall of Soeharto's New Order into three regime periods: *first*, parliamentary democracy or cabinet dominance, from the transfer of power in late 1948 to the period of *Konstituante*;<sup>74</sup> *second*, the period of *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (guided democracy) or presidential dominance, from Presidential Decree aimed at returning to the 1945 Constitution in July 5, 1959, to the break out of a rebellion called "*Gerakan 30 September 1965*" (Movement of September 30, 1965); and third, military dominance in Soeharto's New Order, from 1965 to 1978 (the year when Liddle's book mentioning these periods was published).<sup>75</sup> This classification of periods beginning from the transfer of power by the Dutch government is a perspective inclined to the Dutch's one-sided viewpoint. Whereas, from Indonesia's point of view, its independence was attained since August 17, 1945, the day commemorated every year by all Indonesian citizens.

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<sup>74</sup> *Konstituante* is an Assembly consisting of people's representatives to reformulate the state constitution of Indonesia. This body was the realisation of Soekarno's idea and to be formed through general election of 1955.

<sup>75</sup> See, R. William Liddle, "Participation and the Political Parties", in Jackson D. Karl and Pye W. Lucian eds.): *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (California: University of California Press, 1978), p. 172.

In writing this dissertation the writer is dividing the history of independent Indonesia into three periods: *first*, the Old Order, from 1945 to 1966; *second*, the New Order, from 1966 to 1999; and *third*, the period of 1999 until now which is more popularly known as “Reformation Order”, since the fall of the New Order was marked by reformative movements conducted by college students in various cities in Indonesia. Furthermore, this classification was used to analyse problems in an easier way in accordance with the goals expected from this dissertation.<sup>76</sup>

The three constitutions in force in Indonesia in the three different periods respectively have been: 1) *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (UUD’45, or 1945 Constitution), announced in August 18, 1945, consisting of 37 articles providing absolute power to the president (some months later a decree was made to change the form of government into parliamentary system); 2) *Undang-Undang Dasar 1949* (UUD 1949, or 1949 Constitution) which was made in the period of cease-fire between Indonesia and the Dutch, this was a constitution of a federal country designed for “Republik Indonesia Serikat” (RIS, or United Republic of Indonesia), which a year later, 1950, was reformulated by Indonesia with 146 articles more than articles in the previous year in form of *Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara 1950* (UUUDS 1950, or 1950 Provisional Constitution), this constitution was endured till 1959; 3) 1945 Constitution has been in force again until now together with Pancasila (the five principles) by a Presidential Decree released in 1959 by Soekarno, the president of Indonesia at that time.<sup>77</sup>

Concerning the 1949 Constitution was only in force for a relatively very short period, only eight months (from December 27, 1949 to August 17, 1950). Then, 1950 Provisional Constitution had a longer functioning period (from

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<sup>76</sup> More specifically aimed at the Islamic group, for example, B.J. Boland classified modern Islam period in Indonesia into three categories: 1) the period of political struggles 1945-1955, 2) the period of strengthening internal aspects of Islamic community 1955-1965, and 3) after September 30, 1965 period which was marked as the beginning of the third period in modern history of Islam in Indonesia. This categorization should not be confronted with other opinions regarding this issue, since we should understand that different opinions have different contexts or backgrounds. See, B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 6.

<sup>77</sup> See, Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: ...*, p. 7.

August 17, 1950 to July 5, 1959), although this constitution was provisional but in Indonesia's history this constitution is recognised as a separate constitution.<sup>78</sup>

### **1. Old Order Period (1945-1966)**

Soekarno's Old Order Period<sup>79</sup> is categorized into three crucial phases: *first*, period of seeking and finding an appropriate form for the country (1945-1949), *second*, the period of parliamentary democracy (1949-1957), and *third*, the period of guided democracy (1957-1965). Meanwhile, Schwarz (1995: 6), divided the period of the Old Order into two phases: period of parliamentary democracy, 1945-1955, and Soekarno's guided democracy, 1959-1965.

The formulation of the Old Order's policies was influenced by various brilliant ideas of Soekarno as the central authority of the government and as the architect of various governments' policies during his period of rule. From this point of view, we may study the Old Order's policies by considering Soekarno's ideas in "*Panca Azimat Revolusi*" (Five Amulets of Revolution), as revealed by Rahmawati Soerkarnoputri, as follow:

1. *Nasakom* (Since 1926, which was abbreviated of *Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme*, or Nationalism, Religion [Islam], Communism).
2. *Pancasila*, which was declared in 1945.
3. *Manipol/USDEK* (Manifesto *politik*, or political manifesto/an acronym of the initial letters of the 1945 Constitution), declared in 1959.
4. *Trisakti* or Three Powers (sovereign in political affairs, self-empowerment in economical affairs, and having its own personality in cultural affairs), declared in 1964.

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<sup>78</sup> A more detailed description on differences among the three constitutions, see Drs. A.W. Widjaya, *Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 dan UUD Negara Indonesia dalam Lintasan Sejarah dua Dasawarsa 1945-1965*, (Jakarta: Fajar Agung, 1989), pp. 84-90.

<sup>79</sup> According to Wijaya (1989: 69), the period before the presidential decree, July 5, 1959 can not be said as period of Old Order or other orders. In his opinion, the Old Order happened from July 5, 1959 to March 11, 1966. The writer classifies this Old Order as happened from the proclamation of independence to the fall of Soekarno (1945-1966), this classification refers to general views merely to make easy the periodization of governments in Indonesia.

5. *Berdikari* (*Berdiri di atas kaki sendiri*, stand in one's own foot) or self-empowerment, declared in 1965.<sup>80</sup>

In these main ideas of Soekarno, Islamic affairs were not in an explicit position and did not have special attention, since in this period the focus of the new government was consolidating the Indonesian peoples to formulate together the goals and the steps, which should be taken to regulate the newborn country. In order to achieve this, implementing the idea of *Nasakom*—the unification of three main powers of the Indonesian community which were Nationalist, Religious, and Communist groups—which had been declared long before the proclamation of independence regarded as a relevant and basic capital to develop together the new country, although this idea was not formally declared until the late 1950s. In addition to *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI, or Indonesian National Party), NU and Masjumi, the involvement of *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, or Indonesian Communist Party) in the political development of the newly independent Indonesia indicated the relevance of this matter.

In the period of the Old Order, the political activities of NU consisted of two forms: as a part of Masjumi (1945-1952) and as a political party (1952-1966). In the early period of independent Indonesia, NU participated in the nation's defence by its significant contribution when Dutch troops landed aimed at reoccupying Indonesia followed by an incident popularly known as “Military Aggression I”.<sup>81</sup> This return of Dutch troops made NU's *ulamas* angry. The declaration of “*Resolusi Djihad*” (Resolution of *Djihād* or Holy War) by K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari in a meeting of NU's *ulamas* in October 21-22, 1945, in NU's office, Bubutan, Surabaya, not long after the landing was a part of this participation.

*Resolusi Djihad* declared “basically the fight was provoked by Islamic communities feeling it was obligatory to fight against the colonizing nation to

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<sup>80</sup> See, Rahmawati Soekarnoputri, “Soekarno is to Kill Soekarno”, in *Kompas online*: <http://www.Kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0106/06/opini/soek04.htm>

<sup>81</sup> The Dutch carried out an attack popularly known as “Military Aggression I” in July 21, 1947 about three months after the signing of Linggajati agreement in March 1947. This was arrogance on the part of the Dutch hoping to get back Indonesia after Indonesia's peoples themselves proclaimed the independence of their country.

defend the Indonesian country and Islam”.<sup>82</sup> Therefore, *ulamas* ordered all Muslims in Indonesia to continue the struggle in the way of Allāh (*djihād fī al-sabīl-i-Allāh*) for defending the independence of Republic of Indonesia and the religion of Islam. This resolution was signed by K.H. M. Dahlan in the name of *Pengurus Besar Nahdatul Ulama* (PBNU, the highest-level managing council of the organization) and had a significant influence in provoking high spirit among the Indonesian people. Therefore, although the battle of November 10, 1945, in Surabaya took many lives on the part of Indonesia, this battle was not a useless one for Indonesia since it succeeded in making the world turn its attention upon it. Indonesia was succeeded in showing the world that it existed as a country and that its citizens were ready to defend it.

*Resolusi Djihad* consisted of four obligations for the Muslim community in Indonesia in defending their newly independent country as follows:

1. The independence of Republic of Indonesia, which was proclaimed in August 17, 1945, had to be defended.
2. The Republic of Indonesia’s government as the only government had to be protected and defended.
3. Indonesia’s Muslim Community especially NU members were obliged to fight physically against the Netherlands and other countries hoping to reoccupy Indonesia.
4. This obligation was a *djihād* for any Muslim located in a radius of 94 km (the maximum distance in which a Muslim is allowed to unite two certain successive *ṣalāt* [Islamic prayers]). Meanwhile, those outside of the radius were obliged to assist their brothers within the radius.<sup>83</sup>

The participation of the Islamic community especially NU in the form of responding or involving the formulation of the government’s policies concerning Islamic affairs in this period was begun when the country’s ideology was formulated. This process took a lot of attention and time from the period of preparing the 1945 independence to the continuation of this discussion in

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<sup>82</sup> Munawar Fuad Noeh and Mastuki HS., (eds.), *Menghidupkan Ruh Pemikiran K.H. Ahmad Siddiq*, (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), p. 232.

*Konstituante* (1956-1959) in Bandung, a discussion regarded by the government as a failure in making a common agreement. The period of preparing independence where the role of NU was very significant, however, is important to be considered in the following discussion. Therefore, the following subchapters will discuss some main subjects, what is the role of NU in determining candidates for president?; its roles in formulating the state ideology; its tolerance in accepting the form and state ideology in *Konstituante*; and how this organisation tolerated Soekarno's concept of Nasakom?.

#### **a. Determining the Candidate for the Position of President**

Two big issues toward the proclamation of independence were what form the nation to-be-established should have and who was regarded as appropriate to lead the nation. In three meetings of MIAI (1937, 1939 and 1941), before the arrival of the Japanese colonial government, issues on the preparation for independence began to be discussed. This was clearer in the last meeting, the third Congress of Indonesian Muslims, July 5-8, 1941, in Sala, in which the important issue of what form the nation should have after the proclamation of independence began to be discussed in a panel meeting of the council, in addition two other actual issues: militancy, and "*bloedtransfoesi*" or blood transfusion.

Concerning the two latter issues, the meeting made a final decision of disallowing or forbidding blood transfusion if it was done to assist battles that were planned by the Dutch government and forbidding "*milisi diensplicht*" since it was regarded as assisting "*kafir*" (infidel/unbeliever) government. Meanwhile, concerning the foundation of the nation, the meeting demanded the establishment of a parliament of Indonesia based on Islamic governance. The meeting in Sala making those decisions was the height of struggle of MIAI.<sup>84</sup> For after the arrival of the new colonial government, the Japanese's, MIAI was replaced by Masjumi.

Meanwhile, some years before, GAPI (*Gabungan Politik Indonesia*, or Federation of Indonesian Politic Parties) held the "*Kongres Rakyat Indonesia*"

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<sup>83</sup> See, Ridwan, *Paradigma Politik NU:...* , p. 212.

<sup>84</sup> Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...* , pp. 102-3.



(KORINDO, or Indonesian Peoples Congress) in Batavia (Jakarta), December 23-25, 1934, demanding the establishment of the parliament of Indonesia. On this occasion, NU sent its delegate, K.H. Mahfudz Shiddiq, as a sign of NU's participation in Indonesia's national struggle.<sup>85</sup> The presence of NU's representative showed that NU, as a religious organization, played an active role in national the struggle to establish an independent country.

In the NU congress XV held in June 15-21, 1940, in Surabaya, a closed meeting attended by 11 of NU's figures led by K.H. Mahfudz Shiddiq provided names of two candidates regarded as proper in leading this nation in the independent period, they were Ir. Soekarno and Drs. Muhammad Hatta. In this closed meeting, ten votes were given to Soekarno while one vote was given to Muhammad Hatta.<sup>86</sup>

The appointment of Soekarno as a candidate for the presidential position in the country showed some irony in the fact NU figures hoping that the would-be-independent Indonesia should be an Islamic country chose Soekarno, a nationalist figure who did not seek to establish the country as was expected by NU. It was a wonder why Mohammad Hatta only received one vote while his religiosity was probably more than Soekarno's, although Hatta's concept of Indonesia didn't show his support to the idea that it should be an Islamic country. According to Feillard (1999: 20), considerations on their being Javanese or non-Javanese may be understood in this case, in addition to the skills and insights possessed by Soekarno who was Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, while Mohammad Hatta came from Sumatra.

Some days before Independence Day, in order to solve the two issues, Indonesia's leading figures were gathered in an organization formed by the Japanese government, BPUPKI (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or Investigation committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence). This body appointed Soekarno for the position of Indonesia's first president, while Muhammad Hatta was chosen as vice-president.

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<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, p. 110.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid*, p. 112.

Further development, however, showed that after Soekarno had been appointed for that position, basic issues on the country's position from an Islamic point of view and the religion's position in the country were not regarded as clear yet. Decisions on it were made in conferences of *ulamas* held by Department of Religious Affairs, 1952-1954. In addition to providing regulations which gave power to the chairmen of *Kantor Urusan Agama* (KUA, or Office of Religious Affairs) at the regency level in Java and Madura to appoint *walī al-hākim* (in this context: officials of the marriage register). Whereas, a conference held in May 1952, in Tugu also gave authority to the chairpersons of KUA to appoint his subordinate *penghulu* (officer on Islamic affairs) at *kecamatan* (sub district) level.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, that power of governing the Republic of Indonesia was regarded as a *dhu shauka* (de facto) power and that the holders were regarded as *walī al-amri al-ḍarūrī bi al-shauka* (temporary holders of de facto power) was decided at a conference held on March 3-6, 1954, in Cipanas.

*Walī al-amr* means the holder of governance/power, *al-ḍarūrī* means emergency and *bi al-shauka* means holding de facto power. Therefore, *walī al-amri al-ḍarūrī bi al-shauka* is the holder of governance, which governs in reality (de facto) and is appointed based on an emergency.<sup>88</sup>

The decision was accepted based on a consideration that it was impossible to build separate political power to apply Islamic law in Republic of Indonesia, so that the power of *dhu shauka* was accepted in an emergency (*ḍarūrī*).<sup>89</sup>

Complete decisions resulting from the congress of *ulamas* were as follow:

1. President as the head of the country and other country's apparatuses mentioned in 1945 Constitution, article 44, which were ministers' council, parliament, et cetera, is *walī al-amri al-ḍarūrī bi al-shauka*.
2. *Walī al-amri al-ḍarūrī bi al-shauka* are the holders of governance which Indonesian peoples are obliged to follow in matters not against the *Sharī'a* (Islamic law).

<sup>87</sup> See, K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari Pesantren*, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1992), p. 426.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, p. 427.

<sup>89</sup> Haidar, *Nahdatul Ulama dan...*, p. 4; Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan...*, p. 200

3. *Tawliya walī al-hākim* (decision of *walī al-hākim*) by the president to Ministry of Religious Affairs and other appointees, and *tawliya* of Islamic judges usually lived in places determined by *ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd* (formatting system) are legal. In processing marriage contacts in accordance with the law regarding registration of marriage, *ṭalāq* (repudiation of the wife by the husband) and *rudju'* (reconciliation between husband and his wife) should have a legalization letter of the government first.<sup>90</sup>

The giving of the title to Soekarno was meant to give a religious legitimation to the government so that the authority of the courts of *Sharī'a* newly established in West Sumatra—which were not in accordance with local tradition— was legal according the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) in case of appointing a *walī* (a relative legally responsible according to *fiqh*) for a bride who doesn't have any *walī* from her own family. The legitimation of courts newly established by the government through the Department of Religious Affairs depended upon the legality of the government as a whole. By appointing the government (President Soekarno) to be an *al-amr*, the *ulamas* wanted to acknowledge that the newly established religious courts were institutions having authority to appoint *walī al-hākim* legally according to the *fiqh*.<sup>91</sup>

As a legal guidance for the ulama in considering this problem, there is a Hadīth narrated by Imām al-Daruqūṭni from 'Ā'isha meaning: "A marriage is not legal until there is a *walī* and two fair witnesses. If this *walī* or relative objects to marry off the would-be bride, then the sultan (king) has the right to become a *walī* for the would-be bride who doesn't have any *walī* from her own family". Meanwhile, the term of sultan according to the *ulamas* has the definition proposed by the author of *Sublu al-Ssalām*, Ismā'īl al-Kahlani, which is a ruling king, apart from the fact of whether he is just or unjust. Soekarno as the president of a republic state had a legal power similar to a sultan's. Although the criteria of a sultan were not fulfilled by Soekarno, he had *dhu shauka* position. In accordance with this situation, in order to meet the requirements of *fiqh*, the

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<sup>90</sup> Haidar, *Ibid*, hal. 270; Ridwan, *Paradigma Politik NU:...*, p. 238.

Conference of Ulama in Cipanas appointed President Soekarno to be a *walī al-amri al-ḍarūrī bi al-shauka*.<sup>92</sup>

### **b. Formulating the State's Form and Ideology**

By late May 1945, BPUPKI in its meeting faced some choices on State Ideology, whether or not Indonesia should be a nation state, religious state, or secular state. In this situation in June 1, 1945 —later popularly known as the birthday of Pancasila— on his speech in front of the meeting of BPUPKI Soekarno proposed five basics (Nationalism, Humanism, Citizenship, Social Justice, and Divinity) as the basics of the nation. In the speech, Soekarno confirmed that Indonesia is not a religion-based nation, also not a secular nation, but a Pancasila nation.<sup>93</sup> The Soekarno's proposal was approved by acclamation in the meeting, although to achieve the form of Pancasila as known at present it still needed time two months later.<sup>94</sup>

Soekarno's idea of Pancasila was the idea that had undergone certain tests in dialogues with three key Islamic figures, two of them were from NU: K.H. Wahid Hasjim and Kiai Masykur, and the other figure was Kiai Kahar Muzakir from *Partai Islam Indonesia* (PII, Indonesian Islamic Party) in a long discussion all night long from 7 p.m. to 4 a.m. in Mohammad Yamin's residence. This long discussion resulted in five principles, later used as the country's ideology by Soekarno.<sup>95</sup> Based on this fact we may assume that Pancasila in its basics was

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<sup>91</sup> See, Martin Van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa: Pencarian Wacana Baru*, translated by Farid Wajidi, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), pp. 72-3.

<sup>92</sup> Ridwan, *Paradigma Politik NU:...*, p. 225.

<sup>93</sup> There was an argument who first created Pancasila, Soekano or Muhammad Yamin. Later it was admitted formally by Muhammad Yamin and other witnesses (who have viewed directly Soekarno's speech in front of BPUPKI in June 1, 1945) that Soekarno was the first conceiver of Pancasila. The witnesses among others were KH Dewantara (1950), KH Masykur (1958), RP Suroso (1964), Rooseno (1957), A.A. Maramis. In addition to them, there were informants (who listened this information for other person or media), Mohammad Hatta (that June 1, 1945 he was in Banjarmasin for the whole day), Adam Malik, Abu Hanifah, Notonagoro, Sunario, and A Subardjo, and Fatmawati Soekarno. See G. Moedjanto, *Antara Hari Kelahiran dan Kesaktian Pancasila*, Kompas Online: <http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0209/30/opini/anta40.htm>.

<sup>94</sup> To find out legal formulation of Pancasila, see Appendixes.

<sup>95</sup> See, spoken testimony of Kiai Masykur, a commander of *Sabilillah* troop in the Japanese colonial period, which was written and publicized for the first time in a scientific book by Andree Feillard (1999: 32-35).

inspired not only by Indonesian native culture but also by Islamic values. Contributions of Islamic figures in formulating those basics were undeniably, a historical fact.

In May 31, 1945, in the first meeting of BPUPKI, Soepomo proposed a form of integral country, a country having integrity among the government and the peoples. In his explanation in July 15, 1945, the government system he had proposed put emphasis on the role of the government and especially the role of the country's leader, meaning that there is a centralization of responsibilities and powers in the hands of the government.<sup>96</sup>

In BPUPKI, groups discussing issues regarding the form of state ideology were divided into three categories: Integralists, Islamists and Constitutionals. This categorization continued in the *Konstituante's* meeting. For the Islamist group, the unity between the government and religion was a main requirement for Indonesia. This group demanded that Islam be appointed as the state religion based on the assumption that 85% of the Indonesian population were Muslims so that the existence of an Islamic state was relevant and required. Whereas, for the later groups, what was most important was not the form of the country but its essence and constitution, in other words procedures regarding how peoples participate effectively in the government, limitations on the government's power and the government's accountability.<sup>97</sup>

The meetings of BPUPKI witnessed the contribution of NU in formulating the state ideology, among others: when in July 10, 1945, BPUPKI accepted a text later known as *Piagam Djakarta or Jakarta Charter* which has been agreed about in June 22, 1945, by the Committee of Nine (Hatta, Yamin, Maramis and Soekarno, from the nationalist group; and Muzakir, Wahid Hasjim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Agus Salim from the Islamist group) to be included in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. What is interesting is that one member of this Committee of Nine was an NU figure. In the introduction of the *Piagam Djakarta* the five basics of Pancasila were included with the addition in *sila* (basis) of

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<sup>96</sup> See, Adnan Buyung Nasution, *Aspirasi Pemerintahan Konstitusional di Indonesia: Studi Sosio-Legal atas Konstituante 1956-1959*, (Jakarta: Grafiti, 2001), pp. 88-94.

Belief in One Supreme God: “with the obligation to carry out *Sharī‘a* for adherents of Islam.”

Then in July 16, 1945, in the next meeting Soekarno proposed a call especially for the nationalist group to be willing to sacrifice itself and be willing to accept an article in the constitution mentioning “The President of Republic of Indonesia should be an Indonesian native and confessor of Islam”. A formulation which was a result of Islamist group’s struggle in this body,<sup>98</sup> and was a proposal submitted by Wahid Hasjim, who in the same occasion proposed that Islam should be set as the state religion.<sup>99</sup>

In further development, the inclusion of those last seven words (*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Sjariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja*, or with the obligation to carry out *Sharī‘a* for adherents of Islam) in the basic of Belief in One Supreme God faced serious reactions. Christians from Eastern Indonesia refused the mention of the majority’s religion in Pancasila since it was worried that the mention would result in undesirable impacts for all parties, among others: the feeling of becoming “first class” citizens and “second class” citizens. What was worse that they would not be merely feelings but realities. Therefore, during the night after the independence of Indonesia was proclaimed in August 17, 1945, Mohammad Hatta received a guest, a Japanese Navy officer, bringing in messages of objections from the peoples of Eastern Indonesia regarding the inclusion of the *Piagam Djakarta* in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution.<sup>100</sup> They gave an ultimatum that if the *Piagam Djakarta* would not be removed from the Constitution they would prefer to separate themselves from Indonesia. Therefore, in the next day Mohammad Hatta summoned four members of PPKI (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or Preparatory Committee for Indonesian

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<sup>97</sup> See, Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: ...*, p. 11.

<sup>98</sup> See, Nasution, *Aspirasi Pemerintahan...*, pp. 102-04.

<sup>99</sup> In an interview with K.H. Abdul Chobir, M.T. December 14, 2003, he described the maximum efforts of K.H. Wahid Hasjim to make Islam as the state religion as an obligation for any Muslim. However, with his high tolerance and wisdom for keeping the integrity of the new state, he accepted a common agreement to not making Islam as the religion of the state.

<sup>100</sup> Whereas, in other literature to be said that this occasion happened in the morning of August 18, 1945. See, Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, *Aspiring for the Middle Path: Religious Harmony in Indonesian*, (Jakarta: CENSIS, 1997), p. 39.

Independence) regarded as representing Islam: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo, Teuku Mohammad Hasan, and Wahid Hasjim. With the reason of keeping the integrity of the newly born nation, they agreed to eliminate those seven last words in the first basis of Pancasila included in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution.

All that had been achieved by Islamic leaders in BPUPKI disappeared in the following meeting of PPKI when the body accepted Hatta's proposal to eliminate those seven words, "*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Sjari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja*". Furthermore, the requirement of being Muslim for the president was also eliminated from the articles on presidency in the 1945 Constitution. As a compensation, the Islamist group added words "*Yang Maha Esa*" (The One) after the word "*Ketuhanan*" (Divinity) based on a proposal of Wahid Hasjim.<sup>101</sup> According to Wahid Hasjim, the addition of word *Esa* (One) mentions Oneness of God (*tauḥīd*), a term that is not mentioned in other religions.<sup>102</sup>

The atmosphere of solidarity, unity, and goodwill among the republic's founding fathers at that time proved that Pancasila was a "gentleman's agreement" agreed upon in a brief meeting among them with a consensus of not considering any citizen based on his/her religion. This gentleman's agreement was not only an elite's political agreement, but also a national agreement as proved by the nation's history. The formulation of Pancasila was still mentioned in the two following constitutions, in the Preamble of the 1949 RIS (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*, Indonesian Federal Republic) Constitution and the Preamble of 1950 UUDS (*Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara*, Provisional Constitution) and also mentioned

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<sup>101</sup> In Jakarta Charter it was written as follows: ". . . Belief in The One God with the obligation to carry out *Shari'a* for adherents of Islam." See, Appendixes to get the complete charter!

<sup>102</sup> The presence of Wahid Hasjim that time was doubted by some parties such as Islamic preaching organization like DDII or *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*. Some Islamic figures such as Endang Saefuddin Anshari also was in doubt about Wahid Hasjim's presence that time when commenting this matter. Some witnesses including Mohammad Hatta himself, however, said the Wahid Hasjim was present in the occasion. Kasman (ex chairman of Hisbullah) revealed that it was Wahid Hasjim himself who convinced Ki Bagus Hadikusumo to accept that change. See, Feillard, *NU vis-à-vis...*, pp. 39-40.

in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution which was in force again by a Presidential Decree July 5, 1959 until now.

There was an assumption that the 1945 Constitution was a temporary one as also admitted by its three founding fathers: Soepomo, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta. Soepomo admitted that the Constitution (UUD'45) was not complete yet and was still temporary. Whereas, Soekarno mentioned that the Constitution was temporary since it was made in a relatively very short time. He also mentioned that in a quieter period a more comprehensive constitution could be made. Mohammad Hatta later admitted that the Constitution still needed some additions and he asked that the constitution should be accepted first so that problems that may disintegrate the nation and the government can be avoided.<sup>103</sup>

Therefore, in August 18, 1945 the national leaders explicitly promised that within the next six months a definitive constitution would be framed.<sup>104</sup> The Islamic leaders were then willing to postpone their efforts in supporting the mention of Islam as a basis of the nation in the 1945 Constitution since the newly born nation at that time faced highly serious problems regarding the Japanese Army, the landing of the Allied forces, and internal problems in the following years, such as the rebellion of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) in Madiun 1948 and the *Darul Islam*.

### **c. Reformulating the State's Form and Ideology during the Period of Konstituante (1956-1959)**

As mentioned above, the nation's basics (1945 Constitution and Pancasila) were regarded as temporary by the three founding fathers. This admission was later confirmed by the government's statement that a more comprehensive and definitive constitution would be designed in a quieter period. Promise of reformulating the constitution six months later was not fulfilled by the government due to existing problems. The period 1945-1949 for Indonesian people was a tiring period in defending the newly born country from external and

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<sup>103</sup> See, Nasution, *Aspirasi Pemerintahan...*, p. 96; Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting:...*, p. 29.

<sup>104</sup> Nasution, *Ibid.*, p. 110.



internal disturbances. The return of the Dutch hoping to reoccupy Indonesia faced tough responses including from NU as a part of the nation feeling obliged to defend the new nation. The release of “*Resolusi Dihad*” (Resolution of *Djihād*) by K.H. Hasjim Asj’ari as a form of resistance and refusal against the re-colonization attempts was a response of the Islamic community based on the values of Islamic law. Later, in 1948, PKI stabbed the nation internally in the Rebellion of Madiun, to be added by the rebellion of *Darul Islam* so Indonesia in a hard period had to face three disturbing forces.

In order to fulfil the government’s promise to reformulate the Constitution regarded as temporary in an appropriate time, in addition to choosing members of DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, or People’s Representative Council), the 1955<sup>105</sup> general election was held to choose members of “*Konstituante*” which later were inaugurated in November 10, 1956, by President Soekarno in Bandung. This *Konstituante* was meant as a separate body having the task of reforming and reformulating the constitution of Indonesia. After holding meetings for two and half years (1956-1959), this body was regarded as having failed, but it is admitted that in this period Indonesia really showed that it was a democratic country.

In *Konstituante*, NU as a political party joined the Islamist Bloc with Masjumi, PSII, Perti (*Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamijjah*, or Islamic Education Association), AKUI-Madura, PPTI, *Gerakan Pilih Sunda* (Movement of Choosing Sunda) and *Pusat Penggerak Pencalonan* (Nominating Centre for) L.E. Idrus Effendi-*Sulawesi Tenggara*, struggling to form Islam as the nation’s basis although later with two other big parties, PNI and PKI, they accepted the Presidential Decree, July 5, 1959, to return to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> The election to choose members of DPR was held in September 29, 1955, and the election to choose member of *Konstituante* was held in December 15, 1955. The members of DPR were inaugurated by President Soekarno in March 15, 1956 in Jakarta.

<sup>106</sup> Nasution (1995: 28-34), divided the ideological fractions in *Konstituante* into three categories as follow: I. *Pancasila Bloc* consisting of various Parties and groups among others PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian National Party), PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party), *Republik Proklamasi* (Republic of Proclamation), *Parkindo* (*Partai Kristen Indonesia*, Indonesian Protestant Party), *Partai Katolik* (Catholic Party), PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, Indonesian Socialist Party), IPKI (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, League

In *Konstituante*, the Islamist group was intense in defending the concept that Indonesia should be an Islamic state. Isa Anshary (Masjumi) called upon the Islamic community to refuse Pancasila as the nation's basis. According to Anshary, Soekarno's point of view regarding *gotong royong* (mutual assistance) as the essence of Pancasila may destroy the belief in the One God. The words "*Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*" (Belief in The One Supreme God) was dissolved in the word "Gotong Royong". His refusal was based on the opinion of some *ulamas* in responding to Soekarno's point of view in a speech in May 5, 1954, in Ujung Pandang. The *ulamas*'s opinions were summarized in two points: first, according to the Islamic law it is forbidden for Muslims to reveal Soekarno's point of view; second, it is also forbidden for Muslims to follow and distribute such a point of view. In addition, Isa Anshari also compared the function of a nation according to Islam to the function of a Muslim in this world, *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar* (ordering good deeds and forbidding bad deeds), by following the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>107</sup>

Meanwhile, in his general speech, Achmad Zaini (NU's representative) revealed that the Islamic community that had been existing for decades and even for a hundred years has an aim of forming and struggling for the establishment of a nation in accordance with Islamic belief and ideology. For this struggle he proposed an argument in the form of an article in *Al-Qurān (Al-Baqara: 147)*: "the Truth is from thy Lord; so be not at all in doubt." According to him, consequently the article should be interpreted that only an Islamic nation, which was agreed upon, by NU and other Islamic parties is acceptable. In his point of view, this demand was not because Islam was a majority religion but merely based on an order implicitly stated in law of Allāh. In the following explanation,

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for the Defence of Indonesian Independence), PRN (*Partai Rakyat Nasional*, National Peoples Party), P3RI (*Persatuan Pegawai Polisi Republik Indonesia*, Republic of Indonesia's Police Officials Association), *Partai Persatuan Daya* (United Power Party), GPPS (*Gerakan Pembela Pancasila*, Movement of Pancasila Defenders), PRI (*Partai Rakyat Indonesia*, Indonesian Peoples Party), R. Soedjono Prawirosoedarso, *Gerakan Banteng Republik Indonesia* (Republic of Indonesia's Movement of Wild Buffalo), *Partai Tani Indonesia* (Indonesian Farmers Party), *Radja Kaprabonan*, PIR (*Partei Indonesia Raya*, or Greater Indonesia Party) *Nusa Tenggara-Lombok*, and *Permei*, II. *Islamic Bloc* consisting of members as mentioned above, III. *Social Economy Bloc* consisting of *Partai Buruh* (Labour Party), *Partai Murba* (*Murba Party*), and *Acoma*.

he also underlined that the minority, the non-Muslims, did not have to be worry since they would be protected under the Islamic law, then he also referred to *sūra Al-Baqara: 256* as follows:

Let there be no compulsion in Religion: Truth stands out clearer from Error: whoever rejects Tagut and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy handhold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things.

This article was one of fundamentals for the tolerance of the Islamic community since the Prophet's time for other religions in an Islamic country. Islam called the non-Muslims the *dhimma*,<sup>108</sup> meaning they are entitled to have the guarantees of Allāh. They should have protection as has been guaranteed by the Prophet himself: "Whoever hurts or disturbs a *dhimmī*, and then I will be his enemy in the day after".<sup>109</sup>

However, since all that was proposed by the Islamist group, Pancasila group, and the social economy group never reached a quorum, deadlock was inevitable in the *Konstituante*. Therefore, the government proposed that *Konstituante* return to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and accept Soekarno's guided democracy. In accordance with this proposal, Soekarno tried assure the members of *Konstituante* on the benefits of guided democracy regarded by him as the basis most suitable for Indonesia.

Previously, the idea of a return to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution was an idea proposed by A.H. Nasution in the meeting of *Dewan Nasional* (National Body) 1958. In his opinion, 1945 Constitution was the appropriate format to implement the Guided Democracy being planned by Soekarno. Moreover, while the *Konstituante* supposedly failed, on this occasion Nasution suggested the meeting to be ended.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Nasution, *Aspirasi Pemerintahan...*, pp. 115-7.

<sup>108</sup> In a simple way, *ahl al-dhimmī* often means: "non-Muslims who do not make an enemy of Islam." Yusuf al-Qardhawi defined *ahl al-dhimmī* as non-Muslims both *ahl al-kitāb* (persons who believe holy books revealed to some prophets) and non-*ahl al-kitāb* which are residents of *dār al-Islām* (an Islamic country). Muhammad Dhiya al-Din al-Rais mentioned non-Muslims as *al-aqaliyāt al-diniyāt*, both *ahl al-kitāb* and non-*ahl al-kitāb*. See, Khamami Zada and Arief R. Arofah, *Diskursus Politik Islam*, (Jakarta: LSIP, 2004), pp. 54-5.

<sup>109</sup> Adnan Buyung Nasution, *Aspirasi Pemerintahan...*, p. 118.

<sup>110</sup> See, Chusnul Mar'iyah, "Soekarno dan Demokrasi", in Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (ed.), *Soekarno: Pemikiran Politik dan Kenyataan Praktek*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1988), p. 193.

Soekarno made some efforts in order to make the Islamist group support his idea. In his explanation on guided democracy in front of *Konstituante*, he proposed that the *Piagam Djakarta*, June 22, 1945, be recognised openly. He assumed that the Islamic community would accept the return to 1945 Constitution if at the same time the *Piagam Djakarta* were also accepted. This charter was not part of the 1945 Constitution, but it should be recognised as historical document having significant meaning in the struggle of Indonesian peoples and it has also inspired the formulation of the Preamble as a main part of the 1945 Constitution. Recognising *Piagam Djakarta* means recognising its influences upon the 1945 Constitution, influences of which not only appears in the Preamble but also in article 29 determining the legal foundation for religious activities.<sup>111</sup>

Recognition of *Piagam Djakarta* as a “historical document” was Soekarno’s proposal to promote his idea of a return to the 1945 Constitution. Almost all of the 57 speakers representing all political parties and fractions agreed to the proposal submitted by him. The majority accepting the Soekarno’s proposal were Partai Murba, IPKI affiliating with the Army Force (both parties acknowledged themselves as the pioneers in returning to the 1945 Constitution), PSI, major parties in the government – PNI and NU (both placed their representatives in the cabinet), PKI (the loyal supporter of the cabinet), and minor nationalist parties. Meanwhile, the minority who refused the proposal were Masjumi, minor Islamic parties, *Partai Buruh* (Labour Party), and *Partai Katolik* (Catholic Party). All of them criticized the proposal with their own reasons.

Although NU and PKI agreed to the government’s proposal, they refused the government’s other proposal that the return to the 1945 Constitution should be carried out without amendments. NU proposed that the return to the 1945 Constitution also means a return to *Piagam Djakarta* and proposed the inclusion of the seven words specifically mentioning Islam in the Preamble. Saefudin Zuhri (NU) demanded the inclusion of *Piagama Djakarta* in the 1945 Constitution based on an argumentation that the charter was not only a historical document but that its legality as a legal source inspiring the rest of the 1945 Constitution should

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<sup>111</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 322-3.

be guaranteed. Later, NU together with PKI, PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, Murba, PSI, and Baperki also stressed on the importance of protecting human rights and preventing dictatorship to be a main part of the Constitution.<sup>112</sup>

It is important to note that although, in *Konstituante*, the NU supported the idea that Indonesia should be an Islamic state; it did not reject the Presidential Decree to return to the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. At the time, NU was one of the government's parties due to its involvement in the cabinet and it was one party of the four axes (PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI) established by Soekarno in implementing his idea of *Nasakom*.

#### **d. Nasakom**

Besides introducing Pancasila as the state ideology as the writer has mentioned above, another of Soekarno's important policy in his ruling period was idea of unifying three major ideologies in Indonesia that time: Nationalism, Religion, and Communism. *Nasakom* (*Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme*, or Nationalism, Religion and Communism) was an idea that had been conceived around about 1926<sup>113</sup> —long before the independence of Indonesia— when he was younger. The idea then was declared formally more than 20 years later when the political situation at that time indicated the strong influence of communism in Indonesia.

The results of the 1955 general election showed that PKI was at the fourth rank by receiving a vote of 16,4%, below the other three major parties, PNI 22,3%, Masjumi 20,9%, and NU 18,4%. In 1948 PKI had rebelled in Madiun so that its popularity had decreased in Indonesia. The result, however, indicated that the party succeeded in winning back sympathy on the part of the peoples so that it received fantastically significant vote as an undeniable political reality. The increasing popularity of PKI was affected by the propaganda of its elites in the

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<sup>112</sup> See, Nasution, *Ibid*, pp. 328-61

<sup>113</sup> See, Bernhard Dahm, *Soekarnos Kampf um Indonesiens Unabhängigkeit: Werdegang und Ideen eines asiatischen Nationalisten*, (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1996), pp. 150-2.

general election's campaigns. PKI succeeded in having the sympathy of the masses through the issues on *land reform*.<sup>114</sup>

Based on this fact and various security disturbances in form of separatist movements among others in Sumatera and Sulawesi<sup>115</sup> regarded as serious and threatening the unity and integrity of the nation, President Soekarno submitted his idea of implementing the concept of *Nasakom*. This idea was rejected by Masjumi, which since the beginning has been opposing PKI. Meanwhile, NU compromised with Soekarno and did not want to confront him so that it was compelled by the existing situation to support this policy while expecting compensation from Soekarno to secure NU's interests.<sup>116</sup>

It was not easy for Soekarno to implement his concept since all Muslim forces regarded the highly increasing influence of communism as threatening and deserving of serious attention.<sup>117</sup> Soekarno faced complicated dilemmas to solve this problem. On the one side, communism had been a political reality long before the independence of Indonesia; while on the other side resistance of the religious groups could not be ignored. He wanted to prevent the potential clash between the two groups, in his opinion *Nasakom* was a solution in integrating Indonesia's peoples, which had been polarized into three political ideologies: Nationalism, Religion, and Communism.

The political reality resulting in these three ideologies has been predicted by Soekarno. He was convinced that the three major forces were the souls and powers of the nation, which should be unified. In one of his formal speeches, he even said that "Even the 'Gods of heaven' can't deny this reality!"<sup>118</sup> Therefore, the four-legged cabinet consisting of PNI, Masjumi, NU and PKI was regarded as

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<sup>114</sup> Tri Chandra AP, "Banser antara Perebutan dalam Ketidakpastian dan Kekerasan Politik 1965-1966", in *Taswirul Afkar*, 15<sup>th</sup>, Edition 2003, pp. 124-7.

<sup>115</sup> Many of the rebellions were carried out by military forces themselves as were happened in West Sumatra (Colonel Ahmad Husein), North Sumatra (Colonel Simbolon), although those rebellions failed; in South Sumatra, Colonel Balian, area commander, carried out a rebellion against the central government; in Sulawesi the rebellion were supported by the military. See, Chusnul Mar'iyah, "Soekarno dan Demokrasi", in Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (ed.), *Soekarno: Pemikiran Politik dan Kenyataan Praktek*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1988), p. 173.

<sup>116</sup> Chandra, *Banser antara...*, p. 125.

<sup>117</sup> See, Schwarz, *Nation in Waiting:...*, p. 16.

the solution for maintaining unity and integrity of the nation. In his opinion, what was more important was that in every aspect of life in the nation, these three political forces should be involved including in the structure of ABRI.<sup>119</sup>

Soekarno's intention to place some members of PKI in his government, however, was not achieved until 1962 when he succeeded in placing two figures of PKI, Aidit (General Secretary of PKI, PKI's Representative in MPRS – *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* or Provisional People Consultative Assembly) and Lukman (Vice General Secretary of PKI, PKI's Representative in DPR GR-*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong* or Cooperative People Representative Council).<sup>120</sup> At the time, Masjumi had no longer existed since it had been dismissed in 1960 for allegedly having connections to rebellions in various areas. The legal basis used by Soekarno in dismissing Masjumi and PSI were Presidential Decision No. 7, 1959 and Presidential Regulation No. 13, 1960. By referring to Presidential Decision No. 7/1959 article 9, Soekarno dismissed the two parties and this action was confirmed by *Mahkamah Agung* (the Supreme Court).<sup>121</sup> Dahm —German historian— questioned Soekarno's decision directly in 1966 when PKI rebelled for the second time in 1965 while trying to force him to relinquish his power as the president, Soekarno didn't dismiss the party as demanded by many parties. Soekarno answered this question, "You can't punish a party as a whole only based on the mistakes of some persons in it." When Dahm asked again why he had dismissed Masjumi and PSI in 1960s. He answered that Masjumi and PSI had damaged the completion of Indonesia's revolution; while PKI was an avant-garde or in the front line among revolutionary forces, so that, its existence was required to attain social justice and people's welfare.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> President Soekarno, *Amanat Proklamasi: Pidato pada Ulang Tahun Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia Jilid III 1956-1960*, (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), p. 156.

<sup>119</sup> See, Valina Singka Subekti, "Soekarno dan Marhaenisme", in Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (ed.), *Soekarno: Pemikiran Politik dan Kenyataan Praktek*, (Jakarta: RaJavali Pers, 1988), pp. 161-3

<sup>120</sup> See, Mar'iyah, *Soekarno...*, p. 196.

<sup>121</sup> See, Soekarno, *Amanat Proklamasi...*, pp. 153-4.

<sup>122</sup> See, Subekti, *Soekarno dan...*, p. 150; Bernhard Dahm, *Soekarno and Struggle for Indonesia Independence*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. xii.

From the Islamic community's point of view, the political ideologies that time corresponded to aspirations coming from three societal models developed in Indonesia as mentioned above. The religious group was a place for the Islamist group also known as the *santri* (mean: devoted Muslim) group in the form of Islamic parties such as Masjumi and NU, while nationalist and communist group were a place for *priyayi* (aristocratic) and *abangan* (the nominal Muslim) groups.<sup>123</sup> However, the entry of *santri* groups into nationalist groups played a role in the development of the next polarization in form of a nationalist-religious group on contemporary Indonesia's political stage.

While NU did not show any radical rejection of the concept of Nasakom, not all its components showed the same attitude. Imron Rosyadi was an example of the member who did not agree with the organization's policy. Therefore, he joined a movement opposing Soekarno. In March 2, 1957, six parties: Masjumi, components of NU, PSII, Catholic Party, PSI, and Parkindo (*Partei Kristen Indonesia*, Indonesian Christian Party) released a common statement rejecting Soekarno's concept by forming a body called "*Liga Demokrasi*" (League of Democracy). Prudently this league demanded Soekarno to postpone the establishment of the *kabinet Gotong Royong* (cabinet of mutual assistance). The demand was signed by five figures of IPKI and ten political figures of Masjumi, organizations supporting NU, Catholic Party, Protestant Party, and PSI. Soekarno even regarded the League of Democracy as not being democratic, as being communist-phobic and counter-revolutionary.

Later, when the rebellion of September 30, 1965 provoked by PKI broke out, the involvement of NU's young generation that was so significant in trying to destroy the Communist Party expressed a rejection of the concept of Nasakom, whereas NU elite groups in NU were still trying to maintain good relationships with Soekarno and the Communist Party. The two different actions showed as if there was inconsistency in NU. NU's support of the concept of *Nasakom* only came from some elder groups making policies in the organization. The

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<sup>123</sup> The terms of *Santri*, *Priyayi* and *Abangan* were introduced for the first time by Geertz on his book. See, Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago,



considerable involvement of *Anshor* and *Banser* to destroy PKI, however, showed that resistance to PKI was clearer in its younger groups, although the young groups' actions were supported by charismatic *ulamas* or *kiyais* such as Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin, the leader of Pondok Pesantren of Salafiyah Syafi'iyah Asembagus, and Kiai Zaini Mun'im, the leader of Pondok Pesantren of Nurul Huda.<sup>124</sup>

Considering the huge number of victims resulting from this movement of destroying PKI, Soekarno was very disappointed at the role played by *Banser* and *Anshor*. Therefore, in this situation, NU was in a complicated position since previously NU was always in a moderate position or even supporting various Soekarno's policies. On the other side, the massacre of PKI's members carried out by *Anshor* and *Banser* was the worst and biggest human tragedy in Indonesia during the period of independence. In the period of implementing *Nasakom*, NU was one of the components integrated by Soekarno in his government as a group, which he called Islamists.

## **2. The New Order Period Prior to the 1980s (1966-1984)**

The rise of the New Order's government was a continuity of the fall of Soekarno's Old Order due to political and economical instabilities, and, as the most important factor, the failure of the 1965 PKI *coup d'etat*<sup>125</sup>. The New Order brought a new hope for political life in Indonesia especially for groups directly involved in giving birth to it, including NU. Collaboration among the military, university students, Islamic groups, and certain political parties to resist Soekarno and PKI indicated three supporting forces of the New Order in its beginning period.

Collaboration among Islamic groups and the military was based on a common principal view that the common enemy was the PKI and its branch-groups. PKI with the ideology of communism was regarded as anti-God;

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1976).

<sup>124</sup> Chandra, *Banser antara...*, p. 133

therefore, many Islamic organizations regarded destroying PKI as a *djihād* (holy war). The leader of Muhammadiyah in Central Java released a fatwā (authoritative religious opinion) that resisting the PKI was a religious service. Later, together with the leaders of NU, Muhammadiyah established *Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu/PKI*, (KAP Gestapu/PKI, or Action Front for Destroying *Gestapu/PKI*) in October 4, 1965 and demanded the dismissal of the party. In addition, two student organizations, *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (KAMI, or Action Front of Indonesian University Student) and *Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia* (KAPPI, or Action Front of Indonesian Youth and Students), like NU and Muhammadiyah, also opposed and demanded the dismissal of PKI.

M. Zauhari and Subhan ZE were NU's two key figures leading the action front. Subchan was the chairperson of KAP *Gestapu* assisted by Harry Tjan Silalahi, SH (*Partai Katolik*) as his secretary.<sup>126</sup>

During November-December 1965, *Banser* and GP *Anshor*,<sup>127</sup> the two youth organizations in NU, participated in killing PKI's supporters and sympathizers in Central Java and East Java.<sup>128</sup> In these areas, the youth organized by *Banser* attacked PKI's base areas even before the military and local governments coordinated with each other in taking actions as responses to what PKI had done. They brutally massacred the members of the PKI and its branch group and its sympathizers. What was even worse was that a considerable number of alleged (but never be proved) communists were also pursued, arrested, and imprisoned inhumanly; some of them were also killed at once.<sup>129</sup> Some scholars estimated that the number of PKI members massacred was 500.000 people;<sup>130</sup> the

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<sup>125</sup> After failure of 1965 PKI *coup d'état* results the instabilities in economic and politic sector. The indicator of that problem such as occurred mistrust among governmental apparatus, high cost of the material consumes, and the high of jobless.

<sup>126</sup> See, Dedy Jamaluddin Malik and Idi Subandy Ibrahim, *Zaman Baru Islam Indonesia: Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Abdurrahman Wahid, M. Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Jalaluddin Rakhmat*, (Bandung: Penerbit Zaman Wacana Mulia, 1998), pp. 32-3.

<sup>127</sup> *Banser* (*Barisan Anshor Serba Guna*) was an institution developed in *Gerakan Pemuda Anshor* (GP *Anshor*). GP *Anshor* itself was established in April 24, 1949 in Surabaya, as a continuation of *Anshor Nahdlatul Oelama* (ANO).

<sup>128</sup> See, Rizal Sukma, *Islam in...*, p. 43.

<sup>129</sup> Chandra AP, "Banser antara ...", p. 122.

<sup>130</sup> See, Ricklefs, *A History of...*, p. 274.

participation of Islamic communities in this massacre was very significant as showed by the youth organization of NU.

Meanwhile, it seemed that NU youth's attitude was different from the elders' when in October 1965 *Anshor* released an instruction signed by Chamid Widjaja to its members to assist the TNI AD (Indonesian Army Force) to recover national order, while the *kiais* were carefully responding to the political problem. This different attitude was indicated in Pedomam Politik Pemberitaan Harian NU (Political Guidance on NU's Daily News Affairs) released by PBNU in October 14, 1965 and was sent to five mass media, consisting of instructions to maintain good relations with the PKI and President Soekarno, and not to participate in attacking Indonesian Air Force and ABRI in general.<sup>131</sup>

There were at least two main factors influencing religious communities, especially NU with its *Banser* and *Anshor*. First, when PKI in late 1963 carried out its one-sided action in realizing a land reform program<sup>132</sup> by seizing lands, burning farming lands, and other actions carried out violently and by force. Many NU members became victims of these actions provoking anger on the part of Islamic community. Meanwhile, as confirmed by Morteimer (1969: 18), NU was implicitly categorized as one of seven village's devils that should be destroyed by the PKI<sup>133</sup>. Second, as stated by Walkin (1969: 828), anti-religious attitudes showed by PKI, which never appeared previously, increased religious sentiment in the Islamic community. From this point of view, it may be said that the action of destroying PKI carried out by the NU youth group was a response or a revenge on its previous actions victimizing many NU members.

In this period of the New Order, the policy on Islamic affairs was the main attention of the government. In formulating various policies on Islamic affairs, the government referred to a consideration that in order to support national

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<sup>131</sup> Chandra AP, "Banser antara ...", p. 133.

<sup>132</sup>. The land reform program was a key determining the success of PKI in receiving significant vote in 1952 general election but also was a time bomb destructing itself after have failed in 1965 coup de e'tat.

<sup>133</sup> Since the appearance of PKI as the real political party the Islamic faction to be its rival, so PKI argue that to destroy of the *Ulamas*, the vital component of Islamic faction, was to be one targets of its political movement.

development,<sup>134</sup> a conducive atmosphere in the state and community was required. History has proved that the previous Old Order was full of disturbances and rebellions, so that the processes of governing societal welfare by continuous development were set aside.

The rebellions among others were provoked by the communists group, which was regarded by the government as “left extremism”: 1948 PKI-Madiun rebellion which was led by Muso and G30S PKI (PKI’s Movement of September 30, 1965) which was led by Col. Untung; they were also provoked by Muslim extremist groups, regarded by the government as “right extremism”, demanding the realization of an Islamic state. These were initiated by the rebellion of *Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia* (DI-TII, or Islamic State-Indonesian Islamic Armed Forces) in West Java. This DI-TII led by Sukarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo had a domino effect in other areas in West Sumatra, Sulawesi and Aceh; there is no comprehensive solution for rebellions in Aceh until now. These left extremist and right extremist forces were regarded as two “latent dangers”<sup>135</sup> which may endanger the stability of the government.

Various policies were formulated in order to minimize or even eliminate the two threats. The ban on communism was actually a beginning step in eliminating this ideology and was decreed by the government with support from the majority of Indonesian communities, mainly the Islamic community, including NU. Furthermore, it was hoped that de-ideologization of parties would result in no more ideological conflicts and the parties were expected to be more program-oriented; this process was supported by a policy of mass depoliticisation by means of the “floating mass” concept.<sup>136</sup> This was a crucial policy carried out by the New Order’s government.

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<sup>134</sup> The five-year development in Soeharto’s period was formulated in *Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* (Repelita, or Five Year Development Plan). This plan actually was a continuation of Soekarno’s program of *Berdikari* (self-empowerment) in 1965.

<sup>135</sup> See, Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order Development and Pressure for Change*, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 121.

<sup>136</sup> Floating mass policy was aimed at cutting connections among bases and activities of political parties and *Golongan Karya* (Functional Group) and mass except before general elections as the government’s strategy in minimizing the mass’ political resistances against it.

In order to control the right extremist groups, the government tried to minimize the activities of Islamic groups trying to arouse the spirit of establishing an Islamic state. According to Ricklefs (1981: 273), what had been done by the New Order government indicated its view on the Islamic communities, especially the hardliners, which was similar to the Dutch colonial regime's views. For this purpose, three restructuring steps were gradually carried out by the government: 1) supporting the establishment of Parmusi, 2) simplifying political parties, and 3) as the most important, implementing the policy of *Pancasila sebagai Asas Tunggal* (Pancasila as the Sole Foundation) which was responded to by all Islamic organizations, including NU, and will be specifically discussed in Chapter IV.

Supporting the establishment of *Partei Muslimin Indonesia* (Parmusi, or Indonesian Muslims Party) was a first step of the government's political restructuring as an effort to weaken the political steps carried out by the modernists in Masjumi.<sup>137</sup> Previously, key Islamic figures from the modernist group tried to re-establish the forbidden Masjumi party by proposing the establishment of *Partei Demokrasi Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Democracy Party) submitted by Muhammad Hatta, Indonesia's ex vice president; this proposal was not positively responded to by the government. As a solution, Parmusi was established and legalized by Presidential Decree number 70, February 1968 with a requirement that senior leaders of Masjumi were not allowed to join it. The leaders of Muhammadiyah, H. Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun were appointed to be the chairperson and the general secretary of the party.<sup>138</sup> Actually, in the party's first conference, Mr. Muhammad Roem was elected as the chairperson, but since the government did not accept Muhammad Roem, which it regarded as a Masjumi figure, the elected General Chairman of Parmusi who was accepted by the government was Mintaredja. The government's refusal of Muhammad Roem was understandable since it did not want Parmusi to be led by old figures so that a Neo-Masjumi would be born.

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<sup>137</sup> See, Donal J. Porter, *Managing Politic and Islam in Indonesia*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 43.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid*, p. 42.

After succeeding in breaking Masjumi's connections as a symbol of political Islam struggling for the formalization of Islam in the state's form (Islamic state), the next restructuring step was to simplify the parties. The 1966 MPRS' Decree Number 12, aimed at simplifying parties, was not directly implemented. In order to implement it, the government proposed "*RUU Pemilu*" (Bill of General Elections), stating among others that the next general election will be held by using the district system. This system proposed by Sarbini in the second Indonesian Army's Seminar in Bandung, was regarded as a natural mechanism in reducing the number of political parties. This idea was refused by DPGR mostly consisting of representatives of the parties. Based on a compromise, the general election was postponed until 1971. For the government, postponing the general election was a strategy to consolidate all of its forces to win the election. This strategy succeeded so that Golkar received 62.8% votes, which was a fantastic number in the history of general elections in Indonesia until that time.

The idea of simplification of parties, regarded as a mandate of MPRS, proposed by President Soeharto in February 7, 1970 by stating that parties should be categorized into materialist and spiritualist groups, besides *Golongan Karya* (Functional Group). This proposal was followed up 20 days later by means of a dialogue and consultation with existing political parties. When the government's position was very strong, the idea was realized in 1973 in the form of a Bill of Parties and The Functional Groups, which submitted it to DPR in December 1974 and then legalized it as an Act in August 14, 1975.<sup>139</sup> Based on this grouping, the political parties were simplified into three: PPP, Golkar, and PDI. PPP was a fusion of four Islamic political parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti); while PDI was a fusion of *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI, or Indonesian Nationalist Party), *Partai Kristen Indonesia* (Parkindo, or Indonesian Christian Party), Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), *Murba*, and *Ikatan Pejuang Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (IPKI, or League to Uphold Indonesian Independence).

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<sup>139</sup> See, Samuh, *Dinamika Komunikasi...*, p. 301.

This fusion of political parties had three aims: *First*, replacing old political institutions, especially political parties, with new political institutions or new political parties; *second*, defining strict restrictions between role institutionalization in political areas and role institutionalization in non-political areas; *third*, replacing old values and norms with new values and norms. The concept of one common ideology (Pancasila) resulted as an impact of the third aim, so that there would not be polarization of ideologies, and the trend would be centripetal.<sup>140</sup>

The following discussion will be focused on how the government managed Islamic affairs in order to achieve a conducive atmosphere and stability for supporting national development and how the Islamic community, especially NU, responded to the policies whose periodization would be limited until prior to 1980s.

#### **a. Ban on Atheism and the Emergence of the Trilogy of Religious Tolerance**

The two big mistakes of PKI in provoking two rebellions —the 1948 PKI rebellion in Madiun and the Movement of September 30, 1965— in turn resulted in a policy of banning atheistic communism as a response of the government to strong demands of various elements in society, including NU which played an important role in destroying PKI and its branch organizations. This ban was implemented by means of the government's policy requiring that all Indonesian citizens adhere to one of the religions recognized by the government (Islam, Catholics, Protestant, Hindu, and Buddhism) and that the study of religions are taught in the schools.

Consequently, some hundred thousand adherents of Atheism, *Aliran Kebatinan* (Spiritualism), and Animism then respectively began to adhere to one of religions recognized by the government. Due to the highly striking role of Islamic communities in the massacre of PKI's members and since NU refused anyone to convert to Islam based on political reasons, most of these adherents of Atheism later convert to religions other than Islam to escape from the

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<sup>140</sup> See, Kacung Marijan, "Pembangunan Politik Orba: Stabilitas", in *AULA*, June 1991, pp. 56-7.

government's pressure and repression. Meanwhile, Idham Khalid (General Chairman of PBNU) requested that NU not be entered into by "illegal passengers". This request was confirmed by an instruction of PBNU in 1969 forbidding NU to receive new members from "illegal parties or mass organizations." In fact, however, a small amount of those ex-adherents of atheism confessed to Islam. During the six years after 1965, based on the churches' reports, 2.800.000 person were registered as new adherents of Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). There were also highly significant increases in the number of Hindu's.<sup>141</sup>

The considerable number of adherents of atheism who later adhered to Christianity provoked envy among Muslims. Therefore, there were tensions in the society especially among Muslims and Christians,<sup>142</sup> who have helped each other previously in destroying PKI. In addition, a statement of a Protestant priest in Makasar regarding polygamy as practised by the Prophet Muhammad<sup>143</sup> worsened the situation since the statement provoked the burning of his library by Muslims. Kiai Dachlan, who in October 18, 1967 had replaced Kiai Zuhri as Ministry of Religious Affairs, in November 18, 1967, held a meeting among key figures of Catholic, Protestant, and Islam, then established an inter-religious committee called *Wadah Musyawarah Antar Agama* (Inter-Religious Consultation Forum). When this forum held a meeting, the Muslim group proposed a regulation banning any Indonesian who had believed in any religion to change his/her religion. This proposal was refused by the Christian group, so that the Muslim group accused the Christian group with dishonesty in religious tolerance.

Regarding that incident, Kiai Dahlan, acting as a representative of NU and as Minister of Religious Affairs, tried to be neutral and requested that the majority religious group should not suppress the minority. On the other hand, minority groups should not dominate the majority. In addition, he stated that the government did not give priority to any religion over another even for Islam as the

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<sup>141</sup> See, Feillard, *NU vis a vis ...* , pp. 141-2.

<sup>142</sup> See, Dr. H.Tarmizi Taher, *Aspiring for the Middle Path: Religious Harmony in Indonesian*, (Jakarta: CENSIS, 1997)., p. 40.

<sup>143</sup> Feillard, *NU vis a vis ...* , p.143.



majority religion. All religious groups were treated without discrimination before the law.

Although this inter-religious meeting was regarded as a failure in overcoming conflicts among inter-religious communities, but it succeeded in holding some dialogues in 1970s as beginning steps for reaching common agreements. Later, the Ministry of Religious Affairs released some regulations regarding this matter. The Decrees of the Ministry of Religious Affairs number 70, 77, 1978 confirmed by the Decree of the Ministry of Religious Affairs number 1, 1979 regarding religious mission activities and religious donations from abroad for religious organizations were the government's policies in regulating harmony among inter-religious communities. The decrees determined that: first, religious mission activities or propagation of religions should not be carried out toward communities which professed a religion; second, the propagation of religions should not be carried out in unfair ways, such as giving foods, clothes, medicine, and equipments, and so on with aim of persuading any person who had held any religion to adhere to another religion; third, the propagation of religions should not be carried out by door to door visits; and fourth, all foreign donations in the form of financial assistances should be given through authorized institutions and under control of the government.<sup>144</sup>

Also, in order to maintain harmony among inter-religious communities, the government later used five organisations as the central representatives of religious communities: *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI, the Indonesian Council of Ulama), *Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia* (PGI, The Protestant Communion of Churches in Indonesia), *Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia* (KWI, The Catholic Bishops Conference of Indonesia), *Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia* (Parisadha Hindu Dharma of Indonesia), and *Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia* (Walubi, The Indonesian Buddhists Trusteeship)<sup>145</sup>. These organizations not only acted as

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<sup>144</sup> Taher, *Aspiring for...* , p. 41.

<sup>145</sup> PGI or DGI (*Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia*, Indonesian Churches Council) was founded in 1950. PGI, KWI, Parisada Hindu Dharma and Walubi were established by their adherents not by the government and only MUI has a link to the government.

consulting forums discussing religious issues but also acted as bridges connecting the government with religious communities.

In late 1970s, the government, in this case was the Ministry of Religious Affairs —Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara: 1979-1983— announced the idea regarding the three concepts of tolerances in Indonesia or “Trilogy of Religious Tolerance” as another policy of the government, consisting of Tolerance of Internal Religion, Tolerance of Inter-religious Communities, and Tolerance between the Religious Community and the Government. As a response, NU regarded this policy as positive. Therefore, in formulating its attitudes towards the society and the government, NU referred to this policy. The concept of “*tiga ukhuwahs*” (three brotherhoods) proposed by K.H. Ahmad Sidiq, as well as tolerance as one of the formal attitudes of NU’s members which in turn accepted the Pancasila as the sole national ideological foundation, was apart from harmony between the government’s policy and comprehension of NU’s members regarding *fiqh* affairs; this will be discussed in the next chapter.

It is important to note that the envy of the Islamic community regarding a situation in which many adherents of Atheism and Spiritualism replaced its previous faith with religions other than Islam was not reasonable, since it was a logical consequence of the attitude of Islamic communities, especially NU, which had forbidden ex-members of PKI to adhere Islam. In this case, the Islamic community should have been more introspective, since they should have welcomed anyone, whatever reason or motive he/she had in adhering to any religion and since his/her attitude in this matter should have been understood. After becoming a new adherent of a religion (in this case, especially Islam), the understanding of this religion would be introduced to him/her and will be developed in his/her mind. If anyone were allowed to adhere to any religion he/she liked without any prejudice, then the envy would not exist because the adherents of Atheism would not be afraid of adhering to Islam as one of legitimate- and recognized religions by the government.

Meanwhile, NU also intensively opposed the Bill of Marriage proposed by the government in 1973, since NU’s *ulamas* thought that at least 11 articles in

the Bill were in conflict with the *Sharī'a*. These 11 articles discussed matters about: marriage in religious and civil perspectives, *'idda* period (waiting period allowable to remarry for a wife who had been divorced by her husband), marriage after pregnancy, engagement, adopted children, interfaith/inter-religious marriage, age limitations for marriages, property division between husbands and wives, marriage of milked and adopted children, remarriage between divorced husbands and wives, polygamy.<sup>146</sup>

This refusal of the Bill of Marriage was strictly proposed by *Rois Aam* of PBNU, K.H. Bishri Sjansuri, which was later followed up by DPR members from NU, which joined PPP in the form of a demand to change the bill. The government responded to the protest by changing all those articles in conflict with the Islamic *Sharī'a*.<sup>147</sup>

#### **b. Keluarga Berencana (KB, or Family Planning)**

One of the government's policies regarding societal interests was *Keluarga Berencana* (KB, or Family Planning Program). This policy was aimed to decrease very-high population's growth regarded by the government as decreasing societal welfare due to the heavy burden a family has to bear. The government assumed that the more children the heavier burden a family has to bear and this will influence the heavier burden the government has to bear in overcoming this problem. The KB program was a step used by the government as an alternative in overcoming this overpopulation problem by using various methods of contraception. According to the Islamic community, however, the methods of contraception are a matter that should be previously legitimized by authorised religious experts (*ulamas*) in order to not violate the laws and universal values of Islam.

Meanwhile, *Fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence) used by the Islamic community in Indonesia, mostly consisting of adherents of Sunnite Islam following any of the four *Imāms* of *madhhabs*, referred to classical books written about 1200 years

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<sup>146</sup> See, Feillard, *NU vis a vis ...* , pp. 193-94.

<sup>147</sup> See, Noeh and HS. (eds.), *Menghidupkan Ruh...* , p. 140.

ago by the Imāms. At that time, the technology had not yet invented some of the contraceptives known at present. Regarding this matter, NU's *ulamas* made an *idjtihād* to respond or solve this problem at present. In fact, there were various responses from Islamic communities to the KB program from those, which refused and forbade it to those, which allowed it.

After the government had announced KB as a national program in the late 1960s, then in October 1968, the Ministry of Public Welfare also General Chairman of PBNU, Dr. K.H. Idham Clahid, acting as the Chairman of *Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Pusat* (Central Institution of Family Planning), invited various social and religious organizations to actively participate in this program. *Muslimat NU*,<sup>148</sup> a women organization in NU, participated in this meeting and positively responded to the government's request. This accepting response was followed by a demand that this program should be focused on controlling births for the health and safety of mothers and children, based on an awareness regarding the importance of education on population as an effort to achieve benefit for the families and welfare for the community.<sup>149</sup>

In addition to supporting the policy, NU was also active in formulating various actions in order to make it succeed. The position held by Mrs. H.S.A.Wahid Hasjim in *Dewan Pertimbangan* (Consultative Council) of *Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Pusat* and the position held by Mrs. H. Chasanah Mansyur in the Information Department of the institution were part of the participation. Meanwhile, K.H. Idham Chalid himself was a representative of NU holding an important position in formulating this program.

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<sup>148</sup> *Muslimat NU* is a branch organization for Muslim women in NU. This *Muslimat NU* was established in NU Conference XV, December 9-15, in Surabaya, that time it was named NOM (*Nahdhatul Oelama Moeslimat*). NU Conference XVI, held in March 26-29, 1946, in Purwokerto, Central of Java, announced officially the establishment of *Nahdlatul Oelama Moeslimat* (NOM) in March 29, 1946, coincided with Rabi' II 26, AH 1365. That date was determined as the birthday of *Muslimat NU*. Later, in NU Conference XIX in May 28, 1952, in Palembang, *Nahdhatul Oelama Moeslimat* (NOM) became an autonomous institution of NU having a new name, *Muslimat NU*. For more information on *Muslimat NU*, see this following website, <http://www.muslimat-nu.or.id/muslimatNU.htm>

<sup>149</sup> See, Idham Chalid, *Sejarah Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama*, (Jakarta: P.P. Muslimat N.U., 1979), p. 110.

Furthermore, in order to have guidance and references based on religious law, the leaders of Muslimat NU reported this matter to *Syuriah* and *Tanfidziyah* of PBNU, which responded in September 25, 1969 by determining the formulations for implementing KB based on eight principles as follows:

- 1) KB should be defined as a system for putting a distance between pregnancies in order to achieve welfare not for preventing pregnancy in order to limit the size of the family.
- 2) KB should be based on giving priority to the welfare of the mother and children and not based on concern about poverty, hunger, and so on.
- 3) KB should not be implemented by means of abortion.
- 4) It is forbidden to damage or to remove parts of the bodies of the husband or wife.
- 5) KB is a personal and voluntary program and not a mass and forced program.
- 6) A wife or husband should have an agreement from her/his spouse before participating in this KB program.
- 7) KB should not violate the laws of religion and ethics.
- 8) KB should avoid being misused for any immoral action or purpose.<sup>150</sup>

In NU conference XXV, in December 1971, in Surabaya, NU organizationally legalized the implementation of KB for its members; this legitimation was used as a reference by *nahdiyins* (members of NU) in implementing this government's policy.<sup>151</sup>

This program was regarded as important so it needed a clear position based on *Sharī'a* (Islamic law). Therefore, the program received serious attention from *ulamas* later demanding NU to hold a limited meeting for *ulamas* to discuss KB from a *Sharī'a*'s perspective. The meeting attended by key *ulamas* from some provinces: K.H.M. Bisri Sjansuri (Jombang-East Java), Prof. T.M. Hasybi Ash

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<sup>150</sup> *Ibid*, p. 112.

<sup>151</sup> Actually, the legality of KB based on Islamic law had been clarified by PBNU in the Grand Meeting, Shawwal 21-25, AH 1379/April 18-22, 1960 determining that the use of methods of contraception except stopping pregnancy entirely is *makrūh* (allowable but not encouraged). Meanwhile, stopping pregnancy entirely is *harām* (forbidden) unless there is a danger in not doing it. See, K.H. Abdul Azis Masyhuri, *Masalah Keagamaan Hasil Mukhtamar dan Munas Ulama Nahdhatul Ulama*, (Surabaya, Dinama Press, 1997), pp. 216-7.

Shiddieqy (Yogyakarta-Central Java), Prof. K.H.M. Sjafi'i, A. Karim (Surabaya-East Java), H.M. Sjukri Ghazali (Jakarta), K.H. Saleh Sua'idy (Jakarta) and K.H. Mohammad Sjudja'i (Sukabumi-West Java) resulted in the following three recommendations:

- 1) Participating in the KB program by controlling birth is *mubāḥ* (allowable) if there is a personal necessity on the part of the husband/wife involved if there is awareness, consent, and agreement between the two.
- 2) The implementation of the KB program in general should be preceded by a research carried out by a team of experts in related fields (medicine, demography, economics, social science, education, and religion). If the research determines that, in general, the KB program should be implemented then it is allowable by determining participating areas and the required period.
- 3) Devices/Methods: a). for implementing KB program it is allowed to use medicines/devices and methods not endangering the husband, wife, and their children physically and spiritually such as tablet, salve, condom, diaphragm, periodical continence. b). The use of I.U.D. (spiral device) and similar devices is not allowable as long as there are other medicines and devices, since to fix, install the devices one has to see a woman's genitalia, an action forbidden by *Sharī'a* except in an emergency.<sup>152</sup>

Still regarding the matter, NU recommended that sterilization and abortion are forbidden by *Sharī'a*, except in an emergency, for example in order to save the mother's life.<sup>153</sup>

The government admitted that until the 1970s this KB program was regarded as having failed completely since they did not much involve *ulamas* until that time so that some of the *ulamas* stated that the use of contraceptives was forbidden and this statement was one of factors hampering this program. The situation was different when in the early of 1980s the Junior Ministry of Population Affairs and also the Chairman of BKKBN (*Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional*, or Coordinating Body for National Family

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<sup>152</sup> *Ibid*, p. 186.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid*

Planning), Dr. Haryono Soeryono, realised the failure was due to the fact that they didn't involve *ulamas* in giving counselling and explanations to the society. By means of various discussions, seminars, and workshops, the government later succeeded in inviting *ulamas* to discuss in order to achieve awareness on the benefits of this program. Subsequently, this program of controlling the birth rate of the population was regarded as successful.<sup>154</sup>

Meanwhile, *ulamas* also played important roles in supporting various policies of the government, not only this KB program, but also policies on transmigration, living environment, cooperative, and public health. This indicated that the government needed *ulamas* as stated by Gus Dur to the journalists of MATRA.<sup>155</sup>

From this writer's point of view, the success of implementing of KB program achieved in 1980s was a form of good cooperation between the government and the *ulamas*. It did not mean that the *ulamas* released a new *fatwā* (authoritative religious opinion) but that they only socialized previous *fatwā* made in national conferences of *ulamas*. Meanwhile, cooperation among the government and *ulamas* was the best solution to support this socializing program.

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<sup>154</sup> The government's admittance was stated by an ex-Ministry of Religious Affairs, Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, see Taher, *Aspiring for ...*, p. 27.

<sup>155</sup> See, M. Saleh (Editor), *Tabayun Gus Dur: Pribumisasi Islam, Hak Minoritas, Reformasi Kultural*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1998), p. 48.

## Chapter IV

### Responses of NU to the Government's Policies on Islamic Affairs in the Period of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid as General Chairman of PBNU (1984-1999)

#### A. K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur): A Controversial Figure

Wahid leads a 'traditional, conservative, rural-based socio-cultural organization of some 25-30 million Muslim Indonesians. But he himself is modern in outlook, liberal in approach, and very much an urban intellectual. In a land of decision by consensus (*musyawarah* and *mufakat*), Wahid is an unabashed individualist, lead by inspiration. In a culture in a society ruled along authoritarian lines, Wahid argues for democracy. At a time of nascent Islamic revivalism, Wahid, the single most influential Muslim leader in the land, warns the government against helping Muslim too much.<sup>1</sup>

The 27<sup>th</sup> NU congress in Pesantren Asembagus, Situbondo, East Java was one of the very important occasions in the career of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, more popularly known as Gus Dur, in the NU community. At that time, Gus Dur was honoured by a decision of *ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd* ('those who clarify and solve problems'. A term known in traditional Islamic politics; or formatting council) to occupy the highest position in NU management as a *Tanfidziyah* (Board of Executive) Chairman<sup>2</sup> of PBNU (*Pengurus Besar Nahdhatul Ulama*, The Central Board of the NU) together with K.H. Ahmad Sidiq as *Rois Aam* (the Chief of *Syuriah* Board of The Central Board of the NU). Later, he was re-elected to be the General Chairman (with the additional term "general") of PBNU in the next five years period by acclamation in 28<sup>th</sup> NU congress in Krapyak, Yogyakarta, 1989. In the next occasion, in 29<sup>th</sup> NU congress in Cipasung, Tasikmalaya, he defeated his rival, H. Abu Hasan, MA, by receiving slightly more votes to be re-elected General Chairman of PBNU for the third time.

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<sup>1</sup> A description by Adam Schwarz, in Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and Ideology of Tolerance*, (New York, Routledge, 1196), p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Position of "Chairman" without "General" (not *General Chairman*) was due to the high spirit of giving supremacy to the *ulamas* that time, the desire of NU to return to the *Khittah* of 1926. What have been regarded as the highest leader of the organization were *Syuriah* and not *Tanfidziyah* so that the utilization of the term "Chairman" without "General" for the Chairman of *Tanfidziyah* was merely aimed to eliminate the impression that *Tanfidziyah* was indeed not the final body that makes decision in NU but *Syuriah* that was occupied by most honourable *ulamas*.



Gus Dur's ideas and K.H. Ahmad Sidiq's ideas were often in harmony with each other, although they had differences in certain matters too. While K.H. Ahmad Sidiq was an anti political figure and urged that NU work in social development and placed NU as a moral power correcting the government in implementing the constitution (Pancasila, UUD'45 or 1945 Constitution, and GBHN or Guidelines on State Policy) which have been agreed upon by the Indonesian citizens; Gus Dur wanted NU to have ruling power and become a part of the government.<sup>3</sup> The analogy between the basic ideology, "Pancasila", and the "Medina Charter"<sup>4</sup> drawn by K.H. Ahmad Sidiq was a brilliant idea of the charismatic *kiai* in achieving a political compromise between NU and the government.

In 1979, the three societal attitudes: *al-tawāsuṭ* (standing in the middle position), *al-i'tidāl* (just), and *al-tawāzun* (balance), which should be possessed by the NU community as the implementation of the Islamic teachings of the followers of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* were successfully formulated by K.H. Ahmad Sidiq as a form of societal attitude of NU. Together with Gus Dur, to these three societal attitudes he added *al-tasāmuh* (in the form of tolerances to be given to differences in religious, societal, and cultural affairs) and *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar* (ordering good deeds and forbidding bad deeds).

As a national figure who was also known internationally, Gus Dur had many brilliant ideas. As a leader of NU, the organisation of "*sarungan people*"<sup>5</sup>, his popularity rocketed with his ideas. His ideas were often publicized by the Indonesian mass media especially since 1980s after he occupied an honourable position in the NU leadership. After he together with K.H. Ahmad Sidiq and other figures who had similar ideas, had succeeded in completing the NU's final attitude regarding Pancasila as the national ideology, in the 1990s his typical way

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<sup>3</sup> See, Andree Feillard, "Nahdatul Ulama dan Negara: Fleksibilitas, Legitimasi dan Pembaharuan", in Elyasa K.H. Darwis (ed.), *Gus Dur, NU dan Masyarakat Sipil*, (Yogyakarta: LKIS and Pustaka Pelajar, 1994), pp. 265-6.

<sup>4</sup> See, Munawar Fuad Noeh and Mastuki HS, *Menghidupkan Ruh Pemikiran K.H. Ahmad Siddiq*, (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Popularly term to identify NU community since NU people usually use *Sarung* (a traditional cloth for covering legs) while they practice the religious ritual.

of thinking was getting more obvious but harder to be understood by the common people. His controversial ideas were often making others confused and often regarded as not in harmony with some Islamic communities who, for example, criticized him due to his support for General Murdani who had been considered as suppressing the Islamic community or due to his opinion which wasn't in the mainstream of the opinion of the Islamic community concerning the case of the "Monitor" tabloid. Together with some multi-religious and multicultural figures standing out of the ruling power, he established "*Fordem*" (*Forum Demokrasi*, or Forum of Democracy) and criticized the ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, or Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) for being sectarian organization. He thereby took a risk of opposing the government and this resulted in an unfriendly attitude from the government afterwards.

When a *Romo* or Catholic priest (Romo Sandyawan Sumardi SJ) was suppressed by the government since he was regarded as protecting a figure of the PRD (*Partei Rakyat Demokrasi*, Democratic People Party), Gus Dur acted as his defender. Due to consistency in his tolerance toward multi-religious communities, he was given an honourable award, "*Ramon Magsaysay*" (Asia's equivalent of the Nobel Prize) in 1993.

From this point of view, we will observe his ideas of tolerance. He was indeed a leader of NU but his opinions were not always synchronic with NU as an organization. Disagreements or even oppositions of NU's senior figures and kiais, including his own uncle, K.H. Yusuf Hasjim, to his opinions regarding some matters were a common reality in NU. Therefore, it may be reasonable if some scientists said that Gus Dur was representing himself, not representing of NU. His opinions and ideas will be discussed in next subchapter after describing his short biography as a background of his personality so that a complete understanding will be gained concerning his ideas, or at least, we can arrive as close as possible at the true intention behind his ideas.

## 1. A Brief Biography of Gus Dur

Gus Dur is commonly known as having been born in Denanyar, Jombang, on August 4, 1940, since he always celebrates his birthday on that date. In fact, however, his real birthday was Sha‘bān 4, AH 1359/September 7, AD 1940.<sup>6</sup>

Since he was child, he was educated and nurtured by a prominent ulama’s family. Gus Dur inherited blue blood from his parents; he is a grandson of the two founding figures of NU, *Hadratus Sjeikh* Hasjim Asj’ari and Kiai Bisri Sjansuri. Hasjim Asj’ari, the founder of the well-known “*Pesantren Tebu Ireng*”, Jombang, East Java, which had produced prominent *ulamas* nationwide, is a grandfather from his father side, Kiai Wahid Hasjim. Kiai Bisri Sjansuri is a grandfather from his mother’s side, Solichah.

Gus Dur was introduced into politics since he was four years old when he was brought by his father to live in Jakarta in the last period of 1944. This happened due to a proposal of Kiai Hasjim Asj’ari to the Japanese government to give his oldest son, Wahid Hasjim, authority to lead *Shumubu* (Office of Religious Affairs). Wahid Hasjim and Gus Dur stayed in the Menteng area, Central Jakarta, an elite region favoured by prominent entrepreneurs, professionals, and politicians.<sup>7</sup>

This environment in Jakarta made Gus Dur have some acquaintance with political matters. Due to his father’s position, important political figures often visited Gus Dur’s house. In addition, due to his flexibility as a national figure, Wahid Hasjim was able to form good relations with many people from various backgrounds including communist figures. At one night, Gus Dur opened the door for a visitor, who —based on the visitor’s own request— was called Uncle Husen. Later, it was known that Uncle Husen was Tan Malaka, a communist figure who was very famous that time.<sup>8</sup>

1945-1949 for Indonesia was a period of revolution. At this period Wahid Hasjim and his son, Gus Dur, went home to Jombang, East Java. The struggle to

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<sup>6</sup> See, Greg Barton, *Biografi Gus Dur, The Authorized Biography of ABDURRAHMAN WAHID*, (Yogyakarta, LKiS, 2003), p. 25.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 35.

defend the country forced Wahid Hasjim to conduct guerrilla warfare together with other troops and to leave little Gus Dur with his grandfather, Kiai Hasjim Asj'ari who was later died at the age of 75, in July 1947. From the guests who visited his grandfather's house, Gus Dur's acquaintance with politics continued in his early childhood.<sup>9</sup>

Since K.H. Wahid Hasjim later was elected to be Minister of Religious Affairs in December 1949, the little Gus Dur with his whole family had to move back to Jakarta and stay there. Due to his father's position the little Gus Dur's acquaintance with politics continued by listening to the conversations of his father's companions. His smartness made this five-year-old Gus Dur able to read the alphabet fluently under the guidance of his father. This was mentioned by his mother, Mrs Wahid Hasjim in an occasion.<sup>10</sup>

While living with his father in Jakarta, Gus Dur was also in touch with European cultures, mainly its classical music. This acquaintance started when the little Gus Dur was often entrusted by his father after coming from school in the afternoons to a German friend who had been a Muslim, Williem Iskandar Bueller, who often played classical songs mainly Beethoven's. Due to this acquaintance, Gus Dur began to admire and even later to love European classical songs deeply.<sup>11</sup> In addition to Beethoven, Gus Dur also liked other figures of classical music including Mozart. He said once, that he had collection of Beethoven's 9<sup>th</sup> Symphony played by 19 orchestras and 19 conductors, six of which are in the form of compact disks (CDs) with Herbert von Karajan as the conductor. He admitted that the collections cost a lot of money, among others to hunt for the Violin Concerto of Mozart G Major CD played by the Berliner Philharmonic and conducted by von Karajan abroad.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>9</sup> See, Dedy Djamaluddin Malik and Idi Subandy Ibrahim, *Zaman Baru Islam Indonesia: Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Abdurrahman Wahid, M. Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Jalaluddin Rakhmat*, (Bandung, Penerbit Zaman Wacana Mulia, 1998), p. 79.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>11</sup> See, Barton, *Biografi Gus Dur...*, p. 39.

<sup>12</sup> Malik and Ibrahim, *Zaman Baru Islam...*, p. 87.

From this point of view, we may understand why his appreciation of music is very deep and enthusiastic nowadays, so that when *Perahu Retak* (the Broken Boat) album by Emha Ainun Nadjib and Franky Sahilatua was released, Gus Dur commented that Indonesian musical world should search for educational aspects.

All of Indonesian music at present is mournful and superficial. Its eminence and sincerity has been lost so that influences of music at present are not similar to those of past music. The creators do not create music to touch their listeners' hearts. They create it only for selling it. Love is considered not different from the stimulation of lust. To improve this, Indonesian music should search for its educational aspects so that its influence upon its listeners will be deeper.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to reading various kinds of books, others of Gus Dur's hobbies are playing football and chess, listening to music, and watching films. To fulfil his reading hobby he used his father's library at home and was active as a member of a public library in Jakarta. Wahid Hasjim's house was different from the houses of the upper and middle classes in Jakarta that time, since it had a large library, which was hard to find in other houses.

Gus Dur read almost all the books available in his house so in his teenage years, he was familiar with philosophy, religious history, martial arts history, and fictive literatures. No wonder that he once said that, "I had no girlfriend, I was afraid of girls; my friends were only books and balls."<sup>14</sup> Due to his hobby, the 14-year-old Gus Dur had to wear glasses and forgot his dream to be a soldier and to attend AKABRI (*Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, Academy of the Indonesian Armed Force).

He began his elementary education in KRIS elementary school, Central Jakarta, only in two grades, which were 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> grades, later he moved to Matraman Perwari Elementary School located not far from his new house in Matraman, Central Jakarta. At this stage, he had a fully secular education, but the religious education he had had previously while he lived in Jombang very much influenced him and was his religious foundation.

His mother worried that this secular education would result in the fading of their family's very strong identity, holding tight to the *ulama's* traditions. This

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 80.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 81.

worry was revealed by his mother's remark to the Editor, "I wanted him to go back to his background as a *kiai*'s son who is very familiar with *pesantren*".<sup>15</sup> Gus Dur responded to his mother's anxiety with full understanding. After completing his elementary school, he continued to study in *Sekolah Menengah Ekonomi Pertama* (SMEP, or Junior Economics High School) Gowongan, Yogyakarta and was lodging in *Pesantren*. In this SMEP Gus Dur once was not promoted to higher grade, from 2<sup>nd</sup> grade to 3<sup>rd</sup> grade, since his concentration was disturbed by his hobbies that he could not set aside. His failure was due to among others to watching too much football games and movies in cinemas.<sup>16</sup>

In his early years, Gus Dur experienced deep sorrow when his beloved father died. This happened when his father took him on Saturday, April 18, 1953, to Bandung to attend an NU meeting in Sumedang,<sup>17</sup> a town located 200 kms from Eastern Jakarta. Some kilometres before reaching Bandung, the vehicle he rode had an accident. Gus Dur's father died due to this accident.

From 1953 until 1957, while he studied in SMEP he was living in the house of Kiai Haji Junaid, a Muhammadiyah's *kiai* and a member of Muhammadiyah's *Majlis Tarjih*.<sup>18</sup> Some years later, he lodged in *Pesantren Tegalrejo*, a famous *pesantren* in Magelang. From 1957 to 1963, he was *santri*<sup>19</sup> in *Pesantren Krapyak*, Yogyakarta, and lived in K.H. Ali Maksum's house.

In this *pesantren*, his love of books was getting more intense, so that his friends were surprised when he came to the *pesantren* bringing a sack of books. When he was fifteen years old, he read Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*, Plato and Thales's philosophy books, William Bochner's novels and other books one of his teachers in SMEP lent him. The broad knowledge he gained by reading is a

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>16</sup> See, Barton, *Biografi Gus Dur...*, p. 458.

<sup>17</sup> The trip of Gus Dur with his father according to another writing was a gift, since Gus Dur had just passed *Sekolah Rakyat* (Citizen School) or *Sekolah Dasar* (Elementary School) at present, and since he had become the winner of a writing contest for Jakarta area level, in the form of spending a holiday in Bandung. See, Malik and Ibrahim, *Zaman Baru Islam...*, p. 80.

<sup>18</sup> *Madjlis Tarjih* is an institution in which Muhammadiyah *ulamas* discuss religious decisions or doctrines that will be released by them. This institution was similar to the institution of "*Bahtsul Masail*" in NU.

valuable asset for Gus Dur as a controversial figure having various personalities in Indonesian political world later.

In 1964, Gus Dur continued his struggle for a better education by moving to Cairo, Egypt, to study religious sciences in Al-Azhar Islamic University. He took specialisation in the *Sharī'a* field. Later, he had the opportunity to study further in Egypt by means of a scholarship given by the Religious Affairs Department whose Minister that time was Saefuddin Zuhri from NU. The learning method that was based on memorization of the subjects taught in Al-Azhar disappointed Gus Dur who considered these similar to what he had had in *pesantren*.<sup>20</sup>

Therefore, it is no wonder that he liked to study by his own way by reading books available in the library better than to attend the lecture programs offered at the university, so he spent his days not in classrooms but in the reading rooms of the most complete libraries in Cairo, including the American University Library. He also spent his leisure time by watching good movies especially French movies and playing football.<sup>21</sup>

He continued his study by moving to the Literatures Department, Baghdad University, Iraq, since he did not think that Egypt was a convenient place for him. In addition to attending lectures on literature, he also attended lectures on Philosophy and European Social Theories. In his opinion, the system implemented in his new university was more Europe-oriented than the system implemented in Al-Azhar and he was glad about it. He also had more chances to study Indonesian histories since references on it were available adequately. He used the opportunity to learn about the historical origin of Islam in Indonesia. In addition, he was a chairperson of the Indonesian Students' Association in the Middle East for the 1964-1970 periods.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *Santri* is term usually used in Java to have a meaning student of *pesantren*. *Nyantri* is a term, which means to study religious sciences in *pesantrens* by lodging in the *pesantrens* or just by visiting the *pesantrens* when the lectures were held there.

<sup>20</sup> See, Malik and Ibrahim, *Zaman Baru Islam...*, p. 83.

<sup>21</sup> Greg Barton, *Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia: Pemikiran Neo Modernisme Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, dan Abdurrahman Wahid*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p. 327.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*

When he was studying in the Middle East, he received family news that one of his younger brothers would marry soon. According to Eastern tradition, it is usually inconvenient for an older brother that his younger brother would get married earlier than him. As a solution of this problem, he requested his grandfather, Kiai Bisri Sjansuri, by mail to act as his representative to marry Siti Nuriyah, Gus Dur's student when he was a religion teacher in Tambakberas. Later, a "long distance" marriage was arranged on July 11, 1968, between Gus Dur and Siti Nuriyah in Tambakberas. Fulfilling Gus Dur's request, Kiai Bisri Sjansuri acted as his representative. This surprised some of the guests who did not know about this fact; some of them even said that they felt pity for the bride who had married the old man.<sup>23</sup> This misunderstanding disappeared soon when Gus Dur got home in 1971; the wedding party was rearranged in the same year. From this marriage, Abdurrahman Wahid had four daughters: Alissa Munawwarah, Arifah, Chayatunnufus, and Inayah.

Before he got home in 1971, Gus Dur visited Europe (in Holland 6 months, in Germany 4 months, and in France 2 months) with a hope to study in one of universities there. However, he failed since the qualifications of Middle Eastern students were not recognized there. He did not lose his spirit to study further due to this failure. Instead, it motivated him to change his direction to go to McGill University, Canada, to learn Islamic Studies more deeply. Before he was able to do it, however, he got home to his country in the same year.

After he went back to Indonesia from the Middle East, Gus Dur had some positions. For example, from 1972 to 1974, he was a lecturer and dean at the Faculty of *Ushuluddin*, University of Hasjim Asj'ari, Jombang; from 1974 to 1980, he was a General Secretary of Pesantren Tebuireng, Jombang; in this period, he was also a leading "*Katib*" (Secretary) of *Syuriah* of PB NU since 1979. Previously, since 1978 after moving to Jakarta, he was a caretaker of Pesantren Ciganjur. The positions<sup>24</sup> he had while he lived in Jakarta were, among

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<sup>23</sup> See, Malik and Ibrahim, *Op. Cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>24</sup> Since 1976, Gus Dur has been a consultant at various ministries (Ministry of Cooperative, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry Defence and Security), at LP3ES and at various NGOs (Nongovernmental Organizations) in Indonesia and abroad. See, Choirul Anam, "Gus Dur: Sebuah



others, teaching staff at a training program for Protestant priests. In 1982-1985, he became a chairperson of *Dewan Kesenian Jakarta* (DKJ, or Jakarta Art Council), a position not usually held by a *kiai*. Later he was elected twice to be the Chairman of the Jury of the *Festival Film Nasional* (National Film Festival: 1986-1987) and in 1984, he was elected to be the Chairman of PBNU. Meanwhile, from 1980-1983 he was elected to be one of advisers of *Agha Khan Award* for Islamic architecture in Indonesia. Later, since 1994, he became an advisor for “The International Dialogue Foundation Project on Perspective Studies and Secular Law”. His position in NU as General Chairman of *Tanfidiziyah* in PBNU ended when he was elected as the first executive of the Republic of Indonesia, the fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia in October 1999.

## 2. Discourse of the Ideas of Gus Dur

The dynamics and disputes between conservatism (an *ism* that always refers to Islam in the past) and progressivism (an *ism* wanting to reconstruct Islam for the future) are regarded as a latent agenda of all Islamic communities during its history. In Indonesia, conservatism and progressivism respectively resulted in two pattern of thoughts, traditionalism (old group) and modernism (young group). Each of them firmly defended their own thoughts, and in turn, two forms of Islamic organizations were formed: modernist and traditionalist. The two patterns of thought dominated thoughts and insights on Islam in Indonesia. Later, however, there was another pattern of thought trying to combine the two patterns, which was seemingly adapted from Fazlurrahman.<sup>25</sup> The new thought that was “neo-modernism” was a synthesis of traditional Islam and modern thoughts, especially

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Cermin Banyak Gambar”, in KH. Imron Hamzah dan Drs. Choirul Anam (eds), *Gus Dur Diadili Kiai-Kiai*, (Surabaya: Bima Satu, 1999), p. 5.

<sup>25</sup> Fazlurrahman is not only known from his writings but he also visited Indonesia in 1974. During the visit, he discussed with many Islamic youth intellectuals that time. His visit gave a significant influence in form of the establishment of a young intellectuals group actively developing neo-modernist thoughts. In addition to the four key figures of Indonesia neo-modernism, thinkers such as M. Dawam Raharjo, Jalaludin Rakhmat, and Masdar F. Mas’udi were examples of young thinkers might be categorized into this group, although they did not use the term “neo-modernism” and later developed their own thoughts. Therefore, it is not easy to map the thoughts of the figures of neo-modernism.

western perspectives and insights. The ideas of Gus Dur should be categorized into this kind of Islamic thought.

Neo-modernism as a framework of Islamic thought developed by Fazlurrahman was welcomed by the intellectuals of modernism since it contained an agenda of progressive thoughts needed by modern societies. This agenda, however, was built on Islamic tradition so that the developing thoughts should appreciate the tradition. In turn, the thoughts of neo-modernism connected with intellectuals living in traditional environments. Therefore, although Gus Dur was coming from traditionalist environment, he was able to accommodate the neo-modernist pattern of thought. A "commitment to pluralism and the core values of democracy"<sup>26</sup> was one of consequences of his neo-modernism.

In addition to Gus Dur, some intellectuals categorized into Indonesian neo-modernists were Nurcholis Majid, Djohan Efendi, and Ahmad Wahib. According to Barton (1999: xv), this group was a separate school of thought in Indonesian Islam bridging and developing modernism and traditionalism. Although this group used different terms in stating their variant of Islamic reforms, in concept they referred to a common goal, which was a change in the community as a response to modernism while still keeping the Islamic tradition.

With the neo-modernist pattern of thought as mentioned above on his mind, Gus Dur's ideas regarding religion, society, culture, nationality, and so on were often regarded as too critical by the common public, or even eccentric. Therefore, his ideas were regarded as controversial, but often discussed by observers of intellectuals in Indonesia and abroad. In addition, his activities as a public figure were often a source of news for the press.

Malik and Ibrahim (1998: 89) mapped Gus Dur's thoughts until the 1990s into two periods: *first*, the 1970s and the early 1980s, regarded as Gus Dur's scientific thinking period. During this period, several of Gus Dur's published writings were regarded as coming from a world known shortly, "strange" and "un-understandable", except with certain knowledge. His thoughts and political actions that time were focused on social matters, culture, politics, and religion

directly connected with the dynamics of *pesantrens*. *Second*, the 1980s and the early 1990s, regarded as a period of his wider political actions; his ideas concerning Islam, democracy and politics; Islam's relations with Pancasila, tolerance, human rights, freedom to express opinions; and domesticating Islam were regarded as more "practical" forms of various thoughts he had expressed one decade before.

Although Gus Dur's thoughts on Islamic reforms were differentiated in some fields mentioned above, in a more simple way, they can be explained as follows.

#### **a. Pluralism**

In his opinion, the establishment of Indonesia was more due to the awareness of forming a nation than due to Islamic ideology. This opinion was revealed since he saw that this objective condition was not completely understood by some Islamic movements in Indonesia. Therefore, in his opinion, Islamic thought should be considered as components forming and filling out the societal living of Indonesian citizens. This function was called the complementary function of Islam.<sup>27</sup> As a consequence, some Islamic political groups later regarded him as lowering Islam for making Islam as a subordinate of Pancasila when the Islamic community faced the demand of recognizing Pancasila as the sole foundation. This fact was mainly due to the different approaches used by Gus Dur and his opponents.

In this case, Gus Dur seemed to try to find solutions for the confrontations among various Islamic doctrines and its community. By using the neo-modernist perspective, he tried to find an answer by returning to moderate and flexible traditional Islam's thoughts as the bases for solutions for the present and for the future.<sup>28</sup> It may be concluded that Gus Dur clearly refused absoluteness.

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<sup>26</sup> See, Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia...* , p. 51.

<sup>27</sup> Considering his thoughts, some observers stated that Gus Dur was more a nationalist than an Islamist.

<sup>28</sup> The background of Sunni's tradition indeed highly dominated Gus Dur's thoughts and actions, since every action was always referred to the legality of *fiqh* made by the *Imāms* of Sunni's *madhhas* (school of thoughts).

Therefore, Gus Dur preferred to compromise (*wasāṭan*)<sup>29</sup> pattern of thoughts. He still adopts the pattern of thoughts consistently until now and that pattern was indicated in one of societal attitudes of *nadhiyins* (community of NU).

The socio-cultural approach was used by Gus Dur in his efforts to introduce Islamic values to society. This approach gave priority to developing cultural means and insights and was complemented by efforts to develop a societal system suitable to these cultural insights. This approach stressed cultural activities in the context of developing institutions, which may support the transformation of social system gradually through evolution. Using this approach might facilitate the entering of the “Islamic agenda” into the “national agenda” inclusively without formalizing Islam. In the writer’s opinion, this approach was in accordance with thoughts of several figures in ICMI proposing the Islamization agenda in this context.

If religious thoughts are divided into two categories, substantial and scriptural (contextual and textual), then Gus Dur was in the substantial category. By using this substantial approach, Gus Dur’s later idea on domesticating Islam as an effort to implement Islam’s universal values in Indonesia’s various cultures was proposed. In this context, he viewed Islamic culture as only one of the existing cultures in the nation. The Islamic culture was regarded as only complementary to Indonesia’s cultures as a whole. Based on this thought, the Islamic community is expected to have a national awareness and Indonesia should be developed based on this awareness. Therefore, it may be true that pluralism<sup>30</sup> was one of the implications of the implementation of Gus Dur’s thoughts.

An example of the implementation of Gus Dur’s thoughts was shown when he respected two other groups other than Sunni. Gus Dur stressed on the necessity of understanding the variety of other groups without accepting their thoughts and actions. The first group was *Mu‘tazila* having “five principles” (*al-*

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<sup>29</sup> *tawāṣut*, an attitude developed in NU and was one of five societal attitudes of NU.

<sup>30</sup> The term “pluralism” was regarded as relevant if that means respecting the existence of others without approving their beliefs. Approving their beliefs would destroy one’s own fundamental values. Then, their existences should be regarded only as realities. That what was believed by Gus Dur; by using this term, approval of the transcendental values in other religions or faiths may be evaded.

*mabādi' al-khams*)<sup>31</sup> in *'aqīda* which were analogized by Gus Dur with “*Arkān al-Islām*” (Five Pillars of Islam) of the Sunni group. In Gus Dur’s opinion, the concept of the Principle of Justice (*al-'adāla*) in *Mu'tazila*'s thought should receive serious attention, although he, like other followers of Sunni, disapproved of the other principles. In his opinion, the principle of *'adala* should not be wrong, so the Sunni community should also think about this principle of justice. The followers of Sunni should implement this concept of justice into the whole system of Islamic thought although this principle is not one of the religion’s pillars.

The second was Shi'a with its principle of *Imāma* (the leadership). Gus Dur disapproved of this principle, although sincerely he understood it and even admitted that *Imāma* was one of Shi'a's principles. As a school of thought, Shi'a is in contradiction with Sunni, but as a culture, Shi'a contains deep love for the Prophet Muḥammad, which is also one of main identities of NU. Jokingly Gus Dur once stated that NU is a cultural Shi'a.<sup>32</sup>

Gus Dur’s thoughts regarding the two main schools of thought showed his pattern of thinking in viewing other group in a balanced way without affecting his own *'aqīda*. With this broad insight, Gus Dur tried to understand the two schools of thought in Islam other than Sunni by trying to find similarities and not differences among them. Revealing the history of good relations between the leaders of the two main schools of thought in Islam, between Imām Al-Ghazālī from Sunni and Imām Ibn Babawih al-Qummi from Shi'a<sup>33</sup> was an effort on the

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<sup>31</sup> *al-mabādi' al-khamsa*, also known as *al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, were principles in implementing Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā' bin 'Aṭā' ideas, consisting of: *first, tawḥid*, meaning a belief that Allāh is one, that is His Essence. His Essence is not similar to anything else, does not have any form, not a material, and cannot be seen, and especially not formed by flesh and bone. *Second, al-'Adl* is acting and thinking by using wisdom based on reasoning to achieve goodness and benefits. *Third*, Promise of Allāh, *al-wa'du wa al-wa'id* means the promise of Allāh to human consisting of two things, reward for good doers and punishment for the sinners. *Fourth, al-Manzila Bayna al-Manzilatayn* (the place between two places or the place between paradise and hell), is an identity differentiating *Mu'tazila* from other Islamic sects. *Fifth, al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar*, ordering good deeds and preventing bad deeds is an obligation for all Muslims similar to *djihād* (holy war) against the *kāfirs* (unbelievers) and *fāsiq* (bad doers). See, Hilmy Muhammadiyah and Sulthan Fatoni, *NU: Identitas Islam Indonesia*, (Jakarta: eLSAS, 2004), pp. 49-51.

<sup>32</sup> See, K.H. Imron Hamzah and Drs. Choirul Anam, (eds.), *Gus Dur Diadili Kiai-Kiai*, (Surabaya: Jawa Pos, 1999), p. 21.

<sup>33</sup> Shaykhul Mufid explained that *'aqīda* of Shi'a has principles similar to principles of *Mu'tazila*. Shi'a replaced the principle of *al-Manzila Bayna al-Manzilatayn* with the principle of *Imāma*. Previously, a teacher of Shaykhul Mufid, Ibn Babawih al-Qummi, formulated *'aqīda* of Shi'a

part of Gus Dur to create a conducive atmosphere and harmony between Sunni and Shi'a in non-*'aqīda* matters as has been shown by the *Imāms* of the two groups.

### **b. Universalism and Cosmopolitanism of Islam**

Gus Dur, in one of his articles, explained the idea of the universalism and cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization.<sup>34</sup> The universalism of Islam was shown in the idea of paying attention to the main elements of humanity, which were balanced by wisdom from the openness of the Islamic civilization itself. In his opinion, things indicating the universalism of Islam were the five basic guarantees given by Islam, both to individuals and to groups. The five basic guarantees were (1) the society's physical safety from illegal physical actions; (2) the individual's religious safety without any coercion to change religion; (3) safety of family and offspring; (4) safety of properties and ownership based on legal procedures; and (5) safety of occupation.

In his point of view, the five elements of human rights do not automatically guarantee the safety of human if not supported by cosmopolitanism in the civilization of the Muslim community. The cosmopolitanism in the Islamic civilization appears in some dominant elements such as the disappearance of ethnic borders, the strength of cultural pluralism, and political heterogeneity. Islamic cosmopolitanism has even appeared amazingly in the form of eclectic religious living for centuries. This among other was shown in intense debates in the first four centuries of Islamic history regarding theology and religious law by still respecting other different opinions.

Gus Dur underlined that the cosmopolitanism in Islamic civilisation would reach its optimal point if there were a balance between normative tendencies

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which was similar to *'aqīda* of Sunni with the additional concept of *Imāma*. After Ibn Babawih, Shaykhul Mufid received many ideas given by figures of *Mu'tazila*. See, Hamzah and Anam, (eds.), *Gus Dur...*, p. 22.

<sup>34</sup> See, one of the articles of Abdurrahman Wahid, *Universalisme Islam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam*, September, Week 1<sup>st</sup>, 2002 in: [http://www.gusdur.net/indonesia/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=1745&Itemid=57](http://www.gusdur.net/indonesia/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1745&Itemid=57)

among Muslim communities and freedom of thought on the part of the society, including non-Muslims. Gus Dur called this situation a creative cosmopolitanism that enables the search for the “irrational aspects” of the truth to be sought and found.

In his opinion, the universalism of Islamic teachings consists of some issues: tolerance, openness of attitudes, attention to the main elements of humanity, and wise concern about the backwardness on the part of Muslims so an extraordinary power would break the chain of stupidity and poverty on the part of majority Muslims at present. From this universalism of Islam, a new cosmopolitanism is expected to appear together with other isms and ideologies liberating humans from the injustice of social-economical structures and the incivility of tyrannical political regimes. Only by introducing this new universalism into Islamic teachings and this new cosmopolitanism into its follower’s way of life, Islam would be able to give the required ingredient for human development.

With the ideas of universalism and cosmopolitanism of Islam mentioned above, Gus Dur refused legalistic-formalistic, scriptural-approaches and apologetic alternative worldviews. In his opinion, those approaches cannot be expected in solving various problems. In solving problems of poverty, for example, those approaches would only arrive at “preaching” on how to strengthen one’s faith but would not make the faith play a more significant role in solving the problem justly. Gus Dur viewed that problems of poverty such as that in Indonesia can only be solved by a macro-transformation carried out by enforcing pure democracy, developing societal institutions in all fields, and refusing injustice in all of its forms. Islam cannot separate itself from the macro-transformation, since the attitude of ignoring this matter is a deviance from Islamic teachings itself and betrays Islamic aspirations as a whole.

Meanwhile, in order to understand Gus Dur’s ideas, one may use the framework offered by Barton (2000: 89-90) who concluded that there were five key elements in Gus Dur’s thoughts. *First*, his thoughts were progressive and very futuristic. *Second*, the majority of his thoughts were responses to modernity.

*Third*, there was an affirmation in his thoughts that theistic secularism held by Pancasila was regarded as the most possible and best foundation to form a modern Indonesia based on the reason that a non-sectarian position of Pancasila was very important for the national welfare and prosperity. He stressed that the field most suitable for Islam was the civil field, not that of practical politics. *Fourth*, Gus Dur stressed an open and liberal Islam that is tolerant to differences and pays serious attention to efforts of keeping harmony in the society. *Fifth*, Gus Dur's thoughts were syntheses of traditional Islamic thoughts, elements of Islamic modernism, and western intellectuality.

The five characteristics in Gus Dur's thoughts resulted in high tolerance on his part. This high tolerance was shown in his attitudes even in responding to various issues attacking Islam. The issues were regarding certain occurrences categorized into two scales: *first*, the international scale, for example, the case of Salman Rushdie, the author of *Satanic Verses*, a book that had injured the Muslim community around the world. In responding this case, Gus Dur gave three recommendations: first, it was recommended to Salman Rushdie who has seen the impact of his book to restrain himself more in the future. He recommended Muslim communities not to over react to the book since the over-response would only make the book a best-seller and popular. Last, he recommended Indonesian traditional Muslims to stress on high tolerance and not to over react by calling for the death of Salman Rushdie<sup>35</sup> who had been condemned to death by *ulamas* around the world especially from Iran. On the other side, Gus Dur did not object to the *fatwā* of other *ulamas* in the world regarding the death of Salman Rushdie, in other words, he also tolerated the *fatwās* as a variety of interpreting Islamic law.

The next case on an international scale regarding Islam was the burning of the ancient Mosque of Babri in Ayodya, India, December 1992, by Indian Hindu extremists. PBNU did not give a very tough response, which could be destructive and provoke the rage Islamic community in Indonesia; instead, the organization



demanded the Indian government that similar violence should not spread out further. What was more relieving was that PBNU recommended that Indonesian citizens mostly consisting of Muslims to be self-restrained and not be angry with the extremists so that the Muslims would not feel resentment although Islam was clearly victimized in the incident.<sup>36</sup>

Gus Dur also showed his high tolerance to Muslim groups other than his own group. As a surprising example, in a *ta'zia* (memorial) program remembering Imām Khomeini, three years after his death, in the Embassy of Iran's office, Jakarta, Gus Dur gave a statement honouring Khomeini by saying that Khomeini was the leading religious leader entitled to be called "*Ayah*" (father)<sup>37</sup> although Indonesian Muslims in general had different approaches, insights, and thoughts which were different from Khomeini's. Apart from any point of view that is able to interpret Gus Dur's behaviours and thoughts, these facts show that he would also respect other persons who were not members of his group if the persons indeed deserved the respect. That was a tolerance hard for anyone to give especially if it was given to others who were not in harmony with him/her.

Hence, it was reasonable that in September 1993, he received a prestigious award in the Philippines, the East Asian "*Magsaysay Award*", based on the recognition (given by a decision of a jury) of "the very significant participation of Abdurrahman Wahid in developing inter-religious tolerance".

*Second*, the domestic scale, Gus Dur's tolerance was shown in some actions regarded as amazing and brave by Muslims who admired him and conversely regarded as being reckless or even hurting the Muslim community by those opposed him. Some cases stated before like supporting a General, the Monitor affair, *Fordem* and ICMI and so on are examples of this.

Furthermore, in responding to the government's policy regarding "Pancasila as the sole foundation" which was the basis for tolerance in Indonesia, he gave the regulation a strong support by making it as one of the organizational

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<sup>35</sup> Greg Barton, "Abdurrahman Wahid dan Toleransi Keberagamaan", in Ahmad Suaedy and Ulil Abshar Abdalla (eds.), *Gila Gus Dur: Wacana Pembaca Abdurrahman Wahid*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000), p. 91.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 92.

bases of NU in 1984. This action preceded the government itself, which obliged all non-party organization to apply the regulation one year later 1985.

### 3. Gus Dur's Controversies

With his background of education and his extraordinary course of life, which were different to those of *kiyais* in general which have been mentioned in his brief biography, Gus Dur was a universal *kiai* with a lot of brilliant ideas. Therefore, it was reasonable that Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif (chairperson of the Central Muhammadiyah) and Muhammad Najib (a personal of the Central Muhammadiyah) regarded Gus Dur as a multidimensional figure: he was a religious figure, a person of culture, and a politician at the same time.<sup>38</sup> Due to his multidimensional aspects, a lot of his thoughts and actions sometimes were regarded as controversial not only by Muslims outside of NU but also by Muslims in the NU-community. Controversies regarding his thoughts and actions were due to their eccentricities.

His controversial actions and thoughts among others were: Replacing “*Assalāmu ‘alaikum*” (an Islamic greeting) with “*Selamat Pagi*” (Good Morning) or “*Selamat Siang*” (Good Day); acting as a Jury Chairman of the Indonesian Film Festival when films were considered as taboo in NU, his presence in a meeting of the PGI (*Persatuan Gereja Indonesia*, The Protestant Communion of Churches in the Indonesian Republic) and his opening of a contest of church songs. These three problems were considered as most serious<sup>39</sup> so that they were responded to by the Muslim community. By not ignoring other controversies regarding him, the writer thinks that these three problems should be discussed in following subchapters.

The following explanations, however, will focus on Gus Dur's replies and clarifications in front of the senior *kiyais* forming a “trial” outside of the

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>38</sup> Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif and Muhammad Najib, “Upaya memahami Sosok Kontroversial Gus Dur”, in Ahmad Suaedy and Ulil Abshar Abdalla (eds.), *Gila Gus Dur...*, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> The three controversies regarded as the most serious ones since they directly related to *'aqīda*, a fundamental in Islam, so Gus Dur's clarifications are regarded as needed to be discussed in the following description.

organizational “trial”. The “trial” was held in Pesantren Dar al-Tauhid, Arjawinangun, Cirebon, West Java, a *pesantren* led by K.H. Ibnu Ubaidillah, attended by about 200 *kiais* bringing a “suit” against him. The whole process was documented in a book edited by K.H. Imran Hamzah and Drs. Choeirul Anam<sup>40</sup> and will be discussed again in the following paragraph.

#### **a. Assalāmu‘alaikum**

The case began when he was interviewed by an “*Amanah*” (an Islamic magazine) journalist for five hours in the holy month of *Ramaḍān*. Later he stated that the written record of the interview was partly cut, possibly since it was regarded as too long. In his opinion, the most important part of the interview was cut out. In the interview, he stated that one of problems faced by Muslims were how to unify culture (*‘āda*) and norms (in this meaning of *sharī‘a*); more specifically it was a problem in *uṣūl al-fiqh*. He said that the most general common characteristics should be sought between them. He took as an example the architecture of ancient Indonesian mosques that had three-layer roofs, which were at that time popular in mosques built up by *Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila* (Foundation of Pancasila Muslim’s Charity). The three-layer roof represented *Īmān* (Faith), *Islām*, and *Iḥsān* (Good Deeds). The three layers actually were inspired by symbolism coming from the Hindu-Buddhism period in Indonesia in the form of nine-layer buildings as seen in Bali. The nine layers represented nine human reincarnations. *Wali Songo* (The Nine Saints) replaced the nine layers with only three layers in their own communities’ buildings by changing the meaning. In other words, they only took the cultural aspect of previous beliefs and introduced other aspects, *Īmān*, *Islām*, and *Iḥsān*. The *Wali Songo* adapted gradually and did not directly introduce a completely new approach.

Another example was the tradition regarding *Hari Pasaran* (days according to Hindu or Buddhism periodizations) such as *Wage*, *Kliwon*, *Legi*.

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<sup>40</sup> See, K.H. Imron Hamzah and Drs. Choeirul Anam (eds.), *Gus Dur Diadili Kiai-kiai: Sebuah Dialog Mencari Kejelasan*, (Surabaya: Jawa Pos, 1999), pp. 16-32.

Islam did not recognize this tradition but later there was a certain combination in which *Jum'a Legi* (*Legi* Friday) was regarded as the most honourable day. This form of acculturation did not violate *shara'* but may accommodate the local cultures.

Those adoptions, however, could not be applied in other examples. For example, the rule concerning greetings. "Culturally, indeed, *Assalāmu 'alaikum* is only a greeting said when one meets another. Therefore, culturally, this greeting can be replaced by '*selamat pagi*' et cetera. We should not forget, however, that in the Islamic greeting there are two matters regarding the norms. First, saying a greeting is not an obligation, but replying to it is obligatory, so that the reply cannot be replaced by other greetings except by what had been determined. Second, the greeting is an inseparable part of *ṣalāt*".

According to Gus Dur, this last explanation had been eliminated, what was written was only the cultural example; the normative aspect was cut out. This elimination in turn caused a commotion. It was said that Gus Dur submitted additional explanation to the same magazine. Generally, however, people did not read the second explanation.

Meanwhile, Gus Dur requested that the Islamic community appreciate culture by what he called domesticating Islam. The phrase means absorbing local cultures into Islam, just like what had been done by the *walīs* in the past. In his opinion, if one refuses to domesticate Islam, then he/she would take a backward step from what had been achieved by the *walīs*.<sup>41</sup>

#### **b. Becoming Chairman of DKJ**

Gus Dur explained that his position as Chairman of DKJ (*Dewan Kesenian Jakarta*, Jakarta Art Board) was held before he became a Chairman of PBNU. Furthermore, he could not resign from the position of Chairman of DKJ arbitrarily since he had to follow the rules of the organization, and organizationally the Chairman of DKJ has to complete his period of duty. Meanwhile the period would end when Gus Dur had held his position as the Chairman of PBNU for six

months. In addition, resigning from the position of the Chairman of DKJ could not be done arbitrarily since he had to submit his report of responsibilities in front of the organization at the end of his duty.

In his explanation, Gus Dur said that he was elected to be the chairman of DKJ based on a request that some of *pesantren* figures should also manage art matters and not only focus on *pesantren* matters. In his opinion, however, managing artists was not an easy task but a task with a considerable risk due to the strange behaviours and attitudes of the artists. In his observation, some of the artists began to understand religion, so it would be an unfortunate if they do not receive attention from *pesantren*. It was also said that he had entered into the environment of the artists with a hope of correcting their deviances internally.

Gus Dur stressed the necessity to make a difference between becoming an artist and becoming a manager of art. He explained that he only had been managing art activities and regarded himself as bringing hope and happiness for the decision makers in the country, including the Ministry of Information, Harmoko, and the Governor of Jakarta that time. As one reason, Harmoko had once complained to him that moral consideration in nominating films had been not clear. A film may win in a contest, even when a person who had stolen another's wife was still free without any punishment.

Meanwhile, before engaging himself in doing the corrections, he consulted H. Misbach Yusach Biran etc. They said that in order to be more qualified in judging films; one should directly engage himself in those activities three times. Therefore, Gus Dur engaged himself directly in judging films. He explained again that it had happened before he became a chairperson of PBNU. When K.H. As'ad Syamsul Arifin, however, was urging him to abandon activities in DKJ; he obeyed the order although he said later that his friends there let him go sadly.<sup>42</sup>

In detail, Gus Dur explained what he regarded as positive aspects of his participation in DKJ in front of the *kiais* "bringing a suit" against him. After saying *Alḥamdulillāh* first, Gus Dur stated that some artists were tough defenders

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.

of Islam. For example, in the case of Salman Rushdie's "Satanic Verses", Danarto (an artist) said that a person believing in God would be afraid of Him and would not act like what Salman Rushdie had done. Syu'ban Asa, regarded as one of the best essayists in Indonesia, said that as long as Islamic communities still exist, none of them would portray the Prophet and his family as what had been portrayed by Salman Rushdie. By mentioning himself as being more "liberal", Gus Dur said that Salman Rushdie and his book were wrong and impudent. Let Rushdie be punished by God Himself and we should not think about him too much. Gus Dur said that reading "The Satanic Verses" was not forbidden. Gus Dur stated his conviction that true Muslims would not be negatively influenced by the book. In his opinion, if a Muslim abandons Islam after reading the book, then he/she had wanted to abandon Islam before and he/she had waited for the 'appropriate' reason in doing it.<sup>43</sup>

Gus Dur also explained that activities of reading and studying Al-Qur'an in DKJ had begun to run well and that those activities influenced the religiosity among artists.

### **c. Opening Program of Poetry Night for Jesus**

Gus Dur admitted that his opening Program of "Poetry Night for Jesus" had provoked a kind of commotion in Muslim community in Indonesia. It was reasonable that he was then regarded as a *kāfir* (an unbeliever) by Habib Jamalullail from Kramat, Jakarta. Gus Dur revealed that he had replied the Habib Jamalullail's reaction when he was attending a meeting for reading Al-Qur'an in Raden Saleh Mosque, not far from Jamalullail's residence. Gus Dur explained: *first*, the poetry night was not a religious service program. Meanwhile, what was forbidden in Islam is attending a religious ceremony held by other religions. In his opinion, entering a church, which had been holding a religious ceremony, is not forbidden as long as the Muslim entering it does not have any relation with that religious service. That kind of activity, however, should not be done based on considerations regarding ethical matters. *Second*, Jesus Christ is only a name not

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p.18.

indicating any *'aqīda* (belief). Jesus is a name in one of European languages having a root in the language of Suryani, “*Esu*” is “*Isa*” in Arabic. Word “Christ” derived from “*Kristos*” in the Ancient Greek language meaning the Messiah, which is “*Al Masih*” in Arabic, a term used by Al-Qur’ān itself. The intention in saying either of the two words depends on the speaker. Gus Dur explained that when he was pronouncing Jesus Christ, *'aqīda* in his mind obviously was *Ahl al-Sunna*.

Gus Dur also explained that efforts in giving the clarifications on this case had been carried out seven times openly in various programs of reading Al-Qur’ān so that Habib Jamullail later sent him a letter that the polemic should be ended.<sup>44</sup>

#### **4. Kaleidoscope of Gus Dur’s Leadership**

The first step carried out by Gus Dur after he had been elected to be the chairperson of PBNU was consolidating the organization internally due to the heated atmosphere among the pros and the contras regarding the resignation of K.H. Idham Chalid. This consolidation was aimed at reuniting the groups having different opinions and understandings regarding the central leadership of NU so that a conducive atmosphere may be rebuilt to support all the programs that had been intensively formulated by “The Committee of 24.”

The consolidating process faced an obstacle when in his first year of leadership —two years after the NU’s 27<sup>th</sup> conference— K.H. As’ad Syamsul Arifin stated that he had isolated himself by not supporting Gus Dur, whereas Arifin had been regarded as one of the *ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd* who elected Gus Dur in Situbondo Conference. Later, after Gus Dur has been elected in NU’s 28<sup>th</sup> conference in Krapyak, Yogyakarta, Kiai As’ad stated that he separated himself (*mufaraqā*). “It is as if I am praying at the same mosque with Gus Dur, but no longer his *ma’mūm* (a prayer behind the leader of *ṣalāt*). Since as an *Imām* (the leader in praying) he had passed gas from his bottom and any one can see his sexual organ”, Kiai As’ad stated that time. Kiai As’ad, however, still respected Gus Dur. He said, “Gus Dur is the grandson of my teacher. Therefore, I respect

him as I respect my teacher”.<sup>45</sup> There were some versions regarding what had made K.H. As’ad Syamsul Arifin angry and leave Gus Dur. The main reasons, however, were behaviours and actions of Gus Dur himself which were regarded as controversial as mentioned above, such as his opinion regarding *Assalāmu ‘alaikum*, his position as the Chairman of DJK and his position as a juror of Festival Film Indonesia (FFI), his presence in a PGI meeting and his opening of a church songs contest, and so on.

Some years later, in 1991, K.H. Ali Yafie also resigned from his position as PBNU’s *Vice Rois Aam*. This action related to a step taken by Gus Dur as the Chairman of PBNU and H.A. Ghafar Rahman as the General Secretary of NU when they signed a letter requesting funds for the Foundation of SDSB (*Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah*, Donation with Prize for Social Fund) in the interest of a foundation owned by NU members. This proposal for donation was approved in November 1991 and the NU received about 50 million rupiahs although the fund was returned after considering protests on the part of *kiais*.<sup>46</sup> NU itself organizationally firmly forbade the fundraising processes carried out by the foundation. In K.H. Ali Yafie’s opinion, Gus Dur’s action had violated the principle and should receive a tough response in the form of dismissal. Later, most of the *Syuriah* officers, however, regarded act of apology on the part of Gus Dur as sufficient, but tougher action was applied to the general secretary of NU, which in turn caused his resignation.

In this writing two fields are considered in evaluating Gus Dur’s success in leading the NU as follows: *first*, in the field of human resources, Gus Dur improved many aspects in science, research, and education. In this field, many activities had been carried out in the form of seminars and trainings. A plan, however, to establish a NU pilot university was never realized until the end of his third period as the chairperson of NU.

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 16-7.

<sup>45</sup> See, Zainal Arifin Thoha and M. Aman Mustofa, *Membangun Budaya Kerakyatan: Kepemimpinan Gus Dur dan Gerakan Sosial NU*, (Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press, 1997), p. 10.

<sup>46</sup> AULA, February 1992 edition, pp. 60-1.



In the field of improvement of Islamic missions, as revealed by Budairy (2000: 167), there was no physical progress. For example, the laboratories for Islamic missions and NU's university have never been realized. In the program of improving the qualities of Islamic mission materials for Islamic missionaries, NU also did not achieve significant progress. NU, however, achieved significant progress in paradigms regarding Islamic missions. For example, there was a new paradigm that Islamic leadership should not only be accepted by all Islamic communities but also by adherents of religions and beliefs outside of Islam.

*Second*, in the field of the NU economy, various steps in improving social conditions of *Nahdhiyins*, if measured quantitatively, were regarded more as having failed than succeeded. For example, regarding his idea of “*Bank Perkreditan Rakyat*” (BPR, People Credit Bank), NU should have had at least 1000 BPRs in 1000 *Kecamatans* (sub-districts) for the program and the plan to run well. In 1990, Gus Dur announced to the press that NU through PT “Duta Perintis” which cooperated with Bank Summa would establish 2000 BPRS in 20 years. In fact, NU owned only 20 BPRs ten years later.<sup>47</sup>

After Gus Dur proposed his idea on establishing banks for NU members, a problem arose on the bank interest that he regarded as allowed based on Islamic argument. In this case, establishing banks was better than letting people be suppressed by usurers. Hence, *dar' al-mafāsīd muqaddam 'alā djalb al-maṣāliḥ* (to prevent danger is more important than to do a good action).

NU regarded BPR as a government policy supporting people's small businesses. On the other side, NU as an organization, which was supported by the majority of common people, seemed as if it had found a solution in overcoming their financial problems. New BPRs were established after banking deregulations had been decreed by the government in January 1989. Many BPRs were later established in East Java, and supported by PBNU by establishing PT “Duta Dunia Perintis” through a decree of the Chairman of *Tanfīdīyah* and *Rois Aam*.

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<sup>47</sup> See, M. Said Budairy, “Gus Dur dari Ketua PBNU sampai Presiden RI”, in Ahmad Suaedy and Ulil Abshar Abdalla (eds.), *Gila Gus Dur...*, p. 168.

The support of PBNU also indicated support of NU organizationally to the banking system, which used the interest method. In other words, PBNU was regarded as allowing bank interest, although it was argued by Gus Dur that “PBNU is not allowing it but tolerating it”.<sup>48</sup>

In fact, K.H. Ma’ruf Amin —one of the Chief of PBNU (*Pengurus Besar Nahdhatul Ulama*, Central Board of PBNU)— tried hard to make bank interest allowed. His argumentation was that there had been misunderstandings regarding the difference between loan to get more money —, which is forbidden— and the banking system. Loan is *qardun* in Arabic, while banks in his opinion do not lend money but “rotate” money. A’s money is saved in bank B, to be rotated by C (used as a capital by C). That is not *qardun*, but *qirad*, rotating money in order to use it (as a capital). In his opinion, *qirad* is not forbidden by the religion (Islam), what is forbidden is *qardun*, or lending money to get more money.<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile, the 13<sup>th</sup> NU conference in Menes, Banten in responding to this matter determined that bank interest was an uncertain matter (*khilāfiyya*). In this conference there were three opinions regarding this bank interest: *halāl* (allowed), *haram* (forbidden), and *shubha* (doubtful), so the final decision was postponed to form a common decision. Majority opinion, however, regarded bank interest as *halāl* (allowed).

As another example regarding the NU economy under Gus Dur’s leadership, when launching the first export of canned pineapples by PT “Moreli Sakmurke Taiwan” in July 13, 1991, Gus Dur —acting as General Chairman of PBNU and the Commissary President of PT. “Moreli Makmur”— gave a statement to the press that a similar company, “Moreli Jantica”, would be established in Blitar, East Java and some stocks of the manufacture would be owned by NU. With this statement, Gus Dur convinced others that the pineapple farmers that were also NU members themselves would benefit. As another obsession, in a press conference in Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, October 1, 1991, Gus Dur proposed a plan of establishing nine tapioca factories worth 180 billion

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<sup>48</sup> M. Saleh Isre, *Tabayun Gus Dur: Pribumisasi Islam Hak Minoritas Reformasi Kultural*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1998), p. 240.

rupiahs based on cooperation between PT. “Moreli Makmur” and “Bagna Steel Works” Ltd., Bangkok. The developing processes would begin from the late 1991 until the next two years. The whole plans, however, later failed because five months after the first product launch, PT. “Moreli” went bankrupt and according to news in newspapers there were demonstrations conducted by the labourers due to dismissals without separation pay. Hence, all social improvement programs for NU members by developing factories were regarded as having failed totally.<sup>50</sup>

It may be concluded that in level of organization and real programs NU did not seem to achieve satisfying progress, as indicated by planned programs, which later did not run well as mentioned above. There were some factors causing the failure of various projects proposed by Gus Dur. The main cause, however, probably was Gus Dur’s performance since he did not show himself as manager but more as a pure scientist and a person of culture. Therefore, the “cultural” NU was more striking than the “structural” NU.

Various communities, however, recognized that in thought and concept levels, NU under the leadership of Gus Dur experienced a very rapid progress. His various brilliant ideas had appeared in the previous period were getting more striking in his period of leadership. Therefore, NU previously regarded, as the organization of backward people with *sarung* (a traditional cloth for covering legs) in his leadership became an organization regarded as very influential in political, social, and scientific affairs at the national and international levels. Various writings about NU were published in the form of articles for various mass media; scientific writings such as theses and dissertation<sup>51</sup> were also published as confirmations that NU in this period had its own influence at the scientific level. Therefore, the assumption that stated the lack of writings regarding traditional Islam in Indonesia as represented by NU was proven untrue.

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> See, Budairy, “Gus Dur dari Ketua...”, pp. 168-69.

<sup>51</sup> Many topics of theses and dissertation on this period to be written such as in social and political development of NU under Gus Dur’s leadership.

## B. The Idea of Tolerance in NU

The process of formulating concepts on the societal attitudes of NU members systematically to be made the organization's attitude was began in 1979 when K.H. Ahmad Sidiq proposed ideas on three societal attitudes of NU members, including *al-tawāsut* and *al-i'tidāl* or moderate attitude based on a life principle respecting deeply the necessity to become just and honest in living together;<sup>52</sup> and *al-tawāzun*, an attitude which is balanced and respecting Allāh, other humans, and one's own environment. Balance here means balancing the interests of the past, the present, and the future.<sup>53</sup> These three attitudes were implementations of Islamic teachings believed by the adherents of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a*. Together with Gus Dur, in 1984, to these three societal attitudes Ahmad Sidiq added: 1) *al-tasāmuh*, tolerant in religious, societal, and cultural affairs, and 2) *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*, always be thoughtful to encourage good, useful, and helpful deeds in living together; and refusing and preventing all things which tend to deviated from living norms.<sup>54</sup>

Hence, since 1984 NU had five societal attitudes (*al-tawāsut*, *al-i'tidāl*, *al-tawāzun*, *al-tasāmuh* and *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*) as clear references for NU's members after had been confirmed organisationally.

The implementations of the five societal attitudes were highly significant at the national levels especially in relations with Islamic views regarding the order of a state. The recognition of NKRI (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, Integrated State of Republic of Indonesia) as a final form of Muslims' efforts in supporting pluralities, and the acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation in the system of governmental constitution in Indonesia were undeniable examples.

It is interesting that this tolerance was formulated before formulating other organizational attitudes, which tolerated Pancasila as the sole national ideological foundation in Indonesia. This fact is interesting to be studied further since it indicates some kind of correlation between the government's will to implement Pancasila as the sole national ideological foundation in Indonesia and the idea

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<sup>52</sup> See, AULA, May 1991 edition, p. 42

<sup>53</sup> PBNU, *Kembali ke Khittah 1926*, (Bandung: Risalah, 1985), p. 119.

proposed by K.H. Ahmad Sidiq as a member of DPA (*Dewan Pertimbangan Agung*, High Consultative Board). In addition, at the same time, K.H. Idham Khalid held various strategic positions both in NU and in the government among others, General Chairman of PBNU, President of PPP (*Partei Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party), and Chairman of DPA.

In responding to the demand for tolerance in Indonesia's pluralistic society, at the end of the decade of 1970 the government in this case the Ministry of Religious Affairs —Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara (1979-1983)— implemented three concepts of tolerances in Indonesia or “Trilogy of Tolerance” consisting of tolerance of internal religion, tolerance of inter-religious communities, and tolerance between religious community and the Government.<sup>55</sup> The policy was one of religious development aspects in GBHN (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara*, or Guidelines on State Policy) decreed by MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People Consultative Assembly) once every five years.

Meanwhile, K.H. Ahmad Sidiq in addition to formulating societal attitudes of NU also developed an idea of three *al-ukhūwas* (brotherhoods): *first, al-ukhūwa al-Islāmiyya* (brotherhood among Muslims) applied by improving relations and co operations with other Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah, an effort which was positively responded to by A.R. Fachrudin, the Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah and a colleague of Kiai Ahmad Sidiq in DPA; *second, al-ukhūwa al-waṭaniyya* (brotherhood among citizens) a concept offered to all communities in Indonesia; *third, al-ukhūwa al-baṣariyya* (brotherhood of humans), a highly honourable attitude based on the assumption that basically all humans are good without ideological-theological prejudices and

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> The recognition of existences of various categories, ideologies, and groups in a religion was developed due to comprehension and interpretation of religious doctrines. These differences should not be sources of disputes and conflicts. Furthermore, in a wider context the differences of religions and faiths should not be sources of conflicts among inter-religious communities. Meanwhile, principally the government may not interfere in religious affairs especially religious doctrines, but in order to achieve harmony among inter-religious communities, the government implements various policies which need to be trusted by the religious community so a mutual understanding developed between the two that what had been carried out by the government in turn is for a larger common interest, therefore cooperation between the religious community and

discriminative judgment since humans are regarded as being equal with each other. The differences of religion, nation, and races may not hamper fellowship of humans. The three concepts made NU members more open-minded in facing existing social and religious pluralities as a most important capital in efforts to achieve tolerance among religious communities and among all humans.<sup>56</sup> Hence, after Gus Dur had visited Israel (October 1997) and been criticized for that, he defended himself by stating that what he had done was implementing the concept of *al-ukhuwa al-baṣariyya*. Only in the context of the concepts of *al-ukhuwa*, may the behaviour of Gus Dur be understood.

### **1. Response to Pancasila as *Asas Tunggal***

Islam as universal religion, religion of different nations, does not have a national-formal identity . . . the ability to combine the two universal and national elements, without eliminating any of them, is a capital which make NU able to complete the process of accepting national ideology as a juridical-constitutional foundation, meanwhile Islam as an *'aqīda* functions as a theological-cultural foundation.<sup>57</sup>

Wahid considers Pancasila to be a living political compromise that allows all Indonesians to live together in a national, unitary, non-Islamic state. Pancasila is a tolerant basis for the creation of the civil democratic society, particularly within the Islamic community itself.<sup>58</sup>

Pancasila is still a political compromise among democrats, supporters of the theocratic state, and nationalists, which enables all Indonesians to live together in a national integrated state.<sup>59</sup>

The implementation of Pancasila as the sole national ideological foundation for all communities in Indonesia (1985) was a peak of the New Order government's success in controlling all political ideologies, as the last step of the three important agendas of political restructurisations (breaking Masjumi's link by establishing Parmusi, simplifying political parties, and implementing the policy of 'Pancasila as *Asas Tunggal* or the sole foundation') as mentioned in Chapter III planned by the government towards political deideologisation.

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the government is expected. See Dr. H. Tarmizi Taher, *Aspiring for the Middle Path: Religious Harmony in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: CENSIS, 1997), p. 42-43.

<sup>56</sup> See, Munawar fuad Noeh and Mastuki HS (eds.), *Menghidupkan Ruh Pemikiran K.H. Ahmad Siddiq*, (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), pp. 83-5.

<sup>57</sup> Malik and Ibrahim, *Zaman Baru...*, p. 77.

<sup>58</sup> Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia...*, p. 49.

<sup>59</sup> See, Manam, *Membangun Demokrasi...*, p. 36.

The concerns about the development of ideologies other than Pancasila whether communism or Islam, as rival ideologies were regarded as having disappeared automatically. In Asep Samuh's opinion, the emergence of *Asas Tunggal* was predicted as an effort toward political de-Islamisation or depoliticisation of Islam in Indonesia <sup>60</sup>

Two considerations used as reasons by Soeharto to realize Pancasila as *Asas Tunggal* in all mass organizations were: *first*, more important consideration was an incident in 1978 during a general meeting of MPR, in which NU refused the government's effort to place "P4" (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, Guidance for the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasila) and "*Aliran Kepercayaan*" (Spiritualisms) into GBHN. *Second*, the trauma regarding an incident in 1979 in which a riot happened at the grassroots level between two political organizations: PPP (*Partei Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party) and Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Functional group).

The two considerations may be understood as deriving from the two incidents. Before and in the 1979 riot, PPP's ideology was Islam but it also recognized Pancasila as state ideology, while Golkar's ideology was Pancasila. In their campaigns, the two political parties that had different ideologies often used religious idioms to attack each other. Religious slogans were used by PPP to attract the Muslim masses. Using pamphlets with religious idioms were regarded as effective in gaining supports, for examples, "Those who do not choose *Ka'bah* (term used to call PPP, *Partei Persatuan Pembangunan* – United Development Party) are *kāfir* (unbelievers)". To counter the idioms, Ali Moertopo shouted *takbir* (words *Allāhu Akbar*: The Biggest Allah) three times before starting his campaigns for Golkar.<sup>61</sup>

In his propaganda and campaigns, Bisri Sjansuri —*Rois Aam* of *Syuriah* of PBNU and also the chairman of *Syuriah* board in PPP— stated that in order to

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<sup>60</sup> See, Asep Samuh, *Dinamika Komunikasi Politik Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): Studi atas Pembaruan Pemikiran Politik NU dan proses Sosialisasinya 1970-2001*, (A dissertation for a postgraduate program at Padjajaran University, Bandung, Indonesia, 2003, published limitedly without publisher), p. 304.

<sup>61</sup> See, M. Rusli Karim, *Dinamika Islam di Indonesia: Suatu Tinjauan Social dan Politik*, (Yogyakarta: Hanindita, 1985), pp. 241-2.

enforce the religion (Islam) and law of Allāh, Muslims were obliged to participate in the 1977 general election and PPP members were obliged to choose PPP. To counter PPP's propaganda, the Minister of Domestic Affairs, Amir Mahmud, and the Commander of *Kopkamtib* (*Komando Penjaga Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, Commando for Recovering Security and Order), Admiral Sudomo, started campaigns of *djihād* or "holy war" commando on the perspective of the government.

From those incidents mentioned above, Soeharto assumed that religion was the main source of the conflict. He hoped that with *Asas Tunggal* each party would be program-oriented not ideology-oriented and in turn a healthy democratic life would develop.

Later, the government proposed P4 (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, Guidance for the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasila) in order to make uniform the interpretations and implementations of the five basics of Pancasila as a scheme which would be used as guidance for the behaviour of all Indonesian citizens. FPP (*Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan*, Fraction of United Development) —since the commission meetings were held—toughly opposed the scheme.

Its spokesperson, Karmani SH, stated, "FPP does not object to a guidance in implementing Pancasila as long as it is not a decree and it is not contrary to the spirit and meaning of Pancasila in the 1945 Constitution. FPP does not hold responsibilities in formalizing the Plan of Decree and regarded P4 as the commission's decision. As a consequence, FPP walked out the meeting".<sup>62</sup> After the statement was submitted, members of FPP abandoned the meeting, initiated by K.H. Bisri Sjansuri. This incident made President Soeharto angry and doubts regarding NU's loyalty to the state arose. The suspicion was strengthened by hesitancy on the part of the military as the main component of the "*Orde Baru*" and other secular organizations about the ambivalence of Islamic communities regarding Pancasila as ideology of the state. Already in 1968, in a general meeting



of MPR, various Islamic groups insisted on putting back the “*Piagam Djakarta*” into the constitution and that charter should have a legal legitimation.<sup>63</sup>

According to Asy’ari (1999: 81), officially, the idea of *Asas Tunggal* was introduced in a presidential speech in an ABRI leaders’ meeting, March 27, 1980 and was confirmed in a following speech in a Kopassanda’s (*Korps Pasukan Sandi Yuda*, Army Para-Commando Unit) anniversary, April 16, 1980, in Cijantung, Jakarta. Those facts, however, were not popularly known perhaps because the idea was proposed in a limited forum.

Furthermore, two years later in a state speech, President Soeharto in the summit of DPR, August 16, 1982 proposed the idea of decreeing Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political organizations and mass organizations. Therefore, the date was popularly known as the birth date of the *Asas Tunggal* since the idea was proposed in a more formal forum at national level. In the following year, 1983, DPR agreed to the idea, although it was only in force for all political organizations and not for all mass organizations.

Meanwhile, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara submitted a written response to President Soeharto in July 17, 1983 consisting of among others:

The replacement of Islam as an ideology by Pancasila is in contradiction with the Constitution, which based itself on Pancasila, hence, in contradiction with Pancasila itself. That is, the original Pancasila, the foundation of 1945 Constitution. It is clear that the replacement of the ideology is in contradiction with freedom to adhere to any religion and to perform religious services guaranteed by article 29 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, since according to Islam, establishing Islamic meetings consisting of Muslims who intended to apply Islamic teachings —those are groups based on Islam— are religious services agreed by Allāh.<sup>64</sup>

Only two years later, 1985, MPR agreed that Pancasila was the sole foundation not only for all political organizations but also for mass organizations after what had been recommended by DPR. Furthermore, this decision was ratified in Act Number 8, 1985 on Societal Organizations. The decision, however, was revoked in MPR’s Special Meeting, March 1-11, 1998.

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<sup>62</sup> See, M. Imam Azis, “Beberapa Pertanyaan di Sekitar NU dan Pancasila”, in Zaenal Arifin Thoha and M. Aman Mustofa (eds.), *Membangun Budaya Kerakyatan: Kepemimpinan Gus Dur dan Gerakan Sosial NU*, (Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press, 1997), p. 41.

<sup>63</sup> See, Noeh and HS, *Menghidupkan Ruh...*, pp. 141-2.

<sup>64</sup> See, Karim, *Dinamika Islam...*, pp. 226-7.

According to various opinions, the implementation of the *Asas Tunggal* by the state was a denial of pluralistic society as an objective reality. In this position, the government eliminated democracy, since the *Asas Tunggal* meant that there were no longer any differences in the society, while democracy was required in a pluralistic society. Deliar Noer, as quoted by Karim (1985; 226), as consequences, the *Asas Tunggal* would:

1. Deny the pluralism in the communities that was indeed developing based on individual beliefs.
2. Hamper persons with the same belief to make a group and to discuss matters based on the belief.
3. Deny relations between religion and politics.
4. Put aside problems needed to be resolved without any open and clear reason.
5. Create a trend toward a one-party system.
6. Hamper the possibility of developments of various ideologies that may strengthen Pancasila.

In Situbondo conference (1984), however, NU was the first and the only Islamic organization, which agreed to the implementation of “Pancasila as *Asas Tunggal*” for mass organizations, itself preceding the government that recommended this matter in 1985. This decision was responded to by many figures, both Indonesian Islamic figures themselves and academicians, as recorded by Asy’ari (1999: 67-68), for example:

1. Lukman Harun, a leader of Muhammadiyah, said that it was a logical decision for NU due to its hopelessness in the political arena and the difficulties it had in PPP.
2. Muhammad Dawan Raharjo regarded NU as taking an opportunistic approach to politics.
3. Amin Rais, a figure of Muhammadiyah and a rival of NU in various matters, commented more negatively that the NU’s policy was an overemotional action based on over enthusiasm.

4. Nurcholis Madjid and Douglas E. Ramage regarded NU's decision to abandon the political arena as a representation of depoliticisation of Islam or de-Islamisation of parties.
5. Greg Barton regarded NU more positively in commenting on this matter because he observed it by using the perspective of NU itself. He argued that NU's decision to abandon formal politics was recognition of a reality that political activities of parties in the name of Islam were counter productive to the community and in some aspects caused sectarianism that may damage the society.

In connection with this matter, K.H. Ahmad Sidiq was a conceiver and formulator of relations between religion and state (between Islam and Pancasila). The formulation was accepted in NU's 27<sup>th</sup> conference in Situbondo in 1984 after experiencing intense discussions and argumentations in NU's National Meeting, December 18-20, 1983, at Pesantren of Salafiyah Syafi'iyah led by Kiai As'ad.

On this occasion, K.H. Ahmad Sidiq succeeded in convincing participant of the conference, although at the beginning 32 responders directly opposed and attacked him and only two persons supported him. Meanwhile, the majority of 100 members of NU's *Khittah* (guideline of NU struggles) commission questioned the idea regarding the relations between Islam and Pancasila he proposed. The success of K.H. Ahmad Sidiq in convincing the audience of the conference was due to the support given by NU's four key *ulamas*: K.H. As'ad Syamsul Arifin, K.H. Mahrus Ali, K.H. Masykur, and K.H. Ali Ma'syum. After considering this support, members of NU accepted Pancasila in form of the concept proposed by K.H. Ahmad Sidiq.

The role of charismatic *kiais* in NU often determined various policies, including this one. After considering the opinions of the four *ulamas*, the other members of the conference later understood more deeply and accepted the idea previously not agreed to by them. This indicated that *ulamas* were still in honourable positions in the organization, a thing that was one of aims to be achieved in the process of returning to "*Khittah 1926*". That success made K.H.

Ahmad Sidiq's reputation as NU's thinker, and architect was widely recognized.<sup>65</sup> This brilliant idea was also one of factors, which determined the higher position he held later as *Rois Aam* (the Chief of Syuriah Board of The Central Board of the NU) that time.

K.H. Ahmad Sidiq began his argument by explaining that ideology<sup>66</sup> is defined as matters regarding one's aim or goal (his/her philosophy, struggle's program, tactics and strategy, targets, et cetera). Any ideology, however excellent, is a result of human thought that, in his opinion, would not become a religion. Pancasila as Indonesia's national ideology no exception.

Furthermore, he also explained that Pancasila as an ideology is human-made. Therefore, he suggested to discuss it with developed ratio and science and to not confuse it with religion. The worldly Pancasila should not become religion and the divine religion should not become Pancasila. The religion of Islam is a revelation of Allāh, not a result of human's thought, even not a result of the Prophet's thought. In his opinion, an adherent of any religion may have philosophy, ideology, culture, state foundation, et cetera, as long as the ideology et cetera was not in contradiction with religion. Each of them should occupy an appropriate location. Ideology and religion are not two things in which one had to be chosen by throwing away the other.

The acceptance of Pancasila was not merely a tactic move but was done based on principles. *First*, that Indonesian Muslims (represented by their leaders) are actively participating in formulating and achieving agreements regarding the basis of the state. *Second*, that the noble values formulated into becoming the state's foundation may be agreed upon and regarded as right according to Islam's point of view. Pancasila and Islam are in harmony and support each other. These

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<sup>65</sup> The achievements of K.H. Ahmad Sidiq were recognized by Prof. Dr. Mastuhu, M.Ed. in his writing. See, Prof. Dr. Mastuhu, M.Ed., "Aspek Pemikiran K.H. Ahmad Sidiq", in, Noeh and HS (eds.), *Menghidupkan Ruh...*, p. 215.

<sup>66</sup> Quoting Ali Syariati, the word "Ideology" was formed by words "*ideo*" and "*logos*". "*Ideo*" means thought, imagination, concept, faith, et cetera. Meanwhile, "*logos*" means logic, science, or knowledge. Ideology may be defined as science of faiths and ideas. Meanwhile, an ideologist is a recommender of a certain ideological belief. In this context, ideology contains faith and ideas obeyed by a group, a social class, a nation, or a certain race. See, Ali Syariati, *Ideologi Kaum Intelektual: Suatu Wawasan Islam*, (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1990), p. 72.

are not in contradiction with each other and should not contradict each other. Nahdhatul Ulama accepted Pancasila based on the words and meanings contained in the 1945 Constitution with responsibility and obedience to Allāh. Nahdhatul Ulama refused the interpretation of Pancasila, which deviated from it and refused the perception that Pancasila is on the same level as religion.<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile, other Islamic communities expressed their amazement that NU had accepted Pancasila. K.H. Ahmad Sidiq revealed his own amazement by giving an analogy that Pancasila is like a kind of food that we have been eating and enjoying since 1945. Why at that time —during NU’s 1983 *Munas Alim Ulama* (National Conference of *Ulamas*)— did we question whether it was forbidden or not?. K.H. Ahmad Sidiq stated that the Preamble of 1945 Constitution was a work of the Committee of Nine. It contains the basics known as Pancasila at present. One of the Committee of Nine’s members was a representative of NU, K.H. A. Wahid Hasjim, together with three other *ulamas* in the committee. In his further explanation, K.H. Ahmad Sidiq stated that the word-by-word formulation of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution has certainly been considered deeply, including its Islamic aspects.<sup>68</sup>

In his opinion, NU supported Pancasila not as an action of formality or merely following the trend or for short-time political interests, but it was really done, based on a deep religious comprehension. The “*Resolusi Djihad*” (Resolution of *Djihād*) which provoked struggles against the Netherlands three months after the proclamation of independence was regarded as a form of sacrifice and defence of the NU for Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.<sup>69</sup>

On the 1983 *Munas Alim Ulama* (National Conference of *Ulamas*) formulated three important agendas as follow: 1) recovering NU as a social-religious organization and directing NU’s programs in accordance with a developmental atmosphere and regulating organizational components which support NU’s goals based on *1926 Khittah*, 2) confirming Pancasila as the organization’s ideology and its implementations in the statute, 3) determining the

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<sup>67</sup> See, Noeh and HS (eds.), *Menghidupkan Ruh...* , pp. 121-34.

<sup>68</sup> See, AULA, March 1992 edition, p. 11.

limitations in channelling the political aspirations of NU members through existing socio-political forces.

Meanwhile, the “declaration on the relations between Pancasila and Islam” was a very important decision of the *Munas Alim Ulama*, consisting of as follows:

1. Pancasila as a foundation and philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia is not a religion and cannot replace religion and cannot be used to replace religion’s position.
2. The Belief in One God as one of the bases of the Republic of Indonesia is based on article 29 paragraph 1 of 1945 Constitution, which guarantees the other bases, indicates *Tawhīd* (Monotheism) according to the faith of Islam.
3. For NU, Islam is *‘aqīda* and *Sharī‘a*, encompassing aspects of human relations with God and relations among humans.
4. The acceptance and implementation of Pancasila embody the Indonesian Muslim community’s efforts in applying their religious *Sharī‘a*.
5. Because of the attitudes mentioned above, NU holds the responsibility in securing the right interpretation of Pancasila and its pure and firm implementation by all.<sup>70</sup>

Furthermore, by returning to the *1926 Khittah*,<sup>71</sup> NU tried to find clear differences between itself and political organizations and between itself and activities of practical politics. Therefore, NU gave limitations to its members in doing political activities, which consisted in three prohibitions in holding two or more positions.

1. The key officials of NU are not allowed to hold similar positions in any political party.
2. NU members who are not key officials of NU are allowed to be official or members of any political party.

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p. 12.

<sup>70</sup> See, AULA, March 1992 edition, p. 13.

<sup>71</sup> Return to the *Khittah 1926* is one of the most important decisions of *Munas Alim Ulama 1983* and to be strengthened as the NU’s new constitution on the NU conference 1984.

3. NU members who are also members or officials of any political party are still NU members as long as they show their loyalties to NU.<sup>72</sup>

NU *1926 Khittah* means, as mentioned by Noeh and HS (1999:175): “a guideline of NU’s struggles and also a guidance for activities of NU members as implementations of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā’a* teachings”.

## 2. Response to ICMI

The government played a highly dominant interfering role in the process of establishing ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) so that writer regards this interference as part of the government’s policies on Islamic affairs.

ICMI was established at the University of Brawijaya (Unibraw) Malang, East Java, Friday, Jumādā I 20, AH 1411/December 7, AD 1990 in a symposium opened by President Soeharto himself for an undetermined time. According to the government, ICMI was established based on an idea of some students of Brawijaya University (Erik, Salman G.D, and Ali Mudakir) who previously proposed an idea of holding a “*Simposium Nasional Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*” (National Symposium of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) to Soeharto through B.J. Habibie.<sup>73</sup> ICMI was a religious and cultural mass organization<sup>74</sup> regarded as a symbol of Islamic resurgence in politics in the New Order period that restored relations between the Islamic community and the government. Therefore, political observers stated that this period was a “honeymoon”<sup>75</sup> period between the Islamic community and the government.

ICMI consisted of representatives of all Islamic communities both traditionalists and modernists. Its members included governmental officials,

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<sup>72</sup> See, Noeh and HS (ed), *Menghidupkan Ruh...*, p. 156.

<sup>73</sup> AULA, January 1991 edition, p. 35.

<sup>74</sup> See, Statute and Rules of ICMI, article 6: “Shape, Identities, and Characters of the Organization” mentions that ICMI is a mass Islamic organization; its identities are culture, science, and intellectuality; its characters are open, self-dependent, and familiar. (Archive of Orsat ICMI-Hamburg).

<sup>75</sup> Deliar Noer, however, as an Islamic figure in Indonesia denied that there has been a honeymoon period between the Muslim community and the government. He stated that possibly only those at

Islamic intellectuals previously toughly opposed to the policies of the New Order government, and activists who had refused Pancasila as the *Asas Tunggal* so that they were put aside or made into enemies by the government.

The motivation behind the establishment of ICMI was in connection with a hope of Muslim intellectuals to create a more just and non-discriminatory condition (for Muslims) in Indonesia. On their perspective, Muslims in the past had been in the marginal positions and even regarded as antidevelopment and destructive due to their objective conditions and the manipulations of certain groups.

Ali Murtopo and Beni Murdani played a very dominant role in the political arena in Indonesia in 1970s and 1980s, two first decades of the New Order period. Various policies of the government supposed to suppress Islam and at a certain level depoliticized Islam. Those policies were regarded as influenced by two highly dominant forces (Christians and the secularist military) in political policies in Indonesia. Consequently, in this period Muslim communities were tightly monitored, Islamic missions were investigated, and Islamic activists were arrested.<sup>76</sup> The incident of Tanjung Priok in 1984 that victimized hundreds of Muslims may be regarded as the peak of the repressions. On the government perspective this fact was not to suppress Islamic communities as the whole but to pressure the “right extremism” which has failed in effort to built Islamic country (1947-1962 and 1967).

In 1971 Murtopo established a think-tank institution for the government called “the Centre for Strategic and International Studies” (CSIS) consisting of Chinese-Catholic groups. Various strategic governmental policies originated from here and were alleged to be only benefiting minority groups. Murtopo also brought minority Catholic groups into positions of power to strengthen a coalition

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the elite level, which experienced that honeymoon period meanwhile the grass root community did not experience it, see Interview Deliar Noer in *Tempo Interaktif*, September 26, 1996 edition.

<sup>76</sup> One of victims of the policy of depoliticisation of Islam at this period was Imaduddin Abdulrahim, one of the founders of ICMI; due to his Islamic missions, he was imprisoned for 14 months. Meanwhile, a meeting, which sparked the idea of the ICMI before it was established, has been dispersed by security officer since the meeting regarded as not having any permission.



among the military, irreligious groups, and modernist groups, which were suspicious of Islamic politics.<sup>77</sup>

This situation frustrated the majority Islamic community. The assumption that one of reasons in establishing ICMI was “revenge”<sup>78</sup> of certain groups for the dominance of CSIS in the earlier period of the New Order government may confirm that frustration. ICMI aroused Indonesian Muslims who previously had been suppressed by various pressures including governmental policies which had closed the opportunities of Muslim intellectuals to enter into central power and which had made them stay in the periphery.<sup>79</sup>

Until August 1992, ICMI had 11.000 members and branch offices in all provinces and some countries. Not long before March 1993, its members rapidly increased to 40.000 members, a fantastic number in the history of mass organizations in Indonesia.

According to Porter (2002: 135-138), ICMI had three main agendas that consisted of demilitarisation, democratisation, and Islamisation to counter various political stresses given to the Islamic community previously. In order to prove whether Porter’s statement was true or not, we will examine the three agendas one by one. *Demilitarisation* here means systematically efforts in minimizing roles of the military that had been always suspicious of Islamic power in Indonesia’s political arena. Later this target was achieved in the formation of the next cabinet, which consisted among others of various representatives of civil groups of ICMI. Due to the dominance of Islamic figures, the cabinet was popularly known *Kabinet Ijo Royo-royo* or “the Green Cabinet” (in this case green regarded as a symbol of the Islamic community).

*Democratisation* here means demanding reallocations of the positions in MPR and the cabinet, and of various important positions in the government. The coalition between Christians and secularists-military should have recognized that 87% of the population were Muslims; therefore, according to ICMI, “Proportional

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<sup>77</sup> See, Donald J. Porter, *Managing Politic and Islam in Indonesia*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 25.

<sup>78</sup> See, Nawawi A. Manan, *Membangun Demokrasi Melalui Kontroversi*, (Sidoarjo: Pustaka Andalusia, 2003), p. 27.

Democracy” was reasonable and appropriate. The security approach taken by the government to Islam and the regime’s efforts in depoliticisation of Islam were regarded as policies, which ignored reality in the society.

Regarding *Islamisation*, two of its aspirations appear here: 1) the development of Islamic society that in the writer’s opinion was similar to Gus Dur’s model of Islamisation; 2) the implementation of Islamic law in the state’s law.

The first aspiration was ICMI’s main agenda, although some of its members had different opinions regarding it: *First*, some members had opinions that Islamic society would be realized if idealization were applied in economic equality, social justice, democracy, clean government, and more significant role of Islamic community in the government. *Second*, the majority moderate group hoped that Islamic society would mean the dominance of Islamic moral values in society especially in the middle class and urban cultures, which previously had been regarded as being far from Islamic norms. If that condition was achieved, the Islamic community in turn would have the opportunity to be the government’s reliable partner.

Some more liberal intellectuals who were also reformists in ICMI hoped that Islam would become a source of political morality in Indonesia. Some of them were Adi Sasono who had an opinion that Islamic tradition appreciates pluralism in law. If we relate democracy to Islamic teachings then the society will understand democracy. Democracy should acculturate itself with Islam in Indonesia; Meanwhile, Dawam Raharjo hoped that Islamic morals would be reflected in the behaviour of actors in the government; Dewi Fortuna Anwar hoped that Islam would become an important element in influencing the morality of power structures. Then, the government would not tolerate corruptions, power abuses, human right violations, since those are in contradiction with Islamic values.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> *Op. Cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>80</sup> Porter, *Managing Politic...*, p. 139.

Furthermore, the supporters of the second aspirations who defined Islamisation as implementation of Islamic law in the law of the state can be categorized into two groups as follows: 1) a conservative group that was noticeable when ICMI stated its hope that Islamic law would be implemented in family law and criminal law. This group consisted of among others *ulamas* of MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, The Indonesian Council of Ulama), Ministry of Religious Affairs, IAIN (*Insitut Agama Islam Negeri*, State Islamic Institute), Muhammadiyah, and NU. They didn't try to realize the dominance of Islamic law, they even opposed the idea of Indonesia becoming an Islamic state, but they hoped that Islamic laws would play more significant roles in Indonesia: 2) radical group, in Porter's opinion among them *Dewan Dakwah* (Propagation Council) was more prominent which hoped to realize Islamic laws in Indonesian positive law which may mean that they hoped that Indonesia would be an Islamic state.<sup>81</sup>

Modernist Muslims tended to make Islam more influential in Indonesia by placing more Muslims in the bureaucracy and by implementing Islamic law. In Masdar Farid Mas'udi's opinion (a liberal *ulama* and a chairperson of an NGO), that phenomenon was influenced of Islamisation by ICMI. This trend was regarded by some researchers as a honeymoon between the Muslim community and the government based on the successes of Islamic community in influencing the government. For examples, in 1991 an Arabic language teaching program was broadcasted once a week at TVRI, a revocation of a ban which had prohibited Muslim women from using *jilbab* (scarf) in educational surroundings,<sup>82</sup> and the establishment of "Bank Muamalat Indonesia" supported by the government; a more striking example was the revocation of the SDSB (*Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah*, Donation with Prize for Social Fund – a kind of lottery organisation) program which had run since the early 1980s. Those facts bolstered the assumption of Ramage (1999: 110), which was doubtful that democratization was

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, p. 140.

<sup>82</sup> From the late of 1970s to the late of 1980s student women of high schools were prohibited to wear Muslim women's clothes (*jilbabs*) as their uniform clothes in schools. This policy was regarded as influenced by the government's think tank institution.

a main goal of ICMI; he was more convinced that its main goal was developing an Islamic society.

In order to achieve its goals, ICMI established the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES) as a part of countering CSIS as the previous government's think-tank institution in various policies. Publishing the *Republika* daily newspaper to counter *Kompas* —which had been published by the Catholic (China-Catholic) group as the stockholder of Gramedia company group— and publishing *Gatra* and *Ummat* weekly magazines later were parts of other countering actions.

Adi Sasono, however, stated that ICMI with its CIDES and *Republika* was not opposing the government's policies but observing them. In his opinion, internal reforms were needed to support peaceful transformation in democracy and to prevent social radicalization that would lead to revolution.<sup>83</sup>

When ICMI was selecting persons to fill positions in its organizational structures, Gus Dur gave his reasons in refusing to join ICMI. Furthermore, when Gus Dur was sick and was treated at RSCM, Habibie himself requested Gus Dur to hold a position at ICMI, or at least to permit Dr. Fachmi Saifuddin —the Chairman of PBNU— to hold a position at the organization. Gus Dur refused that offer but he recommended dr. Muhammad Thohir from Surabaya —an *A'wan Syuriah* of PBNU— to hold a position as one of assistants in the department of Administration and a member of the "*Majelis Pengurus*" (Management Board). Meanwhile, Gus Dur himself did not show his clear refusal by saying "it is only a matter of task distribution. You may say that I am a member of ICMI who was outside its formal structure".<sup>84</sup>

He acted that way since as a Javanese who had considerable tolerance, Gus Dur was unable to state a clearer refusal, Habibie came himself as a minister to

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<sup>83</sup> See, Porter, *Managing Politic...*, p. 138.

<sup>84</sup> AULA, April 1991 edition, p. 18.

respect Gus Dur, therefore it can be understood that Gus Dur responded to it in accordance with Javanese etiquette (*teposeliro*).<sup>85</sup>

Afterwards, Gus Dur explained his assumption, when replying to a reader's mail at TEMPO magazine that expressed a disappointment regarding his attitude that time that the establishment of ICMI has been manipulated and said that he would be grateful if the assumption was disproved. Only history, he stated, would prove whether the assumption was true or not.

Both supporters and critics of ICMI recognized that Soeharto's changed attitude to the Islamic community was due to his rivalry with certain forces in the military, especially Benny Murdani's group. This rivalry was noticeable when a cold war between "*Cendana*" (Soeharto's residence) and ABRI's headquarter happened in MPR's 1988 Summit; ABRI opposed the intention of President Soeharto who appointed Soedharmono to be a vice presidential candidate. Since it did not dare to openly confront the president, ABRI appointed another candidate, the General Chairman of PPP, H. Naro.<sup>86</sup>

Deliar Noer, a prominent intellectual from an older generation, regarded ICMI as not an organization representing Islam, but was only an organization that had been manipulated for the reappointment of Soeharto as president. Noer was doubtful about the "Islamic level" of the General Chairman of ICMI, B.J. Habibie, since Habibie had not shown his deep commitment to Islam. In Noer's opinion, the appointment of Habibie to be a chairperson was not due to his Islamic qualities, but due to Habibie's position that was at that time strategic and strong enough to be a "political hook". Deliar Noer also referred to four categories of persons in ICMI, which were: 1) the idealists group, 2) those who wanted to be given projects, 3) those who want to be promoted to have a better position, and 4) those who only wanted to participate. Three months before the establishment of ICMI, he was requested to sign his support for Habibie to be the first chairman by

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<sup>85</sup> Term *teposeliro* or tolerance was popularly known in Java tradition in connection with respecting guests or honourable persons. The term means a careful attitude to keep others' feelings so they would not become hurt or even angry due to our actions.

<sup>86</sup> See, Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa: Pencarian Wacana Baru*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), p. 148.

some figures such as Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Noer refused the request by giving a reason that it was not an intellectual's way.<sup>87</sup>

It is noteworthy, however, that although he criticized it, he acknowledged that he did not hate ICMI.

Gus Dur, the General Chairman of PBNU, was probably one of the toughest critics of ICMI. He regarded the ICMI as being exclusive and elitist, not pan-Indonesian in character. Gus Dur and other critics of ICMI did not want to join it since they knew that the establishment process of ICMI was not as simple as what had been published by the press that reported the role of some students of University of Brawijawa in the process. The news was regarded as oversimplifying the complex truth. In fact, in 1986 Dawan Raharjo proposed the idea of establishing an association of Muslim intellectuals, but that idea was refused by representatives of MUI since they were afraid that the government would not agree with it. Two years later, in 1988, Dawam Rahardjo and Dr. Imaduddin Abdulrahim invited 50 intellectuals to visit Yogyakarta to discuss prospects of similar organizations. The meeting was dispersed by the police since it did not have any permission.

Gus Dur regarded ICMI as only an instrument of the government for continuing its power, since when ICMI was established, Soeharto tried to protect himself for various attacks that may endanger his position. This statement was confirmed by Bintang Pamungkas as quoted by Ramage (1995: 103). Gus Dur regarded figures of ICMI as manipulating Islam to support the government. ICMI had become dangerous since it was used as an instrument for achieving non-Islamic goals. Meanwhile, ABRI was suspicious of ICMI since it regarded ICMI as only an instrument to protect Soeharto *vis 'a vis* ABRI. Based on that consideration, not long before ICMI was established, the military through Try Sutrisno suggested Soeharto not to allow its establishment.

In addition to his criticism that the support given by ICMI to the government only benefited the status quo, Gus Dur also accused ICMI as being

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<sup>87</sup> See, Interview with Deliar Noer, in *Tempo Interaktif*, September 26, 1996 edition.

*neo-masjumi*.<sup>88</sup> It was a criticism uttered to defend NU's position itself. He regarded ICMI as a sectarian organization that did not consider the interests of all Indonesian communities, but only gave priority to Islamic communities, especially Islamic modernist groups. That accusation was because modernist Islamic groups played highly significant roles in ICMI, while the traditional NU did not receive serious attention. Representatives of NU had no important positions and did not play any significant role in ICMI. The participation of K.H. Yusuf Hasjim and Kiai Ali Yafie in ICMI was regarded as artificial and not sufficient for NU to also play an important role in it.

In ICMI's organizational structure in 1991-1995 periods, some representatives of NU had positions, among others Yusuf Hasjim, as a member of Expert Board, Alie Yafie as a Vice Chairman of the Consultative Board, Akhmad Saikhu, as a member of Consultative Board, Slamet Effendi Yusuf as a member of the Consultative Board, dr. H. Muhammad Thohir as Assistant II. This participation indicated that NU's elite highly appreciated ICMI. It also indicated that NU was accommodative to the government's policy that did not want any confrontation but participation. They (the NU's figures) were close to power and in some aspects were rivals of Gus Dur.

Due to his vital position in NU, Gus Dur's statements were sometimes identified as representative of NU in general. Therefore, the participation of many of NU's figures in developing ICMI was not regarded as an indication that NU supported ICMI. On the contrary, Gus Dur's criticisms gave impressions that there was a disharmony between NU and ICMI and that the two organizations were opposing each other. However, Gus Dur himself did not fight ICMI as has been revealed in his statements, he only objected that some figures directed ICMI toward sectarianism. Those figures in fact were highly dominant in ICMI. His accusation that ICMI was a *neo-masjumi* organization possibly was based on that fact.

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<sup>88</sup> See, Hairus Salim and Nuruddin Amin, "ICMI dan NU ada Ketidakberesan", in Zainal Arifin Thoha and M. Aman Mustofa (eds.), *Membangun Budaya Kerakyatan: Kepemimpinan Gus Dur dan Gerakan Sosial NU*, (Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press, 1997), pp. 113-6.

It may be concluded that all critics of ICMI regarded it only as an instrument used by Soeharto for his own political interest in MPR's 1988 Summit to be the president of Indonesia again in a political atmosphere that enabled more than one candidate for the presidential position. Political situations like this always influenced the Islamic community in Indonesia, which was manipulated by the government whenever it needs support in facing a crisis that may endanger its position. The Islamic community was manipulated for someone's political interest in order to achieve the position of power and after that position has been achieved, the community was put aside from the centre of power like what had happened in the early period of the New Order.<sup>89</sup>

Gus Dur actually tried to prevent the manipulation of the Islamic community. The establishment of ICMI should not be a reason for the military to supervise and pursue Islamic activists as had happened in previous periods. It is noteworthy that when CSIS dominated the government, Gus Dur's statements were not as loud as they were after ICMI has been established. That was exactly where the problems began in which CSIS's role was regarded by certain Islamic groups as the dominance of the minority over the majority. Although in other opinion, the participation of some Catholic figures like Beni Murdani and Ali Murtopo were not representatives of Catholic or Christian communities. They might be only representatives from their selves.

### **3. Fordem: Response to the Trends of Sectarianism and Democracy**

Gus Dur was showing his tougher disagreement with ICMI when he and other critical figures established "*Fordem*" (*Forum Demokrasi*, Forum of Democracy) after holding a meeting at Cibereum, West Java, for two days, March 16-17, 1991, which was attended by 40 intellectuals from various groups.

In his opinion, ICMI was a major example of the political exploitation of religion by giving priorities to certain groups over the national interest. The meeting later released "Cibereum's Agreement" consisting of four working plans to be carried out by a "*Pokja*" (*Kelompok Kerja*, Working Group): 1) extending

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<sup>89</sup> See, Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia...*, p. 215.



public participation in maturing the nation by the process of democratization: 2) improving communications among groups supporting the process of democratization and forming interactions with small and separate efforts of democracy in various areas, and 3) maintaining the tradition of democratization efforts by means of various instruments and publications.<sup>90</sup>

In his statement, Gus Dur explained that this forum was not based on a new idea, but was similar to a forum established 10 years before, in 1981. The meeting forum for intellectuals was named *Yayasan Kerti Swadaya* (Foundation of *Kerti Swadaya*), established by Rahman Tolleng, Eko Cokrojoyo, Ekky Syahrudin, Awad Bahasoan, and Gus Dur himself who later was elected to be the chairman.<sup>91</sup>

*Fordem* itself was a meeting for critical persons from different religions and cultures that stimulated political and cultural awakening to develop appropriate, honest, and healthy political insights. As the chairman of the working group, Gus Dur was assisted by some members, which were Eko Cokrojoyo (Catholic-Chinese), Mariane Katoppo (Protestant, a Woman), Alfons Taryadi (representing Group Gramedia), Bondan Gunawan (representing the ‘Banteng community’), and Todung Mulya Lubis (representing the socialists).<sup>92</sup>

The main consideration for the establishment of *Fordem* —as was stated by Gus Dur as the conceiver and the chairperson of the organization— was the increasing trend of giving priorities to one’s own group and the weakening spirit of solidarity. Sometimes democracy and common interests were set aside for groups’ interests or sectarianism.<sup>93</sup>

Two incidents that took place in the late of 1990s were examples of the trend worried about by Gus Dur and his colleagues in the organization. In October 1990, Arswendo Atmowiloto, an editor of an entertainment tabloid “Monitor”, published the tabloid’s survey placing the Prophet Muḥammad in a rank lower than himself and various artists as the most favourite figures. This publication

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<sup>90</sup> Manam, *Membangun Demokrasi...*, p. 32.

<sup>91</sup> AULA, June 1991 edition, p. 27.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, p. 28.

<sup>93</sup> AULA, May 1991 edition, pp.18-9; AULA, June 1991 edition, p. 37.

offended the Islamic community in Indonesia. This feeling of being offended itself was reasonable since the publication of the Prophet's rank in the survey was regarded by the Islamic community as a humiliation. Regarding this case, Gus Dur himself showed his anger when he was interviewed by an EDITOR journalist.<sup>94</sup> He was concerned, however, about the demand for revoking the SIUPP (*Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers*, a publishing license issued by the Ministry of Information), as a part of the Islamic community's anger about this case, proposed by some Muslim intellectuals (one of them is Nurcholis Madjid)<sup>95</sup> who later became members of ICMI. He regarded this action as being not in accordance with democracy and its inseparable principles, including freedom in giving opinions.

In Gus Dur's opinion, let the court decide whether Atmowiloto was guilty or not, but SIUPP of the tabloid should not be revoked due to this case. Fulfilling this demand of revoking the SIUPP, in his opinion, was a backward step in a democratic state, since it hampered the press and the freedom in giving opinions.

Meanwhile, the establishment of ICMI in December 1990 was regarded as confirming that the trends of sectarianism and weakening solidarity were social realities. In supporting Islamic interests, ICMI was considered to be developing an undemocratic vision of Indonesia. Then, it can be argued that *Fordem* was established as a disagreement with ICMI, which was regarded as hiding a political agenda behind its establishment.

In addition to the trend of sectarianism, various forms of stagnation in democratic processes also inspired the establishment of *Fordem*. Forbidding activists regarded as opposing the government to go abroad, revocations of SIUPPs, public activities which always had to be agreed upon by the government, formulation of various acts and regulations which were carried out "mechanically", limitation of public opinions, and limitations of the law's

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<sup>94</sup> See, Isre, *Tabayun Gus Dur...*, p. 62.

<sup>95</sup> See, Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia...*, p. 88.

sovereignty, “court Mafia”, and so on<sup>96</sup> were regarded as indicators that democracy was suppressed.

The government worried about the establishment of *Fordem*, so that the Ministry of the State Secretariat at that time, Moerdiono, and the Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs of Department of Domestic Affairs, Hari Soegiman, tried to meet Gus Dur to request his clarification about it. Gus Dur and his colleagues in *Fordem* regarded this as a form of intervention. The government’s attitude was clearer when it, through Hari Soegiman, allowed the establishment of *Fordem* as long as it met five requirements: *first*, the forum was and would not become an organization; *second*, the forum would not become a new institution of democracy; *third*, it would not carry out activities of practical politics or become a social and political organization and would not be exclusive and function as an opposition; *fourth*, its activities would be implemented through the existing democratic institutions; and *fifth*, to prevent misunderstandings regarding the name it was recommended that *Fordem* change its name. The fifth point was viewed by Gus Dur as a form of the government’s concern that the name would cause various interpretations and prejudices.<sup>97</sup>

Although in fact the establishment of *Fordem* by Gus Dur was criticized by the government and by some figures of NU itself, there were also some parties who supported its establishment and considered it as a positive one. Among Gus Dur’ critics in NU, there were three prominent figures regarded by Gus Dur as persons who were always in disagreement with his actions and it is noteworthy that they were also members of ICMI. One of the three figures was K.H. Yusuf Hasjim, his own uncle, who advised the government to establish *Lembaga Konsultasi Pemilu* (Consulting Institution for General Election) to counter the negative influences of *Fordem*. Two other figures were H.A. Chalik Ali, the former Treasurer of PBNU, who stated his worry that *Fordem* would increase the amount of persons who will not give their votes in the next General Election, and dr. Muhammad Thohir, Deputy Chairman of PWNU East Java which had been

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<sup>96</sup> AULA, May 1991 edition, p. 19.

<sup>97</sup> AULA, May 1991 edition, p. 14.

recommended by Gus Dur as one of Assistants of General Chairman of ICMI, who openly announced his disagreement with *Fordem* and tried to form an opinion in NU that its establishment by Gus Dur has deviated from the organization's rules and statutes.<sup>98</sup>

That opinion was countered by NU's youth by releasing a written statement declaring that what had been done by Gus Dur (establishment of *Fordem*) was not violating any regulations or conventions of NU. This statement was signed by representatives of *GP Ansor*, *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (Legal Aid Institute), *LP Ma'arif*, *Lembaga Dakwah* (Islamic Missions Institution), and *Lembaga Ekonomi* (Economy Institution) of that organization.<sup>99</sup> That statement was confirmed by one of *Rois Aam*, K.H. Hasjim Latif, by reminding that the establishment of *Fordem* by Gus Dur was in accordance with mandate of NU's 28<sup>th</sup> congress in political development affairs, which stated among others: "...NU members who use their political rights, to develop a healthy and responsible political culture, to participate in developing a democratic and constitutional way of life..."<sup>100</sup> In Kiai Hasjim Latif's opinion, Gus Dur's position in *Fordem* was only to use his political rights, which had been guaranteed by the NU's rules, statutes, and *Khittah* and had even been mandated by the decisions of the congress. Hence, in this context the assumption that Gus Dur's actions in responding the government's policies in relations with democracy was also NU's responses to the policies may be understood.

One point should be underlined once again here regarding Gus Dur's disagreement with ICMI is that Gus Dur was not actually too subjective with ICMI as an organization, he only objected to the trend of sectarianism developing in some of ICMI's figures who tried to manipulate ICMI for their own interests and certain groups' interests.

Considering the participation of some key figures of NU in ICMI, some of whom were even recommended by Gus Dur himself, Gus Dur's disagreement with ICMI should not be regarded as his making an enemy of that organization.

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<sup>98</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 22-3.

Gus Dur's disagreement with ICMI through the founding of *Fordem* was only intended to counter and correct efforts of some of ICMI's figures in manipulating democracy, based on his concern about national integrity (that Indonesia should not disintegrate).

#### **4. Rapat Akbar of NU Members' Loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution**

In 1990s, Gus Dur proposed the idea of "*Rapat Abar*" (Grand Meeting) of NU Members' Loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution which was submitted formally in November 16, 1991 in front of the heads of NU's branches in East Java, in NU's Area office, Jalan Raya Darmo 96, Surabaya. He explained this idea together with his explanation about SDSB's fund.<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, that idea was proposed again in a complete meeting of PBNU held in December 1991 in PBNU office, Jalan Kramat Raya 164 and was followed by sending a letter to President Soeharto explaining that plan. The letter informed that the grand meeting would gather 1.5 – 2 millions members of NU in *Lapangan Parkir Timur Gelora Senayan* (East Parking Area, Senayan Stadion), Jakarta. The president was expected to attend the meeting intended to confirm the NU membership commitment to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as instruments for their participation in the succeeding general election of 1992 and the general conference of MPR 1993.<sup>102</sup>

The aim of holding this *Rapat Akbar* is to confirm the pledge of loyalty of NU's members to the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. Gus Dur stated, "Since we often forget this aspect when facing general elections. We debate about the legislative candidates but we forget the Constitution, so NU members want to remind all parties to refer to the Constitution and Pancasila by holding the *Rapat Akbar*".<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>101</sup> AULA, March 1992 edition, p. 25.

<sup>102</sup> See, Budairy, "Gus Dur dari Ketua...", p. 170.

<sup>103</sup> AULA. March 1992 edition, pp. 25-6.

The idea was rejected by some figures, but was also supported by key figures of NU, such as K.H. Ilyas Ruchiyat, the in-charge *Rois Aam* newly elected in Bandar Lampung, and K.H. Hasjim, one of *Rois Syuriahs* of PBNU.<sup>104</sup>

In a common meeting of *Pengurus Besar Harian* (Operational Management Boards) of *Syuriah* and *Tanfidziyah* held in February 9, 1992, however, PBNU made a decision that what would be allowed to be held was the *Rapat Akbar* of NU's 68<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, not the *Rapat Akbar* of NU Member's Loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The *Rapat Akbar* of loyalty was regarded as not being necessary since representatives of NU had always participated in formulating the state's historical documents and historically, NU was never disloyal to Pancasila and the Constitution.

*Rapat Akbar* of NU's 68<sup>th</sup> Anniversary was the agreeable compromise to the program that had been proposed by Gus Dur, while the elected chairperson of the standing committee for the meeting was H. Abu Hasan. Although that meeting was not attended by President Soeharto, the text of loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution was still read by one participant, the Chairman of PWNU Central Java. The text was later submitted to Gus Dur as the General Chairman of PBNU.

This idea of Gus Dur caused positive and negative reaction of NU themselves and the bureaucracy. Figures of NU who refused the idea among others were K.H. Yusuf Hasjim and Chalid Mawardi with an argument that "the time for NU to have any party is over." The chairperson of NU Jakarta Branch showed his tougher refusal by sending a letter stating that any riot that may happen in the meeting would not be his responsibility. Meanwhile, Sudomo from the bureaucracy implicitly refused the idea by stating that the meeting should be postponed until the general election was completed.

Dawam Raharjo, the deputy chairperson of expert board of central ICMI, gave one of the toughest comments about this plan. He stated that this *Rapat Akbar* would be a mass show of force. It would not be impossible that this mass force manipulated for a political movement. The *Rapat Akbar* might be even

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<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27.

manipulated by outside parties that have their own political agendas. In his opinion, NU experienced political disorientation due to the *1926 Khittah* and faced difficulties since it had no qualified figures, although it had no sufficient funds. The *Rapat Akbar* itself would be supported by a person who was not familiar with NU, Liem Soe Liong, who donated 1 billion rupiah, an amount that in Raharjo's opinion would have been more useful if donated to hospitals, parenting institutions, schools, and other humane institutions instead of being spent only in a day.<sup>105</sup>

Dawam Raharjo's statement was supported by Rudini and Sudomo who recommended that the *Rapat Akbar* should be broadcasted by a television station instead of gathering a huge amount of people to minimize the cost. Dr. Miftah Thoha, a lecturer of Social and Political Sciences Faculty, University of Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta, also criticized the program implicitly by asking, "what are you looking for, NU?"<sup>106</sup>

Although the military (ABRI) admitted the danger caused by this event, it regarded the NU's program as a useful activity to persuade the nation to strengthen its unity. NU was regarded as a moral force keeping this nation together as an integral whole. Furthermore, Harsudiono Hartas, the staff chairperson of social political affairs of ABRI officially stated that ABRI did not object to this plan.<sup>107</sup>

The government's worry about this *Rapat Akbar* was shown in interventions in the form of tight security regulations preventing thousands of members of NU to attend it. Security officers examined vehicles coming from Ciputat (Jakarta) and Sawangan (Bogor) and ordered vehicles carrying NU members without complete identification papers to go home. Some officers in regions visited managers of various mosques to prevent the departure of NU members for Jakarta. Some officers of social and political affairs in various areas undertook similar activities to minimize the number of participants of the *Rapat Akbar*. These were revealed by Gus Dur later in responding to comments

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 28-9.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

regarding the target which had been not achieved which was to gather 1 – 2 millions participants. Apart from this statement, in fact the *Rapat Akbar* was attended only by about 500 thousand persons.

Gus Dur's statement that this program would be regularly held by NU was a reference for the NU's youth to hold the second *Rapat Akbar* in Lapangan Parkir Timur Senayan Jakarta on Sunday, November 11, 1998. This program was held to celebrate 53<sup>rd</sup> NU's "*Resolusi Dihad*" Anniversary and 70<sup>th</sup> "*Sumpah Pemuda*" (the Youth Pledge) Anniversary. The main aim of the meeting was, "to sharpen NU members' awareness to defend Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and to protect them from efforts of persons or groups who intend to change them arbitrarily", as mentioned by the chairperson of the standing committee, Arvin Hakim. He explained that NU members were aware of efforts to change Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution arbitrarily, by means of a sacred program the NU members were therefore aroused to participate in maintaining national integrity. "We know that in the nation there are serious problems, there is discontent everywhere. Therefore, NU members were called upon to be not agitated," he said.<sup>108</sup>

### **C. Return to the 1926 Khittah**

It is noteworthy that the participation of *Anshor*, the allied organization of the NU youth in destroying the Movement of September 30, 1965 by means of an instrument called *Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu/PKI* (Crush Gestapu/PKI united act) which led to hundreds of thousand of PKI members and supporters to be killed, and its demand for the banning of the PKI by means of demonstrations coordinated by Subchan ZE,<sup>109</sup> a prominent figure of the NU youth, facilitated the establishment of the New Order government.

That significant contribution of NU in facilitating the establishment of Soeharto's New Order government, however did not make its representatives gain politically important positions in the cabinet or other governmental structures. On

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<sup>107</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29.

<sup>108</sup> See, <http://www.indonesia.com/bernas/9810/12/UTAMA/12uta0.htm>



the contrary, although NU's youth succeeded in convincing Soeharto that they were anticommunists, NU was treated suspiciously due to its active participation in Soekarno's Guided Democracy (Bruinessen, 1997: 90). The participation itself was reasonable since as a large political organization at that time, NU had its position in Soekarno's *Nasakom* (*Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis*, or Nationalism, Religion, Communism) cabinet.

That fact caused concern on the part of the *ulamas* and the youth of NU who introspected and reoriented the history of the organization which began 1926 as a religious social organization, later became a part of Masjumi (a political organization) in 1945, and then itself became an independent political organization in 1952 until 1973 to be merged into PPP (*Partei Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party). Discontent with this situation was getting more intense from time to time and culminated when the government tightly suppressed existing Islamic political organizations at that time, including NU. Therefore, idea of rethinking the basic character of the organization later became more intense in form of the demand to return to the *1926 Khittah* (1926 Guideline) to be an organization in its original form as had formerly been expected by the *ulamas*.

This process of returning to its roots can be explained by carefully analysing the background of the idea that will be discussed below.

### **1. External and Internal Factors**

The NU's idea of "*Kembali ke Khittah 1926*" (Return to the 1926 Guideline) by withdrawing from PPP and repositioning itself as a religious social organization as had been legalized in 1984 was caused by three key factors which are as follows: *First*, the government's direct and indirect interventions by means of various policies, such as the ban decreed in 1977 forbidding civil servants to be members of political organizations other than *Golkar* (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Group) which was followed by the establishment of *Korpri* (*Korp Pegawai Republik Indonesia*, Indonesian Civil Servants Corp). These policies

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<sup>109</sup> See, AULA, June 1991 edition, pp. 57-63.

indirectly forced some activist women (*Muslimat*), NU youth (*Anshor*), and other organizations affiliated with NU to gradually return their NU membership cards; later, the tighter policies in controlling Islamic missions rendered it more difficult for NU members to carry out their religious and cultural activities.<sup>110</sup>

*Second*, Internal conflicts in PPP. For example, in February 1980, the RUU (Bill) on General Election was agreed upon in the DPR-RI without the participation of representatives of NU. Later, a dispute occurred regarding the positions of leaders in various commissions in DPR, NU felt that it was being treated in an unfair way and lost some leadership positions in some commissions. The situation continued and culminated when an agreement was not achieved regarding the list of PPP's representatives-to-be in DPR for the 1982 general election. That was the worst crisis of the PPP during its history.

Efforts to change the decisions of the 1975 PPP National Conference one-sidedly were pointed to as being the main causes of the dispute. Previously, the consensus of the conference was the placing PPP's representatives in DPR proportionally, in accordance with results of the 1971 general election, in which NU had 58 positions in DPR, Parmusi 24, PSII 10, and Perti 4. Suddenly not long before the period for nominating representatives-to-be in the 1982 general election, MI which was represented by Sudardji proposed to change the consensus with a proportion based on the 1955 general election's results in which Masjumi had 57 position, NU 45, PSII 8, and Perti 4, meanwhile MI placed itself in Masjumi's position.

Later, the General Chairman of DPP-PPP, Dr. H.J. Naro, together with three other MI members in October 27, 1981 submitted the list of PPP's representatives-to-be in DPR for the 1982 general election for the Minister of Domestic Affairs, Amir Machmud. Actually, NU that time tried to resist the one-sided decision but it did not succeed, so the list submitted by Naro was legalized by the government. Some of NU's key figures were given lower ranks in the list in such a way that they almost certainly would not have any position in DPR and were replaced by other NU members who were not nominated by NU who were

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<sup>110</sup> Feillard, *NU vis 'a vis...*, p. 31.

not key candidates. Later, a figure of MI admitted that this was also the government's intention.<sup>111</sup>

Due to two external factors, NU's disappointment about its position as an organization involved in political affairs increased. This situation caused deep concern on the parts of certain groups of NU. Demands for a reorientation became more intense especially from groups, which did not agree to NU becoming a political organization. The idea of a return to the *1926 Khittah* became more intense from time to time and had to be responded. This argumentation confirms the assumption that the return to the *1926 Khittah* was a response to the various policies of the government that were regarded by NU as repressive and unfair.

*Third*, with similar importance, was the awareness on the part of some internal groups in NU which were concerned in seeing that NU had deviated from the original aims of its establishment, namely to be a social Islamic organization which focused to concern of development of Islamic education and *da'wa* (Islamic propagation). This awareness was probably caused by dissatisfaction in what had so far been achieved by NU as a political organization.

In fact, the idea of a return to the *1926 Khittah* was initially proposed long before the 1980s, namely in NU's 22<sup>nd</sup> conference held in Jakarta in 1959. On that occasion, K.H. Ahmad Khalimin from Mojokerto proposed that NU rethink its course by reviewing the initial aims of its establishment.<sup>112</sup> That idea, however, did not receive many responses and was later almost forgotten by members of NU in its intense activities in political affairs.

In NU's 25<sup>th</sup> congress held in Surabaya, 1971, K.H. Wahab Hasbullah, *Rois Aam* of PBNU, proposed a theme similar to what had been proposed by K.H. Ahmad Khalimin in 1959 that NU should review its history by contemplating the initial aims of the establishment of this organization. Later, this theme of a return to the *1926 Khittah* got more attention from time to time.

In its 26<sup>th</sup> congress, June 5-11, 1979, in Semarang, in addition to re-electing K.H. Idham Chalid to be the General Chairman of PBNU, the

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<sup>111</sup> M. Said Budairy, "Gus Dur dari Ketua PBNU sampai Presiden RI", in Ahmad Suaedy and Ulil Abshar Abdalla (eds.), *Gila Gus Dur...*, pp. 154-7.

organization also formulated a basic program of five-year development and some of its members expressed their support for the idea of returning to the *1926 Khittah*. After experiencing very long debates, the idea of a return to the *1926 Khittah* was legalized in the 27<sup>th</sup> congress, December 8-12, 1984, held in Situbondo.

Comprehending the call for returning to the *1926 Khittah* basically means comprehending the true nature of NU as a movement and not simply as an organization. It also means understanding the true forces which actually support NU itself such as the roles played by the *ulamas* in directing and strengthening the Islamic community's integrity; the teachings of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* as principles for resolving struggles within the organization; principles of discussion to achieve decisions; the principle of willingness in their implementations; the principle of obedience to the *ulamas* without eliminating the initiatives of NU members themselves; the principle of tolerance supporting strong solidarity among NU members, and so on.<sup>113</sup>

The concern about what had been experienced by NU was not only on the part of a few of elite groups in Jakarta but was shared both at the leaders' level and at the ordinary members' level.

A group in Jakarta later acted as a mediator to receive aspirations coming from other areas by means of correspondence. They formed a group popularly known as "*Kelompok G*" (G Group) since all activities of this group were carried out in a house located in *Jalan G* (G Street), Jakarta. This *Kelompok G* afterwards published *Jurnal Khittah* (Journal of *Khittah*) and *Risalah Nahdliyin* (Message of *Nahdliyin*). Although using only a mailbox as its address since the group did not have any office, the correspondence and the distribution of the two publications ran well.

Furthermore, the working group held a meeting in May 12, 1983, and since the group consisted of 24 members, it named itself "*Madjelis 24*" (Board of

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<sup>112</sup> AULA, March 1990 edition, p. 84.

<sup>113</sup> Budairy, "Gus Dur dari..." , p. 155 ; See also, *Hasil Muktamar NU ke 27 Situbondo: Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali ke Khittah Perjuangan 1926*, (archives of Perpustakaan Wahid Hasyim Tebuireng Jobang-Jatim), pp. 137-9.

24). The 24 members were: 1) K.H. M.A. Sahal Mahfudz, 2) H. Mustafa Bishri, 3) Dr. Asep Hadipranata, 4) H. Mahbub Djunaidi, 5) H. Abdurrahman Wahid, 6) Drs. H.M. Tolchah Hasan, 7) Drs. H.M. Zamroni, 8) Dr. H. Muhammad Tohir, 9) Dr. Fahmi Dja'far Saifuddin, 10) H.M. Said Budairy, 11) Abdullah Syarwani, SH., 12) H. M. Munasir, 13) K. Muchit Muzadi, 14) H. M. Syaiful Mudjab, 15) Drs. H. Umar Basalim, 16) Drs. H. Cholil Musaddad, 17) Ghaffar Rahman, SH., 18) Drs. H. Slamet Effendy Yusuf, 19) Drs. Mohammad Ichwan Syam, 20) Drs. H. Musa Abdillah, 21) Musthofa Zuhad, 22) H.M. Danial Tanjung, 23) A. Bagja, and 24) Drs. Masdar Farid Mas'udi.<sup>114</sup>

The meeting agreed to form a team named “*Tim Tujuh Untuk Pemulihan Khittah NU 1926*” (Team of 7 for Returning to the 1926 *Khittah*). The team had a working period of five months only and would be discharged after completely carrying out the mandate given to it by the “*Madjelis 24*”. Members of the team were H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur-Chairman); Drs. H.M. Zamroni (Deputy Chairman); H.M. Said Budairi (Secretary); H. Mahbub Djunaidi (Member); Dr. H. Fahmi D. Saifuddin (Member); H.M. Danial Tanjung (Member), and A. Bagja (Member). Gus Dur was appointed to be the chairperson of the team due to his potential and to prepare his nomination for the position of chairperson of NU who would eventually lead the NU's return to the *1926 Khittah*.<sup>115</sup>

The team of 7 then succeeded in completing its task in October 1983 by agreeing to some formulations of principal ideas as valuable contributions for NU. These, among others, were the principal thoughts of returning to the *1926 Khittah* and principles for improving and developing NU that consisted of the principle of pioneering, the principle of continuity, and the principle of adjustment to the existing necessities of the time. Meanwhile, the aims of this improvement were facilitating the process of returning NU to the *1926 Khittah*, implementing programs supporting the process, and creating a new pattern of leadership.

The formulation of those principal thoughts was the main theme discussed in *Munas Alim Ulama*, which later also formulated three important agendas.

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<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, p. 158; Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa: Pencarian Wacana Baru*, (Yogyakarta: 1994, LKiS), pp. 133-4.

These important agenda were then adopted as decisions of NU's 27<sup>th</sup> congress in Situbondo, which were: 1) re-establishing NU as a religious social organization and directing NU's programs in accordance with existing developmental atmosphere and directing the organization's components to support the NU's aims in the *1926 Khittah* (principal thoughts of returning to the *1926 Khittah*), 2) confirming Pancasila as the foundation of the organization and its implementation in statutes of the organization (declaration on the relations between Pancasila and Islam), 3) determining limitations in channelling the political aspirations of NU members by means of existing political and social forces (plan for the Introduction of Rules and Statutes of NU).

The government at that time allowed the *Munas Alim Ulama*, which was not held by PBNU but by a group that was ready to push for Gus Dur as the next chairperson of PBNU. PBNU itself under the leadership of K.H. Idham Chalid had prepared a congress, but due to the task given to the chairperson of the committee, K.H. Chalid Mawardi, to be the Indonesian Ambassador to Syria, the plan could not be realized.

Meanwhile, the NU later experienced a divided leadership due to the following case: In May 2, 1984 K.H. Idham Chalid, accepted the advice of some influential *ulamas* to resign from his position as the General Chairman of PBNU because his age and health prevented him from holding the position any longer. Later, K.H. Idham Chalid handed over his position to the *Rois Aam*, K.H. Ali Maksum, and gave authority to the *kiais* to appoint a temporary General Chairman of PBNU until the next congress. This statement was announced in writing four days later in May 6, 1984. The *kiais* who had visited and advised him to resign among others were K.H. As'ad Syamsul Arifin, one of the senior *kiais* of NU; K.H. Ali Maksum, *Rois Aam* of PBNU; K.H. Ali Masykur, *Rois Syuriah* of PBNU; K.H. Mudjib Ridwan, a son of the creator of NU's symbol; and Dr. Muhammad Thohir, the doctor who had nursed Kiai As'ad.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> Budairy, "Gus Dur dari...", p. 160.

A week later, however, K.H. Idham Chalid suddenly cancelled his resignation based on two reasons; one of them was that he has been elected by the congress so that he had to be discharged by the congress too. Another reason with similar importance was that the decision had given rise to protests from central- and regional managements wishing him to keep his position as the general chairperson of PBNU. The case shocked NU, the pros and cons published in the mass media caused inevitable tension within the organization.

The situation was getting worse since various meetings of PBNU, operational managements, and plenary management did not achieve any agreement regarding the pros and cons of the cancellation of resignation as stated by K.H. Idham Chalid. The *kiais* to whom Idham Chalid had handed over his power maintained their opinion that the statement of resignation, which had been previously released by Idham Chalid, was legal and binding on all parties.

This incident increased the burden of the group that was concerned about NU's condition. In addition to reconciling the parties that were in dispute with each other, they also had to find an alternative chairperson acceptable to the majority of NU members. The group of 24 later chose Gus Dur as the alternative chairman since he was regarded as meeting the requirements for the position, which among others were: 1) Gus Dur was a grandson of K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari and K.H. Bisri Sjansuri, two founding figures of NU; 2) Gus Dur also was a smart young figure with extraordinary memory, good sense of humour, and physically fit for the job.

K.H. Ali Maksum —former *Rois Aam* and *Mustasyar* of PBNU— and also one of Gus Dur's former teachers gave special criteria for an ideal chairman of NU, that the chairman should be able to unite *fiqh* and *taṣawwuf* in his personality, by quoting a line of poetry, “Whoever understands *fiqh* (Islamic law) without *taṣawwuf* (Islamic mysticism) will be a *fasiq* (sinful person). Whoever implements *taṣawwuf* without *fiqh* will be a kind of shaman. And whoever implements *fiqh* and *taṣawwuf* will be given help of Allāh”.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*, p. 163.

There were three perceptions, each of them represented by a group, among NU members regarding *Kembali ke Khittah 1926* as follows: 1) NU would leave the political arena and become merely a religious organization, 2) the *ulamas* would be placed in the highest position in the organization which means that *Syuriah* would be in the position of making decisions in contrast to what had happened in the past that *Tanfidziyah* dominated the processes of making decisions, and 3) NU should not necessarily leave the political arena.<sup>118</sup>

It may be concluded from the three groups that the two earlier groups were supporters of the pure *Khittah* as had been proposed by the original author of the idea of *Kembali ke Khittah 1926*, K.H. Ahmad Sidiq, who had proposed completely leaving the arena of practical politics. Among them were senior *ulamas* such as K.H. Abdul Hamid, and K.H. Ali Maksum. In contradiction with the first group, although the third group also supported that idea, they did not want to completely leave the political arena. They among others consisted of some *ulamas* of NU who still engaged themselves in political affairs and were still members of PPP such as Imam Rosjadi, K.H. Sjamsuri Baldawi, and K.H. Idham Chalid himself.

The first group defined *Kembali ke Khittah 1926* as placing *ulamas* in the highest position of the organizational structures, in other words *Syuriah* was repositioned as the highest body of the organization. Principally, *Syuriah* was a body having the highest authority in studying religious matters, giving *fatwā* (authoritative religious opinion), supervising and guiding other bodies in the organization. Besides, *Syuriah* had the task of discussing religious affairs in connection with real occurrences based on the perspective of Islamic law.<sup>119</sup>

Meanwhile, *Tanfidziyah* had a position under *Syuriah's* in the leadership structure of the organization. Therefore, although the management board of *Tanfidziyah* also consisted of *ulamas*, they would accept the decisions of the *Syuriah*. That acceptance was enabled since the organizational structure of NU was formed based on the Sunnite tradition having two main criteria: 1) the

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<sup>118</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, "Konjungtur Sosial di Jagat Politik NU Paska Khittah 26: Pergulatan NU Dekade 90-an", in Ellyasa KH. Darwis (ed.), *Gus Dur NU...*, p. 64.



dominant spiritual leadership of the *ulamas* who always interact with their communities, and 2) strong solidarity among *ulamas*.<sup>120</sup>

In general, the definition of *Kembali ke Khittah 1926* used as a reference by members of NU was, as mentioned by in-charge *Rois Aam*, K.H. Ilyas Ruchiyat, in his speech on March 1, 1992 during the NU's Grand Meeting and 68<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, as follows: “*Kembali ke Khittah 1926* means a return to the patterns of thinking, attitude, and behaviour based on the Islamic ideology of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* which were applied in accordance with societal conditions in Indonesia, consisting of basics for religious and societal activities, which among others had been taken from the history of *Nahdhatul Ulama* from time to time.”<sup>121</sup>

Therefore, the return to the *1926 Khittah* was, on one side, basically a culminating response to the repression and intervention in the activities of Islamic political organizations by the government; on the other side it was a form of concern on the part of NU *ulamas* about their positions in NU and, in a wider context, in PPP. The *ulamas* could not any longer tolerate the political behaviours of various groups, which had tried to repress and minimize roles of the *ulama* in PPP, and the political actors of NU who engaged in practical politics which degrade the *ta'zīm* (honour) of *ulamas* in general.

Meanwhile, the government responded positively to this return to the *1926 Khittah*. It can be seen from the government's attitudes to NU after returning to the *1926 Khittah*, an attitude of which may be regarded as a reward for NU's accommodative responses to the government's policies especially in the form of its acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation. These will be discussed below.

## **2. The Effects of the Return to the 1926 Khittah**

The return to the *1926 Khittah* led to various positive effects on the part of NU in various fields. These probably had been carefully calculated by the authors

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<sup>119</sup> K.H. Achmad Siddiq, *Khittah Nahdliyah*, (Surabaya: Balai Pustaka, 1980), p. 23.

<sup>120</sup> Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Radical Traditionalism of The Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26<sup>th</sup> National Congress, June 1979 Semarang*, (Surakarta: Hapsara, 1982), p. 15.

of the idea. The whole organization experienced these positive effects especially in various programs of education and Islamic propagation (*da'wa*). Some points should be underlined regarding the conclusion gained by tracing NU's long social history: *First*, since it was established in 1926 to 1952, NU had been a social religious organization for 26 years. At that period, NU focused its attention more on the main aims of its establishment as mentioned in the *1926 Khittah*; *second*, in 1952-1973 NU became a political party; in 1955, it was the fourth largest political power. With its position as the fourth largest political power, NU gained some political advantages. For example, some of its representatives had certain positions in Legislative and Executive bodies.

When political changes happened, however, after Soeharto's New Order had implemented a political restructuring by simplification of political parties, NU lost some of its positions (representatives) in executive and legislative bodies. The following description will indicate the political disadvantages experienced by NU after the simplification of political parties by Soeharto's New Order.

Bruinessen (1997: 37-38), described some important historical events regarding NU in the period of the New Order as follows. After NU lost its influence in the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1971, some changes happened regarding religious teachers. The positions of religious teachers were filled in by reformists, and some NU schools changed their names. For example, the University of NU changed its name into University of "Sunan Giri". The decline of NU educational institutions can be seen more clearly, when 30% of its *madrasahs* had left *L.P. Ma'arif*.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, the loss of its position of influence on the Ministry of Religious Affairs had a big impact on NU and caused major disadvantages for the organisation as a whole.

In his position as a Minister of Religious Affairs, Mukti Ali—who was not a member of NU— proposed the idea of integrating *pesantrens* into the national educational system. Based on a Common Decree of Three Ministers

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<sup>121</sup> AULA, March 1992 edition, p. 48.

<sup>122</sup> L.P. (*Lembaga Pendidikan* or Educational Institution) *Ma'arif* is an institution dealing with educational affairs, which was established in 1938 together with *Muslimat* NU (NU Muslims

(Minister of Domestic Affairs, Minister of Educational Affairs, and Minister of Religious Affairs), released in 1974, determined that since that time the three levels of Islamic education (*Ibtidaiyah*, *Tsanawiyah* and *Aliyah*) were regarded as equal with SD, SMP, and SMA so that student transfers between the two kinds of educations (religious and general) might be carried out. This policy was regarded as the government's over-intervention in the *madrasah* curriculum, since for the equivalence of some general fields of study, curriculum standardization was required.

Actually, however, Mukti Ali had a good outlook for that policy, which did not expect *santris* to move to general schools but expected that after finishing their studies, *santris* would return to their villages as useful persons who would give moral and economic contributions to rural communities.<sup>123</sup>

Meanwhile, Andree Feillard noted that after the NU's 1984 orientation by returning to the *1926 Khittah*, the government strikingly increased its subsidy to the *L.P. Ma'arif*, in 1990 its subsidy increased five times compared to its subsidy in 1984. *Pesantrens* also received donations. Effects were also experienced in the field of Islamic propagation; concerned about the *mubalighs* (Islamic propagators) before NU stated its readiness to accept Pancasila to be the sole foundation, the government drafted tight policies on Islamic propagation and preaching. Later, after the return to the *Khittah*, the ban on Islamic propagation and tight admission were now much looser.<sup>124</sup> In the late 1990s, NU received a large amount of funds, not less than 1.2 billions rupiah, especially from the Cendana family for developing NU *Muslimat's* Office.

Gus Dur confirmed that NU's abandonment of the political arena was a strategy to make the Islamic community no longer an object of the government's suspicion that Islamic politic would lead to extreme right wing movements. He also worried that the establishment of ICMI would lead to Islamic politicization

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Women Body). See, Greg Fealy and Greg Barton, *Traditionalisme Radikal: Persinggungan Nahdlatul Ulama-Negara*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1996), p. xiv.

<sup>123</sup> Brunessen, *NU, Tradisi...*, pp. 240-8.

<sup>124</sup> See, Andree Fellard, "Nahdlatul Ulama..." , pp. 38-9.

again as a recurrent history. Suspicion on the part of ABRI might become a reason for pursuing activists of Islamic propagation and other religious activities.

Considering the results mentioned above, the writer thinks that these had been received by NU as being the positive effects of its abandonment of the arena of practical politics by a return to the *1926 Khittah*. Whether it had been realized by NU or not, these were the impacts of the government's political pressure.

The statements of Soeharto, Try Sutrisno (the vice president of Indonesia) and some ministers, in NU's 29<sup>th</sup> conference in Cipasung, Tasikmalaya, West Java that the NU's return to the *1926 Khittah* had been a correct decision<sup>125</sup> indicated that the government's intervention in pressuring or leading NU to follow its political-will was an undeniable reality. In this context, however, there has been a mutual symbiosis between NU and the government in which the both parties were benefited by the return to the *Khittah*.

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<sup>125</sup> See, AULA January 1995 edition, pp. 10-11.

## **Chapter V**

### **Religious Tolerance in NU Community**

This chapter refer to the framework of questions given in questionnaires and interviews. The framework is referred to since it is regarded as relevant in describing religious tolerance in the NU community as a result of data gathered during field researches conducted in two sample areas (East Java and West Java). The description of this research consists of location, samples, informants, and interview materials; all of which will be discussed below and will later be used in the analysis to verify previous hypotheses.

#### **A. Research Location**

East Java and its areas are important regions in the history and development of NU. One of these areas is Jombang, which is an area chosen for this study based on some considerations by not ignoring other areas. Jombang is an important city in this study of NU since in addition to its status as an important city having many prominent *pesantrens*; Jombang is also a city where NU and its founding figures were born. Besides, the availability of informants is another consideration for the researcher. In this study, I was assisted among others by an NU figure, Mr. Drs. Thoha Hamin, M.A., Ph.D., who I met in Germany. He was in the country for another scientific research project at the Universität Hamburg. I think that without his assistance the research in Jombang would not have been carried out as smoothly and in such a relatively short time.

Meanwhile, Tasikmalaya located in the province of West Java was chosen as another location for this research based on the consideration that it is one of NU's bases and that this area is relatively not too far from Jakarta so this relatively short distance facilitates other activities in gathering supporting data for this research. As in Jombang, there are many *pesantrens* as bases of NU in Tasikmalaya. Some researchers regard *pesantrens* as the miniatures of NU, so if one has difficulties in observing NU as a whole since this organization is so large, he/she may observe *pesantrens* for gaining information about it. The informant

aspect is also my consideration. One of my colleagues who is a figure of NU and also a family member of K.H. Ilyas Ruhiyat (*Rois Aam* of PBNU), H. Dendy Yuda M.Ag., assisted me in completing this research, for example in setting an interview with K.H. Abdul Chobir M.T.

### **1. Jombang (East Java)**

The regency of Jombang has a strategic location. Located in the middle of East Java, it is an area with similar distances from the Indian Ocean or Eastern Sea and from the Java Sea. In the east, it borders on the regency of Mojokerto, a part of the Gerbang Kertosusila (Kertosusila Gate) region, in the south, it borders on the regencies of Kediri and Magelang, which are tourist areas, student cities, and industrial cities. In the west, it borders on the regency of Nganjuk, in the north it borders on the regency of Lamongan, a priority area in the development of Gerbang Kertosusila. There are a lot of prominent *pesantrens* in this city, including the Pesantren of Tebu Ireng founded by *Hadratus Syeikh* K.H. Hasjin Asj'ari and Pesantren of Barul Ulum (Tambak Beras) led by K.H. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah from the fourth generation. This city was chosen by the writer for the field study based on considerations mentioned above.

In addition to gaining data in the library of Pesantren of Tebu Ireng, the writer also took samples in Pesantren of Bahrul Ulum (Tambak Beras) and conducted interviews in the Pesantren of Darul Ulum Peterongan. Before describing the results of this research further, a brief description of the *pesantrens* where the questionnaires of this research were given would be useful in gaining insights and a general portrayal of the research locations.

#### **a. Pondok Pesantren of Bahrul Ulum-Tambak Beras (PPBU)**

In about 1825 in a place not far for the centre of Jombang city in Tambakberas village, came an *ulama* named Abdussalam with the aim of expanding Islamic teachings by means of education. He was a descendant of Brawijaya King of Majapahit based on the following pedigree: Abdussalam son of

Abdul Jabbar son of Ahmad son of Pangeran Sumbu son of Pangeran Benowo son of Jakatingkir (Mas Karebet) son of Lembu Peteng Aqillah Brawijaya.

For about 13 years, Abdussalam was busy cutting off bushes and building new residences. In 1838, after a small village was built he began to build a small *pesantren* where he would give Islamic teachings in form of a *langgar* (prayer house) and a simple residence. Later, this *pondok pesantren* (house of *pesantren*) was popularly known as the house of “*Nyelawe or Telu*” since it had only 25 *santris* (students) or 3 local *mushollas* (a small prayer place, usually smaller than a mosque).

Abdussalam (more popularly known as Kiai Soichah) married a girl from Demak named Muslimah and they had sons and daughters, these were named, among others: Layyinah, Fatimah, Abu Bakar, Marfu’ah Jama’ah, Mustaharoh, Ali, Ma’un, Fatawi and Abu Sakur.

Two of his *santris* (students), Ustman and Sa’id, were lucky to be married to his daughters. These two *santris* were regarded as very smart so that the knowledge taught by Kiai Abdussalam was absorbed and mastered quickly, aside from this; they were of course regarded as having good personalities. From his marriage, Ustman had a daughter named Winih. After becoming an adult, Winih was married to a *santri* from Demak named Asj’ari, a founding figure of the Pesantren of Tebu Ireng. Meanwhile, Said was married to Fatimah, the second daughter of Kiai Abdussalam. From their marriage, Said and his wife had four sons: Kasminah, Chasbullah, Sjafi’i, and Asim.

Due to the rapid development of this *pesantren* with its increasing number of *santris*, after having an agreement with his father-in-law, Kiai Ustman established another *pesantren* in the village of Godong located not far from his father-in-law's *pesantren*, in the east of PPBU at present.

Kiai Ustman was one of the *ulamas* giving the teachings of *Ṭarīqa/Taşawwuf*, while Kiai Sa’id taught *Sharī’a*-oriented religious teachings. Therefore, Kiai Ustman’s *pesantren* was also known as “*Thareqat Pesantren*”, while Kiai Sa’id *pesantren* was also known as “*Syareat Pesantren*”. The two

*pesantrens*, however, were in harmony with each other and were supporting each other in various matters for common interests.

After Kiai Ustman and Kiai Sa'id had passed away, the management of the two *pesantrens* were in the hands of Kiai Chasbullah, the son of Kiai Sa'id. This happened because no one else managed the Kiai Ustman's *pesantren* since he had no son. Therefore, all his *santris* were moved to the main *pesantren* under the leadership of Kiai Chasbullah. Kiai Chasbullah was a famous *kiai* who was very rich and had a very wide farming land. He financed the development of the *pondok* (house) and mosque in his *pesantren* by using his own money; he did not want to receive donations from others. Under the leadership of Kiai Chasbullah, this *pesantren* grew more rapidly.

Realizing the importance of regeneration for the continuation of his *pesantren*, Kiai Chasbullah sent all his sons to study religious sciences in other *pesantrens*. For this purpose, his oldest son, Abdul Wahab Chasbullah was sent to Mecca to study there for many years. Since he had a very wide farming land, he also had a large warehouse of *gabahs* (paddies) near the *santris* rooms. Due to the largeness of this warehouse, the village of Godong Barat was also known as "Tambak Beras" (storing place for rice). Until the leadership of Kiai Chasbullah, the *Pesantren* of Tambak Beras had been under the leadership of three generations consisting of Kia Solichah (the founder), Kiai Sa'id from the second generation, and Kiai Chasbullah from the third generation.

After coming back from the holy land of Mecca in 1914, Kiai Abdul Wahab Chasbullah introduced many reforms in the educational system of his *pesantren*. Under his direction, the *pesantren* that had previously adopted the *halaqah*<sup>1</sup> system in its teaching method later adopted *madrasah* system<sup>2</sup> by using a mosque's veranda as place for studying. This change of teaching system was

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<sup>1</sup> *Halaqah* is a studying system where *santri* (students) sat by forming a circle while the *kiai* sat in the circle. The *santris* appeared to the *kiai* one by one to receive their lesson materials. This way was not effective both for the *kiai* himself and for his student since at the same time he had to give lesson materials to *santris* having different knowledge levels.

<sup>2</sup> *Madrasah* system is a modern teaching system using classes and grades for *santris* attending it. This system is more systematic and practical, since the *kiai* gives the same material lesson at the same time for students in a class.



highly resisted by his father so that at one time his father was angry when he was teaching since the new system was regarded as similar to the teaching system used by the Dutch. A Hadīth was used by his father as an authority for refusing this new system, *Man tasabbaha biqaumin fahua minhum* meaning whoever is in similarity with a group belongs to the group.

Due to his father's refusal, Abdul Wahab Chasbullah moved his teaching place to a *langgar* in Brangkulon. However, not a long time later, his father, Kiai Wahab, asked him to come back and permitted him to apply this new teaching system in the previous place (the mosque's veranda). Later, two buildings were even built located in the west of the mosque. This *madrasah* was named *Madrasah Mubdil Fan*, the first *madrasah* in East Java especially in a *pesantren*.<sup>3</sup>

After Kiai Chasbullah passed away in 1920, the following generation (his sons), Kiai Abdul Wahab, Kiai Abdul Hamid, and Kiai Abdurrahim held the leadership of the *pesantren*.

When the Japanese ruled Indonesia, as with all other *pesantrens* at that time, this *pesantren* also used the Javanese and Indonesian languages as languages of introduction. After Kiai Abdul Fattah with H. Abdurrahim participated in *Penataran Kiai* (Upgrading for *Kiais*) program in Jakarta, they introduced the Japanese language to the *pesantren's* curriculum, as another implementation of the Japanese government's policy.<sup>4</sup>

In 1967, based on the idea of K.H. Abdul Wahab, this *pesantren* was named "*Bahrul Ulum*" (the sea of sciences). Then, in 1969 as result of a negotiations conducted by Kiai Abdul Wahab these two *madrasahs* changed their statuses into public (state-owned) schools; I, II and III grades became "*Madrasah Tsanawiyah Agama Islam Negeri*" (MTs AIN), while IV, V and VI grades became "*Madrasah Aliyah Agama Islam Negeri*" (MAAIN) based on a Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs number 23, 1969.<sup>5</sup>

In December 29, 1971, K.H. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah passed away and the next chairperson of the *pesantren* became K.H. Abdul Fatah, while K.H. M.

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<sup>3</sup> See, Trio Tien, Neld Isfa, and Eva (eds.), *Senyum*, (Jombang: CF. Tabah, 1994), pp. 26-30.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31.

Wahid Wahab as the oldest son of K.H. Abdul Wabah Chasbullah was appointed as an honorary senior officer of the *pesantren*. After K.H. Abdul Fatah passed away in 1977, the leadership was given to K.H. M. Nadjib, the third son of Kiai Wahid Wahab. Besides being a leader of the *pesantren*, Kiai Nadjib was also active in NU and held the position of *Rois Syuriah* of East Java, Chairman of “*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat*” (DPP, Central Leading Council) of *Robitoh*, and later had a position in the *Syuriah* of PBNU. Under his leadership, the Faculty of Tarbiyah, Arabic Language Department was opened in 1983/1984.

Later, after K.H. M. Nadjib had passed away in 1987, the leadership in the *pesantren* was collectively held by a caretaking council led by K.H. Sholeh Abdul Hamid and the chairperson of Pondok Pesantren of Bahrul Ulum Foundation, K.H. Achmad Al-Fatich.

Under the leadership of Kiai Sholeh, the Pesantren of Bahrul Ulum experienced rapid growth among others in the form of an increasing number of *santris* coming from various areas in Indonesia. In 1993, the *santris* registered were about 6500. In order to develop the scientific abilities of its community, this *pesantren* opened formal and informal educational programs.

Looking back at the early history of Pesantren of Tambak Beras (*Bahrul Ulum*), there is an interesting point which may be a reference to analyse the development of NU later, which is that when Kiai Wahab Chasbullah, one of the founding figures of NU, showed an open mind and dared to apply the new method from outside without violating any basic principles at all. The *madrasah* system that he applied in the Pesantren of Tambak Beras was a proof of his open mind, although this system was regarded by his father as a system similar to the “*kāfir*” (the Dutch) system. Therefore, it is proved that NU, which is regarded commonly as a traditional organization, in practice was open for reforms. This confirms a thesis proposed by Jamaksyari Dhofier that NU is a moderately traditional organization.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 34.

<sup>6</sup> See, thesis of Jamaksyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982).

## 2. Tasikmalaya (West Java)

Tasikmalaya is a connecting point for traffic among Bandung-Ciamis-Yogyakarta. Its distance from Jakarta is about 380 km. Geographically, Tasikmalaya is located between 107°53' and 108°20' East Longitude, and between 7°3' - 7°49' South Latitude. Tasikmalaya is one of the regencies of West Java Province and also a Priority Region of East Priangan. It is also located in the southeast of West Java. In the west, Tasikmalaya borders on Garut, in the north, it borders on Sumedang and Majalengka, in the east, it borders on Ciamis, while in the south, it borders on the Indonesian Ocean. To go to Tasikmalaya from the capital of West Java, Bandung, after passing *Turunan Nagreg* (Nagreg Slope) — famous for its steepness— one may pass two passages: the northern passage, which is often full of big vehicles such as buses and trucks, and the southern passage that is relatively quiet and convenient for private cars.

Tasikmalaya is known as a city of *santris*, this can be seen from the large number of educational institutions available there especially *pesantrens* consisting of 700 units spread out in various city and village areas. Many of those *pesantrens* has considerable influence in West Java, for example the Pesantren of Cipasung, Pesantren of K.H. Zaenal Musthafa-Sukamanah, Pesantren of Manonjaya, Pesantren of Bahrul Ulum-Awipari, and the Pesantren of Suryalaya. Therefore, Tasikmalaya is similar to Kediri and Jombang, which also have a lot of *pesantrens*. This field research was conducted in one of biggest *pesantrens* in Tasikmalaya, the Pesantren of Cipasung.

### a. Pondok Pesantren of Cipasung

Pondok Pesantren of Cipasung was established when the Dutch colonial government ruled Indonesia, in the last period of 1931, by K.H. Ruhiat. Establishing *pesantrens* in this colonial period often faced serious obstacles from the colonial government since they were worried that *Islamic* institutions such as the *pesantrens* might evoke a spirit of rebellion. K.H. Ruhiat had to be jailed a

few times due to the suspicions of the government about *pesantren* leaders, since previous resistances had always been led by the *ulamas* of *pesantrens*.

In addition to giving teachings for the *pesantren*, K.H. Ruhiat also gave special teachings for the surrounding community by establishing a *Majlis Ta'lim* (Meeting Forum for Studying) for adults within week and month intervals as an effort to provide the community with knowledge about Islam.

At the beginning period, the *pesantren* only had about 40 *santris*, most of whom were *santris* of Cilengga Pesantren where Kiai Ruhiat had studied previously. Many other *santris*, however, only go there to study at nights and go home some hours later.

In the fourth year, in 1935 a religious school (*madrasah diniyah*) was established as a beginning step in the field of formal Islamic education. Therefore, this *madrasah* pioneered the establishment of higher-level *madrasahs*. Two years later, based on the consideration that in the first six year there were many *santris* who had mastered sufficient Islamic knowledge, the *pesantren* felt the urgent need for more *mubaligh* cadres. Therefore, “*Kursus Kader Muballighin wal Musyairin*” (KKM) —a course for recruiting new teachers and orators— was established as a means for practising making speech and holding discussions on Wednesday nights.

Further rapid progress was achieved by this *pesantren* after Indonesia attained independence; this is proved by the establishment of formal schools, for example in *Sekolah Pendidikan Islam* (SPI, Islamic Education School) of 1949 that provided religious- and general education. Five years later, in 1953, this school changed its name into *Sekolah Menengah Pertama Islam* (SMPI, Islamic Junior High School) and obtained status as a “qualification” school in 1985 under a Decree of the Education and Culture Ministry number 802/102/Kep/I/1985 and in 1994 obtained a “qualification” as having the same degree/quality as public or state-owned schools. In 1955, the *Sekolah Rendah Islam* (SRI, Islamic Junior School) was also established. The school then changed its name into *Madrasah Wajib Belajar* (MWB, *Madrasah* of Obligatory Study) and it became the

*Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* (MI) similar to the *Sekolah Dasar* (Elementary School) in general education.

As a continuation of MI and SMPI, *Sekolah Menengah Atas Islam* (SMAI, Islamic Senior High School) was established in 1959. Kiai Ruhiyat's intense struggles in the field of Islamic education also showed another extraordinary result in the form of the establishment of an Islamic College five days before the Movement of September 30, 1965 or in September 25, 1965. This college had one faculty named Faculty of *Tarbiyah* (Faculty of Education). Only four years later, in 1969, this faculty obtained a "qualification" based on the Decree of the Ministry of Religious Affairs number 7, 1969. A Preparatory College for continuing study in the *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* (IAIN, State Institute of Islamic Religion) was also established in 1969, which in 1978 became the *Madrasah Aliyah Negeri* (MAN). Meanwhile, a branch of the Faculty of *Ushuluddin* (Faculty of Theology) was established in 1970, although this branch only lasted for two years due to centralization to its centre, IAIN Sunan Gunung Djati in Bandung. Meanwhile, *Madrasah Tsanawiyah* in Cipasung was also established in 1992.

Kiai Ruhiyat was not only active in the field of *pesantren*, he also joined Nahdhatul Ulama. *Syuriah* Chairman of NU Tasikmalaya, member of *Syuriah* NU West Java, and *A'wan* of PBNU were positions he had when he was active in NU.

He passed away on Monday, November 28, 1977 after undergoing medical treatment for 8 days. After he passed away, the leadership position of the *pesantren* was transferred to his oldest son, K.H. Ilyas Ruhiyat, until the present. K.H. Ruhiyat left 2 wives and 19 sons and daughter (9 sons and 10 daughters).

Like in Pondok Pesantren of Bahrul Ulum, Tambak Beras, these *ulamas*—as pioneers of NU—in Pesantren of Cipasung also apply a modern teaching system. It is obvious therefore, that NU which is regarded as traditional organization doesn't close itself to reforms. Therefore, traditional religious and modern religious organizations have a more slight difference in this respect.

## B. Correspondence between the Ideas of Tolerance at the Elite and the Grassroots Level

When NU was established, the *ulamas* agreed to insert the obligation of having *madhhabs* for NU members in its Rules and Statutes. The Statutes mentions in the article 3: “Nahdhatul Ulama as a *Djam‘iyya Dīniyya Islāmiyya* implements Islamic law and *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā‘a* outlook and follows one of the four *madhhabs*, *Ḥanafīyya*, *Mālikīyya*, *Shāfi‘īyya*, and *Ḥanbalīyya*”. Furthermore, Chapter I of its Rules on Membership Article 1 Point 1 on Membership varieties mentions: “Ordinary member, later mentioned as member, is an Indonesian citizen embracing the religion of Islam, following one of the *Al-Madhāhib al-Arba‘a*, adult, agrees to the basics, laws, and objectives of and is able to implement all decisions of NU”. Furthermore, article 21 on Tasks and Authorities of the Management Board of *Syuriah*, section 1, point b mentions: “Giving directions, guidance, and education in implementing and developing Islamic teachings based on *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā‘a* and *al-Madhāhib al-Arba‘a*, in the fields of *‘aqīda*, *sharī‘a*, and *ahlaq/taṣawwuf*”.<sup>7</sup>

The recognition given to *Al-Madhāhib al-Arba‘a* (the Four *Imāms* of *Madhhabs*), each of them had a different method and approach in implementing the Holy Text and in turn also provided a different *fiqh*, was a beginning asset or capability of NU in facing the pluralistic reality. This asset later became a spirit in the NU’s community to continuously learn to appreciate existing differences. This was admitted by a figure of NU, K.H. Abdul Chobir M.T., in his explanation on socio-cultural situations faced by the NU community.<sup>8</sup> From this aspect, in addition to other aspects, an assumption that NU has a high degree of tolerance may seem reasonable although the assumption itself should be deeply examined. Were those tolerances deeply implemented by the grassroots or, instead, were those tolerances only rhetoric developed at the elite level?

The fact that some differences exist in NU is an inevitable reality. It is important to note, however, when there are different opinions between a more

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<sup>7</sup> See Rules and Statutes of NU.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with K.H. Abdul Chobir MT, December 14, 2003.

“powerful” party, possibly with more supporters, and the other party, the more “powerful” party would not compel the other to accept its own view. For example, when K.H. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah and K.H. Bisri Sjansuri had different views in responding to various political matters, especially the DPRGR proposed by Soekarno.<sup>9</sup> On one side, Bisri Sjansuri regarded what had been done by Soekarno regarding DPRGR as a form of *ghaṣab* (illegally violating others’ rights). DPRGR was regarded as replacing the legal form of parliament; the DPR was elected by means of the general election, which had been previously voided by Soekarno. On the other side, K.H. Wahab Chasbullah and Gus Dur’s mother became members of the institution, with a reason that the memberships were better filled by themselves rather than by the PKI’s representatives.

Two different views in responding to this matter can be seen. K.H. Bisri Sjansuri was radical and dared to assert that the government was wrong although he had to face the various consequences, which did not benefit NU. Meanwhile, with his argumentations, K.H. Wahab Chasbullah supported the government and joined the DPRGR as a member in order to compromise and prevent losses that are more serious. *Dar’ al-mafāsīd muqaddam ‘alā djalb al-maṣālih* (to prevent danger is more important than to do a good action) in this condition, it is preferred to prevent the communists from joining the parliament rather than doing a good deed by opposing Soekarno’s wrong acts.

Furthermore, the following description tries to show how the tolerances, which have been developed by NU elite, were implemented in the grassroots. The following discussion is a problem-analysing phase to answer the question whether there is a correlation between the ideas of tolerance developed by the elite and their comprehension at the grassroots level. This discussion refers to rules-of-sampling and questions given in the interviews that was carried out in the two research locations mentioned above. In the questions contained in the questionnaires<sup>10</sup> and in interviews with NU’s non-structural elite (those *kiais* of

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<sup>9</sup> See, M. Saleh Isre, (Collector), *Tabayun Gus Dur: Pribumisasi Islam Hak Minoritas Reformasi Kultural*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1998), p. 241.

<sup>10</sup> There were 50 questionnaires distributed in Jombang, all of them were returned, while of the 50 questionnaires distributed in Tasikmalaya 46 were returned. So that from a total of 100

*pesantrens* which are not involved actively organisationally in NU management but have strong influence in the *pesantrens*), there are three categories of discussions which are as follows: tolerance toward other Islamic groups (defined by the government to be tolerance of internal religion), tolerance toward religious plurality and socio-cultural plurality (tolerance of inter-religious communities), and tolerance toward the government's policies on Islamic affairs responded to by NU organisationally (one kind of tolerance between the religious community and the Government).

### **1. Tolerance towards Other Islamic Groups**

Various facts showing how tolerance in NU developed at the elite level can be obtained in the previous chapters. As *Rois Aam* of PBNU, K.H. Ahmand Sidiq once tried to improve NU relations with Muhammadiyah to re-harmonize relations between the two organizations, which had not been so close. Kiai Ahmad Sidiq and AR Fachrudin, the chairman of PP Muhammadiyah that time, worked together to try to solve various problems faced by the Islamic community by not making organizational differences between them a barrier for communication. The cooperation relieved the Islamic community and improved unity in a wider scope than between the members of the two major organisations. This context would become popular with the idea of *ukhuwa Islāmiyya*.<sup>11</sup>

In responding to the pluralistic reality in the Islamic community, not all members of NU had the same view, meaning not all of them agreed to the existence of various groups in Islam. The majority grassroots, 73.95 percent, do indeed agree to plurality, but we should not underestimate those who do not agree to the existences of various groups in Islam, since 22.87 percent is not a small

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questionnaires distributed in the two locations, 96 questionnaires were returned. Each research questionnaire consists of 22 questions, which were divided into three groups, *pluralism*, *egalitarian concept*, and *democracy*. All these questions were proposed to find out responses of the NU community to various issues regarding religious tolerance in Indonesia so that percentages of those responses can be gained as analytical references for subject matter of this dissertation. However, only some questions were used in this analysis chapter to find out how tolerance was comprehended by the grassroots. Description of this research's result is a comprehensive representation gained from the two locations with margin of error of about 2-3 percent.



number. Those who agree to plurality consider their agreement to be an implementation of the “the existence of differences of opinion within my community is a blessing” view as are revealed by the argumentations they propose. In addition, in his statement, Kiai Chobir<sup>12</sup> once revealed that being different is a normal tradition in NU. There are always some different opinions on a certain matter, and in turn, the NU community will be requested to choose the stronger and more reasonable arguments to be used as *hujjdja* (argumentation) in the Islamic law. In NU which follows the Sunni, being different is an ordinary thing, the four *Imāms* of Sunni groups are all recognized as sources to be referred to in various religious doctrines, although majority NU members tend to refer to the *madhhab* of Imām al-Shafi‘ī in making decisions on Islamic rules. Meanwhile, *kiais* and *ulamas* of NU should pay special attention to those who do not agree that there are various groups and sects in Islam as a form of plurality in comprehending the religion.

67.7 percent of NU members disagree that a party outside of an Islamic group is allowed to propagate religious teachings not in accordance with the group’s teachings. This disagreement is an interpretation of a Qur’ānic verse that “there is no compulsion in religion”;<sup>13</sup> on the other side, however, the 29.16 percent agreeing that kind of propagation may be considered a fantastic number since it means that almost one of three NU members agree that others be allowed to propagate their teachings to their own group having different teachings/principles.<sup>14</sup> This disagreeing attitude in general which will confront religions other than Islam, there would be no compromise if this attitude on *da‘wa* (religious propagation) was an absolute one, while there are obligations for

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<sup>11</sup> See, Munawar Fuad Noeh and Mastuki HS, (ed.), *Menghidupkan Ruh Pemikiran K.H. Ahmad Siddiq*, (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), pp. 82-5.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with K.H. Abdul Chobir MT, December 14, 2003.

<sup>13</sup> In the sample notes, they propose this Qur’ānic verse as an argument to refuse others to propagate religious teachings to their group.

<sup>14</sup> The data are in accordance with the opinion of Kiai Cholil Dahlan who does not worry about the religious missions of other groups, or even of religions other Islam to propagate their religious teachings. In his opinion the Islamic community strongly holds *‘aqīda* although it does not sufficiently implement *Shari‘a*. As an analogy, even a drunkard adhering to the Islamic *‘aqīda* will be angry if Islam treated unjustly. (The interview conducted on October 20, 2003)

carrying out missions or *zendings* in religions other than Islam, such as the Christian religion.

“There is no compulsion in religion” is a principle used in refusing other groups, which propagate their own religious teachings. Therefore, *da‘wa* will confront this principle if it is carried out compulsively. The situation will not be the same, however, if the *da‘wa* is carried out by using wisdom and good behaviour since a successful *da‘wa* needs a very high understanding and wisdom. Those who propagate religious teaching by not using compulsions will be supported by theological justifications whose socialization requires internal dialogues among the religious communities themselves.

Since a dichotomy arose between the old group and the young group (the traditionalists and the modernists), Islamic groups in Indonesia often are in conflicts with each other at the elite level, and even more so at the grassroots level, as a situation influenced by group fanaticism. The disputes on *khilāfiyya* matters since the establishment of various Islamic organisations in the early period of Indonesia have been inevitable. The young group’s rejection of the old group’s advice and demands to the “World Muslim Congress” forced the old group finally to form another committee separated from the common committee of Indonesian Islamic community is an important phase of these conflicts.

At the beginning, the establishment of the *Central Commite Al-Islam* by the SI group —as a part of the modernist group— and the organisation of *Muktamar Al-Islam* were positive responses in order to unite the Islamic community to improve their comprehension on different views in interpreting religious doctrines. However, the congress could not minimize the differences, and it even became a forum for arguing and debating matters, which were actually not fundamental.

For uniting Indonesian Muslims, new paradigms were emerging and developing in the Islamic community, for example in the 35<sup>th</sup> NU congress in Banjarmasin. In the middle of the 1930s, K.H. Hasjin Asj’ari requested all Indonesian Muslims to abandon *khilāfiyya* and *furū‘iyya* matters which had been

the main sources of disputes among Indonesian Muslim so far and to unite themselves to face the common enemy, the Dutch colonialists.

The establishment of MIAI which in turn led to the establishment of Masjumi by the next colonial government (the Japanese's) may be seen as a growing awareness that there is a plurality in Islam, an awareness which would develop tolerance towards other groups. However, after Indonesia had proclaimed its independence and Masjumi had become a party for Muslims coming from various groups, conflicts of interests among the groups were inevitable. Furthermore, when the conflict of interests could not find any compromise, it was reasonable that NU—as a traditionalist organization—later declared that it had abandoned Masjumi, and is no longer member of it. NU became a separate political party (1952) until later it was compelled to rejoin other Islamic parties when Soeharto's New Order government declared a policy of simplification of parties. In 1973, NU became a part of *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, United Development Party), but later it separated itself from PPP and declared itself as a social-religious organisation, similar to its position in its early period, after the idea of returning to the *1926 Khittah* had obtained strong legitimation in its 27<sup>th</sup> congress in Situbondo, December, 8-12, 1984.

The NU's separation from and rejoining with other Islamic groups can only be understood by means of a political perspective and cannot be used as a proof that the difficulties in uniting modernists and traditionalists were due to a lack of awareness of plurality or the disappearance of values of tolerance between these two groups.

The emergence of a *madhhab* of Indonesian Islamic neo-modernists, which was, in Barton's opinion (1999: 1-13), a group born within a traditional environment which experienced modern education, tried to bridge the thoughts of the two groups (the traditionalists and the modernists) was a part of phenomenon that tolerance always develops by conforming itself to existing demands. This situation mainly proved the correctness of a hypothesis that tolerance in NU was more striking when Abdurrahman Wahid—a neo-modernist figure of Indonesian Islam—became the chairperson of the organisation.

It is important to note that in a statement that may be seen to support Kiai Chobir's statement on this matter, K.H. Cholil Dahlan<sup>15</sup> proposed one example of tolerance in NU, more specifically in "*Bahtsul Masail*" (an institution serving to formulate and to discuss various religious matters). In making decisions on rules of *fiqh*, although it usually refers to books written by Imām al-Shāfi'ī, sometimes if it does not find any relevant legal reference on a certain matter, the council refers to books written by the three other *Imāms*. Meanwhile, if the four *Imāms* have different views, the community is allowed to choose any of those references deemed the most suitable one as an argument to make decisions on certain Islamic matters. That kind of process is a form of respecting each other's opinions by tolerating the different *fiqhs* of the four *Imāms* of *madhhabs*. However, a problem arises when *furū* (not principal) matters are not comprehended in the grassroots so that sometimes they are intolerant by saying that others are wrong or other teachings outside what had been implemented by them are wrong. Furthermore, sometimes the intolerance emerges in form of endless debates or disputes. Kiai Dahlan admitted that this situation is due to the socialization carried out by the elites, which do not adequately reach the grassroots. In other words, sometimes notions developed by the elite become biased when the grassroots try to comprehend or implement them.

However, an incident of note happened in the 31<sup>st</sup> NU congress in Donohudan-Solo, when a plenary meeting agreed to regard the JIL (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*, Liberal Islam Network)<sup>16</sup> as a deviance from NU's teachings and traditions so that its teachings were not allowed to be implemented and propagated by the NU community in particular and the whole Islamic community in general.<sup>17</sup> Whereas culturally and structurally JIL was established by NU's

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<sup>15</sup> Interview with K.H. Cholil Dahlan on October 20, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> JIL emerged in 2001 as a response to demand of various Islamic groups and political parties to implement Islamic laws and as a response to inter-religious conflicts, mainly between Islam and Christianity, causing radical Islamic activists to send their men to certain locations. See, Nicolaus Teguh Budi Haryanto, *Islam and Liberalism in Contemporary Indonesia: The Political Ideas in Jaringan Islam Liberal (The Liberal Islam Network)*, A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, 2003, p. 8.

<sup>17</sup> The rejection expressed in the NU's 31<sup>st</sup> congress was a continuation of the rejecting process previously had been discussed in Area Conference of East Java NU that was held in Pondok

youth led by Ulil Abshar Abdala. This ban on JIL happened probably since at that time NU's structural leadership was no longer led by Gus Dur. If NU was still led by Gus Dur, then the ban probably would not have happened.

This supposition may be supported by some reasons: *first*, historically JIL may be seen a kind of continuation of ideas proposed by some NU figures that were later categorized into Indonesian Islamic Neo-Modernists, one of them was Gus Dur himself. Hence, it is almost not reasonable that Gus Dur as a liberalist would allow NU organisationally to ban JIL. *Second*, high tolerance on the part of Gus Dur would probably open the opportunity for JIL to develop and to be accepted in the NU community. Principally, the thoughts developed by JIL were not much different from thoughts of earlier figures (liberal senior figures of NU),<sup>18</sup> but JIL emerged in the late 1990s by proposing old ideas in vulgar or even provocative ways. Furthermore, NU *ulamas* also regarded JIL as being deviant since it questions the authority of Al-Qur'ān on principal matters such as heritage and interfaith marriage.<sup>19</sup> Those various thoughts of JIL provoked strong reactions on the part of certain Islamic groups, such as in form of a *fatwā* (authoritative religious opinion) that Ulil Abshar Abdala should be punished with death.

## **2. Tolerance towards Religious Plurality and Socio-Cultural Plurality**

In addition to improving unity and relations with other groups in Islam (*ukhuwa Islāmiyya*), Kiai Ahmad Sidiq also offered non-Muslim communities an insight of unity in a nation (*ukhuwa Waṭaniyya*). People should not be differentiated only based on religions or faiths. Assumption that humans are good without ideological, theological, and discriminative prejudice indicates a high-level of egalitarian insight since humans are considered equal. Differences in

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Pesantren al-Yasini Areng-areng Pasuruan on October 11-13, 2003. Therefore, in this 31<sup>st</sup> Conference, the rejection of JIL was initially expressed by the participants from East Java PW, but later that rejection was unexpectedly supported by all PWs (Pengurus Wilayah-Area Management) attending the seminar.

<sup>18</sup> In his book, *NU Liberal: Dari Tradisionalisme Ahlussunnah ke Universalisme Islam*, Dr. Mujamil Qomar mentions nine figures of NU as having liberal thoughts: K.H. Ahmad Siddiq, K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, Prof. Dr. Said Aqiel Siradj, Drs. H. Masdar Farid Mas'udi, Prof. Dr. Sjechul Hadi Permono, SH MA, Drs. H. Muhammad Tolhah Hasan, K.H. Abdul Muhit Muzadi, and K.H. Muhammad Ahmad Sahal Mahfudh.

religions, ethnic groups, colours are artificial ones that should not hamper fellowship of humanity. This comprehension leads to the concept of *ukhuwa Bashariyya/Insāniyya*.

This argument (*ukhuwa bashariyya*) was used as an *ḥudjdja* by Gus Dur when he faced criticisms due to his visit to Israel<sup>20</sup> before NU's 29<sup>th</sup> congress held in Cipasung, Tasikmalaya, West Java. In his clarification submitted in front of the participants of the congress, Gus Dur even stated that interacting well with other humans is not a sin but a good deed as had been exemplified by the Prophet Muḥammad in the "Medina Constitution".<sup>21</sup> Gus Dur's thought on this matter seemed to be well implemented by the grassroots, at least at a certain level, such as in the form of cooperation in Jombang, and other areas, between NU members and Christians, Jawi Wetan Church in particular, in social affairs. K.H. Cholil Dahlan<sup>22</sup> once stated that Darul Ulum Pesantren, Peterongan, had been working together with Jawi Wetan Church in developing art skills since 1979 (when the *pesantren* was held by Kiai Mujtahid). That kind of cooperation may be seen as an approval on the part of the NU elite to the opinion that different religions may not hamper social and cultural cooperation.

The emergence of FLA (*Forum Lintas Agama*, Inter-Religious Forum)<sup>23</sup> as a forum intended for various religious communities led by the youth of NU in East Java and supported by the central NU elite was a positive interpretation of the idea of three forms of *ukhuwas* or brotherhoods. On another occasion, Gus Dur intensely defended the minority's rights especially the Confucian

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<sup>19</sup> See, AULA, January Edition 2003, p. 10-13.

<sup>20</sup> Gus Dur visited Israel in the late of October 1984, based on an invitation of Harry Truman Institute in Hebrew University, Jerusalem to be a speaker in a seminar on responses to the influences of contemporary challenges, a comparative study between Judaism in Israel at present and Islam in Indonesia. See, AULA February Edition 1995, p. 36.

<sup>21</sup> See, AULA, January Edition 1995, p. 56.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with K.H. Cholil Dahlan on October 20, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> The establishment of FLA was inspired by the "Situbondo Accident" in East Java, 1996, causing victims and great losses on the part of the Christians. 8 churches were burned down and, even worse, a *Pastur* (Priest) died since his house was burned down by a throng of people. The concern about this incident encouraged NU members, the youth in particular, to prevent similar accidents allegedly manipulating SARA (tribal affiliations, religion, race and societal groups) from spreading and enlarging. However, this movement only became an institution called *Yayasan Forum Lintas Agama* in 2001. See, "Profil singkat YFLA", archive of East-Java FLA.

community.<sup>24</sup> In an even more strict way, K.H. Drs. Dahlan Hudlari —the chairperson of PCNU Tasikmalaya— regarded the obligation for the Chinese to change their names as governmental coercion, while Confucianism was not admitted as a legal religion. This policy was regarded as intolerance on the part of the government that ignored plurality.<sup>25</sup> In addition to these examples, there were many other examples indicating that the assumption of high-level tolerance on the part of NU had factual proofs.

The fact indicated that “*Kerukunan antar Umat Beragama*” (inter-religious harmony) existed at NU’s elite level due to individuals’ awareness of the pluralistic reality, or, in other words, as a manifestation of tolerance on the NU’s part to religious plurality. It is important to note, however, that inter-religious harmony does not necessarily mean religious tolerance, but inter-religious harmony may be a result of tolerance. Due to religious tolerance, harmony among religious communities will probably manifest. In the Indonesian case, harmony among inter-religious communities is not achieved only by means of tolerance but also by means of pressure from government policies interfering in religious matters.

Besides, the factual examples mentioned above indicated that there was conformity between what comprehended by the elite and what was comprehended by the grassroots on these tolerance matters. The high percentage (68.84 percent) of those who are agree that the Indonesian society consists of adherers of various religions (religious plurality) indicates that the NU community has the basic capital to develop religious tolerance. In previously mentioned theory, it was stated that awareness of plurality is a cornerstone to manifesting tolerance.

Gus Dur’s intense defend for the minority may be seen not only as an individual’s effort but also as a collective effort of the NU community. The high

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<sup>24</sup> In connection with a suit brought by a pair of Confucians against PTUN (*Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara*, State Administrative Court) since their marriage was not recognized legally due to the belief they adhered . Gus Dur attended their court sessions to give his moral support to the pair, although his presence and support did not make the pair win the suit. See, Isre, *Tabayun Gus Dur: ...*, p. X.

<sup>25</sup> See, Ahmad Suaedy and Hermawan Sulisty, *Kyai & Demokrasi: Sebuah Potret Pandangan tentang Pluralisme, Toleransi, Persamaan, Negara, Pemilu dan Partai Politik*, (Jakarta: P3M, 2000), pp. 37-8.

level of awareness on the part of the NU's community in assessing pluralistic socio-cultural reality of Indonesian society is confirmed by the high percentage (94.79 percent) of supporters of socio-cultural plurality, while only 3.12 percent do not agree to plurality. In connection with ethnic groups, the majority NU community regards the pluralistic ethnic groups as a reality, which is justified by religion with a percentage that is not as high as the percentage on socio-cultural plurality. However, 77.5 percent who support ethnic plurality and only 9.9 percent who do not agree to it indicate a high awareness of this aspect of plurality.

The trend of high comprehension of religious and socio-cultural pluralities indicates that there is a comprehension on the religion's holy texts, which confirms this concept as mentioned in some verses of Al-Qur'an.<sup>26</sup> In one theory, Vogt stated that one's high level of formal education would support his/her high level of tolerance. The NU community, however, does not have a high level of formal education on the average, but their level of religious education is higher than their level of formal education and they have a high awareness of plurality. This fact generates a new theory that a high level of religious education may support high awareness of tolerance. Hence, it is reasonable that Gus Dur<sup>27</sup> once said the trend of religious radicalism that tends towards religious intolerance in Indonesia is due to the superficiality of religious values. The fact may be a challenge for other researchers to make an inquiry into religious comprehension in its connections with tolerance.

### **3. Tolerance towards the Government's Policies on Islamic Affairs**

In connection with tolerance to the government's policies on Islamic affairs, not by regarding other aspects as less important, the writer focuses his attention here upon NU's response to the government's policy on Pancasila as the "*Asas tunggal*" (the sole foundation). This focus is chosen since, as admitted by

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<sup>26</sup> See, Qur'an *sūra Al-Hudjurāt* (49: 13); *Al-Māida* (5: 48); and *Yūnus* (10: 99).

<sup>27</sup> While Gus Dur visited France to meet President Chirac, he said that the main factor of radicalism in Islam is the low understanding of Islamic teaching itself of Muslim communities. See, <http://www.kompas.com/utama/news/0310/04/233002.htm>  
That statement replayed while he came in Germany in his speech in Uni-Hamburg on November 14, 2002. See, <http://www.kompas.com/utama/news/0211/14/222418.htm>



some scholars in Indonesia and abroad, Pancasila is not only the state's philosophy but also a manifestation of a form of tolerance in Indonesia. In connection with this positive response on the part of NU elite to the policy of sole foundation, a research had been carried out to find out whether the grassroots had similar positive response too or not. Therefore, the following discussion will try to describe the research's result based on qualitative and quantitative findings at the grassroots' level in the two locations of research.

Salahuddin Wahid admitted that a considerable amount of Muslims (NU members) still hope Islam to become the state's basis or at least that Islam would have the position mentioned in "*Piagam Djakarta*".<sup>28</sup> The statement indicates that although as an organisation NU had decided that the relations between Islam and the state or Pancasila is a final one, in reality however NU members in general still strongly support the idea of making Indonesia an Islamic state. Results of the research carried out cumulatively in two areas, Jombang and Tasikmalaya, indicate that 54.16 percent of NU members hope Islam to become the state's ideology and that they think it is an obligation to struggle for it. Meanwhile, 18.75 percent of them acknowledge their disagreement on this matter and the rest abstained or do not have any opinion. Furthermore, the hope of making Islam the state's ideology, if possible, is indicated by the agreement of 77.07 percent of NU members with only 14.58 percent not agreeing to this hope, while the rest abstained or do not have any opinion on this matter.

In connection with this result on Islam as the state's basis, the elite has a difficult task to educate or at least to develop awareness on the part of the NU members themselves, if the elite hope to reach conformity between their ideas and acceptance of those ideas by the grassroots. It is important to note that the results of this research proves one of the hypotheses the writer proposes in this thesis, which is: There is an inconformity between Gus Dur's thoughts—the chairman of NU and also a representative of neo-modernist group—with the intellectuality of

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<sup>28</sup> Salahuddin Wahid: "Dinamika Hubungan Islam dan Negara di Indoneisa", on *Taswirul Afkar* Edition No. 16, 2004, p. 73.

traditional NU members which enabled some biases between the ideas he developed and their implementation at the grassroots.

Meanwhile, the survey also obtained the interesting information that although NU members strongly hope that Islam would be formalized into the state's ideology, they do not reject Pancasila. The majority of them accept Pancasila to be the state's basis in an emergency or not. This fact is indicated by the data that 76.03 percent of them agree to accept Pancasila, and 13.53 percent of them do not accept it, while the rest do not have any opinion or abstained.

This information gives rise to some assumptions, such as, *first*, NU's acceptance that Islam should be made the state's ideology is the awareness and comprehension of the religious demand as was admitted by Gus Dur when he explained the motive why NU had been so intense in the *Konstituante* in struggling to make Islam the state ideology.<sup>29</sup> However, since the political situation at that time did not enable Indonesian Muslims to realize this demand, NU was willing to accept the other reality. In responding to this matter, NU referred its legal argumentation to a rule of *Mā lā yudraku kulluh lā yutraku julluh* (one may not leave the most important aspect of what cannot be achieved completely).

*Second*, this reality is a consequence of comprehension of the teachings of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* in terms of the *fiqh* of the four *Imāms* of *madhhabs* adhered by NU. The socio-political context in the life of the four *Imāms* that formed the character of the *fiqh* in assessing the government at that time is reappearing in the NU's community in a different socio-political situation. Therefore, on the one hand, NU sometimes may be seen as accommodative so it was labelled as an opportunistic organisation, but on the other hand it may be radical in facing policies regarded as in contradiction with the principal values of Islam.

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<sup>29</sup> See, Sitompul, *NU dan...*, pp. 9-18.

## A. Chapter VI: Conclusion and Remark

### A. Conclusion

Some important conclusions successfully achieved by the completed research presented in this dissertation are as follows:

#### 1. Demand for Tolerance

The birth of NU as an organization aimed at representing the aspirations of the old group (traditionalists) was in connection with the demand for tolerance as a requirement for keeping religious services based on the Sunni tradition in Indonesia. Principally, the conclusion is there were three main factors, which served as the background for the establishment of NU.

1. Now, many researchers conclude that NU was established as a response to the emergence of various modern Indonesian Islamic organizations. Although that conclusion could not be said to be wrong, in the writer's opinion, the main background for the establishment of NU was constituted by the emergence of *khilafat* (caliphate) problems and the developments of Islam in the Middle East (Cairo and Ḥidjāz) and which were later responded to by the Indonesian Islamic community consisting of two categories (the traditionalists and the modernists). If NU was established only as a response to the emergence of modern Indonesian Islamic organizations, then it should have appeared before 1926 or at least some years after the establishment of these modern Islamic organizations.
2. In responding the development of Islam in the Middle East, the modernists in the *Central Committee Hilafat* (CCH) did not support the demand of the traditionalists that King Sa'ūd — the new ruler of Ḥidjāz with a *Wahhābiyya* background— should tolerate the Indonesian Islamic community concerning the implementation of Islamic dogma based on the main principles taught by the four *Imāms* of *madhhabs* (the Sunni tradition). To achieve that purpose, the *ulamas* formed their own committee. This is regarded by the writer as the most crucial among all the relevant background influences in the establishment of NU.

3. It may not be denied, however, that the establishment of NU was the *ulamas'* effort to end colonisation in Indonesia by means of a more moderate and organized way besides protecting the Islamic community from the influence of Western cultural penetration and the Christianisation efforts carried out by the Dutch government.

## **2. The Active Role of NU in Efforts to Achieve Tolerance**

Principally, this research provides conclusions that prove the three hypotheses proposed in the background of the research. That these three hypotheses are correct may be proved by means of a chronological history of NU, which is as follows:

Various roles and efforts of NU in achieving harmonious living in Indonesia since before the period of the independence of Indonesia is a fact that may not be denied. It should be underlined, however, that in the earlier period of this organization various disputes occurred among Indonesian Muslim communities divided into two main groups, the traditionalists and the modernists. NU was a part of the traditionalists, while the modernists among others consisted of Muhammadiyah, *Sjarikat Islam* (SI, Islamic Union), Persis and Al-Irsyad. The two latest organizations were not discussed in this dissertation.

The internal conflict among the Islamic communities occurred due to different perceptions in understanding religious doctrines mentioned in Al-Qur'ān and Sunna. This difference was mainly caused by the different methods to be used. The traditionalists made decisions about *fiqh* (Islamic laws) firstly based on the classical books written by the four *Imāms* from Sunni *madhhab* (Islamic school of thought), then, if the reference was not found, they would refer to Al-Qur'ān and Sunna. Meanwhile, the modernists made decisions about *fiqh*, firstly by referring to Al-Qur'ān and Sunna and then to books written by contemporary *fiqh* experts, if the two main sources did not mention the matters in a detail and sufficient way. A noticeable aspect of the modernists was that they try not to depend on the opinions of *Imāms* from Sunni *madhhabs*, so they claim to be a non-*madhhab* group.

The matters in dispute were *furū'iyya* (branch) matters which in the traditionalist's opinion were not principles and would not harm the faith and the *Sharī'a* (belief). The modernists, however, regarded those matters as possibly harming the faith and the *Sharī'a*. In other words, some things regarded by the traditionalist as *furū* were regarded as *bid'a* (Novelty) by the modernists. A Hadīth stating that "all *bid'a* are deviant" used as a reason to justify that the traditionalists had made mistakes in the modernists' opinion. Some things regarded as *bid'as* were uttering *lafaz niyya* (words of intention) of *Ṣalāt* (not speaking them by heart), visiting graves, reading *Barzandjī*, reading *Talqīn* in front of a dead body before he/she is dead or buried, *tahlil* (ceremony to pray for dead one), et cetera.

The inevitable disputes between the two groups were due to different ways of understanding. Later, some ideas and efforts were developed to minimize the tension. Some Congresses of Al-Islam held before 1926 were the efforts of the modernists to minimize disputes between them. The efforts, however, always failed to achieve the expected result. The peak of the disputes happened in the Congresses of Al-Islam in form of the emergence of two Indonesian Muslim delegation committees that aimed to attend the World Al-Islam Congress held in the Middle East. The occasion was an initial process for the establishment of NU as an organization still keeping the teachings of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* or the Sunni group implementing the teachings of the four *Imāms*.

One of the efforts of NU towards achieving harmonious relations among the Islamic communities was shown in the 11<sup>th</sup> congress, 1936 in Banjarmasin, as one of the most important occasions in its history. K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari on that occasion persuaded all Islamic communities to stop the disputes about the *furū'iyya* matters and to cooperate against the common enemy, the Dutch colonial government. The modernists responded to it positively. The establishment of the first organization uniting all Islamic communities, *Madjlis Islam A'la Indonesia* (MIAI, Supreme Council of Indonesian Muslims), in 1937, was a positive reaction to the persuasion.

In the early period of the Indonesian independence, a crucial discussion was held about the state's form and ideology since those two things would highly influence the integrity of all components in Indonesia, which is very pluralistic in various aspects of society, culture, and religion. NU gave its significant contribution to this discussion by means of the participation of K.H. Wahid Hasjim. Pancasila in its form in the "*Piagam Djakarta*", which had been agreed upon together as the Indonesian state's foundation and was read in the proclamation of independence in August 17, 1945, had to be changed on the following day due to an objection on the part of Christian's group from Eastern Indonesia. The latest seven words in the first principle of Pancasila (*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Sjariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja*, or with obligation to carry out *Sharī'a* for adherents of Islam) were eliminated. As a concession, the Islamic group —based on a proposal submitted by K.H. Wahid Hasjim— puts the words "*Yang Maha Esa*" (One Supreme) into the first principle to replace the eliminated words to form words "*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*" (Belief in One Supreme God). The Islamic community convinced that the words "*Yang Maha Esa*" indicate *tawḥīd* (Monotheism) in Islam. The Islamic group sincerely gave up what had been the maximum struggle in BPUPKI due to the objections on the part of the Christian group. It showed the sacrifice on the part of the Islamic group consisting of, among others, a representative of NU.

When a deadlock happened in *Konstituante* 1956-1959, although NU supported the idea that Indonesia should be an Islamic country it did not reject the Presidential Decree to return to the 1945 Constitution and for Pancasila to be the foundation of the state after other kinds of agreement had not been achieved. NU regarded this as a political reality that should be accepted as a political compromise in order to ensure the existence of Indonesia, which was still in its earlier years.

Meanwhile, in the 1980s, various new waves of Indonesian Islamic communities emerged due to interactions between traditional thinking and modern values that in turn formed *madhhab* of Indonesian Islam neo-modernists. This situation gave rise to new discourses on Indonesian Islam on the part of both the

traditionalists and the modernists. Consequently, disputes that sometimes occurred between the two were reduced by understandings about each other's positions. At this time, K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), one of the earliest neo-modernists, led the traditional NU. With his ideas, Gus Dur brought NU out of the domain of practical politics and tried to make the organization to be a moral force to balance the government, which was almost without a countering force at that time. Furthermore, Gus Dur also acted as the defender of the minority's rights with his belief in tolerance so that he was later recognized both in Indonesia and abroad.

Under his leadership, when the government was regarded as politicizing the Islamic community to maintain the status quo. NU tried to protect it from becoming only an instrument of the government that in turn would cause losses not only on the part of NU but also of the Islamic community as a whole. Furthermore, when Islam was politicized so that the Islamic community was entrapped in sectarianism and did not give priority to the common interests of all citizens, NU also gave its criticisms and acted as a defender, which tried to protect the whole nation. Although these actions were mainly personal efforts of Gus Dur, various youth groups of NU agreed to and supported these efforts.

We may observe, however, that the ideas of tolerance proposed by the elites of NU sometimes were not understood or implemented correctly by the grassroots of NU. Therefore, the intolerance of the grassroots often created tensions between the modernists and the traditionalists. Furthermore, large numbers of NU members objected to various policies of the government which had been responded by the elites of NU —especially Gus Dur— with high degrees of tolerance. This situation was admitted by a *kiai* of NU from East Java (K.H. Cholil Dahlan from Pesantren Darul Ulum Peterongan-Jombang) and a *kiai* of NU from West Java (K.H. Abdul Chobir, MT.) These contradictions about tolerance among others were caused by a wide gap between comprehensions of the traditionalist members of NU and the neo-modernist thoughts of Gus Dur. In addition, the main factor behind this deviation according to Mujamil Qomar is the lack of socialization from the elites (AULA, January 2003 edition: 23).

The one important factor of this matter may be relevant with the analysis proposed by Barton (1999: 513-514), that only a million people of the thirty million members of the NU communities could understand the ideas of Gus Dur—one of the most important elite members of NU.

### **3. The Acceptance of Pancasila as Asas Tunggal: Between Insincere Tolerance and Sincere Tolerance**

Another phenomenal occasion concerning NU and its tolerance was its acceptance of Pancasila as “*Asas Tunggal*” (the sole foundation) in Indonesia. This emplacement of Pancasila as the sole foundation was itself a policy of the New Order government. This acceptance may be comprehended by two different approaches. *First*, in political perspective, it may be regarded as an insincere tolerance due to the pressures stemming from the government’s political policies. The reason for this opinion among others is that NU as a political organization in the earlier period of Indonesia’s independence (1950s) had tried hard to form an Islamic state as we may see in its efforts in *Konstituante* (1956-1959). The other reason is Islam was its organizational foundation when it joined PPP and before. In addition, the fact that there was a continuity between the formulation of tolerance concept as one of the societal attitudes of NU and the acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation serves to strengthen that assumption.

*Second*, on the other side, we may also regard its tolerance as sincere due to deep reflection after observing its own history comprehensively and not partially. The acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation did not happen out of nothing but was based on its comprehension of *fiqh* rules later applied among others in the form of the release of “*Resolusi Jihad*” which may be regarded as its effort to protect Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The Grand Meetings held in 1991 and 1998 to confirm its commitment of loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution may also confirm that assumption. When MPR 1998 abolishes *Asas Tunggal Pancasila*, NU did not discard Pancasila from its organizational foundation as had happened with other Islamic organizations. If this NU’s



tolerance was an effect of the government's pressure, NU might have simply done by the same as other Islamic organizations.

#### 4. Combination of Sunni- and Javanese Traditions

After the *Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn* (the four caliphs: Abū Bakar, Umar, Uthman, and 'Ali) respectively ruling in Islamic governments, the leadership periods of the dynasties of *Mu'āwiyah* and *'Abbāsiyah* were coloured by intense conflicts and violence. In these two periods Islamic power was established by intolerant bases, marked by authoritarian governments so that the differing opinions with those of the governments' were not tolerated and opposing groups did not have strong positions. In these periods the four *Imāms* of Sunni (al-Imām Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad bin Idrīs Al-Shāfi'ī, al-Imām Mālik bin Anas, al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān bin Thābit, and al-Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal) were born. They acted as opponents against the government or at least kept their distance from it in order not be manipulated by the tyrant power. At the same time, however, Sunni traditions were known as a moderate one in its responses the government as we may see in its political *fiqh* (*fiqh al-siyāsa*) which popularized the following principles: 1) *ulamas* (theologians) should cooperate with the *umaros* (the governments), 2) do not rebel against a ruler though he may be *fādjir* (doing bad deeds), 3) silence is better than living in an anarchy, and so on.

Due to these principles, the Sunni tradition gave considerable tolerance to the government in making policies to manage the state. The tradition did not have any habit of resistance in the form of demonstrations and revolutions, except to *al-Darūriyya al-khams* (to protect religion, common sense, blood, property, and offspring) only if these things face very serious threats or attacks. Consequently, however, the government had opportunities to manipulate them. Due to its tolerance to the government, Sunni is also known as one of the first accommodating and opportunist groups (Najib, 1997: 88-91).

In addition, Abu al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī one of two founding fathers of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* uses al-Qur'ān and Ḥadīth as the main resources of the Islamic *Sharī'a*, besides using brains and logic as means to understand these

resources. Brains and logic as means, of course cannot change the understanding of pronouncements of al-Qur'ān so that there are contradictions with each other. This matter makes the ideas of Abu al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (*Ash'ariyya*) more flexible and moderate.

Only in this context, may NU (as a Sunni organization) be comprehended in its response to the policies of various governments, from the Dutch, the Japanese, and the Old Order to the New Order governments. Its accommodating and opportunist attitude may be understood as a part of the Sunni political tradition implemented by NU as the main heir and the keeper of its thinking, an organization claiming to be the follower of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā'a* in Indonesia. NU may be seen as accommodative to various policies of the government, but it may also be aggressive and radical in its response to what it regarded as tyrant government. Therefore, the tradition of NU may be said to be similar to the tradition of four *Imāms* of Sunnite *madhhab* about 12 centuries ago.

The considerable tolerance of NU may also be comprehended by considering the socio-historical aspects of the Javanese society. In Anderson's opinion (1965: 2), the Javanese societies principally regarded every religion as containing truths, but they do not believe any absolute truth. They agree to other beliefs or thinking as long as these are regarded as suitable with their philosophy of life. This attitude supports NU in being at the front line as a tolerant community established in the Javanese tradition and culture in combination with the Sunni tradition.

## **B. Remark**

Intensive guidance given by the *kiais* to their *santris* and their communities will increase the grass roots' comprehension about various ideas of NU elites. Furthermore, a high level of education is expected to help the NU community to solve several problems of the organization in connection with reliable human resources, in other words, to solve problems of the shortage of potential cadres among the very large number of NU members.

A high level of education will also provide human resources that will not only benefit NU but also the nation as a whole. Many of the activities of NU members in various aspects such as society, economy, and culture require qualified human resources. For example, Gus Dur's ambition to form about 68.000 branches of NU in all villages nationwide will require 68.000 branch leaders with relevant high skills and knowledge. Only with qualified human resources working in various programs that had not been carried out or completed will be able to achieve their targets.

Various societal attitudes developed by NU (*al-tawāsuṭ*, *al-i'tidāl*, *al-tawāzun*, *al-tasāmuh* and *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*) are expected to be really implemented by NU members and not merely written in its constitution. These principles should be applied in their behaviour in daily living. Full implementation of these principles will make easy the establishment of a tolerant civil society model within NU as the largest Islamic social organization in Indonesia and worldwide, as had been expected by some researchers. This societal model is expected to use Islamic universal values in responding to all forms of modernization and other problems they may face in the future.

Documenting all writings about NU such as scientific researches, journals, and news in the form of archives, at least in NU's headquarters in Jakarta, will make it easy for researchers who are interested in deepening their understandings about NU. Therefore, concrete efforts of making these archives are expected to be carried out. As a researcher carrying out research about NU, I understand that there are some obstacles in those efforts. Intent, however, is first required to achieve the expected results. "Aren't the thousand "Li" steps started by the first?" The archive centre will help the researchers in the future to gain complete and relevant data about NU in its headquarters.

## Glossary

Abangan	A nominally Muslim who is still being significantly influenced by his pre-Islamic traditions and beliefs
ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> , the Indonesian Armed Forces
‘Ada	(local) Traditions and customs
Ahl al-hall wa al‘aqd	Those who clarify and solve problems, a term known in traditional Islamic politics, or formatting council
Ahlul Wathan	Family of Motherland, one of branches of Nahdatul Wathan used for Islamic school in Wonokromo,
Al-i‘tidāl	Just
Al-tasāmuh	Tolerance (in form of tolerances given to differences in religious, societal, and cultural affairs)
Al-tawāsuṭ	Standing in the middle position
Al-tawāzun	Balance
Al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar	Ordering good deeds and forbidding bad deeds
Aswaja	<i>Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā‘a</i> , in general means the followers of prophet Muhammad’s traditions and <i>Idjmā‘</i>
Atheism	An ism which doesn’t believe the God, this ism spreads in Indonesia through Communism which was banned by New Order government
Baḥṭhul Masāil	An institution serves of NU to formulate and to discuss various religious matters
Banser	<i>Barisan Anshor Serba Guna</i> , Multi functions Troop of Anshor, was an institution developed in <i>Gerakan Pemuda Anshor</i> (GP Anshor).
Barzandji	Chant recounting Muḥammad’s life
Berdikari	<i>Berdiri di atas kaki sendiri</i> , stand in one’s own foot, one of Soekarno’s ideas declared in 1965
Bhineka Tunggal-Ika	Indonesia motto means Unity in diversity
Bid‘a	Novelty, innovation-action or practice deviating from true teachings of the faith; Accretion, deviation
Boedi Oetomo	Society for Good; Noble Endeavour
BPR	<i>Bank Perkreditan Rakyat</i> , or People Credit Bank
BPUPKI	<i>Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> , Investigation committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independent
Chalifah	Caliph, successor
Chilafat	Caliphate
CIDES	Centre for Information and Development Studies
CKM	<i>Coperasi Kaum Moeslim</i> , Cooperative of the Muslim

Comite Chilafat	Caliphate committee founded in 1924 with the support of the reformists and the traditionalists. In 1925 it lost the support of the traditionalists
Da'wa	Religious propagation
Dār al ḥarb	War country
Dār al-Islām	Islamic country
Dār al-Ṣulh	Peace country
DDII	<i>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia</i> , Indonesian Council for Islamic Mission
DI-TII	<i>Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia</i> , or Islamic State-Indonesian Islamic Armed Forces
Demokrasi Terpimpin	Guided democracy
Djihād	Holy war/striving, fighting cause of Allāh
DPA	<i>Dewan Pertimbangan Agung</i> , High Consultative Board
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> , People's Representative Council
Far'ul Wathan	The Branch of Motherland, one of branches of <i>Nahdatul Wathan</i> in Gresik
Fatwā	Authoritative interpretation of the religion stated by an acknowledged religious scholar; authoritative religious opinion; religious decree
Fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence
Fukaha	Canonist, jurist
Furū'	Teaching of ethics based on principles of religion; Branches, details, as opposed to principles, frequently referring to systematic elaboration of positive law
FD (Fordem)	<i>Forum Demokrasi</i> , Forum of Democracy
GAPI	<i>Gabungan Politik Indonesia</i> , or Federation of Indonesian Politic Parties, founded in 1939
GBHN	<i>Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara</i> , Guidelines on State Policy
Gestapu	<i>Gerakan September Tiga Puluh</i> , September 30 Movement
GP Anshor	<i>Gerakan Pemuda Anshor</i> , Movement of <i>Anshor</i> Youth, was established in April 24, 1949 in Surabaya, as a continuation of <i>Anshor Nahdhatul 'Oelama ANO</i>
Golkar	<i>Golongan Karya</i> , Functional group
Gotong-royong	mutual self-help/cooperation
Grass roots	The members of NU: the biggest population in NU community which nota bene village inhabitant or the traditionalist one
Hadīth	(Codified) Statements and/or actions of Prophet Muhammad; the traditions of the prophet life
Hadjdj	The pilgrimage to Mecca
Haji	A Muslim who has accomplished the Mecca pilgrimages
Haram	Religiously forbidden and sinful (ruling)

Hidayatul Wathan	The Guidance of Motherland, one of branches of <i>Nahdhatul Wathan</i> in Jombang
Hizbullah	God's forces
'Ibada	Religious duties/services
ICMI	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i> , Association of Intellectual Muslim Indonesian
Idjmā'	Consensus (the Islamic scholars' consensus)
Idjtihād	To exert intellectual power to fine answers of problems (independent interpretation or interpretations according to one's opinion)
Imām	Head, chip, leader (of a congregational prayer, a <i>madhhab</i> , or community)
Jam'iyah Nashihin	Preachers club, one of branches of <i>Nahdhatul Wathan</i> founded in the first period of NU
Kāfir	Unbeliever, infidel
KAMI	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> , or Action Front of Indonesian University Student
KAPPI	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia</i> , or Action Front of Indonesian Youth and Students
Kaum adat	Adat faction
Kaum muda	Young group, the term used for Indonesian Muslim especially for reformists and modernists.
Kaum tua	Old group; traditionalists, the term used for NU
Khilāfiyya	Differences or uncertain and debatable matters
Khittah 1926	Guideline of struggles of NU 1926
Kiai	Religious scholar/teacher - rural orthodox teachers
Konstituante	An Assembly consisting of people's representatives to reformulate state constitution of Indonesia. This body was the realisation of Soekarno's idea and to be formed through general election of 1955
Kopassanda	<i>Korps Pasukan Sandi Yuda</i> , or Army Para-Commando Unit
Kopkamtib	<i>Komando Penjaga Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i> , or Commando for Recovering Security and Order
Korpri	<i>Korp Pegawai Republik Indonesia</i> , or Indonesian Civil Servants Corp
KWI	<i>Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia</i> , The Catholic Bishops Conference of Indonesia
Lafaz niyya	Pronouncing intend
Langgar (java)	<i>Surau</i> (Minangkabau), prayer house smaller than a Mosque
Madrasah (madrassa)	Reformed Islamic school
Madhhab	School of law
Madhāhib	pl. of <i>madhhab</i>
MIAI	<i>Madjlis Islam A'la Indonesia</i> , Supreme Council of Indonesian Muslims
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> , People Consultative Assembly

MPRS	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara</i> , Provisional People Consultative Assembly
Mudjtahid	The Islamic law discover or one who practice <i>Idjtihād</i>
MUI	<i>Majlis Ulama Indonesia</i> , The Indonesian Council of <i>Ulama</i>
Naib	Deputy registrar of marriage
Nahdhatul Ulama	Renaissance of Theologian
Nahdhatut Tujjar	Renaissance of the economy
Nahdhatul Wathan	Renaissance of Motherland, the first embryo of NU organization founded in 1916
Nasakom	<i>Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunisme</i> , Nationalism, Religion (Islam) and Communism
NKRI	<i>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia</i> , or Integrated State of Republic of Indonesia
NII	<i>Negara Islam Indonesia</i> , Islamic state of Indonesia
Parkindo	<i>Partei Kristen Indonesia</i> , Indonesian Christian Party
Parmusi	<i>Partei Muslimin Indonesia</i> , Indonesian Muslim party
PDI	<i>Partei Demokrasi Indonesia</i> , Indonesian Democratic Party
Penghulu	religious official (Java), <i>adat</i> chief (Minangkabau)
Perti	<i>Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah</i> , Islamic Education Association
Pesantren	Religious boarding-training school/communal centre of traditional Islamic learning in Java; traditional Islamic school; rural Koranic school – like in Catholic <i>monastery</i>
PETA	<i>Pembela Tanah Air</i> , Defender of the Fatherland
PGI	<i>Persatuan Gereja Indonesia</i> , The Protestant Communion of Churches in Indonesia Republic
PGII	<i>Pergaboengan Goeroe Islam Indonesia</i> , Federation of Indonesian Islamic Teachers
Piagam Djakarta	Djakarta Charter
PII	<i>Partei Islam Indonesia</i> , Indonesia Islamic Party
PKI	<i>Partei Komunis Indonesia</i> , Indonesian Communist Party
PNI	<i>Partei Nasional Indonesia</i> , Indonesian Nationalist Party
PPKI/BPKI	<i>Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> , preparatory committee for Indonesian independent
PPP	<i>Partei Persatuan Pembangunan</i> , United Development Party
P4	<i>Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila</i> , Guidance for the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasila
PSII	<i>Partei Sjarekat Islam Indonesia</i> , Indonesian Islamic Union Party
Pondok	Traditional Pattern
Priyayi	Member of Javanese nobility-traditional ruling elite
Qur'ān	The holly book of Islam
Resolusi Djihad	Resolution of <i>Djihād</i> or Holy War declared by K.H. Hasjim Asj'ari in a meeting of NU's <i>ulamas</i> in October 21-22, 1945
Rois Aam	The Chief of <i>Syuriah</i> Board of The Central Board of the NU

Sabilillāh	God's fighter
Ṣalāt	Prayer
Santri	Student/pupil of a <i>pesantren</i> , strongly religious, devoted Muslim or a pious or practicing Muslim
SDI	<i>Sjarekat Dagang Islam</i> , Islamic Commercial Union
SDSB	<i>Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah</i> , or Donation with Prize for Social Fund, a kind of lottery organization
Sharī'ah	The law of Islam or the religious code of Islam
Sheikh	<i>Kiyai</i> , elder/chief <i>ulama</i>
SI	<i>Sjarekat Islam</i> , Islamic Union
STOVIA	<i>School Tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen</i> , School for Training Native Doctors
Ṣūfi	Mystic, a member of religious (mystic) society – <i>tarīqa</i> order/brotherhood
Ṣūfism	Mysticism
Shumubu	Office for religious affairs
Shumuka	Sub-office for religious affairs
Surau	<i>Langgar</i> , a small prayer house, <i>pesantren</i> a religious training school
Syuriah	Board of Legislative of NU structure
Tanfidziyah	Board of Executive of NU structure
Ta'zīm	Respect to the teachers or <i>Kyais</i>
Talqin	Guidance to the dead body who just buried
Taqlīd	Accepting (adopting) the already established fatwā and practices as final and authoritatively binding
Tarīqa	Road; path; a <i>Ṣūfi</i> order/brotherhood; traditional Islamic Mysticism
Taṣawwuf	Islamic mysticism
Tashwirul Afkar	The portrait of thought, discussion forum is one of three pillars (embryos) of NU establishment
Tawāsuṭ	Standing in the Middle position
Trisakti	Three Powers (sovereign in political affairs, self-empowerment in economical affairs, and having own personality in cultural affairs), declared by Soekarno in 1964
Ulama	Islamic scholar/ religious scholar/teacher/theologian
Uṣūl fiqh	The basic of Islamic law
UUD 1945	<i>Undang-Undang Dasar 1945</i> , the 1945 Constitution
UUD RIS 1949	<i>Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia Serikat 1949</i> , the 1949 Constitution of the Indonesian Federal Republic
UUDS 1950	<i>Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara 1950</i> , the 1950 Provisional Constitution
Wadajib	Religiously obligatory (ruling)
Walī	Saint
Walī Songo	The nine saints, referring to the earliest propagandists of Islam in Java



Walī  
Walubi

Male relative legally responsible for a bride  
*Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia*, The Indonesian  
Buddhists Trusteeship

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## **Appendixes:**

### **1) Number 23/1930**

#### **Quotation of General Governor of Netherlands East Indies' Governmental Decree Lists**

Betawi, February 6, 1930.

No. IX.

After reading:

- I. A request letter dated Surabaya September 5, 1929 submitted by Kjai Hadji Said bin Saleh et cetera given authorised by "Nahdhatul Ulama" organization which has been established there for 29 years;
- II. Other documents.

Considering articles 1, 2, and 3 from *Koninklijk's* Governmental Decree March 28, 1870 No. 8 (*Indisch Staatblad* No. 64), which then was changed by The Governmental Issues, April 23, 1937 Number. 8 (*Indisch Staatblad* No. 251).

It is understood and approved that:

That the statute of the „Nahdhatul Ulama“ organization located in Surabaya, as attached in the proposal letter, is recognised as good, therefore the organisation was recognised as a legal organization.

Based on a Decree of General Governor of  
the Netherlands Indies

De Algemeene Secretaris,

Signed by

G.R. Erdbring

(From *ExtraBijvoegsel der Javanese Courant van 25/2-1930* No. 16).

### **2) Statute of „Nahdhatul Ulama“ Organization In Surabaya**

Article 1.

The organization is named „Nahdhatul Ulama“ located in Surabaya and had been exist for 29 years, since the day of its establishment, January 31, 1926.

#### Article 2.

The goal of this organization is to hold tight to any one of *madhhabs* (teachings) of the four *Imām* (religious leaders in Islam) which are al-Imām Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad bin Idrīs Al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Imām Mālik bin Anas, al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa al-Nu‘mān bin Thābit, and al-Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal, and doing whatever will benefit the religion of Islam

#### Articles 3.

To achieve that goal of the organization, following efforts have been carried out:

- a. keeping in touch with *ulamas* of the *madhhabs* mentioned in article 2;
- b. examining religious books previously were used as references in teachings, to find out whether those books are books of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Djamā‘a* or books of *Ahl al-bid‘a*;
- c. carrying out Islamic missions based on any *madhhab* mentioned in article 2, by using any appropriate way;
- d. establishing additional Islamic schools (*madrasahs*);
- e. managing matters regarding mosques, *suraus* (religious training centres), and houses, and orphans and poor people.
- f. establishing institutions supporting matters on agricultures, commerce, and companies which are not forbidden by Islamic *Sharī‘a*.

#### Article 4.

Members of this organization are only Muslims from any *madhhabs* mentioned in article 2 above. They are consisting of:

- a. Religion teachers (*ulama*)
- b. Non religion teachers

To have the right as a member, a person should only report *Bestuur* (the management). A person may loose his right to be a member of this organization due to his own request or due to dismissal.

This discharge should be carried out based on a decision made by majority votes of a *vergadering* (meeting) held among related branch’s members as

mentioned in article 5 paragraph 1. In areas without branches, these discharges are carried out by *hoofdbestuur*.

#### Article 5.

In an area in which there are at least 12 members, an *afdeeling* (branch) is allowed to be established. If the members are under 12 in number, a correspondent should be appointed to keep regular communications with the *hoofdbestuur*. Every member living in a residence located in area in which there is not branch or correspondent, should keep regular communications with the nearest branch, and if there is no branch near his residence he should keep regular communications with the nearest correspondent.

#### Article 6.

The highest authority of this organization should be held by the congress of delegates. All decisions in the congress requiring reference on religious (Islamic) law should be made only by the delegate of *ulamas*. Decisions on other matters requiring not reference on religious law may also be made by other delegates.

#### Article 7.

This organization in or out of the court is represented by *hoofdbestuur* consisting of at least four members of *ulamas*. The four members hold the positions of *Rois*, *Wakilur Rois*, *Katib*, and *A'wan*. Other positions in the *hoofdbestuur* are held by non-*ulamas* members. The five members hold the position of President, Vice President, Treasurer, Secretary, and Commissary.

#### Article 8.

Revenue of this organization is received from any effort not forbidden by the religion.

#### Article 9.

Decision on a proposal to change this statute should only be made by a congress of delegates attended by minimum half of the all members. This decision should be made by a majority vote.

#### Article 10.

This organization only may be dismissed based on a decision which meets the requirements in the article 9 mentioned previously. If after the dismissal there are asset left, then the asset left should be given to other organisations having common goals in virtue

Article 11.

To implement this statute, an executive board would be established to carry out activities based on regulations in this statute. If a related regulation is not in the statute and *huishoudelijk Reglement*, then the *hoofdbestuur* will make a decision on it.

Article 12.

(List of first of members of the highest council).

Article 13.

Kyai Hadji Sa'id bin Saleh, Hadji Hasan Gipo, and Muhammad Sadiq alias Sugeng Yudhadhiwirya made this statute for Your Honour The General Governor of Netherlands Indies and then will make required change and addition to this statute, after *Wakilurrois*, President, and Secretary —together or respectively acting as representatives in submitting proposal for this change or addition— having his approval.

**3) Resolution of NU regarding *Djihad Fisabilillah* (*Djihād fi al-sabīl-i-Allāh*, Holly war in the Way of Allāh)**

***Bismillāhirrahmānirrahīm***

**Resolution of:**

The panel meeting of Area Representatives (Consul 2) of NAHDHATUL OELAMA organization in Java and Madura, October 21-22, 1945, in Surabaya.

**Listening:**

That in the each area in all Java and Madura there is a very significant wish of Islamic communities and *ulamas* to defend and keep the RELIGION, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

**Considering:**



- a. that defending and keeping Republic of Indonesia based on Islam is an obligation of every Muslim.
- b. the fact that Indonesian people mostly consists of Muslims.

**Remembering:**

That the Dutch (NICA) and the Japan coming and occupying this country has committed lots of crimes and violence, which had damaged public order.

That since they carried out those mentioned above with an aim at violating the sovereignty of Republic of Indonesian and the Religion (Islam) and at re-colonising this country, then some battles had happened in various places victimizing a lot of human's souls.

That those battles were provoked by the Islamic community perceiving an obligation based on its religious law to defence the independence of its Nation and Religion.

That in facing the occurrences appropriate commands and guidance is required.

**Determining:**

1. To urgently request the Government of Republic of Indonesia to determine real and appropriate attitudes and actions in facing efforts endangering The Independence and the Religion of Indonesia mainly toward the Dutch and its allies.
2. To command the continuation of struggle in the way of Allāh to defence Republic of Indonesia and Islam.

Surabaya, October 22, 1945

HB. NAHDLATUL OELAMA

(Source: *AULA*, March 1992, p. 10-11)

**4) Declaration on Relation between Pancasila and Islam**

**Results of 1983 NU National Conference in Indonesia**

*Bismillāhirrahmānirrahīm*

1. Pancasila as the foundation and state philosophy of Republic of Indonesia is not a religion, cannot replace religion, and cannot used as a religion.
2. The basic of Belief in One God as the foundation of Republic of Indonesia according to article 29 paragraph (1) 1945 Constitution, inspiring other basics, represents the oneness of God based on the belief of Islam.
3. For Nahdhatul Ulama, Islam is an *'aqīda* (faith) and *Sharī'a* (law), covering human's relations with Allāh and with other human.
4. The receipt of and the realization of Pancasila are the Indonesian community's efforts to apply their religion's law.
5. As the consequence of the attitude mentioned above, Nahdhatul Ulama is obliged to secure the right definition of Pancasila and its pure and consequent application by all parties.

Situbondo, Rabī' I 16, AH 1404  
December 21, AD 1983

(Source: *AULA*, March 1992, p. 13)

### **5) Loyalty Pledge of Nahdhatul Ulama's Members**

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Today we, all members of Nahdhatul Ulama, are thanking Allāh, The Supreme God, for His blessings for us.

We are thanking God, that for 68 years since Radjab 16, 1344 H or January 31, 1926, Nahdhatul Ulama organization has been given spiritual and material powers to be participating in Indonesian struggles with all the consequences.

We realized that although some of the national goals have been manifested, manifestations of other goals still have to be achieved by all Indonesian communities in an atmosphere of harmony and tolerance that should be maintained forever.

Therefore, in a fine day toward the arrival of the holy month of *Ramaḍan*, coincided with the Nahdhatul Ulama's LXVIII anniversary, we are acknowledging these following pledges.

First, we are convinced that our strong will to return to the *1926 Khittah* of Nahdhatul Ulama is a good and honourable one for our own benefit. Therefore, we will strengthen steps to apply it.

Second, we are convinced that Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and UUD Constitution is a final form of our state. Therefore, we are confirming our strong will to develop our country and to maintain the continuation of development of our nation.

Third, we are convinced that values of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were not completely considered and applied by our nation yet, so this disturbs our feeling of secure about our future; therefore, we will consider, apply, and secure them and give cautions to other communities in our nation by polite, sincere, and wise ways.

Fourth, we are realized that Indonesian National Development is a process toward targeted Indonesia in the future. For the last 25 years, we have been much benefited by the national development. Therefore, we are ready to begin Second Phase of The National Development to become a more independent and honourable nation.

Fifth, we are realized that the execution of 1992 General Election by an honest, secure, free, and secret way will be a good means in achieving Sovereignty of Peoples. Therefore, we will support the big work and will secure 1993 MPR's General Meeting as its result.

اهدنا الصراط المستقيم  
حسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل نعم المولى ونعم النصير

Sha'bān 26, AH 1412

Jakarta, March 1, AD 1992

(Source: *AULA*, March 1992, p.18-19)

## 6) The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution

Whereas freedom is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished in this world, as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice;

And the moment of rejoicing has arrived in the struggle in the Indonesian freedom movement to guide the people safely and well to the threshold of the independence of the state of Indonesia which shall be free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous;

By the grace of Allah almighty and impelled by the noble desire to live a free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.

Subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all the people of Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to improve the public welfare, to advance intellectual life of the people and to contribute to establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated in to constitution of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in the One and only God, just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives and the realisation of the social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.

## **7) Piagam Djakarta (Jakarta Charter)**

Whereas independence is the right of every nation, therefore colonialism must be abolished from the face of the earth as it is contrary to the dictates of human nature and justice.

And the struggle of Indonesian independence has now reached [a] glorious moment, having led the Indonesian people safely to the threshold of independence for an Indonesian state which [is] free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous.

With the blessing of God almighty and impelled by the noble ideal of a free national life, the Indonesian people do hereby declare their independence.

Further, in order to establish a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect the entire of Indonesian people and the whole of the land of Indonesia, and in order to promote the general welfare, to improve the standard of living, and participate in establishing [q] world order founded upon freedom,

eternal peace and social justice, therefore the independence of Indonesian people is embodied in a Constitution of the state of Indonesia, which Constitution shall establish a Republic of the state of Indonesia in which the people are sovereign and which is based upon: Belief in One Supreme God with the obligation to carry out Sharī‘a for adherents of Islam, a just and civilized humanitarianism, the unity of Indonesia, and the democracy guided by wisdom arising from consultation and representation, which democracy shall ensure social justice for the whole Indonesian people.

Jakarta, June 22, 1945,

Ir. Sukarno  
Drs. Mohammad Hatta  
Mr. A.A. Maramis  
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso  
Abdulkahar Muzakir  
H. Agus Salim  
Mr. Achmad Subardjo  
K.H. Wachid Hasjim  
Mr. Mohammad Yamin

(Source: Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959*. Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992.)

### **8) Pancasila**

1. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Belief in The One Supreme God)
2. Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab (Just and civilised humanitarianism)
3. Persatuan Indonesia (the Unity of Indonesia)

4. Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan perwakilan (the democracy guided by wisdom arising from consultation and representation)
5. Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Social justice for the whole Indonesian people)

#### **9) Full Text of the Medina Charter**

1. This is a document from Muḥammad the Prophet (May Allāh bless him and grant him peace), governing relations between the Believers i.e. Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib and those who followed them and worked hard with them. They form one nation (*Umma*).
2. The Quraysh Mohajireen will continue to pay blood money, according to their present custom.
3. In case of war, they will redeem their prisoners with kindness and justice common among Believers. (Not according to pre- Islamic nations where the rich and the poor were treated differently).
4. The Bani Awf will decide the blood money, within themselves, according to their existing custom.
5. In case of war with anybody all parties other than Muslims will redeem their prisoners with kindness and justice according to practice among Believers and not in accordance with pre- Islamic notions.
6. The Bani Saeeda, the Bani Harith, the Bani Jusham and the Bani Najjar will be governed on the lines of the above (principles)
7. The Bani Amr, Bani Awf, Bani Al-Nabeet, and Bani Al-Aws will be governed in the same manner.

8. Believers will not fail to redeem their prisoners they will pay blood money on their behalf. It will be a common responsibility of the *Ummat* and not of the family of the prisoners to pay blood money.
9. A Believer will not make the freedman of another Believer as his ally against the wishes of the other Believers.
10. The Believers, who fear Allāh, will oppose the rebellious elements and those that encourage injustice or sin, or enmity or corruption among Believers.
11. If anyone is guilty of any such act, all the Believers will oppose him even if he were the son of any one of them.
12. A Believer will not kill another Believer, for the sake of an un-Believer. (i.e. even though the un-Believer is his close relative).
13. No Believer will help an un-Believer against a Believer.
14. Protection (when given) in the Name of Allāh will be common. The weakest among Believers may give protection (In the Name of Allāh) and it will be binding on all Believers.
15. Believers are all friends to each other to the exclusion of all others.
16. Those Jews who follow the Believers will be helped and will be treated with equality. (Social, legal and economic equality is promised to all loyal citizens of the State).
17. No Jew will be wronged for being a Jew.
18. The enemies of the Jews who follow us will not be helped.
19. The peace of the Believers (of the State of Medina) cannot be divided. (it is either peace or war for all. It cannot be that a part of the population is at war with the outsiders and a part is at peace).

20. No separate peace will be made by anyone in Medina when Believers are fighting in the Path of Allāh.
21. Conditions of peace and war and the accompanying ease or hardships must be fair and equitable to all citizens alike.
22. When going out on expeditions a rider must take his fellow member of the Army-share his ride.
23. The Believers must avenge the blood of one another when fighting in the Path of Allāh (This clause was to remind those in front of whom there may be less severe fighting that the cause was common to all. This also meant that although each battle appeared a separate entity it was in fact a part of the War, which affected all Muslims equally).
24. The Believers (because they fear Allāh) are better in showing steadfastness and as a result receive guidance from Allāh in this respect. Others must also aspire to come up to the same standard of steadfastness.
25. No un-Believer will be permitted to take the property of the Quraysh (the enemy) under his protection. Enemy property must be surrendered to the State.
26. No un-Believer will intervene in favour of a Quraysh, (because the Quraysh has declared war are the enemy).
27. If any un-believer kills a Believer, without good cause, he shall be killed in return, unless the next of kin are satisfied (as it creates law, order problems, and weakens the defence of the State). All Believers shall be against such a wrongdoer. No Believer will be allowed to shelter such a man.
28. When you differ on anything (regarding this Document), the matter shall be referred to Allah and Muḥammad (may Allāh bless him and grant him peace).
29. The Jews will contribute towards the war when fighting alongside the Believers.



30. The Jews of Bani Awf will be treated as one community with the Believers. The Jews have their religion. This will also apply to their freedmen. The exception will be those who act unjustly and sinfully. By so doing they wrong themselves and their families.
31. The same applies to Jews of Bani Al-Najjar, Bani Al Harith, Bani Saeeda, Bani Jusham, Bani Al Aws, Thaalba, and the Jaffna, (a clan of the Bani Thaalba) and the Bani Al Shutayba.
32. Loyalty gives protection against treachery. (loyal people are protected by their friends against treachery. As long as a person remains loyal to the State, he is not likely to succumb to the ideas of being treacherous. He protects himself against weakness).
33. The freedmen of Thaalba will be afforded the same status as Thaalba themselves. This status is for fair dealings and full justice as a right and equal responsibility for military service.
34. Those in alliance with the Jews will be given the same treatment as the Jews.
35. No one (no tribe that is party to the Pact) shall go to war except with the permission of Muḥammad (may Allāh bless him and grant him peace). If any wrong has been done to any person or party it may be avenged.
36. Any one who kills another without warning (there being no just cause for it) amounts to his slaying himself and his household, unless the killing was done due to a wrong being done to him.
37. The Jews must bear their own expenses (in War) and the Muslims bear their expenses.
38. If anyone attacks anyone who is a party to this Pact, the other must come to his help.
39. They (parties to this Pact) must seek mutual advice and consultation.

40. Loyalty gives protection against treachery. Those who avoid mutual consultation do so because of lack of sincerity and loyalty.
41. A man will not be made liable for misdeeds of his ally.
42. Anyone (any individual or party) who is wronged must be helped.
43. The Jews must pay (for war) with the Muslims. (this clause appears to be for occasions when Jews are not taking part in the war. Clause 37 deals with occasions when they are taking part in war).
44. Yathrib will be Sanctuary for the people of this Pact.
45. A stranger (individual) who has been given protection (by anyone party to this Pact) will be treated as his host (who has given him protection) while (he is) doing no harm and is not committing any crime. Those given protection but indulging in anti-state activities will be liable to punishment.
46. A woman will be given protection only with the consent of her family (Guardian). (a good precaution to avoid inter-tribal conflicts).
47. In case of any dispute or controversy, which may result in trouble the matter must be referred to Allah and Muḥammad (may Allāh bless him and grant him peace), The Prophet (may Allāh bless him and grant him peace) of Allāh will accept anything in this document, which is for (bringing about) piety and goodness.
48. Quraysh and their allies will not be given protection.
49. The parties to this Pact are bound to help each other in the event of an attack on Yathrib.
50. If they (the parties to the Pact other than the Muslims) are called upon to make and maintain peace (within the State) they must do so. If a similar demand (of making and maintaining peace) is made on the Muslims, it must be carried out, except when the Muslims are already engaged in a war in the Path of

Allāh. (so that no secret ally of the enemy can aid the enemy by calling upon Muslims to end hostilities under this clause).

51. Everyone (individual) will have his share (of treatment) in accordance with what party he belongs to. Individuals must benefit or suffer for the good or bad deed of the group they belong to. Without such a rule, party affiliations and discipline cannot be maintained.
52. The Jews of al-Aws, including their freedmen, have the same standing, as other parties to the Pact, as long as they are loyal to the Pact. Loyalty is a protection against treachery.
53. Anyone who acts loyally or otherwise does it for his own good (or loss).
54. Allāh approves this Document.
55. This document will not (be employed to) protect one who is unjust or commits a crime (against other parties of the Pact).
56. Whether an individual goes out to fight (in accordance with the terms of this Pact) or remains in his home, he will be safe unless he has committed a crime or is a sinner. (i.e. No one will be punished in his individual capacity for not having gone out to fight in accordance with the terms of this Pact).
57. Allāh is the Protector of the good people and those who fear Allāh, and Muhammad (may Allāh bless him and grant him peace) is the Messenger of Allāh (He guarantees protection for those who are good and fear Allāh).

(Source: <http://www.constitution.org/cons/medina/macharter.htm>)

## **10) Questionnaires Material of Filed Research**

### **I. Pluralism**

1. Do you agree to the reality that there are a lot of Islamic school of thoughts (*madhhabs*), religious sects, and organizations?

2. Do you agree that a person/group with Islamic ideology that is different from yours give teachings of his/its Islamic ideology to a person with the same Islamic ideology as yours?
3. Do you agree to the reality there are many religions adhered by members of the society?
4. Do you agree to efforts of Christianizing Muslims carried out by Christian missionaries at present in Indonesia?
5. Do you agree to the reality that the Indonesian society consists of various ethnic groups?
6. Do you agree to the reality that in Indonesia there are various traditions?
7. Do you agree to the reality that in Indonesia there are various cultures?
8. Do you agree to the reality that the Indonesian society consists of different social strata?

## **II. Egalitarian Concept**

9. Do you agree that women become “*Qa’di*” (judges) as proposed by K.H. Wahid Hasjim?
10. Do you agree that Islamic women (*Muslima*) become the nation’s leaders (presidents), while there are still a lot of men able to be leaders/presidents?
11. Do you agree that a woman become president when an emergency happens due to a political situation disabling any man to hold that position?
12. Do you agree that the Indonesian president is not a Muslim?

## **III. Democracy**

13. Do you agree to an opinion stating that democratic state is the ideal form of state at present?
14. Do you agree that, if your village consists of majority non-Muslims inhabitants, the village is led by a non-Muslim head of village appointed by a democratic election?
15. Do you agree that your village consisting of majority Muslims inhabitants led by a non-Muslim head of village?

16. Do you agree that, if your village consists of majority non-Muslims inhabitants, the village is led by a Muslim head of village appointed by a democratic election?
17. Do you agree that Indonesia led by a non-Muslim president?
18. Do you agree to the form of “Pancasilaism Democracy” state?
19. Do you agree to Pancasila as the state’s ideology?
20. In an emergency disabling Islam to become the state’s ideology, do you agree that “Pancasila” becomes the state’s ideology?
21. Do you agree that Islam becomes the state’s ideology?
22. As Muslims, we should try to make Islam to be the state’s ideology.

**Answers:**

- (a). Highly Disagree
- (b). Disagree
- (c). Do not know
- (d). Agree
- (e). Highly Agree