

**Azanism: A Critical Analysis of the Mytho-Reality Complexity of the  
Azanian Nation**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Substantial amount of academic literature in the field of social sciences (specialized in ethnic and nationalist politics) has dealt considerably with both the colonial and post-colonial aspects of the social and political history of Africa, and undeniably the conventional wisdom about Africa's political landscape should be best characterized as enduring instability. Two main factors, namely the role of colonialism and the [supposed] heterogeneity of the society, are considered crucial to explaining such a disturbing socio-political scenario. As would be expected most concern scholars and authors in this field have dealt with the general political situation in Africa within the modern paradigm of territorial nation-states. In other words, most theories of ethnic and nationalist politics have dealt with Africa's political instability within the formal context of the national state system (or statism). Even those who have attempted to explore the possibility of an integrated or homogeneous social growth or identity formation prior to indigenous Africans encounter with colonialism have often done so within that modern paradigm of statism. Hence, unsurprisingly, conventional wisdom espoused specifically by agents of colonialism/pseudo-nationalism tends to consider Africa's different dialects or linguistic groups as constituting ethnic and/or national categories in their own right.

While such traditional approaches to analysing Africa's social history might be appealing to formal political requirements, they are in themselves disturbing in that they tend to fuel or incinerate the enduring instability characteristic of African politics today. This in turn prompts such reasonably and urgent question(s) as: whether, prior to Africans encounter with political colonialism, the local population had, at least, in its documented social history, never experienced any form of blanket socio-cultural order that could qualify them as constituting an ethno-cultural national community? It must be noted, first, that by taking into account the social history of pre-colonial/political Africa, this doctoral research does not intend to reduce Africans encounter with colonialism to Western Europe's occupation of Africa from the 17<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> century but shall be including much early colonial encounters, as with "Hyksos" [partial] military occupation of "Lower Egypt" in the period between eighteenth and seventeenth century B.C.E and so forth. Although the exact period of the Hyksos conquest and occupation of Ancient Egypt remains contested, I share the calendar proposed by Martin Bernal in *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* (1991) on Hyksos arrival in Egypt; but, unlike Bernal and some Afrocentric scholars, I not only consider foreigners arrival in [what is now] Africa recent, but shall be arguing that the only role such political outsiders or colonial agents played in the indigenous culture was its destruction—the

most recent of which was “the politicized destruction of the nose of the Sphinx (supposedly either by Napoleon in 1798 or Mohammed Saim el-Dahr in 1378.”<sup>1</sup> Another reason for preferring Bernal’s approach to the Hyksos’ role in Egypt is his position that they introduced the Semitic language(s) into the previously “Kushitic Egypt.” So, while I share the views of those scholars who, as will be shown later, agree that the wealth of cultural relics—i.e. the ruins of the cultural institutions of dynastic Egypt, Zimbabwean ruins etc.—that now spread across Africa was primarily an indigenous culture initiative (with later external politicized culture meddlings), I also differ with most on the subject for following those who uphold the thesis of a convergent/homogeneous culture growth for the indigenous population as a whole. The prior existence of such a blanket socio-cultural order should serve to stimulate contemporary debate about the national phenomenon in general and with reference to African politics in particular.

Before we turn to the structure of this dissertation thesis, it is important to first ponder briefly on the methodology as this will give us an overview of some of the major themes to be discussed or the unfamiliar terminologies that will be used in this research. Indeed, as with most previous social sciences doctoral researches, the originality of this particular dissertation lies in its attempt to analytically establish a homogeneous ethno-cultural national consciousness for the indigenous Africans prior to their encounter with colonialism. Consequently, the concept of “Azanism” invoked or introduced in this work should serve as an ideological premise for such a homogeneous national culture, if there had been any as later arguments tend to suggest. Thus, methodologically, this research will be largely “analytical”—that is, analysing not only traditional academic literature on the subject of ethnic and nationalist politics, but also local myths, legends and oral narratives attributed to local culture institutions—such as Hiku-Ptah, *Manfour*/Menēfre (Greek Memphis), Thibe/Thebes, Napata, Meroē, and Bunkper etc.—with the aim of identifying signs of ethnic or cultural convergence that would have transcended Africa’s conventional linguistic differences had later political interventions not interrupted its natural growth. In this sense, the literature to be used for this research will be of diverse sources. Like the concept of Azanism, the closely related concept of Azania should also be used for such an authentically derived ethno-cultural/national community prior to African politics. In any event, because of the mythological origin of the Azanian concept, it would be appropriate to explore it in detail in the section reserved specifically for the “Critical Analysis of the Mytho-reality Complexity of

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<sup>1</sup> Hans-Christian Huf , 2002. *Sphinx: Geheimnisse der Geschichte-Von Spartacus bis Napoleon*. Muenchen, 80-84.

the Azanian Nation.” For our present purpose (introduction), it suffices to maintain that Azania is used here to represent an ethno-cultural national community of the Bantu-Ethiopians prior to colonial African politics.

Hiku-Ptah, from which *Agyptos* (Egypt) is derived, was originally used for the Grand culture institutions in honour of the soul of Ptah; while *Manfour/Menēfre* (or Greek Memphis) was the capital city of [what] Egyptologists generally consider to be the First Egyptian Dynasty founded by Min (the Menes of Herodotus). Martin Bernal for his part states in his “*Black Athena Writes Back...*” that ‘the name translated as “Memphis” was Hkpt, from the Egyptian Ht k3 Pth (“House of the *ka*, spirit of Ptah”), the religious name of the city, from which, by extension to the whole country, the Greek *Agyptos* and our “Egypt” are derived’(2001: 304). Most Egyptologists also agree that Ancient Egyptians called their nation “Kem or Cham,” meaning black (some would say after the black soil of the Nile valley). However, unlike conventional views, this work derives both Cham and *Manfour/Menēfre* (Memphis and its founder Min) from a Bantu-Ethiopian language called Moar (with its speakers known as Moab(s)) spoken today in North and North-western Africa. Mōb generally stands for mouth, so Moar simply means the people of words or language. “Cham” in Moar generally stands for ancestor; so there is Cham-*Ba* (male ancestor) or Cham-*Po* (female ancestor), while Manfou(i)r/menēfre has the mythological equivalence of infinite phenomenon, Moab definition of life. ‘Maann’, in essence, means phenomenon while ‘Fou(i)n’ is derived from Fou(i)r, respiration. Manfour is sometimes also used by this group to represent ultimate-freedom. Accordingly, total freedom and life (in its eternal manifestation) are synonymous. ‘Min’, the founder of Memphis, in Moar is a demonstration of a first person simply meaning me. However, with this group the demonstration is often accompanied by a gesture with the demonstrator pointing either his finger to (or placing the hand on) the chest—as do the so-called Bushmen in the Kalahari when greeting—when claiming credit for, say, an extraordinary act or achievement, especially when such an act is a contested one. If anything, C.A. Diop argues in his “*African Origins of Civilization: Myth or Reality*” that ‘only the indigenous population/Blacks were privileged in serving the cult of the god Min’ (1974: 147). Egyptologists generally agree today that Thibé/Thebes (Karnak/Luxor) was central to the indigenous cultural institutions of Hiku-Ptah and Manfour; and similarly, Napata and Meroē are also generally considered to have been local settlements culturally affiliated to the Ethiopian Kingdom or later Dynastic Egypt.

On the other hand, the culture symbolism of Bunkper (“Old River”) seems rather unfamiliar to conventional academia, but popular among the elderly of the Moabs. Interestingly, this

particular indigenous group not only continue to worship the Sun-god today, who they call Hyen-Nu/Hyeru (“One-hand”), but continue to adore the pre-dynastic crocodile deity of the Great Nile Valley—the latter’s meat they are morally constrained (or forbidden ...) from eating. In addition, the original version of this crocodile deity has an ankh inscribed on its neck. While it seems too early to substitute Hyen-Nu/Hyeru with the dynastic Egyptian myth of Heru/Horus, but it is also compelling not to treat such recurring similarities ... as mere coincidence either. For the early culture practice of not killing crocodiles or eating their meat seems to have anticipated the idea of the mummification of the sacred bull “Apis” of Memphis or the later symbolic use of the ram as the culture representative of Amon/Amen in the culture institutions of Hiku-Ptah, Meroe, etc.—for both sacred animals were supposedly vegetarians. Furthermore, the perception that the key to humanity’s innate quest for eternal life is found in vegetation also fits well with the idea of “golden leaf scales used in the process of weighing the souls of a deceased person in Osiris judgement of the dead in dynastic Egypt”, as in Martin Bernal’s Response to Critics in *Black Athena Writes Back*, (2001: 302-303). The golden Ankh symbolizes eternity in dynastic Egypt. And C.A. Diop also accurately points to the culture role played by Osiris as both god of the Nile and vegetation (Diop, 1974: 88).

Importantly, following the Manfour/Memphetic concept of life as infinite phenomenon mentioned earlier, it is thus presumed that death would have been a latecomer in this people’s culture history. In fact, according to a local mythological narration, in the beginning the celestial provinces or the sky where eternal life dwells was originally within the proximity of human habitation, Earth—thereby facilitating humankind transition between both provinces. In those early days, everything was in abundance and humanity knew virtually nothing about death until one day a Witch/Wizard—out of laziness and greed—decided to cut and use part of one of the celestial bodies as meat/food for her/his family’s dinner. Angered by such “violent bloody” act against one of Hyen-Nu’s eternal bodies, Hyen-Nu not only severed the link between the earth and the celestial provinces (where s/he/it withdrew), but, even worse, introduced death on Earth. A similar mythological inquest into the origin of death is noted of the Dinka. As Liendhardt finds out, “the Dinka believe that the sky, where “Divinity” is located, and earth, where man dwells, were at one time contiguous, the sky lying just beneath the earth and being connected by a rope, so that men could move at will between the two realms. There was no death and the first man and woman were permitted but a single grain of millet a day, which was all that they at the time required. One day the woman, of course, decided out of greed, to plant more than the permitted grain of millet, and in her avid haste

and industry accidentally struck Divinity with the handle of the hoe. Offended, he severed the rope, withdrew into the distant sky of today, and left man to labour for his food, to suffer sickness and death, and to suffer separation from the source of his being, his Creator” (Lienhardt, 1961: 28-55;<sup>2</sup> Geertz, 1973: 106-107). Such mythological inquests into the origins of death might sound rather primitive and trivial for some, but both myths seem to explain why, from the onset, the culture institutions of the Ethiopian kingdom or later dynastic Egyptian took a celestial orientation in their quest for eternal life. Moreover, the former group’s claim to northern or north-eastern descent of Azania is supported by their mythical employment of the “Tortoise” to compose the hymn of their [lament] for having left their ancestral land following the devastation of that land and its cultural institutions by successive economically induced colonial incursions from abroad.

This Moab group, in particular, again maintain to have originated from the same paternal ancestor, whose four wives gave birth to Seven sons—who not only became the Seven Sages/Stars of the national council of the “Twelve Elderly,” but also the seven days of the Egyptian calendar of twelve months (the Month in Moar is synonymous with the Star or Moon).

Thus, if anything, it should by now be clear that this thesis’ interpretation of most local myths, legends, and oral narratives and many of the terminologies that shall be used herein are primary and therefore authentic, especially given that the Semitic idiom that was later used in the decipherment of demotic texts of the dynastic Egypt was a latecomer in the ancient Ethiopian or later ancient Egyptian culture (not to mention Ancient Egyptians secrecy with their knowledge system). Champollion’s use of the Hermetic tradition and Coptic in his decipherment of the hieroglyphs also found mention in Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena* Volume I (BAI) chapter V (footnote 47). However, while, in crediting the authenticity of local sources, the author bears the sole responsibility for the interpretation of the indigenous mythologies and mythical terms used in this research—most of which were [*originally*] orally transmitted and already familiar to the academic world, their originality should rightly be attributed to the culture custodians of the Bantu-Ethiopian Kingdom (henceforth called Azania). Despite attributing the originality of the current interpretation of local mythologies, legends and narratives, to the indigenous Elderly (the *Sages*)—the original embodiment of the social and culture history of the Azanian people; who, unfortunately most contemporary academic authorities have often overlooked in their [superficial] inquest into social history of the indigenous Azanians, it should be added that the author of this doctoral thesis does not

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<sup>2</sup> G. Lienhardt, 1961. *Divinity and Experience*. Oxford.

boast or pretend to have direct access to the “Elderly Twelve” of local culture institutions in this ongoing attempt to analytically derive a homogeneous culture for the Azanians as a whole. Nevertheless, the fact of having been brought up among the Azanians (and having dedicated my research activities to the history of their social growth or identity formation) should give this academic contribution the merit of critical review—for following others in purporting that the indigenous populace of [what is now formally] Africa was once a homogeneous ethno-cultural national community.

As a matter of fact, in contemporary nationalist literature the principle cleavage among theorists of ethnic and national identities is between those who posit that such identities are enduring and culturally based (primordialists/ethnosymbolists) and those who view them as constructions and instruments for gain without deep roots (constructivists, circumstantialists, functionalist or instrumentalist). The primordialist/ethno-symbolist approach, in particular, views ethnic identity as intrinsic and constant and that attachment to an ethnic group can be objectively and culturally defined. This perspective assumes that the pre-existence of ethnic identities in form of *gemeinsame* culture, myths, religion, language and kinship ties, and [an original homeland/territoriality] help explain the ethnic origins of nations (Smith A., 1986). In his explanation of the potency of ethnic identity Paul Brass<sup>3</sup> sees human beings as an essentially social, group-oriented species, and on the basis of this has passionate attachment to self.

Of course, genuine/culture nations are well known for their resilience to any change that has the potential of undermining their ardent quest for self-identity, unity, and ultimate freedom. While the Azania[n] national model differs little from others in this regard, it stands out for critical review when it comes to materializing those core nationalist objectives (self-identity, unity and ultimate freedom). As noted earlier, special about the Azanian nation is its conceptual equation of real freedom with life—that is, *Manfour* (infinite phenomenon), and knowledge with right, the key to attaining the former. Azanians believe that the cultural predispositions of Ptah—their part of mother Earth—is a sacred vehicle in their ardent and relentless quest for ultimate freedom thus go along confirming why cultural nationalists see in territoriality a natural pre-condition for their contribution to (or realization of) the purpose of life. In other words, natural autonomous homelands as self-governing entities are crucial to the realization of nationalist projects since it is in them cultures are cultivated and renovated towards nationalists' objective of ultimate freedom. Sir Roger Casement, an Irish nationalist during his trial for treason in 1916 is quoted by the postcolonialist theorist Robert J

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<sup>3</sup>Brass P R., 2004. 'Elite Interests, popular passions, and social power in the language politics of India.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27, 353-75.



C. Young as arguing that: “Self-government is our right – thing no more to be doled out to us or withheld ... than the right to feel the Sun or smell the flowers or to love our kind.” (Young, 2003: 121). As Margaret Moore also points out, ‘collective self-government is an important good in that it gives expression to moral communities; it reflects people identity; it is a form in which autonomy can be expressed; in which people are empowered to shape the content in which they live and realize their political aspirations. When a group of people is deprived of its territory, it is also deprived of the main institutional conditions or means to exercise its self government’ (Moore, 2001: 167-9). And I will now add to contribute, uniquely and purposefully, to the service of life. After all, if the Earth is not only a sacred vehicle for humanity’s realistic cause for ultimate freedom, but a platform from which distinct nations could make use of their naturally endowed intellects/knowledge in the service of life, it then follows automatically that any attempt to deprive nations of their natural habitat is tantamount to denying them the right of being a legitimate party to humanity’s curious (but legitimate) inquest into the profound depths—the culture custodians of the Ethiopian Kingdom would paint their deities black and modern scientists would allude to Schwarze-Löcher (black-holes)—that hold the secrets of eternal Existence.

It is precisely such unconventional views from the culture institutions of the then Bantu-Ethiopian Kingdom—e.g. Bunkper, Hiku-Ptah, Napata, Meroë, etc.—that make the over-all concept of Azanism/Azania worthy of critical review, especially at a time when proponents of pseudo-nationalism are blatantly calling for the destruction of genuine nations (as in Arab pseudo-nationalists colonial efforts in northern Azania or Al Qaeda’s appeal to empty colonial Sudan of its indigenous population). This notwithstanding, it should be noted that ethnic groups or nations are well capable of co-existing peacefully with each other, based on reciprocal reception of and respect for each other culture authenticity and national territories, but damaging factors such as the malign intentions of political elites often tend to manipulate ethnic identities for the purpose of achieving political and economic goals (Stewart, 2006: 2).<sup>4</sup> This is particularly true in terms of understanding the early perception of enduring instability characteristic of African politics today.

For example, after meticulously scrutinizing the process by which Eritrea forged its national identity, and on the basis of which it eventually achieved statehood, and Somaliland’s apparent route to secession, Dominique Jacquin-Berdal came to the conclusion that in both cases it was the “colonial self” rather than ethnicity that provided the basis for secession, while it was “war” that proved to be the catalyst of nation formation. Three key events are

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<sup>4</sup>Stewart, F., 2002. *Horizontal Inequalities: a Neglected Dimension of Development*. Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House.

important in her analysis of the formation of Eritrea in particular: The first was the creation of Eritrea as a colonial state, an event which not only provided Eritrea with its name and geographical identity, but with a history distinct from that of Ethiopia. The second was the period of Federation (1952-62) during which Eritrea acquired the institutions and symbols of autonomy, and finally the liberation war itself, during which the nationalist struggle gradually spread from a small elite to encompass the Eritrean masses. It was also during this period that Eritrea's identity was cemented and given its present characteristic by the "dominant Movement," the EPLF. In short, while Dominique's position seems close to the ethno-symbolist perspective that one cannot make bricks without straw (Anthony D. Smith, 1986: "*Ethnic Origins of Nations*"), in her analysis of the African national states that straw was not ethnic. So, in her critique of the ethnic interpretation of the origins and spread of nationalism her argument is simply that in much of Africa, ethnicity as much as nationalism is a modern creation. She maintains accurately that, the colonial administration's need to "map" the population under its control led to the establishment of categories whose contours were in many cases substantially different from those that had previously prevailed (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002:135-138). This is almost like suggesting that the colonial legacy pulled in two opposite directions towards the creation of an official statist theory of territorial national state which for the past endured, if seldom in condition of much instability or welfare; and towards a communal and ethnic ordering of society, which in few cases has metamorphosed into viable political order and in many other has become the agency of disorder and intra-state conflicts. There is indeed no shortage of references supporting the argument that the history of the African states has been characterized by violent subjugation and domination; while intra-state conflicts, violent political crises, political instability and state failure characterize the post-independence African politics. 'By all considerations the colonialism of the nineteenth century Africa was, among others, highly competitive and governed after the 1884/5 Berlin doctrine of effective occupation. This not only required that the subject population bear the brunt of its own subjugation, but also facilitated the creation of artificial command structures reminiscent of the Westphalian national state model. The command structures which resulted, even though its expatriate superstructure was modest, achieved unchallenged hegemony by World War I (WW I), and enjoyed an ascendancy sufficient to appropriate significant fraction of the meagre income of its subjects and direct a large amount of labour into economic pursuits desired by the colonial state for fiscal and other reasons (export crop cultivation, plantation labour, mining work force etc). Although some authors viewed the colonial state as weak, relative to its vocation of low-cost domination ("decentralized despotism, in the apt

phrase of Mahmood Mamdani<sup>5</sup>), prior to WW II the scope of its authority was striking. In the most part, brute force and violent subjugation was at the core of its survival strategy, and this became more apparent as genuine nationalist sentiments began to fuel resistance.<sup>6</sup> Eventually, the colonial state was compelled by events of WW II to relinquish, at least formally, partial control of most part of its command structures to local intermediary groups, post colonial African leaders, who for their part have, until this day, been unable to turn the wheel in favour of genuine nationalist demands for (self-identity, unity, and ultimate freedom). In this sense, it might be argued that there was a tacit incorporation of the legacy of the colonial state legacy into the post-colonial African nation-state system. Hence some authors paint a rather bleak future for both the concept of colonial Africa and its associated territorial states.

W. Alade Fawole, for one, argues that “the African national state model which was initiated through the colonial fiat, until circumstances of WW II made the grant for independence unstoppable, was...arguably set for eventual collapse.”<sup>7</sup> And it is true that since independence much of Africa has been virtually consumed by warfare—e.g. in the Great Lakes and Sudan since the 1950s, and Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mauritania since the 1980s (but with far reaching political ramifications for the region as a whole).<sup>8</sup> According to Stephen Ellis, many of the ongoing conflicts in Africa are just the latest twists in a long and bloody history that goes back to the circumstances of decolonization (Ellis, 2005: 140-141). In his study *On the Postcolony* (2001), the postcolonial theorist Achille Mbembe, stressed that “the forms of governance established in many sub-Saharan African countries by colonial powers did not simply lay the foundations for the form of political sovereignty and civil society modelled on the modern European nation-states such as Britain, France and Germany. Hence, “the colony is primarily a place where violence and upheaval is lived, where violence is lived into structures and institutions.” Consequently, colonialism undermined rather than enabled the possibility of economic and political sovereignty in the postcolony (Morton, 2007: 174). It is for this reasons that Mbembe questions the optimism often associated with decolonization:

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<sup>5</sup> Mahmood, Mamdani, 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Crawford, Young, 2004. The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflection on changing African Political dynamics. *African Affairs* **103**, 23-49.

<sup>7</sup> Fawole W Alade, 2004. “A Continent in Crisis: Internal Conflicts and External Interventions in Africa.” *African Affairs*. 103, 297-303.

<sup>8</sup> One of the early perceptive Africanist scholars to apprehend the impact of colonial rule on the conflicts in African States was James O’Connell and he had concluded as early as the 1960s that the mode of independence for the new countries sowed the seeds of later trouble (See, James, O’Connell, 1967. “The Inevitability of Instability.” *Journal of Modern African Studies* **5**, (2), 181).

“Is there any difference – and, if so, of what sort? – between what happened during the colony and “what comes after?” Is everything really called into question, is everything suspended, does everything really begin all over again, to the point where it can be said that the formerly colonized recovers existence, distances him-/herself from his/her previous state?” (Mbembe, 2001: 196-97; Morton, 2007: 170).

From the foregoing, then, constructivists are in some sense right to assert that “ethnicity and nationalism”, in specific reference to African politics, is a modern construct. This is not only true of the Eritrean politics discussed earlier, but also what led to the 1994 Rwandan (and/or the ongoing genocide in Congo, Sudan/Darfur, and Mauritania). In Rwanda’s case, Moya Collett maintains that ‘Belgian colonialism was responsible for solidifying, if not creating, oppositional ethnic identities which had previously been malleable and relatively unimportant to Rwanda’s social existence.’<sup>9</sup> Essentially, Moya’s argument goes along confirming constructivists perception that “ethnic identities are activated depending on the actor’s subjective perception of the situation in which s/he finds himself” and “the salience s/he attributes to ethnicity as relevant factor in that situation”(Okamura, 1981: 454). In Ivory Coast, for example, the French deliberately forged four politically relevant ethnic groups (Mande, Voltaic, Krou and the Akans: now crystallized by post-colonial local leaders into South [Christians] versus North [Moslems]) out of the 60 or more dialects/sublanguages, the overall result of which is the current Ivorian crisis. The same is true of present day Nigerian politics where English colonialism succeeded in forging the so-called Ibo-Hausa-Yoruba political syndrome, thereby pitching Africa’s so-called political relevant groups against each other (for the control of Africa’s seemingly depleting natural resources amidst the natural upshot of the native population).<sup>10</sup>

As observed earlier, the pathological drive to prevent any form of unity from emerging in Africa does not necessarily obliterate the possibility of the persistence of a blanket pre-African—that is, Azanian identity conscience, which could be revoked for critical analysis had scholars genuinely wanted to understand the complexity of social growth or identity formation in that part of the world. Herein, thus, lie some of the shortcomings of the constructivists arguments. One major problem with the Constructivists position, especially,

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<sup>9</sup> Moya, Collett, 2006. “Ivorian Identity Constructions: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the prelude to civil war.” *Nations and Nationalism* **12** (4), 613-629 (esp., 614).

<sup>10</sup> In Nigeria’s case, for example, colonial governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, pursued a deliberate policy of ethnic separateness by adopting a style of administration that, according to him, should secure to each separate people the right to maintain its own identity, its individuality and its nationality, its chosen form of government; and the peculiar political and social form, which have been evolved for it by the wisdom and accumulated experience of generations of its forebears. Quotation taken from J S. Coleman (1958), ‘Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.’ Berkeley: Berkeley University Press; and recited in Okwudiba Nnoli, 1978. ‘*Ethnic politics in Nigeria.*’ Enugu, 112.

when it comes to discussing the social history of Africa, is the often erroneous attempt to (selectively) reduce the legacy of African colonialism to the recent event of the 1884/5 Berlin conference. Such deliberate reductionism for formal political reasons fails because there is credible evidence to sustain nationalists claim that [even] the concept of Africa is not necessarily indigenous (Williams C., 1987: 65); and that Arabs only gained control of the North of Africa as late as the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Century AD. (One must not forget that it was not until the late 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> century that Egypt became largely Arabized, an assimilation process reminiscent of what is currently underway in Sudan and Mauritania respectively. In this light, it suffices thus to argue that prior to indigenous Africans encounter with colonialism there should have been some form of ethno-cultural convergence or integration without which the concept of Azanian Nation would be unthinkable.

Indeed, there are those who think there are good reasons to believe in pre-Africa culture homogeneity; and the fact that the indigenous populace had, in the past, acted concurrently to external colonial threats. In fact, as recently as 500 BC the great Persian warrior, Cambyses, while invading Egypt, planned an expedition against the Ethiopians; but before proceeding upon the belligerent enterprise sent out:

Spies in the first instance, who were to see the table of the sun, which was said to exist among the Ethiopians, and besides, to explore other things, and, to cover their design, they were to carry presents to the king ... When the messengers of Cambyses arrived among the Ethiopians they gave the present to the king, and addressed him as follows: Cambyses, the king of the Persians, desires of becoming your friend and ally, had sent us, bidding us confer with you, and he presents you with these gifts, which are such as himself most delights in.

But the Ethiopian king knowing that they came as spies spoke thus to them:

Neither has the king of Persia sent you with these gifts to me because he values my alliance, nor do you speak the truth, for you come as spies of my kingdom. Nor is he a just man; for if he were just he would not desire any other *territory* than his own; nor would he reduce people to servitude who have done him no injury. However, give him this bow, and say these words to him: King of the Ethiopians advices the king of the Persians, when the Persians can ...easily draw a bow of this, then to make war on the Macrobian Ethiopians with more numerous forces; but until that time let him thank the gods, who have not inspired the sons of the Ethiopians with the desire of adding another land to their own (Blyden (1871) quoted in Kedourie E. 1970: 267-269)

This well formulated argument of territorially induced ethnic nationalism advanced by the Ethiopian leadership here; and their later efforts to recover lost territories to foreign colonial occupations (and their local pseudo-nationalist collaborators) is also briefly compressed in the following statement:

“...one Prince rules in Avaris, another in Ethiopia, and here I am, associated with an Asiatic and a Negro. Each has his slice of Egypt, dividing up the land with me. ... None can rest in peace, despoiled as all are by the imposts of the Asiatics. I will grapple with them, and cut open their belly: I will save Egypt and over-throw the Asiatics” (Smith, 1986: 51).

Interestingly, these quotes above seem to strengthen the previous position on the persistence of ethno-cultural national consciousness among the Ethiopians prior to their encounter with colonialism. For instance, the idea of “the Table of the Sun” among the Ethiopians by Cambyses men presupposes a socio-ethical norm that not only gives the Ethiopian kind its unique moral course, but, in general, encodes the Ethiopians perception of the world around them. But who were/are these Ethiopians?

Blyden, for one, traces the origin of Ethiopia in the word *ham* (derives from Cham/Kem). And Prof. Rev. A.H. Sayce argues that prior to the conquest of Lower Egypt by the “Hyksos”; and/or the arrival of Semites most popular “immigrant”, biblical/koranic Abraham, in Ancient Egypt, the original inhabitants of Egypt were indeed *Hamites* (Sayce, 1895: 20). The root of the word Ham, in Hebrew *Hamam*, Blyden asserts, conveys the sense of *hot* and *swarty*. So the Greeks called the descendants of Ham, from their black complexion, the “Ethiopians,” a word signifying “burnt” or “black” face. Herodotus...tells us that there were two divisions of Ethiopians, who did not differ at all from each other in appearance, except in their language and hair; “for the eastern Ethiopians, he says are straight haired, but those of Libya (or Africa) have more curly than any other people” (Blyden, 1871; Kedourie 1970: 254). Ernst Cassirer in his *The Myth of the State* also has the following to say about the Ethiopians: „...*die Dichter und Mythenschöpfer gaben der gewöhnlichen Versuchung der Menschen nach; die Aethiopier, sagt Xenophanos, machen ihre Götter Schwarz und stumpfnasig*“ (Cassirer, 1949; 2002: 73). Jan Knappert sounds rather undeterred when he specifically stresses on the expression of the unique Bantu features of the Ethiopian type stamped on the Sphinx of Ancient Egypt (Knappert, 1997). By similar analytical token, one could also reasonably argue that the relentless drive by the Ethiopians, in the course of their social history, to recover Kem/Cham, their ancestral land (northern Azania), from foreign colonial occupations should have been analysed within the contours of genuine nationalists culture endeavour (or demands

for self-identity, cultural unity, and total freedom). In any case, since the Ethiopians were the original inhabitants of the land of Cham/Kem and rest of pre-colonial Africa, where in those days colonialism had not yet demonstrated its destructive potential, those grappling with the intricacies of the national phenomenon should have at least strived to find out whether the Ethiopians had—prior to the introduction of divisive politics in Africa—indeed shared a *gemeinsame* culture that could qualify them as a genuine national community?

In his *Old Africa Rediscovered*, Basil Davidson, for one, has incisively and persuasively insisted on such a profound culture interpenetration and interdependence among the indigenous Azanians, which not only have the potential of elucidating the complexity of social growth and identity formation in that part of the world, but, in general, also indicates that the indigenous Azanians, even in conventional wisdom, would have acted culturally as homogeneous ethnic community. As he observes, ‘the greatest of all ancient Egyptian temples of Nubia—of the southern land that would later become the kingdom of Kush—was built by an eighteenth dynasty Pharaoh (Amenophis III, 1407-1370 B.C., and he, just like Tutmosis III., had Nubian blood in his veins) at Sulbe on the west bank of the Nile. Its avenue of approach was guided by ‘rams’ and ‘lions’ caved in granites. Both rams and lions were taken to temples at Barkal near Napata on the Nile, by kushite pharaohs of the twenty five dynasty—they who had [re]conquered Egypt from the south. Thereafter the ram symbol of Amon/Amun also found its godlike way along (what is now called) the west coast of Africa right across all the people of the region. (It is important to note that in the picturesque table below, Amon is represented as source of eternal life—even though later ‘self-proclaimed’ Pharaohs were notorious for reinterpreting the original indigenous-national culture politically to suit their pseudo-nationalist ambitions, as the accompany miniature script also confirms):



Image from the Temple of Luxor, depicting Amenhotep III applying to his own human wife the Legend of Thoth announcing to Neith (the primordial Waters) that she would become pregnant with Ra (the Sun-God or King of the Sky/heaven), the actual impregnation delivered by Knoph and Hathor via the ankh, leaving Neith “ever virgin,” the subsequent birth over a birth brick, and the praise raised to the child by her

courtiers and the gods. the form of Ra at this point was Ra-Amun, who was becoming identified as Horus. The Child that is consequently as being Ra/Horus, went on to become Akhenaton (Amenophis IV).<sup>11</sup>

The Mandinka of present day West Africa consider that the God of storm (water) and thunder (fire) takes earthly shape as ram. The Yoruba national God, *Shango*, appears with a ram's mask, and is equally God of storm and thunder. The Baoulé of present day Ivory Coast represent Nianné, the personified sky with a mask of ram.<sup>12</sup> For the Fon people of Dahomey, the God of lightening is also a ram. Divine rams in one guise or another, with one meaning or another, carry on right down through the Cameroons into the remote basin of the Congo. Carvers of wood are making them until this day. In Davidson's words, these traces of cultural interpenetration can be many times multiplied, and are fresh proofs of that great unity in diversity which gives so much of Azania (pre-colonial Africa) its characteristic quality of resonance, complexity and age' (Davidson, 1959; 1970: 67-68). Wainwright, G. A. has shown "how priestly breastplates, from Yoruba areas in southern Nigeria of the medieval period, recall similar models dedicated to Amon/Amun in dynastic Egypt" (Wainwright, 1951; Davidson, 1959/70: 68). "The divine kingship" of Jukun of Benue River, in present day Nigeria, recalls the "divine kingship" of Kush and Egypt; and is far from being alone in that respect (Davidson, 1970: 68).

In her latest study of the beliefs and legends of the Akan people of Ghana (Nɔ̃hana), Mrs. Meyerowitz, E.L.R has suggested "parallels between the old beliefs of the dynastic north and cults of the Moon-god and Sun-god and other divinities of the Akan people of Ghana, so that the philosophy of the human origins of the one comes to seem remarkably close to the same kind of pondering of the other" (Meyerowitz, 1958; Davidson, 1959/70: 68).

In essence, I share C.A.Diop emphasis that, Ethiopia and Africa interior have always been considered by the Egyptians as the holy land from which their forebears had come. Quoting a passage from Chérubini he refers to the enthusiastic reception of an Ethiopian king, Shabaka, by the Egyptians in the closing days of Egypt's cultural prominence:

"In any event, it is remarkable that the authority of the king of Ethiopia seemed recognized by Egypt, less as that of an enemy imposing his rule by force, than as a guardianship invited by the prayers of a long-suffering country, afflicted anarchy within its borders and weakened abroad. In this monarch, Egypt found a representative of its ideas and beliefs, a zealous regenerator of its institutions, a powerful protector of its independence. The reign of Shabaka was in fact viewed as one of the happiest in Egyptian memory. His

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<sup>11</sup> For similar accounts of divine births associated with the Pharaohs see Clayton, Paeter A. 1994. *Chronologies of the Pharaohs: The Reign-by-Reign Record of the Rulers and Dynasties of Ancient Egypt*. London: Thames and Hudson; O' Conner, David and Silverman David, 1995. *Ancient Egyptian Kingship*. New York.

<sup>12</sup> It is worth adding that the committed culturalists among the Baoulés still refrain from eating the meat of rams.



dynasty, adopted over the land of the Pharaohs, ranks twenty-fifth in the order of succession of national families who have occupied the throne” (quoted in C.A.Diop, 1974:146)<sup>13</sup>.

As Diop rightly assert, the kinship of Egypt and Nubia, of Mesraim and Kush, both sons of Ham/Cham, is revealed by many events in Egypto-Nubian history.

Succinctly, until the close of Egyptian Empire, the kings of Nubia (Sudan) were to bear the same title as the Egyptian Pharaoh, that of the Hawk of Nubia. Amon and Osiris were represented as coal-black; Isis was a Black goddess. And, as noted earlier, only the indigenous populace had access to the cult of Min (Diop, 1974: 146-147). In other words, only the indigenous population had originally the legitimate right to become a Pharaoh, the king of Kings.

“The god Kush had alters in Memphis, Thebes, Meroë under the name of Khons, god of the sky to the Ethiopians, Hercules to the Egyptians.”(Pedrals, 1950: 29<sup>14</sup>) In Wolof, Khon means “rainbow”; it means “to die” in Serer. “Khon being understood to mean: die in the other world, but not yet having attained the divine condition.” There is also a land name Khons on the Upper Nile (Diop, 1974: 147).

Accordingly, Nubia appears to be akin to Egypt and the rest of Black Africa. In fact, right after the end of Egypto-Nubian Antiquity, the Empire of Ghana soared like a meteor from the mouth of Niger to the Senegal River, circa the third century A.D. Viewed in this perspective Africa history proceeded uninterrupted. The first Nubian dynasties were prolonged by the Egyptian dynasties until the occupation of Egypt by the Indo-Europeans, starting in the fifth century B.C. Nubia remained the sole source of culture and civilization until about the sixth century A.D., and then Ghana seized the torch from the sixth until 1240, when its capital was destroyed by Sundiata Keita; which herald the launching of the Mandingo Empire. ... In listing this chronology, we have simply wanted to show that there was no interruption in African history. It is evident that, if starting from Nubia and Egypt, we had followed a

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<sup>13</sup> Chérubini alludes to this passage from Diodorus of Sicily: “The Ethiopians call themselves the first of all men ... It is generally agreed that, born in a country and not having come from elsewhere must be judged indigenous. It is likely that located directly under the course of the Sun, they sprang from the earth before other men... The Ethiopians also say that they instituted the cults of the gods, festivals, solemn assemblies, sacrifices; in short, all the practising by which we honour the gods. One of the ancient and most respected poet in Greece renders them this homage when he introduces Jupiter and other gods en route to Ethiopia (in the *Iliad*) to attend the feast and annual sacrifices prepared for them all by the Ethiopians:

Jupiter today followed by all the gods,  
Receives the sacrifices of the Ethiopians (*Iliad*, I, 422)

“They claim that the gods have rewarded their piety by the important blessings, such as never having been dominated by any foreign prince. In fact, thanks to the great unity that has always existed among them, they have always kept their freedom. Several very powerful princes, who have tried to subjugate them, have failed in that endeavour. ... Bacchus and Hercules, after crossing the whole earth, abstain from fighting the Ethiopians, either through fear of their power or respect for their piety. ... (Cherubini, M.S. *Histoire Universelle*, Bk. I, 337-341.)

<sup>14</sup> Pédrals, Denis Pierre De, 1950. *Archéologie de l’Afrique Noire*. Paris.

continental geographical direction, such as Nubia-Gulf of Benin, Nubia-Congo, Nubia-Mozambique, the course of African history will still appear uninterrupted (Diop, 1974: 147-148).

In order to summarize the perception of cultural interpenetration and interdependence let us stress further on some of the points made earlier about the Mōab(s). (Note, this “Gur” people is also called “Pata-gruman” in Chancellor William’s *Destruction of Black Civilization: The Great Issues of Race* [1987]; and he lists them among the federations of the former Mossi Empire (Williams, 1987: .209-219), which emerged out of the ruins of Nɔ̄hana (ancient Ghana). This research has also proven that the “Naba/Nabé” (King) of Mossi consider his family to be part of the family tree of Mōlé. (And Pédrals also “refers to a monarch who once reigned over a part of Nubia with the name Naba.”<sup>15</sup>)). The distinction between Mōar and Mōlé is a matter of semantics, but if anything, it does confirm the early perception about the proliferation of the Gur people in general. With regard to the Mōab/Moar Sun-god, Hyen-Nu/Hyeru (“One-hand”), it should now be emphasized that the most significant symbols for the Ancient Egyptian myth of Heru/Horus are “One-Eye,” “One-finger,” “One-hand,” “falcon or Sun-God.” And the same is true of dynastic Egyptian mythology of Amon/Amun. In fact, Amon/Amun could be derived from Moar as denoting the heat of the Sun-god. “Mu” in Moar means fire. So the term A+Mon (Amon/Amun) is derived from the entwining of the personal pronoun of a second person = ‘A’ (you)—in our present case the personified Sun-god (Hyen-Nu/Hyeru) in its eternal glowing manifestation, while the ‘mon/mun’ merely describes the red-yellowish colour of fire, thereby furnishing a complex mythical expression that combines a second person’s personal pronoun, its predicate and adjective to mean You-are-yellowish-red. The same combination can be made for ‘A+ton’ (‘ton’= heat or hot) as was later transformed by Akhenaton whose birth was depicted above. In addition, the black cobra often used to encircle the Sun-god of dynastic Egypt in its eternal glowing manifestation should stand for eternity (in that fire cannot devour complexity of blackness).

The latter emphasis leads us to the Southern part of Azania where we encounter in Shona the Sun-Hero Makome in a fierce survival struggle with a giant snake; and Ditutwane in in Venda and Metsing in Khoisan. As C A. Diop convincingly attest, ‘the falcon and crocodile symbol of present day Zimbabwe echoes the divinities of dynastic Egypt’ (Diop, 1956, 1974: 35).

Another very significant cultural factor confirming the previously discussed cultural interpenetration and interdependence among the Azanians is in the linguistic sphere, especially with regard to the invention of complex words for culturally impelling divine

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<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, 36.

objects in the history of language development. Christopher Eyre, for one, attributes the earliest of such development to the culture institutions of Dynastic Egypt (Eyre, 2002: 1-10). While Eyre statement is compelling, there are good reasons not to overlook the culture significance of such culturally impelling names of the Mōabs. *Kari(n)-wan-ta* in Moar, for instance, could be translated as meaning settle down and I (e.g. Hyen-Nu) will show you! But it can also be used for “corn or maize.” So, show what? Is it the culture route to eternity?

In any event, the Bantu Ethiopians as sedentary agricultural communities deserve no further elaboration than the great cultural and artistic accomplishments known about the children of Cham/Ham, the undisputable great builders of the colossal Azanian monuments in honour of Ptah (and Amon). Moreover, the culture symbolism of corn in the history of ancient Egypt also found expression in later biblical narrative and scholarly speculations. Similarly, the ancient Ethiopian myth of “Bata,” in which the cultural attributes of corn, cows and crocodiles are prominent had been shallowly discussed but hardly intensively explored. Of course, in Moar, corn without—the primordial—water will almost be culturally irrelevant. And just as water was for the dynastic Egyptians, especially during the Old Kingdom, “nun/nyun,” this very indigenous name has retained its validity among this particular Azanian group. In viewing this, ‘is there any case one may emphasize for supposing a one way traffic in the diffusion of ideas and ideologies from the valley of Nile right across the whole Azanian people (nation) other than that these people acted together as a homogeneous ethnic community? To reiterate Davidson’s apt phrase, “these traces of cultural interdependence and interpenetration can be many times multiplied and are fresh proofs of that unity in diversity which gives so much the Azanian (pre-colonial African) culture its characteristic quality of resonance, complexity and age. As he puts it, whatever the true values of these parallels may be, they are undoubtedly useful in emphasising the great complexity of social growth in ancient Africa (Azania)” (Davidson, 1959/70: 69).

Following Basil Davidson’s incisive analysis, it should thus be concluded that this particular doctoral research has the main aim of emphasizing that great complexity of homogenous social growth in pre-colonial or pre-political Africa—that is, Azania. For this purpose, the thesis will be structured as follows: Having dedicated the foregoing to the Introduction (Part I), the succeeding section (Part II) will take critical issue with the contemporary debates about the origin of the national phenomenon. In particular, the following questions will be critically examined: (1) In what ways are nationalist sentiments derived from cultural cleavages between groups? (2) In what ways are they rational responses to immediate (or spontaneous) identifiable incentives? (3) And if such identities are constructed who or what constructs

them? Answering these questions should allow us, on the one hand, to have a critical overview of the major theoretical debates about the nationalist problematic. On the other hand, their answerment would be crucial in terms of exploring the Azanian national model since in the view of this work the enduring instability gradually consuming the post-colonial African nation-states—as is presently the case in Congo, Somalia etc.—is symptomatic of a struggle between those who see their future as intrinsically linked with their ancestors culture heritage (the genuine nationalists or the Azanians) and those who think they can forge a future out of the colonially imposed rootless African states, the Pan-Africanists.<sup>16</sup>

In addition, given that contemporary African politics cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account the political developments to the North, that is in Europe; the gradual or reluctant emergence of a realistic national model in the form of the culturally converging European (national) union, with her inherent culture appeal for the rejection of the blood stained swords of the heroes of the Westphalian Leviathan (or the national state system)—without which the artificial African states are unthinkable—impels the need to investigate what is realistic about cultural nationalism and unrealistic about political nationalism (Part III). Distinguishing between the reality of culture nations and the surreality of political nations is ineluctable in terms of explaining the socio-cultural, -economic, -political, -psychological, and historical factors that in the recent past nourished the pseudo-nationalist canons, first, in Western Europe, and then later in other parts of the world. Indeed, Europe's role in the spread of political nationalism into the Americas in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries and later Africa (in the 20<sup>th</sup> century) is a well known fact that deserves critical attention.

The genuine nationalist perception that Azania's future cannot be devoid of cyclical development—that is, a developmental pattern that pays genuine tribute, and not merely lip service, to the *Manfou(i)r* culture institutions of the ancestral past—thus eventually boils down to the main theme of this doctoral research, namely: “The critical review of the Myth-reality complexity of the Azanian nation” (Part IV). As hinted elsewhere, the main interest here will be the analytical reinvigoration of the cultural/ideological premise that led to the erection of the aforementioned culture institutions—e.g. the institutions of Hiku-Ptah, Thibe, Napata, Zimbabwe et cetera. Their reintegration into an authentic culture school, as opposed to the conventional wisdom condoning the heterogeneity of African cultures, is to illustrate

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<sup>16</sup> In the words of the leader of South Africa's Youth Communist League, Castro Ngobese, the cultural practice in honour of the Zulu King Shaka makes women “chained prisoners of backward traditions” (Such internationalist arguments was cited on: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-2/hi/africa/7635543.stm> (accessed September 25, 2008).

the contiguousness or homogeneity of the local culture prior to the indigenous Ethiopians/Azanians encounter with colonialism. In a nutshell, because this dissertation will be delving considerably on the culture basis of nations, and shares those academic views that purport the homogeneity of pre-political African culture, it could, in some sense, be also viewed as validating those perceptions.

Finally, the last section (Part V) shall then seek to reintegrate the key arguments raised in the previous chapters with the aim of demonstrating not only why the authentic knowledge of the indigenous culture is concomitant to materializing the key nationalist demands for unity, self-identity, and ultimate freedom, but also the reality of the culture institutions of the Azanian national model in particular.

## II. THE ONGOING DEBATE ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF NATIONS

### **2.1. In what ways are nationalist and ethnic sentiments derived from cultural cleavages between groups?**

#### 2.1.1. Primordialist Response

Before we explore the key arguments of the primordialist school with regards to the constitution of the national phenomenon, let me first explain what is meant here by primordialism. ‘The term “primordialism” as it is commonly used in the studies of nationalism designates much to a related family of concerns and approaches as to a specific theory. By primordialism is meant those academic approaches to nationalism, that emphasis one or some combination of the following:

- a) Dominant themes of common descent, territorial belonging and shared language in discourse of national identity;
- b) historical depth—the idea that nations generally evolved organically out of a pre-existing substrate of ethnicity;
- c) underlying emotional bounds and feelings of attachment and their evocation through nationalist language and symbols.

Important about these three dimensions of variation in the primordialist school is that they all offer the conception of ethnicity as the [basis for] the extension of nationalism. As Jonathan Hearn remarks, Primordialists tend in general to make ethnicity central, in a causal sense, to their understanding of nationalism, and thus nationalism is understood as late development of a much older processes of ethnicity’ (Hearn, 2006: 20-1).

One such position is represented by the American Anthropologist, the late Clifford Geertz, in his 1973 book: *The Interpretation of cultures*. In this work, especially in chapter 10, the author discussed the “ethnic” and “cultural” roots of nations in light of the general political tensions in the new states after their ascension to independent nation-states after World War II. Of particular importance about Geertz incisive analysis of the primordial dimension of nationhood to this particular research is that, while his work is largely concerned about such political tensions—between traditionalist and forces of modernism—in the new states of Africa, Asia and the Americas, it leaves considerable room for those interested in the origin of

the national phenomenon to be able to cross-analyse the Old States, especially with the view to strengthening the primordialist position. Further, Geertz work also permits the conception of pseudo-nationalism introduced in this dissertation in that it tends to shed light on the ambiguity of some traditionalist invocation of traditional culture or ethnic norms and values in their opposition to colonialism and their continuing maintenance of the colonialist ideal (the state nation) thereafter. In a nutshell, while Clifford Geertz work will be central to this analysis of the primordial aspect of nations, in attempting to elucidate and strengthen his position this research will draw on other encompassing sources as well.

Interestingly, Geertz began his conception of the national phenomenon with the novel concept of a “terminal community”, that is, the kind of politically accepted norm of modern social order where different groups compete for political control and economic influence, the nation-state (Geertz, 1973: 261). It is in such tension, say, between primordial and modern dimensions of social order that Geertz thinks is the central driving forces in the national evolution in the new states as well as one of the greatest obstacles to such evolution (ibid, 258). Amidst such apparent contention Geertz devised the concept of “self sustaining maximal social units” of both “ethnic” and “civic” provenance and then seek to find out if such components are the ideal candidates for nationhood; since in his view such loyalties based on ties to class, party, business, trade unions, profession etc., are more satisfied with the idea of “terminal community” and therefore fall short of being self sustaining maximal social unites or ideal candidates for nationhood (ibid, 261). Importantly, Geertz explicitly acknowledges the potential of both “ethnic” and “civic” components of “nationness”, but seems to incline to the persistence and durability of the ethno-cultural dimension—that is, the primordial component of nationhood. Thus while both national candidates or competing communities of social order might be self sustaining maximal social units capable of attaining the status of nationhood, ‘the ethnic dimension’s homogeneity and continuity is based on calls to “blood” and “land” (and not every land [but an original] ancestral territory). The civic core, on the other hand, national unity is maintained not by calls to “blood” and original “homeland” but by vague intermittent, and routine allegiance to “civil state,” supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by government use of police powers and ideological exhortation’ (Geertz, 1973: 260). In the latter case, original territoriality or homeland is of no essence because of the sheer economic inclination of its key advocates.

Before expounding further on Geertz rather interesting and convincing observation of the constitution the national phenomenon, let’s first briefly consider what is so central to both

national variants membership policies as this tend to shed light on why Geertz seems so inclined to the primordial aspect of nationness. Since membership loyalty to the civic component of nationhood is based in large part on cohesion by sword and economic compensatory schemes (welfare provisions and or bribes) its continuity and durability is less attractive in many ways. A case in point would be the sudden collapse of the Palestinian authority in the Gaza strip in 2007 amidst violent concurrence from Hamas. In this specific instance, had the Western donor nations not stifled off the Palestinian national authority income sources Fatah would have stood up for a fight in the defence of [Philistine] Palestine. Otherwise, it makes no sense to die for Palestine with empty pockets. Why should they, for the well-informed/educated part of Fatah leadership, as president Abbas, in his address to his followers in West Bank shortly after the Hamas take-over in Gaza, admits, Arabs are after-all late comers in Palestine. It is also stated clearly in the *Quran* that “Allah granted the land of Isreal to the children of Israel and ordered them to settle therein” (Sura 5: 21). So, well informed Arabs are aware of the fact that the change of name from Judaea to Palestine by Emperor Hadrian of the Roman Empire (ca. 135 CE) was more or less a concerted political attempt to erase Jewish presence in the region. Only the ill-informed ones continue to uphold the highly politicized thesis that Arabs were divinely elected to spread the word of Allah unconstrained by sword into foreign territories. It thus follows from the foregoing emphasis, that for the civic component of nationhood to survive it must rely on a platform of linear economic development, which in essence entails an eventual destruction of the very raw material basis of its very existence by the time it will have attained its most advanced state of development. But can any development do without the prime resources—that is to say, the primitive culture resources of its very existence?

Foremostly, this seems an unlikely scenario. However, as we shall see later, because the civic dimension of nationhood has historically relied on economic compensatory schemes (e.g. bribes) and or intimidation by sword, it has until now, in most cases, succeeded in convincing or coercing certain key elements, especially the aboriginal ones, of the ethic core of nationness for its expansive and subversive economic and political activities. This at best explains the maintenance of the colonial ideal by the leaders and elites of the newly independent states in Africa, the Americas and Asia. In fact, this is what Geertz has to say about a social unit based solely on primordial attachments:

By primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens”—or more precisely, as culture is inevitable in such matters, the assumed given—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious



community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following a particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom religion and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsmen, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as a result of not merely a personal affection, but at least in great part by virtue of an unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, society to society and from time to time. But for virtually every person in every society, at almost all times, some attachment seen more from a sense of natural—some would argue spiritual—affinity than from social interaction (Geertz, 1973:259-60).

Thus from the above perspective, Geertz merely assumes that such primordial ties based on blood, language, customs, religion and territory have a naturally ingrained potential of social integration capable of animating a nation. Put it another way, unless there is a much more powerful social integration force that [tacitly or openly] stands on the way of primordial aspect of social order, its core proponents have always preferred it to be the legitimate basis for the demarcation of political units. And the thesis that truly legitimate authority flows only from the inherent coerciveness such attachments are conceived some how to possess, is frankly, energetically, and artlessly defended:

“The reason why a unilingual state is stable and multi-lingual state is unstable is quite obvious. A state is built on fellow feeling. What is this feeling? To state briefly it is a feeling of corporate sentiments of oneness which make those charge with it feel they are kith and kin. This feeling is a double edge feeling. It is at once feeling of a ‘consciousness of kind’ which, on the one hand, binds together those who have it so strongly that overrides all differences arising from economic conflicts or social gradations, and on the other, servers them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing not to belong to any group. The existence of this fellow feeling is the foundation of a stable and democratic state” (B, Ambedkar, 1955;<sup>17</sup>quoted in Geertz, 1973: 60)

Indeed, Ambedkar's democratic vision based on reciprocal respect, and recognition of each language potentiality in contributing positively to a translinguistic but homogeneous socio-cultural (or political) unit reminds us of the contemporary development in Europe, which I shall be referring to later. But for now, let's expand further on Ambedkhar's [cultural] linguistic dimension of nationalist argument so as to invoke similar positions, which seem to emphasize Geertz appeal for the need to differentiate between ethno-cultural and civic dimensions of nationhood (and their different approach to culture).

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<sup>17</sup>Ambedkar, B.R., 1955. *Thought on Linguistic States*, 11.

Ambedkar is not idiosyncratic in his use of homogeneous culture based on language to demarcate modern political nations; the use of linguistic traits to recover a “lost” national identity is also contemporaneous with the enunciation by a German nationalist ideologue, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who in his celebration of the German culture in 1783 attests that:

“Has a nationality anything dearer than the speech of its fathers? In its speech resides its whole thought domain, its tradition, its history, religion and basis of life, all its heart and soul. To deprive a people of its speech is to deprive it of its one eternal good...With language is created the heart of a people.”

(Herder, 1783 cited in Hearn, 2006: 33)

A nationalist vision Fichte and Schleiermacher would later heighten to a frankly metaphysical level: “the language and nation express aspects of Divine Truth. A ‘nation’ was an irreducible and original quality, an almost transcendent reality, which we could best grasp through mother tongue and national literature. What is cogitated in one language can never be repeated in the same way in another” (Bhabha, H., 1990: 231-2). Of course, the patriotic version of linguistic nationalist rhetoric employed in Herder’s celebration of his German culture and the complementary maternal *dariole* evident in Fichte and Schleiermacher nationalist language have both proven useful, as we will later see, for both the state centric and primordial variants of the nationalist cause. Important about Herder’s [primordial] position on language, though, is that he was more concerned about the virtue of national languages in general, without any preference to Germany in particular. As Hearn rightly observes, language was for Herder a means through which distinctive peoples come to know God, their natural world and themselves, and the ideal social arrangement was one in which language, nation and government were congruent, developing together (2006: 33). In general, Hearn argues that Herder’s views are congruent with the current ideas of multiculturalism, and defences of inherent values of cultural traditions often espoused by anthropologists than they are to the racial existentialistic, xenophobic and chauvinistic ambitions of fascism (ibid). If anything, Hearn’s statement about Herder’s interpretation of language boils down to Roger Bubaker’s distinction between “cultural” and “civic” nationalisms in Germany and France respectively and the effect of these dimensions of nationalism on their coordination of citizen policies today:

“In the French tradition, the nation has been conceived in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state. Revolutionary and Republican definitions of nationhood and citizenship—uni

tarist, universalist, and secular—reinforced what was already in the ancient regime an essential political understanding of nationhood

### While in Germany:

The German understanding of nationhood has been Volk-centered and differentialist. Since national feeling developed before the nation-state, the German idea of nation was not originally political, nor was it limited to abstract idea of citizenship. This pre-political German nation in search of state, was conceived not as in search of universal political values, but as an organic, culturally linguistic or racial community—an irreducible particular *Volksgemeinschaft*<sup>18</sup>

Important about Brubaker's distinction between the "Franco-civic" nationhood and the pre-political "Germano-ethnic" nationhood for the present analysis is that the former, which departed from the "Parisien-core" of the French state, has a long history of assimilating outlying populations both legally and culturally, while the German tradition draws a deeper, "natural" distinction between Germans and others, and is [therefore] less equipped for assimilation (Hearn, 2006: 90). The anti-assimilationist virtue characteristic of the ethno-cultural nationalism should not be confined to the linguistic sphere alone, as the following arguments presented by Marcus Garvey against the grand colonialist and politically induced assimilation project of the American state system in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century also suggest. For Garvey, "there is room enough in the world for the various human species (or racial groups) to grow and develop by themselves without seeking to destroy the creator's original plan by the constant introduction of the mongrel types as in the colonies. In his view, the white race should uphold its racial purity and perpetuate itself and that the black should do likewise. Since the Negroes of Americas have the same culture with those of their original home nation..., they must return there to make their unique contribution to humanity as whole (Garvey [1924], Pecora (ed), 2001: 237-240).

Evidently, the assimilation and anti-assimilation stance characteristic of both the "civic" and "ethnic" conceptions of nationhood tendentiously implies that these distinct national candidates have different approaches to [national] culture too. We shall be discussing at length the overwhelming importance of culture for the survival of both the civic and ethnic strands of nations later. But in order to bring the foregoing analysis to close, let us invoke Ambedkhar's democratic arguments so as to grasp the present state of the assimilation policies associated with civic nations, as human conscience (mental evolution) becomes

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<sup>18</sup> Brubaker R., 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard university press, 1.

relatively much more matured in terms of dealing with complex social orders of linguistic plurality [but] of the same authentic culture origin, as exemplified by the contemporary cultural and political developments in Europe after the Second World War

There is no doubt that the experimental democratic pendulum at the European (national) level generally tilts in favour of the anti-assimilationist camp, at least, in the linguistic sphere. This is particularly true of Europe's stance on its member states national languages. The fact alone that Europe now explicitly recognizes language (or sub-languages of a compact mythical origin) to be the genuine criterion for a state-nation—at least by virtue of the equal representation of its member states dominant languages at the European level—generally implies that sooner or later the politically disadvantaged sublanguages of Europe (e.g., Basques, Corse, Catalans, the Romas/Gypsies et cetera) would eventually join the culture boat of Europe's linguistic salvation. This in turn would not only strengthen Ambedkhar's egalitarian democratic arguments noted earlier, but would in large also encourage academic debate about what should constitute a national language of larger nations with different sublanguages such as the European nation. For instance, should a European national language entail a compact mythical character (i.e. for sustainable reasons) that pays genuine tribute to its authentic Graeco-European culture with a distinctive and clearly defined objective orientation, thereby enabling its sublanguages (e.g. Basque, English, French, German, Gypsy, Spanish et cetera) or institutions to process their policies accordingly?

In as much as the arguments of *Magisterarbeit*/Master's Thesis (Summer 2006) is concerned, 'the only culturally induced compact language the European nation seems to, at best for now, understand is a pro-life-democratic language—given the fact that Europe now vehemently repudiates the linguistic assimilation policies noted earlier of the "Parisien-core" (civic nation), while at the same time urging its member states to reorient their institutional behaviour towards the consensualized objective of a European national discourse that is based on the mutual respect and recognition of each of its members states (or regional bodies) natural ability to contribute constructively to the persistence and durability of the European nation.'<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Raul Diaz, G., 2006. *How Democratic is the EU-Common Agricultural Policy*. Thesis (Masters). Hamburg University, Germany.

### 2.1.2. The cultural symbiosis of hominid development

As observed elsewhere, culture is ineluctable in terms of the survival of both the civic and ethnic strands of the national phenomenon. And by placing culture at the very centre of the process of human evolution Geertz not only strengthens this position, but also confirms the primordial aspect of nationhood (and hence nationalism). In fact, in positing culture as intrinsic to humanity's natural development, Geertz explicitly defends the thesis that the biological evolution of modern man will have been unthinkable without predisposed cultural ornaments (accessories). As he puts it, 'the innate generic constitution of modern humanity ('human nature') appears to be both cultural and biological products rather than her/him anatomically...slowly discovering culture at a later stage of its development. In other words, Geertz is simply suggesting that in the entire life-line of hominid evolution culture has and will continue to be central to humanity's existence. The Pleistocene period<sup>20</sup>, the argument goes, with its rapid and radical variations in climate, land formations and vegetations would not only have been ideal for the speedy efficient evolution for humankind, but also a period in which cultural environment increasingly supplemented the natural environment in the selection process so as to further accelerate the rate of hominid evolution to unprecedented speed. The Ice-Age appears not merely to have been a time of receding brow ridges and shrinking jaws, but the time in which were forged nearly all those characteristics of [hu] mankind's existence which are most distinctively human—his thoroughly encephalic nervous system, his incest taboo based social structure, and his capacity to use and create symbols. The fact that these distinctive features of humanity emerged together in a complex interaction with one another rather than serially as for long supposed<sup>21</sup> is of exceptional importance in the interpretation of human mentality because it suggests that man's nervous system does not merely enable him to acquire culture, but it positively demands that it does so if it is going to function at all. Rather than culture acting to supplement, develop, and extend organically based capacities logically and genetically prior to it, would seem to be ingredient to those capacities themselves' (Geertz, 1973, ch.3: 68). The human brain, in general, is

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<sup>20</sup> This is a period from approximately two million to 10,000 years ago, marked by alternating cold and warm climates and increased glacial activity. Four major glacial advances—when Ice covered as much as two thirds of North America in-depth reaching 3000 meters—are recognized during the Pleistocene period. From the oldest to the youngest are the Nebraskan, Kansan, the Illinoian, and the Wisconsin collectively referred to as the Ice-Age (see, Marc, Mc Cutcheon, 2000. *Descriptionary* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York, 117.

<sup>21</sup> One such supposition is Freud's thesis that human thought processes he called "primary"(substitution, reversal, condensation and so on) are phylogenetically prior to those he called "secondary" (directed, logically, ordered, reasoning and so on) (Freud, Sigmund, 1938. "The Interpretation of Dreams." Translated in the Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud and edited by A. A. Brill. New York, 179-548; Sigmund, Freud, 1946. "Formulations Regarding Two Principles in Mental Functioning." London, ch. 4: 13-27.

thoroughly dependent upon cultural resources for its very function; and those resources are, consequently not adjunct to, but constituent of mental activity (ibid, 73).

By intrinsically linking culture to the very nature of humankind, Geertz seems to contest that culture has a transcendental effect across the life-line of human history—that is, from the so-called period of Australopithecus right through to the present day. As he puts it, ‘with the unequivocal triumph of the homo-sapiens and the cessations of glaciations, the link between organic and cultural change was, if not severed, at least greatly weakened. Since that time organic evolution in human line has slowed down to walk, while the growth of culture had continued to proceed with an ever increasing rapidity, hence it is, therefore, unnecessary to postulate either a discontinuous “difference-in-kind” pattern of human evolution or a non-selective role of culture during all phases of hominid development’(ibid, 69-70). In as much as humanity is concerned culture has been an inevitable part of its existence.

But if culture is, indeed, a transcendental phenomenon intrinsic of human existence as the primordialist Geertz would have us believe, why has it become such a potent phenomenon and unavoidable part of our lives at all times? To this effect, Geertz began by positing culture as an acted document (1973: ch.I), that is, some form of extra-somatic phenomenon of creative genius of an original knowledge, predisposed to have a significant impact on primate advancement (ibid, ch.II). Interestingly, the idea that humanity itself (or the other universal organisms, including planetary bodies and so on) might be merely cultural products of an authentic knowledge simply begs the conclusion that what humankind after-all does in its cultural creativity—in such a complex and intricate milieu of predisposed cultural material—is a matter of supplementing or adhering to the principles of that culture induced universal existence of which s/he is part (emphasis added). Thus from the standpoint of humanity’s cognitive ability, the most perplexing challenge or phenomenon that compels it to embrace culture institutions is “life” and “death.” In other words, by virtue of humankind’s recognition of the limits of her/his cognitive ability in such a complex transcendental universal existence, s/he realizes that her/his security cannot be left at the mercy of spontaneity, but instead in an organized and orderly manner. Therefore by virtue of existential reason (or common sense) and through the guidance of cultural artefacts (e.g. myth, language, ideas, symbols, emotions, rituals, and art) humanity sets out in its innate quest for the purpose of life (Geertz, 1973: 79-80). At this juncture, a definition of culture much familiar with that purposive mission of life is necessitated:

Culture is an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by meanings of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life (Geertz, 1973: 89)

He then proceeds to argue that cultural pattern sets of symbols have a special dual nature. They function simultaneously as “models of” reality, representing what is, and as “models for” reality, guiding appropriate social action in that reality (ibid, 90-4). As Hearn rightly observes, here ‘one seems to be dealing with the unity of descriptive and prescriptive functions of culture (Hearn, 2006: 171), a point we shall explore in detail below in order to illustrate why culture is the most potent source of social integration capable of rooting real a nation.

#### 2.1.2.1. Religion as a cultural system

What can further be said about the above analysis is that Geertz places culture within the gambit of system of patterned inter-working meanings incited by socio-psychological stresses or strains. In other words the socio-psychological stresses of mankind’s interpretation of the complex existential universe or her/his immediate environment is expressed (moulded) in symbolic forms. Geertz uses symbol here to denote any physical, social, or cultural act or object that serves as a vehicle for conception. Symbolic elements are thus tangible attitudes, judgements, longings, beliefs. Cultural acts, construction, apprehension, and the utilization of symbolic forms are, in his words, social events like any other—they are as observable as agriculture (Geertz, 1973: 91). Cultural patterns, that is, systems and complexes of symbols are, for Geertz, extrinsic sources of information that can be used to give meaning to existence. By extrinsic source of information is meant only that—unlike genes, which are predominantly intrinsic source of information, for example—they lie outside the boundaries of the individual organism as such in that inter-subjective world of common understanding in which all individuals are born. By intrinsic sources of information is meant only that—like genes—they provide blueprint or template in terms of which processes external to themselves can be given a definite form. In this sense cultural patterns (e.g. religious, ideological, philosophical, and aesthetic) are programmes; they provide template or blueprint for the organization of organic processes (Geertz, 1973: 216).

Cultural patterns which are “models of” have intrinsic double aspect: they give meaning, that is, objective conceptual form, to social and psychological reality both shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves. Models of—linguistic, graphic, mechanical, natural, etc.,

processes which function not to provide source of information in terms of which other processes can be patterned, but to represent those patterned processes as such, to express their structure in an alternative medium—are rarer [cultural assets] and may be confined, among living animals, to humankind. “‘Models for’, as the gene example suggests, are found through the whole order of nature; for whatever there is a communication of pattern, such programmes are, simply logically, required”(Geertz, 1973: 94). Hence the intertransposability of “models for” and “models of”, which symbolic formations make possible, is distinctive characteristic of human mentality. For Geertz there are indeed good reasons why humankind cannot do without cultural resources or extrinsic sources of information. First, as a higher animal humankind needs to find out in detail about the environment prior to behavioural performance; and second, but given the high degree of generality of information intrinsically available to the organization from genetic resources cultural patterns are unavoidable for the patterns of her/his behaviour. Simply expressed, the extreme generality, diffuseness, and variability of humankind’s innate response capacities mean that the particular pattern her/his behaviour takes is guided predominantly by cultural rather than genetic templates, the latter something the overall psychological content within which precise activity are organized by the former. As Geertz further stressed, the tool making, laughing, or lying, animal (humankind), is incomplete—or more accurately self completing animal. As agent of her/his own realization s/he creates out of her/his capacity for the construction of symbolic models the specific capabilities that define her/him (1973: 200ff.). Indeed, as we observed earlier, the Hamitic Bantu Ethiopians with their distinctive national territory, using the “Sun-plate” as the measure of their culture endeavour painted their diets in their own image (*schwarze und stumpfnassig*). And this is also true of the Pygmie “Ptah” of dynastic Egypt, who began his journey as man before eventually yielding to the [green] *Amon* of Thebes (emphasis added).

In any event, the perception that extrinsic source of information is crucial for directing/guiding human social behaviour is not less true of religion than language. While the centrality of languages to the national phenomenon has already been discussed, the effectiveness of religion, as a cultural system with even trans-linguistic potential or remedy in terms of social integration, also found a similar convincing elaboration in Geertz’s analysis. Interestingly, Geertz began his critical observation of religion with the belief system of a unique social group he termed his “animalistic informants” (1973: 100ff.). As he remarked:

They seem to be constantly using their beliefs to explain a phenomena; or, more accurately to convince themselves that the phenomena were explainable within the expected scheme of things, for they



commonly only had a minimal attachment to the particular sound possession, emotional, disequilibrium, taboo, infringement or bewitchment hypotheses they advance and were ready to abandon it for some other in the same genre, which struck them as more plausible given the facts of the case. What they were not ready to do was to abandon it for no other hypothesis at all; to leave events to themselves. And what is more important, they adopt this nervous cognitive stance with respect to phenomena that had no immediate practical bearing on their own lives, or for that matter on any one's (ibid, 102).

Albeit the reservation that some of these dragomen have, in certain instances of anthropological enquiries, proven to be either aboriginal elements of the societies concern and are often willing to feed the ears of their inquisitive or intrusive foreigners with the right kind of (fantastic) information that could yield the maximum economic incentive, two main points from above quote—especially with regards to what constitutes a communal religious body and why such a body could serve as the foundation of nation—deserve immediate critical attention, namely the universal communal acceptance of an authentic scheme within which a phenomenon (e.g. universal existential phenomenon, etc.) is explored, interpreted or explained; and the unanimity of the genre within which the scheme is improved, adjusted/modified or otherwise abandoned depending on the lucidity or opacity of the phenomenon in question. It is at this analytical juncture that Geertz made explicit his transcendental view of culture. Religious symbolism, he argues, is often directed at some transcendental truth. What any religion affirms about the fundamental nature of reality may be obscure, shallow, or all too often, perverse; but it must, if it is not to consist of the mere collection of received practices and conventional sentiments we usually refer to as moralism, affirm some thing (Geertz, 1973, ch. 4: 89-95ff). Berger who has written extensively about religious worship thus asserts: ‘all [true] worship is a difficult attempt to reach out to the transcendence. It is this reaching out that must be symbolized, by whatever resources a particular tradition hand has at hand. The chosen form will certainly have a communal aspect. But the community itself is not the object of the exercise; at best it is subject (Berger, 1992: 96).<sup>22</sup>

Thus the quest for lucidity or transcendental truth about how things ought to be in such a complex and perplexing phenomenon such as the universal existence within a communally defined and idiosyncratically accorded social format not only lay the basis of an ethnic (or culturally defined) nation, but seem to confirm Geertz emphasis earlier that humanity well understands that for its own security it cannot do otherwise, but approach the phenomenon of life in an orderly manner. So, Geertz again:

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<sup>22</sup>Berger, P L., 1992. *A Far Glory: A Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity*. New York: Doubleday.

“[man] can adopt himself to any thing his imagination can cope with; but he cannot deal with chaos. Because his characteristic function and highest asset is conception his great fright is to meet some thing he cannot construe. ... Therefore our most important assets are always the symbols of our general orientation in nature, on earth in society and what we are doing: the symbols of our *Weltanschauung* and *Lebensanschauung*... Consequently in primitive society, a daily ritual incorporated in common activities, in eating, washing fire making, etc., as well as pure ceremonial; because the need for asserting the tribal moral and recognising its conditions are completely felt. In Christian Europe the Church brought man daily into their needs to enact if not to contemplate their assent to the ultimate concepts” (Geertz, 1973: 100)

Hence the central religious rituals (be it mass pilgrimage, a corroboree) are symbolic models (here in form of activity than words) of a particular sense of divine, a certain sort of devotional mood, which their continual re-enactment tends to produce in “attitudes,” “sentiments”, etc. with respect to how people conduct their daily life (Geertz, 1973: 206). In religion sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos—the tone, character, and quality of life, its moral and aesthetic style—and their world view—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive idea of order. In religion the belief and practice of a group’s ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adopted by the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the world view is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as peculiarly well arranged to accommodate such way of life (ibid., 90-95). The concrete symbols [involved]—one or another mythological figure materializing in the wilderness, the skull of a dead household hanging censoriously in the rafters, or disembodied ‘voice in the stillness’ soundlessly chanting enigmatic classical poetry—point in either direction: they both express the world climate and shape it, so Geertz (ibid., 95).

Finally, while religion on the one side anchors the power of symbolic resources for formulating analytical ideas in an authoritative conception of world shape of reality, so on the other side it anchors the power of our also symbolic resources for expressing emotions (moods, sentiments, passions, affections, feelings). For those able to embrace them, Geertz asserts, religious symbols provide cosmic guarantee not only for their ability to comprehend the world, but also to comprehending it, to give a precision to their feeling, a definition to their emotions which enable them, morosely or joyfully, grimly or cavalierly to endure it (Geertz, 1973: 104-105). Accordingly, religion in general tunes actions to an envisaged cosmic order and projects images of cosmic order onto the plain of human existence. Hence he defines religion as ‘(1) a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive,

long lasting moods (“reverential”, “solemn”, or “worshipful”) and motivations—that is, a persistent tendency, a chronic inclination to perform certain sorts of acts: fast in the wilderness, or conduct solitary raids on enemy camps and thrill at expectation of counter coup, and experience certain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of situations in man (Geertz, 1973: 96) (2) by formulating conceptions of general order of existence (3) and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality (4) that the moods and motivations (the two main dispositions induced by religious activity) seem uniquely realistic (5)’( *ibid.*, 90ff.). Not surprisingly, religion (albeit “true” and “politicized” ones) is such a potent culture good for the formation of trans-linguistic nations.

#### 2.1.2.2. Ideology as a culture system

It is the unity of ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ functions of culture as basic to the very nature of culture, as shown in the analysis above, that Hearn sees a close affinity between culture and ideology in terms of the prescriptive aspect of cultural symbols (Hearn 2006: 171). Without further ado it is thus obvious that ideologies, including politicized ones, are culturally determinable. In this sense, let’s briefly explore contemporary political ideologies for the purpose of re-integrating them in the original cultural fold.

As a matter of fact, in contemporary political discourse the most familiar terms often associated with the concept of ideology includes—conservatism, liberalism, communism, Fascism, Darwinism and so on. This political dimension of ideology has been rightly compressed by Andrew Heywood as follows:

“coming into existence in the nineteenth century, political ideologies are a kind of ‘world view’ made up of collection of doctrines, theories and principles which claim to interpret the present and offer a view of desired future. These more or less systematic sets of ideas provide the basis for some kind of organized social action; they may defend the existing social order, advocate its reform or improvement, or propose its revolutionary overthrow and replacement” (Heywood, 1994: 7-8<sup>23</sup>; Hearn 2006: 171).

As Heywood accurately remarks, such narrow political sense of ideology is, however, embedded within and linked to larger and more diffuse networks of ideas. In fact “ideology is often used in a much broader sense to characterized society wide patterns of thought, in ways

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<sup>23</sup> Heywood, A., 1994. *Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

that makes it indistinguishable from the concept of culture”(Wuthnow, 1987<sup>24</sup>; Hearn 2006: 171). It is Clifford Geertz who thus expounded further on the subject with the view to shedding light on the affinity between culture and ideology.

As with religion, he defines ideology as systemic symbols of interaction or patterned inter-workings of meanings incited by socio-psychological stresses. In other words, ideology is a system of interaction of symbols or patterns of inter-working meanings nourished or incited by socio-psychological stresses/strains. In order to elaborate on what he meant by socio-psychological strains in symbolic forms, Geertz departs from the concept of “extrinsic theory”, in which “thought consists of the construction and manipulation of symbolic systems which are employed models of other systems (physical, organic, social, psychological etc.); in such a way that the structure of this other systems (and in favourable case how they may therefore be expected to behave) is understood.”<sup>25</sup> Importantly, the concept of extrinsic theory is extendable to the effective side of human mentality as well (Geertz, 1973: 216):

Imaginal thinking is neither more or less than constructing an image of the environment running the model faster than the environment, and predicting that the environment will behave as the model does...The first step in the solution of a problem consist in the construction of a model or image of the “relevant feature” of the [environment]. These models can be constructed from many things, including part of the organic tissue of the body and, by man, paper and pencil or actual artefacts. Once a model has been constructed it can be manipulated under various hypothetical conditions and constraints. The organism is then able to observe outcome of those manipulations and project them into the environment so a prediction is possible (Geertz, 1973: 78)

It is this point that reflective thought consists of matching of states and processes of symbolic models against the state and the wider world, that it is stimulus ‘deficit’ which stimulates mental activity and stimulus discovery which terminates it.<sup>26</sup> Motivational problems begin in puzzlement and ends either in the abandonment of the enquiry or the resolution of the puzzlement: “The function of reflective thought is to transform a situation in which there is an obscurity of some sort into a situation that is clear, coherently, settled and harmonious.”<sup>27</sup> In all, Geertz assert that human intellection in a specific sense of directive reasoning depends upon the manipulation of certain kinds of cultural resources (e.g. cognitive or expressive symbols or symbol systems) in such a manner as to produce (discover, select) environmental

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<sup>24</sup> Wuthnow, R., 1987. *Meaning and Moral Order: Exploration in Cultural Analysis*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

<sup>25</sup> E. Galanter and M. Gerstenhaber, 1956. On Thought: Extrinsic Theory. *Psychol. Review* 63, 218-227.

<sup>26</sup> J. A. Deutsch, 1953. “A New Type of Behaviour.” *British Journal of Psychology* 44, 304-317.

<sup>27</sup> J. Dewey, 1939. “*Intelligence and the Modern World.*” In: J. Ratner, ed. New York, 851.

stimuli needed—for whatever purpose—by the organism; it is a [constant] search for information. And this search is more pressing because of the high degree of generality of the information intrinsically available to the organism from genetic sources (1973: 79 ff). Hence cultural patterns (e.g. religious, ideological, philosophical, aesthetic etc.) are so crucial to human existence. For Geertz, it is through the construction of ideologies and schematic social order that humankind makes her/himself for better or worse a political animal (ibid, 200 ff). In the general sense of political nationalism or nationalist ideologies, ‘one essentially observes a...continuum from cultural to ideological conception of the governing patterns of symbols and ideas at play’ (Hearn, 2006: 171), “given that nationalism has in the narrow sense of political ideology promiscuously combined with other such ideologies as fascism, liberalism, democracy and so on.”<sup>28</sup> But does this not merely imply that nationalism from its inception was indeed culturally inclined.

### 2.1.3. Is there a pre-political cultural nationalism?

In his path-breaking Article<sup>29</sup> concerning the issue of European cultural nationalism—as distinct from political nationalism with its state-centred objectives—Joep Leerssen tends to share this idea about the precedence of cultural nationalism. He hilariously points to ‘the oddness of phrases such as “cultural liberalism” or “cultural socialism”, and the sheer soundness of a phrase such as “cultural nationalism.” This is precisely so because the very concept at the heart of nationalism, that of nation, refers to an aggregate of people whose “peculiar character” is at least in part constituted by cultural factors such as language or historical awareness, he remarks. Further, he remarks that nationalist often advance the right to national self-determination, cultural survival, cultural self-expression, as a self-evident and ethically autonomous principle, alongside (not derived from) equality, justice and political stability. In this sense nationalism sees the state as a means to an end: “the state should embody its constituent nationality, and derives its right to exist in part from that function” (Leerssen, 2006: 560).

Leerssen’s argument seeks to substantiate Miroslav Hroch’s early work (1968, 1996<sup>30</sup>) on [sub] national movements across Europe, especially with regards to Czech’s “national revival” [from a pan-European national perspective]. Hroch’s work focuses primarily on the

<sup>28</sup> Benner, E., 2001. “Is There a Core National Doctrine?” *Nations and Nationalism*, 7 (2), 155-74.

<sup>29</sup> Published in *Nations and Nationalism* 12 (4), 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Hroch, Miroslav, 1968. *Die Vorkaempfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den Kleinen Voelker Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der Patriotischen Gruppen*. Praha: Universita Karlova; Hroch, Miroslav, 1996. *In the National Interest*. Prague: Charles University; Hroch, M. In: John A. Hall, ed. 1998. Ernest Gellner, *The State of the Nation*. Cambridge: CUP, 91-104.

cultural consciousness raising aspect of such national movements. Here the author devises a three phase model of nationalist activities, with the main idea of the model being that: “cultural preoccupations do not positively ‘reflect’ or ‘follow’ social developments or political movements, but rather tend to anticipate them” (Leerssen, 2006: 562). As Leerssen rightly observes, ‘the cultural pre-occupation of what Hroch terms “Phase A” nationalism makes the nation thinkable as a focus of political loyalty; while, the social demands of “phase B” nationalism, and the separatist activism of “Phase C”, follow and indeed seem to presuppose a cultural consciousness raising.’ By and large, Hroch’s model has demonstrated, fundamentally, that separatist movements often begin in the study, that the schoolmasters and poets who collect proverbs and folktales are unwitting avant-garde for social and political activists, and that, while the precise nature of phase A-, or B-, or C-nationalism may differ from country to country, cultural preoccupations stand at the beginning of the alphabet. Thus in placing cultural consciousness-raising at the vanguard of developing nationalist/separatist movements, Hroch singles out of the specificity nationalism among other ideologies. Nationalism stands out of other ideologies in that it formulates a political agenda on the basis of a cultural ideal; following Hroch we may point out that in its historical gestation, too, nationalism is always, in its incipience at least, cultural nationalism (ibid, 562).

#### 2.1.3.1. Nationalism and culture and its cultivation

The idea that political activities (or ideologies) are often fuelled by pre-established cultural norms inevitably begs the conclusion that Europe’s cultural activism antedates European national states divisive political activities. Hence, in the following analysis Leerssen prime interest is in pan-European cultural activities that originally transcended state-nation’s frontiers to encompass—what could be termed—a European national consciousness-raising movement, whose primary focus was with traditions, patterns and practices of popular (demotic) European culture. This is particularly true of the works of cultural nationalist activists such as Sir Walter (creative writer and historian); Jacob Grimm (lexicographer, grammarian, legal historian, folktale collector, editor of old literary texts); or archivists such as Leibniz and Muratori, who worked in a shared institutional and social framework and intellectual template, mainly *philological* (—as originally enunciated by Giambattista Vico in his *La Scienza Nova* of 1724, which draws largely on scholarly investigation of man-made certainties (or truths) and world-views, as articulated through language, poetry, mythology, history, law and institutions: For Vico these were originally a single undifferentiated whole

from which primeval poets, law makers, historians, and priests articulated their universal definition of a nation's culture and world-view) (Leerssen, 2006: 567ff.). For Leerssen such European centred [or national] cultural activities based mainly on letters and learning (or cultural exchange) precedes political nationalism in that it was only on the basis of "cultural-consciousness-raising-movement" that political activism could raise territorial claims on the 'local' of those traditions and practices, thereby unleashing competing and conflicting geographical demands in (once) mixed regions (e.g. Romanic vs. Germanic; or Greek-Albanian, -Macedonian frontiers etc.).

But even after the successful demarcation of political frontiers the outgoing separatist state-nation relied to a greater extent on the compactness of the original culture—hence nationalist scholars, creative and political propagandists were concerned with language, folktales, history, myths and legends, proverbs, ancient tribal/legal antiquity, mythology, antique heirdoms and so on. These, as Leerssen observes, then undergo, at a specific historical juncture, crucial transformation: they are lifted from their context of origin by a professionalizing philological intelligentsia and recontextualized and instrumentalized for modern needs and values; they are studied as organic growth processes and data for the historical track-record of the nation in a prevailing intellectual climate of historicism...; and as a result are invested with a fresh national symbolism and status (ibid, 568). Otherwise, the territorial indistinctiveness of cultural nationalism means that all European national states can be immediately juxtaposed, compared, and brought together into [mutual] neighbourly contact, so Leerssen (2006, 565-66).

Naturally, Leerssen's systematization of "culture and its cultivation" departs primarily from a collected data<sup>31</sup>—on activities termed "cultural" in the critical literature—on early European cultural nationalism. These include a variety of practices and endeavours, e.g. the compilation of dictionaries, and grammars, the erection of commemorative monuments, the establishment of news papers and university chairs, the edition of ancient documents (legal, historical or literary), the writing of historical novels or patriotic verse, the composition of national music, the opening of museums and reading rooms et cetera. The first line of systematization involves the cultural field in question; and four of these seem to cover most of the data in a meaningfully differentiated way (ibid, 569ff.):

**a)** Foremost among these four is clearly that of language. From Herder to the generation of Humboldts, Schlegels and Grimms, language came to be seen as the essential soul of nation's identity and position in the world. Or put it rather more radically a bridge between a given

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<sup>31</sup> [www.hu-m.uva.nl/philology](http://www.hu-m.uva.nl/philology).

nation and the sacred. An extra-ordinary number of cultural nationalist initiatives are concerned with language: from grammar writing to purism, from language revivalism to language planning.

**b)** Closely attendant on this is language twin sister in the mindset of emerging *philology*: the discursive realm of literature and learning. One thinks primarily of novels, theatre and verse, but this should not exclude the more referential genres of disquisition such as antiquarianism and cultural criticism. A critical important genre is history writing, which in romantic decades immediately preceding its professionalization begins to focus on the nation at large as its main protagonist.

**c)** Outside the field of language and discourse we can identify a category of “material culture”: artefacts such as painting, sculptures antiquities, monuments, architecture; symbols such as flags and heraldry; public buildings.

**d)** Finally, that leaves the performance of “immaterial culture”: cultural practices, involving folkdances, past times and sports, manners and customs (and least but not last) music.

On the whole, while Leerssen acknowledges some overlaps between these fields, he attests however, that the division along the lines suggested here provides a workable sorting grid for further comparative analysis.

His second line of systematization concerns the “cultivation of culture.” Here specific reference is made to the agenda on the part of nationalist actors and activists, and their intended instrumentalisation of the national culture. The data suggest a division into some three types of endeavour, which might be called salvage, fresh productivity, and propagandist proclamation respectively (ibid, 570ff.).

The first of these (possibly the earliest in time, with an appreciable pro-romantic run-up in the eighteenth century) is content with mere inventorization (of language, discourse, artefacts or practices, as per the first four fields listed above). Cultural studies in Romantic period often follows a salvage paradigm; particularly so if the cultural topic is of an informal, popular and vernacular provenance. It is part of a romantic mindset to celebrate specimens of ancient tradition as “the last of their kind,” final remaining samples of a vanishing, almost vanished inheritance. Manuscripts are seen as the surviving vestiges of a pre-Gutenberg world eroded by disposal and lost; oral poetry is stereotypically snatched from the lips of aging folk with one foot in the grave; folktales and folk music are invariably part of lifestyle swept away by modernization. (Ironically, this modernization process is feared as a threatening, eroding force by the very scholars whose work it enables and facilitates.) A similar salvaging impulse,



reaching out to a receding antiquity from a modernizing vantage point, concerns ancient buildings, monuments, historical sites or historically invested landscapes; or superstitions, past-times and performative traditions. The link between the emergence of folklore and of nationalism is well established. In sum, a primal urge in the cultivation of cultures is that of *inventory* and *salvage*.

A second type of activity involves fresh cultural *productivity*: contemporary initiatives emerge, inspired historicist inventories and remembrances. Linguist no longer just inventorize language by means of dictionaries and grammar, they argue about orthography, standardization, the status of dialects versus central norm. Often the ambitions of a vernacular language to literary prestige are signalled by initiatives to translate the Bible (or other world classics). We see the uniting of a patriotic or historical verse, or narrative or drama; the emergence of a new type of national history-writing, taking “the nation” for its collective protagonist rather than the deeds of the Monarchs and generals. Literary criticism and literary history-writing formulate a canon and an agenda for a literature now understood as a national pursuit... In the field of material culture we encounter the establishment of national museums and restoration of ancient buildings. In the music culture, there is the rise of schools of “national composition”—which, tellingly, means two things: (a) nationally distinctive, in that it makes the nation stand out amidst others, and (b) drawing for that purpose on the idiom of demotic, non classical musical traditions (folk music and folk dances). The life-style of the peasantry inspires the genre of rustic—‘realist’ narrative, full of local and folkloric colour, which takes over after the romantic historical novel has played itself out. Traditional sports and pastimes, or even traditional dress, may be revived or cultivated by clubs and associations.

Thirdly, the national culture thus salvaged and perpetuated may be used for propagandist proclamations: drawn upon to suffuse the public sphere with a sense of collective national identity. The vernacular (national) language is thought, or used in, or spread by means of education. National history becomes a school subject, as does the nation’s literature. Peasants, ceremonies, historical monuments and pantheon claim the nation rootedness and presence. “Historicist” architecture (neo Gothic or otherwise) is used; newly-built streets are given dedicated names taken from the nation’s past. Festivals, awards and other public manifestations are held involving linguistic, literary, historical or folkloristic agendas.

This gives a differentiated idea of how nationalism can position various aspects of culture, and aspects of cultivation. If we juxtapose these two dimensions “culture and cultivation” into a matrix the “cultivation of culture” takes on the shape in Table 1:

**Table 1.** *'Culture' and its 'cultivation' arrayed in a matrix*

	TYPES OF CULTIVATION		
	salvage	productivity	propagation
<b>CULTURAL FIELD</b>	language description	Language maintenance	language activism, language planning
<b>discourse</b>	text editions	translations, literature, history-writing, criticism	education, festivals, commemorations
<b>material culture</b>	archeography	monument protection, musealisation, architecture	dedicatory investment of public space
<b>practices performed</b>	Folklore studies	folklore revival, national music, rustic literature	folk pageantry

To properly accommodate this model to the available data, two other categories have been identified. These are not specific to any given pursuit/field set out here, but rather function as a facilitating framework to all of them. One is the social ambience (the public organization of cultural pursuits), and the other institutional infrastructure created by modern state. One is “bottom-up”, generated by an urban sociability most strongly represented among the professionals and middle classes, involving the establishment of associations, city academies, book rooms, reading societies and clubs, and the establishment of news papers and periodicals. The other is “top-down”: initiated, funded and/or overseen by the authorities, involving the establishment and management of state-controlled institutions such as archives, libraries, universities or university institutes, national academies, museums or galleries; or else government sponsored surveys of the national culture or of documentary sources of a nation’s history (Leerssen, 2006: 571-572).

Once these two institutional/social frameworks are factored in, the resulting matrix is shown in Table 2.

**Table 2.** A matrix coordinating aspects of the cultivation of culture in nationalism

	1: SALVAGE, RETRIEVAL INVENTORY	2: FRESH CULTURAL PRODUCT- IVITY	3:PROGATION PROCLAMATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
LANGUAGE	dictionaries, grammar   L1	orthography debates, standardization/dialectic debates, language purism   L2	language activism language planning language education   L3
DISCOURSE	edition of older -literary texts -historical documents -legal sources  D1	translations/adaptations(Bible, classics), national/historical drama, novel, poetry, national history-writing, literary history, criticism  D2	history education historical pageants, commemorations, events/festivals/awards  D3
ARTEFACTS, MATERIAL CULTURE	archeography monumental remains symbolically invested sites  A1	monuments protection policy historicist architecture, design restorations, museums  A2	monuments, dedication of public spaces  A3
PRACTICES, PERFORMATIVE CULTURE	editions of oral literature, proverbs, superstitions, pastimes, folklore manners and customs, folkdances/music  P1	rustic-realist literature, traditional sports/pastimes revived, national music composed  P2	revived or invented traditions, events/festivals/awards (folklore, sports, music)  P3
SOCIAL AMBIENCE	associations, congresses, academies; publishing ventures, reading societies, book clubs, periodicals		
INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE	universities/chairs, libraries, archives, state museums, state academies, government agencies		

From the foregoing, Leerssen thus assert that cultural nationalism, at least in European context, is an international movement and not just the cultural fallout of separate political-nationalist movements. It is as international a movement as Romanticism, with ideas and initiatives from one country picked up, imitated or applied elsewhere in a swirl of cross-border intellectual traffic. For example, the nineteenth century revival of the medieval *jeux floraux* festivals spread from Toulouse and Occitanian France, first to Barcelona and Catalonia, and then to Galicia; they inspired each other, and tapped into a shared remembrance of the great days of courtly poetry in Romance languages before the hegemony of Castilian and the Langue d’Oil (Leerssen, 2006: 563-73). The actors who carried it were concerned, not just with a single nationality or cultural tradition to the exclusion of others, but with a philology and taxonomy of Europe’s diversified cultural landscape, involving a

reassessment and revalorization of the various individual, vernacular cultures. In the process, however, they bequeathed to their political fellow-travellers a discourse, rhetoric and mental template concerning their nations' roots, specificity and autonomous cultural status.

The cultivation of culture configures and articulates cultural traditions in the diverse European landscape as 'national'; it transmutes them from informal vernacular/demotic practices to discrete elements in structural systematics of a European continent considered as a set of nations. In this respect, cultural nationalism is a central, fundamental and persistent aspect of nationalism across Europe throughout the last two centuries. It pursues concerns of its own, which should not be seen merely as a side issue in the margin of political nationalism. While its chronological development is connected with known factors of nation-building and state formation—such as the rise of middle-class sociability, the spread of literacy, the penetration of mass print and the centralized organization of universities, libraries and institutions of learning—it also follows a chronology and dynamics of its own, influenced by intellectual factors such as the rise of philology and of literary historicism.

What is more, cultural nationalism is territorially much more free-floating (in that the upholders of this consciousness were more European centric) as opposed to social movements and their political demands (Leerssen, 2006: 573).

#### 2.1.3.2. Europe's re-embrace of cultural unity an indictment of political nationalism

Europe's eventual [even if reluctant] re-embrace of homogenizing culture after its prolonged and destructive wars of demarcated frontiers instigated by political nationalism seems to confirm Leerssen's argument that deep beneath the political mantle Europeans are, after-all, of the same culture origin. Indeed, while the socio-cultural and political trend of the post-war and post-communist Europe is insufficient to speak of a culture unity among the Europeans, especially with regard to the (pockets) of political tensions in south and south east of Europe, but, as noted earlier, there is good reason now to argue that the ideological pendulum of today's Europe has tilted significantly in favour socio-cultural (re)integration inasmuch as the rejection of violent conflicts is concerned.

It is in such an ideological *volte face* of events that one could make sense of Geertz's argument that 'ideologies or the various sorts of cultural symbolic systems...most crucially come into play where the particular kind of information they contain is lacking, where the institutional guides for behaviour, thought, feeling or sentiments are weak or absent. It is when neither a society's most general cultural orientation nor its most down-to-earth pragmatic ones suffice

any longer to provide an adequate image of political process that ideologies begin to become crucial source of socio-psychological meaning and attitudes.’ “The function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concept that render meaningful, the suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped (Geertz, 1973: 218 ff.). As he puts it, the French revolution would not have been the incubator of extremist ideologies—both progressive and reactionary—had the central organizing principle of the political life then, the divine rights of kings, not destroyed” (ibid, 220). From this analytical perspective it suffices thus to conclude that Europe reluctant [but certain] re-embrace of the culture of unity today is itself a serious indictment for political nationalism with its central concern of economically induced divisive political entities.

### 2.1.3.3. Is the nationalist ideal a nomenclature for cyclical development?

Geertz argument that pre-modern and modern political ideologies would have been unthinkable had their culture antecedents not been overwhelmed by socio-political, -psychological and historical circumstances; and Europe’s apparent embrace of homogenizing culture in terms of its identity process after World War II automatically impel such reasonable question as to whether the nationalist ideal is not after all a nomenclature for cyclical development—that is, a social development that pays genuine tribute to its authentic culture heritage? In the unique case of the European nation the re-embrace of its original culture from the Graeco-European social history.

The urge for the maintenance of idiosyncratic aesthetic dimension of a people’s culture is symptomatic of Heidegger’s insistence for an original repetition of the mythical origin of European national (occidental) history (in his *Parmenides* lectures on the History of Being: “Being and Word”; “Being and Ratio”; “Being and Time” in winter 1942-3). For Heidegger the Greek origin of European (Western) history remains incomparable—or in the words of Dostovsky ‘*lux de oriente*’, that is, the harbinger of authentic community beyond alienation—because it constitutes the original Being, the birth of the presence (Nancy) which manifest the mystery of creation, the mystery of origin (Roberts 1999: 28-33). Important here is that the Greek origin departs from a divine aesthetic creative genius (nature), that is, the *Ursprung* (the first creative leap of God/gods). Hence origin—the encounter between Being and History—signifies for Heidegger the totality given form: the *Gestalt* of work of art. As Roberts point out, art for Heidegger is the archetype of truth because it constitutes the origin of history, the original *Dasein* of a people. In other words, Heidegger comprehends art,

especially the mythical art of a community, in relation to the people—that is, a national community united by a language: a language that inevitably bears testimony to the mythical consciousness of the original divine work of art (1999: 19-34). As Heidegger asserts, history does not develop from the inconspicuous beginning. On the contrary all greatness of historical knowledge lies in the understanding of the history of beginning and that the knowledge of the original history (*Urgeschichte*) is the province not of science but mythology (Heidegger 1983: 164-5).

In the Greek beginning “Being” reveals itself in the Mytho-poetic word, which would later be transformed by Plato and Aristoteles into *Logos* thereby inaugurating the history of metaphysics, in which *logos* became *ratio*. With this history is announced Being (Nature) and Time: time points to the more original origin, that is, the origin of the Greek origin. As a primordial ground for the World time announces the more original beginning, destined for occident, the event and advent (*Ereignis*) which can [only] occur in occidental people of poets and thinkers. The German people thus incorporate the site of the history of Europe (or the West), which holds concealed a world fate (Roberts, 1999: 34).

Interestingly, Heidegger had envisaged earlier in his *Hölderlin's* lectures (1934-5) an essential opposition in the European people that would eventually lead to the transmutation of the Greek historical beginning into nature by the Germans in order to give birth to a new beginning. “Greek achieved its identity through the Apollonian mastering of the Dionysian: Germany, the west, will attain its identity when its occidental Apollonian endowment of order and organization is infused with Dionysian power, when, as Heidegger puts it, it is seized by Being. To formulate it another way, if the Greek mission was to transform nature into history, the German mission is to transform history—the exhausted history of the first beginning—back into nature in order to inaugurate the new beginning” (Heidegger, 1980: 290-292; Roberts, 1999: 19-34). And such a mythical re-foundation of history in nature, in the abyss of the native earth, will be one with Germany’s nativity. Germany will give birth to the coming god, Dionysus, and the coming god, the seizure of [Being], will give birth to Germany. Heidegger thus situates himself in the hour of Germany’s destiny, the great time of the world-historical turning of the Occident, in the tradition of the ‘new mythology’, which reaches from the French Revolution to German Revolution, and in which Germany’s birth, identity and mission are conceptualized in terms of a two fold struggle with antiquity and modernity (ibid). ‘Out of this twofold struggle between Greek nature and art and modern history springs the quest for the aesthetic state’ (Chytry, 1989): the coming god of the new mythology is also the god of the aesthetic state, the total work of art (*Gesamtkunstwerk*) which will redeem

modernity though the union of nature and history (Roberts, 1999). As Roberts thus sums up, ‘at each stage of Franco-German history (of Europe) between 1789 and 1933 the coming birth of Germany is announced (ibid, 27).

Of course, the aesthetic state direct role in the cataclysmic events of both World Wars (WWI and II), and the obvious [even if reluctant] re-embrace of homogeneous culture in Europe today, after the *zahlreiche* separatist pro-polis (or state centric) European wars, seems to suggest that that nostalgic longing for authenticity... is as lively as ever among the European populace. In this sense, Heidegger was indeed right to assert that “the great times of the turning of a people comes from the abyss [*Abgründe*] and a degree that a people reach down into it, that is the earth and possess home” (ibid, 19-34).

If the nostalgic longing for authenticity in a community’s historical advances towards the transcendental truth simply imbues some sense of cyclical development..., especially in terms of its *umgang* [procession] with national culture of a mythical provenance, let’s expand further on Heidegger’s concept of “electability”—that is, his notion that the “event” and “advent” (*Ereignis*) of World destiny can only occur in the “occidental people” of poets and thinkers—of the European populace (with a divine mission) in order to bring to close our interpretation of primordialist understanding of the national phenomenon. But is Heidegger alone in that traditional nationalist perception of an elected type in a people—that is, a people chosen, in the words of Charles Blattberg, ‘to receive the gifts of aesthetic aspiration’<sup>32</sup>—with a sacred language of mythical origin that must be maintained [at all cost] in their quest for transcendental truth (or lucidity)?

Indeed not. In fact, the appropriate place to begin, in terms of seeking to understand Heidegger’s concept of divine election of the Graeco-European national artisans is with the literary document of Genesis I. Eric Voegelin, who has extensively researched on people’s historical advances in the quest for lucidity (in what he basically terms the “community of Being” or “It-reality”—that is, the mysterious consciousness of the complex whole of God and the World, man and society), is credible referenced for the discourse of the Genesis I. Essentially, Voegelin analysis generally confirms the argument made earlier that even modern political ideas evolved out of pre-established culture norms of early societies with transcendental ambitions. Voegelin began his investigation by placing the literary work of the Genesis in the historical context of the Middle Sixth and Fifth centuries B.C., that is, the post-exilic history of the Jews people. Hence he acknowledges the importance of external culture

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<sup>32</sup> Charles, Blattberg, 2006. “Secular Nationhood? The Importance of Language in the Life of Nations.” *Nations and Nationalism* 12 (4), 597-612.

influences (Egyptian, Babylonian et cetera) on the conscience of those who authored the Genesis. As a literary document, Voegelin observes, that the Genesis I opens the story of mankind from its beginning in creation, through the history of the patriarchs, of captivity and exodus, of Philistine (later Palestine) settlement, of Davidic-Solomonic Empire, of kingdoms and their catastrophe, of exile and return, down to Deutero-Isaiahic dream of a world Israel, under the guidance of God's covenant with man. Thus through Israel the history of man continues the creational process of order in reality—as part of the comprehending story [of the mysterious] It; and the point at which arrives in the event of the Genesis derives its significance from the revelation of the truth the epiphany structure in reality culminates in the attunement of human history to the command of pneumatic word (Voegelin, 2000: 38ff).

Voegelin then proceeds to discern the creative genius of the pneumatic word. “In the beginning, so said the book of Genesis I, God created the Heaven and Earth.” “God said, let there be light and there was light.” As Voegelin finds out, the spoken word, it appears, is more than a mere sign signifying something; it is a power in reality that evokes structures in reality by naming them. This magic power of the [commanding] word can be discerned even more clearly in Genesis I: 5: “God called the Light: Day! And the darkness he called: Night! And there became evening and morning: a Day” (ibid, 33-34).

In a situation created by the question what is the kind of reality where the spoken word evokes the structures of which it speaks? They, the authors the Genesis document, had to find the language symbols that would adequately express the experience and the structure of the mysterious It-reality. The answer to this question is found in Genesis I: 2: “The Earth was waste and void; darkness on the face of the deep; and the spirit [breath] of God was moving over the face of water.”

As Voegelin observes, over an emptiness over the formless waste of something there moves, perhaps like a storm, the breath or spirit, the *rauch* of God, or rather a plural divinity, *elohim*. Here the It-reality is symbolized as a strong movement of spiritual consciousness imposing form on a formless and non-conforming countermovement, as a tension between a pneumatic, formative force (*rauch*, in later Greek translation *pneuma*) and at least passively resistant counter-force. Moreover, the tension in the ‘It’ is definitely not a human consciousness in its struggle with reality for its truth; it is recognize as a non-human process, to be symbolized as divine; and yet it has to convey an aura of analogy with human process because man experiences his own acts, such as the quest for truth, as acts of participation in the process of It—that is, in the mysterious It-reality that encompasses the consciousness of divinity and that of mankind (ibid, 34ff).



Of particular importance about Voegelin's incisive analysis of the literary work of Genesis I is the assertion that: 'by the differentiation of the pneumatic struggle as the beginning of the mysterious epiphany of all structure of reality, the authors of the Genesis document reveals the presence of its consciousness in the compact language of early mythospeculations on the Beginning, such as in various cosmogenies, anthrogenies, and theogenies. Hence he urges us to consider the Genesis document as one of the great literary documents in the historical process of advance from compact to differentiated consciousness and the corresponding advance from compact to differentiated language. In this view, if we lose this understanding, we lose the larger historical horizon of the differentiated advances, as for instance the equivalence between the symbolization of the Beginning in Genesis and its symbolization as the imposing of form on a formless *chora* in Plato's *Timaeus*. And if this larger historical horizon of advances is lost, we lose the possibility of recognizing the pneumatic differentiation of Genesis the compact presence of noetic structure of consciousness, the presence of the compact consciousness reality-language' (ibid, 37).

To the question what do the story and the truth mean in terms of experience and symbolization? Voegelin referred to 'the event of the quest as being part of a story told by 'It' (the first Creator), and yet a story to be told by a human questioner, s/he wants to articulate the consciousness of his quest as an act of participation in the comprehending story. The story thus emerges as the symbolism that will express the awareness of the divine-human movement and countermovement in the quest for truth. As Voegelin aptly points out, the great quest for truth in which the consciousness metaleptic story becomes differentiated—be they the priestly quest of Genesis with the prophetic quest in background, or the Judaeo-Christian quest, or the Zoroastrian, the Hinduist and Buddhist, the Confucian and Taoist quest, or finally the noetic quest of the Hellenic philosophers—do not occur in a vacuum. They occur in social fields, constituted by older experiences of order and symbolization of their truth, experienced by the questioner to have fallen into disorder and decline. The quest of truth is a movement of resistance to the prevalent disorder; it is an effort to attune the concretely disordered existence again to the truth of the It-reality, an attempt to create a new social field of existential order in competition with fields whose claim to truth has become doubtful... For the quest, if successful, imposes on the fields the previously not existent characteristics of falsehood or lie; this imposition will provoke movements of resistance from the adherents to the older, more compact truth, as well as from the discoveries of varieties alternatives to both the older and the new truth; it will furthermore meet with the social obstacles of spiritual

dullness and indifference; and it will encounter movements of scepticism aroused by the new plurality of varieties. The quest, thus, is not only its own beginning' (ibid, 38-41).

Interestingly, Voegelin informative analysis not only confirm nationalist activities in traditional resistance, but also seems to want us believe that the human questioner, of the divine story being told, does not always question the object of her/his own consciousness, but only that of (pre-established social) orders—as would... the authority behind the authorship of Genesis I document to the *Manfour* ideology of the Hiku-Ptahian culture institutions of Cham/Kem or, in Graeco-European context, the Memphetic philosophy of Aegyptos/Ancient Egypt in its artful composition of God's invention of the story of Joseph and his brothers in ancient Egypt (northern Azania). If we are to agree with Voegelin that the human (outsider) questioner, whose own [dubious] quest for the It-reality often sets her/himself... against the original social order of national communities, then, it suffices to summarize that without the compact consciousness of the mythical beginning of a people's national culture and/or history (e.g. Azanians, Graeco-Europeans, et cetera), the entwined dialectic of *mythopoesy*<sup>33</sup> would never have come to fruition, let alone Plato's philosophical discourse of mythical caves of

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<sup>33</sup> In den glänzenden Kapiteln des ersten Bandes seiner *Paideia*, die der Tragödie der Aischylos bis Euripides gewidmet sind, nennt Werner Jaeger, "die jährlichen dionysischen Festspiele das Ideale Nationale theatre, wie es seither wieder erstrebt und nie wieder verwirklicht worden ist" (Jaeger, 1954 Bd. 1. Berlin, s.319); vgl. Gregor Sebba, Peter Weber-Schaefer (Hrsg), 1969. *Das Politische Leben der Griechen*. Muenchen, ch.2, s.25). Wie Sebba weiterhin bekanntgabe, diesem nationalen theater wurde als Fest an dem sich das Volk an kleinen, grossen und grössten Schoeffungen der dichterischen Vorstellungskraft zu einem neuen Selbstverstaendnis und Selbstbewusstsein heranbilden konnte betractet. Die Tragödie des Aischylos und des Sophokles ist fuer Jaeger eine geistige Verkörperung des neuen Menschentums das in diesen athenischen fuenften Jhrdt erwuchs; eine Verkoeperung auch der erzieherischen Kraft, die die Dichtung damals in hoechsten mass besass. Sie war der hoechste Ausdruck eines Bewusstsein, dem Kunst, Religion und philosophie noch unloesbar eins waren. Die Macht der Tragödie wurde von den Zeitgenossen sogar als so gross empfunden, dass sie den Tragikern die hoechste Verantwortung fuer das Wohl der Polis zuschrieben—jene Verantwortung, die spaeter Platon und Aristoteles dem an der Philosophie geschulten und von ihr geformten staatsmann zu messen (ibid, 25). Werner Jaeger verweist auf der Tatsache, dass eben in der Zeit vor Aischylos in 6 Jhrdt. vor Christus, der Mythen aufgehört hatte, Traeger grossen idean zu sein (Jaeger, W., *Paideia*, Bd.1, s.307ff [ über Aischylos]; s. 187[über Solon]; und s. 206ff[über Jonische philosophische Speculation]; vgl. hierzu kapitel von Sebba, in Peter Weber-Schaefer (Hrsg), 1969:30ff). Zugleich begann die sich entwickelnde Philosophie und Erzählprosa Jonians der geistigen Aufgaben der Dichtung zu übernehmen, den sie konnte in rein intellektueller Sprach sagen, was bisher in der Bildsprach des Mythos zum ausdrück gekommen war. Aber mit dem Niedergang dem Unglaublichwerden der Mythen war auch ihre dichterische Form, die epische Erzählung veraltet, sie war die Darstellung der erregenden, noch gar nicht klar erkannten neuen Einsichten und fragen nicht gewachsen. Da schritt nun Aischylos zur überraschenden Tat. Er macht der Tragödie, die noch mehr als halb epische war, zum Drama; den Stoff an dem die neue Wahrheit zu zeigen war, fand er da, wo man am wenigsten erwarten würde: im alten Mythos. In diese zur blassenden Legende oder poetischen Erfindung (wenn nicht gar zum Aberglauben) Geschichten goss er das Lebensblut oder heldenhaften Haltung des Athens der Perserkriege und gabe ihnen dadurch neuen, bisher ungeahnten Sinn. So entsprang die unerwartete wiedergeburt des Mythos jener neuen Auffassung von Mensch und Welt, die Solon den Athenern gegeben hatte. Aischylos hob sie zur höchsten ethischen, religiösen und politischen Höhe. Seine Tragödie gabe Antwort auf die drängenden neuen Fragen über dem Sinn des Lebens, über das rechte Handeln, über das Wesen der neuen politischen Gemeinschaft. Der erhobene Stil entsprach der Gröss der Aufgabe. So bestimmt Jaeger der Tragödie des Aischylos als politische Dichtung, die eben aus ihrer politischen Wesenheit der erzieherischen Kraft bezieht, denn in der allumfassenden Polis sind Ethik, Religion, und das ganze menschliche nur Aspekte einer grossen Einheit (Peter Weber-Schaefer (Hrsg), 1969: 30)

human “ascension” to lucidity as in Plato’s *Republic*. But are we not merely affirming Geertz previous argument, that without competing (and, in most cases, destructive) social forces of external provenance—as exemplified earlier by the political situation in the new states—the ethno-cultural communities of compact consciousness... are indeed the authentic candidates for nationhood? (Geertz, 1973: 260)

Even some of those who emphasize on agency to assert the origins of nations and nationalism, Isaiah Berlin for one, seems to concede to the idea of culturally rooted nations and/or nationalism as distinct from and antecedent to nation-states. As Berlin also admits, “modern [political] nationalism arose in response to patronizing or disparaging attitudes towards the traditional values of society, the result of a wounded pride and sense of humiliation in its most socially conscious members, which in due course produce anger and self assertion. In other words, given the insecurities felt by certain elites in a newly modern context, they are said to react in a very way that psychologically or sociologically speaking, meets the challenges posed.” (Berlin, 1979:346<sup>34</sup>; Blattberg, 2006:598) This is almost like stating that the key proponents of Germany’s Third Reich made sense of the harsh and unnecessary conditions of the Versailles Peace—some would say War Declaration—Treaty by exploiting the sympathy of German nationalists for their ambitious economic project of *mehrraum* (geographical space) in the hay days of political nationalism. Or the current abuse of confucianism or Chinese nationalism by the current CPP leadership to legitimate its [communo-capitalist] economic agenda of contemporary China—even though its policies since the early 1950s have so far proven more destructive to indigenous Chinese culture than had any external political force. In this respect, the main issue should not be whether the original national Art was/is faked or distorted for sheer rational ends; or whether the rice seed being currently watered to feed the growing Chinese population, amidst the deliberate destruction of China’s agricultural landscape for infrastructural developments, is genetically modified, but instead whether the original seed could indeed be said to have been free from synthetic additives. If this is confirmed, then, Geertz incisive analysis of the primordial aspect of nationness and/or nationalism must be considered among the consistent and lucid contributions to the ongoing debate about the origin of the national phenomenon—even if his original intension was merely to highlight the inherent tensions between traditional and modern forces in the “terminal communities” of modern politics.

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<sup>34</sup>Berlin, I., 1979. ‘Nationalism: past neglect and present power.’ In H. Hardy, ed. *Against the Current: Essays on the History of Ideas*. London: Hogarth Press, 333–355.

#### 2.1.4. Ethno-Symbolists Perspective

Evidently, the apparent tensions in modern polities between traditionalist and forces of modernization is crucial to understanding the prevailing ambivalence—that is, the apparent fracture, namely “ethnic/cultural” and “civic/political” variants (or the primordialist versus modernist strands)—in nationalist literature. It is such fracture that a key proponent of ethno-symbolism, Anthony D. Smith, has made central to his interpretation or understanding of the national phenomenon. Since, as noted earlier, the concept of ethnicity and cultural symbolism is critical to the primordialist conception of nations; the notion of yet another ethno-symbolism in nationalist discourse would automatically impel clarification so as not to confound the latter with the ethno-cultural symbolism evident in primordialist arguments. Therefore, the novel concept of primordialist core should serve as the basic criterion for such a distinction. This is inevitable not only because of the centrality of ethnicity to Smith’s ethno-symbolic approach to the concept of nationhood and nationalism, but also because some key upholders of the modernist school (Gellner 1996a: 366; Breuilly 1996: 150-1) had labelled his ethno-symbolic perspective primordialist. Despite Smith consistent rejection of attempts to label him as a primordialist; and the consistent attempts to posit himself simply as “a critic of the idea that nations lack pre-modern antecedents” (Smith, 1986:1-18; Hearn, 2006), there are those who still refer to him as a “reluctant primordialist” (Hearn 2006: 42). Notwithstanding, Smith has tirelessly tried to clarify his position by presenting arguments which seem to attest some minimal degree of distinction from the primordialist core, as in the following statement:

The perennialist might be right about the antiquity of collective cultural ties and sentiments, nevertheless their claim fall short of the presumption that such ties are universal (let alone natural as primordialist assert). Or if they assume about universal human characteristics like the need to belong or religious community, they fall short in linking such needs with the formation and persistence of nations and nationalism (Smith, 1986: 12-13).

Evidently, Smith is after all not criticising the primordialist (or perennialists) position outright other than the shortcomings he observed in that quote. As a matter of fact Smith himself began in the 1990s to label his own approach as “ethno-symbolic.” Reflecting on the development of his ideas he remarks:

“Given the many economic and political ruptures between pre-modern and modern collective cultural identities in the same area, any continuity between ethnies and nation had to be located in the cultural and symbolic spheres. This in turn led to the adaptation of the term ‘ethno-symbolism’ for an approach that sort to establish nations between the different kinds of collective cultural identity by focussing on elements of myth, memory, value, symbol and tradition that tended to change more slowly, and were more flexible in meaning, than the process in other domains” (Smith, 2004:196; Hearn, 2006).

It is important to note, however, that because of the socio-cultural determinants in Smith’s approach, there is some similarity with Geertz conception of culture (Hearn, 2006: 172ff). So, without further ado let’s critical discern Smith’s ethno-symbolist perception of nations.

In general, Smith’s approach describes ethnies and nations as [being] composed out of “myth-symbol-complex” and more specifically “mytho-moteurs” a term he borrows from Armstrong (1982: 8-9). The former is the given repertoires of given cultures, while the mytho-moteur more specifically designates a “conservative political myth” that defines identity in relation to a specific polity while also legitimating it (Smith, 1986: 58). Mytho-moteur (or ethnic cores) comes in various broad types, namely dynastic and communal. Dynastic mytho-moteur attaches to the office of the ruler by extension to ruling house and dynasty (Smith, 1986: 58; Hearn, 2006: 172ff). Typical of both the ancient imperial polities of the Middle East (e.g. Assyria, Persia et cetera) and the medieval kingdoms of Europe (e.g. Normans, Charlemagne, etc.), such mytho-moteurs are generally fused with religion, connecting dynastic lineages to ancestral religious figures, and infusing the dynastic dominion with an aura of sacredness, and its inhabitants and their ruler with a chosen role in realizing the divine will (Hearn, 2006). Communal mytho-moteurs, on the other hand, are nurtured by the strata and focus on an image of the whole community rather than a privileged lineage or a state institution (Smith, 1986: 61). ‘Here Smith contrast two forms, namely: A more political form, exemplified by the Hellenic city states of the Fifth century B.C., in which cultural pride revolving around a pan-Hellenic religious pantheon, shared heroic myth and linguistic continuity was focused on individual city states with their local deities, political institutions and aesthetic achievements. And a more religious form, in which collective identities revolved a special relationship between people and their God (e.g. the Jews). After a long period of episodic kingdom building, from the destruction of the first temple and the Babylonian Exile (586 B.C.) the history of Jews became one repeatedly politically destabilized by large predatory neighbouring empires. In this context, the role of the priesthood, the prophets and subsequently the rabbis and synagogues, and of law and Tora, with its boundary preserving

rules of intermarriage, circumcision and deity laws, served to reinforce communal identity' (Hearn, 2006: 172-178). According to Smith:

When the synagogues took over the function of the Temple, the democratization of religious self-conception was complete; the rabbi was a teacher and an expounder of the Tora, not an intermediary, and the oral law embodied in the Misnah, was designed for the whole community of believers. Similarly, any restoration of the exile became increasingly geo-communal rather than geo-political: it involved the return of the whole community of Israel to Zion, its sacred center, more than the restoration of the rule of the home of David in Philistine/Palestine, and the Messianic era was centred less on the person of the anointed one than on universal justice and peace which Israel restoration will bring. Priestly and prophetic denunciation of the institutions of the monarchy had paved the way for a more theocratic and communal conception of the basic *mytho-moteur* of the Jewish people (Smith, 1986: 64)

As Hearn rightly observes, part of Smith point here is that these mytho-moteurs are flexible and evolving, and that the Jewish communal-religious type evolved out of an earlier more dynastic type, under the vagaries of historical circumstances. He suggests a similar development of the Hellenic communal political "mytho-moteur" into a more religious communal one under the Ottoman Empire as the Greeks became *millet* (an ethno-religious population with distinctive legal and administrative status under the system of the Ottoman rule) socially organized especially by the patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox church (ibid). By the same analytical token ancient Egypt is viewed as more of an "ethnic state" with overarching religious practices and a relative unified ruling class, but economically localistic and with profound social barriers between nobles and commoners; whereas ancient Israel in the second Temple period seems to have a fairly integrated system of law and religious practices, uniting the social hierarchy, and intensified by collective hardship, periods of religious reform and strenuous claims to territory (ibid, 36-42).

Important about Smith distinction between the Dynastic/Aristocratic (or political) and the rather more communal oriented *ethnies* or ethnic ties is his concept of "lateral" and "demotic" ethnic cores, both of which also furnish the two main routes by which nations have been created. In order to better understand the centrality of the ethnic cores to the creativity of both the ethno-cultural and/or political nations, let's explore in detail Smith's conception of nations.

Essentially Smith began by positing nations as culturally rooted social categories with relatively profound historical background. In other words, nations, as we know them today, could be both appanage of deliberate and spontaneous (circumstantial) historical social entities. Smith does not entirely reject the constructivist or political dimension of modern day

nation-states—but he also reminds us not to lose sight of their deeply entrenched cultural and historical roots. In particular, it is through the cultural dimension of nationness that a group's appeal to unconditional universal sentiment carries much weight, he believes. Accordingly, vital for a nation is the spread of “national sentiments” and usually downward through the strata of the population. National sentiments in this way is no construct, it has a real, tangible, mass base. At its roots is a feeling of kinship, of extended family, that distinguishes national from every other kind of sentiment (Smith, 1981: 63-86; Horowitz, 1985: 55-92). It is in and through the myths and symbols of the common past that such national sentiments find expression; and these may develop over long periods:

“The nation, in this sense, is not a once-for-all, or all-for-nothing, concept; and that historical nations are ongoing process, some times slow in their formation, at other times faster, often jagged and discontinuous as some features emerge or are created, while others lag. In some parts of the world nations have a far reaching historical background and in others recent. In either ways however, objective factors outside human control and will and action, go into creation of nations. Geographical, environmental, and political accidents of warfare but whether it may subsequently do so, may depend on how far a group or its ruling classes become conscious of their identity and reinforce it through education, legal codes and administrative centralization” (Tilly, 1975: 3-163).

Thus Smith perception is that while nations might be constructs or visions of nationalist (or other) elites, they could equally be seen as real, historical formations that embody a number of analytically separable processes over long time span. In other words, nationalist cannot, and do not, create nations *ex-nihilo*. There must be, at least, some elements of the chosen population and its social environment which favours the aspirations and activities of nationalist visionaries. To achieve their goals—autonomy, unity and identity—there need to be some core networks of associations and culture around which nations can be “built.” Language groups are often regarded as the basic networks of nations; but religious sects, like the Druse, Sikhs, Maronites, may also form the starting-point for “reconstructing” the nation. So may certain kind of historical territory (Smith [1989], Pecora, 2001: 335).

#### 2.1.4.1. The real ethnic core and the persistence and durability of nations

Apparently, the above emphases suggest that Smith is generally aware of the aesthetic objective dimension of both the cultural and political streams of nations. Important though, he attests that the political variant of the national phenomenon [alone] has little prospects of survival without recourse to the cultural antecedent (or more accurately to the real ethnic

core—that is, the demotic component of nationness), ‘as those behind the failed aristocratic political ambition to revive ancient Persian culture in the period between 531-579 A.D (Chosroes I) know this pretty well’ (Smith [1989] Pecora, 2001: 339):

“As with other urban civilizations that lacked real roots in the countryside, the results were grand and artificial, in theology as in architecture; and Moslem conquest cut the entire tradition in the Seventh century, just as Alexander’s victories had earlier the high cultures of Achaemenides”<sup>35</sup>

But not all in the aristocratic [camp] of “lateral ethnies”, those mainly behind the projects of political nations, seem so ignorant about the overwhelming importance of the demotic component to the durability and persistence of nations, as the following statement by Pope Boniface of the thirteenth century France historical search for a compact national identity also confirms:

“...like the people of Isreal...the Kingdom of France [is] a peculiar people chosen by the Lord to carry out the orders of heaven” (Davis, 1958: 289-313)<sup>36</sup>

It is precisely this *artful* skill to adapt, especially by the politically induced lateral ethnies of both the ancient, medieval and modern worlds, in the creativity (or re-creativity) of nations, that Smith seems to want us make sense of contemporary “dialectic entwinement” of modern nation-states. Otherwise, wholly ethno-cultural variants of nationness which survived the predatory encroachment of the former—that is, the civic/political dimension of nationhood, have maintained their compact character.

Smith does not provide us with any concrete example of such an ethno-culture nation untainted by politics in today’s context other than his assertion of the persistent desire (and ability in some cases) by proponents of the [*rein*] ethnic core and, of course, those in between to resuscitate and institutionalize the original compact culture passed down across generations in their nation’s turbulent history, as exemplified by the revival of the modern Jewish nation-state. Herein lies the durability of the real “ethnic core.” As Smith remarked, because nations embody ethnic as well as civic components they turn to form around “pre-existing” ethnic cores. The fact that pre-modern eras have been characterized by different *ethnie* is therefore vital to our understanding of the ways modern nations emerged. The number, location and durability of such ethnies are crucial for the formation of historical nations. The relations of

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<sup>35</sup> Mc Neill, William H., 1963. *The Rise of the West: A History of Human community*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 400.

<sup>36</sup>Davis, R H C., 1958. *A History of Medieval Europe*. London: Longmans, Green & Co.



power and exploitation between different kinds of ethnies also help to determine the basis for historical nations. It is this latter circumstance that provides an essential key to the process of nation formation in modern times (Smith (1989) Pecora, 2001: 341).

The exploitation of the authentic compact ethnic core by proponents of the politically inclined lateral ethnies eventually provokes reactionary counter-measures from the real Guardians of the ethnic core—that is, the demotic/vertical component of nationhood, as exemplified early by Jewish cultural mobilization and strenuous resistance of the encroachment of predatory empires earlier. With respect to the modern Jewish nation-state Smith does not rule out rational political substance in its present constitution—albeit persistent traditional hopes for messianic restoration to Zion of generations of the Orthodox community. Simply put, left alone on the political/state-centric component of the Jewish nation-state—one must not forget that had the Orthodox Jews not overwhelmingly turned down the grand political ambitions of Theodor Herzl and his followers, they almost accepted Argentina and Uganda as an alternative to their sacred homeland (Theodor Herzl (1896) in Pecora (ed.) 2001: 185-9)—the Jewish people (nation) would quite certainly have wandered permanently without ever putting foot on that promise [fulfilled] land, let alone Heru-sale[m] (Jerusalem). In this case, for the Orthodox Jews who rejected Herzl's grand and ambitious political project by risking permanency in hostile exilic conditions—laden fully with exterminatory menaces overhead (e.g. being massacred or burnt alive en masse by European crusaders of politicized nationalism in the 11<sup>th</sup> century AD; or lately in Koeln in the 1840s; or more recently in the gas chambers of Hitler's Third Reich)—in that persistent hope of messianic restoration to Zion, other than condoning the expropriation of the primordial homelands (nations) of others only confirms the reality of the demotic ethnic core. In this sense, when my Jamaican, Haitian, Cuban friends, would rather give-up their current respective states to the indigenous population in order to return to Azania, even without formal identification documents, not only reaffirms the reality and undiminished faith in the real ethnic core, but also reminds us why the real ethnic core is such a contested culture asset for both the cultural and political variants of nationalism (emphasis added).

So, the assassination of Yitzak Rabin by an Orthodox Jewish student in the 1990s reminds us again of the sacred-secular dichotomy in contemporary Israeli politics. For the Orthodox Jewish, the true Guardians of the authentic ethnic-core, Heru-Salem is not only a promised fulfilled land, but a “sacred rock” in their communal quest for the transcendental truth; hence carving out any part of it to contemporary political forces misappropriating Philistine for Palestine is like condoning ‘the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple by Titus (Emperor

Vespasian's elder son) in the 70 CE' (Pagels, 1995: 3-34). It is by recognizing the sacred dimension of the real ethnic core one could account for the tendency of primordial nationalist to affirm their ideology in an anti political way, that is, one that favours force over dialogue as a means of responding to conflict of historical truth.<sup>37</sup> But is this Israeli example idiosyncratic?

Similar tensions between proponents of ethno-cultural and political variants of nations could be endlessly resurfaced across the broader political spectrum, as the following statement by a Sri Lankan Monk tends to suggest:

Interestingly, one of the concepts that disturbed the Bhikku was an activity that Westerners (proponents of the nation-state system) regard as cardinal strength of political system: the ability to respond impartially to demands of variety of groups. The political expediency of given in to particular demands of a particular interest, e.g. such as those of the Tamils, was cited by the Bhikku as evidence of the government immorality. He felt that such politicians were incapable of standing up for the truth in the face of competing interests, selfish interests, and their impartiality indicated they ultimately only cared about themselves.<sup>38</sup>

Of course, true primordial (ethno-cultural) nationalists, who often consider their distinctive nations as divinely inspired to fulfil a transcendental mission, would rather not compare their nation's ultimate object with mere mundane political interests that could be abandoned once their temporal validity expires. Instead, the ultimate object in question is a timeless reality that must never be left out of sight or imagination. And it is precisely this resilience by some to solemnly rely on a compact and authentic ethnic core in their pursuit of the timeless reality, that makes the "ethnic core" so attractive to [even] those with short term political agendas. Hence the tendency by proponents of the aristocratic lateral *ethnie* to incorporate other strata of the population in their grand state-centric political ambitions, Smith would have us believe.

#### 2.1.4.2. Bureaucratic incorporation of the ethnic core

So far, this thesis has tentatively tried to affirm the overwhelming importance of the real ethnic core to both the demotic and lateral streams of the national phenomenon. And as "Chosroes I" failed attempt to revive ancient Persian culture earlier did warn us, those advocates of lateral *ethnie* who overlook the centrality of the real ethnic-core in their grand

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<sup>37</sup> Chowers, E., 1998. "Time in Zionism: The Life and Afterlife of temporal Revolution." *Political Theory* 26 (5), 652-82.

<sup>38</sup> Juergensmeyer, M., 1994. "*Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State.*" 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 21.

political projects only do so at their own peril. And this seems to be what Smith wants us to believe when he stressed that aristocratic ethnies have the potential for self perpetuation provided they can incorporate other strata of the population. Even George Bush Jr., the president of the self proclaimed remaining military super-power of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, was forced to invoke crusadic language in his attempt to galvanize support for his war on terror after the event of 9/11/01. “A good many of these lateral ethnies (e.g. Hittites, Philistines, Mycenaeans, Assyrians and so on) which failed to do so disappeared alongside their culture with the demise of their states” (Saggs, 1984: 117-21; Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001). Other lateral ethnies survived by changing their character (post-Islam Persians, Egyptians, Ottoman Turks), while preserving a sense of common descent and some dim collective memories.

Still others grafted new ethnic and cultural elements on to their common fund of myths, symbols and memories, and spread them out from the core area and down through the social scale. They did so, of course, in varying degrees. For example, the efforts of Amhara kings to spread Orthodox Christianity imposed on them by the Byzantine Empire were rather limited in scope; yet they managed to retain their Monophysite Abyssinian Identity in their heartlands (Atika 1968; Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001: 342). That of the Castilians was more successful. They managed to form the core of a Spanish state (and empire) that expelled Moslem rulers and almost united the Iberian Peninsula. Yet, even their success pales before that of their Frankish Norman counterparts.

With these latter examples, Smith simply wants us to have an in-depth critical view of the politico-aesthetic journey of the nation-state (or, accurately, the state-nation). In all three cases, lower strata and outlying regions were gradually incorporated in the state, which was grounded upon a dominant ethnic core (ibid). “This was achieved by administrative and fiscal means, and by mobilization of sections of the populations for interstate warfare, as in Anglo-French wars” (Keeney, 1972<sup>39</sup>). “An upper class ethnie, in other words, managed to evolve a relatively strong and stable administrative apparatus, which could be used to provide cultural regulation and thereby define a new and wider cultural identity” (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985).<sup>40</sup> In practice this meant varying degrees of accommodation between the upper-class culture and those prevalent among the strata and peripheral regions; yet it was the upper-class that set its stamp on the state and the evolving national identity (Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001: 333-354).

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<sup>39</sup> Keeney, Barnaby C., 1972. “Military Service and the Development of Nationalism in England 1272-1327.” In Leon Tipton, ed. *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 87-97.

<sup>40</sup> Corrigan, Philip and Sayer, Derek, 1985. “*The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*.” Oxford: Blackwell.

A clear cut example is afforded by British developments. As there had been an Anglo-Saxon kingdom based originally in Wessex before the Norman conquests the former could not be considered simply as a servile peasantry. Consequently, we find considerable intermarriage, linguistic borrowing, elite mobility and finally a fusion of linguistic culture, within a common religio-political frame work (ibid).

In other words, bureaucratic incorporation of subject ethnies entailed considerable measure of cultural fusion and social intermingling between Anglo-Saxon, Danish and Norman elements, especially from the thirteenth century on. "By the time of Edward III and the Anglo-French Scottish wars, linguistic fusion had stabilized into Chaucerian English and "British" myth served to weld the disparate ethnic Communities together"(Seton-Watson, 1977: 22-31<sup>41</sup>; Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001).

In these analyses Smith is by no means assuming that an English nation was fully formed by the late fourteenth century. There was little economic unity as yet, despite growing fiscal and judicial intervention by the royal state. The boundaries of the kingdom, too, both with Scotland and France, were in dispute. In no sense can one speak of a public, mass education, even for the middle classes. As for legal rights, despite the assumption behind *Magna Carta*, they were common to all only in the most minimal senses. "For the full development of these civic elements of nationhood one would have to wait for the Industrial Revolution and its effects"(Reynolds, 1984: 250-331).<sup>42</sup>

The ethnic elements, on the other hand, were well developed. By the fourteenth century and slightly later, a common name and myth of descent, promulgated originally by Geoffrey of Monmouth, were widely current, as were variety of historical memories (Mac Dougall, 1982: 7-17).<sup>43</sup> These were fed by fortunes of wars in Scotland and France. Similarly a sense of common culture based on language and ecclesiastical organization had emerged. So had a common strong attachment to the homeland of the Island Kingdom, which in turn bred a sense of solidarity amid highly visible internal cleavages. The basis of both unitary state and compact nation had been laid, and laid by a lateral Norman-origin ethnie that was able to develop its regnal administration to incorporate the Anglo-Saxon population. Yet the full idea of Englishness had to wait for late-sixteenth and seventeenth-century developments, when the

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<sup>41</sup> Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1977. "Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism." London: Methuen.

<sup>42</sup> Reynolds, Susan, 1984. "Medieval Origines gentium and the Community of the Realm." *History*, Vol. 68, 375-90.

<sup>43</sup> Mac Dougall, Hugh, 1982. "Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons." Montreal: Harvest House.

old British myth gave way to a more potent middle-class “Saxon” mythology of ancient liberties (Mac Dougall, 1982, ch.2-4; Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001).

A similar process of bureaucratic incorporation by an upper class lateral ethnies can be discerned in France. Some fusion of upper-stratum Frankish with subject Roman-Gallic occurred under the Christianized Merovingians, but a regnal solidarity is only apparent in northern France at the end of the century. It was in this era that earlier myths of Trojan descent, applied to Franks, were resuscitated for all the people of northern France. At the same time, the *Pays d’Oc*, with its different language, customs and myths of descent, remained for the time outside the orbit of northern bureaucratic incorporation (Reynolds, 1984: 276-89; Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001: 344).

As a matter of fact, Capetian bureaucratic incorporation from Philip II onwards was able to draw on the glory and myths of old Frankish kingdom and Charlemagne’s heritage. And this was partly because the kingdom of the Eastern Franks came to be known as *regnum Teutonicorum*, with a separate identity. However, it was also due to the special link between French dynasties and the Church, notably the archbishopric of Rheims (Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001: 344). There was a sacred quality inhering dynastic mytho-motif of the Capetians and their territory that went back to papal coronation of Charlemagne and papal legitimation of Pepin’s usurpation in A.D. 754, which the Pope called a new kingdom of David. The religious language is echoed centuries later, when at the end of the thirteenth century Pope Boniface declared: “...like the people of Israel...the French populace is a peculiar people chosen to fulfil the will of God” (see, footnote: 26 above).

As Smith asserts, though there is much debate as to the feudal nature of the Capetian monarchy, the undoubted fact is that an originally Frankish ruling-class ethnies managed after many vicissitudes to establish a relatively efficient and centralized royal administration over north and central France (and later southern France). So it became able to furnish those “civic” elements of compact territory, unified economy, and linguistic and legal standardization that from the seventeenth century onwards spurred the formation of a French nation as we now know it today. The process, however, was not completed until the end of the nineteenth century. Many regions retained their local character, even after the French Revolution. It required the application of Jacobin nationalism of mass education and conscription under the Third Republic to turn, in Eugen Weber’s much celebrated phrase, “Peasants into Frenchmen” (Weber, 1979, 1976;<sup>44</sup> Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001).

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<sup>44</sup> Eugen Weber’s 1976 *Peasants into Frenchmen* has become one of the corner-stones of nationalism literature. He has shown how long it took for a clear French national identity to really spread through the population of France. Despite the upheavals of French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, at the last quarter of the

An even more radical “change of character” attempted by bureaucratic incorporation by a “lateral” ethnic state is provided by Spain. Here it was the Castilian kingdom that formed the fulcrum of Christian resistance to Moslem power. Later, united with the kingdom of Aragon, it utilized religious community as an instrument of homogenization, expelling those who, like the Jews and Moriscos, could not be made to conform. Here, again, notions of *limpeza de sangre* bolstered the unity of the Spanish crown, which was beset by demands on several sides from those claiming ancient rights and manifesting ancient cultures. Quite apart from the Portuguese secession and the failed Catalan revolt, Basques, Galicians and Andalucians retained their separate identities into the modern era. The result is a less unified national community, and more poly-ethnic state, than either Britain or France. With the spread of ideological (or more accurately political instigated) nationalism in the early nineteenth century, these ethnic communities felt justified in embarking on varying degrees of autonomous development, whose reverberations are still felt today (Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001: 345).

Not surprisingly, modern nation-states (or state-nations) owe a profound legacy to the development of England, France and Spain. This is usually attributed to their possessing of military and economic power at the relevant period, the period of burgeoning nationalism and nations. As great powers of the period, they inevitably became models of the nation, the

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nineteenth century rural France was still a patchwork of regional languages, dialects and cultures—of Peasants economically tied to the land. By the 1860s perhaps half of the population still did not speak the standard French of Paris. Weber describes the gradual penetration of a modern standardized school system into the countryside, and the numerous obstacles it encountered. Fundamental brakes on this process were the poor roads and means of transportation necessary to get rural children to school, and the high demand for child-labour keeping children away from school. Regarding the dissemination of Parisian French more specifically, there were other problems: the lack of trained and qualified teachers who commanded the standard language variety themselves; and high levels of adult illiteracy, and the exclusion of girls from school, which impeded language reinforcement and reproduction in the home.

In this context draconian methods were often used to try to cultivate the use of standard French. Children caught speaking their native tongues were forced to display a ‘token of shame’ (a cardboard ticket, stick peg, ribbon, etc.; even holding a brick out at arms length). A child saddled with such a ‘symbol’ kept it until he caught another child not speaking French, denounce him, and passed it on (1976:313). But it took more than such brutal treatment to make the acquisition of French more appealing to rural people. In the time people began to recognize the opportunities that literacy afforded in an expanding market economy, not only in the agrarian sector, but for the next generation achieving upward mobility into state jobs and better opportunities in military careers. Thus education, literacy and standardized French became means for rural family prosperity, rather than diversions of precarious household labour.

...From this point on it became possible to use texts and practices in the class room to inculcate national values and identity. Children were now increasingly exposed to hexagonal image of France on wall maps, to description of the land in geography texts, to romances and national heroes in history texts and to prescriptions for patriotic behaviour in civic contexts. Weber cites an example: “Society (Summary) (1) French society is ruled by just laws, because it is a democratic society. (2) All French are equal in their rights; but there are inequalities between us that stem from nature or from wealth. (3) These inequalities cannot disappear. (4) Man works to become rich; if he lacked this hope, work would cease and France will decline. It is therefore necessary that each of us should be able to keep the morney he has earned” (1976: 331; Hearn, 2006: 82-3).

Weber, Eugen, 1979. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. London: Chatto and Windus.

apparently successful format of population unit, for everyone else. Yet to the case of England, France, and to a lesser extent, Spain, this was not accidental. It was the results of early development of a particular kind of “rational” bureaucratic administration, aided by development of merchant capital, wealthy urban centres and professional military forces and technology. The state formed the matrix of the new population unit format, the “nation”. It aided the type of compact, unified, standardized and culturally homogenized unit format that the nation exemplifies today (ibid).

Some would say that the state actually “created” the nation, that royal administration, taxation and mobilization endowed the subjects within its jurisdiction with a sense of corporate loyalty and identity. In Smith’s view, even in the West this overstates the case. The state was certainly a necessary condition for the formation of national loyalties we recognize today. However, its operation in turn owed much to earlier assumptions about kingdoms and peoples, and the presence of core ethnic communities around which these states were built up. The process of the ethnic fusion, particularly apparent in England and France, which their lateral ethnies encouraged through the channels of bureaucratic incorporation, was also possible because of a relatively homogeneous ethnic-core. We are here talking about actual descent, much less about ‘race’, but about the sense of ancestry and identity that peoples possess. Hence the importance of myths, memories, symbols and values, embodied in customs and traditions and in artistic styles, legal codes and institutions. In this sense of ‘ethnicity’, which is more about cultural perceptions than physical demography, albeit rooted perceptions and assumptions, England from an earlier date, and France some what later, came to form fairly homogeneous ethnies. These ethnies in turn facilitated the development of homogenizing states, extending the whole idea of an ethnie into realms and onto levels hitherto unknown, to form the relatively novel concept of the nation—that is, the nation-state (ibid., 345-346).

#### 2.1.4.3. Revivalist rediscovery of the ethnic past

Smith assert that in contrast to the route of bureaucratic incorporation by lateral ethnies, the process by which demotic ethnies may become bases for nations is only indirectly affected by the state and its administration. This is either because they were subject communities—the usual case—or because, as in Byzantium and Russia, the state represented interests partially outside its core ethnie. This subdivision also produces interesting variants on the constitutive political myth, or mytho-moteur, or vertical ethnies (Smith, 1986a: 47-68). Here, the general

point is that in all these communities, the fund of culture myths, symbols, memories and values was transmitted not only from generation to generation, but also throughout the territory occupied by the community or its enclaves and down the social scale. The chief mechanism of this persistence and diffusion was an organized religion with sacred, liturgy, rites and clergy, and some times a specialized secret lore and script. It is the social aspect of salvation religions, in particular, that have ensured the persistence and shaped the contours of demotic ethnies. Among Orthodox Greeks and Russians, Monophysite Ethiopians and Copts, Jews, Catholic Irish and Poles, myths and symbols of descent, and the ritual and the sacred texts in which they were embodied, help to perpetuate the traditions and social bonds of the community.

Thus from a revivalist standpoint, especially those under the encroaching shadows of the lateral/aristocratic ethnies and are now seeking autonomy, their communities was already, and had always been nations. Indeed, according to some definitions they were: They possessed in full measure, after all, the purely ethnic components of nation. Arabs and Jews, for example, had common names, myths and descent, memories and religious cultures as well as an attachment to an original homeland, and a persisting, if subdivided, sense of ethnic solidarity. Did this not suffice for nationhood? (Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001: 346) “All that seemed to be necessary was to attain independence and state for the community”(Baron, 1960<sup>45</sup>).

From the foregoing arguments, it thus becomes obvious that two very distinct dimension of nations could be extracted for further critical analysis. The first one, if not under the assimilative shadows of the civic political (state-centric) variant, is wholly culturally derived, with an original homeland, a distinct cultural identity (common names), history (myths of descent and memories), sense of ethnic solidarity and certain unique cultural attributes such as language and religion. This national variant with its uncompromising concern for culture authenticity is less susceptible to aggression and assimilative encroachment. The civic political one, on the other hand—because of its reliance on sword and economically compensatory scheme for survival—, is the direct opposite of the former, only relying on cultural attributes such as religion, language etc. for sheer political and economic reasons, as exemplified by Arabs use of the Islamic religion to legitimate their continuing military occupation of northern Azania (what Bin Ladin and his followers would call Arab Maghribi: Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco). This is particularly true of the royal family in Morocco which continues to base the legitimacy of the monarchy on the assumption of direct descendancy from the prophet’s family. What this all means, in terms of Smith earlier

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<sup>45</sup> Baron, Solo W., 1960. “*Modern Nationalism and Religion.*” New York: Meridian Books.



assertion that the [real] ethnic-core is the genuine basis for compact nationhood, is that, even within distinct ethnic-cores, there are forces with expansive political ambitions who would exploit the authenticity of their community's ethnic core for political and economic gains. Thus religion, in this sense, loses its original purpose of transcendental truth and becomes merely an instrument for political and economic capital, as also exemplified in the following extracts of *Monk* and *Fulcher* echoing Pope Urban II speech at Clermont (1095 AD) in an effort to galvanize support for the first Crusade:

“... oh, race of Franks, race from across the mountains, race beloved and chosen by God—as is clear from many of your works—as set aside from other nations by the situations of your country as well as by your catholic faith and the honour which you render to the holy church: to you our discourse is addressed, and for you our exhortations are intended...

From the confines of Jerusalem and from the city of Constantinople a grievous report..., namely, that a race from the kingdom of the Persians, an accursed race, a race wholly alienated from God, a generation that set not their heart aright and whose spirit was not steadfast with God, violently invaded the lands of those Christians and has depopulated them by pillage and fire. ...The Kingdom of Greeks is now dismembered by them and has been deprived of a territory so vast in extent that could be traversed in two months time.

On whom, therefore, is the labour of avenging these wrongs and of recovering this territory incumbent, if not upon you, you upon whom, above all other nations, God has conferred remarkable glory in arms, great courage, bodily activity and strength to humble the heads of those who resist you? Let the deeds of your ancestors encourage you and incite your minds to manly achievements—the greatness of Charlemagne, and his son Louis, and other monarchs, who have destroyed the lands of Turks and have extended the sway of the Church over land originally occupied by pagans.

Urban II then proceeds to tell his followers, the great children of Frankish Normans: the Germanic warriors who pioneered dynastic and military aristocratic states across Europe, why it was extremely necessary to recover those territories lost to the Persians:

“... for this land which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by seas and surrounded by the Mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage war amongst yourself, and that very many of you perish in intestine strife.

Another of those present at the council of Clermont, “Fulcher of Chartres”, thus reports this part part of the Urban's speech:

“Let those who have formerly been accustomed to contend wickedly in private warfare against the faithful fight now against the infidel, and bring to victorious end a war which ought already to have been begun. Let those who have hitherto been robbers become soldiers. Let those who have formerly contended against their own brothers and relatives now fight against the barbarians as they ought. Let those who have formerly been mercenaries at low wages now gain eternal rewards. Let those who have been exhausting themselves to the detriment of both body and soul now strive for two fold reward (*see a complete translation of Fulcher’s report of Urban II speech in Translation and Reports, Vol.1. No.2*)

Monk version then sums up Pope Urban’s politicized religious speech:

“...enter upon the road to the holy sepulcher, wrest that land from the wicked race, and subject it to yourselves. That land which, as the scripture says, ‘floweth with milk and honey’ was given by God into the power of the Children of Israel. Jerusalem is the centre of the Earth; the land is fruitful above all others, like another paradise of delights....

This royal city, however, situated at the centre of the Earth, is now held captive by enemies of Christ and is subjected by those who do not know God, to the worship of the heathen. She seeks to be liberated ...From you especially she asks succour, because as we have already said, God has conferred upon you other nations great glory in arms. Accordingly, undertake this journey eagerly for the remission of your sins, with the assurance of the reward of unperishable glory in the kingdom of heaven.”<sup>46</sup>

Essentially, this compressed but relatively extended quotes from Pope Urban II speech depite their overwhelming political connotation confirming the previous argument about the instrumentalization of culture by proponents of political nationalism also summarize two key Smithonian ideas with regards to the symbolic construction of communal identity, namely the idea of “golden ages” and that of “elected types” reminiscent of revivalist language. Further, it could also be used to discern the inherent fluidity of lateral/aristocratic ethnies membership loyalty, which in turn sheds light on those ethnies inability to dispense with the [real] ethnic core. This is particularly noticeable of the random recruitment policies inherent in Fulcher’s version of Pope Urban II speech which is undoubtedly reminiscent of the language of political nationalism, especially when combined with the economic compensatory mechanisms meant to entice members’ loyalty as in Monk version of that speech. The foregoing thus lends more meaning to Smith’s apt phrase that: ‘the sense of common ethnicity went wherever Normans sailed and Persians arms conquered’ (Smith (1989), Pecora, 2001: 339). Not surprisingly, in the later days of the disintegration of the Bantu-Ethiopian Kingdom we had Assyrian, Greek, Roman and Persian Pharaohs using all means to assert their political power on the culture institutions of the Azanian nation (emphasis added).

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<sup>46</sup> <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2a.html>

This notwithstanding, in purely culture revivalist sense of “golden ages” and or the “elected type”, Smith assert that ethnies and nation-building frequently draw on ideal periods in a community’s past [and] often characterized by heroic figures and great culture achievements (Smith, 1986: 191-200). A typical example of modern recovery or reconstruction of a golden age is found in Finnish *Kalevala*—a collection of ballads and poems assembled and combined in 1835, which inspired contemporary artists and intellectuals estranged by Swedish culture and Russian political domination in the later nineteenth century, with its tales of heroic ancestral deeds (Smith, 1991: 66). These golden ages are not simply treasured objects of collective memory, but serve important functions. They articulate the defining moral and aesthetic standards of cultural groups; they provide hope and inspiration for cultural regeneration and national rebirth; they indicate, through lineal heritage, the inherent capacity of a group to recapture its glorious past, and, above all, they provide guidance for action in the present, justifying people’s sacrifices for national cause (Smith, 1999: 263-264).

Thus, on the whole, it is this apparent contention in the makeshift of nations—that is, the marriage of convenience inasmuch as the lateral component of nationhood is concern or, on the part of the demotic ethnic core, a misfortunate marriage—that sums up Smith’s interpretation of contemporary nation-states. Otherwise by merely detaching the conceptual ambiguity of modernity—that is, the political state from the ethno-cultural nation, the nation per se has indeed a profound historical background that antedates antiquity, Smith would argue.

## **2.2. In what ways are they rational response to immediate identifiable incentives?**

### 2.2.1. Modernist Perspective

Unlike the primordialist and ethno-symbolist scholars, who until now have insisted on the overwhelming importance of ethnicity in the interpretation of the national phenomenon, modernists generally tend to defend the modernity of nationalism and nations. Subsequently, most modernists claim that nations and nationalism have appeared as a consequence of the processes that mark modern period of social development. Therefore, before we explore the core arguments of the modernist school concerning the national phenomenon, it will be important to briefly highlight the key themes of that school of thought.

According to Jonathan Hearn the ‘term modernist’ tends to encompass an array of approaches that are more coherently unified than those of the primordialist. He lists three main themes to support his assumption about the inherent unity of modernist arguments:

- a) The demands of industrial economies in generating unified national identities. A major sub-theme in this regard is the idea of “uneven development” (the tensions between the core and the periphery relations) as stimulus for modern nationalism;
- b) the modern state as a bureaucratic and legal institution generating new conception of citizenship. A particular important sub-theme is the concept of “civil society”;
- c) the spread of literacy, linguistic homogenization and standardized education as the cornerstone of mass culture and unified national identity.

As Hearn found out, modernists generally emphasize all these themes in combination. The main variations concern how different theorists place accent on these themes in their conceptions of modernization and its role in creating nationalism (2006: 67-78ff). In the words of Atsuko Ichigo et al., ‘a crude division of modernist theories could be made between those who see the period of transition to modernity as erosion of traditional structures that had to be replaced by new ones, which in turn would result into a new form of stability in now modern societies. The latter explains the transition “from below”—as a set of social changes that would eventually substitute the broken social bonds of population dragged into modernity by redefining social relationship and develop new forms of a new national culture.

Hence critics of modernist approaches have generally labelled these theories, among others, structuralist, functionalist, constructivist or instrumentalist. The first two terms indicate that the modernist approach is concerned mainly with structural changes in the transition to modernity and the influences of social institutions on social change. This approach emphasizes the reconstruction of old dysfunctional institutions and the formation of new ones that have brought a new equilibrium in the society. This equilibrium is achieved at the level of social system, in which institutions are seen as actors. Hence, the emergence of nations and nationalism are seen as unintended consequences of broader social processes. In such interpretation the nation is formed “from above”, the population is moulded into a new community, whereby actors are constrained by dominant structures’ (Atsuko, I. et al., 2005: 9-13).

Those critics who see some of the modernist theories as constructivist or instrumentalist emphasize their so-called upward conflation, where the changes in social structure are explained by unconstrained actions of agency. For instance, concepts such as “invention” and “imagination” only assume the role of social actor that radically changes the social structure

and culture in transition. In this sense, socio-cultural integration is explained as a result of an agency's free will. Subsequently, the emergence of the nation is explained as a result of agent's interests and agendas. In these theories the agency appears as unconstrained by previous social structures and cultures. Thus it would seem that the new community of nation is created *ab ovo* (ibid, 13).

Importantly, the central themes recurrent in modernist conception of nations and nationalism are economic development (industrialization), the state and modernity. Therefore, unlike primordialists and ethno-symbolists whose interpretation of the national phenomenon often cast a wider net across different communities, modernist theories are unavoidably Eurocentric. As Atsuko et al. observed, those modernist theories that offer some explanation of the rise of nations in non-European societies (e.g. Kedourie (1971) and Anderson (1983)) are mainly engaged in applying the developed European model to those communities. The explanation of a phenomenon such as the nation is firmly grounded in one specific geo-political area in a specific historical period (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Europe) marked with an equally specific set of social processes known as modernity. Consequently, the explanation of the same phenomenon in different places and times requires a creation of different typologies (Atsuko, I. et al., 2005: 13). As a matter of fact, Ernest Gellner, for one, is adamant that "modernist theories do not necessarily have to be concerned with the navels of the national phenomenon when dealing with the example of Western Europe" (Gellner, 1996: 366-370). Therefore, Gellner's position will be central to the ongoing attempt to critically discern modernist conception of the national phenomenon. Vincent Pecora also reminds us of the fact that, 'Gellner was for some time the leading voice among those who adopted a "modernist position", on the nation, arguing [as had Lenin] that it is a function of economical, technological, and industrial forces emerging in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, and that the ethnic national traditions often invoke to establish modern nation-state are largely imaginary constructions of the fact' (Pecora, 2001: 292 ff). Those who consider Gellner's argument as instrumentalist suggest that his work is the most complete modernist theory of nationalism (Moore, 2001: 76).

### 2.2.2. Nationalism and nations as discussed by Gellner

Perhaps, the appropriate place to begin in terms of seeking to understand Gellner's interpretation of the national phenomenon is with his conception of nationalism. Gellner defines 'nationalism as a striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture

with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that. Put it another way, nationalism invents or creates nations' (Gellner, 1983: 43). Gellner's response to the question why [modern] nationalism would make the marriage between culture and polity (or the endowment of every distinctive culture with its own political roof) its principal task can be discerned from the following statement:

During the agrarian epoch of human history the high cultures or great traditions became prominent, important, and in one sense, but only one sense—that is, cultural sense, dominant. Though they could not altogether impose themselves on the totality, or even the majority of the population, nevertheless, they generally succeeded in imposing themselves on it as authoritative, even if (or because) they were inaccessible and mysterious. They some times strengthened and competed with the centralized state. They could also deputize for that state, when it is weakened or disintegrated during times of troubles (pale or dark) age. A Church or a ritual system could stand in for the shadow of a past or a ghost Empire. (In agrarian age the distinctive high cultures some times had political support and benefited from it, but at other times could dispense with political protection, and that was indeed one of its strengths. In the pale ages when anarchy prevailed and the king's peace was no longer kept, Christian or Buddhist monasteries, dervish *Zawayas* and Brahmin communities could survive and in some measure keep alive the high culture without benefit of protection by sword). But these high cultures did not generally define the political unit, and there are good reasons why, in the agrarian age they should not have been able to do so (Gellner, 1983: 50-1)

Our present interest in Gellner's arguments should not be whether the original Guardians or proponents of the (said) high cultures had the least interest of demarcating economically induced political units (boundaries) that would transcend or undermine their already existing cultural boundaries or were simply unable to do, but instead concentrate on whether different sublanguagues could share the same culture without recourse to the protective sword of the Leviathan? It would seem even in a pan-European context they did, as Di Fabio's interpretation of culture in a post-modern context also suggests: "*Kultur... sei vor allem raumuebergreifende, gemeinsame (westliche) Lebenspraxis. Kultur gebe einen Deutungs- und Handlungsrahmen vor, den wir mit unserem persoentlichen Lebensentwurf lediglich ausfuehren*"(Di Fabio, 2005: 2).<sup>47</sup> Following Di Fabio's culture *verstaendnis* one could thus reasonably foresee that culture has the potential of binding different sublanguagues in their distinctive geographical locations without recourse to protection by the sword.

It follows from the above emphases that Gellner's earlier assertion that genuine cultural entities could indeed outlive political entities unavoidably begs for the conclusion that the

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<sup>47</sup> Udo, Di Fabio, 2005. *Die Kultur der Freiheit*. Muenchen: Verlag C.H. Beck.

former communities do indeed antedate or even anticipate the civic-political states. And Gellner's distinction between "wild" and "garden" cultures seems to confirm just that:

The agrarian man can be compared with a natural species which can survive in the natural environment. Industrial man can be compared with an artificially produced or bred species which can no longer breathe effectively in the nature given atmosphere, but can only function effectively and survive in a new, specifically blended and artificially sustained air or medium. Hence he lives in specially bounded and constructed units, a kind of giant aquarium or breathing chamber. But these chambers need to be erected and serviced. The maintenance of the life-giving and life-preserving air or liquid within each of these giant receptacles is not automatic. It requires a specialized plant. The name of this plant is the national education system. It's effective keeper and protector is the State (Gellner, 1983: 52).

Gellner's sudden transition from artificiality to national education system seems to confirm that he had at last realized that humankind in its entire history, at least the documented one, has yet to wholly construct, synthetically, any life object (and not even the state) that could stand the test of time in the natural environment without that maternal care of nature itself, from whence the word *natio* derives—hence his conception of the national education system. Eventually, if, as Gellner (1983) assumes, the state is the manifest ultimate destiny of the synthetic industrial (or economic) man; and that national states were not the manifest ultimate destiny of ethnic or cultural groups, by simply detaching the objective synthetic substance of the economic man, the state system, from the national phenomenon, one is left to endow the pre-state ethno-cultural groups, at least in their bounded communal sense, with the concept of nation. If anything, the perception of pre-state bounded communities of national inclination also found confirmation in Gellner's own words:

Where existing political boundaries and those of old and crystallizing high cultures with political aspirations, fail to be in harmony, another kind of conflict so highly characteristic of the age nationalism breaks out (Gellner, 1983: 53).

Another point which confirms Gellner's reluctant admission of the existence of pre-state nations or national communities is his notion that languages could serve as the genuine criterion for nationhood. Indeed, Gellner himself did not explicitly endow each language with its own nation; why should he, because according to his model the language grinding machineries of the economically induced nation-states will eventually crush many (especially the aboriginal ones) on their ambitious project of permanent (or lineal) economic development. But by provisionally accepting language as an authentic culture good (Gellner,

1983: 43-45), he implicitly admits that each language, at least, those able to defend their bounded pre-state national communities from the assimilative encroachments of the economic and political states could definitely engender a nation.

At this juncture it makes absolutely no sense to spend more time pondering on what constitutes a national language, at least not in the context of the national state system, since the mythical pre-state national languages of ethno-cultural communities or provenance also had a compact (or homogeneous) character—even if hierarchically diffused. Even in today's context not every one is considered a specialist. What should thus be said of Gellner's incisive arguments is that he was after-all not entirely rejecting the precedence of the cultural nationalism; but only that in its modern economically incline and territorially sensitive sense, political nationalism could have been more a facilitator of the marriage of convenience between the state and the nation, the nation-state. In fact, another staunch defender of the modernist school, Charles Taylor, also sees the need to distinguish between political and cultural nationalism:

French-Canadian nationalism, from the nineteenth into the twentieth century had two forms, of which the dominant one was turned away from the state, and promoted non-state institutions, especially the Church. The more state familiar centred mode was also there, at least since the rebellion in 1837, but remained the less powerful strand; that is until the turnover of 1960, after it has taken over the whole field, with the resultant rise of independentism, and the identity switch from 'Canadian-Francais' to 'Quebecois.' Nevertheless, during those many decades before 1960, there were people whom everybody, including themselves, referred to as nationalities who lacked the state focus. The emotional and moral sources they drew were different.... We gain nothing by excluding this phenomenon from our purview of definitional fiat (Taylor (in E. Gellner), 1998:196)

In terms of modern conception of the national state, Taylor thus rightly perceives a sort of dialectic entwinement of the state and nation. Accordingly, it is not just that nations (especially those with political ambitions) strives to become states; it is also that modern states in order to survive strive to create national allegiances to their own measure (ibid, 191-218).

Importantly, Taylor also realized that even the great founding fathers of secularism—that is, the French and American revolutions, had backward-looking character in that while propagating or preaching horizontal social order against the hierarchical institutions of the high cultures of the past often legitimate their novel constitutions on the basis of the past heritage (i.e. European national descent of creative genius). In his words, the importance of pre-modern revolutions up to and including the English civil war, of the backward look of



establishing original law, come from this sense that the political entity is in this sense action-transcendent. It cannot create itself by its own action. On the contrary, it can act as an entity because it is already constituted as such; and that is why such legitimacy attaches to returning to the original constitution.

Accordingly, the American Revolution took a backward looking spirit in the sense that the colonialists were fighting for their established rights as Englishmen. Furthermore, they were fighting under their established colonial legislatures associated with the congress. But out of the whole process emerges the crucial fiction of “we, the people”, into whose mouth the declaration of a new constitution is placed. Here, the idea is invoked that a people, or, as it was also called at the time, a “nation” can exist prior and independently of its political constitution.—So that these people can give itself its own constitution by its own free action in secular time. Of course, the epoch-making action comes rapidly to be invested with images drawn from older nations of high time (cultures). The *Novo Ordo Saeculorum* just like the new French Revolution calendar draws heavily on Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic. The constitution founding came to be invested with some thing of the force of a “time of origins”, a higher time, filled with agents of a superior kind, which we should ceaselessly try to reproach [in our studies of the modern nation-states] (ibid).

Reproaching some of these superior agents of the hierarchical order of the agrarian age (feudalism) suggests that some of these characters, which Gellner entrusted with the Guardianship of the so-called higher culture, were indeed already economically and politically operational; and only saw in culture a source of legitimacy and enrichment for their socio-economic and political status. And as Blattberg also observes, in the agrarian age of high culture, society was connected to the transcendent through mediating institutions—above all the Church and the Monarchy, with the latter, of course, *Dei Gratia Rex Regina* (Blattberg, 2006: 597-612). The economic and political aspirations of these superior characters have been critically brought to light by Bob Catley and Cristaudo, who further stressed that in the feudal hierarchical social order of Christendom the state power tends to be the preserve of the landowning elite which use the arm forces for internal control, and, where possible, external expansion. Here a hierarchical ideology religious and submissive to the authority in question is often used to enforce this order. This was particularly true of the medieval Church, which did its best to create a system of social control based on the local Church, landownership, the confession and political passivity of Christ (Catley and Cristaudo, 1997: 61ff).

In this sense of rational manipulation of culture (e.g. religion) for sheer economic and political reasons, one could then add that the interests contention which was to later erupt

between the imperial papal authority in Rome and some of its monarchical agents (e.g. King Henry VIII of England—one must not forget that in those days the imperial papal authority in Rome referred to King Henry VIII as the true Guardian of the Catholic faith); and later Martin Luther King on the European mainland, thereby sparking a European-wide social movements of divisive politics (ibid., 62) only goes along confirming the early perception that many of these so-called superior characters—that is, the so-called true Guardians of high culture, were indeed more of economic and political agents than genuine culture custodians. And just as the imperial papal authority in Rome had done earlier with peasants lands to become the dominant landowner in Europe, so did King Henry VIII also redistribute the land seized from the Church to his own loyalists; and even took that future oriented culture initiative to found the Anglican Church. Unsurprisingly, the centralizing state that was to later emerge from the partial ruins of the highly hierarchical social order of feudalism—with its purported horizontal ambitions of modern industrialisation—also played a central role (e.g. in the Enclosure Acts<sup>48</sup>) in the expropriation of Peasants land.

Only in this way one could make sense of Gellner's notion of uprooted peasants seeking identification with the strongest forces of the newly established politico-economic social orders, the nation-states (below). Otherwise, a meticulous review of the social circumstances which in those days compelled the Romano-Celtic rulers of the British Isles to seek the military aid of Germanic mercenaries (Angles-Saxons, Teutons, Jutes), who, as previous accounts did show, later conquered the Isles for themselves, suggest the prior existence of a [demotic] ethnic-core whose claims to original habitation was not necessary guaranteed by the constant guard of the Leviathan sword.

In the words of Margaret Moore, 'the material basis that Gellner provides in his theory of nationalism (below) does not make such a phenomenon reducible to economic interest, but it does explain why national and cultural forms of identity become politicized in the modern industrializing societies of the national state system. Gellner theory provides a material explanation, in terms of life chances, of people's commitment to their own cultural/national group. For many people, their participation in cultural life of the community, their employability, their status, and their skills are all acquired in an all embracing education system operating in the context of a standard cultural milieu supported by the state. This instrumental argument about the salience of these identities, holds even if the historical story that Gellner tells is not absolutely accurate, as long as the connection he makes between the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of life are roughly right (Moore, 2001: 72ff.).

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<sup>48</sup> T.E. Ashton, 1961. *An Economic History of England: the Eighteenth century*. London: Methuen; E. P. Thompson, 1968. *The Making of English Working Class*. Harmsworth: Penguin.

But has Moore's accurate remark about Gellner's work not further strengthened the early postulation of a pre-political cultural nationalism.

Since despite these factors Gellner still seems undeterred by the ideas of a pre-political cultural nationalism and or ethno-cultural nations, let us hand back the podium to him to elaborate on the modernist case. Gellner began his defense of the modernist position by drawing largely on the philosophy of history. He thus categorically shrugs off any idea, that "nations" are there, in the very nature of things, only waiting to be "awakened" (a favourite nationalist expression and image) from their regrettable slumber, by nationalist "awakener"(Gellner, 1983: 48). As he puts it, the high ratio of determined slumberers who would not rise and shine and who refused to be awoken enable them (modernist) to turn the tables on nationalism as-seen-by-itself. Nationalism sees itself as a natural and universal ordering of the political life of mankind, only obscured by that long persistent mysterious somnolence. As Hegel expressed this vision, "nations may have long history before they finally reach their destination—that of forming themselves into states. Hegel immediately goes on to suggest that this pre-state period is really pre-historical (*sic*)"<sup>49</sup>: So it would seem on this view that the real history of nation only begins when it acquires its own state (Gellner, 1983: 48-9ff). However, if we invoke the sleeping beauty nations, neither possessing a state, nor feeling of the lack of it, against nationalist doctrine, we tacitly accept its social metaphysic, which sees nation as the fabric of which mankind is made up. Nations as natural God given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long delayed political destiny, are myth; nationalism which some times takes pre-existing cultures and turn them into nations, some time invent them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general inescapable one (ibid).

### 2.2.3. The transition to the age of nationalism

So, if, as Gellner suggests, nationalism is neither the awakening nor assertion of the prior conscience of the supposedly mysterious natural units of social order, he postulates the period of transition from agrarian to industrial societies as its point of inception. Mankind, Gellner asserts, is irreversibly committed to industrial society, and therefore to a society whose productive system is based on cumulative science and technology (Gellner, 1983: 40ff.). Hence nationalism is rooted in a certain division of labour, one which is complex and persistently cumulatively changing (Gellner, 1983: 24). This society alone can sustain

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<sup>49</sup> G W F. Hegel, 1975. *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*. Translated from German by H B. Nisbett Cambridge, 134.

anything like the present and anticipated number of inhabitants of the planet, and give them a prospect of the kind of living which man now takes for granted, or aspires to take for granted. Therefore it makes no sense, for practical purpose, in discussing the charms and horrors of the cultural accompaniments of the agrarian age, they are simply not available. We do not understand the range of options available to industrial society, and perhaps we never shall; but we understand some of its essential concomitants. The kind of cultural homogeneity demanded by nationalism is one of them, and we had better make our peace with it. It is not the case, as Elie Kedourie<sup>50</sup> claims, that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism (Gellner [1983], Pecora, 2001: 293).

Most of mankind enters the industrial age from agrarian stage. ...The social organization of agrarian society, however, is not all favourable to the nationalist principle, to the convergence of political and cultural units, and to the homogeneity and school transmitted nature of culture within each unit. On the contrary, as in medieval Europe, it generates political units which are either small or much larger than cultural boundaries would indicate; and only very occasionally, by accident, a dynastic state which corresponded, more or less, with a language and culture, as eventually happened in Europe's Atlantic seaboard (Gellner, 1983: 40). In other words, in the onset of industrialism, the rigid, localized social structures and traditional societies stood on the way of industrial modernity, and ought to be weakened or dismantled. In their place develops a new more fluid society, in which the population is much more "modular", able to switch function as the economy demands (Gellner, 1995; Hearn 2006: 69). Here, as the social structures of kinship, caste, differential property rights etc. became less able to functionally integrate society, a new culture develops to do the job. Mass education spreads literacy and common language to the general population—especially to those aboriginals who would dare trade their languages/culture in exchange for economic compensation—helping to facilitate their mobility and inter-changeability. In ancient agrarian states clerics were an elite group specific to the state bureaucracy in modern society every one is a clerk (Gellner, 1964: 160; Hearn 2006: 69ff.). Thus, if a modern society has an official language, a state sponsored, state inculcated and state defined language and culture (say of the dominant group), in which both the economy and the state function; for those originals, who will never and cannot trade-off their cultural identities in exchange for mere economic incentives, will demand to redraw the boundaries of the state, so that they can set up a new

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<sup>50</sup> Elie, Kedourie, 1960. *Nationalism*. London.

polity/economic order where their language will become official. In this way the nationalist imperative is born (Gellner, 1998: 193-194).

This being so, the age of transition to industrialism was bound, according to our model, also to be the age of nationalism, a period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political boundaries, or cultural ones, or both were being modified, so as to satisfy the new modernist imperative which now, for the first time, was making itself felt. Because rulers do not surrender territories gladly (and every change in political boundary must make some one a loser), because changing one's culture is very frequently a most painful experience, and moreover, because there were rival cultures struggling to capture the souls of men, just as there were rival centres of political authority struggling to suborn men and capture territory: given all this, it immediately follows from our model that this period of transition was bound to be violent and conflict ridden. Industrial society did not arrive on the scene from a divine fiat. It was itself the fruits of developments within one particular agrarian society, and these developments were not devoid of their turbulence. When it then conquered the rest of the world, neither this global colonization, nor the abandonment of empire by those who had been carried forward on the wave of industrial supremacy but eventually lost their monopoly of it, were peaceful developments. All this means that in actual history the effects of nationalism tend to be conflated with other consequences of industrialism. Though nationalism is indeed the effect of industrial social organization, it is not the *only* effect hence it is necessary to detangle it from other developments (Gellner, 1983: 40ff.).

This problem is illustrated by the fascinating relationship between reformation and nationalism. The stress of the reformation on literary and scripturalism, its onslaught on monopolistic priesthood (or as Weber<sup>51</sup> clearly saw it, its universalization rather than its abolition of priesthood), its individualism and links with mobile urban populations, all make it a kind of harbinger of social features and attitudes which, according to our model, produce the nationalist age. The role of Protestantism in helping to bring about the industrial world is an enormous complex and contentious topic; and there is not much point in doing more than curiously alluding to it here. But in part of the globe in which both industrialism and nationalism came later and under external impact, the full relationship of protestant-type attitudes and nationalism is yet to be properly explored (Gellner, 1983: 41).

Apart from the link between the protestant and nationalist ethos, there are the direct consequences of industrialization itself. ... Early industrialism means population expansion, rapid urbanization, labour migration, and also economic and political penetration of

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<sup>51</sup> Weber, Max, 1976. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* . 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Talcott Parsons transl.). London.

previously more or less inward turned communities, by a global economy and a centralizing polity. It means that the at least relatively stable and insulated Babel system of traditional agrarian communities, each inward-turned, kept separate by geography sideways, and by an enormous social distance upwards, is replaced by quite a new kind of Babel, with new cultural boundaries that are not stable but in constant and dramatic movement, and which are seldom hallowed by any kind of custom (ibid, 42-3; Pecora, 2001: 294-95).

There is also a link between nationalism and the process of colonialism, imperialism and decolonization. The emergence of industrial society in Western Europe had its consequence the virtual conquest of the entire world by European powers, and some times by European settler populations. In effect the whole of Africa, America, Oceania, and very large parts of Asia came under European domination; and parts of Asia which escape this fate were often under strong indirect influence (ibid). In this particular instance nationalism emerges as traditionalists (and aboriginal traditionalists) in the colonized new world eventually rose up against colonialism and/or imperialism.

### **2.3. If such identities are constructed who (or what) constructs them and why?**

#### 2.3.1. Are National Identities constructed or real?

From the onset of the foregoing (part II), this research has delved analytically through the arguments of the main schools of ethnic and nationalist politics, namely the Primordialist, the Ethno-symbolist, and the Modernist. Quite reasonably, the research began with Geertz's incisive and convincing arguments about the inherent tensions between traditional forms of social organization and modernization that is responsible for the evolution of nations in the newly independent states. The primordialist school has—with specific reference to the political crises of the new states—demonstrated convincingly that most political challenges to traditional forms of social order often originate from economically induced external interventions, whose leaders in the real sense of national culture have neither the slightest idea nor interest in the traditional norms or values of the conquered people. In other words, modern political activities are generally action transcendent in that they traditionally breed on the presumed shortcomings of pre-existing (predisposed) ethno-cultural communities or social orders. As Voegelin rightly points out, all historical quests for the transcendental truth do not occur in vacuum, but in social fields constituted by older experience of order and symbolization of their truth, to be experienced by the [outsider] questioner to have fallen into disorder and decline. This is particularly true of the socio-cultural institutions of the Bantu-

Ethiopians/Azanians (e.g. Manfour, Hiku-Ptah, Thibe, Napata, Meroe and so on), whose authentic quest for the transcendental truth was to later attract mainly economically induced colonial/political interventions from the Hyksos (Philistines?), Persians, Assyrians, Graeco-Romans, Arabs and later Greco-Europeans.

By similar analytical token, Anthony D. Smith has demonstrated convincingly how the political interaction between the inward-looking authentic ethno-cultural communities of nations and the economically induced outward-looking polities (civic political states)—with the support of the aboriginal elements of these traditional social orders—had given rise to the modern concept of nation-states, first, in Western Europe and later in other parts of the earth. According to this model, while modern nation states owe a profound legacy to the political developments of modern England, France and Spain, it must also be noted that such political developments were themselves anticipated by medieval political contentions, a chain of socio-political events that goes as far back to the authentic culture of the Greco-European social history.

Simply put, “the supposedly primitive and barbaric Germanic people, whose quest for individual freedom bravely set them against one of Europe’s early highly professionalized imperial and patrician military machine (the Roman Empire)—e.g. the great invasions of the Roman Gaul by the Franks in the Fifth and Sixth centuries AD...; the Norman conquests in the tenth century AD, and whose political artistry the origin of France (Franks), Burgundy, Lombardy and subsequently Normandy is rightly attributed, which in turn anticipated modern European states like England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain (Renan [1882]; Bhabha, H., 1990:9-21), were, without doubt prior to their grand and ambitious political endeavours, members of an ethno-cultural and hierarchically organized pre-political Germanic *Volksgemeinschaft* of European provenance (Bhabha, 1990: 23-43 especially, 24-25). Only in this way was it feasible in those days of Europe’s political history to mount a coordinated response to the predatory encroachment of the Roman Empire, which eventually led to the disintegration of that empire and the emergence of modern Europe.

This in turn raises such question(s) as to whether the dynastic and militarized aristocratic monarchies, which the Frankish-Normans pioneered across Europe after the disintegration of the Roman Empire, suffice to erase the authentic ethnic-core of European national conscience. In other words, should the malign intentions by political elites to manipulate ethnic identities for the purpose of achieving political and economic incentives—either in the new or old states—be allowed to overshadow the national consciousness of ethno-cultural communities? As we will later see, the culture reintegration of Western Europe after the Second World War

suffices a reminder to critics that informed Europeans are generally aware of their people's common origin. Consequently, prior to discussing the Azanian national model, let's seek to distinguish between realistic-nationalism and pseudo-nationalism.

### III. ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN REAL- AND PSEUDO-NATIONALISM

#### **3.1. Exploring the origin of pseudo-nationalism in retrospect to Europe's political history**

##### 3.1.1. Demystifying the Nation-state symbiosis

In the preceding contesting and at times complementing interpretations of the national phenomenon we might have noticed that certain defenders of the modernist school tend to attest the congeniality of nation-state phenomena, as if the two are synonymous or one could naturally substitute the other. Modernist interpretation of the constitutional nation-state which is largely derived from a normative standpoint contest that territorial and social boundaries of nation-states are contingent—that is to say, it is up to historical contingencies, to the accidental cause of events, normally the arbitrary outcomes of wars or civil wars, who finally seizes power and thereby gains the power of defining the territory and social boundaries of a political community (Habermas, 1995: 286-288). Unsurprisingly, the modernist school treats the nation-state as an overarching modern principle of social organization. In this view there is no clear cut distinction between the nation and state, both seem congenial.

Modernists may be right to claim that the ongoing political marriage [of convenience] between the national phenomenon and state system is a recent political development—and some would say attributed in large part to the political genius of the French revolution. But even so 'this claim to popular representation and national sovereignty by the national state, as it had developed since the French Revolution right through the nineteenth century, was the result of the combination of two factors that were still separated in the eighteenth century and remained separate in Russia and Austria-Hungary, namely nationality and state' (Arendt, 1958, 1969: 229). Therefore, the modernity of the merger between the nation and the state system should not necessary imply that both entities have modern roots. Further, while the state component of the nation-state constitution can be attributed to different historical advances of economic societies, the nation is by its very nature rightly attributed to the culture genius of a distinct people and as a result morally constraining than the state system. It is thus



understandable why both Heinrich von Treitschke and Max Weber “locate the state in the arena of constant struggle between nations”(Guibernau, 1996: 39).

For Treitschke “the grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it makes no sense to desire the [complete] suppression of their rivalry (Guibernau, 1996: 8). War is political science par excellence. Over and over again has it been proved that it is only in war a people becomes in very deed a people. It is only in the common performance of heroic deeds for the salvation of the fatherland that a nation becomes truly and spiritually united.”<sup>52</sup>

Here, we are once again not only being reminded of the precedence of the culture organism, the nation, but how it could be politicized to expand at the expense of other nations. “The nations are themselves growing. No one can say with absolute certainty when the small nationalities will decay internally, or when, on the other hand, they will exhibit an unexpected vital energy.” (Guibernau, 1996: 11) If Treitschke perception about the perpetual conflicts of nations merely evinces their natural durability, his pessimism about the general cause of the history of nations in the shackles of the state system goes along confirming the simple fact that the latter’s continuity or durability is maintained through coercion.

“States, he asserts, do not arise of people sovereignty, but are created against the will of the people; the state is the power of the stronger race (or nation) which establishes itself (Treitschke, 1914:39<sup>53</sup>; Guibernau, 1996: 7). The state is power—that is, the state is people legally united as an independent power; hence the state is always above individuals and has the right to be omnipotent above them. In Treitschke’s view, no moral law exist for the state system. Rather it is the state itself that establishes law in its own domain and requires legal obedience from the individuals or the various nationalities it embodies. In this sense, the state is a moral community of the dominant race or nation.”(Guibernau, 1996: 7)

Moreover, “since states are founded upon the possession of territory, say of the different nationalities they embody, states exert power through war. It is this inherent right of arms that distinguishes the state from all other forms of corporate life” (ibid).

Treitschke’s brief but lucid analysis of the state system seems to contest an abstract prime allocation of bounded geographical regions or territories for the different nations; after all, they are culture imperatives and must be dependent on land for the cultivation of their distinct national cultures. Certainly, “nations entered the scene of history and were emancipated when people had acquired a consciousness of themselves as cultural and historical entities, and of their territory as a permanent home, where history had left its visible traces, whose cultivation was the product of the common labour of their ancestors and whose future would depend

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<sup>52</sup> Davis H W C., 1914. *The Political Thought of H. von Treitschke*. Constable and Company, 150

<sup>53</sup> Treitschke v. H., 1914. *Selections from Treitschke lectures in politics*. London: Gowan and Gray

upon the course of a common civilization. In modern European context, wherever nation-states came into being, migrations came to an end, while on the other hand, in the East and South of Europe the establishment of nation-states failed because they could not fall back upon firmly rooted peasant classes” (Arendt, 1958; 1969: 229<sup>54</sup>). Hence the nation-state was the body politic of the European emancipated peasant class, whose “‘national state army’ was the ‘point of honour’ with the allotment farmers, who themselves later turned into landowners abroad, the newly acquired allotments becoming fatherlands,”<sup>55</sup> and the defence of which promulgated modern European nationalism. Evidently, in a wholly cultural sense, even Europe had originally the potential of actualizing its terminal communal status as an organic nation-being had it not been the divisive political interventions in the course of its social history.

Subsequently, ‘while national consciousness might be comparatively a modern political construct, the structure of the state, for example, was derived from centuries of monarchy and enlightened despotism’(Arendt, 1969: 230). Jürgen Habermas has also stressed convincingly that modern states had existed long before ‘nation’ in the modern sense came about; and that it was not until the eighteenth century that both entities melted into the shape of modern nation-state (1995: 282-283). In this sense, despite the artistic merger and or attempts at the inter-state level to blur or ignore the distinction between these contending principles of social organization, it then follows that neither the national phenomenon nor state system have modern roots. In terms of a brief distinction, ‘the nation is a community whose membership are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture and a national consciousness; while the state, on the other hand, is a political organization with the power to acquire obedience from its members; that is, the different nationalities the state embodies (Seton-Watson H, 1977: 1-5).

Importantly, while Seton-Watson’s definition acknowledges the objective impulse of both social entities, it would seem the former impulse is morally constrained, for example one is morally committed to a distinct communal cause (e.g. ethno-cultural) at all times. In the latter instance, that genuine moral imperative not only loses its objective significance, but is deliberately substituted by forces of permanent contention for power and economic dominance. These dominant politico-economic forces are supposedly divinely chosen to determine the course of political events within the boundary of a given nation-state. A specific instance is what Roberto Dainotto, in the context of contemporary European developments, describes as the North-South dialectic between the hegemonic north and non-canonical

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<sup>54</sup> C A. Macartney, 1934. *National States and National Minorities*. London, 432ff.

<sup>55</sup> Karl Marx, 1898. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. English translation by De Leon.

counter-hegemonic voices from the south, which has accompanied Europe's economic [and cultural] discourses since the eighteenth century until recently.<sup>56</sup>

### 3.1.2. Economic Determinism of European nationalism

If Treitschke's incisive arguments earlier deserve a thorough review, then it is because of his inclusion of war in the activities of states. "War, he argues, is a sharp medicine for national disunion and waning patriotism<sup>57</sup>; it is the political ideal that demands war."<sup>58</sup> (Guibernau, 1996: 8) There are good reasons why war and violence are intrinsic of a political system founded upon the accumulation of the territories of different nationalities Treitschke would have us believe. "If a state loses its independence, it ceases to be a state. Consequently, the chief tasks of the state derived directly from its power involve the administration of justice, the creation of moral law, and war. The exertion of power constantly requires sufficient material resources for self defence and absolute sovereignty. Sovereignty of the state is above that of its individual members. The individual must forget her/his ego for ... the welfare of the whole. The individual must sacrifice her-/himself for a higher community of which s/he is a member; but the state is itself the highest in the eternal community of men."<sup>59</sup> (Guibernau, 1996: 8)

Indeed, Treitschke does not exclude war from the domain of nations, but acknowledges that it has a "sacred dimension"<sup>60</sup> (Guibernau, 1996: 8). So in as much as the life of nations is concerned the sacredness of war cannot and must not transcend that objective quest for real freedom—a 'national freedom which must be defended, at all times, with the blood not of mercenaries (e.g. Blackwater, Légionnaire Francais, or the Gurka of Nepal) but that of the children of the soil' (Habermas, 1995: 286-287). On the part of the state, however, if the sacredness of war is to be taken seriously it is only because the 'secular nation-state—since its inception from the French Revolution—preserves a residue of a sacred transcendence of the pre-political nation' (ibid).

Apart from the exploitation of national symbols and disingenuous members of culture nations by key advocates of the state system for the purpose of safeguarding the state institutions and

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<sup>56</sup> Roberto Dainotto, 2008. Europe (In Theory). *Political Theory* Vol.36 No. 1, 158-160; Roberto, M. Dainotto, 2007. *Europe (In Theory)*. Durham/London: Duke University Press.

<sup>57</sup> Davis H WC., 1914. *The Political Thought ...*, 107.

<sup>58</sup> *ibid*, 153.

<sup>59</sup> Treitschke's Selections, 23, 32.

<sup>60</sup> Treitschke von H., 1916. *Politics* Vol.1, 29

their material fortunes—"I would annexe the planets if I could"<sup>61</sup>; the inclusion of mercenaries in the national state army today, in this age of quasi-denationalized and globalizing economic order, also makes economic sense because of the high cost of maintaining the national constituency in particular (as we will later see). This might further explain the tendentious exploitation of the most powerful race or national group by proponents of the state system in the different historical advances of the nation-states.

For example, when the freedom loving Anglo-Saxons succeeded in putting end to English commercial imperialism in North America they not only inherited the helm of the institutions responsible for the 'oppressing of native/indigenous Americans and other nationalities within the American Federation'<sup>62</sup>, but wasted no time in incorporating French and Spanish controlled territories of North America into the USA as the Napoleonic war machine was systematically disabled from its business of aggression in Europe. Even the state-centric messiah of workers liberty in Europe, Karl Marx, as Catley and Cristaudo find out, "approved that the so-called lesser nations of Europe, including the Slavs, might have to be colonized by the more advanced ones (e.g. the Germans) to get them on the lineal path of economic progress" (1997: 18-19). However, since the Germans could not accomplish that grand economic mission without a united front, Treitschke also acknowledged that his appeal in 1864 for a united Germany would only come to fruition under the leadership of the then most powerful German state, Prussia. In Treitschke words, "...for Germany there is only one hope for salvation, that is: a united and indivisible monarchy (the '*Hohenzollern*'<sup>63</sup>). Prussia, then, has no choice ... but to triumph with the help of the German people." (Guibernau, 1996: 9) Interestingly, a people naturally incline to resist subjugation:

das deutsche Volk ist ein Volk vom Freien, und deutscher Boden duldet keine Knechtschaft. Fremde, Unfreie, die auf ihm verweilen macht er frei.<sup>64</sup>

And if Henning von Tresckow (1943) equivocation of Prussia with real freedom—"Vom wahren Preussentum ist der Begriff der Freiheit nicht zu trennen"—is to be taken seriously,

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<sup>61</sup> Cecil, Rhodes, 1897. *A Biography and Appreciation* (by Dr. Jameson); S. Getrude, Millin, 1933. *Rhodes*. London, 138.

<sup>62</sup> Haywood W. Burns, 1990. In: David Kairy, ed. *The Politics of Law*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 115-120.

<sup>63</sup> Although the Hohenzollern monarchy ascended on Throne in the 18th Century, that monarchy's history goes way back to the Frankish *Kurfürsten* (elected principalities) (Spiegel 'Special Geschichte' March 2007, 27-28.

<sup>64</sup> Jacob Grimm (1848) in einen Antrag für die Frankfurter Versammlung. *Spiegel Special Geschichte* 3/2007, 118.

then the dissolution of the “predatory Prussian state”<sup>65</sup>, after Hitler's political attempt to ‘instrumentalised Prussia’<sup>66</sup> for his pan-Hellenic-Aryan European (national) mission confirms that the state system *per se* is an economic ideal which must never be confused with the national ideal. In short, as noted earlier, if unconstrained by the moral imperatives of its various nationalities or material and other factors, the materially insatiable state system could expand indefinitely; and in most cases at the expense its own source.

As Hannah Arendt further expounds, ‘Expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism, which was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national state limitations to its economic expansion.’ And she is rather explicit about the central role economic agents and their pseudo-nationalist accomplice, within the nation-state constitutions, played in such early expansive endeavours.

‘Conquest and empire building had been carried out successfully only by state forms (or governments) which, like the Roman Empire (Republic), were based primarily on law, so that conquest could be followed by the integration of the most heterogeneous peoples by imposing upon them a common law. The [nation-] state, however, based upon a homogeneous population’s active consent to its government, lacked such unifying principle and would, in the case of conquest, have to assimilate rather than integrate, to enforce consent rather than justice, that is, degenerate into tyranny.

In contrast to the economic structure the political structure cannot be expanded indefinitely, because it is not based upon the productivity of man, which is, indeed unlimited. Of all forms of governments and organizations of people, the nation-state is list suited for unlimited growth because the genuine consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinitely, and is only rarely, and with difficulty, won from conquered peoples. No nation-state could with a clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign peoples, since such a conscience only come from a conviction of a conquering nation that is imposing superior law upon barbarians.<sup>67</sup> The nation,

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<sup>65</sup>Als Kurfürsten Friedrich III sich, vom eigenhändig und nur vom Gottes Gnaden am 18 Januar 1701, zum König Friedrich I krönt, herrschte er über ein zerriessenes, ärmliches Staatsgebiet mit rund 1.5 millionen Einwohnern das aus einigen Herrschaften am Rhein, der Mark Brandenburg, Hinter Pommern und Ost Preussen bestand. Aber hundert Jahr später war die Monarchie der mächtigste Macht Nord Europa, das Staatsgebiet hat sich fast verdreifacht, der Bevölkerung versechsfacht (Spiegel Special Geschichte, March 2007, 7-8). Und noch wichtiger ist dass, nicht nur Friedrich I als Soldaten König berühmt wurde, sondern in Worten seines Nachfolgers, Friedrich II, „sei Preussen ein Militärstaat,“ und alles muss darauf eingetellt sein (ibid, s.10).

<sup>66</sup>Der Nationalsozialismus darf mit fug and Recht behaupten, dass er Preussentum sei. Die Idee, die wir tragen ist Preussisch (Joseph Goebbels cited in Spiegel Special Geschichte March 2007, 16). Und nach Vom Klaus Wiegrefe, war Preussen immer von Mythen und Legenden unterschiedlicher Art gut. Auf den Hohenzollern Staat beriefen sich in den letzten 300 Jahren Reformer und Reaktionär, Monarchisten und Demokraten, Junker und Industrieller, Liberale und Konservative, Nationalsozialisten und Widertandkämpfer (ibid).

<sup>67</sup>This bad conscience springing from the believe in consent as the basis of all political organization is very well described by Harold Nicholson, Curzon, 1934. *The Last Phase* 1919-1925. Boston/New York, NY in discussing

however, conceived of its laws as an outgrowth of a unique national substance which was not valid beyond its own people and the boundaries of its own territory.

Therefore whenever the nation-state appeared as a conqueror, it aroused national consciousness and desire for sovereignty among the conquered people, thereby defeating all genuine attempts at empire building. For example, the early British “empire builders” putting their trust in conquest as a permanent method of rule, were never able to incorporate their nearest neighbour, the Irish, into the far flung structure either of the British empire or the British Commonwealth of Nations; but when, after the last war, Ireland was granted dominion status and welcomed as a full-fledged member of the British Commonwealth, the failure was just as real, if less palpable. The oldest “possession” and the newest dominion unilaterally denounced its dominion status in 1937 and severed all ties with the English nation when it refused to participate in the Second World War. England’s rule by permanent conquest, since it “simply failed to destroy” Ireland (Chesterton), had not so much aroused her own “slumbering genius of imperialism”<sup>68</sup> as it had awaken the spirit of national resistance in the Irish.

The inner contradiction between the nation’s body politic and conquest as a principal device has been obvious since the failure of the Napoleonic dream. The Napoleonic failure to unite Europe under a French flag was a clear indication that conquest by a nation led either to the full awakening of the conquered people’s national consciousness and to consequent rebellion against the conqueror, or to tyranny. And though tyranny, because it needs no consent, may successfully rule foreign peoples, it can stay in power if it destroys first all the national institutions of its own people’ (Arendt, 1958, 1969: 124-128).

Furthermore, many national leaders collusion with agents of European imperialism in the defence of national economic interests abroad explains how disingenuous these really were to genuine nationalist cause of blanket freedom, as Arendt again assert. ‘The complicity of all parliamentary parties in imperialist programs is a matter of record. The history of the English labour party in this regard is an almost unbroken chain of justifications of Cecil Rhodes prediction:

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British policies in Egypt: “The jurisdiction of our presence in Egypt remains based, not upon the defensible right of conquest, or on force, but on our own believe in the element of consent. That element, in 1919 did not in any articulate form exist. It was dramatically challenged by the Egyptian outburst of March 1919.”

<sup>68</sup> As Lord Salisbury put it, rejoicing over the defeat of Gladstone’s First Home Rule Bill, during the following twenty years of Conservative—and that was at the time imperialist—rule (1885-1905), the English-Irish conflict was not only not solved but became much more acute. Also see Gilbert K. Chesterton, 1915. *The Crimes of England*, 57ff.

“Workmen find that although the Americans are exceedingly fond of them. ...yet are shutting out their goods. The workmen also find that Russia, France, and Germany today are doing the same, and the workmen see that if they do not look out they will have no place in the world to trade at all. And so the workmen have become imperialist and the liberal parties are following” (Arendt, 1969: 151).

In Germany “the liberals (not the conservative party) were the actual sponsors of the famous Naval Policy which contributed heavily to the outbreak of the First World War.”<sup>69</sup> The Socialist Party wavered between active support of imperialist naval policy—it repeatedly voted funds for the building of German Navy after 1906—and complete neglect of all questions of foreign policy. Occasional warning of *Lumpenproletariat*, and the possible bribing of section of the working class with crumbs from imperialist table, did not lead to a deeper understanding of the great appeal which the imperialist programs had to the rank and file of the party. In Marxist terms the new phenomenon of the alliance between mob and capital seem so unnatural, so obviously in conflict with the doctrine of class struggle, that the actual dangers of the imperialist attempt to divide humanity into master races and slave races, into higher and lower breeds, into coloured people and white men ... were completely overlooked.

The curious weakness of popular opposition to imperialism in Europe, the numerous inconsistencies and the outright broken promises of liberal statesmen, frequently ascribed to opportunism or bribery, have other deeper causes. ... Half consciously and hardly articulately, these men shared with the people the conviction that the national body itself was deeply split into classes, that the class struggle was so universal a characteristic of modern political life, that the cohesion of the nation was jeopardized. Expansion again appeared as a lifesaver, if and insofar as it could provide a common interest for the nation as a whole, and it is mainly for this reason that imperialist were allowed to become “parasites upon patriotism.”<sup>70</sup> From the very beginning the imperialist adventure of expansion appeared to be an eternal solution because expansion was conceived to be unlimited. Moreover, imperialism was not an adventure in the usual sense because it depended less on nationalist slogans than on the seemingly solid basis of economic interests. Since the dominant and owning classes had convinced everybody that economic interest and the passion for ownership was a sound basis

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<sup>69</sup> In Germany, for example, the liberals and not the right side of the parliament were the supporters of the Naval policy (See, Alfred, von Tirpitz, 1919. *Erinnerungen*. Berlin). See also Danial Fryman (Pseud. for Heinrich Class), Wenn Ich der Kaiser wär 1912: “The true imperial party is the National Liberal Party.” Fryman, a prominent German chauvinist during the First World War, even adds with respect to the conservatives: “The aloofness of conservative milieu about race doctrines is also worthy of note.”

<sup>70</sup> Hobson, J A., 1990. Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa. *Contemporary Review*; Imperialism (1905), Unrevised edition 1938.

for the body politic (the state system), even non-imperialist statesmen were easily persuaded to yield when a common (national) economic interest appeared on the horizon. Hence modern European nationalism developed so clear a tendency toward imperialism, the “inner contradiction”<sup>71</sup> of the two principles notwithstanding.’ (Arendt, 1958, 1969: 151-153)

### 3.1.3. How Economic Agents undermined the Cultural Course of European Nationalism

If Hannah Arendt lucid and incisive analysis not only merely confirm the previous characterization of the state system as an economic ideal, but, on the whole, urges us to reconsider the role economic forces and factors played in undermining the attainment of a culturally homogeneous European nation, then she would most probably have understood that the merger between nation and state was a mixed blessing that would eventually have a negative impact on their distinctiveness in the long-run. For instance, the rational acceptance of the culture of the dominant race or nation by the economic upholders of the state system, even if half-heartedly..., inevitably implies a reciprocal acceptance of the economic institutions and policies of the state system (and/or the cultural institutions of the newly incorporated but subordinated nationalities of the state system) by some of the culture custodians of dominant nation. However, since the incoming subordinate nationalities are not morally obliged to relinquish their indigenous culture heritage or to totally adhere to the culture and economic institutions of the nation-state, it follows that their commitment to the culture and economic institutions of the nation-state would depend largely on either sustainable economic compensation (i.e. permanent golden ages of economic performances) or irresistible coercion by stealth; after all culture and politics are incongruous. Indeed, ‘political societies are always formed partly through coercive force, by which powerful groups impose membership and governance on unwilling populations. But because no ruler has ever had enough coercive power to hold a whole community together by force alone, people always have to form political communities in part through the voluntary cooperation of a critical mass of members, which in essence imply the use of persuasive stories of economic, cultural and political natures’ (Smith, 2008: 287-288). The result is a total aberration from the ideal of the nation for a quasi abstruse political entrapment the disengagement from which has in the past proven cataclysmic for the Europeans and the world at large. Concerted political

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<sup>71</sup> Hobson was the first to recognize the fundamental opposition of imperialism and nationalism and the tendency of nationalism to become imperialist. He called imperialism a perversion of nationalism “in which nations ... transform the wholesome stimulative rivalry of various national types into the cut-throat struggle of competing empires”(ibid., 9).



efforts by pan-Hellenic-Germanic and pan-Slavic nationalists to liberate their people from such early entrapment, that is, the early liberal political tenancy of homogenous national cultures and economic individualism—contemporaneous with the present global economic arrangement (of course, the currency in the nation-states of the global order is multiculturalism and economic individualism)—were not only forced to rely on the artificial institutions of the nation-states they both set out to undo, but ended up provoking the two most destructive wars in modern European social history (the so-called First and Second World Wars).

The main beneficiary of such conflicts, in as much as today's globalised, hyper-privatised, and expressively individualized world is concerned, are the *conmen* of economic and political liberalism. Their eclectic multicultural stance of this global economic age is fully suspect; they are generally disingenuous to culture—in fact, their allegiance is as superficial and tenuous as the economic institutions that flirt across the global economic landscape amassing profits and exploiting cheap labour at the expense of the environment. But 'only at the time of greatest need do these agents of the calculating state switch their rhetoric to the "sacred language" of primordial nationalism. For example, 'when the besieged Joseph Stalin in 1941 switched his rhetoric from "workers" and "peasants" to "Russian motherland"' (Catley and Cristaudo, 1997: 18), after waves of surrender by his Soviet Red Army units, he knew then (as any politician does today) that the suicidal sacrifice required to repel Hitler's Aryan European forces could not come from mundane agents of secularism. In an enlarged political context (e.g. the vision for a world state), the examples are prolific, and merely reiterate what Senator Mc Cain, the Republican nominee for the 2008 US presidential election, once publicly claimed about Israel—infront of Pastor Hagee's convention audience: "If the US government fails Israel where else would it ever succeed."<sup>72</sup> This later eristic statement not only overtly condones George W. Bush post-9/11 "Divine Providentialist" foreign policy rhetoric" (Smith M., 2008: 273-300), but certainly anticipates a positive response from the Right-Wing Christian base of the Republican electorate. With such inconsistencies epitomizing the general character of the economically driven political personalities across the spectrum, it becomes obvious that the state system could not have genuine moral commitment beyond its economic activities.

A critical review of Hannah Arendt accusation of government officials, especially the civil servants, for deliberately confusing the concept of imperialism with nationalism in modern

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<sup>72</sup> <http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2007/gods.Warriors>

European context (Arendt, 1958, 1969: 153-154) serves to elucidate the foregoing point. Accordingly, the civil servants were not only responsible for providing the agents of European imperialism/colonialism with the necessary human resources for their pseudo-nationalist endeavours abroad, but in large saw in the colonization of non-European nations the validation of their status as the true servants of the state system. This might help explain why “when European imperialism entered the scene of politics with the scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century it was welcomed by a large section of European educated class.”<sup>73</sup> (Arendt, 1969: 147) It also explains why academic institutions have evolved to be pro the secular state despite their affinity with [national] cultures. In Malowe *Faustus*:

“Oh, what a world of profit and delight, of power, of honour, and omnipotence, is promised to the studious Artisans.

All things that move between the quite poles shall be at my command; emperors and kings are but obeyed in their several provinces; But his dominion that exceeds in this, stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man” (Sidney, 1904: 29-30)

Even romantic scholars and philosophers (e.g. Fichte and Hegel), who generally spoke in the language of determined spiritualist/idealist, ended up being ardent materialist for supporting the accumulative machinery of the state system (Cassirer, 1949, 2002:186). Thus that the state system and nations are considered to be symbiotically related—as Hegel was quoted earlier as suggesting—has much to do with the fact that ‘states have, since their inception, been incorporating many of the traditional institutions and values for rational purpose of political and social compliance’ (Catley and Cristaudo, 1997: 11-15). In any case ‘the psychological breadth and complexities of traditional experiences and their unintended secular effects must be studied in detail in order to understand the social evolution of states’ (ibid, 1997: 58).

Inasmuch as the modern secular nation-state evolved from traditionally established social norms, ‘there are four major kinds of societies which underpin states in their different stages of historical advances, namely, agricultural, industrial, service based, and information based societies’ (ibid, 60). Moreover, the incorporation of traditional institutions and values by agents of the state for political and social compliance intuitively implies that these different

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<sup>73</sup> According to J.A Hobson “...expansion of the empire appeals powerfully to the aristocracy and the professional classes by offering new and ever-growing fields for the honourable and profitable employment of their sons.” It was “above all ... patriotic professors and publicists regardless of political affiliation and unmindful of personal economic interest” who sponsored the outward imperialistic thrusts of the 70ies and 80ies.” See also, Carlton J. H. Hayes, 1941. *A Generation of Materialism*. New York, 220.

historical stages of nation-state transition were naturally permeated by violent turbulences (ibid., 1997: 310-340):

The human spirit has flung itself in multiplicity of social directions as people have cooperated, conquered, surrendered, built, destroyed, argued, compromised, dreamed, hoped, erred and some times understood what they have been doing. Violence and force has been the constant companion of social life as groups have plundered, killed, co-opted, and coerced others to do their will. Violence is intrinsic to the political history of sexes, races, nations, empires and tribes. Political power is first experienced as something brutal and terrifying, as something in which a power greater than single person is unleashed. The earlier law codes available to us from Mesopotamia and Assyria belie the ferocious brutality which is marshalled against those who dare to transgress what the law lays down. Torture, amputation, burning, violent death are not at the margins of social and political organization. In short, political power is first experienced as something bestial.

And in specific reference to Europe, the revocation of the founding myth of the Roman Empire (to be discussed later) should show that the violent conflicts which in the past overshadowed European identity process—since ‘its inception from the Greek culture’ (Burns, 1989: 75-76)—were more or less brotherly conflicts provoked by hedonic sentience rather than any genuine nationalist endeavour.—A point expounded articulately by Strayer:

The early Germanic kings had destroyed the Roman Empire in the West, but then went on to destroy each other, with new invaders coming along to help the process. The Franks conquered rival kingdoms in Roman Gaul and Germany only to find themselves split by civil war and shaken by attacks of the Northmen. The Ostrogoths and Vandals were wiped out by the Eastern Empire, the Visigoths by a Moslem invasion. The Danes put an end to most of the Anglo-saxon kingdoms. Only in the tenth century did the sole survivor, the Kingdom of Wessex, gain control of most of England. But after 1000 A.D. those sweeping changes became rare. The chief surviving kingdoms, that of England, the Kingdom of West Franks, which became France, the kingdom of Eastern Franks, the nucleus of Germany, were to endure in one form or another down to our present day. The same thing happened at local level; the great noble families took root in specific places instead of wandering about seeking power and plunder. No longer could a count from the Rhineland become ruler of Western France, as the ancestors of the Capetians had done; no longer could a Viking leader make himself master of French province as Rollo had done in the Normandy... (1970: 16-17).

Strayer’s position thus anticipates Sue’s critical review of the exploitative nature of the political arrangements of Agrarian/Feudal Europe:

For the secular power elites, identity was linked to class. Land and population were the property of class and could be conquered, inherited or acquired by dynastic marriage. No state boundaries were rigidly

fixed. Territory could change hands either through force or contract. The highest echelon of this class could become part of the ruling elite in any region of Europe. Most members of the aristocracy married and inherited locally, but at the apex of this class, marriage, inheritance and feudal relationship happened at a pan-European scale. This made it psychologically easy for the group to see itself as a polyglot ruling class which knew each other, who used one or more of the limited prestige language varieties, and who were horizontally differentiated from the peasant masses. ... The peasant class and the nobility from one locality might fight as a unit, but the impermeability of the ruling class and the chasm between classes would prevent a single from becoming predominant ... (2000: 19ff).

And Renan never shied away from the fact that although “the difference between noble and serf was as sharply drawn as possible, but it was in no sense presented as an ethnic difference; it was presented rather as a difference in courage, customs, and education, all of which were transmitted hereditarily; it did not occur to anyone that the origin of all this was conquest. The spurious system according to which nobility owed its origin to a privilege conferred by the king for services rendered to the nation, so that every noble was an ennobled person, was established as a dogma as early as the Thirteenth century. The same thing took place in almost all the Norman conquests. After one or two generations, the Norman invaders no longer distinguish themselves from the rest of the population, although their influence was no less profound because of this fact; they had given the conquered country a nobility, military habits, and a patriotism that they had not known before” (Renan, 1882; cited in Homi Bhabha, 1990: 11). But why such seemingly expedient and serene interminglement, if the Germanic groups ... were genetically different from the Southern Europeans or the Levantines?

Rationally, Renan attributes the relatively serene interminglement of the conquering Germanic groups (e.g., Franks, Burgundians, Goths, Lombards, and Normans) from Europe’s north and central parts with the Levantines of Europe South to two main factors, namely that this particular historically “ambivalent”<sup>74</sup> Germanic groups often fought without their own women (or with very few of them)—hence their chiefs while marrying women of their own race had to settle with Levantine concubines; and so too the rest of the group. So by the time the Germanic groups established themselves ... had to adopt the language of the conquered people. Subsequently, the grandsons and daughters of *Clovis*, *Alaric*, *Gundebald*, *Aloin* and *Roland* became Latin speakers with time.

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<sup>74</sup>Ambivalent in the sense that its incursions into Southern Europe was provoked by the Roman Empire military inroads into Germanic settlements; and as a *Befreiungsvolksgemeinschaft* against Roman aggression ended up emulating the conquering ethos of Roman imperialism.

### 3.1.4. Racial Creed in Greek Philosophy and its Impact on European Political Nationalism

Despite the undeniable political relevance of Renan's rational interpretation of Europe political history, he unintentionally or deliberately overlooked the overwhelming importance of the racial idiom of early Greek philosophical speculations, which was to be later appropriated by geneticists of Hitler's Third Reich in their quest for a European superior race. According to Simona Forti, 'there is no shortage of Nazi and pre-Nazi ideologues who stressed on the Nordic essence of Hellenic-Germanic brotherhood' (Forti, 2006: 14ff). In Forti's exponential reading of Alfred Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des XX Jahrhunderts und Gestalten der Idee*, "the Aryans of antiquity are the Greeks, the people who have given form to their soul, who have produced the *Darstellung* (representation) or the *Gestaltung* (configuration) of their race in the absolute delineation of artistic form. In this view, Greek Aryans art is an organic art that generates life. Germany must repeat the Greek achievement of giving life to the political body, to the people, as a work of art, as a fully achieved form of a German soul, as an identification and realization of the racial Type. Plato provides the mythical power of an idea of a political body that is achieved in a living work of art, to be composed not only with the material offered by language, traditions, and customs, but also with the material provided by blood and soil"(Forti, 2006: 16).

While this form of pre-Nazi and Nazi's interpretation of Plato's works undoubtedly runs through the political culture of German romanticism, scholars of classical culture, like Werner Jaeger<sup>75</sup>, and nationalist propagandists and ideologues, have borrowed Plato's philosophical speculations to legitimate their calls for a European superior race. In *Paideia*, for instance, one finds sinister affinities with pre-Nazi and Nazi platonic interpretations. In the introduction to the first edition of *Paideia*, we can find statements that emphasize the value of platonic philosophy not as a "set of abstract ideas", but rather as a "work whose goal is living reality; more specifically the formation of a superior race ... that can succeed in preserving and propagating its physical and moral type" (Jaeger<sup>76</sup>; cited by Forti, 2006: 16). This kind of Platonic heritage is perfected in a "nationalistic" way in the context of Stefan George Kreis. One may refer, for example, to the work of Kurt Hildebrandt, Platon: *Der Kampf des Geistes*

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<sup>75</sup> Werner Jaeger, 1934. *Paideia: Die Formung des Griechischen Menschen*. Berlin: W.de Gruyter (Werner, Jaeger, 1945. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press); V., Loseman, 1977. *Nationalsozialismus und Antik*. Hamburg: Hoffman and Camp.

<sup>76</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 1-20.

*um die Macht*.<sup>77</sup> Authors such as Bannes and Gabbler even go as far as identifying directly and explicitly the ideal of the Platonic state with the Third Reich<sup>78</sup> (ibid, 16).

In Forti's words, Hans F K. Günther's works are outstanding in this regard for providing an exemplary instance of the way in which some conceptualizations of Western philosophical traditions were used by Nazi pseudo-metaphysics. Guenther texts are valuable because they seem to address the crucial question, what is human for the Third Reich? The answer he provided—in his books *Platon als Hüter des Lebens* (1928)<sup>79</sup> and *Humanitas* (1937)—is much simpler than those put forward by Rosenberg. Arguing in a transcendental manner in these books, he clarifies “the conditions for participating in the ideal, in the type, in the soul; that is in the myth of the people.” (Forti, 2006: 16-17)

In Günther's *Platon als Hüter des Lebens*, we find that everything confirms the “Nordic essence” of the Greek Philosopher. ... “The Nordic race, unlike the other European races, is marked by a strong individuality, by loyalty to his group, by his ability as a doer and producer, by qualities of his judgement, by his aristocratic *Führer Geist*, and by his warrior virtues. These features assume their full relevance when contrasted with the oriental Mediterranean race; especially the Jews race (a race devoid of Soul). Once again we find the idea that ancient Hellenes represented the highest example of “Nordic character,” which was later corrupted through widespread of interbreeding of peoples. Plato must now serve as a warning to Germany, so that it must not repeat the errors that led to the decadence of the great Greek civilization. The German people must revive, indeed bring back to life in a still more authentic form, the Greek original potentiality of true European culture; it must finally give shape to Platonic anthropology, politics, and philosophy.”(Forti, 2006: 16-17)

As Forti points out, Günther's textual references to Plato are especially to Book V of *The Republic*, *The Statesman*, and the *Laws*. For the Nazi anthropologist, “the platonic ideal that coincides with the perfect exemplar of human being is attainable, and at the same time “operative,” if spiritual purification coincides with biological selection, with the choice of an elite that becomes transparently Nordic, and which the blonde image of divinity may be reflected.<sup>80</sup> Beauty and goodness are part of truth once they become real or “embodied.” This is the *kagathia*—the Greek ideal of the inextricable connection of being good and being beautiful—in which the Third Reich must take step from idea to reality, transmitting the ideal

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<sup>77</sup> K. Hildebrandt, 1933. *Platon: Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht*. Berlin: Bondi.

<sup>78</sup> J. Bannes, 1933. *Hitler und Plato*. Berlin-Leipzig: de Gruyter; A Gabler, 1934. *Platon und der Führer*. Berlin-Leipzig: de Gruyter.

<sup>79</sup> H K F., Günther, 1928. *Platon als Hüter des Lebens*. München:Lehemanns Verlag.

<sup>80</sup> Guenther, *Platon als Hüter des Lebens*, 30.

of individual perfection into a humanity made pure and perfect by the process of selection.” (ibid, 18)

This racial idealism presents itself as “metaphysics of form,” of *Gestalt*, of the perfect identity of the body and soul. ... Race thus becomes a phenomenon perceived by our senses as an expression of the soul that, according to the words of *Phaedo*, is related “to divine, immortal, rational, uniform, indissoluble and always identifiable to itself.”<sup>81</sup> As Forti asserts, unlike the Sophists, Günther’s thought is oriented toward action. It wants to intervene effectively in the political crisis brought about by Peloponnesian war in which Athens and Sparta lost the flower of their Nordic youth. “True philosophy is therefore that which re-establishes order in the chaotic democratic city and gives form once again to what is shapeless, selects purity out of the mixture of races that is true cause of decadence. Plato’s virtue cannot be thought; it is a matter of race.”<sup>82</sup> (Forti, 2006: 18)

Forti sees Günther’s monism as built on a system of dual separations and oppositions that re-establish and start a selective mechanism and that transform the selection into a true dialectical process of *askesis*, necessary for reaching the one. “Life is the form union of body and soul, which must prosper, maintain itself and grow, and which can achieve its full expression only if the life of the *ghenos* (race) prospers, maintains itself and grows—in other words, if the life of the type prospers. The form here fixes the features of the soul and the somatic characteristics in a univocal system of correspondences. To allow the best to prosper and to suppress the worst is always for Plato the criterion that must guide political legislation.<sup>83</sup> The death sentence of the unworthy is therefore related to the purification of the race and to the health of the polis: a conception that adheres to Greek thought as it does to Roman and Germanic thought.<sup>84</sup>

Plato’s heritage may therefore be picked up only by Germany, which knows that the distinction between noble and non-noble is not a social, education, or class issue, but rather an

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<sup>81</sup> Plato. *Phaedo*, 78c-80c.

<sup>82</sup> Günther. *Platon als Hüter des Lebens*, 22-28. Here *ghenos* and *ethnos* are translated as race.

<sup>83</sup> Günther’s references to Plato’s arguments include especially those contained in the *Republic*, 450-460: “the best men should have sex with the best women as often as possible, whereas for the worst men and the worst women it should be the reverse. We should bring up the children of the best, but not the children of the worst, if the quality of our herd is to be as high as we can make it ... The children of the inferior parents, on the other hand, or of any deformed species born to other group, will be removed from sight into some secret and hidden place, as is right”(Plato. *Republic*, 157-158). And also *Laws*, 735b-c: “In dealing with a flock of any kind, the shepherd or cowherd, or the keeper of horse or any such animals, will never attempt to look after it until he first applied to each group of animals the appropriate purge—which is to separate the sound from unsound, and the well-bred from the ill-bred, and to send off the later to other herds, while keeping the former under his own care; for he reckons that his labour could be fruitless and unending if it were spent on bodies and souls that nature and ill-nurture have combined to ruin, and that bring ruin on a stock which is sound and clean both in habit and body—whatever the class of the beast—unless a thorough purge be made in the existing herd”(R. G., ed. 1951. *Plato’s Laws* Vol. I. London: Heinemann, 348-351.

<sup>84</sup> Günther, *Platon als Hüter des Lebens*, 72.

opposition of pure and impure, and therefore an ontological issue.<sup>85</sup> One cannot escape from the soul of the race, because nobody can escape from his own body, which is precisely an expression of the Type. For the Hellenes—the Nordic race of antiquity—there was nothing spiritual which did not affect the body, nothing corporeal which did not also affect the soul. This is the spirit of the Nordic race. The medieval Church has dangerously inculcated in the Western man the idea that the body belongs to the domain of sin. This is the spirit of the Levantine race.<sup>86</sup>(Forti, 2006: 19-20ff)

Essentially, true superior values of Hellenic culture finally become authentic the moment they are “embodied.” It is the duty of the Nordic spirit, “nowadays” incarnated by the German people, to suppress, once for all, the contradictions between body and soul, between race and people, between people and the nation, to finally realize the truth of the idea, of the Type, of the one and eternal soul.<sup>87</sup> This is how a Volk is created Günther seems to conclude” (Forti, 2006: 21).

The core appeal of Günther’s second book, *Humanitas*, was the unity of Europe on racial basis. Accordingly, it obsessively returns to the theme of “German-Hellene brotherhood, based on common origin of Nordic stock, located in central Europe in the Neolithic age.”<sup>88</sup> The greatness that has developed, “thanks to the uninterrupted process of selection,”<sup>89</sup> starting from exemplary families in Greece and Rome is, and will always be, the ideal representative of the Nordic race. The value of *Humanitas* lies in this greatness, made true and fortified by racial selection. “The Hellenic Roman value of Humanitas, Indogermanic spirituality directs itself once again towards the racial ideal of the strong, noble and beautiful man.”<sup>90</sup>

In general, “Hellenism is a culture of “reaction” to decadence, and of racial interbreeding: a reaction to a surrounding world that is increasingly de-Nordified and degenerate.<sup>91</sup> Authentic *humanitas* is progressively eroded in its noble meaning of a hymn to life by the process of de-Nordification (*Entnordung*) and degeneration. The Hellenic-Germanic concept is aristocratic: It demands the victory of man over any lowly tendency that is in him, over any physical or hedonistic slackening. It demands firmness, contempt for utilitarian values, sense of measure, and a sense of reserve. And to this inner dignity and nobility there corresponds a brave and

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<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*, 40.

<sup>86</sup> *ibid.*, 56.

<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*, 88.

<sup>88</sup> Günther. *Humanitas*, 10.

<sup>89</sup> Günther. *Humanitas*, 24.

<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, 24.

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*, 22.



proud body: the Nordic type with blue eyes and blond hair, tall and upright, a high and wide forehead with a frank and straight face”<sup>92</sup> (Forti, 2006: 21-22).

Humanitas is therefore the ideal of the Nordic purity that can always be improved; it is the Platonic ideal. ... But Nazism, unlike the philosophies of the past, offers the historical possibility of “embodying” these absolutes, of phenomenalizing them. “The idea of humanitas corresponds to the same Indogermanic ideal of the noble man who in Hellas, in a more strictly selective context, produced the two conceptions of *eugeneia* and *kalokathagia*.” This value is lost when it is transformed into an ideal of individual perfection. “The falsification of Humanism took place in the epoch of late Roman world: the immigrant Levantines, especially the Jews, who pretended to be Hellenes and Romans to avoid the ancient contempt of foreigners, in fact tried to pervert humanism into doctrine of brotherhood and equality, in the name of an abstract man who does not exist.”<sup>93</sup> True Humanism “is a duty to be carried out, a model to be reached..., an ideal of racial and marital selection, because only a conception that distinguishes between the best and the worst can preserve true ethics and ideals, an aristocratic conception... a conception which is the knowledge of the true blood that must be increased and the worst blood which must be purged.”<sup>94</sup> These are the words to be written on the tombstone of the Greek and Roman worlds; and from them meaning arises for us, as descendants of those Germanic peoples who belong to the same race of the Hellenes: *Mihi natura dedit leges a sanguine ductas*”<sup>95</sup> (Forti, 2006: 22-23ff). And such identity forging process is indeed univocal with Hitler’s European ideal.<sup>96</sup> In fact Hitler’s description of his preferred European personality/identity does not leave the least doubt:

So erzählt Adolf Hitler, wie er als 18 jährige 1907 nach Wien zog, wo er sich häufig in Rotlichtviertel herumtrieb und wütend über “Juden und Ausländer” schimpfte, die dieses „ekelhafte, lasterhafte Treiben“ anführten, das „unschuldige jungen blonden Mädchen verdarb“ und „Gift“ in die Adern Deutschlands infiziert (Adolf Hitler<sup>97</sup>; deMause, 2002, 2005: 47)

In Forti’s apt formulation, this “European personality is the *macroanthropos* who will start the ascending path of the *synagogue*, the process of approximation and conforming to the idea, which is at the same time always and already the return to the one. This will happen

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<sup>92</sup> Günther, Humanitas, 30.

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, 30.

<sup>94</sup> *ibid.*, 18.

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.*, 37.

<sup>96</sup> This reference to the Nazi Movement as the frontrunner of modern political endeavour to unify Europe also found its expression in Jörg Haider arguments quoted in Henning Scharsach, 1992. *Haiders Kampf*. Wien, s. 7f

<sup>97</sup> Adolf, Hitler, 1971. *Mein Kampf*. Boston: Houston Mifflin, 59.

through the selection of the material (Gold, Silver or Bronze) through which the people are made, and through the purging of those bodies that are an expression of evil soul, or those bodies that only simulate the Type and that try to falsely insulate themselves into the limbs of the great body of the *ethnos* (race)” (Forti, 2006: 23).

When we now add these type of political interpretations of Plato’s polis-centric philosophical discourse to the hierarchical political tenancy of Agrarian Europe, in which the nobility was by nature supposedly as white as the white clouds underneath the blue sky in a Sunny summer day—after all Plato’s ascending journey from Hades (the abode of the dead) was narrowly conceptualized to take aim at the golden Sun of eternal life, while the European peasant masses a bit darker (again echoing Plato’s ideal of Hades), we are bound for an ideological Molotov which (in modern European context) could be easily appropriated by pseudo-nationalists and pseudo-scholars alike, Simona Forti seems to conclude (emphasis added).

### 3.1.5. The culture deficit of the Greek Polis and its impropriety for the national ideal

This critical review of the culture orientation of Plato’s *Politeia/Republic* (discourse of the Polis), the harbinger of European nation-states, should serve to repel any culture attempt to appropriate the Socratic-Platonic ideal of a “perfect society” for a European nation. As a matter of fact, the opening discourse of the *Republic* stated clearly that Plato’s contemporary Piraeus (Hades) was without doubt in a state of conflicting cultures, especially between the “dominant Thracian” and the “splendid local culture,” when Plato and one of the interlocutors of his Republic, Glaucon (the Sophist), descended to offer prayers to the goddess Bendis and watch festival in her honour (Republic [327] Lee, 1955: 51). Interestingly, as a staunch defender of the Greek polis, Plato was no longer interested in reviving that “splendid local culture” he hinted later to his modern European political nationalist; this would probably have meant a return to the darkness or the intricacies of Hades, where only the culturally constrained mythical mind—with its innate inclination to detail—is capable of recovering from the concoction of the then highly politicized Piraeusian culture the authentic local genius. This domain seemed too esoteric for the economically minded political philosopher—hence it must be left as quickly as possible for a narrowly conceptualized focal point of ascension. In other words, the politically minded Socratic-Plato helpless in terms of reviving his splendid local culture from the utter *melange* of his contemporary Greek political culture opted for an abstract constitution conducive to the then political reality. Even though Plato acknowledged (in his Republic) the need to adhere to the culture prelude in terms of the quest

for transcendental existence—indeed intelligible life must attain immortality, but that should not substitute the fact that the constitution of his Republic was construed to accelerate the journey out of the socio-cultural and political intricacies of Hades (Earth): for the Republic seems to forbid any return to the past. Such a narrowly conceptualized one-way ascending journey seems to imply abandoning the culture inevitability of Hades for yet another supposedly habitable celestial province whose exact location in his contemporary Greece was still uncertain. To use George W. Bush Jr. Providentialist language, “And the light shines in darkness. And darkness will not overcome it” (Smith M., 2008: 285). But are we not too naïve with this form of leucomanic or nyctophobic attitudes by ignoring the primordiality of darkness on Earth?

In Hesiod’s *Theogony* we are told in a song inspired by the Muses that: “the sweet words flowed effortlessly from their lips singing about the past, present, and the future.” These (Muses) who were born in Pieria had Zeus as their Father and Memory (*Mnemosyne*) as their Mother... to allow the oblivion of evils and relief from all worries...” “...with the passing of the time Mnemosyne gave birth to nine daughters, united in heart and purpose... There they dwell with grace, dances, and desire. ...Festively they celebrate and sing and ... glorify the wise laws and virtues agreeable to us all ... rejoice, daughters of Zeus, let me sing an enchanting tune to relate how the gods were first created, then land and the rivers and the Sea; [How] the vast heavenly expanse and the lofty bright stars ... [were created]. Tell me of the beginning of things, what came first”?

And they modestly responded:

“In the beginning there was Chaos  
and then broad-bosomed Earth  
and Eros the most handsome  
among the immortal Gods  
secured (for man) a foothold in eternity

Out of Chaos,  
and (out of the) darkest Night the day  
and the sky came forth:  
the Earth first gave birth to her equal

to the sky with its constellations and to the lofty mountains...<sup>98</sup>

Even modern scientists who generally tend to discredit such divine inspiration as myth have only recently conceded to the fact that without the primordial water or green-crown/vegetation of Hades (Earth) human life is not sustainable in any of these virtually uncountable celestial provinces. Moreover, the container tubes being currently used to transport the green-houses of the international space station (ISS)—in their quest for a habitable celestial province—are originally from Hades/Earth. In this sense, it should be reemphasized that past efforts by European aristocracy to trample on the inhabitants of Hades—what National Socialist leaders would later call *echte Volksgemeinschaft* and the Marxist, proletariat—in their hasty quest for eternal life in the illusionary blue sky above our heads resulted in Europe's two devastating conflicts of the past century.

Evidently, the role “race” and “class” thought played in modern European nationalist (and internationalist) movements and continue to play in modern European thought has been elaboratively explored in Forti's readings of political nationalist interpretation of Greek literature earlier. Since Forti's informative analyses reaffirmed the quasi-uninterrupted development of European social history and or socio-political thought from an original Greek culture template, those familiar with ancient Greek epic literature concerning the hostile reception of Prometheus (Greek god of Hand-workers) in the hands of the Olympian gods of aristocracy should therefore have no difficulty correlating that early epic narrative with Marxist interpretation of history as the struggle between classes. The commonality between *Aichylos* seizure of Prometheus as the real saviour and martyr or the true representation and lawyer of Greek popular front against physical and spiritual enslavement and Marxist seizure of the proletariat; and or Nazis seizure of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, against the economic injustices of the liberal tenancy of class structured society... should have urged the studios to make peace with the common historic and cultural heritage of the Europeans.

This now being the case, one should then add that the early exploitation of the European Masses—through divisive politics—by advocates of the Greek Polis (City-states); the imperial Roman state; Feudal/Agrarian and/or modern European nation-states was for the sheer purpose of hedonic sentience associated with economic and political power. Renan has also remarked that “the emergence of an individual Germanic identity occurred only a few centuries B.C; prior to this time, mingled with Slavs, in the huge indistinct mass of

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<sup>98</sup> Hesiod Theogony 116; See also Michael Kalopoulos, 1995, 2003. *Biblical Religion: The Great Lie*, 22-23. In a footnote to page 22 n.17, Kalopoulos described Hesiod and Homer as the greatest epic poets of Greece.

Scythians, they did not have their own separate identity.”(Homi B., 1990: 15) And the German art historian, Joseph Strzygowski, has also discovered that, “the so-called Nordic race (Indogermans) is composed of the amalgam of Germans, Ukrainians, Armenians, Persians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks.”<sup>99</sup> In viewing this, are we not right to ascribe Friedrich Wilhelm political method—the random kidnapping of European youths (albeit physical selection)—of replenishing his depopulated Prussia as an authentically pan-European initiative.<sup>100</sup> After-all [even] Zeus, one of the numerous Greek aristocratic deities, method of rescuing *Europa* from experiencing the unavoidable tragic fate of her Phoenician ancestor’s divisive politics... was to set the stage for what would later become synonymous with European identity process (one must not forget that Paris was also involved in the kidnapping Helena).

However, such overwhelming evidence in favour of a culturally homogeneous European national identity did not dissuade pseudo-scholars, subservient to the divisive nation-states (of modern European nationalism), from their ability to distinguish between Hellenic-Germanic groups from other Europeans. “The society of medicine in Paris (France) not only published a report on the discovery of “polychesia” (excessive defecation) and “bromidrosis”(body odour) in German race, but propose urinalysis for the detection of German spies; German urine was “found” to contain 20 percent non-uric nitrogen as against 15 percent for other races.”<sup>101</sup> In the apt phrase of Hannah Arendt, ‘we owe it to these scientific preachers rather than any genuine scientific findings that today no single science is left into whose categorical system race-thinking has not deeply penetrated. As a matter of fact, the Sophists deliberate confusion of “Might” with “Justice” in that famous political dialogue with the Socratic-Plato in the *Republic/Politeia* later found its classical expression in Spinoza’s “Might-Right” correlation, which in turn permeated natural science and produced the “Law” of survival of the fittest (1958, 1969: 159-160).

With such economically induced pseudo-scholarship at the permanent service of divisiveness in European social history, we had better not waste time accusing the bestiality of Romulus for the violent death of his twin brother Remus—these brotherly characters, who were supposedly raised by a female Wolf, are the prominent characters of the founding myth of the Roman Empire); the Anglo-Saxon British Lion; the Prussian Adler (Eagle); the Anglo-American Eagle; or even the architects of the Third Reich for wanting to deify the “blue-eyed

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<sup>99</sup> See his Altai, 1917. *Iran und Völkerwanderungen*. Leipzig, 306-307.

<sup>100</sup> In ganz Europa entführten Friedrich Wilhelms sogenannte weber junge Männer. In London z.B. musste die preussische Gesand seinen Platz räumen, weil er heimlich an die brutal Verschleppung beteiligt war (see, *Spiegel Special Geschichte* 3/2007:8-9).

<sup>101</sup> E.g. Jacques Barzun, 1937. *Race*. New York, 239.

and blond-haired” Aryan Europeans. The deliberate misinformation the leadership of this later “classless” (*echte Volksgemeinschaft*) European group was relegated to such utter monstrosity deserve critical attention than is currently the case. Even aside the quasi-satanic and racist proclamation in the Talmud (or later Old Testament) that the reason for divinity’s curse of *Ham/Cham*’s descendants (the Bantu-Ethiopians) was their Blackness<sup>102</sup>; the political notion that the biblical God should be whitened to the likeness of the white clouds hanging under the illusionary blue sky above the Swabian Alps (the locality of the *Hohenzollern* castle) serves to explain the National Socialist leadership disdain for the supposed superiority of non-Aryan Europeans, the black haired Europeans/Levantines. This in turn begs for such pressing question as to why is the survival strategy of the nation-state based upon the deception of the nationalities and citizens of its own constitution; why do the economically induced political agents of the expansive state system within the nation-state constitutions deliberately deny the majority of the nationalities and citizens of these constitutions the right kind of knowledge about their own cultures (or in that matter cultures of others) given such unpredictable political events as the rise of the “Third Reich” or more recently “Al Qaeda and/or Islamic Talibanism”?

Before turning to this rather exigent question, it is worth emphasizing that left alone on the natural instincts of the she-Wolf that supposedly raised the vicious Romulus of the Roman Empire after he and his twin brother Remus were abandoned by their original mother, both brothers would not suffice a genuine meal. Therefore, let’s assume that the culture template of the newly evolving European nation—that is, the choice of the “Minoan Bull”, the mythical animal that Zeus had originally used in his rescue of *Europa*—is judiciously or cognitively intended to emphasize the humanistic side of European politics; then, the resilience of Europe’s culture nationalist deserve our recognition and applause despite such political difficulties as the recent decision by Irish voters to turn-down the Lisbon Treaty on the intensification of Europe’s reintegration. This latter mythical animal of Europe’s reintegration makes cultural sense because had Zeus originally metamorphosed into, say, a carnivorous lion, tiger, wolf, bear, etc.—echoing the blood stains of the “Leviathan sword”, there would probably be nothing left of Europe today. In other words, the prospects for envisaging Europe as a distinct national entity depends in large on its people recognition of the fact that the blood that streams the veins of their nation’s mythical *animal* (the Minoan Bull) stems wholly

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<sup>102</sup> Harold Blackman, 1977. “*The Ebb and Flow of Conflict: The History of Black-Jewish Relations Through 1900.*” This Unpublished 632-page PhD Dissertation (University of California) takes a lengthy issue with the Jewish Invention of the Hamitic Myth found in the Jewish Babylonian Talmud. (*However, that this particular proclamation was made by certain politically compromised Jewish leaders in their Babylonian exile makes it unreasonable to blame the entire Jewish people for the racist remarks of such leaders* (emphasis in asterix)).

from vegetation and not from the blood of supposedly weaker nations to be devoured by a monstrous Behemoth. In fact, European history has also warned us that *even* those members of the “classless” European society, whose leadership quest for a stake in modern capitalist socio-economic-tenancy of exploitative class structured social-order was to later force European leaders to make such a reasonable culture *volte-face* (after 1945), were [supposedly] too weak economically to engender any serious threat to the artificiality of the European nation-states. In this sense, any naïve attempt by agents of the “global creed” to over trivialize the culture demands of the various nations is bound once again to provoke nationalist resistance.

### **3.2. Reaffirming the Politico-economic Origin of European Divisions from the Greek Culture**

That prior to the introduction of the concept of the divisive Polis system in ancient Greece the Greeks did indeed share some sense of homogeneous culture despite tribal differences is aptly compressed by Alfred Burns (1989: 75ff):

... oral [mythical] poetry had been the medium perpetuating the national tradition of the Greeks. It had created a common language which through its rhythms and images provided an aesthetic pleasure and transcended the boundaries of tribal dialects. Homeric poetry provided the Greeks with a collective identity. When alphabets <sup>103</sup>arrived in Greece, it was used not only to record the poetic tradition but, since no establishment controlled the oral heritage or the new literary, it stimulated the creation of new poetry and the expression of personal sentiments and individual identities.

One such individualistic and highly politicized sentiment found its ardent poetic expression in *Pericles* funeral oratory:

We live under a constitution that does not have to be envious of anybody else's. We set an example to others rather than imitate them. Ours is called democracy because it serves the interest not of the few, but of the majority. According to law, the same opportunities are open to all regardless of individual differences. According to public judgement, a person is valued highly more for his ability than his inherited position, nor if some one can make a good contribution to the community is he hindered by the lack of means or reputation. We are just as liberal towards each other in our private life as we are in our political affairs. We hold no grudge against our neighbour if he does as he pleases...

It is up to the same people to carry on their private business and to make public policy, and up to those occupied with their labours to have adequate knowledge about public affairs...

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<sup>103</sup> It is widely assumed that the Greeks adopted the Phoenician alphabets about 1105 BC (see, B L. Ullman, *How old is the Greek Alphabet?* AJA 38, 359-381; *The Antiquity of the Greek Alphabet*, AJA 37, 1933:27; Joseph Naveh, 1978. Some Semitic Epigraphical Considerations on the Antiquity of Greek Alphabet, AJA 77, 1-8.

In sum, I say that Athens as a whole is the educator of Greece and I believe that our citizens, man for man, each for himself, among their other gifts in every respect show the most versatile and self-restraint personality. And that this is no idle boastful talk, but the ... truth, is proven by the power of our city. (Thucydides, Histories, 2.37 cited in Burn, 1989: 87-88)

Setting aside the political suppression of female voices in such a grand sentimental patriotic delirium about Athens male dominated democratic constitution and/or its divine “elected status” among Greek city states; Thucydides arguments may be partly justified not only because of Athens powerful status among other Greek city states then, but, most importantly, its military victories over the powerful Persia. However, that Athens superiority in those days only owed much to its abstract legal genius or political power tends to reaffirm the apparent conviction that at the apogee of its supremacy Athens was no longer operating by the rules of Greek’s authentic culture. Following Nietzsche, “the constitution of the Polis system was authentically not Greek, but a Phoenician political genius.”<sup>104</sup> A position shared by Burckhardt J. who also acknowledges that, “prior to the birth of the Greek Polis there were already similar constitutions with the Phoenicians” (Burckhardt, 1962;<sup>105</sup> Urte Sperling et al., 2004: 74ff). It is in Gobineau’s emphasis that both views found their ardent and radical compression:

*In der europäischen Kultur sind die Griechen mit ihrer blinden Bewunderung für die Polis für das falsche Ideal des Patriotismus verantwortlich. In Griechenland wurde das Individuum von Gesetz regiert. Das Vorurteil, die Autorität der öffentlichen Meinung zwang jeden Einzelnen, dieser Abstraktion alle seine Neigungen, seine Ideen und Gewohnheiten, selbst sein Glück und seine intimsten persönlichen und menschlichen Beziehungen aufzuopfern. Aber die Griechen hatten dieses Ideal nicht ersonnen; sie hatten es von der Semiten entlehnt. Um zusammenzufassen: Patriotismus ist nichts als eine „Kanaanäische Monstrosität.“*(Gobineau;<sup>106</sup> Cassirer, 2002: 312).

But if, as Gobineau further stresses, abstract legal genius and military Might alone was insufficient to salvage the [eventual] disintegration of [even] the Roman Empire:

das römische Reich hatte seine stärkste Grundlage im römischen Recht. Das Recht war die einzige bindende Kraft im römischen Leben geworden. Es wurde gesammelt, kodifiziert, erklärt und analysiert. Nach Gobineau ist die ganze Konstruktion des römischen Rechts in genau gleichen Fall wie die Griechen Polis. Es ist eine bloße Abstraktion. Die Römer machten aus der Not eine Tugend. Sie mussten ein

<sup>104</sup> Dermandt, Alexander, 1995. *Antik Staatsformen, Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte der Alten Welt.* Berlin, 353.

<sup>105</sup> Griechische Kulturgeschichte, 4Bde., Darmstadt (Gesammelte Werke Bd. V-VII), 1, 57, 76.

<sup>106</sup> *Essai Sur l'inegalité des races humaines*, 2. Aufl. Paris, 2vols., Conclusion générale, 548, übers. v. Ludwig Schemann, Stuttgart, 1922, 4Bde.



künstliches Band zwischen den verschiedensten Elementen schaffen. Das konnte nur durch eine Gesetzgebung des Kompromisses geschehen, das einzige, unter einer Bevölkerung möglich war, die aus der Hefe aller raßen bestand... Auf keinem Gebiet der menschlichen Kultur war Rom produktiv oder original. Es hatte nichts Eigenes—keine Religion, keine Kunst, keine Literatur. Alles war von anderen Völkern entlehnt (Gobineau, cited in Cassirer, 1949, 2002: 312-313);

then the glorious days of Athens superiority in the social history of the Greco-Europeans were naturally bound to be numbered. And as Burns rightly observes, the funeral of the first victims of the Peloponnesian war already foreshadowed Athens approaching catastrophe. And just as in the tragedies the occasion of Thucydides previous speech celebrated Athens greatness questions of self praise projected themselves in the opposite light. How was such a disaster possible? How did the Athenians go wrong to deserve such a tragedy? Which of their character traits and actions brought them down? These questions were to echo throughout Socratic-Plato's philosophical speculation (Burns, 1989:88-89), especially the discourse of the Republic (emphasis added).

As a early critical observer of the rise and fall of political constitutions (e.g. timarchy, oligarchy, tyranny, et cetera) of his contemporary Greece, the Socratic-Plato turned inwards in his search for answers to the misfortune of democratic Athens. For him, "the worst human soul is likely to produce the same constitution just as a deformed soul would also produce a deformed body; hence unconstrained liberty is most likely to degenerate into tyranny" (Cassirer, 2002: 93). Hence Plato's approval of constitution of the golden soul/spirit; in fact the amalgam of gold, silver and bronze which was the main source of Piraeus decadence was too corrupt to be of any good:

Good and unity constitutes the fundamental character of God. Without the appropriate projection of one's own gods mankind would be unable to organize and regulate his worldly (affairs) accordingly. Therefore if we continue in the contemporary mythical traditions that the gods are always at each other throats, seeking the destruction of each other, we would be unable to purge evil from our constitutions. Hence it is necessary to replace the contemporary mythical gods with the idea of the absolute good/truth. Oh friend, Callicles, the wise men ... said that heaven and earth are intrinsically interrelated, and that only through friendliness, propriety, insightfulness and justice can the universe function harmoniously (Cassirer, 2002:87-88 (my English translation from German)).

Here Plato not only confirm the conflicting state of his contemporary Greece, but seems to want to create out of the apparent *melange* of gold, silver, and bronze an abstract constitution of the golden spirit/soul, which is by nature the endowed leadership spirit. 'In a state, virtue should be the chief aim, and unless philosophers become rulers, or rulers become students of

philosophy, there will be unceasing troubles for the states and humanity at large. And as the Ideal state is modelled upon the individual soul, and just as the soul has golden, silver, and bronze parts, so also should the state have three parts: the rulers, the warriors, and workers' (Republic VI, 490; V 478; III, 415; G.G.M. James, 1954, 2001: 99). The requirement of soldiers in the constitution of the Platonic Ideal goes along confirming, on the one hand, the earlier statements about the importance of war in the activities of the artificial and culturally indifferent state system and, on the other hand, with the mention of Callicles it becomes obvious that not everyone in the then democratic Athens was convinced about Plato's "Ideal Constitution"; at least, not the Sophists, who were more concerned about immediate human challenges of mundane political matters.

According to Burns, when in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC Athens had become the centre of Greek political and cultural life it was also only natural that the various strands of inquiry be drawn together there. Pericles, the father of Athenian democracy, deliberately tried to attract the best minds of Greece to his side, and many, such as Anaxagoras, the city planner Hipodamus, and the sophist Protagoras, joined his cycle. Eventually most of the Sophists who found the financial and intellectual climate of Athens stimulating appeared for more or less prolonged visits in Athens. They were to make a considerable contribution to literacy and to give human centred concerns a more purposeful direction, especially in their anthropological and sociological speculations (Burns, 1989: 90ff.).

For Werner Jaeger<sup>107</sup> "Sophists most important contribution to Greek literary tradition was their theory of education and culture" (Burns, 1989: 90). As Burns assert, they were the first (in the Greco-European context) to make a formal statement of the nature nurture problematic:

In the aristocratic tradition which had found its most vigorous expression in the poetry of Theognis and Pindar, excellence (*arête*) was a quality to be inherited through noble birth and ancestry; it could neither be acquired nor thought. But inquiries into nature (*physis*) by Ionian thinkers, the "physists" and medical writers, the physicians, had established man as a product of nature with the *physis* of its own, and thus subject to physical inquiry. The nature of his body could be improved through physical exercise and through the ministrations of a physician.

The Sophists extended the concept to include the human mind and its motivations. Accordingly, the natural endowment, the quality of the *physis* of each individual, was important, but to attain its full potential it had to be developed through the proper education.

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<sup>107</sup> Werner, Jaeger, 1945. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. New York, 305-311.

Without education a gifted nature might go to waste while a less well endowed nature under the right educational care might reach the higher level of accomplishment. Plutarch later drew on this sophistic argument in his classical analogy of farming: a good harvest requires a good soil, a good seed, and a good farmer. In education the physis of the pupil is the soil, the teacher is the farmer, the instruction is the seed. The image was later taken up by the Romans: *agri cultura*, the tilling of the soil, inspired the metaphor *animi cultura*, the tilling of the mind, and also influenced Cicero's combination of *Natura et Doctrina*. Importantly, the Sophists promised to produce "cultured" individuals for fee to participate in Greece political life through the mastering of convincing oratory (Burns, 1989: 91-93). In the process they laid the foundation of study of semantics and stylistics, and raised the use of language to a more conscious level; that is to say, rational and logic use of language (ibid).

Furthermore, their concern with human relations and practical matters and their disdain for abstract transcendental theories was also well pronounced. Gorgias' expressed his disdain for the abstract and universal in his dissertation "On Nature and not Being: Nothing exists. If it existed, it would be incomprehensible. What counts in life is the right action at the right time (*Kairos*); to do what is required to the thing requiring it (*to deon toi deonti*).

Protagoras famous statement that "man is the measure of all things" was probably a reaction against such "other world" concepts. To be successful in life man had to deal with his immediate world, his human environment. For the Sophists the various cosmic theories were interesting because they sharpen one's reasoning powers and sceptical outlook. But because these theories often contradict each other and there was no way of proving one against the other it was up to each individual to form her/his opinion. In other words, morality is a matter of conventions, the result of a natural evolution, and not God-given as often speculated by these various comic theories (Burns, 1989:93-94f.).

Since it is almost impossible to determine with exact precision where God-given ends and natural evolution begins, let's expeditiously use the above contrast as again affirmative of the Socratic-Plato and Sophistic dichotomy; and that both contesting positions had the tendency of rationalizing the mythological foundation of Greek culture philosophically. However, that said, a critical review of the views of such Sophists, as Callicles and Thrasymachus, which amounted to advocating that "Might" makes "Right"—that is: that laws of the Polis must have been devised by the stronger and more intelligent racial groups or individuals to dominate the weaker or ill-informed groups/individuals (as stated in the Republic), also demonstrates the gravity of social implosion that celebrated the birth of the Greek Polis. But how was it possible that the authentic Greco-European culture, which, like any other authentic national

cultures (e.g. the Manfour/Memphetic Bantu-Ethiopian ideal), begun in form of a univocal oral mythology synchronous with the hymn of eternal existence, degenerate into such a miserable state—that is, a breeding ground for speculative philosophy subservient to the economic and political agents of Greek city-states?

E.A Havelock<sup>108</sup>, for one, sees the introduction of literacy in Greek culture as a catalyst for such development.—A development which Burns also rightly attributes to “Hellenic Racial endowment” (1989: 75-76). Arnold Gehlen, for his part, has stressed convincingly that ‘due to its profane origin the literary tradition remained for a while outside the doors of indigenous Greek temples’ (Gehlen, 1986: 299-300ff.).

Inasmuch as the distinction between realistic and pseudo-nationalist endeavours is central to the present analytical discernment, the resuscitation of the mythical language of the Greco-European national conscience should show that given its innate inclination to the original hymn of eternal existence, that *einmalig* culture and its associated cultural-remedies could be also equitably shared by the sub-language groups of contemporary Europe without recourse to the bleeding sword of the monstrous Leviathan or Behemoth. In other sense, the prevailing political notion of “Democratic Crusade” has nothing in common with the inward-looking national cultures. “Liberty, George W. Bush said, is both the plan of Heaven for humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth,” and that as part of this plan, America has a “mission to promote liberty around the world.”<sup>109</sup> (Smith, M., 2008: 285) Such politicized “divine providentialism” sounds more interventionist than anything nearing the language of true defenders of liberty. Such highly politicized arguments are at worse imperialistic.

What nationalists in general understand about liberty is to allow the Greco-European culture to flourish synchronously—without any external political influence—with that original hymn of eternal existence. Succinctly, if the equitable demands by nationalist for the fruits of their distinctive national cultures suggest that each national member is worthy of attaining the eternal purpose of life, then we are here not talking in terms of the freedom to participate in the temporal elections of political guardians of a “hyper privatized” global economic order, but instead in terms of a national leadership structure, which, by virtue of its revered

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<sup>108</sup> Haverlock, E A., 1953. *Preface to Plato*. Cambridge, MA; *The Muse Learns to write*, New Haven, 1986.

<sup>109</sup> George W. Bush, “Remarks at the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,” November 6, 2003, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>, (accessed May 21, 2007). What is most troubling about this political dissemination of liberty or global democratic mission is the statement by Joseph Smith, the director of “Blackwater USA, on *3SAT ORF* (November 28, 2007) ‘that the Blackwater mercenary or private military establishment is continuing the Western political ideal of spreading democracy by sword.’

knowledge of local/traditional culture, is entrusted with the keys of a nation's culture institutions housing the seeds of the Great Trees of life.

With regards to the mythological stipulation of the Greco-Europeans about the origin of life, Cassirer thus confirms that ancient Greek mythology, like many other contemporary mythologies in the Euro-Asian region, "begins with the story of a great flood which Zeus sent to destroy humanity. However, Deucalion and his wife Pyrrha survived the flood by clinging to the top of mountain Parnassus; here they were again commanded by Zeus to cast their mother's legs behind them. Deucalion was the first to discover the meaning of such a divine creational oracle; and immediately picked some stones from the ground and cast them on his back and out of those stones evolved the second generation of human race"(Cassirer, 2002: 30). Michael Kalopoulos, who seems more concerned about the similarity between the Deucalion's Myth and the Noah's Arc, argues that Deucalion and his wife Pyrrha and children who survived Zeus destruction of the first generation of humanity and founded the second generation followed Zeus advice to construct a boat which should be used to carry the binary pairs of all the species that shared the earth with human beings (Kalopoulos, 2003: 45-57). Essentially, those with critical insight of mythological stipulations should have observed, especially the first narrative, that such seemingly primitive ... narrative(s) convey early attempt to cognitively explore the interaction between different cosmic agents/bodies in the creativity of humankind. Moreover, as to whether Deucalion and his family's prime knowledge of the secret behind divine creation of human beings suffices for their *Dei gratia* position on Mountain Parnassus, where, hierarchically, they would be much more closer to the aristocratic Zeus deserves no further elaboration than a mere contrasting of this particular location with the royal castle of the [now defunct] Hohenzollern monarchy on Swabian Alps. Even in today post modern context, enlightened scientists often look beyond the blue-sky in their quasi-superstitious or metaphysical quest for extra-terrestrial life (UFOs). In sum, if the prime knowledge of divine source of life constitutes the criterion for legitimate leadership of nations, as Homer seem to contest (below), then the contending leadership structures or constitutions of pre-Socratic and post-Socratic eras—e.g. the contesting political deities of Greek city states; and or the timarchic, oligarchic, liberal democratic, tyrannic or aristocratic constitutions of Greece—were generally disingenuous to the authentic and legitimate leadership structure of ancient Greek culture institutions, as this is particularly true of the Dionysian cult:

Dionysus has no special place in Homer's Olympian gods. Dionysus is conceived to have arrived on Greek religious scene from an Asian cult of the north, probably from Thrace.

In the Dionysian cult one finds no authentic trace of Greek cultural genius (Cassirer, 2002: 57-58)

And the same is true of Attis and Adonis. Important here is that with the ascension of Dionysus on Greek culture scene, one notes a leadership structure of a wholly politicized culture vying for the control of the hearts and minds of the local population—by claiming decendancy from ... Zeus—in order to create a novel identity:

... The history of Dionysus *Zagreus* was the product of Orphic Theology—a theology, which portrayed Dionysus as the son of Zeus and Semele. While the young Dionysus was exclusively loved and adored by his father, he was equally hated by Hera, who unleashed demonic titans after him. After several failed metamorphic attempts to escape the demons, the young Dionysus was eventually ... killed and eaten by the demonic titans. The revenge of Zeus for the untimely death of his son came in form a thunder stroke, which blotted out the demonic titans; and from whose ash it is assumed the novel Greek identity was remoulded. Hence the novel Greek identity is composed of the *melange* of both good [the Dionysian component] and bad [component of the titans] of its constitution (Cassirer, 2002: 59).

This idea of usurping generations of jealous and suscipious gods constantly seeking the overthrow and destruction of those in power for the purpose of recreating novel identities should thus be seen as customary of the Greco-European socio-cultural and political history. “Homer<sup>110</sup>, antedating Hesiod, recorded Oceanus<sup>111</sup> as the first God of Greek Theogony. After keeping company with the human race for an indefinitely long time, Oceanus withdrew silently abdicating authority to his son Uranus. The latter, however, was overthrown, after a fierce battle with his son Cronus, who after a long reign was overthrown himself by his powerful son Zeus. Therefore **Oceanus-Uranus-Cronus-Zeus** is the main theogonic lineage handed down to us by Greek Mythology”<sup>112</sup> (Kalopoulos, 2003: 23-24). Similarly, Hesiod recounts the violent separation of the celestial provinces from the earth. This later narrative is again worked into the history of usurping generations of powerful gods through to the arrival of *Cronos*. As with his predecessors, Cronos was supposedly filled with hatred and envy of his successors and therefore obviated them before hand. It was only with the assistance of Zeus cunning mother that Zeus succeeded in slaying Cronos. Exponentially, this later “history of usurping generations of gods had long been interpreted by some scholars as

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<sup>110</sup> Homer. *Iliad* 14, 246.

<sup>111</sup> “Oceanus served as seed for the whole creation.” (Kalopoulos, 2003: 23 n.23)

<sup>112</sup> With the period of the god Oceanus, a long peaceful coastal food collecting period is implied. Uranus probably designates a period of astronomic achievements, indispensable to seafaring. Cronus (Gr=Time) probably reflects the period of comprehension of the natural periodicity of the seasons, a natural consequence of knowledge obtained during seafaring and through the study of the skies. Finally, the period of the prolific Zeus probably reflects the increasing comprehension of the natural cycles of rebirth, deification of nature’s polymorphism and respect for the sacred fertility of life (ibid, 2003: 24 n 24).

reflecting the victories of [Indo] European ancestors, who migrated to Europe via the Balkan Peninsula ca. 2000 B.C., over the indigenous inhabitants of the Mediterranean region” (Fritz, 1982: 22-23ff.). In this sense, Dainotto is right in his early assessment that ‘the dialectic of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic voices from North and South of Europe is intrinsic of the historical and political process of European identity.’<sup>113</sup>

### 3.2.1. Rediscovering the culture essence of the Homeric charm

Despite the apparent contradiction and or sometimes the explicit acharnement of the general evolution of the Greco-European social history, there is another aspect of the Greco-European culture which merits resuscitation for the contemporary European conscience, as in Homer’s abnegation of the “red-crown” of politics in some his earlier epics; and more succinctly his appeal to the Greeks to relate respectfully to their gods:

Ihr seid Gottinnen und waren bei allem zugegen und wisst es, wir aber hören nur Gerücht und wissen (vom Selbst) nichts (Homer II 485 f.; Fritz, 1982: 33-34 ff.)

Here we observe a hierarchically structured social order based solely on the prime knowledge of one’s culture institutions, which, in modern European context, had been simply overlooked by those subservient to the materially insatiable and culturally divisive national state system. But not everyone, as Fay rightly observes, ‘indeed for centuries benevolent men have been trying to get the Homeric charm into English:

“All grave old men, and soldiers then had been, but for age now left warres; yet counsellors they were exceeding sage.

And as in well growne woods, on trees, cold spinnie Grasshoppers sit chirping and send voices out that scarce can pierce our eares. For softness and their weake faint sounds; (so talking on the towre)

These seniors of the people sate, who, when they saw the power of beautie in the Queens ascend, even those cold-spirited peers, Those wise and almost witherd men, found this heate in their veares That they were forc’t (those whispering) to say...”<sup>114</sup>

Pope, impatient, or finding that readers of his time got clogged in Chapman’s magniloquence, hurries along in pentameter’:

<sup>113</sup> Robert Dainotto, 2008. Europe (In Theory). *Political Theory*. Vol. 36, No.I, 158-160.

<sup>114</sup> George Chapman’s Translation of Homer’s *Iliad* (Book III, published 1611); for both quotes see H.C. Fay, 1952. *Greece and Rome*, Vol. 21, No.63, 104-111.

“There sat the seniors of the Trojan race; chiefs, who no more in blood fights engage, But wise through time, and narrative with sage, In summer-days like grasshoppers rejoice, A bloodless race that send a feeble voice.

They cried, no wonder, such celestial charms  
 For nine long years have set the world in arms!  
 What winning graces! What majestic mien!  
 She moves a goddess, and she looks a queen.  
 Yet hence, oh heaven convey that fatal face  
 And from destruction save the Trojan race.”<sup>115</sup>

There is no doubt that the replacement of the “red-crown” with a “green-crown” might, indeed, be tilting toward the Bantu-Ethiopian or “*Hoi Aiguptoi*” culture ideal of the “Green-Amon” (or the Memphetic sacred Bull “Apis”; or later “Mnêvis” of Heliopolis) as will be discussed later. Consequently, Ernst Cassirer is right when he accused Homer for deliberately ‘suppressing the traditional “good-evil” dichotomy customary of most ancient Greek mythologies’ (Cassirer, 2002:57) by rationally purporting knowledge based culture that is subservient to life in his social discourse. And it also seems some of the Sophists and or the informed Greeks understood the rational behind the Homeric charm when Critias (460-403), for one, wrote: “the idea of imminent gods was probably devised by an intelligent individual who wanted to deny humankind from committing crimes [even] outside the watchful eyes of artificial laws” (Fritz, 1982: 34ff.). Such accusation sounds almost like that of an author who was under the shadows of the watchful eye of Hyen-Nu/Heru (Horus). George G.M. James, for instance, while not specifying Homer, has convincingly shown how most pre-Socratic and post-Socratic Greek philosophers and thinkers had aptly incorporated ancient Egyptian mythologies in their contemporary epics and philosophical speculations (1954, 2001: 55-130). Specifically, he notes that the Osirian God or Sun worship (ca. 5000 B.C.E or more) of the Egyptians was represented in all Egyptian temples by a symbol of an Open Eye—to indicate not only sight that transcended space and time, but also omniscience, as the Great Mind which created and which still directs the universe: “All seeing Eye” (ibid, p.100-101). A position Eberhard Orthbandt further expounds, by extracting some of Homer’s epics, especially the Iliad, from a predisposed Ionian dialect, which he argues had been heavily influenced by ancient Egyptian mythology (Eberhard, 84-85). This notwithstanding, Homer originality confronts us with an alternative reading of Greek or Greco-European culture which can be appropriated for the post-World War II European national conscience.

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<sup>115</sup> ibid.



What makes the Homeric charm such a singular contribution to the culture foundation of a realistic European nation is that, unlike most pre-Socratic and post-Socratic Greco-European thinkers, the Homeric genius refrains from equating the natural qualities of humanity with that of ferum (wild-beast)—e.g. Wolf, Lion, Tiger, Eagle and so on. Left alone to Homer, the Minosian Bull which Zeus had used in the rescue of the beautiful *Europa* ... must condone the “green-crown” of genuine culture. More importantly, it would also seem the colour of the Zeusian bull, at that particular time of the rescue mission—that is to say, the time the Greco-European culture custodians would have succeeded in discovering the appropriate seed of the tree of life—matters less to Homer. That “sacred bull” could be whitened to the likeness of the white clouds hanging underneath the blue-sky above mountain Parnassus; or it could be blackened to the likeness of the black matter that holds all the celestial provinces together, the preferred colour of the Bantu-Ethiopian sacred Bull Apis. What would probably have mattered most to this undeniably well informed individual, Homer, must have been, as human beings—that is the intermediary between the eternal purpose of universal existence and that of Hades/Earth (the abode of death)—one should be intuitively elevated enough to be able to conceive the source of her/his blood from the green-crown of the national cultures. If anything, Amon of the Bantu-Ethiopian (or *Hoi Aiguptoi*) culture institutions did not attain its green colour by default, but by virtue of the knowledge of the appropriate seed of the Great Tree of life. Therefore, the highly intuited or well educated human constituencies of the different nations across the earth must first find their place in the hierarchy of the knowledge of the eternal universal existence. Not surprisingly, Homer is quoted as describing “*Ate* as a temporary mental dullness and bewilderment of the normal consciousness ... a sort of mental delusion ... often prescribed to an external demon which was generally common to the average Greek:

Medea, for instance, claimed she did not kill her own children out of her own free will but had been forced by her *Thumos*” (Dodds, 1964: 5<sup>116</sup>; deMause, 2002, 2005: 286).

Consequently, not Zeus, the murderer of Cronos, alone would later intuitively perceive the culture essence of the green-crown—as evidenced by his choice of the Minosian Bull in his rescue mission of the beautiful Europa, but also early Christian theologians, who, as we will later see, generally condoned the destruction of the culture institutions of Amon/Amen, later

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<sup>116</sup> E R., Dodds, 1964. *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

conceded that the “Lion and Ox” shall one day eat straw together.”<sup>117</sup> Otherwise the Leviathan sword alone, with its guilt of the blood of others, cannot save the *Homo-Trojano*. When today the Guardians of nuclear arsenals to the North of the Atlantic are increasingly becoming paranoid or suspicious of the prospects of agents of Islamic-Jihad or Talibanism acquiring similar technological knowledge, they merely accentuate what Homer and his Bantu-Ethiopian mentors would have understood thousands of years earlier—that “*fortune des armes*” alone is insufficient to determine the destiny of men. And this ‘fact was bitterly experienced by the alliance of Franco-European aristocrats at Valmy in a futile attempt to stave off the agents the French Revolution’ (Arendt, 1969: 164).

### 3.2.2. How the alliance between state- and agents of institutions of pseudo-culture derailed the early attainment of a European nation

While the historical location of a realistic European nation from the standpoint of an authentic Greco-European culture foundation is highly contestable, the centrality of the French and the American Revolutions for our modern and post-modern concept of nationhood and nationalism deserves no further elaboration than Renan’s earlier contention that “it was the particular contribution of the French Revolution to have proclaimed that a nation exists of itself” (Renan 1882; Homi B., 1990: 29ff.). And it is also true that “the French army fought in Valmy on 20<sup>th</sup> September 1792 shouting the battle cry ‘vive la nation’” (Sue, 2000: 38). Yet, as Homi B. rightly points out, Renan’s fundamental position was that the principle of nationality was the creation of both recent period (1813-1815) and a more distant one—the period of Germanic invasions of the Roman Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries AD (ibid). In this regard, Pope Urban II early proclamation of European crusaders ... as a national audience not only lends considerable weight to the relative profundity of the principle of nationality in the European context, but in large also confirms his place among the frontrunners of European pseudo-nationalism (a point to be expanded on later). Seton-Watson is also quoted as arguing that “in 1200 AD neither a French nor English nation existed, but in 1600 AD both were important political realities” (Sue, 2000: 12). Thereby anticipating Sue’s argument that, it was not until the late Middle Ages that ethnic groups in Europe began to acquire self-awareness that propel them into distinct national communities (ibid, 12). Also, Liah Greenfeld has stressed convincingly that it was in Tudor’s England the term ‘nation’ came to be applied both to the elite and the masses:

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<sup>117</sup> August, C. Krey, 1921. *The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Participants*. Princeton, 280-281; this document can also be retrieved from: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/fulk3.html>.

This semantic transformation signalled the emergence of the first nation in the sense in which the words is used today and launched the era of nationalism (Greenfeld, 1992: 6; Sue, 2000: 12)

In general, Liah's position thus further accentuates and strengthens Habermas early distinction between previously espoused notions of aristocratic and popular nations in European social history (1996: 133-134).

If the nationalization of fractures in Europe merely exhibits the divisive genius of politics, the politicization of national cultures (e.g. language, religion etc.) for the purpose of solidifying the economic institutions of the nation-states of Europe [or in that matter elsewhere] serves to remind us of the misappropriation of culture institutions by economic agents. With this later political development we seem to be catapulted onto an ideal platform for the dissemination of pseudo-nationalist policies. And, of course, the French Revolution was not entirely devoid of sacred texture. The French Revolution Renan wrote, "was a great heroic rash"<sup>118</sup>; "it was the French epic"<sup>119</sup>; he also wrote of "the great sacred intoxication in its early days." (Homi B., 1990: 29) Hence that particular Revolution was [supposedly] divinely chosen to liberate every people of every colour under the French flag (Arendt, 1969: 162).

Practically, if this later isolation of culture institutions from the expansive economic ones has the intention of strengthening the prevailing perception that culture, at least in its humane context, must be subservient to life; then, such sanguine religious cults, which in the past had dominated the political scene of ancient Greece—unfortunately, right through to the modern European period—should have no place in our conception of real [national] cultures. So, let us reasonably ask ourselves what is cultural about the human sacrificing practices of the Artemis cult?

In the mythology of Artemis we are told ..., in their passionate love for each other Komaitheo and Melanippos violated the sanctuary of Artemis. And forthwith the wrath of Artemis began to destroy the inhabitants of Greece; the earth yielded no harvests and deadly epidemics devastated the whole land. When the local population appealed to the oracle at Delphi the Pythian priests accused Komaitheos and Melanippos for their ingratitude to traditional moral values; and ordered them to be sacrificed to Artemis.—A ritual which found its annual re-occurrence with the lives of the most fairest Greek youths and maidens.<sup>120</sup> With Artemis we are not dealing with an isolated tragic case of political cannibalism, instead "most of her contemporary Greek goddesses were notoriously sanguine and violent and only relied on the

<sup>118</sup> J E., Renan. *La Monarchie Constitutionnelle*. Oeuvres Completes Vol. I, 478-479.

<sup>119</sup> *ibid.*, 486.

<sup>120</sup> <http://www.theoi.com/cult/ArtemisCult2.html>.

blood of others for their own psychological existence” (Roger, 1989;<sup>121</sup> de Mause, 2002: 287-291). In fact, those familiar with the violent nature of European social history would have foreseen that attributing Artemis murder of Komaithos and Melannipos, the children of Nione, or Aktaion, Orion, Iphigeneia etc. to genuine culture is bound to encourage such destructive political statements as Xenophon “preference of a wild beast over his own mother” (de Mause, 2002: 287). Whether or not such violent sanguinary measures were politically intended to dissuade the Hellenic frontrunners of European nationalism from resuscitating that splendid national/local culture Socratic-Plato failed in his discursive philosophical attempt for an Ideal Constitution remain buried in the ruins of the divisive Polis. Nevertheless, their overall impact on the mental evolution of European personality should not be simply overlooked, especially given Pope Urban II early admission that cannibalism had, until the later days of European Crusades, permeated the general conscience of the Europeans. Sayce thus describes how Greek and Karian soldiers of Psammetikhos III. (in occupied Egypt) had slaughtered the sons of Phanês over a huge bowl in the sight of their father, and after mixing the blood of the boys with wine and water, had savagely drunk it and then rushed into battle (Sayce, 1895: 234-241). Of course, such a genuine political acharnement of utter barbarism must have discouraged any disingenuous nationalist; but not Komaitho and Melannipos. In other words, if culture must be subservient to life and not vice versa, then such individuals as Komaitho, Melannipos and Homer should be the harbinger of genuine European nationalism. Why also Komaitho and Melannipos? Their sacrificial defiance of the sanguine political intimidation apparent in the murderous reach of the Artemis cult must be rightly ascribed to the rim of genuine nationalism.

Furthermore, with the life serving purpose of national cultures it is thus reasonable to approve nationalist defence of the homogeneity of national cultures. For example, when some politicians of the resurging European nation (or Union in political sense) contest that Europe by cultural definition is a Judaeo-Christian exclusionary club because of Turkey’s pending membership application, they not only acknowledge the precarious state of Europe politicized culture (the so-called Multiculturalism), but simultaneously celebrate the univocal language of national cultures. Following directly from the Homeric culture criterion of the “Green-crown”, one could reasonably argue in defence of monolithic national cultures because the core mythical language of these national cultures leave room for only those incoming world-views at the service of life. One must not confuse this latter concession by European nationalists to imply that genuine/culture nationalists are being intimidated by the fate of

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<sup>121</sup> Roger, Just, 1989. *Women in Athenian Law and Life*. London/New York, 21.

Komaithos and Melanippos, but rather because they see in their monolithic national cultures an ideal foundation for the unadulterated service of life. In this sense, the advocates of those economically driven liberal institutions are generally out of touch with the culture essence of nations when they erroneously accuse the national ideal for being a “members-only” social club.

The notion of “liberal nationalism” as purported recently by modern scholars is simply too vague and at variance with the culture foundation of nations. Will Kymlicka, for one, alludes that nationalism can be compatible with and even support liberalism as “an important basis for the achievement of liberal ideals of justice and liberty.”<sup>122</sup> This seemingly catch-all political scenario of nation-states generally lacks the univocal mythical language of real culture so that these later political/socio-economic tenancies are permanently at the mercy of the forces of divisions. Unsurprisingly, the political advocates of the Greek Polis; the imperial Roman Empire; and more recently the modern European nation-states, had been intuitively urged to unconditionally return the eternal culture flame to the upholders of the resurging European nation.

### 3.2.3. Politicisation of Culture and its impact on European Identity Process

As indicated above, that the state system since its inception from a Greco-European culture has remained a threat to the advancement of that particular culture and hence the attainment of a common national identity lies in its inherent economic background and the related divisionism that it engenders. As an economic ideal one should have noted that the predatory imperial Roman state unambiguously inherited most of the policies of the divisive Greek Polis system, especially with regard to its customary quest for the foundation of colonies abroad. The use of Remus blood to lay the foundation stone of the Roman Empire by Romulus<sup>123</sup> is so analogous with the previous idea of usurping generations of imperial Greek goddesses ... that the consolidation of the *imperium Romanum* must undoubtedly have marked the beginning of end of the Greek polis. By similar analytical token, the foundation ritual of the imperial Roman state was thus also imbued with the symptoms of its eventual demise. And as Barbara H. Rosenwein observes, in its later days the Roman Empire had to fend it-self against both internal and external forces seeking its dissection; especially, during the “Crisis of the Third Century”, internal political crisis of succession saw more than twenty

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<sup>122</sup> Will, Kymlicka, 2002. *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 267.

<sup>123</sup> <http://www.roman-empire.net/founding/founding-index.html>

men claim, and lose with their lives, the title emperor between the years 235 and 284. Frequented by such predatory visits from the Germanic and other so-called barbarian tribes from the North and central Europe, beyond the Rhine and Danube rivers; and Persians from the East, the fate of the once mighty imperial Roman state was sealed for the worse. And eventually it did indeed succumb to forces of divisionism; and out of its ruins emerged Europe's feudal/agrarian social order, which in turn cemented the foundations of the Westphalia state model.

Having briefly examined the political characteristics of the imperial Roman state, let's now thoroughly explore its procession with the cultures of its diverse population—since the boundaries of that vast imperial state extended beyond the territory of mainland Europe. In any event, that the “red-crown” of politics alone was insufficient to hold together the vast territorial possessions of the imperial Roman state resulted in one of the most dramatic and large scale culture-U-turn in the political history of pre-modern Europe. This came with the conversion of Emperor Constantine to Christianity. What is so unusual about Constantine's conversion to Christianity is that historical records suggest that the relationship between the then predatory Roman Empire and one of the *abtrünnig* branches of Chaldeo-Jewish religious cult, which would later become the official religion of the Roman Empire, amounts to what the Bantu-Ethiopian culture institutions would mythologically simplify as “Wolf versus Rabbit”, “Crocodile versus Bull or Lion versus Ram” survival dichotomy, in which the blood of the weaker is by nature supposedly predisposed for the survival of the powerful (Pagels, 1995: 3-34; Barbara, 2001: 20 [with emphasis added]). So why would an emperor of such a vicious and once powerful state system like the Roman Empire later turn to an enfeebled Jewish cult, whose symbolic figure Christ was supposedly born on a Ranch of symbolic Amon (Rams), and whose members, according to Elaine Pagels, ‘could not even defend their own sacred sites from the plunderous and destructive’ reach of that Empire (ibid), for the salvation of his intractably degenerating imperial state?

In his book *The Rise of Christianity*<sup>124</sup> the sociologist Rodney Stark explores how an obscure sect of just 40 converts in the year AD 30 became the official religion of the Roman Empire by AD 300. His conclusion is that emperor Constantine had a vision which led to his conversion and an embrace of Christianity. Stark also show the flaws in this “great man” idol of the Roman history.

Let's first contend ourselves with Rodney Stark's visionary explanation and assume that the salvation of the Roman Empire must have been the core motive of Constantine's conversion

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<sup>124</sup> Stark, Rodney, 1997. *The Rise of Christianity*. San Francisco, California: Harper.

to Christianity. But even so, this does not entirely explain why the once mighty and quasi invincible imperial Roman state was to later turn to such an enfeebled and economically and politically (or militarily) insignificant Jewish cult for salvation. There must have been some special trait about the mental state of early Christian personality that would have prompted Constantine's cunning political move.

The psycho-historian, Lloyd de-Mause (2002), who has researched extensively on the mental states of pre-Christian and early Christian personalities, asserts that until the early Christian era machismo had already been a deeply entrenched popular fantasy of human communities. "The Gladiators often voluntarily fought with each other in the Arena in order to kill or to be got killed or just to demonstrate their wounds for public applause."<sup>125</sup> Wars were often fought for simple reasons of demonstrating men braveness and their willingness to pour blood in the defence of their newly gained patriarchal dominance (emphasis added)). In other words, the transition from the "red-crown" of matriarchal social order (e.g. Artemis, Ashera, Lilith etc.) to patriarchal rule in the Antiquity also involved enormous human sacrifices on the part of men. In Babylonia, for example, Tiamat was slain by the arrow of her son Marduk in a violent battle for power. In the Judaeo-Christian context, the defeat of Leviathan by Yahwe (sperm) did not necessarily put end to human sacrifices. On the contrary, in the foundation history of Israel we are told by the biblical narrators that Abraham was commanded by Yahwe<sup>126</sup> to offer his only son Isaac—before a blood brotherly meeting—in the foundation of Israel. And although the poor Isaac was this time extremely lucky that the foundation of Israel took place on a foreign territory originally accustomed to the Bantu-Ethiopians Hyen-Nu/Amon culture<sup>127</sup> (hence the politicized use of the sacred ram in the place of Isaac), it once again reminds us that the violent usurpation of the political authority in Antiquity by men did not necessary put an end to human sacrifices and cannibalism.

In the early Christian period the practices of human sacrifices continued unabated with Christ's death on the cross being the most prominent example. But the death of Mami/God's only son—as had the death of Zeus adopted son Dionysus—had been now politically envisioned to redeem humanity of the Christian world from its sins. Even such mother murderers as Marduk (Babylon) and Nero Claudius Drusus Germanicus (Roman Empire) deserve the compassion and forgiveness of Mami/God's government, who although defeated on Earth had been now relocated in the celestial province (Heaven), but, in the context of

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<sup>125</sup> Carlin, A. Barton, 1993. *The Sorrows of Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster*. Princeton: Princeton university press, 13.

<sup>126</sup> It is true that Yahweh first found mention in Jewish scripts when Moses was sent to deliver the Jews from their so-called Egyptian captivity or bondage (for emphasis see Kalopoulos, 2003: 292).

<sup>127</sup> It might be true that Hyen-Nu/Heru is peaceful/Salem (Hjeru-salem).

Constantine's political sophistry, provided men relive the suffering and endurance of the crucified Christ. Okatvius describes Mami/God's joy to see her own children suffering: "what an appropriate spectacle when God see her own children under arduous pain."<sup>128</sup> Pope Urban who sounds more politically eloquent is quoted by Lloyd deMause as issuing the following statement to the first crusaders:

"We give you this war only with the glory reward through martyrdom; because only martyrs would go to heaven prior to the return of Christ" (my English interpretation)

So, while the vampire goddesses of Antiquity were entirely dependent on the blood of children for their psychological survival, the early Christian God loved to see her own children under enormous pain and deadly sacrifice (de-Mause 2002: 291-293). In this sense, one could reasonably argue that Emperor Constantine, like many other economically driven political agents, saw in the explicitly retarded mental state of early Christian personality—as the use of suicide bombers in the destruction of public schools in Afghanistan by Al Qaeda and Taliban today also partly reveals—a quasi "human reservoir" of martyrs for the salvation of his then degenerating imperial state. If anything, the following arbitrary statement from the bible might have appealed to any imperial soul with transnational political calendar:

Thou art Peter [Petros, or "Rock" in Greek], and upon this Rock I will build my Church and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven (Matthew 16.18-19 cited in Barbara 2001: 21).

Compounded with the retarded mental state of the average Christian personality observed earlier it thus becomes obvious that Emperor Constantine's conversion to Christianity was genuinely politically motivated and therefore deliberate and rational. And, indeed, the 'Empire of Constantine was the Roman Empire restored: The wars over succession ceased with the establishment of Constantine's dynasty, and internal political stability put an end to the border wars (Barbara, 2001:18-19). With Constantine's conversion and privileging of Christianity it was simply a matter of time before most people considered it both good and expedient to convert. Though after Constantine's time several emperors espoused "heretical"—unacceptable forms of Christianity, and one (Julian, the "Apostate") professed paganism, the die of centralization had been already cast. In 391 emperor Theodosius (r 379-

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<sup>128</sup> Judith, Perkins, 1993. *The Suffering self: Sin and Narrative in early Christian era*. London: Routledge, 39.



395) declared Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire. All other cults were outlawed and pagan temples were smashed. Soon at Carthage in 401, Saint Augustine (354-430) bishop of Hippo, and the most influential of the Church fathers, was telling his congregation that all superstitions and pagans and heathens should be annihilated. ... In this way, through legal coercion and conviction, a fragile religion hailing from one of the most backward of provinces triumphed everywhere in the Roman world' (Barbara, 2001: 20).

However, as Barbara soon finds out, with the triumph came again competition and even strife. Who would control and direct this new religion with its all-powerful-God? Who would determine what was holy? Who would know when the old gods, now classified as demons, might reclaim to be gods again? Vigilance was therefore necessary. After Constantine, after the persecutions, Christians fought each other over the doctrine and over the location of the holy (ibid., 21).

#### 3.2.4. Post-Constantine Sacred-Secular political tensions

That these foregoing conflicts were indeed not necessarily cultural but wholly political in nature only became evident as sacred and secular European factions fought each other, not only for the control of the wealth of the degenerating Roman Empire, but also for the control of the mind of European personality. Exponentially, Hobbes, for one, traces "in *Behemoth*"<sup>129</sup> the cause of English civil war to the schism between papal authority and emperor generally known as the investiture. "The initial impulse for the schism can be traced back to the synod of Sutri in 1046."<sup>130</sup> 'Having deposed three rival popes and installed another, the holy Roman emperor, Henry III, offended sections of the clergy who believed it their right to appoint the Pope, and who saw the papacy under threat. This imperial act of papal appointment was to have a costly price. Not only did the offended members of clergy demand that the imperial and other secular powers had no right to appoint the pope that it was a matter for the cardinals, but the right of the investiture of bishops became a major political issue between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV, starting off centuries of protracted violence in Christendom. With the papal dictates of Gregory VII in 1075, it was clear that the spiritual struggle was also saturated with secular implications and consequences. Amongst the twenty-seven dictates of Gregory were the following claims made on behalf of the papacy: the

<sup>129</sup> Thomas, Hobbes, 1990. *Behemoth or the Long Parliament*. Chicago University Press, 1.

<sup>130</sup> Eugen, Rosen-Stock-Huegen, 1969. *Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western man*. Argo, Norwich VT, 530; on the investiture see Harold Berman, 1983. *Law and Revolution: The formation of Western legal tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Roman bishop alone is by right called universal; he alone may depose emperors and other significant powers.

In effect Gregory had proclaimed in the papal Will the legal supremacy of the Pope over all secular authorities, including emperors. In other words, the pope alone held supreme spiritual sway and the successors of Charlemagne and the Ottos were his delegates, even as he himself was the delegate of God, the Pope was the overlord of the rulers who, with their under-lords, administered an empire that was continuous with that of the antique Roman world' (Catley and Cristaudo, 1997: 187-188). Left alone to 'the papal authority, every human creature must be subject of the pope. It was proclaimed, moreover, that the temporal sword of the emperor was held only "*ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis*"—"by the assenting nod and forbearance of the pontiff": so *spake* the ambassador Innocent III to the King of France (Boulting, 1908: 24-25).

Given that these mediaeval Caesars were unwilling to submit tamely to such arbitrary limitations to their secular authority, from the eleventh century the swords of the pope and emperors were stained with blood; for the princes and barons and townships also took sides to advance their own interests and neither the pope nor the emperors had sufficient power to establish their claims or control over their followers' (ibid., 25).

Of particular importance about the different stages of papal revolution, that is 'the different balance of power and the concessions made by each party in the turbulence of bloody skirmishes, and the tumult of changing allegiance, is how the character of politics and political philosophy within Europe was radically transformed; and again set another stage for later European conflicts right through to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Especially feeding into these tensions was the classical doctrine of natural law which was first developed by Plato and Aristoteles (Catley & Cristaudo, 1997: 187-189).

Tapping from the classical teaching of Aristoteles John of Salisbury<sup>131</sup>, a staunch defender of papal supremacy, argued that emperor was mere a hangman, someone who carries out the dirty necessities of political life, but whose contribution to good is the elimination of the worst men and their actions. When the earthly ruler (e.g. emperor or king) oversteps the mark and when he creates more misery through the misapplication of his powers, a subject has the duty to disobey, and in most extreme cases kill him.

The pope is for Salisbury (and Thomas Aquinas) God's earthly representative and hence a force for good in a way that the emperor can never be. But since both men share the powers of divided sovereignty caused by the papal revolution, there must be an hierarchical arrangement

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<sup>131</sup> John of Salisbury, 1990. *Policraticus of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers*. Translated by Cary J. Nederman. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.

which ultimately results in the superiority of one of the sovereigns—in their partisan preference, the pope—as a resolution of the problems of the political instability caused by the divided sovereignty’ (Catley and Cristaudo, 1997: 190).

In contrast, one of the early spokesmen of earthly powers, Marsiglio of Padua, who puts the entire blame of Italy’s internal political conflicts to the division caused by the papal revolution, thinks the only way for maintaining peace is the establishment of a unified form of sovereignty under the power of an earthly authority. In his *Defensor Pacis*<sup>132</sup>, a book dedicated to Louis of Bavaria, Marsiglio of Padua ‘declared boldly, that rulers, whether of the church or of the world, possess but delegated authority derived from the people; the Church, as represented by general assemblage of its most intelligent members, is supreme over popes; and moreover, since popes have been known to misuse their temporal powers as well as err in spiritual matters, the property of the Church may be regulated and even confiscated by the state’ (Boulting, 1908: 29). While Marsiglio worked closely with the natural law doctrine of Aristotle, he pioneered the legal theory which would be developed further by Thomas Hobbes and known in the twentieth century as legal positivism. Law, in this sense, is a coercive command issued by an earthly authority: that and that alone is real law (Catley & Cristaudo, 1997: 190ff.).

For another radical secular contender, Machiavelli, who seems to share Marsiglio blame of the pope for the divided allegiance in Italy, there is nothing Roman about Christianity. ‘Rome had a culture to sustain a strong imperial republic because its religion taught a much more worldly range of virtues than Christianity. If a republic is to endure, it must be built upon a strong and vigorous culture—a culture of the love of magnanimity, ferocity, courage, men of action, bodily strength and boldness. The contrast between Christianity and the religion of the ancient Romans is so obvious to be confused:

“Compare the magnificence of their sacrifices with the humility that characterizes ours. The ceremonial in ours is delicate rather than imposing, and there is no display of ferocity or courage. Their ceremonies lacked neither pomp nor magnificence, but, conjoined with this, were sacrificial acts in which there were much shedding of blood and much ferocity; and in them great numbers of animals were killed. Besides the old religion did not beautify men unless they were replete with worldly glory: army commanders, for instance, and rulers of republics. Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative men rather than men of action. It has assigned as man’s highest good humility, abnegation, and contempt for mundane things, whereas the other identified it with magnanimity, bodily strength, and everything else that

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<sup>132</sup> Marsilius, *Defensor Pacis* [1324]. Translated by A. Gewirth, 1956. New York, NY: Columbia university press, vol.1 xii, S1-3.

conduces to make men bold. And if our religion demands that in you be strength, what it asks for is strength to suffer rather than strength to do bold things”<sup>133</sup>

Hence for Machiavelli what “has made the world weak”, “effeminate”, and unpatriotic are the virtues of delicacy, lack of ferocity, humility, contemplation, abnegation, contempt for mundane things, and a condemnation of the strength that is needed not only to experience but to inflict suffering’ (Catley and Cristaudo, 1997: 162).

In all, since these latest eristic partisan arguments of early modernity merely reiterate the polis-centric classical views observed earlier, whose cultural authenticity and motives were generally deemed suspect, let’s now briefly critically review the culture essence of these latter phrenetic views of early modernity. So, what is cultural about Hobbes *Leviathan* or the Machiavellian *Prince*? For example, the heroic and patriotic qualities of the Machiavellian Prince, who was charged with delivering Italy from foreign occupation (in the *Prince*), “are based not on reflection, but action, not temperance but guile, not on stability of contemplation, but the ceaseless life of manoeuvring and calculating, not justice but willingness to employ violence..., not self knowledge, but the willingness to sell one’s soul for the fatherland. But such qualities, as Machiavelli himself admits, are not authentically human, but bestial” (ibid., 1997: 157-163). Simply formulated, real politics is bestial. But what is then cultural about the bestiality of politics in the human context?

Sidney Halpern, for one, argues that “culture is the work of a hero: someone who has the *mut* (courage) of killing his own mother in order to create a new order in the world.”<sup>134</sup> Otto Rank, for his part, contest that “Hero is someone who has the courage to rebel against the father and in the end victoriously over-come him.”<sup>135</sup> That there is anything cultural about the political mores of the Roman Empire—e.g. Emperor Nero’s assassination<sup>136</sup> of his own mother in AD 59 in order to consolidate his own power-base—is not only a derogation from human characteristics, but goes along undermining the human conscience as whole; as if ascribing the original source of culture to a mentally deranged personality, a psycho- or socio-path. In fact, the scientifically espoused notion of the conquest of nature, as if human kind is secluded from it, is too economically penchant and jejune and ipso facto unfortunate for humanity’s innate quest for total freedom. Assuming the resurgent ‘European nation did not arrive timely

<sup>133</sup> J G A., Pocock, 1975. *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic republican Tradition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 128-129.

<sup>134</sup> Sidney Halpern, 1965. “The Mother-Killer.” *Psychoanalytical Review* 52, 73.

<sup>135</sup> Otto Rank, 1922. *Der Mythos von Geburt der Helden: Versuch einer psychologischen Mythendeutung*. Leipzig: F. Deuticke.

<sup>136</sup> <http://www.roman-empire.net/emperors/nero.html>.

to rescue Germany<sup>137</sup> from its economically derived politicized social act of covering Germany with concrete, Steel and glass mausoleums in the name of myopic economic development (as now evinced by the economic logic of Chinese leadership in today's global context), by the time the Germany population will have attained the two hundred million Mark there would probably be no more suitable land left for the cultivation of culture. In the sense of humanity's quest for real freedom, the state system could rightly be considered as a *de facto lacrimae rerum*. Therefore that politics is by its very nature bestial inevitably implies that non-fictitious or genuine human culture should be preserved specifically for the national domain. And it also seems Machiavelli had this mind when he proposed Chiron (the centaur), the teacher of Achilles, to be the model mentor of the rulers of his principalities (princedom). Simply put, Humanism and Bestiality are divergent natural attributes of advancing mental states towards the transcendental truth.

Similarly, Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, despite its patriarchal and modern connotation, merely reiterates "the monstrosity of the sanguine violence associated with the matriarchal societies of early antiquity" (deMause, 2002: 290-291); that is to say, Hobbes was merely "using old words of statecraft in his construction of the Leviathan" (Catley and Cristaudo, 1997: 197). However, permeated by the multicultural tendencies of the free-choice of one's sacredness, which, in light of the English civil war, was necessary to appease the economic demands of warring European factions, it was just a matter of time before the Leviathan gave birth to yet another monstrous Behemoth. And even though this Behemoth arose from the extreme liberal tenancy of the Weimar Republic, it certainly reaffirms the prevailing arguments that the state system, even in its utter bestiality (the Third Reich<sup>138</sup>), is by no means a cultural ideal, but an abstract legal institution of economic provenance based on the Will of dominant race or class (its customary exploitation of national culture notwithstanding). Therefore, the prevailing perception that Europe is culturally a Judaeo-Christian exclusionary club is not only erroneous, but politically envisioned to dissuade genuine European nationalists from making peace with the green-crown of the Homeric charm.

### **3.3. Politics and the consolidation of modern European Pseudo-nationalism**

Perhaps the appropriate place to begin in terms of explaining how the triumph of the apolitical in Europe's social history—after the protracted political conflicts between the sacred and

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<sup>137</sup> Milward, Alan S., 2000. *The European Rescue of the Nation State*. New York, NY: Routledge

<sup>138</sup> See, Franz Neuman, 1942. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. London: Victor Gollanz.

secular forces—directly influenced the course of a European nation is to reinstate the Romantic-Germanist dichotomy of modern Europe thought. Of central importance about this later political development is its contribution to the escalation of “race” and “class” politics in Europe as various economic agents (e.g. liberals, fascists, communists et cetera) fought the decisive battle for the control of Europe’s political and identity process. As noted briefly elsewhere, in as much as Marxism/Bolshevism and Nazism are concerned, race and class thoughts could be substituted banally for internationalism and nationalism. In terms of the racial creed, which is central to our present analytical discernment, it should be noted that contrary to conventional wisdom often associating racism with Nazism, racism was an ever present shadow accompanying the development of nation-states in Europe. In some cases, especially in European colonies, European liberals, socialists, and monarchists alike were even more racist than the upholders of the Nazi Movement. We do not necessarily have to reinstate the “genocide of the hundreds of million of the indigenous people in the Belgian Congo or German East Africa and so forth” (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 99) in order to fully grasp the racial politics of pre-Nazi Europe. As Arendt reminds us, ‘racism was an ideological tool employed by all European imperialists’ (Arendt, 1958, 1969: 159-161). Thus, if the political notion that the Levantine race, especially the Jews, is an inferior European race is “thousand years older than the Nazi-Movement” (Simona, 2006: 13-14), then any thorough inquest concerning the origin of the racial creed and its pseudo-nationalist implications in modern European context should first confront the rational political ponderings of the Eighteenth century France.

Comte de Boulainvilliers pro-aristocratic political writings are outstanding in this sense for celebrating the feudal tenancy of his contemporary France. The term “feudal government” or “feudality” was first used to describe the nature of social order in Boulainvilliers 1727 *History of the Ancient Government of France, with Fourteen Letters on the Parliament or Estates-General*<sup>139</sup>(Homi B., 1990: 26). This spokesman for French nobility, who must have anticipated the erosion of noble privileges prompted by the monarch’s call for a national unity, began his interpretation of the history of France as that of two different nations of which the one, of Germanic origin, had conquered the older inhabitants of the “Roman-Gaules”, had impose its laws upon them, had taken their lands, and had settled down as the ruling class, the “peerage” whose supreme rights is solely based upon the “right of conquest” and “the necessity of obedience always due to the strongest.”<sup>140</sup> In order to regain uncontested primacy for the nobility, Boulainvillier proposed that his fellow noblemen deny any common

<sup>139</sup> M. Bloch, 1965. *Feudal Society*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Vol.I, p.xvii.

<sup>140</sup> Comte de Boulainvilliers, 1727. *Histoire de l’Ancien Gouvernement de la France*. Tome I, 33.

origin with the French people, break up the unity, and claim an original and therefore eternal distinction.<sup>141</sup> Boulainvillier denied any predestined connection with the soil; he conceded that the “Gaules” had been in France longer, and that the Franks were strangers and barbarians. However, as a student of Spinoza, he based his doctrine solely on the eternal right of conquest and found no difficulty in asserting that “Friesland” had been the cradle of the French nation. For him the natives of France were “subjects”—not of the king—but all those whose advantage was descent from the conquering Germanic people, who by right of birth were to be called “Frenchmen” (Arendt, 1969: 162-163).

By changing Spinoza’s ideas of Might into the concept of conquest, which then acted as a kind of unique judgement on the natural qualities of men and nations, Boulainvillier thus set a theoretical premise for later naturalistic transformation of Might-Right doctrines (ibid). For example, Darwin’s evolutionary theory of “Survival of the Fittest”, which was at the core of European imperialistic policies and European Pseudo-nationalism in both Europe and abroad, would never have gained its actual status had it not received the official blessing of English monarchy and its political and educational establishments. Hence Boulainvilliers germanist interpretation of France history, especially his “attack of the re-Romanization of the French state under the Capetian monarchy, and [above all] his lamentation of the destruction of the free society founded by the Franks, with its elective kingship and its annual aristocratic assemblies”<sup>142</sup> was to become an ambivalent mouthpiece for the contesting forces of modern European politics in the past centuries.

In an attempt to refute Boulainvilliers position, the Abbé Dubos published (1734) a critical History of the founding of the French monarchy, which claimed that “the Franks had not entered Gaul as military conquerors but rather as close allies of the Romans. This argument reiterated in the 1860s and 1870s by Fustel de Coulanges meant that the rise of the French monarchy could not be regarded as a Roman aberration from sound German beginning. Clovis pre-eminence among the Franks could then be seen to derive from the fact that he was a Roman officer, and Justinian cession of the crown, around AD 540, had made the Frankish kings the direct heirs of the Caesars (Homi B., 1990: 27). This latter Romanist contradiction of Boulainvilliers Germanist thesis, as Homi rightly observes, not only served to bolster the cause of absolutism, it also could be used later to the claims of the Gallo-Roman Third Estate, which in 1789 spearheaded the French Revolution” (ibid).

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<sup>141</sup> Montesquieu’s 1748, *Esprit des Lois*, xxx, ch.x also remarked that Comte de Boulainvilliers History was a political weapon against the Tier-Etats (Third Estate).

<sup>142</sup> F L., Ford, 1953. *Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of French Aristocracy after Louis XIV*. Boston: Harvard University Press, *passim*.

Importantly, despite the popular character of this later Revolution, it should again be noted that ‘if its key advocates identified themselves mentally with Rome it was not because they opposed to the “Germanism” of their nobility, the “Latinism” of the Tier Etats but rather because they felt they were the true spiritual heirs of Roman Republicans’ (Arendt, 1969: 164). But are we not misappropriating the national movement for the French Revolution given its key advocates unambiguous celebration of Roman Republicanism?

In short, that the Napoleonic wars were merely the elaboration of the imperialistic ambitions of the upholders of the French Revolution also imply that that Revolution was by no means a genuine nationalist movement, but instead the result of a cumulative civil contentions going back to the political decadence of the Roman Empire. But does the same not hold true for the intra-Germanic/Protestant and Romantic/Catholic rivalries on the British Isles, which cemented the foundation of the Anglo-Saxon nation-state model? We must not forget that “the Anglo-Norman kings prior to their retreat to the British Isles—following the succession war between king Edward III and the Franco-Frankish monarchy, Philip de Valois—had owned territorial possessions on mainland Europe” (Sue, 2000: 33-34). And if they lost their mainland territorial possession to the Frankish monarchy in France, it was simply because “all the Germanic groups, the Franks, the Visigoths, Burgundians, and the Normans alike, were equally vigorous and expansionist” (ibid)—hasting to increase their mainland territorial possessions from the ruins of the Roman Empire (emphasis added). One may also refer to William Boultong for details about the land possessions of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe and elsewhere (1908: 23). Not surprisingly, “Augustine Thierry, as Cattaneo<sup>143</sup> critic of Thierry’s book on Norman conquests remarked, regarded the English people as an amalgam of Angles, Saxons, and Danes and forget that they had themselves earlier been the conquerors of the Gaels and Britons. In Cattaneo’s views, the Norman conquest had not been a struggle between nation and nation, but the continuous increase of a religious and patrician confraternity that was bit by bit woven out of mixed fragments of the Roman, Celtic, Germanic, and Slav peoples”<sup>144</sup> (Homi B., 1990: 28ff).

Since, genuinely speaking, there was nothing nationalistic about the intra-European conflicts responsible for the retardation of the emergence of a European nation, it is foreseeable that forgery was to become the political norm. In her study, *Briton: Forging the Nation 1707-1839*<sup>145</sup>, Colley asked why the Welsh, the English, and the Scots could feel that their

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<sup>143</sup> Cattaneo, Della Conquista d’Inghilterra pei Normani [1839], Scritti Storici e Geografici, Vol.II. Bari: Laterza, 1957: 64-125.

<sup>144</sup> ibid., 65.

<sup>145</sup> Linda, Colley, 1992. *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1839*. London: Pimlico, 11-54; 322-323.



Welshness, Englishness, and Scottishness was consistent with also being British, and the Irish could not. Colley's conclusion is that the Irish were effectively excluded from developing a British national identity because Protestantism was absolutely central to Britishness, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In any event, Colley is not idiosyncratic for implicitly asserting that the highly politicized culture conflicts of the post-Roman period hold the key to the emergence of modern European pseudo-nationalism.

For instance, Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser, whose edited work<sup>146</sup> took a critical issue with the intricate link between religion and modern nationalism, argued convincingly that the passionate commitment to a specific concept of nation was one of the central escalatory mechanisms of the cultural war era. According to this view, the equation of secularism with modernity, which passed via the protestant national liberal political theorist (Max Weber) into the fabric of modernization theory that has written so much of the most authoritative writing on European history since the 1960s, may well be the most enduring legacy of [the] European culture wars. What makes Clark and Kaiser's edited work—about the nineteenth century European conflicts between organized religion (Catholicism) and the secular state—one of the outstanding contributions to modern European nationalism is its comparative nature. The volume covers almost all European societies which had experienced waves of secular-religious conflicts during this period. It deals specifically with key examples such as France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the Netherlands, while also taking into context other European countries as well (e.g. Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Austria and Hungary). In this way, the volume explores the Pan-European nature of such conflicts, the similarities in aims and ambitions driving the participants, or the form of organization and communication that the conflicting parties used.

Otto W. Johnston's equally important work, "*Der Deutsche Nationalmythus-Ursprung eines politischen Programmes*"(1990), is rather more articulate with regard to the consolidation of modern European pseudo-nationalism. This later author takes issue with German Nationalism during the Napoleonic wars. Interestingly, unlike the romantics, who would originally secularized sacred motives and traditional Christian values in their conceptualization of a national spirit with transcendental objectives, we are told that the national model that was supposed to liberate Prussia from the yokes of the nineteenth century Napoleonic occupation was expected to suffuse political motives with Providentialist language. Succinctly, instead of

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<sup>146</sup> C. Clark and W. Kaiser, ed. 2003. *Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth Century Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

secularizing religious motives as Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Novalis, or Hegel<sup>147</sup> had earlier in their writings, German poets and scholars were contracted by wealthy aristocratic politicians and landowning Junkers to do exactly the opposite—that is, to permeate political motives with sacred language. These contracted German writers were told to make the liberation struggle against the Napoleonic occupation look like a sacrosanct messianic mission by deliberately canonizing it be morally binding (Johnston, 1990: 17-19 [my English translation]). Here, one observes genuine politics at work seeking to reinstate the power base of German aristocracy and its wealthy landowning entourage. Consequently, the national state that was to emerge out the language of contracted literature was not only culturally too superficial, but, even worse, also too selective in its historic/heroic characters:

... käm es ihnen nicht darauf an, das, was im Preussen bestand, noch zu retten, sondern das, was sein könnte herbeizuführen. Diese Mitarbeiter an Nationalmythos schauten nicht zurück, sie lehnten es ab, Friedrich den Grossen oder das goldene Zeitalter zu preisen; in der deutschen Vergangenheit suchten sie Vorbilder, die dazu verhelfen sollten, einen künftigen besseren Staat zu errichten—eine geeinte deutsche nation, deren politische Vereinigung einen natürliche Folge der Selbstbewusstsein Kulturidentität und deren mustergültiges Leitbild ein reformiertes Preussen geworden wäre (Johnston, 1990: 20-22).

But as Johnston further found out, that particular politicized nation-state so disingenuous to local culture and history was from the onset also permeated with agents of divisionism:

Katholiken und Protestanten konnten gemeinsam am Ruhm eines Hermanns oder Dietrichs teilhaben, sich allerdings über Luther und Friedrich den Grossen wieder zerstreiten. Das Traumbild einer politischen geeinten Nation der Deutschen wurden von einigen strikt abgelehnt, von anderen in einen geistig-ästhetischen Bereich verwiesen.

In den Jahren zwischen 1807 und 1813/14 forderte eine durch Grossbritannien finanziell unterstützte Fraktion der preussischen Staatsführung jene durch Schriftsteller ausgeschmuckte und promulgierte mythopolitische Struktur, die nach der Reichsgründung neu belebt und bearbeitet und in den ideologischen Überbau eines Preussen-Deutschlands integriert wurde. Statt auf Militarismus hatte die Tätigkeit einzelner deutscher Dichter, Philosophen, Theologen und essayisten in napoleonische Zeit darauf abgezielt den Begriff „Vaterlandsliebe“ in einen politischen motivierenden sozialpolitischen Mythenkomplex hinein zu dichten wo er sich von propaganda auf einer Seite, Ideologie auf der anderen abgrenzen liess (1990: 22-23).

In this sense, Johnston is right to argue that modern German nationalism was a bifurcated social phenomenon with both pseudo-cultural and political ambiguities. This flirtatious

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<sup>147</sup> Eric Weil, 1998. *Hegel and the State*, Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press. ISBN:0-8018-5865-8.

character of the agents of modern European nationalism not only confirm their disingenuousness to the national ideal, but also reiterate how modern European nationalism was in general too political to be realistic.

To fully appreciate Johnston's compelling arguments, it will be important to expand our inquest to include pseudo-nationalist activities in European colonies, especially in the Americas, as this later political development was crucial in terms of national consciousness awakening among the Azanian/Ethiopian-Americans; and the central role these would later play in the formation of the Pan-African Movement. This summarizing analyses will not only elucidate the proliferation of European pseudo-nationalism abroad, but will, on the whole, also demonstrate how out of the divisions that so long haunted Europe's social history a national model is reemerging that implicitly begs for the resuscitation of the *einmalig* Greco-European culture.

### 3.3.1. Exporting European Pseudo-nationalism into Colonies North of the Atlantic

The role Western Europeans played in the political history of the Americas deserve no better elaboration than a cursory review of how European descendants heritage of Europe's political and culture conflicts mentioned elsewhere impacted on the identity politics in that part of world. As noted earlier, despite its civic character the Anglo-American nation-state model owes its actual tenancy to an underlying [supposedly pre-political] ethnic core, namely the Anglo-Saxon core, which, as we shall soon see, was itself merely the brainchild of Medieval England's sacred-secular political tensions. In their edited Volume<sup>148</sup>, Allen J. Frantzen et al also generally consider the Anglo-Saxon identity process to be the construction of creative human agents in response to the exigencies of contemporary life. This is almost like suggesting that creative human agents, especially politicians, are often prone to inventing ethnic identities to suit their myopic interests. Succinctly, this mainly bisected work tends to reaffirm the divisive tendencies of early modern European politics. The first section by Allen Frantzen takes issue with "Medieval and Renaissance Anglo-Saxonism," and examines the social construction of Anglo-Saxon history in England in the Medieval and early modern periods. Frantzen contrast 'Bede's Seventh century treatment of Gregory's praise of Anglian boys in a Roman market with the Sixteenth century reinterpretation of the incident by the reformation historian John Bale. While the Catholic Bede viewed Gregory's remark as a hint of English election—signifying English special relationship with Rome; the Protestant John

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<sup>148</sup>A J. Frantzen and J D. Niles, ed. 1997. *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*. Gainesville: university press of Florida.

Bale by contrast saw the Pontiff's remarks as evidence of how sexual perversion, inflamed by celibacy of Catholic priests, reached all the way to the very heart of the Roman Catholic Church.<sup>149</sup>

The second section looks at similar developments in the Scandinavia, Britain and the United States of America (USA) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here, the issue of identity construction by historically grounded personalities is expanded further in Robert Björn's essay on the seminal role played by Scandinavians in the scholarly development of seventeenth and eighteenth century Anglo-Saxonism. Interestingly, Björn's sums up with a description of how English writers later appropriated this scholarship in the early nineteenth century and deleted Danish patriotic references. It is Gregory Van Hoosier-Carey's *essaic* contribution which deals with the *volte-face* in southern American attitudes towards Anglo-Saxon during the American civil war. Whereas the Southerners viewed themselves as aristocratic Norman civilizers and considered the Anglo-Saxon northerners as Barbarians, in the post-war period, Southern intellectuals came to identify themselves with Anglo-Saxons as the oppressed, but the true holders of liberty and democracy.

In general, John Niles concluding assessment that historical agents generally are not shaped by the past, but instead act to appropriate it for their ends accords perfectly with the idea of social identity construction. For Niles Anglo-Saxon is not more than what has been perceived by historically grounded human beings.<sup>150</sup>

Eric Kaufmann informative Article thus expounds on Niles emphatic remark regarding identity construction by historically grounded personalities in the Anglo-American context. Kaufmann's article takes specific issue with the rise of American "nativism" from an Anglo-Saxon ethnic-core. Accordingly, 'the general idea that pre-conquest Anglo-Saxons had known a primitive form of freedom that had its roots in the German forests was obviously continuous with the socio-cultural and political language of sixteenth century England. Some of the more radical variants of the theory held that the Anglo-Saxons carried a desire for freedom in their veins, and had a destiny to realize this impulse. These ideas later found audience in the Eighteenth century America; and influenced prominent pro-independent writers and interpreters of English history. As Reginald Horsman<sup>151</sup> also observes:

"The various ingredients in the myth of Anglo-Saxon England, clearly delineated in the host of Seventeenth and Eighteenth century works, now appears again in American protests: Josiah Quincy Jr.

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<sup>149</sup> *ibid.*, 24.

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*, 209

<sup>151</sup> Horsman Reginald, 1981. *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origin of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 12

wrote of the popular nature of the Anglo-Saxon militia; Sam Adams stressed of the Old English freedom defended in the Magna Carta; Benjamin Franklin stressed the freedom that the Anglo-Saxons enjoyed in emigrating to England; Charles Carroll depicted Saxon liberties torn away by William the Conqueror; Richard Bland argued that the English Constitution stemmed from the Anglo-Saxon period ... George Washington admired the pro-Saxon history of Catherine Macaulay and she visited him at Mount Vernon after the Revolution” (cited in Kaufmann, 1999: 447)

That most of the personalities mentioned in this quote above are historically grounded personalities deeply involved in the habitual political business of identity construction deserve no further elaboration than Thomas Jefferson’s eloquence: “Has not the restitution of the ancient Saxon laws had happy effects. Is it not better now that we return at once into that happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever yet devised by the wit of man, as it stood before the 8<sup>th</sup> Century?”<sup>152</sup> In addition Thomas Jefferson had also proclaimed to John Adams in 1776 that “Americans were the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the *Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed*”<sup>153</sup> (Kaufman, 1999: 448). Another eloquent celebration of Anglo-Saxon myth by Anglo-American political (or pseudo-nationalist agents) is the instance in which “a New England town meeting was likened to the Anglo-Saxon tribal *Witenagemot* (council), while the statements of Tacitus regarding the free and egalitarian spirit of the Anglo-Saxons he encountered were given American interpretation”<sup>154</sup> (Kaufmann, 1999: 448).

If Jefferson’s appropriation of a common Anglo-Saxon and Levantine ancestral origin for the purpose of a novel American identity here sounds rather conciliatory, a thorough review will show that the general state of pre-independence and even early post-independence confessional relationship in the Americas to the north was generally continuous with the traditional dichotomy observed earlier of Europe’s political conflicts. In fact “by the early 18<sup>th</sup> century a tradition of anti-Catholicism had become well established in “Anglo-Saxon” Britain, forged through protracted warfare with France and fanned by a stream of pamphlet literature”<sup>155</sup> (Kaufmann, 1999: 441) so that the first European settler communities would have disembarked (in the so-called New Found Land (NFL)) with the confessional conflicts of mother Europe. And true, “prior to 1700 only Rhode Island ... gave Catholics full civil and

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<sup>152</sup>Horsman. *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 22.

<sup>153</sup> *ibid.*, 22.

<sup>154</sup>Anita, Haya Goldman, 1992. “*Reconciling Race and Rights: Emerson and the Construction of Nationality.*” Thesis (PhD). Harvard University, 246.

<sup>155</sup>Linda Colley, 1992. *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1839*, 40-42.

religious liberty in the new settlements of North America. After the Revolution most states continued to carry anti-Catholic status in their books.<sup>156</sup> The French and Indian War of 1754-1763 helped to ignite anti-Catholic sensibilities. The treatment of Acadian expellees illustrates the degree to which an exclusive Anglo-Protestant consciousness operated in the period just prior to independence:

Lawrence original intention was to scatter the [Acadian] exiles throughout the British North American colonies ... But ... fear, hatred, and acute distrust for all things French dominated in the hearts and minds of the Atlantic seaboard settlers, such that at no time were the Acadians exiles given more than grudging acceptance.<sup>157</sup>

The Acadian language and religion made them pariahs in American colonies, where they were nearly irrespective of location, forced into indentured servitude and reduced to extreme poverty. Roughly a Third died of disease and exposure, prompting the rest to migrate after a sojourn in France, to Catholic French-speaking Louisiana during 1765-1785” (Kaufmann, 1999: 441).

Since the hostile reception of the Franco-Catholic Europeans by their Anglo-Saxon Protestant brothers in the Americas merely reveals the nature of a political state in search of a dominant culture, it should be expected that those groups who were not militarily strong enough to defend their newly acquired territorial possessions abroad either suffered the fate of Remus or were coerced by the grinding machine of the Anglo-American melting pot. After-all assimilation in the colonies was perfectly concomitant with the nationalist benchmark of the motherland (e.g. France, the U.K, Germany et cetera): It couldn't be an Anglo-American exception. Therefore, in addition to the assimilation of the enslaved Azanians/Ethiopians, other European groups, including Protestant groups (the Germans), also became prey to the political “process of Anglicization.”

As Kaufmann finds out, “the origins of “Anglo-Conformity” could be traced back to the pre-Revolution era with the society for propagating Christian knowledge among Germans. Founded in the mid-eighteenth century by Benjamin Franklin and Anglican minister William Smith, the society pursued what it called the “Anglicization” of Pennsylvania’s large German population.<sup>158</sup> After the Revolution attempts to have federal laws printed in German (1796)

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<sup>156</sup> Ray, Allen Billington, 1938. *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism..* New York, N.Y: Macmillan, 9, 21.

<sup>157</sup> James, H. Dormon, 1983. *The People Called Cajuns: An Introduction to an Ethnohistory.* Lafayette, La.: Center for Louisiana Studies, 16-17.

<sup>158</sup> Lucy, Eve Kerman, 1983. *Americanization: The History of an Idea, 1700-1860.* Thesis (PhD). University of California, Berkeley, 8, 36.

and or to gain official status for German in schools and courts (1837) were rebuffed. The result was the gradual assimilation of Pennsylvania's German population. This was especially pronounced among the Mennonites, whose close theological affiliation with the Quakers rapidly created an "extended cousinage" among the different communities of eastern Pennsylvania.<sup>159</sup>

Other groups to undergo assimilation included the Welsh and Scots, whose language were all but dead in America by early nineteenth century, as well as the Huguenots, who in the nineteenth century disappeared entirely.<sup>160</sup> A similar fate befell the Dutch and Swedes: The majority of Dutch descent of mid-eighteenth century New York had to succumb to the English language. The younger generation scarcely ever spoke anything but English, and there were many who became offended if they were taken for Dutch because they preferred to pass for English."<sup>161</sup> (Kaufmann, 1999: 450) A rather perfect political *volte-face*, of course, given the Dutch-Boers supposed superior elected status in colonial South Africa.

In viewing these—i.e. the argument advanced earlier by Thomas Jefferson with regard to his freedom loving Anglo-Saxon ancestors from the German forest in central Europe; the later transformation of their descendants into a language crushing political community in an occupied foreign land et cetera—are we not right to ascribe this latter political activism to the realm of pseudo-nationalism. It should be noted that only those disingenuous to nationalist demands for total freedom would allow the Anglo-American [imperial] state to pass for the national ideal. There is no doubt that the Europeans and/or the Azanians/Ethiopian constitute legitimate national constituencies of the imperial Anglo-American state. And while it is also true that the Europeans currently constitute the dominant national community in North and South America alike, such dominance, especially in the USA and Canada, is likely to last long provided the other European sub-language groups accept the predominance of the English language.

The circulating rumours about the prevailing challenges to the predominance of the English language from Franco-Canadians and/or Spanish speakers in the USA would most certainly provoke unintended consequences. For instance, the Bantu-Ethiopians, whose Azanian sublanguages were systematically destroyed during the colonial period, could also demand for separate culture institutions so as to reinstate the use of ancient Ethiopian (or later Egyptian) or Meroetic alphabets; and/or Hausa and Swahili as their national lingua-Azanica. But if in

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<sup>159</sup> David, Hackett Fischer, 1989. *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 423.

<sup>160</sup> Jon Butler, 1983. *The Huguenots in America: A Refugee People in New World Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 71, 198.

<sup>161</sup> Richard Conant, 1980. *The Course of the Melting pot Idea to 1910*. New York: Arno Press, 52.

support of a common economic interest, the other Europeans rescind from their challenge to the predominance of the English language in North America ..., then they are merely confirming that external threats encourage national unity—albeit this time in an occupied foreign land.<sup>162</sup> In this sense, it is reasonable to agree with the conclusion advanced by C. Clark and W. Kaiser in their analysis of European culture wars in the nineteenth century, which generally purports that while the conflict between the nation-state and organized Catholicism can be conceived as a struggle for hegemony within a rapidly changing European societies; it was not a struggle either of them could win out right, but one in which both parties were transformed in a significant way.<sup>163</sup>

It is hard to predict exactly how such transformation could influence the resurgent European nation. But we already know that liberal institutions and their media outlets erroneously accredit Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern (the former Irish Premier) with the outcome of the Northern Ireland peace agreement. These latter liberal arguments are too disingenuous to the culture norms of the resurgent European nation. Indeed, the Northern Ireland Peace Treaty is possible today not because of Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern's political genius, but rather by virtue of the fact that both parties of the Protestant-Catholic-Divide have finally judiciously recognized that the European culture unambiguously repudiates the sanguine reach of their distinctive confessions. As a matter of fact, when the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, recently propose the introduction of *Sharia* Law in the U.K.<sup>164</sup>, he implicitly admits that Britain is after-all not a nation but a multicultural state; and that any group—e.g. pseudo-cultural, economic, political etc.—could assert itself within that system provided it has the material resources and resilience necessary to challenge it to the core. But does this latter political development not have serious implications for the enfeebled African states, which, as observed earlier, owes their very existence to the 1884 Berlin Conference divisive deliberation; and, even worse, now dependent on their former colonial masters economic and military assistance for their very survival?

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<sup>162</sup> The Azanian Americans are therefore urged to heed to the nationalist proclamation of the Ethiopian King to Kambyes not to add the land of other people to their own. So, while they are morally obliged to contribute to the freedom of all nations within the imperial American state, they must resist any temptation to claim that part of the world as their homeland. Their only natural habitat/home is the Azanian nation.

<sup>163</sup> C. Clark and W. Kaiser (ed.), *Culture Wars* (cited in footnote 147 above).

<sup>164</sup> [http://news.bbc.UK/2/hi/UK\\_news/7232661.stm](http://news.bbc.UK/2/hi/UK_news/7232661.stm)



### 3.4. Pan-Africanism as an extension of European pseudo-nationalism

The preceding idea that genuine nations, irrespective of location, are ab ovo culturally inclined also found its cogent expression in Wole Soyinka's contribution to the ongoing debate about the national phenomenon. In his view, 'culture was the primary constituency of human associations. Man was first a cultural being. Before politics there was clearly culture. Only man the producer could have evolved into political being, which, to pare away from mystification, is the evolutionary stage related to the development of society and the consequent sophistication acquired in the management and protection of resources. This hierarchy of evolution also explain why man resorts to his cultural affiliation (or institutions) when politics appear to have failed him, never the other way round' (Soyinka, 1996: 128-129). This rather articulate emphasis about the cultural origin of nations tends to qualify Anthony Smith national understanding, that: "the nations of the world, almost without exception, were formed from ethnic-cores, whose pre-modern myth-symbol complex furnished the material for the construction of the modern nation boundary symbols and civil religion. But this, he argues, does not necessarily entail the continuation of an *ethnie*-nation unity. It merely specifies that the modern nation derived its name, official language, national symbolism, conception of territorial boundaries and its history from the ethnic group or groups that inhabited the land in pre-modern times" (Smith, 1991: 39; Kaufmann, 1999: 439). But does Smith perception about the national phenomenon hold true for the colonial African states? Even provided we ostracize the foreign origin of the concept of Africa, where exactly do we begin in terms of wanting to establish the ethnic source of Africa's political entities e.g. Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Congo, Tanzania, Mauritania, or Libya; or the post-independence tribal/pseudo-ethnic categories (e.g. Eritrea, Somali-land, Biafra and so on)? This problem becomes even more exigent in the linguistic sphere giving these countries association with such colonial Lingua-francas as Anglo-phony; Arabo-phony; Franco-phony; Portugese-phonies.

In the specific case of colonial Africa, it will thus be reasonable to accentuate Soyinka's perception that 'any nation apprehension that takes its being in ideas outside the humanity that is the fundamental element of its very existence is as vaporous as the nation itself (Soyinka, 1996: 110). In direct reference to African politics, Soyinka stresses that 'many notions of nation-building and development on the African continent have proved as relevant to actualities as polar boots on the feet of Masai herdsmen' (Soyinka, 1996: 116-118).

This notwithstanding, Soyinka's still posits himself—in his *The Sore of a Continent*—as a staunch defender of democratic nationalism, that is, those who defend the national concept

derived from the “Will” of the people similar to the popular nation-being expressed by Nigerians on the 12<sup>th</sup> of June 1993 presidential election in favour of Bashorun M.K.O Abiola. But are we not trivializing the concept of nationhood by reducing it to the will of a people irrespective of their culture background or even knowledge of the national culture? Even if, in the Nigerian context, democracy is indigenously derived, the fact alone that that political entity is the brainchild of 1884/5 Berlin Conference economic deliberation makes it inconsistent with the national ideal. So, if the artificiality of the African countries in general makes them fall short of national qualification, especially in the culture sphere, Soyinka seems to contest that by merely adhering to the democratic norms of the West they might become political nations:

A democratic Ethiopia has recognized that Revolution is not merely heroism on the battlefield but the cultivation of the far more profound heroic cast of mind. Not only has the new government conceded to Eritrea the right to recover and actualized her nationhood, Ethiopia has gone further and entrenched in its constitution the right of any of its human groupings to aspire to their own nationhood, as long as the will of such people is faithfully established (Soyinka, 1996: 140-141)

Let's shun the fact that the democratic Ethiopian government Soyinka has just portrayed in this quote is not only currently deadlocked with Eritrea on a border conflict, but is deeply enmeshed in Somalia's bloody clan wars desperately trying to hinder Ogaden (the Somali speaking region of Ethiopia) from becoming yet another pseudo-ethnic nation, and instead proceed with the perception that democracy encourages the emergence of tribal states or pseudo-ethnic nations on Africa's political plain. (An expeditious distinction between ethnicity and tribalism is necessitated before hand: “Ethnic groups are communities which share a belief in common ancestry and homeland and which meet a threshold requirement of population and territory (real or imagined) that distinguishes them from tribes and clans”<sup>165</sup>). Indeed, the various armed criminal groups roaming randomly in Africa claiming to be representative of their distinctive group's quest for separate homeland or independence—whether or not these groups are merely exploiting the ideological impotence of African leaders and intellectuals and/or the culture vacancy of Africa's artificial states—reaffirm that Africa's highly politicized nationalist movements (e.g. Irredentist and Pan movements) are merely the brainchildren of external economic and political agents.

In Soyinka's words, ‘for many of my generation the notion of nationhood was not always restricted to that geographical constituency called Nigeria but was indeed a continental state

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<sup>165</sup> E K Francis, 1976. *Interethnic Relations*. New York: Elsevier, 6.

of self identification. Many students of my generation surely set their political sights on variants of continental oneness; the colonial settler regimes of East Africa, not to mention the Apartheid South Africa in particular, dictated this racial challenge. We were destined—this much appeared so gloriously clear to us—our destiny was to be at the forefront of Africa’s version of international brigade. Our liberation hordes would sweep from Ghana (Nɔ̃hana<sup>166</sup>), Nigeria, the Cameroon to engulf the colonial settler regimes of Kenya, the Rhodesias and stopping only at the most provocative tip of the continent—South Africa, whose Apartheid philosophy and policies had moved beyond the terrain of experimentation to the most extreme hallucinatory edges of dehumanization...

Heirs to various pan-African movements, beginning with the famous Manchester gathering of 1945, Ghanaian, Nigerian, and East African Students debated news from these and other stubborn enclaves viewing them as assaults on both racial and national pride. This nationalist vision was to be fulfilled by the liberation forces of which we were destined to be the vanguard: We saw the continent, at least from the South of the Sahara to the Southern tip of the continent, not as a conglomeration of nations but as one nation, as one people’ (Soyinka, 1996: 126-127). In a wholly cultural sense, Walter Rodney thus adds that ‘Africans south of the Nubian (or Sahara) desert—during the period of early development—formed a broad community where resemblances in cultural activities were clearly discernible’ (1982: 34-35). With the early accusation of Cambyses, the Persian despot, by the king of the Ethiopians for the theft of Egypt ... thus implies that the so-called African continent had erstwhile constituted an ethno-cultural national community. Indeed, there is no shortage of historical instances to confirm that the Ethiopians had, several times in the course of their national history, liberated Egypt from foreign/colonial occupations.—One such remarkable endeavour was “Nub Amon of Ethiopia march into Egypt...”(Sayce, 1895: 30). With good reasons to now believe that the indigenous population of pre-colonial Africa had once constituted a homogeneous national community, why are the communal boundaries of the African countries nowadays being so narrowly defined?

Soyinka continues in his bid to defend his democratic thesis:

A common denominator of crisis in many areas may actually be found in the refusal of a section—be this class, ethnic groupings, profession, or religion—to grant others the simple right of participation in the

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<sup>166</sup>The word is derived from a *Gur*/Mandingo language meaning “am I good?” The speaker questions a second person whether s/he is good. Probably the founders of ancient Nɔ̃hana after relocating from Meroe had left behind their kin who ... colluded with the destructive hand of the red crown from the North in order to safeguard their personal gains at the expense of national culture/unity, and were themselves later victimized (expelled) by those forces of the red-crown...

process of deciding a collective destiny. The military dictatorships of the African continent, parasitic, unproductive, totally devoid of social commitment or vision, are expression of this exclusionist mentality of a handful; so are those post-colonial monopolies that parade themselves as single party states. To exclude the sentient plurality of any society from the right of decision in the structures of their own lives is an attempt to anesthetize, turn comatose, indeed, idiotize society (Soyinka, 1996: 138-139)

The consequence of such denial is too serious to be ignored: ‘The revolt against the denial of the innate potential of every unit of society is certainly one of the evolution of scenarios that still plague the African continent in those intractable spots of Liberia, Ethiopia, Somali, Sudan, Mali, Niger and so on. Here, Soyinka seems to confront us with three contesting views of nation-being in specific reference to African politics. The first, which he supports, must reflect the democratic will of a people consistent with the outcome of the 12<sup>th</sup> June 1993 Nigerian election, which Bashorun M.K.O Abiola was the presumed winner. The second which he deplores reflects the will of a minority social predators, who, by virtue of their commitment to sustaining Africa’s colonial states, would do everything to hinder the emergence of a democratic nation. In Soyinka’s words, ‘it was this numerical infinitesimal but well positioned minority, blinded by self interest, seeing that a nation was about to slip out of its hands and to be restored to a majority dispensation that commenced the destruction of all sense of belonging. It is that same miniscule proportion who, having succeeded in robbing the Nigerian people of their nationhood, at least for now, insists ... that the famed election of 1993 is an ancient history. But if that election proves indeed to be ancient history, then Nigeria as a nation has no future. Any election, he argues, even ignoring the history of June 12<sup>th</sup> (1993) Nigerian election, can prove the cement that binds a nation together or else the porous vessel through which its life blood seep away. If the nation’s will has become so tainted that it cannot be implemented, then the nation itself has become so contaminated that it cannot begin to claim the recognition of a nation’(1996: 131-132). The third national contender, which is tribal or pseudo-ethnic often emerge in reaction to the tyrannical character of the second national variant.

Before we expand critically on the tribal/pseudo-ethnic variant of nations, let’s first examine whether Soyinka’s rational attempt to sever a nation’s ancient past from its future not merely puts him in the ranks of those economic agents who myopically condone the replacement of China’s past with concrete, steel, and glass mausoleums in the name lineal economic development; or those who would rather prefer to destroy the earth for another habitable celestial province yet to be fully located somewhere in the illusionary Blue sky above. The fact alone that the raw materials being used in the construction of the space shuttles/vehicles

use for the exploration of the supposedly futuristic celestial provinces are originally derived from the earth suffices to remind Soyinka that nations without past are like trees without roots. Alas, even in its original Greco-European socio-historical and or socio-political context, Soyinka seems oblivious of the fact that the democratic thesis he recommends his fellow Africans—in his compromised deliberation of the ideal state of nations—predates modernity.

### 3.4.1. Questioning the national essence of Africa's Irredentist Movements

Following the riots that celebrated the outcome of Kenya's December 2007 presidential election, one might have observed the partitioning of Kenya into tribal or ethnically dominated territories by BBC cartographers.<sup>167</sup> Was such an unfortunate political development a co-incidence or an overdue anticipation consistent with the 1884/5 Berlin conference deliberation on Africa's political future? By and large the so-called Kikuyu-Luo dichotomy of Kenyan politics is by no means an isolated development—since the legacy of the Rwandan genocide is not only still lingering but is just a stone throw away from Nairobi. Consequently, tribal rivalry seems to be the hallmark of African politics. For instance, the so-called traditional antagonism between the Kimbundus and Mbundus embroiled Angola in decades of protracted civil war shortly after gaining independence from Portugal. And even though the artificial Ndebele-Shona adversary in neighbouring Zimbabwe did not culminate into similar tragic post-independence experience..., the general political development of post-June 2008 run-off-election—if the words of David Miliband<sup>168</sup> should not be taken at face value—is by no means trivial:

“The ongoing political tension is a fight between two different visions for the future of Zimbabwe, one of which has the support of the Zimbabwean people as expressed on 29 March 2008 and the other of which is held together by a small clique that holds power on the basis of violence and intimidation...”<sup>169</sup>

Astonishingly, Miliband intransigence about regime change—“it was now “imperative” there was a new government in Zimbabwe”<sup>170</sup>—coincided with the sentencing of Simon Mann, a former British army officer, in Equatorial Guinea, who has undeniably implicated Sir Mark

<sup>167</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from\\_our\\_own\\_correspondent/7172038.stm#map](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7172038.stm#map) (accessed July 8, 2008)

<sup>168</sup> David Milliband served as the foreign minister of the government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown until 2010.

<sup>169</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/7491979.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7491979.stm) (accessed July 6. 2008).

<sup>170</sup> *ibid.*

Thatcher, the son of UK former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; the Spanish and South African governments; and a London-based Lebanese business man by name Eli Calil for being the main sponsors of that 2004 foiled coup attempt.<sup>171</sup> Even, in the so-called success story of African democratic experiment, South Africa, an internal ANC power struggle between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma early 2008 was again trivialized by foreign Media outlets as deeply seated traditional tribal antagonism between Xhosas and Zulus. And, as noted earlier, the same is true of Africa's most populous state, Nigeria, which, politically, is dominated by the so-called Hausa-Ibo-Yoruba trio since that country's semi-independence from Britain in 1960. In essence, what the leaders of these so-called politically relevant African groups share in common is that they have a special mandate to safeguard the 1884/5 Berlin Conference resolution on Africa's political destiny. Therefore unlike genuine nationalist affiatus for total freedom and national unity, the leaders of Africa's so-called politically relevant groups are elected by their colonial masters to safeguard the continuity of artificial African states at the expense of the local population innate desire for total freedom and national unity.

Indeed irreconcilable divided groups—as the legacy of the 1994 Rwandan genocide; or the recent low level civil war between Africa's "First World" citizens, South Africans, and her "Third World" citizens, the other Africans, in South Africa major cities tend to confirm—are easy to manipulate; successive French governments could pretend to be protecting the chosen *Zagawas* in Ndjamena while simultaneously supporting other Chadian groups via Gabon or Sudan.<sup>172</sup> Indeed, there are recent signs [at least rhetorically] of gradual shift in policy vis-à-vis France African Protégés by the Nicolas Sarkozy government. This rather unusual political move from Paris is said to be in response to Sarkozy's campaign promise to shift substantially from traditional Franco-African relations—an asymmetric relations, a former Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues once called: "the only place in the world where France can single-handedly influence policy." And this policy, as Henri Astier of the British Broadcasting Corporation also acknowledges, was in many ways an extension of France colonial rule in Africa. And even if Sarkozy recent call—on his first presidential trip in Africa—for a new "partnership between equal nations" is a reaffirmation of Sauvagnargues statement (or his campaign promises), Fabrice Tarnit rightly hint that: "Some of Nicolas

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<sup>171</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/Africa/7493717.stm> (accessed July 7, 2008).

<sup>172</sup> It must be noted that France has maintained military presence in Gabon even after that country's independence; and without that military presence Umar Bongo's government wouldn't have remained in power that long. On the other hand, Umar Bongo's deteriorating relationship with the Chadian leadership and his novel relationship with Sudanese leadership indicates that ... (see, [www.sudanforum.net/showthread.php?t=28945](http://www.sudanforum.net/showthread.php?t=28945) (accessed July 8, 2008)).

Sarkozy attitudes with respect to Omar Bongo (Gabon) and Denis Sassou-Nguesso merely indicate continuity in traditional Franco-African relations. In Tarnit's apt formulation, France is not the best partner for peace in Africa because historically France has contributed more to war than peace in Africa." And this is particularly true of France direct role in the 1994 Hutu-led Rwandan genocide.<sup>173</sup> Importantly, these, mainly tribal and pseudo-ethnic (Hutus versus Tutsis), African groups—constantly fighting for the control of Africa's depleting resources (e.g. shrinking rain forest in Congo, Central African Republic, or lakes in Chad, Cameroon etc.)—constitute what intellectuals and scholars of ethnic and nationalist politics would subsume under irredentism (or irredentist movements).

Alas, when John Nwafor<sup>174</sup> once boasted to me about the superiority of his Igbo/Ibo ethnic group in relation to other Nigerians, the only proof he used to substantiate his divisive claim was that Nigeria's oil reserves lie underneath Igbo dominated territory—that is in the Eastern part of Nigeria. Such a myopic and divisive position echoes similar economic developments in neighbouring Ghana with the so-called Ashanti-Gold—of course, now privatized and bears the name "Anglo-Ashanti Gold."<sup>175</sup> Inasmuch as the Anglo-Ashanti-Gold is concerned, the leaders of these ... colonially elected groups are the chosen guardians of the interests of their colonial masters. Otherwise, in a wholly cultural sense, prior to the Ashantis political prominence in that part of Azania—that is to say, prior to their relocation from Mali (via the *Ofori* river in present day Ivory Coast) to what is now Ghana, Bantu-Ethiopian Pharaohs, the most recent among them, Thutmosis, under the guidance of Bunkper secret institutions extracted gold from that region for their culture institutions in *Manfour* and Thibé (Thebes), Napata, Meroe, and later Nɲhana. In fact, the name of the Ashanti Kingdom's capital, Kumasi ("the Tree of Life), merely affirms that that kingdom's founding fathers shared the culture objectives of the Bantu-Ethiopian institutions of Manfour. In order not to miss the main point of our analytical discernment, it is worth noting that not cultural but sheer economic factors are quintessence to understanding the motives behind Africa's irredentist movements.

To illucidate this point, let's expound critically on Mr. John Nwafor's reaction to the prospects of an Ogoni tribal state led by MEND (Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta) prior to Biafra secession from Nigeria. While Mr Nwafor did not hide his disdain for Africa's emerging tribal states, his celebration of the *Wazobia* idiom—the supposed

<sup>173</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7014776.stm> (printed July 8/2008).

<sup>174</sup> This fellow is a Nigerian citizen from the East, who sympathizes but does not actively support the Biafra Movement. He had attended most of the Seminars (I held at the University of Hamburg between 2005 and 2006) on Azanian history. And although we share slightly different views about Africa's political future we intermittently met to ponder about its troubling aspect.

<sup>175</sup> <http://www.anglogold.com/default.htm>

predominance of Nigerian politics by the Hausa-Yorubas-Ibo—led him to want to subject other Nigerian groups in the East to the arbitrary jurisdiction of a future Ibo dominated Biafra. But does this fellow not merely share the economic objectives of Nigeria’s post-independence military governments—now turned democratic leaders of course—for wanting to maintain national unity provided their elected status remains unchallenged. But does the economic background of Africa’s growing pandemic of irredentism and the related states, in addition to the existing ones, not make both miserably short of our national qualification, especially, given the latter’s total commitment to the authenticity of indigenous culture et cetera. Moreover, Africa’s colonial heritage—the artificial states; and the enshrined Christian (European) and or Islamic (Arab) values—is too inconsistent with local culture norms that the maintenance of such a delicate concoction, even in conjunction with the pending democratic experiment, is bound to intensify the already existing divisions.

Assuming Shango, the Yoruba God of thunder or fire, originally reminds us of an incoming or terminal rain (the primordial water ... meant to water the seed of the “Tree of Life”); the fact that that seed was—after the demise of the Bantu-Ethiopian culture institutions—not entrusted to the tribal fanatic of Africa’s irredentism (e.g. Yoruba, Kikuyu, Ibo, Shona, Khoisan, Ashanti, Hutu, Tutsis et cetera), but to the men of language (Mōajab<sup>176</sup>) of the Azanian nation is bound to render the concept of a tribal Oduduwa or Biafra culturally irrelevant. For the creative hand of Hyen-Nu gave “Ptah of Manfour/Memphis first the commanding “word” to create and integrate all other local deities in a univocal social order” (Gehlen, 1986: 168-169). The integration ethos of this particular national culture is well pronounced to be mistaken as indicating other than that the inspiration behind the acculturation of national culture is a divine endowment. If this should then imply that each member of that national culture, irrespective of age and social status..., is equally entitled to the same fruits of that national culture (perhaps, albeit differences in doses for the different age groups), then the prospects of integrating the culture mandate of the Azanian nation with the exploitative economic mandate of the African states is bound to be problematic. In all, this later arguments in turn contradict Soyinka’s notion of what constitutes the ideal state of the national phenomenon.

In addition to Soyinka’s obdurate admiration for Western democracy, his definition of the ‘ideal state of the nation’ also takes an explicit economic overtone. As he puts it, ‘humanity, the core of the national organism, is not abstract and must be dealt with on the material plane.

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<sup>176</sup> Mōajab (men of language) is derived from the so-called *Gur* (linguistics) with “Mōar” meaning language, which in turn is derived from Mōb (mouth).



The ledger book is where to look, and not any mystery texts of pious intentions or abstract notions. We had better not remain strictly within the categories of idealist builders (e.g. the forced labour and distorted production systems under Belgian colonialism in Congo, or the productive collectives of the Soviet Union).’ This material texture of Soyinka’s national understanding inevitably led him to a comparative analysis of the Gross National Products (GNPs) across the political spectrum. Specifically, he contrasted the GNPs of—what he termed—‘the far more comprehensive apprehension of nationhood (e.g. France, Sweden, UK, Japan, Korea, USA etc.) with that of such geographical spaces as Sierra Leone, Gabon and Nigeria (in short, the African states in general); and then proceed to question the impact of national sovereignty of the latter countries on their citizens, who continue to see the buying powers of their national currency dwindle to nothing, the healthcare a special reserve for the few in power and social opportunity the hereditary preserves of their scions. For this group of social predators, the chosen guardians of the African states, a nation is merely a gambling space for opportunism and adventurism for power.’ (Soyinka, 1996: 120-121)

In fact, when Ibrahim Babangida adventurously introduced the organization of Islamic council in corporate national membership, he pretty well anticipated a militant reception from his ill-informed audience [mainly] from the North of the country. The result was the fracturing of Nigeria into Islamic North and Christian South; and the reverberations of such sectarian divide continue to plague Nigeria even today (Soyinka, 1996: 120-122). Simply put, for the purpose of preserving their own power base, most African leaders often resort to the divide and rule tactics of their colonial heritage.

From time to time, however, a portion of the victimized population regain its natural human senses as being part of a human collective that has become conscious of having been robbed of its will, ready to contest the robbery and demand restitution (ibid., 117).

But far from focusing their opposition on just demand for restitution some well known tribal and religious leaders often resort to the threats of secession in order to win concession (from the government in power) by default (ibid., 33-34). So, for the purpose of controlling the economic resources of African countries, we not only observe the politicization of culture but the creation of pseudo-ethnic bonds on Africa’s political plain.

In light of these conflicting interests, what is Africa’s literary laureate recommendation for a genuine national unity? The self-proclaimed democratic nationalist contests that a nation can be united provided there is a mechanism for the reconciliation of the multiple interests within its historic or artificial boundaries (Soyinka, 1996: 30). Because Soyinka’s pluralist *melange*

accords well with the arguments of the liberal nationalist school, let's critically explore what the liberal creed has in common with the monolithic culture demands of nations.

In his defence of liberal nationalism, Will Kymlicka, for one, also argues that "nationalism can be compatible with and even support liberalism as an important basis for the achievement of liberal ideals of justice and liberty."<sup>177</sup> In contrast to non-liberal, communitarian nationalism based on ethnicity, religion, and or thick conception of the national good, liberal nationalism is based on a thinner and more diffuse sense of belonging to an intergenerational society, share a common territory, having a common past and sharing a common future.<sup>178</sup> Liberal states can legitimately promote a "thin" national identity strengthen the sense of mutual obligation needed to sustain liberal justice and thus motivate citizens to respect one another's rights and fulfil the other duties of liberal citizenship"<sup>179</sup> (Curtis, 2007: 334-340). The idea that "liberal [political] cultures are not essentialist and monolithic, but rather are fluid and hybrid mixtures of conflicting values of native and foreign influences that are in perpetual flux also found elaboration in Herr's arguments.<sup>180</sup> Within this dynamic cultural milieu, insiders try to negotiate their differences and attempt to arrive at reasonable agreements on the future direction of the nation. Moreover, insiders can challenge the corrupt status quo by identifying plural national values, constructing multiple interpretations of them, adopting and transforming foreign ideas and values in culturally sensitive ways, or formulating hybrid valuational constructs that are conducive to gender equality"<sup>181</sup> (Curtis, 2007: 336-337). But does this political attempt to manage the culture demands of the national ideal and the economic requirements of state system within the nation-state constitutions not merely create more problems than had been previously envisaged?

Perhaps the best way to respond to the foregoing arguments is to contrast such liberal views with Mr. Modibo Diakite<sup>182</sup> intransigence about his Bantu-Ethiopian national culture. M. Diakité culture narrative is an oral heritage from his grandparents, which generally tends to portray an earthly paradise (in Western Sudan) prior to the arrival of *Batur*<sup>183</sup> or the

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<sup>177</sup> Will Kymlicka, 2002. *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 267.

<sup>178</sup> *ibid.*, 264.

<sup>179</sup> *ibid.*, 265.

<sup>180</sup> Ranjoo, Seodu Herr, 2006. "In Defence of Nonliberal Nationalism.", *Political Theory* 34 (2006), 315.

<sup>181</sup> *ibid.*, 316.

<sup>182</sup> Modibo Diakite, a Dogon traditionalist, is formally from northern Mali. I met him in London (U.K) during my short stay in that city between 2000 and 2003. The Doógon/Mandingos are originally at home in Libya, Algeria, Niger, Mali, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Senegal, Mauritania, Morocco, Chad, and Sudan (formally under different linguistic categorization).

<sup>183</sup> *Batur* or *Baturé* is derived from *Gur* and is used in reference to pale (white) skin person (generally Europeans and/or Arabs; but not local Albinos or light skin people. It is a combination of the verb *baat/r* (come) and *tuun* (meet) which simply means they came and met (e.g. the Sphinx or Pyramids et cetera).

introduction of Islam and Camels. Accordingly, Mali and other parts of Western Sudan had in those remote days of their nation's history sufficient natural water reserves (rivers, lakes etc.) filled with crocodiles and hippopotamus and so on. As a result, the whole landmass of the region was in those days covered with the green-crown/vegetation of Amon throughout the yearly cycles. Moreover, his ancestors then could mingle or integrate freely with these sacred animals of the traditional religion without the least suspicion of being killed ... because of the traditional belief system. However, with the introduction of Islam and camels, and the systematic eradication of Western Sudan crocodile population, not only did the once abundant natural water reservoirs dried up with the disappearance of these sacred animals of the Pharaonic religion, but the whole region is now at the mercy of encroaching desertification from the North – the southwards expansion of the Nubian/Sahara desert. His radical recommendation, which amounts to the proscription of the use of Camels in the whole of colonial Africa and the reintroduction of indigenous crocodiles might sound like yet another culture attempt to resuscitate one of the prominent “sacred animals” of ancient Bantu-Ethiopian (or later Egyptian) Pharaonic culture.

Diakit 's lamentation of his Ancestors naive accommodation of an imperialistic religion, whose divine force (God/Allah) he implicitly accuses for draining the primordial water of his people's culture, sounds too resolute to accommodate any democratic deliberation. Assuming, as he suspects, the systematic eradication of all animals with sacred affinities to the Bantu-Ethiopian Pharaonic culture by pseudo-religious clerics was indeed rationally/politically envisioned to discourage the revival of Bantu-Ethiopian culture institutions, how do we reconcile these diverging positions democratically? For example, while the Arabs in Sudan may see in the large numbers of their Camels, say in Darfur, a classical political method of accelerating the shrinking of the farmlands of this predominantly land bound indigenous population and thus their territorial engrossment (say in the economic sense), the indigenous population, at least in light of Diakit 's lamentation, have only now began to fully understand the purpose of the Semitic companion. It should be noted that Diakite has nothing in particular against Camels—indeed they are part of nature's creative genius for maintaining earth's ecological balance; but, in his view, their divine ecological mission is not in his part of the earth. Hence despite their far reaching culture contacts the indigenous pharaohs did not include camels in their list of sacred animals. In other words, the Semitic companion has no special place among the sacred animals of the indigenous culture. Virtually, Diakite's anticipation that the local population would be fighting Arabs and or pseudo Arab nomadic groups in the Congo-belt by the middle of this century should the expansion of these non-

indigenous animals be left unchecked is bound to render any liberal or democratic argument obsolete.

Compounded with the systematic rapes of indigenous women by Arab nomads, Diakité has good reasons to be suspicious of the ongoing political attempt by agents of colonialism to replace culture humanity with a culturally indifferent global economic humanity:

*was die kapitalistische Produktionsweise vor allen früheren ausgezeichnet, ist, dass sie das innere Bestreben hat, sich mechanisch auf die ganze Erdkugel auszudehnen und jede andere, ältere Gesellschaftsordnung zu verdrängen... Dadurch werden die naturwüchsigen Gesellschaftsverhältnisse und Wirtschaftsweise der Eingeborenen überall vernichtet, ganz Völker werden zum Teil ausgerottet*<sup>184</sup>.

Inevitably, since the contemporary data/narrative of economic successes—the “elevated life expectancy” rate of citizens of the most advanced Economies—not merely confirms the culture man’s original mission to tune life with the sirens of eternal existence, but has, amid the global economic crisis in some parts of the advanced economies (e.g. U.S.A), been regressing steadily<sup>185</sup>; Wole Soyinka and Koffi Annan, the man behind Africa’s Green Revolution, will increasingly find it difficult to persuade genuine nationalist to emulate the miserable economic data being presented at the increasingly undemocratic global economic platform.

This notwithstanding, Wole Soyinka, the spokesperson for Africa’s secularist stream, questions lucidly the economic essence of sacred institutions such as the World’s largest Basilica in Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast); Africa’s largest mosque in Kampala; or Africa’s largest “Buddhist temple” in South Africa.<sup>186</sup> He insist that, apart from the billions of dollars made by the consortiums behind such architectural caryatides, and the livelihood these consortiums guarantee their workforce, the overall contribution of such sacred structures to the enhancement of humanity’s quality of life is not available. Apart from the unskilled labour-force, neither the living conditions nor the moral sensibilities of those living in the localities infested by such religious institutions have improved (Soyinka, 1996: 112-113).

It is against the background of such travesties that Soyinka approves the first paragraph of the preamble of United Nations Document responsible for Human Development towards March

<sup>184</sup> Luxemburg, Rosa, 1975b. *Einführung in die Nationalökonomie* (Gesammelte Werke, Band 5 Ökonomische Schriften). Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 772; cited by Elmar Altvater, 2006. *Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft*, 36 Jahrgang, Nr.2, 157.

<sup>185</sup> [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/12/AR2007081200113\\_2.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/12/AR2007081200113_2.html) (printed June 13, 2008).

<sup>186</sup> Note that this Buddhist Temple is sponsored by the Chinese government in conjunction with its attempt to intensify its late colonial policies in Africa. If any thing, contemporary Chinese leaders seem to have understood the effectiveness of pseudo-religious activities (e.g. the process of Christianization and Islamization) in the destruction of identity of the indigenous population and the insecurity often associated with selflessness.

1995 Copenhagen Conference, especially the final presentation of African Ministers responsible for social and human development, in his conception of an ‘ideal state’ of the nation being (1996: 113):

We the governments of African countries represented by our ministers for human and social development, meeting in Addis Abeba on the 20 and 21 January 1994 as a preparatory regional conference on the World Summit for social development to be held in Copenhagen, Denmark, during 6 and 12 March 1995, resolutely affirm the centrality of the human being as the initiator and beneficiary of development, the means and the end, the agent through whom and for whom, all development activities must be undertaken (ibid: 141)

This rather vague declaration represents, in Soyinka’s view, the final convergence of a nation definition and the fundamental expectations between rulers and the ruled, between the leaders and the led. But are we not merely trivializing the national ideal by ascribing home such an opaque declaration? For instance, what is the green–print for development in that declaration? Should development imply the destructive replacement of, say, sixty to seventy per cent of Africa’s agricultural land with concrete, Steel, and glass mausoleums (as do China and India in this age of globalization) by Western construction consortiums in the name of economic development; or should development mean Africans emulation of India’s “Green-Revolution” as Kofi Annan, the former U.N. general secretary and now chairperson of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)<sup>187</sup>, would prescribe?

Unlike Soyinka, Kofi Annan romanticizes banally India’s 1960s and 1970s Green Revolution for his ill-informed African audience. He sounds rather adamant that the emulation of India’s Green Revolution is a long-term solution for Africa’s economic malaise. But how really informed is Kofi Annan about India’s Green Revolution? For instance, those who have keenly studied Asia late industrializing economies, India and China, have often associated them with chronic and in some instances irreversible environmental problems, specifically acute water and agricultural land shortages—due to the poor management of these culturally inevitable natural resources. We must not forget that land, as a divine culture good to nations, is beyond human creative genius and must therefore be intelligibly managed for both the past, present, and future generations. So, the following critical “observation” of land and water problems associated with India’s 1960s and 1970s “Green Revolution”<sup>188</sup> should serve as a wedge

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<sup>187</sup> <http://www.agra-alliance.org/news/pr050608-speech.html> (accessed June 13, 2008); further details about Kofi Annan’s new could be retrieved from: <http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg19826554.900&print=true>.

<sup>188</sup> Much of the successful expansion of irrigation in recent decades has come from the exploitation of groundwater using tubewells. They have the advantage of small scale, low cost and rapid construction without the loss of fertile land and destruction of human settlements commonly associated with large-scale, gravity-fed

against Kofi Annan's economic recommendation. Moreover, if India's Green Revolution was originally intended to have future prospects why such disturbing headlines as: "Malnutrition getting worse in India?"<sup>189</sup> Nationalists do not need the voiceless dying faces of India's untouchables—e.g. the six month old Roshni; Kajal (two and half years old); Anyali (seven month old); and Aseel (two years old)—in order to perceive the tragic outcome of that country's Green Revolution. As Damian Grammaticas (BBC Madhya Pradesh Bureau) also remarks, even a decade ago 55 to 60 percent—data from National Family Health Survey—of the over ten million children from Madhya Pradesh were deemed malnourished. Today, UNICEF puts the number of malnourished children in Chitori Khurda at 79 per cent.

Astonishingly, Robert J C. Young, citing Amartya Sen, then adds that, "famine in India as elsewhere is not so much caused by the lack of availability of food as by what he calls the relations of entitlement. Thus, although today more people in India suffer chronic malnutrition than the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, and more than half of all children in India are underweight; this occurs when in fact today India produces all the food it needs, and the government stockpile of rice and wheat comprises a quarter of the entire world food stocks. However, largely because of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, India's public Distribution System, which controls these vast stores, appears to be completely powerless to help those, for example in Rajasthan and Orissa, who are starving to death. In order to get rid of its stocks, which cost half its annual food budget to maintain, India has taken to selling its rice at a loss on the international market. While its own people starve to death, India's rice exports amount to a third of the total rice exports in the world." (Young, 2003: 135). This is what the world's most populous capitalist led democracy does to its own citizens.

On the other hand, when nationalist leaders heed to such tragic names as China's "*Krebsdorf* (cancer village)" or "*Krebsstrasse* (Cancer Streets)" or Cancer capital of the world often associated with that country's novel industrial policies<sup>190</sup>, they would be generally baffled by

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schemes based on reservoirs... In India alone, the number of tubewells jumped from nearly 90 000 to over 12 million in 1990. Behind this success, however, is the neglect of the fact that agricultural development based on groundwater is unsustainable, when it uses "fossil" water or when extraction rates exceed rates of recharge.

The rapid expansion of tubewells irrigation has put extreme pressures on what is commonly a static resource because natural rates of recharge are low... Consequently, water tables are dropping and causing a wide range of environmental, economic and social problems. ... Over-pumping has led to increased investment or operating costs as falling water tables have necessitated deeper wells and greater energy consumption for pumping. In some instances poor farmers without capital to deepen their wells have had to revert to rainfed production. In others the necessary adjustments have been too late and the land has been desertified, as in some places in India ... (see, Nikos, Alexandrite, ed. 1995. *World Agriculture-Towards 2010: An FAO Study*. Chichester/New York, 355 [esp. box 3.1]).

<sup>189</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south\\_asia/7445570.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7445570.stm) (accessed June 17, 2008).

<sup>190</sup> Andreas Lorenz in: *Spiegel Special* 5 (2004), 120.

the economic recommendations of both Kofi Annan and Wole Soyinka. The fact alone that China's "seven major rivers, which use to serve as the prime life line for hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants, are contaminated beyond any reasonable regress; while between 400-600 Chinese cities and towns (with a population of ca. 600 Million in the North and North eastern parts of China) are chronically suffering from acute water shortages"<sup>191</sup>, suffice to dispel the "prevailing perception that China is a timely substitute for the economic failures of Africa outgoing colonial masters."<sup>192</sup> In effect, Chinese leadership systematic dislocation of hundreds of thousands of Chinese peasant farmers to Africa for minor construction labor, who most certainly lost their farmlands to wealthy conglomerates of China's capitalist policies, indicate that the current Chinese leadership is not only anti-national, but a watchdog for the global economic platform. Thus if the irreversible contamination of water resources; the misappropriation and destruction of peasant farmlands bear testimony to the global economic policies of the late industrializing economies of Asia, then Thabo Mbeki's recent "appeal to African leaders against falling into colonial relationship with China"<sup>193</sup> deserves nationalist attention.

The unfortunate reality for Azanian nationalists in this age of globalization is the systematic strangulation of Azania's inland water resources prior to the commencement of Kofi Annan's Africa Green-Revolution. In particular, this is true of the present miserable state of Lake Chad<sup>194</sup> due to the over exploitation of its natural water reserves for agriculture use, probably inline with the economic recommendation of experts from France and other Western countries. So, why still naively insist that foreign expert knowledge is prerequisite to the success of Africa's Green Revolution?

In the words of Kofi Annan, "today the efforts of African farmers are thwarted by a lack of access to good seed, fertilizers, and financing." Hence, the unavoidable need to ally with the U.S Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). This present alliance would ensure the delivery of "better technologies for efficient water use; improved infrastructure; paved roads so farmers can get their harvests to markets."<sup>195</sup> But is Kofi Annan unaware of the fact that the very US government, whose aid agency AGRA/he now allies with, has been present in Kenya since that country's semi independence from Britain; in fact both the British and USA governments still have military bases in Kenya. Had successive American governments

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<sup>191</sup> *ibid*, 120-121; National Geographic (Special Issue)/May (2008), 147-169.

<sup>192</sup> Mohamed Guéye, 2006. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (E+Z)*, 47 Jahrgang, December 2006, 483.

<sup>193</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6178897.stm>.

<sup>194</sup> <http://new.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/61364746.html>; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4906692.stm> (accessed June 13, 2008).

<sup>195</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7449989.stm> (accessed June 17, 2008).

wanted a better future for Kenya's agriculture productivity they would not necessarily wait until the formation of AGRA. The sad reality about Kenya's agricultural sector is that most of its products are destined for the shelves of affluent economies in the West, whose ill-conceived export oriented agriculture policies of the past resulted in mono-agricultural productivity—that is, the destruction of seed variety in favour of corn, rice, Soya or wheat; which, in our global economic context, are now being generally employed for the bio-fuel industry at the expense of dead corpse in Somalia and Ethiopia because of the high cost of food. Further, the fertilizers and chemicals often employed in Kenya's agriculture Business are generally not only banned from use in agricultural production in the West, but are also not locally owned; and as food prices continue to rise many of these foreign owned “companies that make fertilizer, grain elevators, food shipping equipments and chemicals and financial investors are now scrambling for land globally and in Africa, in particular. Accordingly, a private equity fund is buying farmland acreage in parts of the world as diverse as Africa and England. In the economic language of Glen Langan, China and India combined could add about 3 to 5 million of world's middle class each year over the next decade. Those are consumers with money to spend, and they will consume more food. And that total does not include expanding middle classes in South America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.”<sup>196</sup> Unfortunately, Africa is again excluded from the list of regions that would supposedly benefit from the global wealth expansion even though its land is suitable for the production of export crops. Since profits are the main motives behind the waves of scramble for land in Africa and elsewhere, one could now reasonably argue that the poor subjects of colonial Africa would again be left to bear the brunt of the ecological strains often associated with the use of chemicals and fertilizers in agriculture productivity. Lake Chad is a specific case in point. And unless exigent and drastic national measures are taken, Lake Victoria, the source of the Great Nile of the indigenous culture institutions, could soon be the next in line.<sup>197</sup> The Hamites are yet again condemned by the gods and goddesses of the global economic order to perish not only by starvation, but also from contaminated inland water resources.—The poisonous concoction seems perfectly continuous with the very concept of Africa, it is not an indigenous preparation.

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<sup>196</sup> <http://webmail.aol.com/37290/aim/de-de/Mail/PrintMessage.aspx> (This information was issued on June 18, 2008 by Newsmax.com with the heading: *Wall Street Global Land Scramble Begins*. Newsmax.com, 4152 West Blue Heron Blvd, Ste 1114 Riviera Beach, Fl, 33404 USA (accessed June 19, 2008).

<sup>197</sup> <http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/39/Tanzania.html>.



Alas, that the original idea of the declaration, which Soyinka appropriated earlier for his conceptualization of his ideal state of nation, is not that of the African ministers who presented it is also elaborated in its general stance on Africa's socio-economic and political issues. The paper, for instance, identifies "a crisis of governance encompassing such well known shortcomings as the near absence of democratic structures, popular participation, political accountability and transparency. Further, the paper also recognizes that civil strife is closely associated with challenges to authoritarian structures of government as well as ethnic and communal conflicts. The stark reality that cripples rescue efforts from within Africa is also acknowledged in that report:

Concomitant with the decline in all the indicators of human and social development is the virtual collapse of African institutional capacity. Hospital and health centres lack basic equipment and amenities: schools lack basic teaching aids necessities such as chalks; African universities and institutions, once the training ground for the region leaders, professionals and technicians have now become poor performing institutions" (Soyinka, 1996: 134-136).

Apart from Wole Soyinka recommendation for his fellow Africans to catch up with the political and economic tenancies/models of advanced industrial countries ..., genuine nationalists would generally find his work suspect for various reasons. Specifically, in addition to his earlier acknowledgement that 'any nation apprehension that takes its being in ideas outside the humanity that is the fundamental element of its very existence is as vaporous as the nation itself' (1996: 110), the author's cursory treatment of the political crises of Nigeria is bound to haunt his work considerably. For example, why did the literary laureate consider the results of Nigeria's 1993 presidential election to be the dawn of a democratic nation-being despite the apparent difficulty of extricating Bashorun M.K.O Abiola<sup>198</sup> from his list of Nigeria's social predators? That the Abiola cult could be so elusive to Soyinka's critical lenses is indeed suspect given the authors disdain for the tribal ideal (Soyinka, 1996: 109-145). In fact, for Soyinka, Nigeria remains a duty and not a nation in the real sense (ibid: 131-

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<sup>198</sup>Olatunde Obakhavbaye, a nigerian political refugee from the Delta region who I met in Greifswald in the 1990s, told me that the financial fortune Bashorun M.K.O Abiola used in financing his 1993 election campaign was made from the chronically bankrupt NEPA institution (National Electric Power Authorities)... But does this description of Abiola not make him the exact opposite of a national figure whose main priority is the welfare of his fellow nationals. And shortly after the annulment of the results 1993 presidential election, Abiola flew a chattered presidential Jet across countries whose leaders still posit themselves as the divine elected colonial masters of Africans—and therefore entitled to the final say in the political destiny of Africa—lobbying support. Indeed with such post-election grand gestures across European capitals, one would find it rather difficult to extricate Abiola from the list of Mobutus or Bedel Bokassa (who in a single night spent over a million Pounds appeasing French audience in many of his numerous marriages abroad).

133). This is almost like suggesting that our quest for establishing the genuine national ideal in Africa should have began at the continental level.

### 3.4.2. Retrieving the National Genus from the Concept of Pan-Africanism

The main obstacle in terms of establishing the national ideal from the concept of pan Africanism is the ‘foreign provenance of the concept of Africa’ (Ben-Jochannan, 1991: 1). Therefore, without further ado, let’s expound on the earlier perception that Pan-Africanism is merely the furtherance of European pseudo-nationalism. Indeed, most academic literature often invokes the capital cities and or education institutions of Western countries as the birth place of the founding ideas of the Pan-African Movement. Reacting to this, the Executive Committee of the Union of African students in London made unequivocal their position on future conferences with regard to early pan Africanism:

The idea of a congress of African nations and all people of African descent is both useful and timely ... But we observe that four of such pan-African congresses had been held, all within recent memory, and that the present under discussion is the fifth. It is unfortunate that these important conferences should have been held outside Africa, but in European capitals. This point is significant and should deserve our attention...

Our Executive Committee are certainly not in favour of this or any future pan-African congress been held anywhere in Europe. We do rather suggest the Republic of Liberia as perhaps an ideal choice. ... for our fifth pan-African congress. We have good reason to believe that the government of Liberia would welcome this idea, and would give us the encouragement and diplomatic assistance that might be necessary to ensure success (W.E.B Du Bois cited in Kedourie, 1970: 386)

With the unavoidable choice for Liberia<sup>199</sup> in that seemingly remote and emotional period of Africa’s political history, one could rightly assume that the political destiny of Africa was, in the early days of pan-African ideas..., largely under the control and influence of foreign economic powers. True, the founding ideas of the pan-African movement are largely attributed to the creative genius of scholars and political activists in the Diaspora, who apparently then were unaware or knew little about the indigenous people genuine desire for the total and unconditional freedom of their homeland and its Manfou(i)r culture institutions. Also, the exact venue of the first Pan-African Congress remains highly contested and so too is the movement’s objectives.

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<sup>199</sup>We should not forget that Liberia was itself a political experiment of the US government of Monroe to repatriate back freed African slaves from the USA; and Liberia then, as today, was quasi a satellite state of the USA government rather than a real independent country.

For example, while P.E. Olisanwuche<sup>200</sup> considers the Chicago congress of August 14 – 21 (1893) as the nascence of pan-Africanism as a movement; W.E.D Du Bois is quoted by Kedourie (1970: 372) as contesting that the Pan-African meeting in London (1900) put the word “Pan-African” in the dictionaries for the first time.

As with its objectives, W.E.B Du Bois stated in the 1930s that “the pan-African movement is aimed at the intellectual understanding and cooperation among all groups of African descent in order to bring about the industrial and spiritual emancipation of the Negro people. Rayford Logan, a black American historian, speaking at the Third Annual Conference of American Society of African culture at the University of Pennsylvania in 1960, saw the pan-African phenomenon in terms of self-government by African countries south of the Sahara. The Nigerian Journalist and politician, Anthony Enahoro, adds that the phenomenon included the economic, social, and cultural development of the African continent, the avoidance of conflict among African states, the promotion of African unity and its influence on world affairs. Taking the argument from A. Enahoro, Senegalese publicist, Alioune Diop, felt that Pan-Africanism was more or less synonymous with the concept of “African personality” or “Negritude.” In short, the list of differing opinions about the objectives of the pan-African movement could be many times resurfaced depending on the socio-economic objectives of the numerous and random Pan-African groups littered across the political spectrum. With this in mind, P.E Olisanwuche describes “the pan-African idea as a bifurcated phenomenon with both political and cultural ambitions that regards Africa, Africans and African descendents abroad as a unit. As a movement it seeks to regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of oneness among the people of African world. It glorifies African past and inculcates pride in African values.”<sup>201</sup>

But what is so glorious about Africa’s past since the very concept of Africa couldn’t be indigenously validated. Contrary to what Olisanwuche would have us believe, far from having any genuine culture orientation the pan-African ideas are wholly politically derived; and, in most cases, at variance with the indigenous people desire for total freedom. One must not forget that the lack of indigenous culture orientation doesn’t necessary imply the absence of politicized culture. After all the substitution of Hyen-Nu/Amon culture institutions with the Christian, Islamic and Buddhist ones, as noted elsewhere, is politically deemed to be culturally verifiable. Consequently, any unbiased review of the various documents of Pan-African congresses since that movement formation would also come to the conclusion that

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<sup>200</sup>PE. Olusanwuche, Esedebe, 1994. *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776-1991*. Howard University Press, extracts mainly from ch.1.

<sup>201</sup> *ibid.*, ch.1.

pan-Africanism is indeed a genuine political endeavour continuous with the objectives of colonialism. Even its most ardent unionist advocate, Kwame Nkrumah, was more politically inclined despite his revocation of such cultural terms as Nɔ̄hana (Ghana) and Azania in 1957 and 1958 respectively. Therefore the following selected list of resolutions from [probably] the first Pan-African Congress in London should invalidate the perception that there is anything cultural about the pan-African ideas:

- (a) That the allies and associable powers establish a code of law for the international protection of the natives of Africa, similar to the proposed international code of labour.
- (b) That the League of Nations established a permanent bureau charged with the special duty of overseeing these laws to the political, social, and economic welfare of the natives.
- (c) The Negroes of the world demand hereafter that the natives of Africa and African descent be governed according to the following principles:
  - 1). The land and its natural resources shall be held in trust for the natives at all times they shall have effective ownership of as much land as they can probably develop.
  - 2). *Capital*: The investment of capital and granting of concessions shall be so regulated as to prevent the exploitation of the natives and exhaustion of natural wealth of the country. Concessions shall always be limited to time and subject to government control. The growing social needs of the natives shall be regarded and the profits taxed for the social and material benefits of the natives.
  - 3). *Labour*: Slavery and corporal punishment shall be abolished and forced labour except in punishment for crimes; and the general condition of labour shall be prescribed and regulated by the state.
  - 4). *Education*: It shall be the right of every native child to learn to read and write his own language and the language of the trustee nation, at public expense, and to be given technical instruction in some branch of industry. The state shall also educate as large a number of natives as possible in higher technical and cultural training and maintain a large corps of native teachers...

5). *The state*: The natives of Africa must have the right to participate in the government as far as their development permits in conformity with the principle that the government exists for the natives, and not the natives for the government. They shall at once be allowed to participate in local and tribal government according to ancient usage, and this participation shall gradually extend, as education and experience proceeds to the higher offices of the state, to the end that in time, Africa be ruled by consent of Africans. ... Whenever it is that at the hands of any state or that any state deliberately excludes its civilized citizens or subjects of Negro descent from its body politic and cultural, it shall be the duty of the League of Nations to bring the matter to the civilized world ... (Kedourie, 1970: 376).

It should be noted at once that despite the modifications made later, in successive pan-African congresses (Kedourie 1970: 377-387), the main language of the resolutions above corresponds in large with the concessions made to acquire the first wave of African independence, after the Second World War. But doesn't the entire language of these resolutions sound too obsequious to be nationalistic? Is it the explicit pleading for the allocation of some parts of indigenous land or natural habitat for industrialization, or the wish for the permanent establishment of bureau of the [defunct] League of Nations, that should be considered nationalistic? In general, these resolutions sound more like that of economically deprived scholars and political activists begging to be integrated in the imperialist-led class structured socio-economic tenancy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Capitalism. In this way, one can understand the acute suspicion of Marcus Garvey's popular movement (UNIA) by both the agents of colonialism and such indigenous elitist intellectuals as W.E.B du Bois (and some influential members of NAACP).

Marcus Garvey is an outstanding national figure for considering his Bantu-Ethiopian populace to be a naturally distinct and geographically localized national constituency, which by virtue of its natural intellectual endowment is not only capable of its own development/improvement, but could contribute uniquely to the development of humanity at large. Garvey's nationalistic argument also found its most potent celebration in the words of a Russian nationalist philosopher, Tschaadajev:

die Russen [sind] ein Ausnahme-Volk. [Sie] gehören zu der Group jener Nationen die scheinbar in den Bestand der Menschheit nicht eingehen, vielmehr nur dazu sind, die Welt irgendeine wichtige Lehr zu geben (quoted in Hannah Arendt, 1986: 510)

Marcus Garvey and Tschaadajev positions are not only genuinely nationalistic, but more importantly convergent; that is to say, both views contradict conventional arguments that nationalist are by nature xenophobic and unable to cooperate. For instance, while accepting the uniqueness of their distinctive peoples/nations, they both acknowledge that their national cultures must be subservient to humanity; in other words both unanimously contest that their divine national missions are wholly humane.<sup>202</sup> The Bantu-Ethiopians and their Russian counterpart could easily cooperate in the service of humanity provided their distinct nations are totally free from external political influences/interventions. This rather culture imperative of being innately committed to the total freedom of one's nation and at the same time innately voluntarily inclined to the service of humanity might sound linguistically incongruous, but it is the acme of nationalism. To polish my national understanding with economic language, each nation is by nature endowed with the monopoly of special culture knowledge. And it is the voluntary integration of these specialized culture knowledges that we are most likely to arrive at that juncture (in the form of ankh) called perfect humanity. With this national understanding one is left to conclude that the pan-African ideas are generally not only too shallow but also too political to be genuinely nationalistic.

Indeed, it would be unfair to consider all the early pan-African official statements as a mere pseudo-nationalist stunt aimed at conforming to the economic realities of the past two centuries. Worthy of note is the perception that “the independence of Ghana (Nɲhana) would be meaningless unless it is linked with the total independence of the whole continent.”<sup>203</sup> This notwithstanding, one must not confuse Nkrumah's genuine political commitment to continental unity with nationalists demand for culture unity and national integration. For this Africa's grand continental unionist individual had no problem whatsoever with Arabs colonial occupation of the northern part of his beloved motherland. As noted elsewhere, even disingenuous nationalists often find it difficult, especially in times of crisis, to disavow the culture institutions of their ancestors. Thus, Kwame Nkrumah's disavowal of the sacred land

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<sup>202</sup>The concept of national humanism also found expression in Ndabaninge Sithole's African Nationalism (1959) cited in Hannah Vogt, 1967. *Nationalismus Gestern und Heute*. Opladen: C.W. Leske Verlag, 203-205; V.Y. Mudimbe, 1994. *The Idea of Africa*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 23 credits Eugene Guernier as among the first to articulate the African origin of humanity and human consciousness.

<sup>203</sup> P.E.Olisanwuche, *Pan-Africanism*, ch.1; Hannah, Vogt, 1967. *Nationalismus Gestern und Heute*. Opladen: C.W. Leske Verlag, 203.

of the culture institutions of his Bantu-Ethiopian ancestors disfranchises his national commitments. Even assuming Nkrumah's revocation of such national culture terms as Nɔ̃hana (Ghana) or Azania was originally intended to give culture resonance to his grand continental political program; supposing the founding fathers of pan-Africanism were indeed generally coerced into accepting the economic and political reality of contemporary Africa; the present political scenarios customary of Arab expansive policies in Sudan/Darfur, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and other parts of Africa suffice as a reminder of how irreconcilable the objectives of imperialism and genuine nationalism really are. As the political crisis in Sudan, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania tends to confirm, Islam for enlightened Arabs is merely an instrument for land theft and territorial expansion. That Kwame Nkrumah was more an internationalist political character, whose political views were inconsistent with the mythical language of indigenous culture, is also evident in the "aim" and "goals" of his early organized political activities in the Diaspora, e.g. the "Circle."<sup>204</sup>

#### **I. Aim of the Circle:**

- a). To maintain ourselves and the Circle as the Revolutionary Vanguard of the struggle for West African unity and national independence.
- b). To support the idea and claims of the All African National Congress in its struggle to create and maintain a union of African socialist Republics.

**II. Circle Goal:** As time as may be deemed advisable "The Circle" will come out openly as a political party embracing the whole of West Africa and whose policy then shall be to maintain the Union of African Socialist Republics. For an extended discussion of Kwame Nkrumah's Circle (see, Kedourie, 1970: 388-391).

With the mention of West Africa's independence via a socialist political platform et cetera, one thus sees in Kwame Nkrumah a determined socialist agent whose political mission was the inculcation of Marxist scientific socialist values in the minds of his fellow Africans. As Nkrumah himself stated, "Long before 1957, I made it clear that the two major tasks to be undertaken after the ending of colonial rule in Ghana would be the vigorous prosecution of a Pan-African policy to advance the African Revolution, and at the same time the adoption of

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<sup>204</sup> From *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in Gold Coast 1948*, Colonial No.231, Appendix II, p.92.

measures to construct socialism in Ghana.”<sup>205</sup> This self-proclaimed Marxist was probably too committed to the Marxist scientific doctrine to have simply overlooked then the apparent contradiction between Karl Marx celebration of the colonization of the so-called backward peasant Slavs by the so-called advanced/superior Germanics and or British colonization of Indians and his fellow Africans desire for emancipation from the Yokes of colonialism. For Nkrumah, “Pan-Africanism and Socialism are organically complementary. One cannot be achieved without the other.”<sup>206</sup> Not surprisingly, the Nigerian based Pan-Africanist, Chinweizu<sup>207</sup>, considers Nkrumah’s commitment to both Pan Africanism and Marxism as a fortuitous development in his academic life. But, as Professor Kwesi Prah reports, “by the mid 1960s, practically all African heads of state, with the exception of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Leon Mba of Gabon and V.S. Tubman of Liberia, had at one time espoused African socialism. Consistently such ideologues have put a distance between what they variously define as African socialism, and the 20<sup>th</sup> century Marxian formulae, with the emphasis on class struggle. Tom Mboya anchored his definition of African Socialism on the pre-industrial communitarian ethos of Africa. ... In Tanzania under Julius Nyerere populist socialism was described as Ujamaa Socialism.”<sup>208</sup> Essentially, Chinweizu considers the prevailing tag of African Socialism in the early 1960s in the place of African Communalism as similarly fortuitously derived to coincide with European socialist political agendas. Hence it shouldn’t be surprising that shortly after the first wave of African independence ... agents of colonialism succeeded in dividing the African states into the so-called Casablanca Group (of which Ghana, one of the radical countries, was part) and the Monrovia Group (that of the moderates). This is how a Ghanaian News paper also characterized both groups when the Monrovia Group met in Lagos in 1962:

“The Casablanca states have consolidated their economic independence and are using it for the benefit of their citizens, while the member states of the French colonies and some English speaking countries are being exploited by their colonial masters. The citizens of these countries are still living under the yoke of poverty, while their European colonial masters continue to enjoy their economic resources” (cited in Minogue, 1970: 134-135).

This concise delineation of the economic background of early Pan-Africanism thus reaffirms its political nature as a whole. Astonishingly, despite their quest for freedom, Western

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<sup>205</sup> Kwame, Nkrumah, 1972. *Revolutionary Path*, 125.

<sup>206</sup> *ibid.*, 127.

<sup>207</sup> Chinweizu, 2008. *African Unity: the problem and its dimensions*. A privately circulated unpublished Paper

<sup>208</sup> Kwesi, Prah, 2006. *The African Nation*. Cape Town: CASAS, 80-81.



economic and political ideals remain for most Pan-African intellectuals and scholars the perfect criterion for emulation. And the Cameroonian Pan-Africanist, Senfo Tonkam (the founder of Black Nation in Germany), who I first met in Hamburg in early 2000 as a first year student from the university of Munich, has since transformed from being once a progressive [socialist] to a liberal/democratic nationalist. This later political development tends to reveal a particularistic character trait of most pan-African personalities given that [even] the founding fathers of the pan African movement, prior to their ascension to power, were also key advocates of global democracy (Kedourie 1970: 379).

In addition to what seems like intellectual impotency on the part of most pan-African leaders and scholars, there might be sound political reasons why the democratic concept is so appealing to the advocates of African unity today. The seemingly tenuous democratic experiment in South Africa suffices for a brief clarification. In this later instance, the appropriation of democracy in 1994 automated a rational transition to majority government from the minority Apartheid system, even though the then retreating Apartheid system had deliberately poorly equipped the indigenous population for such an expeditious democratic transition. As Claude Ake rightly observes, “the social conditions for a formal democratic process is not yet available in Africa; the influence of the political class and especially the opposition is not at all favourable: Their democratic engagement, when at all available, is [superficial] and weak and often an instrument for power strategy.”<sup>209</sup> “Africa is not ready for democracy,”<sup>210</sup> Jacques Chirac once said. There are three pre-conditions for the establishment of democratic culture, Rainer Tetzlaff<sup>211</sup> also acknowledges:

- 1) The establishment of division of labour based on the principle of capitalist market order with political arrangements for fair private ownership and attested civil rights;
- 2) an education and professional training of a disciplined labour force for an industrialized economy; and

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<sup>209</sup> Claude, Ake, 1994. „Demokratisierung der Machtlosigkeit in Afrika.“ In: Jochen Hippler, hrsg. *Demokratisierung der Machtlosigkeit. Politische Herrschaft in der Dritten Welt*. Hamburg, 59-82 (insb. s.78).

<sup>210</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7014776.stm>.

<sup>211</sup> Afrika zwischen Staatsversagen und Demokratizierung. *Das Parlament* (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament), B 44-45 (1995), 3-7.

- 3) the establishment of a parliamentary controlled state, which, on the one hand, embodies a legitimate monopoly of power and, on the other hand, condenses a relatively autonomous power relations (e.g. can raise tax and capable of applying legal norms), thereby facilitating the consolidation of social cohesion from the mediation of conflicting social interests.

The sociologist, Dieter Classens,<sup>212</sup> is also the opinion that the democratic consolidation in Europe would have been unthinkable had these preconditions not been met. Since Africa's economic infrastructure was originally designed to serve as a permanent supplier of raw materials (e.g. Gold, Ivory, Diamond, Timber, Copper, Platinum, Uranium, and so on) for the advanced industrial economies, one can only propose late industrialization as the only alternative for an expedient democratic adjustment. If indeed this is necessary for a realistic transition to democratic governance as Rainer Tetzlaff and Dieter Classens would have us believe, then the fact that the post-modern economy is increasingly drifting towards an ecological economic order inevitably implies that sooner or later African countries would again be seeking external expert knowledge to readjust economically.

However, as observed elsewhere, reliance on foreign expert knowledge does not come without its own cultural and political implications. When we hear today that newly and poorly trained Chinese medics and engineers are filling up lucrative positions in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Ghana (and across Africa as a whole); and in the process are earning three times more than they would normally earn back home, positions, which in a genuine national context, must be reserved [first] for equally qualified indigenous medics and doctors, it thus becomes obvious that African countries are not only a dumping ground for poorly qualified professionals from the industrial and late industrializing worlds, but, even worse, an experimenting ground for the sophistication of poorly qualified/trained professionals from the industrialized and late industrializing worlds.<sup>213</sup> In short, no genuine nationalist would ever place her/his people's future in the hands of the current Chinese government, which until now has so overtly demonstrated its disdain for the indigenous Darfurians of Arab dominated Sudan.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Dieter, Classens, 1992. *Kapitalismus und demokratische Kultur*. Frankfurt am Main, s.181.

<sup>213</sup> See, Sierra Leone shuts bogus clinics: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/8239060.stm> (accessed September 4, 2009).

<sup>214</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7503428.stm>.

### **3.5. The effects of pseudo-nationalism on the natural development of nations**

So far this thesis has analytically demonstrated that nation-states are rational economic extensions from a wholly cultural ideal, the national phenomenon. More to the point, the appropriation of traditional institutions of culture by agents of the economic ideal, the expansive state system, has more to do with the fact that states are generally dependant on material resources to function properly—after all without such resources they would be unable to finance their border guards and bureaucratic institutions of power. As Kenichi Ohmae also observes, modern nation-states were originally conceived to be “the optimal unit for organizing economic activity—a function he acknowledges they do no longer adequately fulfil” (1995: 1-13). If, indeed, the main impulse behind the rational of nation-states was bourgeoisie desire to have a field of order in which markets, people, and resources could be controlled and harnessed for uninterrupted expansive industrial activity as Kenichi convincingly assert, then a critical review of the multicultural texture of the contemporary nation-states would also confirm that the merger between the culture ideal (nation) and the state system must have also been a rational political deliberation or more accurately marriage of convenience.

In a wholly economic sense, the multicultural currency of contemporary political debates at the national state level in this global age makes sense because economic agents who now often claim to be operating from an obscure global economic platform no longer bear the responsibility for the economic failures of the nation-states from which they operate. We must not forget that when the nationalists—those ready to sacrifice their own lives in the defence of the national phenomenon without material compensation—were needed for territorial expansion abroad there was a predominantly protestant Anglo-Saxon British nation. But if in the global context the nationalists of the nation-state constitutions are increasingly being left to fend for themselves economically, it is simply because the exploitive economic mind no longer sees vested economic interest in demarcated frontiers. The nations with their constant demand for economic equality may not only be an impediment to the expansive economic agenda of a world state, but a threat to the crypto-cratic global economic order. The economic institutions are after all better off in China; the concentration camps of the Soviet Union; Auswitz or Buchenwald where peasants would be dispossessed of their lands and or workers exposed unprotected to radiation in factories conjoined to labour camps.

By similar analytical token, the maintenance of democracy at the nation-state level might be also a rational political deliberation to undermine the natural development of the national genus given nations unanimous demand for the equal treatment of their nationalities.

Although it would be unfair to confuse the prevailing democratic tenancy of nation-states with that of the Greek polis (City-States), but the “biography of Pericles” tends to suggest that his timing of the Athenian democracy was equally a rational political deliberation (Kagan, 1992: 1-165). In today’s context, this hypothesis is plausible because at the outset, especially during the period of economic golden ages, unsuspecting nationalities of the nation-states constitutions would generally have no problem sharing their newly acquired wealth or fortunes with citizens of the merging states given that the ultimate objectives of their homogenous national cultures is after-all the service of life. Such unwise economic concessions made earlier by some disingenuous nationalist leaders, especially at a time when their national cultures was still relatively immature, have only now began to haunt their successors. Simply because the maintenance of democracy at the nation-state level in this global economic age makes nationalist leaders demand for equal economic treatment of their co-nationals increasingly irrelevant. In Kenichi words, “a firm in an economic region can source its capital in London, locate its industrial plant in China, tap information from the database in Singapore and hire individuals in India or Germany to design factory layouts” (1995: 13-30). But genuine nationalists are again advised that even such seemingly myriad choices are rational economic deliberations in that they generally tend to avoid regions whose labour forces are too costly for the maximization of profits. Inasmuch as the opacity of the global economic platform is concerned, the ongoing mimicking of the culture requirements that all members total commitment to their national cultures be compensated by the same fruits of life was politically meant to be temporal; that is, to interlock the members of the nation and the state system in an ad hoc marriage which would be later exploited for arbitrary economic activities. In this sense, when George Bush and his political entourage nowadays preach democracy for all the nation-states on earth, their providential democratic language is not meant to impact the global economic order. Because the intensification of multiculturalism and or democracy at the nation-state level would make the global economic scheme increasingly arcane for the common man, which in turn means more wealth for the few wealthy and their political guardians and more misery for the nationalities and citizens of the nation-states. The prevailing notion of America’s and NATO’s divine democratic mission on earth has more to do with the fact that enlightened members of neo-liberal economic institutions often equate humankind inability to precise the image of God with the obscurity of the global economic platform. So, when politicians nowadays point accusative fingers at the global economic order for the economic malaise of their respective nation-states, they generally understand that the majority of the increasingly dispossessed nationalities and

citizens of the nation-states constitutions are too pre-occupied with the complexities of the economic and political tenancy at the national state level to have either the energy or the resources required to challenge the esoteric and undemocratic nature of the global order. In other words, upholders of the global economic order (or the hyper class-structured to-be world state system) generally understand that the domain of God being unquestionably the manifestation of knowledge in its utter complexity (the black god/matter of the Bantu-Ethiopian Pharaohs) is undemocratic. But how do we democratize the relationship between God and man? That life, in its eternal manifestation, concedes to utter ignorance, which is death? In the global context, how do we democratize the crypto-cratic institutions of the so-called global economic order? That the few wealthy agents of the exploitative economic mind and their political watchdogs (government bureaucracies), who are the main beneficiaries of the global economic order descend from the luxury of the current socio-economic and political tenancies to the bathos of common men of the Nation-states (or Hades)? Nationalist intellectuals should be reminded that the economic mind is by its very nature incapable of attending the culture demands of the various nationalities, but only exploit their original ideas for its own survival; the economic mind lives at the expense of the life of nations because the contemporary democratic casuistry of the nation-state constitutions is at best a rational political obstruction rather than a genuine substitute for the moral obligations of national cultures.

In tracing the pre-modern roots of nations, John Armstrong in *Nations Before Nationalism* (1982) has demonstrated credibly how culture homogeneity was crucial in cementing the foundations of [even] Europe divisive political nations. In this view, the Greek Polis and the Roman Patria provided territorial template for the creation of homogenous national identity. In Medieval era, medieval cities also played part in instituting ethnic boundaries and the development of ethnic myths. The rise of Christian and classical-sedentary agrarian order in the Middle Ages also put end to the nomadic impulse of conquering Germanic tribes from the north and central parts of Europe. As settled communities, these once warrior and unruly European groups not only took the mantle of European nobility but developed ancestral ties across the whole Europe. The Franks, the Normans, Burgundians etc. were in Sicily, Florence, Spain, France, England, (in short all over Europe). However, since the economic rational is too obvious in our interpretation of the colonies of Greek City-States and or the imperial Roman Empire, it was to be expected that such political stability was itself transitional. Consequently, the urbanization and dynastic expansion brought disparate

linguistic communities into contact. Territorialized culture difference encouraged the formation of [pseudo] ethnic groups.

Religiously, self-proclaimed defenders of Faith (e.g. Pope Urban II and his Charlemagne descendants), often with dubious economic agendas of territorial aggrandizement, gave birth to myth of particularistic ancestry among border peoples. Such an unfortunate pattern of political divisions would later become synonymous with European nationalist movements (e.g. the Poles, Turks, Irish, Castilians, Tartars, and so forth [emphasis added]). Sacred languages or script helped groups to survive and religious institutions (local religious structures such as the protestant Anglicans in Britain) and intellectuals (lower level local clergy) forged particularistic identities, which became the foundations for extending European nation-states. Hence “in the Middle Ages and early modern period languages became automatically synonymous with nations. In fact students at medieval universities were often divided into nations depending on their regions of origin. In this view, European universities became institutions for the creation of pseudo-ethnic identities.

As Habermas also points out, the so-called *Adelsnation* or Aristocratic nation during the course of the Old German Empire, in which the king or emperor dependent on tax and military support granted the aristocracy, the Church and towns limited participation in political power sums up the final vestige of Europe political divisions. But again, as would be expected of any temporary socio-political tenancy exploiting the ignorance of the people for sheer economic reasons, the days of the denial of the Europeans their original rights of national belonging was bound to be limited—after all knowledge is the prelude to real freedom. With the help of European academics and intellectuals the concept of aristocratic nation was eventually transformed into *Volksnation* (nation of the people). Thanks to the Urban educated middle class, the avant-garde of modern European nationalism, through which the rest of the Europeans became aware of their distinctive national identities. But even so, this latter popular political nation of the nineteenth century Europe was not totally devoid of the particularistic character of its pre-political nation, namely the concept of original belonging.”(Habermas, 1995: 283) On the whole, the urban educated European middle class was not only responsible for the rise of economically induced totalitarian regimes, Fascism, Apartheid literature, and Eurocentricism, but took the torch of the human creative genius of Medieval universities to an unprecedented level of divisions never known before in the social history Europe.

To the extent that original belonging, say, to a homogeneous culture community is appanage to our national understanding, another political attempt to unify Europe on the basis of

originality was the National Socialist Movement (NSM). What makes the Nazi movement such a phenomenal contribution to the nationalist problematic in European history is neither its leaders attempt to create a superior Aryan Europe; nor that movement near destruction of the political and pseudo-cultural institutions of early Europe..., but rather [even] prior to Nazi leadership ascension to political prominence, European bourgeoisie/capitalist and politicians alike saw in Hitler's Behemoth (Third Reich) the appropriate mechanism for the amassment of economic fortunes abroad. So, when Hitler, prior to embarking on his economic quest for *Lebensraum*, asked—in one of his many incendiary ... speeches—why should other European powers (e.g. Great Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal etc.) owned colonies abroad and not Germany, he was merely reiterating the nationalist paradigm of a much earlier Europe; and although his dream for a purely Aryan European nation never came to fruition, it did indeed remind European politicians and intellectuals alike that the Europeans are culturally and historically *eiusdem generis* and that Europe's future lies not in the outward economic rape of non-European cultures but instead in national unity.

Despite the customary castigation of the architects of Third Reich for wanting to replace the imperialist-led liberal economic tenancy of class structured European social order with a politicized national community of blood-brotherliness, it would also seem some of the Nazi leadership were aware of the fact that nations could only attain their ultimate communal destiny provided they are founded by people who share the same authentic culture and or economic/political interests. Therefore those behind the neo-liberal economic agenda of hyper class structured world state ... have good reasons to be suspicious of the most committed members of real nations because the national phenomenon is the only organically evolving social entity, whose loyal advocates insist on the equal treatment of their co-nationals at all times. The political notion that a Philistine would have to kill a Jew in order to survive—the survival dichotomy of the wolf versus rabbit; Lion versus ram; or crocodile versus bull ... as inscribed on the pillars of the ruins of Bantu-Ethiopian culture institutions in Manfour (or Memphis=Greek), Thibe (Thebes), Napata, Meroe, et cetera and prominent in local myths of the Azanians—has nothing in common with the untainted language of culture nationalism. Such divisive language can only rightly be attributed to the politico-economic mind, the very mind that in the New Found Land of the Americas condoned the violent rapes of Bantu-Ethiopian/Hamitic women and continues to do so in Darfur/Sudan and Mauritania in an effort to create a culturally indifferent global economic humanity.

But as the legacy of late ancient Egyptian politics warns us, the consolidation of this later humanity is indeed a misfortune for all cultured nations. For example, “when

Amenôphis/Amenhotep IV, generally known as Khu-n-Aten (the glory of the solar disk), succeeded his father Amenophis/Amenhotep III his first political move was the renunciation of ancient Egyptian culture (religion), of which he was the official representative; and declared himself a convert to an Asiatic faith. The very name of “Amon”, the supreme God of Thebes and the royal family to which he belonged, was proscribed and erased from the monuments wherever they occurred. In the temples and tombs and quarries alike it was defaced; even the name of the king’s own father, which contained it was not spared” (Sayce, 1895: 53-54).

Customary to the Bantu-Ethiopians inherent appetency for total freedom and national unity, it was to be expected that such prominent culture treason would not go unpunished. So, in the special case of Achen-aton/Echnaton “the ruins of the city he built in the North of Egypt for his newly acquired faith—after he was forced out of Thebes—are still buried in the artificial sand mounds of *Tel-el-Amarna* (ibid: 54). Piankhi, Mi[n]-Amon, the king of Napata described the chaotic scene of Egyptian politics later on a great Stêla of granite, which he built on mount Barkal (the holy mountain of Napata). He gave the names of seventeen princes among whom the cities of Egypt had been parcelled out, and each of whom claimed independent or semi-independent authority. In Sayce apt phrase, Egypt was divided against itself, rent with internal wars and private feuds, and ready to fall in the hands of the first invader with military ability and sufficient troops” (ibid., 268-269).

It is significant that Echnaton’s mother, Queen Tiy, was not a true solar princess, and was probably only part Egyptian (more likely Asiatic by birth) (Kalopoulos, 2003: 264).<sup>215</sup> Her husband, Amenôphis/Amenhotep III, was fond of connecting himself by marriage to the royal houses of Asia, and more than one of his wives who occupied a secondary rank in the Pharaonic household were of Asiatic extraction. His own mother had been an Asiatic princess, the daughter of the king of Mitanni the Aram—Naharaim of the Old Testament. From Mitanni had come two of his own wives, as well as wife of his own son and successor, Amenôphis IV (Sayce, 1895: 58). Importantly, Tiy was introduced into Amenophis III’s harem, and through her natural abilities she soon managed to supplant every other woman ... to become the incontestable Queen of Egypt with unprecedented political powers. During the later years of his reign, Amenhotep III appears to have been unable to rule. He is reported to have largely retired in a secluded palace, abdicating to Queen Tiy with her councillors and ministers the affairs of the state (Kalopoulos, 2003: 264-265).

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<sup>215</sup>The mummies of Queen Tiy’s parents Yuga, who was a person of high office and a priest (!) and Thuya have been found and positively identified. Yuga was not an Egyptian but of Hurrian (Mesopotamian) stock.



Accordingly, Tiy was the first Egyptian Queen to have her own name on the official acts; her name was mentioned in the correspondence with foreign head of states and rulers who had become aware of her important political role (ibid: 265).<sup>216</sup>

If indeed most of these prominent marriages between mainly influential male Bantu-Ethiopian leaders with Asiatic princesses in the past were politically motivated, then president Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt personal involvement in the choice of Kwame Nkrumah's wife, after Nkrumah's invocation of the concept of Nḡhana..., seems to also fit perfectly well with that pattern of arrangements. In any event, that the whole northern part of the Bantu-Ethiopian nation/Azania is still under colonial occupation not only confirm the historicity of the biblical narrative about "Samson" and the Semitic "Laila", but suffices as a warning to culture custodians of nations about the consequences of such political marriages of convenience. Azanian nationalists do not necessarily have to exhume "Axum role in the demise of Meroe" (Basil D. 1970: 61), the last refuge of Theben culture custodians..., in order to fully grasp the political rationale behind the coercion of Bantu-Ethiopian leaders and high ranking officials into similar marriages after the Greco-Assyrian alliance overran that part of the then Ethiopian Kingdom. While it would be culturally unreasonable or economically impossible to police what nationalities of different nations do in their private intercourse; it is equally against normal culture norms for genuine nations to condone the systematic political creation of culturally indifferent global economic humanity as is currently the case in Dafur (or was in the Sugar Plantations of enslaved America). In light of the ruinous state of the so-called Egyptian culture or civilization are nationalists then not generally right in their apprehension that the ongoing political attempt to replace the original human constituencies of national cultures with the culturally indifferent global economic humanity<sup>217</sup> is in itself a threat to the future of humanity?

Undeniably, this later creative genius, the quest for culturally indifferent and economically derived global humanity, is not voluntary; it is by its very nature the acme of the apolitical and undeniably arbitrary and imposing. In fact, the recent flocking of China by economically minded global entrepreneurs and companies, in that myopic economic bid to turn China's

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<sup>216</sup> Kalopoulos, who generally shares with those authors who have suggested a possible Hebrew origin for the Queen, thus noted similar political infiltrations by prominent Asiatic women in the Pharaonic household (i.e. the marriage of Sarah, Abraham's wife, to a Pharaoh and later to king Abimelech. Esther also married King Ahasuerus (probably the Xerxes of history who later succeeded his father Darius (B.C.485)).

<sup>217</sup>So sagt Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in: „*Praktischer Idealismus*“: Der Mensch der Zukunft wird Mischling sein. ... Die eurasisch-negroide Zukunftsrasse, äusserlich, der *altägyptischen* ähnlich, wird die Vielfalt der Völker durch eine Vielfalt der Persönlichkeiten ersetzen. Denn nach den Vererbungsgesetzen wächst mit der Verschiedenheit der Vorfahren die Verschiedenheit, mit der Einförmigkeit der Vorfahren die Einförmigkeit der Nachkommen. In Inzuchtfamilien gleicht ein Kind dem anderen: denn alle repräsentieren den einen gemeinsamen Familientypus. [...] Inzucht schafft charakteristische Typen—Kreuzung schafft originelle Persönlichkeiten. (1925: 22-23)

remaining agricultural land into a giant mausoleum of concrete, steel, and glass, is bound to intensify that country's nationalist suspicion. We do not necessarily have to be genuine Chinese nationalists or fanatic environmentalist in order to foresee that by the time China's population will have ticked the two thousand million mark, there wouldn't be any suitable agriculture land left for the cultivation of national culture. The alternative will probably then be either the military occupation of another Tibet or the violent destruction of this recently built mausoleums in order to make room for the rebuilding of future ones—that is, to give the hundreds of millions of Jobless Chinese another thirty years of economic Golden Age, as with the Golden Ages of the European economic rational. And it is true that the reconstruction of Europe's infrastructure from the ruins of the so-called World Wars is often equated with the Golden Ages of Europe's economic performance.

It is after all ruins that the neophyte economic mind envisions for the future of humanity; some sort of experimental ambagious with the destiny of humanity. Here we are no longer dealing with the ultimate objective of national cultures—that is, life in its eternal manifestation: the inseparable embodiment of the soul and body. That untainted culture discourse of nations' voluntary intercourse in search of the perfect humanity was suspended some five thousand years ago or earlier when the legitimate custodians of the Bantu-Ethiopian culture foresaw what was to become of their culture institutions... and withdrew from the destructive reach of economic hand. Simply said, the culture mind and hand creates and the economic mind/hand destroys. Apodictically, not genuine nationalists but economic agents and their political watchdogs of the state apparatus are the main threat to the future of humanity. Therefore the prevailing perception, mainly by the mainstream neo-liberal institutions, that nationalists are by their very nature xenophobic should be perceived as yet another rational political deliberation to distract humanity from the ruinous intensions of the economic mind. And Professor Sayce couldn't be more sincere in his warning to the culture custodians of the different nations:

'...of the ancient city of On (Greeks Heliopolis or Jewish Beth Shemesh), with its famous temple of Ra, the Sun-god, its university of learned priests, and its innumerable monuments of the past, there is little now to be seen. Nothing is left but the mud brick wall of sacred enclosure, and a thick layer of lime-stone chipping which tell how the last relics of the temple of the Sun-god were burnt into lime for the Cairo of Ismail Pasha. Nothing more remains of the Old capital of Egyptian religion and centre of learning. The destruction is indeed complete; the spoiler... burnt with fire "the houses of the gods of the Egyptians"' (Sayce, 1895: 220-221)

### 3.6. What future has the African State System?

If we could recall that the multicultural currency of the nation-state constitutions in this global age has done much to undermine nationalist demands for the equal treatment of their co-nationals in both cultural and economic terms, then we are probably at the verge of an arbitrary economic order which could be detrimental not only to the nationalities and citizens of nation-states, but also worse the nation-states themselves, particularly those weaker ones dependent on foreign handouts for their very existence. For instance, the pseudo-nationalist Chinese leadership could expropriate the land of hundreds of millions of local peasants to a handful of capitalist entrepreneurs/investors or Western companies relocating productivity to Asia in order to escape the high cost of local production or stringent environmental rules in their bid to maximize profits. By similar analytical token, the same economic agents could—in line with the economic policies of local governments, say the Chinese government desperation about the impact of local environmental deterioration on its future—export the remaining stockpiles of hazardous, chemicals, pesticide, and or nuclear waste to unsuspecting farmers or warehouses owners in African countries (e.g. Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia). Practically, the exploitative economic mind and its political backers might have every reason at least for now to exploit the rational incarceration of the various nationalities within the nation-state constitutions. However, their over exploitation in some parts of the world could subsequently trigger the disintegration of weaker nation-states. This is how globalization and multiculturalism could serve as catalyst for the disintegration of African states in particular. Jeffrey Sachs introduction of the new orientation of the global economic order suffices for an analytical amplification in the global context:

“The 1990s is one of the great watershed decades in economic history. The post-war division of the world economy into First, Second, and Third World has ended. Not only has communism collapsed, but the other ideologies of state-led development that were prevalent in the Third World for decades have fallen into disrepute. If the United States and other industrialized countries act with wisdom, they have a chance to consolidate a global capitalist system, with profound benefits for both the rich and poor countries” (Sachs, 1998: 50<sup>218</sup>; Toyin, 2005: 500)

Since there is now every reason to believe that Africa’s fifty four or so countries did not come into being by divine fiat but as a result of external economically induced political interference, let’s assume that the benefits or bequest of early attempts by capitalist interventions to elevate the often so-called backward continent and its primitive population from the

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<sup>218</sup> Jeffrey, D. Sachs, 1998. “Consolidating Capitalism.” *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1998).

underworld of economic misery in nineteenth and twentieth centuries are the political realities we continue to witness across the political landscape of Africa today; or the deportation and enslavement of hundreds of millions of Africans in other parts of the earth. As Toyin rightly observes, ‘slave trade was one of the early manifestations of global trade, with Africa as part of the triangle of an evil commerce in which supposedly [sub] human beings were exchanged for goods of leisure and violence’ (Toyin, 2005: 503). If so, why such pertinacious insistence by Sachs and/or (Professor Wolfgang H. Thomas<sup>219</sup>) that capitalists entrepreneurs or the Business community be core to African economic development? To the extent that the creation and maintenance of artificial states; slave trade; and violent extermination of hundreds of millions in Belgian Congo, Namibia and German East Africa, are just some of the early manifestations of global commerce, genuine nationalists should not wait the outcome of the political crises in Chad, Somali, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and other parts of colonial Africa in order to perceive that the maintenance of the African states—even with the backing of the notorious French legionnaire as in Chad, Cameroun or Gabon, etc.—are a serious threat to the future of the indigenious population as a whole. If today the Eastern, Central, and Western African countries seem increasingly moribund in the “Second-Phase”<sup>220</sup> of Arabs quest for *Lebensraum* in Sudan, Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Somali..., it isn’t because these countries do not anticipate having to confront the forces of Arab colonialism in the Congo belt<sup>221</sup> in the very near future; indeed they are generally aware of the looming existential threat—only that they are politically too divided and weak to act nationally. And this best explains why the Malian and other African governments so desperately rely on the Libyan government<sup>222</sup> for peace in the Sahel region despite Gaddafi and his entourage direct involvement in the Wars of African new frontline states (Sudan, Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania). Left alone to Gaddafi, “the Third of the Arab community living outside Africa

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<sup>219</sup> W H.Thomas (University of Stellenbosch Business School, South Africa) headed a seminal discussion on June 19, 2008 at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, Hamburg, Germany) with the title: *Business involvement in African Development: Can South Africa be a bridge to the First World?* While I fully appreciate Prof. W H. Thomas genuine commitment to promoting the image of Africa abroad; what committed economic agents like Thomas failed to admit or comprehend is the direct role Business people played in the destabilization of the so-called African continent. The economic mind after all does not require that all countries be equally developed let alone the economic betterment of the majority poor: That could threaten the existence of the capitalist system. Provided only 20 million of Africa’s almost 12 000 million are slightly better off economically, the rest could use them as a measure for further competition and divisions.

<sup>220</sup>Chinweisu contests that the First-Phase of Arab colonial expansion from the Arabian Peninsula into other parts of Africa began in Seventh century A.D and ended in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the introduction of European colonialism and the subsequent division of Africa. And the Second-Phase began shortly after independence in the 1950s until today (Chinweizu’s Paper “*Arab Quest for Lebensraum*” was presented at the Global pan African Reparations and Repatriation Conference on 25 July (2006) at the University of Legon, Ghana).

<sup>221</sup> <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/103/412/359> (accessed July 12/2008);

<http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/May1999/cong-m14.shtml> (accessed July 12, 2008).

<sup>222</sup> <http://uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUKL0334958920080403> (printed June 26, 2008).

should move in with the Two Third on the continent and join the African Union which is the only space they have.”<sup>223</sup>

In any event, if the Malian government is too naive to abide by the terms of the Draft-Agreement recently signed in Tripoli—that is, the withdrawal of all Malian troops from the North East of the country so as to allow the Libyan government to control the economic development of the so-called Tuareg region, then the Malian government would have fired the death-shot of the Malian state. Because Gaddafi’s looming territorial claims in the north of Chad and Niger and his recent deportation of hundreds of thousands of the indigenous population including Bantu-Ethiopian Libyans is concordant with King Hassan II of Morocco early resettlement of almost half a million Arabs from Asia in the contested Western Sahara region in the 1970s and 1980; and the deportation of “tens of thousands of indigenous Mauritians to neighbouring Mali and Senegal in the period between 1989 and 1990”<sup>224</sup>, culture nationalists like Diakite should have every reason to be apprehensive of Gaddafi’s economic development pledge. The fact alone that in the midst “Niger 2004/5 hunger crisis”<sup>225</sup> Gaddafi had more “important economic priorities elsewhere”<sup>226</sup> serves to undermine any goodwill economic gesture from his government today.

Also, the multicultural aspect of African political crisis, especially with regard to external agents role in the emergence of self-annihilating pseudo-ethnic groups or political entities (easy prey for Arab colonialism), deserves nationalist critical attention. If not the incitement of divisions why such statement as: “the Bible was forged as it does not mention the prophet Mohammed”<sup>227</sup> during Gaddafi’s trip to open Africa’s largest mosque in Kampala, Uganda. Even if there is some element of truth in Gaddafi’s divisive statement ..., the fact that the “Koran largely draws most of its heroic characters and narratives from the Judaeo-Christian religious doctrine” (Eberhardt, 36-38) is bound to make his defence of the Islamic Faith in the region questionable, especially given that particular religion’s role in the destruction of the culture heritage of the indigenous population and their subsequent enslavement. In all, that local leaders like Yoweri Museveni; Archbishop Cyprian Lwanga or Bishop Samuel Balagadde Ssekadde would exonerate the Libyan leader from such divisive incitement is also an indication of local complicity in the pursuit of colonial objectives, namely the destructive replacement of indigenous culture institutions with colonial ones, as in these biblical

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<sup>223</sup> Col. Muamar Gaddafi’s Statement at an Arab League in 2001 cited in Bankie Foster and Bankie “Pan Africanism or African Union?” In: Bankie F. and Mchombu K., ed. 2006. *Pan Africanism*. Windhoek: Gamberg Macmillan, 217, 235.

<sup>224</sup> *ibid.*, 215-216.

<sup>225</sup> [http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0912\\_050912\\_niger.html](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0912_050912_niger.html) (accessed on July 12, 2008).

<sup>226</sup> [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-08/14/content\\_254761.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-08/14/content_254761.htm); [www.4ni.co.uk/news.asp?id=26168](http://www.4ni.co.uk/news.asp?id=26168)

<sup>227</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7311564.stm>

statements: “Egypt [is like] a very fair heifer, [but] destruction cometh; it cometh out of the North. ... The lord of hosts, the God of Israel, saith; behold I will punish the multitude of No, and Pharaoh and Egypt, with their gods, and their kings; even Pharaoh, and [all] them that trust in him” (Jeremiah 46: 20, 25 and 26 [King James Bible]). And in Hezekel (30:14, 15) it is also stated, “*Der schar von Anbietern, die dort zusammen kam, würde weggetilgt warden*”. Thus contrary to Professor Poku Agyeman wholly politicized argument that “Africa’s predicament has not been in regard to determining the nature and character of the needed unity, but rather in respect to implementing it<sup>228</sup>; these conflicting positions from even early prominent figures of pan-African Movement like Julius Nyerere<sup>229</sup>; Amadou Ahidjo<sup>230</sup>; Azikiwe<sup>231</sup>; Kwesi Prah<sup>232</sup>; Frantz Fanon<sup>233</sup>; Cheik Anta Diop<sup>234</sup>, suggest that African unity is far from settled.”<sup>235</sup> If anything, Chancellor William lamentation that the picture of various black organizations, each independent and vying for political leadership, is substantially the same picture of fragmentation and disunity in Africa that led to the downfall of the whole race<sup>236</sup> then generally seals the fate of the divisive, rootless and culturally indifferent colonial African states.

Chinweizu has argued convincingly that the main obstacle impeding African unity today is the lack of an authentic culture orientation (e.g. religion, ideology and so forth), which the indigenous population could revoke in terms of self-identification. The lack of attention to this type of unity, in the place of state integration by most African leaders and advocates of Pan-Africanism, has resulted in their inability to create appropriate organized bloc of states, a Black African or Black World League where matters of exclusive interest could be addressed without the interference of Arab colonial occupiers of North Africa. The failure of Pan-Africanism since 1958 to attend to and develop other types of unity besides state integration has not only been misguided, but has in general help weakened the effectiveness of Pan-Africanism altogether. It has left it without a basis of appeal to ordinary Africans whose

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<sup>228</sup> Opoku, Agyeman, 2001. *Africa’s Persistent Vulnerable Link to Global Politics*. San Jose: University Press, 123.

<sup>229</sup> See, Kwesi, Kwaa Prah, 2006. *The African Nation*, 276.

<sup>230</sup> *ibid.*, 276-277.

<sup>231</sup> See, the “Future of Pan-Africanism.” In J Ayo, Langley, ed. 1979. *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970*. London: Rex Collings, 305.

<sup>232</sup> K. Kwaa Prah, 2006. *The African Nation*, 269.

<sup>233</sup> *ibid.*, 276.

<sup>234</sup> *Afriscope*, Interview with Carlos Moore. In: Ivan Van Sertima, ed. 1986. *Great African Thinkers*. New Brunswick: Transactions Books, 260-261.

<sup>235</sup> Chinweizu, 2008. *African Unity: the Problems and its Dimensions*. A Privately Circulated Paper, 1-7; cited also in a Lagos News Paper, the BusinessDay ([www.businessdayonline.com](http://www.businessdayonline.com)), with a slight modification in the introduction, on December 11<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> (2008), 11.

<sup>236</sup> Chancellor, W. 1987. *The Destruction of Black Civilization*, 321.

interests are monumetary different from those of states and presidents.<sup>237</sup> Citing Konrad Lorenz<sup>238</sup>, Chunweizu describes the type of unity by norms and customs, rites and ritualized behaviour, which advocates of the multivariant African organizations lack in their political desire for a national unity:

“The triple function of suppressing fighting within the group, of holding the group together, and setting it off, as an independent entity, against other, similar units, is performed by culturally developed ritual. ... Any group which exceeds in size that can be held together by personal love and friendship depends for its existence on these culturally ritualized behaviour patterns. ... From the little peculiarities of speech and manner which cause the smallest possible subcultural groups to stick together, an uninterrupted gradation leads to the most elaborated, consciously performed, and consciously symbolical social norms and rites which unites the larger social units of humanity in one nation, one culture, one religion or one political ideology. It is perfectly right and legitimate that we should consider as “good” the manners which our parents have taught us, that we should hold sacred social norms and rites handed down to us by the tradition of our culture. ...

Our fidelity to the symbol implies fidelity to everything it signifies, and this depends on the warmth of affection for the old custom. It is this type of feeling of affection that reveals to us the value of our cultural heritage. The independent existence of any culture, the creation of superindividual society, which outlives the single being ... is based on this autonomy of the rite making it is an independent nature human action.”<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>238</sup> Konrad, Lorenz, 1967. *On Aggression*. New York: Bantam, 71-72, 74-75, 78, 79, 80.

<sup>239</sup> *ibid.*

#### IV. DISCUSSING THE AZANIAN NATIONAL MODEL

While the preceding chapters have to a considerable extent defended the cultural foundations of nations, it is also true that political forces are generally apt at exploiting national sentiments for their myopic economic agendas. Therefore, the acknowledgement of the genuine culture origin of the Azanian nation shouldn't imply having overlooked the role political forces played in the past and, for that matter, continue to play in the transformation of that unique national culture. Despite 'the belated attempts to integrate Pharaonic Egypt into common African (Azanian) heritage'<sup>240</sup>, the fact remains that the origin of the Pharaonic Egyptian culture and civilization have until recently remained a highly contested subject in academic debates, especially among historians, anthropologists, philologists and Egyptologists. For example, on the ethnic origins of the Egyptians (and in some instances including Ethiopians), most 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries European philologists posit that the language of the Egyptians has a distinct kinship with the so-called Semitic nations. As the argument goes, "spread over anterior Asia, and the East and North of Africa is found a great root language, which has been called after its chief representative the Egypto-Semitic. The Semitic languages of Arabia, Syria, and Mesopotamia belong to this group as well as the allied Ethiopian dialects of East Africa, the languages of Besharis, Gallas and Somalis. Hence, they contest that those who speak these languages belong to the same race. Interestingly, that the so-called Semitics are not indigenous to—but emigrated from one part of Asia to these parts of Azania (or colonial Africa)—has led some philologists to argue that the Egyptians, Libyans, and Ethiopians all forsook their Asiatic homes during the dim ages of the past, and seized possession of North and East Africa" (Erman, [1894] 1971: 29-30). And as Christopher Eyre also remarks, some Western anthropologists and Egyptologists seeking to seize on the advance culture and civilization of dynastic Egypt often tended in the past to idealise Egypt as honorary us rather than negative them. Not surprisingly, from classical Greece onwards Egypt has been claimed as part of the common heritage of the West (Eyre, 2002: 154-155). Ironically, such views tend to deliberately ignore the ancient 'Egyptians claims of being indigenous people, free from any foreign taint. Even naming their country Qemet/Kemit "the black country"' (Erman, 1971:32).<sup>241</sup> With such quasi arbitrary scholarship of formal institutions it would thus be unreasonable to simply integrate the dynastic Egyptian culture into the culture heritage of the

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<sup>240</sup> Eyre, C., 2002. *The Cannibal Hymn: A Cultural and Literary Studies*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 154-155.

<sup>241</sup> Erman here argues that the blackness derived from Kemit was made in reference to the black soil of Egypt; while I stated elsewhere that the blackness of Cham was made in reference to the colour of their ancestors. A reference still used until this day among the Moab.



Azanian nation without critically revisiting these contesting perspectives. There might be convincing reasons to defend the indigenous basis of the ancient Ethiopian (and later Egyptian) culture and civilization, but there is no doubt that that culture, like that of most people in the region, was later tainted by internal and external political influences, especially to the detriment of the original culture. In this view, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the Graeco-Europeans or other peoples who later settled the Mediterranean region contributed nothing to the Ethiopian (or Egyptian) culture and civilization. Cheik Anta Diop, for one, argues that the Egyptian civilization may have disappeared precisely because it was unable to borrow from later cultures and became a victim of its own cultural homogeneity (Diop, 1974: 213). Here, Diop sounds rather unsympathetic to nationalist cause of defending the culture homogeneity and authenticity of their respective nations. The notion of internal decadence of an authentic national culture without any form of external intervention—e.g. political or economic—is rather insufficient in explaining the retraction or demise of the Azanian national culture. Consequently, before we review the prevailing perception that cultural and economic/political forces are the main agents of social history—in an attempt to discern the ideological background the Azanian nation, it will be important to explore the role economic and political factors played in the transformation of the Azanian national culture.

#### **4.1. Early Signs of Politics in pre-dynastic Ethiopian Mythology**

Since there are compelling evidence to confirm that all literary texts of dynastic Ethiopia and later Egypt had oral mythological origin, let's begin our inquiry about the root cause of the demise of the Bantu-Ethiopian national culture with the concept of "Two Lands" and their associated crowns—one White (the original Theban Royal Crown) and the other Red (from the North of Egypt), both of which should be united into the "Green Crown" of the indigenous Pharaohs. Although there are contesting opinions about this rather ambiguous concept, the position taken in this work is that that concept tends to denote an internal political challenge to the original culture establishment.

As instance, among the Moab group of the Bantu-Ethiopians, who according to this work not only continue to worship the Sun-god Hyen-Nu/Heru/Horus but also adore the "pre-dynastic" crocodile deity of Sebek/Subk, there is a mythological stipulation dealing specifically with the relationship between Lions and Bulls. In particular, this mythological stipulation refers to a specific locality in Azania where lions, often associated with heroes in the culture literature of dynastic Egypt, had the unusual habit of devouring the carcass of hunted wild Bulls/Bufaloes and deliberately leaving behind the legs untouched—a locality the locals call *Ta-tera*

(meaning shortened leg(s)).<sup>242</sup> Importantly, this mythology begins with the legendary history of their first male ancestor Cham [-ba] called “Nyaan”, who was earlier associated with four wives and seven sons—numbers which undeniably have astrological significance to the pre-dynastic and dynastic Egyptian culture, but tends to convey an ethical culture message as well, especially regarding the prominent role animals played in the development of institutionalized culture. The mythology claims that while Nyaan was leading his army in a battle against his adversaries, he was severely injured at that particular locality. Of course, in later dynastic Egyptian context picturesque representations of the Pharaoh or King leading his army in the battle is a well known fact in the academia. What seems rather unusual about this myth is that despite being at the head of his army only his “black dog”... witnessed the cave in which he retreated with his equally gravely wounded horse. Naturally, from that mountainous cave and at the verge of death, his first survival measure must have been how to re-establish contact with his people. Thus, he soaked one sleeve of his battle gear in his own blood so that his black dog could deliver the tragic news to his people, especially his immediate family. It is also significant to note that “the early form of the ancient Egyptian god of Wisdom, Thoth, had the emblem of a dog-headed ape. And it was in the words of Thoth that enabled Osiris to become the “true of voice” or triumphant over his enemies or adversaries. It is probably in this capacity, i.e., as friend of the dead, that the dog-headed ape appears seated upon the standard Balance in which the heart of the deceased is being weighed against the feather symbolic of Maāt; for the commonest titles of the god are ‘lord of the divine books,’ ‘lord of divine words...’” (Budge, [1908] 1995: 86-87)

According to local customs, the women back home then shouldn’t have shed tears upon receiving the news of their husband’s tragedy. Unfortunate for both Nyaan and his people on that day, however, the youngest wife could not control her emotions and burst into tears. There are different accounts with regard to the outcome of that myth: One version of the myth claims that he was never seen again from that day, which might either mean he ascended in spirit form to the celestial province where his own ancestors are found...; while other versions claim that he was buried on the side of his horse in that cave of his retreat.

For our present purpose, we shouldn’t be bothered about which version of the conclusions we agree, but instead the symbolic objects and language used in that mythology should serve sharpen the curiosity of those familiar with the astrological-mythology of the pre-dynastic and

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<sup>242</sup>The substantive *Ta-ter* (*a*) seems to be a plural because a single shortened leg will be *Ta-ter*. The substantive derives from *Tâl/r*, leg. Because this particular group of Azanians have the unique habit of naming present localities with pre-dynastic names, e.g. the term *Bun-kper* (Old River) and is named after their present locality of habitation but in reference to the Oldest river in Azania, which is probably the Nile because of its culture importance—since in the view of this research there is no river in the vicinity capable of claiming that title.

early dynastic Egyptian culture. For example, in the mortuary or funerary literature of dynastic Egypt there are instances in which kings, both deceased and alive, were often referred to as Bulls, either of the Sky (a deceased king) or earthly Bull (*Pyramid Spell* 397a<sup>243</sup>; Eyre, 2002: 7). With the Moaba(s) group it cannot be determined whether or not there was any time in their social history when Bulls or Oxen were associated with their kings despite the symbolic importance of bulls to that local culture. “Bêt,” meaning messenger, announcer, teller, representative et cetera is their well-known and still used kingship/chieftancy titles. However, the fact that the cow is called “*nab*” in Moar, seems to have etymological or semantical implication for the universal kingship title of the former Mossi Kingdom, “*naba*”; or, for that matter, the ancient Egyptian kingship title as well. Albert Churchward, who has explored the evolutionary process of the dynastic Egyptian culture or religion from its pre-Stellar, Stellar-, Lunar- and the Solar Mythologies, argued convincingly that *Bes* was “the oldest god of all” in dynastic Egyptian mythology (Churchward, 1993/1994: 154). A position he shares with Dr. Budge’s *The Gods of the Egyptians*.<sup>244</sup> The identification of Bes with Horus I—that is, the anthropomorphise form of Horus or the earliest type of Pygmy Ptah, seems to correlate well with the general idea of Bêt being the first earthly messenger of Hyen-Nu. In fact, the Hieroglyphic symbols of Bes (Churchward, p.154 ff),<sup>245</sup> and the fact that he carries in both hands the vegetational remedy of the resurrected Osiris/Ausar tends to make such a correlation reasonable, especially given the general idea in this text that Heru/Horus could probably be a later misplaced form of Hyen-Nu, Moab Sun-god (with *Hyen* meaning “One” and *Nu* (“Hand”)).



If we agree with the perception that Bes-Horus I was the first earthly representative of Hyen-Nu, then we should have no difficulty in establishing Hyen-Nu as the measure of the Bantu-Ethiopians national culture. In fact, in chapter XVII of the *Book of Coming Forth by Day*, commonly referred to as the “Book of the Dead”, one finds the following statement: “I am the God Temu in his rising; I am the only One. I came into being in Nu. I am Ra who rose in the beginning.” Importantly, Temu and Ra seems one and the same god, and this god was the first offspring of Nu, the primeval watery mass, from which all the gods of dynastic Egypt came into being. “I am the Great God Nu who gave birth to himself, and who made his name to come into being and to form the company of gods.” (Budge, 1995: 89-90) Christopher Eyre, whose’ *Cannibal Hymn* also takes issue with the cultural and political ambiguities of the

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<sup>243</sup> Bull of the Sky is Unas, aggressive in his nature, living on the manifestation of every god.

<sup>244</sup> Vol.II, 286.

<sup>245</sup> See Winter, in Helck W. ed. 1987. *Temple und Kult*, ÄA 46, Wiesbaden, 65-76 for a perceptive discussion of the scribe/artist’s choice of spellings and signs...

mortuary or funerary literature of the late Old Kingdom of dynastic Egypt, shows the importance of the Hieroglyphic determinative “arm” in terms of a deceased person, e.g. king etc., ascension to the state of immortality. Accordingly, the term ... ‘arm’... as written in the mortuary text of Unas is with a bookroll determinative, and seems intentionally to refer to a document or charter of authorisation. However, the graphic variation between  ‘document’ and  ‘arm’ is also common in similar context. In Spell 253, for instance, the king is identified with Re/Ra, bathing in the Field of Reeds: “The hand of Unas is in the Hand of Re. Nu[t], receive (šsp) his hand.”<sup>246</sup> In *Coffin Text* Spell 550—a spell ‘to knot a ladder to the Sky in necropolis’—the address is made: “O *Swš* who went out from the Nut, give your hand to Nut, for N has gone up from the Kenemet.” ... Also in Pyramid Spell 478,<sup>247</sup> an invocation to the ladder of the Sky, gods are addressed, “who shall stretch out the arm against (or oppose)”, or “whose arm shall be for” the king in the ascent. Similarly in *Pyramid Spells* 478b-479a the gods raise up the king “on their arms”, which form a ladder for him.<sup>248</sup> The basic idea is thus one of providing assistance, as in Pyramid Spells 1627: “Arise! You have given your ‘hand’ to Horus that he may cause you to rise.” The idiom may also carry a wider sense of ‘welcome’ or a formal induction into an office, as in Pyramid Spell 456: The king, who knows the spells of Re and the magic of Horakhty: “He will be one by Re. He will be a courtier (*smr*) of Horakhty. His arm shall be grasped in the sky among the attendants of Re.”<sup>249</sup> The underlying theme of assistance in resurrection and ascent is clearest in Pyramid Spell 422, describing the resurrection of Ausar/Osiris as Orion, the verb *šsp* ‘receive’ is used:

This great one has fallen on his side; felled (*ndj*) is the one who is in Nedit. Your hand is received by Re; your head is raised by the two enneads. See, he is come as Orion; see, Osiris is come as Orion, Lord of Wine in the *Wag* festival.<sup>250</sup>

Interestingly, Eyre emphasizes that the crucial theme is that of assistance given by the god, his ‘hand’, to enable the dead to make the journey, the transition from life to afterlife, visualized in different ways in the different texts quoted above (Eyre, 2002: 126-131). The general

<sup>246</sup> See, *Pyramid Spell* 275e. In *Spell* 286a the Teti text has the bookroll and Unas the stroke as the determinative. ... ‘He gives you his hand.’ For the reception of hand see esp. *Spells* 473c and 1327a: ‘Any god who shall receive the hand of this (M) into the Sky’ in an ascension text. Here there seems a clear vision of the god pulling the king up by the hand.

<sup>247</sup> *Spells* 978-980; see also *Spells* 1496a-1498c, and *Pyramid Spell* 1763b-c for an image of posture; or Krauss, R., 1997. *Astronomische Konzepte und Jenseitsvorstellungen in den Pyramidentexten*, ÄA, 59, Wiesbaden, 146-148.

<sup>248</sup> Willems, H., 1995. *The Coffin of Heqata (Cairo JdE 36418) A Case Study of Egyptian Funerary Culture of the Early Middle Kingdom*. Peters Publishers, 290, 467-468...

<sup>249</sup> See, *Pyramid Spell* 856c-e.

<sup>250</sup> See, *Pyramid Spells* 819a-820a; Krauss, *Astronomische Konzepte*, 165-166.

significance of Eyre's conclusion about that primeval Hand (Hyen-Nu or Nu(t)), which tends to assist other gods in their passage through one state to another, is that it reaffirms the geronto-cratic constitution of the Bantu-Ethiopian (or later Egyptian) national culture.

#### 4.1.1. Political Implications of the Cannibal Hymn

The *Cannibal Hymn* in general is among the early literary texts concerning Ethiopian-Egyptian culture. Although the author of the *Cannibal Hymn* while not ruling out its oral origin does not make specific reference to Moab mythology of Taterra etc., it is important to note that the *Cannibal Hymn* is analogous with the latter myth or the early one in which the cannibalistic tendencies of a witch were responsible for divinity's retreat into celestial exile. Eyre describes the *Cannibal Hymn* as one of a group of related spells that appear only in the two earliest pyramids texts, those of Unas and Teti.<sup>251</sup> The Pyramid texts, he argues, stand at the beginning of Egyptian literature, when the writing of continuous literary texts was a novelty, so that the procedures by which they were written down and later transmitted are central themes defining the foundations of cultural history (Eyre, 2002:17-18). These then drop out of regular corpus, to reappear in the Middle Kingdom, when the *Cannibal Hymn* is included among the Pyramid text of the Middle Kingdom tombs of Senwosretankh at Lisht and of Siese at Dashur.<sup>252</sup> A reworked version appears as Coffin Text (CT) Spell 573, while a variety of phrases and themes from the hymn also recur in other Coffin Texts. The Corpus of Pyramid Texts found in the Middle Kingdom tombs is remarkably close to that of the Pyramid of Unas, both in content and layout, but the physical process of textual transmission is unclear (Eyre, 2002: 11-12)<sup>253</sup>.

Importantly, Eyre also acknowledges that the sources of the texts found on individual Pyramid walls (and later on the sides of Coffins) are rather poorly understood. Furthermore, the actual inscription of text on the walls of the Pyramid of Unas show considerable redactional care, with significant number of corrections both to the original ink draft and to the carved signs, in ways that seems to imply copying and then collation from more cursive originals. Hence he suggests that the inscriptions would probably have been copied from Papyrus texts (*ibid.*, 12-13).

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<sup>251</sup> See, *Pyramid Spells* 393, 414, spells 273-274; Faulkner, R.O., 1969. *Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Text*, 80-84; Faulkner, R.O., 1924. 'The "Cannibal Hymn" from the Pyramid Text.' *JEA* 10 (1924: 97-103).

<sup>252</sup> See, Hayes, W.C., 1937. *The Texts in Mastaba of Senwosret-ankh at Lischt*, PMMA 12. New York; Silvermann, D.P., Textual Criticism in the Coffin Texts.' In: Allen et al., *Religion and Philosophie*, 32-33.

<sup>253</sup> See, chapter Seven of Christopher Eyre's *Cannibal Hymn* for problems related to the position and sequence of text on the wall.

In addition, he also hints to some of the major problems that arise from these textual transmissions from the different Dynastic periods. Particularly true of this is a different group of Pyramid texts re-used on the Twelfth Dynasty Coffin of a steward Nefri, from El Bersha (Hermopolis). ... This ritual unit earliest known version appears on the Pyramids of Pepi II, and his queen Neith. In all, it is worthy of note that the Middle Kingdom version is a direct but very mechanical and careless copy of a text written for an obscure King Wahkare Akhtoy, with the lines of the text copied in the wrong order from an original that was evidently inversely written. For a first third of this text the copyist mechanically transcribed even the royal name of his original on to the coffin, not bothering to replace it with the name of Nefri. There are also numerous transcription errors—majority of which results from the confusion between signs with similar hieroglyphic shapes, while a substantial number are also explicable as misreadings of hieratic forms. Evidently, while Eyre attest that the core vision of Egyptian religion was already in existence by the late Old Kingdom, the corpus of the mortuary texts—that is, those of the Pyramids and later on royal and private tombs or coffins, which in normal cultural context must have formed a coherent body of funerary/mortuary literature, had undergone such major transformation that their variations from Pyramid to Pyramid and or tomb to tomb became easily visible in the course of Egypt's culture history<sup>254</sup> (Eyre, 2002: 14-20).

Having, to some considerable extent, explored the original structure of the dynastic Egyptian culture and its socio-historical transformation from the corpus of the Cannibal Hymn; that hymn's ambiguous language as a cultural texts, especially as found later on the Pyramids of Unas and Pepi, suggest clearly that their original authors were in general more politically biased to be genuine upholders of the original culture of the Ethiopian kingdom. Succinctly, the Cannibal Hymn, which is introduced as a ritual meant to ensure the king's transition from mortal to immortal state, or god—and again as a ruler in the celestial province where divinity now rules sway, begins with a cataclysmic event in which the Cosmos is overwhelmed by the appearance of the King (*Pyramid Spells* 924-925, 956, 1110, 1120, 1150, 1771.). The change of ruler is marked cataclysmically with the old order breaking down to be replaced by a new order: on earth for the King<sup>255</sup> and in the Sky for the living god. Cataclysm, marked by

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<sup>254</sup> The tomb of Senmut (TT353)... provides an important example of 'liturgies' used in apparently original ways, from the Book of the Dead and corpus of the Sun Hymn as well as from the Pyramid Texts: see Dorman, P.F., 1988. *Monuments of Senenmut*. London, 82-84.

<sup>255</sup> Otto, E., 1964-1966. "Geschichtsbild und Geschichtsschreibung in Ägypten." *Welt des Orientes* 3, 161-172 (for reign change as a cataclysmic event); Hornung, E., 1982. *Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: The One and the many*. London, 172-185 (on the boundary of existence); Hornung, E., 1982. *Der Ägyptische Mythos von der Himmelskuh: eine ätiologie des Unvollkommenen*, OBO 46. Freiburg und Göttingen, 91-94; Assmann, J., 1990. *Ma'at. Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Alten Ägypten*. Munich, 200-201.

thunder, earth- and sky-quake, is a standard motif that greets the appearance of god <sup>256</sup> and defines the king's progression to heaven as a cataclysmic return to the pre-created state. Eyre also observes a significant 'variation' from the motif of the opening of the Gates of Heaven as stated in the sequences of Spells 313-317 found on the west wall of the entrance passage in the Pyramid of Unas. These begin with the opening of the doors of heaven for the king to enter, and include Spell 314 an address to the bull for slaughter. These early verses of the Cannibal Hymn should, then, salute the appearance of the sacrificial bull—of huge size and power, and which is initially identified as the king himself<sup>257</sup> (Eyre, 2002: 76-77). Thus in:

**Spell 393a:** the sky darkens; stars go out;

**Spell 393b:** Vaults (of Heaven) tremble; bones of earth shake.

**Spell 393c:** The decans are stilled against them.

Significantly, Unas must be empowered to rise above the original Self-Created-Creator, Nu, if he ever intends to ascend to power as the sole heir of the celestial or heavenly throne, as in Spell 394a: "They have seen Unas, risen, empowered (b3)." ... Thus the image becomes that of the birth of the Sun from the horizon:

**Spell 394b:** As god living on his fathers, feeding on his mothers.

Directly related to the issue of the king's power are:

**Spell 394c:** It is Unas, Lord of Wisdom; his mother does not know his name.<sup>258</sup>

**Spell 395a:** The splendour (špss) of Unas is in the Sky; his power (wsr) is in the horizon.

**Spell 395b:** Like his father Atum, who created him; he created<sup>259</sup> him, (but) he is more powerful than he.

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<sup>256</sup> Hornung, E., *Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt*., 131-132; *Pyramid Spells* 215, 143.

<sup>257</sup> See in *Spell 254*: here many of the themes of cataclysm, sacrifice and cannibalism, are repeated, with the king representing the Bull of the Sky (esp. *Spells* 276, 280, 286, 292-293; but also *Spells* 255-260, 627).

<sup>258</sup> On names and their importance see Assman, J., 1984. *Ägypten: Theologie und Frömmigkeit einer frühen Hochkultur*. Stuttgart, 102-107, 113-117; Assmann, J., 1997. *Moses the Egyptian. The momery of Egypt in Western Monotheism*. Cambridge, 194-198, 204-205; see also Bickel, S., 1994. *La Cosmogonie égyptienne. Avante les Nouvel Empire*, OBO 134. Fribourg und Göttingen, 101, 106.

<sup>259</sup> Sethe, K., *Übersetzung und Kommentar zu den altägyptischen Pyramidenten*, Vol.II, 147-148 points to the deliberate use of *msj* rather than 'beget' and argues that it is not exclusively used for mother's role, its use here is more suitable in reference to the primaeval creation by the sole creator god—Atum as father and mother—so placing the king in the original creation. Also see, Zandee, J., The birth-giving creator-god in Ancient Egypt, in *Studies Gywn Griffiths*, 169-185 for extensive references to the role of creator God as both *msj* and *wtt* of the world.

Another description is given of the king—“the image is that as found on from the New Kingdom temple scenes onward depicting the devine birth of the king”<sup>260</sup>—with his symbols and manifestations of power:

**Spell 396a:** The *Kas* of Unas are behind him; his *hemsut* are under his feet.

As personal genii, Eyre stresses that the *Kas* and *hemsut* protect the young king, assuring his succession and success. He is cocooned in the powers that protect a king (Eyre, 2002: 78-79):

**Spell 396b:** His gods are upon him...; his Uraei are at his brow (*wpt*).

**Spell 396c:** The guiding-snake (*sšmt*) of Unas is at his forehead: the spier-out of *ba(s)*, the fiery snake for burning.<sup>261</sup>

Eyre also points to the association between the Uraeu and the neck vertebrae, a theme found elsewhere in the mortuary ritual on the basis of a pun<sup>262</sup> between *Nehebkau* snake, ‘neck,’<sup>263</sup> and for the present context also ‘bulls.’ In this sense, Unas powers and ability to trample on his enemies, and the impossibility of resisting him, is that of the wild Bull, but also a bull that can be sacrificed; and, more importantly, that can be resurrected, as in the related Spell 254 which explores the restoration of the head of the Apis Bull in resurrection. Only through such resurrection that the dead king overcomes the powers that killed him and becomes the Bull of the Sky:

**Spell 397a:** Bull of the Sky is Unas, aggressive in his nature, living on the manifestation of every god

**Spell 397b:** Eating the innards (?) of the..., who come, their bellies full of magic

**Spell 397c:** From the Island of Fire.

Eyre describes the island of fire as a place of passage at the edge of the cosmos, where the vision of fire is both dangerous but also positive. It is a seat of primordial creation, where the Sun-god emerged from the waters of chaos. As such it is a gateway to the other world, where

<sup>260</sup> See Sethe, *Übersetzung II*, 148.

<sup>261</sup> Sauneron, S., 1989. *Une traité égyptienne d' ophiologie. Papyrus du Brooklyn Museum no. 47.218.48 et 85.* Cairo, 173-179 also aludes to the symptoms of snake-bite with reference to snake symbol on the royal crown of dynastic Egypt. In our present context, such an interpretation is rather too political to have any cultural significance.

<sup>262</sup> For extensive exploitation of these puns see *Spells* 318, 511a-512d.

<sup>263</sup> In fact, Eyre also notes in the *Cannibal Hymn* that to sever a bull's head was to kill utterly. Just as the restoration of a severed head was archtypical restoration of life. Thus while decapitation is primarily the destruction of enemies with the threat of death, the restoration of the head marks resurrection (see, *Cannibal Hymn*, esp. 94ff). For an extensive exploration of the puns as discussed by Eyre above see *Pyramid Spells* 318, 511a-512d.



the successful dead<sup>264</sup> will have come into the inheritance of the primaeval god, taking the place of his father. So, for instance, in the *Book of the Dead* Spell 175: “Your seat now belongs to your son Horus, so says Atum, and he will dispatch the Elders; he will rule from your seat; he will inherit the throne which is in the Island of Fire.”<sup>265</sup> Having acquired these necessary powers, the king takes precedence over the powers already there, as in the Coffin Text Spell 37 (Eyre, 2002:81-82):

See, your person has come, you have acquired all power and nothing has been left behind you in the Island of Fire. You have filled your body with magic; you have quenched your thirst with it. Those who watch you tremble like a bird; you have mastered the land with what you know like those to whom you have gone down.<sup>266</sup>

In general ‘magic’ seems to replace ‘food’ on that Island of Fire: So, for instance, “I have come from the Island of Fire, having filled my belly with magic and having quenched my thirst with it.”<sup>267</sup> Alternatively, there seems to be a correlation between knowledge and magic as well.

In any case, the Island of Fire is envisaged as a process of passage where both creation and destruction can take place. It is a place of bright light, where the king need fear no darkness. Here the king himself is not burnt, but burning, with the aid of his Uraei. He is not devoured, but with the aid of the flames—that cook as well as burn—he is devourer. In *Spell* 400a: “Unas it is who eats people, and who lives on gods.”

Having devoured all other gods with their magic, “Unas is risen as that Great One, Lord of Helpers” (*Spell* 398b). “He sits with his back to Geb (Earth)” (*Spell* 398c); which is seen as symbolizing that the seated king as ruler is being protected by the god behind.<sup>268</sup> Hence the deceased king is described as the most powerful, the controller of supernatural powers, and the heir to eternal kingship. However, there is some sense of ambiguity to the idea of Geb in the Pyramid Texts as Eyre observes. For instance, in the *Pyramid Spell* 260 (or Coffin Text Spell 575), the emphasis is on the deceased as a spirit who burns, but who is not burnt by gods. Here Geb himself appears in the role of Bull of the Sky. As the Bull of the Sky, he

<sup>264</sup> Griesshammer, R., 1970. *Das Jenseitsgericht in den Sargtexten*, ÄA. 20. Wiesbaden, 101-103: sees the danger of passage through the Island of Fire expressed in the vision of a place judgement and potential condemnation; also Assman, J., 1990. *Maat. Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Alten Ägypten*. Munich, 216-217.

<sup>265</sup> See, Schott, S., 1956. „Totenbuchspruch 175 in einem Ritual zur Vernichtung von Feinden“ *MDAIK* 14, 181-189; Otto, E., 1962. „Zwei Paralleltex te zu TB 175.“ *CdE* 37, 249-256 especially for ritual usage and mythological context fort he text.

<sup>266</sup> See *Coffin Text* I (CT I), 148b-150b; CT I, 117b-119b.

<sup>267</sup> Willems, H., 1995. The Coffin of Heqata, 242 on *Coffin Text* III, 321d.

<sup>268</sup> On the iconographic mixture of themes of protection and identification see Silverman, in Schafer, B.E., ed. 1991. *Religion in Ancient Egypt: Gods, myths and personal practices*. Ithaca and London, 68-70.

assures Horus rightful succession of his father Ausar/Osiris's throne of Geb (or earthly throne), and so the role of Atum. In contrast, however, the corpse of the dead king is also buried in Geb as earth. Therefore the superiority of the king over Geb, and his refusal to enter into Geb—as in Pyramid Spells 308 and 312, serve as an assertion of his resurrection and succession to celestial authority. And this Pyramid text (*Pyr § 1510*) also speaks of the deceased king being “one of the four gods, the children of Gebb, who is capable of traversing the Southern land and the Land of the North...” Yet in the *Pyramid spell* (*Pyr §*) 2057) there are a group of four gods, the sons of Atem/Atum and Nut, who neither suffer decay nor corruption (Budge, 1934: 227).

Another aspect of Eyres incisive analysis which tends to emphasis Unas' (and others) political ambitions and the consequent disregard to the gerontocratic constitution of the Azanian culture is also elaborated in the following Spells (Eyre, 2002: 82-86):

**Spell 399a:** Unas it is who decides his business together with He-whose name is hidden

**Spell 399b:** On that day of slaughtering the eldest.

**Spell 399c:** It is Unas who is the Lord of offerings, who ties the rope<sup>269</sup>

**Spell 399d:** And provides his offering meal himself.

#### 4.1.2. Internal Political agents and the transformation of the Ethiopian Culture

After reviewing the above spells, there is no doubt that the Cannibal Hymn as a culture text, just like the early Moab mythology of *Ta-terra*, is permeated with ambiguous language that could also be exploited politically. The initial idea of slaughtering the sacred bull, even if not the sacred Apis Bull of *Manfour* (“Memphis”), sounds like a radical deviation from the local culture norm. In fact, that the Apis Bull of Manfour was originally not meant to be slaughtered for culinary purpose<sup>270</sup> is not only demonstrated by Moab moral decision not to eat the flesh of the sacred “Sebek/Subvk” (the Crocodile deity of pre-Dynastic Egypt), but confirmed by “...the oath of the priest in the Late period not to have cut off the head of any living thing.”<sup>271</sup> This latter moral stance of the genuine upholders of the Bantu-Ethiopian national culture did, however, not hinder economically induced political sorcerers/magicians

<sup>269</sup> Sethe, K., *Übersetzung Vol. II*, sees this as a metaphor for independence of action...

<sup>270</sup> For example, Eyre quoting classical sources states that the head of the sacrificial Bull was not eaten, but discarded by the Egyptians. This is after noting that the head of the sacrificial bull is typically shown in the lists of the offering table, along its foreleg (see, Eyres's *Cannibal Hymn*, esp. 92-93).

<sup>271</sup> Merkelbach, R., 1968. , *Ägyptischer Priesterheid.* ZPE 2, 7-30.

from “threatening the beheadment of the (sacred) animals in the court of the temples.”<sup>272</sup> (Eyre, 2002: 94-95)

In a genuine culture context, Eyre acknowledges that a substantial body of mortuary texts are clearly worded in the format of an initiation, in which the deceased claims right to passage through knowledge or through purity, moral or ritual (Eyre, 2002: 70-71). Although Eyre is generally cautious not to associate real cannibalism with the original culture norm of the ancient Egyptians, his suggestion that the sacrificial bull might really have been used for culinary purpose deviates significantly from the local culture norm. True, Eyre admits that in a genuine culture context untainted by political ambiguities the symbolism of blood is that of the life-force that flows away, and, therefore, explicit references to drinking blood, as by the goddess Sakhmet in the story of the “Destruction of Mankind or by monsters in the Underworld”, symbolize evil, savage, aberrant behaviour and not a culinary norm (ibid., 99-100). Indeed, the recurrence of body parts in the traditional hieroglyphic scripts does not necessarily imply the use of genuine human parts. Thus, it is generally significant that Eyre urges us to critically explore the culture symbolism of such core joints in the cannibal hymn as the head, the foreleg and the heart of the sacrificial bull, which forms the main offering list of the ritual of the funerary literature. Accordingly, these core joints are presented as part of the ritual of rebirth and revivification that is at the core of the funerary ritual, and also encapsulated in the “ritual of the Opening of the Mouth.”<sup>273</sup> The foreleg is also a tool, in the image of an adze, for opening the mouth to function. The foreleg itself—as in the spell 405b: “for the cauldron containing them, using the legs of their eldest”—is the primary joint of the offering, symbolizing with the head the whole process of the sacrifice and offering (Eyre, 2002: 52-54). Eyre then points to “a number of depictions”<sup>274</sup> in New Kingdom funeral scenes which show the removal of the foreleg from a standing calf, and which is accompanied by its protesting mother (Eyre, 2002: 7, 102ff.). Evidently, that knowledge, purity/justice, and morality is the measure of the culture of the ancient Egyptians has therefore been plausibly upheld.

In a footnote (note 7) to the spell 393a, on page 77 of Eyre’s analysis of the *Cannibal Hymn*, which is generally concern with the event of cataclysm crucial to Unas (the king’s) transition from mortal to immortal state, it is clearly stated of the *Spells 956a-b* that when the “Sky

<sup>272</sup> Koenig, Y., 1994. *Magie et magiciens dans l'égypte ancienne*. Paris, p. 71...

<sup>273</sup> See also Otto, E., 1960. *Das ägyptische Mundöffnungsritual*. Wiesbaden, 23-25, 43-45; Willems, H., 1988. *Chests of Life*. Leiden, 230-232 for the connection between the ritual of the Mouth Opening and the Food offering.

<sup>274</sup> For the collection of scenes see Guilhou, N., 1993. “La mutilation rituelle du veau dans les scènes des funéraires au Nouvel Empire,” *BIFAO* 93, 276-297; Bartelmess, P., 1992. *Der Übergang ins Jenseits in den thebanischen Beamtengräbern der Ramessidenzeit*, SAGA 2. Heidelberg, 87-92.

trembles, Earth quakes, Horus (Hyen-Nu) arrives, and Thoth appears, They raise Osiris on his side.” Osiris as the god of vegetation often associated with the Green Crown of pre-dynastic and dynastic Egypt culture is already a well known fact. However, if in the company of Thoth by Hyen-Nu in the advent of Osiris resurrection should imply mythologically that Nu, being the acme of the original knowledge of the culture of eternal life, understood from the outset of creativity that vegetation was the purifier of blood critical for the eternal endeavour of human beings, then neither Unas and Teti of the late Old Kingdom nor many of the Pharaohs of the Middle Kingdom and Late Kingdoms, whose funerary texts formed the basis of Eyre’s early analyses, were committed local students of the Bantu-Ethiopian (or later Egyptian) culture institutions. In any event, the original choice of the sacred Apis Bull as the symbolic representation of the culture of *Manfour* by the Bantu-Ethiopian culturalist was by virtue of Apis elevated cognition that vegetation—and not the carcass of a slaughtered lion or wolf—was the key to the purified blood necessary for eternal existence on earth. Symbolically, this culture intuitional aspect of the sacred Apis should be the best alternative explanation why the head of the bull is among the list of parts of the ritual-offerings found in the mortuary/funerary literature.

On the other hand, the foreleg mentioned above in reference to using the legs of their eldest seems to correlate well with the culture role of Moab Bêt (messenger, announcer, pronouncer) and Bes-Horus or Horus I, as illustrated in Churchward (1993/1994: 154-155) incisive analysis. The foreleg of the Bull which is often associated with the divine kingship in dynastic Egypt and the role of Bêt (or Bes-Horus I) makes cultural sense because of the symbolic representative role of the king in this national culture. By and large, given the early association of the foreleg with the Opening of the Mouth, it is possible that early kings and queens were the prime medium for the diffusion of culture information. Even today, Moab kings remain the prime agent for the diffusion of socio-cultural information. In addition, it is not imperative in this later culture that the wives of kings become queens. Instead, queens are naturally not related to the family of the kings. Not surprisingly, there is always a king and queen simultaneously in the social history of the Moaba[s].

Finally, the heart (*ba*<sup>275</sup>) as the seat of love and hatred or energy in terms of the king’s acquisition of the energy essential for his ascension to the celestial role could also be deduced analytically from the Pyr § 292a-b: “Their hearts fall to his fingers: their innards (*bsq*) are for those who belong to the Sky; their blood is for those who belong to the earth.” In the magico-political context, for instance, in which the language of cannibalism is permissible, as in Spell

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<sup>275</sup> e.g. *Spell* 413a: Now their *bas* are in the belly of Unas; their akhs are in the possession of Unas; Eyre’s *Cannibal Hymn*, 133-134.

400a: “Unas it is who eats people, who lives on gods; whom he finds in his way, he eats him/her piecemeal (?) (Spell 407c)”,<sup>276</sup> the consumption of the internal organs of other gods (or god-like creatures), where their magical powers and source of energy presumably reside, could be empowering to the devourer as he strives to become the powerful God, as in “Unas is the God, older than the eldest.”<sup>277</sup> On the other hand, the perception that their blood is for the inhabitants of earth seems to imply the rejection of blood ... after having acquired the original uncorrupted knowledge reserved for the immortal inhabitants of the celestial province or heaven.<sup>278</sup> In any event, the elevation of knowledge and the rejection of blood is prerequisite to the culture norm of the Bantu-Ethiopians. In this present context, it was precisely because of Hyen-Nu’s rejection of all forms of cannibalism that led to her/his celestial exile in the first place. And as stipulated unambiguously of the Dinka mythology, Millet/grains,<sup>279</sup> and not meat—as in Pyramid Spell 1550a: “We eat, we eat the red Ox for the passage of the Lake”<sup>280</sup>, was the original food Hyen-Nu/God permitted their early ancestors. More to the point, Hyen-Nu (Horus/Heru), who remained central to all the astronomical cycles of the Bantu-Ethiopian’s (or Egyptian) national culture, “was not only the God of light, as ‘I am light of the world’, but also symbolized youth, the green shoots of trees and everything that was good” (Churchward, 1993; 1994: 50-51).

Importantly, Eyre also acknowledges that that special culture-knowledge prerequisite for the king’s transition from mortal to immortal state was not the special preserve of the deceased. For it is explicit in a number of examples<sup>281</sup> that knowledge<sup>282</sup> of the texts and rituals from the mortuary literature was of equal value to the living as to the dead. An instance is the New Kingdom title to the full book of Amduat—a text with a specifically royal orientation, which

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<sup>276</sup> *ibid.*, 8-9.

<sup>277</sup> E.g. *Spell* 408a. For his unlimited power see *Spell* 407a: “The Great power, it is Unas; the powerful one of the powerful ones”; but also *Spell* 407d.

<sup>278</sup> See Eyre’s *Cannibal Hymn*..., 99-101 for an alternative and extensive analysis of this spell.

<sup>279</sup> The classical attempt, as evident from the Greek *Aretalogy of Isis* from Kyme, from mid or early Ptolemaic Period to credit Isis/Auset and Osiris/Ausar with the cultivation of culture is unassailable in our present context. This text that claims to have originated from a Stela set up at Memphis (our *Manfour*), in front of the Temple of Hephaistos, states: “I with my brother Osiris put an end to cannibalism” (see, Grandjean, Y., 1975. *Une nouvelle arétalogie d’Isis à Maronée*. Leiden, 8-15 for bibliography, and 122-124 on the text of Kyme). For how much is Greek and how much Egyptian in these texts (see Žabkar, L.V., 1987. *Hymns to Isis in her Temple at Philae*. Hanover and London, 135-160 esp. 151-153). Placed in the context of invention of farming, *agri cultura*, and from early Pharaonic sources that Isis and Osiris discovered grain, its identical expression is also found in Diodorus that: “All men were glad to change their food both because of pleasing nature of the newly discovered grains, and because it seems to their advantage to refrain from butchering one another” (Burton, A., 1972. *Diodorus Siculus Book I. A Commentary*. Leiden, 204-205, 258).

<sup>280</sup> See Eyre’s *Cannibal Hymn*, 56-57.

<sup>281</sup> Pyr §§ 855-856, of ‘he who knows these spells (r) of Re, he will do them, these spells of horizon’ (these first appeared in the Pyramid of Pepi I). Also Eschweiler, P., 1994. *Bildzauber im alten Ägypten*, OBO 137. Freiburg und Göttingen, 242-243.

<sup>282</sup> Barta, W., 1985. „Die Bedeutung der Jenseitsbücher für den verstorbenen König“, MÄS 42. Munich, esp. 135, and note also 11, 19, 44-45, 53, 133.

stresses that the purpose of the Book is to know the other world.<sup>283</sup> In contrast, the introduction to the shorter version states clearly: “As for He who knows these situations (?), he is the likeness of the Great God himself. It is useful to him on Earth, thoroughly; (it) is useful to him in the great Duat.” Thus whether or not the rationale of the Amduat should imply that the king is not dead, but travels with (or indeed as) Sun-god, in Duat at night but on earth during the day, as in Eyre (2002: 66-67), or that the attainment of supreme knowledge is key to total freedom, we are left to conclude that the acme of knowledge was indeed the original measure of the Bantu-Ethiopian national culture.

In this sense, professor Christopher Eyre is absolutely right to note that the mythological resolution found in the Cannibal Hymn—in terms of Unas transition from mortal to the state immortality and or his ascension on the divine throne of his ancestors [both earthly and celestial]—seems rather unusual in normal Egyptian context (Eyre, 2002: 148). Using the heritage of the Green Crown of the divine throne, whose origin goes as far back as the Seven Great Stars of the stellar Mythos (or earlier), as instance, it is stated clearly in the *Ritual*, (ch. cxxxi.), that: “He arriveth at the aged one (Horus I) on the confines of Mount of Glory (Pole star) where the crown awaits him” (Churchward, 1993/1994: 284-285). And what the ancient Egyptians mapped out celestially they depict it terrestrially as well—that is to say, the path to legitimate heritage of the throne of Geb or dynastic Egypt must have in normal culture context adhered to the gerontocratic principle of the original culture too. In other words, it is a more familiar focus in Egyptian mythology that the superior claim to this heritage is one of right rather than one of might. That is explicit in the Myth of Horus and Seth, so Eyre. In the new Kingdom literary version of the story, Shu asserts that the heritage belongs to Horus, not Seth, in the words: “Right is Might” (Maat nb wsr).

In direct contrast to this original culture norm, however, the mythology of the Cannibal Hymn overtly sets out to assert that the king, Unas etc, is heir to (or replacement of) the primaeval god(s), whose varied roles and powers in the ‘other world’ he takes over by force; that is to say, he usurps the functions of his predecessors, the old gods who created the world. Simply put, there is a continuous assertion of the King’s claim to the heritage on the basis of might, and stress on his seizure of power by force. In particular, it asserts explicitly that the king is the most powerful or the archetypal manifestation of various categories of divine power, and that there are the forms of divine powers which manifest themselves in order to control or to intervene physically in the cosmos as a whole, including the visible world (Eyre, 2002: 142-144).

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<sup>283</sup> *ibid.*, 42-46.

Such a blatant magico-political aberration from the original culture norm deserves critical attention because it at best elaborates the highly contested concept of the “Two-Lands” and the associated Double-Crowns of dynastic Ethiopian-Egypt, the one a terra of white linen and elderly from the South (Nubia) and the other Northern and red, both of which must be united in the Green Crown of a homogeneous national culture:

“The Upper Egyptian (Crown) goes north, and the Lower Egyptian crown goes south; the united-one is joined in the speech of Your Person, and the Green Crown is put to your brow” (Eyre, 2002: 132).

This united Green Crown alone was the special reserve or heir of the legitimate Pharaoh—that is, the King of kings. But the legitimate right to the heir of the Green Crown was by virtue her/his knowledge of the life subservient national culture. This best explains the rationale behind the typical “offering of the Maat”<sup>284</sup> to Hyen-Nu (and His/Her other assistant gods) by the King. Succinctly, Unas and other later usurping or illegitimate local Pharaohs were generally aware of this culture requirement<sup>285</sup> for becoming a legitimate Pharaoh. Probably, the apprehension of not being able to present a culturally convincing document (or argument) to the Bantu-Ethiopian culture custodians in Karnak/Thebes must have been prominent on their minds. Unas, for one, understood the importance of presenting a written document to the critical review of the upholders of the national culture and or Amon; but he obviates by “writing with the big finger not the small one” (Eyre, 2002: 130-131). Could there have been any manuscript more prominent in the minds of the Locals [then] than the novel idea of eating the hearts of gods and kings? The threat of killing the sacred Apis Bull of Manfour alone will have presented an unprecedented socio-ethical development and marked the beginning of a major political aberration from the original culture norm of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom.

Even provided one agrees entirely with Professor Eyre’s argument that the dramatic episodes associated with the Cannibal Hymn—that is, the introduction of the sacrificial Bull as the king himself into the slaughterhouse; its slaughter and portioning into different symbolic parts, with these parts symbolizing the different gods or parts of gods or their spirits or powers which the king must absorb in order to become immortal—was rather symbolic than actual; and that in contemporary Egyptian culture norm there was familiar punning

<sup>284</sup> Teeter, E., 1997. *The Presentation of Maat: Ritual and Legitimacy in ancient Egypt*, SAOC 57. Chicago.

<sup>285</sup> E.g., Spell 410b: Unas feeds (*wšb*) on the lungs of the wise. In our present context, if the document must be subservient to eternal existence, which should in essence mean researching on the vegetation that perpetually purifies blood and keeps the heart constantly pumping, he deviates from this norm by merely eating the Red and swallowing the Green (Spell 410a) and also Spell 409c dealt with earlier. Most of the spells dealt with here are also found in Eyre’s *Cannibal Hymn*, 7-10.

identification between spirits and food; and that it was also a commonplace in Egyptian mythology to see the Sun being swallowed at night by the Sky goddess Nu(t), only to be reborn at dawn; and as evinced by the Pyramid Spell 477 where in Thoth's protection of Osiris there is apparent allusion to the symbolic role of the butcher and priest taking in reversion of the ritual-offerings (Eyre, 2002: 154-171); the symbolic threat alone of eating the hearts of the sacred Bull Apis must undeniably have presented an unanticipated socio-political challenge to that authentic culture norm of the local people customary of putting the heads of men on the bodies of lions, jackals, wolves et cetera.

Therefore, despite the limitation of academic knowledge of ancient Egyptian funerary/mortuary literature or culture (Eyre, 2002: 59), the meagre information scholars currently present us should allow us to make a genuine homogenous culture case for elaborating the concept of the Two Lands and their associated Double Crowns of a united Ethiopian Kingdom (the Azanian nation). In a normal national culture context, the Great-Lake-Source of the Nile, where in those days the Ritual of Resurrection found its most potent symbolic manifestation, as in "we eat, we eat the red Ox for the passage of the Lake" (Pyramid spell 1550a), the introduction of the deceased person into the world of the great "Eternal Spirits" of the ancestors on the "Island of the Double Cave"—that was the Island situated in the Great Lake, the source of the Nile, Victoria Nyanza—normally began at the Delta where the great Nile River gushes out its lungs into the Mediterranean sea. For example, the seventeenth chapter of the *Ritual* also states: "I am purified at the two great and mighty lakes at Sutenhunen," and "these were approached by the road that leads to the Land of the Spirits." "Eternity is the name of one and the Great Green One that of the other." Another name given to these lakes in the same chapter, as Churchward finds out, was "Endless Time and Eternity", with Endless Time being Day and Eternity being the Night (Churchward, 1994: 270). This in turn raise the question, why travelling against the floods of the Great Nile?

Probably, since the original purpose of this Ritual was meant to culturally inculcate the knowledge of immortality extant with the Land of the Spirits—the "Khui Land, the terrestrial exit of the Twelve divisions of the Tuat—in the deceased, it is foreseeable that the quest for eternity was never meant to be easy, as in life or thereafter. And we are also told by the *Ritual* that: "the tunnels of the Earth have given me birth." Thus having failed to attain the eternal purpose of Life on the terrestrial province the deceased person must have continued with that difficult journey even in the underworld. Hence the ancient Egyptians commenced the entrance of the Tuat terrestrially from the mouth of Nile and ended at the Island of the Double



Cave. To reach this Island the *Sektit* boat<sup>286</sup> containing the mummy form of Osiris—after passing through the last division—entered the tail of a great serpent, *was drawn through its body* and came out at its mouth, and thus was reborn anew. In other words “He descended” in mummy form at the commencement of the Tuat at the Nile Delta and “ascended” on the Island of the Double Cave, at the source of the Nile, having passed through the twelve divisions of the Tuat and all the difficulties, dangers and darkness therein (Churchward, 1994: 272-273). This should probably explain why Osiris later inherited the role of the god of the Underworld from Shu. According to Churchward, Shu, who was also called An-Heru, the lifter up of heaven, was assigned primarily the place of the god of the Underworld, before Osiris. As some one who lifts up the Heavens, it was natural that he remains underneath the earth. Given that immortality was at the core of the Cushitic/Bantu-Ethiopians national culture, the symbolic lifting up of heavens or the cognition of the earthly dwellers to parity those inhabiting the celestial province could be better done by someone who shares their plight. Simply formulated, the quest for total freedom or immortality is attainable first on Earth, at least, for the earthly dwellers; but the key/ankh to that magnificent culture endeavour cannot be found elsewhere than in the vegetality of the Osirian deity.

The terminus of the Ritual of Resurrection suffices as a confirmation of both the sacredness and centrality of the Great Lake region in terms of the inception of the Azanian national culture. Of particular importance in this regard is the Pygmy tribe in the region called “Ti Kiti-ki”, which in ancient Egyptian means men of the Double Cave. The culture stipulation of this Bantu-Ethiopian group can without doubt serve as the basis of the Dynastic Egyptian culture, especially inasmuch as they not only believe in a Great Spirit, but also think that the spirits of their ancestors inhabit a Great-Black-Serpent, who visits them continuously. Accordingly, when a deceased person is buried the person’s body/spirit automatically joins the Great Spirit of this miraculous and invisible Serpent. That the ancient Egyptians of the Solar Mythos later use to think and believe that the Sun-God—“Osiris in mummified form”—or the flesh of Ra was reborn into life of a new day only after he had been drawn through the body of a serpent merely confirms the incorporation of the original idea of the Pygmies by the ancient Egyptians (Churchward, 1994: 150-153).

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<sup>286</sup>The *Sektit/Seher* or *Hennu* boat, as Churchward notes, was not an ordinary boat, but one end of it very much higher than the other and was made in the shape of the head of a gazelle. The centre of the boat was occupied by a carefully closed coffer, which contained the body of the dead Osiris, and it rested upon a framework or sledge which was provided with runners. This coffer was surmounted by a hawk with protruding wings stretched out over the top of it. To support the sledge, a framework made in the form of lotus flowers, which, according to Churchward, are well known types of the dawn and renewal of life, was used. Papyrus plants are emblems of the South and Lotus plants of the North (see, Churchward, 1994. *Signs and Symbols*, 292-293).

In the words of Maspero, “all that lay beyond Punt was held by the ancient Egyptians to be a fabulous region, a void or intermediate boundary land between the world of men and that of the gods—the Island of the Double—land of the Shades, where the dead came into contact with the souls of the departed.”... “It, the Land of Shades beyond Punt, was inhabited by the Dangas, tribes of half-savage dwarfs whose grotesque faces and wild gestures reminded the Egyptians of the god Bes—none knew better than they the dance of the god(s). One finds that King Assi of the 5<sup>th</sup> Dynasty, B.C.3000, procured one which a certain Biûdri had purchased in Punt. His wildness and activity and the extraordinary positions which he assumed, made a lively impression on the courtiers at the time, and nearly a century later there were still reminiscence of him.” During the 6<sup>th</sup> Dynasty Pepi II also sent, an officer, Heru-Khuf to bring back a Pygmy alive, and in good health, from the land of the great trees, away to the South. Churchward made convincing argument that this Land of the shades, which Professor Maspero refers to as fabulous region, was actually the “Khui-Land”—the land of the Spirits and God(s) (Churchward, 1993, 1994: 155-156). Following *Dr. Edward Naville*, Churchward then stressed that: “if the case of the Dangas is still doubtful there are two instances in which it seems to be certain that the inscriptions mean Pygmies. In the scriptures, which describe the great festival, in the temple of Bubastis, we see a procession of priests, among whom are three small men, marching along holding canes. They have a title, which *Brusgel* translates “guards”, “beadles”, something connected with the police (or policing) of the temple. These guards were certainly Pygmies. They are probably not Egyptians, for we find in the same ceremony another African population, the Anu or Anti of Nubia, from the South. A third extraordinary figure is a man having a face like “Bes” but a well proportion body. The inscription, which is above the figure, cannot be understood, it ends with “nanasu nana”, probably the language of the man” (Churchward, 1994: 157-158). The notion of nanasu or nana, in relation to the Dangas or Pygmies coming from the land of the great trees is rather significant because “nana” recalls the kingship title of the Ashantis mentioned earlier, whose kingdom’s capital is not only called the tree of life, “Kuma-aszi”, but who were originally classified as the pygmies of the Niger.

Thus, in all, it is worth adding that, unlike the magico-political language of Unas’s Spell (*Pyr* § 396c) which alludes to the bite of the guiding-snake mentioned earlier, ‘the original idea behind the concept of the Black Serpent in the mythology of dynastic Egypt was symbolic of the reincarnation of the spirit as a type of rebirth because of the serpent ability to casts out its skin once every year’ (Churchward, 1994: 150). C.A. Diop also makes credible references to the similarity between the Dogon God-Serpent and the God-Serpent of the Egyptian

Pantheon. Each is specialized at dancing in the dark. In fact, the God-Serpent is called “the one who dances in the shadows.” While this refers to a serpent in an inscription found on a sarcophagus ... accompanying the tomb of Osiris; in the Dogon Pantheon, the Seventh Ancestor transformed into a serpent has been killed by his own men, who had his head buried beneath the Blacksmith’s cushion. From this sepulchre the Ancestor serpent rises up to dance underground (e.g. in darkness). By similar analytical token, the incestuous Jackal-god of the Dogon Pantheon also shows some similarity with the Jackal-headed god of the Egyptians. He is the guardian of the pond where the dead are supposed to be cleansed (Diop, 1974: 141 ff.). One should also add that even until today the elderly of the Dogons still uses the footsteps of a mysterious Jackal/Wolf that supposedly only operates under the cover of the darkness/night to determine the cause of human death. After all the core of the dynastic Ethiopian (or Egyptian) culture deals first with immortality and then resurrection later. From a genuine culture perspective, it shouldn’t really matter whether the introduction of the deceased from the Delta region of Egypt back to the Great Lake source of the Nile was mythologically envisioned to mean having to travel through the body of the Great Serpent that symbolizes the Eternal Spirit of their “Ti Kiti-ti” Pygmy ancestors. What matters most is that, prior to “Osiris resurrection, Bes-Horus/Horus I, the early anthropomorphized Egyptian-god, was Amsu in spirit form—that is as resurrected Horus.” As Churchward rightly observes, Osiris was merely the same person in a much later socio-cultural context (1993/1994: 279-280). In fact, the entire literature—both sacred and secular—of the ancient Egyptians and Nubians is replete with inscriptional evidence relating to their Southern origin; and even their “gods”, as recorded in the “Book of Coming Forth by Day [called today the *Book of the Dead*]” and or the “Papyrus of Ani” (ca. 4000 B.C.E), they said: “Came from the Source of the Nile ..., Hapi [the Nile goddess] at the Mountain of the Moon” (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 168-169)<sup>287</sup>. Perhaps Churchward description of the dance of Pygmies sacred ceremony illustrates better the enigmatic endeavour of having to travel through the body of the Great Serpent. The dance, he notes, consists of a series of more or less zig-zag movements in more or less large circle, with the king/chief in front, and one following close behind imitating his steps and actions (1994: 151-152). Simply said, the culture quest for eternity was never meant to be a straightforward journey without its own intricacies; it was a tortuous journey conceived to be full of obscurity and laden with major obstacles, which in turn demands a leadership structure based on the appropriate knowledge of such a cyclical course.

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<sup>287</sup> Ben-Jochannan maintains that the dynastic Egyptian Mountain of the Moon found in the Great Lake region in today’s Africa is the Kilimanjaro. In addition, other sources of the Nile are to be found in present day Ethiopia (ibid.).

From the foregoing, it could thus be concluded that the indigenous people of the Bantu-Ethiopian Kingdom, Azania, which originally stretched beyond the northern and eastern edges of Sumeria right through to the Southern tip of the Cape of Good Hope, and or from the present day Saudi Peninsula to the Western Coast of the Gulf of Guinea, erstwhile shared the same national culture prior to its disintegration due to concerted internal and external political pressures. With regard to the enormous wealth and power of that nation's culture center, Thebes (the biblical Nahum), a Hebrew Prophet once said: "... Ethiopia and Egypt were once thy strength, and it was infinite; Put and Lubim thy helpers" (Erman, 1894/1971: 20-21). Similarly, Homer's Iliad (Book ix) states: "...in Egyptian Thebes the heaps of precious ingots gleam, the hundred-gated Thebes."

#### 4.1.3. Could External Political Forces have instigated the Culture Crisis of the Ethiopian Kingdom?

Alternatively, in light of the geographical reach of the Bantu-Ethiopian culture one could also postulate a wholly external explanation for the political usurpation of the institutions of that national culture. Aside the remarks made earlier about the universal political ambitions of some of the New Kingdom's Pharaohs, there are convincing hypotheses put forward by some authors that merit critical attention. Taking the numerous isolated communities of Bantu-Ethiopians still found in South East and the Austral-Asia region, Churchward, for one, has shown the similarity between the early signs of the Ethiopian (later Egyptian) culture and those found in the cultures of some of these isolated communities. Of particular importance in terms of the culture reach of the Bantu-Ethiopians is the Hieroglyphic sign of Amsu, the resurrected Bes-Horus I or the Pygmy Ptah, which is not only found on the ivory tablets of the tomb of Naqada,<sup>288</sup> but also found depicted on the oldest Boomerangs of some indigenous Australians. The same is true of the hieroglyphic sign of "Khui Land" also found on the boomerangs of some of these indigenous Australians, on the backs of some West Azanian/Africans, and on stones in Ireland (Churchward, 1994: 151, 156). On the basis of this Churchward suggests the primacy of the ancient Egyptian culture and argued convincingly that some of these groups had probably left the Ethiopian motherland during the early phase of the Stellar Mythos. This in turn thus begs the question whether scientific Egyptologists and historians will be ready to accommodate such hypothesis given the disparity between the early

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<sup>288</sup>For details about the Naqada civilization see Bruce Williams, 1987. "Forebears of Menes in Nubia: Myth or Reality?" *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Vol.46, No.1, 15-26.

settlements of the indigenous Australians and the Papau New Guineans etc. and the history of predynastic Egypt.

In the case of India, there are credible evidence indicating that prior to the arrival of the politically dominant and landowning Brahman or Brahmic warrior casts—the so-called Aryan Indians, there was already a well established indigenous community sharing the culture of the Bantu-Ethiopians (e.g. solar deity and the sacred Apis Bull). Hence, Indian divinities, *Devata* in Sanskrit, literary mean “the Shinning One.” And if Cows are revered and accounted sacred in India today it is because the ancient Egyptians originally treated Cows in like manner in honor of Auset/Isis (the Moon Goddess represented with horns [Hathor of the Greeks]), and just as the Indians object to killing them as food so did the ancient Egyptians. It is culturally also significant that Churchward acknowledges that, prior to the arrival of the politically salient Brahmic cast, there was no such thing as the cast divisions now synonymous with contemporary India; and that the indigenous inhabitants treated their women in like manner as did the Egyptians—allowing both sexes to enjoy the same social prestige and standard. Despite the high level of *melange* or intermarriages that would later give India its contemporary characteristics or identity one can still find some isolated communities of the Bantu-Ethiopians in some parts (or on some islands) of India. It is therefore not a coincidence that the Indians still call their male parents Pitah (Ptah).

Furthermore, in a Chinese Manuscript called *Pih-Kea-Sing*, dated probably 3000 B.C. (its mention of Buddha notwithstanding), we are also told that “the [Mongoloid] Chinese originally came from the Northwest—over the heights of Kwan-lun towards the borders of Hwang-ho—as colonists, ...subdued and perhaps exterminated in succession the early indigenous [Afro-Asiatic] population of the land” (Churchward, 1994: 215-216).

Similarly, Diop has demonstrated convincingly how certain verses of The Epic of Gilgamesh shed new light on the early Negro background of ancient Elam (“Persia”):

Father Enlil, Lord of the countries,  
 Father Enlil, Lord of the true word,  
 Father Enlil, Pastor of the Blacks

In this Epic, Anu (Sumerian An), the primitive god father of Ishtar, has the same Negro name as Osiris the Onian: The goddess Ishtar took the floor and spoke thus to god Anu, her father

(Verses 92-93). Amélineau<sup>289</sup> is quoted as stating that “the Anu people were the earliest inhabitants of ancient Egypt and Arabia Patraea” (Diop, 1974: 105).

Sandars, in *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, thus stressed that when the Semites invaded Mesopotamia they not only inherited most of the Sumerian gods, but they altered their names, their mutual relations, and many of their attributes. This notwithstanding, the kind and just attributes of the Sun-god, Shamash (the Sun is Shams in Arabic), remained undiminished. Accordingly, in the days of the Epic of Gilgamesh, Shamash was Omniscient seeing one, the great judge to whom anxious mortal could appeal against injustices, and know that they were heard. Many of his attributes are described in the hymns from Nineveh: “All mankind rejoice to you, O Shamash, all the world longs for your light... in a hollow voice feeble man calls out to you... when his family is far away and his city far off, the shepherd boy fearful of the open field comes before you, the shepherd in confusion among his enemies ... the caravan which marches in dread, the trader, the pedlar with his bag of weights.” In fact, nothing escapes the Sun’s eye, “Guide and beacon who constantly passes over the infinite Seas, whose depths the great gods of heaven do not know; your gleaming rays go down into the Pit, and the monsters of the deep see your light. You make it to burn over unknown stretches of distance for countless hours ...by your terrible brilliance the land is overwhelmed” (Sandars, 1960: 23-24).

Finally, as for the relatively recent culture history of Indo-Europeans (Erman (1894; 1971: 3), there is no doubt that the political alliance of the so-called Caucasians or Aryans (e.g. Hyksos) who later colonized Greece and infiltrated the Bantu-Ethiopian Kingdom systematically and incrementally were predominantly of Nordic and admixture of Euroasian tribes. Their barbaric political nature also found expression in early Greek and Roman myths. Of importance is the general perception of the presence of werewolves among certain European groups. For instance, Ovid’s *Metamorphosis*<sup>290</sup> tells us the story of a family who was punished for one of them fed flesh to Zeus: “Howling he fled, and fain he would have spoke; but humane voice his brutal voice forsoke. About his lips the gathered foam he churns, and, breathing slaughters, still with rage he burns, but on the bleathing flock his fury turns. His mantle, now his hide, with raged hairs cleaves to his back; a farmished face his bears; his arms descend, his shoulders sink away to multiply his legs for chase of prey. He grows a wolf, his hoariness remains, and the same rage in other members reigns. His eyes still sparkle in a narrower space: his jaws retain the grin, and violence of his face. This was a single ruin, but not one deserves so just a punishment alone.”<sup>291</sup>

<sup>289</sup> Amélineau, Abbé Émile, 1916. *Prolégomène à l’étude dela religion égyptienne*. Paris: Ed Leroux.

<sup>290</sup> <http://classics.mit.edu/Ovid/metam.html> (e.g., Sir Samuel Garth, John Dryden et al. (English translation)).

<sup>291</sup> <http://www.eaudrey.com/myth/werewolf.htm> (accessed June 7, 2009).

Referring to the nomadic Scythian tribe, the Neurians, Herodotus state: “It seems that these people are conjurers: for both the Scythians and the Greeks who dwell in Scythia say that every Neurian once a year becomes a Wolf for a few days at the end of which time he is restored to his proper shape. Not that I believe this, but they constantly affirm it to be true, and are even ready to back their assertion with an oath.”<sup>292</sup>

And from the *Speculum Regale* (also called *Konungs Skuggsjá* or King’s Mirror) written in Norway around 1250<sup>293</sup> we also learn that “when the holy Patricius preached Christianity in that country, there was one clan which opposed him so fiercely than any other in the land; and these people strove to insult both God and his holy man. And when he was preaching the gospels to them as to others and came to confer with them where they conferred their assemblies; they adopted the plan of howling on him like wolves. When he saw that he could do very little to promote his mission among these people, he grew very wroth and prayed God to send affliction upon them... as a constant reminder of their disobedience. Later these clansmen did suffer a fitting and severe though marvellous punishment, for it is told that all the members of the clan were changed into wolves for a period and roam through the woods feeding upon the the same food as the wolves; but they are worse than wolves, for in all their wiles they have the wit of men, though they are as *eager to devour men as to destroy other creatures*. It is reported that to some this affliction comes every seventh winter, while in the intervening years they are men; others suffer it continuously for seven winters all told and are never stricken again.”<sup>294</sup> While in this later case both the supposed holyman and the Norwegian clans possessed the magical powers of conjuring each other into Wolves; it generally recalls us of “the dark prince Moses”, who fled his native Egypt at the age of forty years to the Midianites (Exodus 2:15) only to return forty years later as a fully initiated sorcerer capable of conjuring human beings into snakes (Kalopoulos, 2003: 281-290).

Furthermore, there are credible historic indications that the political leaders of the Greco-Europeans were generally apt at appropriating foreign cultures and then imposing theirs on others. Bernal Martin, for one, rightly points to a statement in the Hermetic Corpus that hints to the fact that “the Greeks had taken aspects of Egyptian religion. Also, writing around 100 C.E, Philo of Byblos claimed that Greeks had appropriated Phoenician and Egyptian ancient myths and then imposed their versions or fictions on other peoples. Similarly, the Assyrian Christian, Tatian, argued in the Second century C.E that the Greeks had taken their culture from the “barbarians”, including Phoenician letters and Egyptian Geometry and historical

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<sup>292</sup> Herodotus, *Histories*. Translated in English by George Rawlinson, 1928. New York: Tudor, 88.

<sup>293</sup> [http://www.archive.org/stream/kingsmirrorspecu00konuuoft/kingsmirrorspecu00konuuoft\\_djvu.text](http://www.archive.org/stream/kingsmirrorspecu00konuuoft/kingsmirrorspecu00konuuoft_djvu.text)

<sup>294</sup> <http://www.eaudrey.com/myth/werewolf.htm>.

writing. The Church father Clement of Alexandria even went all the way to call the Greeks thieves” (Bernal, M. (2001: 392-393).<sup>295</sup>

Moreover, we also now know that not only Greek gods were calculously vying for each other positions in historic times, but that there are plenteous examples in Greek mythology when mortal human heroes also challenged the authority and will of immortal gods, as in the famous defiant position of Ajax<sup>296</sup>: I will escape from the Sea, even if the gods do not wish it (Kalopoulos, 2003: 205):

“Once, Zeus’ son, Hercules, challenged every opponent he could find to a wrestling contest. Since no man was equal to the challenge, Zeus took on the form of a mortal man; after a prolonged match that lasted for hours and resulted in a draw, Zeus made himself known to his son Hercules. ... Before the contest began, Hercules had offered up a burn sacrifice of animal’s thighs on the altar” (Kalopoulos, 2003: 205-213).

Kalopoulos thus stressed, that ‘Greek religious thought in particular acknowledged from the dawn of mythical times, man’s right to enhance his importance by means of heroic deeds; the Greek mind was the first to turn from a God-centred way of life and thought to a human-centred society. Accordingly, Greek religiousness, at first God-centred, evolved significantly to become human-centred and then produced the exquisite nature oriented philosophy of the late classical times (ibid).

In order not to miss the main point of the present analytical discernment, assuming the geographical reach of the Bantu-Ethiopian national culture extended from the mainland to Australia (or Kerimi Azania) through the Mediterranean and some parts of Asia, it is possible to envisage a political development in which some of these isolated local communities lying at the northern and/or north-eastern fringes of the then Ethiopian Kingdom having to confront economically engendered external political incursions with total disregard to the sacredness of local deities, as in this statement: “the Egyptians not only worship oxen, but also revered eels instead of eating them, and mourning the death of cats instead of skinning them” (Erman, 1894/1971: 2). This was with specific reference to classical Greeks position on the ancient Egyptian culture. But as Professor Reverend Sayce also reminds us, the early political advances of the Hyksos into the Delta region of the then Ethiopian Kingdom was often accompanied by massacre and utter destruction of the local culture institutions dedicated to


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<sup>295</sup> For further details on Clement see Clement *Stromateis*, I.87.2; see also Ridings, D., 1995. “*The Attic Moses: Dependency Theme in some Early Christian Writers*”. Gothenburg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 223.

<sup>296</sup> Homerus Od. 4.500, Scholia in Homerum 13.66.10. Ajax, according to popular myth means “Eagle.” Pindarus Isthmia 6.35.



the gods of the land (Sayce, 1895: 13-14). So, assuming the local leaders at northern and north eastern fringes of then sparsely populated Bantu-Ethiopian Kingdom/the Azanian nation directly affected by such political incursions against the local culture norms appealed for assistance from the culture centre of a nation customary used to putting human heads on the bodies of lions (as with the sphinx) only to be repeatedly presented with the alternative culture solution of taming and inculcating real culture in these economically driven and blood thirsty political Barbarians; it is feasible that disgruntled community leaders wary of the practicality of the stringent ethical norm of their local culture in the face of such a serious political development must have opted for a much realistic political solution in their response to the situation. In anything, the taming of an uncultivated wild-beast or political barbarian requires certain degree of force; even, if not all out force—some measure of force is inevitable. This might best explain why local district chiefs like Unas, and many of the later politically salient Pharaohs, must have chosen to usurp the institutions of local culture in an effort to advance their urgent political cause. Probably, this might also explain why as the Theban culturalists, the avant-garde of Azanian nationalism, were gradually squeezed out of Upper Egypt, the lion god increasingly gained more prominence in Meroe; or why in the closing days of the ancient Egyptian social history there were more highly politicized Pharaohs at helm of Bantu-Ethiopian culture institutions. In any event, given the centrality of the Delta region of the Nile Valley to the over-all process of the “Ritual of Resurrection, the occupation of that particular region by either internal or external political agents must have rendered the culture custodians of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom redundant; and, consequently, set the stage for the national struggle to reunite what was by then a degenerating nation. This seems to be one of the best alternative interpretations of the ancient Egyptian concept of the Two-Lands and their associated Double Crowns for which both legitimate and illegitimate/pseudo Pharaohs of the Ethiopian Kingdom contested for heritage in the past.



The three-headed Lion-god worshipped at Meroe from a relief at Wād Ba-Naga

Reproduced in Wallis Budge's *From Fetish to God in Ancient Egypt* (p.79)

Another culture interpretation of that concept has been presented by Albert Churchward in his *Signs and Symbols of Primordial Man*. Despite the unavoidable shortcomings, Churchward, unlike other researchers and scholars who in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries desperately tried to misappropriate ancient Egyptian culture and civilization for the West Asiatics<sup>297</sup> and the Greco-Europeans<sup>298</sup>, opts for a masonic interpretation of that highly contested ancient Egyptian concept of Two-Lands. Interestingly, Churchward develops the concept of a pre-Ptah secret/dark Earth in which nothing grew, no human beings were yet created, and no evil was yet known. This is then followed by the idea of Amenta or Lower Earth, which the Pygmy Ptah and his associates, who represented the earliest form of the “Seven Primal Powers”, had created and was presented as a passage—hollowed out of Earth—through which the manes had to pass before emerging as a spiritual body. This second earth or Amenta which is created by Ptah and his assistants or demi-gods constituted, with the original Earth or Upper Earth, “the Double Earth.” After the creation of the *Amenta*, the original North and South divisions as evident in the Stellar Mythos of the Ethiopians/Egyptians was added with the East and West horizons—thereby attaining the four quarters or square on the solstices of equinoxes forming the divine house of Ptah. Since ancient Egyptians pursuit of divine source

<sup>297</sup> See, Erman, A., 1971. *Life in Ancient Egypt*, 30.

<sup>298</sup> See Eyre, C., 2002. *The Cannibal Hymn*, 154-155.

of life was originally conceptualized both terrestrially and celestially, the two Earths—that of Seb (Upper Earth) and that of Amenta (Lower Earth), created by Ptah and his associates,—each had a Sky representing the double Tatt in the *Ritual*, and served particularly in Amenta as a type of eternal stability, and was also portrayed to form the gateway of eternity in the region of *Tattu* (Churchward, 1994: 158-160). Having dealt earlier with the gates, through which the dead must pass or the judges before whom s/he must justify her/himself and so reify the passage of the dead from the mortal to the immortal state (Eyre, 2002: 137), it is also significant that Churchward here has the Ritual of Resurrection in mind. Subsequently this Double Tatt, represented in the later Solar Mythos, the pillars of Sut (the earliest God of Darkness) and Horus (God of Light or Sunshine)—or South and North—the Sun and the Moon, revolving, passed through Amenta issuing light to the passing of the manes; and the meeting of which, at the mountain of the Middle Earth (the Solar Mount in Ainnu), the equilibrium of eternity is established. It was after this eternal unison that the legitimate heritage of the earth was now handed over to Horus, who henceforth became “Chief of the Two-Land.” He wears the double diadem as ruler of the double earth; the one who has traversed the two Earths and as the one who unites both horizons.

In all, it is worth adding that in Egyptian divine dynasties Ptah was not only the God-Father, but also Iu, the son. In the person of Iu he represented the youthful deity who rises from the dead both as the Sun-god and as the soul in the image of Sahu mummy risen, with the Solar-hawk for its head symbolizing the soul issuing from the body of Kheper-Ptah. Iu is also representative of the Put-Cycle or the company of creators. Here, as gods gathered in the Body of One Supreme, they were first Seven in the Stellar Mythos; Eight in the Lunar; Nine in the Put Cycle of Ptah—Solar; and Ten as the sephiroth of the Kabalists, and finally Twelve in the Heaven of Atum-Ra (Churchward, 1994: 160-161).

These later astronomical figures in Churchward interpretation of the concept of the Two Lands recalls once again the original terrestrially founded and celestially celebrated symbolical characters associated with Moabas early ancestors—the four wives of Cham-ba Nyaan, symbolizing the four geographical corners of the Bantu-Ethiopian Kingdom (or later Egyptian Kingdom); and His Seven sons, namely: Jafok, Jakpakar, Jakong or Wakirman, J[aton]g, J[amon]g, Suabnang, and Namauk—symbolizing the seven stellar spirits, which in sum constitute the Twelve Eternal Spirits or Stars later incorporated into the Solar Mythos of the dynastic Egyptians. Furthermore, it also reaffirms the prevailing position that uncorrupted knowledge underlining life’s purpose was the measure of the Azanian national culture. It is on the whole elucidating to know that while in the pre-Solar period there were Twenty four stars

representing the heavens of North and South both terrestrially and celestially..., “these were the twelve who had their thrones as rulers in the zodiac and the 12 spirits with Horus-Khuti, Lord of the spirits in the heaven of eternity. Citing the Papyrus of *Ani* and [Nu]-nefer, Churchward rightly observed that in the *Maat* there are also Twelve Judges sitting on twelve thrones (1994: 194-195).

In order to make sense of Horus legitimate heritage of the Green Crown (or the unison of the Double Crowns) for our present analysis, it is worth adding that while ‘the priests of Heliopolis (On or Beth Shemesh of the bible) had in the past done everything to incorporate the doctrines of the Stellar, Lunar into the Solar Mythos—with undeniable modifications and changes; and are known to have attached the name of Horus to the names of their Kings, as in Min [Menes]-Ptah..., the first King of the Fifth Dynasty, *User-ka-f*, declined the use of Horus name on its title altogether’ (Churchward, 1994: 269). Thus despite “the relative stability often attributed to the Old Kingdom” (Sayce, 1895: 13), the political seed had, by this time, already been sown on the wholly culture landscape of the once unified Azanian nation.

#### **4.2. Conflicting views about the Origin of the Egyptian Culture/Civilization**

In his *Black Man of the Nile* Ben-Jochannan has convincingly argued that any attempt to divide dynastic Egypt into the so-called Semitic dominated Lower Egypt to the North and Bantu-Ethiopian dominated Upper Egypt (South) during the Old Kingdom is tilted at misinformation because prior to the arrival of the Hyksos rulers there wasn’t any direct serious external political threat close to the culture centre of the Ethiopian Kingdom. Naturally, Ben-Jochannan’s informative and lucid analysis takes critical issue with such politically compromised modern scholarship that in the past deliberately tried to extricate the so-called ancient Egyptian civilization from its Ethiopian origin, as in this *Introduction* to “Nubia” in the Encyclopaedia of Egyptian civilization. “Nubia, the lands of the South of Egypt was inhabited by less civilized people who were good soldiers. They were also rich in gold, good quality stone, hard Wood, and large cattle. They formed the gateway to central Africa, whence come Ivory, strange animals and the pygmies.”<sup>299</sup> It is rather intriguing to note that the gold, high quality stone, Ivory and large cattle were those days often destined for the culture institutions of the superior neighbour to the North, the Egyptians (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 114). This position could not be better emphasized: “The Egypt of the first six dynasties had been self contained and pacific. The Pharaohs of the Old Kingdom did not need army, and accordingly did not possess one.” But this did not hinder them from “making few raids

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<sup>299</sup> Posner Georges, 1962. *A Dictionary of Egyptian Civilization*. New York, NY: Tudor Publishing Co., 191.

from time to time against the Negroes South of the First Cataract for the sake of acquiring slaves” (Sayce, 1895: 13). In his “*The Conquest of Civilization*”<sup>300</sup>, Professor Henry Breasted, the first academic authority of Egyptology in the USA, seems rather more exuberant and precise about the superior race who founded the undeniably high cultured ancient Egyptian civilization:

“The Population of the Great Northwest Quadrant, from the Stone Age onwards, has been the race of White men of varying physical types. The evolution of civilization has been the sole achievement of this Great White Race. In the territory adjoining the Northwest Quadrant there are only two clearly differentiated races, the Mongoloid and the Negroid. On the East of the Northwest Quadrant the secluded plateaus of the High Asia developed a type of Man with straight and wiry hair, round head, almost beardless face, and yellow skin—the Mongoloid. The migrations of these yellow men out of High Asia eventually diffused them in all directions, but they did not reach the Northwest Quadrant until long after Civilization was already highly developed. Nor did they themselves develop any civilization until long after it was far advanced in the Northwest. On the South of the Northwest Quadrant lay the teeming black world of Africa, separated from the Great White Race by the impassable desert barrier of, the Sahara, which forms so large a part of the Southern Flatlands. Isolated thus at the same time unfitted by ages of tropical life for any effective intrusion among the White Race, the Negro and Negroid peoples remained without any influence on the development of early civilization. We may then exclude both of these external races—the Mongoloid on the East, and the Negroid on the South—from any share in the origins or subsequent development of civilization.”<sup>301</sup>

The Great White Race itself, which dominated the Northwest Quadrant, includes and always included a considerable range of types from the fair-head, long-headed, so-called “Nordics” of the Northern Flatland, through the round-headed Alpine or “Armenoid” peoples of the Highland zone in the Middle, to the dark-haired, long-headed “Mediterranean Race” of Southern Flatland. To this type belonged the Egyptians (their tanned skin notwithstanding), doubtless also the Semites, and of course the great bulk of the population of Greece, Italy and Spain, long loosely called “Aryan” because of their speech, which of course has no necessary connection with race” (quoted by Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 165-166).

As observed earlier, Professor James Henry Breasted Aryanist position should not surprise us because “from classical Greece Egypt has often been claimed as part of heritage of the West” (Eyre, 2002: 154-155). As a result, most Aryanist scholars in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries generally took such inscriptions as on the so-called “Palermo-Stone”<sup>302</sup> and the “fragments of Hierakonpolis”<sup>303</sup> to indicate the superior Egyptian army North of the First Cataract making military headway into the territory of the inferior Nubians (or Bantu-Ethiopians), South of

<sup>300</sup>Breasted, James Henry, 1926. *The Conquest of Civilization*. New York, NY & London, 112-113; for remarks on China see page 114.

<sup>301</sup>The exceptions later made on the part of the Mongoloids in later European History notwithstanding.

<sup>302</sup>Breasted, James Henry, 1906. *Ancient Records of Egypt* (Vol.I., section 146). Chicago, Illinois.

<sup>303</sup>E.g. J.E. Quibell & W.F., 1902. Green article *Hierakonpolis II* (in Egypt Research Account). London.

that Cataract. Subsequently the inscription on the Hierakonpolis fragment, depicting the battle between the military forces of Pharaoh Khasekhemui of Egypt and the so-called Pharaoh Djer of Nubia ..., was rationally interpreted by these Orthodox historians to be a conflict between the “Semitic Egyptians” and their uncivilized “Nubian” neighbours to the South. Another much cited inscription by these so-called objective historians is the one concerning the submission of a few Nubian minor “Princes or Lords of Medja, Irtet, and Wawat...” to Pharaoh Mernere; or the one showing Pharaoh Sneferu of the IVth Dynasty, c.2720 B.C.E, allegedly destroying Nubia on the so-called “Palermo Stone” (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 116, 167, 171). Hence for most Egyptologists of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, “Egypt North of the [imaginary] First Cataract... [from at least during the IIInd Dynasty, c. 2800-2780] and Nubia, the land South of the First Cataract, were distinctly different nations racially” (ibid., 167).

Dr. Wallis Budge, for one, argues “that the Egyptians not only borrowed their knowledge of the Zodiac from the Greeks”; but “that the Solar doctrines related to Heru/Horus were introduced into Egypt by the Asiatics, who invaded the country and conquered the natives, settled down there and built up the great dynastic civilization” (Churchward, 1994: 63-64, 194-195). Astonishingly, this renowned English Egyptologist later (in 1904) represented an entirely different position about the ancient Egyptians:

“The Egyptians being fundamentally an African people possessed all the virtues and vices of which characterized the North African races generally, and it is not to be held for a moment that any African people could become metaphysians in the modern sense of the word. In the first place no African language is suitable for giving expression to the theological and philosophical speculations, and even an Egyptian priest of the highest intellectual attainments would have been unable to render a treatise of Aristotle into language which his brother priests, without teaching, could understand. The mere construction of the language would make such a thing an impossibility, to say nothing of the ideas of the great Greek philosopher, which belong to a domain of thought and culture wholly foreign to the Egyptian” (Bernal, 1987: 259-260).

In light of these conflicting statements, Ralph Ellison has argued convincingly that confronting social reality, either fiction or non-fiction, involves grappling with “values... affecting [one’s] nation and time. Humans are all too prone to see reality selectively and to interpret it self-servingly...”<sup>304</sup> And the anthropologist Robert Redfield has also stressed that the worldviews of many peoples consists essentially of two pairs of binary oppositions:

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<sup>304</sup> Ralph Ellison, 2008. “Awakening to Race: Ralph Ellison and Democratic Individuality.” *Political Theory* Volume 36, No. 5, 656-657.

humans/non-humans and we and they.<sup>305</sup> These two, Jonathan Z. Smith rightly observes, are often correlated so that “we” equals human and “they” equals non-human.<sup>306</sup> In this sense, Wallis Budge later statement about the Africanness of the ancient Egyptians should be generally perceived in light of modern racist academic tendencies in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century to pull the Egyptians back to Africa, as the idea of Indo-Europeanism began to gain currency—following the discovery of the Sanskrit in India and its associated Aryan conquests from the North (Bernal, M. 1987: 243-244). The same is also true of Johnson’s rational work on the Abyssinians.<sup>307</sup> In this later instance, the use of Abissinia instead of Ethiopia was intended to avoid the blackness originally associated with the concept of Ethiopia. For Baron Curvier had argued, that “the Ethiopians were Negroes, but the Abissians were colonies of the Arabians and hence as Caucasians.”<sup>308</sup> Presently, the anonymous author of the *Webster New Encycopaedic Dictionary*<sup>309</sup> described the Ethiopians as: “a member of any of the mythical or actual peoples usually described by the ancient Greeks as dark-skinned and living far to the South or a native or inhabitant of Ethiopia; but on the subject of the Ethiopian language, the author has no difficulty in ascertaining its Semitic background.

In his attempt to reconstruct the history of Egypt, *Kurt Sethe* also postulated that “the division of the country between Africans in the South and mainly Asiatics to the North was mainly due to split in religion. The Africans refused to accept the cult of Horus that dominated the Delta region as the Asiatics settled there. They, therefore, formed a “second nation” in Upper Egypt and established their national religious shrines at Omnos, Thebes (“Luxor”), Thines, and Napata” (Chancellor, W., 1987: 61-63). In this later case, the indigenous population simply racially separated themselves from the conquering Asiatics. Henceforth, Egypt from the First Cataract to the Mediterranean Sea was definitely called Egypt of the Asiatics and the country from the First Cataract to the South became known as Ethiopia, Nubia, or Kush (*ibid.*, 84). For scholars like W.M Flanders Petrie, the father of archaeology and among the early prominent Egyptologists, “there are definite connections between ancient Egypt and the Caucasus.”<sup>310</sup> (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 175) Essentially, these foregoing academic stipulations

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<sup>305</sup> Redfield, Robert, 1953. “Primitive World View.” In: Redfield, ed., *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 92.

<sup>306</sup> Jonathan, Z. Smith, 1985. “What a Difference a Difference Makes.” In: Jacob Neusner and Ernst S. F., ed., *To See Ourselves as Others see Us: Christians, Jews, “Others” in Late Antiquity*. Chico, California: Scholars Press, 3-48.

<sup>307</sup> Johnson, S., 1768. *The History of Rasselas Prince of Abissinia: An Asiatic Tale*. Philadelphia.

<sup>308</sup> Quoted in Curtin, P., 1971. *Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization*. New York: Harper & Row, 8-9.

<sup>309</sup> *Webster New Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, 1996. New York: Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers Inc. ISBN:1-884822-20-7.

<sup>310</sup> Stuart, Piggott, 1941. *Antiquity* XV, 384.

of the past three centuries should be perceived in light of the Romantic belief that vitality flow from north to south and not the opposite direction (Bernal, 1987: 311-313).

Although Edward W. Said in his *Orientalism*<sup>311</sup> has aptly cautioned against early arbitrary academic attempts to impose Western paradigms in the analyses of non-Western cultures, the outgoing notion of “*The Conquest of Civilization*” generally implies, even if one is rationally objective,<sup>312</sup> that the newly settled conquerors would have left similar cultural institutions and civilization in their original home land(s), as evinced by the hundreds of miniature Pyramids<sup>313</sup> and temples in the Southern part of the Ethiopian Kingdom; or the round thatched-roofed buildings across the whole of the present-day colonial Africa echoing the Solar-Disk or the cyclical/sustainable rhythm of the local culture. However, that most of these political incursions from beyond the Kingdom were engendered economically also be deduced from the *Medinet Habu*, an inscription in Thebes. Originally built by Ramses III as a temple to commemorate his military successes against the military incursions from the North and Northeast of Egypt, the scribe on this wall sounds rather articulate about the sheer economic motives behind such political incursions mainly from the North: “They never reaped a harvest any more.” It was a statement made in commemoration of a major military defeat suffered by these external political barbarians in the hands of Ramses military forces (Sayce, 1895: 86-87). In this sense, one could thus reasonably assert that, even, in these later days of the ancient Egyptian civilization, pillage, plunder and destruction—and not the foundation of civilizations—was generally attributed to the political leaders of these wandering barbarians, as Michelet also explicitly admits:

“It is not without reason that the memory of the Punic Wars has stayed so popular and so alive. The struggle was not merely to decide the fate of two cities or two empires; it was to settle for which of the two races, the Indo-Germanic or the Semitic, was to rule the world. ... On the one side the genius of heroism, of art and law; on the other the spirit of industry, navigation and commerce. The heroes fought—without ceasing—their industrious and perfidious neighbours. They were workers, smiths, miners, magicians. They loved gold, hanging gardens and magic palaces. They constructed towers with

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<sup>311</sup> Said, Edward W., 2005. *L'Orientalisme: l'Orient créé par L'Occident*. Paris: Seuil.

<sup>312</sup> After pointing out some of the difficulties involved in dealing with the Egyptian cultural materials, Adolf Erman insist in his *Life in Ancient Egypt* (page 6), that “in order to grasp a full picture of life in ancient Egypt during any one period, our imagination must aid in filling in the details of one or another portion of it, as it is never complete in itself.

<sup>313</sup> In Meröe, for instance, one of the twenty five major cities in the heartland of the Ethiopian Kingdom, where some of the earlier experiments in Pyramid buildings took hold, one can still see some of these miniature Pyramids standing more than 6000 years after they were first built. These and other advanced ideas were later planted in the northern parts of the Kingdom (*as the locals probably became specialized in their stellar, Lunar, and Solar or astrological observation* (my emphasis in italics)) (see, Chancellor, 1987: 123-124).



titanic ambitions which the swords of the warriors broke up and effaced from the earth.” (Bernal, 1987: 341-342)

Even Prometheus, who by the 20<sup>th</sup> century was plausibly identified as the biblical Japhet, the third son of Noah—after Ham, and Shem (ancestor of the Semites)—and alleged ancestor of the Europeans, with whom most Aryans proudly identify themselves, was presumably punished for having “stolen fire from mankind”(Bernal, 1987: 220; Kalopoulos, 2003: 25<sup>314</sup>). Therefore, from the very moment of their arrival right through to their forced departure from northern Egypt,<sup>315</sup> after several centuries of undermining the institutions of local culture, the leaders of these political barbarians were conquerors of cultured civilizations rather than the founders of civilization.

It was against such backlog of academic prejudices that Dr. Ben-Jochannan set out to make an alternative—that is, an Afro-centrist case in defense of a homogeneous ethno-culture Ethiopian kingdom, which both Lower and Upper Egypt and the rest of Nubia (Africa South of the Nubia/Sahara desert) prior to its disintegration, had originally belonged. Like most Afro-centrists, Ben-Jochannan has for formal academic reasons not discriminated against these compromised academic biases but instead used them to the contrary. He argued convincingly, that prior to the arrival of the so-called Hyksos, the XIVth-XVII foreign Dynasties (c. 1675-1600 B.C.E.), such internal political conflicts as recorded by the ancient Egyptians themselves, especially those conflicts in the early stages of their dynastic history, far from being racially inclined must have been merely internal political conflicts engendered by hedonic sentience or sheer economics. Particularly true of this is the human captives and economic spoils the Northern soldiers looted from the South—e.g. 7000 soldiers, circa 200,000 cattle and sheep etc., as depicted on the so-called “Palermo Stone”, which Professor James Breasted simply overlooked in his objective interpretation of that inscription. In other words, the fact that Joseph Kone,<sup>316</sup> the War-Lord of Uganda’s Lord Resistance Army, has the custom of forcefully recruiting child soldiers (“infantry”) from all the colonial African countries bordering the Great Lake region—including the constant supply of nomadic and or

<sup>314</sup> In footnote 29 Kalopoulos stressed that Prometheus was chained by Zeus on a rock high on Mountain Caucasus, where a Vulture came daily to eat from his liver, which Zeus renewed each day.

<sup>315</sup> Albeit gloss contradiction apparent in the biblical narrative about the great flood, the Noah’s Ark and its passengers, the clear indication so far that that Ark most probably began its unusual culture journey from Egypt to the Caucasus are some of the culturally symbolic animals found on that Ark, namely the so-called seven pairs of clean—for sacrifice animals [sheep], and one pair of unclean animals, the lion (see, Friedman, Richard E., 1987/1989. *Who Wrote The Bible*. New York, 50-59. In fact these seven pairs of clean animals not only recalls us of the seven eternal spirits associated with the assistance of Ptah or Cham-ba Nyaan noted earlier, but they also recall the customary representation of rams and lions before the entrance of Upper Egyptian temples.

<sup>316</sup>Green, Matthew, 2009. “*The Wizard of the Nile*.” Portobello Books Ltd. ISBN: 9781846270314.

aboriginal Arabs by the Bashir's government in Sudan to his aid; ... or his use of mineral resources from Congo and CAR to finance his ongoing war against the Museveni's government, does not make him/his political agenda less Ugandan. Thus, while Ben-Jochannan does not totally disagree with the fact that there were indeed internal political tensions between the defenders of the status quo, the culture nationalists, and the then newly emerging political forces as early as the period of the Old Kingdom; and that by the Fourth Dynasty (c.2680-2565 B.C.E) the ancient Ethiopian Kingdom was increasingly fragmented; he insists to the contrary that on the ethno-culture plain those warring factions were naturally part of the original high culture of the Great Lake region. Accordingly, prior to the Hyksos military occupation of the Delta region, which undoubtedly was later responsible for the mass immigration of foreigners into the region..., the so-called Lower and Upper Egyptians were the same Bantu-Ethiopians. (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 171)

Taking the case of the founder of Memphis, for instance, he emphasized that most the great Pharaohs, who were generally inclined to the culture continuity of their nation and determined in their pledge to holding the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom together, were mainly from the South. Of course, there were northerners equally determined in their pledge to the culture continuity and the unionist cause of the Thebes ("Luxor") conservatives, hence it was possible for the Royalty from the South to entice popular support from the North in its wars against secessionist leaders in the Northern Egypt during the IInd Dynasty (c.2800 B.C.E) (ibid., 1989: 116). Using considerable detail of chronologies currently available in this field he meticulously demonstrated that it was actually "the OPE ("Ordinary People of Egypt"?), whom the Greeks later renamed Thebans—because of their originality from Thebes ("Luxor), that took control of the Fayyum region, including Memphis ("Manfour") and Hierakonpolis up until the IXth-Xth Dynasties (c. 2100-2052 B.C.E.). In his words, the "Southerners" actually ruled all of northern Nubia and much of Southern Egypt before resuming military and political control of the entire North and South—the "Two Lands." Starting their military campaign first across the northern course to Asyut; they extended it to the Southern limits of the Delta before progressing to liberate the whole region of the Delta bordering the Mediterranean Sea. In this view, these indigenous people who founded the XIth Dynasty (c.2150-2000) were actually the power behind the throne of the Ith and the XIth Dynasties, c. 3200-2100 B.C.E. In fact that the Thebans controlled all the way to the Upper Land (South) of the First Cataract is detailed on an inscription related to Pharaoh Meri-ib-Re of the XIth Dynasty (c. 2242-2200 B.C.E.). Another inscription also referred to Thebans control all the way to the North ("Lower Land") to the city of Hierakonpolis near Memphis, the then capital

of Egypt. Reference is also made to a set of inscriptions related to Prince Atef (a distant predecessor of the XIth Dynasty Pharaoh Atef I, c.2160-2150 B.C.E.), to secure the southerners control of the Southern Gateway ... north of the First Cataract. Apparently, these concerted efforts by those behind the IIth and the XIth Dynasties to clear the Delta region from the control of divisive political forces tend to align them with genuine upholders of the national culture.


In fact, that the indigenous population of the Nile Valley were the same people who happened to be fighting each other for cultural, economic and political reasons is inscribed on a fragmented stone taken from the “Gebelein temple” of Pharaoh Mentohotep II of the XIth Dynasty. On this stone, the Pharaoh is shown smiting four enemy armies—including Egyptians, Ethiopians, Nubians, and foreigners from Asia..., which orthodox objective historians and or compromised scholars later named white and black Semites. A similar rock inscription is shown depicting Pharaoh Mentuhotep III, the successor of Mentuhotep II., of the XIth Dynasty (c. 2060-2010 B.C.E.), when he crossed the Nile River near the First Cataract with ships to Wawat during the forty first Nile year of his reign. Worthy of note is that the ethno-cultural interaction between the so-called Northerners (Egyptians) and Southerners (Nubians, including Ethiopians and Meröeans), was so intense that this later Pharaoh had to restore the military office and title of the “Keeper of the Door of the South...” Because of such close cultural interactions, some of these orthodox objective historians on Egypt had to reluctantly concede that: “The princely family of Amen-emhat the vizier of (Pharaoh) Mentohotep III had Nubian blood in his veins” (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 173, [199 for Amen-emhet]).

It is also significant to note that during the liberation wars against the Hyksos occupation of Northern Egypt records from Thebes attest to the fact that the indigenous people of the North naturally relied on the human and material support from the South (Nubia, Ethiopia, and Meröe).<sup>317</sup> Therefore concerning the “Boundary Line” between the so-called Asiatic or Caucasian Egypt (Lower Egypt) and Ethiopian Nubia (Upper Egypt), especially in the true sense of “Boundary Demarcation” as was envisaged in the Westpfalian Treaty, does not hold any genuine academic ground. Accordingly, it was not until Pharaoh Thutmosis I of the XVIIIth Dynasty, c.1530-? B.C.E., the successor of Pharaoh Amenophis (“Amenhotep I”), c.1557-1530 B.C.E., who was the real conqueror of the Northern section of Nubia that any such reference had been noted on a “Rock Inscription” at Tangur in Batn el Hagar, which was

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<sup>317</sup> See, M. Hammand, 1955. Découverte Stéle du roi Kamose” [*Chronique d’Egypte*, xxx], 198-208; A H. Gardiner’s, “The Defeat of the Hyksos by Kamose: the Carnavon tablet, No. 1.” *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, III, 95-110.

erected in “...the second Nile year [of his] reign.” Also at a place called Thumbus, near the Third Cataract, there is another inscription on a granite boulder which provides us with a reference to Pharaoh Thutmosis’ naval engagement at the Dongola Reach—the fertile lands close to northern Kush. This later inscription is the very first of its kind which, with a little stretch of imagination, could be said to have been a “Boundary Mark” or “Demarcation” in the modern sense of the word (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 177-178).



#### REPRODUCED BOUNDARY INSCRIPTION AT KURGUS

Erected by Pharaoh Thutmosis I, c.1530-1520 B.C.E. (He succeeded Amenophis I), final conqueror of Nubia done in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Nile year of his reign, c.1528 B.C.E., on a granite bolder, relating to his victory against the Nubians (ibid., 179).

In all, given that the Hyksos did not arrive in Egypt until XIV-XV Dynasty, c. 1675-1600 B.C.E., neither the “Caucasians” nor the “Macedonian-Greeks” until the ending of the XXXth Dynasty, c. 332B.C.E—after their defeat of the Persian inter-loopers; one could definitely assert that the indigenous Africans and Nubians were still the same people “racially”, who at various times differed some what politically. In any event the beginning of such political separation, not racial separation, could not have begun before the IIIrd Dynasty, c.2780-2680 B.C.E. (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 118-119). As a matter of fact, the indigenous populace of both Egypt and Nubia the Hyksos met when they first occupied the Delta region of the Ethiopian kingdom matches the later physiognomical description of Herodotus: “The Colchians, Ethiopians, and Egyptians have thick lips, broad nose, woolly hair, and they are burnt of skin” (ibid., 1989: 127-128; C.A. Diop, 1974: 1-5).

Ben-Jochannan is not idiosyncratic in his position. In responding to the critics of his *Black Athena*, Bernal Martin has also maintained his defense of the indigeneous origin of the Egyptian culture and civilization. He began by noting the skin colour cline as one goes down the Nile valley and acknowledged that the pre-dynastic population of Upper Egypt, who were

the founders of the Pharaonic civilization, differs less from the Somalis to the South than do [from?] the Late Dynastic people from Lower Egypt” (Bernal, M., 2001: 154). Thus on the race of the ancient Egyptians he asserts:

...Research on the question usually reveals far more the predisposition of the researcher than the question itself. Nevertheless, I am convinced that at least for the last 7000 years, the population of Egypt has contained African, South and West Asian and Mediterranean types. It is also clear that the further south, or up the Nile one goes, the blacker and more Negroid the population becomes and that this has been the case for the same length of time. As I stated in the introduction, I believe that the Egyptian civilization was fundamentally African, and that the African element was stronger in the Old and Middle Kingdoms, before the Hyksos invasion, than it later became. Furthermore, I am convinced that many of the most powerful Egyptian Dynasties which were based in Upper Egypt—the 1<sup>st</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup>, and the 18<sup>th</sup>—were made up of Pharaohs whom one can usefully call Black. (Bernal, M. 2001: 208-209; 1987: 241-242)

Notably, Bernal in large accepts the physionomical admixture of the Egyptians, especially in its later composition; but he equally acknowledges the indigenous origin of what later became known as ancient Egyptian culture or civilization. There are two reasons for his acceptance of the Africanity [Azanianity] of the original Egyptian population. The first, he argues, is to right the misapprehension that ancient Egyptian population was somehow Asian or European. This for him was myth developed by specialist in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. And though experts later in that century knew this was a myth, refused to redress the fact and it has since persisted in popular opinion (Bernal, 2001: 210).

The second reason for associating Egypt with the rest of Africa (Azania) is the simple fact that both the country and its inhabitants were related to the rest of Africa. In fact geographically, during the formative pre-Dynastic period, c.5000-3400 B.C.E., Egypt was linked to West and central Africa by the open Savana that later desiccated to become large regions of the Nubian [now Sahara] desert. Then later Egypt was connected to central Africa by the Nile. Following the leading Egyptian pre-historian Fekhry and others,<sup>318</sup> he stressed the relations between the Sahara—then savannah—and the Upper Nile and Upper Egypt in material culture in the pre-dynastic period. He further notes that in the linguistic sphere the Egyptian language belongs to the Afroasiatic superfamily and that there is no doubt that this linguistic grouping has its origin in Africa, to the South of Egypt proper.<sup>319</sup> Subsequently, while acknowledging the later transformation of and individuality of the Egyptian culture he

<sup>318</sup> Hassan, F. A., 1988. “The Predynastic of Egypt.” *Journal of World Prehistory* 2, 135-185.

<sup>319</sup> Blench, R., 1993. “Recent Developments in African Language Classification and Their Implications for Prehistory.” In: T. Shaw, P. Sinclair and A. Okpoko, ed. *The Archaeology of Africa*. New York: Routledge, 126-137; see also Ehret, Christopher, 1996. “Ancient Egyptian as an African Language, Egypt as an African Culture.” In: Theodore Celenko, ed. *Egypt in Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 25-27.

stressed that it would be extremely misleading to separate Egypt from the rest of Africa (Bernal, M. 2001: 210).

Importantly, these later voices generally tend to uphold Classical, Hellenistic, Roman and early Biblical writers' views about the ancient Cushitic Egyptians ("Ethiopians"), as vividly summed up in this statement:

"By the almost unanimous testimony of ancient historians the Egyptians belong to an African race [Negro] which first settled in Ethiopia, on the middle Nile; following the course of the river, they gradually reached the Sea. ... Moreover, the Bible states that Mesraim, son of Ham, brother of Kush (Chus) the Ethiopian, and of Canaan, came from Mesopotamia and settled with his children on the Banks of the Nile."<sup>320</sup>

Further, the Bible states clearly that Egypt was peopled by the descendants of Ham/Cham, ancestor of the Blacks: "The descendants of Ham are Kush, Mesraim, Phut and Canaan. The descendants of Kush are Saba, Hevila, Sabatha, Regma, and Sabathacha. ...Kush was the father of Nemrod; he was the first to be conqueror on the earth. Mesraim became the father of Ludim, Anamim, Laabim, Nephthuhim, Phethrusim, and Chasluhim. And Canaan gave birth to Sid, his first born, and Heth" (Genesis<sup>321</sup>; Diop, 1974: 2). Unaware, then, of what was to become later of modern scientific historiography, these classical Greek and Roman historians and geographers, etc. along with the Biblical writers, when dealing with Egypt and the rest of Africa never mistook its Blackness. And in so doing they established without doubt that the Blacks were the first Egyptians and the builders of that ancient civilization (Chancellor, 1987: 87-89; Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 179).

Interestingly, the readiness by certain European and American-European scholars, especially upholders of the Aryan and later Extreme Aryan Model, to quote classical and Hellenic Greek, Roman, and Judaeo-Christian sources of Egyptology as their first line of academic authorities, and their equal eagerness to denounce them whenever and wherever their records upset the modern paradigm of rational objective historiography has been the cause célèbre of the Africana scholars and their sympathizers, who, unfortunately for reasons of arbitrary political developments of the past three centuries (17<sup>th</sup> to the second half of 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>322</sup>),

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<sup>320</sup> Gaston, Maspero, 1917. *Histoire ancienne des peuples de l'Orient*. Paris: Hachette, 15.

<sup>321</sup> Genesis, X, 6-16, The New Catholic Edition of the Holy Bible, 1953. New York.

<sup>322</sup> Robert Finzsch, 1999. „Wissenschaftlicher Rassismus in den Vereinten Staaten (USA) 1850-1930.“ In: Heidrun, Kaupen-Haas & Christian Saller, Hrsg. *Wissenschaftlicher Rassismus*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 84-110; see also, Haywood, Burns W., 1990. "Law and Race in Early America." In David Kairys, ed. *The Politics of Law*, New York: Pantheon Books. For a similar perspective in the Franco-African context, see Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch „French Historiography on Africa: A historical and personal contextualization“, in: *Afrika Spectrum* 41 (2006), pp.107-126.

arrived belatedly at the modern academic scene, especially at a time when significant injustice had already been done to the prevailing Egyptological materials. So, unlike the advocates of the Extreme Aryan Model<sup>323</sup> who in the past often tend to overlook external influences on Greek culture and civilization, these African scholars and their academic sympathizers contest massive borrowings from the Ethiopian-Egyptian culture and civilization by the Greeks and hence Europeans as a whole.

#### 4.2.1. External Political Forces Role in the demise of the Ethiopian/Egyptian Culture

Perhaps the appropriate way to address the Ancient Model's stance on the impact of the ancient Ethiopian (or later Egyptian) culture or civilization on the psychological development of the Greco-European personality is to first explore the socio-historical and political circumstances within which the frontrunners of the paradigm of modern scientific historiography operated as this elucidates the socio-political reasons behind the overthrow of the Ancient Model as well as the role external forces played in undermining that unique ancient Ethiopian culture. Foremost, unlike their classical predecessors, these scientific historians treated the remnants of the ancient Ethiopian culture with relative impunity since by then Egypt, just like the rest of the Azanian nation, was firmly under the control of the colonizing foreigner. We have also observed elsewhere how prolonged divisions resulting from political conflicts between sacred and secular forces nurtured different European identities (e.g. Aryans, Caucasians, and Levantines). For our present purpose it is intriguing to know that the inventor of the term Caucasian,<sup>324</sup> probably in reference to the biblical location where the Noah's Ark was supposedly stranded..., was conventional in his age for including the Semites, the descendants of Shem, in the general Caucasian family, whose members he believed were the most talented and beautiful human race from which other races degenerated. (Bernal, M., 1987: 219-220) But while such inclusion or the later attempts to semiticize certain Ethiopian groups was in those days deemed necessary in terms of extricating the so-called ancient Egyptian civilization from its Bantu-Ethiopian origin, we now know that the geneticist of the Third Reich would preferably have excluded all White peoples with dark hair from the superior Aryan race, which, in line with the socio-economic and -political *Zeitgeist* of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was only rationally reserved for the blue- or green-

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<sup>323</sup> The idea of an extreme Aryan Model implicitly implies that there were advocates of a moderate Aryan Model readily accommodating to some of the substantial external influences on Greek culture and civilization (for a detail discussion of this see Bernal M., *Black Athena* Vol. I, 282-399).

<sup>324</sup> See, Blmuenbach, J F., 1795. *De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Göttingen.

eyed and blond/red haired Europeans. In other words, the widespread accommodation of the Talmudic interpretation that “the curse of Cham/Ham (or the Hamitic Myth)” the ancestor of Canaan and Mizraim, Egypt, was blackness in the 17th century European and European-American scholarship<sup>325</sup> had by the 20<sup>th</sup> century nurtured a much more radical interpretation of race in the European context. As noted earlier of pre-Revolution France, class difference was not only later substituted by race difference, as in the belief that the French nobility were the descendants of the Germanic Franks while the advocates of the Third Estate were Gallo-Romans, but in the social history of Europe there seems to have always been that tendency to politically manipulate the process of European identity. It should therefore not surprise us that Barthold Niebuhr, who was so crucial to the transformation of modern or scientific approach to history also saw in the “Patricians” and the “Plebeians” of imperial Rome not merely as different classes, but as constituting different races altogether (Bernal, M. 1987: 303). It is thus only reasonable to anticipate that entrusted with the history of colonized nations such compromised scholars and authors could have done far worse than merely adhering to the norms of the contemporary *Zeitgeist*.<sup>326</sup>

And this is particularly true of Niebuhr. As a product of Scottish Enlightenment,<sup>327</sup> he is accredited for bringing together romanticism and racism in the 1790s (Bernal, M., 1987: 297-305). Surprisingly, Niebuhr’s early belief in the desirability of backward peoples (e.g. the Germans) developing autochthonous cultures did not extend to lesser, non European breeds. Hence he rationally accepted Jean Francois Champollion’s compromised reduction of the Egyptian calendar—then reduced to 2200 B.C.E [a date used then for the Hyksos conquest of Lower Egypt]—as summed up in this report by the French ambassador to Rome:

“[with this] ... important service rendered to religion: ‘He [Champollion] has humbled and confounded the pride of this philosophy which claimed to have discovered in the Zodiac of Dendera a chronology earlier than that of the Holy scriptures’. The holy father has therefore requested that M. Testa, a man most

<sup>325</sup> Jordan, W D., 1969. *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro: 1550-1812*. Baltimore: Penguin, 18; Harold Blackman, 1977. “The Ebb and Flow of Conflict: The History of Black-Jewish Relations Through 1900.” Thesis (PhD), University of California.

<sup>326</sup>The concept *Zeitgeist* [“spirit or genius of the age”] was coined by a German historian and anthropologist, Meiners, C. in the period from 1770-1810. Essentially, his position is that each age and place had special mentality determined by its situations and institutions. Another [of his] innovation closely linked to this development is “source-criticism.” In historical context, this involved the historian assessing the value of different historical sources according to their author and social context and basing its interpretation largely or solely on the reliable authoritarian. This generally allows the historian to reference discriminatory using those references that reveal the “spirit of the age” in question or the social context within which the writer carries out his historical activities. This procedure became prominently dominant in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries historiography. (For details see, Bernal, M., 1987. *Black Athena*, 217-218; Marino, L., 1975. *I Maetr della Germania, Goettingen 1770 – 1812*. Turin: Einaudi, 103-113).

<sup>327</sup> Momigliano, A., 1982. “New paths of Classicism in the nineteenth century.” *History and Theory* (Supplement 21), 9.



learned in the study of Antiquity, set out in detail for him the arguments whereby M. Champollion establishes: (1) that this Zodiac was constructed under Nero; and (2) that no monument exists from before 2200 B.C.E, dating back, that is, to the time of Abraham, so that, in accordance with our faith, there remain approximately eighteen centuries of darkness through which the interpretation of the Holy scriptures alone can guide us.”<sup>328</sup>

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In any event, the following statement he made in 1814 serves to illustrate Niebuhr biased credentials as a scholar:

“European dominion naturally supports science and literature, together with rights of humanity, and to prevent the destruction of barbarous power would be an act of high treason against intellectual culture and humanity.” (Bernal, 1987: 305-306)

In this light, Niebuhr can thus be seen as a Eurocentric German nationalist<sup>329</sup> whose role in transforming modern scientific approach to historiography has been aptly compressed in the words of an anonymous writer in the 1911 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*:

“If every positive conclusion of Niebuhr’s had been refuted, his claim to be the first who dealt with the history of Rome in a scientific spirit would remained unimpaired, and the new principles introduced by him into historical research would loose nothing of their importance.” (Bernal, 1987: 303-304)

One of these new principles was the Romantic positivist approach championed at Göttingen University, especially of studying peoples and their institutions rather than individuals. (Bernal, 1987: 305-306) As adherent of Göttingen source critic, his method involves the combination of racial criticism and creative reconstruction from text analysis, analogy and intuition.<sup>330</sup> In such pattern of racially induced creative scholarship, Niebuhr was then able to make a categorical distinction between the free and creative Greeks and the Egyptians, who he argued, like many oppressed people, were very far advanced in their arts while their intellectual culture was way behind.<sup>331</sup> Niebuhr’s historical writing was in essence thus crucial to modern scholarship intent at overthrowing the Ancient Model because of its relatively positive stance on the influence of Ethiopian (Egyptian) culture on the psychological

<sup>328</sup> Hartleben, H., 1909. *Lettres de Champollion les Jeune recuellies annotée*, Vol. I. Paris: Bibliothèque Égyptologique, 228; Bernal, M., 1987. *Black Athena*, 252.

<sup>329</sup> Rytönen, S., 1968. *Niebuhr als Politiker und Historiker*. Helsinki: Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, ser B. vol. 156, 175-176.

<sup>330</sup> Witte, B. C., 1979. *Der preußische Tacitus: Aufstieg, Ruhm und Ende des Historikers Barthold George Niebuhr 1776-1831*. Düsseldorf: Droste, 185.

<sup>331</sup> Schmitz, L., 1852. *Lectures on Ancient History from the Earliest Times to the Taking of Alexandria by Octavius*, 3 Vols. Philadelphia, 83-84.

development of Graeco-European personality. And as one renowned 19<sup>th</sup> century historian of Rome, Theodore Mommsen, is also quoted as urging: “History must first make a clean sweep of all these fables which though purporting to be history, are little more than improvisations.” (Bernal, M. 1987: 331-332)

Another important scholarly figure in this line of creative historiography, and who is closely related to the Göttingen academic establishment,<sup>332</sup> is Karl Otfried Müller. Martin Bernal thinks Müller was not only among the first to be trained in the post Napoleon’s German education system led by Humboldt, but has in general contributed methodologically in the overthrow of the Ancient Model (ibid., 308ff.). Two main techniques are rightly attributed to him, namely “argument from silence” and “dissection or analysis.” The former, which Bernal considers to be the preferred tool of “archaeological positivism”, involves the belief that if something has not been found, it cannot have existed in significant quantities (ibid., 9). In this sense, in his treatment of the subject of external influences on Greek culture and civilization Müller readily contested that genuine ancient accounts and legends sometimes only appeared in late sources—sources, which he himself had sometimes relied upon. So, in order to deny the authenticity of a legend or ancient account contradicting the modern paradigm of objective scientific historicism, he therefore required additional criterion: “that there must have been a strong contemporary reason for fabricating such a legend.”<sup>333</sup> As Bernal rightly observes, he and his successors generally treated Homer and Hesiod not as poets but as *encyclopaedias*, which allowed them to rationally treat any unknown phrase to Homer or Hesiod as not having existed in their days (Bernal, 1987: 9, 310).

The second technique of dissection or analysis was intended to rectify what Müller personally saw as a general tendency in Antiquity to syncretism. As a champion of Romantic particularism against the universalism of Enlightenment, he took separation to be at the core of mythological analysis. In this way, he was able to systematically reduce most of the earliest myths and legends concerning Greek civilization to local specifics. Two of his works are crucial in this line of objective scholarship, namely the *Histories of Greek Tribes and Cities*<sup>334</sup> and the *Introduction to a Scientific System of Mythology*. Already his direct attack on the Ancient Model is evident in both works. This is particularly true of the first volume of his

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<sup>332</sup> This German university was established in 1734 by the king of England, George II, who was also then the elector of Hannover. In addition to specializing in ethnic and racial scholarship, Göttingen is argued to be the embryo of later modern diversified and professional Universities (Bernal, M., 1987. *BA* Vol.I., 215).

<sup>333</sup> Müller, K.O., 1825. *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Methodologie*. Göttingen, 128-129.

<sup>334</sup> Müller, K.O., 1820-1824. *Geschichten Hellenischer Stämme und Städte, 3 volumes*. Breslau (volume I: *Orchomenos und die Minyer*, volumes II and III: *Die Dorier*). Translated by H. Tufnell and GC. Lewis, 1830 as *The History and Antiquity of the Doric Race*, 2 volumes. London.

Histories of Greek Tribes and Cities, *Orchomenos* and the *Minyans*, in which he began with a quote from Pausanias (Bernal, 1987: 308-310 n. 119):

“Greeks are terribly prone to be wonderstruck by the expense of home products; distinguished historians have explained the Egyptian Pyramids in the greatest detail and not made the slightest mention of the treasure house of Minyas [at Orchomenos] or the walls of Tiryns, which are by no means less marvellous.”

Although the Classicist Rudolf Pfeiffer has positively described Müller’s earliest volumes on *The Dorians*—the work that earned him his chair at Göttingen—as “more an impressive Hymn on the excellence of everything Doric than a narration of history”<sup>335</sup>; it must be noted that with Müller “we have at least arrived at the threshold of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in which the conquest of the ancient World by science was completed.”<sup>336</sup> (Bernal, 1987:315) From this time onwards right through to the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and beyond, Ethiopian-Egyptian history became a scientific discipline firmly under the control of biased experts with personal economic and political agendas.

In his scientific historiography about Life in Ancient Egypt, Adolf Erman made it clear that ‘...a great number of the Egyptian papyri are of no use for his project because their contents are purely religious or magical. On the other hand, however, there are great number of private business letters, inventories, notebooks, and legal documents, which are of greatest importance in the study of the Egyptian nation.’ (Erman, 1894/1971: 5-6)

Furthermore, ‘in Egypt the deceased was honoured as a demi-god, and therefore a chapel of his worship was a necessary adjunct of the Egyptian tomb. ... It follows, of course, that these colossal erections, with their dependencies, their gardens, their cattle yards and store houses, must have given employment to a great number of officials and workmen. If we add to these the crowd of embalmers, coffin manufacturers, and priests of the dead, employed in the numberless private tombs, as well as the stone masons, builders, and other artisans always required for the building of new tombs, we shall understand why these realm of the dead gradually became a real city.’(ibid., 21-22)

Indeed, from a genuine culture standpoint, these modern Egyptologists, Archaeologists, Anthropologists, and Historians main source of information concerning the ancient Ethiopian (or later Egyptian) culture and social history would have been totally inconceivable. Ben-Jochannan, for one, has classified these later scholars among the list of grave robbers in his

<sup>335</sup> Pfeiffer, R., 1976. *History of Classical Scholarship: From 1300-1850*. Oxford: Clarendon, 187.

<sup>336</sup> Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U., 1982. “*History of Classical Scholarship*.” Translated by A. Harris. London & Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 105.

*Black Man of Nile* (chapter IV)<sup>337</sup>; and we know from Egyptian Literature that grave robbery, at least from the Middle Kingdom onward..., was generally punishable by death. That “Richard Lepsius, the German scholar who was despatched to Egypt by the King of Prussia in 1842, and whose classic twelve-volume “Monuments of Egypt and Nubia” (1849-1859) became core to the establishment of Egyptology as a systematic discipline, was allowed to bring back to Berlin 15.000 choice objects, including three entire tombs, which became the nucleus of the Berlin Museum over which Adolf Erman presided in his scientific endeavour to compose his *Life in Ancient Egypt*”<sup>338</sup> confirms the prevailing position that Egypt, like the rest of the Azanian nation or Ethiopian kingdom, was by this time of modern scientific historicism fully under the control of external political forces.

It is also within this political context that one can understand why Manetho’s account about Egypt’s social history; and his chronology of Egyptian monarchies, have until now remained the preferred authority for scholars despite credible evidence that Manetho himself did prudently accommodate the political demands of his contemporary Macedonian Greek rulers of Egypt, who then were eager to see themselves listed among the legitimate lineage of indigenous Pharaohs. It is for that matter intriguing to know that “Manetho, who was born to an Egyptian mother and a Greek father in the town of Samaud in the Sebennytyos region of Lower Egypt, and who was extremely proficient in the Hieroglyphs, was obliged to write his widely referenced *Aegyptica* [“History of Egypt”] in Greek (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 132-133). Indeed, without his political employer, Ptolemy II—commonly known as Philadelphus, a title he acquired after murdering his own two brothers [his only prime adversaries] prior to ascending his father’s Egyptian throne, Manetho’s historical scheme might never have borne fruits. This son of Sôter is rightly accredited for having compiled the hieroglyphic monuments and hieratic papyri of the native temples, which was to become the main source of Manetho’s *Aegyptica*. True, during his reign Philadelphus did show keen interest in both economic development and the literary advancement. And had accordingly not only filled Alexandria with sumptuous buildings, but also stocked the main library of that city’s museum with numerous books and a collection of circa 400.000 rolls of papyrus—aimed specifically at attracting learned men from across the world to the then Greek Egyptian kingdom. However, it is also significant to note that Philadelphus swift replacement of the Museum’s then librarian was rational given that *Demetrius Pharelos*, the ex-tyrant of Athens, had earlier overtly supported his senior brother as the legitimate heir to their father’s Egyptian throne

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<sup>337</sup> See, Mathias, Schulz, 2010. Das letzte Geheimnisse des Pharaon Tutanchamun-Der kinder Könige und die Grabräuber. *Der Spiegel* Nr.2, 32-37.

<sup>338</sup> See Jon Manchip White’s Introduction to Adolf Erman’s *Life in Ancient Egypt*.

(Sayce, 1895: 147-148). It is therefore understandable why despite credible evidence to instances in which different contesting Pharaohs ruled sway in the Nile Valley, Manetho was apt at selecting what he thought his authorities considered to be the legitimate Pharaohs, and disregarded every other (ibid., 1895: 17-18). In one of Manetho's books<sup>339</sup> he wrote to King Ptolemy II, he stats clearly that: "according to your order to translate from the Egyptian Hieroglyphs you will be handed the sacred books written by our ancestor Hermes Trismegistos" (Kalopoulos, 2003: 16). Such compromise not only besmirched the dexterity of Manetho's Aegyptica scheme, but makes his inclusion of the Hyksos rulers among the legitimate Pharaohs of Egypt rather questionable.<sup>340</sup>

In addition Manetho's untimely death before the completion of his dynastic listings in ca. 324 B.C.E is not only further complicated by the fact that most of today's Egyptological chronologies disagree with the original chronology of dynastic Egypt, Nubia, Meroë, Itiopi, Puanit, and Lebu (Libya) which he recorded in his major works during the 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C.E, but the fact that many of his original works have come down to us from his disciples such as the Hebrew or Jewish historian Flavius Josephus (1<sup>st</sup> Century C.E.), the African Christian chronographer, Julius Africanus (c.220 C.E), and the European Christian Eusebius (c.320 C.E). Compounded with Christendom's customary arbitrary reduction of ancient Egyptian calendar with the view to giving priority to the original ancestor of Judaeo-Christian religion, Abraham, or in order to harmonize it with the Septuagint, one can understand why some scholars doubt the reliability of the above chronologies (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 131-135; Sayce, 1895: 17). Moreover modern classicist rational preference of Manetho's Egyptian history over similar accounts from Herodotus tends to be strengthening to Christendom's reductionist scheme because the latter, with his over four hundred Pharaonic dynasties, must certainly have placed Egyptian history circa 8000 to 10,000 years earlier than the biblical Abraham.

Finally while there is no doubt about the direct political role of the Hyksos rulers and or that of later biblical patriarchs in the transformation of the Ethiopian-Egyptian culture, there are conflicting perspectives with regards to the political ambitions of Abraham himself. For example, Diop who is rather more concerned about demonstrating the indigenoussness of the

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<sup>339</sup> Bible Sothios

<sup>340</sup>For example, Sayce traces the origin of the Pharaonic title back to the early days of the Monarchy; and derives its meaning and significance from the Egyptian word *Per-âa* or "Great House." Elsewhere, he accurately observes that the "Double Crown"—that is, the unison of the White Crown from the South and the Red Crown from the North in the "Green Crown" was the genuine symbol of the monarchical power. Thus leaving us with the impression that the so-called dynasties of the Hyksos could not have been genuine Pharaohs (Sayce 1895: 2-3, 22-23).

Negro Canaanites/Phoenicians prior to their admixture with Nordic White tribes [Philistines or Hyksos?] to produce the Semitic element takes us on an analytical *tour de raison* of the Biblical narrative about Abraham's arrival and settlement in that part of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom:

The Lord said to Abraham: "Leave your country, your kinfolk and your father's house, for the land which I will show you. ... Abraham went away as the Lord had commanded him, and Lot went with him. ... Abraham took Sara his wife, Lot his brother's son, all the property they had acquired and the persons they had got in Haran and they departed for the Land of Canaan. When they came to the land of Canaan, Abraham passed through the Land to the sacred place at Sechem (Sichem), near the plain of More. At that time the Canaanites were in that land."

After many turbulent ups and downs, the Canaanites and the White tribes, Abraham and his descendents [Isaac lineage], blended to become in time the Jewish people of today:

"So Hemor and his son Sichem went to the gate of their city and spoke to the fellow citizens "these men" they said, are friendly; let them dwell with us and trade in the land, since there is ample room for them. Let us marry their daughters and give them our daughters to marry" (Diop, 1974: 106-108).

Evidently, both quotes seem to denote the ambivalent character of Abraham. In any case, there are credible indications that Abraham did not arrive in Egypt until after the Hyksos conquest; and probably might have lived during the reign of the Hyksos rulers, which in turn strengthens Sayce argument that Abraham, like many of the Semitic families who later settled in Canaan or Lower Egypt during the Hyksos reign were generally attracted by sheer economic wealth of the Ethiopian Kingdom (Sayce, 1895: 19-20). And indeed the barbarians of antiquity far off in Ionia had often in those days extolled the immense wealth of that kingdom's culture centre:

"Royal Thebes  
Egyptian treasure-house of countless wealth,  
Who boast her hundred gates, through each of which,  
With horses and cars two hundred warriors march"<sup>341</sup>

Regarding the autarky of the Ethiopian Kingdom, Strabo described Egypt as "from the beginning the most self sufficient land" (Kalopoulos, 2003: 252). The Bible speaking about

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<sup>341</sup> Homer *Iliad*, 9, 381ff.; see also Erman, A., 1971. *Life in Ancient Egypt*, 21.

the paradisiacality of Egypt also says: "...was watered as the Garden of the Lord, as the Land of Egypt" (Genesis 13.10; Kalopoulous, 2003: 252). So, if indeed in the person of Abraham we see the Hebrew wanderer who contended against Chedor Laomer and the subject kings of Babylonia, as Sayce reminds us, it is obvious that Abraham himself had both economic and political reasons for migrating and settling in Canaan, especially in as much as the foundation of a community on foreign land is concerned. For instance, Albert Churchward has hinted to a biblical statement, which elucidates Abraham's overall political ambitions. Churchward states that after planting a grove tree in Beersheba Abraham called them [his people?] on the name of Yahweh/Lord; and after when his family had greatly increased in numbers, journeying northwards after leaving their native land, they were strictly commanded by their god to cut down the groves of the people whom they destroyed—"ye shall destroy their altars, break their statues and cut down their groves" (Exodus xxxiv.13; Churchward, 1993/1994: 181-182). If anything, the idea of destroying the fields of groves or the people who planted them weighs more politically than it does culturally.

This particular subject of Abraham's political salience and devotion has also been taken up by Michael Kalopoulous,<sup>342</sup> who demonstrated vividly how Abraham, the Chaldean sorcerer, repeatedly used his beautiful wife Sarah as "bait" to gain access to local rulers of his time so as to ambush them with sorcery intent at causing misfortune, sickness et cetera, for which he could later be called upon to heal—in his urge to acquire wealth and power. A pattern of deception his descendants Isaac, Joseph, and [Moses?] would later use to compromise persons, cities and entire nations, including, of course, the destruction of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom and its unique culture and civilization. This author has shown in detail how Abraham, the expert of sorcery and dream-making, employing the golden rule of the Chaldean tradition, that is: "Only God strikes ... we [they] heal", furiously and treacherously in theological disguise assaulted the unsuspecting Canaanites; Isaac causing terror to his neighbours; Jacob and his sons deceitfully exterminating an entire unsuspecting city; and how Joseph ["the Septuagint"], "the hero of dreams", single-handedly usurped the political power of Egypt *en route* their economic drive to thwart the *einmalig* Bantu-Ethiopian culture and civilization. Professor Sayce, who has also critically dealt with the subject of political corruption among some orthodox/conservative and progressive/liberal Jewish leaders during the Ptolemaic dynasties of Egypt, tends to generally agree that most of these early characters

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<sup>342</sup> Kalopoulous, Michael, 2003. *The Biblical Religion: The Great Lie—The Truth About the Bible after thousands of years! Poisonous Sorcery and Artful Deceit Explain the Miracles of the Biblical Patriarchs*, esp. 71-135, 171-213, 227-261.

of the Judaeo-Christian religion were indeed too politically biased to be culturally significant (Sayce, 1895: 144-162).

Following Henry T. Aubin's *The Rescue Of Jerusalem: The Alliance Between Hebrews And Africans In 701 B.C.*,<sup>343</sup> one could thus reasonably summarize that the descendants of Abraham were caught up in the Historic struggle between the defenders of the Bantu-Ethiopian national culture, with its vast territory and immense wealth and resources ... and the alliance of internal and external political forces seeking to make myopic economic gains at the expense of that unique culture; and that these Jewish leaders were either apt at switching allegiance between the dominant social forces in the Mediterranean region—i.e. succumbing to Bantu-Ethiopian culture pressures from the South or the political pressures from the Nordic barbarians depending on which one was at the helm of power; or willing to employ any poisonous sorcery or treacherous means at their disposal for the purpose of asserting their own political influence. Probably, this might help explain the early quasi-satanic declaration of the destruction of the Ethiopian-Egyptian culture institutions by prophet “Ezekiel”<sup>344</sup>; or his rational proclamation of Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire, to be the first Messiah of the Jewish people—Cyrus freed the Jews from their Babylonian bondage. Apparently, this early proclamation of Cyrus must most certainly have anticipated Reverend John Hagee's proclamation of Adolf Hitler, the main Architect of the Third Reich [Europe's Behemoth], to be the last Messiah of the Jewish people. For Reverend Hagee, the policies of this latter “Messiah of terror” were indirectly responsible for the Jewish people return to Eretz Yisrael (“Land of Israel”).<sup>345</sup> Interestingly, that both defenders of Jewish Orthodoxy and its progressive strands alike were dangerously embroiled in the sacred/culture and secular/economic and political conflicts of the Mediterranean region bordering the vast Ethiopian Kingdom and the political office that comes with it could easily be perceived in the office of the Jewish-Roman historian, Flavius Josephus, who, after the military debacle of the Jewish defenders of [Heru-] Salem against the Roman Empire, immediately switched to the side of the later Emperor Vespasian (Pagels, 1995: 4-5).

Only in this way one can understand why Christianity has been lately proven to be a disfigured copy of Egyptian systematisms. In his *Introduction* to Albert Churchward's *Signs and Symbols of Primordial Man* John Henrik Clark stressed that: “The pick that struck the

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<sup>343</sup> Aubin, H.T., 2002. *The Rescue Of Jerusalem: The Alliance Between Hebrews And Africans in 701 BC*. Canada: Double day.

<sup>344</sup> Andrew, Mein. 2001. *Ezekiel and the Ethics of Exile*. New York: Oxford University Press

<sup>345</sup> [http://www.newsmax.com/koch/mccain\\_hagee/2008/06/02/100795.html?s=al&promo\\_code=6382-1](http://www.newsmax.com/koch/mccain_hagee/2008/06/02/100795.html?s=al&promo_code=6382-1) (03.06.2008).



Rosetta stone in 1796 also struck a mighty blow at historical Christianity. The cryptic literature of Old Egypt, sealed in silence when Christianity took its rise, haunting it like a spectre after the third century, now stalks forth like a living ghost out of the tomb to point its long finger of accusation at a faith that has long thriven on falsity:

The entire Christian Bible, creation legend, descent into and exodus from 'Egypt', and Ark and flood allegory, Israelite 'History', Hebrew Prophecy and poetry, Gospels, Epistles and Revelation imagery, all are now proven to have been the transmission of ancient Egypt's scrolls and papyri into the hands of later generations which knew neither their true origin nor their fathomless meaning ... but the sheer fact that even amid the murks of ignorance and superstition the mere ghost, shell, husk and shadow of Egypt's wisdom inspired religious piety to extremes of faith and zealotry is singular attestation of its original power and majesty. From the scrolls of papyri five thousand to then thousand years old there comes stalking forth to view the whole story of an Egyptian Jesus raising from the dead an Egyptian Lazarus at an Egyptian Bethany, with two Egyptian Maries present, the non-historical prototype of the incident related (only) in John's Gospel" (Churchward, 1993, 1994).

#### 4.2.2. Culture and Economic Forces as the Agents of Social History

The idea that social history of nations and states is determined by the struggle between the defenders of culture and the upholders of the economic institutions of political power is postulated by the Africanist scholar C.A. Diop. Probably, borrowing the environmental determinist views of early romantic scholars in his two cradle theory, Diop contrasted the environmental background of the divergent and quasi irreconcilable characteristics of the mainly politicized Nordic Germanic warrior gods,<sup>346</sup> whose principal requirement for their followers passage through the Gates of Heaven is the certification of having died in the Battlefield, against the demand of the Bantu-Ethiopian [or later Egyptian] God Amon that non of the Bantu-Ethiopians private and social activities should be tainted by the blood of any godly creature. It is worth recalling that in the mythological stipulation of the Bantu-Ethiopian culture this so-called passage through the Gates of Heaven is equivalent to being awarded the certificate of immortality. In this regard, Diop should be seen as trying to contrast the psychology why any god seeking immortality would send her/his followers to kill or to be killed in the battlefield as purported by the Nordic gods with that of the mainly sedentary lifestyle of the Southern peoples. As he puts it, the history of humanity would remain shrouded in confusion as long as we fail to distinguish between the two early cradles in which nature fashioned the instincts, temperament, habits, and ethical complements of these two

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<sup>346</sup> [http://www.berel-am-ries.de/Seiten/Chronoik/Forschungen-bis-808-nChr/Germanische\\_Goetter.htm](http://www.berel-am-ries.de/Seiten/Chronoik/Forschungen-bis-808-nChr/Germanische_Goetter.htm).

subdivisions before they met each other after a long separation dating back to the prehistoric times. For him, the key to understanding the peaceful nature of Amon or his Bantu-Ethiopian followers is to be found in the specific conditions of the Nile Valley, natural abundance of vital resources and their sedentary and agricultural lifestyle. These vital resources and the engendered lifestyle have with time transformed the Negro culturally into being an idealistic, peaceful, and, above all, a personality endowed with a spirit of Justice and gaiety. Such virtues are indispensable in terms of social harmony, so his argument. It was because of the sedentary agricultural requirements that such concepts as matriarchy, totemism, and monotheistic religion evolved among the Bantu-Ethiopians. And since Amon was considered to be the original Uncreated-Creator of all that exist led to the general belief among the ancient Cushitic/Bantu-Ethiopians that S/He is androgynous.

By contrast the ferocity of nature in the Euro-Asian steppes, the barrenness of the region, the overall circumstances of the material conditions, were to create instincts necessary for survival in such harsh environment. Here nature left no illusion of kindness: it was implacable and permitted no negligence; humankind in this region must obtain his bread by the sweat of his brow. Above all, in the course of a long painful existence, s/he must learn to rely on her/himself alone, on his/her own possibilities. He could not indulge in the luxury of believing of a beneficent Self-created-creator, Amon/Hyen-Nu who would shower down abundant means of gaining a livelihood [through hard work]. Instead, the descendants of the Nordic race would conjure up deities maleficent and cruel, jealous and spiteful: Zeus, Marduk, Yahweh, among others. Furthermore the coldness and barrenness of the Nordic region ... will engender the worship of fire—to remain burning from the fire of Mithras to the flames on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier under the Arch of the Triumph and the torches of the ancient and modern Olympics. Thus the tomb of the Unknown Soldier should remind us of the uninterrupted economically induced military movements from circa 1450 B.C. until the time of Hitler toward the South, as recorded in the social history of humankind (Diop, 1974: 111-113). Essentially, Diop's explanation of the aggressive and uncultivated nature of the political leaders of the mainly nomadic Nordic race as resulting from the implacability of the Nordic climate also found echo in the *Epics of Gilgamesh*. After conquering and subjecting the indigenous inhabitants of the Sumerian main city of Uruk under his political control...; and was yet preparing for the decisive expansionist battle against the forest giant Humbaba, 'The great winds Gilgamesh also employed included the north wind, the whirlwind, the storm and the icy wind, the tempest and the scorching wind. And they were like vipers, like dragons,

like a scorching fire, like a serpent that freezes the heart, a destroying flood and lightning's fork ...'(Sandars, 1960: 72).

Although Jared Diamond has also demonstrated convincingly the link between the natural environment and the development of different culture species, especially how the availability of environmental resources such as grain, certain plant types, and domesticated animals (e.g. cattle, sheep, goats etc.) could impact the over-all state of cultures in different regions of the Earth—whereby those regions with grain availability and or domesticated animals are more likely to do well culturally than regions lacking those resources<sup>347</sup>; it is also worth noting that evolutionary problems do not necessarily have to be conditioned by the availability of environmental resources alone. There is no doubt that one would have it much more difficult in terms developing advance form of agricultural production in the Arctic region, but parasites and drought could as well impede the advancement of agricultural production in the tropic regions.<sup>348</sup> Therefore the environment can only partially explain the different evolutions of cultures because while cultures have steadily progressed the ecology has retrogressed due to the exhaustion of the Earth. In fact, the puzzle as to why England was the first European state to become industrialized and not France, Germany or Poland is easily answered by studying the relatively advanced state of that country's childcare policies during the Middle Ages. England's generous child education policies during this period, and the political freedom, religious tolerance and industry these engendered facilitated the development of an advanced 'Psycho-classe' necessary for its early industrial advancement.<sup>349</sup> Therefore the answer to the unresolved question of culture evolution lies in the contemporary rate of innovation and adaptation of new technologies crucial for the extraction of the existing cultural resources—factors generally dependent on the sound child education policies of a given country (deMause, 2002: 174-175). This is almost like suggesting that the matriarchal "psycho-class" responsible for technological genius behind the colossal monuments still found across Azania today must originally have had sound childcare or education policies.

The perception that advanced child education policies is indispensable for the evolution of genuine human cultures—untainted by the political violence of the Leviathans and Behemoths—eventually tilts to upholding the concept of unstressed motherhood. And the proponents of psychogenetic theory of human social history argue convincingly that there is

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<sup>347</sup> Jared, Diamond, 1997. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies*. New York: W.W.Norton & Co.

<sup>348</sup> David S. Landes, 1998. *The Wealth of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 6-14.

<sup>349</sup> A. L. Beier, David Cannadine and James M. Rosenheim, ed. 1990. *The First Modern Society: Essay in English History in Honour of Lawrence Stone*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 213-230.

an intrinsic link between unstressed motherhood—that is from the conception until delivery, and the child’s general well-being and her/his later psychological stability and the associated societal culture norms. As a matter of fact, overstressed mothers are more likely to bear psychologically deficient children with the associated unstable [political] cultures<sup>350</sup> of the Leviathans and or mother murderers—permanently on the march for insatiable economic accumulation. Hence, the psychogenetic theorists purport the elimination of all forms of inhumane stresses—e.g. rapes, forced marriages, the mutilation of female genital organs, in short all forms of violence associated with the concept of motherhood (deMause, 2002: 175-179). However, it should be stressed further that upholding the concept of unstressed motherhood does not necessarily imply advocating matriarchal societies neither does it imply condoning the violence associated with some of the matriarchal societies reviewed elsewhere in this work; and this, of course, include the national culture of the ancient Ethiopian kingdom—the oldest known matriarchal social order customary of mutilating both female and male genital organs.

In order not stray from the main objective of the whole analysis—that is, upholding the reality of the national phenomenon, it suffices to summarize that whether or not the current retracting state of the global capitalist economy confirms Cecil Rhodes early admission that these permanently marching economic forces or political barbarians are incapable of conquering the Planets, the general consensus today, even among the recalcitrant neo-liberal economic agents who in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century sacrificed tens of millions of human lives against Hitler’s Aryan European forces, is that the national phenomenon is a living reality and not merely an economic hypothesis based on market speculation of destructive productivity—that is to say, let us destroy our current Habitat/Earth because of the prospects of discovering another habitable planets in the future. When we hear liberal economic voices like—Ben Bernake, Nancy Pelosi, the Economist Nouriel Roubini, Arthur Levitt, Alan Greenspan and many other more from the bastion of modern capitalism<sup>351</sup>—now calling for the partial or

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<sup>350</sup> Gilbert, Gottlieb, 1992. *Individual Development and Evolution: The Genesis of Novel Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press; Gilbert, Gottlieb, 1997. *Synthesizing Nature-Nurture: Prenatal Roots of Instinctive Behaviour*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Gilbert Gottlieb, 1987. *Individual Development and Evolution*. New York: Oxford University Press, 254; Gilbert Gottlieb, 1998. “Normally Occuring Environmental and Behavioural Influences on Gene Activity: From central Dogma to Probabilistic Epigenesis.” *Psychological Review* **105**, 792-794; Debra, Niehoff, 1999. *The Biology of Violence: How Understanding the Brain, Behaviour, and Environment can Break the Vicious Circle of Agression*. New York: The Free Press, 51; Richard, B. Carter, 1993. *Nurturing Evolution: The Family As a Social Womb*. Lanham: University Press of America, xxxvii; Alexandra Maryanski, 1996. “African Ape Social Networks.” In: James Steele and Stephen Shennan, ed. *The Archaeology of Human Ancestry: Power, Sex and Tradition*. London: Routeledge, 77-79.

<sup>351</sup> <http://moneynews.newsmax.com/printTemplate.html> (accessed February 19, 2009) for Bernake;

[http://moneynews.newsmax.com/streettalk/pelosi\\_nationalization/2009/01/26/175361.html?s=al&promo\\_code=](http://moneynews.newsmax.com/streettalk/pelosi_nationalization/2009/01/26/175361.html?s=al&promo_code=)

complete nationalization of the major Banking system, we are left to conclude that the national phenomenon is a living reality that must be sustained in line with humanity's quest for real freedom. Even the communist Messiah, Karl Marx, who, in support of unilinear economic progress, earlier seems to approve some form of colonialism (e.g., British colonization of India or the advanced Germanic race colonization of the peasant Slavs) also concedes that after all other forms of social organisms will have exhausted their synthetic energies the national phenomenon would remain a contending social force [under the Sun] capable of delivering humankind that culture aspect of freedom. Probably, this may also explain why Hitler's original solution of the then so-called Jews problematic in Europe was to deport them into yet another exile in Madagascar. This in turn raises the question as to whether or not the culture strand of Jewish nationalism could have married to such rational political solution of perpetual wandering. As observed earlier, from the perspective of a genuine nationalist, there can't be an alternative "Home-Land" to Horus/[Heru]-Salem (Jeru-Salem?).

Inasmuch as this research is concerned, the humanitarian aspect of Jewish settlement in that part of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom is yet to receive adequate academic attention. For it seems to hold the key to the Jewish riddle of being God's "Elect." Henry T. Aubin, for one, argues convincingly that the Kushite rescue of Jerusalem from certain annihilation in 701 B.C.E instigated that Jewish concept of being God's Elect. He might after all not be far from the truth—because the twin-concept of Heru-Salem (Jeru-salem) has indeed a genuine culture resonance. Most scholars tend to attribute the foundation of *Heru*-Salem to the biblical cult figure of Moses. That logic seems rational because he delivered the Jewish people the so-called Ten Commandments. For instance, Manetho is cited as stating that "Moses, who received his priestly education and learned all the wisdom of the Egyptians in the city of Heliopolis (On or Beth Shemesh of the Bible) in the Delta, left Egypt with his followers and went to Canaan and founded Jerusalem" (Churchward, 1993/1994: 235-236). However, a meticulous review of Pharaoh Ramses III humanitarian settlement of the Japhetic Philistines in northern Canaan should hold the key to the Jewish concept of electability. According to Lenormant, "in the fourteenth century B.C.E the White Japhetic Philistines invaded the coast of Canaan and were conquered by the army of Ramses III, who destroyed the entire invading

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[78c4-1](#) (January 26, 2009); [http://moneynews.newsmax.com/streettalk/roubini\\_nationalize\\_banks/2009/02/23/184514.html?s=al&promo\\_code=7ACE-1](http://moneynews.newsmax.com/streettalk/roubini_nationalize_banks/2009/02/23/184514.html?s=al&promo_code=7ACE-1) (February 23, 2009); [http://moneynews.newsmax.com/streettalk/levitt\\_banks\\_nationalize/2009/01/21/173652.htm?s=al&promo\\_code=7842-1](http://moneynews.newsmax.com/streettalk/levitt_banks_nationalize/2009/01/21/173652.htm?s=al&promo_code=7842-1) (January 21, 2009); Greenspan: <http://moneynews.newsmax.com/printTemplate.html> (February 18, 2009).

fleet and thus removed any possibility of their return by Sea. The Pharaoh was [morally] compelled to find a way to relocate an entire people deprived of any means of return. He gave them land and the Philistines settled there” (Lenormant, 1890: 509-510<sup>352</sup>; Diop, 1974: 118). Moreover, in the cause of the foundation of the Jewish nation the Biblical narrators tell us that when Moses returned from Mount Sinai and met his Jewish masses adoring the “golden calf” under the auspices of Aaron he reacted furiously and almost destroyed the tablets containing the “Ten Commandments.” Since the resuscitation of the golden-calf tradition simply reminds us of a popular nostalgic yearning for the sacred Apis Bull; Moses (“Moshe/Mossi”), who without doubt was an ethnic Ethiopian<sup>353</sup> but a dedicated follower of Amenophis IV (Akhen-Aton/Echnaton) highly politicized reformation school, with its customary hasty drive to create a universal humanity at the expense of the indigenous culture, was naturally bound to be disingenuous to the sacred Apis Bull anyway. Volney is also quoted as stating that “in vain did Moses tried to proscribe the worship of the symbols which prevailed in Lower Egypt and Phoenicia, and in vain did he tried to blot out from his religion everything related to the stars” (Churchward, 1993/1994: 239). We have already discussed Amenôphis’ new politicized religion and the associated attempt to break away from the past, especially his effort to discard the conventionalism of the art of the original religion with its original delineation of plants and animal life ... (Sayce, 1895: 56-57; Kalopoulos, 2003: 261-271). That Moses then must have reacted furiously against the popular nostalgic yearning for the tradition of the eternal rejuvenation of the golden calf not only confirms his disregard to the indigenous culture but also his loyalty to the Achen-Aten/Echnaton’s Reformation school.

This notwithstanding, if we seek to establish a direct or indirect link between the Jewish concept *Heru-Salem* and the Ethiopian-Egyptian Sun-god Hyen-Nu/Hyeru (“Horus”) one would certainly perceive that as some form of appreciation of the peaceful nature of Hyen-Nu on the part of Jewish culture nationalists. Given the contemporary records of Hyksos destructive incursions into that part of the Bantu Ethiopian Kingdom; or what has become of their culture institutions today, only cultured nations could have felt morally obliged to settle an entire population of warring barbarians on their national territory. It is in light of such humanitarian gesture from the culture custodians of the Azanian nation that one should reasonably seek to understand the Jewish twin concepts of Heru-Salem and being God’s Elect. For it would seem these mainly male Japhetic Philistines, who later amalgamate with the Cushitic Ethiopians or descendants of Ham to become Hebrews, were genuinely among the first group of the mainly economically induced political barbarians from the North to be

<sup>352</sup> Lenormant, Francois, 1890. *Histoire ancienne des Phéniciens*. Paris: Levy.

<sup>353</sup> Ben-Jochannan, 1989. *Black Man of the Nile...*, 227-228.

cultivated after their encounter with the Bantu-Ethiopian culture. One mustn't forget that even the very name of Isai-la/Israel [first] found mention on the culture records—the Stelae of Isai-la/Israel—of Pharaoh Min-Ptah (“Mene-Ptah”), the thirteenth son of Ramses II (Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 236-238). And this is probably why from the perspective of a Jewish culture nationalist there couldn't be any alternative homeland to Heru-Salem.

Inasmuch as the service of humanity elucidates the universal mission of national cultures, whose leaders relatively advanced psychology or elevated cognition have come to realize that the quest for real freedom or perfect humanity would be impossible without the earth and or the equal representation all nations, let's expediently find out what has become of the remnants of [even] the Mongols of these outgoing political Barbarians.

C.A. Diop seems idiosyncratic in his position that the nomadic lifestyle of the global economic mind, that is, the permanent military movements from one region to another for the purpose of wealth accumulation, and the associated indifference to one's ancestral land and culture, is responsible for the modern trend of cremation of one's ancestral remains. The political Mongols of the Nordic man began this unusual custom as it facilitated the transportation of his ancestor's [black?] ashes in Urns. And the Greeks perpetuated it; the Aryans later took it to India, and that explains the cremation of Ghandi and Caesar of our epoch (Diop, 1974: 113). In other words, if left unchallenged by the conservative culture nationalists, the economic minded political barbarians not only long gave up on the idea of eternal existence, but is also capable of transporting the ashes of this culturally irreplaceable Earth in plastic bags ... prior to nationalist intuitive cultivation of perfect humanity capable of transitting both horizons of the universe. In this sense, Sandars is right, even if somehow over-simplified, in her assessment that whereas the ancient Egyptians give humanity the vision of heaven, the Babylonians (and most of the mainly politicized gods of Nordic mythologies) give it the vision of Hell (Sandars, 1960: 28). And these mountain (or later castle) dwelling immortal earthly gods who devised the concept of hell were generally apt at exploiting the threat of painful death—especially from the scorch of perpetual fire in that mysterious dark hole/cave—often associated with it to keep their privileges for themselves and to protect them from the curiosity and natural desires of the mortals (Kalopoulos, 2003: 135ff.).

#### 4.2.3. Assessing the Universal Reach of the Bantu-Ethiopian Culture

Although contemporary historical data does not reveal to our satisfaction the original inhabitants of Greece prior to its conquest by the Caucasians or Greco-Europeans in the first half of the Third millennium B.C.E or earlier,<sup>354</sup> let's for analytical expediency consider the current population of Greece to be the indigenous inhabitants from prehistoric times and then seek to explore the humanitarian rationale behind the exportation of the Bantu-Ethiopian culture into prehistoric Greece. Given the fact that the cultivation of perfect humanity requires the equal representation of all national cultures, it is imperative that unbiased nationalist literature repudiate all forms of colonialism, e.g. of cultural or political nature. Thus, in order to legitimate the influence of the Bantu-Ethiopians culture on the psychological development of the Greco-European personality, let's postulate a political situation which could have prompted the early upholders of the European culture nationalism to unanimously accommodate some form of divine intervention from other national cultures. So, what does Herodotus tell us about the impact of the Egyptian culture on the psychological development of the Greco-European personality?

“How it happened that Egyptians came to Peloponnesse, and what they did to make themselves kings in that part of Greece has been chronicled by other writers; I will add nothing therefore, but proceed to some points which no one else has yet touched upon.”<sup>355</sup>

Of course, Herodotus statement will most certainly have infuriated the early advocates of European political nationalism, as also evident in Plutarch's essay *On the Malice of Herodotus*, who charges him for being a “Philo-barbarous”:

“He says that the Greeks learnt about the possessions and national festivals from the Egyptians as well as the worship of the twelve gods; the very name Dionysos, he says, was learnt from the Egyptians by Melampous, and he taught the rest of the Greeks; and the mysteries and secret rituals connected with Demeter were brought from Egypt by the daughter of Danaos. ... Nor this is the worst. He traces the ancestry of Herakles to Perseus and says Perseus, according to the Persian account, was an Assyrian; ‘and

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<sup>354</sup>Bernal Martin, in *Black Athena Vol.I*, talks about the early infiltration of Greece by the Indo-Europeans as early as the Fourth and Third millennium B.C.E (Bernal, 1987: 19-20). Moreover, antique sources tell us that in Arcadia black Earth begot Pelasgus on the high Mountains crowned with trees (Pausanias *Perieg.* 8.1.4.9; Kalopoulos, 2003: 28). And we are also told by Aeschylus that the first man was the seed of ceramist-god (Aeschylus *Abstr.*369; Kalopoulos, 2003:27). In this sense, there might undoubtedly have been indigenous black Greeks in some parts of Greece prior to the arrival of the conquering Indo-Europeans (for emphasis see footnote 371).

<sup>355</sup>Herodotus, *Histories*, VI.55.



the chiefs of the Dorians' he says, will be established as pure Egyptians...; not only is he anxious to establish an Egyptian and a Phoenician Herakles; he says that our own Herakles was born after the two, and he wants to remove him from Greece and make a foreigner out of him. Yet of the learned men of the Old neither Homer nor Hesiod ... ever mentioned an Egyptian or a Phoenician Herakles, but all of them knew only one, our own Herakles who is the Boiotian and Argive..."(Brenal, 1987: 113).

Herodotus seemingly positive stance on ancient Egyptian influence on the Greeks does not necessarily imply that he did not have his own prejudices or misconceptions about them. As professor Eyre rightly observes, the central difficulty of contemporary anthropological observation begins for Egyptology with Herodotus, for whom Egypt was explicitly idealized as 'other.' Therefore, despite his over-all vision on Egypt being generally positive, his account is explicitly rooted in direct comparison with contemporary Greek culture, and a characteristic search for priority and universal origins in the much more ancient society (Eyre, 2002: 154-155). In addition, there are instances in which Herodotus historical accounts have been proven to be inconsistent with contemporary records of scientific historiography, especially those aspects of his historical accounts derived from the hearsay of ordinary dragomen in his contemporary Egypt. This notwithstanding, the general consensus today is that Herodotus deserves the credit of a genuine historian who is not only capable of distinguishing between genuine historical facts and dragomenian fantasies, but also capable of recording accurate facts which he witnessed personally (Diop, 1974: 2-5; Erman, 1971: 4-5). In all, Herodotus positive stance on the impact of Egyptian culture and civilization on the psychological advancement of the Greco-European personality is also strengthened by the following culture argument extracted from Aeschylus *The Suppliants*:

"The ground whereupon we stand is Apian land itself, and hath of old borne that name in honour of a leech [doctor]. For Apis, seer and leech, the son of Apollo, came from Naupaktos on the farther shore and purged well this land of monsters deadly to man, which earth defiled by the bloody deeds of yore, caused to spring up plagues charged with wrath, a baleful colony of swarming serpents. Of these plagues Apis worked out a cure by surgery and spells to the content of the Argive Land..."<sup>356</sup>

Bernal Martin sees a direct connection between the statement of this quote and the Apis Bull cult of Memphis, which he dates back to the First Kingdom of dynastic Egypt. As he finds out, the original Egyptian form of the name was *Hpw*. Hp or Hpy was the name of one of Horus sons, prominent in the *Book of the Dead*, whose special responsibility was guarding the

<sup>356</sup> See, "The Suppliants" In: Weir Smyth, H., 1922. *Aeschyles Vol. I*. [Loeb]. London: Heinmann/Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 27.

North. At first sight it might seem too far-fetched to connect him with the Greek Apia. However, it should be stressed that in Egyptian Pantheon *Hpy* was the guardian of the Canopic jar containing the small intestines and in the *Book of the Dead* one of his major functions in protecting the dead was to kill demons in the shape of serpents. (Bernal, 1987: 92-93) Though Bernal adds that because the *Apian* name does not occur in Homer and would therefore have not belonged to the general Greek tradition; his association of Apollo with *Hpy*'s father Horus gives us a good reason to emphasize that in the first hymn of the *Odyssey* Homer not only warns his sailors of the severe punishment (e.g. the revocation of the right of return) accorded by the gods to those culpable of slaughtering the cows of the Sun-god (Odyssea 12.453; Kalopoulos, 2003:32-34), but explicitly mentions Ethiopia in relation to that [culture?] voyage. It is even more interesting that “the *pharos* of future Alexandria found mention in Homer’s *Odyssey* (iv.355); it was there, in ‘front of Egypt’, that Menelaus moored his ships and forced Egyptian Prôteus’ to declare to him his homeward road. Even Thebes, the culture centre of the Egyptian civilization, is also known both to the *Iliad* (ix.381) and the *Odyssey* (iv.126)”(Sayce, 1895:183-184; Kalopoulos, 2003: 209-211). Ben-Jochannan is also convinced that Homer was a graduate of the Mysteries system of the indigenous (Bantu-Ethiopians) centred in the *Osirica* at Thebes/Luxor (1989:184). Thus given the overall centrality of “the Homeric epic poems to the education of the Greek youths” (Burns, 1989: 31-32), one could reasonably conceive the Ethiopian culture influencing the psychological development of the Greco-European personality from early historical times. And the following *Oath* by the “European Father of Medicine”, Hippocrates, paying homage to his teacher and god Imhotep, called “Aesculapius” by the ancient Greeks and Romans, also confirms the positive turn the Greco-European mentality took after its encounter with the Ethiopian (or later Egyptian) culture:

“I swear by Apollo the physician, and *Aesculapius*, and Health, and All-heal, and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and judgement, I will keep this Oath and this stipulation—to reckon him who taught me this Art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my substance with him, and to relieve his necessities if required; to look upon his offspring in the same footing as my own brothers, and to teach them this Art, if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or stipulation; and that by precept, lecture, and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the Art to my own sons, and those of my teachers, and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath according to the law of medicine, but to non others. I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgement, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. With purity and holiness I pass my life and practice my

Art. I will not cut persons labouring under the stone, but will leave this to be done by men who are practitioners of this work. Into whatever house I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption; and, further from the seduction of the females or males, of free men and slaves. Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not, in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret. While I continue to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the art, respected by all men, in all times! But should I trespass and violate this Oath, may the the reverse be my lot!"(quoted in Ben-Jochannan, 1989: 254-255).

According to Diop, throughout the entire Aegean epoch the Ethiopian culture influence was predominant and preceded that of the Indo-European because all the populations of the periphery of the Mediterranean at the time were mainly Negroes; and the isolated migrant White communities then were generally under the cultural and economic influence of Ethiopians. A culture pressure which later extended as far North to certain Germanic tribes who also adored Isis, the Negro goddess:

"In fact, inscriptions have been found in which Isis is associated with the City of Noreia—today's Neumarkt in Styria (Austria). Isis, Osiris, Serapis, Anubis have altars in Fréjus, Nînes, Arles, Riez (Basses-Alpes), Paoizet (Isère), Manduel (Gard), Boulogne (Haute-Galronne), Lyons, Besançon, Langres, Soissons. Isis was honoured at Melun ... at York and Brougham Castle, and also in Pannonia and Noricum"(Diop, 1974: 113-114).

As Diop further finds out, the humanitarian aspect of the much later Roman she-Wolf merely recalls the Southern Negro practice of *Totemism* (ibid., 115-116). Since, as observed above, the Homeric epics were the greatest single formative influence and unifying factor that shaped the world views of the Greeks in historical times; and there is compelling evidence that this father of the Greco-European culture was considerably informed about the documented culture of the Ethiopians, it is highly unlikely that the process through which the latter culture was later transmitted into historic Greece will have differed.

Churchward, for one, employing archaeological finds from sites in Crete, Mycenae and the Aegean region of Greece has demonstrated consistently the existence of a pre-Phoenician alphabet, which he argued was derived from the cursive characters developed by the Egyptians from the original hieroglyphics for literary and secular purposes during the Neolithic Age (Churchward, 1993/1994: 42-43). Similarly, Alfred Burns hints to a Bronze Age Greek scripts which came to light in Arthur Evans four archaeological monumental

volumes titled *“The Palace of Minos”* (Burns, 1989: 33). Importantly, this later author succeeded in establishing a link between the mainly linear form of scripts—categorized as Linear “A” and “B”—and the hieroglyphic signs which were also found during his excavations in the Eastern Mediterranean region in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He is convinced that the “Linear B” scripts must have been derived from the “Linear A”, which he believes belonged to a pre-Greek Minoan population. He also thinks the hieroglyphics antedate both script forms. He list approximately 3,000 Linear B tablets from Knossos, 1,000 from Pylos, 60 from Mycenae, and small quantities from across other Hellenic sites in Greece. He stressed that these consist of about 80 syllabic characters and a great number of ideograms, with each of the syllabic signs representing either a vowel or a consonant followed by a vowel. Essentially, he rightly asserts that such writing system can only represent open syllables and is very unsuited for a language like Greek, with its many consonant clusters and consonant word ending. Hence, he seems convinced that these latter tablets were derived from the Linear A script (Burns 1989: 36-37). Reporting on these Cretan and Mycenaean signs, Evans states that 20 per cent of their Cretan hieroglyphics match those found in Egypt in character, and twenty out of the thirty two linear signs are practically identical with those found in Egypt. Churchward is, however, convinced that an in-depth study of Evans archaeological finds would come out with about 98 per cent match between these and the pictorial hieroglyphics and the oldest linear signs of Egypt, while the remaining two signs are indefinite (ibid). The derivation of the “Linear B” tablets or the early form of Greek from the Linear A of a pre-Greek Minoan language unequivocally presupposes a culture interaction between two different groups of people.

And Evans following the legend of king Minos tends to suggest a culture transmission from the Aegean region to the Mycenaean Greece (Greek mainland) in the 2<sup>nd</sup> millennium B.C.E. Interestingly, among the archaeological treasures in the sites and palaces excavated by Evans include such frequent frescoes as the Egyptian double axe and the bull. And Egyptian flora and fauna provided many of the motifs for the Minoan decorative designs. This prompted Evans to conclude that the mainland Greece was colonized by Cretans, and he considered the “Mycenaean” Greece civilization an offshoot and subdivision of the Minoan (Burns, 1989: 34ff.). Herodotus also see in the person of “Minos of Knossos” as the first to establish sea power in Greece. Similarly, Thucydides thinks Minos was indeed the first man, who, according to local tradition, established sea power in the region. “He made himself master of what is now the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades” (ibid).

*En effet* it would seem the Greek notion of Minos merely alludes to the Ethiopian-Egyptian Pan-deity, Min. And Bernal Martin has convincingly established a credible culture link between the Minos kingdom of Knossos on Crete and the Ethiopian-Egyptian bull god *Mntw* or Mint. As he finds out, ‘during the 21<sup>st</sup> century B.C.E. the succession of the black Pharaohs—sharing the name Menthot-Pe and had as their Divine the hawk and the bull god Mntw or Mont—who founded the 11<sup>th</sup> Dynasty not only recovered from the breakdown of the First intermediate period, the so-called Middle Kingdom, and united Upper and Lower Egypt, but intervened in the Levant as well. And from present archaeological evidence it is obvious that this later development would have had wide ranging contacts further afield, certainly including Crete and possibly mainland Greece. It is during the same period that Cretan palaces were established and one finds the beginning there of a bull-cult which appears on the walls of the palaces and was central to Greek mythology about King Minos and Crete. It would therefore seem plausible that the Cretan developments directly or indirectly reflected the rise of the Egyptian Middle Kingdom. Further, while Crete continued with the bull-cult for almost six centuries, Egypt had the ram-god Amon of Upper Egypt as its patron deity after the rise of the 12<sup>th</sup> Dynasty soon after 2000 B.C.E. Accordingly, it was from the influence of this period that most of the ram cults found around the Aegean and generally associated with Zeus were derived, drawing both from Amon and the Lower Egyptian ram/goat cult of Mendēs.

In addition, while Herodotus claims about the widespread conquests of Senwosret and the legends concerning the far reaching expedition of the Egyptian and Ethiopian prince Memnōn were in the past treated with derision, Bernal realized that both ancient positions have been vindicated by the recent reading of an inscription from Memphis which details the conquests, by land and sea, of two 12<sup>th</sup> dynasty Pharaohs, Senwosret I and Ammenemes II. He also points to the intriguing resemblance between *Hpr K3R ̄*, an alternative for Senwosret and Kekrops, the legendary founder of Athens, whom ancient sources said was an Egyptian. And the credible proof of Egyptian culture presence in Boiotia during the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium B.C.E, but is unable to determine the exact type of relationship that might have existed between Egypt and Boiotia in this early stage of Greek social history other than some form of suzerainty’ (Bernal, 1987: 17-20; 2001: 211ff.).

Of course the extension of the Minoan culture from the South ... was not accommodated by everyone; and some scholars have equally convincingly argued that from the 1500 B.C.E onward political influence extended from Mycenaean Greece to the Aegean region and not the opposite direction (Burns, 1989: 36-37). In this way, one could thus foresee a genuine

political desire to intervene and usurp the culture institutions of the then outgoing Ethiopian-Egyptian culture from the South. Yet at this stage of the Greco-European social history local legends unanimously account the arrival of Danaos, the twin brother of the Itiopian-Egyptian “*Agyptos*”, and Kadmos, the Egypto-Phoenician. These later culture missionaries from the South are generally accredited with having introduced irrigation, agriculture and metallurgy (Danaos) and the alphabet, certain types of weapons, and a number of religious rituals (Kadmos). He is generally considered to be the second founder of Greek Thebes after the first was destroyed. And he is also known to have brought two black women from Thebes to found the oracles of Dodona in Greece and Amon in Libya—as this part of the Ethiopian kingdom was gradually being infiltrated by nomadic [Indo?]-European tribes (Diop, 1974: 109-110). According to Greek tradition, referred to by Homer, the first founders of Thebes were *Amphion* and *Zethos*. It is intriguing to know that, like the Egyptian pyramids, the tomb of Amphion and Zethos was associated with the Sun, and, like them, the Greek Thebes had close associations with the Sphinx. Moreover, it was in some way linked to the zodiacal sign Taurus, and subsequently many scholars have drawn parallels between the Theban and the Cretan bull-cults (Bernal, 1987: 19). Ironically, if one is to perceive in the cult figures of Amphion and Zethos as symbolizing the *Alpha* (Ox), *Beta* (House) et cetera of our contemporary Greek alphabet, then it should be emphasized that the Egyptian alphabet also happens to begin with the head of Cow (Jürss 1982: 12-13); and again see in the iconic character of Kadmos as a mere agent of an unfinished culture mission from the South, then, unfortunately, although successful at first could at last not hinder the innate political desire by leaders of these Nordic barbarians to opt for the divisive polis system. We also learn from ancient Greek legends that the battle between Kadmos (the Egypto-Phoenician) and the serpent son Mars (the Greek) ended with the triumph of the supporters of the Polis system. Following Diop’s apt phrase, “Egypto-Phoenician cultural attempt to stamp matriarchal social order on the Greeks hardly survived the economic mentality of these predominantly male dominated societies”(Diop, 1987: 110-111 n.24).

As Alfred Burns also remarks, Mycenaean Greece, like Greece in historical times, also consisted of an individual city states without any central unifying structure. Accordingly, there was no great Greek empire before Alexander the Great although particular strong city could take a position of leadership for a time by prestige and power. And Mycenae apparently held such a position as Athens and Sparta in classical times. There also seems to have been a strong bond of common language, religion and tradition which made some common enterprise possible. Importantly, the Mycenaean civilization, which at its peak dominated the

Greek mainland, most of Aegean islands, Knossos, and some locations on the coast of Asia Minor, and lasted for almost three centuries, saw Greece rise to being the dominant Sea power then, controlling the Sea and the maritime trade (*ibid.*, 42).

Thus putting aside what seems like a genuine political attempt then by the economic minded Greco-Europeans to assert their political power on the matriarchal culture foundation from the South, the fact alone that the Mycenaean Greeks adapted the Linear B script from that illusive language of the Linear A, not to mention the relative ease with which this was achieved, tends imply that the Greeks would indeed have come into contact with the Egyptian alphabet much earlier than is often accepted.<sup>357</sup> As Burns convincingly argued, it is highly unlikely that the Mycenaean Greeks would have traded with such highly documented societies as the Egyptians, Mesopotamians, and the rest in the region without acquainting themselves with the overwhelming benefit of the letters. One must not forget the well known passage in the *Iliad* (6.168-169) in which *Bellerophon* is sent to the king of Lydia to deliver a tablet with “death bringing signs” which tells the king to kill the bearer (Burns, 1989: 42-43). In this later development, we are once again confronted with a genuine political application of culture goods the economic way; that is, the use of an ill-informed hero of the divisive Polis for a suicide mission. It was not until the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when the upholders of the European national Behemoth, the Third Reich, instilled real fear in the heroes of Europe’s divisive Leviathans that European leaders were forced to reluctantly make a culture *volte face*—that is, the rejection of the bloodstained swords of the Europe’s Leviathans and the associated intra-European conflicts, thereby vindicating yet another well pronounced statement in the *Iliad* that historic Greeks ceased to wage wars against each other only after the local heroes had killed off one another. To transpose Homer’s argument in the culture language of the Bantu-Ethiopians, with their customary symbolic use of the survival concurrence between Wolves and Rabbits, Lions and Rams, or Crocodile versus the sacred Apis Bull etc., in their formulation of the Memphetic/Manfour philosophy and or the “Maatian” legal doctrine, one could reasonably foresee that after the economic minded political barbarians would have finished eating all the animals on the earth, fished all the oceans empty, and turn against each other for meat, only those cultured human beings, who

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<sup>357</sup> A counter current to this position is a passage in the writings of Josephus, the Jewish apologist, in which he asserted—in anti Greek tirade specifically attacking the Greeks for their lack of cultural depth—that the Greeks were only boasting when they claimed that they had learnt letters from Kadmos. In fact, according to him, they had been illiterate at the time of the Trojan War (Josephus, *Contra Apionem*, I.II). Hence Josephus version was more accommodating to the Romantic Hellenists when considering the image of Homer the illiterate bard (see Bernal, M., *BA Vol.I*, 1987:393).

initially sought real freedom through the darkest/silent fountains of knowledge, would most certainly survive to steer the nations towards the realistic culture cause of Life/Existence.

#### 4.3. Reviewing the Ideological background of the Azanian nation

The best way to explain the centrality of the Memphetic/Manfour philosophy of complementing oppositions (e.g. fire versus water et cetera) and the Maatian legal document to the national culture of the Bantu-Ethiopians is to critically explore the ideological background of the Azanian nation. Despite considerable difference between ancient and modern sources with regards to the origin of Azania and exact location of Azania in the ancient Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom, the general consensus today is that the Azanians were indeed a cultured sedentary indigenous Bantu-folk with a highly developed civilization. In Huntingford's words, "we may surmise that a civilization which flourished in the Horn of Africa at some time during the first seven hundred years A.D.—a civilization which, no doubt, had taken much from the Sabaeans and the Axumites, as from Meroe and the Middle Nile was destroyed by Islam; that its makers retreated southwards through Kenya where Islam had not yet penetrated; and that it finally came to an end somewhere about the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, possibly earlier."<sup>358</sup> As he puts it, the "Azanian civilization", vague and misleading as a label, was contemporary with the foundation and early growth of Zimbabwe; and, as the pottery suggests, may have had [cultural communication and] trading links with it. And probably this process was linked with movement from the north; and the origins of these modes and manners of life are perhaps to be looked for in Southern Ethiopia where the *Konso* and *Kaffa*, for example, still retain some of the characteristics that mark the Azanian achievement (Basil, D. 1970: 190-195). It is generally intriguing that the Azanian civilization whose origin seems esoteric or presumably centred around the East of the Great Lake region also found echo as far South as Zimbabwe, if not beyond. In terms of the origin of Azania Huntingford offers us two main hypotheses, the first he derives from the Arabic *ajam* ("foreigner, non-Arab"); and the second, which he seems to favour, comes from the Greek word *azainein* ("to dry, patch"), which matches his identification of Azania with the arid coastline of the Somalian plains. Ancient attestation to "Azanian Sea" (N.H.6.38) first found mention in Pliny the Elder (also called Gaius Plinius Secundus)<sup>359</sup> as stretching from the emporium of Adulis (N.H. 6.34)—in present day Eritrea and which was at heart of Axum's

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<sup>358</sup> Huntingford, G. W. B., 1931. "On Blacksmiths. *Man*, 262; Huntingford, G. W. B., 1933. "Azanian Civilization of Kenya." *Antiquity*, 153ff; Huntingford, G.W.B., 1940-1941. "Azania." *Anthropos*, Vol.35, 209ff.

<sup>359</sup>[http://www.livius.org/pi-pm/pliny/pliny\\_e.html](http://www.livius.org/pi-pm/pliny/pliny_e.html)



Sea power around the Red Sea region—and around the south coast of Africa. Huntingford, who made use of chapter fifteen of the *Periplus of the Eritraean Sea*<sup>360</sup>, sees Azania as referring to modern day Somalian coast. However, it should be stressed that chapter 16 of that text places Rhapta, which is generally identified today as constituting the coastline of both Kenya and Tanzania, as the southernmost market of Azania.

As stated earlier, modern usage of Azania is often made in reference to South Africa; a name which was proposed at the “All African Conference” held in Accra, Ghana, in 1958 by Kwame Nkrumah. Another modern textual reference to the term with specific reference to colonial Africa is found in Evelyn Waugh’s fictitious novel.<sup>361</sup> In both ancient and modern usages there can be no doubt the term Azania was/is referred to a locality in the heart of the ancient Cushitic or Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom. And, as we will soon see, was in fact the indigenous name for that vast kingdom formally known as Africa.


It is generally significant that the *Periplus of the Eritrean Sea* also alludes to Rhapta as the southernmost market of Azania. As a matter of fact the local mythology from which the concept of Azania is derived also makes mention of a market on a sacred Lake—opened once every seven years the advent of which the fattest and strongest Bull is ritually sacrificed and offered to the best performing horse of a dancing competition to commemorate that unique culture event. So, in order to resolve the riddle of the Azanian concept, let’s invoke the *Pyramid Spell* (1550a) which specifically states that “We eat, we eat the red Ox for the passage of the Lake.” We have already discussed *in extenso* the passage of the Great Lake(s) source of the Nile for the well-known ancient Egyptian “Ritual of Resurrection.” In addition, the sacredness of cows and other animals and their centrality to the inception of the national culture of the Bantu-Ethiopians deserve no better elaboration than the Theban God Amon/Amen seen in his company of gods below (Budge, 1934, 1988: 162). Therefore this later critical review of the mythological [survival] struggle between the rabbit and Jackal/Wolf/Dog-headed god, Anubis, should not only solve the riddle of the Azanian concept, but also confirm the green focus of the original Azanian culture.

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<sup>360</sup> Huntingford, G. W.B., transl. & ed. 1980. *Periplus of the Eritraean Sea*. London: Hakluyt Society.

<sup>361</sup> Waugh, Evelyn, 1932. *Black Mischief*. Penguin Classics.

## AMON AND HIS COMPANY OF GODS



1. Amen Ra at the head of the Southern Apt (Luxor), the lord of the heaven, and his gods; 2. Mut, Lady of heaven, Mistress of the World. 3. Khonsu, Nefer-hetep. 4. Min with symbol and temple. 5. Isis. 6. Neb Khemenu (Thoth). 7. Maat. 8. The Lady of Amenti/Hathor (3). 9. Osiris. 10. Un-Nefer-Khenti-Amenti. 11. Horus of the two Horizons. 12. He of the embalmment chamber. 13. Het-Her (Hathor). 14- Governor of the House of the physician. 15. Nephthys (Extracted from Wallis Budge's *Fom Fettish to God in Ancient Egypt*, 162).

However before we proceed to analytically discern the survival philosophies of the Rabbit and Wolf/Jackal, it is equally important to reiterate the prevailing conviction in this text that there is no such difference between the ancient Ethiopian-Egyptian God Horus/Heru and the Moab “Sun-god” Hyen[“One”]-Nu[“Hand”]; nor is there any genuine academic justification to discriminate between Hyen-Nu/Horus and the patron deity of Thebes, “Amon”, and or later “Aton/Aten” despite the undeniable alterations and adaptations in later socio-historical contexts. Equally, it should be maintained that the “Anu”, “A” [Your] and “Nu” [Hand], of the Moabas also refers to the same Self-created Creator as illustrated below.

For example, Amélineau who tends to confuse “Anu” with the first indigenous Ethiopians/Nubians who founded the nilothic cities, Esnet, Erment, Qouch, and Heliopolis (biblical On or Beth Shemesh) along the banks of the Nile—and because of those cities’ characteristic symbols denoting the name Anu asserts:

“These Anu... were an agricultural people, raising cattle on a large scale along the Nile, [shutting themselves up in walled cities for defensive purposes?]. To these people we can attribute, without fear of error, the most ancient Egypt book, *The Book of the Dead* (Book of Coming Forth by Day) and the *Text of the Pyramids*, consequently all the myths or religious teachings. I will add almost all the philosophical systems then known and still called Egyptian. They evidently knew the craft necessary for any

civilization and were familiar with the tools those trades required. They knew how to use metals, at least elementary metals. They made the earliest attempt at writing, for the whole Egyptian civilization attribute this art to Thoth, the great Hermes, an Anu-like Osiris, who is called the onian in chapter XV of *The Book of the Dead* and the *Texts of the Pyramids*. The people already knew the principal art; it left proof of this in the architecture of the tomb at Abydos, especially the tomb of Osiris, and in those sepulchres objects have been found bearing the unmistakable stamp of their origin—such as carved ivory or the little head of a Nubian girl found in a tomb near that of Osiris, or the small wooden or ivory receptacles in the form of feline head—all documents published in the first volume of my *Fouilles d’Abydos*.<sup>362</sup>

But, as Amélineau further observes, “it is also in an ethnic sense that we must read the term Anu applied to Osiris. In fact, in an introductory chapter of Hymns extolling Ra and containing chapter XV of the *Book of Coming Forth by Day*, we are told: “Hail to thee, O God Ani in the mountainous land of Atem! O Great God falcon of the double solar mountain...”<sup>363</sup> Following Amélineau’s arguments, Diop has thus suggested that Anu may have meant men because in Diola “An” means man (Diop, 1974: 76-77). To diverge, I opt for the A-Nu of the Moabas with A-Ni signifying the plural Anu.

Alas, as the original god-father of the Sumerian city of Uruk, Anu was not only equated with heaven, but ruled sway with his daughter Ishtar<sup>364</sup> that city’s main temple prior to Uruk’s conquest by the nomadic, anti-wildlife, and enslaving warlord Gilgamesh and his followers. And upon the lamentation of the indigenous population the goddess of creation, Aruru, created Enkidu from the firmament of Anu. Culturally, Enkidu not only shared vegetation with antelopes, gazelles and the rest of wild-life..., but was considered a wild-life conservationist and protector. In that original role he not only terrified Gilgamesh and his nomadic followers because of his natural stamina and power, but was equated with immortality as well. And although the politically minded Gilgamesh and his anti wildlife followers succeeded in destroying Enkidu’s natural powers and strength with the aid of a harlot (probably the antecedence of the biblical Samson and the Semitic Laila), it should be stressed that in Gilgamesh legendary quest for immortality, in the company of the by then subdued Enkidu, the symbolic culture scenes repeatedly shown—e.g. oxen/bulls, gazelles, lions, axes et cetera—merely recall the cultural symbols of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom (Sandars, 1960: 61-69). Elsewhere in these Epics, Enkidu reminded Gilgamesh that that wild-

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<sup>362</sup> Abbé Emile, Amélineau, 1899. *Nouvelles Fouilles d’Abydos*. Paris: Ed. Leroux, 257-258; for further discussing of Amélineau’s arguments see CA. Diop, 1974. *African origin of Civilization...* chapter III, esp., 76-79 notes 47.

<sup>363</sup> A.B Amélineau, 1916. *Prolégomène à l’étude de la religion égyptienne*. Paris: Ed. Leroux, 124-125.

<sup>364</sup> An in-depth study should reveal Ishtar as the Babylonian equivalent of ancient Egyptian Isis.

bull, which repeatedly appear to him in dreams on his way to wage his decisive battle against Humbaba, the giant of the mountain or the battering ram, was actually Shamash, the ultimate protector who will take their hands in the moment of peril (ibid., 77-78).

Lastly, while the following Sumer legend tends to contend that Enkidu's demise shrouded the fate of his people in the region:

“What has become of the Black people of Sumer? The traveller asked the old man, for ancient records show that the people of Sumer were Black. What happened to them?” “Ah, the Old man sighed. They lost their history, so they died” (Chancellor 1987: 15);


the Victory dance of the B[a]mun in present day Cameroun—with the mask of a black stier decorated with green vegetation around its neck—not only strengthens Enkidu's final statement to Gilgamesh, but adamantly insist that the real culture victory remains entrenched in the camp of the sacred Apis Bull. In other words, the true culture victory is for the hand that creates and not the one that destroys.

Culturally, this picture below serves to illustrate the creative genius of Self-created-Creator, Hyen-Nu:



The Creation: The God Nu is seen risen out of the primeval water and bearing in his hands the boat of Rā, the Sun-god, who is accompanied by a number of deities (e.g. Heka, Gebb, Thoth, Horus of Heken, Hu and Sia...). In the upper portion of the scene is the region of the underworld (Tuat) which is enclosed by the body of Osiris, on whose head stands the goddess Nut with arms stretched out to receive the disk of the Sun (recopied from Wallis Budge's *Egyptian ideas of Afterlife*, 25).

As with the previous deification of all parts of the sacred Bull, we should be reminded again that the helping hands of the other deities in the company of Amon are merely Hyen-Nu's, as this is again illustrated in the solar disc of Aton/Aten below (A. Erman, 1894, 1971:46; W. Budge, 1934, 1988: 167):



Amenhotep IV (Achen-Aton) and daughters making offerings to the Sun Disc and receiving blessing from Aten's many hands.

In order not stray from the main point of the present analysis—that is, the conviction that there is no genuine academic justification to discriminate between Hyen-Nu/Horus, Amon/Amen and Aton/Aten, it must be emphasized that the following Hymns in honour of Amen/Amon and Aten/Aton are sang in reference to the same Sun-god.

In this Hymn dedicated to Amon/Amen when he riseth as Horus of the Two Horizons, by Suti, Overseer of the works of Amen, and by Heru (Horus), Overseer of the Works of Amen, it is proclaimed:

“Homage to thee, Rā, beneficent One of everyday! Thou shootest up at dawn without fail, Khepri, Great One of Works. Thy radiance is in thy face,[O thou] who canst not be known. Silver-gold, is not to be compared with thy splendours. Having fashioned thyself thou didst mould thy members. [Thou] who givest birth wast not thyself born: One by himself by reason of his abilities. Traverser of eternity, he is the Chief of the roads of millions of years, maintaining his divine form. As are the beauties of the celestial regions even so are thy beauties. More brilliant is thy complexion than that of heaven. Thou sailest over the heavens and every face watcheth thee as thou goest, but thou thyself art hidden from their faces. Thou showedst thyself at break of day in the beams of light. Strong is thy Sekhet Boat under Thy Majesty. In one short day thou journeyest over a road of millions and hundreds of thousands of miles. Thou passest

through thy day, thou settest. Thou dost make the hours of the night likewise to fulfil themselves. There is no interruption of thy toil. All eyes (e.g. all mankind) fasten their gaze upon thee, and cease not to do so. Thy Majesty settest and thou dost hasten to rise in the TUAT (the Underworld). Thy sparkingly rays bewitch the eyes (?). Thou settest in MANU (the West) and [men] sleep like the dead.”

Similarly, in this Hymn to Aton/Aten there is no such clear-cut distinction between Aton and Hyen-Nu/Horus:

“Hail to thee, O Aten of the day! Creator of mortals and maker of that whereon they live. Hail thou Great Hawk of the many coloured plumage. [Hail] Khepri (or Creator) who didst raise thyself up from [from non-existence]. He created himself, he was not born. Horus the Elder, dweller in Nut (the Sky). At his rising and at his setting likewise men cry out joyfully. He is the fashioner of what the ground produceth, KHNEM and AMEN of the HENMEMET (a class of celestial beings). Master of the Two Lands from the great one to the little one. The mother supreme (?) of gods and men. Worker, expert, exceedingly great, flourishing in what she doeth. [His] cattle (?) cannot be counted, the mighty herdsmen herding his animals to their byre. The springer up traversing swiftly the course of Khepri. His birth is wonderful, raising up his beautiful form in the womb of NUT. He illumineth the Two Lands with his disk. He is the primeval substance (or plasma) of the Two Lands. He made himself. He seeth everything he hath made, the Lord One, bringing into captivity (?) [countless] lands everyday, observing those who walk about on the earth. He shooteth up into the sky with transformations like Rā. He maketh the seasons of the year with (?) the months. [It is] hot at his pleasure, it is cold at his pleasure. He maketh the day to be relaxed (or to droop) and he embraceth (or oppresses) every land. The baboons cry out to him in adoration when he riseth daily.”

Finally, the following Hymn dedicated to Osiris with Litany [from the Papyrus of Ani, sheet 19.] generally tends to reaffirm the object of that unique national culture of the Azanians. “Praise be unto thee, O Osiris, Lord of Eternity, UN-NEFER HARMAKHIS, whose forms are manifold, and whose worship (?) is majestic, Ptah-SEKER-TEM in On (Heliopolis), the Lord of the hidden shrine, the Creator of Het-Ka-Ptah (“House of the soul of Ptah”) and the gods [thereof] the Guide of the Other World (TUAT), who art glorious when thou settest in Nut. Isis embraceth thee in peace, and she driveth away the feinds from the mouth of thy paths. Thou turnest thy face towards AMENTT, and thou makest the Earth to shine like silver-gold. Those who are lying dead rise up to see thee, they breath the air, and they look upon thy face when the Disk (Aten) riseth in the horizon. Their hearts are content because they behold thee, O thou, who art Eternity and Everlasting.” Thus, with this closing statement of Osiris we are led to conclude that the prime object of the Ethiopian culture is Eternity (*Manfourir*) first and then Resurrection later.

## [LITANY]

1. Homage to thee, [Lord of] the starry gods in ON, and of the heavenly brings in Kheri-ĀhĀ, thou god UNTI, who art more glorious than the gods who are hidden in Heliopolis.
2. Homage to thee, O An [u] in Antes (?), Hermakhis, with long strides thou stridest over Heaven O Her-Akhuti.
3. Homage to thee, O everlasting Soul, thou Soul that dwellest in Tetu, Un-Nefer, son of Nut; Thou art the lord of Akert.
4. Homage to thee in thy dominion over Tetu; the Urret crown is established on thy head; thou One who providest the power which protecteth thee. Thou dwellest in peace in Tetu.
5. Homage to thee, O Lord of the Acacia Tree. The SEKER Boat is set upon its sledge. Thou repulsest the feind, the worker of evil, and thou makest the *Udjat* to rest upon its seat.
6. Homage to thee, Mighty One in thine hour, great mighty Prince in ANRUTF, lord of eternity, creator of everlastingness. Thou art the lord of HENSU (HĀNĒS, Herakleopolis).
7. Homage to thee, O thou who restest upon MAĀT. Thou art the lord of ABYDOS, and thy limbs are joined into TA-DJESERT. Thou art he to whom fraud and guile are hateful.
8. Homage to thee, O thou who art in thy boat. Thou bringest HĀPI (Nile) forth from his sources. The light shineth upon thy body, and thou art the dweller in NEKHEN.
9. Homage to thee, Creator of gods, King of the North and South, Osiris, victorious One, ruler of the world in thy gracious seasons. Thou art the lord of the two ATEBU (e.g. the eastern and the western borders of the celestial Nile).

After the recitation of these nine foregoing addresses the deceased was then made to recite the following petition: “O grant thou unto me a path where-over I may pass in peace, for I am just and true. I have not spoken lies wittingly nor have I done aught with deceit” (for detail discussion of this and other hymns, see Budge, Wallis, 1934/1988: 414-428).

That the main object of the Bantu-Ethiopian culture is indeed the quest for a certified passage through the gates that lead to the celestial habitation of divinity also found elaboration in the following ceremonial dance song of the so-called Voo-doo<sup>365</sup> cult, as the then enslaved Haitians strived to reestablish contact with their ancestral spirit:

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<sup>365</sup> There are different opinions with regard to the origin of word Voo-doo. Some scholars tend to associate it with the dance of the Golden calf (“Veau d’ Or”); and it has also been related to the heretical side of the Waldensians (Vaudios) who were reputed to practice witchcraft. Hence, the whole practice of witchcraft in the Middle Ages was called “Vaudoisie.” Jahn, however, sees its origin in West Africa, where it means “genius” or protective spirit among the Ewes or Fons (Janheinz, Jahn, [1958]1961. Muntus: The New African Culture. Translated by Marjolie Grene. New York: Grove Press, 29-30).

Aitibo Legba luvri laye pu mwe  
 Papa Legba, luvri baye pu mwe  
 Luvri baye pu m'kapab ratre  
 A tu bon Legba ouvre la barriere pour moi  
 Papa Legba, ouvre la barriere pour moi  
 Ouvre la barriere pour moi faire capable de rentre

Following Arada Negroes, Ben-Jochannan describes “Voo-doo as a great supernatural being, a snake that embodies the knowledge of the past and the present, and through the medium of the high Priestess and of a Negress, foretells the future. The two are called the King and Queen, Master and Mistress, or Papa and Mama.

Accordingly, in the voo-doo ceremony which usually takes place at Night out of the profane eyes the first *Loa* to be invoked is “Legba.” He is the lord of the roads, and streets, the protector of crossroads and doors, the protector of the herd. His wife *Ayizan* is the goddess of the markets and the highest goddess of the Arada Olympus. Legba’s symbol or his *veve* is the cross. ... The vertical board means the deep and the heights, the streets of the *Loas*, the invisible ones. The foot of this vertical world axis is rooted in the waters of the deep. Here on the Island under the Sea is Guinea, Africa, the legendary home; here the *Loas* have their permanent places, from which they hasten straight upward to the living. Every vertical, above all every stee, and especially poteaumitan in the *hounfort*, symbolizes the Tree of the Gods which unites the damp earth from which all things spring, with heaven. The horizontal bar of the cross signifies the earthly and the human world. It is only at the cross road, where the human and the divine axes meet, does contact with divinities take place. And this crossroad is guarded by Legba. In Nigeria and Dahomey he is the interpreter of the gods who translates the requests and prayers of men into their language. In Haiti he has the function of opening the barriers that separates men from *Loas*. He is invoked in the “Vanvalou-rhythm” and dance.

Voodooism in the neighboring Cuba is called “Maniquismo”, and Fernand Ortiz<sup>366</sup> has called Maniquismo a secret society, a kind of freemasonry, to which only the initiates may belong” (Ben-Jochannan, 1991: xiv-xv).

Despite the coarseness of the French used in that voodoo song above, it is on the whole illuminating that the participants of that particular culture activity allude to a highly hierarchical socio-culture order in which certain leaders are, by virtue of their specialized knowledge, legitimately entrusted with the keys to the different passages leading to

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<sup>366</sup> Fernand, Ortiz, 1950. *La Africana de la Musica Folklorica de Cuba*. La Habana.



Divinity—a culture role taken originally by Hyen-Nu for possessing the authentic knowledge of those passages.

Hyen-Nu's other special culture role is the promulgation of love. Thus, Moabas mythology considers "Nu-Rua" or Nu's creation, humankind, as resulting from the love between Hyen-Nu and the Geb/KeB (Earth). This particular kind of love which undeniably naturally impels infinite creativity is again stipulated to be Hyen-Nu's most difficult culture tasks. Consequently, the sweat that ensues from that difficult culture task of creativity not only condenses to ... water the earth to germinate life, but evaporates ... to form the gases or air equally indispensable for the sustenance of earthly life. We have learnt earlier from Moabas and Dinka mythologies that greediness, hatred and the disregard of the natural law governing immortality was the main reason behind Divinity's celestial exile and the introduction of death on this earth.

An equally indispensable local mythological stipulation that tends to uphold the general idea that earthly life derives from the authentic love of a divine Source is ... the Ngalanje of central Angola. According to this latter myth, the first man, *Féti* (from *Okuféti*, "beginning"), who was dropped from heaven and who began life as a hunter was without human companion prior to his encounter with Coya (from *Okuoya*, to complete). Eventually this later complementary work of Hyen-Nu's infinite creativity took place along the Cunene River where, after exhaustion from previous wanderings or hunting trips, *Féti* had decided to camp and fish. To his bewilderment, instead of the Hippopotamus that he had been pursuing throughout that day, he saw a like female figure emerging out of the Cunene River whom he immediately aided/fished out ... and named Coya. Naturally, as the first female companion on earth she was the most beautiful humanbeing *Féti* had ever seen and could therefore not resist the temptation of falling in love with Coya. The first born of that initial love affair, Ngalanje, would become the original ancestor of all the Ovimbundus of Ngula/Angola.

There is another version of the myth which claims that *Féti* had at least three different wives, namely Coya, Tembo, and Civi. And as one day Civi refused to heed to Coya's plea to inspire her sick child..., with that child's death marked the beginning of death on earth.<sup>367</sup> In other words, hatred (or *Nanng* in Moar meaning scorpion) inspires death.

It is generally mesmerizing that the modern author of this later myth recognizes the myth actual historicity and has subsequently linked it to an archaeological site bearing the same

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<sup>367</sup> Heintze, Beatrix, 1995. *Alfred Schachtzabels Reise nach Angola 1913-1914 und seine Sammlungen für das Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin*. Köln, 52-53; Vansina, Jan, 2004. *How Societies are Born: Governance in West Central Africa before 1600*. Charlottesville/London, 170-174. [http://www.botschaftangola.de/index.php?nav=ueber\\_angola/kunst\\_kultur/feti](http://www.botschaftangola.de/index.php?nav=ueber_angola/kunst_kultur/feti).

name. Missionaries who first found the site in 1893 described it to be as large as contemporary Lisbon. Despite the unprofessionalism of early colonial excavations that was responsible for the damage done to the site and its archaeological treasures, most scholars have upheld the site overwhelming historical and cultural significance to the social history of the region as a whole. Scholars, for instance, have spoken about a 6 meter deep and circa 10 to 12 kilometre long defence wall on both sides of the Cunene River. In addition, they also found a 5 meter high and 15 meter wide Stone pyramid, graves, ceramic and diverse iron tools, copper and a dog figure in copper. Essentially, like the same culture developments in neighboring Zimbabwe..., a fastidious study of the symbolic characters associated with this later myth and or actual site (e.g. Hippopotamus, water, female, birth and so on) would eventually prove that we are once again dealing with the relics of a subculture that without doubt echoes the authentic culture of the Azanian nation. For instance, the ‘Hippotamus deity of dynastic Egypt, Apet, was not only equated with the Sky goddess but assisted as midwife or nurse at the birth of the Sun-god’ (Budge, W., 1934: 242).

Thus if, according to this model, authentic knowledge and love animate infinite creativity and hatred and greediness inspire destruction and death, what specific culture sense could be made of the unfolding survival drama between the Rabbit and the Wolf/Jackal? How do we explain the market psychology/mentality of the Wolf whose life philosophy seems naturally dependent on the butcher’s table? What could be learnt from it in terms of the cultivation of a genuine human culture suitable for harmonious social intercourse?


#### 4.3.1. Reviewing the Survival Concurrence between the Rabbit and the Wolf/Jackal

Astonishingly, most scholars and local authors who have dealt with the moral aspect of this mainly Bantu-Ethiopian myth have done so without making reference to the concept of Azania. Susanne Ewing Bölke, who lectured English in the department of *Anglistik/Amerikanistik* at the University of Hamburg (Germany), and introduced me to the Black-American version of the myth in a Seminar titled *Folktales and Legends of the New World* (2004), saw it as alluding to some sense of moral superiority on the part of the enslaved Negroes over their capitalist enslavers. This linguistic scholar who then was more concerned about the impact of the political developments in the New World on the identity process of her native America, USA, seems literally unaware of the fact that that myth she termed as a Black-American tale has a much more profound socio-cultural and historical background going way back to the pre-dynastic period. It was only after I inferred to the centrality of the

rabbit and wolf/dog-headed gods in the mythology of dynastic Egypt she finally realized that the culture significance of that particular myth goes far beyond the political developments in her native America.

At the local level, Nelson Mandela, whose legend about “Mmutla” (the Rabbit) and “Phiri” (the Hyena) also comes somewhat closer to the original idea in terms of that legend’s emphasis on the different cognitive approaches to life by these wild-life adversaries, fell short of mentioning Azania in his compilation of tales originally intended for children.<sup>368</sup> Indeed, every process of culture indoctrination begins often with neophytes. On the other hand, one could reasonably argue that probably after the demise of the main centres of the institutions of the Bantu-Ethiopians national culture in Thebes/Karnak, Manfour, et cetera most national myths would have been later exposed to the exigencies of local specifics. Keeping this in mind, let’s opt for a critical review of Moab(a)s oral version of the survival concurrence between the rabbit and wolf since this later myth not only addresses the origin of the Azanian concept, but tends to convey a relatively advanced ethical message that is applicable to all sectors of the national community.


Thus according to Moabas culturalists, the Rabbit and Jackal/Wolf had once been loyal and law abiding members of a mythical community in some part of Azania—inhabited by both human beings and the wild-life. Of course, in normal socio-cultural context it is only natural that good and law abiding neighbors assist each other in times of need or crisis. And thanks to the rigorous and strigent ethical norms of that culture, which tended to brand even the slightest carnivorous behaviour among community members as witchcraft—punishable by death..., that mythical community was the most prosperous, peaceful and safest in region, as illustrated in this satirical pictography:



The Wolf depicted as a goat-herd and the cat as Goose-herd (Satirical pictures from London Papyrus).

<sup>368</sup> Nelson, Mandela, 2004. *Meine Afrikanische Lieblingmärchen*. München: C.H. Beck, 43-48.

The peacefulness of the former community is contrasted with the lawlessness of the latter community:



The king of the mice, standing on his battle chariot, drawn by dogs, is besieging the fortress of cats.  
From Turin Satirical Papyrus both are reproduced in Erman's *Life in Ancient Egypt* (pp.369, 520).

Despite having, on one occasion, sighted the youngest son of Wolf with what seems to look like a wet bone; and the growing incidents of child disappearances in the outlying communities plagued by violence, lawlessness and crime, rabbit was virtually unaware of his closest neighbor's double life-style. And, indeed, had in the past borrowed some food from him and promised to repay in kind the following harvest. Unfortunately, those days are long gone when the neighboring villages were reluctant about adopting stringent security measures to counter the growing pandemic of child disappearances. And with surmounting pressures now from the Wolf to repay the outstanding debt prior to the next harvest ... due to the successive failures of his recently adopted nocturnal trips; and the prevailing rumors about half-starvation in Wolf's court ..., rabbit had no choice but to disclose the date of the most important culture event to his increasingly impatient and half-starved neighbor—but provided Wolf would agree to be his horse for that special culture event. The reward, as noted elsewhere, was of course the fattest and strongest bull ritually sacrificed and offered to the best performing horse of a dancing competition held for the opening ceremony of that mysterious market on a sacred lake. The rabbit had not the least doubt about his horse victory on that occasion provided it would undergo the rigorous and systematic preparatory training on the streets of their community. In the case of a victory, so the rabbit, wolf would definitely have had much more harvest for the rest of the season rather than having to risk his life every night, especially amidst the surmounting hostility against strangers from the neighboring communities. Apparently left without an alternative choice, wolf was quick to accept the offer; and after a prolong and rigorous preparatory training...; and with the judges having selected the falcon and two monkeys as the referee and the linesmen respectively; and the date already set for that culture event and now known to almost everyone in the region, rabbit had

every reason to be proud his horse, having successfully drilled it on the streets of their community.<sup>369</sup>

On the day of that special culture event, Rabbit left home earlier than usual so as to find the right position for his golden decorated horse where the Sun-rays could expose it to the invited dignitaries, the jury and the audience. And his plan seems to have worked perfectly well. Even before the closing bell had rang..., a spectator close to the jury informed rabbit about his horse outstanding performance and the subsequent victory. In order to ascertain the accuracy of that unofficial report, the then ebullient rabbit decided to tie his horse under a tree (tree of life?) by the Lake. However, to his astonishment and dismay he was told by the jury that the gods of the land had, on that specific event, voted unanimously for the blood and flesh of the victorious horse. In other words, the gods of the land had unanimously decided on that specific occasion that the butcher must experience his own table. And since nothing could overturn the culture verdict of the gods of that land, rabbit had to hasten and inform his horse about the unusual verdict of the jury; and luckily for the wolf the rope was not tied tightly enough as to hinder an eventual escape.

Putting aside the question whether or not the healthiest and strongest red-ox/bull would have been actually sacrificed for that special culture event, there are two philosophical conduits that could be deduced from this particular mythology, namely that the rabbit succeeded in turning the Wolf into his horse for that culture event attended by the prominent personalities of the region, including wolf's father-in-law's family, speaks mountains. On the other hand, it is intriguing to know that some one whose life philosophy seems intrinsically dependent on the butcher's table or the lives of others should himself be so afraid to die? One can foresee why after narrowly escaping the death trap—of what tends out to be a culture intuitional exercise—the Jackal/Wolf must have automatically earned itself a place among the Judges of the dead. This genuine culture decision to include Anubis among the judges of the dead is justified because only those who understood the eternal essence of life were qualified to judge the dead in the culture institutions of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom.

Another culture role attributed to Anubis, and which does not deserve additional elaboration because the early form of Thoth was a dog-headed deity, is the invention of the hieroglyphics. Thus, when the elderly of the Dogons in present day Mali often seek the cause of a person's death in the footprints/footnotes of a mysterious wolf/jackal that only operates under the darkness of the night, they merely tell us that the dead person is culpable of her/his own death. Succinctly formulated, earthly lives dependency on the carcass of other lives ... is tantamount

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<sup>369</sup> It seems the rigorous training on the streets of their community was deliberately intended at demonstrating to the most beautiful daughter of the community's chief that, after all, that my adversary is only but my horse...

to accentuating or justifying one's own death verdict.<sup>370</sup> And as Eyre rightly remarks, similar legal function was, in the culture history of dynastic Egypt, also assigned to Crocodiles.<sup>371</sup> Indeed, a critical look at the dynastic Egyptian myth, which details the conflict between Bata and his elder brother, provoked by the seditious life-style of the elder brother's wife, who had once attempted to lure Bata into an illicit love affair..., would prove that both the cattle under Bata's care that evening and the crocodiles that hindered the revenge seeking brother from crossing to the other end of the Nile played similar culture roles in the rescue of the hero's life (Sayce, 1895: 25-30). In fact, the Sphinx, with its human head and lion body, suffices as a clear indication that the Bantu-Ethiopians national culture had the original intention of cultivating these bloodthirsty wild-life neighbors with genuine human culture. Hence, from whence the concept of Azania is derived, which, in the simplest socio-cultural and historical context, sought to converge the acmes of the diverse philosophies about life into a homogeneous life serving culture.

It can thus be argued without erring that not only the harbinger of all legal doctrines, the Maat, but education in general is a culture good derived from genuine culture quest for a perfect humanity. This is not to deny the fact that political agents are generally apt at appropriating the institutions of national cultures in an effort to sustain their economic institutions of power. Therefore, unlike the Maatian doctrine which was culturally derived to guide humanity in its innate quest for real freedom, the economically derived legal codes from the Mesopotamian city states, which were later inherited by the modern Leviathans and Behemoths, were generally intended to terrorize humanity into submitting to the economic institutions of political power.

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<sup>370</sup> Interestingly, Wolf/Jackal often turns to the grass or vegetation when seriously sick. And Mandela has also pointed to similar development concerning the friendship between Simba (the Lion) and Sunguru (the Rabbit) as Simba was once almost dead on his sick bed ... (see, *Meine afrikanischen Lieblingsmärchen*, 2004: 49-52).

<sup>371</sup> Eyre, C. J., 1976. "Fate Crocodiles and the Judgment of the dead." *SAK* 4, 103-114.

## V. CONCLUSION

Notably, the enquiry into the Mytho-reality Complexity of the Azanian Nation began with a critical review of the scientific literature specialized in dealing with the main contending social forces, namely the culture upholders of the national phenomenon and the economic advocates of the state system. This was rather ineluctable in terms of establishing which one of these social organizations lurks the original; and or problematizing conventional wisdom about what constitutes ethnicity in colonial African politics in particular. While this research has consistently defended the antecedence of ethno-culture nations, it is also undeniable that economic forces are generally apt at appropriating the culture institutions of nations for the sustenance of their economic institutions of political power. Hence the perception that the modern division of colonial Africa into territorial states; and the consequent heterogenization of pre- and post-independence Africa's ethnicity—with the directly related pseudo-nationalist implications—was the result of such economically induced external political interventions in what was once an ethnocultural national community of the Bantu-Ethiopians, the Azanians. Since the then capitalist dominated and industrializing Europe, responsible for the creation of extant African states, was itself plagued by class struggles with racial connotations, it is only reasonable that their treatment of non-European nations wouldn't have differed from the established local political norms. But as noted elsewhere, the predominance or pre-eminence of the agents of divisive politics—with the related political nationalisms—from the dawn of Europe's social history does not necessarily overshadow the tenacity of the upholders of genuine culture among the Europeans.<sup>372</sup> Despite some European politicians involvement in non-European conflicts abroad today (e.g. Congo, Chad, Sudan et cetera), at least the rejection of the political culture of the blood-stained swords of Europe's Leviathans and Behemoths ... after the Second World War is yet another indication that the culture upholders of Europe's popular conscience are reliable allies of the Minoan Apis Bull in terms of their commitment to service of life.

In this view, genuine nationalism, the ideological basis of the national phenomenon, is described as an immarcesible culture movement subservient to life (*Manfou(i)r*, infinite phenomenon)—a concept borrowed from an extant Bantu-Ethiopian group called Moabas, with *Maann* in Moa(i)r, the language of the Moabs, meaning phenomenon while *Fou(i)r* (infinite) is derived from *Fouiin*, respiration. Not surprisingly, absolute social order is deemed ineluctable for the cause of genuine nationalist, whose culture mission is to intuitively

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<sup>372</sup> Despite Gilgamesh violent rape of the culture institutions of Anu in Sumeria he was generally explicit about his desire for immortality.

cultivate a perfect humanity capable of perceiving absolute truth about life and thereby ordering itself accordingly. In other words, unlike the politicized democratic state-nation that customarily tends to require its citizens to “acknowledge social facts—about power (e.g. the privatization of global economic gains and the nationalization of global economic losses; and or the marriage of convenience between the political state and the culture nation), exclusionary conduct, and absented others, et cetera, “culture nations demand from their members nothing less than the obedience to absolute truth.”<sup>373</sup>

Culturally, the Azanians/Bantu-Ethiopians, as a homogeneous ethno-cultural national community, began their inquest into the deepest/darkest fountain of life (*Manfourir*) with the concept of an androgynous Hyen-Nu, whom they considered to be the authentic and perfect manifestation of life—that is, the inseparable embodiment of the soul and the body (immortality); and hence the authentic measure of their national culture. This universal belief among the Bantu-Ethiopians of being capable, intellectually and culturally, to reintegrate the immortal soul/spirit, which had demonstratively left the easily corruptible and decaying earthly human body in its righteous desire to join the immortal Hyen-Nu, with the deceased body [as in the resurrection of Osiris] seems to explain the old-age Azanian tradition of mummification. And while it would be erroneous to impose dates on this indigenous Ethiopian custom, it can be said without erring that “the oldest of human remains found in Ethiopian-Egypt bear upon them traces of the use of bitumen, which proves that from the very beginning of their stay in the valley of the Nile the locals made some attempt to preserve their dead by means of mummification” (E A. W. Budge, 1995: 157-158). Naturally, that the object of this particular national culture was the intuitive elevation of the cognition of their community members to par that of the inhabitants of the celestial provinces also explains why the culture custodians of the Bantu-Ethiopians/Azanians originally identified terrestrial lives with celestial bodies, stars. And had inline with this unique culture endeavour developed the appropriate monolithic culture institutions along the valley of Nile, the source of which is found the Island of the Double Cave and ... the mountain of the Moon [the highest peak in Azania], where the ancestral spirit of the Bantu-Ethiopians together with the matriarchal Nile goddess Hapi are deemed to be located. In any event, the culture imperative that from the onset compelled the Azanians to become among the earliest of all settled native communities also saw them grow in enormous wealth; and with such wealth came the need for specialization in their study of celestial bodies and the related monolithic culture structures attributed to that unique national culture. Further, it would seem that this innate quest for

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<sup>373</sup> George, Shulman, 2008. “Thinking Authority Democratically—Prophetic Practices, White Supremacy and Democratic Politics.” *Political Theory* Vol.36 No.5, 709.



immortality was undoubtedly behind the far reaching culture explorations which the Ethiopians are known to have undertaken across the Earth from the Azanian mainland; and in the process would undoubtedly have attracted the economic interests of wandering political barbarians from the North, who at the time were generally busy surviving from the implacable—but culturally ineluctable—whirling winds of the North from the scratch.

True, the political alliance that was to later incrementally undermined the continuity and advancement of the Azanian culture came originally from the northern fringes of the then geographically extensive but sparsely populated Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom. Although the culture custodians of the Azanian nation treated the subject of the interaction between the Southern and Northern winds and or polar stars mythologically, especially during their Stellar Mythos; and are also known to have equated earthly beings with the celestial bodies, it is still unclear how to interpret the four earthly geographical regions that became prominent in the literary texts of their Solar Mythology nationally, as would Wallis Budge in his *From Fetish to God in Ancient Egypt* when he alluded to the ancient Egyptian perception of the Lords of the North as referring to the Greeks (1934, 1988: 423).<sup>374</sup> Importantly, the factual intervention of the founders of the 11<sup>th</sup> Dynasty (2300-2065 B.C.E) in the Levant ... seems to suggest that they then generally put the blame of the internal political crises of their national culture on external political agents.

Undeniably, while the culture intervention of the Bantu-Ethiopians was in those days strengthening to the culture stream of the European national conscience—for it succeeded in forging unity among the Graeco-Europeans, and, above all, in transforming the once wandering and warring political barbarians into a sedentary folk..., there is equally no doubt that it was insufficient to hinder the political leaders of this predominantly nomadic population from the North from reasserting their economically induced political way of life. And after the Trojan war, in which the Ethiopians took a decisive role in support of their culture allies, the political victors of that war reestablished their highly politicized patriarchal social order—that is, the divisive and economically unsatiated polis system on the ruins of the then retreating matriarchal social order from the South.

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<sup>374</sup> e.g., in the Pelasgic Myth of creation we are also told, Eurynome, the Mother of all things, emerged from chaos. ... Then, capturing the North wind She caressed him with her hands and lo and behold Ophion the Great Serpent emerged (Homer Iliad V223; Plinius VIII 67; Plinius IS.IV35; Kalopoulos, 2003:24). Eurynome and Ophion dwelt on Mountain Olympus from the beginning of things (Homer Iliad E 898; Hesiod Θ 113; Pausanias H 1.2; Kalopoulos, *ibid*). But Ophion infuriated Eurynome when he claimed he was the Creator. At once she crashed his head with her heel, and banished him from heaven to the darkness of subterranean caves. Then the Goddess created ... the first man was Pelasgus, the ancestor of the Pelasgi. He sprang from the land of Arcadia. ... Pelasgus taught them to construct (round) huts, to eat the fruits of the earth and to sew leather garments from the skins of animals, like those still worn by the poor (*ibid*). Essentially, that the lord also produced garments from animal skins for Adam and Eve (Genesis 3.21; Kalopoulos, 2003:25) merely reiterates the early perception that most of the later talmudic or biblical writers had indeed a European background.

However, culturally the patriarchal victors of the Trojan War, now at helm of the divisive city states, the frontrunners of modern European states [with their pseudo-nationalist implications], were naturally confronted with the challenge of how to respond [even] economically to such natural phenomenon as the perpetual upshot/growth of the native population? Using the economic data of the mainly capitalist dominated political states of Western Europe, I stressed that powerful politicians in the past responded economically—that is to say economic mindedly, to this natural phenomenon either by transferring the so-called surplus population [of nations?] to the so-called New Foundlands; or the deliberate management of their own populations through enslavement, as early with the peasant Slavs (whence *slave* is derived); or through cyclical intercommunal wars (dubbed nationalist), as with the modern European confessional/sacred-secular wars after the disintegration of the Roman Empire or the so-called First and Second World Wars; and not to forget the modern political genius of man made epidemics to dissiminate native populations, as with Spanish experiment with the native American population during colonialism, which merely recalls the political genius of Abraham's Chaldean sorcery in terms of its effectiveness in the amassment of foreign territories.

In today's global economic context, I used the economic model of the late industrializing economies, especially the recent Chinese infrastructural development policies (e.g. the permanent *Betonierung* of China's farmland with concrete, steel, and glass mausoleums; and or the one child policy, to demonstrate not only what is already known to classical Greek scholars—that is, the shrinking farmlands of the territorial states, and the associated mass starvation, cannibalism and the subsequent colonial policies customary of the expansive policies of the state system at the expense of native cultures, but to highlight the ruinous aspect of such myopic economic policies with the associated piecemeal economic golden ages and relentless economic recessions.

Importantly, setting aside the fact that modern economic indicators—e.g. the elevated life expectancy rates of industrialized economies—are aimed at the original culture measure of perfect humanity (eternal being); the post-industrial economic trend of sustainability we observed earlier of the historic Enkidu<sup>375</sup>; the current wave of partial or complete nationalization of financial institutions and some key industries after the failed Chinese

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<sup>375</sup> In fact a closer look at the *Maatian* legal text would also prove that the destruction of the kingdom's forest was among the most serious culture crimes one could commit. And, moreover, while the architects the Pharaonic constructions were known to have used concrete in their constructions, the fact that the local population of the countryside were prescribed with round thatch-roofed buildings was inline with the prevailing idea of sustainability.

experiment<sup>376</sup>; the fact alone that the so-called African nationalist, like their [communist-capitalist?] Chinese counterparts, are once again pleading to share the knowledge of Sustainable Technologies<sup>377</sup> with their partners from the advanced industrialized economies; and their continuing dependence on the failing economic rational and assistance of those industrialized economies, confirm the prevailing apprehension that African politicians and their Pan-Africanist intelligentsia are intellectually incapable of steering the Azanian people toward genuine national freedom. Thus the recent appeal by these culturally indifferent and economically unsatiated global economic nomads to the national phenomenon to rescue the economic mind from the current global economic crisis not only vindicate the reality of the national phenomenon, but also strengthens the age-old nationalists apprehension that the economic mind per se is incapable of delivering in its own speciality.

The fact that amidst the natural perpetual growth of the native population most industrialized economies are now desperately struggling to create even temporal or contractual employment for their citizens suggests that the economic mind is generally ill-equipped for such a genuine culture challenge. If the recent experiment of “One-Euro-Jobs” in Germany, Europe’s Economic Power-house, is the post-modern or post-industrial response to the perpetual trend of the native population, then genuine nationalists have good reason to be wary of the future of their co-nationals in the power state system.

Eventually, for the Azanian nationalists to be able to contribute authentically to the ongoing culture quest for a perfect humanity they must first liberate the Azanian mainland from all forms of colonial interventions as that would enable them to resuscitate the well-known pharaonic “Ritual of Resurrection” and or to plant the seeds of the Great Tree of Life. Despite Azanian nationalists rejection of external political intervention in their culture endeavour to sow the seed of that Great Tree of Life, the fact that from the onset of their social history the culture custodians of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom insisted that the fruits of their nation’s culture institutions was for the entire humanity suffices to repudiate conventional wisdom that nationalists are by nature xenophobic and violent. Such voluntary presentation of the fruits of their national cultures at the advent of Nations intuitional cultivation of that long awaited perfect humanity is in accordance with nationalist general commitment to the service of life.

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<sup>376</sup> The Global economic failure with the Chinese experiment should be understood in light of the fact that China’s infrastructural development was behind the global demand for raw materials; with some economists naively predicting that the Chinese government would require at least between five to ten cities, for the population of between one to two million each year, in order to be able to sustain the housing demand of its growing population. Such unsound economic prognosis forget that the livelihood of the Chinese population depend entirely on the very agricultural land that would be destroyed in the place of these concrete, steel, and glass mausoleums termed cities in modern sense.

<sup>377</sup> <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/publications/imprint/sewps/sewp86/sewp86.pdf>.

Thus contrary to conventional wisdom that nationalists are by nature xenophobic and violent; the present ruinous state of the culture institutions/heritage of the Azanian nation under Arabs colonial onslaught in the northern part of the land of Cham/Kem; or the culturally unwarranted retention of the stolen relics of that unique national culture in the museums and cities of Africa's former colonial masters suffice for the ongoing national struggle for total emancipation of the Azanian nation. As for the Ritual of Resurrection and its twin process of mummification, the culture custodians of the Bantu-Ethiopian kingdom or Azanian nation undeniably took the human conscience to task—that life is not a paradox but an eternal reality; and that through the appropriate culture measures or norms the human cognition is capable of attaining that reality. In fact, when the Moab[a]s in their mythological stipulations generally recall the millenia anniversary of some of their early ancestors—and this, during the Bronze Age of their social or culture history, the modern scientific man, so influenced by the political authority of the economic mind, is often too apt to discount that as a mere myth, pretending there is nothing historical about oral myths of these early ancestors. But the fact that the economic indicators of modern economic Golden Ages tend to mimic the culture measure of life speaks for itself.

The Azanian nationalists accept being consciously submissive to the gerontocratic constitution of Amon in their nation's quest for total freedom. But this is because they consider Hyen-Nu/Amon to be the perfect manifestation of life. What they are unwilling to accept, however, is the erroneous and often biased assumption from the highly politicized Nordic gods that death—the permanent separation of the body from the soul/spirit—is another realistic aspect of life; and or that Amon/Amen is a jealous<sup>378</sup> God suspicious of humanity attainment of the eternal essence of life. Therefore, amidst the natural perpetual growth of the native population—with the natural prospect of it attaining the fifty billion mark in the next century or two<sup>379</sup>; and the related consequences of having to kill and eat all our closest wild-life neighbors—albeit such technological terminologies as horsepowers in the history of

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<sup>378</sup> That the Biblical God was jealous of his own children acquisition of the knowledge of the tree of life also found expression in first Book of the Bible, reason for the banishment of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. In Genesis 3.22, 23-24 we are told, Behold, Adam has become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now lest he stretched forth his hand, and take also the tree of life and eat, and so he shall live forever (see, Kalopoulos, 2003:36-37). Astonishingly, the biblical God is so terrific that only the sighting of him causes death (Exodus 33.20; Kalopoulos, 2003:204). Simply said, the knowledge of him causes death.

<sup>379</sup> A senior UK government scientific advisor, Professor John Beddington, has also recently acknowledged that if the current trend of the exploitation of the earth resources continues, by 2030 when the world population is expected to increase by another two billion (to 8 billion), governments in general would increasingly find it difficult to feed the world population—a position shared by other renown UK Scholars such as Professor David Pink of Warwick University; Professor Jules Pretty (Essex University); and Antony Froggatt, a senior research fellow at Chatham House. If we are to agree with the ancient Bantu-Ethiopians that there is a correlation between upshot of the native population and the infinite expansion of the celestial bodies/stars then the need for an urgent culture solution becomes even more apparent.

industrialization; or the prospects of having to empty the oceans of their fish reserves; not to mention the prospects of having to turn against each other for meat; or, worse of all, uprooting the remaining Great Trees of life...; and in light of the politico-economic responses to this natural phenomenon so far in at least the past three centuries of “economic triumphalism”, until the *eintritt* of “economic skepticism” following the global economic crisis, humanity is now more than ever confronted with the verdict of life, as presented to it by the leaders of these contending principles of social order, namely the culture nation and the economically induced political state. Should human kind consciously align itself with the former and reject the bloodstained swords of the heroes of the Leviathans and Behemoths, it would have accentuated to the fact that life is not a paradox but an eternal reality; and that the ultimate reward for cognitively or judiciously underlining one-self to the green culture norm of life, as did Anubis elsewhere, is the automatic certification of the passage through the Gates of Heaven. However, should human kind be coerced, either militarily, materially, or through political sorcery, to accept the latter definition of life from the mainly political stream that would also have meant accentuating to the prevailing democratic constitutions of the modern state-nations—dominated by mother murderers, sorcerers, homo-sexuals, paedophiles and war mongers etc.—with the unavoidable consequences of having to transport the ashes of this culturally irreplaceable Earth in plastic bags in its innate quest for eternity. The danger of this latter coerced choice, however, is that after incinerating this irreplaceable Earth with the remaining stockpiles of nuclear arsenals..., the myopic economic mind would have denied itself the very culture platform from which it could launch the remaining alluminium capsules destined for [even] the nearest suspended International Space Station (ISS) some few hundred kilometers beyond the blue-skies of a sunny day. Ironically, this later attempt to reach the skies not merely recalls the early culture quest for a perfect humanity capable of inhabiting both the terrestrial and celestial provinces; but the prevailing rumours that modern scientists and their economic sponsors are conducting experiments intended at facilitating the cultivation of vegetation in those alluminium capsules of the ISS is another indication that the Green Crown of the Azanian nation is futuristic and therefore realistic.

Lastly, but not the least, the exclusion of children from the demos that often make the choice of democratic governments tends to strengthen the gerontocratic thesis. The gerontocratic institutions of the Azanian culture is thus understandable given that the specialized knowledge required in terms of the cultivation of that perfect humanity is not different from the special knowledge required to wheel the economic engines of modern democratic states.

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