Walking the Walk or Talking the Talk?

Gender Role Ideology and the Division of Housework in West Germany and Finland

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1 Introduction

Since the educational expansion in the 1960s women and men have become more equal in their human capital investments and in their prospects on the labor market. Nowadays it is even common for women to have higher levels of education than men. However, two things have not changed. Men on average have higher incomes than women, and women are still responsible for the housework. Scholars have exposed an association between these two factors. The remaining income disparities are correlated with greater household responsibilities of (especially married) women (Hersch and Stratton 2002; Brines 1994). Even though it is not clear if the greater household responsibilities are the reason for the income disparities or if they are a result of greater income disparities, there obviously is a relationship between the two factors. This suggests that bearing the responsibility for housework is related to income disadvantages.

The common claim has been that with the increasing number of women in the labor market, there is a change in work and family structures, which also will be reflected in the division of housework (see for example Pfau-Effinger 2010). The research has shown that the increase of double-earner families has indeed had an influence on the division of housework. Women proportionally participate in housework less than they did during the last century. The change, however, has not meant that men have increased their time spent on housework in the same way as women have increased their time spent in employment. The more equal division of housework has been achieved by a substantial reduction in women's time on housework and a slight increase in men's housework hours (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny 2000; Gershuny et al. 2005; Niemi and Pääkkönen 2001a; South and Spitze 1994). The fact that men have not increased their time on housework in the same manner as women have decreased their time has indirectly lead to a general reduction in the time spent on housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny 2000; Gershuny et al. 2005; Niemi and Pääkkönen 2001a; South and Spitze 1994).

Studies have shown that women who work long hours spend less time on housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; Blair and Lichter 1991; Gershuny 2000; Takala 2002). The

findings on women's employment hours in relation to their partner's housework hours are somewhat equivocal. Some studies show that men living with women who work long hours spend more time on housework, which accordingly leads to a more equal division of housework (Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Hochschild and Machung 1989) while other studies come to the conclusion that women's employment hours are only related to men's proportional contribution to household labor. In other words, men's proportion of housework has only increased because women, due to their longer employment hours, do less housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; South and Spitze 1994). Therefore, the question is (and has been for some time now): why is unpaid labor (housework) women's responsibility, despite a more equal division of human capital and more equal chances on the labor market for men and women?

1.1 Research gap and research question

Since the 1990s, the academic community has recognized housework as a serious research topic. The research has documented that the division of housework is not only a private concern, but also embedded in a broader context, where the division of housework reflects as well as retains cultural understandings of family, gender, and class relations (Allen and Webster 2001; Blair 1993; Cooke 2004). Most of the research has been conducted in the United States or another single country (Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Halleröd 2005; Parkman 2004; Presser 1994). Only in recent years have comparative studies on the division of housework been available (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Cooke 2006b; Cooke 2007; Drobnič 2010; Fuwa 2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Voicu et al. 2009).[1]

For a long time, the division of housework has been considered a rational decision that is decided in the family (Becker 1993). The decisive motivation for the decision was expected to be relative income, suggesting that the spouse with the higher relative income would focus on paid labor and therefore spend less time on unpaid work, while

[1] The increase in comparative research has partly been a result of new conclusions on the influence of the societal context on the division of housework, but also of available data for comparative research. Especially in the field of analysis of gender role ideology and its influence on the division of housework, there has been an improvement in the data availability.

the partner with the lower relative income would spend less time on paid work and more time on housework (Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 1990; Scanzoni 1982). This assumption is gender neutral.

A number of studies on housework have explored this gender neutral assumption (Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Fuwa 2004; Gupta 2006a; Gupta 2007; Halleröd 2005; Parkman 2004; Presser 1994). The research on the relationship between relative income and housework came to the result that relative income does not manage to explain the mechanism behind the division of housework. The economic argument was only relevant for as long as the man was the one with the higher income; as soon as the woman is the partner with higher earnings the principles predicted by the theories are violated (Brines 1994). If the woman has the higher income, men start reducing and/or women start increasing their time spent on housework. When couples violate the traditional division of labor in terms of earnings (women earn more or spend more time on employment), the deviance is compensated by acting normatively correct at home when dividing housework (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000). Speaking in terms of the doing gender approach, couples in this case *do gender* (Fenstermaker and West 2002). There clearly seems to be a gendered discrepancy when dividing housework.

Therefore, studies have increasingly included gender role ideology in their analysis of the division of housework (e.g. Bühlmann 2010; Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Kunovich and Kunovich 2008; Nordenmark 2004). Generally, more egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles have been found to lead to a more egalitarian division of housework (Artis and Pavalko 2003; Bond and Sales 2001), although the effect has proven to be stronger in countries with generally more egalitarian attitudes than in other countries (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Crompton and Harris 1999; Fuwa 2004; Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Nordenmark 2004). These studies have focused on broader patterns, based on the concept of welfare state regimes that predict similar outcomes for countries that follow a certain political ideology (Esping-Andersen 1990). The results, however, show that the concept of welfare state regimes cannot explain the differences in the division of housework between countries completely. The unexplained differences between countries is a result of country specific differences towards policies concerning

women (Langan and Ostner 1991; Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994; Sainsbury 1999a).

Hence, it should be taken into account that female employment has evolved differently in different countries and under different circumstances. In some countries, higher female employment rates are a result of increased part-time employment and the possibility to work shorter hours; while in other countries full-time employment has been the common employment form for both men and women. Another difference that is important is the motivation behind women's employment. In some countries, female employment has been enforced to achieve gender equity, while in other countries the increase in women's employment has been a result of economic factors such as the demand for labor. The various paths of female labor force participation can indirectly be expected to influence the division of housework.

Furthermore, the concept of marriage/partnership has also evolved over time and depends on social norms. The so-called traditional family form (referring to the family in 1950s Western societies) was based on clear ideas on men's and women's responsibilities. The husband was responsible for the economic security and the wife for the emotional well-being of the family. The concept of the traditional family was associated with values such as fidelity and a life-long relationship (Huinink 1991). Divorce did not fit in with the ethics bound to the traditional family form. This concept is often regarded as universal. However, a closer look at families shows that normative ideas of what marriage/relationships are supposed to be varies a great deal depending on time and place (Giddens 2001). Similarly to changes in female labor force participation, one can expect that different partnership norms indirectly influence the division of housework.

Therefore, I will take a closer look at the gendered norms, gender role ideologies, and the division of housework in two countries with very different approaches towards gender equity and policies towards the family. As suggested by Coltrane (2000b), I will analyze both the relative measure and the absolute measure of housework. Before doing that I will take a closer look at the measure of gender role ideology and differences in attitudes towards gender roles in Finland and West Germany. Furthermore, I will scrutinize the correlation between partnership status and gender role ideology.

My aims are:

1) to analyze the different perceptions of gender role ideology for men and women in West Germany and Finland and to find a comparable measure of gender role ideology for Finland and West Germany,
2) to explore if there are variations in the partnership status according to gender role ideology in Finland and West Germany, and
3) to measure if gender role ideology is correlated with the division of housework.

In other words, I am interested in the question: do couples actually walk the walk or only talk the talk when it comes to the division of housework?

1.2 Choice of countries

The aim of my study is to find out if gender role ideology has an effect on the division of housework. The relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework has been shown to vary across countries (Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; Bühlmann 2010). According to Breen and Cooke (2005), the division of housework is not only dependent on individual ideology but also on the proportion of men and women's non-traditional attitudes. Thus, it can be assumed that individuals with the same gender role ideology, living in different societal contexts, will differ in their division of housework.

Most research on the division of labor has concentrated either on single countries (Anxo and Carlin 2004; Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000) or on comparisons between welfare state regimes (Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005). Analyses of one country exclude the possibility to measure if certain findings are specific to the settings of this country or if they have universal relevance. The welfare state approach makes it possible to differentiate between institutionalized and 'overall' individual behavior, but country specific specialties might be disregarded when including several countries in one regime (van der Lippe and van Dijk 2002). To be able to draw on ideas based on the concept of Esping-Andersen's welfare state regimes and to control for country specific factors, I will do a case study on two countries assigned to different welfare state regimes, namely

West Germany and Finland (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 2004).[2] This procedure follows the suggestions of van der Lippe and van Dijk (2002) to include individual data from different countries and to combine these analyses with in-depth information on the institutional background.

West Germany is mostly considered an ideal type for the conservative welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990). Typical for the conservative welfare state is that social policy measures are directed to the family. The family is considered to be responsible for caring for its members and the state is only bound to interfere if the family is not capable of solving the problem. The so-called traditional family form, where the husband is considered the breadwinner and the wife the homemaker, has served as the ideal norm for marriage/partnerships (Huinink 1991). Therefore, women's employment has mostly been part-time and has more or less served as an additional income (Zuverdienst) rather than an equal contribution to the family income (e.g. Pfau-Effinger 1996; Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001).

Finland on the contrary is assigned to the social democratic welfare state regime, which denotes that social policy measures are directed to the individual (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 2004). The breadwinner-homemaker model was never established in Finland. Because of economic restraints, women's labor was badly needed in post-war Finland when in most countries the breadwinner-homemaker model was recognized as the most desirable family model (Julkunen 1999). This lead to the fact that in Finland, women's employment did not need special enforcement, as gender equity later became a prominent political force. Therefore, part-time employment was never a measure to advance women's labor force participation. Women already worked (full-time) in paid employment at a time when the women's movement was making this attractive for women in other countries, such as Sweden. Therefore, the double-earner

[2] The reason why I exclude the eastern German states from my analysis is that up until the fall of the (Berlin) wall, East Germany was a completely different institution to West Germany. In East Germany, women worked full-time and the number of children cared for in kindergarten was relatively high. Because there are still substantial discrepancies between the former western and eastern states of Germany with regard to the normative assumptions towards and the practice of women's employment (Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Bussemaker and Kersberger 1999), I prefer to keep these 'sub-societies' separate for the analysis.

couple has a much longer tradition in Finland compared to other Nordic countries (Julkunen 1999).

My aim is to compare two quite different countries in terms of female labor force participation and policy measures, and to analyze why women remain responsible for the housework and if this varies for West Germany and Finland. By comparing these two countries, I avoid disregarding some gender specific differences that have been ignored in the analysis of Esping-Andersen, without disregarding the societal context (Langan and Ostner 1991; Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994; Sainsbury 1999a).[3]

1.3 Outline of work

The outline of the work is as follows. In Chapter 2, the most important theoretical concepts are presented. I will begin by describing the most frequently discussed theories that concern the relationship between relative resources and the division of housework. Three main aspects of relative resources are addressed. I will start by introducing the perhaps most prominent theory by Gary Becker (1993) on the advantages of specialization on paid and unpaid labor, which is followed by the so-called bargaining approach (Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 1990; Scanzoni 1982). Both the bargaining approach and the economic theory of the family arrive at the assumption that the partner with the higher relative income will do less housework than the partner with the lower relative income. The third aspect of relative resources concerns time. The so-called time availability approach is based on the assumption that the time each individual has available determines how much time will be devoted to housework (Bittman et al. 1999; Gershuny 2000; South and Spitze 1994). The main argument of the time-availability approach is that the more time an individual spends on employment, the less time can be devoted to housework. Generally, the theories that discuss the relationship between relative resources and the

[3] The provision of child care has found to differ to a large extent among the countries that according to Esping-Andersen belong to the conservative welfare state regime (Bussemaker and Kersberger 1999; Gornick et al. 1998; Larsen 2004; Lewis 1992; Meyers et al. 1999; O'Connor 1999; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994), as do policies towards female employment (Gershuny 2000).

division of housework rely on the concept that individuals act according to rational considerations about how to divide time between paid and unpaid labor.

Because research has shown that gender has an additional impact on the division of housework after discussing theories on relative resources, concepts of gender and the division of housework are presented. Gender is seen a construction of symbolic interaction, and the division of housework is defined as acting according to normative ideas on masculinity and femininity (Fenstermaker and West 2002). Principally this means that women do housework because it is considered feminine and men refrain from doing housework because that is masculine.

After discussing gender as a product of symbolic interaction, the perceptions indicated by the approaches of doing gender and symbolic interaction are conceptualized in the definition of gender role ideology. In a first step, theoretical assumptions are addressed. This is followed by theoretical ideas on the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework. The assumption is that women (and men) do not hold homogenous attitudes towards gender roles, but have heterogeneous perceptions on how to conduct their lives according to gendered norms (Hakim 2000). Here the focus lies on the implications of gender role ideology on individual decision making such as forming a partnership and dividing housework (Breen and Cooke 2005).

Since the division of housework is expected indirectly to depend on the labor market opportunities of each partner (i.e. education, employment and income) and the cultural context, in Chapter 3 I will describe the historical setting of female employment. First, the reasons for the selection of countries are explained more fully, which is followed by a detailed description of the countries in question. The main focus is on social policy towards the family and the gendered division of resources in Finland and in West Germany. Differences but also similarities of both countries are debated and the expected influence of the societal context on the outcome of the division of housework is addressed.

Chapter 4 is concerned with the empirical side of studying the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework. An initial overview of the data used for the analysis is provided, before presenting the actual analysis. After the brief description of the data, I will carefully look at the measure of gender role ideology to find differences

but also similarities in Finland and West Germany. To be able to see how normative assumptions assigned to partnerships between men and women influence the division of housework, and to be able to rapply Breen and Cooke's (2005) theory of the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework, I will analyze the relationship of partnership status and gender role ideology and how this is moderated by the societal context.

The next step in the analysis is the impact of gender role ideology on the *relative division of housework*. First of all, the analysis focuses on the relative division of housework. The question is: is a non-traditional gender role ideology associated with a non-traditional division of housework? The second step of the analysis is scrutinizing the time men and women spend on housework. By conducting separate analyses for men and women, it is possible to observed what makes men increase and women decrease their time on housework.

The last chapter summarizes the results of the empirical analysis and combines them with the theoretical approaches. The impact of gender role ideology and relative resources for the division of housework in different societal settings is discussed and suggestions for future studies are made.

2 Theoretical framework on housework

Marital laws, but also unwritten norms for the family, define the duties of husbands and wives. In some cultures, marriage has long been considered an economic liaison. For example, among the European aristocracy marriage has traditionally been the basis of transmission of property (Giddens 2001). In the so-called traditional family form, which mostly refers to the family in the 1950s, marriage was no longer seen as an economic alliance but instead based on the idea of romantic love (Giddens 2001; Huinink et al. 2001). The contribution of men and women to the family economy, however, was normatively clearly defined. The husband was to earn the family income and the wife was assigned to provide for a clean home and to look after the children. The so-called traditional family was at the same time a symbol of values, such as fidelity, trust, and a life-long relationship (Huinink 1991). Children born out of wedlock and divorce were out of the question.

Since then, changes in attitudes and behavior can be observed. Divorce has become more common, men and women both invest in labor market skills, and relationships are expected to be rewarding not only economically but also emotionally (Giddens 2001; Huinink and Röhler 2005). The contraceptive revolution and the equal opportunities revolution have offered new lifestyle choices, especially for women (Hakim 2000). Nevertheless, marriage (or cohabitation) is still a popular form of living and even today's families underlie economic necessities that restrict families' lifestyle choices. When analyzing the division of housework I focus on the changes in attitudes and preferences towards men and women's roles, yet without disregarding economic/rational motives.

Before going into the empirical analysis I will on one hand, discuss theoretical approaches that assume that individuals consider marriage an economic liaison. On the other hand, I will discuss approaches that believe that behavior in a marriage beyond economic motives is motivated by normative ideas of gendered behavior. I will start with theories that regard the division of labor in the household from an economic perspective. Despite the somewhat different position, all these theories come to the conclusion that relative income defines the division between unpaid and paid labor in a partnership, and will therefore be referred to as *relative resources* theories. The economic perspective is broadened by ideas of time as a resource and its impact on the division of housework. This perspective is often called the *time availability* approach.

As already mentioned, marriages (or relationships) today are not only considered economic entities in which children and cleanliness are produced (Becker 1993). Marriage is also assumed to provide a normative frame on behavior and to be responsive to different normative ideas on how men and women should behave (Fenstermaker and West 2002). Hence, in addition to the gender neutral theories on *relative resources* and *time availability*, ideas about the *construction of gendered behavior* are discussed. Relying on the idea that men and women respond to norms about feminine and masculine behavior, finally theoretical assumptions are presented which implicitly suggest that *attitudes towards gender roles* have an influence on the division of housework. At the end of this chapter, I will summarize the different theoretical concepts before going into detail about the societal context in which the empirical analysis is conducted.

2.1 Relative resources and the division of housework

In this chapter, economic incentives or disincentives for a certain division of housework will be discussed. The main premise is that the decisions are made in the context of the family/partnership. I will start by describing the economic theory of the family, which assumes that the economic utility of a family is greatest when spouses specialize on paid or unpaid work (Becker 1993; Ott 1997; Polavieja 2008; Treas 2008). This aspect will be broadened by introducing the economic bargaining approach (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Ott 1989; Ott 1997). The main assumption of the bargaining theory is that housework is an economically unattractive option and remains the responsibility of the spouse with the relatively lower income. Finally, I summarize the main aspects of the theories on the relationship between relative resources and the division of housework and make conclusions on the influence of relative resources on the division of housework.

2.1.1 Housework and specialization

The human capital theory argues that prospects on the labor market are defined by the human capital investments of an individual (Mincer and Polachek 1974). This idea is extended by the economic theory of the family, which in additional to individual characteristics also regards the context of the family. The family is no longer seen as one unit, but family members are expected to decide about the division of labor depending on the human capital investments relative to the partner (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001).

Based on ideas on rational behavior, Becker analyzes the division of paid and unpaid labor in the household (Becker 1993). The basic assumption is that societal change evolves as a consequence of rational individuals' reactions to changing circumstances. In a partnership it is presumed that individuals, living in one household, try to maximize the family's common utility. A marriage is considered a long-term contract and goods, such as children, health, common wealth etc. are produced by the family. Since individuals act rationally, it is presumed that the most effective way of producing goods is aimed at. This is achieved by investing in two kinds of human capital, namely skills

in household production and investments in the labor market. The greatest utility of the family is gained through comparative advantages. The partners are argued to hold opposed skills that arrive from different experiences. The partner with comparative advantage on the labor market will be responsible for the paid labor and the partner with comparative advantages in household labor will be responsible for the housework. Human capital investments are accumulated by the time investment in either paid or unpaid work. Therefore, it would not be efficient for different family members to invest in the same type of human capital, which makes it impossible for several members of the household to have the same comparative advantages (Becker 1973; Becker 1974; Becker 1993). Marriage, according to Becker (1993) is only attractive if the spouses gain from their partner's comparative advantage. Someone with higher skills in housework is expected to be attracted to a person with comparative skills in the market place and vice versa. Thus, not only do individual characteristics matter, but also the characteristics of the spouse are relevant when bargaining the division of labor.

Since married women's employment has increased after the so-called golden years of marriage in the 1950s it could be assumed that the comparative advantages for men and women should have become more similar. Along with the rise of female employment, the number of *female* breadwinner families should also be increasing. However, income differences between men and women remain large and the division of labor rigid. Becker (1993) explains this by the fact that women are the ones who bear children and thus women are to some degree predestined to invest in homemaking. Therefore, boys and girls are differently socialized and thus also invest in different kinds of human capital. Men and women follow different vocations and often specialize according to gender in either male or female dominated occupations.

Because the jobs that are typically performed by women are often remunerated at a lower rate than jobs that are considered specifically male, women are predictably going to have lower income prospects than their partners. Hence, even if women are employed, due to their comparative advantage, they still remain responsible for the housework, which again reinforces their skills in homemaking. Because of their household responsibilities, they furthermore have less energy for the labor market and they gain less labor market specific skills. Therefore, their income remains lower than that of their husbands. According to Becker (1993), it is only rational for a couple to

choose this kind of specialization because only then a maximal utility for the family can be achieved.

Becker does not argue that the division of labor is gendered *per se*, but because of the lower investments in labor market skills, women's comparative advantage often lies in homemaking. According to Becker, income measures the direct advantage from the labor market. Therefore, the partner with lower income prospects from the labor market is bound to be responsible for housework. The division of family earnings is still determined by the division of labor between spouses and by the selection of spouses by education (Becker 1993: 79). Since the division of labor in the household is completely based on economic resources, gender ideology is not assumed to have an effect on the amount of completed housework. However, a positive assortative mating in terms of class, attitudes etc. is predicted, because Becker assumes that 'high-quality men' are matched with 'high-quality' women, and low-quality men with low-quality women (Becker 1993:108). This would mean that even though the partners hold comparative skills in paid and unpaid labor, the partners resemble each other in terms like gender role ideology. Becker (1993), however, does not consider the possibility that the husband and wife share paid and unpaid work equally, because this would mean a decreased utility maximization.

According to Becker, families operate according to altruistic mechanisms – contrary to the labor market, where each individual is concerned about their individual advantage. This means that each family member acts to maximize the family's utility and refrains from actions that would decrease it even though the personal advantage might be reduced. For example, one spouse would refrain from moving to a community where his/her income would be higher if it meant that the household income would decrease. As married couples gain the most by specializing in either market human capital or in household human capital, an altruistic action leads to the division of labor being clearly defined by the comparative advantages of the partner (Becker 1974; Becker 1993). Based on these arguments seven assumptions can be concluded:

1. Because of assortative mating, the partners are expected to be similar in terms of gender role ideology.

2. Because the family's utility is maximized by one partner specializing in paid and the other in unpaid labor, a negative assortative mating is expected in terms of human capital investments.
3. Higher investments in education should lead to better prospects on the labor market. Therefore, the partner with higher educational level should be less involved in housework than the partner with lower levels of education.
4. Because of the gendered segregation in the labor market, female specific investments in human capital might not be rewarded with the same amount of income as male specific investments. Thus, income should be used as a more accurate measure of utility maximizing.
5. Since all family members want to maximize their common utility, the partner with the higher relative income is expected to concentrate on paid employment and the partner with the lower relative income does the housework.
6. Gender role ideology is not supposed to have an influence on the division of labor.
7. Pursuant to the economic theory of the family it can be expected that an equal sharing of housework is rare, since it is not considered effective.

Becker's influential theory has not only met positive resonance, but also sparked criticism. For example, the assumption that specialization of each spouse is the most advantageous strategy for the family has been questioned (Oppenheimer 1997; Ott 1993). When family members are totally specialized, the needs of the family are assumed to be constant and the family structure to be rigid. A total specialization means that the family is inflexible and when one of the family members, for example due to illness or unemployment, is temporarily or permanently disabled to perform his/her duties, the functioning of the family is endangered (Oppenheimer 1997; Ott 1997; Simpson and England 1981). This contradicts the assumption that a specialization is the most efficient strategy for the family, and emphasizes rather the need for a flexible division of labor that is more capable of reacting to external influences. Also, the needs of the family might change during the family life course. For example, when children

are small they need more care than when they grow older, which also reduces the need for housework (Julkunen 1999; Julkunen 2001; Krüger 2001; Oppenheimer 1997).[4]

Becker's theory manages to explain the mechanisms of the breadwinner-homemaker model, yet the breadwinner-homemaker model can be considered a historical exception. In fact, women have mostly worked alongside men (Hakim 2000). In the next section, more dynamic economic models that can be applied to family forms other than the breadwinner-homemaker model will be discussed in more detail.

2.1.2 Economic bargaining

Not only does the economic theory of the family disregard changes in the formation of families, it also neglects possible power relations in the family. Proponents of the so-called bargaining theory have criticized the assumption of altruism in the family. Based on game theoretical concepts they argue that family members act according to different interests and try to maximize their own utility rather than the family's utility (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Brines 1993; Hiller 1984; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; McElroy 1990; McElroy and Horney 1981; Ott 1989; Ott 1997).

According to the bargaining theory, marriage can be considered a contract where each partner wants to reach the best possible conditions for themselves (Blau 1964; Blood and Wolfe 1960; Scanzoni 1982). The division of labor is considered to rely on negotiations between the partners. Like in a business relationship, one of the partners can have a better position and thus stronger negotiating power, which also means a higher probability to enforce their own interests.

Power is defined as the potential ability of one partner to influence the other partner's behavior. Investments in household labor are mostly considered to be marriage specific, whereas qualities on the labor market can be considered relationship independent (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Hiller 1984). Hence, the partner who concentrates on housework is claimed to be more dependent on the rewards from the partnership,

[4] Furthermore, it can be questioned if the investments in market skills and in household labor really should be considered as oppositional, or if not management skills, capacity for teamwork and multitasking can be considered to be improved when taking care of family responsibilities?

while the partner with the greater investment in the labor market has the advantage of his/her human capital even if the relationship ends. Since the partner with the lower relative resources feels indebted and also dependent on future rewards from the other partner, the partner with the higher relative resources outside the marriage has the greater power in decision making (Blood and Wolfe 1960). Thus, this person is capable of better enforcing his/her interests.

As already mentioned, in contrast to Becker's assumption that couples act altruistically, the partners are expected to improve their own utility rather than the family's utility. Because housework offers lower rewards, it is suggested that it is something each partner wants to avoid. Accordingly, the partner with the lower labor market rewards does the housework because he/she feels obliged to do so. The outcome for the division of housework is thus the same as assumed by the economic theory of the family: namely, the spouse with lower relative resources will be responsible for the housework, and the partner with better labor market rewards will be assigned to employment. The only difference between the economic theory and the bargaining theory is the motive behind the division of labor. Similarly to the economic theory of the family, income is considered to be the most exact measure of labor market rewards or relative resources. Hence, the partner with the higher relative income is assumed to have a stronger negotiation power and also to feel less responsible for housework. In other words, the person with the higher income is in a position to buy himself/herself out of the housework. Like in the economic theory of the family, the division of housework is defined gender neutrally. What matters is the relative income. The same conclusion as for the economic theory of the family can be made for the bargaining theory: independently of the person's gender, the spouse with the higher relative income is expected to reduce the time they spent on housework, regardless of whether they are husband or wife.

2.1.3 Economic dependency

In contrast to the models of the economic theory of the family and the economic bargaining theories, the so-called economic dependency model considers the family not solely as an economic unit, but rather as a long-term relationship where intimacies are

shared. Thus, qualities such as loyalty, reliability, desirability, love, and status are more important than economic resources when searching for a partner (England and Farkas 1986). For mating, this means that individuals do not feel attracted to someone with comparative advantages on the labor market, but rather to individuals that possess the same values and ideals, which might also mean that they have the same comparative advantages on the labor market.

In a relationship where presumably children will be raised, trust and reliability are considered important factors for the couple. The greatest utility derived from a partnership is not seen in the economic rewards but rather in a trustworthy relationship. When two people find themselves in a relationship where they can trust each other, they are less likely to leave the relationship. Hence, trust can also be argued to be an important relationship-specific resource. This means that not only economic exchange, but also a social form of exchange occurs in a partnership (England and Farkas 1986). Due to the emotional aspects of the relationship, the exchange in the family is not direct but occurs rather implicitly and the rules of economic exchange are not valid in the family. Because the advantage of marriage is a trustworthy relationship, the partner should not be easily exchangeable. The housework provided by a partner is considered a social form of exchange that is argued to be supplied in return for economic support (Brines 1994). This makes the person who provides housework economically dependent on their spouse. Because the exchange in the partnership is not explicit, the economically dependent spouse is to a large extent counting on the fairness of the partner. This again reinforces the dependency. The dependency is not bound to the person's gender, but is defined by the relative resources of each partner. The partner with the lower relative income will have the part of the dependent spouse, independent of his or her gender.

Even though gender is not explicitly included in the analysis, it is assumed that women are the ones who typically earn less and perform more housework, and indirectly receive an economic reward from their husbands for their contribution (Fuchs 1988). However, it is argued that if women earn more than their husbands, the husbands will be the ones who are dependent on their wives. This leads to the same assumptions as the economic bargaining theory (Brines 1994): the partner with the lower income is responsible for the housework. The difference to the economic bargaining theory is that

the marital contract is not considered to follow the conditions of a free market, but due to the distribution of resources one of the partners is considered to be dependent and the other to be the provider. Since the conclusions from the dependency model are similar to those from the economic bargaining theory, the economic dependency model will subsequently be treated as a form of economic bargaining.

Similar to Becker's theory (1993), the partners are expected to resemble each other. Hence, a man and a women living together are expected to hold a similar gender role ideology. However, gender ideology is not considered decisive for the division of housework, only the economic situation is of relevance for the division of housework. Gender role ideology is not expected to directly influence the division of labor in the household, but rather to be the reason why women are the ones who decide to invest in household labor.

2.1.4 Summary

The theories presented so far have the idea in common that individuals behave rationally and therefore try to improve their own or their family's utility. The economic theory of the family (Becker 1993) basically claims that the greatest utility of the family can be reached by specialization of one partner on housework and the other partner on paid work. The specialization on either paid or unpaid labor is determined by investments in human capital/income prospects on the labor market. Because the greatest utility for the family is reached by one partner specializing in housework and the other in paid work, Becker (1993) assumes that the assortative mating in terms of human capital will be negative. This means that while one of the partners has a high level of human capital, which can be invested in the labor market (e.g. high levels of education or good income prospects), the other partner has good homemaking skills. However, in all other aspects except for human capital investments, Becker claims that the assortative mating will be positive and that the human capital resources are decisive for the division of labor. Thus, the assortative mating is expected to be positive in terms of gender role ideology. Since the family members are motivated by altruism, there is no question about who will perform housework and who will be responsible for earning the family income. The partner with the higher income prospects will concentrate on

paid labor and the partner with the better homemaking skills will do the housework. The division of paid and unpaid labor is according to Becker completely based on human capital investments and is therefore gender neutral.

Theories based on the bargaining concept predict that individuals behave in interaction with each other. The division of housework is a result of a negotiation between the partners. The outcome of the negotiation depends on individual utility functions, and the utility of each partner outside the relationship (Coltrane 1989; McElroy and Horney 1981; Ott 1997). According to the economic bargaining and the economic dependency approaches, utility and negotiating power depend on economic rewards in and outside the marriage. The partner with the higher economic rewards is argued to have a stronger negotiating power and greater utility outside the marriage. Thus, the partner with the higher income will also be able to do less housework than the other partner. According to the economic bargaining and the economic dependency models, the partner with the higher income will do less housework and the partner with the lower income will do more. These arguments are in line with the economic theory of the family, with the exception that power relations in the marriage are taken into account and that neither of the partners needs to be completely specialized in either housework or paid work. The relationship between income and housework is expected to be linear. The amount of housework decreases proportionately to relative income.

According to all previously discussed theories, all individual are assumed to marry or cohabit if it serves their individual utility. If the economic reward is higher when the individual stays single, or if the partner does not meet the individual's requirements (e.g. gender ideology) the person is not expected to marry. For the division of housework it can be concluded that there first of all needs to be an economic incentive for individuals to marry. Bargaining theories predict that the partner with the lower income will have a weaker negotiating power or will be dependent on the other partner, and will thus also be bound to be responsible for the housework.

In other words, according to the theories presented until now the division of housework is a conscious choice between two partners who negotiate either the best possible individual deal or the most profitable arrangement for the family. All of these approaches come to the conclusion that relative income are decisive for the division of housework. Since all the theories presented, despite their differing premises, come to

the same conclusion on the impact of relative income on housework, i.e. that the partner with the lower relative income will be responsible for the housework, I will according to existing literature use the term *relative resources* when talking about the impact of income on the division of housework, and will not in future distinguish between the different theoretical models (see e.g. Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Diefenbach 2002; Gupta 2007; Treas and Drobnič 2010).

2.2 Time availability and the division of housework

So far, economic aspects of the division of housework have been discussed. However, money is not the only resource that influences the division of housework. Besides income, time is an important resource when regarding the division of housework. There are no more than 24 hours in a day, seven days in a week, and 52 weeks in a year, which can be divided in time spent on employment, housework and so called 'discretionary time' (Goodin et al. 2004). In this section, I will discuss the relevance of time as a resource for the decision on the division of housework.

First, aspects are considered that regard the individual distribution of time. Here both individual time consumption as well as the distribution of time on the household level are discussed. After that, ideas about the distribution of time and the possibility to outsource housework are presented. Here it becomes clear that the division of time between employment and housework is not only a matter between individuals living in the same household, but it is also connected to the societal context in which individuals negotiate the division of housework.

2.2.1 Time as a resource for bargaining the division of housework

Becker (1965) has presented a theory of the allocation of time in which he explains what determines the time spent on employment and free time. Households and individuals are considered consumers as well as producers; and each household or individual can only consume the amount they also produce (Becker 1965). In his theory, Becker (1965) more or less concentrates on the division of leisure time and employment, where monetary income equals production. This means that in their leisure

time, each individual can only spend the amount of money they earn during the time spent on employment. Thus, the higher the expenditure during the free time, the higher the productivity of employment needs to be. If a person needs to spend a lot of time on employment to earn the income they desire to spend in their free time, less free time will be available. According to Becker, time spent on employment is dictated by consumption during free time. Each individual (or in Becker's theory each household) spends as much time on employment as they need for the production of commodities they need (desire).

If these assumptions are applied to housework, it can be assumed that each individual (household) spends as much time on housework as they need to produce the needed/desired commodities yielded by household production. The time needed for the housework depends on one hand on the needs and on the other hand on the effectiveness of the production.

The need/demand for a specific amount of housework also depends on the household composition and the size of the house/flat that needs cleaning. In a household with several members, more engagement in cleaning and cooking is needed than in a single person household. Not only the number of people living in a household needs to be taken into account but also their age. For example, older children might contribute to the household production and ease the individual burden of other household members instead of increasing the amount of housework as smaller children do. In addition to household composition and the size of the flat, the demand for housework depends on personal perceptions of cleanliness. This makes it difficult to define how much housework is actually needed in an average family (see e.g. Goodin et al. 2004).

The other aspect that defines the time spent on housework is the effectiveness of producing household commodities. The technical development of household devices over the past century has influenced the production of household commodities (Bittman et al. 1999; de Ruijter 2004; de Ruijter et al. 2005; De Ruijter and Van der Lippe 2009; de Ruijter et al. 2003; Treas and Hilgeman 2004; van der Lippe et al. 2004). Because of technical developments, housework nowadays can be performed more efficiently and it can be expected that less time is needed for housework. However, at the same time as the production of housework has become more efficient, it seems that the standards of housework (e.g. cleanliness) have become more demanding (Gershuny 2000). For

example, even though the time needed to e.g. wash clothes has diminished after the expanded use of washing machines, the time spent on housework in general has not dropped after the invention of the washing machine.[5]

Because time is a limited resource, priorities have to be made for the use of time. According to bargaining theory, the rewards from paid employment are higher than those from household labor (Becker 1993; Blood and Wolfe 1960; Brines 1994). Because individuals are expected to maximize their utility; and the rewards from employment are considered higher than the rewards from housework (mainly in economic terms); it can be expected that individuals rather invest time in employment than in housework. Since only limited time is available, the time spent in employment will dictate the time left to spend on housework. This is sometimes also referred to as the *time availability* theory (see e.g. Bianchi et al. 2000; England and Farkas 1986; Hiller 1984; Sayer 2005; Shelton and John 1996; Treas and Drobnič 2010). Basically, it means that the time spent on housework is strongly correlated with the hours spent on employment. The more time spent on employment, the less time spent on housework.

2.2.2 Outsourcing housework

So far, I have only regarded theoretical assumptions at the individual or household level, but the time spent on housework is not only dependent on the time each individual/household has at their disposal, but also on the possibilities for outsourcing housework (de Ruijter et al. 2005; De Ruijter and Van der Lippe 2009; Gershuny 2000). The possibilities to 'buy oneself off' from housework is dependent on the household income and on the range and price of household production offered outside the household.

Partly, incentives for outsourcing are set by welfare states (Goodin et al. 2004). Research on women and the welfare state has shown that there is a correlation between women's employment hours and the welfare state regime (see e.g. Gornick et al. 1998; Meyers et al. 1999). In countries where child care is supported by the government,

[5] Especially in the USA during the 1950's, technical equipment for the household made housework more efficient, but also set higher standards for household production (Künzler et al. 2001).

women spend more time on employment than on housework (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Geist 2005; Knudsen and Wærness 2008). This suggests that governments set incentives for certain time use patterns for men and women. Goodin et al. (2004), for example, calculated in their study that Finnish parents who both are employed gain ten hours/week of 'discretionary' time due to governmental interventions.

This means that governmental interventions can influence the time spent on housework in two different ways. On the one hand, how much time must be used for employment to be able to maintain a certain standard of living is governed by working hour regulations, minimum wage regulations etc. This again will have an influence on the time that is left for housework. On the other hand, the possibility to outsource housework is influenced by the possibilities that the state offers for outsourcing certain household tasks. For example, in a country where child care is supported by the state, spending time on child care might be more costly than taking advantage of outsourced child care.

2.2.3 Summary

Time, as a resource, influences the division of housework on three different levels. First of all, the time spent on housework is decided at the individual level. A person can only spend the time they have available. If paid work is more important than unpaid work and a certain time has to be spent in employment, only the time that is not spent on employment is available for housework. Second, the demand for housework needs to be taken into account. The demand for housework is influenced by the number and age of people living in the household. The more people live in the household, the greater the demand for housework. Small children usually increase the demand for housework, while older children and an assiduous partner might decrease the individual demand for housework (Pääkkönen and Niemi 2002). Finally, the societal time allocation and possibilities for outsourcing need to be taken into account. If household commodities can be bought on the market at a low price, the incentive to buy rather than to produce may be higher.

Taking time allocation into account when analyzing the division of housework it can be concluded that:

1. The time spent on housework is determined by the individual's needs and desire for the commodities produced by household labor (e.g. the perception of cleanliness or the demand for housework).
2. The division of housework is influenced by the time each individual has at their disposal. If employment is prioritized over housework, only time that remains beyond the time spent on employment is available for housework.
3. The time each individual spends on housework is affected by the time allocation of other individuals or by the possibilities for outsourcing. The possibility to outsource depends on the level of household income but also on the range of household products offered on the market and government interventions.

Like theories on relative resources and the division of housework the time availability approach considers the division of housework a tradeoff between paid and unpaid labor based on consideration on what is necessary and rational in economic terms. Both the time availability and the relative resources aspects consider the division of housework a result of negotiations between two individuals who try to maximize their utility either in the form or money or free time. Normative and societal aspects are totally disregarded by theories on relative resources and time availability.

2.3 Construction of gendered behavior and the division of housework

As previously mentioned, I so far have solely discussed theories that consider the division of housework from the rational choice perspective and that disregard the normative component when dividing the paid and unpaid labor in a household. In consequence, these theories fail to explain why in some families the division of housework still follows a traditional pattern even though the wife earns more than the husband (Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Coltrane 2000b; Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Halleröd 2005; Shelton and John 1996).

Some studies namely show that when the woman's income exceeds the man's, in opposition to expectations from relative resources theory or time availability theory, women still do a larger part of housework than men. (Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Hochschild and Machung 1989; Tichenor 2005). This means that the normative idea of what is feminine and masculine influences the division of housework in a way that cannot be explained on the basis of rationality assumptions. To be able to explain this phenomenon, in the following I will present theories that deal with the social construction of gender structure.

One reason for the different behavior of men and women is argued to be based on the different socialization of men and women. Hence, theories about socialization and gender role ideologies shall be discussed first. To better understand the reasons for the persisting gendered division of housework, concepts that address the symbolic value of gender shall be presented in the following chapters. Finally, the so-called doing gender approach is addressed. On this basis, theoretical ideas on the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework will be developed.

2.3.1 Socialization and gender role ideology

The term socialization generally refers to the process by which children get accustomed to societal norms and values. Gendered socialization can be regarded as a special feature of socialization. Children learn how to behave appropriately according to normative expectations on gender (Alwin 1990; Gupta 2006b; Peña et al. 2010). In contrast to biological perspectives, socialization theories argue that differences between boys and girls are not solely biological but emerge because boys and girls are treated in different ways. I treat socialization simply as the societal influence on gendered behavior. It starts in the family, is influenced by different institutions – such as school – and continues during the life course. When I talk about socialization, I refer only to the norms and values that are ingrained in childhood.

The basic argument in theories on socialization is that individuals seek orientation in role models of the same gender (Alwin 1990; Gupta 2006b; Peña et al. 2010). Hence, if for example the mother is responsible for child care and cleaning and the father is the primary provider, a girl would identify herself with housework, whereas a boy would

orientate himself towards paid work. Furthermore, it is assumed that individuals learn how to behave according to what is normatively expected. In school, for example, not only school subjects are taught, but girls and boys are also expected to behave as 'young ladies and young gentlemen' (Martin 1998). This means that boys and girls learn a behavior according to normative assumptions on how women and men should behave. Since women are traditionally responsible for the housework and men for paid work, girls are anticipated to identify themselves with homemaking and boys with providing. However, if boys and girls are socialized in a so-called non-traditional way, it could be expected that they will also behave non-traditionally in their later lives.

The gender role ideology that is manifested in childhood is expected to influence behavior and thereby especially the division of housework in later life. Gendered structures not only influence individual behavior but are also 'institutionalized' and provide different settings for men and women in which they interact. To better understand the reasons for the persisting gendered division of housework, concepts that address the symbolic value of gender shall be presented in the following.

2.3.2 Doing gender and housework

The doing gender approach is not argued to be simply a role that is played (or displayed, see Goffman 1977), depending on normative expectations. Instead of arguing that societal frames dictate the way individuals perform their gender roles, the proponents of the doing gender approach argue that gender is constantly done/performed in social interaction (West and Zimmerman 2002). Each time people act they express gender. In the doing gender approach there is not only a distinction between gender and sex, but also a differentiation between sex, sex category and gender (West and Zimmerman 2002). Sex is considered the classification into male and female at birth. The sex category, on the other hand, is what is achieved by application of the sex criteria. This does not have to correspond with the ascribed status of sex but is defined as feminine or masculine behavior. However, someone can act unfeminine but is still considered female. To 'do' gender is to act in a fashion that is *gender-appropriate* in a given situation. This differs from the definition of the sex category, which is not an *interactional* accomplishment. Since gender is done in interaction with others, gender

does not simply imply that one lives up to normative conceptions, but each individual can be held accountable for their essential nature as women or men even when they wish otherwise (Fenstermaker and West 2002; Fenstermaker et al. 2002). In the doing gender concept, the focus shifts from an individual level to the interactional and, finally, to the institutional level (Fenstermaker et al 2002). The difference to symbolic interactionism is that the decision to perform gendered tasks is not given by the setting or frame in which individuals act. It is more a result of interaction between two people.

By defining gender as an interactional accomplishment, an attempt is made to combine the rather normative (sociological) and rational (economic) arguments (Fenstermaker 2002). In doing so, individuals are neither seen as actors detached from society, nor as puppets on a string who live up to their gender roles. Gender is seen as influenced by structure but also as operating to reinforce structure. This means, that household production – unlike in the economic theory of the family – is not restricted to producing children etc. but each time a household task is performed, gender is also produced/done. A change in the gendered division of labor is thus difficult. It would premise a change in behavior on the individual level but also on the structural level. Based on the arguments of the doing gender approach, gender determines the division of housework. Women are supposed to do the housework because they are women, and men are argued to be the main providers because they are men. The doing gender approach in this sense explains rather the persistence of gender than offers a possible explanation for a change in the division of housework.

2.3.3 Summary

Theories on socialization and doing gender, basically suggest that women do housework because it is considered feminine and men refrain from doing it because it is not regarded as masculine. Arguments deriving from socialization theory suggest that different experiences of the division of housework e.g. in the family or on the societal level, influence the normative idea of how men and women should behave; and consequently also the idea about gender roles for housework. In this sense, patterns that are familiar from childhood often are reproduced in later life. This means that someone who experienced a traditional division of housework in their childhood will very likely

follow a traditional division of housework themselves. Like the socialization theory, concepts of symbolic interaction and the doing gender approach concentrate on factors that explain the prevailing gendered behavior. Although change in gender role ideologies according to symbolic interactionism and the doing gender approach is feasible, it is described as a complicated process. The focus of these theories definitely lies in explaining the persistence of gendered behavior instead of changes in gender roles.

However, today, more women than at the beginning of the 1950s work in male occupations i.e. in the field of construction, or men stay at home to take care of children and women have more choices than at the beginning of the 19th century (Hakim 2000). Neither socialization theory, symbolic interactionism, nor the doing gender approach explain the reasons to the changes. The aim of the theories presented in the Chapter 2.3 is rather to explain the prevalence of traditional gender roles, instead of explaining how a change in gender roles could occur. Furthermore, these theories assume that women (and men) are a heterogeneous group, who are influenced by similar norms. Therefore, these theories fail to explain different life patterns of men and women.

Thus, in the next chapter, theories based on the idea of changed work-life choices, especially for women, and the reasons for the changed (and the unchanged) situation shall be introduced. I will commence with Hakim's (2000) preference theory that in contrast with the theories presented until now, deals with gender and offers a frame in which individuals according to their own perceptions choose the lifestyle that suits them. She claims that individual work-life choices basically depend on individual preferences. In this sense, she also allows for different life patterns among women as well as among men. Relying on the idea that work-life choices are made according to individual preferences, Breen and Cooke (2005), develop a theory on how individuals based on their own and the expected gender role ideology choose a partner. At the end of the Chapter 2.4, the interaction between gender role ideology and work-life choices are described.

2.4 Attitudes towards gender roles and the division of housework

In the previous section different reasons for gendered behavior were given. According to the socialization theory, girls and boys are treated differently and therefore also behave differently. The theories of symbolic interactionism and the doing gender approach claim that differences between men and women are mostly socially constructed. Behavior is argued to have a symbolic meaning, and each time individuals act they also produce gender. For example, housework is not only about cleaning but also about showing gender identity. Because care is considered feminine, each time women do housework they also confirm their femininity. Men on the contrary confirm their masculinity by *not* doing housework.

The theories dealing with the construction of gender, however, do not pick up the changed situation of women in the labor market. They are more focused on the reasons why gender relations persist and more or less disregard the fact that today's men and women have different options than men and women in the past century. The level of education has risen for both men and women, and the number of women relying solely on their husband's income has decreased (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Blossfeld and Hakim 1997; Cunningham 2007; Hakim 1996). The same is true for the theories discussing the relevance of relative resources (relative income) on the division of housework. They disregard the increasing educational level of women and fail to explain why some couples where the woman has a higher income than the man still follow a traditional division of housework, while others do not.

Thus, in this chapter, theories are introduced that take gender and gendered behavior into consideration *and* deal with the possibility of a change in the gendered division of housework. The preference theory of Catherine Hakim (2000) is based on the premise that men and women living in 21st century have new opportunities and options for their work-lifestyle choices. She argues that the life choices made today are no longer predisposed by biological/natural restrains (i.e. unplanned births) or by laws that prohibit equal opportunities for men and women. This enables – especially women – to act according to their personal preferences differently than 50 years ago.

Hakim (2000) does not explicitly discuss the consequences of the changed situation for men and women and its influence on the division of housework. Therefore, I will in

the next section present a theory that discusses the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework. Leaning on Hakim's idea (2000) that attitudes (preferences) on gender role ideology have gained importance for work-life choices, Breen and Cooke (2005) develop a theory based on bargaining according to gender role ideology. The basic idea is that attitudes towards gender role ideology play an important role for mating behavior/the marriage market, and consequently have an influence on the division of housework. By allowing different work-life choices to depend on individual preferences, I hope to be able to explain why some couples follow the traditional pattern, some 'do gender' and others choose a non-traditional lifestyle.

2.4.1 Preference theory

In contrast to the theories on gendered behavior presented previously, Hakim (2000) has a less rigid and 'structural' idea of gender as a determinant for women's and men's life choices. Unlike the previously presented theories, Hakim claims that gendered behavior is no longer solely a question of general societal norms and ideas of gendered behavior, but rather reflects individual preferences and attitudes. According to the preference theory, especially women today have new possibilities and *perceptions* for combining work and family life. First of all, Hakim (2000) argues that five changes in society and the labor market have lead to new options and opportunities for women in the 21st century.

1. The contraceptive revolution, which has given women reliable and independent control over their own fertility.
2. The equal opportunities revolution, which ensured women equal access to education, occupations, positions and careers on the labor market.
3. The expansion of white-collar occupations, which are far more attractive to women than most blue-collar occupations.
4. The creation of jobs for secondary earners.
5. The increasing importance of attitudes, values and personal preferences in lifestyle choices (see Hakim 2000: 3).

Because of these changes in society, women today have better opportunities for following their individual life choices than 50 years ago. Hakim (2000) points out that women have always been heterogeneous in their preferences and priorities regarding the conflict between family life and employment, but that before the decisive societal changes not all life choices were possible. She claims that only because of the changed opportunities can women's 'true perceptions' now become evident. Hakim (2000) differentiates between three *ideal types* of women: home-centered, work-centered, and adaptive women.

Home-centered women prefer not to work, agree to a traditional division of labor in the home, and are non-responsive to employment policies. They are only responsive to family and social policies that facilitate or reward child-bearing or child-rearing. Home-centered women are not necessarily homemakers during their whole life course. Some home-centered women work prior to marriage and might return to work after marriage. Their priority, however, lies in creating an atmosphere that all family members are pleased to return to after work, maintenance of family relationships, organizing leisure activities, and taking care of general household management. A home-centered woman is not necessarily someone who has few or no qualifications as assumed by economists. Quite a few women attend college or university, but not because they are qualifying themselves for the labor market. These women use the educational system to meet a man with at least equal qualifications. Similarly, workplaces serve as marriage markets. Hakim (2000) points out that the marriage career option remains permanently open for women. The classic example is the young successful woman who realizes that her own talents or determination will not get her very far, and thus drops out of the labor market to become a model wife in a 'two-person career' (Hakim 2000: 161). Therefore, it is not unusual that a home-oriented woman's human capital exceeds her husband's human capital, although she never even planned an actual employment career. Hakim (2000: 158) predicts that approximately 20 percent of the women belong to this group.

The opposite of the home-centered woman is the *work-centered woman*. Even though economic activity is the most common channel for self-actualization, a work-centered woman does not necessarily have to be employed, but might equally well be active in politics, religion, sports, arts, or some intellectual activity. The main characteristic is that these women have their main priority in some other activity than

motherhood or family life. This is the stereotypical 'male career and work history', where childless women are concentrated but not exclusive to it (Hakim 2000: 161). The difference between work-oriented women who have children to home-oriented women is that their priorities do not change suddenly after giving birth. These women are most affected by equal opportunities policies, but are less responsive to incentives to have more or fewer children, or to schemes enforcing homemaking or full-time child care. According to Hakim, approximately 20 percent of women belong to this category (Hakim 2000: 158).

The largest and most diverse ideal type is the group of *adaptive women*. Depending on the societal context, Hakim predicts that approximately 60 percent of women belong to this category (Hakim 2000: 158). The adaptive group consists of women who want to combine employment and family without either taking priority (Hakim 2000: 165). Adaptive women have no definite idea about what they want in life and respond quickly to opportunities as they come or not. An adaptive woman might, for example, take up employment if offered a job even if she were not explicitly seeking one. Some adaptive women will acquire good educational qualifications, but more as insurance in case their marriage ends in divorce or widowhood. The decisions of these women are strongly affected by their husbands. If they marry a wealthy or ambitious man they will engage in supporting the two-person career by actively supporting their husband rather than developing their own career. If they marry someone with only moderate earnings, they work to boost the family income to a higher level. The adaptive group is very responsive to all government policies, just as they are responsive to all other opportunities in their social and economic environment. Hakim (2000: 167) argues that because this group of women is the largest and act on government policy, social scientist have often concluded that women 'generally' can readily be manipulated into working or not working as the government wants, or as the economic cycle dictates, but that this is dependent on the size of the adaptive group and will change as soon as the group of work-oriented or home-oriented women grows (Hakim 2000: 167, 168).

Hakim (2000) argues that because women now have more opportunities than fifty years ago, the different preferences and orientations also become more evident to the researchers. She points out that women's preferences have always been heterogeneous, but only since the new opportunities for women arose have heterogeneous life choices

become apparent. Therefore, conflicting interests between the three ideal-types of women also become clear. For example, home-centered women do not need child care services because they prefer to look after their children themselves, while work-oriented women are more than willing to pay for the cost of child care services. The adaptive women's interests conflict with the other two groups and are torn between the desire to work and to take care of the family (Hakim 2000: 175 pp.). This makes it difficult to find a social policy that meets 'the' needs of women.

Hakim's (2000) focus lies on women, their preferences and life choices and only partly picks up men's preferences after the so-called new scenario that has occurred as a result of social change. Men's preferences do not converge with those of women. Most men belong to the group of the work-centered. Hakim predicts that the number of *work-oriented men* lies around 60 percent. This group is the most diverse group. It includes all men whose priority lies in employment or equivalent activities. It is not about being successful in something, but about being committed to some activity. Both a successful politician and an artist who cannot sell his paintings are included in this category. Generally, men are more homogenous in their preferences than women. Most men who are 'egalitarian' are *adaptive men* who want to combine work and family. Hakim (2000: 255) predicts that ca. 30 percent of men belong to the group of adaptive men, and only approximately 10 percent of men are actually *family-oriented*.

There is only a small overlap between men's and women's work-lifestyle preferences. Most men are work-oriented and most women want to combine work and family roles. Considering the most common combination of a couple, namely a work-oriented man marrying an adaptive woman, the work-life choice for the man is clear, and the behavior of the woman is not obvious. The adaptive woman does not want to choose between family and work responsibilities. She is willing to combine the two spheres. Her behavior most likely depends on her husband's status (e.g. income) or incentives set by governmental policies. The scenario for work-oriented or home-oriented women is clearer. Work-oriented women would always prefer a career to family, and probably when married to a work-oriented man remain childless. A home-oriented woman would happily choose family responsibilities to a career, and would rather support their husband's career. The same is true for home-oriented men. They would also prefer family responsibilities to public responsibilities, while an adaptive

man, would try to combine both and is more sensitive to external influences such as governmental policies or a woman's resources (Hakim 2000).

By taking both men's and women's work-life preferences into account, the preference theory offers a 'unisex' theory without disregarding gender (Hakim 2000). The theory suggest that instead of simply regarding gender and sex, the focus should lie on the social roles men and women *want* to adopt for their own lives. The Hakim's preference theory (2000) focuses on the consequences of attitudes and preferences on women's employment and family, not directly on the division of housework. However, following Hakim's argument that, especially women, have the choice to live the life they prefer, this should also apply to housework. For example, work-centered women who follow their ambitions in the labor market could equally reduce their responsibilities in housework, whilst home-centered women according to their preferences would spend more time on homemaking and reduce their time spent on employment. As already mentioned, Hakim (2000) does not tackle the issue of housework in her considerations and therefore neither addresses the opportunities/restrictions for (especially) women to choose a different lifestyle when it comes to bearing the responsibility for housework. Because housework is as crucial for living as earning an income, it cannot be ignored and it can only be outsourced to a certain degree. Thus, men and women who do not want to participate in housework have to find another way to avoid the work. One solution would be to marry or form another sort of partnership and to transfer the housework responsibilities to the partner. If Hakim's description of the proportions of work-oriented, adaptive and home-oriented men and women holds, the opportunities for men and women are unequally divided. Women have fewer opportunities to marry a home-oriented man than men have to marry a home-oriented woman. What this means for the division of housework has been discussed by Breen and Cook's article (2005), where they propose a marriage game and discuss the consequences of that game for the division of housework. This theory will be discussed in the next section.

2.4.2 Bargaining based on gender role ideology

Relying on concepts from preference theory, Breen and Cooke (2005) argue that social change has lead to new choices for decision making. They claim that due to changes in family formation and uncertainties on the labor market, more flexibility from the family is needed. Women's employment can be considered to provide a greater flexibility for the family economy and therefore to be more desirable for the family than a specialization between the partners into housework or employment (Oppenheimer 1997). To explain the discrepancy between the benefits for the family outcome from a non-traditional division of housework, and from a prevailing traditional division of housework, Breen and Cooke (2005) developed an approach that takes individual attitudes into account. Women's employment has become more desirable and therefore men can be expected to do more housework; or at least it can be assumed that women prefer to marry men who participate in housework. Due to the heterogeneous preferences on the division of housework, information about attitudes towards gender roles becomes important. Unlike Becker (1993), mating is not considered to be based on opposing skills but on a similar idea of the division of labor.

In their approach, Breen and Cooke model the possibilities for two people to marry and to stay married (see Graph 2.1). The moves of each individual are dependent on the actions of the future partner and the individual attitudes towards gender roles. Each partner knows their own ideological type, and is expected to be aware of the general distribution of the existing types of ideologies in the opposite gender. The aim is to find a partner whose preferences for the division of housework suit their own expectations.

Each individual has to rely on the information the partner gives them to determine the partner's gender role ideology. The true attitudes only become visible after marriage (Press and Townsley 1998). Since women are traditionally expected to have the main responsibility for housework, they are argued to be so-called 'trusters' and to be the ones who decide whether or not to trust the man and to marry him (Breen and Cooke 2005). The woman's decision to marry depends on her assumptions about the possible partner's gender role ideology. When the couple is married, the next move is made by the husband. He either decides to participate (cooperate) or not to participate in housework (defect). If the husband decides to cooperate, women are expected to

continue the relationship. If not, she has to decide whether or not to continue the marriage, which depends on her gender role ideology. Accordingly, the durability of the relationship depends on the gender role ideology of the woman.

Graph 2.1 The marriage game according to Breen and Cooke (2005).



Male types:[6]
Hardliner: M>B>P>C (always defects)
Adjuster: M>C>B>P
Cooperator: C>M>B>P (always cooperates)

Female types:
Traditional: C>R>S>D (always plays 'Yes'; remains married)
Transitional: C>S>R>D (always remains married)
Autonomous: C>S>D>R (always plays 'Yes')

Relying on Hakim's (2000) and Hochschild and Machung's (1989) categories, Breen and Cooke (2005) distinguish three different types of women and men based on their attitudes towards gender roles. Women are defined as traditional, transitional, or autonomous. A woman who falls into the category *traditional* is expected to accept the role of the homemaker even if she might have to work due to economic circumstances. She will have low investments in human capital and prefer marriage to divorce regardless of her husband's participation in domestic tasks. A *transitional* woman will be full-time employed up to the point when she marries. She will stay at home with pre-school children and will return to employment when the children are grown up (often

[6] S = woman remains single
M = man agrees to marry
P = man divorces (payoff)
C = man or woman cooperates
R = woman remains in the marriage
B = man remains bachelor
D = woman divorces

she will work part-time). This irregular labor market participation is considered to leave the woman economically vulnerable at divorce. Therefore, transitional women are considered, once married, to prefer staying married to divorcing, even if it means a double shift of paid and unpaid work. An *autonomous* woman is one with alternatives to marriage and has good labor market opportunities also after she marries. She is considered to have the least traditional attitudes towards gender roles and also the greatest bargaining power.

Men are also divided into three different categories: hardliners, adjusters, and cooperators. *Hardliners* are men who are never willing to participate in domestic work and child care. They would rather stay single or divorce than lose their role as breadwinner. They would not participate in housework even if it would be necessary for his wife to work. In contrast, *adjusters* prefer not to do housework but are willing to participate in unpaid work if the marriage runs a risk ending in divorce. Therefore, he would participate in housework if his wife has alternatives outside the marriage that might make leaving an unhappy marriage attractive. A *cooperator* is a man who willingly participates in housework.

Taking these categories for granted and assuming that each partner knows the other's 'true' attitudes, it can be expected that *traditional women* would always marry, *regardless of the man's gender role attitudes*. *Transitional women* would marry *cooperators*, but neither hardliners nor adjusters since these would defect when paired with a transitional woman. *Autonomous women* would be able to choose between *adjusters* and *cooperators*, because both of them would cooperate when married. Autonomous women would never marry a hardliner.

The next step in the marriage game is that men decide to participate in housework (cooperate) or not (defect). *Hardliners* will never do any housework. Since *traditional* women are always willing to do the housework, hardliner men and traditional women would be a perfect match. Transitional women would not be happy about a hardliner's reaction, but since transitional women are considered to follow a 1½ breadwinner-homemaker model, they have reduced their opportunities outside of marriage and will stay married regardless of the spouse's participation in housework. If an autonomous woman did marry a hardliner man, she would file for divorce when she noticed that she alone is solely responsible for the housework. An *adjuster* would prefer not to do any

housework, but before risking that the marriage ends in divorce, he would participate in housework. Consequently, an adjuster man would only participate in housework when married to an autonomous woman. In contrast to the other types of men, a *cooperator* would always participate in housework.

Since the 'true' attitudes only become visible after marriage, women are considered to decide whether to stay married or quit the relationship, depending on their options outside the marriage. As already mentioned, *traditional* women will always stay married regardless of their husband's participation in housework. *Transitional* women will also stay married regardless of the husband's participation in housework, due to the lack of other possibilities outside the marriage. Only *autonomous* women are considered to have good opportunities outside the marriage and therefore to have the possibility of leaving the marriage if not satisfied with the division of housework.

This would be the outcome if the attitudes of the future partner were known. However, it has been shown that due to social desirability, individuals often claim to follow less traditional attitudes towards gender role attitudes before marriage. Thus, the assumptions before marriage often do not correspond with the behavior after marriage (Bianchi et al. 2000; Coltrane 1989; Crompton et al. 2000; Crompton and Harris 1999; Fenstermaker and West 2002). This leads to a certain uncertainty about the attitudes of the future partner and the possibility that autonomous women marry hardliner men.

In contrast to the individual attitudes, the distribution of types is assumed to be known. To avoid marrying against their expectations, women consider the general distribution of different types of men before marrying. The decision to marry is thus partly based on the estimated probability that women find a certain (right) type of man. Each time a woman meets a man, she assigns a certain probability that he is a hardliner, adjuster, or cooperator. The same is true for men. For each woman they meet, men assert a certain probability that she is traditional, transitional, or autonomous.

Depending on the distribution of male and female types, the outcome of the division of housework will differ. Breen and Cooke (2005) point out that the distribution of autonomous women and adjuster men is the most decisive factor when it comes to a shift from a traditional to a non-traditional division of housework. Based on Hochschild and Machung's (1989) and Hakim's (2000) studies, the proportion of cooperating men

is assumed to be relatively small. This would mean that autonomous and transitional women would only consider marriage in case adjuster men would cooperate. This leads to a situation where a sufficient proportion of adjuster men are needed so that an autonomous woman decides to marry. At the same time, a sufficient proportion of autonomous women are needed so that an adjuster man will be more likely to cooperate. Thus, an increasing proportion of autonomous women will mean a greater participation of men in housework given a sufficient proportion of adjuster men.

2.4.3 The societal context and gender role ideology

According to Hakim (2000), the differences between the work-oriented and home-oriented women living in one country are greater than the difference between a home-oriented woman in one country and a home-oriented woman in another country. Hakim (2000) more or less denies that there is a societal influence on individual decision making. She postulates that each woman and man essentially behaves according to their individual preferences and do not follow a general gender norm. Nevertheless, Hakim's (2000) preference theory relies on the idea that a new societal scenario changed the situation for men and women's work-life choices. The so-called new scenario is according to Hakim (2000) bound to the changes of the contraceptive revolution, voluntary childlessness, the equal opportunities revolution, the expansion of white-collar and service work, and the creation of jobs for secondary earners. All these changes are often connected with country specific legal regulations. Thus, it can be assumed that both the attitudes as well as behavior based on attitudes are correlated with the societal context in which the individuals interact. The earlier men and women are given equal opportunities, the more likely work-oriented women in this country can act according to their preferences. Especially because the group of adaptive women is large and these women react to government policy, the behavior of women and men will be influenced by the societal frame in which they live in.

Furthermore, the division of housework is expected to be correlated with the distribution of work-oriented and home-oriented women and men and their mating behavior. As claimed by Breen and Cooke (2005), the probability for autonomous (work-oriented) women to marry depends on the number of adjuster men in a society,

and only when this constellation becomes more common will the division of housework become less traditional. As long as the individual preferences depend on the societal influence, the societal context becomes very important when tying to understand individual work-life choices. As already mentioned, the construction of gendered behavior and probably also of work-life choices depend on socialization. The formation of gender role attitudes is related to how boys and girls experience the division of labor between their parents and to education at school, which on the other hand is closely related to the societal context. Thus, individual gender role ideology is interdependent with the societal context. It means that in liberal countries (countries with relatively moderate governmental interference) the probability that individuals live according to their preferences will be highest, whereas in countries where the traditional family model is supported by the government, home-oriented women will find the best pre-conditions to follow their preferences. Finally, work-oriented women will find the best conditions to follow their preferences in a country with governmental support for female employment.

In the following, I will thus summarize what personal attitudes towards gender role ideology mean for the division of housework; and after summing up the theoretical approaches presented until now, describe the societal contexts for the 'case studies' in Finland and West Germany that will be empirically analyzed.

2.4.4 Summary

In the previous sections, Hakim's (2000) preference theory and Breen and Cooke's bargaining theory were presented. Hakim's preference theory (Hakim 2000) and Breen and Cooke's (2005) bargaining theory based on gender role ideologies both assume a heterogeneous picture of men and women's gender role ideologies. Hakim (2000) agues that it is only possible to understand why certain choices are made when the different preferences of men and women are taken into account. She criticizes previous theories for holding a too narrow view of especially women's preferences. The perception of a 'one-way-solution' automatically means that certain options are left disregarded or are considered irrational. She also points out that if gender norms are considered a constant factor, social change can not be detected.

Hakim claims that because of the contraceptive revolution, the equal opportunities revolution, the expansion of white-collar and service work, and the creation of jobs for secondary earners today especially women have the possibility to choose different work-life patterns. The various choices might seem irrational or absurd if one tries to explain these choices for everyone similarly. Not everyone has the same motivation for their actions. Only when taking the various preferences into account do several choices make sense and can be considered rational.

Hakim differentiates between three categories of men and women: the work-oriented, the home-oriented, and the adaptive type. Depending on the priorities that are set by the different types, behavior also varies. For example, a home-oriented woman will always prefer family responsibilities to other obligations independently of the economic rewards from other tasks, while a work-oriented woman will concentrate on public challenges. Hakim (2000) points out that women's preferences have always been heterogeneous, but especially in the new scenario women have the chance to realize them. Thus, preferences become even more important for the work-life choices in the 21st century.

Hakim's preference theory (2000) offers an explanation for women's work-life choices. Picking up from there, Breen and Cooke (2005) develop a theory that describes the consequences of heterogeneous preferences first of all for mating behavior and then for the division of housework. Breen and Cooke (2005) argue that especially women find attitudes towards gender roles important when looking for a partner. Because women are the ones who mostly (have to) choose between work and family responsibilities and are traditionally assigned the responsibility for housework, they want a partner who has the same perception of gender roles. A home-oriented woman (traditional according to Breen and Cooke (2005)) would always marry a work-oriented (hardliner) man so that she can concentrate on the family responsibilities, while the husband takes over the financial provision for the family. Because of the large amount of work-oriented men (hardliners), home-oriented women (traditional) will have no problem in finding an adequate partner. Work-oriented (autonomous) women on the other hand might have problems in finding a partner who is willing to take the responsibility for the housework because of the small proportion of home-oriented or cooperative men. Breen and Cooke (2005) predict that as long as the number of

'cooperative' men remains small, work-oriented (autonomous) women will not even consider marrying, which again means that the division of housework will remain traditional. Thus, the relatively small number of work-oriented women (autonomous) and home-oriented (or adaptive) men means no change in the traditional division of housework.

On the individual level, the consequence of a small number of non-traditional couples is that independently of income distribution, a traditional woman will feel responsible for housework and will also be willing to do the lion's share, while an autonomous woman will always try to refrain from doing housework. A transitional woman's housework contribution will depend on the husband's action. If her husband (partner) is willing to participate in housework she will be pleased to cut down her share of housework. However, if an adaptive woman marries a hardliner man, she will choose to do the larger share of housework over divorcing this man. Conclusively, this means that transitional women's share of housework will depend on their husband's gender role ideology.

Furthermore, attitudes and norms are connected to the societal context. Not only do individuals form ideas in a certain contexts, but they also perform in these contexts. The different preferences can better be performed in societies where the 'new scenario' has a long tradition. In these societies, the diversity of preferences is expected to be more pronounced than in a country where the possibilities are restricted. Hakim (2000) argues that the 'liberal' countries such as Great Britain and USA will have the most heterogeneous groups of men and women than any other country where the government often either supports the breadwinner-homemaker model or the dual-earner model. For the countries in question, West Germany and Finland, two different scenarios are expected. In West Germany, which traditionally is assigned to the group of conservative welfare states, attitudes toward gender role ideology will presumably be more traditional than, for example, in Finland that is traditionally assigned to the so-called social democratic welfare states and associated with less traditional attitudes towards gender roles (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 2004; Korpi 2000; Sainsbury 1994; Sainsbury 1999a).

Because women generally tend to hold less traditional attitudes (Andreß and Heien 2001; Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Kroska 2004; Nordenmark 2004; Sundström 1999; Thornton et al. 1983), it can be expected that in both countries it is more difficult for work-oriented women to find partners who are willing to do an equal or even a larger share of the housework than it is for men to find a partner who would do the same. Nevertheless, it can be expected that, if the attitudes towards gender role ideology are generally (for both men and women) less traditional in Finland, then the probability for non-traditional partnerships also will be higher. Therefore, it also can be assumed that the division of housework will be less traditional in Finland than in Germany. These theoretical assumptions will later be addressed in the empirical analyses.

2.5 Conclusions on the theoretical framework

In the previous section I discussed four different lines of arguments:

1. the *relative resources* theories
2. the *time availability* approach
3. the *construction of gendered behavior*
4. and finally concepts on *gender role ideology*.

I started by outlining theories which claim that the division of housework is dependent on the *relative resources* of a couple. All the theories that I summarized under the category relative resources have in common that individuals are expected to behave rationally and are mainly motivated by economic incentives (Becker 1973; Becker 1974; Becker 1993; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 1990; McElroy and Horney 1981; Ott 1997; Scanzoni 1982; Youm and Laumann 2003). The main motivation for behavior is either the improvement of either individual or family utility. Even though the motivation for the particular division of housework follows different patterns, the mechanisms are the same, independent of the theoretical approach:

The partner who has the highest relative resources in the labor market (higher income or good income prospects) will be engaged in paid work, while the partner with lower labor market skills will be responsible for the housework.

The arguments deriving from the relative resources theories are gender neutral. These theories do not take into account how much time each individual spends on earning their income. For example, some individuals might work part-time and have higher income than someone working full-time. In this case the part-time employed person has more time available to do housework than the full-time employed person, even though they have a higher level of income. Thus, it seems irrational for the part-time employed person to leave all the housework to their partner, even though they earn more than their partner.

In Chapter 2.2 the assumptions deriving from the so-called relative resources debate were extended by the *time availability* approach, which introduces time as an important resource. The main argument of the time availability approach is that there is only a certain amount of time available and each individual needs to make priorities for their time use. Relying on the assumption from the bargaining theory that paid employment is more rewarding (in economic terms) than unpaid labor, the time availability approach suggests that the time spent on employment will dictate the time spent on housework. Consequently, the time spent on housework depends on the time left after employment, and the time considered necessary to produce the needed/desired commodities that are developed in household production. The time required for the desired household production will depend on the effectiveness of their production. Because of technical equipment such as the dishwasher, the washing machine, the vacuum cleaner etc. housework can be more effectively produced today than fifty years ago. Besides technical equipment, which eases the housework burden, there are more possibilities to outsource housework today than fifty years ago. There is the possibility to dine out in a restaurant and practically every household has an own washing machine. Furthermore, depending on the state's capacity to offer possibilities to save time on housework, or as Goodin et al. put it, states offer individuals 'temporal autonomy' (Goodin et al. 2004). For example, some states offer full-time child care arrangements with one daily meal to all parents with small children. This reduces the time spent on housework and child care

for these parents compared to parents who have to arrange child care and meals themselves.

Both the time availability approach and the theories on relative resources are gender neutral. It is expected that independently of an individual's gender, the partner with the lower income or more time available will be responsible for the housework (Becker 1965; Becker 1993; Blau 1964; Blood and Wolfe 1960; Brines 1994; Hiller 1984; Opp 2004). The reality, however, depicts a different picture. Women who have a higher income than their partner in some cases do even more housework than their partner (Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Coltrane 2000a; Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; Halleröd 2005; Shelton and John 1996; Takala 2004c). To understand the gender discrepancies, theories that deal with the *construction of gendered behavior* were introduced in Chapter 2.3. All the theories described in the chapter 'construction of gendered behavior' have in common that they differentiate between the biological sex and socially constructed gender. The socially constructed gender is a result of adapted norms on what is feminine or masculine.

Socialization theories claim that boys and girls are brought up differently. Boys are raised to become proper husbands and girls to be good wives. This implies that boys are prepared to take on the role of the main provider, while girls are equipped to provide emotional care to the family and do the housework (Alwin 1990; Gupta 2006b; Simpson and England 1981). According to proponents of the *doing gender approach* gender is an interactional accomplishment. Gendered behavior is influenced by the societal context, but it also reforms the societal context. This explains why some women who earn more than their husbands sometimes do even more housework than their husbands. These couples 'do gender' (Fenstermaker 2002). Because they already violate one norm: 'the husband should be the main provider', the couple refrains from violating another norm: 'the woman is responsible for the housework'. The doing gender approach is able to explain the deviant behavior in couples where the wife has a higher income but the division of housework still is traditional, but it fails to explain any variation.

In contrast to theories that deal with the construction of gendered behavior, Hakim (2000) in her preference theory develops a concept that allows a 'unisex' explanation for behavior without disregarding gender norms. She claims that theories such as the economic theory of the family or the doing gender approach fail to explain the work-life

choices (especially of women) because they do not differentiate between women or their preferences. The theories on the relative resources only regard one motivation for work-life choices, namely maximizing the family's or individual utility in economic terms; and the proponents of doing gender see gendered norms as the main motivation for decision making. All these theories fail to take individual and diverse motivations into consideration. The preference theory offers a concept that allows an explanation for both and men and women, without, however, disregarding gender norms. Hakim claims that men and women hold different preferences about how to make work-life choices. She basically distinguishes three different types for both men and women: home-centered, work-centered and adaptive. Depending on the preferences each individual holds, they will make different choices in life.

Relying on Hakim's (2000) categories, Breen and Cooke (2005) develop an idea of how mating, and accordingly also the division of housework, could occur. They claim that a certain type of woman will only marry a certain type of man. For example, a work-oriented or autonomous woman will only marry a man who of the adaptive or adjuster type (see Chapter 2.4). Depending on the man the woman married, the division of housework will vary. For example, an adaptive or a transitional woman will continue the relationship independently of the man she married. In case she – against her expectations – married a traditional man, who refuses to do any housework, the transitional woman will take over responsibility for the housework instead of filing for divorce. The home-oriented or traditional woman will always do the housework, while the work-oriented or autonomous woman would rather end the relationship than be fully responsible for the housework. Breen and Cooke (2005) assert that depending on the distribution of adaptive or adjuster men, work-oriented or autonomous women will choose to marry or not. Only when enough work-oriented or autonomous women are married will there be a change in the division of housework towards a less traditional division of housework on the aggregate level.

Before empirically examining these theories, I will start by looking at the societal context in which my case studies are conducted, namely West Germany and Finland. Relying on the idea that the societal context (e.g. the distribution of adaptive or adjuster men) has an influence on the gender role ideology and mating behavior, my intention is to study if the differences in the division of housework can be explained by the

correlation between gender role ideology and partnership forms. After that I will scrutinize the direct impact of gender role ideology on the division of housework, while controlling for relative resources, time availability, and socialization (construction of gendered behavior).

As previously suggested in the theories presented, the societal context is expected to influence gender role ideology, relative resources, time availability and socialization and therefore indirectly to have an impact on the division of housework. Additionally to the indirect influence of the societal context on the division of housework, the societal context is expected to have a direct impact on the division of housework. In the next chapter the societal contexts in which decisions, such as marrying and the division of labor are made, shall be discussed in more detail. I will start by presenting the development of social policy measures that influence the division of housework directly or indirectly. I will mainly discuss measures concerning employment, parental leave and child care. The second aspect that is relevant for the division of housework is the gendered division of resources in a country. I will discuss in detail the relative distribution of education, time spent on paid and unpaid work, the labor market structure and the gendered division of income. Finally, I will contrast both countries and draw conclusions about the possible influences of the societal context on the division of housework.

3 Societal context

In the previous chapter, individual level theories on the division of housework were presented. In this section I will discuss the societal context in which the division of housework is negotiated. Decisions in a family, such as getting married, having children, and deciding about the division of labor depend on the societal context. Marriage, for example, is considered an individual decision, but there are certain legal restrictions, social rights, and liabilities associated with the institution of marriage. The decision for a particular type of care for children is also influenced by the society. Family policies or employment regulations discourage or encourage individuals to make certain decisions. In countries with widespread, publically-funded child care facilities, public child care is obviously more popular than homecare. Conversely, in countries

where homecare is supported by the state, children are more likely to be cared for at home than in child care facilities (Anttonen 2003; Autto 2007; Bühlmann et al. 2010; Hook 2010; Larsen 2004; McElroy 1990; McElroy and Horney 1981). Even in countries where the state is not likely to intervene with specific family policies, the decision to become a parent, and how a child is brought up, still depends on societal factors such as the labor market, the possibility of outsourcing homemaking tasks, and informal relationships.

Decisions in the household are not only determined by the relative resources in the household, but different political measures lead to different economic incentives (Cooke 2010; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; see also Oppenheimer 1997; Treas and Drobnič 2010). In economic/rational terms it could be expected that in countries where homemaking is indirectly supported by the tax system or other subsidies, e.g. long maternity leave, investments in homemaking skills can be assumed to be more attractive than in countries that support the dual-earner model (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Geist 2005; Knudsen and Wærness 2001). Policies are mostly directed differently to men and women. Policies that support women's/mother's employment mostly mean economic incentives for women to be continuously employed, and policies that support men/father's family roles imply economic incentives for fathers to leave the labor market.

As discussed previously, *time availability* is also dependent on the societal context (see Chapter 2.2). On the individual level, each individual is expected to spend the time they have available according to their needs/desires for commodities. Time spent on housework is regulated by the demand for housework, the individual time at disposal, and the possibility of outsourcing housework. Instead of spending time on housework in person, commodities can be bought on the market. For example, food need not be prepared by each individual themselves, but can be consumed in a restaurant (see Chapter 2.2). Of course the idea of outsourcing household tasks pre-supposes a society where there is a supply of household commodities. The demand for outsourcing is presumably highest in a double-earner family, where both partners spend most of their time on paid work. The demand for outsourcing is met differently depending on the societal context and consequently the time spent on housework varies according to the societal context.

In this chapter I will address the historical and socio-political context in West Germany and Finland. Through the gender role ideology and the division of economic resources, the societal context is expected to both indirectly but also directly have an impact on the division of housework (Breen and Cooke 2005). Not only the individual gender role ideology is decisive for the division of housework, but also the general distribution of individuals with a certain gender role ideology is assumed to make a difference (Ostner 1993b).

3.1 West Germany: strong roots of the breadwinner-homemaker model

After the Second World War (May 1949) Germany was divided into West (Federal Republic of West Germany) and East Germany (German Democratic Republic). The central idea about the reconciliation of family and employment were quite different in these two countries. West German policy followed the approach 'neither Third Reich nor GDR' (Ostner 1993a). The importance of the family as a protection against the communism and other totalitarian state forms was praised (Ostner 1993b). The state was not supposed to intervene in the family as it had during the Nazi era. The approach in the GDR that supported female full-time labor force participation, for example by state subsidized child care, was strongly criticized in West Germany (Ostner 1993b). West Germany dissociated from the policy in the GDR and according to the Catholic doctrine emphasized the importance of the family. In West Germany men legally had the power to decide about the family's concerns, which was not changed until 1957 (Schäfgen and Spellerberg 1998).

To provide the family the support that it was considered to need, in addition to the law of equalization of men and women, a law for the protection of the family was passed (Scheiwe 2000).[7] Protection of the family, to a large extent, meant support for the male breadwinner model. From the beginning of the 1950s, women's role as homemakers and mothers and men's role as main providers was legally regulated. Until 1977, married women needed their husband's approval to be employed and it was only

[7] Article 6 of the constitution.

permitted for wives to enter employment if it did not conflict with their duties at home (Born 1993; Lauterbach 1994). Women were legally assigned the role of the homemaker.

Although the responsibility for housework was mainly foreseen for women, the widespread reality of the homemaker wife who permanently left the labor market at the time of marriage or child bearing has been disputed (Born 1993; Krüger and Born 1991; Lauterbach 1994). The ideal of the breadwinner-homemaker model relies on a husband who is capable of supporting his family alone. This ideal picture takes for granted that the husband's income is high enough to ensure the family's economic situation, so that there is no need for the woman to enter employment. Empirical evidence on women's employment patterns in post-war West Germany, however, find no clear evidence on the fact that women exited the labor market to take care of their children, and rejoined the labor force when the children were old enough to care for themselves (Born 1993; Krüger and Born 1991; Lauterbach 1994). Women's exits and entries into the labor market rather followed an unsystematic pattern dependent on the labor market structure, their own and their husband's labor market resources (Ostner 1993a; Pfau-Effinger 2005). Women participated in the labor market if their income increased the economic well-being of the family sufficiently. This indicates that if the husband's income did not secure a certain economic standard for the family, the wife's income served more or less as an additional income to the husband's income (Zuverdienst). Ostner has pointed out that women who were employed in post-war West Germany were behaving against the norm (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). The normative idea that women with small children were responsible for the upbringing of their children was very prominent. This was one of the reasons why during the 1960s, as West Germany's economy badly needed workers, 'foreign guest workers' were recruited instead of expanding women's fulltime labor force participation (Berghahn 2003; Dingeldey 2001).

In the reform of family law in 1977, the explicit encouragement of women's role as mothers was abolished (Ehe- und Scheidungsrechtsreform). Nevertheless, the male breadwinner model was still supported implicitly by the 'splitting advantage' (Ehegattensplitting) (Gornick 1999; Gornick et al. 1998). The 'splitting advantage' means that married couples incomes are added together and then halved before tax is calculated. Due to progressive taxation, in West Germany married couples with one

high income and one low income profit from the splitting. The 'splitting advantage' is greatest if one of the spouses has no income at all. Therefore, it is implicitly regarded as supporting the male breadwinner model (Dingeldey 2001; Drobnič et al. 1999). Women married to men with better labor market prospects have shown to have greater exit rates from employment into homemaking than women married to men with worse labor market prospects. After the educational expansion in the 1960s, norms towards female labor force participation became less traditional and even a cultural/normative shift from the 'housewife model' to the 'female part-time career model' could partly be observed on the normative level (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1997). The shift to the 'female part-time career model' became especially prominent among the cohorts born after 1949 (Grunow et al. 2006). Women in West Germany today are more and more labor market orientated but still exit the labor market at motherhood (Pfau-Effinger 2004b). Since the end of the Second World War, the traditional family form – as in most European countries – has found strong support in West Germany, however a 'slow modernization' (Bussemaker and Kersberger 1999) in norms towards more general acceptance of married women's employment can be observed.

3.1.1 Social policy: general family support

Generally, West Germany's policymaking can be considered family-centered. The family has been the unit for benefits; and benefits for a long period were directed to the primary provider in the family (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). Women's homemaking has been supported by the state on the grounds that the family needs to be protected. Women should not have to be 'forced' to participate in paid work out of economic necessity. For married women, this meant that their main responsibility was to be a good housewife and mother. There has, however, been a shift in policymaking from the breadwinner-homemaker centered perspective, towards making it possible for both parents to reconcile paid work and family obligations (BMFSFJ 1995; BMFSFJ 2004c). This does not mean a shift towards individual centered benefits schemes, like in countries assigned to the social democratic welfare state, but a change in the perception of men's and women's roles. Social benefits are still conferred on the family, but to a

somewhat lesser degree on the homemaker-breadwinner model.[8] Policies for reconciling paid work and family work are mostly directed towards families with small children. Policies aimed at making the reconciliation of family and work more effortless, usually give families the chance to decide whether one parent stays home to take care of the children, or if both parents equally engage in paid labor and child care (Esping-Andersen 2004). The degree of de-familialization has increased somewhat during the past decades, but in international comparison West Germany still has relatively low levels of de-familialization (see e.g. Holst 2001). In the following, policies that influence the division of paid and unpaid labor, and therefore have an indirect influence on the division of housework, shall be debated.

3.1.1.1 Employment regulations

In West Germany, men and women were already given equal rights before the law in the Constitution of 1949 (Grundgesetz Artikel 3 (2)). This however, did not imply equality between sexes in the family or on the labor market. Even in the 1950s, the husband had the right to make all decisions in the household, including the right to terminate his wife's employment contract without notice and the right to manage her earnings (§ 1363 BGB old). This was not changed until 1958 in the Equal Rights Law (Gleichberechtigungsgesetz). From then on, women and men had the right to manage their own income. Women however, were still bound to homemaking. Women were only allowed to be employed if it did not interfere with her responsibilities at home (§ 1356 BGB changed 1977). Only in 1977 was the homemaker-breadwinner model totally abolished in law. Women were no longer obliged to be responsible for homemaking, but had the right to employment regardless of their family situation (§ 1356 (2) BGB).

Three years after men and women were given equal rights in marriage, men and women gained equal rights on the labor market. In 1980, the EC (EU) directives about gender equality were enacted in Sections 611a and 611b of the Civil Code (§ 611a, b, 612 (3) BGB). From then on, men and women were assured the same rights to employment as well as the right to equal pay for equal work. In 1985, women's re-entry

[8] The family is still guaranteed freedom and protection in the constitution (Grundgesetz Art. 6).

into the labor market after child rearing was made easier by facilitating their access to further education (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz). At the same time, part-time and full-time employees were given equal rights, which, given the high proportion of women working part-time, improved women's situation in the labor market.

Because there was no active support for women – who still were responsible for the family's well being – to reconcile family and paid work, gender equity in the labor market was questioned (BMFSFJ 2004c). In 1994, this (at least partly) was changed when Article 3 of the Constitution was modified (Grundgesetz 1994 Artikel 3 (2)). A sentence saying that the state actively encourages gender equality and works towards abolishing disadvantages was included to the statement that men and women are equal before the law.[9] In the same year as the Constitution was changed, a second equality law (das zweite Gleichberechtigungsgesetz) was amended. Accordingly, women should explicitly be supported and the reconciliation of family and paid work should be made easier in the German administration (Bundesverwaltung) and other public agencies. Furthermore, the law against discrimination according to gender was strengthened (Frauenförderungsgesetz).

One incentive for women to enter employment and still be able to reconcile family and paid work is viewed in the option of part-time work (BMFSFJ 2004c). In 2001, the right to part-time employment for parents was introduced in the Child-raising Benefit Act. During parental leave (Elternzeit) parents employed in companies with more than 15 employees have the right to part-time work. Furthermore, part-time work was extended from 19 hours up to 30 hours a week. This means that parents together can work 60 hours. The law was introduced to enable parents to better share family responsibilities (Künzler et al. 2001). Mostly part-time employment is an option for women, while men hardly take advantage of the working time reduction. Therefore, the introduction of parents' right to part-time employment has a two-fold function. At the same time as the option to work part-time makes it easier for women to combine work and family responsibilities, it sustains divergence between men's and women's employment patterns, and confirms the modified breadwinner model (Dingeldey 2001).

[9] Grundgesetz 1994 Artikel 3 (2): 'Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt. Der Staat fördert die tatsächliche Durchsetzung der Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und Männern und wirkt auf die Beseitigung bestehender Nachteile hin.'

As mentioned previously, the traditional division of labor is also bolstered by the splitting advantage (Dingeldey 2001). The splitting advantage favors married couples with large income differences. In other words, it supports the male breadwinner model. The higher the income of one partner, usually the husband, the greater the tax benefit. Economically, this means that if one partner has a much higher income than the other, a married couple profits more if the other partner is not in paid employment.[10] Accordingly, the splitting advantage has been argued to dampen women's participation in the labor market (Ondrich et al. 1996).

3.1.1.2 Parental leave

The discussion of how parental leave impacts on the traditional division of labor has been controversial. The most common argument has been that the longer the leave for mothers, the less likely mothers are to return to work (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Haataja 2004). However, it has also been shown that parental leave schemes enable women to return to their jobs. Mothers with a strong labor market attachment still return to their jobs after the leave protection ends (Crompton and Lyonette 2005). Yet, schemes with low remuneration and long duration can be considered to enforce the woman's economic dependency on their husband and to attach the woman more strongly to homemaking. A long absence from the labor market in several cases means difficulties in re-entering employment again. Furthermore, it is necessary to differentiate between leave schemes that stress the mother's right/responsibility to care, and schemes that also introduce explicit possibilities for fathers to take leave in order to participate in child care. The more fathers are included in the responsibility for caring, the less traditional the division of labor will be (Ondrich et al. 1996). Since children often increase the gendered division of housework, it can be expected that in countries where fathers take a leave to care for children, the division of housework will be more equal.

[10] The splitting advantage has been criticized among other because it benefits many childless couples, which is considered contradicting the goals of German family policy. The proponents of the splitting system, however even argue that the joint taxation is protected by the constitution, which guarantees marriage and the family a special protection (Kolvenbach 2004).

Employed mothers in West Germany have been entitled to maternity leave and benefits since 1979. The regulation from 1979 (Mutterschutzgesetz) provided employed mothers with protection against dismissal during pregnancy and four months after childbirth. Furthermore, women were prohibited from work for a period of eight weeks after delivery (Mutterschutz). The 'Mutterschutz' and the four months long maternity leave made mothers eligible to maternity benefits and leave during the six months after childbirth (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004).

Until 1985, parental leave policy was focused on mothers. Only in 1986 was maternal leave extended into parental leave (Erziehungsurlaub) and fathers were also entitled to leave to care for children. To give family responsibilities and employment the same priority, the parental leave benefit was not only restricted to working mothers but covered all parents who did not exceed a certain income level. The leave was extended from six months to ten months after delivery and ensured the right to return to a job comparable to the one held before taking the leave. Eight weeks of the parental leave fell under the maternity leave (Mutterschutz) and were only conferred to employed mothers. All parents who were entitled received the parental leave allowance of up to 307 Euros (600 German marks), independently of prior employment relationships. The new regulation was designed to remove the financial discrimination against parents who had chosen a traditional division of labor prior to the birth of the child (BMFSFJ 2004b).

Since the introduction of the regulation in 1986, the duration of the parental leave has been extended several times. After the third revision of the Federal Child Care Payment Leave Act (in force since 2001) (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz), parents (either the mother or the father) were granted a parental leave benefit (Erziehungsgeld). Parents had the possibility to decide between a shorter leave period with higher remuneration (Budget) and a longer leave period with a lower remuneration (Regelbetrag). The first option comprised twelve months leave and 450 Euros benefit. The second option offered a leave up to the child's third birthday, and an allowance of 300 Euros for 24 months (BMFSFJ 2002; Bruning and Plantenga 1999). The parental leave option was very popular in West Germany. Almost 96 percent of families took advantage of their parental leave entitlement. While the provision is gender neutral, only about two percent of all parents who took the leave were fathers (Plantenga and Remery 2005). The

relatively low remuneration during the parental leave was probably a disincentive for men (who traditionally have a higher income than their wives) to interrupt their employment and to lose their monthly income (BMFSFJ 2006).

To reduce the economic disadvantage for parents who leave the labor market to care for children, a new parental leave allowance (Elterngeld) was introduced in January 2007. In contrast to the child-raising benefit, the new parental leave allowance is not a social benefit, but an income substitute for parents who stay at home to care for their children. During the first year of child care, the parent who stays at home receives a benefit equal to 67 percent of their income during the twelve months before delivery. The parental leave can be extended by two months if the other parent participates in child care (popularly called 'father's months'). The benefit may not exceed 1800 Euros, nor will it be less than 300 Euros. For parents without income from employment this meant a reduction in their income. Instead of receiving 300 Euros for two years, the benefit is only paid for one year. Principally, this means a loss of 3600 Euros compared to the old regulation. Families with two incomes, however, profit from the new regulation. It seems as if West Germany's family policy is moving from providing incentives for the traditional male breadwinner model, to, at least partly, supporting the double-earner family model. The new regulation supports women's labor force participation and men's carer role (father's months).

3.1.1.3 Child care

Traditionally, mothers have been considered the best possible care taker for children in West Germany (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). State child care facilities were even considered harmful, especially for pre-school children, and for a long time considered to rob parents of their children (Künzler et al. 2001). In the 1950s and 1960s, daycare facilities for pre-school children enjoyed a bad reputation. Even in the early 1970s, less than 1 percent of children under three years, and approximately 30 percent of children between three and six, had access to publicly-financed child care (Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Esping-Andersen 2004). Even today, women who do not stay at home to care for

their children themselves, are sometimes called 'Rabenmutter',[11] which means an uncaring or even a bad mother. The label Rabenmutter does not exist in other languages, and indicates that the mother's role as carer has a very prominent and long tradition in West Germany. Thus, West Germany has mainly been assigned to the family-oriented care regime (Kolvenbach 2004).

Table 3.1 Supply of child care facilities for pre-school children in West and East Germany 1950-2006[12]

	West Germany		East Germany	
	0 >3 years	3-6.5 years	0 >3 years	3-6.5 years
1950	0.4	29.1	1.3	-
1955	0.7	29.4	9.1	34.5
1960	0.7	28.1	14.3	46.1
1965	0.6	28.0	18.7	52.8
1970	0.7	32.9	29.1	64.5
1975	1.3	56.1	50.1	84.6
1980	1.5	67.5	61.2	92.2
1985	1.6	67.7	72.7	94.0
1989	-			95.1
1990	1.8	69.0	-	-
1991	-	-	54.2	-
1994	2.2	73.0	41.3	96.2
1998	2.8	86.8	36.3	111.8
2002	4.2[1]	89.9[3]	37.0[1]	105.0[3]
2005/2006	9.6[2]	-	39.8[2]	-

Sources: Künzler (2001)
[1] Amtliche Kinder- und Jugendhilfestatistik (ohne Tagespflege)
[2] Kolvenbach (2002)
[3] DJI-TAG-Erhebung 2005 (mit Tagespflege)

During the 1990s, a change in public policy can be observed. In 1996, a law was passed that assured each child between three and six a place in a daycare facility. Because of difficulties in ensuring a sufficient supply of child daycare, the legal claim was modified, and came into force at the beginning of 1999. All children from the age of three were guaranteed an absolute right to care (Plantenga and Remery 2005). This

[11] Raven mother.
[12] Number of places as percentage of age group.

should have led to a coverage level of 100 percent, but as Table 3.1 shows, the coverage level of 89.9 percentage in 2002 is below the goal. However, the coverage rate in West Germany was higher than in Finland (70 percent) and approximately as high as in Sweden, were the coverage rate was 90 percent (Plantenga and Remery 2005). The coverage rate for under-threes was lower in West Germany (7 percent) than in Finland (21 percent) or Sweden (41 percent) (Plantenga and Remery 2005).

Plantega and Remery (2005) point out that data on the provision of child care services are difficult to compare, since different standards and measures are used in each country. The supply of child care neither gives information on the coverage nor on the demand for child care. The demand depends on the employment participation of parents and other child care arrangements. The lower coverage rate for Finland, for example, does not necessarily mean that child care facilities are in short supply (BMFSFJ 2005a). In fact, since 1973, Finnish children have been guaranteed a municipal child care place. The relatively low coverage rate suggests alternative ways of looking after young children (see Chapter 3.2).

In West Germany, all facilities, regardless of the duration of care, are counted as child care facilities.[13] Most daycare centers, however, are open only in the morning, or on a part-time basis, and hardly ever offer meals. The Family Survey from 2000 (DJI Familiensurvey) found that only 24 percent of daycare centers were full-time (BMFSFJ 2005b). The average time spent in care reaches fourteen hours a week (Kolvenbach 2004). It also needs to be mentioned that a more detailed look at the data reveals quite a diverse picture of the situation. There are huge disparities in the coverage rate across the different rural districts. In 2002, a total of 29 rural districts had 0 supply of child care for under three-year-olds (Krippenplätze), whereas in bigger cities like Hamburg, the coverage rate reached 13 percent. In some regions, the supply for care for children between three and six is even greater than the demand. Yet, in other regions children might be put on a waiting list (BMFSFJ 2005b).

Along with the changes in the public policy, a change in attitudes towards state provided care can be observed (Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V. 2008). Child care

[13] Child minders (Tagesmütter) are not included in the statistics (Alemann 2006).

facilities are no longer regarded as harmful for the child. After the so-called PISA shock it is even considered necessary to start the institutional education of children as early as possible and the need for child care facilities has been intensively discussed (Engstler and Menning 2004). Furthermore, the remarkable decline in the fertility rate after unification (Hantrais 1997; McDonald 2000; Scheiwe 1994) stimulated the discussion of the relationship between child care facilities and fertility. It has been claimed that measures to ease the reconciliation of family and paid work – such as availability of child care – are needed to achieve optimal levels of childbearing and gender equality in employment (BMFSFJ 2004a).

In 2005, under the Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz (TAG), municipalities were required to provide child care to all eligible parents with children under three years (parents who are employed, seek employment or are part of an educational measure are defined as eligible). Because the law could not be implemented immediately, the municipalities were given time until 2010 to meet the requirements from the new daycare provision law (TAG) (Anttonen and Sointu 2006). It is difficult to find reliable data on the current rate of children in child care facilities, so the success of the implementation of these policies still remains to be seen. Because most child care facilities are open only part-time and the German schools still to largely work on a part-time basis, the expansion of the child care system does not necessarily lead to an increase in the full-time double-earner family model. Yet, a clear change from mother-centered care policy towards a public care policy can be observed.[14] West Germany no longer is assigned solely to the family care regime, but somewhere in-between the family care and public care model (Anttonen and Sointu 2006)

[14] Some scholars have criticized the fact that economic and demographic reasons rather than gender equality arguments are behind the policy change (Eurostat 2003).

3.1.2 Gendered division of resources

3.1.2.1 Education

Since the 1960s, there has been an enormous increase in the educational level of men and women all over Europe. Women have profited most from the educational expansion. In West Germany in 1960, approximately 60 percent of the pupils at the higher educating schools (Gymnasium) were male, whilst today the proportion of boys and girls is almost reversed (Datenreport 2005). German schooling is based on nine years of compulsory education for all children. Once children are aged six, they attend primary school, as a rule for four years, before going on to a variety of secondary schools: Hauptschule (lowest formal qualification), Realschule (mid-level formal qualification), and Gymnasium (higher secondary). In Hauptschulen, grades 5 to 9 are compulsory, and the 10th grade is voluntary. Realschule covers grades 5 to 10 and is halfway between Hauptschule and Gymnasium. The children leave with a 'Mittlere Reife' certificate. The Gymnasium provides in-depth education. Pupils graduate from Gymnasium after the 12th or 13th grade with a high school certificate (matriculation examination). Attendance of all state schools is free of charge.

Table 3.2 Graduates according to degree of schooling in West Germany 2003

	Women (%)	Men (%)
Without degree	6.4	10.4
Lowest formal qualification	25.3	31.9
Mid-level formal qualification (11 years of schooling)	40.9	36.7
Higher secondary	27.5	21.1
All	100.0	100.0

Source: Datenreport 2005: 43

In 2003, fewer women than men left school without a degree and more women than men had an educational level above lowest formal or even higher secondary education (see Table 3.2). The gendered distribution indicates that women have higher human capital resources than men. However, formal education is only the foundation for vocational education, which is decisive for the labor market and income prospects. Vocational training in West Germany can be obtained in three different ways: either in the dual system (apprenticeship), by vocational schooling, or at university/college. The

so-called dual system in the form of an apprenticeship has a specific tradition in West Germany. It differs from on-the-job training since it includes both a theoretical education at a vocational school as well as practical in-firm training. The dual system has been classified as typically German (Krüger 2001). Occupations that are typically considered to be male are more likely to be taught in the dual system, whereas occupations considered typically female are more likely to be taught at vocational schools. The gender division is especially prominent in vocational schools for nurses, midwives etc. (see Table 3.3). In contrast to the vocational schools that sometimes have a tuition fee, the dual system is remunerated and provides work experience already during the qualification period. This gender specific segregation of vocational training has thus been argued to lead to vertical inequality between sexes (Krüger 2001). Even if women do have higher levels of education (several vocational schools demand at least higher secondary level education,) due to lack of work experience and the financial investments in education, young men will often have better chances on the labor market. Thus, it can be argued that the educational level is not the decisive labor market resource, but the labor market specific educational resources are the ones that count (Krüger 2001).

Table. 3.3 Vocational training in West Germany by gender 2003/2004

	Women (%)	Men (%)
Dual System	40.6	59.4
Vocational schools	59.4	40.6
Trade and technical schools	51.0	49.0
Schools for nurses. midwives etc.	80.4	19.6

Source: Datenreport 2005: 49

The proportion of students at universities or colleges in West Germany has tripled since the 1970s. Since the 1980s the proportion of women at universities has doubled. In 2002/2003, more women than men started their studies at university. Since then, men and women have a more equal share of university degrees (Datenreport 2005). This suggests that men and women in West Germany have equal resources when entering the labor market. However, it should be noted that in the same way as vocational training varies to a large extent across gender, so does the course of study. Men more often study computer sciences, engineering, and electrical engineering, whereas women more frequently study languages, educational science, and other social sciences (Datenreport

2005). In the same way as differences vocational training, the differences between the fields of study between men and women can also be predicted to lead to different starting chances for the labor market.

Table. 3.4 Women at various stages of academic career in West Germany, 2003/04

	Women (%)
First year students	48.2
Students [1]	47.4
Graduates	48.4
Doctoral degrees	37.9
Postdoctoral lecturing qualifications [2] (Habilitation)	22.0
Professors[3]	12.8
C4 Professors[3]*	8.6

1 Winter term.
2 Calendar year.
3 01 December.
* C4-Professors in Germany are highest tenured professorship
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2005

University education can be regarded as continuing until the appointment as a professor. Looking at the gendered segregation at various stages of the academic career, it can be observed that the proportion of women diminishes at each level (Table 3.4). Even if women enter university in the same numbers as men, they seem to exit university much earlier. Only approximately thirteen percent at the professorial level are women. In addition to the horizontal differences, vertical segregation between the sexes becomes more evident, the further the academic career develops.

Differences between men and women's educational level have diminished over time. Women have even higher levels of formal education and enter university/college to same extent as men. Nevertheless, women participate to a lower degree in post-graduate studies, and there is a strong gendered segregation in the field of study (both in vocational training and at university or college). It seems that the question *if* it is appropriate for women to study is out of date, and that the question *what* is appropriate for women to study is more relevant. Since the gendered segregation of education leads to unequal labor market opportunities, it is not only relevant to compare the vertical differences, but also to regard the horizontal differences between men and women in education (OECD 2002). Horizontal differences between men and women can be

observed at all levels; vertical differences become more evident the higher the level of education.

3.1.2.2 Paid and unpaid work

Attitudes towards the division of paid and unpaid work between men and women are expected to depend on the general distribution of employed men and women in a country. If women are generally committed to the labor market, a higher bargaining power for women, but also a common acceptance of women's employment can be assumed. A greater acceptance of female labor force participation should lead to less traditional gender role ideology, and accordingly to a less traditional division of housework between couples (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Knudsen and Wærness 2008). It is expected that in a country where men and women participate equally in the labor market, they also share domestic tasks more equally. Assuming that the general division of employment between men and women in a country leads to a greater acceptance of to non-traditional roles, and accordingly also a non-traditional division of housework, in the following I will discuss labor force participation in West Germany.

Table 3.5 Female employment rates (b), 1960-2000 (Persons aged 15 to 64 years)

		1960	1980	2000	*Men*	*Lisbon Distance (a)*
Social democratic						
	Denmark	42.7	66.2	71.2	*80.4*	11.2
	Finland	54.9	65.0	64.3	*69.7*	4.3
	Norway	26.1	58.4	73.4	*88.1*	13.4
	Sweden	38.1	67.6	72.1	*76.2*	12.1
Conservative						
	Austria		52.4	59.3	*78.1*	- 0.7
	Belgium	29.6	35.0	51.1	*69.8*	- 8.9
	France	42.9	50.0	53.1	*68.1*	- 6.9
	West Germany	35.0	34.8	58.1	*73.5*	- 1.9
	Netherlands		35.7	62.1	*81.1*	2.1
Liberal						
	United States	39.5	53.9	68.0	*80.4*	8.0
	Canada		52.3	65.1	*75.2*	5.1
	United Kingdom	43.1	54.5	65.2	*79.3*	5.2
	Ireland		32.2	52.2	*74.0*	- 7.8
Mediterranean						
	Greece		30.7	40.4	*70.2*	- 19.6
	Italy	28.1	33.2	39.7	*68.5*	- 20.3
	Spain	21.0	28.4	40.3	*70.3*	- 19.7
	Portugal		47.1	60.1	*75.9*	0.1
Average				58.6	*75.2*	

Notes:
(a) Lisbon distance is the percentage difference between the female employment rate in 2000 and the 60 per cent level.
(b) Source: OECD 2000

As previously noted, the breadwinner-homemaker model has a long tradition in West Germany. However, the proportion of employed women has increased from 35 percent in 1960 up to 53 percent in 2000 (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991a; Diefenbach 2002). In international comparison, the employment rate of German women does not reach the level of women living in the so-called social democratic countries or in the liberal countries. Nor is the employment rate of German women as high as that of German men. Yet, it is higher than that found in most Mediterranean countries (Table 3.5).

Marital status no longer seems to be decisive for female labor force participation. There is hardly a difference between married and non-married women's employment rates in West Germany. In 2004, the rate was 59 percent for non-married and 58 percent for married women (Datenreport 2005: 120).[15] However, comparing the labor force participation rate of women in West Germany to that of *men* in West Germany or to that of *women* in *East Germany*, the picture changes. In contrast to West German women, both West German *men's* and *East* German *women's* employment rates are higher if they are married (Datenreport 2005: 120). Since marriage often occurs at same time as completing education (Gornick 1999), the entrance into the labor market and marriage often coincide for West German men and East German women. The different pattern for West German women suggests that women in western states still to some extent exit employment in favor of family responsibilities (see also Grunow 2006). West German women's engagement in paid work has been especially sensitive to the presence of small children (Blossfeld and Hakim 1997; Kreimer 2004; Rosenfeld et al. 2004).

3.1.2.2.1 Part-time employment

In West Germany, women today to greater extent participate in gainful employment than at the beginning of 1950s or 1960s. However, men and women have been shown to be unequally committed to the labor market in terms of time spent in employment (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990). Women are more often employed part-time or have so-called mini-jobs (BMFSFJ 2005a).[16] Comparing the part-time employment rate of women internationally, West Germany is no particular exception. In all countries, women more often work part-time than men. No clear patterns across the welfare state regimes can be observed (see Table 3.6). Only in Greece, Portugal, Finland and Spain is women's part-time employment rate lower than 20 percent. In all other countries, the rate is higher. In these countries, part-time work has served as an incentive for women to join the labor market. In Spain and Greece, the overall employment rate of women is not that high (40 percent), and therefore the low

[15] The labor force participation rate is calculated as: employed persons aged between 15 and 64 years as a percentage of the respective population. Individuals taking parental leave are counted as employed.

[16] A 'mini-job' is an employer-employee relationship where the earning do not exceed 400 € per month and/or 4,800 € per year.

part-time employment rate is not very surprising. Portugal and Finland form an exception by having relatively high employment rates for women, yet still a low part-time employment rate (Table 3.6). The reasons in the Finnish case shall be eluded in Chapter 3.2.

Table 3.6 Women and part-time work, 2000 (Persons aged 15 to 64 years)

		Incidence of part-time work *a*		Female share *b*		
		Women	Men	Full-time	Part-time	Total
Social democratic						
	Denmark	23.9	8.6	42.4	71.2	46.9
	Finland	13.5	6.6	45.7	64.9	47.6
	Norway	42.5	9.7	35.7	79.1	46.7
	Sweden	22.6	7.6	43.8	73.3	48.2
Conservative						
	Austria	24.3	2.3	37.9	89.2	44.1
	Belgium	34.4	6.9	35.1	79.4	42.3
	France	24.8	5.3	39.2	79.2	44.9
	West Germany	33.7	4.4	35.2	85.8	43.9
	Netherlands	57.1	13.0	27.1	76.8	42.9
Liberal						
	United States	19.4	7.3	43.1	69.7	46.6
	Canada	27.0	9.8	41.0	70.3	46.2
	United Kingdom	40.2	7.6	34.6	81.3	44.9
	Ireland	32.9	7.5	33.6	75.6	41.2
	Australia	44.6	12.6	33.1	73.6	43.9
Mediterranean						
	Greece	9.2	2.9	36.4	66.5	38.0
	Italy	23.4	5.5	32.3	71.3	37.0
	Spain	16.4	2.5	33.8	79.5	37.3
	Portugal	12.6	3.0	42.7	77.9	45.3

a) Percentage of women (men) working part-time in total female (male) employment.
b) Percentage of women in total employment by category.
c) For above countries only.
Source: OECD 2000

The reasons for part-time employment can vary, e.g. studies, retirement, or homemaking. In West Germany, women often work part-time due to personal or family reasons (Pfau-Effinger 1996). As many as 63 percent of part-time employed women in West Germany assigned the reason for their part-time employment to be personal or

family reasons, whilst only 13 percent of part-time employed men stated this reason for their part-time employment (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001). Women's main role is still to take care of the family and employment is, to a large extent, secondary to family responsibilities.[17] Part-time employment in West Germany has had two different consequences for women's engagement in paid work. It has lead to a stronger participation by women in the labor market, but it also to some degree strengthens the traditional division of labor between the sexes. Women are indeed gainfully employed, nevertheless, they still are responsible for family obligations.

3.1.2.2.2 Homemaking

Traditionally, women stay at home to care for the family, and men go out to work and provide the family income. In West Germany, the so-called male breadwinner model ('housewife model') became widespread during the 1950s (Kaufmann 1995). During the 1950s, women often left the labor market at the time of marriage. As in most western countries, it was considered a privilege for women to stay at home to care for their children. Women's employment was a sign of poverty or economic difficulties, which led to the fact that women often (if they could afford it) left the labor market at the time of marriage. Blossfeld et al. (2001) showed that the likelihood of a West German woman exiting the labor market depends on the labor market resources of her husband. They showed that the higher the educational level of the husband, the higher the likelihood for the woman to exit the labor market, and came even to the result that the husband's educational level weighed more than that of the wife. The traditional family model has been more prominent in West Germany than in countries assigned to the liberal or social democratic welfare state (Grunow et al. 2006). Today women do not interrupt their employment at marriage, but when children are born (Rosenfeld et al. 2004).

[17] This is different to East German women who mostly work part-time due to lack of full-time employment opportunities. 57 percent of part-time employed women in East Germany stated that they work part-time only because no full-time employment was available (see also Rosenfeld et al. 2004).

Graph 3.1 Homemakers[1] in West Germany, 1984-2001 (%)



[1] Everyone who spent at least one month as housewife/house husband during the survey year was assigned as homemaker (the information is based on own statements)
Source: German Socio Economic Panel (own calculations)

Despite the increasing labor force participation of women, only a slight increase in the proportion of men interrupting their employment for homemaking can be observed. Women's rate of homemaking has somewhat decreased from 22.9 percent in 1983 to 19.3 percent in 2001 (Graph 3.2). Men's proportion of homemakers hardly has changed during these 20 years. The proportion of homemakers in this graph is probably higher than in cross sectional measurements, since everyone who spent at least one month as housewife/househusband was defined as a homemaker for that survey year. However, it shows that almost 20 percent of West German women in 2001 were homemakers for at least one month, compared to 1.8 percent of househusbands in the same year. Women are still the ones who leave the labor market due to homemaking.

3.1.2.2.3 Summary

Women in West Germany increasingly participate in the labor market, but family responsibilities still have priority. There is an increased tendency for West German women to reject the role of a full-time homemaker but to prioritize family responsibilities by e.g. working part-time. Women in West Germany often reduce their employment hours due to personal or family responsibilities (63 percent of part-time employed women). Only 13 percent of part-time employed men reduce their time spent on employment due to personal or family responsibilities. The proportion of women committed to homemaking is also much higher than that of men and it seems that the traditional breadwinner-homemaker model (at least partly) exists in West Germany.

West Germany can be considered to belong to the modified homemaker-breadwinner model and therefore the proportion of men and women with traditional attitudes can also be considered larger than the proportion of men and women with non-traditional attitudes.

3.1.2.3 Labor market structure

In the 1980s, the West German service sector was still smaller than in other western countries. One partial explanation for this was the enduring tradition of women's unpaid service provision within the family (BMFSFJ 2005a). Along with the increasing educational level of West German women, they have increased their representation in the expanding service sector. In 2004, 82 percent of employed women worked in the service sector and only 17 percent in the industry. In comparison, 42 percent of men worked in industry and 55 percent in the service sector (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). Women are obviously considered to have better abilities in certain labor market fields, and men in others. As observed within the educational system, women and men follow different vocational training patterns. Graph 3.2 shows the first twenty occupational fields according to female domination. Women are mostly found in the fields of services, health care and social work. Women's domination is also concentrated on fewer occupational fields. Once technical fields are involved, men take over the field. Men are concentrated on more occupations and fields that are better remunerated (Datenreport 2005: 138; see also Krüger 2001).

Graph 3.2 Occupational fields by female/male domination in West Germany, 2005 (%) (20 first fields according to female domination)



Source: (Grunow et al. 2006)
Classification according to Statistisches Bundesamt's definition from1992

Despite the increases in women's educational levels, a great vertical segregation between men and women remains. In 2004 in West Germany, 32 percent of managers were women, but only 20 percent of top management was female. One explanation might be the reduced employment hours of West German women and career interruptions due to family responsibilities. However, this cannot explain the entire gender gap. Even though in East Germany women's commitment to the labor market is much stronger, this phenomenon can also be observed there (Datenreport 2005: 140). Another explanation might be that certain gender role ideologies are associated with

men and others with women. Men are considered more reliable 'leaders', whereas women are expected to be more empathic and therefore also more willing subordinates. This idea also seems to be reflected in the earnings structure of German men and women.

3.1.2.4 Division of income

In 2002, West German women's earnings were 58.8 percent of men's. Men on average have 70 percent higher incomes than women. This can partly be explained by the different labor market commitments. West German women often interrupt their employment (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1997) or reduce their employment hours (Hakim 1992; Hinz and Gartner 2005) due to family responsibilities. However, homemaking and part-time employment do not provide the whole explanation. Even when comparing full-time employed women with men a certain difference still remains. In 2002, the proportion of full-time employed women's income to men's was 75 percent (Datenreport 2005).

The different educational commitments of men and women are certainly one explanation for the prevailing gender gap in earnings even when controlling for full-time employment. Over many decades, men had higher levels of education; and today men and women are focusing on different fields of education. The gendered segregation in the educational system is perpetuated on the labor market. Men and women are accordingly employed in different fields of the labor market, which often means that sectors where women more often are employed have a lower remuneration. In addition, men have supervisor responsibilities more often than women. Both the vertical and horizontal segregation of men and women in the labor market leads to income differences between men and women in West Germany. However, despite taking into account working hours, educational level, and labor market segment, a residual income difference between men and women still remains (Hakim 1992). It seems that men are more successful in transforming their labor market resources into higher income. It is difficult to say what the reasons for this are. Even when comparing full-time employed men and women's incomes, there is mostly no information on overtime and the measure of labor market segment also provides some difficulties (Lewis 1992).

3.1.3 Summary

West Germany is traditionally assigned to the conservative welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 2004). Historically, the prominent family ideology has been the breadwinner-homemaker model (Anttonen and Sointu 2006; Pfau-Effinger 2010). Even though women no longer leave the labor market at marriage but wait until children are born, approximately 20 percent of women are homemakers compared to ca. 2 percent of men. Women also often reduce their employment hours in favor of family responsibilities (Datenreport 2005). Accordingly, West Germany has been suggested to represent a modified homemaker-breadwinner model (e.g. Pfau-Effinger 2004).

In the past few years, changes in the traditional ideology can be observed. Policies are increasingly designed to make it possible for women to be employed in spite of family responsibilities. There are ambitious programs to increase the amount of child care provision, and the parental leave system has gone through tremendous changes. The parental leave benefit has changed, from a social benefit for caring mothers, to an income substitute for employed women, who leave the labor market to care for their children. In addition, the introduction of two so-called father's months is hoped to increase fathers' participation in childrearing. All these changes indicate that West Germany is moving from a family-centered care model towards a "publicly arranged care model" (Julkunen 1999; Lehto 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2004b). Although several changes in German family policy have occurred, one should keep in mind that for a long time family policy in West Germany supported the breadwinner-homemaker model. The consensus was that women should not be forced into employment due to economic reasons. The tax system still is a left-over from the traditional policy and favors married couples with a traditional division of labor and the fact that the constitution provides special protection for the family is often considered an obstacle for encouraging women's employment. Increasing female labor force participation is obviously considered a threat to the family.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the gendered distribution of resources is still to a great extent traditional. Men and women focus on different fields of education and employment. Women work shorter hours than men, mostly to combine their family

responsibilities with employment. Women also earn less than men, despite full-time employment.

3.2 Finland: long tradition of female employment

Comparing female employment rates between 1960 and 2000 (see Table 3.5), it can be observed that already in 1960 over 50 percent of Finnish women participated in the labor market. Finland is furthermore an exception among the Nordic countries, because employed women mostly work full-time. Only 13 percent of women in Finland were employed part-time in 2000 (see Table 3.6). In the other Nordic countries, the situation was quite different. Even in Norway, 42.5 percent of the women work part time and more than 20 percent of Swedish and Danish women are employed part-time (OECD 2000). The great increase in the other Nordic countries can partly be explained by the introduction of part-time employment along with the growth of feminist movements at the end of 1960s. Because Finnish women already were a firm part of the labor force in the 1960s when support for female employment became part of the political agenda, there was no need to introduce part-time employment as an incentive for Finnish women.

One of the main arguments for the early establishment of female labor force participation in Finland is the late industrialization (Karisto et al. 1999). As late as 1940, more than 50 percent of the population was employed in agriculture (Julkunen 1995; Pfau-Effinger 2004c). Women's participation in agriculture was of great importance. Men and women worked together on the farm to run their joint *business*. Due to the late and rapid industrialization, female employment was needed in both agriculture and industry. The economic situation but also the slow urbanization hardly left any room for a broad middle class to become established, and to introduce the breadwinner-homemaker model as the standard family form. Today the double-earner family with two full-time employed people is the norm. Both partners are supposed to support themselves economically and independently of the partner's income (Oinonen 2004). Men and women both work full-time. Finland is one of the few countries where mothers prefer working full-time to part-time. Besides the normative nature of full-time work there are hardly any attractive options for part-time employment (Sutela 2005; Väisänen

and Nätti 2002). Part-time work is more common among young students and older cohorts; and is hardly used as a measure to reconcile work and family (Julkunen 1999; Lehto 1999; Pfau-Effinger 2004b). In Finland, women's full-time employment has always been high and the breadwinner-homemaker model never played a great role in the Finnish family model (Esping-Andersen 2004).

3.2.1 Social policy: dual-earner support

In contrast to West Germany, social benefits are not assigned to the family, but based on individual needs. Finnish men and women gained equal political rights early on[18] and both are considered responsible for earning the family income. Political and legal measures are based on the idea that each individual is capable of providing for themself. If an individual is not capable of providing for themself, regardless of their family background, they are entitled to state support. The provision of welfare follows the so-called principle of universalism (Esping-Andersen 1990; Oinonen 2000).

In West Germany, the family stands under special protection, which often means that married couples are conceded privileges (see e.g. the splitting advantage or higher remuneration for married civil servants). In contrast, in Finland, the idea of individualism applies to both marital and consensual unions. There are no special advantages (e.g. splitting advantage) for married couples. According to the Marriage Act from 1987 both spouses are ordered to work together for the good of the family (411/1987). Unlike West Germany, in case of divorce spouses are rarely obliged to pay maintenance.[19] Marriage is more or less an economic contract and in case of divorce, both spouses are expected to be financially independent after dividing the mutual property (Anttonen 1998). Because of the increasing divorce rate, specialization into homemaking in this situation does not seem very attractive. In the following, employment policies, parental leave schemes, and child care arrangements that might influence the division of housework shall be eluded.

[18] Along with suffrage, women gained full civil rights as early as 1906.

[19] Pursuant to 48§ in the Marriage Act the court may order the other spouse to pay maintenance deemed reasonable with a view to his or her ability. The court, however, hardly orders one spouse to pay alimony for the other spouse.

3.2.1.1 Employment regulations

The Lutheran idea that work holds society together and that through hard (paid) work one can earn the status of a good member of society, has been prominent in Finnish social policy (Anttonen 1998). The right to employment has applied to both men and women. Already in 1922, in the Contracts of Employment Act, married women were given the right to make their own employment contract (141/1922), and male guardianship was abolished by the Marriage Act of 1929 (234/1929).[20] Women's equal rights became one of the main principles of family law reforms, even if equality at first was defined through gender difference (Anttonen 1999). In addition encouraging men as well as women to participate in paid employment, up to the 1960s the few maternal policies that existed were mainly designed to enable women to combine their employment responsibilities with their responsibilities as a so-called good mother. Women's main role was to be mother for their children and social mothers for the nation. Especially during the 1930s, Finnish family policy was driven by pro-natalistic motivations to increase the fertility rate (Anttonen 1998; Julkunen 1995).

The doctrine and ideology of maternal social policy was only changed during the 1960s, when gender policy started stressing the similarity between men and women, and gender difference became negatively loaded (Sainsbury 1999b). From that point on, Finland followed the Scandinavian model of equality and universal social benefits. From the point of view of the feminist movement, mothers' right to paid employment partly outranked the discussion of the importance of mothers' care work. Even if mothering and caring have at least to a degree been acknowledged as social rights, caring and mothering have never gained equal status with paid work.

Since 1963, equal pay between men and women has been part of Finnish legislation. The law is based on the International Labour Organization's (ILO) 'Work of Equal Value Agreement' from 1951 (Agreement Nr. 100). The basic idea is that equal wages must be paid not only for equal work but also for work of equal value, regardless of the employee's gender. The implementation of the equal pay law has not been very successful. Even in 2004, women's earnings were approximately 80 percent of men's

[20] In West Germany the respective law was only abolished in 1977.

(Statistics Finland 2007). Thus, the demand for equal payment and equal treatment of men and women has been strengthened by the Act on Equality.

The Act on Equality was initially passed in 1986. The law was reformed in 1995 to correspond with the equality directives from the European Union. Pursuant to the Act on Equality, authorities and employers are obliged to take active measures in order to implement equality between women and men in working life. With reference to equal pay between women and men, the Act contains a ban on discrimination that prohibits the disadvantageous implementation of pay, or other employment conditions, on grounds of gender, in comparison with other employees working for the same employer. Since the latest reform of the law in 2006, all employers with more than 30 employees are impelled to make a gender equality plan, which is primarily concerned with equal pay, but also other terms of employment. The gender equality plan includes a gender assessment, which amongst other aspects contains an examination of the pay systems and the way they are applied (Gender Equality Law 232/2005).[21]

The so-called housewife bonus was abolished at the end of the 1980s, when Finland followed Sweden's example and changed the family taxation system to individual taxation. Also the exemptions for children where replaced by more generous and universal child allowances (Rubery et al. 1998). In the 1980s, reconciliation of work and family was made more convenient by introducing temporary leave (without income compensation) in the Employment Contracts Act (284/1988). Employees with children under ten years old were given the right to a temporary or partial child care leave. The temporary child care leave applies in the event of their children's sudden illness and give parents the possibility to stay home to care or to arrange care for the child. The leave can at the most be four days long. The partial child care leave can be taken by parents whose children are younger than four or whose children have started the first year in elementary school. The partial child care leave gives the employee the right to reduce their working hours to 30 hours a week (284/1988). Today, the partial child care leave can be taken until the child's second school year ends. Both parents are not entitled to partial child care leave at the same time (533/2006). Especially fathers have

[21] The Equality Act does not apply to churches activity or in families (Finnlex 2005) (Tasa-arvo laki 2005 www.finnlex.fi).

been encouraged to take part in child care by more flexible working conditions and more generous parental leave.

3.2.1.2 Parental leave

Parental leave arrangements have a complex influence on the division of labor in couples. Women’s labor force attachment is, on the one hand, strengthened when women take leave from the labor market as an alternative to an exit. However, leave may also weaken women’s labor market attachment, if it is used instead of child care provision or support (Anttonen 1999; Cooke 2007; Dex 2010). Parental leave that is open to fathers, on the other hand, encourage fathers to participate in child care and family responsibilities, and relieves the strain on women. In this chapter, the degree to which parental leave policies in Finland promote fathers participation in child care and the expectations that are assigned to the mother shall be discussed.

Additionally to parental leaves (maternity, paternity, or parental leave), Finnish parents are entitled to different types of paid and unpaid leave i.e. the partial child care leave, temporary child care leave, and the child home care allowance. The partial child care leave and the temporary child care leave were described briefly in the chapter above about working regulations and shall not be eluded further here.

The child home care allowance was mainly introduced as a compensation for families that do not take advantage of the municipal child care arrangements, and is defined as a child care subsidy. Thus, the child home care allowance shall be discussed in the chapter about child care arrangements. In this chapter, I distinguish between parental leaves that are included in the Sickness Insurance Act according to the title of the allowance, and also the indirectly assigned caretaker.

1.) *Maternity leave* is directed to the mother and commences shortly before and after confinement. Originally, maternity leave was introduced to protect the health of the mother and the newborn child. The influence of maternity leave has been argued to be twofold. On the one hand, maternity leave makes it possible for women to return to employment after taking a break for the birth of a child. On the other hand, it enforces the mother’s role as a homemaker. Long and inflexible maternity leave might make the father’s participation in child care

more difficult and thus enforces the mother's single carer role. Ultimately, however, the combination of different types of leave is decisive.

2.) *Paternity leave* can be held during maternity or parental leave. Since both the father and the mother during this period are on leave it gives mothers and fathers the possibility to spend time together with their child. Hence, paternal leave support the double-carer family model.

3.) *Parental leave* is leave that can be shared between the father and the mother. One of the parents stays home to care for the child and the other parent is employed or has another occupational status (student, unemployed, military service etc.). The possibility to share parental leave supports the double-carer and double-earner family model. Because parental leave is directed to both men and women, this arrangement can be considered the most egalitarian policy.

4.) There is also the possibility to assign parts of the parental leave only to the father, so to speak a *father's month*. The father's quota differs from that of paternity leave by assigning the father the sole responsibility for care, and is for the moment the measure that most strongly enforces the double-carer and double-earner family model.

To give a picture of the development of social norms regarding care responsibilities, I will in the following describe the historical development of the different leave schemes.

As early as 1908, social democratic women in parliament made a proposal to introduce a so-called mother's insurance (Sulkunen 1989). The mother's insurance would have given underprivileged women (women in need) the right for paid leave during the birth (Anttonen 1999). The idea of a mother's insurance, however, only became reality in the Sickness Insurance Act 1963. All mothers – including those who were not in paid employment before the birth – were entitled to the minimum allowance for 18 days before birth and 36 days after (364/1963). Since 1963, the law on maternity leave has been extended on several occasions. In 1971, maternity leave was extended up to 72 weekdays, and in 1974 up to 174 weekdays (Haataja 2004). Considering legal restrictions as normative instructions for behavior, it can be noticed that women's labor

force attachment was strengthened early by short duration and income-related maternity leave. Women also were encouraged to be economically independent of their husbands.

Even if Finnish women have indirectly been encouraged to be economically active and independent, fathers have only been entitled to parental leave since the 1978 Sickness Insurance Act. In the same year as fathers were given 12 workdays paternity leave, maternity leave was further extend to 186 workdays. Paternity leave was supposed to be taken around the birth and subject to the mother's approval (1086/1977). The main aim of paternity leave was to give the mother a chance to rest after the birth, and to ensure that the household work was still accomplished (Lammi-Taskula 2004b).

Since introducing the chance for fathers to spend time with their newborn child and to 'help' the mother with her household responsibilities in 1978, maternity leave has been shortened and the period of parental leave has become longer. In the Sickness Insurance Act passed in 1982 (471/1981), parental leave totaled 258 workdays, out of which 158 days were reserved for the mother (maternity leave), and 100 days could be assigned to the father, subject to mother's approval, or could be taken by the mother (parental leave). Paternity leave was still 6-12 workdays, however, maternity leave was shortened accordingly. In the legislation from 1982, parental leave was remunerated with 80 percent of the last income. The remuneration was reduced to 70 percent in 1983.

The lawmakers differentiated between maternity, paternity, and parental allowances for the first time in 1985.[22] Maternity leave was cut down to 100 workdays and parental leave was extended to 158 workdays. Paternity leave around confinement remained 6-12 workdays and now respectively shortened the parental leave (32/1985). Paternity and parental leave still needed the approval of the mother. Fathers' rights to care were slightly improved by giving them the right to the maternity and parental allowances in case the mother died and the father was responsible for the care (32/1985). In 1988, parental leave was extended by 60 workdays if more than one child was born (1109/1987).

[22] Until 1985 the leave was called 'birth leave' (synntysloma), or if assigned to the father, 'leave equivalent to the birth leave (synnytyslomaa vastaaviksi lomiksi), and the allowance was called maternity allowance (äitiysraha).

Paternal leave was bound to maternity or parental leave up to the reform in 1991. Only then was it individualized, yet only partly. Additionally to the paternity leave of 6-12 workdays in connection with the birth, fathers were given an independent care week, which did not influence the length of the other leave arrangements and could be taken anytime during maternity or parental leave. Also, maternity leave was extended to 105 workdays and parental leave to 170 workdays. If more than one child was born, 60 additional days were granted (1324/1990). In the 1993 legislation, paternity leave became completely individualized, so that it was no longer attached to the other types of leave (1653/1992). The three week long paternity leave was, in 1993, the longest paternity leave among the Nordic countries

'Fathers' caring rights were further improved in 1995 by giving fathers who lived separated from the mother of the child the right to paternity and parental leave in case the mother did not care for the child and the father was responsible for child care (1501/1994). In 2001, more fathers were to be encouraged to take advantage of paternity leave by making it even more flexible. The eighteen workdays paternity leave could be taken anytime during the maternity or parental leave, however, not in more than four separate periods (892/2000).

Maternity leave was introduced to protect the health of the mother shortly before and after birth. Until recently, maternity leave could not be transferred to the father even in the case that the mother, due to illness, was incapable of taking care of the child or herself. In this case, a father only had the option of taking unpaid care leave after paternity leave if he wanted to stay home and care for his wife and child. This was corrected in the legislation from 2003, which gave fathers the right to maternity leave if, due to illness, the mother is incapable of taking care of the child (1075/2002).

To enforce the participation of fathers in childrearing, at the start of 2003 Finland followed the example of the other Scandinavian countries and introduced the so-called father's months. If the father took the two last months of the parental leave, he gained two more weeks (1075/2002). The measure, however, has not gained much support (Kela 2005); in 2005 only five percent of parental leave days were taken by fathers (Repo 2005).

Thus, in January 2007 maternity and parental allowances were increased and the paternity month was made more flexible. The main motivation for these changes was the hope of stronger involvement of fathers to care for their infants. Father's involvement in caring was considered positive for the father-child relationship in later life, but also from the perspective of working life. Sharing parental leave between men and women is hoped to lead to more evenly spread costs between employers whose workforce is predominately female or male, which again should lead to better opportunities for women on the labor market (Ministry of Social Affairs 2007) (www.stm.fi 12.01 2007). In the Sickness Insurance Act Section 11, that took effect at the beginning of 2007, the maternity allowance was increased from 70 percent to 90 percent of the monthly wage for its 56 days. The parental allowance was increased from 70 to 75 percent of the monthly wage for the first 30 days. In the Sickness Insurance Act Section 10a, an increase of 30 workdays leave is ensured if both parents take advantage of the parental allowance (father's month). Paternity leave was made more flexible in this Act and can be taken any time before the child turns 14 months (1342/2006).

Looking at the Finnish parental leave scheme, a familiar picture can be observed. Finnish women early were actively supported to combine their employment with their family responsibilities. Mothers are expected to take only short leave from employment and the degree of parental allowance is also dependent on previous earnings. Fathers' right to care has developed much more slowly than mothers'. For a long time, paternity leave was dependent on the mother's approval. Only much later were fathers encouraged to stay at home to care for their children with the father's month and the more flexible paternity leave. The history of parental leave clearly shows that the dual-earner principle was supported early by the state, whereas the dual-carer model has only slowly is becoming part of the political agenda.

3.2.1.3 Child care

Lack of child care facilities enforces the one-carer family model, whereas universalized child care facilities encourage the double-earner family model. In this section, I will describe the development of child care arrangements in Finland to give a picture of the

possible care arrangements. In contrast to West Germany, child care facilities are widely accepted and used in Finland (Haavio-Mannila 1968). The first kindergarten was established in 1888 (Anttonen 1999). However, it took until 1973 until each child in Finland was legally guaranteed the right to municipal care. By then working mothers' children were mostly cared for by relatives, neighbors, and housemaids. In 1968, when 67 percent of mothers with children under 16 were employed, only nine percent of working mothers' children were cared for in organized daycare (Anttonen 1999). Up to the 1960s, mothers' employment was considered abnormal and an indication of poverty. Mothers' employment was regarded an economic necessity and child care was not seen as a state matter. In 1960, mothers' employment became more common and the maternal ideology was overhauled by ideas on gender equality, which also prompted a debate on public child daycare (Anttonen 1999). At the beginning of 1970s, child care became a political issue and a political debate on homecare vs. daycare facilities started.

In 1973, when the Act on Children's Day Care was adopted, the proponents of daycare facilities were in the majority and were able to implement their program. Child care became a matter for the municipalities. Each municipality was ordered to provide for child care pursuant to the needs in the municipality (36/1973). The Act on Children's Day Care followed the principle of universalism and was supposed to provide care according to need. Indeed, the number of public child daycare centers increased from 40,000 in 1972 up to 100,000 in 1985 (Anttonen 1999). However, public daycare still remained strongly selective because of too few child daycare facilities. Children were granted municipal care on the basis of their parents' income, which for high-income parents meant they had to arrange care privately. This raised the subject of the child home care allowance on the political agenda again (Julkunen 2001).

In 1985, a law on child home care allowance was passed (24/1985). The law on child home care allowance has been considered an ideological compromise, but also an economic necessity. It has been argued that because of too few child care facilities, the child home care allowance was introduced as a compensate parents who did not take advantage of their right to municipal day care (Anttonen 1999). The legislation on the child home care allowance, however, has also been considered a compromise between the ideology of care at home and public daycare (Anttonen 1999). In the 1980s, the political discourse on parents' right to choose the form of care became topical, and

society was expected to provide options to choose from. Parents should be given the choice of whether to take care of the child at home or in municipal care (24/1985).

Together with the introduction of the child home care allowance, other legal changes were made. The Act on Children's Day Care was amended to give parents with children under three the right to care. The Employment Contracts Act was changed to guarantee parents the right to unpaid leave and to return to their job until their child turned three. Child home care allowance was adopted gradually and became fully effective in 1990 (Anttonen 1999; Anttonen 2003; Leira 1998). Child home care allowance was paid to all parents whose children were not minded in municipal care. The children could be taken care of by the parents themselves, grandparents or by a private child minder. Every parent was entitled to a basic allowance. A siblings allowance was granted if further children under the age of ten were living in the household and were not in municipal care. In addition, an income-related supplement was available to families with low income (1386/1990).

In 1989, a partial child home care allowance was introduced (4/1989). Parents who reduced their employment to 30 hours a week when their child is no older than three years, were entitled to 25 percent of the basic allowance, which has varied across time (see Table 3.7). The duration of the child home care allowance has not changed since it was implemented. In 1993, there was a proposal to extend the child home care allowance to children under four, which, however, never came about. Between 1991 and 1993, Finland suffered from an economic depression and high unemployment. During the period of high unemployment the child home care allowance was boosted, and started very much to resemble German parental leave. Some scholars in Finland began to pose the question of whether Finland was starting to resemble the middle European homemaker-breadwinner model (Anttonen 1999). The high child home care allowance during 1991-1995, however, rather seems to be an exception in the child home care allowance's history (Ilmakunnas 1993) and was strongly related to unemployment (Anttonen 1999). In 1993, when the labor market situation improved, the use of child home care allowance first decreased a little and after the reduction in the basic allowance in 1996 decreased even more (Statistics Finland 2005).

Table 3.7 Child care subsidies in Finland (All information is in Euros/month)

	Home Care Allowance			Private day care allowance		Municipal day care (Day care fee)	
	Basic Allowance	Additional child	Supplement (income related)	Basic allowance	Supplement (income related)	Max. fee for first child*	Additional child
1985	159.44	31.79	127.65	-	-		
1986	183.49	36.66	146.83	-	-		
1987	192.91	38.52	154.40	-	-		
1988	203.51	40.70	162.81	-	-		
1989	218.64	43.73	174.92	-	-		
1990	233.44	46.76	186.69	-	-		
1991	311.15	62.23	248.92	-	-		
1992	328.13	62.23	248.92	-	-		
1993	329.31	65.93	263.38	-	-		
1994	329.31	65.93	263.38	-	-		
1995	320.90	64.25	256.82	-	-		
1996	252.28	50.46	168.19	-	-	168.19	
1997	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	168.19	
1998	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	168.19	
1999	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	168.19	
2000	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	185.01	
2001	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	185.01	37.00
2002	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	200.00	180.00
2003	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	200.00	180.00
2004	252.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	117.73	134.55	200.00	180.00
2005	294.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	137.33	134.55	200.00	180.00
2006	294.28	50.46/ 84.09[2]	168.19	137.33	134.55	200.00	180.00
2007	294.28	60.46/ 94.09[2]	168.19	137.33	134.55	200.00	180.00

* Up to 2002 for two first children

[2] If the additional child is under three years old

Source: Anttonen 1999; Kansaneläkelaitoksen tilastollinen vuosikirja 2001-2005; Law on child home care allowance and private child daycare allowance (1256/2006).

In 1997, child home care allowance was changed into home care allowance for small children. Since then, parents of children under the age of three can opt for the child home care allowance, or for the children's private daycare allowance scheme. Children's private daycare is granted if daycare is provided to child under seven by a private daycare supplier approved by the municipality (1128/1996). Like the child home

care allowance, the children's private daycare allowance is divided into a basic allowance and an income-related supplement. The private daycare allowance is paid directly to the carer. In 2005, the basic supplement was increased from 117,73 Euros to 137,33 Euros a month (985/2004). The private daycare allowance was introduced to expand parents' choice of care form, and was amended in 2007 so that families can be entitled to child home care allowance and private daycare allowance at the same time (1256/2006).

Since the introduction of child home care allowance, parents can choose between municipal daycare, private daycare, and care by parents or arranged by parents (child home care allowance). Both care at home and care in daycare facilities seem to be accepted care forms. Slightly more than half the children under seven are cared for in child daycare facilities, and the other half are taken care of in private homes (Table 3.8). Most of the children in daycare facilities are cared for full-time (Ministry of Education 2006). School also provides full-time care and the children are served lunch during their school day. Most families in Finland thus eat at least one meal out of the house, which reduces the time spent on cooking and caring.

Table 3.8 Children in daycare in Finland, 1997-2005 (% of under 7 year olds)

	Municipal daycare	Private daycare	Daycare altogether
1997	49.3	2.2	51.4
1998	50.0	2.9	52.9
1999	50.3	3.2	53.5
2000	47.8	3.3	51.1
2001	48.0	3.5	51.5
2002	47.8	3.6	51.4
2003	47.7	3.5	51.2
2004	46.6	3.7	50.3
2005	46.5	3.8	50.3

Source: Stakes http://varttua.stakes.fi 30.01.2007

In Finland, child daycare facilities have a long history and receive broad acceptance. Child daycare is even considered important for the child's development. The quality of child daycare is also regulated by law. Nevertheless, care at home has been especially popular among parents (mostly women) with children under three. Two different outcomes of the Finnish child care arrangements can be expected. The child home care

allowance scheme supports the one-carer model (mostly care by the mother) and the broad supply of municipal daycare expectedly encourages the double-earner model. Finnish parents principally have the choice between the double-earner model and the one-carer model until their youngest child has turned three years.

3.2.2 Gendered division of resources

3.2.2.1 Education

Since 1991, the number of female students is greater than that of male students in Finland.[23] As in West Germany, women's educational level in Finland has expanded since the 1960s. The Finnish education system distinguishes three levels: basic, upper secondary, and higher education. Basic education consists of a uniform nine year general education, given in comprehensive schools.[24] All children residing in Finland have a statutory obligation to complete the basic education syllabus. Virtually all children (99.7%) complete basic education (Statistics Finland 2005). The compulsory schooling does not lead to any specific qualification, but determines the eligibility for all types of upper secondary education and training. The upper secondary level comprises vocational and general education. The general education provides a non-vocational all-round education and mostly ends with a national matriculation examination after three years of schooling (equivalent to the German Abitur). The matriculation examination is required for higher education studies, but gives also eligibility to certain vocational training programs.[25] More women than men pass the matriculation exam. In 2003, 58.7 percent of the graduates from general schooling were women (StatFin 2007). The vocational education and training is mostly provided in educational institutions and sometimes in the form of apprenticeship training (not as broadly as in West Germany). Vocational training mostly takes three years.

[23] In 1990/91, there were 109 female students per 100 male students, whereas the respective rate was for West Germany was 74. In 2000/01, the rate amounted to 95 German female students per 100 male students, and 117 female students per 100 male students in Finland (de Ruijter 2004).

[24] In West Germany, children attend the comprehensive primary school for four years.

[25] Their training is shorter because some general studies included in the matriculation examination are counted towards their qualification.

Table 3.9 Educational level according to gender in Finland, 2003 (Population over 15 years)

	Women (%)	Men (%)
Basic education (9 years of schooling)	38.3	38.0
Upper secondary education (11-13 years of schooling)	35.3	39.4
Tertiary education (2-6 years schooling after upper secondary)	26.5	22.7
All	100.0	100.0

Source: StatFin 2007 (http://statfin.stat.fi/StatWeb/start.asp?LA=fi&lp=home)

Like in West Germany, vocational training in Finland is highly segregated according to gender (Table 3.9). The most popular field of study is technology, but only 15 percent of graduates in this field are women. Women are rather involved in the fields of health and welfare, services, social sciences and business, and humanities and arts. Vocational training is provided by local authorities, municipalities, registered associations, foundations, the government or state enterprises. They do not differ in the human capital investments as in West Germany, where several vocational schools have a tuition fee and participants of the dual system are remunerated while being educated. Nevertheless, especially the income prospects are quite different in the fields of study. Employees in the field of technology are better remunerated than e.g. employees in health and welfare (StatFin 2007).

Table 3.10 Vocational institutions according to gender in Finland, 2003

	Students (%)			Graduations (%)		
	Total	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men
Teacher education and educational science	166	25	75	174	29	71
Humanities and arts	12 193	61	39	2 689	65	35
Social sciences and business	28 573	65	35	10 262	70	30
Natural sciences	9 332	30	70	2 351	45	55
Technology	55 503	15	85	17 025	15	85
Agriculture and forestry	9 980	50	50	2 241	52	48
Health and welfare	23 781	91	9	8 167	91	9
Services	35 285	68	32	11 170	70	30
Total	174 813	50	50	54 079	54	46

Source: (Ministry of Education 2006)

In 2003, approximately 35.3 percent of women and 39.4 percent of men had upper secondary level education (Table 3.10). More women than men reached the tertiary level of education. Higher education (tertiary education) is provided at polytechnics and

universities. Today, more women than men have graduated from universities and polytechnics. In 2005, even 60 percent of the master's degrees at universities were conferred to women.

Table 3.11 Degrees conferred by universities by field of study in Finland, 2005

	Master's degree	% women	Doctoral degrees	% women
Theology	208	61	25	32
Humanities	1 704	80	113	55
Art and design	219	63	12	75
Music	133	61	11	45
Theatre and dance	82	57	2	100
Education	1 583	83	83	69
Sport sciences	91	49	5	40
Social sciences	253	74	119	50
Psychology	228	87	19	89
Health sciences	336	96	40	85
Law	414	54	15	40
Economics and business administration	1 734	55	89	46
Natural sciences	1 558	53	272	44
Agriculture and forestry	247	61	39	44
Engineering and architecture	2 450	25	277	25
Medicine	460	70	248	59
Dentistry	54	67	20	75
Veterinary medicine	48	92	11	73
Pharmacy	94	80	20	60
Fine arts	24	75	2	0
Total	12 920	60	1 422	49

Source: (Ministry of Education 2005)

The percentage of women with doctoral degrees has also increased in the past few decades. In 1989, 33 percent of the doctorates were earned by women (Statistics Finland 2005) and in 2005 already 49 percent of the doctorates were conferred to women (see Table 3.11). The doctoral degrees are also gendered according to the field of study. Women are especially under-represented in engineering and architecture. Only 25 percent of the graduates are women. There are also great discrepancies between the number of female students of a subject and the number of doctoral degrees completed by women. The most remarkable case is the field of theology. Among theology

students, 61 percent of the master's degrees are conferred to women, but only 33 percent of the doctoral degrees are mastered by women.

Table 3.12 Teachers at universities, 2003

	Women (%)
Assistants and full-time visiting teachers	48
Lecturers and senior assistants	48
Professors	20
Total	39

Source: (Statistics Finland 2005)

The structure of Finnish higher education is clearly gendered, not only at the vertical level, but a hierarchical segregation is especially evident among the Finnish professorate. In 2003, only 20 percent of the professors were female (Table 3.19). As in West Germany, the proportion of women diminishes at the highest levels in the educational system. Finnish women are conferred the master's degree more often than men and finish their doctoral degree almost to same extent as men. Nevertheless, the gendered structure of the educational system is still prevalent at the level of university teachers, but it can be assumed to diminish over time.

3.2.2.2 Paid and unpaid work

Finnish women have high levels of education and are strongly involved in the labor market. In 2004, the employment rate of women was 65.5 percent and men's employment rate 68.9 percent (OECD 2005). Finnish women's labor force participation hardly varies according to marital status, but women often exit the labor market when their youngest child is under three (see Table 3.13). The great drop in female labor force participation is related to the economic rewards from the child home care allowance. In 2002, 21.8 percent of mothers with 0-3 year old children were eligible for child home care allowance (OECD 2005). If mothers receiving child home care allowance were defined as employed – as are the mothers on parental leave – the employment rate for Finnish mothers would be considerably higher. If, however, mothers who are on maternal/parental leave and mothers eligible for child home care allowance are excluded from the category 'employed', only 33.8 percent of mothers whose youngest child is between 0 to 3 years would be considered employed (Melasniemi-Uutela 2005).

The interpretation of mothers' employment rates is not quite so straightforward because of the different parental leave schemes. The description of mothers' employment strongly depends on the parental leave scheme and if women taking a certain type of leave are considered employed or not. In the Finnish case, it can be noted that mothers more often exit the labor market to care for their infants when they are younger than three years, but most of them return to employment before the youngest child turns three. In 2004, 63 percent of the mothers who stayed at home to care for their child had a job to return to after parental leave (Statistics Finland 2005). The employment rate of mothers with children between three and six is even 14.6 respectively 18.1 percentage points higher than the employment rates of all women (Table 3.13). This is related to the age of the woman and the fact that most women at the time of starting a family have finished their schooling.

Table 3.13 Maternal employment rates[26] by age of youngest child[27] (%)

	All	0-16	0-3	3-6	6-16
1995	58.9	65.8	40.8	68.4	78.4
2000	64.5	73.1	47.0	77.2	83.2
2002	66.1	76.0	52.1	80.7	84.2

Source: (Kela 2005)

Fathers' labor force participation is hardly influenced by the birth of a child. In 2005, 47,554 fathers were on parental leave, of whom only 5,953 were paid parental allowance (the corresponding number of women was 99,067). The average duration of leave for the fathers was approximately 18 days, whereas women on average stayed on parental leave for 150 days (maternity leave days not included) (Sutela 2005). Traditionally, men have even increased their employment hours when becoming fathers, but the trend is changing. Especially fathers under 35 years old have changed their employment behavior. As recently as the 1990s, fathers of young children worked the longest hours and did the most overtime. In 2003, fathers of children under three did the least overtime (Takala 2004b). Men increasingly stay at home to care for their sick children (Sutela 2005). In the Working Conditions Survey 2003, in families where both

[26] The employment rate is calculated as: employed people aged between 15 and 64 years as a percentage of the respective population. Individuals taking parental leave are counted as employed.

[27] All mothers on maternity/parental leave are assumed to be employed full-time.

partners were employed full-time and with children under ten, 72 percent of the mothers and 65 percent of the fathers had stayed at home to take care of a sick child. The gender gap is relatively small compared to the results of the Working Conditions Survey from 1984, according to which mothers' probability to stay at home to take care of sick children was twice as high as that of fathers. Irregular working shifts have also lead to the fact that in double-earner families, fathers more often took responsibility for child care (Haataja 2005).

3.2.2.2.1 Part-time and working hours reductions

In 2002, the average workday for men was 8.5 and for women 7.7 hours (Haataja 2005; Nätti 1995). The share of employment hours is somewhat greater for fathers and somewhat lower for mothers with under school-aged children (fathers 8.7 and mothers 7.5). These discrepancies cannot be explained by high part-time employment by mothers. Women are, in fact, more often part-time employed than men (Table 3.14), but mostly not because of family responsibilities (Statistics Finland 2005).

Since 1989, Finnish parents have the right to reduce their employment to 30 hours a week if they have a child under three or a child starting school. Nevertheless, only 10 percent of part-time employed women and 1 percent of part-time employed men explained their reduced working hours with child care. The reasons for part-time employment were mostly lack of opportunities for full-time work or studies (Kela 2005).

Table 3.14 Share of part-time employment, 1994-2005 (%)

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Men	8.3	8.3	8.2	7.0	7.3	7.7	8.0	8.0	8.3	8.6	9.0	9.3
Women	15.0	15.4	15.2	15.3	15.9	16.9	17.0	16.8	17.5	17.7	18.4	18.6

In 2005, only 10,824 families were paid partial child home care allowance, which is approximately 2.3 percent of all families with children between 0 and 8 (Haataja 2005). 71.8 percent of the families who received partial child home care allowance[28] had a child in the first or second grade at school. As long as the child is under three, parents

[28] That is, 1.6 percent of all families with children between 0 and 8.

(the mother) seem to either stay at home to care for the child or to use child daycare arrangements. Reduced working hours do not seem an attractive option. Fathers only use their right to reduced hours to a low extent (Haataja 2005). Mothers mostly either choose to stay at home to care for their children or to use full-time daycare.

3.2.2.2.2 Homemaking

The double-earner family is strongly rooted in Finland and homemaking is a seldom status. Men hardly exit the labor market to take care of the home. Approximately 97 percent of homemakers in 2002 were women. Women's homemaking is strongly linked to child care. This tendency has even increased during the past few decades. In 1989, approximately 69.8 percent of the homemakers were mothers (with children under 18), whereas in 2002 the rate of mothers among homemakers was 83.5 percent. Most of these mothers have children under seven years old (58.8 percent in 1989 and 75.3 percent in 2002) (Haataja 2005).

Table 3.15 shows the changes in homemaking from 1989 until 2002. Homemaking is more and more attached to child care, and reached its peak in 1995. In 1995, the unemployment rate was as high as 15.4 percent (15.7 for men and 15.1 for women) (StatFin 2007) and the use of child home care allowance was highest. During the depression, homemaking seemed to serve as an alternative to unemployment for women (Statistics Finland 2005). Quite a few of the mothers on some sort of parental leave (or receiving the child home care allowance) were without an employment contract (Lammi-Taskula 2005: 112). Nevertheless, only 8.2 of the homemakers had children between 7 and 17, which indicates that even those women who do not have a job to return to after the leave find a job before the child starts school.

Homemaking is obviously not considered a vocation or a job, like in West Germany. If someone is a homemaker, it is the woman. However, homemaking is mostly combined with leaving the labor market to care for infants. Homemaking has also been shown to increase with high unemployment, and can partly be considered an alternative to unemployment, rather than a permanent status. The lack of homemakers indicates that housework in Finland is done rather more casually and in addition to paid employment.

Table 3.15 Homemakers in Finland (share of the whole population according to age and family status (%))

	1989	1995	2000	2002
Men	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
All fathers	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2
Fathers with at least one child under 7	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.3
Fathers with at least one child over 7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Fathers aged 25-44	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3
Men aged 25-44, no children	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1
All men, no children	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
Women	6.4	6.8	5.5	4.5
All mothers	11.3	15.0	12.6	10.8
Mothers with at least one child under 7	19.6	28.1	24.4	21.1
Mothers with at least one child over 7	3.3	2.1	1.9	2.0
Mothers aged 25-44	10.5	15.3	13.9	12.0
Women aged 25-44, no children	1.5	1.4	1.0	0.6
All women, no children	3.1	2.0	1.4	0.1

Source: (Haataja 2005)

Nevertheless, the division between paid and unpaid labor is highly gendered. Men are hardly homemakers. This is also reflected in attitudes towards gender roles. Most Finns consider that women have the right to employment regardless of their family situation, but still think that the man has the main responsibility 'to earn the family's living' (Anttonen and Sointu 2006). The increasing promotion of care at home since the early 1990s, denotes that Finland to some degree can be located closer to the family care model than other Nordic countries. Nevertheless, the public support for care is still relevant (Statistics Finland 2005). Finland can be defined as a double-earner but single-carer society.

3.2.2.3 Labor market structure

Finnish men and women both participate in the labor market, yet according to different premises. This leads to gendered labor market structures. Most of the employees working in the public sector are women and most of those are employed by the municipality. At the beginning of the 1990s, approximately 34 percent of female

employees were employed by the municipality (Graph 3.3). Out of all employees in the municipal sector, approximately 73 percent were women (StatFin 2007). After the high unemployment of 1991-1993, the share of women working for municipalities even increased and reached 40 percent in 1996. The increasing share of women employed in the municipal sector depended on the fact that the private sector was affected by unemployment to a larger extent than the public sector. As the economic situation improved, women again gained their previous positions in the private sector. Before and after the depression circa 53 percent of employed women worked in the private sector.

Graph 3.3 Women's employment according to sector in Finland, 1990-2004



Source: StatFin 2007 http://statfin.stat.fi

It appears that after the economic depression, the state tried to minimize its costs by not filling vacant positions or by privatizing some of its companies. In contrast to the municipal sector and private companies, which in 1994 started increasingly to employ people; in the state sector both men and women were to lesser extent employed after the economic depression than during it (StatFin 2007). Employed men's share in the private sector has increased over time, with the exception of the years of the economic depression, when unemployment reached its peak (Graph 3.4). In 2004, approximately 75 percent of employed men worked in the private sector, which is an increase of eight percentage points from 1990. Finnish men are hardly employed in the municipal sector.

The share of employed men working for municipalities has ranged between 11 to 15 percent. The low share of men employed in the municipal sector can be explained by the gendered specialization into different fields of employment.

Graph 3.4 Men's employment according to sector in Finland, 1990-2004



Source: StatFin 2007 http://statfin.stat.fi

Even though some fields increasingly employ men and women to the same extent, women and men are often still specialized in different fields. Women's fields are social work, health, and services, whereas men are better represented among technical services, agriculture, manufacturing, and construction. In fact, 90 percent of employees in the field of social work in 2004 were women. Also, heath activities were to 85 percent taken care of by women (Graph 3.5). Even if Finnish women do not privately take care of the home and family as homemakers – with the exception of mothers of small children – Finnish women do the caring provided by the state. The relationship between women and the state is somewhat peculiar to Finland. The state provides care so that women can participate in the labor market, and at the same time the state provides jobs for women in the social and health fields. Women can be regarded as *public carers*. The special relationship between the state and women has lead to a higher labor force participation of women, but also to a highly segregated labor market. The

labor market is highly segregated according to gender both in certain employment fields as well as in employment sectors.

Graph 3.5 Industries by female domination in Finland, 2004 (%) proportion of employed persons in the industry



Source: (Ministry of Social Affair and Health 2005)

In the same sense that women and men are assigned different tasks according to the field of employment, it seems that men and women are considered to have different skills concerning tasks along the vertical hierarchy. The share of women in leading positions has increased, although the share of women in managerial positions is not nearly as high as that of men. Even if almost half of the employees in the public sector in 2000 were women,[29] only 35 percent of leading positions in the state sector were held by women (Ministry of Social Affair and Health 2005). In the private sector, only 26 percent of the leading positions were held by women (Ministry of Social Affair and Health 2005), whereas more than 40 percent of employees in the private sector were

[29] 47.3 percent of employees in the public sector were women (StatFin 2007 http://statfin.stat.fi)

women (StatFin 2007). Taking into account that 75 percent of employees in the municipal sector were women (StatFin 2007), the share of 52 percent of women in leading positions in this sector (European Commission 2002) rather indicates that men – independently of employment sector – are more likely to hold managerial positions than women. The strong labor market commitment of Finnish women has not erased differences in the gender specific tasks and positions. The labor market is highly segregated both horizontally and vertically. Even if caring has become a municipal concern, it is still done by women and men still hold the managerial positions.

3.2.2.4 Division of income

Traditionally and historically men and women have both been considered to contribute to the family income in Finland. Nevertheless, men and women have not (and do not) contribute to the family income to the same degree. Since 1963, it is legally prohibited to pay a woman less than a man for the same work. Until then, women's wages were legally lower than those of men. There were even different registers of wages for men and women performing the same job. Since then the legislation has changed, but even if the share of women's earnings relative to men's, is above the European average (EU-15) (Statistics Finland 2005), it seems that women's work is not as highly recognized as men's. In 1985, women earned 79 percent of men's earnings, and this figure has hardly changed since then (Table 3.16). The greatest change has been in the private sector, where a five percentage point increase in woman's share of men's income can be observed. The gender gap has been at its lowest in the municipal sector where mostly women are employed. Nevertheless, the gap is not disappearing. In 2004, women's average monthly wage was only 80 percent of men's. This is relatively surprising taking Finnish women's high levels of education into account.

Table 3.16 Women's share of men's average monthly earnings by sector (%), 1985-2004

	Total	Private sector	Central government (State)	Municipalities
1985	79	76	80	83
1990	80	77	83	83
1991	81	78	83	85
1992	81	78	83	86
1993	81	79	84	85
1994	81	79	82	85
1995	82	81	81	85
1996	82	82	80	85
1997	82	82	81	85
1998	82	82	81	85
1999	82	82	81	85
2000	82	83	81	85
2001	82	83	81	84
2002	80	81	80	84
2003	80	81	81	84
2004	80	81	81	85

Source: (Plantenga and Remery 2005)

Looking at the gendered income gap according to educational level in the private sector and the municipalities, different patterns according to the educational level can be observed. In the private sector, the gender gap is larger among men and women without any special qualification, or with two to four years of schooling after the upper secondary (Table 3.17). Women with a master's (5-6 years of schooling after the upper secondary) or doctors degree seem to have better bargaining positions and earn 80 percent or 86 percent respectively of their male counterparts' income. In the municipal sector, the picture is almost the opposite. The higher the educational level needed for the job, the greater the gender gap. It appears women with high levels of education cannot enforce such high wages as their male counterparts.

Table 3.17 Women's share of men's earnings, 2005, by sector and education (only employees, monthly income, overtime supplements not included) (%)

	Private sector	Municipalities
Compulsory school[1]	79.9	88.8
Upper secondary[2]	80.3	91.1
Tertiary (2-3 years)[3]	76.2	89.0
Tertiary (3-4 years)[3]	73.4	81.8
Tertiary (5-6 years)[3]	80.1	84.5
Doctoral degree	85.9	83.0

[1] 9 years schooling
[2] 11-13 years schooling
[3] Schooling after upper secondary

Source: StatFin 2007 http://statfin.stat.fi

The difference in men's and women's incomes can neither be explained by horizontal segregation. Even though 91 percent of the vocational trainees in the field of health and welfare, and 96 percent of the master's graduates in health sciences were women, women working in the field of health and welfare only earn 77 percent of men's earning in the private sector and 66 percent in the municipal sector respectively (Table 3.18). Men seem to achieve better incomes in female dominated fields, whereas women in male dominated fields like technology are not as successful.

Table 3.18 Women's share of men's earnings, 2005 by sector and field of education (monthly income, only for employees, overtime supplements not included) (%)

	Private sector	Municipalities
Teacher education and educational science	86.7	87.3
Humanities and arts	86.2	93.8
Social sciences and business	71.5	72.5
Natural sciences	85.7	91.0
Technology	78.5	77.5
Agriculture and forestry	85.8	91.5
Health and welfare	77.2	65.6
Services	79.6	78.6

Source: StatFin 2007 http://statfin.stat.fi

Especially when looking at the income distribution, the peculiarity of the gendered division of resources in Finland becomes evident. Finnish women have reached very high levels of education, and even more women than men graduate from universities. Both women and men work full-time and the homemaker-breadwinner model has hardly rooted in Finland. Finnish women only leave the labor market when they have

small children, and the care work women provide is paid for by the state (municipalities). Even if women are paid for doing (at least the public) care work, a significant difference between men and women remains, and does not diminish, even when the educational level and the employment sector are taken into account. Men have higher incomes than women.

3.2.3 Summary

Finland is an interesting case in terms of gendered policies and the division of resources. The right to employment for both men and women has a long tradition. Finland is different from other countries assigned to the social democratic welfare state regime because of the high full-time labor force participation of women. In other Nordic countries, the part-time employment rate of women is much higher. In Finland, women were given the right to make their own employment contract in 1922, which in international comparison is relatively early. In 1963, men and women were given the right to equal payment for equal work. In the same year, short, income-related maternity leave was introduced to ease women's reconciliation of employment and family responsibilities. Ten years later, municipalities were assigned the responsibility for providing child care, and women's employment became the norm. The double-earner model and gender equity has since served as a principle for employment policies. Today, more women than men graduate from universities and women's full-time employment is very common even among mothers of small children in Finland.

Although the double-earner couple is the norm for social policy and is the most common family form, the double-carer couple is still a rarity in Finland. Men's right to care was introduced much later than women's right to employment. Only in 1978 were men given a twelve day long paternity leave, and only since 1995 have fathers who do not live together with the mother been entitled to parental leave if the mother did not care for the child. For a long time, maternity leave was a sole right for mothers. Even if the mother was not capable of taking care of the child, e.g. due to illness, the father had no right to 'maternity' leave until 2003.

The idea that women are considered better carers is also reflected in the labor market structure. Women are mostly employed in the fields of social work, health, and

education. The high employment rates of mothers is highly correlated with a high rate of women employed by the state to do public caring. At the same time as public caring leads to greater gender equality in the labor market, it also leads to a strongly gendered segregation. To some degree this phenomenon is responsible for the income discrepancies between men and women. Nevertheless, this does not explain all of the income differences. Women namely do earn less than their male counterparts, even when they work in the same field (and sector). The work men do is still more highly remunerated and men are still considered to carry the main responsibility for providing for the family. In the same sense, women are still responsible for homemaking. If one spouse (partner) stays at home to take care of family responsibilities, it is mostly the woman. Finland is definitely a double-earner society, but also a one-carer one.

3.3 Conclusions on the societal context

West Germany and Finland have different histories of women's employment, which go hand in hand with incentives and disincentives for female employment and the regulations in family policy. In West Germany, the focus has for a long time been on supporting the family, implying that family equals the breadwinner-homemaker model, and needs specific support. Most policies focus on offering women the possibility to leave the labor market so that they can better take care of family responsibilities. The splitting advantage offers families who choose a more 'traditional' division of labor (either with one partner staying at home or one partner reducing their employment hours) income compensation for the lost income. Furthermore, the three-year long leave enforced women's homemaker and men's breadwinner role in the same way as the splitting advantage did.

This changed in 2007 when the parental allowance was changed into a benefit that compensates the income loss for employed parents. After the reform, parental leave can be extended if the other partner (usually the father) takes two months leave. The new arrangement can be assumed to be an economic incentive especially for women to be in employment before and after birth, while the father's months serve as an economic incentive for men to invest in child care. In West Germany, the stigmatization of working mothers has eased during the last decade and child daycare centers have been

increasingly introduced. Since 1996, all children between three and six have the right to child care. The coverage rate has not reached 100 percent yet, but is higher than in Finland. The long history of the homemaker-breadwinner model and the changes in parental leave and child care regulations indicate better preconditions for home-oriented women and work-oriented men. However, the changes in social policy in the past few years, might be reflected in a less traditional gender role ideology for both men and women and thus also a less traditional division of housework.

In Finland, women have established their position in the labor market historically at an early stage, and women's employment has actively been supported by the state. Parental leave has always been income related and relatively short, which has provided economic incentives for women's employment. The Finnish state has actively endorsed the double-earner model by providing child daycare to everyone in need. All these efforts have bolstered female employment, but have also lead to a highly segregated labor market. Finland has, amongst the other Nordic countries, the most segregated labor market according to gender (Albrecht et al. 2000; Alwin et al. 1992; Scott et al. 1996). Even though most women work full-time and women have higher levels of education, women, independently of their position, earn less than their male counterparts. One explanation seems to be the field of work, but also in the same field with the same human capital investments, women do not reach men's income levels.

Even though women are more work oriented in Finland than in West Germany, Finnish men have not in the same manner started to explore their carer role. The state started supporting men's carer role much later than women's work role, and men have shown less interest in homemaking (child caring) than women have in employment. Hardly any men have taken advantage of the parental leave arrangements and even fewer men choose to be homemakers. The fact that the economic incentives to leave the labor market seem more attractive to women than to men, suggests that men who are work-oriented will have very good preconditions for implementing their preferences, while the Finnish state offers best preconditions for transitional or adaptive women to realize their preferences.

In the following chapter, I will empirically scrutinize attitudes towards gender roles in Finland and Germany. After that I will analyze the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership status, and how this is moderated by the country context.

Finally, I will empirically address the question of what makes men and women increase or decrease the amount of time they spend on housework. The main focus is on the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework. One of the main research questions here is how does the societal context influence the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework.

4 Empirical approach

So far, I have presented a theoretical framework according to which the correlation between gender role ideology and mating behavior will have a decisive effect on the division of housework when controlling for relative resources, time availability and socialization; at the same time pointing out that these factors will strongly be influenced by the societal context. In this chapter, I shall critically examine the theories dealing with the relationship between relative resources, gender role ideology and the division of housework. Previously, I have discussed studies which show that the theories on relative resources fail to explain gendered behavior, while theories on gendered behavior like the *doing gender* approach, do not differentiate between men's and women's individual norms and perspectives towards gender roles. Thus, I will mainly focus on the theories by Hakim (2000) as well as Breen and Cooke (2005), which allow for diverse attitudes on gendered behavior and make assumptions on how this will affect individual work-life choices, without, however, disregarding the economic theory of the family, relative resources and time availability theory.

Hakim (2000) claims that individuals have always had different preferences as to how to combine their work and family roles, although it is only since the beginning of the 21st century that they have had the possibility to realize their preferences. Considering the fact that according to Hakim (2000) women's possibilities to realize their own lifestyle preferences are correlated to societal changes such as the gendered revolution (for more details see Chapter 2.4.1), Hakim's theory also implies that, depending on their societal context, individuals with certain preferences in certain countries have better preconditions for realizing their preferences than individuals in other countries.

Leaning on the ideas of Hakim (2000), Breen and Cooke (2005) claim that, depending on the proportion of non-traditional individuals in a country, the division of housework will differ. They basically argue that mating behavior according to gender role ideology gives an explanation for the prevalence of the traditional division of housework. Breen and Cooke (2005) claim that women will only marry when they see a possibility of finding a man with a corresponding gender role ideology. Women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles will always be inclined to marry. However, the disposition of a woman with a work orientation (or non-traditional gender role ideology) to invest in a relationship depends on the estimated proportion of men who are inclined to share the housework equally. Because the proportion of work-oriented or autonomous women is larger than the share of home-oriented or cooperative men, it leads Breen and Cooke (2005) to argue that the division of housework will only become less traditional when the proportion of men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles becomes larger (for a more detailed explanation see Chapter 2.4.2).

In the following, I will use data from the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) 2002 topic 'Family and Changing Gender Roles III' to empirically scrutinize the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework. ISSP is a continuing annual cross-national project in which different topics in various areas of the social sciences are collected each year. In 2002, 34 countries participated in the project about 'Family and Changing Gender Roles'. The common questionnaire was developed in British English and was translated by the participating countries into their languages. In my analysis, I only concentrate on data from (former) West Germany and Finland.[30]

The German data was gathered together with the ALLBUS (Die allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften) 2002 study. The ALLBUS sample in 2002 was designed to yield a representative sample of the adult population (18 years and older) living in private accommodation in Germany, including foreigners able to complete the questionnaire in German.[31] The total response rate of the ALLBUS was

[30] The reason for using the ISSP data and not time use data – which has proven to give the most accurate estimates of individual's time use – is that the ISSP has comparable information on attitudes towards gender roles across countries.

[31] For full details on the sample see: Blohm, Michael et al. (2003). ZUMA-Methodenbericht 2003/12. Konzeption und Durchführung der 'Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS) 2002.' Mannheim, ZUMA

45.6 percent. 96.7 percent of the ALLBUS respondents agreed to complete the ISSP module. A total of 1,367 questionnaires were completed for the module. 963 interviews were conducted in western and 431 in the eastern states. Because female labor force participation and the attitudes on gender norms differ to a large extent in eastern and western states (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Gershuny 2000; Gershuny et al. 2005), I only include individuals from West Germany in my data set (see Chapter 3).

The collection of Finnish data was carried out by Statistics Finland in cooperation with the University of Tampere and the Finnish Social Science Data Archive. The sampling procedure was a systematic random sampling based on Finland's population register. Everyone living in Finland aged between 18 and 74 belonged to the target population. The sample size was 2,498 people, of whom 1,353 answered the questionnaire, which makes a total response rate of 54.2 percent.[32]

The data for both countries has been collected on the individual level but since there is also information on partner's time spent on housework, educational level, working hours, employment status, and income, the data can to some extent be considered couple data.[33]

All cases without clear information on marital status or partnership are excluded from the analysis. In the ISSP two variables include information about the partner. One variable provides information about marital status, and the other on a steady life partner. Thus, it is possible to differentiate between cohabiting and married couples. In West Germany, individuals who have the marital status of 'single' but have a steady life partner are defined as cohabiting. People who have the status 'married' are defined as married. In Finland, married and cohabiting couples are summarized in one category. In Finland, married couples with no information on a steady life partner were defined as married and people with a steady life partner were coded as cohabiting.

[32] For more information on the Finnish data set see http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD0119/meF0119e.html (15.08 2005).

[33] Unfortunately, there is no information on the partner's gender role ideology, which means that there is no possibility to analyze couple constellation according to gender role ideology.

Table 4.1 Marital status (%)

	West Germany			Finland		
	Men (N=450)	Women (N=483)	All (N=933)	Men (N=583)	Women (N=728)	All (N=1311)
Married	59.3	59.8	59.6	52.1	49.0	50.4
Cohabiting	14.0	11.6	12.8	17.3	18.7	18.1
Widowed	3.1	10.6	7.0	1.2	4.1	2.8
Divorced	7.1	8.1	7.6	7.4	11.3	9.5
Single	16.4	9.9	13.1	22.0	16.9	19.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This means that 933 cases can be identified for West Germany and 1,311 for Finland (see Table 4.1). In Finland, the sample includes significantly more women than men (728 women and 583 men). Generally, there are more cohabiting, divorced, and single people in the Finnish sample than in the German sample. In West Germany, marriage seems to be more attractive than in Finland, where couples more often choose cohabiting as a long term form of partnership (see Table 4.1). This is an interesting composition for the relationship between partnership formation and gender role ideology.

The main aim of this work is to find out if individuals' gender role ideology is indeed reflected in their division of housework. To empirically answer the question, do couples in Finland and West Germany actually walk the walk or just talk the talk, four steps are taken. First of all, to find out if there are any differences in the gender role ideologies in West Germany and Finland, a comparable and reliable measure for gender role ideology is needed. In Chapter 4.1, I describe in detail the problems and solutions for finding a measure that is comparable for West Germany and Finland. In this Chapter, I also take up the issue of the differences and similarities in the attitudes towards gender role ideology in Finland and Germany, and how this is related to the societal context. After finding a comparable measure of gender role ideology, I explore the relationship between mating behavior and gender role ideology. The main interest for me lies in finding out if the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership status is moderated by the societal context. The assumption is that some cultural and socio-political settings offer a more attractive environment for non-traditional couples to seek a partnership than other settings (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Baxter 2005; Finnäs 1995;

Röhler and Huinink 2010; Yodanis 2010). In the second part of the empirical approach, I will therefore analyze if the societal context moderates the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership status. In the third section of the empirical approach, I will conduct an analysis of the impact of gender role ideology on the relative division of housework. I will scrutinize if a non-traditional gender role ideology correspondingly leads to a non-traditional division of housework. Last but not least, I will take a closer look at the effect of gender role ideology on the hours men and women spend on housework. The aim is to find out when men increase and women decrease their time spent on housework. This is expected to reveal the mechanisms that lead to a non-traditional division of housework.

4.1 Gender role ideology: differences between West Germany and Finland

Along with the increase in female labor force participation, attitudes towards gender roles have also become more egalitarian (see e.g. Crompton et al. 2000; Davis et al. 2009; Scott et al. 1996; Scott and Duncombe 1992; Sjöberg 2010; Stickney and Konrad 2007).[34] The way attitudes towards gender role ideology have changed varies in different countries (Albrecht et al. 2000; Alwin et al. 1992; Apparala et al. 2003; Braun et al. 1994; Crompton 1999; Crompton et al. 2000; Sjöberg 2010; Sundström 1999; Treas and Widmer 2000). Several reasons for the correlation between the country context and attitudes towards gender roles have been suggested. Differences in female labor force participation is one explanation for the country differences (Adler and Brayfield 1996; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005), yet high female employment rates have not always been shown to lead to less traditional attitudes towards gender roles (Albrecht et al. 2000; Braun et al. 1994; Crompton et al. 2000). Besides the female employment rate, it has been suggested that family policy institutions (i.e. child care facilities) (Sjöberg 2004; Sjöberg 2010), ratings on women's empowerment, and the gross national product (Apparala et al. 2003), serve as the main explanatory variable for differences in attitudes

[34] Egalitarian attitudes refer to individuals who do not prefer a division of labor between men and women in which men earn the money and women do the household labor.

towards gender roles between countries. Some scholars have even shown that attitudes towards gender roles are more similar than different in various countries (see also Georgas et al. 2004; Inglehart and Baker 2000).[35]

Keeping this in mind, I will start by scrutinizing similarities and differences in attitudes towards gender roles with the goal of coming up with a reliable measure for gender role ideology for Finland and West Germany. After that I will analyze the relationship between partnership formation and gender role ideology.

4.1.1 The societal context and attitudes towards gender role ideology

The comparison of attitudes towards gender roles in different countries is not straightforward (for an overview see Davis and Greenstein 2009). The ISSP 2002 fulfills the criteria of standardized measures and extensive back translation. Nevertheless, the problem of commensurability can never totally be overcome (Crompton 2007). For a cross-national examination of differences across different attitudinal dimensions, a careful operationalization and knowledge of the countries under study is needed (Andreß and Heien 2001; Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Sjöberg 2010). In the ISSP 2002, ten questions were presented to study the opinions of the respondents on different statements towards gender roles. The response alternatives were: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. The items are coded in such a way that number 1 stand for strongly agreeing with the statement and number 5 for strongly disagreeing with the statement. The items in the survey were:[36]

a) A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4).[*]

b) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).

[35] Treas and Widmer (2000) found that women's employment gained widespread support, but mothers with small children are still expected to reduce their employment in all 23 industrialized countries examined in their study.

[36] For the translation of the statements see APPENDIX A.1.

[*] Recoded so that 1 stands for traditional and 5 for not traditional.

c) All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).

d) A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).

e) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).

f) Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9).*

g) Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10).*

h) A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and the family (v11).

i) Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12).*

j) Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13).*

Although Hakim (2000) claims that one's own preferences cannot be measured by asking questions on general attitudes towards gender role ideology, I regard it as acceptable to assume that someone who considers female employment harmful for a child will generally prefer to follow a traditional division of labor and vice versa (see also Crompton and Lyonette 2005). Thus, in the following I will use the measures provided in the ISSP 2002 on gender role ideology as proxy variables for individual preferences for work-life orientations.

Graph 4.1 Depiction of the means for statements on attitudes towards gender roles (More detailed information in APPENDIX A.2)



*Recoded so that 1 stands for traditional and 5 for egalitarian

However, acknowledging the fact that these attitudes only to some degree reflect the work-life preferences of men and women, I argue that women who hold traditional attitudes can be considered home-oriented, women with non-traditional attitudes are more likely work-oriented, while women with more or less moderate values will belong to the group of adaptive women. For men, the opposite is expected to be true. Men with traditional attitudes are assumed to be work-oriented, men with non-traditional attitudes to be home-oriented, whereas men with moderate attitudes towards gender roles are considered adaptive.

A general look at the mean scores for the individual items on attitudes towards gender roles shows that women tend to hold less traditional attitudes than men (Graph 4.1). However, different patterns between the countries exist. For example, the items 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work' (v4: mean 4.05) and 'having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person' (v9: mean 3.94) reach very high scores in West Germany; whereas the items 'a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works' (v5: mean 2.69) and the statement 'all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job' (v6: mean 2.88) attain low scores for West Germany (for the mean, standard deviation and number of valid answers, see APPENDIX A.2).

For Finland, the highest scores are achieved for the items concerning men's homemaking (v12: mean value 3.83; v13: mean value 3.89). The statements are difficult to interpret because disagreeing to the statement might also mean that men already do enough in the household. However, the strong agreement towards the statement suggest that most individuals agree (also the men) that men should participate more in housework and child care. Yet, it is not clear if men include themselves in the statement, and think that they also should participate more in housework and child care but cannot e.g. because of employment responsibilities, or if they only refer to other men and consider their effort to be too modest.

The second highest scores in Finland are reached for the support of the two income family (v10: mean value 3.75)[37] and for the rejection of the traditional division of labor

[37] The mean is not significantly different from West Germany.

(v11: mean value 3.77). The lowest mean scores fall to the items 'a job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children' (v7: mean value 2.74) and 'being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay' (v8: mean value 2.90).

For Finland, the relatively high approval of the double-earner family suggests that the long tradition of female full-time employment is reflected in the attitudes. The low means scores on the attitudes towards women's homemaking furthermore indicate that Finland indeed is a double-earner, yet a one-carer society (see Chapter 3.3). This interpretation should however be viewed with caution, especially since the statements on homemaking include a lot of missing values. This shall be addressed more in detail in the next section.

For West Germany, the first impression is that women's employment is considered positive for the women themselves while the consequences for the family are regarded negatively. Consequently, one can argue that women's employment is highly valued in West Germany (at least for the women themselves) as long as it does not interfere with her duties towards her family and children. However, as already mentioned, these interpretations only give a first impression and need to be explored in more detail.

4.1.2 Missing value analysis

Even though the data from ISSP 2002 offer good preconditions for comparative research, two major difficulties still remain: missing values and the question of comparability (see also Blasius and Thiessen 2006). The number of missing cases is quite large in the variables on attitudes towards gender role ideology. A listwise deletion of all cases that checked 'can't choose' or 'no answer' would mean that only 693 out of 933 cases can be included for West Germany and 944 out of 1,311 cases for Finland. Most missing cases are a result of respondents ticking 'can't choose'. As many as 22.7 percent of German men, 24.6 percent of German women, 26.4 percent of Finnish men, and 19.1 of Finnish women picked 'can't choose' for at least one of the ten statements on gender role ideology (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Distribution of missing values (%)

	West Germany				Finland			
	Men (N=450)		Women (N=483)		Men (N=583)		Women (N=728)	
	Can't choose	No answer	Can't choose	No answer	Can't choose	No answer	Can't choose	No answer
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4).	2.9	0.4	2.9	0.8	**5.5**	1.9	1.9	2.3
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).	4.2	0.4	**5.0**	1.0	**5.1**	1.9	3.0	2.6
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).	2.4	0.4	4.6	1.0	3.9	2.9	2.3	2.3
A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).	**7.1**	0.9	**6.0**	1.0	**9.8**	3.8	**7.0**	2.6
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).	**8.4**	0.7	**5.4**	1.2	**15.8**	3.1	**7.0**	2.2
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9).	4.4	0.7	2.7	1.0	**11.0**	3.3	4.9	2.2
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10).	3.1	0.4	4.6	1.0	2.9	1.2	1.4	1.6
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	2.9	1.1	1.7	1.2	2.1	2.2	1.0	1.6
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12).	**6.0**	0.7	**6.2**	0.8	4.5	2.4	2.3	1.6
Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13).	**5.3**	0.4	**8.3**	0.8	**5.1**	2.4	3.4	1.6
Listwise	22.7	1.8	24.6	2.3	26.4	6.5	19.1	4.9

Both German and Finnish men and women had more than five percent ‘can’t choose’ answers on the statements ‘a job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children’ and ‘being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay’. Almost 16 percent of Finnish men could not choose if ‘being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay’. A listwise deletion would mean a loss of more than a quarter of the cases. To get a general picture of what it would mean for the analysis if all the missing cases are deleted or imputed, a missing value analysis with SPSS was conducted. The analysis was conducted separately for Germans and Finns. For all indicator variables that had more than five percent missing values, separate independent sample t-test were calculated.[38] These are marked bold in Table 4.2 if there is a significant difference between the mean value for those who gave a valid answer and those who ticked ‘can’t choose’.

Because the independent t-tests show significant differences in gender role ideology between those who ticked ‘can’t choose’ and those who gave a valid response, excluding all the cases with ‘can’t choose’, would lead to skewed results. Most of the people who ticked ‘can’t choose’ were less traditional towards other statements compared to those who gave a valid answer. Additionally to a listwise deletion, missing cases can be imputed according to different methods. The imputed data hardly shows any variation to the listwise deleted data (see APPENDIX B.2). Because ‘can’t choose’ can be considered a neutral opinion towards the statement, it is acceptable to recode all ‘can’t choose’ cases into ‘neither nor’. The recoding of ‘can’t choose’ into ‘neither nor’ has no influence on the mean values

After recoding ‘can’t choose’ into ‘neither nor’ a further 222 cases for West Germany and 306 cases for Finland can be included in the factor analysis. This leaves us with 914 West Germans, of whom 442 are men and 472 are women. All in all, 1,237 Finns, 545 male and 692 female, are included in the factor analysis.

[38] The missing value analysis was conducted separately for those who ticked ‘can’t choose’ and those who gave no answer. Since the number of those without an answer never exceeded the five percent limit, no t-test was calculated for these cases.

4.1.3 Operationalization

Excluding all missing cases from the analysis is not enough to develop a comparable measure. An overview of previous literature on gender roles shows that even when using the same data set there are different solutions on how to operationalize gender role ideology. The measure of gender role ideology ranges from using only one statement up to including seven items into one measure, depending on the countries included in the analysis (see APPENDIX B.3). To find the right measure for West Germany and Finland an explanatory factor analysis and a reliability analysis for the items included in the ISSP 2002 were calculated.

I calculated several explanatory factor analyses (principal component analysis, principal axis factoring, maximum likelihood, and alpha factoring). Because the different methods show similar results, I will avoid repetition by only presenting the results from the principal component analysis.[39] When calculating the principal component analysis and the rotations method varimax with Kaiser-Normalization for West Germany and Finland the following results emerge. According to the 'Eigenvalue-test' (Elbow-test) four different components (factors) were found for West Germany and Finland (see Table 4.3). For the principal component analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was as high as 0.69 and the Barlett's test of sphericity showed a highly significant Chi-square value (Chi-square 4887.647 with 45 degrees of freedom).

[39] I also calculated analyses with imputed data and data before recoding or imputation. The results were quite similar. Only the analysis with imputed data from the regression analysis came to a three factor solution with somewhat different component solutions.

Table 4.3 Rotated Component Matrix (N=2151)

	Components			
	1	2	3	4
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).	**0.845**	-0.020	0.097	0.068
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).	**0.824**	0.058	0.186	0.034
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	**0.580**	0.172	0.499	-0.036
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4).	**0.529**	-0.018	0.027	**0.525**
Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13).	0.016	**0.906**	0.006	0.052
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12).	0.058	**0.904**	0.019	0.104
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).	0.047	0.040	**0.772**	0.179
A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).	0.279	-0.067	**0.731**	-0.011
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9).	-0.212	0.072	0.320	**0.735**
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10).	0.185	0.108	-0.054	**0.723**
Total variance explained	28.48	16.95	12.25	10.19
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings (Total variance explained)	21.71	16.93	15.31	13.92
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling adequacy	0.693			
Barlett's Test of Sphericity	4887.647			
df	45			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

The results obtained by calculating the principal component analysis jointly for Germany and Finland differ somewhat from the results obtained by calculating the principal component analysis separately for Germany and Finland (see APPENDIX C.1 and APPENDIX C.2). Furthermore, factor analyses that include all the countries from the ISSP show a somewhat different outcome than the component analysis for Germany and Finland alone (Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Kunovich and Kunovich 2008; Sjöberg 2004; Sjöberg 2010). This is a further indication that the measure of gender role ideology should be carefully considered and that the societal context plays an important role in the interpretation of statements towards gender roles. It is important to conduct

studies in separate countries to reveal the actual mechanisms behind the attitudes towards gender roles (Sjöberg 2010).

In regards of content, the first component measures the consequences of mothers' employment on the family and children, the relationship between working mothers and their children, as well as attitudes towards a traditional division of labor. Someone who scores high on this factor can thus be considered to favor women's employment and to be against a traditional division of labor between men and women. Therefore, this component can be regarded as measuring attitudes towards the division of labor between men and women and I define this component as an indicator of attitudes on 'gender role ideology'.

The second component reflects the respondent's view on men's proportion of housework and child care. Therefore, I label this component an indicator for 'attitudes on men's household labor'. Unfortunately, the attitudes on men and their share of household labor or child care solely address the question of if men should help out more in the household, not if homemaking is okay for men; let alone if it would be rewarding for men to be a homemaker (see statements on 'women's homemaking': 'a job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children' (v7); 'being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay' (v8)). Furthermore, it is not clear if disagreeing with this statement means that men already participate enough in housework and child care and therefore should not do a larger share, or if men are considered to participate too little in housework and child care and therefore should take on a larger share.

The third component consists of the statements 'being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay' (v8) and 'a job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children' (v7). Both of these items address homemaking and its value compared to employment. The first item (v8) deals with the discussion on what is more fulfilling: working for pay or being a housewife, whereas the second item (v7) indicates that women might enjoy employment but their true calling is to stay home and take care of children. Thus, I will address this component with the label attitudes on 'women's role as homemakers'.

The fourth and final component consists of three statements: 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work' (v4), 'having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person' (v9), and 'both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income' (v10). All these items reflect women's employment and its meaning for the woman herself or for the family. The first item (v4) deals with the working woman and her relationship with her children. The second item (v9) postulates the importance of a job for the woman's own independence, and the third item (v10) states the importance of women's employment for the family income. One can say that the fourth component generally deals with attitudes on 'women's paid labor'.[40]

Table 4.4 Mean values for the components according to gender and country (Standard deviation) [Cronbach's alpha]

	West Germany		Finland	
	Men (N=442)	Women (N=472)	Men (N=545)	Women (N=692)
Gender role ideology	3.15 (0.81) [0.674]	3.41 (0.94) [0.763]	3.35 (0.87) [0.760]	3.60 (0.87) [0.797]
Men's household labor	3.47 (0.80) [0.683]	3.65 (0.83) [0.770]	3.68 (0.77) [0.810]	3.94 (0.73) [0.864]
Women's role as homemakers	3.16 (1.03) [0.625]	3.45 (1.08) [0.619]	2.80 (0.75) [0.264]	2.89 (0.86) [0.300]
Women's paid labor	3.75 (0.72) [0.440]	3.97 (0.75) [0.525]	3.35 (0.75) [0.423]	3.58 (0.74) [0.418]

Looking at the descriptive statistics and the Cronbach's alphas, significant differences across gender and country become evident (Table 4.4). The Levene's Test for significance shows significant results for the difference in the mean values between both men and women as well as between Germans and Finns (for more detailed results see APPENDIX C.3 and APPENDIX C.4). As shown in several previous studies, men are

[40] The empirical results found here differ somewhat from the theoretically assumed measures (Davis and Greenstein 2009). This is another argument for a closer empirical analysis of the measure of gender role ideology and its relevance.

more traditional in their attitudes than women (see e.g. Albrecht et al. 2000; Alwin et al. 1992; Andreß and Heien 2001; Crompton et al. 2000; Treas and Widmer 2000). As expected, based on the societal context the attitudes on 'gender role ideology' are somewhat less traditional in Finland than in West Germany. However, a gendered effect becomes evident. German women are less traditional than Finnish men. The difference is only 0.06, however, statistically significant. As shown previously, a closer look at the item means shows that German women score equally high or lower on all items except for the item 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her child as a mother who does not work' (see APPENDIX A.2).[41] Similarly to the general discourse in West Germany and the social policy agenda, German women consider mother's employment harmful for the child, yet the consequences of the mother's employment are not considered negative for the woman. More surprising is the very high level of agreement on the statement 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work'.

The component on the attitudes towards 'men's household labor' shows relatively high Cronbach's alphas and generally non-traditional attitudes towards the statements. However, as already indicated, this measure is problematic. First of all, more than five percent of German men and women chose not to answer this question. Secondly, these statements are not easily interpretable. One indication for this is that German women who ticked 'can't choose' on the statement 'men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now' (v13) generally have a less traditional view towards the statement 'a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family'. Taking this into account, it seems that individuals who generally tend to hold less traditional attitudes towards gender roles tend to be indecisive when it comes to these two items.

Interestingly enough, German men and women hold less traditional attitudes on the components 'women's role as homemakers' than Finnish men and women do. The results should, however, be interpreted carefully. The missing value analyses already

[41] However, it should be noted that German women who checked 'can't choose' on the statement 'a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother worked' generally hold *less* traditional attitudes towards the statement 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work'.

showed that these items are problematic. Up to 7 percent of the women and more than 10 percent of the men ticked 'can't choose' on these items. In Finland, especially women who ticked 'can't choose' on these items tended to hold less traditional attitudes towards other statements. The recoding of 'can't choose' into 'neither nor' might therefore have led to an overrepresentation of traditional attitudes.

The reason behind the large number of missing cases in Finland might be that the statements are interpreted in different societal contexts. As shown in Chapter 3.2, women's homemaking never really became a common phenomenon in Finland. Therefore, Finns (especially men) to a large extent have not experienced very many homemakers, yet also have not been a homemaker themselves. As shown in the missing value analysis, the low score on 'attitudes towards women's role as homemakers' does not mean that the Finns who do not answer the question necessary hold traditional attitudes towards women's role as homemakers. On the contrary, they were found to hold less traditional attitudes towards 'gender role ideology' compared to those who answered the question. Thus, it is very likely that the low score on this component means that individuals who have never experienced being a homemaker prefer not to evaluate something they are not familiar with. This interpretation is supported by the fact that more than 8 percent of German men (who have no experience of being a homemaker) also ticked 'can't choose' on this statement (mean 2.87).

Another explanation might be that agreeing with the statement 'a job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children' does not necessary mean that women could not both be employed and have a family, which principally is not associated with traditional attitudes. However, the low Cronbach's alpha (0.264 for men and 0.300 for women) suggests that the measure is problematic for Finland and therefore this measure shall not be included in the analysis.

It is surprising to see that Finns hold more traditional attitudes towards 'women's paid labor' than Germans do. Unexpectedly, in Finland where the double-earner couple is the most common partnership form and where women already participated full-time in paid work in the 1950s (Chapter 3.2), the attitudes towards women's employment are more traditional than in West Germany. A look at the descriptive statistics on the separate items reveals that the reason for the high score for Germans for this item is the result of a high level of agreement with the statement 'having a job is the best way for a

woman to be an independent person' (v9: mean value 4.03.) and 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work' (v4: mean value 4.20). Surprisingly, employment is considered to affect women more positively in West Germany than in Finland, where women's (full-time) employment is more common. Apparently, Finns who have experienced women's employment do not consider this the ultimate solution for women to gain their independence. On the other hand, one could think that German women, who at least know of cases where the wife depends on her husband's income, see this as a huge disadvantage to women's independence. Because this factor shows the lowest total variance explained (10.19) and very low Cronbach's alphas, I choose not to use this as a measure of gender role ideology but rather just note that this measure is interpreted differently depending on the country context.

4.1.4 Gender role ideology

The results of the missing value analyses, the factor analyses, and the Cronbach's alphas show that the components 'women's role as homemakers' and 'women's paid labor' are not reliable for a comparative measure. Firstly, these components include too many missing values, which leads to skewed measures and then to very low Cronbach's alphas and total variance explained. These components should therefore not be included in the analysis of the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework.

The component 'men's household labor' shows quite high Cronbach's alphas and total variance explained (16.95), however, the measure is quite problematic as regards content. Rather than discussing men's gender roles, the statements address the question of whether men should support women more so that they do not have to carry the sole responsibility for the housework. Furthermore, it is not clear if disagreeing with the statement means that men already do enough or if they still should do more housework.

The first component shows the highest total variance (28.48) and the fewest missing values. Thus, the most appropriate measure in comparing gender roles in West Germany and Finland is the component 'gender role ideology' including the statements:

- 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work' (v4),
- 'a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works' (v5),
- 'all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job' (v6), and
- 'a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).

From now on the mean of these statements is used as the measure of gender role ideology.

4.1.5 Conclusions

The descriptive findings show that interpreting attitudes towards gender roles should be done carefully and by taking the societal context into account. Without the information on the different political approaches and actual behavior in reconciling work and family, the interpretations of the results for Finland and West Germany would be misleading.

First of all, the explicit analyses of the statements on attitudes towards gender roles show that some statements might be interpreted differently depending on the country context. For example, in West Germany female employment was considered very important for women's independence, while in Finland it was not. Knowing that the double-earner family has a long tradition in Finland, whereas in West Germany the breadwinner-homemaker family model has traditionally been favored, it is clear that this finding cannot be interpreted as a more traditional view on female employment in Finland than in West Germany, but that this finding rather suggests that in countries where female employment is common, women's employment is probably not considered to be sufficient for women's independence.

Furthermore, the differentiated analysis showed country specific patterns in the attitudes towards gender roles. Even though similarities for the countries were found, generally women in both countries were found to hold less traditional attitudes towards gender roles than men. Country-specific patterns became evident across gender lines. In Finland, neither men nor women considered women's employment to have especially

negative consequences for the family or the children. These findings support the general discourse that mother's care is not irreplaceable and that child minders in a child care facility are considered experts in child care who are perfectly capable of taking care of the children (for a more detailed description see Autto 2007). However, women's employment is not considered to have as such positive consequences for the woman herself as it did in West Germany. This is somewhat surprising taking into account the conscious policies in Finland to promote female employment in order to enhance gender equity, while in West Germany the policies for a long time supported women's role as homemakers. It can be assumed that this reflects a wish for changes in policies in West Germany (see also Hofäcker 2007), while female employment perhaps has become self-evident in Finland and thus is not considered to be enough for gender equity. It is also interesting to note that in West Germany the advantages of employment were considered high for the women themselves, however disadvantageous for the family and children of the woman. Therefore, it remains interesting to see how this is reflected in behavior when it comes to the new parental leave regulations. Or perhaps the new policies in future will impact the attitudes towards female employment and its consequences for the family and children. This still remains to be seen.

The conclusion for future research from the findings here is that the measure of gender role ideology has to be carefully picked and interpreted in the light of the societal context. As shown, there seems to be a strong relationship between the country context and how attitudes towards gender roles are interpreted, as well as how opinions on gender roles are formed. Gender roles are conceptualized differently in different countries and therefore also interpreted differently. To be able to fully comprehend the relationship between individual attitudes and societal context, societal context also needs to be taken into account. To be able to measure change in attitudes longitudinal data is necessary. In future research, this should be taken into account when conducting comparative studies. Taking this into account I will, in the next section, take a closer look at the relationship between attitudes towards gender roles and partnership formation.

4.2 Gender role ideology: differences in partnership formation?

In this section the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation will be explored. I will address the theoretical points discussed in Chapter 2 and based on them make assumptions explicitly on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation. Hoping to finally get some answers to the question of why the gendered division of housework keeps on persisting despite increased female employment, I will conduct analyses which concentrate on the issues raised by the theories on doing gender, preference theory, and bargaining theory based on gender role ideology when scrutinizing the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation.

4.2.1 Theoretical assumptions

As discussed in Chapter 2, partnership formation is indirectly expected to influence the division of housework. This idea basically stems from the economic theory of the family and some bargaining theories. Principally these approaches predict that relative human capital investments by the spouses (ultimately this means the relative income of the spouse) are decisive for behavior and consequently also determine the division of housework (Blau 1964; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 1990; McElroy and Horney 1981; Ott 1997). According to the perhaps most prominent approach by Becker (economic theory of the family), everything starts with the choice of partner (Becker 1973; Becker 1974; Becker 1993). Marriage is considered a question of finding a partner with comparative advantages. This means that men with high human capital investments (labor market skills) will marry women with good qualities in homemaking (or vice versa: the approach is gender neutral). The division of human capital investments – ultimately income – will then determine the division of labor in the household. The spouse with the higher income will participate less in housework and do more paid work, while the partner with the lower income (presumably also has better homemaking skills) will be responsible for the homemaking. Accordingly, gender is not decisive, but the relative resources each spouse has at their disposal (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 2.1).

Several studies have questioned the empirical relevance of these theories (Oppenheimer 1997; Press 2004). Contrary to the expectations that men and women seek a partner with comparative advantages, studies show that educational homogamy is common (Blossfeld and Timm 2003) and that both employed men and women are more likely to marry and stay married than non-employed men and women (Ciabattari 2004; Finnäs 1995; Jalovaara 2003; Schoen and Cheng 2006; Sweeney and Cancian 2004). Some of the studies have even shown that women's income is positively associated with being married (Sweeney and Cancian 2004). These findings do not support Becker's idea of comparative advantages (Becker 1973; Becker 1974; Becker 1993). In fact, these findings suggest that like attracts like.

Taking up on the idea that like attracts like, Breen and Cooke (2005) develop a marriage game based on different attitudes to gender roles. They construct a theoretical model leaning on ideas from preference theory (Hakim 2000) and on applications from formal game theory (Lundberg and Pollak 1993). The premise is that the increasing female labor force participation should increase the likelihood of men participating more in the domestic field and that today more women prefer men who do more housework. Because women are the ones expected to bear the main responsibility for housework, Breen and Cooke (2005) assume that women choose to 'trust' a man and to form a relationship depending on his gender role ideology and the woman's own lifestyle preferences. Based on Hakim (Hakim 2000) and Hochschild (Hochschild and Machung 1989) they differentiate between three types of women: traditional, transitional, and autonomous. The traditional women prefer a traditional division of labor and are willing to take on the responsibility for housework. The transitional women prefer a man with whom they can share the housework. However, once married they are willing to take over the larger part of housework if their husband does not cooperate by doing his fair share. Only autonomous women will insist that their spouse does his share of the housework, otherwise they will stop cooperating and will quit the marriage. Basically, men and women who hold more traditional attitudes towards gender roles are expected to search for a partner with a similar ideology and will follow a traditional division of housework. In contrast, non-traditional individuals are expected to search for a partner who is willing to break the traditional expectations and to share domestic tasks more equally (for a more detailed description see Chapter 2.4.2). The

quintessence of Breen and Cooke's (2005) theory is that the non-traditional division of housework can only be increased by a boost in the number of non-traditional men. In other words, as long as the number of men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles does not equal the proportion of women holding non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles, the number of non-traditional couples will not increase enough to make a change in the division of housework on the aggregate level.

As mentioned in Chapter 2.4.3, attitudes and norms are expected to be associated with the societal context (Crompton et al. 2000; Crompton and Harris 1999; Crompton and Lyonette 2005; Lee et al. 2007; Treas and Drobnič 2010). Individuals both form their ideas within a certain context and act in these societal surroundings (Adler and Brayfield 1996; Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Charles and Cech 2010; Cooke 2006a; Davis et al. 2009; Drobnič 1997; Drobnič 1999; Drobnič and Blossfeld 2004; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2000; Pfau-Effinger 2004a; Pfau-Effinger 2004c; Pfau-Effinger 2010; Treas and Drobnič 2010; van der Lippe and van Dijk 2002; Yodanis 2010). Therefore, it can be assumed that the societal context moderates decision making even when choosing a partner. I expect this to be true especially for men and women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Because women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles prefer to take care of family responsibilities over employment, I assume that a woman with traditional attitudes towards gender roles will most likely prefer family and marriage independently of the societal context (Hakim 2003). The same can be assumed for a man with a traditional gender role ideology. A man with traditional attitudes towards gender roles can be considered as family-oriented as a woman with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Accordingly, they will be as keen on getting married as traditionally oriented women are, independently of the societal context.

A woman with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles is, however, not necessarily willing to compromise her preferences (e.g. employment and independence) for having a family. She will probably choose staying single over getting married if her lifestyle preference (to be employed and independent) cannot be upheld during the marriage or after dissolving the marriage (see also Breen and Cooke 2005). Thus, the likelihood for her to get married will probably be higher if, in case of divorce – or if her partner against expectations prefers a traditional division of labor after getting married –

she can rely on outside support for her lifestyle, such as public child care and secure employment after parental leave.

Similarly, I expect the societal context to influence men's decision making. It might be somewhat discouraging for men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles to get married if they have to fear taking on the financial responsibility for their wife in case – against expectations – she turn out to be traditional in her gender role ideology. This might especially be true for countries where men are legally assigned the breadwinner role and after a divorce have to pay alimony for their wife. Men who are somewhat ambiguous in their gender roles (moderate) are also expected to be influenced by the societal context. They might choose to marry a woman with traditional attitudes in a country context where the breadwinner-homemaker model is supported by the state, but to marry a woman with non-traditional gender role ideology in a societal context where double-earner families are encouraged by social policies. In this way he can benefit from the policies in his country.

In the next section I will look at research on partnership formation (marriage and cohabitation) and formulate the relevant research questions that can be answered with the data available.

4.2.2 Research questions and strategy

In general, individuals with traditional attitudes towards gender roles are expected to have a greater likelihood of being married, than individuals with non-traditional or moderate attitudes towards gender roles (Cunningham 2005; Davis and Greenstein 2004b). I argue that the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation is moderated by the societal context for two different reasons. First of all, Breen and Cooke (2005) propose that the proportion of non-traditional men will be decisive for the willingness of non-traditional women to get married. Accordingly, more non-traditional couples should be found in countries where the gender role ideology on the aggregate level is less traditional. Furthermore, I suggest that individuals with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles are keener to marry in a country where non-traditional lifestyle preferences are encouraged e.g. by public child care and actively supporting female employment.

Because female employment and the double-earner family has been directly supported by the state in Finland for a long period (see Chapter 3.2) and the attitudes towards gender role ideology on the aggregate level are less traditional than in West Germany (see Chapter 4.1), I predict that more individuals who hold non-traditional or moderate gender role ideology are married in Finland than in West Germany.

Following Baron and Kenny (1986), I include an interaction effect between gender role ideology and the societal context to test if the effect of gender role ideology is moderated by the societal context (see Graph 4.2). Unfortunately, the data set only contains information on the respondent's gender role ideology and their current partnership or marital status. Therefore, I am only able to look at the correlation between partnership formation and gender role ideology on the aggregate level. This means that I can calculate the probability for non-traditional women and men to be married or cohabiting as opposed to being single.

To analyze the actual partnership formation according to gender role ideology, data on the gender role ideology for both spouses[42] would be necessary. Only then would it be possible to test the hypothesis proposed by Breen and Cooke (2005) that women with non-traditional attitudes only marry men with non-traditional attitudes (see also Cunningham 2005). The most accurate analyses would be possible if longitudinal data on both spouses' gender role ideology were available. This would enable analyses of the gender role ideology at the beginning of the relationship and if or how the gender role ideology changes after committing to a relationship.

[42] Here the term spouse also refers to couples who are living together but are not married.

Graph 4.2 Analytical approach to the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation moderated by gender (Based on Baron and Kenny 1986)



Because of the restrictions set by the data structure, the analyses are concentrated on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership status on the aggregate level. I will address both the question of whether individuals with traditional attitudes towards gender roles are more likely to be married than individuals with moderate or non-traditional attitudes, as well as the question of whether the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation is moderated by the societal context.

To be able to test the assumptions on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation, the index of gender role ideology is recoded into three categories: traditional, moderate and non-traditional. The respondents fall into the category traditional if their index value ranges from 1 to 2.5. If the index value for gender role ideology lies between 2.6 and 3.5 the respondents are considered moderate. Finally, the category non-traditional consists of individuals whose gender role ideology index is between 3.6 and 5. The focus here is on having a relationship (being married or cohabiting) and not yet have started a relationship (being single), however not dissolving one. Therefore, I will exclude all divorced and widowed from the analysis.

This leaves 399 German men, 387 German women, 514 Finnish women, and 598 Finnish men for the analysis (see Table 4.4).[43]

Table 4.4 Distribution of gender role ideology categories according to gender and country[44] (%)

	West Germany (N= 786)			Finland (N=1112)		
	Men (N=399)	Women (N=387)	All (N=786)	Men (N=514)	Women (N=598)	All (N=1112)
Traditional	27.1	19.1	23.2	20.2	15.1	17.4
Moderate	43.9	35.7	39.8	37.4	29.6	33.2
Non-Traditional	29.1	45.2	37.0	42.4	55.4	49.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Country difference χ^2: 29,089***

Gender difference in West Germany χ^2: 22,510***

Gender difference in Finland χ^2: 18,640***

As for the gender role ideology index, the correlation between the categorical gender role ideology and country context is significant (χ^2: 29,089). The gender role ideology is somewhat more traditional in West Germany than in Finland. German men hold significantly more traditional attitudes than Finnish men; and German women hold significantly more traditional attitudes than Finnish women. As already shown in the previous section on the measure of gender role ideology, there is a significant difference between men and women in both countries. German men are more traditional than German women; and Finnish men are more traditional than Finnish women. These results are in line with previous findings with the gender role index and studies where women have proven to hold less traditional attitudes than men (Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Fuwa 2004; Nordenmark 2004; Schwarzwald et al. 2008; Solomon et al. 2004; Sundström 1999).

Because partnership formation is not a metric variable and is not ordered, the most appropriate method to analyze the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation is the multinomial regression analysis. The multinomial regression analysis can be considered an extension of the binary logit model for

[43] The results for the distribution of gender role ideology are not particularly different when including divorced and widowed in the sample.

[44] Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050

situations with several categories without a natural ordering. The estimation of the coefficients is carried out iteratively based on the maximum likelihood method, using SPSS NOMREG.

In my analysis, the dependent variable is partnership formation. Partnership formation is operationalized by referring to the marital status of the respondent. The variable has three categories: single, cohabiting and married. For the equation, two categories are included in the analysis and one serves as the reference category ($J-1$). This means that the probability of the response category *j* at sub-population *i* is

$$P(Y = j \mid X_1, X_2, ..., X_i) = \frac{e^{a+b_{j1}x_1+b_{j2}x_2+...+b_{ji}x_i}}{1+\sum_{i=1}^{J-1} e^{a+b_{j1}x_1+b_{j2}x_2+...+b_{ji}x_j}}$$

Because the theory implies different motivations for men and women to engage in a partnership, analyses are calculated separately for men and women. Two different sets of analyses are conducted. First, 'single' is defined as the reference category. This way it is possible to analyze the difference between being in a partnership (married or cohabiting) compared to being single. In the second set of models, 'cohabiting' serves as the reference category. This makes it possible to see if cohabiting and married individuals differ in terms of gender role ideology.

Let's say that singles are the reference category. This means that all parameters in the model are interpreted in reference to individuals who are single. For the interpretation of the multinomial logistic regression, odds ratios are calculated. If single individuals are the reference category, odds ratios above 1.0 refers to positive odds that the individual is either cohabiting or married in reference to single. Odds ratios below 1.0 means decreased odds of cohabiting or being married in reference to single. For example, an odds ratio of 4.3 for married individuals with non-traditional attitudes means that the odds are 4.3 times higher for a person with non-traditional attitudes to be married in comparison to being single. The odds ratio could also be interpreted as a percent increase in odds. Then an odds ratio of 1.3 would mean that the odds of being married increase by 30 percent for individuals with non-traditional attitudes.

The predictor variable is gender role ideology using two dummy variables: moderate, and non-traditional (traditional being the reference category) and the country context

using one dummy variable: Finland (West Germany defined as the reference category).[45] To analyze the interaction between these variables, it is necessary to create product terms in which all the dummy variables for one of the variables are multiplied by all the dummy variables for the other variable. This yields two product terms: moderate*finland, and non-traditional*finland. These product terms are entered into the logistic equation in conjunction with the other terms: non-traditional, moderate, and finland. For this equation, the reference categories are traditional German women or men, depending on for whom the model is calculated.

Additionally to the main predictor variables measuring gender role ideology and the moderator effect of the country context (societal context), control variables are included into the model. Cohabitation can partly be seen as a pre-marital condition (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Baxter 2005; Ciabattari 2004; Cunningham 2005; Seltzer et al. 2005). Therefore, it is important to include age in the equation to control for different stages in life. Younger people are more likely to still be looking for the 'right' partner and therefore still be single. Consequently, singles are mostly expected to be younger than married or cohabiting individuals (Wiik 2009). Cohabitation is often considered a step before getting married and therefore married individuals tend to be older than cohabiting individuals. However, it can be assumed that the likelihood of getting married will diminish over time. Someone who has not married up to a certain point will probably not marry anymore but rather stay single or cohabiting (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Baxter 2005; Ciabattari). Thus, the natural log of age is included together with age in the equation to control for life course effects.[46]

The descriptive statistics on age according to marital status indeed show some life course effects (see Table 4.5). At least in Finland, single respondents generally tend to be younger than cohabiting individuals. In West Germany, there is no significant difference in the mean age of cohabitors and singles. In West Germany, cohabiting individuals even tend to be somewhat younger than singles. This suggests that for

[45] For reason of completeness, models where moderate or non-traditional serve as reference categories were also calculated (see APPENDIX D).

[46] Because previous studies have shown that the timing of marriage is postponed by attending school (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991b), 'still at school' was also included in the analysis to control for life course effects. However, the variable was never significant so the variable was excluded from the equation.

Germans cohabitation during the life course is a parallel stage to being single. In both countries the average age for cohabitors is lower than for married couples. This indicates that cohabitation can be regarded as a 'trial' before marriage and in West Germany more popular among young couples. The mean age for cohabitors is somewhat higher in Finland than in West Germany, which suggests that more individuals in Finland than in West Germany see cohabitation as a replacement for marriage. This seems plausible – because marriage in Finland is not connected with as many advantages as in West Germany (see Chapter 3.1.1). However, one has to keep in mind that this also might be a generational effect. It might be that in Germany couples who belong to a younger generation with less traditional attitudes are more likely to be cohabiting that couples in later generations.

Another event that is often associated with marriage is having children. Having children is often considered to be associated with a stronger commitment towards the partner. Furthermore, married parents (especially fathers) are treated differently in law. Unmarried fathers frequently do not have the same rights as fathers who are married. To control for this life course event, the variable 'child' is also included as a control variable. The variable 'children' is coded 1 if children between 0-17 are living in the household and 0 if no children are living in the household.[47] The descriptive statistics for the variable 'child' also show a life course effect (see Table 4.5). Hardly any of the singles have children, while approximately 40 percent of the married respondents have children. In both countries couples with children are more likely to be married than cohabiting. This seems to hold especially for German men. Only 14 percent of cohabiting German men have children while 40 percent of married German men have children.

[47] 55 of the singles who reported that they were living together with children in their household were under the age of 20 and their household composition is at least two adults and children, which means that they are not single fathers or mothers. The conclusion is that the children are not their own but that they live together with at least one of their parents. Thus, the variable 'child' was coded 0 for them.

Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics for control variables

		West Germany				Finland			
		Men		Women		Men		Women	
		Age	Children	Age	Children	Age	Children	Age	Children
Single	Mean	30.3	0.00	30.6	0.06	29.7	0.02	28.7	0.06
	N	73	74	47	47	122	122	120	120
	Std. Deviation	12.08	0.00	16.74	0.25	13.09	0.16	14.17	0.24
Cohabiting	Mean	29.9	0.13	27.9	0.21	38.7	0.28	34.8	0.28
	N	62	62	56	56	100	100	132	132
	Std. Deviation	8.87	0.34	7.98	0.41	12.97	0.45	13.67	0.45
Married	Mean	52.5	0.40	48.8	0.39	51.0	0.43	48.6	0.44
	N	263	263	284	284	292	292	346	346
	Std. Deviation	13.45	0.49	14.16	0.49	12.58	0.50	11.76	0.50
Total	Mean	44.88	0.29	43.56	0.33	43.54	0.30	41.53	0.33
	N	398	399	387	387	514	514	598	598
	Std. Deviation	16.43	0.45	16.29	0.47	15.62	0.46	15.26	0.47

4.2.3 Results

The general assumption was that married individuals are more likely to hold traditional attitudes towards gender roles than singles or cohabiting individuals. In Graph 4.3 the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation for German men and women, as well as for Finnish men and women is depicted. The percentage of married individuals with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles is indeed lower than for cohabitors in all groups (German men, Finnish men, German women, and Finnish women). This might also be a result of a generational effect. As previously shown, married couples generally tend to be older and perhaps therefore also hold more traditional attitudes.

This correlation between marriage and traditional gender role ideology is most obvious for German men. Only 22.4 percent of married men in West Germany belong to the category non-traditional. Most married men in West Germany hold moderate attitudes towards gender roles (43.3 percent) and even 34.2 percent of them hold traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Cohabiting men in West Germany are mostly non-traditional (46.8 percent) and only 14.5 percent of them belong to the group traditional. Married men are clearly more traditional than cohabiting couples in West Germany. For Finnish men the picture is somewhat different. The difference between cohabitors, singles, and married men in Finland is not significant (χ^2: 6.160). More than 40 percent (41.4 percent) of married men in Finland can be assigned to the group non-traditional, whereas only 22.9 percent of them hold traditional attitudes towards gender roles. This is not very different from cohabiting men. 50 percent of the cohabiting men belong to the category non-traditional and only 15.0 percent are assigned to traditional. Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles tend to be as likely to cohabite as to be married (see Graph 4.3).

This also is a reflection of the higher proportion of non-traditional men in Finland than in West Germany. As previously shown, 42.4 percent of Finnish men are assigned to the category non-traditional, while only 29.1 percent of German men were classified non-traditional (see Table 4.4). This result to some degree supports Breen and Cooke's (2005) assumption that the likelihood for non-traditional marriages to become evident

on the aggregate level is only likely if the number of men holding non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles reaches a certain level. It also suggests that the country context (societal context) moderates the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation.

This assumption that the number of non-traditional men is decisive for an increase in the number of non-traditional couples on the aggregate level is furthermore supported by the finding that only 38.7 percent of married women in West Germany belong to the category non-traditional, even though as many as 45.2 percent of German women were assigned to the category non-traditional and only 19.1 percent were classified traditional (see Table 4.4). As many as 71.4 percent of cohabiting German women hold non-traditional attitudes. Considering the number of German men assigned to the group of non-traditional (see Table 4.4), one could according to Breen and Cooke (2005) assume that as long as the proportion of non-traditional men is not large enough, German women with non-traditional attitudes are not willing to risk marriage but prefer cohabitation.

The difference between married and cohabiting women in Finland is not as evident as for German women. The χ^2 is only 11.336 compared to a χ^2 of 24.437 for German women. As many as 50.6 percent of the married women hold non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles compared to 62.2 percent of the cohabiting couples belonging to the group of non-traditional. It seems as if Finnish women with non-traditional attitudes are more likely to get married than German women with non-traditional attitudes, because of the larger number of Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles.

Graph 4.3 Correlation between gender role ideology and partnership formation



	(N=74) Single	(N=62) Cohabit	(N=263) Married	(N=122) Single	(N=100) Cohabit	(N=292) Married	(N=47) Single	(N=56) Cohabit	(N=284) Married	(N=120) Single	(N=132) Cohabit	(N=346) Married
	German men			Finnish men			German women			Finnish women		
Traditional	12,20%	14,50%	34,20%	18,00%	15,00%	22,90%	8,50%	8,90%	22,90%	8,30%	11,40%	18,80%
Moderate	50,00%	38,70%	43,30%	43,40%	35,00%	35,60%	38,30%	19,60%	38,40%	30,00%	26,50%	30,60%
Non-traditional	37,80%	46,80%	22,40%	38,50%	50,00%	41,40%	53,20%	71,40%	38,70%	61,70%	62,10%	50,60%

German men χ^2: 28.306***
Finnish men χ^2: 6.160 n.s.
German women χ^2: 24.437***
Finnish women χ^2: 11.336*

The differences found in the descriptive statistics (see Graph 4.3) are explicitly tested by calculating the multinomial logistic regression separately for men and women (NOMREG). *The aim is to test if non-traditional and moderate partnerships are more likely in Finland than in West Germany.*[48] Gender role ideology is included in the equation with two dummy variables: moderate and non-traditional (traditional serves as the reference category). To calculate the moderating effect of the societal context, an interaction term for Finland with moderate and non-traditional attitudes is included in the equation (German men or women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles serve as the reference category). To understand the picture of partnership formation, I calculated several different multinomial logistic regression models. To see what the likelihood is of being in a partnership compared to living alone, cohabiting and married individuals are contrasted to singles. Because married couples are sometimes considered to be more committed to their relationship, other algorithms are estimated where cohabiting individuals serve as the reference category. In this way, it can be tested if there is a difference between cohabiting and married individuals and their gender role ideology.

Interaction analysis in logistic regression should typically use hierarchically well formulated models (Jaccard 2001). This means that all lower order components of the highest order interaction term are included in the model. In this case it means that the interaction model should include the dummies for gender role ideology (moderate and non-traditional), the dummy for country context (finland), plus the interaction effect between these two (moderate*finland, non-traditional*finland). To test if the interaction terms improve the model fit, the χ^2 between models without interaction and models including the interaction terms are compared to each other (see Table 4.6 and Table 4.7).

The χ^2 for the model without the interaction terms is 33.168 for men and 57.150 for women with 10 degrees of freedom (see Table 4.6). Comparing these χ^2 to the χ^2 for the models including the interaction terms (χ^2 for men 43.365 and for women 63.076

[48] I am aware of the fact that I cannot explicitly investigate partnerships and their formation because I have only cross-sectional information on either the man's or the woman's gender role ideology. Nevertheless, I will speak about partnership formation in future.

with 6 degrees of freedom (see Table 4.7), leaves a difference of 10.197 for men and 5.926 for women with 4 degrees of freedom. The test for the so-called omnibus interaction effect (see Jaccard 2001: 19) suggest that the interaction effect only significantly improves the models calculated for men but not for women. It appears as if the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation is similar between Finnish and German *women*, but differs between Finnish and German *men*.

The results from the model without interaction effects (see Table 4.6) suggest that there are no differences between single and cohabiting individuals.[49] As predicted, individuals with traditional attitudes towards gender roles have higher odds of being married than individuals with moderate or non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. This is true when singles are compared to married individuals, or when cohabiting and married individual are compared. The results comparing married men to single men (see Model 2 in Table 4.6) suggest that men with moderate attitudes towards gender roles have 0.482 times lower odds of being married than single, compared to men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Or put differently, men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles have more than twice as high odds of being married compared to being single (see Model 2, coefficient: 0.482^{-1}). Similarly, men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles have twice as high odds of being married than single, compared to men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles (see Model 2, coefficient: 0.500^{-1}). German men have 1.43 times higher odds of being married than single compared to Finnish men (see Model 2, coefficient: 0.697^{-1}). When comparing married men to cohabiting men, the effect of country is no longer relevant and the difference between men with non-traditional attitudes and traditional attitudes becomes larger. Traditional men have even 2.75 times higher odds of being married than cohabiting compared to non-traditional men (see Model 4, coefficient: 0.363^{-1}). The difference between moderate and traditional men is smaller when comparing cohabiting to married men than when comparing single to cohabiting men. Traditional men only

[49] Only in the model where non-traditional served as a reference category do men with moderate attitudes towards gender roles have 1.622 times higher odds of cohabiting to being single compared to men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles (see APPENDIX D.2). When the control variables age, (ln)age, and child were included into the model, the odds for non-traditional men increased even by 1.784 (results not displayed but can be requested from the author).

have 1.76 times higher odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to men with moderate attitudes. These findings indicate that more men are single in Finland than in West Germany and that men with traditional attitudes are more likely to be married than single, while they are even more likely to be married than cohabiting.

Similar results can be found for women as for men, only with some differences (see Table 4.6). Women with traditional attitudes towards gender role ideology, compared to women with moderate attitudes towards gender roles, have 2.34 times higher odds of being married than single (see Table 4.6 Model 6 coefficient 0.427^{-1}); while women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles have even three times higher odds of being married than single compared to non-traditional women (see Table 4.6 Model 6 coefficient 0.325^{-1}). German women are almost two times more likely to be married than single compared to Finnish women. In Model 8 Table 4.6, when comparing married to cohabiting women, there are no significant differences between women with moderate attitudes and women with traditional attitudes; and the odds ratio between non-traditional and traditional women is somewhat smaller. Women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles have only 2.67 (0.375^{-1}) times higher odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to women with non-traditional attitudes. The difference between Finnish and German women also becomes smaller when comparing married women to cohabiting women. However, German women still have 1.82 (0.548^{-1}) times higher odds of being married than cohabiting compared to Finnish women.

Table 4.6 Model without interaction effects: odds ratios on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation (Wald statistics)

	Men		Men		Women		Women	
	Model 1 Cohabiting	Model 2 Married	Model 3 Single	Model 4 Married	Model 5 Cohabiting	Model 6 Married	Model 7 Single	Model 8 Married
Moderate	0.848	0.482 **	1.179	0.568 *	0.596	0.427 **	1.678	0.717
	(0.266)	(9.771)	(0.266)	(4.585)	(1.656)	(6.991)	(1.656)	(1.303)
Non-traditional	1.376	0.500 **	0.727	0.363 ***	0.868	0.325 ***	1.152	0.375 ***
	(1.009)	(8.263)	(1.009)	(15.310)	(0.143)	(13.443)	(0.143)	(13.714)
Finland	0.925	0.697 *	1.082	0.754	0.906	0.496 ***	1.104	0.548 ***
	(0.126)	(4.372)	(0.126)	(2.307)	(0.178)	(13.387)	(0.178)	(11.099)
-2LL (final)	68.391		68.391		61.882		61.882	
χ^2	33.168***		33.168***		57.150***		57.150***	
df	6		6		6		6	
N	913		913		985		985	
Nagelkerke	0.042		0.042		0.067		0.067	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

The explicit research question was: are men and women with moderate or non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles more likely to be married in Finland than in West Germany? Thus, despite the results from the test on the omnibus interaction effect – which indicated that the interaction effects only improve the model fit for men but not for women – I will take a closer look at the contrasts that are reflected in the coefficients obtained from the interaction models. Similarly to the models without interaction effects, singles and cohabiting individuals do not show significant differences in the coefficients on gender role ideology. This is true for both men and women (see Table 4.7).

As already indicated by the comparison of χ^2 for the models with and without interaction effects, there is no significant difference between cohabiting and single women (see Table 4.7). However, when comparing married women to single women there is a significant difference between non-traditional and traditional women. West German women with non-traditional gender role ideology have 0.271 times lower odds to be married compared to the reference group: German women with traditional gender role ideology (Table 4.7, Model 6).

Comparing married women to cohabiting women, it becomes evident that West German women with non-traditional attitudes have 0.212 times lower odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to West German women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Or to put it differently, German women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles have 3.00 times higher odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to Finnish women. It also becomes evident that Finnish women have 0.333 times lower odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to German women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Like in the model comparing single women to married women, the interaction effect is not significant.

The results from the models with the interaction terms do not support the idea that the relationship between partnership formation and gender role ideology is moderated by the societal context. Only when comparing non-traditional Finnish women to moderate West German women does a country difference becomes evident (see APPENDIX D.7). West German women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles have 0.278 times lower odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to West

German women with moderate attitudes towards gender roles. This effect is somewhat enforced for Finnish women. Finnish women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles have even 0.215 lower odds of being married than cohabiting (0.278*0.306*2.539), compared to German women with moderate attitudes towards gender roles. It seems that women with non-traditional attitudes are even less willing to 'risk' marriage compared to cohabiting in Finland than in West Germany when differentiating between non-traditional and moderate women.

For men, the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation is clearly moderated by the country context (see Table 4.7). Similarly to the women, no difference between single and cohabiting men can be found. There is only a significant difference between single and married men. The odds of being married and not single are 0.308 times lower for West German men with moderate attitudes towards gender roles, compared to West German men with traditional attitudes. The difference is even higher when comparing West German men with non-traditional attitudes to German men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Men with non-traditional attitudes have 0.211 times lower odds of being married than single, compared to men with traditional attitudes. This difference is moderated by the country context. Calculating the interaction effect for Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes, it becomes evident that Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes have 0.258 times (0.211*0.305*4.012) lower odds of being married compared to single in reference to West German men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles (see Table 4.7, Model 2).

Table 4.7 Model with interaction effects: odds ratios on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation (Wald statistics)

	Men			Men			Women			Women		
	Model 1 Cohabiting	Model 2 Married		Model 3 Single	Model 4 Married		Model 5 Cohabiting	Model 6 Married		Model 7 Single	Model 8 Married	
Moderate	0.649	0.308	***	1.542	0.475	+	0.489	0.373	+	2.045	0.762	
	(0.644)	(8.771)		(0.644)	(3.210)		(0.859)	(2.952)		(0.859)	(0.234)	
Non-traditional	1.036	0.211	***	0.966	0.203	***	1.280	0.271	*	0.781	0.212	**
	(0.004)	(13.866)		(0.004)	(14.601)		(0.118)	(5.428)		(0.118)	(9.672)	
Finland	0.682	0.305	**	1.467	0.447	+	1.200	0.400		0.833	0.333	*
	(0.439)	(7.741)		(0.439)	(3.187)		(0.054)	(2.205)		(0.054)	(4.058)	
Finland*moderate	1.493	2.091		0.670	1.401		1.326	1.216		0.754	0.917	
	(0.357)	(2.205)		(0.357)	(0.388)		(0.097)	(0.079)		(0.097)	(0.017)	
Finland*Non-traditional	1.506	4.012	**	0.664	2.663	+	0.577	1.344		1.733	2.328	
	(0.377)	(7.288)		(0.377)	(3.384)		(0.427)	(0.194)		(0.427)	(2.044)	
-2LL (final)	58.194			58.194			55.956			55.956		
χ^2	43.365***			43.365***			63.076***			63.076***		
df	10			10			10			10		
N	913			913			985			985		
Nagelkerke	0.055			0.055			0.074			0.074		

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

Comparing married men to cohabiting men, the interaction effect is not significant at the five percent level. For Model 4 Table 4.7, only the coefficient for ‘non-traditional’ is significant at the five percent level. This indicates that West German men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles have 0.203 times lower odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to West German men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles; while the interaction effect is not significant. When, however, controlling for age, the natural log of age, and children the interaction effect is significant. When holding the life course stage variables constant the odds for Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes are somewhat lower. While West German men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles have 0.371 lower odds to be married compared to single, the odds of being married and not cohabiting significantly decrease by 0.292 for Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes (0.371*0.211*3.731), compared to German men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles (see Table 4.8 Model 4).

When calculating the same models with an interaction effect between gender role ideology and West Germany (see APPENDIX D.9 Model 2), the coefficients for non-traditional and moderate men are not significant. This means that non-traditional and moderate men do not differ in their partnership formation compared to Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Only the coefficient for West Germany and the interaction effect between West Germany and non-traditional gender role ideology are significant. West German men have 3.284 times higher odds of being married than single compared to Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. This effect is moderated by gender role ideology and depends on age and children in the household. In the model without control variables (Model 2), German men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles have ca. 0.817 times lower odds (3.284*0.249) of being married than single compared to Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles.

Table 4.8 Model including control variables: odds ratios on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation (Wald statistics)

	Men				Men				Women				Women			
	Model 1 Cohabiting		Model 2 Married		Model 3 Single		Model 4 Married		Model 5 Cohabiting		Model 6 Married		Model 7 Single		Model 8 Married	
Moderate	0.643		0.290	*	1.554		0.451		0.388		0.332		2.580		0.856	
	(0.612)		(4.729)		(0.612)		(2.565)		(1.421)		(2.270)		(0.058)		(0.058)	
Non-traditional	1.211		0.449		0.826		0.371	*	1.116		0.313		0.896		0.281	*
	(0.115)		(1.824)		(0.115)		(3.847)		(0.022)		(2.634)		(4.630)		(4.630)	
Finland	0.459		0.097	***	2.181		0.211	**	0.797		0.141	**	1.255		0.177	**
	(1.591)		(14.836)		(1.591)		(8.547)		(0.077)		(6.385)		(7.516)		(7.516)	
Finland*moderate	2.025		5.213	*	0.494		2.574		2.217		2.341		0.451		1.056	
	(0.979)		(5.371)		(0.979)		(2.199)		(0.717)		(0.937)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Finland*Non-traditional	1.871		6.981	**	0.534		3.731	*	0.783		2.605		1.277		3.327	
	(0.778)		(7.026)		(0.778)		(4.298)		(0.079)		(1.289)		(3.055)		(3.055)	
Age	1.136	**	1.262	***	0.880	**	1.110	+	1.207	***	1.566	***	0.829	***	1.297	***
	(6.615)		(14.929)		(6.615)		(3.098)		(16.876)		(92.601)		(28.256)		(28.256)	
ln Age	0.999		0.999		1.001	+	1.000		0.998	***	0.996	***	1.002	***	0.998	**
	(3.379)		(1.848)		(3.379)		(0.128)		(14.360)		(59.077)		(9.476)		(9.476)	
Children	16.042	***	134.580	***	0.062	***	8.389	***	3.462	***	12.731	***	0.289	***	3.677	***
	(19.948)		(62.312)		(19.948)		(65.722)		(10.325)		(46.138)		(30.984)		(30.984)	
-2LL (final)	780.302				780.302				834.262				834.262			
χ^2	650.615***				650.615***				576.081***				576.081***			
df	16				16				16				16			
N	912				912				985				985			
Nagelkerke	0.602				0.602				0.530				0.530			

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

However, when including control variables into the model the relationship is different between partnership formation, gender role ideology and societal context. The difference between non-traditional men and Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender role ideology is now significant (see APPENDIX D.9 Model 4). Finnish men with non-traditional gender role ideology surprisingly have 3.135 times higher odds of being married compared to Finnish men with traditional attitudes. German men have even 10.325 times higher odds of being married compared to Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Also this relationship is moderated by the societal context. German men with non-traditional gender role ideology have even 4.629 times higher odds (3.135*10.325*0.143) of being married than single compared to Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles.

Otherwise, including the control variables into the equation hardly influences the relationship of gender role ideology and the interaction effect of gender role ideology and societal context found in Table 4.8 or APPENDIX D.9. The model fit is considerably better when including age, the natural log of age, and children into the equation. The Nagelkerke for men is as high as 0.602 and for women as high as 0.530. This shows that life course stages play a much more important role for partnership formation than gender role ideology (see Table 4.8). [50]

As expected, age has a positive effect on being married or cohabiting (this is true in each model calculated). For men, the odds to start cohabiting increase by 13.6 percent for each additional year; while the odds of getting married increase even by 26.2 percent for each year they get older. Having children is obviously correlated with forming a partnership. This is especially true for getting married. The odds of being married are actually 134.6 times higher for men with children compared to single men. The results in the difference between married and cohabiting men show no significant influence of age on the odds of being married compared to cohabiting.

[50] Additionally to the models with interaction effects for the gender role ideology variables, models with interaction effects for the control variables were also calculated. The interaction effects did not improve the model fit significantly. The only interaction term that turned out to be significant was finland*child in the model comparing married men to cohabiting men (see APPENDIX D.4).

The significant difference between married and cohabiting men is having children (8.4 times higher odds) and gender role ideology, as well as the interaction effect of gender role ideology and country context. Generally, men with non-traditional attitudes are more likely to be cohabiting than married. However, Finnish men holding non-traditional attitudes have greater odds of being married than traditional Finnish men.

For women, the variables age, natural log of age and children show similar results to those for men. The odds of forming a partnership increase with age. The odds of cohabiting increase by 20.7 percent for each year the women get older; and the odds of being married increase even 56.6 percent for each year (see Table 4.8).

The significant and negative coefficient for the variable natural log of age suggests that for women the hypothesis is true that if someone has not found a partner up to a specific point in time, the likelihood to form a partnership is lower than for younger individuals. Having children increases the odds of both cohabiting and marrying. The odds for cohabiting compared to being single are 3.462 times higher for women with children. The odds of being married are even higher for women with children. The odds of being married for women with children are 12.731 times higher than being single.

The analyses on partnership formation and gender role ideology indicate that – as expected – men and women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles are more likely to be married than men and women with moderate or non-traditional attitudes. However, this effect is moderated by the societal context. West German men are more likely to be married than Finnish men. Even when West German men hold non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles do West German men have higher odds to be married than Finnish men with traditional attitudes. In Finland marriage is not as strongly correlated to traditional attitudes as it is in Germany. This is especially true for men. Finnish men with traditional attitudes have even lower chances to be married compared to Finnish men with non-traditional gender role ideology.

4.2.4 Conclusions

The aim of Chapter 4.2 was to find out how the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation is depicted; and if the relationship is moderated by

the country context. The assumption was that individuals with traditional attitudes towards gender roles tend to seek marriage regardless of the societal context. However, men and women with moderate and especially non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles were expected to be influenced by the settings in which they make their decisions. Based on the theories developed by Hakim (Hakim 2000) and Breen and Cooke (Breen and Cooke 2005), I expected the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation to be influenced by the societal context in two different ways. First of all, the number of non-traditional women, and even more importantly, the number of non-traditional men should influence the likelihood for non-traditional couples to emerge. The hypothesis was that the more non-traditional individuals (especially men) are available on the so-called marriage market, the more likely non-traditional (especially) women are to seek a partnership and eventually to marry (for a more detailed description see Chapter 2.4.4). The second reason why the country context was believed to matter for partnership formation, was that both non-traditional men and women are expected to be more likely to marry in a societal context where their lifestyle is supported by the state, e.g. by public child care or active support for female employment.

Because social policy in Finland has for decades supported the double-earner family model, and the number of men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles was found to be higher in Finland than in West Germany, it was anticipated that Finnish men and women with non-traditional and moderate attitudes towards gender roles will have higher odds, firstly, of being in a partnership, and secondly, of choosing marriage over cohabitation compared to non-traditional or moderate German men.

Although an analysis of direct partnership formation according to gender role ideology (who is married to whom) was not possible with the data available,[51] some support for the ideas on partnership formation according to gender role ideology was found. First of all, differences in partnership formation between Germans and Finns became evident. This supports the idea that even private decisions such as partnership formation are influenced by the societal context. Generally, Germans were more likely

[51] For these kinds of analyses, one would need longitudinal data on the gender role ideology of both partners.

to be married than cohabiting (or single) compared to Finns. This can easily be explained by the positive incentives (e.g. the 'splitting advantage') that are associated with marriage in West Germany (for more information see Chapter 3.1). The popularity of marriage in West Germany is reflected in the fact that cohabiting individuals on average are younger than in Finland. Cohabitation (at least for the older generations) does not seem to serve as an equivalent for marriage in the same sense as it does in Finland. This is probably because in Finland cohabiting and married couples basically have the same legal rights (see Chapter 3.2). Another difference that was found between the countries was that Finnish men and women who were married more often hold non-traditional attitudes than married German men or women (see Graph 4.3).

Despite the differences between the countries, one clear similarity was found. As expected, individuals with traditional attitudes towards gender roles are more likely to be married than cohabiting or single. This was true for men as well as for women both in West Germany and Finland. The multinomial regression analysis showed that this – as anticipated – was partly moderated by the country context (see Table 4.7 and Table 4.8).

The moderating effect was not as strong for women as it was for men. The interaction term did not improve the overall fit of the analysis of women. However, looking at the individual coefficients showed that when comparing Finnish women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles to German women with moderate gender role attitudes, the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation turned out to be moderated by the country context. Finnish women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles were less likely to be married than cohabiting, compared to women with moderate attitudes towards gender roles.

For men, the results regarding the moderating effect of the country context were even more evident. Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles have a lower likelihood of being married than single, compared to German men with non-traditional attitudes. When controlling for age and children, the same is true when comparing cohabiting men to married men. Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes have lower odds of being married than cohabiting, compared to German men with non-traditional attitudes.

Interestingly, there are differences in the way that the societal context moderates the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation for men and for women. For men, the difference is between men with traditional attitudes and men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. In Finland, non-traditional men are somewhat more likely to be married than single (or cohabiting) compared to German men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. For women, the difference is between non-traditional and moderate women and their decision to marry or cohabitate. Women with traditional and moderate attitudes behave similarly, independently of the country context.

This suggests that women with moderate attitudes towards gender roles are more willing to risk a traditional division of labor when getting married than women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Women with non-traditional gender role ideology are only willing to get married if they have a greater certainty that their lifestyle will not be jeopardized if the marriage for some reason does not turn out to fulfill their expectations. This is even truer for Finland, where marriage does not offer same advantages as in Germany. The findings suggest that in Finland non-traditional women are even less likely to jeopardize their lifestyle and get married. This is against the expectations that when the amount of men with non-traditional gender role ideology increases, non-traditional women are more likely to get married. However, this finding might also simply indicate that being married does not offer as many advantages in Finland as in Germany.

For men the moderating effect is much more prominent and on a somewhat different level. Because there are more Finnish women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles it seems as if the likelihood for a man with non-traditional attitudes to be 'chosen' by a moderate or non-traditional woman is greater than for men with traditional attitudes. Or looking at the picture from another angle, it can be assumed that a traditionally oriented man will have greater problems in finding a woman with similar values in Finland than a traditionally oriented man in West Germany.[52]

[52] An analysis of the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation calculated separately for German men, Finnish men, German women and for Finnish women showed that Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles were more likely to be married than single, compared to Finnish men with traditional attitudes towards gender roles (see APPENDIX D.9).

Concluding, the findings on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation support the fact that the relationship is moderated by the societal context. In a country where the double-earner family is supported by the state and gender equity is an important part of the political agenda, like in Finland, the likelihood for a non-traditional man to form a partnership is greater than in a country where the political focus has traditionally been to support the breadwinner-homemaker model. Nevertheless, in both countries marriage still is associated with traditional gender role ideology.

4.3 Division of housework: does gender role ideology matter?

In the previous section (Chapter 4.2), I discussed the measure of gender role ideology and the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation or marital status. Especially, differences between Finnish and German men became evident. The aim of this chapter is to scrutinize if less traditional attitudes towards gender roles indeed lead to a less traditional division of housework. First, a short description of the latest research on the division of housework will be discussed, which is followed by the description of the research question and the strategy. Before discussing the results from the analysis, the measure of housework and the operationalization of the independent variables are elaborated. The analysis of the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework is basically conducted in two steps. In the first step, the relationship between gender role ideology and the relative division of housework tasks is closely observed. The question is, what makes couples follow a non-traditional division of housework and do the mechanisms vary between West Germany and Finland? After the analysis of the relative division of housework tasks, the time men and women spend on housework is scrutinized. West German and Finnish men are compared to each other and then women in West Germany and Finland are closely observed. These steps are taken to see if gender role ideology can explain the persistence of a traditional division of housework despite the changes in the division of paid labor.

4.3.1 Previous research and the division of housework

The following empirical study on the division of housework leans on the four theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter 2, namely: *relative resources*, *time availability*, *construction of gendered behavior* (*doing gender*), and *gender role ideology*. In the following, I will shortly discuss studies that have empirically dealt with the theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 2.

4.3.1.1 Relative Resources

As previously mentioned, one of the most cited theories that discusses the relationship between relative resources and the division of housework is the so-called *economic theory of the family* (Becker 1993). According to the *economic theory of the family*, families choose the most – in economic terms – profitable configuration when dividing paid and unpaid work in the family (Becker 1993). Practically, this means that the partner with the higher relative rewards (mainly measured in income) will spend more time in paid labor, while the partner with better homemaking skills will spend relatively more time on housework (for a more detailed discussion of the theory see Chapter 2.1.1).

Other approaches that make hypotheses about the division of labor between partners according to the income distribution in the family are the so-called *bargaining approach* and the *economic dependency* model (for more detailed discussions of the theories see Chapters 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). Although the mechanisms behind the decision how to divide paid and unpaid labor are assumed to be somewhat different according to the *bargaining approach* and the *economic dependency* model, the pected outcome for the division of housework is very similar to the economic theory of the family. The basic argument is that the partner with the higher income will have greater bargaining power (or will be less dependent on the other partner) and will therefore be able to negotiate a smaller share of the housework, while the partner with the lower relative income will be left to do a larger share of housework (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Brines 1994; Hiller 1984; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; Ott 1993). Like many scholars previously, I will refer to all of these concepts as the *relative resources* approach (see e.g. Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines

and Joyner 1999; Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Diefenbach 2002; Grunow et al. 2007; Gupta 2006a; Gupta 2007; Halleröd 2005; Kroska 2004; Parkman 2004; Presser 1994). I consider the partner with the higher relative income to have higher relative resources.

One of the more prominent studies testing the assumptions about relative resources empirically was conducted by Brines (Brines 1993; Brines 1994). Brines (1994) showed in her study that women indeed decrease their time spent on housework with increasing relative income. However, she also showed that men increase their time spent on housework only up to the point when their partner has equal income. As soon as the woman's income exceeds the man's, men reduce their time spent on housework. Brines (1994) famously referred to this as the *gender display*. She suggests that when couples violate the traditional division of labor in terms of income, meaning that women earn more than their husbands, men want to restore their 'manlihood' by refraining from doing more housework than their spouse.[53]

After Brines (1994) published her article, several studies on the relationship between relative resources and the division of housework have been replicated (e.g. Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Fuwa 2004; Greenstein 2000; Grunow et al. 2007; Gupta 2006a; Halleröd 2005). These studies have shown that the degree of gender display varies across countries. Greenstein (2000) showed that not only men display gender but that also women participate in what he calls the 'gender neutralization' (Greenstein 2000). Similar findings have been found in other countries (Bittman et al. 2003; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Grunow et al. 2007; Halleröd 2005). These studies however, suggest that the influence of relative income on the division of housework – sometimes also referred to as gender deviation – varies depending on the country context. Bittman et al (2003) found that Australian women are 'neutralizing gender deviation' more than men do. The study showed a curvilinear effect for women, but not for men. They argued that this depends on the secondary status of women's employment and the high part-time employment rate of mothers in Australia. Bittman et al (2003) suspect that it is more deviant for Australian women to be employed full-time, and to earn more than their husbands than it is in the U.S., where

[53] Brines (1994) argues that women do not display gender because womanhood is considered a natural condition, however, manliness is regarded an achieved status (Brines 1994).

women's full-time employment is more common than in Australia. In line with the assumptions made by Bittman et al. (2003), studies on Swedish couples show that in Sweden men more strongly neutralize the gender deviation in a country with relatively high gender empowerment. Swedish men seem to reduce their efforts in the domestic field if their spouses have a higher income (Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Halleröd 2005). These findings imply that in countries where women's gender equity is more advanced (especially when it comes to women's employment) women are not the ones who compensate for the gender deviance in the division of housework, but men do so.

4.3.1.2 Time availability

As the studies on relative resources suggest, one explanation for the differences between the countries are different arrangements concerning the employment of men and women. The theories that deal with these concepts are mostly referred to as the *time availability approach* (de Ruijter et al. 2005; Gershuny 2000; Sayer 2005; Shelton and John 1996). The basic argument according to this approach relies on the demand/response argument that the time spent on employment (or other activities) restricts how much time can be spent on housework (for a more detailed description see Chapter 2.2). These ideas suggest that women do more housework than men because of different time commitments (England and Farkas 1986; Shelton and John 1996). Men and women participate in domestic labor to the extent that there are demands on them to do so and to the extent they have available time. The demands and available time is mostly measured by the time spent on employment, presence of children and the time the partner spends on employment or housework.

Studies have shown that women who work long hours spend less time on housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; Blair and Lichter 1991; Gershuny 2000; Takala 2002; van der Lippe 2010). The findings on women's employment hours in relation to their partner's housework hours are somewhat equivocal. Some studies show that men living with women who work long hours spend more time on housework, which accordingly leads to a more equal division of housework (Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Hochschild and Machung 1989), while other studies come to the conclusion that women's employment hours are only related to men's proportional contribution to household labor. In other

words, men's proportion of housework has only increased because women, due to their longer employment hours, do less housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; South and Spitze 1994; van der Lippe 2010).

Studies on the relationship between men's employment hours and their own housework hours have shown varying results. Some research has come to the conclusion that husband's employment hours increase the wife's and reduce the husband's time spent on housework (Davis and Greenstein 2004a); while others come to the result that husband's employment reduces the relative time they spend on housework (Cunningham 2007). Additionally to research on the relationship between the current employment status of women and the division of housework, scholars have found out that husbands whose wives have a longer employment history do relatively more housework than husbands whose wives have shorter employment histories (Gershuny et al. 2005). However, the influence on their own housework hours is not clear.

As mentioned previously, time availability is a result of demand and response. Often the demand for housework is operationalized with children. The presence of children is considered to increase the demand. Previous studies have shown that the presence of children has an influence on both men's and women's time spent on housework. However, the effect is much larger for women than for men (Artis and Pavalko 2003; Grunow et al. 2007; van der Lippe 2010). These differences cannot be explained by the time constraints model, but gender seems to have a moderating effect on the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework.

4.3.1.3 Outsourcing

As previous studies have shown, the division of housework is indirectly influenced by the increase in the number of double-earner families (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Treas and Drobnič 2010), which is reflected in a substantial reduction in women's time spent on housework and a slight increase in men's housework hours (Bianchi et al. 2000; Sayer 2010). The fact that men have not increased their time spent on housework in the same manner as women have decreased theirs has indirectly lead to a general

reduction in the time spent on housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny 2000; Gershuny et al. 2005; Niemi and Pääkkönen 2001; Sayer 2010; South and Spitze 1994).

Because of a decreased propensity to do housework, a number of articles have dealt with the question of what happens with the undone housework (Bittman et al. 1999; Cohen 1998; de Ruijter 2004; de Ruijter et al. 2005; de Ruijter et al. 2003; Spitze 1999; van der Lippe et al. 2004). In line with the time availability theory, it can be assumed that when individuals do not have enough time available to do the housework, they will replace the household production by market substitutes to save time (known as *outsourcing*). Indeed, research has found that couples where both partners work full-time are more likely to use the option of ordering take-away food and going to restaurants than couples where one spouse stays at home (Bittman et al. 1999; Cohen 1998; van der Lippe et al. 2004).[54]

De Ruijter (2004), however, suggests that outsourcing domestic tasks varies by societal context, changes over time, and does not always imply a reduction of time spent on housework. Sometimes the focus only shifts from one field to another. For example, de Ruijter (2004) found that even though the use of child daycare has increased in the past years, it does not mean that parents spend less time with their children. De Ruijter found that the time Dutch parents spend with their children has even increased over years (de Ruijter 2004). Taking the shifts due to social change and variations in cultural norms and social policies in different countries into account, it can be assumed that outsourcing will vary across countries and that the consequences of outsourcing will also depend on the societal context.

Studies have also shown that the type of outsourcing and how it influences the time spent on housework is gender related (de Ruijter et al. 2005; van der Lippe et al. 2004). Domestic help, for example, turned out to save time spent on cleaning only for women, whereas using the microwave reduced husbands' time spent on housework. Owning a dishwasher was found to save only women's time, and having a dryer had no time-saving effect at all.

[54] This is not true for families with small children (de Ruijter 2004). Eating in a restaurant probably does not save time for families with children and it might also be quite expensive for large families. Families with children save time by opting for child care. This at least has been found to be true for Netherlands.

The reasons behind the gendered effects of outsourcing clearly lie in the gendered division of housework. Because women are more often responsible for cooking and cleaning than men (see e.g. Bird and Ratcliff 1990; Hilton and Haldeman 1991; Künzler 1994), it explains why the dishwasher only saves time for women. This implies that the effect of outsourcing will only become less gendered if the division of housework in general loses its gendered characteristics and men and women are assigned the same responsibilities.

4.3.1.4 Gender role ideology

As shown above, research testing the relative resources approach or the time availability theory is not capable of explaining the mechanisms behind the division of housework. On the contrary, despite a more egalitarian division of relative resources and an increase in female employment, women still do the larger part of housework (see e.g. Batalova and Cohen 2002; Baxter 2005; Bianchi et al. 2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Crompton and Lyonette 2005; Geist 2005; Halleröd 2005; Kluwer et al. 2002; Künzler et al. 2001; Sullivan 2000; Thiessen and Rohlinger 1988; Treas and Drobnič 2010). Trying to explain this so-called 'stalled revolution' (Hochschild and Machung 1989), scholars have suggested that the division of housework is not solely a rational choice – based on economic calculations or on their time available to do housework – but rather that while dividing domestic tasks, men and women follow normative assumptions on how men and women are supposed to act. Women do housework because it is considered a woman's task, while men refrain from housework to appear masculine (Erickson 2005; Fenstermaker and West 2002; Ridgeway and Correll 2004).

The idea that the division of domestic tasks is a result of normative assumptions on what is feminine and what is considered masculine is picked up by theorists on *gender role ideology* (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 2.4). The difference to the doing gender approach is that men and women are not expected to act homogenously, but that individuals hold different ideas about how men and women are supposed to act and then behave accordingly (Hakim 2000; Hakim 2003). Allowing individuals different preferences or ideas about how men and women should behave, makes it possible to understand why some women increase their time on housework, even though

they earn more than their husbands, and others do not (Breen and Cooke 2005; Hakim 2003; Hochschild and Machung 1989; Jallinoja 2004).

Generally, a shift towards less traditional attitudes on gender roles has been observed (see e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Charles and Cech 2010; Crompton 2007; Crompton et al. 2000; Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Kunovich and Kunovich 2008; Sjöberg 2010; Treas and Widmer 2000). However, the influence of gender role ideology on behavior (in this case the division of housework) is not obvious. There seems to be a discrepancy between egalitarian gender role ideology and egalitarian behavior. Couples who hold non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles are not necessarily following this through when it comes to the division of housework (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Hochschild and Machung 1989). Bühlmann et al. (2010) emphasize the changes when the first child is born. They show that there is a massive turning point in the division of labor when the first child is born even for couples with egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles. They also show that the probability to return to egalitarian practices varies depending on the societal context. The probability of a change towards inequality with the birth of the first child is smallest in countries with the most developed child care services, while the probability to return to egalitarian practices is more likely in countries with the longest parental leaves (Bühlmann et al. 2010). This means that when the state provides basic parameters for women to reconcile work and family, this is reflected in a stable equal division of housework.

Another explanation is that there is a lag in the attitudes of men and women. Shelton and John (1996), for example, came to the conclusion that egalitarian gender role ideology had a negative influence on the average hours of women's housework, but no influence on men's time spent on housework. Greenstein (1996a) explicitly investigated gender differences in the influence of attitudes on the division of housework, and came to the result that only when men and women both have egalitarian attitudes is this reflected in the division of family work (Breen and Cooke 2005; Greenstein 1996a; Kunovich and Kunovich 2008). It seems that men's attitudes on gender role ideology weigh more than women's.

Gender role ideology also seems to be related to marital status and gender (Cunningham 2005). Among married couples, the division of housework was less traditional only if men had non-traditional attitudes, while within cohabiting couples

women's attitudes weighed more (Cunningham 2005). In support of Greenstein (1996) research, Cunningham's (2005) analyses suggest that in the context of marriage, men's attitudes about gender are more strongly associated with their relative participation in routine housework than are women's. It seems that men's traditional attitudes indeed provide a powerful impediment to social change (Kunovich and Kunovich 2008).

Even though previous findings offer some light on the matter, there still are several unanswered questions about the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework: Is gender role ideology moderated by gender; and what is the influence of the societal context in which the division of housework is negotiated?

4.3.1.5 Societal context

In Chapter 3, I discussed the welfare state policies that are generally considered to influence the gendered division of labor. I differentiated between employment regulations, parental leave, and child care arrangements. Among other factors, these regulations influence the gendered division of resources and indirectly also the division of housework (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Hook 2010; Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Treas and Drobnič 2010). The societal context is significant for the division of housework in several ways. On the one hand, attitudes are formed by the societal context in which individuals live (Pfau-Effinger 2004c; Pfau-Effinger 2010; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). On the other hand, individual's behavior and decisions are influenced by the structural constrains in which individuals act (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Geist 2005; Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Treas and Drobnič 2010).

The most clear indicator that the societal context makes a difference to the division of housework is the fact that men's proportion of housework varies across countries (Davis and Greenstein 2004a; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Knudsen and Wærness 2008; see e.g. Treas and Drobnič 2010). Men's relative contribution to domestic labor is clearly associated with women's time spent on employment. In countries were women are a legitimate part of the labor force, men's proportion of housework is much greater than in countries where men have long working hours and women work part-time or stay at home (Hook 2006; Hook 2010). Nevertheless, women's increased time in the field traditionally considered as men's – the labor market – does not necessarily mean that

men increase their time in the field traditionally regarded as women's – housework. Changes in men's roles seem modest and hardly related to housework.

Why women's roles change and men's seem resistant to change has proved to be a challenge for comparative research. Comparative analyses have shown that not only does the division of housework vary across countries, but also the mechanisms that influence the division of housework depend on the country context (Treas and Drobnič 2010). Studies analyzing the division of housework with multi-level analysis suggest that individual level factors are very much related to macro-level gender inequality (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Fuwa 2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Ruppanner 2009). It seems that women with higher bargaining power (higher relative income) will have better chances to enforce their power in countries with egalitarian values and egalitarian policies (Diefenbach 2002; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Hook 2006; Hook 2010; Knudsen and Wærness 2008). This means that women with higher relative income have a better chance to negotiate a lower proportion of housework when they live in a country with egalitarian values, compared to women who live in a less egalitarian environment.

Similarly, gender role ideology has been found to have a more equalizing effect on the division of housework in countries that are generally more gender egalitarian (Bernhardt et al. 2008; Bühlmann et al. 2010; Crompton et al. 2000; Crompton and Harris 1999; Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Fuwa 2004; Nordenmark 2004). Nordenmark (2004), for example, found that when controlling for gender role ideology the differences between countries decreased. He showed that gender role ideology is more strongly correlated to the share of housework for men than for women. It was also among men that he found the largest changes in the relationships between the conservative welfare regimes and the division of housework when holding gender role ideology constant.

Fuwa (2004) came to the conclusion that individual gender role ideology is not enough for women to enforce a less traditional division of housework, but that the country context has a strong regulating effect on the possibility for women to implement their gender role ideology. Similarly, Knudsen and Waerness (2008) showed that female empowerment at the societal level influences the division of housework and that the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework should always be seen in

the light of the societal context. In other words, the effect of gender role ideology is related to the level of gender equity. It seems that women are able to insist on their own preferences in countries where women's issues are a general focus in policy making (Coltrane 2000b; Lee and Waite 2005). While the relationship between women's resources and the level of gender equity at the societal level has been proven, it still is unclear why women still cannot impose their resources and gender role ideology in countries with high gender equity when it comes to the division of housework.

Also, the relationship between men's time spent on housework and policies that support gender equity have been ambiguous. Hook (2006) found that employment policies directed to enforce women's employment did not increase, but even depressed, men's participation in housework. Apparently, social policies aimed at equalizing men's and women's roles by making it easier for women to reconcile their work and family roles have the side effect that men feel less responsible to take on housework duties (or women are less keen to give up their household responsibilities).

Even though previous research has shed light on the mystery of the division of domestic labor, the contradicting findings on the relationship between the societal context and the division of housework still needs to be explored, so that we can understand the mechanisms behind men and women's gendered division of housework better. It seems as if Coltrane's statement, 'researchers are just beginning to understand why men do so little' (Coltrane 2000a) still applies even after ten further years of research in the field of division of labor.

4.3.2 Research question and strategy

Macro-level explanations postulate that structural and cultural forces shape the way couples divide their domestic responsibilities (Hook 2006; Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Treas and Drobnič 2010). I have already discussed the benefits and important results of multilevel analysis including several countries in one analysis. The downside of these large scale analyses is, however, that more in-depth insight on the mechanisms behind the division of housework is not possible. Because female employment and policies directed towards families and employment have shown to impact the division of housework, I choose to focus my in-depth analysis on two countries with a western

cultural background, but with a very different approach when it comes to the reconciliation of work and family, namely West Germany and Finland. In West Germany, the breadwinner-homemaker model and in Finland the double-earner family model have served as the ideals, and have determined the policies towards reconciliation of work and family (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 3).

As shown in Chapter 4.2, different work and family policies are also associated with differences in partnership formation. I showed that men who hold non-traditional attitudes are more likely to marry in Finland (a country with a long tradition of female employment) than in Germany (a country with more conservative values and a history of the breadwinner-homemaker model). According to Breen and Cooke (2005), this should also be reflected in the division of housework. If the assumption is correct, that only when non-traditional men marry non-traditional women will the division of housework become less traditional, the division of housework should be significantly less traditional in Finland than in Germany (for a more detailed explanation of the theory from Breen and Cooke (2005) and its consequences on the division of housework in Finland and Germany see Chapter 2.4.3). Following previous comparative research on the division of housework, it can be assumed that Germany and Finland also are likely to be different when it comes to the mechanisms influencing the division of housework.

Previous studies on the division of housework in West Germany suggest that it is not related to the proportional division of resources, but reflects normative ideas about gendered behavior (Cooke 2006b; Huinink and Röhler 2005; Röhler and Huinink 2010; Schulz and Blossfeld 2006). Schulz and Blossfeld (2006) found that higher levels of education lead to a less traditional division of housework, instead of – as anticipated by the human capital theory – a specialized division of housework, where the partner with the higher relative human capital will spend less time on housework and vice versa. Because (men's) higher level of education corresponds with a more equal division of housework, Schulz and Blossfeld (2006) made the assumption that a higher educational level is associated with less traditional attitudes towards gender, rather than serving as a proxy for relative resources. Therefore, they suggest that gender norms are more decisive when it comes to determining who is responsible for housework than relative resources.

The effect of gendered norms is expected to vary across countries, but also to depend on the norms for relationships. Röhler and Huinink (2010) find differences in the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework for West and East Germany. They find that affectual egalitarian partnerships are more common in West than in East Germany. Therefore, they argue that because of cultural differences, gender role ideology is more important in West than in East Germany, where the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework is more pragmatic (see also Cooke 2006b).

Besides the normative ideas on men and women's roles, parental status seems to be relevant when it comes to changes in the division of housework. After the birth of the first child, the division of housework becomes traditional even if it was non-traditional beforehand (Cooke 2004; Cooke 2006a; Schulz and Blossfeld 2006). Similarly to Bühlmann et al (2010), Schulz and Blossfeld (2006) came to the conclusion that after the birth of the first child, changing back to an egalitarian division of housework is not very likely. Grunow et al. (Grunow et al. 2006; 2007) show that the probability to hold on to the traditional division of housework after the birth of a child is connected to a traditional division of relative resources (men have higher income than women), yet a non-traditional division of housework is not associated with women's higher earnings. Therefore, they suggest that a traditional division of relative resources enforces the traditional division of housework, but a non-traditional division of resources (woman has the higher relative income) does not necessarily result in a non-traditional division of housework. Grunow et al. (2007) suggest that relative income is more likely to explain the persistence of a traditional division of housework than a change towards a non-traditional division of housework.

Similarly to research on Germany, studies on the division of housework in Finland have shown that women are still responsible for the housework, and that having children enforces the traditional division of housework. Research that has been conducted for Finland shows no obvious relationship between relative resources and the division of housework. Only a weak influence of women's relative income on the division of housework was found for Finland, but this effect disappeared as soon as women's employment characteristics were included in the analysis (Raijas and Varjonen 2007; Takala 2004a). Apparently, women's time spent on employment is more important than

their income. This is also supported by the finding that most women (73%) and men (58%) in Finland disagreed with the statement that 'it is fair that the spouse with lower earnings does a larger share of housework' (Raijas and Varjonen 2007: 275). Time availability seems to offer a much more powerful explanation than relative resources (Raijas and Varjonen 2007: 275). Raijas and Varjonen found that if one spouse reduces their time at work they automatically spend more time on housework. Despite the high full-time employment rate of Finnish women, the division of housework remains gendered. Nevertheless, hardly any research for Finland has been conducted on the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework.

The findings on the division of housework in West Germany and Finland imply that the division of housework is a matter of normative assumptions about men and women's gender role ideology. A consistent finding of comparative research is that the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework shows different forms depending on the country context where the study is conducted. Previous studies show that women who live in countries with more widespread public child care and where men are eligible to take parental leave, can better enforce their lifestyle preferences and take advantage of their relative resources (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Knudsen and Wærness 2008). Likewise, studies in West Germany and Finland indicate that normative attitudes towards gender roles are a better predictor for the division of housework than relative resources, but without exploring this explicitly.

My research will pick up this issue and address the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework, without disregarding income relations and employment patterns of couples. The societal context is taken into account in the analysis by studying Finland and West Germany, countries that differ in their history of female employment. The focus shall be on country differences and the impact of the societal context on the mechanisms influencing the division of housework. The question is: can gender role ideology explain why, despite women's increased participation in the labor market, men's share of housework has hardly changed? Furthermore, I analyze how the societal context moderates the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework. In other words: does the relationship between gender role

ideology and the division of housework vary between West Germany and Finland, while controlling for relative resources, time availability and biographical stage?

4.3.3 Measuring the division of housework

Housework is mainly defined to consist of physical activities and routine tasks such as cleaning, laundry, and cooking. Other aspects like child care, mental labor and planning household management are not included in the data set, even though they also are important for the family's well-being (Coltrane 2000b). The ISSP 2002 includes two different measures on the division of housework: the measure of relative housework tasks and the time men and women spend on housework.

To measure the relative division of housework I utilize two questions from the ISSP module 2002 'Family and Changing Gender Roles III'. The exact wording of the first question was: 'In your household who does the following things…? Does the laundry, makes small repairs around the house, cares for sick family members, shops for groceries, does the household cleaning, and prepares the meals.' The possible answer categories where: always me, usually me, about equal, usually my spouse/partner, always my spouse/partner, and done by a third person, allowing also for 'can't choose'. The responses were recoded into a scale 'always woman', 'usually woman', 'about equal', 'usually man', and 'always man'. 'Always woman' was coded 1, 'about equal' was coded 0, and 'always man' coded -1. This means that a positive value indicates that the woman is mainly responsible for the task and a negative value means that the man is mainly responsible for the task.

If the task was done by a third person, this was coded as an equal division of housework. To control for a possible effect from recoding 'done by a third person' into 'equal division of housework' I include a variable 'outsourcing' in the analysis. The variable 'outsourcing' is coded 1 if the task is done by a third person and 0 if not. Generally, outsourcing is more common in West Germany than in Finland (see Table 4.9). This is an interesting finding considering the fact that in West Germany the breadwinner-homemaker model is traditionally more common, while in Finland the dual-earner concept is the most common family form. One would assume that the breadwinner-homemaker model corresponds with less outsourcing than the dual-career

concept; surprisingly this does not seem to be the case. One explanation for this might be *different perceptions of cleanliness* or a *general devaluation of housework*. Because the housewife-breadwinner model has stronger roots in Germany than in Finland, there is a stronger emphasis on a clean house and a higher evaluation of housework in West Germany, while in Finland the emphasis on employment is related to a 'devaluation of housework' (see also Bianchi et al. 2000). Another explanation is offered by Goodin et al. (2004). They argue that in Finland less time is needed for housework because in Finland the welfare state compensates most families in which both partners work full-time and hire someone else to take care of the children during that time.

The degree of outsourcing seems to depend on the housework task. Cleaning seems to be a task that is often delegated to a third party. Preparing the meal is least likely to be outsourced. Interestingly, this is true for both countries. Here no cultural differences are evident.

Table 4.9 Outsourcing household tasks

	West Germany	Finland
Someone else does the laundry	10	4
Someone else does the small repairs	14	7
Someone else cares for sick family members	5	7
Someone else shops for groceries	4	2
Someone else does the cleaning	21	13
Someone else prepares the meal	1	4
Total	45	25

The responsibility for housework tasks is clearly gendered. 'Small repairs' is the only task that is mostly done by men. The mean value equals -0.507 in Germany and -0.514 in Finland. In both countries 'doing the laundry' is clearly a task for women, while 'shopping for groceries' is almost equally taken care of by men and women (see Graph 4.4). The mean value for 'doing the laundry' is as high as 0.700 in Germany and 0.563 in Finland, while the mean for 'shopping for groceries' is 0.291 in Germany and 0.160 in Finland.

Graph 4.4 Division of household tasks



	Recoded:division of laundry	Recoded:division of small repairs	Recoded:division care of sick fam members	Recoded:division shopping groceries	Recoded:division of hh cleaning	Recoded:division preparing meal
Germany Mean	0,700	-0,507	0,375	0,291	0,487	0,543
Finland Mean	0,563	-0,514	0,255	0,160	0,343	0,368

For the overall picture of the division of housework in the household, a mean sum of scores was computed. The variable measuring the division of small repairs turned out to have a remarkably low correlation on the sum of scores, and loaded on a different factor than the other variables. Hence, it was removed from the item battery. In this way, the measure of relative housework only includes routine tasks and leaves out occasionally performed tasks (see also Cunningham 2005; Knudsen and Wærness 2008). As anticipated, the mean value of the combined tasks measures is 0.482 for Germany and 0.335 for Finland. The division of housework is significantly less traditional in Finland than in Germany.[55] The Cronbach's alpha for the combined measure of the household tasks is as high as 0.788 for Germany and 0.721 for Finland.

Immediately after the question on the relative division of housework, a question on the hours of housework followed. The exact wording was: 'On average, how many hours a week do you personally spend on household work, not including child care activities?' This was followed by the question: 'And what about your spouse? These variables give an impression of how much time individuals spend on average on

[55] There are also significant differences in the responses made by men and women. Therefore, gender is included as a control variable in the analysis.

housework. Because there is information on the hours spent on housework by both partners, it is also possible to use this variable for measuring the relative share of housework for men and women. Similarly to Knudsen and Wærness (2008), I calculated a measure: *relative housework hours.* The variable is created by subtracting men's hours from women's hours and dividing it by the sum of women's and men's housework hours.[56] In this way, this variable is also coded -1 to 1. The mean for the relative share of housework hours is 0.462 for Germany and 0.344 for Finland.

The correlation between the measures relative division of household tasks and relative division of housework hours is significant and as high as 0.615 in Germany and 0.640 in Finland. Because of the high correlation coefficient and relying on the discussion on the best measure of housework, I assume that the measure *division of housework tasks* is a reliable indicator for the relative division of housework (for a discussion on the measure of housework see also Bianchi et al. 2000; Geist 2010; Hook 2006; Kamo 2000; Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Lee and Waite 2005; Marini and Shelton 1993).

4.3.4 Operationalization and variables

For the purpose of analyzing whether a non-traditional gender role ideology leads to a non-traditional division of housework, a logistic regression was calculated with SPSS. Because I am interested in finding out if non-traditional gender role ideology is associated with a non-traditional division of housework, I only differentiate between couples with a non-traditional division of housework and couples with a traditional division of housework. The *division of housework* is coded non-traditional (1), when the division of housework is equally divided or when the man is mainly responsible for the housework, and the division of housework is coded traditional (0), if the woman has the main responsibility for housework. According to this definition, 7.3 percent of the couples in West Germany and 14.0 percent of the couples in Finland are considered non-traditional in their division of housework.

[56] $\frac{(women's \cdot hours - men's \cdot hours)}{(women's \cdot hours + men's \cdot hours)}$

To analyze whether or not gender role ideology can explain some of the differences in the division of housework, I calculate models which include indicators or measures for the previously discussed concepts: gender role ideology, socialization, relative resources, time availability and indicators for different life course stages.

Gender role ideology is measured as an index. In the ISSP a set of variables (including ten questions) asked for agreement or disagreement towards different statements on gender roles. Based on the results of the factor analysis above, an index with a five-point scale was created from the relevant variables (for detailed description see Chapter 4.1.4).

- 'a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work' (v4),
- 'a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works' (v5),
- 'all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job' (v6), and
- 'a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).

In the index, the value of 5 stands for non-traditional attitudes and 1 for traditional attitudes. Unfortunately, there is no information on the partner's gender role ideology. Therefore, only the respondent's gender role ideology is included in the analysis. The assumption is that the less traditional (the higher the mean value for gender role ideology), the higher the odds that the couple's division of housework will be non-traditional. This means that men who hold non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles are expected to increase their time spent on housework, while women are expected to spend less time on housework the less traditional their gender role ideology is.

Because men's attitudes towards gender roles are assumed to have a greater influence on the division of housework than the woman's (Greenstein 1996b; Kroska 2004; Kunovich and Kunovich 2008), an interaction effect with gender and gender role ideology was created. Gender role ideology was set to zero if the respondent was a woman. If men's gender role ideology has a higher impact, then the interaction effect of man and gender role ideology should have a higher impact on the increase in the odds of following a non-traditional division of housework.

Another aspect that takes gendered norms into account is *socialization* theory. The basic argument of gendered socialization is that individuals (in this case, children) seek orientation in role models of the same gender (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 2.3.1). For example, if children grow up in an environment where the division of housework is traditional, they will most likely adopt this in their own partnership (Gupta 2006b; Peña et al. 2010). In the ISSP data set there is a question on whether or not the respondent's mother worked for at least for one year after the respondent's birth and before the respondent turned 14. This variable serves as an indicator of childhood socialization in gendered norms. I assume that if the respondent experienced a working mother in their childhood, the learned gendered norms are less traditional than for someone whose mother stayed at home during the greater part of their childhood. Therefore, I also expect that these individuals are more likely to follow a non-traditional division of housework than individuals who were brought up in a more traditional environment. The variable was coded 1 if this was true and 0 if the respondent's mother never worked during this period.

The measure of income distribution in the household serves as an indicator for the *relative resources*, and is based on the question 'Who has the higher income?' Seven possible answers were given: a) my partner has no income, b) I have much higher income, c) I have a higher income, d) equal income, e) partner has higher income, f) partner has much higher income, and g) I have no income. These answers were incorporated into three different dummies that were included in the analysis: 'man has higher income', 'equal income', and 'woman has higher income'. Woman's higher income would be expected to lead to higher odds of a non-traditional division of housework and men's higher income should lower the odds of a non-traditional division of housework. According to the relative resources theory, the person who has the lower relative income is expected to spend more time on housework, while the partner with the higher relative income is expected to spend less time on housework. This assumption is gender neutral. If however, the assumptions based on the doing gender approach are true and men and women instead of behaving rationally according to economic principles, *do gender*, the effect of relative income is not expected to follow the economic logic if women have a higher income than their partner. This means that if

couples 'do gender', women who earn more than their partners will increase their time spent on housework or men will reduce their time on housework (Brines 1994).

The main assumption according to the *time availability* approach is that the time spent on housework depends on the demand for housework and the time available for the housework. As an indicator for the time available for housework, the respondent's and partner's employment hours are recoded into men's and women's employment hours.[57] The assumption is simply that the more time someone spends on employment, the less time they will spend on housework. For the relative division of housework, long employment hours for men mean a greater likelihood that the division of housework is traditional, while the assumption for women is the opposite; the more time women spend on employment, the less likely the division of housework is traditional. Partner's housework hours are also included in the analysis to control for the demand for housework. The assumption is that the more time the partner spends on housework, the lower the demand is for the respondent to spend time on housework. Similarly, the variable 'children' is expected to measure the demand for housework. When children live in the household, the demand for housework is probably higher than when no small children live in the household. This assumption is gender neutral. However, research has shown that children symbolize a turning point in the division of housework (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Cooke 2006b; Grunow et al. 2007). After the birth of the first child, couples often become traditional in their division of housework despite a non-traditional division of housework before the birth of the child. Therefore, the time spent on housework might only increase for women, but not for men.

To control for other life stages that might influence the division of housework, I include marital status and age in the analysis. Married couples have been shown to have a more traditional division of housework than cohabiting couples (Baxter 2005; Gupta 1999; South and Spitze 1994). Marriage can therefore be regarded to enforce gendered norms. Alternatively, traditionally oriented couples may more likely get married than non-traditional couples. Age cohorts are included in the analysis because gendered norms are associated with the dominant social norms that change over time.

[57] In Germany, the employment hours refer to the last job, not to the current employment status. To have comparable measures for Finland and Germany, employment hours are recoded 0 if the employment status is unemployed, housewife, retired, or student.

4.3.5 Sample and Methods

For the final analysis, only couples with complete information on the division of household tasks, housework hours and the relevant independent variables are included. After excluding outliers, 512 couples for Germany and 681 couples for Finland were included in the analysis of the relative division of housework tasks.[58] For the analysis of housework hours in Germany, 255 female respondents and 260 male respondents were included in the analysis. For Finland, 364 women and 322 men were included in the analysis of housework hours. Because a listwise exclusion of cases meant that more than 20 percent of West German cases and more than 30 percent of cases for Finland would be excluded from the analysis, it is important to control for significant differences between individuals who are excluded from the analysis and individuals who answered all the relevant questions. The Little's MCAR test is significant for both Germany (χ^2 =471.987***, df=2) and Finland (χ^2 =505.012***, df=394). This means that the non-responses are not missing at random. The respondents who did not answer the question of their own housework hours significantly differ from those who did. Comparing those who answered the question on their own housework hours and those who did not, a pattern become evident.

German respondents who did not answer the question on their own housework hours report a *less traditional* division of housework tasks. However, they have significantly *more traditional* attitudes towards gender roles and less often experienced a working mother. The missing value analysis also shows that women, who have missing values on the partner's time spent on housework, generally spend less time on housework and on employment; while respondents who did not answer the question on their own housework hours, tended to report more housework hours for their partner than respondents who did answer the question on their own housework hours. Furthermore, individuals who did not report their own housework hours are less likely to have children and are significantly more often married (see Table 4.10).

[58] Some respondents reported that they spend more than 90 hours on housework per week. To avoid biased results, these cases were excluded from the analysis.

Table 4.10 Missing value analysis (mean for the missing cases)

	Germany				Finland			
	Own hours of housework		Partner's housework hours		Own hours of housework		Partner's housework hours	
Division of housework tasks	0.47	*	0.46	***	0.33	*	0.32	**
	(0.59)		(0.65)		(0.42)		(0.47)	
Gender role ideology	3.28	***	3.26	*	3.50		3.50	
	(2.78)		(3.03)		(3.36)		(3.47)	
Socialization	0.49	*	0.50	***	0.55		0.55	*
	(0.33)		(0.30)		(0.43)		(0.42)	
Man has higher income	0.34		0.35		0.43		0.43	+
	(0.38)		(0.32)		(0.33)		(0.34)	
Equal income	0.10	+	0.09	*	0.19	***	0.19	**
	(0.20)		(0.22)		(0.40)		(0.33)	
Woman has higher income	0.1		0.1		0.15	*	0.15	*
	(0.05)		(0.11)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Woman's employment hours	14.36	*	14.11		23.07	**	23.25	**
	(8.44)		(11.88)		(16.25)		(16.93)	
Man's employment hours	31.96		31.39		28.85	*	28.97	*
	(25.64)		(31.58)		(21.59)		(22.79)	
Outsourcing	0.08		0.07		0.03		0.03	
	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.01)		(0.03)	
Youngest child under 6	0.18	*	0.18	*	0.19	**	0.18	
	(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.17)	
Youngest child over 6	0.21		0.21		0.21		0.21	
	(0.20)		(0.18)		(0.24)		(0.22)	
Married	0.86	***	0.86	***	0.74		0.74	
	(1.00)		(0.96)		(0.69)		(0.68)	
Age	47.41	**	47.34	**	45.96		46.03	
	(54.15)		(52.92)		(48.34)		(47.01)	
Own housework hours	14.77		14.07	***	10.5		10.1	***
	(.)		(22.74)		(.)		(17.11)	
Partner's housework hours	14.66	***	15.23	.	9.09		9.15	
	(26.19)		(.)		(12.57)		(.)	
Man	0.47	***	0.52	***	0.45		0.46	*
	(0.71)		(0.24)		(0.49)		(0.34)	

a. For Germany, Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 471.987, df = 231, sig. = 0.000
b. For Finland, Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 505.012, df = 394, sig. = 0.000
Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

Compared to those who did answer the question on their own housework hours, respondents who did not were more often men. Generally speaking, one can say that

respondents who did not answer the question on their own housework hours tend to report a less traditional division of housework tasks, while they are more traditional in other aspects compared to respondent with information on housework hours.

A similar pattern is evident for those who did not answer the question on partner's housework hours. West Germans who did not answer this question also reported a less traditional division of housework tasks. However, they have significantly more traditional attitudes towards gender roles. They less often experienced a working mother and have more often an equal income to their partner. They are also more often married and report longer housework hours than those who answered the question on the partner's housework hours. In contrast to those who did not report on their own housework hours, respondents who did not answer the question on partner's housework hours are more often women. These findings suggest that West German respondents who had some missing values for partner's housework hours tend to report a less traditional division of housework tasks, but seem more traditional in other aspects compared to respondents who answered the question on partner's housework hours.

The picture for Finnish respondents who did not answer the question on their own housework hours differs somewhat to that of West German respondents. In Finland, respondents who gave no information on their own housework hours, similarly to respondents in West Germany, by trend report a less traditional division of housework tasks. However, unlike in West Germany, they do not report less traditional attitudes towards gender roles. They are most likely to have an equal income and are more likely to report shorter employment hours for both women and men. Furthermore, those who did not report on housework hours are less likely to have children than those who answered the question.

Finns who did not report their partner's housework hours, significantly more often also report a less traditional division of housework tasks. They more often have an equal income and women less often have a higher income. Furthermore, individuals with missing values more often report that men and women spend less time on employment, while a respondent, who answered all questions, is significantly more likely to report more time spent on housework. Generally, Finns who did not report their partner's housework hours are significantly more often women. While Finns who did not report their own or their partner's housework hours (like West German respondents) also

report a less traditional division of housework. Unlike West German respondents, they do not significantly differ in gender role ideology from those who did not report housework hours.

To be sure that the results of the analysis are not biased, I calculated all the models with imputed data. Because the pattern of missing values is not monotonic, the option 'fully conditional specification' is applied. The fully conditional specification (FCS) is an iterative Maskov Chain Monte Carlo method. The FCS method firths a univariate model using all other variables in the model as predictors, then imputes missing values for the variable being fitted.[59] The analyses with the imputed values are included in the APPENDIX. No remarkable differences could be found (see APPENDIX E.3)

4.3.6 Results

The main aim of this chapter is to find out if the mechanisms that influence the division of housework differ in West Germany and Finland: two countries with different approaches towards the reconciliation of family and work. West Germany serves as an archetype for a political system that (used to) support the breadwinner-homemaker model; and Finland as an exemplar of a country with a long tradition of the double-earner family model.

The dependent variable – division of housework – is dichotomous. Therefore, logistic regression analysis is the most appropriate method to analyze the influence of gender role ideology, socialization, relative resources, time availability and different family stages on the division of housework tasks. The estimation of the coefficients is carried out iteratively based on the maximum likelihood method, using SPSS logistic regression. In the logistic regression model, the relationship between Z and the probability of the event is described by this function:

$$\pi_i = \frac{e^{z_i}}{1+e^{z_i}} = \frac{1}{1+e^{-z_i}}$$

[59] In APPENDIX E.1, the mean values for the different imputation techniques are displayed. There are hardly any differences in the mean values calculated for listwise deleted, all values, and imputed.

The dependent variable, division of housework tasks, is operationalized by referring to a 'non-traditional' division of housework if the mean value of division of housework task equals zero or is higher; while the division of housework is considered 'traditional' if the mean value of the division of housework tasks is below zero.

Different mechanisms behind the division of household tasks for West Germany and Finland can be expected. Thus, I analyze the models separately for West Germany and for Finland. Because the non-traditional division of housework is coded one and the traditional division of housework is coded zero, all the parameters are interpreted in reference to people with a traditional division of housework. Odds ratios above 1.0 refer to positive odds that the couple has a non-traditional division of housework. Odds ratios below 1.0 mean decreased odds for couples to have a non-traditional division of housework. For example, an odds ratio of 2.5 for cohabiting couples should be interpreted so that the division of housework is 2.5 times more likely to be non-traditional for cohabiting couples compared to married couples.

Before conducting the multivariate analysis for the mechanisms that influence the division of housework tasks and the time men and women spend on housework, it is necessary to look at the relevant descriptive statistics (see Table 4.11). As already discussed, the division of housework tasks is somewhat more traditional in West Germany than in Finland. The differentiation between men's and women's reporting shows that men consider the division of housework task to be more equal than women do. In West Germany, 10 percent of the men consider the division of housework to be equally shared or to a greater part to be carried out by them (non-traditional division of housework), while only 4 percent of West German women consider the division of housework to be non-traditional. In Finland, 16 percent of the men and 13 percent of the women report a non-traditional division of housework. For West Germany, the difference is significant and therefore a dummy for gender is included in the analysis to control for the discrepancies in reporting.

Over all, Finnish women spend approximately eight hours less on housework than German women do (see Table 4.11). However, Finnish men do not participate more in housework than German men do. Finnish men devote even less time to housework than German men do. The less traditional division of housework in Finland is obviously a result of Finnish women's reduced time on housework, rather than a greater

participation of Finnish men in housework. As already noted, the differences in the time spent on housework cannot be explained by more outsourcing in Finland than in West Germany. In West Germany, 7 percent of the men and 8 percent of the women report that they take advantage of outsourcing; compared to 3 percent of Finnish men and 2 percent of Finnish women who report some degree of outsourcing. There is simply less housework done in Finland than in West Germany

Summing employment and housework, it becomes evident that West German men spend approximately 37.44 hours, Finnish men 34.14 hours, West German women 36.26 hours, and Finnish women 36.69 hours on paid or unpaid labor (excluding time spent on child care). Women in Finland compensate the time they spend on employment by spending less time on housework. As already shown in Chapter 4.1, attitudes towards gender role ideology are less traditional in Finland than in West Germany. It will be interesting to see how this is reflected in the division of housework. Studies using multilevel analysis have shown that especially women are more likely to enforce their gender role ideology and relative resources in countries where gender equity is more common. Therefore, one could expect that gender role ideology has a greater influence on the division of housework in Finland than in West Germany.

In both countries men generally earn more than women, but there are more couples with an equal income or couples where the woman has a higher income than their partner in Finland. This is probably related to the fact that employment hours are more equally divided between men and women in Finland than in West Germany (see Table 4.11). The fact that despite the high employment rate of women, men still have higher earnings than women is a result of the gender segregated education system and consequently also the segregated labor market (see Chapter 3).

Table 4.11 Descriptive statistics according to gender

	West Germany Men (N=260)	Finland Men (N=322)	West Germany Women (N=255)	Finland Women (N=364)
Division of housework tasks (dummy)	0.10	0.16	0.04	0.13
	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.34)
Hours of housework	6.98	6.43	20.96	12.82
	(5.85)	(5.58)	(13.30)	(8.64)
Gender role ideology	3.17	3.41	3.45	3.62
	(0.80)	(0.90)	(0.96)	(0.91)
Mother worked when respondent <14	0.53	0.57	0.50	0.56
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Woman earns higher incomes	0.09	0.17	0.11	0.13
	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.34)
Equal incomes	0.08	0.19	0.12	0.20
	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.40)
Woman's employment hrs	13.85	22.74	15.30	23.87
	(18.64)	(19.38)	(18.59)	(18.31)
Man's employment hrs	31.46	27.71	31.64	30.13
	(22.48)	(20.54)	(31.64)	(20.17)
Outsourcing	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.02
	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.16)
Youngest child under 6	0.15	0.20	0.21	0.17
	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.38)
Youngest child between 7 and 17	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.21
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Married	0.84	0.74	0.87	0.73
	(0.37)	(0.44)	(0.33)	(0.44)
Birth cohort 1969-1960	0.26	0.18	0.28	0.22
	(0.44)	(0.38)	(0.45)	(0.41)
Birth cohort 1959-1950	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.23
	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.37)	(0.42)
Birth cohort 1949-1940	0.19	0.21	0.17	0.20
	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.40)
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier	0.20	0.15	0.17	0.13
	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.34)
Partner's housework hours	21.67	12.46	7.43	5.84
	(15.10)	(9.29)	(7.42)	(5.50)

As previously noted, German couples are more often married than Finnish couples. Nevertheless, German couples do not have more children than Finnish couples. This reflects the more prominent status of marriage in West Germany than in Finland. In

West Germany, marriage is 'under the special protection of the law'. This means privileges for married couples, such as the splitting advantage and more parental rights for men (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 4.2).

4.3.6.1 Relative division of housework tasks

Before I go into the separate analysis for Germany and Finland, I will explore the interaction effect of gender role ideology and the country context on the division of housework. To do that, I include an interaction effect between gender role ideology and Finland in the model. The χ^2 for the model without the interaction effect is 22.186 and with the interaction effect 28.234. The difference between the χ^2 for the models with and without the interaction term is 6.048 with one degree of freedom (see Table 4.12).

The difference between the models is significant at the 5% level. The so-called omnibus interaction effect shows that the interaction term between gender role ideology and country does improve the model (see Jaccard 2001). However, the interaction coefficient itself is not significant. Because the coefficient of the interaction effect might be 1 in the population (meaning no difference between the interaction effect and the reference group), it can only be noted that the thesis that the influence of gender role ideology on the division of housework is moderated by the societal context is not supported by the analysis.[60] Couples with non-traditional attitudes seem to be more likely to have a non-traditional division of housework independently of the societal context they live in.

[60] Because the missing value analysis shows differences in men's and women's reporting on the division of housework, I also calculated the analysis separately for women and men. The analysis showed no particular difference between men and women (see APPENDIX E.3).

Table 4.12 Logistic regression on the moderating effect of societal context on the relationship between gender role ideology and the relative division of housework task

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Constant	0.010	***	0.009	***	0.016	**
Finland	1.472	*	3.629		2.040	
Gender role ideology (GRI)	3.121	**	1.517		1.183	
GRI*Finland			0.960		1.099	
Socialization					0.881	
Woman has higher income					1.865	
Equal income					1.522	
Women's employment hours					1.023	*
Men's employment hours					0.990	
Outsourcing					3.059	*
-2LL (final)	393.492		881.428		839.931	
χ^2	22.186**		28.234***		69.731***	
df	2		3		9	
N						
Nagelkerke	0.069		0.042		0.103	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

After calculating models that examine the interaction effect of societal context and gender role ideology, I calculate separate models for Germans and Finns to see if the mechanisms behind the division of housework differ between the countries. On average, there are only a few couples with a non-traditional division of housework (in West Germany 38 couples and in Finland 100 couples). Thus, there are not enough degrees of freedom so that I could include all theoretically relevant variables into one model. The investigation of the impact of gender role ideology on the division of housework is therefore proceeds as following: First, the interaction effect between gender and gender role ideology is tested, and then the main theories on gender role ideology, socialization, relative resources, and time availability (employment hours and outsourcing) are included in the analysis. In the last model, the influence of gender role ideology is tested under the control of family variables and cohort effects. To distinguish differences influenced by the societal context, German and Finnish couples are explored separately.

Table 4.13 Logistic regression on the relationship between gender role ideology and the relative division of housework tasks (Wald statistics)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	West Germany	Finland	West Germany	Finland	West Germany	Finland
Constant	0.014 ***	0.044 ***	0.007 ***	0.039 ***	0.075 *	0.107 ***
	(10.57)	(18.70)	(28.50)	(37.44)	(6.600)	(13.258)
Man	1.137	1.226	3.508 **	1.327	3.042 **	1.411
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(9.43)	(1.61)	(7.764)	(2.367)
Gender role ideology	1.385	1.402 +	1.227	1.350 *	1.299	1.317 *
	(0.91)	(3.32)	(0.75)	(4.65)	(1.276)	(4.011)
Gender role ideology*man	1.309	1.030				
	(0.39)	(0.01)				
Socialization			1.165	1.113		
			(0.16)	(0.21)		
Woman has higher income			6.543 ***	1.353		
			(11.95)	(0.91)		
Equal income			3.877 **	1.256		
			(7.43)	(0.66)		
Woman's empl. hrs			1.003	1.017 *		
			(0.07)	(5.09)		
Man's empl. hrs			1.003	0.988 +		
			(0.09)	(2.96)		
Outsourcing			4.203 **	2.047		
			(8.81)	(1.70)		
Youngest child under 6					0.774	0.471 *
					(0.199)	(4.095)
Youngest child 7-17					0.170 *	0.925
					(4.939)	(0.059)
Married					0.347	0.550 *
					(3.570)	(4.914)
Birth cohort 1969-1960					0.411	0.932
					(2.568)	(0.038)
Birth cohort 1959-1950					1.153	0.922
					(0.052)	(0.054)
Birth cohort 1949-1940					0.470	0.746
					(1.058)	(0.569)
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier					0.282	0.605
					(2.339)	(1.141)
-2LL (final)	257.611	559.162	227.659	546.625	228.263	543.566
χ_2	13.153**	9.055*	43.104***	21.593**	42.501***	24.651**
df	3	3	8	8	9	9
N (non-trad.)	512 (38)	681 (100)	512 (38)	681 (100)	512 (38)	681 (100)
Nagelkerke	0.062	0.023	0.197	0.055	0.194	0.063

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

In Model 1, the interaction effect between gender and gender role ideology is tested. The assumption is that men's attitudes are more important when trying to estimate the division of housework than women's attitudes are. In this case, this does not seem to be true. The χ^2 for the model without the interaction terms is 12.772 for West Germany and 9.042 for Finland with 2 degrees of freedom (see APPENDIX E.4). The χ^2 for the model including the interaction effect is 13.153 for West Germany and 9.055 for Finland with 3 degrees of freedom (see Model 1).

The χ^2-difference for West Germany is 0.381 and for Finland 0.013 with one degree of freedom. There is no significant difference between the χ^2 for the model with and the model without the interaction term. The so-called omnibus interaction effect shows that the interaction between gender and gender role ideology does not improve the model (see Jaccard 2001). This is an indication that for the division of housework tasks, it does not matter who (women or men) has non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles.[61] Because the influence of gender and gender role ideology are no longer significant when including the interaction effect in the model, the interaction effect is not included in the further analysis.

In Model 2, all the theoretically important factors, namely gender role ideology, socialization, relative income, employment hours (time availability), and outsourcing (time availability) are included in the analysis. Gender is also included as a control for the different responses made by men and women. For this model, the Nagelkerke coefficient is 0.197 in West Germany and 0.055 in Finland, which means an explanatory power of 19.7 percent for West Germany and 5.5 percent for Finland. This is an improvement to Model 1 with a Nagelkerke of 0.062 for West Germany and 0.023 for Finland.

According to the theoretical approach, the odds of having a non-traditional division of housework is expected to be greater, the less traditional the attitudes towards gender roles are. In the basic model without the interaction effect of gender and gender role ideology, this appears to be true in both countries (see APPENDIX E.4). However, when including the measures for socialization, relative resources and time availability in the model, the effect of gender role ideology is no longer significant in West Germany.

[61] To be able to test this hypothesis thoroughly one would need information on both partners' (men's and women's) gender role ideology.

For West Germany, only respondent's gender, relative resources and outsourcing are significantly correlated with a non-traditional division of housework (see Model 2).

German men have 3.5 times higher odds to report a non-traditional division of housework than women do. This is in line with previous findings for other countries. The less equal the division of housework is, the more likely that men's and women's assertions on the division of housework will diverge (Geist 2010; Press and Townsley 1998). Furthermore, it shows that the discrepancies between men's and women's reports cannot be explained by differences in the gender role ideology, socialization, relative resources or time availability. Besides the theoretically important variables, there is a gendered difference in the reporting between men and women in West Germany.

In West Germany, couples where the woman has a higher income than her spouse have 6.5 times higher odds of a non-traditional division of housework compared to couples where the man has a higher income. Couples with equal income have 3.9 higher odds of having a non-traditional division of housework compared to couples where the husband has a higher income than the woman. However, comparing couples where the woman has a higher income than her partner to couples with equal income, no significant differences are evident (see APPENDIX E.5). This means that there is no difference between couples with equal income and couples where the women have higher incomes than their spouse. This supports the findings of Grunow et al (2007) that (a traditional) relative income is an important indicator for predicting a traditional division of housework; whereas a (non-traditional) relative income cannot explain changes towards a less traditional division of housework.

For West Germany, outsourcing is an important factor when predicting the odds of having a non-traditional division of housework. The odds ratio of a non-traditional division of housework is 4.2 times higher for couples who outsource some of the tasks in the household, compared to couples who do not outsource any of the household tasks.

Looking at Model 2 for Finland, a different pattern than for West Germany emerges. Gender role ideology is significant. An increase of 1 in the mean value on the gender role ideology index increases the odds of having a non-traditional division of housework by 35 percent. It seems as if it does not matter who holds non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles (men or women), the attitudes are reflected in the division of housework.

The one other factor that separates non-traditional couples from traditional couples in Finland is woman's employment hours. The odds of having a non-traditional division of housework increases by 1.7 percent for each hour the woman spends on employment. The division of housework tasks in Finland does not seem to be related to the partner's characteristics. The findings suggest that in Finland the relative resources measure is less significant than woman's absolute resources, namely individual employment hours (for a discussion of the importance of absolute versus relative income for women's time spent on housework see Gupta 2007).

To control for *family and life stage characteristics*, marital status and the presence of children are included in Model 3. In line with previous findings (see e.g. Blossfeld and Timm 2003), married couples are expected to have lower odds of a non-traditional division of housework. To control for different life stages, variables on children, marital status and birth cohort are included in the analysis. Children in the household are measured by including the variables youngest child under school age, and youngest child between 7 and 17. Couples who have no or adult children serve as reference group. The division of housework is assumed to be most traditional when small children live in the household.

Age has been shown to influence the gender role ideology, but is also expected to stand for a certain life stage. For example, older couples are more likely to be well established in the labor market, and to greater extent afford outsourcing of housework. Thus, they expectedly have a more equal division of housework than younger couples. In the data set there is only information on the respondent's age (the age of the partner was not asked for). To avoid a gender enhanced measure of age, age shall not be included in the analysis as such, but age cohorts are created. This measure is considered to be valid for both partners and to measure a common age cohort, since most partners are two or three years apart. The family age cohorts are included as dummies, where the youngest birth cohort (born 1970 or later) serves as the reference category. In West Germany, gender is also significant in Model 3. Even when controlling for family and life stage characteristics, men have 3.04 times higher odds of reporting a non-traditional division of housework than women do. In addition to the significant effect of gender, families with children between 7 and 17 have a 0.17 times lower odds ratio than families with adult or no children. Or to put it differently, couples with no or adult

children have 5.88 (0.17^{-1}) times higher odds of having a non-traditional division of housework compared to couples with children between seven and seventeen years.

In Finland, similarly to Model 2, gender role ideology increases the odds by 31.7 percent for each additional increase in the gender role ideology index when controlling for family and life course characteristics. Being married means 0.550 times lower odds of having a non-traditional division of housework compared to cohabiting couples. In other words, cohabiting couples have 1.82 times higher odds of having a non-traditional division of housework compared to married couples. Similarly, Finnish couples with children under six have 0.471 times lower odds of having a non-taditional division of housework compared to families with no or adult children. In other words, couples with no or adult children have 2.12 times higher odds of having a non-traditional division of housework compared to couples with children under six years.

Summing up the results from the analysis of gender role ideology and the division of housework, it should be noted that West German *men* significantly more often report a more egalitarian division of housework tasks than West German women do. It seems that either men in West Germany overestimate their share of housework, or West German women underestimate men's share of housework. These findings show that it is important to have both men's as well as women's estimates of their share of housework to be able to control for gendered reporting effects.

Besides gender, relative resources and having children enforce a traditional division of housework in West Germany. The man having relatively higher income is indeed related to a more traditional division of housework. However, when comparing couples with equal incomes to couples where the woman has a higher income, no significant differences can be found. These findings support Grunow et al. (2007), who suggest that a traditional division of income (man has a higher income) preserves a traditional division of housework, while a non-traditional division of income (woman has a higher income than the husband) is not enough to enforce a non-traditional division of housework. In this sense, West German couples 'do gender'. The only factor that is positively correlated with a non-traditional division of housework in West Germany is outsourcing.

In Finland, non-traditional gender role ideology and women's time spent on employment is positively correlated with a non-traditional division of housework, while having small children and being married is negatively correlated with a non-traditional

division of housework. In contrast to Germany, Finnish men's and women's reports on the division of housework tasks do not significantly differ. This suggests that in a country where the division of housework is more equal, the perception of the other spouse's share of housework is more accurate, whereas if the specialization of men and women into paid and unpaid labor is more common, the perception of the other spouse's share differs between men and women to much higher degree. Furthermore, it is evident that in Finland individual measures, such as gender role ideology and women's employment hours define the division of housework; while in West Germany the relative resources (of the partner) are more important when determining the division of housework.

Interestingly, marriage is only significant for Finnish couples, not for West Germans. In Finland, where marriage is not connected with benefits, as in Germany, it seems that marriage is more attractive to traditional couples, while in West Germany marriage attracts both traditional and non-traditional couples. In West Germany, marriage seems more connected to having children (see Chapter 4.2). Similarly, the effect of children is surprising. In Finland, having children under school age is associated with a traditional division of housework, while in West Germany a traditional division of housework is associated with school-aged children.

Concluding, it can be confirmed that in West Germany male respondents more often report a non-traditional division of housework, while West German women more often report a traditional division of housework. In West Germany outsourcing is linked to a non-traditional division of housework, while traditional division of income and having children are related to traditional division of housework. In Finland, non-traditional gender role ideology and women's employment hours are connected to a non-traditional division of housework, while being married and having small children are associated with a traditional division of housework.

4.3.6.2 Hours of housework

It is not possible to determine what makes women reduce and men increase their time spent on housework just by looking at the relative division of housework. Thus, in addition to the analysis of the relative division of housework tasks, I will have a closer look at the individual amount of hours that men and women spend on housework. We know that Finnish women spend approximately eight hours less a week on housework

than German women do. This –rather than an increase in men's participation in housework – explains the more equally divided division of housework in Finland compared to West Germany (for similar findings for other countries see e.g. Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny et al. 2005; Sayer 2010).

To get a picture of why Finnish women do less housework than German women and what makes German and Finnish men increase their time spent on housework, a closer look at the mechanisms influencing men's and women's housework hours is conducted. *Hours of housework* was measured by asking, 'On average, how many hours a week do you personally spend on household work, not including child care and leisure time activities?' The same question was also asked about the partner. To estimate the mechanisms that make men increase and women decrease their time spent on housework, a linear regression analysis is estimated separately for German and Finnish men, as well as for German and Finnish women.

Table 4.14 Regression analysis with interaction effects for men (standardized coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Constant)	6.791 ***	5.654 ***	4.528 *
Gender role ideology (GRI)	0.060	0.419	0.672
Finland	-0.564	1.370	1.171
GRI*Finland		-0.592	-0.641
Socialization			0.644
Woman higher income			1.450
Man higher income			-0.136
Woman's employment hrs			0.007
Man's employment hrs			-0.032 *
Outsourcing			-0.943
Youngest child under 6			0.410
Youngest child 7-17			1.204 +
Married			-0.584
Birth cohort 1969-1960			0.636
Birth cohort 1959-1950			0.518
Birth cohort 1949-1940			1.228
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier			2.954 **
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	-0.001	0.041
F-Test	0.689 n.s.	0.823 n.s.	2.535***
df	2	3	16
N	582	582	582

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

One hypothesis is that the effect of gender role ideology is moderated by the societal or country context. Previous studies have shown that women living in more egalitarian countries have a better possibility to enforce their gender role ideology than women living in less egalitarian countries (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Fuwa 2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Knudsen and Wærness 2008). The analysis shows that there is no difference between West German and Finnish men (see Table 4.14.). When comparing the standardized regression coefficient for German and Finnish women, a slight difference is evident (see Table 4.15). The coefficient is somewhat greater for Finnish women than for German women. To see if the effect of gender role ideology de facto is moderated by the country context, I calculated a regression analysis with the interaction effect between gender role ideology and the country.

Table 4.15 Regression analysis with interaction effects for women

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
(Constant)	32.290	***	35.553	***	25.439	***
Gender role ideology (GRI)	-3.287	***	-4.234	***	-2.848	***
Finland	-7.566	***	-13.500	***	-12.675	***
GRI*Finland			1.684	+	1.669	+
Socialization					0.188	
Woman higher income					1.598	
Man higher income					1.025	
Woman's employment hrs					-0.111	***
Man's employment hrs					0.015	
Outsourcing					-4.739	*
Youngest child under 6					2.565	*
Youngest child 7-17					2.872	*
Married					2.061	+
Birth cohort 1969-1960					1.178	
Birth cohort 1959-1950					3.908	**
Birth cohort 1949-1940					5.606	***
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier					6.388	***
Adjusted R^2	0.189		0.193		0.285	
F-Test	73.170***		50.138***		16.375***	
df	2		3		16	
N	619		619		619	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

There is no change in the R^2 between the model with and without an interaction effect. The interaction effect between gender role ideology and Finland is not significant for men or for women.[62]

In Table 4.16 the results of the linear regression analyses for men are displayed. It can be noted that Model 3 offers the greatest explanatory power for both countries (R^2=0.174 for West Germany and R^2=0.206 for Finland). In Model 3, partner's housework hours are included into the model. The large explanatory power indicates that the time men spend on housework is mainly dependent on the time their partner spends on housework. In West Germany, men spend approximately eight minutes more on housework for each hour their partner spends on housework. In Finland, men devote ca. 14 minutes more to housework for each additional hour their partner spends on housework. This finding does not support the assumptions of specialization, or the idea that the more time one of the spouses spends on housework, the less time the other will devote to this task. Rather than that one spouse would concentrate on housework and the other on employment, it seems that men's and women's time spent on housework is correlated. This poses the question of homogamy in terms of cleanliness. Similarly to educational or religious homogamy, where spouses resemble each other in terms of educational level or religious beliefs, individuals seem to seek a partner with a similar perception of cleanliness (Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Press 2004). In other words, men who on average spend more time on housework than other men are more likely to seek a partner who spends more time (or is willing to spend more time) on housework than the average woman and vice versa. [63]

Including partner's time on housework into the model has further implications for the analysis. For German men, gender role ideology is significant only when controlling for partner's time spent on housework (compare Model 2 to Model 3). Apparently, there is an effect of gender role ideology on the time German men devote to housework, but it is overshadowed by the strong association between the partner's time and respondent's time spent on housework. In other words, the effect of partner's time spent on

[62] Calculated according to $F = \frac{(R_2^2 - R_1^2)/(df_2 - df_1)}{/1 - R_2^2)/(N - df_2 - 1)}$.

[63] Another explanation for the strong correlation between partner's and respondent's time spent on housework might be related to reporting. Because time spent on housework is a subjective estimation, it is possible that some respondents overestimate the time they and their partner spend on housework, while other respondents underestimate this time.

housework is stronger than the effect of gender role ideology. However when controlling for the effect of partner's time spent on housework, it becomes evident that the less traditional a man's gender role ideology is, the more time he spends on housework.

Additionally to gender role ideology and partner's time spent on housework, men's own employment hours are a relevant factor when it comes to determining West German men's time spent on housework. With each hour devoted to employment, West German men spend ca. 4 minutes less on housework. This supports the assumptions from the time availability theory, according to which the time spent on housework depends on the time at disposal to do housework. The longer the hours West German men devote to employment, the less time is available for housework. The reason why this is only true for West Germany and not for Finland might be the longer average employment hours in Germany compared to Finland.

For Finnish men, the only factor that shows robust results is partner's time spent on housework. When including partner's housework hours into the model all other effects are no longer significant and the R^2 gains in explanatory power. Before including partner's time spent on housework into the analysis, the effect of being partnered to a woman with a higher income and belonging to an older cohort made Finnish men increase their time spent on housework. This indicates that older men on average spend more time on housework than younger (probably due to retirement); and men who are living together with a woman with higher earnings spend more time on housework than men living together with a woman with an equal income.

Table 4.16 The linear regression analysis of men's housework hours (equal income serves as reference category)

	West Germany	Finland	West Germany	Finland	West Germany	Finland	West Germany	Finland
(Constant)	7.258 ***	7.418 ***	5.698 **	4.234 **	7.601 **	3.720 +	4.726 +	0.570
GRI	0.698	-0.246	0.653	0.172	0.736	0.005	0.926 *	0.587
Socialization	0.010	0.633			-0.048	1.221 +	0.207	0.879
Woman earns more than partner	-0.450	2.078 +			-0.303	2.295 *	-0.137	1.904 +
Man earns more than partner	-0.415	-0.369			-0.368	-0.201	.0148	-0.638
Woman's employment hrs	-0.001	0.007			-0.015	-0.001	0.016	0.020
Man's employment hrs	-0.066 ***	-0.026			-0.048 *	-0.006	-0.062 **	-0.014
Outsourcing	-0.436	-1.992			-0.538	-1.190	-0.266	-1.064
Youngest child under 6			-1.684	1.102	-1.746	1.021	-2.134	0.063
Youngest child between 7 and 17			-0.880	2.090 *	-0.615	1.799 +	-0.803	1.031
Married			-0.437	-0.773	-0.580	-0.391	-1.089	-0.727
Birth cohort 1969-1960			0.107	0.851	0.639	0.914	-0.011	0.345
Birth cohort 1959-1950			-0.827	0.768	-0.206	1.176	-0.661	0.504
Birth cohort 1949-1940			-1.347	2.637 *	-1.175	2.880 *	-1.693	1.178
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier			2.146	4.167 ***	0.736	4.071 **	-0.370	2.149
Partner's housework hrs							0.130 ***	0.236 ***
R^2	0.067	0.041	0.063	0.049	0.086	0.088	0.174	0.206
F-Test	2.577*	2.314*	2.094*	2.010*	1.633+	2.105*	3.438***	5.292***
df	7	7	8	8	14	14	15	15
N	260	322	260	322	260	322	260	322

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

Against expectations from the analyses of marital or partnership status and gender role ideology, Finnish men are not keener on spending more time on housework than German men are. Neither is the influence of gender role ideology on the time spent on housework significant for Finnish men. In Tables 4.13 and 4.14 the results for the interaction effect between the country context and gender role ideology are displayed. The analysis of the relationship between the interaction effect of gender role ideology and the country context did not confirm that gender role ideology has a stronger effect on Finnish men's housework hours than on German men's housework hours. As a matter a fact, gender role ideology is not reflected in the housework hours of neither German nor Finnish men. The assumption that when men's attitudes towards gender role ideology are less traditional and more non-traditional men form a relationship, this would lead to a stronger participation in housework for men, cannot be confirmed by the analysis. Apparently, this is only reflected in women's time spent on housework. Hardly any of the individual level factors are relevant for men's time spent on housework. Men's time spent on housework barely varies at all. Men spend almost the same amount of time on housework independently of their gender role ideology, labor market position, and family status. For women the picture is different to that of men. The R^2 for the regression analysis of women's housework hours are much higher than for men (see Table 4.17). This is an indication that the individual level factors explain much more of the variation in the time women devote to domestic tasks than it does for men. Also country specific patterns are more prominent for women than for men. The comparison of West German and Finnish women shows both similarities as well as differences.

Women in West Germany and Finland are similar in the sense that they spend less time on housework, the less traditional their attitudes towards gender roles are, and the more time they devote to paid employment. These findings support the hypotheses deriving from the gender role ideology concept and the time availability approach. The proponents of the gender role ideology approach assume that less traditional attitudes towards gender role ideology are correlated with less traditional behavior by women (Breen and Cooke 2005; Hakim 2000). Traditionally, women are considered responsible for housework, while men are supposed to earn the family's living. Therefore, a non-traditional behavior in this case means that women devote less time to housework. As predicted by the gender role ideology proponents, less traditional attitudes towards

gender roles are associated with less traditional behavior, meaning that the less traditional women's attitudes are, the less time they spend on housework.

Besides the similarities between West Germany and Finland, differences in the mechanisms influencing the division of housework occur. For German women, additionally to gender role ideology, their own employment hours, partner's time spend on housework, men's employment hours and outsourcing significantly influence the time they devote to housework. The more time West German men spend on employment, the more time West German women spend on housework. This indicates that there is some kind of trade-off between the hours men spend on employment and women spend on housework. As shown in the analysis of men's housework hours, West German men tend to reduce their time on housework, the more time they spend on employment. Apparently, West German women compensate for this by increasing their time on housework. Apart from their own employment hours and gender role ideology, German women also reduce their time on housework by outsourcing housework tasks. German women who outsource some of the housework tasks on average spend 6 hours and 27 minutes less time on housework than women who do not outsource any housework.

This is not the case in Finland. For Finnish women, besides gender role ideology, employment hours, and partner's housework hours, having children and belonging to an older birth cohort are the factors that have a significant impact on their time spent on housework. It seems that additionally to the time spent on employment, Finnish women with children (under school aged and school-aged children) spend more time on housework than women without or with adult children. Women belonging to the older cohorts also spend more time on housework than women in their twenties (reference category). Apparently, women in Finland spend more time on housework when they have children. This shows that the effect of having children clearly has a gendered effect on the time spent on housework. Having children in Finland only impacts women's time spent on housework.

Table 4.17 Women's housework hours

	West Germany		Finland		West Germany		Finland		West Germany		Finland		West Germany		Finland	
(Constant)	31.217	***	22.862	***	22.274	***	13.150	***	23.644	***	13.778	***	18.990	***	11.335	***
GRI	-2.597	**	-1.834	***	-3.310	***	-1.583	***	-2.538	**	-1.375	**	-2.197	**	-1.625	***
Socialization	-1.136		-0.588						-0.211		0.686		-0.489		1.184	
Woman earns more than partner	6.664	*	-2.189						6.473	*	-1.181		3.925		-1.356	
Man earns more than partner	2.622		0.014						1.931		0.381		1.963		0.055	
Woman's empl. hrs	-0.219	***	-0.057	*					-0.202	***	-0.039		-0.191	***	-0.060	*
Man's empl. hrs	0.013		-0.046	+					0.076		-0.027		0.103	*	0.020	
Outsourcing	-6.456	*	-1.490						-5.846	*	-1.768		-7.101	*	-0.627	
Youngest child under 6					1.459		6.136	***	-1.671		5.422	***	-0.586		4.363	***
Youngest child 7- 17					2.803		3.770	**	1.128		3.607	**	2.343		3.358	**
Married					6.320	*	1.048		2.488		1.225		2.267		1.191	
Birth cohort 1969-1960					3.188		-0.871		2.327		-0.465		0.819		-1.209	
Birth cohort 1959-1950					3.270		2.938	*	3.947		3.448	*	2.257		2.483	+
Birth cohort 1949-1940					5.609	+	6.078	***	4.562		5.998	***	2.759		4.801	***
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier					7.934	*	8.519	***	6.169		6.842	***	6.273	+	4.481	*
Partner's housework hrs													0.495	***	0.607	***
R^2	0.217		0.117		0.179		0.201		0.250		0.214		0.313		0.340	
F-Test	9.763***		6.720***		6.697***		11.143***		5.705***		6.779***		7.265***		11.949***	
df	7		7		8		8		14		14		15		15	
N	255		364		255		364		255		364		255		364	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

Summing up the results for the regression analyses for women's time spent on housework, it can be noted that the longer the hours women spend on employment and the less traditional their attitudes towards gender roles are, the less time they will devote to domestic responsibilities – both in Finland and West Germany. The differences in the behavior between West German and Finnish women show that the societal context moderates the individual level factors. Because of the long tradition of the homemaker-breadwinner model, women's housework hours in West Germany are still related to partner's employment hours. Unlike in Finland, the state is not responsible for providing the possibility for German women to take up employment, but rather subsidizes the homemaker model by tax benefits for couples who follow a traditional division of labor. This is reflected in the time women spend on housework.

In West Germany the influence of outsourcing is more prominent than in Finland. In West Germany, outsourcing is a measure for women to get the housework that is 'undone' due to e.g. longer employment hours, done. Yet it still remains a mystery why in Finland outsourcing does not seem to be an option. Because Finnish men do not do more housework than German men, men's higher participation in housework cannot be the explanation. One explanation is that the state here also steps in to 'help' the woman. Due to longer schooldays and subsidized child care, some of the housework is outsourced. Another explanation for the lack of outsourcing in Finland might be different value for housework. Because of the long self-conception of the housewife in West Germany, it is possible that this is reflected in standards of cleanliness. Therefore, instead of leaving the housework 'undone' German women who e.g. due to employment do not have that much time to invest in housework, will opt for outsourcing; while in Finland the standards for cleanliness has mostly been set by women in full-time employment and has lead to a devaluation of housework.

As already mentioned, in Finland neither outsourcing nor partner's employment hours have a significant impact on the time spent on housework. The fact that Finnish women only respond to their own employment hours, gender role ideology, children and age cohorts, reflects the fact that the double-earner model is established. The analysis shows that while state support of female employment is also reflected in attitudes towards gender roles and in female employment, it still does not influence the private sphere and has not lead to greater participation of Finnish men in housework. It can be noted that while Finland is a double-earner society, it is also still a 'one-cleaner' society.

4.3.7 Conclusions

The aim of Chapter 4.3 was to analyze the impact of gender role ideology on the division of housework. The focus of the analysis was on the differences between West Germany and Finland, two countries with different histories of female employment (for more details see Chapter 3). Relying on Hakim's preference theory (2000) and Breen and Cooke's (2005) approach on gender role ideology and the division of housework, the focus of the analysis lay on the relationship between normative attitudes towards gender roles and the division of housework. When scrutinizing the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework, an important aspect for the analysis was the influence of the societal context and gendered policies. The task was to analyze how societal context moderates the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework, while controlling for relative resources, time availability and family characteristics. To be able to detect differences and/or similarities between the countries, I conducted separate analyses for West Germany and Finland on the relative division of housework as well as on the actual hours men and women spend on housework.

The division of housework is indeed less traditional in Finland than in West Germany. However, this was only because women do less housework in Finland than in West Germany, not because Finnish men spend more time on housework than West German men. The findings indicate that even though policy making in Finland supports women's employment and advocates gender equity, this is not reflected in the private sphere. Despite women's engagement on the labor market, men have not picked up on housework. Finnish men spend even less time on housework than German men do. It almost seems as if the reconciliation between domestic responsibilities and employment for Finnish women is a matter between women and the state. It seems that because of the strong involvement of the state, reconciling paid and unpaid labor is considered a women's task and that 'helping' women to reconcile homemaking and employment is a state matter. The analysis also indicates that women's employment is associate with a devaluation of housework rather than a stronger participation of men in housework (Bianchi et al. 2000).

As expected, the analysis of the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework showed somewhat different patterns in West Germany and Finland. The in-depth analysis of German couples' division of housework showed that

the factors that are associated with a non-traditional division of housework, are to some extent different than for Finnish couples. In West Germany, gender role ideology is not relevant when dividing the tasks in the household. In contrast to Finland, in West Germany holding non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles does not correlate with a non-traditional division of housework.

In West Germany, men are more likely to report a non-traditional division of housework than women are. This finding supports other studies that have shown that the less equal the division of housework is, the greater the difference in the estimations of men and women are (Geist 2010; Kamo 2000; Press and Townsley 1998). Another factor that is related to a non-traditional division of housework is outsourcing. While the reporting of non-traditional division of housework in West Germany is linked with male respondents and outsourcing, a traditional division of housework in Germany is associated with couples where the husband has a higher income than the wife. However, a non-traditional division of housework is not associated with a non-traditional division of income (woman has higher income than the man). Similarly to Grunow et al (2007), these findings suggest that while the economic logic applies to the families with a traditional division of income, a non-traditional division of income is not associated with a non-traditional division of housework. This partly supports the doing gender approach. When women earn more than their husbands, it does not have the same consequences for the division of housework as it does when the man has a higher income than the woman. Additional, to the relative income, having children has a traditionalizing influence on the division of housework. Couples with children are more likely to follow a traditional division of housework than couples without children. This finding is supported by other studies (Bühlmann et al. 2010; Schulz and Blossfeld 2006)

The same is true for Finnish couples. Finnish couples with children are also more likely to follow a traditional division of housework than couples without children. In addition to having children, being married is related to a traditional division of housework in Finland. It seems that in Finland marriage is associated with more traditional behavior than in West Germany – also in terms of the division of housework. A non-traditional division of housework is associated with women's longer employment hours and less traditional gender role ideology. Apart from gender role ideology, time availability is a decisive factor for Finnish couples. The less time women have (after employment hours) at their disposal to do housework, the more egalitarian the division

of housework is. Similarly, a higher demand (having children) enforces a traditional division of housework. This finding shows that time availability is by no means gender neutral in Finland. Time constraints have a much stronger influence on women's behavior than men's. If the woman spends many hours in employment the division of housework is less traditional (the woman does less housework), yet, when the demand for housework e.g. due to children, is higher, the division of housework is more traditional (the woman spends more time on housework).

In contrast to Germany, in Finland the less traditional the gender role ideology of the couple, the more likely a non-traditional division of housework is. Similar to previous research, this study also suggests that non-traditional attitudes are more likely to be associated with a non-traditional division of housework in a more gender egalitarian environment than in a more traditional setting (Bø 2008; Fuwa 2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Voicu et al. 2009).

The country specific differences are a result of differences in women's behavior. Against expectations from the analysis of gender role ideology and partnership status, Finnish men do not spend more time on housework than West German men do. Neither Finnish nor West German men's time on housework is influenced by their gender role ideology. The assumption that when more men with non-traditional attitudes form a partnership, men spend more time on housework cannot be confirmed by the analysis. Men spend approximately the same amount of time on housework independently of their gender role ideology, labor market position and family status.

As already mentioned, the variations between the countries are a result of differences in women's behavior. On average, Finnish women spend less time on housework than West German women (West German women spend on average eight hours more a week on housework than Finnish women do). This cannot be explained by a larger share of outsourcing in Finland than in West Germany. The opposite is true. The time West German women spend on housework is influenced by outsourcing, while there is no significant relationship between outsourcing and the time Finnish women spend on housework. One explanation could be that because of the long tradition of double-earner couples and the focus on paid employment in Finland, a devaluation of housework has taken in place. Another explanation is offered by Goodin et al. (2004). They argue that the time Finnish couples need to spend on housework is relatively low in Finland because of the female friendly policies in Finland.

Another difference between West German and Finnish women is that West German women's time on housework is related to their husband's time spent on employment. The more time West German men spend on employment, the more time West German women spend on housework. This is logical considering that couples with a traditional division of labor (one spouse focuses on paid work and the other on unpaid work), receive tax benefits due to the splitting advantage, while in Finland there is no such benefit when one partner concentrates on employment and the other on homemaking.

A further difference between Finnish and West German women is that Finnish women spend more time on housework when small children live in the household, while West German women do not spend more time on housework when small children live in the household. The findings for Finland confirm even more that the assumptions from the time availability theory are relevant for the Finnish context. The higher the demand on housework, the more time Finnish women spend on housework. Interestingly, this only applies for Finnish women not for Finnish men. As already noted, there clearly is a gendered dimension to the relationship between time availability and the time spent on housework.

Despite the differences in women's behavior in West Germany and Finland, quite a few similarities become evident when comparing the mechanisms that influence West German and Finnish women's time spent on housework. In both countries, women spend less time on housework the less traditional their gender role ideology is (even when controlling for the other relevant factors). The preference theory seems to be true for women. Women indeed walk the walk, but men only seem to talk the talk. Men do not increase their time on housework, even though they hold non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. It is almost as if men consider that women should have the same rights as men do, however, this should not have to have any consequences for their own behavior.

It is also interesting to notice that non-traditional gender role ideology is only related to a non-traditional division of housework in Finland, but not in West Germany, even though both West German and Finnish women spend less time on housework, the less traditional their gender role ideology is. As previously stated, this is not a result of different behavior between West German and Finnish men. Men in both countries spend approximately the same amount of time on housework independently of their gender role ideology. It rather seems that women with non-traditional gender role ideology in

West Germany do not reduce their time on housework up to the point where the division of housework becomes non-traditional, while Finnish women do so.

Another similarity between the countries is that the more time women spend on employment, the less time they spend on housework. Again, this effect is only reflected in the relative division of housework for Finnish couples, but not for German couples. Yet again, the individual decrease in hours spent on housework is only reflected in the division of housework in Finland, the country where gender equity is part of the political agenda. Similar to previous studies, these findings indicate that women can enforce their own resources better in a country context with higher gender equity (Fuwa 2004).

In both countries there seems to be a generational shift in the time spent on housework. Both West German and Finnish women belonging to older cohorts spend more time on housework than women in their twenties. This supports the notion that there is generally an increasing tendency for women to spend less time on housework.

Against expectations, a strong correlation between women's and men's time spent on housework was evident in the analysis. I suggest that similarly to educational or religious homogamy (Blossfeld and Timm 2003; Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Press 2004; Sweeney and Cancian 2004), individuals seem to seek a partner with similar perceptions of cleanliness. This means that women or men who on average spend more time on housework are more likely to seek a partner who also spends more time on housework than the average individual and vice versa.

Taking into account that a non-traditional division of housework in both West Germany and Finland is dependent on women's behavior (women's time spent on housework) and that the similarities are more prominent than the differences in women's behavior in West Germany and Finland, one can conclude that despite the efforts to enforce gender equity (especially in Finland), there are gendered mechanisms that cannot be influenced with policies. It also seems that holding non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles only has consequences for women's behavior and not for men's. It is as if gender equity is still (even in Finland, where gender equity has a longer tradition and the division of paid labor is more equally divided than in most countries) a matter that is considered women's responsibility. Women either outsource (like in Germany) or together with the support of the state (like in Finland) find solutions to

combine family and work responsibilities, yet men despite non-traditional attitudes are not concerned with this subject.

4.4 Conclusions on the empirical approach

The aim of the empirical approach was to evaluate if the societal context influences the relationship between gender role ideology and mating; and if this can explain the persisting gendered division of housework.[64] I took on the theories by Hakim (2000) and Breen and Cooke (2005), who allow diverse attitudes on gendered behavior and make assumptions on how this influences the division of housework. Following Hakim's (Hakim 2000) idea that since the beginning of the 21st century especially women have increased possibilities to realize their own preferences, Breen and Cooke (2005) assume that the division of housework will vary depending on the proportion of non-traditional individuals (mainly men) in a country and on their mating behavior.

To test the theories proposed by Hakim (2000) and by Breen and Cooke (2005) I started my analyses by looking at the gender role ideology of men and women in West Germany and Finland, two countries with different histories of female employment and political approaches towards the reconciliation of family and work responsibilities. I found that the different societal contexts are indeed reflected in the interpretation of statements on attitudes towards gender role ideology. Despite the fact that men in both countries on average had more traditional attitudes towards gender role ideology than women, men and women in both countries followed a similar pattern when questioned on agreement or disagreement towards some statements. In West Germany, both men and women agreed that children and the family will suffer if the woman works full-time, but they also agreed to a large degree with statements that having a job is the most important thing for a woman to be independent, and disagreed with the statement that having a job is rewarding but what a woman really wants is a family and children. The picture was quite the opposite for Finnish men and women. Finnish men and women disagreed with the statement that the family and children will suffer if the woman is employed. Nevertheless, Finnish men and women did not rate the benefits of being employed for the woman as highly as German men and women did.

[64] While also controlling for factors from the theoretical concepts deriving from the relative resources theory, time availability approach and theories leaning on the socialization concept.

This reflects the societal context. In Finland, women's full-time employment has a long tradition and child care is often arranged with outside help. Obviously, these experiences have not lead to the interpretation that children suffer from this arrangement while women profit from it. Women's independence is considered to include much more than just employment.[65] In Germany, there is obviously a tendency to consider female employment to be rewarding for the woman, but there are still some concerns, especially about the consequences of women's employment on under school-aged children, who traditionally have been taken care of by the mother. This reflects the long tradition of the breadwinner-homemaker model, where the woman was responsible for taking care of the family, while the man was responsible for providing for the family income and the material well-being. The closer look at the measure of gender role ideology showed that when choosing a measure of gender role ideology it is important to consider the societal context. Gender role ideology is very much a reflection of the practices and policies in a country.

I also showed that when choosing a comparable measure for West Germany and Finland, gender role ideology was somewhat less traditional in Finland than in West Germany. This is also reflected in partnership status. In Finland, more men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender role ideology are married compared to West German men. According to Breen and Cooke (2005), this should also be reflected in the division of housework. Breen and Cooke (2005) assume that because there are more couples with less traditional attitudes towards gender roles, the division of housework should be less traditional in Finland than in Germany.

This is true. The division of housework is less traditional in Finland than in Germany. However, the division of housework is only less traditional in Finland because Finnish women spend less time on housework than German women, not because Finnish men spend more time on housework than German men. Both West German as well as Finnish men spend approximately the same amount of time on housework independently of their gender role ideology or other characteristics. The differences in the division of housework derive from differences in women's behavior.

Generally, Finnish women spend less time on housework than West German women do, which is also reflected in the analysis of the relative division of housework. Even

[65] In Finland female employment might even be taken for granted.

though both Finnish and West German women spend less time on housework, the less traditional their gender role ideology and the more time they spend on employment, this is only reflected in the relative division of housework for Finnish couples but not for West German couples. Only in Finland is a non-traditional division of housework associated with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Even though the mechanisms that influence the time women spend on housework are the same, whether or not gender role ideology is reflected in the relative division of housework depends on the societal context. The relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework is partly influenced by the country context.

Another difference that became evident in the analysis is that women in different contexts have different approaches to reducing the time they spend on housework. In Germany, the answer is outsourcing. Women who spend less time on housework than other women outsource some of the housework. In Finland, outsourcing is not a common option. It seems as if Finnish women either rely on support from the state (daycare for children and full-time schools with meals for the children etc.) or they leave the housework undone. It also becomes evident that in a country where women's employment is actively supported by the state, this is reflected in a lower participation of women in housework; while men, due to state support, do not see a reason why they should increase their effort on housework.

Despite the differences in the approach how to reach a non-traditional division of housework, the similarities between West Germany and Finland prevail. The study shows that despite egalitarian policies and less traditional attitudes towards gender roles, there is little movement in the gendered roles of men. This is true for both countries. Reconciling family and work responsibilities seem to be the woman's concern. There are only few couples where the roles are diverse so that men have the responsibility for homemaking and women provide the family income, independently of the gender role ideology. For both countries it is true that the division of housework is less traditional when women spend less time on housework, while men's contribution hardly changes. Furthermore, it is true for both countries that women spend less time on housework, the less traditional attitudes towards gender roles are and the more time they spend on employment.

5 Conclusions

The objective of the final chapter is to summarize the main empirical results and put them in relation to each other. To recapitulate, the aim of the study was to find out if gender role ideology helps understand why, despite increased female labor force participation, the division of housework still remains the responsibility of women and why men do so little housework.

In Chapter 2, four of the most prominent strands of theories that make assumptions about the mechanisms influencing the division of housework were compared. First, theories that deal with relative resources were debated. After that the importance of time availability and the division of housework was pondered. Before discussing the importance of gender roles, approaches on gendered socialization and doing gender were reviewed. Finally, the importance of gender role ideology on the division of housework was specified. Relying on Hakim's theory (2000), the assumption was made that men and women will behave differently depending on their preferences (gender role ideology). Following the ideas of Breen and Cooke (2005), the hypothesis was that: the more non-traditional couples form a partnership, the more likely a change towards a non-traditional division of housework will become visible on the aggregate level. Furthermore, building on previous studies that showed that the mechanisms vary across country contexts, the analysis concentrated on the moderating effect of the societal context on the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework. The question was: do attitudes towards gender roles correspond to the division of housework; or in other words, do individuals walk the walk or just talk the talk? And, how is the 'walk' (relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework) moderated by the societal context?

As shown in Chapter 3, there are several differences in the societal context in West Germany and Finland when it comes to approaches towards the reconciliation of work and family. After the Second World War, the focus of policies in West Germany was on supporting the family, which meant the support of the breadwinner-homemaker model. Most policies therefore offered women the possibility to leave the labor market so that they could better take care of their family responsibilities. The most prominent policies to enable women to take care of their family responsibilities were: the splitting advantage that remunerates families in which one partner stays at home or has reduced

employment hours; and the long parental leave (3 years) with low remuneration. Today, only the splitting advantage is still in place. In 2007, the parental leave allowance was changed into a benefit that compensates for income loss for employed parents and assigns the other partner (mostly fatherstwo months parental leave. Furthermore, the stigmatization of working mothers has been eased and there has been a huge increase in public child care in the whole country. Today's arrangement in Germany is dissociated from the tradition of supporting the breadwinner-homemaker model and has quite a few similarities with the Finnish model. However, the history has been quite different in Finland than in West Germany. In Finland, women established their position in the labor market at an early stage and the state has actively endorsed the double-earner model with two full-time employees. Income-related parental leave was introduced in the early 1960s and ten years later municipalities were made responsible to provide child daycare. Since then, women's full-time employment has been the norm and the double-earner couple has served as a principle for policies. Unlike in Germany, the homemaker model has never been widely practiced in Finland.

The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 showed that the differences in female employment patterns are reflected in the interpretation of statements towards gender role ideology. The analysis showed that the statements towards gender role ideology were largely interpreted in line with the respective tradition of female employment and the prevailing gender norms in each country. In Germany, there seems to be an increasing acceptance of female employment, yet the concern about its consequences for the family is still prevalent. Especially small children were considered to suffer when the mother is employed. These concerns were not present in Finland. There was surprisingly little agreement on the positive aspects for women from their own employment. For example, in Finland several respondents disagreed with the statement that being employed is the best thing for women's independence. Taking into consideration that when asked about preferred employment hours, Finnish women mostly prefer working full-time, this does not indicate that there is a general disapproval for women's employment, but that because of the experiences of female employment, having a job is not considered enough for women's independence.

These findings show the importance of knowing the particular context that is being analyzed. An analysis encompassing several countries provides an important insight into the influences of certain policies, however an in-depth analysis of the countries

yields more detailed information on the effect of particular policies and gives a more accurate picture of the situation. The differences in the interpretations show that when analyzing gender role ideologies, it is essential to take the societal context into consideration and to be careful when interpreting attitudes towards gender roles (Braun et al. 1994; Crompton and Lyonette 2006). It is also very important to take the societal context into consideration when asking about gender role ideologies to avoid enforcing own norms, while analyzing gender role ideologies.

The research also showed that the societal context makes a difference in private matters, such as partnership formation. The analysis showed Finnish men with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles more often live in a partnership than men with traditional attitudes. This is an indication that the less traditional the societal context, the more non-traditional couples are indeed formed. The finding partly supports Breen and Cooke's thesis (2005). According to Breen and Cooke (2005), this should be a decisive factor for a transformation at the aggregate level from a traditional division of housework towards a non-traditional division of housework. However, the difference between non-traditional Finnish men's likelihood to be married compared to non-traditional West German men was not that prominent.

Therefore, it is not that surprising that against the expectations deriving from Breen and Cooke (2005), the higher number of non-traditional couples is hardly reflected in the division of housework. Indeed, only in Finland is a non-traditional gender role ideology related to a non-traditional division of housework. Because a non-traditional division of housework is a result of women's decreased and not men's increased time spent on housework, this implies that Finnish women are more able to enforce their gender role ideology in the division of housework than West German women are. This means that women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles in Finland are more likely to reduce their time spent on housework to the level of men (or spend even less time on housework) than women with non-traditional attitudes in West Germany.

However, the moderating effect of the country context on the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework was not significant, which does not support the fact that non-traditional couples in Finland will be less traditional in their division of housework the less traditional their gender role ideology is, compared to West German couples.

It should be noted that despite the great differences in the history of female employment in West Germany and Finland, there are almost more similarities than differences between West Germany and Finland when it comes to the division of housework. In neither country is the less traditional division of housework a result of men's increased time spent on housework. In both countries men spend approximately the same amount of their time on housework independently of their gender role ideology. Only women reduce their hours of housework, the less traditional their gender role ideology. This is true for women in both countries.

Another similarity between the countries is that gender role ideology has different consequences for men and women. It seems as if women indeed walk the walk, and reduce their time spent on housework when holding non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles; while men only talk the talk. Apparently, there is a gendered lag in the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework. Disagreeing with a statement such as 'it is woman's job to take care of the family and the man's job to earn the money' does not necessarily have any consequences for men's behavior, but it does for women's. It is as if reconciling work and family responsibilities is considered women's responsibility even by men and women with non-traditional attitudes towards gender roles. This holds true even in Finland, where gender equity is part of the political agenda.

While the study conducted here gives a further insight into the relationship between gender role ideology and the division of housework, the mystery why although women's roles have changed in the past few decades there has hardly been any change in men's roles (the so-called stalled revolution) still remains unsettled. The conclusion of the analysis is that there will only be a shift towards a more egalitarian division of housework, if there is a change in attitudes towards men's gendered roles. An equal division of housework cannot be achieved by simply enforcing a change in women's gender roles.

This study once more shows the importance of the quality of data. To better understand the mechanisms behind the gendered division of housework it is important to have concise information on the division of housework and on individual gender role ideology. Because the reports on the division of housework vary depending on the respondent's gender it is important to ask both men and women how they estimate the

division of housework. Only then is it possible to see how men’s and women’s reporting differs.

Similarly, it is important to have information on both partner’s gender role ideology. Only then is it possible to see who marries whom in terms of gender role ideology and if there is a change in gender role ideologies during the relationship. Furthermore, to get a better picture on why men only talk the talk and do not walk the walk, it is important to concentrate on attitudes towards men’s gender roles and not solely analyze changes in attitudes towards women’s gender roles. Only then can we better understand why the lion’s share of housework still rests with women.

It becomes, however evident that equal division of labor is not possible unless both men and women change in their gendered attitudes and behavior. It is not enough to support women’s reconciliation of work and family. Gendered division of housework is a result of couples interacting with each other. Therefore both men and women need to be addressed when trying to reach equal division between unpaid and paid labor among men and women.

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A. APPENDIX: Gender role ideology items

APPENDIX A.1 Translations of the statements on attitudes towards gender roles

Original	**German**	**Finnish**
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4).	Eine berufstätige Mutter kann ein genauso herzliches und vertrauensvolles Verhältnis zu ihren Kindern haben wie eine Mutter, die nicht berufstätig ist.	Työssä käyvä äiti pystyy luomaan lapsiinsa aivan yhtä hyvän suhteen kuin äiti, joka käy töissä.
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).	Ein Kind, das noch nicht zur Schule geht, wird wahrscheinlich darunter leider, wenn seine Mutter berufstätig ist.	Alle kouluikäinen lapsi todennäköisesti kärsii, jos hänen äitinsä käy töissä.
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).	Alles in allem: Das Familienleben leider darunter, wenn die Frau voll berufstätig ist.	Kaiken kaikkiaan perhe-elämä kärsii, kun naisella on kokopäivätyö.
A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).	Einen Beruf zu haben is ja ganz schön, aber das, was die meisten Frauen wirklich wollen, sind ein Heim und Kinder.	Naisten työssäkäynti on kyllä hyväksyttävää, mutta tosiasiassa useimmat heistä haluavat kodin ja lapsia.
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).	Hausfrau zu sein ist genauso erfüllend wie gegen Bezahlung zu arbeiten.	Kotirouvana oleminen on aivan yhtä antoisaa kuin ansiotyön tekeminen.
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9).	Einen Beruf zu haben ist das beste Mittel für eine Frau, um unabhängig zu sein.	Työssäkäynti on naisen itsenäisyyden paras tae.
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10).	Der Mann und die Frau sollten beide zum Haushaltseinkommen beitragen.	Sekä miehen että naisen tulee osallistua perheen toimeentulon hankkimiseen.
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	Die Aufgabe des Mannes ist es, Geld zu verdienen, die der Frau, sich um Haushalt und Familie zu kümmern.	Miehen tehtäväv on ansaita rahaa; naisen tehtävä on huolehtia kodista ja perheestä.
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12).	Männer sollten einen größeren Anteil an Hausarbeiten übernehmen, als sie es jetzt tun.	Miesten tulisi osallistua kotitöiden tekemiseen nykyistä enemmän.
Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13).	Männer sollten einen größeren Anteil an der Kinderbetreuung übernehmen, als sie es jetzt tun.	Miesten tulisi osallistua lastenhoitoon nykyistä enemmän.

APPENDIX A.2 Means for attitudes on gender ideology/roles according to gender (Std. dev.) (Including single, separated and widowed)

Question wording	West Germany			Finland		
	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All
	N=450	N=483	N=933	N=583	N=728	N=1311
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4). *	3.89[1a]	4.21	4.05	3.32[2]	3.65	3.50
	(1.132)	(1.086)	(1.120)	(1.268)	(1.156)	(1.217)
	N=435	N=465	N=900	N=540	N=697	N=1237
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).	2.52[1a]	2.84	2.69	3.01[2]	3.24	3.14
	(1.097)	(1.297)	(1.214)	(1.218)	(1.205)	(1.216)
	N=429	N=454	N=883	N=542	N=687	N=1229
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).	2.81[a]	2.95	2.88	3.51	3.62	3.57
	(1.177)	(1.359)	(1.275)	(1.138)	(1.181)	(1.163)
	N=437	N=456	N=893	N=543	N=694	N=1237
A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).	3.43[1a]	3.67	3.55	2.67	2.80	2.74
	(1.209)	(1.246)	(1.233)	(1.040)	(1.172)	(1.118)
	N=414	N=449	N=863	N=504	N=658	N=1162
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).	2.91[1]	3.28	3.10	2.85	2.94	2.90
	(1.285)	(1.359)	(1.336)	(1.104)	(1.169)	(1.143)
	N=409	N=451	N=860	N=473	N=661	N=1134
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9). *	3.81[1a]	4.06	3.94	3.15[2]	3.34	3.26
	(0.993)	(0.960)	(0.984)	(1.104)	(1.180)	(1.152)
	N=427	N=465	N=892	500	N=676	N=1176
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10). *	3.62	3.73	3.68	3.70	3.79	3.75
	(1.049)	(1.106)	(1.079)	(1.018)	(0.965)	(0.989)
	N=434	N=456	N=890	N=559	N=706	N=1265
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	3.39[1a]	3.69	3.55	3.65[2]	3.86	3.77
	(1.219)	(1.228)	(1.233)	(1.104)	(0.948)	(0.983)
	N=432	469	N=901	N=558	N=709	N=1267
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12). *	3.36[1a]	3.65	3.51	3.67[2]	3.96	3.83
	(1.009)	(1.002)	(1.016)	(0.887)	(0.786)	(0.843)
	N=420	N=449	N=869	N=543	N=699	N=1242
Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13). *	3.64[1a]	3.78	3.71	3.77[2]	3.99	3.89
	(0.864)	(0.879)	(0.873)	(0.803)	(0.763)	(0.788)
	N=424	N=439	N=863	N=539	N=691	N=1230
N (listwise)	340	353	693	391	553	944

*Recoded so that 1 stands for traditional and 5 for egalitarian.
[1] Significantly different from German women ($p<0.05$)
[2] Significantly different from Finnish women ($p<0.05$)
[3] Significantly different from Finland ($p<0.05$)
[a] Significantly different from Finnish men ($p<0.05$)

APPENDIX A.3 Means for attitudes on gender ideology/roles according to gender (Std. dev.) (Only married or cohabiting couples included)

Question wording	West Germany			Finland		
	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All
	N=312	N=323	N=635	N=405	N=493	N=898
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4). *	3.82[1a]	4.20[2]	4.01[3]	3.37[2]	3.63	3.51
	(1.169)	(1.102)	(1.150)	(1.285)	(1.205)	(1.247)
	N=303	N=311	N=614	N=379	N=479	N=858
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).	2.47[1a]	2.84[2]	2.66[3]	3.03[2]	3.26	3.15
	(1.092)	(1.333)	(1.234)	(1.245)	(1.223)	(1.238)
	N=296	N=310	N=606	N=382	N=467	N=849
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).	2.70[a]	2.87[2]	2.79[3]	3.51	3.59	3.55
	(1.197)	(1.370)	(1.288)	(1.186)	(1.228)	(1.210)
	N=305	N=305	N=610	N=385	N=473	N=858
A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).	3.48[a]	3.64[2]	3.56[3]	2.70	2.80	2.76
	(1.154)	(1.260)	(1.211)	(1.083)	(1.207)	(1.154)
	N=288	N=302	N=590	N=352	N=449	N=801
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).	2.87[1]	3.21[2]	3.04[3]	2.84	2.85	2.85
	(1.300)	(1.365)	(1.343)	(1.118)	(1.158)	(1.141)
	N=294	N=304	N=598	N=339	N=457	N=796
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9). *	3.84[1a]	4.03[2]	3.94[3]	3.26	3.29	3.28
	(1.012)	(0.990)	(1.005)	(1.119)	(1.192)	(1.159)
	N=298	N=306	N=604	N=354	N=463	N=886
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10). *	3.56	3.67	3.62[3]	3.70	3.72	3.71
	(1.065)	(1.143)	(1.106)	(1.044)	(0.964)	(1.000)
	N=299	N=307	N=606	N=394	N=481	N=875
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	3.32[1a]	3.69[2]	3.51[3]	3.69[2]	3.86	3.78
	(1.242)	(1.219)	(1.242)	(1.010)	(0.947)	(0.979)
	N=299	N=313	N=612	N=394	N=485	N=879
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12). *	3.37[1a]	3.58[2]	3.48[3]	3.70[2]	3.90	3.81
	(1.020)	(1.037)	(1.033)	(0.873)	(0.815)	(0.847)
	N=294	N=304	N=598	N=385	N=480	N=865
Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13). *	3.71	3.72[2]	3.72[3]	3.81[2]	3.94	3.88
	(0.801)	(0.895)	(0.848)	(0.812)	(0.779)	(0.796)
	N=298	N=296	N=594	N=380	N=474	N=854
N (listwise)	245	241	486	283	394	677

*Recoded so that 1 stands for traditional and 5 for egalitarian.
[1] Significantly different from German women ($p<0.05$)
[2] Significantly different from Finnish women ($p<0.05$)
[3] Significantly different from Finland ($p<0.05$)
[a] Significantly different from Finnish men ($p<0.05$)

B. APPENDIX: MVA for gender role ideology

APPENDIX B.1 Mean values for men's *gender role ideology according to different input methods (Std. dev.)*

	West Germany					Finland				
	Recoded	Listwise	All Values	EM	Regression	Recoded	Listwise	All Values	EM	Regression
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4). *	3.86	3.88	3.89	3.89	3.89	3.28	3.24	3.29	3.29	3.28
	(1.12)	(1.13)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.23)	(1.25)	(1.26)	(1.26)	(1.25)
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).	2.54	2.50	2.52	2.53	2.53	3.01	2.95	3.01	3.02	3.02
	(1.08)	(1.09)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.22)
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).	2.82	2.76	2.81	2.82	2.82	3.49	3.43	3.51	3.50	3.49
	(1.16)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(1.17)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.13)	(1.13)	(1.13)
A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).	3.39	3.40	3.42	3.41	3.43	2.70	2.69	2.67	2.68	2.67
	(1.17)	(1.18)	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.21)	(0.98)	(1.05)	(1.03)	(1.04)	(1.03)
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).	2.92	2.92	2.91	2.92	2.93	2.89	2.87	2.86	2.89	2.89
	(1.23)	(1.30)	(1.29)	(1.29)	(1.31)	(1.01)	(1.08)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.10)
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9). *	3.77	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.82	3.13	3.13	3.14	3.14	3.13
	(0.98)	(0.96)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(1.04)	(1.08)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.10)
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10). *	3.60	3.62	3.62	3.62	3.63	3.66	3.63	3.68	3.68	3.69
	(1.04)	(1.06)	(1.05)	(1.05)	(1.05)	(1.02)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.02)
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	3.38	3.35	3.39	3.38	3.38	3.64	3.59	3.65	3.65	3.65
	(1.20)	(1.22)	(1.22)	(1.22)	(1.22)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12). *	3.34	3.36	3.36	3.35	3.34	3.63	3.66	3.66	3.66	3.66
	(0.98)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.01)	(0.99)	(0.88)	(0.84)	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.89)
Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13). *	3.61	3.67	3.65	3.64	3.66	3.72	3.75	3.76	3.75	3.75
	(0.85)	(0.84)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.80)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.81)

APPENDIX B.2 Mean values for women's *gender role ideology according to different input methods (Std: dev.)*

	West Germany					Finland				
	Recoded	Listwise	All Values	EM	Regression	Recoded	Listwise	All Values	EM	Regression
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4). *	4.17	4.21	4.21	4.21	4.19	3.64	3.66	3.65	3.65	3.66
	(1.10)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.15)	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.15)	(1.15)
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5).	2.86	2.88	2.85	2.86	2.85	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.26
	(1.27)	(1.28)	(1.30)	(1.30)	(1.29)	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.19)
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6).	2.95	2.95	2.95	2.93	2.95	3.62	3.61	3.63	3.62	3.62
	(1.33)	(1.35)	(1.36)	(1.35)	(1.35)	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.17)	(1.18)	(1.19)
A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7).	3.63	3.65	3.67	3.66	3.66	2.82	2.80	2.81	2.81	2.81
	(1.21)	(1.25)	(1.24)	(1.25)	(1.25)	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.17)
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (v8).	3.26	3.29	3.27	3.27	3.27	2.96	2.97	2.96	2.97	2.99
	(1.33)	(1.32)	(1.36)	(1.36)	(1.36)	(1.13)	(1.16)	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.19)
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (v9). *	4.03	4.05	4.06	4.05	4.06	3.33	3.33	3.35	3.35	3.35
	(0.96)	(0.98)	(0.96)	(0.96)	(0.98)	(1.14)	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.18)
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10). *	3.69	3.76	3.73	3.72	3.73	3.77	3.73	3.78	3.77	3.78
	(1.09)	(1.06)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.11)	(0.96)	(0.98)	(0.96)	(0.96)	(0.96)
A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	3.68	3.64	3.69	3.69	3.68	3.87	3.90	3.88	3.88	3.87
	(1.22)	(1.23)	(1.23)	(1.23)	(1.23)	(0.92)	(0.90)	(0.92)	(0.92)	(0.92)
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do now (v12). *	3.60	3.70	3.64	3.65	3.63	3.93	3.94	3.95	3.95	3.95
	(0.98)	(0.96)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.01)	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.78)
Men ought to do a larger share of child care than they do now (v13). *	3.71	3.80	3.77	3.76	3.73	3.95	3.98	3.99	3.98	3.98
	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.77)	(0.77)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.77)

APPENDIX B.3 Overview of previous studies of gender role ideology using the ISSP 2002

Authors	**Countries**	**(Extraction) Method**	**Variables**	**Coding**
Crompton (2006)	Finland, France, Norway, Portugal, and the UK	(not specified)	- A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	Percentage of those who agreed with the statement (traditional).
Hakovirta & Salin (Crompton and Lyonette 2006)	Finland, West Germany, Sweden, Spain, the UK, and the United States	(not specified)	- A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4). - A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5). - All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6). - Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income (v10).	Based on the four variables a mean sum was calculated. The original five categories were recoded into agree, can't say, and disagree.
Crompton et al. (2005)	Norway, the UK, and Czech Republic	(not specified)	- A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7). - A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11). - It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the woman goes out to work.	Based on the three variables a mean sum was calculated. Range from -2 to 2. Maximum gender conservatism 2 and maximum gender liberalism -2.
Crompton & Lynette (2001)	Britain, Finland, France, Norway, USA and Portugal	(Crompton & Lynette (2005) lean on Knudsen and Wearness' study)	- A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4). - A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5). - All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6). - A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7). - A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	Mean sum ranges from 5 to 25
Knudsen & Wærness (Breen and Cooke 2005)	Great Britain, Sweden and Norway	(ISSP 1994) factor analysis	- A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (v4). A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (v5). - All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (v6). A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children (v7). - A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (v11).	Index, based on weights given from factor for the combined sample (Cronbach's alpha: 0.82). The index is coded on a 10-point scale ranging from traditional/ conservative (0) to modern/ liberal (9).

C. APPENDIX: Factor analysis for gender role ideology

APPENDIX C.1 Principal Component analysis for West Germany

	Component		
	1	2	3
A job is alright, but most women really want is a home and children	**0.814**	-0.027	0.068
Man's job is to earn money; woman's job to look after the home and children	**0.789**	0.136	0.083
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay	**0.692**	-0.041	0.153
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job	**0.655**	0.414	-0.162
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works	**0.568**	0.464	-0.240
Both should contribute household income*	-0.047	**0.709**	0.103
Working mom warm relationship to her child*	0.229	**0.708**	0.062
Work best for women's independence*	0.040	**0.521**	0.240
Men larger share child care*	0.039	0.087	**0.844**
Men should do a larger share of housework*	0.074	0.209	**0.824**

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

APPENDIX C.2 Principal Component analysis for Finland

	Component		
	1	2	3
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job	**0.835**	-0.010	0.090
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works	**0.829**	-0.034	0.070
Man's job is to earn money; woman's job to look after home and children	**0.728**	0.098	0.077
Working mom warm relationship to child*	**0.629**	0.026	0.251
A job is alright, but most women really want home and children	**0.606**	-0.049	-0.129
Men larger share child care*	-0.014	**0.929**	0.002
Men should do a larger share of household*	0.039	**0.924**	0.072
Work best for woman's independence*	-0.055	0.191	**0.736**
Both should contribute household income*	0.066	-0.008	**0.672**
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay	0.148	-0.070	**0.610**

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

APPENDIX C.3 Independent Samples Test for the components of gender role ideology according to country

			Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means			
			F	Sig.	t	df	Sig.	Mean Difference
Germany	Gender role ideology	Equal variances assumed	14.022	0.000	-4.516	912	0.000	-0.26318
		Equal variances not assumed			-4.538	905.826	0.000	-0.26318
	Men's household labor	Equal variances assumed	0.848	0.357	-3.301	912	0.001	-0.17856
		Equal variances not assumed			-3.306	911.376	0.001	-0.17856
	Women's role as homemakers	Equal variances assumed	1.504	0.220	-4.135	912	0.000	-0.28881
		Equal variances not assumed			-4.142	911.824	0.000	-0.28881
	Women's paid labor	Equal variances assumed	0.429	0.513	-4.536	912	0.000	-0.22171
		Equal variances not assumed			-4.542	911.252	0.000	-0.22171
Finland	Gender role ideology	Equal variances assumed	0.000	0.983	-4.856	1235	0.000	-0.24115
		Equal variances not assumed			-4.855	1167.342	0.000	-0.24115
	Men's household labor	Equal variances assumed	11.109	0.001	-6.161	1235	0.000	-0.26513
		Equal variances not assumed			-6.123	1138.647	0.000	-0.26513
	Women's role as homemakers	Equal variances assumed	10.219	0.001	-2.092	1235	0.037	-0.09765
		Equal variances not assumed			-2.127	1223.388	0.034	-0.09765
	Women's paid labor	Equal variances assumed	0.313	0.576	-5.304	1235	0.000	-0.22618
		Equal variances not assumed			-5.297	1162.343	0.000	-0.22618

APPENDIX C.4 Independent Samples Test for the components of gender role ideology according to gender

			Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means			
			F	Sig.	t	df	Sig.	Mean Difference
Male	Gender role ideology	Equal variances assumed	4.678	0.031	-3.774	985	0.000	-0.20357
		Equal variances not assumed			-3.801	965.419	0.000	-0.20357
	Men's household labor	Equal variances assumed	1.025	0.311	-4.039	985	0.000	-0.20308
		Equal variances not assumed			-4.025	929.527	0.000	-0.20308
	Women's role as homemakers	Equal variances assumed	67.605	0.000	6.373	985	0.000	0.36070
		Equal variances not assumed			6.173	785.555	0.000	0.36070
	Women's paid labor	Equal variances assumed	0.145	0.703	8.263	985	0.000	0.39036
		Equal variances not assumed			8.293	955.259	0.000	0.39036
Female	Gender role ideology	Equal variances assumed	3.755	0.053	-3.388	1162	0.001	-0.18154
		Equal variances not assumed			-3.336	955.635	0.001	-0.18154
	Men's household labor	Equal variances assumed	26.220	0.000	-6.257	1162	0.000	-0.28965
		Equal variances not assumed			-6.110	925.351	0.000	-0.28965
	Women's role as homemakers	Equal variances assumed	45.362	0.000	9.653	1162	0.000	0.55185
		Equal variances not assumed			9.257	859.059	0.000	0.55185
	Women's paid labor	Equal variances assumed	0.050	0.822	8.672	1162	0.000	0.38588
		Equal variances not assumed			8.649	1002.457	0.000	0.38588

D. APPENDIX: Gender role ideology and partnership status

APPENDIX D.1 Odds ratios for the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation (Wald statistics)

	Men 1		Men 2		Women 3		Women 4	
	Model 1 Single	Model 2 Married	Model 3 Cohabiting	Model 4 Married	Model 5 Single	Model 6 Married	Model 7 Cohabiting	Model 8 Married
Traditional	1.361	2.871 ***	0.735	2.110 **	0.863	2.782 ***	1.159	3.226 ***
	(0.949)	(16.790)	(0.949)	(9.969)	(0.156)	(15.090)	(0.374)	(14.790)
Moderate	1.607 *	1.622 *	0.622 *	1.009	1.447	2.001 ***	0.691	1.383 +
	(4.161)	(5.880)	(4.161)	(0.002)	(2.328)	(12.626)	(0.242)	(2.859)
-2LL (final)	33.487		33.487		32.721		32.721	
Chi	27.663***		27.663***		36.088***		36.088***	
df	4		4		4		4	
N	913		913		985		985	
Nagelkerke	0.035		0.035		0.043		0.043	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.2 Non-traditional as reference category: odds ratios for the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation (Wald statistics)

	Men				Men				Women				Women			
	Model 1 Single		Model 2 Married		Model 3 Cohabiting		Model 4 Married		Model 5 Single		Model 6 Married		Model 7 Cohabiting		Model 8 Married	
Traditional	1.376		2.754	***	0.727		2.002	**	0.868		2.667	***	1.152		3.072	***
	(1.009)		(15.310)		(1.009)		(8.263)		(0.143)		(13.714)		(0.143)		(13.443)	
Moderate	1.622	*	1.565	*	0.616	*	0.964		1.456		1.912	***	0.687		1.313	
	(4.271)		(4.965)		(4.271)		(0.037)		(2.403)		(10.875)		(2.403)		(1.978)	
West Germany	0.925		1.326		1.082		1.435	**	0.906		1.825	***	1.104		2.016	***
	(0.126)		(2.307)		(0.126)		(4.372)		(0.178)		(11.099)		(0.178)		(13.387)	
-2LL (final)	68.391				68.391				61.882				61.882			
Chi	33.168***				33.168***				57.150***				57.150***			
df	6				6				6				6			
N	913				913				985				985			
Nagelkerke	0.042				0.042				0.067				0.067			

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.3 Odds ratios for the relationship between life course variables and partnership formation (Wald statistics)

	Men 1		Men 2		Women 3		Women 4	
	Model 1 Single	Model 2 Married	Model 3 Cohabiting	Model 4 Married	Model 5 Single	Model 6 Married	Model 7 Cohabiting	Model 8 Married
Age	0.878 **	1.100	1.139 **	1.253 ***	0.836 ***	1.252 ***	1.197 ***	1.498 ***
	(7.316)	(2.773)	(7.316)	(15.598)	(16.538)	(23.868)	(16.538)	(87.548)
(ln)Age	1.001 *	1.000	0.999 *	0.999	1.002 ***	0.999 **	0.998 ***	0.997 ***
	(4.337)	(0.229)	(4.337)	(2.260)	(14.101)	(6.576)	(14.101)	(52.768)
Children	0.067 ***	8.096 ***	14.986 ***	121.318 ***	0.283 ***	3.719 ***	3.530 ***	13.130 ***
	(19.201)	(66.244)	(19.201)	(61.217)	(10.839)	(33.410)	(10.839)	(48.479)
-2LL (final)	441.725		441.725		478.415		478.415	
Chi	620.370***		620.370***		620.370***		620.370***	
df	6		6		6		6	
N	912		912		985		985	
Nagelkerke	0.583		0.583		0.498		0.498	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.4 Odds ratios for the interaction effect for the control variables and partnership formation (Wald statistic)

	Men 1		Men 2		Women 1		Women 2	
	Model 1 Single	Model 2 Married	Model 3 Cohabiting	Model 4 Married	Model 5 Single	Model 6 Married	Model 7 Cohabiting	Model 8 Married
Age	0.839 +	1.175	1.192 +	1.401 **	0.713 **	1.103	1.403 **	1.548 ***
	(2.942)	(1.218)	(2.942)	(9.231)	(7.267)	(0.527)	(7.267)	(37.074)
(ln)Age	1.003 +	1.001	0.997 +	0.998 +	1.005 **	1.001	0.995 **	0.996 ***
	(3.058)	(0.115)	(3.058)	(2.717)	(6.976)	(0.289)	(6.976)	(25.495)
Child	2.025E-9 ***	21.999 ***	6.683E7 ***	1.470E9 ***	0.451	6.102 ***	2.216	13.524 ***
	(986.428)	(34.967)	(481.373)	(1110.7)	(1.251)	(17.829)	(1.251)	(15.351)
Finland	2.475	113.831	0.404	45.991	0.142	0.086	7.028	0.606
	(0.204)	(2.103)	(0.204)	(1.724)	(0.802)	(0.893)	(0.802)	(0.066)
Finland*Age	1.025	0.878	0.975	0.856	1.197	1.169	0.836	0.977
	(0.044)	(0.657)	(0.044)	(1.398)	(1.725)	(1.122)	(1.725)	(0.061)
Finland*(ln)Age	0.999	1.000	1.001	1.001	0.997	0.997	1.003	1.000
	(0.577)	(0.003)	(0.577)	(0.905)	(2.641)	(2.008)	(2.641)	(0.077)
Finland*Child	3.736E7	0.234 *	1.978E-7 ***	4.625E-8	0.537	0.506	1.861	0.941
	(.)	(5.772)	(651.387)	(.)	(0.538)	(1.782)	(0.538)	(0.006)
-2LL (final)	548.783		548.783		603.585		603.585	
Chi	661.461***		661.461***		573.861***		573.861***	
df	14		14		14		14	
N	912		912		985		985	
Nagelkerke	0.609		0.609		0.528		0.528	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.5 Odds ratios for the likelihood to be cohabiting or married vs. single (Wald statistic)

	Men 1		Men 2		Women 1		Women 2	
	Model 1 Cohabiting	Model 2 Married	Model 3 Cohabiting	Model 4 Married	Model 5 Cohabiting	Model 6 Married	Model 7 Cohabiting	Model 8 Married
Traditional	0.641	1.183	0.441 +	0.319 **	1.354	2.749 **	1.145	1.226
	(1.290)	(0.314)	(3.511)	(6.781)	(0.477)	(7.594)	(0.082)	(0.199)
Moderate	0.621	0.762	0.575 +	0.483 *	0.877	1.245	0.984	0.951
	(2.563)	(1.271)	(2.927)	(4.003)	(0.209)	(0.851)	(0.003)	(0.023)
West Germany	0.974	0.818	1.165	1.479	1.444	1.861 *	1.603	2.727 **
	(0.006)	(0.488)	(0.184)	(0.845)	(1.488)	(5.643)	(2.258)	(8.201)
West Germany*Traditional	1.506	4.012 **	1.871	6.981 **	0.577	1.344	0.783	2.605
	(0.377)	(7.288)	(0.778)	(7.026)	(0.427)	(0.194)	(0.079)	(1.289)
West Germany*Moderate	1.009	1.918 +	0.924	1.339	0.435	1.105	0.353 +	1.113
	(0.000)	(2.897)	(0.024)	(0.259)	(2.356)	(0.059)	(3.422)	(0.038)
Age			1.136 **	1.262 ***			1.207 ***	1.566 ***
			(6.615)	(14.929)			(16.876)	(92.601)
(ln) Age			0.999 +	0.999			0.998 ***	0.996 ***
			(3.379)	(1.848)			(14.360)	(59.077)
Child			16.042 ***	134.580 ***			3.462 ***	12.731 ***
			(19.948)	(62.312)			(10.325)	(46.138)
-2LL (final)	58.194		780.302		55.956		834.262	
χ^2	43.365***		650.615***		63.076***		576.081***	
df	10		16		10		16	
N	913		912		985		985	
Nagelkerke	0.055		0.602		0.074		0.530	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.6 Odds ratios for the likelihood to be single or married vs. cohabiting (Wald statistic)

	Men 1			Men 2			Women 1			Women 2		
	Model 1 Single	Model 2 Married		Model 3 Single	Model 4 Married		Model 5 Single	Model 6 Married		Model 7 Single	Model 8 Married	
Traditional	1.560	1.846	+	2.267	+	0.723	0.739	2.030	*	0.874	1.071	
	(1.290)	(3.419)		(3.511)		(0.388)	(0.477)	(5.018)		(3.511)	(0.037)	
Moderate	1.611	1.228		1.739	+	0.840	1.140	1.419		1.017	0.967	
	(2.563)	(0.634)		(2.927)		(0.315)	(0.209)	(2.191)		(2.927)	(0.014)	
West Germany	1.027	0.841		0.858		1.269	0.693	1.289		0.624	1.702	+
	(0.006)	(0.378)		(0.184)		(0.357)	(1.488)	(1.236)		(0.184)	(3.536)	
West Germany*Traditional	0.664	2.663	+	0.534		3.731	* 1.733	2.328		1.277	3.327	+
	(0.377)	(3.384)		(0.788)		(0.635)	(0.427)	(2.044)		(0.778)	(3.055)	
West Germany*Moderate	0.991	1.901		1.082		1.450	2.297	2.539	*	2.831	+ 3.151	*
	(0.000)	(2.453)		(0.024)		(0.504)	(2.356)	(4.568)		(0.024)	(5.163)	
Age				0.880	**	1.110	+			0.829	*** 1.297	***
				(6.615)		(0.059)				(6.615)	(28.256)	
(ln) Age				1.001	+	1.000				1.002	*** 0.998	**
				(3.379)		(0.001)				(3.379)	(9.476)	
Child				0.062	***	8.389	***			0.289	*** 3.677	***
				(19.948)		(0.262)				(19.948)	(30.984)	
-2LL (final)	58.194			780.302			55.956			834.262		
χ^2	43.365***			650.615***			63.076***			576.081***		
df	10			16			10			16		
N	913			912			985			985		
Nagelkerke	0.055			0.602			0.074			0.530		

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.7 Non-traditional Finns vs. moderate Germans: odds ratios on the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation (Wald statistics)

	Men			Men			Women			Women		
	Model 1 Cohabiting	Model 2 Married		Model 3 Single	Model 4 Married		Model 5 Cohabiting	Model 6 Married		Model 7 Single	Model 8 Married	
Traditional	1.542	3.246	**	0.649	2.105	+	2.045	2.683	+	0.489	1.312	
	(0.644)	(8.771)		(0.644)	(3.210)		(0.859)	(2.952)		(0.859)	(0.234)	
Non-Traditional	1.597	0.684		0.626	0.428	**	2.618	0.727		0.382	*	0.278	***
	(1.577)	(1.632)		(1.577)	(7.057)		(4.381)	(0.896)		(4.381)	(12.246)	
Finland	1.018	0.637	+	0.982	0.626		1.591	*	0.486	*	0.629	0.306	***
	(0.003)	(3.167)		(0.003)	(2.483)		(1.063)	(5.100)		(1.063)	(10.175)	
Finland*Traditional	0.670	0.478		1.493	0.714		0.754	0.823		1.326	1.091	
	(0.357)	(2.205)		(0.357)	(0.388)		(0.097)	(0.079)		(0.097)	(0.017)	
Finland*Non-traditional	1.009	1.918	+	0.991	1.901		0.435	1.105		2.297	2.539	*
	(0.000)	(2.897)		(0.000)	(2.453)		(2.356)	(0.059)		(2.356)	(4.568)	
-2LL (final)	58.194			58.194			55.956			55.956		
χ^2	43.365***			43.365***			63.076***			63.076***		
df	10			10			10			10		
N	913			913			985			985		
Nagelkerke	0.055			0.055			0.074			0.074		

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

APPENDIX D.8 Odds ratios for the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation (traditional as reference category (Wald statistics))

	Men 1		Men 2		Women 3		Women 4	
	Model 1 Single	Model 2 Married	Model 3 Cohabiting	Model 4 Married	Model 5 Single	Model 6 Married	Model 7 Cohabiting	Model 8 Married
Moderate	0.847	0.478 ***	1.181	0.565 *	0.596	0.429 **	1.677	0.719
	(0.271)	(10.014)	(0.271)	(4.690)	(1.653)	(7.011)	(1.653)	(1.294)
Non-traditional	1.361	0.474 ***	0.735	0.348 ***	0.863	0.310 ***	1.159	0.359 ***
	(0.949)	(9.696)	(0.949)	(16.790)	(0.156)	(14.790)	(0.156)	(15.090)
-2LL (final)	33.487		33.487		32.721		32.721	
Chi	27.663***		27.663***		36.088***		36.088***	
df	4		4		4		4	
N	913		913		985		985	
Nagelkerke	0.035		0.035		0.043		0.043	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.9 Gender role ideology and partnership formation interaction for West Germany (Wald statistic)

	Men 1		Men 2		Women 1		Women 2	
	Model 1 Cohabiting	Model 2 Married	Model 3 Cohabiting	Model 4 Married	Model 5 Cohabiting	Model 6 Married	Model 7 Cohabiting	Model 8 Married
Moderate	0.969	0.644	1.303	1.514	0.648	0.453 *	0.859	0.776
	(0.006)	(2.174)	(0.371)	(0.960)	(0.843)	(4.109)	(0.092)	(0.275)
Non-traditional	1.560	0.845	2.267 +	3.135 **	0.739	0.364 **	0.874	0.816
	(1.290)	(0.314)	(3.511)	(6.781)	(0.477)	(7.594)	(0.082)	(0.199)
West Germany	1.467	3.284 **	2.181	10.325 ***	0.833	2.500	1.255	7.105 *
	(0.439)	(7.741)	(1.591)	(14.836)	(0.054)	(2.205)	(0.077)	(6.385)
West Germany*moderate	0.670	0.478	0.494	0.192 *	0.754	0.823	0.451	0.427
	(0.357)	(2.205)	(0.979)	(5.371)	(0.097)	(0.079)	(0.717)	(0.937)
West Germany*Non-traditional	0.664	0.249 **	0.534	0.143 **	1.733	0.744	1.277	0.384
	(0.377)	(7.288)	(0.778)	(7.026)	(0.427)	(0.194)	(0.079)	(1.289)
Age			1.136 **	1.262 ***			1.207 ***	1.566 ***
			(6.615)	(14.929)			(16.876)	(92.601)
ln Age			0.999 +	0.999			0.998 ***	0.996 ***
			(3.379)	(1.848)			(14.360)	(59.077)
Children			16.042 ***	134.580 ***			3.462 ***	12.731 ***
			(19.948)	(62.312)			(10.325)	(46.138)
-2 LL (last model)	58.194		780.302		55.956		834.262	
χ^2	43.365***		650.615***		63.076***		576.081***	
df	10		16		10		16	
N	913		912		985		985	
Nagelkerke	0.055		0.602		0.074		0.530	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

APPENDIX D.10 Separate analysis of the relationship between gender role ideology and partnership formation for Germans and Finns according to gender (Wald statistics)

	German men				Finnish men				German women				Finnish women			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8	
	Cohabiting		Married		Cohabiting		Married		Cohabiting		Married		Cohabiting		Married	
Moderate	0.669		0.237	*	1.525		1.572		0.340		0.349		0.904		0.791	
	(0.539)		(5.531)		(0.862)		(1.098)		(1.828)		(2.101)		(0.040)		(0.229)	
Non-traditional	1.067		0.372		2.884	*	3.375	**	0.924		0.286	+	0.982		0.850	
	(0.014)		(2.374)		(5.216)		(7.185)		(0.012)		(3.096)		(0.001)		(0.122)	
Age	1.189	+	1.428	**	1.161	*	1.197	*	1.424	**	1.570	***	1.170	**	1.509	***
	(2.815)		(9.541)		(5.451)		(6.234)		(7.174)		(37.898)		(8.306)		(44.888)	
(ln)Age	0.998	+	0.998	+	0.999		1.000		0.995	**	0.996	***	0.998	*	0.997	***
	(2.872)		(3.003)		(2.119)		(0.272)		(6.797)		(27.035)		(5.803)		(25.274)	
Child	2.011E8	***	4.470E9		13.898	***	71.180	***	2.203		13.084	***	4.109	**	12.568	***
	(1290.369)		(.)		(16.745)		(44.371)		(1.200)		(14.892)		(9.394)		(31.252)	
-2 LL (last model)	266.517				485.996				251.820				572.135			
χ^2	342.516***				327.723***				234.157***				327.038***			
df	10				10				10				10			
N	398				514				387				598			
Nagelkerke	0.699				0.549				0.580				0.492			

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100;

E. APPENDIX: Gender role ideology and the division of housework

APPENDIX E.1 Descriptive statistics according to different imputation models

	Germany				Finland			
	Listwise	All Values	EM	MVA	Listwise	All Values	EM	MVA
Division of housework tasks	0.456 (0.301)	0.482 (0.315)	0.483 (0.314)	0.482	0.322 (0.273)	0.336 (0.289)	0.337 (0.289)	0.336
Share of housework hours	0.460 (0.330)	0.461 (0.329)	0.472 (0.327)	0.464	0.344 (0.329)	0.344 (0.333)	0.350 (0.333)	0.350
Gender role ideology	3.311 (0.892)	3.237 (0.911)	3.237 (0.911)	3.237	3.527 (0.909)	3.493 (0.912)	3.493 (0.912)	3.493
Socialization	0.512 (0.500)	0.477 (0.500)	0.477 (0.500)	0.477	0.562 (0.496)	0.539 (0.499)	0.539 (0.499)	0.539
Man has higher income	0.795 (0.404)	0.781 (0.414)	0.781 (0.414)	0.781	0.654 (0.476)	0.645 (0.479)	0.645 (0.479)	0.645
Equal income	0.100 (0.300)	0.109 (0.312)	0.109 (0.312)	0.109	0.192 (0.394)	0.207 (0.405)	0.207 (0.405)	0.207
Woman has higher income	0.100 (0.297)	0.098 (0.297)	0.098 (0.297)	0.098	0.151 (0.359)	0.143 (0.350)	0.143 (0.350)	0.143
Women's employment hours	14.51 (18.60)	13.73 (18.41)	13.75 (18.39)	13.78	23.35 (18.72)	22.60 (18.86)	22.42 (18.88)	22.87
Men's employment hours	31.51 (22.22)	31.10 (22.90)	31.13 (22.92)	31.14	29.04 (20.28)	28.38 (20.68)	28.23 (20.60)	28.47
Outsourcing	0.076 (0.266)	0.072 (0.259)	0.072 (0.259)	0.072	0.026 (0.161)	0.029 (0.167)	0.029 (0.167)	0.029
Child under 6 years	0.182 (0.386)	0.170 (0.376)	0.170 (0.376)	0.170	0.188 (0.391)	0.183 (0.387)	0.183 (0.387)	0.183
Child 7-17	0.207 (0.406)	0.205 (0.404)	0.205 (0.331)	0.205	0.207 (0.405)	0.210 (0.408)	0.210 (0.408)	0.210
Married	0.856 (0.352)	0.875 (0.331)	0.875 (0.331)	0.875	0.736 (0.441)	0.733 (0.442)	0.733 (0.442)	0.733
Age	47.08 (14.96)	48.00 (14.93)	48.00 (14.93)	48.00	45.75 (13.83)	46.14 (13.84)	46.14 (13.84)	46.14
Women's housework hours	21.29 (14.25)	21.62 (14.33)	21.90 (14.44)	21.87	12.59 (8.93)	13.18 (9.54)	13.28 (9.66)	13.40
Men's housework hours	7.21 (6.69)	7.35 (7.05)	7.35 (7.14)	7.52	6.12 (5.55)	6.37 (5.93)	6.37 (6.01)	6.45
Man (dummy)	0.508 (0.500)	0.491 (0.500)	0.491 (0.500)	0.491	0.470 (0.499)	0.451 (0.498)	0.451 (0.498)	0.451

APPENDIX E.2 Logistic regression on the relationship between gender role ideology and the relative division of housework task (Wald statistics)

	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All
Constant	0.015 ***	0.009 ***	0.009 ***	0.017 ***	0.016 **	0.016 **
Finland	3.586	3.629	3.629	2.264	2.040	2.040
Gender role ideology (GRI)	1.880 *	1.517	1.517	1.494	1.183	1.183
Gri*Finland	0.759	0.960	0.960	0.845	1.099	1.099
Socialization				1.454	0.881	0.881
Woman has higher income				2.280 *	1.865	1.865
Equal income				1.865 +	1.522	1.522
Women's employment hours				1.010	1.023 *	1.023 *
Men's employment hours				0.997	0.990	0.990
Outsourcing				3.897 **	3.059 *	3.059 *
-2LL (final)	472.412	393.480	881.428	448.610	373.491	839.931
χ^2	14.815**	22.198***	28.234***	36.618***	42.187***	69.731***
df	3	3	3	9	9	9
N						
Nagelkerke	0.043	0.031	0.042	0.110	0.130	0.103

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

APPENDIX E.3 Logistic regression on the relationship between gender role ideology and the relative division of housework task for imputed data (standard error around the coefficient for the constant.)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Germany	Finland	Germany	Finland	Germany	Finland
Constant	0.011	0.086	0.015	0.064	0.077	0.219
	(0.633)	(0.387)	(0.676)	(0.435)	(0.974)	(0.593)
Missings	1.524	1.253	1.257	1.401	1.098	1.222
	(0.284)	(0.203)	(0.318)	(0.220)	(0.308)	(0.209)
Man	1.930	1.735	2.015	1.758	0.994	0.478
	(0.258)	(0.173)	(0.283)	(0.189)	(1.204)	(0.730)
Gender role ideology	2.000	1.326	1.731	1.347	1.588	1.085
	(0.154)	(0.098)	(0.177)	(0.115)	(0.232)	(0.141)
GRI*man					1.178	1.444
					(0.327)	(0.198)
Socialization			1.152	0.946	1.178	1.444
			(0.286)	(0.196)	(0.327)	(0.198)
Woman has higher income			1.786	2.066		
			(0.407)	(0.267)		
Equal income			2.264	1.630		
			(0.386)	(0.234)		
Woman's employment hrs			1.037	1.012		
			(0.008)	(0.006)		
Man's employment hrs			0.968	0.988		
			(0.008)	(0.006)		
Outsourcing			3.382	1.475	2.447	1.916
			(0.418)	(0.527)	(0.412)	(0.470)
Child under 6 years					0.243	0.497
					(0.466)	(0.295)
Child 7-17					.222	1.089
					(0.458)	(0.249)
Married					0.483	0.848
					(0.425)	(0.226)
Birth cohort 1969-1960					1.445	1.169
					(0.431)	(0.303)
Birth cohort 1959-1950					1.038	0.974
					(0.491)	(0.296)
Birth cohort 1949-1940					0.635	0.815
					(0.527)	(0.321)
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier					0.500	1.052
					(0.561)	(0.352)

APPENDIX E.4 Logistic regression on the relationship between gender role ideology and the relative division of housework task (Wald statistics)

	Germany		Finland		Germany		Finland	
Constant	0.007	***	0.041	***	0.014	**	0.043	***
	(31.92)		(37.73)		(9.50)		(18.43)	
Man	3.038	**	1.366		1.326		1.101	
	(8.47)		(2.01)		(0.03)		(0.009)	
Gender role ideology	1.644	*	1.423	**	1.031		1.315	
	(5.54)		(7.42)		(0.01)		(1.998)	
GRI*man					1.309		1.051	
					(0.35)		(0.037)	
Socialization					1.157		1.113	
					(0.14)		(0.209)	
Woman has higher income					6.561	***	1.353	
					(11.93)		(0.912)	
Equal income					3.785	**	1.256	
					(7.12)		(0.653)	
Women's employment hrs					1.003		1.017	*
					(0.08)		(5.111)	
Men's employment hrs					1.003		0.988	+
					(0.08)		(2.952)	
Outsourcing					4.268	**	2.055	
					(8.89)		(1.717)	
-2LL (final)	257.991		559.175		227.313		546.588	
χ_2	12.772**		9.042*		43.450***		21.630**	
df	2		2		9		9	
Nagelkerke	0.060		0.023		0.198		0.055	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

APPENDIX E.5 Regression analysis with standardized coefficients

	Women				Men			
	Germany		Finland		Germany		Finland	
Gender role ideology	-0.159	**	-0.171	***	0.127	*	0.094	
Socialization	-0.018		0.068		0.018		0.078	
Woman higher income	0.092		-0.054		-0.007		0.128	+
Man higher income	0.063		0.003		0.010		-0.055	
Woman's employment hrs	-0.266	***	-0.127	*	0.050		0.071	
Man's employment hrs	0.169	*	0.046		-0.240	**	-0.051	
Outsourcing	-0.147	*	-0.011		-0.012		-0.031	
Youngest child under 6	-0.018		0.191	***	-0.132		0.005	
Youngest child 7- 17	0.069		0.159	**	-0.058		0.074	
Married	0.057		0.061		-0.069		-0.057	
Birth cohort 1969-1960	0.028		-0.058		-0.001		0.024	
Birth cohort 1959-1950	0.063		0.121	+	-0.045		0.040	
Birth cohort 1949-1940	0.079		0.221	***	-0.113		0.086	
Birth cohort 1939 or earlier	0.177	+	0.174	*	-0.025		0.139	
Partner's housework hrs	0.276	***	0.386	***	0.335	***	0.393	***
R^2	0.313		0.340		0.174		0.206	
F-Test	7.265***		11.949***		3.438***		5.292***	
df	15		15		15		15	
N	255		364		260		322	

Significance level: *** <0.001; ** =<0.010; * =<0.050; + =<0.100

Disputation am 14.7.2011 an der Universität Hamburg.
Erstgutachterin: Prof. Sonja Drobnič
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