

Consumer Intention to Participate in Mobile Based Word-of-Mouth Activities: The Role of Incentive and Tie-Strength from Senders and Receivers Perspectives

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Abstract

Organizations continually explore the best method to achieve a competitive advantage through word-of-mouth activity. The development of technology and mobile technology in particular, has transformed human life profoundly because people can engage in word-of-mouth communication via mobile phones anytime and anywhere, especially via smart phones or so-called mobile-WOM (M-WOM) activities. The key actors for the success of M-WOM activities are senders and receivers; they are therefore the ones that the organization has to pay attention to. The intention of senders and receivers to engage in M-WOM activity is influenced by specific motivations, one of which is monetary gain. Nowadays, it is quite common for organizations to utilize monetary incentives to induce M-WOM activities, so-called incentivized M-WOM. Consequently, the organization has to consider components of incentives that apply to both the senders and receivers as the key actors in WOM activity. However, previous research has paid little attention to incentivized M-WOM and the role of senders and receivers as key players.

The present study aims at investigating the senders' and the receivers' perspective in incentivized WOM activities by doing a series of experiments. The experiments use M-coupons as a M-WOM tool. The first part of the study looks at the senders' perspective and attempts to answer the following questions: To whom should I send the M-coupon? Should it be a strong-tie or a weak-tie receiver? Should it be a deal prone receiver or non-deal prone receiver? For the first part of the study, we employed a 2x2x2x2 research design, the elements of which being 'incentive differentiation' (different vs. no different) x 'incentive conditionality' (conditional vs. unconditional) x 'incentive transparency' (transparent vs. non-transparent) x 'product' (McDonald's vs. Starbucks). The second part of the study observes the receivers' perspective. We adopt the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to analyze receivers' attitudes and their intentions in redeeming the M-coupon, which was designed to have a particular monetary incentive. This second part of the study also utilizes a 2x2x2x2x2 research design using the same set of variables as in the sender study but including the additional variable 'tie-strength' (strong vs. weak).

Using partial least squares (PLS), this study finds that if senders are asked to share an M-coupon with a differing incentive in it (i.e. senders obtain a higher incentive than the receivers) and if the information on the incentive is revealed for both sides, senders will share this coupon with strong-tie receivers. The Incentive differentiation also leads the senders to focus on targeting deal prone receivers. From the receivers perspectives they tend to have an unfavorable attitude toward incentivized WOM characterized by a differing incentive for senders and receivers, regardless of the relationship they have with the senders of these incentives.

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Glossary of Terms

Conditional incentive: the circumstance under which a sender can claim the incentive after a receiver having redeemed the M-coupon as prerequisite.

Unconditional incentive: the situation where the senders can claim the incentive as soon as they send the M-coupon to other persons.

Different in incentive: the situations under which the senders obtain incentive higher than the incentive obtain by the receivers.

No different in incentive: the situations under which the senders obtain the same amount of incentive as the incentive obtain by the receivers.

Transparent situation: the circumstances under which a sender and a receiver get the same information about the incentive.

Non-transparent situation: the situation under which only the senders receive information concerning the incentive for them and for the receivers and the receivers get no information regarding the incentive obtain by the senders.

Incentivized WOM: Incentives given for word-of-mouth activities.

M-WOM: Word of mouth activity conducted through mobile devices

Abbreviation

AVE: Average Variance Extracted

CR: Composite Reliability

IC: Incentive conditionality

ID: Incentive differentiation

M-coupon: Mobile Coupon

M-WOM: Mobile Word-of-Mouth

PBC: Perceived behavioral control

PLS: Partial Least Square

SD: Standard Deviation

TPB: Theory of Planned Behavior

WOM: Word-of-Mouth

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction of Word-of-Mouth

1.1 Proliferation of Word-of-Mouth

Please imagine the following two scenarios: in the first setting, you receive a coupon on your mobile phone or a mobile-coupon from a company. However, before you can redeem the mobile-coupon and obtain the incentive, you need to forward the mobile-coupon to somebody else. With such a condition, you will think about the most suitable person to receive this coupon. In the second setting, you receive a mobile-coupon from a person that you know. You might not have any prejudice against the sender of this coupon, if you have no information about the incentive that the senders have received by sending the coupon to you. However, if you get information that the sender will obtain incentive by sending a M-coupon to you, it might triggering you to start thinking on how big the incentive obtained by the sender, is equal to your incentive, even more or maybe less? And is your incentive enough for you? Is it distributed fairly?

Offering incentives to consumers for engaging in word-of-mouth (WOM) activity is very common in companies' marketing strategy (Ryu & Feick, 2007). Such method is known as "word-of-mouth marketing" or "buzz marketing" (Rosen, 2009). However, it is not easy for companies to encourage consumer to engage in word of mouth activities by offering them an incentive. Referring to the analogies mentioned above, consumers either as senders or as receivers of WOM have to cope with a complex, yet confusing situation when engaging in incentivized WOM. These conditions lead to the following consideration: the senders might think about the suitable receivers for such incentivized WOM, depending on the type of relationship (strong or weak tie). Would the receivers of this incentivized WOM act differently if they have a strong tie to the sender than if their relation is weak? How

is the receivers` attitude towards the incentivized word of mouth? In this dissertation, these are questions to be answered in this dissertation.

1.2 From WOM to e-WOM

WOM is very common activity in everyday interaction and communication between people. Persons engage in WOM activity almost concerning every topic, such as services and food in a restaurant, services at a hotel, discount for shoes and clothes, or about the services of airlines or hospital.

WOM has been a topic of a research for several of decades, so that varying definitions of the concept are available. WOM has been defined in various contexts. Anderson (1998) deemed WOM as “informal communication between consumers regarding their evaluation of products and services”. Accordingly, any formal communication between consumer and company, such as complaints and promotion was not considered as WOM. Furthermore Godes and Mayzlin (2004) define WOM as a type of communication when persons share their experiences related to consuming products or services. Arndt (1967) characterizes WOM as face to face communication between a receiver and a sender, where the information is perceives as non-commercial regarding products or services.

In accordance with Arndt (1967), Westbrook (1987) defines WOM as informal face to face communication between consumers concerning ownership, use and also characteristics of products and services. Dwyer (2007) defines WOM to be a network phenomenon. People create ties to other people through exchanging information, while social networks are shaped because information is shared between groups.

1.3 From e-WOM to M-WOM

Nowadays, in the digital era, consumers indulge in getting and giving information on products and services they are interested in. Because of the digital revolution, WOM is no longer an intimate communication on a one-on-one basis. Through

social network media any information can be disseminated from one person speaker to many people at the same time such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter and other social media applications. Moreover, by mobile phone, consumers may access all available communication media such as SMS, MMS, Blackberry messengers, and WhatsApp whenever they want and wherever they are.

Internet (for the social media mentioned above) has massively facilitated consumer interconnections (Bruyn & Lilien, 2008). E-mail referrals, online forums of users and newsgroups have made information exchange easier between consumers. This type of interconnection is a global phenomenon facilitating both positive and negative WOM (Shankar et al., 2003). Accordingly, WOM is now mostly computer mediated and Sun et al. (2006) even called it “Word of Mouse”. Generally, it is called e-WOM or viral marketing.

Viral marketing has been defined in a variety of ways. Again, several definitions of viral marketing terms were originally introduced in 1998 by Jurvetson and Draper. Jurvetson and Draper use this term to describe the success of Hotmail as Hotmail simply added a short promotional text (“Get your private, free e-mail from Hotmail at <http://www.hotmail.com>”) in the lower section of each mail sent through their service. More than 12 million people signed-up to Hotmail within only 18 months while the marketing cost only US\$ 500,000. Through this message, sender provides an implicit recommendation to use Hotmail’s service.

Meanwhile Kaikati and Kaikati (2004) state that viral marketing is the same as WOM communicated through digital media. In viral marketing activities, the individual consumer is at the center of communication. Along the same lines, according to Montgomery (2001), the term “viral” describes a type of marketing infecting consumers with an advertising message sent from one consumer to others just like contagious virus.

There are several advantages of e-WOM or viral marketing compared to more traditional WOM, such as: (1) faster dissemination, (2) less distortion of the

message since the platform requires the sender to write a blog, an email, via Facebook, via Twitter, instead of verbally communication, (3) senders can be more focused on their receivers (if senders post a message on Twitter, they expect that their followers to be the receivers of their WOM, while WOM written in a blog will reach particular persons due to the title and the given keywords) (Montgomery, 2001).

Through the development of mobile communication, researchers and marketers have recently enlarged the scope of e-WOM (Okazaki, 2005). The transformation from WOM to e-WOM and finally to M-WOM has enriched the possible media for consumers to express WOM. It has also led to more opportunities for business entities to take advantage of media, personalized for consumers. The development of smart phones (internet-enabled mobile handset) makes it easier for consumers to send, search, comments and collect on information on products and services they are interested in via wireless messaging services as this can be done via their smart phones. WOM activities performed with mobile handheld devices are known as mobile-WOM or mobile viral marketing (Wiedemann, 2007). Wiedemann (2007) states that mobile-WOM or mobile viral marketing relies on the consumers` intention to transmit WOM`s content via mobile devices.

The dissemination of mobile viral can be categorized into the local contagious or micro level and global contagious or macro level of social contagion as stated by Wiedemann (2007). Additionally Brown and Reingen (1987) states that network analysis is a powerful method to investigate the contagion effect of WOM on micro level and the macro level. They also find that the dissemination of WOM to take place within particular social network.

In accordance with Brown & Reingen (1987), Kozinets et al. (2010) describe the process of WOM by using the Network Coproduction Model. In the Network Coproduction Model, information does not flow into one direction only but is rather exchanged between members of the consumer network. Marketers applying the

network coproduction model will assume the senders of WOM to be unique and creative persons.

To provide a clearer description of M-WOM, Pousttchi and Wiedemann (2006) developed the Mobile Marketing Framework consisting of various techniques to conduct promotion through mobile devices. According to them, the objectives of mobile marketing include building brand awareness, changing brand image, promoting sales, enhancing brand loyalty, building customer database and make the information become contagious by utilizing mobile devices. Furthermore, according to Pousttchi and Wiedemann (2006), there are four types of mobile marketing tools that can be utilize, to achieve those mobile marketing objectives: (1) mobile information, e.g. by adding the option "send to a friend" to each information sent to the receiver, (2) mobile entertainment, e.g. by giving free ring tones to persons who engage in WOM activities, (3) a mobile raffle, companies e.g. create raffles that require participation from more than one person, and (4) mobile coupon, e.g. by giving incentives to the person sending a coupon to others. The following study is based on m-WOM, focusing on mobile coupon sharing by forwarding the coupon to others.

The advantages of mobile technology as a platform for WOM compared to other traditional channels of communication are (1) ubiquity, as mobile devices and especially mobile phone are always attached to persons wherever they go, and the devices can be accessed anytime and anywhere, (2) immediacy, as any information can be shared responding to events and opportunities in real time, (3) location sensitivity, as any information can be sent to a person located in a particular location, (4) personalization, as information can be targeted at individual consumers based on their particular interests, needs and preferences – additionally, the message can be tailor made and be exclusively available for a particular person, and (5) consumer controlled interactivity, as messages and information can conferencing and viral effects, co-created and co-experienced (Banerjee & Yancey, 2010).

1.4 Motivational Factors in Word-of-Mouth

The development of technology has made word-of-mouth activities much easier to do and WOM can also be done in very different ways as written sentences, coupon, games or video. Bone (1995) stated that word-of-mouth is communication where no participant is marketer from any organization. Furthermore Tuk (2008) outlined that there are three main characteristics of word of mouth:

- (1) Word-of-mouth relates to communication on products and services, as well as other things related to their selling.
- (2) Word-of-mouth relates to interpersonal communication both verbal and face to face, and also through available media technology such as blog, email and mobile phone.
- (3) Word-of-mouth relates to interpersonal communication without marketer involve in communication.

According to Tuk (2008), the third characteristic is an important part in analyzing the effect of incentives on word of mouth activities. In accordance with the third characteristics as explained by (Tuk, 2008), consumers argued that they will believe in the word of mouth which was generated by someone with no self interest in recommending a product and service (Wirtz & Chew, 2002).

Sender and receiver as participants in any WOM activity have their own motive to engage in such activity. From the sender perspective, Dichter (1966) states that there are four motives to engage in WOM activities. The first motivation is *product involvement*, where the sender has a strong feeling about the product. Therefore sharing information or recommending the product or service to others can reduce negative connotation from the consumption experience of a product or service. The second is *self-involvement*, when consuming of a product or a service creates a certain emotion and the senders feel that they should share their feeling with others. The third is *other-involvement*, sender's reason for engaging WOM is simply to do something for the receiver. The fourth factor is *message-involvement*, where the

senders are stimulated by advertisements or commercials. However the receiver's motivation to involve in WOM is highly correlated with the sender and the product or service. (Dichter, 1966) describes it as a triangle approach – sender, receiver and product or service should fit to each other. Furthermore (Dichter, 1966) finds that the most important motive for receiver to engage in WOM activity is that they perceive WOM as to be genuine and no material interest to be attached in the message such as incentive. Accordingly, receivers have also a genuine intention to learn about the products and services.

The receiver's willingness to learn about the products and services is basically dependent on two circumstances: first, the sender of the WOM message perceived to be interested in the receiver's well-being, and second the sender are experienced with and knowledge concerning the product or service they stated in the WOM. In summary, the receiver will appreciate a sender who is intrinsically motivated rather than extrinsically motivated (e.g. monetary incentive).

Recently developed internet technology which can be entrenched in almost all mobile devices, gives customers the opportunity to easily and intensively engage in WOM. In addition, the development of internet technology has made it possible for business entities to create more innovative WOM which not necessarily relies on each consumer's story regarding their experiences, feelings and also emotions about the respective products or services. Therefore it is possible also for business entities to eventually create the WOM content with incentive entrenched in it, which can influence customer's extrinsic motivation.

Of course, offering incentives such monetary incentives or discounts will increase the willingness of a person to behave in a certain way. Consequently, the use of incentives, particularly monetary incentives to induce a desire has been applied by many business entities. However, it remains interesting to see how effectiveness of incentive to increase consumer motivation to engage in WOM activities. Latham and Locke (1991) state that incentives could be motivate persons to behave in a

particular way, while Lepper et al., (1973) find that incentives may decrease a person's intrinsic motivation.

However, every individual involved in word of mouth activities generally has multiple motives, and one of these is their own advantage. According to the research done by Hennig-Thurau et al., (2004), there are eight motivates for someone to be involved in word-of-mouth activities through internet. The eight motivations are (1) platform assistance (consumers hope for support from the platform operator if they face problems), (2) expressing a negative feeling (to reduce frustration and anxiety associated with the event (see Sundaram et al., (1998), (3) concern for other consumers (the act of doing something for others without expecting any reward in return), (4) extraversion/positive self-enhancement (consumers have a strong desire to share their joyous experiences with others), (5) social benefit (consumers engage in e-WOM communication to participate in and to become part of an online community (McWilliam, 2000), (6) financial rewards (consumer engage in e-WOM activity because they want to obtain offered reward), (7) helping the company (to give the company "something in return" exchange for a good experience), (8) the advice seeking (consumers engage in e-WOM activity because they expect to get the necessary skills to better understand, use, operate, modify and/or repair a product).

According to Hennig-Thurau et al., (2004), incentive hence, are one out of these eight motives for person to engage in WOM activities. However according to Tuk (2008); Wirtz and Chew (2002), a financial rewards or other monetary incentive have never been explicitly mentioned as a motive for consumers to engage in a WOM activity because other than monetary incentive are considered as prime motives.

Making consumers satisfied does not guarantee that they will tell others about their experience even though they have a positive attitude towards the consumed products and services (Chung et al., 2000; Swan & Oliver, 1989; Wirtz & Chew,

2002). Thus giving monetary incentives to encouraging people to do WOM can be the option by the firms Buhler (1992). The greater the incentive is the bigger should be the receiver`s intention to engage in WOM activities (Wirtz & Chew, 2002).

1.5 Study Objectives

To summarize, the typical approach of companies to generate WOM is to provide incentives for consumers involved in WOM activities while managing the information flow of the WOM (Stephen et al., 2012). Previous researches have shown that giving incentives for WOM activities leads to an increasing likelihood of persons to participate in this incentivized WOM. However, firms should design the incentive in a way influencing the behavior of both senders and receivers while making sure to induce positive responses from all the participants. Thus to give the new insight regarding the design of incentives considering sender and receiver as key actors, we propose three components for incentive to consider sender and receiver as the key actors of WOM activity, namely (1) incentive transparency (Foreh & Grier, 2003; Stephen et al., 2012); (2) incentive differentiation for senders and for receivers (Ahrens & Strahilevitz, 2007; Thaler, 1988; Xiao et al., 2011); (3) incentive conditionality (Libai et al., 2003; Myerson et al., 2003).

In order to understand the role of (the) senders and (the) receivers in the incentivized WOM activities, it is important for us to have balanced perspectives on how the sender and the receiver will respond to the proposed components of incentive. Senders and receivers as the key actors on WOM seem to have different considerations regarding incentivized WOM. As mentioned by Xiao et al. (2011) senders will be concerned about a possible negative impression as they potentially might be perceived as greedy. Thus, targeting suitable receivers becomes the senders` major concern.

According to Ryu and Feick (2007), the sender –receiver relationship includes the perception of cost and benefit. Previous research shows that tie-strength plays an

important role as the basis for social context in WOM activities (Brown & Reingen, 1987; Ryu & Feick, 2007). Therefore, tie-strength with the receivers becomes one of senders` considerations when determining the suitable receivers. This leads to the first research question:

“When there are components of incentive, namely incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency in incentivized WOM, to whom the senders will send it? Is the receivers from strong-ties or weak-ties?”

In incentivized WOM whether a person act as a sender or as a receiver, they will consider their own advantage namely to obtain an incentive from their WOM activity. However, aim at acquiring as many new customers as possible when inducing incentivized WOM, the senders` decision to choose a suitable receiver in terms of the probability that the receivers` might become new customers is highly relevant for firms. Furthermore, the senders will also be interested in choosing receivers with high probability to participate in incentivized WOM activities, especially if the incentive for the sender depends on the action on behalf of the receiver (e.g. redeeming the M-coupon).

In order to increase the probability that receiver will participate in incentivized WOM, choosing deal prone receivers or persons having a tendency to respond to promotional activities becomes important for the senders (Lichtenstein et al., 1990; Montaner et al., 2011). Therefore, to understand the linking of the components of incentivized WOM and deal proneness, we propose the following research question:

“When there are components in incentivized WOM, is the deal proneness of receivers relevant for the sender in choosing a receiver?”

As mentioned before, the nature of the sender-receiver relationship is about cost and benefit (Ryu & Feick, 2007). The perceived balance of cost and benefit becomes an important factor to determine if the involved parties, especially the

receiver of incentivized WOM feel that they are treated fairly. The perception of fairness is measured as a proxy of the attitude finally leading to the intention to act in a certain way. The theoretical underpinning of attitude and intention in this study is based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) by Ajzen (1991). Hence, we would like to answer the following research questions with the help of TPB:

“Do the components of incentive in incentivized WOM exert any influence on the receivers` attitude and/or their intentions to participate in incentivized WOM activities?”

Without a shadow of a doubt, tie-strength is an important aspect when determining how social aspects influence WOM activities (Ryu & Feick, 2007). Receivers perceive senders from strong-tie relationships as more sincere and trustworthy and the strong-tie senders also have more power of persuasion than the weak-tie ones (Abendroth & Heyman, 2013; Brown & Reingen, 1987). However, to disclose or not disclose the incentive information is often considered by the firms, especially when an incentive is provided for both the senders and the receivers. Changes in the receivers` perception (from a positive to a negative perception vice versa) might occur when the incentive information is disclosed by the firm. Carl (2008) finds that tie-strength and disclosure are confounded because when firms disclose the motive behind the WOM activity, tie-strength does not matter anymore. In addition, Verlegh et al. (2013) find that receivers will not perceived the senders having a strong-tie relationship with them as a greedy person. As disclosing and not disclosing information on the senders` incentive becomes important in shaping the receivers` perception of the senders, therefore we propose the following research question:

“With disclosing and not disclosing information on the senders` incentive to the receivers leads to different attitudes and intentions on behalf of the receivers?”

1.6 Dissertation Outline

Chapter one provides an introduction to the stated research problem, it also gives an overview of the dissertation. As the first empirical section of current study, chapter two extends the introduction by building a theoretical foundation concerning the design of incentive in WOM. The senders` and the receivers` perceptions on incentivized WOM is the topic to investigate and we will utilize M-coupons as the example tools of incentivized WOM.

In chapter three, this dissertation focuses on the senders` perspective. Previous research shows that the nature of the relationship between senders and receivers influences the perception of cost and benefit of incentivized WOM (Ryu & Feick, 2007). Spontaneously senders tend to choose the receivers from a strong-tie relationship rather than from a weak-tie one (Brown & Reingen, 1987). Having a strong-tie relationship with the receivers, the senders already know about the receivers` preferences and their needs because of their recurrent contact (Granovetter, 1973). In addition, Ryu and Feick (2007) state, receivers from strong-tie relationships would naturally engage in WOM regardless of a possible incentive that they might obtain. However, when firms differentiated the amount of incentive between senders and receivers and design an incentive conditionally in WOM activities, it is interesting to find out how senders determine the suitable receivers for incentivized WOM, particularly when information on their own incentive is disclosed by the firms. In this chapter, therefore, we conduct an experimental study from the senders` perspectives to gain better insights on senders` responses when they are involved in incentivized WOM activities with the components of incentive characterized by differing incentive between senders and receivers as well as incentive conditionality in it.

In Chapter four, by adopting Ajzen`s Theory of Planned Behavior, we investigate the receivers` attitude towards the M-coupon, the subjective norms, receivers` perceived behavioral control and receivers` intention to redeem the M-coupon by

manipulating the incentive components (incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency). As argued above, in a “reward both” setting, the incentive components become the most important consideration, particularly when the receivers deal with a situation characterized by reciprocity. Reciprocity is the situation when receivers need to return some favors or they expect something in return from the senders (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). We expect that the incentive components will influence the receivers` attitude, their subjective norms, their perceived behavioral control and accordingly their behavioral intention. In chapter four, we conduct an experimental study to have better insights into the receivers` responses when they are involve in incentivized WOM activities with particular incentive components in it.

Finally, In Chapter 5, we sum up the main findings, highlight of the limitations, as well as the contributions of this dissertation while also discussing the opportunity for future research are discussed.

CHAPTER 2

The Framework of Word-of-Mouth Activities

2.1 WOM as a Marketing Instrument

WOM is not just an informal communication between consumers but can also be employed as a marketing technique or entitled as Word-of-Mouth Marketing (WOMM). Based on the definition of WOM, Carl (2006) distinguished communication WOM “institutional” from “everyday” WOM. Everyday WOM (or just WOM) is represented by informal and evaluative communication which can manifest in two main directions: positive or negative evaluations of organizations, products and services between at least two persons. In Institutional WOM or Buzz according to Carl (2006) have at least one company member becomes a participant in WOM activities and initiate a conversation regarding the company’s products or services. From Carl (2006) definition regarding the two forms of WOM, we starting to understand that WOM is an activity that is manageable and also measurable by the firms.

With the development of technology, marketers can use many new tools to conduct WOM. As mentioned by Dichter (1966) WOM is important for purchase decisions, thus harnessing WOM in many gadgets connected with internet evolves the WOM activity and makes them more manageable by marketers. Using the power of technology to generate WOM is of interesting for marketers because using WOM is potentially low-cost marketing strategy to acquire many potentials new customer through the e-referral process (Ahrens et al., 2013). However it is important for marketers to influence the consumer behavior by incentivizing them to participate in WOM activities. This is called incentivized WOM.

2.2 How Incentivized WOM Differ from Non-Incentivized WOM

It is important to obtain a clear understanding of how incentivized WOM exactly differ from non-incentivized WOM. As discussed above, we understand that WOM has a unique characteristic that is the absence of the firm influence. WOMMA (word of mouth marketing association) called it as organic WOM. Nonetheless, as an opposite of organic WOM, WOM amplified occurs when marketers are involved in creating a campaign or giving an incentive in order to encourage people to engage in WOM activities (Libai et al., 2010).

It is not easy to develop the optimal incentive of WOM so that latter can become contagious. This should be considered by marketers and the most difficult aspect is to provide an incentive for both senders and receivers as the key actors of the WOM activity. Furthermore, Ryu and Feick (2007) state that business entities can come up with schemes of incentives only considering the sender or called “reward me” programs and schemes considering both sender and receiver - called “reward both” program. “Reward me” and “reward both” programs could raise the likelihood of persons to engage in incentivized WOM. Ryu and Feick (2007) also found that those different incentive scheme programs will have a different impact on the senders` tendencies of choosing particular receivers for this incentivized WOM. In “reward me” programs, senders tend to send the incentivized WOM to weak-tie receivers while they tend to send it to both weak and strong-tie receivers in “reward both” programs (Ryu & Feick, 2007; Wirtz & Chew, 2002).

As “reward both” programs in incentivized WOM lead the senders choosing the receivers from both of weak and strong-ties relationship (Ryu & Feick, 2007), it is interesting to understand that in “reward both” programs, senders may choose receivers from a particular tie (strong-tie or weak-tie) but not from both types of relationship. Nevertheless, as is has not yet been examine the components of incentive that leads senders to choose a particular tie of receivers, it will become the major focus of this dissertation.

As mentioned previously, due to advancement of technologies, marketers have a lot of options to conduct incentivized WOM strategy particularly with the “reward both” program. One of the options is by utilizing coupon as tool of incentivized WOM. Coupon can be a traditional coupon, e-Coupon or M-Coupon. Incentives in the coupon can be part of something important that make coupon disseminates like viruses (Pousttchi & Wiedemann, 2006). A common type of monetary incentives in M-coupons is offering a discount (Banerjee & Yancey, 2010). According to Banerjee and Yancey, (2010) there are several discount forms on the coupons. Some of examples are buy one get one (BOGO) free, where the discount is similar to 50% off from the actual price, as well as discount written in an M-Coupon such as 10%, 20% off and many others. According to Banerjee (2009), each of the discount forms can be effective in various conditions e.g. BOGO free can be used when a company want to increase its credibility because with BOGO free, consumers believe that company are generous by giving a reward for consumers. Meanwhile the discount percentage format can be used by companies if they want to target consumers who enjoy making a “smart” self –attribution due to using a discount from M-coupon (Diamond, 1992).

If firms intend to generate WOM with coupons as tool so that coupon can be a contagious virus, monetary incentive (i.e. discount) is one thing that has to be given attention by marketers. In this dissertation, there will be two different parties that will become key actors in WOM activities, the first is “ the senders”, who actively participate in sending WOM content (e.g. a coupon) to potential customers, and the second is “the receivers”, who actively participate in using WOM content (i.e. redeemed the obtained coupon) (Palka et al., 2009). When consumers receive a coupon from a company and are asked to send it to a person that they know, they will choose a receiver who is most suitable with the coupon concerning the product type and also the incentives offered in M-coupon. The receivers could be related to the senders by strong-tie or weak-tie, and also could be receivers who are deal prone or non-deal prone.

The characteristics of deal proneness are widely studied in the use of coupon (Bawa & Shoemaker, 1987; Wirtz & Chew, 2002). Deal prone consumers are more likely to respond to the discount or promotion, because they will perform a purchase activity if they think by doing this will give them benefit (Lichtenstein et al., 1990).

The senders` decision of targeting the suitable receiver of the incentivized WOM is highly influenced by the senders` perception on how the receivers will think about them (Xiao et al., 2011). The tie-strength with the receivers is considered by the senders when determining a suitable receiver. Chew et al. (2005) state that, without any incentive for engaging in WOM, senders would spontaneously send or recommend it to strong ties only. However if there is an incentive, senders would still spontaneously send or recommend it to strong-tie receivers but if the incentive is attractive, senders would also target weak-tie receivers (Chew et al., 2005).

The process of deciding about the recipient of a coupon is the beginning of M-WOM activities performed by the senders. At the first stage of M-WOM activities, senders should give their attention to a number of incentive components in M-Coupons so that they can decide which receivers are the most suitable ones. This judgment by the senders will definitely determine the success of M-WOM.

Moreover, in order to accomplish the target in WOM activities, marketers are expected to consider an incentive design which considering both actors of WOM, sender and receiver. There are a few important incentive components especially monetary incentives with “reward both” program, namely (1) the transparency of incentive information between sender and receiver (Foreh & Grier, 2003; Stephen et al., 2012); (2) incentive differentiation for sender and receiver (Ahrens & Strahilevitz, 2007; Thaler, 1988; Xiao et al., 2011); (3) incentive conditionality (Libai et al., 2003; Myerson et al., 2003).

2.3 Understanding the Incentive Components in Incentivized WOM

Incentives as an extrinsic motivation making consumers want to engage in WOM activities has been the focus of some researches such as Hennig-Thurau et al.

(2004); Tuk (2008); Wirtz & Chew (2002). Their research on WOM activities primarily focus on sender`s perspectives only or receiver`s perception only. There are a very limited number of researches on the effect of incentives of WOM activities considering both WOM senders and WOM receivers. Hence this is an opportunity for further research.

Monetary incentives are now widely used by marketers to encourage consumers to generate WOM. Tuk (2008) states that a consumer can get a monetary reward through e-coupons or M-coupons by providing the name and or address (e.g. email address) of their friends whom they are consider potential costumer for these companies. Furthermore, according to Buhler (1992) persons rewarded for their action are more likely to behave the same again in the future. In Line with Tuk (2008) and Buhler (1992), Gupta and Shaw (1998) argue that monetary incentives can be used to develop a certain behavior.

2.3.1 Incentive Differentiation

The Different amount of incentive for senders and receivers as part of monetary incentives need to be determined by the marketer. The proportion of incentive differentiation between senders and receivers can be in the form of: the incentives are equal for the senders and for the receivers, the senders get bigger portion of the incentive than the receivers or the senders get less than the receivers. The decision for the chosen proportion by companies is actually derived from a concept called an Ultimatum game (Thaler, 1988). According to Thaler (1988) the first experiment using an Ultimatum Game was done by three economists from Germany namely Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (GSS), in 1982. GSS broke down a group into two sub groups. Group 1 acted as the allocator (similar to the sender in an M-WOM activity) and group 2 acted as the recipient (similar to receiver in an M-WOM activity). If the receivers agreed with X amount offered by the allocator, the allocators would receive the rest of the amount. If the receivers refuse the money, then both the allocators and receivers will not receive anything. From the study of GSS, the trend could be derived that allocators gave a smaller percentage to the

receivers than to themselves. From the allocators` (senders) point of view, they thought “how much do I need to offer to the receivers so that they accept my offer, is it resulting in win-win situation for us?” While from receivers` point of view, they thought “was the offer fair, so that I can accept it?”

Actions of the receivers are easier to analyze (Thaler, 1988). In addition Thaler state that when receivers refuse a positive offer, it means that they have a non-monetary consideration. Receivers may turn down an offer if they perceived it as unfair. Meanwhile, the action of the allocators (senders) can be explained by one of the motives (or a combination of both): (1) allocators (senders) make a certain offer to the receivers because they have a sense of fairness and (2) they are concerned that the receivers will refuse the incentive if the offers are perceived as unfair.

To support the study by GSS (1982), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (KKT) in 1986 replicated their study. In addition, in the study by KKT, they also analyze the impact of perceived greediness of the receivers to the senders. The result is that participants mainly argued that it is better for them to share a small portion of money with a sender whose they perceived as “not greedy” instead of getting a bigger amount of money when sharing it with a greedy person. Accordingly fairness matters in the relationship between two parties particularly if an incentive involved in the relationship. In the study our focus will be on how the two parties (senders and receivers) respond concerning fairness.

When referring to the studies by Güth et al. (1982) and Kahneman et al. (1986), we understand that there is a complex decision to be made by the senders and the receivers concerning the incentive differentiation. When senders have to determine the amount of incentive that they offer the receivers, they tend to keep the bigger share for themselves and offer only a smaller portion to the receivers. However when the distribution of incentive between the senders and the receivers are already determined by marketers (e.g. equal distribution, sender more than receiver or sender less than receiver) and the senders are then asked to share it with receivers in order to claim their own incentive, the question arising from senders` point of view

is “who will I share this incentive with?” However this question to date has rarely been observed.

The incentive differentiation between the senders and the receivers is not a simple decision for company. In their research regarding strategies for company to generating referrals (e-referrals), Ahrens and Strahilevitz (2007) finds that providing the same incentive for the senders as the receivers leads to a greater number of referrals. In addition when an incentive unequally distributed between those two WOM actors, the best strategy for business entities is to give the higher portion of the incentive to the sender than to the receiver because if senders are granted with the larger proportion share of the incentive, they tend to make more e-Referrals (Ahrens et al., 2013).

In line with the study by Ahrens et al. (2013), Xiao et al. (2011) finds that in the referral programs, impression from receivers is important for the senders. The senders tend try to give a good impression to the receivers by being perceived as a helping a friend. However when there is an incentive involved in referral programs, the senders are concerned about a possible negative impression by the receivers. Additionally, receivers might perceive the senders of incentivized WOM as non-credible sources. Refer to the particular key impression factor that become one of important factor for senders, thus it would be better for company to give incentive to the receivers more and the senders less.

Referring of the study from Ahrens et al. (2013); Xiao et al. (2011), thus we will manipulate the incentive differentiation strategies with different (which senders get a higher incentive than receiver) and no different (which senders shares an equal incentives with the receivers).

2.3.2 Incentive Transparency

One of the most important things about components of incentive that marketers need to focus on is incentive transparency between senders and receivers. Disclosing or not disclose the proportion of monetary incentive for senders and

receivers remains a discussion in Buzz Marketing (Creamer, 2005), especially in referral activities involving two parties namely referrer (senders) and the receivers. Foreh and Grier (2003) argue that transparency on the monetary incentive will give an impression that the senders who disseminating WOM content are an honest person and they do not have any hidden agenda. This perception will be positively responded by the receivers, compared to the situation where no information in the monetary incentive. The argument by Foreh and Grier (2003) is different to that of Campbell and Kirmani (2000), Kirmani and Zhu (2007), and Williams et al. (2004). They argue that with the transparency of incentive information, there is a trend that receivers will perceive that senders do not have a positive motive for forwarding M-WOM content and only do it to reap a fortune.

In their research regarding online products review, Stephen et al. (2013) find that incentive disclosure could be an indication of something negative regarding the suggested product. In addition Stephen et al. (2013) states that in online product review, giving incentive to the senders will increase their motivation in engage in WOM. However, disclosing the incentive information by the firms could bounce back to the senders because the receivers would drop their assessment of the recommended product.

Furthermore, Tuk (2008) argues that the transparency/non-transparent condition is very much influenced by the relationship between senders and receivers. In the relationship with a friend, a colleague, or even an acquaintance, if the transparency condition is activated, receivers will perceive senders as sincere persons. However in the relationship with business relationship or Tuk (2008) called it as “Market Pricing” relationship, if transparency condition is activated, receivers will perceive senders to be opportunistic. In this dissertation we will further explore the role of tie-strength in shaping the receiver`s perception of the sender.

According to the studies by Tuk (2008), Foreh and Grier (2003) and Williams et al. (2004), there is a complex consideration from senders in targeting receivers of incentivized WOM in transparent condition. Who should the sender addressing the

incentivized WOM so that the receivers do not perceived them as opportunistic, become the major issue for the senders and also important for the marketers to understand it. Besides of the senders` point of view of the incentive transparency in incentivized WOM activities, it is important also for marketers to understand the impact of transparency condition on the consumers` intention and their actual behavioral. In the context of consumer intention to engage in incentivized WOM, Tuk (2008) suggest that the incentive in WOM activities is expected to influence how receivers evaluates the senders rather than influencing the receivers intention engage in WOM activity. In order to understand more regarding the senders and the receivers perspective on transparency condition in incentivized WOM, this dissertation will explore further of that matters.

2.3.3 Incentive Conditionality

In daily activities, consumers are faced with numerous decision options related consumption. Myerson et al. (2003) state that, very often the outcome of a decision appears at a different point in time. In the context of incentives as an outcome, people generally prefer to receive an immediate incentive compared to the delayed one (Myerson et al., 2003). When to give incentives to the consumers, should gain more attention from marketers. Thus, to decide upon the best time to give an incentive for customers so that they value it highly, is important for marketers. The important questions for marketers are: should the incentive be given immediately (unconditional incentive) so that the subjective value of the incentive is high or should a certain requirement be applied on incentive (conditional incentive)?

A conditionality commonly used by firms is giving consumers an incentive only after the consumers have given their name, email address, and/or telephone number of a friend or a family member deemed to be a potential customer for the company (Ryu & Feick, 2007). Furthermore, in the context of M-coupons, company generally set particular conditions before someone can claim for incentive in the form of a discount or an additional incentive (e.g. a free product). In this dissertation, the conditionality of an incentive refers to the circumstance under

which a sender can claim the incentive after a receiver having redeemed the M-coupon as prerequisite. A condition for obtaining an incentive as applied in the current study is similar to the “pay per performance” method, according to the affiliate marketing concept by Libai et al. (2003). The “pay per performance” method is a favorable method for a company because it reduces the company’s risk of paying referrals that do not leads to new consumers (Libai et al., 2003).

Whereas the unconditionally of an incentive refer to the situation where the senders can claim the incentive as soon as they send the M-coupon to other persons. This is known as “pay per lead” method in affiliate marketing concept (Libai et al., 2003). In “pay per lead” method, consumers are paid for referrals regardless of the result, hence, whether or not their referrals leads to new buyer (Libai et al., 2003). Furthermore Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) also suggest that giving a condition for obtaining an incentive will be more profitable for firms than just giving a price discount.

CHAPTER 3

Senders Perspective on Incentivized WOM

3.1 Senders Targeting Receivers Based on Tie-Strength

The relationship between senders and receivers in WOM activities whether incentivized or non-incentivized is an important factor and receive quite some attention by the firms. In each WOM activity, a consumer will interact with many parties coming from various tie-strengths i.e. strong-ties (family) up to weak-ties (friend and acquaintances) (Wirtz & Chew, 2002). The power of interpersonal ties according to Granovetter (1973) is a combination of time, emotional intensity, intimacy and the reciprocal situation characterizing the tie.

According to Bruyn and Lilien (2008), the tie-strength between senders and receivers in WOM activities plays an important role during the awareness stage. In this stage of WOM, the receivers will perceive the WOM message as something more trustworthy and also less risky if they received it from a sender with whom they have a strong-tie relationship compare to a sender with whom they only have a weak-tie relationship.

A research connecting WOM with relational ties from senders point of view performed by Wirtz and Chew (2002), concludes that, if sender is unsatisfied with a product or service, they tend to speak about their experiences and hence discourage persons having weak-ties to them from buying the product or service, and vice versa. Furthermore, Frenzen and Nakamoto (1993) state that senders tend to send something with high economic value to the receivers with whom they have a strong relationship.

The nature of relationship on WOM activities should be a friendship. However when marketers provide an incentive to the WOM participants, the friendship relationship between sender and receiver turns into a sales orientation (Tuk, 2008).

Regarding the sender–receiver relationship in WOM activities, Fiske (1992) focuses the detail of relationship by proposing four types of relationship. The first type is Communal Sharing (CS), a relationship type where each individual has strong-tie and something in common for example family relationship. Second type is called Authority Ranking (AR). It constitutes a hierarchical relationship where one side which is superior to the other, e.g. in the military. The third type is Equality Matching (EM) relationship, e.g. a relationship with friend and acquaintances. The fourth relationship type is Market Pricing (MP), a transactional relationship for example between seller and buyer, where buyers are agreed an offered price from the sellers. In a WOM activity with incentive, the type of relationship that emerges is usually a Market Pricing (MP) relationship (Tuk, 2008). However, in practice the firms using an incentive to generate WOM expects that WOM activity occurs in the context of Equality Matching (EM) because an EM relationship is deemed to be supposedly generates greater impact in generating WOM than any other relationship type (Tuk, 2008). When referring to the consumer relationship type in generating WOM, this dissertation will accordingly focus on the common relationship with friends, which is similar to EM and also familial relationships which are similar to CS.

In the context of incentivized WOM and the sender - receiver relationship, Ryu and Feick (2007) state that senders should send incentivized WOM to weak-ties rather than to strong-ties because the strong-ties will naturally follow the WOM voluntarily without considering any incentive due to their trusting the senders. However when engaging in incentivized WOM with weak-ties, the senders and receivers are more likely to only consider the economic benefit of the reward while not worrying much about possible social and psychological cost and benefits. In brief, if firms only give an incentive to the senders of incentivized WOM, they tend to share it with the receivers having a strong-tie relationship to them. However, if the incentives in incentivized WOM are for senders and receivers, senders tend to send it to both weak-ties and strong-ties.

Furthermore, a study focusing on the “reward both” strategy was done by Ahrens et al. (2013). They suggest that providing the senders with a bigger share of the incentive than the receivers will result in more referrals being made by the senders. However, with whom the senders will share this incentivized WOM with the scheme that senders obtain incentive more than the incentives for receivers, it remains unclear. As Xiao et al. (2011) state, that senders` decision of targeting suitable receivers grow even more important when an incentive involved in WOM activity because the senders have to consider the receivers` impression in order not perceived as a greedy person. Hence, this leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: Incentive differentiation has a positive relationship with tie-strength. When the amount incentive is different between sender and receiver (i.e. there is bigger incentive for the senders than for the receivers), sender tends to choose a receiver from a strong-tie relationship.

One of the reasons for the senders to disseminate particular WOM content to suitable receivers is that they want to strengthen their relationship with the receivers. Nonetheless in incentivized WOM and particularly if the incentive information regarding the different amount of incentives between each sender and each receiver is disclosed by the issuing company. Senders will decide more carefully about the suitable receivers of the incentivized WOM. Senders might have to consider the impression the receivers have and how their later would accordingly respond to this WOM (Ryu & Feick, 2007; Xiao et al., 2011). However, the senders also consider to not to upset the receivers they were close to also one thing that become senders` consideration. Those situations have directed the sender to choose receiver from a particular relationship and leads us to the following hypothesis:

H2: The positive relationship between the incentive differentiation and tie-strength between senders and receivers is moderated by transparency. The senders prefer to choose strong-tie receivers under transparent conditions.

The major objectives of the firm-generated WOM are to spread information quickly to as many people as possible and to acquiring new customers (Stephen et al., 2012). In order to achieve these objectives, targeting the suitable people who have a high probability to become new customer is the key. Empowering consumers to achieve these objectives for the companies is the most effective way. To let their customers think and actively make decision regarding the potential customers for these companies. The active involvement of customers by participating in incentivized WOM will have a considerable positive impact on companies` performance (Biyalogorsky et al., 2001; Buttle, 1998)

To manage referrals is one of the most important activities for firms because incentives or rewards can be a cost effective way to create WOM and to actively recruit new customers. Referral management also in attended to by researchers as well namely Biyalogorsky et al. (2001), Buttle (1998), and Silverman (1997). According to Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) the enemy of any referral activity is the presence of “free riding” persons who only benefiting from the incentive in a referral program without referring a potential customer the companies. Therefore, Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) suggest that, in order to reduce the “free riding” problem, firms should use a setting of conditionality in incentive or a delayed method or a “pay per performance” approach. However, firms could also employ un-conditioning of incentive strategy or else a “pay per lead” approach if they already have highly satisfied customers, as these will make referral naturally without additional incentive. To complement Biyalogorsky et al.`s study from 2001, this study will focus on senders` response to the conditions of an incentive. For own study we expect the following result:

H3: Condition for obtaining the incentive is positively related to the tie-strength between senders and receivers. Conditional in incentives will strengthen the senders` preference for choosing receiver with whom they have strong-tie relationship.

As an important component of incentives for engaging consumers in WOM activities with a condition in incentives, have received attention from some researchers, e.g. Bruyn and Lilien (2008). Bruyn and Lilien (2008) state that in situations where companies offer incentives to customers if referrals turns into sales (so called incentive with a condition), sender usually pick receivers from strong-tie relationship. Here senders` perceive receivers from such close relationships to not have any negative thoughts about the person sending them incentivized WOM. In addition Chew et al. (2005) state that strong ties receivers are usually think that “helping on its own is a reward”.

Closing and disclosing information on the offered incentive in incentivized WOM activities is a debatable topic, particularly in “reward both” situation, where firms provide incentives for both senders and receivers of incentivized WOM. Nonetheless the impact of disclosing information about a financial incentive on how the senders will choose the receivers of incentivized WOM remains under inconclusive. If information about the incentive for the senders is passed on the receivers, senders consider their impression on the respective receivers as they might perceive the senders to be less sincere about their recommendation and assume that they are financially motivated exclusively (Tuk, 2008). In a “reward both” situation, companies also have to consider in how to offer the incentive, whether consumers can redeem their incentive immediately hence unconditionally, or should the companies apply a delayed method i.e. conditionality in incentive (Green & Myerson, 2004). However, little if any research so far has focused on the senders` response on conditional incentive where the information about an incentive is whether disclosed or kept confidential by the companies. Therefore, to add a new perspective to the insight about incentivized WOM, we propose the follow hypothesis:

H4: The positive relationship between an incentive based on a condition and the tie-strength between senders and receivers of incentivized WOM is moderated by transparency. The likelihood to choose strong-tie receiver is high under a transparent condition.

3.2 Senders Targeting Receivers Based on Deal Proneness

In the last 20 years, a vast body of literature has emerged on various aspects of deal proneness (McCall et al., 2009). The personality trait of deal proneness has raised several researchers and most of the studies focus on the usage of coupon (Bawa & Shoemaker, 1987; Guimond, Kim, & Laroche, 2001; Narasimhan, 1984) and the coupons can take the form of traditional coupons, e-coupons or M-coupons. Furthermore, Lichtenstein et al. (1990) state that the coupon redemption behavior is a function of consumer`s value consciousness of coupon (i.e. the comparison between “give and get”) and the deal proneness character.

However, according to Wirtz and Chew (2002) there is still lack of a research which relates consumer`s deal proneness character with their word-of-mouth behavior. In this dissertation we utilize M-coupons as tool to generate WOM. Since M-coupons are one of the tools to generate WOM in mobile phone (Pousttchi & Wiedemann, 2006), therefore, by relating consumer deal proneness character and M-coupon usage, own study can contribute to the research on deal proneness in WOM activities.

Deal Proneness has been defined in different ways, for instance Lichtenstein et al. (1990) define deal proneness as “an increase propensity to respond to a purchase offer because the form of the purchase offers positively affect purchase evaluations”. While Thaler (1985) state that deal prone person will purchase something just because it is a deal and regardless the product is needed or not.

In the WOM, benevolent customer who recommends product or service for an incentive could also be considered as a particular case of deal proneness (Wirtz & Chew, 2002). Deal prone persons are likely to engage in incentivized WOM activity where their involvement is expected to positively influence the success of these WOM activities.

According to Hinz et al. (2011), the success of WOM activity relying particularly on internet platforms can be measured using economic and non-economic

indicators. The measurement of non-economic indicators can be observed by looking at the increase in awareness and an improved of brand perception as the result of information diffused via WOM. The measurement of economic indicators can be observed e.g. by looking at the increase of sales as a result of the mutual information exchange between senders and receivers (Hinz et al., 2011). Concerning M-coupons commonly used by business entities to generate WOM through mobile phone, the success factors of WOM activities through this channel could also be measured with non-economic (by the diffusion of M-coupon) and economic indicators (by the redemption rate).

Referring to this dissertation, with the component of incentive in M-coupons (i.e. incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and transparency information of incentive), the economic and non-economic success of M-coupon is depends on the senders` judgment as they are the initial actors in WOM and they can choose the suitable receiver of M-coupon.

As previously discussed, one factor in the senders` consideration targeting receivers for incentivized M-WOM is the tie-strength. However there are also other considerations of senders when it comes to determining the most suitable receivers who are additionally inclined to seize deals. Receivers who are deal prone are likely to use the incentive they received (e.g. redeem the coupon) as explained in Lichtenstein et al. (1990), in this case, WOM achieves an economic success.

The senders` consideration of targeting deal prone receivers is influenced by the design of the component of incentive in the respective coupon. When the incentive is split unevenly between senders and receivers, senders are concern more about how receivers will perceive them (Xiao et al., 2011). However, besides of the receivers` impression on senders, we have to consider also the possibility that the receivers` likelihood to seize deals is also become senders` considerations when targeting possible receivers if the incentive distributed unevenly between senders and receivers. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

H5: Incentive differentiation positively influences on senders` targeting the deal prone receivers. When the incentive distribute unevenly between sender and receiver, the senders tend to send these M-coupons to deal prone receivers.

When the incentives are unevenly distributed incentive between senders and receivers, thus receivers` impression on sender becomes the senders` main consideration. However to reduce the receivers` negative impression to the sender, targeting the receiver who more likely to seize deals is become one of the senders` strategy. As Lichtenstein et al. (1990) states that deal prone consumer are likely to use the incentive they received, thus the senders can expect that even though the incentive is unequally distributed, receivers will use it anyway. Given that possibility that the information about the unevenly distributed incentive between senders and receivers is passed to the receivers, thus reduce the negative impression by targeting deal prone receivers is the solution for the senders. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

H6: The positive relationship between incentive differentiation and receiver`s deal proneness character is moderated by transparency. In transparent situation sender will focus more to targeting deal prone receiver.

In incentivized WOM activities, it is common for business entities to specify a particular term of condition for all participants engaging in these WOM activities, if they are intend to obtain the incentives. For examples customers could obtain an incentive after they have referred a potential customer to the company or customers could obtain an incentive only if the potential customer recommended by them becomes customer of the company (Ryu & Feick, 2007). Such situation is described by Metcalfe & Mischel (1999) as a delayed of incentive or a conditional incentive.

In the context of the sender – receiver relationship in incentivized WOM, Bruyn and Lilien (2008) called the conditionality in incentive as a reciprocal condition. Under a reciprocal condition, senders will pick particular receivers who have a high

probability to engage in incentivized WOM whereby the senders could obtain the desired incentive. Accordingly, deal prone receivers are the main target of the senders. Since these receivers will perform a purchase activity if they think that it will benefit them (Lichtenstein et al., 1990), so sender could ensure that the chosen receivers would use their incentive so that the senders could receive theirs.


In this dissertation the incentive conditionality is represented two situations. In the first situation senders obtain an incentive after they have shared the M-coupon with others this is the so called unconditional incentive. The second situation senders obtain their incentive only after they have sent the M-coupon to others and these other redeem the M-coupon, hence, this is a conditional incentive.

When there is a conditional incentive in incentivized WOM, the senders` focus of targeting adequate receivers will be stronger when the information of their incentive is revealed by the issuing companies. In a non-transparent situation, the receivers do not obtain any information on the incentive for the senders depending on their action of redeeming the coupon. Therefore the receivers have no urgency in redeeming the coupon. To increase the probability that senders will obtain their incentive, senders should focus on determining receivers who are likely to seize deals. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:

H7: A conditional incentive is positively correlated with the receiver`s deal proneness character. Senders tend to choose deal prone receivers when there is conditionality of incentive.

H8: The positive correlation between conditional incentive and the receiver`s deal proneness character is moderated by transparency. The senders` preference to choose deal prone receivers is stronger in non-transparent situation.

Figure 1: Research Model for the First Study: Sender Perspective



3.3 Design of the First Experimental Study

Our first experimental study will investigate hypotheses H1 to H8, with the objective to understand senders' decision to determine the suitable receivers in incentivized WOM activities. The suitable receivers in this study refer to the tie-strength and deal proneness. A description of the research design which has selected for this study is followed by procedures undertaken to administer the survey and collect the data. The instruments used to manipulate the independent and moderating variables and the instruments to measure the dependent variables will be examined and discussed in this chapter.

To test the hypotheses set forth in the current chapter, we conducted a 2x2x2 factorial design. We manipulated the experimental construct incentive differentiation (different versus no different) x incentive conditionality (conditional

versus unconditional) x incentive transparency (transparent versus non-transparent) and Products (McDonalds versus Starbucks).

In the experiment, the participants are labeled as “sender group” and they are 43 students from Hamburg University and 42 students from Indonesia. In sender group every participant will only participate in 8 out of 16 scenarios.

In the first study, the questionnaire and scenarios of incentivized WOM in the form of M-coupon are set up in online form in two alternative languages, German and Indonesian. The online survey is divided into the four following sections,

In section one, we use the “mentioning name” method. There are four questions and in every question, participants are asked to mention two names. The questions therein structured as follows:

1. One day, you have to leave your apartment for a couple of weeks, maybe for a vacation or because of a business trip. During your absence, you need someone to look after your apartment (e.g. to water plants, to check your mail). Whom would you entrust with that responsibility? For the Indonesian respondents the first question is modified to be more suited to the Indonesian culture. It accordingly is: “One day, you forget your wallet and, thus, have no money, whom will you ask to lend you money when you need it?”
2. When you want to have a casual conversation about hobbies and daily activities, with whom do you prefer to discuss such matters?
3. When you need someone to ask about a school assignment or you need to borrow a lecture notes, whom do you prefer to ask in such matters?
4. When you need someone to talk about personal matters (e.g. about your romantic relationship or about family matters), with whom would you most talk to about it?

Later on, those eight names represent the potential receivers of M-coupon who have strong-tie or weak-tie relationship with the sender.

Section two features the questions about the participants' relationship with each of eight names they mentioned in section one. The questions in this section are used to obtain additional information regarding the tie-strength between senders and receivers. The additional information here refers to the communication behavior between participants and the eight names that they mentioned before.

For the communication behavior, we develop a four-item measure of communication behavior based on Granovetter (1973) and Marsden and Campbell, (1984). Based on them, tie-strength is about the intensity of a relationship, duration and frequency of communication as well the amount of time that both parties (i.e. senders and receivers) spend with person in particular tie. Thus, we have to translate the statements made by Granovetter (1973) as well as Marsden and Campbell (1984) into four indicators by using the following questions: (1) How long have you known this person? The possible answers for this question consist of five possibilities spanning from recently to lasting for more than ten years" (i.e. recently; one to two years; three to five years six to ten years and more than ten years). (2) Throughout the past month, how often have you and this person talked face to face? For answering this question are also given in five possibilities, spanning from "never" to "every day" (i.e. never, once, a couple of times, several times per week every day). (3) Throughout the past month, how often have you and this person have contacted each other via mobile devices (e.g. via call, SMS, WhatsApp or email). This third question can again be answered by choosing from five possibilities, again spanning from "never" to "every day" (hence, again - never, once a couple of times, several times per week, every day).

The deal proneness as one of the dependent variables will be measured in section two thanks to a five point Likert scale. The objective of measuring this characteristic in first study (study one) is to understand it from the senders' point of view. The term "receivers" here refers to the eight names mentioned by the respective senders in section one.

In **section three**, the participants within the sender group will be confronted with eight scenarios presented to them separately (i.e. one scenario at the time). In every scenario, the participants were not only shown their M-coupon, but also the M-coupon destined for their receivers if they decide to forward it. We asked the participants in the role of senders to identify the most suitable receiver for each particular M-coupon based on the eight names that they have mentioned in section one. These mentioned eight names appear automatically as answer possibilities in every scenario and the participant is simply required to choose one answer. They can choose the same name of receiver in different scenarios. We randomized the order of the alternative answer in every scenario.

Figure 2: An Example for a Scenario from the Senders Perspective



Section four consists of demographic information of the “sender group” participants.

3.4 Setup of Empirical Study

3.4.1 Measure Items of the First Experimental Study

In addition to the experimental constructs, we include two other constructs as dependent variables in the model; tie-strength and deal proneness. Tie-strength in

study one refers to the relationship between senders and receivers, whereas deal proneness refers to the consumptive characters of the potential receivers.

For the tie-strength of receiver construct, we assess it by using two items measurement and both of the items are self-design. The first parameter is generated from the “mentioning name” method. This method in accordance with the suggestion from Marsden and Campbell (1984) which state that tie-strength measuring can be done by gauge the breadth of discussion between two persons and also by the mutual confiding. Nonetheless, instead of the breadth of discussion, we also have added a new perspective by correlating tie-strength with the personal activity, such as to whom he/she will ask for help to taking care the apartment when he/she away or to whom he/she will borrow money when he/she unintentionally left his/her wallet at home. Therefore to articulate the perspectives on tie-strength measurement from Marsden and Campbell (1984), we inquired the participants in sender group to mentioning eight (8) names, which later on, those eight names represents of the potential receivers of M-coupon. Each of eight names in section one are generated from four different questions.

Furthermore, after we obtain eight names from four different questions, thus we categorize those names into strong-tie group of receivers and weak-tie group of receivers. The strong-tie group of receivers derives from the name that senders have mentioned in the question number one and number four. For the weak-tie group of receivers, we generate them from the questions number two and three.

The second parameter of tie-strength is based on the degree of closeness between sender and receiver. The measure of closeness is done by five-points likert scales spanning from not close at all (1); not close (2); neither distant nor close (3); close (4) and extremely close (5), with the question: “How close do you feel with this person?”

The measure of Deal proneness construct consists of three items, adapted from Lichtenstein et al. (1990), “this person” is a person who enjoy looking for discount offer, “this person” is a person who enjoy using discount, regardless the amount

he/she can save from doing so, “this person” is a person who is more likely to buy brand who has discount offer. “This person” in the deal proneness measurement refers to the eight names of potential receiver that the participants have mentioned in section one of the survey. Those eight names will automatically appear as the option of the answer in every scenario. Therefore the sender group participants can associate the name with the question more easily.

To measure deal proneness we used three items based on five points Likert Scales with strongly disagree (1); disagree (2); neither agree nor disagree (3); agree (4) and strongly agree (5). We adopted three items to measure deal proneness, from Lichtenstein et al. (1990).

In order to model our experimental data in a structural equation framework, we identify single indicators for the manipulation variables, namely incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency. These manipulation variables are use an effect coding, so different incentive scopes, conditional and transparent are coded as 1 while the no different on incentive, unconditional and non-transparent are coded as -1.

3.4.2 Pre-Test

The scenarios mentioned above were pretested with 20 students from Germany and 20 students from Indonesia. Each of the students has participated in eight scenarios. The objective of this study is to examine whether respondents correctly perceive the differing incentives for senders and receivers, the conditionality of each incentive and the information on incentive transparency in every scenario. Therefore, we present every scenario and ask their opinion about each of them. From this pre-test, we obtain the result that 100% of respondents (both German and Indonesian) correctly classified whether the scenarios include different incentives for senders and receivers or if the amount of the incentive is the same for both parties. Concerning the conditionality of an incentive, 90% of the German respondents as well as 80% of the Indonesian correctly classified conditional and unconditional situations. Furthermore, concerning the transparency of an incentive, 100% of the

respondents in Indonesia and Germany correctly classified the transparent as well as the non-transparent situation.

Refer the result in pre-test, thus we can proceed the scenarios for the main analysis. Since the objective of the pre-test was testing whether or not the participants correctly perceived the manipulated variables, therefore we did not include its results in the main analysis.

3.4.3 Data Collection

From the online survey in first study we obtain the response of 43 students from Universität Hamburg, Germany and 42 students from two universities in Jakarta, Indonesia (Prasetiya Mulya Business School and Multimedia Nusantara University). The majority of the participants in the groups, both from Germany and from Indonesia are female. Every participant participates in eight scenarios out of sixteen. For obtaining details on the demographic characteristic of both groups of “senders”, please refer to Table 1.

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Senders

Characteristics		Percentage	
		Germany (n = 43)	Indonesia (n = 42)
Gender	Male	39.5%	35.7%
	Female	60.5%	64.3%
Age	15 - 24	46.5%	88.1%
	25 - 39	46.5%	9.5%
	40 - 50	4.7%	2.4%
	51 - 70	2.3%	-
	> 70	-	-

Beside the demographic characteristics we obtain insights on the relationship between senders and receivers in this study. This relationship refers to the potential

receivers the senders have mentioned in section one of the online survey. The term “relationship” in this context refers to the communication behavior between senders and potential receivers based on the tie-strength categorization mentioned in section one.

Besides of the demographics characteristic of the participants in sender`s group, we also obtained the profile of the relationship between participants in sender`s group with the potential receiver that senders have mentioned in “mentioning name” method.

According to Granovetter (1973), the power of interpersonal ties is a combination of time, emotional intensity, intimacy and the reciprocal situation characterizing tie. How people share time, share happiness and sadness together and have a “take and give” moment between them will characterizing the tie.

In order to understand how people develop their relationship in particular tie strength (i.e. strong-tie and weak-tie) we divide the data based on the respective tie-strength into strong-ties and weak-ties. Consequently, we measure the communication behavior between the senders and the potential receivers in both the strong-tie group and the weak-tie group. To summary the profile of the relationship in both German and Indonesian group, we use mean and standard deviation as measurement parameters

In the German group (n = 43), senders and receivers shows the following relationship characteristics concerning tie-strength: for both types of tie-strength, they have known each other about three to five years on average (Mean = 3.20 and SD = 1.30 for strong-ties as well as Mean = 3.0 and SD = 1.29 for weak-ties).

Over the last one month, the senders in German group have had face to face communication with the weak-tie receivers at least a couple of times per month (Mean = 3.40, SD = .88), while with the strong-tie receivers a couple of times per week (Mean = 4.11, SD = .77).

Concerning the communication behavior via mobile devices during the last month, we discover that senders communicated with both tie groups, once to a couple of times per month via mobile phone (Mean = 2.78, SD = 1.52, for strong ties) compared to (Mean = 2.50, SD = 1.29) for weak ties.

In the Indonesian group (n = 42), senders and receivers have the following characteristics in their strong and weak relationship ties: for strong ties, they have known each other about three to five years on average (Mean = 3.06, SD = 1.18) – for weak ties, they have known about one to five years (Mean = 2.90, SD = 1.17).

Throughout the last month, they communicated face to face with both groups a couple of times per week (strong-tie receivers: Mean = 4.00, SD = .79); and (weak-tie receivers: Mean = 3.80, SD = 1.40).

Concerning communicating via mobile devices during the last month, we discover that senders had this type of contact a couple of times per week with both groups (strong ties: Mean = 4.30, SD = 1.52; weak ties: Mean = 4.10, SD = 0.98).

3.5 Data Processing


In data collection steps, we obtained 43 participants in German group and 42 participants in Indonesian groups. As every participants only participating in eight scenarios, thus in German group we can generate 344 samples and 336 samples from Indonesian group. As the first step of data processing, we perform manipulation check to test whether the respondents correctly perceived the incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency. The answers given to the questions to check whether or not the participants perceive the *incentive differentiation* indicate that in the German group all participants (100%) correctly classified different and no different of incentive. Meanwhile, in the Indonesian group, only two participants (4.7%) have failed to correctly classify this aspect.

The answers to the questions checking whether or not the participants perceived the *incentive conditionality* indicates that only four participants of the German group

(9.30%) failed to correctly classify if an incentive is conditional or unconditional. Meanwhile, eleven participants in the Indonesian group (30%) have failed to correctly this aspect.

The answers to those questions checking whether or not the participants perceived *the transparency information* indicate that seven participants of the German group (16%) failed to correctly classify transparent and non-transparent information of the incentive for the receiver, when in the Indonesian group only four participants (9.3%) failed here.

Figure 3: An Example for the Manipulation Check

	<p>(Congratulations! You will get 70% discount on a Big Mac by sending this M-coupon to others and person who receive this coupon from you redeem it)</p>
<p>One day you receive an M-coupon directly from McDonalds. You can claim your discount only after the receiver received the M-coupon from you, redeem it. You will obtain a larger discount than the receiver. Your friend and/or family member who have received this M-coupon from you would only receive their respective M-coupon without any other information from McDonald's.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Based on the coupon you just received, which of the following statements is true?<ul style="list-style-type: none"><input type="radio"/> I get the same discount as the receiver.<input type="radio"/> I get a higher discount than the receiver.2. Based on the coupon you just received, which of the following statements is true?<ul style="list-style-type: none"><input type="radio"/> I can claim the discount after I forward the coupon to a receiver (unconditional discount)<input type="radio"/> I can claim the discount only after the receivers redeems their coupon (conditional discount)3. Based on the coupon you just received, which of the following statements is true?<ul style="list-style-type: none"><input type="radio"/> The information about the incentive is known from both sender and receiver (transparent)<input type="radio"/> The information about the incentive is not passed on to the receiver (non-transparent) <p>For the complete scenarios and their wording, please refer to the appendix A</p>	

As the second step, we process the obtained data by removing samples which have low data quality in both of German and the Indonesian group. In German group we have to remove 156 out of 344 samples, while for Indonesia, we have to remove 100 out of 336 samples. Accordingly, we can utilize a total of 188 samples from the German group and 236 samples from the Indonesian group.

Due to removing samples which have low data quality, the total number of samples is reduced while there is also an imbalance in the number of samples between those two countries now. To increase the number of samples and to avoid inconsistency of the results, we consider to merging the samples of the German and the Indonesian group.

To justify our decision to whether or not we should merge the data between German and Indonesian group, first we have to compare the reflective measurement model of the German group compared to the Indonesian group and second, we compare the result of structural model between German group and Indonesian group. The reflective measurement model parameters represent by the internal consistency reliability, indicator reliability and convergent validity. For the structural model, we will compare the R^2 and the path-coefficient significance between these two countries. The Partial Least Squares, with the software from SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle et al., 2014) is used to analyze both models (i.e. the reflective measurement model and the structural model).

3.5.1 Psychometric Properties of German and Indonesian group

In this section, we present the psychometric properties of the reflective measurement in both German and Indonesian group as well as the result of psychometric properties of reflective measurement for the merged data between both groups. The reflective measurement model is to be assessed regarding its reliability and validity (Henseler et al., 2009). Therefore, we assess the internal consistency reliability, the indicator reliability, the convergent validity and the discriminant validity of the measured variables.

The internal consistency reliability attempts to measure the sum of an latent variable's factor loading relative to the sum of the factor loadings plus error variance and leads to values between 0 (completely unreliable) and 1 (completely reliable) with the threshold of not lower than 0.6 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). In this dissertation we use composite reliability as the criterion of the internal consistency.

The indicator reliability measures how much of the indicators variance is explained by the corresponding latent variable and the value should be higher than 0.7 (Chin, 2000). The indicator loading is used in this dissertation as the indicator reliability criterion. Whereas convergent validity with the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) as criterion measurement, attempts to measure the amount of variance that an latent variable component capture from its indicator relative to the amount due to measurement error and the threshold value $AVE > 0.5$ (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

We examine indicator reliability of the construct by verifying the factor loadings suggested by Gerbing and Anderson (1988). These factor loadings should be significantly different from 0 or else higher than 0.7. As to be seen in Table 2, the factor loadings for deal prone receiver and the construct of tie-strength of receiver are both higher than 0.7 for the German group and the Indonesian group separately as well as for the group constructed by merging both groups. However, we also obtain a factor loading of 0.44 in one of the constructs of tie-strength of receiver in the Indonesian group. Since the result still shows an acceptable convergent validity, we do not remove it although it is lower than 0.7.

We assess the internal consistency of deal proneness variable and tie-strength of receiver variable according to their composite reliability. The composite reliability scores for both deal proneness and tie-strength of receiver construct exceed the cut-off value 0.7 suggested by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). For the convergent validity, we use the average variance extracted (AVE) as suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981). The AVE for both German and Indonesian group are exceeds the

cut-off value of 0.5 suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981). Please refer to Table 3 for the detail result.

Table 2: The Psychometric Properties of German and Indonesian Group Separately

Items	Standardized Loading	
	German	Indonesia
Deal Proneness		
This person is a kind of person enjoying the search for discount offers.	.60	.83
This person is a person who enjoying the use of discounts, regardless of the amount he/she can save by doing so.	.87	.88
This person is a person who is more likely to buy products or services by a brand offering a discount	.82	.80
Tie-strength of Receiver		
Based on mentioning name	.84	.44
Based on closeness (How close do you feel to this person?)	.81	.99

Table 3: Composite Reliability and Average Variance Extracted German and Indonesian Group Separately

Construct	Composite Reliability		Average Variance Extracted	
	German	Indonesia	German	Indonesia
Deal Proneness	.80	.87	.57	.70
Tie-strength of Receiver	.81	.72	.68	.60

3.5.2 The Result of Multi Group Analysis on the Psychometric Properties between German Group and Indonesian Group

Before we use the data obtained by merging both groups, we check the validity of our decision by performing a multi group analysis with PLS using SmartPLS 3.0 software. From this analysis, we will acquire difference value of the reflective measurement model between the German and the Indonesian group – both values can be significant or not significant.

According to Henseler et al. (2009) typically multi group analysis consists of two steps. The first step is analysis the sample of each sub population and the result will be a group-wise parameter estimates. In the second step, the significant of the differences between groups is evaluated. To perform the second step Chin (2000); Keil et al. (2000) proposes to use an unpaired samples t-test to compare the parameter estimate of the first group with the parameter estimate of the second group. For this study, we use The Welch-Satterthwaite Test to obtain the t-statistic of the differences between both countries.

For the first reflective measurement parameter, we analyze the loading factor difference between the German and the Indonesian group. As stated in Table 4, there is no significant difference between the loading factors of both groups. The second reflective measurement parameter is the differences in convergent validity between German and Indonesian group expressed with the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) as parameter. There is no significant difference of the AVE between German and Indonesian group concerning both dependent variables, i.e. deal proneness (t-Value = 1.000, $p > .1$) and tie-strength of receiver (t-Value = 0.67, $p > .1$) as can be seen in Table 5. The result from the Welch-Satterthwait Test suggests that there are no differences of Composite Reliability (CR) between German and Indonesian group concerning both deal proneness (t-Value = 0.414, $p > .1$) and tie-strength of receiver (t-Value = 0.414, $p > .1$).

Table 4: Outer Loading Differences between German and Indonesian Sample

Items	Outer Loadings-differences (German - Indonesian)	
	t-value	p-value
Deal Proneness		
This person is a kind of person enjoying the search for discount offers.	1.168	0.244
This person is a person who enjoying the use of discounts, regardless of the amount he/she can save by doing so.	0.049	0.961
This person is a person who is more likely to buy products or services by a brand offering a discount	0.087	0.931
Tie-strength of Receiver		
Based on mentioning name	1.390	0.166
Based on closeness (How close do you feel to this person?)	0.775	0.439

Table 5: Composite Reliability and Average Variance Extracted Differences German and Indonesian Sample

Construct	Composite Reliability-differences (German - Indonesian)		AVE-differences (German - Indonesian)	
	t-value	p-value	t-value	p-value
Deal Proneness	0.414	0.680	1.000	0.319
Tie-strength of Receiver	0.414	0.680	0.672	0.503

AVE: Average Variance Extracted

Furthermore, the result of the Welch-Satterthwaite Test based on the parameters of structural model shows that there are no differences of R^2 between German and Indonesian group concerning both deal proneness (t-Value = 0.17, $p > .1$) and tie-strength of receiver (t-Value = 0.001, $p > .1$), please refer to Table 6.

Table 6: The Differences in R² between German and Indonesian Sample

Constructs	R ² Ger.	R ² Indo.	Differences in R ² between Germany and Indonesia	t-value (German - Indonesian)	p-value (German - Indonesian)
Deal Proneness	0.03	0.04	.007	.169	.866
Tie-strength of Receiver	0.05	0.05	.000	.001	.999

Ger. = German; Indo. = Indonesia

As the next step, we perform the multi group analysis based on the structural model with the path coefficient differences as parameters. The result from the Welch-Satterthwaite Test suggests that from eight relationship paths, only one path shows a significant difference between German and Indonesian sample. This is the path of the interaction effect between the *incentive differentiation* and *incentive transparency* on *deal proneness* (t-Value = 2.517, p<.05). Please refer to Table 7 for the complete results of this analysis.

Table 7: Path Coefficient Differences between German and Indonesian Samples (Obtained Welch-Satterthwait Test)

Hypothesis	The Relationship among the Constructs	Differences in the Path Coefficients (German vs Indonesian)	t-value (German vs Indonesian)	p-value (German vs Indonesian)
H1	ID → Tie-strength of Receiver	0.06	0.73	.50
H2	ID x Transp. → Tie-strength of Receive	.02	.19	.85
H3	IC → Tie-strength of Receiver	.10	1.122	.26
H4	IC x Transp. → Tie-strength of Receiver	.003	.04	.97
H5	ID → DealPron.	.03	.27	.79
H6	ID x Transp. → DealPron	.249	2.517	.01

Hypothesis	The Relationship among the Constructs	Differences in the Path Coefficients (German vs Indonesian)	t-value (German vs Indonesian)	p-value (German vs Indonesian)
H7	IC →DealPron	.02	.256	.80
H8	IC x Transp. →DealPron	.081	1.142	.26

ID = Incentive Differentiation; IC = Incentive Conditionality; Transp. = Incentive Transparency; DealPron. = Deal Prone Receiver

In general, the results of the multi group analysis support our decision to merge the group data obtained from the German and the Indonesian groups. Based on the reflective measurement model in multi group analysis, the results suggest that there are no significant differences in terms of the quality criteria for the outer model between samples of the German and the Indonesian group. Additionally we obtain only one out of eight relationship paths showing a significant difference in a multi group analysis based on a structural model. Therefore, we can simply merge the samples between the two groups in order to raise the number of sample without resulting bias interpretation.

3.6 Result of the First Experimental Study

3.6.1 Psychometric Properties of the Merged German and Indonesian Samples

After we merged the data of the German and the Indonesian groups, we acquire new psychometric properties from the senders' perspective. As we can see in Table 8, the factor loadings for deal proneness and the tie-strength of receiver construct are all higher than 0.7, indicating that both constructs explain 70 percent of each indicator's variance. The composite reliability scores for the construct of deal proneness exceed the cut-off value of 0.7 proposed by Nunnally and Bernstein, (1994), while the AVE also exceeds the cut-off value of 0.5 suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (please refer to Table 9). Thus, the model based on the merged data set between both groups disposes discriminant as well as convergent validity.

Table 8: Outer Loading of the Sender Group: Merged Data of German and Indonesian Group

Items	Standardized Loading
Deal Proneness	
This person is a kind of person enjoying the search for discount offers.	.84
This person is a person who enjoying the use of discounts, regardless of the amount he/she can save by doing so.	.83
This person is a person who is more likely to buy products or services by a brand offering a discount	.75
Tie-strength of Receiver	
Based on mentioning name	.74
Based on closeness (How close do you feel to this person?)	.90

Table 9: Composite Reliability, Average Variance Extracted and R² of the Sender Group: Merged Data of German and Indonesian Group

Construct	Composite Reliability	AVE	R ²
Deal Proneness	.85	.65	.03
Tie-strength of Receiver	.81	.68	.04

AVE = Average Variance Extracted

Concerning the discriminant validity, we follow the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) which postulating that a latent variable should shares more variance with its assigned indicators than with any other latent variable. It means that the AVE for each latent variable should be greater than the latent variable highest squared correlation with any other latent variable. In our study, the square root of the AVE for the construct of deal proneness and tie-strength of

receiver construct is bigger than all corresponding correlations (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Please refer to Table 31, Appendix A.

3.6.2 Hypotheses Testing

We analyze the proposed hypotheses in first study by employing Partial Least Squares (PLS); with Smartpls 3 (Ringle et al., 2014) to obtain parameter estimates for the reflective measurement model and the structural model. PLS is the best suited approach because PLS is able to handle binomial exogenous variables (i.e. different versus no different, conditional versus unconditional, transparent versus non-transparent). PLS also works well with small sample sizes and is frequently used to analyze experimental data (Daryanto et al., 2010; Keeling et al., 2013; Willach et al., 2011).

Furthermore, the fit of the model can be assessed by using R^2 of the endogenous latent variables in the model with the effect size proposed by Cohen (1992): small, i.e. 0.02; medium, i.e. 0.13; large, i.e. 0.26. As stated in Table 9, the variable of deal proneness has a small effect in the structural model with an R^2 value of 0.03. Furthermore, the tie-strength of receiver variable also has a small effect in the structural model with an R^2 value of 0.04.


To acquire t-statistics for the parameter estimates, we use nonparametric bootstrapping with a resample of 5,000 (see Table 10 and Figure 5). For every hypothesis, the multi-group analysis is performed with SmartPLS 3.0, while the Welch-Satterthwaite Test is employed to validate the results of multi-group analysis.

Table 10: Results of the Hypotheses from Senders Perspective

Hypothesis	The Relationship among the Constructs	Path Coefficient Estimation	t-statistic	p-value	Result
H1	ID → Tie-strength of receiver	-.06	1.44	.15	Rejected
H2	ID x Transp → Tie-strength of receiver	.16	3.32	.00	Accepted
H3	IC → Tie-strength of receiver	-.01	.33	.75	Rejected
H4	IC x Transp → Tie-strength of receiver	.05	1.18	.24	Rejected
H5	ID → DealPron	.12	2.60	.01	Accepted
H6	ID x Transp → DealPron	.09	1.86	.06	Accepted
H7	IC → DealPron	-.02	.47	.64	Rejected
H8	IC x Transp → DealPron	.02	.48	.63	Rejected

ID = Incentive Differentiation; IC = Incentive Conditionality; Transp. = Incentive Transparency; DealPron. = Deal Proneness

Figure 4: Result of the Hypotheses from Senders Perspectives



*** = $p < .01$; ** = $p < .05$; ns: not significant

3.6.2.1 Relationship between Incentive Differentiation and Tie-Strength of Receivers

For the first hypothesis, we obtain an insignificant result for the *incentive differentiation* and *tie-strength of receiver* ($\beta = -.06$, $p > .1$). Thus, we have to dismiss Hypothesis 1. The main analysis result of the Hypothesis 1 indicates that when the senders are expected to share M-coupons containing incentives with a scheme where the senders get a higher incentive than the receivers, the tie-strength of the receivers is not a major concern for the senders. To understand this further, please refer to Table 9. The result contradicts our assumed hypothesis stating that an *incentive differentiation* is positively correlated with *tie-strength of receiver*. Hence, our initial hypothesis supposed that when senders are expected to share M-coupons containing incentives with a scheme: the senders obtain a higher incentive than the incentive obtains by the receivers, the senders should have shared this coupon with strong-tie receivers instead of weak-tie receivers.

Considering the fact that every scenario we have presented to the participants contains all manipulation conditions (different versus no different; conditional versus unconditional), it is important to perform additional analyses to understand the impact of other manipulation situation on the relationship between *incentive differentiation* and *tie-strength of receiver* in Hypothesis 1. We perform an additional analysis by following the two step multi-group analysis developed by Chin (2000). In the first step, we split the data according to particular manipulation set and in the second step we perform unpaired samples t-test using Welch-Satterthwaite test in order to test whether there is a significant difference of the interpretation result of hypothesis 1 between the two group-specific parameters.

To employ this additional analysis, we split the data according to the condition of incentive, where “conditional” is coded as 1 and “unconditional” is coded as -1. The result of the additional analysis implies that whether there is conditionality or not in M-coupon, when senders obtain incentive higher than the incentive for the receivers, sender will choose any receiver regardless the tie-strength between them. The detailed result of the additional analysis is the following: in the manipulation set of “conditional” we obtain a negative but insignificant result of the relationship between difference in incentive and tie-strength receiver ($\beta = -.08$; $p > .1$) as well as in the manipulation set of “unconditional” ($\beta = -.04$, $p > .1$). Furthermore, with a t-value of .51 ($p > .1$) the result of the Welch-Satterthwaite test proves that the presence of conditionality in incentive does not influence the relationship between *incentive differentiation* and *tie-strength receiver*. For the detailed results of this section, please refer to Table 23 in Appendix A for the result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive conditionality.

3.6.2.2 Interaction Effect of Incentive Differentiation and Incentive Transparency on Tie-Strength of Receivers

The assumed interaction effect of *incentive differentiation* and *incentive transparency* on *tie-strength of receiver* is significant with a $p\text{-value} < .01$ for the path coefficient (β) of .16. Thus, the result of main analysis implies that when

senders share an M-coupon with a different incentive for senders and receivers, the transparency information will influence the senders' decision to choose receivers with a particular tie-strength. In a transparent situation or when the receivers are well informed about the senders obtaining a higher incentive than they do, senders will choose receivers from a strong-tie relationship.

With the intention of further understanding the interaction effect in Hypothesis 2, we split the data according to incentive transparency by using effect coding, namely "transparent" as 1 and "non-transparent" as -1. The result of this additional analysis indicates that senders will decide differently concerning the suitable receivers for M-coupons with scheme of incentive: senders get incentive higher than the incentive for receivers, when the incentive information is revealed or kept secret by the firm. In a transparent situation, senders will send M-coupons with a higher incentive for them than for the receivers to strong-tie receivers ($\beta = .11$, $p < .1$), while they tend to choose weak-tie receivers ($\beta = -.23$, $p < .01$) in a non-transparent situation. Furthermore, we acquire a t-value of 3.722 ($p < .01$) for the Welch-Satterthwaite test. Thus, it is proven that there is a significantly different result concerning the relationship between the incentive differentiation and senders' decision to choose tie-strength of receivers in these transparent and non-transparent situations. Please confer to Table 24 in appendix A for the comprehensive result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive transparency.

3.6.2.3 Relationship between Incentive Conditionality and Tie-Strength of Receivers

The path coefficient between *incentive conditionality* and *tie-strength of receiver* is not significant ($\beta = -.01$, $p > .1$). Therefore, we have to reject Hypothesis 3. The result of main analysis reveals that the receivers' tie-strength is not a concern of the senders when they share M-coupons with a conditionality of incentive in it (senders can only obtain this incentive after they share the M-coupon with others and these receivers redeem it). Sender will send it with any of receivers regardless the tie-strength between them.

The presence of another manipulation situation, in the context of Hypothesis 3 is incentive differentiation, apparently does not influence the assumed relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *tie-strength of receiver*. When senders have to send M-coupons with a conditional incentive, they are not concerned about the tie-strength with the receivers, no matter whether the incentive is divided equally or unequally between senders and receivers. The subsequent explanation to support this result is the following: in a set of manipulation on “different”, we obtain an insignificant result of the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *tie-strength of receivers* ($\beta = -.03, p > .1$). This also holds true in manipulation set of “no different” ($\beta = .004, p > .1$). With a t-value of .51 ($p > .1$), the unpaired samples t-test use the Welch-Satterthwaite Test proves that differing the incentive between senders and receivers does not influence senders’ decision to choose a particular tie-strength of receivers when there is conditionality in M-coupon. Please refer to Table 22 in appendix A for the comprehensive result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive differentiation.

3.6.2.4 Interaction Effect of Incentive Conditionality and Incentive Transparency on Tie-Strength of Receivers

The interaction effect of *incentive conditionality* and *incentive transparency* on *tie-strength of receivers* show an insignificant relationship ($\beta = .05, p > .1$). The result indicates that when senders share an M-coupon with a conditional incentive and the receivers know that their decision concerning the redemption of their M-coupon affects whether or not the senders can obtain their incentive (transparent situation), the tie-strength with their receivers is not the senders’ major concern.

Considering the insignificant result of assumed interaction effect in Hypothesis 4, we take a simple effect test to determine the nature of the interaction effect by splitting the data according to the incentive transparency. For this, we use effect coding, namely “transparent” as 1 and “non-transparent” as -1. In the manipulation set of transparent situation, we obtain an insignificant result the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *the tie-strength of receivers* ($\beta = .03, p > .1$).

The same is true for the manipulation set of non-transparent ($\beta = -.06, p > .1$). With a t-value of 1.17 ($p > .1$), the unpaired samples t-test using the Welch-Satterthwaite test shows that when senders share an M-coupon with a conditional incentive, the tie-strength with the receivers is not the senders' major concern, independent of the incentive information being transparent or non-transparent

To check the possibility that the presence of another manipulation situation, in this context is incentive differentiation, might have an influence on the result of the assumed interaction of *incentive conditionality* and *incentive transparency* on *tie-strength of receivers*, thus additional analysis is performed. We split the data set according to incentive differentiation with the "different" coded as 1 and "no different" coded as -1. The result of additional analysis reveals that the presence of incentive differentiation on M-coupon does not influence the assumed interaction effect in Hypothesis 4. When senders send an M-coupon with a conditional incentive for them and the information about this incentive is given to the receivers by the firms, the senders are not concerned with the tie-strength of the receivers, independent of the equality of the incentive for senders and receivers.

The subsequent explanation supporting this result is that in the manipulation set of "different" in incentive we obtain an insignificant result of the assumed interaction effect in hypothesis 4 ($\beta = .04, p > .1$) and also in manipulation set of "no different" ($\beta = .05, p > .1$). With the t-value of 0.2, ($p > .1$), the result of the unpaired samples t-test using the Welch-Satterthwaite test implies that the presence of incentive differentiation does not have any influence on the interaction effect of *incentive conditionality* and *incentive transparency* on *tie-strength of receivers*. For the complete description in this section please refer to Table 22 in appendix A for the complete result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive differentiation.

3.6.2.5 Relationship between Incentive Differentiation and Deal Proneness

In support of Hypothesis 5, we find a positive and significant relationship between *incentive differentiation* and *deal prone receiver* ($\beta = .12, p < .05$). The result

reveals that in the situation where a firm requires senders to share an M-coupon so that they can obtain their incentive – which has a higher value than the incentive for the receivers of this M-coupon, senders tend to share this M-coupon with deal prone receivers. Persons with a deal proneness are persons who love using discounts and are constantly looking for them.

3.6.2.6 Interaction Effect of Incentive Differentiation and Incentive Transparency on Deal Proneness

For the assumed interaction effect of *incentive differentiation* and *incentive transparency* on *deal prone receiver*, we acquire a marginally significant result ($\beta = .09, p < .1$) which supports Hypothesis 6. When senders are required to send M-coupons containing an incentive with a higher value for the senders than for the receivers, where the information on the incentive is shared by the firm, senders will send this coupon to deal prone receiver in order to redeem their own incentive.

In the light of the significant interaction effect of *incentive differentiation* and *incentive transparency* on *deal prone receiver*, we conduct a simple effect test to determine the nature of the interaction effect by splitting the data according to the incentive transparency. For the manipulation set of “transparent” situation we obtain a positive and significant relationship between *incentive differentiation* and the *receivers deal proneness* ($\beta = .20, p < .01$), while obtaining an insignificant result for the manipulation set of “non-transparent” ($\beta = .06, p > .1$). In addition, from the unpaired samples t-test using the Welch-Satterthwaite test we obtain a t-value of 1.70 ($p < .1$). Thus the result reveals that compare to the non-transparent situation, in transparent situation, senders tend to send M-coupons with the incentive for them is higher than the incentive for the receivers to deal prone receivers. For the complete description in this section please refer to Table 24 in appendix A for the detail result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive transparency.

3.6.2.7 Relationship between Incentive Conditionality and Deal proneness

Hypothesis 7 predicts that *incentive conditionality* is positively correlated with the *receivers' deal proneness*. However, we obtain an insignificant result in the assumed relationship in Hypothesis 7 with the path coefficient of $-.02$ ($p > .1$). This main analysis result implies that when senders are required to send M-coupons with a conditional incentive (i.e. senders can only obtain their incentive after the receivers of this M-coupon redeem it), they will send it to any receivers regardless their deal proneness character.

In addition, as we understand from the main analysis above that the incentive conditionality does not influence the senders' decision to target particular receivers based on their deal proneness. However, it is important to perform an additional examination aiming at understanding how the presence of another manipulation variable might influence the result of assumed relationship in Hypothesis 7. Therefore, we split the data according to the *incentive differentiation*. The result implies that the presence of other manipulation situation, in this case incentive differentiation, does not influence the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *deal proneness*. Independent of the senders' incentive being higher than the receivers', when senders cannot obtain their incentive immediately, they tend to choose any receivers while not considering their deal proneness.

The detailed result is the following: in the manipulation set of "different" we obtain an insignificant result ($\beta = -.06$, $p > .1$) as well as in the manipulation set of "no different" ($\beta = .03$, $p > .1$) for the assumed relationship in hypothesis 7. Meanwhile, the unpaired samples t-test using Welch-Satterthwaite Test (t-value of 1.30, $p > .1$) has also proven the presence of *incentive differentiation* in M-coupon does not influence the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *receivers' deal proneness*. Please confer to Table 22 in Appendix A for the comprehensive result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive differentiation.

3.6.2.8 Interaction Effect of Incentive Conditionality and Incentive Transparency on Deal Proneness

The assumed interaction effect of *incentive conditionality* and *incentive transparency* on the *receivers' deal proneness* yields an insignificant result ($\beta = .02, p > .1$), leading to the dismissal of Hypothesis 8. The result of the main analysis implies that when senders are required to send M-coupons with a conditional incentive (i.e. senders can only obtain their incentive after the receivers of this M-coupon have redeemed theirs) and the information of incentive is transparent, sender will choose any receivers without considering their deal proneness character.

Considering the insignificant result for both the Indonesian and the German group, we perform an additional analysis by divided the data according to the incentive transparency by using effect coding, namely “transparent” as 1 and “non-transparent” as -1. From this analysis, we obtain an insignificant result of the assumed relationship of *incentive conditionality* and *deal proneness* for the manipulation set of “transparent” ($\beta = .001, p > .1$) as well as for the “non-transparent” ($\beta = -.05, p > .1$). In addition the unpaired samples t-test using the Welch-Satterthwait Test has also shown that there is no different result interpretation for the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *receivers' deal proneness* in transparent and non-transparent situation (t-value of 0.69, $p > .1$). Thus, the result of this additional analysis supports the result of main analysis. Please refer to Table 24 in Appendix A for the comprehensive result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive transparency.

3.7 Summary

The results of this first study support some of our Hypotheses. In our Hypothesis 1 we have assumed that when senders are required to send M-coupons containing an incentive where the value of the incentive is higher for the senders than for the receivers, senders will send it to strong-tie receivers. However, in this study, we find that when senders have to share M-coupon where the value of the incentive is

higher for the senders than for the receivers, they will send it to any of receiver regardless the tie-strength between them.

Apparently, the incentive transparency will make a difference in the senders' decision to choose particular receivers. In a transparent situation, where information about the senders' incentive is revealed by the firms, senders will send M-coupons with the value of the incentive are higher for the senders than for the receivers, to strong-tie receivers. Nonetheless, when the information about the incentive is not revealed by the firms, senders will choose receivers from weak-ties relationship. The senders' consideration regarding the impression they make on the receivers (Ryu & Feick, 2007; Xiao et al., 2011) and how the receivers would respond to the incentivized WOM with the value of the incentive is higher for the senders than for the receivers, might be the reason for the senders to decide differently depending on the incentive transparency. Receivers from strong-ties will participate in WOM by redeeming the M-coupon without needing an incentive. Additionally they also tend not to have a negative impression of the senders of this incentivized WOM (Ryu & Feick, 2007), even if the incentive for the senders is higher than their own.

Concerning the relation between incentive differentiation and the receivers' deal proneness we assume that when the value of the incentive in M-coupon is higher for the senders than for the receivers, senders will share this coupon with deal prone receivers. This is supported by the results of this study. Still, when taking the incentive transparency into consideration, we also find that senders tend to share an M-coupon with deal prone receivers if the value of the incentive is higher for the senders than for the receivers, especially when the information about their incentive is being revealed by the companies issuing this coupon. In a non-transparent situation, the deal proneness of the receivers might not the major consideration of the senders when determining the suitable receivers.

Once again, we find that senders are not really concerned about whether or not they make a negative impression by potentially being perceived as greedy by sending M-coupons with a higher incentive for themselves compared to the incentive for the

receivers. From the senders' perspective, they might think that even though the receivers get a lower incentive than they do, it is still an incentive in the end – no matter how big or how small it is, the receivers can take advantage of it.

Referring to the “pay per performance” and the “pay per lead” method by Libai et al. (2003), this first study also tries to explore these situations by manipulating variables: an unconditional incentive is similar to “pay per lead” while a conditional incentive similar to “pay per performance”. The result shows that the conditionality of an incentive in M-coupons does not determine the senders' decision to choose suitable receivers for this M-coupon. Independent of conditionality in M-coupons, if senders have to share it with others, they will share it with any receivers, regardless the tie-strength between them and independent of whether the receivers are deal prone or not. This result seems consistent Even though the information about the incentive is kept confidential or revealed by firms.

CHAPTER 4

The Receivers Perspectives on Incentivized WOM

Technology has shaped word-of-mouth activity in many different ways. Accordingly, WOM activity has shifted from its traditional verbal communication to more formalized forms such as rich image coupons containing the issuing companies' brand which can be shared with others. With the development of technology to enables WOM activities, thus it is important for firms to be able to manage and measure the potential effect of their customers' WOM activity (Verlegh et al., 2013). Offering an incentive to encourage consumers to engage in WOM activities is one possible strategy for firms to manage and measure the success of their marketing programs through WOM. M-coupons hereby become a new tool for inducing WOM while at the same time enabling firms to manage and measure the result.

Research in the field of mobile coupons so far has only provided a limited understanding of the factors determining consumer responses triggered by mobile coupons (Banerjee & Yancey, 2010). Some researchers have explored the attributes (e.g. technical format, configuration channel and personalization) of M-coupons (Wehmeyer & Müller-Lankenau, 2005), service perspectives (e.g. type of messages, time of delivery of messages and product relevancy) of M-coupons (Bacile & Goldsmith, 2011) and their discount size as well as message timing and the affected / concerned product category (Banerjee & Yancey, 2010) and how these factors influence the consumers' intention to redeem an M-coupon.

Another study on the receivers' intention concerning this incentivized WOM through mobile devices was done by (Yang & Zhou, 2011). Their research concludes that subjective norms, perceived costs and perceived pleasure significantly influence the receivers' intention to respond to WOM content. A research concerning the impact of tie-strength by Willach et al. (2011) states that tie-strength between senders and receivers and the senders are perceived by the receivers as an expert will increase the receivers' purchase intention. However,


little if any research has been done focusing on incentivized WOM dispersed via M-coupons while also taking into account the senders' and the receivers' respective role. Therefore, this dissertation tackles these shortcomings and introduces the components of incentives strategy (e.g. incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency) to improve receivers' attitude towards M-coupon and behavioral intention to redeem the M-coupon.

To understand the receivers' attitude and behavioral intention concerning the redemption of M-coupons, the theory of planned behavior (TPB) provides a solid foundation on how a receiver would respond to M-coupons with a particular component incentive in it. In addition, this second study considering also the tie-strength between senders and receivers of M-coupons.

4.1 Revisiting the Theory of Planned Behavior

In the field of consumer research, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) developed by Ajzen (1991) is an influential approach to predict and understand the behavioral intention and actual behavior of consumers. According to TPB, consumers' behavior is predicted by their inner and outer factors where attitude and perceived behavioral control variables represent the inner factors and the subjective norms variable represents the outer factor. Those inner and outer factors jointly influence each person's actual behavior as they affect behavioral intention. According to Ajzen (1991), attitude describes the degree to which a person has a negative or positive predisposition toward an object. Meanwhile the perceived behavioral control refers to the perception that persons have regarding their ability to perform a particular behavior. Subjective norms denominates as perceived opinions of others deemed as important persons tending to influence how a person assessing a certain situation (Ajzen, 1991).

Figure 5: A Conceptual Model of Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior



Source: Ajzen (1991)

Considering M-coupons as a novel tool to generate mobile word-of-mouth (Palka et al., 2009), thus understanding consumers' attitudes and their behavioral intention in the context of incentivized WOM using M-coupon becomes important factor in this dissertation. In the context of WOM in general, the influence of interpersonal communication on attitude, behavioral intention and actual behavior has been discussed for a long time by physiologists and sociologists. Hovland (1948) states that there are four important things are included in social communication namely: communicators, stimuli (i.e. messages), receivers and responses. Among these four, response from a receiver is the most difficult thing to measure and to control by the firms.


In WOM activity both online (e-WOM) and via mobile devices (M-WOM), a receiver can become a sender as well. This change of roles needs to happen through a process. The basic model of WOM through mobile devices developed by Palka et al. (2009) described three steps in WOM activity, namely "Receipt", "Usage" and "Forwarding". Persons are called "receivers" when they are in the usage and recipient stage, while if the receivers forward the coupon to other people, the receivers act as senders themselves. However, there are numbers of psychological conditions in receiving and sending of WOM content, particularly when incentives are involved, which affect the participants' real behavior to use WOM content.

With the Theory of Planned Behavior, Ajzen (1991) attempt to explain the consumer psychological conditions which affect real behavior.

According to Clement et al. (2012), the TPB postulates that knowledge or beliefs if not accompanied by other factors will not suffice to drive a particular behavior (e.g. to engage in incentivized WOM). In this dissertation, the term “beliefs” refers to the components of an incentive, namely incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency in M-coupons as well as to the particular behavior expect to take place, i.e. redeeming the M-coupon. There are numbers of psychological constructs between knowledge and behavior, such as attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. The term “attitude” refers to the perception of a particular object (i.e. WOM contents), “subjective norm” refers to how others persons perceives of a particular behavior (e.g. engaging in incentivized WOM activities) and “perceived behavioral control” refers to the receivers’ perception of control that they have concerning the redemption of any M-coupon (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). All of these constructs (attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavior) influence the receivers’ behavioral intention of redeeming the M-coupon. This behavioral intention ultimately influences the receivers’ actual behavior concerning redeeming this M-coupon.

Considering this second experimental study focuses on the receivers’ perspective, it is important to take into account the constructs related to this point of view, particularly when incentive is involved in the activities. These include e.g. the tie-strength between senders and receivers as well as, the reciprocity situation which were experienced by the receivers.

Figure 6: Research Model from the Receivers' Perspective



4.2 Research Hypotheses

In incentivized WOM activities, the components of incentives, namely incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency are used as incentive attributes. Based on our theoretical framework, we expect different outcomes as a result of different conditions concerning the incentive transparency, even though the coupons are shared by the same senders at the same time.

4.2.1 Relationship between Incentive Differentiation on the Receivers Attitude towards the M-coupon

According to research in the field of behavioral economics, persons will be more motivated to behave in a certain behavior if they receive a significant incentive (Ahrens et al., 2013). However, companies still find themselves in a dilemma if

they aim at providing incentives for both senders and receivers of incentivized WOM, i.e. if they use a “reward both” program. As discussed above, if a company provides senders and receivers with an equal incentive, both parties will behave differently compared to a situation where the incentive is shared unevenly between senders and receivers.

Getting a new customer as a result of engaging in incentivized WOM activities is the effect of stimuli like incentives. In particular in “reward both” program with the scheme of incentive: receivers obtain incentives larger than the incentive obtain by the senders (Ahrens et al., 2013). However, Ajzen (1991) explains that the psychological conditions affecting the receivers` real behavior remain unexplored. When adopting Ajzen`s theory, TPB, we assume that attitude is the psychological condition directly influenced by a differing incentive for both parties. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: Incentive differentiation between senders and receivers will weaken the receivers` favorable attitude towards M-coupons

In a “reward both” program where senders send M-coupons including a different incentive for the receivers than for themselves, senders consider possible receivers from a particular tie-strength. As Ryu and Feick (2007) state that senders with weak-ties to the receivers tend to maximize their own benefits and minimize their personal costs without feeling any responsibility for the receivers` welfare. Furthermore, Ryu and Feick (2007) argue that with the strong-ties, senders tend to be generally concerned about the receivers` prosperity. Nevertheless, the receivers` reaction to obtain an incentivized WOM from particular tie-strengths is only scarcely explored so far. Willach et al. (2011) suggest that regardless of the senders` tie-strength with the receivers, incentivized WOM will reduce the receivers` perceived trustworthiness of the senders. However, we still need to uncover the receivers` attitude toward incentivized WOM when they receive it from persons belonging to a particular tie-strength. To shed light on the receivers` possible attitude toward the object that being share with them, we postulate:

H2: The negative impact of incentive differentiation on attitude is moderated by tie-strength. The negative impact is stronger when the senders are from weak-ties spectrum

4.2.2 Relationship between Deal Proneness and Receivers Attitude towards the M-coupon

By engaging in promotional activities, companies aim at getting a response from all of their target consumers. However, marketers cannot expect the same promotional activity to yield a similar response throughout the whole group of target consumers as every consumer has different characteristics related to this promotional activity (d'Astous & Jacob, 2002; Montaner et al., 2011). Additionally, deal proneness has been defined as an individual's general tendency to respond to any promotional activity because he/she feels like "striking a deal" (Lichtenstein et al., 1990; Montaner et al., 2011).

In theory, deal proneness is rather related to transaction utility than to obtaining a low price per se. Transaction utility is created when consumers receive a higher incentive than their internal reference incentive (i.e. the incentive they expect, hence, exceeding their expectations) or if the offered price is lower than their internal reference prices (i.e. the offered price is lower than the expected price) (Thaler, 1985). Burton et al. (1998) describe deal proneness as "a mentally stored price" in which prices are always being compared. Accordingly, even though in the both situations the consumer is offered the same price of \$ 1.50, a consumer with deal proneness prefers to redeem a "50 Cents off" coupon for a product priced at \$ 2.00 compared to purchasing the same product for a price of \$ 1.50.

Previous research on validating deal proneness as a consumer characteristic has been done by e.g. DelVecchio (2005); Lichtenstein et al. (1990); Montaner et al. (2011). These research states that deal proneness is positively correlated with a favorable attitude towards the promotional activity for particular. This favorable attitude will influence the person's purchase behavior later on (Lichtenstein et al., 1990). Based on the discussion above, we assume the following:

H3: Deal proneness has a direct positive effect on the receivers' attitude towards M-coupons.

4.2.3 Relationship between Incentive Conditionality and Receivers Perceived Behavioral Control

As an important component in incentive, a condition for redeeming the incentive becomes a common strategy for firms. Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) argues that there are several conditional incentives which commonly used by the firms. For instance, BMG music used the following incentive: "Get 4 Free CDs, when you bring your friend into the club"; telecommunication companies usually offer discounts and other rewards to customers who have referred new customers who in turn sign up with these companies (Biyalogorsky et al., 2001).

These examples expose the complexity of choosing an adequate incentive where two parties are to be involved (e.g. existing and potential customer or sender and receiver). In the "pay per performance" program (or simply "pay per lead"), any decision from the potential receivers (e.g. to engage in WOM activities) will lead to particular consequences for the senders. In "pay per lead", senders obtain their incentive as soon as they send the respective M-coupon to others; meanwhile in "pay per performance" programs, senders obtain their incentive only when the receivers act accordingly by redeeming the M-coupon.

For the receivers, it does not make a difference if an incentive in WOM activities includes a condition. This possible condition does not influence their likelihood to obtain their incentive. Receivers will still obtain their incentive in neither pays per performance nor pays per lead program. However when receivers are aware that their decision to engage or not in incentivized WOM activities will influence the chance of senders to get their incentive, receivers might have to deal with some psychological condition which may influence their intention to engage in incentivized WOM activities. In this transparency situation, receivers are aware that their action will influence the senders' prosperity. This in turn urges or discourages receivers to redeem their own coupon as they thereby benefit the senders.

The receivers' ability or inability to perform a particular action is related to their perceived control on their own behavior (Kang et al., 2006). Perceived control on own behavior or Ajzen, (1991) named it as perceived behavioral control is an important variable in TPB and it indicates the extent to which a person can perform actions required to deal with specific situations (Ajzen, 1991). The Situation concerning perceived behavioral control refer to the presence of factors which may facilitate or hinder an action. For example, the availability of money, time or required skills needed to perform the certain task (Taylor & Todd, 1995), as well as the individuals' self-confidence on their ability to act accordingly (Cheng et al., 2006; Conner & Abraham, 2001).

In the context of this dissertation, the receivers find themselves in a position where the receivers' (non-)action might influence their own as well as others' welfare. By redeeming their M-coupon, the receivers enable the senders to enjoy their incentive for engaging in this WOM activity. In such a situation, the receivers' perceived control on their behavior is not just influenced by internal concerns (i.e. whether or not receivers have resources to perform a certain behavior) but also by external concerns (i.e. considering their actions' effect on the senders' welfare).

Nonetheless, the research having adopted perceived behavioral control as a predictor to influence intention, still assume that perceived behavioral control is exclusively derived from the persons' inner beliefs about their own capabilities. Research done by Kang et al. (2006) e.g. suggests that the receivers' perceived behavioral control is derived from each person's computer skills and their physical environment. This means that perceived behavioral control is derived from personal capabilities to perform a certain action. In accordance with Kang et al. (2006), Becker et al. (2010); Clement et al. (2012) also suggest that perceived behavioral control is each person's belief regarding their own capabilities.

There is still a considerable lack of research on the receivers' perceived behavioral control when engaging in incentivized WOM activities while at the same time considering perceived behavioral control not only in term of each person's belief

regarding their own capabilities but also in term of the others' well-being. To shed light on the possible behavioral intention that receivers may have, particularly when information about the senders' incentive is made available for them we postulate:

H4: Incentive conditionality in M-coupon has direct negative effects on the receivers' perceived behavioral control to redeem the M-coupon.

In view of the fact that perceived behavioral control is derived not solely from each person's belief regarding their capabilities but also from other factors which need to be explored. As we understand that in incentivized WOM there are two parties involves (e.g. senders and receivers). Thus this is important for the firms to understand the relationship between senders and receivers of the incentivized WOM (Bristor, 1990; Willach et al., 2011). As a social behavior, thus a person who is engage in WOM activities will interact with people from a spectrum of various degree of tie-strength spanning from acquaintance to the family (Wirtz & Chew, 2002). Therefore, the concept of tie-strength by Granovetter (1973) can be the good foundation to understand the relationship between senders and receivers on incentivized WOM activities.

According to Brown and Reingen (1987), receivers will perceive senders who have strong-tie relationship to them as more influential than the senders having weak-tie relationship with receivers. That means that senders having strong-tie relationship with the receivers can also influence receivers control on a certain desired behavior. According to Bandura et al. (1980), each person's desired behavior is strongly influenced by their confidence in their ability to perform that behavior. Each person's confidence in their ability to act according to their desired behavior is defined by Ajzen and Madden (1986) as perceived behavioral control.

Normally, a person would not hesitate to say "no" to an offer obtained from weak-tie senders and they feel able to take such a decision. However, it is hard to refuse an offer received from somebody who deemed as strong-tie, particularly when this decision influences the senders' well-being (e.g. when there is conditionality in incentivized WOM). Therefore, we expect tie-strength to positively moderate the

relationship between incentive conditionality and the receivers' perceived behavioral control. Thus, we proposed the following:

H5: The negative effect of the incentive conditionality on receivers' perceived behavioral control is moderated by tie-strength. The negative effect is stronger when the senders have a strong-tie with the receivers

4.2.4 Relationship between Reciprocity and Receivers Perceived Behavioral Control

The key actors in incentivized WOM activities, senders and receivers, have different roles in each activity. Therefore, they react differently depending on the stimuli affecting them. Seen from the receivers' perspective, their own action might be based on their previous experience with the senders or we can identify it as reciprocity circumstances (i.e. receivers need to returning a favor to the senders or senders owes a favor to the receivers). Interpretations on reciprocity are summarized by Fehr and Schmidt (2001) as someone's reaction towards somebody else's behavior referring to them. Several previous studies have linked reciprocity to areas such as enforcement to perform an activity (Fehr & Falk, 1999) and gift giving (Ruffle, 1999). Additionally, other studies have focused on reciprocity and its effect on intention such study by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) (i.e. reciprocity based on intention perceived as kind by the receivers). However, they also consider that the judgment of "kindness" is also based on the fairness of each actor (fairness based kindness). Accordingly, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) consider reciprocity as a reward for kindness or a punishment for an unkindness, which can also be called positive or negative reciprocity (Fehr & Gächter, 2000).

People usually perform reciprocate actions based on the motives: e.g. to reduce the feeling of being treated unfairly and also to punish the opposing party for their unfair treatments and on the other hand people reciprocate other because they want to return a favor to other (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). This means that people try to

achieve an equilibrium on their fairness feeling by decreasing what they give and increasing what they receive (Walster et al., 1973).

In the context of incentivized WOM if the receivers agree to engage in this activity (i.e. by redeem the M-coupon), reciprocity might arise if the receivers have to do the senders some favors or when the receivers expect something in return from the sender. This reciprocity situation will stronger especially when the receivers know that the senders' welfare depends on their action. Therefore "tit-for-tat" becomes the receivers' first reaction. This reaction in turn may influence the receivers' perceived control on their certain behavior.

Whether the receivers have to return the senders a favor by redeeming the M-coupon or whether the receivers expect the senders to thank them if they redeem the M-coupon, the respective situations will influence the receivers' perceived behavioral control. Even though receivers have enough resources to engage in incentivized WOM (e.g. by redeeming the M-coupon), but it does not guarantee that they will do so. Reciprocity situation can be the reason that can reinforce or impede receivers' control on their behavior to engage in incentivized WOM activities. This in turn leads to the following hypothesis:

H6: Reciprocity has a negative direct effect on the receivers' perceived behavioral control when considering redeeming an M-coupon.

4.2.5 Relationship between Reciprocity and Subjective Norms

Reciprocity is about equilibrium and fairness. In order to achieve an equilibrium people tend to do everything that is necessary while disregarding other opinions on whether or not that the action that they will perform to achieve the equilibrium is appropriate (Walster et al., 1973). In normal situation when reciprocity is not involved, other opinions become the social factor which may exert pressure on a person to perform or not perform a particular behavior. Ajzen (1991) labels this circumstance as subjective norms. In this study, subjective norms are a combination of the receivers' normative beliefs about what other people might think about their

decision to engage in incentivized WOM (e.g. by redeeming the M-coupon) on one side and the extent to which the receivers take opinions of others into consideration on the other (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).

The receivers' intention to redeem an M-coupon may be based on motives of reciprocating, i.e. they want to give the senders something in return for what they did for the receivers. Receivers with such a motive will reciprocate the senders' previous action regardless the possible impact of doing so. They might still consider other people's opinion about this reciprocate action. However, the extent to which receivers really deal with other opinions may different between those receivers having according motives and those without a motive to reciprocate. The first type of receivers, i.e. those with a motive to reciprocate tends to perceive opinions of others as not important as these receivers have a desire to achieve an equilibrium between what they received and what they gave and to reduce a certain stress or their feeling of restlessness (Walster et al., 1973). Summing up the relation between reciprocity and subjective norms, the following hypothesis states:

H7: A situation characterized by reciprocity positively influences subjective norms concerning the redemption of M-coupons.

In the relationship between senders and receivers in WOM activities, the tie-strength between them becomes the success factor of WOM activities. The senders and receivers having a strong-tie relationship tend not to expect anything from their relationship. They willing to help or respond to other's needs but they do not expect something in return (Clark et al., 1986; Frenzen & Nakamoto, 1993; Ryu & Feick, 2007). On the other hand, people in the weak-tie relationship spectrum tend to have reciprocation motive which is driven primarily by self-interest and they will consider about cost and benefit on their relationship (Ryu & Feick, 2007). Therefore, we can understand that reciprocation situation will usually occur when senders and receivers are in the weak-tie spectrum.

Receivers having a reciprocity motive tend reciprocate the previous action of the senders and somehow they will first refer to opinion from others whether or not

they have to do the reciprocation. Opinions of others will influence the way receivers perceive a situation at some point, particularly the opinion of those close to the receivers, e.g. parents, friends, relatives (Cheng et al., 2006; Park, 2000). Besides of that, receivers will also referring opinion of others that they regularly communicate with (e.g. subordinate, superior).The more regular communication between receivers and the persons they deem important for them, the probability that receivers will agree with the ideas and beliefs of that person is undeniable (Leenders, 2002).

In the context of receivers having reciprocity motive and the urgency for them to seek opinion from others concerning the best decision whether or not they have to do the reciprocation, there are two direction of opinion which will differentiate receivers` decision based on the tie-strength that they have with the sender of incentivized WOM. The need to fit with others and to avoid conflict and confrontation become the consideration of the Eastern consumer (Fiske et al. 1998), particularly to maintain harmonious with others that they deemed as close to them. Therefore for receivers having Eastern culture, the urgency to rely on other opinion in reciprocity situation is stronger when the senders are from strong-tie relationship. Meanwhile for receiver holding a Western culture which has a high uncertainty-avoidance and assumes an external locus of control, thus rely on other opinion becomes important for them to shape their decision and action (Mooij and Hofstede 2011). However for receiver having Western culture, the need to rely on other opinion is stronger when the senders` of incentivized WOM are come from weak-tie relationship spectrum.

This in turn leads to the following hypothesis:

H8: The Positive impact of reciprocity and subjective norm is moderated by tie-strength.

4.2.6 Behavioral Intention

As suggested by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), when a person determines their intention to perform a particular action, he or she will consider about cost and benefit on doing so. The consideration about cost and benefit lead to positive or negative attitude toward the object and accordingly lead to positive and negative intention to engage to particular activity. According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), attitude is the result of individual`s expectancy and value judgment of the objects or behavior in question. As a person holds a positive attitude, he or she tends to have a positive intention to engage in a certain behavior. In contrast, if a person holds a negative attitude, he or she less likely to engage in such behavior. Previous research have proven that the positive attitude lead to the positive behavioral intention (see also, Becker et al., 2010; Clement et al., 2012). To support the result of previous researches, therefore leads to the following hypothesis:

H9: Attitude towards M-coupon will have a positive influence on receivers` behavioral intention to redeem the M-coupon.

TPB posits that knowledge or beliefs (here, beliefs refers to the cost and benefit of engaging incentivized WOM) alone do not drive behavior (here, redeeming the M-coupon) (Becker et al., 2010; Clement et al., 2012). Besides the attitude, between knowledge and behavior also lies subjective norms that support or impede such behavior.

In this dissertation, we assumed that with the components of incentive namely incentive differentiation and incentive conditionality, receivers will recognized the cost and benefit when engaging incentivized WOM. To confirm their belief regarding the cost of benefit, other opinion becomes the relevant influence for them to shape and to proof the behavior.

Subjective norms are defined by Ajzen and Fishbein, (1980) as the perceived social pressure to perform or not perform the particular behavior. In the context of M-coupon redemption, subjective norms becomes important when receivers are in the

low capacity (e.g. have a limited resources) to perform a particular behavior so that they have to rely on other's opinion (Kang et al., 2006). In accordance with Kang et al. (2006), in this research we also assume that receivers tend to have a low capacity in making a certain decision because they have to consider about the components of incentive in M-coupon and also the reciprocate motive that they might have when they make a decision to redeem the M-coupon. Since the receivers tend to have a low capacity to shape a behavior thus we propose the following hypothesis:

H10: Subjective norms have a positive impact on receivers` behavioral intention to redeem the M-coupon.

As one of predictor of behavior, perceived behavioral control represents as personal inner control over the behavior. According to Ajzen (1991), perceived behavioral control measures how good a person could perform the certain action with a specific situation to deal with. Person might perceive a specific situation as an opportunity or an impediment.

In accordance with Ajzen (1991), Conner and Abraham (2001) state that person`s behavior is influenced by his or her self-confidence on the ability to perform a certain action. The person`s self-confidence in performing a particular action is usually derived from their measurement or judgment regarding the cost and benefit, the difficulties and the available resources to perform such action (Taylor & Todd, 1995). The effect of perceived behavioral control on person behavioral intention has attracted the attention of many researchers from different field. For instance, person`s behavioral intention to spread negative WOM by Cheng et al. (2006); intention to use e-coupon (Kang et al., 2006; Lee, 2009); intention to engage in online game (Lee, 2009); intention to download legal music (Clement et al., 2012). Their results show that perceived behavioral control positively influence person`s intention to perform certain behavior. To support and to complement the result from the previous research but in the context of incentivized WOM, thus we propose the following hypothesis:

H11: Perceived behavioral control will have a positive impact on receivers` behavioral intention to redeem the M-coupon

4.3 Setup of Experimental Study

4.3.1 Design of Experimental Study

Our second experimental study aims at investigating hypothesis H1 up to H11 regarding the influence of receivers` attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control on behavioral intention to redeem the M-coupon, in both of transparent and non-transparent situation. In a transparent situation, hence, a situation in which senders and receivers have similar information regarding the incentive components used in each incentivized WOM tool (e.g. M-coupon). In non-transparent situation, only senders have the information regarding the possible incentive that they will receive and also the incentive addressing for the receivers. This chapter will encompass the research design, outlining procedures to administer the survey and data collection. In addition to that, it will also discuss the instruments used to manipulate the variables and how to measure the dependent variables.

With the intention to test the hypotheses set forth in current chapter, we conducted a 2x2x2x2x2 factorial design. We manipulated the variables of incentive differentiation (different versus no different) x incentive conditionality (conditional versus unconditional) x incentive transparency (transparent versus non-transparent) x tie-strength (strong versus weak) and products (McDonald`s versus Starbucks). In total there are 32 scenarios. However considering the non-transparent situation, therefore we have to eliminate 12 similar scenarios.

In this experiment, the participants are labeled as “the group of receiver”. The participants are 80 students from Universität Hamburg and 80 university students from Jakarta in Indonesia (Prasetiya Mulya Business School and Multimedia Nusantara University). We divide the group of receiver into four groups. Accordingly, every group of receiver participated in five (5) out of twenty (20) scenarios. The distribution of scenarios in every group is based on balance in

complete block design. This means that for each group, four transparent scenarios are presented as well as one in non-transparent scenario.

This study is conducted as an online survey with a questionnaire. The scenarios are also explained in this online survey, which was done in two languages: German language and Indonesian language. The survey is structured as follows:

In **section one** the participants are asked to mention eight (8) names, which will represent potential sender of M-coupons. Each of the eight names in section one is generated with four different questions. Questions number one and four aims to generate names from a strong-tie relationship spectrum while the second and third questions aims to generate name from a weak-tie relationship spectrum. The questions are structured as follows:

1. One day, you have to leave your apartment for a couple of weeks, maybe for a vacation or because of a business trip. During your absence, you need someone to look after your apartment (e.g. to water plants, to check your mail). Whom would you entrust with that responsibility? For the Indonesian respondents the first question is modified to better suit the Indonesian culture. It accordingly is: “One day, you forget your wallet and, thus, have no money, whom will you ask to lend you money when you need it?”
2. When you want to have a casual conversation about hobbies and daily activities, with whom do you prefer to discuss such matters?
3. When you need someone to ask about a school assignment or you need to borrow a lecture notes, whom do you prefer to ask in such matters?
4. When you need someone to talk about personal matters (e.g. about your romantic relationship or about family matters), with whom would you most talk to about it

Section two features the questions about the receivers` attitude toward the product; Starbucks and McDonald`s and their deal proneness. The deal proneness was measured using six items scale adapted from Lichtenstein et al. (1990). Attitude

towards the product; Starbucks and McDonald`s are self- designed question. All items are measured on five-point Likert scales.

In **section three**, the participant will receive 5 scenarios, as follow:

Figure 7: Sample of a Scenario – The Receivers` Perspectives in Transparent Setting

Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Sie eines Tages fünf (5) Mobile-Coupons/M-Coupons erhalten (Rabattgutscheine, die per Mobiltelefon verschickt werden). Stellen Sie sich zunächst vor, Sie haben den nachfolgenden Coupon erhalten und beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen:

P1 (the name of person one that senders have mentioned in section one) hat Ihnen diesen Coupon geschickt



This scenario is followed by 20 questions. For the complete questions please confers to Appendix C

P1 to P8 are the names of the persons that participants have mentioned in section one. Those names are pre-determined and will automatically appear in every scenario. For every scenario, participants have to answer sixteen questions regarding their attitude, subjective norms, their perceived behavioral control, their responses when the situation is characterized by reciprocity and their intention to redeem the M-coupons and four questions regarding the manipulation check (please refer to Table 11 for the complete questions). The scenarios appear one scenario at the time.

The **section four** consists of the questions about demographic information of the participants.

4.3.2 Measures Items for Receivers Perspectives

In addition to the manipulated constructs, we include six constructs in the model namely the receivers` attitude towards M-coupon, the subjective norms, receivers` perceived behavioral control, reciprocity, deal proneness and receivers` intention to redeem the M-coupon. We measured receivers` deal proneness, receivers` perceived behavioral control, receivers` responses when the situation is characterized by reciprocity and receivers` intention with five-point Likert scales spanning from strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), neither disagree nor agree (3), agree (4) and strongly agree (5). To measure attitude and subjective norms we employed five-point semantic scales.

All constructs consist of multiple items, adapted to the characteristics of the research setting and the used scenarios. The three items used to measure attitude are derived from research by Huff and Alden (1999), while the three items used to measure subjective norms are derived from Shimp and Kavas (1984). The three items used to measure perceived behavioral control are derived from research by Clement et al. (2012) as well as from research by Pavlou and Fygenon, (2006). The construct concerning intention is measured using three items adopted from Ajzen (1991). To measure deal proneness construct, we employ six items adopted from Lichtenstein et al. (1990), while the measurement of reciprocity is adopted from Eisenberger et al. (2004). The manipulation checks are self- designed and performed to test whether respondents correctly perceived the incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality, incentive transparency as well as tie-strength.

Table 11: Scale Items Used in Second Experimental Study

Constructs		Items	Sources
Deal Proneness	DP1.	I enjoy looking for rebate offers	(Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, & Burton, 1990)
	DP2.	Redeeming rebates makes me feel good	
	DP3.	Rebates have caused me to buy products, even though I did not	

Constructs		Items	Sources
		plan to buy it.	
	DP4	I enjoy using rebates, regardless of the amount I save by doing so.	
	DP5	When I use rebates, I feel that I am getting a good deal.	
	DP6	I have favorite brands but most of the time I buy the brand that offers a rebate.	
Attitude		The M-coupon that I received from (P1-P8 pre-determined by researcher) is	(Huff & Alden, 1999)
	Att1	Useless - Useful	
	Att2	Unpleasant - Pleasant	
	Att3	Unfair - Fair	
Subjective Norms		Most people who are important for me would think that it isto redeem this M-coupon	(Shimp & Kavas, 1984)
	SN1	Waste of time - Wise of time	
	SN2	Worthless - Worthy	
	SN3	Useless - Useful	
Perceived Behavioral Control	PBC1	I feel free to redeem the M-coupon, because it is my own decision	(Clement et al., 2012; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006)
	PBC2	I am in control when I have to redeem the M-coupon because I only redeem it from a particular sender	
	PBC3	I am in control when I have to redeem the M-coupon because I only redeem the M-coupon if it is valuable for me.	
Reciprocity	Rcp1	I expect that sender would do the same, if I redeem this M-coupon	(Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck,

Constructs		Items	Sources
			2004, Eisenberger et al., 2004)
	Rcp2	I expect that the sender will thank me nicely, if I redeem this M-coupon	
	Rcp3	I redeem this M-coupon because I repay back the favor that sender has done to me	
	Rcp4	I redeem the M-coupon because the sender always treat me well	
Intention	Int1	I have strong possibility to redeem the M-coupon from(the name of sender)	Ajzen (1991)
	Int2	I have high intention to redeem the M-coupon from(the name of sender)	
	Int3	I intend to redeem this kind of M-coupon in the near future	
		Based on the coupon you just received, which of the following statements is true?	Self-designed
Manipulation Check concerning incentive differentiation	Mc1	I get the same discount as the sender I get a lower discount than the sender No do not have information on this	
Manipulation Check concerning incentive conditionality	Mc2	I receive the M-coupon and sender can directly claim his/her discount (unconditional) I get the M-coupon, and only when I redeem it, the sender can claim his/her discount (conditional) No do not have information on this	
Manipulation Check	Mc3	The information about the incentive is known by both sender	

Constructs		Items	Sources
concerning incentive transparency		and receiver (transparent) The information about the incentive is not passed on to you (non-transparent)	
Manipulation Check concerning tie-strength	Mc4	I have a close relationship with the sender I have a distant relationship with the sender	

4.3.3 Demographic characteristics of the participants

The gender proportion is almost equal between male and female, both in German and Indonesian group (please refer to Table 12 for further detail). Every participant participated in five scenarios out of 20 scenarios. Accordingly we obtain 400 responses for each group. After we did the manipulation check and also removing the samples having low data quality, we obtained 332 responses from German group and 352 responses from Indonesian group.


Table 12: Demographic Characteristic from the Receiver Group

Characteristics		Percentage	
		German (n = 80)	Indonesia (n = 80)
Gender	Male	45.7%	48.3%
	Female	54.3%	51.7%
Age	15 - 24	46.9%	81.6%
	25 - 39	50.6%	18.4%
	41 - 50	2.5%	-
	51- 70	-	-
	>70	-	-

As we employ Starbucks and McDonald`s as brands in the fictitious M-coupon, it is important for us to understand whether the receivers have favorability on those two brands. Five-points Likert scales have been utilized to measure receivers` favorability attitudes toward those two brands. The result shows that receivers from

the German group on average disagree that McDonald`s is their favorite brand (Mean = 2.23, SD = 1.11). The most frequent responses from participants show that McDonalds is perceived as unfavorable (32.9%). Please refer to Figure 9 for further details on the perception of McDonalds. Just like McDonald`s, Starbucks is also not perceived as a favorable brand by receivers in German group (Mean = 2.22, SD = 1.19). Additionally, the most recurrent responses have also shown that the respondents have expressed their opinion with choosing “I completely disagree” option to the statement of “I love Starbucks” or “Ich liebe Starbucks” (34.5%), please refer to Figure 10 for further details on perception of both brands by the German participants.

Figure 8: The Receivers` Favorability towards McDonald`s in the German Group **Figure 9: The Receivers` Favorability towards Starbucks in the German Group**



Furthermore, in Indonesian group, in average they neither like nor dislike of McDonald`s (Mean = 3.2, SD = .99). However the most frequent response has suggested that the receivers agreed that they love McDonald`s (38.6%), please see Figure 11. Meanwhile for Starbucks, receivers from Indonesia perceived it as their favorite brand (Mean = 3.83, SD = 1.03) and most of participants agreed that they love Starbucks (50.5%), please refer to Figure 12.

Figure 10: The Receivers` Favorability towards McDonald`s in the Indonesian Group





Figure 11: The Receivers` Favorability towards Starbucks in the Indonesian Group



4.3.4 Data Processing

Similar to the data processing procedures in first experimental study (senders` perspectives), at first, we have to perform manipulation check to test whether respondents correctly perceive the incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality, tie-strength as well as incentive transparency. As the result of manipulation check, we have to remove 20 responses (5%) from the German group (n= 400) and 29 responses (7.25%) from the Indonesian group (n= 400), which were not correctly classified the incentive differentiation, the incentive conditionality, the incentive transparency as well as the tie-strength.

After performing a manipulation check, the next step is to make a decision whether or not we have to merge the data from the German and the Indonesian group. Therefore, the multi group analysis was perform in order to find out the significant results differences of outer model and inner model measurements between those two countries. If there are no significant differences, thus we can merge the samples from German and Indonesian group.

To justify our decision to merge the German and Indonesian samples, thus we have performed multi group analysis using SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle et al., 2014). From the multi group analysis, we will acquire significant or insignificant value differences of reflective measurement model between German and Indonesian group. The

Welch-Satterthwaite test parameter will be used to justify the differences between those two countries.

The first parameter which is based on reflective measurement model is loading factor differences between German and Indonesia samples. As we can see at Table 13, nine out of twenty loading factors have significant differences. We also obtain also significant differences of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR) between German and Indonesian samples on the variables of deal proneness, intention, reciprocity and subjective norms (see Table 14).

Table 13: Outer Loading Differences between German and Indonesian Samples

Items	Outer Loadings-differences (German - Indonesia)	
	t-value (German vs. Indonesia)	p-value (German vs. Indonesia)
Attitude		
The M-coupon that I received from..... (Name of the sender) is.		
Useless - Useful	2.337	0.02
Unpleasant - Pleasant	0.19	0.85
Unfair - Fair	0.10	0.32
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC)		
I feel free to redeem the M-coupon, because it is my own decision	0.006	0.99
I am in control when I have to redeem the M- coupon because I only redeem it from a particular sender	Deleted	Deleted
I am in control when I have to redeem the M- coupon because I only redeem the M-coupon if it is valuable for me.	0.73	0.46
Intention		
I have strong possibility to redeem the M-coupon from(the name of sender)	5.406	0.00
I have high intention to redeem the M-coupon from(the name of sender)	4.911	0.00
I intend to redeem this kind of M-coupon in the near future	3.837	0.00
Subjective Norms		

Items	Outer Loadings-differences (German - Indonesia)	
	t-value (German vs. Indonesia)	p-value (German vs. Indonesia)
Most people who are important for me would think that it isto redeem this M-coupon:		
Waste of time - Wise of time	1.131	0.26
Worthless - Worthy	2.938	0.00
Useless - Useful	2.562	0.01
Deal Proneness		
I enjoy looking for rebate offers	1761	0.08
Redeeming rebates makes me feel good	1144	0.25
Rebates have caused me to buy products, even though I did not plan to buy it.	1066	0.29
I enjoy using rebates, regardless of the amount I save by doing so.	Deleted	Deleted
When I use rebates, I feel that I am getting a good deal.	1396	0.16
I have favorite brands but most of the time I buy the brand that offers a rebate.	2.387	0.02
Reciprocity		
I expect that sender would do the same, if I redeem this M-coupon	1.622	0.10
I expect that the sender will thank me nicely, if I redeem this M-coupon	1058	0.29
I redeem this M-coupon because I repay back the favor that sender has done to me	1.000	0.32
I redeem the M-coupon because the sender always treat me well	1.224	0.22

Table 14: Average Variance Extracted and Composite Reliability Differences between German and Indonesian Samples

Constructs	AVE-differences (German - Indonesia)		Composite Reliability-differences (German – Indonesia)	
	t-value (German vs. Indonesia)	p-value (German vs. Indonesia)	t-value (German vs. Indonesia)	p-value (German vs. Indonesia)
Attitude	1.031	0.303	0.981	0.327
Perceived Behavioral	0.994	0.321	0.653	0.514

Constructs	AVE-differences (German - Indonesia)		Composite Reliability-differences (German – Indonesia)	
	t-value (German vs. Indonesia	p-value (German vs. Indonesia	t-value (German vs. Indonesia	p-value (German vs. Indonesia
Control				
Intention	6.308	0.000	5.835	0.000
Subjective Norms	3.894	0.000	3.623	0.000
Deal Proneness	3.203	0.001	2.732	0.007
Reciprocity	2.844	0.005	2.383	0.018

The result of psychometrics properties in multi group analysis between German and Indonesian shows that there are significant differences in terms of quality criteria for the outer model between samples in German group and Indonesian group. Most of the Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Composite Reliability (CR) and loading factors are significantly different between German and Indonesian samples.

The other parameters to consider in multi group analysis are the parameter based on structural model, namely R^2 and the path coefficient differences between German and Indonesian samples. As we can refer to Table 15, the result from the Welch-Satterthwaite Test suggests that there are significant differences of R^2 between German group and Indonesian group in intention variables (t-value= 5.790, $p < .01$) and subjective norms (t-value= 1.99, $p < .1$). However we acquired also an insignificant differences of R^2 in attitude variable (t-value=0.2, $p > .1$) and perceived behavioral control (t-value=0.24, $p > .1$).

Table 15: R^2 Differences between German and Indonesian Samples

Constructs	R-Square-differences (Indonesian - German)	t-value (Indonesian vs. German)	p-value (Indonesian vs. German)
Attitude	0.010	0.226	0.822
Intention	0.320	5.790	0.000
Perceived behavioral control	0.009	0.240	0.811
Subjective norms	0.098	1.989	0.047

In general, the result of multi group analysis is not suggesting us to merge the data between German and Indonesian group. Based on the reflective measurement of outer model in multi group analysis, most of the AVE, CR and loading factor are significantly different between those two samples. Therefore we have to analyses and interpret the data separately between German and Indonesian group.

4.4 Result of the Second Experimental Study in Transparent Situation

4.4.1 Psychometric Properties in Transparent Situation

In this section we will present the psychometric properties in both German and Indonesian group. Reflective measurement model should be assessed with regard to their reliability and validity (Henseler et al., 2009). Therefore we assessed the reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity of the measured variables. We examined convergent validity of the construct by verifying factor loadings were suggested by Gerbing and Anderson (1988) should be significantly different from 0 or else that should be higher than 0.7.

Furthermore we eliminated some of indicators as recommended by Churchill (1979) in German and Indonesian group (please refer to Table 16 for the detail result). The elimination of the reflective indicators from measurement model should be performed if their outer standardized loading smaller than 0.4. and the elimination of the indicators can be perform only if an indicator`s reliability is low and doing so will increase the composite reliability (Henseler et al., 2009).

Table 16: The Measurement Instrument in the Setting of Transparent Situation

Items	Standardize Loading	
	German	Indonesian
Attitude		
The M-coupon that I received from..... (Name of the sender) is.		
Useless - Useful	0.89	0.77
Unpleasant - Pleasant	0.89	0.88

Items	Standardize Loading	
	German	Indonesian
Unfair - Fair	0.76	0.81
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC)		
I feel free to redeem the M-coupon, because it is my own decision	0.89	0.89
I am in control when I have to redeem the M-coupon because I only redeem it from a particular sender	Deleted	Deleted
I am in control when I have to redeem the M-coupon because I only redeem the M-coupon if it is valuable for me.	0.879	0.79
Intention		
I have strong possibility to redeem the M-coupon from(Name of the sender)	0.97	0.91
I have high intention to redeem the M-coupon from(Name of the sender)	0.98	0.92
I intend to redeem this kind of M-coupon in the near future	0.97	0.89
Subjective Norm		
Most people who are important for me would think that it isto redeem this M-coupon:		
Waste of time - Wise of time	0.90	0.86
Worthless - Worthy	0.94	0.84
Useless - Useful	0.95	0.88
Deal Proneness		
I enjoy looking for rebate offers	0.79	0.68
Redeeming rebates makes me feel good	0.86	0.77
Rebates have caused me to buy products, even though I did not plan to buy it.	0.68	0.76
I enjoy using rebates, regardless of the amount I save by doing so.	Deleted	Deleted
When I use rebates, I feel that I am getting a good deal.	0.80	0.69
I have favorite brands but most of the time I buy the brand that offers a rebate.	Deleted	Deleted
Reciprocity		
I expect that sender would do the same, if I redeem this M-coupon	0.85	0.75
I expect that the sender will thank me nicely, if I redeem this M-coupon	0.82	0.75

Items	Standardize Loading	
	German	Indonesian
I redeem this M-coupon because I repay back the favor that sender has done to me	0.86	0.80
I redeem the M-coupon because the sender always treat me well	0.87	0.80

Furthermore, as we can refer in Table 17, the composite reliability scores for all of the constructs exceeded the cut-off value 0.7 proposed by Nunnally and Bernstein, (1994) and the AVE exceeds the cut-off value of 0.5 suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981).

Table 17: Composite reliability, Average Variance Extracted and R squared in the Setting of Transparent Situation

Constructs	AVE		CR		R ²	
	German	Indonesia	German	Indonesia	German	Indonesia
Attitude	0.72	0.66	0.88	0.86	0.10	0.09
Perceived Behavioral Control	0.77	0.71	0.87	0.83	0.04	0.05
Intention	0.95	0.83	0.98	0.94	0.67	0.35
Subjective Norm	0.86	0.74	0.95	0.90	0.18	0.08
Deal Proneness	0.61	0.53	0.86	0.82		
Reciprocity	0.72	0.60	0.91	0.86		

AVE = Average Variance Extracted; CR= Composite Reliability

To assess the discriminant validity of each construct, we have to make sure that a construct should share more variance with its measures than it shares with other construct (Chin, 2000), thus the square root of the AVE for all constructs should be greater than all corresponding correlation (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Our study, as displayed that the square root of the AVE was greater than all corresponding correlation (please confer to Table 32, Appendix A).

4.4.2 Hypotheses Testing in Transparent Situation

We test the proposed hypotheses in second study by employing PLS with the SmartPLS 3 (Ringle et al., 2014) to obtain parameter estimates for the measurement model and structural model. To model the experimental data in a structural equation framework, we identified single indicators for the manipulation variables, namely incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality, incentive transparency as well as tie-strength. These manipulation variables employ an effect coding, e.g. different, conditional and transparent is coded as 1; and no different, unconditional and non-transparent are coded as -1. The Independent variables e.g. receivers` deal proneness and situation characterized by reciprocity and dependent variables e.g. receivers` attitude towards M-coupon, subjective norms, receivers` perceived behavioral control and receivers` intention to redeem the obtained M-coupon are considered as reflective measurement model.

The fit of the model can be assessed by using R^2 of the endogenous latent variables in the model with the effect size proposed by Cohen (1992) small, 0.02; medium, 0.13; large, 0.26. As we can see in Table 17, for German group, we obtained small effect for perceived behavioral control ($R^2 = .04$) and attitude ($R^2 = .01$), medium effect size of subjective norms ($R^2 = .18$) and large effect size for intention ($R^2 = .67$). Meanwhile for Indonesian group we acquired small effect for attitude ($R^2 = .09$), perceived behavioral control ($R^2 = .05$) and subjective norms ($R^2 = .08$). We obtained a large effect size for the intention construct ($R^2 = .35$). To acquire t-statistics for the parameter estimates, we used nonparametric bootstrapping with 5,000 resample for both German and Indonesian group (please confer to Table 18).

4.4.2.1 Relationship between Incentive Differentiation and Receivers Attitude towards M-Coupon

With a path coefficient of -.15, the path between *incentive differentiation* and *attitude* for German group is significant in $p < .01$, and for Indonesian group we obtained an insignificant result ($\beta = -.04$, $p > .1$). Thus the result supported our Hypothesis 1 in German group and we have to reject the Hypothesis 1 in Indonesian group. The result in German group indicates that when receivers obtain M-coupon with scheme of incentive: receivers obtain incentive smaller than the incentive obtain by the senders, it will cause

unfavorable attitude towards the obtained M-coupon. Whereas for the receivers in Indonesian group, unequal amount of incentive will not necessarily leads to a negative attitude towards the M-coupon.

In the light of the insignificant main analysis results for Indonesian group, we perform of the two steps multi-group analysis to understand the possibility that the presence of other manipulation variable (e.g. incentive conditionality) influencing the relationship of *incentive differentiation* and *the receivers` attitude on M-coupon*. Thus, as first step, we splitting the data according to incentive conditionality, using effect coding, namely conditional as 1 and unconditional as -1. We obtain a positive significant result of the relationship between *incentive differentiation* and *attitude* in the manipulation set of “conditional” (n = 176; $\beta = .13$, $p < .1$) and a negative significant result in the manipulation set of “unconditional” (n = 176; $\beta = -.23$, $p < .01$).

As the second step, we perform the unpaired sample t-test analysis using the Welch-Satterthwaite test to compare the result of the relationship between *incentive differentiation* and *receivers` attitude on M-coupon* in the manipulation set based on incentive conditionality. With T-statistic of 3.67 ($p < .01$), the result of Welch-Satterthwaite Test indicates that when obtain M-coupon with the incentive less than incentive obtain by the senders, receivers in Indonesian will have unfavorable attitude towards the M-coupon, only if the senders could obtain incentive immediately after they forward the M-coupon to other. On the other hand, receivers will have positive attitude toward M-coupon with unequal amount of incentive, only if the incentive that the senders will obtain depends on the redeeming action by the receivers. Receivers from Indonesia might think that it is fine to obtain incentive smaller than the incentive obtain by the senders, because receivers still have power over the incentive that senders will obtain. Please refer to Table 27 in Appendix A for the detail result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive conditionality in Indonesian group.

4.4.2.2 Interaction Effect of Tie-Strength and Incentive Differentiation on Receivers Attitude towards M-Coupon

The assumed interaction effect between *tie-strength* and *incentive differentiation* on *receivers` attitude* is not significant in both the German group ($\beta = .04$, $p > .1$) and the Indonesian group ($\beta = .04$, $p > .1$). This leads to the dismissal of Hypothesis 2. The result for the German group reveals that independent of whether the senders are from strong-

ties or from weak-ties, differing amounts of incentives for senders and receivers leads to the receivers generating an unfavorable attitude towards this M-coupon. Nonetheless, for the Indonesian group, the result of the analysis reveals that regardless of the tie-strength between senders and receivers, differing amounts of incentive will not necessarily lead to the receivers' negative attitude towards this M-coupon.

Considering this insignificant interaction effect, we perform a simple effect test by splitting the data set according to tie-strength. The result from the German group is consistent with the result of the main analysis. In the manipulation set of "strong-tie" (n = 166), we obtain a negative significant result of the relationship between *incentive differentiation* and *receivers' attitude* ($\beta = -.12$, $p < .1$) which is repeated in the manipulation set of "weak-tie" (n = 166, $\beta = -.18$, $p < .05$). Additionally, we obtain a t-statistic of 0.64 ($p > .1$) of the unpaired t-test using the Welch-Satterthwaite test. Since we obtain the insignificant t-value of the unpaired t-test using the Welch-Satterthwait test for the German group, it is proven that, regardless the tie-strength between senders and receivers, different amount of incentive will weaken receivers' favorable attitude toward M-coupon.

Furthermore, the result in the Indonesian group is also consistent with the result of the main analysis. The detailed result from the Indonesian group is the following: in the manipulation set of "strong tie" (n = 176), we obtain an insignificant result between *incentive differentiation* and *receivers' attitude* ($\beta = .01$, $p > .1$), while it is a negative significant result in the manipulation set of "weak tie" (n = 176, $\beta = -.08$, $p < .1$). Additionally we obtain a t-statistic value of 1.23 ($p > .1$) of unpaired t-test using the Welch-Satterthwait statistic. For the receivers in Indonesian group, unequal amount of incentive will not weaken their favorability attitude on M-coupon. Still, receivers in Indonesia have a more negative attitude towards an M-coupon including a different incentive for senders and receivers, if the senders are from a relationship characterized by a weak-tie. Please confer to Table 29 and Table 30 in Appendix A for the comprehensive result of the multi group analysis based on manipulation set of tie-strength for German group and Indonesian group.

4.4.2.3 Relationship between Deal Proneness and Receivers Attitude towards M-coupon

The direct relationship between *deal proneness* and *receivers` attitude* on M-coupon is significant for both the German group ($\beta=.27, p<.01$) and the Indonesian group ($\beta=.29, p<.01$), thus it support Hypothesis 3. The result indicates that receivers who are deal prone will have positive attitude towards the M-coupon.

4.4.2.4 Relationship between Incentive Conditionality and Receivers Perceived Behavioral Control

For Hypothesis 4, we obtain a negative significant relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *receivers` perceiver behavioral control* in German group ($\beta =-.13, p<.05$), whereas in Indonesian group we acquired an insignificant result ($\beta=.04, p>.1$). Therefore leading to dismissal Hypothesis 4 for Indonesian group and for German group the result is supporting the Hypothesis 4. The analysis result in German group denotes that M-coupon with conditionality of incentive will weaken receivers` perceived behavioral control. Meanwhile for the receivers in Indonesian group, M-coupon with conditionality of incentive will not necessarily weaken their perceived behavioral control.

In the light of the insignificant result in Indonesian group, we performed multi-group analysis to have a better understanding on how other manipulation situations might influences the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *perceived behavioral control*. Thus we split the data according to *incentive differentiation* set of manipulation. We acquired an insignificant result of the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *receivers` perceived behavioral control* in manipulation set of “different” ($\beta=.03, p>.1$). Meanwhile in manipulation set of “no different” we obtained a negative significant result ($\beta=-.11, p<.1$). With t-statistic of 1.68 ($p<.1$), the Welch-Satterthwaite Test indicate that the presence of “incentive differentiation” set of manipulation is affecting the relationship between *incentives conditionality* and *receivers` perceived behavioral control*. Therefore the result in Indonesian group reveals that when receivers obtained incentives equal to the incentive obtain by the senders the conditionality in incentive will weaken their perceived control to redeem the M-coupon. Meanwhile, when receivers obtain incentive smaller than the incentive

obtain by the senders, conditionality in incentive will not weaken their behavioral control to redeem the M-coupon. Please refer to Table 26 in Appendix A for the complete result of multi group analysis based on manipulation set of incentive differentiation for the Indonesian group.

4.4.2.5 Interaction Effect of Tie-Strength and Incentive Conditionality on Receivers Perceived Behavioral Control

In Hypothesis 5, we proposed the moderating effect of *tie-strength* and *incentive conditionality* on *receivers` perceived behavioral control*. We assumed that the conditionality in incentive will weaken receiver`s perceived behavioral control only if the senders of M-coupon are having a weak-tie relationship with the receivers. The result shows of non-significant moderating effect of *tie-strength* and *incentive conditionality* on *perceived behavioral control* both in German group ($\beta = -.01, p > .1$) as well as in Indonesian group ($\beta = .06, p > .1$). This leads to the dismissal of Hypothesis 5. The results in German group and Indonesian group indicates that independent of whether the senders are having strong-tie or weak-tie relationship with the receivers, conditionality in incentive will not necessarily weaken receivers` perceived control to redeem the M-coupon.

In the light of this insignificant interaction effect of *tie-strength* and *incentive conditionality* on *perceived behavioral control* in Hypothesis 5, we conducted additional analysis by splitting the data according to tie-strength with the effect coding, strong-tie as 1 and weak-tie as -1. The results of additional analyses are in line with the result in main analysis for both German and Indonesian group. Regardless the tie-strength of the senders, conditionality will not weaken receivers` perceived control to redeem the obtained M-coupon).

The detail result as follows: in German group we obtained insignificant results of the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *receivers` perceived behavioral control*, both in “strong tie” set of manipulation ($\beta = -.13, p > .1$) and “weak tie” set of manipulation ($\beta = -.11, p > .1$). For the unpaired sample t-test using the Welch-Satterthwaite Test, we obtain a t-value of 0.12 ($p > .1$). Furthermore, in Indonesian group, we acquired insignificant results of the relationship between *incentive conditionality* and *receivers` perceived behavioral control*, in which for the

manipulation set of “strong tie” resulted in $\beta = .02$ ($p > .1$), while for the “weak tie” resulted in $\beta = -.09$ ($p > .1$). For the unpaired sample t-test using the Welch-Satterthwaite Test we obtain t-value of 1.39 ($p > .1$). As we obtain insignificant result of the unpaired t-test in both German and Indonesian group, thus tie-strength is not influencing the relationship of *incentive conditionality* and *perceived behavioral control* in both of the countries. Please confer to Table 29 and Table 30 in Appendix A for the comprehensive result of the multi group analysis based on manipulation set of tie-strength for the German group and Indonesian group.

4.4.2.6 Relationship between Reciprocity and Receivers Perceived Behavioral Control

Hypothesis 6 predicts the negative relationship between *reciprocity* and *perceived behavioral control*. With a path coefficient of $-.15$ ($p < .05$), this Hypothesis is support in German group. In addition, for Indonesian group with a path coefficient of $.20$ ($p < .01$), the Hypothesis is also supported but on the opposite direction with the assumed hypothesis. For the receivers in German group, the situation characterized by reciprocity (receivers are expected something from the senders or receivers have to returning a favor to the senders), tend to weaken receivers` perceived control to perform a particular behavior (e.g. redeeming the M-coupon). However in the Indonesian group we find that the reciprocity situation will not weaken receivers` perceived control on their particular behavior (e.g. to redeem the M-coupon).

4.4.2.7 Relationship between Reciprocity and Subjective Norms

Furthermore, Hypothesis 7 predicts a positive relationship between *reciprocity* and *subjective norms*. The positive significant result in both of German group ($\beta = .42$, $p < .01$) and Indonesian group ($\beta = .26$, $p < .01$) are support the Hypothesis 7. The analysis results in both of German group as well as Indonesian group indicates that when deal with a situation characterized by reciprocity, receivers tends to rely on other opinion on the decision whether or not they have to redeem the obtained M-coupon.

4.4.2.8 Interaction Effect of Reciprocity and Tie-Strength on Subjective Norms

In Hypothesis 8 we proposed an interaction effect of *tie-strength* and *reciprocity* on *subjective norms*. We assumed that receivers tend to rely on other opinions in the

situation characterized by reciprocity if the senders of M-coupon are having a weak-tie relationship with the receivers. We obtained a negative significant result in German group ($\beta = -0.06$, $p < .1$) and a positive significant result in Indonesian group ($\beta = .10$, $p < .05$), thus the results are supporting the Hypothesis 8.

The result in German group implies that in the situation characterized by reciprocity, receivers tend to rely on other opinion if the senders of M-coupon have a weak-tie relationship with them. However in Indonesian group, the situation characterized by reciprocity leads receivers to rely on other opinion about redeeming action particularly when the senders of M-coupon have a strong-tie relationship with them.

4.4.2.9 Relationship between Attitude and Intention

Hypothesis 9 is accepted in both German group and Indonesian group. In this Hypothesis we assumed that receivers' positive attitude towards M-coupon leads to receivers' positive intention to redeem it. We obtain a positive significant result in both of German group with $\beta = .68$ ($p < .01$) as well as in Indonesian group with $\beta = .36$ ($p < .01$). The result in both groups indicates that receivers' positive attitude towards M-coupon will lead to the receivers' positive intention to redeem it.

4.4.2.10 Relationship between Subjective Norms and Intention

Moreover, in Hypothesis 10 we proposed a positive relationship between *subjective norms* and *intention* and the result from German and Indonesian group are support the proposed Hypothesis. We obtain a positive significant result in both of German group with $\beta = .22$ ($p < .01$), as well as in Indonesian group with $\beta = .11$ ($p < .05$). The result implies, when other people give a positive suggestion concerning the redeeming of M-coupon, it leads receivers to have a positive intention to redeem it.

4.4.2.11 Relationship between Perceived Behavioral Control and Intention

Finally, we proposed the positive relationship between *perceived behavioral control* and *intention*. In support of Hypothesis 11, we obtain a positive significant result with $\beta = .29$ ($p < .01$) in Indonesian group. In contrast to Indonesian group, in German group we obtain a negative significant result with $\beta = -.17$ ($p < .01$). The result in Indonesia group indicates, when receivers have a strong control on their behavior to redeem the M-coupon they will have also a positive intention to redeem it. Meanwhile for receivers in


German group, when they have a weak perceived control to redeem the obtained M-coupon, they tend to have a positive intention to perform it.

Table 18: Result of the Hypotheses from Receivers Perspectives in the Setting of Transparent Situation

Hypothesis	Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients (β)		t-stat		p-value		Result	
		Ger.	Ind.	Ger.	Ind.	Ger.	Ind.	Ger.	Ind.
H1	ID → Attitude	-0.15	-0.04	3.17	1.06	0.00	0.29	Accepted	<i>Rejected</i>
H2	ID x Tie strength → Attitude	0.04	0.04	0.66	1.06	0.51	0.29	<i>Rejected</i>	<i>Rejected</i>
H3	Deal Proneness → Attitude	0.27	0.29	5.04	6.15	0.00	0.00	Accepted	Accepted
H4	IC → PBC	-0.13	-0.04	2.27	0.95	0.02	0.34	Accepted	<i>Rejected</i>
H5	IC x Tie Strength → PBC	-0.01	0.06	0.28	1.31	0.78	0.19	<i>Rejected</i>	<i>Rejected</i>
H6	Reciprocity → PBC	-0.15	0.20	2.35	3.24	0.02	0.00	Accepted	Accepted
H7	Reciprocity → SN	0.42	0.26	9.56	4.80	0.00	0.00	Accepted	Accepted
H8	Reciprocity x Tie Strength → SN	-0.06	0.10	1.89	2.53	0.06	0.01	Accepted	Accepted
H9	Attitude → Intention	0.68	0.36	18.35	6.43	0.00	0.00	Accepted	Accepted
H10	SN → Intention	0.22	0.11	6.03	2.07	0.00	0.06	Accepted	Accepted
H11	PBC → Intention	-0.17	0.29	4.97	5.42	0.00	0.00	Accepted	Accepted

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger. = German; Ind. = Indonesia; PBC = Perceived Behavioral Control; SN = Subjective Norms

Figure 12: Result of the Hypotheses from Receivers Perspectives in the Setting of Transparent Situation



***= p<.01; ** = p<.05; * = p<.01; ns: not significant

4.5 Result of the Second Experimental Study in Non-Transparent Situation

The second experimental study from receivers' perspectives is considered as the control group. Since the situation is non-transparent, thus receivers do not have any information about the components of incentive. Receivers still have information on who is the sender of M-coupon. The sample of scenario as follow:

Figure 13: Sample of the Receivers Perspective Scenario in the Setting of Non-Transparent Situation



4.5.1 Psychometric Properties in Non-Transparent Situation

Since the research model is a reflective model, therefore we assess the reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity of the measured variables. We examine convergent validity of the constructs by verifying factor loadings which have suggested by Gerbing and Anderson, (1988), should be significantly different from 0 (zero) or else that should be higher than 0.7. As we can refer to the Table 18, the factor loadings for almost all of the constructs are all higher than 0.7 for the German group. However in Indonesian group, we acquire three items with loading factor less than 0.7: one item in attitude construct, one item in perceived behavioral control construct and one item in deal proneness construct.

Even though we obtained three items with loading factor less than 0.7 in Indonesian group, we keep those items because as per suggestion from Henseler et al. (2009), we can eliminate the indicators only if the elimination of the indicator will increase the composite reliability. Thus we retain the indicators which have loading factor less than the threshold since the composite reliability is remain exceed the cut-off value 0.7 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), and the AVE exceeds the cut-off value of 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

Table 19: Measurement Instruments of the Receivers Perspectives in the Setting of Non-transparent Situation

Items	Standardize Loading	
	German	Indonesia
Attitude		
The M-coupon that I received from.....(the name of sender) is.		
Useless - Useful	0.92	0.39
Unpleasant - Pleasant	0.94	0.90
Unfair - Fair	0.76	0.91
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC)		
I feel free to redeem the M-coupon, because it is my own decision	0.97	0.66
I am in control when I have to redeem the M-coupon because I only redeem it from a particular sender	Deleted	0.83
I am in control when I have to redeem the M-coupon because I only redeem the M-coupon if it is valuable for me.	0.72	0.82
Intention		
I have strong possibility to redeem the M-coupon from(the name of sender)	0.98	0.91
I have high intention to redeem the M-coupon from(the name of sender)	0.98	0.83
I intend to redeem this kind of M-coupon in the near future	0.97	0.82
Subjective Norm		
Most people who are important for me would think that it isto redeem this M-coupon:		
Waste of time - Wise of time	0.82	0.91
Worthless - Worthy	0.96	0.79
Useless - Useful	0.96	0.82
Deal Proneness		
I enjoy looking for rebate offers	0.84	0.65
Redeeming rebates makes me feel good	0.87	0.83
Rebates have caused me to buy products, even though I did not plan to buy it.	0.64	0.80
I enjoy using rebates, regardless of the amount I save by doing so.	Deleted	Deleted
When I use rebates, I feel that I am getting a good deal.	Deleted	Deleted
I have favourite brands but most of the time I buy the brand that offers a rebate.	Deleted	Deleted
Reciprocity		
I expect that sender would do the same, if I redeem this M-coupon	0.81	0.82
I expect that the sender will thank me nicely, if I redeem this M-coupon	0.86	0.85

I redeem this M-coupon because I repay back the favour that sender has done to me	0.87	0.82
I redeem the M-coupon because the sender always treat me well	0.85	Deleted

In Table 19, consists of the assessment results on the internal consistency reliability with the the Composite Reliability as criterion and the convergent validity measurement with AVE as criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The Composite Reliability scores for all of the constructs exceeded the cut-off value 0.7 proposed by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) and the AVE exceeds the cut-off value of 0.5 suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981).

Table 20: Composite Reliability, Average Variance Extracted and R squared of the Receivers Perspectives in the Setting of Non-transparent Situation

Constructs	AVE		CR		R ²	
	Ger.	Indo.	Ger.	Indo.	Ger.	Indo.
Attitude	0.77	0.65	0.91	0.84	0.03	0.03
Perceived Behavioral Control	0.63	0.57	0.75	0.80	0.13	0.25
Intention	0.96	0.78	0.99	0.91	0.66	0.26
Subjective Norms	0.85	0.70	0.95	0.88	0.12	0.25
Deal Proneness	0.61	0.52	0.86	0.81		
Reciprocity	0.77	0.71	0.93	0.91		

AVE = Average Variance Extracter; CR = Composite Reliability; Ger. = German; Indo. = Indonesia

To assess the discriminant validity of each construct, we have to make sure that a construct should share more variance with its assigned indicators rather than with any other construct (Chin, 2000). Thus the square root of the AVE for all constructs should be greater than all corresponding correlation (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). In our study, as we displayed in Table 33 Appendix A, the square root of the AVE was greater than all corresponding correlation.

4.5.2 Hypotheses Testing in Non-Transparent Situation

The fit of the model can be assessed using R^2 of the endogenous latent variables in the model with the effect size as proposed by Cohen (1992) is small effect: 0.02; medium effect: 0.13; large effect: 0.26. As we can see in Table 19, the German group obtained small effect for attitude ($R^2 = .03$) and subjective norms ($R^2 = .12$), medium effect size for perceived behavioral control ($R^2 = .13$) and large effect size for intention ($R^2 = .66$). Meanwhile for Indonesian group we acquired small effect for Attitude ($R^2 = .03$), medium effect size for perceived behavioral control ($R^2 = .25$) and subjective norms ($R^2 = .25$) and for Intention construct we obtained large effect size ($R^2 = .26$). To acquire t-statistics for the parameter estimates, we used nonparametric bootstrapping with 5,000 resample for both German and Indonesian group (Table 21).

In non-transparent set of scenario there are no manipulated variables in the model, thus we only analyze the non-manipulated variables e.g. deal proneness, reciprocity and basic model of TPB. We test our hypotheses in non-transparent set by employing partial least squares (PLS) and Table 21 summarizes the parameter estimates.

4.5.2.1 Relationship between Deal Proneness and Receivers Attitude towards M-coupon

Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive relationship between *deal proneness* and *attitude*. With the coefficient of .18 ($p < .05$) for German group and $\beta = .17$ ($p < .05$) for Indonesian group, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Deal prone receivers will have a positive attitude towards the M-coupon.

4.5.2.2 Relationship between Reciprocity and Receivers Perceived Behavioral Control

Hypothesis 6 predicts the negative relationship between the situation characterized by *reciprocity* and *receivers` perceived behavioral control*. With a coefficient of -.35 ($p < .01$), this hypothesis is supported in German group. For Indonesian group with a coefficient of .47 ($p < .01$), the hypothesis also supported but on opposite direction with the assumed hypothesis. For German group the result indicates that, the reciprocity situation (e.g. receivers are expected something from the senders or receivers have to returning a favor to senders), tend to weaken receivers` perceived control to perform a

particular behavior (e.g. to redeem the M-coupon). However, in Indonesian group we found that a situation characterized by reciprocity will not weaken the receivers' perceived control on their decision to redeem the obtained M-coupon.

4.5.2.3 Relationship between Reciprocity and Subjective Norms

Furthermore, Hypothesis 7 predicts a positive relationship between *reciprocity* and *subjective norms*. When facing a situation characterized by reciprocity, receivers tend to rely on other opinion about the best decision regarding the redeeming of M-coupon. We acquired a positive significant result both in German group ($\beta = .33$, $p < .01$) and Indonesian group ($\beta = .28$, $p < .01$), thus, the results are support the Hypothesis 7. When receivers deal with a situation characterized by reciprocity, they will rely on other opinion about the M-coupon redemption.

4.5.2.4 Interaction Effect of Reciprocity and Tie-Strength on Subjective Norms

In Hypothesis 8 we propose a moderating effect between *tie strength* and *reciprocity* on *subjective norms*. We assume that, receivers tend to rely on other opinion in reciprocity situation only if the senders of M-coupon come from the weak-tie relationship spectrum. However we obtained insignificant result in German group ($\beta = -.11$, $p > .1$) and a negative significant result in Indonesian group ($\beta = -.33$, $p < .05$). In Non transparent situation, independent of whether the senders are having a strong-tie or weak-tie relationship with the receivers, when deal with the situation characterized by reciprocity, receivers from German group tends to rely on other opinion about the M-coupon redemption. Meanwhile for the receiver in Indonesian group, when they deal with the reciprocity situation they will rely on other opinion regarding the redeeming action only if the senders of M-coupon are come from a weak-tie relationship spectrum.

4.5.2.5 Relationship between Attitude and Intention to Redeem the M-coupon

Hypothesis 9 is accepted in German group but not in Indonesian group. In Hypothesis 9 we assumed that receivers' positive *attitude* toward M-coupon leads to receivers' positive *intention* to redeem it. We obtain a positive significant result in German group ($\beta = .49$, $p < .01$), yet we obtained insignificant result ($\beta = .30$, $p > .1$) in Indonesian group. The result indicates that when receivers from German group have a positive attitude towards M-coupon, they will also have a positive intention to redeem it. For Indonesian

receivers, the positive attitude towards M-coupon will not necessarily lead to their positive intentions to redeem it.

4.5.2.6 Relationship between Subjective Norms and Intention to Redeem the M-coupon

Moreover, in Hypothesis 10 we proposed a positive relationship between *subjective norms* and receivers' *intention* to redeem the obtained M-coupon. The positive significant result from German group ($\beta = .38, p < .01$) support the proposed hypothesis, meanwhile for Indonesian group we obtained insignificant result ($\beta = .05, p > .1$). The result in German group denotes that, when other people give a positive suggestion to redeem the M-coupon, it leads to the receivers' positive intention to redeem it. However, in Indonesian group positive suggestion from others will not be necessarily followed by the receivers' positive intention to redeem the obtained M-coupon.

4.5.2.7 Relationship between Perceived Behavioral Control and Intention to Redeem the M-coupon


Finally, we proposed a positive relationship between *perceived behavioral control* and receivers' *intention* to redeem the obtained M-coupon. In support of Hypothesis 11, we obtained a positive significant result for Indonesian group ($\beta = .33, p < .05$) and for German group, we obtained a negative marginally result ($\beta = -.10, p < .1$). The results in Indonesian group indicate that when the receivers have a high perceived behavioral control, they tend to have a high intention to redeem the M-coupon. Meanwhile for the receivers in German group, having a high perceived control to redeem the M-coupon, will not necessarily lead them to have a positive intention to redeem it.

Table 21: Result of the Hypothesis from Receivers Perspectives in the Setting of Non-Transparent Situation

Hypothesis	Relationship among constructs	Estimates (β)		t-stat		p-value		Result	
		Ger.	Ind.	Ger.	Ind.	Ger.	Ind.	Ger.	Ind.
H1	ID \rightarrow Attitude	<i>N.a</i>							
H2	ID x Tie -strength \rightarrow Attitude								
H3	Deal Proneness \rightarrow Attitude	0.18	0.17	2.17	2.14	0.03	0.03	Accepted	Accepted
H4	IC \rightarrow PBC	<i>N.a</i>							
H5	IC x Tie- Strength \rightarrow PBC								
H6	Reciprocity \rightarrow PBC	-0.35	0.47	3.08	4.03	0.00	0.00	Accepted	Accepted
H7	Reciprocity \rightarrow SN	0.33	0.28	3.62	2.79	0.00	0.00	Accepted	Accepted
H8	Reciprocity x Tie- Strength \rightarrow SN	-0.06	-0.33	1.01	2.57	0.31	0.01	<i>Rejected</i>	Accepted
H9	Attitude \rightarrow Intention	0.49	0.30	4.23	2.04	0.00	0.04	Accepted	Accepted
H10	SN \rightarrow Intention	0.39	0.05	3.14	0.49	0.02	0.63	Accepted	<i>Rejected</i>
H11	PBC \rightarrow Intention	-0.10	0.33	1.64	2.56	0.10	0.01	Accepted	Accepted

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron. = deal proneness; Ger. = German; Ind. = Indonesia; N.a = Not available; PBC = Perceived behavioral control; SN = Subjective Norms.

Figure 14: Result of the Hypothesis from Receivers Perspectives in the Non-Transparent Setting



***= $p < .01$; ** = $p < .05$; * = $p < .10$; ns: not significant

4.6 Summary

Using the theory planned behavior (TPB) by Ajzen (1991) we attempt to examine the receivers' perspectives on incentivized word-of-mouth. Receivers' perspectives in this dissertation have been divided between transparent situation and non-transparent situation. The result shows that the incentive components plays a significant roles in influencing receivers' attitude towards M-coupon which is later on, this attitude will be followed by the intention and real action in redeeming the M-coupon.

We have discovered that different amount of incentive between senders and receivers hurting the fairness feeling of German receiver compared to the Indonesian receivers. For the German group, incentive differentiation in M-coupon leads the receivers to the unfavorable attitude towards M-coupon, no matter whether the senders of M-coupon are families or acquaintances. In Indonesian group, the different amount of incentive between senders and receivers will not influences receivers' attitude towards M-coupon

regardless the tie-strength that they have with the senders. As we obtained a different result between German and Indonesian group, thus we cannot rule out the influences of cultural factors here. Cultural differences play a significant role in differentiating the result between the German and Indonesian group. According to Mattila and Patterson, (2004); McFarlin and Sweeney, (2001), western customer (represented by German group) with the highly independent self-construal character will have the unfavorable feeling towards inequitable object thus the notion of “getting what I deserve” become the major issue for them. Conversely, in highly collectivism eastern society (represented by Indonesian group) which promotes conflict avoidance and maintaining smooth, an inequitable is not an issue as long as they can manage the harmonious of interpersonal relationship (Mattila & Patterson, 2004).

Nonetheless for eastern culture, the favorability toward incentivized WOM with a differing incentive is determined by whether or not there is conditionality in incentive. Receivers from Indonesia will have a favorable attitude towards M-coupon with unequal amount of incentive if there is conditionality in the M-coupon. Thus, getting incentive less than the incentives obtain by the senders is not a big issue for the receivers as long as the incentive that senders will obtain depends on the receivers redeeming action. The receivers from Indonesia might be think that it is fine to have incentive smaller that the incentive obtains by the senders, because receivers still have power over the incentive that senders will obtain.

Furthermore, deal proneness also plays a significant role in influencing receivers` attitude on M-coupon. Deal prone receivers will have a positive attitude on M-coupon. Moreover concerning the relationship between incentive conditionality and perceived behavioral control, our result shows that, regardless the tie-strength of the senders, when receivers obtained M-coupon with conditionality, they tend to have weak perceived control on their behavior to redeem the M-coupon. Nonetheless this situation is affected more on German receivers compared to Indonesian receivers.

For Indonesian receivers, conditionality in incentive will not necessarily weaken their perceived behavioral control no matter whether the senders are close friends, families or just an acquaintance. As feminine country, consumers in Indonesia are used to have a high involvement of other people in decision making (Mooij & Hofstede, 2011). Since the collective interests are usually involves in every decision, so it is not a big issue for

the receivers from Indonesian when they are expected to put aside their own interest when making a decision (Mattila & Patterson, 2004). As having high involvement of other people is common in Indonesia, thus, it seems reasonable that receivers still have a high control on their behavior, when they are expected to redeem the M-coupon so that sender could obtain their incentive. In contrast with the receivers in Indonesia, as a masculine country, consumers from German tend to be individualist and have low involvement of their family members in decision making (Mooij & Hofstede, 2011). Thus when receivers in German are expected to consider the interest of others in their decision making, they tend to have weak perceived control on their behavior.

Receivers' response and action regarding incentivized WOM might be based on previous experience with the senders or we can identify such situation as reciprocity situation. Reciprocity might arise when the receivers have to give back some favors to the senders or expect something in return from the senders. This may lead the receivers to finally agree to engage on incentivized WOM activity (e.g. redeeming the M-coupon). As a western consumer, the receivers from German tend to concern more on fairness between two parties. When the receivers are recognizes that the senders' prosperity depends on his action, a "tit-for-tat" is likely to become the first reaction from the receivers and that reaction may possibly influence the receivers' control on their behavior. In this study, it is proven that reciprocity situation will weaken receivers' perceived behavioral control to redeem the M-coupon even though they have no information regarding the incentive that will be obtained or have already obtained by senders. Nonetheless, hold an Eastern cultures, the consumers from Indonesia tends to avoid a conflict and maintaining harmonious relationship (Mattila & Patterson, 2004). Therefore this study proves that reciprocity situation will not weaken receivers' perceived behavioral control, no matter whether the information of incentive is transparent or non-transparent.

Receivers with reciprocation motive tend to perceive others' opinions as not important to them since they have a desire to achieve equilibrium and reduce the stress that they have (Walster et al., 1973). Eastern consumers emphasize the need to fit with others and to avoid conflict and confrontation (Fiske et al., 1998), thus other opinions on reciprocity situation should matter a lot for them no matter whether the sender of M-coupon are from strong or weak-tie relationship. In Indonesian group, the transparency information of incentive does matters in differentiating their decision whether or not

they will rely on other opinion when deal with reciprocity situation. In transparency of incentive setting (receivers have information regarding incentive obtained by the senders), reciprocity situation lead the receivers to rely on other opinion regarding the redeeming of M-coupons if the senders are having strong-tie relationship with them. Meanwhile in non-transparency of incentive setting (receivers have no information regarding incentive obtained by the senders) reciprocity situation lead the receivers to rely on other opinion regarding the redeeming of M-coupons if the senders are having weak-tie relationship with them

Furthermore, as German receivers tend to have a high uncertainty-avoidance and assumes on an external locus of control (Mooij & Hofstede, 2011), thus other opinion on the reciprocal situation becomes important for them to shape their decision and action. However we found a further result, when receivers in German group deal with the situation characterized by reciprocity, they tend to rely on other opinion on redeeming action only if the senders of M-coupon comes from weak-tie relationship and the information of incentive is being disclosed for both senders and receivers.

The favorable or unfavorable attitude will influences directly to receivers` intention to redeem the M-coupon, in both of German and Indonesian group. When receivers have a positive attitude towards M-coupon they will also have a positive intention to redeem it. This result is consistent in transparent and non-transparent situation. Furthermore, a positive suggestion from others to the receivers in German group about the redeeming of M-coupon, leads them to a positive intention to redeem it. This result is consistent in both of transparent and non-transparent situation. Meanwhile in Indonesian group, the positive suggestion from others about redeeming M-coupon will lead to the positive intention to redeem the M-coupon if receivers have information regarding the incentive that will be obtained or have already received by the senders. However in non-transparent situation positive suggestion from others about redeeming M-coupon will not necessarily lead to the positive intention to redeem

Receivers` perceived control on their behavior (e.g. to redeem the M-coupon) will influence their intention (e.g. to redeem the M-coupon). Ajzen (1991) stated that positive perceived behavioral control leads to the positive intention. In accordance with Ajzen (1991), the result in Indonesian group also proven that, when receivers have positive perceived control in redeeming M-coupon, they will have also a positive

intention to redeem it. Nonetheless in German group, when receivers have high control whether or not they will redeem the M-coupon, they tends to have a low intention to redeem it and this result is consistent in transparent and non-transparent situation.

CHAPTER 5

Discussion

5.1 Summary of the Main Findings

WOM is always perceived by the consumers as informal communication on particular products or services without firms influencing this process. However, firms recently make efforts to become involved in WOM activities structurally by giving incentives to WOM participants or Godes et al. (2005) call it as referral reward programs. In this dissertation, we use the term “incentivized WOM”. Firms need to react to two challenges in incentivized WOM: first, the ability to create a tool for incentivized WOM which is easy to broadcast for WOM participants and second, the design of the different components of each incentive in order to directly target the senders and indirectly aim at the receivers of this incentivized WOM.

In this dissertation, we address three incentive components, namely incentive differentiation, incentive conditionality and incentive transparency. Previous academic research has partially examined these components, but focused on one-sidedly, either only the senders’ perspective or only that of the receivers’. Here, we propose an integrated study elaborating on both the senders’ and the receivers’ perspectives towards the above mentioned components to consider for each incentive, while also using mobile-coupons as a novel tool for incentivized WOM.

The senders’ decision to choose suitable receivers of WOM with a particular design of the incentive components is the focus of Chapter 3 in this dissertation. The incentive components in WOM activity have also become a field of interest for researchers such as Ahrens et al., (2013). They attempt to compare incentive strategies aiming at encouraging existing customers to refer potential customers to the firm. They use a “reward both” method and manipulate the scheme of the incentives offered to the senders as well as to the receivers. Their result implies that an equal incentive for both senders and receivers does not necessarily lead to a higher referral activity – unless both parties obtain a relatively high incentive.

However, most referrals occur if senders obtain a higher incentive than the receivers. Similar to the study conducted by Ahrens et al., (2013), our study also manipulates the magnitude of the incentive aiming at understanding the role of tie-strength in incentivized WOM. Here, incentivized WOM refers to schemes of incentives which are being used by firms. The result indicates that if senders are asked to share an M-coupon with a differing incentive in it (i.e. senders obtain a higher incentive than the receivers) and if the information on the incentive is revealed to both sides, senders will share this coupon rather with strong-tie receivers. The senders' decision to choose receivers having a strong-tie relationship with them might be caused by the senders' consideration of the impression the receivers of this incentivized WOM might have of them as a result of an M-coupon with an unequally shared amount of incentive (Ryu & Feick, 2007; Xiao et al., 2011). In addition, Ryu & Feick (2007) also state that receivers from the senders' strong ties will participate in WOM activities voluntarily without even considering a possible incentive because they trust the senders to act in their favor. Therefore, it seems to make sense that senders might tend to send M-coupons containing an unequal incentive to strong-tie receivers.

In chapter three, the second incentive component in incentivized WOM considered in this study is the conditionality of each incentive. There are two alternatives concerning this conditionality: first, an unconditional incentive means that the coupon can be redeemed straight away (i.e. right after sharing it with somebody else), or second is a conditional incentive (e.g. senders obtain their incentive only after they share incentivized WOM with receivers and the latter, redeem their coupon).

An unconditional M-coupon is preferred by customers. However, firms prefer not to waste their resources by giving away rewards without any guarantee that senders refer their products or services. Therefore, Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) suggest to applying terms and conditions to coupons to reduce free riders (i.e. customers who only take advantage of their incentive without doing anything in return for the companies). By focusing on the consumers' reactions to such a situation of conditional incentives, this study complements the study by Biyalogorsky et al. (2001). The result of this study suggests that when senders are required to share M-coupons with a conditional incentive neither tie-strength nor the receivers' deal proneness are important to the senders. They just share it to with others and do not pay much attention to how appropriate the incentive is for the receivers.

Furthermore, to make the brand become viral and at the end, convert referrals into sales becomes the main objective in incentivized WOM. Besides of the marketing effort used to support these objectives, the consumers' deal proneness should also be considered by the companies. Previous research regarding deal proneness has focused mainly on deal proneness as antecedent for a particular action such as the impact of deal proneness on consumer willingness to participate in WOM (Bawa & Shoemaker, 1987, Lichtenstein et al., 1990), the impact on deal proneness character on coupon redemption (Guimond et al., 2001) and also the impact of deal proneness on the consumers' willingness to participate in WOM (Wirtz & Chew, 2002).

However there is still lack of research which is focusing in consumer's deal proneness as consequences or outcomes. To complement the previous research, this study explores the receivers' deal proneness from the senders' point of view. It also relates this aspect to the different incentive components. With respect to an unequal incentive for senders and receivers (where receivers obtain the larger incentive), we discover that senders here focus on targeting deal prone receivers, regardless of whether information on these different incentives is made available to the receivers as well or if this information is not disclosed to the receiving parties.

In Chapter 4, we examine the receivers' response on incentivized WOM with the help of scenarios similar to those being used in senders' perspectives. The format of these scenarios is modified to be suitable for the receivers. Referring to the result of senders' perspective, an incentive differentiation for senders and receivers in incentivized WOM activities will lead senders to share these coupons with strong-tie receivers only if the information on these incentives is transparent for the receivers. Nonetheless, it remains largely unexplored how receivers, considering their tie-strength with the senders, will respond to incentives characterized by an incentive differentiation for both parties.

Previous research by Verlegh et al. (2013) states that receivers respond less favorably to incentivized WOM (compared to non-incentivized WOM activities) when they only have a weak-tie relationship with the senders. To complement previous research and to shed light on incentives in the context of incentivized WOM, this dissertation additionally highlights the receivers' perception of these differing incentives by applying the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). We discover that receivers from Germany tend to have an unfavorable attitude toward incentivized WOM characterized

by a differing incentive for senders and receivers, regardless of the relationship they have with the senders of these incentives. Living in an individualist country, consumers in Germany believe fairness to be important (Mattila & Patterson, 2004). Therefore, it is predictable that in the German group a differing incentive will negatively affect the receivers' feelings of fairness.

On the other hand, in the Indonesian group, differing incentives do not weaken the receivers' favorable attitude toward these M-coupons regardless of whether the senders have strong or weak ties with them. Characterized as collectivist people, consumers in Indonesia always strive to preserve harmony (Mooij & Hofstede, 2011). Therefore, unfairness is not a major concern for customers as long as they can harmoniously blend in with others in society.

However, the favorability of receivers in the Indonesian group toward incentivized WOM with a differing incentive is determined by whether the incentive is conditional. If an M-coupon is unconditional (the senders obtain their incentive regardless of whether or not the receivers redeem their M-coupon), differing incentives will lead to an unfavorable attitude, but if the incentive for the senders depends on the receivers' action (i.e. the incentive is conditional one), a lower incentive is acceptable for the receivers. Even though the division of incentives is unfair, receivers in the latter setting still have power over the senders, compensating them for their lower incentive.

In chapter 4, we connect the incentive conditionality with perceived behavioral control and we attempt exploring how conditional and unconditional incentives influence the receivers' perceived behavioral control. In the relationship between incentive conditionality and receivers' perceived behavioral control, we obtain different responses from receivers in the German group and those in the Indonesian group. In German sample, receiver tend to have weak perceive control to redeem the M-coupon when the senders' incentive depends solely on the receivers' action of redeeming their M-coupon – regardless of how strong are the ties with the senders. Germany is categorized by Hofstede as a country with a masculine character. Therefore, consumers in Germany are used to making their own decision. Accordingly, they tend to decide faster when purchasing because they only consider themselves in their decision (Mooij & Hofstede, 2011). Hence, considering other interests during their decision making process is not a

simple situation for the receivers in Germany-and if they face such a situation, it weakens their perceived behavioral control.

Meanwhile, whether an incentive is conditional or not will in general not influence the receivers' perceived behavioral control in the Indonesian group. However, when the incentive is conditional, it weakens the receivers' perceived control concerning the redemption of their M-coupon-provided that the senders have a weak tie relationship with them and that the incentive differs (i.e. receivers obtain a smaller incentive than the senders).

According to Frenzen and Nakamoto, (1993), the nature of the sender-receiver relationship influences their perceptions of costs and benefits. When dealing with persons from their strong ties, people tend to be concerned about the other persons' welfare. This leads them to respond to the others' needs without expecting anything in return (Frenzen & Nakamoto, 1993). In addition, Ryu and Feick (2007) argue that, where persons from weak ties are concerned, reciprocity is important: weakly tie person prefer a balanced situation and they tend to adjust it if they perceive it as being unbalanced. Reciprocity is an important factor for the relationship between senders and receivers in WOM – this particularly holds when incentives are involved. Even though previous research has already explored the relationship of reciprocity and tie-strength (Frenzen & Nakamoto, 1993; Ryu & Feick, 2007) we attempt to add a new perspective on reciprocity in this study by observing it in the context of incentivized WOM and by connecting it with the receivers' perceived behavioral control. We prove that a situation characterized by reciprocity, influences the receivers' perceived behavioral control. In the German group, we discover that regardless the incentive transparency, a situation where reciprocity is experienced by the receivers will weaken their perceived control to perform a particular behavior (e.g. to redeem the corresponding M-coupon). Nonetheless, for receivers from Indonesia, reciprocity does not weaken their perceived control to perform a particular behavior (e.g. redeem the M-coupon) – regardless of whether the information concerning the senders' incentive is transparent or non-transparent.

Furthermore, regarding the relationship between *reciprocity* and *subjective norms*, we discover that in the German group, when in a situation characterized by the reciprocity receivers in this group tend to rely on the opinion of others regarding the coupon

redemption only if they have weak ties with the senders of this M-coupon. Whereas in Indonesian group, regardless their tie-strength with the sender, receivers tend to rely on opinion of others about the best action concerning whether or not to redeem the M-coupon.

In Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), attitude, perceived behavioral control and subjective norms influence the receivers' intention to redeem the corresponding M-coupon. In accordance to Dickinger and Kleijnen (2008), our result shows that the receivers' positive attitude will lead to a positive intention concerning the redeeming M-coupon in question regardless of whether information about the incentive is transparent or non-transparent. This result is consistent for both the German and the Indonesian group.

Furthermore, we obtain a positive and significant relationship between subjective norms and the intention to redeem an M-coupon for both the Indonesian and the German group. This result fits the findings of the previous study by Ashworth et al. (2005). They state that consumers really care about what other people have said about using a specific coupon. However, in a non-transparent setting, we obtain only an insignificant result for the relationship between subjective norms and intention in Indonesian group.

Our results also illustrate that perceived behavioral control significantly affects the receivers' intention to redeem a specific M-coupon. However, the results for the German and the Indonesian group differ. In the Indonesian group, we obtain a positive and significant relationship between the receivers' perceived behavioral control and their intention regardless the incentive transparency. This result is in accordance with previous research by Dickinger and Kleijnen (2008) as well as by Kang et al. (2006). Meanwhile in the German group, perceived behavioral control is negatively correlated with intention – regardless of the possible transparency of the senders' incentive. The result from the German sample provides us with a new insight: it might be possible that receivers perceiving themselves to have a high behavioral control concerning redeeming an M-coupon tend to have a lower intention to redeem it compared to others who perceive themselves to have a lower behavioral control. When receivers in the German group have a low perceived behavioral control, they tend to rely on others' opinions regarding coupon redemption. Thus, the positive suggestions from others will strongly influence the receivers' decision to redeem the M-coupon. However, when receivers

have a high perceived behavioral control, they tend to rely on their own thought concerning the redeeming action and their favorability of the brands (e.g. Starbucks and McDonald's) probably is one of the factor that influencing receivers' thought to redeem the M-coupons.

5.2 Scientific Contribution

This dissertation contributes to the existing scientific literature in various ways. We add a new perspective to the sender-receiver relationship in incentivized word-of-mouth by jointly investigating attitude and behavior of both involved parties (e.g. senders and receivers). We also elaborate on the different incentive components which can be used by firms to manage the distribution of incentives among all participants during the WOM activity.

Previous academic research offers insightful studies on the development of WOM tools and the incentive components as Palka et al. (2009) propose using the latest technology for WOM via mobile devices – or so called mobile WOM – as a new platform for marketers. According to them, mobile coupons are the promising tool to be used by firms in order to generate WOM via mobile phones. Some of the brands have already used mobile coupons to generate WOM. One of these brands is S. Oliver with the following method: to qualify for a discount, a message needs to be passed on to other people. In this dissertation, we also use mobile coupons to generate WOM but we manipulate the particular components of the incentive therein.

From the senders' perspective, our research provides an important insight about to whom senders will send the incentivized WOM. Here "Whom" is determined by the context of tie-strength and that of deal proneness. Tie-strength is an essential factor when determining social relationships in incentivized WOM (Brown & Reingen, 1987; Ryu & Feick, 2007). Ryu and Feick (2007) find that a "reward both" strategy in incentivized WOM is particularly effective for increasing referrals to the receiver having a weak tie relationship with the sender. Complementing previous research, we propose a "reward both" strategy including an unequally divided incentive between senders and receivers (where the reward for the senders is higher than that for the receivers). Our result shows that a "reward both" strategy particularly animates senders to address strong-tie receivers when information about their own incentive is made available to the receivers.

The senders' decision about targeting suitable receivers for an M-coupon does not solely depend on their tie-strength but is also influenced by the receivers' characteristics related to their behavior of utilizing coupons or their so called "deal proneness". Deal proneness has been widely studied in the area of coupon usage (e.g. Bawa & Shoemaker, 1987; Bawa et al., 1997) and particularly in the field of M-coupons (e.g. by Banerjee & Yancey, 2010; Dickinger & Kleijnen, 2008). However, it remains largely unexplored how important is the receivers' deal proneness to the senders. How senders think about the receivers' deal proneness is important because in the end, the receivers with high deal proneness are more likely to engage in incentivized WOM by redeeming their M-coupon. To tackle this lack of insight, our dissertation also focuses on the impact of a differing incentive for both parties on the senders' decision of targeting receivers based on the deal proneness. We find that in "reward both" programs particularly when the senders obtain a higher incentive than the receivers, senders tend to send this M-coupon to deal prone receivers.

Previous research highlights the best strategy for companies to increase their likelihood of being referred in incentivized WOM: Firms should implement a "pay per performance" or a "pay per lead" strategy, i.e. they should make the senders' incentive conditional so that the senders can only redeem it once their receivers redeemed their own (Libai et al., 2003). Still ours is the first systematic investigation of the senders' response to whether their incentive is conditional. Still, we fail to prove that incentive conditionality influences the senders' decision to target receivers based on their tie-strength and the receivers' deal proneness. Our result suggests that the senders' decision to choose suitable receivers is generally not derived from whether an incentive is conditional or unconditional but that their decision is rather based on whether the incentive differs between senders and receivers.

Another contribution of this dissertation to the scientific insights is derived from the receivers' perspective on incentivized WOM. As discussed before, this dissertation provides us with comprehensive information on both the senders' and the receivers' perspective on incentivized WOM. We provide more in-depth insights on the receivers' attitude and their intention concerning incentivized WOM by adopting the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), and by comparing the results based on the transparent and non-transparent setting.

Our results suggest that the receivers in the German group have an unfavorable attitude toward an M-coupon if they obtain a smaller incentive than the senders regardless whether the senders of this M-coupon are from strong ties or from weak ties. Thus, by differentiating the amount of incentive in a “reward both” strategy, tie-strength does not matter anymore. This result is not only in accordance with previous research by Verlegh et al. (2013) on incentivized WOM but also complementing it. Verlegh et al. (2013) suggests that the receivers tend to have an unfavorable attitude towards incentivized WOM, particularly when the senders are from weak ties.

Being part of a Western culture and having highly independent self-construal character (the extent to which the self is defined independently of others) receivers in the German group will tend to feel unfavorable toward unequally distributed incentives. Accordingly, the notion of “getting what one deserves” becomes the major issue for them (Mattila & Patterson, 2004; McFarlin & Sweeney, 2001). In contrast, unequally distributed incentives are not the major issue for receivers in the Indonesian group as they are part of the Eastern culture promoting conflict avoidance and a harmonious interpersonal relationship (Mattila & Patterson, 2004).

With the theory of planned behavior developed by Ajzen (1991), we elaborate on whether the incentive conditionality will influence receivers to engage in incentivized WOM activities (by supporting or impeding their redemption of an M-coupon). Dickinger & Kleijnen (2008) state that if persons have a positive perceived behavioral control regarding their ability and their resources to redeem the M-coupon they are positively inclined to redeem it. Here our study contributed to the new perspective of the perceived behavioral control which is not only influenced by internal factors but also the external ones. The internal factors are, e.g. persons ability to perform a particular action because they have the resources, time and also skill necessary to perform this action. As suggested by Conner and Abraham (2001), each person behavior is strongly influenced by their confidence in their ability to act in a particular way. The External factors are e.g. the impact of the receivers` action on the senders (and their welfare). This matters especially when the involved persons feel obliged to reciprocate during their decision-making process. The external factors in the control beliefs will potentially become a dilemma and finally will influence a person ability to control the situation.

Our study confirms two different kind of impact of external considerations on a person behavioral control: For receivers from the German group, we prove that adding external factors to the situation (i.e. differencing between a conditional and an unconditional incentive) will weaken the receivers` perceived behavioral control. Meanwhile for receivers in Indonesian group, the external factors will not weaken their perceived behavioral control. The result was consistent both in transparent and non-transparent situation (this result is consistent in a situation where the information thereon is made available for the receivers as well as in a situation where receivers have no means to know about the senders` incentive).

This dissertation also contributes to the normative component in the theory of planned behavior by linking reciprocity to subjective norms while using tie-strength as a moderator of this relationship. Ajzen (1991) states that subjective norms relate to a person`s perception of social pressure which in turn motivates them to approve or disapprove of a particular behavior. Our study shows that, for receivers in the Indonesian group, reciprocity is positively correlated with subjective norms. This finding holds for both transparent and non-transparent situations (i.e. whether or not the receivers find out about the senders` incentive). When receivers deal with a situation characterized by reciprocity, they rely on the opinion of others regarding their best decision, i.e. whether or not to participate in this incentivized WOM. This choice of the receivers to rely on the opinion of others regardless the tie-strength connecting them with the senders of incentivized WOM. When finding themselves in a situation characterized by reciprocity, receivers in the German sample only rely on the opinion of others regarding the best decision (whether or not to participate in this incentivized WOM) if they have a weak-tie relationship with the senders. Therefore, in (the case of) the German sample, tie-strength with the senders becomes a crucial factor which can differentiate the receivers` decision.

According to Ajzen (1991), attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control will directly influence the behavioral intention and our study confirm it. As we can quote from (Ajzen, 1991) “the relative importance of attitude-subjective norm and perceived behavioral control varies across behavior and situation”. Therefore, we can expect that when a person has a strong attitude towards a behavior and/or object, or when the opinion of others is much more important in shaping person`s intention to perform a certain behavior, perceived behavioral control may be less predictive for the

person`s intention (Armitage & Conner, 2001). In line with Ajzen (1991) as well as with Armitage and Conner (2001), we find that in the German sample, when receivers get a similar information as senders (transparent situation), the main variables proven to directly influence the receivers` intention of redeeming the M-coupon are attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. However, when receivers do not have any information about the senders` incentive (non-transparent situation), perceived behavioral control is less predictive intention. This is shown by the marginally significant result concerning the relationship between perceived behavioral control and intention.

In the Indonesian group, our study shows that in a transparent situation (senders and receivers have the same information about the incentive), receivers` attitude towards M-coupon, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control are jointly influence the receivers` intention to redeem the M-coupon. However, in a non-transparent situation (receivers do not have any information about the incentive obtained by the senders), subjective norms are less predictive for the receivers` intention. This can be shown from the insignificant result concerning the relationship between subjective norms and intention. Accordingly, our study strengthens and broadens the perspective of previous research having adopted the theory of planned behavior (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2005; Dickinger & Kleijnen, 2008; Kang et al., 2006).

5.3 Limitations and Direction for Future Research

Our study has several limitations suggesting potential opportunities for further research. The first limitation is the absence of psychological aspects from the senders` perspectives. The research design seems to “force” the participants in the sender group to decide on who is the most suitable receiver of an M-coupon characterized by the particular design of the incentive. Thereon, our study does not give them room to articulate their attitude and their intention towards the M-coupon. The senders` attitude and their intention could also be valuable for firms in order to better understand the senders` potential action. Thus this may be a promising topic for future research.

The second limitation is related to the samples used in this dissertation. A convenience sample of university students is employed both in the pre-test as well as in the main study for both groups (i.e. the German and the Indonesian group). Therefore, the generalizability of the findings is limited concerning the validity for all consumers in

Germany and Indonesia. Accordingly, we suggest adding heterogeneity to the sample in future research.

The third limitation is the role of cultural differences which should be considered. Even though most of the results have shown a consistency for both the German and the Indonesian group throughout the study, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results are affected by cultural factors. Examples might be that we obtain a different result regarding the relationship between reciprocity and perceived behavioral control from the receivers' perspective in the German and the Indonesian group. However, we can only speculate about the potential influence of the cultural differences between Indonesia and Germany in this respect. A situation characterized by reciprocity is complex and confusing for the respondents from Germany, because according to Aaker & Lee (2001), Westerners are more likely to be independent or individualist. Thus, for the German group a situation characterized by reciprocity tends to weaken their perceived behavioral control. Conversely, according to (Aaker & Lee, 2001), as participants in the Asian group would have an interdependent self-construal, the reciprocity is something common in their community. Accordingly, it will not weaken their perceived behavioral control. Hence, future research might aim at further understanding the role of cultural differences or cultural aspects defining consumers' reactions towards incentivized WOM.

The second last (namely, fourth) limitation of this dissertation is that we focus more on the incentive in WOM without considering the importance of the brand names used in the study. To make the scenario more lifelike, we employ the brands "Starbucks" and "McDonalds" in our used M-coupons. Since both brands are well-known it is easier for participants to relate to these brands in their mind. Previous research from Banerjee and Yancey (2010) shows that the consumers' intention to redeem an M-coupon is influenced by the character of the product (e.g. utilitarian or hedonic) or service therein as well as by the timing of when receivers obtain an M-coupon. In our study, McDonalds is chosen to represent a utilitarian brand while Starbucks shall represent a hedonic brand. Nonetheless, we neither analyze the impact of these brands on the senders' decision to send it to a particular receiver nor the impact of these brands on the receivers' intention to redeem their coupon. Therefore, future research needs to address the impact of hedonic and utilitarian brands on the consumers' intention to redeem the M-coupon.

Last but not least, in this dissertation the communication behavior between senders and receivers characterizing the tie-strength (Marsden & Campbell, 1984) only takes place in first study (senders` perspective). The main reason why we exclude the questions to measure the communication behavior from the receivers` perspective is simply to reduce the complexity in research design and to reduce the number of questions. Since we only look into the communication behavior between senders and the prospective receivers, it is important for future research to add information regarding the communication behavior between the prospective sender and the receivers.

5.4 Practical Implication

Apart from contributing to scientific knowledge, this dissertation has several practical implications. We provide these separately for firms in Germany and for firms in Indonesia. Ryu and Feick (2007) state that incentives are important for increasing referrals to weak ties because weak ties playing a critical role in bridging the gap between different groups. Therefore, it is important for the firms to also target receivers having a weak-tie relationship with the senders in incentivized WOM activity. Besides of the receivers` tie-strength, firms need to address deal prone receivers. The deal prone receivers are proven to have a favorable attitude toward M-coupon. This favorable attitude will influence the receivers to develop a positive intention to redeem their M-coupon eventually.

Referring to the results of this dissertation, incentive differentiation in M-coupon (senders obtain higher incentive compared to receivers`) will lead the senders to share it mainly with receivers having a strong-tie relationship with them, if the incentive information is transparent. In contrast to the transparent situation, senders will share M-coupon with different amount of incentive with the receivers having a weak-tie relationship with them if the incentive information is not being disclosed by the firms. Concerning receivers` deal proneness, differing amount of incentive between senders and receivers leads senders to share it with deal prone receivers only if the incentive information is transparent. In non-transparent situation, receivers` deal proneness does not become senders` main consideration in targeting particular receivers.

Findings in this dissertation suggest the firms located in Germany to carefully establish a “reward both” strategy since a differing incentive creates a feeling of unfairness which

in turn leads to the receivers' unfavorable attitude towards the M-coupon – regardless of their type of relationship with the senders (being strong or weak ties). Therefore, the best strategy would provide the senders with a higher incentive than for the receivers while not disclosing information thereon to the receivers. With such a strategy, firms could acquire receivers who have a weak-tie relationship with the senders and also avoid the possibility that receivers will have a negative attitude towards M-coupon. Receivers having a positive attitude towards M-coupon will also have a positive intention to redeem it.

For firms located in Indonesia, there are two strategies that can be implemented. The first strategy is to provide the senders with the higher amount of incentive than for the receivers while disclosing the information of incentive between senders and receivers. With this first strategy, firms can expect that senders will choose receivers who have a strong-tie relationship with them as well as deal prone receivers. From the receivers' perspectives, obtains incentive smaller than the incentive obtain by senders will not necessarily lead them to an unfavorable attitude towards M-coupon. Therefore, firms can expect the receivers tend to have a positive intention to redeem the M-coupon since the receivers' favorable and unfavorable attitude towards M-coupon is not determined by the differing amount of incentive rather from their deal proneness character.

The second strategy is to provide the senders with the higher amount of incentive than the incentive for the receivers while not disclosing the information of incentive between senders and receivers. With this second strategy, firm can expect that senders will mainly targeting the receivers having weak-tie relationship with them without considering whether the receivers are deal prone or not. However with this strategy, firms cannot be assured whether the receivers will have a positive intention to redeem the M-coupon or not, since the receivers' attitude and their deal proneness are unpredictable.

When is the best time for firms to offer incentives to the senders as they initiate each action in a “reward both” strategy? Immediately after senders share their M-coupon with others or after the receivers obtaining the M-coupon redeemed it. The pay per lead (unconditional of incentive) and pay per performance (conditional of incentive) becomes a dilemma for the firms. According to Ryu & Feick (2007), it is important for firms to have senders and receivers who have weak-tie relationship spectrum. However,

our results suggest that firms located in either Germany or Indonesia cannot rely on “pay per performance” or “pay per lead” strategies if they want to address person from weak-ties spectrum. This dissertation shows that a conditional incentive does not determine the senders’ decision to choose particular receivers in terms of tie-strength and deal proneness.

Nevertheless firms could still use a conditional incentive to increase the redeeming result from the receivers but not to target the weak-tie receivers. For firms in Germany, it is best for them to employ conditional incentive (also named as pay per performance strategy) with transparency information instead of non-transparent strategy. The conditional incentive in M-coupon with incentive transparency lead the senders to share M-coupon with either strong-tie or weak-tie receivers. However from the receivers’ perspectives, conditional incentive with transparency information will weaken their perceived control whether or not they want to redeem the M-coupon. Their uncertainty feeling surprisingly leads them to have a positive intention to redeem the M-coupon.

In contrast to a transparent situation (where receivers obtain information on the senders’ incentive), a conditional incentive without information about the senders’ incentive will not weaken the receivers’ perceived behavioral control. Receivers’ strong behavioral control will not necessarily influence them to have a positive intention to redeem their M-coupon. Thus, if the firms intend to give a conditional incentive while not disclosing information thereon, the firms cannot assure that the receivers will have a positive intention to redeem their coupon.

For firms located in Indonesia, giving conditionality in M-coupon will lead senders to choose the receivers regardless their tie-strength as well as their deal proneness character, even though the incentive information is being close or disclose by the firms. Furthermore, M-coupon with incentive conditionality will not necessarily weaken receivers’ perceived behavioral control and accordingly high perceived behavioral control will lead to high intention to redeem the M-coupon. Therefore firms located in Indonesia can give a conditional incentive in M-coupon with or without disclosing the incentive information and firms can also expect the receivers’ positive intention to redeem the M-coupon.

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Appendix A:

Tables of Multi Group Analysis

Table 22: Multi Group Analysis of the Senders Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Incentive Differentiation” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (Different)	Path Coefficients Original (No Different)	t-value (Different vs No Different)	p-value (Different vs No Different)
H1	ID → Strong-Weak Receiver	N.a			
H2	ID x Transp. → Strong-Weak Receiver				
H3	IC → Strong-Weak Receiver	-0.031	0.0042	0.5078	0.612
H4	IC x Transp. → Strong-Weak Receiver	0.04	0.054	0.1992	0.842
H5	ID → DealPron.	N.a			
H6	ID x Transp. → DealPron.				
H7	ID → DealPron.	-0.064	0.035	1.294	0.197
H8	IC x Transp. → DealPron.	-0.043	0.075	1.4913	0.137

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; Transp= Incentive transparency; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available

Table 23: Multi Group Analysis of the Senders Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Incentive Conditionality” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (Conditional)	Path Coefficients Original (Unconditional)	t-value (Conditional vs Unconditional)	p-value (Conditional vs Unconditional)
H1	ID → Strong-Weak Receiver	-0.084	-0.044	0.508	0.612
H2	ID x Transp. → Strong-Weak Receiver	0.155	0.168	0.136	0.892
H3	IC → Strong-Weak Receiver	N.a			
H4	IC x Transp. → Strong-Weak Receiver				

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (Conditional)	Path Coefficients Original (Unconditional)	t-value (Conditional vs Unconditional)	p-value (Conditional vs Unconditional)
H5	ID → DealPron.	0.076	0.170	1.065	0.288
H6	ID x Transp. → DealPron.	0.031	0.143	1.364	0.174
H7	ID → DealPron.	N.a			
H8	IC x Transp. → DealPron.				

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; Transp= Incentive transparency; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available

Table 24: Multi Group Analysis of the Senders Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Incentive Transparency” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (Transparent)	Path Coefficients Original (Non-Transparent)	t-value (Transparent vs Non-Transparent)	p-value (Transparent vs Non-Transparent)
H1	ID → Strong-Weak Receiver	0.106	-0.229	3.722	0.000
H2	ID x Transp. → Strong-Weak Receiver	N.a			
H3	IC → Strong-Weak Receiver	0.030	-0.058	1.170	0.243
H4	IC x Transp. → Strong-Weak Receiver	N.a			
H5	ID → DealPron.	0.195	0.056	1.704	0.090
H6	ID x Transp. → DealPron.	N.a			
H7	ID → DealPron.	0.001	-0.046	0.686	0.494
H8	IC x Transp. → DealPron.	N.a			

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; Transp= Incentive transparency; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available

Table 25: Multi Group Analysis of the Receivers Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Incentive Differentiation” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test: German group

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (Different)	Path Coefficients Original (No Different)	t-value (Different vs No Different)	p-value (Different vs No Different)
H1	ID → Attitude	N.a			
H2	ID x Tie-strength → Attitude				
H3	Deal Proneness → Attitude	0.276	0.269	0.060	0.952
H4	IC → PBC	-0.052	-0.245	1.939	0.054
H5	IC x Tie-strength → PBC	0.003	-0.020	0.320	0.749
H6	Reciprocity → PBC	-0.125	-0.167	0.360	0.719
H7	Reciprocity → SN	0.417	0.424	0.078	0.938
H8	Reciprocity x Tie-strength → SN	-0.059	-0.080	0.334	0.739
H9	Attitude → Intention	0.740	0.625	1.585	0.115
H10	SN → Intention	0.160	0.271	1.397	0.164
H11	PBC → Intention	-0.168	-0.145	0.293	0.770

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available; PBC = Perceived behavioural control; SN = Subjective Norms

Table 26: Multi Group Analysis of the Receivers Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Incentive Differentiation” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test: Indonesian Group

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (Different)	Path Coefficients Original (No Different)	t-value (Different vs No Different)	p-value (Different vs No Different)
H1	ID → Attitude	N.a			
H2	ID x Tie-strength → Attitude				
H3	Deal Proneness → Attitude	0.308	0.285	0.239	0.811
H4	IC → PBC	0.031	-0.105	1.681	0.095
H5	IC x Tie-strength → PBC	-0.015	0.134	1.829	0.069
H6	Reciprocity → PBC	0.179	0.237	0.471	0.639
H7	Reciprocity →	0.226	0.246	0.176	0.861

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (Different)	Path Coefficients Original (No Different)	t-value (Different vs No Different)	p-value (Different vs No Different)
	SN				
H8	Reciprocity x Tie-strength → SN	0.154	-0.124	2.157	0.032
H9	Attitude → Intention	0.355	0.353	0.016	0.987
H10	SN → Intention	0.039	0.210	1.669	0.097
H11	PBC → Intention	0.347	0.201	1.253	0.212

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available; PBC = Perceived behavioural control; SN = Subjective Norms

Table 27: Multi Group Analysis of the Receivers Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Incentive Conditionality” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test: in German group

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (conditional)	Path Coefficients Original (un-conditional)	t-value (conditional vs. un-conditional)	p-value (conditional vs. unconditional)
H1	ID → Attitude	-0.137	-0.169	0.314	0.754
H2	ID x Tie-strength → Attitude	0.012	0.054	0.610	0.543
H3	Deal Proneness → Attitude	0.275	0.277	0.016	0.987
H4	IC → PBC	N.a			
H5	IC x Tie-strength → PBC				
H6	Reciprocity → PBC	-0.163	-0.136	0.236	0.814
H7	Reciprocity → SN	0.388	0.453	0.725	0.469
H8	Reciprocity x Tie-strength → SN	-0.105	0.035	2.060	0.041
H9	Attitude → Intention	0.652	0.714	0.845	0.400
H10	SN → Intention	0.234	0.184	0.621	0.535
H11	PBC → Intention	-0.169	-0.131	0.513	0.609

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available; PBC = Perceived behavioural control; SN = Subjective Norms

Table 28: Multi Group Analysis of the Receivers Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Incentive Conditionality” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test: Indonesian Group

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (conditional)	Path Coefficients Original (un-conditional)	t-value (conditional vs. un-conditional)	p-value (conditional vs. un-conditional)
H1	ID → Attitude	0.133	-0.230	3.671	0.000
H2	ID x Tie-strength → Attitude	0.032	0.050	0.262	0.794
H3	Deal Proneness → Attitude	0.329	0.282	0.508	0.612
H4	IC → PBC	N.a			
H5	IC x Tie-strength → PBC				
H6	Reciprocity → PBC	0.225	0.182	0.362	0.718
H7	Reciprocity → SN	0.289	0.250	0.370	0.712
H8	Reciprocity x Tie-strength → SN	-0.123	0.139	2.238	0.026
H9	Attitude → Intention	0.377	0.332	0.384	0.701
H10	SN → Intention	0.102	0.133	0.291	0.771
H11	PBC → Intention	0.273	0.305	0.276	0.783

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available; PBC = Perceived behavioural control; SN = Subjective Norms

Table 29: Multi Group Analysis of the Receivers Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Tie-Strength” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test: German Group

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (strong-tie)	Path Coefficients Original (weak-tie)	t-value (strong-tie vs. weak-tie)	p-value (strong-tie vs. weak-tie)
H1	ID → Attitude	-0.122	-0.188	0.659	0.511
H2	ID x Tie-strength → Attitude	N.a			
H3	Deal Proneness → Attitude	0.315	0.221	0.907	0.366
H4	IC → PBC	-0.125	-0.111	0.129	0.897
H5	IC x Tie-strength → PBC	N.a			
H6	Reciprocity → PBC	-0.088	-0.214	1.138	0.257
H7	Reciprocity → SN	0.365	0.477	1.260	0.209
H8	Reciprocity x Tie-strength →	N.a			

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (strong-tie)	Path Coefficients Original (weak-tie)	t-value (strong-tie vs. weak-tie)	p-value (strong-tie vs. weak-tie)
	SN				
H9	Attitude → Intention	0.684	0.675	0.111	0.912
H10	SN → Intention	0.244	0.203	0.492	0.624
H11	PBC → Intention	-0.197	-0.153	0.539	0.591

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available; PBC = Perceived behavioural control; SN = Subjective Norms

Table 30: Multi Group Analysis of the Receivers Perspective in Manipulation Set of “Tie-Strength” with Welch-Satterthwaite Test: Indonesian Group

Hypothesis	The Relationship among constructs	Path Coefficients Original (strong-tie)	Path Coefficients Original (weak-tie)	t-value (strong-tie vs. weak-tie)	p-value (strong-tie vs. weak-tie)
H1	ID → Attitude	0.011	-0.083	1.234	0.219
H2	ID x Tie-strength → Attitude	N.a			
H3	Deal Proneness → Attitude	0.289	0.296	0.080	0.936
H4	IC → PBC	0.021	-0.090	1.389	0.167
H5	IC x Tie-strength → PBC	N.a			
H6	Reciprocity → PBC	0.182	0.251	0.593	0.554
H7	Reciprocity → SN	0.260	0.286	0.241	0.810
H8	Reciprocity x Tie-strength → SN	N.a			
H9	Attitude → Intention	0.413	0.325	0.765	0.446
H10	SN → Intention	0.157	0.041	1.298	0.196
H11	PBC → Intention	0.250	0.354	0.892	0.374

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC= Incentive Conditionality; DealPron= deal proneness; Ger= German; Ind = Indonesia; N.a = Not available; PBC = Perceived behavioural control; SN = Subjective Norms

Table 31: Fornell-Larcker Discriminant Validity from Senders Perspectives

	IC	Deal Prone Receiver	ID	Interaction Effect: Transparent x IC → DP Receiver	Interaction Effect: Transparent x IC → Tie-strength of Receiver	Interaction Effect: Transparent x ID → Tie-strength of Receiver	Interaction Effect: Transparent x ID → DP Receiver	Tie-strength of Receiver	Transparent
IC	Single indicator								
Deal Prone Receiver	0.02	0.81							
ID	0.00	0.12	Single indicator						
Interaction Effect: Transparent x IC → DP Receiver	0.00	0.02	0.00	Single indicator					
Interaction Effect: Transparent x IC → Tie-strength of Receiver	0.00	0.02	0.00	1.00	Single indicator				
Interaction Effect: Transparent x ID → Tie-strength of Receiver	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	Single Indicator			
Interaction Effect: Transparent x ID → DP Receiver	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	Single Indicator		
Tie-strength of Receiver	0.01	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.16	0.16	0.83	
Transparent	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	1.000

ID= Incentive Differentiation; IC = Incentive Conditionality; Transp. = Incentive Transparency; DP = Deal Proneness

Table 32: Fornell-Larcker Discriminant Validity in the Setting of Transparent Situation

Constructs	Attitude		IC		DP		ID		Intention		Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x IC → PBC		Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x ID → Attitude		Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x reciprocity → SN		PBC		Reciprocity		SN		Tie Strength	
	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I
Attitude	0.85	0.82																						
IC	0.14	0.03	SI	SI																				
DP	0.27	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.73																		
ID	0.15	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	SI	SI																
Intention	0.78	0.50	0.00	0.04	0.25	0.36	0.12	0.05	0.97	0.91														
Interaction-Effect: Tie Strength x IC → PBC	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04	SI	SI												
Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x ID → Attitude	0.07	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.02	SI	SI										
Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x reciprocity → SN	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.16	0.01	0.11	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.84	0.36								

Constructs	Attitude		IC		DP		ID		Intention		Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x IC → PBC		Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x ID → Attitude		Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x reciprocity → SN		PBC		Reciprocity		SN		Tie Strength	
	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I
PBC	0.19	0.31	0.13	0.05	0.07	0.14	0.03	0.08	0.01	0.43	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.88	0.84						
Reciprocity	0.31	0.20	0.04	0.06	0.19	0.12	0.01	0.05	0.40	0.38	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.19	0.85	0.78				
SN	0.61	0.50	0.01	0.04	0.35	0.23	0.06	0.09	0.60	0.38	0.01	0.03	0.08	0.24	0.06	0.10	0.21	0.31	0.42	0.27	0.93	0.86		
Tie Strength	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.06	1.00	1.00

ID = Incentive Differentiation; IC = Incentive Conditionality; PBC = Perceived behavioral control; SN = Subjective Norms; DP = Deal Proneness; SI = Single Indicator; G = German; I = Indonesia;

Table 33: Fornell-Larcker Discriminant Validity in the Setting of Non-transparent Situation

	Attitude		DP		Intention		Interaction Effect: Tie-Strength x reciprocity → PBC		Interaction Effect: Tie-Strength x reciprocity → SN		PBC		Reciprocity		SN		Tie-Strength	
	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I
Attitude	0.88	0.81																
DP	0.18	0.17	0.78	0.72														
Intention	0.76	0.38	0.19	0.32	0.98	0.88												
Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x reciprocity → PBC	0.01	0.21	0.15	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.93	0.77										
Interaction Effect: Tie Strength x reciprocity → SN	0.01	0.34	0.15	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.97	0.76	0.94	0.795								
PBC	0.06	0.13	0.12	0.18	0.06	0.39	0.09	0.18	0.05	0.05	0.79	0.75						
Reciprocity	0.18	0.16	0.04	0.10	0.38	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.35	0.46	0.88	0.84				
SN	0.72	0.54	0.21	0.21	0.74	0.32	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.22	0.04	0.30	0.33	0.32	0.92	0.84		
Tie Strength	0.15	0.17	0.08	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.10	0.35	1.00	1.00

DP = Deal Proneness; SN = Subjective Norms; PBC= Perceived Behavioral Control; G = German; I = Indonesia

Appendix B:

Questionnaire from the Senders Perspectives

**In the senders` perspective questionnaire we divided the participants into two groups. The procedures will be similar in each group and the dissimilarity is only in the scenarios presented in Teil 3 (section 3).*

Teil 1

Die nachfolgende Befragung bezieht sich ganz allgemein auf Ihre persönlichen Kontakte. Bitte beachten Sie die folgenden Instruktionen:

1. Die Personen, die Sie in diesem Teil der Befragung (Teil 1) angeben, werden in den nachfolgenden Teilen des Fragebogens als Antwortoptionen wieder auftauchen (allerdings lediglich mit der entsprechenden Nummer).
2. Die Bezeichnungen, die Sie den Personen geben, gelten lediglich der Identifizierung durch Sie. Als Beispiel können Sie den Vornamen und den Anfangsbuchstaben des Nachnamens der Person angeben, z. B. Tobias K. oder Daniel C.
3. Sie können dieselbe Person auch mehrfach nennen. Besser wäre es jedoch, wenn Sie acht verschiedene Personen benennen.
4. Falls Sie zwei Personen mit identischem Vornamen und identischem Anfangsbuchstaben des Nachnamens nennen möchten, geben Sie bitte z. B. eine Ziffer statt dem Nachnamen an, z. B. Christiana 1 und Christiana 2, damit Sie selbst diese Personen unterscheiden können.

Vielen Dank für Ihre Kooperation und viel Spaß bei der Umfrage!

1. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Sie für einige Wochen verreisen. Wen würden Sie bitten, sich für die Zeit ihrer Abwesenheit um Ihre Wohnung zu kümmern (z.B. Blumen gießen, Briefkasten leeren)?
Person 1: P1 --→ sample
Person 2: P2
2. Mit wem unterhalten Sie sich gerne ungezwungen über Hobbies und alltägliche Dinge?
Person 3: P3

Person 4: P4

3. An wen würden Sie sich wenden, wenn Sie Fragen zu einer Hausarbeit hätten, oder sich Vorlesungsmitschriften ausleihen möchten?

Person 5: P5

Person 6: P6

4. An wen würden Sie sich wenden, wenn Sie jemanden zum Reden bräuchten und es sich um persönliche Themen (wie Familienangelegenheiten oder Beziehungen) handeln würde?

Person 7: P7

Person 8: P8

(Notes: the name that participants have mentioned in Teil 1 will automatically appears in Teil 2 and Teil 3 as the answers` choices)

Teil 2

Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen in Bezug auf die Personen, die Sie in Teil 1 genannt haben

1. Wie alt ist P1?
 - 15 - 24
 - 25 - 39
 - 40 - 50
 - 51 - 70
 - >70

2. Wie lange kennen Sie mit P1 schon?
 - Seit kurzem
 - Etwa 1 – 2 Jahre
 - Etwa 3– 5 Jahre
 - Etwa 6 – 10 Jahr
 - Mehr als 10 Jahre

3. Wie oft haben Sie im vergangenen Monat mit P1 von Angesicht zu Angesicht gesprochen?
 - Gar nicht
 - Einmal
 - Ein paar Mal
 - Ein paar mal pro Woche

- Jeden Tag
- 4. Wie oft hatten Sie im vergangenen Monat mit dieser P1 über Mobilgeräte Kontakt (z.B. Anruf, SMS, WhatsApp, E-Mail etc.)?
 - Gar nicht
 - Einmal
 - Ein paar Mal
 - Ein paar mal pro Woche
 - Jeden Tag

5. Wie nahe stehen Sie mit P1?

- Sehr entfernt
- Entfernt
- Weder nah noch entfernt
- Nah
- Sehr nah

Bitte geben Sie uns abschließend zu P1 noch ein paar Angaben zu seinem Kaufverhalten (Rabatte). Bitte antworten Sie spontan aus Ihrer Einschätzung heraus

6. P1 achtet gerne auf Rabattaktionen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollkommen zu

7. P1 nutzt gerne Rabattaktionen, unabhängig von der Höhe des gesparten Betrags.

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollkommen zu

8. Es ist wahrscheinlicher, dass P1 Markenprodukte kauft, wenn es eine Rabattaktion dazu gibt

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen

- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollkommen zu

(Notes: we will ask the similar questions for person 2 to 8 sequently)

Teil 3 (Group 1)

In diesem Teil. Bitte lesen Sie jedes Szenario sorgfältig durch und beantworten Sie anschließend die Fragen.

Szenario 1

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Wenn Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weiterleiten, erhalten Sie ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich eine Nachricht direkt von Starbucks erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Der Absender hat er einen Rabatt erhalten, weil er Ihnen diesen M-Coupon geschickt hat.
2. Der Absender hat mehr Rabatt bekommen als der Empfänger.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):

- Person 1
- Person 2
- Person 3
- Person 4
- Person 5
- Person 6
- Person 7
- Person 8

(Notes: Person 1 to 8 will appear automatically according to the names that participants have mentioned in section 1 and in every scenario the order of the names will be automatically randomized)

Szenario 2

Sie haben einen M-coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten - genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben und dieser ihn auch benutzt hat, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist höher als der des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleichen Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger
3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?

- Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)
 - Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)
4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
- Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Szenario 3

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist genauso hoch wie der des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
- Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8

Szenario 4

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, erhalten Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird eine Nachricht direkt von McDonalds erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Indem der Absender Ihnen diesen M-coupon geschickt hat, hat er einen Rabatt erhalten.
2. Der Empfänger hat den gleichen Rabatt bekommen wie der Absender



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleiche Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger
3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)

- Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)
4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
- Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Szenario 5

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, und dieser auch den Rabatt in Anspruch genommen hat, erhalten Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird eine Nachricht direkt von Starbucks erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Wenn Sie diesen M-coupon benutzen, erhält Absender einen Rabatt.
2. Der Absender bekommt mehr Rabatt als Empfänger.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7

- Person 8

Szenario 6

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist höher als des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleiche Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger
3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?

- Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)
 - Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)
4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
- Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Szenario 7

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben und dieser ihn auch benutzt hat, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist genauso hoch wie der des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
- Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8

Szenario 8

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben und dieser ihn auch benutzt hat, erhalten Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird eine Nachricht direkt von McDonalds erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Da der Absender Ihnen diesen M-coupon geschickt hat, erhält er einen Rabatt, wenn Sie ihn benutzt haben.
2. Der Empfänger hat den gleichen Rabatt bekommen wie der Absender



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleiche Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger

3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
- Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)
 - Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)
4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
- Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Teil 3 – (Group 2)

Szenario 1

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist höher als des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleiche Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger
3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)
 - Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)
4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Szenario 2

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Wenn Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weiterleiten, erhalten Sie ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich eine Nachricht direkt von McDonalds erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Der Absender hat er einen Rabatt erhalten, weil er Ihnen diesen M-Coupon geschickt hat.
2. Der Absender hat mehr Rabatt bekommen als der Empfänger.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8

Szenario 3

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, erhalten Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird eine Nachricht direkt von Starbucks erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Indem der Absender Ihnen diesen M-coupon geschickt hat, hat er einen Rabatt erhalten.
2. Der Empfänger hat den gleichen Rabatt bekommen wie der Absender



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8

2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleiche Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger

3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)
 - Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)

4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Szenario 4

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist genauso hoch wie der des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):

- Person 1
- Person 2
- Person 3
- Person 4
- Person 5
- Person 6
- Person 7
- Person 8

Szenario 5

Sie haben einen M-coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten - genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben und dieser ihn auch benutzt hat, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist höher als der des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8

2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleiche Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger

3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)
 - Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)

4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Szenario 6

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben, und dieser auch den Rabatt in Anspruch genommen hat, erhalten Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird eine Nachricht direkt von McDonalds erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Wenn Sie diesen M-coupon benutzen, erhält Absender einen Rabatt.
2. Der Absender bekommt mehr Rabatt als Empfänger.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8

Szenario 7

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von Starbucks erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben und dieser ihn auch benutzt hat, erhalten Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Empfänger wird eine Nachricht direkt von Starbucks erhalten, diese lautet:

1. Da der Absender Ihnen diesen M-coupon geschickt hat, erhält er einen Rabatt, wenn Sie ihn benutzt haben.
2. Der Empfänger hat den gleichen Rabatt bekommen wie der Absender



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8
2. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich erhalte den gleiche Rabatt wie der Empfänger
 - Ich erhalte einen höheren Rabatt als der Empfänger
3. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Ich kann den Rabatt einfordern, nachdem ich den Coupon weiter geschickt habe (ohne Bedingung)
 - Ich kann den Rabatt erst einfordern, nachdem der Empfänger seinen Coupon eingesetzt hat (mit Bedingung)
4. Welche der folgenden Aussagen zu dem Coupon, den Sie soeben erhalten haben, ist korrekt?
 - Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist transparent

- Die Information bezüglich den Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger ist intransparent

Szenario 8

Sie haben einen M-Coupon direkt von McDonalds erhalten – genau wie unten abgebildet – mit den folgenden Bedingungen: Erst nachdem Sie den M-Coupon an einen Freund oder ein Familienmitglied weitergeleitet haben und dieser ihn auch benutzt hat, erhalten auch Sie Ihren Rabatt. Der Rabatt ist genauso hoch wie der des Empfängers. Der Empfänger wird diesbezüglich keine Informationen erhalten.



Ihr Mobile-Coupon



Der Mobile-Coupon der vom Empfänger empfangen wird

1. Einen solchen M-coupon würde ich senden an (bitte wählen Sie gezielt eine Person aus der zufällig sortierten Liste aus):
 - Person 1
 - Person 2
 - Person 3
 - Person 4
 - Person 5
 - Person 6
 - Person 7
 - Person 8

Teil 4

Persönliche Informationen

1. Ich bin _____ Jahre alt

- 15 - 24
- 25 – 39
- 40 – 50
- 51 – 70
- >70

2. Ich bin

- Männlich
- Weiblich

3. Sie haben nun die Chance, an einer realen Couponaktion teilzunehmen, die auf dieser Erhebung basiert und 1/3 so lang ist. Als Entlohnung können wir Ihnen einen echten (!) Coupon anbieten.

Es wäre schön, wenn wir Sie hierfür begeistern könnten!

- Ja, gerne mache ich mit
Bitte schreiben Sie Ihre Emailadresse auf:
- Nein, Ich will nicht mehr

Appendix C:

Questionnaire from the Receivers Perspectives

**In the receivers` perspective questionnaire we divided the participants into four groups. The procedures will be similar in all groups. The difference in every group is only the scenarios presented in Teil 3 (section 3).*

Teil 1

Die nachfolgende Befragung bezieht sich ganz allgemein auf Ihre persönlichen Kontakte. Bitte beachten Sie die folgenden Instruktionen:

1. Die Personen, die Sie in diesem Teil der Befragung (Teil 1) angeben, werden in den nachfolgenden Teilen des Fragebogens als Antwortoptionen wieder auftauchen (allerdings lediglich mit der entsprechenden Nummer).
2. Die Bezeichnungen, die Sie den Personen geben, gelten lediglich der Identifizierung durch Sie. Als Beispiel können Sie den Vornamen und den Anfangsbuchstaben des Nachnamens der Person angeben, z. B. Tobias K. oder Daniel C.
3. Sie können dieselbe Person auch mehrfach nennen. Besser wäre es jedoch, wenn Sie acht verschiedene Personen benennen.
4. Falls Sie zwei Personen mit identischem Vornamen und identischem Anfangsbuchstaben des Nachnamens nennen möchten, geben Sie bitte z. B. eine Ziffer statt dem Nachnamen an, z. B. Christiana 1 und Christiana 2, damit Sie selbst diese Personen unterscheiden können.

Vielen Dank für Ihre Kooperation und viel Spaß bei der Umfrage!

1. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Sie für einige Wochen verreisen. Wen würden Sie bitten, sich für die Zeit ihrer Abwesenheit um Ihre Wohnung zu kümmern (z.B. Blumen gießen, Briefkasten leeren)?

Person 1: P1

Person 2: P2

2. Mit wem unterhalten Sie sich gerne ungezwungen über Hobbies und alltägliche Dinge?

Person 3: P3

Person 4: P4

3. An wen würden Sie sich wenden, wenn Sie Fragen zu einer Hausarbeit hätten, oder sich Vorlesungsmitschriften ausleihen möchten?

Person 5: P5

Person 6: P6

4. An wen würden Sie sich wenden, wenn Sie jemanden zum Reden bräuchten und es sich um persönliche Themen (wie Familienangelegenheiten oder Beziehungen) handeln würde?

Person 7: P7

Person 8: P8

Teil 2

In wie weit stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu?

1. Ich Liebe McDonalds!
 - Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu
2. Ich Liebe Starbucks!
 - Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu
3. Ich suche gerne nach Rabattangebot
 - Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu
4. Rabattgutscheine einzulösen macht, dass ich mich gut fühle
 - Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu

- Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu
5. Der Rabattgutschein würde dafür sorgen, dass ich Produkte kaufen würde, obwohl ich es nicht geplant hatte
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu
6. Ich mag es, Rabattgutscheine zu benutzen, egal wie hoch die Ersparnis genau ist
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu
7. Wenn ich einen Rabattgutschein benutze, habe ich das Gefühl, ein Schnäppchen zu machen
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu
8. Ich habe bestimmte Lieblingsmarken, aber meistens kaufe ich diejenige Marke, die gerade Rabattgutscheine anbietet
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollkommen zu

Teil 3 (group 1)

Stellen Sie sich vor, dass sie eines Tages fünf (5) Mobile-Coupons/M-coupons erhalten (Rabattgutscheine, die per Mobiltelefon verschickt werden), Stellen Sie sich zunächst vor, sie haben den nachfolgenden Coupon erhalten und beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen:

Erster M-coupon

P1* hat Ihnen diesen Coupon geschickt

*(P1 to P8 is the name of the potential sender that mentioned in Teil 1 by the receivers)



**The following questions will be readdressed in every scenario that we have presented and the order of the questions will be randomize automatically by the system. The name of P1 to P8 will also be automatically mentioned in every question.*

1. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

2. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unangenehm				Angenehm

3. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unfair				Fair

4. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zeitverschwendung				Zeitersparnis

5. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

6. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unnützlich				Nützlich

7. Ich würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit diesen M-coupon von P1 einlösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

8. Meine Absicht den M-Coupon von P1 einzulösen ist sehr hoch

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

9. Ich habe vor, diese Art von M-Coupon von P1 in der nahen Zukunft einzulösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

10. Ich erwarte, wenn ich einen erhaltenen M-Coupon einlöse, mir P1 den gleichen Gefallen tun würde
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
11. Ich erwarte, dass P1 sich bei mir bedanken wird, wenn ich den M-Coupon benutze
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
12. Ich benutze den M-Coupon, weil ich mich bei der P1 für den Gefallen bedanken will.
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
13. Ich benutze den M-Coupon weil der P1 immer nett zu mir war
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
14. Ich kann ganz frei entscheiden, ob ich den M-coupon benutzen will, weil es meine eigene Entscheidung ist
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu

15. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die von einem bestimmten Absender kommen
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
16. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die für mich wertvoll sind
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
17. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Ich erhalte den selben Rabatt wie der Sender
 - Mein Rabatt ist anders als der des Senders
 - Keine Information
18. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Sobald ich den Coupon erhalten habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (ohne Bedingung)
 - Sobald ich den Coupon eingelöst habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (mit Bedingung)
 - Keine Information
19. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind transparent
 - Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind intransparent

20. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?

- Ich habe eine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender
- Ich habe keine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender

Zweiter M-coupon

P3 hat Ihnen diesen Coupon geschickt



*Followed by the 20 questions as in first M-coupon

Dritter M-coupon

P7 hat Ihnen diesen Coupon geschickt



*Followed by the 20 questions

Vierter M-coupon

P5 hat Ihnen diesen Coupon geschickt



*Followed by the 20 questions.

Fünfter M-coupon

P2 hat Ihnen diesen Coupon geschickt



*Followed by the 20 questions.

Teil 4

Persönliche Informationen

1. Ich bin _____ Jahre alt

- 15 - 24
- 25 - 39
- 40 - 50
- 51 - 70
- >70

2. Ich bin
- Männlich
 - Weiblich

Vielen Dank für Ihre Kooperation und viel Spaß bei der Umfrage!

Questionnaire from the Receivers` Perspective – Group 2

***Teil 1, Teil 2 and Teil 4 are similar with the group 1.**

Teil 3 (group 2)

*We Presents the fictitious scenarios in M-coupon format and we present it one scenario at the time.

Erster M-coupon	Zweiter M-coupon	Dritter M-coupon	Vierter M-coupon	Fünfter M-coupon
				

1. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

2. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unangenehm				Angenehm

3. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unfair				Fair

4. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zeitverschwendung				Zeitersparnis

5. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

6. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unnütz				Nützlich

7. Ich würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit diesen M-coupon von P1 einlösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

8. Meine Absicht den M-Coupon von P1 einzulösen ist sehr hoch

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

9. Ich habe vor, diese Art von M-Coupon von P1 in der nahen Zukunft einzulösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu

- Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
10. Ich erwarte, wenn ich einen erhaltenen M-Coupon einlöse, mir P1 den gleichen Gefallen tun würde
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
11. Ich erwarte, dass P1 sich bei mir bedanken wird, wenn ich den M-Coupon benutze
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
12. Ich benutze den M-Coupon, weil ich mich bei der P1 für den Gefallen bedanken will.
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
13. Ich benutze den M-Coupon weil der P1 immer nett zu mir war
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
14. Ich kann ganz frei entscheiden, ob ich den M-coupon benutzen will, weil es meine eigene Entscheidung ist
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen

- Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
15. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die von einem bestimmten Absender kommen
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
16. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die für mich wertvoll sind
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
17. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Ich erhalte den selben Rabatt wie der Sender
 - Mein Rabatt ist anders als der des Senders
 - Keine Information
18. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Sobald ich den Coupon erhalten habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (ohne Bedingung)
 - Sobald ich den Coupon eingelöst habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (mit Bedingung)
 - Keine Information
19. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind transparent
 - Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind intransparent

20. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?

- Ich habe eine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender
- Ich habe keine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender

Receivers` Perspective Questionnaire (group 3)

***Teil 1, Teil 2 and Teil 4 are similar with the group 1.**

Teil 3 (group 3)

*We Presents the fictitious scenarios in M-coupon format and we present it one scenario at the time.

Erster M-coupon	Zweiter M-coupon	Dritter M-coupon	Vierter M-coupon	Fünfter M-coupon
				

1. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

2. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unangenehm				Angenehm

3. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unfair				Fair

4. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zeitverschwendung				Zeitersparnis

5. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

6. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unnütz				Nützlich

7. Ich würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit diesen M-coupon von P1 einlösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

8. Meine Absicht den M-Coupon von P1 einzulösen ist sehr hoch

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

9. Ich habe vor, diese Art von M-Coupon von P1 in der nahen Zukunft einzulösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

10. Ich erwarte, wenn ich einen erhaltenen M-Coupon einlöse, mir P1 den gleichen Gefallen tun würde
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
11. Ich erwarte, dass P1 sich bei mir bedanken wird, wenn ich den M-Coupon benutze
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
12. Ich benutze den M-Coupon, weil ich mich bei der P1 für den Gefallen bedanken will.
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
13. Ich benutze den M-Coupon weil der P1 immer nett zu mir war
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
14. Ich kann ganz frei entscheiden, ob ich den M-coupon benutzen will, weil es meine eigene Entscheidung ist
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu

15. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die von einem bestimmten Absender kommen
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
16. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die für mich wertvoll sind
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
17. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Ich erhalte den selben Rabatt wie der Sender
 - Mein Rabatt ist anders als der des Senders
 - Keine Information
18. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Sobald ich den Coupon erhalten habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (ohne Bedingung)
 - Sobald ich den Coupon eingelöst habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (mit Bedingung)
 - Keine Information
19. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind transparent
 - Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind intransparent
20. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?

- Ich habe eine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender
- Ich habe keine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender

Receivers Perspective Questionnaire (group 4)

*Teil 1, Teil 2 and Teil 4 are similar with the group 1.

Teil 3 (group 4)

*We Presents the fictitious scenarios in M-coupon format and we present it one scenario at the time.

Erster M-coupon	Zweiter M-coupon	Dritter M-coupon	Vierter M-coupon	Fünfter M-coupon
				

1. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

2. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unangenehm				Angenehm

3. Der M-Coupon, den ich soeben von P1 erhalten habe, ist

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unfair				Fair

4. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zeitverschwendung				Zeitersparnis

5. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wertlos				Wertvoll

6. Die meisten Leute, die mir wichtig sind, empfinden es als wenn ich diesen Coupon benutze:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unnütz				Nützlich

7. Ich würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit diesen M-coupon von P1 einlösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

8. Meine Absicht den M-Coupon von P1 einzulösen ist sehr hoch

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

9. Ich habe vor, diese Art von M-Coupon von P1 in der nahen Zukunft einzulösen

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu
- Stimme vollständig zu

10. Ich erwarte, wenn ich einen erhaltenen M-Coupon einlöse, mir P1 den gleichen Gefallen tun würde

- Stimme gar nicht zu
- Stimme nicht zu
- Unentschlossen
- Stimme zu

- Stimme vollständig zu
11. Ich erwarte, dass P1 sich bei mir bedanken wird, wenn ich den M-Coupon benutze
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
12. Ich benutze den M-Coupon, weil ich mich bei der P1 für den Gefallen bedanken will.
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
13. Ich benutze den M-Coupon weil der P1 immer nett zu mir war
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
14. Ich kann ganz frei entscheiden, ob ich den M-coupon benutzen will, weil es meine eigene Entscheidung ist
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
15. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die von einem bestimmten Absender kommen
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu

16. Ich habe die Kontrolle darüber, wenn ich einen M-coupon einlöse, weil ich nur diejenigen einlöse, die für mich wertvoll sind
- Stimme gar nicht zu
 - Stimme nicht zu
 - Unentschlossen
 - Stimme zu
 - Stimme vollständig zu
17. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Ich erhalte den selben Rabatt wie der Sender
 - Mein Rabatt ist anders als der des Senders
 - Keine Information
18. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Sobald ich den Coupon erhalten habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (ohne Bedingung)
 - Sobald ich den Coupon eingelöst habe, konnte der Sender seinen Rabatt einfordern (mit Bedingung)
 - Keine Information
19. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind transparent
 - Die Informationen bezüglich der Anreize zwischen Absender und Empfänger sind intransparent
20. Welche der folgenden Aussagen ist bezüglich dem Coupon, den Sie soeben von P1 erhalten haben, korrekt?
- Ich habe eine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender
 - Ich habe keine enge Beziehung zu dem Absender