

**Partnering for Sustainable Value Creation:  
Conceptual and Empirical Analyses of Co-Creation in Cross-  
sector Social Partnerships at the Base of the economic Pyramid**

Kumulative Dissertation

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vorgelegt von  
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für Geertje

*M'n vriendje, mag ik even met je praten...*

*(Willeke Alberti)*



## Vorwort

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Hunger, Trinkwasserknappheit, mangelhafte Sanitärversorgung, schlechte Gesundheitssysteme und Bildungsnot sind nur einige von vielen dramatischen Problemen in Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern. Hunderte Millionen Menschen leiden heute unter den Folgen von Armut. Neuartige Formen inklusiver Unternehmensaktivitäten könnten in Zukunft entscheidend zur Reduktion von Armut beitragen. Erste Versuche von Unternehmen nutzen insbesondere sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften, um neue Impulse für nachhaltige Entwicklung an der Basis der Einkommenspyramide zu setzen. In enger Zusammenarbeit mit NGOs, Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen, Bildungseinrichtungen, lokalen Gemeinden und vielen anderen Partnern wird intensiv an der gemeinschaftlichen Entwicklung innovativer Produkte, Dienstleistungen und Geschäftsmodelle gearbeitet. Die Idee, dass mithilfe unternehmerischer Tatkraft neue Märkte erschlossen und gleichzeitig Armut bekämpft werden kann, fasziniert mich seit Beginn dieses Dissertationsprojektes. Die Zusammenarbeit extrem heterogener Partner birgt ein enormes Potential für Innovationen, aber gleichzeitig auch für Konflikte. Dieses Dilemma bildet den Ausgangspunkt dieser Dissertation.

Ich bin allen Studienteilnehmern dankbar, dass sie ihre Erfahrungen und Kenntnisse meiner wissenschaftlichen Forschung zur Verfügung gestellt haben. Die kollegiale Unterstützung und stete Bereitschaft zur kritischen Diskussion von Dr. Benjamin Bader, Katrin Held und den Teilnehmern diverser Doktorandenkolloquien schätze ich sehr. Mein Dank gilt vor allem Frau Prof. Dr. Nicola Berg, die das Dissertationsprojekt ermöglicht und intensiv begleitet hat.

Der unerschütterliche Rückhalt meiner Familie in Deutschland und den Niederlanden ist das Fundament meines Lebens. Meine bezaubernden Frau Geertje hat mich durch alle Höhen und Tiefen des Dissertationsprojektes begleitet. Ich danke Dir von ganzem Herzen:

*...samen zijn - is samen lachen, samen huilen. Leven door dichtbij elkaar te zijn!*

Ronald Venn

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## **I. Überblick der Essays**

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## **Überblick der Essays**

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### **A. Konzeptionelle Essays**

[1] Venn, Ronald und Berg, Nicola (2011)

"Base-of-the-Pyramid-Strategien in Emerging Markets: Interorganisationales Lernen zur Kreation von Innovationen in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften"

Veröffentlicht in *Zeitschrift für Management*, 2011, 6: 3, S. 261 – 286

VHB-Jourqual: D

[2] Venn, Ronald

"Cognitive Heterogeneity - Catalyst and Inhibitor of Innovation in Cross-sector Social Partnerships"

Eingereicht bei *Business and Society*

Status: Revise & Resubmit

VHB-Jourqual: B

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### **B. Empirische Essays**

[3] Venn, Ronald und Berg, Nicola (2014)

"The Gatekeeping Function of Trust in Cross-sector Social Partnerships"

Veröffentlicht in *Business and Society Review*, 2014, 119:3, S. 385 – 416

ABDC-Journal Quality List: C

[4] Venn, Ronald und Berg, Nicola (2013)

"Building competitive advantage through Social Intrapreneurship"

Veröffentlicht in *South Asian Journal of Global Business Research*, 2013, 2:1, S. 104 – 127

ABDC-Journal Quality List: C

SAJGBR ist das offizielle Journal der South Asian Academy of Management (SAAM)

*Essay [4] wurde von Emerald Literati Network mit dem Outstanding Paper Award 2014 ausgezeichnet.*

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## **II. Synopsis**

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# Synopsis

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## 1. Nachhaltige Entwicklung an der Basis der Einkommenspyramide

In den vergangen Jahren wurde im Kontext des internationalen Management intensiv über den Markteintritt multinationaler Unternehmen an der Basis der Einkommenspyramide diskutiert. Der sogenannte Bottom-of-the-Pyramid bzw. Base-of-the-Pyramid Ansatz (abgekürzt BoP) erregte schnell das Interesse multinationaler Unternehmen (u. a. BASF, Philips, Unilever), welche aufgrund erhöhten Wettbewerbsdrucks in gesättigten Märkten kontinuierlich auf der Suche nach neuen Explorationsmöglichkeiten sind (Hart & Christensen, 2002). Armut in Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern wird hierbei nicht länger als Hindernis für unternehmerische Aktivitäten, sondern als einzigartige Chance verstanden. Autoren wie C.K. Prahalad postulierten zu Beginn der 2000er Jahre, dass einkommensschwache Konsumenten in Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern ein bisher völlig unberührtes Marktsegment darstellen (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Die BoP Literatur argumentiert, dass BoP Konsumenten über Kaufkraft verfügen, die jedoch durch ineffiziente Marktstrukturen oftmals verloren geht (De Soto, 2000; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). Häufig muss in Slums und abgelegenen ländlichen Regionen ein sogenannter Armutsaufschlag (auch Armutsstrafe genannt) für Produkte und Dienstleistungen gezahlt werden (Mendoza, 2011; Prahalad, 2005). Gelingt es Unternehmen die vielfältigen Marktbarrieren abzubauen oder zu umgehen, dann steht ihnen ein Markt mit mehreren Milliarden BoP Konsumenten offen (London & Hart, 2004), ohne dass hier mit nennenswertem Wettbewerb gerechnet werden muss (Hammond & Prahalad, 2004; Weiser, Rochlin, Kahane, & Landis, 2006). Hierzu bedarf es allerdings vielfältiger Innovationen. Beispielsweise müssen Unternehmen die Preis-Leistungsbeziehung ihrer Produkte und Dienstleistungen radikal überdenken, um Konsumenten anzusprechen, welche nur über wenige Cents pro Transaktion verfügen. Die Skalierbarkeit von Geschäftsmodellen und die Entwicklung innovativer Distributions- und Marketingkanäle stellen weitere Herausforderungen dar (Anderson & Billou, 2007). Der BoP Ansatz geht davon aus, dass Unternehmen durch ihre Geschäftstätigkeit neue Absatzmärkte erschließen und gleichzeitig einen Beitrag zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung an der BoP leisten (Lodge & Wilson, 2006; Wilson & Wilson, 2006).

## Abgrenzung des BoP-Begriffes

Die Basis der Einkommenspyramide stellt weder ein einzelnes Land noch eine abgrenzbare Region dar, sondern ist als globales, demographisches Segment zu verstehen, welches durch Armut gekennzeichnet ist (Hart, 2007). Armut ist ein mehrdimensionales Phänomen, welches die Situation von Menschen charakterisiert, in der sie unfähig sind ihre ökonomischen, sozialen, politischen, humanitären und sicherheitsrelevanten Grundbedürfnisse zu befriedigen (OECD, 2001). Während in asiatischen und afrikanischen Ländern ein Großteil der armen Bevölkerung in ländlichen Regionen lebt, sind BoP Märkte in Ost-Europa und Südamerika meist in Städten zu finden. Abbildung 1 dokumentiert neben dem Umfang der Basis der Einkommenspyramide auch ihre enorme Diversität, welche in der Vergangenheit zu Problemen bei der Generalisierung von Forschungserkenntnissen führte. Beispielsweise können die Lebensumstände in ländlichen afrikanischen Regionen stark von denen innerstädtischer Slums Südamerikas abweichen. Auch der kulturelle Hintergrund von BoP Konsumenten variiert in hohem Maße. Des Weiteren macht der mehrdimensionale Charakter von Armut eine einheitliche Definition des BoP Begriffes problematisch. In der Literatur werden zur Abgrenzung von Armut deshalb meist Einkommensgrenzen herangezogen, da diese relativ gut dokumentiert und einfach zu vergleichen sind.




Abbildung 1: Marktstruktur der BoP (basierend auf Daten von Hammond et al., 2007)

Die Festlegung adäquater Einkommensgrenzen ist in der BoP Literatur stark umstritten (Pitta, Guesalaga, & Marshall, 2008). Die Spannbreite reicht von Einkommen kleiner als 1,25 US Dollar am Tag, welches laut Weltbank extreme Armut kennzeichnet (World Bank, 2010), bis zu Einkommen von ca. 9 US Dollar am Tag (UNDP, 2008). Diese Unterschiede führen in der

Vergangenheit zu stark abweichenden Schätzungen des Marktumfangs (Pitta et al., 2008; Schuster & Holtbrügge, 2011). Während einige Autoren einen Konsumgütermarkt von mehreren Billionen US Dollar unterstellen (beispielsweise London & Hart, 2004; Prahalad, 2005), gehen pessimistischere Schätzungen von wenigen hundert Millionen Dollar pro Jahr aus (beispielsweise Karnani, 2006). Diese Dissertation folgt der inzwischen häufig angewandten Abgrenzung des World Resource Institutes, welche Einkommen von bis zu 3.260 US Dollar pro Jahr in Kaufkraftparitäten von 2005 (KKP) als Basis der Einkommenspyramide definiert (Hammond et al., 2007)<sup>1</sup>. Innerhalb dieses Einkommens können weitere Subsegmente unterschieden werden, um gegebenenfalls eine noch trennschärfere Beschreibung des Forschungsgegenstandes vorzunehmen. Folgt man dieser Definition, leben schätzungsweise 4 Mrd. Menschen an der BoP, wobei das globale Volumen des Konsumgütermarktes mit 5 Billionen US Dollar in KKP beziffert wird (siehe Abbildung 1).

### *Sektorübergreifende Zusammenarbeit als essentieller Erfolgsfaktor*

Markteintritt und Marktbearbeitung an der Basis der Einkommenspyramide werden durch politische Instabilität, starke Migrationsströme oder auch Naturkatastrophen erschwert (De Soto, 2000; Freudenberger et al., 2010). Die Mehrdimensionalität von Armut setzt Unternehmen häufig diffusen und teils sehr komplexen Problemsituationen aus (Stadtler, 2011; Weber & Khademian, 2008). London & Hart (2004) argumentieren, dass traditionelle Internationalisierungsstrategien im Kontext der BoP häufig an ihre Grenzen stoßen. Jüngste Forschungserkenntnisse zeigen, dass Markteintrittsbemühungen mittels Produktadaptionen (Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & Rufín, 2013; London, 2011) ohne Berücksichtigung des lokalen sozialen Kontexts nur wenig Aussicht auf Erfolg haben (Schuster & Holtbrügge, 2012). Die Literatur fordert deshalb die Entwicklung innovativer Produkte, Dienstleistungen und Geschäftsmodelle, welche den Bedürfnissen und Rahmenbedingungen an der BoP besser gerecht werden (London & Hart, 2004). Westliche Unternehmen verfügen nur sehr selten über ausreichende Marktkenntnisse (Milstein, London, & Hart, 2007; Reficco & Marquez, 2009) was einen intensiven Lernprozess vor Ort erforderlich macht (Pitta et al., 2008; Simanis & Hart, 2009). Hierzu ist die Einbindung relevanter Interessensgruppen in einen gemeinschaftlichen Innovationsprozess (co-creation) erforderlich (Hart & Sharma, 2004; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). Dies erfordert einen intensiven Dialog mit potentiellen

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<sup>1</sup> während die Autoren im Text eine Einkommengrenze von 3.000 US Dollar hantieren (in KKP von 2002), liegt sämtlichen Daten, Berechnungen und Darstellungen jedoch eine Einkommengrenze von 3.260 US Dollar (in KKP von 2005) zugrunde (s. Hammond et al., 2007, Anhang A, Seite 109). Da diese Dissertation teilweise auf Daten dieser Arbeit zurückgreift, wird auf die letztgenannte Einkommengrenze zurückgegriffen.

Kunden in Slums und abgelegenen ländlichen Regionen (Krämer & Belz, 2008; Simanis & Hart, 2006, 2008). Beispielsweise publizierte der Vorstand des multinationalen Zementherstellers CEMEX, nach diversen gescheiterten Versuchen bestehende Produkte in mexikanischen BoP-Märkten einzuführen, eine "declaration of ignorance" (Hart, 2007, S. 146). Dies legte die Basis zur Entsendung von Mitarbeitern in Slums, die in einem gemeinschaftlichen Innovationsprozess die preisgekrönte BoP Initiative "Patrimonio Hoy" entwickelten (Cemex, 2012; Segel, Meghji, & García-Cuellar, 2007). Patrimonio Hoy macht sich traditionelle Glücksspiel und Sparsysteme in Slums zu Eigen, um maßgeschneiderte Dienstleistungen und Produkte für Mexikos BoP Märkte bereitzustellen. Die Entsendung von Mitarbeitern in Slums und abgelegene ländliche Regionen von Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern kann allerdings, aufgrund fehlender Netzwerke, hoher Kriminalität und latenter Terrorismusgefahr, eine enorme Herausforderung darstellen (Bader & Berg, 2013). Die Literatur empfiehlt deshalb die Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern, welche in lokale Netzwerke eingebettet sind (Badry, 2009; Sanchez, Ricart, & Rodriguez, 2006) und über soziales Kapital verfügen (Ansari, Munir, & Gregg, 2012).

Vor dem Hintergrund der Millennium Development Goals der Vereinten Nationen unterstützen diverse Organisationen aus dem öffentlichen und zivilen Sektor die Geschäftstätigkeit von Unternehmen an der BoP (vgl. UNDP, 2008, 2010). Insbesondere NGOs und Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen haben in den vergangenen Jahren ihre Bemühungen zur Zusammenarbeit verstärkt (BMZ, 2011; USAID, 2012). Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften an der Basis der Einkommenspyramide, oft auch als Entwicklungspartnerschaften bezeichnet, nehmen eine immer stärkere Rolle in BoP Strategien ein (Kolk, Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008; Reed & Reed, 2008). In der Literatur wird auf das enorme Innovationspotential dieser Partnerschaften verwiesen. Organisationen aus dem öffentlichen, zivilen und privaten Sektor verfügen über weitgehend komplementäre Ressourcen und Kompetenzen (Gray & Wood, 1991; Waddock, 1988). Werden diese gebündelt, kombiniert und gemeinschaftlich weiterentwickelt, dann eröffnet dies die Chance auf innovative Lösungen für komplexe gesellschaftliche Fragen (Austin, 2000; Waddell, 2000).

### *Problembeschreibung und Forschungslücke*

Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften werden häufig normativ betrachtet und auf ihr Innovationspotential verwiesen (Selsky & Parker, 2010). Die BoP Literatur hat es bisher

versäumt, die sektorübergreifende Zusammenarbeit näher zu analysieren und hierzu etablierte theoretische Konzepte der Managementforschung anzuwenden (Reficco & Marquez, 2009; Rivera-Santos & Rufín, 2010). In der Vergangenheit wurde die Interaktion der Akteure in Entwicklungspartnerschaften meist als Blackbox betrachtet und nicht näher analysiert. Es ist unklar, welche Bedingungen und Prozesse den Innovationserfolg dieser Partnerschaften bestimmen. Hieraus ergibt sich Forschungsfrage (1) dieser Dissertation.

In der Managementpraxis zeigt sich, dass die Zusammenarbeit in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften häufig intransparent, ineffizient und langwierig ist (Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Bäckstrand, 2006; Berger, Cunningham, & Drumwright, 2004). Karamchandani, Kubzansky, & Lalwani (2011) beobachteten, dass Unternehmen sich immer öfter aus sektorübergreifenden Entwicklungspartnerschaften zurückziehen. Insbesondere die starke Heterogenität der Partner erweist sich als problematisch (Arora & Romijn, 2009; Garrette & Karnani, 2010) und stellt eine potentielle Quelle von Konflikten dar (Dahan, Doh, Oetzel, & Yaziji, 2010; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Es bestehen in der BoP Literatur keine adäquaten Konzepte, die eine tiefere Analyse der innovationsfördernden und innovationshemmenden Wirkung von Heterogenität in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften zulassen. Hieraus leitet sich Forschungsfrage (2) dieser Dissertation ab.

Forschungsfrage (3) dieser Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Einfluss konfliktärer Zielsetzungen in Entwicklungspartnerschaften. Gerade die Beziehungen zwischen Unternehmen und NGOs (non governmental organizations) waren in der Vergangenheit von Feindseligkeiten geprägt (Crane, 2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003). In Entwicklungspartnerschaften können stark divergierende Zielsetzungen, wie Gewinnerzielung versus nachhaltige ökologische und soziale Entwicklung, aufeinander treffen (Wijen, 2008). Es wird in der BoP Forschung nicht näher analysiert, welchen Einfluss dies auf die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den heterogenen Akteuren hat. Denkbar wäre beispielsweise, dass einige Akteure ihre Machtposition nutzen, um ihre individuellen Ziele auf Kosten anderer zu realisieren. Zwar warnen Kolk et al. (2008) davor, dass Partner in BoP Initiativen ein tiefes gegenseitiges Verständnis und großes Vertrauen benötigen, um erfolgreich zusammenarbeiten zu können. Die BoP Forschung hat es bisher allerdings versäumt diese

Zusammenhänge empirisch zu prüfen. Diese Forschungslücke bildet den Ausgangspunkt für Essay [3].

Unternehmen wurden in der Vergangenheit heftig für den Versuch attackiert Armut als Gelegenheit für Profite zu nutzen (Karnani, 2006, 2007, 2008). Artikelüberschriften wie „Selling out the poor“ (Mittal & Wallach, 2004) deuten die Schärfe der Diskussion an, welche die ethischen Dilemmas der Geschäftstätigkeit im Armutskontext offenlegt (Davidson, 2009; Hahn, 2008). In der BoP Literatur wurden kaum Argumente für eine Geschäftstätigkeit an der BoP aufgeführt, die über eine Gewinnerzielung hinaus gehen. Diverse Autoren postulierten in der frühen Literatur, dass Unternehmen nicht zum Vorreiter sozialer Initiativen aufsteigen müssen, sondern sich ausschließlich auf die Erzielung von Profiten konzentrieren sollen (s. beispielsweise Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). Zwar wird seit der Einführung des BoP Ansatzes darauf verwiesen, dass BoP Konsumenten durch verbesserte Marktstrukturen, die Verfügbarkeit von Produkten und Dienstleistungen sowie die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen profitierten. Die Dokumentation und Messung dieser Beiträge stellt sich jedoch als schwierig heraus (London, 2009). Des Weiteren übersieht die BoP Literatur, dass Armutsreduktion als philanthropisches Ziel durchaus Akzeptanz findet, im Geschäftsalltag aber oftmals nachrangigen Charakter besitzt. Die kurzfristige Maximierung des Geschäftserfolges ist auch bei BoP Initiativen meist das wichtigste, wenn nicht gar das einzige, Motiv von Unternehmen (Jenkins & Ishikawa, 2010; McFalls, 2007). Hieraus können vielfältige Konflikte mit Partnern, aber auch innerhalb des Unternehmens entstehen (Olsen & Boxenbaum, 2009; Seelos & Mair, 2007). In der Literatur werden erste Hinweise für organisationsinterne Erfolgsbarrieren aufgeführt (Halme, Lindeman, & Linna, 2012). Eine holistische Betrachtung aller Vorteile, die eine Geschäftstätigkeit an der BoP potentiell bereit hält, fehlt heute. Dies formt eine wesentliche Forschungslücke, welche in Essay [4] aufgegriffen wird.

## **2. Inhaltliche Verknüpfung und Forschungsbeitrag der einzelnen Essays**

Ziel dieser kumulativen Dissertation ist es, Probleme und Herausforderung bei der gemeinschaftlichen Innovationsentwicklung in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften an der Basis der Einkommenspyramide zu erfassen und zu erklären. Hierzu wurden zwei konzeptionelle und zwei empirische Essays erstellt, welche zum überwiegenden Teil in

wissenschaftlichen Fachzeitschriften veröffentlicht wurden.<sup>2</sup> Tabelle 1 liefert einen ersten Überblick über die inhaltliche und methodische Ausrichtung der einzelnen Arbeiten.

**Tabelle 1: Übersicht der inhaltlichen und methodischen Ausrichtung der Essays**

Nr.	Ziel der Forschungsarbeit	Theoretische Fundierung	Art der Forschung
[1]	Die Entwicklung eines Forschungsmodells zur empirischen Analyse der Bedingungen, des Prozesses und der Ergebnisse der Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften.	Interorganisationales Lernen, absorptive Kapazität	konzeptionell
[2]	Die vertiefende theoretische Analyse innovationsfördernder und innovationsinhibierender Wirkung von kognitiver Heterogenität in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften unter Ableitung relevanter Implikationen für die Managementpraxis.	Interorganisationales Lernen, absorptive Kapazität, kognitive Distanz	konzeptionell
[3]	Die empirische Prüfung des Einflusses von Zielkonflikten auf den Wissensaustausch in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften unter Berücksichtigung der mediierenden Faktoren Machtmissbrauch und Vertrauen.	Theorie des sozialen Austausches	quantitativ empirisch (Strukturgleichungsmodellierung)
[4]	Die Aufstellung einer empirisch unterbauten Übersicht interner und externer Vorteile aus der Geschäftstätigkeit an der BoP inklusive organisationaler Erfolgsbarrieren.	Apriori Modell auf Basis von Forschungserkenntnissen zur holistischen Nutzenevaluierung	qualitativ empirisch (Fallstudienanalyse)

Essay [1] entwickelt ein konzeptionelles Modell zur Analyse der Zusammenarbeit in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften an der BoP. Gray und Wood stellten bereits 1991 fest, dass Theorien des strategischen Managements zum interorganisationalen Lernen (Grant, 1996; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998) und zum sozialen Austausch (Blau, 1964) zur Analyse von lernorientierter Allianzen besonders geeignet sind. Essay [1] nimmt eine prozessorientierte Analyse vor, die in der Literatur zunehmend gefordert wird (Bryson, Crosby, & Middleton Stone, 2006; Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007) und weist als eine der ersten wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten im BoP Feld auf die Bedeutung interorganisationalen Lernens hin. Ein wichtiger Erkenntnisgewinn dieses Beitrages liegt in der Identifikation erfolgskritischer Bedingungen für die gemeinschaftliche Innovationsentwicklung. Hierzu wurden bestehende theoretische Konzepte des strategischen Managements, wie Rezeptivität und Transparenz (Larsson et al., 1998), um die Dimension „Motivation“ ergänzt. Das vorgestellte Model diskutiert u.a. den Einfluss unterschiedlicher Zielsetzungen auf den Innovationserfolg, welcher in Essay [3] mit empirischer Forschung quantitativ evaluiert wird.

Essay [2] vertieft die aufgeworfene Diskussion zur Rezeptivität von Unternehmen, die mithilfe von sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften eine gemeinschaftliche Innovationsentwicklung für einkommensschwache Konsumenten in Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern forcieren.

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<sup>2</sup> Aufgrund von u.a. Nachkorrekturen, geänderter Schriftsetzung und dem Schutz von Copyrights sind Abweichungen möglich.

Hierzu werden die Erkenntnisse aus der Literatur zu absorptiver Kapazität von Organisationen (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Zahra & George, 2002) und kognitiver Distanz zwischen Partnern in strategischen Allianzen genutzt (Nooteboom, 2000, 2010). Essay [2] liefert eine theoretisch unterbaute Erklärung für das Dilemma, dass sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften einerseits ein enormes Innovationspotential bereit halten, dieses aber andererseits aufgrund vielfältiger Konflikte nicht zur gemeinschaftlichen Entwicklung von Innovationen führt. Die Forschungsarbeit liefert einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der innovationsfördernden und innovationshemmenden Effekte von kognitiver Heterogenität in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften. Das vorgestellte Modell liefert nicht nur eine Erklärung für die langwierige, träge und oftmals wenig erfolgreiche Zusammenarbeit der heterogenen Akteure in Entwicklungspartnerschaften, sondern auch konkrete Empfehlungen für die Managementpraxis zum Umgang mit kognitiver Heterogenität. Essay [2] knüpft an die aktuelle Debatte zur Partnerselektion (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012; Gradl, Krämer, & Amadigi, 2010) und der Bedeutung von Social Intrapreneurship (Halme et al., 2012; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010) im Kontext von sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften an der BoP an. Eine frühe Version des Essays wurde zur Präsentation auf der jährlichen Konferenz der European International Business Academy (EIBA) angenommen.

Essay [3] dieser Dissertation geht näher auf dem Einfluss konfliktärer Zielsetzungen in Entwicklungspartnerschaften ein, welche bereits in Essay [1] thematisiert wurden. Die quantitative empirische Analyse liefert den Nachweis eines stark negativen Einflusses konfliktärer Zielsetzungen auf den Wissensaustausch. Mithilfe eines Strukturgleichungsmodells wird außerdem der mediierende Einfluss der Variablen Vertrauen und Machtmissbrauch genauer analysiert. Es zeigt sich, dass Vertrauen eine zentrale Rolle für den interorganisationalen Lernprozess in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften einnimmt. Der konfirmatorische Charakter des gewählten Analyseverfahrens bestätigt fallspezifische Beobachtungen und konzeptionelle Arbeiten des Forschungsfeldes zur Relevanz von Vertrauen (vergleiche Rivera-Santos, Rufin, & Kolk, 2012; Roloff, 2008; Stadtler, 2011). Interessanter Weise konnte kein signifikanter Effekt der Ausübung von Macht festgestellt werden. Analog der Argumentation von Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) kann dies als Folge der Ressourcenkomplementarität interpretiert werden und deutet an, dass machtbasierte

Interaktionsstrategien in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften kaum Aussicht auf Erfolg haben. Die Erkenntnisse aus Essays [3] unterstützen konzeptionelle Arbeiten, die eine integrative Orientierung der beteiligten Akteure fordern (Austin, 2000; Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007). Austin (2000) argumentiert, dass bei einer integrativen Orientierung organisationale Ziele, Menschen und Aktivitäten zu einem kollektiven Handeln verschmelzen. Es ist fraglich ob dies bei stark differierenden Zielsetzungen, wie beispielsweise die kurzfristige Gewinnerzielung von Unternehmen versus langfristige Ziele von NGOs zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung, überhaupt möglich ist. Diese BoP Literatur liefert heute kaum Anhaltspunkte für alternative Zielsetzungen von Unternehmen. Diese Forschungslücke greift der vierte Essay dieser kumulativen Dissertation auf. Eine frühe Version des Essays [3] wurde auf dem 3. internationalen Symposium für sektorübergreifende Interaktion an der Erasmus Universität Rotterdam für den „Best Paper Award“ vorgeschlagen.

Essay [4] widmet sich mittels einer Fallstudie der Frage, welche Vorteile die Geschäftstätigkeit an der BoP hält. Heute stellt die Gewinnmaximierung das wesentliche Motiv für Unternehmen dar (Jenkins & Ishikawa, 2010). Wird dies weder kurz- noch mittelfristig erreicht, tendieren sie dazu, ihr Engagement an der BoP einzustellen (Karamchandani et al., 2011; McFalls, 2007; Simanis, 2011). Essay [4] entwickelt Gollakota, Gupta, & Bork's (2010) Begriff des „deep benefit management“ weiter und prüft die Existenz von Vorteilen, die über Umsatz und Profit hinaus gehen. Die multiple Fallstudienanalyse liefert erste empirische Beweise für eine erhöhte Arbeitgeberattraktivität, höhere Mitarbeiterzufriedenheit, eine positive Reputation, sowie dem Aufbau einer Fähigkeit zur Zusammenarbeit mit ungewöhnlichen Partnern. Dies schafft die Voraussetzung zur Überdenkung traditioneller Zielsetzungen und liefert Entscheidungsträgern neue Argumente für eine holistischere Evaluation von Geschäftsinitiativen an der Basis der Einkommenspyramide. Darüber hinaus unterbauen die empirischen Daten der Fallstudie, dass Unternehmen eine integrative Orientierung in der Zusammenarbeit entwickeln müssen und Sorge dafür tragen sollten, dass auch Partner ihre Ziele erreichen. Eine ausgeprägte Profitorientierung kann sowohl Kontroversen mit externen Partnern, als auch interne Spannungen induzieren (Olsen & Boxenbaum, 2009; Seelos & Mair, 2007). Projektmitarbeiter geraten schnell unter Druck, wenn BoP Initiativen keine kurzfristigen Gewinne erzielen. Essay [4] liefert empirische Belege, dass Mitarbeiter mit kreativen Mitteln versuchen auf diesen Druck zu reagieren (Halme et al.,

2012) und Zeichen sozialen Unternehmertums aufzeigen (Grayson, McLaren, & Spitzeck, 2011; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010). Essay [4] unterstreicht die Existenz dieses neuartigen Phänomens im BoP Forschungsfeld. Die Forschungsarbeit wurde von Emerald Literati Network mit dem Outstanding Paper Award 2014 ausgezeichnet.

### **3. Fazit**

Diese kumulative Dissertation leistet einen entscheidenden Beitrag für das BoP Forschungsfeld und liefert neue Erkenntnisse zur Erforschung sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften. Der bisherige Forschungsstand wird sowohl durch theoretische als auch empirische Erkenntnisse umfassend erweitert. Insbesondere die beiden konzeptionellen Beiträge liefern wichtige Hinweise zum besseren Verständnis der Zusammenarbeit von Unternehmen mit Partnern aus anderen Sektoren. Die Managementpraxis hat hierdurch ein besseres Bild der Bedingungen interorganisationalen Lernens sowie die innovationshemmende und innovationsfördernde Wirkung von kognitiver Heterogenität. Hierdurch kann die Interaktion verbessert und die Innovationsleistung erhöht werden. Die zukünftige Forschung könnte die Erkenntnisse durch eine quantitative empirische Prüfung weiter unterbauen. Darüber hinaus bereichern die empirischen Studien dieser kumulativen Dissertation das Forschungsfeld mit vielfältigen Erkenntnissen. Während die konfirmatorische Analyse in Essay [3] den negativen Effekt von konfliktären Zielsetzungen auf die gemeinschaftliche Innovationsentwicklung bestätigt, zeigt die qualitative Fallstudie neue Möglichkeiten für Unternehmen auf, um neben monetären auch andere Zielsetzungen zu berücksichtigen. Dies erlaubt Entscheidungsträgern in der Zukunft eine holistischere Betrachtung von BoP Geschäftsinitiativen und liefert entscheidende Argumente für ein langfristiges Engagement und interorganisationales Lernen, welche in der aktuellen Literatur immer öfter gefordert werden (Kennedy & Novogratz, 2011; London, Sheth, & Hart, 2014). Darüber hinaus eröffnen die ersten Einblicke dieser Dissertation in das aufkommende Phänomen des „Social Intrapreneurship“ zukünftiger Forschung neue Perspektiven. Hier könnten die organisationalen Rahmenbedingungen näher analysiert werden, welche Social Intrapreneurship verbessern beziehungsweise behindern. Auch die Identifikation von Eigenschaften und Motiven von Social Intrapreneurs stellt ein interessantes Forschungsfeld dar. Insgesamt leistet diese Dissertation einen entscheidenden Beitrag sowohl für die Wissenschaft, als auch für die Managementpraxis. Nicht zuletzt aufgrund fundierter

wissenschaftlicher Studien ist es Unternehmen in stets grösserem Umfang möglich einen nachhaltigen Beitrag zur Reduktion von Armut in Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern zu leisten.

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### **III. Essays**

#### A. Konzeptionelle Essays

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**Essay [1]**

"Base-of-the-Pyramid-Strategien in Emerging Markets: Interorganisationales Lernen zur  
Kreation von Innovationen in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften"

*Venn, Ronald und Berg, Nicola*

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# **“Base-of-the-Pyramid-Strategien in Emerging Markets: Interorganisationales Lernen zur Kreation von Innovationen in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften”**

*Venn, Ronald und Berg, Nicola*

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**Zusammenfassung:** Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften sind wesentlicher Bestandteil von Unternehmensstrategien zum Eintritt in unerschlossene Marktsegmente an der sog. Basis der ökonomischen Pyramide (BoP) in Emerging Markets. Ziel der sektorübergreifenden Kollaboration ist die gemeinschaftliche Kreation innovativer Produkte, Dienstleistungen und inklusiver Geschäftsmodelle, welches jedoch selten gelingt. In der wissenschaftlichen Forschung wurde bisher versäumt eine systematische Analyse der Bedingungen und des Prozesses sektorübergreifender Kollaboration im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien vorzunehmen. Dieser Beitrag entwickelt ein empirisch prüftbares Forschungsmodell zur vollständigen Analyse der Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften. Motivation, Rezeptivität und Transparenz werden als wesentliche Bedingungen interorganisationalen Lernens identifiziert, welches die Voraussetzung zur gemeinschaftlichen Kreation von Innovationen darstellt.

Schlüsselwörter: Base-of-the-Pyramid, Internationales Management, Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften, Wissenstransfer, Innovation

## **1. Einleitung**

**E**merging Markets stehen auf Grund ihrer großen Wachstumsdynamik (IMF, 2010, S. 2) im Fokus strategischer Internationalisierungsentscheidungen vieler Unternehmen (Holtbrügge & Friedemann, 2011). Während in der Vergangenheit meist klassische Beschaffungs- und Kostenmotive eine Internationalisierung in Emerging Markets forcierten, gewinnen zunehmend strategische und marktliche Motive an Bedeutung (Hausmann, Holtbrügge, & Rygl, 2009). Emerging Markets bieten vielfältige Chancen, die Nachfrage einkommensstarker Marktsegmente mit existierenden Produkten zu bedienen. Darüber

hinaus wird versucht, das bisher ungenutzte wirtschaftliche Potential in Marktsegmenten an der Basis der ökonomischen Pyramide (BoP, Base-of-the-Pyramid) zu erschließen (Hammond & Prahalad, 2004; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002; Prahalad, 2002).

Die Basis der ökonomischen Pyramide stellt weder ein einzelnes Land noch eine abgrenzbare Region dar. Vielmehr handelt es sich um ein demographisches Segment (Hart, 2008, S. IX). Es umfasst alle Personen mit einem Einkommen von weniger als US\$ 3.000 pro Jahr in Kaufkraftparitäten von 2002 (Hammond, Kramer, Katz, Tran, & Walker, 2007).<sup>3</sup> Innerhalb dieser Gruppe können weitere Subsegmente unterschieden werden. Diese reichen von extremer Armut, laut Weltbank definiert als Einkommen von weniger als US\$ 1,25 am Tag (World Bank, 2010), bis zu aufstrebenden Mittelschichten, definiert durch Einkommen zwischen US\$ 6-8 am Tag (Kandachar & Halme, 2008). Folgt man dieser Definition, leben nach Schätzungen des World Resource Institute (WRI) heute 4 Mrd. Menschen an der BoP, wobei das weltweite Volumen des Konsumgütermarktes mit US\$ 5.000 Mrd. (in Kaufkraftparitäten) beziffert wird (Hammond et al., 2007, S. 14). In der Vergangenheit scheiterten viele Versuche BoP-Segmente durch Produktadaptionen zu erreichen (London, 2011). Extreme Armut, Analphabetismus, Korruption, Extralegalität und mangelhafte Infrastruktur stehen beispielhaft für eine Vielzahl von Marktbarrieren (De Soto, 2000). Darüber hinaus sind BoP-Segmente durch eine starke Turbulenz gekennzeichnet. Rahmenbedingungen können beispielsweise durch politische Instabilität, starke Migrationsströme oder Naturkatastrophen stark schwanken. Diese Kombination setzt Unternehmen diffusen Problemsituationen (messy/wicked problems) (Vennix, 1999) aus (Arenas, Lozano, & Albareda, 2009; Payne & Calton, 2004; Weber & Khademian, 2008). In der Öffentlichkeit besteht teils große Skepsis an der Nachhaltigkeit konsumorientierter BoP-Strategien der sog. 1. Generation. Die negativen ökologischen Folgen von Mikropackungen (micro packs/micro sachets) oder die sozialen Nebenwirkungen von kreditgekoppelten Absatzstrategien führen inzwischen zu massiver Kritik (Anderson & Billou, 2007; Arora & Romijn, 2009; Karnani, 2007, 2008; Mittal & Wallach, 2004). Deshalb wird die Entwicklung nachhaltiger BoP-Strategien heute verstärkt gefordert (Hart, 2007; UNDP, 2008). Im Rahmen dieser Strategien der sog. 2. Generation (London & Hart, 2011; Simanis & Hart, 2008) wird die Kreation innovativer Produkte, Dienstleistungen und inklusiver Geschäftsmodelle

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<sup>3</sup> Beziehungsweise 3.260 US Dollar in Kaufkraftparitäten von 2005 (s. Hammond et al., 2007, Anhang A, Seite 109).

fokussiert (London & Hart, 2011; Simanis & Hart, 2009). Hierzu ist kontextuales Wissen über die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen an der BoP nötig (Pitta, Guesalaga, & Marshall, 2008). Auf Grund mangelnder Kenntnis sind viele Unternehmen auf eine Zusammenarbeit mit externen Partnern aus dem privaten, zivilen und öffentlichen Sektor angewiesen (Simanis & Hart, 2008; UNDP, 2008). Ein tiefer Dialog (deep dialog) im Rahmen dieser sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften ist essentiell zur gemeinschaftlichen Kreation von Innovationen (innovation co-creation) (Hippel, 2005). Dies schließt auch den Wissensaustausch mit potentiellen Konsumenten in ländlichen Regionen und Elendsvierteln ein (Gardetti, 2007; Krämer & Belz, 2008). Es wird deutlich, dass ein intensiver, explorativer Lernprozess (March, 1991; Miller, Zhao, & Calantone, 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002) zentrales Element zur erfolgreichen Kreation von Innovationen ist (London, 2011; Milstein, London, & Hart, 2007; Reficco & Marquez, 2009). Die Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften stellt für viele Unternehmen allerdings eine völlig neue Erfahrung dar (Pitta et al., 2008; Prahalad, 2002; Simanis & Hart, 2009). Es erfordert eine hohe Motivation zur Kollaboration, Transparenz im Austausch sowie die Fähigkeit neues und ungewöhnliches Wissen der Partner aufzunehmen.

Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften bilden auf Grund der heterogenen Wissensbasis und der hohen Ressourcenkomplementarität der Partner einerseits eine ideale Plattform für interorganisationales Lernen (Bendell, Collins, & Roper, 2010; Reficco & Marquez, 2009; Simanis & Hart, 2008). Andererseits erfordert dies eine ausgeprägte Kollaborationsfähigkeit. Diese kann durch die großen Unterschiede in der Mission und strategischen Ausrichtung der Akteure deutlich gehemmt sein. Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften bergen deshalb ein hohes Konfliktpotential und sind häufig von geringem Erfolg gekennzeichnet (Bäckstrand, 2006; Dahan, Doh, Oetzel, & Yaziji, 2010). Beispielsweise merken Rondinelli und London an, dass die Kollaboration zwischen Unternehmen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) oftmals als „sleeping with the enemy“ empfunden wird. Die Begründungen hierfür beschränken sich in der aktuellen Literatur jedoch auf Randnotizen und anekdotische Beschreibungen (beispielsweise Rieth & Zimmer, 2007, S. 232, Fußnote 21). Systematische, empirische Analysen stehen noch aus.

Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist die Entwicklung eines theoretisch fundierten Forschungsmodells zur empirischen Analyse der Bedingungen, des Prozesses und der Ergebnisse der Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften als Bestandteil von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets. Hierzu wird zunächst die integrative Orientierung in BoP-Strategien dargestellt (2.1) und im Anschluss der theoretische Bezugsrahmen (2.2) bestimmt. Kapitel 3 diskutiert Motivation, Rezeptivität und Transparenz als Bedingungen interorganisationalen Lernens und präsentiert konkrete Messindikatoren. Kapitel 4 beschreibt interorganisationales Lernen als Voraussetzung für die gemeinschaftliche Kreation von Innovation in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften. Kapitel 5 reflektiert die zukünftige Überprüfung des Forschungsmodells sowie den Erkenntnisgewinn und die Limitationen dieses Beitrags.

## **2. Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien**

### *2.1 Integrativ orientierte Partnerschaften als Forschungsobjekt*

Der Begriff sektorübergreifende Kollaboration wird zur Beschreibung verschiedenster Arten der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Akteuren aus zwei oder mehr Sektoren verwendet. Übliche Definitionen unterstellen einen Austauschprozess, der zu Ergebnissen führt, die von den jeweiligen Akteuren nicht eigenständig erzielt werden können (Bryson, Crosby, & Middleton Stone, 2006). Diese starke Fokussierung auf das Ergebnis der Kollaboration ist auch in der BoP-Literatur, durch die Betonung von Innovationen (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Hart, 2007; Prahalad, 2005), zu beobachten. Die Bedingungen und der Prozess sektorübergreifender Kollaboration werden allerdings kaum thematisiert. Zur systematischen Analyse ist zunächst eine Abgrenzung sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften notwendig, da insbesondere die Partnerkonstellation und das Thema der Zusammenarbeit die Anforderungen an die Kollaboration beeinflussen.

In Abhängigkeit der sektoralen Zugehörigkeit können privat-zivile, privat-öffentliche, privat-civil-öffentliche Partnerschaften unter Beteiligung des privaten Sektors unterschieden werden (Selsky & Parker, 2005, 2010). Obwohl bereits (intra-sektorale) Partnerschaften zwischen Unternehmen eine große Kollaborationskomplexität aufweisen können, ist anzunehmen, dass dies in bi- und trisektoralen Partnerschaften noch stärker ausgeprägt ist. Sektorübergreifende Kollaboration hat in öffentlich-privaten Partnerschaften (ÖPP/PPP, public private partnerships) (EU, 2004, S. 3) eine lange Tradition. In der Vergangenheit waren

ÖPP meist durch einen sehr engen Bezug zum Aufbau nationaler Infrastruktur gekennzeichnet (BMWi, 2004, S. 12) und wiesen eine ausgeprägte Geschäftsorientierung auf, welches Austin treffend als „transaktional“ bezeichnet (Austin, 2000). Im Kontext von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets sind staatliche Akteure wichtige Partner für Unternehmen, da sie einen großen Einfluss auf die wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen (sog. enabling environment/conditions) haben (siehe bspw. Gaye, 2007; Reddy, 2008). Die Kollaboration geht hierbei allerdings deutlich über die in traditionellen ÖPP-Projekten hinaus. Aus diesem Grund werden privat-öffentliche Partnerschaften im Kontext von BoP-Strategien häufig als strategische Allianzen (Bendell et al., 2010; BMWi, 2004, S. 63; Roloff, 2008) oder auch als internationale „Entwicklungspartnerschaften“ (PPDP, public private development partnerships) (BMZ, 2010, Glossar: PPP; SDC (DeZa), 2009, S. 5) bezeichnet.

Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften variieren in den Anforderungen an die Kollaborationsintensität in Abhängigkeit des thematischen Hintergrundes. Murphy und Arenas differenzieren die thematischen Kategorien Konfliktlösung, Philanthropie, Geschäft und Integration (siehe Tabelle 1). Laut den Autoren steigt die Kollaborationsintensität von Themen der Konfliktlösung hin zur integrativen Orientierung stark an (Murphy & Arenas, 2010). Im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien zum Eintritt in Emerging Markets geht die thematische Orientierung deutlich über eine reine Konfliktlösung oder Philanthropie hinaus. Während eine geschäftliche Orientierung der Marktentwicklung (capacity building) und dem klassischen Management von Interessensgruppen (stakeholder management) dient, verfolgt eine integrative Orientierung die Absicht, innovative Lösungen für gemeinsame Probleme zu entwickeln. Nachhaltiger, wechselseitiger Nutzen für alle Akteure (win-win-win rationale (Prahalad & Hart, 2002; Prahalad, 2005)) als Ziel der Kollaboration (Austin, 2000; Murphy & Arenas, 2010) unterstellt den Verzicht auf aggressiven Wettbewerb untereinander. Außerdem setzt das Konzept der integrativen Orientierung eine hohe Motivation der Akteure zum gemeinschaftlichen Handeln voraus (Murphy & Arenas, 2010). Wechselseitiger Wissensaustausch und gemeinschaftliches Lernen sind zentrale Elemente der Kollaboration. Während BoP-Strategien der 1. Generation noch durch eine ausgeprägte Geschäftsorientierung auffielen (Prahalad, 2005), intendieren BoP-Strategien der 2. Generation die gemeinschaftliche Kreation von innovativen Produkten, Dienstleistungen und inklusiven Geschäftsmodellen (London & Hart, 2011; Simanis & Hart, 2008). Analyseobjekt

dieses Beitrags sind sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften mit einer integrativen Orientierung (Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Nijhof, Bruijn, & Honders, 2008; Selsky & Parker, 2005, 2010), welche ein Höchstmaß an Kollaborationsintensität und Kollaborationskomplexität aufweisen (Murphy & Arenas, 2010).

**Tabelle 1: Abgrenzung sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften unter Beteiligung des privaten Sektors  
(in Anlehnung an Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Selsky & Parker, 2005, 2010)**

Kategorie (Zweck)	Partner	bi-sektoral		tri-sektoral
		privat-öffentliche	privat-zivile	
<b>Integration</b> (Innovative Lösung gemeinsamer Probleme)		PPDP	BoP 2.0	BoP 2.0
<b>Geschäft</b> (Management von Interessengruppen, Legitimitätssicherung, Marktentwicklung)		PPP	BoP 1.0	BoP 1.0
<b>Philanthropie</b> (unidirektionale Hilfe)			Strategische Philanthropie/ Stiftungen	
<b>Konfliktlösung</b> (Überwinden von Differenzen)			Dialogforen	

## 2.2 Theoretischer Bezugsrahmen

Die Analyse sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien basiert weitgehend auf wenigen Fallstudien. Die BoP-Forschung hat es in der Vergangenheit versäumt, bestehende theoretische Konzepte zur empirischen Analyse anzuwenden (Reficco & Marquez, 2009; Rivera-Santos & Rufín, 2010). Erste konzeptionelle Arbeiten empfehlen die Übertragung von lerntheoretischen Ansätzen aus dem Forschungsfeld des strategischen Managements von interorganisationalen Beziehungen und (Lern-) Allianzen (Dahan et al., 2010; Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Tashman & Marano, 2010). Die Forschung zu Lernallianzen unterscheidet häufig Bedingung, Prozess und Ergebnis der Kollaboration (Gray & Wood, 1991; Hamel, 1991; Lin, 2007). Diese Aufteilung erleichtert eine trennscharfe Identifikation und Messung relevanter Variablen. Dies ist für die Analyse sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften sinnvoll (Bryson et al., 2006) und wird deshalb in diesem Beitrag übernommen.

Lernallianzen wurden aus einer Vielzahl unterschiedlicher theoretischer Perspektiven analysiert (Gray & Wood, 1991). Theorien zum sozialen Austausch (social exchange theory), zur unternehmerischen Sozialverantwortung (corporate social responsibility/performance) oder auch Konzepte des strategischen Managements finden breite Anwendung (Austin, 2000; Gray & Wood, 1991; Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Selsky & Parker, 2010). Gray und Wood stellten bereits 1991 fest, dass Theorien des strategischen Managements zur Analyse der Bedingungen und Ergebnisse in Lernallianzen besonders geeignet sind. Auf Grund der deutlich vorangeschrittenen Forschung weisen inzwischen insbesondere der ressourcenbasierte Ansatz (resource based view, Barney, 1991) und der wissensbasierte Ansatz (knowledge based view, Grant, 1996) einen weitgreifenden Erklärungsgehalt für Lernallianzen auf (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). Im Analysefokus stehen häufig dynamische Fähigkeiten (dynamic capabilities) zur Integration und Rekonfiguration (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) komplementären Wissens aus internen und externen Quellen zur Anpassung an neue Umweltbedingungen (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Wesentlicher Bestandteil dynamischer Fähigkeiten ist organisationales Lernen, wobei strategische Allianzen hierzu ein wichtiges Instrument darstellen (Mowery et al., 1996). Aus der Literatur ist bekannt, dass der Informations- und Wissenstransfer eine wesentliche Voraussetzung zur Kreation neuen Wissens ist (Gulati, 1998; Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994; Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001; Mowery et al., 1996; Nooteboom, 2004). Das Ziel der gemeinschaftlichen Kreation von Innovationen (Ergebnis) in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften wird somit durch interorganisationales Lernen (Prozess) beeinflusst. Vor dem Hintergrund von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets ist eine externe Wissensakquisition mithilfe eines explorativen Lernprozesses notwendig (March, 1991; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Barrieren im Informations- und Wissenstransfer mit externen Partnern müssen erfolgreich überwunden werden (Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Hamel, 1991), da die Kreation neuen Wissens allgemein als Funktion des gemeinschaftlich preisgegebenen und absorbierten Wissens angesehen wird (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998). Zur Analyse der Bedingungen des interorganisationalen Lernens bietet sich eine Integration bestehender Rahmenmodelle an. Larsson et al. differenzieren fünf alternative Strategien zum interorganisationalen Lernen anhand der Dimensionen Rezeptivität und Transparenz (Larsson et al., 1998). Während Rezeptivität durch die Fähigkeit zur Aufnahme von Wissen gekennzeichnet ist, beschreibt Transparenz die Offenheit des

Partners zur Preisgabe von Wissen. Ähnliche Dimensionen finden sich auch in anderen Rahmenmodellen wieder. Inkpen erklärt die Wissensakquisition in Allianzen beispielsweise durch die Lerneffektivität sowie die Zugriffsmöglichkeit auf den Lerngegenstand (Inkpen, 1998, 2000). Die aktuelle Forschung zeigt zusätzlich, dass die Motivation zur Kollaboration einen signifikanten Einfluss auf den Lernerfolg hat (Simonin, 2004). Das Konzept der integrativen Orientierung unterstellt eine hohe Motivation der Akteure zum gemeinschaftlichen Handeln und eine ausgeprägte „win-win-win“ Logik. Motivationale Aspekte sollten zur Analyse sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften den bestehenden Rahmenmodellen hinzugefügt werden. Motivation, Rezeptivität und Transparenz können somit als wesentliche Bedingungen interorganisationalen Lernens in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften identifiziert werden. Im Folgenden werden Bedingung, Prozess und Ergebnis interorganisationalen Lernens in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets näher erläutert.


### **3. Bedingungen des interorganisationalen Lernens**

Dieser Beitrag differenziert zwischen Bedingung, Prozess und Ergebnis der Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften. Die Elemente unterstellen eine sequentielle Logik, so dass sie mithilfe eines teil-rekursiven Pfadmodells modelliert werden können (s. Abb. 1). Motivation, Rezeptivität und Transparenz als Bedingungen interorganisationalen Lernens werden als latente Konstrukte verstanden. Sie stellen verursachende Größen hinter messbaren Indikatoren dar (Weiber & Mühlhaus, 2010). Das Messmodell der Bedingungen hat somit reflektiven Charakter. Im Folgenden werden nacheinander die drei latenten Konstrukte beschrieben. Für jedes Konstrukt wird eine Proposition über den Zusammenhang zu interorganisationalem Lernen aufgestellt und im Anschluss konkrete Messindikatoren diskutiert.

#### *3.1 Motivation*

Sowohl das theoretische Konzept der integrativen Orientierung als auch die BoP-Literatur unterstellen eine hohe Motivation zur Kollaboration (Murphy & Arenas, 2010) und eine Nutzengenerierung für alle Akteure (win-win-win rationale) (Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Prahalad, 2005). Basierend auf den Forschungserkenntnissen zu Lernallianzen ist ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen Motivation zur Kollaboration und interorganisationalem Lernen zu

vermuten (Simonin, 2004). Murphy und Arenas unterstreichen, dass Akteure sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften äußerst unterschiedliche Motivationen zur Kollaboration aufweisen können. Des Weiteren argumentieren sie, dass es weniger auf einen Abgleich dieser sehr unterschiedlichen Motivationen, als auf deren Intensität ankommt (Murphy & Arenas, 2010). Diese Aussage bedarf jedoch einiger Präzisierung. Hierzu ist es hilfreich zunächst zwischen Motivation, Motiv und Anreiz zu unterscheiden. In der Psychologie wird Motivation als Zustand eines angeregten Motivs definiert, welches sich durch das Streben nach einem Ziel äußert (Nerdinger, 1995). Auf Grund der teils sehr großen Unterschiede in der Mission und strategischen Ausrichtung der heterogenen Akteure in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften, werden in der Praxis vielfältige Motive zur Kollaboration existieren (Payne & Calton, 2004).



Ein gutes Beispiel stellt die Kollaboration zwischen der Baylor Universität (Texas, USA) und einem lokalen Kollektiv im Rahmen eines Elektrifizierungsprojektes im Kibera-Slum (Nairobi, Kenia) dar. Während die Universität insbesondere die Schaffung eines attraktiven Transferfeldes von Lehrinhalten für ihre Studenten intendierte, verfolgt das Kollektiv primär die Förderung der Lebensqualität in dem im 1-Million Einwohner zählenden Slum (Thomas, 2007). Obwohl beide Akteure unterschiedliche Motive zur Kollaboration aufweisen, müssen hieraus nicht zwingend Konflikte entstehen. Entscheidend sind konfliktfreie Zielsetzungen

der Akteure in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften. Sie bilden einen wichtigen Indikator für wechselseitige Motivation zur Kollaboration. Die Aussage von Murphy und Arenas lässt sich somit präzisieren. In sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften kommt es weniger auf einen Abgleich unterschiedlicher Motive zur Kollaboration, als auf die Konfliktfreiheit der partnerspezifischen Zielsetzungen an. Murphy und Arenas unterstreichen außerdem die Bedeutung der Motivationsintensität für den Erfolg. Diese kann allerdings erst mit Blick auf die Interaktion von Motiv und Anreiz erklärt werden. In dem oben genannten Elektrifizierungsprojekt kam es beispielsweise zu starken Irritationen auf Seiten der Universität, als sich das Kollektiv weigerte die marginalen Kosten zum Austausch einer (während der Inbetriebnahme) beschädigten Batterie zu übernehmen. Hierbei ist zu beachten, dass das Projekt lediglich 17 ausgewählte Haushalte des Slums erreicht (Thomas, 2007). Diese geringe Reichweite stellt letztlich keinen großen Anreiz für einen kollektivistisch organisierten Partner dar, der die Förderung der Gemeinschaft in einem 1-Mio. Einwohner zählenden Slums verfolgt. Es wird deutlich, dass neben konfliktfreien Zielsetzungen auch die Intensität der Motivation, bedingt durch die Ausprägung der Anreize, von Bedeutung ist. In der Literatur wird ein starker Anreiz zur Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften durch die „win-win-win“ Logik unterstellt (Austin, 2000). Es ist fraglich, ob eine Nutzengenerierung für alle Akteure in der Realität stets gegeben ist. Zudem wäre es durchaus denkbar, dass einige Akteure der sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaft ausschließlich Interesse am eigenen Nutzen hegen. Mit Blick auf interorganisationales Lernen würde sich dies in einer wettbewerbsorientierten Lernstrategie widerspiegeln.

*Proposition 1: Je höher die wechselseitige Motivation zur Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften, desto höher das Ausmaß des interorganisationalen Lernens.*

### 3.1.1 Zielkongruenz

Eine hohe wechselseitige Motivation als wesentliche Bedingung interorganisationalen Lernens drückt sich in weitgehend konfliktfreien Zielsetzungen zwischen den Partnern aus. Unternehmen verfolgen mit der Partizipation in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften meist traditionelle Ziele wie die Minderung von Markteintrittsbarrieren, Risikodiversifikation, Kombination komplementären Wissens, Innovationszeitverkürzung oder die Vermeidung

xenophobischer Reaktionen (Hagedoorn, 1993; Hennart, 1988). Gemeinnützige, administrative und politische Partner fordern andererseits die konsequente Schaffung nachhaltigen sozialen wie ökologischen Nutzens, um ihrer Mission gerecht zu werden. Die Forschung zum sog. Stakeholder-Paradox zeigt, dass die angestrebte Inklusivität der Teilnehmer eine unüberschaubare Anzahl an Zielvorstellungen mit sich bringt (Vilanova, Lozano, & Arenas, 2009). Vorurteile und Stereotype forcieren zusätzliche Fehleinschätzungen über die wahren Ziele des Partners (Berger, Cunningham, & Drumwright, 2004). Darüber hinaus wirkt sich das häufig beobachtbare Versäumnis konkrete, quantitative Ziel- und Zeitvorgaben sowie beiderseitig akzeptierte ErfolgsIndikatoren zu vereinbaren, negativ aus (Bäckstrand, 2006; Berger et al., 2004; Rondinelli & London, 2003). Die Lösung von Zielkonflikten spiegelt sich häufig in der Existenz formaler Vereinbarungen über die Absicht, Tragweite, angestrebte Resultate und Dauer der Zusammenarbeit wieder (Rondinelli & London, 2003). Über das Ausmaß von Zielkongruenz in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften liegen heute keine empirischen Daten vor. Das Konzept der integrativen Orientierung unterstellt eine hohe wechselseitige Motivation, welches sich in einer weitgehenden Abwesenheit von Zielkonflikten ausdrücken müsste.

### 3.1.2 Lernstrategien

Larsson et al. beschreiben u.a. wettbewerbsorientierte Lernstrategien in strategischen Allianzen (Larsson et al., 1998). Anstelle der Beibehaltung und Stärkung der komplementären Ressourcenprofile wird eine rasche Aneignung der Ressourcen des Partners angestrebt (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988). Die Partnerschaft dient lediglich als Instrument zur Internalisierung von Fähigkeiten, Wissen oder Technologien (Hagedoorn, 1993; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989). Nach Abschluss der Internalisierung wird die Partnerschaft umgehend aufgelöst (learning race) (Hennart & Zeng, 2005). Bereits subjektive Einschätzungen über die Wettbewerbsorientierung des Partners können Schutzreaktionen oder den Abbruch der Kollaboration hervorrufen (Arnulf, Dreyer, & Grenness, 2005; Larsson et al., 1998). Aaker, Vohs und Mogilner zeigen, dass Konsumenten ein ausgeprägtes Kompetenz-Stereotyp mit Unternehmen assoziieren, welches u.a. Konkurrenzdenken sowie Härte und Kälte in Interaktionen beinhaltet (Aaker, Vohs, & Mogilner, 2010). Überträgt sich dies auf Akteure sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften wäre die Anwendung wettbewerbsorientierter Lernstrategien wahrscheinlich. Obwohl erste Fallstudien die Existenz von Stereotypen zwischen NRO und Unternehmen beschreiben (Arenas et al., 2009; Elkington & Fennell,

2000), sind etwaige Konsequenzen für die Kollaboration in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften unzureichend dokumentiert. Rondinelli und London argumentieren allerdings, dass in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften eine „learning race“-Situation unwahrscheinlich ist, da die Partner im Gegensatz zu intra-sektoralen Allianzen nicht als Wettbewerber im Markt stehen (Rondinelli & London, 2003). Ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Kooperation und Wettbewerb, wie es in traditionellen Lernallianzen entsteht (Khanna et al., 1998), wäre somit ausgeschlossen. Des Weiteren unterstellt das Konzept der integrativen Orientierung die Schaffung von Nutzen für alle Akteure (Murphy & Arenas, 2010). Diese Perspektive verdeutlicht, dass nicht der Besitz, sondern der Zugriff auf Ressourcen entscheidend ist (Prahalad & Krishnan, 2008). Bei hoher wechselseitiger Motivation zur Kollaboration wären wettbewerbsorientierte Lernstrategien somit nicht zu erwarten. Zur abschließenden Klärung dieses kontroversen Sachverhalts bedarf es empirischer Analysen sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften.

### *3.2 Rezeptivität*

In der Literatur zum interorganisationalen Lernen in strategischen Allianzen wird nachdrücklich auf die Notwendigkeit zur Rezeptivität der Akteure hingewiesen (Hamel, 1991; Larsson et al., 1998). Cohen und Levinthal bezeichnen die Fähigkeit einer Organisation zur Aufnahme externen Wissens als absorptive Kapazität (absorptive capacity) (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Auf Grund der großen Turbulenz in BoP-Segmenten von Emerging Markets und der Notwendigkeit zum explorativen Lernen stellt sie ein Schlüsselement zum Verständnis interorganisationalen Lernens innerhalb sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften dar (Lichtenthaler, 2009; V.d.Bosch, Volberda, & DeBoer, 1999). Folgt man dem Konzept der integrativen Orientierung (Murphy & Arenas, 2010), dann erfordert die Kollaboration mehr als nur eine einseitige Fähigkeit zur Absorption von Wissen. Eine gewisse Wechselseitigkeit, die durch Aufnahme und Abgabe von Wissen gekennzeichnet ist (Kanter, 1994, 2007; Lin, 2007; Weber & Khademian, 2008), würde sich in einer gegenseitigen Hilfestellung bei der Absorption ausdrücken (Nooteboom, 2010). Aktive Investitionen in gegenseitiges Lernen erhöhen die Lerneffizienz und stellen einen wichtigen Indikator für wechselseitige Rezeptivität dar (Larsson et al., 1998). Beispielsweise gründete der brasilianische Nahrungsmittelhersteller Sadia das Sadia Sustainability Institute mit dem Ziel der Verbesserung sozialer, ökologischer und ökonomischer Nachhaltigkeit in seiner Wertschöpfungskette. Das Institut organisiert den intensiven Wissenstransfer zwischen

lokalen Bauern, Universitäten, Behörden und internationalen Organisationen wie der UNO. Mithilfe des Institutes war es Sadia möglich völlig neues Wissen zu absorbieren (beispielsweise über sog. CDM, clean development mechanism) sowie Hilfestellung bei der Absorption (beispielsweise durch Ausbildung der lokalen brasilianischen Bauern) zu leisten (Boechat, Werneck, & Miraglia, 2007). Das Beispiel unterstreicht die Bedeutung geleisteter Lerninvestitionen als beobachtbarer Indikator von Rezeptivität. Mit Blick auf interorganisationales Lernen wird ein positiver Zusammenhang angenommen.

*Proposition 2: Je größer die wechselseitige Rezeptivität der Partner in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften, desto höher das Ausmaß des interorganisationalen Lernens.*

### 3.2.1 Absorptive Kapazität

Die absorptive Kapazität einer Organisation wird als Fähigkeit zur Aneignung, Anpassung, Abwandlung und Ausbeutung externen Wissens definiert (Zahra & George, 2002). Absorptive Kapazität wird in der Literatur als Funktion des bereits existenten Wissens angesehen (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Je ungewöhnlicher und neuartiger das externe Wissen, desto schwieriger ist die Absorption (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996; V.d.Bosch et al., 1999). Aus diesem Grund besteht die Tendenz Partner mit einem ähnlichen Wissens- und Erfahrungshintergrund auszuwählen, da der Wissenstransfer und die Absorption leichter fallen (Miller et al., 2006). Allerdings birgt völlig unbekanntes Wissen ein größeres Innovationspotential (Nooteboom, 2000, S. 72). Nooteboom beschreibt anschaulich das Dilemma, dass ähnliche Partner zwar einen effizienteren Wissenstransfer gewährleisten (siehe auch Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), sehr unterschiedliche Partner jedoch unbekanntes und somit wertvoller Wissen besitzen (Nooteboom, 2010, S. 95 ff.). Im Kontext sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften bedeutet dies, dass die heterogenen Akteure zwar neues Wissen einbringen, dieses Mangels Verständnis der Partner jedoch nicht in Lernerfolg umsetzen können. Dies verstärkt sich, je schwächer die absorptive Kapazität der Partner ausgeprägt ist. Aus der Literatur ist ein stark positiver Effekt absorptiver Kapazität auf die Lernleistung in turbulenten Märkten (Lichtenthaler, 2009; V.d.Bosch et al., 1999), in denen exploratives Lernen (March, 1991; Miller et al., 2006) zwingend notwendig ist, bekannt. Im Kontext der Entwicklungshilfe wird jedoch vielfach auf

die mangelhafte absorptive Kapazität lokaler Institutionen hingewiesen (Akitoby, Hemming, & Schwartz, 2007). Beispielsweise beschreibt das indische Finanzministerium in einem Positionspapier zu ÖPP-Projekten im Infrastrukturbereich absorptive Kapazität als wesentlichen Erfolgsfaktor und fordert den aktiven Aufbau (MoF-India, 2009). Auf Grund der großen Heterogenität und des hohen Anteils unbekannten Wissens wäre eine niedrige absorptive Kapazität der Akteure in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften zu erwarten.

### 3.2.2 Lerninvestitionen

Die integrative Orientierung in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets fordert eine gewisse Wechselseitigkeit (Murphy & Arenas, 2010). Es bedarf glaubwürdiger Bekenntnisse zur Partnerschaft (Ring & V.d.Ven, 1994), welche sich durch Investitionen in gegenseitiges Lernen manifestieren können (Larsson et al., 1998). Lerninvestitionen (Zollo & Winter, 2002) oder auch learning stakes, dokumentieren Reziprozität (Ring & V.d.Ven, 1992, S. 488, 489, 1994). Sie stärken die Bindung zwischen den Partnern (Weber & Khademian, 2008; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995) und helfen gegenseitiges Vertrauen aufzubauen (Arnulf et al., 2005; Lin, 2007). Es wird deutlich, dass nicht nur die einseitige Fähigkeit zur Absorption, sondern auch die Hilfestellung bei der Absorption in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften wichtig ist (Nooteboom, 2010). Darüber hinaus steigern Lerninvestitionen die Effizienz des Wissensaustausches durch die Entwicklung von Austauschroutinen zwischen den Akteuren (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Larsson et al., 1998). Beispielsweise investierte der brasilianische Kosmetikhersteller Natura im Rahmen einer BoP-Initiative in den Aufbau landwirtschaftlicher Genossenschaften auf Gemeindeebene. Ziel der Initiative ist der nachhaltige Anbau von Priprioca-Pflanzen zur Herstellung von Parfum-Essenzen unter Erhaltung der brasilianischen Biodiversität. Das Wissen über die Pflanze war tief in der lokalen Kultur verwurzelt (bspw. in Sagen und Erzählungen), wurde jedoch nie kommerziell genutzt. Es existierte weder Wissen über Kultivierungstechniken, noch über angemessene Marktpreise. Die Entwicklung von Genossenschaften stellte ein wichtiges Bindeglied in einem offenen Wertschöpfungsprozess zwischen der lokalen Produktion durch Kleinbauern, weiterverarbeitenden Ölmühlen und Natura dar. Einerseits schuf diese Investition das notwendige Vertrauen der Bauern in die Absichten des Unternehmens, andererseits konnten hier gemeinsame Lernerfahrungen über den Anbau und ein Austausch über einen angemessenen Marktpreis gesammelt werden (Boechat & Mokrejs Paro, 2007). Es wird deutlich das Lerninvestitionen eine doppelte

Funktion erfüllen, indem sie die wechselseitige Bindung stärken und die Lerneffizienz erhöhen. Lerninvestitionen können somit als Indikator wechselseitiger Rezeptivität herangezogen werden (Nooteboom, 2010).

### *3.3 Transparenz*

Die Aufnahme externen Wissens ist durch das Ausmaß der Transparenz innerhalb der Partnerschaft limitiert. Offenheit im Austausch birgt jedoch das Risiko opportunistischen Verhaltens (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hamel, 1991), wodurch schnell die Situation eines Gefangenendilemmas entsteht (Axelrod, 1984). Dieses Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Kooperation und Wettbewerb wird seit Langem in der Literatur zu Lernallianzen thematisiert (Hagedoorn, 1993; Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998; Kogut, 1988). Allerdings geht Transparenz deutlich über das strategisch steuerbare Ausmaß an Offenheit im Austausch hinaus: „transparency can be more difficult than simply opening up“ (Larsson et al., 1998, S. 291). Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften bringen Akteure aus stark differierenden sprachlichen, kulturellen und sozialen Kontexten zusammen. Transparenz zeichnet sich somit auch durch das Ausmaß der Kommunikationskompetenz (Larsson et al., 1998) sowie durch einen expliziten Abstimmungs- und Definitionsprozess (Arnulf et al., 2005) zur Schaffung eines gemeinschaftlichen Verständnisses aus (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kanter, 1994, 2007; Roloff, 2008). Die Ausprägung der Kommunikationseffizienz lässt sich somit als Konsequenz der Transparenz operationalisieren. Des Weiteren ist das Wissen vieler Akteure kontextspezifisch und teils schwer explizierbar. Die Transparenz kann somit in erheblichem Umfang eingeschränkt sein. Ein beobachtbarer Effekt wäre die verminderte Effizienz im Transfer impliziten, kontextspezifischen Wissen. Die Literatur zu Lernallianzen unterstellt einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Transparenz und Lernerfolg. Folgt man dem Konzept der integrativen Orientierung wäre mit einer hohen Transparenz zu rechnen. Auf Grund mangelnder empirischer Belege bleibt offen, ob dies in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets tatsächlich der Fall ist.

*Proposition 3: Je höher die Transparenz innerhalb der sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaft, desto höher das Ausmaß des interorganisationalen Lernens.*

### 3.3.1 Offenheit im Austausch

Im Kontext sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften stehen sich oftmals Akteure mit fundamentalen Unterschieden in der Mission und strategischen Ausrichtung gegenüber (Berger et al., 2004). Teilweise wird in der Literatur über die Beziehungen zwischen Unternehmen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen von „culture clash“ oder „war of traditional enemies“ gesprochen (Crane, 2000; Plante & Bendell, 2000). Offenheit im Austausch zwischen Partnern kann keinesfalls erwartet werden. Bäckstrand benennt bspw. mangelhafte Offenheit im Austausch als wesentliche Ursache für niedrigen Erfolg in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften im Rahmen des World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). Sie analysierte 311 ÖPP-Projekte und identifizierte das Fehlen eines verpflichtenden Berichtswesens sowie unklare Richtlinien als Kennzeichen mangelhafter Offenheit (Bäckstrand, 2006). Ohne die Etablierung einer positiven Lernatmosphäre (Calantone, Cavusgil, & Zhao, 2002) und einer Kultur des Wissensaustauschs (Hargadon, 1998) wird interorganisationales Lernen in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften stark limitiert. Mangelhafte Offenheit im Austausch wäre die messbare Konsequenz fehlender Transparenz innerhalb der sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaft.

### 3.3.2 Kommunikationseffizienz

Sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften fallen durch eine große sprachliche Heterogenität auf. Verständigungsprobleme und Informationsverluste (für einen Überblick siehe Traut-Mattausch & Frey, 2006) sind sehr wahrscheinlich. Teilweise greifen BoP-Initiativen auf Grund von Sprachproblemen sogar auf non-verbale Kommunikationsmittel wie Puppentheater oder Zeichenwettbewerbe zum Informationsaustausch zurück (Roy & Hartigan, 2008). Zur Ausbildung von Solartechnikern nutzt beispielsweise das indische Barefoot College non-verbale Lehrtechniken. Dies überwindet sprachliche Heterogenität, so dass selbst Nicht-Inder (z. B. Afghanen) ausgebildet werden können (Roy & Hartigan, 2008). Neben Verständigungsproblemen sind zusätzlich Probleme auf Grund von Bedeutungsunterschieden zu erwarten (Weber & Khademian, 2008). Ein expliziter Abstimmungs- und Definitionsprozess (Arnulf et al., 2005) zur Etablierung eines gemeinschaftlichen Verständnisses ist notwendig (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kanter, 1994, 2007; Roloff, 2008). Zusätzlich fördert eine gemeinsame Erarbeitung von Definitionen, Verfahren und Prozessabläufen die Externalisierung impliziten Wissen (Nonaka, 1994). Eine offene und ehrliche Kommunikation unterstützt den Aufbau gegenseitigen Vertrauens (Ring

& V.d.Ven, 1994; Rondinelli & London, 2003), welches den erfolgreichen Transfer (Weber & Khademian, 2008) und die Kreation (Roloff, 2008) von Wissen fördert. Eine hohe Kommunikationseffizienz (Larsson et al., 1998) durch die Überwindung von Verständigungsproblemen und die Einigung auf eindeutig definierte Begriffe sind ein wesentliches Kennzeichen ausgeprägter Transparenz. Außer knapper Beschreibungen im Rahmen von Fallstudien liegen heute keine Erkenntnisse über die effiziente Kommunikation in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften vor.

### 3.3.3 Transfereffizienz impliziten, kontextspezifischen Wissen

Auf Grund niedriger Bildung ist das Wissen der Menschen an der BoP zum überwiegenden Anteil impliziter Art, sozial eingebettet und „sticky“ (Hippel, 1994; Nonaka, 1994). Wenn es aufgedeckt werden soll, ist eine direkte Interaktion (Nonaka, 1994) in den Elendsvierteln und abgelegenen ländlichen Regionen unvermeidbar. Das Honey-bee Netzwerk des Inders Anil Gupta sammelt beispielsweise Wissen über traditionelle Anbautechniken und den überlieferten (pharmazeutischen) Nutzen von Pflanzen. Hierzu werden Expeditionen durchgeführt, bei denen Wissenschaftler und Unternehmensvertreter zu Fuß abgelegene ländliche Dörfer bereisen. In der direkten Interaktion mit den Menschen vor Ort wird Wissen ausgetauscht (Gupta, 2010). Einerseits weist die Literatur zu Lernallianzen zu Recht darauf hin, dass implizites, kontextspezifisches Wissen die Transparenz reduziert (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 1998, 2000; Larsson et al., 1998; Simonin, 2004). Andererseits verdeutlicht das obige Beispiel, dass in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften eher die Frage der Transfereffizienz impliziten, kontextspezifischen Wissens bedeutsam ist (Reficco & Marquez, 2009). Hierbei sind kulturelle Sensitivität und die Fähigkeit zur empathischen Perspektivübernahme notwendig (boundary spanning) (Ansett, 2006; Crane, 2000; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). Es wird deutlich, dass die große Heterogenität in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften häufig eine große kulturelle Distanz (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) zwischen den Akteuren bedingt. Das Ausmaß kultureller Distanz zwischen kommunizierenden Partnern vermindert die Transfereffizienz, da die Kosten für Kommunikation, Interpretation, sowie das Risiko von Missverständnissen deutlich erhöht sind (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Holtbrügge & Berg, 2004; OECD, 2008, S. 59). Es konnte vielfach empirisch nachgewiesen werden, dass sich kulturelle Distanz insbesondere in internationalen Joint Ventures in Emerging Markets problematisch auswirkt (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997). Eine niedrige Transfereffizienz ist somit Konsequenz fehlender Transparenz innerhalb der

sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaft. Motivation, Rezeptivität und Transparenz werden in diesem Beitrag als Bedingungen interorganisationalen Lernens konzeptualisiert. Sie stellen latente Konstrukte dar, die in einem positiven Zusammenhang mit interorganisationalem Lernen stehen.

#### **4. Interorganisationales Lernen als Voraussetzung für Innovationen**

Angestrebtes Ergebnis sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets ist die gemeinschaftliche Lösung von diffusen Problemen (Arenas et al., 2009; Payne & Calton, 2004; Weber & Khademian, 2008) durch die Kreation innovativer Produkte, Dienstleistungen und inklusiver Geschäftsmodelle. Ohne diese Innovationen ist ein späterer Markterfolg unwahrscheinlich, denn dieser wird in der Literatur häufig als Funktion der Innovationsleistung angesehen (Calantone et al., 2002). Zwar ist die Kreation von Innovationen nicht gleichbedeutend mit Markterfolg, aber sicherlich ein wesentlicher Einflussfaktor (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994; Lane et al., 2001). Hart und Christensen argumentieren, dass sich der Markterfolg von BoP-Innovationen ggfs. erst bei einer Übertragung in Niedrig-Preissegmente westlicher Märkte einstellt (Hart & Christensen, 2002). Mit einer späteren Anpassung an das Anspruchsniveau des Marktes könnten diese Innovationen sogar disruptiven Charakter entfalten (Christensen, 1998, 2006) und zur Bedrohung etablierter Technologien und Geschäftsmodelle werden (Christensen, Craig, & Hart, 2001; London & Hart, 2004). Darüber hinaus ist aus der Organisationsforschung bekannt, dass ein interorganisationaler Wissenstransfer entscheidend zur Identifikation dysfunktionaler Routinen und „blinder Flecken“ sowie der Überwindung organisationaler Trägheit (inertia) beiträgt (Meeus & Oerlemans, 2005; Teece et al., 1997). Dieser sichert die Innovationsfähigkeit und evolutionäre Weiterentwicklung des Unternehmens. In diesem Zusammenhang argumentierten Lundvall und Nielsen, dass Wissen keine knappe Ressource im traditionellen Sinne darstellt. Dies baut auf dem Gedankenkonstrukt, dass Wissen sowohl Einsatz als auch Ergebnis des Innovationsprozesses ist (Lundvall & Nielsen, 2007). Der Wissenstransfer zwischen den Akteuren ist also eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Kreation neuen Wissens (Calantone et al., 2002; Lundvall & Nielsen, 2007). Er bezieht sich auf Daten und Fakten (know-what), allgemeingültige Prinzipien technischer und sozialer Art (know-why), Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten (know-how) sowie die Vernetzung mit Wissensträgern und Schlüsselpersonen (know-who) (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994; Lundvall &

Nielsen, 2007). In sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien erfolgt der Wissenstransfer aber keinesfalls nur einseitig von den Partnern an das Unternehmen. Die erfolgreiche Geschäftstätigkeit in BoP-Segmenten von Emerging Markets erfordert vielfach den Aufbau von rudimentärem Wissen bei Konsumenten. Darüber hinaus wird in der BoP-Literatur auf die Bedeutung des Wissenstransfers an Partnern entlang der gesamten Wertschöpfungskette hingewiesen (capacity building) (Mukherji & Jose, 2009; Vermeulen, Beritsen, & Geurts, 2008). Allen Akteuren in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften bieten sich vielfältige Möglichkeiten zum explorativen Lernen (March, 1991; Miller et al., 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Darüber hinaus wird deutlich, dass sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften durch Wechselseitigkeit geprägt sind. Konsequenter Weise erfordern sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften eine hohe Kollaborationsintensität.

Viele Unternehmen besitzen keinerlei Erfahrung in der Kreation von Innovationen für BoP-Segmente in Emerging Markets (Pitta et al., 2008; Prahalad, 2002; Simanis & Hart, 2009). Bisheriges Wissen ist kaum anwendbar, so dass ein intensiver Lernprozess zwingend notwendig ist (Milstein et al., 2007; Reficco & Marquez, 2009). In der BoP-Initiative „Patrimonio hoy“ des multinational operierenden Zementherstellers Cemex wurde beispielsweise ein traditionelles Spar- und Glücksspielssystem, das tief in den Sozialstrukturen der mexikanischen Slums etabliert ist, als Grundlage für ein innovatives Wohnungsbauprojekt genutzt (Prahalad, 2005; Segel, Meghji, & García-Cuellar, 2007). London beschreibt wie zunächst Versuche von Cemex scheiterten, das mexikanische BoP-Segment über eine klassische Adaption bestehender Produkte zu erreichen. Erst als das Top-Management eine „declaration of ignorance“ verfasste und Führungskräfte für mehrere Monate in die Elendsviertel Mexikos entsandte, konnte im direkten Dialog mit den Konsumenten wertvolles Wissen transferiert und eine gemeinschaftlich kreierte Innovation entstehen (London, 2011). Da diese Vorgehensweise jedoch viele Unternehmen überfordert, leisten lokal vernetzte Partner hier einen entscheidenden Beitrag. Krämer und Belz zeigen, dass in sieben von zehn BoP-Projekten neue Formen der unternehmensexternen Zusammenarbeit zum Wissenstransfer angewandt wurden (Krämer & Belz, 2008). Interorganisationales Lernen im Rahmen von sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften bildet somit die Grundlage zur Kreation von Innovationen (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2000, 2001). Die „Forest-Pulp-Paper Integration Strategy“

des chinesischen Papier- und Printmedienherstellers Huatai liefert hierzu ein anschauliches Beispiel. In einer sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaft mit universitären Forschungseinrichtungen, lokalen Verwaltungen und chinesischen Bauern wurde ein schnell wachsender Baum entwickelt. Dieser ist auf den extrem salzhaltigen Böden im Delta des Gelben-Flusses kultivierbar und schafft eine völlig neue Einnahmequelle für die traditionell sehr armen Bauern der Region. Das gewonnene Holz dient Huatai als Rohstoffquelle zur Papierproduktion. Dem Unternehmen ist es so möglich, teure Holzimporte aus dem Ausland und extrem umweltschädliche Substitute aus Pflanzenfasern zu ersetzen. Der Wissenstransfer zwischen den Partnern erfüllt auch hier eine doppelte Funktion. Zum einen ermöglicht er die Schulung und technische Unterstützung der Bauern (capacity building). Zum anderen bildet er die Grundlage vielfältiger Innovationen, wie beispielsweise eine neuartige Baumsorte, neue Kultivierungstechnik und neuartige Finanzierungslösungen (Shi, 2007). Interorganisationales Lernen wird in diesem Beitrag als Prozessvariable konzeptualisiert, welche die Bedingungen und das Ergebnis in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften mediert. Es wird ein positiver Zusammenhang für den direkten Effekt zwischen interorganisationalem Lernen und der Innovationsleistung unterstellt.

*Proposition 4: Je größer das Ausmaß interorganisationalen Lernens innerhalb der sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaft, desto höher ist die Innovationsleistung.*

## **5. Schlussfolgerungen**

Die BoP-Literatur tendiert dazu, sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften und die gemeinschaftliche Kreation von Innovationen als Universallösung auf ein breites Problemspektrum (bspw. den Abbau von Markteintrittsbarrieren) anzuwenden. Die integrative Orientierung in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften im Rahmen von BoP-Strategien in Emerging Markets bedingt allerdings ein Höchstmaß an Komplexität und KollaborationsIntensität (Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Nijhof et al., 2008; Selsky & Parker, 2005, 2010). Es ist fraglich in welcher Ausprägung die Akteure sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften diesen Anforderungen gerecht werden. Das stetig steigende Interesse an sektorübergreifender Zusammenarbeit, beispielsweise im Rahmen internationaler Entwicklungspartnerschaften, verdeutlicht die Relevanz systematischer Betrachtungen. Die

BoP-Forschung hat es in der Vergangenheit versäumt, bestehende theoretische Konzepte zur empirischen Analyse anzuwenden (Reficco & Marquez, 2009; Rivera-Santos & Rufín, 2010). Erste konzeptionelle Arbeiten empfehlen die Übertragung von lerntheoretischen Ansätzen aus dem Forschungsfeld des strategischen Managements von interorganisationalen Beziehungen und (Lern-) Allianzen (Dahan et al., 2010; Murphy & Arenas, 2010; Tashman & Marano, 2010). Basierend auf den theoretischen Konzepten und Forschungserkenntnissen aus strategischen Lernallianzen stellt dieser Beitrag ein teil-rekursives Pfadmodell auf, das zwischen Bedingung, Prozess und Ergebnis differenziert. Interorganisationales Lernen wird als Prozessvariable konzeptualisiert, welche die Bedingungen und das Ergebnis in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften mediert. Im Rahmen einer Pfadanalyse stellt interorganisationales Lernen somit gleichzeitig endogenes Kriterium wie auch Prädiktor dar (Weiber & Mühlhaus, 2010).

Ein wichtiger Erkenntnisgewinn dieses Beitrages liegt in der Identifikation erfolgskritischer Bedingungen. Hierzu wurden bestehende theoretische Konzepte interorganisationalen Lernens um die Dimension „Motivation“ ergänzt. Dies wird durch aktuelle Forschungsergebnisse zu interorganisationalem Lernen in strategischen Allianzen gestützt. Auf Grundlage dieses theoretischen Rahmens wurden Motivation, Rezeptivität und Transparenz als latente Konstrukte operationalisiert und relevante Messindikatoren abgeleitet. Diese finden in der aktuellen Literatur zu sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften durchaus Erwähnung. So bemerken Murphy und Arenas beispielsweise: „Open and clear communication channels between partners are important throughout the life span of the collaboration“ (Murphy & Arenas, 2010, S. 110). Jedoch reicht der Erkenntnisgewinn häufig nicht über die Feststellung einer allgemeinen Relevanz dieser Variablen hinaus, da eine theoretisch fundierte Einordnung und eine empirische Überprüfung von Zusammenhängen unterbleibt (Murphy & Arenas, 2010, S. 110).

Zur Analyse der Bedingungen stellt dieser Beitrag ein reflektives Messmodell auf. Dies erfordert zur Überprüfung einen kovarianzanalytischen Ansatz (Weiber & Mühlhaus, 2010). Reflektive Modelle verstehen die Messindikatoren als beobachtbare Konsequenz der Wirksamkeit des latenten Konstrukts (Weiber & Mühlhaus, 2010). Sie besitzen „einen gemeinsamen Kern und müssen folglich eine hohe Korrelation aufweisen“ (Weiber &

Mühlhaus, 2010, S. 91). Im Gegensatz zu formativen Ansätzen, welche die hypothetischen Konstrukte als Linearkombinationen der Messvariablen betrachten (regressionsanalytischer Denkansatz), ergeben sich keine Probleme aus etwaiger Multikollinearität (Weiber & Mühlhaus, 2010). Darüber hinaus bietet sich die Möglichkeit theoretisch denkbare korrelative Zusammenhänge, beispielsweise zwischen motivationalen Aspekten und dem Ausmaß der Offenheit innerhalb der Partnerschaft, systematisch zu modellieren. In der Kombination aus konfirmatorischer Prüfung der latenten Konstrukte und einer Pfadanalyse ließe sich das in Abb. 1 präsentierte Forschungsmodell empirisch prüfen. Hierzu bedarf es der Erhebung quantitativer Primärdaten über sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften.

Aus Sicht des strategischen Managements wären bereits erste Erkenntnisse zur Unternehmensperspektive auf die Beziehungen innerhalb der sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaft sehr aufschlussreich. Allerdings fordern sektorübergreifende Partnerschaften inhärent die Analyse von Daten über die Beziehung zwischen den Akteuren. Es ist somit nicht verwunderlich, dass die Literatur zum interorganisationalen Lernen in strategischen Allianzen ein dyadisches Messniveau empfiehlt (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998). Mit einem sog. Mirror-image Design ließe sich beispielsweise ein facettenreiches Bild der einzelnen Beziehungen in sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften zeichnen. Eine partnerspezifische Differenzierung würde beispielsweise Aussagen über die Ausprägung von Motivation, Rezeptivität und Transparenz in Abhängigkeit der Art der Akteure ermöglichen. Darüber hinaus könnten Probleme in der Kollaboration, welche aus der Knappheit bestimmter Partner hervorgehen, identifiziert werden (Reficco & Marquez, 2009). Es ist hervorzuheben, dass insbesondere Partner aus dem öffentlichen Sektor in der Regel kaum substituierbar sind. In der Literatur der öffentlichen Verwaltung wird deshalb darauf hingewiesen, dass Führungs- und Kontrollmodi (governance mechanisms) in privat-öffentlicher Kollaboration nicht identisch mit denen klassischer Unternehmensallianzen sind (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). Der Erkenntnisgewinn einer empirischen Prüfung wäre für Unternehmen, Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) und staatliche Akteure von hoher Relevanz.

Eine Limitation dieses Beitrags liegt in der Übertragung der theoretischen Rahmenmodelle und empirischen Erkenntnisse des interorganisationalen Lernens in strategischen Allianzen auf den Kontext von sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften. Einerseits gelingt hierdurch eine

fokussierte Herleitung relevanter Variablen der Kollaboration, andererseits werden Einflussgrößen außerhalb dieses Erkenntnishorizontes ausgeblendet. Beispielsweise könnten Theorien der Sozialpsychologie helfen, die Auswirkung von Stereotypen zwischen den Akteuren sektorübergreifender Partnerschaften zu erforschen. Anekdotische Schilderungen, aber auch erste empirische Belege, dokumentieren die Existenz stark negative Stereotype zwischen Nichtregierungsorganisationen und Unternehmen (Aaker et al., 2010; Laufer Green Isaac, 2004). Etwaige Konsequenzen für den Kollaborationserfolg sind weitgehend unbekannt (Arenas et al., 2009; Dahan et al., 2010). Dies stellt ein interessantes Feld für zukünftige Forschung dar.

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## **Essay [2]**

"Cognitive Heterogeneity - Catalyst and Inhibitor of Innovation  
in Cross-sector Social Partnerships"

*Venn, Ronald*

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# **Cognitive Heterogeneity – Catalyst and Inhibitor of Innovation in Cross-sector Social Partnerships**

*Ronald Venn*

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## **Abstract**

This study offers a novel theoretical lens for practitioners and researchers in the field of cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) and Base of the Pyramid strategies (BoP). Cross-sector collaboration on social issues (Waddock, 1988) has been outlined as a promising new tool (Austin, 2000; Selsky & Parker, 2005) for sustainable development and poverty alleviation (Kolk et al., 2008; Reed & Reed, 2008). However, heterogeneous partners, such as companies and non-governmental organizations, struggle to work together (Crane, 2000; Seitanidi & Crane, 2009; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Introducing cognitive theory (Nooteboom, 2000, 2010) from strategic management literature provides a powerful new lens to understand collaborative challenges. Thereby we connect to the recent discussion about organizational compatibility/ organizational fit, which has been outlined as the most crucial key to overcome barriers and capitalize on the differences in CSSPs (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). Moreover, practitioners desperately need new management tools, or poverty related partnerships, will be a short lived phenomenon. This paper provides hands-on solutions for partner selection (Seitanidi & Crane, 2009), enhancement of partnering capacity by exploring social entrepreneurship (Halme et al., 2012; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010), and the role of intermediates. Finally, this study contributes to strategic management literature by developing cognitive theory further. The analysis draws on management literature, but recommendations provide valuable insights for all stakeholders such as non-profit organizations and public administration.

## **Introduction**

**T**oday, developing countries face tremendous ecological, economical and social challenges. Millions suffer from malnutrition and poverty. Accesses to health care, electricity, clean water and sanitation are rare privileges at the base of the economic pyramid (BoP). Fighting poverty requires collective efforts of the public, private and civil sector to co-create pioneering innovations (Gray & Wood, 1991; Waddock, 1988). Cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) have been outlined as a promising new tool (Austin, 2000; Selsky & Parker, 2005) for sustainable development at the BoP (Kolk et al., 2008; Reed & Reed, 2008). Over the last decade, we witnessed a massive rise in CSSPs, but partnership performance could not live up to expectations (Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Bäckstrand, 2006; Berger et al., 2004). Literature usually frames heterogeneity as a driver of innovation (Selsky & Parker, 2010), but evidence of its adverse impact is mounting. Heterogeneous partners, such as companies and NGOs, struggle to work together (Dahan et al., 2010; Garrette & Karnani, 2010). Frustration builds up over operational differences, intransparency and mismatches of focus (Karamchandani et al., 2011), especially because mutual learning "progress is counted in years not in months" (Venn & Berg, 2013: p. 114). Facing the dilemma of sector differences being sources of value creation and impediments to collaboration simultaneously (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012), we urgently need new frameworks to explore the catalyzing and inhibiting forces of heterogeneity in CSSPs. Moreover, practitioners desperately need new management tools, or poverty-related partnerships will be a short lived phenomenon. This paper uses cognitive theory (Nooteboom, 2010) as a fresh theoretical lens in CSSP and BoP research. The aim of this study is twofold. First, this paper provides novel propositions and directions for future research. Second, hands-on implications for practitioners are presented. Partner selection, protective white space and the role of social entrepreneurship are discussed for that matter. The analysis draws on management literature, but recommendations provide valuable insights for all stakeholders.

## **Cognitive heterogeneity in cross-sector social partnerships**

### *Inclusive business at base of the economic pyramid*


Traditionally poverty alleviation was pursued by Development Corporation and civil society organizations while private enterprises usually did not contribute beyond corporate

philanthropy. This changed considerably when scholars indicated new growth opportunities in developing countries (Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). C.K.Prahalad (2005) popularized the idea that billions of poor people constitute a vast untapped consumer market. Fighting poverty by making poverty business is a fascinating idea (Lodge & Wilson, 2006; Wilson & Wilson, 2006), but raises ethical dilemmas, too (Davidson, 2009; Hahn, 2008; Karnani, 2007). Complex interdependencies between social, ecological and commercial issues make it hard to achieve sustainable solutions (Payne & Calton, 2004; Wijen, 2008). Literature underscores importance of a deep dialog (Hart, 2007, 2011) and co-creation efforts of all stakeholders (Simanis & Hart, 2006, 2008). Teaming up across sector boundaries (Kolk et al., 2008; Reed & Reed, 2008) is crucial to create inclusive ventures (SNV & WBCSD, 2008; UNDP, 2008). Inclusive business merges consumption and income generation without jeopardizing ecological sustainability. However, companies struggle to collaborate with the civil and public sector. Performance of CSSPs has often been disappointing (Bäckstrand, 2006). Quick return on investment at the BoP will be more an exception than the rule (McFalls, 2007; Seelos & Mair, 2007). Scholars and practitioners underestimated complexities associated with heterogeneity in partnerships (Arora & Romijn, 2009; Garrette & Karnani, 2010). Karamchandani et al. (2011: p. 108) point out that corporate executives get increasingly frustrated by slow progress. Mismatching focus (social versus financial), operational differences and intransparency often leave them no other choice than abandoning partnerships. After a decade of enthusiastic attempts to penetrate BoP markets, practitioners and researchers conclude that there's nothing like a 'ready to tap' market at the BoP (Simanis, 2011). Inclusive business ventures need to build up markets carefully (London & Hart, 2011), which requires patient capital (Karamchandani et al., 2011; Kennedy & Novogratz, 2011) and deep benefit management (Gollakota et al., 2010; Venn & Berg, 2013). Without doubt, inclusive business creation calls for long-term commitment, but this is not enough. Strategic decision makers will hesitate to justify investments if they lack understanding of cross-sector collaboration. The future of inclusive business heavily depends on new theoretical frameworks and scientific research unraveling collaboration in CSSPs (Kolk et al., 2013).

### *Cognitive theory as a fresh theoretical lens in CSSP and BoP research*

Colliding world views are common in CSSPs (Crane, 1998, 2000). Collaboration with unconventional partners is a tough call (Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Berger et al., 2004), because

missions, values, and objectives diverge heavily at organizational level (Kolk, Dolen, & Vock, 2010; Seitanidi, Koufopoulos, & Palmer, 2011). Public, private and civil sector organizations draw on entirely different knowledge bases and operate at dissimilar mindsets (Rivera-Santos & Rufín, 2010). This translates into large 'cognitive distance' between organizations (Nooteboom, 2000).




Cognitive distance is a relatively new notion in management literature drawing on insight of social psychology. The concept is particularly useful to determine innovation performance in interorganizational collaboration (see figure 1). Nooteboom (2000, 2010) argues that people develop their cognition idiosyncratic along different life trajectories and different environments. People have unique cognitive setups considering interpretation, sense making, and evaluation mechanisms, which implies that cognitive distance mirrors differences between people. Cognitive distance can be defined as the difference in cognitive functions which are perception, thinking and mental categories (Nooteboom, 2000, 2004). For example, a corporate manager from a western multinational corporation (MNC) is likely to have entirely different knowledge than Indian people living in the Dharavi slum of

Mumbai (India). Consequently, they interact at large cognitive distance. On the one hand, both can provide radically new insights to each other and greatly benefit from co-creation of new knowledge. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand what one has never heard of before. "If the individuals have entirely separate knowledge bases, then integration cannot occur beyond most primitive level" (Grant, 1996: p. 116). Hence, large cognitive distance impedes knowledge absorption, understanding and co-creation of knowledge. This creates a great dilemma, because cognitive distance unfolds catalyzing as well as inhibiting forces for innovation. Cognitive theory provides a fresh theoretical lens to analyze collaboration in CSSPs, but two major adjustments are necessary for this purpose. First, the notion of cognitive distance deeply roots in social psychology. Literature just began to discover cognitive distance at organizational level. We urgently need a better picture of its organizational equivalents. This paper defines cognitive distance at organizational level, analogous to the difference in cognitive functions of humans, as the difference in organizational focus, procedures and knowledge bases between two organizations. Second, cognitive distance inherently applies a dyadic perspective. However, companies eager to create inclusive business usually team up with multiple partners from multiple sectors (Rivera-Santos et al., 2012; Venn & Berg, 2012). Therefore, research needs to go beyond a dyadic perspective. This paper introduces the term cognitive heterogeneity to indicate the sum of cognitive distance between interacting organizations at partnership level.

Cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs encompasses three interdependent dimensions, namely differences in organizational focus, procedures and knowledge bases. Management research has used technology related proxies, such as patent classification, to capture cognitive distance at organizational level (Li, Vanhaverbeke, & Schoenmakers, 2008). Typically, these measures are not available to CSSPs research as the rural poor or public bodies are unlikely to file any patents. Consequently a novel operationalization of cognitive heterogeneity and its three dimensions is needed. This section develops a reflective measurement model in accordance with the principles of structural equation modeling including a first glance at possible indicators (see figure 2). First, the unique focus of an organization shapes missions, goals, values and norms of behavior. Missions and goals vary to a great deal in CSSP (Kolk et al., 2010; Seitanidi et al., 2011; Sharma & Kearins, 2011). The lack of shared goals can trigger mistrust and intransparency which causes poor partnership performance (Bäckstrand, 2006;

Venn & Berg, 2012). For example, the private sector mainly focuses on shareholder value maximization. Typically, companies enter partnerships to pursue financial goals (cf. Jenkins & Ishikawa, 2010). Even if they desire social impact, evidence shows that this is difficult to incorporate under a profit-maximizing regime (Kistruck & Beamish, 2010; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Olsen & Boxenbaum, 2009). Nevertheless, the civil and public sector will try to put ecological and social impact creation on top of the partnership agenda. Unsurprisingly, CSSPs need to cope with paradoxical goals (Garrette & Karnani, 2010; D. F. Murphy & Coleman, 2000; Vilanova, Lozano, & Arenas, 2009) and different priorities (Karamchandani et al., 2011). Another good indicator is the specific performance metric used by an organization, because it is designed to evaluate compliance with the organizational focus. For example, whereas a company might use turnover and sales data to evaluate performance, environmental NGOs might measure square miles of protected rainforest. Little similarity in applied performance metrics would indicate differences in organizational focus which is the first dimension of cognitive heterogeneity. Next, each organization develops unique values and norms to align employees' behavior with the organizational focus. Values and norms diverge extremely between the private, public and civil sector (Crane, 1998, 2000). In the past, NGOs often perceived the private sector as a natural enemy (Plante & Bendell, 2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003). Unconventional partnering might be seen as betrayal of fundamental values (Davies & Ryals, 2010). Deviance from this dogma can trigger strong disapproval by colleagues, members and fellow NGOs who may denounce collaboration with the private sector as 'selling out'. Interestingly, this holds for companies as well. First evidence shows that corporate managers experience internal pressure for deviation from their organizational focus in CSSPs at the BoP (Halme et al., 2012; Venn & Berg, 2013). Overall, diverging goals and performance metrics as wells as differences in norms and values can indicate cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs. Figure 2 presents a reflective measurement model of cognitive heterogeneity.

## Cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs



Second, organizational procedures vary heavily between partners in CSSPs. Operational differences can significantly hamper successful collaboration if partners cannot find ways to harmonize processes and procedures (Rondinelli & London, 2003). This section suggests using diverging standards, decision making styles and time management as indicators. Organizations usually develop standard procedures to run processes efficiently. Different standards can cause friction in partnerships and significantly hamper co-creation of innovations (Karamchandani et al., 2011; Venn & Berg, 2013). Furthermore, the private sector hunts for entrepreneurial opportunities, which requires fast decision making and quick resource allocation. Their civil and public counterparts usually follow more rigid and time-consuming procedures such as public tendering. Venn & Berg (2013) outline diverging pace of decision making as a major success barrier of collaboration, which is magnified by bureaucratic red tape in developing countries (De Soto, 2000). Furthermore, companies often fail to adapt to bottom-up decision making (McFalls, 2007; Pitta et al., 2008). This is of tremendous importance, since CSSPs rely on poor communities, local cooperatives or self-help groups (see e.g. Rocchi & Kusume, 2008), who employ collective decision making and

conflict resolution. Trouble often arises when corporate managers get impatient due to internal time pressure (Sharma & Kearins, 2011). Evidence shows that inclusive businesses regularly fail to meet time-to-market expectations (Halme et al., 2012; Kennedy & Novogratz, 2011). For example, McFalls (2007, 2008) describes that unrealistic timeframes led to the failure of the HP i-community. Executives of Hewlett-Packard were not comfortable committing to inclusive business beyond a three-year time-frame, which eventually caused termination of the initiative. Long versus short term perspectives can heavily clash in poverty related partnerships (Olsen & Boxenbaum, 2009) indicating diverging organizational procedures which is the second dimension of cognitive heterogeneity (see figure 2).

Thirdly, each organization draws on a unique knowledge base. Technology related proxies have been used to indicate the corporate knowledge base in order to study cognitive distance in inter-firm alliances (e.g. Gilsing et al., 2008; Wuyts et al., 2005). Occasionally some partners in CSSPs might use similar technologies or have expertise in the same technological field. For example, research institutions such as universities often contribute to product development and technological advancement in partnerships at the BoP (see e.g. Kandachar, Diehl, Parmar, & Shivarama, 2011). R&D divisions of companies might have significant overlap in technological knowledge with universities, which would indicate smaller cognitive distance (see figure 1). However, it seems rather difficult to apply technology related indicators beyond this particular dyad. An alternative indicator might be language and vocabulary use. Literature outlines that knowledge and communication are dynamically linked (Nooteboom, 2000). Organizations preserve knowledge which is shared among its members by different means of communication (Daft & Weick, 1984). Organizational language and vocabulary (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) are elements of an unique organizational code (March, 1991). Terminology can have very different meaning outside the organization (Bolino, Turnley, & Bloodgood, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). When the unique knowledge base of an organization shapes terminology, understanding becomes extremely difficult for outsiders. For example, local community networks at the BoP are characterized by density and closure (Woolcock, 1998), which fosters the use of a shared language (Ansari et al., 2012). There will be a significant need for translation (Rivera-Santos & Rufin, 2010) and development of a shared terminology (Simanis & Hart, 2008). Research indicates that communication in poverty related CSSPs is prone to misunderstanding (Pitta et al., 2008) as

partner lack common ground (Arora & Romijn, 2009; Babiak & Thibault, 2009; M. Murphy & Arenas, 2010) and easily talk “past each other” (Sharma & Kearins, 2011). Differences in the organizational knowledge bases will be reflected different use of terminology and different definitions (see figure 2). This paragraph outlined three dimensions of cognitive heterogeneity and suggested various indicators. The following step is to evaluate its impact on partnership performance.

### **The interplay of complementary resources and partnering capacity**

#### *Heterogeneity as catalyst of innovation*

Tapping novel sources of knowledge requires collaboration beyond organizational boundaries (Chesbrough, 2006). Companies increasingly innovate together with customers, suppliers and competitors (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Hippel, 2005). At the BoP, this is put to new levels. Companies engage with fringe stakeholders in slums and distant rural areas of developing countries (Hart & Sharma, 2004; M. Murphy & Arenas, 2010) and foster partnerships with the civil and public sector (Kolk et al., 2013; London, 2011). CSSPs at the BoP typically involve a multitude of stakeholders. The partnership approach “builds on the idea that each sector in society has core competencies and resources that, if appropriately arranged, are complementary to one another” (Sullivan & Warner, 2004: p. 19). Fusing complementary resources provides fertile grounds to co-create disruptive innovations (Hart & Christensen, 2002) which initiate organizational and social transformation (Seitanidi et al., 2011). Literature stresses “the opportunities for co-creation of value due to resource complementarity abound” (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012: p. 734).

### The catalyzing and inhibiting forces of Cognitive Heterogeneity for Innovation




Figure 3: The impact of cognitive heterogeneity on co-creation performance in CSSPs.

Volume, diversity and richness of resources available will often depend on size and composition of partnerships. While ‘the more the merrier’ logics apply to some resources, for instance investment budgets, others, such as knowledge, follow different ones. Here, diversity and richness of resources come into play. Both determine the ability to co-create sustainable solution in CSSPs. Knowledge must be truly novel, meaning non-redundant, to be useful in attempts to innovate (Koka & Prescott, 2002; Nooteboom, 2004). Nooteboom (2000, 2010) argues that cognitive proximity enables efficient absorption of knowledge, but diminishes the degree of its novelty. In other words, one can learn little from a partner having a similar organizational focus, procedures and knowledge base. It is cognitive heterogeneity what makes partnering across sector boundaries such a promising tool to solve social, environmental and economical problems. In sum, one could expect a positive impact of cognitive heterogeneity on volume, richness and diversity of resources in CSSPs (see figure 3).

*P1: CSSPs regularly consist of multiple partners from multiple sectors operating at large cognitive distance to one another. Increasing cognitive heterogeneity at partnership level, leads to greater volume, richness and diversity of complementary resources.*

### *Heterogeneity as inhibitor of innovation*

However, cognitive heterogeneity has a downside. "Even if both parties are willing, organizations with fundamentally different governance structures and missions can find it difficult to exchange information effectively" (Rondinelli & London, 2003: p. 74). Clearly, access to novel resources is of little use, if one lacks understanding (Grant, 1996; Inkpen, 1998; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). It requires immense 'absorptive capacity' to capitalize on collaboration with an unconventional partner (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). Absorptive capacity describes a set of organizational routines and strategic processes, by which organizations acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge for the purpose of value creation (Zahra & George, 2002). It depends on existing knowledge as well as similarity and familiarity between interacting partners to acquire and assimilate knowledge (Koka & Prescott, 2002; Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001). Understanding and assimilating require active engagement (Lane et al., 2001) which "entails not only the ability to absorb, but also, in the opposite direction, the rhetorical ability to help others absorb what one does or says oneself" (Nooteboom, 2010, p. 96). Whenever partners are extremely heterogeneous, it is crucial to add the willingness of sharing, which includes helping other to absorb, resources (Nooteboom, 2000). However, this is not sufficient, because it is not only about absorbing and sharing. Partners interact to co-create groundbreaking innovations. These co-productive exchange patterns are characterized by indirect exchange where partners infuse resources in a network, thereby producing entirely new ones together (Chen & Choi, 2005; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). This is far more complex and difficult than in direct exchange, where partners interact in a transactional way. Clearly, the ability to collaborate with unconventional partners goes far beyond the established notion of absorptive capacity.

## Partnering Capacity




Figure 4: Operationalization of partnering capacity in CSSPs.

Partnering capacity can be defined as the ability and willingness to share, absorb, and combine resources in a network of partners eager to solve complex mutual issues of social, ecological, and economical nature. This includes competence as well as governance aspects (cf. Nooteboom, 2010). Whereas the competence side reflects the ability to absorb, share, and combine resources, the governance side can be split in trust and control (see figure 4). On the competence side, partners need to learn how to absorb, share, and combine resources. This can be very challenging, because sense making and interpretation require cognitive proximity (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005; V.d.Bosch, Volberda, & DeBoer, 1999). Little overlap in organizational focus, processes and knowledge bases of unconventional partners will cause delayed comprehension (Lane, Koka, & Seemantini, 2006; Zahra & George, 2002). Collaboration will be lengthy even with proper communications skills, but completely pointless if partners cannot not make sense of each other (Nooteboom, 2010). „Without cognitive focus of shared perception, meanings, understandings and values, too much effort, time and aggravation would have to be spent to disambiguate meanings, eliminate misunderstanding, set priorities, establish directions, coordinate activities, and negotiate the terms of collaboration“ (Nooteboom, 2010: p. 101). With increasing cognitive heterogeneity one would expect a drop in the ability to collaborate with partner in CSSPs. This might hold for the governance aspects as well. Good governance, through trust and control, should prevent conflict in CSSPs. An increasing number of CSSPs start as public-

private-partnerships (PPPs) between companies and Development Corporation (Kolk et al., 2008; Reed & Reed, 2008). Here governance can be established by formal control when partners sign enforceable contracts which define terms and conditions of collaboration upfront. However, evidence shows that most poverty related PPPs quickly evolve into multi-stakeholder initiatives including a variety of partners. The notoriously weak legal and institutional environment developing countries makes it difficult to establish control by contractual arrangements (De Soto, 2000). Trust is often the only governance mechanism available (Kolk et al., 2008; Nooteboom, 2007), but seldom given from the beginning and needs to be build up carefully (Glasbergen, 2011; Venn & Berg, 2013). Literature points out that lack of trust is a major concern in CSSPs (Gardetti, 2007; Rivera-Santos et al., 2012), since some partners encountered each other with hostility in the past (Crane, 2000; Plante & Bendell, 2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003). For-profit and not-for-profit mindsets collide heavily in CSSPs (Dahan et al., 2010; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). In sum, one can expect a negative impact of cognitive heterogeneity on partnering capacity in CSSPs (see figure 3).

*P2: Increasing cognitive heterogeneity at partnership level diminishes partnering capacity, in terms of absorbing, sharing and combining resources (competence), and impedes establishment of trust and control (governance) in CSSPs.*

#### *Innovation performance peaks at optimal cognitive heterogeneity*

Cognitive theory provides support for theory pinpointing the great potential for innovation as well as the tremendous difficulties practitioners face in CSSPs. It is particularly useful to understand the tremendous dilemma of heterogeneity. On the one hand, it takes cognitive heterogeneity to gain new knowledge. On the other hand however, cognitive heterogeneity rapidly decreases the ability and willingness to collaborate. "A trade-off arises between cognitive distance, for the sake of novelty, and cognitive proximity, for the sake of understanding and utilization" (Nooteboom, 2004: p. 22). Cognitive heterogeneity impacts both, partnering capacity and resources available, but it is their interaction that outlines partnership performance, such as co-created solutions to poverty. Figure 1 displays that one should seek balance (Lane et al., 2006) at medium levels of cognitive heterogeneity to improve performance (Gilsing et al., 2008; Nooteboom et al., 2007; Wuyts et al., 2005). First empirical evidence from the field of strategic alliances confirms an inverted u-shaped function outlined in figure 1 (Cowan & Jonard, 2009; Vasudeva & Anand, 2011). Co-creation

performance peaks at optimal cognitive heterogeneity, but CSSPs will often be stuck at the right side of the performance function. Mounting evidence documents disappointing performance of CSSP (Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Bäckstrand, 2006; Berger et al., 2004) and this study offers a new lens to dismantle underlying logics. Partners are unable to capitalize on complementary resources when partnering capacity diminishes driven by cognitive heterogeneity (see figure 3).

*P3: The interaction of partnering capacity and complementary resources produces an inverted u-shaped performance function. Co-creation performance will be highest at medium levels of cognitive heterogeneity, but most CSSPs are likely to be stuck with low performance due to large cognitive heterogeneity.*

## **Coping with cognitive heterogeneity**

Cognitive theory enhances our understanding of collaboration in CSSPs, but capitalizing on these insights demands to take it one crucial step further. The question we need to ask is: How can we control cognitive heterogeneity and enhance partnering capacity in order to maximize co-creation performance? This section offers first insights on three management tools, namely adjusting partner selection, fostering social intrapreneurship and using external intermediation. These moderating forces have been identified from the field of BoP and CSSP research and provide hands-on guidelines for managerial practice and an excellent starting point for future research.

### *Management tool 1: Partner selection*

Literature emphasizes importance of due diligence before entering a partnership (Rondinelli & London, 2003; Seitanidi & Crane, 2009), but lacks a comprehensive overview of partner selection criteria. This is quite surprising, because scholars increasingly apply a process-based view to better understand managerial issues in CSSPs (Glasbergen, 2011; Kolk et al., 2008; Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007). Seitanidi & Crane (2009) outline that partner selection can be deliberately planned as well an emergent process. However, when it comes to criteria for partner selection, a normative perspective usually prevails (Selsky & Parker, 2010) suggesting to look for partners with complementary resources. For example, companies typically search for partners who enhance reputational profiling, whereas NGOs aim for partners with vast

financial and human resources. This is not surprising, because bundling complementary resources to co-create solution to mutual problems is the bedrock of CSSP theory. However, evidence shows that resource-centric selection criteria turn out to be insufficient (Gradl et al., 2010) and are often shifted towards collaboration centric ones (Venn & Berg, 2013). This makes sense, because it is very tempting to focus on partners with desirable resources at first. However, large cognitive heterogeneity that comes with resource complementarity demands partnering capacity most organizations do not possess. After a while practitioners intuitively question partnership composition and eventually search for new partners less distant in terms of cognitive heterogeneity. Therefore this study proposes (see figure 3):

*M1: Adjusting the composition of partnerships close to the point of optimal cognitive heterogeneity will boost performances of CSSPs. Partnership selection criteria need to span all three dimensions of cognitive heterogeneity. Due diligence should be done upfront and maintained throughout the partnership.*

This study identifies several partner selection criteria and clusters them along the three dimensions of cognitive heterogeneity. Firstly, partner selection should avoid extreme variety of organizational foci. Organizations need to "take actions to identify and understand explicitly a potential partner's goals and objectives" (Rondinelli & London, 2003: p. 73). Literature provides much support for this argument. Determining the degree of mutual goals and alignment of missions is frequently mentioned (e.g. Kolk et al., 2010). Additionally one needs to evaluate the attitude towards mutual learning (Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2008; Simanis & Hart, 2008). By asking about the most important performance indicators a potential partner intends to apply, one can get a good idea about the degree of overlap in organizational focus. If overlap is too small, it will restrain partnering capacity and endanger co-creation performance. Secondly, organizations should apply a quick scan of common organizational processes, because if time scales and decision making procedures deviate too much, it will be hard to collaborate effectively (e.g. McFalls, 2007). This should include the flexibility in operations as well (e.g. Rondinelli & London, 2003). Thirdly, partner selection should spend attention on the mutual overlap in knowledge bases. Two distinct categories are especially important, namely know-how and know-who. The former one comprises technical knowledge and expertise (e.g. Gradl et al., 2010) whereas the latter one includes

embeddedness in the social and economical context (e.g. Schuster & Holtbrügge, 2012). These selection criteria resemble the indicators of cognitive heterogeneity to a great degree. Additional criteria are the overlap in language and vocabulary, respectively the openness towards the development of a shared language. Practitioners can conduct web-searches, review published material and contact colleagues (formally as well as informally), who already collaborated with the potential partner (cf. Rondinelli & London, 2003). They can use a uniform evaluation scheme, based on the indicators of cognitive heterogeneity suggested by this study, to bundle and evaluate information. Plotting and monitoring partners could be done with stakeholder maps for instance (Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2008). With this information at hand, partners closer to the point of optimal cognitive heterogeneity can be selected – keeping in mind that very low levels of cognitive heterogeneity hamper co-creation performance as much as extremely high ones. This hands-on approach prevents practitioners from becoming blinded by their desire to gain complementary resources. Additionally, evaluation schemes and stakeholder maps can be used to start an open and transparent dialog with potential partners on the issue of cognitive heterogeneity, thereby lifting differences up from an implicit layer, which is probably flawed with prejudice and stereotypes (Aaker, Vohs, & Mogilner, 2010; Dahan et al., 2010), to an explicit one. Awareness of cognitive heterogeneity and understanding of its implications gives all partners a fair chance to build up partnering capacity or to call external intermediates for assistance.

### *Management tool 2: Social Intrapreneurship*

Another way of coping with cognitive heterogeneity is the enhancement of partnering capacity. "An upward shift of ability to collaborate, in competence and governance, allows an organization to cope with more cognitive variety, and to thereby increase innovative capacity..." (Nooteboom, 2010: p. 103). The obvious question is to find out how to build up partnering capacity. Kolk et al. (2010) argue that collaboration across sector boundaries is as much about the organization as it is about the individual. Building up partnering capacity is likely to start small with few passionate individuals and will later grow into an organizational capability if properly cultivated. Understanding germination demands a careful look at seedlings. With little experience in cross-sector collaboration, organizations usually send out scouts to explore the field. These boundary spanning individuals are often selected because of their passion for sustainability driven innovation. Through field experience they slowly develop valuable partnering capacity. This study argues that social intrapreneurship

(corporate/organizational social entrepreneurship used synonymously) is vital for building partnering capacity and proposes (see figure 3):

M2: *Shifting partnering capacity upwards allows organization to cope with higher levels of cognitive heterogeneity. Social intrapreneurship is vital for building partnering capacity. Social intrapreneurship flourishes through organizational tolerance in terms of corporate white space and corporate patient capital.*

The term social intrapreneurship emerged from practitioners debate (Grayson et al., 2011; SustainAbility, 2008) where spearheading individuals were boldly labeled as social superheroes in business suits. However, there's more to it than chatter on weblogs and promotion of inclusive business endeavors. Increasing empirical evidence underscores existence of social intrapreneurship and research started to analyze its dimensions and determinants (Halme et al., 2012; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010; Venn & Berg, 2013). Social intrapreneurship is an entrepreneurial activity in organization that merges social, environmental, and commercial objectives. Social intrapreneurship bridges boundaries between divisions, organizations, and sectors to co-create pioneering solutions to mutual problems. This study sheds first light on key characteristics of social intrapreneurs as well as enabling and suppressing conditions for social intrapreneurship.

Firstly, social intrapreneurship starts with passionate individuals (SustainAbility, 2008) who believe in their contribution to sustainable development as well as the corporate mission (Venn & Berg, 2013). These individuals have a mindset that "is manifested in a willingness to tackle extremely challenging problems, such as energy poverty and rural exclusion, and in an ability to discover previously unseen solutions to those problems" (Halme et al., 2012: p. 22). Social intrapreneurs overcome resource constraints and pressure arising from conflicting goals, such as commercial vs. social impact, with intrapreneurial bricolage. Halme et al. (2012) define intrapreneurial bricolage as an entrepreneurial activity in large corporations where employees bundle resources at hand in very creative ways. This includes donation of private time, money and access to private networks (Halme et al., 2012; Venn & Berg, 2013). Pursuing the triple P approach of sustainability (people, planet, profit), social intrapreneurs draw on two more Ps, namely passion and proficiency. Passion underpins a strong

motivation to change the organizational mindset by merging commercial interest with social and environmental goals. This includes a strong faith in 'doing the right thing' by creation of shared value (Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011). Furthermore, proficiency can be defined as a unique skill set that includes entrepreneurial aspects such as intrapreneurial bricolage and partnering capacity. Social intrapreneurs realize the need to create mutual benefits, thereby bridging cognitive heterogeneity and achieving higher co-creation performance in CSSPs.

Secondly, enabling conditions for social intrapreneurship can be distinguished into two categories, namely organizational tolerance and structural safeguards. Social intrapreneurs operate beyond the current cognitive state of an organization. This requires a certain degree of organizational tolerance and flexibility towards experimentation and out-of-ordinary arrangements (Duyemedjian & Ruling, 2010; Halme et al., 2012). Senior executives must provide a "license to experiment outside of the current corporate modus operandi" (Simanis & Hart, 2008: p. 13) otherwise social intrapreneurs will be punished for their deviation from the organizational focus quickly. Top-level executives who publically spread an inspiring vision on sustainability, such as former CEO of Royal PHILIPS Electronics Gerard Kleisterlee (cf. Seebode, Harkin, & Bessant, 2009; UNEP, 2010) or Jefferey Immelt from GE (cf. SustainAbility, 2008), are crucial catalysts for social intrapreneurship. However, it takes more than words to nurture social intrapreneurship. Literature suggests establishing structural safeguards that offer protection. For example, R&D white space provides freedom to experiment and allows social intrapreneurs learn from failure (Hart, 2011; Simanis & Hart, 2008). Kistruck & Beamish (2010) outline that structural separation helps to protect social intrapreneurs operating under a different cognitive framework than the rest of the organization. However, structural separation cannot go so far that entities become completely detached, because social intrapreneurs rely on organizational resources and capabilities. Venn & Berg (2013) advise setting up 'social innovation incubators' and integrate employee volunteering schemes, which would allow multi-disciplinary team building and foster spill-over effects of partnering capacity throughout the organization. Ideally structural safeguards, such as social innovation incubators, are equipped with patient capital and evaluated against long-term objectives (Kennedy & Novogratz, 2011; Simanis & Hart, 2008). By application of deep benefit management, social intrapreneurs can demonstrate their contribution beyond traditional financial targets (Gollakota et al., 2010;

Venn & Berg, 2013). Following an 'open innovation' strategy multiple projects could be monitored and ideas exploited inside as well as outside the boundaries of an organization (Chesbrough, 2006).

Thirdly, several threats hamper social intrapreneurship and can bring development of partnering capacity to a hold. Through cross-sector interaction social intrapreneurs build partnering capacity and incrementally reduce cognitive distance to collaboration partners. Evidence shows that social intrapreneurs are willing to risk their careers to pursue goals beyond their own organization (Halme et al., 2012; Venn & Berg, 2013). This underscores great passion for sustainability and proficiency to collaborate across sector boundaries. However, the more they enhance their capability to bridge cognitive heterogeneity, the more they deviate from the cognitive setup of their own organization. This is a serious dilemma. On the one hand, social intrapreneurs are the "cognitive stepping stone" between their organization and partners in CSSP. On the other hand, they can become strangers to their colleagues and supervisors. If organizations do not value the boundary spanning role, social intrapreneurs will face serious career consequences. They might get fired or move on to pursue their goals outside the organization. Taking their partnering capacity with them will leave an organization empty handed, which underpins the necessity to build partnering capacity at organizational level. If organization have neither spent attention on partner selection or building partnering capacity through social intrapreneurship, it will be very hard to cope with cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs. However, one final tool remains, namely calling external intermediates for assistance.

#### *Management tool 3: External intermediates*

Cognitive heterogeneity can easily become very large in CSSPs. If partner lack adequate partnering capacity they will face the consequence of a very challenging and time consuming interaction process. If frustration over slow progress mounts up, they have two straightforward options, namely shutting operations down, which is increasingly reported in literature (Bäckstrand, 2006; Karamchandani et al., 2011), or they can call in assistance to cope with cognitive heterogeneity. Resourceful intermediates could bridge differences and buffer tensions between participants of CSSPs, thereby moderating the interaction of partnering capacity and complementary resources. This study proposes a moderating effect of resourceful intermediates in CSSPs (see figure 3):

M3: *External intermediates can bridge differences, buffer tension, and act as translators in CSSPs. They facilitate the co-creation process by supporting partners to cope with high levels of cognitive heterogeneity. Thereby co-creation performance in CSSPs is improved significantly.*

Over the last decade several institutions accumulated experience about sustainable development and inclusive business creation. These intermediates can act as "translators between world views" (Rivera-Santos & Rufín, 2010a: p. 63) which indicates their capacity to bridge cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs. The good news is that potential intermediates are out there. Literature implicitly considered intermediates from the very beginning by outlining the important role of so-called "BoP Learning Labs" (Gardetti, 2007; Simanis & Hart, 2008), for example at Cornell University (USA). Most learning labs started as a network platform for cross-sector interaction, but often evolved into enduring institutions. Several universities launched research centers on the broader issues of cross-sector interaction which might be able to act as intermediates, for example the Partnerships Resource Centre at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands). Furthermore, organizations providing physical and mental space for collaboration on sustainability issues as Dutch BoP Innovation Center or the global 'Impact HUB' network. Furthermore, various consultancies branched out into the area of CSSPs or were launched for that purpose, for instance Endeva in Berlin (Germany), Hystra in Paris (France), or Triple Value in The Hague (Netherlands). These intermediates gained substantial knowledge on inclusive business creation and cross-sector interaction so that they can bridge cognitive heterogeneity, intervene in power-play, and facilitate the development of trust in CSSPs. However, organizations relying on these intermediates must be aware that they still need to build up own partnering capacity if they do not want to remain dependent. Overall, this paper offers a novel perspective on cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs and recommends three management tools which can be used to control cognitive heterogeneity (partner selection), build up partnering capacity (social intrapreneurship), and facilitate the co-creation process (external intermediates).

## **Contribution, limitation and future research**

Several important theoretical and practical contributions are delivered in this study. First, this study offers a novel theoretical lens for practitioners and researchers in the field of cross-sector social partnerships. Introducing cognitive theory from strategic management literature provides a powerful tool to understand limited success of CSSPs in the past. Especially, poverty related partnerships suffered from challenges in collaboration across sector boundaries and frustration caused by slow progress. Second, the model presented in this study allows us to evaluate the impact of cognitive heterogeneity and predict co-creation performance in CSSPs. Thereby, it connects to the recent discussion on organizational compatibility/ organizational fit, which has been outlined as the most crucial key to overcome barriers and capitalize on the differences in CSSPs (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). Not only does this study deliver a solid theoretical framework to explain the notion of organizational fit, it goes one important step further. Third, this study provides hands-on solutions to cope with cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs. Adjusting partner selection criteria, enhancing partnering capacity through social intrapreneurship, and calling external intermediates for assistance are three novel management tools for practitioners. Fourth, this study contributes to strategic management literature by developing cognitive theory further. This study presents a new operationalization the moves beyond rough proxies such as patent data. In so doing cognitive distance in dyadic interorganizational relationships, respectively cognitive heterogeneity in strategic networks, can be analyzed in much more depth.

However, introducing a novel theoretical lens to BoP and CSSP research is not without risks. Cognitive theory draws on insights from strategic management literature and social psychology. It has been empirically validated in strategic alliances between companies, but never before been applied to cross-sector collaboration. On the one hand, this offers radically new insights, but on the other, it constitutes a potential limitation. Future research needs to verify and improve the notion of cognitive heterogeneity in CSSPs, preferably by analyzing empirical data. This paper strongly encourages future research use empirical observations and qualitative analyzes, but ultimately calls for quantitative evaluation. To circumvent problems arising from (multi-)collinearity between indicators, this paper deliberately introduced a reflective measurement model. Structural equation modeling (SEM)

treats indicators as observable (measurable) expression of a latent underlying construct. Significant correlation between indicators would be expected, which makes SEM an ideal statistical tool for future research on cognitive heterogeneity. Another limitation arises from the fact that some partners are non-substitutable in CSSPs. For instance, there usually will be only one government authority or administrative body to collaborate with. Partner selection would not be a real option to control cognitive heterogeneity. However, the application of evaluation schemes and stakeholder maps could still be useful to raise awareness of cognitive heterogeneity. Taking cognitive differences on the partnership agenda offers all partners a fair chance to develop required partnering capacity or to ask advice from external intermediates.

Finally, this study hopes to inspire future research to investigate the arising phenomenon of social intrapreneurship, which is key to develop partnering capacity. It starts with passionate and proficient individuals, but partnering capacity at organizational level will bring sustainable competitive advantage. Only then organizations will be able to fully capitalize on complementary resources that come with large cognitive heterogeneity thereby co-creating mutual value (people, planet, profit).

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### **III. Essays**

#### B. Empirische Essays

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**Essay [3]**

"The Gatekeeping Function of Trust in Cross-sector Social Partnerships"

*Venn, Ronald und Berg, Nicola*

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*Business and Society Review*

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# **The Gatekeeping Function of Trust in Cross-sector Social Partnerships**

*Ronald Venn and Nicola Berg*

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## **Abstract**

Hunger and deprivation, lack of education, sanitation, and health care are only a few pressing issues related to poverty in developing countries. Addressing such complex social issues requires pooling complementary resources of the civil, public, and private sector. Over the last decade, stakeholders tried to cocreate innovative solutions in cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) at the base of the economic pyramid (BoP), but collaboration proved to be very challenging. Practitioners become increasingly frustrated with operational differences, intransparency, and mismatched goals in partnerships. This study unravels the black box of collaboration and delivers empirical insights on trust and power in CSSPs based on social exchange theory. Structural equation modeling (SEM) enables us explore relationships beyond case-based insights. Our rigorous empirical analysis covers 207 interorganizational relationships and outlines a crucial gatekeeping function of trust in CSSPs. Findings provide strong empirical support for conceptual works calling for an "integrative orientation" in CSSPs. Furthermore, we pinpoint the role of intermediates and draw implications for future research.

## **Cross-sector social partnerships for poverty alleviation**

**A**ccording to the World Bank (2010), 1.4 billion people suffer from extreme poverty. Hunger and deprivation, lack of education, sanitation, and health care are only a few pressing issues related to poverty at the base of the economic pyramid (BoP). Its tremendous complexity makes poverty hard to tackle as solutions regularly exceed the capacity, resources, and capabilities of any single organization. Literature calls for multi-stakeholder collaboration across sector boundaries (Austin 2000a; Waddock 1988). Cross-sector social partnerships (CSSPs) can be defined as active collaboration between two or three sectors on mutual social problems (Waddock 1988). The partnership approach points out that public, private, and civil sector organizations share complementary competences

and resources, which provides fertile ground for cocreating solutions not achievable by anyone sector alone. Literature mostly assumes a “win– win–win” rationale (Waddell 2000). CSSPs were initiated around sustainability, governance, and poverty alleviation issues.

Despite great enthusiasm, a number of initiatives failed to meet expectations. Many CSSPs were put on hold due to procedural challenges and conflicts between partners (Babiak and Thibault 2009; Bäckstrand 2006; Berger et al. 2004). Heterogeneous participants, such as companies and nonprofit organizations, struggle to work together (Dahan et al. 2010) because divergent expectations concerning outcomes can cause strong conflict (Garrette and Karnani 2010). Practitioners become increasingly frustrated with operational differences, intransparency, and mismatched focus (Karamchandani et al. 2011). In the past, literature has normatively focused on innovation potential (Selsky and Parker 2010), while collaboration was mostly left as a black box (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010a). Early case study evidence indicates the tremendous importance of power and trust in partnerships (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012; Rivera-Santos et al. 2012; Stadtler 2011), and literature strongly calls for further investigation. Quantitative evaluations are virtually nonexistent today, so our rigorous empirical analysis contributes first insights to close this gap.

This empirical study opens the black box of collaboration in CSSPs at the BoP. First, we contribute a novel perspective on collaboration and identify dominant social exchange patterns at various partnership stages. Based on these insights, we examine the impact of conflicting organizational objectives on partnership performance. We then apply a process-based view (Kolk et al. 2008; Seitanidi and Ryan 2007) which enables us to consider power and trust issues between participants. We provide empirical insights by means of structural equation modeling (SEM). Our data covers 207 interorganizational relationships nested in 85 CSSPs by Austrian, Swiss, and German companies. Findings outline a gatekeeping trust function in CSSPs, which means we can deliver missing empirical evidence for earlier conceptual works. Furthermore, we pinpoint the role of intermediates in CSSPs and connect to the discussion of social intrapreneurship.

## Theoretical Background

### *Blurred Partnership Boundaries*

Sector roles and responsibilities undergo dramatic changes in today's society. Boundaries become increasingly blurred, especially in developing countries. Private and civil organizations provide public goods and services nowadays (Warner and Sullivan 2004), which bridge institutional voids (Kolk and van Tulder 2006) and governments' incapacity to fulfill basic human needs of millions living in poverty (Valente and Crane 2010). This development was speeded up when scholars outlined tremendous market opportunities for the private sector (Prahalad 2005; Prahalad and Hammond 2002; Prahalad and Hart 2002). BoP literature argues that sustainable development and commercial interest can complement each other (Lodge and Wilson 2006; Wilson and Wilson 2006). However, engaging in poverty alleviation is entirely new terrain for most companies. Unconventional partnering across sector boundaries is crucial in overcoming market barriers.

Literature emphasizes the importance of cocreating innovative products, services, and business models together with BoP stakeholders (Simanis and Hart 2006, 2009). This requires a "deep dialog" (Hart 2007) with people and organizations familiar with the local social fabric (Gardetti 2007; Krämer and Belz 2008). Ideally, stakeholders infuse their knowledge into bottom-up innovation processes (Krämer and Belz 2008; Pitta et al. 2008). Pioneering initiatives use local networks (Reficco and Marquez 2009; Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010b) to build up entirely new markets (London 2011). Sustaining long-term commitment takes patient capital and holistic benefit evaluation (Kennedy and Novogratz 2011; Venn and Berg 2013).


"Public private development partnerships" (PPDPs) become increasingly popular in fighting poverty (SDC 2009). Typically, companies and Development Corporation enter formal arrangements to bundle resources and competencies (Kolk et al. 2008; Reed and Reed 2008). For example, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) launched "develoPPP," which hosts partnerships between companies and German development aid organizations such as GIZ, Sequa, and DEGInvest. These partnerships are jointly financed, planned, and implemented (BMZ 2012). Over the last few years, we

interviewed various participants of the initiative and learned that companies regularly build their market entry strategy upon competences and resources of Development Corporation. This includes subsidization, market insight, and network access, as well as regulatory and political support. Although most PPDPs start bipartite, they usually evolve into bigger networks. NGOs, communities, and local companies play a vital role throughout the entire process. This shows that boundaries of CSSPs at the BoP are not clear cut. Even if formal bipartite arrangements build a starting point, partnerships commonly draw on a large amount of partners. A good example is the Marap-APA PPDP in Uzbekistan (cf. Trummer and Baktygulov 2010; UNDP 2010). The Austrian food processor Marap GmbH teamed up with the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) to enable poor farmers to produce organic fruits and nuts. The bipartite partnership instantly progressed into a multi-stakeholder collaboration. Ties were quickly formed with local partners such as Uzbekistan's state forest administration, Shredder Uzbek Scientific Institute of Gardening, and rural community groups. Furthermore, Austria's leading inspection body for organic food production (ABG) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) became indirectly involved. UNDP built capacity within Uzbekistan's post communist public administration. Pioneering legal frameworks enabled land ownership, which was crucial in building long-term commitment. Resources and competences were shared and jointly combined throughout the evolving network. Innovation emerged from a cocreative process rather than from "tit-for-tat" exchange. The Marap-APA partnership underlines blurred boundaries and fuzzy interaction. Understanding the dynamics of collaboration requires unraveling social exchange patterns.

## **Social Exchange Patterns in CSSPs**

"Through repeated interactions, relationships grow ... as a consequence of an unfolding social exchange and coordination process" (Muthusamy and White 2005, p. 418). Social exchange theory (Blau 1964) has been outlined as a valuable analytical framework in exploring collaborative alliances (Gray and Wood 1991; Kolk et al. 2010; Muthusamy and White 2005). Social exchange occurs when participants are mutually dependent on each other for valued outcomes (Molm et al. 2000). Chen and Choi's (2005, p. 4) review identifies four general exchange patterns, namely, negotiated, reciprocal, generalized, and co-productive exchange (see Figure 1). The former patterns are direct forms of social exchange, whereas the latter ones are indirect (Molm et al. 2000). Firstly, negotiated exchange is based

on an explicit agreement (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Molm et al. 1999), where participants provide benefits to another after terms of exchange have been clarified. This explicit agreement distinguishes negotiated from reciprocal exchange. Secondly, reciprocal exchange draws on a sequential “tit-for-tat” approach. A participant provides benefits to another without any instant gain but implicitly expects a return in the future. Without reciprocated action, exchange is perceived as inequitable and eventually stopped by the giving participant. Figure 1 outlines direct forms of social exchange.



The remaining two patterns are characterized by indirect exchange (Chen and Choi 2005). Firstly, generalized exchange is defined as the provision of unilateral benefits to one (or more) participant(s) while receiving benefits from (a) different participant(s). This is considerably more complex than direct exchange. Secondly, coproductive exchange is even more demanding. Participants share and combine resources in a wider network, and together, they produce an entirely new resource. Coproductive exchange demands high levels of coordination and interdependence (Chen and Choi 2005).

Austin (2000a) distinguishes philanthropic, transactional, and integrative CSSPs. Together, they constitute stages of a “collaboration continuum” (Austin 2000a). It can be supplemented by a fourth stage, namely, “conflict resolution” (Murphy and Arenas 2010). Firstly, cross-sector social interaction in a conflict resolving context mainly aims to overcome differences

by reaching settlement. For instance, in the aftermath of hazardous accidents, companies commonly aim to overcome disputes with affected stakeholders by initiation of round table sessions. Conflict resolution is mainly short-term, issue focused, and requires only low levels of collaboration. Explicitly negotiated exchange patterns will be dominant as bargaining between participants will frame interaction (see Table 1).

Secondly, in a philanthropic context, interaction is focused on charity and publicity. We can expect exchange patterns to be subtle and implicit, and harsh bargaining will not be necessary because participants can simply step back from collaboration without major harm. Corporate sponsoring for poverty alleviation has a long tradition. Although most donors will not demand anything for their contribution openly, many will implicitly hope for benefits. Corporate philanthropy might seek publicity, brand reputation, or employee retention. Even a small acknowledgement by the recipient might bring the donor satisfaction for "doing good." In one way or the other, the favor is expected to be returned. Reciprocal exchange patterns will be common in philanthropic partnerships.

Thirdly, partnerships at the transactional stage serve the purpose of stakeholder management and capacity building (Austin 2000a; Murphy and Arenas 2010). Exchange patterns increasingly move beyond reciprocity, and generalized terms of social exchange are dominant. Some participants provide unilateral assistance to build capacity while gaining benefits from someone else than the recipient, which requires more intense collaboration. Capacity building is crucial at the BoP (Kanter 2007; London and Hart 2004). For example, NGOs regularly build capacity in educational institutions such as vocational schools. They do not usually receive anything in return. However, companies might want to support NGOs because their capacity building enables recruitment of a qualified workforce. Generalized exchange patterns are common at a transactional stage.

Fourthly, collaboration intensity further increases at an "integrative" stage of collaboration. Solving "wicked problems" such as poverty (Weber and Khademian 2008) requires joint forces of multiple participants from multiple sectors (Rivera-Santos et al. 2012). Exchange patterns are very complex. The Marap case underscores the fact that innovation springs from evolving networks. Partners share, pool, and combine their resources to coproduce entirely

new ones. Interaction between participants can be indirect and mediated. Most poverty-related partnerships call for an integrative orientation, where coproductive exchange patterns are dominant. Their complexity requires participants to develop a basic understanding of exchange principles and agreement on partnership goals (Croppanzano and Mitchell 2005). Otherwise, collaboration will be chaotic and dominated by individual interests. If goals collide between partners, conflict might emerge and seriously endanger success.

## **Hypotheses Development**

### *The Impact of Goal Conflicts on Partnership Performance*

Solving mutual problems lies at the heart of the partnership approach. This holds especially for CSSPs at an integrative stage. Therefore, one might be tempted to imply congruent goals among participants, but this would neglect the tremendous complexity of cross-sector social interaction. Understanding collaboration requires a closer look at several layers (Kolk et al. 2010). Even though macro goals (e.g., poverty alleviation) are shared by most participants, significant differences can emerge at an organizational (meso) and individual (micro) level and constitute a vital barrier for mutual value creation (Venn and Berg 2013). For example, business participants might address poverty in terms of lacking consumption capacity, so raising spending power will be a primary concern. The private sector usually enters CSSPs with a profit seeking mindset. Evidence shows that commercial goals of the private sector partner in PPDPs outrun social motives by far (Jenkins and Ishikawa 2010). However, companies regularly complain about too little acceptance of their commercial intentions (Kolk et al. 2008). "Selling out the poor" has become a common accusation over the last years (Karnani 2007; Mittal and Wallach 2004). Ethical concerns are widespread among the public and civil sectors (Davidson 2009). If mindsets and organizational goals diverge, one might wonder about consequences. We have seen that CSSPs strive for cocreated innovation, which demands open and transparent knowledge exchange (Krämer and Belz 2008; London and Hart 2004). Evaluating the impact of goal conflicts (input) on knowledge exchange (output) requires careful consideration of social exchange processes (throughput). Blau (1964) argues that social exchange mechanisms regulate the interaction between partners by establishment of friendly bonds as well as superordination. This makes trust and

power vital factors in social exchange and salient issues in CSSPs (Selsky and Parker 2010). Therefore, we consider them as mediating variables in collaboration.

### *Trust in Cross-sector Collaboration*

"Partnerships for development unfold in an uncertain, complex and often distant setting, where good governance is frequently lacking ... thus requiring an even greater degree of trust" (Kolk et al. 2008, p. 14). Trust builds up slowly and incrementally through repeated interactions, and breaks down rapidly when betrayed (Mayer et al. 1995). Trust can be defined as an "expectation that things or people will not fail us ... even if there are opportunities and incentives for it" (Nooteboom 2002, pp. 48–49). If terms of exchange between participants are known and guaranteed, little trust is needed (Molm et al. 2000). Trust gains importance with uncertainty. Experiments show that trust is more significant under reciprocal exchange conditions than in negotiated ones (Molm et al. 2000). Generalized and coproductive exchange processes entail even greater uncertainty. Consequently, the need for trust increases along the collaborative continuum (see Table 1).

Table 1: Social exchange patterns at different stages of cross-sector social partnerships.

<b>Partnership stage</b>	<b>Partnership purpose</b>	<b>Social exchange pattern</b>	<b>Trust &amp; Intensity of collaboration</b>
Conflict resolution	Overcoming differences	Negotiated exchange	Low
Philanthropy	Charity & publicity	Reciprocal exchange	
Transactional orientation	Stakeholder management & Capacity building	Generalized exchange	Medium
Integrative orientation	Co-creation of innovative solutions to mutual problems	Co-productive exchange	High

The lack of trust is a major concern in CSSPs at the BoP (Gardetti 2007; Rivera-Santos et al. 2012). Gulati (1995) phrased that "familiarity breeds trust." If participants share background assumption and experiences, trust develops more quickly (Lane and Bachmann 1996). This is an important notion as some participants of CSSPs have been labeled as "traditional enemies" (Plante and Bendell 2000). In particular, companies and NGOs have encountered each other with hostility in the past (Crane 2000; Rondinelli and London 2003). For-profit and not-for-profit mindsets can collide heavily in CSSPs (Dahan et al. 2010; Yaziji and Doh 2009).

Conflicting goals can easily become a source of suspicion (Elkington and Fennell 2000; Roloff 2008). Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows (see path  $\gamma_{21}$  in Figure 2):

*Hypothesis<sub>1a</sub>:* *The higher the level of goal conflicts between participants in CSSPs, the lower the level of trust.*

Research into strategic alliances has shown that trust is crucial for interorganizational knowledge exchange (Dodgson 1993; Muthusamy and White 2005; Nooteboom 2000). It enhances efficiency of collaboration (Dyer and Chu 2003) and increases alliance performance (Krishnan and Noorderhaven 2006). However, trust might play an even stronger role in CSSPs at the BoP. The legal and institutional environment is notoriously weak, as governance cannot be ensured by contractual arrangements. Trust is often the only governance mechanism available in developing countries (Nooteboom 2007). Companies need to gain the trust of local partners to ensure their business operations (Reficco and Marquez 2009). Furthermore, cocreation requires direct interaction in slums and rural sites together with poor people in their most personal environment. Exchanging tacit and socially embedded knowledge requires strong trust between participants (Becerra et al. 2008). For example, the Dutch-based multinational Royal Philips Electronics N.V. initiated a bottom-up cocreation process in rural India. As a result, the award-winning Chula woodstove was created (Rocchi and Kusume 2008). Consumers benefit from lower energy consumption and drastically reduced indoor air pollution. In addition, the initiative provides opportunities for income generation and local entrepreneurship. However, the design team needed to gain access to the kitchen and co-create the stove together with the poor in distant rural sites. As the kitchen is the innermost part of the Indian home, strangers are not usually allowed to enter. Developing trust between designers and the poor became a key enabler for cocreated innovation (Venn and Berg 2013). Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows (path  $\beta_{12}$  in Figure 2):

*Hypothesis<sub>1b</sub>:* *The higher the level of trust between participants in CSSPs, the higher the level of knowledge exchange.*

### *Power in Cross-sector Collaboration*

In social exchange theory, power "is the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment" (Blau 1964, p. 117). Asymmetric possession of strategic resources and lack of alternative supply or substitutes cause unilateral dependence (Blau 1964; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Power imbalances are likely to occur (Babiak and Thibault 2009; Stadtler 2011) because CSSPs are regularly framed by asymmetrical resource positions (Murphy and Coleman 2000). For example, NGOs often depend on financial support by companies they collaborate with (Arenas et al. 2009). However, we need to distinguish between power as a structural potential and the actual use of power (Molm et al. 1999). Even if the structural potential exists, participants do not necessarily use their power. Therefore, we focus on attempts to exploit power. Furthermore, Prahalad (2005) highlighted that market intermediaries often exploit BoP consumers. Tragically, the poor are often forced to pay a premium for goods and services (Mendoza 2011). Reduction of these market inefficiencies is central in most BoP business models. Nevertheless, literature underestimates resistance to societal change. Stakeholders might fear the loss of status or public embarrassment because partnerships change existing community structures or force participants to admit failure to provide public services to the poor (cf. Roy and Hartigan 2008). In the presence of goal conflicts, it is likely that participants try to use power asymmetries to manipulate partnership agendas to achieve more favorable outputs. Our hypothesis is as follows (see path  $\gamma_{31}$  in Figure 2):

*Hypothesis 2a: The higher the level of goal conflicts between participants in cross-sector partnerships, the higher the level of executed power.*

However, the relationship between confrontational interaction and outcomes of CSSPs is not straightforward (cf. Van Huijstee and Glasbergen 2010). On one hand, theory implies the possibility that powerful participants could actually force partners to disclose valuable knowledge. On the other hand, arm-length interaction could foster win–lose situations. This strongly opposes CSSP literature, because in theory, sectors solve shared problems (Waddock 1988) in a coproductive manner to create mutual value (Austin 2000a; Waddell 2000). Aggressive power play does not follow this logic, so one could expect a negative

impact on partnership performance. Our experience from many discussions with practitioners favors the latter scenario. A CEO explained, "The development agency is a big organization rigorously following their protocols ... they forced us to adapt to procedures ... we always stayed in the boundaries of what was accepted by them ... we were never really informed." This indicates adverse effects of executed power. If powerful participants try to force partners, these might not be willing to disclose any valuable knowledge at all. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows (see path  $\beta_{13}$  in Figure 2):

*Hypothesis 2b:* *The higher the level of executed power between participants in cross-sector partnerships, the lower the level of knowledge exchange.*

We carefully developed a research model that captures the relationships between goal conflicts, trust, executed power, and knowledge transfer. However, Das and Teng (1998) argue that trust evolves from patterns of risk taking. Vulnerability and the risk of betrayal are vital elements of trust (Zaheer et al. 1998). This clearly underscores the importance of sustained fairness in relationships (Ring et al. 1992). As trust builds up through interpretation of relational signals in repeated interaction (Six 2003), it is strongly determined by perceptions of behavior (Gulati 1995; Mayer et al. 1995). This line of thinking follows the logic that "trust must be earned by action" (Austin 2000b, p. 48). Execution of power would rather contradict the notion of an "integrative" and equal partnership. Aggressive bargaining can be expected to negatively impact trust between participants (Molm et al. 2000). Thus, we additionally hypothesize (see path  $\beta_{23}$  in Figure 2):

*Hypothesis 3:* *The higher the level of executed power between participants in cross-sector partnerships, the lower the level of trust.*

## **Methodology**

### *Data Collection*

In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey (see Table 2 for sample description) among private sector participants in CSSPs which come from the German-speaking region of Europe (Austria, Germany, and Switzerland). This has several methodological advantages.

Firstly, these countries share one language and are culturally closely related, which allow using a standardized survey questionnaire. Secondly, basic partnership parameters are comparable in all three countries. The ADA, the German development agencies (GIZ, Sequa, and DEGinvest), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation have launched very similar PPDP programs. All partnerships are jointly financed, developed, and implemented by Development Corporation and resident companies. They all apply the logic of the BoP approach, namely that sustainable development and commercial interest can complement each other. All partnerships target the poor and involved multistakeholder interaction in developing countries (cf. ADA 2012; BMZ 2012; SDC, 2009). Thirdly, Austrian, German, and Swiss Development Corporation follow rigorous publication standards, which enabled us to identify 254 partnerships via publications and public databases.

Table 2: Survey sample description

<b>Hub description (n=85)</b>					
Number of employees	Count (Percent)	Turnover in Million Euros	Count (Percent)	Industry Cluster	Count (Percent)
< 50	44 (51.8)	< 1 Mio.	17 (20.0)	Agriculture, Food, Water	25 (29.4)
51 – 200	16 (18.8)	1 – 10 Mio.	29 (34.1)	Energy, Mining	10 (11.8)
201 – 1,000	11 (12.9)	11 – 100 Mio.	20 (23.5)	Construction, Engineering, Machinery	20 (23.5)
1,001 – 5,000	4 (4.7)	100 – 500 Mio.	8 (9.4)	Trade, Logistics, Services	10 (11.8)
> 5,000	9 (10.6)	> 500 – 2,000 Mio.	9 (10.6)	Education, Health Care, Science& Technology	17 (20.0)
Missing	1 (1.2)	Missing	2 (2.4)	Missing	3 (3.6)

<b>Spoke description (n=207)</b>		<b>Partnership description</b>			
Sector composition	Count (Percent)	Partnership length (months)	Count (Percent)	World region	Count (Percent)
Public sector	93 (44.9)	1 -6 months	4 (4.7)	Africa	28 (32.9)
Civil sector	73 (35.3)	7 – 12 months	2 (2.4)	South & East Asia	19 (22.3)
Private sector	29 (14.0)	13 – 24 months	28 (32.9)	Eastern Europe (incl. Balkans)	17 (20.0)
Missing	12 (5.8)	> 24 months	50 (58.8)	Latin America & Caribbean	17 (20.0)
		Missing	1 (1.2)	Multiple regions	4 (4.7)

We used a key informant approach to collect our empirical data. We set two selection criteria. Firstly, to qualify as a key informant, recipients needed to participate personally in the PPDP. Secondly, key informants needed to have a sound understanding of the companies' general BoP strategy. The majority of identified key informants were top management executives (e.g., company owners, CEOs) or high-ranking project managers (e.g., CSR directors). The unit of analysis is the interorganizational relationship between the company and its partners. Through a hub-and-spoke approach, each key informant (hub) was asked to evaluate up to three participants (spokes) in the partnership. On average, each respondent evaluated 2.44 partner organizations. This survey design tripled the length of the

questionnaire and created a problem because lengthy surveys regularly suffer from low response rate. This holds especially when respondents are high up in an organization's hierarchy. Therefore, we limited the measurement to three items per latent variable which is a common consideration in SEM (Byrne 2001; Kline 1998). Questionnaire items (see Appendix Table A) were randomly ordered to prevent biased responses. Out of 254 companies, 85 participated in our survey, which translates into a sound response rate of 33.5%. After deletion of incomplete responses, the final data set spans  $n = 207$  interorganizational relationships.

### *Data Analysis*

This study makes use of SEM technique (SEM). Estimations were made with a maximum likelihood algorithm and carried out with the software package SPSS Amos 19.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). We meet rigorous SEM quality standard to ensure reliability and validity of our analysis. Prior to the general evaluation of our proposed model, we performed assessments of sample size, reliability, and normality and examined modification indices (MIs). Firstly, our sample exceeds a 5:1 ratio of sample size to the number of free parameters ( $n = 207$ ,  $n_{\text{required}} \geq 175$ ) which is recommended in literature (e.g. Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Next, we assessed the internal model structure. We computed factor reliability and average variance extracted manually following the standard procedures outlined by Fornell & Larcker (1981) and Bagozzi & Yi (1988). Table 3 documents the results of the internal fit assessment. Analyses show that indicator reliability for one item of goal conflicts (x3) and one item of executed power (y9) were below the commonly applied cut-off value  $\geq 0.4$  (Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994). Therefore, both items were excluded from further analysis. This minor refinement yielded a significant increase in reliability. All four factors meet the common cut-off values of factor reliability  $\geq 0.6$  (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988) and average variance extracted  $\geq 0.5$  (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

Furthermore, we evaluated the distribution of data. The assumption of normality underlies the analysis of co-variance structures in structural equation modeling and is mandatory for the maximum likelihood estimation applied in this study (see e.g. Byrne, 2001). However, "...in practice, most data fail to meet the assumption of multivariate normality..." (Byrne, 2001: p. 268). Findings point to some discrepancy from the multivariate normality assumption, which is no surprise, as the survey instrument made use of Likert scales (Byrne

2001; Kline 1998). We applied bootstrapping to correct this shortcoming (Bollen and Stine 1992; Efron 1981, 1985). "In bootstrapping, the sample is conceptualized as a pseudo-population that represents the broader population from which the sample was derived...using bootstrapping, no assumptions about the shape of the sampling distribution of the statistic are necessary when conducting inferential tests" (Preacher et al., 2007: p. 190). Bootstrapping thereby delivers insights on the stability of parameter estimates even if data is not multivariate normally distributed (Bollen & Stine, 1992, 1993; Byrne, 2001). Finally, we examined modification indices (M.I.) Freeing parameters with the largest helps to improve the model fit (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). However, model modification should be treated with caution and care in order to preserve the confirmatory character of structural equation modeling (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Inspection of modification indices did not suggest adjustments.

Table 3: Fit assessment of the internal structure (Values of the refined model in parentheses).

<b>Label</b>		<b>Reliability Analysis</b>		
Factor	Indicator	Indicator Reliability	Factor Reliability	Average Variance Extracted
Goal Conflicts	x1	.548 (.576)	.755 (.795)	.517 (.661)
	x2	.735 (.745)		
	x3	.267		
Knowledge Exchange	y1	.441 (.432)	.759 (.759)	.512 (.513)
	y2	.559 (.565)		
	y3	.537 (.541)		
Trust	y4	.568 (.573)	.753 (.755)	.504 (.508)
	y5	.463 (.475)		
	y6	.482 (.475)		
Power	y7	.608 (.620)	.658 (.757)	.423 (.609)
	y8	.631 (.598)		
	y9	.057		

$$\text{Indicator reliability: } \text{Rel}(x_i) = \frac{\lambda_{ij}^2 \Phi_{jj}}{\lambda_{ij}^2 \Phi_{jj} + \theta_{ii}} \quad \text{Standard cut-off} \geq 0.4 \text{ (Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994)}$$

$$\text{Factor (composite) reliability: } \text{Rel}(\xi_j) = \frac{(\sum \lambda_{ij})^2 \Phi_{jj}}{(\sum \lambda_{ij})^2 + \sum \theta_{ii}} \quad \text{Standard cut-off} \geq 0.6 \text{ (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988)}$$

$$\text{Average variance extracted: } \text{AVE}(\xi_j) = \frac{(\sum \lambda_{ij}^2) \Phi_{jj}}{(\sum \lambda_{ij}^2) + \sum \theta_{ii}} \quad \text{Standard cut-off} \geq 0.5 \text{ (Fornell & Larcker, 1981)}$$

$\lambda_{ij}$  = being the estimated factor loading

$\Phi_{jj}$  = being the variance of the latent variable  $\xi_j$

$\theta_{ii}$  = being the error variance (which equals  $1 - \lambda^2_{2ij}$  in case of standardized solutions)

## Results

This section presents the results of the SEM in two steps, namely, the assessment of the model fit and the results of the path modeling. Firstly, our model shows an excellent overall

fit. Chi-squared test statistics indicate fit with  $\chi^2 = 59.3$  (df = 30), Bollen-Stine  $p = 0.08$ , and a  $\chi^2/\text{df}$  ratio of 1.98. The comparative fit index (CFI) (0.97) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) estimates (0.95) meet rigorous cutoff criteria (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Moreover, results display a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) value of 0.07 with a significant 90% confidence interval (CI) ranging from 0.04 to 0.09 (p-close 0.11). Browne and Cudeck (1993) argue that RMSEA values close to 0.06 indicate an excellent fit, especially in combination with high CFI and TLI values (Hu and Bentler 1999). Combined findings show an excellent model fit.

### The gatekeeping function of trust in CSSPs




Figure 2: Structural equation model on the role of goal conflicts in CSSPs (n=207). CFI .97, TLI .95, RMSEA .07 (significance level of standardized regression weights indicated with \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ ).

Secondly, results of the path modeling confirm that goal conflict hampers trust (see  $\gamma_{21}$  in Figure 2). The standardized regressions weight of  $-0.69$  ( $p < 0.01$ ) documents a strong negative effect. Estimate robustness is supported by the bootstrapping procedure which displays significant bias corrected CIs excluding zero (see Appendix Table B and Figure A). Overall, we can conclude that evidence for a direct effect is given. The same holds for Hypothesis 1b. Path  $\beta_{12}$  displays a positive relationship between trust and knowledge exchange of 0.89 ( $p < 0.01$ ). Without trust, exchange of valuable knowledge will be hard to achieve in CSSPs. Figure 2 displays the crucial role of trust in cross-sector collaboration. As we see, the level of goal conflict negatively influences the level of trust which in turn determines knowledge exchange between participants in CSSPs.

Furthermore, we find support for Hypothesis 2a. The higher the level of goal conflicts between participants of cross-sector partnerships, the higher the level of power executed. Path  $\gamma_{31}$  displays a strongly significant impact ( $0.68, p < 0.01$ ). Results of the bootstrapping procedure confirm significant parameter estimates. The lower bound of the 90% bias-corrected CI is estimated at 0.62, whereas the upper bound is 0.73 ( $p < 0.01$ ). However, as we turn attention to the direct impact of executed power on CSSP performance, we do not see a significant relationship. The standardized regression weight for path  $\beta_{13}$  ( $-0.05, p = 0.69$ ) is not significant. Bootstrapping confirms this finding. The CI does not exclude zero (CI  $-0.16$  to  $0.08, p = 0.43$ ). Neither can participants of CSSPs force their partners to disclose valuable knowledge by exploiting power asymmetries, nor does arm-length behavior directly hamper knowledge exchange. We can state that Hypothesis 2b is not supported. Next to the mediation effect of trust and power, we hypothesized a negative relationship between both variables. Showing aggressive bargaining behavior should have consequences for trust in the relationship. Results indeed show a negative effect. Path  $\beta_{23}$  displays a standardized regressions weight of  $-0.30$  ( $p < 0.01$ ). If participants aggressively bargain to manipulate agendas in order to achieve favorable outputs, it has negative consequences for trust. This result supports Hypothesis 3. Furthermore, modeling this relationship adds indirect paths. Firstly, goal conflicts (path  $\gamma_{21}$ ) impact trust in two ways, namely direct ( $-0.69$ ) as well as indirect via power ( $-0.20$ ). Effects add up to a total negative effect of  $-0.89$  ( $p < 0.01$ ). Bootstrapping confirms significance of this finding. Secondly, executed power (path  $\beta_{13}$ ) did not affect knowledge exchange directly. However, findings show a significant indirect effect of  $-0.23$  (CI  $-0.37$  to  $-0.16, p < 0.01$ ). Exerting power indirectly impacts knowledge exchange via trust (see Appendix Table B for effect decomposition). This result shows that exploitation of power asymmetries is still an important factor to consider while discussing the impact of goal conflicts on performance.

## **Discussion**

Poverty-related CSSPs usually evolve into greater networks, even if bipartite PPDP arrangements build a starting point. These partnerships entail a variety of participants from all three sectors. The Marap example outlined collaboration of very unconventional partners such as companies, development corporation, NGOs, local authorities, community groups, and poor farmers. This extreme heterogeneity is a double-edged sword. On one hand,

organizations from different sectors possess complementary resources and competencies, which, in theory, provide a fertile ground for cocreating groundbreaking innovations. On the other hand, agendas and organizational goals vary a great deal. Practitioners become increasingly frustrated by collaborative challenges and notoriously poor performance (Bäckstrand 2006; Karamchandani et al. 2011). This study uses sophisticated statistical techniques to unravel collaboration in poverty-related partnerships. SEM provides a powerful statistical toolkit. Its confirmatory character requires a careful modeling based on solid theoretical ground. We apply social exchange theory (Blau 1964) which has been outlined as a valuable analytical framework to explore collaborative alliances (Gray and Wood 1991; Kolk et al. 2010; Muthusamy and White 2005). Firstly, we match existing literature on partnership stages and social exchange patterns. This offers a novel perspective on collaboration in CSSPs. We show that coproductive partnerships encompass highly complex exchange patterns. Secondly, we outline the importance of trust and power in exchange. The demand for trust in CSSPs increases along the collaborative continuum. Poverty-related partnerships at the BoP demand a high level of trust. This is strongly supported by empirical evidence of this study. Findings show that goal conflicts can become a source of suspicion, which is in line with conceptual works and case study research (e.g., Dahan et al. 2010; Roloff 2008). In addition, we show consequences for partnership performance. Our empirical evaluation reveals a significant effect of trust on knowledge exchange, which is in line with strategic alliance literature (e.g., Khanna et al. 1998; Krishnan and Noorderhaven 2006). The weak institutional context at the BoP makes it difficult to rely on contractual arrangements. Trust is often the only alternative in developing countries (Nooteboom 2007). Our evidence outlines trust as an important governance mechanism in CSSPs.

Empirical results confirm our theoretical considerations that goal conflicts trigger exploitation of power asymmetries in CSSPs. However, no significant relationship between power and knowledge exchange exists. This comes to a surprise for two reasons. Firstly, we argued that rude and aggressive bargaining would have adverse effects on partnership performance because it opposes the mutual value creation logic implied by literature. However, our results do not provide any evidence for that. Secondly, one might alternatively argue that powerful participants could force others to exchange benefits. From a theoretical standpoint, this would be possible if resource dependencies exist. However, our data does

not provide evidence for any of these assumptions and require an alternative explanation. We argue that resource complementarity creates an equilibrium state in CSSPs. Asymmetric possession of resources leads to a situation of counterbalanced power positions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). For example, an NGO might depend on research and development capacity of a company to solve poverty issues. However, the company might equally depend on the NGO's market knowledge to develop a BoP-specific product. If the company tries to force the NGO by withholding its R&D capacity, the NGO might react by concealing its market knowledge and foster a deadlock. We know that cross-sector social interaction tends to be a lengthy and difficult process (Bäckstrand 2006) which requires patience and long-term commitment (Ansari et al. 2012; Kennedy and Novogratz 2011). Case study research outlines "a time consuming learning process between partners in which progress is counted in years not in months" (Venn and Berg 2013, pp. 113–114).

Counterbalanced power positions provide a logical explanation for our empirical results, but we hypothesized a negative effect based on the mutual value creation proposition stated in literature. Exploitation of power would rather contradict an integrative attitude of participants in CSSPs. Although evidence for a direct effect is absent, our data outline a significant indirect effect. Attempts to exploit power asymmetries might be counterbalanced, but they seriously damage trust between partners. This is because trust evolves from interpretation of relational signals (Six 2007). If partners get caught in aggressive power play, trust will vanish. Eventually, partnership performance suffers. Our empirical analysis underscores the notion that CSSPs require a very different mindset than traditional business relationships. For example, bargaining with suppliers is a daily business for the private sector. It is quite likely that success will be associated with tough bargaining rather than careful development of trust. "It is redundant at best and can be misleading to use the term 'trust' to describe commercial exchange" (Williamson 1993, p. 463). Our study shows that collaboration in CSSPs requires a considerable deviation from transactional logics. Trust has a gatekeeping function in poverty-related partnerships. In an equilibrium state of power, trust determines exchange of valuable knowledge. Arm's length behavior causes breakdowns of trust which significantly hamper partnership performance. Developing trust and other forms of social capital requires long-term commitments at the BoP (Ansari et al. 2012; Davies and Ryals 2010). BoP research is still in its infancy. We urgently need a sound discussion on

how to establish trust. From a strategic alliance literature, we know that intermediaries can prevent trust breakdowns (Nooteboom 2002). They mitigate goal conflicts and suppress aggressive bargaining so they act as "translators between world views" (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010a, p. 63). We see two general opportunities to establish intermediaries, namely at organizational as well as individual level. Firstly, specialized organizations could act as intermediates in CSSPs. Over the last few years, several institutions have emerged around poverty alleviation and sustainable development issues, for example, BoP learning labs at universities (e.g., Cornell University), private consultancies (e.g., Endeva in Berlin), as well as nonprofit organizations (e.g., the Dutch BoP Innovation Center). These institutions can link unconventional partners. Due to their accumulating experience in poverty-related partnerships, they can manage expectations and develop a shared understanding of goals and expected outcomes. Most importantly, they can intervene in power play and facilitate the development of trust. Companies, NGOs, and public sector participants should seek partnerships with these institutions. Secondly, we argue that a successful collaboration within CSSPs needs enthusiastic individuals who can act as intermediates. However, this is an underdeveloped and underresearched area (Kolk et al. 2010). First, studies point out that individuals face tremendous organizational hurdles (McFalls 2007; Olsen and Boxenbaum 2009). They easily get caught between objectives of their own organization and those of collaborating partners (Kistruck and Beamish 2010). Nevertheless, they demonstrate enormous creativity and entrepreneurial spirit in solving obstacles (Halme et al. 2012). These individuals understand the need for holistic benefit management beyond their own organization (Venn and Berg 2013), which bridges diverging mindsets and spans boundaries. Practitioners and scholars increasingly label these individuals as "social intrapreneurs." We believe that social intrapreneurs act more as intermediates rather than exclusive agents of their organization. They maneuver in a grey zone where organizational boundaries become permeable. As intermediates, they establish trust and facilitate mutual knowledge exchange. Social intrapreneurs personify the fuzzy front end of cocreated innovation. We strongly encourage future research to explore the intermediating role of social intrapreneurs in CSSPs.

## **Limitation, Contribution and Implications for Future Research**

In the past, collaboration in poverty-related partnerships was treated as a black box. This study unravels collaboration by means of quantitative empirical analyses. Literature advises applying a process-based view in CSSP research (Kolk et al. 2008; Seitanidi and Ryan 2007). We focus on direct collaboration outputs (Kolk et al. 2008) rather than wider societal impact (outcome) at the BoP (e.g., see London 2009). Our empirical analysis documents a major dilemma in CSSPs. On one hand, heterogeneity is deliberately sought as it enlarges the innovative potential. On the other hand, partnership performance suffers when mindsets and goals collide. This study contributes to our understanding of collaboration in CSSPs by considering trust and power issues. However, this may raise concerns about causal ambiguity. Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) outline that interorganizational relationships can be defined as a series of social exchanges (relationship as transaction) as well as an interpersonal attachment resulting from social exchanges (relationship as attachment). Whereas the latter treats trust as an outcome (cf. Molm et al. 2000), the former frames it as a precondition (cf. Muthusamy and White 2005). The pitfall of trust being outcome at one stage and input at another indicates that relationship development is dynamic (Selsky and Parker 2010). Therefore, results depend on the researched sequence (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). This limits our study because we make use of cross-sectional data. We addressed this problem in three ways. Firstly, we model power and trust as mediators of collaboration (throughput). This captures some of the dynamics in partnerships, so we circumvent limitations which arise, if one uses trust and power either as input or output variables. Secondly, we base our analysis on established theoretical concepts. Literature outlines social exchange theory as a valuable framework to analyze collaboration in CSSPs (Gray and Wood 1991; Kolk et al. 2010; Muthusamy and White 2005). Variable identification and SEM are both grounded on theory. Thirdly, validity further increases if insights from explorative research are considered. We discussed previous (field) observations and case study analyses. These outline the importance of trust (Rivera-Santos et al. 2012) and power in collaboration (Stadtler 2011). Our model connects the missing dots between heterogeneous goals, collaboration, and partnership performance, which are issues that bother practitioners today but have not been researched at a broader level (Karamchandani et al. 2011). This study provides insights about 207 interorganizational relationships. Empirical evidence confirms theoretical consideration and practitioners' observations;

nevertheless, we encourage future research to conduct longitudinal studies to explore dynamics of trust and power in CSSPs.

In the past, BoP research struggled to deliver quantitative evaluations. Our study represents a rare attempt to explore success and failure in CSSPs with quantitative statistical tools. However, quantitative research is not without its limitations. Firstly, we limited our survey to German-speaking countries of Europe. We chose these countries to enable us to create a homogenous database to administer our survey. However, data may have some sort of country bias. Future research should investigate similarities and differences to other PPDP programs (e.g., in Sweden [SIDA 2013] or in the USA [USAID 2012]) and look into differences between projects (e.g., if projects that bring water to rural communities differ from ones that educate girls in terms of power and trust characteristics). Secondly, we collected data from key informants in companies who have firsthand knowledge about the CSSP. This holds another limitation as findings are influenced by the key informant's perception. Our results capture the private sector's perspective on CSSPs' relationships. Future research should use dyadic and network data to explore CSSPs in greater depth.

This study contributes to CSSP and BoP research. We address issues of power and trust which have been outlined as important issues of collaboration (Pitta et al. 2008). "There are many examples of failed corporate-NGO partnerships where strategic integration and resource complementarity brought the two parties together, but which were doomed by fundamental differences in organizational culture and a lack of basic trust" (Dahan et al. 2010, p. 336). The confirmatory character of SEM allows us to move beyond case-based insights and conceptual considerations. We have discussed the gatekeeping function of trust and outlined the vital role of intermediates. Intermediates can bridge and buffer differences between participants. We strongly encourage future research to fully explore the facilitating role of intermediates in CSSPs.

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## Appendix

Table A: Item description (Original questionnaire in German).

Factor	Label	Item
Goal	x1	Sometimes there was a conflict of interests between us and this partner.
Conflicts	x2	Collaboration with this partner was somehow difficult due to differences in strategic objectives.
	x3	This partner has the same objectives as we have.*
Knowledge Exchange	y1	This partner was sometimes reluctant to disclose his knowledge.*
	y2	Transparency with respect to knowledge exchange was low during the collaboration with this partner.*
	y3	Overall, there was a high degree of transparent knowledge exchange in collaboration with this partner.
Trust	y4	This partner always keeps his promises.
	y5	This partner cannot be trusted.*
	y6	We have no trust in the expertise of this partner.*
Power	y7	To keep collaboration going with this partner, we sometimes had to make use of our power position.
	y8	Collaboration with this partner sometimes became a strong power-play.
	y9	We had a strong position with respect to bargaining power over this partner.*

\*reverse coded

## Structural Equation Model of Trust in CSSPs




Figure A: Research model linking goal conflicts to trust, executed power, and knowledge exchange in CSSPs at the BoP.

Table B: SEM findings on the impact of goal conflicts in cross-sector partnerships (n=207).

Analysis	Label	Maximum Likelihood Estimation				Bootstrapping Procedure		
		Parameter (standardized)	SE	CR	p-value	90% C.I. bias corrected for standardized parameters		p-value
<b>Factor loadings</b>								
	$\lambda_1$	.834	(.759)	.074	11.330	.000	.727	.788
	$\lambda_2$	1.000	(.863)				.826	.897
	$\lambda_4$	.915	(.736)	.092	9.981	.000	.695	.771
	$\lambda_5$	1.000	(.752)				.711	.790
	$\lambda_6$	.974	(.657)	.109	8.907	.000	.610	.698
	$\lambda_7$	1.048	(.689)	.108	9.688	.000	.652	.720
	$\lambda_8$	.851	(.690)	.088	9.690	.000	.651	.728
	$\lambda_9$	1.000	(.757)				.722	.788
	$\lambda_{10}$	1.107	(.773)	.121	9.121	.000	.731	.817
	$\lambda_{11}$	1.000	(.788)				.734	.837
<b>Path coefficients</b>								
	$\gamma_{21}$	-.513	(-.685)	.089	-5.990	.000	-.790	-.599
	$\beta_{12}$	.888	(.887)	.147	6.050	.000	.788	.988
	$\gamma_{31}$	.585	(.679)	.078	7.458	.000	.622	.729
	$\beta_{13}$	-.046	(-.053)	.115	-.402	.688	-.163	.075
	$\beta_{23}$	-.259	(-.299)	.092	-2.804	.005	-.392	-.191
<b>Effect decomposition</b>								
	$\gamma_{21}$ Indirect	-.152	(-.203)				-.265	-.134
	$\gamma_{21}$ Total	-.665	(-.888)				-.929	-.849
	$\beta_{13}$ Indirect	-.230	(-.265)				-.373	-.158
	$\beta_{13}$ Total	-.277	(-.318)				-.407	-.218

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### **Essay [4]**

"Building competitive advantage through Social Intrapreneurship"

*Venn, Ronald und Berg, Nicola*

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# **Building competitive advantage through Social Intrapreneurship**

*Ronald Venn and Nicola Berg*

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## **Abstract**

**Purpose** – The paper offers a novel perspective on “deep benefit management” in inclusive business ventures at the Base-of-the-Pyramid (BoP). Furthermore, it explores tensions between social impact creation and financial objectives in multinational corporations (MNCs).

**Design/methodology/approach** – The paper opts for an exploratory research design using empirical data, including an expert interview survey and expert discussions. Data is supplemented by documentary analysis, including corporate publications as well as case and impact studies. The paper applies a nested cross-case comparison of three sustainability driven initiatives of PHILIPS Electronics.

**Findings** – The paper provides empirical insights on value creation for customers and partners. Findings indicate the need for “external benefit management”. In addition, MNCs can gain financial as well as non-financial benefits by venturing at the BoP. “Internal benefit management” should consider employee engagement, reputation, and partnering capabilities. Nevertheless, results indicate conflicts between social and financial objectives to which employees respond with “social intrapreneurship”.

**Research limitations/implications** – Due to the research methodology, results may not be generalized. Future research is encouraged to corroborate findings.

**Practical implications** – The paper develops deep benefit management as a powerful tool to plan, manage, and assess value creation in inclusive BoP ventures. Further, the paper proposes to establish protective space in MNCs to capitalize on social intrapreneurship.

**Originality/value** – This study provides an enhanced understanding of benefits of and barriers for inclusive business. Novel insights on social intrapreneurship are provided additionally.

**Keywords** – Base-of-the-Pyramid, Inclusive business, Deep benefit management, Social intrapreneurship, Organizational barriers, Sustainable innovation

**Paper type** – Research paper

## **1. Inclusive ventures at the base-of-the-pyramid**

**M**ultinational corporations (MNCs) increasingly search for new growth opportunities in developing and emerging economies (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). Low-income market segments at the "base-of-the-pyramid" (BoP) (Hart and Christensen, 2002; Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; Prahalad and Hart, 2002) have been vastly overlooked in the past (Prahalad, 2005; Weiser et al., 2006). Accumulated income of the poorest four billion people constitute a US\$5 trillion market (see Hammond et al., 2007). Thus, BoP became a buzz word in management literature (Hart, 2007). MNCs try to make poverty business (Wilson and Wilson, 2006) thereby providing a corporate solution to poverty (Lodge and Wilson, 2006). However, many MNCs struggled to establish profitable businesses (e.g. London and Hart, 2004).

Additionally, critics raise concerns about social (Karnani, 2007, 2008; Mittal and Wallach, 2004) and ecological sustainability of BoP ventures (Wijen, 2008). Ethical dilemmas for companies are multifold (Davidson, 2009). Recently, literature calls for more "inclusive business" that combines consumption, income generation and ecological sustainability (Arora and Romijn, 2009; SNV & WBCSD, 2008; UNDP, 2008). Co-creation of business models (Simanis and Hart, 2006, 2008, 2009) and market development (London and Hart, 2011a; Seelos and Mair, 2007) require collaboration across sector boundaries (Kolk and Tulder, 2006; Valente and Crane, 2010). Next generation strategies (London and Hart, 2011b) depend on cross-sectorpartnerships which are supported with patient capital and long-term commitment (Karamchandani et al., 2011; Kennedy and Novogratz, 2011).

This creates a major dilemma. On the one hand, BoP ventures need to move beyond philanthropy to create scale and impact (Kasper and Fulton, 2006; Lodge and Wilson, 2006; Wilson and Wilson, 2006). On the other hand, sustainability often collides with traditional commercial objectives (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Seelos and Mair (2007) predict that strategic decision makers will have a hard time to justifying BoP investments due to the lack of short-term returns. Serious resource constraints are very likely. Today, we know little

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about organizational barriers (Olsen and Boxenbaum, 2009) and how they hamper success (Halme et al., 2012). Safeguards to cope with internal tension are also unknown. We argue that MNCs should consider a broader scope of benefits in strategic decision making, so that funding can be secured and the momentum of pro-poor engagement sustained. Theory and practice urgently need a more holistic understanding of these benefits.


The aim of this study is to explore how MNCs can capitalize on a broader scope of beneficial effects derived from venturing at the BoP. This involves identification of benefits as well as success barriers. We draw on Gollakota et al.'s (2010) notion of "deep benefit management" to discuss potential benefits. Our empirical analysis delivers novel insights into "internal and external benefit management" and "organizational barriers." We use data from three South Asian BoP ventures by Royal Philips Electronics N.V. (abbreviated to Philips). We present evidence for non-financial benefits such as reputation, employee engagement and partnering capabilities. Furthermore, we document various organizational barriers. Findings reveal that BoP venture managers respond to internal tensions with socially oriented entrepreneurial activities. We label this emerging phenomenon "social intrapreneurship." We present managerial implications and call for protective space in MNCs. Our study contributes to the research fields of BoP, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and cross-sector social partnerships. The paper is laid out as follows. Next we derive a preliminary research framework from a review of literature. This is followed by a discussion of data collection, analysis and empirical findings. We conclude with limitations and future directions for research.

## **2. Theoretical background**

### *2.1 Poverty and growth opportunities in South Asia*

In South Asia tremendous growth opportunities and challenges of poverty co-exist (Khilji, 2012). Although the recent financial crisis took its toll, South Asia recovered at breathtaking speed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects GDP growth for 2013, e.g. Bangladesh 6.4 percent, India 7.3 percent or Sri Lanka 6.8 percent (IMF, 2012). Nevertheless, about 1.4 billion South Asians still live at the BoP (see Figure 1). BoP can be defined as a demographic group of people earning US\$ 3,260 (at PPP) per year (Hammond et al., 2007). It consists of several sub-segments. Poverty is widespread, especially in India (see Figure 1). One-third of

its population suffers from "extreme poverty" by living on US\$1.25 a day (World Bank, 2012). The BoP approach encourages companies to bridge this divide (Prahalad, 2002). Over the last decade, research significantly enhanced our understanding of poor consumers and ways companies can bring prosperity to the BoP (for a review see Follman, 2012).



## 2.2 Organizational success barriers for BoP ventures

Regularly, MNCs have little market information and even hold invalid assumptions about the poor (Milstein et al., 2007; Pitta et al., 2008; Reficco and Marquez, 2009). "The BoP is so radically different that companies will have to ignore what they know as truths" (Pitta et al., 2008, p. 397). New capabilities are needed (Hart and Sharma, 2004; London and Hart, 2004) to rethink existing cost structures and value propositions (Prahalad, 2005). This constitutes a major barrier to develop successful BoP ventures. For example, multinational cement company CEMEX created an innovative BoP ventures called "Patrimonio Hoy" in Mexico. It received lot of international recognition, e.g. United Nations' Habitat Business Award (Cemex, 2012). The venture improves poor housing conditions in Mexican slums (Segel et al., 2007). London (2011) describes that initial attempts of product adaptation were little successful. CEMEX boldly issued a "declaration of ignorance" after realizing lack of market insight (Hart, 2007, p. 146). Subsequently, managers were encouraged to personally explore living conditions in Mexican slums. Thereby CEMEX gained in-depth insights into lifestyles and true customer needs. Clearly, companies need to engage in a deep dialog with various stakeholders (Simanis and Hart, 2008, 2009). However, capturing tacit knowledge of the poor

(Krämer and Belz, 2008) and collaboration with NGOs or public sector actors (Kolk and Tulder, 2006; Kolk et al., 2008) is a lengthy and difficult process (Bäckstrand, 2006; Venn and Berg, 2012). Time constraints become major success barriers (McFalls, 2007) when MNCs are locked into short-term value capturing practices (Simanis and Hart, 2009).


Pitta et al. (2008) identify two motives to engage at the BoP. Contribution to poverty alleviation and turning vast accumulated purchasing power into profits. This indicates existence of two distinct benefit categories, namely external benefits (for stakeholders) as well as internal benefits (for the company). The profit seeking mindset often prevails (Olsen and Boxenbaum, 2009). Financial outcomes, such as profit, sales and customer growth are MNCs' most important drivers (Jenkins and Ishikawa, 2010). Jenkins and Ishikawa (2010) present evidence that social motives were present in less than 45 percent of the analyzed public-private partnerships between MNCs and International Finance Corporation (IFC). Nevertheless, literature advocates that "the firm must integrate all the principles of CSR along with its business planning for the BoP if it is to be truly successful" (Davidson, 2009, p. 31). Merging social, ecological and commercial objectives in profit-driven organizations is extremely challenging (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Olsen and Boxenbaum, 2009). The clashing mindsets "trade-off vs. win-win" (Olsen and Boxenbaum, 2009, p. 109) cause internal friction (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Contrary to the common assumption, BoP ventures might not be equipped with vast resources and competencies MNCs regularly possess (Halme et al., 2012). Restrictions in funding, manpower or research and development (R&D) capacity might exist or emerge over time when BoP ventures get blamed for delayed cash flows (Seelos and Mair, 2007). Recent empirical insights from Nokia and ABB outline resource constraints as a serious organizational barrier (Halme et al., 2012). Despite this evidence, we know little about ways to mitigate internal tension.

Only few BoP ventures achieved social, ecological and commercial sustainability in the past (Pitta et al., 2008; Simanis, 2011). Many MNCs host BoP ventures under their CSR umbrella to pursue motives such as poverty alleviation and sustainable development. For example, Procter & Gamble (P&G) invented a pioneering water purifier system "PUR" which can tremendously improve living conditions of the poor. After fruitless efforts to achieve commercial sustainability in various parts of the developing world (e.g. India and Pakistan),

P&G is now promoting it as a successful CSR initiative (Baddache, 2007). Surely, philanthropic intentions can justify unprofitable investments, but do not necessarily guarantee long-term commitment (Wilson and Wilson, 2006). "Having no way to quantify the benefit of these investments puts such CSR programs on shaky ground, liable to be dislodged by a change of management or swing in business cycle" (Porter and Kramer, 2006, p. 7). We argue that purely philanthropic initiatives inherently contradict the underlying logic of the BoP approach. Poverty alleviation can only gain sufficient scale if the self-sustaining forces of profitability and growth are used. Consequently, BoP ventures should "go beyond philanthropy" (Kasper and Fulton, 2006). However, sustaining commitment without meeting traditional financial targets will be difficult. Therefore, we urgently need a more holistic understanding of various benefits that accrue.

### *2.3 Deep benefit management*

Gollakota et al. (2010) introduced the notion of "deep benefit management" which provides an excellent starting point for our study. Deep benefit management helps MNCs to identify and manage beneficial impact of BoP ventures. Thereby strategic decision makers can draw on a broad scope of advantages to justify long-term commitment to BoP ventures. We distinguish two dimensions, namely "external and internal benefit management" (see Figure 2). Whereas the former outlines beneficial impacts for external stakeholders, the latter evaluates benefits for the corporation. The following section will build a preliminary framework to guide our empirical investigation.



### *2.3.1 External benefit management*

The aim of this study is to explore beneficial effects derived from venturing at the BoP. We use BoP and CSR literature to build a preliminary research framework. Literature regularly outlines beneficial impacts for "external" parties (Gollakota et al., 2010; London, 2009; SNV & WBCSD, 2008). We define external benefits as tangible and intangible beneficial impacts for external parties caused by inclusive BoP ventures of MNCs. Our review yields a useful distinction between customer and partner value creation. First, creation of customer value is an important issue of "deep benefit management" (Gollakota et al., 2010). Literature underscores that traditional feature-function sets are often inappropriate, as customer needs at the BoP can be very different to affluent markets (Gollakota et al., 2010; Prahalad and Hart, 2002). On the one hand, price-performance relationships must be altered radically (Anderson and Billou, 2007; Hammond and Prahalad, 2004). On the other hand, poor consumers require durable products of high quality (Prahalad, 2005). Clearly, if BoP customers spend the little money they have, true customer value must be delivered. Hence, external benefit management should consider "customer value" creation. Second, literature outlines the importance of inclusive value chains (Anderson and Billou, 2007; Gollakota et al., 2010), which calls for joint efforts of the public, private and civil sector (London, 2011; Rivera-Santos and Rufin, 2010a; Rivera-Santos et al., 2012). Cross-sector partnering "builds on the idea that each sector in society has core competences and resources that, if appropriately arranged, are complementary to one another" (Sullivan and Warner, 2004, p. 19). Complementary resources provide fertile grounds to co-create solutions not achievable by any partner alone (Waddock, 1988). However, mutual dependence provides sources for power and aggressive interaction (Venn and Berg, 2012). If actors do not follow the principle of shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2006), collaboration in partnerships for development (Reed and Reed, 2008) will be difficult (Bäckstrand, 2006; Karamchandani et al., 2011). Companies need an "integrative orientation" (Austin, 2000) that fosters mutual value creation (Waddell, 2000; Waddock, 1988). "Partner value" creation should be planned strategically and managed properly. Overall, "customer value" and "partner value" outline benefits for parties outside the company. Together they constitute "external benefit management," but benefits for the company remain unclear. We believe that deep benefit management can be enriched significantly by an internal dimension. "Internal benefit management" will enable more holistic performance evaluations.

### *3.2.2 Internal benefit management*

Existing theoretical frameworks outline external benefits for the poor as well as partners (e.g. Gollakota et al., 2010; London, 2009). We propose to supplement these frameworks with an internal dimension. "Internal benefit management" moves significantly beyond impact assessment for customers and partners. Thereby BoP venture performance can be evaluated in a holistic sense (SNV & WBCSD, 2008). BoP literature mainly advocates financial benefits and has remained relatively silent about non-financial ones. We define nonfinancial benefits as intangible beneficial impacts for a MNC engaged in inclusive business creation at the BoP. This captures effects closely linked to financial performance (e.g. brand value) as well as contributions to broader organizational objectives (e.g. employee retention). Since internal benefits are an uncharted terrain, we choose an explorative research approach. We use CSR literature to build a preliminary research framework. Our review identifies three potential non-financial benefits, namely increased reputation, employee capability and employee engagement. First, CSR is a strategic tool where benefits depend on communication rather than promotion (Lewis, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Polonsky and Jevons, 2009). Increased reputation can be influenced by CSR (Burke and Logsdon, 1996; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Parisi and Hockerts, 2008; Drews, 2010). Even philanthropy creates awareness on market level (SNV & WBCSD, 2008) and can accustom people to brands (Burke and Logsdon, 1996). Additionally, collaboration with a recognizable partner (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) can enhance reputation on a global scale (Lodge and Wilson, 2006; Wilson and Wilson, 2006). Engagement in poverty alleviation helps to demonstrate corporate citizenship (Dawkins and Lewis, 2003; Maio, 2003) which is essential to core business activities (Drews, 2010; Polonsky and Jevons, 2009). Thus, internal benefit management should consider enhanced "reputation." Second, employee capability enhancement is widely hypothesized in literature (Ansari et al., 2012; Turker, 2008; Wood, 2010). Especially employee volunteering schemes foster development of social networks, knowledge transfer and skill acquisition (Basil et al., 2008; Muthuri et al., 2009). Intercultural communication, collaboration and learning might be enhanced, since BoP initiatives often foster a deep stakeholder dialog (Hart, 2007; Simanis and Hart, 2008). Employees have opportunities to experiment with creative ways of knowledge transfer (Hart, 2007; Simanis and Hart, 2009). Hence, internal benefit management should consider improved "employee capabilities." Third, employee engagement is an important outcome of CSR activities (Wood, 2010). Participation in BoP

ventures might provide personal satisfaction by "doing good" (SNV & WBCSD, 2008). Especially employee volunteering claims beneficial impacts such as inner satisfaction, increased motivation and enhanced morale (Peterson, 2004; Basil et al., 2008; Muthuri et al., 2009; Fortune, 2010). Gilder et al. (2005) surveyed 625 employees of the Dutch ABN-AMRO bank and found positive effects even beyond involved participants. Parisi and Hockerts (2008) report increased operational efficiency driven by employee motivation, especially when CSR activities encourage employees' creativity and entrepreneurial action. Corporate citizenship will be enhanced, if BoP ventures apply a mutual value perspective. Impacts might reach beyond BoP ventures, e.g. through increased employer attractiveness (cf. Glavas and Piderit, 2009). Clearly, enhancement of "employee engagement" can constitute a valuable non-financial benefit. Financial benefits, reputation, employee capability and employee engagement build our preliminary conceptualization of internal benefit management. Based on our findings, employee capability enhancement can be described more accurate as increased "partnering capabilities" at individual (micro) and organizational (meso) level (see Figure 2).

### **3. Data collection and analysis**

#### *3.1 Selection of cases*

Exploring a broader scope of beneficial effects derived from venturing at the BoP involves identification of benefits as well as organizational success barriers. We choose an inductive approach for the purpose of theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989). Exploratory research can be used to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Eisenhardt (1989) pointed out that selection of cases should rely on theoretical considerations rather than statistical reasons. Exploring internal aspects demands an in-depth analysis of a single MNC.

A nested cross-case comparison enables investigation of multiple cases within one organization and enhances external validity (Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2009). This is ideal for the purpose of this study. Multiple cases could cover multiple strategic angles as MNCs launch BoP ventures with philanthropic as well as commercial intentions. We selected Philips as source of information, since it fits all of the above mentioned criteria. Philips started several BoP ventures in South Asia which makes cross-case comparison possible. Initiatives

cover philanthropic as well as commercial intentions. Initial activities started 2002, thereby covering the first ten years of BoP strategy evolvement (Follman, 2012).

### *3.2 Data analysis*

We follow Gibbert et al.'s (2008) framework to establish methodological rigor in explorative research. We have undertaken several steps to ensure validity and reliability. First, we derived an a priori research model explicitly from existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). This increases internal validity of investigation (Gibbert et al., 2008). Pattern matching is another action to ensure causal relation between variables and results (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Hence, we will compare our findings with previous research (Gibbert et al., 2008). Second, we establish construct validity in several ways. Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009) recommend triangulation of different sources of information. Data triangulation was addressed by collection of archival material, an expert interview inquiry and in-depth discussion with a corporate key informant over the period of one year. In total, ten experts from India and the Netherlands shared their insights. Semi-structured interviews were conducted via telephone-conference calls between February and April 2011. These took between 40 and 95 minutes. According to Gibbert et al. (2008) construct validity can be enhanced through reviews of transcripts and drafts by peers and key informants. Hence, we discussed findings in international academic workshops and received comments on earlier drafts by several interviewees. Third, external validity was increased by adequate case selection (Eisenhardt, 1989) and cross-case analysis (Yin, 1981, 2009). Therefore, we chose a nested approach (Yin, 1981, 2009). Finally, we addressed issues of reliability. We disclose the name of the selected organization (Gibbert et al., 2008). Furthermore, research notes and recordings were captured during the expert interview inquiry. Afterwards recordings were transferred into transcripts. Transcripts were coded in three steps. First we applied a manual "word-by-word" coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Afterwards we employed the software MAXQDA 10, which enables development of codes, categories as well as key word searches and auto-coding. Especially the multifaceted output options (e.g. graphical mapping) provide a powerful analytical toolkit. In a third step we compared both analyses to check for consistency. Overall, this strategy significantly enhanced reliability and robustness of findings.

### *3.3 Philips*

Philips is a Fortune 500 multi-national corporation headquartered in Amsterdam. South Asian markets offer significant opportunities for its consumer goods, lighting and health care divisions (Philips, 2007a). Philips employs about 119,000 people and achieves annual sales of 25.4 billion euros (Philips, 2011b). Philips is a member of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and supports the United Nations Global Compact (Philips, 2010a). The corporation has a long-standing reputation for addressing ecological sustainability (Philips, 2003; Seebode, 2011). Organizational measures, such as sustainability boards, support implementation of the sustainability strategy throughout the corporation (Kerr, 1998; Philips, 2003, 2005). In 2011 Philips invested 470 million euros (Philips, 2012) in "sustainable innovation" (Seebode et al., 2009, 2012). Philips ranks among the top ten in the Newsweek Environmental Ranking 2011. Furthermore, global supersector leadership of the Dow Jones sustainability index was achieved in 2011 and 2012 (SAM, 2011, 2012). Philips publishes its sustainability performance since 1999. Currently these reports comply with the most advanced GRI G3 reporting guidelines (Philips, 2011b). The first public announcement to target BoP markets date back to 2002 (Philips, 2003). All initiatives explicitly use sustainability as a driver to explore new business opportunities (Philips, 2004, 2005, 2006a). This study offers insights into three BoP ventures undertaken by Philips related to ecological sustainability. Cases were part of the "new sustainable business initiative" (NSBI) and the "Philanthropy by design" initiative (Philips, 2006a, 2011a).

First, Philips research invented a pioneering fan stove which reduces energy consumption up to 80 percent (Philips, 2006b). A battery powered fan generates a regulated airflow into an internal oven chamber which improves the fuel to air ratio of the burning process. As the stove heats up a thermoelectric generator takes over from the battery and recharges it. The stove gasifies wood and charcoal inside a portable container and burns the gas thereby leaving almost no residue (Philips, 2006c). Cooking temperature is reached in one-fifth of the time compared to traditional three-stone fires (Jetter and Kariher, 2009; Maccarty et al., 2008). The groundbreaking technology reduces smoke pollution up to 90 percent and organic volatile emission up to 99 percent (Philips, 2006b). Philips addresses the public health challenge of indoor air pollution which is estimated to cause two million deaths worldwide per year (Bruce et al., 2000; WHO, 2011). The fan stove was commercially piloted

in India by Philips Domestic Appliances and Personal Care division (Philips, 2006c). Full market launch was suspended after market trials. The BoP venture is currently under re-evaluation and might be re-launched in Africa and China. The venture is part of the NSBI (Philips, 2003, 2007b; Rocchi, 2006).

Second, Philips lighting developed a wide portfolio of solar-based off-grid lighting solutions (Philips, 2010b) and received the Leader of Change Award 2011 for its enduring commitment to sustainability. Today about 2.7 billion people have no access to electricity (WBCSD, 2012). Replacement of fuel-based lighting provides a US\$38 billion market, out of which India is currently the biggest (IFC, 2010; World Bank, 2007). Several products such as the high-quality solar lantern "Uday," were successfully rolled out in Indian and African markets (Philips, 2010a). The portable lanterns can be grid as well as solar charged. The battery holds overcharging and deep-discharge protection. The Uday solar lanterns are designed around robustness, long-life and affordability. Philips lighting is driven by social impact creation, ecological sustainability and alleviation of energy poverty. "Lack of clean energy is part of the poverty trap" (Hammond et al., 2007, p. 77) which has serious consequences for income generation, schooling and education, as well as overall well-being (Aron et al., 2009; Gradi and Knobloch, 2011). Clearly, "the relationship between energy and poverty is apparent and goes both ways" (Pachauri et al., 2004, p. 2093). The venture is part of the NSBI (Philips, 2003, 2007b; Rocchi, 2006).

Third, Philips design started a program that aims to create and deploy humanitarian propositions which address social and environmental issues (Philips, 2011a). Rather than giving money to worthy causes, the "Philanthropy by design" initiative donates expertise to projects targeting BoP communities. One of these projects was titled "Killer in the Kitchen" (Rocchi and Kusume, 2007, 2008b). It addresses toxic indoor air pollution and ecological unsustainable energy consumption at the BoP. The design team created the award-winning low-smoke "Chulha" woodstove. Production can be done locally by using a mold-set. The Chulha consists of concrete modular components which makes it less prone to damages and easier to transport. Heat flow is channeled via a bypass tunnel to cook more efficiently. A robust collector filters approximately 50 percent of the soot from the air before releasing it through a chimney outside the house. Thereby energy consumption and indoor air pollution

were reduced significantly (Philips, 2011a). Philips design does not hold any commercial intentions and allows free use of all intellectual property rights (Rocchi and Kusume, 2008a). The online platform [lowsmokechulha.com](http://lowsmokechulha.com) facilitates knowledge about the Chulha.

## 4. Findings

### 4.1 External benefit management

Customer value creation was explicitly addressed by all three initiatives. Especially time and cost savings (see Table I) next to drastically reduced exposure to toxic emission for burning fossil fuels were accomplished (Kandachar et al., 2009; Philips, 2006c, 2009; Rocchi and Kusume, 2008b). Technical studies show superiority of the fan stove technology. Today, it is one of the most advanced stoves regarding energy efficiency and emission reduction (Jetter and Kariher, 2009; Maccarty et al., 2008). Furthermore, solar lanterns provide a safe and efficient light source (Kandachar et al., 2009; World Bank, 2007). Solar lighting increases health, quality of live, enables economic activities and positively influences education (FORA, 2010; IDT & Philips, 2012; IFC, 2010). The IFC (2010) states that using portable solar lanterns almost doubles the average study hours of Indian children. However, one needs to be cautious about customer's value perception. Diverging perceptions can constitute a vital barrier (see B1 in Table I).

Table 1: Empirical findings on external benefits and success barriers (*enabling condition in italic*) in BoP ventures by PHILIPS

<b>External Benefit Management</b>	<b>Achievement</b>			<b>Organizational success barriers*</b>	
	Fan-Stove (high-tech solution)	Uday Solar Lantern	Chulha Woodstove (low-tech solution)	B1	Diverging perception of value
Customer Value	health impact	health impact	health impact	B2	Rigidity of procedures
	time & cost saving	time & cost saving	time & cost saving	E1	<i>Co-creation efforts</i>
	quality of life	quality of life	quality of life		
		economic activity	social status		
Partner Value	environmental and social impact	environmental and social impact	environmental and social impact	B3	Conflicting meso level goals
	capacity building	capacity building	capacity building	E2	<i>Funding for capacity building</i>
			micro entrepreneurship		

\*B: Barrier, E: Enabler

Interview data uncovers that BoP customers did not show much appreciation for environmental protection and health issues. Long-term health consequences of indoor air pollution were either unknown or ignored. However, feedback on the stoves revealed great appreciation of cleaner walls (Kandachar et al., 2009). The poor welcome advanced "quality of live" as any other customer. A volunteer involved in field testing in rural India stated: "People aspire for better things! [The stove] makes people feel improved. That is the feedback we get from the people." Pride of ownership was very important too. The Chulha woodstove usually gets decorated with ritual symbols and is often inaugurated on holy days. It takes an important status function for the Indian BoP customers. This shows the discrepancy in perception of value. Intense observation, field testing and joint idea generation bridged this divide. Findings outline co-creation as a crucial enabler for customer value creation (E1). Furthermore, data reveals a vital success barrier. Customer insights were infused into internal R&D procedures. However, quality standards and R&D procedures are aligned to suit developed markets. This creates tensions, since BoP ventures are strong deviation from regular activities. Interviewees emphasize the need to take an exploratory and experimental approach focused on true customer value creation. Ideally, it should be free of restrictive standards (B2).

Partner value creation was intended by all BoP ventures (Rocchi, 2006; UNEP, 2010). The Chulha woodstove provides direct financial value for micro entrepreneurs at the BoP (Capell and Lakshman, 2008). Production, installation and maintenance are easy to handle locally (Rocchi and Kusume, 2008a, b). Further, achievement of triple bottom-line impact (people, planet, profit) was a core driver in all BoP ventures (Philips, 2006a). Partnering with NGOs and universities (FORA, 2010; Kandachar et al., 2009) increasingly becomes crucial to develop "sustainable innovations" (Philips, 2005; Seebode, 2011; Seebode et al., 2012). Mutual value seems to emerge naturally in partnerships, because macro level goals, such as ecological and social sustainability, are shared by most partners (see Table I). Additionally, partner benefit from extensive knowledge transfer and financial investments (Philips, 2004). Building local capacity is a common issue for energy-related BoP ventures (Aron et al., 2009; Gradl and Knobloch, 2011; WBCSD, 2012). Philips developed the local ecosystem (Philips, 2004) by funding a BoP Chair at Manipal University (India). Furthermore, an engineer was permanently posted there to build capacity and facilitate knowledge exchange: "By putting a permanent

resource like me here [...] I can enable the University in BoP activities and connect PHILIPS to many parties [...] I would not be able to do it if I would be back in the office." Clearly, partner benefit from investments in capacity building which enables BoP venture success (E2). However, mutual value creation goes both ways. Philips benefited from increased market insights and co-creation of sustainable value chains (FORA, 2010; Philips, 2006a, 2011b; UNEP, 2010). Nevertheless, findings reveal significant differences of organizational goals (meso level). Especially NGOs are troubled by the commercial intentions of MNCs. This hampers access to donor-financed subsidies as a senior engineer revealed: "In the end some of the subsidy money will end up as profit of the shareholder. This is something donors are not used to." Interview data indicates a time consuming learning process between partners in which "progress is counted in years not in months." Goal conflicts at an organizational (meso) level constitute a vital barrier for mutual value creation (B3). Findings show increasing demand for active management and strategic planning of mutual value creation (Rocchi, 2006; Seebode, 2011).

#### *4.2 Internal benefit management*

Financial benefits such as profitability, turnover or increased market shares were not intended by the "Philanthropy by design" initiative. Nevertheless, commercial viability was an important requirement while designing the stove in order to promote micro entrepreneurship (Rocchi and Kusume, 2008a, b). Data shows that establishment of financial sustainability was mandatory for all NSBIs (Philips, 2006a; Rocchi, 2006). However, achieving profit was a difficult assignment. Major internal barriers arise from traditional cost structures, financial performance metrics and time-to-market expectations. First, product prices based on traditional cost structures (see B4 in Table II) did not fit to extremely low purchasing power of BoP customers (Capell and Lakshman, 2008). Establishment of rock bottom cost structures took time, which reduced net present values of investments drastically. Philips experimented with external subsidies to overcome this barrier, but new challenges arose. The poor would simply try to sell metal of the fan stove, when they realize that its value exceeds the subsidized price. Second, traditional financial performance metrics put BoP ventures under enormous pressure (B5). Naturally, management structures in MNCs run on commercial mechanisms. If BoP ventures get evaluated on the same financial metrics as any other project, tremendous challenges at the BoP will not be acknowledged. Consequently long-term budget availability for BoP ventures is far from being granted. Philips increasingly

realized the need for novel performance indicators (Philips, 2005; Seebode et al., 2012). Third, time-to-market expectations were mainly shaped by experiences in top tier markets. At the BoP time-to-market was much longer due to challenging market conditions (B6). A volunteering engineer emphasized: "Time-to-market is also a critical barrier. It takes much longer and it is hard to achieve things in the planned time frame. It is very likely that BoP product release will be delayed, because of so many different obstacles."

Table 2: Empirical findings on internal benefits and success barriers (*enabling condition in italic*) in BoP ventures by PHILIPS

<b>Internal Benefit Management</b>	<b>Achievement</b>			<b>Organizational success barriers*</b>	
	Fan-Stove (high-tech solution)	Uday Solar Lantern	Chulha Woodstove (low-tech solution)	B4	Cost structures
Financial benefits	market launch postponed	activities extended to other BoP markets	not intended	B5	Traditional performance metrics
				B6	Time-to-market expectations
Reputation	underutilized	underutilized	multiple awards <i>media coverage</i>	B7	Communication strategy
				B8	General BoP criticism
Employee Engagement	motivation  retention	motivation  retention	motivation  retention	B9 B10 E3	Resource constraints Uncertain career prospects <i>Top level support</i>
	intrapreneurship	intrapreneurship	intrapreneurship		
Partnering Capacity	bridging mindsets  mutual value perspective	bridging mindsets  mutual value perspective	bridging mindsets  mutual value perspective	B11 B12 E4	Pace of processes Partner selection criteria <i>Trust and cultural sensitivity</i>

\*B: Barrier, E: Enabler

Reputational impacts were acknowledged throughout all three BoP ventures, but capitalization on this benefit varied. Brand reputation in BoP markets was very helpful to build trustful relationships at the BoP (Philips, 2006a). Even poor people in remote places of rural India knew Philips (Philips, 2006a, 2009). Additional reputational gains at market level were marginal. Beneficial impacts were much more feasible in western markets. For example, the "Chulha woodstove" won several prestigious design awards such as the INDEX Award, IDEA award and the Red Dot award (Philips, 2011a). Interestingly data indicates a strong pull effect of public interest rather than active promotion. Philips closely monitors stakeholder opinions (Philips, 2004). In the past, Philips has been "careful not to promise more than we can deliver" (Marzano, 1999). Especially the NSBIs applied a very passive communication strategy (B7). The retrospective of a sustainability director underscores: "We are not a company that actively communicates and says: 'Hey guys look what we are doing here!' We somehow failed to get the right PR benefits." Overall, reputational benefits were rather

underutilized. Findings indicate that the passive strategy was partially due to aggressive criticism framing the BoP approach as "fortune stealing" (Capell and Lakshman, 2008). Interviewees emphasize the dilemma of MNCs being called to action in sustainable development, but getting criticized for attempts to establish profitable businesses (B8). Lacking a proactive communication strategy in combination with general BoP criticism significantly hampers MNCs to capitalize on reputational benefits.

Employee engagement was overwhelming. All interviewees report very high levels of staff motivation. Involvement in poverty alleviation and sustainable development is perceived as very rewarding. Interviewees describe even strong emotional feelings such as pride and honor. Voluntary contribution went significantly beyond job assignments. Findings show that especially highly educated staff was eager to join BoP ventures. Volunteers were queuing up. Positive effects reached beyond project teams. Internal communication achieved strong attention. Internal cohesion and retention were increased. Philips measures employee engagement via internal surveys on a regular basis. Between 2002 and 2010 the employee engagement index has risen from 59 to 75 percent (Philips, 2004, 2011b). The sustainability strategy plays a major role to inspire employees and to create an entrepreneurial culture (Philips, 2003, 2009, 2012). BoP ventures are small scale but emblematic for Philips' efforts to transform into a sustainable and people focussed company (Capell and Lakshman, 2008; FORA, 2010). Findings indicate positive impacts on employer attractiveness and recruitment of highly qualified staff. A core driver for employees to participate in BoP ventures is the intention of "doing good" while contributing to the corporate mission. Top-level support strongly enhanced employee engagement (E3). Top-level executives of Philips spread a passionate vision on ecological and social sustainability. Idea challenges were issued to spark sustainable innovation (FORA, 2010; Sherwin, 2004). Gerard Kleisterlee (former president and CEO) personally challenged employees to develop business cases that benefit the poor and contribute to business (Philips, 2004). Interview data strongly underlines importance of top-level support. Nevertheless, findings indicate serious barriers to capitalize on enhanced employee engagement, namely internal resource constraints as well as uncertain career prospects. Although Philips' expectation about commercial success was much more lenient, compared to traditional business, challenges were not fully anticipated (B9). Findings show that employees coped with constraints through donation of personal resources. Especially

private time and access to personal networks were donated. In some cases, employees even invested private money. BoP venture managers developed a strong entrepreneurial attitude with two core objectives, namely social impact creation and financial sustainability. Interestingly, data shows that career motives were completely absent. BoP ventures tend to underperform when performance evaluations are based on traditional financial metrics. Consequently impacts on individual careers were neutral at best. Uncertain career prospects create a significant organizational barrier (B10).

Employee capabilities which respect to traditional work skills were not enhanced. Findings indicate that employees infuse their knowledge and skills into crossfunctional teams as well as external partner organizations (Philips, 2005; Rocchi and Kusume, 2007) rather than looking for chances of capability improvement. Some divisions posted sustainability challenges in high-potential programs and eco-friendly design trainings. However, BoP ventures were treated as business opportunities rather than HR programs. Nevertheless, findings show a strong increase in BoP market knowledge and the ability to collaborate in cross-sector interaction (FORA, 2010; Kandachar et al., 2009; Rocchi and Kusume, 2008a). Employees act as boundary spanners to unconventional partners. Findings indicate increased "partnering capability" at individual (micro) and organizational (meso) level. A sustainability director outlines: "Since PHILIPS is building up alliances with companies, governments, international NGOs and local stakeholders, there is a strongly increased understanding of partners."

Partnering capability was significantly enhanced through co-creation efforts and field research. Both were conducted to better understand the local environment and to get customer feedback (Rocchi and Kusume, 2007, 2008a, b). Success of cocreation procedures depends on trustful interaction. Detailed observation of natural behavior in personal environments is essential to understand customer needs (FORA, 2010; Kandachar et al., 2009). Gaining access to peoples' homes in slums and distant rural areas is quite a challenge. Entering a rural Indian kitchen, which is the most inner part of the home, requires cultural sensitivity and establishment of trust (Capell and Lakshman, 2008; Rocchi and Kusume, 2007). A designer who spearheaded co-creation procedures indicated: "Later there was a connection, but not from the beginning. There was a double trust: They believed in quality,

reliability and long life of PHILIPS' products and they also said that it is a good thing PHILIPS does." Clearly, trust and cultural sensitivity are important enablers for collaboration (E4). Furthermore, findings indicate a time consuming learning process between partners. Seebode (2011, p. 46) states "since sustainable innovation touches on fundamental values and interest, it will often provoke strong views and sometimes powerful disagreement." Especially, collaboration with NGOs and public sector actors was very challenging. Two-related organizational barriers emerged, namely diverging pace of processes and inappropriate partner selection criteria. First, decision-making procedures and time management collide heavily in cross-sector partnerships. Diverging pace creates a tremendous barrier (B11). Entrepreneurial intentions force corporations to reduce time-to-market to the minimum possible. Pace of decision making, resource allocation and delivery of results tend to be fast compared to partners. Public sector actors and large international NGOs often follow rigid procedures (e.g. public tendering) that easily take months to years. A senior project manager indicates: "They [big NGOs] have other priorities [...] and the speed of working – they go for one signature and before you know it a half year is over. You understand that at one point we started to lose confidence and we thought about talking to other people." Second, appropriate partner selection criteria strongly determine success of collaboration (B12). Criteria for search and selection of partners changed over time, especially for NGOs. Philips initially searched for partners that would match its multinational strategy. Consequently, traditional aspects such as size, international reach and reputation of the partner were of great importance. Philips significantly shifted to more practical measures and searched for smaller local NGOs with a clear scope. Nowadays partner selection criteria are response time, flexibility of operation and past success at the BoP.

## 5. Discussion

### 5.1 Holistic benefit management at the BoP

Philips gained valuable market knowledge through co-creation procedures at the Indian BoP. Results underline the need to take an exploratory and experimental approach to create true customer value. Otherwise established R&D procedures constrain development of products and services. This creates a dilemma, since BoP ventures need to draw on corporate resources and capabilities. At the same time it is vital to maintain sufficient independence from standard routines, metrics and structures that usually govern business activities. This

pattern matches Simanis and Hart (2008, p. 9) call to establish protective "R&D white space" within MNCs.

Furthermore, findings underline importance of collaboration with NGOs and public sector actors. This matches the increasing attention in literature on cross-sector social interaction (Austin, 2000; Selsky and Parker, 2005) to foster sustainable development (Kolk and Tulder, 2006; Valente and Crane, 2010) at the BoP (Rivera-Santos and Rufin, 2010b; Rivera-Santos et al., 2012). "Partner value" is created by knowledge transfer and investments in local capacity building (Ansari et al., 2012). Findings reveal that partner value creation is mostly assumed by pursuing objectives such as poverty alleviation, environmental protection and sustainable development. Clearly, these macro level goals (Kolk et al., 2010) will be shared by most partners. Nevertheless, heterogeneous motivations and agendas exist at the organizational (meso) level (Dahan et al., 2010; Seitanidi et al., 2011). They can trigger strong conflict and cause poor performance of collaboration (Venn and Berg, 2012). Coping with friction requires MNCs and individuals to develop partnering capabilities at individual (micro) and organizational (meso) level. Partnering demands a mutual value perspective (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Philips realized the need to let go of the notion "my profit" (Seebode, 2011). Instead, a more holistic benefit assessment (Rocchi, 2006) and novel performance indicators were needed (Seebode et al., 2012). "External benefit management" is an important tool to plan, manage and assess value creation for external stakeholders. It should be supplemented by "internal benefit management." Internal benefits almost exclusively focussed on financial outcomes in the past, but this study provides evidence for significant non-financial benefits (SNV & WBCSD, 2008). Increased reputation should be considered in strategic decision processes. Reputational gains on the BoP market level may not come to corporations as well established and trusted as Philips. However, this does not imply absence of opportunities in general. Especially enterprises less known or with a difficult history in emerging markets might very well achieve beneficial impacts. We have shown that reputational benefits exist in western markets, but depend on the communication strategy. Passive communication was partially due to harsh critique on first generation BoP strategies. Clearly, "window dressing" instead of serious attempts to alleviate poverty will not do the trick. A passive approach combined with real investments and stakeholder inclusion might be more appropriate in


early stages. However, MNCs should switch toward an active communication strategy after establishing good relationships with critical stakeholders.

BoP ventures at Philips had a very high impact on employee engagement. Results indicate that employees' contribution goes far beyond job obligations. Volunteering is driven by the intention of "doing good" while fulfilling the corporate mission. Philips' vision of social and environmental sustainability in combination with top-level support provided an important source of motivation. Results indicate that this holds especially for highly educated staff. This is in line with research on volunteering programs (Gilder et al., 2005). Results show that beneficial effects are not limited to project teams. Inclusive BoP ventures achieve strong internal attention and contribute to employer attractiveness. Overall, application of external and internal benefit management can offer new guidance to strategic decision makers to justify investments at the BoP. However, capitalization on beneficial effects can be significantly hindered by various success barriers.

### *5.2 Emergence of social intrapreneurship*

Although BoP venture managers face strong pressure, they are highly motivated and enormously committed to the corporation even under uncertain career prospects. Our empirical investigation reveals a strong entrepreneurial attitude driven by social as well as commercial objectives. We label this phenomenon "social intrapreneurship" (respectively corporate social entrepreneurship) Social intrapreneurship can be described as an entrepreneurial activity in large corporations that merges social impact creation and commercial growth. Social intrapreneurship in for-profit organizations creates pioneering solutions to complex social problems. It spans internal and external boundaries between divisions, organizations and sectors to achieve mutual value. "Social intrapreneurs" creatively cope with resource constraints and tensions arising from traditional financial metrics. Our results show that social intrapreneurs do not hesitate to invest private resources, such as time and access to networks. Social intrapreneurs believe in their contribution to sustainable development and the corporate mission, even under uncertain career prospects. They realize the need for strategic planning and sound management of benefits for customers and partners. Thereby they bridge diverging mindsets to achieve competitive advantage (see Figure 3). Our findings are supported by similar patterns in other MNCs such as ABB, HP and Nokia. Merging social and commercial objectives often leads to strong tension. Serious

organizational barriers and resource constraints can emerge. Especially time-to-market expectations are not appropriate (McFalls, 2007). Halme et al. (2012) recently described that BoP venture managers at Nokia and ABB responded to internal resource constraints with "intrapreneurial bricolage." Intrapreneurial bricolage is an entrepreneurial activity in large corporations where employees creatively bundle resources at hand. Donation of private time is an indication of bricolage (Halme et al., 2012, p. 19). These matching patterns underscore validity of our findings. If MNCs want to exploit beneficial effects of inclusive business, novel organizational structures and managerial practices are needed to foster social intrapreneurship. Halme et al. (2012) outline the importance of organizational tolerance toward out-of-ordinary arrangements. In a similar vein, literature increasingly calls for protective R&D white space in MNCs (Hart, 2011; Simanis and Hart, 2008). Data from Philips indicates a first experimental attempt to create a special purpose vehicle (SPV) hosting a BoP project. The SPV does not report to shareholders and is free to set its own rules and (non-financial) targets. Establishing such structural safeguards can provide protective space for "social intrapreneurship."



We propose establishment of structural safeguards to mitigate tensions between social impact creation and financial objectives. A "corporate social innovation incubator" could act as an intermediary between the MNC and partners. Furthermore, we propose to extend the notion of "patient capital" (Kennedy and Novogratz, 2011) toward "corporate patient capital"

and equip social innovation incubators with it. Thereby social intrapreneurs would have budgets and protective space to pursue unconventional ideas. Following an "open innovation" strategy MNCs could monitor multiple initiatives and integrate or divest solutions later on. Ideas not in-line with core business activities could still be exploited outside the boundaries of the firm and contribute to sustainable development at the BoP. Nevertheless, structural safeguards should never become detached from the MNC. Findings from Philips strongly emphasize the need to keep close contact with core business activities to allow multidisciplinary team building (Philips, 2005; Rocchi and Kusume, 2007). Integration of employee volunteering schemes would enable MNCs to capitalize on benefits such as motivation, retention and employer attractiveness. If MNCs allow employees to invest a small fraction of working hours in social innovation incubators, spill-over effects to "regular work" might be enhanced. Thereby, sustainability thinking could trickle deep into an organization.

## **6. Limitations and future directions**

This study follows Eisenhardt's (1989) suggestion of grounding construct measures. Thus, we reviewed existing literature from BoP and CSR research. However, the a priori conceptualization might restrict exploratory research which constitutes a limitation of our study. Three measures were taken to address this limitation. First, the semi-structured interview inquiry was designed to prevent a narrow-minded analysis. Higher order questions never forced interviewees to address specific benefits. Lower order questions followed up on benefits and barriers indicated by the interviewee. Second, the analyses included a coding option for "other" benefits and barriers. Finally, we analyzed archival information and triangulated data. Nevertheless, findings are uniquely tied to the cases. In general, case study research cannot be generalized. However, the nested approach delivered valuable insights into benefits and barriers across three different BoP ventures by Philips. Furthermore, pattern matching reveals similarities to earlier research. Since our study delivers much broader insights than previous singular findings, we strongly encourage future research to corroborate findings.

Our study contributes to BoP literature on external "impact assessment" (London, 2009) and "deep benefit management" (Gollakota et al., 2010). We clarify external aspects and add a new dimension to deep benefit management. Sound external and internal benefit

management will put practitioners in a better position to plan, manage and assess BoP venture performance. Moreover, our study contributes to literature on cross-sector partnerships by differentiating between the macro level issue of "partner value" creation (Waddell, 2000; Waddock, 1988) and "partnering capacity" at the organizational (meso) and individual (micro) level (Kolk et al., 2010). We strongly encourage future research to explore partnering capabilities in more depth. Our empirical investigation identified various success barriers. Thereby we significantly contribute to the understanding of tensions between social impact creation and financial objectives in MNCs (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Olsen and Boxenbaum, 2009).

This study delivers novel insights into the emerging pattern of "social intrapreneurship." Shedding first light on social intrapreneurship has important consequences for theory and practice. MNCs that tolerate "intrapreneurial bricolage" (Halme et al., 2012) and provide protective "white space" (Hart, 2011) will be in a better position to benefit from social intrapreneurship. We strongly encourage future research to discuss the arising pattern of social intrapreneurship in MNCs and advance safeguarding solutions. We hope to inspire future research to discuss similarities and differences to social entrepreneurship as well as characteristics of social entrepreneurs.

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**IV. Liste der Promotionsaktivitäten**

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*Entfällt aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen.*

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**V. Lebenslauf**

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*Entfällt aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen.*

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**VI. Eidesstattliche Versicherung**

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## **Eidesstattliche Versicherung**

Hiermit erkläre ich, Ronald Venn, an Eides statt, dass ich die Dissertation mit dem Titel:

"Partnering for Sustainable Value Creation: Conceptual and Empirical Analyses of Co-Creation in Cross-sector Social Partnerships at the Base of the economic Pyramid"

selbstständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe.

Andere als die von mir angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel habe ich nicht benutzt. Die den herangezogenen Werken wörtlich oder sinngemäß entnommenen Stellen sind als solche gekennzeichnet.

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Ort/Datum

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Unterschrift

Prüfungskommission:

Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Michel Clement

Erstgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Nicola Berg

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Dirk Ulrich Gilbert