

COOPERATIVE ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE  
(1973–2014)

A CASE OF REGIME DECAY?

Dissertation  
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*For there is no durable treaty which is not founded on reciprocal advantage, and indeed a treaty which does not satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is apt to contain the seeds of its own dissolution.*

François de Callieres, *On the Manner of Negotiating With Princes* (1716), translated by A. F. Whyte (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), pp. 109-10

*Political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power.*

Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: MacMillan, 1939), p. 97

*The only remedy for a strong structural effect is a structural change.*

Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 111



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## Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACFE	Agreement on Adaptation of CFE
A/CFE	meaning the CFE Treaty and the Agreement on Adaptation of CFE
AIAM	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
CAC	Conventional Arms Control in Europe
CBM	Confidence-Building Measures
CDE	Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFE-1A	Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of CFE
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
C/OSCE	CSCE and OSCE
COW	Correlates of War Index
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CST	Treaty on Collective Security
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach
ES	English School
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy

EST	European Security Treaty (Medvedev initiative of 2009)
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GOP	Grand Old Party (Republican Party)
G8	Group of Eight (see also G6, G7, and G20)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFSH	Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations (theory)
JCC	Joint Consultative Commission
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New START	New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NSNW	Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
NTM	National-Technical Means
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSCC	Open Skies Consultative Commission
PC	Political Committee (of NATO)
PD	Prisoners' Dilemma
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
PMSC	Political-Military Steering Committee
POL-MIL	Political-Military
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
R&D	Research and Development
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC	Security Community
SG	Secretary General
SMM	OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
TFT	Tit-For-Tat
TLE	Treaty-Limited Equipment
TUR	Turkey
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States of America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
VD	Vienna Document
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization



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## Prologue

A chilly eastward wind was howling through the streets of Manhattan. It drizzled since the early hours. New York's hectic aura was only about to unfurl this usual Wednesday morning. A still young-looking man climbed the stairs of the United Nations Headquarters. Even though he was not as young anymore as he appeared to be on the media – he was in fact 57 and would soon turn 58 – his moves were energetic and telic. Guarded by a cluster of people, security guards and various broadcast teams, his thoughts were bound to the first sentences he was about to deliver to the United Nations' General Assembly. Until the very morning hours he had been pondering the weight his words would carry. He was certain that the coming weeks would change the course of history. Though, an awkward feeling which kept him awake at night made him shiver when imagining the future. He was not sure what his future, the future of his people, would look like. Only two events of the same magnitude had come to his mind when crafting his speech.

A few minutes later, routine had gained the upper hand. The golden quadrangle behind his back, some hundred eagerly looking eyes before the podium, he started to formulate the first words that would set the scene; the words which would make the audience aware that a historic moment was about to unfold. 'Two great revolutions, the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian revolution of 1917, have exerted a powerful influence on the actual nature of the historical process and radically changed the course of world events.' (Gorbachev 2011: 16) He paused. From now on, nothing would be the same anymore...

That day – December 7, 1988 – the 57-years old man by the name of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would reduce its military presence in Eastern Europe by half a million soldiers. Considerable numbers of tanks and other conventional arms would be withdrawn in the following years. The world remained in inertia. What had been unthinkable for decades was now about to happen in a blink: the Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe.

Probably more than any other event in the following years, that cold December day marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. It was the irrevocable sign that the politics of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* had become manifest reality. It was the moment Moscow relinquished its trump card in the military standoff with NATO: its quantitative conventional military superiority in Europe. It was the signal for the other Warsaw Pact members that the Kremlin would not constrain their foreign and security policy anymore.

The subsequent years would see the fall of the Berlin Wall, a reunited Germany, and the break-up of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's initiative would pave the way for a comprehensive treaty on the conventional military equipment of both blocs (the CFE Treaty), resulting in the largest disarmament initiative of all times. Based on the mutual reduction of arms, a new system of cooperative security in Europe emerged. Diplomats from the East and the West, for years trapped in ideological trench warfare, now rushed to the various negotiation tables to elaborate a dense network of interlocking agreements, designed to cement the new understanding and to avert a relapse into old confrontational times. The 1990 Charter of Paris of the CSCE stated with overt enthusiasm, 'ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries.' (CSCE 1990) Centuries of bloodshed in Europe seemed to end within a few years only. The future promised security through cooperation.

Almost 20 years later, in 2007, the same Mikhail Gorbachev – now an old and disenchanted pariah to his own people – applauded the Kremlin's leaders for their decision to give up on the CFE Treaty. 'It would be absolutely illogical for Russia to be the only state to abide by the treaty and for others not to even ratify it' (Gorbachev quoted in Shanker 2007), he noted. The preceding years had seen the rise of American unipolarity, the sellout of Russian greatness followed by an econom-

ic recovery under the autocratic Vladimir Putin, and the skulking erosion of the system of cooperative security in Europe.

Only a few months after the end of CFE, Russian troops crossed the border to the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. The five-day battle was the first international war between two recognized states on geographical Europe after the surrender of Nazi Germany. During the early hours of the Russian campaign, a hawkish U.S. Secretary of Defense seriously weighed the option of limited air strikes against the advancing Russian tanks. What seemed to be a long-gone specter of the past was in a sudden a conceivable scenario: a potential military skirmish between Russia and an enlarged NATO.

While those five days came across as a kind of unexpected “historical hick-up”, a sudden relapse, owed to the complicated settings in the South Caucasus and not intended to significantly change the European security setting, the Russian incursion into Georgian territory turned out to be the writing on the wall that the West and Russia were again drifting apart. In a breathtaking coup of Machiavellian impudence, Vladimir Putin in March 2014 ordered the annexation of Crimea to halt Western influence in what the Kremlin sees as part of his *Near Abroad*. Struck by the events, Western policy-makers realized that there was no positive engagement strategy in their dealings with Russia anymore. Belligerent language followed belligerent action and sanctions followed the unlawful presence of Russian soldiers on what was Ukrainian soil for the past 22 years. A quarter of a century after Gorbachev’s bold speech, West-Russian relations had reached an all-time post-Cold War low.

What went wrong? What happened to the enthusiasm that had inspired leaders in the East and the West? And why was the neatly established system of cooperative arms control agreements in Europe incapable of impeding the return to confrontation? Traces to the answers are spread across three continents and three generations of political leaders. Some of them date even back to a past long before the cold and rainy Manhattan winter day.



# 1 Introduction

For more than a decade, Europe's once unique security institutions are affected by decay. (Cf. for example Dunay 2008; Steinmeier 2008; Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative 2012; Mützenich and Karádi 2013) To different degrees this development pertains to almost all institutions under the rubric of cooperative security. In particular, the realm of cooperative arms control is negatively affected.

Significant legally and politically binding arms control agreements under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are either stagnating, deadlocked, or in retreat. The most prominent example is the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). OSCE participating States remain unable or unwilling to successfully overcome the deadlock in arms control institutions. Mirroring this development, cooperative security institutions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation have largely ceased to function. With the Ukraine conflict, prospects for reversing this trend are rather low for the moment.

The decay of cooperative arms control in Europe raises the question, why its institutions are in retreat. Research on the issue is incomplete (see Paragraph 1.3). On the one hand, researchers and analysts have failed to pay long-term attention to the volatile evolution of cooperative security institutions. On the other hand, they missed to comprehensively link institutional decay to the general foreign and security policies of the main actors involved. As a result, research has either concentrated on issue-specific institutions while leaving out the conundrum why the broader schemes behind institutionalized cooperation changed over time, or approached the broader political spectra while ignoring the issue-specificity of relevant institutions.

The decay of cooperative arms control in Europe is therefore a promising research area to analyze the volatility of institutionalized cooperation between the West

and Russia, both from a theoretical and a policy-oriented angle. By concentrating on the establishment, maintenance, and decay of institutionalized cooperation in this specific sphere of Euro-Atlantic security, common interests, divergent interpretations, and crucial structural changes come to the fore. Understanding the volatile process of institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe will not provide a blueprint for taking on current and future challenges but could, at best, help to avoid repeating those policies that partially led to its current state of decay.

## 1.1 Aim and Focus

This thesis is about the decay of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the policies of cooperative arms control in Europe and their institutionalization from 1973 to 2014 and to explain the process of decay. This thesis shall answer two central research questions:

- (1) What forms of institutions compose cooperative arms control in Europe?
- (2) Why are the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe in decay?

The focus of this thesis is on institutions established between 1973 and 2014 with the aim of reducing the potential for military conflict between (1) the United States and NATO on the one hand and the Soviet Union/The Russian Federation and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)/the Collective Security Treaty (CST) on the other, (2) between NATO and the post-Soviet states, and (3) amongst OSCE participating States. Special emphasis is placed on the respective politics under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its successor the OSCE as well as under the NATO-Russia framework. Intra-alliance arrangements of NATO, the coordinating politics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), or bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control arrangements from the realm of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are not part of the analysis.

Within this sphere of multilateral politics, special emphasis will be put on two actors: the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. This focus is due to (1) the quasi-hegemonic roles both held during the Cold War (cf. Leffler and Westad 2010), (2) the United States' quasi-hegemonic position in post-Cold War NATO (Rauchhaus 2000: 175), and (3) Russia's national identity as the prime successor to the Soviet Union. (Cf. also Aggarwal 2000: 71)

Indeed, the politics of cooperative arms control in Europe are neither exclusively shaped by these two actors nor are their foreign and security policies identical with or limited to cooperative arms control in Europe. While further research is needed to fully understand the multilateral dimension of the evolution of cooperative arms control in Europe, concentrating on the two states that helped to substantially shape it is beneficial from a structural point of view. As McKenzie and Loedel (1998b: 8) have put it, 'the United States and Russia remain the key states in determining the outcome of the debate over European security: the United States as the only power with a global reach; Russia because of its ability to threaten its neighbors and to thwart attempts at institutional change.'

## 1.2 Relevance and Originality

Five fundamental reasons speak for examining cooperative arms control in Europe. The first reason is a *lack of comprehensiveness in current research*. Analysts and researchers have not provided a complete picture of the volatility of institutionalization, including establishment, maintenance, and decay of institutions. At the same time, exclusive foci on specific institutions, such as the CFE Treaty (cf. Zellner, Schmidt, and Neuneck 2009), the OSCE (cf. Ghébalí and Warner 2006), or NATO (cf. Pouliot 2010), prevail. Analysis of institutional overlap is underrepresented. No multi-level holistic research approach on cooperative arms control in Europe exists so far.

The second reason is a *lack of theoretical research*. Current and past research has often avoided grounding issue-specific analysis in sound theoretical analysis. While early scholars of arms control have applied clear-cut theories in support of

their analysis (cf. Schelling and Halperin 1961), current arms control research often tends either to overemphasize purely policy-driven approaches (cf. exemplary Andreasen and Williams 2011) or uses approaches that lack a well-researched and reasonable combination of theory and research issue (cf. exemplary Durkalec, Kearns, and Kulesa 2013: 9-10; for a good exception from the rule see Mutschler 2013). In turn, theoretical research of IR scholars has largely evaded the topic of arms control since the end of the Cold War. No well-founded theory-based research on cooperative arms control in Europe exists so far.

The third reason is a *lax use of terminology*. Researchers, political analysts, and decision-makers often employ terminology from the theoretical concept of *regime* (for an analysis of the concept see Chapter 4) when referring to cooperative arms control in Europe without any proof that it really suits their requirement, both from a conceptual point of view and with respect to the topicality of the theoretical concept as such. No genuine research has either verified or falsified the regime claim in relation to the issue. The reasons behind this shortcoming are a general shrinking interest in theoretical research on arms control (cf. opening remarks by Alexei Arbatov, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference 2014) and a specific lack of originality in conjunction with the issue.

The fourth reason is a *lack of research on regime decay*. As referred to above, cooperative arms control is in decay. Directly deriving from the lack of comprehensiveness in current research on the issue is the fact that researchers are struggling to explain institutional decay, both from an issue-specific and from a theoretical perspective. Issue-specific research either remains with descriptions of the current problems (cf. exemplary Zellner 2012) or approaches the wider spectra of U.S.-Russian relations without going into the cumbersome procedure of searching for the reasons behind its poor state (cf. exemplary Walt 2014). Theoretical research based on the regime episteme has a somewhat different problem. Decay is simply not an equal part of regime scholars' research agenda (see Chapter 4). The result is an incomplete picture. So far, studies about the reasons for regime decay are underrepresented.

The fifth reason is the *topicality of the issue*. Policy-makers, researchers, and analysts alike agree that the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe is a severe problem for the continent's security (cf. exemplary Sikorski, Westerwelle, and Sovndal 2013). The Ukraine conflict has only helped to elevate the pre-existing difficulties (cf. Ischinger, Pifer, and Zagorski 2014). However, future-oriented policy analysis based on sound theoretical research on the issue and designed to address the unraveling of institutions is absent. The issue-specific and theoretical lack of research is not apt to alter this shortcoming. A comprehensive and theory-based approach towards the issue might help to reveal long-term policies that led to the current state. It might also help to formulate alternative policy concepts at a later stage.

### 1.3 Shortcomings of Previous Research

When scrutinizing previous research on the issue, three important shortcomings come to the fore. (1) Previous research lacks a commonly agreed terminology when referring to the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe. Without a commonly agreed terminology, actors do not know whether they speak about the same issues. (2) With regards to institutions, scholars often employ the regime terminology without any proof that the institutions are regimes. Furthermore, their applications of definitions are often imprecise and contradictory. Without proof, definitions become irrelevant. (3) Theoretical works on the issue are either highly outdated or they pay considerably less attention to the fact of institutional decay. Without up to date research and a holistic approach to institutionalization, research remains incomplete.

#### 1.3.1 The Problem of Terminological Diversity

In previous and/or contemporary research and/or politics it is impossible to find a commonly agreed term describing the research subject at hand. Instead, diversity prevails. Often, architectural or artisan paraphrases are employed to describe institutionalization. Already in 1994, Walker (p. 13) issued a warning that 'the talk of security "architecture" is misleading; "patchwork" is a better metaphor for the plethora of shifting and overlapping experiments under way'. Particularly the term

of ‘security architecture’ has certain prominence in the literature (cf. Czempiel 1998: xi), which can be explained by its inherent vagueness. The absence of clear terminology has opened up the doors for diverse interpretations. Whereas some speak of ‘Euro-Atlantic security structures’ (Zellner 2009: 18) or a ‘full fabric of European security’ (Gottemoeller 2008: 7), others refer to a ‘multilayered security architecture that incorporates [...] NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, and the CFE regime’ (Auton 1998: 153).

With a view to the OSCE, Rupp and McKenzie (1998: 120) see ‘a web of interlocking institutions in post-cold-war Europe’. During his first term in office, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier (2009: 11) termed the result of ‘the cooperative approach to arms control [...] a network of mutually supporting and complementary arms control agreements.’ In addition, former German Ambassador Hartmann (2009: 54) describes a ‘CFE system [...] complemented by a [...] network of confidence- and security-building measures’. Krause (2003: 1) dubs the post-Cold War European order simply a ‘liberal peace’.

Diversity in terminology is a problem for research because it opens the door for misunderstandings. How can participants in an academic debate actually know that they speak about the same issue or not if no agreed terminology is applied?

### 1.3.2 The Problem of Theoretical References without Evidence

In conjunction with the subject of this thesis, scholars of IR have regularly referred to regime theory or at least its terminology without providing empirical evidence. Chung (2005: 187) classifies the OSCE as a ‘security regime’ based on the general assessment that ‘regimes can have formal structures as well’. Zellner (2012: 15) refers to a ‘European arms control regime’ and the CFE Treaty as ‘the regime’s core’ (Zellner 2009: 12) without elaborating a regime-analytical line of argument. Contradicting these assumption, in another article, he labels CFE itself a ‘regime’ (cf. Zellner 2010: 67). Auton (1998) views confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and CFE as ‘multilateral security regimes’ without analyzing what their possible regime quality generates in terms of institutional

interdependence. None of these authors nor any other author who uses the regime label with reference to cooperative arms control in Europe, has ever made the effort to embark on a sound regime-analytical line of analysis. Their observations are only assumptions.

Theoretical references without evidence are first a problem for the credibility of academic research and for the cognitive effects such research generates. As Thomas Hobbes noted in *Leviathan*, the abuse of speech happens ‘when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves.’ Secondly, they are also a problem for the possible consequences of issue-specific research. If the forms of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe deserve the regime label – as most IR scholars claim – the decay of certain institutions, such as the CFE Treaty, might have a different consequential effect on other potential regimes or a potential regime network than anticipated and substantiated by researchers so far.

### 1.3.3 The Problem of Incomplete Theoretical Research

Terminological diversity and theoretical references without supporting evidence in relation to cooperative arms control in Europe have their roots in the lack of theoretical research on the issue. First, there are only a handful of studies on the research subject which rely on a sound theoretical basis at all. Second, of those few studies almost all employ regime theory. Other theoretical approaches are rare. Third, researchers have not analyzed the institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe continuously. Instead, the very few theoretical accounts are either incomplete or highly outdated. In the following, the central insights of the few theoretical accounts on the issue are quoted.

Nye (1987: 392-3) sees the CSCE as a ‘U.S.-Soviet security regime’ and argues ‘that at least a weak regime exists in Europe and that its broad principles and norms are the division of Germany, the legitimate role of the United States and the Soviet Union in European security, and mutually recognized spheres of con-

cern. The implications and implementation of these principles are spelled out in various ways, including the Berlin agreements and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.’

Janice Stein (2003: 17, footnote 5) claims that the provisions of the 1986 Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) led to a ‘limited security regime designed to build confidence in central Europe.’ Efinger, Rittberger, and Zürn (1988: 174) conclude in late 1988 that the regime conduciveness in the realm of limitation of conventional armaments is ‘presumably non-existent’. In a study on CSBMs, Rittberger, Efinger, and Mandler (1988: 28) admit that ‘East-West relations have rarely been considered as a field for ‘regime analyses.’ They infer that an East-West CSBM regime exists as ‘a stabilizing element in the still highly militarized security situation in Europe.’ (Ibid: 30) In two other studies, Efinger (1989: 343-84; 1990: 117-50) traces the evolving CSBM regime back to the formative days of the Helsinki Final Act.

Without much further elaboration, Müller (1993a: 133-4) rates the Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 OSCE Charter of Paris as regimes that consolidate the territorial order in Europe and concludes that the policies of regulating military capabilities in Europe through means of CSBMs and CFE have reached a certain level of regime quality. In another account, Müller (1993b: 361) identifies a security regime in the realm of European military order, including ‘INF Treaty, Stockholm/Paris agreements on confidence-building, CFE Treaty, 2+4 Treaty, practices such as doctrine seminars and mutual visits of military personnel, the Crisis Control Centre, and the recent mutual promises of unilateral reductions of short-range nuclear weapons’. Kelleher (1994: 318) sees an emerging ‘cooperative security regime [...] in the Northern Hemisphere.’ In the same account (ibid: 326) she refers to ‘the intersecting regimes set in place under the CFE, the CSCE, and the Open Skies agreements in 1992.’

Ropers and Schlotter (1989) have contributed the most elaborate account of the ‘negotiation system of the CSCE’ so far. They conclude that the system has led to

generate regimes of differing scope and quality, with the military realm of CSBMs being the most established (ibid: 333). Furthermore, they anchor the regime demand in the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to establish all-European hegemony and in the subsequent bloc confrontation which underlined the need for regulating political, military, economic, and human issues. Through employing issue linkages within and outside the CSCE system, the two blocs were able to establish the CSCE as reinforcing processual institution. The CSCE in its entirety, they conclude, can be classified as a 'declaratory regime'. Schlotter (1999) views the evolution of CSBMs as the only full-fledged regime in the CSCE process.

Neuneck (1995) has contributed a novel approach towards one aspect of cooperative arms control in Europe by modeling conventional stability and arms control measures according to models of Game Theory. His approach has a sound theoretical basis from the mathematical realm. The downturn is that it concentrates mostly on conventional forces stability and leaves out the wider political evolution which has shaped the process of conventional force limitations as well as the multitude of CSBMs in the C/OSCE framework beyond the Vienna Document (ibid: 228-59; see Annex II for a list of the relevant CSBMs).

Incomplete theoretical research is a problem for the further evolution of research in this given field because it limits the explanatory power of analysis. Without an encompassing and up-to-date approach based on a sound theoretical basis, the decay of cooperative arms control cannot be comprehensively explained. Instead, approaches towards the research subject would have to rely on assumptions.

Summing up the three previous paragraphs, up-to-date and comprehensive theoretical accounts are missing. In addition, clear-cut and commonly agreed terminology based on sound theoretical research is absent. It is therefore important, first, to provide a clear definition of the research subject at hand.

## 1.4 Definitions of Key Terms

So far, this thesis has relied on the term of *cooperative arms control in Europe* without further elaboration. It is indeed important to provide a definition for two reasons: (1) in order to avoid repeating the diverse and confusing use of terminology of previous research; (2) because the term is a neologism<sup>1</sup> by the author – an approach to unite the various terminological concepts under one clear definition.

Defining the subject of this thesis means scrutinizing a number of concepts and definitions first. Cooperative arms control in Europe appears within the issue-area of Euro-Atlantic cooperative security. The ‘issue-area’<sup>2</sup> itself should by no means be confused with the issue of cooperative arms control in Europe or the boundaries of a specific regime or a network of regimes (cf. Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013: 30).

### 1.4.1 Cooperative Security

The first term to be defined is *cooperative security*. Cooperative security has been defined differently (cf. Mihalka 2005: 113-4). In this thesis, the concept of cooperative security is understood to include a number of central tenets: increasing *mutual* security and predictability by means of reciprocity, inclusiveness, dialogue, a defensive orientation, transparency, confidence-building, and arms limitations (cf. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner 1992; Nolan 1994a,b; Mihalka 2005; Dewitt and Acharya 1996: 9-10; Jervis 1999). The aim of cooperative security is to generate interstate relations ‘in which disputes are expected to occur, but they are expected to do so within the limits of agreed-upon norms and established procedures.’ (Nolan 1994b: 5) Zartman provides an explanation of the just distribution

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<sup>1</sup> The term is not a mere translation of the definition of arms control provided by the Hamburg School (‘kooperative Rüstungssteuerung’). In contrast to the Hamburg School (cf. von Baudissin and Lutz 1979: 5-6), there is no stringent causal reference to nuclear deterrence in this thesis.

<sup>2</sup> Keohane (1984: 61) defines issue-areas as sets of issues that are ‘dealt with in common negotiations and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureaucracies.’ Ernst B. Haas (1980: 365) defines an issue-area as ‘a recognized cluster of concerns involving interdependence not only among the parties but among the issues themselves.’

of gains in security policy negotiations aimed at increasing mutual security. It captures well a basic definition of cooperative security:

*Both negotiation and security policy are too often presented as tools for maximizing single party gain, when they should be presented as ways of maximizing two (or multi) party gain, jointly if possible, separately if necessary. Negotiations that provide something for everyone, or that trade off differentially valued goods, and security measures that provide security for all, or that tie my security to your security, are likely to lead to more favorable, stable, productive, and just results.*  
(Zartman 1995: 892)

The politics of cooperative security in Europe have often been identified with the institution of the OSCE (cf. Krause 2003). Therefore, a large part of the analysis will concentrate on policies achieved under the auspices of the OSCE and its predecessor, the CSCE (see Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7). However, the focus is not limited to this organization but instead tackles cooperative policies of NATO as well (ibid). This is particularly due to the fact that the different layers of security institutions and policies have come to increasingly overlap in the aftermath of the Cold War (cf. Flynn and Farrell 1999: 505). Bauwens et al (1994: 21) have thus argued that ‘it is difficult to distinguish NATO’s enlarged mandate from the overall approach of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.’

The OSCE’s approach to security is basically holistic (cf. Krause 2003). So is the concept of cooperative security. It encompasses “hard” security issues in the military realm, economic and environmental, as well as human security aspects. It does not stop with the legal concept of the sovereign nation state but views intrastate developments as well as transnational and transboundary threats as key factors affecting the security of others – that are states *and* the individual human being.

Even though the holistic approach of cooperative security together with the encompassing security approach of the OSCE is of particular importance for the concept of this thesis, only a certain spectrum – arms control – is under considera-

tion. Hence, the concept of cooperative security serves rather as the normative background of this thesis against which a particular set of arms control institutions and the policies directed to them are analyzed. The following table comprises the aims and means of the concept of cooperative security.

**TABLE 1**

AIMS AND MEANS OF THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY

<i>Aims</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>increasing mutual security and predictability</i></li> </ul>
<i>Means</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>reciprocity</i></li> <li>• <i>inclusiveness</i></li> <li>• <i>dialogue-based</i></li> <li>• <i>defensive orientation</i></li> <li>• <i>transparency</i></li> <li>• <i>confidence-building</i></li> <li>• <i>arms limitations</i></li> </ul>

#### 1.4.2 Arms Control

The second term to be defined is *arms control*. Bull (1961: 4-5) sees ‘peace through the manipulation of force’ as the grand scheme under which to place the concept theoretically. In its most practical sense and in relation to the early period of the bipolar arms race, arms control’s foremost objective was the prevention of (nuclear) war (cf. Schelling and Halperin 1961: 3; Bull 1961: 3-4).

Historically, arms control in the bipolar context existed before the emergence of the paradigm of cooperative security during the 1970s. However, the two became almost equated (cf. Dunn 2009: 175). Nolan (1994b: 5) concludes: ‘at the practical level cooperative security seeks to devise agreed-upon measures to prevent war and to do so primarily by preventing the means for successful aggression from being assembled’. This quote reads almost like a description of the concept of arms control. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner (1992: 6) refer to ‘a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational

practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.’ Again, they do not refer to arms control but to cooperative security. These examples show how closely connected the two concepts are. Arms control has thus become an integral part or means of the “toolbox” of cooperative security. In recent years, the paths of the two concepts have somewhat drifted apart with arms control being questioned particularly in the United States (cf. Larsen 2009: 11 et seq) and cooperative security seen mostly through the prism of Constructivist theory (cf. Müller and Wunderlich 2013). For the purpose of this thesis, a rather broad definition of arms control is employed. Arms control is thus

*any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, or types of military forces, weapons, or facilities. Whatever their scope or terms, however, all plans for arms control have one common factor: they presuppose some form of co-operation or joint action among participants regarding their military programs.*  
(Larsen 2009: 1)

Military-to-military contacts, military exchange programs, and the democratic control of forces, usually subsumed under the headline of CSBMs<sup>3</sup>, are all part of this definition. In this sense, arms control ‘should be thought of as encompassing all aspects of the military dimension’ in order ‘to prevent conflicts within states as well as between them.’ (Walker 1994: 6-7)

### 1.4.3 Europe

*Europe* is the third term to be defined. The term as such resembles ‘a concept as well as a continent, and the borders of both oscillate wildly.’ (Jacobs 2012) Europe in this thesis is neither employed in purely geographical nor in cultural terms. It is a linguistic reference to a historical-political development.

As already stated, cooperative security in Europe has always been in close vicinity to the C/OSCE. Zagorski (2010: 58) argues that the contemporary understanding

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<sup>3</sup> For a discussion about the validity of distinguishing between arms control and CSBMs see Holst 1991 and Wright 2000: 4-5.

of cooperative security should not be confused with the indivisibility of security from the early documents of the CSCE. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War approach towards cooperative security in Europe can only be understood against the specific historical European background (cf. Krause 2003: 4).

As will be explained below (see Chapter 3), the politics and institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe took off shortly before and in parallel to the early CSCE framework. Even though the end of the Cold War triggered a fundamental shift in the political goals pursued and in the composition of parties to a number of agreements and organizations, the historical provenance of the concept of cooperative arms control in Europe is European. This thesis argues, however, that it is not limited to the OSCE but stretches across a densely institutionalized area, including NATO, and involving 56 states from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Hence, this thesis is not about regionalism. Snyder (2012b: 312) defines regions as ‘groupings of states that share either geographic proximity or have sufficient cultural/historic ties that bind them together.’ In the vast OSCE area, stretching across three continents, this is not the case, neither from a cultural nor from a geographical point of view.

#### 1.4.4 Cooperative Arms Control in Europe

The result of these observations is the new term of *cooperative arms control in Europe*. The term shall serve the purpose of combining cooperative security and arms control in a specific European historical-political setting. Cooperative arms control is not simply a merger of two already closely connected concepts (i.e. cooperative security and arms control). It is also not a reference to the definition of the Hamburg School (see footnote 1 above). Instead, it is an attempt to link institutionalization in a specific sphere of arms control to a strongly normative concept of European origin.

#### 1.4.5 Institutions and Regimes

So far, this thesis has made continued references to *institutions* and *institutionalization*. The title of this thesis contains the concept of *regime*. As Thomas Risse (2002: 605) correctly noted, ‘there are at least as many definitions of (international) institutions as there are theoretical perspectives’. The term *international institution* is often applied in IR to cover diverse social concepts such as treaties, organizations, regimes, or conventions. Duffield (2007) has addressed this terminological diversity by differentiating between ontological and functional forms of international institutions. Accordingly, ontological forms refer to intersubjective elements such as “norms”. Functional forms refer to formal elements such as “rules”. (Ibid: 8) Following his typology, regimes, in a general understanding, fall under ontological forms while agreements and formal IGOs fall under functional forms. (Ibid: 15) Throughout this thesis, these three types of international cooperative interaction – regimes, agreements, and IGOs (or IOs) – will be covered by the term institutions, while the process of their establishment, maintenance, and, in a more general understanding, their evolution will be captured by the term institutionalization.

International institutions are in close vicinity to the theoretical concept of regime. Often institutions become equated with regimes (see Chapter 4). Before this thesis will provide an analysis of the concept of regime (ibid), it will be important for the further research process to provide a first, though incomplete, definition of the concept.

*Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.* (Krasner 1982: 2)

## 1.5 The Theoretical Basis

Previous research has failed to comprehensively analyze what forms of institutions compose cooperative arms control in Europe and what their relationship is (see Paragraph 1.3 above). As a consequence, decay has not been comprehensively explained. Possible reasons for decay which might have to do with the institutional form (e.g. linkages between regimes) remained unconsidered (ibid). Since cooperative arms control in Europe – the name already implies it – is based on international cooperation, theoretical approaches from the realm of International Relations (IR) which analyze and explain international cooperation will provide the theoretical basis of this thesis. Different theories have tried to explain and understand international institutionalized cooperation (cf. Schieder and Spindler 2010).

This thesis relies on a multi-theory approach – meaning the analytical application of different theories of IR to the empirical evidence contained in this thesis. A multi-theory approach towards explaining the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe and the related foreign and security policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia is a more adequate method of analyzing long-term cooperation than a possible single-theory approach (see below). Some IR theories have empirically-proven merits with respect to explaining specific issue areas or actors (cf. Schieder and Spindler 2010). Realism, for instance, has a proven track record in security studies (cf. for example Walt 1987). Regime theory particularly helped to explain cooperation in the realms of trade relations and the environment (see the overview contained in Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997). Constructivism is particularly apt to make assumptions about the impact of cognitive repercussions such as emotions (cf. Ross 2006). This thesis will particularly rely on Realism (see Chapter 2) and regime theory (see Chapter 4) and will complement these two theoretical approaches with the essentials of the concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics (see Chapter 8). (For a short discussion see below) Together, these theories provide a broader analytical perspective on the research issue of this thesis. Such ap-

proach seems particularly valuable because of the long time horizon (41 years) this thesis covers.

One alternative possibility to approach and (possibly) model international cooperation would be the heuristic device of a 2 x 2 matrix in Game Theory (cf. Mutschler 2013). However, instances of repeated and long-term cooperation involving different layers of cooperation and different situations would have to include a variety of multi super games (cf. McGinnis 1986) with different payoff structures. Such instances would be extremely difficult to model. In addition, explanations along the lines of a rational choice approach would most likely suffer from its static and rigid approach (cf. Hopmann and Druckman 1991: 273).

The following paragraphs will shortly introduce the five theories and will explain why they are applied in the process of analysis (for a detailed discussion of the different approaches and their application see Chapters 2, 4, and 8).

#### 1.5.1 Realism

In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, a Realist approach is applied (for a detailed discussion of Realism see Chapter 2). A Realist approach has been chosen for several reasons (see Paragraph 2.1 below for a detailed discussion). Realism's skepticism towards international cooperation and its occupation with the impediments to successful cooperation provides a critical basis because the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe are in decay. Russia's foreign and security policy has regularly been characterized as following Realist rationales (cf. Mearsheimer 2014). Realism could thus provide a valuable basis for better understanding contemporary Russian foreign and security policy (cf. Jonsson 2012: 450). Further on, the Ukraine conflict has triggered a revival of the Neoliberal vs. Neorealist debate amongst some U.S. scholars (see Mearsheimer 2014; McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer 2014; Charap and Shapiro 2014a,b) which U.S. and/or Russian foreign policy orientation (Liberal vs. Realist) is to blame for the conflict. Realism is therefore a very timely approach. In addition, Realism's occupation with conflict provides a valuable base because the U.S.-Soviet/Russian security relation-

ship has undergone crucial and recurring periods of competition and conflict (see Chapter 3). Last but not least, the role of power remains central to understanding international cooperation (cf. Müller 2013).

### 1.5.2 Regime Theory

In Chapters 4-7, a regime-theoretical approach is applied (for a detailed discussion why regime theory is applied see Paragraph 4.1 below and Paragraph 1.3.2 above). Regime theory has mainly been chosen because of the widespread recognition of the research subject either as a single regime or as a network of inter-linked regimes in both, the existing research literature and in official documents (see Paragraph 1.3 above); even more so, because no research has ever proven the regime assumption (ibid). In addition, Realism is biased when it comes to international institutions and is limited in its approach to explain the persistence of international institutions; particularly in times of change or crisis (see Chapter 4). Regime theory provides more answers to this phenomenon. Beyond that, regime theory was an effort by Neoliberal scholars of IR to bring the Neorealists on board in their effort to explain and accept international institutions. Regime theory thus builds on a number of distinct Realist assumptions and can be viewed as the Neoliberal “extension” to Neorealism (see Chapters 2 and 4; cf. also Crawford 1996). It is thus well suited to build upon the Realist approach which has been chosen in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. Last but not least, regime theory is a good methodological approach for classifying international institutions (see Chapter 5).

Before we can speak of regimes when referring to the empirical evidence in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe, the term regime will be handled very carefully throughout the course of research of this thesis. Instead of speaking of regimes when referring to the empirical evidence, the term of *cooperation clusters* is applied. Young (1996) was the first to speak of ‘clustered institutions’ when referring to institutional linkages. The term cooperation clusters will be applied until the very form of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe has been fully analyzed and clarified (see Chapter 6).

### 1.5.3 Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist Analyses

Aside from regime theory, three further theoretical approaches of IR have sought to analyze and explain international cooperation (see Chapter 8). Since decay is a prominent part of this thesis, particularly such theoretical approaches that take also account of the wider cooperation spectra which drive institutionalized cooperation might provide an additional basis for understanding the reasons for and effects of decay. The discussion in Paragraphs 4.4 and 8.1 shows that regime theorists have not explained institutional decay comprehensively. The consequences of this shortcoming make it necessary to look into further theoretical approaches towards explaining the volatility and, hence, the decay of international institutionalized cooperative efforts. Amongst those approaches is the concept of Security Community, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics. Those approaches will be discussed and set in relation with the empirical evidence in Chapter 8.

### 1.6 Methodology

This thesis follows in large parts an inductive approach as outlined in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (2008). It does not aim at theory formation but rather tries to either verify or falsify whether the research subject can be characterized along the lines of the already established theoretical concept of regime. This leads to instances of abductive analysis where inductive and deductive methods go hand in hand (cf. Daase et al 2008: 152; and see below).

The reason for this approach is rooted in the inadequate state of previous research. As already stated, a plethora of institutions under the broad rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe has already been labeled *regime* by various IR scholars (see Paragraph 1.3 above). The diverse use of terminology and the lack in sound theoretical research on the issue has left a definitional cacophony (ibid). Of course, one could proceed on the basis of empirically describing the institutions and decay. However, the shortcoming of such method would be that theoretical insights which go beyond a mere description would be left unattended. As an example, certain institutions might share significant characteristics of the regime

concept. If that would be the case, the decay of specific agreements such as CFE would have a stronger effect on other agreements which might be part of the same potential regime (see the effects of ‘negative reverberation’ described in Alter and Meunier 2009). Before any questions about institutional decay can be answered, it has to be either verified or falsified that the form of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe actually deserves the regime label.

The methodological approach of this thesis proceeds in a number of sequential stages. First, a Realist model for understanding international cooperation is developed. Then, the empirical evidence of 41 years of cooperative arms control in Europe is assessed and analyzed, applying the Realist model. Next, the principle findings and assumptions of scholars of regime are introduced and applied as methodological tool for the classification of the empirical evidence. The aim of this classification is to test whether and which institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe deserve the regime label. Finally, the question shall be answered whether regime theory can produce meaningful results with regards to decay or whether other theories of cooperation have more explanatory power. The following paragraphs explain those sequential stages.

#### 1.6.1 Developing and Applying a Realist Model of International Cooperation

In Paragraph 2.3 (below), a Realist model for understanding international cooperation will be developed. Focusing on Realism, the discussion in Chapter 2 shall help to explain what international cooperation is and why it is so problematic from a Realist point of view (see Paragraph 2.2 below). The Realist model for understanding international cooperation consists of five variables which all derive from Realist theory. The variables determine a number of processual sequences of international cooperation. The model has been developed by the author for this thesis in order to assess repeated instances of U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe during the last 41 years. In Chapter 3, a qualitative review of cooperative arms control in Europe from 1973 to 2014, based on primary and secondary sources, is conducted. The model will be applied to the empirical evidence in order to analyze the origins and consequences of coopera-

tion and institutionalization. Application of the model shall allow for assessing reasons for cooperation, strategies of cooperation, and states' evaluation of gains from cooperation. By highlighting these factors, a preliminary confrontation with the essentials of regime theory shall be made possible (see Chapter 4).

#### 1.6.2 Performing a First Abductive Test

After confronting the empirical evidence with the principle claims of regime scholars (see Chapter 4), Steven Krasner's (1982: 2) typology of regimes ('principles', 'norms', 'rules', and 'decision-making procedures') will be used as a model to qualitatively classify 36 agreements with relevance for the research subject (see Chapter 5; a list of the 36 agreements is contained in Annex II). The aim of this classification is to test whether the form of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe deserves the regime label by identifying possible shared principles and norms. Thus, a final assessment about a potential regime quality of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe will be possible (see Chapter 6). Beyond that, regime scholars' findings about indicators of decay are compared with the empirical evidence in order to assess whether the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe display such signs of decay. The test is abductive since it combines the inductive process of extrapolating from potentially shared principles and norms to a general regime quality with the deductive process of extrapolating from general findings of regime scholars about decay to the specific state of certain institutions.

#### 1.6.3 Performing a Second Abductive Test

Principles and norms are a significant part of regime theory (for a discussion see Chapter 4). In a second abductive test, their condition with a view to their topicality and relevance is analyzed (see Chapter 7). In the test, 51 statements delivered as speeches by U.S. and Soviet/Russian delegations to the C/OSCE between 1990 and 2014 (a list of statements is contained in Annex III) are analyzed by means of quantitative and qualitative content analysis (cf. Krippendorff 1980) and compared to twelve key principles and norms that shape cooperative arms control in Europe (see Table 57 below). The aim is to find out which of the principles and

norms are still reflected in the statements, which are not anymore, and which other general policy topics are on the two states' agendas. Thereby, additional reasons for the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe shall be highlighted. The test is abductive as well since it combines the inductive process of extrapolating from the use of key principles and norms to a general assessment of their political relevance with the deductive process of extrapolating from general policy topics of the two states to the specific state of key principles and norms.

#### 1.6.4 Conducting a Confrontation with Other Theories

Regime theory has a number of shortcomings, both from a conceptual as well as from a historical and societal point of view (see for a discussion Paragraphs 4.4 and 8.1). Additional analyses deriving from the theoretical concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics might help to extend the regime approach in order to better explain the general volatility of international cooperation. By confronting the empirical evidence with other those theoretical approaches, a more encompassing perspective, not exclusively bound to Realism and regime theory, shall be gained. Thus, a complete picture of the reasons behind the volatility of cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe will emerge.

### 1.7 Overview of Chapters

The first chapter introduces the research subject, outlines the aim and focus of the thesis, explains the purpose of research, analyzes the related literature, clarifies a number of key terms, sketches the employed theories and methodology, and describes the process of research. The second chapter discusses international cooperation from a Realist viewpoint and introduces a Realist model for understanding international cooperation to analyze and assess the empirical evidence contained in Chapter 3. The third chapter highlights the institutional evolution of cooperative arms control in Europe from 1973 to 2014 and assesses the respective U.S.-Soviet/Russian politics, applying the Realist model of international cooperation. The fourth chapter discusses the various facets of regime theory and links the theoretical concept to the empirical evidence. In the fifth chapter, a first abductive

test of 36 agreements is conducted, applying Krasner's regime typology. The sixth chapter assesses the regime quality of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe, based on the findings of the first abductive test, and analyzes the degree of decay. In the seventh chapter, a second abductive test is conducted, assessing 51 statements of U.S. and Soviet/Russian delegations to the C/OSCE. Chapter eight will focus on the theoretical concepts of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics in order to better explain the volatility of international cooperation. The ninth chapter summarized the main findings of this thesis with regards to the two central research questions and arrives at the main theoretical and political conclusions of this thesis.

Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 contain a number of guiding research questions which relate to the two central research questions of this thesis at the beginning of every respective chapter. Those guiding research questions will be answered in the concluding paragraphs of the respective chapters. Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 will also address the two central research questions of this thesis in their respective concluding paragraphs. Chapter 9 will comprehensively answer the two central research questions of this thesis.

## Annexes

Attached to this thesis are six annexes. Annex I contains the data input for measuring U.S.-Soviet/Russian capabilities. Capabilities are assessed in Chapter 3. Annex II has a list of 36 agreements. It contains the main agreements of cooperative arms control in Europe. All agreements are assessed in Chapter 5. Annex III lists 51 statements by U.S. and Soviet/Russian delegations to C/OSCE Summits and Ministerials. The statements are assessed in Chapter 7. Annex IV contains the referenced literature. Annex V contains German and English abstracts of the thesis as well as corresponding publications by the author. None of the central findings of this thesis have been published before. Annex VI has the curriculum vitae of the author.



## 2 International Cooperation from a Realist Viewpoint

This chapter is about international cooperation – meaning state-to-state cooperation – from a Realist viewpoint. The guiding research question of this chapter is: How do states, according to Realism, arrive at international cooperation and which factors complicate their efforts?

The aim of this chapter is to understand the problems associated with international cooperation from a theoretical angle. Different theoretical approaches try to explain and understand cooperation and the institutionalization of cooperation among states in an environment which lacks any central authority such as a world government (see also Chapter 4 for the concept of regime and Chapter 8 for the concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist normative approaches). Among them is the Realist approach. Realism is the most cooperation-skeptical approach of major IR theories and has provided powerful arguments which speak against the probability of repeated, stable, and long-term cooperation; particularly in the realm of security. At the same time, Realism assumes a number of prerequisites which should be in place in order to achieve international cooperation. This chapter draws upon a Realist approach for understanding international cooperation (for a discussion why Realism has been chosen see Paragraph 2.1.1 below) and develops a model for understanding international cooperation from a Realist viewpoint. The model is of a new design and has been elaborated by the author for this thesis. The model shall help to understand and assess the policies of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Chapter 3).

The chapter contains four paragraphs. The first paragraph provides a few introductory remarks. The second paragraph highlights the problem of international cooperation from a Realist point of view. The third paragraph develops a Realist model for understanding international cooperation. The fourth paragraph contains the conclusions.

## 2.1 A Few Introductory Remarks

This paragraph offers a few useful clarifications with regards to the subject of this chapter and explains why Realism has been chosen as theoretical basis. Before turning to Realism, we should define cooperation. The Oxford Dictionary (Oxford University Press eds. 2014) defines *cooperation* as ‘the action or process of working together to the same end’. Studying the behavior of animals, Clements and Stephens (1995: 527) define cooperation as ‘joint action for mutual benefit’. Both definitions tell us little about the process or act other than that it is based on a reason and that it involves more than one entity engaged in a certain activity with at least another entity. The reason, the nature of the entities, their activity, the surrounding environment, and their relationship towards reason, towards their activity, towards each other, and towards the environment remain a matter of speculation or, better, of definition and explanation.

Explaining *international cooperation* is not possible without first reflecting upon the nature of the entities and the environment in which international cooperation takes place. Since the Westphalian Peace, a particular system of sovereign *nation states* has developed, first in Europe and since the end of Colonialism also globally (cf. Reinhard 2009). Major elements of this system are states’ sovereignty, mutual recognition of sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs of the nation state, diplomatic conduct amongst states, and war (cf. Bull 1977).

Ideally, the modern nation state has an internal monopoly of power which works to establish and uphold order. The domestic monopoly of power can have different forms. The most common forms during the last centuries were democracy, autocracy, monarchy, and oligarchy (cf. Hobsbawn 1992). In the environment in which states operate, no central authority (e.g. a world government) exists. If states want to cooperate with each other they have to find ways to deal with the consequences of the absence of a central authority. Basically, all major schools of thought of IR theory recognize this fact; however, they treat the consequences for cooperation differently (cf. Baldwin 1993: 5). While Liberal and Constructivist

theories of IR view this fact as a lesser impediment to international cooperation (see Chapter 4), Realism sees it as a major hindrance.

Explaining and understanding international cooperation can rely on different theoretical approaches (see Chapters 4 and 8). This thesis applies a Realist approach in Chapters 2 and 3. Realism has been chosen for five reasons.

First, Realism views the chances for successful international cooperation basically skeptical. Since this thesis is about institutional decay, skepticism towards successful cooperation seems appropriate. The skepticism of Realism will help to critically assess the interests and the cooperation strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. In a Strangean sense, the ‘who-gets-what’ from cooperation (Strange 1982: 496) gets better addressed by Realism. Also, Realism underscores the impediments to successful cooperation. Concentrating on these impediments might help to explain for institutional decay. In comparison, Realism excludes a possible normative enthusiasm for cooperation per se, often found in Neoliberal or early Constructivist accounts (see Chapter 4 and 8).

Second, Russia’s foreign and security policy has regularly been characterized as following Realist rationales (cf. Jonsson 2012: 450). Thorun (2009) describes Putin’s first term as President as ‘pragmatic geo-economic realism’ and his second term as ‘cultural geopolitical realism’. Jonsson (2012: 450) views Russia’s foreign and security policy as ‘pragmatic, geopolitically focused, [and] realist rather than value-based’. In conjunction with the Ukraine crisis, John Mearsheimer (2014) has argued that Putin acts like a Realist and that Western politicians do not understand his political provenance anymore. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s reported comment to U.S. President Obama that Putin was living ‘in another world’ (quoted from Packer 2014) has been used to underscore this assumption (cf. Charap and Shapiro 2014b). Realism thus could provide a valuable basis for better understanding and explaining contemporary Russian foreign and security policy.

Third, the recent conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine has triggered a revival of the Neoliberal vs. Neorealist debate amongst some U.S. scholars (see Mearsheimer 2014; McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer 2014; Charap and Shapiro 2014a, b; Lipman 2014) about which U.S. and/or Russian foreign policy orientation (Liberal vs. Realist) is to blame for the conflict. A Realist approach is therewith very timely from a theoretical and a content-related point of view.

Fourth, the U.S.-Soviet/Russian security relationship has undergone crucial and recurring periods of competition and conflict (see Chapter 3). Realism's occupation with explaining the roots of conflict provides a valuable base to analyze the reasons behind these two states' competitive relationship.

Fifth, the role of power remains central to understanding instances of international cooperation (cf. Müller 2013). The dominant actors in world affairs – states – are still highly unequal in terms of military, economic, technological, or cultural capabilities and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Even though, international institutions have constraining effects on states' behavior (see Drezner 2008), particularly powerful states do not shy away from giving preference to the unilateral employment of power once critical interests are at stake (for a discussion see Chapter 8). The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia are particularly powerful states. At the same time, particularly with regards to interests, the constraining effects of international institutions are indeed visible through learning effects, adjustment of interests to the interests of others, and the implication of norms on states' behavior (for a discussion see Chapter 8; cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). To say that international institutions do not matter at all in the process of international cooperation would be a false assessment; however, they matter less than assumed by Neoliberals (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95).

In the next paragraph, the problems associated with international cooperation are highlighted from a Realist viewpoint.

## 2.2 Realism and the Problem of International Cooperation

The long history of Realism starts with Thucydides' depiction of the *Peloponnesian War* (431-411 B.C.), was expanded at the end of the Middle Age by Niccolo Machiavelli's *Il Principe* (1513) and Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan* (1651), and re-emerged as one of the principle schools of IR theorizing with the end of World War II (cf. exemplary Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1954). Particularly two scholars of IR have shaped modern Realism: Hans Joachim Morgenthau with his seminal work *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* and Kenneth Neal Waltz with his opus magnum *Theory of International Politics*. The former gets equated with what is called *Classical Realism*, the latter with *Neorealism* or *Structural Realism* (for a short comparison and distinction see Pashakhanlou 2009). Both authors share significant views; at the same time, their works show important differences.

As all Realists (cf. *ibid*), Morgenthau and Waltz attempt to see the world as what it is and not what it ought to be (cf. Carr 1939: 5). Their approaches are an empirical rather than a normative paradigm (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 4). They also agree that states are operating in an environment of *anarchy* (cf. Waltz 1959: 224 et seq; Hoffmann 1965: 54 et seq) which lacks any central authority. The state of anarchy has strong features of the Hobbesian state of nature of *homo homini lupus* (cf. Waltz 1979: 102). It should, however, not become confused with anarchy in the sense of complete political disorder and lawlessness. Rather, anarchy in international affairs means 'a lack of common government in world politics' (Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 226).<sup>4</sup> Morgenthau and Waltz concur that *states* are the principle actors in the environment of anarchy and that particularly powerful states have the most impact (Mearsheimer 2001: 17-8). Further on, it is the distribution of *power* which determines states' position in the environment of anarchy (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 31-7; Waltz 1979: 97-9). In addition, it is states' national *inter-*

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<sup>4</sup> Art and Jervis (1992: 1) explain that 'international politics takes place in an arena that has no central governing body. No agency exists above individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punishes deviations. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.'

*est* and the constraining effects of anarchy which determine their behavior to act as *rational* egoists (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 5-12; Waltz 1979: 117). Realism assumes that it is rational for states to seek their individual advantage in an absolute and a relative understanding in order to avoid dependence on other states, or worst, their disappearance. Therewith, both agree that it is rational for states to seek *gains* (cf. *ibid*; for a definition of gains with regards to the focus of this thesis see Paragraph 2.3.1 below). However, they differ with regards to their definition of power and states' reasons for pursuing power.

For Morgenthau (1954: 5), 'international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power'. Power is 'anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.' (*Ibid*: 11) Aside from military power, Morgenthau also adds a moral stratum counting a nation's character, its morale, and the quality of governance as factors of power. (*Ibid*: 186) Waltz (1979: 131) infers that power derives from several factors which he summarizes under the term *capabilities*. Capabilities are the 'size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence'. He adds that 'although power is a key concept in realist theory its proper definition remains a matter of controversy.' (Waltz 1986a: 333)

They also slightly differ with their reasoning why states seek power. According to Morgenthau (1954: 31), 'international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.' Morgenthau sees states' struggle for power primarily rooted in the nature of man (*ibid*: 4) and the inability of the anarchic system to constrain his, and thus states, desires. Morgenthau rests his theory on three images: the first image of the nature of man, the second image of the nature of nation states which he views as an extension to man's desires, and the third image of anarchy. Waltz puts greater emphasis on the third image and largely ignores the first. He sees primarily the structural causes of anarchy at work. Waltz (1979: 95) views states as 'the units whose interactions form the structure of international-political systems' and 'although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabili-

ties across units is not. The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept.’ (Ibid: 98) The absence of a higher authority leads to a constant state of insecurity. In contrast to Morgenthau who sees a permanent struggle for power as states’ prime interest, Waltz (1979: 126) views states as being less concerned with maximizing their power. ‘States can seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal. International politics is too serious a business for that.’ (Ibid: 127) Instead, ‘states seek to ensure their survival.’ (Ibid: 91; cf. also Mearsheimer 1994/95: 9) Since *survival* is the prime interest of states, *security* is posited as the principle goal in Waltz’s theory (cf. Baldwin 1997: 11, footnote 33). He asserts, ‘in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power.’ (Waltz 1979: 126) For Waltz, ‘power is a means and not an end’. (Ibid)

Even though security and power considerably overlap from a conceptual point of view (cf. Buzan 1991: 7-11), the different emphases Waltz (survival/security as a more defensively-oriented approach) and Morgenthau (struggle for power as a more offensively-oriented approach) employ are probably the main features distinguishing their work and thus classical Realism from Neorealism (cf. Baldwin 1993; Powell 1994; Jervis 1999). I will return shortly (see Paragraph 2.2.1 below) to the consequences of states’ defensive and offensive orientations.

Interestingly though, Waltz does not provide a clear definition of security (cf. Baldwin 1997). This circumstance might have to do with the fact that Waltz was strongly influenced by Scientism (see Chapter 4 for a debate) and that security is extremely difficult to measure (cf. Buzan 1991). A host of international scholars have provided definitions of security (cf. exemplary the selection provided by Baldwin 1997: 8-9) but one of the most basic Realist definition comes from Wolfers (1952: 458): ‘security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.’ Correctly, Baldwin (1997: 13) adds that ‘there is some ambiguity in the phrase “absence of threats”’ if one thinks for instance about earthquakes. He

offers to reformulate Wolfers' definition to describe security as 'a low probability of damage to acquired values' (ibid).

Realism's central tenets of power and security have been challenged very early by John H. Herz (1950: 157) who argues that groups and individuals are 'concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.' (See also the conclusions of the Palme Commission; cf. Galtung 1983) This *security dilemma* renders the Realist assumption of the desirability of power and security at least questionable. I will return to this conundrum in Paragraph 2.3.1 below.

Aside from power and security, all Realists agree on the central role of the nation state and the constraining effects of anarchy which lead states to rely mostly on their own capabilities and which they employ for the pursuit of their interests (cf. Waltz 1959: 224 et seq; Hoffmann 1965: 54 et seq; Gilpin 1984: 304). In the realm of international security relations, Realism sees the effects of anarchy as particularly strong (cf. Jervis 1978; Gilpin 1984: 304) because security is inevitably connected to states' survival. While thus every state is in permanent *competition* with the others to secure its own survival (cf. Aron 1966: 5), cooperation offers states a chance to secure or enhance their position in the system (cf. Jervis 1999). Nevertheless, Realism is basically skeptical of states' chances to arrive at and uphold cooperation. Mearsheimer (1994/95: 12) explains: 'Although realism envisions a world that is fundamentally competitive, cooperation between states occur. It is sometimes difficult to achieve, however, and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: relative-gains considerations, and concern about cheating.'

In the next paragraph, these two factors (states' relative-gains concern and concern about cheating) and their practical consequences for states are discussed in more detail.

### 2.2.1 States' Relative-Gains Concern

According to Realism, states have a very high sensitivity to their positionality (i.e. their power and thus their ability to survive) in the 'system of states' (Waltz 1979). States' position in the system is dependent on the distribution of power. Morgenthau (1954: 174) stresses that 'the concept of power is always a relative one.' Rousseau (1999: 3) adds that 'due to the anarchical nature of the international system any gain in power by one state represents an inherent threat to its neighbors.' Grieco (1988: 498) outlines that 'states fear that their partners will achieve relatively greater gains; that, as a result, the partners will surge ahead of them in relative capabilities; and, finally, that their increasingly powerful partners in the present could become all the more formidable foes at some point in the future.' (Ibid: 499) Waltz (1979: 105) adds: 'When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other.' The argument as such is fundamentally based on the third image of anarchy because 'states recognize that, in anarchy, there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them.' (Grieco 1988: 497-8)

States' relative-gains concern is directly linked to their positionality, their rationality, and their ambitions. Waltz (1979: 97) explains that 'changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce.' Waltz thus points to changes in capabilities, to expectations, interests, and gains. With regards to *expectations*, Realism pleads to expect and prepare for the worst. In Morgenthau's words (1954: 52), 'history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously prepar-

ing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war.’ (Cf. also Grieco 1988: 497-8) Waltz (1979: 99) takes a more materialistic view: ‘We ask what range of expectations arises merely from looking at the type of order that prevails among [states] and at the distribution of capabilities within that order.’ While the distribution of capabilities determines states’ positionality, states’ interests determine their policy and how states will perceive each other (ibid: 117).

Morgenthau (1954: 52-3) offers two basic patterns for identifying states’ interests: ‘A political policy seeks either to keep power [...] or to increase power’.<sup>5</sup> He thus identifies status quo and revisionist/expansionist<sup>6</sup> states which can be grouped around a defensive (status quo) and an offensive (revisionist/expansionist) orientation.

While classical Realism (cf. Morgenthau 1954) has put greater emphasis on states’ *offensive* orientation (see for a debate Mearsheimer 1994/95; Schweller 1996; Jervis 1999), Structural Realism (cf. Waltz 1979: 126) stresses that ‘the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.’ Accordingly, states rather have a *defensive* positionality. Grieco (1988: 498) adds, ‘the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities’. Mearsheimer (1994/95: 12) agrees but adds that ‘not only that [states] look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, but also that they work to insure that other states do not take advantage of them. States are, in other words, both offensively-oriented and defen-

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<sup>5</sup> Morgenthau (1954: 52-3) actually offers a third basic pattern, namely ‘to demonstrate power’. This third pattern is pursued by ‘the policy of prestige’ (ibid: chapter 6), which ‘has two possible ultimate objectives: prestige for its own sake, or much more frequently, prestige in support of a policy of the status quo or imperialism.’ For the sake of consistency with regards to the following argument about offensive and defensive positionality, the policy of prestige has been left out. Further on, as Morgenthau (ibid: 86) argues, ‘the policy of prestige is one of the instrumentalities through which the policies of the status quo and of imperialism try to achieve their ends.’

<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau (1954: chapter 5) originally speaks of ‘imperialist states’. Since imperialism is a politically loaded term, Realists have used the more neutral terms ‘revisionist’ (cf. Schweller 1996) or ‘expansionist’ (cf. Jervis 1999) instead. In this thesis the terms revisionist and expansionist are used interchangeably and attached to the same meaning.

sively-oriented.’ The distinction between defensive and offensive Realism is an important one because it heavily influences states’ chances to pursue cooperation. Jervis (1999: 51) concludes that ‘offensive realists see much less room for increasing cooperation [while] for defensive realists, much depends on the nature of the situation’ and the strategies (ibid: 52) employed. In short, the probability of cooperation among status quo powers who aim at preserving the balance of power is much higher than between a status quo and a revisionist power with the latter aiming at changing the balance of power (ibid: 51-2).

*Balance of power* has basically two different meanings in conjunction with these observations: ‘an approximately equal distribution of power’ (as the state of near-perfect equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War) and ‘any distribution of power’ (Morgenthau 1954: 187, footnote 1).<sup>7</sup> Throughout this thesis, the concept of ‘balance of power’ is used to describe any distribution of power.

In the next paragraph, states’ efforts to deal with the consequences of their mutual relative-gains concern are analyzed.

### 2.2.2 Dealing with the Consequences of States’ Relative-Gains Concern

How do states, according to Realism, deal with the consequences of their relative-gains concern? The important point Realist make by stressing states’ relative-gains concern is that the relative gain-seeking mentality of states theoretically excludes *only* such cooperation which would relatively change the balance of power which existed before the act of cooperation (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95: 12-3). Thus, the crucial aspect of relative gains is that they are always relative to the distribution of power. As long as gains distribution reflects the distribution of power, cooperation is possible. According to Grieco (1988: 501), ‘states define balance and equity as distributions of gains that roughly maintain pre-cooperation

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<sup>7</sup> Morgenthau (1954: 187) explains: ‘The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to politics that aim at preserving it.’ In addition to the two meanings quoted above, Morgenthau (ibid: footnote 1) adds ‘a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs’ and ‘an actual state of affairs’.

balances of capabilities.’ Accordingly, agreements which ‘roughly reflect the [existing] distribution of power’ (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 13) are tolerable for states (cf. Grieco 1988: 501). Only agreements which will not result in a gap in payoffs altering the distribution of power (ibid), or at least a mutual recognition of the tolerance of a gap, would be acceptable. The SALT and ABM agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union were extreme examples of that kind because they reflected the existing distribution of power of near-perfect equilibrium (cf. Bull 1973).

While the case of U.S.-Soviet cooperation on nuclear arms control was reflecting near-perfect equilibrium, *alliances* to preserve or alter the balance of power (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 192 et seq) or to line up against a threat (cf. Walt 1987) usually involve differently positioned states. In that case, cooperation among relatively weaker and stronger states would reflect their respective positionality. Morgenthau (1954: 205) explains that ‘the distribution of benefits is [...] likely to reflect the distribution of power within an alliance’. Or, as Mattingly (1955: 163) puts it: ‘the biggest dog gets the meatiest bone, and others help themselves in the order of size.’

Schweller (1996: 111) adds that ‘who gets more through cooperation is often difficult to discern and may change over time.’ He thus points to what Axelrod (1984) has termed poetically the *shadow of the future* (see below for a discussion), meaning that cooperation (under Axelrod’s condition of repeated cooperation) can promise accumulated larger gains in the future if states continue to cooperate. A state might enter a cooperative arrangement believing that the gains from cooperation will relatively increase over time. However, the rationality of its cooperation partner would, theoretically, not allow the former to gain relative increases. At the same time, cooperation might also tilt to the negative over time, thus leaving a state with relatively lesser gains than originally expected. Referring to firms as an equation for states’ behavior, Waltz (1979: 106) infers that ‘the relative strength of firms changes over time in ways that cannot be foreseen. Firms are constrained to strike a compromise between maximizing their profits and minimizing the dan-

ger of their own demise.’ Since rationality calls for an ex post *evaluation of gains* from cooperation (cf. Schweller 1996: 111), states which find that over time gains turn out to be to their detriment will seek ways to address their dissatisfaction. For such cases, Grieco (1988: 487) finds that ‘a state that is satisfied with a partner’s compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains.’ Another way to address the problem would be for states to plead for a re-distribution of gains, for instance in the form of re-negotiating an existing agreement.

As referred to above, power is relative and therewith hard to measure because of its abstract nature (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 9; see Waltz 1979: Chapter 7). What applies to the determining variable of power is also true for its distribution in a cooperative arrangement. Only in an ideal understanding do gains from cooperation reflect exactly the underlying distribution of power. Realists therefore agree that in order to moderate states’ relative-gains concern, in reality, states expect to receive approximately equal *compensation* if gain allocation would favor one state and would work to change the balance of power (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 179; Grieco 1988: 501-2).

While gains distribution relative to the distribution of power is a pre-condition for Realists, compensation is a *strategy* to deal with states’ relative-gains concern. Strategies and strategic thinking are inherent parts of Realist thinking and theorizing (cf. Kissinger 1957; Morgenthau 1954; Jervis 1999) and Snidal (1986: 37) defines strategy as ‘a complete plan for action, covering all contingencies including random exogenous events as well as endogenous behavior by others.’ In conjunction with cooperation, states employ different strategies in order to address the two basic problems of cooperation which Realism identifies. In addition to the strategy of compensation, the next paragraph will introduce strategies with regards to states’ rationality to cheat (see also Paragraph 2.3.5 below).

Summing up, Realism is basically skeptical of states’ chances to arrive at cooperation because states fear that cooperation might change the existing balance of

power to their detriment and might therewith negatively affect their security and thus their chances to survive in the environment of anarchy. Since states are rational actors, they will not only seek to advance their gains from cooperation in an absolute way but also in a relative way. Cooperation amongst states is nevertheless possible if the gains from cooperation roughly reflect the underlying distribution of power.

The next paragraph deals with the second problem of states' mutual rationality to cheat on each other.

### 2.2.3 States' Rationality to Cheat

According to Realism (and also Neoliberalism; see below for a debate), the constraining effects of anarchy create a second problem for cooperative efforts. Not only works the absence of a world government to the detriment of states security, it also creates undesired effects in conjunction with states acting as rational agents. Since Realism views states as behaving as unitary rational agents who are 'sensitive to costs' (Grieco 1988: 488; cf. also Waltz 1986b: 331) rational gain-seeking can lead states to forego cooperation even in cases where mutual cooperation would promise higher gains than mutual refusal. Different models from the broader realm of economics have helped to illustrate the point Realism makes.

Referring to Kahn (1966), Waltz outlines a so called 'collective action problem'. 'If shortage of a commodity is expected, all are collectively better off if they buy less of it in order to moderate price increases and to distribute shortages equitably. But because some will be better off if they lay in extra supplies quickly, all have a strong incentive to do so. If one expects others to make a run on a bank, one's prudent course is to run faster than they do even while knowing that if few others run, the bank will remain solvent, and if many run, it will fail.' (Waltz 1979: 107) The consequence is that the bank will go bankrupt even though no one desired so.

Another example comes from the security realm where the absence of a world government is particularly critical. As already referred to above, one state's inten-

tion to increase its security (through increased military spending or alliances) can result in another state's perception of diminished security which leads the latter to answer similarly. The resulting security dilemma (cf. Herz 1950; cf. Jervis 1978) is a spiral of policies with a heightened level of tensions that can lead to conflict – even though, none of the states really desired conflict. The arms races in the nuclear realm between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War are examples of that kind (cf. Schelling and Halperin 1961).

The ideal type to illustrate the problem is the heuristic device of the payoff structure in a 2 x 2 matrix in the game-theoretical model of the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD). In a PD situation, two players are left with no information, no chance to communicate, and no superior enforcement mechanism (cf. McGinnis 1986: 162). They can choose between cooperation (C) and defection (D). Both have a higher incentive to defect (DC) even though both would prefer the gains from mutual cooperation (CC) over the gains from mutual defection (DD) because they fear exploitation (CD). For both, their preference ordering is  $DC > CC > DD > CD$ . Their dominant strategies lead them to defect which leaves both with a lower payoff than the possible payoff from cooperation in the end. Since both players act rational, meaning, they seek the highest guaranteed absolute payoff, which necessarily derives from the fact that they cannot assume that the other will not cheat, cooperation is, rationally, impossible even though both would desire it.

Chart 1 (next page) illustrates the payoff structure and preference ordering in a single-shot PD.

## CHART 1

### SINGLE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA

		PRISONER B	
		B <sub>1</sub>	B <sub>2</sub> *
PRISONER A	A <sub>1</sub>	2, 2	0, 3
	A <sub>2</sub> *	3, 0	1, 1**

For Chart 1: The chart has been developed by the author for this thesis. Cell numerals refer to ordinal ranked preferences with 3 = best, 0 = worst; the first number in each cell refers to A's preference and the second number in each cell refers to B's preference.

\* Actor's dominant strategy \*\* Nash Equilibrium outcome

In the next paragraph, states' efforts to deal with the consequences of their mutual rationality to cheat are analyzed.

#### 2.2.4 Dealing with the Consequences of States' Rationality to Cheat

How do states, according to Realism, deal with the consequences of their rationality to cheat if cooperation is really desired? Realist scholars have first turned to the originally economic theorem of *hegemonic stability* (cf. Kindleberger 1973). Realist proponents of the theorem argued that international cooperation can be achieved if a dominant actor with a paramount interest in a given field of politics invests its capabilities to start and uphold cooperation while, at the same time, persuades and, if necessary, forces other states to cooperate (cf. Krasner 1976).

However, hegemonic stability might not be as stable as the term suggests because it encounters a 'public goods' problem (cf. Olson 1985; Waltz 1979: 196-7). Accordingly, the paramount interest of a certain actor can be sufficient to establish a public good – take for instance a free-of-charge museum established by a patron. As an example from international politics, the overriding interest of the United States to deter the Soviet Union was sufficient to uphold the long-term and costly

U.S. military and nuclear assurance to European NATO allies throughout the Cold War. The downturn of hegemonic stability is again its undesired consequences. Olson's analysis (1985) of 'privileged groups' shows that smaller states will exploit the dominant state as "free riders". Their unwillingness to pay for the public good which gets provided anyways can lead to continued losses for the dominant state. In turn, this behavior can lead the hegemon to lose power and/or interest in cooperation. The result is that cooperation breaks down (Haufler 1993).

An important contribution to address states' rationality to cheat comes from Neoliberal scholars of IR. Even though their approach departs in significant points from the assumptions of Realism (see below for a debate; cf. Grieco 1988), they started by accepting a number of genuinely Realist tenets such as anarchy, the centrality of the nation state, and the rationality of states (cf. Baldwin 1993b). Their main points are that (1) cooperation under anarchy can be the rational choice even though states have an incentive to defect and (2) international institutions or regimes can provide frameworks for repeated cooperation, thus reducing states' transaction costs and increasing the accumulated gains from repeated cooperation (see Chapter 4 for the regime debate; cf. Keohane 1984; Oye 1986). In order to prove their assumption, Neoliberals (cf. Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Oye 1986) extended the PD situation through  $N$  rounds of iteration, arguing that 'in most instances the international environment is more akin to an iterated game' (Rousseau 1999: 4). Mutual cooperation 'can be rational because the sum of relatively small cooperative payoffs over time can be greater than the gain from a single attempt to exploit your opponent followed by an endless series of mutual defections.' (Ibid) This future discount parameter is what Axelrod (1984) terms the 'shadow of the future'. In his first computer tournament (1984), the conditional strategy of tit-for-tat (TFT) emerged as the most successful strategy. Under TFT (Axelrod 1984), one player (A) introduces a cooperative move and then subsequently replicates the other players' (B) previous action. If B was previously cooperative, A is cooperative. If B is not, A is not. If B returns to cooperation, A is "forgiving" and cooperates as well.

Axelrod et al tried to prove that cooperation can be rational; i.e. cooperation can maximize players' utility even under an artificial situation which has certain constraining features akin to the state of anarchy where the basic coordination problem would make defection (i.e. cheating) the rational choice for both players (cf. Axelrod 1984; Oye 1986). Neoliberals thus assume that states do not care whether other states gain from cooperation as long as they themselves gain from cooperation in an absolute understanding (cf. Axelrod 1984; Oye 1986). The prospect of maximizing one's own absolute gains provides the incentive to pursue cooperation if only both overcome the trust dilemma. Cooperation which would benefit everyone, no matter how much each gains from cooperation and leaving aside balance of power considerations, would thus be acceptable for states.

While the Neoliberal approach shows that cooperation can be rational it ignores states' relative-gains concern. Grieco (1988) argues that Neoliberals misconstrued the Realist understanding of anarchy. Accordingly, states are not primarily motivated by greed (i.e. maximizing absolute gains) but by fear (ibid: 498). He argues that the absence of a world government is not so much the problem because no higher institution would guarantee for the payoff from cooperation but because its absence fundamentally strips states of any higher guarantee of survival. (Ibid) States' sensitivity to costs makes them not only act as absolute gain-seekers (as Neoliberals assume) but more inclined to ascribe paramount importance to relative gains. Neoliberals could not falsify Grieco's argument (cf. Baldwin 1993b: 5-6; Schweller 1996; Keohane and Martin 1999). Their preoccupation with institutionalized cooperation on economic and environmental issues and their relative disinterest in the realm of security (cf. Jervis 1999: 51; for contrasting examples see Zürn, Efinger, Rittberger et al, referred to above) only underscored Grieco's critique, because it is particularly the realm of international security where Realism sees a heightened importance of relative-gains concern (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95: 13; Rousseau 1999: 3).

The Neoliberal regime debate and its emphasis on the benefits of international institutions (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion) had nevertheless left its

marks on Realism. Already in 1986, Waltz (1986: 81) conceded that ‘supranational agents’ (such as international institutions or regimes) do exist. Again referring to hegemonic stability, Waltz assumed that in order to operate effectively, they have to acquire ‘some of the attributes and capabilities of states’ and ultimately need ‘the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the principal states concerned with the matters at hand.’ (Ibid) Neorealists therewith tried to integrate the tenets of hegemonic stability into the workings of international institutions. As Haufler (1993: 95) puts it: ‘When power in the international system is concentrated in one state, that state, or hegemon, attempts to reduce the costs of its leadership by institutionalizing the framework for negotiation in particular issue areas. The hegemon establishes regimes in order to provide stability to the system as a whole.’

The downturn of this argumentation is that it does not fully reflect reality. As Neoliberals such as Keohane (1984) have argued, international institutions might contain their own causal dynamics even in times of hegemonic decline. Following Neorealism, particularly in times of hegemonic decline a sharp decrease in the functioning of international institutions should become visible. However, this has not been the case in every issue-area. Take for instance the hegemonic decline of the United States in certain policy fields during the last 50 years (e.g. the economic crisis of the 1970s and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system) which did not lead to a complete breakdown of international institutionalized cooperation (cf. Grieco 1988: 491-2; Müller 1993a: 18). Instead, other forms of international institutionalized cooperation such as the G6 (1975, Rambouillet) and later the G7, G8, and G20 Summits took over. In addition, international institutions have turned out to be much more persistent to changes in the general political climate (cf. Zangl 2010: 132) than expected by Realists (cf. Morgenthau 1954). However, in the realm of international multilateral security, the relative decline of American hegemony and the ‘rise of the rest’ (Kupchan 2012) parallel the increasingly weak performance of international institutions such as the NPT (cf. Müller 2009).

A second important aspect of the Neoliberal regime episteme was that the ensuing debate between Neoliberals and Neorealists (see Baldwin 1993b) shifted the focus

towards cooperation, international institutions, and cooperative strategies – a field which Realism had previously often ignored; even though Realism has never denied the fact of states’ potential interest in cooperation per se (cf. Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1954; Waltz 1979). Jervis summarizes:

*[Neoliberals and Neorealists] agree that cooperation is more likely or can be made so if large transactions can be divided up into a series of smaller ones, if transparency can be increased, if both the gains from cheating and the costs of being cheated on are relatively low, if mutual cooperation is or can be made much more advantageous than mutual defection, and if each side employs strategies of reciprocity and believes that the interactions will continue over a long period of time. (Jervis 1999: 52)*

The ‘slicing up’ of certain policy issues into increments (cf. Oye 1986b: 17), the principle of reciprocity, and the belief that the gains from cooperation will increase over time if cooperation continues are basically all features or conclusions of the strategy of TFT which had emerged as the winner in Axelrod’s (1984) first computer tournament. Translated into real-life politics, the separation of certain policy issues into segments (take for instance the CFE negotiations with their five categories of conventional arms; see Paragraph 3.3.1 below), the reciprocity through repeated rounds of negotiation, and the expectation that cooperation would be more than a one-time encounter all point to the arms control strategy of *confidence-building* which basically aims at addressing states’ trust deficit (for a discussion see Paragraph 2.3.5 below; cf. Kaiser 1983). Neoliberals have argued that confidence-building can lead to institutionalization if it continues over a longer period (cf. Oye 1986a). Jervis (1999: 52, footnote 27) infers that ‘it is not true, however, that a long “shadow of the future” by itself increases cooperation.’ Fearon (1998: 272) explains ‘that though a long shadow of the future may make enforcing an international agreement easier, it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal.’

Beyond repeated TFT, Jervis’ reference to increased transparency and to limiting the gains from cheating can be partially addressed by the strategy of employing

*monitoring* mechanisms (for a discussion see Paragraph 2.3.5 below). Particularly in the security realm, cheating can quickly lead to changes to the balance of military power as modern arms technology develops in an increasingly rapid manner (cf. Jervis 1978). Mearsheimer (1994/95: 13) calls this effect a “special peril of defection” in the military realm’. The gains from cheating in security relations are thus comparably higher than in most other issue-areas. Hence, the concrete monitoring instruments (e.g. inspections, notifications, data exchange) have to be extremely timely, intrusive, and reliable in order to decrease the possible break-out time and thus the gains from cheating. However, particularly in the realm of security, secrecy works against efforts to increase transparency (cf. Larsen and Wirtz 2009). States have to strike a balance between their own demand for transparency and their concern that too much transparency might advantage the other side. Monitoring instruments thus have to be carefully tailored. To be clear, monitoring cannot eliminate defection; it does not even directly address it. In a PD situation, non-transparency is not the problem because rational actors already know what to expect from each other (i.e. defection). However, in real life, monitoring can limit the losses one side will suffer once the other side cheats. In reaction, the betrayed side can faster return to its pre-cooperative policy (e.g. through arms deployment, development, or acquisition). Particularly international institutions can lessen the costly burdens associated with monitoring capabilities. Take for instance the sophisticated monitoring system of the CTBT which could not be technically and financially sustained on a single basis by most parties to the treaty. Nevertheless, also international institutions cannot eliminate the danger of cheating.

Contemporary Realism has largely accepted the role of international institutions (cf. exemplary Jervis 1999; Drezner 2009). However, today’s Realists see the same forces (i.e. relative power distribution, competition, and states’ rationality) at work within international institutions as in classical state-to-state relations. According to Mearsheimer (1994/95: 13), Realists ‘recognize that states sometimes operate through institutions. However, they believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that

they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it.’ Evans and Wilson (1992: 330) agree that institutions are ‘arenas for acting out power relationships.’

Under the so called ‘modified structural’ approach, Schweller and Priess (1997) developed a model that combines traditional Realist state-to-state interactions on the sub-systemic level of international institutions with the structural notions of Neorealism, thus allowing international institutions to get integrated into what basically traditional Realist thinking is. Daniel Drezner (2007) takes this “Neo-Neo” Realist approach further by arguing that even in times of Multipolarity and globalization, states’ regulatory power is not necessarily constrained by international institutions but that powerful states exert their power through international institutions in order to achieve their domestic interests. Following Drezner, “size matters” when looking at the politics employed and the goals pursued in international regimes. By means of their capabilities in specific issue-areas, states make strategic use of the various institutions of international cooperation (cf. Drezner 2009); particularly in the realm of security (cf. Thakur 2013).

While thus Realists have come to accept international institutions and even their potential role in international security, their assessment is that the operation of international institutions is essentially constrained by the same structural forces on a sub-systemic level. Their conclusion is that institutions ‘have minimal influence on state behavior’ (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 7) or, to carry the argument to the extreme, that they ‘matter only on the margins’ (ibid).

Summing up, Neorealists as well as Neoliberals have tried to address the problems of states’ rationality to cheat. Both have provided arguments which speak for repeated cooperation (hegemonic stability, international institutions) and a reduced possibility that states will actually cheat (shadow of the future and to a lesser degree monitoring instruments). Nevertheless, none of their approaches can completely eliminate the problem that Realism assumes. Rational gain-seeking states in an environment of anarchy will still find it tempting to cheat on each oth-

er if they deem the short-term gains from cheating higher than the long-term gains from cooperation. International institutions provide stable frameworks for repeated cooperation. However, they too can neither eliminate cheating nor restrain states' ambitions.

In the next paragraph, a Realist model for understanding international cooperation will be developed. It is based on Realist theory.

### 2.3 Developing a Realist Model of International Cooperation

In this paragraph, a Realist model for understanding international cooperation based on five variables (of which one is a composite variable) will be developed. The variables all derive from Realist theory and include reflections on power and security, interests, the central role of nation states, states' expectations, their related strategies, and their rational gain-seeking mentality. Before, some necessary clarifications will be offered.

#### 2.3.1 Clarifying Realist Means and Ends

As explained above, classical Realism and Neorealism put different emphases on power (see Paragraph 2.2). While for classical Realists such as Morgenthau power is the prime objective of states and their interest is defined in power, Neorealism sees power more as a means – though the *central* one – and not an end. The end is, according to Waltz, survival. In order to ultimately ensure survival, states strive for security. Herz's observations of security dilemmas have stressed the ambiguity of security (see Paragraph 2.2 above). Glaser (1994/95) has therefore offered a different interpretation of security. He argues that 'if cooperation increases a country's security, then increases in the adversary's security are usually desirable, whether or not they exceed increases in the defender's security. In the security realm, instead of a relative-gains problem, we often have a mutual-gains benefit.' (Ibid: 76) Schweller (1996: 104) agrees: 'When security is the goal, as in the security dilemma, states will seek to succor, not sucker, their neighbors (the CC payoff).' Even though such viewpoints have remained a minority opinion among

scholars of Realism, they should be taken into account in conjunction with the concept of cooperative security and I will shortly come back to this point.

Baldwin correctly asks: ‘Security for whom? And security for which values?’ (Baldwin 1997: 13) This thesis examines security policies and institutionalization in a specific policy field of security between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Hence, we can answer Baldwin’s first question: security for the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Defining, and particularly measuring security is extremely hard (cf. Buzan 1991). Realism sometimes tends to equate security with military security (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95). Such viewpoint is nevertheless too narrow for the purpose of this thesis. The analysis will show that particularly security considerations in the economic realm led the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev to forego certain military advantages vis-à-vis the United States and NATO (see Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3; cf. Gorbachev 1996). Since this thesis analyzes the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia devoted to cooperative arms control in Europe – a policy field based on the holistic concept of cooperative security (see Paragraph 1.4.1 above) – we can, partially, also answer Baldwin’s second question: increased *mutual* security by means of reciprocity, inclusiveness, dialogue, a defensive orientation, transparency, confidence-building, and arms limitations. Waltz’s Neorealism, emphasizing security, is closer to the analytical focus of this thesis. Therefore, his deliberations will provide the main, though not the exclusive, basis for elaborating the model.

We should now specify the gains from cooperation. Baldwin (1993b: 16) notes that Realists ‘sometimes neglect to specify precisely what kinds of gains they have in mind. Usually the answer is gains in capabilities. This answer, however, begs yet another question, namely: “Capabilities to get whom to do what?”’ Following Waltz (1979: 131), capabilities comprise various factors of power. Nagel (1975: 14) points out, ‘anyone who employs a causal concept of power must specify domain and scope’. As explained before, the specification of this thesis lies in the domain of security. The scope is achieving mutual security (i.e. cooperative security).

When assessing realms of security policy which include crucial military aspects, questions of military advantage and disadvantage come into play (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95: 11-2). Mearsheimer (ibid: 12) summarizes that ‘every state would like to be the most formidable military power in the system because this is the best way to guarantee survival in a world that can be very dangerous.’ At the same time, the specific concept of cooperative security is inherently bound to a defensively-oriented approach, aimed at increased *mutual* security (cf. Paragraph 1.4.1 above and Zartman 1995: 892). Cooperative security thus tries to escape the security dilemma (cf. Herz 1950) by defining security not as unilateral national struggle but as concerted international effort (see also the arguments provided by Glasler 1994/95 and Schweller 1996). It thus breaks with the mainstream Realist definition of security which sees states competing for security. However, cooperative security and Realism are perfectly compatible as long as one assumes the gains from cooperation on cooperative security to reflect the balance of power. It follows that the gains from U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe have to (1) reflect the balance of power and (2) increase mutual security.

A direct conclusion derives from this assumption: since the concept of cooperative security is inherently defensive, it has to involve at least two status quo-oriented powers (cf. Jervis 1999: 51-2). Since the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have shaped, and continue to shape cooperative arms control in Europe (cf. McKenzie and Loedel 1998b: 8), their orientation in this specific realm of security has to be defensive (i.e. not geared towards changing the balance of power) in order to achieve cooperation. This assumption shall help us to distinguish cooperative from non-cooperative security policies in Chapter 3.

Beyond these observations, the Realist model of international cooperation shall serve a central purpose in this thesis. Applying the model in Chapter 3 shall help to assess potential reasons for cooperation, strategies of cooperation, and states’ evaluation of gains from cooperation. Since the model is designed to take account of repeated instances of cooperation over a longer period of time, it shall help to

highlight which factors may lead to repeated cooperation and/or the slowing-down or decay of cooperation. The model has five variables which all reflect central Realist tenets as discussed in the previous paragraphs: capabilities, interests, expectations, strategies, and evaluation of gains. All variables depend on each other. Interests, expectations, strategies, and the evaluation of gains ought to be understood as dependent in a sequential understanding. States' interests determine their expectations. Then, interests and expectations trigger certain strategies. The composite variable of the evaluation of gains is the last stage in this sequence. The intervening variable of capabilities constantly interacts with the other four variables. Recalling Waltz (1979: 98): 'The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept.'

The model has been developed to reflect only upon bilateral international cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia during the previous 41 years in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe. In the following five paragraphs, the five variables are introduced.

### 2.3.2 Capabilities

States' ability and willingness to engage in efforts of international cooperation is, in large parts, though not exclusively, shaped by the respective state's relative capabilities in the international arena (cf. Waltz 1979) – that is, its power. A comparison of capabilities (i.e. power) of states can rely on different methods and factors (cf. Hart 1976). One method would be to compare states' 'national material capabilities' (see COW 2014). Capabilities are, according to Waltz (1979: 131), the 'size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence'. The Waltzian capabilities are a more materialistic definition of power than Morgenthau's is (1954; see Paragraph 2.2 above). From a methodological point of view, they are easier to quantify than for instance Morgenthau's factor of states' morality. They also take into account economic factors which are important for the scope of this thesis (see Paragraph 2.3.1 above).

For reasons of methodology, only three of the Waltzian factors are taken into account for an assessment and comparison of the capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Those factors are: size of population and territory, economic capability, and military strength. The factor of resource endowment could, theoretically, comprise almost everything from natural resources over gender equality to intellectual capital. The political stability and competence of a given state is already hard to measure (see the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index 2014); it particularly is with a view to assessing in hindsight the closed Soviet system (cf. Cohen 2004). In addition, this thesis does not focus on the domestic policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Therefore, these two factors of Waltz's definition of capabilities are not employed.

The remaining three factors make a straightforward comparison possible. Economic capabilities can be assessed by comparing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP in current US\$; see IISS 1973 and World Bank 1989-2013). The factor of economic capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia was particularly important in relation to the end of the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War period (cf. Gorbachev 1996). In addition, it pre-determines to a large degree both countries performance in the military realm. Military strength can be assessed by counting total armed forces (not including reserve or paramilitary forces) and comparing national defense budgets (see IISS 1973-2014). The factor of military strength is particularly important from a Realist point of view because some Realists assign military power a paramount role determining states' national security (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95). The size of population and territory can be assessed making use of official geographic (see CIA 1982-2014) and population geography (see IISS 1973-2014) data. The factor of size of population and territory is particularly important for the Russian security concern from a geopolitical point of view (see for a discussion Paragraph 3.7.1 below).

Since the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia were/are part of military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact, later also the CST), the combined forces of those countries, their combined defense budgets as well as their accumulated size

of population and territory are included in the assessment as well. This procedure does not apply to the factor of economic capabilities. As reference for assessing and comparing these three factors the International Institute for Security Studies *Military Balance* series (1973-2014), the *GDP Data Base* of the World Bank (1989-2013), and the *CIA World Factbook* series (1982-2014) are taken. The respective data has been compiled in Annex I of this thesis.

Since capabilities can undergo changes in a quantitative and a qualitative understanding (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 11; Waltz 1979: 97), the variable of capabilities allows application of the model over a longer period of time with different instances of international cooperation.

### 2.3.3 Interests

According to Waltz, states' paramount interest is survival (1979: 91) and thus security (ibid: 126). Waltz views states' interest in securing their survival as fixed. According to this logic, every attempt at cooperation has to serve – in one way or another; directly or indirectly – the interest of securing survival. From now on, and throughout this thesis, this interest in securing survival is termed states' *general interest*. Below the level of general interest, states can rank their preferences in any order. Waltz (1979: 91): 'Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone.' (Cf. also Morgenthau 1954: 31) From now on, and throughout this thesis, states' interests below the level of general interest are termed *issue-specific interests*. Issue-specific interests and the general interest may be extremely close connected; particularly in the military realm because Realists view the military and policies directed to states' forces as extremely close connected to states' security (cf. Morgenthau 1954; Mearsheimer 1994/95).

As a historic analogy, the general interest of the United States and the Soviet Union became particularly visible during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Their prime aim was to avoid the scenario of an all-out nuclear war. At the same time Washington had an issue-specific interest in the removal of Soviet nuclear arms from Cuba

while Moscow had an issue-specific interest in challenging Washington through deployment of those weapons. If both would have remained on a confrontational collision course, the possibility of a nuclear exchange would have most likely become manifest reality (cf. Nathan and Allison 2012). Both issue-specific interests were thus closely connected to their general interest. The mutual general interest and the condition of MAD finally trumped the issue-specific interest of the Soviet Union (cf. Jervis 1978: 180). The Assistant to U.S. President Reagan for national security affairs, Robert C. McFarlane, explained in an interview in 1985 that albeit the ‘expansionist’ character of the Soviet Union, both countries ‘share a fundamental interest [sic!] in avoiding nuclear conflict and reducing tensions.’ (Quoted from J. Stein 1985: 614)

When cooperation promises to serve states’ general interest, notwithstanding states’ relative-gains concern and the problem of cheating for a moment, states might seek cooperation. In this case and when cooperation on an issue-specific subject is closely connected to states’ general interest or states’ perception of the interconnectedness, one can assume that states will bargain extremely hard in reaching a cooperative arrangement (cf. Jervis 1999). When issue-specific interests are convergent, achieving cooperation becomes either trivial (when interests are identical towards cooperation) or impossible (when interests are identical towards non-cooperation). When issue-specific interests are divergent, achieving cooperation becomes complicated. In that case much will depend on states’ expectations and the possible strategies employed by states in arriving at cooperation. Divergent issue-specific interests can nevertheless be overcome if they are very closely connected to states’ survival instinct, as in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, if one or both would see a chance to forge ahead of the other, the general interest in survival might become the driving force to forego cooperation on issue-specificity.

In the model, interests are classified as general interest and issue-specific interests. The general interest is fixed. It does not change, according to Realism. Issue-specific interests however can change as a consequence of changes in capabilities,

change in leadership, newly available information, technological developments and so forth. In the model, issue-specific interests are divided into convergent and divergent.

#### 2.3.4 Expectations

While states' interests might be geared towards cooperation, states are nevertheless uncertain what to expect from their potential cooperation partner. Because states are uncertain, they are cautious. They will thus assess cooperation *ex ante* according to their expectations. Their expectations are a form of *ex ante* assessment of the probability of cooperation.

Even though expectations are seldom referred to directly by Realists (cf. exemplary Waltz 1979), they are an indirect part of Realist theory because they derive logically from states' uncertainty (cf. Grieco 1988: 500; Glaser 1994/95: 56; Zakaria 1998: 20). According to Realism, all states act rational in the sense that they share a paramount concern for the balance of power and their own survival. At the same time, states have to comply with the shortcoming of imperfect information and deviant behavior from this rule. Waltz (1979: 92) openly admits that his assumption of states' general interest 'allows for the fact that no state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival. It allows for the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival; they may, for example, prefer amalgamation with other states to their own survival in form. It allows for the fact that in pursuit of its security no state will act with perfect knowledge and wisdom'. States thus know only little about their opponents other than that 'those who conform to accepted and successful practices [i.e. conforming to the consequences of anarchy] more often rise to the top and are likely to stay there.' (Waltz 1979: 92) At the same time, states' rationality demands assessing cooperation *ex ante*. Sebenius (1991) stresses that the actual existence of expectations is a precondition to the realization of interests. According to Realism, states assess each others' foreign and security policy in order to gain knowledge what to expect from each other (cf. Morgenthau 1954: Part 2).

With regards to cooperation, basically three Realist expectations of the probability of cooperation exist. When a status quo power faces another status quo power, the possibility for cooperation exists because both have a defensive orientation (cf. Jervis 1999: 51-2) and because both states' relative-gains concern should become reflected in a cooperative arrangement which would roughly mirror the existing balance of power. When a status quo power faces an expansionist power, the probability of cooperation is very low because it would be irrational for the status quo power to accept relative losses (ibid).

In the model, the variable of expectations is divided into two possible ex ante expectations. The first expectation derives from a situation where a defensively-oriented state faces another defensively-oriented state. According to Realism, cooperation between the two is possible, taking into account their relative-gains concern and including efforts to limit the consequences of cheating (cf. the previous paragraphs of this chapter). This expectation is termed *defensive vs. defensive* in the model. The second expectation derives from a situation where a defensively-oriented state faces an offensively-oriented state. The chance to arrive at cooperation under this constellation is very low according to Realism (cf. Jervis 1999: 51-2).<sup>8</sup> This expectation is termed *defensive vs. offensive* in the model.

### 2.3.5 Strategies

After having assessed ex ante their chances to arrive at possible cooperation, in case of pro-cooperation assessment, states have to employ strategies in order to ensure their relative-gains concern gets put into practice and to limit as much as possible the consequences which necessarily arise from states' rationality to cheat. States can make use of different strategies or a mix of strategies to cooperate (cf.

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<sup>8</sup> A third possible expectation is an offensively-oriented state facing another offensively-oriented state (offensive vs. offensive). In this situation, cooperation might be possible as the secret partition of Poland under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) shows. However, more often, instead of cooperating, expansionist powers wage war (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 67 et seq). Cooperation among the two would logically be at the expense of third state(s) and is thus in contradiction to the concept of cooperative security which (theoretically) seeks to achieve mutual security for *all* (see Zartman 1995: 892). This expectation is therefore excluded from the cooperation model which only assesses cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe (which is based on the concept of cooperative security).

Jervis 1999). The model contains three strategies which derive from Realist and Neorealist/Neoliberal theory. They are introduced in the following.

*1. Compensation:* States can choose a strategy of compensation if the distribution of gains does not roughly reflect the existing balance of power (cf. Morgenthau 1954: 179; Grieco 1988: 501-2). The strategy of compensation is in close vicinity to the concept of linkage (cf. McGinnis 1986) because states link the emerging gap in relative gains to a certain form of compensation in order to offset a potentially emerging result which would alter the balance of power. Compensation often takes the form of a political quid pro quo (ibid). McGinnis (ibid: 161) notes that albeit official assurances about the separate nature of certain policy issues, nevertheless, tacit linkages between the issues can be concluded. As another example from the Cuban Missile Crisis, during the 13 days in October 1962, Kennedy agreed to withdraw nuclear weapons from Turkey as a political quid pro quo for Soviet withdrawal from Cuba while publicly denying any such deal (cf. Nathan and Allison 2012).

McGinnis (1986: 158) raises a caveat with regards to political linkages in cooperative institutionalized arrangements. He notes that institutions of linkage-based cooperation ‘may be very “brittle”, in the sense that any disturbance can be quickly transmitted throughout the material, causing it to shatter into numerous pieces.’ He concludes that particularly where cooperation is actually based on or achieved through a strategy of linkage, even minor changes can increase the already existing “brittleness” of the arrangement. While this assumption might pose a problem to international institutions, states might as well decide to adjust the consequences of change according to their preferences.

*2. Confidence-building:* Under the strategy of confidence-building, states aim at increasing trust in the actions of the other by: (1) slicing up the issue at stake into increments; (2) employing reciprocity; (3) lengthening their levels of expectations through repeated engagement on the issue (cf. Jervis 1999: 52). As explained above (see Paragraph 2.2.4), the strategy of confidence-building is thus in close

vicinity to the game-theoretical illustration of the strategy of TFT. If confidence-building continues successfully over a longer period of time, it can lead to institutionalization (cf. Oye 1986a).

However, confidence-building does not guarantee for success. Neoliberals such as Axelrod (1984) have only proven that under an artificial condition which resembles some of the constraining features of anarchy, a conditional strategy of cooperation emerges as the most successful, with “success” defined in purely economic terms of absolute gain-maximizing. TFT does neither eliminate the problem of cheating nor does it take into account states’ relative-gains concern (cf. Grieco 1988). Jervis (1999) notes that the incentive which Axelrod’s ‘shadow of the future’ (1988) promises does not increase the probability of cooperation – particularly not in the realms of security and arms control – because states will bargain even harder (cf. also Fearon 1998). It is not for nothing that politically binding CSBMs either preclude legally binding arms control treaties (as in the case of the Stockholm CDE stipulations preceding the CFE and INF treaties; for a discussion see Chapter 3) or apply to security areas where the most powerful states take a more relaxed stance towards possible cheating (take for instance most of the C/OSCE CSBMs; for a discussion see Chapter 3). Even though confidence-building has proven that it can be a successful strategy in arms control negotiations (cf. Lachowski 2004), it cannot guarantee for successful cooperation (see the failed MBFR talks, Paragraph 3.2.1 below; cf. Fearon 1998).

*3. Monitoring:* The strategy of employing monitoring mechanisms has proven to decrease the incentive to cheat in real-life cooperation (cf. Jervis 1999; Larsen and Wirtz 2009). Returning to the PD situation, Glaser (1994/95: 130) argues that ‘improving a state’s ability to monitor an agreement reduces the difference between an adversary getting a lead and starting an arms race at the same time, that is, it reduces CD-DD, thereby making cooperation more desirable.’ Monitoring is particularly valuable for the realm of legally binding arms control agreements which is especially prone to cheating (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95).

However, as in the case of confidence-building, in real life, monitoring does not eliminate the rationality to defect. It does not even address the problem of cheating in a direct way. Monitoring addresses the *consequences* of cheating because it limits the losses of the betrayed side and, at the same time, limits the gains that the cheating party achieves. Hence, the higher the possible losses from unilateral defection, the tighter the monitoring instruments states would seek. As explained above, states' monitoring requirements often clash with their secrecy concern which is particularly high in the military realm of security. Therefore, states seek to minimize the negative consequences of unwanted knowledge transfer by limiting the parties to those agreements which touch upon issues of high sensitivity and by insisting on strict reciprocity (cf. Larsen and Wirtz 2009). The U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control agreements in the nuclear realm are examples of that kind. Monitoring can come in various forms such as (on-site) inspections, data exchange, notifications, national-technical means (including national intelligence), and open source information (e.g. crowd sourcing). It can be conducted on a unilateral (if one state's independent national monitoring capabilities are already satisfactory), a bilateral, multilateral, or institutionalized basis. The following table comprises the three cooperation strategies.

**TABLE 2**

COOPERATION STRATEGIES

<i>Compensation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>addresses states' relative-gains concern</i></li> <li>• <i>offsetting possible imbalance in the relative distribution of gains which would lead to changing the balance of power</i></li> <li>• <i>form of political quid pro quo</i></li> <li>• <i>close vicinity to the concept of political linkage, problem of increase of brittleness</i></li> <li>• <i>problem of subjectivity of the value of compensation</i></li> <li>• <i>does not eliminate the incentive to cheat</i></li> </ul>
<i>Confidence-Building</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>addresses states' trust deficit</i></li> <li>• <i>allows states to engage in repeated interaction</i></li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>tactics of slicing up policy issues into increments</i></li> <li>• <i>principle of reciprocity</i></li> <li>• <i>incentive of accumulated gains through lengthened shadow of the future</i></li> <li>• <i>often employed ex ante to legally binding measures</i></li> <li>• <i>can lead to institutionalization</i></li> <li>• <i>does not eliminate the incentive to cheat</i></li> </ul>
<i>Monitoring</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>addresses the consequences of cheating</i></li> <li>• <i>allows states to gain more transparency about implementation of cooperative arrangement</i></li> <li>• <i>allows states to faster return to pre-cooperation policies in case of cheating</i></li> <li>• <i>often employed in conjunction with legally binding measures in the “hard” sphere of security</i></li> <li>• <i>problem of states’ secrecy concern</i></li> <li>• <i>possible forms: (on-site) inspections, data exchange, notifications, NTM, open source information, unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, or institutionalized basis</i></li> <li>• <i>does not eliminate the incentive to cheat but limits the losses/gains from cheating</i></li> </ul>

In the model, the three strategies of compensation, confidence-building, and monitoring are listed as ‘and/or’ options (see Chart 1 below). According to Realism, for successful cooperation to happen in policy fields which touch upon states’ general interest, the strategies would most likely come in combination.

### 2.3.6 Evaluation of Gains

The variable of the evaluation of gains is a composite variable because it combines reflections of states (ex post to the act of cooperation) on the gains from cooperation with their reflections on the variables of capabilities, interests, and expectations *over time*. In this understanding, states’ evaluation of gains starts with Day 1 after cooperation has been agreed upon. While states’ expectations (see Paragraph 2.3.4) are a form of ex ante assessment of cooperation probability; the evaluation of gains is a form of ex post assessment of cooperation conse-

quences. This second form of assessment is important from a Realist point of view because states were initially uncertain about the consequences of cooperation (cf. Grieco 1988: 500; Glaser 1994/95: 56; Zakaria 1998: 20). Their ex post evaluation determines to a large degree whether to continue cooperation or not. The composite variable shall help to analyze whether actors got what they wanted from cooperation and how changes to the variables of capabilities, interests, and expectations influence their assessment. The composite variable of the evaluation of gains allows application of the model over a longer period of time.

As argued above, power, security, gains, and gain allocation are all in the eye of the beholder (cf. Schweller 1996). States might differ in their ex post assessment of cooperation. In addition, states might value the long-term consequences of cooperation differently over time. Changes in capabilities, in leadership, with regards to issue-specific interests, technological innovations, or newly available information can all lead to a changed assessment over time. States thus tend to conclude agreements with a rather long time horizon where crucial issues of national security are at stake (cf. Bull 1973). A longer time horizon allows for repeated rounds of re-evaluating gains before possibly re-engaging on the issue. The current U.S.-Russian New START agreement with its duration of ten years is an example of that kind. Yet, a longer time horizon also includes the possibility of important changes which might be to the perceived by one side as to its detriment.

The ex post evaluation of the gains from cooperation might be a difficult job for states against the background of subjectivity, longer time horizons, imperfect information, and possible changes. Particularly for agreements where strategies based on the concept of linkage (e.g. compensation), possibly involving more than one policy issue, have been employed, states might find it hard to assess gains (because linkage between different policy issues leads to more than a single assessment). As a consequence, evaluation of gains might produce mixed results; particularly where different national agencies with different interests are involved or where the domestic opposition challenges the administration's policy (take for

instance the current domestic debate in the United States about how to deal with INF Treaty compliance issues; cf. Pifer 2014a).

In the model, the composite variable of evaluation of gains concentrates on the relative gains that states achieve and their assessment of those gains over time. Their assessment leads states to pursue a certain action. In case of continued mutual satisfaction, continued cooperation between states might be the preferred option; renewed cooperation might be an additional choice. In case of mutual dissatisfaction, the chance for mutual exit increases and another round of cooperation becomes unlikely. In case where one side is satisfied and the other is (partially) not, states can either look for exit (take for instance the CFE Treaty; for a discussion see Chapter 3) or plead for re-negotiation (take the CFE Flank Agreement and the ACFE Treaty; for a discussion see *ibid.*)<sup>9</sup> In the model, the composite variable is thus sub-divided into continued/renewed cooperation (i.e. satisfaction), re-negotiation (i.e. partial dissatisfaction), and exit (i.e. dissatisfaction).

### 2.3.7 Assembling the Variables

Assembling the five variables of capabilities, interests, expectations, strategies, and evaluation of gains, Chart 2 (next page; the chart has been developed by the author for this thesis) illustrates the Realist model for understanding international cooperation. The five variables are written in capitalized letters. Their subunits are written in small letters. The variables and subunits are placed according to their capacity to decrease or increase the probability of cooperation. The variables of 'Interests', 'Expectations', 'Strategies', and the composite variable of the 'Evaluation of Gains' characterize four sequential stages in the process of cooperation. The lines symbolize connections to the next sequential stage (i.e. the next variable). In the case of the dotted line between the subunit of 'defensive vs. offensive' and the next variable/stage of 'Strategies', Realism assumes the cooperation probability between a defensively-oriented power and an offensively-oriented power to be rather low (cf. Jervis 1999: 51-2). Nevertheless, the option should not be


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<sup>9</sup> Even though these three options are akin to Hirschman's (1970) triad of 'exit, voice, and loyalty', there is no direct or intended correlation.

excluded from the model. The intervening variable of ‘Capabilities’ constantly interacts with all other variables. After having assembled the five variables on the next page, the following paragraph contains the conclusions of this chapter.

**CHART 2**

**REALIST MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**



## 2.4 Conclusions

According to Realism, achieving international cooperation under anarchy faces certain barriers which can impede cooperation. The absence of a world government, a system of nation states in competition, the unequal distribution of power in the system of states, the survival concern of states, the primacy of security policies, states' relative-gains considerations, and the rationality to cheat are all critical factors which increase skepticism towards long-term, continued, and stable international cooperation; particularly in the realm of military security.

How do states, according to Realism, arrive at international cooperation and which factors complicate their efforts? For successful cooperation, Realism assumes two basic prerequisites: the gains from cooperation have to roughly reflect the relative distribution of power and states have to limit the possible consequences of their rationality to cheat as much as possible. If those two prerequisites are met, international cooperation can take place. Nevertheless, it will still be hard to establish and even harder to maintain. International institutions have their role in this process. They can limit states' transaction costs, particularly in the realm of monitoring crucial agreements. By means of continuous interaction they can help to build confidence. However, states employ their power in international institutions as much as they do in their state-to-state relations. These insights are particularly valuable with regards to the two central research questions of this thesis. However, it is too early to answer them at this stage of research.

The model developed in this chapter shall help to understand international cooperation from a Realist point of view. Applying the model in the next chapter, its variables shall help to highlight what calculus led the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia to cooperate on cooperative arms control in Europe. What strategies did they employ? And, more importantly, did they get from cooperation what they wanted? And what were the consequences? In the next chapter, it will be important to focus on the different issue-specific interests of the two states, their cooperative or non-cooperative orientation, their strategies, and the Strangan 'who-gets-what' from cooperation (Strange 1982: 496).



### 3 Cooperative Arms Control in Europe, 1973-2014

This chapter is about the U.S.-Soviet/Russian policies on cooperative arms control in Europe between 1973 and 2014. The guiding research questions of this chapter are: (1) What calculus led the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia to cooperate on cooperative arms control in Europe, and did they get from cooperation what they wanted? (2) Does the degree of institutionalization justify application of the regime episteme?

The aim of this chapter is to understand the respective policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, directed at cooperative arms control in Europe along the lines of the Realist model of international cooperation, developed in Chapter 2. By focusing on their policies, also the degree of cooperation institutionalization shall be analyzed. A vast amount of literature has concentrated on issues of European and Euro-Atlantic security, U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, the history of the Cold War, the C/OSCE, NATO, and related arms control policies (see Paragraph 1.3 above). Those secondary as well as primary sources form the empirical basis of this chapter. They have been reviewed and qualitatively analyzed and are quoted where appropriate. The empirical evidence is divided into six historical periods from 1973 to 2014 (see Paragraph 3.1 for a discussion). The model will be applied to analyze the empirical evidence (see *ibid*).

The chapter contains eight paragraphs. The first six paragraphs highlight the development of cooperative arms control in Europe from 1973 to 2014. Each of those six paragraphs concludes with an analysis of cooperative processes, applying the Realist model for understanding international cooperation. The last paragraph sums up the findings and answers the guiding research questions of this chapter.

### 3.1 A Few Introductory Remarks

This paragraph offers a few useful clarifications with regards to the subject of this chapter and explains the methodological procedure. During the last 41 years, cooperative arms control in Europe has undergone a number of fundamental shifts and changes. These years have seen the tentative emergence of the paradigm of cooperative security including arms control policies between the two blocks during the 1970s, the establishment of a number of legally and politically binding arms control agreements during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the adaptation of these instruments during the mid- and late 1990s, eight years of stagnation and regress from 2000 to 2008, attempts to reset and repair cooperative arms control in Europe between 2009 and 2011, and the breakdown with the confrontation in and over Ukraine. In terms of institutionalization, Europe has experienced an unparalleled growth in multilateral security institutions which include various types of agreements, actors, and overlapping organizations.

In this chapter, the empirical evidence of the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia is analyzed. Because of the rather long time span of 41 years, a periodization of six specific periods (1973-1989; 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2008; 2009-2011; 2012-2014) is applied. This periodization has been chosen because of a number of critical political events that serve as periodical margins: (1) the start of MBFR talks in 1973 and the start of CFE talks in 1989, (2) German reunification in 1990 and the conversion of the CSCE to the OSCE in 1994, (3) the start of the NATO enlargement debate in 1995 and the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, (4) the beginning of George W. Bush's and Vladimir Putin's first presidency in 2000 and the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, (5) the beginning of Barack Obama's first presidency in 2009 and the end of the reset policy in 2011, and (6) Putin's third presidency in 2012 and the Ukraine conflict in 2014.

The account does not claim to be a complete historiographic portrayal but rather concentrates on the main institutional achievements and the respective U.S.-Soviet/Russian policies in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe as defined in Paragraph 1.4 above. For an encompassing overview of the different his-

toric stages of European security and arms control in general as well as the C/OSCE in particular see George (1988), Stares (1992), McKenzie and Loedel (1998), Ponsard (2007), Wenger, Nünlist, and Mastny (2008), Zellner, Schmidt, and Neuneck (2009), Villaume and Westad (2010), Alcaro and Jones (2011), Peter and Wentker (2012), or consult the annual IFSH OSCE Yearbook.

At the end of each period (except for the last period; see explanation in Paragraph 3.7.1 below), an analysis of cooperation processes and policies is conducted, applying the five variables of the Realist model from Chapter 2. Since the composite variable of the evaluation of gains has been designed to cover the entire period of analysis, certain analyses might refer to earlier periods of cooperation. As an example, the initial evaluation of the gains from cooperation on conventional forces limitation under CFE produced a rather positive mutual feedback which changed over time to the negative.

As explained in Paragraph 2.3.1 above, the gains from U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe have to (1) reflect the balance of power and (2) increase mutual security. When the composite variable of the evaluation of gains is applied in the following paragraphs, this condition shall be tested. In each of the paragraphs below devoted to analysis, the composite variable shall help to assess whether this condition was met and to which degree. Such undertaking meets the problem that security is ultimately hard to measure (cf. Buzan 2011). However, in order to assess the gains from U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe, security has to be measured in either a qualitative and/or quantitative understanding. One way to address the problem could be to compare the initial claim of a state entering negotiation with the actual outcome. If the outcome would not be in line with the initial claim, one could assume that the state did not achieve the desired security. However, the initial claim could lead to the perception of insecurity on the other side (see the problem of the security dilemma). Also, states might employ maximal demands when entering negotiation for purely tactical reasons (cf. Kremenyuk 1991a). Another way to address the problem could be to measure certain capabilities (e.g. military

manpower) before and after cooperation took place. Here the problem is that not every cooperative agreement in the military realm touches directly on specific capabilities (take for instance the monitoring agreement of Open Skies). Also, it is a question of perception whether increased or decreased specific capabilities increase or decrease security. To settle the problem, security in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe shall be measured in a qualitative understanding; that is, the central tenets of the concept of cooperative security (i.e. reciprocity, inclusiveness, dialogue, a defensive orientation, transparency, confidence-building, and arms limitations) shall be understood as increasing mutual security (cf. Mihalka 2005; Dewitt and Acharya 1996: 9-10; Nolan 1994b: 5; Zartman 1995: 892). Of course, this approach can be questioned as well for its per se interpretation of cooperative security leading to mutually increased security. However, the following paragraphs will show that the concept of cooperative security has helped to reduce the risk of open conflict. In addition, the initial U.S.-Soviet/Russian claims before cooperation and the actual outcomes of cooperation shall be addressed as well in order to get a more complete understanding.

In the following six paragraphs, the U.S.-Soviet/Russian policies on and the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe from 1973 to 2014 are introduced and analyzed.

### 3.2 Genesis and Change, 1973-1989

The genesis of cooperative arms control in Europe can be traced back to the late days of détente. In 1973, Moscow accepted the long-standing U.S. demand to enter into talks about conventional forces in Europe to address the imbalance in the conventional realm which was to the detriment of the United States and its NATO allies (see the comparison of capabilities of military strength in Paragraph 3.2.1 below). The ‘negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe’<sup>10</sup> – more commonly referred to as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks – were the first institutionalized, for-

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<sup>10</sup> Cited from Paragraph 2 of the Mutual Force Reductions in Europe - Communiqué of the Exploratory Talks, 28 June 1973.

mal, and (at least in official terms) multilateral arms control talks between the East and the West.<sup>11</sup> The talks continued for almost 16 years without any concrete result and were finally replaced by the CFE negotiations in 1989. For the Soviet Union amongst the reasons to agree to MBFR was the start of formal negotiations on the mandate for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1972. Particularly at the beginning of the CSCE process, Washington showed a very low degree of interest (cf. Maresca 1988: 109, Morgan 2008) and was more inclined to view it as a bargaining chip in conjunction with conventional and nuclear arms control goals (cf. Morgan 2008). When MBFR gained shape, Washington gave its fiat to the Soviet prestige project (cf. Darilek 1987: 6).

According to Haftendorn (2008:237), MBFR and the CSCE are ‘two sprouts from one bulb’. Even though the initial idea was to combine the two processes into one, NATO had difficulties to arrive at a common position with the United States pressing for separation of the two issues. In Haftendorn’s (2008: 254) words, ‘the U.S. benefited from its hegemonial position within the alliance and from its wealth of resources – including direct contacts with the USSR.’ In the end, Washington prevailed and conventional arms control was handled separately and not formally integrated in the CSCE framework (cf. Schlotter 1999: 223). In July and August 1975, the CSCE process reached its first climax with the Helsinki accords.<sup>12</sup> As part of the accords, a non-binding declaration of intent in the realm of arms control, the ‘Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament’ was agreed upon (cf. Ghéballi 1989).

While the MBFR talks dragged on inconclusively until 1989, the deteriorating East-West climate led to two lengthy CSCE follow-up conferences in Belgrade (1977-1978) and Madrid (1980-1983). Particularly since the coming into office of the Carter administration, the United States used the CSCE mainly as a forum for charging the Soviet Union for continued violations of its human rights commitments under the 1975 Helsinki Charter (cf. Selvage 2012).

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<sup>11</sup> For a good introduction to MBFR see Blacker (1988). For an encompassing account see Mutz (1983).

<sup>12</sup> The documents of the CSCE and the OSCE are accessible at [www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org).

In January 1984, the Stockholm negotiations of the Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) began with fundamentally divergent approaches taken by NATO and the WTO. The CDE was characterized by strong bipolarity and bilateralization of negotiations (cf. Ropers and Schlotter 1989: 320) and only arrived at a result in 1986 after a fundamental change in policy on the Soviet side began to loom with the advent of Gorbachev's 'new political thinking' (cf. Gorbachev 1996). Even though the CDE's stipulations were still of minor military relevance, the resulting CDE Document symbolizes the transition from the Cold War to a new European security order which started to take shape at the final days of the block confrontation (cf. Ghéballi 1989; Alexander 2005). In 1987, Moscow and Washington concluded the INF Treaty. In 1988, Moscow announced the unilateral and unconditional withdrawal of 500,000 soldiers of the Red Army from Eastern Europe and thus relinquished an important part of its conventional superiority in the European theater (cf. Gorbachev 2011: 16). In early 1989, the Third CSCE Follow-up Conference in Vienna began. Shortly afterwards, in March 1989, MBFR talks were replaced by a novel conference on European force limitations (CFE).

### 3.2.1 Analysis of Cooperation

In this paragraph, three cooperation processes – MBFR, the Helsinki CSCE, and the Stockholm CDE – are analyzed along the lines of the Realist model of international cooperation (see Chapter 2). Before, a closer look at the development of U.S./NATO-Soviet Union/WTO capabilities between 1973 and 1989 is taken.


#### Capabilities

The period from 1973 to 1989 saw the slow-down and final collapse of the Soviet economic system and thus, a major change in the factor of economic capabilities. During the Brezhnev era, economic growth came to a halt (cf. Mazat and Serrano). From the mid-1980s onwards, the Soviet economy shrank (ibid). At the same time, the U.S. economy of the 1980s experienced a period of growth. These diverging trends were not so much influencing the relationship during the 1970s but more and more during the 1980s (cf. Leffler and Westad 2010). In 1989, the GDP

of the United States (US\$ 5.6 trillion) was already ten times the GDP of the Soviet Union (US\$ 0.5 trillion). Chart 3 (below) illustrates these diverging trends. With this huge increase in national GDP, Washington could devote relatively more money to defense spending at a time where the Soviet Union was searching for ways to lift the financial burdens associated with its huge military apparatus (see below for a discussion).

**CHART 3**

COMPARISON OF U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN GNP/GDP<sup>13</sup>, 1973-1989




With regards to the first capabilities factor of military strength, the development of national defense budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union and the combined defense budgets of NATO member states and WTO member states showed a similar trend. While in 1973, the combined defense budgets of NATO member states were only US\$ 30 billion ahead of WTO states, in 1989, the difference had grown to US\$ 300 billion. Chart 4 (next page) illustrates these diverging trends.

<sup>13</sup> The World Bank GDP Data Base does only start with assessing the Soviet GDP from the year 1989 onwards. Therefore, data from the IISS Military Balance series (here issue 1973) has been taken for 1973. The IISS Military Balance series of 1973 only assesses the GNP.

#### CHART 4


COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET AND  
NATO-WTO COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGETS, 1973-1989



With regards to the second capabilities factor of military strength, the number of total armed forces shows the military buildup of the Soviet Union during the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Military Balance 1977-1984). While in 1973, the combined total armed forces of NATO (5.2 million) exceeded the WTO forces (4.45 million) by 700,000 men, in 1989, the combined total armed forces of WTO states (5.42 million) and NATO (5.35 million) were almost equal. While the United States had roughly maintained its level of total armed forces and NATO allies had filled the gap (in 1982, Spain joined the alliance), on the Eastern side, the Soviet Union had increased its military commitment almost by one million soldiers. At the same time, the defense budget of the Soviet Union could not keep pace with the American one (see Chart 4 above). The economic effects of this additional military burden led the new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev to reconsider its military engagement from the mid-1980s onwards and to withdraw 500,000 soldiers from Eastern Europe (see below for a discussion). Chart 5 (next page) illustrates the Soviet military buildup in total armed forces between 1973 and 1989.

### CHART 5

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET AND  
NATO-WTO COMBINED TOTAL ARMED FORCES<sup>14</sup>, 1973-1989




With regards to the capabilities factor of the size of population, the existing relative difference between the Eastern and the Western bloc remained largely the same between 1973 and 1989. In 1973, the combined size of population of NATO member states was 0.54 billion. In comparison, WTO member states had 0.35 billion. In 1989, and after Spain had joined NATO in 1982, the alliance had 0.65 billion while the Eastern bloc had 0.4 billion. Chart 6 (next page) illustrates these figures. With regards to the capabilities factor of the size of territory, the combined size of territory of WTO states was 32.3 million km<sup>2</sup> in 1973 and 1989. Only the combined size of territory of NATO member states increased between 1973 and 1989 due to the accession of Spain. In 1973, NATO member states had 22.2 million km<sup>2</sup> and in 1989 the figure was 22.7 million km<sup>2</sup>. Chart 7 (next page) illustrates these figures.

<sup>14</sup> In this and the following charts on total armed forces, reserve and paramilitary forces are not included. The figure of total armed forces includes forces assigned to WMD missions.


**CHART 6**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET AND  
NATO-WTO COMBINED SIZE OF POPULATION, 1973-1989



**CHART 7**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET AND  
NATO-WTO COMBINED SIZE OF TERRITORY, 1973-1989



## MBFR and the Helsinki CSCE

*Interests:* Throughout much of the Cold War the general interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in securing survival was closely associated and sometimes became even exclusively equated with aspects of military strength (cf. Leffler and Westad 2010). Since the years 1962, their general interest had led to a mutual interest in cooperation in order to avoid nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 had underscored how real this worst case scenario was and had triggered the Western policy of *détente* (cf. Hershberg 2010). Even though cooperation promised ‘strategic stability’ (see Colby and Gerson 2013), the interrelationship between security and aspects of military strength determined mutual policies. The SALT treaties with their numerical parity were examples of that kind. With regards to Europe, the issue-specific interests of the United States and the Soviet Union related to *détente* were divergent (cf. Hershberg 2010). Washington had an issue-specific interest in achieving a change to the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe which was to NATO’s detriment; Moscow was not interested in relinquishing its conventional advantage (cf. Mutz 1983). On the Helsinki CSCE, Moscow wanted a conference which would cement the territorial status quo in Europe (cf. Schlotter 1999); Washington was initially less interested in the CSCE (cf. Morgan 2008: 25 et seq).

*Expectations:* With regards to the MBFR talks, the setting was clear. Moscow wanted to avoid a change to the status quo through MBFR; Washington wanted to change the status quo to its advantage (cf. Blacker 1988; Mutz 1989). Washington acted as offensively-oriented power; Moscow as defensively-oriented power. According to Realism (see Chapter 2), both could expect that cooperation on the issue would most likely fail. With regards to the potential outcomes of the Helsinki CSCE, the setting was rather vague on the U.S. side. Moscow wanted to achieve an official recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. It thus acted defensively-oriented. As referred to above, Washington did not show great interest or even enthusiasm for the CSCE and acted rather passively in the beginning, leaving the initiative in the initial negotiations to its allies and the non-aligned states (cf. Morgan 2008: 25 et seq). However, the closer the parties moved towards the

1975 Helsinki Summit, the more Washington pressed for an inclusion and official recognition of human rights commitments in the Final Act (cf. Schlotter 1999). Even though, Washington could not expect a somewhat binding declaration on human rights, its effort to press the East for declaratory commitments can be seen as an offensively-oriented undertaking at declaratory change. Washington thus acted as offensively-oriented as well as defensively-oriented power. According to Realism (see Chapter 2), both could expect that cooperation on the issue would be very hard to achieve, if at all.

*Strategies:* Both applied a strategy mix of (cross-policy) compensation and confidence-building. On the one hand, MBFR should compensate for the Helsinki CSCE and vice versa (cf. Haftendorn 2008).<sup>15</sup> Soviet cooperation on MBFR should thus secure U.S. cooperation on the Helsinki CSCE which in turn should secure continued Soviet cooperation on MBFR (cf. Morgan 2008). On the other hand, both processes were sliced up into increments (cf. Oye 1986: 17). The Helsinki CSCE was transformed into a continuous conference and MBFR saw 47 negotiation rounds before it was suspended in 1989 (cf. Mutz 1989). Slicing up the issues into increments made it possible to lengthen the shadow of the future and to gain more confidence in the actions of the other. At the same time, lengthening the shadow of the future, led to increasingly hard bargaining on the issue of MBFR over the next 16 years without any concrete result (cf. Fearon 1998: 272).

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<sup>15</sup> Ropers and Schlotter (1989: 325) argue that the Helsinki CSCE and MBFR were only part of a larger package deal of cross-issue linkages (cf. also Kremenyuk 1991: 34-5). MBFR and the Helsinki CSCE are, however, the only issues with direct reference to the subject of this thesis. Further on, Ropers and Schlotter claim that during the years 1972-1989 it was always the United States who acted as the 'linker' and the Soviet Union who acted as 'linkee'. (Ibid: 324) This assumption is supported by former Secretary of State Kissinger's portrayal of the U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during his time in office: 'We insisted that progress in superpower relations, to be real, had to be made on a broad front. Events in different parts of the world, in our view, were related to each other; even more so, Soviet conduct in different parts of the world. We proceeded from the premise that to separate issues into distinct compartments would encourage the Soviet leaders to believe that they could use cooperation in one area as a safety valve while striving for unilateral advantages elsewhere. This was unacceptable.' (Kissinger 1979: 129) Ulam (1983: 59) argues against a one-sided perspective on linkage policies: 'In fact, the Soviets, when it came to something they badly wanted, have themselves been strong believers in linkage'.

*Evaluation of Gains:* Washington achieved the establishment of MBFR talks; however, in the talks themselves, cooperation failed. The Soviets were not willing to accept a change to the relative distribution of power in the conventional military realm. The talks continued without any result until 1989. Washington did not get what it wanted. Cooperation failed because the different orientations (defensively-oriented on the Soviet side; offensively-oriented on the U.S. side) and the general interest, which was closely associated with aspects of military strength, did not allow for real cooperation on the issue. Hence, the evaluation of gains from cooperation on MBFR changed over time from initially positive assessment to increasing signs of U.S. and Western dissatisfaction (cf. Alexander 2005). The former Head of the United Kingdom's delegation to the talks, Michael Alexander (ibid: 172), later concluded: 'the MBFR talks were almost a metaphor for the Cold War itself – a negotiating confrontation for which there was no mutually acceptable outcome but whose infinitely tedious exchanges the participants were determined neither to abandon nor to allow to self-destruct.' In 1989, both exited from the MBFR format and shifted to the newly established CFE negotiations.

Moscow succeeded in convening the Helsinki CSCE and in writing down a number of status quo principles such as the 'indivisibility of security in Europe', 'sovereign equality', 'respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty', 'refraining from the threat or use of force', the 'inviolability of frontiers', the 'territorial integrity of States', and the 'non-intervention in internal affairs' – all of a declaratory and non-binding nature (see Helsinki Final Act 1975; for an evaluation see Chapter 5). At the same time, Washington, together with a number of other states, pressed for the inclusion of human rights commitments, the establishment of a first tentative approach at military CSBMs, and a continuation of the CSCE (cf. Schlotter 1999). Cooperation became possible because of this issue-specific form of compensation (human rights for status quo recognition) and because of an additional strategy of cross-policy compensation with Washington compensating Moscow for MBFR with the Helsinki CSCE and vice versa (cf. Haftendorn 2008).

While Moscow had achieved its preferred issue-specific interest on the Helsinki CSCE, the further processual character of the CSCE turned out to be to the Soviets' detriment over the years. On the one hand, the Carter and Reagan administrations increasingly used the CSCE to openly charging the Soviet Union for her human rights record (cf. Schlotter 1999). On the other hand, dissidents in the WTO states used the promises of the CSCE Charter to charge their own governments and to call for more personal freedoms (cf. Gorbachev 1996). Moscow initially gained and, over the long run, also lost from the CSCE. The evaluation of gains on the Soviet side (cf. Schlotter 1999) thus changed over time from an initially positive evaluation (shortly after 1975) over a period of negative evaluation (from the late 1970s onwards) back to a rather positive evaluation (towards the end of the 1980s). On the U.S. side, the initially rather negative evaluation of the gains from cooperation on the CSCE changed, over time, to positive evaluation (ibid). The actual gains from U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the Helsinki CSCE did reflect the balance of power inasmuch as the outcome of cooperation did not lead to a change in the relative distribution of military strength. The gains increased mutual security through confidence-building by repeated dialogue-based interaction and through declaratory commitments on human rights, military transparency, and the territorial status quo.

#### Stockholm CDE

*Interests:* The Stockholm CDE negotiations (1984-1986) displayed a slightly different setting. The mutual interest in cooperation had decreased since 1975 against the background of Moscow increasingly deploying SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, NATO's Double-Track Decision in 1979, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in the same year, and the proclamation of martial law in Poland in 1981. The mutual close association of security with aspects of military strength only increased during those years (cf. Leffler and Westad 2010). When the CDE started in 1984, U.S. and Soviet issue-specific interests were divergent. Washington was interested in verifiable transparency on WTO conventional forces, suggesting intrusive on-site inspections (cf. Leatherman 2003: 171); Moscow was interested in disarmament measures in the realm of WMD (see ibid; Schlotter

1999: 230). At the same time, the INF and MBFR talks in Vienna had been suspended by Moscow as reaction to NATO's stationing of U.S. mid-range nuclear weapons to Europe in 1983. Therewith, a minimal convergent interest in establishing the CDE was apparent since no other forum for East-West arms control talks, aside from the United Nations, was available (see Alexander 2005). Negotiations dragged on without any concrete result until Gorbachev took office in March 1985.

With Gorbachev, the manifestations of the Soviet general interest in securing survival became much more influenced by economic considerations than in the past (cf. Gorbachev 1996). Increasingly since 1986, security aspects of military strength were not the prime variable determining Soviet security policy anymore (ibid). Instead, political-economic efforts to reform the Soviet command economy, which had come under increasing pressure since the end of the 1970s (see Chart 3 above), became one of the prime interests of the Communist Party (cf. Gorbachev 1996). The foreign and security policy of the Soviet Union changed accordingly. Gorbachev sought closer relationship with the West in order to increase economic cooperation. In his own words, the Soviet Union needed, 'perhaps more than ever before, favorable external conditions so that we can cope with the revolutionary and broad task toward renewing Soviet society.' (Quoted from Baker 1991: 816)

The change in economic capabilities triggered a change in issue-specific interests and related policies (cf. Legvold 1991: 357 et seq). The survival-related interest in economic recovery led the new leaders of the Politburo to pursue the goal of economic cooperation with the West, which was dependent on efforts to lessen the costly effects of military competition through policies of arms control (ibid). As a consequence, Moscow started to act much more conciliatory on security aspects of military strength which were of interest to the West. The CDE was amongst these issues even though Washington's issue-specific interest in the conventional military realm was still geared towards reductions in the MBFR framework (cf. Alexander 2005). With regards to issue-specificity, Washington wanted to achieve

more transparency on the conventional forces of the WTO through the CDE; Moscow wanted to make use of the CDE in order to pave the way for reductions in WMD and to achieve a lessening of expenditures associated with its costly military (cf. Leatherman 2003: 171). Even though for different reasons, their issue-specific interests in the CDE shifted towards convergence.

*Expectations:* Both states entered the CDE negotiations with a defensively-oriented approach which was not aimed at achieving a significant change to the balance of military power (i.e. the U.S. goal of conventional transparency; the Soviet goal of WMD reductions; cf. Schlotter 1999: 230). According to Realism, cooperation under this constellation was at least possible. However, their initial and mutual close association of security with aspects of military strength and the general political climate at the early 1980s was not conducive to cooperation. As a consequence of Gorbachev's change in policy, Moscow's concern about military strength relatively decreased and gave way to concerns related to issues of higher importance (i.e. economic recovery). Moscow could act cooperatively in the CDE because the promise of arms control was in line with the economic postulate of Gorbachev (cf. Holloway 1988: 77-8). Since both states kept their defensive orientation, they could expect the possibility of successful cooperation.

*Strategies:* The processual character of the institution of the CSCE had allowed both sides to maintain cooperation at a low level since 1975 (cf. Schlotter 1999: 79, 227-33). On the CDE, they decided for continuation of the strategy of confidence-building and sliced up the issue into increments, thus, gaining more confidence in each other while at the same time allowing the process to remain inconclusive. The first cooperative Soviet move in the CDE was to accept on-site inspections on its territory in 1986. In parallel, Washington and Moscow opted for the strategy of cross-policy compensation by tacitly linking the talks to the nuclear realm (cf. Leatherman 2003: 171). Only one year after the CDE, Moscow achieved its aim of WMD reductions in the Vienna INF negotiations.

*Evaluation of Gains:* The evaluation of gains from cooperation on the CDE was positive on both sides (cf. Darilek 1987) because both got what they wanted in the end. Washington became the desired transparency on conventional Soviet forces and later serious negotiations on conventional forces (CFE) while Moscow achieved negotiations eliminating a whole category of nuclear weapons (INF) and, later, economic support by the West (cf. Baker 1991). Thus, both opted for renewed cooperation in other formats (i.e. CFE and INF). Falkenrath (1995a: 40) notes that ‘the emphasis in Soviet policy toward Europe gradually shifted from scoring propaganda points to achieving meaningful results in serious negotiations’. The actual gains from U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the CDE did reflect the balance of power inasmuch as the outcome of cooperation did not lead to a change in the relative distribution of military strength. The gains increased mutual security by achieving transparency through on-site inspections.

#### Institutionalization

The institutionalization in the realm of cooperative arms control between 1973 and 1989 developed on two parallel tracks. The CSCE became the multilateral forum for CSBMs and military transparency, a sphere of arms control where tentative results were comparably easier to reach than in the disputed sphere of bipolar force limitations under MBFR (cf. J. Stein 2003: 15). Darilek (1987: 5) speaks of ‘two competing approaches to arms control involving conventional military forces in Europe [...] a “structural” and an “operational”’. (Cf. also Auton 1998) The case of the early CDE shows that both sides were able to continue minimal cooperation on CSBMs within the wider framework of the CSCE over a longer period of deadlock in bilateral relations. The continuing process, even though inconclusive at that time, is a first sign of institutionalization in the realm of CSBMs.

The following table (below) comprises the three cooperative processes of MBFR, the Helsinki CSCE, and the CDE and assesses them in short according to the Realist cooperation model.<sup>16</sup>

**TABLE 3**

U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION ON MBFR, HELSINKI CSCE, AND CDE

INSTITUTION	ACTOR	ISSUE-SPECIFIC INTERESTS	EXPECTATIONS	STRATEGIES	EVALUATION OF GAINS
<i>MBFR</i>	USA	divergent	acting offensively-oriented	offering compensation through CSCE, confidence-building	continued cooperation, later exit
	USSR	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued cooperation, later exit
<i>Helsinki CSCE</i>	USA	divergent	acting offensively- as well as defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued cooperation
	USSR	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	offering compensation through MBFR, confidence-building	continued cooperation
<i>CDE</i>	USA	initially divergent, later convergent	acting defensively-oriented	offering compensation through WMD reductions, confidence-building	renewed cooperation in other fora
	USSR	initially divergent, later convergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building	renewed cooperation in other fora

<sup>16</sup> In this and the following tables of this chapter, the variable of capabilities is not taken into account. Instead, an overview of capabilities is provided at the beginning of each analytical paragraph. A conclusive assessment of capabilities will be provided in Paragraph 3.8.

### 3.3 Convergence and Realization, 1990-1994

The period between 1990 and 1994 marks the heyday of the politics of cooperative arms control in Europe. Spurred by the unraveling of the bloc confrontation, German unification, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and the outburst of violent ethnic conflicts in South-East Europe and in a number of successor states to the USSR, institutionalization rapidly gained shape.

The politics of cooperative arms control in Europe were mainly grouped around and achieved within the CSCE framework, which also underwent a fundamental change in those years. Diverging interests about the future of the CSCE should characterize the discussion. The Soviet Union and, later, its main successor, the Russian Federation, saw NATO as obsolete and lobbied towards upgrading the role of the CSCE to become a pan-European security institution with primary responsibility for security in the whole region (cf. Krause 2003: 19). Then-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (cited in Anstis 1994: 79) pledged in May 1990, ‘the most important architectural element of the future Common European Home is the security system based on all-European cooperation.’ What he meant was spelled out more clearly four years later by Foreign Minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev in 1994 (65): ‘The creation of a unified, non-bloc Europe can best be pursued by upgrading the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe into a broader and more universal organization.’

In contrast, strong voices in Washington called for not giving up the successful structures of NATO and preventing any form of subordination under a new pan-European structure (cf. Sloan 1990: 499-500). Out of ‘long-held suspicions of the Soviet Union and the fact that the CSCE is seen as having resulted from a Soviet initiative, while NATO has been the main vehicle for U.S. influence in Europe’ (ibid), Washington lobbied for adapting NATO to the new geopolitical changes while at the same time keeping the profile of the CSCE comparably low. As a result of these diverging interests and against the background of the CSCE’s inability to stop the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia, CSCE states agreed on adapting the structures of the CSCE; though, to a much lesser degree than envi-

sioned by Moscow. At the CSCE's Budapest Summit in 1994, the Conference was re-named to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Even though it was now officially named an organization, Washington lobbied successfully for not giving the OSCE an internationally recognized legal personality, privileges, and immunities.

In 1989, the new CFE negotiations took off. Like MBFR, negotiations took formally place outside the CSCE and between the two blocks with their respective hegemony, of which one, the USSR, was already in rapid decline. The resultant CFE Treaty is a classic dyadic East-West agreement achieved at a time where its design already became anachronistic because of the rapid changes the Eastern bloc underwent. CFE is based on the idea of perfect equilibrium of balance of forces between two 'groups of states' (meaning NATO and WTO). The treaty led to the destruction of approximately 70,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in five categories<sup>17</sup>, eliminated the two blocs' ability to launch large-scale surprise attacks on one another, and established a hitherto unmatched level of military transparency. Even though the treaty has been hailed as the 'cornerstone of European security', much of its relevance already vanished shortly before and during the negotiation process and even more so in the following years (cf. Coker 1992). The basic Western goal in the negotiations was to achieve that Western Europe is no longer threatened by a numerically superior force which could rapidly attack through coordinated pincer movements from the north and the south (cf. Zellner 1994). With Gorbachev's 1988 announcement at the UN General Assembly to unilaterally withdraw Soviet forces and military equipment from Eastern Europe (cf. Gorbachev 2011: 16), together with the subsequent signs of disintegration of the USSR, this goal was already partly achieved (cf. Falkenrath 1995a: 242). One of the main Soviet interests was to release the USSR from the economic burdens associated with its troop deployments in Eastern Europe (cf. Horelick 1991: 627) and to back up its unilateral withdrawal announced in 1988 with mu-

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<sup>17</sup> The five CFE weapons categories are battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. For a comprehensive overview of the achievements and politics under CFE see Croft 1994, Kelleher, Sharp, and Freedman 1996, Sharp 2006, Zellner, Schmidt, and Neuneck 2009.

tual legally-binding commitments. Therefore, Moscow was willing to make large-scale concessions to accommodate the West on the central questions of conventional arms control in the run-up to and during the negotiations (cf. Gorbachev 1996: 502; Horelick 1991).

Meanwhile, the CSCE's role in arms control was debated as well between Moscow and Washington but also between Washington and the states of the European Community (EC) (cf. Schlotter 1999: 90 et seq). The Paris CSCE Summit in 1990 established the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna to deal with arms control issues. Because of Washington's concerns that it might undermine the work of NATO (ibid), its role was limited to tasks related to the implementation of politically-binding or purely voluntary CSBMs. The United States became the prime leader of minimalist solutions, cautiously resisting the evolution of the CSCE into a pan-European security institution (cf. Anstis 1994: 102). As a result of this blockade policy, the new arms control framework envisaged by the Berlin Council in July 1991 did not result in a forum that would somehow upgrade the role of the CPC. Instead, it was established in parallel. The resultant Forum for Security Cooperation's (FSC) tasks were arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs, security cooperation, and conflict prevention.<sup>18</sup> As Anstis predicted in 1994 (103) 'the lack of concrete proposals for "hard security" seems to confirm limited prospects for traditional arms control negotiations in the foreseeable future.' Nevertheless, the C/OSCE produced an extensive amount of multilateral CSBM agreements during these years. Examples are the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992 and the eight stipulations of the 'Programme for Immediate Action Series' (for an analysis see Chapter 5).

The increasing institutionalization was not limited to the C/OSCE. NATO as well began to adjust its political structures and strategy to the new geopolitical landscape. It 'emerged as the most promising security organization' (Kelleher 1994: 314), at least in the view of many U.S. analysts and politicians. As Kelleher predicted in 1994, it could even 'extend its presence into central and eastern Europe

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<sup>18</sup> See Section V 'CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation', Helsinki Document 1992.

and ultimately over the entire CSCE area.’ (Ibid) A first step in this direction – also meant as political reassurance to the new eastern democracies that NATO would not be indifferent to those states’ security concerns – was a U.S.-German initiative which led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in late 1991. In January 1994, the U.S.-led Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched to establish closer ties with the former WTO states and the newly emerging CIS states and to enhance European security. The program also served the function of preparing for the possibility of enlarging NATO to the east (cf. U.S. State Department 1995), as predicted by Kelleher in 1994. Moscow saw its participation in PfP mainly as a chance to derail such development (cf. Ponsard 2007: 68).

While in 1994 the debate about possible NATO enlargement accelerated (cf. Pradetto 2004), Moscow’s first negative reactions already showed the high degree of sensitivity on the Russian side towards this issue (cf. Talbott 2003: 96). The larger historical background to this debate is composed of the talks which led to German reunification, Soviet forces withdrawal from East Germany, and full NATO membership of then-unified Germany. Two interpretations of historical narratives compete. On the one side, particularly the current Russian leadership under Vladimir Putin claims that Washington had promised Gorbachev not to enlarge NATO further to the East as a political quid pro quo for German unification and NATO membership of unified Germany (cf. Putin 2007). According to this view, Gorbachev had been tricked by the Americans and had failed to get a written commitment from Washington. In an interview of 2014, Gorbachev has denied that any such commitment was ever expressed by the Americans (quotes from Gorbachev in Korshunov 2014). On the other side, U.S. policy analysts have long argued that the mainstream Russian view on the issue is wrong (see Zelikow 1995; Kramer 2009; Pifer 2014b). According to this viewpoint, the U.S. leadership of 1989/90 never made any promises related to NATO in conjunction with German unification other than not to enlarge its military structure to the territory of the former East Germany. Three extensive studies by Mary Elise Sarotte (see 2010a, b; 2014) based on newly available primary sources contests the main-

stream U.S. viewpoint. According to Sarotte, U.S. and West German leaders implicitly signaled Gorbachev and Shevardnadze not to enlarge NATO's borders further to the east. The hectic environment of the talks and the turbulent developments within the Soviet political apparatus made any written agreement impossible (Sarotte 2014). Whatever viewpoint one takes on the issue, the contested interpretations of the events are only a minor aspect of the larger East-West divide that NATO enlargement should produce in the post-Cold War order. Even though the Clinton administration recognized the Russian concern (cf. Talbott 2003), in 1994, Western expectations towards enlargement were rather positive (ibid).

As an addition development, in 1992, one year after the official dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, six former Soviet Republics<sup>19</sup> signed the Treaty on Collective Security (CST). In substance and partially in terms of terminology, the CST mirrors the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty – an indication of Moscow's objective of consolidating its geopolitical environment in light of possible NATO enlargement (see Rozanov and Dovgan 2010).

### 3.3.1 Analysis of Cooperation

In this paragraph, four cooperation processes – CFE, adaptation of the CSCE, adaptation of NATO, and CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE – are analyzed along the lines of the Realist model of international cooperation (see Chapter 2). Before, a closer look at the development of U.S./NATO-Soviet Union/Russian/WTO/CST capabilities between 1990 and 1994 is taken.

#### Capabilities

With the end of the Cold War, the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact underwent a fundamental change in political, geographic, economic, and military terms (cf. Garthoff 1994). In 1992, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Soviet command economy was replaced by a market economy (cf. Gorbachev quoted in Breslauer 2002: 98). The same year, the Warsaw Pact fell apart. As a


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<sup>19</sup> Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were the initial parties to the Treaty (see Treaty on Collective Security 1992).

result of the revolutionary developments, the Soviet/Russian economy decreased. According to the World Bank (2014), the Soviet/Russian GDP fell from US\$ 517 billion in 1989 to US\$ 395 billion in 1994. At the same time, the United States' GDP increased from \$ 5.6 trillion to \$ 7.3 trillion. In 1994, the U.S. GDP was 18 times the GDP of Russia. Chart 8 (below) illustrates these diverging trends.

**CHART 8**

COMPARISON OF U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN GDP, 1990-1994




With regards to the first capabilities factor of military strength, the development of national and combined defense budgets showed two trends. On the one hand, in 1991, the Warsaw Pact dissolved and was replaced the same year by the newly founded CST. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the decrease in military manpower (see Chart 10 next page) affected national defense budgets. In addition, the 1990 concluded CFE Treaty had led to the destruction of ~70,000 costly heavy conventional weapons systems over the next years (cf. Hartmann, Heydrich, and Meyer-Landrut 1994). The result was a parallel decrease in national defense budgets. While in 1990, the combined defense budget of NATO allies was US\$ 451 billion and the combined defense budget of WTO states was US\$ 137 billion, already in 1994, the combined defense budget of NATO allies was

US\$ 387 billion and the combined defense budget of CST states was US\$ 81 billion. The figures also suggest that the CST was in no way a substitute for the WTO since the financial commitment of the other CST states (besides Russia) is only marginal (~US\$ 2 billion) compared to the financial commitment of the other WTO states (~US\$ 20 billion). Chart 9 (below) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 9**


COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-WTO/CST COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGETS, 1990-1994



With regards to the second capabilities factor of military strength, the number of total armed forces shows the remarkable drop in Russian and CST forces. Again, the reasons behind this development are the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the downsizing of forces in conjunction with the CFE-1A agreement. While in 1990, the combined total armed forces of the WTO were 5.02 million soldiers, in 1994, the combined total armed forces of the CST were 1.99 million soldiers. In parallel, also the number of NATO forces decreased from 5.24 million in 1990 to 4.19 in 1994. Chart 10 (next page) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 10**


**COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-WTO/CST COMBINED TOTAL ARMED FORCES, 1990-1994**



With regards to the capabilities factors of the size of population and territory, the breakup of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union led to a significant drop in the size of population and territory of the Russian Federation. While the Soviet Union had ~288 million inhabitants and a territory of 22,4 million km<sup>2</sup> in 1990, the Russian Federation had ~148 million inhabitants and a territory of ~17 million km<sup>2</sup> in 1994. With regards to the Eastern military alliance, the Warsaw Pact had ~402 million inhabitants and a territory of ~23.3 million km<sup>2</sup> in 1990, the newly established CST had ~226 million inhabitants and a combined territory of ~20.9 million km<sup>2</sup>. In contrast, the territory of NATO remained the same size and the number of inhabitants increased by ~40 million. Charts 11 and 12 (next page) illustrate these trends.


**CHART 11**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-WTO/CST COMBINED SIZE OF POPULATION, 1990-1994



**CHART 12**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-WTO/CST COMBINED SIZE OF TERRITORY, 1990-1994



## CFE

*Interests:* As already explained in the previous paragraph, the Soviet general interest in securing survival became more and more influenced by economic considerations towards the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev wanted to reform the USSR while at the same time preserving the state's unity (cf. Gorbachev 1996). In order to succeed with that policy goal, his foreign and security policy focused, amongst other policy objectives, on ending the bloc confrontation and lessening the financial burden of the Soviet Union associated with its huge military apparatus (cf. Baker 1991; Legvold 1991; Gorbachev 1996). A first important step was the unilateral withdrawal of 500,000 men from Eastern Europe, announced in 1988 (cf. Gorbachev 2011: 16). Against this background, Washington's general interest in securing survival triggered a cooperative stance towards Moscow. Supporting Gorbachev was not an altruistic move by Washington but out of fear that he could become replaced by a less cooperative leader (cf. Baker 1991). Washington thus responded by giving preference to cooperation and by quickly locking in the Soviets in the security realm by a number of legally and politically-binding arms control and risk-reduction agreements (ibid). On CFE, both had a convergent issue-specific interest in cooperation – though for different reasons. Washington wanted to quickly lock in the Soviets (cf. Baker 1991) and finally achieve what 16 years of MBFR talks could not. In the U.S. view, CFE should codify the relative distribution of military strength in the conventional realm which was already in flux since 1988 (cf. Gorbachev 2011). The Pentagon wanted reductions in conventional forces with the aim of equal ceilings for the two blocs in order to offset the numerical advantage of NATO forces and geographical limitations to prevent large-scale surprise attack (cf. Zellner 1994). Moscow had a critical interest in economic cooperation with the West and was willing to make large-scale concessions on CFE in exchange (cf. Gorbachev 1996: 502).

*Expectations:* Since 1988, the relative distribution of military strength in the conventional realm was undergoing changes due to the Soviet decision to significantly downsize its military deployments in the other Warsaw Pact countries. Moscow thus acted defensively-oriented. Washington wanted to seize the moment and

aimed at codifying the new state of affairs (cf. Baker 1991). Its goal was an equilibrium state of balance of heavy military equipment between the two blocs (cf. Zellner 1994). Even though the Soviet withdrawal announcement had already changed the balance of military strength, the U.S. aim of equilibrium was a significant step further. One could therefore argue that Washington acted offensively-oriented because it sought a further change to the balance of forces. Nevertheless, Washington did not act against the Soviet will but in unison with the Gorbachev postulate to reduce the Red Army's military size and commitments and Washington and Bonn signaled to pay compensation (see below). Washington's orientation could thus as well be described as defensive in nature. According to Realism (see Chapter 2), both could expect that cooperation on the issue was possible as long as the gap in relative gains was adjusted by compensation.

*Strategies:* Both employed a strategy mix of compensation, confidence-building, and monitoring. First, Washington engaged on compensation in the form of side-payments because of the wide-ranging concessions Russia was willing to make on CFE (cf. Gorbachev 1996: 502). At the Malta Summit in 1989, George H.W. Bush promised Gorbachev various arms control proposals in order to end the pressure on the Soviet economy stemming from the U.S.-Soviet arms races (cf. Grogin 2001: 338-9). In addition, West Germany agreed to shoulder major economic and financial commitments in return for German unification and the removal of Soviet forces from East Germany (ibid: 339). This policy was in line with Moscow pleading for compensation in the economic realm (cf. Gorbachev 1996: 502). All issues were dealt with separately but tacitly linked (cf. Grogin 2001). Second, both opted for confidence-building through slicing up the issue into increments. Negotiations concentrated on five different categories of heavy conventional armaments (cf. Zellner 1994). In order to limit the possible consequences from cheating, CFE was equipped with a wide-ranging monitoring system inside and outside of the treaty. To the inside, CFE came with monitoring provisions such as regular and challenge on-site inspections, regular consultations in the JCG, and data exchange (cf. Hartmann, Heydrich, and Meyer-Landrut 1994). To the outside, the later agreed upon Treaty on Open Skies served as sup-

plementary monitoring instrument (cf. Spitzer 2011). As a result of these successful strategies and because of the immense time pressure, both came to an agreement within a few months only (cf. Zellner 1994).

*Evaluation of Gains:* The evaluation of gains from cooperation on CFE was positive on both sides (cf. Feinstein 1990) because both got what they wanted. Washington received codifying the drawback and downsizing of Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces, resulting in a state of equilibrium between the two 'groups of states' (CFE 1990); Moscow could lift some of its military-economic burdens and received large-scale credits in return, particularly from Germany. During the next nine years the evaluation of gains from cooperation on CFE should change. Even though initially positive on both sides (see U.S. and Russian Statements 1-11 contained in Chapter 7), particularly on the Russian side evaluation changed to the negative, visible through continued calls for re-negotiation (see Paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5). The actual gains from U.S.-Soviet cooperation on CFE in 1989/90 did reflect the balance of power inasmuch as the outcome of cooperation was rather a codification of the already existing reality than real change. Where the agreement produced change (i.e. the new state of equilibrium), compensation was paid. The gains increased mutual security by providing the Soviets with financial aid and the European NATO allies with security against large-scale surprise attack. In addition, both sides achieved significantly lower levels of conventional equipment and transparency through intrusive on-site inspections.

#### Adapting NATO and the CSCE

*Interests:* The crumbling of the Warsaw Pact as well as the impact of the war in the former Yugoslavia and in a number of newly emerging CIS states had underscored the need for a new post-Cold War security order for Europe (see US.-Russia 1992; cf. Flynn and Farrell 1999: 506). The general interest of the United States and Russia in securing survival by means of cooperation was thus put to a test. Both had directly related issue-specific interests. For Moscow it was: (1) preserving the territorial integrity of Russia; (2) restructuring the Russian economy with the help of the West; (3) establishing an all-inclusive European security architec-

ture replacing the old alliance structure and readily addressing secessionist conflicts in Europe (cf. Breslauer 2002; Yeltsin 2001). Washington had a continued interest in stabilizing the new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin. In the words of George H.W. Bush: 'Our support for Russia is unshakable because it is in our interest.' (The White House 1992b) In addition, Washington wanted to avoid any subordination of NATO under any form of multilateral European security governance. Secretary of State James Baker advised President George H.W. Bush that the 'real risk to NATO is CSCE.' (Quoted from Sarotte 2010: 112) Instead, Washington focused on preserving Western unity (cf. Schlotter 1999: 90 et seq) by adapting and (from early 1994 onwards) possibly enlarging NATO (cf. Holbrooke 1995), and, similar to Russia, avoiding further scenarios of civil war in Europe. One of the main U.S. reasons behind NATO maintenance and adaptation was uncertainty about the future development of Russia in particular and European security in general (cf. Cohen 1995). U.S. and Russian issue-specific interests were partially overlapping but also significantly divergent. Particularly with regards to the basic design of the new European security order, divergence in interest prevailed. Moscow lobbied for an upgrade of the CSCE and the dissolution of NATO. Foreign Minister of Russia, Kozyrev (1994: 65) argued: 'After all, it was the democratic principles of the 56-member CSCE that won the Cold War – not the NATO military machine.' Washington did not seek a greatly expanded role for the CSCE and instead remained firmly committed to the structures of NATO. 'In no way can the OSCE be made "superior" to NATO', U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Richard Holbrooke (1995), declared shortly after both organizations had been adapted. The OSCE, he continued, 'will not become the umbrella organization for European security, nor will it oversee the work of the NATO alliance.'

*Expectations:* Both states could expect a difficult setting with regards to cooperation on NATO and CSCE. On NATO, Russia acted offensively-oriented since it sought a change to the existing relative distribution of power (i.e. NATO dissolution). Washington wanted the maintenance of the balance of power which was already to its advantage after the dissolution of the WTO. Washington thus acted

defensively-oriented (i.e. maintaining and adapting NATO). According to Realism (see Chapter 2), the chance for cooperation was small as long as Russia would not either compensate Washington for the losses from potential NATO dissolution or give up its offensive orientation. On the CSCE, again, Russia acted offensively-oriented, for Moscow lobbied for an upgrade of the CSCE to an all-inclusive European security institution overlooking all other security institutions including NATO (cf. Tscherner and Castelmur 1997). Washington wanted to keep the status quo of the CSCE as much as possible (ibid). According to Realism, the chance for cooperation on the CSCE was small, would Russia stick to its orientation.

*Strategies:* Both applied a strategy of confidence-building on the issues of NATO and the CSCE. However, the strategy of confidence-building alone would have most likely failed if Moscow would not have changed its orientation (nevertheless, without evidence, this is speculation). When Moscow realized that it was not in the position to either change Washington's interest or to pay enough compensation, the Russians gave in on both issues and accepted the U.S. position (cf. Anstis 1994: 102). Moscow thus shifted from an initially offensive orientation to a defensive one. In turn, Washington compensated Moscow by including Russia in the new structures of the adapted NATO (i.e. the PfP and the NACC) and allowing for an upgrade of the CSCE – even though conditional to its preferred option. Cooperation in both frameworks was secured by lengthening the shadow of the future by formally institutionalizing the processes.

*Evaluation of Gains:* In the end, both gained on both issues but Washington gained comparably more. The United States could achieve the further maintenance and adaptation of NATO while the CSCE remained inferior to NATO. Moscow did not achieve its preferred interest, neither on NATO nor on the CSCE. By changing its orientation, Moscow not only accepted the results but also took account of the relative distribution of power. It accepted that it was in no position to challenge the U.S. interest (see capabilities charts above). On the question of the new design of Europe's security architecture Russia was simply not capable of following through with its preferred option. At the same time, Moscow also

gained from cooperation because it was formally included in the new NATO cooperation frameworks and it achieved an upgrade of the CSCE, even though to a much lesser degree than hoped for. The evaluation of gains, though initially positive on Moscow's side (see Russian Statement 12 contained in Chapter 7) soon gave way to increasing signs of dissatisfaction and continued calls for renegotiating the principal institutionalized security design of post-Cold War Europe (cf. Kozyrev 1994: 65). Nevertheless, Russia continued cooperation on both issues. Having achieved all preferred interests, Washington's evaluation was almost completely positive. In the understanding of some U.S. analysts, the successful handling of the end of the Cold War marked the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992) and the beginning of America's 'unipolar moment' (Krauthammer 1991). The actual gains from U.S.-Russian cooperation on NATO adaptation and CSCE upgrade did reflect the balance of power. At the same time, the gains increased mutual security by achieving a continued and institutionalized exchange on issues of military and non-military security.

#### CSBMs under the Auspices of the C/OSCE

*Interests:* As explained above, both Washington and Moscow had an overlapping convergent issue-specific interest in containing secessionist ethnical conflicts in Yugoslavia and the entire CSCE area (cf. Kaufman 2002). The envisioned establishment of number of CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE should address the new challenges emerging from civil war and ethnic strife. With regards to the concrete design of CSBMs, issue-specific interests were also rather convergent and geared towards achieving stability and increasing military transparency and predictability (cf. Auton 1998).

*Expectations:* Since the direct focus of most of the CSBMs of that period was not on U.S. and Russian forces, both could expect that no change affecting the relative distribution of power in the sphere of military strength would result. Both orientations were defensive in nature. According to Realism (see Chapter 2), cooperation was possible if both would agree on a successful strategy.

*Strategies:* Both employed a mix of strategies. On the one hand, the strategy of confidence-building within the successful-proven CSCE framework was maintained also in the new institution of the OSCE. On the other hand, monitoring mechanisms were attached to a number of CSBMs such as the Vienna Document (see Paragraph 5.3 below).

*Evaluation of Gains:* On CSBMs, both got what they wanted from cooperation. The evaluation of gains was positive in both capitals (see U.S. and Russian Statements 12 and 13 contained in Chapter 7). Both opted for continued and renewed cooperation on the issue. The actual gains from U.S.-Russian cooperation on CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE did reflect the balance of power. At the same time, the gains increased mutual security by devising arms control measures to increase transparency, predictability, and stability.

#### Institutionalization

The institutionalization in the realm of cooperative arms control between 1990 and 1994 developed on three parallel tracks. On the first track, the signing of CFE cemented the MBFR legacy inasmuch as conventional arms control was maintained as an exclusive NATO-WTO issue with strong bilateral U.S.-Soviet characteristics (cf. Zellner 1994). The complementing treaties from 1992 on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A) and on Open Skies (OS) underscored this development. On the second track, the C/OSCE emerged as the principal gatekeeper of various kinds of CSBMs and benefited from past experiences, which made realization easier to achieve. On the third track, NATO adapted its structures to the new post-Cold War Europe by setting up institutions for military and political cooperation with the former WTO states and the newly emerging states of the CIS.

The following Table 4 (next page) comprises the four cooperative processes of CFE, adapting the CSCE, adapting NATO, and establishing CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE and assesses them in short according to the Realist cooperation model.

**TABLE 4**

U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON CFE, CSCE, NATO, AND CSBMS

INSTITUTION	ACTOR	ISSUE-SPECIFIC INTERESTS	EXPECTATIONS	STRATEGIES	EVALUATION OF GAINS
<i>CFE</i>	USA	convergent	acting defensively-as well as offensively-oriented	offering compensation through economic aid, confidence-building, monitoring	continued cooperation
	USSR	convergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building, monitoring	continued cooperation, calls for renegotiation
<i>CSCE Adaptation</i>	USA	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	offering compensation through CSCE upgrade, confidence-building	continued cooperation
	USSR/Russia	divergent	initially acting offensively-oriented, later defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued cooperation, calls for renegotiation
<i>NATO Adaptation</i>	USA	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	offering compensation through including Russia, confidence-building	continued cooperation
	Russia	divergent	initially acting offensively-oriented, later defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued cooperation, calls for renegotiation
<i>CSBMs</i>	USA	convergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building, partially monitoring	continued cooperation, renewed cooperation
	USSR/Russia	convergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building, partially monitoring	continued cooperation, renewed cooperation

### 3.4 Adaptation and Re-Adjustment, 1995-1999

Four major institutional processes happened during the years 1995-1999. The first was the process of adapting CFE. In late 1994, fighting in Chechnya escalated to open civil war which led Russia to exceed specific CFE limitations in the so called southern flank region – a geographical remnant of the old bloc-to-bloc arrangement of CFE (cf. Falkenrath 1995b). The flank issue had military priority for the Kremlin (ibid). Aside from that, Russian demand re-negotiating CFE because of the changed political realities. Already during the late CFE negotiations in 1990, some WTO states were tacitly contemplating the option of leaving the Pact (cf. Zellner 1994). Therefore, the treaty does not speak of NATO and the WTO but refers to two general ‘groups of States Parties’ (Article II, 1(A) CFE 1990), meaning the two alliances. While the treaty’s rationale of bloc-to-bloc parity had vanished with the end of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, particularly the prospect of NATO enlargement would further change the balance of power and gave Russia an additional argument to request re-negotiation. While the Clinton administration officially denounced any connection between CFE adaptation and the flank issue on the one hand and NATO enlargement on the other, Washington’s policy was tacitly steered towards compensating Moscow for its unease with enlargement (cf. Kühn 2009). A first Russian attempt demanding compensation from Washington made Russia’s accession to the PfP framework conditional on changes in the flank (cf. Deni 1994: 28). As a commentary concluded in 1997, ‘revising the CFE Treaty is likely to be the key to reducing Moscow’s concerns with NATO enlargement.’ (IISS 1997b: 2). Washington agreed to a first round of re-negotiation which resulted in the Flank Document of 1997 (cf. Kühn 2009).

The ensuing ratification process of the flank agreement revealed strongly diverging political approaches in the U.S. Senate (ibid: 2 et seq). The domestic chasm was not only caused by partisan politics but more generally by disagreement between those who favored a more cooperative Russia policy and those who argued for a more confrontational approach. The latter saw the Russian Federation as the undemocratic and neo-imperialistic revenant of the Soviet Union (ibid). Their “antidote” was a policy mix of fast NATO enlargement, cuts to financial aid, and

rigorous support of the independence of former Soviet Republics, amongst them particularly Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. In the words of Republican Congressman Gerald Solomon (1996: E80): ‘there can be no doubt that Russia will attempt at least to “Finlandize” the former Warsaw Pact countries. It is silly to oppose NATO enlargement with talk of drawing lines in Europe. There already is a line, and because of it, stability has been fostered in those countries west of it. Quite frankly, the farther east that line is, the better.’

The consequence of this conservative approach, which went along with a general dismissal of the Clinton administration’s arms control policy (cf. Rosner 1995), were 14 conditions attached to the resolution of ratification of the Flank Document. Amongst them was the condition ‘to achieve the immediate and complete withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under the control of the Russian Federation that are deployed on the territories of the independent states of the former Soviet Union [...] without the full and complete agreement of those states.’ (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1997: 28) This condition binds the U.S. administration to promote the withdrawal of remaining Russian forces from secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova. Also the second round of re-negotiating CFE turned out to be successful (cf. Dunay and Zellner 2000). On November 19, 1999 the Adapted CFE Treaty (ACFE) was signed in Istanbul. In a number of accompanying politically binding commitments – the so called Istanbul commitments – Russia agreed to withdraw excess military equipment and personnel from Georgia and Moldova (see OSCE 1999).

The second important development was the handling of NATO enlargement. From late 1994 onwards, the White House followed a double-track policy. It advanced continuously on the enlargement track while filing measures aimed at alleviating Russian concern (cf. Kaufman 2002: 45). Besides the hard-fought Flank Document and the ensuing negotiations on ACFE, a third measure in the realm of cooperative security was the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 (cf. Kupchan 2000: 132). Established in parallel to the new cooperation structure of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the successor framework to the

NACC, the Founding Act gave Russia a prominent and visible role in its future dealings with the alliance. In the words of the Founding Act, this development ‘marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia.’ Both sides ‘intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.’ (NATO and Russia 1997) In addition, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established. While Russia had pledged for a legally binding agreement and a say in NATO’s decision-making (cf. Ponsard 2007), the Founding Act was as a political-binding agreement with the PJC based on the formula of 16+1 instead. Besides compensation in the realm of cooperative security and arms control, the White House offered a number of other rewards such as Russian accession to the G7 (cf. Aggarwal 2000:77).

The third development of that period saw Russia still promoting her idea of the OSCE as an all-encompassing security organization for Europe (cf. Ghébalí 2005). In September 1996, the Russian leadership took up the proposal of elaborating a ‘new security system’, encompassing all international organizations active in Europe (cf. Primakov 1996). Central to the Russian proposal was the claim that no state should ensure its own security at the expense of others (cf. Kühn 2010b). The discussion continued for years and was finally watered down to become the 1999 OSCE’s Charter for European Security – a politically binding declaration of intent, signed at the 1999 Istanbul Summit and ‘empty by Russian standards’ (Ghébalí 2005: 378) Even according to the former British OSCE Ambassador, the Charter ‘lacked substance’ (Cliff 2012: 65). Besides the Charter, the Summit agreed on an updated version of the Vienna Document and on the Platform for Cooperative Security to enhance inter-organizational division of labor.

The fourth development was an answer to the civil wars on the Balkans. With the Dayton peace accords of 1995 (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) all sides had agreed on an encompassing framework to guarantee for peace and stability. In the realm of cooperative arms control, two

agreements on CSBMs and disarmament<sup>20</sup> were negotiated and agreed upon. In both cases, previous experiences under the auspices of the C/OSCE served as the basis for institutionalization and led to a close modeling of the two agreements along the lines of the OSCE's Vienna Document on CSBMs and the CFE Treaty (cf. Vetschera 2009). The stipulations represent the first sub-regional arms control arrangements in Europe after the Cold War and were later extended in 2001.<sup>21</sup>

Aside from these cooperative approaches, in 1999, NATO member states launched a 78-days air campaign to end the Kosovo War. Afraid of a Russian veto, Washington decided for circumventing the UN Security Council (cf. Kaufman 2002). 'Deeply angered' about the air campaign, President Yeltsin (quoted in Hoffman 1999) ordered a suspension of NATO-Russian institutionalized cooperation. Aside from rhetorical condemnation of 'NATO's aggression' (Yeltsin 1999), Moscow exercised restraint, mainly because the Kremlin was interested in a renewed loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stop the increasing downward spiral, the Russian economy was facing since 1998 (see Chart 13 below and cf. Hoffman 1999). NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia had a decisive impact on the European security setting. Freedman (2014: 15) argues that 'this was a key moment in Russia's disenchantment with post-Cold War security arrangements, especially in the context of the wider restructuring of the European state system, which had already begun and led to many post-communist states joining NATO and then the EU. This was largely beneficial to those countries, in terms of governance and economics as well as security, but was viewed from Moscow with increasing misgivings.' Aside from the structural implications the NATO air campaign had, the campaign also demonstrated to Moscow the significant gap that had opened up between U.S. and Russian military capabilities since the end of the Cold War (cf. Renz 2014). In the coming years, Russia would invest in modernizing its conventional forces, trying to narrow the gap (cf. McDermott 2011).

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<sup>20</sup> Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996, Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, Article IV, 1996.

<sup>21</sup> Concluding Document of the Negotiations Under Article V of Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### 3.4.1 Analysis of Cooperation


In this paragraph, four cooperation processes – re-negotiating CFE, establishing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, further adapting the OSCE, and establishing a sub-regional arms control framework for the Balkans – are analyzed along the lines of the Realist model of international cooperation. The first three cooperation processes are closely intertwined and dependent on the issue of NATO enlargement. Before, a closer look at the development of U.S./NATO-Russian/CST capabilities between 1995 and 1999 is taken.

#### Capabilities

Between 1995 and 1999 the capabilities gap between the United States and Russia further increased. The Russian GDP fell from US\$ 396 billion in 1995 to US\$ 196 billion in 1999 while the U.S. GDP increased from US\$ 7.6 trillion to US\$ 9.6 trillion. In 1999, the GDP of the United States had ~50 times the size of the Russian GDP. The year 1998 brought the so called ruble Crisis and resulted in the Russian Central Bank devaluing the ruble and defaulting on its debt (see Government of Russia 1998). Chart 13 (below) illustrates these diverging trends.

**CHART 13**


COMPARISON OF U.S.-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN GDP, 1995-1999



With regards to the first capabilities factor of military strength, the development of national defense budgets of the United States and Russia and the combined defense budgets of NATO member states and CST member states also show diverging trends. While the Russian/CST defense budgets halved themselves, the U.S and NATO budgets started to grow for the first time since the end of the Cold War. On the side of NATO, this development was also due to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining NATO officially in April 1999. All in all, in 1999, the combined defense budget of NATO was 14.4 times the combined defense budget of the CST. While Washington could pursue a policy of financial burden-sharing, the national defense budget of Russia and the combined budget of the CST are almost identical. Chart 14 (below) illustrates these diverging trends.

**CHART 14**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGETS, 1995-1999




With regards to the second capabilities factor of military strength, the number of total armed forces shows a slight increase in NATO's combined total armed forces (due to the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), a considerable drop in U.S. national total armed forces, and a significant drop in Rus-

sian and CST total armed forces. Therewith, the trend since the end of the Cold War towards smaller national armies continued; however, much more pronounced on the Russian/CST side. Chart 15 (below) illustrates these parallel trends.

**CHART 15**


COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED TOTAL ARMED FORCES, 1995-1999



With regards to the capabilities factors of the size of population and territory, the trends are also divergent. While NATO's combined size of population and territory increased due to the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the CST's combined size of population and territory decreased, partly because Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan left the organization in 1999. Charts 16 and 17 (next page) illustrate these trends.


**CHART 16**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED SIZE OF POPULATION, 1995-1999



**CHART 17**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED SIZE OF TERRITORY, 1995-1999



## Re-Negotiating CFE, Establishing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and Further Adapting the OSCE

*Interests:* From 1995-1999, the general interest of the United States and Russia in securing survival remained bound to the concept of cooperation; though, for different reasons. Washington had an issue-specific interest in continuing its support for the Yeltsin administration while the Kremlin had a continued issue-specific interest in halting and reversing economic recession with the help of the United States and its allies (cf. Lippman 1997). On the further design of Europe's security architecture, again divergence prevailed. In 1995, Washington had finally decided to enlarge NATO (ibid). Because of the well-known Russian resentment towards the issue, Washington sought the consent of Moscow (ibid). The Russian leadership found itself in a dilemma. On the one hand, it was Moscow's interest to avert NATO enlargement. According to Russian President Yeltsin, 'the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that.' (Quoted in Lippman 1997) The problem was that Moscow had no pivotal leverage against the inevitable and a continued interest in a cooperative relationship with the West. (Cf. Aggarwal 2000: 73) While facing the inevitable, at least, the Kremlin wanted to receive compensation (cf. Kaufman 2002: 45). For Moscow, compensation could include one or more of the following policy objectives: re-negotiating CFE, establishing a treaty regulating NATO-Russian relations, and/or significantly upgrading the OSCE (cf. Truscott 1997: 54; Tscharner and Castelmur 1997; Sharp 1995).

On CFE, Moscow wanted a change to the old bloc system and more freedom of military movement in the Russian southern flank where the First Chechen War was raging (cf. Kühn 2009). In addition, the prospect of a potential future accession of the Baltic States to NATO forced Russia to press for re-negotiation (cf. Sharp 1995). Washington was divided on the issue. The Clinton administration did not attach huge military value to CFE anymore and was willing to meet the Russian concerns (ibid). The GOP-dominated Congress wanted to make use of CFE to press Russia on withdrawing her remaining forces from secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova (cf. Kühn 2009).

On a potential NATO-Russia treaty, Moscow aimed at legally binding assurances which would prevent the Alliance from moving military installations closer to Russia's borders. At best, such agreement would have to be equipped with a veto mechanism for Russia and would preclude the future accession of Ukraine and the Baltic States (cf. Kahl 1998: 24-5; Ponsard 2007). Washington wanted to avert such far-reaching concessions and instead pleaded for a politically binding charter with no veto power for Russia (cf. Lugar and Nuland 1997: 14-5).

On the OSCE, Moscow continued to lobby for a 'new security system' under the auspices of the OSCE (cf. Borawski 1996: 384). Part of such system should be a charter for the organization in order to transform the OSCE into a legal entity with a possible European Security Council overseeing the work of all other security institutions (i.e. NATO) in the area (cf. Tschärner and Castelmur 1997). Washington was open to declaratory adjustments but declared to remain steadfast in resisting any attempts to give the OSCE a legal capacity (cf. Dean 1998).

*Expectations:* On the issue of NATO enlargement, Washington acted offensively-oriented and aimed at changing the existing distribution of power. Moscow acted defensively-oriented and wanted to keep the status quo. According to Realism, cooperation on the issue was almost impossible if Washington would not compensate Russia for her losses. On CFE, Russia wanted the codified recognition of the changes that had occurred since 1990. Russia thus acted defensively-oriented. Washington – at least the Democratic government – showed the same stance. According to Realism, cooperation on the issue was possible if the strategies would ensure cooperation. On the issue of establishing a NATO-Russia agreement, Moscow acted defensively-oriented. Pleading for legally binding assurances that NATO would not enlarge further east (i.e. the Baltics and Ukraine) and a veto mechanism which could, theoretically, block any future NATO decision-making underscored that Moscow was interested in options cementing the status quo. Washington also acted defensively-oriented; aiming at a politically binding document which would reflect the balance of power. However, since Washington was against a Russian veto and against a no-further-enlargement pledge it aimed at

keeping the option of further changing the balance of power in the future. According to Realism, cooperation on the issue was possible if the strategies would ensure cooperation. On the issue of further adapting the OSCE, Russia entered the talks again with an offensive orientation aimed at changing the balance of power (i.e. making NATO subject to OSCE decision-making). Washington acted defensively-oriented and tried to stick with the status quo as much as possible. According to Realism, cooperation on the issue was rather unlikely as long as Moscow was not changing its orientation or paying compensation to Washington.

*Strategies:* Direct cooperation between Russia and the United States on NATO enlargement did not take place because their issue-specific interest was too divergent and because of their different orientations (Washington offensively; Moscow defensively). In addition, NATO enlargement was formally an intra-alliance decision not dependent on U.S.-Russian cooperation and the Clinton administration was already facing domestic criticism from the GOP for being too soft on Russia (cf. Kühn 2009). However, Aggarwal (2000: 68) is correct to note that enlargement ‘can be seen as a game primarily between the U.S. and Russia’. In order to alleviate Russian concern and to back the Yeltsin administration against domestic opposition, Washington tacitly offered compensation (cf. Talbott 2003). Moscow openly linked the establishment of the NATO-Russia Founding Act as well as renegotiating CFE to the issue of NATO enlargement (cf. Solomon 1997: 219, Wilcox 2011) while avoiding portraying the issues as being of equal value. Washington cautiously avoided any official linkage and instead continued its strategy of tacit compensation. Bill Clinton (1997: 9) insisted: ‘The NATO-Russia Founding Act was not an effort to buy Russian acquiescence to enlargement.’ Russian opposition to enlargement were ‘an issue on which we have decided to disagree, while working together to manage that disagreement.’ The management of disagreement took the form of a complex bundle of compensating deals, including in the economic realm (see Aggarwal 2000: 76 et seq). As Pipes (1997: 77) suggested, ‘the situation calls for a subtle policy that mixes toughness with understanding of Russian sensitivities.’

The first compensation would be to negotiate with Russia the NATO-Russia Founding Act (cf. Lippman 1997). In the words of the Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on European Security of 1997: 'In order to minimize the potential consequences of [NATO enlargement], the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system.' (U.S.-Russia 1997) In the words of Boris Yeltsin (quoted in Lippman 1997): 'in order to minimize the negative consequences [of NATO enlargement] for Russia, we decided to sign an agreement with NATO.' Beyond compensation, both employed the strategy of confidence-building through institutionalization. Therefore, the Founding Act includes the establishment of the PJC.

The second compensation would emerge from CFE adaptation in 1999. Adapting CFE was, according to Sharp (1995: 21), 'the quid pro quo for Russian acceptance of NATO's expansion'. In the process of negotiating ACFE, both employed a strategy mix of confidence-building and monitoring. On the one hand, the process was sliced up into increments so that negotiations continued for almost three years (cf. Hartmann and Heydrich 2002). Negotiators could build on the already established CFE institution of the JCG. On the other hand, ACFE was equipped with stricter monitoring clauses to minimize possible cheating consequences (ibid).

The third compensation would result from further adapting the OSCE at the 1999 Istanbul Summit while simultaneously resisting Russian claims for a legal upgrade of the organization (cf. Dean 1998). When Moscow changed its offensive orientation towards a defensive orientation, thus recognized the distribution of power, cooperation became possible. The U.S. degree of attention to the OSCE, Dean (ibid: 39) concluded, 'evidences an energetic United States effort to meet – or to appear to meet – [the Russian interest and] was part of the vigorous effort to bring President Yeltsin to acquiesce in at least the first stage of NATO enlargement.' Here, both could build on existing OSCE institutions to continue the successfully proven strategy of confidence-building.

A fourth compensation was paid in the economic realm. In 1998, Russia was given access to the G7 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in order to open up new economic possibilities for the Yeltsin administration (cf. Aggarwal 2000: 76 et seq).

*Evaluation of Gains:* The evaluation of gains from this complex deal is as difficult as the deal itself. In general, Washington got what it wanted from cooperation. It achieved NATO enlargement and could “buy” Russian acquiescence. It achieved adapting CFE and could include the Senate’s demand for Russian forces withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia in the form of politically binding pledges by Russia (i.e. the Istanbul commitments). In addition, Washington achieved the Founding Act and the PJC, both operating on the formula of “16+1” without a Russian veto and based on politically binding mechanisms. A plea not to enlarge NATO further eastwards was not included. On the OSCE, Washington achieved keeping the status quo and endowing the organization with additional declaratory instruments (i.e. the 1999 Charter for European Security). The evaluation of gains was mostly positive on the U.S. side. The Founding Act and the results of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit were positively welcomed by the administration (cf. The White House 1999). At the same time, members of the GOP criticized the administration for their soft handling of Russia in conjunction with CFE (cf. Kühn 2009: 14-5). Washington continued cooperation on the OSCE and even allowed for renewed NATO-Russia cooperation (i.e. setting up the NRC in 2002) when the PJC showed signs of dysfunctionality in conjunction with the Kosovo crisis (cf. Ponsard 2007). After George W. Bush had taken over, the new Republican administration continued cooperation on CFE but made the ratification of ACFE conditional on Russia fulfilling her Istanbul commitments (cf. Kühn 2009).

Moscow did mostly not get what it wanted from cooperation. NATO enlargement took place without an official cooperation process. The distribution of power allowed the United States to move forward on the issue and to change the balance of power. Moscow did not have the means and/or will to thwart the issue (cf. Yeltsin quoted in Lippman 1997). In addition, the Russian leadership did not

achieve a legal personality for the OSCE. On the Founding Act it failed to meet its goal of a legally binding treaty based on an inclusive framework “at 17” with full veto power for the Kremlin and a guarantee that NATO would not include former Soviet states at a later stage. In the case of CFE, the 1997 Flank Document met the initial Russian claim for greater freedom of movement for her troops in the southern flank (cf. Kühn 2009). However, the 1999 adaptation agreement came at the price of signing political commitments to withdraw Russian forces from Moldova and Georgia. The evaluation of gains on the Russian side soon turned from positive to negative. For Moscow, the OSCE Istanbul Summit was rather disappointing, not only for reasons of Western criticism with regards to Russian actions in Chechnya (cf. BBC 1999). Nevertheless, Russia continued cooperation but increasingly voiced its disenchantment with the organization over the following years (see Russian Statements from 2003 onwards contained in Chapter 7). ACFE was positively received until NATO’s decision to withhold ratification (cf. Putin quoted in Wilcox 2011: 571). In 2007, Russia partially exited from the agreement (see the next paragraph). The evaluation of gains from cooperation on the Founding Act and the PJC (later the NRC) soon turned from positive to negative in the context of the Kosovo crisis. Even though both continued cooperation based on the Founding Act, Russia soon called for re-negotiating the PJC. Therefore, renewed cooperation took place in 2002 with the establishment of the NRC (see next paragraph; cf. Ponsard 2007).

The actual gains from U.S.-Russian cooperation on these issues did reflect the balance of power. Where the balance of power was changed (i.e. NATO enlargement) official cooperation did not take place. The gains increased mutual security to differing degrees. The Flank Document and the adaptation of CFE provided Russia with more security by lifting the regulations in the southern flank and led to further downsizing of conventional forces of all parties to the treaty. However, since ACFE never entered into force, the security gains from cooperation largely remained in the declaratory realm. The NATO-Russia Founding Act provided Russia with politically binding assurances that NATO member states ‘have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new

members' (NATO-Russia 1997). In addition, the alliance committed itself to 'carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.' (Ibid) In turn, Russia pleaded to 'exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.' (Ibid) The establishment of the PJC increased security in the sense of confidence through institutionalized dialogue-based interaction.

#### Establishing a Sub-Regional Arms Control Framework for the Balkans

*Interests:* In contrast to the above analyzed setting, the establishment of a sub-regional arms control framework for the Balkans was built on issue-specific convergent interests between the United States and Russia. Both had an issue-specific interest in peace and stability in the region (cf. Hartmann 1997). Washington was the first member of the Contact Group to press for measures of disarmament and CSBMs in the Dayton negotiations (ibid: 256). Even though negotiations within the Contact Group were divisive at times (cf. Camisar et al 2005: 12), with regards to the issue-specific measures devised to ensure stability, also convergence prevailed that they should be modeled along the lines of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document (cf. Hartmann 1997). Both were able to devise cooperative measures for the war-torn region in a top-down approach.

*Expectations:* Since the direct focus of the stipulations of the sub-regional arms control framework for the Balkans was not on U.S. and Russian forces, both could expect that no change affecting the relative distribution of power in the sphere of U.S.-Russian military strength would result. Both orientations were defensive in nature. In addition, the force levels foreseen in the agreements reflected the relative distribution of power in the sphere of military strength of the Balkan states (ibid). According to Realism (see Chapter 2), cooperation was possible if both would agree on a successful strategy.

*Strategies:* Washington and Moscow pursued a mix of strategies. On the one hand, the strategy of confidence-building through slicing up issues into incre-

ments (i.e. different categories of weapons) proved successful. On the other hand, the strategy of monitoring limited the possible consequences from cheating. Monitoring mechanisms could build on earlier C/OSCE experiences and were designed along the lines of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document.

*Evaluation of Gains:* On the issue of establishing a sub-regional arms control framework for the Balkans, both got what they wanted from cooperation. The evaluation of gains was positive in Moscow and Washington (cf. Jopp 2000: 346-7). Both opted for continued and renewed cooperation on the issue in 2001. The actual gains from U.S.-Russian cooperation on sub-regional arms control for the Balkans did reflect the balance of power. At the same time, the gains increased mutual security by devising reciprocal measures increasing transparency, predictability, and stability as well as limiting conventional military equipment in the region. In addition, the dialogue-based process was institutionalized by setting up the JCC and the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission.

#### Institutionalization

During the years 1995-1999, the institutional fragmentation of cooperative arms control in Europe solidified. Institutional “winners” and “losers” emerged (cf. Hækkerup 2005: 371). While NATO broadened its political-military portfolio through the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the PJC, and the EAPC, the OSCE’s pace of institutional achievements slowed down. With the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999, the OSCE’s fate as a secondary or even tertiary security organization was being cemented (cf. Hækkerup 2005). The OSCE became the forum for debate, NATO the framework for action. This development was illustrated by the painstaking evolution of the Istanbul Charter (cf. Ghébalí 2005: 378). ‘It was not the OSCE but NATO that emerged as the decisive security and defence organisation in Europe’, Hækkerup (2005: 371) concluded. In addition, a new institutional framework which concentrated on sub-regional arms control at the Balkans was added to the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe.

Table 5 (below) comprises the four cooperative processes of CFE adaptation, establishment of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (including the PJC), further adaptation of the OSCE, and establishment of a sub-regional arms control framework for the Balkans and assesses them according to the Realist cooperation model.

**TABLE 5**

U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON CFE ADAPTATION, FURTHER OSCE ADAPTATION,  
NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT, AND BALKANS ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORK

INSTITUTION	ACTOR	ISSUE-SPECIFIC INTERESTS	EXPECTATIONS	STRATEGIES	EVALUATION OF GAINS
<i>CFE Adaptation</i>	USA	convergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building, monitoring	continued cooperation conditional on Istanbul commitments
	Russia	convergent	acting defensively-oriented	demanding compensation for NATO enlargement, confidence-building, monitoring	continued cooperation, partial exit
<i>Further OSCE Adaptation</i>	USA	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued cooperation
	Russia	divergent	initially acting offensively-later defensively-oriented	demanding compensation for NATO enlargement, confidence-building	continued cooperation, calls for re-negotiation
<i>NATO-Russia Founding Act (Including the PJC)</i>	USA	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued cooperation, renewed cooperation
	Russia	divergent	initially acting offensively-later defensively-oriented	demanding compensation for NATO enlargement, confidence-building	continued cooperation, calls for re-negotiation, renewed cooperation
<i>Sub-Regional Arms Control Framework for the Balkans</i>	USA	convergent	defensively-oriented	confidence-building, monitoring	renewed cooperation
	Russia	convergent	defensively-oriented	confidence-building, monitoring	renewed cooperation

### 3.5 Stagnation and Regress, 2000-2008

The years between 2000 and 2008 were heavily influenced by the 9/11 attacks on U.S. homeland. The period saw the mutual departure from the essentials of cooperative security in Moscow and Washington. Consequently, only one major new institution in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe was created.

With the coming into office of the new Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2000, Moscow changed its policy towards the OSCE and the West (cf. Ghébalı 2005: 379 et seq). Dissatisfied with the role and work of the OSCE, the Kremlin launched a verbal attack on the organization, arguing that it could no longer accept seeing the OSCE being assigned ‘a kind of maidservant’s role, carrying out the orders and implementing the decisions of other organizations’ (2001 Russian statement to the OSCE, quoted from Ghébalı 2002: 36). Moscow’s warnings that ‘the pan-European process will be doomed to extinction’ (ibid) turned into an active policy substantially blocking the organization’s work (see Ghébalı 2005: 379 et seq). Washington’s OSCE policy under the new George W. Bush administration was twofold. On the one hand, efforts to strengthen the politico-military dimension of arms control were rejected (cf. Ghébalı 2002: 36). On the other hand, the United States increasingly promoted human rights standards in conjunction with continued critique about Moscow’s politics in this realm. Hopmann (2009: 89) analyzed that ‘human rights has been virtually the sole focus of the United States within the OSCE for many years, especially since 2001.’ Consequently, new institutional cooperative efforts under the OSCE’s auspices were rare in this period.

On conventional arms control, NATO made the fulfillment of the Russian Istanbul commitments a precondition to ratifying ACFE at the Alliance’s 2002 Summit in Prague; a policy decision which was harshly criticized by Moscow (cf. Kühn 2009: 15-6). In response, Russia significantly slowed down the pace of withdrawing military equipment from Moldova and Georgia (cf. Boese 2002: 22). The following years were characterized by mutual recriminations which side was responsible for the deadlock (cf. Zellner, Schmidt, and Neuneck 2009). Frustrated with

the ongoing standstill and after having launched a series of political warning signals (see Kulebyakin 2009), Moscow unilaterally suspended the CFE Treaty in 2007 – an action not in accordance with the formal stipulations of the treaty.

Meanwhile, NATO enlargement advanced with two further rounds in 2004 and 2009 against previous warnings from Moscow (cf. Pradetto 2004; Umbach 2004). The Russian National Security Concept of 2000 had explicitly named ‘NATO’s eastward expansion [a] fundamental threat [to] the Russian Federation’s national security’. (Russian Security Council 2000) With Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, for the first time three countries that were previously part of the Soviet Union joined the Alliance. In addition, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined. In 2008, NATO member states agreed after heavy pressure from Washington (cf. Erlanger and Myers 2008) that Georgia and Ukraine ‘will become members of NATO’ (NATO 2008). In contrast to the Clinton years, the U.S. administration under George W. Bush sought not to compensate Moscow by means of cooperative arms control measures. While the Clinton administration for instance had viewed CFE as an important bargaining chip in the game about the first round of NATO enlargement (cf. Aggarwal 2000 and Paragraph 3.3 above), the new Republican-led policy establishment in Washington did not anymore. A study by the influential RAND Corporation of 2000 illustrated that ‘it is not CFE but rather NATO that must play a leading role in managing contemporary European crises and local wars.’ (Peters 2000: 2) In September 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld declared: ‘I don’t see any linkage between NATO enlargement and CFE, and I don’t know any NATO countries that do.’ (Quoted from Disarmament Diplomacy 2002: 63)

The only major institutional achievement was the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in conjunction with the signing of the Rome Declaration in 2002. In contrast to the U.S. policy during the 1990s, the NRC was not an attempt at compensating Russia for further enlargement. It was the product of two factors. First, the structures of the PJC had failed the test of the Kosovo crisis when cooperation in this format was suspended. Both sides wished for a fresh start (cf. Pon-

sard 2007: 77 et seq). Second, President Putin's support for Washington after the 9/11 attacks and the initially convergent interests of Moscow and Washington in the war on terrorism had laid the basis for a new understanding. The new structures should readily address, amongst others, the threat of international terrorism and should compensate Russia for opening her airspace to coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan (ibid: 78-84). Even though the NRC operates on the principle of consensus and holds meetings on the principle of equality, it still deprives Russia of a veto on security issues. 'At best, Russia will still be a junior partner in the increasingly important Alliance', Mlyn (2003: 52) concluded.

In addition, substantially diverging national policies in Washington and Moscow negatively affected U.S.-Russian arms control relations. Under George W. Bush, the U.S. administration pursued a foreign policy which rejected the essentials of cooperative security (cf. Luongo 2001). Consequently, Washington departed from the legacy of bilateral arms control accords from the Cold War. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and started to promote a missile defense system for the protection of its European NATO allies – an effort which provoked strong negative reactions from Moscow (see Becher and Zagorski 2007). The revival of missile defense produced 'a cataclysmic break in U.S.-Russian relations' (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003: 312). Nevertheless, Washington did not perceive its policy as problematic. 'The Russian government has bet it will not lose as much from a world without the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as it will gain from a United States willing to cooperate', the current Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, Celeste A. Wallander, observed in 2002 (Wallander 2002: 4). The subsequent U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul noted: 'Bush could threaten to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty [...] because Russia was too weak to do anything about it.' (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003: 312) In addition, the newly concluded bilateral Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) could not live up to the intrusive quality of its predecessors in the realms of verification and transparency (cf. Kimball 2002). The new U.S. understanding of arms control culminated in the perception that 'the philosophy and practice of traditional arms control are no

longer contributing effectively to the goal of reducing threats to U.S. national security.’ (Sokolsky 2001: 4)

Beyond arms control, the U.S.-Russian relationship experienced a significant downturn during those eight years. With the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington increasingly followed a “go-it-alone” approach which centered on unilateralism and coalitions of the willing (cf. Kelleher 2012: 16-7). On the one hand, for Washington, Russia did not matter a great deal anymore. ‘Beyond its nuclear weapons’, Kelleher (ibid: 17) assessed, ‘Russia, in the view of some neo-conservative members of the Bush administration, was simply no longer relevant to the new American strategic and political preeminence.’ On the other hand, the relationship vis-à-vis Moscow centered on criticism of Russia’s human rights record (cf. U.S. Statements 29 et seq contained in Chapter 7). In that regard, the U.S. policy mirrored the Russia-critic stance which a number of GOP representatives had already shown during the late 1990s (cf. Solomon 1996). Collective security, in the form of NATO enlargement or missile defense was deemed more important than cooperative security (see Kelleher 2012).

Russia, under its new President Putin, answered with a similar departure from cooperative security. Kelleher (ibid: 17) explained, ‘just like traditional European allies, Russia in the end had no other choice but to deal with the United States on its own terms and within the framework of the American global agenda.’ Particularly at the highest echelon of Russian leadership, dissatisfaction with the new American administration gained the upper hand. ‘Putin has come to the conclusion that a gentlemen’s agreement is not possible with the United States’, Lukyanov (2012) concluded. ‘He thinks Bush responded with base ingratitude to Moscow’s positive gestures more than once – from its support during 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, to its voluntary closing of military facilities in Vietnam and Cuba. Putin believes that these gestures were met with aggressive efforts of the United States to bolster its presence in the post-Soviet space, expand NATO, and deploy missile defense systems on Polish and Czech territory, to name a few.’

Clandestine U.S. support through state-sponsored NGOs and intelligence for the Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003 and the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 (cf. McFaul quoted in Remnick 2014) further increased the tensions between Russia and the United States. In 2002, the members to the CST established the collective defense organization of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and thus gave the CST an institutional framework for continuous cooperation (see Kurtov 2008). At the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy, President Putin accused the United States of overstepping 'its national borders in every way' and condemned 'an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations' (President of Russia 2007).

Only a few months later, in August 2008, Russia used military force to advance into Georgian territory. The triggering events were increasing skirmishes between pro-Russian fighters in the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia and official Georgian forces through the first half of 2008, followed by a ground offensive of Georgian forces (cf. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009). In response, Russian official forces crossed the border to Georgia and drove back the Georgian military, basically occupying South Ossetia and the second breakaway region of Abkhazia (see Asmus 2010). The background of the conflict was strong vocal support by the U.S. administration of the Georgian Saakashvili administration which had culminated in the April 2008 NATO announcement that Georgia will become an alliance member (ibid). The Saakashvili administration had apparently hoped for active U.S. military support should fighting escalate – a possible option that a minority of U.S. government officials seriously pondered (ibid). As reaction, NATO member states condemned Russian actions and suspended the NRC. On 25 August 2008, the Russian State Duma unanimously urged President Dmitry Medvedev to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. A consequence of Russia's mixed military performance in Georgia was a comprehensive reform of the Russian military, launched in late 2008 (see McDermott 2011).

### 3.5.1 Analysis of Cooperation


In this paragraph, the cooperation process of the establishment of the NRC is analyzed along the lines of the Realist model of international cooperation (see Chapter 2). Before, a closer look at the development of U.S./NATO-Russian/CST capabilities between 2000 and 2008 is taken.

#### Capabilities

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the economic capabilities gap between the United States and Russia decreased between 2000 and 2008. According to the World Bank (2014), the Russian GDP grew from US\$ 260 billion in 2000 to US\$ 1.6 trillion in 2008. Under the new Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian economy recovered relatively and registered strong annual growth rates (ibid). At the same time, the U.S. GDP further increased from \$10.2 trillion to \$14.7 trillion. In 2008, the U.S. GDP was eight times the size of the Russian GDP. Chart 18 (below) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 18**


COMPARISON OF U.S.-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN GDP, 2000-2008



On the first capabilities factor of military strength, comparison of the development of national defense budgets of the United States and Russia and the combined defense budgets of NATO and CST member states shows a remarkable increase on the side of the United States and NATO. Between 2000 and 2008, the national defense budget of the United States more than doubled in size and reached an unprecedented high of US\$ 693 billion in 2008. The reason behind this significant jump was the U.S.-led War on Terror in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq (cf. Thompson 2011). The combined defense budget of the other NATO member states also increased by ~US\$ 100 billion, in parts due to the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. At the same time, Russia and the CST increased their defense budgets as well. In comparison, the 2008 combined defense budget of NATO has ~24 times the size of the combined defense budget of the CST. Chart 19 (below) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 19**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGETS, 2000-2008




On the second capabilities factor of military strength, the number of total armed forces shows only a relatively modest increase in Russian and CST forces. NATO

shows only a relatively slight increase, even though seven countries joined the alliance in 2004. Washington increased the number of its total armed forces by ~135,000 soldiers. In comparison to the strong increase in the U.S. national defense budget (see Chart 19 above), the relatively modest increase in manpower leads to conclude that the United States ramped up its military capabilities from a qualitative viewpoint, including new military-technological R&D programs (cf. U.S. Army War College 2012: 140). Chart 20 (below) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 20**


COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED TOTAL ARMED FORCES, 2000-2008



On the capabilities factors of the size of population and territory, the combined size of CST population increased by ~25 million while the Russian population decreased. The combined size of population of NATO member states increased by ~85 million. The size of the U.S. population increased as well. With regards to territory, NATO's territory increased due to the 2004 round of enlargement and the territory of the CST increased by the re-entry of Uzbekistan in 2006. By 2008, the combined size of population of NATO was more than four times the combined size of population of the CST. Charts 21 and 22 (next page) illustrate these trends.


**CHART 21**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED SIZE OF POPULATION, 2000-2008



**CHART 22**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED SIZE OF TERRITORY, 2000-2008



## Establishment of the NATO-Russia Council

*Interests:* With the 9/11 attacks the U.S. general interest in securing survival led Washington to focus on fighting terrorism and to heavily increase its defense budget (Daalder and Lindsay 2005; see also Chart 19 above). Hence, the Islamic World came into focus (Daalder and Lindsay 2005). Russia dropped out of the immediate focus (ibid). The consequence was that for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia did not share an interest in cooperation in order to secure mutual survival anymore. Even though both had initially issue-specific interests in cooperation – Russia because it sought closer economic ties with Washington; the United States because it wanted to use Russia to balance China (cf. Goldgeier and McFaul 2003: 312 et seq) – the terrorist attacks of 9/11 fundamentally altered the U.S. foreign and security policy (ibid). Subsequently, the U.S. general interest in securing survival led to the issue-specific interest in securing as much support as possible in the so called War on Terror.

For Washington it was important to secure a stable line of ordnance for U.S. forces in Afghanistan; thus having Russian overflight permission. Ponsard (2007: 77) concludes: ‘Considering Russia’s key role and military experience in Central Asia and Afghanistan, its participation was paramount to the success of the coalition against terrorism’. As initial reaction, Moscow stated its full support, linked to the hope for a fresh start in bilateral relations after the Kosovo crisis (ibid). With the increasing dissatisfaction with the development of the U.S. foreign and security policy (i.e. ABM withdrawal and the looming second round of NATO enlargement, cf. ibid: 77 et seq; Kelleher 2012: 16-7), the Kremlin reduced its engagement with Washington.

With a short delay of almost two years, also the Russian general interest in securing survival through means of U.S.-Russian cooperation decreased (cf. Charap and Shapiro 2014b). Instead, the Russian general interest shifted towards consolidating its geopolitical neighborhood in the so called Near Abroad (meaning the former Soviet Republics, excluding the Baltics) against the background of NATO enlargement and the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (cf. Kelleher

2012: 30 et seq). As a direct consequence, the Kremlin's support for the U.S. war in Afghanistan decreased because the Russian military was concerned about a possible long-term engagement of U.S. forces in Central Asia (cf. Ponsard 2007: 78).

On the issue of establishing the NRC, convergent issue-specific interests were apparent with regards to political objectives. The political objectives were: a) devising a prominent institution which could address, amongst other issues, the threat of international terrorism; and b) overcoming the institutional deficiencies of the PJC (cf. Ponsard 2007). Since Washington benefitted enormously from Russian military assistance and the opening of Russian airspace to U.S. planes, the White House, pressured by the British government, was willing to compensate Russia through a new cooperation mechanism (the NRC) which would remove some of the institutional inefficiencies of the PJC (cf. Ponsard 2007: 78-84). The NRC was thus a product of the Kosovo crisis and 9/11. It was never seen as compensating Moscow for the looming second round of NATO enlargement in 2004 (ibid). With regards to the concrete design of the NRC, issue-specific divergence prevailed. Moscow pleaded again for an institution based on equality and including the right to veto NATO policies. The Pentagon's concern was that Russia would 'sneak in by NATO's back door, split the allies and veto military decisions' (quoted from ibid: 82). Therefore, Washington was only willing to give the Kremlin an enhanced "voice but not a veto" in NATO decision-making (ibid: 81-3).

*Expectations:* The setting resembled some of the features of U.S.-Russian cooperation on the 1997 Founding Act (see Paragraph 3.4.1 above). Again, a compensation deal loomed in the background (i.e. in 1997 the Founding Act compensated Russia, amongst other deals, for NATO enlargement; in 2002 the NRC should compensate Russian for her support of the U.S. war on terror). Again, both acted defensively-oriented. Russia sought a legal codification of the status quo by means of a veto on future NATO decision (i.e. blocking further enlargement). Washington sought a politically binding institution which would reflect the status quo but which would not exclude the possibility to change the status quo in the

future (i.e. therefore not giving Moscow a veto). According to Realism, cooperation was possible if both would agree on a successful strategy.

*Strategies:* The convergent issue-specific interest in establishing the NRC led both to pursue a strategy of confidence-building through institutionalization. Such effort could build on and continue their previous cooperation experiences in the NATO-Russia framework (i.e. PfP, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the PJC).

*Evaluation of Gains:* The actual gains from U.S.-Russian cooperation on establishing the NRC did reflect the balance of power. Washington fully got from cooperation what it wanted. It succeeded in tailoring the new cooperation mechanism according to its preferred interest of giving Russia “a voice but not a veto”. The Kremlin did only partially get what it wanted. It achieved a new institutionalized cooperation mechanism. It did not get a veto mechanism. Even though Vladimir Putin faced considerable criticism for his initially positive attitude towards NATO (Ponsard 2007: 83), the Kremlin’s interest in an agreement was too high and Russia’s position relative to NATO too weak (cf. Mlyn 2003: 53; Mankoff 2009: 22) to insist on a veto. The result was that ‘the NRC does resemble the PJC in many ways’ (ibid: 82). and the cooperation in the NRC framework did not prevent the further enlargement of NATO or plans for the deployment of European missile defense. The evaluation of gains was initially positive in Washington but changed over time to dissatisfaction the more that the NRC became the forum for Russian discontent with NATO’s and the United States’ security policy (cf. U.S. Mission NATO 2009). On the Russian side, the evaluation of gains over time turned into the negative the more the working format of the NRC impeded proportionate influence for Russia (cf. Kelleher 2012: 50). Both have continued cooperation on the NRC but NATO has partially suspended the institution in reaction to the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and the 2014 Ukraine conflict and Russia has increasingly voiced its dissatisfaction with the institution (cf. U.S. Mission NATO 2009). The establishment of the NRC increased security in the sense of confidence through institutionalized, dialogue-based interaction.

## Institutionalization

In terms of institutionalization, the years between 2000 and 2008 brought a slow-down in the establishment of new institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Chapter 5). Existing institutions came under political stress; most notably the CFE Treaty, the OSCE, but also the NRC in conjunction with the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. The derailment of the CFE process was to a lesser degree a sign of the treaty's dysfunctionality in particular but more the result of a mutual U.S.-Russian neglect of cooperative security in general (cf. Zellner, Schmidt, and Neuneck 2009). The institutionalization of conventional arms control itself did not prevent both actors from pursuing policies that were in contradiction with cooperative security (i.e. unilateralism, non-cooperation, and warfare). At the same time, Moscow did not give up completely on CFE, for the act of "suspension" allows Russia to return to implementation – albeit conditional on institutional changes to Moscow's advantage (cf. Russian Statement of 12 June 2007 in OSCE 2007a).

The following Table 6 (below) assesses U.S.-Russian cooperation on the establishment of the NRC according to the Realist cooperation model.

**TABLE 6**

U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NRC

INSTITUTION	ACTOR	ISSUE-SPECIFIC INTERESTS	EXPECTATIONS	STRATEGIES	EVALUATION OF GAINS
<i>NRC Establishment</i>	USA	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	offering compensation for Russian support in the war on terror, confidence-building	continued cooperation, later partial exit
	Russia	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued cooperation, calls for re-negotiation

### 3.6 Reset and Repair, 2009-2011

With the first presidential term of Barack Obama, the pendulum of America's foreign and security policy swung again towards a more cooperative approach (cf. Brzezinski 2010). Under the catchphrase of "Reset" Washington re-engaged with its Russian counterparts in order to repair the strained relationship (see The White House 2010). A result of this policy was a revival of bilateral arms control policies; most notably the conclusion of the New START agreement, tentative talks about negotiating cuts to non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), and the U.S.-led initiative to involve Russia in the newly designed missile defense approach for Europe, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

However, Washington's cooperative approach did not result in successfully repairing the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe. On the one hand, Moscow continued to show a deep-seated frustration with the existing European security architecture. A leaked U.S. cable summarizes well Russian dissatisfaction: 'Russia's frustration with its declining influence in European affairs has been magnified by waves of NATO and EU enlargement, the abandonment of the ABM Treaty and subsequent development of new missile defense plans on European soil, the stalemate in progress toward an adapted CFE agreement on conventional arms control, NATO's refusal to engage on Russia's other proposals for confidence-building measures, Western actions in Kosovo, and increasingly close NATO, EU, and bilateral relations with Russia's immediate neighbors', the U.S. cable concludes (Mission U.S. OSCE 2009). On the other hand, the Russian administrative apparatus was split between divergent opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. These internal Russian quarrels blocked for instance a reform of the NRC (see Mission U.S. NATO 2009).

In the realm of conventional arms control, a last effort led by Washington in order to revive the CFE Treaty at informal talks "at 36" (meaning CFE parties to the treaty and new NATO members not part to the treaty) failed in 2011, mainly due

to Russian disengagement.<sup>22</sup> As a consequence, Washington announced that it would not accept Russian inspections of U.S. bases under CFE any longer and that it would not provide Russia with the annual December exchange notifications and military data called for in the treaty (cf. United States State Department 2011). A few days later, NATO allies and Georgia followed the example. In addition, the Treaty on Open Skies temporarily became hostage to disputes between Turkey and Greece as well as between Georgia and Russia (cf. Spitzer 2011). The treaty's operation was therewith partially affected as well (cf. Delawie 2013).

For the OSCE, the change in office in Washington initially brought along a wave of optimism, which was even more propelled by an initiative of then-President Dmitry Medvedev for an overhaul of Europe's security structures (cf. Voronkov 2011). In November 2009, Medvedev publicly put forward the draft of a European Security Treaty (EST) to OSCE participating States. At the same time, a second draft for an agreement between Russia and NATO was introduced to the NRC (cf. Mission U.S. NATO 2009). This second draft, suggesting a concretization of the Founding Act's formula of 'substantial combat forces' (NATO-Russia 1997; see also Paragraph 3.4.1 above), was more or less an attempt to re-negotiate the Founding Act in light of the Russian non-attendance of CFE (cf. Mission U.S. NATO 2009c). Even though both drafts were in large parts duplicating Russian initiatives from the 1990s for an all-encompassing European security order (see Paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.4.1 above and cf. Kühn 2010b), the initiative showed certain re-engagement of Russia after almost eight years of stonewalling. The main drawback of the initiative was again its more or less hidden attempt to subordinate NATO to an inclusive legally binding treaty mechanism based on the consensus rule. NATO states therefore rejected the idea and suggested transferring the debate to the OSCE instead (see Embassy U.S. Moscow 2009b).

The result was the so called Corfu Process of the OSCE which was launched in June 2009 at an informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers on the Greek island of Corfu. Its stated aim was to 'restore confidence and take forward dialogue on

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<sup>22</sup> This information was passed on to the author by German officials; cf. also Kühn 2013.

wider European security' (OSCE 2014). The Corfu Process turned out to become a shortened version of the OSCE's Security Model exercise of the late 1990s (cf. IFSH 2010). The initial optimism of 2009 vanished soon (ibid). The more it turned out that NATO member states would not accept either one of Medvedev's drafts, the faster Moscow lost interest in the project (cf. Mission U.S. NATO 2009). With the OSCE Astana Summit in 2010 – the first summit since eleven years – the short period of optimism and re-engagement came to an end. Participating States could not decide on a concrete Framework for Action due to substantially divergent views on the OSCE's political role (cf. Zagorski 2011). Instead, participating States decided for a declaratory document, the Astana Commemorative Declaration, which outlined the vague idea of a Security Community (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of the concept by Karl Deutsch) for the OSCE space (cf. Mützenich and Karádi 2013). From Astana on, the political climate in the OSCE deteriorated gradually. The long-awaited update of the Vienna Document resulted in merely technical and procedural changes, agreed upon in 2011 (see Schmidt and Zellner 2012). With overt disappointment, 36 parties to the VD stated, 'in contrast to the strategic update of the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures that we believed was required, [the VD2011] is clearly less ambitious than we expected.' (OSCE 2011)

With regards to NATO-Russian relations, the first term of the Obama administration brought a certain level of re-engagement albeit both sides were unable to forge new institutions of cooperation. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO member states invited Russia to cooperate on the development of the EPAA. Divergent interests about the system's concrete design and operation prevented Washington and Moscow from reaching a preliminary understanding (cf. Zadra 2014). At the same time, Washington's aim of reducing NSNW with Russia rather led to increase tensions, both within the alliance and vis-à-vis Russia (cf. Chalmers, Chalmers, and Berger 2012). Meanwhile, further enlargement plans took a back seat due to political frictions within the alliance, cost considerations, non-readiness of potential candidates, and, though not officially voiced, also because of Moscow's military intervention in Georgia (cf. Freedman 2014: 17).

### 3.6.1 Analysis of Cooperation


In this paragraph, two cooperation processes – the CFE talks ‘at 36’, and the Corfu Process – are analyzed along the lines of the Realist model of international cooperation (see Chapter 2). The two cooperation processes are closely intertwined and dependent on the discussion about the Medvedev EST proposals. Before, a closer look at the development of U.S./NATO-Russian/CST capabilities between 2009 and 2011 is taken.

#### Capabilities

With regards to economic capabilities, between 2009 and 2011 both countries struggled economically because of the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. Nevertheless, both national economies continued to grow between 2009 and 2011. According to the World Bank (2014), the Russian GDP grew from US\$ 1.2 trillion in 2009 to US\$ 1.9 trillion in 2011. At the same time, the U.S. GDP increased from US\$ 14.4 trillion to US\$ 15.5 trillion. By 2011, the U.S. GDP had 8.1 times the size of the Russian GDP. Chart 23 (below) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 23**


COMPARISON OF U.S.-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN GDP, 2009-2011



With regards to the first capabilities factor of military strength, the development of national defense budgets of the United States and Russia and the combined defense budgets of NATO member states and CST member states show a further comparably stronger increase on the side of the United States/NATO. By 2011, the combined defense budget of NATO was 14.3 times the size of the combined defense budget of CST states. Chart 24 (below) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 24**


COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGETS, 2009-2011



With regards to the second capabilities factor of military strength, the number of total armed forces shows a significant decrease on the side of NATO (minus ~270,000) even though two further countries (Albania and Croatia) joined the alliance in 2009. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russia increased the number of total armed forces. Chart 25 (next page) illustrates these trends.

**CHART 25**

**COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED TOTAL ARMED FORCES, 2009-2011**



With regards to the capabilities factor of the size of population and territory, no significant changes occurred during this period (see years 2009 and 2011 in Annex I).

CFE Talks “at 36” and the Corfu Process

*Interests:* Like during the George W. Bush years, the United States and Russia did not share an interest in cooperation in order to secure mutual survival (cf. Indyk, Lieberthal, and O’Hanlon 2012: 12 et seq). Rather, both had partially complementary issue-specific interests in different policy fields. The Obama administration’s general interest in survival was much more geared towards fighting the consequences of the financial and economic crisis, restoring Washington’s international reputation, ending the War on Terror, and hedging against the growing influence of China (ibid). Washington’s policy towards Europe and Russia was only one objective amongst many (ibid). The “Reset” policy was thus more of a pragmatic attempt to identify those areas in which the United States and Russia actually had a shared interest, for instance in nuclear non-proliferation and strategic nuclear

arms control (ibid). Russia's general interest in securing survival was closely associated with consolidating its economic growth and its influence in Russia's direct neighborhood. In 2006, Dmitri Trenin observed that 'until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the center but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia's leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system.' (Trenin 2006: 87) Selective cooperation with the West and the United States was thus seen as means of preserving the status quo and preventing any changes to the detriment of Russia and the Russian leadership (cf. Lyne, Talbott, and Watanabe 2006). All subsequent attempts at cooperation were geared towards these ends (cf. Mankoff 2009: 16 et seq).

Particularly the two treaty proposals by Russian President Medvedev tried to prevent any future changes to Russia's disadvantage. Therefore, the Kremlin returned to the older idea of subordinating NATO to a higher legal authority. During the 1990s, the vehicle for achieving this end was the OSCE (see Paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.4.1). Because Moscow had more or less given up on the organization in this regard (cf. Ghéballi 2005), now the EST was the vehicle of choice (cf. IFSH 2010). With the Georgia campaign in 2008, the Kremlin had also signaled that it has effective means to thwart efforts at further enlarging NATO to the East. At the same time, the Medvedev EST proposals reflected the Russian interest to re-engage with the West on issues of European security. The Russian objective behind the two proposals was obvious: subordination of NATO under a new cooperative mechanism and thus a change to the distribution of power (cf. Kühn 2010b). Washington had a genuine interest in preventing such scenario (see Embassy U.S. Moscow 2009b). Instead, Washington sought to make use of the Medvedev proposals to advance on the deadlocked cooperation processes of CFE and the OSCE. A leaked U.S. cable from 2009 concludes: 'an effective response to Medvedev's proposal should acknowledge Russia's apprehensions about the status quo and European security and accept the possibility of building incrementally on existing structures without compromising the centrality of NATO and OSCE.' (Ibid) Consequently, the United States did neither dismiss nor agree to the proposals but

instead transferred the Russian initiative to the existing institutions of CFE and the OSCE. ‘With skillful diplomacy, we can use Medvedev’s proposal to try to overcome deadlocks on CFE and A/CFE as well as enhancing transparency measures’, the same cable suggested. (Ibid) While thus both had a convergent issue-specific interest in cooperation on European security, the objectives behind that interest were fundamentally divergent. Divergence was further elevated by issue-specific divergent interests with regards to CFE and the OSCE.

On CFE, Moscow’s issue-specific interest was still NATO ratification of ACFE (cf. Collina 2011) together with additional demands such as CFE accession of the Baltic States (cf. Kühn 2010a). Washington had still an issue-specific interest in Russia fulfilling her Istanbul commitments related to Moldova and Georgia as a precondition to ACFE ratification (ibid). Meanwhile, the Russian recognition of sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the additional Russian forces stationed in the two Georgian breakaway regions had further complicated the setting (see Paragraph 3.5.1 above). Also, the Russian issue-specific interest in a clear definition of ‘substantial combat forces’ (NATO-Russia 1997) had already been transferred by Moscow to NATO member states as part of the second Medvedev treaty draft. Therewith, Moscow had tied an additional demand in conjunction with CFE to the signing of the second draft (cf. Mission U.S. NATO 2009c). In an exchange between then-Russian Prime Minister Putin and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, Putin explained ‘that lack of progress on the CFE front had forced Moscow to table the proposed treaty on European Security’ (ibid).

On the OSCE and the subsequent Corfu Process, Russia had an issue-specific interest in making the signing of the first Medvedev treaty draft the outcome of the Corfu Process. ‘Russia did not have any timeframe to deliver a treaty, but [...] Russia would seek a legally binding instrument as the outcome’, a leaked U.S. cable explained (Embassy U.S. Moscow 2009b). In addition, Russia lobbied again for strengthening the politico-military dimension (cf. Zagorski 2010). Already before the start of the Corfu Process, a U.S. guidance demarche had outlined the U.S. issue-specific interest: ‘The Corfu Ministerial presents an opportunity for the

U.S. to channel discussion in a productive direction, locating the security dialogue firmly within the OSCE framework, and basing it on the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security.' (Secretary of State 2009) Hence, Washington's issue-specific interest was geared towards the comprehensive security approach of the OSCE, stressing "soft" security issues, for instance in the realm of human rights (ibid).

*Expectations:* Both could expect a difficult setting with different policy issues and institutions in close interaction. On the EST and the Corfu Process, Moscow acted offensively-oriented. The EST was an attempt at changing the existing distribution of power by subordinating NATO to the treaty's mechanisms. With regards to the Corfu Process, Russia again showed an offensive orientation; insisting on a legally binding outcome which would echo the tenets of the EST (i.e. subordinating NATO). Washington tried to keep the status quo and acted defensively-oriented; hoping that Moscow would change its orientation in the Corfu Process as it did during the 1990s (see Embassy U.S. Moscow 2009b). According to Realism, cooperation on the issues would be impossible as long as Russia was not either changing her orientation or compensating Washington for its anticipated losses. On CFE, both continued with their respective orientations from the previous years (see Paragraph 3.5.1). Washington acted offensively-oriented, trying to change the balance of power by insisting on Russian forces withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia (cf. Kühn 2013). Moscow acted defensively-oriented, demanding ratification of ACFE (ibid). Again, cooperation was almost impossible, according to Realism, as long as Washington was not either compensating Moscow for the anticipated losses or changing its offensive orientation.

*Strategies:* On the issue of the EST proposals, Washington decided, backed by its allies, not to engage directly and to transfer the initiative to the CFE consultations "at 36" and the OSCE Corfu Process instead (cf. Secretary of State 2009). In both institutional frameworks, the United States and Russia agreed on the strategy of confidence-building by slicing up issues into increments. In the CFE case, consultations happened in twelve rounds of talks over almost a year. For the Corfu Process, a leaked U.S. cable explained the strategy: 'Ensure that this process re-

mains open-ended. At least at the outset, this dialogue would have no fixed timeline and no fixed outcome; rather, the results of the discussions would determine whether additional security arrangements, or adjustments to current arrangements, might be necessary.’ (Secretary of State 2009) The strategy of confidence-building had the additional advantage of building on previous experiences in the JCG of the CFE Treaty and the FSC of the OSCE. No strategies of compensation were employed.

*Evaluation of Gains:* The two cooperation processes of CFE talks “at 36” and the Corfu Process failed. In the end, no side got what it wanted. The only real (non-cooperative) success for Washington was that it succeeded in rejecting the EST proposals. Basically, Washington repeated its stance from the 1990s, blocking all attempts at relegating existing institutions, and particularly NATO, to any higher mechanism. The downturn of that approach was that Washington failed to achieve a serious long-term involvement of Russia in a comprehensive discussion on European security. Neither the CFE Treaty nor the OSCE were seriously revived despite all atmospheric optimism. In the CFE case, the talks “at 36” were a continuation of the policies of the previous ten years (cf. Kühn 2013). No side was willing to make a first cooperative move (ibid). The talks were abandoned without any concrete result after twelve rounds of consultations. After the end of the talks, NATO allies partially exited from the treaty by suspending data exchange with Russia and Russian inspections on-site inspections on NATO soil while officially remaining bound by the treaty (cf. Collina 2011). Russia continues her partial exit strategy of “suspension” of CFE.

For Russia, the whole process of short-term engagement was disappointing (cf. IFSH 2010). Most prominently, Moscow failed on the EST proposals. From a Realist point of view, both treaty drafts were either hopelessly naïve or blatantly over-estimating Russian capabilities. Moscow did also not get what it wanted in the CFE and the OSCE frameworks. On CFE, Russia did not get the ratification of ACFE. Moscow’s additional demands only helped to overburden the already fragile agenda (cf. Schmidt 2013). The Corfu Process ran basically into the same old

problems which earlier Russian efforts at OSCE reform had displayed (i.e. U.S. blockade policies; cf. Zagorski 2011). The difference to the 1990s was that this time Moscow was not interested in achieving its issue-specific interest through multilateral negotiations within the organization but instead relied on a unilateral course of action, confronting OSCE and (in parallel) NATO countries with a ready to sign treaty coupled with the demand for separate discussions in different institutional frameworks (cf. Mission U.S. OSCE 2010). The further the Corfu Process evolved, the more serious the Russian disappointment got (cf. Zagorski 2011). The ensuing OSCE Summit in Astana, the first since 1999, did not only mark the inconclusive end of the Corfu Process, the Summit itself was a disappointment (cf. Kühn 2010a). Even though Russia and the United States have quietly exited from the Corfu Process, they continue minimal cooperation in the OSCE format.

In all three cases, cooperation either failed (CFE and Corfu Process) or did not take place (in the case of the EST) because of the non-conductive orientations (Moscow offensive on EST and Corfu Process; Washington offensive on CFE) and the mutual reluctance to either change orientations towards a defensive approach or to pay compensation. The strategy of confidence-building was not enough to ensure cooperation.

#### Institutionalization

In terms of institutionalization, two developments stick out during the years 2009-2011. First, like during the previous eight years of the George W. Bush administration, the unraveling of certain institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe (i.e. CFE and the OSCE) continued (see also Chapters 5-7). Second, in contrast to all other previous periods neither the United States nor Russia employed the strategy of compensation in order to possibly mitigate the consequences of their respective offensive orientation.

Table 7 (next page) assesses U.S.-Russian cooperation on the CFE Talks “at 36” and the Corfu Process according to the Realist cooperation model.

**TABLE 7**

U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON CFE TALKS “AT 36” AND THE CORFU PROCESS

INSTITUTION	ACTOR	ISSUE-SPECIFIC INTERESTS	EXPECTATIONS	STRATEGIES	EVALUATION OF GAINS
<i>CFE Talks “at 36”</i>	USA	divergent	acting offensively-oriented	confidence-building	partial exit
	Russia	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building	continued partial exit
<i>Corfu Process</i>	USA	divergent	acting defensively-oriented	confidence-building	exit, continued minimal cooperation in OSCE
	Russia	Divergent	acting offensively-oriented	confidence-building	exit, continued minimal cooperation in OSCE

3.7 Crisis and Confrontation, 2012-2014

During the last two years of the overall period of analysis, West-Russian relations deteriorated to an unprecedented state of confrontation. With the start of Vladimir Putin’s third term as President of Russia in May 2012, relations quickly took a downturn. Already in 2009, Mikhail Gorbachev had openly criticized Putin’s intention of a hand-over of power from Medvedev. ‘Questions of modernization - in the economy, in the social sphere, and in culture - cannot be decided without the involvement of the people, and without increasing civil liberties. And this cannot be done through pressure, commands, and administrative methods, but only through the further development of democracy. The people must be involved in this’, Gorbachev (RIA Novosti 2009) urged. With the municipal elections in March 2012, mass protests throughout the big cities of Russia started and increased towards the Presidential election which saw Putin’s re-election. The Kremlin reacted with a clamp down on civil liberties, considerable pressure on critical media, rhetorical demonization of ‘the West’, and politically motivated

trials against unpleasant opponents such as the punk band Pussy Riot or political activist Alexei Nawalny (cf. Freedman 2014: 16).

Inner-Russian developments increasingly affected the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship; most visibly in acts of open intimidations against the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, whom the Kremlin viewed as an active supporter of Russian opposition groups (see Remnick 2014). In late 2012, the U.S. Senate passed a law punishing Russian officials assumed to be responsible for the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky attached to a wider act (Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012) normalizing bilateral trade relations more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War. The State Duma reacted with a ban on the international adoption of Russian children into the United States.

Tensions quickly spilled over to the multilateral and bilateral levels of security policy. With its inherent focus on human rights, particularly the OSCE was affected. Already shortly after the OSCE's Astana Summit, Zagorski (2011: 32) had commented: 'When we talk about old or new dividing lines that may occur because of this or that decision, we need to keep in mind that this dividing line already exists, and it clearly manifested itself during the Corfu Process and at the Summit Meeting in Astana.' The 2012 OSCE Ministerial Council in Dublin underscored that assessment as participating States could not even agree on the language of non-binding declarations of intent anymore. Herd (2013: 395-6) concluded: 'Over the past year, we have witnessed multilateralism becoming less effective, efficient, and legitimate on account of institutional and organizational weaknesses. Solidarity and shared responsibility are less in evidence – states prefer to act according to their own immediate interests and priorities, giving these precedence over the longer-term interests of preserving peace in the system. When we survey the strategic landscape through 2011 and 2012, a crisis of governance - with governments being overwhelmed - manifests itself at the level of leading states and international organizations within the OSCE area.'

What pertained to the OSCE continued at other levels of institutionalized cooperation. Efforts to reach an understanding about the EPAA in the working groups of the NRC ran ashore due to diverging views about the system's capabilities and scope (cf. Zadra 2014). A last-ditch effort by the Obama administration to open discussions with Russia about a follow-on agreement to New START (see The White House 2013) did not receive an answer from the Kremlin. Without further rounds of engagement, the CFE Treaty remained blocked with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia in non-compliance with specific force and geographical limitations (see United States Department of State 2014: 7).

What started as domestic Russian crisis with already severe repercussions at the international level turned into open confrontation with escalating events in Ukraine.<sup>23</sup> When then-Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich turned down the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement in November 2013 and instead sought closer political and economic ties with Russia, pro-Western protests started in Kyiv and culminated in the ousting of Yanukovich and his cabinet in February 2014. Russia, viewing the protests as illegal overthrow of an elected government by 'fascist elements' actively supported by the United States and the EU (Trenin 2014), employed special forces without national insignia and local activists to take over institutions in Crimea on February 27 (cf. Freedman 2014: 8-9). A hastily arranged referendum resulted in the de facto annexation of Crimea on March 18.

This totally unexpected turn of events led NATO and EU states to punish Russia for her 'illegal activities' (Burke-White 2014) with staggered economic sanctions. The situation worsened when fighting between the Russian minority of the Eastern-Ukrainian Donbas region and official as well as unofficial Ukrainian forces escalated to open civil war. Between April and December, 4,707 people were killed and 10,322 wounded in the conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine, according to the UN Human Rights Office (cf. United Nations in Ukraine 2014). More than 200,000 IDPs have registered in Ukraine (ibid), not counting those that

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<sup>23</sup> The following section covers only briefly the complex events in Ukraine in order to not distort the focus of this thesis. For a balanced account of the ensuing events see Freedman 2014.

fled to Russia. Pro-Russian militias backed by the Russian military and forces without national insignia are fighting in South-Eastern Ukraine (see the next footnote; cf. MacFarquhar and Gordon 2014).

In response to Russia repeatedly violating Ukrainian borders and sovereignty, NATO member states came close to revoking the Founding Act and partially suspended the NRC which is only theoretically functioning at the level of ambassadorial meetings while all working groups have been suspended. Against the background of the Russian belligerence, member states decided at the Newport Summit to gear up their collective defense capabilities through enhanced military engagement in the Baltic States and Poland on a rotational basis (see NATO 2014b). While NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow (NATO 2014a) concluded that the alliance ‘will be forced to consider Russia less of a partner and more of an adversary’, President Putin allegedly threatened to be able to quickly deploy Russian forces to Kyiv, Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, and Bucharest (Brössler 2014).

In December 2014, the low price of crude oil and the Western sanctions, which had been concluded in response to the annexation of Crimea, plunged the Russian ruble to experience its steepest intraday fall since the Russian financial crisis in 1998 (cf. Winning and Abramov 2014). Increasingly, some Western policymakers saw the consequences of the economic confrontation with concern. In an interview from December 19, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steinmeier issued a warning: Whoever tries to bring Russia to her knees is terribly wrong to conclude that this would lead to increased security in Europe, Steinmeier insisted (quoted in Spiegel on-line 2014, translation by the author). I can only warn against such perception, he added (ibid). Already in August 2014 Vladimir Putin had flexed his muscles by stressing that “it is better not to come against Russia as regards a possible armed conflict.” “I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations,” he added (Putin quoted in Botelho and Smith-Spark 2014). At the December 4 Basel Ministerial, OSCE participating States voted for Germany as OSCE Chairman in 2016.

### 3.7.1 Analysis of Policies


The years 2012-2014, and particularly the Ukraine conflict mark a watershed for cooperative arms control in Europe – to a lesser degree in institutional terms but more with a view to the principles that had guided policies and institutional development since the end of the Cold War. Those three years did not bring any new cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe, let alone any new institutions. Therefore, this paragraph will concentrate on analysis of U.S.-Russian policies in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict and the tenets of cooperative security. The Realist model for understanding international cooperation cannot be applied in its entirety. However, some of the variables of the model will be used in this paragraph to assess U.S.-Russian policies.

#### Comparison of Capabilities, Interests, and Orientations

*Capabilities:* Between 2012 and 2013 the economic capabilities of Russia stagnated in terms of GDP (see Chart 26 below).

**CHART 26**

COMPARISON OF U.S.-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN GDP, 2012-2013




According to the World Bank (2014), the Russian GDP roughly remained at US\$ 2 trillion. In comparison, the U.S. GDP showed a relatively stronger increase from US\$ 16.1 trillion in 2011 to US\$ 16.7 trillion in 2013. For 2014, analysts by the World Bank (2014b) expect a further increase in U.S. GDP and a decrease in Russian GDP.<sup>24</sup>

With regards to the first capabilities factor of military strength, the development of national defense budgets from the previous period continued. Between 2012 and 2013, the combined defense budget of NATO, and this time also of the United States decreased. The reason behind this development was the decision by the White House to significantly downsize its military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq (cf. Walker 2014). In contrast, Russia's and the combined CST defense budget increased.<sup>25</sup> Chart 27 (below) illustrates these divergent trends.

**CHART 27**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGETS, 2012-2013




<sup>24</sup> At the time of completion of this thesis, the data by the World Bank for 2014 was not yet available.

<sup>25</sup> At the time of completion of this thesis, the IISS had not yet released figures for the year 2014.

With regards to the second capabilities factor of military strength, the number of total armed forces all decreased between 2012 and 2014. This is only the second period since the end of the Cold War where a parallel decrease happened. Chart 28 (below) illustrates these parallel trends.

**CHART 28**

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL U.S.-RUSSIAN AND  
NATO-CST COMBINED TOTAL ARMED FORCES, 2012-2014



With regards to the capabilities factor of the size of population and territory, no significant changes occurred during this period (see years 2012 and 2014 in Annex I).

*Russian Interests:* Since the beginning of the millennium, the Russian general interest in securing survival was much closer associated with consolidating Russian influence in the so called Near Abroad (cf. Jonsson 2012: 450). Therewith, the Russian leadership saw NATO enlargement and colored revolutions as prime concerns (cf. Erickson 2013) for two reasons. On the one hand, further NATO (and also EU) enlargement to the east was seen as moving the Western military geopolitically closer to the Russian border (cf. President of Russia 2007; 2014b).

Already since the Napoleonic wars, the Russian military highly values the enormous geographic depth of the Russian homeland and has continuously tried to assemble additional territories (i.e. buffer states) around the Russian territory in order to increase geographical depth (cf. Erickson 2013). On the other hand, the colored revolutions in neighboring states were a possible precedent for Russia itself – a scenario which touched upon the Russian leadership’s general interest in its own personal survival. That was the reason why the Putin government reacted so harshly to the protests throughout Russia in the first half of 2012.

Hence, in the Kremlin’s understanding, the situation in and around Ukraine was somewhat the “perfect storm”. The new Kyiv leadership was willing to sign an association agreement with the EU which includes, amongst many other stipulations, also aspects of continuous military cooperation (see Title II in EU-Ukraine 2013). Ukrainian membership in the EU and, possibly, later NATO was not excluded. In conjunction, the large Russian naval bases of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea port of Sevastopol would be at stake in such a scenario. At the same time, the ousting of Yanukovych was just another example of the swift toppling of an autocratic leadership. The debate amongst scholars of IR, which of those two factors (preventing further NATO enlargement vs. preventing the domestic loss of power) are mainly responsible for Russia’s policies in Ukraine is only about to start (cf. Mearsheimer 2014; Sestanovich, McFaul, and Mearsheimer 2014; Charap and Shapiro 2014b). What seems obvious for the moment is that Ukraine, with a formidable protracted conflict in its south-eastern part, can hardly become a member of NATO in the near future. For the moment, it seems that the Kremlin has achieved its issue-specific interest of preventing Ukraine from becoming an alliance member.

*Russian Orientations:* The debate between Mearsheimer et al (ibid) has also opened up the question whether Russia is acting offensively in the understanding of Realism. With a view to international principles such as the inviolability of frontiers, the respect for sovereignty, and the non-use of force in international relations, Russia has clearly shown an offensive orientation. However, Moscow

has not altered the larger distribution of power vis-à-vis the West since Ukraine was neither a NATO member nor an immediate candidate to join the alliance (albeit the 2008 NATO Bucharest promise). Moscow has rather prevented a possible future change to the balance of power which was perceived in Moscow as being to Russia's detriment. Vladimir Putin has explained the situation in a recent interview: 'I will reiterate: where are the guarantees that the coup d'état, this second color revolution that happened in Ukraine, won't be followed by NATO's arrival in Ukraine? Nobody has ever discussed this issue with us in the past two decades. I'd like to emphasize that nobody has conducted a meaningful dialogue with us on this. All we heard was the same reply, like a broken record: Every nation has the right to determine the security system it wants to live in and this has nothing to do with you.' (Putin quoted in Charap and Shapiro 2014a) Given Russian occupation with keeping the status quo, one can argue from a Realist viewpoint that the Kremlin acted defensively-oriented. Again, the debate about this question is only about to unfold and it is too early to give a sound and compelling answer.

*U.S. Interests:* Since the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the U.S. general interest in survival is not closely associated with Russia anymore; neither with a view to an interest in containment (as during the Cold War) nor with a view to cooperate for the sake of mutual survival (as during détente and in conjunction with the end of the Cold War). Therewith, other objectives have entered center stage. Amongst them was the U.S. issue-specific interest in promoting the Liberal Western model based on free markets, Capitalism, individual human rights, and democracy worldwide (cf. Lagon 2011). The autocratic design of most post-Soviet states (including Russia) was an apparent challenge to these rationales. Therewith, Washington supported civil movements in those states wherever it was seen to enhance Liberal values (cf. Remnick 2014). These policies started already during the mid-1990s – at that time, mostly promoted by the Republican-led Congress (cf. Kühn 2009) – and became a central tenet of U.S. foreign and security policy under George W. Bush (cf. Lagon 2011). At the same time, policies of multilateralism, particularly in the realm of arms control, took a back seat (cf. Luongo 2001). The two Obama administrations returned to the policies of multilateralism and arms

control; however, democracy promotion remained a central U.S. objective, seemingly confirmed by the Arab Spring (cf. Lagon 2011). From this point of view, the events in Ukraine were only another confirmation of the U.S. objective. It was and is therefore in the interest of the United States to support the democracy, freedom, and territorial integrity of Ukraine (cf. The White House 2014a).

A second issue-specific interest, which has remained a central tenet of U.S. foreign and security policy since a very long time, is the maintenance and (possible) further enlargement of NATO (cf. Pradetto 2004). The policy of “open door” continues to allow other states to enter NATO as long as the state wishes so and as long as membership would enhance the alliance’s security (cf. NATO 2014a). Because Washington views NATO enlargement as increasing the stability of new democratic states and therewith European security as a whole (see U.S. Statements 13, 15, and 17 contained in Chapter 7), the policy tool of enlargement is in close relation to the objective of democracy promotion. Even though, Moscow has since long expressed its concern with NATO enlargement, Washington continues to officially denounce Russian concerns as unfounded. At the recent Wales Summit, Heads of State and Government reiterated that “the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia.” (NATO 2014b) From this angle, Russia has no reason to deny Ukraine alliance membership; both from a normative point of view (i.e. Ukraine’s sovereign decision) and from a security point of view (because Ukraine’s possible membership would not be directed against Russia and because NATO enlargement is to the security advantage of all states, including Russia).

*U.S. Orientations:* From a Realist viewpoint, both U.S. issue-specific interests – democracy promotion abroad and NATO’s open door policy – show strong features of an offensive orientation. Both approaches aim at changing the distribution of power. Realists do not ask whether the policy objective behind an offensive orientation – be it stabilizing the new European democracies after the end of the Cold War – is morally just or not. Realism concentrates primarily on the resultant changes to capabilities and who benefits from those changes. To assume that

Washington engages on democracy promotion and the open door policy because of altruistic motives as some U.S. comments might imply (cf. McFaul in Sestanovich, McFaul, and Mearsheimer 2014) is irrelevant from a Realist viewpoint. Assuming that democracy promotion and the open door policy would really lead to the desired U.S. outcome of increased international stability; at the same time, they do increase U.S. influence and power.

Taken together, both U.S. interests clash with the Russian interest of keeping the status quo. According to Realism, because of the offensive orientation of the U.S.-led policies of NATO enlargement and democracy promotion, they make real cooperation on the issues themselves almost impossible. The consequences of this incompatibility have partially contributed to the conflict in and over Ukraine (see Mearsheimer 2014). They might also have contributed to the decay of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe.

#### Consequences for Institutions

With the ongoing war in the Donbas region of Ukraine, its military involvement<sup>26</sup>, its continued ignorance of international law<sup>27</sup>, and its openly belligerent stance towards the West, Russia has departed from the idea of cooperative security. Even though Russian policy shows some remains of respect for institutional constraints – its continued participation in the OSCE, its acceptance of the OSCE as an interlocutor in the bargaining process for a ceasefire agreement (Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group of September 5, 2014), its only clandestine military involvement in contrast to the possibility of open invasion, and the continued application and observation of the Vienna Document (cf. Rich-

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<sup>26</sup> As this thesis was finalized there was no irrevocable evidence for the active military involvement of Russian forces at the order of the Russian Ministry of Defense. However, significant indicators such as the capturing of Russian paratroopers by Ukrainian forces at Ukrainian soil or the reporting of missing Russian soldiers on duty by Russian NGOs point to that direction. (Cf. Saul 2014; Odynova 2014) Putin's belated confession of Russian forces involvement at Crimea after his initial denial (see Freedman 2014: 21) could also serve as a tactical blueprint for possible actions in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

<sup>27</sup> For a particularly good discussion of the legal aspects of the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent legal arguments brought forward by Putin in his March 18, 2014 speech see Burke-White 2014.

ter 2014)<sup>28</sup> – Moscow has openly declared an end to the European security order of the post-Cold War era (cf. Legvold 2014). Putin’s continued reference to international law (cf. Burke-White 2014) and the alleged transgressions of the West, most vividly brought forward in his March 18 speech following the annexation of Crimea (President of Russia 2014a), extrapolate two important aspects.

On the one hand, Russian policy has not gone completely off the beaten track but feels internationally pressured to justify her actions (cf. Burke-White 2014). On the other hand, the current situation provides the Kremlin with an opportunity to paint a picture which resembles all the Russian dissatisfactions associated with the development of the European security order after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amongst those are institutional developments such as NATO enlargement, the degradation of the OSCE, and the standstill and regress in arms control matters; but also significant instances of Western power projections such as the Yugoslavia bombing in 1999 or the Iraq War in 2003 (President of Russia 2014b). Following the Kremlin’s rationale, this sequence of Western “wrong doings” led to and culminated in a last resort to self-help. Since the way back is not imaginable for the moment and also not desired, as the rhetorical Russian campaign against ‘Western values’ (cf. Lukin 2014) underscores, Russia seems to see its future in Asia (cf. Meister 2014). The continued push for a Eurasian Union – though for the foreseeable time without Ukraine – coupled with stronger economic ties with China (see Luhn and Macalister 2014) and the development of a somewhat alternative values model as compared to the ‘Western model’ (cf. Lukin 2014) start to crystallize as essentials of a possible new orientation of Russia in the international arena.

For the West – here, the United States and NATO – events in Ukraine came as a big surprise (cf. Freedman 2014; even though there were a number of signs that Russia would not allow an integration of Ukraine into either NATO or the EU; cf. Kropatcheva 2010) and were interpreted as the possible dawning of a ‘New Cold

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<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, Russia successfully used existing loopholes in the VD to cloak its troop concentrations at the Ukrainian border. (Cf. Richter 2014: 3-4)

War' (Legvold 2014). Its reactions – mainly condemnation and economic sanctions – reveal a certain degree of helplessness and a lack of policy conceptions on how to re-engage with Russia (cf. Charap and Shapiro 2014). Some commentators suggest reviving elements of cooperative security (cf. Brocking 2014). A number of signs might point into this direction. Only partially suspending the NRC, resisting calls from Eastern member states to call off the Founding Act (cf. Karnitschnig 2014), the vivid employment of the Vienna Document by NATO member states, and the key involvement of the OSCE are all signs that the United States is re-discovering institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe which have not enjoyed full U.S. attention in the years preceding the current confrontation.

### 3.8 Conclusions


Between 1973 and 2014, a host of institutions developed in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia were the two main driving forces behind institutionalization. During the last 14 years, these institutions have come under increasing political stress. Some institutions are experiencing signs of decay; though, to varying degrees. In the following, the main conclusions with regards to the variables of the Realist model of international cooperation, with regards to institutionalization, and decay are summarized. Then, the two guiding research questions of this chapter are answered. Finally, the two central research questions of this thesis are approached.

#### 3.8.1 Capabilities

In the years between 1973 and 2014, the capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia developed completely different. In economic terms, the United States experienced an almost steady growth with only short periods of stagnation (see Chart 29 next page). In contrast, the Soviet/Russian economy more or less stagnated during the last 41 years. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the fast transformation to Capitalism, and the subsequent years of internal turbulence left their marks on the Russian economy. Between 1989 and 1999, the Russian GDP shrank by half. Only with the coming into office of Vladimir Putin in 2000 and the rise in international crude oil and gas prices did the Russian economy experience significant growth rates – shortly interrupted by the 2008 international financial crisis (cf. Gill and Young 2012). Since early 2014, reform gridlock, the drop in oil and gas prices, and the Western sanctions have all pushed the Russian economy towards recession (cf. World Bank 2014). For 2015, analysts of the World Bank expect the Russian economy to shrink (ibid). All in all, the current economic capabilities of the United States in terms of GDP outnumber the Russian economic capabilities by a factor of eight. In economic capabilities in terms of GDP, Russia is far from being a peer competitor to the United States.

## CHART 29

### TREND ANALYSIS OF U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN GDP<sup>29</sup> DEVELOPMENT, 1973-2013




With regards to the first capabilities factor of military strength (national defense budget), the diverging trends are even more obvious (see Chart 30 next p). During the early and mid-1970s, Moscow and Washington were equal competitors in this realm. In 1973, the national defense budgets of the United States (US\$ 85 billion) and the Soviet Union (US\$ 89 billion) were almost equal. With the coming into office of Gorbachev, the Soviet defense budget fell behind the American. The breakup of the Soviet Union led to a drop from US\$ 117 billion in 1990 to US\$ 31 billion in 1999. Only since 2001, the Russian defense budget has increased and is US\$ 81 billion in 2013. In contrast, the U.S. defense budget has skyrocket during the eight George W. Bush years. Between 2000 and 2008, the national defense budget grew from US\$ 293 billion to US\$ 693 billion. In terms of comparing the defense budgets, Russia is far from being a peer competitor to the United States.

<sup>29</sup> For the respective data underlying the following five charts, please see Annex I. The basis for assessing economic capabilities is a comparison of GDP in the years of periodization, except for 2014 (there has not yet been data available for 2014). For some years, the basis was comparison of GNP. This is due to the alternating methods applied in the IISS Military Balance series (see Annex I). For this and all following charts: Blue line = United States; red line = Soviet Union/Russia.

**CHART 30**

TREND ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND NATO-WTO/CST  
COMBINED DEFENSE BUDGET DEVELOPMENT<sup>30</sup>, 1973-2013




In terms of the second capabilities factor of military strength (total armed forces), trend analysis shows a different development (see Chart 31 next page). During the Cold War, the total armed forces of the Soviet Union were superior to the United States in the European theatre in a quantitative understanding (cf. Neuneck 1995). At the end of the Cold War in 1989, the number of combined forces of the Warsaw Pact (5.4 million) and the combined forces of NATO (5.3 million) was almost the same. With the end of the Cold War, the drop in defense spending, the huge reductions in military manpower (including through arms control agreements), and the breakup of the WTO and the Soviet Union, a massive change in the number of total armed forces occurred. Since 1989, the overall trend in numbers is going down. Even though, NATO has enlarged three times since 1989, the current overall number of total armed forces of the alliance (3.5 million) is still below the number at the end of the Cold War. In comparison, the United States (1.49 million) has almost double the number of the total armed forces of Russia (0.8 million) in 2014. The difference in numbers of the combined total armed forces of

<sup>30</sup> The figures for the year 2014 were not yet available at the time of completion.

NATO (3.58 million) and the CST (0.99) is much greater. NATO exceeds the CST forces by a factor of more than three. Again, in this realm, Russia and the CST are far from being peer competitors to the United States and NATO.

**CHART 31**

TREND ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND NATO-WTO/CST  
COMBINED TOTAL ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT<sup>31</sup>, 1973-2014




In terms of the capabilities factor of size of population, the trends are again diverging (see Chart 32 next page). The United States show slow but steady growth rates while the Russian population has largely remained at the same level since the end of the Cold War. Today, Russia has a population of about 142 million; the United States has a population of about 316 million. The size of population of combined NATO member states has continuously gone up; particularly due to the fact of three rounds of enlargement. In comparison, the combined size of population of NATO member states (921 million) outnumbers the combined size of population of CST member states (186 million) roughly by the factor of five. Again,

<sup>31</sup> For this and all following charts: Blue dotted line = combined capabilities of United States and NATO; red dotted line = combined capabilities of Soviet Union/WTO resp. Russia/CST.

in this realm of capabilities, Russia and the CST are far from being peer competitors to the United States and NATO.

**CHART 32**


TREND ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND NATO-WTO/CST  
COMBINED SIZE OF POPULATION DEVELOPMENT, 1973-2014



In terms of the capabilities factor of size of territories, the trends mirror the political developments of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as well as the three rounds of NATO enlargement (see Chart 33 next page). While in 1990, the combined territories of NATO member states (22.7 million km<sup>2</sup>) were almost the same size compared to the combined territories of Warsaw Pact member states (22.4 million km<sup>2</sup>), today, the combined territories of NATO member states are about 24 million km<sup>2</sup> and the combined territories of CST member states are about 20 million km<sup>2</sup> - not including overseas territories. In this specific realm of capabilities, the combined territory of NATO member states outnumbers the combined territory of CST states by almost a fifth.

CHART 33

TREND ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL U.S. -SOVIET/RUSSIAN AND NATO-WTO/CST  
COMBINED SIZE OF TERRITORY DEVELOPMENT, 1973-2014



What were/are the consequences of the significant decline of Soviet/Russian capabilities relative to the United States? While during the Cold War, Moscow could act as an equal competitor to Washington, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the WTO and the parallel loss in power, Moscow lost its ability to challenge Washington on an equal basis. The consequences of this relative decline in power can be seen in the design of the post-Cold War European security architecture and its institutionalization. While Washington could follow through with its preferred issue-specific interests, Moscow could not. The most vivid examples are the design of the OSCE and the enlargement of NATO. Particularly with regards to NATO, Russia could not prevent enlargement but could only ‘minimize the negative consequences’ (Yeltsin quoted in Lippman 1997). In contrast, Washington, the winner of the Cold War (see The White House 1992a), was not only in a stronger position, it could even enhance its capabilities, for instance by enlarging NATO. According to Realism, the change in relative capabilities determined to a large degree the two states’ abilities to pursue their respective issue-specific interests. The change favored the United States.

From a Realist viewpoint (cf. Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994/95), the huge difference in relative capabilities between the United States and Russia should lead Moscow to worry with regards to securing Russian survival in the future. In purely power-political terms, Washington is a giant compared to Russia. Barack Obama's talk of Russia as a 'regional power' (quoted in Blake 2014) might not have been very wise under the current conditions, it is nevertheless the truth. The only realm where Russia can threaten U.S. survival is the nuclear (cf. Deep Cuts Commission 2014). Not surprisingly, it is this realm where Vladimir Putin has issued indirect threats to Washington and its allies in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict (cf. Botelho and Smith-Spark 2014). If Putin really thinks and acts like a Realist (cf. Mearsheimer 2014), he should know that possible cooperation with the United States would almost always roughly reflect the underlying balance of power. And the balance is to Russia's detriment (see charts above). He should thus be interested in either securing the status quo while possibly waiting for a relative decrease in U.S. capabilities, or forging an alliance with a potent partner to balance the United States (cf. Walt 1987). At the same time, Washington's continuing increase in capabilities and its ability to act offensively-oriented in the sense of changing the balance of power makes it even more threatening the closer U.S. military installations are moving towards Russia's borders. This second aspect should, from a Realist viewpoint (ibid), increase pressure on Russia to seek a strong alliance partner in the future.

### 3.8.2 Interests

According to Realism, states share an equally strong interest in securing survival (see Chapter 2 above). With regards to each other, this general interest of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia underwent two crucial changes between 1973 and 2014. During the times of the Cold War, the general interest of the United States and the Soviet Union was pointed at each other. Because of the state of constant competition, sometimes closely below the level of open warfare (see the 1958 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis), the general interest was almost always closely associated with questions of military strength (cf. Leffler and Westad 2010). With the scenario of nuclear Armageddon, the mutual

interest in cooperation to prevent such scenario became an integral part of the survival motive. Cooperation, even though to strongly varying degrees, remained a central tenet of the relationship until the end of the Cold War.

The first shift occurred with Gorbachev's new political thinking and the Soviet turn towards economic survival aspects. The relative decline in the general interest to secure survival almost exclusively by military means led to the end of the military standoff and to a significant asymmetric reduction of military capabilities (most vividly through the CFE Treaty) in turn for economic and financial aid. Washington answered the Soviet shift in interest by giving preference to the politics of cooperative security in general and cooperative arms control in Europe in particular. It continued this policy throughout the 1990s.

The second shift occurred with the coming into offices of George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin and the subsequent attacks of September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks had the consequence that the U.S. interest in survival focused on the War on Terror and a major increase of the U.S. defense budget (see Chart 30 above). Cooperation with Russia was not one of the central survival motives anymore. At the same time, the Russian interest in survival shifted away from cooperation towards consolidating the Russian economy and the Russian influence in the direct geopolitical neighborhood. Even though, the Obama administration has recalibrated the foci of U.S. foreign and security policy, cooperation with Russia remained to be outside of the immediate survival interest. In contrast, Moscow' interest in securing its influence in the so called Near Abroad increasingly clashed with the U.S. policy of further enlarging NATO to the east.

Taken together, the combined survival interest had tied the two states together during the Cold War and shortly after the end of the Cold War. They managed this interest – though only partially during the Cold War – through means of enhancing security through cooperation. Increasingly with the end of the Cold War, they managed their security concern through enhancing *mutual* security. The policies of cooperative security and cooperative arms control in Europe were the results of

this combined interest. With the fading confrontation and the massively increasing gap in relative capabilities, this interest got lost. The attacks of 9/11 were only the triggering events for the United States to shift their attention to other areas of immediate survival concern. Since the late 1990s, the two states have not found a mutually compelling rationale for aligning their mutual survival concern beyond the realm of strategic nuclear arms control. From a Realist viewpoint, the reason for this circumstance lies in the weak state of Russian capabilities, relative to the United States. Accordingly, Moscow is simply not perceived as a serious challenge in Washington anymore. In the words of U.S. President Obama, Russia is just a 'regional power' (quoted in Blake 2014).

Below the level of general interest in survival, U.S.-Soviet/Russian issue-specific interests were largely divergent throughout the period of analysis. This pertains particularly to issues such as the C/OSCE or NATO enlargement. Here, Washington followed its general interest in securing survival through cooperation while, at the same time, advanced with its issue-specific interest of maintaining and later enlarging NATO while keeping the OSCE's profile comparably low. Even where both shared an issue-specific interest in cooperation (take the establishment of the CFE Treaty), their objectives behind cooperation were mostly divergent (see Paragraph 2.3 above). Because of the weak Russian position throughout the 1990s, Russia often changed its issue-specific interest during the course of negotiation. In contrast, Washington remained firm to its issue-specific interests. The last time that this form of cooperation took place was the signing of the Rome Declaration and the establishment of the NRC in 2002. Since then, divergence in issue-specific interests has prevented relevant cooperation. One can argue whether this circumstance is due to the Russian relative increase in economic capabilities since the year 2000 (see Chart 29 above), whether it is due to the Russian survival concern with regards to NATO enlargement (cf. Mearsheimer 2014), whether it is due to the Russian leadership's survival concern with regards to Washington promoting democracy abroad (cf. McFaul in Sestanovich, McFaul, and Mearsheimer 2014), or whether it is due to a difficult to distinguish combination of all three factors.

### 3.8.3 Expectations

According to Realists, cooperation between an offensively-oriented and a defensively-oriented power is ultimately hard to achieve, if at all (cf. Jervis 1999). This assumption holds true for most of the empirical evidence of this chapter. As long as the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia acted both defensively-oriented, they were able to cooperate. In the case of MBFR, cooperation failed because of the offensive U.S. orientation which was geared towards changing the balance of power to the advantage of Washington. In the case of the first round of NATO enlargement, cooperation did not even take place (directly) because of the offensive orientation of the United States. The same is true with regards to the failed CFE talks “at 36” and the Russian EST proposals.

However, a significant difference to the assumption of Realists exists with regards to CFE and NATO enlargement. In the case of CFE, the treaty did change the distribution of power to the detriment of Moscow. The Soviet Union nevertheless agreed to the treaty. This was mostly due to the shift of interest on the level of general interest (towards giving preference to economic considerations) and because Washington (and particularly Bonn) paid large compensation. In the case of the first round of NATO enlargement, Washington could have proceeded without considering the Russian concern at all – according to a Realist view, simply because Moscow was too weak. However, Washington did pay compensation in the form of the Founding Act, further OSCE adaptation, ACFE, and Russian accession to the G7 and APEC. One could therefore argue that cooperation on NATO enlargement actually did take place (albeit tacitly; cf. Aggarval 2000) and that Washington acted not exclusively offensively-oriented on the issue.

Two important differences exist between the Cold War years, the 1990s, and the new millennium. First, offensive orientations did not lead to a change in the relative distribution of power during the Cold War. During the 1990s, they did lead to a relative change in the distribution of power (i.e. NATO enlargement) and were accompanied by cooperative processes. Second, offensive orientations continued to lead to changes to the relative distribution of power in the new millennium (i.e.

the second and third round of NATO enlargement). However, they were not accompanied by successful cooperation processes anymore. It is thus also possible to distinguish between cooperative and non-cooperative policies. In a narrow sense, NATO enlargement was a non-cooperative process in three stages (1999, 2004, and 2009). In a wider sense, the Clinton administration acted both offensively- and defensively-oriented on the issue by making use of the policies of cooperative arms control in Europe. In contrast, the George W. Bush administration did exclusively act offensively-oriented on the issue and did not make efforts to engage cooperatively with Moscow. As explained above (see Paragraph 2.5.1), the establishment of the NRC had no political links to the second and third round of enlargement.

#### 3.8.4 Strategies

An important insight of the analysis of this chapter is that issue-specific divergence and even different orientations were often overcome by policy changes at the level of issue-specificity and the employment of the strategy of compensation. Compensation was a prominent strategy tool throughout much of the Cold War and during the 1990s. Compensation was paid in conjunction with the MBFR/CSCE deal (in a mutual way), the CFE Treaty (United States/West Germany to the Soviet Union), the first round of NATO enlargement (United States to Russia), and in conjunction with the War on Terror (NRC establishment; United States to Russia). Every time crucial aspects of national survival and power were dealt with cooperatively (A/CFE), the strategy of monitoring was added to the strategy of compensation. Where issues of military security were dealt with on a politically binding level which was not directly touching upon the relative distribution of military strength (CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE), the strategy of confidence-building was sufficient – however, only after the end of the Cold War. The strong institutionalization in the sphere of cooperative arms control in Europe during the period of analysis is a clear evidence of the success of the strategy of confidence-building through repeated interaction. Both, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have recurrently sliced up contentious policy

issues into increments (cf. Oye 1986b: 17). In some cases (take MBFR and CFE after 1999), this strategy has resulted in continued deadlock.

### 3.8.5 Evaluation of Gains

Today, only a few institutions and cooperative processes of cooperative arms control in Europe enjoy positive feedback in both capitals. The CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE still generate mostly positive feedback (cf. Richter 2014). The OSCE's role in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict has been strengthened (cf. President of Russia 2014b). On the other institutions, the mainstream opinion in contemporary Russia (cf. President of Russia 2007) is that Moscow was tricked by the West at the end of the Cold War (see the debate about a no-enlargement pledge; cf. Sarotte 2014), that NATO distorts the European security architecture, that NATO-Russia cooperation has failed, that the OSCE does not live up to its mandate, and that conventional arms control is dead. Russian officials often argue from a Realist point of view and infer that Russia was too weak during the 1990s and that Washington exploited that weakness (cf. Mearsheimer 2014). A quote from U.S. President George H.W. Bush from 1991 only underscores this view: 'We [the United States] prevailed, they didn't. We can't let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.' (Quoted from Sarotte 2014: 94) In the Russian understanding, Moscow did not get what it wanted from cooperation. In the words of Vladimir Putin: 'The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards. This created the impression that the so-called "victors" in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests.' (President of Russia 2014b) In contrast, Washington continues to value the gains from cooperation, particularly on the C/OSCE (see U.S. Statement 51 contained in Chapter 7). The positive American evaluation of gains implies that Washington got what it wanted from cooperation (see also Sarotte 2014: 97).

Against the current one-sided, negative assessment of Russia, it becomes increasingly hard to argue with hindsight that the gains from cooperation on cooperative

arms control in Europe only increased mutual security. However, it would be false to argue exactly the other way around. No-one knows what the European security landscape would look like today without the gains achieved from cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe in conjunction with the end of the Cold War. It is questionable whether the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union would have happened in a largely peaceful way without these cooperative policies. It is also questionable whether the parallel decrease of military capabilities after the direct end of the Cold War (see Charts 30 and 31 above) would have happened without the policies of cooperative arms control in Europe.

From a Realist viewpoint, the gains from cooperation on cooperative arms control did almost always roughly reflect the underlying balance of power (in parts except for the 1990 CFE Treaty). Where the balance of power was changed (i.e. through NATO enlargement), the respective policies cannot be characterized as being fully in line with the concept of cooperative security (even though the Clinton administration made use of the instruments of cooperative security in order to cushion Russian unease with enlargement).

Therefore, it seems adequate to explain the negative Russian evaluation of gains and to distinguish between two broader strands of policy. The first strand of policy does mostly resemble the central tenets of the concept of cooperative security and has resulted in the creation of the C/OSCE, agreements in the realm of conventional arms control, CSBMs under the auspices of the OSCE, and a sub-regional arms control framework for the Balkans. The second strand of policy is hybrid in nature. On the one hand, it has resulted in the enlargement of NATO. On the other hand, it has partially been endowed with political-military cooperation measures from the realm of cooperative security (i.e. NACC, PfP, Founding Act, PJC, EAPC, and NRC) and has been achieved through cooperation strategies that have linked this second strand to other institutions of cooperative security from the first strand (e.g. A/CFE). According to its basic nature of an offensive orientation (thus changing the balance of power), this second strand does not comply with the concept of cooperative security. While it had been softened by policies of

cooperative security during the 1990s (cf. Lipman 2014), since the year 2000, its offensive orientation has not been mitigated anymore. According to the Russian complaints (cf. President of Russia 2007), it is this hybrid strand of policy that the Russian leadership has a principle problem with and which led to the Russian perception of dissatisfaction with the European security structures. To quote again Vladimir Putin: 'But the United States, having declared itself the winner of the Cold War, saw no need for [checks and balances]. Instead of establishing a new balance of power, essential for maintaining order and stability, they took steps that threw the system into sharp and deep imbalance.' (President of Russia 2014b)

With these observations, the first guiding research questions of this chapter can be answered. What calculus led the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia to cooperate on cooperative arms control in Europe, and did they get from cooperation what they wanted? The mutual U.S.-Soviet interest in securing survival led them to seek cooperation on security issues during the Cold War, even though cooperation was largely constrained by considerations of military strength. After the Cold War, both sought to increase mutual security by means of cooperative arms control in Europe. According to the evaluation of gains, the United States got what it wanted from cooperation. It achieved the reciprocal downsizing of forces, supporting the Russian leadership throughout the 1990s, a network of CSBMs to help stabilizing post-Cold War Europe, and a low profile role for the OSCE with a strong impetus on the so called third basket. At the same time, Washington could maintain and enlarge NATO. As explained above, Moscow claims that it has not achieved what it wanted, particularly not with a view to NATO and the role of the OSCE in the European security architecture.

### 3.8.6 Institutionalization

In terms of institutionalization, the empirical evidence collated in this chapter leads to the preliminary conclusion that four cooperation clusters have evolved under the broad rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Paragraphs 3.2.1-3.6.1).

The first cooperation cluster evolved around conventional arms control (see Table 8 below). MBFR kick-started a difficult cooperation process on the issue which was informed by strong divergence in issue-specific interests. After MBFR had been put to rest, a meaningful cooperation process evolved around the central elements of CFE, CFE-1A, ACFE, and the supporting monitoring instrument of the Treaty on Open Skies under the auspices of the C/OSCE. From the onset of the process until today the cooperation cluster displays strong bilateral U.S.-Soviet/Russian elements. As a byproduct of the strategy of compensation, conventional arms control has been linked to a number of significant political decisions, foremost NATO enlargement. The United States employed the strategy of compensation in the MBFR/CSCE context and particularly during the years of the Clinton administration. After the signing of ACFE, divergent issue-specific interests prevented further cooperation. Today, the cooperation cluster of conventional arms control is technically highly outdated, politically deadlocked, and disputed (cf. Kühn 2013). The cooperation cluster is based on reciprocity, dialogue, transparency, confidence-building, and arms limitations. It resembles central tenets of the concept of cooperative security. However, its political links to NATO enlargement have put it in close political vicinity to a policy which does not resemble the tenets of the concept of cooperative security.

**TABLE 8**

COOPERATION CLUSTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

- *MBFR (1973-1989 inconclusive)*

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- *CFE (1990 in force, partially suspended)*

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- *CFE-1A (1992 in force, partially suspended)*

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- *Flank Agreement (1997 in force, partially suspended)*

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- *ACFE (1999 not in force)*

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- *Treaty on Open Skies (1992 in force since 2002)*

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- *Talks “at 36” (2010-2011 inconclusive)*

The second cooperation cluster developed in the realm of confidence- and security-building measures (see Table 9 below). It is the oldest of the four cooperation clusters and has its roots in the Helsinki accords. It evolved through the CDE and gained its full shape during the early 1990s with the elaboration of a number of politically binding agreements. While the early CSBMs developed as part of a larger compensation deal between MBFR and the CSCE, convergence in issue-specific interests stood behind the instruments achieved during the early 1990s. Their realization took place in the multilateral C/OSCE framework. The continued strategy of confidence-building, most vividly in the form of institutionalization, made realization easier to achieve. Today, this cooperation cluster is still functioning from a technical point of view. From a political point of view, some of the instruments, such as the VD, are in need of a timely update in order to better address contemporary security challenges (cf. Richter 2014). The cooperation cluster is based on reciprocity, inclusiveness, dialogue, a defensive orientation, transparency, and confidence-building. It resembles central tenets of the concept of cooperative security.

**TABLE 9**

COOPERATION CLUSTER OF CSBMS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE C/OSCE<sup>32</sup>

- *Helsinki CBMs (1975-1986)*

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- *Stockholm CDE stipulations (1986-1990)*

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- *Vienna Document (versions 1990-2011 in force, in need of update)*

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- *Forum for Security Cooperation (1997 in force)*

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- *Programme for Immediate Action Series (1992-1994 in force, in need of update)*

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- *OSCE Framework for Arms Control (1996 in force)*

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- *OSCE Document on SALW (2000 in force)*

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- *OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (2003 in force)*

<sup>32</sup> Not all institutions of the C/OSCE have been analyzed in this chapter. For an encompassing assessment of all institutions see Chapter 5 below.

The third cooperation cluster developed in the realm of political and military cooperation under the auspices of NATO (see Table 10 below). It includes cooperation mechanisms such as the PfP framework, the EAPC (the former NACC), the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the NRC (the former NATO-Russia PJC). Issue-specific divergent interests were present at all times between the United States and Russia. Early on, Washington linked the cluster to the issue of NATO enlargement. Today, the cluster is functioning where military and political cooperation mechanisms are concerned involving third states. In NATO's political and military dealings with Russia, the cluster is dysfunctional and politically deadlocked. The cluster is hybrid in nature because it combines tenets of cooperative security (e.g. dialogue-based, confidence-building, declaratory limitations in the case of the Founding Act) with elements of inequality and partial non-transparency (e.g. the information- and decision-making design of the NRC). It did not develop through an inclusive negotiation process but by exclusive means of invitation and qualification.

**TABLE 10**

COOPERATION CLUSTER OF POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION  
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF NATO

- *NACC (1991-1997)*

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- *PfP (1994 in force)*

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- *NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997 in force)*

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- *PJC (1997-2002)*

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- *EAPC (1997 in force)*

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- *NRC (2002 in force, partially suspended)*

The fourth cooperation cluster emerged out of the need to achieve sub-regional stability for the war-torn countries of the Balkans (see Table 11 next page). Based on the experiences of the C/OSCE CSBM enterprise and the framing of conventional arms control a top-down approach was pursued. Moscow and Washington basically shared an issue-specific interest on the issue. Today, the cluster is still

functioning. The cooperation cluster is based on reciprocity, dialogue, inclusiveness (in a regional sense), transparency, confidence-building, and arms limitations. It resembles central tenets of the concept of cooperative security.

**TABLE 11**

COOPERATION CLUSTER OF SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR THE BALKANS

- *Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996 in force)*

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- *Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, Article IV (1996 in force)*

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- *Concluding Document of the Negotiations Under Article V of Annex I-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001 in force)*

With these observations, also the second guiding research questions of this chapter can be answered. Does the degree of institutionalization justify application of the regime episteme? To answer the question, the preceding definition of regimes of this thesis (see Paragraph 1.4.5) should be recalled. Accordingly, regimes are ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.’ (Krasner 1982: 2) Departing from this definition, the degree of institutionalization justifies application of the regime episteme because cooperative ‘sets’ in the form of political agreements accompanied by and achieved under the auspices of certain organizations are omnipresent in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe. The incomplete analysis of the previous paragraphs suggests four cooperation clusters under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe. Those four clusters might turn out to represent regimes. More specific analysis is needed to prove this assumption and to clearly define what their respective ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures’ are (see Chapters 5-7).

These findings allow for a first, though incomplete, confrontation with the two central research questions of this thesis. In a preliminary response to the first question, the empirical evidence suggests that the forms of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe might be well captured by the regime episteme. With

respect to the second central research question, of the four cooperation clusters, three show serious signs of decay (for a detailed analysis see Chapter 6).

### 3.8.7 Decay

Even though the search for the reasons behind decay continues, three significant findings with regards to decay derive from the analysis of this chapter.

First, Washington and Moscow are not equals in terms of capabilities anymore. In all five factors assessed above, Washington is in the lead. In four of the five factors, Washington outnumbers Russia considerably. The massive shift in capabilities after the Cold War has heavily influenced cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia on cooperative arms control in Europe. On a number of important occasions (take the adaptation of the C/OSCE), Moscow could not get from cooperation what it wanted. From the viewpoint of Realism, cooperation among relatively different powers results in the relative distribution of gains (cf. Mattingly 1955: 163). In reality, this circumstance seems to have created a perception of grievance in Russia (see Sarotte 2014: 97). On other occasions, issue-specific interests were divergent to such a degree that cooperation was impossible (take NATO enlargement). In those cases, Russia could only but accept the change to the balance of power and take the compensation Washington offered during the 1990s. This circumstance seems to have exacerbated grievances in conjunction with the survival instinct of Russia.

Second, the change in cooperation interest on the U.S. side has had a significant impact on the policies based on the concept of cooperative security. In a basic understanding (cf. Mihalka 2005), cooperative security either helps to stabilize an adversarial relationship (as during the Cold War) or it helps to transform the relationship to a non-adversarial state (as in conjunction with the end of the Cold War). Cooperative security becomes meaningless when the relationship has not adversarial for a long time (take for instance the EU; see the concept of Security Communities in Chapter 8) or if one side does not perceive the relationship to be adversarial. If one side (United States) has no direct survival concern with respect

to the other side (Russia), instruments of cooperative security become somewhat obsolete. This might explain why the United States turned away from cooperation with Russia and cooperative arms control in Europe in the new millennium. Against the background of the obviously existing and continuously communicated Russian grievance (see Sarotte 2014: 97), this finding would imply a lack of political foresight on the U.S. side and could partially explain the unpleasant surprises the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and the current Ukraine conflict have caused in Washington (cf. Asmus 2010; Charap and Shapiro 2014b).

Third, policies of linkage might have contributed to decay. Issue linkages in the form of compensation were established between the cooperation clusters of conventional arms control and the NATO political and military cooperation cluster (and therewith NATO enlargement) as well as between the development of the C/OSCE (and therewith the CSBM cluster) and the NATO political and military cooperation cluster (and therewith NATO enlargement). As a consequence of linkage, negative developments such as the CFE deadlock could potentially spill over to other cooperation clusters more easily (cf. McGinnis 1986). The following Table 12 (below) lists the preliminary findings related to decay.

**TABLE 12**

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS PERTAINING TO DECAY

- *massive shifts in capabilities*

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- *Russian perception of grievance*

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- *divergent issue-specific interests*

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- *diminished U.S. interest in cooperation*

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- *issue linkage*

In the next Chapter, the theoretical concept of regime is introduced and scrutinized against the background of the empirical evidence collated in this chapter.



## 4 Regime Theory and the Empirical Evidence

This chapter is about the concept of regime in conjunction with the empirical evidence. The guiding research question of this chapter is: What findings and assumptions of regime theory are relevant for cooperative arms control in Europe?

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the concept of regime in order to highlight approaches applicable to the empirical evidence collated in the previous chapter. From the mid-1970s onwards Anglophone and later European IR scholars developed the theoretical concept of regime in an effort to explain patterns of institutionalized cooperation between states in an increasingly interconnected world of political and socio-economic interaction. The fast evolving debate drew attention from all strands of IR theory (for a good overview see Rittberger 1993a and Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997). While particularly the early works of regime analysts focused mainly on economic and environmental issues, research on security regimes gained certain prominence in conjunction with the bipolar constellation and with respect to regional security regimes (see Paragraph 1.3 and below). Nevertheless, empirically, the study of security regimes was, and still is, underrepresented and regime analysis with regards to the subject of this thesis has held a niche existence, even during the times of the Cold War (see Paragraph 1.3 above). Today, regime research on cooperative arms control in Europe is more or less non-existent (*ibid*). Another underrepresented issue of regime research is regime decay (see below for a discussion).

The chapter has seven paragraphs. After a few introductory remarks in the first paragraph, definitions of regimes are introduced and critically assessed in the second paragraph. The third paragraph deals with the factors that lead to regime creation and influence their maintenance. Signs of and reasons for regime decay are highlighted in the fourth paragraph. The fifth paragraph gives the floor to the critics of regime analysis. The sixth paragraph sets regime theory in relation to cooperative arms control in Europe. The seventh paragraph has the conclusions.

#### 4.1 A Few Introductory Remarks

Before introducing and analyzing the concept of regime, I will shortly answer the question why regime theory is added to the Realist approach already applied in the third chapter. Regime theory has been chosen for three reasons:

First, the main reason is because previous research on cooperative arms control has employed the terminology of regime without providing sound and convincing empirical evidence that the forms of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe actually *are* regimes (see Paragraph 1.3 above). It is one of the basic tasks of critical research to question the use of definitions; particularly when they are applied without proof.

Second, Realism provides a good basis for focusing on the decay of international cooperation because Realism underscores the hurdles to arrive at and uphold international cooperation (see Chapter 2 above). However, Realism is biased when it comes to international institutions (*ibid*). Even though contemporary Realists have accepted the role of international institutions, they view them more as a sub-level of classical state-to-state relations in an environment of anarchy. Therewith, Realism is still in opposition to Neoliberal and particularly Constructivist approaches which ascribe international institutions a life of their own (see below). Realism has also a problem explaining the persistence of international institutions; particularly in times of fundamental change of states' interests and capabilities and in the case of continued dissatisfaction of major states. Following the Realist logic, Russian exit from the OSCE is long overdue. In the case of CFE, despite Russian dissatisfaction, it took Moscow ten years to exit from the treaty. There are probably additional factors at work when it comes to the staying power of institutions. Realism misses to address these factors.

Third, regime theory was an effort by Neoliberal scholars of IR to bring the Neorealists on board in their effort to explain international institutions and to make Neorealists accept the role of international institutions. Regime theory thus builds upon a number of distinct Realist assumptions and can be viewed as the Neoliber-

al “extension” to Neorealism (cf. Crawford 1996). It is thus well-suited to build upon the previous Realist approach and to complement it.

The discussion in the following paragraphs will mainly focus on Neoliberal and Constructivist approaches to the concept of regime. Because Chapter 2 saw already a detailed discussion of international cooperation from a Realist angle, Realist contributions to the regime debate (e.g. the absolute vs. relative gains debate of the 1980s) are not reiterated in the following paragraphs. However, Realist contributions will be listed in Paragraph 4.6 when the main conclusions of regime theory with regards to decay are summarized.

In the following paragraphs, the concept of regime will be introduced, analyzed, and critically questioned.

## 4.2 The Concept of Regime

Today, regime theory is considered a recognized approach, amongst others, to the study of institutionalized international cooperation (cf. Zangl 2010); this for four reasons.

First, through the concept of regime, Neoliberal scholars of IR tried to take Neorealists on board in their analysis of international cooperation (cf. Nye 1987: 372-4). Neoliberal regime scholars accepted a number of distinct Neorealist assumptions such as states as the prime actors in the international arena, states’ rationality, and certain constraining effects of the environment of anarchy (particularly states’ rationality to cheat; see also Paragraph 2.1 above). At the same time, Neoliberal proponents of regime remained committed to John Locke’s vision of mankind’s common interest in cooperation as outlined in his *Two Treatises of Government* (1689). Neoliberal regime scholars took the rapidly increasing phenomenon of institutionalized international cooperative after World War II as a fact in need of analysis and explanation. They viewed it as a clear challenge to the classical Realist assumption of the limited role of international institutions and the constraining effects of anarchy. Making use of microeconomic models of rational

choice (see below), they tried to prove that cooperation under anarchy can be rational and that international institutions significantly increase trust and reduce states' transaction costs (see below). Realist scholars had to respond to the Neoliberal regime challenge in order to preserve Realism's explanatory credibility. The ensuing debate between Neoliberals and Neorealists, later extended to include Constructivists, was one of the most fruitful IR debates and helped to shift the focus towards international cooperation, international institutions, and cooperative strategies (cf. Oye 1986; Baldwin 1993).

Second, the Anglo-American domination of IR theory (cf. Hollis and Smith 1990: 16; Wæver 1998; Crawford and Jarvis 2000; Acharya and Buzan 2007) was mirrored in the concept-building process of international regimes (Crawford 1996: 4-7). By its very promotion, regime theory increased vice versa the perception of conceptual lead.<sup>33</sup> If Cox's argument (1981: 128) is right that 'theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose' than regime theory was, at least in its juvenile stage, an exclusive American intellectual reflex to a perceived decline of hegemony during the Carter presidency (cf. Strange 1982: 480-4; Russett 1985; Müller 1993a; Yoshimatsu 1998). American regime scholars addressed the perceived decline through means of enhanced and institutionalized cooperative efforts in the international arena. Such attempt should not be mistaken with the intellectual development of a purely egoistic American national agenda, particularly not since a large number of Liberal American regime theorists might have come to view increased cooperation less as a national prerogative but more as a common moral good (cf. Hurrell 1993: 67). Rather, the concept of regime reflected the Realist-Idealist dichotomy of IR theory in general as 'the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be' (Carr 1939: 5). Hence, regime theory took into account the steadily growing phenomenon of international institutionalized cooperation and sought to prescribe ways and means of how to address and shape it – indeed, mostly from a U.S. perspective and for a U.S. audience.

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<sup>33</sup> However, regime theory soon became more internationalized, particularly through contributions of German (e.g. the Tübingen group) and Scandinavian scholars (cf. Rittberger 1993b: 3-22).

Third, a general dissatisfaction in theory and praxis with the works of formal International Organizations (IOs) such as the UN during the late 1970s triggered a shift in the focus of IR away from formal IOs towards broader forms of international institutionalized cooperation (cf. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Scholars of IR started to look for more fruitful research areas which promised more positive results – whereas continuous institutionalized cooperation was viewed as a positive factor. The underlying reasoning is the principle question of IR scholars of how the international community (should) govern(s) itself. The result was a concentration on the emerging research issue of regimes which pushed research on IOs to the sidelines until the mid-1990s.

Fourth, the occurrence of the regime episteme correlates with the ascent of Scientism (cf. exemplary Waltz 1979) which challenged the traditional humanities methods of political theory, history of diplomacy, and international law (cf. exemplary the classical English School; for a debate see Chapter 8). Particularly Waltz's seminal work *Theory of International Politics* triggered the use of analytical methods endemic to economics also in IR. Methods such as analysis of market failure or Game Theory allowed Neorealists but also Neoliberals to assess international cooperation along the lines of scientific models, based on the assumption that states act as rational gain seekers in an environment of anarchy. Methodological Scientism thus fertilized the works of scholars of regime theory, most notably visible in the works of Robert Keohane (1984).

In the next paragraphs, definitions of regimes, security regimes, and regime complexes are provided.

#### 4.2.1 Definitions of Regimes

Defining regimes in a stringent, precise, and commonly agreed way has always been difficult and disputed (cf. A. Stein 1982: 299; Rochester 1986: 800; 1989a: 9). The regime concept by its very nature entails certain vagueness (cf. Crawford 1996: 55). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were the first to make the term 'international regime' popular in IR study through their usage in *Power and Independen-*

dence. They argue that ‘by creating or accepting procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations. We refer to these governing arrangements as *international regimes*.’ (Keohane and Nye 1977: 5) From a purely formalistic point of view, no clear and commonly agreed definition, of what regimes are, exists. However, most IR scholars (Rittberger 1993a: xii; Zangl 2010) rely on the widely accepted definition by Stephen Krasner:

*Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.*  
(Krasner 1982: 2)

Haufler (1993: 96-7) provides a simplified declination of Krasner’s definition: ‘principles are beliefs of fact, cause, and right. Norms are standards of behaviour. Rules tell the actors what to do or not to do under specified conditions. Decision-making procedures refer to practice and implementation.’ According to Hurrell (1993: 68), ‘the term ‘norm’ is mostly used in regime theory to describe generalized rules of cooperative social behaviour.’

A principle problem arises from Krasner’s definition when linking regimes to and demarcating them from more classical institutions of international cooperation such as agreements or international organizations (cf. Young 1989a: 195; Crawford 1996: 83). According to Keohane (1982: 337), regimes ‘facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation.’ Their main function is thus to *facilitate* cooperation by providing states with information and thus reducing their transaction costs. Regimes limit uncertainty (Keohane 1984: 97, 245). This assumption nevertheless leads to two questions: If regimes facilitate cooperation, for instance in the form of agreements, what upstream cooperative endeavors and possible frameworks

facilitate the establishment of regimes? And what distinguishes this exercise from mere agreement-making?

As an example from the empirical evidence, the Vienna Document is an agreement within the wider cooperation cluster of CSBMs under the auspices of the OSCE. The CSBM cooperation cluster (which some scholars label a 'regime'; see Ropers and Schlotter 1989: 333) emerged as a part of the CSCE process, which other authors view as a regime itself (Nye 1987; Chung 2005). If the CSCE is indeed a regime, it came into being through the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which is on the other hand an agreement made possible through the politics of détente (see Paragraph 3.2.1). Most likely, one could also find relevant evidence that already the politics of détente displayed certain regime characteristics.

Without ending up in a "chicken and egg" paradox of what came first, the question is not trivial, particularly not since Keohane and Young, who most vividly shaped the regime debate, disagree when it comes to distinguishing regimes from agreements. While for Young (1982: 283) regimes *are* agreements, or 'negotiated orders', for Keohane (1982: 334) regimes *facilitate* agreements.

While particularly decision-making procedures indicate some form of organized interaction, the same problems as with the regime vs. agreement difficulty arise when distinguishing regimes from international organizations. Young (1982: 277) argues that 'as with other social institutions, regimes may be more or less formally articulated, and they may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements.' Ropers and Schlotter (1989: 317) point to the fact that international organizations or 'negotiation systems' such as the CSCE are important for regime creation and maintenance, particularly with a view to regime evolution. Müller (1993b: 135-6) and Cirincione (2000b: 3) share this view for the realm of multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. Thus, regimes might lead to the creation of international organizations. They might also be accompanied by IOs.

A number of additional indicators for defining regimes have been stressed by regime scholars. Amongst them are what Young (1982: 278) calls 'the impact of time' and effectiveness. These two factors also give evidence about the persistence of regimes. According to Young (1982: 337):

*A set of rules need not be 'effective' to qualify as a regime, but it must be recognized as continuing to exist. Using this definition, regimes can be identified by the existence of explicit rules that are referred to in an affirmative manner by governments, even if they are not necessarily scrupulously observed. (Young 1982: 337)*

Regimes, in this understanding, display 'a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest.' (Jervis 1982: 357) Krasner (1982: 186) complements: 'Regimes must be understood as something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or interests.'

The behavioral dimension influences regime persistence as well. Following Zacher (1987: 174) the 'effectiveness of behavioral guidelines' is a very part of the nature of regimes. While 'deviance or nonconforming behavior is a common occurrence in connection with most social institutions' (Young 1982: 278), 'occurrences of major or long-term noncompliance, particularly involving participation of or support by major actors in the system, bring into question the efficacy of regime injunctions' (Zacher 1987: 174). Thus compliance in its various forms seems to be an indicator for identifying regimes. Nevertheless, again the definitional opacity stands in the way of assessing compliance as a clear-cut variable since compliance equals seldom (in)action limited to a single regime aspect. It is often hard to assess whether compliance pertains to the whole of the regime, to the normative level (principles, norms), or to the action level (rules, procedures), and what the interplay between those levels of analysis is.

As an example from the empirical evidence, longstanding Russian non-compliance with the Istanbul commitments is a violation of rules whereas NATO's refusal to ratify ACFE could as well be judged as a rejection of general principles of conventional arms control (see Chapter 5 for a discussion). Is the

violation of rules as severe as the negation of shared principles in a regime? Keohane stresses the wider policy space and points to the fact that violation or 'cheating' becomes also limited by the often broader framework regimes are nested in. In this way regimes produce issue linkages (cf. Keohane 1984: 89 et seq; Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 234).

A noteworthy approach comes from Aggarwal (1985). Addressing the dichotomist nature of Krasner's definition (principles/norms and rules/decision-making procedures) and the problem of demarcating regimes from agreements, he pleads for a distinction between 'meta-regimes' (principles and norms) and 'regimes' (rules and procedures). (Ibid: 18-20) 'By distinguishing between rules and procedures [...] and norms and principles [...]', he argues, 'we can proceed to systematically analyze changes that take place in both of these areas.' (Ibid: 18) His approach also makes possible to reconcile Young's and Keohane's positions on the relation between regimes and agreements. Regimes, in Aggarwal's understanding, would equal agreements (cf. Young 1982: 283) and meta-regimes would underlie, and thus facilitate, in Keohane's words, the making of regimes/agreements.

#### 4.2.2 Security Regimes

Research on security regimes has particularly benefitted from early works of German scholars on East-West security regimes in conjunction with the end of the Cold War (cf. Wolf and Zürn 1986; Efinger, Rittberger, and Zürn 1988; Efinger 1989; Efinger 1990; Efinger and Zürn 1990; Rittberger and Zürn 1990). A number of authors have stressed the special role of security regimes and argued that the issue-area of international security is generally less propitious to regime establishment because of its severe nature, compared to areas such as trade or telecommunication (cf. Jervis 1982; Lipson 1984). Nye (1987: 374-5) concludes that 'the difficulty of ascertaining intentions and the large stakes at risk in case of defection may be higher in most security issues than it is in most economic issues'. However, if security regimes involve 'timely warning' mechanisms, 'states are not totally vulnerable to defection'. (Ibid: 375; cf. also J. Stein 1985) Nye thus points to the cooperation strategy of monitoring (see Paragraph 2.3.5 above).

Jervis (1982: 360-1) outlines four conditions for the establishment of a security regime which can be circumscribed with shared interests, shared expectations, shared convictions, and cost-benefit considerations in favor of cooperation. Furthermore, he stresses reciprocity as a pattern of interaction likely to strengthen the operation of a security regime. Janice Stein (1985: 607) comes to conclude that 'new [security] regimes are often created in the aftermath of an important change in the distribution of power, especially after a major war.' This hypothesis is in accordance with the empirical evidence that at least two of the cooperation clusters of cooperative arms control in Europe (conventional arms control and the political-military cooperation under the auspices of NATO) took off in conjunction with, and shortly after, the end of the Cold War. Stein (*ibid*: 609) goes on to argue that regimes continue to exist even in cases where the distribution of power and interest shifts.

Focusing on the bipolar security constellation, Jervis (1982: 371-2) denounces successful regime establishment. Nye (1987: 376) objects, arguing that rather 'than focusing on whether the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship can be categorized as a security regime, we should more fruitfully consider it as a patchwork quilt or a mosaic of sub-issues in the security area, some characterized by rules and institutions we would call a regime and others not.' Janice Stein (2003: 7) sees an early version of a U.S.-Soviet security regime emerging in the 1960s, which 'certainly did not transform their relationship until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.' In an earlier article, she highlights 'the difference between bargaining over principles and norms where no consensus exists and bargaining over the distribution of benefits within the framework of agreed principles. Most of bargaining theory concentrates on the latter, but much of the conflict over security takes place precisely when principles and norms are not shared.' (J. Stein 1985: 626) With regards to the empirical evidence, it would be important to scrutinize the qualitative degree of sharing of principles.

Peter Jones (2011: 11) concentrates on regional security regimes and infers that 'the key is the adoption of a set of agreed norms within a given region which best

expresses the local traditions and desires'. He goes on to argue that regional security regimes must be inclusive, membership must be voluntary, and the regime 'must be able to adapt and develop in response to new concerns and issues.' Beyond that, he stresses the factor of perceptions. '[A]ctor's perceptions are shaped over time by [...] the evolutionary *process* of developing a regional security regime'. Perceptions in this understanding function as a result of the complex interplay of the variables outlined in the new cooperation model of this thesis (see Paragraph 2.3 above).

#### 4.2.3 Regime Complexes

Oran Young (1996) concluded in the mid-1990s that international institutions seldom stand alone but rather often interact closely in the international arena (cf. Young 1996). Describing institutional linkages, he differentiated between 'embedded', 'nested', 'clustered', and 'overlapping' institutions. When referring to nested institutions, Young primarily described efforts to build on existing institutions, e.g. in the form of protocols, to translate international institutional obligations into national law, and to extend the reach of international institutions through means of regional arrangements. Aggarwal (1998) then advanced the term of 'nested regimes' and described their architecture as telescoped like the different pieces of a 'Russian doll'.

In the 2000s, a new generation of regime scholars sought to refine the incipient stages of research on regime interaction. Rosendal (2001) differentiated between compatibility and divergence of both rules and norms, thus referring to overlapping regimes. Raustiala and Victor (2004) took regime analysis to the next level by providing for a more encompassing approach to regime interaction which avoided Young's four-type classification: 'The rising density of international institutions', they concluded 'make[s] it increasingly difficult to isolate and "decompose" individual international institutions for study.' (Ibid: 278) In order to take account of institutional interaction, they coined the term of 'regime complex' as an 'array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area.' (Ibid: 279)

During the most recent years, regime scholars have increasingly paid attention to the issue. Keohane and Victor (2011: 7) see nested regimes and regime complexes as located ‘between comprehensive international regulatory institutions, which are usually focused on a single integral legal instrument, at one end of a spectrum and highly fragmented arrangements at the other.’ They infer that ‘regime complexes are marked by connections between the specific and relatively narrow regimes but the absence of an overall architecture or hierarchy that structures the whole set.’ (Ibid: 8; cf. also Alter and Meunier 2009: 13)

Orsini, Morin, and Young (2013: 29) offer a more detailed taxonomy of a regime complex ‘as a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively.’ In their understanding, single regimes are the constitutive elements of a regime complex. Their respective principles, norms, and rules can, to some degree, diverge or converge. To achieve network quality, at least three regimes compose a complex. In accordance to Keohane (1984: 61), they argue that ‘regime complexes focus on a specific subject matter, often narrower in scope than an issue area.’ (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013: 30) As another requirement for a regime complex, membership has to partially overlap, but seldom entirely. Interaction between the elemental regimes is a key component of their definition with every distinct regime interacting at least with one other regime of the complex. Finally, they claim that ‘policymakers and stakeholders must see the simultaneous existence of elemental regimes as being actually or at least potentially problematic for a regime complex to exist.’ (Ibid: 31) To enable comparison between regime complexes, the authors stress ‘the conflictual or synergetic nature of its links.’ (Ibid: 32) Employing network analysis, they offer three modes of regime interaction (links): (1) dense networks where all nodes (the elemental regimes) are connected to one another, (2) centralized networks with one node having relatively more ties with other nodes than the remaining ones, and (3) fragmented networks where both centrality and density are low. (Ibid: 33)

The next paragraph contains Neoliberal and Constructivist approaches towards explaining regime creation and maintenance.

### 4.3 Regime Creation and Maintenance

In this paragraph, explanations by Neoliberal and Constructivist scholars towards the creation and maintenance of regimes are introduced in order to get a better understanding of the multiple factors that lead states to engage in regularized patterns of cooperative behavior. Such factors might, in an inverse understanding, also hint at possible factors to disengage. Neorealist explanations towards the creation of regimes are rare. They mainly refer to the paradigm of hegemonic stability (see Krasner 1976; see Chapter 2). Neorealist approaches have already been highlighted in Chapter 2 above.

Before entering the life cycle of regimes, we should ask why states create regimes. First, it will be important to get rid of any misleading notion of cooperation as a moral good per se, as sometimes brought forwards by Neoliberal scholars of regime (cf. Hurrell 1993: 67). Cooperation as such has no moral value or origin. Soviet-Nazi Germany cooperation on the partition of Poland is just one example. Keohane consequently admonishes that ‘although international regimes may be valuable to their creators, *they do not necessarily improve world welfare*. They are not *ipso facto* “good”.’ (Keohane 1984: 73) A number of authors have demonstrated that regimes might serve only the interests of a single state – in most cases a hegemon – with this state pressuring other reluctant states to comply with the regime (cf. Krasner 1993: 152-5). The propensity of certain regime scholars to view cooperation as a moral good is actually more of a reflection of regime theory’s inherent liberal nature than a distinct research program. Regime creation by virtue of altruistic or, more general, moral motives should thus be discarded. Also, states do not engage in cooperative endeavors for the very sake of cooperation. Instead, regime scholars agree that states seek certain gains from cooperation (cf. Keohane 1984; Oye 1986). Cooperation thus needs to be understood as a purely neutral and unbiased term.

In the following, explanations by Neoliberal and Constructivist scholars about the creation and maintenance of regimes are provided.

#### 4.3.1 Neoliberal Approaches

One of the most influential substantiations of the Neoliberal regime episteme comes from Robert Keohane. Keohane's main argument for the creation of regimes is based on rational choice assumptions. In *After Hegemony* (1984) he applies various situation-structural approaches to prove that stable cooperation can emerge even if the contracting parties find themselves in anarchy-like situations where it is rational for both to defect. Keohane departs from the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma and concentrates on other coordination games as well (cf. Keohane 1984: 75-8; see also Paragraph 2.1 above). Regimes, he concludes, can provide a stable framework for facilitating agreements because of their repetitive character, the information regimes provide, the accumulated gains over time (Axelrod's 1984 'shadow of the future'), and the reduced transaction costs for states.

As the title of Keohane's seminal work (1984) implies, institutionalized international cooperation can emerge and persist even in times of hegemonic decline. Having said that, Keohane did not dismiss hegemony as a positive foundation for the emergence of regimes (cf. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997: 87) but underlined that even in cases of declining satisfaction by the hegemon or other regime participants, regimes can persist because of the difficulty – that is costliness – of creating a regime in the first place (Keohane 1988: 386 et seq). Following this approach, maintaining the regime even in times of dissatisfaction is more cost-effective than rather 'letting it die' (cf. Keohane 1984: 103). Regime maintenance thus rests also on cost-benefit considerations.

The value of Neoliberal explanations for the creation of regimes based on models of rational choice is limited insofar as they suppose purely rational gain seekers – concerned with absolute and not relative gains; a criticism most vividly brought forward by Grieco (1988). Also, Neoliberals did not eradicate the basic problem of states rationality to cheat. Furthermore, they have favored two-party games,

which miss to take into account complex multi-preference settings. Last but not least, Nye has argued that states' preferences are not stable over time but could be influenced by the regime framework (cf. Nye 1987: 400). Such understanding is already in close vicinity to Ernst Haas's Constructivist understanding of learning (cf. E. Haas 1990: 23 et seq; see also below). Taken together, rational choice approaches have received criticism for their rigid and unrealistic postures (cf. Hopmann and Druckman 1991: 273). Nevertheless, Neoliberal explanations make their cogent points when stressing cost concerns as an argument for regime maintenance.

Another important, though different, Neoliberal contribution comes from Young. In his account of 'institutional bargaining' (Young 1989b: 359-66), he affiliates himself with the skeptics of game theory and argues that 'the analytic literature on bargaining exhibits a marked tendency to abstract itself from a number of real-world factors that are important in the context of international regime formation (for example, incomplete information, unstable preferences).' (Young 1982: 284) In Young's model, 'uncertainty' is the major variable as actors are uncertain about their opponents' strategies as well as to their own strategies, and with respect to possible outcomes. Uncertainty about the time and the unpredictability of the future creates, what Young terms, a 'veil of uncertainty' regarding the future positions and interests of the parties involved. As those interests can change over time – the established regime nevertheless cannot be changed easily – states opt for institutional arrangements that can produce acceptable results for states in quite different positions. (Cf. Young 1989a: Chapter 3) Besides the influence of uncertainty, Young presents six factors responsible for successful regime formation which are 'contractual environment', 'exogenous shocks or crises', 'availability of equitable solutions', 'existence of salient solutions', 'compliance mechanisms', and 'leadership' (Young 1989b: 366-74). By 'capturing some of the essential features of the processes involved in the formation of international regimes', Young (1989b: 374) both augments the regime approach with concrete variables and rejects 'mainstream utilitarian' as well as classical 'power theorists['] accounts for regime formation. With a view to regime maintenance, Young (cf. 1989a: 62-70)

is mostly in line with Keohane's argument (cf. 1984; 1988) of regime persistence as a result of cost considerations.

George (1980: 248) approaches uncertainty from a different angle. He points to the impact of uncertainty in leaders' calculations and suggests that leaders are generally uncertain about consequences of potential new arrangements. Furthermore they are uncertain about how to secure domestic support for a new regime. In light of these uncertainties, leaders tend to give preference to already established forms of cooperation instead of striving for new ones. This form of explaining regime maintenance could be labeled "leadership conservatism".

A third approach under the rubric of Neoliberalism comes from German scholars of international regimes. The so called 'problem-structural approach' (cf. Hasenclever et al 1997: 59-68) is located between the attributes of the actors and the characteristics of the international system as a whole. Thus the nature of the issue-area enters the limelight. According to Efinger and Zürn (1990: 68) 'issue-areas [...] consist of one or more, in the perception of the actors inseparably connected objects of contention and of the behavior directed to them. The boundaries of issue-areas are determined by the perception of the participating actors.' Thereby 'objects of contention' equate conflict and 'the behavior directed to them' equates conflict management. Thus conflict equates positional differences (cf. Czempiel 1981: 198-203) and conflict management equates cooperation, which, theoretically, ranges from total war to stable peace. In opposition to Keohane, problem-structuralists highlight the conflictual background of regime-based cooperation (cf. Hasenclever et al 1997: 61-2). They classify the policy space in which regimes might occur, with 'security' included in their typology. In order to allow for a classification of the conflictual background, problem-structuralists scrutinize the issue-area and the type of conflict under consideration. Their classification of issue-areas departs from Czempiel (1981: 198) and rates security as medium positioned in terms of regime-conduciveness (cf. Efinger and Zürn 1990: 75). Following their conflict typology, conflicts can be categorized into dissensual and consensual conflicts with the former divided into conflicts about values (very low

regime-conduciveness) and conflicts about means (medium regime-conduciveness) and the latter divided into conflicts about relatively assessed goods (low regime-conduciveness) and conflicts about absolutely assessed goods (high regime-conduciveness). (Cf. Rittberger and Zürn 1990: 31 et seq)

The problem-structural approach can be questioned on grounds of its overt formalism. Issue-areas often comprise more than one subject of contention. Further on, different stages of negotiation might cover different types of conflicts and the conflictual issue at stake might change its nature over time. These objections highlight the artificial rigidity inherent to the problem-structural account and contest its value for comprehensively explaining regime maintenance.

#### 4.3.2 Constructivist Approaches

Cognitivist or (social) Constructivist<sup>34</sup> explanations for the emergence of regimes highlight the impact of norms, ideas, knowledge, and epistemic communities. In an attempt to further develop the rational interest-based model of states as utility-maximizers, Constructivists sought to focus not only on fixed interests but particularly on the impact and emergence of changed interests. Ernst Haas (1990: 7) asserts ‘that the knowledge actors carry in their heads and project in their international encounters significantly shapes their behavior and expectations’. Following Constructivist assumptions, knowledge can change over time, which in turn can lead to a change in preferences. Also under conditions where power relations are in flux new ‘ideas serve the purpose of guiding behavior’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993a: 8-24).

According to the Constructivist approach, uncertainty claims a prominent role. Uncertainty in the Constructivist sense should not be confused with uncertainty as in Young’s model. Rather the term serves the function of a more fundamental understanding of uncertainty in the sense of ‘what do I know?’ Particularly in an ever more interconnected world of specific technicalities decision-makers cannot

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<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of the two closely interlinked concepts see Hasenclever et al (1997: Chapter 5) and Ulbert (2010). For reasons of consistency the term ‘Constructivism’ is employed when referring to the two concepts.

be certain to make the right choices without seeking advice from experts who supply the desired knowledge (cf. Adler and Haas 1992: 375 et seq). Such knowledge becomes available through like-minded and well-informed peer groups, so called *epistemic communities*. 'Scientific knowledge may be best operationalized in terms of epistemic communities. Consensual knowledge does not emerge in isolation, but rather is created and spread by transnational networks of specialists. [...] Epistemic communities are networks of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise [...]'.<sup>35</sup> (P. Haas 1993: 179) Adler and Haas (1992: 372-85) see the influence of epistemic communities during both stages of regime creation and maintenance.

During the 1990s, the Constructivist research agenda gained further prominence through the so called normative debate (for a detailed debate see Chapter 8). Constructivist scholars such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) criticized behavioral approaches for their economics-induced fascination with measurements of all kinds, therewith leaving ideational or social phenomena outside of IR research focus. In their understanding, the effects of ideas and knowledge only constitute interests, reality, and therewith actors themselves. According to such understanding, even anarchy is only 'what states make of it' (Wendt 1992).

Constructivists have not only added valuable explanatory variables to the first two stages of the regime life cycle, they have also helped to question the rigidity of the Neorealist, the situation-structural and, in a form of actors' disentanglement from the causal regularity of the issue-area, also the problem-structural approach. Their merit is the substantiation of the idea that regimes can assume a life of their own through providing a framework for the exchange of ideas, through the effects of learning in changed and complex constellations, and through the input of epistemic communities. Obviously, Constructivism places an important emphasis on change as an integral dynamic element of regimes. It could thus provide explanatory variables for the decay of regimes if change is to be understood as a continuum of possibilities. Particularly changing norms, more precisely understood in

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<sup>35</sup> For a defining set of characteristics of epistemic communities see Peter Haas (1993: 180).

terms of a changed understanding about norms, could have a serious impact on the survivability of a regime (cf. Krasner 1982: 4). A caveat should be raised with regards to the influence of epistemic communities. It is questionable whether their influence is as vital and verifiable when it comes to the realm of “hard” security (see Mutschler 2013 for the potential role of epistemic communities in relation to outer space arms control).

In the ensuing paragraph, the life cycle of regimes is completed by an assessment of theoretical explanations for and signs of regime decay.

#### 4.4 Regime Decay: In Search of Indicators

*It becomes important to think about the developmental patterns or life cycles of regimes. How can we account for the emergence of any given regime? What factors determine whether an existing regime will remain operative over time? Can we shed light on the rise of new regimes by analyzing the decline of their predecessors? Are there discernible patterns in these dynamic processes? Is it feasible to formulate nontrivial generalizations dealing with the dynamics of international regimes? (Young, 1982: 278)*

What reads like a research agenda for scholars of regime has in practice not resulted in a consequent study of the life cycle of regimes. Peter Haas (1993: 168-201) observes that ‘in general, international scholars of regime have been mainly occupied with regime creation, persistence and change’. Even though change is basically neutral, change towards the unraveling of a regime – more precisely, regime decay – is still underrepresented in regime analysis.<sup>36</sup> In the following, regime scholars’ approaches to indicators of decay are highlighted.

##### 4.4.1 Signs of Decay

Before turning to a number of potential reasons for regime decay, signs of decay shall be highlighted first. Ernst Haas (1983: 192) defines regime decay as ‘the

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<sup>36</sup> For a good treatment of the phenomenon of decay see Ernst Haas 1983. His account of global and regional conflict management nevertheless lacks the identification of general indicators of regime decay, applicable to other issue-areas.

gradual disintegration of a previously routinized pattern of conduct.’ All proponents of regime agree that regime decay is a function of change. Differences exist mainly with regards to the reasons for and the consequences of change. Krasner (1982: 4) asserts: ‘*Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself.* When norms and principles are abandoned, there is either a change to a new regime or a disappearance of regimes from a given issue-area.’ His proposition highlights a crucial sign of decay: changes in principles and norms. He admits that ‘assessments of whether principles and norms have changed [...] are never easy because they cannot be based on objective behavioral observations.’ However, ‘if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened’. (Ibid: 5) Another sign of decay has been underlined by Aggarwal (1985: 143-82). In his observation of regimes he highlights protracted negotiations compared to earlier periods of swift and successful negotiations as potential indicators for decay.

In contrast to the very few signs of regime decay identified by IR scholars, the likely reasons for decay have gained comparably more attention. In the following, reasons for decay are laid out according to their theoretical origin in the three major schools of IR theory.

#### 4.4.2 Reasons for Decay

As already explained above (see Chapter 2), Neorealists have ascribed regime decay mainly to the more general problem of upholding international cooperation over a longer period. According to Neorealism, the consequences of states’ rationality to cheat, which is particularly high in the security realm, can be limited (particularly through monitoring agreements; cf. Jervis 1999). But the rationality to cheat can never be completely eliminated (ibid). In addition, a state which might come to the assessment that the cooperating state receives relatively more gains from an agreement over time, thus altering the distribution of power, will exit from the agreement. (See Paragraph 2.2.3 above) Further on, Neorealists have set decay in relation to the decay of hegemonic stability. ‘When the hegemon loses its power, [...] regimes will weaken and fail’ (Haufler 1993: 95).

Neoliberal and Constructivist scholars of regime stress the ambiguity of change. Focusing on the Realist power variable, Young's assessment is already in close vicinity of the paradigm of hegemonic decline. He observes that 'it should come as no surprise that shifts in the distribution of power will be reflected, sometimes gradually rather than abruptly, in changes in social institutions like international regimes.' (Young 1982: 293)

While regimes can disintegrate, more often they are being adapted in the wake of technological changes, learning effects related to new problem areas, shifts in power and capabilities, or changing domestic preferences (Müller 1993a: 48). 'Situations sometimes arise (for example, as a result of the collapse of some pre-existing order) in which it is difficult to avoid conscious efforts to create or reform specific regimes.' (Young 1982: 281) In such situations 'planned changes in regimes require not only the destruction of existing institutions but also the coordination of expectations around new focal points.' (Ibid: 280) As a result of this difficulty, 'deliberate efforts to modify or reform international regimes can easily produce disruptive consequences neither foreseen nor intended by those promoting specific changes, so that there is always some risk that ventures in social engineering will ultimately do more harm than good.'

Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2004) put forward the hypothesis that distributive justice is a necessary condition for a high level of regime robustness. 'Inequity in the allocation of benefits and burdens among regime members', they assume, 'guarantees a low degree of "staying power" in the face of exogenous shocks.' (Ibid: 184)

Müller (1993a: 49) stresses the need for converging interests. Regimes' further existence, he argues, is in danger when actors' divergent interests forestall regime adaptation to external changes.

Jervis (1982: 366) takes into account cognitive repercussions of negative expectations: 'If an actor thinks the regime will disintegrate – or thinks others hold this

view – he will be more likely to defect from the cooperative coalition himself. On the other hand, if he believes the regime is likely to last, he will be more willing to “invest” in it (in the sense of accepting larger short-run risks and sacrifices) in the expectation of reaping larger gains in the future.’

Janice Stein (2003: 13) helps to broaden the picture and emphasizes positive aspects of regime decay. ‘The European experience suggests that regimes tend to be created after the kind of behavior they are prescribing is already becoming politically taboo, but participants are not confident that the taboo is deeply enough embedded so that it will be universally observed. Once confidence grows that the taboo is universally accepted, regimes tend to fade away as they evolve into security communities.’ (For a discussion of Security Communities see Paragraph 8.2 below.) A differentiation of Janice Stein’s approach comes from McGinnis (1986: 165): ‘cooperation that comes to be seen as routine may lose its relative appeal, as the costs of defection recede from memory. Thus, a disquieting substantive interpretation of this sensitivity problem is that a linkage-based international regime of cooperation may be unstable in the presence of changes in actor interests, even though the very existence of such a regime may stimulate exactly such changes.’

Issue linkage can further threaten the stability of regimes if conflicts from other issue-areas penetrate the regime or other closely connected regimes. It can also hamper regime evolution if connected to progress in an already stagnating issue-area. (Müller 1993a: 43) Amongst the most precarious implications of issue linkage are attempts to increase actor-specific gains through the inclusion of other, not directly related issue-areas. Müller (ibid: 48) argues that such forms of issue linkage signal that the issue-introducing actor is not satisfied with the conventional gains from cooperation. ‘Although some linkage-based regimes of cooperation are resilient to perturbations, others are particularly brittle and subject to dissolution should one of the players attempt to add other, especially highly contentious, issues to that regime.’ (McGinnis 1986: 165) Sebenius (1983: 315) adds: ‘In some cases, the combination of individually resolvable issues may wreck the chances of settling any of them.’ McGinnis (1986: 158) thus pleads ‘to be at best guardedly

optimistic in our assessment of the potential contributions of linkage to the establishment of stable patterns of international cooperation.’

Further on, possible ‘birth defects’ can erode a regime over time. ‘The development of an international regime frequently involves intense bargaining that leads to critical compromises among the interested parties.’ (Young 1989: 22) As a consequence, ‘some regimes harbor internal contradictions that eventually lead to serious failures and mounting pressure for major alterations. Such contradictions may take the form of irreconcilable conflicts among the constituent elements of a regime.’ (Ibid: 96) Müller (1993a: 50-1) argues that particularly old regimes with a long history of evolution might display a high degree of internal dissent.

#### 4.4.3 Complexity Decay

Scholars of regime complexity are paying comparably more attention to decay than the classical school of regime analysis has done over the years. Alter and Meunier (2009: 20) collected possible consequences of regime complexity and found ‘that changes within one institution could reverberate across parallel institutions. [...] Events in one area’, they conclude, ‘can reverberate in ways that states cannot fully anticipate or control.’ Such changes include for instance negative spill-over effects. (Ibid: 19) Further on, they summarize that ‘international regime complexity facilitates exit via non-compliance, regime shifting, or withdrawal from IOs.’ Hafner-Burton (2009: 35) notes a tendency ‘for actors to use one institution to escape or invalidate a legal obligation in another institution. Regime complexity makes this à la carte behavior more likely by reducing the clarity of legal obligations and by producing opportunities to forum shop. Betts (2009) finds that states tend to use the environment of regime complexity to escape existing legal obligations by creating new institutional structures.

For the area of regime complexity in international security, Hofmann (2009) detects a number of strategies and effects that might have a negative influence on questions such as persistence and performance. Hostage taking and turf battles are just two strategies states employ to assert their interest. Besides competition, re-

verberation occurs in the form of institutional inefficiencies such as duplicated structures.

All in all, scholars of regime complexity have identified a number of negative effects that might arise from institutional density. In general, interdependent institutions seem to increase the likelihood of “negative” behavior of actors towards specific institutions. This is also true with respect to “positive” behavior such as compliance. However, the question and consequences of decay (e.g. negative spill-over and ripple effects) in relationship to the evolution of regime complexes remain an unexplored matter (cf. Morin and Orsini 2013).

In the next paragraph, the critics of regime will gain attention. Through an understanding of their arguments possible mistakes in the application of the regime episteme to the empirical evidence shall be avoided.

#### 4.5 Of Dragons and Fireflies: Regime Critique ... and Apologia

Amongst the earliest but still most profound critics of regime analysis it was Susan Strange (1982) who revealed vividly the concept’s inherent weaknesses. To quote from her terminology, five ‘dragons’ inhabit the arcane waters that surround the concept. While Strange reveals where the dragons lurk on the epistemological map of regimes, she does, however, not explain where the creatures came from. The following paragraph introduces her critique and critically scrutinizes her assumptions and findings. In the ensuing paragraph, an attempt at a more holistic explanation for the concept’s shortcomings is made.

##### 4.5.1 Five Dragons

Dragon number one: ‘The study of regimes is, for the most part a fad, one of those shifts of fashion not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events in the real world but in itself making little in the way of a long-term contribution to knowledge.’ (Strange, 1982: 479) Adding to the first dragon, Palan (2012), a scholar of Strange, asserts that ‘regime theory supposedly tells us about the impact of coordination, but has little to say about the substance of the regime as

such.’ Crawford (1996: 86) asks ‘whether regimes provide order and stability in international politics so much as they reflect it.’ The underlying reproach is that form prevails over substance in the study of regimes. Such critique of regime theory as being almost apolitical and a fashionable l’art pour l’art exercise overestimates its theoretical explanatory power. As will be discussed further below, regime theory was never made to arrive at a fundamental understanding of *why* regimes come about but rather *how*.

Dragon number two: ‘It is imprecise and woolly.’ (Strange, 1982: 479) Indeed, as already discussed above, the very concept of regimes is imprecise and even prone to cause what Blaise Pascal (1909-14: Para. 34) denoted a ‘confusion of controversies’. Instead of following a classical ‘spirit of precision’ (ibid) in scientific discourse, confusion is partially apparent in Keohane’s, Krasner’s, and Young’s definitions. Strange is therefore generally right in criticizing regime theory’s imprecision but misses to scrutinize it from a systemic point of view. Her critique lingers at the surface of the regime debate.

Dragon number three: ‘It is value-biased, as dangerous as loaded dice.’ (Strange, 1982: 479) Strange exemplifies that regime theory helps to solidify existing divergences, particularly in the global North-South divide. (1982: 487-8) The blame is that regime theorists have fallen too deeply in love with their subject and lost critical distance. While Keohane rightfully raises caveats to a value-laden treatment of cooperation in general (1988: 380) and regimes in particular (1984: 73), Keeley (1990: 84) argues that Liberal regime theory even encourages IR scholars ‘to regard regimes as benevolent, voluntary, cooperative, and thus legitimate associations.’ Strange’s critique might be too rigid inasmuch international institutions generally tend to ‘reflect and sustain the existing political order and distribution of power’, as Schachter (1982: 28) notes with recourse to international law. However, she is right to point to regime theory’s propensity to elevate cooperation into a moral sphere (cf. Hurrell 1993: 67) without elaborating on what kind of cooperative endeavor is morally just and worthwhile pursuing.

Dragon number four: 'It distorts by overemphasizing the static and underemphasizing the dynamic element of change in world politics.' (Strange, 1982: 479) Strange's critique of the static *weltanschauung* of regime theorists is incomplete as she misses to take on IR theory's generally increasing occupation with positivist designs, which gained speed through the regime debate. As Judt (2010: 38-9) noted in his final lecture, the rationalist economic contributions of Anglo-American scholars of IR during the last decades tend to generally over-emphasize static suppositions. Regime theory, propelled by approaches of Scientism such as rational choice projections, reflected and amplified this process during the 1980s.

Dragon number five: 'It is narrow minded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of a wider reality.' (Strange, 1982: 479) At the time of her critique Strange was right to find fault with regime theory's almost exclusive concentration on international issues dealt with by the nation state. However, later analyses have displayed the impact of non-state actors on regimes (cf. Haufler 1993) and the emergence of private corporate regimes (cf. Cutler et al 1999). Even in the security realm, non-state actors have gained a certain impact level, for instance in the realm of humanitarian arms control (cf. Wisotzki 2010). The important but incompletely elaborated aspect of Strange's critique points to the systemic vicinity of regime theory to Neorealism. This kinship can be either questioned or lamented; it should, however, and in hindsight, rather lead to a debate about the general value of state-centric epistemes for theories of IR in the 21<sup>st</sup> century than to a justified dismissal of the concept of regime.

#### 4.5.2 Where the Dragons Came From

Strange's critique of the concept of regime addresses a range of shortcomings of which most can be explained by an inherent conceptual contradiction. As Crawford (1996) proves convincingly, the regime concept is means and ends in itself. It is both the result of a paradigm which partially tries to reconcile Realist and Idealist/Liberal suppositions and the intellectual vehicle leading to the desired outcome. Accordingly, Krasner (1982: 1-2) has coined the term of 'modified structural' approach to regimes, based on the 'analytic assumptions of structural realist

approaches'. This modified structural or, more pronounced, modified Realist approach derives from the assumption that Neorealists can explain the creation of regimes but are unable to provide convincing reasons for their growth into autonomous or semi-autonomous actors in international politics. Most regime proponents start from Waltzian structural suppositions about the state as both producer and product of the system of states and modify them to include Liberal assumptions that extend the international structure to include (semi)-autonomous supranational agents. The beauty of this idea lies in its attempt of a transformative reconciliation of the two oldest schools of theory in IR. It can thus partially explain the wide reception the regime episteme has gained (cf. Crawford 1996: 4).

Regime theory's origin, located between structural Realist and Liberal idealist suppositions about international institutionalized cooperation, explains for its imprecision, its value-biased affirmation of cooperation, its obsession with static models, and the centrality of the nation state. Regime theory elevates form so much over substance because of the concept's close vicinity to Neorealism. As Palan (2012) puts it: 'Regime theories are theories about the coordination problems that states are facing with no particular reasons or cause for coordination besides some vague notion that those states join regimes have a reason for doing so.'

In its essence, Palan's critique (ibid) questions regime theory's explanatory value. Its descriptive value, even though challenged by its very own definitional vagueness, was not so much put into question, not even by its harshest critics (cf. Crawford 1996: 3). It was regime theory that acknowledged the increasing interdependence of states and recognized the growing number of cooperative efforts in various international institutions of all policy areas. Its main added value derives from the attempts of scholars of regime to map the complex space of convergence towards cooperation and coordination. To put it simple: regime theorists gave the policies of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977) a form. Beyond that, Constructivist regime theory allowed institutionalized international cooperation a life of its own. Nevertheless, both merits cannot hide the facts that regime

theory remained in parts at the descriptive level. There is thus reason to assume that regime theory is less of a *theory* but more of a praxeologic *description*.<sup>37</sup> Regime theory would be ipso facto an analytical tool of methodology (cf. Donnelly 1986: 640; Ropers and Schlotter 1989: 316; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997: 11) that was never apt to arrive at a fundamental understanding of *why* regimes come about but rather *how* (cf. Thompson and Snidal 2000: 705). If one accepts this assumption, regime theory can be used as what it is: nothing more and nothing less than a methodology, helpful in identifying institutionalized patterns of cooperative behavior. From this perspective, Strange's dragons would lose much of their threatening posture when being dwarfed to the size of small but, in their entirety, highly illuminating fireflies.

In the next paragraph, regime scholars' conclusions will be put in relation with the empirical evidence of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Chapter 3).

## 4.6 Regime Theory and the Empirical Evidence

In the previous paragraphs, definitions of and theoretical approaches towards the concept of regime, its establishment, maintenance, and decay have been introduced, analyzed, and critically questioned. In the following, regime scholars approaches will be shortly summarized and confronted with the empirical evidence collated in Chapter 3.

### 4.6.1 Definitions of Regimes and the Empirical Evidence

Various definitions of regimes and regime complexes exist in the literature (see above). Before those definitions are set in relation to the empirical evidence, Table 13 (see next page) will list scholars' key definitions of regimes and regime complexes.

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<sup>37</sup> Note that Strange constantly employs the term of regime 'analysis' instead of 'theory'.

**TABLE 13**

DEFINITIONS OF REGIME (AND REGIME COMPLEXES)

<i>Aggarwal</i> (1985)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• distinction between meta-regimes and regimes</li> </ul>
<i>Jervis</i> (1982)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest</li> <li>• reciprocity strengthens the operation of security regimes</li> </ul>
<i>Jones</i> (2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• norms of security regimes express regional traditions and desires, regional security regimes should be inclusive, voluntary, and able to adapt</li> </ul>
<i>Keohane</i> (1982, 1984)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regimes facilitate cooperation in the form of agreements</li> <li>• regimes limit uncertainty and reduce costs</li> <li>• existence of explicit rules that are referred to in an affirmative manner</li> <li>• regimes are often nested in broader frameworks, they produce issue linkages</li> </ul>
<i>Keohane, Victor</i> (2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regime complexes are marked by connections between the specific and relatively narrow regimes</li> <li>• absence of an overall architecture or hierarchy that structures the whole set (of a regime complex)</li> </ul>
<i>Krasner</i> (1982)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge</li> <li>• more than temporary arrangements</li> </ul>
<i>Kratochwil</i> (1993)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regimes trigger domestic procedures</li> </ul>
<i>Orsini, Morin, Young</i> (2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regime complex: a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter</li> <li>• a regime complex exhibits overlapping membership</li> <li>• a regime complex generates substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively</li> <li>• regime complexes focus on a specific subject matter, often narrower in scope than an issue-area</li> <li>• interaction between the elemental regimes (every distinct regime interacting at least with one other regime)</li> <li>• three modes of regime interaction: dense, centralized, fragmented</li> </ul>
<i>J. Stein</i> (1985, 2003)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• security regimes include detection and defection mechanisms</li> <li>• security regimes are often created after a major shift in power</li> <li>• regimes endure significant changes in power and interest</li> </ul>
<i>Young</i> (1982, 1986, 1989)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regimes as the product of conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behavior or practice</li> <li>• regimes are agreements and may be accompanied by organizations</li> </ul>
<i>Zacher</i> (1987)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• effectiveness of behavioral guidelines</li> <li>• compliance of major actors</li> </ul>

Krasner's set of regime characteristics (1982: 2) is a useful starting point for an inductive approach testing the empirical evidence (see Chapter 5 for the ensuing test). Keohane's assumption that regimes facilitate cooperation in the form of agreements (1982: 337) is supported by the empirical evidence of various agreements in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 for an assessment of agreements). The persistence of the majority of agreements in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe points to the likely existence of explicit rules referred to in an affirmative manner (Keohane 1982: 337). Jervis' assumption that regimes are a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest (Jervis 1982: 357; cf. also Krasner 1982) is also supported by the persistence of some of the agreements of cooperative arms control in Europe which continue to (formally) exist since almost 40 years (i.e. the Helsinki Final Act). Jones' (2011: 11) reference to security regimes which ought to be inclusive, voluntary, and able to adapt is underscored by the empirical evidence in the C/OSCE's CSBM cooperation cluster. All of those agreements are inclusive, voluntary, and some have been successfully adapted (see the VD 2011).

Young's proposition that regimes may be accompanied by organizations (Young 1982: 277) is in line with the empirical evidence of two major European security organizations (NATO and the C/OSCE) which are in very close vicinity to the agreements of cooperative arms control in Europe. Janice Stein's hypothesis about security regime creation after the occurrence of significant shifts in capabilities (J. Stein 1985: 607) concurs with the empirical evidence since two of the cooperation clusters emerged either in conjunction with the end of the Cold War or shortly afterwards. Her finding that security regimes include detection and defection mechanisms concurs with a number of C/OSCE CSBMs (e.g. the VD) and the A/CFE Treaties. Stein's assumption that regimes endure significant changes in power and interest (1985: 609) is nevertheless questionable with regards to the empirical evidence. Zacher's observation that major instances of long-term non-compliance, involving major actors, weaken regimes (1987: 174) is supported by acts of Russian non-compliance in the cooperation cluster on conventional arms control (cf. Kühn 2009; for a detailed discussion see Chapter 5).

Keohane's argument of the wider framework regimes are nested in (1984: 89 et seq) is crucial inasmuch as the empirical evidence shows that political linkages in the form of the strategy of compensation have been established between the four cooperation clusters and have led to close relationship between the four. Particularly the adjoining concept of regime complexity (see Thakur 2013) might turn out to best characterize the relationship of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe.

Vinod K. Aggarwal's differentiation between 'regimes and meta-regimes' (1985: 18-20) could be applied towards the empirical evidence in order to clarify the question of the relationship between those four cooperation clusters, particularly as the historical provenance and the political linkages between these clusters might hint at a common origin (see Chapter 3). If the cooperation clusters were to share specific principles and norms, the likelihood for the existence of an Aggarwalian meta-regime would increase. Deriving from such hypothesis, the relationship between institutional decay and potential repercussions to the meta-level would come into focus.

Taken together, definitions of regime and regime complexes provide a sound basis for a regime analytical approach towards the empirical evidence because they mirror important institutional developments in the area of cooperative arms control in Europe. In the next paragraph, the tenets of regime creation and maintenance are set in relation with the empirical evidence.

#### 4.6.2 Regime Creation and Maintenance and the Empirical Evidence

Beyond defining regimes, IR scholars have collated a number of explanations for regime creation and maintenance. The following Table 14 (see next page) lists explanations according to their theoretical origin.

**TABLE 14**

EXPLANATIONS FOR REGIME CREATION AND MAINTENANCE

<i>Neoliberalism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• hegemony a positive but not necessary foundation</li><li>• cooperation can be rational even under anarchy</li><li>• states strive to reduce transaction costs</li><li>• regimes limit the incentive to defect; particularly through monitoring mechanisms</li><li>• costliness of disbanding regimes even in times of hegemonic decline</li><li>• regimes provide a stable framework for facilitating agreements; they lengthen the ‘shadow of the future’</li><li>• states opt for institutional arrangements that limit the ‘veil of uncertainty’</li><li>• leadership conservatism</li><li>• contractual environment and equitable solutions</li><li>• regime creation dependent on the conflictual background</li></ul>
<i>Constructivism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• regime members learn and exchange ideas</li><li>• regimes can assume a life of their own</li><li>• politicians are uncertain about the issues at stake; influence of epistemic communities</li></ul>

Neoliberals’ assumption that states maintain regimes in order to limit transaction costs (Keohane 1984; 1988) could be in line with the transformation of the CSCE to the OSCE. Cost considerations with regards to institutional dissolution, uncertainty about the future, and leadership conservatism (cf. George 1980: 248) could have explanatory power with a view to the (formal) maintenance of the cooperation cluster on conventional arms control. Neoliberals’ proposition that regimes limit the incentive to defect, particularly through monitoring mechanisms (cf. Nye 1987: 374-5) gets underscored by the employment of monitoring instruments in two of the four cooperation clusters (CSBMs and conventional arms control) and might explain in parts for the maintenance of the CSBM cooperation cluster. Young’s regime-conducive factor of the ‘availability of equitable solutions’ (1989b: 366-74) is on the one hand in line with the Realist tenet which sees the distribution of gains roughly reflecting the relative distribution of power; at least as long as equity is understood in terms of reflecting the Realist tenet of the relative distribution of power. On the other hand, this factor might prove valuable for addressing the Russian frustration with the gains from cooperation on cooperative

arms control in Europe which Russia perceives as inequitable (cf. President of Russia 2007; cf. Sarotte 2014: 79).

Constructivists' impetus on learning effects and change (see Paragraph 4.3.2 above) has direct value for the empirical evidence. In the context of the changed Soviet attitudes towards the evolving CSBM and conventional arms control cooperation clusters (cf. Falkenrath 1995a: 40), the effect of learning through repeated interaction is clearly visible (see Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 above). The argument that regimes can assume a life of their own (see Paragraph 4.3.2) can claim validity with regards to the evolution of the C/OSCE against continuous diverging issue-specific interests in Washington and Moscow. The likely influence of epistemic communities (see Adler and Haas 1992: 372-85) is nevertheless hard to assess; particularly in the realm of security which is often constrained by states' secrecy concern.

Not all Neoliberal and Constructivist assumptions and approaches have explanatory power in relation to the empirical evidence. Neoliberal scholars of regime have emphasized that cooperation can be rational even under the constraining effects of anarchy (cf. Axelrod 1984). Aside from the Neorealist critique that Neoliberals have not fully understood the constraining effects of anarchy (see Grieco 1988), that Neoliberals miss to take into account states' relative-gains concern, and that international institutions cannot fully eliminate the problem of states' rationality to defect (particularly not in the security realm), their methodology of rational choice has received criticism for its rigid, static, unrealistic, and one-dimensional approach (see exemplary Strange 1982). A possible game-theoretic model applicable to all instances of repeated cooperation in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe would be hard to apply without ending up with one-dimensional explanations.

In the next paragraph, regime scholars' assumptions with regards to regime decay are set in relation with the empirical evidence.

#### 4.6.3 Regime Decay and the Empirical Evidence

Scholars of regime have collated a number of indicators of regime decay (see Paragraph 4.4 above). These are highlighted in the following and set in relation to preliminary findings of the empirical evidence pertaining to decay (see Paragraph 3.8.7 and Table 12 above).

According to Realism, states' rationality to cheat can undermine and terminate institutionalized cooperation (see Chapter 2). What Krasner (1982: 5) has termed 'inconsistent practice' would thus equal non-compliance. An example from the empirical evidence would be Russian non-compliance with her Istanbul commitments (cf. Kühn 2009) as well as non-compliance with a number of political commitments stemming from the Helsinki Final Act in conjunction with the ongoing Ukraine conflict (see Chapter 5 and 6 for a discussion).

According to Young (1982: 293), shifts in the distribution of power can weaken regimes. His assumption is in close vicinity to Realist assumptions that states' relative-gains concern can lead them to exit from an agreement if they evaluate that the gains from cooperation do not roughly reflect the underlying distribution of power anymore (cf. Grieco 1988: 487). One example from the empirical evidence would be Russia's slow withdrawal from cooperative security in parallel to the reemergence of the Russian economy after the year 2000 (see Paragraph 3.5 above). In addition, his assumption is particularly valuable because of the strong shifts in capabilities as assessed in Chapter 3. The indicator will be summarized under the previously applied headline of "shifts in relative capabilities".

States' possible perception of the inequitable distribution of gains is in close vicinity to notions of justice and injustice (cf. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2004: 184) According to Realism, the distribution of gains is neither just nor unjust; it is simply relative to the distribution of power (cf. Grieco 1988: 501). However, the argument of the *perception* of inequity might have explanatory power when it comes to explaining the long-term dissatisfaction the Russian leadership continues to nurture with regards to the gains from cooperation on cooperative

arms control in Europe after the end of the Cold War (cf. President of Russia 2007) and which seems to have created feelings of grievance on the Russian side (see Paragraph 3.8.7 and Table 12 above). The indicator will be summarized under the headline of “Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains”.

The decline of hegemonic stability (cf. Krasner 1976) is not directly applicable to cooperative arms control in Europe for three reasons: (1) because the United States never held a hegemonic role with regards to Russia; (2) because it is arguable whether the United States is in hegemonic decline since the end of the 1990s (cf. Kupchan 2012); (3) if all four cooperation clusters would have been established during the Cold War (between the two hegemons), hegemonic decline would be a possible partial argument because of the decline of the Eastern hegemon (the Soviet Union); however only the cooperation cluster of CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE has already been established during the Cold War. Aside from the decline of hegemonic stability, the large capabilities of the United States relative to Russia (see Paragraph 3.8.1 above) leads to the question whether the possibly negative influence of U.S. hegemonic *practices* could be an argument relevant for explaining decay. This indicator will be addressed in Chapter 8. The indicator will be summarized under the headline of “hegemonic practices”.

The indicator of negative adaptation consequences (Young 1982: 281) could have explanatory power with regards to the adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the concomitant Istanbul commitments (see Paragraph 3.5.1 above). With regards to the other cooperation clusters, the empirical evidence does not suggest that adaptation had directly negative repercussions. Rather, adaptation reflected the issue-specific interest of the more powerful cooperation partner (as in the case of C/OSCE adaptation; see Paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.4.1 above).

The indicator of divergent interests (Müller 1993a: 49) is only partially in line with the empirical evidence. On the one hand, divergent issue-specific interests have informed the U.S.-Soviet/Russian policies of cooperative arms control in Europe throughout the whole of the evaluation period (see Chapter 3). On the oth-

er hand, divergence has not blocked the main actors from achieving cooperation (ibid). It seems appropriate to continue to follow the approach taken so far (Paragraph 2.3.3 above), and to distinguish between issue-specific interests and a general interest in cooperation (rooted in the Realist survival motive); the latter will be addressed shortly below. The indicator as such will be summarized under the previously applied headline of “divergent issue-specific interests”.

The indicators of regime success, routine, and fading memories (cf. Janice Stein 2003: 13; McGinnis 1986: 165) might be worthwhile exploring in conjunction with the shift in general interest on the U.S. side away from European security and cooperation with Russia after 9/11 (see above; see also Paragraphs 3.5, 3.6, and 3.8.7 and Table 12 above). In order to define success in conjunction with cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe we should return to the definition of the gains from U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe (see Paragraph 2.3.1 above). Accordingly, the gains have to (1) reflect the balance of power and (2) increase mutual security (in the sense of reflecting the tenets of cooperative security; see Paragraph 3.1 above). Analysis of the empirical evidence in Chapter 3 has shown that the gains have mostly met those two conditions; however, a second parallel strand of U.S. policy (i.e. NATO enlargement) was basically not in line with the tenets of cooperative security and made use of the gains from cooperative arms control in Europe in order to compensate Russia. The combination of these two policies has led to an overall negative assessment on the Russian side (see Paragraph 3.8.5 above). Hence, to speak of success and fading memories would be counterfactual with a view to continuing Russian dissatisfaction and grievance (cf. President of Russia 2007; 2014b). However, if one takes account of Washington’s positive evaluation of the gains from cooperation one can assume that Washington viewed cooperation as successful and did thus not see an immediate need to re-engage on the issue. The conclusion would be that Washington showed a somewhat diminished interest in cooperation with Russia (see also Paragraph 3.8.7 and Table 12 above). Therefore, the indicators of regime success, routine, and fading memories will be summarized under the pre-

vously applied headline of “diminished U.S. interest in cooperation” in order to better address the question of decay of cooperative arms control in Europe.

The indicator of negative expectations (Jervis 1982: 366) is particularly visible on the Russian side from the late 1990s onwards (see the respective Russian Statements contained in Chapter 7). However, it should not become confused with the variable of ‘expectations’ from the Realist model (see Paragraph 2.3.4 above).

The indicator of protracted negotiations (Aggarwal 1985: 143-82) has its merits because protracted negotiations are apparent with regards to the CFE negotiations after the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit and the stalled development of the cooperation cluster on CSBMs under the auspices of the OSCE (cf. OSCE 2011).

The indicator of the possible negative consequences of issue linkage (cf. Müller 1993a: 43-8; McGinnis 1986: 165; Sebenius 1983: 315) has already been shortly addressed (see Paragraph 3.8.7 and Table 12 above). Issue linkage has certainly influenced the establishment and maintenance of the four cooperation clusters; particularly by employment of the linkage strategy of compensation (see Paragraph 2.3.5 above), for instance in conjunction with the first round of NATO enlargement (see Paragraph 3.4.1).

Because of linkages between several cooperation clusters, the indicator of negative spill-over effects (Meunier 2009: 19) comes into the picture. However, since the formal relationship of the cooperation clusters has not been fully analyzed at this stage of research (see Chapter 6 for a discussion) it is too early to make statements about negative spill-over.

The same applies to the indicator of regime-internal contradictions (cf. Young 1989: 96; Müller 1993: 50-1). Without having assessed the agreements of cooperative arms control in Europe using a regime-methodological approach (see Chapter 5), it is too early to assess the likely impact of regime-internal contradictions.

Krasner (1982: 4) argues that changes in principles and norms can be indicators of decay. Again, such possible changes can only be assessed after the principles and norms of the four cooperation clusters have been clearly identified (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The following Table 15 (below) lists those 13 indicators of regime decay. Some of the indicators have already been mentioned in the previous chapter (see Paragraph 3.8.7 and Table 12 above) and are included under their previous headline (*ibid.*).

**TABLE 15**

13 INDICATORS OF REGIME DECAY

• <i>protracted negotiations</i>
• <i>changes in principles and norms</i>
• <i>non-compliance</i>
• <i>hegemonic practices</i>
• <i>shifts in relative capabilities</i>
• <i>Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains</i>
• <i>negative adaptation consequences</i>
• <i>divergent issue-specific interests</i>
• <i>negative expectations</i>
• <i>diminished U.S. interest in cooperation</i>
• <i>issue linkage</i>
• <i>negative spill-over</i>
• <i>regime-internal contradictions</i>

Proponents of regime complexity have highlighted a number of additional negative effects of the systemic interrelationship in regime complexes. While the question whether the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe might form a regime complex remains unanswered at this stage of research (see Chapter 6 for

an assessment), some of the negative implications of complexity correlate with the empirics. The following Table 16 (below) lists possible negative effects of complexity.

**TABLE 16**

NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF COMPLEXITY

- competition

---

- reverberation

---

- inefficiencies

---

- regime shifting

---

- non-compliance

Particularly the effects of reverberation might turn out to have explanatory power. Even though negative spill-over effects are observed by scholars of complexity, their real impact has so far not been linked to decay in complex institutionalized systems (cf. Thakur 2013). With regards to cooperative arms control in Europe, contradictory issue-specific interests were often overcome through strategies of linkage. These linkages might serve the function of a “negative bridge” that helps proliferate ripple effects, which reverberate throughout the whole system. If such inverse logic might turn out to be true, the dysfunctionality of specific sub-systems such as CFE could spill over into other sub-systemic units to negatively influence the system as a whole. To proof such hypothesis, an inductive test, testing whether the politics of cooperative arms control in Europe have resulted in the formation of a regime complex, has to be conducted first (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Summing up, scholars of regime provide a number of important findings and assumptions that are applicable to the empirical evidence. In Chapter 5, those explanation and methods are partially used to conduct a regime test.

## 4.7 Conclusions

The Neoliberal, and later Constructivist, regime episteme provides a number of compelling reasons how international institutions (i.e. regimes) can help to establish and uphold international cooperation. Particularly with regards to confidence-building and monitoring they obtain an important role. However, from a Realist point of view, international institutions can neither fully eliminate the cheating problem nor can they really constrain states' interest and power (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95).

What findings and assumptions of regime theory are relevant for cooperative arms control in Europe? Answering the guiding research question of this chapter, the majority, of the findings and assumptions about regime establishment, maintenance, and decay are relevant for cooperative arms control in Europe. The four different cooperation clusters identified in Chapter 3 resemble a broad range of regime characteristics. However, this correlation does not yet allow concluding that the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe are regimes. First, clear evidence should verify or falsify the regime assumption. It is hence too early to fully answer the first central research question of this thesis. With regards to the second central research question, regime scholars have collated a number of important indicators of the decay of institutions which will be included in the further analysis. At this stage of research, it is premature to make convincing statements about the origins of decay without having classified the empirical evidence by means of a regime test (see Chapter 5).

Steven Krasner's regime typology has become almost equated with the regime episteme itself. It provides a well-recognized tool for identifying regimes. In order to provide sound regime evidence, the different institutions that form the four cooperation clusters will undergo a rigorous regime test according to Krasner's typology in the next chapter.

## 5 A First Abductive Test

The empirical evidence so far collated in this thesis points to a densely institutionalized policy space under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe. Assessed through the Realist model of international cooperation, four cooperation clusters are traceable. Of the four, three clusters exhibit signs of decay, though to different degrees. The ensuing qualitative review of various works of regime scholars has helped to gather possible theoretic and methodological approaches applicable to the empirical evidence.

In this chapter, a regime-methodological approach is applied. By means of an abductive test, 36 agreements with direct relevance for cooperative arms control in Europe are qualitatively assessed. The 36 agreements are listed under Annex II. In order to classify the provisions of these agreements, Krasner's regime typology of 'principles', 'norms', 'rules', and 'decision-making procedures' is applied as methodological framework. The aim of the test is to either verify or falsify whether the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe are regimes and, if so, which institutions are part of which regime.

The guiding research questions of this chapter are: (1) Is there clear evidence that the four cooperation clusters under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe are actually four regimes? (2) If so, do those four regimes form a regime complex? (3) Which indicators of decay are present, and to what degree?

The chapter has six paragraphs. After a few introductory remarks in the first paragraph, the following four paragraphs comprise the 36 agreements divided along four historical periods from 1975 to 2014. The sixth paragraph sketches a preliminary assessment. The ensuing Chapter 6 sums up the respective findings and arrives at conclusions regarding the three guiding research questions of this chapter and the two central research questions of this thesis.

## 5.1 A Few Introductory Remarks

In the following four paragraphs, 36 agreements with relevance to cooperative arms control in Europe are classified and assessed continually from 1975 to 2014 in four historical periods, depending on their date of signature and not entry into force.<sup>38</sup> In contrast to Chapter 3, four instead of six historical periods are applied as breakdown. This is owed to the fact that the years between 2000 and 2014 have only produced a total of six relevant agreements. The assessment will proceed as follows.

First, each agreement is shortly introduced with respect to its regulations and its historical background and attributed to its corresponding cooperation cluster on conventional arms control (CAC), CSBMs under the C/OSCE, NATO political-military (pol-mil) cooperation, or the Balkans sub-regional arms control stipulations. Attribution follows the insights gained from assessment of the empirical evidence in Chapter 3. A number of agreements cannot be attributed to one of the four cooperation clusters. A discussion regarding this fact will follow below (see Paragraph 6.1).

Second, departing from a qualitative assessment, the agreements' main provisions are listed and matched to the corresponding regime framework of Krasner (1982: 2). To allow for a more focused application of Krasner's typology, agreements are not scrupulously assessed on a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of their respective injunctions. Instead, attention is being paid to its central provisions. As an example, the CFE Treaty lists an extensive range of specific verification and counting rules for conventional weaponry. These rules are not taken into account. Rather, central rules of a general character, such as CFE's "sufficiency rule" (Article VI, CFE 1990), are listed.

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<sup>38</sup> Only successfully concluded agreements are taken into account. This leaves out the unsuccessful MBFR talks. Some agreements, particularly from the C/OSCE, entail a wide range of political provisions going beyond the scope of this study. In order to avoid recalibrating the focus, only those principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures are taken into account with direct relevance for cooperative arms control in Europe. For all agreements, preambular paragraphs are treated as an integral part of the respective agreement and are thus assessed as well. Reaffirmations of conformity with the UN Charter and/or relevant UN conventions are not taken into account.

Third, the current state of each agreement and of its provisions is shortly observed with respect to indicators of regime decay. All 13 indicators of regime decay, as collated in Chapter 4 (see Table 15 above), are applied and matched to the agreements. Also indicators of decay are listed that do not exclusively pertain to U.S.-Russian political decisions. The 13 indicators of regime decay are listed again below.

#### 13 INDICATORS OF REGIME DECAY

- *protracted negotiations*

---

- *changes in principles and norms*

---

- *non-compliance*

---

- *hegemonic practices*

---

- *shifts in relative capabilities*

---

- *Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains*

---

- *negative adaptation consequences*

---

- *divergent issue-specific interests*

---

- *negative expectations*

---

- *diminished U.S. interest in cooperation*

---

- *issue linkage*

---

- *negative spill-over*

---

- *regime-internal contradictions*

Each of the four historical periods is assessed at the end of each paragraph in a specific table. The goal of this assessment is to highlight the number of indicators of regime decay in each specific period and with regards to agreements concluded before that period. As some of the indicators of regime decay are not bound to the act of conclusion of a given agreement but can occur sometime after the agree-

ment's conclusion, it will be important to highlight also such indicators of decay that pertain to already concluded agreements.<sup>39</sup>

The test is abductive since it combines the inductive process of extrapolating from potentially shared principles and norms to a general regime quality with the deductive process of extrapolating from general findings of regime scholars about decay (see Table 14 above) to the specific state of certain institutions (see below).

In the following paragraphs, the respective 36 agreements from the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe are assessed.

## 5.2 Agreements, Period 1975-1989

**TABLE 17**

CSCCE, QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE, DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, 1975

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 1: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki 1975: Questions relating to Security in Europe, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	--
<i>Description</i>	The Helsinki Decalogue is at the heart of the 1975 CSCE and the nucleus of the further C/OSCE process. It was the prestige project of the Kremlin and only came into being in conjunction with MBFR and the West's insistence on the inclusion of human rights standards. The central aim of Moscow was the recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security in Europe</li> <li>• commitment to peace, security, and justice</li> <li>• sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> <li>• inviolability of frontiers</li> </ul>

<sup>39</sup> For instance: Agreement X might have been established in Period Y and did not show any signs of decay during that period. However, in the following Period Z, Agreement X was violated by Actor P. In such a case, the corresponding indicator of regime decay will be counted in the respective assessment at the end of the paragraph that deals with Period Z.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• territorial integrity of States</li> <li>• peaceful settlement of disputes</li> <li>• non-intervention in internal affairs</li> <li>• cooperation among States</li> <li>• fulfillment in good faith of obligations under int. law</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• taking effective measures for disarmament</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• - -</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• exchange of views on implementation of provisions</li> <li>• multilateral meetings of representatives in Belgrade in 1977</li> <li>• possibility of a new conference</li> <li>• meetings held in participating States in rotation</li> <li>• technical secretariat provided by the host country</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1973-1989</i>	non-compliance, protracted negotiations, divergent issue-specific interests, negative expectations, issue linkage, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1973-1989</i>	During the period 1973-1989, non-compliance with principles and norms appeared on a regular basis until the mid-1980s because effective measures for disarmament were not pursued at least until the Soviet announcement of unilateral partial withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe in 1988 and because the Solidarity movement in Poland was suppressed by the declaration of martial law – a violation of the principle of ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’. Protracted negotiations, divergent issue-specific interests, and negative expectations characterized the CSCE process between 1977-1985/86 (cf. Schlotter 1999). Issue linkage with MBFR was the force behind the genesis of the CSCE (cf. Haftendorn 2008). Internal contradictions are apparent as the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’ clashes with the principle of ‘sovereign equality’. Theoretically, every state under the CSCE could follow any sovereign policy which in turn could be interpreted by any other state as a violation of the ‘indivisibility of security’. Bonn’s decision to implement NATO’s dual track

**TABLE 18**

CSCE, QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE, DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT, 1975

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 2: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki 1975: Questions relating to Security in Europe, Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament</b>
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<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The Document on CBMs marks the starting point of the cooperation cluster on CSBMs of the C/OSCE. It is part of the CSCE Final Act and reflected the West's desire for more transparency in military relations. As regards its substance, the Document contains only a limited set of non-binding transparency rules.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening of peace and security</li> <li>• strengthening of confidence</li> <li>• increasing stability in Europe</li> <li>• territorial integrity of States</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security</li> <li>• indivisibility of security in Europe</li> <li>• reciprocal measures</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reducing the dangers of armed conflict</li> <li>• promoting disarmament</li> <li>• promoting military exchanges</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• voluntary stipulations</li> <li>• prior notification of major military maneuvers (&gt;25,000)</li> <li>• territory of Europe plus adjoining sea area and air space</li> <li>• exchange of observers by invitation at military maneuvers at a voluntary basis</li> <li>• prior notification of major military movements</li> <li>• provide negotiations information to CSCE third parties</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• see CSCE Final Act</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1973-1989</i>	non-compliance, protracted negotiations, negative expectations, divergent issue-specific interests, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1973-1989</i>	During the period 1973-1989, non-compliance occurred with regards to the non-promotion of disarmament until the end of the Stockholm CDE in 1986. Protracted negotiations with partially negative expectations and divergent issue-specific interests characterized the CBM process until 1986 (cf. Ropers and Schlotter 1989: 320). Internal contradictions are present with the 'sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security' contradiction.

**TABLE 19**

CSCE, STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, 1986

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 3: Document of the Stockholm Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance With the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE, 1984-1986</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1986 Stockholm Document builds on the stipulations of the 1975 Helsinki CBM Document. Its central aim was extending and further concretizing the Helsinki provisions, particularly through means of intrusive inspections. It marks the transition from the phase of erratic CBMs of small scale to a full-fledged cooperation cluster with complementary provisions and came into being by a fundamental change in survival-related interest on the Soviet side towards more cooperation with the West.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening peace, security, and confidence</li> <li>• territorial integrity of States</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• peaceful settlement of disputes</li> <li>• prevent and combat terrorism</li> <li>• compliance</li> <li>• reciprocal measures</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reducing the dangers of armed conflict</li> <li>• promoting disarmament</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• compliance</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• territory of Europe plus adjoining sea area and air space</li> <li>• prior notification of military activities (&gt;13,000 troops and further specific provisions)</li> <li>• specification of information given</li> <li>• observation of military activities (&gt;7,000) through observers</li> <li>• provide prior specific information to observers</li> <li>• exchange of annual calendars of military activities</li> <li>• constraining military activities (&gt;40,000)</li> <li>• national technical means allowed for monitoring</li> <li>• specification of inspections</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reference to Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting</li> <li>• consideration of all topics deemed relevant</li> </ul>

<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1973-1989</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1973-1989</i>	--

**TABLE 20**

EVALUATION OF PERIOD 1973-1989

Number of Agreements	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded in 1975-1989	Ratio of Indicators of Regime Decay Per Agreement Concluded in 1975-1989	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 1975	Overall Number of Indicators of Decay in 1975-1989
3	11	3.66	--	11
Evidence for Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 1975		There is no evidence for indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded before the period of 1975-1989.		

Of the three agreements concluded in 1975-1989, two can be easily attributed to one of the four cooperation clusters identified above. The 1975 Document on confidence-building measures and the 1986 Stockholm Document kick-start the cooperation cluster on CSBMs. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act cannot be clearly attributed to one of the four cooperation clusters. All agreements show a high ratio of indicators of regime decay per agreement (3.66), with the specific indicator of inconsistent behavior sticking out.

### 5.3 Agreements, Period 1990-1994

**TABLE 21**

CSCE, CHARTER OF PARIS, 1990

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 4: Charter of Paris for a New Europe</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	--
<i>Description</i>	The 1990 Charter of Paris recalls and renews the Helsinki Decalogue. It formally ends the Cold War and states the goal of a Europe free from dividing lines. Its aim is to set the standards of security and cooperation after the bloc confrontation. Besides its reaffirmation of principles and norms, the Charter contains a large amount of concrete decision-making procedures for the further CSCE process.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> <li>• territorial integrity of States</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• peaceful settlement of disputes</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• commitment to peace, security, and justice</li> <li>• cooperation among States</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting arms control and disarmament</li> <li>• developing mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	--
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSCE Follow-up Meeting in 1992, then every two years</li> <li>• annual Council meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs</li> <li>• establishment of Committee of Senior Officials</li> <li>• establishment of a Secretariat in Prague</li> <li>• creation of Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna</li> <li>• establishment of an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw</li> <li>• intended creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly</li> <li>• financial arrangements</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	non-compliance, issue linkage, shifts in relative capabilities, inequitable distribution of gains, divergent issue-specific interests, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	During the period 1990-1994, non-compliance occurred during the First Chechen War and the Balkan Wars as both cases were instances of the violation of the principle of 'peaceful settlement of disputes'. Shifts in relative capabilities and the Russian perception

of the inequitable distribution of gains shaped the CSCE process during those years (cf. Ghéballi 2005). Divergent issue-specific interests between the United States and Russia prevailed with a view to the further role and the institutional framework of the CSCE process. Issue linkage was apparent in the evolution and the subsequent organizational upgrade of the CSCE being linked by Washington to maintaining NATO. Internal contradictions are apparent in the ‘sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security’ contradiction.

**TABLE 22**

CSCE, VIENNA DOCUMENT, 1990

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 5: Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The Vienna Document 1990 takes significantly forward and broadens CSBM stipulations of the Helsinki and Stockholm Documents. Its aim is to strengthen transparency and predictability after the end of the Cold War.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• achieving disarmament</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• annual exchange of military information, annual calendars</li> <li>• information on the plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• information on military budgets</li> <li>• mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities</li> <li>• cooperation on hazardous incidents of a military nature</li> <li>• rules for military contacts</li> <li>• prior notification of certain military activities</li> <li>• observation of certain military activities</li> <li>• specific constraining provisions</li> <li>• compliance and verification rules</li> <li>• evaluations and communications rules</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• annual implementation assessment meeting (AIAM)</li> </ul>

<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 23**

TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, 1990

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 6: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CAC cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The CFE Treaty of 1990 establishes parity in conventional armed forces on significantly lower levels between the two blocs. It is built on a zonal system of concentric circles aimed at disentangling the troop concentrations in Central Europe. Established in five categories of conventional armaments, special limitation zones to the very North and South deprive the former antagonists of their ability to launch large-scale offensive action and surprise attacks. After the unsuccessful MBFR experience, CFE marks the laying of the foundation stone of the cooperation cluster on conventional arms control in Europe. During the following years, the cluster gained its full shape through the supporting agreements of CFE-1A, the Treaty on Open Skies, and the Adapted CFE Treaty of 1999.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• territorial integrity of States</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> <li>• prevent military conflict</li> <li>• strengthen stability and security in Europe</li> <li>• peaceful cooperation</li> <li>• balance of forces at lower levels</li> <li>• eliminating the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• legally binding</li> <li>• specification of treaty-limited equipment (TLE)</li> <li>• TLE not to exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat</li> </ul>

	<p>aircraft, and 4,000 attack helicopters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protocol on Existing Types</li> <li>• sufficiency rule</li> <li>• NATO-WTO balance of forces</li> <li>• ATTU area, concentric regional zones, TUR exclusion zone</li> <li>• specific rules of holdings, flank rule</li> <li>• host nation consent rule</li> <li>• verification, notification, destruction, and storage rules</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishment of a Joint Consultative Group</li> <li>• consensus rule</li> <li>• review conferences every five years</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	non-compliance, issue linkage, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	<p>During the period 1990-1994, non-compliance occurred with Russia violating CFE ceilings in the so called Southern Flank (cf. Kühn 2009: 4). Those violations were nevertheless openly communicated by the Russian government in conjunction with the First Chechen War (see Letter of President Yeltsin to German Chancellor Kohl from September 17, 1993, in Hartmann et al 2002: 701-4). Issue linkage shaped CFE's genesis with economic aid to the Soviet Union being linked to Russian forces withdrawal from Eastern Europe (cf. Gorbachev 1996: 502). The deal resulted in the inequitable distribution of gains (see Table 10). Internal contradictions are apparent in the 'sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security' contradiction.</p>

**TABLE 24**

NATO, NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL, 1991

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 7: North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, 1991</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	NATO pol-mil cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	<p>The establishment of the NACC in 1991 marks the beginning of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War era after the 1990 NATO London Summit. It provided NATO with an institutionalized framework for political-military cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The NACC depicts the nucleus of the evolving cooperation cluster of political and military cooperation under the auspices of NATO.</p>
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening peace and security in Europe</li> <li>• promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• principle of sufficiency in arms</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• building partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe</li> <li>• strengthening the role of the CSCE, recalling CSCE principles</li> <li>• strengthening non-proliferation</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• focus of consultations and cooperation on defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management, and conversion of defense production to civilian purposes</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishment of NACC</li> <li>• annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level</li> <li>• bi-monthly meetings of the North Atlantic Council with liaison partners at the Ambassadorial level</li> <li>• additional NACC meetings at Ministerial level or of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session with Ambassadors of liaison partners</li> <li>• meetings at regular intervals of NATO subordinate committees with representatives of liaison partners</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, issue linkage, inequitable distribution of gains, internal contradictions,
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	During the period 1990-1994, indicators of regime decay are apparent in shifts in relative capabilities and the subsequent Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains in conjunction to issue linkage. As explained above (Paragraph 3.3), NATO's further maintenance was linked to an upgrade of the CSCE with Washington securing its preferred issue-specific interest. Divergent issue-specific interests between Moscow and Washington were thus present. Internal contradictions apply to the 'sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security' contradiction.

**TABLE 25**

CSCE, VIENNA DOCUMENT, 1992

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 8: Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE, 1992</b>
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<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The Vienna Document 1992 enhances and deepens the provisions of its predecessor. It contains a number of new regulations such as the voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities and the demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• achieving disarmament</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• annual exchange of military information, annual calendars</li> <li>• information on the plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• information on military budgets</li> <li>• mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities</li> <li>• cooperation on hazardous incidents of a military nature</li> <li>• voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities</li> <li>• rules for military contacts</li> <li>• demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• prior notification of certain military activities</li> <li>• observation of certain military activities</li> <li>• specific constraining provisions</li> <li>• compliance and verification rules</li> <li>• evaluations and communications rules</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AIAM</li> <li>• CPC serves as the forum for meetings</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 26**

TREATY ON OPEN SKIES, 1992

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 9: Treaty on Open Skies, 1992</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CAC cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1992 Treaty on Open Skies establishes a system of unarmed aerial observation flights over the states parties' entire territory. It is designed to gather information about military forces and activities and is mainly being used for monitoring states' compliance with the provisions of the CFE Treaty. The treaty came into effect in 2002.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting openness and transparency in military activities</li> <li>• enhancing stability</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enhancing security by means of CSBMs</li> <li>• facilitating the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements</li> <li>• strengthening the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• legally binding</li> <li>• establishment of observation quotas</li> <li>• specification of sensors</li> <li>• designation of aircraft</li> <li>• provisions for the conduct of observation flights</li> <li>• requirements for mission planning</li> <li>• specific flight provisions</li> <li>• designation of personnel</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishment of the OSCC</li> <li>• consensus rule</li> <li>• review conferences every five years</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 27**

CFE-1A, 1992

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 10: Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1992</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CAC cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The so called CFE-1A agreement originates in the stipulations of Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty ‘to conclude an agreement [...] to limit the personnel strength of [States Parties] conventional armed forces within the area of application.’ Its stipulations are closely connected to those contained in CFE. As distinct from the 1989-90 CFE negotiations, the number of signatories to CFE-1A had increased significantly through the break-up of the Soviet Union. The agreement is of a politically binding nature and was initiated by Germany in order to avoid being singularized as the only state with limits on military personnel through the stipulations of the so called Two Plus Four Agreement (Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany). In contrast to CFE, the agreement was not adapted in 1999. The CFE suspensions by Russia (2007) and NATO (2012) are also pertaining to CFE-1A since the agreement’s verification measures were carried out as parts of regular CFE inspections. The agreement is nevertheless formally in force.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability and security in Europe</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• sufficiency rule</li> <li>• specific national personnel limits</li> <li>• specific information exchange</li> <li>• specific stabilizing measures such as notification of increases</li> <li>• specific verification and evaluation measures</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• responsibility of the CFE Joint Consultative Group</li> <li>• review conferences every five years</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 28**

CSCE, SECTION V OF THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT, 1992

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 11: Section V ‘CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation’, Helsinki Document 1992</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	Section V of the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Document establishes the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) as the main responsible body for dealings with disarmament and CSBMs. The establishment of the FSC marks the beginning of the institutional adaptation process of the CSCE in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War and the Balkan wars. A significant number of CSBMs were concluded in the FSC since its inception.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability and security in Europe</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• principle of sufficiency</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishing new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building</li> <li>• giving new impetus to conflict prevention</li> <li>• designing specific regional measures (border areas)</li> <li>• enhancing transparency</li> <li>• increasing predictability</li> <li>• supporting measures for non-proliferation and arms transfers</li> <li>• enhancing military contacts</li> <li>• enhancing verification measures</li> <li>• strengthening the CPC</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	--
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishment of the FSC</li> <li>• establishment of a Special Committee and a Consultative Committee</li> <li>• an Executive Secretary will provide conference services to the two Committees</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	Regime-internal contradictions are apparent in the ‘sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security’ contradiction.

**TABLE 29**

CSCE, PROGRAMME FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, 1992

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 12: Programme for immediate action, Helsinki Document 1992</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The Programme for immediate action is an annex to Section V of the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Document. It complements the provisions of Section V and can be understood as a working program for the newly established FSC. It contains the rules that Section V did not outline. In the further CSCE process, it led to the establishment of eight CSBM agreements. The Programme was strongly influenced by the war in the former Yugoslavia.
<i>Principles</i>	--
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• harmonization of obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building</li> <li>• further development of the Vienna Document 1992</li> <li>• further enhancement of stability and confidence</li> <li>• global exchange of military information</li> <li>• enhancing cooperation on non-proliferation</li> <li>• developing regional measures</li> <li>• transparency about force planning</li> <li>• cooperation in defense conversion</li> <li>• further developing provisions on military cooperation and contacts</li> <li>• enhancing security consultations</li> <li>• encouraging verification cooperation</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	--
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 30**

CSCE, PROGRAMME OF MILITARY CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION, 1993

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 13: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 1: Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation, 1993</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1993 Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation was the first agreement to develop from the 1992 CSCE Programme for Immediate Action. It governs military contacts with the aim of enhancing mutual knowledge and transparency about national forces on a voluntary basis.
<i>Principles</i>	--
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• specific provisions to enhance military contacts at all levels</li> <li>• joint military exercises and training</li> <li>• visits to military facilities and to military formations</li> <li>• observation visits</li> <li>• provision of experts</li> <li>• seminars on cooperation in the military field</li> <li>• exchange of information on agreements on military contacts and cooperation</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme implementation assessed at AIAM</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 31**

CSCE, STABILIZING MEASURES FOR LOCALIZED CRISIS SITUATIONS, 1993

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 14: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 2: Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations, 1993</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1993 Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations were amongst the responses of CSCE participating States to sub-regional conflicts on the Balkans and in the newly emerging CIS. The agreement establishes a catalogue of de-escalating rules of engagement for the military in localized crisis situations.
<i>Principles</i>	--
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• voluntary</li> <li>• identification of parties involved in a particular crisis situation does not affect their status</li> <li>• extraordinary information exchange</li> <li>• notification, constraints, and observation of certain military activities</li> <li>• notification of plans for acquisition and deployment of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• introduction and support of a cease-fire</li> <li>• establishment of demilitarized zones</li> <li>• cessation of specific military flights</li> <li>• deactivation of certain weapon systems</li> <li>• specific treatment of irregular forces</li> <li>• handling of public statements</li> <li>• specific communications and experts measures</li> <li>• specific measures for monitoring of compliance and evaluation</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• specific selection of measures and their specific application based on the decision of the appropriate CSCE body and on the consensus rule</li> <li>• application requires prior consent and active support of the parties involved in a particular crisis situation</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 32**

CSCE, PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 1993

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 15: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 3: Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, 1993</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1993 Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers focus on streamlining the different national approaches to the control of weapons and equipment transfer and CSCE participating States' cooperation in the field of export controls of conventional weapons.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources</li> <li>• recognition of the peace dividend</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adherence to transparency</li> <li>• restraint</li> <li>• prevention of excessive arms build-ups</li> <li>• streamlining national policies with CSCE criteria</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• provision of national mechanisms</li> <li>• principled criteria for arms transfers</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• exchange of information in the FSC</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	Adherence to the agreement's principles and norms itself is hard to judge as there is no clear and commonly agreed criteria to what 'the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources' really means. The same pertains to the extent and the effects of the peace dividend. Particularly with respect to the peace dividend, the large military budgets of the United States and Russia (see Annex I) as well as the amount of arms exports of a number of C/OSCE participating States (e.g. United States, Russia, Germany, and France) seem to collide with the agreement's reaffirmation 'that the reduction of world military expenditures could have a significant positive impact for the social and economic development of all peoples'.
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 33**

CSCE, DEFENCE PLANNING, 1993

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 16: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 4: Defence Planning, 1993</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1993 Defence Planning agreement addresses information exchange of CSCE participating States' respective national defense planning and military doctrines.
<i>Principles</i>	--
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• provide annual information about defense policy, doctrine, force planning, previous expenditures, budgets</li> <li>• specific provisions for clarification, review, dialogue</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	--
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 34**

CSCE, GLOBAL EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, 1994

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 17: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 5: Global Exchange of Military Information, 1994</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1994 Global Exchange of Military Information regulates the annual exchange of information about CSCE participating States' major weapons and equipment systems and personnel in their conventional armed forces, on their territory as well as worldwide. The agreement is not subject to limitations, constraints, or verification.

<i>Principles</i>	--
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• annual exchange of specific information about command structure and personnel with specific levels of disaggregation</li> <li>• annual exchange of specific information about holdings of major weapon and equipment systems and those newly entered into service</li> <li>• specific provisions for clarification</li> <li>• communications made in accordance with the VD 1994</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	--
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 35**

CSCE, VIENNA DOCUMENT, 1994

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 18: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 6: Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 1994</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The VD 1994 takes forward stipulations of its predecessors and contains new regulations such as specific information on military forces, exchange of specific major weapons data, and a regular exchange of information on defense planning.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• achieving disarmament</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• annual exchange of military information, annual calendars</li> <li>• specific information on military forces</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• exchange of specific data relating to major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• information on the plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• exchange of information on defense planning</li> <li>• clarification, review, and dialogue on defense planning</li> <li>• mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities</li> <li>• cooperation on hazardous incidents of a military nature</li> <li>• voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities</li> <li>• specific rules for military contacts</li> <li>• specific program on military contacts and cooperation</li> <li>• demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• prior notification of certain military activities</li> <li>• observation of certain military activities</li> <li>• specific constraining provisions</li> <li>• compliance and verification rules</li> <li>• evaluations and communications rules</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AIAM and annual meeting on defense planning</li> <li>• establishment of a Communications Group</li> <li>• the Special Committee of the FSC will hold preparatory meetings for the AIAM</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 36**

CSCE, CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, 1994

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 19: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 7: Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 1994</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security sets rules for national forces in relation to human rights and democracy. It combines various political and military aspects of inter- and intra-state security and proscribes principles for good

	conduct. It marks the peak in CSCE efforts to set common norms for the regulation and control of the national military.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enhancing security cooperation</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• strengthening security and stability</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• principle of sufficiency</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• responsible and cooperative behavior in the field of security</li> <li>• further developing measures and institutions</li> <li>• act in solidarity if norms are violated</li> <li>• prevent and combat terrorism</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• determining military capabilities on the basis of national democratic procedures</li> <li>• denial of imposition of military domination of one state over any other state</li> <li>• implementation and further pursuit of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> <li>• democratic political control of military, paramilitary, internal security forces, intelligence services, and the police</li> <li>• consistency of armed forces, defense policies, and doctrines with international legal provisions</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• host nation consent rule</li> <li>• early identification and effective cessation of hostilities</li> <li>• rules for the democratic conduct of military and other forces</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• if requested, a participating State will provide appropriate clarification regarding its implementation of the Code</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 37**

CSCE, PRINCIPLES GOVERNING NON-PROLIFERATION, 1994

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 20: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 8: Principles Governing Non-Proliferation, 1994</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1994 Principles Governing Non-Proliferation focus on the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the related control of the spread of missile technology, and other sensitive goods and technologies.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• proliferation of WMD and missiles poses a threat to international peace, security, and stability</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthen existing norms</li> <li>• full implementation of existing international obligations</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• streamline national legislation with international commitments</li> <li>• promote international co-operative efforts to provide peaceful opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers</li> <li>• exchange information about national laws, regulations and practical measures</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• security dialogue within the FSC (including through seminars and working parties)</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	--

**TABLE 38**

NATO, PFP FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND INVITATION AGREEMENT, 1994

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 21: Partnership for Peace: Framework Agreement and Invitation Agreement, 1994</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	NATO pol-mil cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1994 Partnership for Peace (PFP) was the first far-reaching

	NATO initiative towards the East since the NACC in 1991. Its aim was keeping NATO at the centre of European security issues and, at the same time, introducing a concrete cooperation work for states interested in NATO membership. Furthermore, PfP helped to alleviate Russian concerns about NATO enlargement. The Framework Agreement and Invitation Agreement were amended by the Individual Partnership Programme.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• enhancing security and stability in Europe</li> <li>• strengthening ties with the democratic states to the East</li> <li>• deepening political and military ties</li> <li>• refrain from the threat or use of force</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to the CSCE acquis</li> <li>• fulfillment of disarmament and arms control obligations</li> <li>• active participation in PfP as an important role in the process of NATO expansion</li> <li>• transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; exchange of information</li> <li>• ensuring democratic control of defense forces</li> <li>• maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under UN and/or CSCE authority</li> <li>• development of cooperative military relations with NATO for specific purposes</li> <li>• long-term development of forces able to operate with NATO</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• provision of a country-specific Presentation Agreement, followed by a program of partnership exercises and the development of an individual Partnership Programme and a corresponding liaison office with NATO Headquarters</li> <li>• specific funding provisions</li> <li>• access to NATO technical data</li> <li>• review, evaluation, direction, and guidance processes</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	--
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, issue linkage
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1990-1994</i>	During the period 1990-1994, indicators of regime decay are apparent: shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, and the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains shaped the genesis of the PfP initiative as Washington pushed through its preferred issue-specific interest of NATO maintenance and enlargement against the Russian issue-specific interest to derail enlargement (cf. Ponsard 2007: 68). Issue linkage occurred in conjunction to the upgrade of the CSCE and its instruments.

**TABLE 39**

EVALUATION OF PERIOD 1990-1994

Number of Agreements	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded in 1990-1994	Ratio of Indicators of Regime Decay Per Agreement Concluded in 1990-1994	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 1990	Overall Number of Indicators of Decay in 1990-1994
18	18	1.0	--	18
Evidence for Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 1990	There is no evidence for indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded before the period of 1990-1994.			

The short period of 1990-1994 produced an impressive number of 18 agreements. Most of the agreements in that period pertain to the CSBM cooperation cluster. The CAC cooperation cluster took off in 1990 with the conclusion of CFE; further supporting instruments followed in the ensuing years. With the 1991 North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, also the NATO pol-mil cooperation cluster started to gain shape. The ratio of indicators of regime decay per agreement (1.05) is comparably low in the period of 1990-1994, particularly when compared to the previous period. Indicators of regime decay are rather diverse and pertain to a lesser degree to instances of non-compliance. This fact is, however, also owed to the circumstance that a critical number of agreements were only concluded at the end of this period. Possible instances of non-compliance before the agreements' conclusion can thus not be counted. A certain consistency between the two periods can be traced, as there are no indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded before 1990. This leads to infer that the stipulations before 1990 had either lost their validity or were still mostly observed.

## 5.4 Agreements, Period 1995-1999

**TABLE 40**

OSCE, A FRAMEWORK FOR ARMS CONTROL, 1996

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 22: A Framework for Arms Control, Lisbon Document, 1996</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1996 OSCE Framework sets a standardized guidance for deepening and enhancing the OSCE arms control acquis. It recalls principles and prescribes goals and methods for further developing measures. It stresses the already existing ‘basis for a web of interlocking and mutually-reinforcing agreements’.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs integral to the OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative concept of security</li> <li>• enhancing military and political stability</li> <li>• strengthening co-operation, transparency, and predictability</li> <li>• complementarity between OSCE-wide and regional approaches</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• full implementation and further development of arms control agreements</li> <li>• developing new ways to deal with security concerns</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• creation of a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments</li> <li>• addressing concrete challenges and risks such as military imbalances, inter-State tensions and conflicts, internal disputes, and non-transparency</li> <li>• sufficiency rule</li> <li>• transparency through information exchange</li> <li>• verification</li> <li>• limitations on forces, constraints on military activities</li> <li>• evaluation of the effectiveness of existing measures</li> <li>• devising concrete and practical measures to reduce regional instability and military imbalances</li> <li>• devising arms control measures for stabilizing specific crisis situations</li> <li>• enhancing transparency of instruments with respect to non-signatories</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• key role for the FSC</li> </ul>

<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, issue linkage, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	During the period 1995-1999, indicators of regime decay are apparent. As part of the upgrade and further evolution of the OSCE, the agreement is an indirect product of the issue linkage between the further development of the OSCE and NATO enlargement. As described in Chapter 3, this process was characterized by shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, and the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains. Internal contradictions are apparent in the 'sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security' contradiction.

**TABLE 41**

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 1996

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 23: Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	Balkans cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) committed the signatories to the 'establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control'. 'Annex 1-B: Agreement on Regional Stabilization' of the Dayton accords binds parties in Article II to agree on a series of CSBMs under the auspices of the OSCE and to develop 'Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control' (Article IV). The resulting two agreements are the first and only purely sub-regional CSBM and arms control agreements under the auspices of the OSCE. The 1996 CSBM agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina was negotiated amongst the three internal war parties. It is designed along the lines of the VD and takes significantly forward VD provisions.
<i>Principles</i>	--
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• definitions of military equipment and force structures</li> <li>• exchange of information</li> <li>• data exchange relating to major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment</li> </ul>

	<p>systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• information on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• information on defense related matters</li> <li>• notification of changes in command structure or equipment holdings</li> <li>• mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities</li> <li>• cooperation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature</li> <li>• notification and observation of and constraints on certain military activities</li> <li>• restrictions on military deployments and exercises in certain geographic areas</li> <li>• restraints on the reintroduction of foreign forces</li> <li>• measures on withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonments/barracks or other designated areas</li> <li>• restrictions on locations of heavy weapons</li> <li>• notification of disbandment of special operations and armed civilian groups</li> <li>• identification and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities</li> <li>• special program of military contacts and co-operation</li> <li>• principles governing non-proliferation</li> <li>• verification and inspection regime</li> <li>• specific communications</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• creation of a Joint Consultative Commission</li> <li>• inclusion of the Personal Representative</li> <li>• consensus rule</li> <li>• review process at least once every two years</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	--

**TABLE 42**

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, AGREEMENT ON SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL, ARTICLE IV, 1996

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 24: Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, Article IV, 1996</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	Balkans cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, Article IV (Florence Agreement) is the second agreement originating in the Dayton accords. Negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE amongst the former Yugoslav war parties, the agreement incorporates measures designed under the CFE Treaty, such as TLE categories and force limitations based on the principle of sufficiency. Together with the principles of the Dayton Peace agreement and the stipulations of the 1996 Agreement on CSBMs, the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control forms the foundation of a cooperation cluster on sub-regional CSBM and disarmament stipulations for the Balkans.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishment of measures for regional security essential to creating a stable peace in the region</li> <li>• principle of sufficiency</li> <li>• avoid an arms race in the region</li> <li>• achieving greater stability and security in the region</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• building transparency and confidence</li> <li>• achieving balanced and stable defense force levels</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CFE weapons categories</li> <li>• definitions of geography, military equipment, and force structures</li> <li>• specific counting rules</li> <li>• specific limitations and reduction periods</li> <li>• specific rules for armaments export</li> <li>• specific rules for decommissioned armaments</li> <li>• specific provisions for exchange of information and notifications</li> <li>• specific inspection provisions</li> <li>• specific counting rules for armored infantry fighting vehicles of internal security forces</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• creation of a Sub-Regional Consultative Commission</li> <li>• inclusion of the Personal Representative</li> <li>• consensus rule</li> <li>• review process at least once every two years</li> </ul>

<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	--

**TABLE 43**

NATO, RUSSIA, FOUNDING ACT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 25: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, 1997</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	NATO pol-mil cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act is both, the recognition of a genuinely new and cordial relationship between NATO and Russia and the first expression of new competing issue-specific interests in the European security sphere. The need to give expression to this “special” relationship emerged out of the quarrels surrounding NATO enlargement. In order to cushion Russian concerns, NATO member states, led by Washington, offered Moscow a number of accommodating deals, amongst them the Founding Act. The Act lists a number of general principles and establishes the PJC. The PJC’s mandate was to consult on a wide range of areas, amongst them conflict prevention, joint operations, arms control, possible cooperation on BMD, and non-proliferation efforts. Beyond that, the Founding Act declares the mutual commitment to a number of specific political-military rules. The institutional deficiencies of the PJC, conveyed in the wake of the Kosovo War, led to the subsequent creation of the NRC. The NATO-Russia Founding Act is an integral part of the multilateral cooperation cluster on political and military cooperation under the auspices of NATO, even though it is only directed at one partner nation: Russia.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• building a lasting, stable, peaceful, inclusive, undivided Euro-Atlantic area based on democracy, cooperative security, non-inimical relationship</li> <li>• overcoming earlier confrontation and competition</li> <li>• strengthening mutual trust and cooperation</li> <li>• partnership based on common issue-specific interest, reciprocity, and transparency</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• acknowledging the vital role of democracy, political pluralism, rule of law, human rights, free market economies</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening the OSCE</li> <li>• mutual transparency in creating and implementing defense policy and military doctrines</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• support of peacekeeping operations</li> <li>• improving arms control regimes and CSBMs</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PJC built upon reciprocity and transparency</li> <li>• specific areas for consultation and cooperation in the PJC</li> <li>• intention of non-deployment of nuclear weapons and storage sites of NATO on new members' territories</li> <li>• commitment to adapt CFE, including lowering total amount of TLE and commitment to CFE sufficiency rule</li> <li>• NATO pledge not to station additional permanent substantial combat forces; Russia pledges similar restraint</li> <li>• expanding political-military consultations and cooperation through the PJC</li> <li>• implementing a program of enhanced military-to-military dialogue</li> <li>• reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture</li> <li>• further development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• creation of the PJC</li> <li>• consensus rule</li> <li>• consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States, or Russia</li> <li>• establishment of Russian Mission to NATO</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, issue linkage, negative expectations, non-compliance, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	During the period 1995-1999, indicators of regime decay are parent. As with the PFP framework, the Founding Act was part of a larger deal of issue linkages which occurred with the looming NATO enlargement. As outlined in Paragraph 3.4.1, shifts in relative capabilities shaped its evolution and divergent issue-specific interests as well as the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains were behind the design of Europe' security architecture which gained its full shape during those years. Negative expectations about the further cooperation process in the PJC occurred on the Russian side in conjunction with the Kosovo War (cf. Kupchan 2000: 132). Non-compliance with principles and

norms occurred with the violation of the principle to build an inclusive' and 'undivided' Euro-Atlantic area, as NATO's mission was seen as "drawing lines" by both, U.S. and Russian policy makers and analysts (cf. Solomon 1996, Zagorski 2011: 32). Also the norm of 'commitment to conflict prevention' was violated by Russia with the beginning of the Second Chechen War in late 1999. Internal contradictions are apparent in the 'sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security' contradiction.

**TABLE 44**

NATO, PFP STATES, BASIC AGREEMENT OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC  
PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL, 1997

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 26: Basic Agreement of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 1997</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	NATO pol-mil cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The establishment of the EAPC as the successor to the NACC happened against the background of NATO's eastward enlargement and the concurrent establishment of the Founding Act and the PJC. The EAPC was established to provide the overarching framework for consultations amongst its members 'on a broad range of political and security-related issues', including PFP activities and matters. The Basic Agreement of the EAPC can be understood as the working program for the newly established EAPC and does thus contain only a limited number of principles but a broad body of rules on what issues to engage in the EAPC.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening and extending peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area</li> <li>• inclusive</li> <li>• self-differentiation in members' levels and areas of cooperation with NATO</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• specific areas for consultation and cooperation in the EAPC (crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, WMD proliferation; international terrorism; defense planning and budgets; defense policy and strategy; security impacts of economic developments; civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation; nuclear safety; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation; peace support operations)</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• creation of the EAPC</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• open to accession of other OSCE participating States</li> <li>• EAPC meetings in different formats ranging from plenary over limited to individual sessions</li> <li>• EAPC meetings on different levels ranging from Ambassadorial to Heads of State or Government sessions</li> <li>• SG chairs</li> <li>• Regular support by the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) and the Political Committee (PC)</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, issue linkage, negative expectations, non-compliance
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	During the period 1995-1999, indicators of regime decay appear with regards to the underlying political developments in the Euro-Atlantic area as outlined above (see Table 42). Non-compliance occurred with the violation of the principle of ‘strengthening and extending peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’ in the North Caucasus from 1999 onwards.

**TABLE 45**

AGREEMENT ON ADAPTATION OF THE TREATY ON  
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, 1999

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 27: Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1999</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CAC cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1999 ACFE Treaty adapts the CFE Treaty to the changed security constellation of the late 1990s. Adaptation of the treaty was requested by Russia to take account of NATO enlargement. The agreement also served the political purpose of easing Russian reservations. Accompanying the legally binding ACFE, the Istanbul Summit Declaration (Art. 19), the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and its annexes contain the so-called Istanbul commitments which became widely associated almost exclusively with the Russian politically binding pledges to withdraw excess forces and equipment from Moldova and Georgia. In 2002, NATO member states made ACFE ratification contingent upon the fulfillment of Russia’s commitments, which Russia, in turn, used as justification for unilaterally suspending CFE in 2007.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sustaining the key role of CFE as the cornerstone of European security</li> <li>• territorial integrity of States</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prevent military conflict</li> <li>• strengthen stability and security in Europe</li> <li>• peaceful cooperation</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• secure, stable and balanced overall level of conventional armed forces in Europe lower than heretofore</li> <li>• eliminating disparities and the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• internationally binding provisions</li> <li>• retaining TLE types</li> <li>• retaining ATTU area</li> <li>• retaining host nation consent rule</li> <li>• opening the treaty for accession on a case-by-case basis for states within the ATTU area</li> <li>• system of national and territorial ceilings for individual State Parties</li> <li>• specific rules for basic and exceptional temporary deployments</li> <li>• abolishment of CFE's concentric zones in the center of Europe and of the sufficiency rule</li> <li>• maintenance of the flank provisions as contained in the Flank Agreement</li> <li>• increased reporting requirements and on-site inspections</li> <li>• mandatory notification of the transit of major weapons</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• retained from CFE Treaty</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, issue linkage, negative adaptation consequences, non-compliance
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	<p>During the period 1995-1999, indicators of regime decay appear with regards to shifts in relative capabilities and divergent issue-specific interests between the United States and Russia. Moscow saw the adaptation of the treaty above all as a means to address NATO's conventional superiority in Europe while Washington viewed CFE adaptation as a chance to cushion Russian disagreement with NATO enlargement. Issue linkage shaped ACFE's genesis with NATO enlargement being linked to adaptation of CFE. This deal resulted in the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains to Moscow's detriment. Also negative adaptation consequences came to the fore with a U.S. amendment to the CFE Flank Agreement triggering the inclusion of the Russian Istanbul commitments (cf. Kühn 2009). Non-compliance occurred with Russian actions in Chechnya violating the principle of 'prevention of military conflict' and with NATO's eastward enlargement violating the principle of the 'indivisibility of security' – at least in Moscow's view.</p>

**TABLE 46**

OSCE, VIENNA DOCUMENT, 1999

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 28: Vienna Document 1999 on the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Istanbul Document, 1999</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 1999 Vienna Document takes forward the stipulations of its predecessors, particularly through a new set of regional measures in response to the Balkan wars.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• achieving disarmament</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• annual exchange of military information, annual calendars</li> <li>• specific information on military forces</li> <li>• exchange of specific data relating to major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• information on the plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• exchange of information on defense planning</li> <li>• clarification, review, and dialogue on defense planning and possible additional information</li> <li>• mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities</li> <li>• cooperation on hazardous incidents of a military nature</li> <li>• voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities</li> <li>• specific rules for military contacts</li> <li>• specific program on military contacts and cooperation</li> <li>• demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• prior notification of certain military activities</li> <li>• observation of certain military activities</li> <li>• specific constraining provisions</li> <li>• compliance and verification rules</li> <li>• evaluations and communications rules</li> <li>• specific regional measures</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AIAM</li> <li>• use of OSCE Communications Network for transmission of messages</li> </ul>

<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	--

**TABLE 47**

OSCE, OPERATIONAL DOCUMENT - THE PLATFORM FOR CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY, 1999

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 29: Operational Document - the Platform for Co-operative Security, Istanbul Document, 1999</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	--
<i>Description</i>	The 1999 Operational Document establishes the Platform for Co-operative Security. Its aim is to provide principles and modalities for cooperation amongst ‘those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area.’ The Platform’s principles and norms claim validity for both the OSCE and cooperating organizations and institutions. The Platform agreement is part of a package of new agreements of the OSCE at the end of the 1990s in order to adapt OSCE institutions to the changing security realities in Europe, meaning NATO enlargement.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening inter-organizational relationship</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adherence to C/OSCE principles and commitments</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations</li> <li>• institutional transparency</li> <li>• institutional inclusiveness</li> <li>• active support of OSCE’s concept of common, comprehensive, and indivisible security</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• institutional readiness to support OSCE’s work, particularly conflict prevention and crisis management</li> <li>• subscription to VD principles</li> <li>• transparency in OSCE’s contacts and cooperation with other security organizations</li> <li>• use of specific instruments and mechanisms (regular contacts, including meetings; a continuous framework for dialogue; increased transparency and practical co-operation, including the identification of liaison officers or points of contact; cross-representation at appropriate meetings; and other</li> </ul>

	<p>contacts intended to increase understanding of each organization's conflict prevention tools)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• development of cooperation on OSCE field operations</li> <li>• enhanced inter-organizational cooperation and information exchange in response to crises situations</li> <li>• avoidance of institutional duplication and fostering of efficient use of available resources</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chairman-in-Office to consult with participating States on process of offering OSCE as a framework for cooperation</li> <li>• SG to prepare annual report on relevant interactions</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, issue linkage, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	<p>During the period 1995-1999, indicators of regime decay are apparent because the Platform Document was the product of a cross issue linkage between adapting the OSCE and the CFE Treaty, establishing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and enlarging NATO (see Paragraph 3.4.1). As explained above (ibid), shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, and the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains characterized this process. Internal contradictions occur with the norm of 'institutional inclusiveness' standing in contrast to NATO's organizational nature which is per se designed to be exclusive towards non-signatories of the Washington Treaty. Also, the norm of 'adherence to C/OSCE principles and commitments' is a general recognition of principles and recalls thus the internal contradiction of 'sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security', even though in a clandestine manner.</p>

**TABLE 48**

OSCE, CHARTER FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1999

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 30: Charter for European Security, 1999</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	--
<i>Description</i>	<p>The 1999 OSCE Charter for European Security carries forward the OSCE acquis in all three security dimensions. It should be seen in a continuing line with the Helsinki Decalogue and the Charter of Paris. It symbolizes the capstone of the transitional period of adjusting the OSCE to the changed security realities of the 1990s. The Charter belongs to the package of agreements agreed at the Istanbul Summit, reflecting the changing security realities in Europe.</p>

<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• upholding democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> <li>• enhancing security and peace</li> <li>• strengthening confidence and cooperation among States</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• implementation of OSCE commitments</li> <li>• promoting and further developing arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• enhancing efforts to prevent terrorism</li> <li>• closer cooperation among IOs</li> <li>• enhancing practical dialogue with other IOs</li> <li>• offering the OSCE as a forum for sub-regional cooperation</li> <li>• continuing work on CFE and VD</li> <li>• strengthening the instrument of Field Operations</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• setting up Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation</li> <li>• setting up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• consensus as the basis for OSCE decision-making</li> <li>• establishment of the Platform for Co-operative Security</li> <li>• establishment of a Preparatory Committee under the Permanent Council's direction</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, issue linkage, non-compliance, internal contradictions
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 1995-1999</i>	During the period 1995-1999, indicators of regime decay are apparent because the Charter was the product of a cross issue linkage between adapting the OSCE and the CFE Treaty, establishing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and enlarging NATO (see Paragraph 3.4.1). As explained above (ibid), shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, and the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains shaped the process. Non-compliance with principles and norms occurred with regards to 'upholding democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights' in contrast to the realities on the ground in a number of post-Soviet states. Also, the norm of commitment to conflict prevention was violated by Russia in the North Caucasus. The internal contradiction of 'sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security' is again present.

**TABLE 49**

EVALUATION OF PERIOD 1995-1999

Number of Agreements	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded in 1995-1999	Ratio of Indicators of Regime Decay Per Agreement Concluded in 1995-1999	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 1995	Overall Number of Indicators of Decay in 1995-1999
9	34	3.77	5	39

<p>Evidence for Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 1995</p>	<p>The period between 1995 and 1999 saw evidence for indicators of regime decay pertaining also to agreements concluded before 1995.</p> <p><b>1975 Helsinki Final Act:</b> (non-compliance) In the Russian understanding (cf. President of Russia 2007), NATO enlargement was a violation of the Helsinki principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’ and therewith inconsistent behavior towards its stipulations.</p> <p><b>1990 Charter of Paris:</b> (non-compliance) The Charter recalls the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’. In the Russian understanding, NATO enlargement was a violation of that principle (ibid). The Second Chechen War was a Russian violation of the principle of ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’.</p> <p><b>1990 CFE Treaty:</b> (non-compliance) The treaty recalls the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’. In the Russian understanding, NATO enlargement was a violation of that principle (ibid). The Second Chechen War was a Russian violation of the principle to ‘prevent military conflict’.</p> <p><b>1991 North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation:</b> (non-compliance) The Statement recalls the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’. In the Russian understanding, NATO enlargement was a violation of that principle (ibid).</p>
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**1992 : Section V ‘CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation’,  
Helsinki Document:**

(non-compliance)

Section V recalls the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’. In the Russian understanding, NATO enlargement was a violation of that principle (ibid).

The period 1995-1999 only produced nine agreements, which is half the amount of the previous period. In 1996, also the Balkans cooperation cluster started to take shape. Compared to the preceding period, indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in 1995-1999 (35) as well as the ratio per agreement (3.88) sprang upwards. In addition, five agreements from earlier periods were violated by acts of non-compliance during that period, which leads to an overall number of 40 occurrences of indicators of regime decay in the period 1995-1999.

5.5 Agreements, Period 2000-2014

**TABLE 50**

OSCE, DOCUMENT ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, 2000

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 31: OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2000</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The 2000 OSCE SALW Document addresses risks emanating from surpluses of SALW and conventional ammunition. It aims at securing the production, transfer, and stockpiling of SALW as well as the proper disposal of surpluses.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• cooperation on threats emanating from the spread of SALW</li> <li>• combating illicit trafficking</li> <li>• reduction and prevention of the accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms</li> <li>• building confidence, security, and transparency through appropriate measures on small arms</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• exercising restraint</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• developing appropriate measures at the end of armed conflicts</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• ensuring OSCE addresses issue of small arms</li> </ul>

<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• national control over manufacture of small arms</li> <li>• marking of small arms and record keeping</li> <li>• transparency measures and common export criteria</li> <li>• import, export, and transit procedures and documentation</li> <li>• control over international arms-brokering</li> <li>• improving cooperation in law enforcement</li> <li>• specific indicators of a surplus</li> <li>• improving national stockpile management and security</li> <li>• destruction and deactivation</li> <li>• financial and technical assistance</li> <li>• transparency measures on surplus weapons</li> <li>• procedures for assessments, recommendations, and measures related to early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation</li> <li>• stockpile management and reduction in post-conflict rehabilitation</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CPC main point of contact</li> <li>• review through the FSC</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	non-compliance
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	During the period 2000-2014, indicators of regime decay are apparent in the form of non-compliance because Russia and Georgia violated the norm of ‘commitment to conflict prevention’ in their 2008 war and because of the Russian violation of the norm in Ukraine in 2014. In the context of the Ukraine conflict and the fights between the central Ukrainian authorities and the separatist movements in East Ukraine, non-compliance occurred as the principle of ‘reduction and prevention of the accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms’ was violated by clandestine arms transfers from Russia into East Ukraine (cf. Kramer and Gordon 2014).

**TABLE 51**

CONCLUDING AGREEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ART. V OF ANNEX 1-B OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 2001

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 32: Concluding Agreement of the Negotiations Under Article V of Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2001</b>
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<i>Attribution</i>	Balkans cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	In 2001, the third regional arms control agreement for the Balkans, called for by Article V of ‘Annex 1-B: Agreement on Regional Stabilization’ of the Dayton accords, emerged after two years of negotiation between 20 participating States under the auspices of the OSCE. Its politically binding provisions go beyond the provisions contained in the VD.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sovereign equality</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adherence to the OSCE acquis and full implementation of OSCE CSBM agreements</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• encouraging exchange of defense-related information</li> <li>• facilitating expanded military contacts and cooperation</li> <li>• reducing the thresholds for military activities</li> <li>• offering supplementary inspections and evaluation visits</li> <li>• support for de-mining of areas</li> <li>• commitment to stop the accumulation and spread of SALW</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishment of a Commission to review Agreement</li> <li>• annual meetings under the auspices of the OSCE</li> <li>• consensus rule</li> <li>• liaison with the sub-table on Defence and Security Issues of Table III of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	--
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	--

**TABLE 52**

NATO, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS: A NEW QUALITY, 2002

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 33: NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, 2002</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	NATO pol-mil cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	In 2002, the NATO-Russia declaration of the Rome Summit established the NRC as a successor to the PJC. Following a British

	<p>initiative, the NRC was created to provide a fresh stimulus to NATO-Russia relations on a more equal footing than the replaced PJC. In contrast to the 1997 Founding Act, which, amongst other stipulations contained the establishment of the PJC, the Rome declaration contains no rules but outlines the principles and norms of the working agenda of the new NRC.</p>
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reaffirming goals, principles, and commitments set forth in the Founding Act</li> <li>• building together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area</li> <li>• principles of democracy and cooperative security</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• reaffirming OSCE acquis</li> <li>• equal partnership</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• working together in areas of common issue-specific interest</li> <li>• standing together against common threats and risks</li> <li>• strengthening cooperation in the struggle against terrorism</li> <li>• strengthening cooperation in crisis management</li> <li>• broadening and strengthening cooperation on non-proliferation of WMD</li> <li>• reaffirming adherence to CSBMs, A/CFE, and Open Skies</li> <li>• enhancing consultations on theatre missile defense</li> <li>• promoting cooperation on search and rescue at sea</li> <li>• enhancing military-to-military cooperation and cooperation on defense reform</li> <li>• enhancing mechanisms for civil emergency response</li> <li>• exploring possibilities for confronting new challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic area</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	--
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishment of NRC</li> <li>• consensus rule</li> <li>• NRC chaired by NATO SG</li> <li>• continuous meetings at all levels (including Chiefs of Staff)</li> <li>• establishment of a Preparatory Committee</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	<p>shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, inequitable distribution of gains, negative expectations, negative spill-over, protracted negotiations, non-compliance, internal contradictions, diminished U.S. interest in cooperation</p>
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	<p>During the period 2000-2014, indicators of decay are present with regards to shifts in relative capabilities, divergent issue-specific interests, and the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains. Particularly Washington achieved its preferred issue-specific interest of restarting NATO-Russia relations, thus securing continued Russian support for the war on terrorism, while Moscow failed to achieve its preferred issue-specific interest of a say in NATO decision-making (see Paragraph 3.5.1</p>

above). At the same time, these issue-specific interests reveal that Washington did not view the NRC as a direct vehicle for actively engaging with Moscow but as means in the war on terror (cf. Ponsard 2007). Hence, the NRC emerged against the ground of the diminished U.S. interest in cooperation. Negative expectations came to the fore the more often the NRC was unable to constructively deal with the divergent issue-specific interests of the West and Russia – most vividly underscored by the suspension of the NRC after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and by the partial suspension of cooperation programs after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Negative spill-over can be traced from the CFE deadlock (cf. Embassy U.S. Moscow 2009a). Truncated negotiations on the NRC’s working agenda came to the fore since 2008, reaching a first climax with the inability to agree on the reform agreement ‘Taking the NRC Forward’ (see Mission U.S. NATO 2009). Non-compliance with principles and norms occurred on several occasions with the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and with NATO’s further enlargement violating the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’ – at least in the Russian notion (cf. President of Russia 2007). The internal contradiction of ‘sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security’ is again present with the principle of ‘sovereign equality’ dodging behind the reaffirmation of principles of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Also, the principle of ‘equal partnership’ is practically in contradiction with the working procedure of the NRC.

**TABLE 53**

OSCE, STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THREATS TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2003

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 34: OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, 2003</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	In December 2003, the 11th OSCE Ministerial Council, held in Maastricht, adopted the Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century as a response to new forms of inter- and intra-state insecurity, in the first place terrorism and related criminal activities. The Strategy also touches upon the realm of CSBMs.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to a free, democratic, and more integrated OSCE area without dividing lines</li> <li>• prevention of terrorism</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• compliance with OSCE norms, principles, and commitments</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• continued relevance and validity of military factors and fighting power for the strategic security environment</li> <li>• implementation of instruments for conflict prevention and confidence-building essential</li> <li>• full implementation, timely adaptation, and further development of arms control agreements and CSBMs as key contributions to political and military stability</li> <li>• enhancing cooperation on issues of non-proliferation, export, and transfer control as far as illicit conventional arms transfers and transfers of SALW are concerned</li> <li>• expanding CSBM and arms control acquis to adjacent areas</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• voluntary exchange of information on national initiatives to prevent WMD proliferation</li> <li>• addressing proliferation of MANPADS</li> <li>• addressing the risks arising from surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition and explosives</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual Security Review Conference to review the Strategy</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	non-compliance
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	<p>During the period 2000-2014, indicators of decay are present in the realm of non-compliance with principles and norms. As examples, the principle of ‘commitment to a free, democratic, and more integrated OSCE area without dividing lines’ stands in contrast to the realities in a number of post-Soviet states and to NATO’s eastward enlargement which can be viewed as creating dividing lines (cf. Zagorski 2011). Also the norm of ‘full implementation, timely adaptation, and further development of arms control agreements and CSBMs as key contributions to political and military stability’ has been contradicted by Russian as well as NATO policies directed to CFE and the OSCE’s CSBM acquis. The norm of ‘commitment to conflict prevention’ was violated by Russia and Georgia in 2008 and by Russia in Ukraine in 2014.</p>

**TABLE 54**

OSCE, DOCUMENT ON STOCKPILES OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION, 2003

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 35: OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, 2003</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster

<i>Description</i>	The 2003 OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition complements the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and addresses risks arising from surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material, and detonating devices.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recognizing the risks and challenges caused by the presence of stockpiles of conventional ammunition, explosive material, and detonating devices in surplus and/or awaiting destruction</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening national capacity</li> </ul>
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• enhancing transparency through voluntary exchange of information on surplus stocks of conventional ammunition, explosive material, and detonating devices</li> <li>• providing participating States with a specific procedure</li> <li>• establishing a framework for international assistance</li> <li>• request for and provision of assistance takes place on a voluntary basis</li> <li>• possible role of OSCE Field Operations</li> <li>• list of specific categories of conventional ammunition</li> <li>• specific indicators of a surplus</li> <li>• specific procedures for stockpile management and security</li> <li>• specific procedures for transparency about needs and assistance</li> <li>• scope of assistance and procedure incl. Model Questionnaire</li> <li>• development of a “best practice” guide of techniques and procedures</li> <li>• regular review of agreement</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CPC as point of contact</li> </ul>
<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	non-compliance
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	During the period 2000-2014, indicators of decay are present in the realm of non-compliance with principles and norms: Russia’s policy of continued storage of conventional ammunition in the outpost of Cobasna (Transnistria) is a violation of the Document’s central principle.

**TABLE 55**

OSCE, VIENNA DOCUMENT, 2011

<i>Agreement</i>	<b>Agreement 36: Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 2011</b>
<i>Attribution</i>	CSBM cooperation cluster
<i>Description</i>	The Vienna Document 2011 takes forward the stipulations of its predecessors on a very limited technical basis.
<i>Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• achieving disarmament</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> <li>• recalling OSCE CSBM and arms control acquis</li> </ul>
<i>Norms</i>	--
<i>Rules</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• politically binding</li> <li>• annual exchange of military information, annual calendars</li> <li>• specific information on military forces</li> <li>• exchange of specific data relating to major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• information on the plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• exchange of information on defense planning</li> <li>• clarification, review, and dialogue on defense planning and possible additional information</li> <li>• mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities</li> <li>• cooperation on hazardous incidents of a military nature</li> <li>• voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities</li> <li>• specific rules for military contacts</li> <li>• specific program on military contacts and cooperation</li> <li>• demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems</li> <li>• prior notification of certain military activities</li> <li>• observation of certain military activities</li> <li>• specific constraining provisions</li> <li>• compliance and verification rules</li> <li>• evaluations and communications rules</li> <li>• specific regional measures</li> </ul>
<i>Decision-Making Procedures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FSC decisions to update VD labeled VD PLUS</li> <li>• special FSC meeting on the VD every five years</li> <li>• factual presentation by the CPC to all participating States of all CSBM information exchanged</li> </ul>

<i>Indicators of Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	protracted negotiations, negative expectations, non-compliance, divergent issue-specific interests, negative spill-over
<i>Evidence for Regime Decay, Period 2000-2014</i>	During the period 2000-2014, indicators of decay are present. Amongst them are protracted negotiations: it took OSCE participating States eleven years to update the 1999 VD. The pointment of the majority of states over this long process and the subsequent narrow result of the VD 2011 is stated in an tive statement by 39 states parties annexed to the VD (see OSCE 2011). This statement gives also evidence of the negative tions that prevailed. Further on, non-compliance occurred during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. gent issue-specific interests shaped its evolution in recent years as NATO member states were striving for more transparency on Russia's conventional forces (particularly since the beginning of the Russian military reform in 2010); a focus divergent from Moscow's issue-specific interests. <sup>40</sup> Negative spill-over occurred from the dysfunctionality of the cooperation cluster of conventional arms control (cf. Mission U.S. OSCE 2008).

**TABLE 56**

EVALUATION OF PERIOD 2000-2014

Number of Agreements	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded in 2000-2014	Ratio of Indicators of Regime Decay Per Agreement Concluded in 2000-2014	Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 2000	Overall Number of Indicators of Decay in 2000-2014
6	17	2.83	36	53

Evidence for Indicators of Regime Decay Pertaining to Agreements Concluded Before 1995	<p>The period between 2000 and 2014 saw evidence for indicators of regime decay pertaining also to agreements concluded before 2000.</p> <p><b>1990 CFE and 1999 ACFE Treaties:</b></p> <p>(protracted negotiations, 2x non-compliance, negative adaptation consequences, divergent issue-specific interests, negative expectations, issue linkage, negative spill-over, diminished U.S. interest in cooperation)</p> <p>Since the year 2000, protracted negotiations have impeded progress on the issue of ratification of ACFE. Non-compliance is apparent. Examples</p>
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<sup>40</sup> This information was passed on to the author by an informal source.

are the Russian suspension of CFE, NATO's decision to make ratification of ACFE dependent on the fulfillment of Russia's Istanbul commitments, Russian and Georgian use of force in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, and Armenia's and Azerbaijan's non-compliance with CFE ceilings (cf. U.S. Department of State 2014: 1). In concrete, non-compliance occurred with a view to the principle of 'sustaining the key role of CFE as the cornerstone of European security', for both NATO member states and Russia did not live up to the principle through the actions of non-ratification (NATO member states) and suspension (Russia and partially NATO member states). Negative adaptation consequences came to the fore with the adaptation agreement in 1999 and its political link to the withdrawal of Russian forces and equipment from Moldova and Georgia. Divergent issue-specific interests were apparent in this regard. A diminished U.S. interest in cooperation is visible as Washington continues to insist on fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments. Negative expectations characterize the treaty at least since NATO's 2002 decision to link the issues of ACFE ratification to Russia fulfilling her Istanbul commitments. Negative spill-over effects are visible with CFE's increasing dysfunctionality affecting the further development of the cooperation clusters on CSBMs in the last decade (cf. Mission U.S. OSCE 2008) and on political and military cooperation under the auspices of NATO (cf. Ponsard 2007: 60 et seq).

#### **1992 Treaty on Open Skies:**

(protracted negotiations, divergent issue-specific interests, non-compliance)

The treaty displays a number of indicators of regime decay such as protracted negotiations in the recent years due to divergent issue-specific interests between Georgia and Russia as well as between Turkey and Greece (cf. Spitzer 2011). Non-compliance is visible with respect to the principles of 'promoting openness and transparency in military activities' and 'enhancing stability' since Russian behavior in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict was a clear violation of those two principles. Negative spill-over cannot be thoroughly verified; however, it remains a matter of fact that protracted negotiations and divergent issue-specific interests started to affect the treaty only after the Russian suspension of CFE in 2007 and the subsequent war in Georgia in 2008.

#### **1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1990 Charter of Paris, and 1999 Charter for European Security:**

(protracted negotiations, 3x non-compliance, divergent issue-specific interests, negative expectations, negative spill-over)

All three central agreements of the C/OSCE process have been affected by indicators of regime decay in the years 2000-2014. At least since the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, partially protracted negotiations have come to characterize the development of OSCE institutions, particularly in the realms of CSBMs and arms control (see Paragraphs 3.6 and 3.7 above). Non-compliance occurred at various instances, most obvious in the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and in the Ukraine conflict in 2014 where a whole range of C/OSCE core principles and norms were violated. Taking the 1999 Charter for European Security as an example,

non-compliance with principles and norms occurred with regards to ‘upholding democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights’ in contrast to the realities on the ground in a number of post-Soviet states. The principles of ‘refraining from the threat or use of force’, of ‘strengthening confidence and cooperation among States’, and the norms of ‘implementation of OSCE commitments’ as well as of the ‘commitment to conflict prevention’ were violated by Russia in Georgia and at Crimea. The norm of ‘promoting and further developing arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs’ was ignored by both the West and Russia since the dawn of the new millennium, most visibly in the CFE context. Divergent issue-specific interests in the role of the OSCE (for Russia: a pan-European security structure with central authority in the realm of “hard security”; for the United States: a political vehicle for the promotion of human rights standards; see Chapter 3) triggered increasingly negative expectations (see Chapter 7). Negative spill-over occurred from the dysfunctionality of the cooperation cluster on conventional arms control on the OSCE’s ‘First Basket’ during the last decade (cf. Mission U.S. OSCE 2008).

#### **1999 OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security:**

(non-compliance)

Non-compliance occurred again with regards to the norms of ‘adherence to C/OSCE principles and commitments’ and the ‘implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations’. The former were violated for instance by NATO enlargement as in contradiction to the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’ (at least in the Russian perception) and by the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and Russian action in Ukraine in 2014; the latter was violated by the West and Russia in the CFE context. The rule of ‘enhanced inter-organizational cooperation and information exchange in response to crises situations’ was ignored by NATO member states as the NRC was suspended as an answer to the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and when all cooperation programs with Russia were stopped as a reaction to the Ukraine conflict in 2014.

#### **1996 OSCE Framework for Arms Control:**

(negative expectations, non-compliance)

Negative expectations about the OSCE’s arms control acquis have come to shape Russia’s stance towards the Organization’s political-military dimension (see statement by Ulyanov in Mission U.S. OSCE 2010). Non-compliance occurred with the violation of the principles of ‘enhancing military and political stability’ and ‘strengthening of co-operation, transparency, and predictability’ in conjunction with the conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Ukraine conflict of 2014. As described above, the norm of ‘full implementation and further development of arms control agreements’ was violated in the CFE context.

#### **1992 Section V ‘CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation’, Helsinki Document:**

(divergent issue-specific interests, protracted negotiations, non-compliance, negative spill-over)

After a successful period of establishing a number of CSBMs, the pace of policy achievements under the FSC slowed down and almost came to an end during the last 14 years (see this Chapter). Divergent issue-specific interests and protracted negotiations came to the fore – the years-long update of the VD being just one example. Non-compliance took over as most norms (e.g. enhancing/increasing disarmament, transparency, and predictability) were not scrupulously observed anymore. Negative spill-over occurred from the dysfunctionality of the cooperation cluster on conventional arms control (cf. Mission U.S. OSCE 2008).

### **1993 Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations:**

(non-compliance)

Even though the Stabilizing Measures are of a voluntary nature, their rules pertaining to the treatment of irregular forces were violated on several occasions by Russian non-compliance in conjunction with the 2014 Ukraine conflict (cf. Roulo 2014). The rule of ‘careful handling of public statements’ was violated on numerous occasions of open or hidden conflict in the OSCE space during the last 14 years (cf. exemplary Englund and Wan 2011).

### **1993 Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers:**

(non-compliance)

With a view to the prevention of excessive arms build-ups, the example of arms acquisition in Azerbaijan in recent years (cf. Sultanova and Poghosyan 2013) depicts acts of non-compliance with norms.

### **1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security:**

(non-compliance)

Indicators of regime decay are apparent with regards to non-compliance with norms. The norms of ‘responsible and cooperative behavior in the field of security’ and ‘denial of imposition of military domination of one state over any other state’ were violated in the ongoing conflicts of the South Caucasus and the Ukraine conflict in 2014. The norm of ‘further developing measures and institutions’ with regards to the Code did not result in any update of the agreement. The norm to ‘act in solidarity if norms are violated’ was itself violated as no common responses were found to the violations of norms as described above. The norm of ‘commitment to conflict prevention’ was also violated in Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014. The norms of ‘determining military capabilities on the basis of national democratic procedures’ and ‘democratic political control of military, paramilitary, internal security forces, intelligence services, and the police’ have been repeatedly violated through non-democratic conduct in a number of post-Soviet states but also with respect to the dysfunctional democratic control of intelligence services in a number of Western states.

### **1994 Principles Governing Non-Proliferation:**

(non-compliance)

Indicators of regime decay are apparent through acts of non-compliance

with norms. The norms to ‘strengthen existing norms’ and of the ‘full implementation of existing international obligations’ were violated by Russia in the Ukraine conflict through the violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine. As the Budapest Memorandum stands in close vicinity to the NPT acquis, also the non-proliferation norm associated with negative security guarantees has been violated by Russia’s actions (cf. Fitzpatrick 2014: 86-7).

**1994 Partnership for Peace: Framework Agreement and Invitation Agreement:**

(non-compliance, negative expectations, negative spill-over)

Non-compliance is present with regards to the principles of ‘enhancing security and stability in Europe’. At least in the eyes of Moscow, NATO’s eastward enlargement has been undermining stability in Europe (cf. President of Russia 2007). The conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Russian annexation of Crimea are clear violations of the principle to ‘refrain from the threat or use of force’. The norm of ‘commitment to the CSCE acquis’ has been violated on several times by a number of states. The ‘fulfillment of disarmament and arms control obligations’ norm has been violated by Russia’s suspension of CFE and the later suspension of information exchange towards Russia under CFE by NATO member states. The norm of ‘ensuring democratic control of defense forces’ stands in contrast to the actual conditions in a number of post-Soviet States. Negative expectations about cooperation under PFP prevail in the NATO-Russia relationship (cf. Ponsard 2007: 60 et seq). Negative spill-over from the dysfunctionality of CFE has affected NATO’s political and military cooperation with Russia (cf. *ibid* and Embassy U.S. Moscow 2009a).

**1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation:**

(non-compliance, diminished U.S. interest in cooperation)

Non-compliance with principles and norms is widely visible. Examples are the violation of the principle to acknowledge ‘the vital role of democracy, political pluralism, rule of law, [and] human rights’ by infringement against basic human rights in Russia but also in the U.S. war on terror; the neglect of the principle to build a ‘non-inimical relationship’, as shown in the Ukraine conflict; the violation of the principle to build a partnership ‘based on transparency’, as in contradiction to the Russian military’s policy of non-transparency in the Ukraine conflict; the violation of the principle of ‘refraining from the threat or use of force’ as during the Russian campaigns in Georgia (2008) and at Crimea (2014); and the mutual violation by the United States and Russia of the norm of ‘improving arms control regimes and CSBMs’ in the context of CFE. Diminished U.S. interest in cooperation was visible when Russia tabled the second Medvedev draft to the NRC pleading for specifying ‘substantial combat forces’ and Washington did not reply.

**1997 Basic Agreement of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council:**

(non-compliance)

Non-compliance occurred with the violation of the principle of ‘strengthening and extending peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’ (see the conflicts of the South Caucasus and the Ukraine conflict).

The period 2000-2014 only produced six agreements. This is the second lowest output of all four periods. In comparison to the preceding period, the sum of indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in 2000-2014 dropped from 33 to 16 and resulted in a lower ratio of 2.83. At the same time, indicators of regime decay pertaining to earlier agreements reached a peak with 36 occurrences and led to an overall number of occurrences of indicators of decay of 53 in the years 2000-2014. Of course, this fact may well be owed to the circumstance of the growing base of already existing agreements in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe. The more agreements, the higher the probability of occurrences of indicators of regime decay. This pertains most of all to occurrences of non-compliance. At the same time, two events – the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and, to a larger degree, the 2014 Ukraine conflict – triggered an unprecedented high in violations of principles and norms agreed upon before (see affected agreements in Table 56 above). Hence, a total of 16 agreements of earlier periods suffered from occurrences of indicators of regime decay in this period. Most badly affected, the ACFE Treaty never came into force and the CFE Treaty practically ceased to function.

## 5.6 Preliminary Assessment of the Four Periods, 1975-2014


In the following preliminary assessment of the four periods only two aspects shall be scrutinized in more depth: (1) the trend of institutionalization and (2) the trend of occurrences of indicators of regime decay. All other aspects relevant to answering the guiding research questions of this chapter and of the thesis will be treated in the following Chapter 6.

With regards to the trend of institutionalization, a high degree of volatility comes to the fore. Roughly three cycles alternate. During the 15 years from 1975-1989,

only three agreements with relevance for cooperative arms control in Europe have been concluded. In the following ten years from 1990-1999, a total of 27 agreements were concluded. In the remaining 15 years from 2000-2014, only six agreements were concluded. Taken together, an alternating trend with a dense cycle of strong institutionalization, framed by two cycles of comparably weak institutionalization comes to the fore. Chart 34 (below) visualized this trend, applying a polynomic trend line.

**CHART 34**

POLYNOMIC TREND OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
(NEW AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED PER YEAR), 1975-2014




Two further aspects are worth taking note of when comparing the data to the empirical evidence collated in Chapter 3. First, the beginning and the end of the cycle of strong institutionalization correlates with two significant events. The beginning in 1990 correlates with the end of the Cold War; marked by the German reunification. The end in 1999 concurs with the last year of Boris Yeltsin’s second presidency and the start of handing over of power to then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in late 1999. Second, the last cycle of weak institutionalization from 2000-2014 displays in itself certain volatility, as the first four years (2000-2003) have seen the conclusion of five out of the total of six agreements during those years.

Here again, the third cycle's volatility correlates with a significant historical event. With the year 2003, which saw America's second intervention in Iraq, institutionalization in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe almost comes to an end (with the exception of the Vienna Document 2011).

Chart 35 (below) visualizes occurrences of indicators of regime decay in conjunction to institutionalization during the four periods.

**CHART 35**

INDICATORS OF REGIME DECAY: TREND DYNAMICS 1975-2014



For Chart 35: dotted line = number of agreements; continuous line = indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in corresponding period; dashed line = overall number of indicators of decay, including indicators pertaining to agreements concluded before corresponding period.

Visualizing a trend of occurrences of indicators of regime decay is not easy. Most indicators cannot be assigned to a certain point on the vertical time axis because they develop over time. Therefore, in Chart 35 (above) a simplification is applied in order to allow for visualizing decay dynamics. The occurrences of indicators of regime decay during a certain period are accumulated at the end of each respective period. As an example, the period 1995-1999 saw 34 occurrences of indicators of

regime decay for agreements concluded in this period. The preceding period saw only 18 occurrences. Hence, period 1995-1999 starts with the accumulated number of 18 occurrences from the preceding period and ends with the accumulated number of 34 occurrences. The same method is used with regards to the overall number of indicators of regime decay during a certain period (including occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to earlier agreements).

The visualization of the trend dynamics of decay highlights four important findings.

(1) Occurrences of indicators of regime decay were present throughout the whole period of analysis; however, to varying degrees. While Period I (1975-1989) had eleven occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in that period, Period II (1990-1994) has already 18 occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in that period. Period III (1995-1999) then shows the most significant increase in the occurrence of indicators of regime decay with 34 cases.

(2) The increase of occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in Period III (1995-1999) is paralleled by the presence of indicators of regime decay pertaining to earlier agreements. Also, the increase during Period III (1995-1999) happens only after institutionalization had reached its peak during Period II (1990-1994).

(3) Period IV (2000-2014) sees the further increase of occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to earlier agreements. At the same time, occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in Period IV (2000-2014) drop again to 17 cases.

(4) When calculating the ratio of occurrences of the overall number of indicators of decay per period in relation to the total number of agreements concluded so far, figures result in a value of 3.66 indicators of decay per agreement for Period I

(1975-1989), 1.0 for Period II (1990-1994), 1.13 for Period III (1995-1999), and 1.47 for Period IV (2000-2014). The overall ratio of total occurrences of indicators of decay (121) in all four periods (1975-2014) in relation to the total number of agreements concluded (36) is: 3.36.

Interpreting these findings becomes possible when again comparing the data to the empirical evidence collated in Chapter 3. The dynamics displayed in Period III (1995-1999) all occur against the background of a number of significant historical events and developments. Those years saw the beginning of the Second Chechen War, the preparations for NATO enlargement, and the dismissal of Russia's ideas of an upgrade of the OSCE to an encompassing security organization for the Euro-Atlantic space. At the same time, the marked increase of occurrences of indicators of regime decay in Period III (1995-1999) can be partially explained with the growing basis of governing agreements. While Period II (1990-1994) had seen the strongest increase in institutionalization, the following Period III (1995-1999) saw the strongest increase in occurrences of indicators of regime decay. To put it simple: the more agreements available, the potentially more cases of decay.

With regards to Period IV (2000-2014), the historical events of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and the Ukraine conflict of 2014 have pushed occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to earlier agreements again upwards. At the same time, occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in Period IV (2000-2014) dropped in comparison to Period III (1995-1999). This is owed to the fact of the different political nature of agreements established during those two periods. While Period II (1990-1994) saw the conclusion of strongly debated agreements such as the NATO-Russia Founding Act, ACFE, or the OSCE Paris Charter – all of which exhibit a strong political importance for Euro-Atlantic and U.S.-Russian security relations and all of which were reflecting competing interests – Period IV (2000-2014) saw only the establishment of the NRC as a major political endeavor. While the central agreements of Period III (1995-1999) are heavily affected by indicators of regime decay (see Tables 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, and 48), the other agreements of Period IV (2000-2014)

are much lesser affected by indicators of regime decay (see Tables 50, 51, 53, and 54). This is explainable, as for instance the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the 2003 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, or the 2003 OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition were of a lesser controversial nature.

Analyzing the trends of institutionalization and decay does nevertheless reveal only little about the forms of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe and the reasons for decay. In the following chapter, therefore, an encompassing assessment of the regime conundrum and of the indicators of regime decay will be conducted.



## 6 Assessment of the First Abductive Test's Results

In the previous Chapter 5, 36 agreements with relevance to cooperative arms control in Europe were assessed. Applying Krasner's standard typology together with the 13 indicators of decay (see Table 15 above), a number of significant results derive. As the previous chapter and the present one belong together, this chapter will summarize and assess these results as well as answer the guiding research questions to the two chapters. To recall these three questions: (1) is there clear evidence that the four cooperation clusters under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe are actually four regimes? (2) If so, do those four regimes form a regime complex? (3) Which indicators of decay are present, and to what degree?

The chapter has four paragraphs. The first paragraph answers the first guiding research question of Chapters 5/6 and arrives at a final conclusion about regime creation related to cooperative arms control in Europe. The second paragraph turns to the second guiding research question and addresses the complexity question. The third paragraph sets the findings in relation to decay and tries to answer the third guiding research question. The fourth paragraph sums up the results and confronts them with the two central research questions of this thesis.

### 6.1 Assessment I: Successful Multi-Regime Creation

Is there clear evidence that the four cooperation clusters under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe are actually four regimes? Recalling Keohane (1982: 337), regimes 'facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation.' In contrast, Young (1982: 283) argues that regimes *are* agreements. According to Young, all 36 agreements assessed in the previous chapter would deserve the regime label. However, as shown in the tables above, a significant number of agreements in the CSBM cooperation cluster do not incorporate a full set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures (e.g. the 1994 CSCE Global

Exchange of Military Information; see Table 34 above). Following Krasner, such agreements were no regimes.

Both approaches, Young's and Krasner's seem too formalistic when confronted with the empirical evidence collated in Chapter 5. In contrast, Keohane's definition of regimes appears more flexible and encompassing because it points to the wider contractual environment in which regimes might be established. Hence, in the further process of analysis of this thesis, it will be important to search for the Keohanian 'framework [or frameworks] of rules, norms, principles, and procedures', which 'facilitate the making of substantive agreements'. Identifying such framework(s) should be possible by comparing which agreements are sharing which principles and norms. In a simplistic understanding, such identification follows a "bottom up" approach.

Therefore, in this paragraph an assessment will be conducted in which key principles and norms of the 36 agreements are counted and attributed to the number of agreements that incorporate those principles and norms. At the same time, those agreements will be attributed to the respective cooperation cluster and it will be assessed as to whether different agreements from different cooperation clusters share key principles and norms. A number of methodological considerations are explained first.

With regards to key principles and norms, only such principles and norms are listed that appear more than three times amongst the 36 agreements and, at the same time, in at least three different cooperation clusters. Seven agreements (no. 7, 21, 29, 32, 33, 34, and 36) are 'recalling' C/OSCE principles and norms or call for 'adherence' to C/OSCE principles and commitments. In these cases, the principles and norms of the two 1975 Helsinki accords (Tables 17 and 18 above) are taken as the reference basis and included in the data base. The 'principle of sufficiency' should not become confused with the CFE 'sufficiency rule' (Article VI, CFE 1990). The former is referred to as general sufficiency in armaments.

With regards to the number of agreements assessed, the Vienna Document represents a special case as it has recurrently been updated and only the Document's rules have been expanded to include additional provisions (see above). If each version of the Vienna Document would be counted as a single unique agreement, the data input would be distorted. Therefore, the 1986 Stockholm Document and its successors of the Vienna Documents 1990, 1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011 are treated as one contiguous agreement. The number of agreements evaluated therewith shrinks from 36 to 31.

As regards attribution to the cooperation clusters, four agreements could not be attributed to one of the previously identified four cooperation clusters. Those agreements are the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris, the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security, and the 1999 Charter for European Security. Those accords are basically the central political agreements of the C/OSCE process (cf. IFSH 1997-2014). Even though some of those agreements also incorporate relevant stipulations for arms control, their main provisions are more in the realm of guiding principles and norms, based on the concept of cooperative security (ibid). The decision to include these declaratory agreements is mainly based on their centrality to the process of institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe and their direct historical links to the evolution of the other four cooperation clusters (see Chapter 3). In the following Table 57 (see next page), those agreements have been grouped in a column under 'C/OSCE Declaratory Cluster'.

With regards to shared key principles and norms, the quantity of shared key principles and norms in a specific cluster of cooperation – e.g. for CSBM agreements – shall help to identify whether the respective agreements of the cluster in their entirety have regime quality.

**TABLE 57**

SHARED KEY PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF THE 31 AGREEMENTS ASSESSED

Key Principles and Norms	CSBM Cluster (15)	NATO Pol-Mil Cluster (5)	CAC Cluster (4)	C/OSCE Declaratory Cluster (4)	Balkans Cluster (3)	Σ (31)
<i>strengthening stability</i>	6	5	4	0	2	<b>17</b>
<i>sovereign equality</i>	4	4	3	4	1	<b>16</b>
<i>promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</i>	5	4	1	3	1	<b>14</b>
<i>indivisibility of security</i>	3	3	2	4	1	<b>13</b>
<i>peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful cooperation</i>	2	4	2	3	1	<b>12</b>
<i>further developing measures</i>	6	3	3	0	0	<b>12</b>
<i>refraining from the threat or use of force</i>	1	3	2	3	1	<b>10</b>
<i>implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations</i>	5	3	0	1	1	<b>10</b>
<i>strengthening confidence and security</i>	5	3	0	0	2	<b>10</b>
<i>commitment to conflict prevention</i>	3	1	3	2	0	<b>9</b>
<i>territorial integrity of States</i>	0	0	2	2	0	<b>4</b>
<i>principle of sufficiency</i>	2	1	0	0	1	<b>4</b>
<b>Σ</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>131</b>
Ø (per agreement)	2.8 ± 0.4	6.8 ± 1.2	5.5 ± 1.2	5.5 ± 1.2	3.6 ± 1.1	4.2

Numbers in parentheses: agreements evaluated

The dataset reveals that twelve key principles and norms span over five cooperation clusters. The cluster of CSBMs under the auspices of the C/OSCE has the largest data input with 15 agreements. The other four clusters have a markedly narrower data input. This discrepancy between the different data bases is reflected by the absolute uncertainty ( $\pm$ ) that has been calculated for each column. For cooperation clusters with a higher number of analyzed agreements, the relative value of the uncertainty is smaller when compared with the results for other clusters. Figures show that NATO pol-mil agreements display the highest average of vertically shared principles and norms per agreement (6.8). CAC as well as C/OSCE declaratory agreements display a value of 5.5, Balkans agreements display a value of 3.6, and CSBM agreements display a value of 2.8.

Taking into account the uncertainty ( $\pm$ ), these figures produce the first principle finding: there is clear evidence that the politics of cooperative arms control in Europe have resulted in regime creation. The average value of vertically shared principles and norms reveals a strong consistency within each cluster.<sup>41</sup> This leads to conclude that, in the words of Keohane (1982: 337), each cluster has a framework of shared principles and norms, which facilitate the making of the respective agreements in that cluster. Hence, what has been labeled *clusters* so far turns out to be *regimes* in the understanding of Keohane (ibid). Contrary to the previous assumption (see Paragraph 3.8.6), five instead of only four regimes are present. The C/OSCE declaratory cluster is the fifth regime. Particularly the NATO pol-mil cooperation regime, the CAC regime, and the C/OSCE declaratory regime exhibit a high degree of consistency with a view to vertically shared principles and norms. Compared to the CSBM regime, their higher value can partly be explained by narrower data input. When compared to the Balkans regime (3.6), the

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<sup>41</sup> It has to be noted, however, that no common average reference value can be established for measuring from which point on the degree of vertically shared principles and norms speaks for or against general regime quality. Any artificially established common average reference value would suffer from subjectivity as comparative case studies in this field of research are obsolete. Nevertheless, this thesis treats the degree of vertically shared principles and norms in all five cooperation clusters as sufficient if the average value per cluster is above half of the average value of the sum of key principles and norms per sum of agreements (4.2) to prove the regime assumption. In addition, further factors such as historical evolution (see Chapter 3) and regime persistence are completing the picture.

explanation lies more in the exclusive arms control focus taken in the assessment which has not assessed the general stipulations of the Dayton peace accords.<sup>42</sup>

## 6.2 Assessment II: Densification to Complexity

The results of the previous paragraph lead directly to the second principle finding pertaining to regime complexity. All five regimes also share key principles and norms on a horizontal level, which means that key principles and norms are not only formative for the respective regime but that they are formative across the boundaries of single regimes. The dataset highlights this finding. Five key principles and norms are horizontally shared by all five regimes. The regimes of CSBMs, CAC, and NATO pol-mil cooperation horizontally share even eight out of twelve key principles and norms. Of the principles and norms themselves, ‘strengthening stability’ (17) and ‘sovereign equality’ (16) are most often mentioned across the five regimes. Further on, the data suggests that the five regimes are so closely interwoven on the level of key principles and norms that they might form a regime complex. Taking the number of horizontally shared principles and norms across the five regimes as a reference base to assess regime complexity is nevertheless only a first, though significant, indicator for complexity.

In their research agenda for analyzing regime complexity, Orsini, Morin and Young (2013: 32) suggest, identifying the ‘links’ (interactions) among the different ‘nodes’ (regimes). However, they miss being specific with respect to identifying concrete reference values for detecting interaction. Therefore, in the following, three reference values are established (see below). Clearly, shared principles and norms across a set of autonomous regimes, as in the case of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Table 57 above), do represent a potential reference base. The same applies to political linkages. As analyzed in Chapter 3, various political linkages in the form of the strategy of compensation were applied during the stages of regime creation and maintenance. Some of them had synergetic and some

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<sup>42</sup> In the Dayton peace accords, principles and norms of the process are set out in the ‘The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and are not as continuously repeated in the respective arms control stipulations as is the case with CSBM agreements under the auspices of the OSCE.

had conflictual consequences. During the process of qualitatively assessing the 36 agreements in Chapter 5, also direct references came to the fore. In some cases, agreements from one specific regime make active textual references to an agreement from another regime. This is for instance the case for CAC. CAC agreements such as CFE and the corresponding political developments have regularly been cited in agreements from the NATO pol-mil regime and the CSBM regime. Another form of direct reference is design. Particularly the agreements of the Balkans regime have been designed according to the structure and content of the CFE Treaty and a number of CSBM agreements from the C/OSCE (such as the Vienna Document).

In the following, another test is applied in order to highlight forms of regime interaction and to either verify or falsify the complexity assumption. Three reference values for forms of regime interaction are applied. (1) The quantity of the cross-sharing of key principles and norms between the respective five regimes serves as the first reference value. Each regime will be analyzed with a view to the number of key principles and norms that it shares with any other regime. (2) Political linkages are included as the second reference value. Relying on the findings of Chapter 3 about the evolution of the politics of cooperative arms control in Europe, each regime is analyzed as to whether its inception and maintenance was bound to political linkages with any other regime. (3) Direct references amongst the five regimes is the third reference value. Each regime is assessed with a view to direct references of a textual and/or design nature with any other regime. Textual references are subdivided into active and passive references. As an example, the agreement establishing the NRC (see Table 52 above) makes direct textual references to CSBMs, CFE, and Open Skies. In that case, the textual reference will be counted as 'active' for the corresponding NATO pol-mil regime and 'passive' for the corresponding CSBM and CAC regimes. Direct references of a design nature are mentioned separately. The following Table 58 (see next page) lists the reference values and assesses their respective occurrence. Thereby, interaction between the five regimes becomes visible.

**TABLE 58**

COOPERATIVE ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE: FORMS OF REGIME INTERACTION

Reference Value	Regime	CSBM Regime	NATO Pol-Mil Regime	CAC Regime	C/OSCE Declaratory Regime	Balkans Regime
	Regime					
<i>cross-sharing of key principles and norms</i>	CSBM Regime	/	yes (11)	yes (8)	yes (7)	yes (9)
	NATO Pol-Mil Regime	yes (11)	/	yes (8)	yes (7)	yes (9)
	CAC Regime	yes (8)	yes (8)	/	yes (7)	yes (6)
	C/OSCE Regime	yes (7)	yes (7)	yes (7)	/	yes (6)
	Balkans Regime	yes (9)	yes (9)	yes (6)	yes (6)	/
<i>political linkages</i>	CSBM Regime	/	yes	no	yes	no
	NATO Pol-Mil Regime	yes	/	yes	yes	no
	CAC Regime	no	yes	/	no	no
	C/OSCE Regime	yes	yes	no	/	no
	Balkans Regime	no	no	no	no	/
<i>direct references</i>	CSBM Regime	/	passive	active	active	passive/design
	NATO Pol-Mil Regime	active	/	active	active	no
	CAC Regime	passive	passive	/	active	passive/design
	C/OSCE Regime	passive	passive	passive	/	passive
	Balkans Regime	active/design	no	active/design	active	/

Numbers in parentheses: quantity of cross-sharing of key principles and norms

The evaluation in Table 58 underscores once more the assumption that the five regimes form a regime complex. The NATO pol-mil cooperation and the CSBM regime cross-share the largest number of principles and norms (11), followed by the Balkans regime and the CSBM regime (9), and the Balkans regime and the

NATO pol-mil cooperation regime (9). Political linkages occurred between the C/OSCE declaratory regime and the NATO pol-mil cooperation regime and therewith also between the CSBM regime and the NATO pol-mil cooperation regime during the early and mid-1990s<sup>43</sup> and between the CAC regime and the NATO pol-mil cooperation regime from 1995 onwards (see Paragraph 3.4.1 above). There are no political linkages involving the Balkans regime. Direct references of a textual nature (active and passive) pertain to almost all regimes, with the exception of missing references between the NATO pol-mil cooperation regime and the Balkans regime. Direct references of a design nature pertain only to the Balkans regime, which was designed along the lines of the CFE Treaty and of a number of CSBMs, first and foremost the VD (*ibid*).

Of the twelve key principles and norms of the regime complex, five are already listed almost word by word in the 1975 CSCE Helsinki ‘Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States’.<sup>44</sup> Another principle, the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’ is mentioned in the 1975 preambular paragraphs. The conclusion is that the historical roots of the regime complex are in the Helsinki accords. They represent the starting point of the C/OSCE process (cf. Schlotter 1999) and function as a framework of principles and norms (cf. Keohane (1982: 337) which informed the other regimes over time. This influence on the meta-level of key principles and norms did not stop with the Helsinki stipulations but was continuously fostered through their repetition and extension in the declaratory agreements of the C/OSCE, particularly in the Charter of Paris (1990) and the European Security Charter (1999). All these agreements have so far been attributed to the C/OSCE declaratory regime in this paragraph. Indeed their significance for the overall regime complex points to a special position within this complex. Recalling Aggarval (1985: 18-20), they are less of a meta-regime in the sense of principles and norms inherent to a single regime but more of a meta-

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
<sup>43</sup> However, in the latter case of political linkage between the CSBM regime and the NATO pol-mil cooperation regime, the interaction was rather indirect and depended heavily on the linkage between the further evolution of the C/OSCE and NATO enlargement (see Paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.4.1 above).

<sup>44</sup> Those are: sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and promoting disarmament.

regime multiplier of principles and norms that informs a whole complex. Following such re-interpretation of the episteme of ‘meta-regime’ (ibid), the normative C/OSCE stipulations and their practical manifestation (the OSCE) form an overarching canon of values which frames the whole regime complex. Below this meta-regime, a dense regime complex of four regimes with a high degree of interaction among the different nodes of the complex becomes visible. Chart 36 (below) visualizes the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe.

**CHART 36**

THE REGIME COMPLEX OF COOPERATIVE ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE



For Chart 36: The chart has been developed by the author for this thesis. Arrows symbolize an active or passive direct reference of a textual and/or a design nature. Continuous lines symbolize cross-shared key principles and norms; thickness of lines indicates degree of cross-sharing. Dashed lines symbolize political linkages.

The chart highlights a vivid interaction among the elemental regimes of the complex. While the C/OSCE meta-regime sits on top of the complex, the regimes on CSBMs, CAC, and NATO pol-mil cooperation have seven links each with other regimes. The links refer to interactions at the level of cross-shared principles and norms, political linkages, and direct references. The Balkans regime has the lowest number of links (five) and is the only regime with no historical linkages and no active direct reference – a fact due to its later evolution, its top-down genesis as part of the Dayton accords, and its adopted design. In addition to regime interaction, the complexity requirement of partially overlapping membership (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013) does apply to all four elemental regimes and the meta-regime. Further on, the complex displays a high degree of density and a low degree of centrality. On the one hand, interactions among the nodes are frequent and vivid; on the other hand, no node has considerably more links than the others. The regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe is thus neither centralized nor fragmented but displays a high degree of density. Therewith, also the second guiding research question of the last two chapters can be answered: the five elemental regimes of cooperative arms control in Europe form a regime complex.

### 6.3 Assessment III: A Complex in Decay

Which indicators of decay are present, and to what degree? In order to answer the third guiding research question of Chapters 5/6, all 13 indicators of regime decay (see Table 15 above), shall serve as a reference base to assess the empirical input from Chapter 5. Again, the same 31 agreements provide the basis for data input. As in the previous case of assessing shared principles and norms (see Table 57 above), the data input of the five regimes is uneven, with a markedly larger data input for CSBMs. Again, the different sized data bases result in different uncertainties when comparing the average. The absolute uncertainty ( $\pm$ ) has been calculated for each average value and included in the following Table 59 (see next page). Occurrences of indicators of regime decay pertaining to agreements concluded in earlier periods (see Tables 48 and 55 above) are included in the assessment.

**TABLE 59**

COOPERATIVE ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE: ASSESSING INDICATORS OF REGIME DECAY

Indicators of Regime Decay	CSBM Regime (15)	NATO Pol/Mil Regime (5)	CAC Regime (4)	C/OSCE Meta-Regime (4)	Balkans Regime (3)	Σ (31)
<i>non-compliance</i>	12	7	6	8	0	<b>33</b>
<i>divergent issue-specific interests</i>	4	5	3	4	0	<b>16</b>
<i>issue linkage</i>	1	4	3	4	0	<b>12</b>
<i>Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains</i>	1	5	2	3	0	<b>11</b>
<i>regime-internal contradictions</i>	3	3	1	4	0	<b>11</b>
<i>negative expectations</i>	3	4	1	2	0	<b>10</b>
<i>shifts in relative capabilities</i>	1	5	1	2	0	<b>9</b>
<i>protracted negotiations</i>	3	1	2	2	0	<b>8</b>
<i>negative spill-over</i>	2	2	1	1	0	<b>6</b>
<i>negative adaptation consequences</i>	0	0	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
<i>diminished U.S. interest in cooperation</i>	0	2	1	0	0	<b>3</b>
<i>changes in principles and norms</i>	/	/	/	/	/	/
<i>hegemonic practice</i>	/	/	/	/	/	/
<b>Σ</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>121</b>
Ø (per agreement)	2.0 ± 0.4	7.6 ± 1.2	5.7 ± 1.2	7.5 ± 1.4	0	3.9

Numbers in parentheses: agreements evaluated

The overall number of occurrences of indicators of regime decay is 121 (combined number of Tables 20, 39, 49, and 56). Of the 31 agreements evaluated only eight show no indicators of regime decay. The Balkans regime is the only regime that is not impacted at all. The highest number of counted indicators of regime decay is in the NATO pol-mil row with 38 cases. Proportionally, the NATO pol-mil regime is most badly affected with 38 indicators of regime decay and an average of 7.6. The C/OSCE meta-regime has the second highest average value of indicators of regime decay per regime agreement (7.5). However, together with the CAC (1.2) and the C/OSCE meta-regime (1.4), the NATO pol-mil regime has a markedly higher absolute uncertainty (1.2) than the CSBM regime (0.4), which could, partially, explain the higher average value.

‘Divergent issue-specific interests’ (16 cases), ‘issue linkage’ (twelve cases), the ‘perception of the inequitable distribution of gains’ as well as ‘regime-internal contradictions’ (eleven cases of each indicator), ‘negative expectations’ (ten cases), and ‘shifts in relative capabilities’ (nine cases) are all powerful indicators of decay. In absolute terms, the indicator of ‘non-compliance’ is the strongest with 33 cases. Accordingly, the weakest is ‘diminished U.S. interest in cooperation’ with only three cases. In the following, these indicators will be interpreted separately. The aim is, to analyze the degree to which certain indicators are responsible for decay. The indicator of ‘changes in principles and norms’ gets addressed in Chapter 7. The indicator of ‘hegemonic practice’ is addressed in Chapter 8.

### Non-Compliance

In absolute terms, non-compliance is omnipresent in the regime complex. To recall Zacher (1987: 174): ‘occurrences of major or long-term noncompliance, particularly involving participation of or support by major actors in the system, bring into question the efficacy of regime injunctions’. The sheer number of occurrences of non-compliance (33) cannot be explained by the commonality of non-conforming behavior in connection with most social institutions (Young 1982: 278) alone. It is also in contradiction to Keohane’s assumption (1984: 89 et seq) that violation or cheating becomes limited by the broader framework (in the cur-

rent case a regime complex) in which regimes are nested in. While compliance is essential particularly for security regimes (cf. Levy, Young and Zürn 1995: 277; see Paragraph 2 above), it is not so much the seriousness of the fact of non-compliance but rather the degree to which other actors in the regime interpret it as serious violation and the way the non-compliant actor communicates the act of non-compliance (cf. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). A good example is the Russian violation of CFE injunctions during the First Chechen War and the immediate explanations given by Boris Yeltsin which States Parties found acceptable (see Hartmann et al 2002: 701-4).


What is critical for the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe in conjunction with non-compliance, are two factors. First, one major actor is almost always involved when it comes to non-compliance: Russia (see tables contained in Chapter 5). Be it non-compliance with key principles and norms such as to ‘refrain from the threat or use of force’, respect for the ‘territorial integrity of states’, the commitment to ‘further develop [cooperative] measures’, or non-compliance with specific rules such as the CFE ‘host nation consent rule’, Russia has always been a problematic actor (ibid). This circumstance points to a general problematic stance of Russia towards the regime complex. As Chayes and Chayes (1994: 68-72) point out, it is the normative base of a regime which decides about success. If one actor is repeatedly challenging regime injunctions, the normative base is challenged as well. Hence, the relationship between the problematic actor and the nature of the normative base comes into the picture. In the current case, the important question derives whether Russian foreign and security policies are still convergent with the key principles and norms of the regime complex.

The second crucial factor is that Russian non-compliance does not occur on a constant level but has only started to skyrocket during the last ten years. The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and the Ukraine conflict and the related Russian re-interpretations of international law (cf. Burke-White 2014) have played a critical part in contributing to an unprecedented peak in instances of non-compliance (see

Chart 37 below). This circumstance leads to question what reasons and developments are behind these dynamics.

**CHART 37**

COOPERATIVE ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE: NON-COMPLIANCE DYNAMICS



For Chart 37: colored sector = total number of agreements per period; continuous line = occurrences of non-compliance (not limited to instances of Russian non-compliance).

Divergent Issue-Specific Interests, Issue Linkage, Shifts in Relative Capabilities, and the Russian Perception of the Inequitable Distribution of Gains

While obviously Russian non-compliance is a part of the process of decay, it is nevertheless not the sole reason but rather the product of a number of sequential indicators. As analyzed in Chapter 3, divergent issue-specific interests between Washington and Moscow about the future design of Europe’s security architecture prevailed throughout the 1990s with the United States’ issue-specific interest of maintaining, and later enlarging, NATO structures and with Russia being in strong opposition while working towards achieving a superior role for the C/OSCE (see Paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.4.1 above). Those divergent issue-specific

interests were nevertheless present against the background of a mutual interest in cooperation (rooted in the survival motive). At the same time, a massive shift in relative capabilities had left Russia in an extremely weak position relative to the United States (see Charts 29-33 above). On the one hand, this massive shift only made cooperation possible because it triggered the Soviet interest in cooperation (cf. Gorbachev 1996). On the other hand, against the background of this massive shift, Washington could follow through with its preferred issues-specific interest of enlarging NATO while accommodating Russia by means of cooperative security. The resulting strategy of compensation led to a number of political linkages. Even though the distribution of gains reflected roughly the relative distribution of power (cf. Paragraph 3.8.5 above), it led to the Russian perception of inequity (cf. President of Russia 2014b) which did not vanish over time but increasingly affected the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship (cf. Charap and Shapiro 2014b). When the Russian economy regained strength from 2000 onwards this minor shift in relative capabilities led the new Russian leadership under Vladimir Putin to concentrate on consolidating its economy and its influence in the direct neighborhood and to slowly withdraw from the politics of cooperative security.

#### Negative Expectations, Protracted Negotiations, and Negative Spill-Over

Chart 37 (above) visualizes that the number of cases of non-compliance increases from the mid-1990s onwards. At the same time, negative expectations, and later protracted negotiations (most obviously in the cases of CFE and the Vienna Document), came to the fore. Statements by Russian delegations to the OSCE prove Moscow's growing disappointment with the way European security evolved during those years (see Chapter 7). Political linkages had served the purpose of compensating Moscow and thus cushioning Russian unease with NATO enlargement. Linkages led, amongst other factors, to a densely integrated regime complex (see Chart 36 above). In conjunction with the increasing Russian perception of inequity, issue linkage resulted in negative ripple effects (cf. McGinnis 1986: 158), which reverberated throughout the system (cf. Alter and Meunier 2009: 19-20) and started to spill-over, affecting the complex. In the case of CFE, the treaty's deadlock and later suspension led to traceable negative spill-over effects into the

NATO pol-mil regime (cf. Ponsard 2007: 60 et seq; Embassy U.S. Moscow 2009a) and the C/OSCE meta-regime (cf. Mission U.S. OSCE 2008). In the case of the C/OSCE meta-regime, spill-over effects affected the CSBM regime.

### Regime-Internal Contradictions

The origins of the regime complex date back to the Helsinki days (see Paragraph 3.2.1 above). The Helsinki principles are still part of an overarching canon of values to the complex (see Chart 36 above). Their universality mirrors their genesis as East-West accords of the lowest common denominator with a low level of issue-specification at their time of origin (cf. Schlotter 1999). Their ‘symbolic’ (Strange 1982: 484) and ‘declaratory’ (Ropers and Schlotter 1989) nature and ambivalence allowed for an understanding which reflected the Cold War realities of the 1970s. They were torn between the Soviet desire to cement the status quo and careful Western attempts at change in the human dimension. They were the prestige project of the Eastern super power and the side-project of the Western one (cf. Maresca 1988: 109).

The first Helsinki principle speaks of ‘sovereign equality [and the] respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty’. This principle includes explicitly the right ‘to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance’. It follows directly after the preambular recognition of the ‘indivisibility of security in Europe’. Over the years, both stipulations have become key principles of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Chapter 5). The former is mentioned 16 and the latter 13 times in the agreements of the regime complex (see Table 57 above). Particularly the agreements of the 1990s – most prominently in the NATO pol-mil cooperation regime – have made the principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’ a central declaratory element of the new political order. Even though the Cold War is long gone, 39 years after their inception, these two principles are still at the declaratory heart of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe. In relation to each other, they form a classical paragon of an internal contradiction as every party could basically find any sovereign decision of any other party to join any treaty or

alliance an infringement to its security and hence as contrary to the indivisibility of security. Lawyers call such discrepancy a *contradictio in adjecto* (cf. Rotfeld 2014: 57).

Internal contradictions are nothing exceptional when it comes to international agreements. Particularly negotiated principles are often the smallest common denominator and hence contradictory. As an example from the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, Brzoska (1992: 217 et seq) finds ‘two contending sets of principles and norms’, based on the two main ‘diverging interests of types of actors in the system’. Correctly, he notes that combinations of the two sets appear to be ‘uneasy’ and have direct negative consequences for policy-making.<sup>45</sup> With regards to the two Helsinki principles, both principles fundamentally clash from a practical and a philosophical point of view<sup>46</sup>, which was not so much the problem during the geopolitical inertia of the Cold War in Europe (cf. Rotfeld 2014: 54). However, with the end of the Cold War, the regime-internal contradiction in conjunction with the rapid shift in relative capabilities of the post-Cold War era became the buzz word for Russia’s critique of NATO enlargement (cf. President of Russia 2007), the West’s recognition of independence of Kosovo (cf. Lavrov 2008), or of contended NATO military initiatives such as missile defense<sup>47</sup>.

There were almost countless occasions where Russian officials referred to the imperative of the principle (see for exemplary the discussions during the Corfu process Cliff 2012: 67). In 2010, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov explained ‘that there is a problem with the concept of indivisibility of security and that it will have to be tackled’. One year earlier, in 2009, he had complained to the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference that ‘the main structural shortcoming lies in the fact that over a period of 20 years we have been unable to devise guar-

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<sup>45</sup> A number of authors go as far as to see the regime-internal contradictions as being the main reason behind the ongoing political deadlock surrounding the NPT (cf. Müller 2009).

<sup>46</sup> Of course, the two principles have much older roots than the Helsinki process and can be traced back to the Westphalian order and Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’.

<sup>47</sup> As an example, Roberto Zadra, former Chairman of the NRC Missile Defence Working Group points out that the principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ was repeatedly ‘raised by Moscow throughout the period of negotiation’ on missile defense cooperation (Zadra 2014: 57).

antees to ensure the observance of the principle of the indivisibility of security.’ (OSCE Lavrov 2009) The tabling of Medvedev’s EST proposal was openly linked by Russian officials to achieving a legal guarantee for the principle’s perpetuity. ‘This is a kind of test’, Lavrov explained in 2010, ‘if we continue to believe in what our leaders declared and subscribed to in the 90s, why cannot we make the same things legally binding.’

While the security setting had changed dramatically since 1975 in terms of relative capabilities and issue-specific interests, the principle has remained unchanged on the declaratory level. At the same time, the cases of NATO enlargement (in the Russian perception), the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, and the latest clear violations of the principle by Russia in Ukraine (cf. Freedman 2014) underscore that the principle is not consistently reflected in the operational Euro-Atlantic policies of Washington and Russia.

The fact of non-compliance with key principles and norms of the regime complex also explains to a certain degree, why the C/OSCE meta-regime is on average (7.5) so badly affected by indicators of regime decay. Particularly with a view to non-compliance, the meta-regime displays the highest average value per agreement. Every time a key principle or norm of cooperative arms control in Europe is violated, the C/OSCE meta-regime suffers indirectly. The violation of principles and norms triggers the significant question whether the declaratory level of principles and norms is still reflected at the operational level of policy-making. As the abductive test of Chapter 5 has revealed, there have been no traceable changes to principles and norms when qualitatively assessing 36 agreements. However, focusing on the operational level of policy-making might reveal differences between contemporary policies and inherited principles and norms (see Chapter 7 for a discussion).

#### Diminished U.S. Interest in Cooperation

In comparison to the other indicators, the indicator of ‘diminished U.S. interest in cooperation’ is the weakest in absolute terms (according to the assessment in Ta-

ble 59 above). The indicator occurs only three times. At the same time, particularly Liberals (cf. Young 1989b: 366-74; McGinnis 1986: 165; Müller 1993a: 49) have argued that a relative loss in interest is a very powerful argument in conjunction with states disengaging from international cooperation. Because the assessment in Table 59 (see above) concentrates on decay from the endogenous perspective of regimes, the broader political spectra that drive cooperation are somewhat left out of the analysis (see Chapter 8 for a discussion). In addition, the period of relative U.S. disengagement from cooperation with Russia (2000-2014) has only produced six agreements of which only one – though the most significant one (establishment of the NRC) – was affected by the indicator of ‘diminished U.S. interest in cooperation’. Therewith, the indicator is relatively underrepresented even though it provides powerful arguments explaining regime decay. In conjunction with cooperative arms control in Europe four decisive aspects of U.S. foreign and security policy started to take shape with the beginning of the new millennium.

(1) Washington’s general interest in survival was not geared towards Russia anymore. Russia was neither seen as an enemy nor as a potential rival. To re-quote Kelleher (2014: 17), ‘Russia [...] was simply no longer relevant to the new American strategic and political preeminence.’ With the events of 9/11, the U.S. general interest in survival turned even further away from Russia towards the War on Terror (cf. Daalder and Lindsay 2005). Under Obama, this policy continued; though, to a lesser degree and now with China in the direct U.S. focus (cf. Indyk, Lieberthal, and O’Hanlon 2012: 12 et seq).

(2) Washington did not see an immediate need to engage on cooperative arms control in Europe (cf. Kelleher 2014: 17 et seq). The institutions of the 1990s had been set up and were largely functioning in the U.S. view (cf. Mlyn 2003).

(3) In its dealings with Russia, Washington continued its policy from the 1990s which was basically non-negotiable with a view to the central Russian demands

(i.e. an end to NATO enlargement and a superior role for the OSCE; see Paragraphs 3.4.1 to 3.7.1 above).

(4) Washington's policy under George W. Bush was generally not very much interested in multilateralism and the tenets of cooperative security (e.g. arms control; cf. Luongo 2001).

Taken together, these aspects all contribute to the indicator of 'diminished U.S. interest in cooperation'. The empirical evidence collated in Chapter 3 (see particularly Paragraphs 3.5.1-3.7.1) has underscored that this factor contributed significantly to decay.

Summing up, of the 13 indicators of regime decay (see Table 15 above) eleven indicators provide compelling indications why the regime complex is in decay. The remaining two indicators of 'hegemonic practices' and 'changes in principles and norms' remain unattended so far. The indicator of 'changes in principles and norms' will be addressed in detail in Chapter 7. The indicator of 'hegemonic practices' will be addressed in detail in Chapter 8.

#### 6.4 Conclusions

The abductive test conducted in Chapter 5 along the lines of Krasner's regime typology has helped to explain which institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe form a regime. The 13 indicators of regime decay as collated by scholars of regime (see Table 15 above) provide compelling indications why the regime complex is in decay.

(1) Is there clear evidence that the four cooperation clusters under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe are actually four regimes? (2) If so, do those four regimes form a regime complex? The abductive test has proven that regime creation under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe has taken place. As earlier assumed (see Paragraph 3.8.6), the four cooperation clusters under the rubric of cooperative arms control in Europe are actually four regimes. In addition

to these four regimes, the test led to the conclusion that a fifth regime – the normative C/OSCE meta-regime – exists. As a result of the cross-sharing of key principles and norms, regime complexity comes into play, for all five regimes share a significant number of principles and norms. When further taking into account political linkages and direct references among the regimes, a regime complex, in the most recent understanding of complexity research (cf. Thakur 2013), crystallizes. Following Aggarwal's assumptions about meta-regimes (1985: 18-20), the normative stipulations of the C/OSCE form an overarching meta-regime that has strongly influenced the evolution of the regime complex. Crucial principles and norms from the 1975 Helsinki accords have survived to the very day and span across all elemental regimes of the complex.

As a consequence of these results, the first guiding research question of this thesis can be answered: The form of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe is that of a dense regime complex with five elemental regimes (one of them being a meta-regime) in vivid interaction.

(3) Which indicators of decay are present, and to what degree? As already outlined in Paragraph 3.8.7 (above), specific institutions are affected by decay. Of the five regimes, four are affected. This leads to conclude that the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe is characterized by decay. A number of indicators provide compelling indications why the regime complex is in decay. Non-compliance with principles, norms, and rules is the most visible (in absolute terms), impacting the complex. Here, Russia's problematic role and the dynamics of an increase of Russian non-compliance puts into question the normative injunctions of the regime complex and Russia's stance towards the normative basis.

Visible to a comparably lesser degree, though being amongst the most important reasons for decay, is the diminished U.S. interest in cooperation with Russia since the year 2000, massive as well as minor shifts in relative capabilities (in conjunction with the end of the Cold War and, later, with the Russian economic recov-

ery), employed strategies of issue linkage, and the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains.

Regime-internal contradictions in the form of the ‘sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security’ paragon are a continuous reference frame for Russian claims. The former British Ambassador to the OSCE Ian Cliff observed: ‘the “indivisibility of security” [is] widely regarded as code for continued Russian hostility to NATO enlargement’. (Cliff 2012: 67)

The fact of the persistence of the declaratory principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’ in conjunction with Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the operational policies in the Euro-Atlantic security space as well as Russian non-compliance points to a significant level of tension between principles and norms of the regime complex on the one hand and operational policies on the other. It might be the case, that the normative basis of the complex – its key principles and norms – has ceased to reflect the realities of Euro-Atlantic security and is thus not valid for the operational level of policy-making anymore. Such possible result would add an important insight to explaining decay from the hitherto unattended indicator of ‘changes in principles and norms’ (cf. Krasner 1982: 4). In order to either verify or falsify this assumption, a second abductive test will be conducted in the following Chapter 7. Before the results of this test are available it would be premature to comprehensively answer the second central research question of this thesis.



## 7 A Second Abductive Test

The previous two chapters have helped to identify twelve key principles and norms that are at the heart of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe. While those principles and norms are still incorporated in the respective agreements of the complex, doubts have arisen whether the operational policies of the United States and Russia are still reflecting these key principles and norms. The regime-internal contradiction of the ‘sovereign equality vs. indivisibility of security’ paragon and the related Russian complaints that the latter principle has been violated by the West on different occasions have hinted at a significant level of tension between principles and norms of the regime complex on the one hand and operational policies on the other. If that were the case, it would add an important stratum to explaining decay by addressing the hitherto unexplored indicator of ‘changes in principles and norms’ (cf. Krasner 1982: 4).

In this chapter, a second abductive test is conducted, assessing 51 statements of delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia directed to the C/OSCE during five historical periods from 1990 to 2014. The 51 statements are listed under Annex III. The aim of the test is to identify possible commonalities with and differences to the key principles and norms of the regime complex.

The guiding research questions of this chapter are: (1) to what degree are key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe still reflected in the operational policies of the two main actors? (2) Are there indicators for an erosion of key principles and norms of the regime complex?

The chapter has eight paragraphs. After a few introductory remarks in the first paragraph, the ensuing five paragraphs assess the 51 statements. In the seventh paragraph the results of the test are collated and assessed. The last paragraph sums up the findings and answers the two guiding research questions of this chapter as well as the second central research question of this thesis about regime decay.

## 7.1 A Few Introductory Remarks

In this chapter, a second abductive test is conducted, assessing 51 statements of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Assessment of the political statements of those two actors shall help to identify possible commonalities with and differences to the key principles and norms of the regime complex. The 51 statements have all been delivered as speeches to either Ministerial Councils or Summits of the C/OSCE between 1990 and 2014.

The exclusive focus on the C/OSCE is due to its systemic centrality to the regime complex and its comprehensive approach at the concept of cooperative security (cf. Krause 2003). The periodical focus of the years 1990-2014 has been chosen because only with the 1990 Paris Summit CSCE high-level meetings became a regular and continuous endeavor. The period of those 24 years is in itself again broken down into five historical periods which resemble five of the six historical periods applied in Chapter 3 above. Those five periods are 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2008, 2009-2011, and 2012-2014.

For all years, opening statements of the Heads of Delegations are taken as empirical basis. Not all statements are publicly available.<sup>48</sup> Closing statements by delegations, additional U.S. or Soviet/Russian documents annexed to the respective Ministerial Journal or the Summit Document, or statements on behalf of the United States or the Russian Federation are not taken into account. This is due to their often very issue-specific nature. In contrast, opening statements allow for a broader reflection of general policy topics of the respective delegation.

The method applied in this test is a mix of qualitative and quantitative content analysis (cf. Krippendorff 1980). Quantitative content analysis applies where di-

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<sup>48</sup> Most of the statements are available on-line at [www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org). Copies of the statements not available on-line have been provided by the OSCE archive in Prague to whose staff I am extremely grateful. U.S. and Russian statements from the 1991 Moscow Additional Ministerial Meeting were not available. The Russian statement from the 1993 Rome Ministerial is also not available. The U.S. and Russian Copenhagen statements of 1997 have an OSCE+' restricted distribution status and are not publicly available as well. The Soviet and Russian statements of 1991, 1993, and 1995 were only available in Russian. In these cases, professional translations were commissioned for this thesis.

rect references to the twelve key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Table 57 in Paragraph 6.1 above) are counted. No electronic program has been applied. Qualitative content analysis applies where the general policy topics, mentioned by U.S. and Soviet/Russian delegations, are highlighted.

The test is again abductive. It combines inductive and deductive methods. The test is inductive since reflections of specific key principles and norms of the regime complex from the U.S.-Soviet/Russian statements (see below) are taken to make assertions about their general continued relevance and their respective state. Key principles and norms are marked as 'contested' with an 'X' if U.S. and Soviet/Russian views are diverging at the period of delivery of speeches. As reference base for assessing divergence, the statements as well as the empirical evidence of the respective period, analyzed in Chapter 3, are applied. In some statements, key principles and norms are not directly referred to but rather indirectly. As an example, the key principle of the 'indivisibility of security' is sometimes indirectly referred to as states' imperative not to 'strengthen their own security at the expense of the security of others' (OSCE 2012). In such cases, the indirect reference of the key principle is included in the assessment.

The ensuing test is also deductive since the general policy topics on the agendas of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia are identified (see below) and broken down to allow for assertions about their specific content in relation to the twelve key principles and norms of the regime complex (see Table 57 in Paragraph 6.1 above). Again, general policy topics are marked as 'contested' with an 'X' if U.S.-Soviet/Russian views are diverging, based on the statements as well as on the empirical evidence analyzed in Chapter 3. In the following paragraphs, all statements are quantitatively and qualitatively assessed in a matrix displaying which of the twelve key principles and norms of the regime complex are detectable and contested as well as what other general policy topics are relevant and contested. In Paragraph 7.7, the results of this second abductive test are summarized and analyzed.

7.2 Statements, Period 1990-1994

**TABLE 60**

SOVIET UNION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, PARIS, 1990

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 1: Speech by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to the Second Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Paris, November 19-21, 1990</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• territorial integrity of states</li> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• end of the Cold War</li> <li>• U.S.-Soviet partnership</li> <li>• universal human values</li> <li>• freedom and democracy</li> <li>• rule of law</li> <li>• political pluralism</li> <li>• building a new order for Europe</li> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• economic cooperation</li> <li>• transforming WTO and NATO</li> <li>• cooperation with the European Community</li> <li>• political solution to the Iraq/Kuwait crisis</li> </ul>	

**TABLE 61**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, PARIS, 1990

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 2: Speech by U.S. President George Bush to the Second Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Paris, November 19-21, 1990</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• peaceful settlement of disputes</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	

<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• end of the Cold War</li> <li>• growing nationalism</li> <li>• protecting minority and human rights</li> <li>• democracy promotion</li> <li>• rule of law</li> <li>• Iraq/Kuwait crisis</li> </ul>
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**TABLE 62**

SOVIET UNION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BERLIN, 1991

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 3: Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Bessmertnykh, at the first session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating States of the CSCE, Berlin, June 19, 1991 [Unofficial Translation]</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• maintenance of NATO questionable</li> <li>• profound transformation of all existing organizations</li> <li>• CSCE process not subordinated to NATO</li> <li>• more work on the ‘second basket’</li> <li>• including naval forces in the CFE</li> <li>• comprehensive agreement on pan-European security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li></li> <li>X</li> <li></li> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> </ul>

**TABLE 63**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BERLIN, 1991

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 4: European Architecture, Remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III at the First Restricted Session of the CSCE Ministerial, Berlin, June 19, 1991</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	

<i>And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• growing nationalism</li> <li>• political and economic freedom</li> <li>• retaining NATO</li> <li>• reaching out of European Community to the East</li> <li>• adapting CSCE structures</li> <li>• non-proliferation of WMD</li> </ul>	X

**TABLE 64**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, PRAGUE, 1992

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 5: Statement by Andrei V. Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the CSCE Council Meeting, Prague, January 30, 1992</b>	
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	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• democratic transition of Russia</li> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• U.S.-Russia friendship</li> <li>• international guarantees and reciprocal verification mechanisms for Helsinki principles</li> <li>• expanding CSCE structures</li> <li>• CSCE peacekeeping operations</li> <li>• strengthening economic cooperation</li> <li>• protecting minority and human rights</li> <li>• building a new order for Europe (proposal of multi-lateral treaty on security and cooperation in Europe)</li> <li>• cooperation with NATO and the European Community</li> </ul>	X

**TABLE 65**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, PRAGUE, 1992

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 6: CSCE: Our Community of Democratic Values, Remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting, Prague, January 30, 1992</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• rule of law</li> <li>• market economies</li> <li>• civil societies</li> <li>• growing nationalism</li> <li>• recalling CSCE principles</li> <li>• Yugoslavia crisis</li> <li>• promoting democracy and human rights</li> <li>• strengthening economic cooperation</li> <li>• adapting CSCE structures</li> </ul>	

**TABLE 66**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, HELSINKI, 1992

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 7: Speech by President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation to the Third Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Helsinki, July 9-10, 1992</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting freedom and democracy</li> <li>• growing nationalism</li> <li>• Yugoslavia crisis</li> </ul>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ethnic conflicts in the CIS</li> <li>• CSCE peacekeeping operations</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> </ul>
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**TABLE 67**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, HELSINKI, 1992

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 8: Speech by U.S. President George Bush to the Third Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Helsinki, July 9-10, 1992</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yugoslavia crisis</li> <li>• Protecting human rights</li> <li>• Growing nationalism</li> <li>• Promoting democracy</li> <li>• Sanction violations of CSCE norms</li> <li>• Adapting CSCE structures</li> <li>• NATO contribution to CSCE peacekeeping</li> </ul>	

**TABLE 68**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, STOCKHOLM, 1992

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 9: Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. A. V. Kozyrev at the CSCE Council Meeting, Stockholm, December 14, 1992 [Unofficial Translation]</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>

<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• see footnote<sup>49</sup></li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• see footnote</li> </ul>	

**TABLE 69**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, STOCKHOLM, 1992

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 10: Europe in Transition: The Role of CSCE, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Secretary of State, CSCE Council Meeting, Stockholm, December 14, 1992</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• overcoming the Cold War legacy</li> <li>• promoting freedom and democracy</li> <li>• tackling the Yugoslavia crisis</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> <li>• adapting CSCE structures</li> <li>• tackling conflicts in the CIS</li> <li>• recalling CSCE principles</li> </ul>	

**TABLE 70**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, ROME, 1993

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 11: Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the CSCE Plenary Session, Rome, November 30, 1993</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>

<sup>49</sup> In his statement, Kozyrev used a rhetorical device and read out a statement which did not reflect the Russian policy but which summarized the most radical arguments of the domestic Russian opposition. He did so in order to make the other delegations aware of the threats that Russia was still facing on its way of overcoming the Communist legacy. His statement did thus not contain any detectable key principles and norms or other general policy issues.

<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• refraining from the threat or use of force</li> <li>• territorial integrity of states</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• countering nationalism</li> <li>• promoting democracy</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> <li>• securing freedom of the media</li> <li>• tackling the Yugoslavia crisis</li> <li>• adapting CSCE structures</li> <li>• tackling conflicts in the CIS</li> <li>• CSCE peacekeeping operations</li> <li>• promoting non-proliferation of WMD</li> <li>• maintaining NATO</li> <li>• fostering free market economies</li> </ul>	X

**TABLE 71**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BUDAPEST, 1994

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 12: Address by President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation at the CSCE Summit, Budapest, December 5, 1994 [Unofficial Translation]</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful cooperation</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• building a new order for Europe (legal, all-European organization, new Security Model)</li> <li>• calling for respect of Russian interests</li> <li>• concern over NATO enlargement</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> <li>• countering nationalism</li> <li>• CSCE peacekeeping operations</li> </ul>	X  X

**TABLE 72**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BUDAPEST, 1994

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 13: Remarks by the President of the United States William J. Clinton at the Plenary Session of the Summit of the CSCE, Budapest, December 5, 1994</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting democracy and freedom</li> <li>• ensuring free markets</li> <li>• tackling the Yugoslavia crisis</li> <li>• maintaining and enlarging NATO</li> <li>• countering spheres of influence</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> <li>• CSCE peacekeeping operations</li> <li>• tackling conflicts in the CIS</li> <li>• promoting economic growth</li> </ul>	X

7.3 Statements, Period 1995-1999

**TABLE 73**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BUDAPEST, 1995

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 14: ‘On a New Model of Common and Comprehensive Security for Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century’, Statement by A. V. Kozyrev at a session of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Budapest, December 7, 1995 [Unofficial Translation]</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security Model discussion</li> <li>• Europe must be free of dividing lines</li> <li>• setting up OSCE peacekeeping operations</li> <li>• streamline inter-agency work</li> <li>• strengthening the economic dimension</li> <li>• transforming and strengthening the OSCE</li> <li>• updating the Helsinki Decalogue</li> <li>• legal capacity for the OSCE</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;">X</p> <p style="text-align: center;">X</p> <p style="text-align: center;">X</p>

**TABLE 74**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BUDAPEST, 1995

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 15: Intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, OSCE Ministerial, Budapest, December 7, 1995</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• countering nationalism</li> <li>• respecting democracy</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> <li>• rule of law</li> <li>• conflict in Chechnya</li> </ul>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• tackling conflicts in the CIS</li> <li>• CFE compliance in the Flank region</li> <li>• OSCE Security Model</li> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> </ul>	X
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**TABLE 75**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, LISBON, 1996

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 16: Address of the President of Russia Boris N. Yeltsin to the Participants of the Meeting of Heads of States or Government of the OSCE Participating States, Lisbon, December 2, 1996</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OSCE Security Model</li> <li>• upgrading the OSCE</li> <li>• legal structures of a new European security architecture</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> <li>• adaptation of CFE</li> </ul>	X X

**TABLE 76**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, LISBON, 1996

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 17: Transcript of Vice-President Al Gore Statement, OSCE Lisbon Summit, Lisbon, December 2, 1996</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• tackling conflicts in the CIS</li> <li>• protecting human rights</li> </ul>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yugoslavia crisis</li> <li>• no transformation of OSCE into all-responsible security organization</li> <li>• no legal structures for OSCE</li> <li>• NATO enlargement proceeds</li> <li>• NATO poses no threat</li> <li>• building strong and cooperative NATO-Russia relationship</li> <li>• OSCE Security Model</li> <li>• adaptation of CFE</li> </ul>	       X X X
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**TABLE 77**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, OSLO, 1998

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 18: Address by Mr. Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Oslo, December 2, 1998</b> [Unofficial Translation]	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• territorial integrity of states</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• achieving legal capacity for the OSCE</li> <li>• OSCE peacekeeping operations</li> <li>• security enforcement only if mandated by UN Security Council</li> <li>• OSCE Charter on European Security</li> <li>• Kosovo conflict</li> <li>• critique about pace of adaptation of CFE</li> </ul>	      X X     X

**TABLE 78**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, OSLO, 1998

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 19: Address to the OSCE Ministerial As Delivered by U.S. Head of Delegation Under Secretary Thomas R. Pickering, Oslo, December 2, 1998</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• critique about theoretical focus of the OSCE Security Model</li> <li>• strengthening human rights</li> <li>• tackling conflicts in the CIS</li> <li>• withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova</li> <li>• conflict in Chechnya</li> <li>• non-democratic conduct in Belarus</li> <li>• non-democratic conduct in Kazakhstan</li> <li>• development of OSCE Platform for Cooperative Security</li> <li>• adaptation of CFE</li> <li>• update of Vienna Document</li> <li>• Kosovo conflict</li> <li>• promoting democracy</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p>

**TABLE 79**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, ISTANBUL, 1999

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 20: Statement by President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation at the OSCE Summit, Istanbul, November 18, 1999 [Unofficial Translation]</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> </ul>	

<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	• new transnational threats and challenges	
	• combating terrorism	
	• rebuking critique about Russian actions in Chechnya	X
	• ensuring human rights	
	• rebuking humanitarian interventions	X
	• NATO aggression against Yugoslavia	X
	• recalling Helsinki principles	
• compliance with international law		

**TABLE 80**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, ISTANBUL, 1999

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 21: Remarks by the President of the United States William J. Clinton at the Opening of the OSCE Summit, Istanbul, November 18, 1999</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adapting OSCE</li> <li>• new transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• Russian actions in Chechnya</li> <li>• combating terrorism</li> <li>• alleged 'NATO aggression' against Yugoslavia</li> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p>

7.4 Statements, Period 2000-2008

**TABLE 81**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, VIENNA, 2000

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 22: Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. Igor S. Ivanov at the Eighth Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Vienna, November 27, 2000 [Unofficial Translation]</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• territorial integrity of states</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• new transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• critique about strong OSCE focus on human rights issues in the East</li> <li>• critique about “double standards” within the OSCE</li> <li>• threat of growing nationalism</li> <li>• OSCE role in Chechnya</li> <li>• Russian compliance with the CFE ‘Istanbul commitments’</li> <li>• achieving legal capacity of the OSCE</li> </ul>	X X X X X

**TABLE 82**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, VIENNA, 2000

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 23: Intervention by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, OSCE Ministerial, Vienna, November 27, 2000</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• ensuring human rights</li> </ul>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adapting OSCE instruments</li> <li>• OSCE role in Chechnya</li> <li>• Russian non-compliance with the CFE 'Istanbul commitments'</li> <li>• Russian non-compliance with CFE Flank ceilings</li> <li>• protracted conflicts in the Caucasus</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p>
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**TABLE 83**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BUCHAREST, 2001

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 24: Statement by Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Ninth OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Bucharest, December 3, 2001</b> [Unofficial Translation]
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	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• combating terrorism</li> <li>• compliance with international law</li> <li>• reforming the OSCE</li> <li>• critique about strong OSCE focus on human rights issues in the East</li> <li>• promoting human rights</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p>

**TABLE 84**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BUCHAREST, 2001

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 25: Secretary of State Colin Powell's Remarks to the 9th OSCE Ministerial Council, Bucharest, December 4, 2001</b>
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	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• respect for human rights</li> </ul>	





**TABLE 88**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, MAASTRICHT, 2003

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 29: Remarks of The Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the 11th Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Maastricht, December 2, 2003</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• tackling new transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• combating terrorism</li> <li>• countering intolerance</li> <li>• solving the conflict in Moldova</li> <li>• critique of Russian non-compliance with CFE Istanbul commitments</li> <li>• addressing protracted conflicts</li> <li>• critique about human rights standards in Belarus and Turkmenistan</li> <li>• critique about situation in Chechnya</li> <li>• welcoming Georgian revolution</li> </ul>	          

**TABLE 89**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, SOFIA, 2004

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 30: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Twelfth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Sofia, December 7, 2004</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• strengthening stability</li> <li>• strengthening confidence and security</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	     
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• combating terrorism</li> </ul>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• critique of postponement of ACFE ratification</li> <li>• calling to adapt the VD</li> <li>• critique about handling of Kozak Memorandum</li> <li>• critique of new Georgian government</li> <li>• proposal of conference on the energy sector</li> <li>• protecting Russian minorities in the Baltics</li> <li>• critique of OSCE “double standards”</li> <li>• preventing new dividing lines</li> <li>• need for comprehensive OSCE reform</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p>
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**TABLE 90**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, SOFIA, 2004

<i>Statement</i>		<b>Statement 31: Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE, Sofia, December 7, 2004</b>
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ensuring minority rights</li> <li>• engaging on protracted conflicts</li> <li>• critique of Russian non-compliance with CFE Istanbul commitments</li> <li>• Ukraine elections</li> <li>• democracy deficit in Russia</li> <li>• dismissing “double standards”</li> <li>• supporting OSCE field missions</li> <li>• respecting human rights</li> <li>• ensuring rule of law</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p>

**TABLE 91**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, LJUBLJANA, 2005

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 32: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Thirteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, December 5, 2005</b>

	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p>
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• dissatisfaction with the OSCE’s work</li> <li>• “double standards”</li> <li>• need to reform the OSCE</li> <li>• legal capacity for the OSCE</li> <li>• critique about the work of ODIHR</li> <li>• critique about strong OSCE focus on human rights issues in the East</li> <li>• protecting Russian minorities in the Baltics</li> <li>• OSCE neglects the principle of co-operation</li> <li>• critique of postponement of ACFE ratification</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p>

**TABLE 92**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, LJUBLJANA, 2005

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 33: Intervention at the Thirteenth OSCE Ministerial Council as delivered by Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns to the 13th OSCE Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, December 5, 2005</b>
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	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	<p>X</p>
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• advancing human freedoms</li> <li>• fostering democracy</li> <li>• strengthening the OSCE</li> <li>• critique about Uzbekistan</li> <li>• applauding ODIHR</li> <li>• strengthening NGOs</li> <li>• addressing protracted conflicts</li> <li>• welcoming Georgian action plan for South Ossetia</li> <li>• critique of Russian non-compliance with CFE Istanbul commitments</li> <li>• OSCE needs no “fixing”</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p>

**TABLE 93**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BRUSSELS, 2006

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 34: Address of Mr. Sergey V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation before the 14th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, December 4, 2006</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p>
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• efforts to revive OSCE have failed</li> <li>• ‘first basket’ becomes irrelevant</li> <li>• critique of postponement of ACFE ratification</li> <li>• critique about exclusive focus on human rights</li> <li>• need to reform OSCE</li> <li>• need to reform ODIHR</li> <li>• OSCE misused as a vehicle to advance one-sided interests regarding protracted conflicts</li> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> </ul>	<p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p> <p>X</p>

**TABLE 94**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BRUSSELS, 2006

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 35: Statement by the Head of Delegation of the United States of America, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns at the 14th OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, December 4, 2006</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• territorial integrity of states</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	<p>X</p>
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• countering transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• recalling OSCE principles</li> </ul>	

• degradation of Helsinki principles in recent years	X
• critique of Russian non-compliance with CFE Istanbul commitments	X
• critique of Belarus	X
• critique of human rights standards in certain countries	X
• more support for Moldova and Georgia	X
• engaging in protracted conflicts	
• strengthening the OSCE	
• dismissing attempts at OSCE reform	X
• applauding ODIHR	X
• strengthening human rights	

**TABLE 95**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, MADRID, 2007

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 36: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Fifteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Madrid, November 29, 2007</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> </ul>
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Helsinki principles undermined</li> <li>• critique about Kosovo development</li> <li>• OSCE lacks relevance</li> <li>• need for legal capacity of OSCE</li> <li>• European architecture about to crash</li> <li>• “double standards”</li> <li>• critique of NGOs</li> <li>• critique of ODIHR</li> <li>• critique of VD development</li> <li>• Russian CFE suspension</li> <li>• countering new threats and challenges</li> <li>• protecting Russian minorities in the Baltics</li> <li>• critique about strong OSCE focus on human rights issues in the East</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X</li> </ul>

**TABLE 96**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, MADRID, 2007

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 37: Intervention to the OSCE Ministerial Council, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, Madrid, November 29, 2007</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• no consensus on cooperative security</li> <li>• ignorance of human rights commitments</li> <li>• lack of democracy in some states</li> <li>• certain proposals undermining OSCE acquis</li> <li>• lack of rule of law in certain states</li> <li>• efforts undermining ODIHR</li> <li>• CFE crisis</li> <li>• situation in Kosovo</li> <li>• more work in Central Asia to be done</li> </ul>	X X X X X X X X

**TABLE 97**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, HELSINKI, 2008

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 38: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Sixteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Helsinki, December 5, 2008</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sovereign equality</li> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	X X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OSCE cannot prevent wars anymore (e.g. 1999 Yugoslavia, 2008 South Ossetia)</li> <li>• critique about OSCE field missions and ODIHR</li> <li>• Medvedev EST draft proposal</li> <li>• restoring CAC</li> <li>• Russia-Georgia war</li> </ul>	X X X X

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• new threats and challenges</li> <li>• legal capacity for the OSCE</li> <li>• progress on protracted conflicts</li> </ul>	X
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**TABLE 98**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, HELSINKI, 2008

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 39: United States Intervention to the 2008 OSCE Ministerial Council as delivered by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns to the Ministerial Council, Helsinki, December 4, 2008</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• addressing situation in Georgia</li> <li>• resolve protracted conflicts</li> <li>• preserve CFE</li> <li>• fully implementing human rights</li> </ul>	X



<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	• Corfu process	X	
	• Medvedev EST draft proposal		
	• CFE principle of host nation consent		
	• promoting conflict resolution		
	• countering transnational threats and challenges		
	• engaging on energy security		
	• tackling protracted conflicts		
	• OSCE principles and commitments were violated in the Russia-Georgia war 2008		X
	• updating VD		
	• CFE deadlock		X
• protecting human rights			

**TABLE 101**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, ASTANA, 2010

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 42: Speech of the President of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev at the plenary meeting of the OSCE summit, Astana, December 1, 2010</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medvedev EST draft proposal</li> <li>• overcoming dividing lines</li> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• updating VD</li> <li>• CFE deadlock</li> <li>• securing a common information space</li> <li>• allow more freedom of movement (visa)</li> <li>• countering transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• develop a set of common principles for conflict resolution</li> <li>• Russia-Georgia war 2008</li> <li>• reform the OSCE</li> <li>• achieve legal capacity for the OSCE</li> </ul>	X X  X  X X X X X X

**TABLE 102**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, ASTANA, 2010

<b>Statement 43: Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the OSCE Summit, Astana, December 1, 2010</b>		
<i>Statement</i>	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• OSCE principles and commitments face serious challenges</li> <li>• supporting mutual interests in Afghanistan</li> <li>• situation in Georgia</li> <li>• tackling protracted conflicts</li> <li>• updating VD</li> <li>• engage in the human dimension</li> </ul>	X

**TABLE 103**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, VILNIUS, 2011

<b>Statement 44: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Eighteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Vilnius, December 6, 2011</b>		
<i>Statement</i>	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medvedev EST draft proposal</li> <li>• misuse of UN Security Council resolutions</li> <li>• “double standards”</li> <li>• cooperation amongst IOs</li> <li>• task of establishing security community</li> <li>• countering transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• common standards for conflict prevention and</li> </ul>	X X X  X

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>resolution</li> <li>• tackling protracted conflicts</li> <li>• growing nationalism</li> <li>• reforming the OSCE</li> <li>• achieving legal capacity for the OSCE</li> </ul>	X

**TABLE 104**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, VILNIUS, 2011

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 45: Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the OSCE First Plenary Session, Vilnius, December 6, 2011</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening stability</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening human rights</li> <li>• critique on Belarus (human rights)</li> <li>• critique on Ukraine (human rights)</li> <li>• critique on Russia (human rights and elections)</li> <li>• freedom of the internet</li> <li>• situation in the Middle East</li> <li>• CFE deadlock</li> <li>• tackling protracted conflicts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li></li> <li></li> <li>X</li> </ul>

7.6 Statements, Period 2012-2014

**TABLE 105**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, DUBLIN, 2012

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 46: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Nineteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Dublin, December 6, 2012</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> <li>• promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• initiatives such as ‘security community’ and EST stalled due to unilateral policies</li> <li>• dividing lines</li> <li>• critique on U.S. missile defense plans for Europe</li> <li>• politico-military dimension in decay</li> <li>• arms control used to achieve other political goals</li> <li>• countering transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• economic crisis in the EU</li> <li>• critique on visa barriers</li> <li>• critique on “double standards” by ODIHR</li> <li>• continue work on CBMs for the Internet</li> <li>• tackling protracted conflicts</li> <li>• reforming OSCE (legal basis)</li> </ul>	X X X X X X X X X X X

**TABLE 106**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, DUBLIN, 2012

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 47: Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the Intervention at the OSCE Ministerial Council First Plenary Session, Dublin, December 6, 2012</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• --</li> </ul>	

<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	• human rights are being challenged	X
	• critique on Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Romania (human rights)	X
	• ‘declaration on fundamental freedoms in the digital age’ blocked	X
	• no institutional changes that would weaken the OSCE	X

**TABLE 107**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, KYIV, 2013

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 48: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Twentieth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Kyiv, December 5, 2013</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• indivisibility of security</li> <li>• commitment to conflict prevention</li> <li>• further developing measures</li> </ul>	X
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• no progress on ‘security community’</li> <li>• dividing lines continue</li> <li>• critique on visa barriers</li> <li>• politico-military dimension in decay</li> <li>• tackling transnational threats and challenges</li> <li>• countering protracted conflicts</li> <li>• continue discussion on energy security</li> <li>• international regulation of the Internet</li> <li>• critique about neoliberal interpretations of human rights</li> <li>• growing nationalism</li> <li>• achieve a legal basis for the OSCE</li> <li>• critique about ODIHR</li> </ul>	X X X X  X X  X X

**TABLE 108**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, KYIV, 2013

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 49: Remarks by Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the OSCE Ministerial Council, Kyiv, December 5, 2013</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>strengthening stability</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>U.S. support for Ukraine protests at Maidan</li> <li>respect for human rights and fundamental freedom</li> <li>human dimension in decay in a number of countries</li> <li>oppression of freedom of speech</li> <li>critique of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Hungary, and Turkey (human rights)</li> <li>increase work in the OSCE's first dimension</li> <li>addressing protracted conflicts</li> <li>tackling corruption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> </ul>

**TABLE 109**

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BASEL, 2014

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 50: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Twenty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Basel, December 4, 2014</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>indivisibility of security</li> <li>sovereign equality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X</li> </ul>
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>recognition of Helsinki principles</li> <li>unilateral approaches and the failure to recognize mistakes have contributed to Euro-Atlantic crisis</li> <li>criticizing the EU</li> <li>Western support of Ukrainian 'coup d'état'</li> <li>Ukrainian offensive against ethnic Russian minority</li> <li>Minsk Agreements</li> <li>OSCE must intensify efforts related to the SMM and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> <li>X</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>participation in the Contact Group</li> <li>• ‘European House’ has been consistently undermined by unilateral actions (i.e. NATO enlargement, EPAA, EU Eastern Partnership)</li> <li>• support of the Helsinki+40 process</li> <li>• ensure freedom of movement, protect the rights of ethnic minorities and end all intolerance</li> <li>• OSCE must become a fully fledged international organization</li> <li>• establishment of Panel of Eminent Persons</li> </ul>	X
	X

**TABLE 110**

UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENT, BASEL, 2014

<i>Statement</i>	<b>Statement 51: Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry at OSCE Ministerial Plenary Session, Basel, December 4, 2014</b>	
	<i>Detectable</i>	<i>Contested</i>
<i>Key Principles And Norms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• --</li> </ul>	
<i>Other General Policy Topics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• recalling Helsinki principles</li> <li>• Ukraine tested by external aggression</li> <li>• value of OSCE in Ukraine conflict</li> <li>• Russian weapons supply to Ukrainian separatists</li> <li>• Russian non-compliance with OSCE obligations</li> <li>• U.S. does not seek confrontation</li> <li>• Russia should take steps to end the conflict (e.g. end Crimea annexation)</li> <li>• Russia unwilling to abide by the rules and the principles of the OSCE</li> <li>• numerous violations of Helsinki principles in 2014</li> <li>• repression of civil societies in a number of OSCE participating States</li> <li>• OSCE concentration on the Third Basket</li> </ul>	<p>X</p>

## 7.7 Assessment of the Second Abductive Test's Results

In the previous five paragraphs, a test has been conducted, using 51 statements of U.S. and Soviet/Russian delegations to C/OSCE Ministerial meetings and Summits. The aim was to quantify which key principles and norms are still reflected in the two countries' statements directed at the C/OSCE. At the same time, the test was conducted in order to quantify which of the key principles and norms were contested and which general policy topics were brought forward as well as which of the latter were contested.

Of the twelve key principles and norms of the regime complex, five are mentioned only very rarely in the 51 statements. Those are the principles of 'territorial integrity', 'peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful cooperation', 'strengthening confidence and security', 'refraining from the threat or use of force', and of 'sufficiency'. All other principles and norms are mentioned regularly, though to very differing degrees. The most often mentioned is the principle to 'further develop measures' (27 cases). At the same time, this principle is not contested at all. The second most often mentioned principle is the 'implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations' (17 cases). This principle also displays the highest degree of contention. In 15 cases, the principle was directly or indirectly debated in connection to non-compliance of either Russia or the (Russian perception of non-compliance of the) United States. Two other principles and norms are also highly contested. One of them is the 'indivisibility of security' (eight out of 13 cases); the other is the principle of 'sovereign equality' (four out of ten cases). The rest of the principles and norms is either not contested at all or only minimally contested in the statements. In the following Table 111 (see next page), the twelve key principles and norms of the regime complex are listed, arranged in descending order of the number of their being mentioned in the statements. A second row of figures quantifies occurrences of contestation.

**TABLE 111**

## ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENTS: KEY PRINCIPLES AND NORMS MENTIONED

	detectable	contested
<i>further developing measures</i>	27	0
<i>implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations</i>	17	15
<i>commitment to conflict prevention</i>	16	0
<i>promoting arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs</i>	15	2
<i>strengthening stability</i>	14	0
<i>indivisibility of security</i>	13	8
<i>sovereign equality</i>	10	4
<i>territorial integrity of States</i>	5	0
<i>peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful cooperation</i>	2	0
<i>strengthening confidence and security</i>	2	0
<i>refraining from the threat or use of force</i>	1	0
<i>principle of sufficiency</i>	0	0
<b>total</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>29</b>

The results of this first assessment lead to a number of conclusions. First, while some principles and norms have been mentioned regularly, others have not. There are issue-specific reasons why that is the case. The principle of ‘sufficiency’ (not mentioned at all) has lost most of its attention since the end of the bloc confrontation, the fulfillment of the disarmament stipulations of CFE, shrinking national defense budgets in a number of OSCE participating States (see IISS 1973-2014), and the revolution in military affairs have led to significantly smaller national forces anyways (cf. also Chart 31 in Paragraph 3.8.1 above). The principle to ‘refrain from the threat or use of force’ (mentioned one time) has lost certain promi-

nence as the post-Cold War peace made international incidents of the use of force in the Euro-Atlantic area for most of the time obsolete. However, the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and Russia's covert incursions into Ukraine in 2014 (cf. Freedman 2014) could trigger a revival of the use of the principle together with the principle of the 'territorial integrity of states'.

Second, three principles are strongly contested, which points to a high degree of divergent views. As mentioned in Paragraph 6.3 above, the principle of the 'indivisibility of security' has served the function of a template for accusations by Russia (cf. Cliff 2012). Almost all Russian critique directed at NATO enlargement or other relevant cases of U.S.-Russian disagreement were underpinned by quotation of the principle (ibid). A similar function applies to the principle of 'sovereign equality'. As can be seen in the tables of the previous five paragraphs, U.S. policy towards the C/OSCE was mostly dominated by concentration on human rights issues (see for example the last U.S. Statement by John Kerry, Basel 2014, Table 110 above). This fact derives from Washington's historically rooted understanding of the CSCE as a vehicle for human rights promotion in the East (cf. Schlotter 1999). With the change in presidency from William J. Clinton to George W. Bush, this pillar of U.S. foreign policy gained additional propulsion and led to an increase of instances of accusations of human rights violations in a number of eastern countries (amongst them Russia). In turn, Russia rejected such claims as violation of the principle of 'sovereign equality' or as interference in internal (Russian) affairs (see for example the last Russian statement by Sergei Lavrov, Basel 2014, Table 109 above). Last but not least, the contested state of the principle of the 'implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations' is a direct result of the high number of occurrences of deviant behavior in the arms control realm – most notably by Russia and in conjunction with the CFE Treaty.

Third, the large number of references to the principle of 'further developing measures' is the result of three critical motivations: (1) International institutions in general tend to be permanently concerned with advancing their governing instru-

ments in order to not becoming obsolete (see for an example from the WMD non-proliferation realm, Cirincione 2000b). This is a general form of institutional persistence and an indirect outcome of Keohane's (1984: 103) argument of the cost-effective maintenance of regimes. (2) During the last 25 years, Europe has experienced an unprecedented era of fundamental shifts and changes (see Chapter 3). From the peaceful management of the end of the Cold War, over violent ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and a number of CIS states, the emergence of transnational threats such as terrorism, to the dawning of the information age: this short era of ample change made adaptation inevitable, as can be read in most of the statements contained above. Particularly the C/OSCE with its three-dimensional approach at security (cf. Krause 2003) was always under pressure to develop timely governing instruments, addressing newly emerging threats to security (cf. IFSH 1997-2014). (3) Russia was almost always dissatisfied with the structures of the C/OSCE (see Chapter 3). Be it the contested attempt to achieve a legal capacity for the OSCE, the 1990s 'Security Model', the conclusion of the 1999 Charter for European Security, or the 2008 Medvedev EST draft and the ensuing Corfu Process, Moscow was a constant and impatient driver behind institutional adaptation (see Paragraphs 3.3-3.7 above).

Let us now turn to the general policy topics that were on the two countries' agendas between 1990 and 2014 and see whether there are any correlations between the normative and the policy level. Of the multitude of different policy topics mentioned, in the following matrix, the top 15 general policy topics have been assessed with a view to their occurrence and to their state of contention.<sup>50</sup> All in all, 13 of the 15 general policy topics were at some point contested. Only the policy topics of 'countering/addressing new transnational threats and challenges (including terrorism)' and of 'countering growing nationalism' were completely uncontested. Most often, the topic of 'reforming/transforming C/OSCE (including possibility of legal capacity and Medvedev EST)' was mentioned (60 cases). This topic, together with the topics of 'human rights critique towards specific states (including treatment of Russian minorities)' and of the CFE Treaty, was also

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<sup>50</sup> Only such general policy topics are listed that were mentioned more than seven times in the 51 statements.

among the top three contested topics. The following Table 112 (below) lists the general policy topics and quantifies their degree of contestation.

**TABLE 112**

ASSESSMENT OF STATEMENTS: TOP 15 GENERAL POLICY TOPICS


	detectable	contested
<i>reforming/transforming C/OSCE (including possibility of legal personality and Medvedev EST)</i>	60	34
<i>human rights critique towards specific states (including treatment of Russian minorities)</i>	39	37
<i>engaging on protracted conflicts</i>	32	12
<i>protecting/strengthening human rights</i>	31	4
<i>CFE Treaty</i>	28	23
<i>recalling Helsinki principles (including mentioned cases of erosion of principles)</i>	28	6
<i>countering/addressing new transnational threats and challenges (including terrorism)</i>	23	0
<i>Yugoslavia wars/crises (including Kosovo)</i>	16	4
<i>promoting democracy and freedom</i>	16	2
<i>countering growing nationalism</i>	11	0
<i>debate about NATO transformation/enlargement</i>	10	7
<i>critique about OSCE imbalance between the three dimensions</i>	9	7
<i>assessment of the work of ODIHR</i>	9	9
<i>C/OSCE peacekeeping</i>	9	3
<i>critique about OSCE human rights “double standards”</i>	8	8
<b>total</b>	<b>328</b>	<b>155</b>

Almost all policy topics in the above matrix were/are to different degrees a matter of contention. Correlating with the findings from Table 112, the topic of ‘reforming/transforming C/OSCE (including possibility of legal personality and Medvedev EST)’ is at the top spot and shows strong features of contention. This fact underscores once more that divergent issue-specific interests between the United States and Russia have shaped the institutional evolution of the C/OSCE (see also Chapter 3). While the topic in all its changing facets was addressed throughout the whole of the evaluation period (most often by Russia), it was also indirectly referred to by the heavy use of the key principle of ‘further developing measures’ (see Table 112). The topic of ‘human rights critique towards specific states (including treatment of Russian minorities)’ was most often brought forward by U.S. delegations but also mentioned by Russian delegations in conjunction with Russian minorities in the Baltics and in Ukraine. As this topic was almost always directed at Russia or Russian protégé states such as Belarus, it received in turn strong criticism by Russia and is thus the most contested topic on the list. It also correlates with the key principle of ‘sovereign equality’ which was used by Russia to rebuke human rights criticism. The high level of contention surrounding the CFE topic correlates with the use of the key principle of the ‘implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations’ in conjunction with Russian non-compliance. Because the contested CFE Treaty is closely interwoven with the three protracted conflicts in Georgia and Moldova (through the Istanbul commitments; cf. Kühn 2009), also the general policy topic of ‘engaging on protracted conflicts’ shows a comparably high degree of contention.

Aside from the high degree of contention surrounding most general policy topics, an even more pronounced insight derives from assessing the trend dynamics of contestation. When counting the overall number of contested topics and principles per year, an increasing, though volatile, trend is visible. From 1990 to 2014, the number of contested general policy topics has steadily risen with two periods of heavy average increase (2000-2008 and 2011-2012), interrupted by a period of a significant drop in contested general policy topics (2008-2011). The following Chart 38 (see next page) visualized these trend dynamics.

### CHART 38

#### U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN CONTESTED POLITICS IN C/OSCE FRAMEWORK: TREND DYNAMICS 1990-2014



For Chart 38: dashed red line indicates trend in occurrences of contested key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe; continuous blue line indicates trend in occurrences of contested general policy topics. Bold segments highlight periods of strong change ( $\Delta$ ). Please note: for the Stockholm Ministerial 1992 (see Table 68 and corresponding footnote) and for the year 1993, no Russian statements were included in the assessment. For the year 1997, no statement by either delegation was publicly available. Dashed blue line = mean trend line for occurrences of contested general policy topics.

The strong increase between 2000 and 2008 correlates with the two presidential terms of George W. Bush and the first two presidential terms of Vladimir Putin. Within this period, the year 2003 marks a peak in increase ( $\Delta+8$ ). As outlined in Chapter 3, these dates correlate with a change in politics in Washington and Moscow towards each other, towards the OSCE, and the 2003 Iraq War. Between 2008 and 2011 the drop in contested general policy topics correlates with the coming into office of Barack Obama in 2008 ( $\Delta-14$ ), the subsequent “reset” policy, the Medvedev draft EST proposals, and the OSCE Corfu Process. With the return to power of Vladimir Putin and the subsequent protests in Moscow, contested general policy topics have skyrocket in 2012 ( $\Delta+10$ ).

Besides this correlation with domestic political developments in the United States and Russia, the trend dynamics also correlate with the trends from Chart 35 above which displays occurrences of indicators of regime decay and from Chart 37

above, which shows occurrences of non-compliance. For all three trends it is remarkable that from the year 2000 onwards trend dynamics have considerably gone up.

## 7.8 Conclusions

The constant rhetorical reference by U.S. and Soviet/Russian delegations to the C/OSCE of key principles and norms, their state of contestation, the comparably higher degree of contested policies, and the high number of occurrences of non-compliance lead to conclude that the United States and Russia deal with key principles and norms at different levels and with different outcomes.

(1) Key principles and norms are firstly dealt with at a declaratory level. This level is mostly visible in the form of references in the preambular paragraphs of the regime complex's agreements (see agreements contained in Annex II). It is also often referred to in the general introductory remarks of U.S. and Russian political statements (see statements contained in Chapter 7).

(2) Key principles and norms are also dealt with at a second, the interpretative level (cf. Rotfeld 2014: 57). This level becomes manifest in the two states' ability to agree or disagree on institutionalization based on the key principles and norms. Besides the mere ability to agreement-making, this level is also reflected in the general policies that the two states pursue and that reflects their respective interpretations of key principles and norms (see Chapter 3).

(3) At the third level, their respective interpretations of key principles and norms and the related policies flow directly into the implementation of agreements. This level becomes most visible by acts of compliance or non-compliance with certain agreements (see Chart 37 above), and thus, in an indirect way, with the underlying key principles and norms.

Not only do the two states deal with key principles and norms at three different levels, the outcome at each level differs remarkably.

At the declaratory level, the key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe remain unchanged. Without making any unsubstantiated statements about the likely processes of negotiation, they are regularly referred to in an uncontested manner. U.S. and Russian delegations have referred to the Helsinki Decalogue in 26 statements and have repeatedly made use of the key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe in 122 cases. In only one of the 51 statements, a Russian delegation has brought forward concrete arguments in favor of changing or abandoning key principles and norms. In 1995, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev stated: ‘It is possible that it will be necessary to update, to a certain degree, the Helsinki Decalogue, including finding and formulating the optimum relationship between the principles of the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of states, on the one hand, and the right of nations to self-determination, on the other.’ (OSCE 1995, Statement 14, Table 73 above) Aside from this exception from the rule which did not result in any changes, no visible change to key principles and norms has occurred.

The picture changes when looking at the interpretative level. In 29 cases, key principles and norms have been a matter of contention between the United States and Russia. When directly linking key principles and norms to concrete policies, divergent interpretations of the meaning of principles and norms become visible. The principle of ‘strengthening stability’ is a good example. At the declaratory level, the principle remains uncontested. However, Russia’s occupation of parts of Ukraine in 2014 (cf. Freedman 2014) has been interpreted by most Ukrainian and Western politicians as destabilizing not just for Ukraine, but also for the Russian-Ukrainian relationship as well as for NATO-Russian relations (ibid). As NATO member states pointed out at the 2014 NATO Summit, ‘Russia continues to supply weapons to militants in eastern Ukraine; and it maintains thousands of combat-ready troops on its border with Ukraine. These developments undermine the security of Ukraine and have serious implications for the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.’ (NATO-Ukraine Commission 2014)

From the Russian perspective, it is the possible prospect of future NATO membership of Ukraine which is perceived as de-stabilizing. In 2008, Vladimir Putin explained to the press that NATO membership of Ukraine would ‘force Russia into a situation where it has to take countermeasures [including] to target its nuclear offensive systems at Ukraine.’ (President of Russia 2008) Obviously, differing interpretations of the principle of ‘stability’ prevail. What pertains to the international level finds its continuation at the domestic level. According to Herd (2013: 396), ‘the notion that authoritarianism is the solution to instability, rather than its cause, still prevails in the minds of many [Russian] elites. According to this understanding, human rights, democracy, and humanitarian interventions undermine the stability of government and societies.’

Another example is the ‘indivisibility of security’. While Moscow sees NATO enlargement as ‘a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust’ (President of Russia 2007) and thus as contrary to the principle, the United States view enlargement as being in line with the principle and not directed at Russia (cf. OSCE 1996). While Russia criticizes the treatment of Russian minorities in the Baltics as being in conflict with the human rights approach of the OSCE, it repels U.S. claims about Russia’s human rights record as being contrary to the principle of ‘sovereign equality’.

While Moscow and Washington agree on the principle of the ‘implementation of arms control, disarmament, and CSBM obligations’, both interpret it differently when it comes to substantiation. The Kremlin interprets the CFE Istanbul commitments as ‘artificial conditions that had nothing at all to do with the CFE Treaty’ (OSCE 2007a). Washington and NATO insist that ‘swift fulfillment of the outstanding Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova [...] will create the conditions for Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.’ (NATO 2002)

These examples show that the United States and Russia do not share a common understanding of the meaning of key principles and norms when it comes to con-

crete policy implications. Rotfeld (2014: 57) concludes, ‘countries in the Euro-Atlantic area have recognized the catalogue of European values agreed upon in the OSCE constitutional documents as their common foundation, but they have stuck to their own specific interpretations of these principles and values.’ The result is that at the interpretative level, key principles and norms are highly contested.

Even more visible, at the implementation level, key principles and norms of the regime complex have undergone a process of active and ongoing erosion through acts of non-compliance. The ‘implementation of arms control agreements’ was eroded through repeated instances of non-compliance (see Chapter 5). The most serious cases are Russian non-compliance with her CFE Istanbul commitments, Washington’s push for non-ratification of ACFE in 2002 (cf. Kühn 2009), and Russia’s CFE suspension in 2007. From the Russian perspective, the ‘indivisibility of security’ was eroded through four rounds (including German reunification) of NATO enlargement (cf. President of Russia 2007). ‘Sovereign equality’ has been eroded by Russia’s incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 (cf. Burke-White 2014). After all, both events have heavily contributed to eroding the key principles and norms of the regime complex. Almost all key principles and norms of the regime complex were violated by Russia in this context.


Last but not least, even though Washington and Moscow took constant recourse to ‘further developing [the institutionalized] measures’ of the regime complex, they did not agree on the concrete outcomes of reform. This leads to conclude that reference was mostly apt to generate agreement on the declaratory level while at the same time cloaking disagreement on the implementation level. All in all, the impressive number of 33 cases of non-compliance and their increasing occurrence (visualized in Chart 37 above) are indicative of a process of erosion of key principles and norms at the implementation level.

The following Chart 39 (see next page) visualizes the different policy outcomes at the different levels of U.S. and Russian reference to key principles and norms of

the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe. The more concrete the degree of substantiation (= policies) of key principles and norms at the three reference levels get, the heavier principles and norms are negatively affected.

**CHART 39**

REFERENCE TO KEY PRINCIPLES AND NORMS  
AT DIFFERENT LEVELS WITH DIFFERENT OUTCOMES



For Chart 39: The chart has been developed by the author for this thesis.

Taken together, the two guiding research questions of this chapter can be answered. (1) To what degree are key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe still reflected in the operational policies of the two main actors? (2) Are there indicators for an erosion of key principles and norms of the regime complex? The key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe are still reflected in the operational policies of the two main actors; however, to different degrees. At the declaratory level, key principles and norms are fully reflected and mostly uncontested. At the interpretative level, the United States and Russia do not follow policies that re-

semble a common understanding of key principles and norms. Against the background of the origin of most of the key principles and norms as lowest common denominator during the Cold War (i.e. Helsinki 1975) it is questionable whether both states ever shared a common understanding. This question shall be addressed in Chapter 8. Today, key principles and norms and the respective policies are highly contested. At the implementation level, diverging interpretations of key principles and norms and the related policies trigger increasingly acts of non-compliance which have resulted over time in an erosion of key principles and norms.

Therewith, also one of the two remaining indicators of regime decay – ‘changes in principles and norms’ (cf. Krasner 1982:4) – can now be addressed. Analysis of the results of the second abductive test shows that there are no detectable *changes* to principles and norms of the regime complex at the declaratory level which could explain the complex’s decay. Indeed, acts of non-compliance as a result of divergent *interpretations* of principles and norms in conjunction with conflicting policies, have led over time to an *erosion* of principles and norms.

Against this background, another indicator of regime decay which has been discussed in Paragraph 6.3 above – ‘regime-internal contradictions’ – turns out to be less important when confronted with the empirical evidence of Chapter 7. Even though the test conducted in this chapter has helped to underpin once more the earlier evidence of continued Russian recourse to the ‘indivisibility of security’ and to ‘sovereign equality’, their inherent contradictory nature is just one case amongst others where Russian and U.S. interpretations of key principles and norms and their related policies diverge.

These insights allow adding the factors of ‘divergent interpretations of principles and norms’ and ‘erosion of principles and norms’ to the list of answers addressing the second central research question of this thesis about decay. Slowly, an encompassing picture of the reasons for decay takes shape. However, the indicator of the

possible negative consequences of ‘hegemonic practice’ remains unaddressed so far (for a discussion see Chapter 8).

Both, the indicator of the possible negative consequences of ‘hegemonic practice’ and the question whether the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia ever shared a common understanding of the normative basis of cooperative arms control in Europe point to the broader socio-political spectra which drive international cooperation. While scholars of regime have collated meaningful factors that have validity for describing the process of decay, regime theory alone cannot explain the reasons behind that process and the general periodical volatility of institutionalized cooperation (cf. Thompson and Snidal 2000: 705). This is because regime theory is not a universal IR theory in the sense of Realism or Liberalism (see Paragraph 8.1 below for a detailed discussion; cf. Strange 1982).

The next chapter analyzes three theoretical approaches addressing the volatility of international institutionalized cooperation and sets them in relation to cooperative arms control in Europe.



## 8 Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist Analyses

In the previous three chapters, a regime-methodological approach has been applied in order to explain the forms of institutions that compose cooperative arms control in Europe. The result of the analysis is a dense regime complex consisting of five regimes (one of them being a meta-regime) which shows strong signs of decay. In the course of explaining decay, the more general question of the volatility of international institutionalized cooperation came up in conjunction with the hitherto unexplored decay indicator of the possible negative consequences of 'hegemonic practice' and the question whether the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia ever shared a common understanding of the normative basis of cooperative arms control in Europe.

In this chapter, three further theoretical approaches explaining the volatility of international institutionalized cooperation are introduced and analyzed. These are: the concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivism. The aim of this chapter is to find additional explanations for the decay of international cooperation in general and cooperative arms control in Europe in particular.

The guiding research questions of this chapter are: (1) What broader spectra of cooperation integration and dissolution drive the development of institutionalized cooperation? (2) What are the reasons behind norm erosion? (3) Do international institutions make a difference when it comes to the interests of the powerful? (These questions will be developed in the next Paragraph 8.1)

The chapter has five paragraphs. After a few introductory remarks in the first paragraph, the second paragraph introduces the concept of Security Community. In Paragraph 3, reflections by the English School are introduced. Paragraph 4 assesses Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics. All of those four paragraphs include a confrontation with the empirical evidence. The last paragraph sums up the findings and arrives at a final conclusion with regards to decay.

## 8.1 A Few Introductory Remarks

41 years of politics of cooperative arms control in Europe have led to an unprecedented growth of institutions and institutionalized cooperation (see Chapters 5 and 7). Now, four decades after their first tentative inception, cooperation between the United States and Russia on these issues has been reduced to a minimum (cf. Charap and Shapiro 2014b). Learning effects, cost-considerations, and repeated forms of contractual interactions, all of which are important essentials of regime scholars' assumptions of the constraining effects of institutionalized cooperation (cf. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997), could not prevent this process from happening. Analysis of the empirical evidence of cooperative arms control in Europe shows that international cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia followed a volatile evolution: from the first tentative efforts (1973-1975), followed by a longer period of stagnation (1976-1989), over the elaboration of a dense regime complex (1990-1999), to the retreat from cooperation and (partial) institutional dissolution (2000-2014). Behind these different periods, more general rationales seem to loom which make states fall in and out of love with the idea of cooperation. Regime theory is not suited to address these broader spectra. This is for several reasons.

(1) Regime theory lacks a broader historical perspective (cf. Buzan 1993: 328; Yoshimatsu 1998: 12). Like all theoretical reflections on contemporary social interactions (cf. Carr 2009), regime theory was directly impacted by those societal developments it sought to analyze. It is thus nothing more and nothing less than a "child of its time" (cf. Strange, 1982: 479). Historically seen, regime theory is in parts a product of the Cold War (cf. Rittberger 1993a). As such, a number of critical post-1990 international developments, be it Multipolarity, the perforation of the paradigm of state sovereignty by the episteme of the *responsibility to protect* (see Evans 2009), or the decay of regulatory institutions – such as the regime complex on cooperative arms control in Europe – cannot be explained from regime theory's narrow focus on institutions alone. In addition, the possibility of regime decay and cooperation dissolution runs almost contrary to the ideal of the majority of regime scholars which view international institutionalized cooperation

as improvement, in order to get away from the classical Realist state of anarchy and self-help (cf. Keeley 1990: 84). As a typical example of such understanding, Rittberger (1993: 19) argues that ‘the accomplishment of international regimes as to the promotion of peace seems to lie in the effect of insulating certain issue areas against a negative “spill-over” from tensions which have arisen between and among the same actors elsewhere.’ However, as the empirical evidence of this thesis has shown, even sophisticated forms of successful institutionalized cooperation such as regime complexes can go into reverse or even dissolve (current complexity research has so far missed to make such assessment; cf. Morin and Orsini 2013). Since institutionalization is not a guarantee for the continuation of cooperation, the question comes up, what broader spectra of cooperation and non-cooperation drive the development of institutionalized cooperation in all its facets.

(2) Another important insight from analyzing the empirical evidence pertains to the normative basis of the regime complex. As explained in Chapter 7, principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe are subject to divergent interpretations by the United States and Russia. The fact as such is not unusual at all (cf. van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007: 221). In general, principles and norms almost never have a degree of substantiation which would allow for uniform interpretation (cf. Brzoska 1992). By their very nature of scarcity they are seldom unambiguous (cf. van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007: 221). Their often value-laden implications ask for opposition (see Strange, 1982: 479). In the political context, they are more of a smallest common denominator which serves the purpose of a framework that shall allow states to achieve more meaningful and concrete results (cf. Keohane 1982: 337) or leads to learning effects, socialization, and so forth (see Chapter 4).

In the case of cooperative arms control in Europe, however, divergent interpretations result in concrete U.S. and Russian foreign and security policies that are challenging the normative basis of the regime complex to a degree where the normative basis becomes eroded through repeated and increasing acts of deviant behavior (e.g. in the form of non-compliance; see Chart 37). The problem with

regime theory is that scholars of regime have prescribed principles and norms a certain degree of “positive” commonality (cf. exemplary Keeley 1990: 84) based on Western-centric understanding of what is morally just. This degree of commonality does neither correspond with the empirical evidence of this thesis related to decay (see Paragraph 6.3 above) nor with critical research on norm dynamics (see Paragraph 8.4 below). Various authors (cf. Acharya and Buzan 2007; Hurrell 1993: 67) have not only criticized the ‘Western’ claim of the universality of historically-rooted European norms, latest research has also highlighted aspects such as norm devolution (see Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007), questions pertaining to norm justice (see Müller and Wunderlich 2013), and the morality of certain norm (see Heller and Kahl 2013). With regards to cooperative arms control in Europe and the consequences of decay, the question comes up, what are the reasons behind norm erosion.

(3) Most regime-theoretical approaches do not explore the Neorealist assumption that powerful states basically make use of international institutions in order to achieve their preferred interest (see Chapter 3; cf. Schweller and Priess 1997; Drezner 2007; see also Thakur 2013). As has been shown above, the cooperation volatility between the United States and Russia follows certain dynamics which correlate with changes in presidencies in the two countries (2000 and 2008) as well as with certain events such as the 2003 Iraq War (see Charts 35, 37, and 38 above). These correlations lead to assume that changes in interest of those two powerful actors have a direct impact on international institutionalized cooperation frameworks (see also Paragraph 6.3 above). If that were the case, Neorealists would have a serious point in case for arguing that powerful states exert their power through international institutions in order to achieve their interests (cf. Drezner 2007). The question is thus, do international institutions make a difference when it comes to the interests of the powerful.


The following paragraphs introduce the essentials of the concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics in order to answer these questions.

## 8.2 Security Communities

Research on the theoretical concept of Security Communities (SCs) has experienced a revival in latest years (see Adler 2011). Based on a concept developed in the 1950s by Karl Deutsch together with a number of further scholars, SCs can be viewed as the logical next cooperation step after the sequential establishment and operation of agreements, regimes, and regime complexes. Chart 40 (below) illustrates this possible process. In the chart, SCs are located at the intersection of a high level of states' convergent interests and a high level of cooperation.

CHART 40

INSTITUTIONALIZED COOPERATION IN A CONTINUUM



For Chart 40: The Chart has been developed by the author for this thesis.

Particularly Constructivist scholars have picked up a number of assumptions by early integrationists like Deutsch (see Adler and Barnett 1998c: 11). In general, research on SCs has employed a much broader view on the cooperation-enabling preconditions which allow states to finally achieve or fail to achieve lasting cooperation and thus permanent peace. Because cooperative arms control in Europe is in decay, reviewing the concept of SC might help adding an additional stratum to explaining the wider cooperation spectra, regimes are embedded in. Further on, the concept has become closely associated with latest declaratory political initiatives to transform the future OSCE space into a Security Community (see OSCE 2010; cf. Mützenich and Karádi 2013).

### 8.2.1 Essentials of Security Communities

The overriding principle under which to place the various works of scholars of Security Communities was the search for a stable state of peace. In 1957, Karl W. Deutsch and scholars released their seminal work on *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Reacting to the cruelties of World War II, at the heart of the book lays the old problem of how to eliminate war (Deutsch 1957: vii). In order to search for the conditions and processes that would enable long-term or permanent peace, the authors looked at peace within the North Atlantic area (ibid: 3). The basically new approach of the group, led by Deutsch, was their broader focus on explaining *why* certain groups, such as NATO member states, have permanently stopped warring (ibid: 4). Scrutinizing specific historical periods from different centuries, the Deutsch group came to conclude that certain forms of so called ‘Security Communities’ existed during the last centuries. As SCs they defined

*a group of people which has become “integrated”. By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”.*

*By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force. A security-community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. (Ibid: 5; capitalized letters as in the original)*

According to their research, the state of integration differs at the state level with two distinct types of SCs: an amalgamated SC where two or more previously independent units merge into a single unit (the United States being one example) and a pluralistic SC in which the units retain their legal independence of separate governments (Norway and Sweden being another example). According to Deutsch et al, political communities become eventually successful (in the sense of ensuring peace) once they cross the integration threshold and achieve the state of a SC. However, they also note that the process can be unsuccessful ‘if it ended eventually in secession or civil war’. (Ibid: 6-7)

With regards to the conditions of successful SC establishment, the authors highlight a number of ‘background conditions’ and ‘essential requirements’. As one background condition, the authors particularly stress a ‘somewhat deeper understanding of the meaning of “sense of community” [that is a] “we-feeling” [of] trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it’. (Ibid: 36) This condition translates directly into the essential requirement of ‘values and expectations’. For values, a compatibility of the main values held by the relevant political groups and a ‘set of established or emerging habits of behavior corresponding to them’ has to be present. (Ibid: 47-8) Habits of behavior should be based on the mutual predictability of behavior. With regards to expectations, joint rewards (e.g. political equality) or gains for the future had to be tangible. In addition, Deutsch et al found the presence of cores of political strength around which the integrative process develops an important condition. Political strength however turns out to be another multidimensional condition for successful SC establishment. On the one hand, the political units must have a considerable degree of capabilities (‘power’) to act as a political unit - the

higher that degree, the better. On the other hand, they must be able to constrain their 'power' and exert 'responsiveness'.

*More accurately, this means the ability of its political decision-makers and relevant political elites to redirect and control their own attention and behavior so as to enable rulers to receive communications from other political units which were to be their prospective partners in the integrative process. It means, further, the ability to give these messages from other political units adequate weight in the making of their own decisions, to perceive the needs of the populations and elites of these other units, and to respond to them quickly and adequately in terms of political or economic action. (Ibid: 37 et seq)*

'Power that cannot be controlled by the governments [is likely to meet] growing external resistance; and responsiveness would remain a matter of mere intention', Deutsch et al conclude. (Ibid: 40) Explicitly, they discard the existence of a hegemonic power as of eminent importance for the formation of SCs (ibid).

According to Deutsch et al, SCs can develop into different directions: evolution, stagnation, and devolution. Devolution, or decay, occurs if one simply turns the essentials of SCs (non-violent problem resolution, compatibility of values, dependable expectations) into the other direction. Amongst the most important factors for devolution Deutsch et al note the failure of a formerly strong state 'to adjust psychologically and politically to its loss of dominance as a result of changed conditions.' (Ibid: 64)

While the concept of SC lost most of its attention in the following decades, regime theory resembles strong features of definitions of SCs. Institutionalized procedures, dependable expectations, a compatible value base, and continued habits of behavior corresponding with the value base are all elements of critical regime definitions as outlined by Krasner (1982) or Young (1982). Forty years after the inception of the SC episteme, and only shortly after regime theory started to receive comparably less scholarly attention, a second generation of IR scholars revived the concept of SC. In 1998, Adler and Barnett re-focused attention towards

SCs and explicitly included the OSCE as a ‘security community-building model’ (Adler 1998: 119-160). The theoretical debate became elevated when the former Secretary General of the OSCE Marc Perrin de Brichambaut drove the organization’s attention towards the concept.<sup>51</sup> In 2010, OSCE participating States signed the Astana Commemorative Declaration which strives to achieve the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian ‘security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals’ (OSCE 2010). Adler concluded,

*“[The OSCE] rather than waiting for ‘the other’ to change its identity and interests before it can be admitted to the security community-building institution, [...] has incorporated, from the outset, all states that express a political will to live up to the standards and norms of the security community, hoping to transform their identities and interests”.* (Adler 2011: 15)

Adler and Barnett (1998b: 30) helped to refine Deutsch’s concept by distinguishing between ‘loosely coupled’ and ‘tightly coupled’ pluralistic SCs. As Deutsch did, Adler and Barnett stress the importance of at least an embryonic form of “we-feeling” amongst pluralistic SCs (ibid: 30 et seq). Further on, the authors categorize SCs into ‘mature’, ‘ascendant’, and ‘nascent’ forms, with the United States and, to a lesser degree, the EU, having reached the highest level (‘mature’) of integration (ibid: 50 et seq). The authors also concentrated on the evolution of SCs and distinguish between three stages: birth, growth, and maturity. While at the stage of birth, often a form of a common threat perception helps to engage in the first cooperative efforts, at the stage of growth, the respective units develop closely interconnected institutions, particularly in the realm of military coordination and cooperation; at this stage, also collective identity in the form of “we-ness” develops. Finally, at the last stage, a common identity together with common expectations flows into a genuine Security Community.

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<sup>51</sup> This information was passed on to the author in a private conversation with Marc Perrin de Brichambaut in 2012.

### 8.2.2 Analysis and Confrontation with the Empirical Evidence

The added value of the concept of SC compared to the regime episteme is its broader focus on cooperation and its inherent realism when it comes to viewing development as a continuum. While most regime scholars have a problem with decay as an inherent possibility to the development of regimes, Deutsch et al have been clear from the onset that SCs can disintegrate. When looking at the empirical evidence from 41 years of cooperative arms control in Europe, the process of institutionalization resembles strong features of the SC episteme. In that regard, the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe can be seen as a certain state of cooperation in the process of the eventual achievement of a SC (see Chart 40 above).

Applying Adler's and Barnett's categorization of the three stages of SC development, the empirical period between 1973 and 1989 can be seen as the nascent phase. With regards to a common threat perception, such can be found in the omnipresent threat of unlimited nuclear war between the two superpowers, elevated by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ensuing politics of détente would serve as framework for avoiding such outcome by approaching the problem at various layers. One layer addressing the nuclear realm, were risk reduction agreements such as establishment of a hot-line, the ABM, and SALT I. A second layer addressing the conventional realm, were the MBFR talks. A third layer, at that time mostly declaratory in nature and aiming at a general understanding of mutual security, was the Helsinki CSCE. This third layer, in a Deutschean understanding, established the 'essential requirement' of a value base of principles and norms.

In contrast to Deutsch et al, the CSCE value base was less the product of a common sense of 'we-feeling' but rather the offspring of a political linkage deal between the four main issue-specific interests of territorial status quo (Soviet issue-specific interest), achievement of a CSCE (Soviet issue-specific interest), addressing human rights issues (U.S. issue-specific interest), and establishment of talks on the conventional imbalance in Europe (U.S. issue-specific interest). In 1975, the declaratory nature of the CSCE value base was not expected to directly trans-

late into any kind of concrete habits of behavior (cf. Mützenich and Karádi 2013: 52). This changed with the end of the Cold War. The following years saw the spread of cooperative security institutions, based on the (now) commonly perceived value base (see Russian Statement 7 contained in Chapter 7). Building upon earlier agreements and cooperation processes, regimes developed and finally merged into a regime complex (see Chapter 5 and 6). This phase of ascendant SC development (1990-1994) promised, at least from an institutional perspective, the continuation of cooperation: the achievement of a tightly coupled pluralistic SC. From the mid-1990s on, the ascendant SC entered a new phase. The slow-down of institutional achievements (1995-1999) was followed by periods of stagnation (2000-2006) and devolution (2007-2014). (See Chapter 3 above)

The volatile development of the institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe can thus be as well described as several stages of the overall process of SC integration and dissolution; and thus as feedback to changes in interest and perception. The previous insight that regimes and regime complexes are also subject to wider developmental processes which, by no means, have to result in a somewhat eternal state of continuous and successful cooperation (see Paragraph 6.3 above), becomes further support from scholars of SCs. Beyond its aspects of evolution and devolution, the SC episteme contains relevant insights with regards to failed cooperation. Particularly two aspects are worth mentioning in conjunction with the empirical evidence: power and norms. In the normative realm, scholars of SCs ascribe paramount importance to a certain compatibility of the main values, more precisely, a partial identification in terms of self-images and interests which triggers predictability of behavior. As has been argued in the previous Chapter 7, for most of the preceding years, compatibility of values between the United States and Russia has only been present at the declaratory level. Indeed, a certain form of “we-feeling” is completely absent (cf. Lukin 2014) and partial identification in terms of (a general) interest has mostly vanished over the course of time. As a result, unpredictable behavior prevails, as can be seen in the many instances of non-compliance (see Chart 37 above).

These insights lead to the question whether the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia ever shared a common understanding of the normative basis of cooperative arms control in Europe. For the years of the Cold War this question can be negated from the outright due to the singular nature of Communist ideology (cf. Leatherman 2003; Leffler and Westad 2010). After the Cold War, new security challenges such as secessionist conflicts, instances of “ethnic cleansing”, or transnationally operating terrorism networks occurred. While the level of threat perception thus changed (relatively away from the scenario of nuclear holocaust), the normative base remained unchanged. Instead of engaging in efforts of ‘social engineering’ (Young 1982: 281) to adjust the normative base, the United States and Russia increasingly applied their own interpretations of the normative base to tackle those new challenges. Their interpretations differed remarkably with regards to tenets such as sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and the non-use of force. Examples are the two Chechen Wars (1994-1996; 1999-2000), the 1999 Kosovo War, the 2003 Iraq War, the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, the NATO-led Libya intervention in 2011, and the 2014 Ukraine conflict.

From a purely functionalist perspective (cf. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 767), the question whether the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia ever shared a common understanding of the normative basis of cooperative arms control in Europe is irrelevant as long as both actors are able to bring in line their divergent interpretations. From the viewpoint of the SC episteme however, true integration cannot occur without a feeling of “we-ness”. The latest rhetorical campaign by Russian politicians and researchers to negate a common value base with “the West”, stressing the differences instead (see President of Russia 2013; Lukin 2014), is thus a clear departure from the integration process outlined by Deutsch et al. Whether a short window of opportunity towards a truly common understanding of shared values existed at the beginning of the 1990s (see Soviet/Russian statements between 1990 and 1994 contained in Chapter 7) remains open to debate. At least from the Russian view, it ceased to exist with the maintenance and the further enlargement of NATO (cf. President of Russia 2014b; Charap and Shapiro 2014b). Addressing this question would benefit from further research.

The second important aspect deriving from SC research relates to the realm of power (cf. Adler and Barnett 1998b: 39). While one essential requirement for the establishment of a SC, the presence of a core of political strength around which the integrative process develops, was present throughout the ‘unipolar [U.S.] moment’ (Krauthammer 1991) of the 1990s, a number of directly related aspects involving power were non-conducive. Obviously, the Russian Federation has failed ‘to adjust psychologically and politically to its loss of dominance as a result of changed conditions.’ (Deutsch et al 1957: 64) The famous statement by Vladimir Putin that ‘the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century’ (President of Russia 2005, official translation), underscores this.

At the same time, analysis of the empirical evidence highlights that the United States were not willing to constrain their power and to exert ‘responsiveness’ towards Russian sensitivities in the way Deutsch et al saw it as necessary for successful SC establishment (see Paragraphs 3.3 et seq above). Washington’s refusal to allow the OSCE to become a full-fledged and encompassing regional security organization in conjunction with affirmation of NATO enlargement are the two major U.S. decisions underlining lack of power constraint and responsiveness. Walt (2014) claims that with the coming into office of the second Clinton administration, the United States became increasingly unwilling, in a Deutschean sense, to ‘redirect and control their own attention and behavior so as to [...] receive communications’ (Deutsch et al 1957: 37) from the Kremlin. Or as the former U.S. ambassador to NATO and one of the principle architects of enlargement, Robert Hunter, acknowledges in hindsight: ‘things began to go off the rails, as the U.S. foreign policy team changed in the late 1990s [...] NATO enlargement went too far’ (Hunter 2014). The result was that positive dependable expectations got lost at the Russian side. Mützenich and Karádi (2013: 50) conclude: ‘In Russia, the predominant view is that the cooperative strategy of the 1990s was a failure.’ As Deutsch et al (1957: 40) predicted, ‘power that cannot be controlled by the governments [is likely to meet] growing external resistance’. With the first coming into office of Vladimir Putin in late 1999 supported by the ensuing recovery of the Russian economy (see Chart 29 above), this effect becomes visible.

Taken together, the SC episteme contains important theoretical insights explaining the volatility of institutionalized cooperation in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe. The absence of an inclusive sense of “we-feeling”, based on commonly agreed, equally shared, and continuously observed values, combined with the problematic handling of power accretion (United States) and dissolution (Russia) led to the decay of an institutionalized policy space which already had strong institutional features of an ascendant SC. Last but not least, the repeated use of force by certain actors, mainly Russia (cf. Freedman 2014), shows that the reality in the OSCE area is far from the state of a genuine Security Community.

### 8.3 The English School

Starting in the late 1950s with the discussions amongst the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, the English School (ES) in the sense of a “school” developed around an initial core group of a handful of British scholars.<sup>52</sup> Their deliberations have flown into a number of emblematic texts, amongst the best known are Hedley Bull’s *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1977) and Martin Wight’s *Systems of States* (1977). From the early 1990s onwards, a second wave of ES scholars, amongst them prominent figures such as Barry Buzan, Andrew Hurrell, or Tim Dunne, and from the 2000s onwards a third more globalized ES generation, sought to refine the works of their predecessors (see Green 2014: 2). In contrast to the peace-embracing episteme of Security Communities, the ES is primarily concerned with international order; that is the structures, maintenance, and instruments of order. While some proponents of the ES have been flirting with the SC concept (see Adler and Barnett 1998b: 11), there are more similarities with regime theory (see Buzan 1993; Yoshimatsu 1998), for both approaches aim at explaining the development and preservation of order in the international sphere; though, at different levels. Aside from these conceptual similarities, the ES’s essentials of ‘order’ and ‘international society’ might provide explanations of additional inter-state cooperation spectra in which political institutions such as regimes are embedded.

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<sup>52</sup> Prominent figures of the original school included Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Alan James, C.A.W. Manning, and Adam Watson. For a good overview of the development of the ES see Green and Navari (2014).

### 8.3.1 Essentials of the English School

The ES starts off from the Realist assumption that international politics take place in a state of international anarchy which is lacking a centralized authority with the power to enforce rules. Proponents of the ES are quite close to Waltzian assumptions (cf. Waltz 1979) and recognize a number of structural features which they describe as arising from as well as shaping an international system. In the international system, states, much like Waltz's (1986: 343) 'shoving and shaping', recognize certain interdependence amongst each other; they do, however, lack common interests and consent of common rules (Bull 1977: 10). In order to establish a certain set of rules of behavior, the different units of the system – the states – form an 'international society' with the aim of maintaining their independence as well as preserving the states' system (ibid). Hedley Bull defines international society as follows:

*a society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.*

Bull (ibid: 13)

In short, states aim at establishing and preserving order (cf. Bull 1969: 637). According to Bull (ibid: 67), the development of a sense of common interests is crucial for the operation of international society. In his writings, he outlines three crucial rules which derive from states' common interests: (1) the preservation of sovereignty which derives from a general security of life against violence and the fundamental purpose of the stability of possession; (2) reciprocity in the recognition of mutual sovereign equality which derives from the sanctity of promises and manifests itself in the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* which, anon, serves the bedrock of international law and diplomatic procedures; and (3) the maintenance of a balance of power among great powers which serves the function of prevention of system transformation into a universal empire, maintenance of states' independence, and provision of basic conditions for the operation of further institu-

tions of international order such as agreements, organizations, and so forth. (Cf. Vincent 1988: 197-202) For Bull, war is a basic determinant of the international system.

*War and the threat of war are not the only determinants of the shape of the international system; but they are so basic that even the terms we use to describe the system – great powers and small powers, alliances and spheres of influence, balances of power and hegemony – are scarcely intelligible except in relation to war and the threat of war. (Bull 1977: 187)*

Vincent (1988: 202) thus concludes that ‘war itself might be interpreted as an institution of international society’. As such, war is in close vicinity to the balance of powers, for it is the great powers that (now) carry (additional) responsibility for managing the state of anarchy up to a point where their global interests were accommodated without the need to resort to large-scale violence or war. Bull did not view the balance of powers as an ideal state but rather as the best arrangement possible under the historic circumstances of the Cold War which were shaped by the nuclear arms race of the 1960s (cf. Bull 1961: 39).

Beyond Bull’s minimalist framework of how to obtain order in the international society achieved against the background of the international system, scholars of the ES have outlined a third layer of international interaction and order, termed ‘world society’. (See Wight 1991; Buzan 2004) World society exists at the personal level and includes individuals, non-state organizations, and the global population as a whole. The concept thus relates to a *Kantian* view of revolutionist or idealist thinking which envisions development towards a future state of overcoming nation state primacy. As Buzan (1993: 337) pointed out, the third layer of the trinity of system, international, and world society adds a strong liberal stratum which is particularly in conflict with Bull’s tenet of the state as primary fortification against a relapse into the classical *Hobbesian* state of anarchy.

Bull’s societal concepts are sometimes lacking clarity – not just in relation to war as a determining feature for either ‘international system’ or for both ‘international

system' and 'international society'. First and foremost, they leave open the question of clear-cut boundaries between the states of 'international system', 'international society', and 'world society'. The lack of an analytical framework (see Buzan 1993: 332) also prevents clear identification of when and how evolution takes place in the system. Bull's analysis that international society is subject to trends of strengthening and weakening (ibid) is not very satisfying in this regard.

Barry Buzan (ibid) has addressed these analytical shortcomings and has linked the concept of international society to regime theory and Neorealism. Starting from Wight's (1977: 33) civilizational approach which assumes that international society 'will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members', he applies Tönnies' (cf. 1926) sociologic distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* conceptions of society and links it to the *Waltzian* argument that anarchy generates 'like units' (cf. Waltz 1979: 93) of the *Gesellschaft* type of society whereas Wight's definition leans towards the *Gemeinschaft* type of society. Buzan concludes that sovereignty is central to the coming into being of international society. In international societies states recognize each other as sovereign equals (Buzan 1993: 345) and thus create like units. As a consequence of interactions among 'a group of states [that] have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements' (Bull and Watson 1984: 1), international law, which is central to understanding the concept of international society, develops. By linking sovereignty to a more functional (Neorealist) understanding of society as *Gesellschaft*, Buzan is able to make a distinction between the state of international system and international society. Mutual recognition and sovereign equality are the key distinctions drawing the line.

At the same time, by applying the *Gemeinschaft* type of society, Buzan is able to outline a rather fluid boundary between international society and world society. While world society rests on Wight's understanding of historically evolved shared values which establish a kind of "we-feeling" among participating states, it can develop in parallel to international society. The conduct of international relations

based on international law and differently shared values leads over time to ‘layers of concentric societal circles [where those] in the core circle will have more shared values, and much fuller sets of rules and institutions, than those in the outer circles.’ (Buzan 1993: 345) In this core circle – and here Buzan links the ES to the regime episteme – networks of regimes are operating, thus maintaining order at the operational level. Understood in these terms, ‘international society [...] might be seen as a regime of regimes’, he concludes. (Buzan 1993: 350)

Buzan’s ‘concentric circles’ represent only one manifestation of another important aspect of the ES, that is the historical expansion of international society (cf. Bull and Watson 1984). As much as the early ES and its theoretical essentials are purely European conceptions of international order and conduct, the spread of the theory as such and the developmental aspects of the episteme of international society have always included the wider spectra of global participation (cf. Bull 1977: 315-17). The global model of international society which exists in the contemporary world could have come about in two possible ways. Either, if the different centers of the ancient world would have developed in parallel, recognizing at a certain point in time that their mutual interdependence dictates a certain degree of order to manage interdependence or, closer to what actually happened, if a certain centre of power (here European) advances faster on the track of international society (through the Westphalian model) than the others and finally takes over the system as a whole (through Colonization), thus imposing its already established rules of order. (Cf. Buzan 2014: 60) Through the process of De-Colonization, the Third World finally becomes member of the international society and brings with it its inherent problems. Another important aspect of this process is the way in which the European international society got into contact with other centers of power. While early scholars of the ES paid much attention to the so called *encounter* version where the European core got in contact with other units like early China and the Ottoman Empire and failed to colonize the latter, the *standard of civilization* version (Gong 1984) concludes that from the nineteenth century onwards other non-European states had to qualify, like Japan, in order to gain entry to the European model of international society.

The important implications of the expansionist debate among scholars of the ES derive from introducing dynamism and questions of morality to the concept of international society. Regarding dynamism, Gong (1984: 90-3) sees the nineteenth century version of the standard of civilization overtaken by a more contemporary Western demand for human rights. As such, the Western states would again raise the ante of qualification for entry into the (now global) society of states, which would thus undergo a structural change in terms of common values and rules. Already Bull had voiced pessimism with regards to the further development of the international society. Amongst other reasons, he saw it weakened by its global expansion and the trend to move from the state-centric episteme of international society to the individual level of world society, most vividly brought forward in the promotion of human rights standards which might open the door for moral claims undermining the existing order (Bull 1977: 151-53). Keene (2002) argues that the ES stresses too much the aspect of order and underestimates the consequences of inequality and coercion which the ongoing evolution of the European standard of civilization model continues to trigger in third states.

Bull's as well as Buzan's findings about the further evolution of international society have in common that the concept is by no means an end to itself. Buzan (1993: 351) concludes that 'there is no guarantee that international society is a one-way process' and particularly the 'problematic agenda of intervention' (ibid) clashes with the current state-centered system of international society and human-centered world society aspirations. The same dynamics can be attributed to Buzan's 'societal circles' because it is not safe to argue that the current Western core will remain at the center or that other states are progressively heading towards the center.

### 8.3.2 Analysis and Confrontation with the Empirical Evidence

The broad historic approach of the ES contains a number of important insights for this thesis. First, it allows for a certain "downgrading" of the centrality of regimes, both from a theoretical and from an analytical point of view. As Buzan suggests, regimes are the legal tool box for close state-to-state interaction in an international

society. The more regimes are interconnected and overlapping, the higher the chance that the states located at the core center of international society already share a common civilizational background (a sense of “we-feeling”) in the understanding of Wight (cf. Buzan 1993: 349-51). With the cultural and societal sharing of principles and norms, often found in global sub-systems or regions such as the “Western world” or the Middle East, regimes would emerge particularly in the ‘European (now Western) core’ where ‘states voluntarily bind themselves in pursuit of increased security, economic efficiency, environmental management, societal openness, and a range of other objectives.’ (Ibid) Regimes are thus primarily a Western conception rooted in the long-term development of a *Gemeinschaft* type of international society which has spread both in terms of geography (though as the *Gesellschaft* type) and operational conduct. It follows that the study of regimes is mostly a study of the operational level embedded in a wider historically evolved spectrum of international cooperation dynamics.

The second important insight derives from tensions between the status quo impact of order preservation, best characterized by Bull’s writings, and the dynamics unfolding by the historical evolution of international society. With regards to the empirical evidence of this thesis, the Cold War depicted the classical paragon of Bull’s conceptions. Two opposing great powers which carry the additional responsibility of preserving international order (cf. Bull 1977: 200-5) have a shared interest in balancing their power (in the sense of equilibrium) through means of nuclear arms control against the permanent threat of nuclear annihilation. As both powers recognize each other as ‘like units’ (in the *Waltzian* sense) of an international society, they are able to manage their relations through diplomatic conduct, respect for mutual spheres of influence (the other WTO and NATO states; cf. Nye 1987: 392-3), non-intervention in internal affairs, and sporadic war at the periphery (mostly in the Third World), to the detriment of those states located at the periphery. The Helsinki Final Act is thus a classic example of an accord which stresses status quo preserving principles such as sovereign equality and non-intervention. At the same time, the West, which is a more stringently evolved international society of its own, shares a common civilizational background ex-

pressed in a common canon of values. This canon includes, amongst others, *Kantian* notions of world society which produce the imperative of individual human rights. As the Helsinki accords were only declaratory in nature and by no means enforceable, the East agreed to include the rights of individuals as a *quid pro quo* for status quo (cf. Schlotter 1999).

With the end of the Cold War, order was in danger of overthrow. The West – now relatively more powerful than its former adversary – and Russia recognized the danger and cooperated in establishing a new order based on the legal instruments that had guided the way so far. Even though they cooperated, both had two competing visions of order: the United States wanted to maintain NATO and wanted to include Russia in a dense network of interlocking agreements in the realm of cooperative security; Russia wanted a ‘common European house’ (Gorbachev 1996) where all inhabitants are equal and equally secure. The result of these two competing visions was twofold: on the one hand, a dense network of overlapping agreements (amongst them the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe) emerged and facilitated international conduct. On the other hand, during the early 1990s, Russia pushed towards the societal core by embracing idealist conceptions (see Soviet/Russian statements of the early 1990s contained in Chapter 7), now more forcefully voiced by Western states. At the same time, war moved from the geographical periphery to the center, most visibly in Yugoslavia. The power vacuum left by the demise of the WTO and the Soviet Union gave way to ethnic conflicts, secessions, and large-scale human rights abuses. For three reasons this development and its consequences were crucial. First, they occurred on territories previously associated with the Soviet sphere of influence or even at the Russian territory. Second, the West was now much more willing to give expression to its own world society understanding of policies than against the previous background of nuclear deadlock (cf. Flynn and Farrell 1999). Third, Russia found itself trapped between aspirations at joining the societal Western core while at the same time remaining bound to the more classical order-preserving international society of Bull (expressed by Russian opposition to NATO enlargement).


These three conflicting realities led to different outcomes. One outcome was that increasingly the West gave its fiat to humanitarian interventions, sometimes bypassing the UN Security Council, the most visible example being the Kosovo intervention in 1999. Freedman (2014: 15) concludes, '[The Kosovo crisis] qualified the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, elevated the principle of self-determination and reduced the standing of the Security Council'. Another outcome was NATO enlargement in order to stabilize the former Soviet client states. Enlargement further contradicted the old order principle of an equilibrium balance of power and strengthened the new emerging order shaped by the West; a development criticized by Russia with the recourse to the 'indivisibility of security'. The third important outcome was that Russia, after a short period of collective interventions in the early 1990s (cf. Flynn and Farrell 1999), again started to progressively retreat from the inner core of international society and is today at the outer fringes vividly opposing the West's world society values such as the imperative of human rights in international politics. Lukin (2014: 52) states that 'the concept of the absolute priority of human rights, which forms the foundation of the West's dominant ideology [...] is alien to most other cultural traditions [including the Russian orthodox]'. At the same time, Russia is now also re-interpreting older ordering principles such as territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the non-use of force, as seen in the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.

In 1993, Buzan (1993: 349) assumed that the demise of the Soviet Union had increased the cohesion of the Western international society and would propel the spread of regimes because the peer competitor had vanished. What was certainly true in 1993 appears in a totally different light some twenty years later. The opposing dynamics of Western integration towards world society on the one hand and Russian separation towards a retreat even from ordering principles of international society on the other hand has created a tension impacting the common legal framework. If regimes and regime complexes are understood as binding instruments of common orders of an international society (ibid: 351), their texture gets increasingly stretched the more the major powers involved are drifting apart to opposing poles. At a certain point, the texture yields to the centrifugal powers and

falls apart. This process can be seen in the decay of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe and gets elevated by the fact that the regimes composing the complex are embracing dyadic conceptions of international society (sovereignty principles) and world society (human rights principles) at the same time. The following Chart 41 (below) illustrates the process.

**CHART 41**

OPPOSING POLES STRETCHING COMPLEXITY TEXTURE



For Chart 41: The Chart has been developed by the author for this thesis.

The third important insight deals with the employment and aggregation of power in international society. Following Bull, one of the ordering principles of international society is the balance of power and thus the prevention of hegemony or world domination by one single power. In contrast, concentration of power in the hands of a single actor distorts the foundations of balance, and thus, threatens international society as a whole, as Clark (2007: 227-43) argues. It follows from ES interpretation that the post-Cold War period of the U.S. ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer 1991) was apt to further thwart the formerly achieved order of U.S.-Soviet equilibrium balance. In reality, the end of the Cold War equilibrium state of balance of power led to two outcomes.

First, even though the initial years of the post-Cold War period (1990-1994) saw a significant growth in institutionalized order, the empirical evidence has revealed strong tendencies of the United States to push through its preferred issue-specific interests in the formation and scope of institutions (see Chapter 3). At least between 1990 and 2000, American power policies went almost completely unchecked. Buzan (2011: 11) adds, ‘with the shift to unipolarity, the U.S. became the principle representative and exponent of the hegemonic practice by which the West continues to dominate international society.’ At the same time, ‘anti-hegemonism is an emergent property of post-colonial international society.’ (Ibid) While post-Cold War Russia does by no means represent a post-colonial entity, it carries on the one hand historical memories of being dominated for many centuries (see Neumann below), on the other hand, its decline from superpower status and the parallel unchecked aggregation of U.S. power triggered almost inevitably perceptions of deprivation, imperfection, and disregard on Russia’s side (cf. exemplary President of Russia 2005).

The second outcome was a loss of political and moral credibility on the U.S. side. From the point of international society order as well as from the point of world society order, Washington did not practice what it preached. Regarding international society order, the United States and its NATO allies increasingly departed from the old ordering principles of respect for sovereignty and arrived at a middle position increasingly embracing ideas of world society, most notable by humanitarian interventions (cf. Luck 2003). At the same time, Washington, particularly under the eight years of the George W. Bush administration, contradicted its own ideas of world society order by the use of double standards. What Ruggie (2004) labeled ‘American exemptionalism’ found its expression in ‘U.S. abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, its policy of “extraordinary renditions” and acceptance of de facto torture, as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court, [which] have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights.’ (Buzan 2011: 10) As such, the United States found itself increasingly in a hard to sustain position of criticizing Russian non-compliance with principles and norms of the regime complex while actively contradicting a num-

ber of principles and norms of the Helsinki acquis in other parts of the world. Not surprisingly, after the unlawful annexation of Crimea in 2014, President Putin countered Western accusations with a lengthy tirade of the West's 'transgressions' during the last 15 years (see President of Russia 2014a). Nevertheless, the covered Russian actions in Ukraine (e.g. forces without national insignia) and the fact of the Russian rhetoric recourse to international law shows that principles and norms of the regime complex (at least those pertaining to an international society understanding of order) are still having certain constraining effects on Moscow (cf. Buzan 2011: 19).

Summing up, the ES applies a historic perspective on ordering principles among states. Its tripartite approach including *Hobbesian*, *Grotian*, and *Kantian* views on international conduct allows for understanding the diverse dynamics between integration and separation, with the concept of international society leaning more towards Neorealist and the concept of world society tending towards Liberal/Idealist conceptions (cf. Buzan 1993: 335-7). Analysis of the empirical evidence along the lines of the ES leads to two central insights.

(1) The downfall of the equilibrium state of balance of power disrupted the existing order. As scholars of the ES predicted, the emerging unipolar hegemony was counterproductive to efforts achieving a new stable order.

(2) The civilizational difference between two understandings of international society and world society put additional strain on the newly established instruments of order.

Both factors together contributed to the decay of the post-Cold War order. Beyond that, the ES allows for theoretically locating the United States and Russia in different regions of the pursuit of international order.

From an ES point of view, contemporary Russia is trapped between a classical state of the international society as outlined by Bull and the search for a new defi-

inition of international society which it can share with other participants. Moscow's latest push towards Eurasian integration and closer economic ties with China (cf. Lukin 2014) is thus not only a geopolitical game or owed to the fact of Western economic sanctions but can as well be interpreted as search for a new definition of international society which will allow Moscow to achieve its issue-specific interests against a background of ordering principles in accordance with its own issue-specific interests. Neumann (2011: 463) argues that Russia's entry into international society is shaped by its memories 'of being part of a suzerain system [of the Golden Horde between 1240 and 1500], and that it is therefore still suspended somewhere in the outer tier of international society.' The contemporary policies of Moscow might therewith even signal a departure from the 'outer tier' towards another yet to be defined international society. Such speculation nevertheless stands on a narrow empirical base and would thus benefit from further research on the issue.

In turn, the West is progressively moving towards world society in the understanding of Wight. Its domination of world policies during the short period of the unipolar moment brings with it all the associated problems of the standard of civilization such as hubris, hegemonic practices, and inequality (cf. Gong 1984; Buzan 2014). The re-emergence of a multi-polar system (cf. Buzan 2011) thus challenges the Western conceptions of international society and particularly of world society (see BRICS 2014, particularly Paragraphs 27 and 28). It is yet too early for a sound analysis of how possible multiple future societies might interact and develop abreast (cf. Stivachtis 2014; more predictive Buzan 2011).

#### 8.4 Constructivist Analyses of Norm Dynamics

Both theoretical approaches analyzed so far in this chapter have pointed to the complex interplay between power and the normative dimension. Both theories stress the rationale of common values as significant driver for integration; though the ES puts more effort into developing its arguments from a historical/cultural perspective. While the episteme of SC with its peace-embracing focus sees common values expressed in common norms as a product of the process of integration

and cooperation and views power with more skepticism, the order-embracing ES is more nuanced in its assessment of the different societal backgrounds of the uneven evolution of values and norms and views power more positively as long as an equilibrium of power prevails (see Bull 1977). Both theories thus assume certain dynamics in the evolution of values and norms as important driving forces behind the volatility of institutionalized cooperation. Both agree that their models of cooperation (Security Communities here and International Society/World Society there) and their scope (abandoning war here and order there) are subject to dynamics and, at worst, reversible. This leads to analyzing norm dynamics and the reasons behind dynamism in more depth. The ES has a compelling point in case in arguing for different historical/civilizational developments as driving forces. Scholars of SCs lean more towards idealistic reasoning in the pursuit of peaceful conduct which clashes with classical Realist thinking (see Chapter 2 above). Further concentrating on norm dynamics might add additional strata explaining institutionalized cooperation integration and dissolution.

#### 8.4.1 Norm Dynamics: Essentials of Constructivist Analyses

While norms have always been an integral part of the research agenda of IR, scholars from different schools of thought have treated the issue considerably different at different times. Initially, classical Realists treated norms as principle axioms for understanding world politics. Carr (1939: 97) claimed that ‘political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power’ and criticized Realism’s failure to emphasize emotional appeals and moral judgment (*ibid*). While primarily concentrating on the struggle for power, Morgenthau (1985: 5-6) included normative factors such as nationalism and the link between morality and international law in his works. With the dawning of scientism in the 1970s (*cf.* Waltz 1979), Neorealists took a significant turn away from the normative dimension arguing that states comply with norms when it suits their interests and violate norms when they conflict with defined interests (*cf.* Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 1995: 340-43). Only shortly afterwards, the Neoliberal regime episteme brought back norms as an integral part of its method of describing institutionalized cooperation (*cf.* Krasner 1982: 2; see Chapter 4 above).

With the advent of Constructivism in the late 1980s and early 1990s (cf. Shannon 2000: 293), norms finally became a central reference point in the study of IR and the corresponding literature fills whole shelves by now.<sup>53</sup> The generally agreed and often referred to definition of norms comes from Katzenstein (1996: 5) whereas norms are ‘collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity’. The observance of norms is thus rooted in the logic of what is morally appropriate (March and Olsen 1998). Norms are not exogenously given variables but develop in a societal process. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) present a model which has long been accepted as the standard model for norm development. In their ‘norm life cycle’ model, a minority group of so called ‘norm entrepreneurs’ advocate the advancement of a new norm in order to strengthen their specific position (ibid: 893). After a while the new norm starts spreading and more and more actors embrace the norm which leads to a crucial ‘tipping point’ from which onwards a ‘norm cascade’ develops. At this stage, already a majority of actors embrace the norm which leads in the end to a quasi universal acceptance. Norms have then achieved a ‘taken-for-granted quality’ (ibid: 895) of internalization.

Much in the literature about norms concerns with the question of agency and structure. According to Wendt (1987: 337-8), ‘the agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors’. Such ontological view was primarily aimed at creating a counter model to the individualism-centered approach of rationalistic theories. Particularly with a view to the dynamics of norm evolution the agency/structure relationship nevertheless resulted in a one-sided account which over-emphasized structure as an idealistic quasi endpoint (see exemplary Risse-Kappen and Sikkink 1999: 33). With a pejorative undertone, Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007: 221) emphasize that ‘this is all the more curious because constructivists in particular should be

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<sup>53</sup> For a good overview of the corresponding literature see Wunderlich 2013.

open to the possibility that norms are open to “social reconstruction”.’ Remedying this shortcoming, the so called ‘second wave’ (Cortell and Davis 2000: 66) of *critical* Constructivists highlighted the need to bring back agency in the discussion of norm dynamics as no compelling evidence exists that norms, once they have achieved a structural taken-for-granted quality, will eternally stay the same or trigger endless adherence (cf. Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007: 256-7). As Shannon (2000: 298) puts it very basically, ‘the “message” of social structure must be received through the filter of human agency. Humans are not omniscient observers of reality; they are imperfect interpreters of it. Whether a norm’s prescriptions and parameters are understood in a given situation is up to the perceiver, with all associated cognitive limits and biases.’

Departing from this crucial insight, Constructivists have contributed important insights to understanding norm dynamics – particularly norm violation and/or erosion. Starting with norm violation, Shannon (2000; and all in the following) argues that norms are what states and leaders make of them and places his analysis between Realist and Constructivist understandings of norm adherence. Departing from the insight that ‘state leaders are not either selfish or social but both at the same time’, he offers a model based on psychological research in which leaders make their choices to violate norms according to a number of variables such as the non-routine character of a situation (e.g. if adherence to a norm clashes with a perceived major national interest), the “fuzziness” of norms (meaning that the norm inherits certain ambiguities which allow for different interpretations), and the situatedness (meaning if leaders have the chance to define a situation in a way that allows socially accepted violation). If all variables can be positively answered, norm violation most likely occurs. With regards to the first variable of the non-routine character of a situation, three factors facilitate norm violation: (1) dramatic events, (2) a culmination of events, and (3) changes in personnel. With regards to the second variable of the “fuzziness” of a given norm, according to Shannon, any norm has two components: (1) prescription and (2) parameters. The prescription tells actors what to do or not to do. The parameters inform the actor of the conditions that apply to the prescription. The more parameters a norm has

and the more unspecific prescriptions and parameters are the easier to find socially acceptable grounds for violation. With regards to the situatedness, leaders need an account ‘that resolves the moral dilemma in the minds of actors as well as (actors hope) the audiences to whom they feel accountable.’ (Ibid: 304) Four types of accounts are usually applied: (1) apologies, (2) denials, (3) excuses, and (4) justifications.

Turning to norm erosion, Rosert and Schirmbeck (2007; and all in the following) point to the contemporary norm density in international relations which is a result of international governance efforts. They conclude that the growth of governance structures naturally constrains actors’ room for maneuver. Norm erosion or the removal of a given norm by another “weaker” norm thus helps to widen states’ room for maneuver. Scrutinizing the norms of anti-torture and the nuclear taboo, they come to conclude that seemingly internalized norms can indeed become watered down. They identify what they call ‘norm challengers’ and the act of norm-challenging speech (most notably through debates amongst elites) as important actors and means in this process and infer that norm internalization does neither work in a linear vertical way nor does it automatically work on a horizontal level including all relevant actors in a given state. Particularly in reaction to a ‘domino effect of the unthinkable’, which works to widen the cognitive space of what was formerly not imaginable (take 9/11), norm challengers can start questioning well-established norms and thus initiate the process of reversal (cf. also Wunderlich 2013: 35). Kahl and Heller (2013) share their assessment of the wider consequences of norm-challenging speech with regards to policies of counterterrorism. For a ‘reverse cascade’ (McKeown 2009) of norms to happen, certain conditions must be met: (1) norm-challenging speech must spill over from the domestic level of one state to be echoed by other states; (2) major powers must be involved to increase the severity of norm de-legitimation; (3) norm challenging behavior by major powers must occur on repeated instances to further contribute to norm de-legitimation (Kahl and Heller 2013: 420).

Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007: 218) assess that 'norms are adopted because they mean different things to different actors and that, in consequence, compliance with a norm is partly a product of the recurrence of policy differences already existing before the adoption of the norm. Actors may make strategic use of such a situation.' Concentrating on the EU subsidiarity norm, they also infer that battles over norms 'are more likely to occur if the international norms adopted in their application are expected to affect the power relations between the major actors involved.' (Ibid: 235) Adding another stratum to the debate, Wiener and Puettnner (2009: 16) infer that norms undergo a process of cultural validation. Norm contestation is thus understood as relating to different cultural contexts – an understanding in close vicinity to scholars of the English School. They assert that even within an existing community 'divergence and convergence of individually perceived normative meanings' can prevail amongst the different identities of a community.

Chayes and Chayes (1994: 66) have pointed to the important realm of justice. 'The basic conception of cooperative security implies general acceptance of and compliance with binding commitments limiting military capabilities and actions. The key to compliance with such a system of norms is that it be seen as legitimate. Legitimacy, in turn, requires that the norms be promulgated by fair and accepted procedures, applied equally and without invidious discrimination, and reflect minimum substantive standards of fairness and equity.' They infer that 'to be durable, international legal norms, whether or not treaty based, must meet broad tests of legitimacy.' (Ibid: 72) Müller (2013: 6-7) adds that justice is particularly salient for arms control whereby asymmetric relations exacerbate notions of inequalities in distribution. He concludes that 'justice claims are a particularly salient type of [norm] contestation.' (Ibid: 7) Zartman helps to break down the 'meta-norm' (Müller 2013: 7) of justice to the operational politics level. 'The notion that parties first establish a formula for an agreement before they go on to apply that principle of justice to determine the disposition in detail of the items at stake is well established empirically.' (Zartman 1995: 895) Closely connected to justice is the question of the impact of power distribution. Again, Müller (2013: 12) points to this realm of constant agency-structure interactions and assumes that

‘seminal changes in the distribution of international power might lead to adjustments in the normative order with a view to accommodating the priorities of rising powers at the cost of declining ones.’

Taken together, critical constructivists have collated crucial insights to better understanding norm dynamics; particularly with regards to norm violation and erosion. What is nevertheless missing is a comprehensive model capturing norm erosion processes (cf. Wunderlich 2013: 27).

#### 8.4.2 Analysis and Confrontation with the Empirical Evidence

Critical Constructivist research on norm dynamics contributes important insights to the further research process of this thesis. When confronted with the empirical evidence as well as the research design of this thesis, a number of important findings come up.

First, Constructivist research underscores the wider normative dimension in which regimes are embedded in and which they help to govern. While this thesis has elaborated on cooperative arms control in Europe, and, departing from the findings, concluded that regimes as well as regime complexes can disintegrate, scholars of critical Constructivism have highlighted that also norms can undergo a process of decay. Chapter 7 has underscored that key principles and norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe are highly contested, subject to non-compliance, and thus caught in the process of erosion. Following the analytical understanding of Müller and Wunderlich (2013: 5, 38), regime principles and norms belong to the normative realm of regime injunctions and can thus serve as analytical reference base for assessing norm dynamics in general.<sup>54</sup> In the same vein, Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007: 236) have rediscovered regime

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<sup>54</sup> Similarities between principles and norms in the regime concept have led some scholars of IR to treat the two as an entity (for a discussion see Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997: 11 et seq) or to the assessment that regimes are ‘systems of norms’ (Wunderlich 2013: 38). Müller (2013: 5) refers to ‘metanorms’ which sometimes can be called ‘principles’. Even Krasner (1982: 4) has argued that ‘changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. When norms and principles are abandoned, there is either a change to a new regime or a disappearance of regimes from a given issue-area.’ His unitary treatment of principles and norms points to a certain commonality between the two which he has not specified though.

theory as methodological tool for better understanding the dynamics of norm acceptance and compliance. The methodological regime focus of this thesis does therewith also allow for drawing conclusions that pertain to the realm of norm dynamics. It follows that if the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe is in decay, so is its normative dimension.

Second, research on norm dynamics allows for better analyzing agency and structure as factors in the process of decay. Starting with structure, and here with the endogenous dimension of structure; as already emphasized in Paragraph 6.3 (above), important parts of the normative dimension of cooperative arms control in Europe are inherently vague and contradictory. Key principles and norms such as the ‘indivisibility of security’ or ‘strengthening stability’ are fuzzy and allow for a wide range of divergent interpretations. What aggravates their normative impact is the fact that their application is apt to affect the power relations between the major actors. (Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007: 235) However, even seemingly concise and historically older principles such as sovereignty and thus the non-intervention in internal affairs allow for contestation which will be explained below.

At this point, the exogenous dimension of structure comes into play. As explained before, dramatic events (Shannon 2000) and a ‘domino effect of the unthinkable’ (Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007) have happened during the last 41 years of cooperative arms control in Europe. Amongst those unthinkable events were the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, the Yugoslavia Wars, the enlargement of NATO, 9/11, and the current Ukraine conflict. All such events have triggered the constant re-thinking of major national interests as well as of normative injunctions. While the crumbling of the Eastern bloc changed the power setting (cf. Müller 2013: 12) and allowed for commonly embracing norms such as the development of arms control measures and more generally of cooperative security in Europe, the Yugoslavia Wars presented a formidable challenge for the principle of sovereignty and led to a first revision of the principle towards the emerging concept of humanitarian intervention. The enlargement of NATO challenged the indivisibility of security, at

least in the perception of the major power Russia. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 triggered a whole bundle of norm-challenging policies (see Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007), amongst other again challenging the principle of sovereignty. The same applies to the Ukraine conflict (see Burke-White 2014). Taken together, inherently vague principles and norms and exogenous events of political magnitude have contributed to a process of norm erosion; not just affecting cooperative arms control in Europe.

Turning to agency, both principle actors in the system, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have played the roles of norm entrepreneurs and norm challengers at different times and in different contexts. With the codifying of the Helsinki Final Act, both acted as norm entrepreneurs; however, given the equilibrium state of balance of power, the rhetorical-only character of principles and norms, and the partial inherent normative vagueness, norm establishment did not have serious consequences constraining their behavior (cf. Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007: 218). With the end of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow acted as norm developers, building on the established normative base, this time also in the legally-binding sphere of agreements. With the Yugoslavia Wars and NATO enlargement, the United States turned into a norm challenger; in the former case internationally recognizable, in the latter case, mainly in the perception of Russia. From the year 2000 onwards Russia joined as norm challenger through acts of openly criticizing the uneven employment of principles and norms, non-compliance with arms control agreements, and the questioning of normative injunctions in the human dimension. Washington during those years continued its path of norm challenger, particularly with regards to sovereignty (most notably in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and through the employment of targeted drone attacks in failed states). Russia in turn challenged sovereignty in Moldova (in the CFE context), Georgia, and Ukraine.

The norm-challenging behavior of both states is the more severe because they are the two major powers in the system of cooperative arms control in Europe and because of the repeated instances of norm de-legitimation (cf. Kahl and Heller

2013: 420). Concentrating on two events, NATO enlargement and the current Ukraine conflict, both events displayed and led to norm-challenging behavior. Applying Shannon's (2000) model, NATO enlargement was triggered by dramatic events; meaning the break-up of the Eastern bloc. Changes in personnel, and hence in politics in a partisan domestic setting (cf. Wunderlich 2013: 35), from the George H. W. Bush government to Bill Clinton and later to George W. Bush facilitated the process (cf. critically Hunter 2014). Enlargement clashed with the Russian perception of the principle of indivisibility of security but was in line with the U.S. issue-specific interest and could also easily exploit the "fuzziness" of the principle. Also, the broad support in most countries of Europe as well as in NATO and in the U.S. domestic setting allowed for social acceptance. Critique (mostly by Russia) was countered on accounts of denial (cf. exemplary OSCE 1996).

Focusing on the current Ukraine conflict and again applying Shannon's model, dramatic events in the form of the revolutionary ousting of President Yanukovich and the prospect of Ukraine joining closer ties with the EU and maybe, at a later stage, also NATO (cf. Putin quoted in Charap and Shapiro 2014b), triggered Russian norm-challenging behavior. Changes in personnel and the politics vis-à-vis the West from Yeltsin to Putin and Medvedev to Putin had facilitated the process. Possible adherence to the principles of strengthening stability and sovereignty clashed with a perceived major Russian issue-specific interest. However, Russian norm-challenging behavior could not that easily exploit norm "fuzziness", particularly not the principle of sovereignty. Even though broad domestic support allowed for social Russian acceptance (as shown by the independent Levada pollster; see Baczyńska 2014), at the international level acceptance remained unattainable. Therefore, the Kremlin countered the critique on lengthy accounts of justifications, mainly referring to earlier norm-challenging behavior by 'the West' (President of Russia 2014a).

Critical Constructivists have also pointed to the realm of vocal contestation as an important driver of norm dynamics. While Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 899)

have found that norm entrepreneurs often draw on ‘some kind of organizational platform from and through which they promote their norms’ this might as well pertain to norm challengers. In the case of cooperative arms control in Europe, the OSCE was and still is the organizational platform through which Russia has expressed its dissatisfactions and to which it addressed norm-challenging speech. From the late 1990s onwards and particularly increasingly since the year 2000, Russia has employed norm-challenging speech with regards to the indivisibility of security, the realm of arms control, and the norms governing the human dimension (see Russian Statements contained in Chapter 7). If Shannon’s (2000: 304) psychology-based assumption is correct that ‘the process of justifying violations occurs in the actors’ minds prior to committing the act’, the next logical step might be vocalizing possible grounds for eventual later violation. Hence, the repeated acts of norm-challenging speech, most vividly brought forward in the 2007 Munich speech of Vladimir Putin (President of Russia 2007), might have anticipated the later cascade of norm-challenging behavior such as non-compliance with the Istanbul commitments, CFE suspension, the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, and the on-going Ukraine conflict.

Russian perceptions of the inequitable distribution of gains and massive shifts in relative capabilities have informed the development of cooperative arms control in Europe and can as well be viewed as motives for norm contestation (cf. Müller 2013). Referring to Zartman (1995: 895), international negotiators adopt ‘a principle of justice as the basis of their formula for an agreement’. In the case of the Helsinki Decalogue, this principle of justice was status quo for declaratory human rights commitments (and including the linked deal to MBFR). This principle was made obsolete with the crumbling of the Eastern bloc but for Moscow it was still in place and became reflected in the formula of the ‘indivisibility of security’. Russian recourse to the formula was thus a constant cognitive reflection of power shifts and perceptions of inequality.

Taken together, the empirical evidence of cooperative arms control in Europe reveals a normative ‘reverse cascade’ (McKeown 2009). It is extremely hard to

identify a singular factor with overriding importance for the erosion of the normative base of cooperative arms control in Europe. Instead, a whole bundle of factors led to norm erosion. What can be said is that crucial indicators for norm erosion correspond significantly with crucial findings from the empirical evidence. Amongst them are inherently vague norms, power shifts, changes in personnel, dramatic events, notions of inequity and injustice, norm-challenging speech, divergent re-interpretations of norms, repeated norm-challenging behavior by the two principal actors, and non-compliance. What becomes obvious is that Washington and Moscow do not share (or never shared; Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007: 222) a common understanding of the normative basis underlying cooperative arms control in Europe. As such circumstance is not unusual or severe, more important is the question how both treated their dissatisfaction with the substantiation of norms.

Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007: 218) assess that ‘norms are adopted because they mean different things to different actors and that, in consequence, compliance with a norm is partly a product of the recurrence of policy differences already existing before the adoption of the norm. Actors may make strategic use of such a situation.’ When crucial national interests were at stake, both gave priority to their interests once they were able to do so (the United States after the end of the Cold War; Russia after the year 2000). Obviously, such interpretation is in very close vicinity to a Neorealist understanding whereas norms only matter as long as they serve the interests of the powerful (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95). However, such interpretation falls short of noticing the facts that (1) at least for Russia, a long process involving norm-challenging speech (from the mid-1990s until Russian CFE suspension in 2007 and the Russian-Georgian war in 2008) preceded the actual violation of norms and (2) that the Kremlin used multiple excuses and recourses to normative injunctions to justify the most blatant forms of norm violation seen in the current Ukraine conflict (cf. President of Russia 2014a). These facts show the constraining power of norms and underline that even if crucial norms are ignored or violated, even powerful actors struggle to do so without preparing for and following up the genuine act of violation.

## 8.5 Conclusions

Scholars of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivism have all contributed meaningful approaches explaining the volatility of international cooperative efforts. In contrast to regime theory, their focus is not bound to institutionalization but relates to the wider historical, cultural, and societal contexts which influence cooperative efforts. While some of their insights have only underscored some of the previous findings of this thesis (e.g. that massive shifts in capabilities, offensively-oriented power policies in conjunction with NATO enlargement, and the subsequent Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains are powerful factors behind institutional decay; cf. Deutsch et al 1957: 40; Bull 1961: 39; Müller 2013: 12), some contain additional explanatory strata that have not surfaced in this thesis so far but which help to explain the volatility of the process of institutionalization of cooperative arms control in Europe.

In the following, the conclusions deriving from this chapter will be collated in the process of answering the three guiding research questions of this chapter. What broader spectra of cooperation integration and dissolution drive the development of institutionalized cooperation? Both, the English School and the concept of Security Communities are concerned with a grand idea. For the ES it is *order*, for the concept of SCs it is *peace*. While the ES was originally a rather Realist-influenced reflection of the Cold War, and order became equated with stability and the equilibrium state of balance of power (cf. Bull 1977), the concept of SCs is more of a post-World War II development with a strong idealist touch towards the elimination of war. Except for this crucial difference, both relate to each other through the basic premise of a commonly shared sense of “we-ness”. Again, both treat it differently. While the ES views “we-ness” often in a utilitarian understanding of mutual recognition of governing principles such as sovereignty and international law, its idealistic concept of world society embraces “we-ness” on the individual level and comes therewith very close to the concept of a security *community* in a *Gemeinschaft* understanding. It is at this point that Constructivism with its focus on norms comes into play, analyzing how norms, the practical manifestation of “we-ness”, emerge and develop.

With regards to the research subject of this thesis, these differently though partially overlapping approaches allow for extrapolating three broad spectra driving cooperation: an ideational, a civilizational/cultural, and an implementational. The ideational spectrum reveals four turning points in the development of grand ideas (or cooperation interests) of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the politics of *détente* and arms control manifested the idea of *stability*. Both embraced this idea. The Helsinki Final Act was a byproduct of this idea. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crumbling of the Eastern bloc, stability became replaced by the ideas of *cooperative security*, *democracy*, and *free market economies for the former WTO states*. Again, both shared these ideas. NATO enlargement, from 1994 onwards, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 two years later marked the transition towards the U.S. ideas of *unipolarity*, *devaluation of international law*, and *the primacy of the universality of individual human rights*. It is important to note that these ideas were the first that were not shared by Washington and Moscow anymore. While older ideas such as cooperative security were nevertheless (institutionally) maintained, both started to give precedence to the newer ones. With the Russian-Georgian War in 2008 and the Ukraine conflict in 2014, Russia pushed forward its new ideas of *consolidation of the post-Soviet space* and *rejection of older ideas*.

Summing up, it is important to notice that since the mid-1990s, the major actors did not share a common grand idea (or interest) anymore. This fact relates to a second important essential of the ES and the concept of SCs – that is the presence of an exceptional common threat perception. Since ideas can be understood as meta-answers to a common threat, the inability to develop commonly shared ideas and thus the degradation of cooperation can be seen as decline of the magnitude of mutually shared threat perceptions (be it regional instabilities or international terrorism; in the same vein cf. Buzan 2011). Such conclusion is in line with the Realist-based assessment of Chapter 3 that from the late 1990s onwards the United States' general interest in securing survival was not directly linked to Russia anymore (cf. Kelleher 2012).

The civilizational/cultural spectrum has best been captured by the ES and relates closely to the ideational spectrum. Applying Buzan's (1993) societal circles allows for locating Russia and the United States at different layers. While both enjoyed a short "honeymoon" at the inner core during the first years of the post-Cold War period, a common sense of "we-ness" has been absent for most of the time of the period of analysis of 41 years of cooperative arms control in Europe. Clearly, this spectrum driving cooperation has deserved the least attention in this thesis which is owed to the methodological fact of largely omitting domestic policies. Further societal research, which would also have to include a much broader historical focus, is needed to explain the civilizational/cultural differences which have triggered different emphases on different ideational concepts.

At the implementational spectrum lies the debate about norms and norm dynamics. Norms are the somewhat grand governing lines behind institutionalization. In relation to regime theory, they consist of the key principles and norms of the regime complex. They are triggered by common interests. Their achievement becomes much easier if a sense of "we-ness" is already in place. While the Cold War brought with it a common interest (avoiding nuclear war) which translated into a common idea (stability), a common sense of "we-ness" was absent in an idealist understanding but present in a utilitarian understanding. The Helsinki Final Act managed that balancing act and devised norms that reflected the existing common idea and the non-existing idealistic common sense of "we-ness". While with the end of the Cold War, an idealistic common sense of "we-ness" started to flourish, the common idea was at first replaced and later got lost. At the same time, the common sense of "we-ness" in a utilitarian understanding became downgraded through repeated instances of intervention. In a critical Constructivist understanding, unequal norm entrepreneurs became unequal norm challengers. Through these processes of dynamism and divergence, the normative basis became increasingly eroded; the built-upon institutions followed suit.

Another important aspect of the implementational spectrum is the role and treatment of power. The massive shifts in relative capabilities after the Cold War al-

lowed for regime establishment not only because of an emerging core of strength (the United States) but also because the crumbling Soviet Union had an equal interest in the establishment of governing institutions. The regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe is thus not based on imposition but on agreement. Nevertheless, the resulting institutions carried (Russian) perceptions of inequity with them which, over time, led to dissatisfaction. It was thus not only the economic recovery of Russia after the year 2000 and the emergence of Multipolarity which led to decay but even more so the effects of perceived inequity. This relates directly to the decay indicator of 'hegemonic practices'. It is to a lesser degree the possibility of hegemonic decline (loss of U.S. power) but more the fact of hegemonic practices (use of U.S. power) which negatively influenced the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe and contributed to their decay. Both, the ES and scholars of SCs were correct in their early predictions that unconstrained growth in power is to the detriment of larger cooperation efforts; particularly those involving critical questions of power.

What are the reasons behind norm erosion? Both the United States and Russia worked as repetitive norm challengers. For a long time, Russia was a norm-preserving actor. Even though Moscow violated a number of principles and norms of the Helsinki accords in conjunction with the two Chechen Wars, one can argue that the overriding national interest of the Kremlin to preserve the unity of the Russian nation state created a problematic setting. However, with the suspension of CFE in 2007, the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, and the Ukraine conflict in 2014, Russia has turned into a norm challenger. Washington, only shortly after the end of the Cold War (with the first steps aimed at NATO enlargement from 1994 onwards), became a more multi-dimensional norm challenger in the classical security realm, in the realm of humanitarian intervention, and in the treatment of international law. Particularly Russia employed norm-challenging speech from the late 1990s onwards in the forum of the OSCE. One of the unintended effects of norm-challenging speech is that acts of vocal dissatisfaction, even though aimed at preserving a certain norm (e.g. indivisibility of security), help to erode a norm, since the act of debate manifests the notion that something is "wrong" with the

norm (cf. Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007). Aside from these agency-related reasons, multiple norms of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe are “fuzzy” and allow for a wide range of interpretations. As explained before, this is the result of the Helsinki accords and the balancing act of norms related to a common idea and norms related to an obsolete common sense of “we-ness”. While the end of the Cold War would have allowed for re-assessing and possibly re-crafting the normative basis, it stayed unaltered. The “fuzziness” of important norms allow the actors wide-ranging and diverging interpretations up to a point where non-compliance becomes explained with preserving the normative base.<sup>55</sup> Last but not least, analysis of the empirical evidence in relation to the theoretical approached contained in this chapter suggests that the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia never really shared a common understanding of the normative basis of cooperative arms control in Europe. The historical chance for such understanding was there (roughly from 1989 to 1994); however divergent issue-specific interests prevented the development of a common sense of “we-ness” and resulted in divergent interpretations and, later, non-compliance.

Do international institutions make a difference when it comes to the interests of the powerful? The empirical evidence suggests that changed domestic interests as well as changes in personnel in Washington and Moscow had an enormous impact on the development of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe. They involve the Gorbachev reforms in the Soviet Union, the foreign and security policy changes initiated by the George W. Bush administration, and the changes under the first and third presidential terms of Vladimir Putin. Müller (2013: 10) observes that ‘the domestic politics related to international norms have a significant impact on norm robustness and development.’ With no change in meaning,

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<sup>55</sup> The U.S. decision not to ratify ACFE as long as Russia’s ‘Istanbul commitments’ remained unfulfilled is in contradiction to the treaty’s principle of ‘sustaining the key role of CFE as the cornerstone of European security’ and can be seen as non-compliance with the key principle of strengthening stability. This act of non-compliance was explained with strengthening the principle of ‘sovereignty’ by U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns: ‘For us, their [the ‘Istanbul commitments’ fulfillment continues to be a prerequisite for the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. These are not just words on paper: a basic principle of the CFE Treaty is the right of sovereign states to decide whether to allow stationing of foreign forces on their territory.’ (OSCE 2005)

the term ‘norm’ could be replaced by ‘institutions’. According to the understanding of Neorealism, changes at the level of international institutions are only an effect of changed interests by the powerful. Mützenich and Karádi’s (2013: 43) framing captures well such utilitarian understanding: ‘International institutions have two functions here. On the one hand, they mirror the interests of the states involved in them: Membership of international organizations is in the interest of a state (in terms of power projection). When these interests change, so does the character of the international institution concerned. Thus, the evolution of NATO and the OSCE since 1989 illustrates the changing preferences of their members – above all those of the major states.’

As much as such framing is also true for the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe, critical Constructivism helps to understand the processes at work once genuine states’ interests collide with the political framing of international institutions. The lengthy critique, vocal contestation, and convening of special meetings preceding the Russian suspension of CFE as well as the fact that Moscow even invented the formula of ‘suspension’ in the CFE context to possibly return to treaty implementation at a later stage, shows the constraining effects of international institutions. Even though, the consequences of NATO’s non-ratification of ACFE were to the detriment of Russia, it took the Kremlin seven years to finally let go of the treaty. The same constraining effects, even though much lesser visible, are apparent in the on-going Ukraine conflict where Russia is struggling to find an internationally acceptable formula which would allow depicting its actions as being in conformity with international law (cf. Burke-White 2014). Therewith, one possible answer to the question is Yes and No. Yes, international institutions make a difference when it comes to the interests of the powerful because they constrain actors’ abilities to go it alone. No, international institutions do not make much of a difference when it comes to the interests of the powerful if those interests are perceived as being of extraordinary magnitude (often involving critical questions of national security). Another possible answer would be that international institutions can make a difference for some time. As long as the effects of international institutions (e.g. contractual environment,

learning, lower transactions costs, confidence-building, etc.) help a relatively weaker state to achieve a minimum of national interest (for Russia for instance a prominent role in its dealing with NATO through the NRC) they make a difference. Once, the underlying relative distribution of capabilities changes to the relative advantage of that state (as in the 2000s for Russia) or once their constraining effects start to collide with major national interests, international institutions might lose their appealing role.

Taken together, the insights gained from this chapter allow drawing a more encompassing picture of the development of cooperative arms control in Europe. Particularly the aspect of decay becomes better captured when supplementing Realist assumptions and assumptions from regime theorists with insights from the ES, the concept of SCs, and critical Constructivism. A normative base of strongly interpretative character which allows for widely diverging views and norm erosion, the absence of a common sense of “we-ness”, and the uneven historical/civilizational location of the two main actors which are heading towards different societal poles are all powerful factors which have caused the volatility of cooperative efforts.

The last chapter summarizes the central findings of this thesis and arrives at final theoretical and political conclusions.

## 9 Summary and Conclusions

For more than a decade, Europe's once unique security institutions in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe are affected by decay. This thesis has analyzed what the institutional design of cooperative arms control in Europe is and why the institutions are in decay. The aim of this thesis was to answer two central research questions:

- (1) What forms of institutions compose cooperative arms control in Europe?
- (2) Why are the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe in decay?

The thesis concentrated on the foreign and security policies of the two main actors in the area of cooperative arms control in Europe – the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – between 1973 and 2014. By focusing on the two states which most vividly shaped and continue to shape cooperative arms control in Europe, the political reasons behind the institutional design of cooperative arms control in Europe and the process of decay were highlighted. The next paragraph sums up the methods and findings.

### 9.1 Summary

In this thesis, a multi-theory approach was applied in order to comprehensively analyze and explain policies and institutions. A single-theory approach – take for instance Realism – would have been possible. However, it would have fallen short of explaining a number of additional important reasons for the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Paragraph 9.1.2 below).

Qualitative analysis of 41 years of U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperative arms control in Europe policies was first conducted on the basis of Realism (see Chapter 2). The IR theory of Realism has been chosen because of its inherent skepticism towards international cooperation. Since cooperative arms control in Europe is in decay, a basically cooperation-skeptical approach, highlighting the impediments

to successful cooperation, was deemed valuable. Another reason for Realism is the Russian foreign and security policy which has been regularly characterized as following Realist rationales (see Paragraph 2.1 for a discussion and for further reasons). Therefore, Realism was seen as valuable basis for better understanding and explaining contemporary Russian foreign and security policy.

On the basis of Realism, a model for understanding international cooperation was developed (see Paragraph 2.3) and applied to the empirical evidence of 41 years of U.S.-Soviet/Russian policies of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Chapter 3). The model helped to analyze and compare those two states' capabilities (see Annex I), interests, expectations, strategies of cooperation, and their respective evaluation of the gains from cooperation over time. Analysis also helped to highlight a number of significant institutional achievements in four different cooperation clusters and a number of preliminary findings about decay.

On the basis of regime theory (Chapter 4) and the empirical evidence analyzed in Chapter 3, 36 agreements (see Annex II) with direct relevance to cooperative arms control in Europe were qualitatively analyzed (see Chapter 5). Regime theory was applied because previous research has constantly employed terminological references to regime theory without relying on sound theoretical research and/or providing compelling empirical evidence. Regime theory provides a number of indicators for identifying regimes as well as regime decay. Those indicators were applied to the 36 agreements in a first abductive test in order to test their regime quality and their respective state. The result (see Chapter 6) was a regime complex in decay for a number of reasons (see Paragraph 9.1.2 below).

One of those reasons was a possible tension between the normative basis of the regime complex and the operational policies of the United States and Russia. In order to prove this assumption, a second abductive test was conducted (see Chapter 7). 51 statements by U.S.-Soviet/Russian delegations to the OSCE between 1990 and 2014 (see Annex III) were assessed by methods of qualitative and quan-

titative content analysis. The result was that divergent interpretations of the normative basis and subsequent national policies contributed to regime decay.

In order to complement the institution-endogenous view of regime theory with exogenous views explaining for the broader spectra that drive international institutionalized cooperative efforts, three further theoretical approaches were applied to the empirical evidence (see Chapter 8). The aim was to find additional reasons for decay which Realism and regime theory could not explain. Theoretical deliberations from the concept of Security Communities, the English School, and Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics helped to complement the picture.

Taken together, this multi-theory approach helped to comprehensively answer the two central research questions of this thesis. In the next two paragraphs, the answers to these two questions are summarized.

#### 9.1.1 Explaining the Forms of Institutions: A Regime Answer

What forms of institutions compose cooperative arms control in Europe? Qualitative analysis of the empirical evidence of 41 years of U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe (see Chapter 3), assessed by means of the Realist model of understanding international cooperation (see Paragraph 2.3), has led to the assumption that four cooperation clusters had developed.

Those cooperation clusters evolved over a period of 41 years (1973-2014). The first cooperation cluster evolved in the realm of declaratory or politically binding CSBMs, achieved under the auspices of the C/OSCE. It is the oldest of the four cooperation clusters; is based on the 1975 Helsinki accords; is multilateral in nature; gained its full shape through a whole range of agreements during the early and mid-1990s; and is today still largely functioning from a technical point of view. Politically, the cluster is outdated and does not address current security challenges anymore. Its initial aim was to provide more military bloc-to-bloc confidence through means of transparency. Its later aim was to achieve more stability for the newly emerging post-Soviet states.

The second cooperation cluster evolved in the realm of conventional arms control (CAC). It dates back to the early 1973 MBFR talks but only led to serious cooperation with the end of the Cold War and the signing of the CFE Treaty. The cluster is bilateral in nature (NATO-Warsaw Pact; general strong U.S.-Soviet/Russian focus); gained its full shape through the inclusion of additional instruments during the early 1990s; was significantly adapted in the mid- and the end of the 1990s; and is deadlocked since 2002. Because of the Russian “suspension” of CFE and NATO’s partial suspension the cluster does not address current security challenges anymore. Its initial aim was to prevent large-scale conventional surprise attack by establishing numerical parity and a zonal limitations system between the two blocs, to significantly downsize conventional holdings, and to provide for military transparency. Its later aim was to achieve lower national levels of conventional equipment, reflecting the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and NATO’s eastward enlargement.

The third cooperation cluster evolved in the realm of political and military (pol-mil) cooperation under the auspices of NATO. It took off shortly after the end of the Cold War. The cluster is multilateral and bilateral (e.g. NRC) in nature; was adapted during the 1990s and the early 2000s; and is in its dealings with Russia deadlocked since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict. Because of the partial suspension of the NRC, the cluster is only partially addressing current security challenges. It has three aims: (1) achieving more stability for the newly emerging post-Soviet states; (2) preparing for NATO enlargement; (3) giving Russia a prominent and visible role in its dealings with the alliance.

The fourth cooperation cluster evolved in the realm of sub-regional arms control for the Balkans. The cluster is multilateral in nature; took off during the mid-1990s; was amended in the early 2000s; and is still functioning. Its initial aim was to achieve lower levels of conventional armaments on the Balkans. Its continued aim is to provide for more predictability and military transparency.


Qualitative analysis of 36 agreements (see Annex I and Chapter 5) with direct relevance for cooperative arms control in Europe, assessed by means of a regime-methodological approach (cf. Krasner 1982: 2), has led to the conclusion that those four cooperation clusters actually represent regimes (see Chapter 6). In addition, a fifth regime was discovered.

This fifth regime evolved in the realm of declaratory and politically binding general commitments under the C/OSCE. It dates back to the 1975 Helsinki accords and is multilateral in nature. It gained its full shape in conjunction with the end of the Cold War; was adapted throughout the 1990s; and is most visibly manifest in the organization of the OSCE. It is still mainly functioning but is characterized by internal dissent and protracted negotiations. Its continued aim is to provide the OSCE area with an inclusive, holistic, and consensus-oriented framework for cooperative security.

Analysis of the 36 agreements also showed that those five regimes together form a regime complex in the latest understanding of complexity research (cf. Thakur 2013). All regimes share a significant number of key principles and norms amongst themselves and across the five elemental regimes. Since the twelve key principles and norms of the complex are in large parts already contained in the 1975 Helsinki accords and are repeated and amended in the ensuing agreements of the declaratory C/OSCE regime, it was concluded that the declaratory C/OSCE regime forms an overarching meta-regime in the understanding of Aggarval (1985: 18-20). Thus, the C/OSCE meta-regime provides the normative basis of the regime complex. In addition, three regimes share historically-evolved political linkages. The CAC regime, the C/OSCE meta-regime, and the NATO pol-mil regime were all adapted in the wake of the first round of NATO enlargement and were part of a political compensation deal between Washington and Moscow (see Paragraph 3.4.1). Because of this development, those regimes also share a significant number of active or passive direct textual references. With regards to the Balkans regime, the regime shares passive direct references with the CAC and the CSBM regime because it was designed along the lines of the CFE Treaty and the

Vienna Document. In addition, all regimes have partially overlapping memberships. The interactions between the five regimes are frequent and vivid. The complex shows a high degree of density (see visualization below).

THE REGIME COMPLEX OF COOPERATIVE ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE



For visualization above: The visualization has been designed by the author for this thesis and resembles Chart 36 from Paragraph 6.2 above. Arrows symbolize an active or passive direct reference of a textual and/or a design nature. Continuous lines symbolize cross-shared key principles and norms; thickness of lines indicates degree of cross-sharing. Dashed lines symbolize political linkages.

Analysis of the different periods of regime development shows that the complex gained its full shape during the 1990s with the years between 1992 and 1994 being especially productive in terms of establishment of new agreements (see Chart 34 in Paragraph 5.6 above). Since the year 2000, the pace of establishment of new

agreements has slowed down significantly. During the last ten years, only one new agreement in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe has been concluded (the Vienna Document 2011).

Analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests further that of the regime complex, four elemental regimes show indicators of decay; though to different degrees. Having applied 13 indicators of regime decay (which resulted from a review of regime theory; see Chapter 4) to the 36 agreements, on average, each agreement in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe is affected by 3.9 indicators of decay. Particularly the C/OSCE meta-regime, the NATO pol-mil regime, and the CAC regime are on average most strongly affected. In absolute terms, the three indicators of non-compliance, divergent issue-specific interests, and issue linkage are most often present. With regards to non-compliance, instances of Russian non-compliance are overrepresented. Taken together, the distribution and the high number of occurrences of indicators of decay have led to the conclusion that the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe is in decay.

These findings relate directly to answering the second central research question of this thesis.

### 9.1.2 Explaining Decay: A Multi-Theory Answer

Why are the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe in decay? The multi-theory approach applied in this thesis generates a number of different answers which directly relate to each other and help to comprehensively analyze and explain decay. Each theoretical approach stresses different indicators. In the following, the different indicators and their relation to the empirical evidence of this thesis are summarized according to their theoretical origin.

#### Realism

According to Realism (see Chapter 2), massive as well as minor shifts in capabilities; partially offensive orientations; a (mutually) diminished interest in cooperation related to the survival motive; calls for re-negotiation; and repeated and in-

creasing acts of non-compliance by major actors are indicative and help explaining decay.

(1) According to Realism, the relative distribution of capabilities affects states' interest in cooperation (cf. Waltz 1979). The massive shift in U.S.-Soviet/Russian capabilities in conjunction with the end of the Cold War (see Paragraph 3.8.1 and Annex I) had a cooperation-enabling and (over the long term) a cooperation-disabling effect. On the one hand, it led the Soviet Union under Gorbachev to focus relatively more on the economic capabilities of the USSR than on the military. Against the background of the rapidly decreasing economic capabilities, Moscow decided to prioritize the economy and to seek cooperation with the West. Gorbachev's aim was to downsize the costly Soviet military and to get economic and financial aid from the West in return (Gorbachev 1996). On the other hand, the loss of relative capabilities on the Soviet side left Washington with relative more capabilities. Against the background of the relative Soviet, and later Russian, weakness, the United States could largely pursue its preferred policies in its dealings with Moscow. The results were Russian perceptions of inequality, dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War security design of Europe, continued calls for renegotiation, protracted negotiations, and increasing acts of non-compliance. After another minor shift in economic capabilities with the relative recovery of the Russian economy during the 2000s, Russia started to (partially) exit from the institutions and policies of cooperative arms control in Europe.

(2) According to Realism (cf. Jervis 1999), offensively-oriented states complicate cooperation. From 1994 onwards, the United States showed an offensive orientation which resulted in an additional change to the existing relative distribution of power in Europe. In contrast to the Cold War, Washington was now able to succeed with that orientation. NATO enlargement (first officially debated in Washington in 1994) led to a further shift in capabilities in three rounds (1999, 2004, and 2009). According to Realism (cf. Jervis 1999), direct cooperation between Washington and Moscow on enlargement did not take place due to the offensive orientation of U.S. policy. However, tacitly, Washington sought to cushion Rus-

sian unease with enlargement through means of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Paragraph 3.4.1). The establishment of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, the adaptation of CFE, and the adaptation of the OSCE were all measures, designed to accommodate Moscow and to support the weak Yeltsin government at home (ibid). Washington rejected Russian counterproposals (such as replacing NATO with the OSCE) and linked important strands of the defensively-oriented policy of cooperative security to a policy which was offensive in nature (i.e. enlargement). These policies led to increased Russian frustrations (cf. President of Russia 2014b).

(3) According to Realism, states' interest in securing survival is paramount (cf. Waltz 1979). At the latest from the year 2001 onwards, Washington showed a diminished interest in cooperation with Russia. Both states shared a direct interest in cooperation throughout the Cold War; according to Realism because of their mutual survival concern in conjunction with the scenario of MAD. This interest continued in the direct post-Cold War period – though for different reasons: Russia for economic reasons; the United States because they were concerned about a possible backslide of Russia into authoritarianism. With the 9/11 attacks, the survival concern of Washington shifted away from Russia to the War on Terror and, later, towards China. Russia dropped out of the focus. Cooperation with Moscow was not a direct priority anymore (see Paragraph 3.5.1). In turn, Moscow under Putin shifted its priority towards economic consolidation and consolidating its influence in the Near Abroad (ibid). This (mutual) diminished interest in cooperation led to the U.S. perception that issues of European security were basically non-problematic in nature and (later) to mutually non-compromising behavior when it came to issue-specific divergent interests and.

(4) According to Realism, dissatisfied states call for re-negotiation (cf. Grieco 1988). Russian calls for re-negotiating elements of the post-Cold War security architecture or the whole system altogether are apparent from the mid-1990s onwards (see Chapter 3). They contributed to the adaptation of CFE, the adaptation of the OSCE in the second half of the 1990s, and to the establishment of the NRC

in 2002. They increased in the OSCE during the 2000s and culminated in the two unsuccessful security treaty drafts of Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 and the ensuing Corfu Process of the OSCE (see Paragraph 3.6.1). Russian calls for re-negotiation were thus partially successful. However, Moscow never achieved its (indirect) overriding goal of either subordinating NATO to a higher security institution or to codify an end to NATO enlargement. Washington and its allies continued to resist any such attempt. This fact aggravated Russian dissatisfaction.

(5) According to Realism, the incentive to cheat is omnipresent in all cooperative efforts under anarchy (cf. Grieco 1988). Repeated acts of U.S. and Russian non-compliance with injunctions of cooperative arms control in Europe start to increase from the late 1990s onwards. They involve major decisions such as NATO enlargement (in the Russian perception a violation of the Helsinki principle of the ‘indivisibility of security’), NATO’s 2002 decision to withhold ACFE ratification, Russian non-fulfillment of her CFE Istanbul commitments, Russian CFE “suspension” in 2007, the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, and Russia’s role in the current Ukraine conflict. Almost always, Russia was involved when it came to non-compliance (see Chapter 6). According to Realism (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95), non-compliance is a major hindrance to uphold international cooperation – an assumption in line with the deadlock of the cooperation cluster of conventional arms control.

#### Regime Theory

According to regime theory (see Chapter 4), policies of issue linkage; divergent issue-specific interests; regime-internal contradictions; protracted negotiations; divergent interpretations of principles and norms; negative adaptation consequences; Russian perceptions of the inequitable distribution of gains; negative expectations; and negative spill-over are indicative and help explaining decay.

(1) According to regime theory, policies of issue linkage can lead to negative spill-over effects (cf. McGinnis 1986). Policies of issue linkage were present throughout most of the period of analysis. Their result was threefold. First, those

policies helped to establish cooperation by the cooperation strategy of compensation. This was the case in the MBFR/CSCE deal and particularly in the case of the deals achieved throughout the 1990s. Second, those policies were used by the Clinton administration in the process of NATO's first enlargement and resulted in the combination of offensively-oriented (enlargement) and defensively-oriented (cooperative security) policy concepts. Third, they led to close political-historical connections between some of the elemental regimes of the regime complex. When the first important agreement of the CAC regime (the CFE Treaty) came under increased political stress, these negative developments started to spill-over to other regimes and reverberated throughout the complex system. Since the Russian "suspension" of CFE in 2007, such negative ripple effects can be traced towards the NATO pol-mil regime, the C/OSCE meta-regime, and the CSBM regime.

(2) According to regime theory (cf. Müller 1993a: 49), divergent issue-specific interests can impede cooperation. Divergent issue-specific interests were present on almost all occasions of U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on cooperative arms control in Europe. Nevertheless, until the new millennium they were mostly overcome by either compensating deals or because Russia shifted from an initially offensive policy orientation to a defensive orientation (see Paragraph 3.4.1). During the last 14 years, both actors insisted either on their issue-specific interests or were unwilling to set up possible compensation deals in order to offset their (partially) offensive orientation (see Paragraph 3.6.1).

(3) According to regime theory, protracted negotiations can result in continued deadlock (cf. Aggarwal 1985: 143-82). Protracted negotiations occur at least since 2002 when NATO member states (led by Washington) made ACFE ratification conditional on Russia fulfilling her Istanbul commitments (cf. Kühn 2009). They are indicative of the political process in the OSCE since more than ten years and also affect the NATO pol-mil regime. They led to increased negative expectations in the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe since the dawn of the new millennium.

(4) According to regime theory, negative adaptation consequences can hamper and terminate institutionalized cooperation (cf. Young 1982: 281). Negative adaptation consequences occurred in the conventional arms control regime. The inclusion of the 14 amendments of the U.S. Senate to the ratification document of the Flank Agreement and the ensuing Istanbul commitments marked a significant change, though passing mostly unnoticed at that time (cf. Kühn 2009). They led directly to ACFE non-ratification, protracted negotiations, negative expectations, Russian non-compliance with her Istanbul commitments, Russian exit from CFE, and generated effects of negative spill-over to other elemental regimes of the regime complex.

(5) According to regime theory, regime-internal contradictions can significantly constrain successful institutionalized cooperation (cf. Young 1989: 96; Müller 1993a: 50-1). Regime-internal contradictions are included in the 1975 Helsinki accords (see Paragraph 6.3). The accords were designed to allow for a declaratory understanding against the background of strongly divergent issue-specific interests. Since the Helsinki accords are at the heart of the normative basis of the regime complex (ibid), they continue to have declaratory validity almost 40 years later. Their partially contradicting nature allows for diverse understandings and divergent interpretations of the normative base, serves as a reference frame for continued Russian calls for re-negotiation, and even allows justifying acts of non-compliance with reference to divergent interpretations of the normative basis.

(6) Departing from regime theory (Krasner 1982: 4), divergent interpretations of principles and norms (see Paragraph 6.3 above) can complicate institutionalized cooperation. Divergent interpretations of principles and norms are quite common in international cooperative efforts (cf. Brzoska 1991). They are not a problem as long as states are able to bring their divergent interpretations constructively in line. On cooperative arms control in Europe they have led to justifications of divergent issue-specific interests and acts of non-compliance; most visibly in the on-going Ukraine conflict. Their roots in the regime-internal contradictions of the Helsinki accords and their almost constant occurrence since the late 1990s on-

wards (see the assessment of statements contained in Chapter 7) leads to assume that Moscow and Washington (almost) never really shared a common understanding of key principles and norms of the regime complex.

(7) According to scholars of regime theory (cf. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2004: 184), the inequitable distribution of gains can lead to dissatisfaction with cooperation. The occurrence of Russian perceptions of the inequitable distribution of gains is hard to assign from a periodical point of view. At least since the year 2002, Russian statements delivered to the OSCE are full of complaints about 'double standards' and the unevenly directed critique of the organization in the so called "third basket" (see Russian statements contained in Chapter 7). The continued Russian calls for re-negotiations are indicative of the Russian perception of being treated unequally. The most prominent example of vocal dissatisfaction was the 2007 Munich Security Conference speech of Vladimir Putin (see President of Russia 2007). Negative expectations, at least on the Russian side, started to occur in conjunction with the perception of the inequitable distribution of gains.

#### Security Communities

According to the theoretical concept of Security Communities (see Paragraph 8.2), no common sense of "we-ness"; no U.S. willingness to constrain its power and exert responsiveness towards Russia; the absence of a common threat perception; and the Russian failure to adjust to its loss of dominance are indicative and help explaining decay.

(1) According to the concept of Security Communities (cf. Deutsch et al 1957), a common sense of "we-ness" is a precondition for the establishment of a Security Community. A common sense of "we-ness" was almost always absent between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia throughout the period of analysis. Only during the short period between 1989/90 and 1994 do the statements delivered to the OSCE (see Russian statements contained in Chapter 7) show a significant (rhetorical) convergence in terms of values and policies. This short period ceased with the U.S. decisions to maintain and (later) enlarge NATO. The contin-

uing divergence in issue-specific interests, the divergent interpretation of principles and norms of the regime complex, the increasing acts of non-compliance, and the re-emergence of war and belligerent rhetoric (2008 between Georgia and Russia and in the 2014 Ukraine conflict) prove that a sense of “we-ness” is absent for the time being.

(2) According to the concept of Security Communities (cf. Deutsch et al 1957), security communities often develop around a core of strength. A precondition is the ability of the strong state to constrain its power (ibid). The enlargement of NATO and particularly the non-cooperative policies during the eight Bush years are indicative of the unwillingness of the United States to constrain its power which Washington enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. So is the U.S. insistence to push through its preferred issue-specific interests in conjunction with NATO enlargement and the minor role of the OSCE. The continued signs of Russian dissatisfaction are crucial signs that Washington was either not willing or not sensitive enough to exert enough responsiveness (ibid) towards Russia. The result was growing frustration on the Russian side, acts of Russian non-compliance, and (over the longer term) a diminished interest in cooperation with the United States.

(3) According to the concept of Security Communities (cf. Deutsch et al 1957), the presence of a common threat perception is helpful in establishing a Security Community. With regards to the empirical evidence, the absence of a common threat perception goes hand in hand with a (mutual) diminished interest in cooperation. The Cold War nuclear standoff generated a clear, though at the same time rather abstract common threat perception: MAD. In contrast, the threat perception after the Cold War was rather multi-dimensional and not so much common anymore. It consisted of diverse threat perceptions such as economic downfall of Russia, civil wars in the OSCE area, terrorism, or relapse of Russia into authoritarianism (see Paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.4.1). Those diverse threat perceptions were partially overlapping, partially divergent, and partially convergent. Since the year 2001, the results were divergent national policies based on divergent issue-

specific interests and divergent interpretations of principles and norms of the regime complex.

(4) According to the concept of Security Communities (cf. Deutsch et al 1957), formerly strong states have to adjust to their loss of dominance in order to facilitate Security Community establishment. The continuing Russian calls for renegotiation, the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains, and the growing dissatisfaction and frustration are all indicative of the Russian failure to adjust to its loss of dominance. The Russian attempts to consolidate the so called Near Abroad and to forge military (CSTO) and economic (Customs Union, Eurasian Union) alliances as well as the concealed (Medvedev EST) and open (Ukraine conflict) attempts to stop NATO enlargement are all signs that Russia has not accepted its relative loss of power or dominance in global and regional affairs. The result is a partial incompatibility of the current Russian foreign and security policy with the tenets of cooperative security because the Russian leadership employs short-term offensively-oriented policies (e.g. in Ukraine) in order to achieve the long-term goal of securing the status quo (no further NATO enlargement) in the post-Soviet space.

#### The English School

According to the English School (see Paragraph 8.3), the absence of a common civilizational background and a sense of “we-feeling”; the loss of the ordering principle of the equilibrium state of balance of power and as a consequence thereof the absence of respect for mutual spheres of influence; the emerging unipolar hegemony of the United States together with hegemonic practices, hubris, and loss of credibility; the U.S. orientation towards the concept of world society and the Russian opposition of world society values; and the mutual violations of the concept of international society are indicative and help explaining decay.

(1) According to the English School, historically evolved shared values help to establish a kind of “we-feeling” among participants of the concept of world society (cf. Wight 1977). The absence of a sense of “we-feeling” based on the absence

of a common civilizational background (cf. Neumann 2011) helps to understand why Russia and the United States are not sharing a common understanding of the normative basis of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe. The consequences are incompatible policies and political discourses which take place in different layers of the concepts of international society and/or world society.

(2) According to the English School (cf. Bull 1969), the maintenance of a balance of power among great powers hedges against hegemony. With regards to the empirical evidence, the end of the Cold War brought an end to the ordering principle of the equilibrium state of balance of power. The consequences were unchecked rise of power of the United States and disregard for (former) spheres of influence. The practical products of these consequences are opposing policy concepts (NATO enlargement vs. Near Abroad policy) which negatively affect third states (e.g. Ukraine) and the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe. The emerging unipolar hegemony of the United States in the 1990s together with hegemonic practices, hubris, and loss of credibility (see Abu Ghraib) are a product of the massive shift in relative capabilities after the end of the Cold War. They led to policies of double standard (e.g. mutual respect for sovereignty), U.S. non-responsiveness to Russian complaints, and offensive orientations (NATO enlargement) which were softened by a parallel second U.S. policy strand of continuation of the policies of cooperative security.

(3) According to an important strand in the English School, promotion of individual human rights standards and moral claims, represented by the concept of world society, can help to undermine the existing order, represented by the concept of international society (Bull 1977: 151-53). The U.S. orientation towards the concept of world society and the Russian opposition of world society values are a product of the different civilizational backgrounds (cf. Neumann 2011). With the 1999 Yugoslavia bombing and the later recognition of the independence of Kosovo, Washington gave precedence to ideas of world society (e.g. individual human rights; overcoming the primacy of the nation state; self-determination) over con-

siderations of the concept of international society (i.e. sovereignty; non-interference in internal affairs). At the same time, Russia, increasingly under the third Presidency of Putin, has started to vehemently oppose ideas of world society and instead relies on international relations definitions based on international society (cf. Lukin 2014). The result is another layer of practical and rhetorical incompatibility of policies. This incompatibility starts to overstretch the already strained normative basis of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe the further the two states are drifting apart.

Further on, both violated the (historically older) concept of international society. Examples are the circumvention of the UN Security Council in the 1999 Yugoslavia bombing, the precedent of the recognition of independence of Kosovo, the U.S.-led Iraq war, the Russian recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the annexation of Crimea. These examples are practical manifestations of the divergent interpretations of older and newer ordering principles. Their result is a loss of a common basis for understanding and conducting international affairs cooperatively.

#### Constructivist Analyses of Norm Dynamics

According to Constructivist analyses of norm dynamics (see Paragraph 8.4), the “fuzziness” of the Helsinki norms; Russian notions of injustice and inequality; acts of norm-challenging speech; the mutual U.S.-Russian role of norm challengers; the non-routine character of certain situations, the domestic situatedness, and changes in personnel; have all facilitated norm violation and thus contributed to the erosion of the normative basis of cooperative arms control in Europe. The erosion of norms is indicative of cooperation dissolution and helps explaining decay.

(1) According to Constructivist research (see Paragraph 8.4), the erosion of norms can have a negative impact on cooperation. The erosion of norms happens in conjunction with a number of facilitating variables (cf. Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007). First, the “fuzziness” of norms can facilitate norm violation and erosion (cf. Shannon 2000). In relation to the empirical evidence, the partial “fuzziness” of the

normative basis of the Helsinki accords relates directly to the indicator of regime-internal contradictions and has helped the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia to interpret key principles and norms of the regime complex differently (see Chapter 7). Constructivists conclude that the more “fuzzy” a norm, the easier it gets to exploit it (cf. Shannon 2000). The result is a constant Russian reference to “fuzzy” principles and norms such as the ‘indivisibility of security’ once national issue-specific interests lead to instances of non-compliance (see Chapter 7).

The second variable pertains to acts of norm-challenging speech (cf. Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007). Acts of norm-challenging speech have occurred increasingly on the Russian side from the late 1990s onwards in the forum of the OSCE (see Russian Statements contained in Chapter 7). Norm-challenging speech in conjunction with justice claims are a particularly salient type of norm contestation (Müller 2013: 6-7). Russian notions of injustice and inequality are linked to NATO enlargement, the U.S. foreign and security policy which, as Russia claims, would employ double standards, and the role of the OSCE (see President of Russia 2007; 2014b). The consequences of the Russian notions of being treated unfair were increasing acts of norm-challenging speech, a (partial) retreat from the institutional structures of cooperative security, and the (partial) ignoring of the normative basis of the regime complex.

The repeated and increasing use of norm-challenging speech has actively prepared for the next variable of norm-challenging behavior (cf. Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007). Both, the United States and Russia have acted as norm challengers at different times. In conjunction with NATO enlargement (in the Russian perception a U.S. violation of the principle of the indivisibility of security), the Yugoslavia bombing, the Russian CFE “suspension”, the Russian-Georgian war, and the annexation of Crimea, both have challenged existing normative injunctions which are inherent parts of the regime complex (see Chapter 6). Since both states are the two main actors in the system of cooperative arms control in Europe and since both acted repeatedly and increasingly, their actions are all the more severe.

The variable of the non-routine character of certain situations in conjunction with the domestic situatedness and changes in personnel (cf. Shannon 2000) has facilitated norm violation on different accounts. In conjunction with the first deliberations to enlarge NATO, the non-routine character of the dissolution of the USSR, the domestic U.S. support for enlargement, and the change in office from Bush senior to Bill Clinton have all facilitated norm violation. The same applies to the situations of 9/11 and the current Ukraine conflict. The consequences of the political handling of these events of magnitude are that central normative tenets of cooperative (European) institutions were largely ignored, and therewith partially devalued. The result was a slow but increasing erosion of norms of the regime complex. With the erosion of norms, the normative basis has been considerably weakened (see Chapter 7).

The following Table 113 (next six pages) comprises the different indicators of decay according to their theoretical origin and according to their occurrence(s) throughout the period of analysis (1973-2014). With regards to some indicators it is rather hard to determine exactly when they happened or when they first occurred. Indicators such as the Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains or negative expectations developed over time. In those cases, the empirical evidence collated in Chapter 3 rather points to the first years of the first Putin Presidency as period of first (official) occurrence. In that regard, the following table does not claim absolute correctness from a temporal point of view.

**TABLE 113**

INDICATORS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION DECAY  
 ACCORDING TO THEORETICAL ORIGIN

YEAR	REALISM	REGIME THEORY	SECURITY COMMUNITIES	ENGLISH SCHOOL	CONSTRUCTIVISM
1973		issue linkage (MBFR and CSCE); divergent issue-specific interests (MBFR)			
1974					
1975		regime-internal contradiction (Helsinki Final Act); divergent issue-specific interests (CSCE)	no sense of "we-ness"	no common civilizational background; no sense of "we-feeling"	"fuzziness" of Helsinki norms
1976		protracted negotiations (MBFR)			
1977					
1978					
1979					
1980					
1981					
1982					
1983					
1984					
1985					
1986					
1987					
1988	massive shift in capabilities (Gorbachev UN speech)				
1989					
1990					

1991				loss of ordering principle of balance of power (dissolution of the USSR); emerging unipolar hegemony (USA)	
1992					
1993	Russian non-compliance with CFE flank regulations				
1994	U.S. offensive orientation (discussion about NATO enlargement)	divergent issue-specific interests (NATO and CSCE upgrade); divergent interpretation of principles and norms (NATO enlargement)	no sense of “we-ness”; no U.S. willingness to constrain its power and exert responsiveness towards Russia	U.S. hegemonic practices; U.S. hubris; no common civilizational background; no sense of “we-feeling”	U.S. becomes norm challenger (discussion about NATO enlargement); process of norm erosion starts; Russian notions of injustice and inequality (NATO enlargement)
1995	Russian calls for CFE re-negotiation	issue linkage (NATO enlargement and Flank Agreement)			
1996					
1997	U.S. offensive orientation (14 amendments to Flank Agreement)	divergent issue-specific interests (NATO, Founding Act, and OSCE adaptation); issue linkage (NATO enlargement and Founding Act and CFE adaptation and OSCE adaptation); negative adaptation consequences (14 amendments to Flank Agreement)			

1998					
1999	Russian perception of U.S. non-compliance with the indivisibility of security (1 <sup>st</sup> NATO enlargement); U.S. non-compliance with OSCE acquis (Yugoslavia bombing)	divergent interpretation of principles and norms (Yugoslavia bombing); negative adaptation consequences (ACFE Istanbul commitments)		U.S. embraces world society concept (Yugoslavia bombing)	U.S. acts norm-challenging (Yugoslavia bombing and NATO enlargement); norm erosion
2000					parallel changes in personnel (Putin and Bush)
2001	diminished U.S. interest in cooperation with Russia (new focus: War on Terror, later China)		no common threat perception anymore	U.S. embraces world society concept (intervention in Afghanistan); increased U.S. hegemonic practices; U.S. hubris	non-routine character of 9/11 and U.S. domestic situatedness in conjunction with change in personnel (Bush in 2000) facilitates U.S. norm violations; U.S. acts norm-challenging (intervention in Afghanistan); Russia starts to employ norm-challenging speech in the OSCE; norm erosion

2002	minor shift in relative capabilities (Russian economic recovery); U.S. non-compliance with CAC acquis (ACFE non-ratification)	divergent issue-specific interests (NRC establishment and further CFE process)			growing Russian notions of injustice and inequality (ACFE non-ratification by NATO)
2003	diminished Russian interest in cooperation with U.S. (new focus: economic consolidation and neighborhood consolidation); Russian non-compliance with CFE Istanbul commitments	protracted CFE negotiations; protracted negotiations in the OSCE; Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains starts to take shape; divergent issue-specific interests; increasing negative Russian expectations	Russian failure to adjust to its loss of dominance; no U.S. willingness to constrain its power and exert responsiveness towards Russia	U.S. embraces world society concept (war in Iraq); U.S. loss of credibility (Abu Ghraib and Guantamo)	U.S. acts norm-challenging (war in Iraq, Abu Ghraib, and Guantamo); Russia becomes norm challenger by non-fulfillment of CFE Istanbul commitments; norm erosion
2004	U.S. offensive orientation (2 <sup>nd</sup> NATO enlargement)				
2005					
2006					
2007	Russian non-compliance with CAC acquis (CFE suspension)	divergent interpretation of principles and norms (CFE suspension)			Russia acts norm-challenging (CFE suspension); norm-challenging speech (Putin Munich speech); norm erosion

2008	U.S. offensive orientation (NATO promise to Georgia and Ukraine); Russian non-compliance with OSCE acquis (Russia-Georgia war); Russian calls for European security architecture re-negotiation (Medvedev EST)	divergent issue-specific interests (Medvedev EST); divergent interpretation of principles and norms (Russian-Georgian war); negative spill-over (CFE on VD)		no respect for mutual spheres of influence anymore (NATO 2008 promise of accession to Georgia and Ukraine)	Russia acts norm-challenging (Russian-Georgian war 2008); non-routine character of Russian-Georgian war and Russian domestic situatedness in conjunction with change in personnel (Medvedev) facilitates Russian norm violations; norm erosion
2009	Russian offensive orientation (Corfu Process); U.S. offensive orientation (3 <sup>rd</sup> NATO enlargement)	divergent issue-specific interests (Corfu Process); negative spill-over (CFE on NRC)			Russia starts to employ norm-challenging speech in the NRC
2010		negative spill-over (CFE on Open Skies)			
2011	NATO non-compliance with CAC acquis (partial suspension)			U.S. embraces world society concept (Libya bombing)	
2012				Russia starts to oppose world society values (suppression of domestic opposition; no freedom of the media; anti-gay laws, etc.)	
2013					

2014	Russian non-compliance with OSCE acquis (Ukraine conflict)	divergent issue-specific interests (Ukraine conflict); divergent interpretation of principles and norms (Ukraine conflict)		Russia violates international society concept (Crimea annexation)	non-routine character of Ukraine conflict and Russian domestic situatedness facilitates Russian norm violations; continuous acts of Russian norm-challenging speech; norm erosion
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The next paragraph contains the main conclusions which derive from the analysis of this thesis, both from a theoretical and from a political point of view.

## 9.2 Conclusions

Analysis of 41 years of U.S.-Soviet/Russian policies on cooperative arms control in Europe has shown that as a result of those two main actors' policies a dense regime complex with five elemental regimes (one being a meta-regime) has developed. A number of indicators from different theoretical approaches to IR (see above) are indicative of the process of decay of the regime complex. Interpretation of those findings leads to a number of key theoretical and political conclusions which will be summarized in the following two paragraphs. The next paragraph contains the main theoretical conclusions.

### 9.2.1 Theoretical Conclusions

(1) Previous research on the issue of cooperative arms control in Europe has failed to acknowledge the complex relationship of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe (see Paragraph 1.3). Because of the lack of sound theoretical research on the issue and because of the lax use of regime terminology without compelling empirical evidence, scholars of IR have missed to take account of the complex form of the institutions. The approach of explaining cooperative arms control over a long period of time (1973-2014; see Chapter 3) and to include different security institutions (e.g. NATO and the C/OSCE) was fruitful for identify-

ing the historical-political and normative common origin of the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe. This conclusion has direct bearings on the likely consequences of elemental decay and the political handling of those consequences (see Paragraph 9.2.2 below).

(2) The cooperative policies and institutions of NATO are an integral part of the regime complex and are much closer interwoven with other cooperative institutions than usually assessed in the literature (cf. Ponsard 2007). Even though previous research has successfully linked NATO's eastern policy towards the concept of cooperative security (ibid), analysis of this thesis shows that NATO's respective cooperative institutions share the key principles and norms of the regime complex to a significant degree. Particularly the principle of the 'indivisibility of security' is a central tenet of the relevant NATO agreements (see Table 57). Because the institutions of NATO are an integral part of the regime complex, their policies can potentially lead to negative spill-over effects to other elemental regimes of the complex. These conclusions have a direct impact on the political handling of those institutions (see Paragraph 9.2.2 below).

(3) The research on regime complexes is incomplete. So far, complexity research has not tried to analyze seemingly "old" security institutions based on the premises of latest complexity assumptions (see Thakur 2013). Analysis of this thesis shows that the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe even dates back to 1975. In addition, the empirical evidence of this thesis has proven that even sophisticated forms of long-term successful institutionalized cooperation such as regime complexes can go into reverse or even dissolve. This empirical finding contributes significantly to current theoretical complexity assumptions which have so far missed to address the possible evolution stage of complexity decay (cf. Morin and Orsini 2013). The methods applied in Chapters 3-6 have helped to name concrete reference values for identifying the interactions ('links') between the elemental regimes ('nodes') of a complex (cf. Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013: 30). Current complexity research has so far not been specific with respect to identifying concrete reference values for detecting interaction (ibid). In

this thesis, four possible reference values were established (cross-shared key principles and norms; political-historical linkages; active or passive textual references; active or passive design links).

(4) The multi-theory approach applied in this thesis was particularly helpful in analyzing the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe and the related foreign and security policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Realism helped to identify the structural shifts in the system and their interactions with the units of the system (cf. Waltz 1979). The shifts in relative capabilities and the subsequent changes in the orientation of the United States help to explain why regime establishment in conjunction with the end of the Cold War took place and why the political deals of that time contained the seeds of future contention and institutional decay. Realism is particularly valuable for identifying issue-specific foreign and security policy orientations of states (in terms of defensive vs. offensive orientations; see Chapter 2) and the likely consequences for cooperation. The theory helped to explain why direct U.S.-Russian cooperation on NATO enlargement did not take place. Realism also helped to understand certain Russian policy initiatives (the common European house; the upgrade of the CSCE; the OSCE Security Model exercise; the Medvedev draft EST) which were all ultimately geared, in one way or another, towards achieving an end to future rounds of NATO enlargement. It was thus possible to identify Russia (mainly) as a status quo power and the United States as a power which leaves all options on the table.

On other accounts, Realism is not very helpful in addressing the reasons behind the decay of the regime complex. The Russian perception of the inequitable distribution of gains and the subsequent signs of dissatisfaction and frustration are a good example. From a Realist perspective, the distribution of gains is not “unfair” but relative to the underlying distribution of power (cf. Grieco 1988). If the gains from cooperation are not mirroring the relative distribution of power anymore, rational states will seek exit to cooperation (ibid). Such assumption is nevertheless only in line with the Russian behavior in conjunction with CFE; it does indeed not address the negative Russian emotions and their consequences at all. Particularly

Neorealism (cf. Waltz 1979) is too narrow in that sense. Here, Constructivist approaches (see Chapter 4 and Paragraph 8.4) seem more valuable.

An important conclusion from the Realist approach pertains to the survival motive (cf. Waltz 1979). Since the United States and Russia are enjoying nuclear strategic parity in numerical terms of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles (cf. New START 2011), their national survival in terms of security against direct military attack is secured as long as both deem the other to act rational in the sense of sharing an ultimate concern for survival. Russian reference to NATO enlargement as a threat to national security (cf. Ministry of Defence 2010) and the indivisibility of security are thus parts of a constant Russian construction of the survival motive. Efforts to halt enlargement, to codify the status quo, or to thwart possible future enlargement (as some commentators claim in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict; cf. Charap and Shapiro 2014b) are thus probably better explainable in terms of power defined in influence and status than in terms of (Russian) security. Morgenthau's (1954) classical concept of the struggle for power, complemented with Constructivist analysis of emotions of inferiority, loss, grievance, and collective memories would be a valuable approach to explaining contemporary Russian foreign and security policy towards the West. These conclusions only derive from application of the different theoretical approaches in this thesis and have not led to deeper analysis because of the focus of this thesis which largely excludes the nuclear strategic realm in all its aspects (e.g. including conventional precision-guided munitions, outer space weapons, and missile defenses and countermeasures) as well as the domestic political realm. Indeed, further research on this crucial aspect is needed.

(5) Institutions and norms matter to the powerful – but to varying degrees. Analysis of the empirical evidence has shown that powerful actors such as the United States make strategic use of institutions in order to achieve their preferred issue-specific interest. The U.S. strategic use of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe during the mid-1990s in order to cushion Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is a good example of that kind. Another example was the U.S.-led

shifting of the second part of the Medvedev EST initiative from the NRC to the OSCE's Corfu Process (see Paragraph 3.6.1). In addition, international institutions have constraining effects. It took Russia five years to exit from CFE after NATO had made the ratification of ACFE conditional on Moscow fulfilling its Istanbul commitments. Even the Russian exit in the illegal form of "suspension" was a sign that Russia could – under changed conditions – return to the agreement. The same applies to the OSCE. Russia has voiced its dissatisfaction with the structures and the work of the organization at least since the beginning of the 2000s (see Russian statements contained in Chapter 7). Nevertheless, Moscow has not exited from the OSCE and continues to show no such signs (cf. Statement 50 in Chapter 7). Even in conjunction with the Russian violations of a number of key principles and norms of the regime complex in the current Ukraine conflict, constraining effects are visible. Russia refers to key principles and norms of the regime complex in order to find an internationally acceptable justification (see President of Russia 2014a,b; cf. Burke-White 2014). On the other side, particularly the Ukraine conflict shows as well that powerful states such as Russia do not shy away from violating inherited key principles and norms and internationally recognized agreements once they deem critical national issue-specific interests at stake.

These theoretical conclusions relate directly to the political conclusions which are contained in the next paragraph.

### 9.2.2 Political Conclusions

(1) Analysis of the U.S. foreign and security policy towards cooperative arms control in Europe has highlighted that Washington was not willing or capable of constraining its power from the mid-1990s onwards. The maintenance and further enlargement of NATO and the parallel policy of keeping the C/OSCE's profile comparably low are indicative of this conclusion. Analysis further suggests that different political opinions shaped the debate about NATO enlargement and the subsequent handling of the decision to enlarge (see Paragraphs 3.3.1 and 3.4.1). While the official line of argument was that NATO enlargement was seen as a stabilizing tool for the newly independent states to the East, also views existed

which propagated enlargement in order to hedge against a possible relapse of Russia into authoritarianism. The former spectrum (the majority of the Clinton administration) voted for coupling NATO enlargement with a cooperative security approach towards Russia; the latter spectrum (the later majority of Congress) saw close cooperation with Russia as a mistake because, according to this view, the Yeltsin government was made up of ‘basically communists who had changed their suits from red to blue’ (Lake quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul 2003: 121). The result was a policy which could never fully conceal that it involved the potential future option of containing Russia (once again) – an option which has gained renewed prominence in conjunction with the on-going Ukraine conflict. In turn, Russia has never accepted this dual policy concept and has continued to view NATO basically as an alliance against Russia (cf. Ministry of Defence 2010). The political conclusion is that both states have not yet found (or seriously considered finding) a mutually acceptable formula to bring their contradicting power aspirations and their related policies in line with each other.

(2) One of the results of the U.S. unwillingness to constrain its power was the U.S. strategic use of institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe in conjunction with NATO enlargement. The adaptation of CFE, the establishment of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the U.S. re-engagement on the OSCE in the second half of the 1990s were all measures designed to achieve a certain level of Russian acquiescence of NATO enlargement. As a result, certain decisions and institutional developments related to the concept of cooperative security are hard to distinguish from other decisions and institutions that are involving concepts which are not consistently in line with the tenets of cooperative security (cf. Bauwens et al 1994: 21). One example from the analysis is CFE adaptation. While the cooperative security measure as such was also aimed at cushioning Russian unease with enlargement, it contained a clause (the Istanbul commitments) which was aimed at diminishing the Russian influence in Moldova and Georgia. Besides the more laudable goal of increasing those two countries formal sovereignty, Russian forces withdrawal from the three break-away regions of Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia was also a precondition for a possible future Moldovan and

Georgian accession to NATO. Once this part of U.S. CFE policy gained the upper hand (under the George W. Bush administration), the cooperative security institution of CFE became as contested as the issue of enlargement. The political conclusion is that institutions from the realm of cooperative security can become bones of contention once they become politically linked to other already contested strands of policy which are not in line with the concept of cooperative security.

(3) Russia has never really accepted her loss of power. The above contained conclusions all arise in part from the Russian leadership's inability to come to terms with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the parallel decline in power (cf. also Deutsch et al 1957). Particularly under the three Putin Presidential terms, rhetoric has underscored this assessment (cf. President of Russia 2005). This conclusion in conjunction with the above noted assumption that the Russian leadership might be more struggling for power in terms of influence and status and to a lesser degree for security in its dealings with the West makes possible re-engagement on cooperative arms control in Europe in the future a difficult endeavor. The conclusion is that any such approach would have to firstly answer the question whether the West would be willing to acknowledge Russia a certain sphere of influence and, if so, under what conditions.

(4) The institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe lack an encompassing approach which really includes Russia (also) in terms of Russian issue-specific interests. Neither the OSCE nor the cooperative institutions of NATO have a design which reflects the difficult to fulfill Russian demand for equal security for all. NATO does not have it because of the inequality of decision-making between NATO members and non-NATO members. The OSCE does not have it because of its missing a legal personality and because of its non-existing authority over NATO decision-making. For much of the post-Cold War period, the two U.S. approaches towards European security (cooperative security and NATO maintenance/enlargement) have co-existed in a sometimes problematic parallelism. At the latest with the current Ukraine crisis, their growing incompatibility has come to light. Particularly the political handling of NATO's cooperative security institu-

tions is increasingly problematic. Suspending fora for dialogue such as the NRC in times where dialogue is most needed (2008 in conjunction with the Russian-Georgian war; 2014 in conjunction with the Ukraine conflict) is in conflict with central tenets of cooperative security. This is particularly the case since those NATO institutions are an integral part of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe. Even partial withdrawal or suspension of those institutions can generate negative spill-over effects which could resonate throughout the whole system.

(5) The decay of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe has left Europe with comparably less institutions addressing current insecurities and uncertainties. The on-going Ukraine conflict underscores this conclusion (cf. Richter 2014). Particular aspects of the conflict such as the Russian forces build-up on the Ukrainian border could have been addressed by the CFE Treaty if the treaty were still in force. Other aspects of the conflict such as the Russian strategy of hybrid warfare in the annexation of Crimea cannot be addressed by any of the existing (or deadlocked) institutions without adapting those institutions. The conclusion is that a lack of functioning and up to date institutions exists. Another conclusion is that the political handling of the decay of certain elemental parts of the regime complex was not very far-sighted.

(6) Reviving the institutions of cooperative arms control in Europe or the whole concept of cooperative security will be very hard. The structures of the system have proven persistent, adaptable, and successful for a long time. They were even mostly functioning at times when the underlying fragile political understanding had vanished. National administrations tend to cling on to already existing institutions and shy away from setting up new ones (cf. George 1980). At the latest since the on-going Ukraine conflict, the need for new security arrangements has finally spilled over to the public U.S. political debate (see Charap and Shapiro 2014b; Lipman 2014, Mearsheimer 2014a). Any future effort will be extremely difficult because the institutions are so closely interwoven. It would be hard to disentangle them. A complete restart would probably reap larger gains – it is at the same time

extremely unlikely at this moment in time. The latest Swiss OSCE Chairman in Office deliberations of setting up an OSCE Panel of Eminent persons addressing the crisis of European security (see OSCE 2014b) shows that, for the moment, OSCE participating States continue to rely on traditional measures of low political profile.

Coming to an end, the decay of the regime complex of cooperative arms control in Europe is a rich field for analyzing the volatility of international institutionalized cooperation. It stands symbolically for the inability of the West and Russia to craft a mutually acceptable post-Cold War security architecture. More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, Europe has entered a new period of confrontation with Russia. The decay of cooperative arms control in Europe is thus deplorable. At the same time, it is even more a reason to re-engage on the issues that have led to its current state. Careful and non-biased analysis of the failures of the past might hopefully contribute to shaping the future.



## Epilogue

The enervating sound of sharp claws had come simmering through the wooden floor all through the morning. The obtrusive noise had made him feel at unease; a feeling, he knew too well. For days he had felt as if it was calling for him, for a decision, for an act of personal courage. Again, he weighed his options, carefully assessing the situation. Next he stood up and opened the squeaking cellar door, his sweaty fingers clasped around a club.

Before the boy, a dusty stairway petered out in the dark. Beaten stairs led the way. The boy, his neatly cut side parting stuck to his heated forehead, took each one of them in slow motion. “Don’t fall”, he told himself over and over again. Reaching the ground floor, he could see it. There it was, bigger and meaner than he had expected. It was the kind of monster his school mates would not believe, were he to tell his heroic tale. Slowly, he approached the beast. Once it turned to the left, he followed suit. Once it was about to escape to the right, he closed the gap. There was no escape from the cellar’s corner. He had it there, exactly, where he wanted it to be. A sudden flow of confidence rushed through his veins while his body tensed up, the club raised high above his head. Then...suddenly...the rat jumped at him!

This story, though slightly dramatized here, can be read in Vladimir Putin’s self-portrait *First Person* (see Putin et al 2000). There, the now grown-up President of the Russian Federation explains how the hunt for the rat, driven to the wall, and its sudden attack on him in the cellar had taught him a lesson. It seems that Putin internalized the uneven battle. Some decades later, under the impression of America’s growing influence in military, economic, and cultural terms, Russia had backed down – at least in Putin’s and a majority of the Russian population’s perceptions. Against the seemingly almighty NATO machinery and the economic verve of the European Union, Russia, the former bold empire, was driven to the wall. First in 2008 but more so in 2014, Russia “jumped”. In a chilling metaphor,

almost echoing his childhood memory, Putin confirmed that in the 2014 Ukraine context, 'Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.' (President of Russia 2014a)

While such portrayal is clearly painted in white, blue, and red, more than a grain of truth about the reasons for Russia's rejection of the concept of cooperative security in Europe can be found in the early 1990's years of the shaping of the continent's post-Cold War order. When Gorbachev laid down arms in an act of significant symbolism in 1988 in New York the door had opened up for a rapprochement of historical magnitude. Not few Soviet and Russian leaders, struck by the speed with which the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union dissolved into thin air, hoped for the subsequent dissolution of the Western military alliance. Soon, it turned out that their hopes were unrealistic. In his State of the Union Speech to Congress in 1992, George H.W. Bush declared: 'By the grace of God, America won the Cold War.' (The White House 1992a) And as is well known from a popular song: *The winner takes it all*.

This thesis has shown that the re-making of Europe's security order between 1989 and 1999, particularly in the crucial realm of arms control, was characterized by cooperation. However, it was cooperation amongst non-equals with almost always divergent interests. The institutional results of that process mirror this historical fact. Neither did NATO dissolve nor did Washington constrain its ambitious enlargement plans. Russian complaints throughout the 1990s were heard but did not trigger any change of course. The 1975 Helsinki promise of the 'indivisibility of security' began to sound hollow in Russian ears. Most importantly for the Kremlin, its own prestige project from the Cold War, the CSCE, did not evolve into a full-fledged security organization with comprehensive responsibility for the Euro-Atlantic security space. With the dawn of the new millennium, the organization underwent a process of political marginalization to which Russia contributed. In parallel, important institutions of cooperative arms control such as the CFE Treaty collapsed due to divergent interests between the United States and Russia.

Does that mean that the West is the main responsible for the decay of cooperative security in Europe and should therewith shoulder at least the partial blame for today's escalation in Ukraine? The answer is straightforward: it should not! Neither the United States nor its NATO allies are responsible for Russia's failure to establish a functioning democracy based on strict respect for human rights and the rule of law. They are not responsible for the Russian leadership's failure to accept the relative loss of power after the Cold War. The West is not responsible for the Kremlin's course of rejecting once agreed-upon principles and norms such as the inviolability of frontiers, the respect for the territorial integrity of states, and abstaining from the threat or use of force. Also, Western leaders are not to blame for Russia's mixed account when it comes to compliance with international arms control and risk reduction agreements. Some would therefore even argue that Russian actions in Ukraine only affirm those who regularly pleaded for containment and not cooperation as the central goal in the West's dealings with Moscow.

However, Western policy makers and political analysts have to take the blame for two important failures of the past. First, they failed to establish a cooperative security system for Europe based on the principle of equity. Particularly the realm of cooperative arms control in Europe highlights the inability of Washington and its allies to constrain their own ambitions and interests. Since equity and thus justice are seldom real-life outcomes of international negotiations, the second failure carries even more weight: for too long and with too little appetite for cooperative solutions did policy makers in the United States and Europe stand by as the institutions of cooperative arms control eroded. As we now know, the system of interlocking agreements was much more fragile than most would have expected. Its passing was not the sudden product of any conscious ad hoc decision. Rather, it was skulking degradation over many years. It should have been the warning signal that something between the West and Russia was about to go terribly wrong.

So, what is next? Without question, the return to confrontation harbors a number of unpleasant and unclear dangers for the West and Russia alike. Cooperative arms control instruments might regain some of their importance at some point in time; however any future effort to craft substantive and also equitable institutions will encounter a much more “realistic” setting than the enthusiastic atmosphere at the end of the Cold War. The absence of enthusiasm might turn out to be helpful in order to sharpen political senses. As an old proverb has it: *history doesn't repeat itself but it does rhyme*. In that sense, we are not entering a New Cold War. But the features of the new confrontation resemble some of the problems we were already facing some decades ago. Re-visiting the old confrontation should therefore go hand in hand with re-visiting the old instruments of cooperation. What had its merits during the Cold War has not lost its validity in today's confrontation.

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## Annex I: Data Input (Capabilities)

1973

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GNP
<b>United States</b>	<b>210,900,000</b>	<b>9,371,829</b>	<b>2,252,900</b>	<b>\$85.2 billion</b>	<b>\$1,289.1 billion</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>544,828,500</b>	<b>22,219,135</b>	<b>5,200,050</b>	<b>\$125.8 billion</b>	-
1. Belgium	9,800,000	30,562	89,600	\$990 million	-
2. Canada	22,300,000	9,971,500	83,000	\$2,141 million	-
3. Denmark	5,020,000	42,994	39,800	\$568 million	-
4. France	52,000,000	551,670	503,600	\$8,488 million	-
5. West Germany	60,100,000	248,640	475,000	\$11,083 million	-
6. Greece	8,900,000	132,608	160,000	\$580 million	-
7. Iceland	213,500	102,952	-	-	-
8. Italy	54,400,000	301,217	427,500	\$3,964 million	-
9. Luxembourg	345,000	2,590	550	\$15 million	-
10. Netherlands	13,500,000	33,929	112,200	\$2,102 million	-
11. Norway	4,000,000	323,750	35,400	\$665 million	-
12. Portugal	9,200,000	94,276	204,000	\$523 million	-
13. Turkey	37,900,000	766,640	455,000	\$812 million	-
14. United Kingdom	56,250,000	243,978	361,500	\$8,673 million	-
<b>Soviet Union</b>	<b>250,500,000</b>	<b>22,402,200</b>	<b>3,425,000</b>	<b>\$88.9 billion</b>	<b>\$612.5 billion<sup>1</sup></b>
<b>Warsaw Pact</b>	<b>355,835,000</b>	<b>23,393,098</b>	<b>4,452,000</b>	<b>\$95.59 billion</b>	-
1. Bulgaria	8,660,000	111,852	152,000	\$301 million	-
2. Czechoslovakia	14,600,000	127,946	190,000	\$1,336 million	-
3. East Germany	17,000,000	108,262	132,000	\$2,031 million	-
4. Hungary	10,450,000	92,981	103,000	\$695 million	-
5. Poland	33,725,000	312,354	280,000	\$1,799 million	-
6. Romania	20,900,000	237,503	170,000	\$528 million	-

<sup>1</sup> The U.S. Dollar has been converted from Rubles at the 1973 official rate of 0.72 Rubles = \$1.

1989

Country/ Military Alliance	Popula- tion	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>248,917,000</b>	<b>9,372,610</b>	<b>2,124,900</b>	<b>\$290.30 billion</b>	<b>\$5,657.7 billion</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>656,570,900</b>	<b>22,740,436</b>	<b>5,358,350</b>	<b>\$435.55 billion</b>	<b>-</b>
1. Belgium	9,938,000	30,510	92,400	\$2.53 billion	-
2. Canada	26,065,000	9,976,140	89,000	\$9.29 billion	-
3. Denmark	5,141,000	43,070	31,600	\$1.86 billion	-
4. France	55,784,000	547,030	466,300	\$28.83 billion	-
5. West Germany	61,214,000	248,580	494,300	\$28.57 billion	-
6. Greece	10,105,000	131,940	208,500	\$3.89 billion	-
7. Iceland	250,000	103,000	-	-	-
8. Italy	57,587,000	301,230	390,000	\$16.22 billion	-
9. Luxembourg	369,000	2,586	800	\$80.39 million	-
10. Netherlands	14,800,000	37,290	103,600	\$6.64 billion	-
11. Norway	4,210,900	324,220	34,100	\$3.01 billion	-
12. Portugal	10,373,000	92,080	75,300	\$1.25 million	-
13. Spain	39,263,000	504,750	285,000	\$6.84 billion	-
14. Turkey	55,541,000	780,580	650,900	\$2.93 billion	-
15. United Kingdom	57,013,000	244,820	311,650	\$34.56 billion	-
<b>Soviet Union</b>	<b>287,776,000</b>	<b>22,402,200</b>	<b>4,258,000</b>	<b>\$119.44 billion<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>\$506.5 billion</b>
<b>Warsaw Pact</b>	<b>401,279,000</b>	<b>23,392,520</b>	<b>5,422,300</b>	<b>\$139.44 billion</b>	<b>-</b>
1. Bulgaria	8,985,000	110,910	117,500	\$1.75 billion	-
2. Czechoslovakia	15,624,000	127,870	199,700	\$2.94 billion	-
3. East Germany	16,616,000	108,330	173,100	\$12.01 billion	-
4. Hungary	10,590,000	93,030	91,000	\$827.47 million	-
5. Poland	38,105,000	312,680	412,000	\$1.68 billion	-
6. Romania	23,583,000	237,500	171,000	\$797.48 million	-

<sup>1</sup> Western intelligence sources still maintain that by NATO definition standards, defense spending was about twice as large as officially claimed (IISS 1990-1991: 33)

1990

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>248,855,000</b>	<b>9,372,610</b>	<b>2,117,900</b>	<b>\$291.4 bil- lion</b>	<b>\$5,979.6 bil- lion</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>657,101,000</b>	<b>22,740,436</b>	<b>5,247,350</b>	<b>\$450.61 bil- lion</b>	-
1. Belgium	9,865,000	30,510	92,000	\$2.89 billion	-
2. Canada	26,625,000	9,976,140	90,000	\$10.194 bil- lion	-
3. Denmark	5,088,000	43,070	31,700	\$2.192 billion	-
4. France	56,414,000	547,030	461,250	\$33.03 billion	-
5. West Germany	60,362,000	248,580	469,000	\$31.02 billion	-
6. Greece	10,139,000	131,940	162,500	\$3.79 billion	-
7. Iceland	255,000	103,000	-	-	-
8. Italy	57,299,000	301,230	389,600	\$18.979 bil- lion	-
9. Luxembourg	365,000	2,586	800	\$90.44 mil- lion	-
10. Netherlands	14,766,000	37,290	102,600	\$7.466 billion	-
11. Norway	4,200,000	324,220	34,100	\$3.351 billion	-
12. Portugal	10,504,000	92,080	68,000	\$1.54 billion	-
13. Spain	39,859,000	504,750	274,500	\$7.98 billion	-
14. Turkey	55,860,000	780,580	647,400	\$3.28 billion	-
15. United King- dom	56,645,000	244,820	306,000	\$33.405 bil- lion	-
<b>Soviet Union</b>	<b>288,561,000</b>	<b>22,402,200</b>	<b>3,988,000</b>	<b>\$117.48 bil- lion</b>	<b>\$516.81 billion</b>
<b>Warsaw Pact</b>	<b>402,320,000</b>	<b>23,392,520</b>	<b>5,022,700</b>	<b>\$136.98 bil- lion</b>	-
1. Bulgaria	9,062,000	110,910	129,000	\$2.208 billion	-
2. Czechoslovakia	15,692,000	127,870	198,200	\$3.224 billion	-
3. East Germany	16,664,000	108,330	137,700	\$11.86 <sup>1</sup> bil- lion	-
4. Hungary	10,567,000	93,030	94,000	\$716.84 mil- lion	-
5. Poland	38,479,000	312,680	312,800	\$700.73 mil- lion	-
6. Romania	23,295,000	237,500	163,000	\$789.98 mil- lion	-

1994

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>259,533,000</b>	<b>9,372,610</b>	<b>1,650,500</b>	<b>\$263.3 billion</b>	<b>\$7,308.8 billion</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>699,773,900</b>	<b>22,848,766</b>	<b>4,197,600</b>	<b>\$387.18 billion</b>	<b>-</b>
1. Belgium	10,059,000	30,510	63,000	\$2.6 billion	-
2. Canada	28,125,400	9,976,140	78,100	\$8.45 billion	-
3. Denmark	5,196,600	43,070	27,000	\$2.6 billion	-
4. France	57,842,400	547,030	409,600	\$35.6 billion	-
5. Germany	80,974,600	356,910	367,300	\$28.6 billion	-
6. Greece	10,569,500	131,940	159,300	\$3.3 billion	-
7. Iceland	266,200	103,000	-	-	-
8. Italy	58,134,600	301,230	322,300	\$16.1 billion	-
9. Luxembourg	395,200	2,586	800	\$111 million	-
10. Netherlands	15,335,000	37,290	70,900	\$7.42 billion	-
11. Norway	4,322,000	324,220	33,500	\$3.2 billion	-
12. Portugal	10,512,400	92,080	50,700	\$1.5 billion	-
13. Spain	39,736,600	504,750	206,500	\$5.8 billion	-
14. Turkey	60,641,200	780,580	503,800	\$4.6 billion	-
15. United Kingdom	58,130,200	244,820	254,300	\$34 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>148,920,000</b>	<b>17,075,200</b>	<b>1,714,000</b>	<b>\$79 billion</b>	<b>\$395.09 billion</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>226,283,800</b>	<b>20,975,200</b>	<b>1,994,700</b>	<b>\$80.72 billion</b>	<b>-</b>
1. Armenia	3,421,000	29,800	32,700	\$71 million	-
2. Azerbaijan	7,462,000	86,600	56,000	\$132 million	-
3. Belarus	10,491,600	207,600	92,500	\$430 million	-
4. Georgia	5,682,000	69,700	not known	\$88 million	-
5. Kazakhstan	17,407,600	2,717,300	40,000	\$450 million	-
6. Kyrgyzstan	4,684,000	198,500	12,000	\$57.3 million	-
7. Tajikistan	5,897,200	143,100	2,500 <sup>1</sup>	\$115 million	-
8. Uzbekistan	22,318,400	447,400	45,000	\$375 million	-

<sup>1</sup> Data ranges from 2,000-3,000 total armed forces; the mean value of 2,500 has been used for calculation.

1995

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>263,119,000</b>	<b>9,372,610</b>	<b>1,547,300</b>	<b>\$263.5 billion</b>	<b>\$7,664.1 billion</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>703,150,000</b>	<b>22,848,766</b>	<b>4,057,100</b>	<b>\$428.85 billion</b>	<b>-</b>
1. Belgium	10,071,000	30,510	47,200	\$3.45 billion	-
2. Canada	28,130,000	9,976,140	70,500	\$8.14 billion	-
3. Denmark	5,214,000	43,070	33,100	\$3.11 billion	-
4. France	58,125,000	547,030	409,000	\$35.9 billion	-
5. Germany	81,109,000	356,910	339,900	\$34.02 billion	-
6. Greece	10,455,000	131,940	171,300	\$3.38 billion	-
7. Iceland	270,000	103,000	-	-	-
8. Italy	57,867,000	301,230	328,700	\$16 billion	-
9. Luxembourg	406,000	2,586	800	\$114 million	-
10. Netherlands	15,446,000	37,290	74,400	\$8.56 billion	-
11. Norway	4,353,000	324,220	30,000	\$3.77 billion	-
12. Portugal	9,869,000	92,080	54,200	\$1.60 billion	-
13. Spain	39,144,000	504,750	206,000	\$6.59 billion	-
14. Turkey	61,284,000	780,580	507,800	\$6.24 billion	-
15. United Kingdom	58,288,000	244,820	236,900	\$34.48 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>148,940,000</b>	<b>17,075,200</b>	<b>1,520,000</b>	<b>\$63 billion<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>\$395.53 billion</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>226,622,000</b>	<b>20,975,200</b>	<b>1,839,600</b>	<b>\$64.01 billion</b>	<b>-</b>
1. Armenia	3,800,000	29,800	60,000	\$77 million	-
2. Azerbaijan	7,640,000	86,600	86,700	\$109 million	-
3. Belarus	10,372,000	207,600	98,400	\$78 million	-
4. Georgia	5,441,000	69,700	not known	\$56 million	-
5. Kazakhstan	16,763,000	2,717,300	40,000	\$297 million	-
6. Kyrgyzstan	4,636,000	198,500	7,000	\$13 million	-
7. Tajikistan	6,002,000	143,100	2,500 <sup>2</sup>	\$67 million	-
8. Uzbekistan	23,028,000	447,400	25,000	\$315 million	-

<sup>1</sup>Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimate

<sup>2</sup>Data ranges from 2,000-3,000 total armed forces; the mean value of 2,500 has been used for calculation.

1999

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>273,133,000</b>	<b>9,629,091</b>	<b>1,371,500</b>	<b>\$292.1 billion</b>	<b>\$9,660.6 billion</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>780,748,000</b>	<b>23,589,663</b>	<b>4,097,458</b>	<b>\$447.51 billion</b>	-
1. Belgium	10,115,000	30,510	41,750	\$2.5 billion	-
2. Canada	29,236,000	9,976,140	60,600	\$7.0 billion	-
3. Czech Republic	10,480,000	78,703	58,200	\$1,163 million	-
4. Denmark	5,256,000	43,070	24,300	\$2.6 billion	-
5. France	59,165,000	547,030	317,300	\$29.5 billion	-
6. Germany	82,057,000	356,910	332,800	\$25.4 billion	-
7. Greece	10,645,000	131,940	165,670	\$3.4 billion	-
8. Hungary	10,028,000	93,030	43,440	\$745 million	-
9. Iceland	280,000	103,000	-	-	-
10. Italy	57,917,000	301,230	265,500	\$16.2 billion	-
11. Luxembourg	417,000	2,586	768	\$102 million	-
12. Netherlands	15,724,000	37,290	56,380	\$6.5 billion	-
13. Norway	4,425,000	324,220	31,000	\$3.3 billion	-
14. Poland	38,854,000	312,683	240,650	\$3.2 billion	-
15. Portugal	9,874,000	92,080	49,700	\$1.6 billion	-
16. Spain	39,218,000	504,750	186,500	\$7.4 billion	-
17. Turkey	65,161,000	780,580	639,000	\$8.9 billion	-
18. United Kingdom	58,763,000	244,820	212,400	\$35.9 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>146,300,000</b>	<b>17,075,200</b>	<b>1,004,100</b>	<b>\$31 billion<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>\$195.91 billion</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>186,909,000</b>	<b>20,371,500</b>	<b>1,221,400</b>	<b>\$31.33 billion</b>	-
1. Armenia	3,967,000	29,800	53,400	\$75 million	-
2. Belarus	10,470,000	207,600	80,900	\$94 million	-
3. Kazakhstan	14,952,000	2,717,300	65,800	\$117 million	-
4. Kyrgyzstan	4,600,000	198,500	9,200	\$24 million	-
5. Tajikistan	6,620,000	143,100	8,000 <sup>2</sup>	\$18 million	-

<sup>1</sup> PPP estimate

<sup>2</sup> Data ranges from 7,000-9,000 total armed forces; the mean value of 8,000 has been used for calculation.

2000

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>275,636,000</b>	<b>9,629,091</b>	<b>1,365,800</b>	<b>\$293.3 billion</b>	<b>\$10,284.8 billion</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>784,707,000</b>	<b>23,594,548</b>	<b>3,942,329</b>	<b>\$440.44 billion</b>	-
1. Belgium	10,126,000	30,510	39,250	\$2.5 billion	-
2. Canada	29,512,000	9,976,140	59,100	\$7.6 billion	-
3. Czech Republic	10,290,000	78,866	57,700	\$1,153 million	-
4. Denmark	5,267,000	43,094	21,810	\$2.3 billion	-
5. France	59,425,000	547,030	294,430	\$27.0 billion	-
6. Germany	82,112,000	357,021	321,000	\$23.3 billion	-
7. Greece	10,692,000	131,940	159,170	\$3.3 billion	-
8. Hungary	10,005,000	93,030	43,790	\$791 million	-
9. Iceland	283,000	103,000	-	-	-
10. Italy	57,930,000	301,230	250,600	\$16.0 billion	-
11. Luxembourg	420,000	2,586	899	\$100 million	-
12. Netherlands	15,794,000	41,532	51,940	\$6.2 billion	-
13. Norway	4,443,000	324,220	26,700	\$2.9 billion	-
14. Poland	38,648,000	312,685	217,290	\$3.2 billion	-
15. Portugal	9,875,000	92,391	44,650	\$1.6 billion	-
16. Spain	39,237,000	504,782	166,050	\$7.0 billion	-
17. Turkey	66,130,000	780,580	609,700	\$7.7 billion	-
18. United Kingdom	58,882,000	244,820	212,450	\$34.5 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>146,000,000</b>	<b>17,075,200</b>	<b>1,004,100</b>	<b>\$29 billion<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>\$259.71 billion</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>185,805,000</b>	<b>20,371,500</b>	<b>1,208,260</b>	<b>\$29.33 billion</b>	-
1. Armenia	3,803,000	29,800	42,060	\$96 million	-
2. Belarus	10,045,000	207,600	83,100	\$75 million	-
3. Kazakhstan	15,000,000	2,717,300	64,000	\$115 million	-
4. Kyrgyzstan	4,852,000	198,500	9,000	\$29 million	-
5. Tajikistan	6,105,000	143,100	6,000	\$19 million	-

<sup>1</sup> PPP estimate

2008

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>301,139,947</b>	<b>9,826,630</b>	<b>1,498,157</b>	<b>\$693 billion</b>	<b>\$14,718.6 bill.</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>870,645,888</b>	<b>24,392,848</b>	<b>4,019,863</b>	<b>\$942.81 billion</b>	-
1. Belgium	10,392,226	30,528	39,690	\$3.82 billion	-
2. Bulgaria	7,322,858	110,910	40,747	\$886 million	-
3. Canada	33,390,141	9,984,670	64,000	\$15.9 billion	-
4. Czech Republic	10,228,744	78,866	23,092	\$2.91 billion	-
5. Denmark	5,468,120	43,094	29,960	\$4.10 billion	-
6. Estonia	1,315,912	45,226	4,100	\$425 million	-
7. France	61,083,916	547,030	254,895	\$41.1 billion	-
8. Germany	82,400,996	357,021	245,702	\$39.86 billion	-
9. Greece	10,706,290	131,940	156,600	\$5.62 billion	-
10. Hungary	9,956,108	93,030	32,300	\$1.62 billion	-
11. Iceland	301,931	103,000	-	-	-
12. Italy	58,147,733	301,230	186,049	\$20.81 billion	-
13. Latvia	2,259,810	64,589	5,696	\$513 million	-
14. Lithuania	3,575,439	65,300	13,850	\$500 million	-
15. Luxembourg	480,222	2,586	900	\$360 million	-
16. Netherlands	16,570,613	41,526	45,608	\$10.93 billion	-
17. Norway	4,627,926	323,802	15,800	\$4.83 billion	-
18. Poland	38,518,241	312,679	127,266	\$8.54 billion	-
19. Portugal	10,642,836	92,391	42,910	\$2.65 billion	-
20. Romania	22,276,056	237,500	74,267	\$2.76 billion	-
21. Slovakia	5,447,502	48,845	17,129	\$1.38 billion	-
22. Slovenia	2,009,245	20,273	5,973	\$756 million	-
23. Spain	40,448,191	504,782	149,150	\$11 billion	-
24. Turkey	71,158,647	780,580	510,600	\$8.84 billion	-
25. UK	60,776,238	244,820	180,527	\$59.7 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>141,377,752</b>	<b>17,075,200</b>	<b>1,027,000</b>	<b>\$36.35 billion</b>	<b>\$1,660.84 bill.</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>209,499,860</b>	<b>20,818,843</b>	<b>1,277,720</b>	<b>\$39.16 billion</b>	-
1. Armenia	2,971,650	29,743	42,080	\$395 million	-
2. Belarus	9,724,723	207,600	72,940	\$681 million	-
3. Kazakhstan	15,284,929	2,717,300	49,000	\$1.61 billion	-
4. Kyrgyzstan	5,284,149	198,500	10,900	\$46 million	-
5. Tajikistan	7,076,598	143,100	8,800	\$79 million	-
6. Uzbekistan	27,780,059	447,400	67,000	not available	-

2009

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>303,824,646</b>	<b>9,826,675</b>	<b>1,539,587</b>	<b>\$697.8 billion</b>	<b>\$14,418.7 bill.</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>877,049,724</b>	<b>24,400,624</b>	<b>4,044,134</b>	<b>\$966.94 bill.</b>	-
1. Belgium	10,403,951	30,528	38,844	\$3.97 billion	-
2. Bulgaria	7,262,65	110,879	40,747	\$1.04 billion	-
3. Canada	33,212,696	9,984,670	64,371	\$18.5 billion	-
4. Czech Republic	10,220,911	78,867	24,083	\$2.96 billion	-
5. Denmark	5,484,723	43,094	29,550	\$4.11 billion	-
6. Estonia	1,307,605	45,228	5,300	\$356 million	-
7. France	64,057,790	551,500	352,771	\$46 billion	-
8. Germany	82,369,548	357,022	244,324	\$43.5 billion	-
9. Greece	10,722,816	131,957	156,600	\$10.9 billion	-
10. Hungary	9,930,915	93,028	25,207	\$1.63 billion	-
11. Iceland	304,367	103,000	-	-	-
12. Italy	58,145,321	301,340	292,983	\$21.5 billion	-
13. Latvia	2,245,423	64,589	5,187	\$341 million	-
14. Lithuania	3,565,205	65,300	8,850	\$484 million	-
15. Luxembourg	486,006	2,586	900	\$556 million	-
16. Netherlands	16,645,313	41,543	40,537	\$12.1 billion	-
17. Norway	4,644,457	323,802	19,100	\$5.36 billion	-
18. Poland	38,500,696	312,685	121,808	\$7.36 billion	-
19. Portugal	10,676,910	92,090	42,910	\$2.54 billion	-
20. Romania	22,246,862	238,391	73,200	\$2.29 billion	-
21. Slovakia	5,455,407	49,035	17,445	\$1.53 billion	-
22. Slovenia	2,007,711	20,273	7,200	\$766 million	-
23. Spain	40,491,051	505,370	221,750	\$10.9 billion	-
24. Turkey	71,892,807	783,562	510,600	\$9.95 billion	-
25. UK	60,943,912	243,610	160,280	\$60.5 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>140,702,094</b>	<b>17,098,242</b>	<b>1,027,000</b>	<b>\$65.5 billion</b>	<b>\$1,222.64 bill.</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>209,534,174</b>	<b>20,850,936</b>	<b>1,277,720</b>	<b>\$68.83 billion</b>	-
1. Armenia	2,968,586	29,743	42,080	\$401 million	-
2. Belarus	9,685,768	207,600	72,940	\$612 million	-
3. Kazakhstan	15,340,533	2,724,900	49,000	\$948 million	-
4. Kyrgyzstan	5,356,869	199,951	10,900	\$44 million	-
5. Tajikistan	7,211,884	143,100	8,800	\$88 million	-
6. Uzbekistan	28,268,440	447,400	67,000	\$1.24 billion	-

2011

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>317,641,087</b>	<b>9,826,675</b>	<b>1,563,996</b>	<b>\$739.3 billion</b>	<b>\$15,517.9 bill.</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>908,626,894</b>	<b>24,485,966</b>	<b>3,774,186</b>	<b>\$1,031.55 bill.</b>	-
1. Albania	3,169,087	28,748	14,245	\$136 million	-
2. Belgium	10,697,588	30,528	37,882	\$3.88 billion	-
3. Bulgaria	7,497,282	110,879	31,315	\$725 million	-
4. Canada	33,889,747	9,984,670	65,722	\$21.5 billion	-
5. Croatia	4,409,659	56,594	18,600	\$935 million	-
6. Czech Republic	10,410,786	78,867	23,441	\$2.52 billion	-
7. Denmark	5,481,283	43,094	18,707	\$4.91 billion	-
8. Estonia	1,339,459	45,228	5,450	\$393 million	-
9. France	62,636,580	551,500	238,591	\$58.8 billion	-
10. Germany	82,056,775	357,022	251,465	\$44.2 billion	-
11. Greece	11,183,393	131,957	138,936	\$6.83 billion	-
12. Hungary	9,973,141	93,028	29,626	\$1.41 billion	-
13. Iceland	329,279	103,000	-	-	-
14. Italy	60,097,564	301,340	184,609	\$21.0 billion	-
15. Latvia	2,240,265	64,589	5,745	\$292 million	-
16. Lithuania	3,255,324	65,300	10,640	\$425 million	-
17. Luxembourg	491,772	2,586	900	\$281 million	-
18. Netherlands	16,653,346	41,543	37,368	\$11.7 billion	-
19. Norway	4,855,315	323,802	26,450	\$6.43 billion	-
20. Poland	38,038,094	312,685	100,000	\$9.43 billion	-
21. Portugal	10,732,357	92,090	43,340	\$2.83 billion	-
22. Romania	21,190,154	238,391	71,745	\$2.67 billion	-
23. Slovakia	5,411,640	49,035	16,531	\$1.07 billion	-
24. Slovenia	2,024,912	20,273	7,600	\$578 million	-
25. Spain	45,316,586	505,370	142,212	\$15.3 billion	-
26. Turkey	75,705,147	783,562	510,600	\$10.3 billion	-
27. UK	61,899,272	243,610	178,470	\$63.7 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>140,366,561</b>	<b>17,098,242</b>	<b>1,046,000</b>	<b>\$68 billion<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>\$1,904.79 bill.</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>209,217,720</b>	<b>20,850,936</b>	<b>1,303,210</b>	<b>\$72.13 billion</b>	-
1. Armenia	3,090,379	29,743	48,570	\$395 million	-
2. Belarus	9,587,940	207,600	72,940	\$470 million	-
3. Kazakhstan	15,753,460	2,724,900	49,000	\$1.74 billion	-
4. Kyrgyzstan	5,550,239	199,951	10,900	\$33 million	-
5. Tajikistan	7,074,845	143,100	8,800	\$72 million	-
6. Uzbekistan	27,794,296	447,400	67,000	\$1.42 billion	-

<sup>1</sup> PPP estimate

2012

Country/ Military Alliance	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget	GDP
<b>United States</b>	<b>311,050,977</b>	<b>9,826,675</b>	<b>1,569,417</b>	<b>\$655 billion</b>	<b>\$16,163.2 bill.</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>910,138,234</b>	<b>24,485,966</b>	<b>3,771,761</b>	<b>\$928.89 bill.</b>	-
1. Albania	2,994,667	28,748	14,245	\$185 million	-
2. Belgium	10,431,477	30,528	34,336	\$5.27 billion	-
3. Bulgaria	7,093,635	110,879	31,315	\$659 million	-
4. Canada	34,030,589	9,984,670	65,700	\$18.4 billion	-
5. Croatia	4,483,804	56,594	18,600	\$827 million	-
6. Czech Republic	10,190,213	78,867	25,421	\$2.22 billion	-
7. Denmark	5,529,888	43,094	18,628	\$4.42 billion	-
8. Estonia	1,282,963	45,228	5,750	\$437 million	-
9. France	65,102,719	551,500	238,591	\$50.3 billion	-
10. Germany	81,471,834	357,022	251,465	\$41 billion	-
11. Greece	10,760,136	131,957	145,647	\$6.68 billion	-
12. Hungary	9,976,062	93,028	22,587	\$1.2 billion	-
13. Iceland	311,058	103,000	-	-	-
14. Italy	61,016,804	301,340	184,532	\$24 billion	-
15. Latvia	2,204,708	64,589	4,600	\$256 million	-
16. Lithuania	3,535,547	65,300	10,640	\$317 million	-
17. Luxembourg	503,302	2,586	900	\$267 million	-
18. Netherlands	16,653,734	41,543	37,368	\$10.3 billion	-
19. Norway	4,691,849	323,802	24,450	\$6.97 billion	-
20. Poland	38,441,588	312,685	100,000	\$8.54 billion	-
21. Portugal	10,760,305	92,090	42,634	\$2.64 billion	-
22. Romania	21,904,551	238,391	73,900	\$2.21 billion	-
23. Slovakia	5,477,038	49,035	15,799	\$881 million	-
24. Slovenia	2,000,092	20,273	7,600	\$509 million	-
25. Spain	46,754,784	505,370	143,006	\$13.9 billion	-
26. Turkey	78,785,548	783,562	510,600	\$10.2 billion	-
27. UK	62,698,362	243,610	174,030	\$61.3 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>138,739,892</b>	<b>17,098,242</b>	<b>956,000</b>	<b>\$73 billion<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>\$2,017.47 bill.</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>209,933,175</b>	<b>20,850,936</b>	<b>1,146,474</b>	<b>\$77.97 billion</b>	-
1. Armenia	2,967,975	29,743	48,834	\$402 million	-
2. Belarus	9,577,552	207,600	72,940	\$552 million	-
3. Kazakhstan	17,304,513	2,724,900	49,000	\$2.28 billion	-
4. Kyrgyzstan	5,587,443	199,951	10,900	\$105 million	-
5. Tajikistan	7,627,200	143,100	8,800	\$170 million	-
6. Uzbekistan	28,128,600	447,400	67,000	\$1.46 billion	-

<sup>1</sup> PPP estimate

2014

Country/Military Alliances	Population	Territory (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total Armed Forces	Defense Budget <sup>1</sup>	GDP <sup>1</sup>
<b>United States</b>	<b>316,668,567</b>	<b>9,826,675</b>	<b>1,492,200</b>	<b>\$600 billion</b>	<b>\$16,768.1 bill.</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>921,396,432</b>	<b>24,485,966</b>	<b>3,584,710</b>	<b>\$873.85 bill.</b>	-
1. Albania	3,011,405	28,748	14,250	\$182 million	-
2. Belgium	10,444,268	30,528	30,700	\$5.29 billion	-
3. Bulgaria	6,981,642	110,879	31,300	\$751 million	-
4. Canada	35,568,211	9,984,670	66,000	\$16.4 billion	-
5. Croatia	4,475,611	56,594	16,550	\$813 million	-
6. Czech Republic	10,162,921	78,867	23,650	\$2.18 billion	-
7. Denmark	5,556,452	43,094	17,200	\$4.51 billion	-
8. Estonia	1,266,375	45,228	5,750	\$480 million	-
9. France	65,951,611	551,500	222,200	\$52.4 billion	-
10. Germany	81,147,265	357,022	186,450	\$44.2 billion	-
11. Greece	10,772,967	131,957	143,350	\$5.68 billion	-
12. Hungary	9,939,470	93,028	26,500	\$1.1 billion	-
13. Iceland	315,281	103,000	-	-	-
14. Italy	61,482,297	301,340	176,000	\$25.2 billion	-
15. Latvia	2,178,443	64,589	5,310	\$300 million	-
16. Lithuania	3,515,858	65,300	11,800	\$355 million	-
17. Luxembourg	514,862	2,586	900	\$249 million	-
18. Netherlands	16,805,037	41,543	37,400	\$10.4 billion	-
19. Norway	4,722,701	323,802	25,800	\$7.52 billion	-
20. Poland	38,383,809	312,685	99,300	\$9.83 billion	-
21. Portugal	10,799,270	92,090	42,600	\$2.77 billion	-
22. Romania	21,790,479	238,391	71,400	\$2.47 billion	-
23. Slovakia	5,488,339	49,035	15,850	\$995 million	-
24. Slovenia	1,992,690	20,273	7,600	\$474 million	-
25. Spain	47,370,542	505,370	134,900	\$11.6 billion	-
26. Turkey	80,694,485	783,562	510,600	\$10.7 billion	-
27. UK	63,395,574	243,610	169,150	\$57 billion	-
<b>Russia</b>	<b>142,500,482</b>	<b>17,098,242</b>	<b>845,000</b>	<b>\$81.4 billion<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>\$2,096.78 bill.</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>186,295,533</b>	<b>20,403,536</b>	<b>996,500</b>	<b>\$85.01 billion</b>	-
1. Armenia	2,974,184	29,743	44,800	\$447 million	-
2. Belarus	9,625,888	207,600	48,000	\$552 million	-
3. Kazakhstan	17,736,896	2,724,900	39,000	\$2.32 billion	-
4. Kyrgyzstan	5,548,042	199,951	10,900	\$102 million	-
5. Tajikistan	7,910,041	143,100	8,800	\$189 million	-

<sup>1</sup> Data only available for 2013

<sup>2</sup> PPP estimate



## Annex II: List of Agreements Reviewed

Agreement 1: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki 1975: Questions relating to Security in Europe, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

Agreement 2: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki 1975: Questions relating to Security in Europe, Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament

Agreement 3: Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance With the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1984-1986

Agreement 4: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1990

Agreement 5: Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1990

Agreement 6: Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE

Agreement 7: North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, 1991

Agreement 8: Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Agreement 9: Treaty on Open Skies, 1992

Agreement 10: Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1992

Agreement 11: Section V "CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation", Helsinki Document 1992

Agreement 12: Programme for immediate action, Helsinki Document 1992

Agreement 13: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 1: Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation, 1993

Agreement 14: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 2: Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations, 1993

Agreement 15: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 3: Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, 1993

Agreement 16: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 4: Defence Planning, 1993

Agreement 17: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 5: Global Exchange of Military Information, 1994

Agreement 18: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 6: Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 1994

Agreement 19: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 7: Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 1994

Agreement 20: Programme for Immediate Action Series, No. 8: Principles Governing Non-Proliferation, 1994

Agreement 21: Partnership for Peace: Framework Document and Invitation Document, 1994

Agreement 22: A Framework for Arms Control, Lisbon Document, 1996

Agreement 23: Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996

Agreement 24: Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, Article IV, 1996

Agreement 25: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, 1997

Agreement 26: Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 1997

Agreement 27: Operational Document - the Platform for Co-operative Security, Istanbul Document, 1999

Agreement 28: Vienna Document 1999 on the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Istanbul Document, 1999

Agreement 29: Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1999

Agreement 30: Charter for European Security, 1999

Agreement 31: OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2000

Agreement 32: Concluding Document of the Negotiations Under Article V of Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2001

Agreement 33: NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, 2002

Agreement 34: OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, 2003

Agreement 35: OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, 2003

Agreement 36: Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 2011



## Annex III: List of Statements Reviewed

Statement 1: Speech by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to the Second Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Paris, November 19-21, 1990

Statement 2: Speech by U.S. President George Bush to the Second Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Paris, November 19-21, 1990

Statement 3: Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Bessmertnykh, at the first session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating States of the CSCE, Berlin, June 19, 1991 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 4: European Architecture, Remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III at the First Restricted Session of the CSCE Ministerial, Berlin, June 19, 1991

Statement 5: Statement by Andrei V. Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the CSCE Council Meeting, Prague, January 30, 1992

Statement 6: CSCE: Our Community of Democratic Values, Remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting, Prague, January 30, 1992

Statement 7: Speech by President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation to the Third Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Helsinki, July 9-10, 1992

Statement 8: Speech by U.S. President George Bush to the Third Summit of CSCE Heads of State or Government, Helsinki, July 9-10, 1992

Statement 9: Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. A. V. Kozyrev at the CSCE Council Meeting, Stockholm, December 14, 1992 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 10: Europe in Transition: The Role of CSCE, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Secretary of State, CSCE Council Meeting, Stockholm, December 14, 1992

Statement 11: Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the CSCE Plenary Session, Rome, November 30, 1993

Statement 12: Address by President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation at the CSCE Summit, Budapest, December 5, 1994 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 13: Remarks by the President of the United States William J. Clinton at the Plenary Session of the Summit of the CSCE, Budapest, December 5, 1994

Statement 14: 'On a New Model of Common and Comprehensive Security for Europe in the 21st Century', Statement by A. V. Kozyrev at a session of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Budapest, December 7, 1995 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 15: Intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, OSCE Ministerial, Budapest, December 7, 1995

Statement 16: Address of the President of Russia Boris N. Yeltsin to the Participants of the Meeting of Heads of States or Government of the OSCE Participating States, Lisbon, December 2, 1996

Statement 17: Transcript of Vice-President Al Gore Statement, OSCE Lisbon Summit, Lisbon, December 2, 1996

Statement 18: Address by Mr. Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Oslo, December 2, 1998 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 19: Address to the OSCE Ministerial As Delivered by U.S. Head of Delegation Under Secretary Thomas R. Pickering, Oslo, December 2, 1998

Statement 20: Statement by President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation at the OSCE Summit, Istanbul, November 18, 1999 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 21: Remarks by the President of the United States William J. Clinton at the Opening of the OSCE Summit, Istanbul, November 18, 1999

Statement 22: Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. Igor S. Ivanov at the Eighth Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Vienna, November 27, 2000 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 23: Intervention by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, OSCE Ministerial, Vienna, November 27, 2000

Statement 24: Statement by Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Ninth OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Bucharest, December 3, 2001 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 25: Secretary of State Colin Powell's Remarks to the 9<sup>th</sup> OSCE Ministerial Council, Bucharest, December 4, 2001

Statement 26: Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Igor S. Ivanov at the Tenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Porto, December 6, 2002 [Unofficial Translation]

Statement 27: Statement by U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman as delivered at the Tenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Porto, December 6, 2002

Statement 28: Statement by Mr. Igor S. Ivanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Eleventh Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Maastricht, December 1, 2003

Statement 29: Remarks of The Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the 11th Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Maastricht, December 2, 2003

Statement 30: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Twelfth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Sofia, December 7, 2004

Statement 31: Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE, Sofia, December 7, 2004

Statement 32: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Thirteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, December 5, 2005

Statement 33: Intervention at the Thirteenth OSCE Ministerial Council as delivered by Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns to the 13th OSCE Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, December 5, 2005

Statement 34: Address of Mr. Sergey V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation before the 14th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, December 4, 2006

Statement 35: Statement by the Head of Delegation of the United States of America, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns at the 14th OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, December 4, 2006

Statement 36: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Fifteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Madrid, November 29, 2007

Statement 37: Intervention to the OSCE Ministerial Council, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, Madrid, November 29, 2007

Statement 38: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Sixteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Helsinki, December 5, 2008

Statement 39: United States Intervention to the 2008 OSCE Ministerial Council as delivered by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns to the Ministerial Council, Helsinki, December 4, 2008

Statement 40: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Seventeenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Athens, December 1, 2009

Statement 41: 17th OSCE Ministerial Council, Statement by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, Athens, December 1, 2009

Statement 42: Speech of the President of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev at the plenary meeting of the OSCE summit, Astana, December 1, 2010

Statement 43: Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the OSCE Summit, Astana, December 1, 2010

Statement 44: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Eighteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Vilnius, December 6, 2011

Statement 45: Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the OSCE First Plenary Session, Vilnius, December 6, 2011

Statement 46: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Nineteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Dublin, December 6, 2012

Statement 47: Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the Intervention at the OSCE Ministerial Council First Plenary Session, Dublin, December 6, 2012

Statement 48: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Twentieth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Kyiv, December 5, 2013

Statement 49: Remarks by Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the OSCE Ministerial Council, Kyiv, December 5, 2013

Statement 50: Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Twenty-First Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Basel, December 4, 2014

Statement 51: Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry at OSCE Ministerial Plenary Session, Basel, December 4, 2014

## Annex IV: References

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## Annex V: Abstracts and Corresponding Publications

### English Abstract

This thesis analyzes the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe – that is, the forms of the institutions and the reasons for decay. It applies a multi-theory approach for assessing the foreign and security policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia directed at cooperative arms control in Europe between 1973 and 2014 and the related institutions. Analysis of the thesis proves that the institutional form is that of a dense regime complex, consisting of five elemental regimes. The regime complex is in decay since almost all regimes are affected by indicators of decay. The reasons behind decay are multi-dimensional and relate to the times when the regime complex gained its full shape in parallel to the first round of NATO enlargement. The current lack in functioning European security institutions makes reviving the complex an urgent but hard to accomplish task.

### German Abstract

Im Zentrum dieser Dissertation steht die Analyse des Verfalls „Kooperativer Rüstungskontrolle in Europa“ – ihrer entsprechenden Institutionen und der Gründe des Verfalls. Die Dissertation baut auf einem multi-theoretischen Ansatz zur Untersuchung der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten und der Sowjetunion/Russischen Föderation im Hinblick auf „Kooperative Rüstungskontrolle in Europa“ von 1973 bis 2014 auf. Die Analyse beweist, dass ein dichter Regimekomplex, bestehend aus fünf einzelnen Regimen, den Institution Form gibt. Der Regimekomplex befindet sich im Stadium des Verfalls, da fast alle fünf Regime Verfallsindikatoren aufweisen. Die Gründe für den Verfall sind multidimensional. Sie gehen zurück auf die Zeit als der Komplex im Zusammenhang mit der ersten Runde der NATO-Osterweiterung seine volle Form entfaltete. Das momentane Defizit an funktionierenden europäischen Sicherheitsinstitutionen lässt die Wiederbelebung des Komplexes dringlich aber schwer erreichbar erscheinen.

## List of Author's Publications Corresponding with this Thesis

(2014): The Relevance of Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control to European Security Today, Viewpoint for the European Leadership Network (ELN)

(2014): (with James Acton, Steven Pifer, Sergei Rogov et al): Подготовка к процессу глубоких сокращений ядерного оружия: Варианты укрепления Евроатлантической и международной безопасности (Первый доклад Комиссии по проблемам глубокого сокращения ядерного оружия, Гамбург, Москва, Вашингтон)

(2014): (with James Acton, Steven Pifer, Sergei Rogov et al): Preparing for Deep Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic and International Security (First Report of the Deep Cuts Commission, Hamburg, Moscow, Washington)

(2013): The Role of Conventional Arms Control in Euro-Atlantic Security: Is It Needed and Is It Achievable? Viewpoint for the European Leadership Network (ELN)

(2013): Conventional Arms Control 2.0, in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* (26:2) pp. 189-202

(2010): In the Middle of Nowhere - The OSCE's Astana Summit, Opinion Paper published at the IFSH website

(2010): Politico-military security: a dimension in transition. Commentary on the OSCE's Review Conference website, Vienna, 18 - 26 October 2010

(2010): Russlands Vorschläge für eine neue europäische Sicherheitsordnung, in Staack, Michael [Ed.]: *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Friedens- und Sicherheitsordnung* (Schriftenreihe des Wissenschaftlichen Forums für Internationale Sicherheit e.V.), Bremen: Edition Temmen, pp. 138-60

(2010): ДОВСЕ: выход из тупика, in *Россия в глобальной политике* (8:2)

(2010): CFE: Overcoming the Impasse, in *Russia in Global Affairs* (8:2), pp. 61-70

(2010): Medvedev's Proposals for a New European Security Order: A Starting Point or the End of the Story?, in *Connections, The Quarterly Journal* (9:2), pp. 1-16

(2009): *From Capitol Hill to Istanbul: The Origins of the Current CFE Deadlock* (CORE Working Paper; 19), Hamburg: IFSH

## Annex VI: Curriculum Vitae

1977	born in Leipzig as Ulrich Thomas Kühn
1987	relocation to Niederkassel, NRW
1997	Abitur at the Kopernikus Gymnasium Lülsdorf (grade: 1.7)
2007	Magister Artium at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (Medieval and Modern History, Political Sciences, Newer German Literature; grade: 1.1)
2007	Senior Researcher at the Roy McKenzie Centre for the Study of Families at the University of Wellington
2008	Master of Peace and Security Policy Studies at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (grade: 1.0)
2008	Junior Researcher at the Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany
2010	Political Affairs Officer at the German Federal Foreign Office, Division 240 for Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation
2011	United Nations Fellow on Disarmament 2011
2011	Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
2015	submission of thesis at the University of Hamburg