EXPLAINING FLAWS OF SECURITY REGIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH:

LESSONS FROM SOUTH AMERICA

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For Demetrio Boersner, in memoriam

Acknowledgments

It is widely known that a doctoral project is an individual effort that affects the daily life of more than one person. When I embarked on this venture, I thought I had all the answers ready and that it would only be a matter of time to sit down to transcribe what seemed so obvious to me. The dynamics of research and living for more than two years in another continent, made me see how little I had anticipated in this regard. In these initial lines, I want to recognize and thank those people who have been part of this company to a greater or lesser extent, not only contributing ideas, but also making me see my failures, giving me unique opportunities and simply being there, directly or indirectly, constantly or no, to offer me encouragement being so far from home.

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Víctor M. Mijares
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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Presentation

This doctoral dissertation raises a rational explanation of cooperation flaws in regional security mechanisms in the Global South. *My main argument is that, when it comes to regional cooperation for security, the Global South is susceptible to tensions between the search for regional autonomy and those of national autonomy. The result of these tensions is low multilateral cooperation. This outcome could be mitigated through the manipulation of the institutional design, although the operability of these regional security mechanisms can be permanently affected. I call this effect "paradox of autonomy", and a conspicuous case is South America.*

This research born of an interest in understanding the reasons for the failure of security and defence institutions in the Global South. The potential breadth of the task implied by said interest brought me to undertake a case study to try to extract some lessons that could be contrastable with other regional realities in the area of security. Thus, this doctoral dissertation in political science explains the emergence, but above all the performance, of the South American Defence Council (CDS, with its Spanish and Portuguese initials) of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, with its Spanish acronym), as this is the first exclusively South American regional security institution.

The importance of the theme lies in that unprecedented character, given that the establishment of a self-proclaimed "defence" organisation in a region where there has been no agreement regarding external threats is striking, at the very least. Even more striking is that part of the original proposal included the creation of a collective defence alliance whose principal objective would have been to create combined deterrence capabilities facing the United States (US) and/or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a whole. Such hyperbole responds to the spectacular rhetoric that accompanied the unstoppable multipolarity in the first decade of the 21st century. The whole project of UNASUR, and the CDS in particular, understood as a product of the wave of leftist governments, more or less self-defined as revolutionary, who assumed that the perceived changes in the distribution of global capabilities were, in effect, an unmistakable sign of historic change. Less dramatically, studies of international relations have been warning of the relative decline of the West, the rise of emerging powers and the "emergence of the rest". Especially in the Western Hemisphere, this process, has been labelled as a "post-

hegemonic" stage, and in this sense, the dominant explanation of the emergence of the CDS has been given by post-hegemonic regionalism.

Post-hegemonic regionalism offers a persuasive explanation for the emergence of regional institutions in Latin American in the last decade and a half. Its main explanatory strength based on the strong correlation between what the specialised literature has called the "American decline" and a new wave of Latin American regionalism. However, despite the strength of its argument, post-hegemonic regionalism has not been meticulous in demonstrations, nor has it managed to explain the limited performance of the CDS. The thesis assumed post-hegemony as fact without completely defining, testing or operationalising it. Likewise, it has not sufficiently demonstrated the causal mechanisms that led to the emergence of this new regionalism, meaning it has difficulties in overcoming being only an interesting correlation: widely accepted but poorly demonstrated, and above all facing the performance of the CDS. Hence, the main objective of this research has been to offer and demonstrate an alternative explanation, not of its origin, but rather of its performance between 2009 and 2017.

In this sense, this dissertation proposes, first, a solid demonstration and operationalisation of the systemic changes that influenced the South American international political context. Second, the methodological and theoretical sophistication that allows it to understand and explain the causal mechanisms that led to the institutional design which, in turn, conditions the capabilities of the Council. This could allow the research to go beyond South America and replicate the analysis and its methods in other regions. Finally, it introduces a novel and composite explanatory model, which enriches and clarifies the analysis of regional security in the Global South: the paradox of autonomy.

To offer said explanation, this research presents three different stages, which in turn demanded three theoretical sub-frameworks related to distinct and specific methodological approaches, resulting in the practical applicated of multiple methods. The first part refers to a global investigation with hemispheric implications, and is related to the analysis of geoeconomic and geostrategic systemic variations, as well as the recent geopolitical dynamics of South American regionalism. An important part of this research stage implied the collection, analysis and reconstruction of databases related to the distribution of capabilities in the international system. Additionally, it included geopolitical analysis from a neoclassical perspective, in a way that could give a specific

meaning to what the global diffusion of power and US geostrategic reorientation meant for South America, after 2001 in particular.

The second part of the research was more arduous and the most time-consuming, as it required distinct stages of methodological refinement, through process tracing, as well as collecting and codifying primary and secondary material that could account for the causal mechanisms, which resulted in the restricted institutional design of the CDS. Given that this doctoral research takes a place in the vanguard of analysis of the performance of the CDS, instead of its origin, the method of descriptive inference, took from process tracing. This method allowed the development of a first hypothesis, and its sub-hypotheses, on the limited performance of the CDS. The principal cause identified was the search for national autonomy which obstructed from the beginning the realisation of a project of regional autonomy.

Finally, in the third document of this dissertation by compilation, the lessons learned from the research were compiled and the importance of autonomy as a central factor in the aspirations of South American states was revealed. But the most important, and most original, contribution of this dissertation, was to develop the explanatory model of autonomist tensions, which gave origin to the paradox of autonomy. This final part does not try to cover the reality of the entire Global South, but to offer a contribution which allows further progress in a broader and more ambitious research program, in the purest lakatosian sense (Lakatos 1978), related to the study of security regionalism and its failings in the Global South.

The following sections of this introductory chapter will present the research design through the puzzle, the research question, the dominant explanations, and the hypothesis that guided the research process of my doctoral dissertation. Subsequently, the theoretical framework is presented, with a review of the post-hegemonic thesis and its relationship with the theory of autonomy, and the paradox of autonomy and its overcoming through institutional design. Then, the methodological approach is shown, demonstrating the qualitative-quantitative articulation through the formula of concentration, geostrategic analysis, the descriptive inference of process tracing, and techniques of conceptual formulation.

1.2 Puzzle, Research Questions, and Hypotheses

1.2.1 The Puzzle

Peter Katzenstein synthesised the process of regionalisation of the international system with the term "a world of regions" (2015). That world vision is shared by Amitav Acharya (2014) and Andrew Hurrell (2007), for whom the architecture of the international system is more and more dominated by regional realities, and that such realities should have a privileged place in the study of international relations.

This regionalised international reality has had as its focus international political economy. However, the more distant the Cold War appears and the more evident the (re)appearance of conflictive regional realities, the greater the space for interest in security issues for regionalism (Solingen, 2014). The regionalisation of international security was masterfully analysed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) who, noting this trend, combine their contributions on Regional Security Complexes and Securitisation, to develop a specific theory of regional security, signalling the trend towards the specific geographic localisation of threats. In this sense, regionalism in the 21st century is inexorably linked and indebted to research on international security.

Following the logic outlined, it is essential to review the contribution of Björn Hettne (2008). For this author, regionalism has a dual character, both as a tendency and a political commitment, directed at ordering the world in terms of regions. The approach of Hettne has the additional virtue of considering regionalism by integrating its two main dimensions: the dominant, derived from international political economy, and the other, less studied, from international security studies. In the case of the security aspects of regionalism, Hettne refers to six crucial factors in the analysis of crisis management and involvement in conflicts: (i) early prevention, or "provention", of conflicts; (ii) the construction of mutual trust measures and preventative diplomacy; (iii) external intervention modalities; (iv) establishing peace through agreements; (v) conflict resolution; and (vi) post-conflict reconstruction (2008: 407). Seen in this way, regional security institutions – the regionalisms of security – fulfil a central task of stability in an international system characterised as a world of regions.

In addition to the importance of these institutions for the purposes of regional stability and international security, the regionalisation of security fulfils a greater task also: it offers

autonomy. For recently decolonised states, or regions that were under the direct influence of one of the superpowers of the Cold War, autonomy in the field of international politics is a precious and intangible asset. The Global South, by definition, harbours strong aspirations in terms of autonomy. Economic regionalism has been the promise of autonomy in international political economy and security regionalism may fulfil the same function in terms of security and defence. Despite this importance, regional security institutions have presented significant failings. An eloquent example is that of the European Union, whose Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has faced great problems in its realisation (Bickerton et al., 2011). In this case, the continuance of NATO is the main explanation as to why the CSDP is not consolidated (Howorth, 2014). In the Global South, even without the existence of collective defence structures as operational as those of NATO, the limitations are the same or even greater. Transformations in international security have managed to, in effect, proliferate and/or renew regional initiatives in terms of regional institutions, but their operability is questionable.

In the case of Latin America, and particularly South America, autonomy is assumed as a precious asset, equivalent to development (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño Ruiz, 2013). South America has been, historically and geopolitically, in a situation of autonomist tension. On one hand, it is a peripheral region of the US, with all that implies in terms of North-South influence and vulnerability. But on the other, it has never seen direct intervention by the superpower, at least not in a military sense, as has been the case of other Latin American states in Central America and the Caribbean (Teixeira, 2012). This borderline condition, together with the generally superior capabilities of South American states compared to Central American and Caribbean ones, has provoked the (sub)region to seek autonomy. Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian (2002) explore the meaning of "autonomy" from a South American perspective, positing as extreme poles antagonistic and relational autonomy. Subsequently, the same authors identify the central role of autonomy in the great Latin American strategy, contrasting it with acquiescence (Russell and Tokatlian, 2013). From this search emerged UNASUR and its CDS.

Despite its wide acceptance, the post-hegemonic explanation has not managed to encompass all systemic aspects related to the origin of the CDS. The nature of security regionalism continues to be problematic for the dominant studies on regionalism, still predominantly oriented from the perspective of international political economy. The situation regarding the study of the performance of the Council is no better, being, in fact,

limited to an optimistic vision that exploits the scarce evidence of South American security cooperation and associates it automatically to the CDS, even if the evidence is not conclusive, relevant, or multilateral. Thus, this research has been concerned with offering a dispassionate explanation, free of political-ideological commitments, and elaborated on the basis of systemic and regional evidence of CDS performance.

1.2.2 Research Questions

The neoregionalist theses of post-hegemonic regionalism and post-liberal regionalism have had a strong impact as the dominant explanations of the formal consolidation of the CDS, and of UNASUR in general. However, these explanations have been limited to answering only one of the two possible and relevant questions about this regional organism: the *whys* of its emergence. These explanations, although politically and academically relevant, do not reveal the causal mechanisms behind its performance. Moreover, they do not respond to the reasons for its institutional design and poor performance. Because of this, the dominant explanations have been insufficient to offer a comprehensive understanding of the CDS, besides setting aside the possibility of generating a mid-range theory transportable to other regional realities. Following up on these shortcomings, this research generated a research question tied to two sub-questions. These have the virtue of not only complementing the failings of the dominant explanations, but they also generate new conceptual and analytical models, apply novel methods which have been overlooked in regional studies, especially those related to Latin America, and open doors to application in other regions in the framework of Comparative Area Studies and in delicate areas such as foreign policy, and security and defence policy.

The first research question complements the original question that gave rise to the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism:

Q = Why do regional security institutions have to fail, presenting low operability, in the Global South?

To answer this question, the case of the CDS of UNASUR was taken and studied, addressing two sub-questions:

q^1 = Which structural factors conditioned the emergence of an institution like the CDS, despite the foreseeable low multilateral security cooperation?

q^2 = Which regional factors conditioned the low commitment performance of the CDS?

Chapters 2 and 3 consider and respond to q^1 and q^2 respectively, while Chapter Four responds to Q, making an analytical proposal likely to be applicable in other regions distinct to South America.

1.2.3 Hypotheses

From the research questions, a main hypothesis and two sub-hypotheses were developed:

H = Changes perceived by South American governments regarding the international system encouraged projects of national and regional autonomy in security matters. These two types of project were incompatible, generating a paradox of autonomy and limiting, by design and performance, the operability of South American security regionalism.

h^1 = The CDS emerged as a product of changes in the distribution of global economic power and the geostrategic reorientation of the US regarding Latin America, which offered South American countries sufficient autonomy to experiment with new forms of regionalism, with the express exclusion of the hemispheric great power.

h2 = Paradoxically, the structural conditions that created the possibility of a growing regional South American autonomy were also conditions that enhanced national autonomist aspirations in terms of foreign policy objectives, generating tensions between the national and regional levels, these tensions being overcome through an institutional design of restricted scope that would allow consensus at the expense of the original security and defence ambitions.

1.3 Theoretical Framework, Concepts, and Assumptions

The general approach of this research was made from an epistemologically realist and theoretically rationalist platform. Epistemological realism is equidistant between the extremes of positivism and relativism, based on the principle that reality is largely susceptible to being understood, but that not all of it can be directly observed. This approach to knowledge is useful in explanation and theorisation based on case studies, and demands a research effort based on multiple methods, as explained by Marsh and Furlong:

> The [epistemological] realists are looking for causal relationships, but think that many important relationships between social phenomena cannot be observed. This

> means they may use quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data will only be appropriate for those relationships that are directly observable. In contrast, the unobserved relationships can only be established indirectly; we can observe other relationships which (…) are the result of those unobservable relationships. (2010: 21-22).

For its part, rationalism in international relations theory assumes that it is possible to evaluate political behaviours with some objectivity, insofar as it is assumed that actors, as a general rule, seek the maximisation of their benefits through rational strategies (Keohane, 1986). This efficient orientation includes the reduction of costs and presupposes that, in general, governments must deal with internal and external resistances that lead them to opt for the principle of the minimum effort necessary to achieve the maximum gain possible. In this research, rationalism is represented by three theoretical proposals: neoclassical realism, the theory of autonomy, and rational institutional design.

The referential theoretical framework of this research is neoclassical realism, in that it considers the importance of structural factors in conjunction with regional and domestic ones related to the formulation of foreign policy strategies. Neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy that deals with, first, the distribution of capabilities in the international system as a condition of origin or independent variable, but also incorporating domestic political factors as part of the causal mechanisms or intervening variables. In this sense, this theory continues being part of the family of structural realism, but corrects the limitations of neorealism in the analysis of foreign policy (Waltz, 1996; Schweller, 1997; Sterling-Folker, 1997; Rose, 1998). Additionally, neorealism, concerned exclusively with the international structure, abandoned the ethical considerations implicit in classical realism, giving primacy to phenomenological description over normative prescription (Lebow, 2003; Mijares, 2015). Thus, the neoclassical realist label was placed on those works which analysed foreign policy in the light of the international structure as a particular distribution of power in the system, and the complex processes of domestic politics, considering capacity and the perception of elites. Gideon Rose (1998), who gave this label based on a specific set of articles and books, tried to trace the background of this booming approach within the modern Anglo-Saxon tradition in the field of the history of international relations.

However, neoclassical realism is not necessarily novel in the expressed sense, although its recent academic boom is perceptible. More recently, and although it belongs to a tradition

of "rational choice" political thought, Charles Glaser has shown the utility of rationalism in international politics. According to the author, material variables – those that would be more associated with neorealism in its search for defining conditions of the international structure and the order it generates – must be accompanied by variables of information, which permit the identification of the capacity of a state, assumed by Glaser as a rational actor, to process facts from the international system and act accordingly (2010: 3-6; 85-87). The thesis of Glaser does not contradict realism in its classical sense – it questions the "billiard ball" effect and the "black box" of the state – insofar as it is concerned with the study of foreign policy decisions, particularly in its historical development on the basis of the processing of information by the politicians responsible, especially in sensitive themes like security and defence.

As Dario Batistella (2012) aptly indicates in the case of Raymond Aron, in retrospect we can find examples of antecedents from neoclassical realism, or in the words of Batistella, "avant-garde neoclassical realism" (2012: 371). Aron (1963), influenced by the *École des Annales*, proposed an analysis that combines study of the distribution of power capabilities in the international system with consideration of the biographical, psychological and ideological factors that surround each statesman. Aron refused a purely historical analysis, in the methodological style of classical Anglo-Saxon realism, but also the structural-rationalist analysis, as it would later be posited by neorealism. A dynamic realist approach is the aronian proposal, as attached to material reality as it is to the equally crude reality of the intimate fears and motivations of decisionmakers (Batistella, 2012: 380 et seq.). And just as Rose and other neoclassical realists ignore Aron, Batistella omits the method proposed by two other French authors: Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (2000). Both authors tested models of international historical analysis and explanation, emphasising, in the case of Renouvin, the concept of "deep forces", or objective conditions under, over and with which the statesman must work (1958). Duroselle (1998), for his part, advanced his proposal of international relations theory in a work that could be categorised more as foreign policy theory. This author penetrates the character of the statesman, but also points to an aspect that is today considered characteristically neoclassical realist: that the basic political unit is not the individual nor the state, but rather the decision-making group (Mijares, 2015).

Neoclassical realism has adopted the term "foreign policy executive" (FPE), to highlight this decision-making group composed of politicians, bureaucrats and lobbyists, civilians

and military, who surround the final decisionmaker, who condition their preferences, and who play a decisive role in its execution (Lobell, 2009: 43 and et seq.). In form and substance, the concept of the FPE does not depart from the definition of the "decisional team" of foreign policy of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1998: 213-217), which manifests another unregistered debt of neoclassical realism to the French school of international relations. The usefulness of said concept is beyond doubt, but it must be emphasised that it is reduced to foreign policy functions, even if it has contact with other governmental and public policy sectors. That is why, to give this research more breadth, the decision was taken to use the concept of "strategic nucleus of government" (Fernández and Rivera, 2013).

In a more specific way, but equally important for the research, the theory of autonomy was incorporated. Based on the work of Juan Carlos Puig (1980; 1986; 1994) and Helio Jaguaribe (1969; 1979), the theory of autonomy is considered one of the most important Latin American contributions to international relations. This theory explains the reasons that have led Latin America to be so prolific in terms of regional integration, given the privileged place it has occupied in the search for international autonomy with respect to great powers, especially facing its relationship with the US. Autonomy should not necessarily be confused with anti-Americanism or with an orientation against Western culture, although for practical purposes it can be manifested through such expressions.

The concept of post-hegemony requires a review that allows its analytical application to phenomena of regionalism, implying the provision of information about what post-hegemony truly means in distinct regions. This research assumed a structural-functionalist analysis of post-hegemony, demanding the statistical and geopolitical analysis of tangible variables. The notion of post-hegemony constrained to the geographical and cultural framework of Latin America, has led to incomplete answers in the best cases, or incorrect answers in the worst ones. Studies of hegemony correspond to the period of the so-called "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer, 1990/91; Krauthammer, 2002), in which the values of the liberal model – that is, those of free market over state planning, the primacy of human rights over national sovereignty, and Anglo-Saxon style liberal democracy – were driven by the victorious superpower of the Cold War (Huntington, 1999).

Post-hegemony is not a linear or homogenous process, nor does it respond in a structurally unequivocal way in all regions. An important contribution of this research is that it does not only contribute with data of the concentration/diffusion of economic capabilities in

the international system (Cf. Chapter Two), but rather it also specifies the effects of the marked turn in the geostrategic reorientation of US interests (Cf. Chapter Three). Both phenomena contribute to the explanation of post-hegemony understood in the South American context. But they would not do so in a distinct regional context such as, for example, South East Asia, where the patterns of diffusion-concentration of economic capabilities favour the regional power, China, and the geostrategic reorientation of the US did not exclude, but rather included, the superpower in matters of regional security (Odgaard, 2007; Acharya, 2014a). This review vindicates area studies, because it assumes the necessity of the geopolitical specificity of a region, but it connects them to global studies, as the specificity connects to a greater phenomenon of global scale.

Latin American states in general, and those of South America in particular, have historically maintained an autonomist position that shaped politically and intellectually. The concept of Westphalian sovereignty has had a dominant character in the definitions of South American national identities. The period of European empires in process of industrialisation left its imprint on these societies. Nevertheless, it was the economic and military rise of the young US that initially marked the position of South America in relation to the North Atlantic. The zeal generated by the Monroe Doctrine was confirmed by the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) and by events such as the final thrust of the Spanish Empire, the representation of Venezuela in the litigation over the Essequibo territory, the Platt Amendment in the first republican constitution of Cuba, and the multiple incursions into the Caribbean and Central American during the Cold War. The most forceful ideological-intellectual argument came from Dutch-American geopolitician Nicholas Spykman, when he presented his vision of "the two Americas" (North and South) in a sense of invariable asymmetry (1942). The material and political differences between an industrialised state unit and a multitude of young, unequal and underdeveloped societies reinforced in the minds of elites an understandable dual perception of apprehension-admiration towards the powerful neighbour in the north.

The first political and intellectual reactions were of an autonomist character, without a particular partisan ideology. Not even against a specific state. Hence, the so-called Drago Doctrine was announced in 1902 by the Minister of Foreign Relations of Argentina, Luis María Drago, in response to US refusal to execute the Monroe Doctrine during the naval blockade against Venezuela by Britain, Germany and Italy. This legal doctrine establishes that no foreign state can use force against an American nation for the purpose of collecting

a financial debt. Inter-American solidarity aimed to strengthen national autonomy through multilateral means, always with the understanding of the exceptional nature of the Americas. This idea was later taken by the theorists of autonomy, especially Helio Jaguaribe and Juan Carlos Puig, and in the same sense, by the dependency theory of Raúl Prebisch (Prebisch and Cabañas, 1949), seconded by, among others, Theotonio Dos Santos, Andre Gunder Frank, Ruy Mauro Marini and Celso Furtado. The dependentist model was of a world defined by power relationships in a scheme of concentric symmetry. In the centre one can find the developed states, highly industrialised, consumers of raw materials and producers of manufactured products. In the periphery are the dependents, with primary economies, exporters of raw materials and consumers of foreign technology.

The analytical model of dependency theory served as a framework for autonomist theorisation. But the same model coincided with the thesis of Leon Trotsky (1980) of "unequal and combined development". This is how the natural link between socialism and nationalism that has been so widely reproduced in the Global South, beyond only Latin America, began to operate. This link is important to understand the most recent thesis of post-hegemony in the framework of articulation with the theory of autonomy. The concept of hegemony is associated with another Marxist thinker, Antonio Gramsci, applied to the study of the international relations of power by Robert Cox (1983). Traditionally, hegemony in international relations has been understood as a relationship of supra-subordination given openly asymmetrical conditions in terms of economic and military capabilities (Kennedy, 1987; Luttwak, 1990). David Lake (2009) refined this definition, establishing that the system of domination through clearly unequal capabilities does not necessarily imply hegemony, but rather hierarchy. In this sense, hegemony in international politics would be a step further, in which the hegemon divides what has been understood as indivisible: the sovereignty of the subjugated state.

Stephen Krasner (1999) made it clear that the sovereignty of states responds to a fiction that facilitates relations, but that ultimately rests in power. Hence, Lake's assertion of hegemony as a hierarchical relationship in which the hegemon extends its authority by restricting sovereign attributes of others, presenting his argument through the categories of Jack Donnelly (2006) on the limitation of sovereignty through: rights of protection or guarantees, rights of economic and financial control, rights of servitude, and/or rights of intervention (Krasner, 1999: 50). In the South American case, this type of relationship has been unusual and contrasts with the much more forceful actions of US interventions in

Central America and the Caribbean (Moniz Bandeira, 2013; Teixeira, 2012). Hence, US hegemony over South America is not presented in all cases in terms of intervention and limitation of national sovereignties, but rather as a combination of comparative economic-military power and, in Gramscian terms, as a domain of the culture-generating apparatus, or what we could call "soft power" in the terms of Joseph Nye (2004).

The thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism, also defined as post-liberal (Sanahuja, 2009; 2012), affirms that the new forms of regional organisation that emerged in Latin America, and above all in South America, have their root in a movement of political-ideological contestation derived from the rise of leftist governments in the region (Riggirozzi, 2012; Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012). The analytical scheme of what has, until now, been accepted as the dominant current in the explanation of the new regionalism has been related above all to the Gramscian currents of cultural counter-hegemony via ideological rupture. Nevertheless, the causality is not clear, as it assumes that the political answers of the South instigate the transition to a post-hegemonic stage, but without considering the transformations that have been operating in terms of distribution of economic capabilities, nor the US geostrategic orientation that occurred after the events of 11th September 2001. This research establishes analytical elements needed to undertake this analysis in its first section

In the context of this research, post-hegemony is understood as a global, historical sub-stage of the diffusion of capabilities in the generation of wealth and/or income capture for the exportation of natural resources. The post-hegemonic stage with which Latin American processes of neo-regionalism have been identified is associated with the super cycle of raw materials of just over a decade, at the beginning of the 21st century. Nevertheless, the diffusion of economic capabilities is not enough to explain post-hegemony, making it necessary to incorporate the geostrategic element. One cannot speak of post-hegemony, nor of expanding the margins of autonomy in Latin America, especially in South America, without considering the geostrategic reorientation in US national security policy from the end of 2001. The "benign negligence" that had been attributed to Washington with respect to Latin America (Haluani, 2003) reached levels of "radical negligence" through the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 and the "War on Terror" (Emerson, 2010). This displacement of interest has been scarcely considered by the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism in Latin America. The lack of stability in the variables of the diffusion of economic capability and geostrategic reorientation also went unnoticed

by post-hegemonic theorists, so the review of the theme undertaken in this dissertation is important for understanding the transience of the conditions of post-hegemonic regionalism.

An early necessity in the course of this research was to strengthen the meagre links between the thesis of post-hegemony and the theory of autonomy. Despite an apparently evident connection, post-hegemony and autonomy have not coincided frequently in the body of explanations of the external conduct of states of the Global South. This bifurcated development has limited the potentialities of both. Hence, in the interest of a better explanation of the foreign policy strategies of South American states facing the Defence Council project of UNASUR, the decision was taken to develop the nexus. This is how post-hegemony and autonomy are understood here, through a causal relationship in which the conditions that promoted a historical regional post-hegemonic state were exploited by South American national elites to serve their autonomist interests.

Thus, the absolute and relative increase in South American economic capabilities, due to the super cycle of raw materials, provoked the interest of great extra-regional powers in the region, and facilitated the diversification of relations based on greater autonomy (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). On the other hand, the geostrategic reorientation of the US after 11th September 2001, with an exaggerated interest in the Middle East and Central Asia, freed South American governments from potential political and military pressures. This served as an incentive for a particular form of regionalism: security regionalism. As is expected, security mechanisms that exclude great powers generate regional tensions. This fact would have inhibited the South American nations from experimenting with their own mechanisms and ones which exclude the US. Similarly, the absence of concrete threats recognised by all the potential members made it difficult to argue in favour of a collective defence mechanism. On the other hand, the interest in preserving, and if possible increasing, national autonomy was incompatible with collective security and its tendency to supranational governance in matters of high importance for sovereignty. Through the analysis of congruence, it is identified that the geostrategic reorientation of the US National Security Strategy was a central factor for post-hegemony and created the conditions for the diversification of extra-regional relations and the regional experiment with a Defence Council.

The relation between post-hegemony and autonomy occupied a central position in the explanation offered by this research. The review of the meaning of post-hegemony, with

its two components of the diffusion of economic capabilities and geostrategic reorientation, allowed linkage with the theory of autonomy in the specific case of South America. This constituted the necessary step in the development of a key concept of this dissertation: the paradox of autonomy.

One of the main findings of this research relates to the verification of the tension between national autonomy and regional autonomy. This allowed the development of the analytical model of the "paradox of autonomy". This paradox finds its logical basis within the family of collective action problems, long studied by political science (Olson, 1965; Oye, 1985; Ostrom, 1998). The paradox of autonomy is presented when there are discrepancies in the objectives of international autonomy between the national and regional levels. Discrepancies between these levels are natural, above all when the dominant concept of sovereignty is Westphalian, as is the case in the majority of the Global South, including South America. However, there are two striking features in the paradox of autonomy. First, the structural causes that create conditions which facilitate national autonomy are the same that incentivise cooperation in terms of regional autonomy or in a bloc. Second, intra-regional cooperation is one of the strategies used to achieve greater national autonomy, through diversification (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007), but the natural trajectory of cooperation for regional autonomy would ultimately result in the emergence of supranationality and/or regional hegemony, limiting the room for manoeuvre of the national elites of secondary powers in domestic and foreign policy (Lake, 2009; Nolte, 2010; Schenoni, 2012).

The problem of intra-regional cooperation presented by the paradox of autonomy is particularly severe in terms of security and defence policy. The protection of territorial integrity is a central factor, and national armed forces are important actors in the decision-making of states in which the veto on some external matters has been constituted as a formula of compensation to guarantee civil control over the military forces (Coletta, 2010; Jaskoski, 2012). Thus, the paradox of autonomy puts in direct conflict national interests that make the leadership face decision dilemmas. The dilemmas have the complexity of having to be resolved multilaterally at two parallel levels: the domestic and the regional. The rational, although not optimal, solution in the mitigation of the effects of the paradox of autonomy in security regionalism may be explained by the rational theory of institutional design, insofar as, as is shown in this research in the case of the CDS, members abandon maximalist and minimalist postures to achieve consensus and thus

guarantee a minimum level of cohesion in search of as much national autonomy as is possible, and as much regional autonomy as is necessary. Despite its wide diffusion, it is not until this research that said problem is included at the same time in the theoretical bodies of three international research agendas: security regionalism, the theory of autonomy, and the rational theory of institutional design.

In the course of the research, the development of the analytical model of the paradox of autonomy came to solve the explanatory problems generated by the tension between a great regional project that appeared to fit with both South American aspirations as a whole, and with national agendas of autonomy, not only facing great extra-regional powers, but also facing neighbours and rivals within the same region. With the paradox the contradictions were clear, but the concurrences were not, because the Working Group of the CDS of UNASUR managed, in effect, to establish a founding document by consensus. This shift in explanatory demand forced the search for new theoretical tools, thus incorporating the theory of the rational design of international institutions (Koremenos et al., 2001). This theory forms part of the tradition of thought on rational decision, and affirms that states, or more precisely governments, design institutions with the aim of achieving their goals and objectives.

The application of the rational design of international institutions to the case of the CDS does not only explain how the twelve sovereign states of South America tried to materialise their interests, but also how they blocked both maximalist and minimalist aspirations that had been proposed since the start of the discussion and negotiation process. The possibility of evidencing the multilateral rationality implicit in the creation of the CDS made it possible to explain the way in which the members of UNASUR could resolve their differences and establish a regional security and transparency forum, despite their obvious differences. The paradox of autonomy was resolved at the expense of the scope of the CDS and to achieve a cohesion that would permit the tense coexistence of national autonomy projects and minimal forms of security governance.

1.4 Research Designs and Methodological Approaches

This research is a case study on security regionalism in international conditions of the diffusion of material capabilities. Its purpose is explanatory, with the purpose of revealing the underlying causal mechanisms in the formation of the Defence Council of UNASUR between 2003 and 2009. The research showed the limitations of the explanations that have

been dominant until now and incorporated Latin American theoretical contributions from studies of autonomy, as well as the conceptual proposal of the paradox of autonomy in the sectoral context of regional security and defence policies.

The data used is from diverse sources, highlighting the sequential use of quantitative and qualitative data. Data from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were used to measure the concentration/diffusion of economic capabilities. For the case of other power capabilities, data was used from the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) of the Correlates of War (COW) Project. The geostrategic analysis was done with information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) of the Department of Defence (DoD) and the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the National Security Council (NSC) of the US. Data on the diplomatic and defence positions of South American countries, above all facing the conformation process of the CDS, correspond to the revision of public documents from Foreign Ministries, defence white papers, and direct interviews commissioned with South American regional experts, politicians, diplomatic functionaries and military officials directly linked to the negotiation process that resulted in the creation of the CDS.

For the analysis of post-hegemony, two methods were used. First, statistical analysis, using the formula of concentration of Edward Mansfield (1993). In this first stage of the research, two indicators were considered: nominal GDP and military spending, both standardised to avoid deviations due to inflation. The results of concentration/diffusion generated contradictory data, with an accelerated diffusion of economic capabilities from 2001 on one hand, but with a recovery of concentration of military spending on the other. This encouraged the questioning of the concept of post-hegemony and justified the second method, qualitative geostrategic analysis, based on the observation and study of official documentation and real displacement of forces in the global geographical space (Gray, 2004; Brzezinski, 1997a; 1997b).

Once the real conditions of post-hegemony in the Western hemisphere were redefined with empirical evidence, the creation process of the CDS was analysed based on the original theses planted by the governments of Venezuela and Brazil. To verify the hypotheses posited by the research, the process tracing method was used, with the aim of revealing the causal mechanisms that led to the formalisation of the Council and how its institutional design was imposed unanimously. In the framework of neoclassical realist theoretical considerations and rational institutional design, the main sources of data for

the elaboration of the process tracing were official UNASUR documents, the public declarations of the governments, and data provided by interviewees in the research process. The analytical model of "Coleman's bathtub" was used to illustrate and establish a guide for the research, indicating the causality between the post-hegemonic conditions and the emergence and design of the CDS, and included the underlying causal mechanisms.

The final part of the research collected the results of the first two stages, and advanced the conceptualisation of the paradox of autonomy as an analytical model to understand processes of regional security institutionalisation under conditions of diffusion of power and autonomist aspirations of national elites. In this section, the data generated in the previous analyses was interpreted with the purpose of proposing the basis of a specific explanation of the case of the CDS, but also to contribute in advancing towards a mid-range theory on the institutionalisation of regional security in the Global South.

1.5 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation responds to the modality of accumulative dissertation in the framework of the regulations in force at the Graduate School of the WiSo Uni-Hamburg in the winter semester 2014. According to these regulations, the accumulative dissertation must build an integrated body of at least three independent articles which are published, accepted, or publishable, provided that together they articulate and respond to a research question. Co-authorship is regulated in such a way that at least half of the work in the articles must have been undertaken by the candidate to the qualification of *Dr. phil.* The articles in question must be integrated by means of two unpublished chapters, one introductory – this chapter – and another of conclusions. The bibliography is consolidated for all chapters, although in the independent versions each paper has its own references. In the case of this dissertation, the balance between a complete explanation, while sufficiently parsimonious, was achieved with the articulation of three papers.

The first corresponds to the definition of causal conditions based on the global level of analysis. This section consists of two chapters, 2 and 3. Chapter Two, entitled "Missing Geopolitical Links in Explaining the South American Defence Council", corresponds to a paper of my exclusive authorship. In this document, statistical analysis was used to give empirical support to the thesis of the international deconcentration of national economic capabilities, in contrast to a concentration of gross national capabilities. Based on the

formula of concentration of Edward Mansfield (1993), it was demonstrated that between 1980 and 2013, global capabilities of gross wealth generation by the sovereign state passed through three clearly differentiated stages: late bipolarity (1980-1992), unipolarity (1993-2001), and economic deconcentration with reconcentration of other capabilities, above all military ones (2002-2013). The same formula of concentration that was used to measure the diffusion of GDP, but with material capability data from the CINC, generated contradictory results in the post-hegemonic thesis in the case of South America, as concentration increased instead of reducing. Nevertheless, the concentration of national capabilities forced the search for missing links that could explain the projects of the CDS and UNASUR. Geostrategic factors relating to the over-orientation of the US towards the Middle East, Central Asia and the Asia Pacific (2001-2006) were found. It is in this stage that the CDS takes form, is created and performs.

The combination of the statistical method with geopolitical analysis allowed the creation of a robust argument, giving way to the second section of the dissertation on the failing performance of the CDS. This section is composed of Chapter Three, entitled: "The South American Defence Council Performance under Autonomy Pressures". This paper, again of my exclusive authorship. The evidence processed under a neoclassical realist framework and through the descriptive inference method of process tracing suggests that the autonomist aspirations of the distinct governments of the region, especially the secondary regional powers, not only limited the scope of the institutional design of the CDS, but also continued to be presented and have obstructed the possibility of achieving the limited aims proposed in 2008-2009. These national (individual) aspirations have undermined the possibility of a hypothetically collective objective such as regional autonomy. In this sense, the South American regional power, Brazil, was contested by the agendas of the secondary powers, but also its own internal crisis since 2015, which also affects the possibility of a better performance of the CDS. This chapter presents as a question an idea central to this doctoral dissertation and which could be useful for the analysis of regional security institutions both in South America and the rest of the Global South: the paradox of autonomy.

Chapter Four corresponds to the third paper written for this dissertation, entitled: "Flaws of Security Regionalism in the Global South: Lessons from the South American Paradox of Autonomy". This paper also of my exclusive authorship. The reason behind this choice relates to the fact that the chapter has a conceptual character and lays its foundations on

theoretical development based on case studies (George and Bennett, 2004). This paper gathers the lessons learned from the research and opens discussion on the real possibilities of comparative studies of regional security based on the theoretical and methodological approach applied throughout the preceding chapters. The paradox of autonomy occurs in the tension between national autonomy – the freedom of decision and action that a state can enjoy in the international system – and regional autonomy – referring to that of regional groups organised in regional schemes. Most of the literature on autonomy assumes that this is a common South American – and Global Southern – objective. The explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy agrees with this statement in principal, but at the same time challenges it in two ways. Firstly, in terms of homogeneity: the paradox of autonomy is a subsidiary model of structuralism, so it assumes that the regional hierarchy is fundamental in the prediction of foreign policy behaviour. And secondly, it contrasts the notions of "common" and "collective", while the paradox lies in the potential conflict between the notion of autonomy as a recurring objective and that of autonomy as a shared objective.

It is understood that for regional powers, and secondary powers, autonomy is a key objective. However, from a rational choice point of view, the lesser the capacity, the greater the need for external cooperation. Asymmetries generate stimulus for bandwagoning, and can leave aside autonomous objectives in favour of security, growth and/or development objectives. Thus, the paradox of autonomy is commonly presented at the level of secondary powers, because for them, collective (regional) autonomy can be both a route and an obstacle for individual (national) autonomy. Thus, even considering the possibility of autonomy as a common objective, it might not be considered a collective objective.

In sum, the three central chapters of this dissertation fulfil the three distinct phases and dimensions in the process of answering the research question posed. The first of the chapters, Chapter Two, contributes structural criteria on a solid empirical base which allows the identification of the conditions that facilitated both the emergence of the CDS and the search for greater autonomy by South American states. Additionally, it offers indications of how those conditions affected the performance of the Council. This is complemented with what is advanced in Chapter Three, whose main contribution is to establish a logical causal chain that allows the identification of the regional causes of the failings of South American security regionalism, without leaving aside crucial aspects of domestic politics that conditioned distinct foreign policy strategies and regional security

cooperation. The interaction of the two chapters is transcendental for this dissertation, insofar as it puts systemic and regional analyses in contact. This, in addition to including the security dimension and the fact of not being guided by political preferences or desires that try to force idealised realities, constitutes an important contribution to research on regionalism in the Global South, and in South America in particular. The lessons learned in the research processes of these chapters are translated into Chapter Four which has a clear theoretical orientation, but with the aforementioned empirical basis. The specific result is a chapter that systematises elements of the analysis of security regionalism, but which also contributes a theoretical framework willing to be tested in new comparative research designs. The general result is that of a dissertation that intends to open new avenues of research on regional security in the Global South from a rational and realist perspective.

Chapter Two

Missing Geopolitical Links in Explaining the South American Defence Council

Abstract

The so-called post-hegemonic regionalism has emerged as the dominant explanation for the latest wave of South American regionalism. According to this, the regionalist phenomenon was a product of American decline, the rise of a multipolar global order, and autonomy reactions from South American governments. However, this thesis is insufficient to explain the poor performance of the South American Defence Council (CDS). This article presents a critique of that explanatory model. The shortcomings of post-hegemonic regionalism are exposed in explaining the CDS limited performance as an institution of security regionalism. Starting from the patterns of concentration of power and polarity in the international system, as well as changes in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), an alternative explanation is proposed from neoclassical geopolitics, as a first step in the elaboration of a more robust explanation of the flaws of security regionalism in the Global South.

Keywords: post-hegemonic regionalism, South American Defence Council, security regionalism, neoclassical geopolitics.

2.1 Introduction

Post-hegemonic regionalism is the dominant thesis on the most recent wave of regionalisation in Latin America, especially in South America. This thesis assumes that the emergence of new forms of multilateral regional organisation is attributable to the decline of the US, the rise of multipolarity, and the consequent autonomist reaction of South American governments (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Riggirozzi, 2012; Briceño-Ruiz and Morales, 2017). In the context of regional security, post-hegemonic regionalism assumes that such factors led to the South American Defence Council (CDS) of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (Battaglino, 2012a). However, this thesis is insufficient to explain the emergence of the CDS and, above all, to explain its performance between 2009 and 2017.

This article presents an alternative explanation from the neoclassical geopolitical point of view (Murphy et al., 2004; Megoran, 2010; Guzzini, 2014). It interprets data and facts related to the concentration of economic and national capabilities in the international system, as well as evidence of the geostrategic orientation of the US and recent developments in South American regionalism. The findings of the research are that both

the emergence and the development of the CDS have been responding structurally to regional and global geopolitical transformations omitted by the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism, which is strongly anchored in alternative and temporal political agendas in South America. These findings are part of a first structural approach towards a comprehensive explanation of the failures of security regionalism in South America, as well as the rest of the Global South.

The structure of this article is as follows. Firstly, the theoretical approach and methods are set out, in which definitions are given from neoclassical geopolitics, but also concepts and analytical tools such as security regionalism, rational institutional design and Regional Security Complexes (RSC). In terms of methods, it presents the way in which the data and documents related to general geopolitical processes –geoeconomic, geostrategic and the geopolitics of South American regionalism– were analysed and interpreted. The second part is a brief historical analysis of the emergence and development of the CDS, starting from its initial objectives which contrasted with the regional security dynamics. The third and final part presents what I call the missing geopolitical links in South American security regionalism, highlighting the polarity and concentration of economic and military capabilities in the international system, the highly important geostrategic orientation of the US, and the divisive dynamics of South American regionalism.

The conclusions point to the importance of including empirical evidence in the study of security regionalism, and the necessary follow-up to these processes, considering issues beyond only what is stated. Moreover, it puts into perspective the contribution that this work has as part of a greater effort in understanding the failings of other regional security and/or defence institutions in the Global South.

2.2 Theoretical Approach and Methods

The dominant approach in the proposals of the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism has moved between interpretivism (Rigirozzi, 2012) and espistemological realism (Furlong and Marsh, 2010; Battaglino, 2012a; Briceño Ruiz and Morales, 2017). Interpretivism has given little importance to much of the evidence that could offer explanations of regionalisation processes. Meanwhile, on the side closest to epistemological realism, researchers have taken the emergence of regionalism, in a political and intellectual context that affirms the decline of the US, as valid and sufficient. Both approaches have resigned themselves to studying the most recent wave of South American regionalism as a phenomenological

manifestation (Schutz, 2011). This article includes the study of this regionalist phenomenon from the angle of regional security, responding to global reality, and based on an epistemological realist approach, with the inclusion of empirical elements which could account for the dependent variable through potential structural causal chains.

This epistemological approach, which emerges as a critique of the naïve role of traditional phenomenology in the post-hegemonic regionalist explanation, is complemented with a rationalist theoretical approach (Wight, 2002). In this case, central elements of structural realism (Mearsheimer, 2007) were used, especially concerning the dominant role of the distribution of capabilities in the international system, and their character as an independent variable to understand both the individual and collective foreign policies of states. Additionally, criteria derived from subaltern realism (Ayoob, 1997; Ayoob, 2002) and peripheral realism (Escudé, 1992; Schenoni and Escudé, 2016) were taken into consideration. In the case of subaltern realism, issues related to sovereignty and its relationship to security in underdeveloped states with incomplete processes of institutional consolidation were considered. In the peripheral, the conditions of political regimes and autonomist aspirations were taken in account to explain the greater and lesser degrees of inconformity with the primacy of the US.

Thus, the general analytical framework of this research is linked to neoclassical geopolitics (Mamadouh, 1998; Megoran, 2010). Given the absence of robust empirical explanatory criteria in post-hegemonic regionalism, neoclassical geopolitical analytical factors associated with geoeconomics (Luttwak, 1993) and geostrategy are introduced (Brzezinski, 1997a; Brzezinski, 1997b). These were operationalised through quantitative and qualitative methods. Firstly, analyses of the polarity (concentration) and polarisation of the international system were undertaken. The data was taken from the World Bank and the Correlates of War Project, taking Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) as the respective indicators.

Patterns were recorded by quantitative macro-data analysis through the Concentration of Capabilities (CON) formula (Mansfield, 1993: 111). The quantitative CON analysis brings depth to the well-known debate around polarity, as it does not concentrate on the mere identification of poles of power, but rather it goes much further, indicating flows of capabilities throughout the international system. Accordingly, a system could be multipolar, with more than three poles or powers occupying dominant positions relating to their capabilities, but also be highly concentrated in this handful of powers. Or, at the

other extreme, the system could be unipolar, at least in the terms of William Wohlforth (1999), but rest on a changing international structure, with dynamic flows of deconcentrating capabilities. The formulation of the CON index is presented below:

Equation 2.1: CON Formula

$$CONt = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{Nt}(Sit)^2 - 1/Nt}{1 - \frac{1}{Nt}}}$$

The analysis of US geostrategy was based on documents, principally official documents of the National Security Strategy (NSS). The diachronic examination of said texts reveals the overt orientation of US strategists in terms of geopolitical priorities. The revision of the patterns of reorientation and emergence of US Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) revealed that, in the midst of a process of high concentration of military might towards the US, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), with direct responsibility in Latin America, was losing relative importance to the emergence of a GCC for North America and another for Africa. All this while the US Central Command (CENTCOM) – for the Greater Middle East, and later the US Pacific Command (PACOM) were taking more geostrategic importance. This part of the analysis draws on the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan and Wæver, 2003), characterising each one as an autonomous security reality in the international system, but capable of indirect influence through agents or great geostrategic players, such as the US.

2.3 Post-hegemonic Regionalism and the South American Defence Council

The thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism is the dominant explanation for the rise of the most recent intergovernmental institutions in South America (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Riggirozzi, 2012; Briceño Ruiz and Morales, 2017). Its proponents affirm that Latin American regionalism, and especially South American regionalism, emerged at the start of the 21st century and responds to the latent collective interest of intraregional cooperation and interregional relations without the intermediation of the US and its

liberal practices.[1] In this sense, the relative decline of US influence coincided with the rise of South American economies and, above all, the "progressive" leaderships in the framework of the so-called "Pink Tide" (Panizza, 2008). The redirection of national resources in terms of social welfare – through a better redistribution of incomes – aimed at reducing social inequalities, which could only have been achieved by decoupling from the neoliberal model of the Washington Consensus. This combination of factors weakened US hegemony, offering an exceptional opportunity for South American countries to experiment with new forms of organisation of their own, in terms of regional interests and aspirations. Post-hegemonic regionalism represents the maturing of democratisation processes and the definitive historical transition from the Cold War to a new global order.

One of the most important factors in this explanation refers to the almost simultaneous rise in South America of leaderships affiliated with the Sao Paulo Forum. This organisation of leftist political parties and social movements emerged in 1990 as a response to the Soviet collapse and imminent Western hegemony under the leadership of the US. In this sense, the Sao Paulo Forum was the Latin American answer to the Washington Consensus. Within this broad coalition distinct visions converge and which, in terms of international politics, can be summarised as in search of autonomy and revisionism under neo-Marxist criteria associated with the geopolitical thesis of centre-periphery (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). The rise of this vision to various Latin American presidencies provoked a historic regional shift from 1999. The Pink Tide imposed new patterns of intraregional and extra-regional relationships, which altered the trends in South American regionalism. Until then, the principal regional blocs had been constituted on commercial criteria, as shown in the cases of the Andean Community and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) (Van Klaveren, 1997). In a variety of ways, these new leaderships began to include autonomy and international revisionism in regional integration agendas, motivating geopolitical ideas such as South American identity, multipolarity and, in particular, post-hegemony.

It is important to consider that South American identity forms part of the Brazilian geopolitical project (Galvão, 2009), which consists of giving symbolic and political importance to geographical facts. Close to half of South American territory is occupied by Brazil, and moreover, it represents just less than half of the continent's population and

[1] Some authors, such as Juan Antonio Sanahuja, use a definition similar to that of post-hegemonic regionalism, but calling it "post-liberal regionalism" (Sanahuja, 2009; Sanahuja, 2012).

more than half of its GDP. These attributes would give priority to Brazilian leadership, and make the region a unipolar system (Schenoni, 2014). The aspirational role of Brazilian leadership was considered by Brasilia as a platform for its reformist project of the UN Security Council, so that South American regionalism should not only extend to the whole region, but also abandon functionalist criteria and embrace a structural integration. In this way, not only would strictly Brazilian objectives be achieved, but it would also underpin South American autonomy and rebalance the international system in search of greater diversity in power poles (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). This scheme of the South American bloc, represented by the UNASUR project and led by the Brazilian Workers' Party under the leadership of Luiz Inacio "Lula" Da Silva, was concordant with the autonomist, defensive and revisionist visions of the governments of secondary regional powers such as Argentina and Venezuela, or of lesser states such as Ecuador and Bolivia. The route to the geostrategic objectives was South American unity, and the opportunity presented was the historic post-hegemonic stage.

The above thesis, however, presents some important failings. These failings were theoretically predictable in the process of formation of the CDS, because of the nature of the issues assigned to the Council: coordination of security and defence policies in a region in which the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity is a central aspect of national identity. In this sense, Thomas Legler warned about two strands of thought in the relationship between sovereignty and post-hegemonic regionalism in Latin America: the optimists and the sceptics (Legler, 2013). While both strands present solid arguments, the sceptical strand better explains the difficulties of cooperation in regional security. This is insomuch as it warns of the zeal for sovereignty of South American states.

In addition to the failures that could be predicted at the birth of the CDS, the performance of the regional agreement has been a difficult test to overcome for the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism. According to its postulates, the advance of a multipolar international order and the decline of the US, above all relating to South America, had to consolidate the regionalism processes started in the first decade of the 21st century. On the contrary, the result has been that of a moment of "post-hegemonic boom", followed by a period of languishing by the regional institutions that emerged in the heat of the moment. In the case of the CDS, the institutional design was, to begin, affected by two trends, one maximalist and the other minimalist, which pulled in opposite directions (Comini, 2015). While at one extreme the Venezuelan government of Hugo Chávez aspired to the creation

of a full military alliance, the so-called "South Atlantic Treaty Organisation" or "NATO of the South", at the other extreme the Colombian government of Álvaro Uribe proposed the dismantling of any initiative that put at risk its special relationship with the US (Tickner, 2008; Gratius, 2008; Mijares, 2011; Comini, 2015).

The result of these tensions was a compromise managed by the Chilean Foreign Ministry, with an institutional design that created a forum to coordinate policies which would serve to generate measures of mutual trust —as confirmed by the former Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations (March 13th, 2009-March 11th, 2010), Mariano Fernández Amunátegui, in a personal interview (Fernández Amunátegui, personal communication, January 15th, 2015). In practice, post-hegemonic regionalism suffered from the South American geopolitical fault-line distinguished by the difference between the Atlantic states, MERCOSUR, and those of the Pacific, the Pacific Alliance (AP) (Nolte and Wehner, 2015; Wehner and Nolte, 2017; Briceño Ruiz and Morales, 2017). The objectives of the CDS were broken down in such a way that no signatory government would perceive a risk to its autonomy or interests. These objectives are: 1) consolidate a zone of South American peace; 2) construct a common vision in defence matters; 3) articulate regional positions on defence in multilateral fora; 4) cooperate regionally in defence matters; 5) support actions of demining and the prevention, mitigation and assistance for victims of natural disasters (UNASUR, 2009).

The first objective is difficult to evaluate, given that its operationalisation is not trivial and there is no consensus on the so-called "zone of peace". Jorge Battaglino, expert in themes of Latin American security and defence, and who has demonstrated an optimist vision of post-hegemonic regionalism in terms of security (Battaglino, 2012a), has argued convincingly that South American can best be typified as a region with a "hybrid peace", in that it is "…characterized by the simultaneous presence of: 1) unresolved disputes that may become militarized, yet without escalating to an intermediate armed conflict or war; 2) democracies that maintain dense economic relations with their neighbour countries; and 3) regional norms and institutions (both old and new) that help to resolve disputes peacefully."(Battaglino, 2012b: 142). Under this type of peace, the use of force is probable and conflicts present themselves in the form of militarised crises (Battaglino, 2012b: 134). In this sense, the region has a long history of militarised inter-state disputes (Mares, 2001; Martín, 2006), and there is insufficient evidence to indicate a change stemming from the

CDS. South American hybrid peace continues to be a product of political dynamics and the limited military capabilities of member states (Jenne, 2016), not of regional security.

The second and third objectives of the CDS, to build a common vision defence matters and to articulate regional positions on defence in multilateral fora, have been significantly lagging. Between 2011 and 2012, there was a period of rapid alternation of the Secretary General of UNASUR between Colombia and Venezuela. María Emma Mejía assumed the post for Colombia from May 2011 to June 2012, then Alí Rodríguez Araque between June 2012 and July 2014 for Venezuela. In this period, the idea of harmonising the defence doctrine of UNASUR through the CDS was managed, centred on the defence of energetic and natural resources. In June 2014, a conference was held in Buenos Aires titled "Defence and Natural Resources" (UNASUR, 2014). These efforts, however, have not arrived at anything concrete. According to the high-ranking military officials and diplomats of Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela who participated in the project of a South American doctrine (Argentine diplomat, personal communication, November 24th, 2016; Colombian diplomat, personal communication, November 24th, 2016; Venezuelan diplomat, personal communication, November 26th, 2016), from the beginning of UNASUR and the CDS there had been a propensity to pompous declarations but mutual distrust or disinterest always prevailed (Venezuelan military officer, personal communication, November 26th, 2016; Colombian military officer, personal communication, May 12th, 2017). In the framework of security regionalism there has also been a common phenomenon of "declarative regionalism."(Jenne et al., 2017).

Finally, the fourth and fifth objectives, to cooperate regionally defence matters, and to support actions of demining and the prevention, mitigation and assistance for victims of natural disasters, have not been achieved. In these cases, principles of sovereignty have prevailed and, facing the greatest natural disasters that South Americans have suffered in the last decade, no military force has crossed borders, nor been asked to do so. In this aspect, as in all the rest, the classical concept of "Westphalian sovereignty" (Krasner, 1999: 20-21) has prevailed. The explanation for this behaviour can be found in subordinate realism. According to this theory, to understand the importance of sovereignty in the Third World it is necessary to introduce elements of historical sovereignty in the formation of the state. Accordingly, weak states, such as those of medieval Europe and early modernity as well as the states of Africa, Asia and Latin America today, tend to exalt

elites who jealously guard national sovereignty, while representing their own power domain (Ayoob, 1995).

On the other hand, there are the difficulties of multilateral cooperation in security and defence issues. Between 2009 and 2017, twelve executive-level meetings were held within the CDS. Parallelly, at least twenty bilateral and sub-regional multilateral agreements have been signed on security and defence themes, especially related to borders issues.[2] Despite interest in the multilateralisation of diplomacy in South American defence, the trend is of bi- or tri-lateralisation, or limited multilateralisation in the Southern Cone, the most stable security sub-complex in Latin America. In South American security and defence, multilateralism has given way to minilateralism in general issues which do not affect the functioning of national political agendas.

Considering the post-hegemonic regionalism thesis, this can be considered a contradiction and weakens its explanatory power, because post-hegemonic regionalism presents a marked bias towards a definition of hegemony close to a Gramscian one. While it is true that this form of understanding hegemony in international politics has achieved a certain academic acceptation (Cox, 1983), its tendency to privilege abstract concepts through which cultural influence is exercised frequently leads to the omission of empirical data which could support the contradictory existence of highly hierarchical relationships in an anarchic system (Lake, 1996; Lake, 2001). One of the warnings made by Legler in his study on schools of thought in post-hegemonic regionalism was precisely this, that the explanation requires greater effort in presenting empirical evidence (2013: 327).

In the following section of this article, geopolitical evidence is offered which contributes to the refinement of post-hegemonic regionalism in the light of, not only the emergence of the CDS, but also its very modest performance as a central institution in South American security regionalism.

[2] One of the most successful cooperation initiatives for security in South America, yet bilateral, is the SIVAM (Amazon Surveillance System) and SIPAM (Amazon Protection System) programs. However, despite the fact that Brazil shares the Amazon with seven other neighbouring States, cooperation has been operative only with Peru. These Brazilian systems precede the CDS itself. For details see: Brigola & de Albuquerque (2016).

2.3.1 Missing Geopolitical Links

Why does post-hegemonic regionalism present problems in explaining the emergence, and in particular, development of the CDS? My principal argument is that geopolitical factors have been omitted since the beginning. In this part of the article, I elaborate an explanation that tries to strengthen the thesis in question, putting into a structural perspective the changes in the international system which have affected the conduct of South American states in regional security cooperation. I base this explanation on three factors: global geoeconomic patterns, global geostrategic patterns, and geopolitical dynamics of South American regionalism.

2.3.1.1 Global Geoeconomic Patterns

The shortcomings of the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism create an, until now, unseen puzzle when applied to the most recent case of South American security regionalism. If we want to show with data that there has been a process of displacement of the relative power and influence of the US, as a causal condition of regionalism, it is necessary to use data such as that presented in Figures 1 and 2, in which the relative national capabilities –in terms of CINC– and the relative economic capabilities –in terms of GDP– of the US facing the sovereign states of South America. In the context of the US-South America comparison, the stability of the gap in terms of composite material capabilities can be appreciated, despite the significant fall produced in precisely the year in which UNASUR was founded.

Figure 2.1: Comparative CINC:
the twelve South American states vis á vis the US



The evidence of material patterns suggests stability in the distribution of power. That is to say, in polarity. The thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism presents a void which weakens its own explanation of the new forms of South American regionalism. This void remains exposed once an analysis of the evidence of the effective transformation, or not, of the inter-American system has been undertaken. Talk of a post-hegemonic phase would imply an assumption that, from the point of view of national capabilities in general, and economic capabilities in particular, the pattern of hemispheric hierarchy has changed radically. As for the concentration of capabilities in the generation of wealth, the pattern shows that, in effect, the international system experiences a sharp deconcentration between 2001 and 2008, the year in which the CDS was created by consensus. Notwithstanding this change, an approximation to the concrete reality of the Western hemisphere demonstrates that the deconcentration could have had perceivable effects (Jervis, 2015), but that regional patterns have in fact barely changed. Even stronger is the result of the quantitative analysis of data related to national capabilities in general, in which there is evidence of a progressive reconcentration of capabilities in the hands of a few powers, to the detriment of the majority of states in the international system. This asymmetry is particularly marked in the Americas.

In retrospect, the pattern of global power corresponding to the Cold War appears stable. In general terms, claims about the stability of bipolar systems find, despite criticism, a link with what was experienced between 1945 and 1990 (Waltz, 1964; Copeland, 1996). Waltzian neorealism is a product of this bipolarity, which established a scheme in which the dynamic of concentration-deconcentration of capabilities was equally, or more, crystallised than the limits of the spheres of influence of the two superpowers. But it was precisely the year in which the *Theory of International Politics* of Kenneth Waltz (1979) was published when, in an initially slow and timid form, the changes that resulted in the breakdown of the limits of said world tension began. A recent application of the CON formula demonstrates that between 1980 and 2013 trends in gross economic capabilities of the states of the world passed through two clearly definable stages. The first was high concentration, which is to say an increase in inequality, between 1980 and 2001, and the second of a rapid deconcentration, between 2002 and 2013 with a particularly high speed until 2008, in which the capability to attract wealth spread in the international system.

What explains the marked differences between one period and the other was the super-cycle of commodities. Between 2000 and 2014 the general trend was an increase in the

prices of raw materials (Radetzki et al., 2008; Erten and Ocampo, 2013; Jacks, 2013). Demand from emerging markets, including through the accelerated industrialisation of China and India, stimulated the rise of raw material prices. From 2003, with the US intervention in and military occupation of Iraq, and the dramatic effect of the armed separatist revolts in the Niger Delta, together with the oil strike of the Venezuelan state-owned PDVSA, fossil fuels added strongly to the commodities push, slowing the growth of mature industrialised economies, strengthening industrialisation processes in the biggest emerging markets, and accelerating growth in the economies most dependent on raw materials. This situation deconcentrated the global economy spectacularly, favouring perceptions of parity, promoting the idea of multipolarity, and in some extreme cases, of non-polarity (Kupchan, 1998; Haass, 2008; Bremmer and Roubini, 2011). In this context of catching up and power parity towards power transition (Tammen et al., 2000), the revision of the international system based on ever more autonomous foreign policy strategies appeared plausible.

However, the analysis of global economic concentration does not match that of military capabilities. Although subject to debate, it is difficult to counterargue that the pairing of economic and military capabilities continues to be a central piece in the definition of hierarchies of power in international politics. Even soft power theorists admit that hard power continues to be a fundamental instrument of global politics, as is shown by the development of the concept of smart power, based on the alternative and progressive use of instruments of soft and hard power (Nossel, 2004; Nye, 2009). Thus economic and military capabilities play a leading role in analyses of international power relations, either as sufficient conditions or as necessary ones. The analysis of the concentration of economic capabilities shows that, in effect, the super-cycle of raw materials coincided with an accelerated deconcentration of economic capabilities in the world.

Applying the same formula to variables of gross military power obtained from the CINC (Singer et al., 1972), a distinct pattern becomes evident, one which does not coincide in either intervals or trends. This can be appreciated in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2.2: Patterns of world concentration of GDP and CINC (1980-2013)



If we accept the idea that economic capabilities are only part of the story, and that power in international politics cannot be understood without considering military capabilities, then the results presented in Figure 2 represent a challenge to the definition of international polarity. Towards the end of the 20th century, Samuel Huntington affirmed that, far from unipolarity, what the world was experiencing was a uni-multipolarity, or a game of multiple boards on which capabilities were distributed in different forms by sector (Huntington, 1999). The analytical model of uni-multipolarity, usually described with the metaphor of a three-dimensional chessboard, could be a solution to the apparent contradiction of economic deconcentration and the concentration of global military capabilities, at least as a global explanation but with potential deficiencies in regional analysis, as we will see in the following section on the South American case. But accepting the uni-multipolarity model is not an easy step to take if we want a parsimonious explanation of global politics. The possibility of giving an unequivocal conception of international polarity runs through the model like water through fingers. This is due to its global perspective and its interest in explaining the system as a whole, as happened with bipolarity during the Cold War. This is not so feasible in a world of regions (Katzenstein, 2015).

The differences between the patterns of concentration of economic and military capabilities are real, but the contradiction is apparent. This can be affirmed when analysing the global political reality from the angle of the regions. Peter Katzenstein affirmed that global dynamics have been abandoning their dominant global character to

adapt to a world of open and porous regions (2015). Similarly, important academics of International Relations have been writing about these processes of regionalisation in a range of fields as broad and complex as international security and international political economy (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Acharya, 2013). In 2015, the organisers of the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, which took place in New Orleans, dared to go a semantic step further, and instead of talking of a "world of regions", they proposed to speak of "regional worlds" (Acharya, 2014b). This more than symbolic gesture recognised the importance of regions and partially closed their porosity, in order to give them a privileged place in the global context. The hard to question importance of regions defends the relationship between social sciences and global area studies.

Privileging the regional perspective does not imply forgetting phenomena at the global level, but rather incorporating said phenomena in the context of the region being studied. The contradiction presented in the types of capabilities, which cannot be fully resolved through the analytical model of uni-multipolarity, can be presented as an apparent contradiction in the international system, but not in regional systems. For a better understanding of regional dynamics, we could consider elements of the dominant political culture, patterns of cooperation, and conflict, but principally the geopolitical criteria which regulate them. Analysis of regions is, firstly, a geopolitical analysis as it is based on a spatial logic with respect to the incidence of global trends in spaces distinguishable as regions. This does not deny the ideational or behavioural dimensions of regions, but rather defends the relevance of the physical condition for the definition. Seen in this way, we must reconsider the contradiction presented in Graphic 1 and stop viewing it in the global context, to begin to see it from regional angles. What can resolve the apparent contradiction is not necessarily an ingenious, but exhausting, concept such as that of uni-multipolarity, but rather the exercise of asking ourselves if what we see, which is a global phenomenon, corresponds to the way in which it is perceived in each region of the world, or, if preferred, each regional world.

The geopolitical focus on regional realities brings us from a non-regionalised global perspective to a regional perspective which considers the global. Geopolitical realities are crossed by the pursuit of national objectives through the mobilisation of ample resources in the form of a great strategy (Liddell Hart, 1967; Kennedy, 1992; Christensen, 1996; Gaddis, 2002; Russell and Tokatlian, 2013) or the management of geopolitical objectives through geostrategy (Brzezinski, 1997a; Brzezinski, 1997b; Walton, 2007). The form in which states

of distinct dimensions react to the geostrategies of other states conditions the meaning given to them and, as a consequence, the courses of action they follow, a posteriori. Thus, for example, the signifier that implies a greater diffusion of economic power, that is, a lesser concentration, signifies in South East Asia a displacement of capabilities which transforms the political economy of the region, insofar as it implies the relative gain of capabilities by China. On the other hand, the concentration of military capabilities in the international system is a signifier which coincides with its conventional meaning in the Persian Gulf, as there is not only an increase in military spending in that region, which encourages global concentration, but also a displacement of capabilities in the potential use of force by extra-regional powers. In the case of South-East Asia, apparently contradictory patterns reveal congruence when the members of ASEAN, above all those in dispute with China's control of the South China Sea, invite the US to participate as a regional military power.

The incorporation of geopolitical analysis at the regional level, with the addition of observing geostrategies in interaction, has been lacking in the explanation of South American post-hegemonic regionalism. The inclusion of this type of analytical approach does not deny the initial conclusions of the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism, but instead refines them, incorporating empirical elements and potential causal chains. Additionally, it adds the possibility of a dynamic and non-static interpretation, which would explain later processes, as shown in the following section.

2.3.1.2 Global Geostrategic Patterns

Drawing on the historical analysis applied to the study of international politics, I affirm that an important missing link in the explanation of the new regionalism is found in the geostrategic orientation, with a marked Eurasian emphasis, of the superpower, the US, precisely from 2001. This change was reflected in the US NSS document of 2002, and had an important impact on the international perception of South American governments. This was because, on one hand, the global conditions of hierarchy did not change; the system continued to be unipolar. And on the other, the exaggerated geopolitical interest of the administration of George W. Bush in the Middle East and Central Asia opened an extraordinary window of opportunity for autonomist South American forces, of a leftist orientation, which had demonstrated resistance to the globalisation promoted during the Clinton era, and which from 2003 had growing resources derived from the super-cycle of raw materials.

It is impossible to separate the effect of South American autonomy from the geostrategy of the US. Prior to the most recent wave of South American regionalism, Zbigniew Brzezinski identified the strengthening of economic and military positions of occupation and influence in three key peninsulas of Eurasia, Europe, the Arabian Peninsula and South-East Asia, as a great US geostrategic imperative (Brzezinski, 1997a; Brzezinski, 1997b). In parallel, Christopher Layne (1997) cautioned against the convenience of *offshore balancing* in Eurasia as a replacement strategy for the primacy approach which the US could not sustain in the face of slow but progressive decline. This geostrategic approach is based on comparison with the role played historically by England, as a maritime power, facing any attempt at continental hegemony in Western Europe. There has been continuity among US realist academics in calling for *offshore balancing*, always oriented to the efficient use of power with the aim of avoiding a single or collective hegemony across Eurasia (Mearsheimer, 2001; Innocent and Carpenter, 2009; Pape, 2010; Walt, 2011; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2016).

The geopolitical importance of Eurasia was reemphasised by Brzezinski in drawing on the work of Halford Mackinder on the geographical pivot of history (Mackinder, 2004). Thus, Eurasia occupies a central position at the base of original geopolitical thought, implying the displacement of the importance of other regions, above all those that do not contain a great power. This explains the marginal position of South America in dominant geostrategic calculations, including those of a superpower such as the US, neighbouring this region. This structural condition is exacerbated by conditions which draw the strategic attention of Washington towards the great continental pivot.

For the geostrategy of the US, the most salient event after the geostrategic proposals of Brzezinski and Layne were the attacks of September 11th, 2001. These brought a reconsideration of US foreign policy priorities and national security, with the Western hemisphere virtually disappearing. The military and intelligence apparatus over-focused on Central Asia, Afghanistan in 2001, and later the Middle East, Iraq in 2003 (Feffer, 2003; Layne, 2007). The accumulation of capabilities and the development of conventional combat skills from the time of the Cold War gave the US its current global military superiority. However, these capabilities and skills did not correspond to the multidimensional challenge of the War on Terror (Posen, 2001), which consumed not only economic resources, but also time and attention by the entire national security apparatus,

including above all, the Departments of Defence, State, Treasury and Homeland Security (Sloan, 2008; Cohen, 2004).

Beyond the actual event, September 11th occurred in the midst of a large-scale economic process with the potential to lead to a transition of power: the material rise of China. The possibility of this power transition has been widely debated, with no agreement on the real prospects of a peaceful or conflictive transition (Zhu, 2006; Tammen and Kluger, 2006; Lebow and Valentino, 2009; Mearsheimer, 2010; Allison, 2017). What is certain is that China presented impressive numbers which reinforced the hypothesis of US decline and forced Washington strategists to take more seriously the necessity of maintaining presence and influence in Eurasia. The development of this geostrategy did not stop with the end of the Bush administration, extending into the Obama administration and achieving its climax in 2011 with the "Pivot to Asia" doctrine (Campbell and Andrews, 2013; Campbell, 2016).

On a smaller scale, and different to that of China, Russia experienced a resurgence driven by two factors: one international and structural, the increase in oil and gas prices, and the other related to domestic politics, the rise of the assertive leadership of Vladimir Putin (Stuermer, 2008). The Russian awakening reactivated the dynamics of geopolitical competition with the US. The relationship of energy cooperation between China and Russia was only part of the joint strategy to displace the US in Central Asia (Klare, 2002). The process of security cooperation, started in 1996 with the creation of the Shanghai Five forum, including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, led to a bilateral border demilitarisation measure between China and Russia in 1997 (Tsai, 2003). The Shanghai Five evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001, including Uzbekistan (Marketos, 2008; Frost, 2009). The strategy of denying the US regional access was clear, and made patent when, in 2005, Beijing and Moscow decided not to invite US observers to their first joint military exercise, the Peace Mission 2005. US observers were also not invited to any of the biannual military exercises of the Peace Mission program between 2007 and 2015, nor to the annual Sino-Russian naval trials between 2012 and 2017, developed in scenarios as distinct as the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Baltic Sea.

The warning of Brzezinski points to the possibility of cooperation between three Eurasian powers. China and Russia were the most important because of their material capabilities and long history of rivalry with the US. The third power is Iran. Because of its dimensions

and capabilities, Iran is not in the same league as China or Russia, but its central position in Eurasia was compounded by the increase in oil prices during the super-cycle of raw materials, and the aggressive leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). Encouraged by the advantages afforded by high oil prices, Ahmadinejad implemented a foreign policy of confrontation with the US and the rest of the West (Friedman, 2006; Ansari, 2007). This confrontation reached the point of sanctions against Iran for the secrecy in its nuclear program. While there is no evidence of an alliance between China and Russia with Iran, the first is the principal buyer of Iranian oil (British Petroleum, 2017; OPEC, 2017), while the latter is its principal supplier of arms, with China second (SIPRI, 2017). These geopolitical links appeared to close the Eurasian triangle of Brzezinski, threatening the interests and influence of the US in the super-continent.

The situation described thus far does not account for any serious US decline in terms of quantifiable capabilities. On the contrary, the geostrategic manoeuvres of China, Russia and Iran, together with US military efforts in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, stimulated an increase in US military spending and thus the concentration of capabilities. What declined was US interest in hemispheric matters, whose importance paled in comparison to the hot spots of the national security agenda on the other side of the world. Even the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative, indirectly associated with national security policy, suffered the disinterest of its main promoter, opening the doors for a greater demonstration of post-hegemony in South America: a successful parallel summit of resistance to the FTAA in the framework of the IV Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, on November 4th and 5th 2005, in which Néstor Kirchner and Hugo Chávez declared the death of the agreement of North American origin.

The geostrategic reorientation and exaggerated Eurasian geopolitics were captured in documents of the US NSS, especially those of the Bush administration (Bush, 2002; Bush, 2006) and of the Obama administration (Obama, 2010). The first abandoned any reference to the previously mentioned FTAA and drastically reduced the consideration it had had of anti-drug policies. As for the geographical focus, already scarce reference to Latin America was further reduced as an area of critical interest for the US national security strategy. From the point of view of doctrine, an aspect that shows the greatest change with respect to the NSS document of 1999 (Clinton, 1999), the thesis of preventive war was presented as the basis of the fight against terrorism. The NSS of 2006 inflated the importance of Iraq as the greatest concern for national security, and barely mentioned Latin American

countries. By 2010, the NSS timidly abandoned the Middle East and Central Asia, but to focus more and more on East Asia.

In addition to the documents of the NSS, one relevant piece of evidence of the geostrategic reorientation of the US is the relative weight of the GCCs (Watson, 2011). The GCCs respond directly to US geostrategic imperatives, giving its strategists the possibility of having a structure of command, control and communications which responds to the specificities of each regional security cluster in the international system (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Watson, 2011). The first two commands have their origin in the Second World War, and are associated with the principal theatres of operations, namely Europe (EUCOM) and the Pacific (PACOM). During two distinct stages of the Cold War, two other commands were created, one for Latin America (SOUTHCOM) in 1963 and the other for the Middle East (ENTCOM) in 1983, extended to Central Asia after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Since September 11th, 2001, and in the framework of the War on Terror, the two latest commands were established: that of North America (NORTHCOM) in 2002, and the command for Africa (AFRICOM) in 2007 (Watson, 2011).

Map 2.1: US Geographic Combatant Commands



Observation of the six GCCs has been omitted by the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism, despite the potential use it has in discerning between what could be a process of genuine decline or one of geostrategic reorientation. In the case of South American post-hegemonic regionalism, the trends suggest the latter. The weight of SOUTHCOM in the NSS has been relatively low and with a stable trend in terms of the percentage of spending and troop numbers (Watson, 2011). Its emergence in 1963 is suggestive, as it coincides with

the Missile Crisis at the end of 1962. Beyond that, SOUTHCOM served as the political-military structure of diffusion of the National Security Doctrine for Latin America, which privileged the thesis of the internal enemy and trained the armed forces of the region in communist containment (Comblin, 1989; Buitrago, 2003). Its relative weight was lost with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threats. Accordingly, SOUTHCOM assumed a predominant role in the War on Drugs of the 1990s. However, and following the trajectory drawn in the NSS documents, September 11th drastically changed US strategic priorities.

The creation of NORTHCOM in 2002 suggests that the US NSS saw North America, for the first time, as a scenario of geostrategic deployment and as a favourable scenario for external aggressions. War arrived in the territory of the US. But the most significant change was the increase of the budget and military capabilities of CENTCOM. In the period of the rise of South American post-hegemonic regionalism, this command came to occupy a privileged position in the NSS, as the centre of geostrategic attention. The marginalisation of SOUTHCOM reached historically low levels after 2007, when USAFRICOM was founded, with which Mackinder's thesis of the "world island" was asserted almost one century after first being presented (Mackinder, 2004). The reconfiguration of PACOM from 2011 with the "Pivot to Asia" doctrine was added to the attention paid to the Greater Middle East and Africa. This process of a decade of very low geostrategic interest in Latin America allowed the rise of a mechanism of security regionalism such as the CDS.

The greatest problem of the post-hegemonic explanation is that it does not establish a causal link between the supposed US decline and the new wave of regionalism, above all in the case of security regionalism. The main reason for this failing is that, as has been shown, no evidence exists of said decline, at least in quantifiable material terms. Moreover, it does not consider the geostrategic factor of the reorientation of the NSS. The Gramscian character (Cafruny, 1990) which underlies the proposed post-hegemonic explanation is associated with the dominant official narratives and acts of foreign policy in South America in the period studied (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). These narratives and acts are based on perceptions. Robert Jervis explains that political leaders adjust their discourses and agendas to their expectations, which can be grouped into fears and desires (2015: 356 et seq.). Accordingly, decision-makers perceive in the international political reality what they expect, or fear, to see and/or what they want to see, as perception is not a passive

action but an active one, in which the subject that perceives does not receive stimuli objectively, but rather recreates the perceived reality based on their expectations.

The leaders of the South American left perceived that the relative contraction of geopolitical interest from the US in their region was evidence of the decline of the superpower. Despite never having experienced military intervention by US troops, unlike Central America and especially the Caribbean islands, tension related to the regional presence of the US has persisted in South America. The Rio Pact, effective from 1947, and the continuity of SOUTHCOM from 1963, in addition to the formal activation of the IV South Atlantic Fleet from 2008 (Clarín, 2008), stimulated leaders such as Lula Da Silva (Brazil), Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández (Argentina), along with Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Evo Morales (Bolívia) and Fernando Lugo (Paraguay), to push for a South American mechanism of collective defence or deterrence. The idea of counteracting the perceived hegemony in security matters encouraged the regionalism project of the CDS of UNASUR.

But it was not only the fear of losing autonomy which motivated the emergence of security regionalism. Expectations of US decline spread rapidly the academic sphere in the first decade of the 21st century (Wallerstein, 2003; Haass, 2008; Ikenberry, 2008; Zakaria, 2008; Acharya, 2014a). Similarly, in the plans and declarations of emerging powers and revisionist leaderships the term "multipolarity" appeared in its different meanings, both as a diagnostic and as a desirable objective (Russia, China, Iran and Venezuela) (Mijares, 2017). The economic rise of China, in particular, and the so-called BRICs in general, pushed the perception of US decline. However, as has already been shown in this paper, more than US decline, we can see the economic rise of multiple centres of power, many of these as a consequence of the super-cycle of raw materials. This situation generated the already mentioned deconcentration of power in the generation and accumulation of wealth, but without denying the privileged position that the US continued to hold, even in the worst moments of the economic crisis of 2008-09. Even in this moment of abrupt decline in the concentration of economic power, national capabilities, especially military spending, were concentrated in only a few powers, with the US leading the process.

But in this scenario of perceived, or desired, US decline, not only the rivals of the superpower and South American revisionist governments diagnosed post-hegemony and the need for a multipolar world. More conservative governments in foreign policy and defence, such as those of Álvaro Uribe (Colombia), Michelle Bachelet (Chile) and Alan

García (Peru) agreed to be part of the process of post-hegemonic regionalism, despite their good relations with the US. The discrediting of the US government under George W. Bush was the first condition for the reduction of its regional diplomatic influence. The change of administration in 2009, and the arrival of Barack Obama, made clear very quickly that Latin America was not among the priorities of the national security agenda of Washington. In the V Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in May 2009, the discourse of Obama projected the idea of a horizontal relationship with Latin America (Obama, 2009).

In the specific case of the relationship of security cooperation between the US and Colombia, the country with the most reluctant government in security regionalism, two events coincided. The first brought a critical juncture: the *Operación Fénix* of March 1st, 2008, in which, through an unauthorised bombing in Ecuadorian territory, Colombian armed forces destroyed a camp of the FARC, killing Luis Édgar Devia Silva (a.k.a. Raúl Reyes), spokesman and commander of the secretariat of the guerrilla group. The operation resulted in a diplomatic crisis with Ecuador and Venezuela, with whom there was a militarised border dispute, and the cutting of relations with Quito and Caracas. Diplomatic pressure from Brazil and Argentina, along with the rest of UNASUR, forced Colombia to submit to the Defence Council project, to avoid the escalation of the conflict with Venezuela as well as political isolation in its own region (Ardila and Amado, 2009).

The second factor relates to the cooling of relations between Washington and Bogota after the arrival of Obama to the White House. The "special relationship" of the US and Colombia (Tickner, 2008), forged in the presidencies of Andrés Pastrana and Bill Clinton with the "Plan Colombia", were deepened in the era of Uribe and Bush. Both presidents shared a security vision, and the Colombian abandoned the phrase "narco-guerrilla" to use instead that of "narco-terrorists" to define the armed insurgent groups in his country (Felbab-Brown, 2009). With the arrival of Obama, the approach to hemispheric relations was partially desecuritised and the relative importance of Colombia in the national security agenda of the US was reduced.

2.3.1.3 Geopolitical Dynamics in South American Regionalism

While the previous two factors analysed correspond to global effects on the region, this final factor originates in South America itself. Although the CDS does not have any institutional rival that duplicates its functions, its belonging to a larger project, UNASUR, has caused the geopolitical divisions in South American regionalism to compromise its

cohesion. The failure of Brazil to consolidate its leadership in South America (Malamud, 2011) meant that the geopolitical divisions of the regionalist projects could not be avoided. Initially, UNASUR and its CDS appeared capable of heading a different, and therefore successful, project. Post-hegemonic regionalism appeared capable of replacing the liberal regionalism of limited commitments. This was especially true of what was the definitive decline of the CAN, uncertainty about MERCOSUR, and the limitations of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas.

But the development of UNASUR, and its CDS, has suffered from the fractures within South America. The biggest of these is the tension between Atlantic and Pacific. On the one hand, MERCOSUR has been experiencing disruptions due to the end of the super-cycle of raw materials and internal political tensions which have meant the end of governments affiliated with the Sao Paulo Forum, above all in Brazil and Argentina. On the other hand, although also associated with the processes just mentioned, the political and economic crisis in Venezuela has posed a difficult challenge for MERCOSUR to overcome. Incapable of forcing Caracas to adopt the trade regulations and democratic principles of the Ushuaia Protocol, the decision was taken to suspend Venezuela technically in December 2016, and politically on August 6th, 2017. The AP, for its part, has manage to consolidate itself as a mechanism of economic integration which brings to mind liberal, open regionalism or, in post-hegemonic jargon, a hegemonic one.

When the governmental and trade trends of MERCOSUR and the AP are reviewed, the differences emerge immediately. While the Brazilian and Argentinian governments of Michel Temer and Mauricio Macri have a markedly liberal orientation, their predecessors, Dilma Rouseff and Cristina Fernández, were the heirs of more statist models which also tolerated the autocratisation of Venezuela. Meanwhile, the South American governments of the AP – Colombia, Peru and Chile – demonstrate a trend to economic opening and a democratic record which, on average, exceeds that of MERCOSUR, above all if one includes Venezuela.

MERCOSUR and the AP are not in open opposition. In fact, the south of the Continent, Chile and Argentina, encourage the possibility of convergence between the two blocs. This possibility has been made more probable while Venezuela remains suspended from the former. However, Brazilian political instability has not allowed progress in that direction, maintaining the geopolitical fracture in South America. This geopolitical division has

broken UNASUR in two, limiting even further the security dialogue between its members and, as a result, affecting the performance of the CDS.

The combination of global geoeconomic and geostrategic patterns with geopolitical dynamics of South American regionalism, offers an analytical panorama which allows one to think in an alternative to the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism from a neoclassical geopolitical perspective. The neoclassical geopolitical structural approach is also capable of explaining the origin of the CDS, but it is superior when going beyond only the origin and looking to understand the inherent limitation of this security regionalism project. It is for this reason that it can be taken as a first proposal for the analysis of security regionalism from neoclassical geopolitics, with the potential to be applied, as an analytical model, to other regional realities.

2.4 Conclusion

The data and facts presented in this paper show the need for a reinterpretation of so-called post-hegemony as an explanation of South American security regionalism. More than absolute or relative contraction in the power of the US, the process refers to a geostrategic reorientation which re-emphasises Eurasia and the world island of Mackinder in the NSS, depending on both structural imperatives and circumstantial events. The effect of the "vacuum of power" incentivised visible changes in foreign policies which, in the South American case, were translated into the search for greater autonomy in terms of security and defence.[3]

The arguments presented herein pose a structured critique of the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism as an explanation of South American security regionalism. This contribution is neither capricious, nor does it intend to initiate a confrontation in the structuralist/post-structuralist framework which has been dividing both the social sciences in general, and IR in particular. Neither does it aspire to completely replace post-hegemonic regionalism as an explanation. From the beginning of this research, the objective was to highlight the limitations of the thesis in a context of the evident decline of said regional autonomist project, which has the CDS at the forefront in security issues. Understood in this sense, this article contributes to widening the analytical margins towards geopolitical spaces and

[3] On vacuum of power effects on regions, see Roy, 1995.

tools, to what has until now appeared to be a process of constriction caused by the dominant position of post-hegemonic regionalism.

As a systematic effort of critique, from a structuralist and neoclassical geopolitical position, this article presents undeniable limitations. The first of these relates to the deliberate neglect of domestic political processes and the study of ideas, both dominant and displaced. This was neglected for two practical reasons: the first, space to parsimoniously develop the required aspects, and the second, the need to be emphatic in the empirical-structural flaw of post-hegemonic regionalism. The second limitation is linked to the analysis of foreign policies, as no detailed study was undertaken of national reactions to the geopolitical links omitted by post-hegemonic regionalism. What explains this limitation relates to the interest in covering the same analytical level, the regional, of the thesis under criticism, in order to present an alternative with a view to theoretical displacement. The third limitation relates to the validation of the affirmations. Insofar as the research includes only one case study, its generalisation can be questionable. Notwithstanding trends in methodological possibilities relating to generalisation based on case studies (Gomm, et al., 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2013), it is true that the alternative proposal from neoclassical geopolitics requires greater investigation from the perspective of comparative area studies (Basedau and Köllner, 2007; Ahram, 2011). This type of trans-regional comparative study, together with the historical evaluation of the performance of regional security institutions, is the only guarantee of confirmation that would avoid the decoupling of theory from reality, as happened with post-hegemonic regionalism.

Finally, this article has the potential to initiate debates and open new spaces on the research agenda relating to the study of security regionalism in the Global South, and especially in Latin America. On the one hand, it opens the debate related to the need to (re)introduce geopolitical factors of analysis and interpretation in security regionalism, with the aim of providing structural support to its explanations. In addition, it presents arguments which could problematise North-South relations in a new context of the diffusion of power and changing geostrategic priorities, beyond the simplistic idea of multipolarity and the so far rigid dichotomy of hegemony-autonomy. On the other hand, the research agenda that appears demands the consideration of two major aspects. The first is the study of national decision-making processes facing the perceived changes in the international system, and the second is the possibility of generating a theory capable of being translated to different regions. In both cases it is necessary to take forward greater

empirical and documentary research in South America and the rest of the Global South, combining the principles and tradition of regional studies, security studies, global studies and foreign policy analysis, in a framework which rescues the analytical utility of geopolitics.

Chapter Three

The South American Defence Council Performance under Autonomy Pressures

Abstract

This article evaluates the performance of the South American Defence Council through the thesis of rational institutional design and the concept of the operability of alliances. The trajectory of the Council between 2009 and 2017 is analysed through a theoretical approximation inspired by neoclassical realism and by applying the descriptive inference method of process tracing. The result of this research indicates that, in almost a decade of operation, the Defence Council of UNASUR did not achieve full operability according to its institutional design. The evidence suggests that aspirations of national autonomy undermined the project of regional security autonomy. The preliminary conclusion of this research presents the first sketch of an analytical model of security regionalism called the "paradox of autonomy".

Keywords: neoclassical realism, descriptive inference, paradox of autonomy, South American Defence Council

3.1 Introduction

Most recent literature relating to security regionalism in Latin America has been concentrated on the study of the South American Defence Council (CDS, for its initials in Spanish and Portuguese). Nevertheless, these works deal mostly with the origins of the Council, not its performance, almost a decade after its creation. The reason for the high level of interest in studying the origin of the CDS, as well as the low interest in monitoring its performance, could be associated with the expectations it generated since 2008, and, in turn, the limited results it has presented. This work presents an explanation for this hyperbolic trajectory based on an approximation from rational institutional design and through the concept of operability, something originally thought of for alliances. Using these tools, the performance of the CDS is analysed from its creation until the year 2017, considering data and testimonies through the descriptive inference method of process tracing.

The evidence suggests that the autonomist aspirations of the distinct governments of the region, especially the secondary regional powers, not only limited the scope of the institutional design of the CDS, but have also continued to appear, and have obstructed the possibility of achieving the limited aims proposed in 2008-2009. The national – individual– aspirations have undermined the possibility of a hypothetically collective

objective such as regional autonomy. In this sense, the South American regional power, Brazil, was contested by the agendas of the secondary powers, but also by its own internal crisis since 2015, which also affects the possibility of a better performance of the CDS. To present our case, the outline of this work is as follows: firstly, the theoretical-methodological approximation and research design are presented. Secondly, the descriptive inference method is applied to establish the working hypothesis: that the search for national autonomy, in the framework of seeking regional autonomy, generated a dynamic of competition that resulted in the lack of CDS operability. This highlights what I consider the central factor in explaining both the origin and the performance of the institutionalism of security regionalism: the search for autonomy. And finally, an idea that could be useful for the analysis of regional security institutions both in South America and the rest of the Global South is presented as a question: the paradox of autonomy.

3.2 Research Design and Approaches

The starting point of this research, is causal design (Beach and Pedersen, 2016), proposing the pressures of national autonomies as a dominant causal condition in explaining the CDS as operationally limited by its design, and above all, in explaining its performance. To establish said causality, the technique of descriptive inference (Collier, 2011) is used to establish the validity of the pressures of national autonomies as cause of the limited operability of the CDS. The basis of the study is a general theoretical framework of foreign policy analysis centred on the interaction between the international and national levels, as posed by neoclassical realism. Analytically, I start with a framework of rational institutional design (RID) and its assumptions to characterise the CDS and track its performance. Additionally, I take up and adapt the concept of the operability of alliances, originally employed in the analysis of collective defence schemes, or military alliances. And finally, interviews with South American experts and protagonists related to the CDS are used.

In accordance with Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, "…states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly" (2001: 762). Encompassing five dimensions of international institutions, namely, membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralisation of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements (Koremenos et al., 2001: 763), a characterisation of the CDS is undertaken that serves as a starting point to analyse its

performance. The realist critique of the RID approach covers the entire idea of international institutions, attacking a presumed normative-prescriptive character detached from historical reality (Mearsheimer, 1994; Duffield, 2007). For its part, constructivism criticises RID as it focuses on a presumption of rationality that is only detected *a posteriori*, omitting the fact that the design of an institution is born of a desire for a normative and regulatory projection to the future (Wendt, 2001). Both critiques have impeccable arguments and real pretexts. However, RID fulfils an analytical function which allows it to offer something useful, as it systematises the regulatory objectives of international political behaviour in specific aspects, without abandoning the rational search for advantages by the governments that design institutions. It is precisely this virtue of parsimony that inclines one to consider the rational thesis, in order to go beyond the origin of the CDS and to analyse its performance.

In this work I used the comprehensive but succinct analysis of foreign policy achieved by neoclassical realism (Sterling-Folker, 1997; Rose, 1998; Lobell et al., 2009; Ripsman et al., 2015). For neoclassical realism, foreign policy is the dependent variable, while the international system is the independent one – following the structural realist tradition. But what is interesting for this study is that this theory incorporates domestic factors as an intervening variable, both in ideational aspects, such as those related to socio-political and domestic economic dynamics. For the study of the CDS, the importance of connecting both levels of analysis lies in what Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert (2011) identify on the superposition of interests and ideology in the formulation of Latin American foreign policy. Neoclassical realism allows the linking of ideology and pragmatism insofar as it deals with analysis of domestic dimension of foreign policy and how national political systems react to external stimuli.

The analysis includes the concept of the operability of alliances, as it helps to establish a minimum standard and therefore to understand the performance of the CDS. Presented for the first time by Hans Morgenthau (2005) in the context of the early Cold War, the concept of operability of alliances refers to the real possibility that the members of a military alliance respond opportunely and in the manner expected by the commitments made in terms of collective defence. Although the problem of loyalty between allies was thoroughly dealt with by Glenn Snyder (1997), there have been only limited approximations to the application of the concept in other types of international security institutions, above all in Latin America (Mijares, 2011). *Operability of regional security*

institutions is understood as a fluid, multilateral cooperation in the observance of the fundamental principles of the founding agreement. This concept is key in tracking the performance of the CDS in light of the multiple South American foreign policy strategies and the manifested pressures for national autonomy.

For its part, the application of process tracing requires empirical inputs that permit the establishment of causal chains (Blatter and Haverland, 2012). This research takes these inputs from the observation of historical evidence registered in the media, as well as from secondary sources of specialised literature. Another source of inputs are interviews with South American experts and political leaders, diplomatic functionaries and military officials who have been involved in the process of the formation, and later the performance, of the CDS. Conducting interviews with elites and experts has become one of the most outstanding characteristics of the rise of process tracing as a qualitative technique for the causal organisation of facts and data in social sciences (Tansey, 2007; Checkel, 2008). Based on these inputs, theoretical and analytical framework, and considering the research design of this article, one can proceed to identify below the causal mechanisms behind the performance of the CDS between 2008 and 2017.

3.3 Mechanisms behind the CDS' Performance

3.3.1 Regional Setting

The CDS, along with the rest of the project that led to UNASUR, originated in the heat of a new global and regional historical context. Since the 1990s, the idea of a liberal order led by the West, and this in turn led by the US, began encountering dissidences and resistances. However, it was the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of Washington that, from 2002, started a process of balancing from South America (Bush, 2002). This process coincided with two international structural conditions that had national parallels: a global process of deconcentration of economic power in which the capacities of state income collection and the generation of wealth spread through the international system to emerging regional powers and lesser powers, and the geostrategic reorientation of US military power to Eurasia, with special emphasis on the Middle East and Central Asia (Watson, 2011). Reactions against a liberal order, and the subsequent weakening of support for said order in many parts of Latin America, coincided with the crisis of representation of parties in the region (Mainwaring, 2006) and the rise of socialist movements that were progressively reaching power in some key countries of South America (Panizza, 2008).

A striking factor for a number of important analysts and scholars was the rise of Brazil as a regional power with extra-regional aspirations (Malamud, 2011; Stephen, 2012; Malamud and Rodriguez, 2013). Brazil, along with Latin American states generally, managed to reduce the economic gaps between itself and the great Western powers. However, the phenomenon of the deconcentration of economic capabilities suggests that this was something more than only a Brazilian rise; this was the growth given to a large part of the region by the super cycle of raw materials (Radetzki et al., 2008). The geopolitical consequence of this was not only the development of the profile of Brazil as a regional power (Nolte, 2010), but also the emergence of apparently contradictory foreign policy strategies: on one hand those of collective regional balancing facing the US, and on the other, that of secondary regional powers against Brazil itself (Flemes and Wehner, 2015). This phenomenon reinforced the thesis of Brazil as a "leader without followers", with a growing global profile but a limited regional interest and capacity (Malamud, 2011).

Another factor of capital importance was the ideologisation that accompanied the balancing policy with respect to the US. Although ideological aspects in the formulation of foreign policy respond more to the criteria and necessities of domestic policy than to strategic external demands (Gardini and Lambert, 2011), South American intraregional tensions due to differences in perceptions and diagnostics of reality were not unusual, and they conditioned the relations between future members of the CDS. Relations and negotiations between the Colombia of Álvaro Uribe and the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez were especially tense. Conceptual differences were also present from the start, because while in the southern Andes the concept of security is susceptible to association with that of defence, generally accompanied by securitisation processes, in the Southern Cone and Brazil the tendency to separate the concepts and practices of security and defence forms part of a recent but robust security culture (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Comini, 2015).

Border tensions are unavoidable in the regional setting prior to the CDS of UNASUR (Bons, 2015) and the consequent fear of escalation. The security regime of the region has been defined as a "hybrid peace" (Battaglino, 2012). Latin America in general, and South America in particular, has presented a significant record of militarised interstate tensions and disputes (MIDs) (Mares, 2001; Martín, 2006). Of all the South American MIDs, almost two of every three were concentrated in the Colombia-Venezuela dyad in the moment in which the CDS was created (Palmer et al., 2015), meaning that in addition to their ideological conflicts, they sustained an old geopolitical rivalry. But this rivalry, although prominent in

terms of militarised events, was not the only one, as the dyads of Chile-Peru, Chile-Bolivia, Peru-Ecuador and Venezuela-Guyana also presented recent activity and/or latent tensions, as well as important offensive arsenals in some cases (Mijares and Schenoni, 2016).

The general regional configuration on the way to the CDS is completed by the tendency of division that started to be perceived in South America. The separation of Venezuela from the Andean Community (CAN, with its Spanish initials) and its interest in joining MERCOSUR created two dominant sub-regional aspects which today translate to the Pacific Alliance (AP, with its Spanish initials) and the MERCOSUR with Venezuela (Uzcátegui, 2017). To this prior scenario must be added the rise of the ALBA (first the Bolivarian Alternative for the America, and later the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Treaty), a project of Cuban-Venezuelan initiative without the participation of Brazil, and to which, from South America, only the Bolivia of Evo Morales and the Ecuador of Rafael Correa were added. Although the ALBA no longer represents a sub-regional aspect of geopolitical importance, it was the third bloc in the moment of the emergence of the CDS, with Venezuela playing a central role in the contradictory ALBA-MERCOSUR point of contact, and in the fracture between the CAN and MERCOSUR. This condition, together with the complex interactions in the Brazil-Venezuela and Colombia-Venezuela dyads, are key to understanding the path of the CDS of UNASUR, as well as its chosen regional institutional design.

To establish causal inferences in the institutionalisation process of the CDS, this research considered three types of sources to obtain observable evidence. First, there are primary sources, represented by interviews with experts, political leaders, diplomatic functionaries and military officials directly involved in the negotiation process which brought about the institutional design of the CDS. The interviews include representatives to the Centre of Strategic Defence Studies (CEED, with its Spanish initials) of the CDS, Mariano Fernández Amunátegui, Chilean Foreign Minister in 2009-2010, the consolidation period of the founding agreement of the CDS which was undertaken in the Chilean Foreign Ministry, and Álvaro Uribe Vélez, President of Colombia from 2002 to 2010, and the most vocal opponent of the CDS. Second is the follow-up in the media of the public information available from the original informal proposal of Venezuela in 2003 until the effective results to 2013. In this type of source, not only the information strictly related to the specific process of creation of the CDS or UNASUR was considered, but rather all information related to the context of South American international relations and the

domestic political events and conditions that may have impacted the multilateral negotiations. Finally, academic works published on the theme were also considered, not only by South Americans, but also by European and American authors who have been studying the institutionalisation of regional security in the south of the Western Hemisphere.

At the end of the 20th and the start of the 21st centuries, Latin America in general, and South America in particular, started to experience significant changes in their domestic political systems. In the 1990s, unipolarity was accompanied by an important concentration of economic capabilities[4]. This phenomenon had a profound impact on the post-Cold War Latin America, on one hand promoting democratisation processes in the Southern Cone and Central America, as well as first strengthening, then breaking, the Peruvian authoritarian hiatus. On the other hand, it generated resistances to what was perceived as a (neo)liberal imposition by means of the recipe book of the IMF and the so-called "Washington Consensus". The apparent liberal triumph left by the Soviet defeat had its own characteristics in the Western Hemisphere, highlighting regional political identities that lay under the mantle of bipolarity. The Brazilian boom began to be felt, and not without the contradictory effects of a political and economic transition. The combination of internal democratisation and external resistance had its first manifestation in regionalism, and its second in what was known as the "Pink Tide" (Panizza, 2008).

In the framework of regionalism, the MERCOSUR project, thought of even from the times of military authoritarianism, would allow the resolution of various themes parallelly, including the industrial-commercial complementarity of Argentina and Brazil, along with their economic satellites Paraguay and Uruguay, as well as the reduction of tensions derived from a historical rivalry which was attempted to be appeased by measures of complex interdependence (Russell and Tokatlian, 2002; Milanese, 2005; Schenoni, 2017). An older bloc, but one which achieved high levels of institutionalisation through the "unipolar moment" was the CAN, led by the democracies of Colombia and Venezuela. In the CAN, the interest of harmonising commercial relations, with a low industrial level compared to MERCOSUR, was also evident, but without forgetting the constant search for peaceful coexistence between neighbours who showed border animosity. However, efforts stemming from regionalism aimed at creating conditions of interdependence that would

[4] Cf. Chapter Two.

reduce the inclination to militarised tensions through a regional security complex (Buzan and Wæver 2003), characterised by what has been defined as a "hybrid peace" (Battaglino 2012).

International security in South America was a lesser concern during the Cold War. Despite the MIDs, conflicts of greater intensity, duration and severity in other regions occupied the majority of attention from the media, governments and academics. An extraordinary event like the Falklands War, with all its burden of contradiction for the Western bloc, confirmed the fact that although MIDs were frequent in the region, war between neighbours was not. The dominant explanation was borrowed by international security from international political economy: the hegemonic stability theory (HST) (Snidal, 1985; Gilpin, 1988). HST was, in turn, reinforced by the thesis of Grieco's institutional framework of hegemony (1988), Axelrod and Keohane's on cooperation in international regimes (Keohane, 1982; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985), and Pedersen's explanation on cooperative hegemony and regionalism (2002). The institutional security framework in the South American case, likewise in the entire hemisphere, was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, with its Spanish initials) of September 1947. This treaty, slightly older than NATO, was the first measure of international security governance in the aftermath of World War II. The TIAR corresponded to one of the first national security decisions framed in the Truman Doctrine, and established a security perimeter for the Americas facing what was considered an imminent Soviet threat, after the experience of the Greek Civil War.

The TIAR was a collective defence agreement in which the members could invoke assistance from their allies by virtue of counteracting the effects of an external threat. Overwhelming American power, manifested in terms of relative economic and military capabilities, created a hegemonic hemispheric subsystem which was formalised in the TIAR, and almost immediately after, by the Organisation of American States (OAS), in May 1948. However, this subsystem, institutionally anarchic but hierarchical in practice, did not prevent inter-American conflicts, nor defections to the Soviet side. In fact, Latin America was another theatre of operations in the Cold War, but with marked differences between Central America and the Caribbean, and South America. US military interventions in the Caribbean basin during the most intense period of bipolarity contrast markedly with its scarce military activities on the South American continent (Teixeira, 2012). South American-US relations were a changing mosaic of cooperation, tensions,

loyalties and defections. There appeared to be no interest from the US in assuming the political and strategic costs of enforcing national security policy lines to the letter, or at least not in the form in which they had been applied in a good part of the Caribbean basin.

The result was paradoxical, because on one hand it created a security subsystem with the noted absence of the hegemonic power, or at least a presence that was only intermittent and sectorised. But it was not for that reason that right-wing nationalist currents, and the Latin Americanism of the left, identified latent US military presence in Latin America as a threat to autonomy, security and the development of the countries of the region. On the contrary, liberal national elites, more committed to the idea of inserting their countries into globalisation, saw the US triumph in the Cold War as an opportunity to lead the hemisphere in a unique project of prosperity, democracy and security: the Free Trade Area for the Americas (ALCA, with its Spanish initials). Although it appeared to be the natural evolution of regionalism, the ALCA was met with more resistance than expected. Social inequalities reinforced vertical political cleavages, and the different projects that sought a course in a unipolar world revived horizontal cleavages, sectorising public opinion, weakening party systems, and strengthening the idea of strong popular leaderships. This was the base of the second manifestation of the resistance to US hegemony: the Pink Tide.

The South American countries that had experienced the second wave of democratisation, Colombia and Venezuela, already gave signs in the 1980s of exhaustion in their bipartisan systems. This South American dyad went through one of the worst regional crises in 1987 when Caracas considered the incursion of the Colombian corvette Caldas into waters of the Gulf of Venezuela, or Gulf of Coquivacoa for Colombians, as potential *casus belli*. Colombian-Venezuelan MIDs would be accentuated by the apparent inability of both states to confront the Colombian insurgency and the illicit activities on their long, shared border of more than 2200 km. Colombia as a state had pulled back not only against the leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries, but also against the powerful cocaine cartels. Venezuela, for its part, had closed an oil bonanza cycle with new debts and limited opportunities to sustain its rate of social ascent. At the end of the Cold War, both democracies were found in precarious institutional conditions. In Colombia, the constituent process managed to give a second wind to its institutions, achieving along the way the demobilisation of the powerful urban guerrilla of the M-19. Venezuela, for its part, experimented with the formula of the Washington Consensus, failing spectacularly in trying to modernise the rentier economy and make the transition to a productive free

market. The result was a decade of instability inaugurated by a traumatic uprising in February 1989, two attempted *coups d'etat* in February and November 1992, and the trial of President Carlos Andrés Pérez in March 1993.

These Venezuelan events are important in the context of the Pink Tide as, with the aim of easing political pressure, President Rafael Cadera would dismiss the case against the coup leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, who would in turn reach the presidency at the start of 1999, preceded by an institutional crisis and a significant fall in oil prices. Chávez was the first president of the Pink Tide and, given his closeness to Cuba, was the most outstanding in terms of international activity. Through constitutional changes, Chávez succeeded in implanting competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010) in that petrostate (Karl, 1997), managing to maintain his hold on power until the announcement of his death in March 2013. Chávez had a tense relationship with Washington and Bogotá, especially with Presidents George W. Bush and Álvaro Uribe Vélez. After a failed coup in April 2002, Chávez accused his two principal external enemies of having plotted his demise, and insisted that Latin America should unite to balance the US and its regional allies. Having supported the candidate who, from January 2003, would become president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, Lula himself interceded –as president-elect– before the president in office, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to supply fuel to Venezuela during a general strike at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003, with Chávez announcing that the Brazil of Lula would be the new great regional ally of the revolutionary Venezuela.

Venezuela began a foreign policy of changing alliances, although without abandoning the OPEC project. The idea was to diversify regional and extra-regional relations, politicising relations in the OPEC framework (Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria), with a non-OPEC power (Syria), and to expand relations with great extra-regional powers, such as China and Russia (Mijares, 2017a). The pattern of relations followed by President Chávez pointed to a specific but growing profile in that moment: authoritarian governments with an interest in balancing the US. In the regional framework, in March 2003, given the deployment of US forces in Iraq and the push given by oil prices, Chávez announced that it was time to denounce the TIAR and for Latin America to have its own defence force facing the emerging global changes. Thus, for the first time, the head of a Latin American state not only openly denied the usefulness and suitability of the TIAR, but also proposed an alternative: the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (OTAS, with its Spanish initials) (Mijares, 2011). This proposal for a full military alliance would be rejected in the first stages

of the Working Group of the CDS, although it remained the maximum aspiration of Venezuela and its imprint would remain in the official name of the CDS, accepting the term "defence", even if the organisation refused the principle of collective defence in practice (Comini, 2015).

In parallel, and with greater diplomatic capability, the government of Lula began a campaign for the consolidation of South America in what would be, firstly, the Community of South America Nations, from 2004 to 2006 with presidential summits in Cuzco, Brasilia and Cochabamba, and later UNASUR (Sánchez Cabarcas, 2017). The idea of the CDS took force with the management of the Brazilian Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim, who expressed that, although the defence instrument of UNASUR would not have the structure of a full alliance, insofar as it would not assume a character of collective military defence, it should have dissuasive characteristics. But above all, it should expressly exclude the US (Mijares, 2011). Thus, while the bloc led by Venezuela called for a full military alliance, that led by Brazil and Argentina sought a collective deterrence mechanism facing the South Atlantic. Colombia, which deepened its military relations with the US, avoided committing itself to a regional security and defence agreement, while Chile tried, successfully, to impose an institutional design with minimal commitments. Based on these contradictions in terms of institutional design, an agreement was built that aimed at generating regional autonomy and measures of mutual trust.

3.3.2 Regional Foreign Policy Conditions

To explain the performance of the CDS, it is necessary to consider the conditions in which foreign policies in the region were deployed. For this analysis, I take as the theoretical starting point the most general contributions of neoclassical realism, assuming that external stimuli do not generate a linear political response without the mediation of domestic factors (Ripsman et al., 2016). I assume that the principal external stimuli for the South American region were the prices of raw materials and a marked geostrategic reorientation of the US towards Eurasia, especially Central Asia and the Asia Pacific[5]. The intervening variable in South American foreign policy is related to presidential power, and the way in which Foreign Policy Executives (FPE) adapted to international conditions while preserving the primary objective of national autonomy. Figure 3.1 illustrates the

[5] Cf. Chapter Two.

evolution of commodity prices from 2002 to 2017. The dotted line indicates the year 2009, the starting point of the CDS.

Figure 3.1: Commodities prices (2002-2017)



Source: World Bank, 2017

In the period from 2009 to 2017, there were significant presidential successions in South America. One of the most important was that of Lula to Dilma in Brazil. Dilma Rousseff assumed the presidency from the hand of Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva in January 2011. The continuity of the *Workers' Party* (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* or PT) allowed the emerging power to continue dreaming of a preponderant role in global and regional politics. Likewise, having survived the financial crisis of 2008-2009 almost unharmed, this further allowed the idea of a powerful Brazil that would lead South America. However, reality pointed in another direction. Not only did secondary regional powers not follow Brazil, but domestic Brazilian policy also became its own burden for the deployment of its foreign policy (Malamud, 2017). Internal protests and the impeachment of Dilma were the result of her loss of capacity to hold the presidential coalition. Consequently, this brought the weak and questioned government of Michel Temer from September 2016. While the Lula administration had to face the lack of recognition of its leadership in South America that of Dilma was focused on the hard internal political fight that ended in her destitution, leaving little room to attend to the South American project. Meanwhile Temer's administration has focused on matters of political and macroeconomic stability, and has not been exempt from accusations of corruption, meaning an assertive foreign policy is not a priority.

The loyal presidential succession in Brazil demonstrated that a coherent and solid foreign policy project could not be sustained without a material basis. The opposition succession in Argentina would arrive at similar results, but by another route. During the majority of the period under consideration, Argentina was under the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, from December 2007 to December 2017. The relatively strong control of President Fernández allowed her to maintain a foreign policy according to the formal criteria of regional autonomy that had been promoted by Néstor Kirchner (Merke and Reynoso, 2016; Ribeiro and Urdinez, 2017). Nevertheless, Argentina oscillated between Brazil and Venezuela, trying to balance one against the other, above all concerning the model of security regionalism that would be followed (Comini, 2015; Frenkel and Comini, 2017). This political reaction explained the Argentinian preference for bilateral agreements and the paradoxical lack of real interest in the CDS, despite hosting the CEED in Buenos Aires. The economic contraction caused by the fall in commodity prices led to electoral defeat and the arrival to the presidency of Mauricio Macri, with a vision of returning to liberal regionalism and a notable disinterest in multilateral security mechanisms. Macri was the first president who, in 2016, confronted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro for Human Rights violations and for undermining democracy. The suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR, in December 2016, established a clear criterion for how far regionalism should go, according to the new Argentinian president.

Despite their marked differences in terms of political systems, concepts of security, threat perceptions and belonging to distinct regional security complexes, Colombia and Chile have followed similar trajectories in their responses to security regionalism. Both countries were reluctant to create a military alliance or regional mechanism of collective defence. The Colombia of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, a charismatic president with a broad control of the country's political system, tried to defend its relationship with the US, following the principle of *Respice Polum,* or looking to the north (Tickner and Morales, 2015; González Parias et al., 2017), and to ferociously fight the insurgency, avoiding commitments that he considered superficial and inconvenient (Uribe Vélez, personal communication, 2017). With the arrival of Juan Manuel Santos to power in August 2010, the transition from the doctrine of "democratic security" to that of "democratic peace" began, with subsequent variations towards a peace process (Wills-Otero and Benito, 2015). Despite the inherent tensions, between 2010 and 2017 Santos maintained cordial relations with the chavista Venezuela, as it fulfilled the role of intermediary and guarantor in the negotiation process with the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia* (FARC, with its Spanish initials). But

even in that conciliatory context, apparently demonstrating an approach of *Respice Simila*, or looking to its peers, the security cooperation policy of Colombia continued to be bilateral and minimalist, above all in its borders with Brazil, Peru and Ecuador (González Parias et al., 2017).

Chile, for its part, has been loyal to the idea of limiting commitments within the CDS. The Chilean idea of security regionalism is minimalist and defined by good neighbourly relations that facilitate regional stability in favour of a peaceful global economic insertion (Fernández Amunátegui, personal communication, 2015). This fits with the Chilean diplomatic tradition since the transition to democracy in 1990, with a clear liberal orientation. Both the parties of the centre-left coalition, the historical *Pact (Concertación)* and the new *New Majority* (*Nueva Mayoría)*, and the more centre-right *Coalition for Change (Coalición por el Cambio)* or *Alliance (Alianza)* of Sebastián Piñera, share the same foreign policy platform, and that of defence (Sarkis, 2015; Briones and Dockendorff, 2015). This cohesion in the political elites allowed a coherent foreign policy, despite the successions of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) to Piñera (2010-2014), then again to Bachelet (2014-2018). Agreements with Argentina have been maintained, and the delimitation with Peru in 2014 allowed the deepening of a liberal coordination scheme such as the AP.

The third South American member of the AP, Peru, has also achieved an important cohesion among its elites in a national project oriented in the same direction as that of Chile (Novak and García Belaunde, 2015). The stabilisation of the country started with Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), a president with a distinct technocratic orientation (Tanaka, 2004), but who promoted South American unity with the Cuzco Summit in 2004. Successive Peruvian presidents, Alan García (2006-2011), Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (2016-2021), have followed a liberal path in terms of foreign relations, privileging foreign trade and maintaining security cooperation only as is strictly necessary, above all in terms of the country's borders. Peru resolved its litigation with Ecuador in the Peace Accord of Brasilia in 1998, and with Chile, through a favourable ruling of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, in January 2014 (Wehner, 2014). It has been the only Amazonian country that has worked with Brazil in the Amazon surveillance and protection systems, SIVAM and SIPAM (St John, 2016). Thus, its security cooperation was not mediated by the CDS, nor does it present multilateral characteristics.

Ecuador, for its part, presents an interesting profile in terms of regional security cooperation. After Operation Phoenix (*Operación Fénix,* 1st March 2008), through which

the second commander of the FARC, Édgar Devia –a.k.a. "Raúl Reyes"– was killed by the Colombian government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the Ecuador of President Rafael Correa (2007-2017) was a promoter of cooperative security in the region (Ardila and Amado, 2009; Vitelli, 2016). The headquarters of UNASUR are in Ecuador, and the country maintains an active role in favour of the CDS, as indicated by the Ecuadorian ambassador to Colombia, Rafael Paredes Proaño (personal communication, 2017). Of the people interviewed for this research, the Ecuadorians were the most enthusiastic integrationists and the main defenders of the usefulness of the CDS (Zambrano Jauregui, personal communication, 2014; Celi, personal communication, 2015). In the words of Ambassador Paredes Proaño himself, the region has created and maintained formidable institutions that are simply wasted because individual interests are prioritised over collective ones. According to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ecuador of Correa was attracted to the ALBA, an institution that Paredes Proaño assumes as obsolete and inoperative, but its attachment to said scheme of a strong ideological nature was never fully complete.

Finally, in this non-exhaustive account of the regional foreign policy conditions, we have the two Bolivarian regimes par excellence: Venezuela and Bolivia. The *United Socialist Party of Venezuela* (PSUV, with its Spanish initials) and the *Movement to Socialism* (MAS, with its Spanish initials) of Bolivia formed hegemonic party systems (Weyland, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010), which allowed Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), and allows Nicolás Maduro (2013-2019) and Evo Morales (2006-2020), to exercise foreign policies with ample room for manoeuvre in the face of diminished internal resistances (Ceppi, 2014; Romero, 2006; Romero and Mijares, 2016; Mijares, 2017a). Through the ALBA, the express objective has been to oppose the West, be it through the diversification of relations and/or the creation of regional blocs. Despite this interest, the lack of ideological coordination, historical rivalries, and unsolved territorial conflicts, above all with neighbours such as Colombia and Chile, naturally limit the possibilities of security cooperation policies. The ALBA countries, enthusiastic promotors of the UNASUR and the CDS, facing the lax design of the latter, and the impossibility of cooperation in their own peripheries, have ended up searching for autonomy just like the rest of the region.

3.3.3 The CDS' Performance: A Descriptive Inference

To evaluate the performance of the CDS, the causal process tracing (CPT) method was considered. This method tries to establish causal chains that can explain the process with a greater degree of detail. Kay and Baker (2014) argue that the CPT method is well suited

to the study of politics, as it can enquire into factors that are likely to affect decisions. The same authors highlight the usefulness of Bayesian logic tests, but warn that even if they are attractive tools, their practical applicability is usually limited. For this research, an exercise of descriptive inference is undertaken, without arriving at the stage of applying process tracing tests for an obvious reason: until now the research agenda on the CDS has made little progress in the study of its performance, making it premature to try to establish causality based on the validation of the hypothesis (Van Evera, 1997; Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). It is for this reason that this research develops its own hypothesis based on descriptive inference. The opportunity for descriptive inference creates the possibility for political scientists to ask causal questions and create new theories that previously would have been impossible (Grimmer, 2015; Monroe et al., 2015). The hypothesis under test assumes that:

H1. The search for national autonomy in the framework of the search for regional autonomy generated a dynamic of competition that resulted in the lack of operability of the CDS.

H1.a There was reluctance to establish alliances or deep security and defence commitments.

H1.b The prior reluctance brought limitations in the institutional design of the CDS.

H1.c The limitation by design of the CDS created conditions for the bi-lateralisation and mini-lateralisation of South American security cooperation policy (if any), generating a dynamic of competition that resulted in the lack of operability of the CDS.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the causal chain of H1.

Figure 3.2: Causal chain in the performance of the CDS



3.3.3.1 Lack of Operability

Operability applied to security institutions can be a controversial category for two reasons. First, the development of security institutions has been scarce since Hans Morgenthau coined the term immediately after World War II, and second, its application was originally intended to be for military alliances and not regional security mechanisms. Despite these obstacles, the category is useful to evaluate the performance of a regional institution such as the CDS. This is especially useful as there has not been political or academic consensus on what the CDS is, and what it should be (Vitelli, 2017). Instead of freely interpreting these issues, we must refer to the founding statute of the CDS. According to this document, the CDS is: "a [regional] organisation of consultation, cooperation and coordination in the area of Defence…" (UNASUR, 2009). In this sense, important conceptual aspects must be considered. The first in importance is that the member states defined said organisation in terms of "defence". The second is composed of the terms "consultation", "cooperation", and "coordination". This suggests that, although the Venezuelan thesis on the construction of a mechanism openly oriented to "collective defence", that is to say, a military alliance, did not triumph (Comini, 2015; Sánchez Cabarcas, 2017; Frenkel and Comini, 2017; Vitelli, 2017), important conceptual elements of collective defence and security remained in the founding statute of the CDS.

Jeremy Pressman offers a definition of alliance that, and in accordance with its founding statute and despite the apparent failure of the thesis of collective defence, the CDS does in fact have clear features of an alliance: "An Alliance is a relationship between two or more states based on shared interest, an Exchange of benefits, security cooperation, specific written agreements, and/or an expectation of continuing ties." (2008: 5).

On the other hand, according to Harald Müller:

> Security cooperation implies relying for an essential objective, national survival, on the resources, intentions and activities of other states, which is hard to reconcile with the notion of security being guaranteed exclusively by self-help. In addition, security cooperation entails some loss of freedom of action [national autonomy] (…) States opting for security cooperation sacrifice a security asset to gain higher security by obtaining that, they believe, helps them better to provide for their security: the collaboration of their potential enemies and the pursuant agreements and organizations. (2006: 370-371).

This necessary multilateral transaction between autonomy and security should be assumed as the basis of cooperation for regional security institutions and agreements. The foundation of this is *mutual commitment*. However, in a setting of diffuse regional leadership, historical rivalries, unresolved border conflicts, and ideological tensions, national autonomist aspirations are guaranteed a privileged place. Mutual commitment allows the establishment of transparent relations based on trust, which constitutes the underlying matter of operability. To paraphrase Morgenthau, operability lies in the capabilities of policy coordination with respect to objectives (Morgenthau, 2005). This is expressed in similar terms by Glenn Snyder when dealing with the problem of collective management:

> Management involves pursuing both common interests and competitive interests and thus is essentially a process of bargaining, either tacit or explicit. The most fundamental common interest is to preserve the alliance (…) The primary competitive interest is to control or influence the ally in order to minimize one's own costs and risks. (1997: 165).

According to the above, the category of operability of alliances matches the case of the CDS. And this, for the purposes of this research, supposes the interest for an effective (multilateral) mutual commitment regarding the consultation, cooperation and coordination in terms of common security and defence in the South American region. Put in those terms, and in the absence of a common threat accepted by all members, the probabilities of an operability deficit are high. This has been the case of the CDS, at least between 2009 and 2017. The main reason for this, according to the hypothesis I propose, is a structural persistence for the search of national autonomies, which was reinforced by ideological tensions of domestic origin in the specified period.

3.3.3.2 Quest for national autonomy

So why the South American tenacity in this quest? The answer is found in historical, economic and geographical reasons. Something Latin America shares with the rest of the Global South is its colonial past. Nevertheless, the Latin American colonial past is more remote, and independence was the project of creole elites, which allowed the historical consolidation of independence, but not that of autonomy in the international system. High dependence on the export of raw materials created a bond of dependency between the new republics and extra-regional powers, above all European ones, and later with the US. An interesting factor in the specific case of South America is that the US has never

intervened directly with troops in the territory (Teixeira, 2012). This fact has favoured the generalisation of a dual vision of the superpower: on one hand, it does not intervene directly, as it did in the rest of the region between 1846 and 1989, but its political and economic influence is constant by virtue of its capabilities and proximity. The result of this dual vision has been a latent general policy of the search for autonomy regarding the US.

Specialised literature on the theme starts from the idea that autonomy has been a national objective, and that the ideal means to achieve it is regional integration (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz, 2013; Briceño-Ruiz and Simonoff, 2015). In the international political arena, maximum autonomy would be achieved in the field of security and defence, with this being the goal-function of the CDS. However, observation of the performance of the CDS results in intraregional rivalries and territorial conflicts (Mares, 2001; Martín, 2006), with membership of distinct sub-complexes of regional security (Buzan and Wæver, 2003), conflicting concepts in the area of security and defence (Comini, 2015), as well as competing ideological projects, which have limited the possible operability of security regionalism. This undermines the performance of the CDS and favours a vision of national (individual) autonomy over a project of regional (collective) autonomy.

The independent variable in the hypothesis is the generalised search for autonomy. Historically, autonomy has occupied a central position in the aspirations of elites of the Global South, and especially those of Latin America. In the case of South American states, there has been a remarkable relation between the consolidation of the state and the search for autonomy. It is because of this that the theoretical principles of autonomy, as well as the first consolidated ideas on said necessity, have been developed, above all in countries such as Argentina and Brazil (Jaguaribe, 1969, 1979; Puig, 1980, 1986; Thies, 2008; Briceño Ruiz and Simonoff, 2015). With a remote independence compared to the rest of the Global South, but living with a superpower in the same hemisphere, South America developed a form of international insertion that has postulated, at least since the time of the Drago Doctrine, autonomy as a central element of the great strategy (Russell and Tokatlian, 2013).

The search for autonomy has also explained the resilience of Latin American regionalism (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño Ruiz, 2013). In an intuitive way, it can be deduced that a region of the Global South such as South America, with a certain cultural homogeneity and geographical compaction, would tend towards integration. This has been seen in the two main South American demographic corridors: the Andean-Caribbean, from Lima to

Caracas, and the Southern, from Buenos Aires to Rio de Janeiro. Integration attempts in these corridors, such as the CAN and MERCOSUR, have been of a predominantly economic nature and with results that vary over time. The idea of a wider project, with a regional autonomy beyond the dimension of political economy took place in the early 21st century, after global geopolitical changes.[6] The result of this, in a peak moment of macroeconomic and political conditions for South America, was UNASUR, and especially its CDS. Autonomy through regional integration, putting political interests at the forefront and not only liberal-economic ones, as posited by the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Briceño Ruiz and Morales, 2017).

Paradoxically, the structural and circumstantial conditions of international political economy, such as the super cycle of commodities, and political circumstances, such as the rise of leftist leaderships, better known as the "Pink Tide" (Panizza, 2008), brought opportunities for both regional autonomy and national autonomies. In retrospect, it is almost impossible to think that, facing a favourable international scenario for long-awaited national autonomy, South American governments would have preferred to cede fully to a common project. Nevertheless, until 2008, that was precisely what was aspired to, encouraged from Brasilia and Caracas above all, as well as from South American academia. But optimism about an integration that could contemplate aspects of security cooperation did not withstand the test of time and sub-regional rivalries. The effect of factors such as the reluctance to establish alliances or deep security and defence commitments, deliberate limitations in the institutional design of the CDS, and the bi-lateralisation and mini-lateralisation of South American security cooperation policy, resulted in a regional security agreement weakened by its lack of operability.

The causal chain of the proposed hypothesis is completed by considering the facts that made it possible, thus establishing a descriptive inference.

3.3.3.3 Reluctance to establish alliances or other deep security and defence commitments

In conversation with the ex-Foreign Minister of Chile, Mariano Fernández Amunátegui (2009-2010), he confirmed that the Chilean idea of the CDS was to create a mechanism of mutual trust generation and not, as the members of the ALBA wanted, a mechanism of

[6] Cf. Chapter Two.

deep commitment in defence (Fernández Amunátegui, personal communication, 2015). Similarly, the ex-president of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010), affirmed that in his presidential terms, and above all after the establishment of the CDS, Colombia did not participate in rhetorical and superficial exercises that, according to him, hid interests contrary to those of his country (Uribe Vélez, personal communication, 2017). From another politician, the current Vice-Minister for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014-), and ex-Ambassador of Venezuela to Peru (2012-2014), Alexander Yánez Deleuze (personal communication, 2016), confirmed that the position of his government was to generate critical mass to force a multilateral defence agreement, although he recognises that this continues to be impossible because of persistent ideological and geopolitical tensions, above all between Venezuela and Colombia.

In practice, the members of the CDS did not make progress towards commitment mechanisms beyond what was strictly related to their bilateral relations. This is demonstrated by the relations between Peru and Chile after the border ruling of the Tribunal of The Hague in January 2014, and by Brazilian efforts to establish links and security cooperation mechanisms with its Amazonian neighbours, having advanced only with Peru in previous agreements of surveillance and protection of the Amazon – SIVAM and SIPAM – although these systems and agreements were started in 2003. With Colombia, Brazil achieved a first approach in terms of multidimensional security in January 2012, later achieving cooperation agreements in May 2016. In November 2017, Brazil led joint exercises in the triple border between itself, Colombia and Peru, but these were done outside the CDS framework and with the participation of the US.

Selective commitment implies a foreign policy strategy in which the dominant elites of the state agree to undertake efforts to influence the internal affairs of another state or its relations with third parties, only if said efforts do not involve a considerable cost with direct repercussions, and if the expected result favours national interests. Thus, selective commitment is the result of a process of discrimination under two criteria: political efficiency – low costs and high returns, and attention to concrete results over abstract principles. The strategy was proposed as US foreign policy for the early 21st century, and tries to combine the favourable elements of other grand strategy options, such as domination, global collective security, regional collective security, containment and isolationism, and to avoid their pernicious effects (Art, 1999).

Doubt could arise here on whether it is appropriate to use a category of grand strategy thought of for a superpower in the analysis of security in South America (Posen, 2013). I consider it possible for two reasons. First, the strategy of selective commitment does not necessarily include aspects of global action, for which its application to regional and secondary powers, even including lesser powers, far from distorting the term, it in fact broadens its analytical range. Second, the conditions of diffusion of power that started to operate in an accelerated manner from 2001-2002, opened a range of strategic alternatives that were not appropriate in an international system organised under clearer hierarchical criteria. Under these conditions, the concept of selective commitment broadened its range and explanatory use, since it not only stops concentrating on the reality of a specific power or on great powers in general, but it also includes lesser powers, and becomes more complex from the fact that it has become the strategy followed by the majority of states of a region, even though they have established a multilateral security governance agreement between them.

The diffusion of power generalises the strategy of selective commitment, fostering bilateral cooperation and showing few signs of strengthening multilateralism, and reveals an apparent contradiction, since the international deconcentration of capabilities made the CDS possible. The results are still encouraging, as there is a significant reduction in border tensions in the Andean region, territorial disputes such as that of Chile-Peru have been resolved by international judicial means, and with the exception of the Guyana-Venezuela dyad, which following maritime tensions have reaffirmed the character of good officiant of the United Nations Security Council. In summary, there have not been significant militarised interstate disputes. However, the CDS does not appear to have modified the type of peace prevalent in the region towards a more positive configuration (Battaglino, 2012), and until multilateralism is imposed, the possibility of a security community remains distant.

3.3.3.4 Limitations in institutional design

The most studied aspect of the CDS has been its origin. However, until now, no research has been undertaken based on the five criteria of RID, and have much less linked the origin of the CDS to its performance in those analytical terms. The least problematic aspect between origin and performance are the membership rules. Membership of the CDS is based on geopolitical criteria. While one could identify some degree of disagreement between its two principal proponents, Brazil and Venezuela, it is clear that the Brazilian

geopolitical thesis triumphed in limiting the CDS to no more and no less than all sovereign states of the South American continent. This agreement has been maintained without defections, at least until 2017.

The scope of issues covered was a problem from the beginning and has been a major obstacle in the performance of the CDS. The roots of the problem lie in the divergent definitions of security and defence, and in the divergent objectives and needs in a region with unequal security realities. The ex-Foreign Minister of Chile, Mariano Fernández Amunátegui, who led the Ministry of Foreign Relations in the first phase of the CDS, explains that, for Chile, the simple interest was to maintain open communication channels to avoid traditional South American border tensions. In Santiago, it was never considered that the CDS would include collective defence functions (personal communication, 2015). This opinion contrasts with that of Venezuelan Vice-Minister Yánez Deleuze, who continues to affirm that failures in the performance of the CDS lie, precisely, in a minimalist vision of security cooperation among the countries of the region, assigning this failing to the governing elites of the countries of the AP who, for the ex-Ambassador of Venezuela to Peru, maintain ideological, economic and military commitments with the US (personal communication, 2016). In practice, between 2009 and 2017, the member states of the CDS have not moved beyond the scope of issues agreed in December 2008. On the contrary, the matters dealt with multilaterally by the CDS have been reduced to routine encounters.

The CDS was, from the start, an effort to centralise and harmonise defence policies and govern intra-regional cooperation. However, the centralisation of tasks was hardly a formal aspiration for those states who tried to create a multilateral collective defence mechanism. The formality of this aspiration was confirmed by a Venezuelan military official who preferred to remain anonymous, and who has participated as a representative and assessor of his country's delegations in the framework of UNASUR. For this official, the Venezuelan case is more extreme in terms of vehemence for the centralisation of decisions in the CDS. However, among diplomatic and military personnel, as well as among political leaders of high military ranking, there is no interest in losing control of defence policy at the hands of foreign officials, some of whom come from rival countries or political movements, above all Colombians (Venezuelan military officer, personal communication, 2016). From the Colombian side, the early disinterest in centralising tasks

is confirmed, as well as apprehension about cooperation with the Venezuelan military forces (Colombian military officer, personal communication, 2017).

The rules for controlling the institution in the case of the CDS are subject to the decision-making principles that were defined in the parent organisation of the Council, UNASUR, the golden rule being voting by consensus. This type of mechanism in institutional security cooperation design usually generates a negative impact in decision-making processes, above all in the absence of a hegemonic member (Dahl, 1999; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Intra-South American tensions have marked the paralysis of UNASUR in terms of crisis management.

Björn Hettne defines regionalism in a dual form, first as a tendency, and second as a political commitment, directed at ordering the world in terms of regions. The approach of Hettne has the additional virtue of considering regionalism by integrating its two main dimensions: the dominant is derived from international political economy, and the other, less studied, from international security studies (2008). In the case of the security aspects of regionalism, Hettne refers to six crucial factors in the analysis of crisis management and involvement in conflicts. First, the early prevention, or "provention", of conflicts. Second, the construction of mutual trust measures and preventative diplomacy. Third, external intervention methods. Fourth, establishing peace through agreements. Fifth, conflict resolution. And sixth, post-conflict reconstruction (2008: 407). In the aforementioned case of Venezuela, the CDS as a whole has not identified the situation as a threat to regional security. Similarly, in the Colombian peace process, which has enjoyed broad international participation, there has not been a designated role for the CDS.

Finally, the high flexibility of arrangements was what allowed the birth of the CDS, as no government was subjected to a strong supranational institutionality. But it is precisely this factor of institutional design that undermined its performance and condemned it to minimalism. Nevertheless, this is an inescapable reality, given the regional characteristics and South American security and foreign policy conditions.

3.3.3.5 Bi-lateralisation and mini-lateralisation of South American security cooperation policy (if any)

A regional system of defence diplomacy is a framework of interactions between states that forms a regional security complex and that closely manages their foreign and defence

policies in search of better conditions for their military capabilities and national security conditions. The definition of defence diplomacy is used, not that of military diplomacy, given that the former has a greater administrative and strategic reach, and can be managed by Ministries of Defence, but also by those of Foreign Affairs, as well as by heads of state and government. Military diplomacy is more restricted, above all in sectoral aspects, military institutions, and, in some cases, issues of intelligence and deterrence.

Since 2009, the CDS tries to regulate defence diplomacy in a framework of generating mutual trust measures for regional security. It is presented as an organisation that aspires to establish harmonised patterns in the South American system of defence diplomacy. The CDS is faced with a paradox, as its emergence was facilitated by conditions of multipolarity in the international system, the same conditions that affect its performance as a multilateral framework of South American defence diplomacy. In multipolar conditions, the tendency is for states to seek better power conditions. In the case of regional and secondary powers, this translates to a desire for greater autonomy regarding great powers. Hence, South America has been able to concretise an organisation that proposes a multilateral governance of regional security. But the same tendency weakens the centralisation of Brazilian leadership, generating parallel games of cooperation and conflict, and offers sufficient autonomy to lesser powers to sustain foreign and defence policies of low or selective commitment.

Latin American countries have experienced growing autonomy in the last decade. This is manifested in the decline of the OAS and the inter-American system in favour of a new regionalism expressed in the ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC and the AP. These changes in terms of foreign policy also affect defence diplomacy, provoking the emergence of institutions such as the CDS or the Defence School of the ALBA, as well as bilateral and trilateral agreements of military and technological cooperation. The South American system of defence diplomacy is a spontaneous order, and poses a challenge for stability, especially in times of crisis. The region does not have protocols, nor the capacity for joint action, in four key aspects in a world under conditions of diffusion of power: (1) collective defence facing multidimensional threats; (2) collective security to restore a desired political order in the case of a violent rupture or democratic-institutional degradation; (3) natural disaster management, for the coordinated mobilisation of resources and knowledge as and when needed; and (4) monitoring of natural resources and sensitive areas, which would suppose

a step towards a confederated architecture due to their territorial nature. Current trends are far from the necessary multilateralism demanded by the four aspects mentioned.

Reality demonstrates an inclination towards bilateralism and trilateralism, which makes the South American system of defence diplomacy a manifestation of multipolar anarchy covered by a thin mantle of institutional harmony. The tendency continues to be contrary to what the summits suggest in South America, especially in terms of defence. Distinct factors emerge as potential non-exclusive explanations of this tendency. The presence of extra-regional interests is one of those, as global multipolarity has brought opportunities for the diversification of commercial partnerships and quasi-alliances.

Ideological tensions in the region and high global demand for natural resources have encouraged this factor, as well as unresolved territorial disputes. While there is more and more public consensus on the peaceful resolution of controversies, it is worrying to see patterns of potential geostrategic encirclement, such as the naval agreements between Chile and Ecuador, and those agreed immediately after by Peru and Colombia. Additionally, there is the military cooperation between Venezuela and Ecuador, but above all that of Caracas and La Paz. Added to this are the parallel increases in military spending and purchasing between neighbouring countries, such as Colombian efforts to respond to the nominal increase in Venezuelan aerial power, or the same done in naval terms by Peru facing Chile. Here, one can also identify the sustained high prices of raw materials that have given more financial autonomy to the states, pushing up military spending, be it due to external threats, balancing policies, security dilemmas and/or internal demands of the armed forces.

It must be said that the system designed by these agreements has three features that mitigate fears of regional instability: (1) they are public, and there do not appear to be conditions for a secret system of defence diplomacy such as that which led Europe to war a century ago; (2) the majority is concentrated on technical aspects and, with the exception of ALBA, does not include aspects of ideological strengthening and diffusion that could be divisive; and (3) many of the bilateral and trilateral agreements invoke the CDS as the general framework. But the problem does not lie in the probability of armed conflicts in the region, rather in the conception and development of regional security, not as something casual and derived from the interaction of capabilities, but rather under an operative institutionality.

The South American system of defence diplomacy shows two faces, one institutional and associated with the CDS, and the other spontaneous and defined by the evaluation of capabilities and national interests. The first responds to supranational institutional aspirations, oriented to giving the region an articulated order through coordination, while the second is the result of historical, ideological and geopolitical conditions. This parallelism would be irrelevant if both were not mutually exclusive. And it is the case that the CDS is an effort to govern regional security through an effective regime of mechanisms of mutual trust. This step cannot be taken prior to the consolidation of a regional alliance that offers genuine security governance and satisfies collective defence demands, until the aforementioned trends are reversed. The problem is that what is expected by a multipolar world order is the continued offer of incentives for autonomy, generating asymmetric and selective commitments.

The ideology and interests of elites also play their role in the definition of national interests, above all in settings of precarious institutionality. The result, when we combine the structural-systemic analysis with the level of actors and their socio-political systems, is a predictable crystallisation of tendencies to strengthen attributes of sovereignty. In South America, as in the rest of Latin America, foreign and defence policy are strongly subject to internal conditions and the capacity of elites to model their own political systems. The states of the South American system of defence diplomacy respond to the search for power and/or autonomy in a multipolar international system that offers advantages by changes in hierarchies, or that at least exposes them to challenge. Meanwhile, their elites experience a greater external freedom due to structural conditions and can, in turn, act with greater ease insofar as low institutionality offers lower resistance to personal or partisan projects.

3.4 Conclusion: A "Paradox of Autonomy" in South America?

The causal analysis of the performance of the CDS demonstrates that tensions between national autonomy and regional autonomy have been the main limiting factor in the operability of this regional security institution. This raises the challenge of systematising the finding in an explanatory model that is parsimonious but that can also be generalised. That is to say, a model capable of application to other regional realities in which security regionalism presents operational limitations. The main problem for the development of this explanation lies in a paradoxical fact: that the structural and ideational factors which

promote the search for regional autonomy largely coincide with those that prompt the search for national autonomy. This generates autonomist tensions at two levels, and is what can be called a "paradox of autonomy".

This paradox refers to inherent tensions in the search for national autonomy, its channelling through regional cooperation schemes for the development of regional autonomy, and the frustration derived from the incompatibility that, in practice, is manifested between the two levels of autonomy. A central element in the paradox of autonomy corresponds to the distinct visions, held by regional powers, of the international system and their roles in it, according to their capabilities and aspirations. For a regional power such as Brazil, the creation of a South American regional security scheme would contribute to its own international projection as an emerging power. In this case, there is no evident difference between national and regional autonomy, as both would mutually reinforce each other in the framework of using a regional platform for international recognition.

In contrast to the main regional power, national autonomy is not always perceived as encouraged or preserved by regional autonomy. The results of this research suggest that the FPEs of secondary powers such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, despite their ideological differences and distinct levels of regional commitment, pulled in different directions, encouraged positively by the search for national autonomy and negatively by the distrust caused by the rise of Brazil, historical and ideological rivalries, and unresolved border conflicts.

The paradox of autonomy allows us to start to understand the parsimonious form of the contradictions of South American security regionalism, bringing to light the inherent tensions between national and regional autonomy. Presenting competing perspectives with respect to how to achieve greater margins of autonomy in the international arena, this potential explanatory model offers possibilities to understand the Latin American political dynamic and its regionalisation processes. The observable evidence and testimonies of bureaucratic actors of the region allow us to give shape to this idea based on an experience of eight years of institutional functioning. Beyond being a pillar of Latin American foreign policy, it is exposed as a potential obstacle for integration and, above all, for intraregional cooperation in the area of security and defence. In light of the evidence analysed, the CDS does not appear doomed, although its future does not look bright. Its limitations in crisis management –as in the case of Venezuela– and in the active

participation in peace processes –as in the case of Colombia– question its potential as a fully operative security institution. However, its existence cannot be ruled out in a framework of low multilateral diplomatic interaction in the area of regional security.

But the South American case is not unique, as in the Global South there are other examples of failings in regional security institutionalisation. Thus, this work did not only have a vocation of specific explanation for the case of the CDS, but rather it tries to open spaces for generalisation and debate in the framework of comparative regional studies. It opens new research avenues in which qualitative and quantitative methods could be linked insofar as they expose links between the international and national levels of foreign policy analysis and regional international politics.

3.5 Interviews list

Interviewed	**Relevant position related to the CDS/Position held at the time of interview**	**Interview date**
Camilo Jose Zambrano Jauregui	Head of Political Section, Ecuadorian Embassy to the United States	December, 2013
Pablo Celi	Ecuadorian representative to the UNASUR's Centre of Strategic Studies for Defence	July, 2014
Mariano Fernández Amunátegui	Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations between 2009 and 2010 Chilean Ambassador to Germany between 2014 and 2016 Chilean Ambassador to the Holy See since 2016	January, 2015
Venezuelan diplomat	Undisclosed	August, 2016
Argentine diplomat	Undisclosed	November, 2016
Venezuelan military officer	Undisclosed	November, 2016

Colombian military officer	Undisclosed	May, 2017
Álvaro Uribe Vélez	Colombian president between 2002 and 2010 Colombian Senator since 2014	August, 2017
Rafael Paredes Proaño	Ecuadorian ambassador to Colombia since 2016	November 2017

Chapter Four

Explaining Flaws of Security Regionalism in the Global South: Lessons from the South American Paradox of Autonomy

Abstract

This article addresses key causes of the weakness of security regionalism in the Global South, generalising from the South American Defence Council (CDS) experience. From a structural interpretation, I claim that security regionalism flaws in the Global South rely on high sensitivity to: the geostrategy of great powers, commodity cycles, political leadership, and regional rivalries. These causes can be summarised in the "paradox of autonomy". This paradox enlightens the outcome of competition among regional and national autonomy, and its effects on security regionalism. As an analytical model, the paradox of autonomy assumes that global power shifts affect autonomy in the foreign and security policies of main and secondary regional powers. The idea of Westphalian sovereignty, dominant in the Global South, intensifies autonomy tensions, highlights rivalries, and reduces chances for multilateral regional security cooperation, diminishing confidence and security-building measures, as well as the consolidation of regional security governance.

Keywords: autonomy theory, security regionalism, South American Defence Council, paradox of autonomy, Global South.

4.1 Introduction

In recent years, a research program that appeared to have been forgotten has been recovered in studies of international politics in Latin America: that of autonomy. Inspired principally by the works of Juan Carlos Puig (1980; 1986; 1994) and Helio Jaguaribe (1969; 1979), studies on international autonomy have been reconsidered given the patterns in South American foreign policy towards the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Driven structurally by the diffusion of power and exercised by strong presidents, most of them highly motivated and ideologically aligned, the search for greater margins for action in international insertion became an imperative of foreign policy. New intra- and extra-regional alignments, as well as a new and more ambitious wave of regionalism, took place in the face of the perceived global diffusion of power and the geostrategic reorientation of the US. This article forms part of the new wave of research on international autonomy, and its principal contribution is the elaboration and development of the analytical model of the paradox of autonomy.

The paradox of autonomy occurs in the tension between national autonomy – the freedom of decision and action that a state can enjoy in the international system – and regional autonomy – referring to that of regional groups organised in regional schemes. The literature on autonomy assumes that this is a common South American objective (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Riggirozzi, 2012; Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz, 2014; Russell and Tokatlian, 2013; Briceño-Ruiz and Simonoff, 2015; Briceño-Ruiz and Morales, 2017). The explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy agrees with this statement in principal, but at the same time challenges it in two ways. Firstly, in terms of homogeneity: the paradox of autonomy is a subsidiary model of structuralism, so it assumes that the regional hierarchy is fundamental in the prediction of foreign policy behaviour. And secondly, it contrasts the notions of "common" and "collective", while the paradox lies in the potential conflict between the notion of autonomy as a recurring objective and that of autonomy as a shared objective. It is understood that for regional powers, and secondary powers, autonomy is a key objective. However, from a rational choice point of view, the lesser the capacity, the greater the need for external cooperation. Asymmetries generate stimulus for bandwagoning, and can leave aside autonomous objectives in favour of security, growth and/or development objectives. Thus, the paradox of autonomy is commonly presented at the level of secondary powers, because for them, collective (regional) autonomy can be both a route and an obstacle for individual (national) autonomy. Thus, even considering the possibility of autonomy as a common objective, it might not be considered a collective objective.

The paradox of autonomy can occur in many areas of foreign policy, but it is a particularly sensitive phenomenon when it comes to issues of defence and security, especially in South America. An oft-forgotten aspect in the developed South American autonomist doctrine of international law is the primacy of sovereignty in its Westphalian sense (Krasner, 1999; Ayoob, 2002; Acharya, 2006). The notion of territorial integrity is central to security and defence policies, mainly for Hispanic American countries (Ayoob, 1995; Clapham, 1999; Zacher, 2001). The connection between sovereignty and security puts national autonomy ahead of the regional. This is a common problem for South American cooperation in security questions, and remains a latent condition in border tensions and rivalries in the region (Mares, 2001; Dominguez, 2003; Martín, 2006; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2007). Hence, multilateral governance agreements on regional security are unusual, making the region far from being a security community (Battaglino, 2012). Thus, although forms of regionalism relating to development have shown formidable resistance (Rivarola

Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz, 2014), reluctance in terms of security cooperation is linked to the rigid meaning of sovereignty, leading to the paradox of autonomy.

This article is structured as follows: the first section is dedicated to the review of autonomy and regionalism in South America, both as research programs and as policies, with special attention to their mutual interaction. The second section explains the specificity of security regionalism, arguing that security and territorial integrity are not simply other sectors of public policy, but rather a crucial area for South American states. The third section presents the paradox of autonomy, considering its theoretical roots and its connection with other explanatory models, with the international structural order, and the predicted classifications of foreign policy strategies. This section is the theoretical core of the article. The fourth and final section refers to an introductory empirical and descriptive presentation of how the paradox of autonomy shaped the institutional design of the CDS, making it more flexible and limiting its ambitions in the interest of the institutionalisation of regional security (Mijares, 2011; Comini, 2015).

4.2 Autonomy and Regionalism in South America

4.2.1 Autonomy: New Perspectives on an Old Concept

In the first decade of the 21st century, the rise of new regional schemes in Latin America in general, and South America in particular, had a pronounced impact on the regional geopolitical panorama. The phenomenon was partially eclipsed by the economic rise of Brazil in the framework of the so-called BRICS. However, the evidence suggests a strong correlation between the process of deconcentration of global economic capabilities and the peak of autonomist regional policies. Graphic 1 shows the concentration of global economic capabilities from 1980 to 2013. Two general trends can be noted in the thirty-three-year period. Firstly, for two thirds of the period a high concentration of capabilities suggests a marked growth in inequality in terms of latent power. And secondly, in the final third, more specifically from 2001, an accelerated fall in concentration, or a drastic recessive trend in the inequality of latent global power.

Figure 4.1: Concentration of latent capabilities in the international system (1980-2001; 2002-2013)[7]



The effects of this phenomenon crossed the barrier of the political and found an echo in the South American academic community. The new regionalism and growing ambitions for foreign policy strategies oriented to autonomy did not go unnoticed, above all for their link to the old South American research program, the so-called "the theory of autonomy". If we follow the criteria of Briceño-Ruiz (2014), and Briceño-Ruiz and Simonoff (2017), the theory of autonomy can be considered the first Latin American explanation and doctrine since the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the Americas.

Emerging as "knowledge" (*saber*) before being rationalised as doctrine, and later systematised as theory, autonomy has been a constant objective in the political agendas of the region (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz, 2014; Briceño Ruiz, 2014). Despite the strong autonomous interest, the search for autonomy has not always topped the political agenda of South American states. An interesting correlation between concentration of power, polarity and regionalism indicates that structural changes in the distribution of power in the international system could act as a necessary condition for the revitalisation of regionalism. The recent evidence of accelerated deconcentration in latent power, as a probable correlate of the commodities boom of the 2000s (Figure 2), suggests that the

[7] The formula for the concentration of capabilities is taken from the work of Edward Mansfield on the distribution of power in the international system (1993). Calculations made by the author.

search for autonomy in South America was boosted by said change of power, which coincided with the geostrategic reorientation of the US and its maximalist agenda in Eurasia. The result in terms of security regionalism was the proposal and creation of UNASUR, and especially the CDS.

Figure 4.2: Trends in the commodity price index (1980-2013)



Source: World Bank, 2017.

In the field of international political research, the phenomenon brought about an awakening in the autonomist research agenda, as an autochthonous or native South American intellectual product, and as an explanation adjusted to the new political agendas of prominent states in the region. The rebirth of the theory of autonomy not only recovered the classical teachings of Juan Carlos Puig (1980; 1986; 1994) and Helio Jaguaribe (1969; 1979), but also incorporated elements of foreign policy strategy (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño Ruiz, 2013; Flemes and Wehner, 2015), the return of geopolitics to Latin American studies (Rivarola Puntigliano, 2011; Nolte and Wehner, 2015; Rivarola Puntigliano, 2017; Wehner and Nolte, 2017), and reflection on South American contributions to the Theory of International Relations (Tickner, 2002). Nevertheless, the research agenda remained open to other problems related to the search for autonomy, such as the specificity of security regionalism, obstacles to autonomy, and the inherent tension between national autonomy and regional autonomy.

4.2.2 Incentives and obstacles for South American autonomy

Although the search for autonomy is aimed at obtaining a greater freedom of action in the international arena, this is above all a necessity of internal policy which interacts with the international structure. Autonomy is closely related to the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, and with that, intends to have as much, or more, freedom in internal matters as it has in foreign policy. Therefore, explanations of the search for autonomy lie in both internal policy objectives and external ones. Moreover, its incentives and obstacles must be analysed through both material and ideational objectives. With this, hierarchical differences in terms of power and status are shown: the greater the international position occupied, the greater the interest in the search for autonomy would be. Likewise, significant advantages in capabilities and prestige could lead to the satisfaction of ideational objectives rather than those of a material nature, especially if there is a relatively high availability of resources and a perceived low international status, which would naturally lead an emerging regional power to seek the recognition of established global powers (Hart and Jones, 2010; Patrick, 2010; Nolte, 2010; Stuenkel, 2013).

Recent literature states that regionalism is driven by the search for autonomy, as well as development objectives (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño Ruiz, 2013; Briceño Ruiz and Simonoff, 2015). Insofar as this literature does not specify differences between national and regional autonomy, it is possible that the complementarity between the two is taken for granted, with the potential effect of leading to imprecise conclusions regarding security regionalism. Although this article expounds on this distinction in its third section, it will be assumed in terms of hypothetical coincidences until then. These coincidences would occur more frequently in the foreign policy agendas of regional powers. Following the ideas on South American regionalism, it is possible to identify the main driving forces behind the search for autonomy. The first of these is *development*, the most prominent argument in favour of institutionalising regional cooperation. The combination of economic underdevelopment and material potential has historically motivated regional cooperation. The second driving force is *democracy*, since the third wave of democratisation contributed to the synchronisation of political regimes in the region, motivating multi-sectoral cooperation. And the third driving force is the *balance of power*, given the changes in the distribution of power and the geostrategic reorientation of the US, security regionalism has been identified as a driving force of regionalism in a broader

sense, especially in post-hegemonic literature (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Briceño Ruiz and Morales, 2017).

But the paths of regionalism are not completely open in South America. The primary obstacle to the institutionalisation of regional cooperation can be analysed as a problem of collective action. Consequently, the principal obstructing forces are national strategies for international insertion, rival ideological programs, and low regional interdependence. Regarding the national strategies for international insertion, global changes in the distribution and concentration of power brought a new opening for external interactions beyond traditional relations based on proximity and culture. The rise of new powers and international orders modified regional patterns of cooperation. Thus, regions have maintained importance, but not exclusivity. For their part, the rival ideological programs in South America made the region experience the effects of ideological diversity and "de-democratisation", that is to say, the ebb of the wave of democratisation (Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2016). Significant differences between political regimes in the region promoted the emergence of sub-regional blocs with marked ideological biases. Finally, there is the low intraregional interdependence, derived from the generally high dependence on the export of raw materials, having adverse effects on national industrialisation processes (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014; Ray, 2017; Ding and Hadzi-Vaskov, 2017). The lack of economic complementarity and the technological-industrial deficit orient South American commercial interests outside the region, reducing the possibilities of interdependence and cooperation (Giordano et al, 2016).

What is the balance between the driving forces of regionalism and the conditions which block this in times of changes in the global distribution of power? According to Andrés Malamud (2003), South American regional integration has managed to advance on the basis of national institutions, rather than supranational ones, with the executive branch being the main branch of public power. Accordingly, presidentialism would be the cornerstone of the explanation of regional cooperation. Strong presidents tend to have greater freedom of action to take forward executive diplomatic actions (Malamud, 2005) and can reach agreements expeditiously. However, the deficiency in the supranational institutionality of regionalism remains tied to the effective power of presidents and their governmental projects. The aforementioned driving forces of regionalism could be reinforced by strong presidents coordinated in a framework of collective action. This was the case of South America in the first decade of the 21st century. Nevertheless, this strong

dependence on the conjunction of personalities and projects weakens the regionalism project in the long term, and reinforces the conditions that block it. Accordingly, it is clear that the analysis must consider the factor of presidential power, but also the specific nature of the sector in which regional cooperation is studied.

4.2.3 Regionalism: autonomy, development, or both?

What is the meaning of regionalism? With the advent of the post-Cold War period, attention was drawn to what was called a "world of regions" (Katzenstein, 2015) or one of "regional orders" (Lake and Morgan, 2010; Solingen and Malnight, 2016). But the regions were there before, and regionalism also, including during the most ferocious duels of the "cold warriors". In Latin America, regionalism has had a long-standing agenda. The new wave of literature on autonomy is connected to the fact that in Latin America, the resilience of regionalism is directly linked to the search for autonomy and development (Briceño Ruiz and Simonoff, 2015). However, the literature available so far has not been concerned with defining positions of autonomy and development in an order of preference. In doing so, one can identify at least two ideal types of foreign policy strategy towards regionalism: the first when *autonomy follows development*, and the second, when *development follows autonomy*. The difference is not trivial and, empirically, the two principal models of Latin American regionalism are based on one of these two strategies.

The first type of strategy prioritizes development as a necessary condition for autonomy. This used to be the dominant regional focus, both for democratic regimes and autocratic ones. Two schools of thought also emerged in distinct periods, that of the *dependency* developmentalists, inspired by the "Cepalist"[8] theory and the centre/periphery diagnostic, and that of the *(neo)liberals*, emerging based on the Washington Consensus. On the other hand, development through autonomy is associated with the Latin American turn to the left. But the preference for one approach or the other has more than an ideological bias, it also has a material basis, since accelerated economic growth is capable of encouraging autonomist policies and behaviours rather than development projects. The historically recent turn to the left combined both factors, an assertive ideological package fuelled by a boom in the prices of the raw materials that underpinned the quest for autonomy.

[8] CEPAL is the Spanish acronym of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (or ECLAC).

The distinction between the two focuses on the search for autonomy must be considered to better understand autonomy as a policy and as a potential paradox. In the absence of an overwhelming regional hegemony, regionalism is a collective project with the typical problems of collective action. This is especially true when it comes to security regionalism. Regionalism understood under the strategy of autonomy through development, particularly in the (neo)liberal form, pursues autonomy through economic cooperation and stability agreements, avoiding regional commitments, pursuing modest goals and going one step at a time. On the contrary, the strategy of development through autonomy tends to be expansive and maximalist in its objectives. Economic cooperation comes in second place, behind political commitment.

Figure 4.3: Two opposite ways to development and autonomy



Generally, for liberal democracies, growth and development are priorities, not the expansion of their own regimes and political values (Van Klaveren, 1997; Sanahuja, 2009). The opposite is the case of hybrid and authoritarian regimes, for which autonomy is the priority within regionalist projects, as well as the instrumentalisation of these for the diffusion and promotion of their own values and political practices (Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2016). Taking this distinction into account is fundamental to address the specificity of security regionalism and the paradox of autonomy for secondary regional powers.

4.3 The Specificity of Security Regionalism

4.3.1 Regionalism in its most broadly accepted sense

The most evident legacy of the post-Cold War was the restoration of a division of the world in a geopolitical sense, distinct from the dominant ideological sense in the confrontation of East and West. But the regions were always there, with their own dynamics and before the balance of terror could even be imagined. Nor is regionalism a new phenomenon. In

some cases, this phenomenon even resulted in the creation of states such as the US or Germany, for example. Regionalism has been widely understood as a process through which international institutions emerge and are sustained, which span a regional space in which the members share an identity, and aspire to reinforce it while encouraging mutual cooperation (Farrell and Héritier, 2005). This definition in a positive sense has a correlate in the tacit inverse aspect of regionalism, none other than the exclusivity-inclusivity dichotomy, established under a combination of political criteria based on geographical grounds.

Despite the implicit broadness and potential wealth of the accepted sense of regionalism, this has been studied with greater intensity from the perspective of commercial integration (Hettne et al., 2001; Solingen, 2014). This, of course, does not mean a mistake, and nor is it an inexplicable phenomenon. Regionalism has been widely studied from the angle of International Political Economy insofar as it has largely reflected the advances of the EU project, an originally economic mechanism, whose security had been guaranteed by another structure: NATO's umbrella (Jones, 2003; Rosato, 2011). The confrontation between great powers –defined by, among other things, their capacity to project power and influence beyond their immediate peripheries– left regions as anecdotal facts and subsystems with their own capacity to provide security. Studies on alliances also contributed to minimising the role of the region in international security, as collective defence agreements generally included one or more extra-regional great power. Hence, studies on security regionalism have occupied a secondary place.

The lessons from the South American case are telling in this sense. Regionalism in its broadly accepted form, the economic, has a long history in Latin America in general. This is explained by interests in development and autonomy, but also by the context of the Cold War in which the definition of threats was linked early to the institutionalisation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR with its Spanish initials, also known as the "Rio Pact") of September 2nd, 1947. Hence, economic integration mechanisms and schemes have prospered, while security regionalism hardly have appeared in an international scenario of accelerated deconcentration of power. This claim is reinforced by the hypothesis that South America, still in the hemispheric security perimeter of the US, has been functioning as an international subsystem in which direct US intervention has been more potential than real (Mares 2001; Teixeira 2012), so the absence of a regional

security mechanism cannot be explained by a supposed hegemony or American military presence.

Thus, regionalism in South America has been concentrated in economic aspects, above all commercial ones, which follows a widely spread international pattern. This experience has been replicated in other sectors of intraregional cooperation in which national security, defence policy and foreign policy autonomy would not be directly exposed. This has not guaranteed the success of economic regionalism, but it has given way to the institutionalisation of regional cooperation in aspects that are not central to Westphalian sovereignty. Understanding the distinctive nature of security regionalism is key to explaining the mechanisms behind the paradox of autonomy.

4.3.2 Security regionalism is different

Few aspects of public policy are as capable of putting sovereignty and, of course, autonomy, at risk as defence policy. In a broad sense, interior security policy and foreign policy are articulated with national defence policy. This broad set of policies can be attributed to the objectives of the preservation of the great national strategy. The existential sense of defence policy is, in itself, an obstacle for supranational security mechanisms, above all when the potential partners are part of the same region or international subsystem. Security regionalism, which would contemplate the possibility of some coordination of national defence policies, lies at the base of the basic needs of states. Even within the framework of advanced regional schemes, such as the EU and its office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, coordination of foreign and defence policy is little more than symbolic, with member states reserving the form, degree and moment of acting diplomatically and militarily (Kelly, 2007).

Almost as a general rule, it is understood that security agreements indicate two widely spread schemes: (a) collective security, which is to say, mechanisms to avoid aggressions between the parties, and/or (b) collective defence, to dissuade or reject external threats to the parties. Security regionalism could respond to one or both schemes, but within a common geographical space, forming a geopolitical set, an international subsystem or, to be more precise, a regional security complex (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). To understand why the paradox of autonomy originates, it is necessary to consider one fact: national security and defence are not simply another area in the range of public sectors. This is especially true in the South American reality, which as an international subsystem, has

developed in parallel a marked interest in regional autonomy and zeal for national autonomy. Two phenomena explain the specificity of security regionalism in South America, one of a global character and the other rooted in the geopolitics of the region.

The first of these phenomena is the limitation of transferring security and defence tasks to private actors. Although many South American states have had, to a greater or lesser extent, problems in comprehensive territorial control and there is a tendency among some great powers to privatise security work, the transfer does not occur as in other sectors of public policy in which private actors assume core tasks. Firstly, because the identity of the South American nation-state is directly linked to territorial integrity. And in the case of the privatisation of security, this has been happening in extraterritorial operations, such as in the cases of occupied territories in which the political cost of direct action by national armed forces is very high in terms of public opinion, or when one wishes to evade responsibilities derived from international law related to the use of force outside one's own borders (Nweihed; 1992; Zacher, 2001; Ayoob, 2002). The state continues to be the central actor in national defence.

In the case of the geopolitical reason for the specificity of security regionalism in South America, and its link to regional and national autonomies, there is the latent presence of a superpower that never occupied any territory of the subcontinent, and the persistence of territorial tensions which limited mutual trust and the generation of regional cooperation mechanisms for security and defence. These conditions had a parallel effect with respect to the search for autonomy in South America. This is because, on one hand, it was considered that a goal as important as development must have the possibility of taking and executing political decisions without US tutelage – with which it had maintained an alliance during the Cold War and of a hemispheric hegemony which had as an effective military perimeter the south coast of the Caribbean. And on the other hand, the search for national autonomy in terms of security, because of two factors which generated intraregional mistrust: the first, historical territorial tensions and rivalries, above all among Hispanic American states (Mares, 2001; Franchi et al., 2017); and the second, caution facing the possible materialisation of Brazilian hegemonic primacy (Flemes and Wehner, 2015).

For these reasons, I claim that security regionalism in ontologically different to what can be established in other sectors because it can affect the constitutive structures of the state. In the case of South America, the historical and geopolitical conditions reinforce the

specificity and highlight the possibility of the paradox of autonomy and its dilemmatic consequences.

4.4 The Paradox of Autonomy

4.4.1 National autonomy or regional autonomy?

The paradox of autonomy is a proposal of an analytical model with classical roots within the study of the problems of rational choice and collective action. In conditions of the diffusion of power, opportunities were presented for the expansion of the margins of international action, especially for non-dominant powers. To gain greater autonomy in a sensitive sector such as that of security and defence, the member states of a region could join efforts to build an alliance or a security community, which would generate greater autonomy as a bloc. However, and as in any collective enterprise, the autonomy of each member would be adversely affected. This is where the paradox arises, as in international conditions of diffusion of power, regional cooperation mechanisms would gain space for their creation and development, but it is also true that in these circumstances it is possible that the incentives for cooperation distress the growing alternative relationships for individual benefit, that is to say, for national autonomy.

This is a paradox of antinomy, insofar as the conditions encourage contradictory results. This, in turn, leads to decision-making crossroads which become dilemmas. The basic requirement for a dilemma is the presence of at least two courses of mutually exclusive action. False dilemmas diverge from real ones in the exclusivity-inclusivity dichotomy. Therefore, a dilemma is false when at least two of an actor's alternatives could hypothetically be taken at the same time with harmless mutual effects. The real dilemmas become problematic given the character of politics as a strategic game, which makes the intentions of the other(s) impossible, as well as ideological and material changes within a system of the interaction of wills. In this way, uncertainty plays an important role in international issues (Snyder, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001; Rathbun, 2007; Glaser, 2010; Jervis, 2015). *The paradox of autonomy leads to an autonomic foreign policy dilemma, in which governments face the decision of choosing between a collective good, such as regional autonomy, and an individual good, such as national autonomy*.

National autonomy frequently assumes distinct forms, from the nominative and grandiloquent term of "independence", to the tactical but inelegant concept of "room to

manoeuvre". National autonomy on the international stage presupposes independence and the absence of control by another power, and goes beyond room to manoeuvre insofar as it operates at abstract and complex levels of political strategy. In this sense, *national autonomy is a favourable condition of opportunity and capability to mobilise resources by national elites to exploit the given conditions in the search for a better position of international insertion, preserving legitimate exclusivity in domestic affairs.* These conditions have both internal and external origins. The internal ones refer to what neoclassical realism has called the conditions of extraction and mobilisation of resources (Taliaferro, 2006; Taliaferro, 2009; Schweller, 2009), while the external ones relate to a particular international constellation in terms of the distribution of power and effective patterns of influence.

National autonomy is closely associated with territorial, international and Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). It is conventionally related to the optimum conditions for the design and conduct of foreign policy strategies and, as an idea, can easily be traced in the history of international relations (Renouvin, 1958; Ayoob, 2002). The case of regional autonomy is different, not only in scale, but also in nature. At the regional level, autonomy can be erroneously understood as a coordinated aggregation of national autonomies. It is for this reason that, to avoid said error, I affirm that *regional autonomy is the harmonisation of external objectives by virtue of a shared principle and according to self-imposed regional (supranational) governance, always with the aim of developing joint abilities to better detect opportunities, coordinate the mobilisation of resources and take advantage of favourable conditions for collective objectives.* Regional autonomy supposes at least one of these two conditions: a global system of regional blocs in fluid interaction, and a system of great competing powers which should be mutually balanced.

Regional autonomy under the criteria of security regionalism implies a trade-off of regional security and stability in exchange for national autonomy. Accordingly, it enters the domain of supranationality. But accepting such an arrangement entails some preconditions, such as the common definition of perceived external threats, and/or the establishment of regulation mechanisms to avoid costly intraregional conflicts. A significant hierarchisation is another route to regional autonomy (Wohlforth, 1999; Wohlforth, 2007; Lake, 2009; Lake and Morgan, 2010; Lemke, 2010; Vieira and Alden, 2011). Theoretically, a region under the clear leadership of its central power, must be able to implement a strategy of access control – diplomatic, cultural, economic and/or military –

facing external powers. Most of the recent literature on emerging powers has taken for granted the possibility of some isolation of regions driven by their central powers (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Mattli, 1999; Schoeman, 2000; Adebajo, 2002; Nolte, 2010; Burges, 2010; Malamud, 2011; Vieira and Alden, 2011; Flemes and Wehner, 2015). The study of the interaction of regional powers has principally focused on strategies of contestation and of interaction facing extra-regional powers. In theory, in a well-structured regional hierarchy, with a functional internal market and an agreement on security and collective defence, regional autonomy could thrive by restricting external influences and preserving an autonomous development model. But the dilemma emerges based on political frictions within the regions. The harmonisation of interests is an arduous task within national elites, and even more arduous between the ruling elites of various states. International cooperation is possible when these elites succeed in aligning complementary interests, or by the external imposition of an effectively hegemonic power.

In addition to the superlative structural capabilities relating to its periphery, a regional power must be capable of sustaining a strategy of denial of access, or at least be capable of fulfilling the function of manger of regional access facing external powers. Paradoxically, systemic conditions that are likely to foster the rise of regional powers, can also do this in the cases of secondary and minor powers, encouraging foreign policy strategies which could include the launch or strengthening of bilateral relations both inside and outside their regions. This would contain the grounds for intraregional tensions and rivalries, not only in terms of economic relations, but also in the collective management of regional security.

4.4.2 Theoretical grounds

The analytical model of the paradox of autonomy is based on the theoretical developments that give it form and content. Strongly anchored to the rational theoretical framework of international politics, the model has intellectual debts which could be summarised in six pillars: the South American theory of autonomy; the theory of sovereignty; collective action theory; the security dilemma in multipolar conditions; the security dilemma in alliances; and the model of alliance restraint.

4.4.2.1 The autonomy theory

The paradox of autonomy is based principally on the theory of autonomy developed in South America. The early emancipatory movement of Latin America, the type of colonial model of the region and the geopolitical conditions of South America are the three factors which combine to make autonomy the original and persistent objective of the foreign policies of South American states. On one hand, the Latin American emancipation was part of a larger political and intellectual process of global reach, which combined Enlightenment principles with the decline of the pre-industrial empires. In the newcomer states, firstly in Hispanic America then later in Brazil, this generated the necessity for an international insertion which preserved freedom of action, both against the old metropolis and imperialism in the process of industrialisation.

The Iberian colonial model was also key in the construction of an Ibero-American political identity which would clamour for autonomy. Unlike the almost exclusively extractivist models imposed in Asia and, above all, in Africa, by industrial empires, the preindustrial Iberian empires used a form of conquest and colonisation which incorporated the new political-territorial components as integral parts of the empires themselves[9] (Boersner, 1982; Guerra, 2011). Hence, the international insertion of the new republics, and of the Brazilian empire, has been from the outset a legitimate necessity and on an equal footing in the conditions of the international concert of the nineteenth. Geopolitics also played a role in the early and persistent thirst for autonomy. The continental dimensions, the predominant coastal occupation of the South American territory and the rise of the US in the hemisphere, generated the duality of relatively low contacts with limited continental interdependence, with the addition of boundary conflicts where there is greater contact, and reserved cooperation facing Washington, fuelled by military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean basin (Hybel, 1990; Teixeira, 2012).

The paradox of autonomy includes in the debate the classical "decisional autonomy" of Puig (1986) and Jaguaribe (1979) and the later definition of "relational autonomy" of Tokatlian and Russell (2002). The first form of autonomy refers to freedom of decision, but also of political action. It consists of the expansion of the external room to manoeuvre

[9] In the case of the Spanish empire, both in its Habsburg era but especially in its Bourbon period, the American territories overseas were considered an integral part of the empire, which was consecrated in the creation of the viceroyalties, captaincy generals and royal audiences. In the Portuguese case, the integration of Brazil to the crown is even more complete, as it became the effective metropolis after the successful flight of the Braganza.

in the sense of aspiration for international insertion motivated by the historical and geopolitical factors already mentioned. The second form of autonomy, relational, poses cooperation between equals as a condition for its realisation (Russell and Tokatlian, 2002). It corresponds to a distinct historical moment in which the impetus for integration would have been reached after the regional democratic settlement and changes in geostrategy and the distribution of capabilities in the international system.

This debate is central to the paradox of autonomy, but it retakes it in a non-sequential historical sense, neither epistemological, nor paradigmatic – that of the transition from decisional to relational autonomy, but rather dialectical, to say, its opposition to the generation of a political dilemma. This is manifested in the resistance of national autonomy in an area of high political impact for states: security and national defence policy. When this resistance coincides with the interest to coordinate security and defence policies oriented at gaining greater autonomy as a group, that is when the interest in relational autonomy is manifested, and when the paradox of autonomy is presented. The dialectical sense of the autonomic tension would, according to the recent lessons of South American regionalism, revolve around the rational and multilateral manipulation of institutional design (Koremenos et al., 2001).

4.4.2.2 Westphalian sovereignty

An explanatory model of South American international relations must consider the regional propensity for a conventional conception of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Recent explanatory developments of regionalism and regional integrations start from the normative thesis of diffusion (Jetschke and Lenz, 2013; Lenz, 2013; Risse, 2016). According to this thesis, the integration model of the European Union has been able to spread its principles and norms, as well as its operating codes, to other regions, creating a mimetic effect. Undoubtedly, since the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the EU has shown an unprecedented performance, being the best example of supranationality in a region. However, the European experience is difficult to transfer to South America. The EU is largely a geopolitical project which from its early stages was encouraged by the US as a hegemonic power in its contention strategy (Rosato 2011). The post-World War II and Cold War periods shaped the traditional conception of sovereignty in Europe, making supranational governance viable and collectively acceptable.

The Hispanic South American states were born bound to the principle of *uti possidetis iuris*, making territorial integrity a substantial part of national identities. The historical experience of the region is not without interstate violence (Mares 2001; Martín 2006; Thies 2008), but it is much less severe than that of Europe, and the level of perceived external threats is substantially less (Battaglino, 2012). Moreover, the region is not in the immediate military reach of great powers beyond the US. These historical factors have an impact on the way in which territorial integrity is understood. Westphalian sovereignty is a central component in understanding the paradox of autonomy. Autonomist tensions take place when foreign policy executives (FPE) (Lobell, 2009) differ in the degree of sovereign exclusivity in defence and national security policies, especially if territorial disputes persist, or if ideological aggravating factors emerge. This is the case of rival secondary powers such as Colombia and Venezuela, a dyad which concentrate almost two thirds of South American militarised disputes (Mares, 2001), or Chile and Peru, above all facing the promulgation of the CDS agreement and the ruling of the International Court of Justice (Armijo, 2014; Wehner, 2014).

4.4.2.3 Collective action theory: The tragedy of the commons

The central presumption of the explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy is that it is a collective action problem. The basis of the explanation of its logical mechanisms can be found in the "tragedy of the commons", a model coined by Garrett Hardin (2009) and explained in depth in the works of Mancur Olson (1965) and Elinor Ostrom (1998; 2015). The tragedy is centred in the tension between individual interests and collective goods. Following instrumentally rational strategies, individuals –as well as foreign policy executives, especially those dominated by strong leaders in presidentialist regimes– can pursue and achieve their own objectives, even though they negatively affect collective aspirations and goals in the process. The paradox of autonomy confronts national autonomy and regional autonomy, establishing the resemblance to the tragedy of the commons. But the similarity is not perfect, as the tragedy of the commons assumes that the common good is of equal benefit for all individuals involved, and although it is true that regional autonomy has been a solid South American objective, it is not clear to what extent it has been a method for achieving a more valuable national autonomy.

Given that the model of the paradox of autonomy is especially designed for the sensitive sector of regional security, individual interests tend to be more resilient due to the existential nature of national security and defence. In the paradox of autonomy, the

similarities between the "commons" are more ontological than operational, as governments take care of what they consider to be best for their societies and are more willing to sabotage formally shared goals. However, under conditions of international deconcentration of power, which are prone to encouraging the possibilities of national autonomy, security regionalism can be damaged, but unlike the tragedy of the commons, not necessarily destroyed as a common good. The paradox of autonomy could (re)shape the institutional design of security regionalism, partially preserving the shared objectives. And if liberal institutionalism has taught us anything, it is that, with all its limitations and without knowing with certainty to what extent, institutions are capable of moderating political behaviour.

4.4.2.4 Security dilemma

The two main branches of structural realism, the defensive and the offensive, are distinguished by what they assume to be the primary objective of the state in international politics: maximise its security or maximise its power (Mearsheimer, 2007). This debate has consumed years of research without having a clearer conclusion than the affirmation that, sometimes, greater power offers security, while in other moments it stimulates threats. This is the content of the security dilemma, an analytical model of which the paradox of autonomy is also a subsidiary. The security dilemma, coined by John Herz (1950) and reformed and revised by Robert Jervis (1978) exposes the potentially conflictive relationship between national security and international security. It assumes that one of the principal mechanisms to strengthen national security, if not the principal one, is the strengthening and/or refining of military capabilities. This is generally recorded in increases in defence budgets and/or military exercises. The result, according to the dilemma, is that in trying to guarantee its own security, the state puts its neighbours and other potential rivals on alert to what they could see as a threat, negatively affecting international security.

The debt of the paradox of autonomy to the security dilemma is evident. The potential conflict of individual and collective interests is present, as well as the tension between unilaterality and bi- or multi-laterality. However, the differences are also clear. Firstly, the security dilemma works at a tactical-operative level of national defence. Although this has strategic implications, it does not compare to the ramifications that the model of the paradox of autonomy assumes to exist in the search for room to manoeuvre, national defence and the freedom of sovereign action in domestic politics, due to the already

mentioned supremacy of Westphalian sovereignty. Secondly, it is even further removed from the structural realist debate between offensive and defensive realisms, insomuch as it focuses on secondary powers rather than great powers. The makes the paradox of autonomy part of peripheral realism (Escudé, 1992; Schenoni and Escudé, 2016) or subaltern realism (Ayoob, 2002). And thirdly, and as a corollary of the two previous differences, the paradox of autonomy does not result in drastic effects such as armament spirals, arms races, or war, but rather in more, or less, significant limitations in the reach of regional security institutions.

4.4.2.5 Security dilemma in alliances

A pillar of the model of the paradox of autonomy is the security dilemma in alliances, of Glen Snyder (1984; 1997: 180-192). According to this, those responsible for foreign policy of allied states can experience one of two fears. Firstly, the fear of abandonment, when their allies do not follow a course of collective action facing a threat, or do not assume an active role. This behaviour could be attributed to the existence of more attractive material alternatives, intergovernmental ideological empathy with the third party perceived as a threat, or to avoid tangible or ideological costs. Secondly, the fear of commitment, which arises when the commitment to balance is not aligned with one's own interests, or when it could even result in damage. As a general rule, the lesser the asymmetry, the more probable the dilemma. Thus, periods when international power is deconcentrated and asymmetries tend to ease, are likely to affect the commitment within an alliance.

The security dilemma in alliances is another example of a collective action problem, in which a conflictive mechanism can be seen between distinct individual interests and the collective objective. Thus, it maintains similarity with the paradox of autonomy, but they differ in the phase in which they arise. While in the security dilemma in alliances the collective action problem appears after the creation of a reciprocal assistance agreement, threatening trust between the allies, in the paradox of autonomy the problem appears before the formalisation of the agreement, threatening trust between potential partners and affecting the institutional design of the founding treaty. The difference is important because the former is an operational problem for established and operative alliances, or those with aspirations to operationality, and the second, a problem in the process of forming regional security agreements. Thus, the paradox of autonomy is an obstacle for an "operational alliance" (Morgenthau, 2005; Mijares, 2011) before it has been established.

4.4.2.6 Alliance restraining

A secondary theoretical source, but not irrelevant for the paradox of autonomy, is the contribution of Jeremy Pressman on alliance restraint. According to this model, some alliances may not be oriented to counterbalancing power or threats, nor be mechanisms for the pursuit of interests, but rather mechanisms of mutual or unilateral control (Pressman, 2008). As foreign policy tactics, moderation alliance agreements are measures to avoid involvement in an undesired conflict due to the commitment of assistance, or to control the behaviour of a potential rival who is offered cooperation. This tactic usually functions under conditions of broad asymmetry between (potential) allies, with the greater ally being provider of security which reduces the uncertainty of the lesser ally or allies. Between states of similar hierarchical position, alliances of restraint may present operational problems, unless they are generated in a multilateral format, closer to that of collective security, as has been shown during decades of the five-power mechanism of the UN Security Council. In any case, being part of a security agreement is in itself a restriction on one's own autonomy, and can always lead to paradoxes and, at the same time, dilemmas.

4.4.3 The explanatory model

The principal hypothesis of the paradox of autonomy is rooted in the tradition of rational choice, to a large extent shared by the (neo)liberal and (neo)realist theories of International Relations. However, it differs from the realist approach, centred on power, because instead of assuming the search for power (classical realism and offensive realism) or security (defensive realism), it assumes the search for freedom of action or the reduction of obstacles and external interference. In this explanatory model, actions take place at the national and regional analytical levels, but the causal condition originates at the international systemic level. Just as great powers in the international system could be motivated by pre-eminence, primacy, or even hegemony, lesser powers maintain more modest objectives, centred above all on national development and autonomy. Some tend towards a mixed search, especially emerging regional powers (Nolte, 2010), seeking indisputable leadership in their region while improving their industrialisation and trying to create peripheral markets and security communities (Adler and Greve, 2009; Deutsch, 2015). To achieve these goals, the search for power and autonomy are combined in a great national strategy. The following table presents a typology of states classified according to their status and objectives:

Table 4.1: Typology of states and their expected objectives

Typology of state	**Predicted objective(s)**
Great powers	Global hegemony, primacy or pre-eminence
Emerging regional powers	Regional hegemony, regional autonomy and national development
Secondary regional powers (or sub-regional powers)	National autonomy and development (the order may vary) Regional autonomy in instrumental terms
Small states	National development

The dynamics of concentration-deconcentration of power in the international system tend to be less stable than those of polarity (Mansfield, 1993). For example, a multipolar order could be, at the same time, one with a high concentration of power which would imply that, although there are many poles, these would concentrate the majority of material capabilities. Inversely, a uni- or bipolar international constellation could be far from being a hegemonic system if it is also deconcentrated, or in other words, if the gaps of power are unimportant or diminishing. An international system in deconcentration creates conditions for autonomy insofar as it undermines the material primacy of the great powers. The process of compensatory economic growth facilitates the diffusion of technologies, while at the same time attacking commercial and security hegemonies.

At the regional level, emerging powers could be inclined to take advantage of the improvement in their capabilities to guard their own zones, thus assuring their hegemony in international subsystems. However, they could face challenges on two fronts. Firstly, that of external powers, both established and emerging, trying to enter the region through bilateral contacts and avoiding the regional power, and secondly, that of secondary regional powers which could support the project of regional autonomy for utilitarian purposes, wanting to take advantage of the pluralist order and preserve both their national autonomy and their own development plan.

Table 4.2: Interaction polarity/concentration: typology of international (sub-)systems

		Concentration (CON)		
		High (≥.4)	*Medium (<.4,.3)*	*Low (<.3)*
Polarity	*Unipolar*	Hegemony	Primacy	Pre-eminence
	Bipolar	Diarchy	Dyadic System	Dialogical System
	Tripolar	Triumvirate	Triadic System	Trialogical System
	Multipolar	Polyarchy	Pluricentric System	Anarchy

Regional autonomy and national autonomies coincide harmoniously for the elites of central regional powers, but not for those of secondary powers. For the latter, regional autonomy implies a concession in freedom of action and the acceptance of external limitations. The paradox of autonomy takes place at the regional level under global conditions of deconcentration of power. This implies the conflict between the central regional power, which seeks to construct a bloc to guarantee regional autonomy, and for its own hegemonic role, and the secondary regional powers, which would partially support regional autonomy while this is of use for their national autonomy and own development. The dilemma is presented for the latter, as for their elites there is the possibility of a functional separation between regional autonomy and national autonomies. In other words, the elites of the secondary powers in a deconcentrated system will try to encourage *as much national autonomy as possible and regional autonomy as is necessary*, always with the aim of not empowering the central regional power beyond what is manageable.

4.5 Effects of the Paradox on Security Regionalism

4.5.1 Limits of cooperation

The celebrated article of Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma" (1978), has been debated (Glaser, 1997). As already mentioned, the security dilemma predicts potential contradictions between national security and defence policies, and international security, due to the possibility of provoking arms races within a spiral logic of action-reaction. The explanatory model of Jervis was a landmark in the neorealist wave in International Relations theory at the end of the 1970s. Taken from classical realism, and based on the concept of John Herz of "security dilemma" (1950), Jervis rationalised through game theory the problem of international cooperation under conditions of uncertainty and distrust. The principal critics against him come from reflectivism, especially constructivism and the set of so-called critical theories (Wendt, 1999; Krause and Williams, 1997; Farrell, 2002; Mitzen, 2006). The critics point to the mechanistic reduction of complex foreign policy decision-making processes, and also the alleged conflict of interests as a natural and essential part of human interaction. These observations lie on strong arguments taken from the debate between positivism and post-positivism. But reflectivism fails to offer an alternative model that is just as parsimonious and fit for generalisation.

Recognising the defects of Jarvis' model, the paradox of autonomy incorporates analytical utility and assumes the general mechanisms of the security dilemma. This brings us to the limits of security cooperation between central and secondary regional powers in the absence of hegemony. As has been said, regional autonomy could be considered an essential national objective for a central regional power (Mearsheimer, 2001; Nolte, 2010). This is particularly true in the South American international subsystem, due to the gap in capabilities of Brazil and its potential, but not effective, regional hegemony. In the last four decades, Brazil has surpassed its neighbours in the main indicators, and Argentinian-Brazilian rivalry was reduced to only football a long time ago. Colombia is now the emerging secondary power, but far from "parity" –in terms of power transition theory (Tammen et al., 2000). Like other (re)emerging regional powers – Russia, China, India, Nigeria and South Africa– Brazil has problems in making its relative power a true hegemony. Such powers experience a problem of the extraction and mobilisation of resources, given the interaction of its physical and human dimensions, and its unequal industrial and bureaucratic development, in addition to counterbalancing policies by their less powerful neighbours, anxious to preserve their national autonomies, whether it be through intraregional cooperation or by inviting external powers.

The paradox of autonomy is problematised given that the main condition which facilitates the collective search for regional autonomy is the same that conditions the search for national autonomy: the international diffusion or deconcentration of power. For the majority of South American elites in the early 21st century, keeping the region out of the direct influence of the US was a shared interest. Brazilian regional hegemony would be unachievable if Washington played a hegemonic role in the sensitive areas of security and defence policy. The limits of regional security cooperation began to become evident with the open opposition of Uribe's Colombia to the original institutional design of the CDS, based on the special Colombia-US relationship in the defence and security sector (Tickner, 2008).

Less obvious, but not less effective, obstacles were put forward by the secondary powers that embraced the original Brazilian project. Argentina, Chile and Venezuela supported the CDS, and assumed it as part of their political priorities. However, a security and defence agreement openly led by Brazil would have been a restriction on the objectives of the national elites. The delicate balance between regional autonomy and national autonomies plays an important role for South American secondary powers given that

national autonomy is a necessary condition for soft-balancing policies towards Brazil (Flemes and Wehner, 2015), and thus, keeping regional hegemony at bay while preserving freedom of action in terms of security and defence. Similarly, the idea of regional autonomy was considered in order to block and soft-balancing US global pre-eminence and its overwhelming hemispheric hegemony.

Another equally important goal for some secondary powers was to pacify border disputes and avoid militarised escalations. This is particularly true in the cases of Chile and Colombia, and more recently Peru, whose economic policy strategies demonstrate clear guidelines for opening and whose governments are liberal democracies, but who bear the weight of unresolved territorial conflicts and have a relatively high military spending as percentage of GDP (SIPRI, 2017b) and important arsenals (IISS, 2017). A regional security agreement is likely to promote regional autonomy and limit the national, taking as a counterweight the reduction of border tensions, which would permit the strengthening of regional integration and redirect part of the national defence budget towards economic and social investment, for example. In this sense, the paradox of autonomy fits in with the old dilemma of opportunity cost, illustrated with the dichotomy of "guns versus butter" model of the production possibility frontier. Thus, regional autonomy could partially benefit the interests of national elites, although it could negatively affect the primary objective of secondary powers – national autonomy. Hence, efforts to overcome the paradox of autonomy tend to be centred on the institutional design of regional security mechanisms. In the following table, the trilemma of regional powers and secondary regional powers within the paradox of autonomy is proposed.

Table 4.3: Complex trilemma within the paradox of autonomy

Secondary Regional Power (sub-regional power) Strategy	**Non-Hegemonic Regional Power's Strategy**		
	Fully Cooperative	*Partially Cooperative*	*Non-Cooperative*
Fully Cooperative	1) Consolidated regional leadership 2) Fully operative regional security intuitions 3) Regional autonomy reinforcement imposing upon national autonomy	1) Delegated regional leadership 2) Partially operative regional security institutions 3) Regional autonomy reinforcement imposing upon national autonomy	1) No regional leadership 2) Diminished regional security institutions 3) Coordinated but unlikely successful regional/national autonomy efforts
Partially Cooperative	1) Consensual regional leadership 2) Partially operative regional security institutions 3) National autonomy reinforcement imposing upon regional autonomy	1) Unlikely regional leadership 2) Partially operative regional security institutions 3) National autonomy reinforcement imposing upon regional autonomy	1) No regional leadership 2) Diminished regional security institutions 3) Uncoordinated and unlikely successful regional/national autonomy efforts
Non–Cooperative	1) No regional leadership 2) Inoperative regional security institutions (if any) 3) No regional autonomy, and unlikely national autonomy	1) No regional leadership 2) Inoperative regional security institutions (if any) 3) No regional autonomy, and unlikely national autonomy	1) No regional leadership 2) No regional security institutions 3) Uncoordinated and unsuccessful national autonomy efforts

4.5.2 Realistic possibilities for regional security governance

The realistic possibilities to overcome the dilemmas of regional security fomented by the paradox of autonomy, go through agreements preceded by *maximin* strategies. The evidence to support this claim can be found in regional institutional design. Following the logic of Ikenberry's argument, the constitution of international institutions reflects the systemic distribution of power and the interest in reducing uncertainty (Ikenberry, 2009). Additionally, institutions create incentives for the generation of normative mechanisms which moderate the conduct of their members, increasing the costs of unilateral actions. Regional security agreements also promote group logics and establish lines of exclusion, which fits with the expected geostrategy of access to regional control by regional powers. Hence, the importance of institutions is primordial for regional hegemons, especially those who are barely fulfilling this role. For those states that pursue national autonomy,

regional security institutions create conditions for the contention of global hegemonies and can increase their power of international negotiation facing third parties.

The institutional constitution generates mechanisms of compensation prone to tilt the balance in favour of those who seek regional autonomy. However, the benefits of multilateral regional security agreements could be related to the principle of mutual moderation in the alliances of Pressman, a strategy of mitigating the security dilemma in the alliances in which states can establish agreements on defence and security, by aspiring to obtain guarantees of conduct and thus avoid being dragged into undesirable conflicts (Snyder, 1997; Pressman, 2008). Under the paradox of autonomy, regional institutions also function as restriction mechanisms, containing both the rise of a regional hegemonic power and the exercise of greedy unilateral strategies of national autonomy. But rigid regionalism is likely to fail under conditions of global multipolarity (Garzón, 2015), especially if the constitutive agreements are related to issues of national security and defence. Under conditions of high concentration of power in the international system, security and defence agreements tend to be rigid and connected to great rivalries. In that type of system, threats are easily identifiable. The rapid deconcentration of global power significantly alters international patterns of political economy and security, increasing the possibilities of diversification in external relations for minor powers, and their own autonomies. This can be found rooted in the rise of flexible regionalism and in the modelling of regional institutional design.

4.5.3 Modelling institutional design in regional security

The meaning of "modelling" is polysemic and if not treated with conceptual care, this can lead to both theoretical and political errors. In this text, by institutional modelling, one must understand the decision and action of giving an institution a specific form and designated limits, always within an international structural context capable of conditioning, either by empowering or limiting, those decisions and actions that are presumed to be rational. In the specific case of institutional design in regional security, the multilateral modelling is subject to the imperative of satisfying multiple interests which are managed at more than one analytical level of decision, and can even contemplate distinct political-ideological, or even cultural, criteria, depending on the degree of heterogeneity in the region in question. Obviously, the conditioning factors in the modelling of the design of the CDS respond to particular South American characteristics, being a region which has little in common with others of the Global South.

Nevertheless, certain criteria appear likely to be transferred and applied to other geopolitical contexts. These are: a) the degree of autonomy-heteronomy expected by the governments of the member states; b) the existence or not of a leadership able to impose a more, or less, unilateral agenda; and, c) the presence of a near power inclined to activate balance of power mechanisms, in the case of a great power, or a balance of threats, in the case of a power perceived as aggressive.

In the South American case, and most especially in that of the CDS, the lessons that can be drawn from modelling relate principally to the form in which the search for consensus ended in moderating the aspirations of both the maximalist and minimalist positions through a viable and acceptable result for the twelve governments of the region. On one hand, one can find the effect generated by the dilemma of autonomy, encouraged by the desire for a high degree of international autonomy by the national elites with access to, or influence in, foreign policy executives. The most notable consequence was the abandonment of the principle of collective defence, as well as a reduction in the degree of commitment in security terms. In this sense, it was Chilean diplomacy that was charged with giving practical shape and practical limits to the CDS, in accordance with its own interests in fomenting a regional instrument both lax and capable of creating spaces conducive to generating measures of mutual trust.

In this context, one must also consider the extreme positions and aspirations that were aborted, those of the Colombian and Venezuelan governments. The first was oriented to avoiding the creation of any form of regional institution which could put at risk its links with the US, Israel and, potentially, with NATO, while the latter was determined to push for a full military alliance, ready to balance the North Atlantic powers. But in addition to the mutual neutralisation of both secondary regional powers, it is also worth underlining the limited role played by the undisputed regional power, Brazil (Schenoni, 2014). This "leader without followers" (Malamud, 2011) was unable to impose its thesis on deterrence in the South Atlantic and agreed to support a minimal institutional design in the form of a regional security forum in which it unexpectedly delegated responsibility for the final modelling in the name of consensus.

Finally, US presence played a minor role in the modelling of the CDS design, with its relative absence being the most notable factor. The reason for this can be linked to the geostrategic reorientation of the US after September 11th, 2001, and which reached its climax in the middle of the global financial crisis, a period in which, besides its declining

economic capabilities, its capabilities of influence – soft power – and discretional use of military power – hard power – were seen as highly compromised given the stagnation of the US armed forces in Eurasia. The end of the Bush administration, marked by the weakening of US influence, and the gestures of goodwill or "benign neglect" (Haluani, 2003) promised by the new Obama administration, significantly reduced the impact of the thesis of balance of power facing Washington, leaving the governments of the Bolivarian Alliance with fewer arguments, given that the US did not appear either omnipotent or aggressive in the eyes of the majority of the South American political elite.

4.6 Conclusion

The development of the research agenda on the theory of autonomy must be taken through challenges. This article has referred to two of those, contributing to the encouragement of further progress. The main challenge is the conceptual definition of autonomy, to overcome the lack of agreement on what this means in the broad context of international politics, and in particular, in the study of regional security and security regionalism. The definitions of national autonomy and regional autonomy, proposed in parallel, reveal the possibility of a paradox with dilemmatic potential, undoing the Gordian knot of the debate between decisional autonomy and relational autonomy. But, while solving the conceptual problem, this shows an analytical and political problem which, until now, has not been dealt with.

Thus, the second challenge presented and confronted by this work is the problematisation of the theory of autonomy. In fact, that was the main task of the article. The first step towards a compilation and reorganisation of ideas about autonomy was taken by Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz (2013), connecting autonomy with regionalism and development, and relating it to ideological orientations and foreign policy strategies (Gardini and Lambert, 2011). In this work, steps were taken in both directions, developing the research program on autonomy. Firstly, it proposed a distinction between national, or individual, autonomy and regional autonomy, or collective, autonomy. And secondly, it explained their potentially conflictive relationship. Therefore, the paradox of autonomy and its dilemma does not contravene current advances in the theory of autonomy, on the contrary, it expands the research agenda and increases its complexity, instrumentalising it as a conceptual tool to understand security regionalisation processes under conditions of global power deconcentration.

What the recent South American experience indicates is that the dilemma produced by the paradox of autonomy, in the case of security regionalism, is not unsolvable. The circumstantial evidence suggests that in the case of the creation of the CDS the paradox was present, being resolved through the rational and multilateral manipulation of the institutional design. The paradox that the diffusion of power encourages both national and regional autonomy was reinforced by the limits on regional leadership, an effect that could also have among its causes the deconcentration of capabilities. These lessons continue to be preliminary findings which must be explored to establish the existence of causality. However, the relationships between the consequences and the assumed causes stand out, and this study opens a path which the research agenda can follow in the immediate future.

The above forms part of the theoretical testing deficit in the development of the research agenda in the new wave of studies on autonomy. Perhaps the analysis of a large number of cases could be too ambitious, given that, by definition, security regional institutions are few and the analysis of less recent cases seems an implausible possibility due to the absence of qualitative data. Thus, the next step in the research agenda on the theory of autonomy should involve theoretical testing and the establishment of causalities in a comparative transregional perspective.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

5.1 Final Remarks, Theoretical Contributions, and New Research Avenues

Why do the institutions associated with security regionalism in the Global South fail? Naturally, all political institutions are subject to performance problems, whether due to their design, structural conditions in their region, global structural transformations or changes in direction in the governments that form them. Rightly, Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallender titled their study of security institutions *Imperfect Unions…* (1999). The dissertation presented here accepts that, in effect, these institutions are subject to the pressures of the issues they encompass, or try to encompass. Nonetheless, the increase in regionalist attempts in the Global South, including the unprecedented CDS of South America, draws attention both in political and academic terms. In this doctoral dissertation, I affirm that the main reasons for failures in regional security in the Global South are linked to the effect I call the paradox of autonomy (Cf. Chapter Four).

The explanatory model developed on said paradox, warns of the inherent tensions regarding the search for autonomy. Thus, an international system that shows signs of deconcentration of capacities offers incentives for regional autonomy, even in political aspects as complex as security and collective defence. However, these same incentives trigger the search for greater autonomy on the part of national elites – especially in the case of secondary regional powers – potentially putting national interests in conflict with regional ones, the latter of which are generally represented by central regional powers. This undermines the possibility of functionally satisfactory security cooperation. This explanatory model was developed based on the South American experience. However, I claim that general common structural and historic factors between regions such as South America, West Africa, Southern Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and South-East Asia, are open to being analysed and compared through the lens of the paradox of autonomy. The model is not intended to give a uniform answer to the problems of security cooperation for all regions of the Global South, rather to be a tool to analyse and compare distinct patterns based on similar conditions.

Both in the original approach and in the later development of this doctoral dissertation, a natural blend of so-called global studies and research in regional studies was developed. A constant concern was to avoid regionally exclusive specificities as well as broad generalizations. This balance, however, was not forced but rather formed through an

analytical observation of reality. In this sense, this dissertation materialises two academic claims. The first is of an intellectual character, related to the relationship between global and regional studies – the same purpose as the general research program of the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, and the classical vision of IR – in the framework of Political Science – posited by the *Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften* of the *Universität Hamburg* (UHH). The second claim is academic-administrative, and is related to the usefulness of the GIGA-UHH agreement in the development of this type of social research project.

The general contribution of this doctoral dissertation is to the understanding of security dynamics in the Global South, taking in account the complex intergovernmental relations generated in this type of dynamic. These complexities relate to the high sensitivity of the geostrategy of great powers, the relative weakness of the states, the persistence of unresolved territorial conflicts and/or political-ideological rivalries, high dependence on raw materials and the volatile commodities market, and unstable political systems. This leads to a natural zeal for sovereignty in its most classical sense, as is affirmed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. South America has specificities which distance it significantly from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East or East Asia. The origins of its culture, and much of its population, are found in Western Europe. It is also a region that, with some exceptions, demonstrates a wide spread of democracy. However, structurally, it presents common characteristics which make it comparable with the rest of the Global South, especially in the aforementioned complexities of sovereignty.

Another aspect to highlight is the contribution of this research in the field of International Security Studies (ISS). Studies on regionalism have been focused, above all, on the study of schemes and models of economic integration (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010; Solingen, 2014). In this sense, the sub-field of IR most associated with regionalism has been International Political Economy (IPE). From IPE, analytical models of a certain sophistication have been developed, taking advantage of two inherent conditions in the sub-field of study: on the one hand, a greater link to Economics as science, which allows it to make use of developments in quantitative analytics and modelling (Solingen, 2014), and on the other, more time in the development of theories and methods, insomuch as regionalism was dealt with by IPE very early (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010), while ISS was focused more on regional alliances (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

There now exists a long tradition in ISS, as emphasised by Buzan and Hansen (2009), from the tradition of strategic studies originating in the heat of the Cold War, to more recent critical security studies, which include, for example, visions as radically distinct as classical strategic studies and the feminist school of thought. However, in the intersection between regionalism and security, the literature remains limited in comparison to the contributions in other areas of ISS. This is striking considering the tendencies towards a "world of regions" or a "regional world" (Katzenstein, 2005; Acharya, 2014). This dissertation forged a dialogue between ISS and regionalism, as well as regionalism and geopolitics – an angle that has been little analysed until recent works (Wehner and Nolte, 2017; Rivarola Puntigliano, 2017) – trying to respect the conceptual traditions of each one and foster the consolidation of research in the regionalisms of security. Additionally, it finds a narrow niche, and contributes to its development through mixed methods and by developing unusual analytical tools and models in the study of (security) regionalism.

But the contribution of this dissertation is not limited only to that of the intersection between ISS and regionalism, and of that, in turn, with geopolitics. The dominant literature on security regionalism has principally been produced in the US and Western Europe (McDougall, 2001; Collins, 2009; Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003; Hentz and Bøås, 2003; Dieter, 2007; Simon, 2007; Hettne, 2008). There has been little from the Global South which has transcended to international academia, and what has is mainly related to security problems in South-East Asia, especially the evolution of ASEAN (Goh and Acharya, 2007). This dissertation offers a contribution for and from the Global South, and particularly for and from South America. The notion of a "zone of peace" which has dominated studies on South American international politics, has marginalised it from the core of ISS. The South American dynamics of relative impotence in the projection of military power, as mentioned in Chapter Two, together with the development of a dense network of economic agreements, mentioned in Chapter Four, has given a vast field of study to regionalism based in IPE. This has not been the case of regionalism based in ISS. The CDS offered a key opportunity to introduce a focus on security in South American regionalism, and this dissertation capitalised on the possibility.

The way in which the case of security regionalism in South America was addressed in this dissertation is also a novel factor. The dissertation by compilation of manuscripts or articles already accepted or published, is not only functional for a scholar in the process of consolidating an academic career, but also allows the development of distinct theoretical

approximations and the application of different methods in each stage of doctoral research. Its three central chapters were written with a common general objective: to explain why security regionalism has such marked shortcomings in the Global South. Equally common was the design of researching a case study, South America, with the idea of theorising a general explanation that could be applied to other regions. The division into manuscripts and articles also allowed the independent application of distinct methods with the aim of responding to distinct aspects of the research. While Chapter Two criticised post-hegemonic regionalism and offered an alternative explanation of the development of South American security regionalism from the structuralism of neoclassical geopolitics, Chapter Three presented the performance of the CDS based on a causal chain of observable variables. This allowed the final, central chapter, Chapter Four, to be a more theoretical and analytical effort aimed at developing an explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy as a means of getting closer to understanding the failings of security regionalism in the Global South, based on a theorisation of a case study (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2006; Yin, 2011).

The methods applied merit an additional mention, based on the originality of their application in the intersection between ISS and regionalism. In Chapter Two, the qualitative interpretation of quantitative data and recent historical facts does not present an apparent novelty. However, in the context of the post-hegemonic explanation, dominant in South America, these conventional methods open a breach in the middle of the dominant interpretations which limited a phenomenological explanation at the dawn of UNASUR and the CDS. Chapter Three, on the other hand, used the qualitative method of process tracing. This method, booming in social studies, has barely been seen in the framework of ISS (Mahoney, 2015). It permitted the establishment of an explanatory causal chain on the practical limitations of the CDS in almost ten years of existence. And finally, in Chapter Four, a theoretical-methodological approach was proposed in favour of the analytical usefulness of case studies. Interpreting the data and facts considered in the previous two chapters, this final chapter sets out the validity of an explanatory model which, based on the South American experience, can be applied to other regional realities, recognising the need to consider contextual specificities but also the common characteristics of the Global South, in particular its relationship with the Global North and tensions relating to autonomy in elites attached to classical criteria of sovereignty (Ayoob, 2002).

Beyond the multiple methods applied, this research built an argument based on criticism. The principal object of this criticism, especially in Chapter Two, is the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism. The post-hegemonic explanation of South American regionalism has become, paradoxically, hegemonic. This research challenged what has been, until now, conventional South American wisdom. In that sense, this dissertation is not a voice in the desert, as other researchers and some centres of Latin American studies have started to talk about the "end of the post-hegemonic cycle". For example, the German Association of Latin American Research (ADLAF in its German initials) presented a forum in October 2017 titled *Krise des post-hegemonialen Zyklus? Außenpolitiken und internationale Beziehungen Lateinamerikas nach dem Ende des Rohstoffbooms* (Crisis of the post-hegemonic cycle? Foreign policy and IR in Latin America after the commodity boom). The forum was organised by the *Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut*, Berlín, and the GIGA, the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. However, this is the first doctoral research which presents the causes of the end of this cycle, and also contributes a parsimonious explanation of the phenomenon.

The challenge to the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism was framed inside an even greater challenge: that which refers to the rescue of structural criteria as explanation of international political phenomena. The growth of post-structural focuses in Political Science, in general, and particularly in IR, has been enriching epistemological and theoretical debates in the discipline for at least thirty years (Onuf, 2012; Dunne et al, 2013). The post-structuralist contribution has allowed the generation of critical schools of thought with the potential to make us rethink the study of IR, especially regarding problems such as the relation of the subject with the diffuse object of study, or the definition of causality. However, the post-structural reticence regarding positivist epistemology, and even epistemological realism (Furlong and Marsh, 2010), has made international analysis difficult, bringing research to a self-referencing loop of intradisciplinary debate. In this research, distance from the intradisciplinary debate was marked, a realist epistemological position assumed, and the structuralist analysis defended based on a pivot capable of upholding the development of logical arguments based on observable evidence, and with a lesser susceptibility to assuming discursive elements of political origin as facts.

This is part of a larger debate in IR. Going deep into more specifically regional debates, this research forms part of academic efforts to rescue the main characteristic of South

American international politics: autonomy. The research agenda on Latin American autonomy has historically relied on important contributions, mainly from South America (Briceño-Ruiz and Simonoff, 2015). One of the unspoken objectives of this dissertation was to enter, and contribute to, the study of South American autonomy, but with a clear orientation to problematise it by exposing the until now neglected paradox of national, or individual, autonomy and regional, or collective, autonomy. This concern is perceived as a common factor in the Global South, although it has been better developed academically in South America and over a longer period. It was precisely this debate in South America which allowed this dissertation to be considered an initial part of a broader project for a better understanding of the failures of security regionalism in the Global South.

With that task in mind, the challenge was to construct a general analytical model which did not leave aside South American regional specificities. Thus, Chapters 2 and 3 took in account strictly South American factors. In the case of Chapter Two, these factors related to the geopolitical dynamics of regionalism, emphasising the trend towards fragmentation. In a region in which regionalism has tended to be primarily economic, and its study based in IPE, it is natural that the specificity is related to the divergence between MERCOSUR and the AP (Briceño-Ruiz and Morales, 2017). It was assumed that this division in South America, following the Andes mountain range and directly affecting UNASUR, would have a structural effect on the CDS. In Chapter Three, using the process tracing method between 2009 and 2017, it was confirmed, with some degree of certainty that the orientations of the members of the AP have tended to diverge from the international and political postures of the governments of MERCOSUR. Moreover, it was established that recent convergences are not only limited, but also that, firstly, traces of the so-called hegemony do not appear, and secondly, they do not escape the logic exposed by the explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy.

The development of this explanatory model, constructed from the findings of Chapter Three and clearly set out in Chapter Four –based on the structural factors included in Chapter Two– was one of the major challenges in the elaboration of this dissertation and is, without doubt, its principal analytical contribution. The paradox of autonomy includes elements of the rationalist thought tradition in IR (Powell, 1999; Glaser, 2010), organising and applying them in order to logically and systematically account for the principal failing detected in South American security regionalism. The model has the express virtue of parsimony, as well as the potential virtue of application to other regional contexts in the

Global South. The development and application of this explanatory model not only confronts the thesis of post-hegemonic regionalism, being a potential substitute, but also calls into question the thesis of multipolarity as the driving force behind the changes in regionalism, especially in matters of security.

Discussion of polarity in the international system, and particularly around the supposed multipolar order in which new forms of South American regionalism have emerged and developed, has occupied an important position in studies of international politics in the 21st century. In Chapter Two of this dissertation, the assumption of increasing multipolarity is questioned with facts, and between Chapters 2 and 4 the usefulness of this assumption is refuted. More than polarity, polarisation – operationalised through the concentration of material capabilities – offers a better answer when contrasted with the solidity of great poles of international power. In this research, polarisation played a prominent role in accounting for capability flows that affect, above all, the Global South. The opposition to polarity as a useful tool to explain security regionalism culminates in the model of the paradox of autonomy and is nourished by the varieties of polarisation in the international system, while putting these in the context of the South American dynamics associated with that sovereign zeal referred to by subaltern realism (Ayoob, 2002).

But to construct said explanation, it was necessary to call on two neoclassical turns in the framework of theories of IR. The first of the turns which nourished this dissertation was presented in Chapter Two, and came from neoclassical geopolitics (Megoran, 2010; Guzzini, 2012; Wehner and Nolte, 2017), by rescuing structural criteria which permitted the challenging of the principles of post-hegemonic regionalism. The second was neoclassical realism (Sterling-Folker, 1997; Rose, 1998; Lobell et al, 2009; Ripsman et al, 2016). By considering the interaction between the domestic and international levels, it was possible to follow the evolution of the CDS in Chapter Three. Within this framework, it was possible to find causal chains which resulted in confirmation of the paradox of autonomy. Together, these neoclassical turns favoured a systemic approach which returns to look at the fundamental pillars of IR, such as the relationship of states with the international structure, and its variations, and the relations between weak states of the South and the great powers of the North (Escudé, 2012; Schenoni and Escudé, 2016).

In this sense, a reconsideration was undertaken of the role of the US in its material dimensions, both absolute and relative. The above analysis dismissed the principal of

structural post-hegemony and developed a richer taxonomy than that proposed by polarity, be it uni-, bi-, or multi- (Cf. Chapter Four). As explained, in a still unipolar order, a process of deconcentration of power is possible and this could generate more complex orders, and explain autonomist strategies, without the occurrence of a transition of power or a systemic crisis. Thus, the regional presence of a (super)power such as the US could be a latent phenomenon, containing possible gaps that give minor powers more room to manoeuvre. Greater or lesser polarisation, analysed in terms of concentration, offers an explanation for these gaps without necessarily having to assume the absolute decline of the (super)power, or much less, a structural post-hegemony. Another factor, explained in Chapter Two and taken up again in Chapter Four, is the geostrategic orientation towards extra-regional areas. This phenomenon, together with the deconcentration of capabilities, possesses an explanatory capability difficult for post-hegemonic regionalism to attain.

But as an explanatory model, the paradox of autonomy does not have all the answers for all cases. The special attention it gives to the great powers in the North-South relationship, following the principals of peripheric realism (Escudé 2012; Schenoni and Escudé 2016), must be carefully applied in each regional case. This has a geopolitical reason related to the localisation of great powers and their marked interests in Eurasia and Africa – the "world island" of Mackinder. Thus, the geostrategic orientation of the US towards Asia has a different effect on security regionalism in South-East Asia than it could have in South America. Similarly, the geostrategic orientation of China in Africa, and the competition in security that has arisen with the US after the creation of USAFRICOM must be viewed in a specific light, as it represents a scenario of rivalry between two extra-regional powers.

Deserving of special mention, although complementary to the explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy, are the analytical frameworks of the rational design of institutions (Koremenos et al, 2001) and the operability of alliances (Morgenthau, 2005). In Chapter Three, rational institutional design played a central role in the identification of incentives which, from the same origin as the CDS, conditioned a search for national autonomy over regional. The framework of this institutional design affected the full operability of the CDS. To analyse these failures, an under-used concept in IR was adopted: that of the operability of alliances. It is controversial that typical criteria of military alliances are applied to schemes of security regionalism. However, readapted as an analytical framework, the operability of alliances managed to account for the limitations of the CDS based on the limited multilateral commitments of the partners/allies. Moreover, the use of the

operability of alliances as an analytical framework was justified according to the original proposals of Brazil and Venezuela on the design of the CDS (Mijares, 2011).

A feature of this dissertation, in the framework of studies on Latin American regionalism, and particularly studies of UNASUR and its Councils, is its non-militant character. Although in Thomas Legler's exposition on post-hegemonic regionalism (2013) it appeared that the optimists and sceptics were equivalent blocs, there has in fact been a marked orientation towards a militant explanation in favour of the new regionalist wave. On one side are the ideological sympathies of the left, and on the other, the constructivist conviction that discourses can construct realities. This dissertation reflects an exercise of distance with respect to any militant academia, which has permitted it to develop an approach with a critical spirit, based on data and actions collected through a politically disinterested scientific curiosity. This realist approach goes against the majority of recent works on South American regionalism, especially those related to UNASUR and its distinct Councils. Thus, in addition to its explanatory contributions, this research introduces greater pluralism in the study of regionalism, not only in terms of the expansion from IPE to ISS, but also defending a critical vision from a predominantly structural realist approach based on observable, and in some cases, operationalisable, evidence.

In addition to a non-militant vision, this dissertation offers an explanatory framework which goes beyond Latin America or South America. Unlike most studies of Latin American regionalism, it does not explicitly or implicitly evoke exceptionalism. Even when the specificities of Latin America, and particularly South America, are considered in each of the chapters, the idea of this project is to draw lessons from the experience of the CDS with the aim of explaining the South American dynamic, as well as to extrapolate these lessons to other regional contexts. There is a rich literature on the formation of regional security mechanisms but, with the exception of ASEAN, this wealth decreases substantially when referring to the performance of such institutions. This dissertation has been a first attempt at understanding the performance of security regionalisms in the Global South based on the South American experience. But at the same time, it offers explanations that could be applied to other forms of cooperation in regional security and defence, including military alliances.

In this way, the work presented here is intended to be an explanatory model which allows, with time and through extended multi-regional empirical research – in the framework of the so-called "comparative area studies" (CAS) (Basedau and Köllner, 2007; Ahram, 2011),

the development of a general explanation, or even a theory, of security regionalisms. To this end, this research presented the first, minimum criteria of comparison. Starting from respect for regional specificities, these minimum criteria of comparison are only applicable insomuch as they understand factors such as: the inherent needs of elites in weak states; adherence to the classical criteria of Westphalian sovereignty; rivalries, security dilemmas and intra-regional mistrusts; the polarity/polarisation relationship in the global international system; and the geostrategic role that the Global North continues to play, especially the referential power(s) in each region.

On the other hand, there are the differences, particularly those related to the specificities of security matters. One of the elements within the theoretical framework of this dissertation, above all in Chapter Two, has its origin in the RSCT (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). This element attributes a high range of autonomy in terms of specificities conditioned by spatial factors. Regional realities in the Global South differ significantly, although the trend is towards hybrid zones, as defined by Jorge Battaglino (2012) for the case of South America. This trend, although not yet complete and still to be tested empirically, is a fundamental thesis from which the application of the explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy in the broad and growing research agenda of CAS could be initiated. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that an important gap in the field of ISS can be detected in said agenda, especially in relation to security regionalisms. This doctoral dissertation tries to be, in effect, a starting point to move in that direction.

This study of security regionalism also intends to create a dialogue with other theses, beyond its critique of post-hegemonic regionalism. Thus, for example, a more extensive study would appear to be inexorably directed at the thesis of institutional diffusion (Jetschke and Lenz, 2013). As explained by Thomas Risse (2016), institutional diffusion does not occur through direct effects, but rather indirect stimuli of emulation. This occurs in terms of specific regional conditions and objectives defined by national elites. The pertinent considerations of Risse favour the possibility of a dialogue between the thesis of institutional diffusion and the explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy in security regionalisms. This shows, on one hand, the limitations of institutional diffusion as an explanation of the emergence of regional mechanisms in the Global South, in terms of the direct influence of the Global North. And on the other hand, it introduces the criterion that could be called an interested emulation, which creates, in effect, common

institutional conditions on which it would be possible to make the comparisons expected from the research agenda of CAS.

Finally, once the actual and potential contributions of this dissertation have been revised, it is necessary to consider what follows. Firstly, as has already been suggested in these conclusions, this research opens new avenues in a research agenda which combines ISS and regionalism, but also includes a rational-structuralist and neoclassical geopolitical vision of the Global South. The factors shown in this research highlighted the shortcomings of approaches and theses laden with an initial militant optimism, but which have been deficient in explaining regional institutional performance in matters of security and defence cooperation. These shortcomings arise from interpretative epistemological positions which set aside facts and concrete actions. The new research avenues must not fall into the same trap of relegating interpretative focuses in terms of positivist or realist epistemologies; rather, they must establish a broad epistemological dialogue, anchored in observable evidence.

This emerging agenda of comparative security regionalisms must be multidisciplinary and draw on multiple traditions. Firstly, I believe that the success of this agenda will depend, to a large extent, on the investigative capability to combine the best of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of IR, from the platform of Political Science and its comparative methods, with Regional or Area Studies, which although also coming from Anglo-Saxon roots, have tended to be more associated with the continental European tradition. The combination of theories and methods of Political Science, of which IR is a field of study and ISS a sub-field, offers a global extension which would allow comparison between regions in terms of similarities and differences. Said differences would, in particular, enter Area Studies as an invaluable contribution to the understanding of both geopolitical and cultural specificities, essentially in terms of the dominant political culture of each region. Area Studies, in turn, would incorporate the multidisciplinary factor, in a range that goes from economics to anthropological-cultural studies, via research on social psychology and political regimes.

As for the possibility of theoretical and, above all, methodological growth, the proposed agenda could have a direct impact on dialogue with the historical institutionalist focus (Thelen, 1999; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). The way in which the explanation of institutional performance in security regionalism is proposed would allow the reconstruction of its histories. This would facilitate the follow-up task in terms of sensitivity to changes of greater or lesser magnitude at the systemic level, as well as to

dominant regional logics and dynamics; all of this framed in the explanatory model of the paradox of autonomy.

The specific nature of this agenda would be found in ISS focused on the Global South. The most prominent precedent on security studies in the South is found in the research of Mohammed Ayoob (1991, 1995, 2002). This doctoral dissertation owes a profound intellectual debt to the theoretical proposal of Ayoob related to subaltern realism. This realism *for* the South, as well as the realism *from* the South of Carlos Escudé, peripheral realism (1992), has been incorporating into the study of less developed regions concepts and criteria which, while remaining universal or generalisable, pay attention to realities distinct from those of the Global North. This intellectual debt to subaltern and peripheral realisms would also be shared by the research agenda derived from this dissertation, as its main feature would be in the systematic and comparative study of security regionalisms. The central axis in the formation of this research program would be in the understanding and explanation of the failures frequently presented by security institutions in the Global South.

Concern for security institutions, especially their flaws and problems in the Global South, in regions in which, with greater or lesser degrees of severity, there has been an important interest such as unstable zones or open conflicts, inevitably arouses interest beyond the academic sphere, constituting a potential research field under political attention. The study of failures in security regionalisms would have the virtue of transcending the academic field and being easily accommodated in current political analysis. For that reason, it could have three types of audience: one interested in political-military considerations, another in economic matters, and a third focused on humanitarian themes.

The audience interested in political-military considerations, principally members of the armed forces, diplomats and political decisionmakers, could see a research agenda in security regionalisms as a source of data and knowledge which could help them understand and anticipate possibilities of greater or lesser cohesion in regional security in sensitive regions. From an economic perspective, it is known that the Global South is characterised by the possession of vast natural resources in conditions of internal under-exploitation and low political institutionality, which make greater or lesser security cooperation a highly relevant factor in evaluating investment risks. Both audiences tend to make use of political risk analysis (Rugman, 2003; Jarvis and Griffiths 2007; Bremmer and Keat, 2010). The research agenda in security regionalisms could well be

accommodated in this type of analysis, increasing its political analytical value and adding a financial and commercial interest. In addition, the third potential audience, Human Rights analysts and activists, could find in the study of failures of security regionalisms in the Global South an explanation leading to a roadmap based on a desirable impact for better regional security cooperation in unstable zones where the civil population is the most affected; that is to say, a useful approach for human security (Paris, 2001).

This research, as an ambitious work in progress, culminates with an obligation to deepen and a promise to expand. Firstly, an obligation to deepen: research limitations in the field of ISS relate to the reluctance of military officers and diplomats to reveal information, and while interviews and private conversations with military officers and diplomats were undertaken (Cf. Chapter Three), resources were insufficient to cover a wider spectrum. How are security regionalisms seen from the small states such as Guyana and Suriname, in the case of the CDS? What impact does a regional security agreement have on the complex bureaucracy of regional powers such as Brazil? What domestic implications do security regionalisms have for maximalist political projects in oil states such as Venezuela? What role do these institutions play in peace processes, as in the case of Colombia? This obligation leads towards a future refocus, to combine again multiple methods, but this time including a greater number of in-depth interviews with elites and experts.

The promise to expand is associated with the next step towards generalisation based on a case study, which is the test of the explanatory model and its methodology in other regions. This large-scale project can only be started with a doctoral dissertation which, despite limitations of time and budget, opens a space for research. Under the principle of expansion in this study, the same questions would be applied to questions relating to the interaction between regionalism and security in the Global South, in contexts of systemic-structural influence, always under the assumption of the search for some form of autonomy. But puzzles and doubts relating to regional logics and dynamics will necessarily arise. How does the impotence of Nigeria facing the insurgency of Boko Haram, and its oath of loyalty to the Islamic State, affect the operation of the ECOMOG? What implications has the creation of the USAFRICOM had in the performance of the OPDS of the SADC? How to interpret the sanctions imposed on Bahrain by its partners and allies in the GCC in the framework of the Peninsula Shield Force? Does the Asia Pivot of the US reinforce the initiative of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint or does it generate unnecessary tensions with China?

Both the obligation to deepen and the promise to expand entail admitting two things that are logically and sequentially tied. The first is that a doctoral dissertation does not involve the sufficient time, resources or space to undertake a task of such dimensions. The second, that such a titanic task requires institutional and financial support for the establishment of an academic career based on the comparative study of security regionalisms in the Global South. Thus, this doctoral dissertation is far from being a final stage, but the starting point of a challenging but thriving academic project.

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Appendices

I. Summary

This doctoral dissertation offers a rational explanation of cooperation flaws in regional security mechanisms in the Global South. My main argument is that, when it comes to regional cooperation for security, Global South regions may be susceptible to tensions between the search for regional autonomy and that of national autonomy. The result of these tensions is low multilateral cooperation. This outcome could be mitigated through the manipulation of institutional design, although the operability of these regional security mechanisms can be permanently affected. I call this effect the "paradox of autonomy", and its most conspicuous case is the South American one. The chosen case was the Defence Council of the Union of South American Nations (CDS for its acronym in Spanish and Portuguese). This study covers the almost decade of the existence of the CDS, considering structural aspects of the international system, as well as regional geopolitical factors, and domestic political dynamics.

The research revealed an incongruence that accompanied the CDS from its beginning: the structural conditions, as well as the regional and national dynamics that favoured an unprecedented exercise of South American regional autonomy, also opened opportunities for the search for greater margins of freedom of action in the international political arena. This incongruence between regional autonomy and national autonomy became a tension is explained by the paradox of autonomy, an analytical model developed for this work.

The project went through three distinct phases reflected in three manuscripts that make up the central chapters of the dissertation. The first one is entitled "Missing Geopolitical Links in Explaining the South American Defence Council." In this Chapter Two, I start with a structural explanation of the origins and subsequent deficiencies that the CDS has presented in terms of multilateral cooperation. Based on a quantitative analysis of the concentration of capabilities in the international system, as well as a geopolitical analysis, the chapter explains how the incentives for the creation of the Council also serve as inducements for a low multilateral regional security commitment.

The second manuscript corresponds to Chapter Three, entitled "The South American Defence Council Performance under Autonomy Pressures". It explores the shortcomings of the performance of the CDS with greater emphasis on the regional and national levels

of analysis. The chapter presents a purely qualitative methodology based on the method of descriptive inference, a subsidiary of process tracing. Use of historical analysis, and interviews with elites and experts, supported the method and neoclassical realism works as the referential theoretical framework. The results of this phase confirmed those of Chapter Two, but also provided empirical elements that allowed me to infer the regional (collective) / national (individual) tensions derived from a generalized quest for autonomy in South America.

Finally, Chapter Four, entitled "Explaining Flaws of Security Regionalism in the Global South: Lessons from the South American Paradox of Autonomy," corresponds to a theoretical formulation based on the results of the previous two chapters. In it, I address the major contribution of the dissertation: the analytical framework of the paradox of autonomy in security regionalism, offering clues to its application for the rest of the Global South.

II. Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Diese Doktorarbeit bietet eine Erklärung für Schwachstellen in der Kooperation in regionalen Sicherheitsmechanismen des Globalen Südens. Mein zentrales Argument ist, dass Regionen des Globalen Südens im Bereich der regionalen Sicherheitskooperation anfällig für Spannungen sein können, die sich aus dem Streben nach regionaler Autonomie auf der einen und nationaler Autonomie auf der anderen Seite ergeben. Die Folge dieser Spannungen ist ein niedriges Niveau multilateraler Kooperation. Dieses Resultat könnte durch die Veränderung des institutionellen Designs entschärft werden, obwohl dadurch die Funktionsfähigkeit der regionalen Sicherheitsmechanismen dauerhaft beeinträchtigt werden kann. Südamerika ist die Region, in der dieser Effekt, den ich als das „Paradox der Autonomie“ bezeichne, am augenscheinlichsten zu beobachten ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht als Fallstudie den Verteidigungsrat der Union Südamerikanischer Nationen (CDS nach seiner spanischen und portugiesischen Abkürzung) und behandelt den gesamten Zeitraum – mittlerweile fast ein ganzes Jahrzehnt – des Bestehens dieser Institution. Dabei werden strukturelle Aspekte des internationalen Systems, regionale geopolitische Faktoren und innenpolitische Dynamiken berücksichtigt.

Die Untersuchung offenbart einen Zielkonflikt, der den CDS von seiner Gründung an begleitet: die strukturellen Bedingungen des internationalen Systems sowie die regionalen und nationalen Dynamiken, die eine beispiellose Stärkung der regionalen Autonomie in Südamerika begünstigten, eröffneten zugleich Möglichkeiten für ein Streben nach größerer Handlungsfreiheit der einzelnen Staaten in der internationalen politischen Arena. Die Arbeit erklärt diesen Zielkonflikt zwischen regionaler und nationaler Autonomie mit dem oben erwähnten analytischen Modell des Paradoxes der Autonomie, das für diese Arbeit entwickelt wurde.

Das Forschungsprojekt durchlief drei unterschiedliche Phasen, deren Ergebnisse in den drei zentralen Kapiteln (Kapitel zwei, drei und vier) der Dissertation dargestellt sind. Das erste davon, Kapitel zwei der Arbeit, trägt den Titel “Missing Geopolitical Links in Explaining the South American Defence Council”. Es beginnt mit einer strukturellen Erklärung der Ursprünge der multilateralen Kooperation im Rahmen des CDS und der daraus folgenden Unzulänglichkeiten. Aufbauend auf einer quantitativen Analyse der Konzentration von Ressourcen im internationalen System sowie einer geopolitischen Untersuchung erklärt das Kapitel, wie die Motivation für die Einrichtung des Rates

zugleich einen Anreiz für ein niedriges Bekenntnis zu multilateraler regionaler Sicherheit darstellt.

Kapitel drei, "The South American Defence Council Performance under Autonomy Pressures", untersucht die mangelnde Leistungsfähigkeit des CDS mit Schwerpunkt auf der regionalen sowie der nationalen Ebene der Analyse. Diese rein qualitative Studie basiert auf deskriptiver Inferenz, einer speziellen Methode des Process Tracing. Diese Methode wird unterstützt durch historische Analyse sowie Interviews mit Vertretern der Elite und Experten. Neoklassischer Realismus bildet den referentiellen theoretischen Bezugsrahmen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie bestätigen die Resultate des vorangegangenen Kapitels und bringen gleichzeitig neue empirische Erkenntnisse zu den Spannungen zwischen der regionalen (kollektiven) und nationalen (individuellen) Ebene, die sich aus dem allgemeinen Streben nach Autonomie in Südamerika ergeben.

Aufbauend auf den empirischen Ergebnissen der zwei vorherigen Kapitel entwickelt Kapitel vier mit dem Titel "Explaining Flaws of Security Regionalism in the Global South: Lessons from the South American Paradox of Autonomy" ein theoretisches Erklärungsmodell. Hier befasse ich mich mit dem zentralen Beitrag der Dissertation: dem analytischen Rahmen für das Paradox der Autonomie im Regionalismus der Sicherheitskooperation und Möglichkeiten für dessen Anwendung für den Rest des Globalen Südens.

Selbstdeklaration bei kumulativen Promotionen

Konzeption / Planung: Formulierung des grundlegenden wissenschaftlichen Problems, basierend auf bisher unbeantworteten theoretischen Fragestellungen inklusive der Zusammenfassung der generellen Fragen, die anhand von Analysen oder Experimenten/Untersuchungen beantwortbar sind. Planung der Experimente/ Analysen und Formulierung der methodischen Vorgehensweise, inklusive Wahl der Methode und unabhängige methodologische Entwicklung.

Durchführung: Grad der Einbindung in die konkreten Untersuchungen bzw. Analysen.

Manuskripterstellung: Präsentation, Interpretation und Diskussion der erzielten Ergebnisse in Form eines wissenschaftlichen Artikels.

Die Einschätzung des geleisteten Anteils erfolgt mittels Punkteinschätzung von 1 –100%.

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Bogota D.C., Kolumbien,
der 22. Februar 2018



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