

Medical Metaphors in Plutarch: The Example of πολιτικὴ ἰατρεία

Dissertation

zur Erlangung der Würde der Doktorin der Philosophie (Dr. phil)

der Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften,

Fachbereiche Sprache, Literatur, Medien I & II

der Universität Hamburg

vorgelegt von

Eleni Plati

aus Volos (Griechenland)

Hamburg 2020

1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Christian Brockmann (Betreuer)

2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Klaus Lennartz

Datum der Disputation: 09.09.2020

Στους γονείς μου και την αδερφή μου

Στη μνήμη του λατρεμένου μου θείου Τάκη

Acknowledgments

The idea of this project was conceived during my graduate studies at the University of Thessaloniki. From the inception of it to the final stage of this study, I have accumulated many debts to people who have supported me in one way or another. First of all, I am indebted to my supervisor Christian Brockmann for his careful remarks, acute comments, and intellectual support. I am also grateful to Professor Klaus Lennartz for his comments and intellectual enthusiasm, and to the whole scientific board that I met at the University of Hamburg. I would especially like to thank Marlene Grau for her encouragement and support on language matters.

For supportiveness and stimulating discussion on Plutarchan matters and beyond I must look further back too. I am indebted to all my professors from the University of Thessaloniki, especially to Professor Evangelos Alexiou, who was the first who inspired me into the Plutarchan world. My warmest gratitude belongs to the dearly departed Professor Paraskevi Kotzia, who urged me to delve into the Galenic Corpus. Moreover, I am grateful to my Professor Maria Andronikou for her moral support and encouragement.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Foundations that supported this project financially. The financial assistance provided by the *Foundation for Education and European Culture (IPEP)* allowed me to begin and promote my doctoral studies at the University of Hamburg. Furthermore, the grant by the *Leventis Foundation* made the progress of this study possible. Finally, the fellowship by the *German Research Foundation (DFG)* in the collaborative research center *CRC 1015 Otium* offered me the necessary *otium* to complete this study in peace of mind at the University of Freiburg.

Above all, I wholeheartedly thank my friends and family for their support and affection in every imaginable manner.

Contents

Acknowledgments	iii
-----------------------	-----

Introduction

Research Status	2
Politics and Medicine.....	7
Terminology, Scope and Structure of the Study	11

Chapter I

The frontiers between medicine and philosophy

1.1. The Philological Debate	16
1.2 Ancient Sources on <i>scientia</i> and <i>sapientia</i>	18
<i>Conclusions</i>	27

Chapter II

Preliminary theoretical framework: Metaphors in context

2.1. Plato: εἰκῶν.....	28
2.2. Aristotle and the conceptual metaphor theory	30
2.3. Metaphor and intertextuality: Does metaphor open a text to its intertext?	35
2.3.1. Interdiscursivity and medicine	36
2.3.2. Metaphor and textuality of science: Does metaphor obscure or uncover scientific truth?	37
2.4. Galen on metaphor and Metaphors in medicine.....	38
2.5. Plutarch on metaphor.....	45
2.6. <i>Papyrus Hamburgensis 128</i>	50
<i>Conclusions</i>	56

Chapter III

Metaphors from anatomy

3.1. ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν δεσμοί	58
3.2. παράθρησις	62
3.3. κατάτασις–κατάστασις	64
3.4. Galen & Aristotle on motion	67
3.5. Plutarch, Aristotle and Galen on proper place.....	68
3.6. δικαιοσύνη φύσις.....	70
3.6.1. κατὰ φύσιν	72
3.6.2. παρὰ φύσιν	73

3.7. Ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν φεύγων τὸν ἰατρόν	78
3.8. ἔλκος Τηλέφειον	80
<i>Conclusions</i>	85

Chapter IV

ἀπόρρητος πολιτικὴ ἰατρεία

Towards a Plutarchan political philosophy in the flesh (Praec. ger. reip. 814F-815C):

4.1. The term of embodiment in Cognitive Linguistic Theory (CLT)	88
4.2. πρᾶος ἰατρός: <i>Philanthropia</i> in medicine and politics	90
4.3. ὥσπερ ἰατροὶ τὰ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τῆς πολιτείας ἔξω τρέποντες: Warding off the <i>longa manus</i> of the political doctor	94
4.4. ὡς γὰρ ἰατρός, ἀφελὼν πολὺ τοῦ διεφθορότος αἵματος: Bloodletting and political corruption.....	99
4.5. ὀλίγον ἀβλαβοῦς τροφῆς προσήνεγκεν: Regimen against πλῆθος and στάσις	102
4.6. διαφ(θ)ορά and πρόσκρου(σ)μα: Corruption in the political and human body.....	108
<i>Conclusions</i>	113

Chapter V

Metaphors from mixture (κρᾶσις)

5.1. δεῖ τὸ ἀπαθές καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι πολὺ.....	115
5.2. ἰσχύσασα-σύμμετρος κρᾶσις vs στάσις.....	118
5.3. Hippocrates on κρᾶσις.....	121
5.4. Galen on κρᾶσις.....	123
5.5. Plutarch on κρᾶσις.....	127
5.6. Plutarchus Aristotelicus and Galenus Aristotelicus on δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις.....	130
5.6.1. The Aristotelian schema on μίξις, κρᾶσις, and σύνθεσις.....	131
5.6.2 The paradigm of <i>τετραφάρμακον</i>	132
5.6.3. <i>Body going through body</i> : The Stoic ἀντιπαρέκτασις	134
5.7. Political bodies going through political bodies: Plutarch towards a Stoic ἀντιπαρέκτασις of political bodies?.....	142
5.8. ὑπουλος in medicine and politics	149
5.9. ἄκρατος δημοκρατία and ἐλευθερία.....	154
5.10. ὠφελῆειν, ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν.....	159
<i>Conclusions</i>	163
<i>Texts, translations, and abbreviations</i>	167

<i>Bibliography</i>	168
<i>Appendix:</i>	
<i>Summary</i>	191
<i>Zusammenfassung</i>	192
<i>Publication list</i>	194
<i>Index locorum</i>	195

Introduction

[ΜΟΣΧΙΩΝ]

Σὺ δὴ Γλαῦκον χθές, ὦ Ζεύξιππε, τὸν ἱατρὸν ἀπετριψῶ συμφιλοσοφεῖν ὑμῖν βουλόμενον.

[ΖΕΥΞΙΠΠΟΣ]

Οὐτ' ἀπετριψάμην, ὦ φίλε Μοσχίων, οὐτ' ἐβούλετο συμφιλοσοφεῖν ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλ' ἔφυγον καὶ ἐφοβήθην λαβὴν φιλομαχοῦντι παρασχεῖν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἰατρικῇ καθ' Ὅμηρον ὁ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων οὐκ εὐμενῆς δὲ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τι τραχὺ καὶ δύσκολον ἔχων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. καὶ νῦν ἐναντίος ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἐχώρει, βοῶν ἔτι πρόσωθεν οὐ μικρὸν οὐδ' ἐπικεικὲς ἔργον ἡμῖν σύγχυσιν ὄρων τετολμῆσθαι, διαλεχθεῖσι περὶ διαίτης ὑγιεινῆς. 'χωρίς' γὰρ ἔφη τὰ φιλοσόφων καὶ ἱατρῶν ὥσπερ τινῶν 'Μυσῶν καὶ Φρυγῶν ὀρίσματα,' καὶ τινα τῶν οὐ μετὰ σπουδῆς, οὐ μὴν ἀχρήστως εἰρημένων παρ' ἡμῶν διὰ στόματος ἔχων ἐσπάραττεν.

[ΜΟΣΧΙΩΝ]

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἔγωγε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὦ Ζεύξιππε, πρόθυμος ἀκροατὴς ἠδέως ἂν γενοίμην.

(Plutarch, *De tuenda sanitate praecepta* 122B-D)

In the introductory dialogue above, the physician Glaucus appears as an enemy of philosophy who denounces to discourse on philosophical matters (οὐκ εὐμενῆς δὲ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν). Rather, he challenges indignantly the philosophers' right to discuss medical topics accusing them of having ventured to cross the borders between medicine and philosophy (σύγχυσιν ὄρων τετολμῆσθαι). These are so close to each other as the neighbouring frontiers between Mysians and Phrygians (*De tuenda* 122C [=Adespota TGrF 560 Nauck]: χωρίς [ἐστίν] τὰ φιλοσόφων καὶ ἱατρῶν, ὥσπερ τινῶν Μυσῶν καὶ Φρυγῶν ὀρίσματα). The 'crossing' of these boundaries between medicine and philosophy in the Plutarchan Corpus defines the broader field of my dissertation. The transition from philosophy to the science of medicine, from *sapientia* to *scientia*, and vice versa, is built upon the formulation of metaphor. The aim of this study is to explore this transition and exchange of concepts between medicine and politics as part of philosophy on the axis of Plutarch's metaphorical thinking. The metaphor itself implies the transfer of meaning (μεταφορά, *translatio*) serving not only as a merely rhetorical or literary device but as a cognitive one. For Plutarch the metaphor is of indispensable cognitive value - it uncovers the foundation from which philosophical

concepts, but also medical contemplation emerge. Plutarch's frequent appeal to metaphors demands further investigation into metaphor's positive role in philosophical and political thought, as it appears in the *Moralia* and the *Lives*.

RESEARCH STATUS

To begin with, studies or monographs on metaphors in Plutarch are scarce. Scholars, even two decades ago, have pointed to this gap in bibliography; Valverde Sánchez stated characteristically: “uno de los rasgos más notables de la prosa plutarquea, el ejemplo de los símiles, en torno al qual la bibliografía es sin duda insuficiente (...) la técnica peculiar de Plutarco en el empleo de los símiles apenas ha sido analizada”.¹ As standard reference work is regarded the monograph by F. Fuhrmann, *Les Images de Plutarque*, who explored the imagery in the Plutarchan oeuvre devoting, however, only three pages to medical metaphors and imagery (p. 41-43).² The oldest dissertation which investigates metaphors and comparisons in Plutarch is written in Latin by A. I. Dronkers, *De Comparationibus et Metaphoris apud Plutarchum*.³ Here, the human body metaphors are listed under the first chapter: “Metaphorae a corpore humano ductae” (p. 8-10) Both works classify metaphors into specific domains in view of their origin. However, both provide scattered and very brief references to medical metaphors without cross-referring, let alone further analysing their medical equivalent. This is thus the aim of my study; the analysis of medical metaphors in Plutarch's political context of the *Moralia* and the *Lives* mirroring the medical concepts and the medical tradition. In short, from the wide spectrum of his metaphorical images, I focus on the metaphorical interplay between politics and medicine connecting the *Moralia* to the *Lives*. In

¹ M. Valverde Sánchez, “Los símiles en el Erótico de Plutarco”, in J.G. Montes Cala, M. Sánchez Ortiz de Landaluce & R.J. Gallé Cejudo (eds.), *Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco, Cádiz, 14–16 de Mayo de 1998*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999, 501. Cf. also J. García López, “La Naturaleza en las comparaciones de Plutarco,” in J. García López & E. Calderón Dorda, E. (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: paisaje y naturaleza. Actas del II Simposio Español sobre Plutarco, Murcia 1990*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1991, 203.

² F. Fuhrmann, *Les images de Plutarque*, Paris: Klincksieck, 1964, 41-43.

³ A.I. Dronkers, *De Comparationibus et Metaphoris apud Plutarchum*, Diss., University of Utrecht: Traiecti ad Rhenum, 1892, 8-10.

respect of the latter, the article by Larmour, “Metaphor and Metonymy in the Rhetoric of Plutarch’s Parallel Lives” is to be mentioned.⁴ In addition, Martín del Pozo explored briefly the paedagogical aspect of the model of physician in Plutarch.⁵

The most recent and insightful monograph on Plutarch’s images and ‘language pictures’ belongs to R. Hirsch-Luipold; his work, *Plutarch’s Denken in Bildern: Studien zur literarischen, philosophischen und religiösen Funktion des Bildhaften*, offers an overview of the Plutarchan metaphorical horizon stressing the value of his Platonically image-based thinking.⁶ However, he analyses metaphors from medicine only from a theological perspective;⁷ these medical metaphors and images are constrained to the motif of ‘Deus Medicus’ in Plutarch’s treatise *On the delays of divine vengeance* (Gott als Arzt: Eine exemplarische Untersuchung der Bilder aus dem Bereich der Medizin in *De Sera numinis vindicta* [p. 225-281]). Hirsch-Luipold exploits ‘image’ (Bild) as an umbrella term (Oberbegriff) that includes *inter alia* similes, metaphors, allegories, illustrations; these are interpreted in terms of another intellectual domain: “jeweils ein Gegenstand (A) durch einen anderen (B) sichtbar (gemacht) wird” (p. 26). This thesis is actually a reflection on the basic principle of conceptual theory coined by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson.⁸ In light of this, my study explains political or philosophical concepts in terms of more basic concepts and illustrations from

⁴ D. Larmour, “Metaphor and Metonymy in the Rhetoric of Plutarch’s Parallel Lives” in L. Van der Stockt (ed.), *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch, Acta of the IVth International Congress of the International Plutarch Society*, Leuven, July 3-6, 1996, Louvain-Namur: Éditions Peeters/Société Des Études Classiques, 2000, 267-281.

⁵ J.F. Martín del Pozo, “El médico como referente pedagógico en Plutarco”, in: J.A. Fernández Delgado & F. Pordomingo Pardo (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio Espanol sobre Plutarco, Salamanca, 26 a 28 de Mayo de 1994*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1996, 185-192.

⁶ R. Hirsch-Luipold, *Plutarch’s Denken in Bildern: Studien zur literarischen, philosophischen und religiösen Funktion des Bildhaften*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002.

⁷ For the same theological approach to Plutarch’s metaphorical thinking cf. K.-G. Eckart, “Plutarch und seine Gleichnisse”, *Theologia Viatorum* 11 (1966-72) 59-80.

⁸ Hirsch-Luipold himself links Plutarch’s concept of image and metaphor to Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory. See Hirsch-Luipold, *Plutarch’s Denken in Bildern*, 12 n. 32: “Mit dieser Struktur der Bildlichkeit bewegt man sich ganz in der Nähe dessen, was G. Lakoff und M. Johnson (interessanterweise ein Philosoph und ein Sprachwissenschaftler) *conceptual metaphor* genannt haben (LAKOFF/JOHNSON, *Metaphors*, 4). Die Autoren heben darauf ab, daß Metaphern kein poetischer Sonderfall der Sprache sind, sondern daß unsere gesamte Wahrnehmung der Welt durch *metaphorical concepts* strukturiert ist, auch wenn das jeweilige Konzept nie expliziert wird”.

the realm of medicine. Moreover, in my approach, I try to extend the analysis of medical metaphors beyond the borders of Plutarch's text mirroring equally their medical equivalent and detecting its place in the medical tradition. An analogous methodology employs M. Vamvouri Ruffy, who explores Plutarch's medical imagery pertaining to the world of the symposium.⁹ Her monograph, *Les Vertus thérapeutiques du banquet: médecine et idéologie dans les Propos de Table de Plutarque*, focuses on the portrait of the symposiarch as doctor who moderates or cures his guests' behavior. Furthermore, she bases on Hippocratic treatises in order to highlight the description of the good symposiarch as a good doctor alluding, for example, to terms like *καίρος* (proper time) or mixture theories. Hence, the application of the medical terminology is extended beyond the symposium, to the larger political-social world that Plutarch and his guests inhabit. My study accordingly brings into focus the usage of medical metaphors by Plutarch mainly in the field of politics. Medical terms and concepts are to be viewed not only through the lens of the Hippocratic tradition but also of Plutarch himself.

As for Plutarch's interest in medicine, it has gained broad appeal over the last decades.¹⁰ Plutarch's high appreciation of medicine is best summarized in the following passage from his

⁹ M. Vamvouri Ruffy, *Les Vertus thérapeutiques du banquet: médecine et idéologie dans les Propos de Table de Plutarque*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012a.

¹⁰ Plutarch's interest in medicine is mostly profound in the following works of *Moralia*: *De tuenda*, which is expressly devoted to medical matters; *Quaest. nat.*; *Quaest. conv.*; *De esu* and *Sept. sap. conv.* In these works Plutarch cites explicitly Hippocrates. However, his medical material is not confined in the *Moralia*, but it is scattered throughout the extensive oeuvre of the Plutarchan Corpus including the *Parallel Lives*. On the role of medicine in Plutarch's work see C. Morales Otal, & J. Garcia López, *Obras morales y de costumbres*, Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1985, 120-1; J.A. López Férez, "Plutarco y la medicina," in A. Pérez Jiménez & G. Del Cerro Calderón (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Obra y Tradición*, Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1990, 220; L. Senzasono, *Plutarco: Precetti Igienici* (Corpus Plutarchi Moraliium), Napoli: D' Auria, 1992, 11-36; R.M. Aguilar, "Hipócrates en Plutarco", *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica* 4 (1994) 35-45; Andò, V., "La ricezione ippocratica in Plutarco", in I. Gallo (ed.), *La biblioteca di Plutarco. Atti del IX Convegno plutarqueo: Pavia, 13-15 giugno 2002*, Napoli: M. D' Auria, 2004, 159-183; J. Boulogne, "Les digressions scientifiques dans les Vies de Plutarque", in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work. 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 733-750; R.M. Aguilar, "Pharmakon en Plutarco", in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work. 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 751- 772; Z. Plese, "Deformity (anapêria) Plutarch's Views on Reproduction and Imperfect Generation in the *Moralia* and *Lives*" in Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work*, 773-784; Vamvouri Ruffy, *Les Vertus*

treatise *Advice about Keeping Well* (*De tuenda* 122E: τῶν ἐλευθερίων δὲ τεχνῶν ἰατρικὴ τὸ μὲν γλαφυρὸν καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ἐπιτερπέες οὐδεμιᾶς ἐνδεέστερον ἔχει, “and of the liberal arts medicine is inferior to none in elegance, distinction, and the satisfaction which it yields”, transl. F.C. Babbitt). This statement justifies his frequent references to medicine, the quotations from medical works, and furthermore his medical knowledge and active relationship with the medical sources and the Hippocratic tradition. The so-called “Quellenforschung” pointed out a wide range of medical sources, from which Plutarch drew in his writings. Fundamental here remain the works of D. Tsekourakis¹¹ and J. Boulogne¹². According to Tsekourakis in his treatise on the etiology of causes, Plutarch mostly influenced by Hippocrates deals not only with general, everyday matters, as philologists like G. Boehm and F.C. Babbitt have pointed out, but also with the technical side of medicine.¹³ Tsekourakis states characteristically (1989, 258): “Es gibt in den *Moralia* eine Menge von Vergleichen, in denen Bilder, Beschreibungen und Erklärungen aus der Medizin verwendet werden, die zeigen, dass ihr Verfasser viel mehr medizinische Kenntnisse besaß, als man von einem Gebildeten jener Zeit erwarten wurde”.

These depictions, representations, and similes transferred from medicine into the Plutarchan Corpus are investigated in my dissertation under the general term ‘medical metaphors’. These do not merely serve rhetorical purposes, hence they do not have an ornamental value but a cognitive one, as Boulogne (1996, 2773) expressly described in accord with Tsekourakis: “Plutarque ne se réfère pas à la médecine uniquement pour les besoins de la rhétorique, afin d’embellir ses phrases des citations, d’images ou de comparaisons qui n’auraient d’autre valeur qu’ornementale”. Furthermore, Boulogne extends the wide spectrum of analogies between Plutarch and Hippocrates,

thérapeutiques du banquet, 2012a; M. Meeusen, *Plutarch’s Science of Natural Problems. A Study with Commentary on Quaestiones Naturales* (Plutarchea Hypomnemata), Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016.

¹¹ D. Tsekourakis, “Die Ursachen von Krankheiten bei Plutarch”, *Ελληνικά* 40 (1989) 257-269, esp. 265: “Natürlich ist es schwer, mit Sicherheit zu sagen, aus welcher Quelle genau Plutarch seine Ansichten über diesen Gegenstand genommen hat, da die Überlieferung die Medizin betreffend eine Menge von Lücken in der Periode zwischen Hippokrates und Plutarch aufweist”.

¹² J. Boulogne, “Plutarque et la médecine”, *ANRW II* 37.3 (1996) 2762-2792.

¹³ See G. Boehm, *Plutarchs Dialog Ὑγιεινὰ παραγγέλματα analysiert und auf seine Quellen untersucht*, Diss. Giessen 1935, 29. Likewise, cf. F.C. Babbitt, *Plutarch’s Moralia*, Vol. II, London: Loeb, 1971, 214.

which had drawn Tsekourakis in regard to the cause (internal and external) of disease.¹⁴ Actually, Boulogne's work has the special value of a collection with precise typology which includes a great number of physicians who are quoted in Plutarch or have influenced him. Boulogne's statement in the very first line that "medicine is a field of Plutarch's thought largely unexplored" ("Il est un pan de la pensée de Plutarque qui reste largement inexploré", p. 2762) and Durling's one in the very last line of his article that "the chief value of Plutarch's medical knowledge is as a lay-witness to pre-Galenic medicine" are both motivations for this study.¹⁵

In particular, my concern is the interpretation of medical metaphors located in Plutarch's works through the lens of Greek medical theories which extend from Hippocrates to his luminous successor, Galen of Pergamum (A.D. 129–c. 200), even to early Byzantine medical writers. In this medical course, I focus mainly on the medical concepts as summarized, commented and presented by Galen. His works include a wide spectrum of *materia medica*: physiology, anatomy, medical prediction and treatment, the preservation of health, psychology, logic, and philosophy; in his œuvre he echoes the opinions of the ancients, the medical sects and their debate over medical matters. Galen embraces, thus, self-consciously the Hippocratic tradition and reflects upon it maintaining always an open dialog, or debate with the medical Hellenistic schools (e.g. Erasistrateans) and their survival in the Imperial Era. However, as Nutton characteristically stated, Galen's editions "occupy a smaller place in the affections of classicists than on the library shelf".¹⁶

Plutarch, on the other hand, who lived also in the Imperial Era, but just a few decades earlier than Galen (A.D. c. 45–125), very frequently cites in his ethical treatises and the *Lives* metaphors projecting ideas, concepts or discourse that belong to the scientific field of medicine.¹⁷ In this *inter-textual*, or in more detail, *inter-discursive* and *inter-generic* exchange of concepts between

¹⁴ In particular, with regard to internal causes D. Tsekourakis, "Die Ursachen von Krankheiten bei Plutarch", 267-268 explores the role of the humours in the causation of disease tracing similarities between the Hippocratic treatise *De morbis* 4.51 (8.586 L.) and the Plutarchan one: *De tuenda* 128E; similarly, he draws parallels between *De morbis* 4.32 (7.542 L.) and *De tuenda* 127B in view of external causes denouncing any metaphysical causality of illness.

¹⁵ R.J. Durling, "Medicine in Plutarch's *Moralia*", *Traditio* 50 (1995) 311-314.

¹⁶ V. Nutton, "Galen and Medical Autobiography", *Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc.* 18 (1972) 50-62.

¹⁷ A.V. Zadorojnyi, "Libraries and paideia in the Second Sophistic: Galen and Plutarch", in G. Woolf, J. Koenig & K. Oikonomopoulou (eds.), *Ancient Libraries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 377-400.

medicine and philosophy, metaphor unfolds the depiction of philosophical, political and ethical issues through medical terms and concepts. By formulating metaphors Plutarch is more frequently inclined to transpose medical terms and theories onto philosophical and political contexts. Therefore, metaphor promotes the shift from Plutarchan texts to medical contexts crossing the boundaries between medicine and politics.

POLITICS AND MEDICINE

For the relationship between politics and medicine, of special significance is the essay by J. Jouanna, “Politics and Medicine. The Problem of Change in Regimen in Acute Diseases and Thucydides (Book 6)”.¹⁸ Following this train of thought, I draw parallels between Plutarch and medical writers at the interface of medical metaphors that stem from the realm of medicine and are placed in the field of politics. For the connection of medicine with politics in Plutarch’s most medical work, the short article by L. Sensazono, “Health and Politics in Plutarch’s *de tuenda sanitate praecepta*” is noteworthy.¹⁹ The incorporation of medical metaphors in political contexts serves, on the one hand, Plutarch’s moralising and biographical art. For his political ideal is integrated into the goals of ethics he conveys to his readers shedding light on the political behaviour of his protagonists; on the other hand, medical metaphors reflect on the contemporary theory and practice of medicine, and as such decipher information about Plutarch’s medical knowledge. This is to a great extent comparable to what we find in the *Hippocratic Corpus* and tradition. Moreover, the metaphorical relationship between medicine and politics can take in Plutarch the opposite direction; one can find political concepts (e.g. *στάσις*) in medical texts to explain the human body function and particularly the theory of humours, as was the case in the oldest medical or, more accurately, political metaphor attested in Alcmaeon.

¹⁸ J. Jouanna, “Politics and Medicine. The Problem of Change in Regimen in Acute Diseases and Thucydides (Book 6)” in id. (ed.) *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen* (Studies in Ancient Medicine 40), Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2012, 21-22.

¹⁹ L. Sensazono, “Health and Politics in Plutarch’s *de tuenda sanitate praecepta*”, in J. Mossman (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World: Essays on Plutarch*, London: Duckworth/Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 1997, 113-118.

Indeed, the oldest metaphorical link between medicine and politics is traced in the famous passage from Alcmaeon, where it is held that physical philosophy met medicine for the first time.²⁰ The doxographic tradition of Aëtius based upon Ps.-Plutarch (*Placita Philosophorum*, 5.30.1 [=DK 24 B 4.1-4 =Doxograph. [Diels] 442a3]) and Stobaeus (*Anthologium* [Hense & Wachsmuth] 4.37.2 and 38.29) provides a clear view of his central theory about health and disease through metaphors vested in political terms.²¹ Alcmaeon defines health as *isonomia* of the faculties of wet, dry, cold and hot; all faculties contribute equally to good health, whereas disease is described as the outcome of monarchy, of the predominance of one faculty over the others. It is here apparent that from the very first medical roots of physical philosophy, terms typically political such as *isonomia* (ἰσονομία) and *monarchia* (μοναρχία) lend their political meaning to describe metaphorically the physiological side of medicine. *Isonomia* as a *vehicle* for medical metaphor makes its first appearance in the very first records of medicine. Metaphorical thinking had a functional semantic role in early Greek thought since metaphors or analogies constituted a preliminary step towards arriving at a greater understanding of the nature of unknowable, or less

²⁰ Alcmaeon is generally regarded as a pupil of Pythagoras favouring a practical philosophy rather than a speculative one; cf. Diog. Laert. *Vit. Phil.* 5.25. Diogenes Laertius deals thereby apart from Alcmaeon's early life (*Vit. Phil.* 5. 25), also with Aristoteles' lost treatise *Contra Alcmaeonem*. Despite of the fact that Alcmaeon is listed amongst the Pythagoreans by Iamblichus (*VP* 104 and 267) and by Philoponus (*In De An.* 88), Aristotle (*Metaph.* 986a27ff.) excludes him from the Pythagoreans. For views denying that Alcmaeon belonged to the Pythagoreans see G.E.R. Lloyd, "Alcmaeon and the Early History of Dissection", *Sudhoffs Archiv*, 59.2 (1975a) 113-147). The knowledge of his medicine is controversial, as his views survive in a fragmentary form. According to J. Longrigg, *Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and Medicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians*, London/New York: Routledge, 1993, 48: "Whether he himself actually originated the theories attributed to him is of subsidiary importance. What is important is that his medical beliefs reveal precisely the same rational outlook characteristic of the Ionian natural philosophers before him and the pre-Socratic philosophers after him". According to the commentary of Chalcidius who translated the *Timaeus* into Latin in the fourth century AD: "primus exsectionem aggredi est ausus", Alcmaeon is esteemed as the "Father of Human Anatomy", (Chalcid. *In Tim.* CCXLI, 256. 22-257.4 Waszink [Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevii: Plato Latinus IV] = pp. 279ff. Alc. frg. 24A10 DK Wrobel = Heroph. Frg. 86.1-7 von Staden).

²¹ Ps.-Plutarch is an epitome of Aëtius. Stobaeus as a rule quotes verbatim, but his *Anthology* has been much abridged. Hence, Stobaeian parallels for Ps.-Plutarch are no longer extant. On doxography of medicine see further P.J. van der Eijk, *Ancient Histories of Medicine. Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity* (Studies in Ancient Medicine 20), Leiden: Brill, 1999.

knowable phenomena in terms of the nature of knowable things, as suggested by Lloyd.²² In order to consider the nature of a thing that cannot be investigated directly, namely what a thing is, one should consider what a thing is *like*.²³

In the opposite direction to that described by Alcmaeon, who incorporated political terms in medical contexts exploiting their metaphorical usage, Plutarch is more frequently inclined to incorporate medical terms into political contexts formulating metaphors. By doing so, he departs from sense perception evidence, physical metaphors towards abstract political terms (e.g. *Cim.* 1.13: ἄκρατος δημοκρατία) or philosophical formulations and ethical precepts. In the *Moralia*, and in particular in his *Precepts of Statecraft* Plutarch employs the metaphor of the physician most often (809E, 814F, 815B, 818B, 818E, 824A, 825 E).²⁴ The first seeds of such medical metaphors can be traced back to Solon and Pindar.²⁵ However, Plato (*Republic* and *Timaios*) was the first who systematized medical metaphors in a philosophical train of thought and exploited their political potential echoed in the medical conceptions of Aristotle (*Politics* and *Movement of Animals*) and Plutarch.²⁶ As with Plato, medical metaphors became an essential part of Plutarch's political philosophy. By applying a medical framework to statesmanship Plutarch offers not only an image but turns this image into a political paradigm. I explore, thus, the ways in which medical and bodily metaphors shape Plutarch's political philosophy and conclude that they support educational interpretations of his political thought, while weakening every harsh criticism of his

²² See G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy, Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*, Cambridge: University Press, 1966, 175.

²³ For the incorporation of metaphors in medical texts in general see F. Skoda, *Médecine ancienne et métaphore. Le vocabulaire de l'anatomie et de la pathologie en grec ancien*, Louvain-Paris: Peeters-Selaf, 1988 and B. Holmes, "Pure Life: The Limits of the Vegetal Analogy in the Hippocratics and Galen", in J.Z. Wee (ed.), *The Comparable Body: Analogy and Metaphor in Ancient Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Greco-Roman Medicine*, Leiden: Brill, 2017, 358-386.

²⁴ Moreover, he makes use of the metaphor of the helmsman (801D, 801F, 812C) or the carpenter (807C-D) in order to describe in terms of metaphor the statesmanship.

²⁵ Sol., fr.4 [West]: τοῦτ' ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον; Pind., *Pyth.* 4. 270-1: ἐσσι δ' ἰατῆρ ἐπικαιρότατος, Παι-/άν τέ σοι τιμᾶ φάος./ χρῆ μαλακὰν χέρα προσβάλ-/λοντα τρώμαν ἔλκεος ἀμφιπολεῖν.

²⁶ F.Wehrli, "Der Arztvergleich bei Platon" *MH* 8 (1951) 177-184; J. Jouanna, "Le médecin modèle du législateur dans les Lois de Platon", *Ktèma* 3 (1978) 77– 91. This model of the politician-physician survives in the Hellenistic and Classical Roman historians and philosophers, the Stoics, Neo-Platonists and Biblical traditions (especially St. Paul's Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians), the Church Fathers.

ideal statesmanship in terms of the Platonic model of a strict statesman, who like a surgeon cuts, hacks, and cauterizes the politic body (topos of τέμνειν καὶ καίειν).²⁷ The Platonic statesman makes use not only of repressive, but also preventive medicine against tyranny.²⁸ Overall, painful, invasive cures were resorted to only when the gentler measures had failed. By the Late Republic, the envision of the body politic as a macrocosm of the human body, and the metaphor of political illness or inflammation associated with both opposite directions: for and against one-man rule builds not only a common *topos* but also a cliché, which is recurring in Plutarch's works.

In his *Moralia* metaphor enhances the philosophical examples and arguments by simplifying and illuminating the didactic train of thought; it makes hence the philosophical concepts and precepts more comprehensive. Metaphor either as a rhetorical device or as a cognitive structure stirs up the comparison, which constitutes the core of his *Lives*. Plutarch uses a variety of rhetorical strategies to compare his protagonists from different eras calling upon the reader to reconstruct their ethical or political behavior and to evaluate their lives. In this respect, metaphor promotes the shift from the concrete to the abstract; from medicine to politics in the case of medical metaphors; from the 'source domain' to the 'target domain', according to the conceptual metaphor theory.²⁹ In short, the 'source domain' (the image donor) is the conceptual domain from which metaphorical expressions are drawn (here, medicine), whereas the 'target domain' is the conceptual domain that we try to understand (politics). Metaphors are thus mappings across conceptual domains.

²⁷ Cf. Pl., *Pol.* 293b 1: τοὺς ἰατροὺς δὲ οὐχ ἤκιστα νενομίκαμεν, ἐάντε ἐκόντας ἐάντε ἄκοντας ἡμᾶς ἰῶνται, τέμνοντες ἢ κάοντες ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀληθῆνα προσάπτοντες, and Aesch., *Ag.* 848–850: καὶ τὸ μὲν καλῶς ἔχον ὅπως χρονίζον εὖ μενεῖ βουλευτέον, ὅτῳ δὲ καὶ δεῖ φαρμάκων παιωνίων, ἦτοι κέαντες ἢ τεμόντες εὐφρόνως πειρασόμεσθα πῆμ' ἀποστρέψαι νόσου.

²⁸ eg. Pl., *Resp.* 8.564b-c: Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἠρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον νόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχία τε φυόμενον ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν δημοκρατία δουλοῦται αὐτήν. (...) Τούτῳ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταραττετον ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένῳ, οἷον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ὧ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἦττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργὸν πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα σὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον. See G. Vlastos, *The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato's Republic* (Studies in Greek Philosophy II: Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 69-103.

²⁹ G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, 253-254 and Z. Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 17-32.

TERMINOLOGY, SCOPE, AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

In light of this theoretical schema, the argument of my study develops in two parts in accordance with the ‘source and target domain’ of medical metaphors in Plutarch. On the one hand, I explore the medical comparable, namely the source of the metaphors, drawing parallels with the Hippocratic tradition, with Galen, even with early Byzantine medical writers; on the other, I try to elucidate the political and philosophical background of the medical metaphors and their conceptualization in Plutarch’s metaphorical thinking in the *Lives* and *Moralia*. My general aim is twofold: to unravel the train of both medical and political thought behind Plutarch’s medical metaphors and to assess their role in his political and pedagogical ideal.

Regarding the terminology, the research status on Plutarch’s metaphorical thinking is inconsistent with a common ‘Oberbegriff’. Actually, most scholars may agree with the use of the term ‘image’ as an umbrella term. Nonetheless, the meaning they attach to it is different. In particular, Hirsch Luipold (2002) uses εἰκῶν as ‘Oberbegriff’ attaching to it a parade of terms including μεταφορά, ὁμοιότης, ἀφομοίωσις, εἰκασία, εἴκασμα, ἀλληγορία, αἰνιγμα, σύμβολον, μῦθος. Fuhrmann (1964) uses similarly the term image, under which he subsumes comparisons and metaphors; these include, in turn, personifications and allegories. García López (1991) excludes metaphors from his essay and speaks only of comparisons and similes from the field of nature drawing parallels to Homeric images and motifs. These similes and examples are subordinated under the term ‘image’ as well. Eckart employs the comparison (Gleichniss) as a broader term and describes their syntactical order as follows (1966-72, 69): “sie stehen teils unverbunden nebeneinander, teils sind sie durch Partikel verbunden, teils aber auch untrennbar miteinander verschmolzen. Ineinanderflechtung zweier Gleichnisse sowie der Verwendung von Bildmaterial als Gegenbeispiel, also zur Behauptung des Gegenteils”.

In my study, I do not draw strict borderlines between comparison, similes, and metaphor. Rather, I focus on the term metaphor and subordinate under it similes, comparisons, exempla and metaphorical thinking. By doing so, I follow Duff’s and Said’s designation of medical metaphors.³⁰ Moreover, the view that metaphor is a broader term that encompasses simile was first

³⁰ T. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 93 n.86: “humoural theories lie behind Plutarch’s frequent use of medical metaphors to describe the activity of the good statesman, metaphors themselves related to the Platonic notion of the state as the macrocosm of a man” and S. Said

coined by Aristotle. According to him, similes are extended metaphors (*Rh.* 1406b 20-22: Ἦστιν δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορὰ: διαφέρει γὰρ μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπη [τὸν Ἀχιλλέα] “ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν”, εἰκὼν ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε”, μεταφορὰ (“The simile also is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles, “he rushed on like a lion,” it is a simile; if he says, “a lion, he rushed on,” it is a metaphor”, transl. J.H. Freese).³¹ Moreover, Aristotle stated that both metaphors and images can be identical (1407a 11-15: πάσας δὲ ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν, ὥστε ὅσαι ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον ὅτι αὗται καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες μεταφοραὶ λόγου δεόμεναι, “All such expressions may be used both as similes and metaphors, so that all that are approved as metaphors will obviously also serve as similes which are metaphors without the details”).

Still, modern linguistic theories, and in particular that by Steen, share the same view.³² Steen names simile as direct metaphor accompanied by external signs, like the adverb *like* and contrasts it to the indirect metaphor, i.e. the normal lexical metaphor. He states characteristically (33): “The criterion of similarity is clearly appropriate since utterances contain the adverb like which suggest that some similarity has to be constructed”. Very similarly, in my approach, medical metaphors are in their majority externally indicated by Plutarch through the adverb ὥσπερ (just as/like) in an attempt to direct the reader’s attention to the metaphorical cross-domain mapping. Metaphor refers to an implicit statement of similarity that holds between two things by way of a copula between them. It is a commonplace for Plutarch to introduce an exemplum with the adverb ὥσπερ, and in its description to elaborate on it on the axis of (lexical) metaphors. The method is as follows: adverbs or phrases (e.g. εἰπὼν ἐν μεταφορᾷ or μιμούμενος) point explicitly and self-referentially to the act of comparing alluding *prima vista* to the traditional lines between comparison and simile; the context is afterward imbued with terms from an alien domain, in the case of this study from medicine, and their combination as a whole results in an exemplum. In short, Plutarch introduces

Said, “Plutarch and the People in the Parallel Lives”, in L. De Blois, J. Bons, T. Kessels & D.M. Schenkeveld (eds.), *The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works, Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the International Plutarch Society, Nijmegen/Castle Hernen, May 1–5, 2002, vol. 2: The Statesman in Plutarch’s Greek and Roman Lives*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004, 22.

³¹ Cf. Ch. Rapp, s.v. metaphora, in: O. Höffe (ed.), *Aristoteles-Lexikon*, Stuttgart: Kröner, 2005, 351.

³² G.J. Steen, “Three Kinds of Metaphor in Discourse: A linguistic Taxonomy”, in A. Musolff, J. Zinken (eds.), *Metaphor and Discourse*, Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2009, 25-39.

initially a comparison, then he integrates into it metaphors from the same domain, i.e. medical terms and concepts, and finally he arrives through analogical thinking at an overarching paradigm, which is but the desideratum outcome of this comparative process. Therefore, this chain of metaphors (*Metaphernkette*) is shaped and built upon the initiating metaphor (initierende Metapher), which in most cases is externally signalled; he advances thus a series of metaphors which shall exhibit a constantly increasing proportion of analogies and comparisons, given that in the background of both simile and metaphor resides the function of projection and comparison. In this way, I refer to the notion of metaphor as a conceptual cross-domain mapping that provides a unifying platform for the description of Plutarch's comparisons between medicine and politics.

In particular, my dissertation takes the following structure: The first introductory chapter explores this complicated issue of generic frontiers between medicine and philosophy; *scientia* and *sapientia*. Here, I begin with selected ancient sources focusing on the Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine* and Celsus' *On Medicine* and conclude with the opinions of Aristotle, Galen, and Plutarch on the overlapping relationship between medicine and philosophy. Before embarking on the discussion of the metaphorical relationship between medicine and philosophy in the Plutarchan Corpus, it will be as well, at the outset, to set out some essential features of my understanding of what metaphor is and what metaphor does. In the second chapter, I provide thus the theoretical framework of metaphors. Here, I take a comparative look into ancient theories on metaphor beginning with Plato. In this analysis, I include Aristotle and the Papyrus Hamburgensis 128 and conclude with the theoretical treatment of metaphor by Plutarch and Galen. Moreover, I briefly refer to the modern cognitive theory on conceptual metaphor which conceives of 'source and target domain' of metaphors. Drawing on research from the field of metaphor studies and intertextuality ones I point to the intertextuality-based variant of medical texts drawn mainly from the Hippocratic tradition. The cross-mapping model developed is then applied to medical metaphors in the Plutarchan Corpus in order to show in chapter III how Plutarch's philosophical-political thought might work with the medical tradition.

The third chapter, which is the main part of the argumentation of this study, interprets the medical metaphors located in political contexts in the Plutarchan Corpus. Some metaphors are anatomical and physiological; others relate to diagnostics; the ideal state and tyranny are compared with healthy and diseased states of the ancient Greek and Roman political community, respectively. Still other medical metaphors concern treatment: the political rule is often compared with surgery

or pharmaceutical treatment. In this interplay, I compare the function of the same metaphors in different works of Plutarch shedding light on the applications and implications of medical metaphors in the *Lives* and *Moralia*. My contribution in this chapter is to document, analyse and compare metaphors of medical treatment in political contexts in the Plutarchan Corpus. I shall point out that the metaphorical references to medical treatment in the Plutarchan political discourse depict aspects of ruling, aristocratic or democratic, by focusing on the terms of ‘justice’ and ‘physis’. Plutarch puts forward a theory of stasis from a naturalistic perspective. He treats stasis as a pathology resulting from injustice. Justice is the tissue of both physical and political cohesiveness.

Therefore, the fourth chapter pursues this general issue in an overview of body metaphors incorporated in the context of medical imagery in Plutarch’s *Precepts of Statecraft*, but also in the *Lives*. Here, I explore the ways in which medical and bodily metaphors shape Plutarch’s political philosophy. But the target of medical metaphors is not restricted only to politics, but it extends to philosophy and ethics. Hence, my objective is to investigate the different targets of medical metaphors located in Plutarch’s works stemming from the same source, which is but medicine. The scope of the ‘source’ domain is also widened in the last chapter in order to include different framings, such as mixture theories, or terms like ‘ἀκρασία’ (‘ill temperature’) or ‘ἀμετρία’ (‘disproportion’). To conclude with, analysis of metaphor provides the affirmative link between medical and philosophical discourse defining thus the borders of this study, namely philosophy and medicine, in an open dialogue, as the following passage describes (Plut. *De tuenda* 122E):

ὥστ’ οὐ παράβασιν ὄρων ἐπικαλεῖν δεῖ τοῖς περὶ ὑγεινῶν διαλεγόμενοις φιλοσόφοις, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνελόνητες οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς ὄρους ὥσπερ ἐν μιᾷ χώρᾳ κοινῶς ἐμφιλοκαλεῖν, ἅμα τὸ ἡδὺ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διώκοντες.

so that it ought not to be called transgressing the bounds of a philosopher to dispute about those things which relate to health, but rather, all bounds being laid aside, we ought to pursue our studies in the same common field, and so enjoy both the pleasure and the profit of them. (transl. Goodwin)

Bruno Snell -speaking of the Platonic philosophy- put it explicitly:³³ “Die Platonische Philosophie ist voll von solchen übergreifenden Analogien, und jede Philosophie, die nicht nur einen Aspekt der Welt ergreifen möchte, die zu einer Einheit des Wissens kommen will, wird notwendig solche μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, solchen Modell-Wechsel und Analogie-Sprung vollziehen.” Similarly, Plutarch -within this orbit of Platonism- exploits the metaphorical or analogical thinking in terms of cross-domain mappings between different fields of knowledge establishing his argumentation in a shared common field (ὡσπερ ἐν μιᾷ χώρᾳ).

³³ B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 9th edition, 2011, 202. See also the chapter of the same influential work inscribed as “Gleichnis, Vergleich, Analogie, Metapher, Analogie. Der Weg vom mythischen zum logischen Denken”, 178-204.

Chapter 1.

The frontiers between medicine and philosophy

1.1. The Philological Debate

“Primoque medendi scientia sapientiae pars habebatur, ut et morborum curatio et rerum naturae contemplatio sub isdem auctoribus nata sit”.

At first the science of healing was held to be part of philosophy, so that treatment of disease and contemplation of the nature of things began through the same authorities. (transl. W.G. Spencer)

(Celsus, *Med. prooem.* 6-7)

According to Celsus in the passage above, medicine (*scientia medendi*) was regarded initially to nest in philosophy (*sapientia*). The term ‘*sapientia*’ denotes both science and philosophy, given that ‘*scientia*’ is described as part of ‘*sapientia*’. The complex relationship between medicine and philosophy is given by Celsus in terms of metaphor; his metaphor of concurrent birth of *morborum curatio* and *rerum naturae contemplatio*, both from the same parent, the written culture, tries to provide a unifying explanation for the inherent relationship between philosophy and medicine.³⁴ The aim of this introductory chapter is to give a brief outline of the basic philological views, on the one hand, and the key ancient sources, on the other, pertaining to the frontiers between medicine and philosophy.

With Celsus’ view accords the old and long-prevailing philological view of the predominance of philosophy over medicine. Indeed, for many years philologists confined medicine within the boundaries laid down by philosophy.³⁵ For medicine was viewed as the sister or daughter of

³⁴ Celsus, *Med. prooem.* 6-8 [p.18. 7-8 Marx= pp.14-15 Mudry= I, pp.3-4 Serbat]: See Ph. Mudry, *La Préface du De medicina de Celse. Texte, traduction et commentaire*, Rome: Institut Suisse, 1982 and H. von Staden, “Celsus as Historian?”, in Ph.J. van der Eijk (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden: Brill, 1999, 251-294.

³⁵ Cf. K. Sprengel, *Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte der Arzneikunde*, Leipzig: Gebauer, 4th edition, 1846, 2: “Die Philosophie ist die Mutter der Medizin in wissenschaftlichen Rücksicht, und das Wachstum der einen steht mit der Zunahme der anderen Wissenschaft in ungetrennter Verbindung”. Furthermore, see J. Schumacher, *Antike*

philosophy (*philosophia et medicina duae sorores sunt*), since the latter influenced the former, rather than being influenced by it;³⁶ this view suggests that all medical treatises have sprung from the philosophical insight into nature. The physical or medical investigation was long perceived as an exclusively philosophical matter, even when taken over by physicians. But the flow was not only in one direction, i.e. from philosophy to medicine. Opinions differed among philologists as to where the line was to be drawn. It is noteworthy to sketch out here the basic lines of this debate. In particular, Edelstein believed that even the oldest surviving medical literature, the *Hippocratic Collection* of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., is but an adaptation and development of pre-Socratic theories, of Heraclitus, of Diogenes of Apollonia, and underlined that the assumption of an influence of Greek medicine on Greek philosophy must be regarded as historically incorrect.³⁷ Although philologists used to frown upon those who did not share this skepticism, still opposite

Medizin. Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Medizin in der griechischen Antike, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1940; W.H.S. Jones, *Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece*, Baltimore, 1946; J. Longrigg, "Philosophy and Medicine. Some Early Interactions", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 67 (1963) 147–75; J. Barnes, "Ancient Scepticism and Causation", in M. Burnyeat (ed.), *The Skeptical Tradition*, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983, 190–1; M. Frede, 'Philosophy and Medicine in Antiquity', in A. Donagan et al. (eds.), *Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Essays Presented to Marjorie Grene on the Occasion of her Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986, 211–32; R.J. Hankinson, "Greek Medical Models of Mind", in S. Everson (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought. 2: Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 194–217; see also the second chapter inscribed as "Philosophy and Medicine in context" in Ph.J. van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity. Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 8-14; V. Nutton, "Medicine and Philology in Renaissance Paris", in C.W. Müller, Chr. Brockmann & C.W. Brunschön (eds.), *Ärzte und ihre Interpreten. Medizinische Fachtexte der Antike als Forschungsgegenstand der Klassischen Philologie. Fachkonferenz zu Ehren von Diethard Nickel*, Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2006, 49-59. The naturalistic thinking in view of the causation and heal of the illness was connected to the religious one; for Greek medicine was practiced at the healing temples of the God Asclepius, which were considered as the most famous medical treatment centres. Cf. Chr. Brockmann, "A God and Two Humans on Matters of Medicine: Asclepius, Galen and Aelius Aristides", in M.B.Trapp, D. Russell, & H.-G. Nesselrath (eds.), *In Praise of Asclepius: Aelius Aristides, Selected Prose Hymns*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016, 115–128.

³⁶ This *dictum* is attributed by the Alexandrians to Aristotle according to the Cod. Ambr.; however, it is not regarded as genuine, but as a later addition. See O. Temkin, *The Double Face of Janus and Other Essays in the History of Medicine*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, 187 (with n. 70)-188.

³⁷ L. Edelstein, "The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine", in O. Temkin & C.L. Temkin (eds.), *Ancient Medicine. Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 350.

voices like that of Burnet, who held that the examining of the history of medicine is a prerequisite for perceiving the history of philosophy, did make their appearance as early as in the beginning of the 20th century and did constitute a shift to the attitude of philosophical predominance.³⁸ Longrigg recognized the validity of Burnet's statement, contrary to Edelstein who regarded it as a misconception.³⁹ Recent scholarship has reversed the supremacy of philosophy over medicine as dominant consideration scope recognizing an active influence of Greek medicine on ancient philosophical thought. Van der Eijk states: "But more recently there has been a greater appreciation of the fact that Greek medical writers did not just reflect a derivative awareness of developments in philosophy (..) but also actively contributed to the formation of philosophical thought more strictly defined".⁴⁰ Of course, medicine arose in conjunction with philosophy, as Celsus attests, and its relationship and contextualization with philosophy are largely reflected both on medical and philosophical treatises. However, it is difficult to separate the medical from the philosophical occupation among the pre-Socratic philosophers, and even more difficult to define which of both was born first. The pre-Socratic philosophers, especially, Empedocles, Diogenes, and Democritus, who grounded their medical and physiological contemplations on a unifying principle, reveal a turn from the philosophical macrocosm to the medical microcosm.⁴¹

1.2 Ancient Sources on *scientia* and *sapientia*

This philological debate on the predominance of philosophy over medicine and the reliance of medicine on natural philosophy is actually as old as the earliest sources that defend epistemology against sophistry. Here, it is interesting to see how ancient sources depicted and evaluated this confusion of borders of philosophy and medicine as interwoven domains of knowledge. Our sources do not provide unambiguous definitions for them nor do they make a clear distinction between the two. Empedocles, for example, combined both theoretical and practical medical

³⁸ J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, London: A & C Black, 1930, 201 n. 4.

³⁹ Edelstein, *Selected Papers*, 354. Notwithstanding the fact that Edelstein rejected an influence of medicine on philosophy, he admitted (id.) 350: "the true contribution of medicine to philosophy lies in the fact that philosophers found in medical treatment and in the physician's task a simile of their own endeavour."

⁴⁰ van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy*, 8-9.

⁴¹ J. Longrigg, *Greek Medicine from the Heroic to the Hellenistic Age*, New York: Routledge, 1998, 34.

knowledge, as Diogenes Laertius attests.⁴² But in antiquity, Empedocles was the target of the Hippocratic writer of *Ancient Medicine*, who rejected the reliance of medicine on natural philosophy. He stated that the precise knowledge of the natural world can be gained only from the art of medicine in the following interesting passage, which is situated in the context of an ongoing debate and is representative of the antithetic relationship between medicine and philosophy ([Hippocrates], *De prisca medicina* 20. 1-10: 1.620.6-622.2 L.=1.24.5-15 Kw.= *CMG* 1.1.51.6-15 Heiberg).⁴³

Λέγουσι δὲ τινες καὶ ἰητροὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔνι δυνατὸν ἰητρικὴν εἰδέναι ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δεῖ καταμαθεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς θεραπεύσειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Τείνει δὲ αὐτέοισιν ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη. Ἐγὼ δὲ τουτέων μὲν ὅσα τινὶ εἴρηται σοφιστῆ ἢ ἰητρῶ, ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος, ἥσσον νομίζω τῆ ἰητρικῆ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῆ γραφικῆ. Νομίζω δὲ περὶ φύσιος γινῶναι τι σαφὲς οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἰητρικῆς.

Certain sophists and physicians say that it is not possible for anyone to know medicine who does not know what man is [and how he was made and how constructed], and that whoever would cure men properly, must learn this in the first place. But this saying rather appertains to philosophy, as Empedocles and certain others have described what man in his origin is, and how he first was made and constructed. But I think whatever such has been said or written by sophist or physician concerning nature has less connection with the art of medicine than with the art of painting. And I think that one cannot know anything certain respecting nature from any other quarter than from medicine; (transl. W.H.S. Jones)

⁴² Cf. Diog. Laert., 8.59.5-6 = DK 31 B 111 = fr. 15.1 Inwood: φάρμακα δ' ὅσσα γεγῆσσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ / πέυση, ἐπεὶ μούνη σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα. Empedocles should transmit his medical knowledge to the addressees of his poems about the drugs that constitute a defence to ward off ills and old age. The practical effect of his activity is reflected in the following verses Diog. Laert., 8.62.6-10= DK 31 B 112 = fr. 15.1 Inwood: τοῖσιν ἅμ' εὖτ' ἂν ἴκωμαι ἐς ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα./ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξί, σεβίζομαι· οἱ δ' ἅμ' ἔπονται/ μυριοί, ἐξερέοντες ὅπη πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός·/οἱ μὲν μαντοσυνέων κεχρημένοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ νούσων/ παντοίων ἐπύθοντο κλύειν εὐηκέα βάζιν. (“Straightway as soon as I enter with these, men and women, into flourishing towns, I am revered and tens of thousands follow, to learn where is the path which leads to welfare, some desirous of oracles, others suffering from all kinds of diseases, desiring to hear a message of healing”, transl. R.D. Hicks).

⁴³ M. Vegetti, “Empedocle medico e sophista: l’ antica medicina 20”, *Elenchos* 19 (1998) 345–60. For Empedoclean influences on the Hippocratic Corpus see J. Jouanna, ‘Présence d’Empédocle dans la Collection hippocratique’, *Lettres d’Humanité* 20 (1961) 452–63.

The apologetic character of the passage is apparent. The Hippocratic author disregards the theories on human nature drawn from the pre-Socratic inquiry and Empedocles as irrelevant to medical practices.⁴⁴ In particular, he dismisses the views of sophists or physicians, who held that the philosophical occupation and knowledge of human nature is a condition for gaining medical knowledge. Sophists or physicians who describe what man is, are more relevant to the art of painting than medicine, and thus are to be neglected. Hence, the frontiers between philosophy and medicine must not be crossed and confused. Only from medicine, one can obtain precise knowledge of the nature of man. The author purports the view that the theory of human nature must be built upon medicine, through the observation of the human organism within nature. He dismisses thinkers such as Empedocles who wanted to arrive at such an understanding through their cosmological theories. Furthermore, his polemic is against medical thinkers who would base medicine on principles of the physical world postulated in the theories of physical philosophers. A sort of such a philosophical medicine is rejected as suitable only for the art of painting.⁴⁵ Instead, he clearly declares that with respect to nature only the art of medicine can give a clear and reliable picture.⁴⁶ In this way, the Hippocratic author introduces the earliest documentation of epistemology and the earliest traces of manipulation of science from philosophy.

Science obtains thus an increasing degree of awareness of its generic development, crystallized in Celsus' words (*Med. prooem. 8*): *primus ex omnibus memoria dignus, a studio sapientiae disciplinam hanc separavit, vir et arte et facundia insignis* ("Hippocrates of Cos, a man first and foremost worthy to be remembered, notable both for professional skill and for eloquence, separated

⁴⁴ This treatise is the earliest one from the 5th century B.C. survived in its entirety, on the contrary to the fragmentary nature of Pre-socratic theories on medicine. See M. Schiefsky, *Hippocrates On Ancient Medicine: Translated with Introduction and Commentary*, Leiden: Brill, 2005 and B. Maucolin, "Untersuchungen zur hippokratischen Schrift „Über die alte Heilkunst“" (BzA 258), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.

⁴⁵ C.W. Müller, "Schreibkunst oder Malerei?", *Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften* 49.3 (1965) 307-311.

⁴⁶ It is characteristic that the science of medicine is described here as an art, view that is also found in the work *On the art of medicine (De arte)*. Erotian classifies both treatises, together with the *Law*, the *Oath*, the *Embassy* and *Speech from the Altar*; see Erot., *Voc. Hipp. coll.* 36.19-21 Nachmansohn: ζ'. τῶν δ' εἰς τὸν περὶ τέχνης τεινόντων λόγον· Ὀρκος, Νόμος, Περὶ τέχνης, Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἰατρικῆς. Πρεσβευτικὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἐπιβόμιος φιλόπατριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἰατρὸν ἐμφαίνουσι τὸν ἄνδρα. On the contrary to the fragmentary nature of Pre-socratic theories on medicine, the treatise *Ancient medicine* is the earliest one from the 5th century B.C. survived in its entirety.

this branch of learning from the study of philosophy”). With these words, Celsus attributed to Hippocrates the emancipation of medicine from philosophy, the ‘studium sapientiae’ and its development as an independent discipline.

However, the notion of generic frontiers was still after the emancipation of medicine from philosophy by Hippocrates unclear, and only from the Hellenistic period and after, a grade of generic refinement becomes clearer.⁴⁷ The practical character of philosophy may embrace the science of medicine, whereas medical theories may overlap with philosophy. Even after the composition of the Hippocratic Corpus medicine and philosophy did not become independent disciplines.⁴⁸ Rather they continued to be interwoven with each other.

Aristotle comments on the overlap between ‘students of nature’ and ‘physicians’ at the beginning and at the end of his *Short treatises on nature (Parva naturalia)*. In particular, in the treatise *On Sense and Sensible Objects* he states that most physical philosophers complete their works with a discourse on medicine, whereas the more sophisticated physicians derive their medical principles from their inquiry into nature (*De sensu* 436a 19–b 1: διὸ σχεδὸν τῶν περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρωσ τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατρικῆς, οἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄρχονται περὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς). Most natural philosophers end by going into matters that concern medicine. On the other hand, the physicians who exercise the art of medicine philosophically take their departure from what concerns nature. In short, the starting point of the philosophically-minded physicians is placed in physics; conversely, the ending point of most philosophers is placed in medicine. Therefore, Aristotle describes an overlap between the occupation of the natural philosopher and the physician, whose field borders are difficult to separate.

The same view repeats Aristotle at the end of the same work (*Parv. nat.*), where he argues that the inquiries of the physical philosopher and the physician in view of the causes are conterminous (σύνορος ἢ πραγματεία) (*De respiratione* 480b 22-30):

περὶ δὲ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἰατροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν. ἢ δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ ἢ διαφέροντα θεωροῦσιν, οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε σύνορος ἢ πραγματεία μέχρι τινός ἐστι, μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον· τῶν τε γὰρ ἰατρῶν ὅσοι κομψοὶ καὶ περιέργοι λέγουσὶ τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς

⁴⁷ van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy*, 13-14.

⁴⁸ von Staden, *Celsus as Historian*, 262-3.

ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀξιοῦσι λαμβάνειν, καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως πραγματευθέντων οἱ χαριέστατοι σχεδὸν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἰατρικὰς.

Our discussion of life and death and kindred topics is now practically complete. But health and disease also claim the attention of the scientist, and not merely of the physician, in so far as an account of their causes is concerned. The extent to which these two differ and investigate diverse provinces must not escape us, since facts show that their inquiries are, to a certain extent, at least conterminous. For physicians of culture and refinement make some mention of natural science, and claim to derive their principles from it, while the most accomplished investigators into nature generally push their studies so far as to conclude with an account of medical principles. (transl. G.R.T. Ross)

Both Aristotelian passages above from the works *On Sense and Sensible Objects* and *On respiration* respectively, underline in similar words that the more proficient natural scientists conclude their inquiry into nature with contemplations on medical principles, or matters that concern medicine (*Sens.* 436a 22: οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατρικῆς, and *Resp.* 480b 30: σχεδὸν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἰατρικὰς). On the other hand, the sophisticated and enlightened physicians (τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφώτερος τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες and τῶν τε γὰρ ἰατρῶν ὅσοι κομψοὶ καὶ περιεργοὶ) refer to physics and deduce their principles from natural science (*Sens.* 436 b1: οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄρχονται περὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, and *Resp.* 480b 29: λέγουσὶ τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀξιοῦσι λαμβάνειν). In other words, the point of departure for the physicians may be placed in physics, whereas the point of arrival for the physical philosophers may be located in medicine in view of the causes of the diseases (περὶ δὲ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἰατροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν).

On the causes grounds Plutarch as well the borders between natural philosophers and physicians in his work *On the principle of Cold*. However, here Plutarch does not speak of the overlapping domains of knowledge and practice between natural philosophers and technicians. Rather, he clearly separates them in a chain of epistemological hierarchies, as follows (*De prim. frig.* 948B-C):

οἱ μὲν οὖν, τῶν σκαληνῶν καὶ τριγωνοειδῶν σχηματισμῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι κειμένων, τὸ ῥιγοῦν καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὑπὸ τραχύτητος ἐγγίγνεσθαι λέγοντες, εἰ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος διαμαρτάνουσι, τὴν γοῦν ἀρχὴν ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνουσι δεῖ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀφ' ἐστίας τῆς τῶν ὄλων οὐσίας ἄρχεσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν. ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα δόξειεν ἂν ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ καὶ αὐλητοῦ διαφέρειν ὁ φιλόσοφος. ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν αἰτίων θεωρῆσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ πάθους αἴτιον ἂν συνοφθῆ, πυρετοῦ μὲν ἔντασις ἢ παρέμπτωσις ἐρυσίβης δ' ἥλιοι πυριφλεγεῖς ἐπ' ὄμβρω βαρύτητος δὲ κλίσις αὐλῶν

καὶ συναγωγή πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἰκανόν ἐστι τῷ τεχνίτῃ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον. τῷ δὲ φυσικῷ θεωρίας ἕνεκα μετιόντι τάλιθες ἢ τῶν ἐσχάτων γνῶσις οὐ τέλος ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀνωτάτω πορείας. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ὀρθῶς καὶ Δημόκριτος αἰτίαν θερμότητος καὶ βαρύτητος ζητοῦντες οὐ κατέπαυσαν ἐν γῆ καὶ πυρὶ τὸν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὰς νοητὰς ἀναφέροντες ἀρχὰς τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέχρι τῶν ἐλαχίστων ὥσπερ σπερμάτων προῆλθον.

Now those who affirm that there are certain uneven, triangular formations in our bodies and that shivering and trembling, shuddering and the like manifestations, proceed from this rough irregularity, even if they are wrong in the particulars, at least de-rive the first principle from the proper place; for the investigation should begin as it were from the very hearth, from the substance of all things. This is, it would seem, the great difference between a philosopher and a physician or a farmer or a flute-player; for the latter are content to examine the causes most remote from the first cause, since as soon as the most immediate cause of an effect is grasped – that fever is brought about by exertion or an overflow of blood, that rusting of grain is caused by days of blazing sun after a rain, that a low note is produced by the angle and construction of the pipes – that is enough to enable a technician to do his proper job. But when the natural philosopher sets out to find the truth as a matter of speculative knowledge, the discovery of immediate causes is not the end, but the beginning of his journey to the first and highest causes. This is the reason why Plato and Democritus, when they were inquiring into the causes of heat and heaviness, were right not to stop their investigation with earth and fire, but to go on carrying back sensible phenomena to rational origins until they reached, as it were, the minimum number of seeds.

This passage is anchored in the Platonic tradition.⁴⁹ Plato is for Plutarch the standard against which all thinkers, including Aristotle, are measured. On the contrary to Aristotle's overlapping borders between medicine and philosophy, Plutarch aligned with the Platonic world of ideas, draws distinct lines between the two domains of knowledge pertaining to the immediate causes and the first ones. Plutarch adds to the task of the natural philosopher the burden of deeper investigation

⁴⁹ as rightly suggested by the research. See G. Roskam, "Aristotle in Middle Platonism. The case of Plutarch of Chaeronea", in Bénatouïl, T., Maffi, E. and Trabattoni, F. (eds.), *Plato, Aristotle, or Both? Dialogues between Platonism and Aristotelianism in Antiquity*, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms, 2011, 60 explores the same Plutarchan passage (*De prim. frig.* 948B-C) from the perspective of the Platonic influence on the formulation of Plutarch's philosophical thought. Cf. id., "Plutarch on Aristotle as the first Peripatetic" *Ploutarchos* 6 (2007/8) 37-38: "But a quick look at Plutarch's œuvre shows that he often uses Aristotle as an historical source and no less often as the authoritative source on all kinds of physical and biological issues: e.g. *De tuenda* 133F (= fr. 233 Rose); *De prim. frig.* 948A and 949C (= fr. 212 Rose); *Quaest. nat.* 911E; 912A (= fr. 215 Rose)".

into the higher intelligible principles. Technical knowledge, including medical one, is regarded as a preliminary stage towards a natural philosophical investigation. In particular, according to Plutarch, both the physician and the natural philosopher begin their inquiry into nature with data from sense-perception; but whereas the physician completes his research when finding out the natural causes and is content with them (*ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν αἰτίων θεωρῆσαι*), the natural philosopher goes on ‘further upwards’ in the pursuit of the forward first causes.⁵⁰ These are different from the natural causes, which provide just the starting point of their investigation (*τῶ δὲ φυσικῶ θεωρίας ἔνεκα μετιόντι τάληθες ἢ τῶν ἐσχάτων γνῶσις οὐ τέλος ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀνωτάτω πορείας*).⁵¹ Hence, natural philosophers direct their survey or *θεωρία* towards the intelligible principles (*ἐπὶ τὰς νοητὰς ἀναφέροντες ἀρχὰς τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέχρι τῶν ἐλαχίστων ὥσπερ σπερμάτων προῆλθον*).

Plutarch, on the contrary to Aristotle, does not define the borders between natural philosophers and physicians in terms of overlap. Rather, he establishes a hierarchy between them by subordinating the knowledge derived from sense data (*αἰσθητὰ*) to the intelligible principles (*νοητὰς ἀρχὰς*). Whereas Aristotle presented the points, where the physical philosopher meets the physician, and vice versa, Plutarch provides us with a discrete description of their borders; he highlights thus the points of divergence and not that of convergence. Plutarch in his Platonic conception of the natural world elevates the physical philosopher over the physician.⁵² The occupation of the latter is confined in the world of sensible things, in the discovery of the natural causes (*τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν αἰτίων*), which are most remote from the first causes. Therefore, he draws strict lines between science and philosophy. The natural philosopher concludes with the first cause,

⁵⁰ Cf. Arist., *Met.* 981a ff.

⁵¹ See L. van der Stockt, “Plutarch on *τέχνη*”, in I. Gallo (ed.), *Plutarco e le scienze. Atti del IV Convegno plutarco*, Genova – Bocca di Magra, 22-25 aprile 1991, Genova: Sagep, 1992, 292: “It seems that all that is needed here is a further distinction between what we call science and... philosophy”. Cf. M. Meeusen, *Plutarch’s Science of Natural Problems. A Study with Commentary on Quaestiones Naturales*, Plutarchea Hypomnemata, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2017, 316-317.

⁵² See P. Donini, “Lo scetticismo accademico, Aristotele e l’unità della tradizione platonica secondo Plutarco”, in G. Cambiano, in Cambiano, G. (ed.), *Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica*, Turin 1986 210-211 and J. Opsomer, *In Search of the Truth: Academic Tendencies in Middle Platonism* (Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 60, Nr. 163.), Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1998, 215-216.

whereas according to Aristotle, the natural philosopher may conclude with principles of medicine; The physician derives the medical principles from physics according to Aristotle, whereas according to Plutarch, the physician confines his survey into the sensible things in contrast to the natural philosopher who directs his survey to a superior theoretical contemplation of the natural world. Aristotle may summarize the meeting points of philosopher and physician. By doing so he defines at the same time the epistemological boundaries, different from that given by Plutarch.

However, the Dogmatist followers of Herophilus did follow Aristotle's overlapping borders between medicine and philosophy in order to delineate clearly the borders of their science.⁵³ According to Galen, Herophilus is regarded as a dogmatic physician, who asked the physicians to refrain from excessive physiology. For the inquisition of the first elements belonging to the task of the philosopher (*De methodo medendi* 10.107.9-12 K.: ἀποχωρεῖν τῆς ἄκρας φυσιολογίας κελεύοντες καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν οὕτω φύσιν ἀνθρώπου καταμαθεῖν ὡς οἱ φιλόσοφοι καταμανθάνουσιν, ἄχρι τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων ἀνιόντες τῷ λόγῳ).⁵⁴ This view of the Dogmatists is similar to that expressed by Plutarch; the first causes are to be discovered by the natural philosophers, whereas the immediate ones by the physicians. Galen puts it explicitly: the first causes for the dogmatists should be confined to the evident causes, though these are not the real first causes (10.107.16 K.: ἔστω ταῦτα εἶναι πρῶτα, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐστὶ πρῶτα). In short, only the physiology that concerns the human must be the subject of the physician, and not the excessive physiology, which must concern the philosopher.⁵⁵ Hence, this view of Herophilus aligns with that of Plutarch. For a hierarchical

⁵³ Ph.J. van der Eijk, *Ancient Histories of Medicine. Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity* (Studies in Ancient Medicine 20), Leiden: Brill, 1999, 387: "The Dogmatists firmly believed that the knowledge proper to medical science could not go beyond the anatomical evidence and thought it was the task of natural philosophy (..) to deal with the basic elements of nature. On this point, the dogmatist followers of either Herophilus or Erasistratus accepted the epistemological boundaries traced by Aristotle in the *De sensu* 436 a-b2 and in fact used these to protect the autonomy of medical science from the philosophy on nature".

⁵⁴ Cf. Gal., *De alim. fac.* 6.455-456 K., where Diocles criticizes the excesses of casual research.

⁵⁵ Moreover, Galen presents here the conception of physiology by two different sects; on the one hand, the Dogmatists who investigate both the natural, immediate, evident causes and the hidden ones formulating theoretical claims about physiology and aetiology of diseases; on the other hand, the Empiricists, whose investigation does not succeed the surface of sensible phenomena and evident causes, since they believe that "nature cannot be comprehended". Hence, the Empiricists avoid any statement about physiology, and therefore any theoretical formulation. Cf. Celsus, *Med. prooem.* 12.

structure in view of the borders of medicine and natural philosophy is established by both Plutarch and Herophilus, as described by Galen.

The confusion of the generic frontiers between medicine and philosophy still exists in late antiquity, and even takes the opposite direction: Sextus Empiricus combines his scepticism with medical practice, whereas Galen's work *The Best Doctor is Also a Philosopher* confirms the persisting affinity between the two areas of intellectual activity during their individual development.⁵⁶ In particular, Galen purports the view that the best physician should be versed in logic or the science of *physis*. In this way, he will be able to discover the nature of the human and the nature of the diseases. Moreover, he must be acquainted with all kinds of philosophy, including the logical, the physical, and the ethical one (*Quod optimus medicus sit quoque philosophus* 1.61.7-10 K.):

καὶ μὴν εἴ γε πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐφεξῆς ἄσκησιν ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία, δῆλον ὡς, ὅστις ἂν <ἄριστος> ἰατρός ᾤ, πάντως οὗτός ἐστι καὶ φιλόσοφος. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ φιλοσοφίας δεῖ τοῖς ἰατροῖς.

And indeed if, for learning the Art from the beginning, and for exercising it in due order, philosophy is necessary for physicians, it is clear that whoever is a physician must be altogether a philosopher. I do not think it needs further proof that philosophy is necessary for doctors if they are to use the Art correctly.

⁵⁶ See V. Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, London/New York: Routledge, 2013, 229: "To attempt to divide his philosophy from his medicine is impossible, even when considering his day-to-day activities. Not only did Galen associate with philosophers, like Arria, the female Platonist, and benefit from their ideas, but he welcomed them to his anatomical displays and even to the bedside, and wrote treatises at their request. "

Conclusions

To sum up, the relationship between philosophy and medicine is depicted in the above-selected key sources, as follows: in the Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient medicine* as antithetic, even polemic, in Aristotle's *Parva naturalia* as supplementary, in Plutarch's *On the principle of Cold* as hierarchically antithetic, in Galen as supplementary, even inherent, since philosophy springs from medicine. This spectrum of the association between medicine and philosophy, from polemic to identical, sketches out their gradual development and delimitation as genres. All the thinkers mentioned above do recognize the different principles of each domain of knowledge and genre. What differs is the extent to which they measure the points of convergence or divergence between medical occupation and philosophical contemplation; the Hippocratic author has a polemical attitude towards sophistry; for Aristotle, where the physician ends, begins the natural philosopher, and vice versa; for Plutarch, the natural philosopher exceeds the physician directing his survey to the intelligible things; this train of Platonic thought is purported by the Alexandrian dogmatic school (Herophilus). For it was the evidence of the senses that laid the essential groundwork of medical knowledge. Finally, Galen widened this spectrum of borders, since for him philosophy includes a broader array of pursuits: the science of physis, in its widest sense, and ethics. Galen dealt with generalization from observations and deductive reasoning. All these authors may provide a penumbral area by associations that are still in doubt and make our understanding of them still limited in many aspects, especially with regard to what we call a scientific inquiry into nature. However, the core of their philosophical or medical thought is clear.

What emerges from this measuring of the frontiers between philosophy and medicine is the clarification of the placement of Plutarch's medical thought in an era when the borders between these intellectual disciplines were permeable. In this context is located Plutarch's metaphorical thinking. In view of his medical metaphors that promote the transfer from medicine to politics, the exchange of ideas between medicine and natural philosophy is as important as the points where politics meets natural philosophy. Hence, natural philosophy and, in particular, the conception of physis provides the *tertium comparationis* between the two poles to be compared, medicine and politics, as I shall show in chapter III after exploring the nature of metaphors in the following chapter.

Chapter II.

Preliminary theoretical framework: Metaphors in context

2.1. Plato: εικόν

ΞΕ. Εἰς δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖον

ἀπεικάζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς βασιλικοὺς ἄρχοντας.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποίας;

ΞΕ. Τὸν γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν. κατίδωμεν γὰρ δὴ τι σχῆμα ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς πλασάμενοι.

(Plato, *Pol.* 297e 8-13)

In this passage from the *Statesman*, Plato establishes the initiating metaphor of the statesman as a physician, which constitutes the core of this study. In particular, the Eleatic Stranger compares the ruler both with the physician and the ship's captain. However, Plato does not use the term metaphor to describe this comparison, but that of image (εἰκών).⁵⁷ This encompasses verbal images, illustrations, comparisons, and metaphors. In my analysis of medical metaphors, I follow Pender who argues that the two terms εἰκών and παραδείγματα correspond in Plato to metaphor and model, respectively.⁵⁸ Furthermore, he purports the view that Plato refers to metaphor also by the use of the verbs: ἀπεικάζειν (express by comparison) or μετονομάζειν (call by a new name). An image can be further developed into a norm and paradigmatic example (παράδειγμα). This is a more

⁵⁷ P. Louis, *Les Métaphores de Platon*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1945. See also J. Bryan, *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

⁵⁸ The term εἰκών refers to metaphor in *Meno* 72a and *Resp.* 531b. See E. Pender, *Plato on Metaphors and Models in G.R. Boys-Stones, Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition. Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55. On the other hand, M.H. McCall Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison* (Loeb classical monographs), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 5 supports that εἰκών never stands for metaphor, but only for comparisons, similes and other rhetorical devices: "Nothing in the context narrows εἰκονολογία to any specific form of likeness, let alone equates it with metaphor for which the simple term εἰκών is never a synonym". J.T. Kirby, "Aristotle on Metaphor", *AJPhil* 118.4 (1997) 530 n. 46 agrees with McCall that εἰκών refers to simile, but not to metaphor.

elaborate and complex system of images that can be divided into metaphorical mappings and framings apart. The political paradigm, which Plato refers to, consists thus of the art of healing and that of weaving (287b 1-2: πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἴωμεν πάλιν, τῆς προρρηθείσης ὕφαντικῆς αὐτῷ φέροντες τὸ παράδειγμα). Both are compared to the art of statesmanship. For the healing or the weft of the society are metaphorical mappings and framings of political art.⁵⁹

The Stranger suggests the formulation of analogical thinking in regard to another domain of art. Metaphors project structures from domains of schematized bodily or enculturated experience, namely medicine, seamanship, and weaving onto the field of statesmanship. In this way, he stresses the importance of the image-schema in view of a structure of comparing (κατίδωμεν γὰρ δὴ τι σχῆμα ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς πλασάμενοι). An image introduces not only a resemblance between two subjects. But it can be developed into a broader paradigm, given that the resemblance builds a structural framework which constitutes a model (277d 1-2: Χαλεπόν, ὃ δαμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἰκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων). In this sense, metaphor is seen as part of the Platonic paradigm. As Pender characteristically states: “The same sort of analogies can be prompted by the use of images but where a εἰκὼν is brief and undeveloped, a παράδειγμα is an extended comparison developed specifically to explore structural similarities and differences”. A παράδειγμα is an extended form of εἰκὼν, which is typically brief. Plato’s usage of the metaphorical language in terms of a ‘participation’ (μετέχειν) of things in ‘model forms’ (παραδείγματα) is criticized by Aristotle as “empty speaking” and “poetic metaphors” (*Metaph.* 991a 21-22: τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τᾶλλα κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς). However, Aristotle established the basic theory of metaphors, which survives in the modern conceptual metaphor theory.

⁵⁹ For Plato and the simile of medicine see L. Edelstein, “The role of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium”, *TAPA* (1945) 98 ff.

2.2. Aristotle and the conceptual metaphor theory

*There have been many more discussions of
what people from the Greek philosophers on called metaphor
than any bibliography could show.⁶⁰*

The first systematic approach of the concept of metaphor is traced to Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*. Aristotle introduced the terms in which the debate on metaphor was framed for many hundreds of years. In particular, metaphor is defined in *Poetics* as “the application of an alien name either transferred from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion” (*Po.* 21, 1457b 6-7: μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον). Hence, metaphor is inherent to the imagery of movement (ἐπιφορὰ), implied also in the etymology of the term (μεταφορὰ: μετά + φέρειν, lat. metaphora, translatio).⁶¹ And it is a successful metaphor if in its new place it seems to belong as if migrating into its own and not invading into an alien place, as Cicero characteristically states (*Brutus* 79.274: *non irruisse in alienum locum sed migrasse in suum*). Latin authors adopt the term mostly latinized as tra(ns)latio, according to Verrius' obscure definition of metaphor attested in Festus' *Lexicon*.⁶² Indeed, the anonymous Auctor ad Herennium defines metaphor as follows (*Auct. ad Her.* 4.34.45: *translatio*

⁶⁰ W.C. Booth, “Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation”, *Critical Inquiry* 5 (1978) 50.

⁶¹ For the term ‘ἐπιφορὰ’ have been suggested the following translations: ‘giving’ (Bywater), ‘movement’ (Kennedy), ‘transfer(ence)’ (Golden, Telford), ‘application’ (Butcher, Else, Grube, Hutton, Janko). See G. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Aristotle, translated, with introduction, notes, and appendixes by George A. Kennedy*, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 222 n. 25 mentions that ‘μεταφορὰ’ as term is itself a metaphor (the idea of carrying-‘ἐπιφορὰ’). The word ‘μεταφορὰ’ is a classical coinage attested for the first time in Isocr. *Evag.* 9–10, where Isocrates claims to banish poetic embellishments like metaphor from his prose.

⁶² *De Verb. Signif. Libr. XX*, 136. 23–138. 2 [Lindsay]: “Metaphoram quam Graeci vocant, nos translationem, id est domo mutuatum verbum: quo utimur, inquit Verrius”. See A. Novokhatko, “The use of the term ‘metaphor’ in Latin linguistic discourse before Quintilian”, in P. Poccetti (ed.), *Latinitatis rationes. Descriptive and Historical Accounts for the Latin Language*, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2016, 395-409 and Id., “The linguistic treatment of metaphor in Quintilian”, *Pallas* 103 (2017) 311-318.

est cum verbum in quandam rem transferetur ex alia re, quod propter similitudinem recte videbitur posse transferri. Ea sumitur rei ante oculos ponendae causa, “metaphor occurs when a word applying to one thing is transferred to another because the similarity seems to justify this transference. Metaphor is used for the sake of creating a vivid mental picture”, transl. H. Caplan).⁶³ This bringing-before-the-eyes process, for which the Loeb translation uses the phrase “vivid mental picture”, is expressed in the Latin phrase “rem ante oculos ponere”, a verbatim translation of the Aristotelian one (*Rh.* 1405b 11: τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν).⁶⁴ In this sense, metaphor does not stand between the meaning and the reader. Rather, it activates the reader’s readiness to decipher and separate its meaning from stylistic ornaments and patterns.⁶⁵ Style or ornamentation is external to the thought, in the same way as a dress adorns the body (Cicero, *Brutus* 75.262). But metaphor is not just a matter of style, as was held for decades according to the mainstream of the rhetorical tradition. Metaphor is seen, instead, as a matter of thought serving a double function (enclosing and disclosing meaning): it is both ornamental and functional; as a rhetorical and literary device or *trope* it encodes meaning, i.e. it embellishes the content in a rhetorical register, whereas as a conceptual construction it is branched out from its rhetorical uses and decodes meaning, i.e. it uncovers and discovers meaning in a cognitive register, as implied in the phrase “vivid mental picture”.⁶⁶

Furthermore, this cognitive dimension of metaphor can be proved in the following three passages of Aristotle.⁶⁷ Firstly, the Aristotelian statement enclosed in the passage above: “everyone

⁶³ See G. Guidorizzi and S. Beta, *La metafora: Testi greci e latini* (Testimonianze sulla cultura greca), Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2000, 177–179.

⁶⁴ Cf. Arist., *Rh.* 1411b 25: “λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει” (“setting before the eyes means to say things that manifest being in action”). Metaphor’s role in putting the matter before the reader’s or audience’s eyes is discussed generally in Arist., *Rh.* 1405b16–1411b25. Cf. also Dem. *Eloc.* 81: “Ἀρίστη δὲ δοκεῖ μεταφορὰ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ἢ κατὰ ἐνέργειαν καλουμένην”.

⁶⁵ For the view that what is used to encode serves to decode in Aristotle, see M. Beuchot, “Retórica y hermenéutica en Aristóteles”, *Noua tellus* 25.1 (2007) 233.

⁶⁶ See B. Debatin, *Die Rationalität der Metapher. Eine sprachphilosophische und kommunikationstheoretische Untersuchung*, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1995 and A. Haverkamp, *Theorie der Metapher*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996, 2nd ed.

⁶⁷ On cognitive and semiotic aspects in Aristotle’s approach to metaphor, see P. Swiggers, “Cognitive Aspects of Aristotle’s Theory of Metaphor”, *Glotta* 62 (1984) 40–45; Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor”, 531–540; Ch. Rapp,

converses using metaphors” (*Rh.* 1404b 34: πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται) may be seen as prescient of the cognitive approach of metaphorology, as Kirby puts it.⁶⁸ In short, metaphor is universal and inherent to the thought and not to language at all; it resides in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another. Secondly, in his *Rhetoric* Aristotle stresses again the importance of metaphor both in poetry and in prose: a metaphor is an outcome of inner cognitive process, and as such, it cannot be learned from anyone else (*Rh.* 1405a 4-10 καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν παρ’ ἄλλου).⁶⁹ Thirdly, the cognitive function of metaphor is apparent in *Po.* 1459a 9 (τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἔστιν, “the right use of metaphor means an eye for resemblances”, transl. W.H. Fyfe).⁷⁰ This innate perception of the similarity in dissimilarity distinguishes both the philosopher and the scientist. In detecting and perceiving this similarity as a tension between identity and difference, the locus of metaphor is to be traced not in language at all, but in a different conceptual domain. In the latter sentence lies the basic principle of the theory of “conceptual metaphor” introduced by Lakoff and Johnson.⁷¹

Aristoteles Rhetorik. Übersetzt und erläutert von Christof Rapp. 1. Halbband (Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 4/1), Berlin: Akad.-Verl., 2002a, 369; Ch.Rapp, *Aristoteles Rhetorik. Übersetzt und erläutert von Christof Rapp. 2. Halbband* (Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 4/2), Berlin: Akad.-Verl., 2002b, 886–930; A. Schmitt, *Aristoteles Poetik*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008, 634–640; and D. Vázquez, “Metáfora y analogía en Aristóteles (Metaphor and Analogy in Aristotle)”, *Tópicos* 38 (2010) 85-116. From the sender’s point of view making metaphors is considered as a sign of poetic intelligence and talent (*Poet.* 1459a5–8: “πολὸν δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημειῶν ἔστι”).

⁶⁸ See Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor”, 539.

⁶⁹ Aristotle’s recognition of metaphor’s disclosive function is reflected by P. Ricœur, “La métaphore et le problème central de l’herméneutique”, *RPhL* 70.5 (1972) 107: “the meaning of a text is not behind the text, but out in front of it. It is not something hidden, but something that is discovered and open”.

⁷⁰ According to A. Marcos, “The Tension between Aristotle’s Theories and Uses of Metaphor”, *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 28.1 (1997) 136: “This heuristic task yields the *poetic discovery* of new analogic relationships. Every good metaphor is followed by what might be called a *heuristic inertia*”.

⁷¹ Lakoff & Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*; G. Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987; G. Schöffel, *Denken in Metaphern. Zur Logik sprachlicher Bilder*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987; Johnson, *The Body in the Mind*; R.W. Gibbs Jr. (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. See also M. Fludernik, *Beyond Cognitive Metaphor Theory. Perspectives on Literary Metaphor* (Routledge Studies in Rhetoric and Stylistics 3), Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2011.

In light of the cognitive conceptual theory, metaphor unfolds a process of mapping from a source domain onto a target domain. Conceptual metaphors consist of two poles: a more abstract concept is conceived as the *target*, whereas a more concrete or physical concept constitutes their *source*. These cross-domain mappings imply a transfer of concepts articulated by words outside of their normal conventional meaning to express a similar concept. According to the principle of unidirectionality introduced by Kövecses, the flow of this transfer follows typically one direction: from the more familiar, concrete and physiological (source) to the more abstract, psychological and philosophical (target), and not the other way around.⁷² With these conceptions of ‘target’ and ‘source domains’ in cognitive metaphor theory accords also the older bipolar schema of ‘Richards’ *tenor-vehicle* model of metaphor.⁷³ In this respect, I explore Plutarch’s medical metaphors viewing medicine as a *vehicle* (or ‘source domain’) and politics as a *tenor* (or ‘target domain’). “As used by Richards, the tenor is the underlying idea and the vehicle the other idea, the one brought in from outside, so to speak, the one to which the tenor is, in logical terms, compared”.⁷⁴ Therefore, in this study, the flow of the metaphorical transference is from medicine, which serves as ‘source’, to politics under the umbrella of philosophy, which constitutes the ‘target’ domain of Plutarch’s medical metaphors.⁷⁵

But medical and political terminology can be both the ‘source’ and the ‘target’ domain of medical metaphors in the Plutarchan corpus overturning the principle of asymmetric, unidirectional mapping suggested by Kövecses. In this regard, Dancygier & Sweetser underline that metaphor cannot always follow the direction “from concrete to abstract”.⁷⁶ The very same view expressed

⁷² Z. Kövecses, *Metaphor. A Practical Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 6.

⁷³ I.A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936, 100.


⁷⁴ M.S. Silk, *Interaction in Poetic Imagery with Special Reference to Early Greek poetry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, 9. Cf. also G. Steen, *Understanding metaphor in literature: An empirical approach*, London/New York: Longman, 1994 and id., “The Paradox of Metaphor”, *Metaphor and Symbol* 23 (2008) 213-41.

⁷⁵ For an analogous application of the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors in the realm of ancient concepts of emotions see D.L. Cairns, “Mind, Body, and Metaphor in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion”, *L’Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques* 16 (2016). (<https://journals.openedition.org/acrh/7416>).

⁷⁶ B. Dancygier & E. Sweetser, *Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics. Figurative language*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 14: “Metaphoric mapping: a unidirectional relation between two conceptual domains (the source domain and the target domain) which sets up links (mappings) between specific elements of the two domains’

Lévi-Strauss stating that metaphor is not a “one-way” transfer (“Einbahnstraße”) but a “two-way” one (“Zweibahnstraße”): “Die Metapher funktioniert immer auf zwei Weisen: wenn man uns den Kalauer durchgehen lassen will, so ist sie, wie manche Straßen, eine Zweibahnstraße”.⁷⁷ In this respect, medical metaphors in Plutarch are to be viewed as *bidirectional*; from medicine to politics/ethics (reception of medical concepts in politics) and from politics/ethics to medicine (reception of political concepts in medicine)”. However, the flow from the sense perception to the abstract formulation is most dominant, as different domains or framings of medicine serve the conceptualization of medical metaphor. In light of this, my study explores this flow from the concrete, metaphors from medicine, as exemplified in the specific fields of chirurgy, anatomy and humorpathology, to politics or, as a rule, to philosophy.

Schema *CLT*:



structures. A conceptual connection of this kind may be further reflected in metaphoric expressions, linguistic usages of source-domain forms to refer to corresponding aspects of the target domain.”

⁷⁷ C. Lévi-Strauss, *Die eifersüchtige Töpferin*, Nördlingen: Franz Greno, 1987, 309.

2.3. Metaphor and intertextuality: Does metaphor open a text to its intertext?

Metaphor actually does what intertextuality describes. Both terms express transference of meaning between different domains, including texts or genres; both shape a text's meaning by another text; both can be seen as a literary device that creates an interrelationship between texts generating an understanding of them in terms of another. Following Ricœur's statement that "metaphor not only opens the text but keeps it open" I view metaphor as a vehicle of intertextuality.⁷⁸ Metaphor's function of creating openness in a text serves the contextualization of the metaphorical meaning into wider contexts. Hence, regarding this point of opening the text, I suggest that the interpretation of intertextuality is analogous to the interpretation of metaphoric expression provided that texts are conceived as traces and tracings of other texts. What differs is the structure of reference. Metaphor is an explicit form of mapping onto another text, whereas intertextuality is a broader one that can unfold a cluster of ideas either explicitly or inertly. Metaphor creates this openness at a micro-scale and is included in but not conterminous with intertextuality. Metaphorical thinking works like an allusion; it stems from the intention of the author to shed light or highlight certain aspects of his argumentation. Intertextuality, on the other hand, is activated by the reader, and not necessarily consciously deployed by the author. Drawing on research from the field of metaphor studies and intertextuality ones, I point to the intertextuality-based variants of medical texts drawn mainly from the Hippocratic tradition.⁷⁹ The cross-mapping model developed is then applied to medical metaphors in the Plutarchan corpus in order to show in chapter III how Plutarch's philosophical-political thought might work with the medical tradition.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Ricœur, "La métaphore", 107.

⁷⁹ See also H. Weinrich, "Semantik der Metapher", in H. Weinrich (ed.), *Sprache in Texten*, Stuttgart: Klett, 1976, 295-316; id., "Semantik der kühnen Metapher", in A. Havenkamp (ed.), *Theorie der Metapher*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996, 316-339.

⁸⁰ See B. Weissenberger, *Die Sprache Plutarchs von Chaironea und der pseudo-plutarchischen Schriften*, Diss. Würzburg 1895; S. Yaginuma, "Plutarch's Language and Style", *ANRW II.33.6* (1992) 4726-4742.

2.3.1. Interdiscursivity and medicine

How these medical sources and discourses are imported into the Plutarchan corpus helps us reconstruct the theory of interdiscursivity as a kin term of intertextuality. In the case of Plutarch's medical thought, as interwoven with his political one, on the metaphorical axis of medical metaphor, the term of interdiscursivity seems apter than that of intertextuality. For interdiscursivity manifests itself as genre-mixing or shifting. In my approach, I follow Fairclough's earliest elaboration of intertextuality and interdiscursivity, along with Kristeva's notion of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' intertextuality.⁸¹ Interdiscursivity as 'vertical' intertextuality deals with how a text is formed by a combination of genres and discourses and is differentiated from intertextuality in that it exceeds the textual surface of borrowed forms. Rather, it succeeds in disclosing discourse conventions. In this sense, interdiscursivity is more complicated because it is concerned with the implicit relations between discursive formations. To the last belong metaphors which permit the connection to the scientific genre of medicine. By formulating metaphors Plutarch is more frequently inclined to transpose medical terms and theories onto philosophical and political contexts. Therefore, metaphor promotes the projection of Plutarchan texts on medical contexts crossing the boundaries between medicine and philosophy including politics.

⁸¹ N. Fairclough, "Intertextuality in Critical Discourse Analysis", *Linguistics and Education* 4.3 (1992b) 269–293. The term 'interdiscursivity' was coined by N. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992a when he accounted for the more overarching concept of 'intertextuality'. However, the concept of interdiscursivity can be traced to Bakhtin's dialogized 'heteroglossia'; See M. Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," in M. Holquist (ed.), *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981, 259-422. Cf. J. Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue and Novel," in T. Moi (ed.), *The Kristeva Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 37: "Horizontal axis (subject-addressee) and vertical axis (text-context) coincide, bringing to light an important fact: each word (text) is an intersection of word (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read".

2.3.2. Metaphor and textuality of science: Does metaphor obscure or uncover scientific truth?

“It is still unfortunately necessary to argue that metaphor is more than a decorative literary device and that it has cognitive implications whose nature is a proper subject of philosophic discussion”.⁸²

This question is as old as the first coinage of metaphor by Isocrates who advocated the expulsion of metaphor from prose and non-poetic discourse.⁸³ As Kirby characteristically refers, Aristotle’s famous statement ascribed to him by Diogenes Laertius: αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἴσοκράτην δ’ ἔἂν λέγειν (“It is shameful to be silent and let Isocrates speak”) could be enlightening in combination with the fact that he underlines the value of metaphors both in poetry and in prose.⁸⁴ However, in his *Posterior Analytics*, he rejects metaphor from the logical activity and dialectical disputation (*A.Po.* 97b 37-38: εἰ δὲ μὴ διαλέγεσθαι δεῖ μεταφοραῖς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ’ ὀρίζεσθαι οὔτε μεταφοραῖς οὔτε ὅσα λέγεται μεταφοραῖς· διαλέγεσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἔσται μεταφοραῖς, “We may add that if

⁸² M.B. Hesse, *Models and Analogies in Science*, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966, 158.

⁸³ *Enag.* 8-10: Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδονται κόσμοι· (..) καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, (..) τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστιν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ’ ἀποτόμως καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς μόνον καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν χρῆσθαι.

⁸⁴ Cf. Diog. Laert., *Vitae Phil. [Arist.]* 5.3: αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ξενοκράτη δ’ ἔἂν λέγειν; Phld., *Rh.* 2.50 [Sudhaus]: col. 196: P.Herc. 832, 40.1–8. All editors emend Xenokraten to Isokraten; Cf. also Quint., *Inst.* 3.1.14: nam et Isocratis praestantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni studiorum genere, eoque iam seniore (octavum enim et nonagesimum implevit annum) postmeridianis scholis Aristoteles praecipere artem oratoriam coepit, noto quidem illo (ut traditur) versu ex Philocteta frequenter usus: turpe esse tacere et Isocraten pati dicere. ars est utriusque, sed pluribus eam libris Aristoteles complexus est, (“The pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study, and when he was already advanced in years (and he lived to the age of ninety-eight), Aristotle began to teach the art of rhetoric in his afternoon lectures, in which he frequently quoted the well-known line from the Philoctetes in the form “Isocrates still speaks. ‘Twere shame should I Sit silent.’ Both Aristotle and Isocrates left text-books on rhetoric, but that by Aristotle is the larger and contains more books”, transl. H.E. Butler). The phrase: αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἴσοκράτην δ’ ἔἂν λέγειν is but a slight alteration of the verse from Euripides’ *Philoctetes*, where Odysseus says (*TGF* 796.2 [Nauck]: αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, βαρβάρους δ’ ἔἂν λέγειν, (“It’s a shame to be silent and let barbarians speak”). See Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor”, 532.

dialectical disputation must not employ metaphors, clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are precluded in definition: otherwise dialectic would involve metaphors”, transl. G.R.G. Mure). The similar view expresses Aristotle in his *Topics* when arguing that it is impossible to apply a new definition to what is already defined (*Top.* 153a 21–22: οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἕτερον εἶναι ὄρον, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦ πράγματος κατηγορεῖται). This principle is opposed to the semantic transference included in his definition of metaphor.⁸⁵ Metaphor is thus inapt for Dialectic. Although Aristotle criticizes the use of metaphors in scientific discourse, it remains a riddle if he really denounces metaphor from the dialectic discourse. For he implements metaphors very often in his philosophical writings in order to enhance and elucidate his argumentation (e.g. in *De Anima*).⁸⁶ However, metaphor has been for years disregarded from the field of science as a result of Aristotle’s above disregard of metaphor in Dialectic.

2.4. Galen on metaphor and Metaphors in medicine

Galen’s concept and appreciation of metaphor are similar to that of Aristotle already described. The metaphorical thinking entails ambiguity, as put explicitly by Aristotle (*Top.* 139b 34-35: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφές τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον). Hence, metaphor should be banished from the realm of science. This view shares also Galen when speaking of the placement of metaphor in the textuality of science. For metaphor is improper to the first truth; Following in the footsteps of Aristotle, Galen regards metaphor as a deterrent against truth and as such incompatible with science. His theory on metaphor is mainly reflected in his treatise *On the Differences of Pulses*,

⁸⁵ According to S. Halliwell, *Aristotle’s Poetics*, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1986, 349: “Although metaphor can be examined and classified, as it is in both the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*, it clearly remains resistant, in Aristotle’s eyes, to a ‘technical’ understanding”. Cf. also P. Gordon, “The Enigma of Aristotelian Metaphor: A Deconstructive Analysis”, *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 5.2 (1990) 83: “much that remains highly suggestive, even enigmatic, in Aristotle’s treatment of metaphor” and D. Vázquez, “Metáfora y analogía en Aristóteles: Su distinción y uso en la ciencia y la filosofía”, *Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía* 38 38 (2010) 85-116.

⁸⁶ Cf. S. Driscoll, “Aristotle’s A Priori Metaphor”, *Aporia* 22.1 (2012) 20-30: “Aristotle’s seemingly ambiguous position can be clarified by examining how he actually used metaphors in his own writings”.

where he explores the literal and metaphorical meaning of the adjectives ‘empty’ and ‘full’.⁸⁷ All the bodies which are characterized by *homoiomereia*, namely similarity of parts, cannot be called in fact full or empty, except for the case when one speaks metaphorically. The use of metaphors, adds Galen, is inapt for scientific lectures. Hence, he expels metaphor from the scientific discourse (*De puls. diff.* 8.675.4 K.: οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁμοιομερὲς σῶμα κενὸν ἢ πλήρες καλεῖται, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μεταφορὰν, ἧς οὐ χρὴ προσάπτεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστημονικὰς διδασκαλίαις).⁸⁸ In view of the example of emptiness and fullness, Galen can be seen as a forerunner of the so-called “conduit or container ontological metaphor”. In “container ontological metaphors”, experiences are treated as containers, as if they were discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 25). In this respect, Plutarch makes explicit use of the container ontological metaphor when he projects mixture theories from the human body onto the political one, but mainly when he characteristically conceives of the regimen of Alexander the Great as a cup (*De Al. Magn. fort.* 329C: ὡσπερ ἐν κρατῆρι φιλοτησίῳ μείζας τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τοὺς γάμους καὶ τὰς διαίτας), as we will see in chapter V.

But to return to Galen, he disregards metaphor from scientific discourse.⁸⁹ Galen’s strict view on clarity gives priority to definitions rather than metaphors; unlike metaphors, definitions reflect a concept’s logical structure. As put by Jim Hankinson (quoted by von Staden 1995, 513), “naming may begin with metaphor, but it has to end with *horoi*”.⁹⁰ Galen’s critical attitude towards metaphor has also moral implications; metaphor is seen as a betrayal of the communication contrary to nature in *De nominibus medicis* 9.12-22 Meyerhof and Schacht.⁹¹

⁸⁷ See the excellent overview of Galen’s theory on metaphor by H. von Staden, “Science as text, science as history: Galen on metaphor”, *Clio Med.* 28 (1995) 499-518.

⁸⁸ A TLG search yields 26 occurrences of the word metaphor in his work *De puls. diff.* Apart from it, cf. Gal., *De sympt. diff.* 7.48-49 K; *De simpl. med. temp. et fac.* 5.16 (11.758); *De comp. med. per gen.* 2.21 (13.552 K); *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 9.9.43 (608 De Lacy; 5.803-4 K); *De san. tuenda* 2.5.4 (CMG V.4.2, 53-54 Koch; 6.120 K).

⁸⁹ M. Asper, “(Some) Domains of Metaphor in Hellenistic Literature”, in M. Witte & S. Behnke, (eds.), *The Metaphorical Use of Language in Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature* (Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook 2014/15). Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015, 54.

⁹⁰ For a different view, see M.B. Hesse, *Models and Analogies in Science*, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966, 5: “It is often suggested that the analogy leads to the formulation of the theory, but that once the theory is formulated the analogy has served its purpose and may be removed and forgotten. Such a suggestion is absolutely false and perniciously misleading.”

⁹¹ I cite the German translation of the Arabic text.

Wenn der Mensch auch diese Mächtigkeit des Antriebes zur Liebe und Förderung der (Mit-) Menschen besitzt, so dass es nichts gibt, das ihm eigentümlicher und naheliegender wäre, da doch der Mensch ein sprachbegabtes Lebewesen ist, von Natur geschaffen zum Teilnehmenlassen anderer an dem, was er weiß, so missbrauchen und verderben doch diejenigen Leute, welche das schlecht anwenden, es anderen gegenüber. Das besteht darin, dass es ihnen freigestanden hätte, für jedes festgestellte Ding bestimmte Namen und Bezeichnungen einzuführen, während sie mit ihrem Streben nach Übertragung von Namen und Bezeichnungen, welche seit langer Zeit eingeführt waren, und ihrer Verwendung auf dem Wege der Entlehnung (Metapher) auf Grund der Ähnlichkeit für alles (beliebige), was sie benennen wollen, das vernachlässigen und sich selbst zu allererst betrügen.

According to the passage above κατάχρησις lies in the metaphorical transfer and application of established names and designations. Although people have the option for introducing names and definitions for every observed fact, they resort to metaphor, due to similarity, and neglect the natural gifts of mankind. Hence, they cheat themselves. Galen ascribes metaphor to the grammatical category of κατάχρησις elsewhere (*De puls. diff.* 8.675.9-11K.: ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μεμαθηκότι τὸ πρᾶγμα συντόμου δηλώσεως ἔνεκεν ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ὀνομάτων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐκ καταχρήσεως ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὸ λεγόμενον). It is interesting that the *LSJ* lexicon under the term κατάχρησις refers to the analogical application of a word and not to the misuse of a word, as it has been established by the later tradition.⁹² It is a trope or figure of speech, in which the meaning of a word is transferred to another unnamed or completely different meaning, based on some, not essential, similarity between them (e.g. γόνυ καλάμου, ὀφθαλμὸς ἀμπέλου).⁹³

⁹² According to the Patristic Lexicon of *Lampe*, κατάχρησις is the use of a term in other than its proper connotation, misuse, misapplication of language. See also H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, Stuttgart : Steiner, 1990, 3rd ed., 288-289.

⁹³ Cf. Tryph. i. *De trop.* 192.21-25 (*Rhet. Graeci* [Spengel]): β'. Περὶ καταχρήσεως: Κατάχρησις ἐστὶ λέξις μετενηνεγμένη ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου κατονομασθέντος κυρίως τε καὶ ἐτύμως ἐφ' ἕτερον ἀκατονόμαστον κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον, οἷον γόνυ καλάμου, καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς ἀμπέλου, καὶ χεῖλος κεραμίου καὶ τράχηλος ὄρους; on the other hand, his definition of metaphor is as follows id. 192.1-2: Μεταφορὰ ἐστὶ λέξις μεταφερομένη ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ κύριον ἐμφάσεως ἢ ὁμοιώσεως ἔνεκα, “metaphor is the transference of a part of speech from the literal or proper meaning to another meaning because of allusiveness or similarity”.

According to Quintilian, *κατάχρησις*, *abusio*, is found where there was previously no word, metaphor where there was a different word (*Inst. Or.* 8.6.35: *discernendumque est <ab> hoc totum tralationis istud genus, quod abusio est ubi nomen defuit, tralatio ubi aliud fuit*, “we must be careful to distinguish between abuse and metaphor, since the former is employed where there is no proper term available, and the latter when there is another term available”, transl. H.E. Butler). This passage suggests that metaphor is used where there was previously another designation. However, Quintilian regards that “metaphor should either occupy an empty place or, if it enters the others’ place, it should have a more effective meaning than what it expels” (*Inst.Or.* 8.6.18: *metaphora enim aut vacantem locum occupare debet aut, si in alienum venit, plus valere eo quod expellit*). As Novokhatko (2019, 388) says: “when one should distinguish between two kinds of linguistic metaphor, the creation of new names for unnamed objects and the replacing of a previous name with a new one for the same object, Quintilian is ready to accept the terminology of catachresis for the first category (creating a new name) and metaphor purely for the second one (replacing a previous name)”.⁹⁴ Hence, Quintilian attaches metaphor to the place of *κατάχρησις*. Similarly, Galen puts explicitly metaphor and catachresis into the same category.⁹⁵ The following passage from Galen is revealing (*De san. tuenda* 6.120.1-6 K.):

ὅτι διττή τις ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων χρῆσις ἐγένετο, κυρίως μὲν ὀνομαζόντων ἕτερα, καταχρωμένων δ’ ἕτερα. τὸ μὲν οὖν κυρίως ἀραιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ μέγαλοισι διαλαμβανόμενον πόροις, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πυκνὸν τὸ μικροῖς· τὸ δ’ ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ἢ καταχρήσεως ἢ ὅπως ἂν τις ὀνομάζειν ἐθέλη καὶ κατὰ τοῦ κεχυμένου τε καὶ πεπιλημένου λέγεται.

For one can employ the names in two ways, either by proper names or by catachresis. Hence, the sparse can be conceived, on the one hand, mainly as composed of big pores, similar to the dense characterized by

⁹⁴ A. Novokhatko, “The typology of linguistic metaphor in first-century CE Roman thought”, in N. Holmes, M. Ottink, J. Schrickx, and M. Selig (eds.), *Words and Sounds*, Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2019, 388.

⁹⁵ For the connection of metaphor to *catachresis* in Galen cf. Gal., *De simpl. med. temp. et fac.* 11.484.1-2 K.: καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἔλαιον ἀπλῶς γε καὶ πρώτως ὀνομάζεται, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ μεταφορὰν τινα καὶ κατάχρησιν; *In Hipp. Prorrh. I comm.* 16.806.9-13 K.: Ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τίνος συμπτώματος εἴρηται τὸ τῶν παλμῶν ὄνομα. πρὸς γὰρ τῶ μηδὲ διακεκρίσθαι σαφῶς τὰς προσηγορίας τῶν παλαιῶν, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ Περὶ παλμῶν βιβλίον, ἐν ᾧ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρτηρίας σφυγμῶν διαλέγεται, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ γράμμας τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον εὐχερῆς ἐστὶν εἰς θέσιν ὀνομάτων ἐκ καταχρήσεως ἢ μεταφορᾶς.

small ones. But on the other hand, according to the metaphor or catachresis or whatever name one applies to it, one can say that it is poured out or oppressed.

In order to give a name to the ‘dense’, one can describe it either *by a proper name* (κυρίως), that is as a composition of big pores or *figuratively* (ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ἢ καταχρήσεως ἢ ὅπως ἄν τις ὀνομάζειν ἐθέλη) as poured out (κεχυμένου) or oppressed (πεπιλημένου). In particular, Galen in his treatise *On the different types of pulse* builds up his argumentation on metaphor on the axis of the distinction between *primary* and *secondary* meaning.⁹⁶ One can apply a name to a thing either *primarily* or *secondarily*.⁹⁷ In view of it, Galen opposes the main name (κύριον ὄνομα) to metaphor (μεταφορά) establishing a further distinction between κύριον and τροπικόν, literal and metaphorical. Galen adds further a new criterium for metaphor: κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, namely according to the accidental (*De puls. diff.* 8.690.4-6: ἕκαστόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα σκληρὰ λέγομεν οὐ κυρίως οὐδὲ πρώτως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε καὶ μεταφέροντες ἀπὸ τινος ὁμοιότητος οὕτως ὀνομάζομεν, “It is not literally (κυρίως) and primarily (πρώτως) that we say each of all the other things (which we call hard) is hard, but we name them thus both accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) and by transference from some similarity”). The accidental is similar to *polysemia*, as it is given in the following passage, where he connects the multiplicity of meanings with metaphor alluding to Aristotle and Plato as regards with their views on metaphor (8.688-689 K.):

ἀλλ’ ἐν ἐκατέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων ἄμφω τὸ ἄνδρῳ εὐρίσκετον σημαίνομενον, ὅταν γ’, ὡς εἴρηται, κυρίως τις ὀνομάζει καὶ μὴ τροπικῶς, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε τὰς μεταφορὰς ἀναρίθμητον ἔσται τι πλῆθος σημαينوμένων, οὐ τούτων μόνον τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημαιόντων (conj. Frede: σημαينوμένων Kühn)⁹⁸ ἀπάντων.

⁹⁶ *De puls. diff.* 8.671-672 K.: οὕτω μὲν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι κυρίως τε καὶ πρώτως ὀνομάζουσι. μεταφέροντες δ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη τινὲς ἐπὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν τέχνας, οὐκέτι δηλονότι κυρίως, οὐδὲ πρώτως, ἀλλὰ δευτέρως τε καὶ τροπικῶς ὁ μὲν ἔριον ὠνόμασε πλήρες, ὁ δὲ οἶνον, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι τῇ χρεῖα κρίνων ἕκαστος τὸ πρᾶγμα. For the distinction between primary and secondary meaning, cf. Gal., *De sympt. diff.* 7.48-49 K.; *De simpl. med. temp. et fac.* 11.758 K.; *De comp. med. per gen.* 13.552 K.; *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 5.803-4 K. (=608 De Lacy); *De san. tuenda CMG* V.4.2, 53-54 Koch; 6.120 K).

⁹⁷ This view alludes to Arist., *EN* 1158b 30-33: ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρώτως τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀξίαν δευτέρως.

⁹⁸ I follow the option of H. von Staden, “Science”, 507 footnote 23.

Both authors discovered one meaning of each of the two words (scil. 'hard' and 'soft'), at least (..) whenever one uses them literally and not figuratively, seeing that there will be a countless multitude of meanings in the case of metaphors, and not only countless meanings of these two words but also of all other signifiers.
(transl. H. von Staden)

Galen's views on metaphor can be depicted in the following schema:

<u>κύριον ὄνομα</u>	<u>μεταφορά</u>
κυρίως	τροπικῶς
πρώτως	δευτέρως
	κατὰ συμβεβηκός
	κατάχρησις
	ἀναρίθμητον πλῆθος σημαινομένων

To sum up, Galen in his discussions on the placement of metaphor in the textuality of science designates metaphor from the scientific realm as improper to the first truth. By so doing he follows Aristotle who theoretically rejects metaphor from scientific discourse, but indeed makes use of it and even elevates it as a key technique of argumentation in his philosophical treatises. Very similarly, Galen also did make use of them in his treatises although he denounced them. This happens because metaphorical thinking is rooted in the human experience as suggested by the conceptual metaphor theory. Hence, the genre where a metaphor is applicable is decisive for the appreciation of metaphor. The textuality of science permits the technical use of metaphor in order to reach the less probable, whereas prohibits the rhetorical embellishment, with which metaphor was charged. Similarly, the textuality of philosophy bases its argumentation on metaphor to arrive at the less foreseeable.⁹⁹

In medical texts, metaphor is used in a technical sense in that it unfolds a comparison between a phenomenon that is known and perceptible and another that is latent and unknown. The latter is to be reconstructed and explained by the former. This is the method of analogy applied in medical science, especially in the realm of internal medicine. It is about the demonstrative type of

⁹⁹ See Snell, "Gleichnis", 178-204; H. Hoffmann, "Why did the Greeks Need Imagery?", *Hephaistos* 9 (1988) 143-162.

knowledge which bases the unknown onto the known; in this search for understanding metaphorical and analogical thinking are the most appropriate methodologies so that one can reach the hidden, ‘τὸ ἄδηλον’. The Anaxagorean dictum ὄψις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα (DK 59 B21a) “phenomena are the sight of the hidden” encapsulates best this method of inferring conclusions by appealing to analogies from a different, more comprehensible domain. Galen makes use of it as stated, for example, in his work *On Semen*, where he conceives of the development of the embryo in terms of that of a plant.¹⁰⁰ The following passage is characteristic (*De sem.* 1.9.8-11: 4.543.5-544.2 K.= *CMG* 5.3.1.94.6-16 De Lacy):

ταῦτα γὰρ ὕστερον, ὡς Ἱπποκράτης ὠνόμασεν, ὀζοῦται, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς κλάδους ἀναλογίαν ἐνδειξάμενος τῇ προσηγορίᾳ. τέταρτος δ’ οὗτός ἐστι καὶ τελευταῖος χρόνος, ἡνίκα ἤδη τὰ τ’ ἐν τοῖς κώλοις ἅπαντα διήρθρωται, καὶ οὐδ’ ἔμβρυον ἔτι μόνον, ἀλλ’ ἤδη καὶ παιδίον ὀνομάζει τὸ κουόμενον ὁ θαυμάσιος Ἱπποκράτης, ὅτε καὶ ἀσκαρίζειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι φησιν, ὡς ζῶον ἤδη τέλειον. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ὡς ζώου δέομαι τό γε νυνὶ τοῦ κουομένου μνημονεύειν, ὡς φυτὸν γὰρ ἅπασάν τε τὴν γένεσιν ἔσχηκε καὶ τὴν διάπλασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σπέρματος, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα διπλῆν ἀρχὴν κινήσεώς τε καὶ διαπλάσεως εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνδειξάμενα. οἷα μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ κάτω τε καὶ κατὰ τῆς γῆς ἐστὶν ἡ ῥίζωσις τοῖς φυτοῖς, τοιαύτη τοῖς κουομένοις ἢ εἰς τὴν μήτραν ἔμφυσις τῶν κατὰ τὸ χορίον ἀρτηριῶν τε καὶ φλεβῶν.

Later on they form ‘twigs’, as Hippocrates expressed it, indicating by the term their similarity to branches. The fourth and final period is at the stage when all the parts in the limbs have been differentiated; and at this point Hippocrates the marvelous no longer calls the fetus an embryo only, but already a child, too, when he says that it jerks and moves as an animal now fully formed. But for the present I need not to speak of the fetus as an animal, for as a plant it got all its generation and formation from the semen, and right from the start it indicated, as plants do, that the beginning of its motion and formation was two-fold. The downward and underground growth of roots in plants corresponds in the fetus to the growth of the veins and arteries.

¹⁰⁰ See B. Holmes, “Pure Life: The Limits of the Vegetal Analogy in the Hippocratics and Galen”, in J. Z. Wee (ed.), *The Comparable Body - Analogy and Metaphor in Ancient Mesopotamian, Egyptian, and Greco-Roman Medicine* (Studies in Ancient Medicine 49), Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017, 358-386. See also F. Giorgianni (ed., trans.), *Hippokrates, Über die Natur des Kindes (De geniture und De natura pueri)* (Serta Graeca. Beiträge zur Erforschung griechischer Texte 23), Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2006.

This metaphorical concept of the embryo *qua* plant is part of a wider metaphor of the uterus as the earth.¹⁰¹ The growth of the embryo is thus compared with that of a plant. Hence, we *are* plants in figurative but ontological respect; this connection is attested in the earliest Hippocratic embryological texts. Galen cites Hippocrates who described the limbs of the human in terms of twigs. Actually, their *physis* is similar (παραπλησίη φύσις), as had been argued by Hippocrates in his works *Generation* and *Nature of the Child*.¹⁰² Furthermore, he purports the view that it is the comprehensibility and clarity, for the sake of which a metaphor is used (*De nat. puer.* 18: 63.1 ff. Joly; 7.504 L.: Μέλλω δὲ τὸ δεύτερον νῦν ὀνομάζω σαφηνίης εἵνεκα “And now I shall state the whole thing over again, for the sake of clarity”). For the sake of clarity, the usage of analogical and metaphorical thinking is indispensable. This view lies in contradiction to the Aristotelian principle: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον adopted by Galen. Therefore, the appreciation of the role of metaphor in Galen turns into a riddle, as was the case in Aristotle.

2.5. Plutarch on metaphor

The same view that metaphor makes words to be more easily understood expresses Plutarch in *Cic.* 40.2: τὰ μὲν μεταφοραῖς, τὰ δ’ οἰκειότησιν ἄλλαις γνώριμα καὶ προσήγορα μηχανησάμενος. Metaphor is described here as a tool for familiarization, for embracing the unfamiliar and turning it into familiar and known. According to Rainer Hirsch-Luipold (2002: 129: “μεταφορά wird nicht nur terminologisch für eine bestimmte sprachliche Figur verwendet, sondern fungiert allgemein als Beschreibung einer übertragenen Redeweise, die einem logischen Akt oder einer ontologischen

¹⁰¹ H. King, “Making a Man: Becoming Human in Early Greek Medicine”, in G.R. Dunstan (ed.), *The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions*, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990, 10-19.

¹⁰² Hipp., *De nat. puer.* 27.1: 77.5 f. Joly; 7.528 L.: Ἀναβήσομαι δ’ αἰθίς ὀπίσω οὗ εἵνεκά μοι λόγου τάδε ἀμφὶ τῶνδε εἴρηται. Φημὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῆι φυόμενα πάντα ζῆν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἰκμάδος, καὶ ὅπως ἂν ἡ γῆ ἔχη ἰκμάδος ἐν ἑωυτῇ, οὕτω καὶ τὰ φυόμενα ἔχειν· οὕτω καὶ τὸ παιδίον ζῆ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν τῇσι μήτρῃσι, καὶ ὅπως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ ὑγιείης ἔχη, οὕτω καὶ τὸ παιδίον ἔχει. Ἦν δὲ τις βούληται ἐννοεῖν τὰ ῥηθέντα ἀμφὶ τούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐς τέλος, εὐρήσει τὴν φύσιν πᾶσαν παραπλησίην εἶδεν τῶν τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων. Καὶ ταῦτά μοι ἐς τοῦτο εἴρηται. See A. Anastassiou, “Textkritische Bemerkungen zu den Ps.-Hippokratischen Schriften de genitura und de natura pueri”, *Hermes* 100 (1972) 624–626.

Struktur folgt.¹⁰³ Such an approach of medical metaphors I adopt in this study. Metaphor is a valuable linguistic and cognitive tool which unfolds a logical structure and enhances the train of Plutarch's argumentation.

In respect to the morphology, Plutarch introduces metaphor by the following verbal ways: 1. by the syntagmatic sequence of the following phrases: a. εἰ δεῖ μεταφορᾶ <χρησάμενον> τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν (e.g. *Pel.* 13.7), b. εἰ δεῖ μεταφορᾶ χρῆσάμενον λέγειν (*Quaest. Conviv.* 692C), c. εἰπὼν ἐν μεταφορᾶ (*De tuenda* 135E), d. ἢ τῆ μεταφορᾶ χρώμενος (*Quaest. Plat.* 1000F); 2. after the adverbs ὡσπερ or καθάπερ. This way of implementing metaphorical thinking in the Plutarchan Corpus is very common; 3. by substitution of names. This is the most elaborate though latent art of metaphorical writing.

Concerning his views on metaphor, Plutarch refers to its function eighteen times, in total, according to a *TLG* search. However, Plutarch does not have a steady view of it. He describes metaphor in multiple ways: a. positively, as a useful political vehicle; as a trope that offers pleasure, and as a vehicle of historical truth, b. with grey colours as a deterrent against truth, and c. negatively, as an opponent of truth. To begin with, it is interesting that Plutarch himself highlights the role of metaphor in the political discourse. Metaphor has a special impact on the audience, as is described in the following passage (*Praec. ger.* 803A):

δέχεται δ' ὁ πολιτικὸς λόγος δικανικοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ γνωμολογίας καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ μύθους καὶ μεταφοράς, αἷς μάλιστα κινουῦσιν οἱ χρώμενοι μετρίως καὶ κατὰ καιρόν· ὡς ὁ εἰπὼν “μὴ ποιήσητε ἑτερόφθαλμον τὴν Ἑλλάδα,” καὶ Δημάδης τὰ ναύαγια λέγων πολιτεύεσθαι τῆς πόλεως.

And political oratory, much more than that used in a court of law, admits maxims, historical and mythical tales, and metaphors, by means of which those who employ them sparingly and at the proper moment move their audiences exceedingly; as did he who said ‘Do not make Hellas one-eyed,’ and Demades when he said he was ‘governing the wreck of the State’.

Plutarch recognizes here the power of metaphor to move the audience. Actually, he suggests the proper and prudent use of it in order to achieve the best political impact on the crowd. He views metaphor as part of the political quiver that an orator must have among sayings, histories, and

¹⁰³ For the usage of the term ‘metaphor’ by Plutarch see Hirsch-Luipold, *Plutarchs Denken in Bildern*, 124-129.

myths. Moreover, he purports the view that metaphor offers pleasure (*Dem.* 2.4: *χαρίεν μὲν ἡγούμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἀτερπές*). Furthermore, Plutarch underlines its disclosing function; metaphor reveals things (*De fort. Rom.* 322F: *ἀλλ' ἔχον ἐκ μεταφοῶς ἀναθεώρησιν, οἷον ἐλκούσης τὰ πόρρω καὶ κρατούσης συμπροσισχόμενα*) and sheds light on the truth, as the following passage from *Pel.* 13.7 reveals:

ὁ γὰρ καταλύσας τὸ τῆς Σπάρτης ἀξίωμα καὶ παύσας ἄρχοντας αὐτοῦς γῆς τε καὶ θαλάττης πόλεμος ἐξ ἐκείνης ἐγένετο τῆς νυκτός, ἐν ἣ Πελοπίδας οὐ φρούριον, οὐ τεῖχος, οὐκ ἀκρόπολιν καταλαβὼν, ἀλλ' εἰς οἰκίαν δωδέκατος κατελθὼν, εἰ δεῖ μεταφοῶ *<χρησάμενον>* τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἔλυσε καὶ διέκοψε τοὺς δεσμοὺς τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγεμονίας, ἀλύτους καὶ ἀρρήκτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας.

For the war which broke down the pretensions of Sparta and put an end to her supremacy by land and sea, began from that night, in which Pelopidas, not by surprising any fort or castle or citadel, but by coming back into a private house with eleven others, loosed and broke in pieces, if the truth may be expressed in a metaphor, the fetters of the Lacedaemonian supremacy, which were thought indissoluble and not to be broken.

Pelopidas, along with the other eleven Theban men, broke off the firm fetters imposed by the Spartan leadership. In fact, the war which terminated the dominion of Sparta began when Pelopidas rent asunder the fetters of Sparta.¹⁰⁴ The metaphor of breaking the knots is used here in order to highlight this historical deed that challenged the Spartan hegemony, whereas its allusion to Alexander's Gordian Knot (*Alex.* 18.2-3) makes Pelopidas' victory even more important.¹⁰⁵ The role of the metaphor is, in this case, to unveil the historical truth in a vivid manner. In short, metaphor sheds light on history. It is interesting this connection with the truth that Plutarch ascribes here to metaphor. Metaphor has thus, a genuine function in disclosing historical truth. On the other hand, metaphor can obscure or distort reality. For example, in the *Pythian Oracles* the metaphorical poetic language, with which the oracles were clothed, casts a shadow on the understanding of their true meaning. In this case, metaphor makes the oracles even more obscure and less comprehensible (*De Pyth. orac.* 405D; 407A; 409D). Furthermore, in his *Quaestiones*, namely in texts with a scientific perspective, Plutarch rejects metaphor as a

¹⁰⁴ A. Georgiadou, *Plutarch's Pelopidas: A Historical and Philological Commentary* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 105), Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011, 98.

¹⁰⁵ Hirsch-Luipold, *Plutarchs Denken*, 126.

transmitter of truth. For example, the phrase εἰ δεῖ μεταφορᾷ χρησάμενον λέγειν (*Quaest. Conviv.* 692C) or its kin one εἰ δεῖ μεταφορᾷ <χρησάμενον> τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν (*Pel.* 13.7) opposes metaphor to the truth. Hirsch-Luipold says characteristically (2002, 128):

ἀληθῆς kann in solchen Zusammenhängen parallel zu κυρίως einfach im eigentlichen Sinne bedeuten. Bei der bildhaften Rede deutet Plutarch zuweilen eine gewisse Vorsicht an: wenn man es bildlich ausdrücken darf. Metaphorische Sprache, dies wird hier deutlich, muß ihre Wahrheit erst erwiesen.

Metaphor lies in contradiction to the truth, or to the main names. Moreover, Plutarch connects metaphor with *catachresis* similarly to Galen, as already seen. In view of the conjunction of metaphor to *catachresis*, Plutarch reflects a similar view like that of Galen. He distinguishes the genuine poetic staff, namely the fiction or myth, from metaphor. Metaphor is only an external embellishment among obsolete words, *catachresis*, lyrics, and rhythms, to which Pindar restored due to lack of poetic elegance when he was still young (*De glor. Athen.* 347F: γλώσσας δὲ καὶ καταχρήσεις καὶ μεταφορὰς καὶ μέλη καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἡδύσματα τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑποτιθέντα). In particular, Corinna warned him that his writing lacked refinement since he made use of metaphors, misuses and obsolete words instead of introducing myths, which are the proper core of poetry. The same view on the essence of poetry reflects Plutarch elsewhere. In his most evident treatise on poetry, namely in *How the young man should study poetry*, Plutarch distinguishes the essence of poetry, which is fiction, from metaphor, as described in the following passage (*De aud. poet.* 16B):

οὔτε γὰρ μέτρον οὔτε τρόπος οὔτε λέξεως ὄγκος οὔτ' εὐκαιρία μεταφορᾶς οὔθ' ἁρμονία καὶ σύνθεσις ἔχει τοσοῦτον αἰμυλίας καὶ χάριτος ὅσον εἶ πεπλεγμένη διάθεσις μυθολογίας· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν γραφαῖς κινητικώτερον ἐστὶ χρῶμα γραμμῆς διὰ τὸ ἀνδρείκελον καὶ ἀπατηλόν, οὕτως ἐν ποιήμασι μεμιγμένον πιθανότητι ψεῦδος ἐκπλήττει καὶ ἀγαπᾶται μᾶλλον τῆς ἀμύθου καὶ ἀπλάστου περὶ μέτρον καὶ λέξιν κατασκευῆς.

And indeed, neither the measures nor the tropes nor the grandeur of words nor the aptness of metaphors nor the harmony of the composition gives such a degree of elegance and gracefulness to a poem as a well-ordered and artificial fiction doth. But as in pictures the colors are more delightful to the eye than the lines, because those give them a nearer resemblance to the persons they were made for, and render them the more apt to deceive the beholder; so in poems we are more apt to be smitten and fall in love with a probable fiction than with the greatest accuracy that can be observed in measures and phrases, where there is nothing fabulous or fictitious joined with it.

Here, Plutarch gives primacy to the fiction over metaphor. The appropriate application of metaphor implied by the word εὐκαίρῳ appears as a *desideratum* in the ancient discussions on stylistic matters of poetry (e.g. Arist., *Rh.* 3.1404b 26-1405b 21).¹⁰⁶ However, Plutarch does not only suggest the moderate use of metaphor. Rather, he contrasts metaphor to fiction elevating the latter over the former. He insists on the importance of myths and content, in general.¹⁰⁷ Metaphor is only an external adornment and as such, it is inferior to myth. Plutarch underestimates here the poetic value of metaphor introducing an analogy. Myth is more attractive and appealing than any verbal construction which lacks fiction, similar to the colours which are more pleasant to the eye than the lines. To sum up, Plutarch does not present a systematic and consistent theory of metaphor but reflects on it in line with the variant purposes of his texts and his narrative techniques pertaining to the biographical or moralizing art.

¹⁰⁶ R. Hunter, *Plutarch, How to study poetry (De audiendis poetis)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 85.

¹⁰⁷ R. Hunter, "Reading for Life: Plutarch, How the young man should study poetry?", in R. Hunter (ed.), *Critical Moments in Classical Literature: Studies in the Ancient View of Literature and its Uses*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 169-201.

2.6. *Papyrus Hamburgensis* 128

- με-
ταφορὰν δὲ <τὸ> τῶν αὐτῶν ὀ-
νομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων συν-
40 θέτων ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς
ἐπ’ ἄλλο πρᾶγμα μετενη-
νεγμένον, οἶον· τὸ γῆρας
δυσμᾶς βίου, καὶ τὴν ἔρη-
45 μον νῆσον χηρεύειν ἀνδρῶν,
καὶ τὸμ βασιλέα ποιμένα
λαῶν. ἐπίθετον δὲ τὸ
μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λε-
γόμενον, οἶον· σίδηρος αἵ-
θων, καὶ χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις.
50 γίνεται δὲ καὶ διπλοῦν
καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸ
μὴ συμβεβηκὸς[ς], ὃ δὴ στέρη-
σίν τινες καλοῦσιν, οἶον·
τὸν σακεσφόρον, ἀρηΐφιλον·
55 τὸ δὲ τριπλοῦν· [βο]τρυο-
καρποτόκον καὶ ἄστερομαρ-
μαροφεγγές, τὸ δὲ μὴ κα-
τὰ το συμβεβηκὸς ἀπ[λ]ουν,
ἄπτερον. μετουσίαν δ’ ἐκ-
60 τοῦ παρεπομένου διτ-
ταχῶς ἀγλαμβάνουσιν,
ἐνίοτε μὲν [ἀπ’] εἶδους ἐπὶ
γένους, <ἐνίοτε δ’ ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ
εἶδος>· οἶον ἀπὸ γένους
μὲν ἐπ’ εἶδ[ος,] ὅταν τ[.]ν

10. *P. Hamburgensis* 128, (*Griechische Papyri der Hamburger Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek*, Bd. 4, 1954, Bruno Snell, p.38) II. 37-64; Theophrastus App. 9 FHS&G.

(Men call) metaphor the transfer of unchanged substantival or verbal composite expressions from something similar to another thing, e.g. old age <is> “the setting of life” and the desolate island “is bereft of men” and the king <is> “shepherd of the people”. Men call epithet that which is used in conjunction with ordinary words, e.g., blazing iron and dazzling gold. There is also double and triple epithet and that in respect to what does not apply, which some call privation, e.g., (double): “shield-bearing”, “Ares-lover”; triple: “grape-fruit-productive” and “star-crystal-bright”; and that which is not in respect to what does apply: “footless”, “wingless”. Men classify metousia

from what follows in two ways: sometimes from species to genus and sometimes from genus to species, e.g. from genus to species, when (transl. FSH&G slightly modified)¹⁰⁸

This papyrus of the third century B.C. provides a post-Aristotelian theory of metaphor which has striking resemblances to Aristotle's concept of metaphor, as it appears in his *Poetics* 21. Bruno Snell ascribes the papyrus "mit grösser Wahrscheinlichkeit" to Theophrastus' work *On style* (*Περὶ λέξεως*). According to him, it belongs to the first book of his work. Doreen Inees disagrees with this ascription.¹⁰⁹ One reason for this objection lies to the fact that the term μετουσία is absent from the later influence of Theophrastus on Demetrius or Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who quote from Theophrastus' work *On Style*. Doreen Inees says characteristically (1985, 252): "Yet if a major critic like Theophrastus is the author of the papyrus, it is perhaps suspicious that later theory fails to use the term metousia". Schenkeveld agrees with Doreen Inees.¹¹⁰ In particular, he regards the papyrus as representative of a Hellenistic *ars poetica* that assimilates to the grammatical art of Dionysius Thrax (1993, 80). According to him (*Ars*. 1): γραμματική (sc. ἐστὶ) ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικούς τρόπους, "grammar is interpretation according to the poetic tropes present in the text". One of them is metaphor. The brief definitions are reminiscent of the species of a grammatical art, and not of an influential work like that of Theophrastus. However, Fortenbaugh incorporated the papyrus in the Appendix to Theophrastus' works in his edition of Theophrastus, but hesitantly.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ See W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples, and D. Goutas (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*. 2 vols. (Philosophia Antiqua 54), Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill, 1992.

¹⁰⁹ D.C. Innes, "Theophrastus and the theory of style", in W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, and A.A. Long (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus. On His Life and Work*, New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction, 1985, 251–67.

¹¹⁰ D.M. Schenkeveld, "Pap. Hamburg. 128: A Hellenistic Ars Poetica", *ZPE* 97 (1993) 67-80.

¹¹¹ W. Fortenbaugh, *Theophrastus of Eresus Commentary Volume 8: Sources on Rhetoric and Poetics*, Leiden: Brill, 2005, 254–66. Fortenbaugh (*op. cit.*, 266) adds that "the several difficulties involved in the section on metaphor, especially the apparently mindless use of συνθέτων and the imprecision concerning similarity (lines 39-41) may be thought to speak against attributing the papyrus to Theophrastus. But then again, great minds sometimes fail, and copyists can make a mess of what had once been an admirable text". See also G. Calboli, "The Metaphor After Aristotle," in D.C. Mirhady (ed.), *Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of William W. Fortenbaugh* (Philosophia Antiqua 105), Leiden: Brill, 2007, 123-150.

Regardless of the attribution of the papyrus to Theophrastus or to a Hellenistic art, the treatment of the concept of metaphor and, in particular, its comparison to the *Poetics* provides a clear framework of the interwoven threads of metaphor. According to Aristotle, the seeing of the similarity is a condition of the good metaphor (*Po.* 1459a 9: τὸ γὰρ εἶ μεταφέρειν τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν). This view seems to be echoed in the definition of metaphor in the papyrus as ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐπ’ ἄλλο πρᾶγμα μετενηνεγμένον. Moreover, the example that provides the papyrus alludes to the Aristotelian type of proportional metaphor (οἶον τὸ γῆρας δυσμάς βίου). The same word δυσμάς is transferred unchanged from its literal environment, namely the setting of the sun to the metaphorical one, the old age.¹¹² Aristotle uses the same example in order to elaborate on the type of metaphor based on analogy (*Po.* 1457b 16-26):

τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχη τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον. καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν ἀνθ’ οὗ λέγει πρὸς ὃ ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ οἶον ὁμοίως ἔχει φιάλη πρὸς Διόνυσον καὶ ἀσπίς πρὸς Ἄρη· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν φιάλην ἀσπίδα Διονύσου καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην Ἄρεως. ἢ ὁ γῆρας πρὸς βίον, καὶ ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας ἢ ὡσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίου ἢ δυσμάς βίου. ἐνίοις δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦττον ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται·

Metaphor by analogy means this: when B is to A as D is to C, then instead of B the poet will say D and B instead of D. And sometimes they add that to which the term supplanted by the metaphor is relative. For instance, a cup is to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares; so he will call the cup “Dionysus’s shield” and the shield “Ares’ cup.” Or old age is to life as evening is to day; so he will call the evening “day’s old-age” or use Empedocles’ phrase; and old age he will call “the evening of life” or “life’s setting sun.” Sometimes there is no word for some of the terms of the analogy but the metaphor can be used all the same. (W.H. Fyfe)

The metaphor of the papyrus accords with the Aristotelian metaphor by analogy. Both are exemplified through the proportional transference of meaning between setting sun and old age. In other words, old age is to life as setting sun is to day (γῆρας/βίος: ἡμέρα/δυσμαί). The fact that Aristotle himself expresses the view that the proportional metaphor is the best type of metaphor (*Rh.* 1411a 1) can justify the survival of the proportional metaphor in the papyrus. The other two types of metaphor labelled as metaphor from genus to species and from species to genus (1457b

¹¹² For the metaphor of the sunset of life (δυσμαῖς βίου, τῷ τέλει τῆς ζωῆς) cf. *Tim.*, *Lex.* [delta] 983b26; *Phot.*, *Lex.* 827.1; *Sud.* 1653.1.

7-8 and 9-13) are given by the papyrus under the term μετουσία. Concerning the classification according to the transference of meaning between genre and species, the following schema depicts their similarities:

Arist., *Po.* 1457b

μεταφορά

ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος

ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος

ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος

κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον

Pap. Hamb. 128

μετουσία

ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος

ἀπ' εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος

In the Aristotelian passage from *Poetics* 21 metaphor is divided into four types: a. from genre to species; b. from species to genre; c. from species to species, and d. that based on analogy or proportional metaphor (*Po.* 1457b 6-10: μεταφορά δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον). The papyrus provides a similar distinction in the discussion of μετουσία and not metaphor. In particular, μετουσία is classified in a. that from genre to species and b. from species to genre. In the papyrus, the Aristotelian metaphor is thus divided into metaphor and μετουσία. Snell puts it explicitly (1954, 44): “Die Metusie kann also entweder darauf gehen, dass ein allgemeiner Ausdruck das Spezielle oder aber ein spezieller Ausdruck das Allgemeine bezeichnet. Von der Metapher, die etwas von einem Fremden und Andersartigen „herüberholt“ ist also die Metusie mit gutem Grund geschieden.“ Schenkeveld states that the term metousia of the papyrus was substituted by the terms of μετωνυμία and συνεκδοχή of the later tradition. To sum up, μετουσία as a term focuses on the participation of a part in its whole, to which it is akin. Metaphor, on the other hand, entails a cross-domain transference of meaning between completely different areas due to a point of similarity (ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐπ' ἄλλο πρᾶγμα μετενηνεγμένον).

I would like now to focus on the terms of the non-accidental that are present in the papyrus: κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός and τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός. These are incorporated in the papyrus' theory on epithet. It is assumed that the author of the papyrus should refer here to the literal meaning, to the main names, in conjunction with which the adjectives are used (*Pap. Hamb.* 128, 46-48: ἐπίθετον δὲ τὸ μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λεγόμενον). According to the *LSJ* lexicon, τὸ συμβεβηκός

has double meaning: a “contingent attribute”, “accident”, “chance event”, hence κατὰ συμβεβηκός means “by accident, contingently”. In this sense, the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκός is opposed to the following adverbial phrases: καθ’ αὐτό, ἀπλῶς, φύσει, κυρίως, πρώτως. According to its second meaning, it implies an “attribute necessarily resulting from the notion of a thing, but not entering into the definition thereof”. In Epicurus, it means the essential attribute, property, opposed to σύμπτωμα “accident” (Diog. Laert., *Vit. Phil.* [Epicurus] 10.40.6: τὰ τούτων συμπτώματα ἢ συμβεβηκότα).¹¹³ Therefore, depending on the context τὸ συμβεβηκός may refer to accident or be opposed to it.

According to the papyrus, the phrase κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός describes that type of epithets that some call privation. After presenting the conjunction of epithets with ordinary words (κύρια ὀνόματα), e.g. blazing iron (σίδηρος αἴθων) and dazzling gold (χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις), namely *nomina ornantia*, the author adds three types of epithets: a. double, b. triple, namely composite ones, and c. privative. The last ones are formulated κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός or τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός. Fortenbaugh translates the phrase as “that in respect to what does not apply” and “that which is not in respect to what does apply”, respectively. The author of the papyrus provides the examples: “footless”, “wingless”. The privative epithets are composed of an ordinary name accompanied by an alpha- privative prefix, as in the case of wingless ἄπτερος or ἄπους. Their formulation is thus unusual, κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός. But what does this phrase here mean? According to Snell (43): “κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός scheint kein aristotelischer Begriff, obwohl natürlich nicht sicher ist, ob Aristot. Ihn nicht in dem verlorenen Teil der Poetik gebraucht hat; er scheint aber auch später nicht vorzukommen”. Schenkeveld however does find later references to the privative epithets in terms of τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός. He cites two examples. The first comes from Sextus Empiricus treatise *Against the Mathematicians*.¹¹⁴ By criticizing Plato’s definition of man

¹¹³ Cf. Phld., *Sign.* 3: ἀνθρώπου τὸ θνητὸν εἶναι; in the Stoics, it has the notion of consequence being opposed to the αἴτιον, cf. Zeno Stoic., *SVF* 1.25 H. von Arnim.

¹¹⁴ Sext. Emp., *Adv. Mathem.* 7.281-282: Πλάτων δὲ χειρόν παρά τοὺς ἄλλους ὀρίζεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον, λέγων “ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῷον ἄπτερον δίπουν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν.” ὅθεν καὶ προὔπτα ἐστὶ τὰ ὀφείλοντα πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι. πάλιν γὰρ οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκτέθειται, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καὶ ἀποσυμβεβηκότα τούτῳ κατηρίθμηται: τὸ μὲν γὰρ “ἄπτερον” ἀποσυμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ “ζῷον” καὶ τὸ “δίπουν” καὶ τὸ “πλατυώνυχον” συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ “ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν” ποτὲ μὲν συμβέβηκεν, ποτὲ δὲ ἀποσυμβέβηκεν. ὥστε ἡμῶν ἕτερόν τι μαθεῖν ζητούντων αὐτὸς ἕτερόν τι παρέστησεν.

he introduces a distinction between τὰ συμβεβηκότα καὶ ἀποσυμβεβηκότα, positive and negative attributes of man. ζῶον ἄπτερον is a negative attribute (τὸ μὲν γὰρ "ἄπτερον" ἀποσυμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ) reflecting on the papyrus example of ἄπτερον as κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός, as a property that is absent, that cannot be applied. The second instance that Schenkeveld uses comes from Galen's definition of ὑποχόνδριον.¹¹⁵ This takes its name from a property that does not exist (ἐκ τῶν οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων or cannot be applied (ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συμβεβηκότητος). All these instances apply to the second meaning of συμβεβηκός as an "attribute necessarily resulting from the notion of a thing, but not entering into the definition thereof". But Galen in the definition of metaphor attributes to the same word of συμβεβηκός the meaning of the accidental (*De puls. diff.* 8.690.4-6 K.), as already seen. This is the first meaning, according to the *LSJ*. Galen states that metaphor, in contrast to the proper names, takes place by accident implying the multiplicity of its meanings. The accidental refers to polysemia of metaphorical expressions, according to Galen. In this sense, the author of the *papyrus Hamburgensis* speaks of epithets that arise as non-accidental properties in the case of the privative epithets. We can then assume that in a few lines before the author of the papyrus had spoken of the main names in order to oppose them afterwards to metaphor or *metousia*. This assumption lies in accord with Galen's distinction between proper names and metaphors and his placement of accidental in metaphor. As a result, the contrary to the accidental belongs to the main ordinary names and epithets. The latter are not formed by accident but in accord with an ontological explanation between the signifier and signified. Aristotle connected the privative adjectives to metaphor (*Rh.* 1408a 6-9: ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα ἰέναι μέλος ἄλυρον, ("for poets employ epithets from negations, a course which is approved in proportional metaphors, as for instance, to say that the sound of the trumpet is a melody without the lyre"). However, the papyrus does not exhibit such a connection. The fragmentary structure of the papyrus does not provide certainty about an integrated theory on metaphor in general. Only assumptions can be built upon its fragmentary pieces which reflect the Aristotelian metaphor.

¹¹⁵ Gal., *In Hipp. progn. comm.* iii 18b85.12-86.5 K.: κατὰ μέρος δὲ αὐτοῦ διδάσκων ὁ Ἱπποκράτης τὰ γνωρίσματα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων εἶπεν, ἃ δὴ καλεῖν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀποσυμβεβηκότα. τὰ δὲ ἐφεξῆς δύο γνωρίσματα τῶν συμβεβηκῶν ἐστὶ τοῖς ὑποχονδρίοις. ἀνώδυνον μὲν οὖν ὑποχόνδριον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συμβεβηκότητος αὐτῷ λέλεκται, μαλθακὸν δὲ καὶ ὁμαλὸν ἐξ ὑπαρχόντων τινῶν.

Conclusions

To conclude, it is impossible to put together in one nice and neat scheme the different views of the complicated concept of metaphor. The history of the term metaphor can be summarized as follows: Plato introduces the meaning of the metaphor but not the coinage of the term. Under εικόν, he encapsulates the metaphorical thinking. Aristotle systematized the theory of metaphor. His classification of metaphor survives in all main or secondary later sources on it including also Plutarch, Galen, the papyrus Hamburgensis 128, even the contemporary cognitive theory of Lakoff. Plutarch reflects the multiple meanings of it without, however, providing a steady theory. On the contrary, Galen seems to provide a more precise and systematized theory of metaphor on the axis of its distinction between main and secondary meaning, a distinction that traces its origin in Aristotle. This distinction between πρώτως or κυρίως and δευτέρως or κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός survives both in Plutarch as a tension between metaphor and truth, and in the Papyrus Hamburgensis 128, as an opposition of the main names (κύρια ὀνόματα) to the accidental (κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός). Plato's usage of the metaphorical language in terms of a 'participation' (μετέχειν) of things in 'model forms' (παραδείγματα) though criticized by Aristotle as "empty speaking" and "poetic metaphors" (*Metaph.* 991a 21-22) seems to accord with the papyrus metaphorical theory in terms of participation (μετουσία).

Regardless of the designations of μετουσία, μεταφορά, κατάχρησις, ἀναλογία, εικόν the core of the metaphorical thinking implies the transference of meaning from a domain of knowledge to another different, as put precisely by Aristotle. The threads of this analogical interweaving I will try to discuss in this study as a result of the transference of medical terms into the politics as given in the Plutarchan Corpus. Plutarch's *explanandum* (the tenor of the metaphor) is the politics conveyed by his historical protagonists in his *Lives* or by Plutarch himself in his admonitions in the *Moralia* (e.g. *Precepts of Statecraft*); the *explanans* (the vehicle) is the medical model which supplies the metaphorical transference in terms of the healing of the social-political body. But this metaphorical mapping involves several levels of metaphor. In particular, the capacities and qualities of the rulers (the tenor or explanandum) are attributed not only to the physicians that constitute the model (explanans, vehicle) for the metaphor of the healing of the society. Metaphor reflects a wide spectrum of meanings and it may be vested with various forms; it may begin with the substitution of a word, the metonymy, the comparison or simile; it may be further developed into a wider analogical structure composed of many different metaphors subject to an underlying

idea, even a complicated paradigm that serves as an *exemplum*. Metaphor is in short one technique for likening one domain of knowledge to another by means of words. Plutarch may make use of an explicit comparison built around the words: *like* or *as* (ὅσπερ or καθάπερ) or some other explicit comparative construction, such as “if the truth may be expressed in a metaphor” (εἰ δὲ μεταφορᾷ χρησάμενον λέγειν) or “if I speak in terms of metaphor” (εἰπὼν ἐν μεταφορᾷ). Thus, in my study, I adopt the term metaphor as ‘Obergriff’ in order to refer to all these types of metaphorical thinking and imagery.

Chapter III.

Metaphors from anatomy

3.1. ὡσπερ οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν δεσμοί

This chapter examines the intertextual connotations of *physis* both as a natural and political state on the basis of the medical metaphor found in Plutarch's *Comparatio Cimonis et Luculli* 2.7.¹¹⁶ In these lines of the Plutarchan passage, I will explore the nexus of the inter-relations generated by the metaphorical connotations framing the medical metaphor of aristocratic natures as physicians. This Plutarchan metaphor grounds an interdiscursive bridge between medical texts on anatomy and *physis* tracing its origins back to the Hippocratic Corpus and tradition. In particular, I will be exploring the passage above in the context of Hippocrates, *De fracturis* 3.412.1.1-8 L. and 3.426.3.3-18 L., and Galen's commentary on the same passage shedding light on the notions of *physis* and justice ('δικαιοσύνη φύσις'). However, parallels are to be drawn, not only between the Plutarchan metaphor and the Hippocratic tradition but also between different Plutarchan *Lives*. In *Solon* (3.7), the notion of justice is presented along the same lines as it is by Hippocrates, i.e. as normative and inherent to the *physis* exempt from any external force. I will thus explore how Plutarch transposes the medical discourse into his metaphor of aristocratic natures as physicians.

According to Aristotle, "the right use of metaphor means an eye for resemblance" (*Po.* 1459a 9: τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν). This implied innate perception of the similarity in dissimilars or 'identity in difference' representative of metaphor's disclosive function could also describe both intertextuality and Plutarch's biographical technique of searching for similarities between his heroes in order to achieve an overarching concluding judgement, as follows (*Comp. Cim. et Luc. 2.7*):

ἢ τοῦτό γε καὶ πρὸς Κίμωνα κοινόν ἐστι: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ὑπήγαγον εἰς δίκας οἱ πολῖται καὶ τελευτῶντες ἐξωστράκισαν, ἴν' αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν ὡς φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων (*Gorg.* 516d) τῆς φωνῆς μὴ ἀκούσωσιν. αἱ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατικαὶ φύσεις ὀλίγα τοῖς πολλοῖς <συν>ἄδουσι καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ

¹¹⁶ An earlier version of this chapter was published in E. Plati, "Medical Allusions and Intertext in Plutarch's *Comp. Cim. et Luc. 2.7*", in T.S. Schmidt, M. Vamvouri & R. Hirsch-Luipold (eds.), *The Dynamics of Intertextuality in Plutarch* (Brill's Plutarch Studies), Leiden: Brill, 2020, 376-387.

προσβιαζόμεναι τῷ κατευθύνειν διαστρεφομένους ἀνιῶσιν ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν δεσμοί, καίπερ εἰς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγοντες τὰς παραρθρήσεις. ταύτης μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἀπαλλακτέον τῆς αἰτίας ἐκότερον.

Or perhaps this has its counterpart in the life of Cimon, for he was brought to trial by his fellow citizens and finally ostracised, in order that for ten years, as Plato says, they might not hear his voice. For aristocratic natures are little in accord with the multitude, and seldom please it, but by so often using force to rectify its aberrations, they vex and annoy it, just as physicians' bandages vex and annoy, although they bring the dislocated members into their natural position. Perhaps, then, both come off about alike on this count.

Plutarch refers to the fact that both men were opposed to the πλῆθος as a point of similarity (κοινόν ἐστὶ) between their *Lives* after stating that both Cimon and Lucullus subverted great empires and subdued Asia without managing to complete their work (2.5).¹¹⁷ Lucullus was severely despised by his soldiery whereas Cimon was condemned to exile (2.5-6). Plutarch quotes the Platonic passage from *Gorgias*, where Socrates states that “the Athenians condemned Cimon to ostracism in order that for ten years they should not listen to his voice”.¹¹⁸ The passage from *Gorgias* is overtly drawn upon in the Plutarchan text in the form of an incorporated Alexandrian footnote, as Ross, speaking of Latin poetry, defines this way of intertextual citation promoted through eye-catching verbal signs that appeal in a self-reflecting way to tradition and report (ὥς φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων).¹¹⁹ As a result, Plutarch’s knowledge of Plato is portrayed by him as a kind of learned citation. However, Plutarch’s medical knowledge emerges in an implicit way through the metaphor of aristocratic natures as physicians (2.7). Contrary to the above explicit intertextual quotation, Plutarch - without referring to a specific author or text - closely follows a certain type of medical discourse through the medical metaphor.

“Just as physicians’ bandages vex and annoy, albeit they bring the dislocated members into their natural position, aristocratic natures, similarly, vex and annoy the multitude as they use force to

¹¹⁷ Cf. the beginning of their *Synkrisis* and the metaphor of the diseased state in *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 1.1-1.2.

¹¹⁸ Pl., *Gorg.* 516d5-7.

¹¹⁹ D.O. Ross, *Backgrounds to Augustean Poetry: Gallus, Elegy and Rome*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 78, coined the term in order to signal words and phrases which seemingly reflect the act of ‘narrating’ or ‘reporting’ (e.g. *dicitur*, *ferunt*, *fama est*) and as such point out a poetic allusion. For Plutarch’s quotations from Hippocrates cf. W.C. Helmbold & E.N. O’Neil, *Plutarch’s Quotations* (Philological Monographs 19), Baltimore: The American Philological Association, Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1959, 19.

rectify its aberrations” (2.7). The Plutarchan ideal of the statesman as a gentle doctor, who uses less invasive methods than ‘burning and cutting’ is replaced here by the painful political treatment imposed by the aristocratic natures.¹²⁰ Plutarch portrays Lucullus negatively blaming him for his inability to woo the crowd.¹²¹ Similarly, Cimon was ostracized with the charge of being “a lover of Sparta and a hater of the people” (*Per.* 9.5: φιλολάκων καὶ μισόδημος); his philolaconism was perceived by his fellow citizens as a betrayal.¹²² Aristocracy in these cases seems inconsistent with the multitude. In order to depict the opposition of the multitude to the aristocratic statesmen, Plutarch transfers medical discourse drawn from anatomical texts. The interdiscursive openness of the Plutarchan metaphor to the Hippocratic anatomy is advanced through the notion of *physis* as an anatomical constitution. Aristocratic *natures* impose their power on the *plêthos* in order to rectify its aberrations. Thus, they are represented as being unpleasant and little in accord with the multitude because they annoy and vex it similarly to physicians whose bandages annoy and vex the patients in order to redirect the dislocated members into their *physis*. Hence, the term *physis* serves as a component of the Plutarchan metaphor and succeeds in bridging it with the Hippocratic tradition (Hipp., *De fract.* 1: 2.46.1-9 Kw. = 3.412.1-414.1 L.):

Ἐχρῆν τὸν ἰητρὸν τῶν ἐκπτώσιων τε καὶ κατηγμάτων ὡς ἰθυτάτας τὰς κατατάσιας ποιέεσθαι· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δικαιοτάτη φύσις. Ἦν δέ τι ἐγκλίνη ἢ τῆ ἢ τῆ, ἐπὶ τὸ πρηνὲς ῥέπειν· ἐλάσσων γὰρ ἡ ἀμαρτὰς ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ὕπτιον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν μηδὲν προβουλεύσαντες οὐδὲν ἐξάμαρτάνουσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πούλυ· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ ἐπιδεόμενος τὴν χεῖρα ἀπορέγει, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῆς δικαίης φύσιος ἀναγκαζόμενος·

In dislocations and fractures, the practitioner should make extensions in as straight a line as possible, for this is most conformable with nature” but if it inclines at all to either side, it should turn towards pronation (palm down) rather than supination (palm up), for the error is less. Indeed,

¹²⁰ See Saïd, “Plutarch and the People in the Parallel Lives”, 23.

¹²¹ See S. Swain, “Plutarch’s characterization of Lucullus”, *RhM* 135 (1992) 307-316; M. Tröster, “Struggling with the Plêthos: Politics and Military Leadership in Plutarch’s Life of Lucullus”, in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch’s Work: ‘Moralia’ Themes in the ‘Lives’, Features of the ‘Lives’ in the ‘Moralia’*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 393.

¹²² Cf. Plut., *Cim.* 15.3. See E. Stein-Hölkeskamp, “Kimon und die athenische Demokratie”, *Hermes* 127 (1999) 145-164; L. Piccirilli, “Commento. Vita di Cimone”, in C. Carena et al. (eds.), *Plutarco. Le vite di Cimone e di Lucullo* (Scrittori greci e latini), Milano: Fondazione Lorenzo Valla, 2001, 251.

those who have no preconceived idea make no mistake as a rule, for the patient himself holds out the arm for bandaging in the position impressed on it by conformity with nature. (E.T. Withington)

In medicine, the *physis* of the body or of an organ often coincides with its anatomical character, as is the case when the Hippocratic author describes that the *patient* himself forced by the ‘most right’ nature unfolds the arm for bandaging in the right position. Actually, the functional character of the Hippocratic anatomy portrays *φύσις* (*physis*) and *χρῆσις* (‘function’) very similar to each other, illustrating that both concepts, were in fact perceived as a unity in accordance with Hippocratic anatomy.¹²³ Closely allied to this force of functional or anatomical *physis* seems to be the description of *physis* in terms of a natural constitution and position, to which the physician has to rehabilitate dislocated members. Whether performed by the physician or by the patient, the extension aims at restoring the initial *physis*, namely the constitutional or normative, which the author names ‘most just’.¹²⁴ The return to this norm presupposes the forceful stretching into a straight line (ὡς ἰθυτάτας τὰς κατατάσιαις ποιέεσθαι) mentioned also by Plutarch (προσβιαζόμεναι τῷ κατευθύνειν) in view of his metaphor of the statesman as a physician who rectifies the deviation from the norm by repositioning the displacement to its natural state (εἰς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγοντες τὰς παραθρήσεις).

¹²³ Cf. Hipp., *De artic.* 18: 2.142.11-15 Kw. = 4.132.3-11 L.: Τὰς δὲ κατορθώσιαις, ἀπάγοντα ὅτι πλεῖστον, ὡς μὴ ψαυῆ τῆς κορώνης ἢ κεφαλῆ, μετέωρον περιάγειν, καὶ περικάμπτειν, καὶ μὴ ἐς εὐθὺ βιάζεσθαι, ἅμα δὲ ὠθέειν τάναντία ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα, καὶ παρωθέειν ἐς χώρην· ξυνοφελοίη δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐπίστρεψις ἀγκῶνος ἐν τουτέοισιν, ἐν τῷ μὲν ἐς τὸ ὕπιον, ἐν τῷ δὲ ἐς τὸ πρηνές. Ἰησις δὲ, σχήματος μὲν, ὀλίγῳ ἀνωτέρω ἄκρην τὴν χεῖρα τοῦ ἀγκῶνος ἔχειν, βραχίονα δὲ κατὰ πλευράς· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀνάληψις, καὶ θέσις, καὶ εὐφορον· καὶ φύσις, καὶ χρῆσις ἐν κοινῷ, ἦν ἄρα μὴ κακῶς πωρωθῆ· and id. 52: 2.191.20-192.9 Kw. = 4.230.1-8 L.: Ὅσοισι μὲν οὖν μήπω τετελειωμένοιισιν ἐς αὐξήσιν ἐκπεσῶν μὴ ἐμπέσοι, γυιοῦται ὁ μηρὸς καὶ ἡ κνήμη καὶ ὁ πούς· οὐτε γὰρ τὰ ὀστέα ἐς τὸ μῆκος ὁμοίως αὐξεται, ἀλλὰ βραχύτερα γίνεται, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ τοῦ μηροῦ, ἄσαρκόν τε ἅπαν τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἄμυον καὶ ἐκτεθλησμένον καὶ λεπτότερον γίνεται, ἅμα μὲν, διὰ τὴν στέρησιν τῆς χώρας τοῦ ἄρθρου, ἅμα δὲ, ὅτι ἀδύνατον χρέεσθαι ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐ κατὰ φύσιν κέεται· χρῆσις γὰρ μετεξετέρη ῥύεται τῆς ἄγαν ἐκθηλύνσιος. See M. Michler, “Die Praktische Bedeutung des normativen Physis-Begriffes in der Hippokratischen Schrift de Fracturis-De Articulis”, *Hermes* 90.4 (1962) 394.

¹²⁴ Cf. F. Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts* (Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 1), Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1945, 87. Heinemann proposes a systematic distinction between *φύσις* as a constitution-concept and *φύσις* as a norm-concept. However, both concepts have blurring borders in practice covering each other in the area of anatomy. The word *physis* has thus the meaning of anatomical form and that of position-functional indication.

3.2. παράθρησις

Under the term παράθρησις (<παραθρέω) is understood the partial dislocation of joints as opposed to the total one, i.e. ἐξάρθρωσις.¹²⁵ A luxation (ἐξάρθρωσις or ἐξάρθρημα) is a displacement of a member from its proper place (κατὰ φύσιν τόπον or οἰκεία θέσις) to an unusual place (παρὰ φύσιν τόπον), by which means the voluntary motion is impeded. But when the bone of a member is not completely removed from its proper place but only a little, then one should speak of subluxation (παράθρησις or παράθρημα). Enlightening is the definition by Ps.-Galen in *Definitiones medicae* 19.460.15 K.: υοβ'. Ἐξάρθρημά ἐστιν ὄστου κινουμένου κατὰ φύσιν ἐκ κοιλότητος βαθείας ἔκβασις εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν παρὰ φύσιν. υογ'. Παράθρημά ἐστι παραλλαγή ἢ φορὰ ὄστου παρὰ φύσιν ἐξ ἐπιπολαίου κοιλότητος εἰς τὸν παρὰ φύσιν τόπον. Similarly, Palladius, a professor of medicine at Alexandria in the sixth century A.D., commenting on the Hippocratic treatise *De Fracturis* gives a similar definition in terms of a perfect or imperfect dislocation; the complete dislocation from the proper place is called ἐξάρθρημα, whereas the partial displacement is called παράθρημα (*Scholia In Hipp. De Fract.* 24.19-21 Irmer: καὶ πάλιν ἢ τελείως ἐξίσταται τὸ ἄρθρον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας θέσεως καὶ καλεῖται ἐξάρθρημα ἢ ἀτελῶς καὶ καλεῖται παράθρημα). Moreover, Paulus Aeginita, the Byzantine physician in the seventh century A.D. reflects the same distinction (*Epitomae medicae libri septem* 6.118.1= *CMG* 9.2.175.18-19 Heiberg: [Περὶ τῆς κατ'

¹²⁵ The term παράθρησις (subluxation) is attested in Galen in *De diff. morb.* 6.870.6 K. and *In Hipp. De fract. comm.* 18b 477.3 K. Furthermore, it appears in Late antiquity in Apollonius of Citium, *In Hipp. De artic. comm.* 1.1.11 Schöne (= *CMG* 11.1.1.10.10 Kollesch & Kudlien); 2.10.12 Schöne (= *CMG* 11.1.1.38.19); 2.10.24 Schöne (= *CMG* 11.1.1.40.10 Kollesch & Kudlien); 2.11.1 (= *CMG* 11.1.1.40.24 Kollesch & Kudlien); 2.12.19 Schöne (*CMG* 11.1.1.46.1 Kollesch & Kudlien); in Paulus Aeginita, *Epit. med. libr. sept.* 6.115.1.5 Heiberg (*CMG* 9.2.170.18 Heiberg), and in Oribasius, *Collect. med.* 47.5.7.2 (*CMG* 6.2.2.249.6 Raeder) and 49.15.7.4 (*CMG* 6.2.2.27.16 Raeder). Its kin term παράθρημα is found in the following sources: Gal., *In Hipp. De artic. comm.* 18a 513.16 K.; 515.14 K.; 662.2 K. and 744.1 K.; Ps.-Gal., *Medicus. Introd.* 14.780.13 K. and *Def. med.* 19.460.15 K.; Paul., *Epit. med. libr. sept.* 6.111.1.8 Heiberg (*CMG* 9.2.164.4 Heiberg); 6.112.1.5 (*CMG* 9.2.164.10 Heiberg); 6.117.1.4 (*CMG* 9.2.172.13 Heiberg); 6.118.1.1 (*CMG* 9.2.175.18 Heiberg); 6.120.2.8 (*CMG* 9.2.182.1 Heiberg); Aet., *Iatric. liber xv* [Μοσχίωνος Καταγματική] 14.266 Zervos; Orib., *Collect. med.* 48.65.3.4 (*CMG* 5.2.1.290.14 Raeder); 48.66.3.1 (*CMG* 5.2.1.290.21 Raeder); Leo, *Consp. medic.* pr.7.26; 7.26t; 7.26.3 Ermerins; Steph., *Schol. in Hipp. De fracturis* p.17.8; p.25.16 Irmer; Pall., *Sch. in Hipp. de fracturis* 16.7; 16.9; 16.11; 24.21 Irmer.

ισχίον ἐξαρθρήσεως.] Τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τοῖς ὀστοῖς ἄρθρων ποτὲ μὲν παράρθρημα, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τελείαν πασχόντων ἐξάρθρησιν). In the same train of thought, Leo, the Byzantine physician from Pella who lived in the ninth century A.D., distinguishes subluxation from luxation (*Conspectus medicinae* 7.26.1-4 Ermerins: [Περὶ ἐξαρθρήματος καὶ παραρθρήματος.] Ἐξάρθρημα λέγεται, ὅταν τὰ ἡρμωσμένα ὀστᾶ παρακινήθῃ, οἷον πῆχυς ἐκ τοῦ βραχίονος· εἰ δὲ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον μεταστῆ, λέγεται παράρθρημα. θεραπεύεται δὲ ἀμφοτέρω ὡς τὰ κατάγματα).

It is obvious that the terms of subluxation are interwoven with the concept of *physis* (εἰς τὸν παρὰ φύσιν τόπον, κατὰ φύσιν, οἰκεία θέσις/φύσις). These form a typical schema that survives in the medical authors of Late antiquity and early Byzantine times but in fact goes back to Hippocrates. Subluxation is cured by the extension of the dislocated joint in a direct line, as described in Plutarch (προσβιαζόμεναι τῷ κατευθύνειν), but also in Hippocrates. Actually, Plutarch’s description of repositioning into a straight line as given by *physis* (εἰς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγοντες τὰς παραρθρήσεις) widens the spectrum of the Hippocratic discourse - alluding to the extension of the fractured arm in the Hippocratic tract *De articulis*, which was considered to be once united with his tract *De fracturis* already mentioned.¹²⁶

The term of subluxation makes its first appearance as a participle in the Hippocratic treatise *De articulis* 17: 2.141.17-20 Kw. = 4.130.13-16 L.: Ἀγκῶνος δὲ ἄρθρον παραλλάξαν μὲν ἢ παραρθρήσαν πρὸς πλευρὴν ἢ ἔξω, μένοντος τοῦ ὀξέος τοῦ ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ τοῦ βραχίονος, ἐς εὐθὺ κατατείναντα, τὸ ἐξέχον ἀπωθεῖν ὀπίσω καὶ ἐς τὸ πλάγιον.

¹²⁶ Cf. Gal., *In Hipp. libr. de fract. comm. iii.* 18b 323.10-324.16 K: ὅθεν ἐνιοὶ φασιν οὐδὲ διηρηῆσθαι πρὸς Ἴπποκράτους αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα, γραφῆναι δὲ ἐν ὅλον ἄμφω προσκειμένου τῷ νῦν ἡμῖν προκειμένῳ βιβλίῳ τοῦ περὶ ἄρθρων ἐπιγεγραμμένου, διαιρεθῆναι δὲ ὕστερον ὑπὸ τινος εἰς δύο διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ἡνίκα δὲ ἦν ἐν ἄμφω, κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὴν κατ’ ἰητρείου φωνήν. On this theme see H. Grensemann, “Hypothesen zur ursprünglich geplanten Ordnung der hippokratischen Schriften *De fracturis* und *De articulis*”, *Medizinhist. J.* 5 (1970) 217–235; Chr. Brockmann, “Philologische Annäherungen an Chirurgie und Anatomie. Beobachtungen an Galens Kommentar zu Hippokrates, *De articulis*”, in C.W. Müller–Chr. Brockmann–C.W. Brunschön (eds.), *Ärzte und ihre Interpreten: Medizinische Fachtexte der Antike als Forschungsstand der Klassischen Philologie*, München/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2006, 64-69; id., “Die hippokratischen Schriften *De fracturis* und *De articulis* im kulturellen Kontext des 5. Jahrhunderts”, in: V. Boudon-Millot, A. Guardasole, C. Magdelaine (eds.), *La science médicale antique: nouveaux regards, publié en l’honneur de Jacques Jouanna*, Paris: Beauchesne, 2008, 119-137.

When the elbow-joint is displaced or dislocated to the side or outward, while its sharp point (olecranon?) remains in the cavity of the humerus, extension is to be made in a straight line, and the projecting part is to be pushed backward and to the side. (transl. C.D. Adams)

Here, the Hippocratic author describes the subluxation of the elbow-joint or *radius* towards the side or outwards. He also suggests that the extension must be made in a direct line (ἐς εὐθὴ κατατείναντα), whereas the projecting part must be pushed obliquely backwards. The importance of the straight line is recurrent in the Hippocratic surgical treatises. Similarly, the author gives weight to the direct stretching of a whole fractured arm: from the little finger to the elbow and from the twist to the end of the humerus (*De fract.* 3: 2.50.13-51.7 Kw. = 3.426.3-16 L.). In this way, both the bone will be turned so as to be straight (ἐπιστρέψει μὲν τὸ ὀστέον ἐς ἰθὴ) and the cords will be in a direct line (ἰθυσωρίην).¹²⁷ It is obvious that the redirection of the dislocated members into a straight line appears as a precondition for the restoration of the normative *physis*.

3.3. κατάτασις–κατάστασις

ἢ γὰρ εἰς εὐθὴ τάσις ἀποκατάστασιν τῶν ἄρθρων ποιεῖ, ὥστε ῥαδίως εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν χώραν τὸ ἄρθρον παραγενέσθαι.

The stretching in a straight direction causes the joints to be repositioned, so that the joint can easily return to its natural position.

Apoll., *In Hipp. De artic. comm.* 2.10.28-29 Schöne

(*CMG* 11.1.1.40.5-17 Kollesch & Kudlien)

¹²⁷ Cf. Apoll., *In Hipp. De artic. comm.* 2.10.20-29 Schöne (*CMG* 11.1.1 p. 40.5-17 Kollesch & Kudlien): δηλοῖ δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον (IV 130.13 L.): ἀγκῶνος ἄρθρον παραλλάξαν μὲν ἢ πρὸς πλευρὴν ἢ ἔξω, μένοντος τοῦ ὀξέος τοῦ ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ τοῦ βραχίονος. τοὺς μὲν οὖν τούτων σχηματισμοὺς ὑπογράφειν παρήσω· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο ἀπλῆς τῆς τάσεως αὐτῶν γινομένης καταλημφθῆναι. αἱ δὲ παραρθρήσεις ἔκδηλοι γίνονται τὰ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐντός, τὰ δὲ εἰς τὸ ἐκτός, πολύτροπον «ρόπην» ἔχοντος τοῦ ἄρθρου, διαστρεφομένου τε καὶ νεύοντος τοῦ μορίου ὅτε μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω, ὅτε δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω μέρος. ἃ δὲ οὕτως διὰ τῶν ἐξῆς καταγγίζειν παρακελεύεται (IV 130.15 L.): ἐς εὐθὴ κατατείνοντα τὰ ἐξέχοντα ἀπωθεῖν ὀπίσω καὶ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον. ἢ γὰρ εἰς εὐθὴ τάσις ἀποκατάστασιν τῶν ἄρθρων ποιεῖ, ὥστε ῥαδίως εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν χώραν τὸ ἄρθρον παραγενέσθαι.

Apollonius in his definition of κατάτασις puts the end of the stretching into a direct line at the natural position (τὴν κατὰ φύσιν χώραν). The process of stretching for the purpose of setting broken or dislocated bones described under the term of κατάτασις is given also in terms of natural repositioning (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν σχῆμα) by Hippocrates (e.g. Hipp., *De fract.* 13: 2. 66-69 Kw. = 3.460.10-466.8 L.; *Mochl.* 38: 2.267.12-270.6 Kw. = 4.382.3-386.13 L.).¹²⁸ Hippocrates accompanies the word with the adjective δίκαιη formulating a typical phrase that occurs frequently in the work *De fracturis*.¹²⁹ Galen commenting on the Hippocratic δικάιη κατάτασις introduces a condition for it; if the physician makes the stretching successfully, then the patient would experience no pain (*In Hipp. De fract. comm.* 18b 581.11-13 K.: Ταῦτα τοίνυν εἰ καλῶς μηχανοποιηθεῖ τὴν τε κατάτασιν δικάιην ἂν παρέχοι καὶ ὁμαλὴν κατὰ τὴν ἰθυωρίην καὶ τῷ τρώματι πόνος οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴη).¹³⁰ Galen binds afterwards, justice (δικαιοσύνη) together with equality (ισότης) and normality (ὁμαλότης). Hence, the Hippocratic just stretching is according to Galen, equal and normal as well.¹³¹

The technical meaning of the adjective δίκαιος reappears in the Hippocratic description of physis as δικαιοτάτη. According to Michler (1962, 387), the connection of the adjective δίκαιος with the term φύσις as technical - anatomical phrase is representative of the *normative* concept of physis in

¹²⁸ Cf. also Ps.- Gal., *Def. med.* 19.461.12-13 K.: Κατάτασις ἐστὶν ὀλκὴ εἰς τοὺς κάτω τόπους.

¹²⁹ Cf. Hipp., *De fract.* 8: 2.59.4-5 Kw. = 3.4.444.4-5 L.: Δικαιοτάτη οὖν βραχίονος κατάτασις ἦδε; 30: 2.90.15 Kw. = 3.4.516.15-16 L.: ὅκως κατάτασιν δικάιην καὶ μὴ βιαίην σχήσει τὸ κατεγὸς τοῦ σώματος; 30: 2.92.11-12 Kw. = 3.4.522.10-12 L.: τὴν τε κατάτασιν καὶ δικάιην ἂν παρέχοι καὶ ὁμαλὴν κατὰ τὴν ἰθυωρίην; 41: 2.104.22-23 Kw. = 3.550.1-2 L.: ἡ τοιαύτη κατάτασις τοῦ τοιοῦτου ὀλισθήματος δικαιοτάτη.

¹³⁰ In light of this consideration and under the assumption that the verb ἀνιῶ implies, apart from distress, also pain, the political rectifying (κατάτασις) that Plutarch ascribes metaphorically to his pair of Cimon- Lucullus seems to be insufficient. In other words, their bandages evoke pain, which means that the statesman-physician does not do successfully his job. Therefore, Cimon and Lucullus are to be portrayed negatively, whereas their metaphor as physicians should be understood as negative paradigm.

¹³¹ See Gal., *In Hipp. De fract. comm.* 18b.582.1-12 K.: Δικάιην ἔφην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι τὴν ἴσιν. δόξει δ' ὑποπεπτωκέναι ταῦτ' ὀφθαλμομένω καὶ ἡ ὁμαλότης καὶ ἰσότης ἐφεξῆς· ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐνὸς πράγματος ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν. ἡ δὲ δικαία δ' ἐν δυοῖν τὸ ἐλάχιστον συνίσταται, διὸ καὶ νῦν δικαίαν μὲν κατάτασιν ἀκουστέον εἰρησθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ τε τὴν ἀντίτασιν, ἣν αἱ δύο σφαιραὶ ποιοῦνται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐμβεβλημένας αὐταῖς κρνααῖνας ράβδους, ὁμαλὴν δὲ τὴν καθ' ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, οἷον τὴν κατὰ τὰ σφυρὰ μόνην αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐξεταζομένην, εἶτα τὴν πλησίον τοῦ γόνατος, εἶτα τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος ράβδου καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ὑπὸ τῆς περὶ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος ράβδου καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ὑπὸ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν.

the Hippocratic circle: “Die Tatsache aber, daß die Wortverbindung von δίκαιος und φύσις, daß diese δικαίη oder gar δικαιοτάτη φύσις einen eigentümlichen Ausdruck des knochenchirurgischen Werkes darstellt, legt die Vermutung nahe, daß der Normbegriff seine entscheidende naturwissenschaftliche Weiterentwicklung im engeren Kreis der Hippokratiker erfuhr”.

Κατάτασις is often confused with κατάστασις as is the case in the following passage from Galen’s commentary on the Hippocratic treatise *De articulis*. Indeed, all relevant medical instances of repositioning (κατάτασις) in as straight a line as possible, are best summarized in a vivid metaphor given by Galen in topographical terms of crossing from Athens to Eleusis and vice versa (*In Hippocratis librum de articulis commentarii iv. 18a 320.6-15 K.*):

φυλάττειν μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἀνασκευάζειν αὐτὰ πρόκειται, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα πρόκειται μὲν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπανάγειν, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἐστὶ τῷ μέλλοντι εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἐπανέρχεσθαι κατάτασιν, ὅθεν ἐξετράπετο τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἀνάπαλιν ἐλθεῖν, ὅπερ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ φάναι τὴν ἐναντίαν ὁδὸν ἀνύσαι. τοῖς οὖν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν εἰς Ἐλευσίνα πορευθεῖσιν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐναντίαν ὁδὸν ἐτέραν εἰπεῖν ἢ τὴν ἐξ Ἐλευσίνος Ἀθήναζε· καίτοι γε τὸ πρῶτον ἀνυσθὲν μέρος τῆς ὁδοῦ πορευομένοις ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ὕστατον ἀναστρεφόντων.

I will sustain and not refute the above. What is unconformable to nature is to restore its conformity to nature, and it is necessary what is about to recur into the ancient status, wherefrom it deviated, to cross the same way reversely, which is no different to saying to cross the opposite way. For those who go from Athens to Eleusis one cannot say that the route is different from that from Eleusis to Athens. For, the first part of the road to be walked by those who depart from Athens is the last when they return.¹³²

Thus, the medical metaphor, in this case, is as follows: a joint being dislocated is mapped as leaving its *physis*, whereas being rehabilitated as returning to its *physis*. The route to be traversed in either case is similar to that of Athens to Eleusis and vice versa; what is about to recur in the ancient status (κατάστασις), from where it deviates, must cross the same way reversely, i.e. the opposite way; in this context, the word κατάστασις seems to have been falsely overwritten with that of κατάτασις.¹³³ Kühn himself gives in his Latin translation the meaning of status: *quae vero praeter naturam sunt propositum est in naturalem statum restituere*. Hence, through the proper stretching (κατάτασις) the dislocated joint will restore to its initial status (κατάστασις). This

¹³² The translation here is my own.

¹³³ However, the Aldina provides the right lectio κατάστασις.

deviation of dislocated members from the ancient status or *physis*, which is mapped both as the point of departure and of arrival when returning to it, is reminiscent of Aristotle's notions of a. motion and b. proper place, both found in his *Physics*.

3.4. Galen & Aristotle on motion

Aristotle in his *Physics* determines the sorts of contrary motions. Contrary motions are motions respectively from and to the same thing; from contraries to contraries; from a contrary to the opposite contrary, and from the latter to the former. However, motions from a contrary and to the opposite contrary are not contrary motions, but one and the same.¹³⁴ He even exemplifies these categories on the axis of possible motions between health and disease. In this respect, the contrary motions between health and disease depending on the starting and ending point can take the following directions (*Phys.* 229a 7-18):

- a. ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας τῆ εἰς ὑγίαν (from health: to health)
- b. ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας τῆ ἐκ νόσου (from health: from disease)
- c. ἡ εἰς ὑγίαν τῆ εἰς νόσον (to health: to disease)
- d. ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας τῆ εἰς νόσον (from health: to disease) (one motion)
- e. ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας εἰς νόσον τῆ ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίαν (from health to illness: from illness to health)

The above Aristotelian lore is absorbed by both Galen and Plutarch binding different traditions and genres on the axis of the terms of *physis*, *βία*, and motion. The latter Aristotelian instance (e), i.e. the motion from health to illness as contrasted with the motion from illness to health reflects Galen: the return to the ancient status entails the crossing of the same way reversely, namely, the

¹³⁴ Arist., *Phys.* 4.5. 229a7-18: "Ἐτι δὲ διοριστέον ποία κίνησις ἐναντία κινήσει, καὶ περὶ μονῆς δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. διαιρετέον δὲ πρῶτον πότερον ἐναντία κίνησις ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῆ εἰς τὸ αὐτό (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας τῆ εἰς ὑγίαν), οἷον καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ δοκεῖ, ἢ ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίων (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας τῆ ἐκ νόσου), ἢ ἡ εἰς ἐναντία (οἷον ἡ εἰς ὑγίαν τῆ εἰς νόσον), ἢ ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίου τῆ εἰς ἐναντίον (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας τῆ εἰς νόσον), ἢ ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον τῆ ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας εἰς νόσον τῆ ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίαν). ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ἓνα τινὰ τούτων εἶναι τῶν τρόπων ἢ πλείους· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἀντιτιθέσθαι. ἔστι δ' ἢ μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίου τῆ εἰς ἐναντίον οὐκ ἐναντία, οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγείας τῆ εἰς νόσον· ἢ αὐτὴ γὰρ καὶ μία.

crossing of the opposite way, as already seen (*In Hipp. De artic. comm.* 18a 320.6-15 K.). According to Aristotle (*Phys.* 229a 17-30), contrary motions cross a route from a contrary to the opposite contrary and from the latter to the former. Aristotle exemplifies this thesis by contrasting the motion from health to disease with that from disease to health (229b 1-2: ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον τῆ ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον κίνησις ἐναντία, οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγιείας εἰς νόσον τῆ ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν). In other words, he describes the motion from the proper place (κατὰ φύσιν) to an alien place contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν) and vice versa. As long as the motions have contrary goals, their implied processes have also contrary goals. Thus, falling ill is perceived as contrary to recovering one's health (229b 3-4). In anatomical terms of subluxation, dislocation is regarded as contrary to restoring to its proper place. Aristotle puts it explicitly by saying that locomotion can be contrary in three ways: a. lengthwise: upward vs downward locomotion; b. breadthwise: right vs left locomotion and c. furthermore: forward vs backward locomotion (229b 7-10). The last was adopted by the Hippocratic author when describing the styloid process, according to which the projecting part must be pushed obliquely backwards: from the little finger to the elbow and from the twist to the end of the humerus, as already seen in *De fract.* 3: 2.50.13-51.7 Kw. = 3.426.3-16 L.). In this way, the displacement will be recovered by returning the dislocated joint to its proper place.

3.5. Plutarch, Aristotle and Galen on proper place

As for Plutarch, he alludes to the Aristotelian schema on motion and proper place in terms of anatomy and physis.¹³⁵ The return to the physis is described -apart from the passage from the *Comp. Cim. Luc.* 2.7- in his treatise *De Stoicorum repugnantibus* 1055B: τὰ γὰρ θρυπτόμενα καὶ σκεδαννόμενα τοῦτο πάσχει διακρίσει τῶν μερῶν ἐκάστου καὶ διαλύσει πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον

¹³⁵ For the Aristotelian portrait of Plutarch see e.g. F. Sandbach, "Plutarch and Aristotle", *ICS* 7 (1982) 207-232. For Plutarch's connection to Aristotle see D. Babut, "Plutarque, Aristote, et l'Aristotélisme", in L. van der Stockt (ed.), *Plutarchea Lovaniensia. A Miscellany of Essays on Plutarch* (Studia hellenistica 32), Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 1996, 1-28; A. Pérez Jiménez-J. García López-R.M. Aguilar (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S., Madrid - Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo de 1999*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999 and G.E. Karamanolis, *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2006.

ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπορρέοντος. (“For things that are broken and dissipated suffer this by the separation and dissolution of their parts, every one of them hastening to its own place from that which it had contrary to Nature”). Here, Plutarch - after quoting Chrysippus’ principle that all bodies have this first motion according to nature towards the centre of the world- reflects on a macroscopic level the same motif of restoring to the proper place what comes apart from the place of irregular nature. Aristotle expressed the same view in *Phys.* 253b 33-254a 1: ἔτι δ’ ἡ γῆ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένουσι μὲν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις, κινουῦνται δὲ βιαίως ἐκ τούτων· εἴπερ οὖν ἐνὶ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις, ἀνάγκη μὴδὲ κατὰ τόπον πάντα κινεῖσθαι. (“Again, earth and all other bodies necessarily remain in their proper places and are moved from them only by violence; from the fact, then, that some of them are in their proper places it follows that in respect of place all things cannot be in motion”). This Aristotelian thesis on ‘proper place’ is reflected by Plutarch by the use of the phrase εἰς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγοντες τὰς παραρθήσεις. The proper place is always in accord with nature. The proper place is identified with the place conformable to nature (οἰκεῖος τόπος = κατὰ φύσιν).¹³⁶

Aristotle stated that each element has its ‘proper place’ (‘οἰκεῖος τόπος’) “to which it betakes itself as naturally as a cat returns home”.¹³⁷ Aristotle’s definition of ‘proper place’ given in his *Physics* stresses the importance of the concept of ‘natural’ places in the explanation of the natural motion of the elements.¹³⁸ In particular, the ‘proper place’ of something is ‘the limit of the surrounding body, at which it is in contact with that which is surrounded’. For a body to be somewhere, it must have a proper place, i.e. a place that only it occupies (καὶ φέρεσθαι φύσει καὶ μένειν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων).¹³⁹

¹³⁶ The *LSJ* (s.v. οἰκεῖος) gives *inter alia* the meaning of ‘belonging to, conformable to the nature of a thing.’ For οἰκεῖον in Aristotle cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 1161b 19.

¹³⁷ W.A. Heidel, “Περὶ Φύσεως. A Study of the Conception of Nature among the Pre-Socratics”, *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 45.4 (1910) 104.

¹³⁸ See B. Morison, *On Location: Aristotle’s Concept of Place* (Oxford Aristotle Studies), Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.

¹³⁹ See Arist., *Phys.* IV 3.210b 32-211a7: Τί δέ ποτ’ ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος, ὃδ’ ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅσα δοκεῖ ἀληθῶς καθ’ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ. ἀξιοῦμεν δὴ τὸν τόπον εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν περιέχον ἐκεῖνο οὗ τόπος ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴδὲν τοῦ πράγματος, ἔτι τὸν πρῶτον μὴτ’ ἐλάττω μῆτε μείζω, ἔτι ἀπολείπεσθαι ἐκάστου καὶ χωριστὸν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πάντα τόπον ἔχειν τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ φέρεσθαι φύσει καὶ μένειν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ ἄνω ἢ κάτω. ὑποκειμένων δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ θεωρητέον. For the motif of ‘οἰκεῖος

3.6. δικαιοτάτη φύσις

This Aristotelian concept of ‘proper’ (‘οικεῖος’), is reflected also by Galen, who comments on the above Hippocratic ‘δικαιοτάτη φύσις’ (‘most just physis’) as ‘most proper’ (*In Hippocratis librum de fracturis commentarii iii.* 18b 335.7-16 K.):¹⁴⁰

β’.

Αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοτάτη φύσις.

Ὡς εἰ καὶ οικειοτάτη εἶπεν. ὅταν γὰρ ἐκάστῳ πράγματι τὸ οικεῖον φυλάττεται, δικαίως ἔχει τε καὶ διοικεῖται τοῦτο. τὸ δ’ ἄλλο οικεῖον ἐν σώματι παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οὐδ’ ἐπινοῆσαι ῥάδιον. ὅταν οὖν ἐκάστῳ μορίῳ καὶ σχήματι καὶ χρώματι καὶ μεγέθει ὑπάρχη τὸ οικεῖον, ἄριστα δείκνυται.

So this is the most right nature.

τόπος’ cf. also id. 212b33; 215a17; 253b33. Aristotle's definition of proper place (‘the first immobile limit of that which surrounds’) is commented by Alexander of Aphrodisias as follows: Ἀριστοτέλει μὲν λέγοντι τὸν τόπον πέρασ τοῦ περιέχοντος σώματος ἔπεται τὸ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων εὐλόγως ἐπὶ τὸν οικεῖον φέρεσθαι τόπον· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ συγγενές σῶμα εὐλογον αὐτὰ φέρεσθαι, οὗ τὸ πέρασ τόπος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ φύσιν τε καὶ οικεῖος. καθ’ οὓς ὁ τόπος, πῶς ἔτι τούτοις ἀκολουθήσει ἢ κατὰ φύσιν τῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τοὺς οικεῖους τόπους κινήσις; ἀδιάφορον γὰρ τὸ διάστημα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἄλλο ἄλλου οικειότερόν τι αὐτῶν. See M. Rashed, *Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la “Physique” d’Aristote (Livres IV-VIII) Les scholies byzantines. Édition, traduction et commentaire* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina 1), Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011, 224, fr. 81.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. the commentaries of Apoll., *In Hipp. De artic. comm.* 1.2.32-36 Schöne (= *CMG* 11.1.1.14.20-25 Kollesch & Kudlien); Erot., *Voc. Hipp. coll.* 62.14-63.11 Klein = 32.3-16 Nachmanson s.v. *δίκαιον*; Steph., *Sch. in Hipp. De fract.* 33.81-11 Irmer; Pallad., *Sch. in Hipp. De fract.* 32.61-9 Irmer and Gal., *In Hipp. De fract. comm. iii.* 18b 335.9-16 K. which shed light on the notion of the Hippocratic justice focusing on the terms ‘δίκη’ (‘justice’), ‘νόμος’ (‘law’), but also ‘οικεῖον’ (‘proper’) and ‘ἰθύ’ (‘straight’). See Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis*, 59f. On Galen’s reinterpretation of Hippocrates’ ‘δικαιοτάτη φύσις’, see P. Moraux, “Galien comme philosophe: la philosophie de la nature”, in V. Nutton (ed.), *Galen. Problems and Prospects*, London: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1981, 87–116; F. Kovačić, *Der Begriff der Physis bei Galen vor dem Hintergrund seiner Vorgänger* (Philosophie der Antike 12), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001 and A. Roselli, “Dalla δικαίη φύσις dei trattati chirurgici alla δικαιοσύνη τῆς φύσεως di Galeno”, in A. Thivel & A. Zucker (eds.), *Le normal et le Pathologique dans la Collection hippocratique. Actes du Xème Colloque International Hippocratique Nice, 6-8 octobre 1999*, Nice: Faculté des Lettres, Arts et Sciences Humaines de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, 2002, 731–752.

*That is to say the most conformable to the nature of a thing. For when what is conformable to the nature of every individual part is kept, the whole is right and it is regulated rightly as well. However, it is not easy even to invent something else, which is unconformable to nature, to be conformable into the body. So when every part or shape or colour or size has its own conformity to its nature, it turns out to be the best.*¹⁴¹

In the passage above, the Aristotelian teleology becomes apparent, which Galen incorporates in his commentary on the Hippocratic δικαιοτάτη φύσις.¹⁴² Shifting from the adjective ‘most right’, with which the Hippocratic author characterizes *physis*, Galen presents justice as a universal overarching and organizing rule placing Aristotle in the background of his commentary on the Hippocratic δικαιοτάτη φύσις.¹⁴³ Only what is in accord with nature can be proper to the body. Moreover, Galen’s thesis that “the maintenance of what is proper to the nature of each individual part entails the just and best function of the entire body” can be rephrased in teleological forms within the bounds of nature’s necessity. Nature belongs to the causes which act for the sake of something (*Phys.* 198b 10: διότι ἡ φύσις τῶν ἕνεκά του αἰτίων). Aristotle includes among the things which are by nature both whole organisms and their parts including limbs and bones. These parts are also by nature (φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῶα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν). However, apart from the organism, the parts cannot continue to function normally and independently. A detached joint cannot, for example, come into existence alone. Nevertheless, although the parts do not possess their own nature, one can still claim that they are by nature, for the nature of the organism to which they belong caused them to be formed and maintain them into existence (*Phys.* 192b 8-13). What is potentially bone has not yet its own nature, and does not exist by nature. Rather, it takes its form when it exists in actuality (ἐνδελέχεια) than when it exists potentially (δυνάμει).¹⁴⁴ When we refer

¹⁴¹ The translation here is my own.

¹⁴² See Michler, “Die Praktische Bedeutung des Normativen Physis-Begriffes”, 394 n. 5: Galen scheint in seiner Erklärung der δικαιοτάτη φύσις vor allem aristotelisch beeinflusst zu sein, wenn er zum Lemma β’: Αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοτάτη φύσις ausführh: Ὡς εἰ καὶ οικειοτάτη εἶπεν. For the term of δικαιοτάτη φύσις cf. also Gal., *De usu part.* 3.379.14-15 K.: ἀξίαν ἐκάστῳ σκοπεῖσθαί τε καὶ διανέμειν ἔργον δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶ, πῶς οὐ δικαιοτάτη πάντων ἡ φύσις; and id. 4.200.5-6 K.: οὕτως ἐν ἅπασιν ἡ φύσις δικαιοτάτη.

¹⁴³ Cf. J. Jouanna, “Galen’s Concept of Nature”, in J. Jouanna (ed.), *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers*, Leiden: Brill, 2012, 308: “Aristotle normally appears in second place behind Hippocrates, when there is no discussion of Plato, and he eventually precedes the Stoics, who come in third place”.

¹⁴⁴ Arist., *Phys.* 193a 36-193b 8: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν οὐτ’ ἔχει πῶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ᾧ ὀριζόμενοι λέγομεν τί ἐστὶ σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν, οὔτε φύσει ἐστίν. τὸ δ’ ἐκ τούτων φύσις μὲν οὐκ

to the nature of a thing, we refer to the form, or shape of a thing, which was already present as potential. In this respect, Galen comments on the Hippocratic concept of *physis* influenced by Aristotle's teleological view on nature as an inner principle. This justifies the fact that Galen attributes to Aristotle the characterization of the "exegete of Hippocrates' reasoning on nature" (Gal., *De meth. med.* 10.15.8 K.).

3.6.1. κατὰ φύσιν

According to Diller, "in der Herausarbeitung und Anwendung dieses Physis-Begriffes liegt vielleicht die größte Leistung der hippokratischen Medizin."¹⁴⁵ The adverbial phrase 'κατὰ φύσιν' functions as a technical formula in the surgical tracts of Hippocrates and is to be understood in terms of the normal and correct position of a joint.¹⁴⁶ As Galen states in *The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*: "The expression κατὰ φύσιν has several meanings, but in this case, we should understand it in the following sense: what is produced κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον by nature" (*De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 6.1.8: 5.507.12-14 K.= *CMG* 5.4.1.2.362.5-6 De Lacy: πολλαχῶς δὲ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λεγομένου, τοῦτ' ἀκούειν χρῆ νῦν ὁ κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίγνεται). Galen explains further the multiple meanings that the word possesses: "What we call that which is produced κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον by nature, is that which nature intends as an aim and not things that necessarily follow other things. Such movement κατὰ φύσιν exists, regardless of whether what is moved is moved by itself or by something else" (id. 6.1.9: 5.507.14-18 K.= *CMG* 5.4.1.2.362.6-9 De Lacy).¹⁴⁷

ἔστιν, φύσει δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης: ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε λέγεται ὅταν ἐντελεχέα ἦ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν δυνάμει.

¹⁴⁵ H. Diller, "Der griechische Naturbegriff", *Neue Jahrbücher für Antike und deutsche Bildung* 2 (1939) 248f.

¹⁴⁶ See Ch., Huit, *La philosophie de la nature chez les anciens*, Paris: Fontemoing, 1901 and Vegetti, M., "Historical strategies in Galen's physiology" in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 1999b, 383-395.

¹⁴⁷ I cite the translation by Jouanna, "Galen's Concept of Nature", 291. However, De Lacy translates the phrase 'κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον' as 'in the first instance': "And as the term according to nature is used in many ways, we must here take it to be used of that which occurs through the agency of nature in the first instance. But 'that which occurs through the agency of nature in the first instance' I mean that which nature seeks as an end, and not that which necessarily follows on something else". I agree with the translation by Jouanna who incorporates the phrase untranslated κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον, implying the polysemy of the term *logos* instead of the translation by Lacy as 'in the first instance'.

In this respect, the phrase *κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον* confirms the normative character of *physis*. The common phrase ‘*κατὰ φύσιν*’ (‘*kata physin*’) seems to have been built on the analogy of words such as *logos* or *nomos*. Indeed, Erotianus, in his commentary on the same Hippocratic passage, names the Hippocratic ‘most just *physis*’ as just *nomos* (“*αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δικαιοτάτη φύσις. ὥσπερ νόμος δίκαιος,*” *Vocum Hippocraticorum Collectio* 63.7-8 Klein = 32.12-13 Nachmanson). Hence, the normative character of *physis* which approaches *nomos* becomes evident.

The Hippocratic author of the work *De Fracturis* connected the adjective ‘proper’ (‘*οἰκεῖος*’) with *physis*: *πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὴν οἰκεῖν φύσιν ἐκπίπτει* (“for many other things are removed from their proper place”, *De Fract.* 42: 2.105.5-6 Kw. = 3.550.6 L.). Apart from this work the Hippocratic author adjuncts the adjective proper to the disease; if the disease is in accord with the *physis* of the patient, then it is less dangerous; contrarily, if the disease is not or little in accord with the *physis* of the patient, then it is more dangerous (Hipp., *Aph.* 2.34.1-3 = Gal., *In Hipp. Aphor. comm.* 17b 529–532 K: Ἐν τῆσι νοῦσοισιν ἧσσον κινδυνεύουσιν, οἷσιν ἂν οἰκεῖ τῆς φύσιος [...] ἢ νοῦσος ἧ μᾶλλον, ἢ οἷσιν ἂν μὴ οἰκεῖ κατὰ τι τουτέων ἧ). Hence, the disease itself is divided into *οἰκεῖη* and *μὴ οἰκεῖη τῆς φύσεως*, or in other words into *κατὰ φύσιν* and *παρὰ φύσιν*. Galen offers an analogous distinction in terms of *ἐνέργεια* and *πάθος*. Jouanna (2012, 292) states characteristically: “the explanation of *κατὰ φύσιν* is placed, like a Russian doll, within another explanation of words, the definition of *ἐνέργεια* and *πάθος*.”

3.6.2. *παρὰ φύσιν*

τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ κίνησιν ἡμῶν νοούντων, τὸ δὲ πάθος παρὰ φύσιν.

(Gal., *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 6.1.8: 5.507.11-12 K.= *CMG* 5.4.1.2.362.4-5 De Lacy)

The motion according to nature is called by Galen *ἐνέργεια* (activity), whereas the motion contrary to nature is called *πάθος* (affection). In the initial metaphor of the aristocratic natures as physicians, Plutarch introduces the forceful way of governing that would not violate the regular state of the society, but restore it by rehabilitating its civic health. He speaks, thus, of the *rectifying force* that suppresses the citizens either from doing or from omitting certain actions. In this sense, a law can be a threat to citizens or prevent them from acting in a specific manner. This is how the term *βία* is to be understood (*προσβιαζόμεναι*). However, this *βία* is opposed to the *rectifying force* that

restores a dislocated joint to its proper place. However, Plutarch speaks of the *disturbing force* that overturns physical justice as well. The dislocation seems to be a threat to nature in the same way: it overturns the physical proper place of the dislocated joint. Thus, the latter occupies places other than those in which they properly belong. To avoid this violation, physicians make dislocated members move contrary to their proper direction so that the order does not collapse.

After dwelling on the comments on the Hippocratic physis (κατὰ φύσιν vs παρὰ φύσιν) echoed by the Plutarchan metaphor, let us return to the Plutarchan corpus of the *Lives* and expound on the pre-Socratic notion of justice inherent in nature, as is described by the law-giver Solon. On the basis of the forceful nature of aristocratic ruling that Plutarch describes in the metaphor of aristocratic physeis as physicians, I would now like to establish an intratextual link with the interpretation of natural justice as it is reflected in *Solon* (3.7). As an intratextual reference, I mean the way in which Plutarch himself in these different *Lives* echoes the ‘most just nature’ with regards to the imposition of external force by the aristocratic *physeis* and the law-giver Solon.¹⁴⁸ In the first case of the *Comparison of Cimon-Lucullus* (2.7), the *rectifying force* of the bandages rehabilitates the dislocated members to their normative physis, which alludes to the Hippocratic ‘most rightful physis’. In the second case, the notion of *disturbing force* that overturns justice is located in the following passage of Plutarch, where he quotes the Solonian verses of fragments (*Solon* 3.6-7= fragm. 9.1-2 & 12 West):

φιλοσοφίας δὲ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μάλιστα τὸ πολιτικόν, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τότε σοφῶν, ἠγάπησεν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀπλοῦς ἐστὶ λίαν καὶ ἀρχαῖος, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τούτων

ἐκ νεφέλης πέλεται χιόνος μένος ἠδὲ χαλάζης,
βροντὴ δ’ ἐκ λαμπρᾶς γίνεται ἀστεροπῆς
ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταρασσεται· ἦν δέ τις αὐτὴν
μὴ κινῆ, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη.

In philosophy, he cultivated chiefly the domain of political ethics, like most of the wise men of the time; and in physics, he is very simple and antiquated, as is clear from the following verses:

From clouds come sweeping snow and hail,

¹⁴⁸ See G. Vlastos, “Solonian Justice”, *CPh* 41.2 (1946) 65-83.

And thunder follows on the lightning's flash.

By winds the sea is lashed to storm, but if it be

Unvexed, it is of all things most amenable.

Plutarch incorporates the Solonian verses verbatim into his *Life*. We read and appreciate this intertextual quotation as testimony, which provides a description of Solon's engagement in both politics and physics. His interest in physics is exemplified through a description of the physical state of the sea, description which alludes to the political sphere as well, as it can be perceived as a metaphor of a just polis guarded by good laws.¹⁴⁹ The undisturbed, flat surface of the sea characterized as “most just”, “most calm” is ‘transferred’ in the political sphere as representative of justice; as long as there is no disturbing cause, no impose of violence, (ἦν δέ τις αὐτήν μὴ κινῆ), i.e. winds that agitate it, it is the most rightful of all things.¹⁵⁰ According to Aristotle, “coming to a standstill seems to be identical or at least concomitant with the locomotion of a thing to its proper place” (*Phys.* 230b 26-27: ἔτι δοκεῖ τὸ ἴστασθαι ἢ ὄλως εἶναι τὸ εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ τόπον φέρεσθαι ἢ συμβαίνειν ἅμα).

Following Reggiani's view who suggests that the quietness of the sea has cosmogonic resonances and evokes the idea of ‘euthesia’ (“correcta stabilità”) of primordial waters, the flat surface of the sea is reminiscent of the “most just” *physis*, at which aims the stretching of the dislocated limbs by physicians, εἰς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγοντες τὰς παραρθήσεις.¹⁵¹ Both Plutarchan metaphors allude to this ‘euthesia’, a term clearly Hippocratic and representative of the balance.¹⁵² In this respect, the rectifying force of the dislocated members into the most just physis (προσβιαζόμεναι τῷ κατευθύνειν) accords with the Plutarchan phrase (*Sol.* 15.1 = fr. 36.16): ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας (“combining both force and justice together”).

¹⁴⁹ See D. Leão, “Plutarch on Solon's simplicity concerning natural philosophy: Sol. 3,6-7 and frgs. 9 and 12 West”, in M. Meeusen and L. Van der Stock (eds.), *Natural Spectaculars: Aspects of Plutarch's Philosophy of Nature*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2015, 227-238.

¹⁵⁰ For νηνεμία καὶ κατάστασις, settled weather, cf. Plut., *Aet. graec. et rom.* 281B; settling, quieting, calming, εἰς ἡρεμίαν καὶ κατάστασιν ἐλθεῖν Arist., *Ph.* 247b 27.

¹⁵¹ See N. Reggiani, “Giustizia e misura. Le riforme di Solone fra polis e cosmo”, in Gheller, V. (ed.), *Ricerche a confronto. Dialoghi di Antichità Classiche e del Vicino Oriente*, Milano: Edizioni Saecula, 2013, 13–22.

¹⁵² Gal., *Voc. Hipp. gloss.* 19.101 K.

At this point, I would like to introduce a reversed medical metaphor shifting from the above δικαιοσύνη θάλασσα (Plut., *Sol.* 3.6-7). The ‘source domain’, which was previously discussed, namely medicine in general, gives its place to the ‘target domain’. In particular, Ps.-Plutarch in his treatise compares the movement of fever with the movement of the vexed sea presenting the above metaphor reversed.¹⁵³ Hence, the target of this metaphor is not placed in politics, but in medicine, and in particular, in the inquiry into the causation of fever. Ps-Plutarch after citing Erastistratus’ definition of fever compares the rough status of the sea to the symptoms of fever, as follows (Ps.-Plut., *Plac. philos.* 5.29):

κθ’. Πῶς γίνεται πυρετός, καὶ εἰ ἐπιγέννημά ἐστι

Ἐρασίστρατος ὀρίζειται τὸν πυρετὸν οὕτως: πυρετὸς ἐστὶ κίνημα αἵματος παρεμπεπρωκότος εἰς τὰ [p. 371] τοῦ πνεύματος ἀγγεῖα ἀπροαιρέτως γινόμενον: καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης, ὅταν μηδὲν αὐτὴν κινῆ, ἡρεμεῖ, ἀνέμου δ’ ἐμπνέοντος βιαίου παρὰ φύσιν, τότε ἐξ ὅλης κυκλεῖται, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὅταν κινήθῃ τὸ αἷμα, τότε ἐπίπτει μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀγγεῖα τῶν πνευμάτων, πυρούμενον δὲ θερμαίνει τὸ ὅλον σῶμα, ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιγέννημα εἶναι ὁ πυρετός...

Διοκλῆς δὲ φησιν: ὅψις ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα ἐστὶ δέ, οἷς φαινομένοις ὀρᾶται ὁ πυρετὸς ἐπιγενόμενος, τραύματα καὶ φλεγμοναὶ καὶ βουβῶνες.

What is the cause of a fever, or whether it is an affection of the body annexed to a primary passion.

Erastistratus gives this definition of a fever: A fever is a quick motion of blood, not produced by our consent, which enters into the vessels proper unto the vital spirits. This we see in the sea; it is in a serene calm when nothing disturbs it, but is in motion when a violent preternatural wind blows upon it, and then it rageth and is circled with waves. After this manner it is in the body of man; when the blood is in a nimble agitation, then it falls upon those vessels in which the spirits are, and there being in an extraordinary heat, it fires the whole body. The opinion that a fever is an appendix to a preceding affection pleaseth him. Diocles proceeds after this manner: Those things which are internal and latent are manifested by those which externally break forth and appear; and it is clear to us that a fever is annexed to certain outward affections, for example, to wounds, inflaming tumors, inguinary abscesses. (transl. W.W. Goodwin)

¹⁵³ The treatise *On the Opinions of the Philosophers* belongs to the so-called pseudepigrapha works. Their authorship is unknown; their author is not Plutarch, but they come from a slightly later era.

In this passage, Ps.-Plutarch incorporates Erasistratus' definition of fever. He ascribes fever to the observable symptoms according to Diocles' saying: "those things which are hidden and latent are revealed by those which externally come forth and arise" (ὄψις ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα). This principle directs Galen's criticism against Erasistratus' causation of fever, as described in Galen's treatise *On antecedent causes*.¹⁵⁴ Galen presupposes that the revealing cause and the revealed effect should be in a solid and proportional relationship (*De caus. procat.* 8.102-3 K.). In this way, he attacks Erasistratus' thesis on the causation of fever disqualifying the excessive heat as supposed and revealing cause from its casual identity. Hence, heat says Galen, is not always correlated with fever. On the contrary, Erasistratus suggests, that the stirred blood fills up vessels causing an extraordinary heat; the latter fires, in turn, the whole body. In respect to this movement of fever, he defines fever on the basis of the metaphor of stirred sea: καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης, ὅταν μηδὲν αὐτὴν κινῆ, ἡρεμεῖ, ἀνέμου δ' ἐμπνέοντος βιαίου παρὰ φύσιν, τότε ἐξ ὅλης κυκλεῖται. When nothing disturbs the sea, then it is in a calm and serene status. But when the violent winds agitate it, then the storm-tossed sea cannot rest and be still. In this latter case, the vexed status of the sea is compared to the status of fever, both being likewise *contra naturam* (παρὰ φύσιν).

Ps.-Plutarch presents health in general, and the absence of fever in particular, in terms of the serene status of the sea: ὅταν μηδὲν αὐτὴν κινῆ, ἡρεμεῖ. This condition seems to allude to the Solonian verses: ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταράσσεται· ἦν δὲ τις αὐτὴν μὴ κινῆ, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη.¹⁵⁵ Actually, the Solonian description of the sea seems to be here paraphrased by Ps.-Plutarch in a medical context. If the sea is not stirred up by the winds, then its status is the most just or according to ps.-Plutarch, it is serene (ἡρεμεῖ). Aristotle puts this calmness in relation to contrary motions (*Phys.* 230a). He develops his syllogism as follows: the states of rest in contraries are opposed to each other (ἡρεμίαι δ' ἀντικείμεναι). But the motion that is opposed to the state of rest in disease is not that from disease to health, but only that from health to disease. For a motion

¹⁵⁴ Galen's treatise on antecedent causes survives only in a Latin translation. Bardong (1937), who offers a back-translation ("Rückübersetzung") from Latin to Greek, translates "ocassiones" as "παράφρασις", whereas Hankison (1998) translates them as "revealing causes".

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Varro, *De ling. lat.* 7.23: *mare aequor appellatur quod aequatum commotum vento non est*. The term 'mare aequor' ('just sea' or according to the translation of R.G. Kent 'level water') is identical to the Solonian 'δικαιοσύνη θάλασσα' ('most just sea') quoted by Plutarch (*Sol.* 3.6-7).

to that, in which a thing is at rest, is rather a coming to rest (ή γάρ εις αὐτὸ κίνησις ἐν ᾧ ἔστηκεν, ἡρέμησις μᾶλλον ἐστίν), which occurs simultaneously with the motion.¹⁵⁶

Following Aristotle's view, the flow of the motion from health to disease is opposed to the state of rest (even in disease). Contrarily, when the violent motion of the winds agitates the sea, it is circled with waves (ἀνέμου δ' ἐμπνέοντος βιαίου παρὰ φύσιν, τότε ἐξ ὅλης κυκλεῖται). It is to this vexed status of the sea that Plutarch compares the vexed motion of the blood causing fever. The violent motion of blood into the vessels provokes fever.¹⁵⁷ It is interesting that here also appears the phrase παρὰ φύσιν (contra naturam) to describe the violation of δικαιοσύνη φύσις.

3.7. Ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν φεύγων τὸν ἰατρόν

The escape from the rectifying force of the physician describes Plutarch in terms of the anatomical metaphor of bandages in another philosophical context in his treatise *On listening to lectures*.¹⁵⁸ In this case, the metaphorical mapping stems from medicine. However, its 'target domain' is not at politics, but at philosophy and in particular, at its pedagogical character. This metaphor is located at the forefront of Plutarch's educational output described in his treatise *De recta ratione audiendi* 46E:

Ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν φεύγων τὸν ἰατρόν καὶ τὸν ἐπίδεσμον μὴ προσιέμενος τὸ μὲν ἀλγεινὸν ἀνεδέξατο, τὸ δ' ὠφέλιμον οὐχ ὑπέμεινε τῆς θεραπείας, οὕτως ὁ τῷ χαράζαντι καὶ τρώσαντι λόγῳ τὴν ἀβελτερίαν ἀπουλῶσαι καὶ καταστῆσαι μὴ παρασχὼν ἀπῆλθε δηχθεὶς καὶ ἀλγήσας ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ὠφελῆθεις δὲ μηδέν.

¹⁵⁶ For a comparative approach of Erasistratus', Galen's and Aristotle's views on the circulation of blood in the vessels in terms of the metaphor of vessel, irrigation system and maritime imagery see I. M. Lonie, "Erasistratus, the Erasistrateans, and Aristotle", *BHM* 38 (1964) 426–443.

¹⁵⁷ The marine imagery as a metaphor or analogy for the description of the vascular system is given by Aristotle (*De part. Anim.* III 7 670a 8-9). In particular, here, liver, spleen and the kidney are depicted as kind of quadruple anchor for the vena cava, whereas veins are afloat in the body. Cf. also the metaphor of port of the liver in Arist., *Hist. anim.* I.17.496b 2 9: "The liver grows on to the great vessel (vena cava), but does not communicate with the aorta. For a vessel from the great vessel extends through the liver at the place called the port of the liver. See C.R.S. Harris, *The heart and the vascular system in ancient Greek medicine. From Alcmaeon to Galen*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973.

¹⁵⁸ See B.P. Hillyard, *De audiendo: A Text and Commentary*, New York: Arno Press, 1981.

Just as one who runs away from the physician after an operation, and will not submit to be bandaged, sustains all the pain of the treatment, but waits not for its benefits: so when the word has cut and wounded a man's foolishness, if he give it no chance to heal and quiet the wound, he comes away from philosophy with a smart and pain but with no benefit.

In this passage, Plutarch draws a parallel between the physician and the philosopher. The escape from both means pain and no benefit. Young men run away without looking back and desert philosophy if they do not hear compliments for themselves. Even they turn away from corrections (ἐπανορθώσεις) and admonitions or advice. Instead, they prefer voluble flatters who please them. When the incisive word has cut and wounded their foolishness, as Plutarch says, they do not heal nor soothe the wound. On the contrary, they escape from philosophy like the patients who run away from the physician refusing the bandages for their wounds after an operation. Plutarch afterwards refers proverbially to Telephus' wound (46F-47A: οὐ γὰρ μόνον, ὡς Εὐριπίδης φησί, τὸ Τηλέφου τραῦμα πριστοῖσι λόγχης θέλγεται ῥινήμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐμφυόμενον εὐφρέσινέοις δηγμὸν αὐτὸς ὁ τρώσας λόγος ἰᾶται, "For not only the wound of Telephus, as Euripides says, is soothed by fine-rasped filings from the spear but the smart from philosophy which sinks deep in young men of good parts is healed by the very words which inflicted the hurt").

Under the term Τηλέφεια τραύματα, is understood the incurable wounds. According to the myth, the wound which Telephus had received in the hip from Achilles could not be cured.¹⁵⁹ The oracle gave the answer that only he could cure him who had wounded him (ὁ τρώσας ἰάσεται). Indeed, the rust of the spear by which the wound had been inflicted cured Telephus. In other words, the spear that had caused the wound served as a remedy. Plutarch introduces the image of Telephus to describe the effects of philosophical language. When some wise dictum stings young men making them suffer, they do not take advantage of what is useful in it but run away. They are not healed, thus, by the very words which inflicted the hurt. Plutarch in his pedagogical ideal suggests that young men must endure the pain without being discouraged. For the pain philosophy provokes, will be cured and removed by the same discourse that gave the wound, like Telephus' ulcer.

In view of the arrows propelled by the philosophical dicta, Plutarch refers elsewhere to Telephus' ulcer in an analogous moral context in his treatise *How to profit by one's enemies*. In order to

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, Euripides, fr. 724.

enhance his view that it is better to succumb to the enemy's sayings than to the voluble flattery and mute admonition of friends, Plutarch repeats the same example of Telephus (*De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* 89A-89C). Shifting from the Sophoclean verses: “φιλεῖ” γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα: γλῶσσαν ἐκχέας μάτην / ἄκων ἀκούειν οὐς ἐκὼν εἶπη λόγους, (“By babbling thoughtless talk is wont to hear Against his will the words he willing speaks”), Plutarch in his discussion on friendship uses the image of Telephus, who submitted his wound to his enemy's spear.¹⁶⁰ Hence, he explains that the submission to the enemy is prudent when true friendship is absent. Given that friend's words are imbued with flattery, which lacks in true admonition, it is preferable to depend upon enemies to hear the truth (ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φιλία τὰ νῦν ἰσχνόφωνος γέγονεν ἐν τῷ παρρησιάζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ κολακεῦον αὐτῆς λάλλον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ νουθετοῦν ἄναυδον, ἀκουστέον ἐστὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Those who are in need of benevolent admonition must submit with patience to the words of a malevolent enemy, if he exposes and reprehends their vice, focusing on the deeds and not to what is in the mind of the detractor. In this case, the arrows from enemy's words are healing likewise to Telephus (*De cap. ex inim* 89C: ὡς γὰρ ὁ Τήλεφος οἰκείου μὴ τυγχάνων ἰατροῦ τῷ πολεμικῷ δόρατι τὸ ἔλκος ὑπέθηκεν).

3.8. ἔλκος Τηλέφειον

Χειρόνια δὲ καὶ Τηλέφεια καλεῖν ἔλκη περιττόν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἅπαντα κοινῇ κακοῆθη προσαγορεύειν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ψώρα καὶ ἡ λέπρα μελαγχολικὰ πάθη μόνου τοῦ δέρματος ὡς εἴ γε κὰν ταῖς φλεβί καὶ τῆ σαρκὶ γίγνοιτο, καρκίνος ὀνομάζεται.

(Galen, *De tumoribus praeter naturam* 7.727.9-13 K.)

*But it is superfluous to call ulcers Chironian or Telephean. It is sufficient to call them all as malignant. Also the scabies and the leprosis are black gall diseases exclusively of the skin; but if they penetrate into the veins and the flesh, they are named cancer.*¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ These verses are incorporated in the following four-verse fragment. Cf. Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, Sophocles, fr. 843: τὶ ταῦτ' ἐπαινεῖς, πᾶς γὰρ οἰνωθεὶς ἀνὴρ/ἦσσαν μὲν ὀργῆς ἐστὶ, τοῦ δὲ νοῦ κενός/γλῶσσαν ἐκχέας μάτην/ἄκων ἀκούειν οὐς ἐκὼν εἶπη λόγους.

¹⁶¹ The translation here is my own.

In the passage above from the work *On abnormal swellings*, Galen defines the Telephean ulcer in conjunction with the Chironian one after designating the ulcer of phagedaena.¹⁶² The denomination of Chironian and Telephean ulcers signifies malignant ulcers in general. But he points at no particular kind of ulcer. Similarly, Paulus Aeginita ascribes Chironian and Telephian ulcers to all malignant and old ulcers (τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ δυσκατούλωτα τῶν ἐλκῶν) without any specific reference to the type of them.¹⁶³ Ulcers which hardly admit skinning named malignant (κακοήθη), some call Chironian, as if they did require the hand of Centaurus to cure them. Others call them Telephean, such as Telephus suffered from, which require the spear of Achilles that cured him. Chiron had a fingular dexterity in the manual operations of chirurgy. He taught Achilles being his successor in chirurgy, a fact that justifies the connection of Chironian with Telephean ulcers.¹⁶⁴

The above view is found in Stephanus' early Byzantine *Commentary on the most-cited Aphorisms of Hippocrates*. According to him, the Chironian ulcers derive their name from the healer, whereas the Telephean from the patient.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, both belong to the category of old

¹⁶² Cf. Gal., *De tum. praeter nat.* 7.727.3-5 K.: Ὅσα δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπινέμεται καὶ τῶν περίξ ἄπτεται διαβιβρώσκοντα τὸ περιέχον ὑγιὲς σῶμα, ταῦτα σύμπαντα φαγεδαϊνικὰ προσαγορεύεται. Under the term of phagedana Galen describes the erosion not only of the skin, but also of the fleshy parts. In a phagedaena there is a tumor in the brims of the ulcer, whereas there is none in a consuming ulcer (ulcus depascens) opposed to the eating one (ulcus exedens). See J. Reedy, *Galen. De tumoribus praeter naturam*, Diss. University of Michigan, 1968, 1-28.

¹⁶³ See Paulus, *Epitom. med. libr. sept.* 4.46.1.1-15: *CMG* 9.1.366.20-367.8 Heiberg: [Περὶ κακοήθων ἐλκῶν, ἃ δὴ Χειρώνια καὶ Τηλέφεια καλεῖται] Τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ δυσκατούλωτα τῶν ἐλκῶν οἱ μὲν Χειρώνια προσηγόρευσαν οἷα δὴ τοῦ Χείρωνος αὐτοῦ δεόμενα πρὸς ἴασιν, οἱ δὲ Τηλέφεια διὰ τὸ τὸν Τήλεφον ἐν ἔλκει τοιοῦτῳ χρονίσει. σκεπτέον τοῖνον, μήποτε καὶ τὸ ὄλον σῶμα κακόχυμον ὑπάρχον τοιαύτας ἐπιρροίας ἐκπέμπει τῷ ἔλκει, καὶ τὸν πλεονάζοντα χυμὸν διὰ τῶν καταλλήλων κενωτέον φαρμάκων. εἰ δὲ καὶ κιστὸς ἐπιπέμπων εἴη τοῖς σκέλεσιν ἐν τούτοις τοῦ ἔλκους τυγχάνοντος, καὶ τοῦτον ἀποληπτέον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς χειρουργουμένοις εἰρήσεται, ἢ διὰ φλεβοτομίας γοῦν αὐτοῦς κενωτέον συχνὸν ἀφαιροῦντας τοῦ αἵματος, κάπειτα τοῖς τοπικοῖς χρηστέον βοηθήμασιν τῆς ἀνασκευαστικῆς ἀδύκτως ὑπάρχουσι δυνάμεως. ἀπλᾶ μὲν οὖν τὰ διὰ κισήρεως τε καὶ διφυροῦς καὶ λεπίδος ἰοῦ τε καὶ τιτάνου μετρίως πλυθείσης· ἢ στυπτηρίαν σχιστὴν λείαν ἐπίπασσε. ὑσσώπου < δ, σταφίδος < δ, νίτρου < β, προεπιχρίσας μέλιτι κατάπλασσε, ἢ λεπίδος χαλκῆς < ι, στυπτηρίας < β, μετὰ κηροῦ < ι μαλάξας ἐν ἡλίῳ ἐπιτίθει. σύνθετα δὲ ταῦτα·

¹⁶⁴ According to a variable version of the myth Achilles himself did cure Telephus.

¹⁶⁵ Steph., *In Hipp. Aphor. comm.* 5.23.28-39 = *CMG* 11.1.3.3.76. 14-22 Westerink: τινὰ δὲ τῶν ἐλκῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεπονθότος ὀνομάσθησαν, ὡσπερ τὰ Τηλέφεια, ὁ γὰρ Τήλεφος ἐκεῖνος ἀρχαῖος Ἕλληνας ὃν ἔλκος ἔσχεν δυσίατον, καὶ ἐκ τούτου ὀνομάσθη τὸ ἔλκος Τηλέφειον· τινὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἰωμένου, ὡσπερ τὰ Χειρώνια, ὁ γὰρ Χείρων ἐκεῖνος ὁ

and inveterate ulcers (*In Hipp. Aphor. comm.* 6.45: 4.574. 8-9 L. = *CMG* 11.1.3.3.258.19-20 Westerink: Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ χρόνια ἔλκη ἢ Τηλέφεια ὀνομάζονται ἐκ τοῦ παθόντος ἢ Χειρώνεια ἐκ τοῦ θεραπεύσαντος ἢ φαγεδαινικά). He further characterizes both as composite, in contrast to the uncomplicated wounds which are subject to suppuration due to heat (*In Hipp. Aphor. comm.* 5.23: 5.22.538.13-540.5 L.= *CMG* 11.1.3.3.76.4-7 Westerink: οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ τῶν συνθέτων, τουτέστιν Χειρωνείων καὶ Τηλεφείων νομωδῶν ἐλκῶν, φαγεδαινῶν καὶ τῶν μετὰ φλεγμονῆς καὶ ὕλης ἐπιρρύτου ἐλκῶν. τούτων γὰρ συνθέτων ὄντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκπυητικὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ θερμόν, τὸναντίον δὲ καὶ βλαπτικόν). In the case of Chironian and Telephean wounds (and sores attended by inflammation) heat does not cause suppuration, but is, on the contrary, even harmful.

For several centuries suppuration, known as ‘laudable pus,’ was believed to be a sign of a healthy, healing wound. This concept of ‘laudable pus’ implied in the passage above by Stephanus, has been attributed to Galen. Though he recognized the Hippocratic adage “ubi pus ibi evacua”, Galen did not believe that pus was required for wound healing. Suppuration must not be provoked in wounds. However, in explaining the treatment of apostemes Galen speaks of complicated wounds including apostemes, whose development is so advanced that they cannot be cleared by evacuation, repercussion, and solution, without provoking suppuration.¹⁶⁶ It is better

διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὰ κακοήθη τῶν ἐλκῶν ἰάτρευεν. ἀμέλει ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν μέχρι τοῦ νῦν, ἡνίκα κακοήθες θεάσωνται ἔλκος, ὅτι «Οὗτος τῆς Χείρωνος δεῖται θεραπείας.» ὡς οὖν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ θερμόν ἐκπυητικὸν ἔστιν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς ἔλκεσιν, οὐ μὴν τοῖς συνθέτοις τῶν ἐλκῶν. For the same distinction cf. Theoph. Protosp., Damasc. et Steph. Athen., *Comm. in Hipp. aphorism.* 2.510.18-21Königsberg: χρόνια δὲ ἔλκη εἰσι τὰ φαγεδαινικά, τὰ Τηλέφια, τὰ Χειρώνεια. καὶ φαγεδαινικά μὲν εἴρηται διὰ τὸ βιβρώσκειν, Τηλέφια δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πεπονθότος, Χειρώνεια δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεραπεύσαντος. See also *Schol. in Homerum, Scholia in Iliadem (scholia vetera et recentiora e cod. Genevensi gr. 44)* 4.219bis 1-6 Nicole: * [Χείρων] <τὰ Χειρώνεια λέγεται> ὡσπερ τὰ Τηλέφια· ὁ γὰρ Τήλεφος ἀρχαῖον ἐλὼν ἔλκος ἔσχε δυσίατον, καὶ ἐκ τούτου ὀνομάσθη ἔλκος Τηλέφιον, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Χείρωνος ἢ Χαιρωνεία, ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ Χειρώνεια ἰᾶσθαι νοσήματα. * [Χείρων] εἷς τῶν Κενταύρων, εὐρέτης ἰατρικῆς καὶ λυρικῆς, υἱὸς Κρόνου καὶ Φιλύρας, ἢ ὡς ἔνιοι Ποσειδῶνος.

¹⁶⁶ Galen advocates medical therapies designed to dry wounds and reduce the amount of suppuration. See Gal., *Meth. med.* 10.281 K.: ὠμήλυσις γὰρ δι’ ὕδρελαίου καὶ ἄρτος δι’ ὕδρελαίου καὶ καταίονησις δι’ ὕδατος θερμοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ ἡ τετραφάρμακος δύναμις, ἅπαντά τε τὰ θερμαίνοντα καὶ ὑγραίνοντα διαπύσκει τάχιστα. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς φλεγμαίνουσι μορίοις, ἐπειδὴν ἤδη σφύζη σφοδρότερον, ὡς ἀπελπισθῆναι τὴν χωρὶς διαπύσεως ἴασιν, ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παλαιοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσφέρουσι φάρμακα, πρότερον δ’ οὐ. καὶ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἐναργῶς ἡμᾶς διδάσκει κατὰ τε τὴν προγεγραμμένην ῥῆσιν, ἐν ἧ κελεύει τὰ μὲν χωρὶς τοῦ τεθλάσθαι τετρωμένα μόρια ξηραίνειν ὡς μάλιστα, τὰ δ’ ἅμα θάλασει τινὶ γεγεννημένα διαπύσκειν ὡς τάχιστα. καὶ μέντοι κἀπειδὴν εἶπη, τὰ δὲ

first to expel the wastes of apostemes, and then to dissolve them. And only if it does not succeed, he suggests to ripen and provoke the suppuration. It is in vain to engender suppuration in wounds since desiccative medicines are appropriate for all wounds.

In the Plutarchan passage, ἔλκος is coupled with the verb ἀπουλόω (οὕτως ὁ τῷ χαράζαντι καὶ τρώσαντι λόγῳ τὴν ἀβελτερίαν ἀπουλώσαι καὶ καταστήσαι μὴ παρασχῶν ἀπῆλθε δηχθεὶς καὶ ἀλήσας ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ὠφεληθεὶς δὲ μηδέν.) This conjunction is attested also in medical texts and in particular in Galen's commentary on Hippocrates' *De fracturis* (*In Hipp. De fract. comm. iii. 18b 599.1-13 K.*).¹⁶⁷ Galen describes, here, the cicatrization of pusture in a linear succession; generally, a skin ulcer looks like a round open sore in the skin or like a crater, for the outer border might be raised and thick. It weeps hence, pus.¹⁶⁸ The physician has to expel it by the means of an acute needle twice, for the ulcer fills up again with pus after its first removal; afterwards, the skin builds a shield of protection for healing cover, which functions as a binding agent. During this stage of wound healing, the skin is drawn tight to the flesh, for the abscess does not project (εἴτ' ἐκθλιβέντος τοῦ ὑγροῦ προστέλλεται τῷ χρωτὶ τὸ δέρμα καὶ φυλάττεται μέχρι ἂν ἀπουλωθῆναι τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ χρωτὸς ἠλκωμένον). The deep cutting of the flesh is necessary (so that the bones arise from the skin). Moreover, the wound area on the flesh, where the section took place, is better to be covered by the surrounding layers of skin (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέσχεν ἐκεῖνα διὰ τοῦ δέρματος, εἰ μὴ διέτεμε πρῶτον ὅλην τὴν σάρκα. ταύτην οὖν βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἐσκεπάσθαι τῷ πέριξ δέρματι).¹⁶⁹ In

ἔλκεα ὅσα μὴ καλῶς καθαρθέντα ἐς τὸ δέον, αἰεὶ πρότερον ἄρξεται βλαστάνειν, ταῦτα ὑπερσαρκέει μάλιστα· ὁκοῖα δ' ἂν καθαρθέντα καλῶς καὶ ἐς τὸ δέον αἰεὶ, ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον θεραπεύεται, πλὴν εἰ θλασθῆ, ταῦτα οὐχ ὑπερσαρκέει ὡς ἐπιπολύ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πλὴν εἰ θλασθῆ προσκείμενον, ἀναμμνήσκει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν προγεγραμμένην λέξιν εἰρημένου, τοῦ χρῆναι πάντα ξηραίνεσθαι πλὴν τῶν θλασθέντων.

¹⁶⁷ For the verb ἀπουλόω and its connection with inflammation cf. Diosc., *De mater. med.* 5.79.9.3-4: ≤τὰ παλαιὰ> ἀπουλοῦν ἔλκη σὺν ἐλαίῳ καὶ κηρῷ and Gal., *De compos. medic. per gen. libr. vii.* 12.844.4-6; 13.1001.13-15.

¹⁶⁸ For the connection to the hidden ulcer see the chapter (V.8.) on ὕπουλον, inscribed as “ὑπουλος in medicine and in polis”, p. 149.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Gal., *Ars med.* 1.7.401: οἷς δ' αὖ περιτετεύει, τοῦτ' ἐκκόπτειν αὐτὸ, ἥτοι διὰ σμίλης, ἢ διὰ πυρὸς, ἢ διὰ φαρμάκου καυστικοῦ. ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα σχεδὸν δυνατόν ἐστιν ἰάσασθαι, γεννησαὶ δ' οὐχ ἅπαντα δυνατόν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ σπέρματος ἀποδέδεικται λόγῳ. τινὰ δὲ κἄν αὐτὰ μὴ δυνατόν ἦ γεννησαὶ, ποιῆσαι γοῦν ἀντ' αὐτῶν ἕτερόν τι δυνατόν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀστοῦ τελέως ἐξαιρεθέντος οὐσίαν ἕτεραν ἐν τῇ κατ' αὐτὸ χώρα, διαφέρουσαν ὀστοῦ τε καὶ σαρκός. ἔστι γὰρ ἢ γινομένη κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ καθάπερ τις σὰρξ πωροειδῆς, ἢ πῶρος σαρκοειδῆς, καὶ τοῦ χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος

this way of blanket covering or suturing, the break is sealed and the wound is rebuilt with new tissue. To provoke suppuration is to injure nature. The process of wound healing described by Galen corresponds to the basic principle of attunement to nature which is recurrent in the Galenic Corpus (ὅσον γὰρ αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν, ἐκείνῳ πλησιάζει).¹⁷⁰ The return to the initial *physis* is the prerequisite for restoring health, both in the case of wound healing and in the case of repositioning of the dislocated limbs to their δικαιοτάτη φύσις.

ἐπὶ τὸ πωροδέστερον μεθίσταται, κατ' ἀρχὰς σαρκοειδῆς μᾶλλον οὔσα. καθ' ὅ τι δ' αὖ μόνιον ἀπολλύμενον οὔτε τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν κατ' εἶδος, οὔθ' ὁμοίαν ἐργάσασθαι δυνάμεθα, τρίτος ἡμῖν σκοπὸς ἐξευρεῖν τινα κόσμον, ὡς ἐπὶ κολοβωμάτων. ἐπικοινωνεῖ δὲ δηλονότι τὸ γένος ὅλον τοῦτο τῷ κατὰ τὸ πηλίκον.

¹⁷⁰ Gal., *Ars. med.* 1.7.402.2-10 K.: ὅσον γὰρ αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν, ἐκείνῳ πλησιάζει. τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς τῷ γένει παρὰ φύσιν ἀποκεχώρισται μόνον. ἐφ' οὗ πρῶτος μὲν σκοπὸς ἡ ἀφαίρεσις· εἰ δ' ἀδύνατος οὗτος, ἡ μετάθεσις δεύτερος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποχυμάτων. ὅσα δ' οὐχ ὅλοις μορίοις, ἀλλ' ἐν μέρεσι μορίων ἐλλείπει τε καὶ ὑπερβάλλει τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀνάθρεψις μὲν ἢ γένεσις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων, ἀφαίρεσις δὲ ἢ καθαίρεσις ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων.

Conclusions

The Plutarchan metaphor located in the *Comparison of Cimon and Lucullus* 2.7 unfolded a tradition of medical intertexts, concluding also with a naturalistic metaphor in the same context of nature and politics. In this spectrum of medical discourses drawn from the surgical treatises of Hippocrates, the Plutarchan phrase ‘κατὰ φύσιν’ is attained to a medical and technical discourse recurrent in the surgical treatises of Hippocrates. This Plutarchan phrase serves as a *terminus technicus*, the context of which has been interpreted through the Aristotelian lens of Galen. The contextualization of this phrase in the Hippocratic tradition of dislocations alludes inevitably to the notion of “most just physis”; however, in Hippocrates there arises a pro-Aristotelian conception of justice with implied teleological connotations, which only Aristotle then systemized.

Jouanna (2012, 308) states characteristically: “The passages where Hippocrates and Aristotle say the same thing, with the one discussing the principles of medicine and the other the principles of physiologia, are indeed exceptional. Aristotle normally appears in second place behind Hippocrates, when there is no discussion of Plato, and he eventually precedes the Stoics, who come in third place”.¹⁷¹ In light of Jouanna’s view, the passages above discussing the principles of κατάτασις and motion to the proper place do constitute such an exception regarding the connection of Aristotle to Hippocrates. Aristotelian teleology of physis and motion and his concept of proper place on the one hand, and the Hippocratic anatomy-physiology on the other, share the same basic concepts of *physis* and teleology. But Aristotle, as figured out later by Galen, is the intermediate main station between Hippocrates and Plutarch. The Plutarchan metaphor is seen under the Aristotelian scope of the Hippocratic *physis*. Aristotelian teleology is echoed in the commentary of Galen on the Hippocratic “most just” *physis*. In this respect, Galen’s commentary on the Hippocratic nature could also be seen as a commentary on the Plutarchan expression εἰς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγοντες τὰς παραρθήσεις.

Plutarch’s medical metaphors and examples perceive of the Hippocratic tradition after meeting their Aristotelian investment. The reflection on Aristotelian teleology, physics, and philosophy is given by both Plutarch and Galen. Galen summarizes the flow of the Hippocratic and Aristotelian traditions. Similarly, this flow had been perceived before Galen by Plutarch in a combination of

¹⁷¹ Jouanna, “Galen’s Concept of Nature”, 308.

philosophical and medical interests. Moreover, Galen's adherence to Plato, given that he regarded him as one of his gods, together with Hippocrates, reminds us of the Plutarchan adherence to Plato; however, both Plutarch and Galen in their scientific train of thought reflect on Aristotle.

Apart from connecting the Plutarchan phrase *κατὰ φύσιν* with the Aristotelian teleology, I drew parallels in adopting an intratextual approach of Solon's most just sea. The serene sea is compared to the status of health in ps.-Plutarch as well. Here, I explored the reversed metaphor of fever in terms of tossing sea; this analogical metaphor draws on *physis* in order to depict health. Hence, health is described in terms of the serene sea, which is in accord with nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*). The thread that connects all the above intertexts is the notion of the "most just nature". The characterization of the normative *physis* as most just, even though being absent in the first Plutarchan metaphor, is implied and reconstructed by the rest of the intertexts. The circle of ideas that the reader is called to reconstruct, frames both Plutarchan metaphors turning on the axis of 'euthesia' as innate to the "most just" *physis*; the latter is transferred to the political sphere; here *subluxation*, on the contrary to luxation, is curable politically. Therefore, the aristocratic *physeis* of Cimon and Lucullus "combine force and justice" in a medical conception of *physis*.

Similar to *κατὰ φύσιν* medicine Plutarch proposes not only a *κατὰ φύσιν* politics but also a *κατὰ φύσιν* moral education. Upon it, he bases and develops the didactic function of physical metaphors. In essence, Plutarch extends the usage of medical metaphors to fit its paedagogical ideal. The philosophical admonition is, like its medical equivalent, in accord with *physis*. Hence, Plutarch promotes physical moral education. The instructive role of medical metaphors is exploited not only in the field of politics but also in that of ethics. Throughout his corpus Plutarch is constantly translating medical concepts into opportunities either for political, or ethical instruction. In this respect, Plutarch places the importance of nurture above that of nature. In the *Lives*, the behaviour of certain characters undergoes 'change' (*μεταβολή*) and 'correction' (*ἐπανόρθωσις*). The correction, which is also present in Aristotle (*EN* 1103a ff.), is of greatly expanded importance in Plutarch, who seems inspired by the Hellenistic literary criticism (souls are corrected just like the text of Homer), but mainly by Hippocratic anatomy which corrects any dislocations to the direct line (*ἐς εὐθὺ κατατείνειν*).

To sum up, the role of medical metaphors as didactic tools in Plutarch is fundamental. Medical metaphors build models for moral education, which are viewed through a pedagogical lens. Moreover, expected roles and hierarchies of the relationship between the physician and the patient

recast as variations of the teacher-student relationship. This is the case of the *Precepts of Statecraft*, where Plutarch admonishes Menemachus, a young man who has asked Plutarch for advice concerning public life. In this treatise, Plutarch offers precepts on political matters along with *exempla*. Most of them are given in terms of medical metaphors which serve as essential didactic tools, as we will see in the next chapter.

Chapter IV.

ἀπόρρητος πολιτικὴ ἰατρεία

Towards a Plutarchan political philosophy in the flesh (Praec. ger. reip. 814F-815C):

The aim of this chapter is to explore the human body in its contextualization in medical metaphors that appear in Plutarch's political treatise *Precepts of Statecraft*. This treatise, which serves as a 'vademecum' for the future politician, illustrates in many ways the metaphorical relationship between medicine and politics. Plutarch admonishes his future statesmen on political behaviour and, by doing so, he incorporates in his political precepts medical *exempla* and metaphorical references to discord (στάσις) and political disease (νόσος). Metaphors drawn from the bodily and medical experience as embodied concepts have particular physiology. This offers a reflective view of political concepts and practices in terms of more basic, concrete, physical, and visible medical phenomena.

4.1. The term of embodiment in Cognitive Linguistic Theory (CLT)

The embodiment of medical metaphors in Plutarch's treatise calls furthermore into question the linguistic connotations of them as conceptual metaphors. The concept of 'embodiment' and 'embodied mind' in connection with metaphorical thinking, in the realm of Cognitive Linguistics, stem from Lakoff and Johnson's work *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999). According to their theory, the mind is inherently embodied; that means that the functioning of our bodies is crucial for the structure of our conceptual system. The last is mirrored in the systematic use of metaphor. It is thus a question of how one wants to understand 'body'. This theoretical claim has been fleshed out by Johnson (1987) who developed the idea of 'image schemata' or 'embodied schemata'. The definition of an 'image schema' is that of a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity within our cognitive process at the level of our bodily movements through space. Therefore, more abstract reasoning is shaped by underlying spatial patterns.¹⁷² Embodiment can illuminate all kinds of

¹⁷² M. Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, 29.

mapping, metaphor, analogy or blending. This idea of embodiment goes along with a conceptualization shaped only by the body: only through body concepts are formed and the understanding of them is framed. Lakoff and Johnson's theory on embodiment is best summarized in their following key sentence (1999, 18): "A philosophical perspective based on our empirical understanding of the embodiment of mind is a philosophy in the flesh".

Turning the focus to the embodiment of political-philosophical thought in the body metaphors of the *Corpus Plutarcheum*, the treatise *Precepts of Statecraft* provides plenty of medical *exempla* for this metaphorical mapping: bodily subjugation, eradication of the harmful elements, mixture, *cacochymia*, bloodletting. In particular, Plutarch describes the process of people's subjugation to its sovereigns in terms of bodily subjugation; similar to subjecting the neck to the yoke after the fetters on legs, some people provoke the enslavement of their country or destroy its constitutional government willingly (814F). He extends this metaphor mirroring the blind enslavement to the sovereigns upon those who have become accustomed neither to dine nor to bathe except by the physician's orders. "Similar to those who do not even enjoy that degree of health which nature grants them (οὐδ' ὅσον ἡ φύσις δίδωσι χρῶνται τῷ ὑγιαίνειν), so those who invite the sovereign's (ἡγεμονική) decision on every occasion granting of a privilege, or administrative measure, force their sovereign (ἡγεμόνας) to be their master (δεσπότης) more than he desires" (814F-815A).¹⁷³

Plutarch describes this self-imposed enslavement to the sovereigns in reference to the self-imposed enslavement to the physician.¹⁷⁴ In other words, the physician is metaphorically compared to the emperor who has absolute control over the citizens. Or, in further reading, Greece is the patient under the control of Rome, which is perceived as a physician.¹⁷⁵ Plutarch recommends that

¹⁷³ As regards the translation of Plutarch's *Precepts of Statecraft*, I adopt the Loeb translation by H.N. Fowler.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. the Asclepian sort of medicine described by Plato in his *Republic* 404b as corrupted, for the patient is "slave to the disease". Plato contradicts this corrupted sort of medicine to the original and unadulterated one when speaking of the two different schools of Asclepian medicine. Socrates advocates the view that physicians and judges must correct for citizen's poor self-discipline. According to Plato, indulgence in pleasures ruins the body and necessitates the medical treatment, which is temporary and makes the patient addicted to the physician's rules. The addiction to them is also condemnable by Plutarch; however, in the Plutarchan passage above the patient is subject and 'slave' to the physician and not to the disease, as he resorts to him willingly and unjustifiably.

¹⁷⁵ See e.g. C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971; S.-T. Teodorsson, "Plutarch, amalgamator of Greece and Rome", in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener (eds.), *Historical and biographical values*

the statesman should guarantee the obedience of the people to the emperor, but only to the degree that people can themselves defend their own rights and protect their own nature without restoring to the emperor blindly. Having a look into the contemporary historical background, the inhabitants of the Greek provinces, under the regime of Trajan and Hadrian, are subject to the political, but also ethical behaviour of the emperor and to his higher representatives in the province, as Plutarch elsewhere points out.¹⁷⁶ It seems not obvious at all that the governors and procurators under a good emperor will be benevolent and gentle.

4.2. πρῶος ἰατρός: *Philanthropia* in medicine and politics

The ideal of the gentle statesman is consistent with the image of the gentle doctor (πρῶος ἰατρός).¹⁷⁷ Plutarch underlines it in terms of another correlational metaphor representative of the affinity of medicine and politics, as regards to the civic coherence within the boundaries of the society (*Praec. ger. reip.* 815A):

δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας ἰσότητι, τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς ἀνθυπεῖξει πραῦνοντα κατέχειν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ διαλύειν τὰ πράγματα, πολιτικὴν τινα ποιούμενον αὐτῶν ὥσπερ νοσημάτων ἀπόρρητον ἰατροίαν.

the statesman should soothe the ordinary citizens by granting them equality and the powerful by concessions in return, thus keeping them within the bounds of the local government and solving their difficulties as if they were diseases, making for them, as it were, a sort of secret political medicine.

The key phrase here is ‘political medicine’ (πολιτικὴν ἰατροίαν), a phrase that brings medicine close to politics by the use of the adjective ‘political’ as a specific modifier of the noun ‘ἰατροίαν’.¹⁷⁸

of Plutarch's Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society, Malaga/Logan: University of Malaga/Utah State University, 2005, 283-324.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. e.g. *De def. or.* 434D and *De exilio* 604B, where Plutarch criticizes the depraved political behavior of governors. On this theme see R. Flacelière, “Rome et ses empereurs vus par Plutarque,” *AC* 32 (1963) 28 ff.

¹⁷⁷ For the orthography of πρῶος or πρῶος see A.G. Nikolaidis, “Γύρω από την ορθογραφία των λέξεων πρῶος/πρῶος και φιλόνομος/φιλόνομος,” *Hellenica* 32 (1980) 364-370.

¹⁷⁸ However, the Teubner edition by M. Pohlenz adopts the lectio ἀπορρήτων attaching it to the noun νοσημάτων. This version follows W.W. Goodwin in his translation: “making for these things, as it were for secret diseases, a certain political medicine”. I do not opt for this version, although Plutarch provides elsewhere the common phrase of

This passage suggests that the statesman should apply a carefully quantitative treatment for the sake of counterbalance enhancing the powerless, whereas yielding in the powerful members of the body politic. This is the secret political medicine (ἀπόρρητος πολιτική ιατρεία).¹⁷⁹ The secret dosology of providing rights to the weak, on the one hand, and submitting to the mighty, on the other hand, assimilates to the treatment of a physician in his attempt to rehabilitate the physical balance of the patient.¹⁸⁰ The treatment is to be made in a manner silent and thoroughly hushed within the state. As a result, the cured state may have as little need as possible of medicine drawn from the outside and thus ward off the *longa manus* of physicians and their medicine (815B: ὡς ἂν ἥκιστα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἰατρῶν καὶ φαρμάκων δέοιτο).

The secret political medicine and the politics of mildness, in general, were not set forth, however, in the case of Solon, as described by Plutarch (*Sol.* 15.1). The biographer portrays Solon as a negative paradigm for this politics of mildness. In particular, Solon did not manage affairs in the mildest possible manner, although he rejected tyranny, and did not submit to the potent citizens. Plutarch repeats here the political terms that he introduced in the passage above from his political treatise. What changes is the sort of politics. What remains the same is the importance of the politics of mildness stressed by Plutarch. In his political treatise, he provides the program of political mildness and remedy, whereas in *Solon's Life* he describes the failure of this political

ἀπόρρητα νοσήματα (e.g. *Pel.* 1.3.1: ὁμολόγησέ τινα νόσον τῶν ἀπορρήτων and *De cur.* 518D: ἀποθανεῖν πρότερον ἢ δεῖξάι τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων νοσημάτων ἰατροῖς). For Plutarch explains here the sort of domestic politics, which functions self-sufficiently without restoring to the external 'longa manus' of the physician. The focus is thus on the balancing and secret way of the governing of a self-reliant community, and not on the disease. Therefore, the lectio ὥσπερ νοσημάτων ἀπόρρητον ἰατρείαν that provides the Loeb edition by H.N. Fowler is more convincing.

¹⁷⁹ At this point, I would like to draw a parallel to Aristotle's concept of πολιτικὴν ἰατρείαν, as it appears in his *Politics*. Aristotle sketches the political medicine implicitly when speaking *e contrario* of the improper, non-political and dynastic medicine that the Cosmi (ἔφοροι) employ. They live on an island, far away, from any who might corrupt them keeping their office unduly. The medicine they use, in order to cure the crime of the restriction of their office, is the exile of Cosmi by a conspiracy. This political remedy is characterized as "inappropriate, and less characteristic of a republic than of a dynasty" (*Pol.* 1272b 5: ἦν δὲ ποιοῦνται τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἰατρείαν, ἄτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ δυναστευτικὴ).

¹⁸⁰ For the submission of the statesman to the powerful members of the society cf. the following passage from the same treatise *Praec. ger. reip.* 824A: οὔτε γὰρ σώματι νοσοῦντι γίγνεται μεταβολῆς ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν συννοσοῦντων μερῶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἐρρωμένοις ἰσχύσασα κρᾶσις ἐκστήσῃ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν. For an analysis of this passage see the following pages: 142-143.

ideal. The theoretical framework of the secret political medicine, as given by Plutarch in his political treatise, could not be fulfilled in practice in the case of the Solonian politics. It is noteworthy that the vocabulary he uses is the same. Plutarch's description of Solon as a statesman who did not serve the politics of mildness and did not succumb to the mighty citizens (οὐδὲ μαλακῶς οὐδ' ὑπέικων τοῖς δυναμένοις), is a word for word repeat, given of course as negative, of his phrase: τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς ἀνθυπείξει πραῦνοντα κατέχειν from his political treatise. Apart from it, the term ἰατρεία appears as a metaphor in both passages; in the first case, as desirable politics; in the second case, as non-desirable and non-applied ones, and thus as a failure. For Solon was afraid of being unable to reconstitute the state, after utterly confusing and mixing up the city (*Sol.* 15.1: οὐκ ἐπήγαγεν ἰατρείαν οὐδὲ καινοτομίαν, φοβηθεὶς μὴ 'συγχέας παντάπασι καὶ ταραξᾶς τὴν πόλιν, ἀσθενέστερος γένηται τοῦ καταστῆσαι πάλιν' (fr. 23, 13 D.) καὶ διαρμόσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον).

The requirements for the best political administration Plutarch defines in his political treatise of the *Moralia* are tested for the success or failure of their fulfillment in the practical field of politics in the *Lives*.¹⁸¹ It is noteworthy that Plutarch exploits the same vocabulary, even the same metaphors shedding light on the inner cross-references (Querverweise) between his different works.¹⁸² In his *Political Precepts*, he postulates and establishes the canon, or defines, in other words, the positive imitation paradigm. On the other hand, in his *Lives*, he verifies or assesses the application of the paradigm for its fulfillment, or non-fulfillment in the course of history. Plutarch succeeds in this evaluation by the lens of the descriptive method in accordance with the principles of biography¹⁸³. In this way, he returns to the very first axiom, to its redefinition and seals it as he draws on the historical exemplification. Hence, the flow of the political paradigm follows the

¹⁸¹ For this connection of the *Moralia* to the *Lives* see T.E. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 55; S.-T. Teodorsson, (2008), "The Education of Rulers in Theory (Mor.) and Practice (Vitae)", in A. G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work: 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, Berlin/New York, 2008, 339–350. Russell also connected the *Moralia* and the *Lives*; D.A. Russell, "On Reading Plutarch's 'Lives'", *G&R* 13.2 (1966) 139-154.

¹⁸² See C.B.R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Adaptation of his Source Material", *JHS* 100 (1980) 127-140; id., "Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives", *JHS* 99 (1979) 74-96.

¹⁸³ Cf. Pelling, "Aspects of Plutarch's Characterisation", *JCS* 13 (1988) 257-274 for the distinction between protreptic or expository ethics, on the hand, and descriptive or exploratory one, on the other.

direction from the *Moralia* to the *Lives*, from the theoretical rule to the practice, given that the *Political Precepts* were composed after the *Solonian Life*.¹⁸⁴

It's a common practice of Plutarch to compare positive paradigms with negative ones drawing on his biographized heroes. This technique of comparing takes place not only in the typical proem and the concluding *synkrisis* of his *Lives* but also in the main corpus of the *Lives*.¹⁸⁵ The comparison, however, between the principles he poses in the *Moralia* and their verification, or refutation by his biographized protagonists is methodically more insightful and instructive. For it represents his political ideal expressed both as theoretical and applied politics. Therefore, he builds an inner bridge between his theoretical framework on politics in the *Moralia* and its practical outlook in his *Lives*. The fulfillment of his conditions and admonitions given in the *Political Precepts* is tested in the political arena of his heroes, as described in the *Lives*. In this respect, the principles of the ideal of secret political medicine do not meet success and implementation in practice in the case of Solon. The political criterium he poses in his political treatise is not satisfied by the Solonian politics. The same technique of comparing his theoretical claims on best politics and their application through the historical actions of his biographized protagonists is expressed in the following metaphor; at this time, not as a negative paradigm but as a direct analogy. For Plutarch gives a positive paradigm that is in accord with his political program of the *Moralia*, as follows.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. C.P. Jones, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works", *JRS* 56 (1966) 61-74.

¹⁸⁵ See H. Erbse, "Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs", *Hermes* 84 (1956) 398-424; Cf. also C.B.R. Pelling, "Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives", in F.E. Brenk & I. Gallo (eds.), *Miscellanea Plutarchea. Atti del I convegno di studi su Plutarco, Rome, 23 novembre, 1985*, Ferrara: Giornale filologico ferrarese, 1986, 83-96, especially 95; D.H.J. Larmour, "Making Parallels: Synkrisis and Plutarch's 'Themistocles' and 'Camillus'", *ANRW* 2.33.6 (1992) 4162-4163: "It is obvious that he shapes his narratives in line with the basic intention behind the Lives: to present the readers with – or to encourage them to discern for themselves- the similarities and differences between the two heroes in the areas of character, action and morality". See also S.C.R. Swain, "Plutarchan Synkrisis", *Eranos* 90 (1992b) 101-111 and H. Beck, "Interne 'synkrisis' bei Plutarch", *Hermes* 130 (2002) 467: "Daß der synkrisis im narrativen Arrangement der vitae parallelae eine Schlüsselrolle zufällt, bestreitet seither niemand mehr".

4.3. ὥσπερ ἰατροὶ τὰ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τῆς πολιτείας ἔξω τρέποντες: Warding off the *longa manus* of the political doctor

Using a metaphor *e contrario* Plutarch contrasts in his political treatise the statesman with the physician as regards their cure for the seditions or diseases (*Praec. ger. reip.* 815B). Though the statesmen cannot keep the city altogether free from internal troubles (ἀπράγμονα), they keep the seditious parts of the political body within the boundaries of the society (ἐν αὐτῇ γε πειράσεται τὸ ταρασσόμενον αὐτῆς καὶ στασιάζον ἀποκρύπτων ἰᾶσθαι καὶ διοικεῖν). Contrarily, the physicians turn the diseases that cannot eradicate towards the surface of the body (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰατροὶ τῶν νοσημάτων ὅσα μὴ δύνανται παντάπασιν ἀνελεῖν ἔξω τρέπουσιν εἰς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος). The same medical metaphor of turning any distemper and sedition to the surface of the body politic employs Plutarch elsewhere. Namely, in the *Life of Camillus*, the metaphor reappears not as an *e contrario exemplum*, but as a direct analogy or a *positive paradigm* (9.3: ἐπιεικῶς γὰρ ἀεὶ φαρμάκῳ τούτῳ χρώμενοι διετέλουν, ὥσπερ ἰατροὶ τὰ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τῆς πολιτείας ἔξω τρέποντες).¹⁸⁶ In particular, on the occasion of the capture of the city of Falerii by Camillus, Plutarch exploits the same metaphor of turning the disease towards the surface of the infected body in favour of keeping the civic coherence within the frontiers of the community. But Camillus poses this eradication in a different direction from that which Plutarch set forth in his political treatise.

It is interesting to take a comparative look at the same medical metaphor focusing on its variant ‘target domain’. The ‘source domain’ of the above metaphorical mapping is kept unaltered: the eradication and shift of the diseases to the surface of the body. What changes is its ‘target domain’. The latter is located in the changing political arena, as depicted in two different cases, in two different cultures, in two different treatises and genres by the same author.¹⁸⁷ In the *Precepts of Statecraft* Plutarch proposes a ‘secret political medicine’ as a unifying solution, in order to conceal

¹⁸⁶ For the meaning of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ paradigms in Plutarch, especially in his *Lives* see E. Alexiou, “The Parallel Lives of Plutarch. The issue of “Positive” and “Negative” Examples”, 2007, Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 32-42

¹⁸⁷ Cf. C.B.R. Pelling, “Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives”, *JHS* 99 (1979) 74-96; A.G. Nikolaidis, “Plutarch’s Contradictions”, *C&M* 42 (1991) 153-186; H. Beck, “Interne ‘synkrisis’ bei Plutarch”, *Hermes* 130 (2002) 469-469;

the seditions within the frontiers of their community. In an opposite direction from that described by Plutarch in his *Precepts of Statecraft*, Camillus kept the citizens busy in the polemic arena, in order to draw off the seditions away from the frontiers of the community that wanted to subdue. Camillus' direction is consistent with Roman politics and polemical virtues after he invaded the territory of the Faliscans and laid siege to Falerii. The difference, in the second case, lies in the fact that the community to be treated is to be subdued. In other words, the same gentle (ἐπιεικῶς) remedy (φάρμακῳ τούτῳ) of turning the distempers to the outside reflects the Roman strategy of subduing the foes. The eradication which Camillus, at the head of his army, applied to the body politic of the Falerii is a common Roman practice, as Plutarch himself goes on saying (9.4). As part of Roman external politics, it aimed at distracting the focus of the subjugated citizens to other matters that refrained them from being involved in civil seditions and fall prey of seditious leaders (ἄλλως δὲ τρίβειν τοὺς πολίτας καὶ περισπᾶν βουλόμενος, ὡς μὴ σχολάζοιεν οἴκοι καθήμενοι δημαγωγεῖσθαι καὶ στασιάζειν). Therefore, when Plutarch speaks of a foreign body politic, he adopts the analogical or proportional use of this metaphor in politics, whereas renouncing its antithetical metaphorical relationship, which applies in his political treatise.

In both cases, the aim is identical: civic coherence; but the motivations and, thus, the sort of politics are different. Hence, Plutarch reverses the same medical exemplum of remedy in accordance with the different purposes and the different politics applied by the remedy, i.e. internal and external politics. In the first case, there is no compulsory expulsion of the harmful element from society, but only its concealment is suggested. When eradication takes place outside the frontiers of the society in foreign borders, it is not criticized as reprehensible, since it is incorporated in external politics. When it takes place within the community, however, it is blameworthy as being dangerous to the city, which is about to suffer and be contaminated by a political illness: discord or civil war.¹⁸⁸ The remedy approved and disapproved, respectively, is the removal of the harmful and troublesome elements. In his theoretical political treatise, Plutarch

¹⁸⁸ Similarly, when corruption takes place for the good of the city and outside its frontiers, it is not necessarily criticized as reprehensible, as is the case with Pericles in Plut., *Per.* 22. See M. Vamvouri, "Physical and social corruption in Plutarch", in: P. Bosman (ed.), *Corruption and integrity in Ancient Greece and Rome*, Pretoria: Classical Association of South Africa, 2012b, 133 : "The fact that both the Athenians and Plutarch in the *Life of Pericles* refused to consider bribery as categorically 'bad' suggests that, although Plutarch usually interprets moral corruption as equivalent to physical illness, on occasion he seems to condone such corruption and thus avoids this particular metaphor".

employs this metaphor in opposition to the remedies of good statesmen for the sake of keeping the civic coherence and staving off discord. By contrast, in the case of the *Life of Camillus*, the relation is analogical and reflects the historical siege of Camillus and his Roman warlike virtue and strategy; this is a strategy inconsistent with the Greek Platonic model of *philanthropia* attributed to a gentle statesman.¹⁸⁹

The imagery of evacuation of the harmful elements from the body politic for the sake of the maintenance of the civic coherence as a result of gentle politics is recurrent in Plutarch. *Philanthropia*, and its adjectival or adverbial forms, occur in Plutarch in juxtaposition or close connection with the corresponding forms of gentleness (πρᾶότης)¹⁹⁰ and clemency (ἐπιείκεια)¹⁹¹. The ideal of the gentle statesman as a portrait of the gentle doctor is steadily apparent in Plutarch, who highlights the virtue of moderation. The last is a Platonic virtue that goes along with that of justice in a parade of terms, such as πρᾶος, ἥπιος, ἐπιεικής. These compose the general and difficult to translate the term of πρᾶότης (clemency).¹⁹² For example, Plutarch in *Caesar* 28.6 refers to the willingness of the sensible people to consent in public to a monarchy, for the state to be cured by

¹⁸⁹ The concept of ‘philanthropia’ is accompanied in Plutarch by that of ‘civilization’ and ‘Hellenism’ constituting a tripartite unity almost inseparable; e.g. *Comp. Lyc.-Num.* 1. 8-10; *Marc.* 1. 2-3; *Lys.* 27. In the *Life of Nicias* 11.2.5 the term φιλόθροπον is coupled with δημοτικόν, the political inferences of which are obvious (11.2.4-11.3): καὶ μάλιστα τῆς διαίτης τὸ μὴ φιλόθροπον μηδὲ δημοτικόν, ἀλλ’ ἄμεικτον καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἀλλόκοτον ἐδόκει, πολλὰ δ’ ἤδη ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν ἀντιτείνων καὶ παρὰ γνώμην βιαζόμενος πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἐπαχθῆς ἦν. ‘Philanthropia’, in fact, when used in this sense of ‘politeness’ or ‘mildness’, is for Plutarch a quality often associated with the ‘popularis’. See H. Martin, “The Concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch’s Lives”, *AJP* 82.2 (1961) 164-175.

¹⁹⁰ *Rom.* 7.5; *Fab.* 17.7; *Cat. Min.* 23.1; *Pyrrh.* 11.8; *Arist.* 23.1.

¹⁹¹ *Brut.* 30. 6; *Comp. Phil.- Flam.* 3.4; *Comp. Thes.- Rom.* 2.3; *Cor.* 30.7. For φιλοθροπία in conjunction with εὐγνωμοσύνη see *Marc.* 20.1; *Cleom.* 24.8; *Demetr.* 5.4; 17. 1; with χρηστότης see *Demetr.* 50.1; *Luc.* 18.9; *Comp. Dem.- Cic.* 3.3, and with δικαιοσύνη see *Comp. Lyc.- Num.* 1.9; *Luc.* 29.6.

¹⁹² For the motif of gentle doctor (πρᾶος ἰατρός) and its connection with the virtue of moderation in Plutarch see J. de Romilly, *La douceur dans la pensée grecque*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1979, 275-308 (ch. XVI: “Plutarque et la douceur des héros” and XVII: “Plutarque et la douceur des sages”). Contrarily, for the connection of πρᾶος with docility (εὐπείθεια) cf. the metaphor of the king as an equestrian in Plut., *Lyc.* 30.3: καὶ καθάπερ ἵπικῆς τέχνης ἀποτέλεσμα πρᾶον ἵππον καὶ πειθήνιον παρασχεῖν, οὕτω βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔργον ἀνθρώποις εὐπείθειαν ἐνεργάσασθαι.

the gentlest of the doctors who were offering this remedy- meaning Pompey (καὶ τὸ φάρμακον τοῦτο χρῆναι τοῦ πραοτάτου τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀνασχέσθαι προσφέροντος).¹⁹³

However, Plutarch himself reverses the identity of the gentlest doctor attributing it to Pompey's opponent, Caesar. In particular, Plutarch clearly alleges that no tyrannical deed sprang from Caesar's rule, but that Caesar was God's gift to Rome as the gentlest possible doctor (πρῶτατος ἰατρός) at a time when the state needed monarchy (*Comp. Dion-Brut.* 2.2-3: ἔργον δ' ἀπ' αὐτῆς οὐδὲν ὠμὸν οὐδὲ τυραννικὸν ὑπῆρξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεομένοις ἔδοξε τοῖς πράγμασι μοναρχίας ὥσπερ πρῶτατος ἰατρὸς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ δαίμονος δεδόςθαι).¹⁹⁴ Plutarch puts πρῶτος in the same semantic train of mildness echoed in *Caesar* 57.4, where he says that in gratitude for his mildness a temple to Clemency was ordered (καὶ τό γε τῆς Ἐπιεικείας ἱερὸν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου δοκοῦσι χαριστήριον ἐπὶ τῇ πραότητι ψηφίσασθαι). Moreover, in *Caesar* 15.4 mildness (πραότης) is depicted along with clemency (ἐπιεικεία) referring to Caesar's attitude towards the defeated Gauls.

Plutarch highlights and expands the role of the secret political medicine in reference to the ideal of the gentle politician sprang from *philanthropia*. In this respect, he compares the gentle statesman to the gentle physician building another analogical metaphor of evacuation, that of bloodletting (*Praec. ger. reip.* 818 D5-E5):

Κάτων δὲ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὸ Καίσαρος ὀρῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Κατιλίαν διαταρασσόμενον καὶ πρὸς μεταβολὴν τῆς πολιτείας ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχοντα συνέπεισε τὴν βουλὴν ψηφίσασθαι νεμήσεις τοῖς πένησι, καὶ τοῦτο δοθὲν ἔστησε τὸν θόρυβον καὶ κατέπαυσε τὴν ἐπανάστασιν. ὡς γὰρ ἰατρός, ἀφελὼν πολὺ τοῦ διεφθορότος αἵματος, ὀλίγον ἀβλαβοῦς τροφῆς προσήνεγκεν, οὕτως ὁ πολιτικὸς ἀνὴρ, μέγα τι τῶν ἀδόξων ἢ βλαβερῶν παρελόμενος, ἐλαφρᾷ πάλιν χάριτι καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ τὸ δυσκολαῖνον καὶ μεμνιμοῖρον παρηγόρησεν.

And Cato, seeing that the people was being greatly stirred up by Caesar in the affair of Catiline and was dangerously inclined towards a revolution, persuaded the senate to vote a dole to the poor, and the giving of this halted the disturbance and ended the uprising. For just as a physician, after drawing off a great deal of infected blood, supplies a little harmless nourishment, so the statesman, after doing away with something

¹⁹³ Cf. *Pomp.* 54.7 and 55.4. See also *Cat. Min.* 47.2.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. also Plut., *Caes.* 29.5, where the festering state alludes to the Platonic city, which swells and festers beneath its flesh (Plato, *Gorg.* 518e). See C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch Caesar: Translated with an Introduction and Commentary* (Clarendon Ancient History Series), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 427-8.

big which was discreditable or harmful, appeases the spirit of discontent and fault-finding by some slight and kindly act of favour.

The envision of the body politic empirically bounded and grounded as a macrocosm of the infected human body is described here in terms of moderation. Plutarch proposes a moderate way of governing and acts of favour (ἐλαφρῶ πάλιν χάριτι καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ) after the removal of the infected parts of the body politic. He bases his argumentation on the following chain of historical events, which are typical examples of *philanthropia*; Pericles and Demetrius followed a politics of benefits for the sake of the people, including public spectacles or distribution of funds; Cimon beautified the market-place by planting plane-trees and laying out walks (818D2-5).¹⁹⁵ Moreover, Plutarch draws on again from the Roman historical background and specifically the discord between Caesar and Cato. According to the *Life of Cat. Min.* 26.1.1-8, Caesar, in view of the charges and accusations made against him to the senate, took refuge with the people. In this way, he was stirring up and attaching to himself the numerous diseased and corrupted elements in the commonwealth (26.1.3: τὰ πολλὰ νοσοῦντα καὶ διεφθαρμένα τῆς πολιτείας μέρη). Cato succeeded, on the other hand, in warding off Caesar's peril and gaining the benevolence of the people stirred up by Caesar, in the affair of Catiline, thanks a benefaction and kind act of favour (26.1-7: περιφανῶς δὲ τῆ φιλανθρωπία ταύτη καὶ χάριτι τῆς ἀπειλῆς ἐκείνης διαλυθείσης); he persuaded the senate to conciliate the poor and landless multitude to include them in the distribution of grain (26.1.5-7).¹⁹⁶ All the examples above illustrate, from their variant perspective, the portrait of the gentle statesman, who blew out the revolutionary disposition of the people (πρὸς μεταβολὴν τῆς πολιτείας) by providing them with benefits. By analogy with the noble and gentle physician, who does not engage in harsh surgery, but appeases the affected parts after removing plenty of infected blood, the gentle politician causes the bleeding of the corrupted elements of the body politic and prescribes moderate civic nourishment.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Plut., *Per.*12 and *Cim.* 10.13.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Plut., *Caes.* 8.6-7: Διὸ καὶ Κάτων φοβηθεὶς μάλιστα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀπόρων νεωτερισμόν, οἱ τοῦ παντὸς ὑπέκκαυμα πλήθους ἦσαν ἐν τῷ Καίσαρι τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχοντες, ἔπεισε τὴν σύγκλητον ἀπονεῖμαι σιτηρέσιον αὐτοῖς ἔμμηνον, ἐξ οὗ δαπάνης μὲν ἑπτακόσια πεντήκοντα μυριάδες ἐνιαύσιοι προσεγένοντο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀναλώμασι, τὸν μὲντοι μέγαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φόβον ἔσβεσε περιφανῶς τὸ πολίτευμα τοῦτο καὶ [τὸ] πλεῖστον ἀπέρρηξε τῆς Καίσαρος δυνάμεως καὶ διεσκέδασεν ἐν καιρῷ, στρατηγεῖν μέλλοντος καὶ φοβερωτέρου διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄντος.

4.4. ὡς γὰρ ἰατρός, ἀφελὼν πολὺ τοῦ διεφθορότος αἵματος: Bloodletting and political corruption

Plutarch calls the reader's attention to the Hippocratic tradition, where the very same idea is expressed. Turning, thus, the scope to the 'source domain' of the medical metaphor, which is medicine, one can see how well informed Plutarch was on medical matters. Plutarch invites the reader to focus his attention on the medical knowledge of extracting the corrupt blood. By doing so, the reader will be able to conceptualize political corruption through his medical metaphor. Looking into the medical equivalent of his metaphor and, in particular, into the notion of infected blood in its contextualization in medical texts, one can confirm Plutarch's medical knowledge.¹⁹⁷ For medical authors, any corrupt element must be expelled from the body lest it extends through the whole body causing even greater harm. According to Hippocrates, what is corrupt is either sloughed off by itself or it must be extracted.¹⁹⁸ The evacuation of the morbid elements embedded in the body is called κάθαρσις (purgation).¹⁹⁹ This is a physiological process, whereby a superfluous or noxious element is removed from the body either naturally, or by cathartic remedies, or by external bloodletting.²⁰⁰

On the method of evacuation and bloodletting have been written by Galen three works: 1. *On Venesection against Erasistratus* (*De venae sectione adversus Erasistratum*), an early (ca. AD 163) treatise directed against Erasistratus for preferring the therapy of purgation and starvation to bloodletting; 2. *On Venesection against the Erasistrateans in Rome* (*De venae sectione adversus*

¹⁹⁷ Plutarch attributes to the verb διαφθείρω both the Aristotelian physiological meaning of alteration of things (cf. Arist., *GC* 1.3.317a 31-319b 5; 2.9-10.335a 24-337a 33) and the Platonic moral notion of disease that may strike a person or a city in a metaphorical sense (cf. Pl., *Soph.* 228a1-b1). On the physical, moral and political connotations of διαφθείρω as expressed in infected blood see M. Vamvouri, "Physical and social corruption in Plutarch", 132-151.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. e.g. Hipp., *De mul. affect.* 8.2.304.7-10 L.: Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο σκεψάμενος ἐν τοῖσιν ἐπιμηγίοισι μάνθανε, ἦν τε χολώδεα ἦ, ἦν τε φλεγματώδεα, ἦν τε αἷμα διεφθορόδες ἦ, καὶ ἦν δέη αὐτὴν αἷμα καθῆραι, προστιθέναί, ὅτου ἂν σοὶ δοκῆ μάλιστα δεῖσθαι, καὶ μετακλύζειν τοιούτοις.

¹⁹⁹ See Chr. Brockmann, "Katharsis im Streit antiker medizinischer Konzepte am Beispiel der hippokratischen Schrift *Über die Natur des Menschen*", in M. Vöhler & B. Seidensticker (eds.), *Katharsiskonzeptionen vor Aristoteles. Zum kulturellen Hintergrund des Tragödiensatzes*, Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007, 53-63.

²⁰⁰ The term ἀφαίμαξις (letting of blood) is not mentioned by Galen. In the field of medicine, it occurs in Aet., *Iatricor. liber viii* 76.47; *Hippiatr. Berolin.* 42.4.11; *Hippiatr. Paris.* 56.6.

Erasistrateos Romae degentes), (ca. A.D. 175-80), which attacks both Erasistratus for rejecting phlebotomy, and the Roman Erasistrateans for misinterpreting Erasistratus and for using venesection excessively and irrationally. 3. Last, Galen's treatise *On Treatment by Venesection* (*De curandi ratione per venae sectionem*), from the 190s, underlines the value of phlebotomy for evacuation in curing plethora.²⁰¹ In these medical contexts, the evacuation of infected blood from the diseased body is recommended as a cure for *plethora* or *plethos*. Under this term, Galen means the excess and superfluity of blood, which persists in the veins and distends them constituting the cause of the disease.²⁰²

According to Galen, blood is produced by perfect nourishment, perfectly digested. Blood is regarded perfect since it originates from a balanced mixture of all primary elements (*De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 8.4.23: 5.677.5-6 K.= *CMG* 5.4.1.2.504.1 De Lacy: ἡ δ' ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν τετάρων στοιχείων σύμμετρος κρᾶσις ἐγέννησε τὸ ἀκριβὲς αἷμα).²⁰³ In Galen's commentary on the *Nature of Man* it is described as the most closely associated to the nature of the human being (*In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* 1.31: 15.1.78.10 K.= *CMG* 5.9.1.41.27 Mewaldt: ὡς ἂν οικειότατος ὢν τῆ φύσει χυμός) and the most well-mixed (*In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* 1.40: 15.1.96.12-13 K.= *CMG* 5.9.1.51.2-3 Mewaldt: αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ αἷμα τὸ δοκοῦν εὐκρατότατον λέγεται τοῦτον). In his work *On Temperatures*, it is characterized as the most useful and proper (*De temperamentis libri III* 2.603.8-9 K.= 59.20-21 Helmreich: Τῶν δὲ χυμῶν ὁ μὲν χρηστότατός τε καὶ οικειότατός ἐστι τὸ αἷμα). Yet, even blood is vulnerable to various imbalances, disorders, and pathologies, which can either

²⁰¹ See P. Brain, *Galen on Bloodletting: A Study of the Origins, Development and Validity of His Opinions, with a Translation of the Three Works*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

²⁰² Galen had written a book on *plethos*, where he explains “the dynamic form of plethos and its variety due to the dilatation of the space in which the liquid is contained”, as he states in *De cur. rat. per venae sect.* 257 K. Cf. also Gal., *De plen.* 7.556.3-6 K.: καίτοι γε ὢν ὡς ἐν αἵματι μόνῳ τὴν τῆς πληθώρας ὑποτίθεται γένεσιν, οὐ κακῶς ἐπ' ἐκείνων πρόσκειται τῆ διαγνώσει τὸ ἔρευθος ἢ τε διάτασις τῶν ἀγγείων; and *Meth. med.* 14.891.16-892.5 K.: ἡ μὲν οὖν πληθώρα διὰ τε τῆς τοῦ αἵματος ἀφαιρέσεως θεραπεύεται καὶ διὰ λουτρῶν πλεόνων καὶ γυμνασίων καὶ τρίψεων, ἔτι δὲ φαρμάκων διαφορῶντων, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀσιτίαις, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐν τοῖς ὑγιεινοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν εἴρηται τελέως. ἡ κακοχυμία δὲ διὰ τῆς οικείας ἐκάστου τῶν πλεοναζόντων χυμῶν καθάρσεως. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἐν τῷ προφυλακτικῷ μέρει τῆς ὑγιεινῆς πραγματείας. Furthermore, Plutarch himself refers to ‘πλήθος αἵματος’ as a source of warmth in *Quaest. Conv.* 651A-B: δεύτερον δὲ τῷ πλήθει τοῦ αἵματος, ὃ πηγή μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμότητος; in combination with fever as a cause of death in *Agis-Cleom.* 36.3.5-36.4.1: αἵματος πλήθος ἀνενεγκεῖν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἀποκοπῆναι, and 51.4.3-4: πλήθος αἵματος ἀνήγαγε καὶ πυρέξας συντόνως ἐτελεύτησε.

²⁰³ For the term ‘σύμμετρος κρᾶσις’, see the relevant chapter (V.2.) “ισχύσσα-σύμμετρος κρᾶσις vs στάσις”, p. 118ff.

be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature. Exploring the type of infection in the blood may be linked with *plethos*, *cacochymia* (i.e. excess characterized by yellow bile, black bile or phlegm), all cases accompanied by inflammation.²⁰⁴ Quantitatively, blood disorders can be differentiated into those of excess, or *plethora*, also called congestion or engorgement;²⁰⁵

According to Galen, when a *plethos* of blood is causing trouble, venesection must be ordered for it to be dispersed (*De venae sectione adversus Erasistratum* 161 K.). However, venesection can be ordered even where no signs of *plethora* exist, e.g. in the case of fevers (*De comp. med. sec. loc.* 10.564-7; 10.637 K.). Galen uses phlebotomy in order to divert blood from a particular part of the body through derivation (*παροχέτευσις*) and revulsion (*ἀντίσπασις*) (*De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.* 11.178-9 K.).²⁰⁶ As a method of evacuation of the infected blood and cure for *plethora*, Galen suggests phlebotomy. He even underlines that the best therapy for *plethora* is phlebotomy. For it is the most appropriate, effective and short type of revulsive remedy.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, Galen attacks Erasistratus for his preference for purgation and starvation rather than phlebotomy. As Galen characteristically says, Erasistratus “did not add five extra syllables alongside the other remedies, the word *phlebotomia*”, except only once in praising Chrysippus for not using phlebotomy (*De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg.* 216 K.). Erasistratus, however, mentions the word *plethora*, but he prefers as a cure for it fastening to bloodletting (*De venae sect.*

²⁰⁴ For inflammation and *plethora* see Galen, *De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.* 11.220.7-221.6 K. further analysed and contextualized on the following pages 102-3.

²⁰⁵ and, on the other hand, various forms of blood deficiency, or anemia. Qualitatively, blood can be corrupted because it may be thinned, attenuated or thickened, congested; It may be subject to various distempers or dyscrasias. Cf. on anomalous dyscrasias Gal., *De inaeq. intemp.* 7.737.7-16 K.: πρὸ δὲ τούτων αἱ ἀρτηρίαὶ καὶ φλέβες, αἱ δὴ καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα ποικίλως ὀδυνῶνται. καὶ γὰρ ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τοῦ ρεύματος θερμαίνονται τε καὶ διατείνονται καὶ διασπῶνται, καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν θερμαίνονται ἅμα καὶ θλίβονται καὶ βαρύνονται· τὰ δ' ἄλλα μόρια, τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαίνεσθαι μόνον ἢ θλίβεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ κάμνει. καὶ καλεῖται μὲν τὸ νόσημα φλεγμονή, δυσκρασία δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνώμαλος τοῦ μύος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἷμα τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν ἦδη ζέει· συνεκθερμαίνει δὲ αὐτῷ πρώτους μὲν καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς χιτῶνας τῶν ἀρτηριῶν καὶ φλεβῶν.

²⁰⁶ See M.-H. Margarine, “Sur l’origine hippocratique des concepts de revulsion et de derivation”, *AC* 49 (1980) 115-30.

²⁰⁷ In contrast to other purgative means, such as enemas (*κλυστήρας*), emetics (*ἐμέτους*), purges (*καθάρσεις*), baths (*λουτρά*), exercises (*γυμνάσια*), rubbings (*τρίψεις*), swingings (*αιωρήσεις*), anointings (*χρίσματα*), heating plasters (*θερμαίνοντα καταπλάσματα*), which Erasistratus made use of: *De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg.* 11. 211.3-18 K.

adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg. 236.9-10 K.: ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ σαφῶς ὁ Ἐρασίστρατος ἔγραψέ τε τὸ τῆς πληθώρας ὄνομα καὶ θεραπείαν αὐτῆς διδάσκων ἀσιτίας μὲν ἐμνημόνευσε, φλεβοτομίαν δὲ ἐσιώπησε). Galen accuses Erasistratus of having neglected phlebotomy as a remedy for plethora and asserts that there is no longer any need for fasting.

4.5. ὀλίγον ἀβλαβοῦς τροφῆς προσήνεγκεν: Regimen against πλῆθος and στάσις

Galen's attack to Erasistratus is so persistent, that he even paraphrases and distorts Erasistratus' theory on starvation, which Erasistratus reflects in his book pertaining to the treatment of fevers. Erasistratus opposed bloodletting as a treatment for fever. However, Galen, hypothetically speaking, ascribes to Erasistratus phlebotomy as a cure for plethora. In this fictional manner, he reconstructs Erasistratus' treatment of plethora and its accompanying symptoms, as follows (*De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg.* 220-221 K.):

ὥσθ' ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν ῥῆσιν γενέσθαι τοιάνδε· περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀρρώστιῶν καὶ τὰς τῶν φλεγμονῶν γενέσεις ἀφαιρετέον ἂν εἴη πᾶσαν προσφορὰν ῥοφημάτων τε καὶ σιτιῶν, χρηστέον δὲ φλεβοτομία. γίνονται γὰρ ὡς τὸ πολὺ αἱ τοὺς πυρετοὺς ποιοῦσαι φλεγμοναὶ διὰ πληθώραν. διδομένων οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις καιροῖς προσφορῶν καὶ τῆς πέψεώς τε καὶ ἀναδόσεως τὰς κατ'αὐτὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδουσῶν, πληρουμένων τε τῶν ἀγγείων τῆς τροφῆς, ἔτι γε πλείστας τε καὶ ἰσχυρὰς συμβήσεται τὰς φλεγμονὰς γίνεσθαι. βέλτιον οὖν μῆτε διδόναι σιτία καὶ τέμνειν φλέβα.

so that the whole passage would read:

“Round about the time, then, when illnesses are beginning and of the onset of inflammatory conditions, all sloppy food, in addition to solids, should be withdrawn, and phlebotomy should be used. For the inflammations that give rise to fevers arise for the most part as a result of plethora. So if nourishment is given at such times and digestion and distribution perform their functions, the vessels are filled with nutriment, and more powerful inflammations will ensue. It is better not to give food and to open a vein.”
(transl. P. Brain)

On the rise of illness, vessels should be evacuated from nutriment or the nutriment should be digested lest inflammations and fevers are boosted. Thick and glutinous foods, too, are more likely

to promote inflammation, because the humours they produce trigger the plethoric symptoms (*De cur. rat. per venae sect.* 287-8 K.). Similarly, as Galen cites in *De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.* 176-7 K., Erasistratus, both in his third book on fevers with reference to inflammations due to *plêthos* and in his first book on injuries, repeats that food should not be given to patients suffering from inflammations caused by plethora.²⁰⁸ According to Erasistratus, after the evacuation of plethoras' infected blood by means of exercises and baths, the patient should abstain from eating. He prescribes the following diet: breakfast must be omitted and dinner must be eliminated. The food intake must be less harmful (ἀβλαβοῦς τροφῆς) and nourishing (ῥγκους ἀτρόφους) including vegetables, gourds, and cooked figs, green figs and a little pulse cooked with vegetables, and moderate bread intake (*De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg.* 238 K.).²⁰⁹ Fasting describes a middle stage after nourishment and prior to evacuation; for it neither nourishes nor evacuates (*De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.* 183 K.). That there is no certain amount of food or drink the patient should take, justifies the fact that medicine is based on presumptions and prognostication. As Galen says, “nothing shows so clearly that the medical art is in practice a matter of guesswork as the question of the amount of each remedy” (*De cur. rat. per venae sect.* 285.12 K.).²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Cf. Gal., *De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.* 176.10-15 K.: ἐκ μὲν τοῦ τρίτου περὶ πυρετῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπὶ πλήθει γινομένων φλεγμονῶν· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου περὶ τραύματος· ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ βιβλίοις οὐχ ἅπαξ, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῶν ἀσιτιῶν κενουμένας τὰς φλέβας ἐπιτηδειότερας ἔσσεσθαι φησὶ πρὸς τὸ πάλιν εἰς αὐτὰς δέξασθαι τὸ παρεγχυθὲν αἷμα.

²⁰⁹ Cf. also the Erasistratean diet and food preparation in *De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg.* 214.12-18 K.: τὴν μὲν πρώτην προσφορὰν ἄλφιστα κριμνώδη πεφρυγμένα εὖ ἀποσεσεισμένα· ὅταν δὲ προσφέρεσθαι μέλλι, ἐν τινὶ ψυκτῆρι ἐπιχέοντα ὕδωρ φυράσαντα διδόναι, μὴδ' εἰς ἅπαξ δὲ ἅπαν ὃ ἂν μέλλης διδόναι φυράσας, ἀλλὰ δις ἢ τρις, ὅπως μὴ ξηρὰ γενομένη ἢ μᾶζα δυσάλωτος μὴ πολὺ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀναδέξηται· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων χρήσιμον· προσεσθίειν δὲ διδόναι τῶν κυχωρίων συχνὰ εἰς ὄξος μὴ δριμύ ἐμβάπτοντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σιτίων ἀναλίσκειν· ἐφθὰ κυχώρια ἐψηῆναι δεῖ δύο παρασκευάζοντας χυτρίδας, καὶ εἰς μὲν τὴν μίαν ἐμβάλλοντας ἐψεῖν, ὅταν δὲ ἤδη καθεψηθῆντα εὖ μάλα ἦ καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα χύτρα τοῦ ὕδατος ζέη, μεταγγίξειν αὐτὰ εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν. See G.V. Mann, “Food intake and resistance to disease, *Lancet* 1 (1980) 1238-9.

²¹⁰ Cf. Gal., *De cur. rat. per venae sect.* 285.10-14 K.: Οὐδὲν οὕτω τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀποφαίνει στοχαστικὸν, ὡς τὸ ποσὸν ἐκάστου τῶν βοηθημάτων· εἰδότες γοῦν ἀκριβῶς πολλάκις ὡς καιρὸς τοῦ δοῦναι τροφήν ἢ ποτὸν ἢ τοὶ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἐνέστηκεν, ὁπόσον χρὴ δοῦναι βεβαίως οὐκ ἴσμεν.

Galen's remedy for nourishment after bloodletting, though quantitatively uncertain, contains as a main component melicratum.²¹¹ Galen, after completing the phlebotomy, provides his patients with some melicratum, nicely cooked, with one of the attenuating drugs, hyssop or organy or even mint or pennyroyal; or oxymel or oxyglycy with melicratum.²¹² Both phlebotomy and nutrition take place gradually, according to the endurance and the needs of the patient; sometimes doctors take six cotyles of blood, either all at once or spread over two, three or four days (287.6-8 K.). For the patients who experience also fever, or pain and have not consumed plenty amounts of food or the food taken in the previous day is well digested, bloodletting is to be done even on the very first day of the disease (287.14 K.: οἶδα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡμέραν τελευτῶσαν ἀφελῶν αἵματος).

However, Galen's theory of bloodletting was so dominating, that he was prepared to adapt it even on the twentieth day of the illness. On the contrary, Celsus believed that the most appropriate day for venesection was the second or the third one because the food taken before the illness would have been by then digested (11.308-10 K.). As Galen states: "the veins, when emptied of nutriment, will more readily receive back the blood that has gone across to the arteries." (*De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.* 177.7 K.: κενούμεναι γὰρ αἱ φλέβες τῆς τροφῆς ῥᾶον παραδέχονται τὸ παρεμπεπτωκὸς αἷμα εἰς τὰς ἀρτηρίας). This recurring principle that appears as a common component of all doctrines is actually Hippocratic (*De diaeta acutorum* (Spur.) 1.7.149.9-22 Kw. = 2.5.404.10-408.1 L.):

Ὅκοτ' ἀλγήματα προγένηται, μελαίνης χολῆς καὶ δριμέων ρευμάτων ἐπιρρύσιες γίνονται· ἀλγέει δὲ τὰ ἐντὸς δακνόμενος· δηχθεῖσαι δὲ καὶ λίην ξηραὶ γενόμεναι αἱ φλέβες ἐντείνονται τε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαι ἐπισπῶνται τὰ ἐπιρρέοντα· ὅθεν διαφθαρέντος τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οὐ δυναμένων ἐν αὐτῷ τὰς κατὰ φύσιν ὁδοὺς βαδίζειν, καταψύξιές τε γίνονται ὑπὸ τῆς στάσιος, καὶ σκοτώσιες, καὶ ἀφωνίη, καὶ καρηβαρίη, καὶ σπασμοί, ἢν ἤδη ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίην ἢ τὸ ἥπαρ ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν φλέβα ἔλθῃ· ἔνθεν ἐπίληπτοι γίνονται

²¹¹ Cf. Gal., *De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg.* 204.12-15 K., where melicratum in combination with large quantities of moistening food and some wine instead of fasting is prescribed by the gynaecologists in Rome, as regards the menstrual purgation.

²¹² Cf. Gal., *De cur. rat. per venae sect.* 286.14-17 K: μελικράτου καλῶς ἡψημένου μετὰ τινος τῶν λεπτοντικῶν φαρμάκων ἢ ὑσσώπου ἢ ὀριγάνου καὶ ποτὲ καλαμίνθης, ἢ γλήχωνος ἢ καὶ μετὰ τοῦ μελικράτου, ἢ ὄξυμέλιτος, ἢ ὄξυγλυκέως.

ἢ παραπληγες, ἢν ἐς τοὺς περιέχοντας τόπους ἐμπέση τὰ ρεύματα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων οὐ δυναμένων διεξιέναι καταξηρανθῆ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ τοὺς τοιοῦτους προπυριῶντα φλεβοτομέειν ἐν ἀρχῆσιν εὐθέως.

When pains precede, and there are influxes of black bile and of acrid humors, and when by their pungency the internal parts are pained, and the veins being pinched and dried become distended, and getting inflamed attract the humors running into the parts, whence the blood being vitiated, and the airs collected there not being able to find their natural passages, coldness comes on in consequence of this stasis, with vertigo, loss of speech, heaviness of the head, and convulsion, if the disease fix on the liver, the heart, or the great vein (vena cava?); whence they are seized with epilepsy or apoplexy, if the defluxions fall upon the containing parts, and if they are dried up by airs which cannot make their escape; such persons having been first tormented are to be immediately bled at the commencement, while all the peccant vapors and humors are buoyant, for then the cases more easily admit of a cure; (transl. W.H.S. Jones)

As described in the above passage from the *Appendix on Regimen for acute diseases*, the veins after being pinched and dried, become distended due to the influx of black bile and acrid humour.²¹³ In this case, the patient experiences pain in a certain part of the body due to this cacochymia. The blood that articulates in the veins is characterized here, also, as corrupt (διαφθαρέντος τοῦ αἵματος), as was the case in the Plutarchan metaphor (τοῦ διεφθορότος αἵματος). Corrupt blood is linked with inflammation either in the case of plethora or in the case of an influx of black bile and acrid humour accompanied by pain. The circulation of air is impeded or overturned and, consequently, the patient becomes extremely cold undergoing the symptoms of vertigo, loss of speech and spasms. As a cure for this *stasis*, the Hippocratic author suggests bloodletting, for the corruptive vapours and humours to be emptied out.²¹⁴ Removing corrupt blood is a way of purging the patient's infected body and restoring the counterbalance of his humours and thus his health.²¹⁵

²¹³ See H.D. Kunstmann, *Die Diät bei akuten Krankheiten. Eine Untersuchung zweier Schriften des Corpus Hippocraticum*, Diss. med., Hamburg, 1976.

²¹⁴ Cf. Hipp., *De Diaet. Acut.* (Spur.) 1.4.168.7-14 Kw. = 2. 3.400.5-402.3 L.: καὶ ἄλλαι φλεγμασῖαι τε καὶ ὑπὲρ φρενῶν περιωδυνῖαι, καὶ ξυστροφαὶ νοσημάτων, οὐ δύνανται λύεσθαι, ἢν τις πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήη φαρμακεύειν· ἀλλὰ φλεβοτομή τῶν τοιῶνδε ἡγεμονικόν ἐστίν· ἔπειτα δὲ ἐπὶ κλυσμόν, ἢν μὴ μέγα καὶ ἰσχυρόν τὸ νόσημα ἦ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ ὕστερον φαρμακεῖης δεῖ· δέεται δὲ ἀσφαλείης καὶ μετριότητος μετὰ φαρμακεῖης φλεβοτομῆ.

²¹⁵ On κάθαρσις and διαφθορά, see also Hipp., *De steril.* 8: 448-51 L.; *De affect.* 6: 232-35 L.; *Coac. praenot.* 5: 700 L. See also L. Van der Stockt, *Twinkling and Twilight: Plutarch's Reflections on Literature*, Brussels: Paleis der Academiën (AWLSK), 1992, 132-42 has shown that catharsis in Plutarch is simultaneously psychosomatic, ethical

It is noteworthy that the Hippocratic text uses the political term of *stasis* in order to denote metaphorically the disease of *cacochymia*, which is cured by bloodletting. In this case, the ‘source domain’ of the metaphor of *stasis* is placed in the field of politics, whereas the ‘target domain’ is located in medicine. Conversely, with the word ἐπανάστασις - as a composite kin term of στάσις - Plutarch describes the sedition stirred up by Caesar and warded off by Cato, as already seen. In this political context, Plutarch incorporates the medical metaphor of bloodletting. Therefore, in Plutarch, the ‘source domain’ of the metaphor is the domain of medicine and its terminology of bloodletting, whereas its ‘target domain’ is politics. Comparing both passages, *stasis* in Hippocrates directs a metaphorical mapping from politics to medicine, whereas ἐπανάστασις is contextualized by Plutarch in medicine, which serves as ‘source domain’. Hence, the same medical and political terms and frames put in different genres, build reverse metaphors serving different purposes. This reversed structure, which draws on from the tripartite schema: *stasis*-corruption-bloodletting can be depicted as follows:

Cause	Symptom	Cure	
Hipp.: the metaphor of stasis	κακοχυμία/διαφθορά	bloodletting	
Plut.: ἐπανάστασις	διαφθορά	the metaphor of bloodletting	
Metaphor	‘source domain’	‘target domain’	
Hipp.	politics	medicine	political metaphor
Plut.	medicine	politics	medical metaphor

Both metaphors follow the direction from concrete to abstract in accord with the principles of the conceptual metaphor theory. As already seen, conceptual metaphors typically employ a more abstract concept as target and a more concrete or physical concept as their source. For the Hippocratic author, the domain of politics is representative of the concrete that is exemplified in the field of medicine. He puts thus forward a theory of stasis from a naturalistic perspective; stasis reflects a state where the internal order within the human organism is disrupted and its normal functions are undermined. Hence, the human body undergoes stasis which implies humoral

and intellectual. It refers to purification within the body or to the cleansing of the soul and spirit through literature and philosophy.

disorder, *cacochymia*. Through the metaphor of stasis, which could be regarded as a political metaphor, the Hippocratic author offers a clearer understanding of the mechanism of the eradication of the infected part through bloodletting. On the other side, Plutarch converts the ‘target’ domain of the Hippocratic metaphor to ‘source’ one in order to offer a clearer understanding of the politics on the occasion of Catilina’s affair. In the second case, the flow is also from concrete to abstract. The latter is conceived through the medical metaphor, which serves as a political exemplum.

Plutarch, indeed, refers to bloodletting outside the above metaphorical framework. In particular, he describes it as a necessary medical practice without any metaphorical connotations in the *Life of Agesilaus* 27.1-2. Agesilaus suffers from cramp and pain in his leg, which swelled up (διογκωθὲν μεστὸν αἵματος) and was excessively inflamed (φλεγμονὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν παρεῖχεν). His pains were immediately cured by phlebotomy by a Syracusan physician, who let excessive blood and put Agesilaus’ life in danger due to profuse bleeding (27.2.2-5: τὴν ὑπὸ τῷ σφυρῷ φλέβα σχάσαντος, αἱ μὲν ἀλγηδόνες ἔληξαν, αἵματος δὲ πολλοῦ φερομένου καὶ ῥέοντος ἀνεπισχέτως λιποψυχία πολλή καὶ κίνδυνος ὄξυς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς περιέστη τὸν Ἀγησίλαον). In the passage above, the symptoms of disease, inflammation, and bloodletting are described by Plutarch as medical records of Agesilaus outside any metaphorical framework. In Plutarch’s works, what is corrupt and resides inside the body must be moved away either in a medical, or metaphorical context. A state that undergoes a disease, is described by Plutarch in the same terms that describe the pathology of the human body: φλεγμονή, νόσος, στάσις, ταραχή, διαφθορά.²¹⁶ Therefore, Plutarch establishes a cause and effect relationship between διαφθορά (corruption) and διαφορά (discord).

²¹⁶ See G. Cambiano, “Pathologie et analogie politique”, in F. Lasserre and Ph. Mudry (eds.), *Formes de pensée dans la Collection hippocratique, Actes du IVe Colloque international hippocratique, Lausanne 21-26 Septembre 1981*, Genève: Droz, 1983, 441-458.

4.6. διαφ(θ)ορά and πρόσκρου(σ)μα: Corruption in the political and human body

ΞΕ. Νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταῦτὸν νενόμικας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρὴ με ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΞΕ. Πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἠγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει

συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφορὰν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' αἴσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν γένος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.

(Plato, *Sophist* 228 a1-b1)

The stranger from Elea asks, in the above Platonic dialogue, if disease (νόσος) is the same thing as discord (στάσις). The response is positive because discord is a disagreement in what is naturally akin, because of some sort of corruption (διαφθορά). Hence, the stranger in the Platonic *Sophist* links corruption with discord observing that disagreement (διαφορά) of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption. Disagreement in the naturally kindred stems from corruption. Stasis is given also as a result of corruption implying decay, degeneration, infection.²¹⁷ But the disease may be the same as discord because both are characterized by lack of proportion, or symmetry (ἀμετρία). However, Galen, who comments on the same passage, on the contrary to the rest tradition, links disagreement with corruption reversing the cause as an effect: the term of διαφορά is put instead of διαφθορά and, in reverse: ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφορὰν;²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Plato's concept of stasis is consistent with his concept of justice. For he regards stasis as a pathology resulting from injustice. Justice is the connective tissue of political society and from this perspective, he explains its internal cohesiveness, and conversely, its disunity and ultimate dissolution. Cf. J.P. Euben, "Corruption", in T. Ball, J. Farr and R.L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 223.

²¹⁸ Gal., *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 5.2.39: 5.4.1.2.302.17-20 De Lacy: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἀνωτέρω καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς μικρὸν ἐμπροσθεν εἴρηται. περιλάβωμεν οὖν αὐτῆς τὴν ἔννοιαν· ἢ τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος <διαφθορᾶς> διαφ<θ>ορά· οὕτως γὰρ ἐν Σοφιστῇ Πλάτων ὠρίσατο; id. 5.3.24-25: 5.4.1.2.310.21-28 De Lacy: ἔχουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ τοῦ

Galen in a few lines above (*De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 5.2.36-38: 5.441.5-13 K.= CMG 5.4.1.2.302.8-16 De Lacy) refers to discord (στάσις) and symmetry (συμμετρία) as causes of disease (νόσος) and health (ὕγεια), respectively. By doing so, he draws a proportional analogy between the soul and body. If the three parts of the soul, the logical (λογιστικόν), the spirited (θυμοειδές) and the appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν) stay in harmony, then the soul is healthy (συμφωνοῦντα μὲν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὰ τρία καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν στασιάζοντα τὴν ὑγίαιαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπεργάζεται, διαφωνήσαντα δὲ καὶ στασιάζοντα τὴν νόσον). On the contrary, when this symmetry is disrupted, there rises discord (στάσις) between these parts, and disease (νόσος).²¹⁹ The latter is due to a lack of symmetry. The health and disease of the soul, which is described by Galen with the same terms of symmetry and discord, is equivalent to that of the body. In this respect, corruption (διαφθορά) is an outcome of lack of symmetry, of agreement, of διαφορά.

Following this reasoning, political corruption (διαφθορά) appears even as a result of personal dispute (διαφορά). Plutarch stresses again the role and the skills of the statesman in curing and preventing factional discord. The best virtue he attributes to the statesman is the ability to foresee that factional discord shall never arise among the citizens. This is the greatest and noblest function of the art of statesmanship (*Praec. ger. reip.* 824C: κράτιστον δὲ προνοεῖν ὅπως μηδέποτε στασιάζωσι, καὶ τοῦτο τῆς πολιτικῆς ὥσπερ τέχνης μέγιστον ἠγεῖσθαι καὶ κάλλιστον). However, sedition (στάσις) and the accompanied civic discord (ταραχή) is triggered not only by public affairs

Πλάτωνος ῥήσεις ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον.”—δύο μὲν εἶδη κακίας περὶ ψυχῆς ῥητέον. —ποῖα; —τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ’ οἷον αἴσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον. —οὐκ ἔμαθον. —νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταυτὸν νενόμικας; —οὐδ’ αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρῆ με ἀποκρίνασθαι. —πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἠγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἐκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν; —οὐδέν. —ἀλλ’ αἴσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ὄν γένος; —οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.” However, Maximus Planudes and Stobaeus keep the lectio ἐκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθορά. Cf. Max. Plan. *Comp. e Plat. dial., Sph.* 65.2-3: ἔστι δ’ ἢ μὲν νόσος, στάσις, ἢ τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἐκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθορά; and Stob., *Antholog.* 2.31.129: Πλάτωνος ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ (p. 227D—230E). Δύο μὲν εἶδη κακίας περὶ ψυχῆς ῥητέον. — Ποῖα; — Τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ’ οἷον αἴσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον. — Οὐκ ἔμαθον. — Νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταυτὸν νενόμικας. — Οὐδ’ αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρῆ με ἀποκρίνασθαι. — Πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἠγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἐκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν; —Οὐδέν. —

²¹⁹ For the history of *stasis* see A. Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City 750–330 B.C.*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982; A. Fuks, *Social Conflict in Ancient Greece*, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, Hebrew University/Leiden: Brill, 1984; H.J. Gehrke, *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Vestigia, 35), Munich: C. H. Beck, 1985; K. Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease. An Inquiry into Stasis*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000.

but often by private ones (825A: οὐκ ἀεὶ στάσιν πόλεως αἰ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ φιλονεικίαι διακάουσιν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐκ πραγμάτων καὶ προσκρουμάτων ἰδίων εἰς δημόσιον αἰ διαφοραὶ προελθοῦσαι συνετάραξαν ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν). Private troubles may become the causes of public ones and small troubles of great ones if they are overlooked. Plutarch states it explicitly through another metaphor from the field of medicine, where the statesman is compared again with the provident physician who must remedy or prevent the discord (825A: οὐδενὸς ἤττον τῷ πολιτικῷ προσήκει ταῦτ' ἰᾶσθαι καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν). Apart from the preventive politics against civil sedition Plutarch speaks of suppressive ones; resolving factional discord and restoring harmony is like suppressing diseases that spread quickly and curing them (825C-D: Διὸ χρὴ μὴ καταφρονεῖν τὸν πολιτικὸν ὥσπερ ἐν σώματι προσκρουμάτων διαδρομὰς ὀξείας ἐχόντων, ἀλλ' ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ πιέζειν καὶ βοηθεῖν).

In both passages, discord is metaphorically presented as a disease which strikes the body in acute attacks (διαδρομὰς ὀξείας).²²⁰ The acute disease has to be repressed in both body politic and human. Actually, the term πρόσκρου(σ)μα means that against which one strikes, obstacle and has both medical and political connotations.²²¹ It appears, for example in *Hippiatrica Berolinensia*

²²⁰ For the adjective acute (ὀξύς-εῖα-ύ) related to the word disease (νόσημα, νοῦσος) see Hipp., *De aere aquis locis* 3 = 2: 18 L.: Πλευρίτιδες δὲ καὶ περιπλευμονίαι καὶ καῦσοι καὶ ὀκόσα ὀξέα νοσήματα νομίζονται, οὐκ ἐγγίγονται πολλά·; 4 = 2: 44 L.: πλευρίτιδές τε πολλαὶ, αἶ τε ὀξεῖαι νομίζόμεναι νοῦσοι. For its connection with fever (πυρετός), see id. 10 = 2: 15-19 L.: ὥστε τοὺς πυρετοὺς ἐπιπίπτειν ὀξυτάτους ἅπασι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖσι φλεγματίησιν; 10 = 2: 50 L.: καὶ πυρετοὶ ὀξέες καὶ πολυχρόνιοι.

²²¹ According to *LSJ*, the form πρόσκρουμα freq. occurs in the same Mss. as πρόσκρουσμα. Cf. Plut., *Per.* 19.7-8: οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύχης πρόσκρουσμα συνέβη περὶ τοὺς στρατευομένους; *Con. praec.* 141B: ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ἰατροὶ τοὺς ἐξ αἰτιῶν ἀδήλων καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν συλλεγομένων γεννωμένους πυρετοὺς μᾶλλον δεδοίκασιν ἢ τοὺς ἐμφανεῖς καὶ μεγάλας προφάσεις ἔχοντας, οὕτω τὰ λανθάνοντα τοὺς πολλοὺς μικρὰ καὶ συνεχῆ καὶ καθημερινὰ προσκρούματα γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς μᾶλλον δίστησι καὶ λυμáίνεται τὴν συμβίωσιν; *De coh. ira* 461B-C: ὥσπερ φλεγμαίνοντι καταπλάσματα κομίζοντας, ἀσθενεῖ καὶ φιλαιτίῳ καὶ μεμνημοίρῳ δουλεύων διαίτη καθάπερ ὑπὸ βηχὸς ἐνδελεχοῦς [ἢ] προσκρουμάτων πολλῶν ἔλαθεν ἐλκῶδη καὶ καταρροϊκὴν διάθεσιν περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἀπεργασάμενος. ἐθιπέον οὖν τὸ σῶμα δι' εὐτελείας πρὸς εὐκολίαν αὐταρκες ἐαυτῷ γινόμενον· and *De tuenda* 137C: Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μικρολογίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας προσκρούματα λαμβάνουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ περὶ τε συγκομιδὰς καρπῶν καὶ τηρήσεις ἐπιπόνους, ἀγρυπνίας καὶ περιδρομαῖς ἐξελέγχοντες τὰ σαθρὰ καὶ ὕπουλα τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστι δεδιέναι μὴ πάθωσιν ἄνδρες φιλόλογοι καὶ πολιτικοί, πρὸς οὓς ἐνέστηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος. For its metaphorical use by Plutarch see Plut. *Them.* 20; *Fav.* 26; *Cat. Ma.* 23. The lexicon by F. Montanari, *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*, (GE) s.v.

(96.2.2 Hoppe & Oder: ἐκ προσκρούσματος πονῆ αὐτὸ [τὸ γόνυ] καὶ χωλεύη χρονίως) with the meaning of knock. On the other hand, its political meaning is apparent in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Antiq. Rom.* 10.31.1.3-5: πολιτικὰ δέ τινα προσκρούσματα τοῖς δημάρχοις πρὸς τοὺς ὑπάτους συνέστη πάλιν).

In personal conflicts, the statesman must be a mild mediator (ἡμερον διαλλακτὴν), not at all angry (ἀμήνιτον) and dispassionate (*Praec. ger. reip.* 825E: μηδ' ἄλλο πάθος ἐμποιοῦν).²²² Plutarch employs at this point, another metaphor from the field of palestra in order to stress the importance of mildness.²²³ Like the athletes in the ring bind their hands all around, for the injuries to be soft and unpainful, lest the contest has a fatal outcome (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διαμαχομένων ἐπισφαίροις περιδέουσι τὰς χεῖρας, ὅπως εἰς ἀνήκεστον ἢ ἄμιλλα μηδὲν ἐκπίπτῃ, μαλακὴν ἔχουσα τὴν πληγὴν καὶ ἄλυπον), the statesman should treat the discords softly and be conciliatory in the private differences.²²⁴

Moreover, Plutarch employs metaphorically the term διαφθορά so as to denote the moral and political corruption on the occasion of disloyalty between two friends. Their personal discord arose from the fact that one of these being entrusted with his friend's beloved for safe-keeping, seduced him, while the other was away (825C: διέφθειρεν ἀποδημοῦντος); the answer of the latter was to commit adultery with his wife. Lest the state is infected with enmity through them (ἀναπλησθῆναι τὴν πόλιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῆς ἔχθρας), an old man suggested to the senate that both be banished. The senate, however, overruled his proposal. As a result, sedition broke out, which caused great distress (στασιάσαντες) and overturned a most excellent government (ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου στασιάσαντες ἐπὶ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀνέτρεψαν). The vocabulary that Plutarch uses here,

πρόσκρουσμα gives the following meaning: “body that strikes, thing that gives trouble or harm, Ar. *P.A.* 658a7 to the eyes, πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν; Fig. clash, conflict, dissent Arr. Epict. D 4.12.9; usu pl. Dem. 54.3, Dion 4.25.5, 7.45.5, 10.31.1”.

²²² For the motif of the mild doctor-statesman see the familiar chapter p. 90-93 .

²²³ Alternatively to the medical imagery, imagery of athletic competition is commonly used by Plutarch in order to describe the life of a statesman in an oligarchy, or democracy in the *Moralia* and *Parallel Lives* (e.g. 795A, 798B or *Dion* 1.1-3). See Fuhrmann, *Les images*, 41-42 and 48-53.

²²⁴ The word ἀνήκεστος, ον, (ἀκέομαι) incurable, desperate, fatal, ἄλγος, χόλος, (cf. e.g. *Il.* 5.394, 15.217; Hdt.1.137: ἀ. πάθος ἔρδειν τινά; id.3.154: ἀ. λώβην λωβᾶσθαί τινα) is totally attested three times in Plutarch's Precepts of Statecraft, and all these references occur in a chain in the passage above, which is rich in metaphors, especially from the domain of medicine (825E7; 825F3 and 825F7). Plutarch exploits the same metaphor of hand-fasting in the *Comp. Cim.-Luc.* 2.7, but this binding is to be made by the physician, as already seen in the previous chapter.

is drawn again on the realm of medicine. Only the extraction of the corrupt elements can prevent the polis from ruining. This is exactly what the old man proposes when he asks the Senate to banish both friends. The word ἀναπλησθῆναι reflects the physiological aspect of the passage; this word (ἀναπίμπλημι, fill up) is often used with the medical meaning of being infected with the disease.²²⁵ In this sense, it denotes the origin of a disease, which sometimes is identified with *plethora*, the excess of blood. Infection and corruption are presented again in a cause and effect relationship in regard to the human body and the body politic. Therefore, the old man proposed the expulsion of the corrupted ex-friends, similarly to a physician who would succeed in eradicating the corrupted elements of the body, as we will see in more detail in the next chapter.

²²⁵ See Th., 2.51.4-5: καὶ ὅτι ἕτερος ἀφ' ἑτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπιμπλάμενοι ὡσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθνησκον; Pl., *Phd.* 67a 5-6: μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἄν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς and Iamb., *Myst.* 5.15.14-16: Ἐπὶ θάτερα τοίνυν ἀντιδιαίρει τὸ φερόμενον καὶ ἀνίδρυτον καὶ ἀναπεπλησμένον ἄλλοτρίων φύσεων. For the use of the term by Galen see eg. Gal., *In Hipp. Aphor. comm.* 17b.466.13 K.: ὅταν ἡ γαστήρ ἀναπεπλησμένη μοχθηρῶν χυμῶν ἢ τινῶν; id., *De temp.* 1.3.679.18 K.=106.24 Helmreich: ψυχρᾶς ποιότητος ἀναπίμπλασθαι τὸ σῶμα; id., *De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae deg.* 11.188.12-15 K.: τέταρτος εἶη μὴν πεπλησμένος τῆς ἐπισχέσεως τοῦ αἵματος, αὐθις ἐντυχῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἐπεχείρουν πείθειν ἐπὶ τὴν φλεβοτομίαν ἀφικέσθαι. For the notion of corrupting, defiling, infecting cf. also Pl., *Ap.* 32c: ὡς πλείστους ἀναπληῆσαι αἰτιῶν. For its connection to the plethora of blood (πληθώρα<πλήθω<πίμπλημι < IE *pel- πληθος), see the former chapters, p. 101-3. Cf. R. Brock, “Sickness in the body politic”, in E. Marshall and V. Hope (eds.), *Death and disease in the ancient city*, London: Routledge, 2000, 24-34.

Conclusions

The treatise *Precepts of Statecraft* provides plenty of medical *exempla* that activate the reader to conceive of the metaphorical mapping of medicine onto politics. The metaphors built on the axis of bodily subjugation, eradication of the harmful elements, bloodletting, *cacochymia*, gentle doctor shape an explanandum for Plutarch's political thought and admonition. The character of this treatise is obviously didactic. However, the same medical metaphors appear not only as part of Plutarch's political precepts but are to be found in his *Lives* as examples of his biographized heroes. Regarding this point of moralizing technique, a person's character is presented in the *Moralia* as more flexible and susceptible to education and change, whereas in biography it is more fixed. Therefore, in respect to Pelling's distinction between a. expository, or protreptic moralism, and b. exploratory, or descriptive moralism, the *Moralia* seem to satisfy the second principle of descriptive moralism, since they offer contemplations about human behavior;²²⁶ on the other hand, each *Live* is, in most cases, a clearer understanding of a negative or positive paradigm corresponding to the category of protreptic moralism. However, the borders between positive and negative paradigms are in many cases blurring. Pelling stresses that Plutarch is less concerned with protreptic moralism in the form "do this or do not that", but rather with descriptive moralism.

In the case of metaphors, however, Pelling's distinction is very hard to meet application, whereas the above generic tendency is not fulfilled. In the *Moralia*, the medical metaphors tend to be more consistent with the expository or protreptic moralism, since they confine the wide philosophical spectrum to concrete paradigms and, thus, enhance Plutarch's argumentation on what is right. On the other hand, their input in the *Lives* widens the spectrum of biography prompting reflections on the human or political behavior, since biography meets ethics, politics, and medicine at the interface of metaphors. Given their conceptual function and so their didactic role, metaphors as part of Plutarch's moralizing method tend to be more of a descriptive and overarching art even in the *Lives*. Hence, medical metaphors in the *Lives* offer cross-mapping and overarching analogies regarding the domain of politics.

This tension is pertaining to the function of metaphor, whose role is to promote comparisons. Metaphor breaks and opens the text to a cross-domain mapping. By implementing comparisons, metaphor functions either as a negative, or positive paradigm; as a negative one, it redirects the train of political or ethical thought correcting bad behaviors; as a positive one, metaphor sheds

²²⁶ See C.B.R. Pelling, "Aspects of Plutarch's Characterisation", *ICS* 13.2 (1988) 274.

light on Plutarch's argumentation and admonitions. One cannot apply with certainty Pelling's bipolar distinction in Plutarch's different genres. However, to my view, the tendency which appears both in the *Moralia* and in the *Lives* is the following: where the moralizing scope of the Plutarchan text tends to be more canonistic and expository, metaphor turns it into descriptive, and vice versa. The reason lies in the fact that metaphors offer a deviation from the narration introducing an alternative domain of thought that invites the reader to see between and beyond the negative or positive lines of biography.

Chapter V.

Metaphors from mixture (κρᾶσις)

5.1. δεῖ τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι πολὺ

For Plutarch, the danger of corruption in the sphere of the city is similar to the dangers experienced by the human body, when a corrupt element resides in it.²²⁷ He suggests as a remedy the external eradication of the harmful elements from the body politic, on the one hand, and the internal submission to the healthy parts, on the other. This balancing treatment is necessary for the healthy parts to prevail over the diseased ones and physically restore body balance and health. Plutarch repeats hence the motif of *politicus doctor* who cures the body of the society; the following passage is built upon an analogy between the human body and the political one, unfolding a parade of medical terms including μεταβολῆς ἀρχή, ἰσχύσασα κρᾶσις, τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, ἀναίσθητον, ἀνάλητον, στάσις, ἀναταραχή, ἀταραξία (Plut., *Praec. ger. reip.* 824A):

οὔτε γὰρ σώματι νοσοῦντι γίγνεται μεταβολῆς ἀρχή πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν συννοσοῦντων μερῶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἐρρωμένοις ἰσχύσασα κρᾶσις ἐκστήσῃ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν· ἔν τε δήμῳ στασιάσαντι μὴ δεινὴν μὴδ' ὀλέθριον στάσιν ἀλλὰ παυσομένην ποτὲ δεῖ τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι πολὺ καὶ παραμένειν καὶ συνοικεῖν· ἐπιρρεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκ τῶν σωφρονούντων καὶ δίδεισι διὰ τοῦ νενοσηκότος· αἱ δὲ δι' ὅλων ἀναταραχθεῖσαι πόλεις κομιδῇ διεφθάρησαν, ἂν μὴ τινος ἀνάγκης ἔξωθεν τυχοῦσαι καὶ κολάσεως ὑπὸ κακῶν βία σωφρονήσωσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀναίσθητον οὐδ' ἀνάλητον ἐν στάσει καθῆσθαι προσήκει τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀταραξίαν ὑμνοῦντα καὶ τὸν ἀπράγμονα καὶ μακάριον βίον, ἐν ἑτέροις ἐπιτερπόμενον ἀγνωμονοῦσιν·

For in a body afflicted with disease the beginning of a change to health does not come from the diseased parts, but it comes when the condition in the healthy parts gains strength and drives out that which is

²²⁷ See C. Doganis, *Aux origines de la corruption: démocratie et délation en Grèce ancienne*, Paris: PUF, 2007. See also G. Cambiano, “Pathologie et analogie politique”, in F. Lasserre & P. Mudry (eds.), *Formes de pensée dans la Collection Hippocratique. Actes du IVe colloque international hippocratique, Lausanne 21-26 Septembre 1981*, Genève: Droz, 1983, 441-458.

contrary to nature; and in a people afflicted with faction, if it is not dangerous and destructive but is destined to cease sometime, there must be a strong, permanent, and permeating admixture of sanity and soundness; for to this element there flows from the men of understanding that which is akin to it, and then it permeates the part which is diseased; but States which have fallen into complete disorder are utterly ruined unless they meet with some external necessity and chastisement and are thus forcibly compelled by their misfortunes to be reasonable. Yet certainly it is not fitting in time of disorder to sit without feeling or grief, singing the praises of your own impassiveness and of the inactive and blessed life, and rejoicing in the follies of others;

Plutarch regards calmness as a prerequisite for a healthy body politic and contrasts it with the noisy colony of bees.²²⁸ Although the hive which hums loudest gives the impression that it is flourishing (823F), in a flourishing and healthy society a prudent statesman must regard that the happiness of the people stems from their calmness and their mildness (πραότης).²²⁹ Moreover, he should accept and imitate the rest Solonian measures as right, except for that, which foresees the deprivation of political rights imposed on the citizens, who remain neutral in case of civil discord, (823F-824A: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοῦ Σόλωνος ἀποδέξεται καὶ μιμήσεται κατὰ δύναμιν, ἀπορήσει δὲ καὶ θαυμάσει τὶ παθῶν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἔγραψεν ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει πόλεως μηδετέροις προσθέμενον).²³⁰ Plutarch criticizes Solon's law elsewhere; in *De sera num.* 550C he says

²²⁸ Cf. E.K. Borthwick, "Bee imagery in Plutarch", *CQ* 41 (1991) 560-562.

²²⁹ For the twofold image of the legislator as a physician and a bee-keeper cf. the dialogue between Socrates and Adeimantus in *Pl., Rep.* 564b9-c4: Τούτω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταράττετον ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένω, οἷον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ὦ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἦττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργὸν πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα σὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον. Here, there is a twofold metaphor of the legislator: the state-physician must restrain the lazy spenders and paupers from the body politic, just as the physician must cure the dominance of the phlegm and bile over the other humours to the body of the patient, or just as the bee-master keeps the drones out of the hive.

²³⁰ Cf. *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 8.5: ὁρῶν δὲ τὴν μὲν πόλιν πολλακίς στασιάζουσας, τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν ἐνίους διὰ τὴν ῥαθυμίαν [ἀγα]πῶντας τὸ αὐτόματον, νόμον ἔθηκεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἴδιον, ὃς ἂν στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως μ[ῆ] θῆται τὰ ὅπλα μηδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. This passage from *Ath. Pol.* is quoted by Aul. Gel., *Noct. Att.* 2.12.1: Considerata perpensaque lex quaedam Solonis speciem habens primorem iniquae iniustaeque legis, sed ad usum et emolumentum salubritatis penitus reperta. *In legibus Solonis illis antiquissimis, quae Athenis axibus lignis incisae sunt quasque latas ab eo Athenienses, ut sempiternae manerent, poenis et religionibus sanxerunt, legem esse Aristoteles refert scriptam ad hanc sententiam: "Si ob discordiam dissensionemque seditio atque discessio populi in*

characteristically: παραλογώτατον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος, ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει πόλεως μηδετέρα μερίδι προσθέμενον μηδὲ συστασιάσαντα (“that of Solon is most absurd, who, when a city is in sedition, brands with attainder the person who stands neuter and adheres to neither party”). In contrast to Solon, Plutarch does not condemn the uninvolved in political matters citizens in the event of civil strife but regards that from these citizens the city will be rescued.

He even highlights the role of the uninvolved (ἀπαθές) and stolid (ἀτάραχον) part of society as promising a sort of ‘secret political medicine’. In this way, the *external manus* of the doctor shall be avoided. But he suggests this therapy only under the condition that the state can be cured of its disease and it is not condemned to a total disaster. For the cities that have succumbed to a total disaster, there is no hope to recover from their disease, except for being forced by misfortunes, namely by an external force or punishment that will make citizens prudent. When the state cannot be rescued by itself, then the politician has to be active. But, in the case of sedition, which is about to have an end, as long as the faction is not dangerous and destructive, the remedy comes not only from the calm part of society but even from the neutral. Therefore, the healthy and mild part of the body politic must have the same rights as the rest of it, coexist with it and penetrate into the diseased part by offering its admixture of sanity and soundness (ἐν τε δήμῳ στασιάσαντι μὴ δεινὴν μηδ’ ὀλέθριον στάσιν ἀλλὰ παυσομένην ποτὲ δεῖ τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι πολὺ καὶ παραμένειν καὶ συνοικεῖν). For that which conforms to the healthy part (τὸ οἰκεῖον) flows from prudent men, and then it permeates the diseased part. The value of neutral politics highlights Plutarch (824B) saying characteristically that when civil sedition arises, the statesman has to put

duas partes fiet et ob eam causam irritatis animis utrimque arma capientur pugnabiturque, tum qui in eo tempore in eoque casu civilis discordiae non alterutrae parti sese adiunxerit, sed solitarius separatusque a communi malo civitatis secesserit, is domo, patria fortunisque omnibus careto, exul extorrisque esto. (“A law of Solon, the result of careful thought and consideration, which at first sight seems unfair and unjust, but on close examination is found to be altogether helpful and salutary. Among those very early laws of Solon which were inscribed upon wooden tablets at Athens, and which, promulgated by him, the Athenians ratified by penalties and oaths, to ensure their permanence, Aristotle says that there was one to this effect: “If because of strife and disagreement civil dissension shall ensue and a division of the people into two parties, and if for that reason each side, led by their angry feelings, shall take up arms and fight, then if anyone at that time, and in such a condition of civil discord, shall not ally himself with one or the other faction, but by himself and apart shall hold aloof from the common calamity of the State, let him be deprived of his home, his country, and all his property, and be an exile and an outlaw,” tr. J.C. Rolfe).

on the buskin of Theramenes; he shall converse with both parties without discriminating in favour of one party, but sympathizing with all alike (πάσι φαίνη συναλγῶν ὁμοίως).

5.2. ἰσχύσσα-σύμμετρος κρᾶσις vs στάσις

Plutarch describes this internal cooperative struggle for the self-treatment of a polis in *stasis* in terms of bodily counterbalance and mixture (*krasis*).²³¹ He bases his argumentation on the medical metaphor of the predominant *krasis* (mixture) as a treatment for the political disease (ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι πολύ). In particular, in a body that is sick, the recovery from the illness begins with the predominance of the healthy parts over the diseased one. In so doing, the prevalent mixture drives out what is discrepant with nature (ἰσχύσσα κρᾶσις ἐκστήσει τὸ παρὰ φύσιν). Attunement with nature is associated with the balance and symmetry of the healthy body. Through inner physiological processes of mixture, the good elements will prevail and win over the harmful. Plutarch indeed in his *Quaestiones Naturales* characterizes *krasis* as balanced, symmetric, and harmless (*Quest. Natur.* 915E: σύμμετρος καὶ ἀβλαβῆς ἢ κρᾶσις). This σύμμετρος κρᾶσις constitutes a *locus communis*, the fulcrum of which is located in Alcmaeon in a famous passage which survives as a pseudepigraph in Plutarch's *Plac. Philosoph. Doxograph.* [Diels] 5.30. 911A (λ'. Περὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου καὶ γήρωτος):

Ἀλκμαίων τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ ξηροῦ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ πικροῦ γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν: τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικὴν: φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναρχία: καὶ νόσων αἰτία, ὡς μὲν ὑφ' ἧς, ὑπερβολῆς θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος: ὡς δ' ἐξ ἧς, διὰ πληθους ἢ ἔνδειαν: ὡς δ' ἐν οἷς, ἢ αἷμα ἐνδέον ἢ ἐγκεφάλου: τὴν δὲ ὑγείαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσιν.

Alcmaeon states that the maintenance of health depends upon equilibrium of the faculties, moist and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet and so on, and that the predominance of any is productive of disease: for the predominance of any single one of them is disastrous. He says that disease occurs in some instances from excess of heat or cold, in some owing to excess or deficiency and in some from fault of the blood or brain.

²³¹ For *krasis* as a model of thought in Plutarch concerning different domains, such as physics, metaphysics, ethics, politics and aesthetics see J. Boulogne, "Le paradigme de la crase dans la pensée de Plutarque", *Ploutarchos* 4 (2006/7) 3-17. Plutarch chooses the image of an integral mixing without destruction of its components parts, rather than of weaving, although more current, which looks like to a change of paradigm.

Health depends upon an evenly proportioned combination of qualities. (transl. P.S. Codellas, slightly modified)

Here are traced the first roots of medicine.²³² The concept of *krasis* appears here along with the coupled contradictory terms of cohesive *isonomia* (συνεκτικὴν ἰσονομίαν) vs corruptive *monarchy* of faculties (φθοροποιὸν μοναρχία) and *plethos* (πλῆθος) vs *deficiency* (ἔνδεια) as a cause of disease.²³³ Lloyd stresses the significance of the use of opposites in Greek speculative thought saying characteristically: “The attempt to classify, or otherwise account for, other things in terms of pairs of opposites is a feature of a great many theories and explanations which appear in various branches of early Greek philosophy and medicine, and this fact calls for some discussion or comment.”²³⁴ In this set of opposite terms, health is defined as a *symmetric krasis* of the faculties (τὴν δὲ ὑγείαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσιν). The health or well-being of the human is described by Alcmaeon as being subject to a dynamic equilibrium of the opposite powers counterbalancing each other (ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων). In particular, monarchy depicted as the predominance of one element over the others provokes corruption, and thus, disease, whereas *isonomia* guarantees the physical health, just as *isonomia* in body politic guarantees the political health.

As seen before, the concept of *isonomia* is described in Plutarch in terms of the disapproval of Solon’s law on deprivation of the political rights of the uninvolved citizens in political matters (*Praec. ger. reip.* 823F-824A). Plutarch denounces the Solonian law on *stasis* that penalized neutrality in civil strife and advocates for the political blending, the equal coexistence and the same

²³² J. Mansfeld, “The body politic: Aëtius on Alcmaeon on *isonomia* and *monarchia*”, in V. Harte & M. Lane (eds.), *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 78-95.

²³³ It is noteworthy that *isonomia* (ἰσονομία) appears in conjunction with *monarchia* (μοναρχία) and *krasis* (κρᾶσις) only in Alcmaeon. In the same context of other medical texts (e.g. Gal., *De temp.* 1.526-527 K.= 11.10-12.7 Helmreich; 1.564 K.= 34.24-35.14 Helmreich) or even in Presocratics (e.g. Pythagoras, Diog. Laert. 8. 26; Empedocles, Aët. 5. 19. 5 [= DK 31 A72]) the term of *isonomia* (ἰσονομία) is replaced by that of *isomoiria* (ἰσομοιρία). See Triebel-Schubert, “Isonomie bei Alkmaion” 41 n. 8. See also M.D. Grmek, “Il concetto di malattia”, in M.D. Grmek (ed.), *Storia del pensiero medico occidentale, Antichità e medioevo*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1993, 330 and 330 n. 18.

²³⁴ G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy, Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*, Cambridge: University Press, 1966, 26.

rights of the neutral, impassive (ἀπαθές) but healthy part of the body politic. Hence, the Plutarchan criticism against the above Solonian law could explain that *isonomia* as an archaic political term described a political stage after the *eunomia* of Solon and prior to the democracy of Cleisthenes.²³⁵

There is a controversy regarding the democratic nature of *isonomia* by Alcmaeon. According to Triebel-Schubert, who accords with Ehrenberg, the *isonomia* by Alcmaeon is more of an aristocratic than democratic concept, since it emerged as a reaction to *tyrannis*.²³⁶ On the contrary, Vlastos sees *isonomia* as a label for democracy established by the political reformation of Cleisthenes.²³⁷ In this respect Plutarch can be said that suggests a political mixture (*krasis*) (824A) analogous to that introduced by Cleisthenes' tribal organization. For all citizens would be mixed in politics and have an impact on legislation and policy-making (ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναμειχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις).²³⁸ Membership in a *deme* constituted the most important indication of Athenian citizenship since the substitution of the *deme* for the *phratry* fragmented the influence of the noble families and their leadership. Interestingly, the composition of the ten tribes and its division into three regions (τριπτύες) that Cleisthenes introduced, is defined by Plutarch as perfectly mixed (Plut., *Per.* 3.2: ὅς πολιτείαν ἄριστα κεκραμένην πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ σωτηρίαν κατέστησεν). However, this perfect democratic mixture is incompatible with the more 'aristocratic' concept of *krasis* by Alcmaeon. For the elements in Alcmaeon that are to be composed do retain their unique character and stay unmixed, as Triebel-Schubert (1984, 49) claims:

Die Krasis bei Alkmaion ist eine Verbindung mehrerer, gleichberechtigter Elemente einer Gruppe, ohne daß damit deren Mischung (Vermischung) verbunden wäre. Im Gegenteil, die Krasis des Alkmaion setzt

²³⁵ See G.J.D. Aalders, *Die Theorie der gemischten Verfassung im Altertum*, Amsterdam: Verlag A. M. Hakkert, 1968, 7-27 (ch.2 "Der Ursprung der Theorie der gemischten Verfassung", especially 21).

²³⁶ For disuse under the tyranny had brought about an eclipse of Solon's laws and had made Cleisthenes enact new legislation in his attempt to gain the favour of the masses. See C. Triebel-Schubert, "Der Begriff der Isonomie bei Alkmaion", *Klio* 66.1 (1984) 47; V. Ehrenberg, "Origins of Democracy", *Historia* 1 (1950) 515-548.

²³⁷ See G. Vlastos, "Isonomia", *AJP* 74.4 (1953) 363: "Isonomia in Alcmaeon manifests closer affinities with democracy than with any other form of government".

²³⁸ Cf. Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 21. 2: πρῶτον μὲν συνέειμε πάντας εἰς δέκα φυλάς ἀντὶ τῶν τεττάρων, ἀναμειῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως μετάσχωσι πλείους τῆς πολιτείας; and 21.3-4: ἦσαν γὰρ ἐκ δ' φυλῶν δώδεκα τριπτύες, ὥστ' οὐ [συν]έπιπτεν <ἂν> ἀναμίγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος. Cf. also Arist., *Pol.* 1319b 25: καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναμειχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις.

voraus, daß die jeweiligen beteiligten Elemente in ihrem eigenen Charakter erhalten bleiben. Der Unterschied zu dem neuen Prinzip einer echten Vermischung, das der Kleisthenischen Reform zugrunde lag und den demokratischen Isonomie-Begriff prägte, ist deutlich.

Hence, the question posed is the following: how should one interpret Cleisthenes' concept of *isonomia* as a proportional mixture of rights, which must be concrete, and not confused with one another, given that Alcmaeon's *krasis*, differently from Cleisthenes, refers to the unmixed state of the qualities, as Triebel-Schubert explains? But in the field of medicine, the elements in the mixture (κρᾶσις) act and are acted upon each other. The same problem of divergence between the constitution of elements and the concept of *krasis* appears out of the realm of politics, in the medical tradition and particularly in the reception of the Hippocratic theory on *krasis* by Galen. In medical terms, the question can be rephrased, as follows: how should one interpret Galen's concept of *krasis* as a proportional mixture of qualities, which must not be confused with one another, given that, Galen's *krasis*, differently from the Hippocratic notion, refers to the state of the primary elements within the mixture?

5.3. Hippocrates on κρᾶσις

The Hippocratic author of the treatise *On the nature of man* introduces a theory of mixture of the four humours and not of the four elements at all; he refers to the elements by the names of their qualities. In so doing, he does not denote the quality, nor the body dominated by the qualities. Rather, he means the body that maintains the qualities, or the substances in extremity, in which the qualities reside. Hence, hot is not the quality, nor the body by dominance of the quality, but the body that possesses extreme heat. According to his theory, good health is defined as balance and mixture of the humours: phlegm, blood, yellow bile, and black bile, whilst their imbalance and separation is the cause of disease.²³⁹ Not only the body, from which the element is separated,

²³⁹ This theory is presented with variations in the following four Hippocratic works: a) Hipp., *De nat. hom.* 4.1-3 L.= *CMG* 1.1.3.172.13-15 Jouanna: phlegm (moist and cold), blood (moist and hot), yellow bile (dry and hot), black bile (dry and cold): Τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν ἑωυτῷ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν τε καὶ μέλαιναν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτέω ἢ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγέει καὶ ὑγιαίνει. b) *De prisca med.* 14.23-28 L.= *CMG* 1.1.45.26-46.4 Heiberg: bitter, sweet; acid, astringent; salt, insipid; hot, cold etc.: Ἐνὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ

becomes imbalanced and diseased, but also the new body, in which it may be transplanted suffers from pain (*De nat. hom.* 4: 4.6-9 L.= *CMG* 1.1.3.174.3-6 Jouanna: Ανάγκη γὰρ, ὁκόταν τι τουτέων χωρισθῆ καὶ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ στῆ, οὐ μόνον τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον, ἔνθεν ἐξέστη, ἐπίνοσον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔνθα ἂν ἐπιχυθῆ, ὑπερπιμπλάμενον ὀδύνην τε καὶ πόνον παρέχειν). In other words, sickness occurs when the humours do not remain in a state of equilibrium, or one of the humours becomes excessive, or deficient in quantity.

By restoring the balance of these humours the patient regains his health. Each of these humours is assigned two primary qualities: blood is hot and moist, yellow bile is dry and hot, black bile is dry and cold, and phlegm is moist and cold. The measured mixture (κρᾶσις) of opposing qualities contribute to the health (ch. 14), and only when elements stand alone, harm arises (ch. 16.4-6: κρῆσις γὰρ καὶ μετριότης τῷ μὲν ψυχρῷ γίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, τῷ δὲ θερμῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ· ὅταν δὲ ἀποκριθεῖη χωρὶς ἐκάτερον, τότε λυπέει).²⁴⁰ This Hippocratic concept of *krasis* appears explicitly as balanced, symmetric in his *Aphorisms* (5.62.4-6: 4.554.15-556.2 L.: ὁκόσαι δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὴν κρᾶσιν ἔχουσι ζύμμετρον, αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπίτεκνοι γίνονται). The following scheme sets out the Hippocratic theory on *krasis* according to the Hippocratic treatise *On the nature of man*:

yellow bile	blood	black bile	phlegm
warm and dry	warm and wet	cold and dry	cold and wet
summer	spring	autumn	winter

ἀλμυρὸν, καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ ὄξυ, καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ πλαδαρὸν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, παντοίας δυνάμιας ἔχοντα, πλήθος τε καὶ ἰσχύν. Ταῦτα μὲν μεμιγμένα καὶ κεκρημένα ἀλλήλοισιν οὔτε φανερά ἐστιν, οὔτε λυπέει τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ τι τουτέων ἀποκριθῆ, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ γένηται, τότε καὶ φανερόν ἐστι καὶ λυπέει τὸν ἄνθρωπον. c) *De aere aquis locis* 24.1-50 L: *CMG* 1.1.76.24-78.11 Heiberg: hot, cold, dry and wet; Regarding the geographic places the qualities are freely combined: warm/dry, warm/wet, cold/dry, cold/wet. See H. Grensemann, “Das 24. Kapitel von De aeribus, aquis, locis und die Einheit der Schrift”, *Hermes* 107 (1979) 423-441. d) *De diaeta I*, 6.3.1-3 and 4.1-4 L. = *CMG* 1.2.4.126. 5-6 and 20-23 Byl.: fire (hot and dry), water (cold and moist): Ἐνίσταται μὲν οὖν τὰ ζῶα τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀπὸ δυοῖν, διαφόροι μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, συμφόροι δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν, πυρὸς λέγω καὶ ὕδατος and τῷ μὲν πυρὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν, τῷ δὲ ὕδατι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν· ἔχει δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρὸν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρὸν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν.

²⁴⁰ For the term κρᾶσις or κρῆσις in Hipp., *De prisca med.* see 5.18; 5.20; 16.4; 19.15; 19.36. Cf. also Hipp., *De aere aquis locis* 12.10.

5.4. Galen on κρᾶσις

On the contrary to the Hippocratic quadripartite system presented in *On the nature of man*, Galen both in his commentary on it, *In Hippocratis De natura hominis commentarius tertius*, and in his work *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis libri IX*, suggests a differentiated humoral quadripartite schema.²⁴¹ He relies, of course, upon the Hippocratic treatise *On the nature of man*, as if it were a cornerstone, as he characteristically says: τὸ μὲν ὅλον τὸ βιβλίον ἐκ τούτων σύγκειται, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀπάσης τῆς Ἱπποκράτους τέχνης ἔχει τὴν οἶον κρηπίδα (*In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* [prooem.] 11: 15.11.12 K.= CMG 5.9.1.8.19-20 Mewaldt). He even regarded the first eight chapters of it as authentically Hippocratic, although today the treatise is ascribed to Hippocrates' student, Polybus.

elements, qualities, humours

However, even though the Hippocratic theory on humours was his starting point, he himself did not follow it exactly. But taking this theoretical basis, he developed his own theory vesting and enriching it with empirical adequacy. Galen's theory on *krasis* is developed in his three basic works of i) *On elements according to Hippocrates* (*De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia libri II*, CMG 5.1.2 De Lacy), ii) the *Commentary on Hippocrates' Nature of Man* (*In Hippocratis De natura hominis commentaria III*, CMG 5.9.1 Mewaldt), iii) the three books of *On mixtures* (*De temperamentis libri III*, Helmreich). In particular, he systemized his theory on the axis of the four *elementary qualities* (ποιότητες): hot, cold, dry and wet (*De temp.* 1.519; 1.529-537 K.= 7.5-22; 13.5-18.22 Helmreich), their mixtures, but not the humours.²⁴² Galen's *krasis* is not representative

²⁴¹ On the history of the four humours, the work by E. Schöner, *Das viererschema in der antiken Humoralpathologie* (Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften: Beiheft 4), Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1964 remains fundamental. See also W. Schwabe, „Mischung“ und „Element“ im Griechischen bis Platon, Bonn: Bouvier, 1980 and M. Vegetti, “Tradition and truth. Forms of philosophical-scientific historiography in Galen's *De Placitis*”, in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 1999a, 333-358.

²⁴² See J. Jouanna, “Galen's reading of the Hippocratic text *The nature of Man*. The foundation of Hippocratism”, in J. Jouanna (ed.) *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen. Selected Papers. Translated by Neil Allies. Edited with a Preface by Philip van der Eijk*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012, 339: “However, even when he envisages the mixtures

of a mixture of humours, but of a proportional mixture of qualities, which are not confused with one another.

Furthermore, he defines nature as “the whole substance and the mixture out of the primary elements, hot, cold, dry and wet” (*De temp.* 3.675.4-6 K.= 104.1-3 Helmreich: φύσιν δ’ ὅταν εἶπω, τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν τε καὶ κρᾶσιν λέγω τὴν ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ).²⁴³ The humours are in his system, in the vein of the Hippocratic one, also coupled with two *elementary qualities* = primary elements: i.d. yellow bile is hot and dry, black bile dry and cold, blood moist and hot, phlegm moist and cold (*De morb. causis* 7.21-2 K.). The humours may be assimilated to the primary elements (*De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 8.4.20-21: 5.676.7-16 K.= *CMG* 5.4.1.2.502.16-25 De Lacy), but -differently from the Hippocratic view- they do not contain the primary qualities to the extreme degree (*De temp.* 1.510.8-9 K.= 1.16-17 Helmreich: οὐδὲ γὰρ δύνασθαι ζῶον οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἄκρως θερμὸν ὑπάρχειν ὡς πῦρ οὔτ’ ἄκρως ὑγρὸν ὡς ὕδωρ) and in that differ from the primary elements.

Galen provides the interrelations between primary elements, humours, and the perceptible elements, as follows (*De elem. ex Hipp. sent.* 1.479.9-480.6 K.: 8.11-13 Helmreich: *CMG* 5.1.2.126.1-12 De Lacy). The human being consists of the primary and simplest visible elements called homoeomerous (e.g. fiber, membrane, flesh, etc.); these are characterized by uniformity (ὅν τὰ μόρια τῆς αὐτῆς ἀλλήλοις ιδέας ἐστὶ σύμπαντα). Moreover, these homoeomerous parts have been generated from the humours (blood, phlegm, yellow and black bile) which Galen characterizes as “other elements closest to themselves” (ἐκ τινῶν ἐτέρων προσεχῶν ἑαυτοῖς

from the perspective of the humours, he does not speak of four mixtures caused by the predominance of the four humours. Significantly, melancholic mixtures are not attributed to the predominance of innate black bile, but rather result from the combustion of the blood. See *De temp.* 2.641.8 K.= 83.4 Helmreich.: γίνονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ μελαγχολικαὶ κράσεις ἐκ συγκαύσεως αἵματος: “melancholic temperaments result from a combustion of the blood.” It is noteworthy that Galen’s treatise *De temp.* was influenced more by the Alexandrian canon than by Hippocrates’ *De nat. hom.* Cf. also *De arte* 8: 295.4– 299.4 Boudon = 1.326.9–329.10 K., where physical or intellectual differences are regarded to stem from the elemental qualities (in particular of the brain), and not from the humours.

²⁴³ V. Boudon-Millot, “La notion de mélange dans la pensée médicale de Galien: mixis ou crisis?”, *REG* 124 (2011) 262. For the twofold interpretation of this equivalence of φύσις with οὐσία and κρᾶσις as essence and as natural condition see P. van der Eijk, “Galen on the nature of human beings”, in P. Adamson, R. Hansberger, J. Wilberding (ed.), *Philosophical themes in Galen*, London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2014, 89–90.

στοιχείων). The generation of these elements comes from things the human eats or drinks, which in turn come from air and fire, water and earth. The last ones are the least parts of all the rest and are not composed of other bodies, but of matter and qualities (ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἐτέρων σωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὕλης τε καὶ ποιοτήτων ἐστὶ) and that is why these are considered the simple and primary elements (primary elements → humours = elements → homoeomerous). In this respect, Kovačić (*Der Begriff der Physis* [Die immanente Physis in Galens Physiologie] 2001, 98) puts the humours at an intermediate stage between the elements and the ὁμοιομερῆ, the perceptible elements (αἰσθητὰ στοιχεῖα):

στοιχεῖα → χυμοί → ὁμοιομερῆ

Mit der Lehre von den vier Säften, die wiederum als Elemente, d.h. „Bausteine“, für die Homöomeren gelten, als betonte Zwischenstufe folgt Galen den Hippokratikern. Diese behandeln die vier Säfte wie vier Elemente, indem sie dieselben in Beziehung zu den vier Grundqualitäten stellen.

In this Galenic vein of hierarchies, appears also the mixture and its kin term of balanced *krasis* in the first book of Galen's *De temperamentis*. Galen incorporates the balanced mixture (σύμμετρος κρᾶσις) in his system of nine mixtures.²⁴⁴ In particular, this symmetric *krasis* is well-tempered (εὐκρατος), evenly balanced followed by eight types of *dyskrasia*, in which one quality or a particular combination of qualities predominate over the others. In contrast to the archaic notion of Hippocratic κρῆσις, which implies an inherent “good mixture”, Galen's κρᾶσις is

²⁴⁴ Gal., *De temp.* 2.572.1-8 K.= 40.1-8 Helmreich: Ὅτι μὲν δὴ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων ἐστὶν ὑγρὸν τε σῶμα καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν, ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου λόγῳ διήρηται. δέδεικται δὲ καί, ὡς ἐννέα διαφοραὶ τῶν κρᾶσεων εἰσι, μία μὲν ἢ σύμμετρος τε καὶ εὐκρατος, αἱ λοιπαὶ δὲ πᾶσαι δύσκρατοι, τέτταρες μὲν ἀπλαῖ, μιᾶς ἐν ἐκάστη πλεονεκτητοῦσης ποιότητος ἥτοι θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος ἢ ξηρότητος ἢ ὑγρότητος, ἕτεραι δὲ τέτταρες, ἐπειδὴν ἐξ ἐκατέρας ἀντιθέσεως ἢ ἐτέρα κρατήση δύναμις. Cf. Gal., *De temp.* 1.559.4-8 K.= 31.28-32.4 Helmreich: ἐννέα τὰς πάσας εἶναι τῶν κρᾶσεων διαφοράς, εὐκρατον μὲν μίαν, οὐκ εὐκράτους δὲ τὰς ὀκτώ, τέτταρες μὲν ἀπλαῖς, ὑγρὰν καὶ ξηρὰν καὶ ψυχρὰν καὶ θερμὴν, ἄλλας δὲ τέτταρας συνθέτους, ὑγρὰν ἅμα καὶ θερμὴν καὶ ξηρὰν ἅμα καὶ θερμὴν καὶ ψυχρὰν ἅμα καὶ ὑγρὰν καὶ ψυχρὰν ἅμα καὶ ξηρὰν. Cf. also Steph., *in Gal. Ad Glauc.* 6: 40.16-17 Dickson: Τῶν κρᾶσεων, δύο εἰσι διαφοραί: τέσσαρες μὲν ἀπλαῖ, θερμὴ ψυχρὰ ὑγρὰ ξηρὰ: τέσσαρες σύνθετοι, θερμὴ καὶ ὑγρὰ, θερμὴ καὶ ξηρὰ, ψυχρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ, ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ. καὶ ἡ εὐκρατος. See A.M. Ieraci Bio, “Dihairesis relative all' ars medica di Galeno nel. Neap. Orat. CF 2.1-1 (olim XXII-1)” *Galenos Rivista di Filologia dei Testi Medici Antichi* (1) (2007) Pisa; Roma: Fabrizio Serra, 157-160; P. van der Eijk and P. N. Singer (eds.), *Galen: Works on Human Nature. Mixtures (De Temperamentis)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

representative of any relative equilibrium formed by the constituents. In this sense, the Hippocratic κρῆσις conceived as a good and healthy mixture is presented by Galen as a composite, i.e. εὐκρασία, which is distinguished from the rest eight types of mixtures called δυσκρασίαι. In accord with his notion of εὐκρασία, Galen affirms that the Hippocratic author of *On Nature of Man* had already recognized two symmetries: one according to πλῆθος and one according to δύναμις, and he re-interprets the Hippocratic words as referring to ποσὸν τῆς οὐσίας and δύναμις τῶν κεραυνυμένων (*In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* 1.20: 15.1.60.4-61.3 K.= *CMG* 5.9.1.33.1-13 Mewaldt).²⁴⁵

[*CMG* 1.1.3.172.15-174.2 Jouanna] Ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὅταν μετρίως ἔχη ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ μάλιστα, ἢν μεμιγμένα ἦ.

Κατὰ πάντας ἰατρούς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους τοὺς τελείους δογματικοὺς ἢ συμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων ὑγίαν ἐργάζεται. διττῆς δ' οὐσης τῷ γένει τῆς ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς αἰρέσεσι στοιχειώσεως, ἢ μὲν ἕτερα κατὰ παράθεσιν τε καὶ περιπλοκὴν τῶν πρώτων σωμάτων τὰς γενέσεις τῶν συνθέτων γενέσθαι φησίν, ἢ δὲ ἕτερα κατὰ κρᾶσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν προτέρα τὴν συμμετρίαν ἐν τῇ ποροποιίᾳ τίθεται, ἢ δὲ ἕτερα κατὰ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν στοιχείων ὑγιαίνειν ἡμᾶς φησιν, ἧς δηλονότι δόξης ὁ Ἴπποκράτης ἐστὶν ἡγεμών. οὐσης δὲ διττῆς συμμετρίας, τῆς μὲν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τῶν κεραυνυμένων, τῆς δὲ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τῆς οὐσίας, ἑκατέρας ἐμνημόνευσεν ὁ Ἴπποκράτης εἰπὼν· τῆς τε δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ πλήθους.

So, it is particularly healthy when these things (sc. the four humours) maintain a balance of their power and their quantity in relation to one another, and in particular when they are mixed together.

According to all perfect dogmatic doctors and philosophers, it is the proportionality of the elements that creates health. But element-theory takes two different forms among the rationalist schools; the one says that the generation of composite bodies comes to be as a result of the juxtaposition and interweaving of the primary bodies, the other as a result of their mixture. The former account locates the proper proportion in the creation of the pores, while the latter doctrine, of which Hippocrates was evidently the pioneer, asserts that we are healthy in relation to the proper blending of the elements. Since proportionality takes two forms, one consisting in the power of the things mixed, the other in the quantity of their substance, Hippocrates mentioned both when he said “of their power and their quantity”. (Trans. Hankinson)

²⁴⁵ J. Jouanna, “The Legacy of the Hippocratic treatise *The Nature of Man*: the theory of the four humours,” in Jouanna J. (ed.) *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen. Selected Papers*. Translated by Neil Allie. Edited with a Preface by Philip van der Eijk, Leiden/Boston: Brill 2012, 335-360.

In the passage above, Galen poses two different theories concerning the proper proportional mixture of the four elements and their contribution to the generation of the composite bodies. These two opposite directions of the *Elementenlehre* among the rationalist schools (Democritus) consisted, on the one hand, of the mere juxtaposition of the primary elements and, on the other hand, of the blending of the elements. This dualism is extended to the proportionality which in turn, takes two forms; following the quality, and the power of the mixed, respectively.²⁴⁶

Atomists

Galen on Hippocrates

κατὰ παράθεσιν τε καὶ περιπλοκὴν τῶν πρώτων σωμάτων

κατὰ κρᾶσιν

τὴν συμμετρίαν ἐν τῇ ποροποιίᾳ

κατὰ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν στοιχείων ὑγιαίνειν

τῆς δὲ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τῆς οὐσίας

τῆς μὲν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τῶν κεραννυμένων

5.5. Plutarch on κρᾶσις

This dualism of the *Elementenlehre* in terms of atomism and humorism is purported also by Plutarch in his treatise *Reply to Colotes in Defence of the Other Philosophers*. Plutarch constructs in a fictional manner his Epicurean opponent in order to present his own theory on the four elements as a reply to him. In doing so, he introduces the topic not for its own sake, but as part of a *reductio ad absurdum* of Epicurean theories that deny the possibility of interchange between the simple bodies. Plutarch arrives at his theory through a typically Aristotelian, dialectical discussion of the views of other, unnamed thinkers. In this fictional train of argumentation, Plutarch's opponent would advance against him the argument that Plutarch, as a follower of the Platonic philosophy, would accept the theories of Plato, Aristotle, and Xenocrates, according to which all

²⁴⁶ Cf. also Hipp., *De prisca med.* 14.1.602.9-14 L.= 45.26-46.4 Heiberg: Ἐνὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἀλμυρὸν, καὶ γλυκὸν καὶ ὀξὺν, καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ πλαδαρὸν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, παντοίας δυνάμιας ἔχοντα, πλῆθος τε καὶ ἰσχύον. Ταῦτα μὲν μεμιγμένα καὶ κεκρημένα ἀλλήλοισιν οὔτε φανερά ἐστιν, οὔτε λυπέει τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ τι τουτέων ἀποκριθῆ, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ γένηται, τότε καὶ φανερόν ἐστι καὶ λυπέει τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

beings are generated from the four simple primary elements (*Adv. Col.* 1111D).²⁴⁷ In short, Plutarch's imagery opponent could base his overturning argument on the following question: how could Plutarch reject the Epicurean atomism given that his philosophers express the same Epicurean view? By answering this question and disarming his opponent Plutarch develops his *Elementenlehre* (1111D-E):²⁴⁸

ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοις μὲν εὐθύς τε συνίασιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου γένεσιν ὥσπερ συμβολὰς μεγάλας φέρουσαι τὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ποιότητες, καὶ ὅταν συνέλθωσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συμπέσωσι ξηροῖς ὑγρὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ θερμοῖς καὶ στερεὰ μαλθακοῖς, σώματα κινούμενα παθητικῶς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ μεταβάλλοντα δι' ὄλων ἐτέραν ἀφ' ἐτέρας κράσεως συναποτίκτει γένεσιν.

But with those bodies immediately concur also the principles for the generation of every thing, bringing with them great contributions, that is, the first qualities which are in them; then, when they come to assemble and join in one the dry with the moist, the cold with the hot, and the solid with the soft,—that is active bodies with such as are fit to suffer and receive every alteration and change,—then is generation wrought by passing from one temperature to another.

²⁴⁷ It is noteworthy that Plutarch here identifies the Aristotelian theory on the four elements with that of Plato, fact that is far from true. Cf. Arist., *GC* 316a11-16: *περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἄτομα εἶναι μεγέθη οἱ μὲν φασιν ὅτι τὸ αὐτοτρίγωνον πολλὰ ἔσται, Δημόκριτος δ' ἂν φανεῖη οἰκείους καὶ φυσικοῖς λόγοις πεπεῖσθαι. Δῆλον δ' ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προιοῦσιν. Ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θεῖη σῶμά τι εἶναι καὶ μέγεθος πάντη διαιρετόν, καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν. Τί γὰρ ἔσται ὅπερ τὴν διαίρεσιν διαφεύγει;*

²⁴⁸ Cf. Ps.-Plut., *Plac. Phil.*, 17.883E (*On mixture and crisis, ιζ'.* *Περὶ μίξεως καὶ κράσεως*): *Οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι τὰς τῶν στοιχείων μίξεις κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν. Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Δημόκριτον κατὰ παράθεσιν. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δ' ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἰοῖται στοιχεῖα στοιχείων. Πλάτων τὰ μὲν τρία σώματα (οὐ γὰρ θέλει κυρίως αὐτὰ εἶναι στοιχεῖα ἢ προσονομάζειν) τρεπτὰ εἰς ἄλληλα, πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ, τὴν δὲ γῆν εἰς τι τούτων ἀμετάβλητον. Cf. also id., 885D (*On nature, λ'.* *Περὶ φύσεως*): *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φύσιν μηδὲν εἶναι, μῖξιν δὲ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ διάστασιν. γράφει γὰρ οὕτως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Φυσικῶν· «Ἄλλο δὲ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπάντων θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτιο τελευτή, ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγνόντων ἐστί, φύσις δὲ βροτοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν». Ἀναξαγόρας ὁμοίως τὴν φύσιν σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν, τουτέστι γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν. Cf. also Plut., *De prim. Frig.* 952B and 954B; *De Isid. Et Osir.* 376D; *Aqua an Ignis* 956F-957A; *De def. or.* 395D; 411A5; 432C4; 432D3· 432E2; 433E7; 435A9; 435B8; 436E3; 436F3; 437A1; *Quast. Conv.* 620E; 626D; 635D; 647C; 648D; 650E; 652A; 657C-D; 678A; 688A; 731D; 735E.**

Plutarch refutes the view of his imagery opponent pointing out that the principles propounded by Plato, Aristotle, and Xenocrates are far from the atomist's first principles. The reason lies to the fact that the first elements or first principles (αἱ ἀρχαὶ) have *qualities* (they are dry, wet, hot, cold, solid, soft), are affected by each other (σώματα κινούμενα παθητικῶς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων) and are subject to a complete change (1111D-E). For the genesis to take place, these entities have to be *thoroughly* (δι' ὅλων) mixed.²⁴⁹ Plutarch rejects the role of the four elements of fire, water, air and earth in the generation of physical beings. By this way, he expresses his objection to the atomism, whether Democritean or Epicurean, as unchangeable atoms are devoid of any quality and destitute of every generative faculty (1111E: ἡ δ' ἄτομος αὐτὴ τε καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἔρημος ἐστὶ καὶ γυμνὴ πάσης γονίμου δυνάμεως). Even when they are joined with the others, they can generate only a noise because of their hardness and firmness, but nothing else. The primary entities postulated by atomists are incapable of generating compound beings, given that they lack qualities. In this way, Plutarch alludes to Aristotle's critique of perceptible generation according to Presocratics given also as *reductio ad absurdum* in the Aristotelian treatise *De generatione et Corruptione A*. The presentation of the theory of humours by Plutarch may be more of a descriptive and not a scientific art. But this does not overshadow the portrait of *Plutarchus Aristotelicus* that ensures the bridging to *Galenus Aristotelicus* and justifies the convergence of their views.

²⁴⁹ Cf. Plut., *De def. or.* 427D: γίγνεται τοίνυν ἀέρος μὲν ἐν στοιχεῖον ἐκ δυεῖν πυρὸς <σωμάτων> συγκραθέντων καὶ συστάτων, τὸ δ' ἀέρος αὖ κερματιζόμενον εἰς δύο πυρὸς διακρίνεται σώματα, συνθλιβόμενον δ' αὖθις αὐτῷ καὶ συμπύπτον εἰς ὕδατος ἰδέαν ἄπεισιν. ὥστε πανταχοῦ τὸ προϋφιστάμενον ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐπόρως παρέχειν τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τῆς μεταβολῆς.

5.6. Plutarchus Aristotelicus and Galenus Aristotelicus on δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις

Furthermore, Plutarch's priority to the elementary qualities rather than to the elements can be said that resonates with Aristotle, whereas the term of total mixture foreshadows Galen's theory on mixture. The elements are affected by each other, go through complete changes and result in a new generation after being mixed (1111E: σώματα κινούμενα παθητικῶς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ μεταβάλλοντα δι' ὅλων ἑτέραν ἀφ' ἑτέρας κράσεως συναποτίκτει γένεσιν).

Plutarch's reference to *krasis* here and his point about the interaction and eventually complete mixture of the combining elements thanks to their qualities alludes to the Aristotelian theory on *mixis* in *GC* 326a 11-b 6.²⁵⁰ Moreover, this process of complete blending is given also by Galen in terms of δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις, which describes the complete mixture of the components that produce a *pharmakon*.²⁵¹

Aristotle refers to *elements* in order to denote not the primary bodies, i.e. earth water, fire, air but the four basic qualities, the hot and the cold the wet and the dry. Aristotle defines elements as qualities that stem not from an equilibrium of opposed qualities, but from a new combination of qualities which are being replaced by each other. The elements that act upon and are being acted upon by one another are the single basic qualities, not the different simple bodies (329b 22-4; 329a 34; 329b 11 and passim). The outcome of this exchange of qualities is a simple body which is itself mixed, a compound of a kind (μικτόν). Namely, fire may be a simple body, but it is hot and dry, whereas the air is hot and moist. Hence, Aristotle gives priority to the qualities rather than to form, a principle that Galen was about to develop over the Hippocratic mixture.

²⁵⁰ For a modern discussion of Aristotle's theory see D. Frede, "On generation and Corruption I.10: On mixture and mixables", in F. de Haas & J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Book I, Symposium Aristotelicum*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2004, 289-314 and J.M. Cooper, "A note on Aristotle on Mixture" in *op. cit.*, 315-326. See also G. Cambiano, "Pathologie et analogie politique", in F. Lasserre & P. Mudry (eds.), *Formes de pensée dans la Collection Hippocratique. Actes du IVe colloque international hippocratique*, Lausanne 21-26 Septembre 1981, Genève: Droz, 1983, 441-458.

²⁵¹ Cf. *De elem. sec. Hipp. CMG* 5.1.2.138.11-14 De Lacy.

The Aristotelian view on qualities and their equilibrium as a prerequisite for health is adopted both by Galen and Plutarch.²⁵² Plutarch admits that health is maintained not by the removal of heat and cold, but by the proportionately quantitative admixture of the two opposite qualities (*De virtute morali* 451F: ἐν δὲ σώμασιν ἰατρικὴ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ φθορᾶ θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας καὶ ποσότησι κραθεισῶν ἀπεργάζεται). Plutarch's *Elementenlehre* discussed also in his treatise *De primo Frigido* states that the qualities correspond to the first four elements or first principles (fire, water, air, and earth) and act or being acted upon each other. Here, Plutarch reflects again the Aristotelian theory of the elements acting and being affected; the primary, simple qualities, i.e. warmth and cold, dryness and moisture, cause by their nature all the elements to act and be acted upon (*De prim. Frig.* 947E): τίνες οὖν εἰσιν αὗται πλὴν θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ ξηρότης καὶ ὑγρότης, αἷς τὰ στοιχεῖα πάσχειν ἅπαντα καὶ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν; (“And what should these be but warmth and cold, dryness and moisture, which by their very nature cause all the elements to act and be acted upon?”, transl.W. Helmbold)

5.6.1. The Aristotelian schema on μίξις, κρᾶσις, and σύνθεσις

Both views of Plutarch and Galen seem to be built upon the Aristotelian schema on μίξις and κρᾶσις. Both terms refer to complete combination through and through when perception fails to discriminate the constituents one from another. In mixture (μίξις /κρᾶσις) the compound must be uniform in texture throughout and any part of this compound must be the same as the whole, just as any part of the water is water: τὸ μιχθὲν ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι. On the contrary, σύνθεσις is a mere juxtaposition or combination of differentiated parts, e.g. the mixture of grains of wheat and

²⁵² Gal., *In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* 15.60.7-8 K.: Κατὰ πάντας ἰατροὺς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους τοὺς τελείους δογματικούς ἢ συμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων ὑγίαν ἐργάζεται. Cf. Arist., *GC* 328a 18-28: Ἔστι δὴ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ποιητικὰ τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τούτων παθητικὰ. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀντιστρέφει, ὅσων ἢ αὐτὴ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀλλήλων καὶ παθητικὰ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· τὰ δὲ ποιεῖ ἀπαθῆ ὄντα, ὅσων μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ὕλη. Τούτων μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι μίξις· διὸ οὐδ' ἢ ἰατρικὴ ποιεῖ ὑγίαν οὐδ' ἢ ὑγίεια μίγνυμένη τοῖς σώμασιν. Τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν καὶ παθητικῶν ὅσα εὐδιαίρετα, πολλὰ μὲν ὀλίγοις καὶ μεγάλα μικροῖς συντιθέμενα οὐ ποιεῖ μίξιν, ἀλλ' αὔξησιν τοῦ κρατοῦντος· μεταβάλλει γὰρ θάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν, οἷον σταλαγμὸς οἴνου μυρίοις χροῦσιν ὕδατος οὐ μίγνυται· λύεται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ πᾶν ὕδωρ.

barley).²⁵³ Since the constituents are preserved in small particles, one must speak of them as composed and not combined. The reason is that they result from composition and every portion of the resultant does not manifest the same ratio between its constituents as the whole. Aristotle refers to this type of mixture as σύνθεσις even though he recognizes that it is sometimes less technically referred to as μίξις (*GC* 328a 2). This is the type of mixis which Joachim propounds as “mechanical mixture” and contrasts to “chemical combination” which gives rise to a uniform tertiary product.²⁵⁴ Flesh originates from fire and earth but is identical with neither (334b 5). There has to be some sort of chemical combination taking part through which the separate constituents interact with each other, shed their peculiar properties, and transform into a uniform new being with properties of its own. But this sort of combination can only happen if the primary entities have certain qualities contrary to each other and can thus act upon each other and are susceptible to change.

5.6.2 The paradigm of *τετραφάρμακον*

It is noteworthy that Aristotle is an authority on his own in Galen’s work on mixtures, *De temperamentis libri III*. Following Aristotle, Galen draws also a distinction between real mixture (μίξις) and a mere juxtaposition of constituents (σύνθεσις). In the real mixture exemplified by Galen through the image of the *tetrapharmakon*, the final product acquires new qualitative determinations in comparison to the original ingredients of the mixture (*De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia libri II*, 3.8: 1.428.6 K.=*CMG* 5.1.2.70.18 De Lacy: μηδὲν αὐτῶν ὀλόκληρον καὶ παντελὲς ἐν αὐτῇ [τετραφαρμάκῳ] περιεχόμενον φαίνεται). In the composition, contrarily, the

²⁵³ Arist., *GC* 327b 33-328a 12: Ὅταν γὰρ οὕτως εἰς μικρὰ διαιρεθῇ τὰ μιγνύμενα, καὶ τεθῇ παρ’ ἄλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὥστε μὴ δῆλον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, τότε μέμικται ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὥστε ὅτιοῦν εἶναι μόριον τῶν μιχθέντων; λέγεται μὲν οὖν ἐκείως, οἷον κριθᾶς μεμίχθαι πυροῖς, ὅταν ἠτισοῦν παρ’ ὄντινοῦν τεθῇ. Εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ πᾶν σῶμα διαιρετόν, εἴπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα σώματι μικτὸν ὁμοιομερές, ὅτιοῦν ἂν δύο μέρη γίνεσθαι παρ’ ὅτιοῦν. Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς τὰλάχιστα διαιρεθῆναι, <οὐδὲ> σύνθεσις ταῦτόν καὶ μίξις ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, δῆλον ὡς οὔτε κατὰ μικρὰ σωζόμενα δεῖ τὰ μιγνύμενα φάναι μεμίχθαι. Σύνθεσις γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐ κρᾶσις οὐδὲ μίξις, οὐδ’ ἔξει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μόριον. Φαμὲν δ’, εἴπερ δεῖ μεμίχθαι τι, τὸ μιχθὲν ὁμοιομερές εἶναι, καὶ ὥσπερ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ μέρος ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ κραθέντος. Ἄν δ’ ἢ κατὰ μικρὰ σύνθεσις ἢ μίξις, οὐθὲν συμβήσεται τούτων, ἀλλὰ μόνον μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν.

²⁵⁴ See H.H. Joachim, “Aristotle’s Conception of Chemical Combination”, *JPh* 29 (1904) 72-86, who regards krasis as a species of mixis, but often uses both terms interchangeably.

ingredients preserve their original composition unaltered.²⁵⁵ Thus, stones, bricks, or planks remain inalterable as they were before the construction of the house. Galen's theory of mixture draws on the above Aristotelian theory but it is also influenced by Stoic theories of mixture, as Galen himself alludes explicitly to them in *In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* 1.6: 15.1.37.3-9 K.= *CMG* 5.9.1.21.15-18 Mewaldt: γενήσεται γὰρ ἢ ἐκ τούτων δόξα τὴν γένεσιν ἡμῶν ἐν ποιᾷ συνθέσει τῶν αἰδίων ἐκείνων σωμάτων τιθεμένη, καθάπερ ἢ Ἴπποκράτους ἐν τῇ κράσει τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, ἢν Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ προσήκοντο,²⁵⁶

Similar to Galen, Plutarch absolutely shares the opinion of Aristotle and the Stoics on the distinction between mixture and composition.²⁵⁷ In his *Precepts of marriage* he presents the following typology of three mixtures ascribing it to the Stoicists (*Conjug. Praec.* 142E-F):

- a. composition by juxtaposition, where the components remain disjoint and separate, like a fleet or an army (διεστῶτα)
- b. conjunction by mutual admixture, where the components joined together constitute a broader unity without losing their coherence, like a house or a ship (συναπτόμενα), and
- c. integral or total mixtures (ἡνωμένα καὶ συμφυῆ), where the components are transformed and merged into a new intimate union after combination and coalescence, as is the case with every living creature.

It is for this third kind of mixture that Plutarch reserves the notion of *krasis*. In particular, the latter sort of mixture accords with the stoic notion of δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις, as Plutarch himself a few lines after implies (δεῖ δέ, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν λέγουσι δι' ὅλων γενέσθαι τὴν κρᾶσιν). As the mixing of liquids, extends throughout their entire content, so also in the case of married people there ought to be a mutual amalgamation of their bodies, property, friends, and relations.

²⁵⁵ See P. Moraux, "Galien comme philosophe: la philosophie de la nature," in Nutton V. (ed.), *Galen: Problems and Prospects. A collection of papers submitted at the 1979 Cambridge conference*, London: Wellcome Institute, 1981, 87-116; id., *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias-Zweiter Band: Der Aristotelismus im I und II Jh.n.Chr. (Vol. II)*, Berlin/New York: Walter Gruyter, 1984, 304-305.

²⁵⁶ Cf. *CMG* 5.9.1.27.20-27 and 33.4-13 Mewaldt.

²⁵⁷ See R.B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Stoic Physics. A study of the De mixtione, with preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary*, Leiden, 1976.

5.6.3. *Body going through body*: The Stoic ἀντιπαρέκτασις

The term ‘ὄλων δι’ ὄλων κρᾶσις’ represents a total mixture and was established by Zeno in his Stoic school of philosophy, referring to the four primary elements (fire, air, water, and earth) as thoroughly mixed with one another through mutual coextension (ἀντιπαρέκτασις). This theory was adopted by the third head of the Stoic school, Chrysippus.²⁵⁸ The Stoics’ doctrine on mixture became famous for its principle of coextension and the blending of the whole (ὄλων δι’ ὄλων κρᾶσις). In exploring the confusion of tongues from *Gen.* 11:1-9, Philon asks about what things resemble confusion. By answering this question he draws a threefold distinction between a. mixture concerning the dry materials (μῖξις), b. krasis concerning the liquids (κρᾶσις) and c. σύγχυσις.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁸ Cf. *SVF* I 102 (= *Stob. Ecl.* I 17.3 152.19 Wachsmuth = *Ar. Did. fr.* 38) “On mixture and blending” (*Περὶ μίξεως καὶ κράσεως*): Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην δὲ δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὄλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι’ ἀέρος γένηται, τὸ μὲν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀμιζομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι, λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτεσθαι, τὴν δὲ μῖξιν [μ. secl. von Arnim; μ. Diels] κρᾶσιν γίνεσθαι τῇ εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν στοιχείων μεταβολῇ σώματος ὄλου δι’ ὄλου τινὸς ἐτέρου διερχομένου.

²⁵⁹ Phil., *De confus. ling.* 184-188: τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ συγχύσει πράγματα ὅμοια; ἡ μῖξις, ὥσπερ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ κρᾶσις· ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν μῖξις ἐν ξηραῖς, ἡ δὲ κρᾶσις ἐν ὑγραῖς οὐσίαις δοκιμάζεται. μῖξις μὲν οὖν σωμάτων διαφερόντων ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ παράθεσις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις σωρὸν ποιήσειε κριθᾶς καὶ πυροῦς καὶ ὀρόβους καὶ ἄλλ’ ἅττα εἶδη τῶν σπαρτῶν εἰς ταῦτ’ εἰσενεγκών, κρᾶσις δ’ οὐ παράθεσις, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνομοίων μερῶν εἰς ἄλληλα εἰσδυομένων δι’ ὄλων ἀντιπαρέκτασις, ἔτι δυναμένων ἐπιτεχνήσει τινὶ διακρίνεσθαι τῶν ποιότητων, ὡς ἐπὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατός φασὶ γίνεσθαι· συνελθούσας μὲν γὰρ τὰς οὐσίας ἀποτελεῖν κρᾶσιν, τὸ δὲ κραθὲν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀναπλοῦσθαι πάλιν εἰς τὰς ἐξ ὧν ἀπετελέσθη ποιότητας· σπόγγῳ γὰρ ἡλαιωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι, τὸν δ’ οἶνον ὑπολείπεσθαι· μήποτε ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ὕδατος ἡ σπογγίᾳς γένεσις ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν οἰκείον, ὕδωρ, πέφυκεν ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι πρὸς αὐτῆς ἐκ τοῦ κράματος, τὸ δ’ ἀλλότριον ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὁ οἶνος. σύγχυσις δὲ ἐστὶ φθορὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιότητων πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἀντιπαρεκτεινομένων εἰς διαφορῶσεως μιᾶς γένεσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν ἰατρικῇ τετραφαρμάκου συντέτευχε· κηρὸς γὰρ καὶ στέαρ καὶ πίττα ῥητίνη τε, οἶμαι, συνελθόντα ταύτην ἀποτελεῖ, συντεθείσης δὲ ἀμήχανον ἔτι τὰς ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη διακριθῆναι δυνάμεις, ἀλλ’ ἐκάστη μὲν αὐτῶν ἠφάνισται, πασῶν δ’ ἡ φθορὰ μίαν ἐξάιρετον ἄλλην ἐγέννησε δύναμιν. See also *Stob., Eclog.* I 153.24 W., where the above passage from Philon’s *De confusione linguarum* is cited. However, Stobaeus presents a fourfold schema of mixtures: παράθεσις (in accordance with the Aristotelian composition, σύνθεσις), μῖξις, κρᾶσις and σύγχυσις.

a. Mixture (μίξις) is the uneven juxtaposition of different bodies (μίξις μὲν οὖν σωμάτων διαφερόντων ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ παράθεσις), such as we find in a measure of grain in which beans, vetch, and grains are mixed.

b. By contrast, *krasis* is a complete coextension of bodies in a liquid solution (ἀντιπαρέκτασις); the dissimilar parts merge into another thoroughly and get mixed with one another through mutual coextension (κράσις δ' οὐ παράθεσις, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνομοίων μερῶν εἰς ἄλληλα εἰσδυομένων δι' ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασις).

c. Confusion (σύγχυσις) resembles the modern concept of a chemical compound. Here, the two materials, mutually permeate each other, undergo a change in their essence and properties and form a third material. The latter does not resemble its components, as is the case with *tetrapharmakon* (σύγχυσις δὲ ἐστὶ φθορὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιότητων πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἀντιπαρεκτεινομένων εἰς διαφερούσης μιᾶς γένεσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν ἰατρικῇ τετραφαρμάκου συντέτευχε). In a different case, one should speak instead of mixture, of σύνθεσις, which results in the alteration of mixed substances and the composition of an entirely new entity according to Chrysippus, fragment 471 (v. Arnim, *SVF* 2.151-153). Here, the extreme form of the mixture, the confusion (σύγχυσις) leads to a product of synthesis (σύνθεσις), as it is the case in pharmacopoeia. In contrast to this Stoic notion of synthesis, the Aristotelian σύνθεσις as “mechanical mixture” accords to the Stoic παράθεσις. Likewise, Galen ascribed his *tetrapharmakon* to the real mixture (*krasis*) and not to its antithetic term of σύνθεσις.

Apart from the example of *pharmakon*, the differences between Aristotle and the Stoics include the notion of the total mixture (ἀντιπαρέκτασις) as exemplified through the blending of wine and water. Whereas Aristotle thinks that a little wine in a vast quantity of water produces an increase in the water by domination, the Stoics teach that a couple of wine can be mixed with a great deal of water and is helped by the water for an extension. The *krasis*, therefore, appears as an integral mixture (δι' ὅλων), the result of which is the creation of a composite body but homeomere, i.e. similar to itself in each of its parts. According to Philon, each of the constituents of the mixture retains its integrity and can be found intact after decomposition; wine is separated from water by means of a sponge, whereas evaporation separates salt from water. Thus, for Aristotle there is a species of alteration so that the stronger overwhelms the weaker, while for the Stoics that which is little is preserved intact when it comes into contact with that which is greater.

However, Alexander of Aphrodisias in *De mixtione* (*De mixt.* 233.14-24 and 234.23-32 Bruns [= *SVF* II 735]) attempts to subvert this coextension (ἀντιπαρέκτασις) of bodies.²⁶⁰ His criticism of Chrysippus provides us with the basic principles of the latter (*De mixt.* III 216.14-34). Chrysippus developed a threefold system of mixtures. On the one hand, there are some mixtures which occur by juxtaposition, representative of the term *παράθεσις*, like the beans and wheat in conjunction. On the other hand, there is the total mixture or confusion (σύγχυσις), during which the substances of the components and their qualities are destroyed and a new body is produced, like drugs. In between of these polarities lies mixture (μῖξις) as an older equivalent form of *krasis* (κράσις) implying the coextension of bodies, the inherent properties of which remain unaltered. Alexander of Aphrodisias rejects the notion of body going through body and defends Aristotle from the Stoic attack.

The earliest criticism of the notion of total mixture can be traced back to an attack made on the Stoic theory by Arcesilaus, the head of the new Academy in Plutarch's treatise *Against The Stoics on Common Conceptions* (*De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos*) 1078A-D. Plutarch denounces Chrysippus' principle of total mixture (ἀντιπαρέκτασις) on the example of the blending of wine and sea, as follows (*De comm. not.* 1078D):

εἷς δέ τις κύαθος ἢ μία σταγὼν αὐτόθεν εἰς τὸ Αἰγαῖον ἐμπεσοῦσα πέλαγος ἢ τὸ Κρητικὸν ἐρίζεται τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τῆς Ἀτλαντικῆς θαλάσσης, οὐκ ἐπιπολῆς ψαύουσα τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἀλλὰ πάντη διὰ βάθους εἰς πλάτος ὁμοῦ καὶ μήκος ἀναγεομένη. καὶ ταῦτα προσδέχεται Χρύσιππος εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν Ζητημάτων οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος οἴνου σταλαγμὸν ἓνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν· καὶ ἵνα δὴ μὴ τοῦτο θαυμάζωμεν, εἰς ὅλον φησὶ τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμὸν· ὧν οὐκ οἶδα τί ἂν ἀτοπώτερον φανείη.

but if one glass or but one drop of wine shall fall from hence into the Aegean or Cretan Sea, it will pass into the Ocean or main Atlantic Sea, not lightly touching its superficies, but being spread quite through it in depth, breadth, and length. And this Chrysippus admits, saying immediately in his First Book of Natural Questions, that there is nothing to hinder one drop of wine from being mixed with the whole sea. And that we may not wonder at this, he says that this one drop will by mixtion extend through the whole world; than which I know not any thing that can appear more absurd.

²⁶⁰ For the attack of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Stoics but also his constructive criticism of Stoic physics see R.B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Stoic Physics. A study of the De mixtione, with preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary* (Philosophia Antiqua 38), Leiden: Brill, 1976

In the case of the mixing of materials in unequal proportions, Chrysippus believes that a drop of wine spilled into the sea and dissolved in it expands to the extreme limits of the sea. But Plutarch refutes his view as mostly absurd. The wine cannot diffuse over the entire extent of the Aegean. At this point, Plutarch seems to be again “Aristotelicus”. According to Aristotle, the mixture is the outcome of a *mutual* modification of these elementary qualities. What characterizes the mixture is the moderation of two extremes that continue to coexist potentially in the mixture. The mixture destroys not the compound but the extremity of the contraries (*GC* 334b 11-12).

But why, therefore, does Plutarch make use of the expression of δι’ ὅλων κρᾶσις, that belongs typically to the Stoic terminology? Boulogne says that the answer lays in the fact that Plutarch finds in this formula a meaning of total mixture, which is in its base Platonic.²⁶¹ Plato in *Timaeus* 34c–36d describes the creation of the cosmic soul in terms of the question of how the creator shapes the essence of the soul from a mixture of pairs: a. of the indivisible and the divisible and, b. of the same and the other. The puzzle of how can seemingly unmixable things be mixed together leaves *Timaeus* unanswered.²⁶² However, it is not only the Platonic background that could justify Plutarch’s option for the use of the term ‘total mixture’ (δι’ ὅλων κρᾶσις). Galen, himself, made use of this Stoic formula, although he did not agree with the Stoics on the coextension (antiparektasis) of bodies; rather, he suggested the proportional mixture of qualities. This fact implies that this formula was used outside of its Stoic philosophical context as a descriptive term of the blending of two different, disproportional materials.

To sum up, the Plutarchan view and typology of mixture is invested with the Stoic terminology but alludes to the Aristotelian distinction between mixture and composition, which in turn is taken over by Galen. Furthermore, the theory of balanced *krasis* coined by Alcmaeon under the influence of pre-Socratic *Elementen-und-Mischungslehre* and *Volksmedizin*, established by the Hippocratic author of *On Ancient Medicine* is developed by Plutarch and Galen in terms of the Aristotelian and Stoic *Proportionslehre*. Both Plutarch and Galen classified the middle, τὸ μέσον or τὸ σύμμετρον,

²⁶¹ J. Boulogne, “Le paradigme de la crase dans la pensée de Plutarque,” *Ploutarchos* 4 (2006/7) 5.

²⁶² Pl., *Tim.* 34c–36d: τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γινομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταυτοῦ φύσεως [αὖ πέρι] καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἐτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταυτὸν συναρμόττων βίᾳ.

an Aristotelian concept, as the perfect equilibrium point (Gleichgewichtspunkt) between the extreme qualities in relation to the whole substance (τὸ μέσον ἀπάσης οὐσίας).²⁶³

The following scheme sets out an overview of the views of the main representatives on mixture theories with respect to the constituents, mixture, and health:

	constituents	mixture	health
	ποιά, δυνάμεις, χυμοί, and στοιχεῖα	-genesis	
Alcmaeon	ποιά hot, cold; bitter, sweet; moist, dry, etc. Elements retain their character Qualities (ποιότητες) as faculties (δυνάμεις)	no mixture	ὑγεία = σύμμετρος τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσις = ἰσονομία τῶν δυναμέων φθοροποιὸς μοναρχία = νόσου ποιητική
Hippocrates	Humours (substances) : 2 qualities= elements by the name of their qualities contain the primary qualities to the extreme degree	no mixture	health = opposing elements in equilibrium
<i>On Ancient Medicine:</i>	bitter, sweet; acid, astringent; salt, insipid; hot, cold, etc.	κρῆσις = an inherent “good mixture”	imbalance and separation is the cause of disease.
<i>On Nature of Man:</i>	phlegm (moist and cold), blood (moist and hot), yellow bile (dry and hot), black bile (dry and cold)		

²⁶³ Cf. Arist., *Top.* 145b8; *Phys.* 246b5.

*On Airs, Waters,
Places:*

hot, cold, dry and wet

On Regimen I:

fire (hot and dry),
water (cold and moist)

Aristotle

priority to the qualities
elements as qualities,
the four basic
qualities, the hot and
the cold, the wet and
the dry

= contradictory,
supplementary
opposites, not the
primary bodies, i.e.
earth, water, fire, and
air

mixture = the outcome
of a mutual
modification of the
elementary qualities

= a moderation of two
extremes that continue
to coexist potentially
in the mixture

Genesis or change =
the exchange of one of
the four qualities for
another

- not from an
equilibrium of
opposed qualities
- but from a new
combination of
replaced qualities

The outcome = a
simple body itself
mixed.

οὐδ' ἡ ἰατρικὴ ποιεῖ
ὑγίαιαν οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίαια
μιγνυμένη τοῖς
σώμασιν.

Plutarch

the elements have
qualities (they are dry,
wet, hot, cold, solid,
soft)

four elements:
στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχάς,
πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ
ἀέρος καὶ γῆς.

καὶ ποιότητος εἶναι
τὰς πρώτας καὶ ἀπλᾶς
τοσαύτας

σώματα κινούμενα
παθητικῶς ὑπ'
ἀλλήλων καὶ
μεταβάλλοντα δι'
ἄλλων ἐτέραν ἀφ'
ἐτέρας κράσεως
συναποτίκτει γένεσιν.

σύμμετρος καὶ
ἀβλαβῆς ἢ κρᾶσις

health is maintained
by the proportionately
quantitative admixture
of the two opposite
qualities: ἐν δὲ
σώμασιν ἰατρικὴ τὸ
ὑγιεινὸν οὐ φθορᾶ
θερμότητος καὶ
ψυχρότητος, ἀλλὰ
συμμετρίας καὶ
ποσότησι κρᾶθεισῶν
ἀπεργάζεται.

Galen

elementary qualities
their mixtures but not
the humours

The humours=
coupled with two
elementary qualities=
primary elements

The humours do not
contain the primary
qualities to the
extreme degree

- a. στοιχεῖα
- b. → χυμοί
- c. → ὁμοιομερῆ

κρᾶσις is not
representative of a
mixture of humours
but of a proportional
mixture of qualities,
which are not
confused with one
another.

σύμμετρος κρᾶσις as
part of his theory of
nine mixtures.

κρᾶσις as constituted
by “portions” or
μοῖραι of hot/cold and
dry/wet in the
contrarities or
ἀντιθέσεις, which can
be equal (ἰσομοιρία)

ἡ συμμετρία τῶν
στοιχείων ὑγείαν
ἐργάζεται.

The kinds of mixture:

Aristotle

- a. μίξις /κρᾶσις: τὸ μιχθὲν ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι
“chemical combination” which gives rise to a uniform tertiary product.
- b. σύνθεσις is a mere juxtaposition or combination of differentiated parts, e.g. the mixture of grains of wheat and barley (“mechanical mixture”).

Plutarch

- a. διεστῶτα: composition by juxtaposition
- b. συναπτόμενα: conjunction by mutual admixture without losing their coherence
- c. ἠνωμένα καὶ συμφυῆ: integral or total mixtures, the components are transformed into a new intimate union.

Galen

- a. μίξις: a real mixture, the tetrapharmakon
- b. σύνθεσις: a mere juxtaposition of constituents

Stoics (Philon,
Chrysippus)

‘ὅλων δι’ ὅλων κρᾶσις’

- a. μίξις → the dry materials
Mixture (μίξις) is the uneven juxtaposition παράθεσις of different bodies (e.g. grains and beans).
- b. κρᾶσις → By krasis is a complete coextension of bodies in a liquid solution (ἀντιπαρέκτασις)
- c. σύγχυσις (confusion) → a chemical compound, the *tetrapharmakon*; the extreme form of the mixture, the confusion (σύγχυσις) leads to a product of synthesis (σύνθεσις), as it is the case in pharmacopoeia.

5.7. Political bodies going through political bodies: Plutarch towards a Stoic ἀντιπαρέκτασις of political bodies?

The above described Aristotelian concept of τὸ μέσον or τὸ σύμμετρον is projected as *desideratum* in Plutarch's political sphere, as well. In the passage from Plutarch's *Precepts for Statecraft* (*Praec. ger. reip.* 824A), the starting point for the above discussion on mixture, the political change in a diseased body politic should come from the impassive but healthy part of society. This will take the role of the acting ingredient that will be mixed with the diseased part, make it lose its extremeness and move towards the agent's own activity. From their mixing, which Plutarch compares to the dominant mixture in the human body, a new balanced state will arise. Aristotle puts it explicitly (*GC* 328a 29-31):

Ὅταν δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἰσάζη πως, τότε μεταβάλλει μὲν ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, οὐ γίνεται δὲ θάτερον, εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, οὐ γίνεται δὲ θάτερον, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ καὶ κοινόν.

But when the two are more or less equal in strength, then each changes from its own nature in the direction of the dominant one, though it does not become the other but something in between and common to both.

According to Aristotle, neither of the ingredients converts the other to its own condition; instead, they jointly come to an intermediate state in common, different from that of the agents themselves, as they were when the process started. Furthermore, the mixture destroys the extremity of the contraries and not the compound (334b 11-12). For nothing comes from an excess of the extreme contraries, like ice or burning fire: because of the extremity of their qualities they do not, or do not easily, enter a mixture (330b 25-30). Aristotle says that genesis or substantial change is the exchange of one of the four qualities for another and the direction that it follows is from the excessive to the deficient (326a 11-12: Τοιαῦτα δ' ὄντα μὴ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀδύνατον, οἷον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολὺ ὑπερβάλλοντος θερμοῦ τὸ ἡρέμα θερμόν). Very similarly, Plutarch speaks of the dominant mixture (ἰσχύσασα κρᾶσις).

Actually, it is the same direction (from the excessive to the deficient) that Plutarch attributes to the *political change* (μεταβολῆς ἀρχή). The more salubrious part of society will cure the diseased and deficient one and by this interaction, the change in the body politic will take place

Praec. ger. reip. 824A: οὔτε γὰρ σώματι νοσοῦντι γίγνεται μεταβολῆς ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν συννοσοῦντων μερῶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἐρρωμένοις ἰσχύσασα κρᾶσις ἐκστήσῃ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν). Plutarch himself stated that genesis or change can happen after the bodies are affected by each other and converted through a total mixture (*Adv. Col.* 1111E: σώματα κινούμενα παθητικῶς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ μεταβάλλοντα δι' ὅλων ἐτέραν ἀφ' ἐτέρας κράσεως συναποτίκτει γένεσιν). But in his political treatise, Plutarch speaks of a change through disproportional political bodies. As long as the body politic is diseased, it means that the healthy part which is that of a minority should be more active and overpower the diseased one. The question that emerges, however, concerns the extremity of the qualities of bodies to be mixed. Is the impassive part too sound or too little in proportion, like a drop of wine in the sea, to be mixed with the diseased part? The answer could be positive and it could justify the Stoic view of a total mixture (ὅλων δι' ὅλων κρᾶσις) and coextension (ἀντιπαρέκτασις) of political bodies as better adjustable in the case of the mixing of materials in unequal proportion (κρᾶσις δ' οὐ παράθεσις, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνομοίων μερῶν εἰς ἀλληλα εἰσδυομένων δι' ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασις). If Stoic theory accepted, then the composite political body would be homeomere but each of its constituents would retain its integrity. For the Stoics that which is little is not subject to alteration but preserved intact, when it mixes with that which is greater.

However, Plutarch defines the mixture to be made as dominant and by this way, he denounces the Stoic view whereas advocating for the Aristotelian one. On the example of the dominant *krasis*, his alignment with Aristotle's theory of *krasis* is undeniable. If Plutarch would not speak of a dominant *krasis*, then the Stoic coextension of bodies could be adjustable. For in a diseased society the healthy and unmixed part of it is a minority and the two extremes continue to coexist potentially in the mixture, unless the healthier part is capable of imposing his force on the diseased one. Hence, the beginning of the change presupposes that the former becomes strong and overpowers the latter, which has, indeed, lost its attunement with *physis*.

Plutarch exemplifies this opposition between the Stoic theory on mixture and the Aristotelian one on the basis of the Solonian constitution and mixture of the body politic in *Solon's Life* (18.1). With regard to the metaphor of mixture in Solonian politics, Plutarch exploits it differently in his works. In his *Precepts of Statecraft* he criticized Solon's law for deprivation of the political rights (ἀτιμία) of the uninvolved in political matters citizens in case of civil discord, i.d. for non-mixture of the neutral part in the body politic (δεῖ τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι πολὺ); but, in

Solon's Life the metaphor of mixture features his political reformation. For he mixed the common people with the nobles (*Sol.* 18.1: τὴν δ' ἄλλην μεῖξαι πολιτείαν, ἧς ὁ δῆμος οὐ μετεῖχεν) by appraising the property of the citizens and giving them share in the rest of the government. Those who enjoyed a yearly increase of five hundred measures, he placed in the first class and called them Pentakosiomedimnoi.²⁶⁴ Actually, the Solonian constitution divided citizens into four political classes defined by their assessable property and corresponding services to the Athenian State. For this purpose, he divided the population into four classes, founded on the possession of the land. a. Pentakosiomedimni, b. Hippeis, c. Zeugitae, d. Thetes. The standard unit for this assessment was one medimnos of cereals. Indeed, this medimnos of cereals can be said that describes the sort of mixture that Solon refers to (*Sol.* 13.1-3):

Αἱ δ' Ἀθηναίη τῆς Κυλωνεῖου διαπεπαυμένης ταραχῆς, καὶ μεθεστῶτων ὥσπερ εἴρηται τῶν ἐναγῶν, τὴν παλαιὰν αὐθις στάσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας ἐστασίασαν, ὅσας ἢ χώρα διαφορὰς εἶχεν, εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη τῆς πόλεως διεστῶσης. ἦν γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῶν Διακρίων γένος δημοκρατικώτατον, ὀλιγαρχικώτατον δὲ τὸ τῶν Πεδιέων, τρίτοι δ' οἱ Πάραλοι μέσον τινα καὶ μεμειγμένον αἰρούμενοι πολιτείας τρόπον, ἐμποδῶν ἦσαν καὶ διεκόλυον τοὺς ἐτέρους κρατῆσαι.

But the Athenians, now that the Cylonian disturbance was over and the polluted persons banished, as described, relapsed into their old disputes about the form of government, the city being divided into as many parties as there were diversities in its territory. The Hill-men favoured an extreme democracy; the Plain-men an extreme oligarchy; the Shore-men formed a third party, which preferred an intermediate and mixed form of government, was opposed to the other two, and prevented either from gaining the ascendancy.

²⁶⁴Arist., *Pol.* 1273b 35-174a 7: Σόλωνά δ' ἔνιοι μὲν οἶονται νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον· ὀλιγαρχίαν τε γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν πάτριον, μείξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικόν. ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τὴν τε βουλὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἴρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες αὐτῷ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστήριον πάντων, κληρωτὸν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσχυσεν, ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν; cf. also Arist., *Const. Ath.* 7.3 f.

Athens was torn by recurrent conflict about the constitution. Solon divided thus the city into as many parties as there were geographical divisions in its territory. So, the political parties were separated geographically: a. the party of the people of the hills represented an extreme democracy; b. that of the people of the plain was most in favour of extreme oligarchy; c. while the third group, the people of the coast, which preferred a mixed form of constitution somewhat between the other two, formed an obstruction and prevented the other groups from predominating. The sort of mixture that mainly features the Solonian political constitution is not but that of παράθεσις, a juxtaposition between the constituents. According to Aristotle and Galen, it is about the kind of σύνθεσις, of a mere juxtaposition or combination of differentiated parts, e.g. the mixture of cereals (“mechanical mixture”). Plutarch confirms this type of mixture through the typical term of ‘διστώσης’ in his expression: εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη τῆς πόλεως διστώσης. Actually, Plutarch repeats the typical term of διστώτα, as descriptive of composition by juxtaposition according to his theory of mixture, as already seen (*Conjug. Praec.* 142E-F). Similarly, Plutarch speaks of mixture (*Sol.* 18.1: τὴν δ’ ἄλλην μεῖξαι πολιτείαν, ἧς ὁ δῆμος οὐ μετεῖχεν) alluding to the Stoic terminology of mixture as an uneven juxtaposition (παράθεσις) of different bodies.

In terms of uneven juxtaposition, the division of the land corresponds to the division of the body politic into tribes, which are separated even geographically and form the Solonian constitution. Plutarch advocates for the distinct cooperation of the members of the society and the distribution of political power; all parts of the society have to be separated in order to cooperate efficiently (*Praec. ger. reip.* 812D-E). For, when power seems to be distributed among many, the weight of enmities becomes less troublesome and there is greater efficiency in the conduct of affairs. Plutarch makes use of the following metaphor 812D-E: “just as the division of the hand into fingers does not make it weak, but renders it a more skillful instrument for use, so the statesman who gives to others a share in the government makes action more effective by cooperation” (812 E: ἐνεργοτέραν ποιεῖ τῆ κοινωνία τὴν πρᾶξιν).

However, Solon speaks of the middle political party that mixes with both opposite parties, make them lose their extremeness and prevent them from predominating (μέσον τινὰ καὶ μεμειγμένον αἰρούμενοι πολιτείας τρόπον, ἐμποδὼν ἦσαν καὶ διεκώλυον τοὺς ἐτέρους κρατῆσαι). It is evident that Plutarch here, designates the juxtaposition that characterized the absolute forms of democracy and monarchy in the rest two parties. Rather, he advocates for the Aristotelian middle of the party at the coast, which guarantees the counterbalance of the opposite political powers. This description

of the third party echoes the above Aristotelian view of *μεταξὺ καὶ κοινόν* (GC 328a 29-31) that weakens the polarities and contributes to the counterbalance and health of the body. The quality and role of the third party could, thus, describe the sort of *μίξις/κρᾶσις* as “chemical combination” which gives rise to a uniform tertiary product.

But the Solonian constitution could not be uniform as a whole, because the mixture of the political areas and parties did not meet the principle of uniformity (*τὸ μιχθὲν ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι*) that Aristotle ascribed to the kind of *μίξις/κρᾶσις*, or in other words, it lacked equality. For this reason, Solon pleased neither party; the rich were dissatisfied at the loss of their securities, and the poor were still more so because the land was not divided afresh, as they hoped it would be. In short, Solon did not establish absolute equality like Lycurgus.

καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ μόνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας,
οἷον καὶ Λυκοῦργος καὶ Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν.

Arist. *Pol.* 1274a 32-34

Both Solon and Lycurgus framed constitutions. But, contrary to Solon, Lycurgus, the quasi-legendary lawgiver of Sparta, established equality among citizens regardless of their property. These were called ‘*homoioi*’ (‘equals’), as they had no wealth differentiation. All reforms of Lycurgus promoted, indeed, the three Spartan virtues: equality (among citizens), military fitness, and austerity. More importantly, the first reform instituted by Lycurgus involved establishing a council of elders (*γερουσία*) of twenty-eight men, who would have a power equal to the two royal houses of Sparta.²⁶⁵ With regard to this Lycurgus’ institution, Plutarch introduces another medical metaphor from the perspective of mixture: the council of elders was blended with the ‘feverish’

²⁶⁵ The laws of Lycurgus, which transformed Spartan society, purported to be utterances of the Delphic oracle, and were called *rhētra*. See Plut., *Lyc.* 6.1: Οὕτω δὲ περὶ ταύτην ἐσπούδασε τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Λυκοῦργος ὥστε μαντείαν ἐκ Δελφῶν κομίσει περὶ αὐτῆς, ἣν ῥήτραν καλοῦσιν. ἔχει δὲ οὕτως· “Διὸς Συλλανίου καὶ Ἀθανᾶς Συλλανίας ἱερὸν ἰδρυσάμενον, φυλὰς φυλάζαντα καὶ ὠβὰς ὠβάζαντα, τριάκοντα γερουσίαν σὺν ἀρχαγέταις καταστήσαντα, ὥρας ἐξ ὥρας ἀπελλάζειν μεταξὺ Βαβύκαος τε καὶ Κνακιῶνος, οὕτως εἰσφέρειν τε καὶ ἀφίστασθαι· δάμω δὲ τὰν κυρίαν ἡμεν καὶ κράτος.” For the Spartan constitution see e.g. H. Michell, *Sparta*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964, 100 and P. Cartledge, *Spartan Reflections*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

or, more precisely, ‘inflamed’ government of the kings and had an equal vote with them. Plato (*Leg.* 691e-692a) puts it explicitly and Plutarch cites him (*Lyc.* 5.6-8):²⁶⁶

Πλειόνων δὲ καινοτομουμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Λυκούργου πρῶτον ἦν καὶ μέγιστον ἡ κατάστασις τῶν γερόντων, ἦν φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων τῇ τῶν βασιλέων ἀρχῇ φλεγμαινούση μιχθεῖσαν καὶ γενομένην ἰσόψηφον εἰς τὰ μέγιστα σωτηρίαν ἅμα καὶ σωφροσύνην παρασχεῖν. αἰωρουμένη γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία καὶ ἀποκλίνουσα νῦν μὲν ὡς τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ τυραννίδα, νῦν δὲ ὡς τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ δημοκρατίαν, οἷον ἔρμα τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ἐν μέσῳ θεμένη καὶ ἰσορροπήσασα τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην τάξιν ἔσχε καὶ κατάστασιν, αἰεὶ τῶν ὀκτῶ καὶ εἴκοσι γερόντων τοῖς μὲν βασιλεῦσι προστιθεμένων ὅσον ἀντιβῆναι πρὸς δημοκρατίαν, αὐθις δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι τυραννίδα τὸν δῆμον ἀναρρωνύντων. τοσοῦτους δὲ φησὶ κατασταθῆναι τοὺς γέροντας Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅτι τριάκοντα τῶν πρώτων μετὰ Λυκούργου γενομένων δύο τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐγκατέλιπον ἀποδειλιάσαντες.

Among the many innovations which Lycurgus made, the first and most important was his institution of a senate, or Council of Elders, which, as Plato says, by being blended with the ‘feverish’ government of the kings, and by having an equal vote with them in matters of the highest importance, brought safety and due moderation into counsels of state. For before this the civil polity was veering and unsteady, inclining at one time to follow the kings towards tyranny, and at another to follow the multitude towards democracy; but now, by making the power of the senate a sort of ballast for the ship of state and putting her on a steady keel, it achieved the safest and the most orderly arrangement, since the twenty-eight senators always took the side of the kings when it was a question of curbing democracy, and, on the other hand, always strengthened the people to withstand the encroachments of tyranny. The number of the senators was fixed at twenty-eight because, according to Aristotle, two of the thirty original associates of Lycurgus abandoned the enterprise from lack of courage.

²⁶⁶ Pl., *Leg.* 691e-692a: καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι φύσις τις ἀνθρωπίνη μεμειγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει, κατιδοῦσα ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν φλεγμαινούσαν ἔτι, μείγνυσιν τὴν κατὰ γῆρας σώφρονα δυνάμιν τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδει ῥώμῃ, τὴν τῶν ὀκτῶ καὶ εἴκοσι γερόντων ἰσόψηφον εἰς τὰ μέγιστα τῇ τῶν βασιλέων ποιήσασα δυνάμει [...] καὶ κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ βασιλεία παρ’ ὑμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἔδει σύμμεικτος γενομένη καὶ μέτρον ἔχουσα, σωθεῖσα αὐτὴ σωτηρίας τοῖς ἄλλοις γέγονεν αἰτία. See P.A. Stadter, “Plato in Plutarch’s Lives of Lycurgus and Agesilaus,” in A. Pérez Jiménez, J. García López, and R.M. Aguilar (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S., Madrid - Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo de 1999*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999, 475-86 and S.-T., Teodorsson, “Plutarch and Peripatetic Science”, in *op. cit.*, 665-674.

Lycurgus mixed the diseased and inflamed reign with the Elders, representative of the healthy part of the body politic. This mixture is given in Aristotelian terms (*GC* 334b11-12) as a result of the mutual modification of the extreme elements. Before, Sparta had oscillated between the extremes of democracy and tyranny: anarchy and dictatorship (αἰωρουμένη γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία καὶ ἀποκλίνουσα νῦν μὲν ὡς τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ τυραννίδα, νῦν δὲ ὡς τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ δημοκρατίαν). The council of the Elders offered stability and safety to the commonwealth by strengthening afresh (ἀναρρῶννύτων) and moderating the extremity of the contraries (democracy and tyranny) that continue to coexist potentially in the body politic.²⁶⁷ For the state was a pendulum, and sometimes it was tending to tyranny on the part of the kings, and sometimes to democracy on the part of the people, the council of the Elders functioned balancing as a ballast; neither turning into democracy nor into tyranny. With the addition of the Gerousia, which resisted both extremes, the government became stable (ἐν μέσῳ θεμένη καὶ ἰσορροπήσασα).²⁶⁸ Plutarch stresses here again the importance of the middle as a prerequisite for equality and safety (τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ἐν μέσῳ θεμένη καὶ ἰσορροπήσασα τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην τάξιν ἔσχε καὶ κατάστασιν). According to Aalders (1968, 125): “Die von der Mischverfassung bewirkte αὐτάρκεια (*Lyc.* 13.5 ff.; 31.1) ist ein Ideal der klassischen Staatlehre, ebenso wie die ὁμόνοια (*Lyc.* 8.9; 31.1; *Per.* 3.2) und das Einhalten des Mittelweges: die das Gleichgewicht wahrende Gerusia steht ἐν μέσῳ zwischen Königen und Volk (*Lyc.* 5.11)”.²⁶⁹

Apart from the theory of mixture which constitutes an integral part of the Spartan political constitution, Lycurgus is assimilated explicitly to the physician (*Lyc.* 4.3.5). Here Plutarch narrates that Lycurgus sailed from Crete to Asia in order to study the difference of their modes of life and forms of government (the luxurious Ionian vs the austere Cretan one).²⁷⁰ The method was that of

²⁶⁷ The verb ἀναρρῶννυμι is an hapax legomenon as it occurs only here.

²⁶⁸ For the synthesis of Sparta’s government of monarchical, oligarchic and democratic components cf. *Arist., Pol.* 1266a 22-24: βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μιγνόντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ πλείονων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων. ἔπειτ’ οὐδ’ ἔχουσα φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρατικά· μᾶλλον δ’ ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.

²⁶⁹ Aalders, *Die Theorie der gemischten Verfassung*, 125.

²⁷⁰ According to Aristotle (*Politics* X) and Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F148), the Lycurgan politeia was derived from a Cretan model. Cf. Herodot. 1.65. In *FGH* 70 148 Polybius criticizes Ephorus for describing Crete and Sparta as being identical with respect to their political constitution.

comparing (παραβαλὼν ἀποθεωρῆσαι); similarly, the physician compares to healthy bodies those which are unsound and sick (ὥσπερ ἰατρὸς σώμασιν ὑγιεινοῖς ὕπουλα καὶ νοσώδη).²⁷¹

5.8. ὕπουλος in medicine and politics

On the contrary to this method of Lycurgus, the Hippocratic author states that the health of a patient is defined by the healthy part of his own body, which is in turn compared with the diseased one, and not with other foreign healthy bodies. Hence, the physician has to seek individually for the healthy part of a diseased body in order to cure a specific patient and not to compare diseased bodies with healthy bodies of different persons.²⁷²

The adjective ὕπουλος in Plutarch is descriptive of the inflammation due to a wound implying the bad, the disease.²⁷³ It' about sickle disease, which occurs only at an advanced stage. In Plutarch, the term ὕπουλος appears with a medical meaning always in conjunction with the adjective νοσώδης or a synonymous one. In particular, it constitutes the following pairs: σαθρὸς καὶ ὕπουλος, νοσώδης καὶ ὕπουλος, ψευδῆς καὶ ὕπουλος, ὕπουλος καὶ νοσερός.²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ Cf. X., *Lac.* 1.2: “Λυκοῦργον μέντοι τὸν θέντα αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους, οἷς πειθόμενοι ἠὲ δαιμόνησαν, τοῦτον καὶ θαυμάζω καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα [μάλα] σοφὸν ἠγοῦμαι. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐ μιμησάμενος τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία γνοὺς ταῖς πλείσταις, προέχουσαν εὐδαιμονία τὴν πατρίδα ἐπέδειξεν.”

²⁷² Hipp., *Art.* 10: 102.8-17 L.= 126.1-8 Kw.: Γινώσκειν δὲ, εἰ ἐκπέπτωκεν ὁ βραχίον, τοισίδε χρὴ τοῖσι σημείοισιν· τοῦτο μὲν, ἐπειδὴ δίκαιον ἔχουσι τὸ σῶμα οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ τὰ σκέλεα, παραδείγματι χρέεσθαι δεῖ τῷ ὑγιεῖ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὑγιές, καὶ τῷ μὴ ὑγιεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιές, μὴ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἄρθρα καθορῶντα (ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἐξαρθροὶ πεφύκασιν), ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κάμνοντος, ἢν ἀνόμοιον ἔη τὸ ὑγιές τῷ κάμνοντι. Καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται μὲν ὀρθῶς, παραξύνεσιν δὲ ἔχει πάνυ πολλήν· διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οὐκ ἀρκέει μόνον λόγῳ εἰδέναι τὴν τέχνην ταύτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμιλίῃ ὁμιλέειν·

²⁷³ According to the *TLG*, it is totally attested 31 times in the *Corpus Plutarcheum*. Plutarch also makes use of the phrase ὑπούλως ἔχοντες frequently: *Alex.* 47.11: καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπούλως ἔχοντες, συνέκρουον πολλάκις ὑπούλως ἔχοντες a favourite phrase of Plutarch; cf. *Luc.* 22.5: ὑπούλως εἶχε πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα; *Dion* 54.4: ἵνα μηδεὶς λανθάνῃ τῶν ὑπούλως καὶ δυσμενῶς ἔχόντων, and *Arat.* 40.2: ὑπούλως ἔχοντες.

²⁷⁴ Cf. respectively Plut., *De tuenda* C4-7: ἀγρυπνίας καὶ περιδρομαῖς ἐξελέγχοντες τὰ σαθρὰ καὶ ὕπουλα τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστι δεδιέναι μὴ πάθωσιν ἄνδρες φιλόλογοι καὶ πολιτικοί, πρὸς οὓς ἐνέστηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος; *De aud. poet.* C4-8: καὶ νοσώδη μὲν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὕπουλον ὡς ἀτερπὲς θέαμα φεύγομεν, τὸν δ' Ἀριστοφῶντος Φιλοκτῆτην καὶ τὴν Σιλανίωνος Ἰοκάστην ὁμοίους φθίνουσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσι πεπονημένους ὀρῶντες χαίρομεν; *De*

Generally, the term ὑπουλος (< of it under the ulcer or with hidden wounds) describes in medical terms the body or part of it affected, inflamed or purulent.²⁷⁵ The Hippocratic author when recording the species of sores, says that there are sores which extend deeply inwards under the flesh, and calls them ὑπουλα ἔλκεα, ‘hidden wounds’ (*De medico* 11.1-3: 9.216.13-15 L.= *CMG* 1.1.23.29-31 Heiberg: Τὰ δὲ ἔλκεα δοκεῖ πορείας ἔχειν τέσσαρας, μίαν μὲν ἐς βάθος· ταῦτα δ’ ἔστι τὰ συριγγώδη καὶ ὅσα ὑπουλά ἐστι, καὶ ἔνδοθεν κεκοιλασμένα). The same characterization attributes Galen to epilepsies that are chronic (*De victu att.* 1.2: *CMG* 5.4.2.433.14-15 Kalbfleisch: καὶ ἐπιληψίας τὰς μὲν μικρὰς ἔτι καὶ ἀρχομένας ἰᾶται τελέως, ὅσαι δ’ ἤδη χρόνιαί τε καὶ ὑπουλοι, καὶ ταύτας ὀνίνησιν οὐ σμικρά).²⁷⁶

But ὑπουλος with the meaning of ‘festering sores underneath, unsound, hollow’ is used metaphorically as devious both in politics and psychology. Plato was the first who attributed the characterization of ὑπουλος to the polis (*Gorg.* 518e: οἶδεῖ καὶ ὑπουλός ἐστιν [ἡ πόλις]) and to the soul (ibid. 480b: ὑπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει). Plutarch follows him in both points;²⁷⁷ in view of

ad. et am. 59D1-3: ὥσπερ ἡ κίβδηλος αὐτὴ παρησιία κενὸν ἔχουσα καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ ὑπουλον ὄγκον ἐξήρθη καὶ ᾤδησεν; *Comp. Nic. et Crass.* 1.1.5-6: βαρβάρων ὀνίων, δεδεμένων καὶ φθειρομένων ἐν τόποις ὑπούλοις καὶ νοσεροῖς.

²⁷⁵ According to *LSJ* s.v. ὑπουλος, it may come from ὑπεῖλλω, lit. shut up, suppressed; ὑπουλον = a ‘gathering’.

²⁷⁶ Cf. also Gal., *De fac. natur.* 2.132.19-133.6 K: καὶ μὴν ὅσοις γε τὸ σῶμα θάλλει, τούτοις ὁ σπλὴν φθίνει, φησὶν Ἴπποκράτης, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὀρμώμενοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἰατροί. καὶ ὅσοις γ’ αὖ μέγας καὶ ὑπουλος αὐξάνεται, τούτοις καταφθεῖρει τε καὶ κακόχυμα τὰ σώματα τίθησιν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν οὐχ Ἴπποκράτης μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὁμολογοῦσιν ἰατροί. καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ σπληνὸς δὲ κακοπραγοῦντος ἴκτεροι μελάντεροι καὶ τῶν ἐλκῶν αἱ οὐλαὶ μέλαιναί.

²⁷⁷ Cf. Th., 8.64.5-6: σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρᾶσσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες and Dem. 128.307: ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἄδικον καὶ ὑπουλον. For the connection of ὑπουλος with the soul in Plutarch cf. *Quaest. Plat.* 1000 D 1-2: οὐ γὰρ σώματος ἡ Σωκράτους ἰατρεία, ψυχῆς δ’ ἦν ὑπούλου καὶ διεφθαρμένης καθαρμός; *Quaest. conv.* 715 F 1-2: καὶ <τὸ> κακότητος καὶ τὸ ὑπουλον ὥσπερ τινὰς διπλόας ἀναπτύσσει τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ παντὸς ἠθους καὶ πάθους ποιεῖ καταφάνειαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις; *De Is. et Os.* 383 B 3-5: οὐ γὰρ ᾤοντο καλῶς ἔχειν οὔτε σώμασιν οὔτε ψυχαῖς ὑπούλοις καὶ νοσώδεσι θεραπεύειν τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀβλαβὲς πάντη καὶ ἀμίαντον; *De ad. et am.* 61 F 4-6: γὰρ ὑφορμεῖ τι πάθει καὶ τοῦτο παιάνει, καὶ πάρεστι βουβῶνος δίκην ἐκάστοτε τοῖς ὑπούλοις καὶ φλεγμαίνουσι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιγιγνώμενος.

politics, ὕπουλος refers to discord.²⁷⁸ The following passage from Plutarch's treatise On the fortune or the virtue of Alexander is revealing (*De Al. Magn. fort.* 329 B-C):

οὐ γὰρ [...] πολέμων πολλῶν <καὶ> φυγῶν ἐνέπλησε καὶ στάσεων ὑπούλων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, ἀλλὰ κοινὸς ἦκειν θεόθεν ἀρμοστής καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὄλων νομίζων, οὗς τῷ λόγῳ μὴ συνῆγε τοῖς ὄπλοις βιαζόμενος <καὶ> εἰς ταῦτ' ἐσυνεγεγκὼν τὰ πανταχόθεν, ὥσπερ ἐν κρατῆρι φιλοτησίῳ μίξας τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τοὺς γάμους καὶ <τὰς> διαίτας.

for to do so would have been to cumber his leadership with numerous battles and banishments and festering seditions. But, as he believed that he came as a heaven-sent governor to all, and as a mediator for the whole world, those whom he could not persuade to unite with him, he conquered by force of arms, and he brought together into one body all men everywhere, uniting and mixing in one great loving-cup, as it were, men's lives, their characters, their marriages, their very habits of life.

Alexander did not impose his leadership through battles, fugitive incendiaries and festering seditions (στάσεων ὑπούλων). Rather by believing himself as a heaven-sent arbiter of all nations, he mixed (μίξας) and united them totally in one great cup sacred to friendship. By so doing, he brought together into one body all regions, far and near, under the same dominion. Furthermore, Plutarch in the same treatise names Macedonia as ὕπουλος as part of the seditions that struck Greece due to Philip's wars before Alexander's expedition (327C: καὶ συνῆπτον αἱ Ἀθῆναι τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγουσαι, πᾶσα δ' ὕπουλος <ἦν> ἡ Μακεδονία πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας).²⁷⁹

Apart from the festering discord, Plutarch speaks of festering arrogance (οἰήμα ὑπούλον) in *De audiendo* 44A, on which Wyttenbach comments and defines ὕπουλος as “tamquam ulcus latens, occultum et insidiosum odium”.²⁸⁰ In particular, Plutarch describes here the offensive listener as someone untouched by what is said, full of festering presumption and ingrained self-assertion,

²⁷⁸ Cf. Th.8.64.5-6: σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες and Dem. 128.307: ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἄδικον καὶ ὕπουλον.

²⁷⁹ See J.R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, 132.

²⁸⁰ D.A. Wyttenbach, *Animadversiones in Plutarchi Opera Moralia I*, Leipzig: Teubner, 1820, 292.

convinced of his superiority in rhetorical skills (44A-B). Furthermore, in the *Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis* (3.1.9-12: ἀλλὰ τὰ τρυφῶντα καὶ ὕπουλα καὶ φλεγμαίνοντα τοῦ πλούτου περιελών, ὅπως εὐπορήσωσι τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων ἅπαντες, ὡς ἄλλος οὐδεὶς νομοθέτης προενόησε) Plutarch uses again the medical designations of ὕπουλα καὶ φλεγμαίνοντα in order to describe the avarice that Lycurgus wanted to expel from Sparta. By banishing both silver and gold from Sparta and introducing the coinage of iron, Lycurgus removed the greed and the swollen and feverish wealth. In this way, all citizens contented themselves only with the useful things of life. For he foresaw that the helpless, and poor citizen was a greater menace to the commonwealth of Sparta than the rich one.

More interestingly, in regard to the Athenian constitution at the Time of Pericles Plutarch speaks of a διπλόη τις ὕπουλος. It is about a crack in the state arisen from the tension between popular and aristocratic preferences and widened into a τομή, a section between *demos* and *oligoi* (*Per.* 11.3):

ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς διπλόη τις ὕπουλος ὥσπερ ἐν σιδήρῳ, διαφορὰν ὑποσημαίνουσα δημοτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῆς προαιρέσεως, ἡ δ' ἐκείνων ἄμιλλα καὶ φιλοτιμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν βαθυτάτην τομὴν τεμοῦσα τῆς πόλεως, τὸ μὲν δῆμον, τὸ δ' ὀλίγους ἐποίησε καλεῖσθαι.

Now there had been from the beginning a sort of seam hidden beneath the surface of affairs, as in a piece of iron, which faintly indicated a divergence between the popular and the aristocratic programme; but the emulous ambition of these two men cut a deep gash in the state, and caused one section of it to be called the 'Demos,' or the People, and the other the 'Oligoi,' or the Few.

Plutarch makes here the use of the medical discourse explicit. The hidden wound is being developed into a section that politically divides the city into the *Demos* and the *Oligoi*. Beneath the surface of the body politic, the political change is being incubated. The origin of it lies to a hidden seam, which is assimilated to a flaw emerging from a fold in a material (διπλόη τις ὕπουλος).²⁸¹ As Stadter comments on it, “διπλόη is a flaw or a weak spot in metal, a sure correction for mss. διαπλοκή”.²⁸² The combination of metallurgical and medical imagery occurs elsewhere

²⁸¹ Cf. Plut., *Praec. ger. reip.* 802B; Pl., Soph. 267E.

²⁸² P. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press Enduring Editions, 1989, 134.

in Plutarch.²⁸³ Through this metaphor from chirurgy Plutarch depicts the political division of Athens; on the one hand, Thucydides, son of Melesias, was the leader of the conservative faction after Cimon, posed by the aristocrats against Pericles (11.1: Θουκυδίδη τὸν Ἀλωπεκῆθεν, ἄνδρα σώφρονα καὶ κηδεστὴν Κίμωνος, ἀντέστησαν ἐναντιωσόμενον); on the other hand, Pericles showed up this division between the aristocrats and the people, which was only a latent crack before.²⁸⁴

Plutarch incorporates the medical term ὑπουλος in Roman politics, as well. Due to the disease of envy which festered in the body politic (*Caes.* 29.5.5-6: καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνταῦθα διὰ φθόνον πολιτείας ὑπούλου μόλις ἔχοντα) Caesar could hardly control the affairs in the city, on the contrary to his external politics. Moreover, Plutarch refers to the hidden distemper and unrest, for which Nymphidius warned Galba through messages (Galba 13.3.6-7: νῦν μὲν ὡς ὑπουλα καὶ μετέωρα πολλὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐχούσης). Lastly, with the sense of the secret disease from which the state had long been suffering the term appears in the *Life of Marius* (*Marius* 35.1-2: Ταῦτα τὴν πόλιν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ὑπουλον γεγενημένην καὶ νοσοῦσαν ἀνέρρηξεν).²⁸⁵

Plutarch speaks not exactly of ὑπουλον but of ὑποπτον οὐλή, a filthy hidden sore of suspicion when referring to the fraternity in *De fraterno amore* 481C. Here, Plutarch describes friendship in terms of mixture in that the bonds that knit together friendships are integral. Plutarch incorporates these terms in his description of friendship dissolution (διάλυσις) through an analogy to the solid and composite bodies. If these break up, it is possible to adhere. Similar to the disintegration of a composite body, friendships can be resumed again after breaking up (ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ συμπαγένητα, κὰν χαλάσῃ τὸ ἐχέκολλον, ἐνδέχεται πάλιν δεθῆναι καὶ συνελθεῖν, συμφυοῦς δὲ σώματος ῥαγέντος ἢ σχισθέντος ἔργον ἐστὶ κόλλησιν εὐρεῖν καὶ σύμφυσιν). On the contrary, the broken bonds of brothers cannot easily be rebuilt, because their reconciliation bears with it a filthy hidden sore of suspicion (αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ χρείας συνημμένοι φιλία κὰν διαστῶσιν οὐ χαλεπῶς αὐθις ἀναλαμβάνουσιν,

²⁸³ *Quaest. conv.* 715F1-2: καὶ <τὸ> κακότηδες καὶ τὸ ὑπουλον ὥσπερ τινὰς διπλόας ἀναπτύσσει τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ παντὸς ἥθους καὶ πάθους ποιεῖ καταφάνειαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

²⁸⁴ However, this division was already existing, as Pericles had gained the absolute control over the whole city (15.1-3). See Stadter, *Plutarch's Pericles*, 135.

²⁸⁵ Cf. M. Aur., *Med.* 3.8.1.1-2: Οὐδὲν ἂν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῦ κεκολασμένου καὶ ἐκκεκαθαρμένου πυῶδες οὐδὲ μὴν μεμωλυσμένον οὐδὲ ὑπουλον εὔροις: (“In the understanding of a man of chastened and purified spirit you will find no trace of festering wound, no ulceration, no abscess beneath the skin,” transl. by A.S.L. Farquharson).

ἀδελφοὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκπεσόντες οὔτε ῥαδίως συνέρχονται, κἂν συνέλθωσι, ῥυπαρὰν καὶ ὑποπτον οὐλὴν αἱ διαλύσεις ἐφέλκονται). In this passage, Plutarch uses all the terms that describe his three types of mixture, as already seen (p. 133, 141, 144, and 145): a. διεστῶτα: composition by juxtaposition, b. συναπτόμενα: conjunction by mutual admixture without losing their coherence and c. ἠνωμένα καὶ συμφυῆ: integral or total mixtures.

5.9. ἄκρατος δημοκρατία and ἐλευθερία

In reference to the term of ἄκρατος ἐλευθερία or δημοκρατία, the Platonic influence is deep. Plutarch is less explicit about the definition of *undiluted democracy* (ἄκρατος δημοκρατία). He uses this phrase in the *Lives of Cimon* (15.2.7) and *Dion* (53.4.1) and in his treatise from *Moralia*, *On Monarchy, Democracy, and Oligarchy* (*De unius in republica dominatione, populari statu, et paucorum imperio* 826F). Undiluted democracy (ἄκρατος δημοκρατία) goes along with its pair term of undiluted freedom (ἄκρατος ἐλευθερία). Both democracy and liberty bear the same metaphorical resemblance of undiluted wine. Actually, the origin of their conjunction and metaphorical association with unmixed wine is located at Plato's *Republic* 562c-d, where a democratic polis under bad leaders is intoxicated with the sense of their own omnipotence and *undiluted freedom*.²⁸⁶ The following passage describes the change from a democratic polis to a tyranny (μεταβολὴ πολιτείας) (*Rep.* 562c-d):

Ὅταν, οἶμαι, δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχη, καὶ πορρωτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἄκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῆ, τοὺς ἄρχοντας δὴ, ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ᾦσι καὶ πολλὴν παρέχωσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς.

Δρῶσιν γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο.

²⁸⁶ For the multiple and variant meanings of δημοκρατία see G.E.M. De Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*, London: Duckworth, 1981: 321-3. For its opposition to monarchy or tyranny in Plutarch see *An. Sen.* 783d; *Dion* 28.4; *Thes.* 24.2. Cf. G.J.D. Aalders, *Plutarch's political thought*, Amsterdam/Oxford/New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1982, 29.

“Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine, and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly, it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed oligarchs.” “Yes, that is what they do,” he replied. (transl. P. Shorey)

Analogous to the greed for wealth, which brought about the destruction of oligarchy, the greed for freedom, which is a constituent element of democracy, is to bring about the destruction of democracy and the birth of tyranny (562b-c). In this context, freedom is described metaphorically as undiluted wine (ἄκρατος ἐλευθερία), for which a democratic city may have an inextinguishable thirst.²⁸⁷ If this city is governed by bad and non-abstinent cupbearers, who fill out to them, even to excess, the pure wine of liberty, then it gets drunk. But if the governors are abstinent and mild offering wine with moderation, the people accuse them of being cursed oligarchs. Hence, the statesman is assimilated to a cup-bearer (οἰνοχόος) and the latter is, in turn, compared to the physician, given that ἄκρατος reflects both medical and sympotic connotations.²⁸⁸

The passage above contextualised in politics and sympotics is cited twice by Plutarch in *Pericles* 7.8.3 and in *Aetia Romana et Graeca* 295D, respectively: πολλήν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα (respubl. 562c) καὶ ἄκρατον τοῖς πολίταις ἐλευθερίαν οἰνοχοῶν and εἶτα πολλήν κατὰ Πλάτωνα (Rep. 562d) καὶ ἄκρατον αὐτοῖς ἐλευθερίαν τῶν δημαγωγῶν οἰνοχοούντων διαφθαρέντες. The Platonic quotation of *undiluted freedom* and their slightly modified adaptation into the Plutarchan text is revealing. Plutarch cites Plato and reflects the metaphor of undiluted freedom in the context of Ephialtes’ reformation in the *Life of Pericles*, whereas in *Aetia Rom. et Graec.* he refers to the

²⁸⁷ The same metaphorical motif of ἄκρατος ἐλευθερία is transferred in Latin literature as *mera libertas*. Cf. e.g. Cic., *De Or.* 2.94: *libertas mera veraque virtus*; Hor., *Ep.* 1.18.8: *illa vera et mera Graecia*; Plin., *Ep.* 8.24.2. Cf. Livy, *Epit.* 39.26: *velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem*.

²⁸⁸ This metaphor occurs most evidently in Plutarch’s *Sept. sap. conv.*, where the symposiarch is compared with the ruler pertaining to moderating or curing the behaviour of the guests or the citizens, respectively. See G.J.D. Aalders, “Political thought in Plutarch’s *Convivium Septem Sapientium*”, *Mnemosyne* 30 (1977) 28-39. Similarly, Vamvouri Ruffy explores the application of this terminology beyond the symposium, to the larger political-social world. See Vamvouri-Ruffy, *Les Vertus thérapeutiques du banquet*, 2012a; id., “Physical and social corruption in Plutarch”, 131-150, and id., “Symposium, Physical and Social Health in Plutarch’s *Table Talk*”, in K. Oikonomopoulou & F. Klotz (eds.), *The Philosopher’s Banquet, Plutarch’s Table Talk in the Intellectual Culture of the Roman Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 130-157.

unrestrained and abusive behavior of the Megarian demos after the expulsion of the tyrant Theagenes.²⁸⁹ By giving the definition of παλιντοκία (the returning of use-money) Plutarch narrates of the expulsion of Theagenes. After it, the Megarians became corrupt, as their orators filled out to them, even to excess, the pure strong wine of liberty (ἄκρατον ἐλευθερίαν). The undiluted wine of freedom recalls Plutarch in the *Life of Pericles*, whereas in the *Life of Cimon* he speaks of undiluted democracy (ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν) referring again to the political change of Ephialtes. In particular, in the mid-fifth century, Ephialtes is credited with far-reaching reforms of the Areopagus that changed the Athenian political system. Under his leadership, the Athenians deprived the council of the Aeropagus of almost all of its judicial powers and distributed these among the citizens' assembly, the council, and the other law courts. By this way, he thrust the city towards undiluted democracy (*Cim.* 15.2: Ἐφιάλτου προεστῶτος ἀφείλοντο τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς τὰς κρίσεις πλὴν ὀλίγων ἀπάσας, καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων κυρίουσ ἐαυτοῦσ ποιήσαντες, εἰς ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν ἐνέβαλον τὴν πόλιν).²⁹⁰

Plutarch alludes to Plato again, when referring to ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν in the *Life of Dion* 53.4: ἐπενόει δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν, ὡσ οὐ πολιτείαν ἀλλὰ παντοπόλιον οὔσαν πολιτειῶν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα (*rep.* 8, 557d). Dion wanted to curb upon unmixed democracy in Syracuse since he considered it not as a civil polity, but rather as a 'bazaar of polities' (ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπόλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν), as Plato stated.²⁹¹ Plutarch goes on the narration of Dion's political deeds using terms of mixture. Dion wanted to institute a mixture of democracy and royalty, in a way modelled after the Spartan and Cretan political constitution, wherein an aristocracy should have the most prevailing role in the administration.²⁹² A republic is described as a fair where every kind of freedom can be sold; where one can find a magazine of every sort of regime, and that in its worst form. In this sense, the Athenians sold justice. In this context, Plutarch seems to advocate a

²⁸⁹ Stadter, *A Commentary on Pericles*, 100.

²⁹⁰ However, Plutarch speaks positively of Ephialtes as he acknowledges his rhetorical skills and his political integrity. Cf. *Cim.* 10.8; *Dem.* 14.1; *Prec. ger. reip.* 802B-C.

²⁹¹ Pl., *Rep.* 557d: καὶ ἔστιν γε, ὃ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν. τί δῆ; ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκη τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπόλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξαμένῳ οὕτω κατοικίσειν.

²⁹² C. Mossé, "Plutarch and the Sicilian tyrants", in S. Lewis (ed.), *Ancient Tyranny*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, 188-195.

type of democracy that is like an aristocracy.²⁹³ Plutarch's conception of democracy appears thus as flexible since he describes it as a bazaar of republics.

Similarly, Galen employs the same opposition with a pejorative connotation in order to depreciate the charlatan physician; he says characteristically in *De diebus decretoriis libri iii.* 9.823.5-7 K.: οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν ὑπηρέτην φύσεως ὀνομάζει τὸν ὄντως ἰατρὸν, οὐ φαρμακοπῶλην τινὰ ἐκ τριόδου, “By this way, one should call the true physician as a servant of nature, not as a seller of drugs met in the crossroad”.²⁹⁴ The real physician (ὁ ὄντως ἰατρὸς) is distinguished from a vulgar drug-seller (φαρμακοπῶλης ἐκ τριόδου) similarly to the true statesman opposed to the vulgar statesman-salesman, and thus the best political regime is distinguished from the bazaar of regimes. In terms of mixture, a ruler of an ideally proportional democracy (ἄριστα κεκρημένη δημοκρατία) is opposed to a statesman of undiluted democracy (ἄκρατος δημοκρατία) who is a salesman of justice in the bazaar of republics.²⁹⁵

In each of the instances above, medicine is present as a *tertium comparationis* in the metaphorical relationship between politics, on the one hand, and symposium or even commerce, on the other. In the *Table Talk*, Plutarch provides reconstructed conversations with multiple references to the body, to the prevention of illness, and to medicine. The text's medical vocabulary frequently

²⁹³ Cf. *Conv. sep. sap.* 152D; 154D-F. See Aalders, “Political Thought”, 37 and A. Erskine, “Standing up to the Demos. Plutarch, Phocion, and the Democratic Life”, M. Canevaro & B.D. Gray (ed.), *The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 241-242.

²⁹⁴ The various Greek words for “druggists” underline different aspects of their activity: drug sellers (φαρμακοπῶλαι) or makers (φαρμακοποιοί), root cutters/collectors (ρίζοτόμοι), perfume experts (μυρεψοί). According to the *TLG* search the term φαρμακοποιοί does not occur in medical texts; in the Hippocratic corpus, neither the drug makers (φαρμακοποιοί) nor the drug sellers (φαρμακοπῶλαι) are referred to as such. Galen mentions the sellers (4 times), but more often uses the term ‘root cutters’ ρίζοτόμοι (7 times). The Latin ‘translations’ of the Greek term φαρμακοπῶλαι appear in Fuchs’ *Paradoxorum medicinae libri tres* (1535) and *Primi de stirpium historia Commentariorum tomi vivae imagines* (1542). The term *pharmacopolae*, i.e. the drug-sellers, and *seplasiarii*, literally “ointment merchants” (etymology: Seplasion, a street in Capua where ointments were sold) are used interchangeably.

²⁹⁵ Apart from its characterization as undiluted, democracy is invested with negative connotations when described by Plutarch as unbridled (ἀκόλαστος) or as disordered in *Pyrrh.* 13.7.1-2: οἷα δ’ ἐν ὄχλῳ δημοκρατίας κόσμον οὐκ ἐχούσης, “in a throng of free people not given to decorum”. Cf. also, Ps.- Plut. *De unius* 826F: Ἀθηναῖοι δ’ αὐτόνομον καὶ ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν [ἀπεκληρώσαντο]. ὧν ἀμαρτανομένων παρατροπαὶ καὶ ὑπερχύσεις εἰσὶν αἱ λεγόμενα τυραννίδες καὶ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὀχλοκρατίαι· ὅταν βασιλεία μὲν ὕβριν ἐντέκη καὶ τὸ ἀνυπεύθυνον: ὀλιγαρχία δ’ ὑπερφοσύνην καὶ τὸ αὔθαδες: δημοκρατία δ’ ἀναρχίαν, ἰσότης δ’ ἀμετρίαν, πᾶσαι δὲ τὸ ἀνόητον.

describes the composition of the ideal symposium and on a second level of the political body. In short, the physician is assimilated to the cup-bearer and, on a second level, to the statesman in view of the metaphorical connotations of ἀκρασία.

As regards the term ἀκράσια, it arises from the first Hippocratic texts on the theory of mixture (krasis). So, it means bad mixture, ill temperature, as opposed to the Hippocratic κρήσις (good mixture) and its Galenic composite equivalent, εὐκρασία.²⁹⁶ So, ἀκρασία in the medical field may refer to the humours (χυμός) and bodily constituents. The adjective ἄκρατος refers to different kinds of liquids, such as wine, blood or milk.²⁹⁷ A *TLG* search yields 52 references to οἶνος ἄκρατος (ἄκρητος) or ἀκρατέστερος (ἀκρητέστερος) and ἀκρατέστατος (ἀκρητέστατος) in the Galenic Corpus. Galen comments on the Hippocratic term ἀκρησίη in relation both to the bodily humours and the undiluted wine in *Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* 3.2 [1L.]: 15.177.9-180.16 K.= *CMG* 5.9.1.90.18-92.7 Mewaldt). Here, according to Galen, Hippocrates states that during the winter one should eat as much as possible, but drink as little as possible. The most suitable drink is the most undiluted wine (εἶναι δὲ χρῆ τὸ πόμα οἶνον ὡς ἀκρητέστατον), as it contributes, alongside with the suitable nourishment, to keep the body as warm and dry as possible (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τὸ σῶμα θερμόν τε εἶη καὶ ξηρόν). Galen commenting on this Hippocratic thesis explains the keeping of warmth and dryness in terms of *symmetric crasis* and highlights the role

²⁹⁶ For ἀκράσια (vs ἀκράσις-ία = ἀκράτεια) see Theophrast., *De caus. plant.* 3.2.5.1-6: Οὐδὲ γὰρ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ τοῦ ὄλου καταστάσει καὶ περιφορᾷ (ἢ τῇ φύσει) τῶν δένδρων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ σπερμάτων ὡς πολλάκις τὰ ἀμαρτανόμενα τῇ ἀπὸ τούτου ἀκρασίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν δυνάμει τὰ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ δὲ τινα ἀναμάχεται καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φύσις τὰ ὑπὸ ἰατρικῆς. Τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα διὰ χυμῶν δριμύτητος καὶ ἀκρησίας φημι ἔγωγε γίνεσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀποκαθίσταται κρηθέντα καὶ πεφθέντα. Cf. Hipp., *De prisca med.* 7.6-10: Ὁ μὲν, ὅσων μὴ ἠδύνατο ἡ φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ἐπικρατέειν ὑγιαίνουσα ἐμπιπτότων, διὰ ἀγριότητά τε καὶ ἀκρησίην, ὁ δὲ, ὅσων ἢ διάθεσις, ἐν οἷῳ ἂν ἐκάστοτε ἕκαστος τύχη διακείμενος, μὴ ἦν δυνατὸς ἐπικρατέειν, ταῦτα ἐζήτησεν ἀφελεῖν; and 18.16-18: Τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα διὰ χυμῶν δριμύτητος καὶ ἀκρησίας φημι ἔγωγε γίνεσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀποκαθίσταται κρηθέντα καὶ πεφθέντα.

²⁹⁷ It can also be employed with regard to colours, odours or abstract terms like justice, and extend to the psychological sphere with the meaning of “unrestrained”. As for ἄμικτος, the adjective refers to abstract nouns (courage, pleasure) or to thoroughbred animals (de animales de pura sangre). With the corresponding nomen actionis μίξις, it is also used in social contexts and in this case it refers to sexual abstinence or to unsociable or intractable individuals (unsociable, intractable), cf. R. Adrados (*DGE*) s.v. ἄκρατος and ἄμικτος.

of undiluted wine in keeping the mixture balanced. In this respect, *akrasia* is a symptom of *ametria*.

The body, comments Galen, ought to be warm and dry due to the lack of a measure of the winter mixture (διὰ τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὥραν κράσεως). If it were symmetric, just as in the spring, Hippocrates would admonish the *diaeta* to be symmetric. For one should keep what is characterized by symmetry, whereas change what stays asymmetric (μεταβολὴ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀμετριῶν γίνοιτο). Here, Galen alludes again to the Aristotelian principle of measure and symmetry which stems from the mutual moderation of extremes. The opposite disproportion (ἀμετρία) would cure the ill-tempered disproportion by covering in the opposite direction the distance from the middle and symmetric, from which the latter deviated (τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀμετρίαν προσφέροντας τοσοῦτον ἀπέχουσιν τοῦ μέσου τε καὶ συμμετρου, ὅσον ἀφέστηκεν ἢ νοσάζουσα). By this counterbalancing process the health would be restored. For everything that is ill-proportioned is contrary to nature, and everything that is moderate is in accord with nature.

5.10. ὠφελῆειν, ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν

Λέγειν τὰ προγενόμενα· γινώσκειν τὰ παρεόντα· προλέγειν τὰ ἐσόμενα· μελετᾶν ταῦτα· ἀσκέειν, περὶ τὰ νοσήματα, δύο, ὠφελῆειν, ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν. Ἡ τέχνη διὰ τριῶν, τὸ νόσημα, ὁ νοσέων, καὶ ὁ ἰητρός· ὁ ἰητρός, ὑπηρετῆς τῆς τέχνης· ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι τῷ νοσήματι τὸν νοσεῦντα μετὰ τοῦ ἰητροῦ χρή.

Hipp., *De morbis popularibus* (= *Epidemiae*) 1.11: 1.2.5.634.6-636.4 L.= 1.189.24-190.6 Kw.

The physician must be able to tell the antecedents, know the present, and foretell the future- must mediate these things, and have two special objects in view with regard to disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm. The art consists in three things- the disease, the patient, and the physician. The physician is the servant of the art, and the patient must combat the disease along with the physician.

The portrait of the ideal statesman as an ideal doctor seems to be particularly favoured as a locus communis in the Plutarchan Corpus. Apart from the art of foreseeing which a statesman shares in common with the physician, a virtue that Plutarch highlights in his *Precepts of Statecraft* (824C) the statesman must follow the above Hippocratic principle of *ὠφελῆειν, ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν*. According to the above definition of the ideal doctor in *Epidemics* 1.2.5 the physician has “to be useful (*ὠφελῆειν*) or at least to do no harm (*ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν*). This is a basic Hippocratic principle that is not constrained only in the Hippocratic tradition but constitutes a motif in the historical texts as well.²⁹⁸ Thucydides puts it explicitly at the end of Nicias’ and Alcibiades antilogic speeches 6.14: τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ’ εἶναι, ὅς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὡς πλεῖστα ἢ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάβῃ, “Good governance is to do as much good for the country as possible, or at least no voluntary harm.”²⁹⁹ According to Ilberg, this couplet of *ὠφελῆειν, ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν* (*primum non nocere*) is an extension of the medical metaphor of the ideal governor as the ideal doctor.³⁰⁰ The same motif is exploited also by Plutarch as a metaphor for the political behaviour of Agesilaus in the *Comparatio Agesilai et Pompeii* 2.2:

Οἷον μέντοι τῆ περι τῶν τρεσάντων ἀπορία προσήγαγεν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἴαμα μετὰ τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις ἀτυχίαν, κελεύσας τοὺς νόμους ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν καθεύδειν, οὐ γέγονεν ἄλλο σόφισμα πολιτικόν, οὐδ’ ἔχομέν τι τοῦ Πομπηίου παραπλήσιον, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον οὐδ’ οἷς αὐτὸς ἐτίθει νόμοις ᾗετο δεῖν ἐμμένειν, τὸ δύνασθαι

²⁹⁸ For the motif of *ὠφελῆειν-βλάπτειν* in the Hippocratic Corpus cf. eg. *De arte* 5.14-22 L.: καὶ τῷ ὠφελῆσθαι πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῦς ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι, ὅ τι ἦν τὸ ὠφελῆσαν, καὶ, ὅτε ἐβλάβησαν, τῷ βλαβῆναι, ὅ τι ἦν τὸ βλάβαν. Τὰ γὰρ τῷ ὠφελῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τῷ βεβλάβηθαι ὠρισμένα οὐ πᾶς ἰκανὸς γνῶναι· εἰ τοίνυν ἐπιστήσεται ἢ ἐπαινέειν ἢ ψέγειν ὁ νοσήσας τῶν διατημάτων τι οἷσιν ὑγιάσθη, πάντα ταῦτα τῆς ἱητρικῆς ὄντα εὐρήσει· καὶ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἦσσαν τὰ ἀμαρτηθέντα τῶν ὠφελησάντων μαρτύρια τῆ τέχνῃ ἐς τὸ εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὠφελήσαντα τῷ ὀρθῶς προσενεχθῆναι ὠφέλησαν· τὰ δὲ βλάβαντα τῷ μηκέτι ὀρθῶς προσενεχθῆναι ἔβλαψαν. See also G. H. Knutzen, *Technologie in den hippokratischen Schriften* *περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, περὶ ἀγμῶν, περὶ ἄρθρων ἐμβολῆς* (=Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz. Abhandlungen der Geistes- und sozial wissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1963, nr. 14), Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964, 1330 (20) f.

²⁹⁹ J. Jouanna, “Politics and Medicine”, 21-22. See also K. Weidauer, *Thucydides und die hippokratischen Schriften*, Heidelberg: Winter, 1954, 72 and F. Heinemann, “Eine vorplatonische Theorie der τέχνη”, *MH* 18 (1861) 119. The opposition *ὠφελῆειν-βλάπτειν* is found elsewhere in Thucydides in a medical context, in the description of the Athenian plague (2.51.2).

³⁰⁰ J. Ilberg, *Die Ärzteschule von Knidos*, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1925, 9, n. 1.

μέγα τοῖς φίλοις ἐνδεικνύμενος. ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀνάγκην καταστάς τοῦ λῦσαι τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τῷ σῶσαι τοὺς πολίτας, ἐξεῦρε τρόπον ᾧ μήτε ἐκείνους βλάψουσι μήτε ὅπως οὐ βλάψωσι λυθήσονται.

On the other hand, when we consider the remedy which Agesilaos applied to the perplexity of the state in dealing with those who had played the coward, after the disaster at Leuctra, when he urged that the laws should slumber for that day, there was never another political device like it, nor can we find anything in Pompey's career to compare with it; on the contrary, he did not even think it incumbent upon him to abide by the laws which he himself had made, if he might only display the greatness of his power to his friends. But Agesilaus, when he confronted the necessity of abrogating the laws in order to save his fellow-citizens, devised a way by which the citizens should not be harmed by the laws, nor the laws be abrogated to avoid such harm.

Plutarch reports that the king Agesilaos called for the laws to sleep for a day during the crisis over how to treat the runaways shamed survivors (τρέσαντες) of the Leuctra disaster.³⁰¹ The dilemma that Spartans had to face upon the news of the defeated Spartans at Leuctra was the following: If they were to apply the law that required the stigmatization of those who had not bravely fought, they would stay without warriors; if they defrauded it, they would violate the patriarchal order. This dilemma is invested with the ambiguous term ‘σόφισμα πολιτικόν’ (political skill or trick), which characterizes Agesilaus’ choice to allow the laws to sleep for a day. According to Shipley, “the word σόφισμα is carefully chosen: the device worked well, but to ignore the law was to risk weakening Sparta’s reputation, which rested largely on the Lycourgan tradition of respect for the law”.³⁰² Plutarch credits Agesilaus with the title of his country’s healer (ιατρός) by characterizing his political sophism as a remedy (ἴαμα). With regard to it, he develops the familiar metaphor of the ideal statesman-doctor focusing on the motif of ὠφελεῖν, ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν in a slightly modified manner: ἐπὶ τῷ σῶσαι τοὺς πολίτας, ἐξεῦρε τρόπον ᾧ μήτε ἐκείνους βλάψουσι μήτε ὅπως οὐ βλάψωσι λυθήσονται. The rescue of the citizens is dependent on his σόφισμα, by which the laws should not harm the citizens, nor the laws are abolished to avoid such

³⁰¹ Cf. Plut. Ages. 30.2 and 30.5–6.

³⁰² See D.R. Shipley, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos: Response to Sources in the Presentation of Character*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, 19. Plutarch indicates political approval of the sofisma by a comparison with Pompey’s contravention of his own laws, a reference to the case of Plancus (*Pomp.* 55.8-9). See S.G. Jacobs, *Plutarch's Pragmatic Biographies: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in the Parallel Lives* (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2017, 234-236 and 265-267.

harm. The second leg of this couplet (ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν) appears here duplicate in a twofold repetition (μήτε βλάψουσι and ὅπως οὐ βλάψωσι), whereas the first one (ὠφελείν) is metonymically expressed (σῶσαι).

On the contrary to Pompey, who failed to remedy his ailing high command, Agesilaus turned out to be a good healer as a lawgiver (νομοθέτης) on the survivors of Leuctra. By comparing Agesilaus to Pompey Plutarch observes their divergent responses to similar situations. In *Agesilaus* and *Pompey* the understanding of one *Life* “is not especially enhanced by its pair”.³⁰³ Plutarch describes them in similar situations, but their choices are dissimilar. Therefore, Plutarch sheds light on Agesilaus’ actions, whereas casting shadow over Pompey’s ones. Both are credited with the quality of *πρότης* and with the title of their country’s healer (*ἰατρός*). Both disregarded the laws of the state. However, the similarities between them are outweighed by their differences, which are in favour of Agesilaus, who proved to be a better physician of his state in accordance with the Hippocratic dual principle of ὠφελείν, ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν.

³⁰³ C.B.R. Pelling, “Synkrisis in Plutarch’s Lives”, in F.E. Brenk & I. Gallo (eds.), *Miscellanea plutarchea: atti del I convegno di studi su Plutarco* (Rome, 23 novembre, 1985), Ferrara: Giornale filologico ferrarese, 1986, 83-4.

Conclusions

The idea of mixture pertains to Plutarch's political thought, his interest in scientific matters, his medical metaphors, the concept of metaphor, and this study as a whole. Examples of medical imagery in a political context are omnipresent in the Plutarchan Corpus. Plutarch employs systematically the motif of *politicus doctor* and *political medicine* in his political precepts. As seen in the chapter above, Plutarch very often employs the medical metaphor of the predominant mixture (ἰσχύσασα κρᾶσις) as a cure for the symptoms of political pathology. In general, Plutarch's reflections on politics constitute a coherent part of his philosophy. He provides practical advice for politicians combining it with theoretical contemplations on politics, together with admonitions of wider application. His interest in politics is attested also in the *Lives*, where he deals mainly with famous statesmen. The framework of Plutarch's political ideal can be encapsulated into the metaphor of ideal mixture; the quiet submission to the mighty members of the society and the empowerment of the weak ones can be projected onto the Greek polis of his time and its symbiosis with the Roman Empire. Plutarch does not draw strict lines between politics on the smaller and the larger stage since his focus remains on the Greek polis.

In particular, Cleisthenes' reformation is a key model of political mixture that Plutarch offers. By mixing and reorganizing the entire citizen body, he aimed at the creation of a counterweight, which would break, diffuse, and counterbalance the monopoly of political power. The composition of the ten tribes and the division into three regions are characterized as "perfectly mixed" (*Per.3.2: ἄριστα κεκραμένην*). Plutarch extends Cleisthenes' political exemplum of a mixing process to his *Political Precepts* and the *Lives*. All citizens would be mixed in politics and have an active role in politics to achieve a feasible greater democratic sovereignty (*Praec. ger. reip.* 824A: ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναμειχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις). This balancing treatment is necessary for the healthy parts to prevail over the diseased ones and physically restore balance and well-being. By mixing the citizens the ruler would ameliorate the conditions that had driven to aristocracy or tyranny and would establish *isonomia*. This has its counterpart in the medical concepts of both δικαιοτάτη φύσις (most just nature) and σύμμετρος κρᾶσις (balanced crasis).

The theory of σύμμετρος κρᾶσις was coined by Alcmaeon under the influence of pre-Socratic philosophy, and established by the Hippocratic author of the work *On Ancient Medicine*. Plutarch under the influence by Aristotle and the Stoics classified the middle, τὸ μέσον or τὸ σύμμετρον as

the perfect equilibrium point between the extreme qualities in both his mixture and medical theory and his political one. Regarding the concept of the balanced mixture, he presents his own mixture theory in the treatise *Against Colotes*. Plutarch, in this sense, can be said that foreshadows Galen. Plutarch's theory on mixture reflects, in general, the Aristotelian principle of μεσότης, and the Aristotelian distinction between mixture and composition. This is, in turn, taken over by Galen a few decades later in the Imperial Era. The question that arises here, and pertains to the whole of this study is put as follows: How did Plutarch obtain his medical knowledge? Was he a reader of the Hippocratic writings?

The answer lies in Plutarch's intellectual pluralism and *paideia* which stem from a tradition, either popular or specialized. Plutarch was influenced by an anonymous popular tradition, whereas the intermediation of secondary sources (e.g. the Ps.-Aristotelian Problems) cannot be excluded. In this respect, we cannot assume that Plutarch was directly influenced by Hippocrates except for the cases, where the allusions are striking, or Plutarch cites him explicitly. However, in the investigation of the medical metaphors, Hippocrates cannot always be retraced in his writings. Rather, he appears as a figure of reference mainly through the lens of his later commentators. In these cases, the medical equivalent is to be traced in the reception of the Hippocratic tradition mainly by Galen or even Byzantine medical authors who comment on Hippocrates. Babbitt (1928, 214) had purported the view that "the body of Hippocratic medical writings had undoubtedly been read by Plutarch". However, the reliance of Plutarch on popular medicine and intermediate medical sources should not be underestimated. Though the reliability of his medical knowledge cannot be denied, Plutarch implements his medical thought in a manner descriptive, not exactly scientific, in most cases in line with his rhetorical purposes. The concept of mixing characterizes thus the flow of literature, reflecting Plutarch's relation to the medical tradition.

In this respect, the term 'interdiscursivity' is the most suitable to describe the intersections between the Plutarchan Corpus and medical literature. A discussion in terms of intertextuality seems to be here impeded by Plutarch's intellectual pluralism given his oeuvre is a mine of the past. The references to the medical tradition are to be viewed as echoes of the contemporary literature or anamnesis of the past one, with which Plutarch as an intellectual (πεπαιδευμένος) was acquainted. The medical interdiscourse refers to the whole language system, including the theoretical and terminological framework, not to isolated intertextual cross-references. Hence, interdiscursivity does not require any explicit and direct quotation from Hippocrates, but only a

common medical discourse and terminology which flourishes best in the oral popular tradition as well.

Interdiscursivity is a kin term of intertextuality. The former is differentiated from the latter in that it widens the scope of projection between texts since it refers to genres. Hence, the dialogue between texts and traditions is not constrained in textual interfaces or references on a micro-scale. Rather it pertains to the whole discourse regardless of its ascription to a concrete author. It is like an echolalia that keeps the tradition alive. Unlike intertextuality, interdiscursivity describes the grounding of words and texts in other, often anonymous, words and texts. What both share in common is the process of lending words, terms, and texts from other texts. Interdiscursivity denotes relations between genres and types of discourse, or even between large heterogeneous discursive fields, such as medicine and politics according to M. Foucault's definition in *L'archéologie du savoir* (1969). This was the case of this study. To explore metaphors at the crossroad between medicine and politics.

The idea of the mixture is dominant in the conceptualization of metaphor itself. Plato put it in terms of participation (μετέχειν); Aristotle in terms of transference or proportional analogy; the Papyrus Hamburgensis 128 in terms of μετουσία; cognitive linguistics in terms of blending. One concrete object is capable to cast light upon another, which is in principle more abstract, in the form of a metaphor or comparison. This happens because we read into the object the very qualities that it in turn illustrates. This cognitive principle which alludes to the Aristotelian one: τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν, applied in Plutarch's medical metaphors casts light on the similar or analogous threads of thought between medicine and politics. This mapping process makes clear the interrelation between the craft or ruling and the art of healing. The reverse route from politics to medicine is also feasible but limited in the Plutarchan Corpus. Hence, Plutarch's political thought and moralism are elucidated through reference to medicine, which in turn is explained by analogy. This circular transference of ideas shows that concepts emerge about another system of knowledge which in turn lends its meanings and conceptions from the same or a similar domain of knowledge. Apart from this interplay between medicine and politics, medical metaphors are integrated into Plutarch's rhetorical quiver reflecting his pedagogical reasoning. In this respect, metaphors are an indispensable vehicle of Plutarch's moralism. His educational goals are achieved by constant hints of, or references to, philosophers, historical and mythical figures, authors and traditions that Plutarch invites the reader to (re)discover through the metaphorical thinking.

To conclude, the thread that runs through and binds together all the chapters of this study concerning the medical equivalent of the metaphors, is the principle of alignment with the laws of nature. The dominant mixture drives out what is discrepant with nature (ἰσχύσασα κρᾶσις ἐκστῆση τὸ παρὰ φύσιν). Attunement with nature is associated again with the balance and symmetry of the healthy body. This principle is recurrent in most of Plutarch's medical metaphors: in dislocations, in pathology, in bloodletting, in nourishment, in humours, and mixture. On the other hand, this is translated into a politics of justice, balance, and *otium*. What is correct by nature is also mapped as politically correct onto the sphere of society. Medical metaphors are thus part of Plutarch's political thought and his work as a whole. For metaphors bring together two different fields by encountering, interpreting and defining the one in terms of the other stirring up the comparison, which constitutes besides the core of his *Lives*. This aspect of comparing is very central in Plutarch's technique of searching for similarities between different *Lives*. His *Lives* are constructed on a metaphorical basis through the association of one *Life* with another. Moreover, the *Lives* are associated and interpreted in terms of the *Moralia*, and vice versa. Hence, the trope of metaphor is enlarged by the association of one *Life* with another; of one treatise with another *Life* or treatise. Plutarch's oeuvre offers the cross-references to different genres and discourses in a comparative chain of reflections; of Greek upon Roman, of old upon new, of medicine upon politics.

Texts, translations, and abbreviations

For the text of Plutarch's works I have consulted primarily the Teubner editions: for the *Moralia* those by M. Pohlenz *et al.* (Leipzig 1925-1978); for Plutarch's biographies those by Konrat Ziegler (Leipzig 1957-1973; revised edition by H. Gärtner, 1994-2002). My references follow the pagination of the Frankfurt edition of Stephanus (1599) and the chapter and verse reference system used in the Teubner edition of Sintenis (1825-5), respectively. Translations of Plutarch's texts are drawn from the Loeb Classical Library Editions; for the *Moralia*, I adopt the Loeb translations mainly by F.C. Babbitt (1927-1976) and H.N. Fowler (1936), whereas for the *Lives* those by B. Perrin (1914-1926). The rest translations of the cited texts are drawn from the Loeb Editions, as well, unless noted otherwise.

For the text and translations of the Hippocratic works and Galenic ones, I have consulted the bibliography compiled by Gerhard Fichtner and continued by the project "Galen of Pergamum: The Transmission, Interpretation, and Completion of Ancient Medicine" (*Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*) of the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (edition 2017/12 for Hippocrates, and 2019/12, for Galen: http://cmg.bbaw.de/online-publications/Galen-Bibliographie_2019-12.pdf). The text of Hippocrates is that contained in the Littré edition; where relevant, I use the edition with Kühlewein's edition. As for the Corpus Galenicum, I cite the texts included in the edition by Kühn. Some of the translations of Galen's text are my own, as noted.

For the abbreviations of the medical texts, I adopt the *CMG* abbreviations. For the abbreviations of journals, I use those of *L'Année Philologique*. Names of ancient authors, their works, and their abbreviations follow the *LSJ* (9th ed. 1940; Revised Supplement 1996).

Bibliography

A

Aalders, G.J.D., *Die Theorie der gemischten Verfassung im Altertum*, Amsterdam: Verlag A. M. Hakkert, 1968.

, “Political thought in Plutarch’s “Convivium Septem Sapientium””, *Mnemosyne* 30 (1977) 28-39.

, *Plutarch’s Political Thought*, Amsterdam/Oxford/New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1982.

Adrados, F.R. (ed.), *Diccionario griego español (DGE)*, Madrid: C.S.I.C, 1980-1997.

Aguilar, R.M., “Hipócrates en Plutarco”, *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica* 4 (1994) 35–45.

, “Pharmakon en Plutarco”, in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch’s Work. ‘Moralia’ Themes in the ‘Lives’, Features of the ‘Lives’ in the ‘Moralia’*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 751- 772.

Alexiou, E., *The Parallel Lives of Plutarch. The issue of “Positive” and “Negative” Examples*, Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2007.

Anastassiou, A., “Textkritische Bemerkungen zu den Ps.-Hippokratischen Schriften de genitura und de natura pueri”, *Hermes* 100 (1972) 624-626.

Andò, V., “La ricezione ippocratica in Plutarco”, in I. Gallo, *La biblioteca di Plutarco. Atti del IX Convegno plutarqueo: Pavia, 13-15 giugno 2002*, Napoli: M. D’Auria, 2004, 159-183.

Asper, M., “(Some) Domains of Metaphor in Hellenistic Literature”, in M. Witte & S. Behnke, (eds.), *The Metaphorical Use of Language in Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature* (Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook 2014/15), Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015, 41-58.

B

- Babut, “Plutarque, Aristote, et l’Aristotélisme”, in L. van der Stockt (ed.), *Plutarchea Lovaniensia. A Miscellany of Essays on Plutarch* (Studia hellenistica 32), Lovanii: Peeters Publishers, 1996, 1-28.
- Bakhtin, M., “Discourse in the Novel”, in M. Holquist (ed.), *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981, 259-422.
- Barnes, J. “Ancient Scepticism and Causation”, in M. Burnyeat (ed.), *The Skeptical Tradition*, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983, 149-203.
- Beck, H., “Interne synkrisis bei Plutarch”, *Hermes* 130.4 (2002) 467-489.
- Beuchot, M., “Retórica y hermenéutica en Aristóteles”, *Noua tellus* 25.1 (2007) 217-234.
- Boehm, G., *Plutarchs Dialog Ὑγιεινὰ παραγγέλματα analysiert und auf seine Quellen untersucht*, Diss. Giessen, 1935.
- Boudon-Millot, V., “La notion de mélange dans la pensée médicale de Galien: mixis ou crasis?”, *REG* 124 (2011) 261-279.
- Boulogne, J., “Plutarque et la médecine”, *ANRW II* 37.3 (1996) 2762-2792.
- , “Le paradigme de la crase dans la pensée de Plutarque”, *Ploutarchos* 4 (2006/7) 3-17.
- , “Les digressions scientifiques dans les Vies de Plutarque”, in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch’s Work. ‘Moralia’ Themes in the ‘Lives’, Features of the ‘Lives’ in the ‘Moralia’*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 733–750.
- Booth, W.C., “Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation”, *Critical Inquiry* 5 (1978) 49-72.
- Borthwick, E.K., “Bee imagery in Plutarch”, *CQ* 41 (1991) 560-562.
- Brain, P., *Galen on Bloodletting: A Study of the Origins, Development and Validity of His Opinions, with a Translation of the Three Works*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Brock, R., “Sickness in the body politic”, in E. Marshall & V. Hope (eds.), *Death and disease in the ancient city*, London: Routledge, 2000.

Brockmann, Chr., “Philologische Annäherungen an Chirurgie und Anatomie. Beobachtungen an Galens Kommentar zu Hippokrates, De articulis”, in C.W. Müller, Chr. Brockmann, C.W. Brunschön (eds.), *Ärzte und ihre Interpreten: Medizinische Fachtexte der Antike als Forschungsstand der Klassischen Philologie*, München/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2006, 61-80.

, “Katharsis im Streit antiker medizinischer Konzepte am Beispiel der hippokratischen Schrift Über die Natur des Menschen”, in M. Vöhler & B. Seidensticker (eds.), *Katharsiskonzeptionen vor Aristoteles. Zum kulturellen Hintergrund des Tragödiensatzes*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007, 53-63.

, “Die hippokratischen Schriften *De fracturis* und *De articulis* im kulturellen Kontext des 5. Jahrhunderts”, in: V. Boudon-Millot, A. Guardasole, C. Magdelaine (eds.), *La science médicale antique: nouveaux regards, publié en l' honneur de Jacques Jouanna*, Paris: Beauchesne, 2008, 119-137.

, “Gesundheitsforschung bei Galen”, in: Chr. Brockmann, W. Brunschön, and O. Overwien (eds.), *Antike Medizin im Schnittpunkt von Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften*, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2009, 141-154.

, “A God and Two Humans on Matters of Medicine: Asclepius, Galen and Aelius Aristides”, in M.B.Trapp, D. Russell, & H.-G. Nesselrath (eds.), *In Praise of Asclepius: Aelius Aristides, Selected Prose Hymns*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016, 115–128.

Bryan, J., *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Burnet, J., *Early Greek Philosophy*, London: A & C Black, 1930.

C

Cairns, D.L., “Mind, Body, and Metaphor in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion”, *L'Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques* 16 (Histoire intellectuelle des émotions) (2016). (DOI): 10.4000/acrh.7416 <https://journals.openedition.org/acrh/7416>

Calboli, G., "The Metaphor After Aristotle," in D.C. Mirhady (ed.), *Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of William W. Fortenbaugh* (Philosophia Antiqua 105), Leiden: Brill, 2007, 123-150.

Cambiano, G., "Pathologie et analogie politique", in F. Lasserre & P. Mudry (eds.), *Formes de pensée dans la Collection Hippocratique. Actes du IVe colloque international hippocratique, Lausanne 21-26 Septembre 1981*, Genève: Droz, 1983, 441-458.

(ed.), *Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica*, Torino: Tirrenia Stampatori, 1986.

Cartledge, P., *Spartan Reflections*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Cooper, J.M., "A note on Aristotle on Mixture", in F. de Haas & J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Book I, Symposium Aristotelicum*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2004, 315-326.

D

Dancygier, B. & Sweetser, E., *Cambridge textbooks in linguistics. Figurative language*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Debatin, B., *Die Rationalität der Metapher. Eine sprachphilosophische und kommunikationstheoretische Untersuchung*, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1995.

de Romilly, J., *La douceur dans la pensée grecque*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1979.

De Ste Croix, G.E.M., *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*, London: Duckworth, 1981.

Diller, H., "Der griechische Naturbegriff", *Neue Jahrbücher für Antike und deutsche Bildung* 2 (1939) 241-257.

Doganis, C., *Aux origines de la corruption: démocratie et délation en Grèce ancienne*, Paris: PUF, 2007.

Donini, P., "Lo scetticismo academico, Aristotele e l'unità della tradizione platonica secondo Plutarco", in G. Cambiano (ed.), *Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica*, Torino: Tirrenia Stampatori, 1986, 203-214.

Driscoll, S., "Aristotle's A Priori Metaphor", *Aporia* 22.1 (2012) 22

Dronkers, A.I., *De Comparationibus et Metaphoris apud Plutarchum*, Diss. Utrecht - Traiecti ad Rhenum: Van Boekhoven, 1892.

Duff, T., *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Durling, R.J., "Medicine in Plutarch's *Moralia*", *Traditio* 50 (1995) 311-314.

E

Eckart, K.-G., "Plutarch und seine Gleichnisse", *Theologia Viatorum* 11 (1966-72) 59-80.

Edelstein, L., "The role of Eryximachus in Plato's *Symposium*", *TAPA* (1945) 85-103.

, "The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine", in O. Temkin and C.L. Temkin (eds.), *Ancient Medicine. Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967, 349-366.

Ehrenberg, V., "Origins of Democracy", *Historia* 1 (1950) 515-548.

Erbse, H., "Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs", *Hermes* 84 (1956) 398-424.

Erschine, A., "Standing up to the Demos. Plutarch, Phocion, and the Democratic Life", M. Canevaro & B.D. Gray (ed.), *The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 237-259.

Euben, J.P., "Corruption", in T. Ball, J. Farr and R.L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 220-246.

F

Fairclough, N., *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992a.

, "Intertextuality in critical discourse analysis", *Linguistics and Education* 4.3 (1992b) 269-293.

Fernández Delgado, J.A. & Pordomingo Pardo F. (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio Espanol sobre Plutarco, Salamanca, 26 a 28 de Mayo de 1994*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1996.

Flacelière, R., “Rome et ses empereurs vus par Plutarque”, *AC* 32 (1963) 28-47.

Fortenbaugh, W.W., Huby, P.M., Sharples, R.W. and Goutas, D. (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*. 2 vols. (Philosophia Antiqua 54), Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill, 1992.

_____, *Theophrastus of Eresus Commentary Volume 8: Sources on Rhetoric and Poetics*, Leiden: Brill, 2005, 254-66.

Foucault, M., *L'archéologie du savoir*, Paris: Gallimard, 1969.

Frede, D., “On generation and Corruption I.10: On mixture and mixables”, in F. de Haas & J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Aristotle: On generation and Corruption, Book I, Symposium Aristotelicum*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2004, 289-314.

Frede, M., “Philosophy and Medicine in Antiquity”, in A. Donagan, A. N. Perovich, Jr. & M. V. Wedin (eds.), *Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Essays Presented to Marjorie Grene on the Occasion of her Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986, 211-232.

Fuhrmann, F., *Les images de Plutarque*, Paris: Klincksieck, 1964.

Fuks, A. *Social Conflict in Ancient Greece*, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, Hebrew University/Leiden: Brill. 1984.

G

García López, J., “La Naturaleza en las comparaciones de Plutarco”, in J. García López & E. Calderón Dorda, (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: paisaje y naturaleza. Actas del II Simposio Español sobre Plutarco, Murcia 1990*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1991, 203-220.

Gehrke, H.J., *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Vestigia 35), Munich: C. H. Beck, 1985.

- Georgiadou, A., *Plutarch's Pelopidas: A Historical and Philological Commentary*, Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011 (=Stuttgart; Leipzig: Teubner, 1997).
- Gibbs, R.W. Jr., (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought* (Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Giorgianni, F., (ed., trans.), *Hippokrates, Über die Natur des Kindes (De geniture und De natura pueri)* (Serta Graeca. Beiträge zur Erforschung griechischer Texte 23), Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2006.
- Gordon, P., "The Enigma of Aristotelian Metaphor: A Deconstructive Analysis", *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 5.2 (1990) 83-90.
- Grensemann, H., "Hypothesen zur ursprünglich geplanten Ordnung der hippokratischen Schriften De fracturis und De articulis", *Medizinhist. J.* 5 (1970), 217–235.
- Grensemann, H., "Das 24. Kapitel von De aeribus, aquis, locis und die Einheit der Schrift", *Hermes* 107 (1979) 423-441.
- Grmek, M. D., "Il concetto di malattia", in M.D. Grmek (ed.), *Storia del pensiero medico occidentale, Antichità e Medioevo*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1993, 323-347.
- Guidorizzi G. & Beta, S., *La metafora: Testi greci e latini* (Testimonianze sulla cultura greca), Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2000.
- H**
- Halliwell, S., *Aristotle's Poetics*, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1986.
- Hamilton, J.R., *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Hankinson, R.J., "Greek Medical Models of Mind", in S. Everson (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought. 2: Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 194–217.
- Harris, C.R.S., *The heart and the vascular system in ancient Greek medicine. From Alcmaeon to Galen*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973.
- Haverkamp, A., *Theorie der Metapher*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996, 2nd ed.

- Heidel, W.A., “Περὶ Φύσεως. A Study of the Conception of Nature among the Pre-Socratics”, *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 45.4 (1910) 79-133.
- Heinimann, F., “Eine vorplatonische Theorie der τέχνη,” *MH* 18 (1861) 119.
- , *Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts* (Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 1), Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1945.
- Helmbold, W.C. & O’ Neil, E.N., *Plutarch’s Quotations* (Philological Monographs 19), Baltimore: The American Philological Association, Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1959.
- Hesse, M.B., *Models and Analogies in Science*, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
- Hillyard, B.P., *De audiendo: A Text and Commentary*, New York: Arno Press, 1981.
- Hinds, S., *Allusion and Intertext, Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hirsch-Luipold, R., *Plutarch’s Denken in Bildern: Studien zur literarischen, philosophischen und religiösen Funktion des Bildhaften* (Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 14), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002.
- Hoffmann, H., “Why did the Greeks Need Imagery?”, *Hephaistos* 9 (1988) 143-162.
- Höffe, O. (ed.), *Aristoteles-Lexikon*, Stuttgart: Kröner, 2005.
- Holmes, B., “Pure Life: The Limits of the Vegetal Analogy in the Hippocratics and Galen”, in J.Z. Wee (ed.), *The Comparable Body: Analogy and Metaphor in Ancient Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Greco–Roman Medicine*, Leiden: Brill, 2017, 358-386.
- Huit, Ch., *La philosophie de la nature chez les anciens*, Paris: Fontemoing, 1901.
- Hunter, R., “Reading for Life: Plutarch, How the young man should study poetry?”, in R. Hunter (ed.), *Critical Moments in Classical Literature: Studies in the Ancient View of Literature and its Uses*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 169-201.
- , *Plutarch, How to study poetry (De audiendis poetis)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

I

Ieraci Bio, A.M., “Dihaireseis relative all’ ars medica di Galeno nel. Neap. Orat. CF 2.1-1 (olim XXII-1)” *Galenos Rivista di Filologia dei Testi Medici Antichi* 1 (2007) 157-160.

Ilberg, J., *Die Ärzteschule von Knidos*, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1925.

Innes, D.C., “Theophrastus and the theory of style”, in W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, and A.A. Long (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus. On His Life and Work*, New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction, 1985, 251–67.

J

Jacobs, S.G., *Plutarch’s Pragmatic Biographies: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in the Parallel Lives* (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2017.

Joachim, H.H., “Aristotle’s Conception of Chemical Combination,” *J.Phil.* 29 (1904) 72-86.

Jones, C.P., *Plutarch and Rome*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Jones, W.H.S., *Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1946.

Jouanna, J., “Présence d’Empédocle dans la Collection hippocratique”, *Lettres d’Humanité* 20 (1961) 452-463.

, “Le médecin modèle du législateur dans les Lois de Platon”, *Ktèma* 3 (1978) 77-91.

(ed.), *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen. Selected Papers. Translated by Neil Allies. Edited with a Preface by Philip van der Eijk* (Studies in Ancient Medicine 40), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012.

, “Galen’s reading of the Hippocratic text *The nature of Man*. The foundation of Hippocratism”, in Jouanna (ed.), *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen*, 313-334.

, “The Legacy of the Hippocratic treatise *The Nature of Man*: the theory of the four humours”, in Jouanna (ed.), *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen*, 335-360.

, “Politics and Medicine. The Problem of Change in Regimen in Acute Diseases and Thucydides (Book 6)”, in J. Jouanna (ed.), *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen*, 21-38.

, “Galen’s Concept of Nature,” in J. Jouanna (ed.), *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen*, 287-312.

Johnson, M., *The Body in the Mind*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.

K

Kalimtzis, K., *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease. An Inquiry into Stasis*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000.

Karamanolis, G.E., *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.

Kennedy, G., *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Aristotle, translated, with introduction, notes, and appendixes by George A. Kennedy*, New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

King, H., “Making a Man: Becoming Human in Early Greek Medicine”, in G.R. Dunstan (ed.), *The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions*, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990, 10-19.

Kirby, J.T., “Aristotle on Metaphor”, *AJPhil* 118.4 (1997) 517-554.

Kövecses, Z., *Metaphor. A Practical Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Knutzen, G. H., *Technologie in den hippokratischen Schriften περι διαίτης ὀξέων, περι ἀγμῶν, περι ἄρθρων ἐμβολῆς* (=Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz. Abhandlungen der Geistes- und sozial wissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1963, nr. 14), Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964.

Kovačić, F., *Der Begriff der Physis bei Galen vor dem Hintergrund seiner Vorgänger* (Philosophie der Antike 12), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001.

Kövecses, Z., *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Kristeva, J., "Word, Dialogue and Novel," in T. Moi (ed.), *The Kristeva reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 34–61.

Kunstmann, H.D., *Die Diät bei akuten Krankheiten. Eine Untersuchung zweier Schriften des Corpus Hippocraticum*, Diss. med. Hamburg, 1976.

L

Lakoff, G., *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987.

Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M., *Philosophy in the Flesh: the Embodied Mind & its Challenge to Western Thought*, New York: Basic Books, 1999.

Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M., *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980 (german transl.: *Leben in Metaphern. Konstruktion und Gebrauch von Sprachbildern*, Heidelberg: Carl-Auer, 2004).

Larmour, D.H.J., "Making Parallels: Synkrisis and Plutarch's 'Themistocles' and 'Camillus'", *ANRW* 2.33.6 (1992) 4154-4200.

, "Metaphor and Metonymy in the Rhetoric of Plutarch's Parallel Lives" in L. Van der Stockt (ed.), *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch, Acta of the IVth International Congress of the International Plutarch Society*, Leuven, July 3-6, 1996, Louvain-Namur: Éditions Peeters/Société Des Études Classiques, 2000, 267-281.

Lausberg, H., *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1990, 3rd ed.

Leão, D., "Plutarch on Solon's simplicity concerning natural philosophy: Sol. 3,6-7 and frgs. 9 and 12 West," in M. Meeusen & L. Van der Stock (eds.), *Natural Spectaculars: Aspects of Plutarch's Philosophy of Nature*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2015, 227-238.

Lévi-Strauss, C., *Die eifesüchtige Töpferin*, Nördlingen: Franz Greno, 1987.

Lintott, A., *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City 750–330 B.C.*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Llyod, G.E.R., *Polarity and Analogy, Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*, Cambridge: University Press, 1966.

, “Alcmaeon and the Early History of Dissection”, *Sudhoffs Archiv* 59.2 (1975) 113-147. (reprinted with new introduction in G.E.R. Llyod (ed.), *Methods and Problems in Greek Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 164–193).

, *Methods and Problems in Greek Science: Selected Papers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Longrigg, J., “Philosophy and Medicine. Some Early Interactions”, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 67 (1963) 147–75.

, *Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and Medicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians*, London, New York: Routledge, 1993.

, *Greek Medicine from the Heroic to the Hellenistic Age*, New York: Routledge, 1998.

Lonie, I.M., “Erasistratus, the Erasistrateans, and Aristotle”, *BHM* 38 (1964) 426–443.

López Férez, J.A., “Plutarco y la medicina,” in A. Pérez Jiménez & G. Del Cerro Calderón (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Obra y Tradición. Actas del I Symposium Español sobre Plutarco. Fuengirola 1988*, Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1990, 217-227.

Louis, P., *Les Métaphores de Platon*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1945.

M

Mansfeld, J., “The body politic: Aëtius on Alcmaeon on isonomia and monarchia”, in V. Harte & M. Lane (eds.), *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 78-95.

Mann, G.V., “Food intake and resistance to disease, *Lancet* 1 (1980) 1238-9.

Marcos, A., “The Tension Between Aristotle’s Theories and Uses of Metaphor”, *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 28.1 (1997) 123-139.

- Margarine, M.-H., “Sur l'origine hippocratique des concepts de revulsion et de derivation”, *L'Antiquite classique* 49 (1980) 115-30.
- Martín del Pozo, J.F., “El médico como referente pedagógico en Plutarco”, in: J.A. Fernández Delgado & F. Pordomingo Pardo (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio Espanol sobre Plutarco, Salamanca, 26 a 28 de Mayo de 1994*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1996, 185-192.
- Martin, H., “The Concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch’s Lives”, *AJP* 82.2 (1961) 164-175.
- Maucolin, B., *Untersuchungen zur hippokratischen Schrift „Über die alte Heilkunst“* (BzA 258), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.
- McCall, M.H. Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison* (Loeb classical monographs), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Meeusen, M., *Plutarch’s Science of Natural Problems. A Study with Commentary on Quaestiones Naturales* (Plutarchea Hypomnemata), Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016.
- Michell, H., *Sparta*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.
- Michler, M., “Die Praktische Bedeutung des normativen Physis-Begriffes in der Hippokratischen Schrift de Fracturis-De Articulis,” *Hermes* 90.4 (1962) 385-401.
- Montanari, F., Goh, M., Schroeder, Ch., (eds.), *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek (GE)*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015.
- Morales Otal, C. & Garcia López, J., *Obras morales y de costumbres*, Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1985.
- Morau, P., “Galien comme philosophe: la philosophie de la nature”, in V. Nutton (ed.), *Galen: Problems and Prospects. A collection of papers submitted at the 1979 Cambridge conference*, London: Wellcome Institute, 1981, 87-116.
- , *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias-Zweiter Band: Der Aristotelismus im I und II Jh.n.Chr.* (Vol. II = PERIPATOI 6), Berlin/New York: Walter Gruyter, 1984.

- Morison, B. *On Location: Aristotle's Concept of Place* (Oxford Aristotle Studies), Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.
- Mossé, C., "Plutarch and the Sicilian tyrants n Ancient Tyranny", in S. Lewis (ed.), *Ancient Tyranny*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, 188-195.
- Mudry, Ph., *La Préface du De medicina de Celse. Texte, traduction et commentaire*, Rome: Institut Suisse, 1982.
- Müller, C.W., "Schreibkunst oder Malerei?", *Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften* 49.3 (1965) 307-311.
- Müller, C.W., Brockmann, Chr. & Brunschön, C.W. (eds.), *Ärzte und ihre Interpreten: Medizinische Fachtexte der Antike als Forschungsstand der Klassischen Philologie*, München/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2006.
- N**
- Nikolaidis, A.G., "Γύρω από την ορθογραφία των λέξεων πράος/πράιος και φιλόνικος /φιλόνεικος," *Hellenica* 32 (1980) 364-370.
- , "Plutarch's Contradictions", *C&M* 42 (1991) 153-186.
- Novokhatko, A., "The use of the term 'metaphor' in Latin linguistic discourse before Quintilian," in P. Poccetti (ed.), *Latinitatis rationes. Descriptive and Historical Accounts for the Latin Language*, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2016, 395-409.
- , "The linguistic treatment of metaphor in Quintilian," *PALLAS* 103 (2017) 311-318.
- , "The typology of linguistic metaphor in first-century CE Roman thought", in N. Holmes, M. Ottink, J. Schrickx, M. Selig (eds.), *Words and Sounds*, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2019, 384-398.
- Nutton, V., "Galen and Medical Autobiography", *Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc.* 18 (1972) 50-62.
- , "Medicine and Philology in Renaissance Paris", in C. W. Müller, C. Brockmann & C. W. Brunschön (eds.), *Ärzte und ihre Interpreten. Medizinische Fachtexte der Antike*

als Forschungsgegenstand der Klassischen Philologie. Fachconferenz zu Ehren von Diethard Nickel, Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2006, 49-59.

, *Ancient Medicine*, London/New York: Routledge, 2013.

O

Opsomer, J., *In Search of the Truth: Academic Tendencies in Middle Platonism* (Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 60, Nr. 163.), Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1998.

P

Pelling, C.B.R., “Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives”, *JHS* 99 (1979) 74-96.

, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source Material”, *JHS* 100 (1980) 127-140.

, “Synkrisis in Plutarch’s Lives”, in Brenk, F. E. & Gallo, I. (eds.), *Miscellanea plutarchea. Atti del I convegno di studi su Plutarco, Rome, 23 novembre, 1985*, Ferrara: Giornale filologico ferrarese, 1986, 83-96.

, “Aspects of Plutarch’s Characterisation”, *ICS* 13.2 (1988) 257-274.

, *Plutarch Caesar: Translated with an Introduction and Commentary* (Clarendon Ancient History Series), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Pender, E., “Plato on Metaphors and Models”, in G.R. Boys-Stones (ed.), *Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition. Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 55-81.

Pérez Jiménez, A., & Del Cerro Calderón, G. (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Obra y Tradición. Actas del I Symposium Español sobre Plutarco. Fuengirola 1988*, Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1990

Pérez Jiménez, A., García López, J., Aguilar, R.M. (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S., Madrid – Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo de 1999*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999.

Pérez Jiménez, A. & F. Titchener (eds.), *Historical and biographical values of Plutarch's Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society*, Malaga/Logan: University of Malaga/Utah State University, 2005.

Piccirilli, L., “Commento. Vita di Cimone,” in C. Carena - M. Manfredini - L. Piccirilli (eds), *Plutarco. Le vite di Cimone e di Lucullo* (Scrittori greci e latini), Milano: Fondazione Lorenzo Valla, 2001, 203-268.

Plati, E., “Medical Allusions and Intertext in Plutarch's Comp. Cim. et Luc. 2.7” in T.S. Schmidt, M. Vamvouri Ruffy & R. Hirsch-Luipold (eds.), *The Dynamics of Intertextuality in Plutarch* (Brill's Plutarch Studies), Leiden: Brill, 2020, 376-387.

Plese, Z., “Deformity (anapêria) Plutarch's Views on Reproduction and Imperfect Generation in the Moralia and Lives” in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work. 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 773-784.

R

Rapp, Ch. (ed.), *Aristoteles Rhetorik. Übersetzt und erläutert von Christof Rapp. 1. Halbband* (Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 4/1), Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002a.

, *Aristoteles Rhetorik. Übersetzt und erläutert von Christof Rapp. 2. Halbband* (Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 4/2), Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002b.

Rashed, M., *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la "Physique" d'Aristote (Livres IV-VIII) Les scholies byzantines. Édition, traduction et commentaire* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina 1), Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011.

Reedy, J. *Galen. De tumoribus praeter naturam*, Diss. University of Michigan, 1968.

Reggiani, N., “Giustizia e misura. Le riforme di Solone fra polis e cosmo”, in V. Gheller (ed.), *Ricerche a confronto. Dialoghi di Antichità Classiche e del Vicino Oriente*, Milano: Edizioni Saecula, 2013, 13–22.

Richards, I.A., *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936.

Ricœur, P., “La métaphore et le problème central de l’herméneutique,” *RPhL* 70.5 (1972) 93-112.

Roselli, A., “I commenti di Galeno ai trattati chirurgici (fratture / articolazioni ed officina del medico): Problemi di tradizione ippocratica e galenica”, *Stud. Class. Orient.* 41 (1991) 467–475.

, “Note sulla tradizione dei commenti di Galeno ai trattati chirurgici di Ippocrate: l’apporto degli scoli ad Oribasio”, in A. Garyza & J. Jouanna (eds.), *Storia e ecdotica dei testi medici greci. Atti del II Convegno Internazionale, Parigi 24–26 maggio 1994*, Napoli: M. D’Auria, 1996, 375–388.

, “Dalla δικαίη φύσις dei trattati chirurgici alla δικαιοσύνη τῆς φύσεως di Galeno”, in A. Thivel & A. Zucker (eds.), *Le normal et le Pathologique dans la Collection hippocratique. Actes du Xème Colloque International Hippocratique Nice, 6-8 octobre 1999*, Nice: Faculté des Lettres, Arts et Sciences Humaines de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, 2002, 731–752.

Roskam, G., “Aristotle in Middle Platonism. The case of Plutarch of Chaeronea”, in T. Bénatouïl, E. Maffi & F. Trabattoni (eds.), *Plato, Aristotle, or Both? Dialogues between Platonism and Aristotelianism in Antiquity*, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms, 2011.

, “Plutarch on Aristotle as the first Peripatetic” *Ploutarchos* 6 (2008/9) 25-44.

Ross, D.O., *Backgrounds to Augustean Poetry: Gallus, Elegy and Rome*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Russell, D.A., “On Reading Plutarch’s ‘Lives’”, *G&R* 13.2 (1966) 139-154.

S

Saïd, S., "Plutarch and the People in the Parallel Lives," in L. de Blois, J. Bons, T. Kessels & D.M. Schenkeveld (eds.), *The Statesman in Plutarch's Works, Volume II: The Statesman in Plutarch's Greek and Roman Lives* (Mnemosyne Suppl. 250/2), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004, 5-25.

Sandbach, F., "Plutarch and Aristotle", *ICS* 7 (1982) 207-232.

Schenkeveld, D.M., "Pap.Hamburg.128: A Hellenistic Ars Poetica", *ZPE* 97 (1993) 67-80.

Schiefky, M., *Hippocrates On Ancient Medicine: Translated with Introduction and Commentary*, Leiden: Brill, 2005.

Schmidt, T.S., Vamvouri Ruffy M. & Hirsch-Luipold R. (eds.), *The Dynamics of Intertextuality in Plutarch* (Brill's Plutarch Studies), Leiden: Brill, 2020.

Schmitt, A., *Aristoteles Poetik*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008.

Schöffel, G., *Denken in Metaphern. Zur Logik sprachlicher Bilder*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987.

Schöner, E., *Das viererschema in der antiken Humoralpathologie* (Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften: Beiheft 4), Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1964.

Schumacher, J., *Antike Medizin. Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Medizin in der griechischen Antike*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1940.

Schwabe, W., *'Mischung' und 'Element' im Griechischen bis Platon*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1980.

Senzasono, L., *Plutarco: Precetti Igienici a cura di Luigi Senzasono* (Corpus Plutarchi Moraliu 12), Napoli: D'Auria, 1992.

, "Health and Politics in Plutarch's de tuenda sanitate praecepta", in J. Mossman (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World: Essays on Plutarch*, London: Duckworth/Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 1997, 113-118.

Shipley, D.R., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos: Response to Sources in the Presentation of Character*, Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Silk, M.S., *Interaction in poetic imagery with special reference to early Greek poetry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Skoda, F., *Médecine ancienne et métaphore. Le vocabulaire de l'anatomie et de la pathologie en grec ancien*, Louvain-Paris: Peeters-Selaf, 1988.

Snell, B., *Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 9th edition, 2011 (=Hamburg: Verlag Classen und Goverts., 1946).

Sprengel, K., *Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte der Arzneykunde*, Leipzig: Gebauer, 4th edition, 1846 (=Halle: Gebauer, 1792).

Stadter, P.A., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press Enduring Editions, 1989.

, "Plato in Plutarch's Lives of Lycurgus and Agesilaus," in A. Pérez Jiménez, J. García López, and R.M. Aguilar (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S., Madrid - Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo de 1999*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999, 475-86.

Steen, G.J., *Understanding metaphor in literature: An empirical approach*, London/New York: Longman, 1994.

, "The Paradox of Metaphor", *Metaphor and Symbol* 23 (2008) 213-241.

, "Three kinds of metaphor in discourse: A linguistic taxonomy," in A. Musolff, & J. Zinken (eds.), *Metaphor and discourse*, Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 25-39.

Stein-Hölkeskamp, E., "Kimon und die athenische Demokratie," *Hermes* 127 (1999) 145-164.

Swain, S.C.R., "Plutarch's characterization of Lucullus," *RhM* 135 (1992a) 307-316.

, "Plutarchan Synkrisis", *Eranos* 90 (1992b) 101-111.

Swiggers, P., "Cognitive Aspects of Aristotle's Theory of Metaphor, *Glotta* 62 (1984) 40-45.

T

Temkin, O., *The Double Face of Janus and Other Essays in the History of Medicine*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.

Teodorsson, S.-T., "Plutarch and Peripatetic Science", in in A. Pérez Jiménez, J. García López and R. Ma Aguilar (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S. (Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7 de mayo de 1999)*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 665-674.

, "Plutarch, amalgamator of Greece and Rome", in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener (eds.), *Historical and biographical values of Plutarch's Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society*, Malaga/Logan: University of Malaga/Utah State University, 2005, 283-324.

, "The Education of Rulers in Theory (Mor.) and Practice (Vitae)", in A. G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work: 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, Berlin/New York, 2008, 339-350.

Todd, R.B., *Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Stoic Physics. A study of the De mixtione, with preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary* (Philosophia Antiqua 38), Leiden: Brill, 1976.

Triebel-Schubert, C., "Der Begriff der Isonomie bei Alkmaion", *Klio* 66.1 (1984) 40-50.

Tröster, M., "Struggling with the Plêthos: Politics and Military Leadership in Plutarch's Life of Lucullus," in A.G. Nikolaidis (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work: 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 387-402.

Tsekourakis, D., "Die Ursachen von Krankheiten bei Plutarch," *Ελληνικά* 40 (1989) 257-269.

V

Valverde Sánchez, M., “Los símiles en el Erótico de Plutarco”, in J.G. Montes Cala, M. Sánchez Ortiz de Landaluze & R.J. Gallé Cejudo (eds.), *Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco, Cádiz, 14–16 de Mayo de 1998*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999, 501-516.

Vamvouri Ruffy, M., “Symposium, Physical and Social Health in Plutarch’s Table Talk”, in K. Oikonomopoulou & F. Klotz (eds.), *The Philosopher’s Banquet, Plutarch’s Table Talk in the Intellectual Culture of the Roman Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 130-157.

, *Les Vertus thérapeutiques du banquet: médecine et idéologie dans les Propos de Table de Plutarque*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012a.

, “Physical and social corruption in Plutarch”, in: P. Bosman (ed.), *Corruption and integrity in Ancient Greece and Rome (Acta Classica Supplementum IV)*, Pretoria: Classical Association of South Africa, 2012b, 131-150.

Van der Eijk, P.J. (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine. Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity (Studies in Ancient Medicine 20)*, Leiden: Brill, 1999.

, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

, Van der Eijk, P.J. & Francis S., “Aristoteles, Aristotelismus und antike Medizin”, in: Chr. Brockmann, W. Brunschön and O. Overwien (eds.), *Antike Medizin im Schnittpunkt von Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften*, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2009, 213–234.

, “Von der Natur des Menschen. Menschenbild und Naturwissenschaft im antiken und frühchristlichen Denken”, Berlin, 2010. (DOI): 10.18452/1750; <https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/18452/2402/eijk.pdf?sequence=1>

- , “Galen on the nature of human beings”, in P. Adamson, R. Hansberger, and J. Wiberding (eds.), *Philosophical themes in Galen*, (BICS Suppl.114), London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2014, 89-134.
- , “Galen on the assessment of bodily mixtures”, in B. Holmes & K.-D. Fischer (eds.), *The Frontiers of Ancient Science: Essays in Honor of Heinrich von Staden*, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2015, 675–698.
- Van der Eijk, P.J. & Singer, P.N. (eds.), *Galen: Works on Human Nature. Mixtures (De Temperamentis)*, (Cambridge Galen Translations 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Van der Stockt, L., “Twinkling and twilight: Plutarch’s reflections on literature”, Brussels: Paleis der Academiën (AWLSK), 1992.
- , “Plutarch on τέχνη”, in I. Gallo (ed.), *Plutarco e le scienze. Atti del IV Convegno plutarco, Genova - Bocca di Magra, 22-25 aprile 1991*, Genova: Sagep, 1992, 287-295.
- , *Plutarchea Lovaniensia. A Miscellany of Essays on Plutarch* (Studia hellenistica 32), Lovanii: Peeters Publishers, 1996.
- Vázquez, D., “Metáfora y analogía en Aristóteles (Metaphor and Analogy in Aristotle)“, *Tópicos* 38 (2010) 85-116.
- Vegetti, M., “Empedocle medico e sophista: l'antica medicina 20”, *Elenchos* 19 (1998) 345-360.
- Vegetti, M., “Tradition and truth. Forms of philosophical-scientific historiography in Galen’s *De Placitis*”, in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 1999a, 333-358.
- Vegetti, M., ‘Historical strategies in Galen’s physiology’ in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 1999b, 383-395.
- Vlastos, G., “Solonian Justice,” *CPh* 41.2 (1946) 65-83.

, "Isonomia", *AJP* 74.4 (1953) 337-366.

, "The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato's Republic," in D.W. Graham (ed.), *Studies in Greek Philosophy/Gregory Vlastos, Vol. II: Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 69-103.

von Staden, H., 'Rupture and Continuity: Hellenistic Reflections on the History of Medicine', in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 1999a, 143-187.

, "Celsus as Historian?", in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine*, 1999b, 251-294.

W

Wehrli, F., "Der Arztvergleich bei Platon", *MH* 8 (1951) 177-184.

Weidauer, K., *Thucydides und die hippokratischen Schriften*, Heidelberg: Winter, 1954.

Weinrich, H., "Semantik der Metapher", in H. Weinrich (ed.), *Sprache in Texten*, Stuttgart: Klett, 1976, 295-316.

, "Semantik der kühnen Metapher", in A. Havenkamp (ed.), *Theorie der Metapher*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996, 316-339.

Weissenberger, B., *Die Sprache Plutarchs von Chaironea und der pseudo-plutarchischen Schriften*, Diss. Würzburg 1895.

Y

Yaginuma, S., "Plutarch's Language and Style", *ANRW* II.33.6 (1992) 4726-4742.

Z

Zadorojnyi, A.V., "Libraries and paideia in the Second Sophistic: Galen and Plutarch", in G. Woolf, J. Koenig & K. Oikonomopoulou (eds.), *Ancient Libraries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 377-400.

Appendix: Summary

My dissertation entitled “Medical Metaphors in Plutarch: The Example of πολιτικὴ ἰατρεία” aims at exploring the medical metaphors in Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives* and *Moralia* through the lens of medical terms and theories. As a medical metaphor, I define every metaphorical mapping that springs from the medical discourse. This is projected into the Plutarchan Corpus in order to shed light on abstract terms and matters pertaining mainly to politics. The medical equivalent of this metaphorical mapping is mirrored – in terms of the theory of interdiscursivity – in Hippocrates, Galen, and early Byzantine medical authors. This analogical structure of metaphor is further applied in my study as a bi-polar crossing from medicine to politics under the umbrella of philosophy. In this respect, the first chapter is built upon the axis of the neighbouring frontiers between medicine and philosophy and concludes with Plutarch’s position in this tradition. Plutarch seems to be theoretically in line with the Platonic philosophy which elevates the philosopher above the physician. However, the rest of this study proves that Plutarch’s association with Plato is put aside when matters of medicine are at the forefront. For Plutarch’s medical knowledge implied through medical metaphors does reflect his adherence not to Plato, but rather to Aristotle. Plutarch’s alignment with the basic principles of the Aristotelian philosophy shapes his portrait of ‘Plutarchus Aristotelicus’, which is apparent throughout this study in view of physical or medical matters. In this respect, Plutarch meets Galen through Aristotle. Apart from the philosophical and medical background, the application of medical metaphors in Plutarch meets the prerequisites of the theoretical treatment of metaphor, given in the second chapter. Here, I take a comparative look into ancient theories on metaphor including Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Galen, and the *Papyrus Hamburgensis* 128, connecting them with the modern conceptual metaphor theory. In light of this, the main research focus explores the different targets and contexts of medical metaphors located in Plutarch’s works, with an emphasis on the terms of ‘justice’ and ‘physis’ in chapter III. The concept of ‘political medicine’ is further analysed in chapter IV, which focuses on his most evident political treatise: *Precepts of Statecraft*. Here, I explore cross-references between the *Moralia* and the *Lives* on the axis of common medical metaphors (e.g. the gentle ruler-physician). Furthermore, the ideal of the ruler-physician who “mixes” the citizens proportionally in the political body is interpreted in terms of mixture theories in the last chapter of my study, which mostly proves Plutarch’s scientific knowledge. To conclude, medical metaphors as part of Plutarch’s pedagogical and political ideal are embedded in both his ‘descriptive’ and ‘expository’ moralizing technique.

Anhang: Zusammenfassung

Meine Dissertation „Medizinische Metaphern bei Plutarch: Das Exemplum der πολιτικὴ ἰατρεία“ hat zum Ziel, die medizinischen Metaphern in Plutarchs *Parallelbiographien* und den *Moralia* durch die Linse der medizinischen Begriffe und Theorien zu untersuchen. Als medizinische Metapher definiere ich jegliches metaphorische Abbilden, das einem medizinischen Diskurs entspringt. Dies wird auf das Plutarchische Corpus projiziert, um abstrakte Termini und Themen hauptsächlich aus dem politischen Bereich zu beleuchten. Das medizinische Äquivalent dieses metaphorischen Abbildens wird – gemäß der Theorie der Interdiskursivität – gespiegelt bei Hippokrates, Galen und frühbyzantinischen Autoren. Diese analogische Metaphernstruktur wird in meiner Untersuchung des Weiteren verwendet als bipolares Wechseln von der Medizin in die Politik unter dem Mantel der Philosophie. Somit ist das erste Kapitel aufgebaut auf der Achse der Grenzlinien zwischen Medizin und Philosophie und schließt ab mit Plutarchs Position innerhalb dieser Tradition. Plutarch scheint theoretisch in Einklang mit Platons Philosophie zu sein, welche den Philosophen über den Arzt erhebt. Es wird sich jedoch im Laufe der Untersuchung erweisen, dass Plutarchs Assoziierung mit Platon in den Hintergrund tritt, wenn medizinische Belange im Vordergrund stehen. Denn Plutarchs medizinisches Wissen, impliziert durch seine Metaphernverwendung, reflektiert seine Zugehörigkeit nicht zu Platon, sondern eher zu Aristoteles. Plutarchs Ausrichtung an den Grundprinzipien der aristotelischen Philosophie formt das Bild des ‚Plutarchus Aristotelicus‘, welches in dieser Untersuchung durchgängig bei den physischen oder politischen Zusammenhängen offenbar wird. In dieser Hinsicht begegnet Plutarch Galen über Aristoteles. Neben dem philosophischen und medizinischen Hintergrund erfüllt der Gebrauch von medizinischen Metaphern bei Plutarch die Voraussetzungen der theoretischen Behandlung der Metapher im zweiten Kapitel. Hier stelle ich eine komparative Betrachtung von antiken Metapherntheorien an, einschließlich derer von Platon, Aristoteles, Plutarch, Galen sowie dem *Papyrus Hamburgensis* 128, und verbinde sie mit der modernen kognitiven Metapherntheorie. Damit liegt der zentrale Fokus der Untersuchung auf den verschiedenen Zielen und Kontexten der Medizinmetaphern in Plutarchs Werken, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Begriffe von „Gerechtigkeit“ und „Physis“ im dritten Kapitel. Das Konzept der ‚politischen Medizin‘ wird weiter analysiert im vierten Kapitel, welches Plutarchs wohl politischsten Traktat gewidmet ist, den *Regeln der Staatskunst*. Hier untersuche ich die inneren Bezüge zwischen den *Moralia* und den *Biographien* auf der Achse der gemeinsamen medizinischen Metaphern (z.B. des

sanften Herrscher-Arztes). Des Weiteren wird das Ideal des Herrscher-Arztes, der die Bürger in den politischen Organisationen proportional „mischt“, im letzten Kapitel der Untersuchung im Lichte von Theorien zur Mischung interpretiert, was Plutarchs wissenschaftliches Wissen weitgehend unter Beweis stellt. Schließlich werden die medizinische Metaphern als Teil von Plutarchs pädagogischem und philosophischen Ideal eingebunden sowohl in seine ‚deskriptive‘ wie auch seine ‚erklärende‘ moralisierende Technik.

Appendix: Publication list

The pages: p.5 (partly), p.35-36 (partly), p. 58-61, p. 70-75, and p. 85-86 of my dissertation have been published (slightly modified) in the following essay: Plati, E., “Medical Allusions and Intertext in Plutarch’s *Comp. Cim. et Luc. 2.7*”, in T.S. Schmidt, M. Vamvouri & R. Hirsch-Luipold (eds.), *The Dynamics of Intertextuality in Plutarch* (Brill’s Plutarch Studies), Leiden: Brill, 2020, 376-387.

Index locorum

Alexander of Aphrodisias

330b 25-30: 142

De mixt.

334b 5: 132

233.14-24 Bruns [= SVF 2.735]: 136

334b 11-12: 142, 148

234.23-32: 136

Metaph.

Anaxagoras

991a 21-22: 29, 56

DK 59 B21a: 44

Phys.

Apollonius

192b 8-13: 71

In Hipp. De artic. comm.

198b 10: 71

2.10.28-29 Schöne: 64

229a 7-18: 67

229a 17-30: 68

Aristotle

229b 1-2: 68

A. Po.

229b 3-4: 68

97b 37-38: 38

229b 7-10: 68

230a: 77

EN

230b 26-27: 75

1103a: 86

253b 33-254a 1: 69

GC

Po.

326a 11-b 6: 130

1457b 6-7: 30, 53

326a 11-12: 142

1457b 16-26: 52

328a 2 : 132

1459a 9: 32, 52, 58

328a 29-31: 142, 146

329a 34: 130

Pol.

329b 22-4: 130

1274a 32-34: 146

329b 11: 130

Resp.

480b 22-30: 21

480b 30: 22

480b 29: 22

Rh.

1404b 34: 32

1405a 4-10: 32

1405b 11: 31

1404b 26-1405b 21: 49

1406b 20-22: 12

1407a 11-15: 12

1408a 6-9: 55

1411a 1: 32, 52

1457b 7-8: 52, 53

1457b 9-13: 52, 53

Sens.

436a 19-b1: 21

436a 22: 22

436b1: 22

Top.

139b 34-35: 38

153a 21-22: 38

Auctor ad Herrenium

Rhet. Her. 4.34.45: 30

Celsus

Med. prooem.

6-7: 16

8: 20

Chrysippus

frg. 471 (v. Arnim, *SVF* 2.151-153): 135

Cicero

Brutus

75.262: 31

79.274: 30

Diogenes Laertius

Vit. Phil.

10.40.6: 54

Dionysius Thrax

Ars. 1: 51

Erotianus

Voc. Hippocr. Collect.

32.12-13 Nachmanson: 73

Galen

De caus. procat.

8.102-3 K.: 77

De comp. med. sec. loc.

10.564-7: 101

10.637 K.: 101

De cur. rat. per venae sect.

11.285.12 Kühn: 103

11.287.6-8: 104

11.287-8: 103

11.287.14: 104

11.308-10: 104

De diebus decr.

9.823.5-7 K.: 156

De elem. ex Hipp. sent.

CMG 5.1.2 De Lacy: 123

3.8: CMG 5.1.2.70.18: 132

8.11-13: CMG 5.1.2.126.1-12: 124

De meth. med.

10.15.8 Kühn: 72

10.107.9-12: 25

10.107.16: 25

De morb. causis

7.21-2 K.: 124

De morbis popul. (= Epidem.)

1.2.5.8-13 : 159

De nominibus medicis

9.12-22: 39

De plac. Hipp. et Plat.

5.2.36-38: CMG 5.4.1.2.302.8-16 De Lacy:
109

6.1.8: CMG 5.4.1.2.362.5-6: 72

6.1.8: CMG 5.4.1.2.362.4-5: 73

6.1.9: CMG 5.4.1.2.362.6-9: 72

8.4.23: CMG 5.4.1.2.504.1: 100

8.4.20-21: CMG 5.4.1.2.502.16-25: 124

De puls. diff.

8.675.4 Kühn: 39

8.675.9-11: 40

8.690.4-6: 42, 55

8.688-689: 42

De san. tuenda

6.120.1-6 K.: 41

De sem.

1.9.8-11: CMG 5.3.1.94.6-16 De Lacy: 44

De temp.

1.510. 8-9 K.=1.16-17 Helmreich: 124

1.519 K.= 7.5-22: 124

1.529-537 K. =13.5-18.22: 123

2.603 K.= 59.20-21: 101

3.675.4-6 K.= 104.1-3: 124

De tum. praeter nat.

7.727.9-13 K.: 80

De venae sect. adv. Erasistr.

11.161 Kühn: 101

11.176-7: 103

11.178-9: 101

11.177.7: 104

11.183: 103

*De venae sect. adv. Erasistrateos Romae
deg.*

11.216 Kühn: 102

11.220-221: 102

11.236.9-10: 102

11.238: 103

De victu att.

1.2.: CMG 5.4.2.433.14-15 Kalbfleisch: 150

In Hipp. Aphor. comm.

17b 529-532 K. (= Hipp., Aph. 2.34.1-3): 73

In Hipp. De artic. comm.

18a 320.6-15 K: 66, 68

In Hipp. De fract. comm.

18b 335.7-16 Kühn: 70

18b 581.11-13: 65

18b 599.1-13: 83

In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.

CMG 5.9.1. Mewaldt: 123

[Prooem] 11, CMG 5.9.1.8.19-20: 123

1.6: CMG 5.9.1.21.15-18: 133

1.20: CMG 5.9.1.33.1-13: 126

1.31: CMG 5.9.1.41.27: 100

1.40: CMG 5.9.1.51.2-3: 100

3.2: CMG 5.9.1.90.18-92.7: 158

Quod opt. med. sit etiam philos.

1.61.7-10 K.: 26

Hippiatr. Berolin.

96.2.2: 111

Hippocrates

Aphor.

5.62.4-6: 4.554.15-556.2 Littré.: 122

De artic.

17: 4.130.16-19 L.: 63

17: 4.130.13-16 L.: 63

De diaet. acut

2.5.: 404.10-408.1 L.: 104

De fracturis

1: 3.412.1-8 L.: 58, 60

3: 3.426.3-18 L.: 58

3: 3.426.3-16 L.: 64, 68

13: 3.460.10-466.8 L.: 65

42: 3.550.6 L.: 73

De medico

11.1-3: 9.216.13-15 L.= CMG 1.1.23.29-31
Heiberg: 150

De nat. hom.

4: CMG 1.1.3.174.3-6 Jouanna: 122

De nat. puer.

18: 7.504 L.: 45

De prisc. med.

20. 1-10: 1.620.6-622.2 L. = CMG 1.1.51.6-
15 Heiberg: 19

Epid. I

1.11: 1.2.5.634.6-636.4 L.: 159

Mochl.

38: 4.382.3-386.13 L.= 65

Leo

Conspect. medic.

7.26.1-4: 63

Palladius

Scholia In Hipp. De Fract.

24.19-21 Irmer: 62

Pap. Hamb. 128

37-65: 50

46-48: 53

Paulus Aeginita

Epitom. med. libr. sept.

6.118.1.1 = CMG 9.2.175.18-19 Heiberg: 63

Plato

Gorg.

518e:150

Leg.

691e-692a: 147

Pol.

277d 1-2: 29

287b 1-2: 29

297e 8-13: 28

Rep.

557d : 156

562b-c: 154

562c-d: 154

562d: 155

Soph.

228a 1-b1: 108

Plutarch

Lives

Ages.

27.1-2: 107

27.2.2-5: 107

Alex.

18.2-3: 47

Caes.

29.5.5-6: 153

57.4: 97

Cam.

9.3: 94

9.5: 95

Cat. Min.

26.1: 98

Cic.

40.2: 45

Cim.

1.13: 9

15.2 : 154, 156

Comp. Ages. et Pomp.

2.2: 160

Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.

3.1.9-12: 151

Comp. Cim. et Luc.

2.7: 58, 59, 68, 74, 85

2.5: 59

2.5-6: 59

Dion

53.4: 154, 156

Comp. Dion-Brut.

2.2-3: 97

Dem.

2.4: 46

Galba

13.3.6-7: 153

Lyc.

4.3.5: 148

5.6-8: 147

5.11: 148

8.9: 148

13.5: 148

31.1: 148

Mar.

35.2: 153

Pel.

13.7: 46, 47, 48

<i>Per.</i>	327C: 151
3.2: 120, 163	329 B-C: 151
7.8.3 : 155	329C: 39
9.5: 60	
11.1 : 152	<i>De aud.</i>
11.3: 152	44A: 151
	44A-B: 151
<i>Sol.</i>	46E: 78
3.6-7: 76	46F-47A: 79
3.7: 58, 74	
13.1-3: 144	<i>De aud. poet.</i>
15.1: 75, 91, 92	16B: 48
18.1: 144, 145	
	<i>De cap. ex inim.</i>
<i>Moralia</i>	89A-89C: 80
	89C: 81
<i>Adv. Col.</i>	
1111D: 128	<i>De comm. not.</i>
1111D-E: 128, 129	1078A-D: 136
1111E: 129, 130, 143	1078D: 136
<i>Aet. Rom. et Graec.</i>	<i>De fort. Rom.</i>
295D: 155	322F: 47
<i>Antiq. Rom.</i>	<i>De glor. Athen.</i>
10.31.1.3-5: 111	347F: 48
	<i>De prim. frig.</i>
<i>Conjug. Praec.</i>	948B-C: 22
142E-F: 133, 145	947E: 131
<i>De Al. Magn. fort.</i>	

De Pyth. orac.

405D: 47

407A: 47

409D: 47

De sera num.

550C: 116

De Stoic. rep.

1055B: 68

De tuenda

122C:1

122B-D: 1

122E: 5, 14

135E: 46

De unius

826F: 154

De virt. mor.

451F: 131

Praec. ger. reip.

803A: 46

809E: 9

812D-E: 145

812E: 145

814F: 9, 89

814F-815A: 89

815B: 9

814F-815C: 88

815A: 90

815B: 94

818B: 9

818D2-5: 98

818 D5-E5: 97

818E: 9

823F: 116

823F-824A: 116, 119

824A: 9, 115, 120, 142, 143, 163

824B: 117

824C: 109, 159

825A: 110

825C: 111

825C-D: 110

825E: 9, 111

Quaest. Conviv.

692C : 46, 48

Quest. Natur.

915E: 118

Quaest. Plat.

1000F: 46

Ps.-Galen

Definitiones medicae

19.460.15 K.: 62

Ps.-Plutarch

Plac. Philosoph.

5.29: 76

5.30: 8, 118

Quintilian

Inst. Or.

8.6.35: 40

8.6.18: 41

Stephanus

In Hipp. Aphor. comm.

5.23: *CMG* 11.1.3.3.76.4-7 Westerink: 82

6.45: *CMG* 11.1.3.3.258.19-20: 82

Stobaeus

Antholog.

4.37.2: 8

4.38.29: 8