

# FORMALIZING ROLES TO ASSESS EXTRA REGIONAL POWERS' INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY: SOUTH AMERICA, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2015

Universität Hamburg

Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften

Dissertation

Zur Erlangung der Würde des Doktors der Wirtschafts- und  
Sozialwissenschaften

„Dr. Phil“

(gemäß der Promotionsordnung vom 24. August 2010)

vorgelegt von

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Hamburg, 2019

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## Acknowledgments

Although only my name appears on the cover of this dissertation, its research and writing process was, without a doubt, a team effort. A lot of people, at one point or another, helped me sail across the untamed waters of doing a Ph.D. Now that I am reaching the shore, they deserve public credit. I could not have done it alone.

I must highlight the constant support and advice I received from Professor Doctor Detlef Nolte. From the very first day, and even before that, Professor Nolte helped me find my own research voice. He guided me without imposing. His experience and knowledge contributed to the development of this research, and his insights and feedback were critical for narrowing and centering the focus of my dissertation. He always found time to address my doubts and supported me all along this journey. I will always be grateful. Professor Doctor Leslie Wehner also deserves my recognition. His extensive knowledge on role theory gave me the tools to tackle the most difficult sections of this dissertation. He encouraged me to find alternative roads to operationalize my research problem, and always backed up my solutions.

I also want to thank my home university. In addition to having studied my B.A. there, the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana opened me its doors to become an academic. It also provided me with time and resources to think and develop my research. Former Dean Claudia Dangond saw in me academic potential and hopefully this document turns out to be a small retribution for her support. Doctor Eduardo Pastrana also played a significant role in this endeavor. He encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D. and showed me Germany as a destination where I could fulfill my goals. In addition, his experience and advice helped me throughout this journey.

I am also grateful for the support I received at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA). GIGA offered me an inquisitive and critical environment, which was stimulating and challenging at the same time. The Academic Director of GIGA's Doctoral Program, Dr. Miriam Prys-Hansen, and the Acting Academic Director, Dr. Maren Wagner, had always time and disposition to help me when in need. I also want to acknowledge Stephanie Stövesand's guidance and orientation, especially as a newcomer in Hamburg.



My fellow doctoral students, most of them now Doctors, were always there for me. Although this is not an exhaustive list, and I hope that I am not forgetting anyone, I want to acknowledge Markus Kirchschrager, Medha, Christoph Heuser, Insa Ewert, Lisa Bunselmeyer, Martin Ostermeier, Simone Schotte, Carolina Guerrero, Víctor Mijares, and Isabel Rosales. Thanks for your friendship and colleagueship.

I want to stress my wife's support and sacrifices she made from the very moment I decided to come to Hamburg. Bibiana's encouragement helped this project stay afloat. I know that it was not easy, and her encouragement gave me the necessary forces to keep walking. I am glad that we have chosen each other for this adventure, and now that we have fulfilled our academic goals, I hope we can embark in new ones as the team we are. A team that now includes Laura! She motivates me in unimaginable ways, and now I understand that the three of us can take anything life has to offer.

This journey began two decades ago, even before I decided to pursue an academic career. A journey that began with my parents' support and encouragement, and that included Australia and now Germany. Mom, I guess that my sister and I took after you in your love for teaching. Thanks for the lively math discussions that are at the center of this dissertation. Dad, you are a role model for me, and your sacrifices will never be forgotten.

Hamburg, April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2019

Eduardo Velosa

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Research Topic

After more than two decades of economic growth, the People's Republic of China (China/PRC) is playing a more active role in the international system. It has engaged different regions in the world pursuing raw materials to support its economic development and, in parallel, has promoted the building of a multipolar world; a world that could foster its rise. One of the regions that has seen this intensification of interactions with China since the turn of the century has been South America. In fact, some analysts argue that Beijing's foreign policy, including its trade and aid, are consequential for regions across the world, including South America (Foot & Walter, 2011, p. 17).

China's engagement in this region, once subject to the sole influence of Washington and branded as the United States' "backyard", occurs at a time when the United States "is no longer the dominant variable in the foreign relations of most Latin American countries" (Muñoz, 2001, p. 73). This does not mean, however, that the United States has withdrawn from the region (Emerson, 2010, p. 38), as the dominant narrative on hemispheric relations has implied (Feinberg et al., 2015, p. 1). Washington is still a relevant economic, political, and military actor in the region. In this sense, South America is facing two distinct forces, albeit different in their intensity, derived from the simultaneous interactions it has with these two powers. Moreover, given that these two powers have different understandings of how the international order should be, it could be presumed that the United States and China are pressing South America for foreign policies aligned with their own interests.

This competition is the focus of this dissertation. However, instead of privileging the actions of the PRC and the United States, it takes the agential perspective of South American states. Using role theory as the main theoretical frame, it delves into the role conceptions and performances of South American states that include either Washington or Beijing as Significant Others. Specifically, by concentrating on the concepts of role set, role conflict, and role change, this dissertation's main goal is to assess the influence of China on the constitution of South America's role sets vis-à-vis the United States.

After the end of the Cold War, liberal optimists declared the “end of history,” as democracy and free markets became the building blocks of a new world order. In the 1990s Latin America did not escape these logics. On the one hand, democracy became the predominant political regime across the region. On the other hand, after the “debt crisis” of the 1980s, distinct Latin American governments implemented neoliberal principles embodied in the Washington Consensus. In this new environment, the then President George H. W. Bush launched the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, followed by Bill Clinton’s Summit of the Americas and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. These were platforms designed to bring the region closer to Washington’s interests.

By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the region’s outlook was rather different. Failures in addressing inequality and economic development in the context of the prevailing economic order led to changes in the region. A series of left-wing candidates won their respective presidential campaigns in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, starting the so-called “Pink Tide” in the region. These new leaders, with their own nuances, rejected the economic orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus and steered their economic systems in different directions, ending the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas process. These changes were nurtured by the commodities price boom, boosting “government revenue in most South American countries, [and] opening opportunities for significant investment aimed at promoting greater equity” (Beasley-Murray et al., 2009, p. 320). Precisely, one of the drivers of these new conditions was China’s thirst for natural resources and investments in the region. The PRC became a main destination of South America’s primary products, and a source of financial resources for countries that saw the international financial institutions’ doors closed.

These dynamics outline the temporal-spatial scope of this research. Although interactions between China and Latin America can be traced back to colonial times (Cheng, 2006, p. 500), it is only after the rapprochement between the People’s Republic of China and the United States in the 1970s that official diplomatic relations were established. Between 1970 and 1982, China established diplomatic relations with 13 Latin American states (Tsai & Tai-Ting Liu, 2012, p. 290), which led to increasing exchanges in the 1980s and 1990s (Mora, 1999, p. 91). It is, however, only from the

2000s onwards that China began to practice “an active diplomacy towards Latin America” (Zhu, 2016, p. 81), and thereby displaying the characteristics of a Significant Other. Between 2001 and 2015, Chinese presidents and premiers visited 12 different Latin American states (Dussel Peters, 2015, p. 7), in what can be deemed as the exercise of presidential diplomacy. Brazil was the primary choice of these visits. Brazilian leaders hosted in total 6 different visits, followed by Argentina (4), Chile (4), and Cuba (4). These top-level exchanges carried symbolic meanings, and were “effective in achieving foreign-policy goals” (Zhu, 2016, p. 10), such as opening markets for Chinese products, securing supply of raw materials, and signing cooperation agreements in different areas with its Latin American counterparts. In addition, China publicized its first policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008, precisely at the time when the United States was facing its subprime mortgage market crisis, that would later develop into an international crisis. In this policy paper, the Chinese government set out its interests in the region and the areas in which Latin America and China could cooperate. Amidst these visits and framed within the policy paper, trade between China and Latin America soared from 2000 onwards. Chinese investments and loans started to become important for the region after the 2008 crisis. In this sense, the turn of the century worked as an inflection point in Sino-Latin American relations.

Based on these considerations, the timeframe of this research spans 1990 to 2015. This period allows for the assessment on an ex ante ex post fashioning of the impact China has had, given the changes in their interactions on South American foreign policies. This design enables setting up a baseline for South American role sets—the 1990s, when the United States was a Significant Other and China was not yet in the picture as such—and also permits the identification of changes in those role sets as a consequence of the integration of China as a Significant Other, along with the United States—after the 2000s, when the PRC started to interact with the region in a more active manner.

The end of the period also takes into account crucial events for South America. 2015 marks the end of the commodities price boom. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF (2020), the average price for a barrel of oil in 2013 was \$104.07 US dollars. In 2014, the average price fell to \$96.25, and plummeted in 2015 to \$50.79 US dollars. Oil exporting countries, such as Venezuela, saw that prices in 2015 were less than a half of what they earned two years before. Soybeans exporters, such as Argentina and Brazil, experienced losses as well. The price for a metric ton in 2013 was \$517.20

US dollars and in 2014 it was \$457.81. In 2015 it lost a third of its 2013 value, reaching \$347.36 US dollars. Besides the economic impact of falling prices for countries in the region, the end of 2015 was also politically significant. On December 10<sup>th</sup>, the Kirchners' era ended in Argentina, with Mauricio Macri being sworn into office as new president. In the same month, the impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff began in Brazil and nine months later, she was ousted from office. These two political changes signal the first stage of the finalization of the "Pink Tide" in the region.

China's engagement also has spatial determinants. The most prominent feature of the PRC's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean has been economic interactions. Although Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean have seen an increasing presence of China in their territories, the highest volume of economic relations has been oriented towards South America. Indeed, from an economic perspective, South America has outperformed the other subregions in its interactions with China (Rosales & Kuwayama, 2012, p. 74). Politically, the Chinese government has also privileged South America over the rest of Latin America. China has established six strategic partnerships in Latin America, five of which are with South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela (Feng & Huang, 2014, p. 18). In this sense, it is more likely that China has had a more visible impact on South American foreign policies than on the rest of the region.

Addressing China's influence on South American foreign policies due to its growing relations with the region, mediated by the presence of the United States, tackles both empirical and disciplinary concerns. On the one hand, some analysts see China's engagement with the region as an opportunity for states in the region to "replace the United States with China as a primary benefactor" (Dreyer, 2006, p. 85), thus affecting the overall regional configuration and the economic, political, and security relations Washington has with the region (Pham, 2010, p. 372). Besides the economic drivers of the Sino-South American relations, China also seems to be offering alternative international norms that "are more appealing to the regional states than those by the US" and "by playing the China card, they can effectively hedge against the US, equipping them with a greater leverage over Washington" (Choo, 2009, p. 72). The most radical view holds that China is creating "a 'sphere of influence' in the traditional 'backyard' of the United States" (Yu, 2015, p. 1048), thus challenging "U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere" (Roett & Paz, 2008, p. 1). This research, then, provides concrete answers

to these empirical questions by analyzing the extent to which South American states have included China in their role sets and tracing the consequences of this inclusion for their foreign policies.

On the other hand, from an alternative theoretical approach, that of role theory, this research adds nuances to the portrayal of China-United States-South America triangle. The rise of China and its evolving relations with South America (or Latin America in general), and the consequences for the United States have been addressed from systemic perspectives. For example, Strüver (2014), Hsiang (2016) and Urdinez et al. (2016) use tenets of power transition theory to examine the competition between China and the United States in a regional setting, as a token of global dynamics. Overall, they portray these relations as a zero-sum game, where gains made by China necessarily imply losses for the United States. In this sense, the focus of these analyses is on the great powers. This black and white picture overlooks the complexity and multidimensionality of these interactions and neglects the agential side of South America. Drawing upon role theory allows this research to offer an alternative picture. First, by relying on the concept of role set, this research develops a range of possible political spaces within the foreign policies of South America where the competition between China and the United States can be identified. In this sense, it breaks down distinct levels of relations, eliminating the zero-sum dichotomy of ally and enemy, adding complexity to international dynamics. Second, role conflict and role change address the actual extent of China's influence on the foreign policies of these states. Third, this research uses social network analysis as a novel tool not only for identifying roles, but also to see how they relate to each other and how they changed over time. In this sense, this dissertation takes a step further in the development of role theory in foreign policy analysis and advocates for its usage as a means to gain deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics of the competition between China and the United States.

## **1.2 Literature Review**

This dissertation addresses distinct strands of International Relations literature. A first set of literature tackles the idea of China's rise and its impact on the international order, that is, the consequences for the United States-led international order. In all, these texts questions what type of power China is (would be) and what the implications the rise of China would have for the United States. Is China's rise going to be peaceful? Is a war

inevitable between an incumbent power—the United States—and its challenger—China? The Brzezinsky-Mearsheimer debate, almost 15 years ago, summarized the main answers to these questions (2005). On one side, represented by Brzezinsky's optimistic position, China's rise can be peaceful if accommodated into the current international order. This position is based on the overarching liberal paradigm of International Relations that contends that engagement and interdependence reduce the likelihood of war because international institutions can socialize a rising power into existing practices and norms. It will depend, then, on the policies of the established powers, mainly the United States, to open up a space for China's interests (Ikenberry & Slaughter, 2006, pp. 49–51), and manage the complex cooperative and conflictive nature of their relations (Gill, 2007, p. 16). Among the authors who take this position are Zhu (2005), Jannuzzi, Hills, and Blair (2007), Deng (2008), Men (2009), Buzan (2010), and Breslin (2010). They all share the idea that China's rise does not lead inevitably to war, if the United States, and the West, implement policies commensurate to the challenges China's rise presents.

As opposed to this, Mearsheimer contends that China's interests cannot be accommodated into the existing international order, and that China's increasing material capabilities will inevitably become a source of conflict between the United States and China (2003). Resting on the realist paradigm of International Relations, and specifically on power transition theory and on offensive realism, the central question is not if China's rise will lead to war, rather when this will happen. In this sense, the premise used is that war is more likely between rising powers and dominant powers than not (Allison, 2015). The reason lies on the observation that eventually the rising power will feel dissatisfied with the international order (Tammen & Kugler, 2006) and will strive for change. Starting from its very own region, the ascending state will attempt to push away external powers and reward or punish neighbors according to the acceptance of these new conditions (Xiaoting Li, 2016). The status quo power will try to protect that same order. These opposing expectations will clash, and eventually will lead to a serious conflict. Therefore, the idea of being amidst a power shift "have profound practical implications" (Pan, 2014, p. 405). Here, East Asia will be ground zero. Indeed, "the most likely route to war with China is via a dispute involving one or more of the United States' Asia allies" (Miller, 2014, p. xxi), especially Taiwan (A. Goldstein, 2007).

In this opaque scenario, Geis and Holt argue that the United States should be prepared for China 2030 (2009). At that moment in time, China's capabilities should be comparable



to the United States, hence Washington should not allow Beijing to catch up militarily or technologically because militarily, “trend lines are moving against the United States” (Heginbotham et al., 2015, p. 21). Zhao joins in, stating that eventually China will want to “create a new political model, rather than just follow the established political order” (2016, p. 562), a model that will “challenge Western, and especially American, global supremacy” (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 21). This transition will not be peaceful, and actions from the United States and its allies to impede this bleak future should not wait. As Freidberg bluntly states,

Downplaying or denying the competitive aspects of Chinese behavior will not make them disappear, but it could make it much harder to respond to them in a measured and timely way. Fear of creating self-fulfilling prophecies may cause our nation and our friends and allies to refrain from doing things that might actually help to deter threats, reduce risk, and keep the peace. And failure to acknowledge potential future dangers could leave us ill-prepared to deal with them should they eventually emerge. A serious discussion of how best to meet the challenges posed by a rising China cannot wait until we have dealt with other urgent problems; debate on this issue is not only necessary, it is long overdue (Friedberg, 2011, pp. 5–6).

In the end, from a realist perspective, relations between both powers “are doomed to be competitive now and well into the future” (Tellis, 2012, p. 90). Conflict looms, and the only possibility to avoid it altogether, as one analyst suggests, is the “abdication of America’s position as a great power in Asia. This is not likely until and unless Washington concludes that America cannot sustain this position” (Roy, 2013, p. 57). Based on these insights, “Beijing and Washington are, indeed, on a collision track” (Lim, 2015, p. 297).

Between these two opposite poles, other authors posit different alternatives. On the one hand, Chin and Thakur suggest that China’s rise is following a third way, whereby Beijing internalizes selected norms that favor its development and ascendance, while claiming its right “to be at the table for rewriting some others” (2010, p. 120). This duality enables China to play a role of bridge-builder (Clegg, 2011) between the interests of the South and the established rules of the North.

On the other hand, but linked to the third way, another position claims that China is “certainly not about to ‘rule the world’” (Shambaugh, 2013, p. 248). Domestic fragility, fears of the Chinese Communist Party that it would loose its grip, and the “Taiwan-issue”

make China a “fragile” power (Shirk, 2007). In this sense, fears about China are deeply overstated and any suggestion on impending conflict between the United States and China overlooks empirical evidence.

In this sense, China’s rise and its effects on the international system can be summed up by three possible scenarios (Glenn, 2016, pp. 191–205): China is not able to continue to increase its capabilities and, even more critically, it implodes, and the threat vanishes; China becomes fully integrated in the current international order, and therefore, a major conflict with the United States is avoided; or, the most pessimistic scenario of the three, China grows strong enough to become a real challenger to the United States, and the likelihood of a major war between them increases dramatically.

Finally, a distinct way of looking at the revisionist power versus the status quo power turns the logic upside down. Analysts have contended that given the development of the current international order and the foreign policies implemented by China and the United States in recent times, the roles played by Beijing and Washington reverse the predominant logic (Chan et al., 2019; De Soysa & Midford, 2012). China has behaved according to the ‘rules of the game,’ supporting the basic tenets of the liberal order, thus playing the role of responsible stakeholder. Conversely, the United States has been undermining the international order it helped create, acting out its own interests in total disregard of the international norms. This behavior corresponds to that of a revisionist power.

The present dissertation engages with this debate. As it analyses the extent of China’s influence on the foreign policies of South America and the consequences it has for the region’s relations with the United States, this research provides empirical evidence to the effects of China’s rise. More significantly, the concepts of role sets, role conflict, and role change help single out where exactly China’s influence (or not) on the regional foreign policies has played out and if this influence has reached levels that challenge the United States’ standing in the region.

More specifically, a second set of literature that this research addresses focuses on the United States-China-Latin America triangle. This literature turns its attention to the relations of China with the region, using, to various degrees, the United States as a point

of reference and comparison. Among the burgeoning literature that is being written to make sense of the PRC's intentions in Latin America, two broad groups that include a political dimension in these relations can be found. They differ on their conclusions, that is, the effects of China on the region's relations with the United States. On the one hand, some analysts make the case for a benign presence of China for the regional and international orders. The main contention of this body of work is that given the nature and extent of their interactions, Beijing does not present a real challenge to the United States in the region, at least not yet (Cheng, 2006; Choo, 2009; Dosch & Goodman, 2012; Dreyer, 2006; Martínez, 2014; Nolte, 2013). It has not altered the security dynamics of the region (Spanakos & Yu, 2012, p. 184), nor has increased trade affected the voting behavior of the region at the General Assembly (Domínguez, 2006, p. 13).

According to this line of thought, the main interest being pursued by the PRC in the region is economic and it is not interested in political meddling (Ding, 2008, p. 208): Gaining access to raw materials and food, and opening markets for its own goods are the main aims. These goals do not necessarily clash with Washington's. In fact, contrary to common perception, China does not privilege the region's left-wing governments over liberal ones. Therefore, the idea that China is supporting only authoritarian regimes (e.g., Venezuela or Cuba) is overstated (Brand et al., 2015, p. 21).

Moreover, despite the rhetoric of some leaders in the region, China has not supported the development of an autonomous regional policy (Legler et al., 2018), being autonomous the key word of these regional policies (Giacalone, 2015; Jaguaribe, 1979; Tokatlian & Carvajal, 1995). Those regional organizations that propose a radical political and economic view of the international order, such as the *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* (ALBA), do not enjoy the full support of Beijing. Conversely, China has engaged both "traditional" and recently-created Latin American multilateral forums as political spaces in which it can deal with the whole region, adding a regional facet to its bilateral strategy. From this perspective then, China is playing under the rules Washington laid down decades ago.

On the other hand, other analysts contend that China's interactions with the region should be a matter of concern for the United States. Although these relations do not represent an economic, political, or security crisis for the United States at the moment, the fact that the distance across the Pacific is diminishing is altering the configuration of

the region, even physically (Ellis, 2013) and, therefore, changing the region's alignment with Washington (Pham, 2010; Urdinez et al., 2016). Moreover, the PRC has taken advantage of the United States' retreat from the region, especially after 9/11. In this sense, China has filled the void left by the United States, even as Washington has prioritized other regions, such as the Middle East or East Asia. Although military exchanges between the region and China do not compare to those with the United States, China's inroads into South America is changing the security landscape of the region. In this sense, Beijing is a prospective challenger to Washington in the region (Ellis, 2011).

The evidence presented in this body of work shows that trade, the most visible trait of Sino-Latin American relations has affected previous foreign policy alignments of the region with the United States (Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013; Strüver, 2014). They have shown how an increase in bilateral trade between China and a Latin American states is correlated with a convergence in their voting behavior at the United Nations General Assembly. In this political space, China and the region "have found ample common interest when they have joined forces to promote the agenda of developing countries in the post-Cold War era" (Mora, 1999, p. 93). Furthermore, economic and financial resources derived from exchanges with China have given Latin American states the means to exercise a more autonomous foreign policy, causing the region and the United States to drift apart (Wigell, 2016). Additionally, China's strategic partnerships with the region are aimed at debilitating Washington's influence in the region (Yu, 2015).

Another strand of literature focuses exclusively on China-Latin American relations from an economic perspective. Overall, the main conclusion is that Latin America in general, and South America in particular, have taken the opportunity to bandwagon China's model of economic growth as suppliers of raw materials (Oviedo, 2013, p. 16). At the same time, China's physical presence in the region, mostly via foreign direct investments, implies changes and challenges to the economic structure of the region (Ellis, 2014).

From a positive perspective, economic relations are good, despite these challenges (Hernández Rodríguez, 2013; Xing Li, 2016). China has been able to satisfy, in part, its need for natural resources and Latin America has found a market for its primary goods and benefited from the commodities boom. However, the region still needs to take the

necessary steps to improve its competitiveness (Gouvea & Kassicieh, 2009), a factor that deters Latin America to go a step further in its development.

The other side of the argument is that the economic relations have been negative for Latin America (Ray, 2016). Despite the “win-win” rhetoric of the economic relations, the exchanges only serve China’s interests (Bernal-Meza, 2016; Ray et al., 2015). The terms of trade are unequal. While Latin America is exporting primary products and commodities to China, Beijing is opening markets for its manufactured and technological goods. This is the same type of economic dependency forged by Latin America and the West during the twentieth-century, and China was supposed to help the region break past these hegemonic relations. This has not happened, however. In actuality, the region has seen processes of re-primarization and non-integration (Ortiz Velásquez & Dussel Peters, 2016).

This dissertation engages the literature on China-Latin America-United States relations from a novel perspective. As it was pointed out, there are opposing conclusions regarding China’s engagement with South America and its effects on the region’s relations with the United States. One source of this ambivalent findings rests on the fact that usually analysts treat the region as the setting where the competition between China and the United States unfolds, without taking into account the regional states’ own perceptions and interests regarding the international and regional orders and their place in those configurations. Another source is neglecting the multidimensionality of the relations between South America and the extra regional powers.

From a role theory perspective, these problems can be partially solved. On the one hand, role theory, and specially the concepts of role set, and role conflicts allow this research to focus on South American foreign policies, without discarding the interests and actions of the PRC and the United States. In this sense, the assessment of the effects of China’s presence in the region via South American roles’ conceptions and performances is balanced against their own relations with the United States.

Although there is an incipient interest in using role theory to analyze South American foreign policies, such as the works of Thies (2017b), Wehner (2015, 2016), and Wehner and Thies (Wehner & Thies, 2014), there is a deficit in terms of studies that address the

regional setting and its interactions with extra regional powers simultaneously. In this sense, this dissertation opens up avenues for future research from this approach.

On the other hand, by using social network analysis, content analysis, and congruent procedure, this research follows the trajectories of South American foreign policies along distinct dimensions of international relations. The analysis of the economic, political, and military dimensions of the relations between South America, and China and the United States offers a panoramic view of the extent of the engagement of China in the region and its effects on the United States.

Moreover, it also compares the level of interconnection across these dimensions over a longer period than is usually the case. Most of the studies that directly take into account China and the United States start their observations at the turn of the century, or even after that point. Their conclusions, then, are mediated by anecdotes or data that seem impressive, but are historically or comparatively weak. The literature on Chinese foreign direct investments is a case in point (an overview of this literature is presented in Chapter 5).

### **1.3 Research Questions, Objectives, and Hypothesis**

Based on the considerations of the previous sections, this research addresses the influence of China in South American foreign policies, considering the presence of the United States in the region. Therefore, the overarching research question is **how has the intensification of relations with China affected South American foreign policies amidst the influence and presence of the United States in the region?**

To answer this overarching question, the following several subsidiary questions need be addressed from the theoretical perspective employed in this dissertation: What is the position that South American states occupy in the regional order? What meanings and functions do South American states attach to the roles that compose their role sets? What activities do South American states perform to sustain the meanings of these roles? What are the expectations that the United States and China have of these roles? To what degree do South American states conform to each of the extra regional powers' expectations? Finally, are there roles that ought to be enacted due to the expectations

of one extra regional power and that cannot be used to form a role relationship with the other? Is the intensification of relations with China a factor mediating the choice of these roles?

This set of subsidiary questions provides the context and the logic of this research. Therefore, the following objectives are associated to these questions and the overarching research question:

1. Identify the position each South American state occupies in the regional order.
2. Assess the level of interactions between China, the United States, and each of the positions that compose the regional hierarchy.
3. Identify the functions and orientation that South American, Chinese, and American leaders have for their respective states.
4. Evaluate the relationships between the functions and orientation attributed by South America with those attributed by China and the United States.
5. Assess the congruence between the foreign policies of South America and the foreign policies of China and the United States.
6. Evaluate the degree of interactions between South America, China and the United States.
7. Identify conflicting expectations of the United States and China with South American role performances.
8. Assess the effect China has had in those conflictive role relationships.

The hypotheses related to the research questions are the following:

1. The more China engages a South American state, the more likely it is that the latter enters experiences a role conflict with the United States.
2. The position a state occupies in the South American pecking order is not affected by its relations with China or the United States.
3. The level of relations a South American state has with China changes the meanings it attaches to the functions in the system it has in opposition to the United States.
4. The level of relations a South American state has with China affects the enactment of its foreign policies towards the United States.

## 1.4 Methodology and Methods

The main goal of this research is to grasp a substantial process in foreign policy, that of role conflict and role change. Therefore, it follows a factor-centric research design because the concern is 'in providing evidence for one or more particular causal mechanisms and effects' (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 8). That is, the effect of China's relations on South America's foreign policies in relation to the United States. As it is theory-based, it is mainly deductive, although it acknowledges that empirical data can have feedback effects on the research design. Since the main idea is to assess China's rise and its impact on South America, a region influenced for long by the United States, the emphasis is on outside-in/top-down explanations.

It follows a longitudinal design, encompassing 26 years, from 1990 to 2015. This time-span allows for before-after comparisons (Folz, 2011, p. 149). In this sense, since China began its active relations with South America after the turn of the century, this period of observations allows for the assessment of the extent Chinese influence on the region's foreign policies.

Based on the nature of the research problem, its design includes a quantitative multi-methods approach. Social Network Analysis and Content Analysis are used to identify the positional and functional aspects of South American roles, respectively. The advantages of each method, as well as their disadvantages, and their operationalization based on the research problem and the theory are explained at length in the following chapters (chapter 3 for Social Network Analysis, and chapter 4 for Content Analysis).

Additionally, the design also includes a cross-case comparison based on the methods stated above and the congruence procedure, adding a qualitative feature to the research. This procedure, following Rosati, focuses on the level of consistency between the content of ideas, such as the ones sustaining roles, and the actual foreign policy of a state (1995, p. 65). Although it lacks the capacity to determine strict causality, it allows for association between the variables, which suffices for the purposes of this research.

The data gathered for this analysis came from primary sources of the role beholders (in chapter 4, the state's leader's speeches at the United Nations General Assembly are



used). However, secondary sources are privileged. These secondary sources can be divided in two: databases and scholarly work. The databases depict economic, political, and military relations among the South American states and between them and China and the United States (chapters 3 and 5). At each step of the analysis, each database, its operationalization, and the logics behind its usage will be explicated. The literature on the subject matter will help in explaining those instances where role conflict is present. As Müller argues, “even if these studies have not used the role conception, they are likely to lend themselves to an exegetic exercise which would help establish a solid description of the role that this actor plays, according to these studies, in international relations” (2011, p. 57).

## **1.5 Structure**

The organization of the dissertation is as follows. The following chapter deals with role theory. It explains the basic concepts that make up the core of the theory and formalizes them. As its main contribution, it proposes a general formalization of role conflict and a specification for a situation where Ego deals with two Significant Others, which is the case of this research. The third chapter examines the concept of role as position within South America using Social Network Analysis. As a result, a regional social order is depicted, and confronted with the relations these states have with China and the United States. It also serves as a case-selection process for taking the research forward.

The fourth chapter uses Content Analysis to set up a baseline of roles as functions based on the speeches of the states’ leaders at the United Nations General Assembly. The coding of these speeches was based on the definitions of the roles identified by Holsti (1970) and Thies (2017b). Finally, the chapter includes a description of the resulting classification of meanings and orientations of each president’s roles. The fifth chapter picks up this portrayal to assess the role relationships between the South American states and China and the United States. In a first step, it uses, again, Social Network Analysis to establish how the presidents are related to each other based on their role conceptions, as well as how the roles are related to each other according to the presidents’ conception. These relations provide the elements to identify which roles were an ideal space for role conflict to occur. Based on this, it describes the content the United States and China give to the Defender of the Faith role. Following this, the chapter presents the assessment of the foreign policies of South America based on the faiths of

the extra regional powers, identifying intra-role conflicts. Lastly, this chapter evaluates the extent of the relations of South America and China and the United States to assess which power occupies a place as Significant Other to the South American states. In a circular analysis, these results were contrasted with the role relationships identified at the beginning of the chapter to determine which states had role conflicts due to the inclusion of China as a Significant Other in their role sets. Finally, the conclusions supplies the main findings of this research.

“Perhaps every science must start with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps without metaphor there would never have been any algebra” (Black, 1962, p. 242)

## **2. Theoretical Chapter**

The following chapter introduces the main theoretical concepts and relations of role theory that allows grasping an understanding of the influence of China on South American foreign policies and their relations with the United States. It starts with the definition of role, distinguishing between its characteristic as position and as patterns of behavior within a social system. The explanation of the basic concepts of role theory follows. After this, using set theory it delves into the formalization of key concepts for the research: role set and role relation. It also presents a general formalization of role conflict and then presents an applied version of this formalization dealing with two Significant Others, which is the core of the dissertation, and one of its contributions to role theory research. It closes with one of the effects of role conflict: Role change.

### **2.1 The Concept of Role**

Roles are very elusive, as most of the social sciences' concepts. As argued by Biddle (1986, p. 68), the role concept is understood in different manners by role theorists. For example, Turner (2006, p. 233) claims that roles are patterns of behavior or attitudes that belong together, to which Bengtsson and Elgström (2012, p. 94) add the appropriateness of these patterns or the expectations attached to them. Other authors claim that these behaviors are linked to a certain position in a social system (Aggestam, 1999, “The Concept of Role”, para.1; Brandes, 2016, p. 7; Keohane, 1969, p. 296; Nyström et al., 2014, p. 484; Stryker & Burke, 2000, p. 289). From an exclusive structural perspective, roles can be equated just to structural positions (Gould & Fernández, 1989, p. 94).

Against this structural perspective, when Holsti (1970, pp. 241–247) introduced role theory to foreign policy analysis, he differentiated the identification of the position a state belongs to within the international system (or status according to his terminology) from the actions and decisions that correspond to the actual foreign policy of this state. In so doing, he downplayed the structural effects on roles and privileged their domestic sources, especially the leaders' conceptions on how their state should behave (a point

that will be addressed later). However, more recent usage of the role concept accepts that these two sources, external and domestic, are at interplay (Le Prestre, 1997a, p. 6). Additionally, following McCourt, the concept of role actually “connect self and society, identity and action, agent and structure, and are therefore central to our understandings of individual action in everyday life” (2012, p. 370).

In this sense, roles cannot be confined to either side of the structure-agency spectrum. Indeed, Harnisch posits, “Social roles cannot be reduced to cognitive structures in individuals or structural domains, such as material economic conditions or immaterial discourse” (2012, p. 52). Therefore, roles are *both* positions in a social system, and patterns of appropriate or expected behavior belonging to a socially recognized category of actors (Harnisch, 2011, p. 8; Thies, 2017a, “The Descriptive Conceptual Language”, para. 1; Wehner & Thies, 2014, p. 414). This is the definition that is going to be used in this dissertation. This conceptualization allows to consider and account for, at the same time, both the constraining side of roles (Barnett, 1993, p. 275) and their enabling quality given by the actors’ agency (Hollis & Smith, 1986, p. 276; Wehner, 2015, p. 438).

Their restricting feature is mostly associated with the structural elements contained in the definition of social roles. Following these ideas, the “social structure is regularities in the patterns of relations among concrete entities” (White et al., 1976, p. 733). Therefore, the international system, as a whole structure, emerge from the interaction among different states (Maoz, 2011, p. 109), creating these patterns of behavior.

This interactional perspective means that structures “come into being and evolve via a process of formation” (Salvini, 2010, p. 373). With this in mind, change is an open possibility if states interact with each other in different manners (Wendt, 1992). This take on structure departs from common understandings of this concept provided by the realist paradigm of international relations, where changes in the structure are mainly associated with changes in its ordering principle or in the distribution of capabilities of the units composing it (Lake, 1997, p. 60, 2009, p. 36; Waltz, 2010, p. 100).

The interactional approach states, then, that the structure “is the ultimate arbiter of whether the role(s) chosen by any state is reflective of the underlying ‘reality’” (Thies, 2012, p. 30). A social structure “limits the kinds of definitions available to call into play,

and thus limits possibilities for interaction” (Stryker, 2006, p. 226). This constraining effect serves as a reality check for the declarative content of roles and their physical manifestation. However, it should be stressed that these structures indeed “do not determine this action” (Salvini, 2010, p. 374), but are indispensable in a foreign policy analysis because they allow states to “be what they are” (McCourt, 2014, p. 37).

As stated above, roles also have an enabling characteristic, which is mainly associated with the agential side of social life. From a general perspective, agency can be defined as “the capacity of socially embedded actors to appropriate, reproduce, and, potentially, to innovate upon received cultural categories, and conditions of action in accordance with their personal and collective ideals, interests, and commitments” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, pp. 1442–1443). This means that states have the ability to choose which roles to enact, or even change their contents – which meanings and actions correspond to which roles (Wehner & Thies, 2014, p. 419).

In the end, this definition of role transcends its script metaphor. Actors are not necessarily just following a predetermined routine, as was suggested by Checkel when he stated that when “role playing is at work, agents will comply with group/community norms, but in a nonreflective manner” (2007, p. 12). On the contrary, they can improvise amidst their interactions, they can add new meanings to the roles they are playing, or even dismiss altogether the group’s prescriptions. These ideas, then, situate this research “in the middle ground between the dichotomous positions of rationalism and constructivism” (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017, p. 1208).

These two features, the constraining and enabling sides of roles, are not separated from each other. Understanding roles as positions and as patterns of behavior implies that structure and agency, although analytically separable, are intertwined as “determinants of foreign policy behavior” (Breuning, 2011, p. 16). Indeed, what actors choose to do through their interactions construct the structure, which in turn has the capacity to have an effect on the actors’ behaviors (Maoz, 2012, p. 248). Therefore, any explanation of foreign policy must include their connection to one another, or in other words, how they “interact reciprocally” (Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 250).

## 2.2 Roles as Positions in a Social System

The first element used to build the concept of roles, i.e., roles as position in a social system, is the result of the interactions among the different units that constitute such system. This idea of position means that the location of an actor in the system is a “relational construct” (Sheppard, 2002, p. 318). Therefore, the position a given state occupies in the international system is the result of its set of relations with other members of this system, on the one hand, and of the set of relations the other members have with each other, on the other hand.

This definition of position broadens the idea defended by Waltz. For him, a state’s position in the international system (rank in his terminology) is a function of six attributes: “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz, 1993, p. 50). This kind of approach to defining the position of states is commonly used in analysis based on the realist paradigm, as exemplified by the four clusters of states identified by Mares (1988, p. 456). More recently, the attributes approach is used as part of more elaborated conceptualizations to classifying states in an international power ranking (Nolte, 2010, pp. 884–889).

Therefore, although these attributes are indeed important, they cannot be automatically translated into roles as positions. Following Maoz, “the pecking order of states is determined not only by their relative capabilities or wealth, but also in terms of their international status, which is also a function of the structure of exchange relations among states” (2011, p. 214).

Thies (2001, p. 708, 2012, p. 33, 2015, p. 285) and Whener (2015, pp. 435–436), following Holsti’s terminology described above, consider a state’s position in the international system and its status as synonyms and deem these as comprising a master role. Bengtsson and Elgström use the concept of meta-role to depict this same idea (2011, p. 114), while Ovali uses the concept of main role (2013, p. 4). In this reading, a state’s status follows “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes” (Larson et al., 2014, p. 7). Although these valued attributes are closely related to Waltz’s proposition given above, the idea that collective beliefs compose a status starts to broaden the concept in a relational or interactional way. Moreover, these authors then

continue to describe the features status has. In this sense, status “is *collective*, *subjective*, and *relative* (...) is recognized through voluntary *deference* by others” (Larson et al., 2014, p. 8, emphasis in the original). Thus, status in the international system reflects on the one hand a “social order”, and “‘social judgments’ and recognition of others” (Freedman, 2016, p. 800), on the other hand. The logic behind this elicitation is to point out that master roles are drawn from the understandings and relations that states have in the international system, which in turn compose it. In the end, “status is held in the public domain (Leifer, 1988, p. 874).

In this vein, Maoz argues that there are two types of status: ascribed and achieved. The latter refers to what a state “accomplishes through its own attributes and efforts”, whereas the former refers to “the prestige accorded to an actor through the recognition by others of these achievements” (2011, p. 225). Therefore, although a good starting point to unveiling master roles is to look for states’ capabilities and rank them accordingly, it is also necessary to include what kind of relations this focal state has with the rest of the members of the system it belongs to, and how these other members of the social system behave toward that focal state in terms of validating or contesting that position. According to a recent research, these differences are related to a hierarchy of prestige and a hierarchy of deference patterns, respectively (R. Wolf, 2019, p. 2).

The implications of this approach are two-fold. On the one hand, it is necessary to analyze several types of relations, e.g. economic, political, or security relations. One dimension of the social life of a state, for example, its economic muscle and interactions, will portray just one side of its international position, or its master role. Therefore, including different relations allows to grasp the actual master role a state has in a social system. In the case of this dissertation that system is South America. On the other hand, the idea of having different relations to account for a master role implies that there could be some connections between or among different relations, i.e., a state’s trade relations can also influence its security relations or vice versa. Besides, this multidimensional approach also helps explain why some states that do excel in one realm of international politics but not in another one are not considered to have a better position in the social system.

## **2.3 Roles as Patterns of Behavior**

The second component of the definition of roles is the patterns of expected or appropriate behavior that corresponds to a recognized category of actors. This definition is attached to the ideas that “individual behavior in social contexts is organized and acquires meaning in terms of roles” (R. H. Turner, 2006, p. 233), and that “status and roles become concepts serving to connect culturally defined expectations with these patterned conduct and relationships which make up a social structure” (Merton, 1957, p. 110).<sup>1</sup> Thus, as mentioned above, the two elements of roles, positions and behavior, are present and reinforce each other. The same happens with the idea of the mutual constitution of agent and structure.

Moreover, the connections between behavior and roles, and the social context they are embedded in, are produced through the interactions among different actors. Therefore,

Behavior depends on a named or classified world providing ends toward which human activity is directed and the means by which these ends are (or are not) achieved. That world represents opportunities for action, conditions that enhance or defeat success, and makes more or less probable contact with others with whom persons cooperate or conflict as they act. Names or class terms attached to the physical and social environment carry meanings: shared behavioral expectations growing out of social interaction. One learns from interaction how to classify objects and in that process learns the expectations for behavior with reference to those objects. Among the class terms are symbols used to designate positions, relatively stable morphological components of social structures, and the kinds of persons it is possible to be in a society. Attached to positions are the shared behavioral expectations conventionally called roles. Roles, necessarily social in derivation and in that all roles at least implicitly reference counterroles, vary in ways important to interaction: they may carry strong norms or not; require specific behaviors or be couched in nonspecific terms; be clear in demands made or vague and uncertain; apply to few interactions or across a large range of interactions, and so on. (Stryker, 2006, pp. 225–226).

This classification of social actors, the kind of people one can be within society, is, as stated above, relationally constructed. However, it only makes sense if socially

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<sup>1</sup> Merton considers status as those culturally defined expectations and roles as those patterned behaviors and relationships. However, as explained above, in this dissertation status is understood as a marker of the social position a state occupies.



conscious actors about themselves and about others enter these interactions (Malici, 2006, p. 130). In this sense, these ideas relate to identity, which, due to its multiple conceptualizations (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p. 284), can be “elusive, slippery, and amorphous” (Abdelal et al., 2006, p. 695). On the one hand, identity can be related to the set of meanings an actor has of herself/himself (Aggestam, 1999, “II. Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity”, para. 1; Burke, 2004, p. 5, 2006, p. 81; Burke & Tully, 1977, p. 883; Davis & Love, 2017, p. 498). On the other hand, identities can also be collective, in the sense that they are a set of “shared values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and roles that are used to draw a boundary between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’” (Rousseau & García-Retamero, 2007, p. 748).

However, this distinction is, to some extent, artificial. Social identities “have both individual and structural properties” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Moreover, Wendt proposes that identities are both subjective, in the sense that they rely on self-understandings, but also intersubjective, because those meanings are also dependent upon what other actors make out from those same understandings (2003, p. 224). He defines four types of identities, two of them being mainly subjective—corporate and type—and the other two being mainly intersubjective—role and collective—(Wendt, 2003, pp. 224–230). The first identity can be related to the material capabilities of states from a realist perspective; the second to a more liberal approach to international politics where classes of regimes are important for behavior; whereas the third and fourth identities are associated to the connections between a focal state and other actors or even the links it has with the international structure.

Following these arguments, identities could be equated to roles, especially to the role identity, which involves “occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms towards Others possessing relevant *counter*-identities” (Wendt, 2003, p. 227, emphasis in the original). However, this definition does not comprise the other nor his expectations or actions (Harnisch, 2016, p. 9). Besides, it is important to keep in mind that Wendt also defined three more classes of identities. Therefore, just equating roles to identity, in general, leaves out the distinct types of identities Wendt identifies.

In this vein, Nabers explains that identities are “the incorporation of the meanings and expectations associated with a role into the self” (2011, p. 83), which implies that the process of forging an identity tends to rest mainly on the actor’s side, though the Other

is present as reference. In other words, identity is internal, whereas role is external (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p. 289). Therefore, it is best to analytically separate them, bearing in mind their interconnectedness.

This definition opens the door to the claim that roles carry agency, whereas identities do not (Wehner & Thies, 2014, p. 428). Therefore, roles are the link between identity and action (Wehner, 2016, p. 66). Roles can make this connection because what an actor does “involves two components: the action proper and the capacity to give meaning to this action” (Franzosi et al., 2012, p. 4). These meanings, as explained above, are intersubjective in order to construct the social action (McCourt, 2012, p. 377) and are referred to the patterns of expected or appropriate behavior. These meanings are “established in the conjoint adjustive responses of interacting and communicating individuals” (Maines, 1977, p. 239).

This logic of appropriateness that a social action follows “involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation” (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 951). Thus, foreign policy, as social action, is guided by this logic (McCourt, 2012, p. 379). However, these patterns of behavior, or sets of foreign policies, that constitute the second dimension of roles cannot be considered exclusively in terms of appropriateness. As explained, even when social actors agree upon a definition of a given role, that does not preclude the agency they have to reinterpret these meanings or act in ways that are contrary to those definitions. In this sense, those expectations also follow the logic of consequences, meaning that actors also “choose among alternatives (...) conscious that other actors are doing likewise” (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 949). Indeed, these two logics are not mutually exclusive nor are located in strictly opposition to one another (Barkin, 2010, p. 56).

Which logic guides foreign policy is temporal, situational, and relational specific. For example, when two states are involved in a stable alliance, i.e. are performing the roles of allies, the logic of appropriateness intuitively should guide these performances. Each state should behave according to what an ally should do. However, this logic does not prevent a state of asking itself if behaving as an ally is in its best interest or, more precisely, which alternatives are available and which one works best given the situation it is facing. On a more emphatic perspective, when a state faces a new situation for which

it has no role, it can create a new one. In this situation, an appropriate behavior not yet exists, and that paves the way for creating a new role, following a consequential logic.

Master roles, as explained above, correspond to social positions. At the same time, they also comprise patterns of behavior, by which states perform “specific functions” (Wehner, 2015, p. 436). These patterns become the auxiliary roles that help states uphold their master role. In this sense, each master role restricts the number and content of auxiliary roles a state can perform (Thies, 2012, p. 33). Therefore, each master role consists of an array of auxiliary roles, e.g., the master role of regional power is supported by the enactment of different auxiliary roles (Thies, 2015, p. 285).

This relates to the agency of states because they can choose which auxiliary role, or a combination thereof, to enact. These possibilities imply that states are not just following some rigid guidelines of the master role, but they can also associate some auxiliary roles to sustain that master role. To understand these different auxiliary roles a state can enact, it is necessary to understand its full social identity provided by the social position it occupies (Wehner, 2015, p. 439), because “states will pursue auxiliary roles that are consistent with their master roles” (Thies, 2012, p. 34).

## **2.4 The Role Concept Triad: Role Conception, Role Expectations, and Role Performance**

Roles, as described above, portray at the same time a position in a social system and patterns of expected or appropriate behavior. As far as these two elements are present, roles can account for foreign policies (derived from both auxiliary and master roles) and for the interaction among states. The underlying logic behind this possibility stems from the idea that roles are always present in complementary pairs (Thies, 2012, p. 31), forming a role relationship. Roles are inherently social, and therefore they “do not stand in isolation but presuppose and relate to counter-roles and, in fact, can only be understood in relation to counter-roles” (Burke & Tully, 1977, p. 883). The symbiotic relationship between a role and a counter-role implies that each one is necessary to sustain the other, “thereby sustain[ing] itself” (Burke, 2004, p. 10).

A few exceptions of the pairs condition can be traced down, although these do not prevent the social and interactional features of roles because they do imply “interaction with other incumbents of the same role” (R. H. Turner, 2006, p. 235). Roles such as ally or enemy fulfill this condition. One state, by itself, cannot be an ally or an enemy. It needs a counterpart. A state is an ally or an enemy *of* another state. In this sense, they are forming a role relationship too within one encompassing role. Besides, taking further the argument of the need of having at least two states in a role relationship, an alliance, according to Walt, is formed to “balance against threats” (Walt, 1987, p. 5), which imply that if two states perform the role of allies, then it presupposes the existence of another state performing the *not-an-ally* counter-role, or even the enemy role.

These ideas suggest the presence of at least two actors interacting in a role relationship, which opens the door to the basic concepts of role theory: Role conception, role expectations, and role performance. Traditionally, these two actors are branded Ego and Alter when they are connected through a role relationship. Ego, analytically speaking, represents the focal state the researcher centers her/his attention on at one point in time. Alter, on the other hand, portrays the other side of the role relationship and it is an actor who “sees and interacts” with Ego’s foreign policy behavior. These categories are used interchangeably, i.e., at one moment a state X can be Ego and state Y Alter, and another moment X is Alter and Y is Ego. However, they help to understand the perspective the analysis takes regarding each one of them.

Taking this into account, the first concept that needs be addressed is role conceptions. This concept takes the perspective of Ego (Nabers, 2011, p. 78), and is defined by Holsti as

the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems (1970, pp. 245–246).

Holsti’s definition opened the door for further developments and refinements of the concept and for some debates among role theorists in foreign policy analysis too. The latter refers to the possibility of having all-encompassing society-wide role conceptions, since Holsti included the adjective “national” to the role conceptions. Disputing this idea, Krotz contends that role conceptions cannot be reduced to individuals, regardless of how

high in the foreign policy-making hierarchy they might be (2002, p. 5), and Sakaki joins in arguing that these roles are “shared within society” (2011, p. 9). This take on role conceptions precludes the possibility of change, or at least makes it harder and slower, because for a change in a role conception to happen, a whole change in the society’s structure should also occur.

However, this argument is refuted by different authors who claim that role conceptions are domestically contested (Brummer & Thies, 2015; Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012, 2016; Wehner & Thies, 2014). Therefore, depending on the group in power, role conceptions tend to change. Moreover, Grossman argues that role conceptions are derived from the policymakers’ perception of both national and international conditions (2005, p. 337). Precisely, a school of foreign policy analysis centers its attention on operational codes – beliefs held by the leadership which help them assess the situation their state is facing and guide them to make a decision (S. G. Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 4). Considering this, change in role conceptions, as a product of change in the state’s leadership, is an ever-present possibility. In this sense, though role conceptions are representing the state (Ego), nothing in this assumption implies that they are nationally shared. This is the reason this research drops the “national” adjective out from role conceptions.

This assumption also deals with the “level of analysis” problem (Thies, 2017a). Policy-makers, based on their own definitions, are acting on *behalf* of their state (Ashizawa, 2008, p. 575; Chafetz, 1996, p. 664; McCourt, 2014, p. 35). Unveiling Ego’s role conceptions, then, presupposes focusing primarily on the state’s leadership’s conceptions.

Succinctly, role conceptions refer to a state’s own perception of its social position (Wehner & Thies, 2014, p. 414), and of the accompanying behavior regarding others’ own positions and expectations in the international or regional system (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012, p. 94). On the one hand, this definition incorporates the structural dimension of roles by including the social setting in which they are embedded (both domestically and internationally). When defining role conceptions, policymakers make sense of these alternatives according to their account of the international and domestic orders. Role conceptions can be used as proxies to analyze the focal state’s understanding of its social order (Harnisch, 2011, p. 15).

Additionally, it retains its constraining features because role conceptions are used as a framework by policymakers, which, in turn, sets the foreign policy alternatives available to them (Grossman, 2005, p. 337; Krotz, 2002, p. 4; Le Prestre, 1997a, p. 5; Noesselt, 2014, p. 6; Sakaki, 2011, p. 9).

On the other hand, it retains the enabling features depicted above. Its agential dimension is expressed by Ego's capacity to filter those conditions and choose the appropriate role, thus, the behavior for that social situation. In sum, role conceptions imply "purposeful and deliberate" actions while being "shaped by the structural, historical, or institutional contexts" (Prys, 2010, p. 490).

Finally, this concept also allows for variance within a state. Ego can conceive distinct roles for different social situations. From sociological and social psychology perspectives, an individual does have an array of roles which she or he can enact depending on the situation. The same person can be a worker/spouse/member of an association. This person will enact, ideally, the worker role at the workplace, the spouse role at home, and the member of an association role during the weekends while attending the association's Sunday activities. Based on this logic, role theory in foreign policy analysis also accept this plurality of role conceptions. For example, Holsti's seminal article coded seventeen different roles (1970, p. 260), to which Thies added some specific roles he found in the literature on Latin America (2017b, p. 667). Those different role conceptions, which a state as Ego has the capacity of performing, compose the overall "self" of that state (Montgomery, 2005, p. 36). In other words, those role conceptions are the building block of the behavioral expression of the identity of the state, as explained above.

The second important concept in the role literature is role expectations. This concept takes the perspective of Alter on Ego's roles and actual behavior (Aggestam, 1999, "The Concept of Role"; Naylor et al., 1980, p. 116; Wehner, 2016, p. 65). The logic applied to unveiling role expectations follows the discussion of role conceptions. This means that the leadership of the state (Alter) defines, from its standpoint, what is the position and appropriate behavior for Ego.

Following these ideas, while Alter observes and interacts with Ego, the former presupposes the latter's appropriate behavior taking cues from the social environment they are in, mediated by its own definitions, and how she or he perceives Ego's material and ideological capacities. Those expectations are communicated to Ego in different ways (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012, p. 94), such as Alter's foreign policy. At the same time, those expectations are, in turn, part of the systemic inputs Ego receives to develop its role conceptions. If Alter expects Ego to be an ally, for example, the former assumes that in a conflictive situation, the latter will behave as such. These expectations, in this specific example, can be formalized in a treaty. However, expectations need not be formalized. Via interaction, Alter can take a stand on what Ego should do, as in a leader-follower role relationship.

Lastly, role performance is the actual behavior of Ego (Harnisch, 2011, p. 9). It refers to the general orientation of Ego's foreign policy (Holsti, 1970, p. 245) and help sustain its own role conceptions. By developing a foreign policy that supports a given role conception, Ego is also developing role relationships and creating social positions (Baker & Faulkner, 1991, p. 281). In this sense, as described above, role performance is not limited to following a certain script given by Alter's expectations. Ego's foreign policy can set up the political space for creating new role expectations, which will, in turn, feed its own role conceptions.

Besides, this behavior is situational (Leifer, 1988, p. 866). An action's meaning is derived from the social situation in which it is performed. This situation includes both Ego and Alter amid their interactions, as well as the overall international and regional structure in which they take place. On the one hand, from a sociological perspective, the "ideal behavior [a behavior that is in tune with role expectations and conceptions] should shift with the status of characteristics, personality traits, and moods of the interactants" (Heise, 2000, p. 498). These ideas can be translated to the state system as follows: let Alter (C) be a state who is involved in an armed conflict with state (D). Alter expects from two Egos (A and B) to perform the role of allies and support its cause. However, these two Egos have differences in material capabilities – A has an important economy, while B is amid an economic crisis. Therefore, they cannot perform the role of ally in the same way. Ego A should economically and militarily support Alter, for it to conform to Alter's expectations and its own conceptions as an ally, while a formal political declaration from B, either supporting C or condemning D, will suffice. These different meanings imply that

the same role can be performed in diverse ways by the same Ego, or even different Egos.

On the other hand, the importance of the situation is also expressed by the fact that the same behavior can have different meanings depending on the context it is performed, thus belonging to different role conceptions and expectations. A state, represented by Ego, selling weapons to another (Alter) can be an expression of an alliance or it can be an expression of hegemony. If Alter does not have other options to buy from, this transaction can be understood as a sign of the dependency Alter has on Ego to secure itself. However, if Alter does have more alternatives but chooses to buy from Ego, this interaction is part of a friendly relationship between them.

The above definitions of role conceptions, role expectations, and role performance, as stated, form the cornerstone of role theory. The way they were defined shows that, although analytically separable, these three concepts reinforce each other, adding simultaneity and complexity to the relations among states. Opperman argues that, in support of the interconnectedness of those concepts, “Decision-makers thus reinforce and refine their national role conceptions in the process of interacting [performing roles] with international and domestic demands [role expectations and role contestation, respectively] on their foreign policies” (2012, p. 505).

The underlying premise holding these three concepts together is that roles emerge from social interactions and define them. The interplay among role conceptions, expectations, and performance gives role theory a conceptual range that accounts for different dynamics in this social setting. Precisely, the following section will explicate other role dynamics that are at the core of this research.

## **2.5 Formalizing Role Sets, and Role Location and Role Relations**

### **2.5.1 Role Sets**

As suggested in the definitions provided so far, states have an array of roles at their disposal. The number of roles are dependent on the social environment they participate in (Wehner, 2016, p. 67), and their own material capabilities (Thies, 2001, pp. 708–712).



They are time- and place-specific (Harnisch, 2016, p. 4). Although there is one international system, which encompass every international actor, there are different social environments in which states can interact. Li exemplifies that a state can perform the roles of a nuclear state, a European state, or a major power (2010, p. 353). The first role corresponds to the security domain, the second to a regional dimension, and the third one to the whole international system, as representations of these different environments. The second condition has been explored, for example, by the cycle of power theory, which combines structuralism and realist thoughts with role theory (Doran, 1989, 2003). According to this perspective, roles need operational power (capacity of undertaking an activity in the international system), and structural power (the state's economic capabilities) (Lahneman, 2003, p. 100).<sup>2</sup> In this sense, the more material power a state has, more opportunities it will have to perform different roles in different settings.

All the roles a state has compose its role set (Harnisch, 2011, pp. 8–9; Sakaki, 2011, p. 26; Thies, 2015, p. 295; Wehner, 2016, p. 65). However, this definition is not the one traditionally used in sociological role theory. In this discipline, a role set is “the complement of role-relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status” (Merton, 1957, p. 110). This means that role sets are composed by Ego's focal role and the counter-roles performed by Ego's respective alters (Miles, 1977, p. 23; Shenkar & Zeira, 1992, p. 57). This definition is a synonym of a role relationship, mentioned above, and further developed below. As a way of exemplifying these role sets, Merton uses the case of the teacher (1957, p. 111). The role set of the teacher is composed by her/his students (arguably, the most important role relationship for the role of teacher to even exist), but also by the managerial roles of the school, and the students' parents. These persons demand and expect certain role performances from the individual occupying the role of teacher. In the same vein, Walker uses this conceptualization in foreign policy analysis to define a role set as a dyad conformed by Ego and Alter where their respective roles are congruent (2011, p. 247).

Although this traditional approach to role sets is insightful, and its main idea is going to be maintained in this dissertation as role relationships, the point of departure to define role sets is different to the one taken here. For Merton, there is a difference between

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<sup>2</sup> Although this approach to power and roles is not going to be used in this dissertation, it exemplifies how roles have a material basis, in addition to their ideational and declarative dimensions.

status and roles. Statuses depict a social position, with corresponding rights and obligations, while roles are the expected behavior associated to those statuses. He later adds that the idea of having multiple roles (as understood in this dissertation) can be contained under the label status set (1957, pp. 110–111). However, as described above, roles include both the position within a social system and the behavioral expectations attached to that position. The positional dimension of states in the international or regional system can be equated to a master role or status and the behavioral dimension (foreign policies) is linked to auxiliary roles, which in turn support the existence of that master role.

Given these ideas, from a set theory perspective, the relationship among a master role, auxiliary roles, and foreign policy options, which will constitute its role set, can be explained parting from the following formalization:

[1]

$$M = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n\},$$

[2]

$$A = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\},$$

[3]

$$F = \{f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n\},$$

where  $M$  is an ideal master role set containing master roles ( $m_x$ ) that can be enacted by the states in the international system, according to the conditions exposed above. For example, assume that a state has in its master role set a master role of superpower. It also has in this set a master role of regional power. Depending on the social situation it is dealing with, the state can choose which one is more appropriate for that situation. Notwithstanding this, since this dissertation deals with a regional setting (South America), it will be assumed that the  $M$  set has a cardinality of 1, i.e., for every state, only one master role will be available within its master role set:

[4]

$$|M| = 1, \text{ therefore}$$

[5]

$$M_i = \{m_i\},$$

where  $i$  represents Ego, and  $m_i$  is the master role for that state.

The  $A$  set is the ideal set of auxiliary roles available for the states in the international system. However, not every single auxiliary role is available for every state because roles have ideational and material bases. Moreover, Ego's auxiliary role set needs be defined in terms of its  $M$  set, because, as stated above, these auxiliary roles sustain and develop, at the same time, its master role. Taking again the idea of a state's role conception and performance of a superpower, its set will be composed of roles such as *leader*, *ally*, or *developer*, which are available to that state at any moment in time, given the social interaction the state is developing. Accordingly, the  $A$  set for Ego is defined as:

[6]

$$A_i = \{a_i \in A \mid a_i R m_i\},$$

where  $i$ , represents Ego. This formulation expresses the idea that every auxiliary role  $a$  that Ego has in its auxiliary role set belongs to the general, or ideal, set of auxiliary roles  $A$ , and further, this auxiliary role needs to comply with the requirement that it must have a relation  $R$  with Ego's master role. This relationship  $R$  can be specified as "is associated to," which encompass both sustainability and development between that auxiliary role and the master role. It is possible to define Ego's auxiliary role set in this way due to the quality of the  $R$ .

In set theory, a relation  $R$  between two sets is defined within the domain of their Cartesian product. The Cartesian product consists of all the ordered pairs of the elements that belong to each set, defined as

[7]

$$A \times B = \{ \langle x, y \rangle \mid x \in A \text{ and } y \in B \}$$

where  $A$  and  $B$  are two sets, and  $\langle x, y \rangle$  represents the ordered pairs of elements of both sets, in which the first element of the pair corresponds to the first set and the second element to the second set.

Therefore, the  $R$  set is a subset of those ordered pairs that follow the rule of the relation between the elements of those two sets, hence a binary relation. Formally, it can be expressed as,

[8]

$$R \subseteq A \times B,$$

where  $A$  and  $B$  represent different sets, and the elements of  $R$  belong to a subset of the Cartesian product of  $A$  and  $B$ .

By extension of these ideas and formulations, an  $F$  set is a set containing the different foreign policy options that are materially and ideationally available to Ego and that are consistent with the auxiliary roles. Continuing with the example of the superpower, assume that the state's role conception in a specific social setting is that of an ally. Then, to enact this auxiliary role the superpower state must associate to it some congruent foreign policies such as signing an alliance agreement, providing security assistance when needed, selling military equipment, and condemning the behavior of those deemed as enemies, to name some of the possibilities at its disposal. Overall, these options should display a cooperative behavior towards its ally. Thus, these alternatives of foreign policies will sustain and develop both the mentioned auxiliary and the master roles. In this sense, the  $F$  set for Ego can be defined as

[9]

$$F_i = \{f_i \in F \mid f_i R a_i\},$$

where  $i$  stands for Ego,  $f$  for any given foreign policy option belonging to the general, ideal set  $F$  of foreign policy options,  $R$  for the relation "is associated to", and  $a_i$  represents any of the auxiliary roles that is a member of Ego's auxiliary role set.

Bringing all these formal definitions, a state's role set  $S_i$ , *its own self*, can be understood as a super set containing the Cartesian product of the  $M_i$ ,  $A_i$ , and the  $F_i$  sets. That is,

[10]

$$S_i \supseteq M_i \times A_i \times F_i$$

This definition of role set takes the perspective of the role beholder (Ego) and comprises its role conceptions understood simultaneously as positions and expected patterns of behavior. Ego's role set, then, includes its master role, the auxiliary roles associated with it, and the foreign policy options associated to each auxiliary role. By the transitivity of the relations that defined the  $A_i$  and  $F_i$  sets, those foreign policy options are also associated to the master role. Therefore, each element  $s_x$  of the  $S_i$  set is composed by a triplet containing the master role, an auxiliary role, and a foreign policy option.<sup>3</sup>

As an example, if Ego has one master role, two auxiliary roles, and three foreign policy options, its entire role set contains a total of six triplets that can be represented as follows:

[11]

$$S_i = \{ \langle m_1, a_1, f_1 \rangle, \langle m_1, a_1, f_2 \rangle, \langle m_1, a_1, f_3 \rangle, \langle m_1, a_2, f_1 \rangle, \langle m_1, a_2, f_2 \rangle, \langle m_1, a_2, f_3 \rangle \} = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, s_5, s_6\}$$

where  $s$  stands for each of the triplets in its role set  $S$ .

Role sets, thus, incorporate the agential side of roles, because states can choose which triplet to perform and how to perform it. These alternatives are available depending on the time and social setting Ego is experiencing. According to the example above, the

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<sup>3</sup> This definition of role set opens the possibility of having triplets (a master role, an auxiliary role, and a foreign policy option) that are internally contradictory from the perspective of the relations' rules used to construct Ego's auxiliary role and foreign policy options sets— i.e., an ally that imposes economic sanctions to a fellow ally or a rival that sells weapons to its counterpart—. However, they are mathematically possible according to the Cartesian product of the three sets. This is not a contradiction of the definition nor it is unfeasible for a state to have such a triplet. At the same time, the above definition also entails the possibility of having inconsistent triplets, which is logically possible. See Williams (1981) for a short discussion on the difference between contradiction and inconsistency. Some of the implications of these conditions will be addressed under role conflicts and will be empirically evaluated in Chapter 5.

auxiliary role  $a_1$  can be active, guiding foreign policy choices, while the  $a_2$  can be latent (Thies, 2015, p. 295), waiting to be activated when the social situation demands it.

In parallel, role sets are also depicting the structural dimension of roles in two ways. On the one hand, as mentioned, roles exist in pairs. In this sense, when choosing an auxiliary role, or even its master role, the state is considering Alter's expectations, while at the same time the social actor is developing a notion of what its counter-role is and what it entails (R. H. Turner, 2006, p. 247). On the other hand, role sets also include the state's position in the social system, which reflects the interactions of the different actors that compose such system, and gives the material and ideational foundations for the master and auxiliary roles and their associated foreign policy options.

### **2.5.2 Role Location and Role Relationship**

The interactional process between Ego and Alter leading to the selection of the role(s) that will define their role relationship is defined as role location. Thies argues that this bargaining process is a socialization process, although he excludes the role enactment from this process (2012, p. 29). In this dissertation, the contention that role location can be equated to a socialization process is supported. The reason is that at one side of the process Ego is defining the situation and trying to conceive and perform a given role, while at the other side, Alter is either accepting or rejecting this performance and simultaneously trying to ascribe a role to Ego (R. H. Turner, 2006, p. 242). They are both attempting to define themselves and the other as social actors, reflecting the spatial, temporal and social dimension of the international system (S. G. Walker, 2011, p. 261).

However, the exclusion of role enactment from the role location is not supported. The reason behind this decision is that locating a suitable role (and therefore a counter-role) occurs while both parties are interacting, i.e., they are at the same time learning the roles in the socialization process and negotiating new meanings for them (Reitzes & Mutran, 1994, p. 315). They are using elements of their role sets to guide their interaction and trying to accommodate the other's expectations to their own role conceptions and performances to set up a role relationship. Certainly, a foreign policy option, for example, can be associated to different auxiliary roles, letting Alter make some possible attributions to which role Ego is enacting. From the perspective of Alter, Ego is performing one of the possible triplets that contain such behavior (Montgomery, 2005, p.

36). It is possible that Alter cannot make a precise judgment on which auxiliary role Ego is performing, but Ego, although not explicitly, is performing a specific triplet from its role set. One that it wishes to be corresponded by Alter. Precisely, these interactions are the core of the role location process and cannot be understood as such without the idea of role performance.

Additionally, amidst the interactions between Ego and Alter, another process could happen. Ego could attempt, purposefully, to impose its own definition of the role to Alter, thus changing the whole role relationship (McCourt, 2012, p. 380). In other words, in this process, called altercasting, “the incumbent of one role attempts to play his or her role in such a way as to force alter into a particular role that may not be of the latter’s choosing” (R. H. Turner, 2006, p. 242). Malici sums up the effects of altercasting process in this way,

The underlying logic here is the self-fulfilling prophecy: by treating other as if he is to respond in a certain way, ego is literally trying to ‘teach’ its definition of the situation to Alter. If alter is ‘willing to learn,’ then both actors will emerge with a newly created intersubjective understanding of each other [sic] (Malici, 2006, p. 131).

Admittedly, it can be argued that not all behavior amid an interaction between two social actors is indeed role-related (Leifer, 1988, p. 868). Nevertheless, those actions should not impede the focal person to later claim a coveted role. In this sense, at the state level, they should correspond to some foreign policy options that, in turn, could be associated to different auxiliary roles, opening multiple possibilities for Ego to claim a role when appropriate. Although in the beginning of the interaction actions need not be tied to a specific role, once the interaction develops into a role location process, the dynamics described in the previous paragraphs start to apply, which include the idea of role performance.


Finally, the result of the role location process is the role relationship, which gives stability and endurance to roles as both building blocks and the result of social interactions. In other words, the finalization of the role location process has systemic properties beyond its two units (S. G. Walker, 2011, p. 247). A role relationship, then, can formally be defined as a set containing Ego’s roles and the complementary or counter-roles of Alter, defined as triplets, amidst their interaction.

Therefore, it can be formalized as,

[12]

$$L_{ij} = \{(s_i \in S_i) \cup (s_j \in S_j) \mid s_i R s_j\}$$

where  $s_i$  corresponds to a triplet of Ego's  $S_i$  and  $s_j$  corresponds to a triplet of Alter's  $S_j$ . The  $R$  relation is defined under the idea that Ego's triplet "is compatible with" Alter's triplet. The compatibility of the two triplets follows the principle that roles need be in pairs, either as complementary or counter-roles. Those pairings need not be optimal from a game theoretical perspective. Once a "match" is produced during the role location process between Ego's role and Alter's counter-role or complementary role, a role relationship emerges. Figure 1 shows this relationship, where Ego has six triplets to perform, whereas Alter only has four. The arrows stand for a possible match between Ego's and Alter's triplets, constituting a role relationship, i.e., their roles are complementary or counter-roles. The existence of these two arrows gives a degree of freedom to Ego to choose between foreign policy option  $f_2$  or foreign policy option  $f_3$  of the auxiliary role  $a_1$ , without breaking the relationship. Conversely, Alter is more constrained because it only has one triplet to perform if it wants to establish a role relationship with Ego.



**Figure 1:** Role Relationship ( $L_{ij}$ )  
Source: Own elaboration.



The role relationship will guide their interaction in that social setting until one of them either changes the content or meaning of its role set or stops performing the role (triplet) that follows the rule to pair it to the other one's role set, so the process of role location begins again. Besides, it will place Ego and Alter within a larger system of role relationships of their social environment, for the rest of social actors to see.

## **2.6 Significant Other**

So far, this dissertation has assumed that Ego establishes a role relationship with Alter via their interactions. In specific multilateral settings, all states can eventually perform at some point the role of Alter for any other state. Although Alter can be any actor that belongs to the social environment where Ego is located, not every single country in the international system is important to the focal state for conceiving and performing its roles. Due to the different dimensions where states can interact, states are influenced by those to which they are closely related (Cao, 2012, p. 382).

In role theory, a major source for Ego's self is denominated as Significant Other. This Significant Other represents an important Alter's self for Ego, the latter's reference point for conceiving and, thus, performing its roles. The Significant Other is the primary socializing agent for Ego (Beneš & Harnisch, 2015, p. 150; Harnisch, 2011, p. 11), and this process can be based on negative or positive interactions between both of them (Wehner, 2016, p. 66). The negative interactions are conflictual in nature, where Ego attempts to conceive itself in opposition to what it perceives Alter is. Conversely, the positive interactions reflect Ego's desire to emulate Alter.

Ego's selection of Significant Others is not random; it depends on Ego's and Alter's material and immaterial resources (Harnisch, 2011, p. 12). In most cases, history, power, and geography play a key part in this process (Beneš & Harnisch, 2015, p. 150). Past events such as war, invasion, or secession, for example, can lurk in Ego's memories and experiences as to compose the state's self primarily in conflictual opposition to Alter. Additionally, as Wendt proposes, "power and dependency play an important role" (2003, p. 327) for Ego's Significant Other selection. A global power, a hegemon, or even a regional power, can create patterns of interaction that make it a permanent reference for

Ego. Finally, neighbors are also important because Ego cannot escape from those border dynamics (positive or negative). This segmentation of the sources of Ego's Significant Others follows the idea of the Politically Relevant International Environment (PRIE). The relevant environment for Ego, along these lines, is composed by all states contiguous to the focal state, all regional powers in its region, and all global powers (Maoz, 2011, p. 116). Ego's Significant Other will emerge from its PRIE insofar they have deep interactions across several dimensions.

However, the constitution of a Significant Other need not be reciprocated. An Alter can be a Significant Other for Ego, but the latter can be just one of the multiple Alters for the former (when it is the focal state).

In summation, a Significant Other is an Alter upon which Ego has substantial "material and/or intersubjective dependency" (Wendt, 1994, p. 390) for developing its own self. The nature of the relations between Alter and Ego will define the former's condition as Significant Other.

In the case of this research, the United States has been one of South America's traditional Significant Others since the beginning of the twentieth century. Due to China's rise and increasing relations with South America, it is likely that Beijing has changed its standing in South America's role set. From being a peripheral Alter, it could have become a Significant Other as well, competing with the United States as being the source of South America's roles definitions. Precisely, one of the objectives of this research is to assess the extent to which South America has included China as its Significant Other. A primary market for South America's goods, a source of political norms, financial resources, or military equipment are qualities that China fulfills in some South America's cases; thus, it could have to become Ego's Significant Other.

Following the definition of role sets given above, a significant other for Ego can be determined then by the number of roles that compose their role relationship. The higher the number of pairs of triplets—comprising roles and complementary or counter-roles—, the higher the Alter will be in Ego's ranking for its self-definition, thus becoming a Significant Other. This has empirical implications, because the more important a partnership is for a state, "the more reluctant that actor will be to deviate from role

expectations" (Harnisch et al., 2011, p. 254). In practice, if Alter is the source (as Significant Other) of most of Ego's roles, Ego will conform to Alter's interests and ideas, forming, for example, a dependent relationship.

## **2.7 Formalization of Role Conflict, and its Consequences: Role Change**

Returning to the subject of role sets and the array of roles states could have, in principle, this should not be a problem for Ego because those roles could belong to different social environments (R. H. Turner, 2006, p. 246) or could be performed successively (Thies, 2012, p. 29). From a social psychological or sociological perspective, an individual can be a worker and be married. In the workplace, her Alter could be her boss, while at home her Significant Other would be her spouse. Ideally, those social settings are separated so when she is at the office, she enacts the role of worker, and when she is at home, she enacts the role of wife. Actually, having more roles can be a source of self-worth (Reitzes & Mutran, 1994, p. 313) because Ego can deal with different Alters in different situations, or allow Ego to make different choices to enrich its own role(s) (K. J. O'Brien, 1994, p. 378).

Notwithstanding these possibilities, in most cases, those separations between or among social environments are not as clear cut as the ideal picture suggests. In the example above, it is possible to find situations where her husband expects her to be home early while her boss wants her to stay over hours at the office. Or it is possible too to find days when she brings work home or that she is distracted at office because of some marital problems she is having. Those situations, that are not far from reality, show how having multiple roles could generate conflicts within an individual (which role should she prioritize over the other) or among social actors (the individual, her husband and her boss).

The same situation occurs from the perspective of states. States are embedded in a complex network of interactions because they move among distinct levels (global, regional, or subregional) in different dimensions, e.g., economic, political, and military. This complexity comprises conceiving and performing a variety of roles, being a member of different international institutions, and having meaningful relations with more than one

partner. Furthermore, states can even have several Significant Others demanding competing behaviors from each one of them.

In those situations, the likelihood of Ego facing a role conflict is high (Harnisch, 2012, p. 49). Succinctly, a role conflict is the “concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the behavior of a person” (Biddle, 1986, p. 82). During the role location process, Ego and Alter could have different expectations regarding what role Ego should enact in a social environment, impeding the enactment of complementary roles.

This broad definition opens the door to several types of role conflicts. In role theory literature, different possibilities of role conflict arise depending on what is being contested and between which actors that contestation occurs. Hall (1972, p. 473) and Brummer and Thies (2015, p. 279) identify two types of role conflicts, whereas Sakaki presents three categories (2011, p. 31), Shenkar and Zeira state, from organizational role theory, four types (1992, p. 57), and finally Stryker and Statham Macke argue for five types (Stryker & Statham Macke, 1978, p. 72). Those different approaches have in common the ubiquity of role conflict in social interactions because it could stem from rich role sets, having different Significant Others, or being involved in several social dimensions.

To bring together those classifications of role conflict, this research takes advantage of the definitions of role sets and role relationships provided above and contends that role conflicts can be identified and classified according to three simultaneous dimensions of social interactions:

- 1) Element of Ego’s triplet being contested: Master role, auxiliary role, or foreign policy option.
- 2) Source: Which actors are involved (Ego; Ego and Alter; or Ego and several Alters).
- 3) Social environments: Where the conflicting interaction occurs.

The first dimension asks which parts of the triplets of the role set are in conflict. When Ego’s master role is being contested, the actors are experiencing what in sociology has been referred to as status inconsistency (Fleishman & Marvell, 1977; Stryker & Statham Macke, 1978), or the role-power gaps or role misalignments in power cycle theory

(Lahneman, 2003, p. 103).<sup>4</sup> In this sense, a master role conflict means that a role, understood as the position a state occupies in the international system, is contested. This conflict can work in two different directions but on the same premise: the position Ego occupies in the social system does not correspond to the expectations attached to it. On the one hand, Ego is claiming a higher position in the international system, but Alter's expectations do not correspond to Ego's conceptions. Alter, in the end, is trying to preserve the status quo in this case. On the other hand, this conflict can be the product of an Alter demanding more involvement of Ego in regional/international affairs but Ego's conceptions are directed to maintaining the status quo. Overall, a master role conflict is the more encompassing of all because, due to the definitions given above, it would also involve a conflict of auxiliary roles and of foreign policy options. Moreover, since Ego's master roles are limited in number, the possibility of the role conflict encompassing most of Ego's triplets is higher, which leaves almost no option for Ego to enact a triplet.

The second element of Ego's triplet that could be contested is the auxiliary role. Although these roles are also positional, they also relate to patterns of behavior or functions within a social system. In this sense, auxiliary roles guide actors as to what to do in a certain social situation. Therefore, an auxiliary role conflict describes the situation where Ego's function or, in other words, how Ego manages an interaction is contested. The conflict can be born out from the inability of Ego to choose from two or more roles that could satisfy the requirements of the situation, or from the dislocation between Ego's conceptions and Alter's expectations of the proper auxiliary role to be performed. In the former case, the conflict is internal, or domestic, while the latter reflects different understandings of the situation and the appropriate responses states have. This can be termed as inter-role conflict.

Lastly, the third element is composed by specific foreign policy options chosen by Ego to address an interaction. Since those options can range, for example in a crisis, from "not doing anything" to "going to war," there exists the possibility for Ego to choose a course of action that does not correspond to the associated auxiliary role. In the definition of role set given above, this possibility was mathematically created to account for those situations where states choose to go in "an unexpected direction" according to the auxiliary role enacted. The foreign policy options role conflict can be due to, then, Ego's

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
<sup>4</sup> Although in this literature status and role are separated, it is important to recall that, in the definition of role provided above, status works as a master role, and, therefore, it is a component of the positional dimension of roles.

decision to perform a triplet that is inconsistent from within (the foreign policy option is not associated with the auxiliary role) or it chooses to pursue a course of action that is not corresponded by Alter, although they both agree on Ego's master and auxiliary roles. Therefore, it can be termed as an intra-role conflict, i.e., what actions correspond to the meanings attributed to an auxiliary role.

The second dimension of role conflict refers to the sources of the contestation. As it can be inferred from the element of Ego's triplet that is contested, role conflicts can also be differentiated according to who is contesting Ego's roles. The source of conflict can come from within Ego (which corresponds to a domestic role conflict), from Alter in a binary relation with Ego, or from a ternary relation involving two Alters. The latter case occurs when Ego's increasing interactions with a "second" Alter affects the role relationship established with a first one. Those increasing interactions open the door for competing expectations between the first and the second Alters regarding Ego's roles. This situation will lead Ego to face a role conflict regarding which triplet to enact in a certain situation, knowing that with its decision, it will be corresponding to one Alter but not to the other.

Finally, the social dimensions follow the ideas advanced by Barnett (1993, 1995). This author argues that acting within two different institutions can generate role conflicts because what is consistent with one institution might be inconsistent with the other one (Barnett, 1995, p. 484). As an example, imagine a state that supports self-determination and sovereignty, while at the same time advancing the principle of responsibility to protect within the United Nations framework. Those roles, in some situations, will prove to be incompatible and cannot be performed simultaneously, forcing Ego to decide on which one to enact. Additionally, the social dimension also implies the possibility of conflict which stems from the performance of one role in one dimension, for example in the economic realm, which can be inconsistent in another dimension, for example in security affairs. Once again, Ego's performance of one triplet will motivate an election on which dimension is more relevant for its self.

Figure 2 shows the relationship across the three types of role conflict according to the element of Ego's triplet that is being contested. The concentric circles represent the extent of the conflict, being the master role conflict the more encompassing of the three, followed by the auxiliary role conflict and the foreign policy option conflicts.



**Figure 2:** Role Conflict Based on Ego's Role Set Elements  
Source: Author's own elaboration.

Formally, these different situations can be generalized with the following equation:

[13]

$$C = \{!(k_i), !(\neg k_i)\}, \quad \text{for } \forall k_i \in s_i$$

where  $C$  is the set of Ego's conflicting roles,  $k$  represents an element of a triplet belonging to Ego's role set, encompassing the possibility of standing for a master role, an auxiliary role or a foreign policy option. The  $!$  symbol<sup>5</sup> represents an imperative, which means that  $k$  should be enacted or  $k$  should not be enacted. This imperative stands for "the dictates of various sources of obligation" (Horty, 1994, p. 38), where those sources of obligations can be equated to the different expectations regarding a role Ego should enact (or not) in a situation. Additionally, from this definition of  $k$  it follows the idea that the contestation involves all triplets that have that element. In this sense, for example, a master role conflict, according to the definitions provided above, will involve Ego's entire role set. An

<sup>5</sup> Although Hansen argues that the  $!$  symbol should be replaced by  $\bigcirc$  to express "ought to be..." (2008, p. 8), Horty differentiates between the two, being the exclamation point used to denote a specific imperative, whereas the latter expresses the situations where the imperative is fulfilled, or violated (1994, pp. 36–38).

inter-role conflict will involve all the triplets containing that auxiliary role, and the intra-role conflict will only include those triplets that differ among them in just that last element.

Thus, this generalization conforms to the idea that role conflict emanates from inconsistent expectations from Significant Others or when “leaders’ self-conceptions diverge from the expectations of their surroundings” (Nabers, 2011, p. 76). In this sense, it includes expectations from domestic and politically relevant actors (i.e., an opposition party and the party in government or different groups within government voicing their support for a distinct course of action) or they can represent Ego’s desire to perform a certain triplet whereas Alter expects Ego to enact a different one (ergo, not the one Ego wants). Besides, this formula is built from the premise that normative constraints (such as the expectations regarding a role) need not be logically consistent (Montgomery, 2005, p. 42), in the sense that the imperatives “Ego should enact  $k$ ” or “Ego should not enact  $k$ ” are both true, but their logical conjunction is not (Horty, 1994, p. 38). That is, Ego cannot follow both expectations at the same time.

Moreover, due to the focus of this dissertation, role conflict derived from having two Significant Others is further developed, following the principles of Equation 13. Since it is assumed that China and the United States have different views regarding the international order, they will also have different expectations from the states in South America. Therefore, each state in this region will be subjected to different expectations as to which role and how to play it in the different social dimensions they meet. Precisely, a rising China (which means increasing interactions with the South American states) could generate role conflicts for this set of Egos in their interactions with the United States. Specifically, recall that the more important a binary relation is for a state, the more reluctant this actor will be to deviate from those expectations generated by its Significant Other. In this sense, if a state increases its relations with China to the extent that the latter becomes a Significant Other of the former, it is more likely for Ego to experience role conflict given the set of diverging expectations emanating simultaneously from both Washington and Beijing.

These dynamics can be formally represented in this way:

[14]

$$O_1 = \{\exists k_i \in s_i \mid ! (k_i) \rightarrow (s_i R s_j) \wedge \neg (s_i R s_i)\}$$



Equation 14 represents the case where Ego has one role but cannot use it for establishing simultaneous relations with Alter *j* and Alter *l*. Should Ego enact that element, then it can be used to establish the role relationship with a triplet of Alter *j* AND cannot be used to establish a role relationship with Alter *l*. A basic situation exemplifying this case is the role of an exclusive ally. If Ego should enact that role, then it can be an ally of one Alter but not of both at the same time. Ego must choose one of the alters.

These formalizations of role relations and role conflicts show how complex social interactions are. It is important to make emphasis, though, that role conflict does not equate to interstate conflict. It does not preclude violence either. Two states, involved in an armed conflict for example, are performing the role of enemies, and, from role theory perspective, they have fulfilled their role location process and have established their role relationship as one of enmity. Conversely, difficulties in locating a proper pair of roles for Ego and Alter could lead to violent behavior between them, as a way of solving the role conflict.

The dynamics of role conflict, in any of its variations, could lead to role change (Harnisch et al., 2011, p. 256). When the role enactment does not correspond to a set of expectations or identities (Nabers, 2011, p. 84), the actors engage in a conscious process to change the conflicting role (Schmitt, 1966, p. 321). This process is of paramount importance, not only theoretically, but also empirically, because role change can affect the possibilities for interaction between Ego and Alter, and can eventually lead to the transformation of the social spaces in which those interactions occur (Stryker, 2006, p. 226).

The extent of change is not uniform, however (Davis & Love, 2017, p. 3). They could involve a redefinition of the role's meaning and its congruence with the overall policies of the state (Le Prestre, 1997a, p. 5). This could happen when an actor "has the power to define or redefine the meanings and expectations associated with a particular role or group" (Burke, 2004, p. 12). Precisely, powerful states, such as the United States and China, acting as Significant Others, have the capabilities to try to preserve, or press for change in, all elements of Ego's triplet, including the definition of the master roles and the its associated contents of the auxiliary roles. In other words, these extra regional states, acting as external sources of role change (Frank, 2011, p. 132), could act upon

the values attached to a role (master role) or its functions (auxiliary roles) (R. H. Turner, 2006, p. 251).

The role change can also occur on the foreign policy options of the actor. This take on the behavioral side of the roles implies a change “of strategies and instruments, without modifying the role conception itself” (Folz, 2011, p. 149). Due to the role conflict, Ego decides to support the orientation of its Significant Other and the role’s definition it has, thus altering the material or discursive expression of the role in an attempt to maximize its utility (Harnisch et al., 2011, p. 256).

In summation, Harnisch, Frank, and Maull (2011, p. 253) offer a classification of role change according to the extent of change of an actor’s foreign policy. This research supports their central ideas about role change. However, this dissertation advocates to focus on the element of the triplet that is being contested and changed. According to this new frame, a change in the foreign policy options will entail a change in instruments, strategies. As it would be explained below, changes in voting behavior at the United Nations General Assembly or in the national economic policies are expressions of role change derived from intra-role conflict.

If the conflict lies on the auxiliary roles, there could be change in what they termed as foreign policy goals. That is, the definition of the role is in question, and a new meaning will necessarily imply the adoption of new strategies and instruments to put it into practice. As it would be shown below, conflicts on the very definition of what is being defended led to changes in the conception and performance of the Defender of the Faith role. This process involves an inter-role conflict and it can also include a change of identity. Therefore, role transformation (Harnisch et al., 2011, p. 253), the most radical change for these authors, includes changes in the overall orientation of the state. However, it is not the highest change. This dissertation contends that there is a higher degree of change: Master role change. Here, not only the definitions or meanings change, but also the overall position of the state in the social hierarchy. By the transitivity property of the role sets and the pervasiveness of a master role conflict, as explained above, a change in the master role entails a change of all triplets containing this role.

In a nutshell, role theory expects that as actors acquire new Significant Others, they would experience changes across their role sets (Schmitt, 1966, p. 314). This is the theoretical underpinning of this research. It follows the idea that the more salient a given norm is for an actor, the more reluctant it will be to deviate from the role expectations associate to that norm (Harnisch et al., 2011, p. 254; Stryker, 2006, p. 228). In this sense, in terms of this research, the basic theoretical hypothesis is that the more interactions a South American state has with a Significant Other (the United States or China), the more it would conceive and perform roles associated to it. In turn, the possibilities of experiencing role conflict increases as China and the United States occupy the same place in the state's role set.

# **1 South American Networks and Master Roles**

This chapter deals with roles as positions in a social system. It analyses regional relations using Social Network Analysis to measure roles “considering the temporal and network dynamics that lead to their emergence” (Campbell, 2018, p. 294). The relations included are trade, foreign policy events, and small arms trade. Although the research acknowledges that the regional partners might not be significant for some states, these networks provide information regarding the overall position across different dimensions and across time of the regional states. This chapter also addresses the region’s relations with China and the United States on those same dimensions to examine if those relations are guided by the position South American states occupy within the region and validate the presence or not of a master role conflict.


## **1.1 Trade Network**

Trade is an important interaction states have in the international structure. From the international trading system, states extract monetary and other type of resources, which in turn can be used for accomplishing different domestic or international objectives. Moreover, trade can create political influence (Lake, 2009, p. 47). However, not all states benefit from the trading system in the same way. The ability to derive those benefits from the international trading system is related to the position they occupy in the overall structure. A position a state occupies in this economic structure, although dependent on its own actions, is the result of the combined actions of each state in the international system. Thus, the connections they make through international commerce show how they position themselves in the overall international trading. Snyder and Kick, for example, evaluated how these dynamics placed countries in a core, semiperipheral, or peripheral position and how this position was linked to economic growth (1979). This location also mirrors how free or dependent a state can be in their economic choices. A state with many partners is less likely to be subject of trade pressures for political purposes. Conversely, a concentration of trade on one partner makes that state highly vulnerable to the manipulation of that said partner (Lake, 2009, p. 47).

Based on these considerations, trade was chosen as one of the relational dynamics that can reflect the position the South American states occupy in the regional structure. Trade data was collected from the International Monetary Fund – Department of Trade Statistics – (2020) for the period 1990-2016. Exports figures in millions of dollars were used, and for the network, each country’s figure for each year was constructed averaging

the data from the previous, the actual, and the following years, to avoid unusual transactions (S. Kim & Eui-Hang, 2002, p. 452). Thus, 25 different directed networks were constructed (1990-2015). Then, this data was turned into percentages on the total trade for each country. This transformation led to a matrix  $12 \times 12$ , one for each analyzed year, where the rows stand for the exporting country, and, by symmetry, the columns depict the importing one. The value in each cell shows how much of their total trade the exporting economy destined to their corresponding partner.


Several indicators were chosen to grasp, on the one hand, the overall structure of trade within South America, and the position each state occupies in it, on the other hand. The first basic network indicator used to portray the regional trade structure was the Input Degree. This measure counts the number of countries that chose the focal state as a destination for their goods. In Social Network Analysis' terms, the Input Degree shows the number of incoming ties in a directed network. Therefore, the higher the score a country has in this indicator, more important it is as a source of revenues for the rest of the countries of the region. The minimum value for this measure is 0 (i.e. the focal state did not import any goods from the region), and the maximum is 11 (i.e. all the countries of the region exported to the focal state), given the structure of the South American trade network. Figures 3 shows in boxplots these dynamics, where the horizontal red line shows the median (6) across the different yearly networks.



**Figure 3:** Input Degree of the South American Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

According to this measure, two different sets of countries stand in contrast to one another across the 25 years. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela compose the first group. These are the preferred markets of the region according to the number of states that chose them as the destination for their goods, while Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname, and Uruguay belong to the second group because they are chosen less, finding themselves below the median of the region. This division also shows that the region is not strongly connected. Half of the region has, as median, 5 partners or less, out of 11, that consider them as the destination of South American exports.

The second basic indicator is the Output Degree. This measure takes on the opposite direction of trade, and counts the number of countries a focal state chooses as the destination of its exports, or the outgoing ties in general terms. Whereas the Input Degree shows which are the main regional markets, the Output Degree depicts how regionally diversified a state is, according to its own exports. The values of the Output Degree also range from 0 (i.e. the focal state did not export to any country in the region) to 11 (i.e. the whole region is a market for the focal state's goods). Figure 4 shows the export linkages of the region. The median of the region's Output Degree complements the boxplots for the whole period (6), represented by the horizontal line.



**Figure 4:** Output Degree of the South American Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International


Complementing the dynamics portrayed with the Input Degree, the Output Degree also shows that Guyana and Suriname placed themselves outside the main trade network because they have between no intraregional exports in a given year and 3 partners in the region. On the other side of the spectrum, Argentina, and Brazil, and to a lesser extent Chile, and Bolivia are the more active countries on their exports to the region. They have found more partners markets to export their goods throughout the analyzed period. Following them, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay also perform well under this measure. Their median is above the regional value, which also shows that they have found different markets to place their goods.

Finally, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela compose another set of states, because although in some years they reached the median of the region, most of the time they did not. An interesting case is the latter of the three. Venezuela is the least regional-oriented of them, based solely on its number of partners. In some years, Caracas' export partners are the same as those of Guyana and Suriname. In this sense, these 3 states (Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname) are not well integrated to the rest of the region. Moreover, given that the Output Degree only counts partners, the region is also divided between those who have found more than half of the region as markets for their products and those who have not.

These two measures give a basic outlook of the region's trade structure. However, the number of ties alone cannot portray all the underlying features this structure has. The South American trade network is not only a directed one, but also a weighted network, since every tie implies a transaction of goods for money. As mentioned above, the original data consisted of US dollars, which were then converted to percentages of the world trade each member of the region had every year, and averaged with those of the year before and of the year after. Therefore, another set of measures were used to account for this feature. On the one hand, the Weighted Input Degree sums the percentages of the trade the focal state's partners directed to it. On the other hand, the Weighted Output Degree sums the percentage of the trade the focal state destined to its regional partners as exports. The advantage of including these two weighted measures is that they can add the idea of intensity of the interactions to the previous ones. Whereas the Input/Output Degree measures show how diverse (or not) the focal state is in its

trade relations (as an importer and exporter), the weighted version depicts the quality of these relations.

Figure 5 shows the results of the analysis of the Weighted Input Degree. The horizontal red line stands for the median of the score of the region (14). According to its Weighted Input Degree, the figure shows that Brazil leads the region as the main South American market. Brasilia has a considerable distance with its immediate follower: Argentina. Those two states are, overall, better markets for the region's export goods, while the rest of the region receive fewer exports.



**Figure 5:** Weighted Input Degree of the South American Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).


A revealing case for the necessity of combining different measures is that of Venezuela. Caracas has an important result in its incoming ties, meaning that on a yearly basis, several countries chose it as a destination for their goods. Yet the intensity of these relations is not as strong because Venezuela's median is 25, far behind Brazil's.

Chile, Peru, and Colombia, the remaining members of the main markets group depicted with the Input Degree, score better than the rest of the region. Chile, with a median of 31, Peru (24) and Colombia (19.5) exceed the median of South America. Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname, and Uruguay, conversely, are located behind



the median, confirming that as regional markets, they are not sources of revenues for the region as a whole.

As mentioned, the Weighted Output Degree accounts for the intensity of the other direction of the exchanges, i.e. from the focal state to the region. Figure 6 shows the results. The median for the region is 18, depicted with the horizontal red line. The score of the Weighted Output Degree ranges, theoretically, from a minimum of 0, where it has no trading relations with one partner in South America, to maximum of 100, meaning that the focal state directs all its exports to the region. For this case, the range of this degree is from 1 to 84. Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela have the smallest score, while Paraguay has the largest one.



**Figure 6:** Weighted Output Degree of the South American Trade Network, 1990-2015

Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay stand out in this measure. They concentrate their exports to the region. Paraguay is paradigmatic in this regard. Asunción exported to the region at least 39 percent of its total trade, though its median is 62 percent. South America, then, is the most important market for Paraguayan goods. Bolivia follows Paraguay closely in this regard. Its median is 57.5, meaning that half of the time, the region accounts for more than half of its exports.

At the other side of the spectrum are Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela. Their exports go outside the region. Guyana's median is only 2, Suriname's 4, and Venezuela's 5.5. Given these numbers, only a small fraction of their international trade goes to regional partners. These results are equal with those of the Output Degree. These three states have fewer partners, and they do not export much to them.

Another interesting result is that 3 original members of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), namely, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay have high scores on this measure, while Brazil behaves as the rest of the region. Part of the reason is that for the former, the regional market is very important for them. Argentina exported an average of 25 percent to the Mercosur, while Paraguay 55 percent, and Uruguay 35 percent, being Brazil the main destination of these exports. Conversely, Brazil only exported, on average 11 percent of its total trade to Mercosur.

These four measures (i.e. Input Degree, Output Degree, Weighted Input Degree, and Weighted Output Degree), are local measures, in the sense that they portray de relational activities from a focal node perspective. This means that these measures grasp the position South American states occupy in the trade network by only considering what they export or import, regardless of the actions carried on by the rest of the region. They give elements to describe the trade structure of South America, but they must be complemented with additional measures that do take into consideration all the relations of the 12 states.

One of these complementary measures is Betweenness Centrality. Following Freeman (1977, p. 36), a node is central when it falls between the shortest path communicating two other nodes. Since there can be more than one path connecting any pair of nodes, Betweenness Centrality accounts for the proportion of paths the focal node falls between all the pairs of nodes of the network. Therefore, the Betweenness Centrality of a node  $k$  is the sum of these proportions of paths, expressed in the following equation:


[15]

$$BC(k) = \sum_{i \neq k \neq j \in N} \sigma_{ij}(k) / \sigma_{ij}$$

where  $i$ ,  $k$ , and  $j$  are three nodes belonging to the network  $N$ ,  $\sigma_{ij}$  are the shortest paths connecting nodes  $i$  and  $j$ , and  $\sigma_{ij}(k)$  are all the shortest paths between  $i$  and  $j$  that include node  $k$ .

Betweenness Centrality accounts then for the importance of a node as a conveyor of the resources being distributed across the network, as well as a connector of disconnected nodes. In terms of trade, this quality represents the possibility of being an important link in production chains or being a re-exporter between two states that have not yet developed commercial ties in particular sectors.


Figure 7 shows the Betweenness Centrality scores for all the 12 states in South America. The median score of the whole region is 0.018, depicted with the horizontal red line. Theoretically, this centrality ranges from 0, a vertex that does not lie in the path between any pair of vertices from the network, to 1, expressing that a node lies in between every path connecting other two nodes of the network. For the South American trade network, it ranges from 0 to 0.29.



**Figure 7:** Betweenness Centrality of the South American Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

Brazil stands out in this measure, with a median of 0.189. Its follower, Venezuela, has a median of 0.051. Argentina, Chile, and Peru join them in the group of states whose median is above the regional median.

Suriname is a special case, given its earlier scores. Its median is 0.014, very close to that of the region. Its high standing here is attributed to its close connection to Guyana, and the poor connection the latter has within the region. In ten networks, i.e., in ten years, Suriname is the only tie Guyana has, thus making the former's Betweenness Centrality higher because it lies in the shortest path between Guyana and any other member of South America. Figure 8 illustrates this situation. The network corresponds to the trade figures of 2008. The blue lines stand for bilateral trade (i.e. both states exported to each other in that year). The black lines depict trade in one direction, with the arrow representing this direction (e.g. Paraguay exported to Chile, while the former did not import anything from the latter).



**Figure 8:** South American Trade Network, 2008  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014).

The second measure that takes on the decisions of each individual state plus the decisions of their partners is the Aggregate Constraint. This measure builds on the concept of structural hole (the absence of a tie between alter and a third party) in the triad Ego-Alter-Third Party. The presence of structural holes could give ego certain

advantages due to the lack of communication between alter and the third party because ego can bridge between them for the resources shared in the network.


Conversely, a complete triad (i.e. there are ties between each member of the triad) impose restrictions to ego because that node cannot withdraw from any of its two relations without opening a structural hole, which alter or the third party can exploit (de Nooy et al., 2011, pp. 166–172). Precisely, the Aggregate Constraint of a vertex takes on this situation adding up the constraints it has given its actual relations with other vertices as well as those its neighbors have with each other. In the end, the Aggregate Constraint shows the dependency a node has on its current relations, given their structure and strength, and how easy it is for it to end its relations. The following equation, proposed by Burt (1995, p. 55), formalizes these ideas:

[16]

$$AC(i) = \sum_j \left( p_{ij} + \sum_q p_{iq} p_{qj} \right)^2, \quad q \neq i, j$$

where the Aggregate Constraint of a node  $i$  is the sum of the square of the constraints of its relations with every neighbor  $j$ .  $P_{ij}$  is the proportional strength of the relation between  $i$  and  $j$  (i.e. how much  $i$  invests in  $j$  – the value of the tie divided by the value of all ties  $i$  has).  $P_{iq}$  and  $P_{qj}$  stand for the proportional strength of the relations from  $i$  to another neighbor  $q$ , and from this node back to  $j$ , respectively.

The Aggregate Constraint's scale in the South American trade network goes from 0 to 1, where higher scores depict higher dependency on the established trade relations. The median score for the region is 0.5. Figure 9 shows it with a red line.




**Figure 9:** Aggregate Constraint of the South American Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

The boxplots show that Brazil (0.4), Colombia (0.43), Peru (0.44), Venezuela (0.46), and Chile (0.47) are less dependent on their regional trade relations. Conversely, Paraguay and Uruguay, given their concentration on Argentina and Brazil, have high Aggregate Constraint scores, 0.76 and 0.74, respectively. As expected from the prior measures, Guyana and Suriname also have high scores. Surprisingly, given the scores it has on the prior measures, Argentina shows also a strong dependency on its relations with its regional partners, mainly Mercosur, as mentioned above.

Theoretically these six measures reveal different characteristics of the South American trade network. As explained above, on the one hand, some of them (Input Degree, Output Degree, Weighted Input Degree, and Weighted Output Degree) give the countries' centrality based on the decisions each one takes on whom to sell to or buy from. They take on the dyadic relationship between Ego and Alter. On the other hand, Betweenness Centrality and the Aggregate Constraint are based on the triad among Ego, Alter, and a Third state. This means that they take on different aspects of the trade structure, and combined they portray the position each of the South American states occupy within this structure.

In order to notice if these measures actually display different characteristics of the trade structure, correlations between pairs of these measures were run. Since their relations, in most of the cases, resemble a monotonic function, the Spearman's correlation coefficient was used. Figure 10 shows the Spearman Correlation of the six measures, with the distribution of the measure, their relations, and the corresponding coefficient, along with their statistical significance.



**Figure 10:** Spearman Correlation between Centrality Scores South American Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Based on the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). Elaborated with the Performance Analytics package for R (Peterson & Carl, 2014).  
ind: Input Degree; outd: Output Degree; wid: Weighted Input Degree; wod: Weighted Output Degree; bc: Betweenness Centrality; ac: Aggregate Constraint. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ;  $\cdot p < 0.1$ .

The correlation coefficients are as expected. The signs of the relationships follow the expectations. On the one hand, since the Input Degree, the Output Degree, the Weighted Input Degree, the Weighted Output Degree, and the Betweenness Centrality portray how central a state is within the network (or how important), higher scores reflect more importance, and lower scores suggest less importance. On the other hand, the Aggregate Constraint is not per se a centrality measure. However, as stated, it shows how

dependent a node is on the network's state of affairs. Given its formula, higher scores are less desirable than lower scores, hence the negative relationship it has with the rest of the measures. The only exception is its relationship with the Weighted Output Degree, but this also falls into the expectations. A state that exports much of its goods to few partners in the region (e.g. Paraguay), turns out to be very dependent on its current trade partners. Any problem with one of these partners will result on an important hit to this state's economy.

As for the characterization of the relationships given their coefficients, only the relationship between the Input Degree and the Weighted Input Degree can be deemed as very strong. These results were expected, since the more incoming ties a state receives, more percentage of the regional trade it gets. Conversely, three pairs display a very weak relationship: Input Degree and Weighted Output Degree; Weighted Input Degree and Weighted Output Degree; and the Weighted Output Degree and Betweenness Centrality. The rest of the pairs fall between a strong and a weak relationship. This distribution of correlations between pairs supports, then, the idea that they capture different aspects of the trade structure in South America.

Finally, with these results the states can be classified according to the position they occupy in the trade network. For this classification, each of the state's mean scores was normalized following this formula:

[17]

$$x_{norm} = \frac{\bar{x} - \mu}{\sigma}$$

where  $\bar{x}$  is the mean score of a country,  $\mu$  is the mean of the scores of the region in that particular measure, and  $\sigma$  is its standard deviation. The idea behind this normalization was to be able to compare them or aggregate them, since some of them were on a different scale (e.g. the Weighted Output Degree ranges from 0 to 100, while the Betweenness Centrality ranges from 0 to 1). Following this procedure, four groups were distinguishable according to thresholds defined by one standard deviation above or below the mean. The first group exceeded one standard deviation above the mean; the second group scored higher than the mean but was below one standard deviation above the mean; the third group had scores below the mean but above one standard deviation



below the mean; and the fourth group had scores below one standard deviation below the mean.<sup>6</sup>

Secondly, the Input Degree and the Weighted Input Degree, on the one hand, as well as the Output Degree and the Weighted Output Degree, on the other hand, were averaged together because they have the same direction of the link. The former pair depicts states as importers, whereas the latter as exporters. Thirdly, each state was placed in the corresponding group according to its normalized score. Fourthly, each group received a score according to its position: the first group had a score of 1, the second of 2, the third of 3, and the fourth of 4. Fifthly, each state received the score of its corresponding group and those scores were averaged in different ways (columns 5-7). Finally, the South American states were located to their appropriate group according to the score of their respective groups (column 8).<sup>7</sup> Table 1 displays these results.

Country	In	Out	BC	AC	G4	G3	G2	AveT
Argentina	0.53	1.04	0.08	0.20	2.00	2.33	2.5	2.28
Bolivia	-0.46	0.99	-0.63	-0.22	2.25	2.67	2.5	2.47
Brazil	2.16	0.43	3.05	-1.12	1.25	1.00	1.0	1.08
Chile	0.63	0.10	0.51	-0.81	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.00
Colombia	0.25	-0.18	-0.41	-0.97	2.50	2.33	2.5	2.44
Ecuador	-0.38	-0.26	-0.69	-0.55	2.75	2.67	2.5	2.64
Guyana	-1.20	-1.48	-0.51	1.52	3.75	3.67	3.5	3.64
Paraguay	-0.68	1.21	-0.76	1.40	2.75	3.33	3.5	3.19
Peru	0.48	-0.10	-0.23	-0.94	2.50	2.33	2.5	2.44
Suriname	-1.17	-1.47	-0.16	1.14	3.75	3.67	3.5	3.64

<sup>6</sup> The logic for the composition of groups for the Aggregate Constraint follows the inverse logic. Since lower scores are deemed “better”, the first group scores below one standard deviation below the mean, the second scores below the mean but above one standard deviation below the mean, and so on.

<sup>7</sup> The final position follows the same logic of the Aggregate Constraint groups. The lower the score the better. Therefore, countries belonging to the first group were those scoring below one standard deviation below the mean of the region. Countries belonging to the second group scored above one standard deviation below the mean, but below the mean. The third group was composed by countries scoring above the mean but below one standard deviation above the mean. Finally, the fourth group has members that scored above one standard deviation above the mean.

Uruguay	-0.62	0.58	-0.59	1.23	3.00	3.33	3.5	3.28
Venezuela	0.48	-0.87	0.33	-0.88	2.25	2.00	2.0	2.08
MEAN	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.56	2.61	2.63	2.60
SD	0.91	0.88	1.00	1.00	0.69	0.76	0.74	0.71
MEAN + SD	0.91	0.88	1.00	1.00	3.25	3.37	3.36	3.31
MEAN - SD	-0.91	-0.88	-1.00	-1.00	1.88	1.86	1.89	1.89
First Group	1							
Second Group	2							
Third Group	3							
Fourth Group	4							

**Table 1:** Position of States in the South American Trade Network, 1990-2015

Source: Based on the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). In: Average of the Input Degree and the Weighted Input Degree; Out: Average of the Output Degree and the Weighted Output Degree; BC: Betweenness Centrality; AC: Aggregate Constraint; G4: Average of Group Scores of In+Out+BC+AC; G3: Average of Group Scores of In+BC+AC; G2: Average of Group Scores of BC+AC; AveT: Average of G4+G3+G2.

G4 combines the results of the 4 scores to give an overall picture of the dynamics of the region. G3 excludes the exporting dimension of the trade network. The reason for leaving it out was that scoring high on this dimension could have contradicting effects. On the one side, having multiple contacts within the region prevents dependency on one or few markets, which is positive. Furthermore, the concentration of exports in the region (exemplified by Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argentina) makes the case of a strong regionalization process of Mercosur in the trading dimension, which is also positive. On the other side, exporting huge portions of their total goods to few markets (taking into account the world market) makes that state dependent on these few relations. In case of any economic crisis occurring in one of these markets, the exporting state will immediately suffer.

G2 takes on the position derived from the interactions among Ego, Alter, and a Third party, as explained above, by including just the Betweenness Centrality and the Aggregate Constraint dimensions. The last column, represented by AveT, shows the positions the states received in each of the previous averages.

G4, G3, and G2 show consistency in the location of the states within the regional trading structure. Only five states (Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay) have changes across the 3 dimensions, though they move up or down just one group. Among these 4 states, only Ecuador moves one group up (in two occasions it belongs to group 3, and in one it belongs to group 2), while the rest scale one group down (Bolivia was placed twice in group 2 and one time in group 3, and Paraguay and Uruguay were members of group 3 twice, and one time in group 4).

The global average, AveT, locates the twelve states in a corresponding group. Brazil has the higher scores; hence it belongs alone in one group. The second group has as members Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, though Bolivia has a slightly higher score than the rest of the group. However, it is not high enough to accompany Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay in the third group. Lastly, Guyana and Suriname belong to the fourth group.

## **1.2 Foreign Policy Events Network**

The involvement in international affairs is yet another dimension of the international structure that places states in different positions. Back in 1980, building on Holsti's work (1970), Wish analyzed the relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior, which she assessed using international participation (i.e. the number of external events initiated by the government of each state), as one of the 4 variables to account for the behavioral side of the relationship (1980, p. 541). In her study, Wish found that international participation was "closely related to role status" (1980, p. 544). As explained above, role status is a synonym of a master role.

More recently, researchers have found that major powers, for example, show high levels of activities around the globe (Volgy et al., 2014, p. 65), or at least outside their own

regions (Volgy et al., 2011, p. 11). In the same vein, regional powers “must be willing to use [their] capabilities to achieve wide ranging policy goals *within* the region. Willingness is measured using the level of interaction by a state with others in the region” (Cline et al., 2011, pp. 142–143, emphasis in the original).

In this tradition, a ranking of states, then, can be made measuring how much a state takes part in world affairs, in relation to some other states, or to the whole bulk of states in the international system. The assumption is that a state that develops a very active foreign policy, weighted by its participation, has a better position in the system because it has more contacts and has more possibilities to exert influence on the outcomes of a given process. Indeed, from a network analysis perspective, Kim suggests that “a state with most visibility and centrality is the point where there is most activity in the network and gains influence as a result” (2010, p. 406).

However, not only the number of foreign policy activities matter. It is important to also account for the direction thereof. Maoz argues that links between nodes suggest “the extent to which other states trust the focal state to honor its commitments under the rule that defines ties in this network” (Maoz, 2011, p. 217). Based on this insight, the amount of activities a state receives from its peers also signals how important it is for the rest of the system or subsystem. In this sense, international participation, based on the foreign policy actions states undertake and on how many of those it receives, can portray their position in the regional structure.

According to this line of research, event data can account for international participation. This type of data is “a formal method to measure the behaviour of political actors” (Veen, 2008, p. 3) and the patterns that can be discerned “usually correspond to the narrative summaries of the interactions found in historical sources” (Schrodt, 1995, p. 148). Although event data records single events between two actors, “(the dots on the line), an observer still has a sense of the unobserved continuous variable” (King, 1989, p. 125), which is the behavioral pattern of each actor. Furthermore, since the data sets’ aim is to include all the interactions among the units that compose their universe (limited to the nature of each particular data set and to the way the information is gathered), “it should be possible to study characteristics of that system beyond the dyadic level” (Schrodt & Mintz, 1988, p. 218). Therefore, the analysis of this data moves from the agency of states to the structure of the system and back.

Throughout the development of event data, several definitions on what constitutes an event have been elaborated. Azar, the leader of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), argued that an event, to be recorded as such, should have the following characteristics: “on a specific *date* a specific *actor* directs an activity towards a specific *target* regarding an *issue* of mutual concern” (1972, p. 184, emphasis in the original). The premise was that the activity had to be nonroutine (Andriole & Young, 1977, p. 118), meaning that, for example, regular midlevel diplomatic encounters or trade between two states were excluded. However, these definitions did not include the source of the information nor how it was retrieved. Goldstein partially solved this problem by defining events as “day-by-day accounts of who did what to whom as reported in the open press” (1992, p. 369). A more elaborated definition, which includes the process of content analysis whereby the information is collected, states that an event “can be described in a natural language sentence that has as its subject and object an element of a set of *actors* and as its verb an element of a set of *actions*, the contents of which are transitive verbs” (Gerner et al., 1994, p. 95). Both the actors and the actions are coded from dictionaries such as the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) Codebook (Schrodt & Yilmaz, 2007) or the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) protocol (Bond et al., 2003).

The Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS), the data set used in this research, defines in its dictionaries that even data corresponds to “coded interactions between socio-political actors (...) extracted from news articles by the BBN ACCENT event coder (...) [and are] essentially triples consisting of a source actor, an event type (...), and a target actor” (Boschee et al., 2015, ICEWS Coded Event Data Read Me file).

Since the early 1960s, several event data bases have been created with different objectives in mind (Schrodt, 1995, pp. 151–156) although the most used data sets for international relations research have been COPDAB and the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) (Gerner et al., 1994, p. 92). The COPDAB data base includes events from 1948 to 1978, while the WEIS survey originally included events from 1966 to 1978, but it has been updated until 1992 (Koch, 2016, p. 836). Reuveny and Kang have showed that these two data sets can be spliced (1996) to obtain a more encompassed data set.

From a more recent perspective, Schrodtt provides a non-exhaustive list of 18 different events data sets in production since 2000 (2012b, p. 549). These data sets vary in scope (i.e. span of time and territorial coverage), as well as what are the events recorded (e.g. terrorism, inter-state conflicts, organized violence, protests). Since the objective of this research revolves around foreign policy, and comprises states from South America in addition to the United States and China, a global data set was needed. With this aim in mind, three different data bases were initially surveyed in order to select one: the Phoenix Event Data (Althaus et al., 2017), the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) (Leetaru & Schrodtt, 2013), and ICEWS.

These three data sets use automated coding. In contrast to earlier efforts where humans were in charge of perusing their sources and extracting the events, these data bases have turned to computers to code. The development of natural language processing tools, in combination with the development of computers and, overall, the information and communication technologies, have made this possible. Although “computer-automated event data often duplicate and misclassify events” (W. Wang et al., 2016, p. 1503), misclassification also occurs when humans perform this task. Indeed, previous research shows that on the long-run, computers outperform human coders, and “warrant a serious reconsideration of the apparent bias against using events data, and especially automatically created events data, in the study of international relations” (King & Lowe, 2003, p. 636).

Regarding duplicates, these could show the importance of the events and “will amplify politically-relevant signals” (Schrodtt, 2012b, p. 553), and usually “are concentrated in specific event forms” (Bond et al., 2003, p. 738). In this sense, although this research measures international participation by the quantity and direction of foreign policy events, implicating that duplicates will bias the analysis, they will occur, in principle, across all states given a specific event form. Moreover, as explained below, ICEWS does not specify the source(s) of each event individually, impeding a process of deduplication by reading the content of the news. An alternative is to filter using the “One-A-Day” approach, which means selecting just one event per day. However, this technique was discarded because there can be cases where “two actors are simultaneously engaging in material and verbal conflict, or where an actor is simultaneously meeting with another actor and criticizing it” (Schrodtt, 2015, p. 7).

Besides the automated coding issues, events data bases face other problems. Firstly, they tend to reproduce the media bias from which they extract the information (Wooley, 2000, pp. 158–160), especially the ones that rely on a single source. This is not a concern with the three data bases preselected. The Phoenix Event Data rely on three different sources: The New York Times, the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); GDELT initially used 13 different sources (Leetaru & Schrodtt, 2013, pp. 2–3), although it now claims that uses sources that publish their stories in 65 different languages;<sup>8</sup> and ICEWS uses Factiva<sup>9</sup> and the Open Source Center (now Open Source Enterprise)<sup>10</sup> to collect its events from English, Spanish, and Portuguese news outlets. The variety of sources these data bases use not only reduces the media bias (how events are portrayed) but also addresses the “Western” bias, meaning that events occurring in the non-Western world are also recorded.

A second problem is the ontology of events. What constitutes an event and how to code it imply a specific view of the world. Veen argues that while COPDAB and WEIS relied on a realist account of the international system to code their events, other coding systems, such as CAMEO, rely on the “tradition of liberal IR theorists” (2008, p. 15). The latter system “is specifically designed to code events relevant to the mediation of violent conflict” (Gerner et al., 2002, p. 2). By expanding the categories of events, compared to COPDAB or WEIS, CAMEO offers a nuanced perspective of the post-Cold War interactions between actors, which is the time span of this research. Phoenix Event Data, GDELT, and ICEWS use the CAMEO ontology, which means that they share a vision of the dynamics of the current international system, though they differ in their events counts and have a weak to moderate correlation among them (Beielser, 2016b, pp. 43–48; W. Wang et al., 2016).

Concatenated to the ontology of events issue, the way the events are scaled into values on the conflict-cooperation continuum is also a problem, as any attempt to quantify a small fraction of “the real world” is. Veen gives the example of two negative non forceful events being equal to a war, according to the sum of their weights (2008, p. 17).

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<sup>8</sup>See GDELT's website <https://www.gdeltproject.org/data.html#intro>

<sup>9</sup>Factiva is a global news data base owned by Dow Jones & Company. See <https://www.dowjones.com/products/factiva/>

<sup>10</sup>The Open Source Enterprise is the successor of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and its part of the CIA. See <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2016-featured-story-archive/ose-pearl-harbor-to-digital-age.html>

However, they are indeed very different, and have different consequences for the actors and for the system, so these events “should not be treated as equivalent” (Lowe, 2006, p. 323). This is not a problem for this research because only events counts are considered for measuring international participation, as mentioned above, and no scaling of events is yet used. However, the conflict-cooperation scale will be employed to further the analysis on role performance and role conflict, thus this issue will be revisited and dealt with below.

With these limitations of events data in mind, the revision of the three data bases continued. The Phoenix Event Data covers events from 1945 to 2015. GDELT has three different versions of the raw data files: GDELT 1.0, GDELT 2.0, and a reduced event database that records only one event per dyad. The publicly available data set from ICEWS span from 1995 to 2017. Phoenix and GDELT, then, are more comprehensive and better suited for this research, than ICEWS, where the first five years are missing (1990-1994).

However, Phoenix Event Data and GDELT present some issues that made them not proper for the goals of this research. Under examination, Phoenix does not report any events stemming from the strained relations between Colombia in Ecuador in 2008. Colombia’s airstrike to a guerrilla camp in Ecuador’s side of the border between these two states in March 2008 had regional consequences (e.g. extraordinary meetings of the Organization of American States (OAS)), and led to the severing of diplomatic relations between them. Due to the high conflictive nature of these relations, at least one event should have been recorded. However, as this episode can be considered as a hard case, the database shows no evidence of these dynamics being reported.

Another hard, conflictive case was tested: Argentina and Uruguay’s relations involving the Uruguayan plan in 2003 to construct two pulp mills on the eastern bank of the Uruguay River. According to Torres, this was the most complex and tense event during Nestor Kirchner’s tenure in Argentina’s presidency (2013, p. 123). On the one hand, from Argentina’s point of view, the construction and operation of these mills would pollute the river, with the economic consequences attached to that, and would also economically affect the tourism to that region. For Uruguay, on the other hand, that foreign direct investment would be the largest the country ever received, plus its Gross Domestic Product would increase in 2 percent (Spiegel, 2008, p. 799). This conflict between them



lead to massive protests on the Argentinian side and suits ensued before the International Court of Justice, which made its final verdict in 2010. Given the magnitude of this conflict, several events should have been recorded. However, in Phoenix's data set covering the years 1979 to 2015, only 4 events are recorded under the dyad Argentina-Uruguay between 2003 and 2010; being all of them positively valued. In the other direction of the dyad, i.e. Uruguay-Argentina, 6 events are recorded in the same period; they are positively valued too. This examination points to a lack of coverage of South American dynamics, and underrepresentation of the events between the 132 dyads of this region. The Phoenix Event Data was therefore discarded.

The GDELT project was launched in 2013, and "caused a stir in academic and policy communities alike" (Hammond & Weidmann, 2014, p. 1) due to the scale of this endeavor. Contrary to the Phoenix Event Data, GDELT recorded the above hard cases used to test their coverage. In this sense, from a data perspective, GDELT was fulfilling the requirements for this research. However, the reasons for not using it were from a different nature. In 2014 it faced legal issues regarding the way it used the news sources to generate its datasets (Donnay & Bhavnani, 2016, p. 8, footnote 10; Halterman & Irvine, 2014, p. 2, footnote 1; W. Wang et al., 2016, p. 4, supplementary materials).<sup>11</sup> Though it is now publicly available in its website, it is supported by Google, and apparently the project solved its legal issues, due to this controversy, it was also discarded.

Finally, the ICEWS project began in 2007 (S. P. O'Brien, 2013, p. 405), and its goal was "to cover the broadest possible spectrum of events encompassing instability and political violence" (S. P. O'Brien, 2010, p. 90). Initially it covered only 29 states from the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States Pacific Command has its area of responsibility. After the end of the initial project, it was extended and now covers 177 countries (Minhas et al., 2017, p. 10), and its maintained by Lockheed Martin.<sup>12</sup> Some of the data it has produced is classified, and the public releases in Harvard's Dataverse has a one-year embargo. Notwithstanding this, the overall ICEWS project has invested significant resources to further develop the event data field (Schrodt, 2012b, p. 547), "including the development of the automated coders, actor and action dictionaries, and for access to a

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<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the International Studies Quarterly issued a post announcing its refusal to accept submissions using GDELT, which they later retracted. See <https://www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Posts/ID/321/GDELT>

<sup>12</sup> See <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/W-ICEWS.html> They added the W for World, but for sake of congruence, it is referred to in this research as ICEWS.

very large collection of news documents” (D’Orazio & Yonamine, 2015, p. 3). Indeed, they use natural language processing tools and graph theory to survey and code “about 30 million media reports from about 275 local and global news sources in or translated to English” (Minhas et al., 2016, p. 496).

ICEWS, then, has a global reach, which is necessary to the purposes of this research. Additionally, as GDELT, it recorded significant events, both conflictive and cooperative, between Colombia and Ecuador in 2008, and between Argentina and Uruguay from 2003 to 2010. This means that ICEWS can pick events in South America, which is paramount to place its states within the network according to their international participation. Even though it misses the first 4 years, overall trends and patterns of the international behavior of South American states can be discerned from 1995 onwards, reducing the effect of not having those years in the analysis. Following these ideas, ICEWS was chosen as the source of the events data.

The first task for building the South American networks to measure the states’ international participation was cleaning the data sets by removing all events that do not relate to foreign policy behavior. As mentioned, ICEWS extracts events from news sources using the “who-did-what-to-whom-and-when” format (D’Orazio, 2012a, p. 281), based on an updated CAMEO structure using the BBN ACCENT software (Boschee et al., 2015, BBN ACCENT Event Coding Evaluation, updated v01.pdf). Based on this ontology, the actors (who – source actor, and whom – target actor) are coded from a general standpoint (the country) to the specific (Schrodt, 2012a, pp. 90–93): first the country, followed by primary roles (government, military, opposition, insurgents, judiciary, rebels, separatists, state intelligence services or armed forces not aligned with the government or against it); the secondary roles follow (sector of society such as business, media, civilian, etc); and finally a tertiary role is coded accounting for its political stance, being radical or moderate. Note that not every actor will have the code for all this specificity. Sometimes events include only the country, and some other times include the country and the primary role code.

Nonetheless, this classification system allows for aggregating and cleaning the data for the research purposes. The first batch of data to be removed was every country, as source country, not belonging to South America. Then, every domestic event was also removed. For this purpose, the target country must not coincide with the source country.

For example, to drop Argentina's domestic events, the source country was set as "Argentina" and then every event having "Argentina" as the target country was taken out. Finally, to account for foreign policy actions, all events not initiated by actors belonging to any of the three branches of public power (following the secondary role codes) were also eliminated. This last step was tailored for each country. In the end, the data for South American interactions contained 213,191 events.

With the clean data, 21 directed and weighted networks were constructed following a 12 X 12 matrix form (corresponding to the South American states as sources and targets of the events), for each year (1995-2015). The rows stand for the source country and the columns for the target country. The value of each cell is the number of events the country in the row started targeting the country in the column. Since domestic events were excluded, the diagonal from top left to bottom right is empty. These events networks seem symmetric, due to the "who-did-what-to-whom" format, but they are not. The way some of the events are coded implies symmetry, such as codes 042 "Make a visit" and 043 "Host a visit", or code 057 "Sign formal agreement". In the former case, the same episode produces two different coded events, while in the latter it produces two different events, with the same code, but with the source actors reversed (Schrodt, 2012a, pp. 29–33). However, other codes only apply for one direction of the action. For example, code 1011 "Demand economic cooperation" portrays an event, which the target can or cannot reciprocate.

Contrary to the trade network, the numbers of events per year were not averaged. The reason behind this decision was to keep the regional interactions as intact as possible, with the possibility of having unusual activities visible. These high numbers could reflect an issue between two states that caught the attention of the foreign policy apparatus. Conversely, very low numbers in a given year could be a sign of some critical juncture that impeded a more fruitful relationship between those two states.


Four different indicators were chosen to account for the international participation of the South American states within their region. On the one hand, the Weighted Output Degree accounts for the number of activities a state started, reflecting its desire to engage with the region. In other words, it accounts for the capabilities and willingness of having an active foreign policy. On the other hand, the Weighted Input Degree shows the number of events that have a state as target, reflecting its importance for the rest of its peers. To

some extent, it can be equated to the prestige a state has because it reflects the choices of other states.

The other measures are the Hubs and Authorities Weights. Based on the idea that “it matters who you know” (de Nooy et al., 2011, p. 153), these measures provide a score for ego based on the actions of its neighbors (the alters linked to the former). The hubs are nodes sending links to important authorities, while the latter are vertices that receive their links from important hubs. While these definitions of hubs and authorities seem circular, they reflect an important characteristic of networks, which mirrors the idea of international participation: the importance of a node is also dependent of the importance of the ones it relates to. If a state is close to another one, which in turn is selected by many others, the former state increases the possibilities of influencing the outcomes of its interactions. Moreover, on a basic principle, a state wants to be close to the most important states to receive the benefits of the network, and to fulfill its foreign policy goals. In this sense, targeting those important states is a characteristic of the international participation.

The simple Input and Output Degrees were not used because there was not enough variation among the states. These measures count the number of states ego interacts with. The median for the former for all states was 9, with the exemption of Brazil (11), Venezuela (10), Guyana (3), and Suriname (2), while the median for the latter was also 9 for the region, Brazil had 11, Venezuela 10, Guyana 4, and Suriname 2. Furthermore, these scores could be meaningless if, for example, ego just make one statement regarding a partner. This event would link both, without considering that it was only one minor event, increasing the score for both countries.

Figure 11 shows the boxplots for the Weighted Output Degree. The red horizontal line shows the median for the region (203.5 events per year). The scores range from 0 events per year to 1989. Venezuela holds the latter in 2008, while the former was from Suriname in 1996.




**Figure 11:** Weighted Output Degree for the South American Foreign Policy Events Network, 1995-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

Venezuela was the most active state in the region with a median of 529. Argentina (434), and Brazil (425), were also important sources of events in South America across the 1995-2015 period. Colombia (288), Peru (256), Chile (222), and Ecuador (212) had more events than the median of the region. Uruguay (186), Paraguay (168), and Bolivia (147) fell below the median, while Guyana (17), and Suriname (7) did not target the region in their foreign policy behaviors.

An important remark here is due, and one of the reasons why the Phoenix Event Data was discarded. The outlier points in Ecuador and Colombia's boxplots correspond to 2008. Ecuador had 1638 events, of which 1065 were directed to Colombia, while on the other direction, Colombia had 1382, of which 594 were to Ecuador, highlighting the importance of Colombia's March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008 airstrike to a guerrilla camp in Ecuador's territory, and the events that followed between them.

Figure 12 shows the boxplots for the Weighted Input Degree. The horizontal red line shows the median for the region (210). This measure ranges from 0 (no other state targets ego) to 2780. Given the distance between this high score and the region's


median, it is important to note that it was Colombia, which in 2008, received this number of events coming from Ecuador (1065), and Venezuela (1288).



**Figure 12:** Weighted Input Degree for the South American Foreign Policy Events Network, 1995-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

The most targeted state in the region was Venezuela, which has a median of 419 events. Colombia (378), Brazil (374), and Argentina (360) follows Caracas in this regard. They separate themselves from Peru (279), Chile (251), and Ecuador (215), whose medians are above that from the region. Below that threshold are Uruguay (164), Paraguay (173), and Bolivia (137). Finally, with a considerable break from the region's dynamics are Guyana (15), and Suriname (9).

From these two measures, it can be argued that Guyana and Suriname do not engage the region, nor the region significantly interacts with them. On the other side of the spectrum, Venezuela ranks first in these networks. Caracas has had more involvement in the region than any other state, as well as has been the target of most actions coming from South America. Figure 13 shows how both directions of events followed the same pattern, increasing after former president Hugo Chávez took power, peaking between 2006 and 2008, and declining afterwards.



**Figure 13:** Venezuela's Outgoing and Incoming Foreign Policy Events, 1995-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

As mentioned above, both the Weighted Input and Weighted Output Degrees take into account the decisions of each ego, and in the case of the former, it aggregates all the choices of all alters targeting ego. The idea of including the Hubs and Authorities Weights was to highlight the close connections between ego's and alters' choices from a network approach. The choices of ego's alters regarding a third party have an effect on ego's position in the network. If a state targets alter, which is also a target of other states, alter's authority score will increase, while ego's hub's score will also improve. From an international participation perspective, a state directing its foreign policy to important states (based on how much other states also choose them) shows, on the one hand, the standing of those targets, and the need for those other states to aim to the same states. On the other hand, having the opportunity of pointing to many important states reflects how close a state is from them too.

Kleinberg developed an algorithm with two main operations to account for these dynamics regarding the world wide web (1999, pp. 8–9), though the main principle can be extrapolated to other social environments. In this sense, the operations are as follows:

[18]

$$\text{authority weight } x^{(p)} \leftarrow \sum_{q: (q,p) \in E} y^{(q)}$$


and

[19]

$$\text{hub weight } y^{(p)} \leftarrow \sum_{q: (p,q) \in E} x^{(q)}$$

where  $p$  is ego,  $q$  is alter, and  $E$  is the network. As shown in the operations, both weights reinforce each other, following the idea that “if  $p$  points to many pages with large  $x$ -values, then it should receive a large  $y$ -value; and if  $p$  is pointed to by many pages with large  $y$ -values, then it should receive a large  $x$ -value” (Kleinberg, 1999, p. 8). In sum, these scores, which range from 0 to 1, are dependent on ego’s and alters’ choices, within the whole structure of the network. Scores closer to 1 mean that those states are “better” hubs or authorities.

Figure 14 presents the boxplots for the Hubs Weights. The scores of the South American foreign policy events range from 0 to 0.96, achieved by Venezuela in the 2010 network. The horizontal red line in this figure stands for the median of the region (0.168).






**Figure 14:** Hubs Weights for the South American Foreign Policy Events Network, 1995-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

Venezuela (0.47), Argentina (0.36), and Brazil (0.35) have higher scores as hubs, meaning that they direct their foreign policies toward important states (authorities) in the region. Following them are Ecuador (0.23), Colombia (0.21), Peru (0.19), and Chile (0.17), which are above the regional median. Below this threshold are Bolivia (0.14), Uruguay (0.13), Paraguay (0.09), and, further down are Guyana (0.01), and Suriname (0.003).

Conversely, Figure 15 shows the boxplots for the Authorities Weights. The median for the region, represented by the horizontal red line, is 0.16. It ranges from 0 to 0.98. Colombia achieved this high score in the 2008 network, due to the reasons exposed above.



**Figure 15:** Authorities Weights for the South American Foreign Policy Events Network, 1995-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).


Colombia has the highest median in this regard, with 0.40, followed by Brazil and Argentina, both with 0.36. Above the median threshold are also Venezuela (0.26), Peru (0.22), and Chile (0.18). Ecuador is in-between with a score of 0.16, the same as the regional median. Below them are Bolivia (0.15), Uruguay (0.11), and Paraguay (0.10). Closing the region's scores are Guyana (0.01), and Suriname (0.003).

These four measures, as noted, were used to grasp the position the South American States have according to their foreign policy behavior. The Weighted Input Degree, on the one hand, accounts for the international activities each one displays within the region. In this sense, it corresponds to their material capabilities and to their willingness to act. The Weighted Output Degree, on the other hand, shows how important a state is for the rest of the region, given that it is the target of the others' behaviors. In the meanwhile, the Hubs and Authorities Weights take ego's and alter's choices, but put them in a regional perspective. These two are connected, in the sense that ego's score in one weight is dependent on the score of its alters in the other weight.

Mathematically, each one of these measures depict different sides of the regional structure. To corroborate this idea, Spearman Correlations were used to see how related to each other these measures in the foreign policy events network are. Figure 16 shows the results of these correlations, with the distribution of the measure, their relations, and the corresponding coefficient, along with their statistical significance. The very strong correlation between the Weighted Output Degree and the Weighted Input Degree was not expected, since they depict different directions of the interactions. However, what can be interpreted from this high correlation means is that the most active states in the region, i.e. those states that engage the region the most, are also the most targeted by the rest of the states. Therefore, the more active a state is, the more its peers recognize it, and this situation makes them develop foreign policies towards it. This relationship portrays a differentiation within the region when it comes to foreign policy behavior.

The Hubs and Authorities Weights capture this dynamic as well, as the very strong correlation between them, and their strong correlations with the Weighted Degrees, show. In sum, these measures give a sense of the relationships among all the states in the region according to their behavior. As a product of these relations, a structure emerges into which all states are located. Although a state's choices are important to

depict its standing vis-à-vis its regional partners, the latter's choices have an effect in the former's original position.



**Figure 16:** Spearman Correlation between Centrality Scores South American Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Based on the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). Elaborated with the Performance Analytics package for R (Peterson & Carl, 2014). WID: Weighted Input Degree; WOD: Weighted Output Degree; HUB: Hubs Weights; AUT: Authorities Weights. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

Based on this results,<sup>13</sup> the procedure to locate these states in the regional structure followed that from the trade network. First, the mean scores were normalized (equation 18) to be able to compare and aggregate them. After this normalization, 4 groups can be distinguished for each measure, depending on where those scores lied – above one standard deviation from the mean, above the mean, below the mean, and below one standard deviation from the mean. These positions were then given a score (1, for the first group; 2, for the second group; 3, for the third group; and 4, for the fourth group) and assigned to each state in each measure. These scores were averaged to obtain the different scores of G6, G4, and G2. Finally, to obtain the states' final position in the South

<sup>13</sup> An alternative analysis was done leaving out events belonging to CAMEO's codes 01 "Make a public statement" and 02 "Appeal", which are deemed as "neutral" by Beiler (2016a, p. 28). This approach is based on the original classification by Duval and Thompson (1980), who grouped the codes according to what they expressed: verbal cooperation, material cooperation, verbal cooperation, and verbal conflict. The overall results were the same, with only Argentina scoring higher and moving up to the First Group.

American foreign policy events network, those final scores were averaged and presented in table 2.

Country	WID	WOD	HUB	AUT	WOHU	WIAU	G6	G4	G2	AveFP
Argentina	0.92	1.09	0.84	0.81	0.97	0.86	1.83	1.75	2.00	1.86
Bolivia	-0.22	-0.21	-0.38	-0.40	-0.29	-0.31	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Brazil	0.87	1.00	0.84	0.81	0.92	0.84	1.83	1.75	2.00	1.86
Chile	0.02	0.09	-0.23	-0.17	-0.07	-0.08	2.67	2.50	3.00	2.72
Colombia	1.63	0.49	0.05	2.16	0.27	1.90	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Ecuador	-0.11	0.19	0.55	0.06	0.37	-0.03	2.33	2.25	2.50	2.36
Guyana	-1.53	-1.51	-1.45	-1.45	-1.48	-1.49	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Paraguay	-0.83	-0.89	-0.81	-0.62	-0.85	-0.73	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Peru	0.22	-0.02	0.34	0.51	0.16	0.37	2.17	2.25	2.00	2.14
Suriname	-1.59	-1.57	-1.45	-1.52	-1.51	-1.56	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Uruguay	-0.66	-0.56	-0.52	-0.70	-0.54	-0.68	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Venezuela	1.29	1.91	2.20	0.51	2.05	0.90	1.33	1.25	1.50	1.36
MEAN	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.56	2.52	2.63	2.57
SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.85	0.87	0.82	0.84
MEAN + SD	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	3.40	3.39	3.44	3.41
MEAN - SD	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	-0.99	-0.99	1.71	1.65	1.81	1.73
First Group	1									
Second Group	2									
Third Group	3									
Fourth Group	4									

**Table 2:** Position of States in the South American Foreign Policy Events Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Based on the events data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). WID: Weighted Input Degree; WOD: Weighted Output Degree; HUB: Hubs Weights; AUT: Authorities Weights; WOHU: Average of Weighted Output Degree and the Hubs Weights; WIAU: Average of the Weighted Input Degree and the Authorities Weights; G6: Average of Group Scores of WID+WOD+HUB+AUT+WOHU+WIAU; G4: Average of Group Scores of WID+WOD+HUB+AUT; G2: Average of Group Scores of WOHU+WIAU; AveFP: Average of G6+G4+G2.

The G6 column takes the average position of each state across the 4 centrality measures plus the average of the Weighted Output Degree and the Hubs Weights (WOHU), and the average of the Weighted Input Degree and the Authorities Weights (WIAU). The reason to aggregate them was that they follow the same direction of the links. A Hub is a sender connected to important Authorities, as noted above. Though its score is dependent on whom it connects to, it must develop foreign policies to link itself to those Authorities, which can be seen through its Weighted Output Degree. Hence, the direction of the measures is the same. The same logic applies for averaging the Weighted Input Degree and the Authorities Weights, though the direction of the links is reversed. An Authority receive the links from important Hubs, and the Weighted Input Degree captures this orientation of the interaction. The G4 column depicts the states' positions according to just the 4 centrality measures, while the G2 column only takes on the aggregation explained above. These 3 columns show consistency in the location of the states in the regional foreign policy events network. Chile is the only one that moves one position from the third group to the second.

The global average, shown in the AveFP column, presents the final standing of the South American states in this network. Venezuela and Colombia have some of the higher scores in the network, so they belong to the first group. Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru follow them in the second group. Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay belong to the third group, according to their results. Finally, Guyana and Suriname are members of the fourth group.

### **1.3 Security Network**

Security is yet another dimension that constitutes the South American regional structure. In the twentieth century, South America has experienced few inter-state wars (B. Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 304), with the last one occurring between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1935 (Merke, 2011, p. 3). Moreover, "the region has increasingly moved towards stable peace. Some significant border differences have been resolved, military cooperation has deepened, and an unprecedented process of building regional institutions is underway" (Battaglino, 2016, p. 230), such as the South American Defense Council. However, international, or domestic security conditions in the region are far from being perfect, and

the progress made in this area does not prevent states from seeking and engaging in military cooperation.

This engagement in military cooperation has different alternatives or layers. Atkinson, using a positivist approach to evaluate some constructivist claims, operationalized it via military education exchanges, arms sales, military troops stationed in a different state as part of a formal agreement between the sender and the host, military aid, and alliances (2006). These indicators reflect the extent to which a state is committed to another one's security. Of these, alliances "have long been recognized as one of the central means through which states in the international system structure their relationships and actions" (Warren, 2010, p. 698).

In this sense, the alliance structure is commonly used to depict foreign policy similarity, hence the international structure, under the logic that states pull resources together and enter into an alliance if they share a common interest (or threat) (D'Orazio, 2012b; Maoz, 2006; Signorino & Ritter, 1999). Alliances, however, should not be viewed solely as the aggregation of capabilities in the face of a threat, implying shared interests, rather they also point to an asymmetric relation of power where weaker states offer concessions in exchange of protection (Morrow, 1991, p. 905).

Following these ideas, an alliance can be defined as "a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states" (Walt, 1987, p. 12), though the two main data sets of international alliances (the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Data set and the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project) only focus on the formal arrangements as a way of operationalizing it. In these two data sets, the main alliances involving the members of South America are the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 and the establishment of the Organization of American States in 1948. Chile and Argentina's non-aggression pact of 1984 is the most recent one according to those data sets (Gibler, 2009; Leeds et al., 2002). Given these conditions, using the alliance data to portray the South American security network will show a static picture of the regional power and security dynamics. Indeed, Haim uses this data to build up a world network and is clear from his article that from this perspective South America – embedded into Latin America, is just one block from 1950 onwards (Haim, 2016, pp. 489–490).

Due to data availability, all other indicators of military cooperation used by Atkinson were excluded from this research, except for arms sales (trade). Sorokin argues that a state, pursuing its own security, can build alliance support, or can acquire arms, either by buying them from international sources or producing them domestically (1994, p. 425). These two policy options become substitutable or complementary. A state can produce or buy arms to enhance its security and/or can formalize an alliance with another one to guarantee the latter's protection in case of a third party threat. From an analytical perspective, arms trade can also portray the security dynamics of the international (or regional) system because in this relationship, as with alliances, "arms transfers are indicative of the supplier's commitment to the recipient's security" (Kinsella, 2003, p. 14).

Following suit, these connections serve as "proxies for political ties, and global arms trade network should reflect constellations of political allies" (Akerman & Seim, 2014, p. 536) too. Additionally, arms transfers have more variability over time than alliances, thus allowing for better capturing alignment patterns (Abb & Strüver, 2015, p. 58). Furthermore, from a foreign policy approach, arms transfers "still constitute a tool of statecraft at the hands of arms-exporting countries, including the United States, China, and Israel" (Efrat, 2010) and can be used to motivate a change in the recipient's international or domestic behavior (Sislin, 1994, p. 667).

Based on these ideas, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database was reviewed to build the arms trade networks, bearing in mind that the arms transfers rate has fallen down from the Cold War period, the trade flow has increased since the 2000s (Kinne, 2016, p. 360). In conventional weapons trade, this database recorded six South American countries as intra-regional exporters in the period 1990-2015: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In total, 40 links were coded, out of 3432 possible links for the whole period (12 states \*11 possible links – excluding itself – \*26 years), or just around 1.2 percent of the total possible connections. The presence of a link corresponded to the transactions between two states in a given year. For example, Argentina sold conventional weapons to Bolivia in 2006 for an amount of 2 million US dollars. This transaction will then be registered as one link. Additionally, Brazil sold weapons to Uruguay in 2006 for 1 million dollars, and then in 2009 for 6 million. These transactions will form two distinct links. As it can be noticed, to grasp some of the main security dynamics in the region, this data does not suffice, given the amount of 0s (no links between two states) that will make up the whole network.


Yet, small, and light weapons is another side of the arms trade coin. From just a value perspective, small arms trade is just a fraction of the total arms trade. However, “these items are largely the current combatants’ weapons of choice and most weapon-related deaths in recent wars are caused not by modern major systems but by small arms, mines, and light artillery” (Neuman, 1995, p. 51). Besides, the small arms trade is important in South America because the region hosts major producers such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, which “contributes to a regional dynamic of licit and illicit small arms transfers, particularly between countries in the south of the region”(Dreyfus et al., 2006, p. 83).

The trade data came from the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017). This database records a state’s imports and exports of small arms, being the possibility of including a “mirror” dataset to contrast what a country exports with the imports from this country made by its partners (Jackson et al., 2007, p. 3). Precisely, this feature was used to construct the South American small arms trade networks. For each year, from 1990 to 2015, a 12 X 12 matrix was built, corresponding to the twelve South American states, with each entry recording the US current value of exports from the row state to the column state. These values from the exports data set were compared to the values of the imports the column state made from the row state registered in the imports (“mirror”) data set. When these values differed, the highest value was chosen. Finally, the links in the different networks did not include any transaction below a 1000 dollars threshold, and the raw values were only used to calculate the Weighted Degrees, as explained below. For the remaining centrality measures, the matrix was binarized, meaning that each transaction was coded as 1, and the absence of transactions were coded as 0. Overall, these networks have higher connectivity than the conventional weapons, explained above. In total, the 26 networks have 622 links, out of 3432 possible connections. On average, each network has 24 ties, with an overall network density (the number of ties as a proportion of the total possible) of 0.18.

To portray the arms trade structure and the position each state occupies in it, five network measures were used: Input Degree, Output Degree, Weighted Input Degree, Weighted Output Degree, and the Aggregate Constraint. The Input Degree, as explained above, counts the number of links a state receives from the region, and its independent of the




value those links have. Therefore, the results are the same with a weighted or a binary network. Theoretically, its range is from 0 to 11, though in the empirical networks it ranged from 0 to 5. Figure 17 shows the boxplots for each state in the region in this measure, and the horizontal red line stands for the median of the region, which is 2.



**Figure 17:** Input Degree for the South American Small Arms Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

This measure depicts the states as recipients of arms from the region. Chile is the state in the region that had the most incoming ties, with a median of 3 partners. The rest of the countries, except for Guyana (1), and Suriname (0), had a median of 2.


In the other direction of the exchanges, the Output Degree counts the number of ties an exporter had and is impervious to their values. The results are the same whether the network is a weighted one or if it is binary. This measure shows which states are the biggest producers and exporters of small arms to the region. Again, theoretically it ranges from 0 to 11, which the empirical networks match. Figure 18 shows these dynamics, and the red horizontal line stands for the median of the region: 0. Though this median could imply that there are no small arms exporters in the region, this is not the case, as verified by the mean of this measure: 1.86. However, as the following boxplots show, there are just a few intra-regional exporters of this kind of weapons.



**Figure 18:** Output Degree for the South American Small Arms Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

As it is clear from this figure, Brazil is the main exporter in the region. Brasilia's median is 9, meaning that on a yearly basis, it exports to most countries in the region. Its followers are Argentina, with a median of 7, and Chile, with 2.5. These three states are ahead of Peru, and Colombia, with medians of 1 partner each. The rest of the region had some transactions during the period under analysis, though they cannot be considered as exporters of small arms to the region.


The Weighted Input and Output Degrees stand for the deepness of those ties. Since they sum the values of the exchanges, their calculations used the raw values in millions of US dollars. The Weighted Input Degree takes on the imports side of the transactions. Its range for the 1990-2015 period is 0 to 54.5 million. The median of the region is 583,433 US dollars, represented by the horizontal red line in Figure 19.



**Figure 19:** Weighted Input Degree for the South American Small Arms Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

Although Chile was the state with most incoming ties according to the Input Degree, Colombia was the main recipient in the regional small arms trade, according to the value of its transactions. Bogotá's median (5.9 million) was far above the median of the region and bought, in 1993, 54.5 million worth of small weapons. Argentina followed Colombia, with a median of 2.1 million. Paraguay (1.4 million) and Chile (1.3 million) were next.


From the other side of the exchanges, the Weighted Output Degree sums the value of the exports a state made in a given year. Figure 20 presents the boxplots for the region, and the horizontal red line stands for the median of the region, expressed in millions of dollars: 0. This value comes from the fact that not all the countries in the region are exporters of these arms. However, the region has a mean of 1.6 million dollars in trade. It must be noted that these values, although low compared to other transactions, still reveal a dynamic that places states in a regional security structure in different positions.



**Figure 20:** Weighted Output Degree for the South American Small Arms Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

As the Output Degree results show, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile were the main intra-regional small arms exporters. The median for Brazil was 13 million dollars, while the median for Argentina was 1.5, and for Chile was 0.5. Since the rest of the region did not export much, the median for the remaining states ranged from 0.3, belonging to Peru, to 0.

Finally, the Aggregate Constraint was calculated on the binary matrices to measure the extent to which their small arms relations limited their freedom to change partners. Figure 21 displays their scores. The range of these scores for the period under analysis was from 0.14 to 1.00. As explained above, the higher score a state gets the more constrained it is. The median for the region was 0.68, meaning that, overall, the region is highly dependent on the relations they have set up.



**Figure 21:** Aggregate Constraint for the South American Small Arms Trade Network, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

Following the earlier results, Brazil is the least constrained state in the region. As it is a major exporter, both in connections and in their values, Brasilia did not depend on any particular relation it had. Its median reflects this condition, which was 0.33. Argentina (0.43), Chile (0.53), and Peru (0.62) have medians below the region's. As noted by the boxplots, on the other side, Guyana and Suriname are the most constrained states in this particular network, with a median of 1.


Although these findings present a picture of the regional security structure, it is not complete, since not all states actively engaged in the small arms trade dynamics. Therefore, it had to be complemented with other indicators to get closer to a representation of the regional security structure from which the positions the states occupy in it can be derived. As explained in the previous chapter, states' attributes add elements that can be used to place them in the international structure.

Based on this idea, military expending was an alternative indicator that, combined with the results of the intra-regional small arms trade, can present a clearer picture of the security structure of South America. The data for this indicator came from the Military Expenditure Database (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI, 2018). SIPRI's database provides different measures of the states' military expenditure, and to have elements for comparison among the region, three of them were chosen:

Military Expenditure in constant 2015 US dollars, Military Expenditure as share of the Gross Domestic Product of each state, and Military Expenditure per Capita.

The first of them reveals how much the South American states are investing on their military, and since it is in constant currency, it shows which are the bigger spenders in the region. The second one allows to relativize those values according to the size of their economies. The advantage of using this second measure stems from the fact that the position a country has according to the value of its military expenditure can change, dependent on the proportion of their GDP destined to their military. In this sense, this second indicator can be used to reflect the real impact of this expenditure on each state's military capabilities in comparison to the rest of the region. Finally, the third measure also relativizes the military expenditure by the size of the country. A basic assumption that can be made is that bigger countries spend more in their military than smaller ones. Any deviation from this norm from a small country's perspective could indicate an emphasis on the state's security, or on the other direction, could signal a security environment that prevents the bigger state from investing more. The mean values for the 1990-2015 period of these three measures are presented in Table 3 below.

The complementarity of the network measures and the states' military expenditures can be seen in Figure 22, which displays the Spearman correlation among them. The signs of all correlations followed the expectations. The only negative correlations are the pairs involving the Aggregate Constraint that, as explained, has the characteristic that having a lower value is "more desirable" than a higher one. The strongest correlation is between the Output Degree and its weighted version, but in the other direction of trade, i.e. the Input Degree and the Weighted Input Degree, only has a moderate correlation. Another noticeable result is that the different measures of the military expenditures have null to moderate correlations among them. This means that they are capturing different dynamics of this process and that is it worthy to keep them in the analysis.



**Figure 22:** Spearman Correlation between Centrality Scores and Military Expenditure in South America, 1990-2015  
Source: Based on the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), and the Military Expenditure Database (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI, 2018) analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). IN: Input Degree; OUT: Output Degree; WID: Weighted Input Degree in 2015 millions of dollars; WOD: Weighted Output Degree in 2015 millions of dollars; AC: Aggregate Constraint; MilSp15: Military Spending in 2015 millions of US Dollars; MilSpGDP: Military Spending as share of the Gross Domestic Product; MilSpPCap: Military Spending Per Capita in current US dollars. \*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.05; .p<0.1.

Table 3 shows the mean values of these three measures, along with the mean values of the small arms trade network. In this case, none of the scores or values were normalized since they are more indicative for the reader of the regional security dynamics. The biggest military spender in region is Brazil, followed by Venezuela. The former spent, on average, more than 17 billion dollars, while the latter spent more than 11 billion, as the measure in constant 2015 US dollars shows. Between them and Colombia and Argentina there is a gap of 6 billion dollars. However, as explained above, these raw values need be relativized according to the characteristics of each country. In this sense, while Brazil spent 17.6 billion dollars, this amount of money only represented 1.7 percent of its Gross Domestic Product, while Colombia spent a third of this value, namely 5.7 billion dollars, this expenditure represented 3.1 percent of its GDP. Furthermore, Chile and Uruguay spent US\$ 184 and US\$ 168, respectively, while Brazil only spent US\$ 92, which is half of Chile's. These differences are open to different interpretations. However, from the

point of view of this research, they provide different sides of the states' military capabilities that help position them more accurately in the regional security structure.

Country	IN	OUT	WID	WOD	AC	GSArms	MilSp 15	MilSp GDP	MilSp PCap	GMilSp	AveS
Argentina	1.96	6.81	2.52	2.08	0.45	1.60	4751	1.11	82.97	3.00	2.30
Bolivia	1.92	0.19	0.35	0.00	0.76	2.80	399	2.06	27.83	3.00	2.90
Brazil	1.81	9.35	1.28	15.63	0.33	1.80	17686	1.67	92.49	2.00	1.90
Chile	3.12	2.73	1.77	1.14	0.56	2.00	3311	2.50	183.8 7	1.67	1.83
Colombia	2.00	0.92	8.16	0.10	0.71	2.40	5750	3.14	123.2 5	1.67	2.03
Ecuador	1.77	0.08	0.68	0.00	0.8	3.00	1438	2.23	74.78	2.67	2.83
Guyana	0.88	0.04	0.07	0.00	0.93	3.40	24	1.60	26.33	3.33	3.37
Paraguay	2.12	0.12	1.82	0.02	0.73	2.60	248	1.47	32.27	3.33	2.97
Peru	2.19	1.42	1.07	0.30	0.64	2.60	1820	1.78	52.28	3.00	2.80
Suriname*	0.35	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.99	3.40	—	—	—	—	3.40
Uruguay	2.35	0.42	0.71	0.01	0.68	2.60	807	2.28	167.5 4	2.00	2.30
Venezuela	1.88	0.27	0.82	0.00	0.75	2.80	11770	1.38	87.46	2.00	2.40
MEAN	1.86	1.86	1.61	1.61	0.69	2.58	4364	1.93	86.46	2.52	2.59
SD	0.66	2.93	2.10	4.27	0.18	0.54	5349	0.56	51.13	0.63	0.51
MEAN+SD	2.53	4.79	3.71	5.88	0.87	3.13	9713	2.49	137.5 9	3.14	3.10
MEAN-SD	1.20	-1.06	-0.49	-2.67	0.52	2.04	-985	1.37	35.33	1.89	2.07
First Group	1										
Second Group	2										
Third Group	3										
Fourth Group	4										



**Table 3:** Position of States in the South American Foreign Security Structure, 1990-2015

Source: Based on the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), and the Military Expenditure Database (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI, 2018) analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). IN: Input Degree; OUT: Output Degree; WID: Weighted Input Degree in 2015 millions of dollars; WOD: Weighted Output Degree in 2015 millions of dollars; AC: Aggregate Constraint; GSArms: Average of Group Scores for the Small Arms Network; MilSp15: Military Spending in 2015 millions of US Dollars; MilSpGDP: Military Spending as share of the Gross Domestic Product; MilSpPCap: Military Spending Per Capita in current US dollars; GMilSp: Average of Group Scores for Military Spending Data; AveS: Average of GSArms + GMilSp. \*SIPRI does not have military expenditure data for Suriname. Therefore, its final position corresponds to the small arms trade network.

Lastly, Table 3 also presents the position each state occupies according to their scores in the small arms network and to their expenditures. As in the Trade and Foreign Policy Events networks, the strategy to place each state in a given group depended on the thresholds defined previously: it belonged to the first group if its score was above one standard deviation from the regional mean; to the second group if its score was below one standard deviation from the mean but above it; to the third group if its score was below the mean but above one standard deviation below the mean; and, finally, to the fourth group if its score was below one standard deviation below the mean of the region. There is no fourth group in the Out, Wid, Wod, and MilSp15 columns because one standard deviation below the regional mean resulted in a negative number, when the lowest possible integer for these measures or values is 0.

Since the small arms network and the military expenditure have different nature, the resulting scores from the former, or the values of the latter were not aggregated. Instead, an average for each feature was calculated according to the group scores in each measure. The GSArms and GMilSp columns present these averages. In the small arms network, as expected, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are members of the first group, while Colombia sits alone in the second group. Guyana, and Suriname, continue to belong to the fourth group, and the rest of the region belongs to the third group. The GMilSp column presents a different picture. Chile, and Colombia are members of the first group, while Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela are members of the second group. Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru are members of the third group, and Guyana, and Paraguay belong to the fourth group. The last column, AveS displays the average of the scores obtained in the

GSArms and GMilSp columns. As shown, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, due to their interactions and attributes in the regional security structure, are members of the first group. Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela follow them in the second group. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru are members of the third group, and Guyana, and Suriname belong to the fourth group.

## 1.4 South American Master Roles

With these results, each state's master role can be depicted. Table 4 presents the final position the states occupy according to the three different dimensions analyzed: Trade, Foreign Policy Behavior, and Security. The Trade, Foreign Policy Behavior, and Security columns display the group the states belonged to in each of these structures. The Regional Position column averages the score of the three previous columns. According to these averages, the final position was determined with the same strategy explained above. Countries belonging to the first group scored one standard deviation below the mean of the region; the second group has states that scored above this threshold, but below the mean of the region; states scoring above the mean, but below one standard deviation above the mean were placed in the third group; and the fourth group has members that scored above one standard deviation above the mean. Finally, the Master Role column assigns the master role for each state according to the group they belong to.

The advantages of using different social relations to rank states in the region to depict their master roles, or status, stem from the fact that they scored differently across the three dimensions. The only ones that could be consistently placed in the same group are Argentina, Guyana, Paraguay, and Suriname. Argentina's relations placed it in the second group, while Paraguay was always in the third group. Guyana, and Suriname are the least powerful states in the region, thus across the three dimensions, they ranked in the fourth group.

Country	Foreign Policy			Regional Position	Master Role
	Trade	Behavior	Security		
Argentina	2	2	2	2.00	Secondary
Bolivia	2	3	3	2.67	Tertiary

Brazil	1	2	1	1.33	Primary
Chile	2	3	1	2.00	Secondary
Colombia	2	1	1	1.33	Primary
Ecuador	3	2	3	2.67	Tertiary
Guyana	4	4	4	4.00	Quaternary
Paraguay	3	3	3	3.00	Tertiary
Peru	2	2	3	2.33	Secondary
Suriname	4	4	4	4.00	Quaternary
Uruguay	3	3	2	2.67	Tertiary
Venezuela	2	1	2	1.67	Secondary
MEAN				2,47	
SD				0,85	
MEAN + SD				3,33	
MEAN - SD				1,62	

**Table 4:** Master Roles of South American States, 1990-2015  
Source: Author's own elaboration.

Brazil, and Colombia are members of the first group and, therefore, have the primary master roles derived from the regional structures. Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela are members of the second group, and they hold the secondary master roles. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay belong to the third group, thus having the tertiary master role. The last group is composed by Guyana, and Suriname. They hold the quaternary master role.

Therefore, each state's role set in South America includes a master role ( $m$ ) as follows:

Brazil = {*Primary*, *A*, *F*},

Colombia = {*Primary*, *A*, *F*},

Argentina = {*Secondary*, *A*, *F*},

Chile = {*Secondary*, *A*, *F*},

Peru = {*Secondary*, A, F},  
 Venezuela = {*Secondary*, A, F},  
 Bolivia = {*Tertiary*, A, F},  
 Ecuador = {*Tertiary*, A, F},  
 Paraguay = {*Tertiary*, A, F},  
 Uruguay = {*Tertiary*, A, F},  
 Guyana = {*Quaternary*, A, F}, and  
 Suriname = {*Quaternary*, A, F}.

These results go along with the literature on the position of states or their master roles, and on the South American regional hierarchy. On the former, Thies stated that the interactions among states, based on competition and socialization, give rise to four categories of states (2001, p. 708, 2012, p. 33): Novice, Small Member, Major Member, and Great Power.<sup>14</sup> The division of groups according to their scores and their deviation from the regional means yielded those four categories. This means that the chosen strategy to find these categories was on the right track.

Though these master roles were named differently, from a regional perspective, they correspond to Thies' categorization. The novices, or those states having the quaternary master role, namely Guyana, and Suriname, are countries that are not heavily engaged the region and play a minor role in its structure. The small members have the tertiary master role because they participate to some extent in the region's interactions, but their power derived from their position is quite low. The major members are the secondary powers in the region. They have multiple connections within the region, and in some dimensions, they belong to the first group (e.g., Chile in the security structure or Venezuela in the foreign policy behavior dimension). Finally, the great powers are the

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<sup>14</sup> He later added 3 new master roles: Regional Power, Emerging or Rising Power, and Hegemon (Thies, 2015, p. 289). However, the Emerging or Rising Power is a temporary master role, according to his definition. In addition, from a realist perspective, a hegemon is a prospective master role, one which no state has yet played, and "there is not likely to be one anytime soon" (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 41). For that reason, Mearsheimer separates global from regional hegemony, being the United States, at present, the only state in the world performing the latter one (2003, p. 40). Finally, the regional and the emerging powers are a subset of the major members. Therefore, the four basic categories are still valid.

main actors in the regional structure, thus having the primary master role. They are important players in each dimension analyzed.


On the latter, the findings are, to some extent, congruent with the regional literature on the regional hierarchy. However, they differ in two specific cases. Some authors argue that Brazil is the leading power in South America, and that Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela are secondary powers within this region (Flemes & Wehner, 2015, p. 164; Schenoni, 2017, p. 75). This means that the rest of the states belong to at least the third category. However, as seen, Colombia's centrality in the foreign policy networks and in the security structure (small arms trade and military expenditures) is high, in comparison to the states upholding the secondary master role. Therefore, it plays a primary master role. The second case is Peru. Rather than being a tertiary power in the region, the fact that it belongs to the second group in both the trade and the foreign policy networks, makes it climb up in the regional hierarchy.

These divergences in the regional ranking also highlights the usefulness of approaching it from a tridimensional structure, on the one hand, and on the other hand, deriving those statuses on an interactional perspective, rather than relying solely on the states' attributes. Related to the former, an economic dimension, combined with political and security dimensions give a better sense of the overall regional structure. As explained above, only four states scored equally across these three dimensions. This means that focusing in just one of these dimensions would affect the results of the analysis.

Regarding the latter, a different picture of the region's structure would arise basing the analysis on attributes. Figure 23 displays the boxplots of the Composite Index of National Capability's (CINC) scores for the period 1990-2012, available in the National Material Capabilities database, version 5.0 (Singer et al., 1972).<sup>15</sup> The bottom horizontal red line stands for the mean of the region (0.0043), and the top blue line represents one standard deviation above the mean (0.011).

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<sup>15</sup> An analysis from the South American regional perspective was also made. That is, the six variables that make up the Composite Index were aggregated considering only the twelve countries in the region. Although the scores were different, the basic structure portrayed using the world scores did not change.



**Figure 23:** CINC Scores of South America, 1990-2012  
Source: Elaborated with the National Material Capabilities database (Singer et al., 1972).

As seen from the boxplots, the distance between Brazil and the rest of the region is enormous. Indeed, Brazil's mean score for the 1990-2012 period is 0.025, while the sum of the rest of the region's means amounts to 0.026. Therefore, the regional structure derived from this index would entail Brazil as holding the primary master role, while Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela would have the secondary master role because their scores are above the regional mean. The rest of the states would be part of the third group, thus playing the tertiary role in the region.


However, these scores fail to capture the dynamics of the region. Compared to the other boxplots from the trade, foreign policy events, and small arms trade networks, the CINC scores are rather static across the 23 years depicted. The amount of change for each state, represented by the size of each boxplot, is almost negligible for most of the region.

## 1.5 China, the United States, and South American Master Roles

The master roles performed by the states in South America, the way portrayed above, have validity not only in describing the regional structure, but also shed light on the way extra regional powers relate to the region. China, and the United States tend to have more intense relations overall with countries that enact primary or secondary master roles than with the remaining two groups.

To corroborate this, interactions were measured on the same three dimensions that were used to depict the master roles. In the trade networks, however, minor adjustments were made. Rather than taking the global average of exports from China, and the United States directed to each individual country in South America, the regional average was calculated (i.e., the percentage filling up each cell of the matrices corresponding to the rows of China, and the United States came from the total exports to South America). The reason behind this change was to highlight which states were more important in their relations with the region.

Figures 24 show the boxplots of the United States and China's trade to the region. In panel A, the horizontal red line stands for the mean of the exports from the United States, in percentage, South American countries received: 8.3.<sup>16</sup> Some countries did not import at all from Washington (mainly Guyana, and Suriname, hence, their percentage was 0), and Brazil, being the main destination for American goods, concentrated 43 percent of the regional imports in 2001, and 2002.



<sup>16</sup> The mean for the region was chosen instead of the median, as used in the previous boxplots, because the former accounts for extreme values, which usually countries at both extremes of the extra regional powers relations with the region display. This decision was kept in the boxplots that follow.

**Figure 24:** Exports of the United States and China to South America, according to their Master Roles, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).


The median for the states enacting the primary master roles was 21.5, while the secondary states was 10. Both groups received more exports from the United States than the mean of the region. Combined, Brazil, and Colombia imported twice as much from the United States than Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, according to the group's medians. Below them are the third and fourth groups, whose medians were 1 and 0, respectively.

China (panel B) also privileged states performing primary or secondary master roles. The mean of China's exports the region was 8.3, the same as for the United States' exchanges with the region. The horizontal red line depicts it. The range of this relation was from 0 percent (again, mainly Guyana, and Suriname did not import much goods from China in this period), to Brazil's 45 percent in 2009.

Again, the first group's states were bigger markets for Chinese products than the rest of the region. However, the distance between the primary and secondary states was shorter than in the United States' trade. The median of the first group was 13, while the second group received 10 percent of China's exports. The third group scored better than in the relations with the US, having a median of 2.5. The fourth group did not improve its standing as markets for extra regional goods because its median was also 0.

In the foreign policy behavior dimension, China and the United States also targeted more states performing the primary and secondary master roles than the rest of the countries of the region. Figure 25 shows these relations' dynamics from the extra regional powers' perspective. Overall, Washington (panel A) had a mean of 124.6 events for the region, depicted with the horizontal red line. The greatest number of events targeting a South American state was 959, which was Venezuela in 2006 (the highest outlier in the second group), while at the other end of the continuum Suriname, in several years (mainly in the second half of the 1990s), had no events coded in the database.





**Figure 25:** Foreign Policy Events from the United States and China to South America, according to their Master Roles, 1995-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).


The median of Washington's events for Brazil, and Colombia combined was 252.5 events, while for the second group was 114, just below the mean of the region. However, all four outlier points in the boxplot for the second group came from Venezuela, corresponding to 2006, as mentioned above, and to 2005, 2007, and 2015. Though the third group had a median below the mean of the region, it also had outliers, represented by Uruguay's score in 2006, and 2007 (127, and 345 events, respectively), Bolivia in 2006, and 2008 (288, and 215 events, respectively, and Ecuador from 2004 to 2006, being the target of 173, 138, and 136 events, respectively).

China's behavior towards the region (panel B) also privileged states belonging to the first and the second group, and as with trade, the distance between these two groups is narrower than that emanating from the United States. While the former had a median of 46 events, the latter had 35. The regional mean was 37.1 events, depicted with the horizontal red line. If compared to the events involving Washington, this mean is significantly lower.

Brazil, again, was Beijing's most targeted state in the region. Brasilia had 366 events coming from China in 2004, and in 2009 it received 360. The three outlier points in group

two were Argentina in 2004, being the target of 344 events, and Venezuela in 2001, and 2006. Beijing directed 222, and 212 events to Caracas in those years, respectively. These sets of states separate themselves from the third and fourth groups, in relation to China's foreign policy events. The median for the former was 6 events, and 2 events for the latter.

Finally, on the small arms trade networks, the picture presented in Figure 26 is less clear from the Chinese side (panel B). While the US still favored states performing the primary and secondary roles (panel A), with medians of 10.2 and 2.6 millions dollars, respectively, Chinese median of small arms sales to the second (US\$ 9,772) and third (US\$ 8,058) groups were slightly higher than those directed to the first group (US\$ 6,367). However, while Washington's nine biggest small arms sales were made to Colombia (first group), Beijing's six out of the ten biggest sales had Brazil as its counterpart.




**Figure 26:** Small Arms Trade from the United States and China to South America, according to their Master Roles, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

The regional means also highlight another key difference between the extra regional powers' small arms trade with the region. In the case of the United States, its mean was US\$ 4.8 million, while China's mean was US\$ 127,013.


From a regional context, and across these dimensions, these results confirm that Brazil, and Colombia, on the one hand, and Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, on the other, had the most intense interactions China and the United States directed to the region. However, the behavior of these latter states cannot be thought as being the same. Indeed, there is variation within groups that the present analysis need to consider. Figures 27 through 29 compare Beijing and Washington's relations with these groups disaggregating them according to each country.

Figure 27 show the trade relations. The first group had the biggest differences. Exports from China and the United States presented Brazil and Colombia as different types of markets. Brazil's mean imports from both China, and the United States reached 35.8 percent of the regional total, while Colombia's mean was 9.2 percent. States in the second group also presented some divergences in their behavior as markets, but their imports relations with Beijing, and Washington are more clustered together. The third, and fourth groups' states have relatively been neglected as markets by the US and China. The data points concentrated in the bottom left parts of the plots indicate that these states were not major markets for Chinese or American goods in this period. These points are also located below the means of Chinese (8.3 percent) and American (8.3 percent) exports to the region, depicted with the vertical, and horizontal dashed lines, respectively.



**Figure 27:** Comparison of Exports of the United States and China to South America, according to their Master Roles and Destination, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).


The groups that had the least within variation in the foreign policy events networks were the third and the fourth group too. As Figure 28 shows, Guyana, and Suriname tend to cluster around 0, below the regional means of events coming from both China (37.13 events), and the United States (124.62). The vertical dashed line stands for China's mean, while the horizontal dashed line represents the US' mean. Members of the third group had more events coming from the extra regional powers, but most of the data points can be found in a 50 (events from China) X 125 (events from the US) box.



**Figure 28:** Comparison of Foreign Policy Events from the United States and China to South America, according to their Master Roles and Target, 1995-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).


Combining the events from China, and the United States, Colombia had the highest average, 216.7 events, followed by Brazil, being the target on average of 178.3 events. In the second group, Venezuela had a joint mean of 164.2 events, very close to Brazil's. Next is Argentina, with 113.2 events, Chile, with 82 events, just above the regional mean, and, finally Peru, with 79.5 events.

Lastly, Figure 29 displays these relations for the small arms trade networks. The small arms exports from China and the United States to the region have means of 0.127 million US dollars, and of 4.84 million dollars, represented by the vertical and the horizontal dashed lines, respectively. Colombia's imports from the United States, in the first group, surpassed Washington's regional mean, while Brazil's imports from China exceed Beijing's mean in nine occasions. Colombia's joint mean, driven by its imports from the United States, was 15.4 million, while Brazil's mean was 3.1 million. States in the second group do not display this internal variation. Chile had the highest joint mean (3.7 million). Venezuela followed, with a mean of 2.0 million, Argentina was next with a mean of 1.6 million, and closing the group was Peru, with a mean of 0.8 million. Finally, the joint means for the third and fourth groups were 0.72 million and 0.19 million, respectively.



**Figure 29:** Comparison of Small Arms Exports Events from the United States and China to South America, according to their Master Roles and Target, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016).

Figure 30 show these dynamics, but in a joint fashion, and from a Social Network Analysis perspective, through the Proportional Strength measure. What it does, in this case, is dividing each of China's or the United States' outgoing ties (and its weights) by the total of its ties (and weights) for each year. The vertical dashed lines stand for China's Proportional Strength mean across the trade, foreign policy events, and small arms trade networks, which is 0.082. The horizontal dashed lines represent the United States' Proportional Strength, which is 0.083. An important South American state in these interactions for the extra regional powers would have most of its data points in the upper-right quadrant, according to the latter means.



**Figure 30:** Proportional Strength of the Relations from China and the United States to South America across the Trade, Foreign Policy Events, and Small Arms Trade Networks, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), and the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). There are fewer data points from the foreign policy events (21, compared to 26 for the other two relations) because the database only covers the period 1995-2015.

From this perspective, again the states enacting the primary or secondary master roles are presented as the most important in the region for China and for the United States. Within them, Brazil, in these networks, is the most important state for both extra regional powers. It has most of its Proportional Strength scores above both means, and since most of them are light blue, it means that both, Washington, and Beijing have intensified its relations with Brasilia as time goes by.


Brazil leads the relations coming from Washington to South America, according to the strength of their relations. After Brazil (0.28), the most important states in the region for the United States are, in descending order, Colombia, with a mean of 0.20, Venezuela (0.13), Argentina (0.08), Chile (0.07), and Peru (0.06). For China, these important states are Brazil, with a mean of 0.25, Chile (0.20), Argentina (0.13), Venezuela (0.10), Peru (0.07), and Colombia (0.05).

If the interactions of China and the United States are combined (they have a joint Proportional Strength mean of 0.08), then the ranking shows Brazil in the top, with a mean of 0.26, followed by Chile (0.13), Colombia (0.13), Venezuela (0.12), Argentina (0.11), and closing it Peru (0.06), which is the only one below the regional mean.

These descriptions do not consider the South American states agency. They reflect the decisions, and actions of the extra regional powers on the region. Putting this agency to the fore, there are some dynamics that could highlight the possibilities of experiencing role conflict for states in the region. There could be cases where a regional state has had strong relations with one external power (i.e. it has high Proportional Strength scores in the direction State  $\rightarrow$  External Power A), while at the same time, the External Power B has also strong relations with that focal state (i.e. it has high Proportional Strength scores in the direction External Power B  $\rightarrow$  State). The scores from the state to the extra regional powers were calculated following a zero-sum logic to show the dichotomy of these relations. Though the data to build the networks came from the databases used in the previous sections, all links among South America were deleted to highlight the dynamics between each individual state and China, and the United States. In this sense, South American states artificially had only relations with the two external powers, and their scores revealed how much importance they attached to each of these relations. Therefore, the sum of the Proportional Strength scores from the state to the external powers is 1.0.


Based on these considerations, Figures 31, and 32 display these dynamics. The important aspect to have in mind here is the direction of the relations, or what the Proportional Strength scores are representing. Figure 31 shows the case where China has interactions with a South American state (x-axis), while the latter has those interactions with the United States (y-axis). Conversely, Figure 32 deals with the other direction of these relations. The x-axis shows the strength of the relations from a South American state to China, while the y-axis stands for the strength of the relations from the United States to the regional state. In both figures, the dashed lines represent the mean of the interactions. The horizontal lines are related to the y-axis, while the vertical lines are related to the x-axis. Again, the logic behind these representations is to find states whose data points are located in the upper-right quadrant, depicting strong relations with one external power, while at the same time having strong relations with the other one.





**Figure 31:** Proportional Strength Dynamics: China-South America vs. South America-the United States, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), and the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). There are fewer data points from the foreign policy events (21, compared to 26 for the other two relations) because the database only covers the period 1995-2015.

In both figures, the states holding the primary, and secondary master roles, as described above, have data points in the upper-right quadrant. This means that they were the focus of the interactions emanating from China, and the United States, as explained above, but also, that they had strong relations with those external powers, as compared to the rest of the states in the region. In the case of Figure 31, the horizontal dashed lines represent the regional mean of the proportional strength from South America to the United States, which was 0.80. This makes the mean scores from the region to China to amount to 0.20, represented by the vertical line in Figure 32. Therefore, as a conclusion derived from these means, the region, overall, had stronger relations with the United States than with China, though these have changed in the period under analysis. South America had, in 1990, a Proportional Strength mean to China of 0.12, reached its peak in 2009 with a mean of 0.25, and, after some minor downs afterwards, ended this period with this same score. Conversely, those same points that have gained China, the United States has lost, according to the rules to build the networks. South America had a mean score of 0.88 towards the United States in 1992, which was its peak, and reached its low in 2009, with a mean score of 0.75.



**Figure 32:** Proportional Strength Dynamics: South America-China vs. the United States-South America, 1990-2015  
Source: Elaborated with the trade data from the International Monetary Fund (2017), the event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), and the Small Arms Trade Database (Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers – NISAT, 2017), analyzed with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014) and R (R Core Team, 2016). There are fewer data points from the foreign policy events (21, compared to 26 for the other two relations) because the database only covers the period 1995-2015.

Of the six major states in the region, Colombia had the strongest relations with the United States (with a mean of 0.93), hence it had the weakest relations with China on these networks (Figure 31, and Figure 32, respectively). On descending order in the strength of the relations with Washington – which means an ascending order in their relations with Beijing –, Bogotá was followed by Venezuela (0.87), Peru (0.80), Brazil (0.76), Argentina (0.74), and Chile (0.69).

## 1.6 Conclusions

South American states' interactions are a good source to portray the regional structure. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, states' actions construct a social structure, and that same structure limits and enables states' behavior. In this sense, using the economic, political, and security dimensions of these relations, and from a network

analysis approach, this research reveals a clearer, though not perfect, picture of this structure.

Via trade, foreign policy events, and small arms trade and military expenditure, each of these dimensions was operationalized. Trade was chosen to represent the economic structure of the region for two reasons. On the one hand, exports reflect industrial, agricultural, or raw materials capacities plus the entrepreneurial (and political) drive to open and maintain foreign markets. On the other hand, imports exhibit power as sources of revenues for the rest of the region. Seen across multiple relations from multiple actors, these two directions of trade revealed the economic side of the regional structure.

Foreign policy events, understood as a proxy for international political participation, showed the political hierarchy of the region. Being the target of foreign policy actions reflect the prestige or status a state has within the region. On the other direction, being the one conducting those events, demonstrate proactivity, and interest in the region's affairs. In sum, the foreign policy events networks display how politically connected is the region.

Finally, as explained above, the small arms trade and the military expenditures were used to portray the region's security structure. Other indicators of this structure were excluded from this research because they did not properly account for the regional security dynamics. The membership of security alliances, for example, was deemed not unsuitable for this research due to its lack of variability in regard of the region. Although some other indicators, such as the Militarized Interstate Disputes could display the conflictual relations in the region, or lack thereof, and hence a facet of the security structure, it is useless for ranking states within this structure. The use of the small arms trade and military expenditures have, then, advantages over those other indicators to fulfill the purpose of finding out the master roles of South American states. One first advantage is the connection between arms sales and security. Though this research does not deny the economic drive of these sales, it emphasizes the fact that political and security commitments between supplier and recipient of arms emerge in every transaction. Secondly, though not all members of South America are small arms exporters, they could be buyers. In this sense, this arms trade network highlights the recipients' side of the equation, too. Thirdly, military expenditures compensate the potential lack of connections in the arms trade. As national attributes, they do not depend

on interactions, and therefore adds up another dimension of the security structure. Finally, combining these two empirical sources gives a sense of the security hierarchy of the region.

In every relation, different network measures were used to reflect different aspects of the power each state has derived from its own relations, and from the relations of its peers, thus placing them distinctively in the regional structure. The aggregation of these results made up an indicator of how central a state is within the region, and under the assumption that centrality is closely related to power, a regional hierarchy emerged. This approach has the advantage of looking at the whole set of dynamics, instead of looking at individual states in isolation.

The findings indicate that South America has a four-tier structure. Some states did not actively engage the rest of the members across these three dimensions nor the region, as a whole, directed to them their actions. Guyana, and Suriname were on the periphery of the region's dynamics because they scored low in most of the measures, if not all of them. From a regional perspective, then, both states occupied the least powerful group. This means that, derived from this classification, they enacted the quaternary master role.

A set of four states followed upwards Guyana, and Suriname in the regional hierarchy. These states had more relations but mostly they were limited to some few partners. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay made up a group of states that are also peripheral but had better connections to more powerful states in the region. Therefore, these states enacted the tertiary master role within the region.

The secondary powers in the region, given the extent of their interactions in the trade, foreign policy actions, and security networks were Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. A state enacted this master role when it had meaningful relations, across the three dimensions, with the rest of its peers. Indeed, Chile, and Venezuela were occupants of the first group in the security, and foreign policy events networks, respectively, while Argentina was constantly a member of the second group across the different structures. Peru, in the meanwhile, did not score high in the security dimension, but belonged to the second group in the remaining two.

Finally, the holders of the primary master roles were Brazil, and Colombia. While the former excelled in the trade, and security networks, the latter did so in the foreign policy events and security networks. Overall, they were the main sources, or recipients, of the regional interactions in those three dimensions. This condition placed them atop of the regional structure.

These findings go along the literature on South America, though with divergences on Colombia's and Peru's position. These differences highlight the convenience of the relational approach. Basing a ranking solely on attributes could distort the picture of the regional structure, as it neglects the actual relations and exchanges among states. As shown with the CINC scores, using them exclusively overemphasizes the master role of Brazil, and diminishes the roles of other states in the region. Schenoni, for example, uses the CINC scores and military expenditures in millions of dollars, which is one of the six variables that make up the composite index, to portray South America as unipolar (2017, pp. 75–77). However, though Brazil is indeed the biggest military spender in the region, these figures need be relativized according the size of the country. If researchers did so, then they would find that, as Sussumu stated 20 years ago, Brazil's "figures are comparatively modest" (1998, p. 577), and corroborated by comparing these raw figures as proportion of its GDP, and measure them per capita with the rest of the region's.

Finally, China's and the United States' relations with South America are focused on those states enacting the primary and secondary master roles. These results were based on the actual figures of their trade, foreign policy actions, and small arms exports to the region, and on the Proportional Strength of those exchanges. It can be argued, then, that from an external point of view, these master roles are confirmed and the presence of a master role conflict (status conflict) was not detected due to these relations.

However, relations with the extra regional powers exhibited variations among them. While the United States and China targeted Brazil the most, Colombia displayed the second closest relationship with Washington, and Chile had the second closest relationship with Beijing. Given that these relations have changed across time, and that they are not mutually exclusive, these are the cases where the probabilities for the South American primary, and secondary states to experience role conflict are the highest.

Therefore, the next chapters of this dissertation will focus on them, dwelling on their auxiliary roles, and on their foreign policy actions.

## **2 Auxiliary Roles – This is Us, or How They Conceived Themselves**

In the previous chapter, the South American states were placed according to the extent of their relations within their regional structure. As explicated in the theoretical chapter, this location equates to their master roles, which means that South America, as a region, is socially stratified. Six countries, i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, performed each either primary or secondary power master roles.

To continue the analysis, the next step is to identify and describe their auxiliary roles from the perspective of each state. This means that the focus should be shifted to national role conceptions, which are the expressions of the auxiliary roles at their disposal in their role set. From an operational standpoint, then, national role conceptions can be conceived as nominal or categorical variables (Krotz, 2002, "Sources of Data and Coding," para. 2), describing in a general manner the orientation and purpose of each role.

Thies argues that role theorists' work could be placed along a continuum on where they collect empirical evidence, ranging from primary sources, such as presidential speeches, to secondary sources, such as academic accounts of a state's foreign policy (Thies, 2017b, p. 670) to identify role conceptions. As examples, for his seminal work, Holsti used statements from leaders he found in primary sources, such as speeches or parliamentary debates (Holsti, 1970, p. 256). Wish also used primary sources such as interviews, speeches, and articles the states' leaders had written to find indicators of national role conceptions. The passages where these roles could be identified "were content analyzed" (Wish, 1980, p. 536). Other authors pursued a strategy that combines both types of sources to obtain their empirical evidence. For example, this was made explicit in Cantir and Kaarbo's edited volume, where they state that "virtually all authors used secondary historical research to either define or identify roles, as well as multiple primary resources" (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2016, p. 19).

In this line of inquiry, this research follows a double-tiered strategy. First, in order to establish a baseline of auxiliary roles, it uses primary sources in the form of foreign policy-makers leaders' speeches at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

sessions during the period 1990-2015, retrieved from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS). On a second stage, secondary sources, namely scholarly accounts of each state's foreign policy, were used to provide the context for the national role conceptions identified in the speeches.

## **2.1 Building a Baseline of Auxiliary Roles**

As mentioned above, the leaders' speeches at the UNGA were used to identify their states' national role conceptions. For each country, 32 speeches were reviewed, totaling 256 during the period under analysis, 1990 to 2015. Notwithstanding the fact that the tenure's length of each government varies (e.g., Argentina had presidents that lasted less than a year, while Fujimori was in office in Peru for over 10 years), the overall average of documents per each government was 6.7 speeches, making the sample representative of the views of the leaders towards the international system and the role their states play within it.

The reasons to choose those speeches over other type of documents were manifold. First, the objective at this point was to identify general auxiliary roles, which would compose their role sets. In these statements, the nations' leaders address diverse issues they consider important for the rest of the world to know. These could be on international or domestic topics, or a combination thereof, and serve as referents on how they see the world's state of affairs, and the stand their country takes on those affairs. In this same vein, those speeches serve as mirrors because the leaders portray an image on how they want the rest of the world's leaders to see their nations (Hecht, 2016, p. 924).

Second, placing those states in the same setting allows for collating how they address relevant international issues at the same moment (e.g., Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the financial crisis of 2008, or Syria's crisis). Third, since in the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (where the addresses were retrieved from) a researcher can retrieve documents in the same language (in this case in English, either provided by the delegations or directly translated by the United Nations), translation problems were minimized to perform the analysis.




Fourth, these speeches were made by top officials, e.g. Presidents, Foreign Affairs Ministers or Ambassadors to the United Nations (UN), thus reflecting the views of each state's government. The speaker's position within the government for each speech is presented in table 5.

Year/Session Number	Type of Meeting	ARG	BRA	CHL	COL	PER	VEN	USA	CHN
1990 A/45	General Debate	Minister	President	President	President	Minister	President	President	Minister
1991 A/46	General Debate	Minister	President	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	President	Minister
1992 A/47	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	Ambassador	Minister	President	Minister
1993 A/48	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	President	Minister	President	Minister
1994 A/49	General Debate	President	Minister	Minister	President	Minister	President	President	Minister
1995 A/50	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister
1995 A/50	50th Special Meeting	President	President	President	President	Vice-President	President	President	President
1996 A/51	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	Minister	Minister	President	Minister
1997 A/S-19	Special Session on Agenda 21	President	President	Minister	Vice-President	Vice-President	Minister	President	State Counsellor
1997 A/52	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	Minister	Minister	President	Minister
1998 A/S-20	Special Session on Narcotic Drugs	President	President	President	President	President	President	President	Ambassador
1998 A/53	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	Minister	President	President	Minister
1999 A/54	General Debate	President	Minister	Minister	President	President	President	President	Minister
2000 A/55	Millennium Summit	President	Vice-President	President	President	President	President	President	President
2000 A/55	General Debate	Deputy Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister	Minister	Ambassador	Minister	Minister
2001 A/56	General Debate	President	President	President	President	President	President	President	Minister
2002 A/57	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	President	President	President	Minister
2003 A/58	General Debate	President	President	Minister	President	President	Minister	President	Minister
2004 A/59	General Debate	President	President	President	President	President	Minister	President	Minister
2005 A/60	High-Level Plenary on Millennium Summit	President	President	President	President	President	President	President	President
2005 A/60	General Debate	Minister	Minister	Minister	President	President	Minister	Minister	Minister
2006 A/61	General Debate	President	President	President	President	Minister	President	President	Minister
2007 A/62	General Debate	President	President	President	President	Deputy Minister	Minister	President	Minister
2008 A/63	General Debate	President	President	President	President	Ambassador	Ambassador	President	Premier of State Council
2009 A/64	General Debate	President	President	President	President	Minister	President	President	President

2010 A/65	High-Level Plenary on Millennium Goals	Deputy Minister	Minister	President	Deputy Minister	President	Ambassador	President	Premier of State Council
2010 A/65	General Debate	President	Minister	President	President	President	Ambassador	President	Premier of State Council
2011 A/66	General Debate	President	President	President	President	President	Minister	President	Minister
2012 A/67	General Debate	President	President	Minister	President	Minister	Ambassador	President	Minister
2013 A/68	General Debate	President	President	President	President	President	Minister	President	Minister
2014 A/69	General Debate	President	President	President	President	President	President	President	Minister
2015 A/70	General Debate	President	President	President	President	Ambassador	President	President	President

**Table 5: States' Representatives Delivering Speeches at the UNGA**  
Source: Own elaboration with data from UNBIS. ARG: Argentina; BRA: Brazil; CHL: Chile; COL: Colombia; PER: Peru; VEN: Venezuela; USA: United States; and CHN: China.

Presidents delivered 57 percent of the total speeches, followed by Ministers with 34.8 percent. These two government positions amount to 91.8 percent of the 256 speeches reviewed. Ambassadors to the UN were present in 3.5 percent of the times, while Vice-Presidents and Deputy Ministers accounted for, each, 1.6 percent of the deliverances. Some Chinese representatives occupied special positions not comparable to the rest of the states. These positions were Premier of the State Council and State Counsellor. They delivered 1.2 percent and 0.4 percent of all speeches, respectively. The overall distribution of positions is presented in figure 33.



**Figure 33: Distribution of Positions Delivering Speeches at UNGA, 1990-2015**  
Source: Own elaboration with data from UNBIS.

Fifth, governments delivering these addresses had less external constraint than in other social settings, even within the United Nations' system (Baturo et al., 2017, p. 2)

However, choosing these speeches over other type of materials has downsides too. Since leaders must address the UNGA, often the language is vague. General statements such as their commitment to international law or to the purposes of the United Nations are quite common, providing fewer possibilities for differentiating among states and their role conceptions. In other words, their generality overshadows the specificity other types of sources have, which would suggest clear-cut national role conceptions *vis-à-vis* other nations. However, the other side of the coin is that the speeches are often constructed to overlook some domestic or international dynamics, or to spin those dynamics in ways commensurate to their own ideas and interests. These maneuvers offer a better understanding of the context in which leaders are conceiving the roles for their nations.

Despite these limitations, for uniformity, availability, and the various reasons provided above, those speeches were deemed fit – their advantages outweighed their disadvantages – to construct a baseline of role conceptions for all states under analysis.

These speeches were analyzed using Content Analysis. Content Analysis is an unobtrusive method aimed to examine and interpret human forms of communication in order to “identify patterns, themes, assumptions, and meanings” (Lune & Berg, 2017, p. 182) they may convey. There are two main strands, quantitative and qualitative content analysis. They “differ in the types of questions they address, as well as in the procedures they use both to analyze text and to record, process, and report data” (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 319). Mainly, quantitative content analysis addresses ‘what’ questions because its focus on the manifest meaning of the text, while qualitative content analysis addresses ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions due to its concentration on latent meaning (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p. 449). However, by themselves these strands cannot give a full picture of what is being transmitted in the texts. Pashakhanlou advocates for a fully integrated content analysis, combining them “in the study of international politics for research projects that would benefit from their respective strengths” (2017, p. 453). This research follows his advice.

On the one hand, qualitative content analysis “tell us about meanings, norms, values, motives, and purposes” (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 319). In order to extract these meanings, the speeches were read using “analytical codes and categories derived from existing theories and explanations relevant to the research focus”, which is considered to be direct content analysis (Lune & Berg, 2017, p. 183). These analytical codes were the 17 national role conceptions identified by Holsti (1970) and three more roles added by Thies (2017b) derived from the Latin American foreign policy literature, though not all of them were actually found in the speeches.

Using the software *Atlas.ti*, all speeches were read two times. In the first round, the idea was to get a sense of what was being said and how to identify the main themes addressed and the orientations policy-makers had towards them. Unfortunately, role theorists have not yet produced a keywords database in order to recognize roles via content analysis (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2016, p. 19). Moreover, foreign policy leaders seldom use wordings like “the role of my state is” or “we will act as an X” (being X a given role), which will render coding relatively easy. That is why, in the second round, relevant passages of the speeches were coded using an updated definition of Holsti’s<sup>17</sup> and Thies’ role conceptions. This procedure tried to match Holsti’s definitions with the meaning of the message the speaker was trying to convey.

Though there are some criticisms to Holsti’s typology for not being sensible to different cultures (Shih, 1988, p. 600), different researchers have used it to identify national role conceptions, “often confirming the existence of the same roles (or variations on those roles) outside the sample of countries and time period originally investigated” (Thies, 2015, p. 294). For example, Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, using Holsti’s research and constructivist arguments, identify three roles played by regional powers: regional leader, regional protector, and regional custodian (2010, p. 740), the latter being their own addition. In his research on Russian foreign policy change, Grossman listed 11 national role conceptions for Russia, which “reflects a combination of those identified by Holsti (1970) and Thibault and Lévesque (1997)” (2005, p. 343). Ovali also employed Holsti’s national role conceptions in his study on Turkey. He argued, though, that “a new categorization of national role conceptions and a unique wording are vital to decode Turkish foreign policy” (Ovali, 2013, p. 4). Le Prestre, in his study of the George H. W.

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<sup>17</sup>Holsti coded the national role conceptions amid the Cold War. Hence, some of his definitions and examples closely relate to this period. Consequently, these roles needed being adapted to the post-Cold War period, although their essence was not altered.

Bush and Bill Clinton administrations (1989-1993), used Holsti's typology too, and complemented it with ideas from other authors (1997b, p. 69).

Conversely, other "authors commonly identify roles inductively, based on close readings of the text" (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2016, p. 19). Sakaki inductively established seven role conceptions for Germany and Japan. These national role conceptions were: Exporter of Security, Promoter of Universal Values, Non-Militarist Country, Reliable Partner, Regional Stabilizer, Contributor to Regional Cooperation, and Respected Trusted Country, the latter only applying to Japan (Sakaki, 2011, pp. 43–44). As it would be evident below, some of these roles are comparable to those of Holsti.

On the other hand, following the deductive strategy using the categories provided by role theorists, the coded passages were analyzed via quantitative content analysis in a third round of the process. The main objective here was to guarantee that in fact the passages coded as expressions of a given role were "talking" about the same issues. Van Atteveldt warns that "the fact that a word occurs with a certain frequency is not by itself interesting to the content analyst, unless it is seen as an indicator of a relevant theoretical construct" (Van Atteveldt, 2008, p. 16). In this sense, quantitative content analysis was used in intra-code and inter-code analysis to make sure that excerpts coded under one role conception had some uniformity, and that the different role conceptions were, to some extent, mutually exclusive, i.e., that they were addressing different themes or, at least, from different perspectives. However, as it will be clear below, some passages may relate to different role conceptions, and the line dividing each role is, in some occasions, very thin to make a clear-cut division. Nonetheless, this method was used to gain reliability and validity on the coding process.

For this analysis, all passages were tokenized in n-grams of length 1 (i.e., all sentences were decomposed in words) because words "are the most common semantically meaningful components of texts" (Welbers et al., 2017, p. 250). After this, all "stop words" were eliminated from the analysis. These are very common words in the English language, such as "the," "in," "of," and so forth,<sup>18</sup> that do not add any particular meaning to the analysis undertaken in this research.

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<sup>18</sup>The list of stop words contains 175 English words and is available at <http://snowballstem.org/algorithms/english/stop.txt>

Furthermore, all compound words representing one object or concept were joined together to avoid overrepresentation, underrepresentation, and ambiguity in the analysis. Words such as “United Nations” or “United States,” for example, were combined, thus eliminating the ambiguity of the word “united.” This word could be used by the foreign policy leaders in at least three distinct ways: referring to the United Nations, to the United States, or as conjugated form of the verb unite. As a result, the importance of the United Nations and of the United States, as sole concepts in their own right, was increased, while at the same time decreasing the importance of the word united standing alone. Another case that illustrates the convenience of combining key words relating to one object was binding together words constructing “Latin America” and “South America.” The former refers to the region comprising states from Mexico to Argentina, the latter to the region from Colombia to Argentina, and America, without any qualifier, is used in the English Language as a synonym of the United States. Without compounding, in this example America would rank high, and Latin America or South America, as single entities, would disappear from the analysis.

To complement this analysis, this process was repeated, but the passages were tokenized using bigrams (sets of two adjacent words, instead of single words, as explained above).<sup>19</sup> In a sentence like “we would seek a lasting peace in the region,” without stop words filtering, the 8 bigrams are: “we would,” “would seek,” “seek a,” “a lasting,” “lasting peace,” “peace in,” “in the,” and “the region.” The reason for this separate analysis is recuperating some of the context, structure, and meaning of the passages associated to each of the roles given by qualifiers located immediately before or after the central word (Munzert et al., 2015, p. 306). For example, the concept “cooperation” is qualified in the speeches by the words “economic,” “south-south,” or “international.” These combinations depict different international dynamics, and indeed have high frequencies in different role conceptions. “Economic cooperation” ranks high in the Regional Subsystem Collaborator role, “south-south cooperation” belongs to the role of Developer, and “international cooperation” occurs within the Internal Development role. In this sense, bigrams helped the analysis in two ways: on the one hand, providing a better meaning, though not full, to each word highlighted in the analysis, and on the other, giving some context to the content of each of the roles.

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<sup>19</sup>This tokenization in bigrams is different from compounding words. Whereas the latter refers to the process of framing a single object that is named with two words, the former is used to provide context to each word enunciated by the speakers.

Finally, the last step of the analysis was to establish the frequency of words used by foreign policy leaders to provide a sense of the overall content and direction of the role conceptions of each state. This analysis turned to the relative frequency of the feature (word or bigram) composing each coded passage. Since the length of those extracts varied (it could be a single sentence or a whole paragraph), counting the times each feature was enunciated proved not too informative from a comparative perspective. Instead, the relative frequency measures the importance of the feature within its own context, that is within the length of the passages.

In order to perform this measurement, a document-term matrix was constructed, where each row ( $i$ ) represented a document (the structure containing the set of words or bigrams), which in this case was the coded excerpt, and each column ( $j$ ) represented every single feature that was in every document. The value in each cell ( $i,j$ ) of the matrix represented the term frequency, the number of times each feature ( $i$ ) appeared in the document ( $j$ ). Following this operation, the matrix was transformed to group all passages belonging to a country. Therefore, while the columns remained the same, the rows changed to represent each country conceiving the role. Moreover, the value of each cell in the new matrix came from the added term frequencies for all instances where the role was publicly conceived. With this new matrix, the relative frequency of the feature acquired full sense for comparison across countries, because the importance of the feature related to all coded passages, regardless of their extension. Moreover, it also provided evidence of the validity and reliability of the coding, because the top words or bigrams used by leaders in their speeches needed be associated with the definition of each role. If the features were closely related to the definition, they would confirm the quality of the coding. Otherwise, this analysis would prove deficiencies in the way the qualitative coding was performed.

The mathematical equation for the relative frequency is as follows:

$$rf = \frac{tf_{ij}}{\sum_j tf_{ij}} \quad [20]$$

where,  $rf$  is the relative frequency score,  $j$  stands for each word or bigram,  $i$  stands for all passages coded for each country, and  $tf$  is the term frequency, or the times each word or bigram was enunciated by the given country. The following subsections present the results of such procedure.

Quantitative content analysis was also used to identify the main context of each state's government. Therefore, speeches were grouped according to the term of each president to make sense of their main topics, both domestic and international, they wanted to address. This contextualization provides a further understanding of their national role conceptions. The periodization of each state's governments is presented in table 6.

Year	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Peru	Venezuela	United States	China
1990	Carlos Saúl Menem	Fernando Collor de Melo	Patricio Aylwin Azocar	César Gaviria	Alberto Fujimori	Carlos Andrés Pérez	George H. W. Bush	Deng Xiaoping*
1991								
1992								
1993		Itamar Franco				Ramón José Velásquez	Bill Clinton	Jiang Zemin
1994								
1995		Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle	Ernesto Samper	Rafael Caldera				
1996								
1997			Fernando Henrique Cardoso	Andrés Pastrana				
1998								
1999		Ricardo Lagos Escobar		Álvaro Uribe	Alejandro Toledo Manrique		George W. Bush	Hu Jintao
2000								
2001								
2002	Eduardo Duhalde							
2003	Néstor Kirchner	Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva						
2004								
2005								
2006								



2007			Michelle Bachelet Jeria		Alan García Pérez			
2008								
2009								
2010								
2011	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner		Sebastián Piñera Echenique	Juan Manuel Santos	Ollanta Humala Tasso		Barack Obama	
2012		Dilma Rousseff						
2013						Nicolás Maduro		
2014			Michelle Bachelet Jeria					Xi Jinping
2015								

**Table 6:** List of Presidents at the Opening of UNGA Sessions, 1990 - 2015  
Source: Own elaboration. \*The official president of the People's Republic of China at the time was Yang Shangkun, who occupied that position from 1988 to 1993. Deng Xiaoping was, however, the most important political figure at the time until Jiang Zemin's ascension to power. Consequently, the replacement of Yang with Deng.

## 2.2 National Role Conceptions Derived from UNGA Speeches

As explained above, this research used the typology provided by Holsti in his seminal paper on national role conceptions and that of Thies related to Latin America. According to the former, there are 17 distinct national role conceptions and they are classified according to the “degree of passivity or activity in foreign policy that the role conceptions seem to imply” (Holsti, 1970, p. 260). This typology is a comprehensive list of role conceptions that depict how leaders see their respective states' function within the international system. However, these conceptions lack an exact orientation towards the system. For example, the Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator role implies an active duty to change the political conditions other states are facing.<sup>20</sup> Given that Holsti made this typology during the Cold War, he used two different examples to illustrate it. The first one is from Mao's China advocating for a world revolution in socialist terms. The second one is from Tanzania amid the decolonization wars in Africa (Holsti, 1970, p. 261). Therefore, what is being liberated from, or what kind of revolution a state is supporting change the content of the role conception. Nonetheless, the two countries from Holsti's example were categorized under the same label, though they are not aligning their foreign policies to the same goals.

<sup>20</sup> The actual definition of this role is presented in the next subsection.

To overcome this situation, this research also uses Thies' typology, which uses Holsti's, but adds directionality to these conceptions. He surveyed Latin America foreign policy and came up with a typology based on "the pro-core-anti-core and autonomy-dependence dimension" (Thies, 2017b, p. 667). While the former relates to the role conceptions' direction, the latter relates to the degree of activity a given role entails. In all, "the pro-core vs. anti-core and autonomous vs. dependent axes categorise Latin American foreign policy according to its relationship *vis-à-vis* the core" (Hey, 1997, p. 651, emphasis in the original). These distinctions fill the void left by Holsti and help understanding the content of each role. Specifically, this research uses the Pro-Core vs. Anti-Core dimension. This means that though labeled under the same role conception, two states can be classified differently according to the object – what the content and direction are – of that national role conception. However, not all roles' contents display this directionality. Therefore, another category was added in the Pro-Core Anti-Core continuum to account for those contents that cannot be classified under this dichotomy: Neutral orientation.

Besides the orientation of the roles, Thies adds three new roles: Patron, Client, and Rival to the roles list. These new role conceptions come from the political culture of Latin American inter-state relations and their relations with the United States, and as a reflection of the Lockean culture of anarchy (Thies, 2017b, pp. 665–666).

However, not all the roles in Holsti's and Thies' typologies were identified in the speeches (either in their manifest or latent meaning). Though this does not mean that these roles are absent from their role sets, it indeed means that South American, American, and Chinese leaders did not allude to them in their speeches. The 16 roles identified in the speeches were: Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator, Regional Leader, Regional Protector, Active Independent, Liberation Supporter, Anti-Imperialist Agent, Defender of the Faith, Mediator – Integrator, Regional Subsystem Collaborator, Developer, Bridge, Faithful Ally, Independent, Example, Internal Development, and Rival. Exemplifications of each of them, i.e. the passages of the speeches coded as standing for the conception of each role, are presented below. In addition, the quantitative analysis in terms of the relative frequency of the words or bigrams used by the leaders to express the roles is also presented in the next subsections.

### 2.2.1 Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator

The first role conception identified by Holsti and found in the speeches is the Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator. In this role, state's leaders see that one of the function of their state is to "liberate others or act as the 'bastion' or [*sic*] revolutionary movements, that is, to provide an area which foreign revolutionary leaders can regard as a source of physical and moral support, as well as an ideological inspirer" (Holsti, 1970, p. 261).

According to the analysis, the only leaders who talked about their states in terms commensurable to that definition were representing Venezuela and the United States. Regarding the latter, then president Clinton, for example, stated that they "will work to reduce the threat from regimes that are hostile to democracy and to support liberalization of non-democratic States when they are willing to live in peace with the rest of us" (United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1993, p. 9). His successor, George W. Bush, in 2004, amid the "war on terror", said: "We will stand with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq until their hopes of freedom and security are fulfilled" (United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, 3rd Plenary Meeting, 2004, p. 10).

Former president Obama conceived the role of liberator too, in the terms propounded by Holsti. In 2010, following remarkably close George W. Bush's remarks, he uttered: "Because part of the price of our own freedom is standing up for the freedom of others. That belief will guide America's leadership in the twenty-first century" (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 14). A year later, he said "In Yemen, men, women and children gather by the thousands in towns and city squares every day with the hope that their determination and spilled blood will prevail over a corrupt system. America supports those aspirations" (United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2011, p. 12). These examples show that across the period under analysis, the United States' leaders put on their shoulders the burden of liberating others from oppressive regimes, or at least give support to these liberating efforts.

The expression of this role under the last government of the *Punto Fijo* regime in Venezuela was uttered by Rafael Caldera in his second term.<sup>21</sup> The idea of playing the

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<sup>21</sup> His first term at office was from 1969 to 1974.

role of liberator voiced in his speech meant freeing countries in Latin America from dictatorship and spreading democracy. Caldera stated in 1994 that “we have consequently supported efforts aimed at reintroducing a fully democratic system in those Latin America countries where it is not at present established” (United Nations General Assembly, 49th Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 1994, p. 7). A year later, his foreign affairs minister, Miguel Ángel Burelli Rivas highlighted the liberator spirit of Venezuela by stating that Venezuela “freed itself and other countries by following the dreams of Francisco Miranda, brought to fruition by Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre, by systematic thinking and by the actions of Andrés Bello and Simón Rodríguez, among other well-known figures” (United Nations General Assembly, 50th Session, 13th Plenary Meeting, 1995, p. 9). Then minister Burelli followed those references with Bolívar’s famous Letter from Jamaica, where he connected these ideas of freedom with Bolívar’s proposals of uniting Latin America under a single nation.

During Hugo Chávez tenure and that of his successor, Nicolás Maduro, the Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator role was even more clearly conceived. The liberating part of it was associated to the fight against imperialist or hegemonic forces though, represented primarily by the United States. In 2005, for example, he stated that “Simón Bolívar, our liberator and the guide of our revolution, swore that he would not rest until he saw America free [referring to America the continent, not the country]. Let us not rest in body or in soul until we have saved humanity” (United Nations General Assembly, 60th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2005, p. 20). A year later, he said: “Yes, we may be described as extremists, but we are rising against the empire, against a model of domination” (United Nations General Assembly, 61st Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 2006, p. 10).


Nicolás Maduro followed the ideas of his predecessor. In 2015, he explained from a different perspective Bolívar’s Letter of Jamaica and how it is the foundation of the revolution Venezuela is currently undergoing:

*The purpose of that letter was to define the nature of their struggles and outline the path they need to follow. In it, Simón Bolívar defined the elements of a geopolitical vision for the Americas – a non-imperialist, non-colonialist geopolitical vision that, in twenty-first century terms, we might call anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. Two hundred years ago, he set down the conceptual lines of the*

*geopolitical thesis we continue to support today to address the need to establish a balanced universe and a world with justice and peace for all (United Nations General Assembly, 70th Session, 17th Plenary Meeting, 2015, p. 6).*


As these excerpts show from a qualitative approach, the United States and Venezuela, though conceiving the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator role, were attaching different meanings to it. These differences started after Chávez took power, when he filled the content of Venezuela's role with an anti-hegemonic and socialist stance.

These differences are corroborated in the quantitative content analysis. Figure 34 shows the top 20 words the United States and Venezuela used for this role. In the case of the US, words such as "Iraq," "Change," "Support," "Democracy," and "Terrorists" reflect the will to liberate people from dictators (as in the case of Iraq) or from terrorists. Conversely, for Venezuela the top word is "Revolution," which as explained below, is one of the top descriptors of Chávez foreign policy. In those passages "Justice," "Vision," and "Geopolitical" appeared prominently too, along with references to Simón Bolívar. In this sense, revolution is intricately connected to a sense of bringing about justice.



**Figure 34:** Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator Top Words Relative Frequency  
 Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 35 show the relative frequency of bigrams. Since pairing adjacent words multiplies the sparsity of the document-term matrix, the relative frequencies of bigrams are much lower than those of top words. However, the fact that some bigrams were repeated highlights their importance to understand the meaning of the role.



**Figure 35:** Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
 Source: Own elaboration.

An important characteristic of these results from the two states is the presence of verbs as components of the top bigrams. In the United States’ case, verb forms such as “Must,” “Supports,” or “Stand,” reveal the sense of obligation or commitment in its foreign policy to enact the role. Venezuela’s case displays a more normative-oriented role conception, with verbs such as “Build,” or “Save.”

As figures 34 and 35 show, the main words and bigrams featuring in the passages coded under this role show different directions of the role. On the one hand, the United States frames the role within the liberal order it advocates: promotion of democracy and

extension of rights. This role, then, from Washington's perspective as a liberator is closely related to the Defender of the Faith role, as will be shown below. On the other hand, Venezuela conceives it as an alternative of that liberal order, with the word "Revolution" at its center. In this sense, Caracas' conception falls into the Anti-Core direction.

### **2.2.2 Regional Leader**

This role conception refers to "duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relations with states in a particular region with which it identifies, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as international communist movements" (Holsti, 1970, p. 261). The six South American states, and the United States and China displayed this conception. However, only Brazil, the United States, Argentina, and Colombia had at least in two occasions enunciated this role during the period under analysis. Brazil did it in 15 different years, starting in the mid 1990s to 2011, the US in four different years (1991, 1993, 2009, and 2013), and Argentina and Colombia only twice (the former in 1994 and 1995, and the latter in 2010 and 2012). Chile was coded as conceiving this role in 2008, Peru in 2002, Venezuela in 2010, and China in 2003.

Brasilia, for example, conceived itself as the representative of Latin America, thus the leader of the region, in its bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. Then Foreign Affairs minister, Luiz Felipe Lampreia, stated in 1997 that

*Brazil has expressed, through President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, its willingness to accept the responsibilities of permanent membership in the Security Council, if called upon by the international community to do so. In such case, Brazil would be determined to carry out the role of permanent member as the representative of Latin America and the Caribbean (United Nations General Assembly, 52nd Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 1997, pp. 6–7).*

This idea was carried forward by former president Lula, who in 2003 affirmed

*Brazil believes that it has a useful contribution to make. It seeks not to advance an exclusive conception of security, but rather to give expression to the perceptions and aspirations of a region that today is a hallmark of peaceful coexistence among its members and that is a force for international stability. Given the support we received in South America and beyond, Brazil is encouraged to continue advocating for a Security Council that better reflects contemporary reality (United Nations General Assembly, 58th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 2003, p. 6).*

Lula also pushed for leading the creation of South America as a distinct regional space. He said that “Brazil is committed to the establishment of a South America that is politically stable, prosperous and united” (United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, 3rd Plenary Meeting, 2004, p. 6). A theme that continued until the end of his term. Celso Amorim, his Foreign Affairs minister, summing up this role during Lula’s period in office, stated that “in recent years, the Brazilian Government has invested heavily in South America’s integration and peace” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 6).

The United States also expressed this leadership role in different opportunities. President George H. W. Bush pondered the US role in the changing world order, though from a general leadership perspective, in these terms:

*Let me assure you, the United States has no intention of striving for a pax americana. However, we will remain engaged. We will not retreat and pull back into isolationism. We will offer friendship and leadership. In short, we seek a pax universalis, built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations (United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1991, pp. 83–85, emphasis in the original).*

President Obama, referring to the Middle East, affirmed that “the danger for the world is that the United States, after a decade of war, rightly concerned about issues back home and aware of the hostility that our engagement in the region has engendered throughout the Muslim world, may disengage, creating a vacuum of leadership that no other nation




is ready to fill” (United Nations General Assembly, 68th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2013, p. 15).

Argentina expressed the conception of the Regional Leader role in connection to its participation in the United Nations Peace-keeping operations. Though Argentina’s conception does not relate directly to special functions it envisions towards a region, it tries to locate Buenos Aires in a position above the rest of the region, and that is why it was coded under this role. This is exemplified by then President Menem, when he stated that “the participation of Argentina in nine peace-keeping operations – *the highest number of any Latin American country* – in the form of troops, military observers and civilian police, is a concrete contribution that bears out the convictions that I have spoken today” (United Nations General Assembly, 49th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 1994, p. 13, emphasis added).

Colombia, presenting an optimistic view of the developments of the Latin American region, voiced this role as a representative of this region on its bid for a non-permanent seat at the Security Council in 2010 (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 15th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 4), and conceived itself as exercising a leadership role in the adoption of the sustainable development goals in 2012 (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 10th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 2).

As mentioned above, the rest of the countries only expressed this role once. Chile promoted itself as the convener of the meeting held to help protecting Bolivia’s democracy in 2008 (United Nations General Assembly, 63rd Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 2008, p. 16); in the same spirit of self-promoting as convener, China talked about its leadership role hosting the three-party and six-party talks to deal with North Korea’s nuclear program (United Nations General Assembly, 58th Session, 9th Plenary Meeting, 2003, p. 30). Venezuela, following its Bolivarian ideals for regional integration, stated that the union of the region was its top national priority (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 24th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 14); finally, Peru said that its initiative led to the signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001 (United Nations General Assembly, 57th Session, 2nd Plenary Meeting, 2002, p. 13).


The quantitative analysis results of the countries that only expressed this role once or twice are not interesting. Chile, Peru, and Colombia do not display any variance at all in both the words, and the bigrams analyses. The reason for this behavior is that their leaders did not repeat any of the words. Argentina, China, and Venezuela exhibit a slight variance in the usage of single words, and bigrams (Venezuela did not show any variance at all in the latter analysis, though). This is the reason they were removed from figures 36 and 37. However, they were included in the overall validation of the role's coding.



**Figure 36:** Regional Leader Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 36 displays the top twenty words for Brazil and the United States under the role of Regional Leader. Naturally, both used the word “Region,” and in the case of Brazil, the actual configuration of one: “South America.” Therefore, in those passages there is a sense of identification with a given region. Another important characteristic reflected in the coding is that most of the words have positive meanings. Additionally, Words like “Integration,” “Contribution,” “Community,” “Hope,” or “Peace/Pax” involve the use of diplomatic means to pursue these foreign policy goals. In this sense, the coding also allowed for a portrayal of the responsibilities Holsti defined for the role.

The top ten bigrams in Figure 37 below help understand the individual meaning of the role. Brazil, for example, associated it with assuming responsibilities within their intent to become a permanent member of the Security Council. The United States conceived this role of leadership by being still engaged in world affairs.



**Figure 37:** Regional Leader Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

In most cases, the analysis shows that the conceptions of the Regional Leader display a Neutral direction, that is, those states conceiving it cannot be associated with a Pro-Core or Anti-Core stand. However, Venezuela’s Regional Leader role conception is the only one that can directly be classified as Anti-Core, since its ideas for regional integration under presidents Chávez and Maduro involve anti-American proposals. To a lesser extent, Brazil’s intention of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council, and its proposal of South American regional integration was intended to gain autonomy *vis-à-vis* the United States. In this sense, although not as radical as Venezuela’s ideas, Brazil’s regional leadership can be considered as Anti-Core as well.

### 2.2.3 Regional Protector

Holsti specifies that this role conception “places emphasis on the function of providing protection for *adjacent* regions” (1970, p. 262, emphasis added). From this perspective, regional protectors could be only those states with power-projection capacity across different regions. However, the idea of only protecting “adjacent” regions, and not their own seems arbitrary. In his examples, he used one statement from the United States claiming the role of protecting the developing world, which could be argued Washington would defend if these countries followed the ideas and interests of the capitalist block; the second one is from Great Britain making clear that they will defend Malaysia and Singapore: its former colonies. As it can be seen, there is a notion of identification with the object being protected, and, in this sense, nothing inherent to the conception impedes that the protection could be on the region to which they belong.

Based on this clarification, only 3 states conceived this role in their speeches. Brazil did it one time (in 1998), the United States claimed in 5 different years that its role includes protecting specific regions in the world (in 1995, 2003, 2004, 2013, and 2014), and China in 4 years (in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2011).

Brasilia described its protective function stating that “the fact that South America is a region in which countries essentially live in a harmonious, peaceful and increasingly integrated manner is for Brazil a vital and defining trait that our peoples are determined to preserve” (United Nations General Assembly, 53rd Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 1998, p. 7). Brasilia, then, conceived this role in terms of the region in which it is located.


China identified itself with the events occurring in its vicinity as well. In 2011, for example, declared that it “has worked hard to promote peace through dialogue, and has played a unique role in easing tensions and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula” (United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, 25th Plenary Meeting, 2011, p. 43).

Washington takes a different approach. The United States was the only one conceiving the role in an extra-regional fashion, fully conforming to Holsti’s definition. Moreover, the protection is not directed to just one adjacent region. Towards the Asia-Pacific region, the US stated that it “is and will continue to be a Pacific Power, promoting peace, stability, and the free flow of commerce among nations” (United Nations General Assembly, 69th

Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2014, p. 12). Regarding the Middle East, a year earlier president Obama warned that “America is prepared to use all elements of our power, including military force, to secure these core interests in the region” (United Nations General Assembly, 68th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2013, p. 13), being those interests protecting allies and partners, guaranteeing free flow of oil from this region, combat terrorist networks, and impeding the development of nuclear weapons.

As Brazil only displayed this conception once, the variance in the word, and bigram analyses is close to 0. Therefore, as in the previous role, it was removed from the following figures, though it was kept in the overall analysis of the role. Figure 38 shows the top words according to their relative frequency for China and the United States. Given the weight of China’s top words, all the coded excerpts revolved around North Korea’s nuclear weapons development plans. This is exemplified by the words related to the Korean peninsula, and the words “Stability” and “Nuclear.”


Although the United States often used the word “Region,” the object of their protection is not reflected in the top words. However, as stated above, the US was the only state conceiving the role outside its own region. And since this outreach involves material capabilities, the word “Power” ranked high.



**Figure 38:** Regional Protector Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

The association the United States did between power projection and regional presence is clearly shown in Figure 39, amounting to the protective role. The top three bigrams for the US were “International Law,” “Engaged Region,” and “Military Force.” In this sense, their notion of protection dealt with the use of force. Notwithstanding this, only those three bigrams appeared more than once in the coded passages. Therefore, its association from this quantitative analysis should not be overstated.

Conversely, China’s top bigrams include “Stability,” and “Peace,” and has seven bigrams that were used more than once by its leaders. This presence allows for a finer analysis, though it would have been better to find more bigrams. Nevertheless, China’s main theme under this role is accentuated: North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. In this issue, China associates the employment of diplomatic means to solve the nuclear issue, thus protecting the whole region.



**Figure 39:** Regional Protector Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Since Brazil only displayed once this role conception without any reference to which were the threats to South America, its orientation cannot be classified neither as Anti-Core nor

Pro-Core, instead as neutral. China's protection of Northeast Asia on North Korea's nuclear weapons development program is aligned with the United States' interests, though under different motives. However, since these interests converge, China's Regional Protector role conception can be classified as Pro-Core.

#### **2.2.4 Active Independent**

The national role conception of an Active Independent is one of Holsti's broadest definitions. This role is related to the Non-Aligned Movement because it involves a disengagement from military alliances. However, it does not end up with this. It encompasses an active foreign policy activity that "emphasizes at once independence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world" (Holsti, 1970, p. 262).

Given this definition, all the states, apart from the United States, were coded as conceiving it. Though the United States shows this type of active foreign policy, the reason that it is the current sole super power, with all that this entails, excluded it from this conception. In all, 432 different passages from the speeches were recorded as displaying the characteristics mentioned above. These excerpts have several common themes: Reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council, as well as of the Bretton Woods institutions, based on a notion of equality among nations; a multilateral approach to diplomatic activity, such as the active participation in forums or organizations, and an expansion of their diplomatic and economic networks; a commitment to collective security, expressed, in part, as the participation in peace-keeping missions, and opposed to collective defense or military alliances; a commitment to non-proliferation and eradication of nuclear weapons; multilateral solutions to common and global problems; equitable trade rules; independence in their foreign policy decision-making; and the establishment of a democratic international order.

All seven countries referred to the reform of the United Nations organizations, with an emphasis on the reform of its Security Council. Three cases will suffice to illustrate this issue. Argentina, for example, stated that they "always came calling for reform of the Security Council and of the International Monetary Fund" (United Nations General Assembly, 69th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2014, p. 47). Chile, in the same year,

affirmed that “reform of the Security Council is a pending issue requiring political decision and swift action” (United Nations General Assembly, 69th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2014, p. 24). China voiced that “reform of the Security Council should aim, as a priority, to increase the representation of the developing countries, African countries in particular, so that more countries, especially small and medium-sized countries, can participate in the decision-making of the Security Council” (United Nations General Assembly, 60th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2005, p. 20).

This role conception also entailed a multilateral approach to foreign policy, via taking part in different regional or global institutions as well as increasing their diplomatic and economic contacts. In this regard, again all seven countries displayed this theme along their speeches. Brazil, for example, declared that they “have made genuine strides in enlarging our dialogue and cooperation with friendly nations worldwide, developed and developing alike. We have strengthened traditional partnerships and established new ones, especially in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East” (United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1996, p. 2). Peru also expressed it in the sense of expanding their contacts with other regions in the world. Then president Humala affirmed that though their base is Latin America, they “will not neglect our political, trade and cooperation relations with other regions of the globe (...) our regionalism will provide a platform to bring us closer, in a more articulated and proactive way, with other regions of the world” (United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, 16th Plenary Meeting, 2011, p. 15). Venezuela’s government focused on multilateral fora. They stated that “the Bolivarian Government calls for the relaunching of the Group of 77 and China and the Non-Aligned Movement so that developing countries can more forcefully defend the interests of their peoples” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 24th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 14). These three cases show how the idea of developing a multilateral foreign policy was conceived by the states under analysis.

As mentioned above, collective security was also revealed as a theme under the Active Independent role conception. All countries, apart from Venezuela, referred to the need of supporting the idea of collective security. Besides references to their participation in United Nations’ peacekeeping missions, Argentina stated that it “resolutely and actively supports the system of collective security provided in the Charter and the decisions of the Security Council” (United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 1993, p. 25). In the same vein, Colombia reflected upon its participation in



peacekeeping missions and the idea of peace. Colombian government affirmed that “as advocates of peaceful coexistence, we Colombians are proud to participate in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations (...) This participation reflects our commitment to peace anywhere in the world, which we reaffirm today” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 15th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 4). From a different standpoint, China offered a “new security concept that features mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation” (United Nations General Assembly, 57th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2002, p. 15), in which it rejected any military alliances.

Related to the previous theme, non-proliferation was included under this role conception too. Only Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and China discussed it in their speeches. As illustrative examples, Argentina stated that “efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can count on the firm support and full participation of the Argentine Republic” (United Nations General Assembly, 62nd Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2007, p. 15), while Brazil proposed “an additional contribution to nuclear disarmament. We want to take a constructive part in discussions within the framework created by the indefinite extension of the NPT, the most universal of disarmament treaties” (United Nations General Assembly, 52nd Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 1997, p. 5). Chile exalted itself as a “constant participant in the debates in multilateral forums on disarmament on a global scale, without prejudice to our active involvement on the regional level” (United Nations General Assembly, 47th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 1992, p. 102). Finally, China mentioned that it “actively participated in the Treaty negotiations [Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty] and displayed maximum flexibility, thereby contributing significantly to the final conclusion of the Treaty” (United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 1996, p. 16).

Finding multilateral solutions to common or global problems is also a part of pursuing an Active Independent role conception. Again, most of the states directly addressed this issue in their speeches. Only China and Venezuela did not follow this trend. The way it was coded can be clarified with the following excerpts. Argentina declared that they have performed different foreign policies to address common issues, “such as protection of the environment, preservation of natural resources and social and human development, within the framework of regional mechanisms for dialogue and political cooperation, as well as bilaterally, in regional forums and at the United Nations” (United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1996, p. 14). Brazil and Peru had a

common approach to this issue. Brazil's government stated that it supports "international organizations as forums for cooperation and dialogue. There is no more effective way to bring States together, to keep the peace, to protect human rights, to promote sustainable development and to work out negotiated solutions to common problems" (United Nations General Assembly, 61st Session, 10th Plenary Meeting, 2006, p. 7), while Lima affirmed that they "are aware of the importance of multilateralism as the ideal context for low- and medium-income countries to take part in the international arena, as well as helping to find solutions to the challenges the globalized world must face" (United Nations General Assembly, 61st Session, 20th Plenary Meeting, 2006, p. 22). From a more concrete perspective, given that it is a problem that its different governments have had to deal with, Colombia said that "the debate about drugs that have caused so much harm throughout the world and to my country must be frank and, most certainly, global" (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 10th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 2).

The sixth topic that the Active Independent role conception entails is the construction of equitable trade rules. On this issue, all but Colombia addressed it. For example, while China "strongly oppose protectionism in all its forms and call for strengthening the multilateral trading regime" (United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, 25th Plenary Meeting, 2011, p. 42), Argentina called for a "fair international trade system," where "Developed countries must eliminate protectionist measures in the form of subsidies, non-tariff barriers and arbitrary standards, which distort and limit commercial exchanges, especially in the agricultural sector" (United Nations General Assembly, 60th Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 2005, p. 28). Chile advocated for a "multilateral system to establish standards and practices to ensure free trade throughout the world, with clear institutional machinery for negotiations and dispute settlement, is the best option for the global economy and for each of our countries" (United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 1996, p. 8).

Coding an Active Independent role must include some remarks of independence and self-interest as its expression. Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and China made specific declarations on this theme. Chávez stated that Venezuela's voice is "an independent one representing dignity, the search for truth and the reformulation of the international system, with denunciation of persecution and of the aggression of hegemonistic forces against peoples of the world" (United Nations General Assembly, 61st Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 2006, p. 11). Brazil also made clear their foreign policy orientation by

affirming that “President Lula has developed a foreign policy that is independent, free of any sort of submission, and respectful of Brazil’s neighbours and partners” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 7). China, as well, declared that “even when China grows stronger, it will continue firmly to pursue its independent foreign policy of peace and will live in amity with other nations” (United Nations General Assembly, 50th Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 1995, p. 12). Argentina declared that their foreign policy, since 1989, “has been marked by our will to join in the new international order, by the defense of our interests and by our international reaffirmation of democratic values” (United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 1991, p. 23).

Lastly, building a democratic international order was also a recurring theme under this role conception, where power politics and alliances would give way to deliberation and consensus. Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and China talked about this purpose. Brazil, for example, stated that it “is convinced that a truly new order must be based on a pluralistic and democratic perspective on international relations” (United Nations General Assembly, 49th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1994, p. 3). China’s role conception is exemplified by the following statement: “We should promote equality and democracy in international relations. Mutual respect and equality are basic norms governing international relations” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 25). Argentina affirmed that they “believe that if this consensus [aimed at reducing risks to peace] were based on greater democratization in international relations this would increase the efficacy and the functioning of the system” (United Nations General Assembly, 55th Session, 27th Plenary Meeting, 2000, p. 26). Chile stated that “countries need freedom, peace, security and respect for international law; based on scrupulous respect for treaties, we need to work towards the building of a shared global order” (United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 2004, p. 24). Colombia emphasized the need to “restore the lost consensus for safeguarding international peace. Building that consensus requires each State to feel that it is being heard and that it is being taken into account” (United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, 15th Plenary Meeting, 2004, p. 3). Finally, Venezuela’s foreign policy “has been aimed at restoring and promoting multilateralism as a means and a blueprint for the shaping of a more democratic world” (United Nations General Assembly, 58th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 2003, p. 36).


As all these examples show, there were several ways to conceive the Active Independent role. However, these are interrelated. They expressed detachment from military alliances, thus from power politics, and the development of an active foreign policy to gain a voice in international affairs, especially through multilateralism. In this sense, these paths are commensurate to what Holsti proposed for this role conception.

The quantitative analysis further reveals commonalities and differences among the states, as well as the important themes for each of them. Figure 40 shows the top words used by each state in the excerpts coded under the Active Independent role conception. The concept of “Reform,” oriented towards the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions as explained above, figures prominently in all cases but Colombia. For the South American countries, the word “Reform” is located among the top ten words used, while for China occupies the 20<sup>th</sup> position. Another concept that was used by most of the countries was “Multilateral,” or its derivation “Multilateralism,” which carries the idea of opening spaces for their voices to be heard. That is the case for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru.

China’s top words are based on the principles of peaceful coexistence,<sup>22</sup> such as “Cooperation,” “Equality,” and “Benefit,” which are unique to Beijing’s foreign policy. Besides, Argentina’s usage of the word “Financial,” or Colombia’s of the word “Drugs” also exhibits particular problems and orientations. Argentina’s financial crisis at the turn of the century, and Colombia’s war on drugs are reflected in this role conception as ways for overcoming them.


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<sup>22</sup> The five principles of peaceful coexistence are: 1) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) Mutual non-aggression; 3) Non-interference on each other’s internal affairs; 4) Equality; and 5) Mutual Benefit. These principles were incorporated into China’s Constitution in 1982 (Liu, 2014, p. 127).



**Figure 40:** Active Independent Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Moreover, the analysis of the bigrams shows the main recurring themes for each country. Figure 41 below shows the top ten bigrams in the coded passages. Interestingly, Argentina, Chile, and Peru gave priority to “Peacekeeping Operations,” which fits the collective security theme, Colombia, and Venezuela to the “Non-Aligned Movement,” and Brazil and China to “Developing Countries,” which both related to a multilateral approach to foreign policy. In addition, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela alluded to financial institutions, while Chile to its “Open Regionalism,” expressing the economic side of the role conception. Colombia highlighted its war against drugs and focused on sustainable development, China its principles of peaceful coexistence, and Venezuela strived for a multipolar world and South-South cooperation. Lastly, Peru constantly referred to the countries where it has contributed to peacekeeping operations.



**Figure 41:** Active Independent Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Based on these findings, though the Active Independent role conception is constructed against the global powers, or at least not siding with them, it cannot be directly classified under an Anti-Core orientation. The reason is that this role has different underlying motives, which sometimes display a “neutral” feature, meaning that it does not encompass an active stand contrary to the global powers’ interests. As an example, taking part in peacekeeping operations or supporting the non-proliferation regime does not locate the countries in opposite sides from the United States. However, pushing for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, or advocating a fairer trade system against the protectionist policies of the developed countries indeed mark an Anti-Core stance.

In this sense, a nuanced classification is needed based on each country’s excerpts. Peru’s coded declarations display an overall Neutral orientation. Argentina displayed a Neutral orientation until 2003. After that, it has shown an increasing Anti-Core stand. Although Brazil criticized the West’s protectionist trade policies, most of its remarks are more general. However, it always included themes such as legitimacy and representativeness, implying a change in the international order where more developing countries, including itself, can influence the international decision-making processes. In this sense, it can be classified as having an Anti-Core orientation, though not as radical

as other countries, like Venezuela. Caracas, even during the 1990s, referring to the Non-Aligned Movement and to the oil producers grouping, and after Chávez took power, conceived this role in a more belligerent fashion, with a clear Anti-Core orientation. Chile's role conception, on the contrary, was constructed under a Neutral orientation. For the same reason, Colombia had a Neutral stance. However, during president Samper's tenure, it displayed an Anti-Core orientation. The same happened from 2010 to 2015, when Colombia called for a renewed discussion on the pitfalls of the current international anti-drugs regime. Finally, China displayed an Anti-Core orientation, calling for a new international order based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

### **2.2.5 Liberation Supporter**

According to Holsti, the Liberation Supporter role conception differs from the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator because the former is more general and does not require any formal international duties regarding the process of liberating. Instead, the Liberation Supporter role is vaguer, entailing just a disposition to the liberation movements (Holsti, 1970, p. 263).


Throughout the passages coded under this role conception a theme stood out: Palestine's statehood. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, the United States, and China advocated, with some differences in their approach, the need for an international diplomatic recognition of the Palestinian state. For example, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, stated that "Venezuela hereby affirms its unconditional solidarity with the Palestinian people and its unlimited support for the Palestinian national cause, including, of course, the immediate admission of Palestine to the United Nations as a full Member State" (United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, 29th Plenary Meeting, 2011, p. 3). A year later, former president Obama declared that "the road is hard, but the destination is clear: a secure, Jewish State of Israel and an independent, prosperous Palestine" (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 14). The same year, Beijing affirmed that

*China supports the Palestinian people in establishing, on the basis of the 1967 border, an independent Palestinian State that enjoys full sovereignty, with East Jerusalem as its capital. China supports Palestine's membership*

*of the United Nations and other international organizations (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 27).*

In addition to this case, Brazil and Venezuela supported in 1990 Namibia's independence, and the former also advocated in 1999 for the peaceful transition towards East Timor's independence. Chile in 2000 defended the popular referendum scheduled in Western Sahara, and, finally, the United States made a general statement in 1993 supporting all democratic movements throughout the world.


In sum, the way the Liberation Supporter role was conceived during the period under analysis related specifically to the creation and recognition of the Palestinian state. This is confirmed in the quantitative analysis of the coded passages. Figure 42 shows the top words used by the seven states that displayed this conception. All states used the words "Palestinian" and "State" with a high relative frequency, meaning that given the context of what they were saying, these words were used more times. Along with this idea, states also used words related to the configuration of that political entity, such as "Borders," "Self-determination," and "Independent."



**Figure 42:** Liberation Supporter Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.



The results of the bigrams analysis side with the earlier findings. That is, they run in the same direction of the role conception explicated above. Bigrams such as “Palestinian People” or “Palestinian State” rank high among states’ passages, as figure 43 shows. This confirms the idea put forward above that all states support the creation of the Palestinian state.



**Figure 43:** Liberation Supporter Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Overall, this role conception cannot be classified neither as having a Pro-Core nor an Anti-Core orientation. The reason is that the United States supports the Two-State solution, meaning that Washington also believes in the creation of the Palestinian state. However, there are indeed differences between the United States and the rest of the countries on this issue, which can be better perceived under a different role: Washington’s unconditional backing of Israel as its *Faithful Ally*.<sup>23</sup> However, the fact that there are differences does not automatically mean that the rest of the countries display an Anti-Core orientation.

<sup>23</sup> In a section below, this role conception will be discussed in depth.


### 2.2.6 Anti-Imperialist Agent

An Anti-Imperialist Agent role entails perceiving itself as an important actor in the battle against the evil of imperialism, in whatever sense this imperialism is defined (Holsti, 1970, p. 264).

In the speeches under analysis, the only state that talked about itself in the terms envisioned by Holsti was Venezuela. Other states, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and China, denounced hegemonic or imperial practices, but their statements lacked the agential side of the role. In other words, they did not portray their states as being responsible for changing the situations to which they did not agree. Given that this aspect is a cornerstone of the definition, these excerpts were not coded under this role.


Conversely, Caracas did confer itself the possibility for action to change the status quo. For example, in the following passage, which was also coded under the Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator role, they expressed the whole meaning of being an Anti-Imperialist Agent: “Yes, we may be described as extremists, but we are rising against the empire, against a model of domination” (United Nations General Assembly, 61st Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 2006, p. 10). Continuing with this line of thought, then president Chávez affirmed that “this century, in Latin America and the Caribbean we will build our own way and no one can stop it. No one can stop it. Imperialism must end” (United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2009, p. 5).

Figures 44 and 45 show the results of the quantitative content analysis. In figure 44, the word “Imperialism” ranks second, while “Imperial” ranks 14<sup>th</sup>, being the core of the role conception. In addition, the way Venezuela conceived imperialism was oriented towards an economic notion. The words “Model,” “Neo-Liberal,” “Economic,” and “Capitalism” point in that direction.



**Figure 44:** Anti-Imperialist Agent Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

The bigrams analysis, in figure 45 below, does not reveal anything interesting. Although excerpts from Venezuela's speeches coded under this role conception span across 15 different years, no combination of words was uttered enough to reveal a specific pattern. Therefore, no conclusions or insights from this analysis can be drawn. However, given the context of the role conception, equating capitalism and the Washington Consensus with imperialism, the direction of the role can be classified as Anti-Core.



**Figure 45:** Anti-Imperialist Agent Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

### 2.2.7 Defender of the Faith

The Defender of the Faith role conception deals with safeguarding a value system against an attack from countries espousing a different set of ideals (Holsti, 1970, p. 264). In this sense, although it can deal with defending certain territories, this role conception's expression focuses on ideologies. This definition stems from Cold War dynamics, hence the wording of defending and attacking. However, in the world context after the end of the confrontation between East and West, its militaristic emphasis has been downgraded. Therefore, passages coded under the Defender of the Faith role conception dealt with supporting a value system, in which states promulgated their views on economic or political issues. By not limiting to its original militaristic focus, the role became broader, allowing for the inclusion of stances that do not imply necessarily the definition of specific threats against the focal value system. Rather, it presupposes an ideological arena that will frame each state's foreign policy decision-making, and that they will consider as the proper path for their relations with other members of the international community.

Due to this modification, the role conception of Defender of the Faith was the second highest in the number of excerpts coded. In total, this role conception amounted to a total of 360 passages from all eight states under analysis. The Faith most states were defending or supporting involved the establishment of free trade and opposed protectionist policies of the developed world; the protection and promotion of democracy and basic freedoms, with an emphasis on Human Rights; defending the "civilized nations" from attacks from terrorist organizations; and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

For example, Celso Lafer, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, stated in the early 1990s that "the leverage from international trade is extraordinary. We must therefore prevent protectionist pressures linked to short-term parochial interests from undercutting the negotiating effort of the Uruguay Round, inspired by free competition and the multiplication of benefits" (United Nations General Assembly, 47th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1992, p. 17). China joined this call, declaring that "we should support an open,

equitable and fair multilateral trade regime and oppose trade protectionism” (United Nations General Assembly, 62nd Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2007, p. 19).

Chile expressed its responsibility to protect and promote democracy, when it declared its “commitment to democracy goes beyond our region. We and other countries are part of the Community of Democracies, an initiative aimed at promoting and strengthening this system of coexistence throughout the world” (United Nations General Assembly, 58th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 2003, p. 31). Linked to the idea of democracy, Argentina took a stance defending human rights: “The Argentine Republic will, from its seat, do everything in its power to promote the values that it has always defended: peace and the unconditional promotion of human rights in all countries” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 10).

Colombia, in addition, mentioned the need to fight terrorism. Then president Uribe stated that

*it would be a tragedy if the civilized world does not unite its efforts once and for all to defeat terrorism and to support the democracies that are fighting against it. We need the unity of all democratic people in order to defeat terror (United Nations General Assembly, 58th Session, 17th Plenary Meeting, 2003, p. 11).*

Amid the increasing ideological cleavage in Latin America, between liberal countries embracing free trade and left-wing countries championing an alternative model for development, Peru defended the former approach, by claiming that

*That second path [referring to the model advanced by Venezuela and others in the region] does not seem to us a responsible one, because it avoids reality and offers no sustainable solutions to social problems, nor does it create jobs that people need, because poverty cannot be diminished and true employment created without modern technology and integration into the global economy. Therefore, Peru opts for a realistic and*

*global approach (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 35).*

Venezuela changed the focus of its Faith. In the mid 1990s, then president Caldera “decided to open up the economy and incorporate prevailing market economy values through the Venezuelan Agenda” (United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, 19th Plenary Meeting, 1996, p. 15). However, after Chávez took power, the Faith shifted to other value system. This was made clear in 2009, when he stated

*As President Obama said yesterday with regards to his fourth pillar, we need an economy that serves human beings. Well, President Obama, that is called socialism. Come over to the side of socialism, President Obama, come join the axis of evil and we will build an economy that truly serves human beings. It is impossible to do that with capitalism (United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2009, p. 8).*


Finally, from the standpoint of the United States, the liberal order they helped create was their faith. Then president Obama clearly stated that “there are basic principles that are universal. There are certain truths that are self-evident, and the United States of America will never waiver in our efforts to stand up for the right of people everywhere to determine their own destiny” (United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, 3rd Plenary Meeting, 2009, p. 14). Their responsibility or function to “stand up” for other people’s political rights, associated to the establishment of democracy, also relates to the Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator role, as explained above.

In sum, all countries displayed a propensity to support a value system to which they identify. In this sense, the Defender of the Faith role conception is very general and ambiguous. They all recurred to broad statements defending their economic and political worldviews.


This is corroborated in the quantitative analysis. On the one hand, figure 46 shows the top words used by each state. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Peru, and to a lesser extent the United States, often included the word “Trade” in their statements. From

a political perspective, all countries in the Western Hemisphere used the word “Democracy,” while for China this word is not in its top 20 words. In contrast, China used words that do not appear in the other countries’ lists, such as “Sovereignty,” “Equality,” and “Benefit,” all present in the five principles of peaceful coexistence advocated by Beijing. Colombia was the only one including the word “Security,” while Venezuela was the only one uttering “Socialist,” and “Revolution” in the coded passages.

On the other hand, the bigrams analysis, in figure 47 below, shows the orientation of that Faith. Most of the top bigrams are related to economic issues. “Free Trade,” “International Trade” composed the basis of the Faith for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, while the United States strived for “Open Markets,” and Peru for “Jobs People.” For China, the economic issues were addressed via “Mutual Benefit,” and “Multilateral Trade.” From a political perspective, “Rule Law” was important for Peru and the United States, while “Respect Human Rights” was for Argentina and Chile. Finally, Venezuela repeated “Social Justice” as part of its political worldview, setting itself apart from the rest of the South American countries.



**Figure 46:** Defender of the Faith Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.



**Figure 47:** Defender of the Faith Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Overall, Chile, Peru, and Colombia, and of course the United States, displayed a Pro-Core orientation in their Defender of the Faith role conceptions, especially on its economic dimension. They did, however, criticized the protectionist policies for agricultural products implemented in the developed world. To a lesser extent, Argentina and Brazil also shared this perspective. However, they also criticized the “free trade – globalism” of the liberal approach, defended by the countries mentioned above. In addition, both highlighted their opposition to unilateralism, targeting the actions of the United States. In this sense, their orientation can be assessed as Anti-Core. It is important to note that Argentina changed its orientation during the period under analysis. Throughout the 90s and up until its financial crisis, it had a Pro-Core stance. This orientation was redirected after the crisis, becoming Anti-Core. Venezuela and China joined them in this category. The former, predominantly by the ideology defended by the Bolivarian Revolution, and the latter by espousing the principles of peaceful coexistence.

## 2.2.8 Mediator – Integrator

The states conceiving the role of Mediator – Integrator have the perception of having the “task to help adversaries reconcile their differences” (Holsti, 1970, p. 265), and, given




the Integrator part of the role, helping to bring together different states on certain issues. In his study, Holsti found that most of the sample countries showed indications of this role. This research had the same findings. All the eight countries, at least one time, conceived for themselves the responsibility of mediating between rival parties. The United States conceived this role in 13 different years, followed by China and Brazil, both with 9 years. Argentina and Chile were next, conceiving this role in four different years. Colombia and Venezuela did it twice, while Peru did it once – but only on the Integrator part of the role.

The main conflicts addressed by the mediators were Israel-Palestine, North Korea's and Iran's nuclear weapons development programs, Peru-Ecuador, the Honduran *coup*, and Cuba-United States. As illustration of this role conception directed to the Middle East, three cases are presented. Then president Obama, for example, stated that “understanding that such peace must come through a just agreement between the parties [Israel and Palestine], America will walk alongside all who are prepared to make that journey” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 14). Brazil also conceived itself as a Mediator to bring peace to the Middle East. In 2010, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, stated that “Brazil, which has about 10 million people of Arab descent and a sizeable Jewish community living together in harmony, will not shy away from making its contribution to the peace that we all yearn for” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 7). China too involved itself in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. “Guided by Xi Jinping's four-point proposal on resolving the Palestinian issue, China will continue to work for a comprehensive, just and durable solution to the issue” (United Nations General Assembly, 68th Session, 15th Plenary Meeting, 2013, p. 40).


In a regional setting, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile highlighted their roles as mediators between Peru and Ecuador in the 1990s. Then president Menem declared that “as one of the guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, we contributed to the peace agreement between Peru and Ecuador” (United Nations General Assembly, 54th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 1999, p. 4). Chile stated that it is “pleased to have contributed to the rapprochement between the parties and to have facilitated the dialogue that led this year to the settlement of their differences and the signing of a peace agreement” (United Nations General Assembly, 54th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 1999, p. 21). Finally, Brazil affirmed that its government

*as the coordinator of the guarantor countries of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, has been making a sustained effort to assist Ecuador and Peru in reaching at the earliest possible date a solid and final agreement on the border differences that have kept them apart for decades (United Nations General Assembly, 53rd Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 1998, p. 7).*

These examples show how the states conceived their Mediator – Integrator role. Again, the quantitative analysis also reflects the content of this role. Given that Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina had few passages coded, they were removed from the following figures, for a better visualization of the findings. However, they were included in the overall analysis of the role. In figure 48, words like “Peace,” “Solution,” “Contribution,” “Parties,” relate to the function of reconciling adversaries, as Holsti proposed. In addition, the relative frequency of the words used by each state also reflect their priorities. For Brazil, the role conception was primarily conceived towards Ecuador and Peru’s conflict, for China, nuclear issues were paramount – with an emphasis on North Korea and Iran –, while the United States concentrated on the Israel-Palestine conflict. These findings are corroborated by the bigrams’ analysis, as shown in figure 49 below.



**Figure 48:** Mediator – Integrator Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.



**Figure 49:** Mediator – Integrator Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

As the rest of the countries were included in the analysis, the role conception of Mediator – Integrator did not show any particular orientation regarding the Pro-Core-Anti-Core dichotomy. In this sense, this role was classified as being Neutral.

## 2.2.9 Regional Subsystem Collaborator

The role conception of Regional Subsystem Collaborator was reflected by all the countries. Indeed, 181 different passages were coded under this role conception, which Holsti defined as pursuing long-term “cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting subsystems” (Holsti, 1970). Throughout all statements, the leaders reflected on a sense of belonging to a regional setting, or several, where their interests would come to fruition.

Argentina provides an example of an economic perspective. In 2007, they stated that their foreign policy

*is being strengthened and expanded, with a clear and decisive commitment to the national interest. Regional integration is a priority. Over the past two decades, through the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), Argentina has strengthened its commercial ties with countries of the region (United Nations General Assembly, 62nd Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2007, p. 14).*

Brazil expanded Argentina's approach, including other dimensions to integration, as well as enlarging the region. They affirmed that "Brazil is committed (...) to the promotion of a prosperous, integrated, and politically stable South America, building upon our experience in the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). (United Nations General Assembly, 60th Session, 9th Plenary Meeting, 2005, p. 7).

Venezuela stressed the political orientation of its regional collaboration. For its leaders, "the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America is a new coordination mechanism for dialogue guided by cooperation, complementarity and solidarity among sovereign nations. It represents an alternative for the liberation and independence of our countries" (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 21st Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 13).


Chile kept enlarging the scope of its region, which can be thought as including cross-regional features. In the early 1990s, they assessed that

*An outstanding feature of the major changes taking place throughout the world is the important role being assumed by the Pacific basin in political, economic and strategic terms. Chile is a coastal State of that ocean, and our identification with the basin is one of the most innovative elements of in the foreign policy pursued by President Aylwin. We have made a sustained effort to associate ourselves with the main agreements on cooperation in the Pacific region (United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 1993, p. 39).*

However, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator role conception is not limited to political or economic integration. As the last example shows, it can also include security issues. Precisely, Chinese leaders emphasized that


*It is in the spirit of this new security concept that we in China have been working hard to promote mechanisms for a regional security dialogue and cooperation, actively participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, and endeavouring to establish an Asia-Pacific security framework that is for dialogue and against confrontation (United Nations General Assembly, 57th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2002, p. 15).*

The words used by the leaders reflect their priorities on regional collaboration. Argentina and Brazil, as figure 50 shows, emphasized MERCOSUR. Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela used more frequently “Latin America.” Brazil and Peru highlighted as well “South America,” while Chile focused on the “World.” Peru also referred to the Andean region, which neither Colombia, Venezuela nor Chile used. Venezuela’s political orientation is corroborated by its usage of “Alliance” and “Bolivarian.” China’s main regions were Northeast Asia, by using the word “Peninsula” – referring to the Korean peninsula –, and the Asia Pacific region. Finally, the United States’ economic orientation of the role conception included the words “Cooperation,” “Partnership,” and “Economies.”



**Figure 50:** Regional Subsystem Collaborator Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

The prioritization is also confirmed by the bigrams' analysis, in figure 51 below. Argentina and Brazil were inclined towards the Common Market of the South. Chile's cross-regional approach includes its region, Latin America, without losing sight of the World. Colombia and Venezuela were facing Latin America and the Caribbean. They also displayed a political orientation: The former, referring to the Rio Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, from which Colombia exercised its presidency from 1995 to 1998, and the latter invoking the Bolivarian Alliance. Peru, again, emphasized its Andean vocation. China dwelled on the Korean peninsula, and on economic cooperation. Unfortunately, the United States' analysis did not show any variance among its bigrams. Therefore, no conclusions can be derived from it.



**Figure 51:** Regional Subsystem Collaborator Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Based on this analysis, most of the orientations of these role conceptions cannot be characterized either as Pro-Core or Anti-Core. Instead, they are Neutral. The only exception, however, is Venezuela. Caracas' political orientation of its regional collaboration under the Bolivarian governments can be considered as having an Anti-Core stance.

## 2.2.10 Developer

The role conception of the Developer involves “a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries” (Holsti, 1970, p. 266). Usually, this role is conceived by those states that have the material capabilities and skills to perform such endeavor. However, all countries under analysis alluded to it in their speeches, although not with the same frequency. At one side of this continuum, Peru made one indirect reference in 2010, and Argentina and Colombia talked about it in three different years. The former did it in 1994, 1995, and 1997, while the latter did it in from 2010 to 2012. They were followed by Venezuela, conceiving it 8 different years, Chile in 9, and Brazil in 10. At the other side of the frequency continuum, China conceived it 13 different years, starting in 2001, and the United States in 17. According to this frequency, then, material capabilities are indeed associated with this role conception.

The sense of obligation to conceive this role is expressed, for example, by the United States. In 2007, then president Bush stated that “feeding the hungry has long been a special calling for my nation. Today, more than half the world’s food assistance comes from America. We send emergency food stocks to starving people, from camps in Sudan to slums around the world” (United Nations General Assembly, 62nd Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 2007, p. 9).


China and Venezuela emphasized cooperation as one of the pillars of their foreign policies. On the one hand, Beijing affirmed that “as a responsible and major developing country, China has always made common development an important aspect of its foreign policy. We have made a great effort to provide support and assistance to other developing countries” (United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 2009, p. 10). On the other hand, Caracas claimed that “South-South cooperation is a top priority for Venezuela” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 24th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 13).

Brazil offered its skills to help developing countries: “We are in the position to provide a solidarity-based contribution to brotherly countries in the developing world in matters such as food security, agricultural technology, generation of clean and renewable energy and the fight against hunger and poverty” (United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2011, p. 8). In the same vein, Chile declared that it

*will cooperate in the assignment and training of troops in Bolivia, Ecuador and other countries of the region. However, when we say ‘troops’, we are not talking about soldiers. It will be a force of nurses, midwives and doctors specialized in maternal and child health, who will travel through the fields and mountain ranges of our America, delivering babies, helping mothers, providing vaccinations and caring for sick children (United Nations General Assembly, 63rd Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 2008, p. 17).*



Since Argentina, Colombia, and Peru had few years where they expressed the role conception of Developer, they were removed from Figures 52, and 53, below. However, they were included in the overall analysis of the role conception. Figure 52 shows the top words for the remaining five countries. Hunger and poverty were conditions that appeared prominently in Brazil's and Chile's speeches. China and the United States focused on development and assistance, while Venezuela highlighted its cooperation through its own regional processes, such as Petrocaribe, under its Bolivarian ideology.




**Figure 52:** Developer Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

The top bigrams presented in figure 53 complement the overall picture of the Developer. Brazil encouraged the fight against hunger and poverty, as Chile did. China centered its attention on common development with developing countries. Under the role conception of Developer, the US draw its attention to the Millennium Challenge Account and associated development with economic freedom. Finally, Venezuela included in its role conception of Developer the principle of solidarity and, again, the regional process being built under its leadership.

According to the definition of the Developer role, it does not display an orientation as neither Pro-Core nor Anti-Core. Although development aid can be politically motivated, most of the cases did not let it through their speeches. However, the United States did express in some of its remarks the conditionality upon adopting liberal values of its aid,

and Venezuela associated it to the Bolivarian Alliance, which, as noted above, had an underlying Anti-Core stance. The rest of the states were Neutral as reflected in their coded excerpts.



**Figure 53:** Developer Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

## 2.2.11 Bridge

The role conception of a Bridge is quite vague, ephemeral, and involves the function of conveying messages between different cultures and states (Holsti, 1970, pp. 266–267). Brazil, China, Peru, and the United States were the only ones reflecting these ideas in their speeches, though without a high frequency. Peru and the United States referred to this role in one year, each, while Brazil did it in three different years, and China in four.

As examples of the few instances that this role could be coded in the different speeches under analysis, Peru stated in 2012 that

*From the South American perspective, we also aspire to build bridges with all the regions of the world. In such a spirit, Peru will in a few days welcome heads of State and Government of South American and Arab countries to the third Summit of South American and Arab Countries (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 38)*

On its part, the United States declared that they “will pursue positive engagement that builds bridges among faiths and new partnerships for opportunity” (United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, 3rd Plenary Meeting, 2009, p. 12).

Brazil affirmed that they “are working to bring together peoples and regions. We seek to enhance political dialogue and economic links with the Arab world, Africa and Asia, and we do so without sacrificing our traditional partners” (United Nations General Assembly, 62nd Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 2007, p. 7).

Finally, Beijing declared that “China encourages dialogue and exchanges among civilizations. We should replace confrontation with dialogue and bridge differences with inclusiveness in order to make the world more harmonious and to ensure common progress for humanity” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 26).

Given the low frequency of this role, in terms of number of passages coded, the quantitative analysis differentiating each of the states did not display much variance. Hence, no interesting findings are reported in figures, as in the prior role. Besides, the role of Bridge cannot be considered as having an Anti-Core nor a Pro-Core orientation. Therefore, this role is characterized as being Neutral for all states conceiving it.

#### **2.2.12 Faithful Ally**

The Faithful Ally, Holsti contented, implies a “specific commitment to support the policies of *another* government” (1970, p. 267, emphasis in the original). Though this definition implies a broad support for the government in power, it could also mean the backing of specific important policies for the state being supported. In this sense, besides a support for general policies, the coding also included those instances of support to specific policies carried on by a state, which the focal state, the role conceiver, considered worthy of following. Therefore, all states under analysis openly declared their support to some other country’s policies.

For example, in the early 1990s, all South American states, but Peru, supported the United States' Americas Initiative. As an example, Chile stated in 1991 that they "have positively appraised President Bush's Americas Initiative and are fully ready to continue making progress towards the implementation of its provisions" (United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, 22th Plenary Meeting, 1991, p. 67). Venezuela also followed this trend. In the same year, then president Pérez affirmed that "we support the spirit of President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which poses the long-term challenge of a hemispheric market and at the same time includes the essential factors of debt, trade, investment and development" (United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 1991, p. 7).

Another policy that was supported in the speeches was G4 states' (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) intentions to become permanent members of the Security Council. Chile "supports the inclusion of Brazil, Germany, Japan and India as permanent members of the Security Council" (United Nations General Assembly, 68th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2013, p. 24). Peru called for the "expansion of the Council in order to ensure equitable participation by developing countries and it supports also the aspirations of States such as Japan and Germany to become permanent members" (United Nations General Assembly, 50th Session, 40th Plenary Meeting, 1995, p. 33).

The role conception of Faithful Ally was also coded when leaders sided with one government against policies from a third party. A special case in this regard was the call from Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela to end the United States' embargo on Cuba. Then president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, made it clear when she stated that

*Cuba has made great progress in bringing its economic model up to date. To continue on its path, it needs the support of partners both near and far. Cooperation on Cuba's progress is, however, hampered by the economic embargo that has plagued its population for decades. The time has long since passed for us to put an end to that anachronism (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 10).*

In the same year, 2012, Peru condemned "once again the unfair, illegitimate and illegal economic, financial and commercial blockade imposed against Cuba" (United Nations


General Assembly, 67th Session, 14th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 37). In stronger terms, then Foreign Affairs Minister of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro called for

*An end to the shameful criminal blockade against our sister republic of Cuba, imposed by the United States empire for more than 50 years with gruesome cruelty against the heroic people of José Martí (...) we have no choice but to believe that such aggravated cruelty against the Cuban Revolution is the result of imperial arrogance in the face of the dignity and courage shown by the defiant Cuban people in their sovereign decision to determine their own fate and fight for their happiness. (United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session, 29th Plenary Meeting, 2011, p. 4).*

Finally, a commitment to another state's security – the core of being an ally – can be exemplified by the close relationship between the United States and Israel. Then president Obama warned members of the General Assembly by saying the following: "Israel is a sovereign State, and the historic homeland of the Jewish people. It should be clear to all that efforts to chip away Israel's legitimacy will be met with the unshakeable opposition of the United States" (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 12).


As stated above, all states had in their speeches passages that were coded under this role conception. Notwithstanding this, they did not express it with the same frequency. China only did it in one year in support for Libya's transitional government. Argentina did it in two years, Peru in three, and Colombia in four. They were followed by Brazil, whose leaders' speeches had excerpts that were coded as Faithful Ally in 6 different years, Chile in 9 different years, and the United States and Venezuela in 12 years. Given the sparse number of references by most states, the figures below only show the quantitative analysis for Chile, the United States, and Venezuela. However, as in earlier cases, all cases were included in the overall analysis.

Figure 54 shows the top words used by Chile, the United States, and Venezuela. Germany's and Japan's bid to become permanent members were at the top of Chile's support as Faithful Ally. For the United States, Israel was paramount, while Cuba and Syria were for Venezuela.



**Figure 54:** Faithful Ally Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

The top bigrams used by the three states are shown in figure 55. Again, Chile supported Germany and Japan to be seated as permanent members of the Security Council, the United States supported Israel, and Venezuela did so with Cuba. Besides, in the latter case, other allies appeared. First, Brazil, as part of the G4, was also supported by Caracas. Second, as mentioned above, in the early 1990s Venezuela supported Washington's Americas Initiative. Third, it backed Argentina's claim to the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. Fourth, Venezuela also considered Russia's Vladimir Putin as an ally, in the sense of this role conception.



**Figure 55:** Faithful Ally Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Classifying the Faithful Ally according to the direction as Anti-Core, Pro-Core, or Neutral depended on the ally and, therefore, on the period it was conceived. Therefore, Argentina's role, supporting the Americas Initiative and Washington's special envoy to the Middle East, was classified as Pro-Core. Brazil's display of the role moved across different orientations. Its support of the Americas Initiative located its role conception in the Pro-Core orientation. However, its rejection of Washington's embargo on Cuba places it on the other side, as Anti-Core. Meanwhile, its broad support for Argentina was classified as being Neutral.

Chile's role conception as a Faithful Ally was located under the Pro-Core orientation because its support for the Americas Initiative. The rest of the passages did not show a stance, thus placing it under the Neutral category (its support for the G4, and for Colombia's peace process). However, its support for Argentina's claims to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, given that it involves the United Kingdom, which belongs to the core, could locate Chile's role also in the Anti-Core orientation.

Colombia displayed a Pro-Core orientation in its role conception. It supported Washington's Americas Initiative, and its fight against illegal drugs and against terrorism. Peru's rejection of the United States' embargo on Cuba place it on the Anti-Core orientation. Meanwhile, China's only reference to its support for the Libyan transitional government had a Neutral orientation.

Finally, though in some cases Caracas had a Pro-Core or Neutral orientation (as in the cases of the Americas Initiative or Brazil's bid for a permanent seat), in most cases it had an Anti-Core stance. Its support for Cuba, Syria, Libya, Iran, Russia, and Argentina's denouncing of the "Vulture Funds" placed it in this orientation.

### **2.2.13 Independent**

The role conception of Independent is indeed close to the Active Independent role explained above. The only difference is that the former "emphasize this element of self-determination (...) [without] any particular continuing task or function in the system"

(Holsti, 1970, p. 268). Due to only claiming that its foreign policies will follow their own interests and not others', the state conceiving the role of Independent does not align itself with any political or economic pole. Given this definition, the role conception was coded under the idea of pursuing a foreign (or domestic) policy according to their national objectives.

The only countries conceiving this role were Argentina and China. Then president Fernández de Kirchner stated, in 2012, that Argentina was “not a player in a soccer game; it is a sovereign nation, which makes its decisions on a sovereign basis. It will not be subject to pressures brought to bear from the outside nor any threats of red cards” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 6). Along these lines, Beijing claimed that they will “steadfastly take up economic development as the central task, resolutely press ahead with reform and opening up, consistently maintain social stability and unswervingly pursue an independent foreign policy of peace” (United Nations General Assembly, 54th Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 1999, p. 18).

The role conception of Independent had a low frequency, because Argentina only expressed it in three occasions and China in two. A reason for this low coding is attributable to the breadth and scope of the Active Independent role conception as defined above. Since the latter encompassed different issues that would translate into pursuing a self-interested foreign policy agenda, the former was left only with some vague references. This situation made the role's quantitative analysis unfruitful. There was not much variance to highlight the important words or bigrams uttered by these two states. Besides, given that the Independent role conception aligns itself with no international power or block at all, and implied no particular international agenda, it was consequentially classified as being Neutral.

#### **2.2.14 Example**

Holsti explained that the role conception of an Example “emphasizes the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies” (1970, p. 268). All states, with varying degrees of frequency,



highlighted their domestic or foreign policies to gain status among the international community.

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, for example, highlighted their developmental models. Opening its economy to global markets was the path chosen by Chile. In this regard, they stated, “what Chile has done (...) is recognized, and has been frequently praised in recent years. In little over a decade, Chile has doubled the size of its economy” (United Nations General Assembly, 53rd Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 1998, p. 23). Along these lines, Peru also saw itself as an Example when then president García declared that “Peru has been one of the proving grounds for realistic, global development, for modern, democratic development that follows a global market policy for sustained development while pursuing social policies that ensure increasing stability and equity for our citizens” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 35).

From a different model, then president Fernández of Argentina affirmed that they “have put social policies and programmes in place, and they are the most notable in Latin America” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 7). Venezuela also praised its economic model. They declared that “the successes of the Bolivarian Revolution are evident. Venezuela has met the targets set by the Millennium Development Goals before 2015” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 21st Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 15).

The environmental policies were also addressed under this role conception. Brazil stated that they “have considerable experience in many areas of interest to environmental preservation, and we are ready to make this available to our partners” (United Nations General Assembly, 19th Special Session, 1st Plenary Meeting, 1997, p. 10). Colombia joined Brazil in this topic: “We Colombians want to be a model country for the world in monitoring forests, carbon emissions and the state of its biodiversity” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 15th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 5).


Argentina and Brazil also praised their decision to renounce to use their nuclear development for purposes other than peaceful: “Argentina’s self-restraint in the development of nuclear weapons is recognized as an example by the international

community” (United Nations General Assembly, 54th Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 1999, p. 5). Brazil recognized the value of the agreements signed on this issue with Argentina: “Our bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear cooperation are exemplary and a stabilizing force in the region and worldwide” (United Nations General Assembly, 54th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1999, p. 6).

Another common topic in this role conception was their values. Only the United States and China expressed it in these terms. Then president Obama clearly signaled this orientation as the democratic lighthouse of the world when he stated that “every nation must know that America will live its values, and we will lead by example” (United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, 3rd Plenary Meeting, 2009, p. 9). China praised its long history as a nation when they recall that “the moral values and wisdom drawn from the 5,000-year-old Chinese civilization do not belong to China alone but also to the world” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 43).

These excerpts show how the role of Example was conceived by all states under scrutiny. The quantitative analysis went further to reveal the priorities for each state according to the number of times each topic was addressed by their leaders. As is shown in figure 56, the priorities differed among countries. For Argentina, its nuclear development and its commitment to non-proliferation constituted the highest source for being an Example to the world. Peru was proud of its development and integration to the world. Colombia highlighted its policies against drug-trafficking. China often mentioned the “Chinese Dream” and emphasized its cultural background to the world. Venezuela pointed out its policies under the Bolivarian Revolution.


For Brazil, Chile, and the United States the relative frequency of the words used are less conclusive. Brazil reiterated the word “Social,” which highly likely referred to the economic policies undertaken by president Lula. In Chile’s case, though the role was coded in 6 different years, no high-scoring word revealed a specific topic. Finally, the United States only conceived this role in two different years, under Obama’s administration. Given how brief these passages were, the quantitative analysis showed no variance at all. From this approach, no topic could be defined.



**Figure 56:** Example Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

The bigrams analysis, in figure 57, confirmed or expanded these results, or did not supply any additional information. In Colombia's case, its fight against illegal drugs made it an example to the world, according to its leaders. China's developing social model, embedded in its values, served as an example to the world.

Adding to the single word analysis, Argentina's Example role conception included the MERCOSUR as a source of pride. Brazil's bigrams, "Extreme Poverty," and "Child Mortality" clarified the use of the word "Social," mentioned above. In this sense, its exemplary role stemmed from its economic policies. In this same vein, the "Free Trade" bigram at the top of Chile's chart also oriented the analysis towards the economic model being implemented there. Lastly, the bigrams analysis did not supply any additional information regarding Peru's, the United States', and Venezuela's priorities.



**Figure 57:** Example Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

Since the Example role conception deals with reflecting upon their domestic policies to gain influence and prestige in the international system, it is closely related to the idea of exercising soft power. Employing different means to attract other states to follow or imitate a set of policies or values because they want to is behind the idea of soft power (Nye, 1990, p. 166; Slaughter, 2017, p. 162; Szczudlik-Tatar, 2010, p. 47). In this sense, setting themselves up as examples in the international system let states gain partners to pursue their own domestic and international agendas. That, for example, is the case for Venezuela and China. The Bolivarian Revolution and the Chinese Dream, the individual basis for their role conception as Examples, are meant to allure other states to follow them. For them, then, these role conceptions have an Anti-Core orientation.

However, the role of Example can also be conceived as a “living proof” of their alignment to or detachment from the referential power. In other words, the exhibition of their policies allows states to keep traditional partners, or, conversely, to part from them. Colombia’s appeal to its fight against terrorism or illicit narcotics (especially during the 1990s and 2000s) went in the first direction. Chile’s and Peru’s references to their economic model, following liberal ideas of free trade and integration, were used as evidences of the benefits of following the core’s prescriptions too. In this sense, these three cases of the Example role conception are Pro-Core oriented.

The detachment from an established power, though plausible, was found in just one excerpt: Argentina's remarks of being a "reminder of the unreliability of models that claim to be universally valid" (United Nations General Assembly, 62nd Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2007, p. 13), making a direct reference to the neoliberal recipe suggested by the IMF, was meant to signal other states that following those prescriptions would be harmful for their respective economies.

However, since Argentina's priorities, as measured above, rested in other issues, which had little to do with a Pro-Core-Anti-Core dichotomy, its overall general role conception of Example was classified as being Neutral. The same case was that of Brazil's. The exemplary policies decided in Brasilia and coded in the speeches referred to the Mendoza Agreement (among Argentina, Chile, and Brazil), its democratic electoral process, the protection of the environment, nuclear cooperation, its domestic diversity and tolerance, and its developmental model. Therefore, it had a Neutral orientation.

#### **2.2.15 Internal Development**

The role conception of Internal Development deals with the government's efforts to deal with their own domestic issues. There are no specific functions or responsibilities towards the international system in this conception, other than seeking support or cooperation from the international community (Holsti, 1970, p. 269). According to this definition, the excerpts coded under this role reflected their inward-oriented activities in which certain conditions of the international system would help them in these endeavors, or their appeal for international support. Based on these characteristics, the role of Internal Development was conceived by five states, with different frequencies, though: Colombia expressed it in 15 different years, China in 11, Peru and Venezuela in three different years, and Brazil in two.

Colombia's armed conflict and illicit drug production as the main focus of the government's attention was characterized by then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guillermo Fernández de Soto, when he addressed the Assembly in the following terms,

*Every day, lives are lost in Colombia through the action of outlaw groups whose activities are financed from resources obtained from the traffic in drugs. Now, when all our efforts are focused on the difficult battle against this problem, we need increased support and the effective solidarity of the international community. (United Nations General Assembly, 55th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2000, p. 31).*

China made emphasis on their own economic development. In 2010, for example, they said that “China will continue to focus on developing the economy. Development is our top priority, as it constitutes the basis for addressing all issues. We will rely mainly in our own efforts in pursuing development” (United Nations General Assembly, 65th Session, 11th Plenary Meeting, 2010, p. 42).


Venezuela conceived this role only during the 1990s, before Hugo Chávez took power. After Rio’s 1992 Conference on the Environment, they requested “technical support and political, economic and social backing to confront the economic interests that are destroying our heritage” (United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, 12th Plenary Meeting, 1993, p. 10). Calling for international support was also Peru’s voicing of the Internal Development role: “The Peruvian people (...) has set in action a process of national renovation that should deserve the recognition and support of the international community” (United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, 16th Plenary Meeting, 1991, p. 71). Finally, Brazil related its economic development with its international status:

*My country is striving to ensure its rightful place on the international scene. We are aware of the fact that to that end we must rely above all on our own efforts. It is our obligation to manage our domestic affairs, to solve our problems among ourselves and to persevere on the right path. There is no other path to progress, harmony and social well-being. There is no other path to the role to which we aspire in international decision-making processes. We ask nothing of the world that we are not prepared to give. We propose nothing to the world that we are not in a position to do ourselves (United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, 4th Plenary Meeting, 1991, pp. 13–15).*


Due to the limited number of times Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela conceived this role, they were removed from the figures below, though they were kept for the general quantitative analysis. Figure 58 shows the top words for China and Colombia. “Development” appears prominently in China’s case. Moreover, it associated its own development with international peace and stability. In Colombia’s case, “Support” is the second highest word used by Colombian leaders, and it can be associated to the internal problems mentioned above: illicit drugs and the internal armed conflict.

These findings are corroborated in figure 59 below. On the one hand, “Peace-Development” was China’s only bigram that was repeated across the coded passages. Colombia, on the other hand, addressed the “International-Community” often, followed by bigrams containing the word “Support,” and domestic endeavors, such as the “Peace-Process” and “Democratic-Security.” The latter being the main policy implemented by president Álvaro Uribe from 2002 to 2010.

Finally, since the role conception has an inward orientation, it cannot be classified neither as being Anti-Core nor Pro-Core. Therefore, it was classified as Neutral.



**Figure 58:** Internal Development Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.



**Figure 59:** Internal Development Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

## 2.2.16 Rival

The last role conception found in the speeches given by the states' leaders at the United Nations was that of a Rival, which Holsti did not use in his analysis, but was introduced to the Latin American role theory setting by Thies. He argues that this role is a basic feature of the international system (Thies, 2017b, p. 667). The Rival role, belonging to Wendt's Lockean culture, implies a competition between Self and Other with limited use of violence. That is, rivals will observe each other's right to exist amid their pursuit of their own interests (Wendt, 2003, pp. 279–285).

Though there have not been violent displays of force among the states under analysis,<sup>24</sup> the role of Rival was coded when a focal state condemned the actions of another one.

<sup>24</sup> However, the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 Chinese downing of a U.S. surveillance plane, which took the bilateral relations to a "low ebb" (Zhong & Shen, 2008) can be considered as exceptions to this statement.



These actions needed be considered as a security threat for the role conceiver. Three states displayed this role conception in this sense: Brazil, the United States, and Venezuela.

The only time Brazil conceived this role, it was condemning the U.S. electronic espionage on private citizens, businesses, and the Brazilian government. Then president Rousseff voiced: “We have registered our protest with the Government of the United States and we have demanded explanations, apologies and guarantees that such procedures will never be repeated” (United Nations General Assembly, 68th Session, 5th Plenary Meeting, 2013, p. 7).

The United States displayed this role conception in 18 different years. Its targets were: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Burma, North Korea, and Russia. For example, in 2002, then president Bush stated that

*history, the logic and the facts lead to one conclusion. Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger (...) To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And that is a risk we must not take (United Nations General Assembly, 57th Session, 2nd Plenary Meeting, 2002, p. 8).*


In another occasion, referring to the nuclear development programs of North Korea and Iran, then president Obama said that the world would be less secure when countries do not abide by international law. Precisely, “in their actions to date, the Governments of North Korea and Iran threaten to take us down this dangerous slope” (United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, 3rd Plenary Meeting, 2009, p. 11).

Venezuela, under presidents Chávez and Maduro, conceived this role of Rival in relation to the United States and Israel. In 2012, for example, Venezuela expressed its concern about “the warmongering threats of the Governments of Israel and the United States against Iran. A military attack on the Persian nation would have fatal consequences for world peace” (United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session, 21st Plenary Meeting, 2012, p. 14).

Finally, aside the reasoning behind the coding explained above, one more state was coded as displaying this role conception: China. In most instances, its excerpts were coded as a negative Rival or a Non-Rival. Most of the time, China went far explaining that its development did not pose a threat to anyone in the international system, that they will not seek hegemony, and that it will follow a peaceful rise path. These cases, then, constituted the Non-Rival role conception as understood in this analysis.

In the early 1990s, for example, they stated that “even when China becomes more developed, we will never engage in aggression or expansionism; nor will we ever seek hegemony” (United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 1993, p. 21). 22 years later, president Xi Jinping continued conceiving China as rival of no one: “We are committed to peaceful development. No matter how the international landscape may evolve and how strong China may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion or to establish a sphere of influence” (United Nations General Assembly, 70th Session, 13th Plenary Meeting, 2015).


The quantitative analysis showed the construction of the rivalry between the Self and the Other. In the case of the United States, in figure 60 below, Iran and Iraq mainly constituted the Other. For Venezuela, the United States was the source of the threat for the Bolivarian governments. Following the Non-Rival coding for China, the words “Peace” or “Peaceful” appear at the top of the ranking, associated with its own condition of development. Since Brazil only conceived this role one time, it was removed from this figure and the next one. However, the coded passage was quoted above to show its content and was included in the general analysis of the role.



**Figure 60:** Rival Top Words Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

The analysis of the bigrams expanded these findings. Figure 61 shows that Venezuela's main target of the role was the government of the United States. Whereas for Washington, North Korea was included along Iran, where their development of nuclear weapons was its main concern. China, as mentioned, emphasized its peaceful development. Since the words "Not" and "No" were removed during the analysis because they were on the "stop words" list, the bigrams "Pose-Threat" and "Seek-Hegemony" need be qualified with them. In this sense, adding the negation to these bigrams, the Non-Rival role conception arises.

Finally, these results provide information on the orientation of the role. China's Non-Rival role can be classified as being Neutral, Venezuela's discourse on the United States classified its role as Anti-Core.



**Figure 61:** Rival Top Bigrams Relative Frequency  
Source: Own elaboration.

## 2.3 Assessing the Baseline of National Role Conceptions

Before continuing further, it is necessary to validate the results from the previous analysis. To assess the validity and reliability of the coding, two different strategies were followed based on a quantitative content analysis. These tests focused on the aggregation of the passages coded under each role, without paying attention to which countries were conceiving them. Therefore, its objective was oriented towards the operationalization of the definitions of the role conceptions into actual empirical evidence in the form of coded excerpts.

The first strategy relied on two different measurements, term frequency (*tf*) and inverse document frequency (*idf*), to assess how internally coherent each role was, and how it differed from the rest of the roles. These two measurements gave the *tf-idf* score. This score is the result of the following operation:

$$tf-idf_{t,d} = tf_{t,d} \times idf_t \quad [21]$$

The term frequency (*tf*), as mentioned above, is a simple count of the number of times a term *t* (word or bigram in this analysis) appeared in a document *d*. Here, the document is the grouping of passages associated to a given role. In this context, though

informative, the *tf* alone can be misleading. For example, a word such as “International” can easily have a high frequency in all roles. Since it is very common, its explicative value diminishes because it is not useful to differentiate among roles. Then, it is important to scale this weight.

The inverse document frequency helps in this task. The *idf* for a term *t* is the log of the total number of roles coded (16) divided by the number of roles having the specific word *t*. This operation gives high scores to infrequent terms, while penalizing those that appear in all or in most roles.


With these two measurements, then, a *tf-idf* score can be calculated for each word by multiplying *tf* by *idf* for each term. The result is a discriminating value for each word in each role that is:

Highest when it occurs often within a small number of roles.

Lower when the word occurs seldom in a role or occurs many times in many roles.

Lowest when the word appears in all roles (Manning et al., 2008, p. 109).

This score distinguishes each role according to its top words, allowing to verify if the words correspond to the nature of the role conception, and if there is overlapping among roles. Figure 62 shows the results of this analysis.



**Figure 62:** Top Words in each Role according to their TF-IDF Scores  
Source: Own elaboration.

According to these results, the highest scoring words in each role are indeed associated to the nature of the corresponding conception. Considering the definitions presented above, the high scoring words signal the topics each role tries to address. For example, words such as “Aids,” “Developing,” “Malaria,” and “Medical” in the Developer role conception reveal a concern by the leaders for solving health problems, usually present in the developing world. In the same vein, the presence of “Neo-Liberal,” “Imperialism,” and “Salvation” are words uttered by Venezuelan leaders depicting a negative reality they want to alter; hence these words belong to the Anti-Imperialist Agent role conception. When it comes to defending a set of principles or values, that is, conceiving a Defender of the Faith role, words like “Human Rights,” “Universal,” “Trade,” or “Democracy” are part of an ideology or worldview the states under analysis are trying to protect.

However, the analysis also shows that one role has associated to it very vague words that does not allow for getting a sense of its content. That is the case of the role of Independent. As was explained above, the definition of the role is broad, with subtle differences with the Active Independent role. Its top word according to the *tf-idf* score is “Crucially,” which does not direct the analysis on any particular path. Besides, the rest of the words have the same score, so no conclusions from them can be derived either. Another case that does not produce conclusive results is the Regional Protector, though it behaves better than the Independent. The former includes words that point towards a region, e.g., “Peninsula,” and “Korean.” However, the rest of the words do not provide the actions or ideas for protecting it. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the quantitative analysis confirms that the qualitative coding of the roles corresponds to their common interpretation, supporting its validity and reliability.

From an inter-code perspective, the roles of Active Independent and Defender of the Faith have the highest scoring words, meaning they have words that were used, and coded, mostly only in the context of those roles. On the other side of the spectrum, the roles of Independent, Regional Protector, Bridge, and Regional Leader have the lowest scoring words. They have words that were spoken few times in each one of them, and, at the same time, were coded under distinct roles. For example, the words “Bridge” or

“Bridges” appeared 4 times in total in the coded passages belonging to the Bridge role conception. However, their importance diminished as they also were coded 4 separate times too under other roles. Revisiting the word “Crucially,” the highest scoring for the Independent Role, it was only uttered twice under this role, and just one more time under the Active Independent role by the same country and leader: Cristina Fernández, former president of Argentina. The remaining role conceptions have words whose scores are between those extremes. Though they were used in different roles, they were repeated more times in a given one. This situation makes them stand out from the rest. A closer examination of the composition of each role reveals that few words rank high between any two roles. Therefore, although there is some overlapping among some roles, overall the qualitative coding procedure was done in such a manner to portray exclusively the nature of each role.

Furthermore, a second strategy was running the *Pearson Correlation* on the contents of the 16 roles found, to further test how similar or different they were. This correlation was based on the relative frequency of the words contained in all passages coded under different roles. Table 7 shows that most of the 120 pairwise correlations fall under the categories “very weak” or “weak.” In total, 90 (75 percent) pairings belong to these two, with the former amounting to 25 (20.8 percent) of the correlations, while the latter to 65 (54.2 percent). A little more than a quarter of the correlations are moderate, while only two are strong (1.6 percent), both involving the Active Independent role conception. On the one hand, as explained above, this role conception includes several themes, which could be addressed with words closely related to those used in the Defender of the Faith (this is the highest correlation). On the other hand, seemingly contradictory roles at first, the Active Independent and the Internal Development have a strong correlation too. Indeed, while the active part of the former implies a broad foreign policy agenda, the internal part of the latter describes an inward-oriented attitude. However, both share the focus on acting according their own interests, without being entangled in complex power politics in the international system (the independent part of the former, and the development part of the latter). These similarities explain their correlation. Finally, these findings run in the same direction as the *tf-idf* results. Overall, each role has its own topics, confirming their exclusive orientation and nature.

	A.I.	A.I.A.	B.R.L.	B.	D.F.	D.	E.	A.	I.	I.D.	L.S.	M.I.	R.L.	R.P.	R.S.C.	R.
A.I.	1.00															
A.I.A.	0.39	1.00														
B.R.L.	0.36	0.46	1.00													
B.	0.31	0.20	0.16	1.00												
D.F.	0.71	0.41	0.51	0.24	1.00											
D.	0.55	0.30	0.34	0.23	0.47	1.00										
E.	0.52	0.36	0.38	0.26	0.55	0.48	1.00									
A.	0.40	0.26	0.40	0.16	0.37	0.35	0.29	1.00								
I.	0.26	0.13	0.11	0.09	0.21	0.15	0.15	0.13	1.00							
I.D.	0.61	0.31	0.36	0.22	0.57	0.46	0.50	0.36	0.25	1.00						
L.S.	0.21	0.11	0.27	0.08	0.21	0.15	0.19	0.27	0.10	0.22	1.00					
M.I.	0.46	0.20	0.33	0.25	0.43	0.33	0.35	0.41	0.16	0.44	0.32	1.00				
R.L.	0.42	0.21	0.24	0.20	0.34	0.30	0.34	0.35	0.12	0.33	0.16	0.40	1.00			
R.P.	0.25	0.12	0.26	0.13	0.31	0.22	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.27	0.12	0.47	0.33	1.00		
R.S.C.	0.59	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.54	0.52	0.50	0.37	0.18	0.42	0.15	0.45	0.49	0.33	1.00	
R.	0.38	0.28	0.41	0.19	0.38	0.37	0.36	0.33	0.22	0.39	0.21	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.27	1.00

A.I.: Active Independent. A.I.A.: Anti-Imperialist Agent. B.R.L.: Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator. B.: Bridge. D.F.: Defender of the Faith. D.: Developer. E.: Example. A.: Faithful Ally. I.: Independent. I.D.: Internal Development. L.S.: Liberation Supporter. M.I.: Mediator-Integrator. R.L.: Regional Leader. R.P.: Regional Protector. R.S.C.: Regional Subsystem Collaborator. R.: Rival.  $p < 0.01$  for all correlations.

**Table 7: Roles' Contents Pearson Correlation**  
Source: Own Elaboration.

## 2.4 The Leaders and their Role Conceptions

It is important to note that the earlier attribution of roles to the states under analysis did not consider variations in their conception, though the analysis spans for 26 years. This omission overstates the presence of the auxiliary roles in each state's role set, as well as disregards the variability of the roles' contents throughout the years given the fact that changes in the international system as well as in the domestic setting from where they were conceived could affect these conceptions.

To address this issue, the coded passages, in all their length, were grouped by president, following the periodization presented in table 3.2. From this perspective, all roles conceived by the states have different frequencies. While some transcended several governments, others were communicated few times. Besides, some governments conceived a limited number of roles. In contrast, others saw their functions in the international system expanding along their ruling.

Along the period under analysis, the 8 states conceived on average 4.14 roles per year. While the South American states had an average slightly lower, with 3.88 roles per year, the extra-regional powers had it slightly higher, with 4.92. From a different perspective



on the data collected from the speeches, the 8 states conceived their roles, on average, for 9.45 years. South American states showed less consistency on the conception of their roles than the extra-regional powers. The former had an average of 9.3 years, and the latter 9.9 years.

Argentina was below the average of the region regarding the number of roles conceived per year: Buenos Aires reflected upon 3.58 roles. The duration of those roles, however, was the same as the regional mean: 9.3 years. Its distribution of roles, as presented in table 8, shows each government's priorities, and which roles transcended governments. It consistently conceived the role of Active Independent, spanning along 25 out the 26 years under analysis. Following it, the role of Defender of the Faith was conceived in 21 different years, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator in 14 years, Liberation Supporter in 11, and Example in 8 years. Other roles were conceived few times, ranging between 2 and 4 years, corresponding to particular governments, while others were not conceived at all.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Menem										De la Rúa		Duhalde	Kirchner				Fernández									
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator																											0
Regional Leader																											2
Regional Protector																											0
Active Independent																											25
Liberation Supporter																											11
Anti-Imperialist Agent																											0
Defender of the Faith																											21
Mediator-Integrator																											4
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																											14
Developer																											3
Bridge																											0
Faithful Ally																											2
Independent																											3
Example																											8
Internal Development																											0
Rival																											0
Roles per Year	5	4	4	3	5	5	3	5	4	5	3	2	3	4	3	2	3	4	1	4	5	3	5	2	3	3	

**Table 8:** Argentina's Role Conceptions per Government

Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column).

The government of Carlos Menem, which lasted for 10 years, was the most active in conceiving roles, with an average of 4.3 roles per year. Moreover, his government conceived three roles that were not present in his successors' speeches: Regional Leader, Developer, and Faithful Ally. This average fell in the following governments of De la Rúa and Duhalde, amidst the economic and financial crisis Argentina endured at the turn of the century. The former conceived, during the 2 years of his government, 2.5 roles, and the latter conceived 3 different roles during his only year in office. Néstor Kirchner conceived 3.2 roles, and Cristina Fernández 3.3 roles.

Argentina's presidents conceived the following auxiliary roles for the 1990-2015 period, presented in set notation. The subscripts represent the number of years in power of the presidents and the number of years each role was conceived, while the superscripts symbolize the orientation of the role conceptions. The letter "a" stands for Anti-Core, "p" for Pro-Core, and "n" being Neutral. This notation is used in every case below.

$\text{Menem}_{10} = \{\text{Active Independent}_{10}^{(n)}, \text{Regional Subsystem Collaborator}_{10}^{(n)}, \text{Defender of the Faith}_{9}^{(p)}, \text{Mediator-Integrator}_{3}^{(n)}, \text{Developer}_{3}^{(n)}, \text{Example}_{3}^{(n)}, \text{Regional Leader}_{2}^{(n)}, \text{Faithful Ally}_{2}^{(p)}, \text{Liberation Supporter}_{1}^{(n)}\},$

$\text{De la Rúa}_2 = \{\text{Defender of the Faith}_{2}^{(p)}, \text{Active Independent}_{1}^{(n)}, \text{Liberation Supporter}_{1}^{(n)}, \text{Regional Subsystem Collaborator}_{1}^{(n)}\},$

$\text{Duhalde}_1 = \{\text{Active Independent}_{1}^{(n)}, \text{Liberation Supporter}_{1}^{(n)}, \text{Defender of the Faith}_{1}^{(a)}\},$

$\text{Kirchner}_5 = \{\text{Active Independent}_{5}^{(a)}, \text{Defender of the Faith}_{5}^{(a)}, \text{Liberation Supporter}_{2}^{(n)}, \text{Regional Subsystem Collaborator}_{2}^{(n)}, \text{Independent}_{1}^{(n)}, \text{Example}_{1}^{(n)}\},$

$\text{Fernández}_8 = \{\text{Active Independent}_{8}^{(a)}, \text{Liberation Supporter}_{6}^{(n)}, \text{Defender of the Faith}_{4}^{(a)}, \text{Example}_{4}^{(n)}, \text{Independent}_{2}^{(n)}, \text{Mediator-Integrator}_{1}^{(n)}, \text{Regional Subsystem Collaborator}_{1}^{(n)}\}.$

Brazil conceived 5.15 roles per year, on average, and the duration of each role was of 10.3 years, scoring higher than the region. Table 9 shows each government's role conceptions. The Active Independent role was conceived by every government. The only year it was not conceived was in 1999, by president Cardoso. Following it, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator was also conceived by the five different governments that were in power during the period under analysis. This role was conceived in 20 different years. Close to it, the Defender of the Faith role was conceived in 18 different years. The first auxiliary role not conceived by all governments was the Regional Leader. President Collor did not have it in his role set, while president Rousseff only had it in her first year in office. Overall, this role was conceived in 15 different years. Following them, in descendant order, were the Liberation Supporter, Example, Developer, Mediator-Integrator, Faithful Ally, Bridge, Internal Development, Regional Protector, and Rival.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Collor				Franco				Cardoso				Lula				Rousseff										
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator																											0
Regional Leader																											15
Regional Protector																											1
Active Independent																											25
Liberation Supporter																											13
Anti-Imperialist Agent																											0
Defender of the Faith																											18
Mediator-Integrator																											9
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																											20
Developer																											10
Bridge																											3
Faithful Ally																											6
Independent																											0
Example																											11
Internal Development																											2
Rival																											1
Roles per Year	4	7	3	4	6	5	5	4	5	4	4	5	5	7	5	8	6	5	3	4	8	5	6	5	5	6	

**Table 9:** Brazil's Role Conceptions per Government

Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column).

President Lula had the highest average of role conceptions among Brazilian leaders, with 5.8 roles per year. Presidents Rousseff, with 5.4 roles per year, Franco, with 5 roles during his two-year term, Collor, with 4.7 roles, and Cardoso, with 4.6 roles followed him.

Overall, Brazil's governments had the following auxiliary roles in their role sets:<sup>25</sup>

$Collor_3 = \{Active\ Independent_3^{(a)},\ Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_3^{(n)},\ Liberation\ Supporter_2^{(n)},\ Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_2^{(a)},\ Mediator-Integrator_1^{(n)},\ Faithful\ Ally_1^{(p)},\ Example_1^{(n)},\ Internal\ Development_1^{(n)}\},$

$Franco_2 = \{Active\ Independent_2^{(a)},\ Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_2^{(a)},\ Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_2^{(n)},\ Regional\ Leader_1^{(a)},\ Faithful\ Ally_1^{(a)},\ Example_1^{(n)},\ Internal\ Development_1^{(n)}\},$

$Cardoso_8 = \{Regional\ Leader_7^{(a)},\ Active\ Independent_7^{(a)},\ Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_7^{(n)},\ Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_5^{(a)},\ Liberation\ Supporter_3^{(n)},\ Mediator-Integrator_3^{(n)},\ Example_2^{(n)},\ Regional\ Protector_1^{(n)},\ Developer_1^{(n)},\ Bridge_1^{(n)}\},$

$Lula_8 = \{Active\ Independent_8^{(a)},\ Regional\ Leader_6^{(a)},\ Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_6^{(n)},\ Developer_6^{(n)},\ Mediator-Integrator_5^{(n)},\ Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_4^{(a)},\ Example_4^{(n)},\ Liberation\ Supporter_3^{(n)},\ Faithful\ Ally_3^{(n)},\ Bridge_1^{(n)}\},$

<sup>25</sup> President Lula conceived the Faithful Ally role in three different years. In two of them expressed the importance of Brazil's relationship with Argentina. In the remaining one, condemned the US embargo on Cuba. Due to this distribution, the role conception was coded as being Neutral.

$Rousseff_5 = \{Active\ Independent_5^{(a)}, Liberation\ Supporter_5^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_5^{(a)}, Developer_3^{(n)}, Example_3^{(n)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_2^{(n)}, Regional\ Leader_1^{(a)}, Bridge_1^{(n)}, Faithful\ Ally_1^{(a)}, Rival_1^{(a)}\}.$

Chile had an average of 3.9 role conceptions per year, and their duration averaged 11.3 years. Both figures are above the regional means. The Active Independent role was consistently conceived throughout the different governments, as shown in Table 10. The Defender of the Faith role also ranked high in Chile's role set, being present in 25 out of the 26 years under analysis. With a considerable distance, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator was conceived in 16 different years, the Developer, and the Faithful Ally roles in 9 different years, while the Liberation Supporter and the Example roles were present in 6 different years. Finally, the Mediator-Integrator was part of their role set for 4 years, and the Regional Leader was conceived one time.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Aylwin				Frei				Lagos				Bachelet				Piñera				Bachelet						
Basion of the Revolution-Liberator																											0
Regional Leader																											1
Regional Protector																											0
Active Independent																											26
Liberation Supporter																											6
Anti-Imperialist Agent																											0
Defender of the Faith																											25
Mediator-Integrator																											4
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																											16
Developer																											9
Bridge																											0
Faithful Ally																											9
Independent																											0
Example																											6
Internal Development																											0
Rival																											0
Roles per Year	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	3	2	5	2	3	3	5	2	3	6	7	6	6	4	

**Table 10:** Chile's Role Conceptions per Government  
Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column).

President Piñera had an average of 5.5 role conceptions per year, followed by president Bachelet (second term) with 5 roles per year. President Aylwin conceived on average 3.8 different roles, president Frei 3.7, and president Lagos and president Bachelet (first term) both with an average of 3.3 roles per year.

Chile's leaders conceived these auxiliary roles as follows:<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> President Bachelet's auxiliary roles set comprises her first term and the first two years of her second one.

Aylwin<sub>4</sub> = {Active Independent<sub>4</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Defender of the Faith<sub>4</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Regional Subsystem Collaborator<sub>4</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Faithful Ally<sub>2</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Developer<sub>1</sub><sup>(n)</sup>},

Frei<sub>6</sub> = {Active Independent<sub>6</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Defender of the Faith<sub>5</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Regional Subsystem Collaborator<sub>4</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Mediator-Integrator<sub>2</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Faithful Ally<sub>2</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Example<sub>2</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Developer<sub>1</sub><sup>(n)</sup>},

Lagos<sub>6</sub> = {Active Independent<sub>6</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Defender of the Faith<sub>6</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Liberation Supporter<sub>3</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Regional Subsystem Collaborator<sub>3</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Developer<sub>1</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Example<sub>1</sub><sup>(p)</sup>},

Bachelet<sub>6</sub> = {Active Independent<sub>6</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Defender of the Faith<sub>6</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Developer<sub>5</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Regional Subsystem Collaborator<sub>2</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Faithful Ally<sub>2</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Regional Leader<sub>1</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Example<sub>1</sub><sup>(p)</sup>},

Piñera<sub>4</sub> = {Active Independent<sub>4</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Defender of the Faith<sub>4</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Liberation Supporter<sub>3</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Regional Subsystem Collaborator<sub>3</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Faithful Ally<sub>3</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Mediator-Integrator<sub>2</sub><sup>(n)</sup>, Example<sub>2</sub><sup>(p)</sup>, Developer<sub>1</sub><sup>(n)</sup>}.

Despite being identified as having a primary master role, Colombia's averages are below the regional mean. Regarding the number of roles per year, Bogotá conceived 3.8 roles, while their duration was 8.9 years per role. The most consistent role was the Active Independent, which was conceived in 20 different years. Following it, with 17 years, was the Defender of the Faith role conception, and the Internal Development with 15 years. Table 11 shows these dynamics. The Example role was present in 9 different years, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator in 8 years, the Faithful Ally in 4, Developer in 3, and the Regional Leader and the Mediator-Integrator roles in 2 occasions.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Gaviria				Samper				Pastrana				Uribe				Santos										
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator																											0
Regional Leader																											2
Regional Protector																											0
Active Independent																											20
Liberation Supporter																											0
Anti-Imperialist Agent																											0
Defender of the Faith																											17
Mediator-Integrator																											2
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																											8
Developer																											3
Bridge																											0
Faithful Ally																											4
Independent																											0
Example																											9
Internal Development																											15
Rival																											0
Roles per Year	2	5	4	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	4	2	2	3	4	4	2	1	1	5	6	5	5	4	4	2	

**Table 11:** Colombia's Role Conceptions per Government  
Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column).

The most active leader was president Santos, with an average of 4.3 roles per year, followed by Gaviria with 3.5 roles. President Uribe conceived, on average, 2.8 roles per

year. Both presidents, Samper and Pastrana, conceived 2.3 roles per year. The composition of their role sets is as follows:

$Gaviria_4 = \{Active\ Independent_4^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_3^{(p)}, Faithful\ Ally_2^{(p)}, Example_2^{(p)}, Internal\ Development_2^{(n)}, Mediator-Integrator_1^{(n)}\}$ ,

$Samper_4 = \{Active\ Independent_4^{(a)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_2^{(a)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_2^{(n)}, Faithful\ Ally_1^{(p)}\}$ ,

$Pastrana_4 = \{Internal\ Development_4^{(n)}, Active\ Independent_2^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_2^{(p)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_1^{(n)}\}$ ,

$Uribe_8 = \{Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_7^{(p)}, Internal\ Development_7^{(n)}, Active\ Independent_4^{(n)}, Example_3^{(p)}, Faithful\ Ally_1^{(p)}\}$ ,

$Santos_6 = \{Active\ Independent_6^{(a)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_5^{(n)}, Example_4^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_3^{(p)}, Developer_3^{(n)}, Regional\ Leader_2^{(n)}, Internal\ Development_2^{(n)}, Mediator-Integrator_1^{(n)}\}$ .

Peru has the lowest average of role conceptions per year of the region. Each president conceived only 2.5 roles, and in four different years, 1990, 1993, 1999 and 2000, no role was identified in the UNGA speeches. Concomitantly, the duration of the role conceptions is also below the regional average, lasting only 5.8 years. The Active Independent and Regional Subsystem Collaborator roles were the most prominent, being conceived in 17 different years, followed by the Defender of the Faith, conceived in 14 different years. An important gap separates this set of roles from the rest, as shown in Table 12. The Liberation Supporter was present in 4 years, Faithful Ally, and Internal Development roles, both part of Peru's role set in three different years, Example in two, and a handful of roles conceived only once: Regional Leader, Mediator-Integrator, Developer, and Bridge.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Fujimori											Toledo					García					Humala					
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator																										0	
Regional Leader																										1	
Regional Protector																										0	
Active Independent																						17					
Liberation Supporter																										4	
Anti-Imperialist Agent																										0	
Defender of the Faith																						14					
Mediator-Integrator																						1					
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																					17						
Developer																										1	
Bridge																										1	
Faithful Ally																										3	
Independent																										0	
Example																										2	
Internal Development																				3							
Rival																										0	
Roles per Year	0	3	3	0	3	3	1	3	2	0	0	2	4	3	2	3	2	3	1	1	4	3	6	2	6	4	

**Table 12:** Peru's Role Conceptions per Government  
Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column).

President Humala was the most active in this regard, conceiving on average 4.2 roles per year. Presidents Tole, with 2.8 roles per year, García, with 2.2 roles, and Fujimori, with only 1.6 roles followed him. Their different role sets are as follows:

Fujimori<sub>11</sub> = {*Active Independent*<sub>5<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Regional Subsystem Collaborator*<sub>5<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Defender of the Faith*<sub>4<sup>(p)</sup></sub>, *Internal Development*<sub>3<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Faithful Ally*<sub>1<sup>(n)</sup></sub>},

Toledo<sub>5</sub> = {*Defender of the Faith*<sub>5<sup>(p)</sup></sub>, *Active Independent*<sub>4<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Regional Subsystem Collaborator*<sub>4<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Regional Leader*<sub>1<sup>(n)</sup></sub>},

García<sub>5</sub> = {*Regional Subsystem Collaborator*<sub>4<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Active Independent*<sub>3<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Defender of the Faith*<sub>2<sup>(p)</sup></sub>, *Developer*<sub>1<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Example*<sub>1<sup>(p)</sup></sub>},

Humala<sub>5</sub> = {*Active Independent*<sub>5<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Liberation Supporter*<sub>4<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Regional Subsystem Collaborator*<sub>4<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Defender of the Faith*<sub>3<sup>(p)</sup></sub>, *Faithful Ally*<sub>2<sup>(a)</sup></sub>, *Mediator-Integrator*<sub>1<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Bridge*<sub>1<sup>(n)</sup></sub>, *Example*<sub>1<sup>(p)</sup></sub>},

Venezuela's averages, on both the measures, roles per year and years per role, are above the regional means. On the former, it conceived 5.08 roles per year, while their duration was of 10.2 years. As shown in Table 13, the Active Independent role was conceived the most, followed by the Defender of the Faith. The former was present in 22 different years, while the latter in 18. The Bastion of the Revolution was conceived in 16 years, the Anti-Imperialist Agent in 15, Regional Subsystem Collaborator in 14, Faithful Ally in 12, and the Rival in 10. The Developer was part of Venezuela's role set in 8 years, the Liberation Supporter role in 7, Example in 4, Internal Development in three, Mediator-Integrator in two, and the Regional Leader in one.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Pérez		Velasquez			Caldera										Chávez										Maduro	
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator																											16
Regional Leader																											1
Regional Protector																											0
Active Independent																											22
Liberation Supporter																											7
Anti-Imperialist Agent																											15
Defender of the Faith																											18
Mediator-Integrator																											2
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																											14
Developer																											8
Bridge																											0
Faithful Ally																											12
Independent																											0
Example																											4
Internal Development																											3
Rival																											10
Roles per Year	5	5	3	3	4	6	3	2	2	2	2	5	4	3	5	5	6	6	6	6	9	8	9	7	8	8	

**Table 13:** Venezuela's Role Conceptions per Government  
Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column).

President Maduro had the highest average of roles per year, with 7.7 role conceptions, followed by its antecessor, president Chávez, with 5.4 roles. President Pérez conceived on average 4.3 roles, president Caldera 3.4. Finally, president Velásquez, in his only year in office, conceived 3 roles. Their role sets are as follows:

$Pérez_3 = \{Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_3^{(p)}, Active\ Independent_2^{(a)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_2^{(n)}, Faithful\ Ally_2^{(p)}, Liberation\ Supporter_1^{(n)}, Anti-Imperialist\ Agent_1^{(a)}, Mediator-Integrator_1^{(n)}, Developer_1^{(n)}\}$ ,

$Velásquez_1 = \{Active\ Independent_1^{(a)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_1^{(p)}, Internal\ Development_1^{(n)}\}$ ,

$Caldera_5 = \{Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_4^{(p)}, Active\ Independent_3^{(a)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_3^{(n)}, Bastion\ of\ the\ Revolution-Liberator_2^{(p)}, Faithful\ Ally_2^{(n)}, Internal\ Development_2^{(n)}, Mediator-Integrator_1^{(n)}\}$ ,

$Chávez_{14} = \{Active\ Independent_{13}^{(a)}, Bastion\ of\ the\ Revolution-Liberator_{11}^{(a)}, Anti-Imperialist\ Agent_{11}^{(a)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_8^{(a)}, Rival_7^{(a)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_6^{(a)}, Developer_6^{(a)}, Faithful\ Ally_6^{(a)}, Liberation\ Supporter_4^{(n)}, Example_3^{(a)}, Regional\ Leader_1^{(a)}\}$ ,

$Maduro_3 = \{Bastion\ of\ the\ Revolution-Liberator_3^{(a)}, Active\ Independent_3^{(a)}, Anti-Imperialist\ Agent_3^{(a)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_3^{(a)}, Rival_3^{(a)}, Liberation\ Supporter_2^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_2^{(a)}, Faithful\ Ally_2^{(a)}, Developer_1^{(a)}, Example_1^{(a)}\}$ .

As said above, the extra-regional powers have averages slightly higher than the South American means. The United States conceived 4.9 roles per year, as well as China. Moreover, the former's roles lasted, on average, 10.7 years, and the latter's roles 9.1 years. As shown in Table 14, Washington consistently conceived the Defender of the Faith role throughout the whole period under analysis. It was followed by the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator role, which was conceived in 20 different years. The role of Rival was part of its role set in 18 occasions, the Developer in 17 years, the Mediator-Integrator in 13, and the Faithful Ally in 12. The Liberation Supporter was conceived in 6 years, the Regional Protector in 5, the Regional Leader and Regional Subsystem Collaborator roles both in 4 different years, the Example in two, and the Bridge only once.



Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Bush Sr.					Clinton					Bush Jr.					Obama											
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator																											20
Regional Leader																											4
Regional Protector																											5
Active Independent																											0
Liberation Supporter																											6
Anti-Imperialist Agent																											0
Defender of the Faith																											26
Mediator-Integrator																											13
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																											4
Developer																											17
Bridge																											1
Faithful Ally																											12
Independent																											0
Example																											2
Internal Development																											0
Rival																											18
Roles per Year	4	5	2	5	4	6	3	2	3	3	3	4	6	5	5	4	6	5	4	8	7	6	5	10	8	5	

**Table 14:** The United States' Role Conception per Government  
Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column). Bush Sr. stands for George Herbert Walker Bush, and Bush Jr. for George Walker Bush, 41st and 43rd presidents of the US, respectively.

The most active president was Barack Obama, conceiving on average 7 roles per year. He was followed by president George W. Bush, who conceived 4.9 roles per year. His father, George H. W. Bush, conceived 3.7 roles, and the latter's successor, Bill Clinton conceived 3.6 roles. Their role sets are as follows:<sup>27</sup>

$Bush\ Sr._3 = \{Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_3^{(p)}, Bastion\ of\ the\ Revolution-Liberator_2^{(p)}, Faithful\ Ally_2^{(p)}, Rival_2^{(p)}, Regional\ Leader_1^{(p)}, Developer_1^{(p)}\},$

$Clinton_8 = \{Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_8^{(p)}, Bastion\ of\ the\ Revolution-Liberator_5^{(p)}, Developer_4^{(p)}, Rival_4^{(p)}, Mediator-Integrator_2^{(p)}, Faithful\ Ally_2^{(p)}, Regional\ Leader_1^{(p)}, Regional\ Protector_1^{(p)}, Liberation\ Supporter_1^{(p)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_1^{(p)}\},$

$Bush\ Jr._8 = \{Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_8^{(p)}, Bastion\ of\ the\ Revolution-Liberator_7^{(p)}, Developer_7^{(p)}, Rival_5^{(p)}, Mediator-Integrator_4^{(p)}, Liberation-Supporter_3^{(p)}, Faithful\ Ally_3^{(p)}, Regional\ Protector_2^{(p)}\},$

$Obama_7 = \{Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_7^{(p)}, Mediator-Integrator_7^{(p)}, Rival_7^{(p)}, Bastion\ of\ the\ Revolution-Liberator_6^{(p)}, Developer_5^{(p)}, Faithful\ Ally_5^{(p)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_3^{(p)}, Regional\ Leader_2^{(p)}, Regional\ Protector_2^{(p)}, Liberation\ Supporter_2^{(p)}, Example_2^{(p)}, Bridge_1^{(p)}\}.$

<sup>27</sup> By definition, all the role conceptions of the United States fall under the Pro-Core orientation, even those roles deemed as Neutral.

Finally, China conceived the Active Independent role during the 26 years under analysis, as shown in Table 15. It was followed by the (not a) Rival role, in 18 different years, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator in 14, Developer in 13, and Defender of the Faith and Internal Development, both in 11 different years. The role of Mediator-Integrator in 9 years, Liberation Supporter in 8, Example in 6, Regional Protector and Bridge, both in 4 different years. The Independent role was conceived two times, and Regional Leader and Faithful Ally were present in its role set once each.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Years per Role
President	Deng			Jiang										Hu								Xi					
Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator																											0
Regional Leader																											1
Regional Protector																											4
Active Independent																											26
Liberation Supporter																											8
Anti-Imperialist Agent																											0
Defender of the Faith																											11
Mediator-Integrator																											9
Regional Subsystem Collaborator																											14
Developer																											13
Bridge																											4
Faithful Ally																											1
Independent																											2
Example																											6
Internal Development																											11
Rival																											18
Roles per Year	4	4	3	2	3	3	3	4	4	3	4	6	6	6	6	5	8	10	4	4	4	5	8	8	7	4	4

**Table 15:** China's Role Conceptions per Government  
Source: Own elaboration. Each dark block represents the conception of the role (row) in that year (column).

President Hu had an average of 6.4 roles per year, followed by president Xi, with 5. President Jiang conceived 3.8 roles per year, while China, under Deng's leadership, had an average of 3.7 roles. The auxiliary roles within Chinese governments' role sets is as follows:

$Deng_3 = \{Active\ Independent_3^{(a)}, Liberation\ Supporter_2^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_2^{(a)}, Mediator-Integrator_2^{(n)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_1^{(n)}, Internal\ Development_1^{(n)}\}$ ,

$Jiang_{10} = \{Active\ Independent_{10}^{(a)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_6^{(n)}, Rival\ (not\ a)_6^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_5^{(a)}, Internal\ Development_3^{(n)}, Liberation\ Supporter_2^{(n)}, Developer_2^{(n)}, Independent_2^{(n)}, Bridge_1^{(n)}, Example_1^{(a)}\}$ ,

$Hu_{10} = \{Active\ Independent_{10}^{(a)}, Rival\ (not\ a)_{10}^{(n)}, Developer_8^{(n)}, Internal\ Development_7^{(n)}, Regional\ Subsystem\ Collaborator_6^{(n)}, Mediator-Integrator_5^{(n)}, Regional\ Protector_4^{(p)}, Liberation\ Supporter_3^{(n)}, Defender\ of\ the\ Faith_3^{(a)}, Bridge_3^{(n)}, Example_3^{(a)}, Regional\ Leader_1^{(n)}, Faithful\ Ally_1^{(n)}\}$ ,

$Xi_3 = \{\text{Active Independent}_3^{(a)}, \text{Developer}_3^{(n)}, \text{Mediator-Integrator}_2^{(n)}, \text{Example}_2^{(a)}, \text{Rival (not a)}_2^{(n)}, \text{Liberation Supporter}_1^{(n)}, \text{Defender of the Faith}_1^{(a)}, \text{Regional Subsystem Collaborator}_1^{(n)}\}$ .

## 2.5 Conclusions

In sum, analysis of the United Nations General Assembly's speeches reveals differences, as well as continuities, in the role conceptions of the South American countries and the extra-regional powers, both within states and among them. For example, all countries had, on a general count of auxiliary roles in their role sets, more roles than the yearly average of each government. Brazil is a case in point. It conceived 13 out the 16 distinct roles employed in the analysis, though its different governments had an average of 5.15 roles. This difference illustrates changes in the priorities of each government, as they added or subtracted auxiliary roles from their role sets.

Besides, some roles were conceived by all states. The role of Defender of the Faith was conceived by all 38 governments analyzed. The Active Independent role was also conceived by all governments but the ones of the United States. As explained above, being the super power, this role was deemed as not conceivable for Washington, though it might display its contents in other roles. Notwithstanding these similarities, the content of these roles, as shown above, might differ among the governments and states.

From the other side of the spectrum, the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator role was only conceived by Venezuela and the United States, and the Anti-Imperialist Agent only by Caracas. The meanings they attached to the Bastion of the Revolution – Liberator role were vastly different, however. While Caracas filled it with an anti-US stance, Washington oriented it towards getting rid of dictators and bringing about democracy.

Finally, the orientation of the roles in the Anti-Core-Pro-Core continuum also reveals discontinuities and changes in the content of the roles. The most revealing case is Venezuela. During the 1990s, Venezuelan presidents had a general mix of Anti-Core, Pro-Core and Neutral roles. Since the Bolivarian leaders took power at the turn of the century, most roles turned to an Anti-Core stance. To a lesser extent, Argentina followed

this pattern, reorienting its roles to the Anti-Core extreme after its financial crisis of the end of the century.

Overall, this analysis provides a comprehensive picture, though not exhaustive, of the auxiliary roles conceived by each state. Based on these findings, the next chapter will focus on how these roles interlock with each other and which are the key role relations, and their underlying dynamics, between the South American states and the extra-regional powers.

### 3 Role Relationships

Based on the findings presented in the previous chapter, the analysis turns to the role relationships between or among the South American states, China, and the United States. A good place to begin with is portraying the connections between states and roles. Social Network Analysis, again, provides the necessary tools to perform this task with a different starting point from that of chapter 2, however. Since states and roles are different, the former considered as agents while the latter as social constructions, a different kind of network had to be constructed to account for these differing qualities.

Precisely, this type of network is a two-mode network. The data from the last chapter involve “ties between two different set of agents,” (Lazer, 2011, p. 64), or vertices: states and auxiliary roles. A two-mode network fits these data because it has two set of vertices, with edges (or arcs) beginning in one vertex of one set and ending in another vertex of the remaining set, while no links exist within sets. Usually, two-mode networks “are the focus, for instance, in the study of interlocking directorates or *belief systems*” (Brandes, 2016, p. 3, emphasis added), being the latter strongly connected to the leitmotif of this dissertation.

Without the intention of being comprehensive, as examples, in International Relations data from states and their membership in International Governmental Organizations (IGO) has been used to explain China’s increased participation in international organizations (Xiaojun Li, 2010), the connection between membership in IGO and militarized disputes (Kinne, 2013), the effects of political globalization on the world polity (Beckfield, 2010), or as part of more comprehensive explanations of the international system (Maoz, 2011). From a foreign policy perspective, other researchers used an approach similar to the interlocking directorates to explain the continuity in the United States’ grand strategy since the end of the Cold War by looking at how key officials were affiliated to policy-planning institutions (van Apeldoorn & de Graaff, 2014). In all, these accounts used the two-mode networks as a proper path to derive insights in their area of inquiry.

Therefore, in this research, as said, the two-mode network is derived from a  $N \times M$  matrix, where  $N$  is the set of Presidents and  $M$  the auxiliary roles, and each entry is the

number of years each President conceived a given role. Presidents were chosen as vertices over states in those networks for two main reasons: simplicity and comprehensiveness. The period under analysis, as a reminder, spans across 26 years. Instead of building 78 different networks (26 times 3 orientations) to capture the dynamics of the role-state relationships, the Presidents as vertices encapsulate the time they served as leaders of their respective state. Moreover, they reflect, by their presence or absence in each network changes on role conceptions within their states in just three networks, each standing for the direction (or content) of each role: Pro-Core, Anti-Core, or Neutral. Additionally, auxiliary roles are considered as events to which the other set of vertices, the Presidents, decide to affiliate by conceiving them.

Figures 63-65 show these networks. In those figures, the boxes symbolize the roles, while the ellipses Presidents. The size of each vertex stands for their weighted degree (i.e. the sum of the number of years the role was conceived, or the sum of years per role a President conceived all of them within that orientation).<sup>28</sup> Isolates (i.e. roles that were not conceived or Presidents that did not conceived any role in the specified direction) were removed from the figures.

A close inspection of these graphs reveals interesting patterns. Overall, the Neutral Roles-Presidents network, in Figure 65 is the busiest of the three, having 33 out of 37 Presidents conceiving at least one role with this orientation (none of the Presidents of the United States was coded in this category), and 13 out of 16 roles present in the UNGA speeches. The Pro-Core network, in Figure 63, follows with 25 Presidents and 12 roles, and the Anti-Core network, in Figure 64, is the least populated because it has 20 Presidents and 10 roles.

Within this distribution of Presidents and roles, 6 roles appear across the three networks, showing the richness and complexity of their contents: Developer, Example, Faithful Ally, Regional Leader, Regional Subsystem Collaborator, and Rival. At the other end of this continuum, three roles belong to just one network: Independent and Internal

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
<sup>28</sup> The resulting score may exceed the number of years under analysis (26) in which a role could be conceived or exceed the number of years a President was in office. In the former case, the weighted degree sums the number of years all Presidents conceived a given role. Therefore, a common role would have a weighted degree higher than 26. In the latter case, assume that a President lasted in power 4 years and that during all his time in office she conceived two roles within a specific orientation. This situation leads to that President having a weighted degree of 8, doubling the years in office.

Development only displayed a Neutral orientation, and the Anti-Imperialist Agent had exclusively an Anti-Core content. The Pro-Core-Neutral networks have 4 common roles: Bridge, Liberation Supporter, Mediator-Integrator, and Regional Protector, while the Anti-Core-Neutral networks only share one role: Active Independent. The Pro-Core-Anti-Core networks, interestingly, share two roles: Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator and Defender of the Faith.

In the same vein, 8 Presidents are present in all three networks: Collor (Brazil), Samper and Santos (Colombia), Humala (Peru), Pérez, Velásquez, and Caldera (Venezuela), and Hu (China). The remaining Presidents, but the United States' which as explained in the last chapter were only coded under the Pro-Core orientation, appear in 2 different networks. The combination of the Pro-Core and Neutral networks has 13 Presidents in common, while the combination Anti-Core-Neutral networks has 12. In contrast to the presence of shared roles, the Pro-Core-Anti-Core networks do not exclusively share Presidents.

Turning to the individual networks, the Pro-Core Roles-Presidents network, in Figure 63 below, shows that the leading role connecting most of the Presidents (23) is the Defender of the Faith, i.e. it has the highest degree. The Faithful Ally role links 11 different Presidents, which makes it the second most prominent role in this network according to this metric. The third one is the Example, conceived by 9 Presidents.

This ordering changes to some extent if the number of years the Presidents conceived them is considered. That is, if the weighted degree is employed. According to this metric, the first two places stay unaltered. The Defender of the Faith role has a weighted degree of 99 and the Faithful Ally has 23. The third-place changes, however. The Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator role comes close to the second place, with a weighted degree of 22, while the Example role falls to the sixth place, with a weighted degree of 15. Notwithstanding this, it is important to note that the four Presidents of the United States were the ones conceiving the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator, Rival, and Developer roles (places third to fifth, according to the weighted degree—the sole exemption being Caldera conceiving the former role twice).



**Abbildung 63: Pro-Core Roles-Presidents Network.**  
Source: Own elaboration with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014).

Therefore, one preliminary conclusion from these data is that three main roles connect the South American Presidents with the United States: Defender of the Faith, Faithful Ally, and Example. In addition, the only role connecting a Chinese President, President Hu, to his US counterparts is the Regional Protector, which none of the South American Presidents conceived. Therefore, there are no direct links between China and South America in this network (expressed as two-step ties–President-role-President).


From another point of view, which involves the other set of vertices, and excluding the US from this analysis since all its leaders were deliberately coded in this network, only two South American Presidents conceived those three main roles of the network: Gaviria and Uribe from Colombia. Additionally, all Chilean, Colombian, and Peruvian Presidents are present in the Pro-Core network, which shows stability in these conceptions. Argentina and Venezuela display changing relations with the US. Only Presidents in power in the 1990s conceived roles with a Pro-Core orientation: Menem and de la Rúa (Argentina), and Pérez, Velásquez, and Caldera (Venezuela), while their respective successors did not. Finally, Brazil's leadership only appears once in the network (with Collor), as well as China's with President Hu.



The average number of roles (degree) Presidents conceived in this orientation is 1.66. 12 Presidents are above this average: Menem (Argentina), all 5 Chilean Presidents, Gaviria and Uribe (Colombia), García and Humala (Peru), and Pérez and Caldera (Venezuela), while the rest 9 only conceived one role. The highest scoring Presidents according to the weighted degree are Menem and Uribe, both with 11, while the average for all Presidents is 4.9 years-role. Following them are Frei, Lagos, and Bachelet (Chile), and Gaviria (Colombia), all with a score of 7. At the other side of the spectrum, Collor (Brazil), Samper (Colombia), and Velásquez (Venezuela) only conceived one Pro-Core role once.

On an aggregate level, then, Chile, Colombia, and Peru are closer to the United States than the rest of the states in South America because all their leaders conceived roles with a Pro-Core orientation. Within them, Chile has the highest weighted degree average, scoring 6.6, Colombia follows with 4.8, and Peru has an average of 4. Coincidentally, Venezuela has the same average as Peru, but as stated, Caracas only conceived these roles before Chávez came into office in 1999. Lastly, Argentina has a high weighted degree average (6.5), driven by Menem's conceptions throughout the 1990s.

The Anti-Core roles-Presidents network, in Figure 64, shows that two main roles connect most of the Presidents: Active Independent and Defender of the Faith. The former links 18 Presidents, while the latter 15. The remaining roles have lower degrees, of which the Example, Faithful Ally, and Regional Leader roles have a degree of 5. The weighted degree also underscores the prominence of the Active Independent and Defender of the Faith roles in the Anti-Core network. The former has a weighted degree of 96 and the latter of 51. They distance themselves from their followers, among which the Regional Leader, Anti-Imperialist Agent, and Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator roles have weighted degrees of 16, 15, and 14, respectively.



**Figure 64:** Anti-Core Roles-Presidents Network.  
Source: Own elaboration with Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2014).

It is also clear from the figure that Presidents Chávez and Maduro (Venezuela) are particularly important in this network. On the one hand, Venezuela has ties to all roles in the network. Late President Chávez has a degree of 10, which means that he conceived, during his tenure, all the Anti-Core roles coded from the UNGA speeches. His successor, Maduro, has a degree of 9, lacking the conception of the Regional Leader. Both Venezuelan Presidents are above the average degree for all Presidents (3), while only two more Presidents are above it: Rousseff (5) and Franco (4), from Brazil. On the other hand, Venezuelan Presidents also have the highest weighted degree within their set of vertices. Chávez have 72 and Maduro 21. Cardoso (19) and Lula (18) follow them.

Additionally, all Chinese leaders are present in the network. While leader Deng is connected to the most prominent roles in the network, his successors added to China's role set the role of Example. On average, China has a weighted degree of 10.8, slightly less than the average for all 20 Presidents present in the network (12.1). However, if President Chávez is excluded from the network, the average for Presidents fall to 8.9,

placing the PRC above it. Finally, all South American Presidents, but Humala (Peru), have direct ties to their Chinese counterparts.

Complementing the Pro-Core network, Argentina's Presidents, from 2002 onwards, conceived Anti-Core roles. Additionally, all Brazilian and Venezuelan leaders are present in the network, while Chile is completely absent. As for Colombia and Peru, the former has two Presidents figuring in this network, Samper and Santos, while the latter only one, Humala.

In sum, as the Pro-Core network, the Anti-Core network has also roles that are central to it: Active Independent and the Defender of the Faith roles play a key part binding most of the network. Besides Venezuela, Brazil has an important presence in the network too, reflected in its overall score from the two centrality measures: its average is 3.4 roles (degree) and 12.2 years-role (weighted degree).

The last network features roles whose content reflected a Neutral orientation, presented in Figure 65. Though it has more vertices than the other two networks, some of them are more relevant for its structure. On the one hand, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator leads the roles' corresponding set. It connects 27 (degree) out of 33 Presidents present in the network. The Liberation Supporter role follows it, linking 19 (degree) Presidents. Three roles have the same degree (15) and occupy the third place: Active Independent, Developer, and Mediator-Integrator. All of them are above the average degree for the roles, which is 11.2.

Regarding the weighted degree, the Regional Subsystem Collaborator more than triples the roles' average. While this role has a score of 94, the average for all roles is 29.9. Its followers are the Active Independent, with a score of 65, the Liberation Supporter (49), Developer (40), and Internal Development (34).



the same when the weighted degree is used. Only Argentina and Peru switch places between them.

The structure of these networks, based on the individual decisions of each President, reveals several possibilities for role conflict to happen. The general view on role conflict was formalized in equation 13. This equation states that if an element of the role set ought to be enacted, then another element of the role ought not to be enacted. From this idea and the conception of roles, two different conflicts ensue: Intrarole conflict or interrole conflict. On the one hand, the enactment of a given role could not correspond to its conception. That is, the foreign policy options chosen by a leader could run contrary to orientation of the role. On the other hand, as equation 14 shows, role conflict can occur when the performance of one role with *one alter* impedes its enactment with *another one*, that is the role ought to be exclusively performed with one alter. Among the roles conceived by all states, only one role fits this description because it is present in the Pro-Core and Anti-Core networks: Defender of the Faith. The other role that is present in these two networks is the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator. Only two states conceived it: Venezuela and the United States, however. The dynamics involving this role, then, lack a third party to cause role conflict as stated in equation 14. Additionally, other roles that are in either of these networks are also in the Neutral network, which indicates a non-confrontational stance, at least regarding the United States. Therefore, with the conception and enactment of these roles, role conflict would seldom happen. Conversely, all states conceived the Defender of the Faith role and, within them, by all leaders. Moreover, the United States and China are in different networks, creating the environment conducive to a dichotomy for the South American leaders as to which “faith” they should adhere.

Additionally, the Defender of the Faith role is a broad role, as explained above, encompassing the leader’s overall stance on the international order. In this regard, it has both a normative and a pragmatic side. The former implies a valuation of the state of affairs in the international system, of the distribution of power, of the norms and ideas currently flowing in the international society, and of the place his state occupies in the system. The latter informs these assessments, supplying the necessary tools to make judgements on the direction his state’s foreign policy should follow to help bring about the desirable outcomes for the system as a whole. In this sense, this role lays the foundations to understand the general foreign policy of the states under analysis.

The following sections, then, analyze the role relationships derived from the way leaders conceived their states' roles. This analysis will consider both the conception and the foreign policy options associated to these roles, i.e., their enactment. This strategy follows the advice to include several indicators to grasp a state's foreign policy orientation, because "when words are backed up by deeds, rhetoric becomes more credible" (Chan et al., 2019, p. 7).

### 3.1 Different Faiths, Different Roles

The United States conceived the Defender of the Faith role across all the period under analysis. Other accounts, coming from role theory, realist, and liberal perspectives corroborate the presence of this role in Washington's role set. For example, Le Prestre, analyzing the national role conceptions of the U.S. from 1989 to 1993, concluded that the role of Tribune increased its salience from George H. W. Bush's incumbency to Bill Clinton's first year in office (1997b, p. 82). Due to its functions in the international system, promoting democracy, freedom, human rights, and American values and ideals (Le Prestre, 1997b, p. 69), the Tribune role is very much alike to the Defender of the Faith, as defined in this research.

In his study from a role theory perspective, Maull argues that the foreign policies of Bill Clinton, all the way through to Barack Obama have shared more common traits than being radically different from one another. Moreover, he contends that "the three most recent US administrations operated *within* one US foreign policy role conception, rather than pursuing *different* role conceptions" (Maull, 2011, p. 167, emphasis in the original). To support this argument, he claims that this role conception is that of a Hegemon (which can be used interchangeably with leadership), comprising five central themes: 1) exclusive international leadership role; 2) pursuit of US global power and purposes; 3) extending the liberal order, or the "American ideology"; 4) performing pragmatic internationalist policies, meaning that the role has a functional approach, rather than normative; and 5) propensity for military action (Maull, 2011, pp. 170–171). Maull's contention of having just one role conception is contestable. The role of Hegemon is a Master role, as defined in the theoretical chapter, while the central themes he proposed equate to Auxiliary Roles, or even the actual foreign policies sustaining a given role, such

as the fifth theme. As it can be easily seen, Maull's third theme is the expression of the Defender of the Faith role.

Along these lines, van Apeldoorn and de Graaff found continuity in the United States' grand strategy since the end of the Cold War, with minor variations on emphasis across administrations though (2014). They deemed this strategy as following very closely the Open Door imperialism of the end the XIX century. The Open Door strategy comprises also five issues, two of which relate to the Defender of the Faith role: promotion of free markets and a liberal world order, and promoting democracy (van Apeldoorn & de Graaff, 2014, pp. 35–36).

From a different approach, Walt, for example, working within a realist paradigm, claimed that

the United States would use its privilege position to expand a liberal order to every corner of the world, peacefully if possible but if necessary by force. This was the ultimate goal of the Clinton's administration *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, the Bush administration's 'Freedom Agenda', and the Obama administration's fetishizing of US 'global leadership' (Walt, 2018, p. 12).

This quote conveys the idea of conceiving the Defender of the Faith role too. Indeed, defending and promoting the liberal order has been very important since the Reagan administration (Emerson, 2012, p. 630). President George H. W. Bush stated in 1989 that "America stands at the center of a widening circle of freedom—today, tomorrow, and into the next century" (Smith, 2012, The End of the Cold War and a "New World Order", para. 16). Furthermore, Clinton "echoed Woodrow Wilson: Americans must 'organize and lead a long-term Western Strategy' to advance 'democracy'" (LaFeber, 1994, p. 767). Clinton's officials connected the advancement of democracy to economic freedom and to Americans' interests. Indeed, they

pushed hard to encourage these 'emerging' democracies—such as Russia, Poland, Chile, South Africa—to open their markets as rapidly as possible. They believed that states with open economies would benefit from the huge trade and investment flows,

as would the Americans banks and brokerage firms that invested in them, and local democracy would flourish through the exchange (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008, p. 248).

For George W. Bush's team, conversely, the promotion of the liberal order aimed at the creation of domestic institutions abroad commensurable to American democracy. In fact, "ridding the world of the Taliban and even al Qaeda was less important (...) than ridding the Middle East of nondemocratic regimes" (Neack, 2008, p. 149). This led him to embark in the "the largest nation-building exercise since World War II" (Selden, 2004, p. 34).

Portraying the People's Republic of China's faith is more complex than the United States' faith. Some analysts explicitly argue that Beijing, since processes of reform and "opening up" began in the late 1970s, does not have yet framed its foreign policy along distinct ideological lines to be discernable by other states. Indeed, Since Deng's ascension to power, ideologies held by other players do not play an important part in guiding China's foreign policy towards them. (Men, 2009, p. 18; Shih & Huang, 2016, p. 62).

Other authors argue that the overarching worldview is there, albeit not as explicit as it should be. For example, Zhang argues that "one trouble with Chinese foreign policy today is not that it does not have a vision or ideology, but that this vision, still in its inception, is vague, self-centered, and largely defensive" (2013, p. 307). Legro also highlights the vagueness of Chinese foreign policy values, such as peaceful coexistence or the establishment of a new economic and political order (2007, p. 517).

Buzan follows them, arguing that, though a grand strategy has been in place since Deng took power, "unlike the US China projects no ideological preference on the system level, confining that aspect to preserving its own domestic political order" (Barry Buzan, 2014, p. 394), which makes it open for interpretation. China does not propose an "overarching set of values or universal order (...) other than each of its relationships is unique" (Shih & Huang, 2016, p. 65). Even changes in foreign policy rhetoric (e.g., from peaceful rise/development to harmonious world) have "not contained concrete alternative policy prescriptions, nor has it led to a fundamental shift in China's foreign policy direction" (Deng, 2008, p. 53). It can be argued, then, that the overall grand strategy developed in Beijing lacks an ideological component to avoid conflicting expectations from other states on its place in the system.



This is exacerbated by the presence of at least 7 schools of thought on Chinese International Relations, ranging from isolationists to globalists, each addressing some dimension of Chinese identity(ies) and roles in the international system (Shambaugh & Ren, 2012). This has, of course, foreign policy implications. Therefore, some urge China to “signal the outside world as to how it will rise or develop in the future” (He & Walker, 2015, p. 385).

Notwithstanding this, there is an overarching theme across China's foreign policy and the leitmotif of the coding of the Defender of the Faith role conception: The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Gottwald & Duggan, 2011, p. 236; Lu, 2016, p. 344; Men, 2009, p. 19; Noesselt, 2016, p. 108; Shih, 1988, p. 626; Shih & Yin, 2013, p. 70; Wu, 2016, p. 61).

This is congruent with role theory approaches to China's foreign policy. Beylerian and Canivet found 9 distinct role conceptions for China in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. One among them was the “advocate of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation.” After their analysis, they concluded that this role “can be considered the dominant role in the post-Cold War role set” (Beylerian & Canivet, 1997, p. 207). Even if the principles of peaceful coexistence are not coded under a distinct role, the role conceptions of the Chinese leadership “have been molded into Chinese foreign policy through the ‘five principles of peaceful co-existence’” (Michalski & Pan, 2017, p. 617). These underlying principles can be inferred from some of the roles Liu found too: independent, peace lover, developing, cooperator, and great power (Liu, 2014, p. 104).

Zhang provides a sharp contrast between the United States' and China's faith. He argues that,

While America claims the superiority of its ideals about democracy and freedom, China professes respect for and tolerance of all political values and system without putting its own doctrines at the center. While America's sense of mission and self-righteousness induces it to cast foreign policy in moralistic and Manichean terms, China claims to have a foreign policy of peace and accommodation with all countries. While the missionary aspect of American foreign policy induces it to promote American values and remake the world in its image, China professes to strive for a world of harmony and diversity. While America would not shy away from spreading

its institutions and values to the world, and to impose them by force if necessary (as in the case of the Iraq War), China claims to be satisfied with national defense and pursue its unique brand of benevolent pacifism. While America at times seeks to revolutionize world politics by blunt unilateralism, China claims only to reform world politics by developing itself into a new kind of great power” (F. Zhang, 2013, p. 319).

These differences point to the direction of role, i.e., why it was coded under the Anti-Core orientation. Although Chen argues that “China does not have a comprehensive role set of anti-hegemonic strategies” (2016, p. 120), Beijing’s main objections to the current international order deal with Washington’s preeminence (Denmark, 2014, p. 8), and with its “necessary linkage between economic and political liberalisation/democratization and against the idea that there is or should be a single model” (Breslin, 2010, p. 57), thus providing a normative content to its foreign policy.

Therefore, China’s faith addresses two sides of the international system. On the one hand, the principles of peaceful coexistence adhere to and defend the Westphalia-based norms. On the other hand, China’s actions “which are non-compliant with the international order are in fact non-compliant with the liberal-based norms” (Vandamme, 2016, p. 11).

This orientation defies the United States’ position in the system by supporting a reform of the international order from within (i.e., using the norms upon which the system was built) towards multipolarity and the democratization of international relations (Chen, 2016, pp. 123–124; Connolly & Gottwald, 2013, p. 88; Deng, 2008, p. 44; Gottwald, 2016, p. 130; Pang et al., 2017, pp. 7–8; Vandamme, 2016, p. 6). Additionally, Beijing has not rejected human rights and democracy altogether. It has qualified them stating that “principles such as sovereignty, stability, and territorial integrity should trump such considerations” (Legro, 2007, p. 518).

Based on these considerations, China promotes the “Beijing Consensus,”<sup>29</sup> in which a “country’s economic and political policies should be adapted to national conditions” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, p. 84) and not imposed by foreign powers. Moreover, the

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<sup>29</sup> Ramo first coined this concept in mid-2000s, but Kennedy argues that there is no such thing (Kennedy, 2010; Ramo, 2004). Ferchen agrees with Kennedy, but states that nonetheless, the idea has been debated and has become “alive” (Ferchen, 2013).

“traditional view of sovereignty translates into an opposition to foreign intervention and to the use of force in international relations, in full respect of the principle of mutual non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs” (Finamore, 2017, p. 167). These principles have an expression in the idea that regular exchanges must be of mutual benefit, “with no liberalizing strings attached” to them (Breslin, 2010, p. 57).

### **3.2 A Strategy for Identifying South American Faiths and Role Performances**

The faiths portrayed above encompass two different dimensions. On the one hand, the economic orientation marks a stark difference between the United States and China. While the former promotes a (neo) liberal agenda where economic freedoms are paramount, the latter emphasizes development and growth above other considerations. The general terms “Washington Consensus” and “Beijing Consensus” characterize this dichotomy. On the other hand, the faiths defended by these two extra regional powers also have a political orientation towards the international order. Whereas the United States pursues a strategy of advancing liberal values such as democracy and human rights, China privileges the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and non-interference in other’s domestic affairs.

These distinct Defender of the Faith role conceptions need proper complementary or counter-roles for the South American states to set up role relationships with them. Being an overarching theme, the complementary or counter-roles are defined by sharing the same orientation (or not), thus enacting the role via foreign or domestic policies commensurate to that direction. Therefore, to operationalize the level of concordance between the faiths portrayed by the South American states and those of the extra regional powers, this research turns to the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), developed by the Heritage Foundation (2018), and the KOF Globalization Index (KOFGI), developed by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute (Axel Dreher, 2006; Gygli et al., 2019) to grasp its economic dimension. Since these indexes consider specific policies states carry within or outside their borders, these actions correspond to the enactment of the Defender of the Faith role.

Several analysts have used these indexes in their research. Dahlman, for example, used the Economic Freedom Index to trace the evolution of India’s and China’s economic

systems (2012, pp. 72–73). Other analysts have used it to assess whether international trade promotes economic reforms or if these reforms obey spatial dynamics (Gassebner et al., 2011). This index measures 12 different economic freedoms, grouped in four basic categories: Rule of Law, comprising property rights, government integrity, and judicial effectiveness; Government Size, where it focuses on government spending, tax burden, and fiscal health; Regulatory Efficiency, assessing business freedom, labor freedom, and monetary freedom; and finally, Open Markets, evaluating trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom. All these freedoms are weighted equally to generate an overall score for each individual country, ranging from 0.0 to 100. A higher score means more economic freedom.

This index has received some criticism, however. Macleod criticizes this approach to quantify economic freedom arguing that this index, as well as the Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney et al., 2018),<sup>30</sup> is embedded in a neo-liberal view of globalization (Macleod, 2005, p. 147). The nature of this contention makes the case for using it in this research, however. Precisely, the goal is to measure how South American states conform or not to this neo-liberal view.

The KOF Globalization Index, on its part, is a “general measure of country exposure to the world economy” (Ezrow & Hellwig, 2014, p. 820), and “it is quite close to the integration of countries into a world economy” (Krieger-Boden & Soltwedel, 2013, p. 1435). The index, in its most recent version, consists of 43 variables divided in the *facto* and the *jure* instances of globalization, grouped in five subdimensions (trade, financial, interpersonal, social, and political globalization), under three global dimensions (economic, social, and political globalization). In total the index has 43 variables with different weights, while the three global dimensions have the same weight, leading to an overall score ranging from 0.0 to 100. The higher the score, the more globalized a country is and, conversely, a low score means that it seldom participates in global flows and processes.

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<sup>30</sup> The Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index was chosen over the Fraser Institute's index because the latter only has a yearly score from 2000 onwards. Before that, they measure freedom on a quinquennial basis going back to 1970. The Economic Freedom Index has yearly scores from 1995 onwards.

This index has been used extensively, as Potrafke showed in his review of over 100 empirical studies (2015). Related to the objectives of this research, Mazarr, for example, used several indicators to group countries that support or defend the current international order (2017). Among those indicators, Mazarr uses the KOF Globalization Index. Later on, he used the Economic Freedom Index too to discern his guiding coalition even further (Mazarr, 2017, pp. 33–35).

Therefore, the combination of these two indexes aim to see how integrated to and supportive of the international economic system the South American states have been throughout the period under analysis. Being the premise that the international economic order has been set up by the Western powers, led by Washington, a behavior showing high scores in both indexes points to a convergence of faiths, and thus roles, between a South American state and the United States. Conversely, lower scores show a drifting away from Washington's position, in an Anti-Core role orientation.

The Defender of the Faith role, as expressed by China and the United States, also deals with their position towards the overall structure of the international order. This research then, uses states' voting behavior at the United Nations General Assembly to "operationalize the notion of normative positions towards the basic foundations of the international order" (Strüver, 2017, p. 48). The data comes from Voeten (2013), which includes all roll-call votes at the UNGA that took place during the period under analysis.

This approach has received some criticism however, mainly because "it is not always clear that each state's vote in the General Assembly precisely reflects the state's world view" (Gartzke, 1998, p. 15). Notwithstanding this, the General Assembly is "a forum in which international politics is played out, (...) [thus offering] a unique context in which to study post-cold war international politics, [and] providing a great deal of information about the issues most salient to its members states and about their preferences" (S. Y. Kim & Russett, 1996, p. 629). Due to its characteristics and taking into account its downside, voting behavior has been used extensively, either as an independent or dependent variable, to assess overall trends and dynamics of the international system and convergence in national preferences (Abb & Strüver, 2015; Domínguez, 2006; Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013; Haim, 2016; Montenegro & Mesquita, 2017; Mourón & Urdinez, 2014; Neto & Malamud, 2015; Pang et al., 2017; Strüver, 2014; Urdinez et al., 2016; Voeten, 2004).


Analysts have employed different methods to measure the convergence on voting behavior and thus make conclusions about the similarity (or dissimilarity) of foreign policies and preferences among states. Among them, some of the most often used include basic agreement percentages, used by the United States State Department, Kendall's  $\tau_b$ , which Bueno de Mesquita began to use to assess alliance portfolios (1975) and later employed to assess similarities in voting behavior, S-scores (Signorino & Ritter, 1999), chance-corrected measures, such as Scott's  $\pi$  and Cohen's  $\kappa$  (Häge, 2011), and ideal point estimates (Bailey et al., 2017; Ward & Dorussen, 2016). Each of these measures build upon each other's deficiencies to enhance the understanding of foreign policy similarities. Based on these considerations, this research uses the ideal points estimates. The main advantage of the ideal points estimates is that it considers the content of the resolutions being voted, separating changes in the UNGA agenda from changes in policy preferences. In this sense, the "advantage of [this] approach is that it provides a context-free positional measure, independent from the set of issues under discussion" (Ward & Dorussen, 2016, p. 398). Moreover, the ideal points estimate allows for identifying shifts within states, thus allowing as well the detection of which state has changed in dyadic analysis (Bailey et al., 2017, p. 2), which is at the core of role relationships research. Precisely, as it would be clear below, similarity in preferences is a two-way street, and the possibility of identifying who is changing in a dyad enriches the analysis.

### **3.3 South America's Defender of the Faith Foreign Policy Options**

Turning back again to the economic dimension of the faiths, according to the Economic Freedom Index, the South American states display patterns of behavior that are distinct. Figure 66 shows these dynamics, as well as the regional mean score as the dashed line along the of 61.6 horizontal mark.

First, two states, namely Argentina and Venezuela, show major changes, exhibiting downward trends at the turn of the century. Precisely, after Argentina's economic crisis of the late 1990s and President Menem left office, his successors reversed some of his economic policies, changing Argentina overall economic orientation. Argentina scored the highest in this indicator in 1996, with an overall score of 74.7, and scored the lowest at the end of the period under analysis, with a score of 44.1. Venezuela underwent a

similar process. The economic crisis of the 1990s led to a change of regime. Though Caldera struggled to keep Venezuela's economy afloat, hence the variability of the EFI score during his tenure, it is after Chávez took power that Venezuela's economic orientation changed, becoming the least liberal economy of the region.



**Figure 66:** Economic Freedom Index Scores for South America, 1995-2015.


Source: Own elaboration with data from the Heritage Foundation (2018).

Second, Brazil improved its position during the second half of the 1990s, but after Lula took power, it followed a downward trend, though not as severe as Buenos Aires and Caracas. Brasilia, overall, scored within the 60-point range, just below the regional average. Third, Chile excels in this indicator, constituting itself as the freer country in the region. Its scores throughout the period are way above the regional mean and have an upward trend. Finally, Colombia's and Peru's scores are mostly above the regional mean too. They coincide in having an upward trend since the years 2006-2007. However, they differ in their behavior before that. While Colombia was relatively stable, Peru had an upward trend up until 2001, when it showed a decline of almost 10 points until 2006.

Besides the yearly movements, the EFI scores show how close the South American states are in their economic orientation to either China or the United States. Figure 67 shows the boxplots for each of them, including the extra regional powers. It also shows the regional mean as a horizontal dashed line. The figure shows two separate groups of

countries according to the location of their individual median, either above or below the regional mean. Four states appear above it: Colombia, Peru, Chile, and the United States. Among them, Chile is the closest to the United States, meaning that they share the same economic orientation as put in practice in their national economies. Colombia, and Peru are closer to each other, showing that the Andean neighbors also share the same overall economic structure and orientation.

On the other side of the spectrum, Brazil, China, and Venezuela have their medians below the regional mean. This group includes two different dynamics according to the distribution of their scores. While China barely moved throughout the 21 years of the data, consistently scoring just above the 52-point mark, Venezuela and Argentina are the countries with the most variation across the years (Figure 4.4 shows the direction of these changes, from a liberal orientation to a more protectionist and statist orientation). These movements imply a change in the overall economic content of their respective faiths. Finally, Brazil has a higher median than the rest of the group. Notwithstanding how close it is to the regional mean, its scores place Brasilia closer to China's orientation than to that of United States.



**Figure 67:** Economic Freedom Index Scores for South America, China, and the United States, 1995-2015.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Heritage Foundation (2018).

The KOFGI measures three different dimensions of the globalization process: Economic, social, and political, as stated above. While social and political globalization reflect the




extent of international exchanges a state may have in those dimensions, of interest in this section is the economic globalization subindex (KOFecGI). To build it, the KOF Institute assess two different sets of variables on trade and financial globalization. The first set, called *de facto* economic globalization, includes international exchanges of goods, services, and partner diversity, in an overarching trade category, and foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, international debt, international reserves, and international income payments, related to finances. The second set is the *de jure* economic globalization, which includes regulations, tariffs, taxes, and number of trade agreements, related to trade, and investment restrictions, capital account openness, and international investment agreements, under finances. Since “the *facto* globalization measures actual international flows and activities, [while] *de jure* globalization measures policies and conditions that, in principle, enable, facilitate and foster flows and activities” (Gygli et al., 2019, p. 2), the latter is considered more appropriate for this research because it considers what states can actually do regarding their economic system. In this sense, the *de jure* economic globalization index (KOFecGI<sub>dj</sub>) supplies more information on the economic faiths conceived by the states under analysis.

The KOFecGI<sub>dj</sub> scores of the South American states reveal interesting dynamics as well. Figure 68 shows the behavior of the South American states according to this index. All the countries began with a score below the 40-point mark. Understandably, before the 1990s, apart from Chile that started its economic reforms in the 1970s, Latin America followed the Industrialization by Substitution of Imports (ISI). This model focused on domestic economic development, leading to few international exchanges. However, after the debt crisis of 1982, and especially during the 1990s, most of Latin American economies started to open themselves to international markets. Since then, as shown in the figure, they followed different trajectories.

On the one hand, Chile, Colombia, and Peru have an upward trend throughout the period. Chile, which shows the best performance in this index, skyrocketed in the second half of the 1990s, reaching its peak in 2007 with a score of 84.2. After that point, its scores decreased, but stayed around the 80-point mark. Peru surpassed the regional mean (51.3) in the early 1990s and since early 2000s Lima outranks the remaining countries. Finally, Colombia’s performance is less impressive than its South American Pacific Alliance partners. Bogotá barely surpassed the regional mean in the second half

of the 2000s. However, since 1993, when it reached its lowest point, it constantly improved its marks.




**Figure 68:** KOF *De Jure* Economic Globalization Index for South America, 1990-2015.

Source: Own elaboration with data from KOF (Gygli et al., 2019).

On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela show different patterns. Argentina and Brazil had a more global orientation to their economies during the 1990s, as shown by their increasing scores across this decade. After the turn of the century however, Argentina followed a downward trend, ending with a less globalized economy than after the end of the Cold War. In the case of Brazil, during President Lula's time in office, its scores reached its highest mark, to then falling with President Rousseff. Finally, Venezuela saw an impressive spike under President Caldera in the second half of the 1990s, to reach its highest during President Chávez first years. Since the Bolivarian Revolution started to set its bases, however, its scores followed a downward trend, plummeting after 2002.

The South American states' KOFecGIdj scores comparison with those of the United States and China resembles that of the Economic Freedom Index. To the right of Figure 69, the United States, Chile, and Peru have their medians above the South American mean, being Santiago the South American state closer to the United States. Colombia has its median (50.6) just below the regional mean, placing it in-between the group to

the right of the figure and the group to the left. To this latter group belong China, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela.



**Figure 69:** KOF *De Jure* Economic Globalization Index Scores for South America, China, and the United States, 1990-2015.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from KOF (Gygli et al., 2019).

The differences in the states' economic orientation as measured by these indexes are important, expressing a real difference between the role conceptions of Pro-Core and Anti-Core Defenders of the Faith. Based on the timeframe each index covers, states' leaders (including China's) in the Anti-Core network amount to 12 in the EFI index and the number increases to 15 in the KOF. These figures differ with the Pro-Core leaders' network (including the United States'), which has 17 in the former index and 22 in the latter. In both indexes, the expectations are that the Pro-Core leaders would outperform (score-wise) their counterparts having the Anti-Core orientation (alternative hypothesis), instead of having rather equal scores between the groups (null hypothesis). Since the data in both indexes are not normally distributed, the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test was performed to assess the significance of the differences between groups signaled by the boxplots. The one-sided tests confirm that the Anti-Core-Core Presidents tend to have lower scores than the Pro-Core Presidents in both the EFI and KOFGI indexes ( $W = 15$ ,  $p < 0.000$  and  $W = 54$ ,  $p < 0.000$ , respectively).

The dynamics of these indexes follow the general Latin American economic history of the past 30 years, as hinted above. The debt crisis of the 1980s and the realization of the inadequacy of the ISI model led most of the states in the region to adopt reforms

towards the liberalization of their economies (Biglaiser & DeRouen Jr., 2004, p. 563; Feinberg et al., 2015, p. 4; Pastor, 1996). These reforms belonged to the “Washington Consensus,” a “decatalogue” of sound macroeconomic policies recommended by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Department of Treasury to avert the crisis. However, at the turn of the century, “confronting the reality of a globalised capitalism with no immediate alternative, Latin America’s politics came to be defined by the rise of the progressive left, a remarkable reversal of post-Cold War trends” (Biegon, 2017, pp. 9–10). In South America, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and to a lesser extent Brazil, and Chile, represented different strands of these movements. The most radical parties hoisted the anti-neoliberal flag, considering that the Washington Consensus was an “ideological Trojan Horse for US global hegemony” (Ferchen, 2013, p. 403). Therefore, they turned away from the liberal economic principles towards a system where the state played key roles in development and economic growth. Venezuela’s and Argentina’s scores illustrate these foreign and domestic policy changes. Interestingly, Chile, despite having leaders that belonged to this progressive left, had the most liberal economic profile, reflecting that changes within its economic system did not alter its overall economic orientation.

On the political dimension of the faith, i.e., how the states conceived their orientation towards the international order, this research then turns to the voting behavior at the United Nations General Assembly on “important votes” as defined by the United States instead of using all resolutions that required a voting procedure. Since resolutions at the General Assembly may include procedural matters or general issues that do not rise major concerns to states, “shifts in a country’s voting record can be costless rather than meaningful indications of increased political proximity” (Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013, p. 358). Additionally, this decision follows the idea that “the U.S. government would not be likely to exercise pressure for all UN resolutions but would do so on issues considered vital to America’s national interests” (T. Y. Wang, 1999, p. 201).

These resolutions important to the United States address issues defined by Washington as those “which directly affected important United States interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively” (U.S. Department of State, 2018, p. 34). This narrow focus on specific important resolutions is a proper path to follow in this research because it reveals the extent of alignment or shared preferences between any state and the

United States, and by extension with China, thus exemplifying the level of “shared faiths” and thus the fulfillment of the role location process.

There is an empirical cost with this decision, however. The number of votes decreases in a significant manner. From 1877 resolutions that states voted on from the 45<sup>th</sup> session to the 70<sup>th</sup> session, the United States deemed as important only 317. Consequently, the average number of voted resolutions per year falls from 72 to 12. Notwithstanding this, since these resolutions are the most indicative of their orientation towards the international order and the convergence between faiths, either with the United States or China, this number of resolutions is rich in meaning.

Table 16 presents a summary of how each state voted on these resolutions. All states have three possibilities to voice their preferences: yes, no, or abstaining.<sup>31</sup> The highest *nay-sayer* was the United States, voting contrary to the spirit of the resolutions half of the time, while Chile was the highest *yea-sayer*, voting in favor of the resolutions 91 percent of the time. Finally, the biggest abstainer was Colombia, refraining from voting in either direction close to one-third of the time. Furthermore, this description begins to tell the story of how these states conceived the international order and what is the extent of their convergence. Overall, South America is different from both the United States and China. Their affirmative votes are above the 220-mark, while their negative votes, but Venezuela’s, are equal or under 4.

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<sup>31</sup> A fourth possibility for states is being absent from the roll-call. Usually, in research on voting behavior these cases are considered null data because the connection between the motivation to behave in this manner and the state’s preferences are difficult to elucidate.


	Vote		
	<i>Nay</i>	<i>Yea</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
United States	159 (50.2%)	155 (48.9%)	3 (0.9%)
China*	58 (18.3%)	184 (58%)	69 (21.8%)
Argentina*	4 (1.3%)	237 (74.8%)	75 (23.7%)
Brazil	0 (0%)	260 (82%)	57 (18%)
Chile*	4 (1.3%)	289 (91.2%)	22 (6.9%)
Colombia	4 (1.3%)	225 (71%)	88 (27.8%)
Peru	1 (0.3%)	243 (76.7%)	73 (23%)
Venezuela*	38 (12%)	240 (75.7%)	34 (10.7%)

**Tabelle 16:** Voting on UNGA Resolutions (Important Votes), 1990-2015.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Voeten (2013). Note: Countries with asterisk were absent in some voting procedures: China on 6 resolutions, Venezuela in 5, Chile in 2, and Argentina in 1.

To further the analysis, the analysis turns to the ideal points estimate, as mentioned above. This estimate on important votes is indicative of changes or continuities in each state's foreign policy (Bailey et al., 2017). Figure 70 shows the overall trends of South American states' foreign policy positions compared to those of China and of the United States, until 2014. Important to say is that the positive or negative ideal points only reflect the location on a political space derived from the dynamics of voting and do not mean "better" or "worst," or "right" or "wrong" foreign policy preferences.

Overall, South America lies farther from Washington than from China. These behaviors correspond to two different dynamics. On the one hand, all regions in the world, on average, have diverged from the United States' preferences since the end of the Cold War (Feinberg et al., 2015, p. 2; Voeten, 2004). On the other hand, "China's foreign policy standing is much closer to the developing countries than the developed countries" (Pang et al., 2017, p. 11). As the table above and the figure below show, the United States and China conceived the international order in an opposite manner, inferred by the way they voted and thus their location on the political space. Besides, they have changed their preferences in distinct ways. While Washington changed its voting

behavior from 2001 onwards, Beijing radically altered its behavior following the Tiananmen incident of 1989 and the end of the Cold War.



**Figure 70:** Ideal Point Estimates on Important Votes, South America, China, and the U.S., 1990-2014.

Source: Own elaboration with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).

The acting of voting on the important issues at the UNGA reveal different dynamics within South America. Only two states had relative stable patterns on their voting behavior, namely Brazil and Chile. In the 1990s, Brasilia and Santiago were slowly moving towards the United States. Their foreign policy preferences slightly changed around the turn of the century. Brazil began moving downwards with President Cardoso, and Chile did the same with Lagos in 2000. It is important to note that Washington had a descending movement as well around the same moment as the former states. Colombia and Peru had also similar patterns, though Bogotá in the 1990s had a downward trend (along with Venezuela, they were only ones displaying this behavior). However, the overall trend for them is bridging the gap with the United States.

Argentina's and Venezuela's scores reveal a unique behavioral pattern. In the first half of Menem's decade in power, had a stark movement towards the Western position (exemplified by the United States' position). Indeed, Kim and Russet, analyzing UNGA voting behavior from 1991 to 1993, clustered Argentina with Western states, rather than with its neighbors, which were clustered under the Non-Aligned Movement (1996, p. 639). However, its behavior changed even prior to the left-wing governments took power


in 2003 and started to drift apart from this cluster of countries. Interestingly, the pace of change was higher before Kirchner than with him and with Fernández. Venezuela's preferences moved away from the United States from the 1990s onwards. This movement made Caracas to bridge the gap that existed between them and China by the second half of the 2000s.

Figure 71 shows the ideal point similarity between each South American state and China, and the United States. This similarity is a dyadic measure estimated by computing the absolute value of the difference between the state's and the extra regional power's ideal points (Bailey et al., 2017). Values closer to zero reflect similar foreign policy preferences between states, while higher values imply differences in those preferences.

Venezuela reached the highest dissimilarity in their preferences to Washington compared to its regional counterparts, scoring 4.08 in 2014, followed by Colombia in 1999, with a score of 4.00. At the other side of the aisle, Peru was the closest to the U.S. in 2013, scoring 1.54, followed by Colombia in the same year, with a score of 1.56. Regarding China, Argentina occupied the farthest location from Beijing, from 1995 to 2000 (its highest score, 3.32, was in 1996). Chile followed in 1997, with a score of 2.24. The countries closest to China were Argentina in 1991 (0.02), followed by Venezuela in 2012 (0.05).

Interestingly, all states had almost the same starting point in terms of their similar (or dissimilar) preferences to both China and the United States. Washington was separated from South America by around 3 points at the beginning of the 1990s, while Beijing's interests were almost the same to those of South America, placing the difference below the 0.5-point mark.






**Figure 71:** South America Ideal Point Similarity on Important Votes to China, and the U.S., 1990-2014.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).

The trajectories since then diverged, however. Most of the cases show an increasing drifting apart between them and China during the 1990s. After that, the similarity scores started to descend, revealing an increasing agreement in their voting behavior. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela followed this pattern, being Caracas the closest to Beijing in the 2000s and first half of the 2010s. Peru and Colombia, on the other hand, behaved differently. While Colombia and China moved continuously away from each other throughout the whole period, Peru reached the 2-point mark difference by the end of the 1990s and its level of similarity stayed stable around it for the rest of the period.

Washington saw an overall increased convergence of preferences with Peru and Colombia, though the Andean countries had distinct voting behaviors during the 1990s. Bogotá and Washington distanced themselves during this decade, while the latter and Lima remained around the 3-point mark of dissimilarity. By the turn of the century, however, Colombia and Peru ended up closer to Washington. At the other side of the continuum, Venezuela, throughout the 25-year span, augmented its divergences with the United States. Of the Southern Cone countries, Brazil and Chile followed the same path with minor differences, being 2005 the threshold when these states' interests started to move closer towards Washington's, but not as significant as the cases of Colombia and Peru. Argentina had a separate similarity course. In the early 1990s it reached its closest point to Washington, but its behavior quickly retraced their steps to the starting point. In the 2000s, despite having left-wing governments, Buenos Aires followed Brazil and Chile moving closer to Washington.

Taken these behaviors together, 4 distinct patterns appear: 1) Colombia and Peru voted in such a way that by the end of the period of analysis they were equidistant from Washington and Beijing (i.e., their interests started to converge to those of the United States and diverge from China's). This does not mean, however, that they began to have the same preferences as the United States, nor that they did not have anything in common with China. Although they moved closer to Washington after the turn of the century, the main difference between Lima and Bogotá was that Lima's distance to Beijing remained stable while Bogotá's gap with China continued to grow. 2) Venezuela, throughout the period under analysis, had increasing differences with the United States on the content of the voted resolutions. This increase placed Caracas the farthest from Washington than any other South American state. In parallel, Venezuela's interests started to match those of China, especially under the Bolivarian regime. 3) The preferences gap between Chile and Brazil with the extra regional powers stayed relatively unaltered. Apart from the early 1990s when China changed its preferences (as seen in Figure 71), they balanced their relations with Beijing and Washington across the period (i.e., when they moved closer to either one, they moved away from the other). 4) Finally, Argentina had a unique pattern, in which at some points in time it was closer to the United States and at some other times it was closer to China. These moments were reciprocal (when it was closer to one, it was the farthest to the other). Moreover, the gap between its foreign policy similarity with China and that with the United States was not as big as the gap the rest of the states had.

In summation, the enactment of the political dimension of the Defender of the Faith role, measured with the ideal points estimate, is associated to the conception's orientation of said role. On the one hand, the ideal points estimate does help classify leaders in either the Pro-Core or the Anti-Core camps. The Wilcoxon test confirms the hypothesis that Anti-Core leaders tend to have an ideal points estimate lower than leaders in the opposite camp ( $W = 54$ ,  $p < 0.000$ , one-sided). The boxplot in Figure 72 shows that most of the Pro-Core leaders tend to have positive scores or close to 0. Conversely, Anti-Core leaders, with few exceptions, have negative scores or close to 0. Additionally, the dashed vertical line reflects the regional average (0.1), standing farther from the average of the United States (3.03) than from China's (-1.26). In this sense, the disaggregation of the states' scores in their respective leaders confirms that South America's voting behavior is closer to Beijing rather than to Washington.




**Figure 72:** Presidents' Ideal Points Estimate, 1990-2014.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).


However, when it comes to the foreign policy preferences, measured by similarity to China and the United States, the association between the Pro-Core or Anti-Core orientation and their voting behavior (as measured by their foreign policy similarities to Beijing or Washington) is less significant, as the Wilcoxon tests reveal ( $W = 67$ ,  $p = 0.08$  and  $W = 130$ ,  $p = 0.09$ , respectively for one-sided tests). The figures 73, for the similarity to China, and 74, for the similarity to the U.S., show that preferences are quite mixed, though the regional means (depicted with vertical dashed lines in both figures) are consistent with the claim that after the end of the Cold War, South America has been closer to China than to the United States. Indeed, South America's mean towards China is 1.4, while towards the United States is 2.9.

In relation to China, some leaders' voting behavior ran contrary to the expectations. For example, Pro-Core leaders, such as Pérez, Gaviria, and Aylwin had foreign policy preferences closer to Beijing than Anti-Core Presidents: Duhalde, Cardoso, or Kirchner. The same counter-expectations appear in the individual leaders' foreign policy similarities to the United States, depicted below. Presidents Fernández and Kirchner are closer to Washington than Presidents Pastrana, Gaviria or Fujimori. However, left-wing

leaders, such as Chávez and Maduro in Venezuela, and Lula and Rousseff in Brazil did follow the expectations of being farther away from the United States and closer to China. These findings are commensurate to that of other researchers, whose research “consistently indicates that left-wing regimes in Latin America were systematically less favorable to the United States than right-wing regimes” (Bailey et al., 2017, p. 431).




**Figure 73:** South America’s Presidents’ Ideal Points Similarity to China, 1990-2014.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).



**Figure 74:** South America's Presidents' Ideal Points Similarity to the United States, 1990-2014.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).

An interesting point though, is that having similar preferences to those of the United States implies having less similar preferences to those of China, or the other way around, which reflects the exclusive nature of the role conception. As shown in Figure 75, the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two set of similarities is  $-0.57$  ( $p < 0.001$ ), reflecting a moderate negative correlation between both similarities from the perspective of South America. Besides changes in South America's ideal points, dynamics between the two extra regional powers also explains this result. Washington's and Beijing's preferences are in opposite sides of the ideal points estimate, as shown in Figure 70. Indeed, the average of the absolute difference between their ideal points estimate for the 25 years recorded is 4.29, higher than any other comparison made.

Additionally, as shown in the figure, the correlation between the ideal points estimate of the South American states and their similarities to Washington or Beijing is weak in both cases, though they have the right signs. As the ideal points of South American states move towards the positive side of the scale (y-axis) and given that the United States have also positive ideal points the similarity between them should move closer to 0 (x-axis). In other words, the higher the value of the ideal points estimate is, the lower the similarity score should be. Conversely, since China's ideal points are on the negative side of the scale, South America's positive ideal points should move the similarity scores away from 0 (x-axis). Therefore, the higher the ideal points estimate, the higher the similarity score should be, expressing increasing dissimilarity between them on their voting behavior.



**Figure 75:** Pearson Correlation Coefficient between South American Foreign Policy Similarities to China and the United States, and Ideal Points Estimate, 1990-2014.

Source: Own elaboration with PerformanceAnalytics (Peterson & Carl, 2014) package for R, with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).

### 3.4 Role Relationships and Intrarole Conflicts

The foreign and domestic policies portrayed above describe the overall economic and political orientation of the different South American states and their leaders and complete the role triplets in each of their role sets (master role, auxiliary role, and foreign policies). In the economic dimension, the overall results of the previous analysis indicate a congruence between the conception of the Defender of the Faith role and its enactment. To further the analysis, states' leaders were divided into two different groups according to the extent of their economic freedom and openness. This classification took into consideration two different criteria, involving each of the indexes. On the one hand, the Heritage Foundation provides a scale to rank countries based on their overall EFI score:

- Free: 80-100;
- Mostly Free: 70-79.9;
- Moderately Free: 60-69.9;
- Mostly Unfree: 50-59.9; and
- Repressed: 40-49.9.

On the other hand, KOF does not provide this type of rankings. Instead, this research used the yearly world median as a baseline. Presidents who scored above this threshold during all their tenure, or most of their years in power, were considered as being open to

economic globalization. Conversely, those scoring below it were placed in the second group of those having a more restricted and closed view for their national economies.

	Pro-Core	Anti-Core
Liberal Policies	Bachelet Piñera Fujimori Menem Pastrana Frei Aylwin Toledo De la Rúa Lagos García Humala Santos	Samper      Cardoso Duhalde
Non-Liberal Policies	Gaviria Uribe Caldera  Pérez Velásquez	Fernández Lula Maduro Kirchner Franco Chávez Rousseff Collor

**Table 17:** Defender of the Faith Economic Conception and Enactment  
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Heritage Foundation (2018) and from KOF (Gygli et al., 2019).

Based on these considerations, both rankings were combined to classify leaders between those performing liberal economic policies and those developing non-liberal economic policies.<sup>32</sup> In the case a President scored higher in one index and low in the other one, he was located at the border between liberal and non-liberal (5 cases out of 29 had this characteristic).

Table 17 shows these results in a 2 X 2 matrix. The columns stand for their economic role conception, as exemplified by their orientation: Pro-Core or Anti-Core. The rows show their membership on either the liberal or non-liberal camps. The main diagonal implies congruence between the role conception and its enactment. In all, 21 South American Presidents implemented foreign and domestic policies in line with their role conception's economic orientation. Moreover, since Gaviria, Uribe, and Caldera in the Pro-Core orientation, and Cardoso and Duhalde in the Anti-Core orientation are at the intersection between performing liberal or non-liberal policies, 26 Presidents in total behaved according to the expectations their role conceptions generated.

<sup>32</sup> Due to EFI's data availability, only the KOF index was used to classify Presidents in office between 1990 and 1994 into those groups.

Three Presidents are in the matrix's off-diagonal, however. This means that they might have experienced an intrarole conflict, i.e., implemented policies that do not correspond to or associate with their auxiliary role. In the case of Samper, under his administration Colombia conceived the Defender of the Faith role towards an Anti-Core orientation criticizing the rising barriers to developing countries' exports to developed markets (Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 1995, p. 89), and urging for the creation of a "new economic model that can satisfy the needs of our people, one characterized by social justice and equity, efficiency and competitiveness" (United Nations General Assembly, 50th Session, 13th Plenary Meeting, 1995, p. 32). His economic orientation leaned toward microeconomics instead of placing an emphasis on macroeconomic stability guided by the Washington Consensus. As his foreign affairs minister put it at the time, Colombia's foreign policy will include social issues and policies within an open economy (Pardo, 1994, p. 3). Moreover, Samper had hinted a departure from the United States (Tokatlian, 2000, p. 41), away from the foreign policy principle of *Respice Polum* (look to the north) that guided Colombia's international relations for most of the twentieth century (Cepeda & Pardo, 1989).

Notwithstanding his general views on these issues, he did not alter Colombia's economic reforms towards an open economy put in place by his predecessor, as reflected by the scores in both indexes. Indeed, as his national development plan situated his approach to the economy midway between the neoliberal and the state interventionists camps (Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 1995, La Estrategia Económica y Social del Plan de Desarrollo, para. 8), he supported open markets and regional integration (even hemispheric integration on equal footing, which included the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas).

The fact that Colombia embraced economic liberal values and walked down that path despite Samper's role conception implies an intrarole conflict in Colombia's role set. Strained relations with the United States during his tenure framed the mismatch between conception and enactment. From the outset, President Samper felt the pressure for behaving according to Washington's expectations on his policies against illicit drugs, derived from the 8000 process (a judicial investigation on the illegal funding of his Presidential campaign by drug cartels) (Dallanegra Pedraza, 2012, p. 58). This led to processes of altercasting from Washington to Bogotá, including punishments on deviant



behavior such as the cancellation of the President's visa to enter the United States, which in turn made Colombia comply with the implementation of policies tailored to Washington's interests and views on the war on drugs (Tickner, 2000, pp. 43–48). In fact, "this conflict made the relationship between the United States and the Samper administration one of the most abrasive episodes in U.S.-Latin American relations since the end of the Cold War" (Crandall, 2001, p. 96). In line with these arguments, Samper needed not another issue to be added to the conflictive relations with Washington and did not overtly defy the principles of the Washington Consensus.

Venezuela's cases are different. Their membership in the non-liberal group was defined solely on the KOF globalization index because EFI does not cover their terms, as explained above. Due to the unavailability of EFI, key features of their policies were unassessed, such as rule of law, government size, and regulatory efficiency. These aspects could have inclined their positions towards the liberal group. However, this does not seem to be the case and the lack of data did not influence the classification. As a validity check of their membership the Frasier Institute's Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) (Gwartney et al., 2018) was employed for the quinquennia 1990-1995. Venezuela scored 4.35 (out of 10.0) in 1995 (covering the period of both Presidents, Pérez and Velásquez), which was below the world median of 6.06. Moreover, the Fraser Institute placed Venezuela in the fourth quartile for that year, which meant that Caracas was one among 29 other states not having economic freedom as measured by them.

These memberships also seem counterintuitive, because although Pérez ran his campaign on an Anti-Core platform (contradicting the Pro-Core orientation coded with the UNGA speeches), as soon as he took office he changed his orientation and implemented economic reforms in line with the Washington Consensus (Rodríguez Rojas, 2010, p. 191; Romero & Curiel, 2009, p. 41).

However, these reforms were not complete. Although Pérez made some changes to Venezuela's economic system, "he was not able to pass key legislation. In particular, he faced an adversarial Congress that did not pass his fiscal reform, the cornerstone of the program" (Monaldi & Penfold, 2014, pp. 303–304). During Velásquez tenure as interim President, the privatization processes were put on hold (Myers, 2011, p. 280) and his priorities shifted to getting external support for Venezuela's democracy (Romero, 2003,

p. 326). Indeed, Corrales argues that the Washington Consensus policies were not implemented in full in Venezuela:

There was trade liberalization, but not banking liberalization. There were privatizations, but only in a few sectors. There were fiscal cutbacks, but not sustained in time to kill inflation. There were no serious pension, labor, fiscal, and education reforms (...) To be sure, Pérez and Caldera achieved trade opening and a few grand privatizations, but crucial elements of the old statist model (heavy dependence on state investments and oil, labor market rigidities, fiscal volatility, inflation, and rent-seeking) survived through the 1990s (Corrales, 2014, p. 380).

Despite the attempted reforms, these policies did not address the structural deficiencies of Venezuela's economic system (Serbin, 1993, p. 649) and did not move Venezuela away enough from the interventionist side to place both Presidents in the liberal camp.

These dynamics also are the expression of an intrarole conflict.<sup>33</sup> Domestically, the fact that Pérez faced 2115 strikes (Corrales, 1997, p. 624), two coup d'état attempts, and fierce opposition from his own party, whose members blocked the intended reforms and supported his impeachment in 1993 (Di John, 2014, p. 347), made him implement policies opposing his own role conception. Additionally, internationally, in the 1990s Venezuela had disputes with the U.S. on "the degree of Venezuela's market opening and eligibility for credits from the Export-Import Bank of the United States and other lending organizations" (Corrales & Romero, 2013, p. 73), which pushed Caracas towards adopting policies in line with the promulgated orientation of the Defender of the Faith role. In summation, Pérez and, to a lesser extent, Velásquez due to his interim position activated inconsistent triplets within their role sets.

Colombia and Venezuela in the 1990s adjust to what was framed in the theoretical chapter. On the one hand, the Cartesian product of their auxiliary roles and foreign policy options that makes up their role set indicates the possibility of implementing foreign policies that does not align with the conception of the role. In the case of Colombia, it was conceiving an auxiliary role contrary to the U.S. expectations, but enacting a role

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<sup>33</sup> They also are an example of domestic role contestation, which exceeds the objectives of this research.

(foreign policy options) in line with those same expectations. The role relationship then was determined by the presence and forceful expectations of the U.S. as to not changing the economic orientation started in 1990. As shown in figure 63, the only role that connected Samper with Clinton was the Faithful Ally. The basis of this role was, precisely, the war on drugs and its economic components, such as anti-money laundering policies and measures to confiscate assets obtained illegally. In Colombia's role set in its relations with the United States, then, the Faithful Ally role occupied a more prominent position than the Defender of the Faith role. This relationship explains the contradiction between claiming an Anti-Core role orientation and choosing Pro-Core foreign policy options.

Venezuela's dynamics ran contrary to those of Colombia. Both Pérez and Velásquez conceived a role aligned with the U.S. but their policies did not fully follow through. Though they started to change the economic system of Venezuela, their reforms did not go all the way because of domestic pressures. However, they did implement some of the Washington consensus policies, thus creating the possibility of locating the role of Defenders of the Faith according to Washington's orientation.


The political dimension of the faith, expressed as the ideal points estimate of their voting behavior at the UNGA, introduces a different dynamic to the role relationships with China or the United States. Each state's degree of similarity in their voting behavior to the extra regional powers depended on their own position on the General Assembly's agenda, which the ideal points estimate addressed. These distances need be qualified, however. Figure 70 above shows that in general South America is closer in their conception of the international order to China than to the United States. The reason lies in that "the US demonstrates voting that is highly resistant to global forms of multilateralism it does not control" (Volgy et al., 2003, pp. 63–64), whereas all South American Presidents expressed their will to enhance multilateral institutions as fora where they can address the structural deficiencies of the international order. In this sense, the question in terms of role performance is not if they are different from (or similar to) these powers, but *how* different (or similar) they are, and if these differences are significant.

As a measure of distance within a political space, the normalization of the ideal points estimate provides the basis for this qualification. Since there are not cut-off points or thresholds for determining the extent of closeness or farness between two points, and

hence their enactment of a Pro-Core or Anti-Core role, each dyad's (state-extra regional power) similarity score was divided by the highest score (the maximum distance in their voting behavior) for every country. Therefore, the only point of reference was each state's own behavior, which accounts for leadership or regime changes. The resulting scores ranged from 0 to 1, where values close to 0 implied high similarity between their voting behavior (within their differences), and, conversely, values close to 1 meant they were highly dissimilar (again, within their own differences). After this procedure, the standard deviation was calculated from the total scores, and added and subtracted from each country's average score. These were the thresholds defined to classify Presidents as behaving in a Pro-Core or in an Anti-Core fashion. Those leaders scoring above the mean plus one standard deviation had a voting behavior quite different from that of the extra regional power, while those scoring below the mean minus one standard deviation were deemed as behaving similar to that said power. The downside of this method, however, lies in the need for differentiation within the state based on the maximum score on the similarity scale. Therefore, each state has a leader representative of high dissimilarity to both the United States and China. With this disadvantage in mind, this classification strategy provided a sound base for unveiling role conflict dynamics.

Figure 76 shows the normalized scores for all South American Presidents, which is another perspective of the dynamics shown in Figure 71, allowing for comparisons among and within the states. On the one hand, Presidents with long tenures in office tended to alter their foreign policy positions extensively. Menem, Fujimori, and Chávez shifted in different dimensions: Menem scores moved across both the vertical and the horizontal axes, switching between Beijing and Washington as reference points. Fujimori and Chávez moved across the vertical axis. The former distancing from Beijing, while the latter bringing Venezuela closer to China. On the other hand, all states had different degrees of similarity to China or the United States. The beginning of 1990s represented, for most of the states, the moment at which they were the closest to Beijing. Indeed, "according to Chinese data, China and Latin America voted together in the United Nations more than 80 percent of the time during the early 1990s" (Mora, 1999, p. 103). The sole exception is Venezuela after the Bolivarian governments took power. With Chávez and Maduro, Caracas moved really close to China. On the horizontal axes (i.e., their degree of similarity to the U.S.), only Argentina, Colombia, and Peru moved extensively. Again, Menem bringing Argentina closer to Washington throughout his tenure, while Colombia's and Peru's movements towards the United States occurred after the turn of the century. It is important to note, however, that Presidents that were in

office after the turn of the century tended to be closer to Washington than their predecessors in all cases but Venezuela's.



**Figure 76:** Position of South American Presidents in the United States-China Similarity Political Space.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).

Based on this placement in the political space, the classification of Presidents displaying a Pro-Core, or an Anti-Core voting behavior was possible. Table 18 shows a double 2 X 2 matrix, one for South America's similarity to the United States (top), and one for the corresponding relations with China (bottom).<sup>34</sup> The columns stand for the orientation of the role conception and the rows show whether a President scored above or below the defined threshold. For the cases involving the United States, Presidents in the diagonal have role consistency (i.e., their voting behavior corresponds to their role conception), while Presidents in the off-diagonal casted votes inconsistent with their conceptions, generating the possibility of role conflicts. The opposite reading applies for China's cases. Presidents in the off-diagonal voted in line with their role conception. Those that are in the diagonal, conversely, showed inconsistency between their orientations and their votes.

<sup>34</sup> Only Presidents falling above or below the defined threshold are listed in the matrix. Those that are absent are assumed to behave within the limits of their role conceptions, thus not having role conflicts nor sharing preferences with either extra regional power to the extent of signaling a strong commitment to their faiths.

		Pro-Core		Anti-Core	
USA	More Similar	Menem Bachelet Santos García	Piñera Aylwin Humala Pérez	Rousseff Fernández	Lula
	Less Similar	Menem Lagos Fujimori	De la Rúa Pastrana	Kirchner Franco Chávez	Collor Samper Maduro
China	More Similar	Menem Gaviria Pérez	Aylwin Fujimori	Collor	Chávez
	Less Similar	Menem Santos Caldera	Frei Humala	Cardoso	

**Tabelle 18:** Defender of the Faith Political Conception and Enactment.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).

Table 18 displays several interesting role dynamics. Most notoriously, Menem appears in all Pro-Core boxes. During his 10-years tenure, he radically changed Argentina's foreign policy orientation, thus being at one point in time closest to China and farthest to the United States, and at another one closest to Washington and farthest to Beijing. Menem, at the beginning of his term in office, continued his predecessor's policy towards China based on political and economic considerations, but it "did not openly focus on democratic values" (Malena, 2011, p. 263). A prominent example of the interest he had in developing closer relations with China was that he was the first Western President to visit Beijing after the Tiananmen events in November 1990 (Corigliano, 2013, p. 33). Overall, this policy was framed under the ideas of non-alignment and non-dependence on Western resources.

However, the shifting winds in the international system, the turmoil and later collapse of the Soviet Union, made him acknowledge the "rampant globalisation, the predominance of market economies, and the US global leadership" (Busso, 2016, p. 105). He promptly steered Argentina towards the West, towards the United States. Consequently, the high priority he assigned to Washington in Argentina's international agenda, "the so-called automatic alignment" (Malamud, 2011, p. 90), made him change the way the Southern Cone state voted UNGA resolutions: From a "strongly anti-Western voting profile to a

mildly pro-Western one” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016, p. 10). However, this change did not mean “automatically mirroring U.S. postures” (Norden & Russell, 2002, p. 100). The major differences stemmed from their positions on Washington’s Cuba embargo, the Middle East peace process, and disarmament (Norden & Russell, 2002, p. 101), all of them being at the heart of the issues considered important by the United States. In the end, Menem’s scores were the result of his policies steering Argentina towards the United States. His foreign policy actions, then, were congruent with his policy orientation.

Another interesting result is that of Fujimori. He appears to have had a role conflict (an inconsistent triplet in the Defender of the Faith role), given that he was the least similar Peruvian President with the United States, though he was coded under the Pro-Core orientation. Moreover, he also features as the most similar to China.

He was, indeed, in line with the ideas coming from the West. As one analyst commented: “He was a strong man politically but a liberal in economic matters, and his administration took a very pro-Western stand throughout his term in office” (Berríos, 2003, p. 222). Moreover, given the economic crisis that Peru was living by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, he “recognized that the active support of the United States would be critical in implementing an economic strategy to restore the international standing of Peru (St. John, 2011, p. 123). Some analysts argued that besides the emblematic cases of a coupling strategy (one in which states defend the status quo and follow the U.S. strategic interests, displayed, for example, by Menem or Uribe), Fujimori’s foreign policy was really close to following it (Russell & Tokatlian, 2009, p. 229).

Fujimori’s relations with the United States did not run smoothly, however. Human Rights violations, the *Autogolpe* of 1992 (he closed the Peruvian Congress and restricted civil liberties arguing his fight against terrorism), and his 2000 campaign’s criticism of the neoliberal model to charm voters strained relations between Washington and Lima (Ellner, 2003, pp. 156–157; Mantilla Falcón, 1998, pp. 87–88). Despite these problems, he did not alter the overall Pro-Core orientation of Peru’s foreign policy.

In this sense, the low similarity of his administration’s voting behavior at the UNGA to the United States and its high similarity to China need a finer analysis of the scores. The ideal point similarity score is a dyadic measure, which necessarily involves the actions

of the two extra regional powers. After the end of the Cold War, the United States ideal point estimate moved away from the average position of South America. Indeed, Clinton was the most extreme of the United States' Presidents, as Figure 4.10 shows, reaching Washington's highest score in 1999 with an ideal point estimate of 3.54. Moreover, Clinton's average was 3.45, while his predecessor had an average of 3.02 and his successor of 3.07.

On the other side of the Pacific, China's ideal point estimate was the closest to South America at the beginning of the 1990s, with a significant "drop" in 1993. Beijing had positive ideal point estimates in 1990 and in 1991, and only afterwards its voting behavior moved away from South America's trends. While China's average under Deng's leadership was -0.03, Jiang's ideal points estimate average was -1.45.

With these considerations in mind, Peru's voting behavior under Fujimori changed significantly, as shown above. His lowest ideal point estimate score was -0.14 in 1991, his highest was 0.31 in 1998, and the overall trend was a movement towards a positive figure. This process coincided with China's initial stance in early 1990 (thus making him the closest Peruvian President to China's positions). Despite Fujimori's change, when Clinton was reaching his highest score, so was Fujimori. In other words, Clinton's voting record outpaced Peru's approximation to Washington's position. In sum, Fujimori's similarity scores were more the result of extra regional powers' actions than the outcome of his own orientation and policies. Therefore, the apparent inconsistency within his triplet stemmed from decisions he could not control and not from his own contradictory policies.

Besides these cases, in terms of the possibility of ensuing role conflicts due to their proximity to China, the Pro-Core Presidents all share the same characteristic: they were in office in early 1990s, when China was not an important partner for South America. As with Menem and Fujimori, Aylwin, Gaviria, and Pérez coincided with Deng's leadership in China, whose voting behavior was closer to South America than his successors. Besides, they all witnessed the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the "new world order", as stated by then President George H. W. Bush. In these cases, then, the possibilities of role conflicts stemmed solely from role relations with the United States, conforming to equation 13. Given the orientation of their role conceptions, which were in line with Washington's expectations, the source of the conflicting expectations rested on



their foreign policy options—the way their administrations voted at the UNGA—, thus creating intrarole conflicts.

From the Colombian perspective, Gaviria considered the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a group within the U.N. system in which he could forge alliances to push forward its own foreign policy agenda (Pardo, 1990, p. 5). This Third World approach to addressing multilateral issues was reaffirmed by chairing the Group of 77 in 1993 and by winning the bid during Gaviria's tenure to chair the NAM between 1995 and 1998. Additionally, on the day of his inauguration, Gaviria declared that his government did not believe in a natural harmony of interests between Washington and Bogotá (an "automatic alignment" à la Menem), and that they will strive for developing friendly and constructive relations with Washington, based on realism and mutual interests (Gaviria Trujillo, 1992, p. 25).

Gaviria thus considered that Colombia's relations with the Third World was not a reason for relations with the United States to turn sour, given the realist prism that guided Bogotá's relations with Washington since the end of World War I (Randall, 2017, p. 127). This balancing behavior between Washington—a Pro-Core orientation—and an active multilateral foreign policy has been a central characteristic of Colombia's international activities, which "has been driven primarily by *realpolitik* and a belief in the fundamental importance of international law" (Randall, 2011, p. 141). Given these reasons, Colombia's behavior at the UNGA was following the Active Independent role, rather than the Defender of the Faith. The former role has a Neutral orientation, thus avoiding an overt clash with the United States. On the contrary, during Gaviria's tenure the United States approved the Andean Trade Preference Act, from which Colombia received economic benefits (Tokatlian, 1996, p. 49).

In Chile's case, Aylwin's main foreign policy goal was to bring back Chile to the international stage (Fermendois, 2006, p. 92) via Chile's active participation in multilateral fora (Medina Valverde & Gajardo Pavez, 2016, p. 735), on the one hand. This goal was set up because his predecessor, Pinochet, faced "international community's rejection (...) which resulted in Chile's political isolation" (Morandé, 2003, p. 244). In consequence, Chile began to participate in regional and global fora following its traditional principles, such as "respect for international law, fulfillment of its international obligations derived from treaties, peaceful resolution of conflicts, self-determination and non-intervention" (I. Walker, 2006, p. 24).

On the other hand, Aylwin's foreign minister stated that Chile's national development was associated to restoring relations with the United States (Morandé, 1995, p. 326). However, although the U.S. ranked high in Chile's foreign policy priorities, Chile did not define its behavior around the United States: It "did not seek an alliance with the great power nor considered necessary to join its antagonists or its detractors" (Van Klaveren, 2011, p. 163). As in Gaviria's case, Aylwin's voting behavior was an expression of the Active Independent role.

These pragmatic relations with Washington led to "Chile's reincorporation to the General System of Preferences, elimination of the Kennedy Amendment sanctions regarding military assistance, and Chile's renewed participation in regional naval exercises" (Loveman, 1995, p. 329). In all, the enactment of the Active Independent role, under its Neutral orientation, did not affect Chile's relations with the United States.

Finally, Venezuela's role behavior on the political dimension of the Defender of the Faith role followed the one enacted on the economic dimension, explained above. President Pérez conceived the orientation of the role as being Pro-Core, but his actions went on a different direction. Venezuela used multilateral institutions, such as the UNGA, to voice its differences with the United States without having to deal with the consequences of bilateral clashes with Washington (Kelly & Romero, 2002, p. 56). In addition, given Venezuela's characteristics at the time: a stable democracy and reliable oil supplier, Washington "should even show tolerance for 'deviant' positions assumed by Venezuela from time to time –voting against American positions in the United Nations, for instance– just as a longtime friend forgives occasional lapses" (Kelly & Romero, 2002, p. 92).

Paradoxically, Pérez voting behavior, although placing Venezuela closer to China, simultaneously made him the closest Venezuelan President to Washington, given the orientation of his successors. These contradictory positions stemmed also from the behavior of the extra regional powers, as in the case of Fujimori. Although he had the most positive ideal points estimate for Venezuela in the period under analysis, changes in U.S. foreign policy drove him away from Washington. At the same time, China's orientation at the beginning of the 1990s made him be closer to Beijing.

The last case with the possibility of intrarole conflict on its voting behavior compared to China is that of Cardoso. He was coded under the Anti-Core orientation but displayed less similarity to China in Brazil's voting behavior at the UNGA than other Brazilian Presidents. This contradiction stemmed from two different processes. On the one hand, changes in the international system in the post-Cold War era led to the belief in Cardoso's government that states would find opportunities if they took the chance of integrating to the emerging international order (Actis, 2014, p. 201). Within this context, Cardoso understood that Washington was an important player in the system and conflicts with the extra regional power would be futile and contrary to Brazil's interests. He thus steered Brazilian foreign policy "away from the *terceiro-mundista* orientation of previous Presidents" (Cason & Power, 2009, p. 122), and concluded that "the United States is our fundamental partner because of its central position" in the international system (as cited in Vigevani et al., 2007, p. 66). This shift led to cooperative relations with the U.S. throughout his tenure (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007, p. 1319). This positive view of the United States is reflected in how favorable he spoke of the United States (Vilela & Neiva, 2011, p. 81). In all, his administration "sought to internalize, absorb, and consolidate the liberal changes that globalization brought to international society during the 1990s" (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2012, p. 53).

On the other hand, Cardoso emphasized "Brazil's normative commitment to democracy and anchoring its promotion and protection in Brazilian foreign policy" (Santiso, 2003, p. 344) too. This focus on democracy ran on three distinct levels. It had domestic roots, based on Brazil's regime change of the 1980s; it had regional expressions, as reflected in Brasilia's position regarding, for example, Fujimori's 2000 election; and on the international or global level. Cardoso believed that "all participants in multilateral fora such as the IMF and the World Bank [should] have an equal voice. This proposition (...) restated Brazil's long-standing adherence to the principle of multilateralism, combining it with the notion of solidarity among developing countries" (Burgess, 2009, pp. 87–88). Solidarity and multilateralism connected Brazil and China, and during Cardoso's tenure relations between the two improved significantly, as they developed the strategic partnership set up in 1993. Indeed, Brazil was one of the first states to support China's accession to the World Trade Organization (Vigevani et al., 2007, p. 74). Notwithstanding this, some analysts argue that "the possibilities for long-term coordination [between them] in multilateral forums are limited by domestic (institutional) and regional variables" (Pereira & De Castro Neves, 2011, p. 9).

These difficulties are reflected in Brazil's voting behavior under Cardoso's government, despite sharing some principles with China on how the international order should be. Additionally, Russell and Tokatlian consider Brazil as the quintessential case of the limited opposition model of foreign policy dealing with the United States (Russell & Tokatlian, 2009, p. 231), where a state defies Washington in some areas where is prudent to do so and collaborate with the extra regional power in some other areas where mutual interests come together. As an example of these dynamics of cooperation and discord, Brazil and the United States agreed on

global themes such as democracy and human rights, free trade, protection of the environment, and the peaceful resolution of disputes, [and even further Brazil] signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but trade disputes and rivalry persist and are increasing. Brazil has differences with the United States not only on account of the protectionist measures adopted against Brazilian industrial exports to the North American market and effective competition in third-country markets but also with regard to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Bandeira, 2006, p. 21).

In this case, there are two sets of expectations: Washington's and Beijing's, conforming to equation 14. Should Cardoso fully enact the Anti-Core political orientation of the role, that is, voting closer to China, then Brazil could not use the whole role to relate to Washington. However, as shown, although relations with China were increasing, the United States held primacy over China in Brazil's international agenda at the time. Indeed, Itamaraty leaders under Cardoso's administration believed in "building a constructive, positive, and trustful agenda with the United States" (Duarte Villa & Viana, 2008, p. 82). Moreover, less similarity to China does not imply, automatically, complete agreement with the United States. While conceiving an Anti-Core Defender of the Faith role, Cardoso was not fully antagonistic of the United States, nor wholly dissimilar to China.

On the top of the matrix in Table 18 some Presidents showed elements of intrarole conflict too, given their degree of similarity or dissimilarity to the United States and the orientation of their role conceptions. On the Pro-Core column, besides Presidents Menem and Fujimori, explained above, de la Rúa, Lagos, and Pastrana also showed a voting behavior that was considerably different from the United States, within the differences between Washington and South America.

Fernando de la Rúa was in office only two for two years. He was forced to resign amidst Argentina's political and economic crisis of 1999-2001 (Llanos & Margheritis, 2006). De la Rúa's campaign was based on the continuity of Menem's legacy on the economic model, with additional institutional and structural adjustments (Fair, 2017, p. 80). On the foreign policy front, he believed in the need for Argentina to further integrate itself to international markets and to embrace the globalization and integration processes among nations (Fair, 2017, p. 95). Based on these considerations, his voting record in his first year in office was almost the same as his predecessor's (Norden & Russell, 2002, pp. 100–101), and corresponded to the orientation of his role conception.

However, he stopped Menem's automatic alignment with the United States "due to differences on particular questions that are unavoidable in an intense relationship" (Norden & Russell, 2002, p. 116), advocated for multilateral consensus, and did minor changes to Argentina's voting behavior at the General Assembly (Margheritis, 2010, p. 24). As a reflection of this, his position on the matrix corresponds to the score obtained in his second year, which was one of Argentina's highest, in dissimilarity terms, vis-à-vis Washington. During de la Rúa's administration, Argentina's ideal points estimate moved from 0.96 in 2000 to 0.63 in 2001. This change of 0.33, along with movements from Beijing and Washington, implied extending the gap between Buenos Aires' similarity scores to China and the United States. While this difference in 2000 was only 0.24, it was 0.86 in 2001. This change was symbolically represented in the visit de la Rúa did in September 2000 to China (the first he made outside Latin America), and his support for China's accession to the World Trade Organization (Malena, 2011, p. 267). Although he sought Washington's support to find solutions to Argentina's economic crisis, de la Rúa's decisions at the UNGA in his second year signaled, as well, the beginning of the reorientation process of Argentina's foreign policy, by privileging the Active Independent role in this multilateral forum.

Pastrana, as the successor of Samper, came into power at the time when Colombia's relations with the United States were at a low point, as explained above. One of his main foreign policy goals, then, was to restore relations between Bogotá and Washington. By placing a strong emphasis on the domestic problems Colombia was facing, Pastrana developed the idea of "Plan Colombia," a multidimensional strategy that needed important flows of international aid. The United States agreed to participate, but with a

shift towards a counter-narcotics strategy (Pachón, 2009, p. 131; Rojas, 2007, p. 17), to which Colombia acquiesced (Guáqueta, 2005, p. 48). Therefore, of \$860 million the United States gave Colombia, around \$630 million were destined to improving Colombia's military and police forces in the war against drugs (DeShazo et al., 2007, p. 10). The extent of Washington's involvement in Colombia led to an updated version of the *Respice Polum* principle.

However, Pastrana's foreign affairs minister, Guillermo Fernández de Soto, does not concur with this judgement. According to him, the principle guiding Colombia's foreign policy from 1998 to 2002 was *Respice Omnia* (to look to the universe in its totality) under what he termed "interdependent autonomy" (Fernández de Soto, 2004, p. 198). Explaining the gap between Colombia's and the United States' voting behaviors, especially regarding Palestine, he stated that they "were convinced that the friendship and cooperation between Colombia and the U.S. rested on deep and mutual interests bonds, which cannot be altered by the natural actions of both countries in multilateral fora" (Fernández de Soto, 2004, p. 197). In this sense, Pastrana's voting behavior resembles that of Gaviria, where the performance of the Active Independent role explains Colombia's positions at the General Assembly. Furthermore, given its Neutral orientation, its performance did not cause major conflicts with the United States.

Complementing this analysis, Colombia's position at the UNGA, which changed throughout Pastrana's term towards the United States (in 1998 Colombia's ideal points estimate was -0.51 and in 2001 it was -0.06), coincided with Clinton's extreme positions. These dynamics, as in Fujimori's case, helped Pastrana's location in the matrix as less similar to the United States, despite its roles orientations.

Finally, Chile's voting behavior under Lagos exemplifies the divergent postures between the United States and Latin America. He was the first socialist President since Pinochet's coup d'état and, overall, his policy positions can be considered as left-leaning (Gallagher, 2008, p. 56). However, the socialism he represented was a strong defender of democracy and capitalism, "promising to continue the open market policies of the past, but with greater attention to social welfare" (Leogrande, 2007, p. 370). Indeed, he thought that for Latin America the only path for development was to embrace the globalization process and this could only be done via the open regionalism principle (Bywaters C.,

2014, p. 77). This worldview led Lagos to conclude Free Trade Agreements with the United States in 2003 and with China two years later.

The trade agreement with Washington was not without controversy, precisely because of a decision made by Lagos within the United Nations, though it was at the Security Council as a non-permanent member. Amidst the conflict between Iraq and the United States on the former's alleged plans for developing weapons of mass destruction despite the United Nations' resolutions, Washington pushed for a vote on a second resolution condemning Saddam Hussein's regime, thus opening the door for a military intervention with the support of the U.N. Lagos did not support this resolution (Heine, 2006, p. 491), despite Washington's mounting pressure hinting at the stalling of the trade agreement ratification process. Lagos did not cave in and believed that these were two separate issues that had their own logics (Bywaters C., 2014, pp. 79–80). According to some analysts, Lagos' decision "was based on the legalist tradition of Chile's foreign policy as [he] considered the Iraq invasion contrary to the principles of the UN Charter" (Colacrai & Lorenzini, 2005, p. 59), and that his government would not give up "a margin, although a reduced one, of autonomous space to defend the interests and political principles that it considers fundamental" (Wilhelmy & Durán, 2003, p. 285).

Lagos' view on globalization, the issues Chile should stand for in multilateral fora, and its relations with the United States framed how Chile voted in the General Assembly. As part of being an active part of the globalization process, since the early 1990s, Chile defined Asia-Pacific as the "new economic frontier" (Heine, 2016, p. 663). This strategy matched Lago's orientation towards furthering Chile's insertion in international markets, without privileging one sole partner. Thus, signing both Free Trade Agreements did not contradict his overall Defender of the Faith role on the economic dimension, as shown above. Conversely, these actions are in line with the performance of said role, adding to Chile's political portfolio the ideas and interests of its new economic partners.

Lagos also followed the Pro-Core Presidents' logic as he separated Chile's relations with the United States from its positions towards the international order. Therefore, despite Washington's altercasting efforts to locate Chile's role as its ally, Chile played a different role in this situation, that of Active Independent, which Lagos' played it throughout its administration at the General Assembly.

Finally, three Presidents displaying an Anti-Core orientation seems to have intrarole conflicts due to their voting behavior: Fernández, Lula, and Rousseff. However, these three Presidents consistently moved away from the positive side of the ideal points estimate, as shown in Figure 70. The year Fernández came into office, Argentina scored 0.32, while in 2014 it scored 0.01. In Brazil's case, when Lula was sworn in its ideal points estimate was 0.18 and when he left it was -0.19. Rousseff went even further, scoring in her first year -0.3 and in 2014 she scored -0.39. These scores reflect consistency between their role conception and their role performance. Therefore, the reason for their placement in the matrix as similar to Washington lies at the other end of the dyad of the similarity score: The United States. The three of them coincided with President Obama. From the year of his inauguration up until 2013, the United States' score descended almost a quarter of a point. In 2009, its score was 2.52 and in 2013 it was 2.29 (in 2014 he scored more than in 2009: 2.56). Although the South American Presidents were moving faster than the United States, the direction of the movement was the same, thus narrowing the gap between them, as compared with their predecessors in Argentina and Brazil.

In other words, in Brazil's case, between 2008 and 2013, Lula and Rousseff were closer to the United States in their voting behavior than their predecessors, but this does not mean that they were voting more favorably to the United States' interests. The United States was voting closer to them. The same is valid for Fernández in 2010, when Argentina, since Menem, had a low similarity score regarding the U.S.

Moreover, nothing in the secondary literature review on these cases suggests an approximation from the Southern Cone countries towards Washington, besides some agreements on particular issues. On the contrary, dynamics of conflict and cooperation between Argentina and Brazil, and the United States were common in this period.

For example, during Fernández tenure, relations with the United States could be characterized under a consented discord phase (Miranda, 2018, p. 132). This means that both governments agreed to disagree on several issues and on the nature of their relations, though not as stark as how relations between Washington and Caracas were under the Bolivarian governments. From the perspective of Fernández, and from that of her late husband, "the United States was more of a problem than a partner, which opened the door for including it in the portrayal of an epic struggle to liberate the country



from old ties” (Rubbi & Hunt, 2017, p. 599). However, they shared some interests, mainly on Argentina’s need to solve the financial crisis and getting resources from international creditors. As summed up by Malamud, “the Kirchners’ relations with the United States were mixed and variable but not bad overall. They were marked by a degree of tacit reciprocity” (2011, p. 96), involving support by Buenos Aires for Washington’s fight against terrorism in exchange for the United States’ support in dealing with international creditors.

A mixture of agreement and dissent between Brazil and the United States was present during Lula’s and Rousseff’s administrations too. Cason and Power illustrated an interesting case on Brazil. After Brasilia won a case in the World Trade Organization against the United States on cotton subsidies, it refused to raise its tariffs (Cason & Power, 2009, p. 129), signaling Lula’s administration’s interest in cautiously managing their bilateral relations. From the other side of the aisle, President George W. Bush acknowledged the importance of developing good working relations with Brazil. As Lula’s former foreign affairs minister recalled, during Lula’s Presidential visit to Washington in 2003, President Bush said “Brazil and the US have their differences, but let’s work on what we have in common” (as cited in Amorim, 2010, p. 217). Based on these shared interests, “the ‘Strategic Dialogue’ established in 2005 represents US recognition of Brazil’s stature in South America and the world” (Pecequillo, 2010, p. 133). Following the development of shared interests, during then Vice-President Joe Biden’s visit to Rio de Janeiro in 2013, the United States continued to ask for Brazil to “take on more responsibilities commensurate with the country’s new economic power” (Noesselt & Soliz-Landivar, 2013, p. 2). According to this train of thought, then, Washington and Brasilia shared some preferences and interests. In all, Brazil’s foreign policy in this period “constitutes a bid for greater global influence, implicitly at the expense of the traditional Western European powers, but does not threaten the values underpinning the liberal world political economy” (Armijo & Burges, 2010, pp. 15–16).

However, divergences and opposition have also been part of the bilateral relations. Cason and Power also cited an interview with a former Brazilian ambassador to the United States, complaining that Lula’s appointments at Itamaraty were filling the ministry with sentiments of “anti-Americanism” (Cason & Power, 2009, p. 137, footnote 21). Additionally, an image projected by Brasilia rested on the idea that Brazil “has achieved its current stature and influence, not through cooperation, but largely by acting on its own

and regularly saying no to Washington” (Hakim, 2014, pp. 1162–1163). An example of this opposition were the FTAA negotiations. In 2003 and 2004, when Brazil and the United States co-chaired the negotiations, these talks “turned into a US-Mercosur battlefield” (Soares de Lima & Hirst, 2006, p. 34), which in the end led to the dismissal of the whole process.

In a more conciliatory account, some analysts contend that during Lula’s government, Brazilian efforts attempted to “influence the international system in order to stimulate multilateralism, in a fashion that is not antagonistic to the United States but nevertheless considers the possibility of the latter’s weakening” (Vigevani & Ramanzini Júnior, 2010, p. 67). In fact, a parallel frame of Brazil’s foreign policy in this period is the enactment of the role of bridge “between first the United States and Latin America and then the North and the South” (Burgess, 2013, p. 586). This role has allowed “its diplomats to establish the country as a critical coalition-organizer and ideational leader for southern actors looking for major changes in global governance systems” (Hou, 2013, p. 360), hence its Defender of the Faith Anti-Core orientation and its foreign policy at the General Assembly.

In conclusion, the intrarole conflicts derived from the conception and performance of the Defender of the Faith roles, in most cases, only involved one Significant Other: The United States. On the economic dimension, in the cases of Samper, Pérez, and Velásquez China was not yet an important partner for Colombia and Venezuela. The role location process between Colombian and the United States during Samper’s administration involved the enactment of an alternative role, which subsumed the incongruency between the Anti-Core role orientation and the liberal economic policies. The Faithful Ally role in Colombia’s role set linked Samper to Clinton under the basis of the war on drugs. Since this issue was paramount in Bogotá-Washington relations, and Clinton enforced policies to keep Samper in line with the United States’ interests on this matter, Samper did not have a choice to act on its own orientation. In Venezuela’s cases, the role relations followed the opposite pattern. Pérez and Velásquez conceived a Pro-Core role, but their economic policies were not aligned with this orientation. However, they did implement some of the policies under the “Washington Consensus,” thus minimizing the extent of the intrarole conflict.

On the political dimension, the role relations were less harmonic and the distance between South America and the United States framed the role location processes. As mentioned above, since the end of the Cold War the region drifted apart from Washington's positions at the United Nations General Assembly. Within these differences, 12 out of 29 Presidents had voting behaviors opposite to the expectations generated by their conception of the Defender of the Faith role. Of these cases, Menem was a special instance. Argentina's foreign policy changes under his administration were captured by his moving positions across the similarity/dissimilarity spectrum, both in relation to China and to the United States. However, as shown above, overall his foreign policy options were in line with his role orientation, thus eliminating the apparent intrarole conflict.

Another special case was Fujimori's. Despite his role conception, Peru's voting behavior in his administration was the closest to China and the farthest to the United States among all Peruvian Presidents. This contradiction was, nonetheless, attributable not to his decisions, but to Washington's and Beijing's. Changes in the ideal points estimate of the United States and China led to this inconsistency. Fujimori's ideal points estimate records show that he was orienting Peru's votes towards the positive side of the political space closer to the United States. Clinton's "radicalization" was deeper than Fujimori's intent to get closer, however. Additionally, the starting point of the analysis for South America and China, the early 1990s, was the moment in which Peru's scores were closer to Beijing.

This last point is also part of the explanation of Gaviria's, Aylwin's, and Pérez's intrarole conflicts. These three Presidents, despite their role orientation, had voting behaviors closer to China than their successors. The fact that they occupied their posts at the beginning of the 1990s, when China and South America had remarkably similar voting behaviors, translated into their position in the role conflict matrix. These similarities cannot be attributable, however, to a close political relationship with China, nor to a complete clash of interests with the United States.

Rather, in the cases of Colombia and Chile, their voting behavior reflected the performance of a different role: Active Independent. They pragmatically separated their relationships with the United States (their Pro-Core orientations) from their positions in multilateral fora (e.g., the United Nations General Assembly). Given the Neutral

orientation of this role, they were able to develop close relations with the United States, thus ending the role conflict in their interactions with Washington. Moreover, they secured economic resources from the United States: The ATPA for Colombia and the elimination of economic sanctions imposed during the end of Pinochet's regime for Chile.

Pérez lived a different situation. His voting behavior corresponded to the enactment of the Active Independent role as well, but with an Anti-Core orientation. He was, however, at the same time, the Venezuelan President closest to the United States. This paradoxical situation stems from the behavior of China, on the one hand, and on the behavior of his successors, on the other hand. As reiterated several times, at the beginning of the 1990s China had voting patterns closest to South America, which coincided with Pérez term in office, thus placing him in the most similar box to Beijing on the conflict matrix. Additionally, from a domestic perspective, the leaders that came to Miraflores at later points in time, especially Chávez and Maduro, had clear opposing views on the international order to Washington's views. Due to Venezuela's ideal points estimate and the classification parameters, Pérez occupied then a position closer to the United States.

De la Rúa, Pastrana, and Lagos location in the conflict matrix also conforms to their relations with the United States. In all three cases, despite their Pro-Core orientations, their voting behaviors were the least similar to the United States, in comparison to other Presidents in their states. The reason is that they performed a different role at the UNGA, that of Active Independent with a Neutral orientation. Although in Argentina's and Chile's cases China was starting to become a Significant Other, reflected by De la Rúa's symbolic visit to China in 2000 and by Lagos' signing of the Free Trade Agreement with China, the United States was still a referent for their role performances. In the former's case, Argentina needed Washington's help to divert the financial crisis. In the latter's case, closing the deal with China was important in Chile's strategy of diversifying its economic partners. However, the FTA with the U.S. was a foreign policy goal since Aylwin's tenure and ranked higher in Chile's foreign policy agenda at the time.

The remaining four cases did show the simultaneous bidirectional pull from China and the United States, especially in Cardoso's terms. He had to balance Brazil's need to insert itself in global economic and political dynamics without risking the establishment of a hard opposition by the United States. The establishment of the Strategic Dialogue

between Brasilia and Washington, for example, showed how important for both capitals the other was. However, this dialogue was set up to manage their differences, rather than building a common project. At the same time, Brasilia and Beijing were strengthening their strategic partnership, in which they could work on their commonalities. Both coincided in their overall assessment of the international order and the direction it should take. In this case, then, Brasilia had to choose which one it privileged. The matrix located Cardoso in the least similar box Brazilian President to China. This does not mean necessarily, however, that Cardoso was the closest to Washington. In both cases Cardoso's similarity scores descended: from 3.3 to 3.02 with the United States, and from 1.72 to 1.57 with China. These scores and the overall development of relations with the extra regional powers show the balancing act Cardoso performed.

Finally, the cases of Fernández, Lula and Rousseff reflected, as well, the presence of China and the United States in their foreign policy agendas. Running contrary to the expectations given their role orientations, they were placed in the most similar Presidents to the United States quadrant. However, as shown above, this placement had to do more with Washington's performance than with Argentina's or Brazil's decisions. In Fernández tenure, the difference in the voting positions between Argentina and the United States grew, from 2.3 to 2.56, while with China receded, from 1.76 to 1.33. The proximity to the United States, then, was the result of Obama's foreign policy and not due to her actions.

In Brazil's cases, the situation was the same. Lula's and Rousseff's ideal points estimates descended, but so did Obama's. In addition, opposite to Argentina, they did not have an antagonistic view of the United States. This configuration allowed them to perform the role of Bridge, joining forces from the South, but always leaving a door open in their relations with the North/West.

### **3.5 The Dynamics of Interrole Conflicts as China becomes a Significant Other**


The analysis above showed how under just one role, that of Defender of the Faith, opened the spectrum of the relations between South America, and China and the United States. Besides, it showed that most of the role conflicts occurred in the 1990s, before China started to gain economic and political leverage in the region.

As said in the introduction, Beijing began to interact with South America on a more intense fashion since the early 2000s. Ellis described the extent of China's involvement in the region and the possible impact on the regional order in these terms,

the financial solvency of anti-U.S. regimes is increasingly underwritten by Chinese loans, investments and commodity purchases, giving them time and resources to work against the U.S. agenda in the region. On the other hand, the rise of China as a global power, its potential role as a customer, investor and loan provider, and the simultaneous economic stagnation and fiscal difficulties of the United States, leads many Latin American nations to view the United States as but one partner among many, and not necessarily the most attractive one (Ellis, 2013, p. 11).

To qualify this characterization the analysis turns to the analysis of three different relations: Economic, Political, and Military. These are the same that were used to evaluate the interactions within the region and the confirmation of the South American master roles in the second chapter. The following analysis expands and complements the findings derived from the social network analysis' proportional strength measure used in the second chapter by tracing the actual dynamics of each type of relation South America has with China and the United States. With these data, then, it is possible to evaluate the extent to which China has been included in South America's role sets as Significant Other and which has been the consequences of this inclusion for their role performances vis-à-vis the United States.

In economic terms, for example, for most countries 2005 was the year when the curve of goods exchanges in both directions (imports from China and exports to China) became steeper, as shown in figure 77. In other words, China started to be a trade partner only after the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century.




**Figure 77:** Total Trade between South America, the United States, and China, 1990-2015.

Source: Own elaboration with data from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (2020).

Contrasted to exchanges with the United States, Beijing was able to outstrip Washington in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, while in Perú it got closer to the amount of exchanges between Lima and Washington. For Colombia and Venezuela, the United States remained in the top position, despite the increase in the volume of their trade across the Pacific. Important to note though, is that Caracas' trade increment with China was almost twice as much as Colombia's. The former went from close to zero to 20 billion U.S. dollars, while the latter went from close to zero to 12 billion.

From the perspective of South American exports, the position China and the United States occupy in their economic agendas changed as well for most countries. As figure 78 shows, China became the primary international market for Argentinian, Brazilian, Chilean, and Peruvian goods, especially commodities. Again, Colombia and Venezuela lagged their neighbors, thus keeping the United States as their primary destination for their goods. A key feature in Latin American exports to China is that they are composed primarily by raw materials and manufactures derived from these same raw materials (Ortiz Velásquez & Dussel Peters, 2016, p. 13), which has led to a "primary-export specialization in the region" (Bernal-Meza, 2016, p. 32). These exports benefited from the commodities-price boom 2002 to 2011, driven by China's rise (Office of the Regional Chief Economist, 2016, p. 32).




**Figure 78:** South American Exports to China and the United States, 1990-2015.

Source: Own elaboration with data from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (2020).

In the other direction of trade, that is in South American imports from China and the United States, the latter, for all states, was their primary source of goods, as figure 79 shows. In most cases, however, the gap between the extra regional powers became narrower from 2005 onwards as well. Again, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru had closer relations with China than Colombia and Venezuela. In the former countries the PRC was able to close the gap with the United States. In spite these differences, the surge of imports across South America in the first half of the 2000s reflects the competition between the extra regional powers as sources of goods for the regional markets.






**Figure 79:** South American Imports from China and the United States, 1990-2015.

Source: Own elaboration with data from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (2020).

In another important feature of economic relations, foreign direct investments (FDI) reveal the South American priorities for China and the United States. The figures for American FDI were retrieved from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (2020), and the figures for Chinese FDI were provided by the China Global Investment Tracker of the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute (2020). Besides the problems in Chinese FDI figures that Blanchard described regarding their reliability (2016, p. 556), an empirical reality is that Chinese investments in the region were “very limited until 2010” (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2013, p. 11). As an example, between 1990 and 2005, being the latter year precisely the data collection starting point of the China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese investments amounted just 65 million U.S. dollars in Brazil, 22 in Argentina, and 15 in Colombia (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2011, p. 106). This is not just a Latin American characteristic, however. Only after 2001, Beijing “began to formally encourage domestic firms to invest abroad with the launching of the ‘Go Out’ strategy” (Espinasa et al., 2015, p. 2). Under this umbrella, “the Chinese are also now implementing an assertive investment strategy for Latin America” (Bunck, 2009, p. 194). Therefore, instead of showing the movement of FDI across time, figure 80 shows the total amount of investments made by China and the United States between 2005 and 2015.



**Figure 80:** Total Foreign Direct Investment from China and the United States, 2005-2015.

Source: Own elaboration with data from the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute (2020), and the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (2020).


The first thing to note from the figure above is that despite the fuzz of Chinese investments in Latin America, which amounted to a surge of literature (see, for example, Dussel Peters (2014), Dollar (2017), Avendano, Melguizo, and Miner (2017), Grupo Regional sobre Financiamiento e Infraestructura (2016), Gonzalez-Vicente (2012a), and Roldán Pérez et. al. (2016)), the amount that Beijing has invested in the region does not measure up to that of the United States. While the total Chinese investment to the states under analysis amounted to U.S. 97.75 billion dollars from 2005 to 2015, the United States invested in those same states more than twelve-fold, totaling 1289.5 U.S. billion dollars. Notwithstanding this, Chinese investment has been directed to the extractive industries, providing needed resources for South America at a time when international investors were cautious amidst the international financial crisis of 2008.

Aside from these huge differences, a common feature is that both extra regional powers privileged Brazil as the destination of their investments given the size of its economy. In both cases, as well, Argentina and Venezuela followed the South American giant. A third common characteristic is that Colombia occupied the last place as the receptor of foreign investments from both powers. The main difference between the extra regional powers, aside from the total amounts, is that Chile and Peru ranked differently for Washington and Beijing. While the United States prioritized Chile, China focused on Peru.

At the intersection of the political and economic dimensions lies the official aid granted by China and the United States to South America. As other developed states, China has aid as one of its foreign policy tools to advance its political and economic interests (H. Li, 2005, p. 87; Prado Lallande & Gachúz Maya, 2015, pp. 91–92). Due to these apparent self-motivated drivers to allocate aid in different regions of the world, critics often see China's aid as supportive of norm-deviant regimes and as counter-measure for improving governance due to its lack of conditionality (Bräutigam, 2011, p. 753; Deng, 2008, p. 242), in what was defined in this research as Anti-Core. However, others see these flows as an expression of China's emphasis on "mutual benefit and south-south co-operation and contend that China is not a donor but an equal partner" (Bräutigam, 2011, p. 753).

Taking China's intent aside, either as just investing to guarantee continuous access to raw materials, or providing financial support for governments akin to its own political interests, "Latin America received the largest amount of aid of any region" from China between 2001 and 2011 (C. Wolf et al., 2013, p. 25). This fact signals the importance the region has for Beijing. Additionally, this aid and cooperation have been executed "regardless of [the recipients'] political colors" (Zhu, 2016, p. 98).

To compare the extra regional powers' aid flows, two different datasets were employed. The United States's data came from the so-called "Green Book" (U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 2018). Data for China's aid was retrieved from AidData (A. Dreher et al., 2017), which has "provided useful research on China's economic cooperation with Africa" (Carter, 2017, p. 10), and now has global reach. As with investment data, aid data coverage has limitations, one being the time coverage. AidData only covers the period between 2000 and 2014, while U.S. aid data used in this research spans from 1990 to 2015. A reason for the missing years is that Chinese aid, as a foreign policy tool, obeys the "Going Out" strategy, which started in the 2000s. Figure 81 below shows the evolution of aid from these powers to South America.



**Figure 81:** Aid from the United States and China to South America, 1990-2015.


Source: Own elaboration with data from AidData (A. Dreher et al., 2017) and from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (2018). Note: China's figures are in constant 2014 U.S. dollars and the United States' figures are in constant 2016 U.S. dollars.

The analysis of the aid data reveals interesting dynamics: The United States and China have distinct strategic goals given their choice of partners. The United States focused on Colombia and Peru. Although there were aid flows directed to the rest of the South American countries, these flows were negligible compared to those to Bogotá and Lima. Conversely, China privileged those states that were not the center of U.S. aid: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. Additionally, China has given more money to South American states than the United States, despite its "late" entry to the region. This feature makes China a real alternative to Washington for them. The former totals 26.16 billion U.S. dollars, while the latter totals 22.23 U.S. billion.

On the political dimension, the ICEWS database (Boschee et al., 2015), which records foreign policy events, was used. Figure 82 shows the total number of events that have China or the United States as their origin targeting South America.<sup>35</sup> The United States

<sup>35</sup> Although events are not symmetrical, the number of events originating from South America targeting the United States and China does not differ much from what figure 4.18 shows, especially in relation to China. A major difference exists, however, in Venezuela's and Colombia's interactions with the United States. The events originating in Caracas and targeting Washington rounded 8000, while those starting in Bogotá rounded 6000, thus exchanging places between them in comparison to the figure above. The order of the rest of the states remained the same.

had more interactions with South America than China had. Washington privileged, foremost, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. focused on Argentina, Perú and Chile. China centered its actions on Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile.




**Figure 82:** Total Number of Events from China and the United States Targeting South America, 1995-2015.

Source: Own elaboration with data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015).

This number of events supplies one side of the story, however. Conflict and Cooperation are at the center of international interactions. Due to this characteristic, these dimensions also guided South American relations with the extra regional powers. In addition to the event coding, ICEWS supplies an intensity scale to quantitatively assess the level of cooperation or conflict between states. Based on Goldstein (1992), this scale ranges from -10 to 10. ICEWS assigns a value within this range to every recorded event based on the CAMEO classification system. On one extreme, events valuated negatively are conflictive in nature, around 0 are neutral in nature, and on the positive side of the spectrum these events are cooperative.

From the perspective of South America, relations with the United States were mostly cooperative, scoring an average of 1.54 on the intensity scale. Colombia and Chile have the highest average on their relations with Washington, with total means of 2.24, and 2.18, respectively. They were followed by Peru with an average of 1.77, Argentina (1.49), and Brazil (1.43). Venezuela distanced itself from the rest of the states because it had

an average of 0.14. Relations with China were more cooperative than those with the United States, averaging for the region a score of 2.76. Chile had the highest mean (3.09), followed by Venezuela (3.08), Peru (3.00), Argentina (2.63), Brazil (2.48), and Colombia (2.25).



**Figure 83:** South American Events Targeting China and the United States, 1995-2015.

Source: Own elaboration with data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015).


Figure 83 shows the yearly average of the intensity of the events originating from South America and targeting China and the United States, as measured by the CAMEO scale. Although these relations have peaks and valleys for all states, discernable patterns appeared. On the one hand, only Colombia and Peru had an overall increasing cooperative trend in their relations with the United States throughout the years, although falling by the end of the period. The remaining states had downward trends. Of them, Venezuela stands out, due to the steep negative slope of its relations with Washington, reaching the conflictive side of the scale in early 2000s. Following Caracas, as time passed by Buenos Aires also had fewer cooperative relations with the United States, especially after the turn of the century. Although Brazil and Chile also moved in this direction, their downward trend was not as impressive as Argentina's or Venezuela's. On the other hand, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela increased their cooperative relations with China. Brazil and Colombia had negative trends, but the latter had a steeper pattern than the former.

Finally, on the military dimension, China and the United States also had distinct choices. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database (2017),<sup>36</sup> the United States sold conventional weapons to all the countries in the region, as figure 84 shows. The transactions had peaks and valleys as well, but Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru were, in general, the main recipients of U.S. arms. Transfers descended for Argentina and Venezuela at the turn of the century, however. Precisely, the change in pattern began when left-wing governments started to run these states.

China, on the other hand, the data above reveal that it did not have significant exchanges with the region, despite analysts claiming otherwise (Bunck, 2009, p. 199). The only exception was Venezuela. These transfers started, precisely, when the United States stopped selling arms to Caracas. Beijing's other partner was Peru, but the amount of sales did not compare to what Washington sold Lima. Then, Venezuela was the only state that experienced an exchange of arms trade partners, while Argentina did not replace the United States with China, nor with another partner. Indeed, Buenos Aires had engaged in what some analysts called the "unilateral disarmament" (Rubbi & Hunt, 2017, p. 604).

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<sup>36</sup> The data on major conventional arms transfers was selected over the data on small arms provided by NISAT (used in chapter 2) for one reason: China's small arms transfers were minuscule compared to the United States' figures. Not even Venezuela received an amount that would prompt some partial conclusions about the nature of the military relations between China and South America.



**Figure 84:** Arms Transfers from China and the United States to South America, 1990-2015.  
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017).

Based on the nature and intensity of these relations with South America, the United States and China converge and diverge in distinct aspects. Therefore, they have not played in the same manner the role as Significant Other for South America. Table 19 shows the relevance China and the United States had in each type of relation for each South American state.

At the outset, since China started engaging the region and South America started to look east, Beijing has not become a Significant Other in any dimension for Colombia's role set. Although there was an increase in most of the relations with Beijing, none of these measured up to the intensity and extent of Bogotá's relations with Washington. From Colombia's role set perspective, President Uribe's role set had five roles, 3 of which had a Pro-Core orientation, and 2 were Neutral: Internal Development and Active Independent, none of which ignited a closer relationship with China. Moreover, despite President Santos' efforts to "publicly embrace new economic and security ties with the PRC" (Ellis, 2013, p. 11), China did not turn up to be an alternative for Colombia. Although there were changes in the composition and orientation of President Santos' role set, these changes were, for most of their part, the product of domestic interests related to the peace negotiation process undertaken by his administration and not motivated by an increase in Colombia's interactions with China. Therefore, the United



States was Colombia's sole Significant Other and did not experienced any role conflict due to its relations with China.

	Economic				Political		Military	
	Trade		Investment		Aid	FP Events Intensity	Arms Transfers	
Argentina	China	United States	China	United States	China	China –United States		
Brazil	China	United States	China	United States	China	China United States		United States
Chile	China	United States		United States	China	China United States		United States
Colombia		United States			United States	United States		United States
Peru	China	United States	China		United States	China United States		United States
Venezuela		United States	China	United States	China	China –United States	China	

**Tabelle 19:** South American Significant Others across Dimensions.  
Source: Own elaboration.

Conversely, Peru did include China in its role set. As seen above, trade and investments increased since the turn of the century, as well as the cooperative nature of the foreign policy events originating from Lima. First and foremost, on analyzing Peru's relations with China, the economic dimension trumps the political dimension because the economy is paramount "to understand the importance of China in Peruvian foreign policy" (Ramírez Bullón & Ayala Castiblanco, 2017, p. 26). Regarding FDI, Peru has seen important inflows of Chinese investment on minerals (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2012b, p. 109; Novak & Namihas, 2016, p. 55). Due to this emphasis, China holds approximately, "30 percent of Peru's mining investment portfolio" (Creutzfeld, 2016, p. 604). In spite of having a strategic partnership that has evolved from comprehensive partnership in 2004, to a strategic partnership in 2008, to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013 (Feng & Huang, 2014, p. 18), the economic interactions outperformed political exchanges.

However, the United States was an integral part of Peru's role set too and was able to offset these increasing interactions with China. For example, while Peru figured as one of the main destinations of Chinese FDI in the region, the United States privileged Peru in terms of regional aid. The United States is Peru's main international partner in the fight against drugs (a priority that has not been changed by any president) and Washington has substantially funded anti-drug policies in Peru (Koven & McClintock, 2015, pp. 64–66). Peru's signing of free trade agreements with both powers also reflects this balancing act. While the agreement with the U.S. entered into force on February 2009, the agreement with China did so just 13 months later, on March 2010.

Amidst these increasing interactions with China and the simultaneous presence of the United States, Peru's role set has remained relatively stable since the 1990s, conceiving a combination of Pro-Core and Neutral roles. However, Humala did conceive an Anti-Core role: Faithful Ally. This role conception had to do with denouncing the United States' Cuban embargo. Therefore, it had nothing to do with increasing relations with China.

In sum, Peru was able to balance China and the United States as Significant Others in its role set. While the United States was Peru's most important ally, the array of roles in its role set offered the possibility for "developing links with other countries that can be considered as challengers to the American power" (Ramírez Bullón & Ayala Castiblanco, 2017, p. 40) without entering in conflictive role location processes. As China became a Significant Other in respect to some of Peru's relations, mostly economic, the United States remained a Significant Other in political and military terms.

Brazil and Chile faced an analogous situation. They balanced China and the United States in their respective role sets as Significant Others. The stability in their role conceptions, as shown in the role networks above, demonstrates that they were able to have meaningful relations with both extra regional powers without facing role conflicts. In Chile's case, the fact that its leaders conceived Pro-Core roles did not impede the development of close relations with China. Conversely, Brazil's Anti-Core roles did not hamper sound relations with the United States. In both cases, having several roles at their disposal in their role sets allowed them to locate different roles with China and the United States in order to satisfy their role relationships with them. According to the baseline of role conceptions, Brazil's leaders conceived 10 distinct roles, while Chile's averaged 7. Additionally, the Neutral orientation was the most prominent in both cases, allowing them to offset their Anti-Core and Pro-Core orientations, respectively.

In Brazil's case, as one analyst pointed out, its government "should concur to mitigate the rivalry between the US and China" (Guilhon-Albuquerque, 2014, p. 119). The role of Bridge, as explained above, is but one role Brazil conceived to integrate the interests of the two extra regional powers. The fact that Brazil has strategic partnerships with both opened the window of opportunity for performing said role without dealing with role conflicts. Brazil's overall foreign policy orientation and its international standing showed the pull of China and the United States. As Sotero and Armijo contended,

We observed that Brazil was inevitably a Western power, closely tied by culture, history, and geography to the United States and Western Europe, and is thus an emerging power whose future military and diplomatic alignment are not in doubt. In terms of the broad tenor of global governance, one might imagine substituting Brazil for Italy, Canada, or France within the G-7 without anyone noticing the difference.

At the same time, Brazil is a developing country, albeit a middle-income one, and a number of its policy preferences for the international political economy remain closer to those of the modal poor country than to those of the advanced industrial democracies” (Sotero & Armijo, 2007, pp. 64–65).

The United States and Brazil had differences on the international agenda, however, but they “rarely compromise the overall quality of relations” (Lessa, 2010, p. 121). The most recent significant bilateral conflict derived from Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2014 of U.S. spying on Brazilian politicians and entrepreneurs. This incident, reflected in the intensity of the foreign policy events, pushed Rousseff to cancel a planned visit to Washington and a fighter jets purchase order (Ríos, 2015, p. 291), momentarily enacting the role of Rival of the United States.

In parallel, Brazil has found in China a strong supporter for several issues at multilateral fora (Lessa, 2010, p. 124). Among the multilateral spaces Brazil takes part in, the creation and development of the BRICS is the most important stage in which Brasilia met Beijing. This grouping has allowed constant interactions between them, and allowed China to find important partners to promote “its understanding of a ‘fair governance structure’ in international financial institutions” (Peng & Tok, 2016, p. 743), and “enable[d] the four countries to coordinate strategy [sic] for the G20 summits” (Armijo & Burges, 2010, p. 35). Additionally, since very early in their bilateral relationship, they included technical and scientific cooperation, involving the development of satellites, biotechnology, and medicine (De Oliveira, 2004, p. 19). These “new” issues implied a diversification of the nature of their interactions and made possible distinct roles to be located in their relationship.

Despite these new avenues and the opportunities they offered, “a consistent and recurring pattern of Sino-Brazilian relations is the coexistence of polite and laudatory diplomatic rhetoric with timid economic and political follow-through” (Tavares Maciel & Nedal, 2011, p. 240). Precisely, to amend in part this situation, when then President

Rousseff visited China just four months after her inauguration in 2011, Brazil's interests revolved around the creation of business opportunities for Brazilian firms, expanding and diversifying their bilateral trade, mutual investments, technical cooperation, and technology transfers (Ramos Becard, 2011, p. 42). In this sense, although Brazil had deeper relations with China than any other South American state, the economic dimension was particularly important, being a trait Brasilia shared with its neighbors.

Chile, on the other hand, focused on "connections with China and the Asia-Pacific region, and on seeking a privileged relationship with the United States" (Oyarzún, 2013, p. 276). On the one hand, East Asia has been considered by several Chilean governments as "an opportunity to foster economic development" (Dingemans, 2014, p. 68), and its economic foreign policy has achieved several goals in this respect, two of which are paramount for the argument being made: Membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC)—where Santiago meets simultaneously with Washington and Beijing—, and the free trade agreement with China, which was the first Beijing signed with a Latin American country. On the other hand, in this period Chile managed to sign an FTA with the United States—Washington's second agreement with a Latin American country—. In an evaluation of Chile's foreign policy since democratization to 2006, Fernandois argued that relations with the United States "have been the best" in Chile's history (2006, p. 96), and in general this qualification extends to the present.

Its balancing act and the key role relationships Santiago has with Beijing and Washington were made clear in a time span of just three months. President Obama visited Chile in March 2011. During this trip, he "showcase[d] Chile, which has thrived on the 'Washington Consensus'", and in June then Vice-President Xi Jinping set foot in Santiago and signed agreements to "strengthen China's access to Chilean copper" (Dosch & Goodman, 2012, p. 4). On the one hand, Chile has become the exemplary case for sound economic policies and for the stability of its democratic regime, conforming to the liberal view of the international order, as the orientation of the Example, and Defender of the Faith roles shows. On the other hand, its open regionalism approach to economic development, also an expression of its Defender of the Faith role, has met with China's appetite for natural resources. From this perspective, Washington's and Beijing's expectations on Chile's foreign policy could be accommodated without engaging in role conflicts.

Finally, China outperformed the United States in Argentina's and Venezuela's role sets. On the one hand, the only dimension in which the United States was present was the economic, and it had to compete with Beijing. China, on the other hand, became a sole Significant Other in the political dimension, both in terms of aid and in the increasing cooperative nature of their interactions. Additionally, Venezuela was the only South American state that included China as a Significant Other in the military dimension.

From the perspective of their role conceptions, Argentina and Venezuela also experienced changes in their orientation. They modified their contents. As mentioned above, in the 1990s Argentina under Menem had an overall Pro-Core orientation. After the economic crisis and Kirchner came into power, Argentina started to conceive and perform roles with an Anti-Core orientation. Of importance were the Defender of the Faith and the Active Independent roles. Menem conceived the former in its Pro-Core orientation and the latter in a Neutral orientation. Kirchner and Fernández conceived both roles in an Anti-Core orientation.

Some analysts claim that Argentina's alignment with China rested on "grandiose proclamations," while in practice "this position is either debatable or has had doubtful consequences" (Rubbi & Hunt, 2017, p. 602). Moreover, the basis of the relations between Argentina and China has been the economy and that "it seems unlikely that the Chinese directly intervene in the domestic affairs of our country" (de la Balze, 2013, p. 5).

However, Buenos Aires has found in China a supportive partner in the Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands conflict with the United Kingdom (Bartesaghi, 2015, p. 261), which for Kirchner and Fernández was very important in their foreign policy agendas. Moreover, the confrontations these governments had with the international financial institutions and the partial international isolation Fernández experienced led to closer political relations with China (Oviedo, 2016, p. 12). Between 2014 and 2015, both governments signed several agreements on, for example, infrastructure investments, currency swaps, and a joint plan of action to deepen their interactions (Mazzina & González Cambel, 2018, p. 206).

This change in orientation was reflected in the enactment of the Anti-Core roles, as explained above. Kirchner and Fernández changed the overall structure of Argentina's economic system, reducing "the levels of economic openness" (Oviedo, 2010, p. 60), and thus reflected in the economic indices shown above. Amidst this transformation, the international financial institutions, which embodied Western values, were the target of their discontent, as they charged them with the responsibility for not allowing Argentina to overcome its economic crisis. As an example, in 2010 then President Fernández managed to renegotiate Argentina's foreign debt with 93 percent of its creditors. The remaining 7 percent did not agree to this proposal and sued Argentina. The Court of New York sided with the plaintiffs, which "created renewed tensions between Argentina on the one hand and the USA and international financial sector on the other" (Busso, 2016, p. 121).

As Argentina started to have difficulties locating those the Defender of the Faith and the Active Independent roles with the United States, China became its Significant Other in these dimensions. As the increasing relations with China on the economic and political dimensions demonstrates, Beijing threw Argentina a lifeline throughout this period. Besides becoming an important market for Argentinian goods, especially soybeans, aid, in the form of loans and grants amounted US 46000 billion dollars, as shown above. This financial support allowed Argentina to altercast Washington as the source of its problems and strive for a meaningful engagement with countries offering alternatives to the United States.

Finally, Venezuela is the most clear case of role conflict due to having two Significant Others. Although Venezuela conceived the Active Independent role in an Anti-Core fashion during the 1990s, and it kept this orientation afterwards, since the Bolivarian regime came to power its whole role set suffered major changes. Not only did some roles shift the orientation but new roles were conceived. The former process included the Defender of the Faith (which in the 1990s was Pro-Core) and the Regional Subsystem Collaborator (which was Neutral). Chávez and Maduro conceived these roles with an Anti-Core orientation. The latter process involved the conception of the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator and the Rival roles. The United States was the target of these new roles.

As the Bolivarian revolution was taking root, the Department of Defense of the United States considered Chávez as a threat to its interests because he was undermining democracy and promoting regional instability (Lizano, 2008, p. 132). Against these fears, during President Bush's first year, American organizations supporting democracy in Venezuela spent nearly a million dollars supporting Chávez's opposing groups (Leogrande, 2007, p. 372). President Obama kept this negative image of Chávez. He was concerned about the restrictions of "universal rights of the Venezuelan people, threaten[ing] basic democratic values" (as cited in Emerson, 2012, p. 631). Overall, the United States' perception of the Bolivarian Revolution was that it was settled "to undermine the power of international institutions charged with midwifing the New World Order" (Hellinger, 2011, p. 55), as the Venezuelan-led regional initiatives strived for, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. As part of Washington's efforts to rein Venezuela in, amidst their role location processes in altercasting efforts, since 2005 Venezuela has been designated as an uncooperative partner in Washington's war on drugs, and since 2006 in its anti-terrorist campaign, leading to an arms sales embargo and financial sanctions (Sullivan, 2014, p. 321).

Venezuela also shared the threatening expectations of the other. After the United States supported the 1992 coup against Chávez, and "Bush administration geared its efforts towards isolating his leftist government" (Biegon, 2017, p. 3), Venezuela foreign policy radicalized (Nelson, 2013, p. 178). Chávez identified "the United States as the most important external threat to Venezuela's sovereignty, self-determination, and potential for greatness" (Trinkunas, 2009, p. 21), and internationally projected a set of expectations related to a "radical anti-Americanism, or at least, an image of courageously standing up to U.S. objectives" (Corrales & Romero, 2013, pp. 170–171). Dependency to the United States was, then, "a political issue, rather than an economic problem" (Thies, 2017b, p. 672). This portrayal of the United States nurtured the performance of the Anti-Core roles, such as being the Rival of the United States, the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator, or an Anti-Imperialist Agent, to free the region from the American influence and doctrines, using Latin American integration and the oil diplomacy as its preferred foreign policy tools (Sekhri, 2009, p. 431). As proof of the commitments to these roles abroad, in Caracas bilateral relations with the United States President Chávez engaged at times in on-the-ground confrontation with Washington, expelling part of the latter's diplomatic corps, not only as a response to dyadic conflicts, but also as "to

support other Latin American countries experiencing strained diplomatic relations with the United States” (McCarthy-Jones & Turner, 2011, p. 561).

Across the Pacific, Caracas found a “political ally that can serve as a counterweight to Washington, as to who they want to reduce dependencies [sic]” (Ríos, 2013, p. 62), especially against the U.S. hegemony in the region (Tirado Sánchez, 2015, p. 329). Venezuela’s expectations of China revolved around finding reliable trade partners, i.e., governments that could directly led exchanges and investments, and developing international alliances with states that, because their own nature, would be out of reach from Western accountability efforts. China became important for Venezuela on the basis of these expectations (Corrales & Romero, 2013, p. 32). China, then, seemed the right fit to locate these roles. Beijing’s “‘no-strings attached’ policy that does not require adherence to western requirements” (Morgan, 2015, p. 108), especially its disassociation “from political democratization” (Mendes, 2013, p. 2), supplied an alternative to Washington.

The financial and commercial support Venezuela received from China allowed Caracas to perform these Anti-Core roles against the United States. In times when Western resources were scarce, Beijing aided Venezuela with 11.21 billion U.S. dollars, and became a destination for its oil, thus reducing its dependency on the U.S. market (Mijares, 2017, p. 215). Parallel to these economic endeavors, Venezuela also tried to “drag China into Venezuela’s conflict with Washington” (Paz, 2011, p. 222), amidst their role location processes. In other words, Venezuela attempted to altercast China as a rival of the United States and as its Faithful Ally against Washington’s imperialism. China has, however, rejected these roles and has not fully embraced Venezuela’s long-term Anti-Core goals (Cannon, 2009, p. 181; Corrales & Romero, 2013, p. 32; Ríos, 2013, p. 60). China’s (not a) Rival role conception and performance impeded the location of Venezuela’s radical roles in their relationship. A clear example of this is that although China has been involved in Latin American regional institutions (e.g., as a donor in the Inter-American Development Bank, an observer in the Pacific Alliance, and participated in the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States forum), it lacked formal links with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Legler et al., 2018, p. 255). In sum, by addressing the economic benefits of their relations (Hermann, 2013, pp. 142–143), China played “the role of financial and commercial balancer” (Mijares, 2017,



p. 222), and allowed Venezuela to perform the Defender of the Faith, and the Active Independent roles.

### **3.6 Conclusions**

These findings show several dynamics on China's increasing relations with South America and their impact on the region's role conceptions and performances. On the one hand, the interrole conflicts derived from the enactment of a foreign policy option not congruent with the conception of the role involved exclusively the United States. First, on the economic dimension of the Defender of the Faith role, these conflicts occurred during the 1990s, before China engaged the region in any significant way. Second, on the political dimension, although some detected conflicts developed in the 2000s, their empirical tracing showed that, when involving Pro-Core presidents, the source of these conflicts were voting contrary to the expectations of the United States. When these dynamics involved Anti-Core presidents, in most cases these conflicts were caused by choices and changes in the extra regional powers, rather than by the actions of the South American leaders. In all, these intrarole conflicts were reduced by activating a different role in South America's role sets, that of Active Independent. As seen above, none of the Pro-Core presidents suffered harsh reactions from Washington.

On the other hand, a key finding of this research was that despite China's increasing relations with South America and its configuration as Significant Other, the region, overall, did not see a radical change in the composition of their role sets. In other words, China's regional engagement did not bring about a reorientation of the region's overall foreign policies.

Brazil, Chile, and Peru were able to accommodate their interests and foreign policy goals derived from their intensifying relations with China, with those they had with the United States. Colombia, on its part, did not develop intense relations with China, thus Beijing did not become a Significant Other that could compete with the United States. However, Argentina and Venezuela did see a change on its role conceptions, thus in their role sets. Buenos Aires relations with China supported and enabled the conception and enactment of Anti-Core roles, mainly the Defender of the Faith and the Active Independent. On this light, Argentina altercasted the United States as the source of its problems, mainly because of its close links with the international financial institutions. These relations with

both China and the United States derived in interrole conflicts, where the location of those Anti-Core roles with China constrained their location with the United States.

Finally, Venezuela was the exemplary case of interrole conflict as the product of the arrival of China to the region. As relations with the United States started to run on a conflictive path, both states engaged in altercasting efforts to change what each considered deviant behavior. Washington used diverse foreign policy tools, such as economic and military sanctions to try to isolate Caracas. Besides the rhetoric, Venezuela started to act within and outside the region to escape these measures and found in China an alternative partner. Across the economic, political, and military dimensions of the interactions, China became a Significant Other for the Bolivarian leadership. With China's support, Venezuela could play the Defender of the Faith and of the Active Independent roles. Furthermore, Venezuela tried to encourage China to join it in the performance of additional roles: Rival, Anti-Imperialist Agent, and Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator. However, China did not go along with Caracas's expectations. China's own role conceptions, mainly its (not a) Rival role impeded the location of these new roles.

## 4 Conclusions

States interactions construct the social structure in which they meet. In the case of South America, the relations of its members define its order. Based on this idea, the regional order was portrayed using Social Network Analysis on three different relations: trade, tackling the economic dimension; foreign policy events, addressing foreign policy activism and the political dimension; and small arms trade, complemented with military expenditure, dealing with the security dimension. Additionally, different Social Network Analysis measures were employed to reflect the network power of each South American state because the position it occupies is related to its power. The combination of these measures resulted in a regional hierarchy.

According to this analysis, South America has a four-tier structure. While some states economically, politically, and militarily engaged the region, two of them were observants to the regional dynamics: Guyana and Suriname. Therefore, their regional power was lower than the rest of the states. Their master role, then, was that of a quaternary power. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay belonged to a group that performed better than Guyana and Suriname, but the extent of their interactions positioned them in a tertiary master role group. Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela were identified as having a master role of secondary powers. They engaged most of the region across two or three dimensions. Finally, Brazil and Colombia were identified as being the primary powers of the region. The case of Brazil conforms to what other analysts using traditional realist measures state. However, the case of Colombia was surprising, given that the common assumption is that it plays the role of a secondary power in the region. In this sense, an avenue for future research could be opening further the relational approach to confirm these results. Finally, the United States and China privileged their relations with the first two groups. This acted as a confirmation of their master roles and none of the states experienced a master role conflict. In sum, these findings validate hypothesis 2: *The position a state occupies in the South American pecking order is not affected by its relations with China and the United States.*

Notwithstanding this, the differences in the depth of the relations across the region and between South America and the extra regional powers, showed that not all states had the likelihood to experience role conflicts given the simultaneous significant relations with China and the United States. These criteria, then, served as a threshold to reduce the cases to examine their auxiliary roles.

Precisely, this was the focus of the third chapter. It included the Quantitative Content Analysis of the speeches pronounced at the United Nations General Assembly by each leader of the 6 South American states, plus of those of China and the United States from 1990 to 2015. This analysis, based on the categories proposed by Holsti (1970) and Thies (2017b), revealed continuities in the role conceptions of these states, but also some discontinuities and changes. The latter case is reflected by the changing number of conceived roles in each state, compared to the individual leader's average of that same state. More than an anomaly, this finding supports the idea that roles are fluid, and depend on the priorities of each government, as well as on the international and regional conditions.

In terms of continuities, an important finding was that the role of Defender of the Faith was conceived by all governments, signaling the importance of having a discursive-normative frame for the international actions of the state. The role of Active Independent was also highly conceived. In fact, the only state not conceiving it was the United States, but this was a choice of the researcher, rather than an empirical finding. The fact that the United States is a global pole, and that the Active Independent role tries to detach from any pole in the system, coding any American president under this role seemed unconventional. Some of the underlying principles and meanings of this role were coded under distinct roles. It is important to note, however, that although these states shared the role brand, it might be the case that its contents were different. A case in point was the Defender of the Faith conceived by Hugo Chávez and the Defender of the Faith conceived by George W. Bush. Other roles, conversely, were conceived by one or two states. The Anti-Imperialist Agent was conceived only by Venezuela, and the Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator was conceived by Washington and Caracas.

The orientation of the roles along a continuum defined by their stance towards the international order set up by the West showed, as well, changes in the content of roles. When Chávez took office, he gradually changed the general orientation of Venezuela's foreign policy. In the 1990s, Venezuela's role set included roles with a Pro-Core orientation along a few with an Anti-Core orientation. After Chávez started to radicalize the revolution, especially after the unsuccessful coup d'état of 2002, Venezuela had only Anti-Core and Neutral role conceptions.

The last step to examine the influence of China's "arrival" to the region included the assessment of the South American states' foreign policy options. Based on the indexes chosen to measure the degree of convergence between their role conceptions and their role performances of the Defender of the Faith role, it could be concluded that the intra-role conflicts involving the incompatibility of the auxiliary roles with the foreign policies did not include China. This means that the only reference was the United States. On the economic dimension of this role, these conflicts happened before China started to develop closer relations with the South American states. On the political dimension of the faith, the dynamics were more complex. In the case of presidents having a Pro-Core orientation, intra-role conflicts had the United States as reference. Additionally, when these conflicts were present for Anti-Core presidents, they were the result of the foreign policies enacted by the extra regional powers. Moreover, the conflicts were attenuated by enacting a different role from their role sets. Here, the condition of having several roles at their disposal was the source of solving the conflict because they activated the role of Active Independent. Since this role had a Neutral orientation, the role relation could be redefined. To support this claim, the fact that the United States did not punish the Pro-Core presidents for the deviant behavior shows that Washington's role expectations were in line with the Active Independent role, rather than with the Defender of the Faith role.

Based on these results, this analysis did not find any evidence, all things being equal, in support of hypothesis 4: *The level of relations a South American state has with China affects the enactment of its foreign policies towards the United States.*

Another conclusion stems from the composition of the role sets in South America. Despite China's active participation in the region since the 2000s, most of the states did not change the overall composition of their role sets. Brazil, Chile, and Peru, which included China as Significant Other due to the intensity of their relations with Beijing, were able to accommodate the presence of China with the presence of the United States. Colombia, on the other hand, did not include China as a Significant Other. The low level of Bogotá-Beijing relations did not open the space for China and the United States to compete for Colombia's alignment.

Argentina and Venezuela, however, did change the composition of their role sets. This change occurred in their role conceptions, i.e. in the meanings attributed to their auxiliary

roles. In the case of Argentina, its relations with China supported the conception and enactment of Anti-Core roles, especially the Defender of the Faith and the Active Independent roles. Amidst this process, Argentina blamed Washington for its domestic problems, in an altercasting effort. This case exemplifies an inter-role conflict where the location of a role with China impeded its location with the United States.

Venezuela, according to the analysis, immersed in different inter-role conflicts derived from its simultaneous relations with China and the United States. On the one hand, Caracas and Washington tried to altercast each other, in efforts aimed at changing deviant behavior. Washington implemented several foreign policies to isolate Caracas, while Venezuela engaged in discursive efforts to condemn the United States. Additionally, Caracas acted in the region to create an Anti-Core bloc, and outside it found China as an alternative partner. Across the three dimensions evaluated, China became a Significant Other for Venezuela. With this support, Venezuela enacted the Defender of the Faith and Active Independent roles in their Anti-Core orientation. In addition, Venezuela tried to altercast China to play more active Anti-Core roles: Rival, Anti-Imperialist Agent, and Bastion of the Revolution-Liberator. However, China resisted because the composition of its own role set, especially the conception and enactment of the (not a) Rival role—fundamental in Beijing’s peaceful rise/development rhetoric—impeded the location of these new roles.

These results show that hypothesis 3: *The level of relations a South American state has with China changes the meanings it attaches to the functions in the system it has in opposition to the United States*, can only be partially accepted. Three states, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, that have important and dynamic relations with China, have not experienced radical changes in the contents of their auxiliary roles, compared to what they had in the 1990s. As noted, the absence of role conflicts suggest that they establish role relations with both China and the United States with different triplets of their role sets, avoiding role conflict dynamics. Only Argentina’s and Venezuela’s cases confirm this hypothesis.

Finally, hypothesis 1: *The more China engages a South American state, the more likely it is that the latter experiences a role conflict with the United States* is also partially supported. China’s interactions with the region have not generated role changes as expected, given its economic muscle and its interest in the region. The composition of

the South American role sets did not experience major changes after China started to interact with the region. On the one hand, the master roles and the foreign policy options were not affected by the dynamics of having to deal simultaneously with China and the United States. On the other hand, only Argentina and Venezuela had changes in the orientation of their auxiliary roles, supported by their relations with China.

This dissertation sheds light on the United States-China competition from the lenses of South American foreign policies. By formalizing the role relationships and role conflict dynamics and combining them with Social Network Analysis, it provided new insights on the United States-China-South America triangle and opened a new research avenue, amidst its own limitations. To overcome them, extending the research design to other type of relations, and contrasting those results with the ones of this dissertation, could extend the conceptual richness of Role Theory, support the interactional turn in International Relations via Social Network Analysis, and, more importantly, could enhance our understanding of the implications of China's rise in the region.





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## **Appendix 1: Summary and Zusammenfassung**

### **Summary**

The People's Republic of China has been pursuing an active foreign policy across the world. One of the regions where China has increased its engagement is South America. Bilateral trade has soared since the turn of the century, financial loans and Chinese investments have targeted key sectors for China's interests, direct political contacts have increased, and even military exchanges have been developed across the Pacific. Since this region has traditionally been ordered along the United States' interests and norms, and there has been a qualitative and quantitative expansion of areas where China interacts with South America, this region becomes an interesting political space to assess the extent of influence Beijing has gained vis-à-vis Washington.

The competition between these two powers in South America has been analyzed from the perspective of China and the United States. This dissertation takes the opposite direction. Based on role theory, and specially on the concepts of role sets and role conflicts, with the aid of social network analysis, content analysis, and congruence procedure, the research focuses on how and on which foreign policy dimensions South America has included China as Significant Other and what has been the consequences of this inclusion for their relations with the United States.

The period of observation was from 1990 to 2015 on three distinct foreign policy domains: economic, political, and military, to compare South American role sets before and after China's engagement with the region. In this sense, the first step was to identify the ordering of the region according to their master roles because this concept is associated to the position a state occupies within a social hierarchy. The first finding of the research, using social network analysis' centrality measures, was that four distinct categories of states, according to the extent of their relations with their neighbors, make up the regional order. Moreover, China and the United States privileged 6 states belonging to the first and second most important states, and was concluded, then, that

their interactions did not cause a master role conflict with neither of the states. In addition, this analysis also served as a case selection method.

On a following step, speeches at the United Nations General Assembly were content analyzed. The purpose of this analysis was to establish a baseline of role conceptions for the six South American countries and the extra regional powers. Besides this identification, their orientation was also characterized as being Pro-Core, Anti-Core, or Neutral. This led, on the one hand, to advance in the task of building up the role sets for each state, and on the other hand, to the construction of three role networks according to their direction. The main finding in this section was that the Defender of the Faith role was broad enough to allow for the detection of role conflicts and role change.

Based on these role sets, a third step included the analysis of foreign policies associated to the Defender of the Faith role, and thus completing the states' role sets. On its economic dimension, the level of congruence between the orientation of the role and the economic policies implemented in their states was assessed, using economic freedom and globalization indexes. On the political dimension, the congruence was measured using voting behavior on "important votes" at the United Nations General Assembly. Based on this analysis, only a handful of presidents implemented policies contradicting their own role conceptions, leading to intra-role conflicts. However, these instances occurred in the 1990s, before China's engagement with the region. Thus, the sources of the conflicts cannot be attributed to Beijing. These were expressions of their domestic realities and their relations with the United States.

Finally, the analysis contrasted the changes in the composition of South American role sets to the degree of their economic, political, and military relations with both China and the United States. The data showed that despite the increase of relations with China and its inclusion as Significant Other, only two countries, after the 2000s, changed the composition of their role sets. Argentina and Venezuela were the only cases in which inter-role conflicts and role changes in relation to the United States were detected due to their own national conditions and their interactions with China. Therefore, it could be concluded that China's influence in the overall orientation of the region's foreign policies has been limited and, within the period under observation, it did not represent a big challenge for the United States.



## **Zusammenfassung**

Die Volksrepublik China betreibt weltweit eine aktive Außenpolitik. Südamerika ist dabei eine der Regionen in denen sich China verstärkt engagiert. Seit der Jahrtausendwende steigert sich der bilaterale Handel, finanzielle Darlehen und Chinesische Direktinvestitionen gehen auf Chinas Schlüsselbrachen zurück, direkter politischer Austausch findet immer häufiger statt und auch auf militärischer Ebene intensiviert sich die Kooperation. Da die Region traditionell von US-amerikanischen Interessen und Normen geprägt ist und die chinesisch-südamerikanische Interaktion sowohl qualitativ als auch quantitativ zugenommen hat, ist Südamerika ein interessanter politischer Raum, um zu untersuchen, ob der Einfluss Pekings im Vergleich zum Einfluss Washingtons gestiegen ist.

Der Wettstreit zwischen diesen beiden Mächten in Südamerika wird meist aus der Perspektive Chinas oder aus der Perspektive US-Amerikas analysiert. Diese Dissertation geht jedoch den entgegengesetzten Weg. Basierend auf Rollentheorie, insbesondere unter Verwendung der Konzepte Rollen-Sets und Rollenkonflikte wurden soziale Netzwerkanalyse, Inhaltsanalyse und Kongruenzanalyse methodisch verschränkt, um zu untersuchen, in welche Außenpolitikbereiche südamerikanische Staaten China als BezugsgöÙe integrieren und welche Auswirkungen diese Integration für ihre Beziehungen mit US-Amerika hat.

Der Analysezeitraum reicht von 1990 bis 2015 und umfasst drei Außenpolitikbereiche, wirtschaftliche, politische und militärische Zusammenarbeit. Innerhalb dieser Bereiche werden südamerikanische Rollen-Sets vor und nach Chinas Engagement in der Region verglichen. Dafür muss in einem ersten Schritt zunächst die regionale Ordnung anhand

der Master-Rollen analysiert werden. Sie bestimmen die Stellung eines Staates innerhalb der sozialen Hierarchie. Basierend auf dem Zentralitätsmaß der sozialen Netzwerkanalyse kann als erstes Ergebnis festgehalten werden, dass vier bestimmte Kategorien von Staaten die regionale Ordnung bestimmen. Diese Kategorien wiederum sind gegliedert nach der Intensität der Beziehungen, die ein Staat mit seinen Nachbarn hat. Sowohl China als auch US-Amerika bevorzugen sechs der am besten vernetzten Staaten und es kann festgestellt werden, dass die Interaktionen keinen Master-Rollenkonflikt verursachte. Die erste Analyse diente zudem auch der Fallauswahl.

In einem nächsten Schritt werden Redebeiträge vor der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen einer Inhaltsanalyse unterzogen. Auf ihrer Grundlage lassen sich grundlegende Rollenbilder der sechs südamerikanischen Länder und der zwei außerregionalen Mächte erarbeiten. Neben der Identifizierung der Rollenbildern wird zusätzlich eine Kategorisierung in pro-Zentrum, anti-Zentrum oder neutral vorgenommen. Sie ermöglicht zum einen die Konstruktion der Rollen-Sets für die jeweiligen Staaten, zum anderen können so drei Rollennetzwerke mit entsprechender Richtung konstruiert werden. Als Ergebnis dieses Abschnitts zeigt sich, dass die Rolle des Fidei Defensor, des „Verteidiger des Glaubens“ dazu geeignet ist, Rollenkonflikte und Rollenveränderungen aufzudecken.

Basierend auf den zuvor erarbeiteten Rollenbildern werden in einem dritten Schritt die jeweilige Außenpolitiken der Staaten mit Hinblick auf die Rolle des Fidei Defensor analysiert und damit die Rollenbilder vervollständigt. Im Bereich der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit wird anhand von Indizes zu ökonomischer Freiheit und Globalisierung die Kongruenz zwischen der Rollenorientierung und der tatsächlich implementierten Wirtschaftspolitik untersucht. Im Bereich politischer Zusammenarbeit wird die Kongruenz anhand des Abstimmungsverhaltens bei wichtigen Abstimmungen in der UN Generalversammlung bestimmt. Die Analyse zeigt, dass nur wenige Präsidenten politische Entscheidungen trafen, die ihren eigenen Rollenbildern widersprachen und so Rollenkonflikte hervorriefen. Zudem traten all diese Fälle in den 1990er Jahren, vor Chinas Engagement in der Region, auf. Die Ursachen dieser Konflikte können folglich nicht Peking zugeschrieben werden, sondern waren Ausdruck innenpolitischer Gegebenheiten und Folgen der Beziehung zu US-Amerika.

Zum Schluss wird die veränderte Zusammensetzung südamerikanischer Rollenbilder in Relation zur wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Kooperation mit China und mit US-Amerika gesetzt. Die Auswertung der Daten zeigt, dass nach der Jahrtausendwende trotz intensiver Beziehungen zu China nur zwei Länder die Zusammensetzung ihrer Rollenbilder veränderten. Nur in Argentinien und Venezuela können Rollenkonflikte und Rollenveränderungen mit Bezug auf US-Amerika nachgewiesen werden, die von innenpolitischen Faktoren und der Interaktion mit China verursacht wurden. Daher kann abschließend festgehalten werden, dass Chinas Einfluss auf die grundlegende Ausrichtung der Außenpolitik der Region gering ist und im Beobachtungszeitraum keine große Herausforderung für US Amerika darstellt.