

**Constructing Turkey's European Identity:
Discourses in the Council of Europe's
Consultative Assembly, 1949-1963**

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1 Introduction

1.1 Subject of Research

“Turkey is not a European country [...]. Its capital is not in Europe and 95 per cent of its population live outside Europe,”¹ said former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in a 2002 interview against Turkish membership into the European Union. The question of Turkey’s belonging to Europe has challenged politicians, historians, and geographers for decades. The subject gained considerable public attention when the country became an EU candidate in 1999. In times of on-going accession procedures, opponents of Turkey’s EU membership used identity politics, whether geographically, culturally, or historically to argue that Turkey was not part of Europe. Proponents emphasized Turkey’s political and economic progress and its long partnership with Europe and, thus, focused less on essentialist images of Europe having fixed geographic or cultural borders.²

In 1963, the association agreement between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC) was signed – known as the Ankara Agreement. The President of the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein, clearly stated, “Turkey belongs to Europe.”³ It should be noted, however, that at the time of this statement there was little consensus between EEC decision makers regarding Turkey’s European identity.⁴ And the idea of what it meant ‘to be European’ and

¹ Honor Mahony, “Turkey is not a European country, says Giscard,” *EUobserver*, 8 November 2002, <https://euobserver.com/enlargement/8315> (18 December 2019).

² Currently, the relationship between Turkey and the EU is “rather gloomy” (Atila Eralp, “Revitalizing Turkey-EU Relations?” *IPC-Mercator Policy Brief* (March 2018), 3, https://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/RevitalizingTurkeyEURelationsPolicyBrief_web.pdf) since Turkey has been moving away from the EU, particularly since it declared the state of emergency in July 2016 following the attempted coup and the implementation of the presidential system. See also the Turkey 2018 Report of the EU, <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-turkey-report.pdf> (9 April 2019). With regard to the accession process of EU candidates, the term ‘negotiations’ is misleading since it simply means the opening of chapters with the aim to apply the EU *acquis*. Regardless of the open-ended decision-making process following these national legislative reforms to meet the EU regulations (namely, the whole *acqui* consisting of 35 chapters), within this process there is nothing to be negotiated. For a detailed explanation of all the single steps of the EU’s accession policy and what it means to open chapters and ‘to negotiate’, see the following report: European Stability Initiative (ESI), “The chapter illusion. For honesty and clarity in EU-Turkey relations,” 15 May 2017, <https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20The%20Turkey%20chapter%20illusion%20-%2015%20May%202017.pdf> (9 April 2019).

³ “Die Türkei gehört zu Europa” (translation from German by the author). See Walter Hallstein’s speech on the occasion of the signature of the so-called Ankara Agreement (“Agreement Creating an Association Between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community”), Ankara, 12 September 1963, in *Walter Hallstein - Europäische Reden*, ed. Thomas Oppermann, in collab. with Joachim Kohler (Stuttgart: Dt. Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), 438-440.

⁴ With regard to Turkey’s belonging to Europe, there were two camps within the EEC, as Eugen Krieger shows in his analysis of the decision-making process concerning an EEC-Turkey association: the proponents led by Germany, and the sceptics led by France. France thereby also argued with cultural arguments and questioned Turkey’s cultural belonging to Europe. Cf. Eugen Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei. Der*

Europe's borders were loosely defined. Still, Turkey was accepted as an associate member and, according to Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, a "European country"⁵ – just as it had been when it joined Western and European organizations like the OEEC (today's OECD) in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO in 1952.

As a result, definitions of Europe's identity, as well as perceptions of Turkey's compatibility with these constructions, have changed in time and (discursive) space. It becomes apparent that Turkey's European character has been as contested and convertible as the concept of Europe and its identity. In other words, according to Walter regarding Turkey's European identity, "It would all be so simple, if there was something like a *real* Europe."⁶ Considered from a constructivist and discourse-analytical perspective, there have been numerous social constructions of Turkey's identity as European as well as numerous attempts of defining European identity.

This study contributes to the field of research on formation processes of Turkish and European identity constructions. It analyses the active role Turkish politicians had in representing Turkey's identity as European and, while doing so, on Turkish contributions in shaping concepts of the European collective. It also examines Turkey's passive role in European identity formations by analysing how European politicians perceived Turkey in regards to its belonging to Europe.

The research focuses on the Council of Europe (COE), the oldest European political organization, founded in 1949. The COE's main goal was to secure peace in Europe through economic, social, and cultural cooperation. This was the first time representatives of national parliaments across Europe came together to form a Consultative Assembly.⁷ The Council's main task was to preserve core elements of defining European identity – that is democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Even more important for the choice of the COE as the study's key object of inquiry is the fact that Turkey was accepted as a member shortly after

Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft während der Assoziierungsverhandlungen mit der Türkei 1959-1963 (Zürich: Chronos, 2006), 162 and 233ff.

⁵ According to the EEC Treaty, "Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community." Treaty establishing the EEC, Article 237: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html (9 April 2019).

⁶ "Alles wäre ganz einfach, wenn es so etwas wie ein *reales* Europa gäbe" (translation from German by the author). This is how sociologist Jochen Walter summarizes in his analysis of German and British newspapers concerning perceptions of Turkey as in- or outside the European community. Jochen Walter, *Die Türkei – ‚Das Ding auf der Schwelle.‘ (De-)Konstruktionen der Grenzen Europas* (Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 75.

⁷ The main bodies of the COE were the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly (in 1974, it was recalled Parliamentary Assembly). Concerning its motivation see the Statute of the COE, the Preamble as well as Article 1.

the organization's inception in 1949.⁸ Turkish delegates were active participants in discussions about Europe's future from the very first parliamentary session. The COE's Consultative Assembly remains a unique example of a European assembly incorporating Turkish representatives as equal members. A Turkish deputy commented in a parliamentary session, "We Europeans must obey certain common rules and have the same conception of a common liberty."⁹ It is evident in the verbatim speeches of the COE's Assembly that Turkish deputies actively contributed to Turkish identifications with Europe and shaped European principles and identity.

The analysis starts with Turkey's accession process to the Council of Europe in 1948/49 and ends in 1963 – the year Turkey and the European Economic Community signed the Ankara Agreement. The Ankara Agreement was an important caesura for Turkey in its efforts to be accepted as an equal member of the European community.¹⁰ Although this treaty was achieved outside the scope of the Council of Europe's policy, it was still a topic of discussion in the COE's Assembly. The Assembly, not least, served Turkish delegates as a stage to argue for their country's association with the EEC as the minutes of meetings demonstrate (after all, all of the EEC member states were represented in the COE).

The selected period (1948/49-1963) is of particular importance with regard to Turkish-European relations. Following World War Two, after years of external neutrality, Turkey began demonstrating an active foreign policy shift towards Europe by joining different Western organizations and by its military contribution to the Korean War (1950-53). It was these war efforts that proved its allegiance to the 'Western Bloc'. During the Cold War, the common enemy in 'the East' – perceived as the 'evil Other' – was advantageous for Turkey to be accepted as a part of Europe, as the verbatim records of the COE's Assembly show.

In contrast to the limited power and conflicting reputation of today's COE,¹¹ the period of investigation can be seen as the organization's "golden age"¹² in which the COE became "a

⁸ Turkey joined the COE shortly after the signing of the London Treaty in May 1949 and, hence, became a member in August 1949 (together with Greece). As a result, a Turkish delegation already took part in the first session of the Assembly on 10 August 1949.

⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 9th sitting, 16 August 1950, Baban (Turkey), 283.

¹⁰ Last but not least, the vast amount of sources made it necessary to limit the period.

¹¹ The COE's decrease in reputation was especially due to cases of corruption revealed by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in 2012. See European Stability Initiative (ESI), "Caviar Diplomacy. How Azerbaijan silenced the Council of Europe," 24 May 2012, https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_131.pdf (9 December 2019). See also European Stability Initiative (ESI), "The European Swamp (Caviar Diplomacy Part 2). Prosecutors, corruption and the Council of Europe," 17 December 2016, <https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20The%20Swamp%20-%20Caviar%20Diplomacy%20Part%20two%20-%202017%20December%202016.pdf> (9 December 2019).

forum of the framing of European policy.”¹³ This is highlighted by a series of conventions and agreements that were adopted in the 1950s, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Cultural Convention. In contrast to the predecessor organizations of the EU, which focused on economic issues and represented only six European states at the time of formation, the COE, with 12 member states in 1949 (47 today), embodied the idea of ‘greater Europe’ and covered different areas including local government, the environment, education, and science. In other words, it “played a part in building Europe in areas from which the EEC was absent.”¹⁴

In essence, this research examines social constructions of Turkey’s identity as European, as well as constructions of Europe and its collective identity through Turkish self-identifications in the COE’s Assembly from 1949 to 1963. Focus remains on the contributions of Turkish Assembly members, their practices identifying Turkey with Europe, and on the simultaneous interpretations of ‘what is Europe’. This study explores which types of discursive practices, arguments, and narratives served Turkish delegates to argue for Turkey’s belonging to Europe and what kind of Europe they imagined in doing so.

1.2 Literature Review

Research literature relevant to this study is presented according to its proximity to this study’s key research question. It starts with an overview of the literature on 20th-century Turkish-European relations, with a focus on the two decades after World War Two. The second set of research looks at Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe. The third set of research deals with European identity constructions through Turkey. These studies analyse Turkey’s passive role as ‘the Other’ or part of ‘the Self’ in European discourses.¹⁵ The last set of research deals with Turkey as an active contributor to constructions of its own identity as a European or Western country, as well as images of Europe.

Research on more specific topics, like European integration, Turkish domestic and foreign affairs, and the genesis and structure of the Council of Europe are also included in this

¹² Birte Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publ., 2013), 67f. Wassenberg labels the first two decades of the COE as its golden age, and considers the beginning of the end of the golden years when Greece withdrew from the organization after the military coup in 1967.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁵ In the following, the quotation marks are usually omitted for ‘the Other’ and ‘the Self’ in identity constructions.

study.¹⁶ Literature on the concept of collective identity, and especially of European identity (without any reference to Turkey), is presented separately in Chapter 2 on theoretical concepts.

There is a large number of studies arising from the social sciences on contemporary Turkey-EU relations.¹⁷ There is also literature from historical scholars dealing with Turkish-European relations before 1999, when Turkey was granted candidacy status. Among those that contributed the most to this study as overviews, is Heinz Kramer's and Maurus Reinkowski's book *Die Türkei und Europa. Eine wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte (Turkey and Europe. A complicated history of relations)*. Published in 2008, it summarizes milestones of Ottoman-European relations (Reinkowski), as well as Turkish Republican-European relations (Kramer) until 2008.¹⁸ The anthology *Die Türkei und Europa (Turkey and Europe)*, edited by Gabriele Clemens and published in 2007, provides specific articles from different disciplines, each with a reference to the question of Turkey's place in Europe.¹⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand's Turkish-language monograph on Turkish-European relations gives an overview of the period between 1959 and 1995.²⁰

Eugen Krieger (2006) and Sena Ceylanoğlu (2004) provide interesting findings on Turkish-European relations regarding the present study's time focus. Both authors examine Turkey's association with the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1959 to 1963. Krieger analyses documents from the EEC Commission, the Council, and Foreign Ministries of member states, especially Germany and France. Negotiations on the agreement within the

¹⁶ However, those are not presented in this subchapter.

¹⁷ From this huge amount of literature on Turkey-EU relations, it is only possible to mention a few: Beate Neuss and Antje Nötzold, ed., *Türkei – Schlüsselakteur für die EU? Eine schwierige Partnerschaft in turbulenten Zeiten* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018); Senem Aydın-Düzgüt and Nathalie Tocci, *Turkey and the European Union* (London et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Meltem Müftüler-Baç, *Divergent pathways: Turkey and the European Union. Re-thinking the dynamics of Turkish-European relations* (Opladen et al.: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016); Ebru Turhan, *The European Council decisions related to Turkey's accession to the EU: Interests vs. norms* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012); Belgin Akçay and Bahri Yılmaz, ed., *Turkey's Accession to the European Union. Political and Economic Challenges* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2012); Constantine Arvanitopoulos, ed., *Turkey's Accession to the European Union. An Unusual Candidacy* (Berlin et al.: Springer, 2009); Edel Hughes, *Turkey's Accession to the European Union. The Politics of Exclusion?* (London et al.: Routledge, 2011); Birol Yeşilada, *EU-Turkey relations in the 21st century* (London et al.: Routledge, 2013); Annette Freyberg-Inan, *Growing together, growing apart: Turkey and the European Union today* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016); Peter-Christian Müller-Graff and Haluk Kabaalioglu, ed., *Turkey and the European Union: Different Dimensions* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012); Harun Arikian, *Turkey and the EU: An awkward candidate for EU membership?* (London et al.: Routledge, 2018). An often cited (if older, and partly non-academic) volume in German language about different positions with regard to a possible Turkish accession is: Claus Leggewie, ed., *Die Türkei und Europa: die Positionen* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004).

¹⁸ Heinz Kramer and Maurus Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa. Eine wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008).

¹⁹ Gabriele Clemens, ed., *Die Türkei und Europa* (Hamburg et al.: LIT, 2007).

²⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Gümrük Birliği macerası* (Bağcılar, İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1996).

EEC were heavily contested and protracted. Whereas the German government under Adenauer shared the US containment policy and was, therefore, prepared to meet Turkish demands to stabilize the region, the French government never raised security-related arguments within the negotiation process. Apart from economic, agricultural, and political reservations towards Turkey and its commitment to economic reforms, the documents analysed by Krieger reveal that the French Foreign Ministry perceived Turkey as a non-European country also for cultural reasons. As a result, Krieger demonstrates that Hallstein's speech in 1963, identifying Turkey as part of Europe, covered up the internal doubts and critics existent towards Turkey's credibility as a Western European state.²¹

Ceylanoğlu similarly deals with the EEC negotiations on the association with Turkey in her doctoral dissertation. Her work compares the negotiations between the EEC with Greece and Turkey, and focuses on the institutional development process within the EEC, particularly, how the Commission and Council interacted during the negotiations. She reveals that the rationale for different agreements with Turkey and Greece were multifactorial and less grounded in the economic and political contexts in Greece and Turkey. Instead, the different organizational situation of the EEC in 1959, compared to 1961 when the negotiations with Turkey finally started, gave reason for different agreements.²² Both studies provide vital background information about how Turkey and its Europeanness were perceived within the community of the so-called 'Six' when Turkish delegates argued for Turkey's association with the EEC in the Council of Europe.

Incesu's monograph *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel*, published in 2014, examines the entanglement between (Western) German-Turkish relations and the relationship between Turkey and the European Communities between 1959 and 1987. In his analysis of German and Turkish media coverage, he shows the key impact of German-Turkish relations on the relationship at the European institutional level. His thesis explores the existence of a cross-border debate and – most important to this study – discursive interactions influencing perceptions and representations of Turkish and European identity.²³

²¹ Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*.

²² Sena Ceylanoğlu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die Türkei. Die Assoziationsabkommen im Vergleich (1959-1963)* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004). In her dissertation, Ceylanoğlu also refers to other studies, mostly articles, on the association between the EEC and Turkey. For those, mostly older publications, see Ceylanoğlu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 19f.

²³ Günal Incesu, *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel. Die deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen und die Beitrittsbemühungen der Türkei in die Europäische Gemeinschaft 1959–1987* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2014).

Research about Turkey in the Council of Europe is relatively sparse. Apart from an article by this study's author,²⁴ most of the academic literature on this topic examines the reaction of the Council of Europe towards the third military coup in Turkey in 1980 and the subsequent violations against human rights and democratic principles. These studies look at a period when Turkey's membership in the COE was challenged for the first time and the Turkish delegation was excluded from the Assembly until 1984.²⁵

More important to this study is a Turkish-language article by Öncü and Cevizliler that deals with the accession process of Turkey to the Council of Europe. It focuses on diplomatic contacts between COE founding members and Turkey in the summer of 1949, as well as the debate in the Turkish parliament on the approval of Turkey's membership. Speeches from deputies across Turkey's political spectrum show enthusiastic and optimistic views of parliamentarians towards the Council of Europe as the driving force in future European integration.²⁶

Turkey's COE entry is also examined from the European perspective. Zeki Öztürk's French-language doctoral dissertation crucially analyses the impact of the Council of Europe on Turkey's democratization process since 1949.²⁷ However, regarding Turkey's COE entry, Öztürk omits the discussions from the Brussels Treaty Organization in 1948/49, where the

²⁴ Wiebke Hohberger, "Ein Europa ohne die Türkei? Türkische Bemühungen um eine assoziierte Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1959-1963," in *Die Türkei im Spannungsfeld von Kollektivismus und Diversität*, ed. Burcu Dođramacı, Yavuz Köse, Kerem Öktem, and Tobias Völker (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016), 9-35.

²⁵ There are two articles and two unpublished MA theses that focus on this period. The two articles are the following: Dimitris C. Conostas, "The 'Turkish affair': a test case for the Council of Europe," *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 9/2 (1982): 69-87; Burcu San, "The Council of Europe and Forceful Suspension of Democracy in its Member States. A Comparison between the Council of Europe's Response to the Military Takeover of 1967-1974 in Greece and the Military Takeover of 1980-1983 in Turkey," *Turkish Yearbook of Human Rights*, Vol. 17-18 (1995-1996), 15-42. The two theses are: Ahmet Edel, *Die Türkei im Europarat. Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und dem Europarat in der Krisenzeit von 1980 bis 1986 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhaltens der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats gegenüber der Türkei* (MA thesis, University of Kassel, 2002); Kaan Esener, *Avrupa Konseyi ve Türkiye (1980-1986)* (MA thesis, Ankara University, 2003). Additionally, the journalist Kayhan Karaca focusing on European institutional debates wrote a non-academic book on Turkey's contribution in the process of uniting Europe through its COE membership since 1949. Karaca describes debates in the Assembly and thereby puts Turkish delegates on a pedestal considering their importance for Europe's unification process. See Kayhan Karaca, *Turkish Founding Fathers of United Europe* (Istanbul: NTV, 2011). Another book that includes 'Turkey' and 'Council of Europe' in its subtitle is the dissertation of Yusuf Aslan; however, this is somewhat misleading since Turkey's membership in the COE and the debates subsequent to the military coup of 1980 are only briefly described, but neither analysed on the basis of primary sources nor is it considered from a certain perspective or a key research question respectively. See Yusuf Aslan, *Die Türkei: Von der West-Integration zur Ost-Wendung? Institutioneller Verwestlichungsprozeß in der türkischen Geschichte und dessen Auswirkungen auf die türkische Außenpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beziehungen der Türkei zum Europa-Rat, der NATO und der EU* (Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Peter Lang, 1998).

²⁶ Ali Servet Öncü and Erkan Cevizliler, "Avrupa Bütünleşmesi İçin Önemli Bir Adım: "Avrupa Konseyi" ve Türkiye'nin Konseye Üyeliđi Meselesi," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 7/13 (2013), 15-44.

²⁷ Zeki Öztürk, *Le rôle du Conseil de l'Europe dans la démocratisation de la Turquie* (Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Peter Lang, 2016).

founding of the Council of Europe was established and Turkey's admission was discussed.²⁸ Taken together, these two studies reveal that the Turkish quest to become a member of the first political European organization was by no means uncontested. Ultimately, Turkey's accession in each setting was due to security reasons in an increasingly bipolar world system. Consequently, what it meant for Turkey to be a member of the COE as of 1949 has been examined only by few academics. Key research questions of the existing literature refer to the tribulations of Turkey's democratization process and the COE's reaction to and influence on this process. Questions on social constructions of Turkey's Europeanness, whether produced actively or passively through Turkey, have been left in the dark.

Many analyses deal with discursive constructions of European identity through Turkey as the Other.²⁹ It became a popular research subject when Turkey became an EU candidate in 1999 and more so in 2005 when the 'negotiations' on Turkey's EU bid started – and when Turkey's credibility as a member of a *European* club began to be widely contested in the public sphere. These studies generally come from the social sciences, particularly sociology, political science, and communication sciences, and focus on contemporary debates, beginning in 1987 with Turkey's request to become a full member of the EU/EC. They consider European identity from a constructivist and/or poststructuralist perspective, with a focus on constructions of difference/Others to identify the European Self. They are based on discourse-analytical approaches but have different methodological designs. Different design elements might include quantitative and qualitative framing-analysis, metaphor analysis, or qualitative content analysis. The favoured texts that are analysed are print media, and minutes of national parliamentary and EU institutional debates.

In 2019, Aynur Sarısakaloğlu published her doctoral dissertation, which conducted a communication science framing-analysis of the media debate about Turkey's accession to the EU in different countries at a certain point in time. She analyses constructions of European identity through Turkey in media coverage on the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013 in Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Turkey.³⁰ Other scholars who analyse media debates in different European countries in a comparative way are Creutzfeld-Banda (2009), Negrine et

²⁸ As the present study's Chapter 4 on Turkey's COE entry will show in detail.

²⁹ For a comprehensive overview about discourse-analytical approaches on European identity constructions in different national European settings, without any reference to Turkey, see Julia Lönnendonker, *Konstruktionen europäischer Identität. Eine Analyse der Berichterstattung über die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei 1959-2004* (Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2018), 191-199.

³⁰ Aynur Sarısakaloğlu, *Europas Identität und die Türkei. Eine länderübergreifende Framing-Analyse der Mediendebatte über den EU-Beitritt der Türkei* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2019).

al. (2008), Walter (2008), Wimmel (2006), and Carnevale et al. (2005).³¹ Creutzfeld-Banda and Wimmel analyse French, German, and British media with a particular look at transnational discourses. Negrine et al. take a selection of media in France, Britain, Greece, and Turkey into account. Carnevale et al. analyse German, British, French, and Italian news. Walter compares images of Turkey and Europe in German and British media. A sole focus on German news coverage is found in studies by Lönnendonker (2018), Musolff (2010), Küçük (2009), Madeker (2008), Zschache (2008) Schäfer and Zschache (2008). Finally, Paksoy (2013), Schneeberger (2009) and Negrine (2008) concentrate on the public debate in British media, and Aissaoui (2007) on French media coverage.³²

The analyses of Jochen Walter and Julia Lönnendonker are most interesting for this study since they do not concentrate solely on contemporary debates. Instead, they examine the change of discourses over a longer period of time and partially overlap with this study's period of investigation. They both analyse perceptions of Turkey as inside or outside of Europe, and European identity constructions through Turkey from a historical angle – although they arise from communication sciences (Lönnendonker) and sociology (Walter).

³¹ Naomi Creutzfeld-Banda, *Does Turkey belong to Europe? A comparative analysis of the public debate in the media in Germany, France and the UK concerning Turkey's accession to the EU, from 1999 to 2005* (Göttingen: Cuvillier, 2009); Ralph Negrine, Beybin Kejanlioglu, Rabah Aissaoui, and Stylianos Papatianassopoulos, "Turkey and the European Union: An analysis of how the press in four countries covered Turkey's bid for accession in 2004," *European Journal of Communication* 23/1 (March 2008): 47-68, DOI: 10.1177/0267323107085838; Walter, *Die Türkei*; Andreas Wimmel, *Transnationale Diskurse in Europa: Der Streit um den Türkei-Beitritt in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2006), see also Wimmel's short version in English language: Andreas Wimmel, "Beyond the Bosphorus? Comparing public discourses on Turkey's EU application in the German, French and British quality press," *Journal of Language and Politics* 8/2 (January 2009): 223-243, DOI: 10.1075/jlp.8.2.03wim; Roberta Carnevale, Stefan Ihrig, and Christian Weiss, *Europa am Bosphorus (er-)finden? Die Diskussion um den Beitritt der Türkei zur Europäischen Union in den britischen, deutschen, französischen und italienischen Zeitungen. Eine Presseanalyse* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2005).

³² This is again only a selection of literature on this topic: Lönnendonker, *Konstruktionen europäischer Identität*; Andreas Musolff, "The eternal outsider? Scenarios of Turkey's ambitions to join the European Union in the German press," in *Contesting Europe's eastern rim. Cultural identities in public discourse*, ed. Ljiljana Saric (Bristol, Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2010), 157-172; Bülent Küçük, "Borders of Europe: Fantasies of Identity in the Enlargement Debate on Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 41 (Fall 2009): 89-115, DOI: 10.1017/S0896634600005380; Ellen Madeker, *Türkei und europäische Identität. Eine wissenssoziologische Analyse der Debatte um den EU-Beitritt* (Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008); Ulrike Zschache, *Europa im Mediendiskurs. Die Auseinandersetzung um den Beitritt der Türkei zur Europäischen Union in der deutschen Presse* (Saarbrücken: VDM, 2008); Mike S. Schäfer and Ulrike Zschache, "Einheit in Vielfalt? Vorstellungen von der Europäischen Union in deutschen Pressekommentaren zum Türkei-Beitritt," *Sociologia Internationalis* 46 (2008): 69-90; Alaaddin F. Paksoy, "Turkey and the issue of European identity: An analysis of the media representation of Turkey's EU bid within the framework of religion and culture," *Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations* 15/1 (April 2013): 37-55; Agnes Schneeberger, "Constructing European identity through mediated differences: a content analysis of Turkey's EU accession process in the British press," *Journal of Media and Communication* 1 (2009): 83-102; Ralph Negrine, "Imagining Turkey: British press coverage of Turkey's bid for accession to the European Union in 2004," *Journalism* 9/5 (2008): 624-645, DOI: 10.1177/1464884908094162; Rabah Aissaoui, "History, cultural identity and difference: the issue of Turkey's accession to the European Union in French national press," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9/1 (April 2007): 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/14613190701216896.

Jochen Walter approaches German and British media coverage in three selected time periods between 1960 and 2004. He concludes Turkey was neither perceived as a stable Other nor as a natural part of the European Self. Instead, it was predominantly observed as ‘the thing on the brink’ and thereby stimulated diverse constructions of Europe. Between 1960 and 1963, he found that assigning Turkey the role of a geostrategic highly important Western ally made it impossible to exclude Turkey completely. However, it was possible to observe the country as partly different from Western Europe. Compared to Germany, Turkey’s otherness was communicated less in the British public debate. Only in the last period of investigation, 1999-2004, was it explicitly discussed whether Turkey’s identity was compatible with European identity. Instead of the Soviet Union, now Turkey became the dominant Other.³³

Julia Lönnendonker analyses the media coverage of seven German newspapers in five selected periods of two weeks between 1959 and 2004. For the period of interest here – the first selected period around Turkey’s request to become an associate member of the EEC in 1959 – she found that German journalists equally accepted Turkey as a natural part of Europe. Europe here refers to Western Europe defined, at the time, as the group of 18 OEEC countries, including Turkey. They also did not question Turkey’s EEC association based on differences. The only characteristic observed as being different to the rest of the EEC was Turkey’s economic backwardness. Greece and Turkey were defined as developing European states in need of support. For the second interesting time period of 1963, when the Ankara Agreement was signed, she concludes that German coverage equalled Europe spatially as the EEC (and less as the OEEC). Although its EEC association was positively regarded, Turkey was no longer unanimously perceived as a natural part of Europe. Lönnendonker, in this regard, refers to the historical context of a changing global policy after the Cuban missile crisis, which was the beginning of the policy of détente, further of Turkish domestic riots in the context of the first military coup, and rapprochement of the EEC and EFTA.³⁴

The EU funded research project FEUTURE (Future of EU-Turkey Relations) was conducted between 2016 and 2019, releasing more than 30 papers.³⁵ Numerous researchers analysed past, present, and future drivers of the EU-Turkey relationship; some focused on past and present European and Turkish identity constructions. In particular, two papers deal with

³³ Cf. Walter, *Die Türkei*. See also his following article (together with M. Albert): Jochen Walter and Mathias Albert, “Turkey on the European doorstep. British and German debates about Turkey in the European Communities,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12/3 (September 2009): 223-250, DOI: 10.1057/jird.2009.13.

³⁴ Cf. Lönnendonker, *Konstruktionen europäischer Identität*, especially 337ff., 350f.

³⁵ The FEUTURE project received funding from the European Union’s *Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme* and was based at the University of Cologne. The online papers can be downloaded at the project’s website: <http://www.feuture.eu/> (25 January 2020).

mutual identity representations of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey and European powers in the 1815-1999 period and essentially show that there were no linear patterns in those representations.³⁶

In addition to the media, the institutional EU level itself is another popular framework for the analysis of European identity constructions in discussions about Turkish EU membership. The authors Caner Tekin (2020), Senem Aydın-Düzgit (2012), Angelos Giannakopoulos (2012), and Selcen Öner (2011) examine how Turkey's Europeanness and Europe's identity were discussed and produced in the debate about a possible Turkish EU accession in various EU institutions by various political parties and politicians at the EU level.³⁷ These studies reveal that the question of Turkey's accession to the EU has been a reference point leading to identity discourses producing multiple European/EU identities.

Similar to Aydın-Düzgit and Tekin, who also include analyses of national parliamentary debates of three EU member states (Germany, France, and Great Britain), some scholars choose national parliaments as discursive settings. Then, they analyse debates and discourses on Turkey's belonging to Europe and the resulting European identity constructions.³⁸ However, studies that focus on parliamentary and EU debates base their analyses on a possible Turkish EU membership and leave the historical perspective aside.

Studies that analyse Turkish discursive practices that helped to (re-)produce its European (or Western) identity, as well as specific images of Europe, are particularly relevant for the

³⁶ These papers show the results of the FEUTURE research team at Sabancı and Koç University in Istanbul. For this study, however, they are less relevant due to a pre-given structure and policy aim of the research project (which is obviously not to enrich the historical research on Turkish-European relations with details but to guideline EU politics). See Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Johanna Chovanec, Seçkin Barış Gülmez, Bahar Rumelili, and Alp Eren Topal, "Turkish and European Identity Constructions in the 1815-1945 Period," *FEUTURE Online Paper* No. 4 (July 2017); Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Johanna Chovanec, Seçkin Barış Gülmez, Bahar Rumelili, and Alp Eren Topal, "Turkish and European Identity Constructions in the 1946-1999 Period," *FEUTURE Online Paper* No. 15 (March 2018).

³⁷ Cf. Caner Tekin, *Debating Turkey in Europe: Identities and Concepts* (Berlin et al.: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), apart from plenaries held in the European Parliament, Tekin analyses French, British and German public debates (media and politics) in 2005; Senem Aydın-Düzgit, *Constructions of European Identity. Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Angelos Giannakopoulos, *Europa-Türkei-Identität. Der ewige Kandidat und die EU seit der Zollunion* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012); Selcen Öner, *Turkey and the European Union. The Question of European Identity* (Lanham, Md. et al.: Lexington Books, 2011).

³⁸ To name not all but a few who analyse national parliamentary debates: Silke Paasche, *Europa und die Türkei. Die Konstruktion europäischer Identität in deutschen und französischen Parlamentsdebatten* (Saarbrücken: VDM, 2007). Ozan, furthermore, analyses German and Turkish parliamentary debates on Turkey's EU accession process from a linguistic perspective. See Didem Ozan, *Parteiliche Kommunikation am politischen Wendepunkt. Der EU-Beitritt der Türkei in deutschen und türkischen Parlamentsdebatten* (Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010). Tekin, moreover, analyses representations of Turkey in the French political discourse. See Beyza Ç Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the EU Context* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub. Company, 2010).

present focus on Turkey's active role in constructing its European identity. Compared to the category of analyses that focus on European identity constructions through Turkey as a passive object, there are fewer studies that focus on Turkey as an active architect of Turkey's Europeanness and images of Europe. Monographs are very rare, and articles in anthologies and journals are still manageable. However, they too, predominantly focus on contemporary identity discourses in Turkey, in particular AKP discourses on Turkey's identity as Western and/or Muslim.

Whereas some studies that consider Turkey as an active part in European identity constructions predominantly focus on conflicting images of Europe by Turkish agents,³⁹ others concentrate on efforts to define Turkey as a European or Western country.⁴⁰ And others, again, combine these two perspectives and analyse, for instance, Turkish identity politics and the respective images of Europe it produces. Among those, a popular subject of research is the transformation of Islamist discourses in Turkey and their perceptions of Europe. What these studies commonly present is a predominating change within Islamist discourses of how to consider Europe. The prevailing anti-European stance of Islamist movements that became visible in the late 1970s, in response to decades of the Kemalist secular ideology including the abolishment of any religious visibilities in public, has been accompanied by representations of Turkish identity as primarily Muslim, while at the same time supporting a pro-European orientation in terms of foreign affairs. This identity has been (re)produced, particularly in AKP discourses, by imagining Europe as an economic and political partner instead of a civilizational role model.⁴¹ For instance, Macmillan's paper (2013), in which she analyses how Europe is represented in the discourses of the main political parties in Turkey, shows that the dominating representation of Europe within the

³⁹ Bülent Küçük, for example, examines in his dissertation not only European images of Turkey but also Turkish images of Europe and the EU. See Bülent Küçük, *Die Türkei und das andere Europa. Phantasmen der Identität im Beitrittsdiskurs* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2008). Also Macmillan's article, which is discussed below, examines various representations of Europe and the EU in the discourse of the four main Turkish political parties. See Catherine Macmillan, "Competing and Co-Existing Constructions of Europe as Turkey's Other(s) in Turkish Political Discourse," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 21/1 (2013): 104-121, DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2013.766479.

⁴⁰ For instance, an article by Yılmaz and Bilgin, which is discussed below, focuses on Turkish constructions of Turkey's 'Western' identity. See Eylem Yılmaz and Pinar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's 'western' identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the intellectuals of statecraft," *International Journal* 61/1 (Winter 2005/2006): 39-59, DOI: 10.2307/40204128.

⁴¹ See, for instance, Kenan Çayır, "The Transformation of Islamism and Changing Perceptions of Europe in Turkey," in *Perceptions of Islam in Europe: Culture, Identity and the Muslim 'Other'*, ed. Hakan Yılmaz and Çağla E. Aykaç (London et al.: Tauris, 2012), 195-210; Menderes Çınar, "Turkey's 'Western' or 'Muslim' identity and the AKP's civilizational discourse," *Turkish Studies* 19/2 (2008): 176-197, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2017.1411199; İhsan D. Dağı, "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization," *Turkish Studies* 6/1 (March 2005): 21-37, DOI: 10.1080/1468384042000339302.

AKP discourse is an image of Europe as inferior and as belonging to a different, but not superior, civilization. This contrasts with the traditional Kemalist image of Europe, as both superior in civilizational terms and an imperialist threat. Macmillan shows that the latter perception has been overcome in the AKP discourse by representing Europe as a non-threatening neighbour and as equal, if not inferior, according to material and moral development. AKP's predominant representation of Europe, she further emphasizes, also contradicts traditional Islamist and traditional nationalist groups such as the Islamist *Saadet Party* and the right-wing ultranationalist MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*), which both represent an overall Eurosceptic stance ever since.⁴²

Although most of the studies looking at Turkey's active role in constructing Europe focus on contemporary discourses, some are relevant to this dissertation. They reveal strategies of Turkish agents to demonstrate Turkey's importance for 'the West' as well as Turkey's 'Western' identity,⁴³ which again can be examined in the present analysis as well. In this regard, for instance, the concept of Turkish 'exceptionalism' by Lerna Yanık is interesting. It implies a Turkish post-Cold War strategy that presented Turkey as an exceptionally important state by arguing that the country possessed a liminal character. This was presented as being grounded in hybrid representations of Turkey's geography and history. These representations were then used to justify foreign policy actions, Yanık shows.⁴⁴ Also consequential to the present study is an article by Yilmaz and Bilgin regarding Turkish strategies since the 1970s that justified Turkey's foreign policy decisions alongside the Western Bloc by attributing a collective identity level to Western institutions such as NATO.⁴⁵ The present study includes these strategies as potential devices of Turkish delegates in debates in the Council of Europe and examines the extent to which they were used as arguments for Turkey's belonging to Europe, also in earlier times.

An exception to the period of investigation is Sümeyra Kaya's revised version of her doctoral thesis, entitled *Entscheidung für Europa (Decision in Favour of Europe)* and published 2014, in which she provides new insights considering Turkey's foreign policy shift from Kemalist neutrality towards the West after World War Two. Her focus is on Turkish domestic discourses constructing concepts of a Turkish identity in the 1950s. She analyses in particular

⁴² Macmillan, "Competing and Co-existing Constructions of Europe."

⁴³ In the following, the quotation marks are usually omitted when talking about 'the West'/'Western Bloc' and 'the East'/'Eastern Bloc'. It refers in general to the division of the world into the antagonistic blocs in Cold War rhetoric.

⁴⁴ Lerna K. Yanık, "Constructing Turkish "exceptionalism": Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy," *Political Geography* 30/2 (2011): 80-89, DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.003.

⁴⁵ Yilmaz and Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "western" identity."

how Turkish intellectuals wrote about Europe while searching for a collective identity for the Turkish nation. With the emergence of political pluralism in 1950, it became possible to discuss political issues openly. One issue of discussion included Turkey's orientation towards Europe in terms of domestic and foreign affairs. Kaya shows that Turkey's position in Cold War contexts and its Western orientation was discussed not only in political circles but also at the civil society level among academics, especially within the humanities, social, and economic sciences.⁴⁶ Therefore, for the present study, Kaya's monograph provides relevant details on domestic discourses backing Turkey's foreign policy orientation towards Europe and the West in the period of this study's investigation.

In conclusion, the active role of Turkish agents, compared to the passive role, in imagining concepts of Europe as well as their country's own identification with an imagined European collective is an underexplored research topic, especially from a historical perspective. In the context of the Council of Europe, there is not a single study with this research interest. However, this public forum offers the opportunity to examine these questions in a European discursive field – beyond Turkish-national borders and with a European audience. This study seeks to fill this research gap and provide new findings for the understanding of the conflicting relationship between Turkey and Europe, the contested concept of Europe, as well as the discursive strategies of identity representations, by analysing how Turkish representatives used this setting to argue for their country's acceptance as a European country and how Turkey, thereby, contributed to efforts of constructing a European community.

1.3 Objective and Key Research Question

By analysing the speeches of COE Assembly members, particularly of Turkish parliamentarians, this study aims to identify how Turkey's identity was discursively constructed as European in the early 'hot' years of the Cold War. Similarly, this study will further examine how these representational practices attributing Turkey to Europe contributed to definitions of Europe's Self by exploring the following questions: Which kind of arguments and rhetorical devices served Turkish representatives to argue for their country's acceptance as an equal part of Europe? What kind of images and imaginations of Europe were produced in terms of Turkish attributions to Europe? Which rules and distributions of power

⁴⁶ Sümeyra Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa. Historische Grundlagen der türkischen Europapolitik* (Essen: Klartext, 2014).

led to these different images? And how did non-Turkish delegates react to their Turkish colleagues' representations of Turkey as a European country?

Thus, the objective is not to find out what Turkish and non-Turkish deputies thought about Turkey's identity and if they 'really' perceived Turkey as being European, nor if COE delegates believed in a strong collective identity throughout Europe during this time. It is about the discursive practices (re)producing Turkey's identity as European and the consequentially produced images of a common Europe.

In short, the key research question, consisting of two parts, is the following: How did parliamentarians of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, specifically Turkish ones, construct Turkey's identity with regard to its European character in the early years of European integration (1949-1963)? And how did these attributions of Turkey being a part of Europe result in definitions of Europe and its identity itself?

The question of *how* points to different strategies and arguments, rhetorical techniques, and formation processes of narratives and, hence, includes subjects of discursive rules of the power of language and interpretation. This also involves the question of what *could* be said and what *could not* – which again points to discursive rules and the question of *why* certain things could or could not be said, particularly, what kind of contextual conditions enabled or discouraged certain utterances.

1.4 Methodological Approach, Sources, and the Council of Europe as the Institutional Context

Given a social constructivist perspective on identity formations and a focus on discursive practices, taking a discourse-analytical approach is useful. Since the term discourse-analysis encompasses a range of scholarly approaches, defining its theoretical foundations is necessary.⁴⁷ The present study relies on Foucault, who provided the groundwork for discursive research.⁴⁸ In his works, he provides a set of conceptual tools useful for discourse-analysis. Nevertheless, his theory lacks a clear-cut methodology and consistency with regard

⁴⁷ Discourse-analysis is used in linguistics, sociology, and cognitive psychology and is based on terms specific to those different fields, scholarly interests, and approaches.

⁴⁸ In works such as *The Order of Things* or *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault established his influential discourse-theories, which are applied in numerous essays about phenomena such as madness and sexuality. There, he reconstructs the organization of knowledge of the past on the basis of historical source material, exemplifying not only that these have limited validity over time, but also that they do not develop in a constant fashion; rather, they are to be considered as contingent phenomena.

to the use of his terminology.⁴⁹ This is why this study further resorts to the work of Keller and Landwehr who have conducted discourse-analytical studies in the context of social and historical sciences.⁵⁰

Foucault assumes that knowledge and reality are formed in processes of social construction, which he calls discourse. Discourses are to be treated “as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.”⁵¹ The resulting truths are subject to certain categories of thought and regimes of knowledge, which can change over time due to different formations in practice and are only valid for a limited period. Ways of looking at phenomena such as ‘imagined communities’⁵² and ‘collective identities’ are consequently dependent on the types of knowledge and processes of construction particular to the time of their prevalence. A discourse is identifiable when an object is constituted by utterances with recurring typical contents and assigned meaning; so-called *statements*. They can materialize in different ways and follow certain specific formation rules in their appearance, structure, and their relationship towards each other.⁵³ Thus, discourses consist of statements whose formations shed light on the practices of knowledge and reality production. Keller’s *Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse*, thereby, differentiates between *discursive* and *non-discursive practices* of discourse production. Non-discursive practices relate to non-lingual actions such as certain gestures or wearing particular clothes, but of interest to this study are discursive practices dealing with spoken or written texts.⁵⁴ These practices are exercised by *social actors* and are either individual or collective producers of statements. These could be institutions, the state, scholars, literati, and others. As producers of discourse, they negotiate

⁴⁹ Foucault resorts to different accentuations, definitions of terms, and approaches, which is why any discourse-analysis based on his work must include determining the terminology in question as well as adapting it to one’s own research interests.

⁵⁰ At this point, the author would like to thank her dear colleague and friend Charlotte Jestaedt for discussing methodologies of discourse-analysis intensely. Part of the sections on discourse theoretical approaches according to Foucault and discourse-analytical methodologies according to Keller and Landwehr were developed in collaboration with her. See also the published version of her dissertation: Charlotte Jestaedt, *Der Massenmensch zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ein diskursgeschichtlicher Vergleich zur deutschen und spanischen Literatur* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2019), 31-35.

⁵¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. M. Sheridan Smith (London et al.: Routledge, 2002), 54.

⁵² Anderson coined the term ‘imagined communities’ describing the phenomenon of social cohesion within a nation-state due to certain manifested (and socially constructed) commonalities although not knowing most of the members of this community. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Ed., 1983), 15f., as well as Chapter 2.1.

⁵³ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 41f.

⁵⁴ Cf. Reiner Keller, *Diskursforschung. Eine Einführung für SozialwissenschaftlerInnen*, 4th ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2011), 66. There is also a translated English version of Keller’s book: Reiner Keller, *Doing Discourse Research: An introduction for social scientists*, trans. Bryan Jenner (Los Angeles et al.: Sage, 2013). However, since the German version is the original text it is favoured; the English version, however, is used at some points, especially when longer verbatim quotes were included.

definitions of reality amongst each other. Establishing specific lingual constructions of reality at a certain time depends on the powers in place. These manifest in the various producers of discourses on the one hand, and in the rules of speech on the other.⁵⁵ Bourdieu, who understands the generation of the order of knowledge as the result of negotiations between social actors, speaks of “the power to create things with words” in this context.⁵⁶ In this study, the Turkish and non-Turkish delegates of the COE’s Assembly are potential social actors negotiating definitions of reality. The consideration of discourse participants overlaps with the *Discourse-Historical Approach* (DHA) by Wodak and Reisigl, which also focuses on social actors as discourse participants with differing points of views and agendas and examines the strategies and discourse practices they use to claim their respective truths.⁵⁷

With regard to different types of discourse, Foucault differentiates between a “general domain of all statements”⁵⁸ concerning a certain topic and *special discourses*, pertaining only to a group of statements within a specific domain of formation. This can imply certain academic fields, for instance, within which phenomena can be addressed. According to this differentiation, research that focuses on a special political environment producing statements such as the Council of Europe’s Assembly, can be described more precisely as the analysis of the special discourse of the COE’s Assembly about Turkey’s belonging to Europe.⁵⁹

Foucault understands discourse-analysis as an archaeological undertaking, through which he attempts to reconstruct the conditions for the production and structure of knowledge at a particular point in time. This is the focal point of Landwehr and his approach to historical discourse-analysis, which offers a methodological guideline to this study. Landwehr underlines the historicity of discourses and asks, “which statements emerge at which place at

⁵⁵ Cf. Keller, *Diskursforschung*, 66, 68.

⁵⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *Rede und Antwort*, trans. Bernd Schwibs (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), 153. He also writes: “If you want to change the world, you have to change the way how world is ‘made’.” (“Will man die Welt ändern, muß man die Art und Weise, wie Welt ‘gemacht’ wird, verändern,” translation from German by the author). Ibid., 52. The entire regulatory framework of a discourse that cements its power is what Foucault calls *dispositive*. This is the infrastructure underlying a discourse and through which it is (re-)produced. The *dispositive* describes a network that connects different discursive elements and thus acquires a strategic function. On Foucault’s concept of *dispositive* see Michel Foucault, *Dispositive der Macht. Über Sexualität, Wissen und Wahrheit* (Berlin: Merve, 1978).

⁵⁷ For a detailed explanation of the interdisciplinary methodological approach of DHA by Wodak and Reisigl see, e.g., Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA),” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles et al.: Sage, 2009), 87-121. For a precise summary of the DHA as a specific method of *Critical Discourse Analysis* by Wodak and others, and with a particular perspective on discursive strategies of identity constructions see also Stefan J. Schustereder, *Strategies of Identity Construction. The Writings of Gildas, Aneirin and Bede* (Bonn: Univ. Press, 2015), 58.

⁵⁸ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 90.

⁵⁹ Keller defines the special discourse as a “discourse within a partially public social domain, e.g. scientific contexts.” Keller, *Doing Discourse Research*, 73.

which point in time.”⁶⁰ This also includes the question of discursive change and “the perspective of the ‘history of what can be said’,” as labeled by Keller.⁶¹ Landwehr emphasizes that not everything that is (grammatically) sensible can be said at a certain point in time.⁶² This study considers discourse-analysis also as a process of hermeneutic interpretation and thereby follows Landwehr and Keller, amongst others.⁶³ Accordingly, the present study also asks *why* a certain statement emerged at the time of its occurrence, and why other things could or may not have been said. As Landwehr makes clear, other than traditional hermeneutics, historical discourse-analysis does not aim to uncover ‘the reality of historical events’ through sources, such as the reality of Turkish-European relations at a time, but rather uses hermeneutic tools to inquire the contextual conditions that enabled the emergence of statements, and as such, the conditions and rules of construction of social reality.⁶⁴ To analyse the contextual conditions of discursive practices, this study follows Keller’s suggestion to consider three different contextual dimensions: the institutional-organizational, the situative, and the historical-social context.⁶⁵

In the present analysis, with a focus on the debates in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the institutional-organizational context is constant and presented in more detail below with regard to the Council of Europe’s and particularly the Assembly’s structure, institutional power-relations and the organization’s importance during the period of investigation. The situative context concerns particularly the actors of discursive practices – the respective speakers in the Assembly debates – thus representatives of different national delegations. In this study, whenever possible they will be briefly characterized when quoted. However, as part of the process of interpreting why certain things could be said or could not be said, more vital to this study is the historical-social context of the speeches. In this regard, it is repeatedly considered which historical events, processes and changes potentially determined the rules of communication and discursive practices in the Council of Europe. With regard to this study’s research field of Turkish and European identity formations, contextual determinants of historical-social nature refer to European integration politics, Turkish domestic and foreign policies, as well as global politics in times of a bipolar world

⁶⁰ Translated from German by the author: “welche Aussagen zu welchem Zeitpunkt an welchem Ort auftauchen.” Achim Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2009), 92.

⁶¹ Keller, *Doing Discourse Research*, 17.

⁶² Cf. Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse*, 92.

⁶³ Cf. *ibid.*; Keller, *Diskursforschung*, 76f.

⁶⁴ Cf. Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse*, 92.

⁶⁵ Cf. Keller, *Doing Discourse Research*, 110f. Landwehr suggests considering very similar contextual conditions (four in sum: the situative, the medial, the institutional as well as the historical context). Cf. Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse*, 107-110.

order. Concerning Turkish affairs, important historical developments impacting the political context between 1949 and 1963 were the shift from being a one-party-state to a democratic multi-party system, the first military intervention in 1960, Turkey's NATO accession, its association with the European Economic Community (EEC), and its turbulent relations with its Greek neighbour. On the European side, there was a deepening of European integration through the creation of supranational organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the EEC, as well as the failed attempt of creating a European Defence Community (EDC). On a global level, the beginning and the 'hot phase' of the East-West Conflict is of crucial importance throughout the period of investigation. These and other milestones will be presented in detail in the course of the analysis.⁶⁶

Concerning the concrete steps of text analysis, this study follows Landwehr, who distinguishes between the *macro- and microstructure of a text*. While he provides a wide range of possible steps of analysis, he emphasizes the rough guideline character of his repertoire and the necessity of individually modifying what is relevant and expedient for each analysis, and what is feasible with regard to the text format.⁶⁷

In the present research, the analyses of the macrostructure of the texts – which are mainly speeches within parliamentary debates in the COE's Assembly regarding Turkey and its role in Europe – primarily examine the contents, hence the themes and topics of the relevant text fragments. This corresponds to questions such as: Which kind of content-related arguments serve as contributors to Turkey's belonging to Europe? And what kind of images of Europe are discursively constructed through Turkish (self-)identifications? Aside from content, the role of the author is part of each macro-analysis, and how the text is communicated. The question of the relationship between oral and written communication, which Landwehr also suggests in this step, is very clear in this study:⁶⁸ Oral speeches were transformed into written texts and recorded verbally. Based on the assumption of historical discourse-analysis that language is considered an action, more precisely, an action that constructs a social world,⁶⁹ it is the verbatim form of the records of the Assembly debates which enables a linking of

⁶⁶ An overview of the relevant historical context will be introduced in Chapter 5 (Defence) as it is the first chapter presenting the results of the discourse-analysis of the Assembly debates; besides, more specific events regarding the historical context will be presented at relevant points in the course of the analysis.

⁶⁷ Cf. Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse*, 112f.

⁶⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 113f.

⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 23. The meaning of language within the approach of social constructivism is also part of Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework).

patterns and strategies on the macro- as well as on the micro-level to the speaker itself.⁷⁰ The speakers, again, are identified as delegates of each member state's national parliament and, therefore, represent the respective people at the European level.⁷¹ While all utterances concerning Turkey's place in Europe were evaluated, whether from Turkish or non-Turkish delegates, only those who provided a new argument or rhetorical strategy are mentioned or quoted below individually. However, repetition and reinforcement of arguments are pointed out to reveal the prevailing statements and practices.

Aside from the macrostructure of the text, the *macrostructure of the discourse* is also considered. According to Landwehr, the macrostructure of a discourse is related to "what linguistic features are at the centre, what words, arguments, boundaries are found repeatedly, hold the discourse together and constitute the core of conflicts and disagreements."⁷² Following Landwehr, the textual macro-analysis of several speeches made it possible to outline the corresponding macrostructure of the special discourse considering Turkey's belonging to Europe in the discursive field of the COE's Assembly. Several thematic fields could be identified. A longitudinal analysis of the macrostructure of the special discourse showed that representations of Turkey as belonging to Europe emerged in first line with regard to security issues by representing Turkey as exceptionally important for Western Europe in geostrategic terms, be it by authors of Turkish or non-Turkish origin. Furthermore, arguments in favour of identifying Turkey as European could be identified with reference to constructions of Europe as a value-based, economic and cultural community. Finally, these four thematic fields were chosen to structure the discourse-analytical part of the dissertation.⁷³

Concerning the microstructure of a text, this study examines aspects of argumentation strategies, stylistics, and linguistic methods that can be found on the textual, sentence, and word levels – such as metaphors, repetitions or exaggerations. Questions on these aspects focus more on the function of these stylistics and rhetoric and less on the lingual forms themselves.⁷⁴ Accordingly, interest in the rhetoric of speeches does not suggest a 'fine art' of speaking but is due to the effectiveness and power of persuasion of rhetoric.⁷⁵ Among argumentation strategies, this study examines the extent to which the strategy of 'rhetorical

⁷⁰ Nevertheless, what we cannot explore is the intonation and undertone of a text. Landwehr, in this context, makes aware of the possibility of analysing sources other than written texts with the help of a historical discourse-analysis. Cf. Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse*, 112.

⁷¹ Details on the appointment of delegates follow below.

⁷² Ibid., 115, see also Keller, *Doing Discourse Research*, 108f.

⁷³ As it is closer described below when the outline is presented.

⁷⁴ In this assumption, Landwehr refers to Dijk and Bourdieu. Cf. Landwehr, *Historische Diskursanalyse*, 117.

⁷⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 117.

action' can be observed within the Turkish argument in favour of Turkey belonging to Europe. The concept of rhetorical action, first introduced by Frank Schimmelfennig in the mid 1990s, is a theoretical approach that accounts for value-related interactions in international communities: rhetorical action describes a strategy of reasoning or argumentation that deprives members of the oppositions of the opportunity to adopt an oppositional stance by making explicit reference to the community's ethos based on values, since any opposition to this ethos would question the oppositions' credibility as members of the community. Schimmelfennig terms this inability to retort in any way 'rhetorical entrapment'.⁷⁶ The question to what extent rhetorical action can be observed as a rational strategy of the Turkish argument for a closer affiliation to the European community will be part of this analysis. As a guiding thesis, this study proposes that Turkish representatives acted rhetorically, not least in their awareness of how to use Turkey's integration with the West for themselves in the context of the East-West conflict.

Sources

The corpus of sources consists mainly of the minutes of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly between 1949 and 1963. These *Official Reports of Debates* are available in edited form, both in French and English.⁷⁷ As indicated, the verbatim conference transcripts are advantageous to this study in comparison to, for example, a general summary of the individual sessions' content. This is relevant from a constructivist perspective, as language is of central importance to every process of construction. In other words, language is considered constitutive of social construction.⁷⁸ Thus, the verbatim records facilitate the analysis of discursive formation on the micro-level, for instance, by examining rhetorical devices.

⁷⁶ On the concept of 'rhetorical action' see Frank Schimmelfennig, "Rhetorisches Handeln in der Internationalen Politik," *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 4/2 (1997): 219-254, and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Debatten zwischen Staaten: Rhetorisches Handeln in internationalen Gemeinschaften," *Jahrbuch Rhetorik* 25 (2006): 83-97, DOI:10.1515/9783484604827.83. With the approach of 'rhetorical action' political scientist Schimmelfennig, for instance, tries to explain how the decision was made to start negotiations for the eastern enlargement of the EU in 1997. By appealing to the goal of a pan-European unification, which was set decades ago, the advocates did not allow any opponents to have a legitimate counter-voting space (thus, they were 'rhetorically entrapped' due to a value-based community ethos). With regard to this, see especially Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap. Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55/1 (2001): 47-80.

⁷⁷ The speakers could decide which language to speak. In this study, only the English versions were analysed (a comparison of both versions resulted in the assumption of identical interpretations). Consequently, a certain responsibility is obliged to the interpreters. The reports consist of about 1,000 to 1,500 pages a year.

⁷⁸ As an outstanding representative for the constructivist perspective in the discipline of International Relations, here, Nicholas G. Onuf shall be mentioned who coined the term 'constructivism' at the end of the 1980s and who emphasized the role of language as constitutive: "By speaking, we make the world what it is." Nicholas G. Onuf, *Making sense, making worlds. Constructivism in social theory and international relations* (London et al.: Routledge, 2013), 29.

At certain points, other Assembly documents were examined. These documents included reports of special committees, proposals of certain Assembly members, draft resolutions, recommendations to the CM – edited as the Assembly’s *Documents, Working Papers* – and some adopted documents edited as *Texts Adopted by the Assembly*.⁷⁹ Minutes and adopted documents of the Committee of Ministers were also considered, when useful, to get information about whether a draft resolution of the Assembly was adopted by the CM.⁸⁰ Due to the general closure of the Archives of the Council of Europe (ACE) in Strasbourg for external use, it was not possible to do further research in the physical archives,⁸¹ however, since many documents have been digitized, it was possible to access unedited sources of both COE bodies as well.⁸²

Concerning the time prior to the first Assembly session in August 1949, with regard to Turkey’s accession process to the Council of Europe, other external sources were consulted to analyse the debates about a potential Turkish membership in the COE. This included primarily the minutes of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in 1948/49 – both of its Consultative Council, assembling the foreign ministers, and its Permanent Commission, consisting of ambassadors in London. These records were accessed through the (physical) National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). Furthermore, of importance in this context are the minutes of the *Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe* that took place in London, 3-5 May 1949, finalizing with the signatory ceremony of the Treaty of London, which has been considered the Statute of the Council of Europe ever since, as well as the notes of the Preparatory Commission of the COE about Turkey’s admission in the summer of 1949, both from the Archives of the COE. To get an impression regarding how the entry to the first European political organization was discussed among Turkish representatives, the minutes of the respective debate in the Turkish Parliament were also analysed, specifically concerning different perceptions of Europe and constructions of Turkey’s collective identity

⁷⁹ Especially when according to the reports of debates essential results were suggested, these documents were examined. However, these were not systematically analysed in the whole period of investigation.

⁸⁰ CM sources are not edited for the time of this study’s investigation; however, single documents including minutes and verbatim records of the sittings are available online: <https://search.coe.int/cm> (27 November 2019).

⁸¹ This is why it was not possible to analyse the verbatim records of Assembly committee’s meetings; brief summary minutes are available online, however. Nevertheless, due to a short opening of five days for external use, it was possible, with the support of Mathias Schütz, to access some relevant sources (as described below) concerning preparatory meetings prior to the CM’s and CA’s first session in August.

⁸² CM sources since 1949 are available at: <https://search.coe.int/cm>; Assembly sources at: <http://semanticpace.net> (both: 27 November 2019).

beyond its national borders. The verbatim records of the parliamentary debates are available in the online archives of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM).⁸³

The Institutional Context: The Council of Europe and its Consultative Assembly

The Council of Europe's importance for the process of European integration in its early years is not to be compared with its minor importance in European integration nowadays. In this section, several important facts about the Council of Europe's organizational structure as well as its vital importance during the period of investigation shall be provided. Significant focus is on the Consultative Assembly as the principal forum of research. The COE's creation process, however, will be examined in detail in Chapter 4.

According to agreements made in London in May 1949, when the Council of Europe was officially established, the new intergovernmental organization comprised two bodies. These were the Committee of Ministers (CM), a decision-making body comprising government representatives, and a Consultative Assembly (CA) as a deliberative organ to the Committee of Ministers containing representatives of the member states' national parliaments.⁸⁴ Moreover, the Secretariat, led by the Secretary General, would manage the complex organization administratively.⁸⁵ The newly founded COE, as Bond stresses, was appreciated by the general public as the necessary "soft power" complement to the "hard power" of the NATO, established only a few weeks earlier.⁸⁶

Ever since in the Committee of Ministers, every member state is represented on the basis of equality with one seat and one vote each. According to the Statute, these representatives shall

⁸³ See https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/tutanak_sorgu.html (27 November 2019).

⁸⁴ For details on the COE's organs as determined in the Statute see the Statute of the COE, Article 10-21 on the Committee of Ministers and Article 22-35 on the Assembly. See also, e.g., Klaus Brummer, *Der Europarat. Eine Einführung* (Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), on the CM see pp. 33-92, on the CA see 93-124, on the SG see 125-142; Martyn Bond, *The Council of Europe. Structure, history and issues in European politics* (London et al.: Routledge, 2012), on the CM see 11-13, on the CA see 13-15.

⁸⁵ For the responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Secretary General, such as organizing the budget and coordination between the CM and CA, see the COE's Statute, Article 36-39. Two other pillars were established in the 1960s and 70s: In 1961, the CM made the Congress of Local Authorities, which was extended to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in 1975, a third body of the COE. Before, in 1957, a Conference of Local Authorities had brought together representatives of different local and regional authorities from western European states. The Congress is a consultative body with the key task to make proposals to the COE's Assembly and the CM, which help to promote local democracy. For more details see Bond, *Council of Europe*, 15f. Another organ that was established later is the Conference of International NGOs (INGOs): In 1952, INGOs were given the possibility to consult the COE in different topics; since the 1970s, with a growing number of INGOs consulting the COE, a special committee was established as the fourth pillar of the COE (the Conference of INGOs). Cf. Bond, *Council of Europe*, 17f.

⁸⁶ Bond, *Council of Europe*, 1.

be the foreign ministers of the states.⁸⁷ In line with the intergovernmental character of the body, resolutions shall be passed by unanimous vote in general.⁸⁸ The CM is the executive organ of the institution, empowered to act on behalf of the COE, focusing on the conclusion of conventions and the adoption by governments of a common policy concerning particular matters.⁸⁹ The foreign ministers assemble twice a year (since 2004, mostly once a year) in non-public meetings to discuss key issues of European cooperation and to decide on the areas of focus, the budget, and on activities of the organization.⁹⁰ On behalf of the foreign ministers, the ambassadors of the member states meet regularly, at least once a month, to administer the daily business of the Committee.⁹¹ Even though the CM is the decision-making body of the COE, it has to inform the Assembly about its activities regularly, consider the opinions of the Assembly in its decision-making process, and answer requests of the Assembly.⁹²

The key forum of this study, the Consultative Assembly (CA; renamed Parliamentary Assembly in 1974⁹³), has ever been the voice of the peoples of Europe and, according to Holtz, the “democratic conscience.”⁹⁴ Its task has been to discuss European political, economic, social and cultural matters and to present its conclusions in the form of recommendations to the CM.⁹⁵ This public forum started with a month-long public plenary session in August 1949, followed by week long public sessions twice a year. This increased to three times a year in 1957 (today the forum meets four times a year for about five days).⁹⁶ The first Assembly session in 1949 had 101 voting representatives, eight of whom were Turkish.⁹⁷

⁸⁷ According to the COE’s Statute, Article 14, the representatives shall be the foreign ministers; however, when necessary, an alternate may be nominated as a deputy, who shall, whenever possible, be a member of the government.

⁸⁸ The unanimity rule, as it is determined in Article 20 of the Statute, however, has been replaced by the principle of two-third majority in some cases since the 1990s, e.g., for recommendations of the CM to the governments of members. Cf. Hans-Joachim Bauer, *Der Europarat nach der Zeitenwende 1989-1999: Zur Rolle Straßburgs im gesamteuropäischen Integrationsprozeß* (Münster et al.: Lit, 2001), 21.

⁸⁹ Cf. COE’s Statute, Article 15a.

⁹⁰ The CM’s chairmanship changes every six months in alphabetical order. Cf. Brummer, *Der Europarat*, 35.

⁹¹ For a detailed description of the structure and tasks of the CM as well as the foreign ministers’ representatives see, e.g., Brummer, *Der Europarat*, 33-92.

⁹² Cf. Edel, *Die Türkei im Europarat*, 16.

⁹³ The Consultative Assembly renamed itself Parliamentary Assembly in 1974, which was, however, accepted by the CM not until 1994 and which has not been changed in the Statute ever since. See Uwe Holtz, “50 Jahre Europarat – Eine Einführung,” in *50 Jahre Europarat*, ed. Uwe Holtz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 19, note 30.

⁹⁴ In original: “demokratisches Gewissen.” Holtz, “50 Jahre Europarat,” 19.

⁹⁵ Cf. COE’s Statute, Article 22. See also Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 25.

⁹⁶ See the CA’s minutes of meeting since 1949.

⁹⁷ According to the verbatim records of the fourth sitting of the first session on 13 August 1949, these 101 seats were distributed as follows: 18 for the UK, Italy and France, eight for Turkey, six for Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden, four for Denmark, Norway and Ireland, and three for Luxembourg. Among these there was only one woman (UK). Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 4th sitting, 13 August 1949, 82, 84. Additionally,

According to the Statute, the delegates have been elected or appointed by the national parliaments representing each parliament's political spectrum of opinion since 1951.⁹⁸ They represent the public opinion of each member state and do not have to account for their national governments or respect a certain diplomatic jargon.⁹⁹ The eight Turkish members of the first delegation, appointed by the government, all represented the then ruling party, CHP. Later, with the transformation to a multi-party system and the COE Statute's amendment in 1951 determining the national parliaments as nominators of the delegates, the Turkish delegates – ten in total as of 1951 – represented the political spectrum of the Turkish parliament. The DP (Democrat Party) was in the majority, and the traditional Kemalist CHP, the minority, until the military coup in 1960.¹⁰⁰

Assembly delegates gathered in Strasbourg were considered the highly educated elite of Europe. Within the British delegation, 11 of the 18 delegates in 1949 had studied at the University of Oxford or Cambridge.¹⁰¹ Some Turkish delegates had been educated abroad in central European countries and were, thus, part of a cosmopolitan Turkish elite able to speak several foreign languages.¹⁰²

Today, parliamentarians identify as members of both national delegations and transnational political groups.¹⁰³ However, until 1964 (during the period of investigation), parliamentarians only identified as belonging to national delegations, which is also visible in the Assembly's minutes when a speaker was identified solely by its name and nationality. Of parliamentary character is the Assembly's division into specialist committees providing the technical work,

until today every representative in the Assembly may have a substitute who is entitled to vote in the absence of the representative. Today the Assembly consists of 324 representatives plus 324 substitutes.

⁹⁸ Cf. Brummer, *Der Europarat*, 93f. Before the amendment of the Statute in May 1951, every government could decide on its own how to determine their delegates in the Assembly.

⁹⁹ Cf. Wolf D. Gruner, "Der Europarat wird fünfzig – "Vater" der europäischen Integration: Gründungsvorstellungen, Wirkungen, Leistungen und Perspektiven nach 50 Jahren" in *Jubiläumsjahre – Historische Erinnerung – Historische Forschungen (Festgabe für Kersten Krüger zum 60. Geburtstag)*, ed. Wolf D. Gruner (Univ. Rostock, 1999), 135.

¹⁰⁰ In November 1951 the number of delegates to the Assembly was increased to a total number of 132. Cf. PACE, *Documents, Working Papers*, Doc. 74, 26 November 1951.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Achim Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg. Politische Eliten und europäische Identität in den 1950er Jahren* (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2007), 29f.

¹⁰² For instance, one of the most active Turkish delegates in the examined time period, Kasım Gülek, had studied at elite universities in France, the USA, the UK, and West Germany, and spoke six foreign languages. On his educational background, see Meral Balcı, *Sıradışı Bir Siyasetçi: Kasım Gülek. Hayatı ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri*, (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2015), 38-42. Although there is no overview of all Turkish delegates to the Council of Europe, an analysis of the social and educational background of Turkish parliamentarians – which ultimately made up the group of delegates – shows that the majority had university degrees (62 % in the examined period between 1920 and 1957). Cf. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 43f.

¹⁰³ Today, there are five political groups (plus members who are not part of a political group). For the political groups see the Assembly's website: <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/Page-EN.asp?LID=PoliticalGroups> (04 October 2019).

such as preparing draft recommendations and questions about the Assembly's agenda.¹⁰⁴ The Standing Committee, set up in September 1949, was established as a substitute for the Assembly to coordinate the Assembly's work in between sessions.¹⁰⁵

The deliberative character of the Consultative Assembly, as specified in the Statute, shall not negate its meaning in shaping European politics, particularly during the period of the present study. In the early years, politicians of considerable distinction attended the Assembly, such as the former, and again later, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the French Prime Minister Georges Bidault. Their attendance demonstrated the perceived importance of the institution at the time.¹⁰⁶ According to historian Achim Trunk, delegates from the 1950s can be considered a significant sample of the political elites of the member states.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, based on the Assembly's recommendations, the CM has adopted numerous conventions. Among them is the well-known European Convention on Human Rights drafted by the COE in 1950, and taking effect in 1953, which led to establishing the European Court of Human Rights.¹⁰⁸ This explains why, despite its only "quasi-parliamentarian" character, the Assembly has been repeatedly called "the COE's motor," due to its function of political opinion-making and coordination in European affairs.¹⁰⁹ Moreso, the Assembly has had an impact on the CM's decision-making process ever since, and also on the national parliaments (and as a consequence, also on the national governments) – since Assembly members transfer ideas of the Assembly to the national parliaments and thereby influence national debates on similar

¹⁰⁴ The possibility of setting up committees or commissions is laid down in Article 24 of the Statute.

¹⁰⁵ During its first session, the CA decided to set up a permanent body "for the purpose of supervising, between Sessions, the implementation of decisions taken by the Assembly, to coordinate the work of Committees, and in general to take any measures that, appear calculated to facilitate or expedite the work of the Assembly." PACE, *Documents, Working Papers*, Doc. 7 (Report, Standing Committee), 07 August 1950, point 1.1.1. Apart from documents such as reports of the Standing Committee, which are included in the edited Assembly sources titled *Documents, Working Papers*, also the draft minutes of the Standing Committee are available in the online archives of the CA; however, a systematic analysis did not seem to be enriching and gainful for the purpose of this study, particularly due to its non-verbatim, but only briefly summarizing character. The same applies to the specialist committees, of which only brief minutes are available in the COE's online archives.

¹⁰⁶ Bond, in this respect, mentions the British delegation that, at the first session, included high politicians such as Winston Churchill, Hugh Dalton, David Eccles, Robert Boothby, Lord Layton, Harold Macmillan, David Maxwell-Fyfe, and Herbert Morrison. See Bond, *Council of Europe*, 84. See also the list of the British delegation in PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 4th sitting, 13 August 1949, 84.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 23.

¹⁰⁸ Every COE member state has ratified this Convention (which is precondition for new members) so that any citizen of a COE state can take a case to the court in cases of violations according to the Convention. Judgments are binding on the states, so that they are obliged to conduct them. The Convention had already been demanded at the Hague Congress. For details on the Convention and the Court see, e.g., Bond, *Council of Europe*, 21 ff.

¹⁰⁹ For these labels see Bauer, *Der Europarat*, 24f. ("quasi-parlamentarisch" and "der Motor des Europarats," translation from German by the author). See also Joern Stegen, "Die Rolle der Parlamentarischen Versammlung als Motor des Europarats" ("The role of the Parliamentary Assembly as the Council of Europe's motor," translation from German by the author), in *50 Jahre Europarat*, ed. Uwe Holtz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 79-90.

subjects.¹¹⁰ Accordingly, Bond properly identifies the Assembly as a body with “few formal powers but considerable moral authority.”¹¹¹

From the beginning, Assembly meetings provided a setting to discuss matters of European political unification and closer cooperation among the member states in various fields. In the first years, especially between 1949 and 1951, one of the key issues discussed in the CA was the political structure of Europe and the question of giving up national sovereignty for closer unification. Several proposals were presented and debated in the Assembly. These called for strengthening the powers of the Assembly vis-à-vis the Committee of Ministers by transforming it from an advisory body to a ‘real’ parliament. Some also called for strengthening the powers of the CM vis-à-vis the national governments and the role of the COE vis-à-vis other international organizations such as the OEEC and the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO). The COE, in this context, was considered to become a European Political Authority (EPA) with responsibilities in defence as well as economic issues. It was specifically the proposal of the so-called Bidault Committee, furthermore, the Mackay Protocol (named after the British parliamentarian Ronald Mackay), and the La Malfa Proposals by Italian parliamentarians, led by Ugo La Malfa, that called for these grave changes in Europe’s political structure.¹¹²

However, foreign ministers in the CM rejected these grave reform plans. This left the Assembly with smaller concessions, such as granting it the right to determine its own agenda freely (except for defence issues, which were excluded by the Statute), and creating a joint committee to facilitate the communication between ministers and parliamentarians in the future. The result was disappointing for those who sought a supranational political authority with a strong European parliament. Instead, the fight for restructuring the COE in the interests of the Federalists ended with the manifestation of an intergovernmental organization with a weak parliamentary component.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Cf. Bond, *Council of Europe*, 14. Additionally, as a form of decision, other than recommendations and opinions that are addressed to the CM, the Assembly can pass resolutions, which are binding only for the CA itself but serve the purpose to appeal to the CM, member states or the publicity. On the different forms of Assembly decisions see, e.g., Beat Habegger, *Parlamentarismus in der internationalen Politik. Europarat, OSZE und die Interparlamentarische Union* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 85.

¹¹¹ Bond, *Council of Europe*, 13. He also quotes one of the former presidents of the Assembly who defined the CA as having „hardly any powers, but real authority“ in 1963 (ibid).

¹¹² For details on these proposals cf. ibid, 84f., and Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 27-30.

¹¹³ This also led to the resignation of the Assembly President and Federalist Paul-Henri Spaak in December 1951. Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 30. On the CM’s smaller concessions to the Assembly see also Bond, *Council of Europe*, 85f.

It was also within the scope of the Assembly that establishing European supranational organizations was discussed. Finally, based on the Schuman Plan, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the forerunner of the EEC, the EC and later EU – was founded in 1951. It composed of six member states: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.¹¹⁴ Concerning its relationship to the COE, a British proposal, the Eden Plan, suggested that the ECSC, as well as the, then nascent, European Defence Community (EDC), and any other specialized European institutions that might establish in the future, should operate under the aegis of the COE. However, this was rejected by the ECSC member states.¹¹⁵ As of 1951, there were two institutional Europes: a smaller-scale and supranational Europe in the form of the ECSC, composing ‘the Six’, and a larger-scale intergovernmental European organization, the COE. Cooperation between the two was limited to occasional joint meetings of the assemblies, sporadic participation of leading ECSC figures in COE meetings, and the presentation of annual reports to the COE.¹¹⁶

In summary, even though the COE lost its initially crucial role in the process of European integration throughout the 1950s, it was also within the COE where plans to establish specialized communities such as the ECSC and Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community) were discussed and developed. In this respect, the COE’s Assembly served as a forum of discussion about new formations of institutions that enabled the integration of those states prepared to give up national sovereignty. The larger-scale COE, in contrast, included governments that rejected a closer integration at the time, primarily the UK, the Scandinavian countries, and Ireland.¹¹⁷ However, until the first enlargement of the European Community in 1972, the COE played an important role in uniting ‘the Six’ of the European Community and the rest of ‘Western’ Europe represented in the COE,¹¹⁸ between 12 (in August 1949) and 17 member states (as of May 1963) in the period of investigation.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ The Plan is named after the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman who, based on the ideas of Jean Monnet, launched a plan to unite the entire French and German coal and steel industries under the control of a joint high authority. For details on the emergence of the ECSC see, e.g., Wilfried Loth, *Building Europe. A History of European Unification* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), 28-35.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Bond, *Council of Europe*, 88.

¹¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Cf. Gruner, “Der Europarat wird fünfzig,” 125.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Bauer, *Der Europarat*, 3.

¹¹⁹ For a list of new members see Bond, *Council of Europe*, 87 (for the years 1949-1961) and 99 (1961-1989). Today the COE comprises 47 member states. As a brief outlook concerning the COE’s significance in European integration, it is to be mentioned that the COE gained new importance as a supporter of democracy as of 1989/90 when it opened its doors to middle and Eastern European countries during their process of becoming democratic states and hence also served as an instrument to foster the understanding between Western and Eastern Europe. Cf. Bauer, *Der Europarat*, 3.

Apart from the COE's significance in European integration at the time of analysis, there is another reason why it makes sense to focus on the COE as the key forum of this study. The first supranational organizations concentrated primarily on economic integration. However, the COE presented 'greater Europe' and was responsible for protecting fundamental values – based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law – which have since become key markers when identifying what Europe should stand for.

As in any empirical study, it is often difficult, yet necessary, to limit the scope of research. The methodological approach took into account the selection of the sources, the period of investigation, and the allocation of the speakers' utterances and statements to only one of the four main topics (defence, political values, economics, and culture). However, these selections and limitations, as justified above, do not confront the aim of this study – to examine the formation and (re-)production processes of Turkey's European identity within the scope of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly in the golden age of the organization.

The present study does not seek to identify statements about the comprehensive Turkish nor the European discourse on Turkey's belonging to Europe at the time (let alone the definition of a 'European discourse'). Nor does it assume that Turkey's belonging to Europe was a key issue in Assembly debates. This study aims to demonstrate how (and under which circumstances) Turkey's European character was produced, and reproduced, in the special discursive field of the COE's Assembly during the period of analysis – despite sometimes happening somewhat covertly in the margins of debates about the continued European unification process. How Turkey's identification as European was constructed in other discursive fields at the time, such as in the field of academic or popular science literature, can only be considered based on existing research literature.

1.5 Overview of the Structure

Following the introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework and serves as a basis for interpreting and understanding the data analysed. Given the methodological approach of discourse-analysis and the focus on the character of affiliations and identities as socially constructed, the chapter discusses various assumptions within the theoretical approach of constructivism and presents social constructivism as the foundation of this dissertation. Related to social constructivism, the *critical geopolitics* approach – focusing on the discursive origin of geopolitical concepts such as 'the East' and 'the West' – and its relevance for this study is highlighted. The chapter further introduces theoretical assumptions

on the study's key concept of 'collective identity' before narrowing the focus on collective identity formations of 'imagined communities' beyond nation-states. Finally, the chapter opposes essentialist and constructivist assumptions on European identity formations and defines Europe, in line with Gallie, as an essentially contested concept.¹²⁰

Chapter 3 provides an overview of European (and partly Turkish) historiography of Turkish-European relations until the end of World War Two and seeks to provide details regarding the historical-social context of this study's analysis. It focuses on Ottoman and Turkish orientation towards a supposed Western European civilization and outlines reform initiatives along European lines: from the Ottoman era of *tanzimat* (reforms) to the Young Turks' and finally Kemalist reforms. This chapter also explores the Republic's foreign policy shift from a neutral stance to active incorporation in international affairs after World War Two. This historical review is important since it demonstrates the long-lasting conflicting relationship between Turkey and Europe. From the Turkish perspective, Europe was perceived both as a civilizational model to aspire to and as an imperialist threat that should never be fully trusted. From a European perspective, Turkey and its ancestors were observed ambivalently and repeatedly as being different in terms of its political and cultural compatibility with European powers and peoples. These mutual perspectives and ambivalences are important to understand the strategies and discursive practices representing Turkey as a part of Europe in this study's period of investigation.

Chapter 4 summarizes the genesis of the Council of Europe and, afterwards, discusses Turkey's process of accession. The Council of Europe is the central setting of this study and, as such, the institutional-organizational context of the following discourse-analysis. The first part of this chapter presents milestones in the founding history of the first European political organization. Thereby, it provides insights into discussions within civil society and intergovernmental platforms about how to unite Europe. This includes settings such as the civil Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948, as well as intergovernmental debates among the five powers of the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO). The latter setting is also crucial in the subsequent part of Chapter 4, which takes into account the Turkish accession process to the planned organization. It clarifies that the founding members of the COE considered a Turkish membership in the COE not as self-evident; in contrast, this sub-chapter reveals how Turkey's Europeanness was questioned and negotiated at the time. The last section of Chapter 4 addresses Turkish perspectives on the country's entrance to the COE. While focusing on

¹²⁰ Cf. Walter B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1956): 167–198.

debates in the Turkish parliament in 1949, this sub-chapter reveals how Turkish representatives discussed their country's identification with Europe in the context of accession. Consequently, this chapter provides insight into two other special discourses connected with the focus of this study; the discourse on Turkey's belonging to Europe among the founding members of the COE on the one hand, and among members of the Turkish National Assembly on the other. Thereby, this chapter shows inside and outside formations of social constructions of Turkey's European identity.

Chapters 5 to 8 present the focal analyses and evaluations of the Assembly protocols, structured according to the four main topics that supported Turkish representatives in representing Turkey as a part of Europe. Divided into the thematic fields of security/defence (Chapter 5), political values (Chapter 6), economics (Chapter 7) and culture (Chapter 8), these chapters concentrate on the central research questions and examine the discursive practices and strategies that constructed Turkey's Europeanness. These chapters show how Europe and its collective identities were socially constructed through Turkish (self-)identifications.

The concluding chapter (Chapter 9) interlinks the results of the discourse-analyses of the four thematic fields in order to demonstrate the macro-structure of the special discourse examined in this study. Using Landwehr's methodological approach of historical discourse-analysis, cross-thematical answers are given to the question of which characteristics are paramount, and which words, arguments, and distinctions are dominant and emerge repeatedly. This chapter unites the theoretical-methodological framework with the results of the analyses of the Assembly protocols and relates the findings to the existing research literature. Finally, the study's conclusion poses research questions to enrich the topic of Turkish European identity constructions.

2 Theoretical Framework: the Concept of Collective European Identity

The first challenge of analysing identity constructions of bigger formations such as Europe is: What do we mean when we talk about ‘collective identities’? Although the concept of identity has become a popular object of research in all variants, respectively in different disciplines such as sociology, political science, anthropology, history, psychology and literary studies, the term ‘identity’ itself and therefore ‘collective identity’ is not clear at all. Instead, the term is used in a number of different ways, with various focuses and meanings within the different disciplines and different theoretical approaches. Consequently, how this term is defined and used as an analytical category depends ultimately on the interest of the researcher and their theoretical perspective on it.

The amount of academic work on the term and concepts of collective and European identity is almost impossible to survey.¹ Based on its complex constitution and ambiguity, the term ‘identity’ has been increasingly criticised as an object of research in the last years. Its ambiguity has even resulted in the complete rejection of it. Sociologist Rogers Brubaker and historian Frederick Cooper (2000), for example, argue that the term identity “tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense) or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity).”² In a similar way, historian Lutz Niethammer accuses the term of being empty, thus lacking content in designating it as a ‘plastic word’. In addition, he emphasizes that the term is regularly instrumentalised and manipulated for political ends.³ However, the critiques on identity as an object of analysis do not only result

¹ Some of these will still be referred to below. In addition, the following theoretical considerations should be mentioned specifically with regard to European identity: Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (London: Macmillan, 1995); Jürgen Gerhards, “Identifikation mit Europa. Einige begriffliche Vorklärungen,” in *Entstaatlichung und soziale Sicherheit. Verhandlungen des 31. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Leipzig*, ed. Jutta Allmendinger (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003), 467-474; Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, eds., *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Campus, 2002); Wilfried Loth, “Europäische Identität und europäisches Bewusstsein,” in *Nationale Identität und transnationale Einflüsse. Amerikanisierung, Europäisierung und Globalisierung in Frankreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Reiner Masekowitz (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2007), 35-52; Thomas Meyer, *Die Identität Europas: Der EU eine Seele?* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004); Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte und Zukunft der europäischen Identität* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2010); Bo Stråth, “A European Identity – to the Historical Limits of a Concept,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 5/4 (2002): 387–401; Bo Stråth, ed., *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other* (Brüssel et al.: Lang, 2010).

² Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘identity,’” *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 1. This paper is probably one of the most detailed argumentation against the use of the term ‘identity’ as an analytical category in social analysis at all.

³ For details see Niethammer’s often-cited work on collective identities in sum: Lutz Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität. Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur*, in collab. with Axel Dossmann (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2000). In designating identity as a ‘plastic word’, he refers to Uwe Pörksen’s categorisation of words that are frequently used in research although being empty. Cf. Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität*, 33. For details on Pörksen’s concept of plastic words see Uwe Pörksen, *Plastikwörter. Die Sprache einer internationalen*

from its plurality of uses nor from its political abuses but also from the fact that some scholars fail to explain how they use the term at all, as if its definition were clear without ambiguity. Nevertheless, the term's ambiguity and the complexity of different concepts of collective identities should not be a valid reason to eliminate it completely from the research arena. Instead, every researcher should specify the interest of knowledge, including the theoretical perspective, when dealing with 'identity'. In other words, as Kaina and Karolewski summarize in the context of analysing European identity formations: "We simply must be precise about what we are referring to and what we are interested in whenever we speak of the emergence of a "European identity"."⁴

This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study with a focus on theoretical approaches to European identity constructions. The first subchapter examines how theoretical-analytical as well as empirical research from the social sciences and humanities deal with the term and concepts of collective, and in particular European, identity. The second subchapter concentrates on theoretical assumptions on formation processes of collective and European identities and argues for the constructivist approach. The third subchapter focuses on a specific constructivist approach, the critical geopolitics approach, which deals with the question of how geopolitical identities emerge and how space identities are constructed through discourse. The last subchapter summarizes some conclusions relevant to this study and refers Gallie's theoretical concept of "essentially contested concepts"⁵ to 'Europe'.

2.1 Theoretical-Analytical Considerations on the Concept of Collective Identity

In the following, the term 'identity' and particularly 'collective identity' will be split into its different potential meanings before 'European identity' is presented as a concept of analysis in contemporary research literature. While the focus is on theoretical-analytical research, empirical research on European identity constructions is also included in this subchapter.

Personal, Social and Collective Identity

To introduce the term and concept of 'collective identity', its origin as well as its path into the social sciences is outlined in brief. Semantically the term 'identity' originates from the Latin

Diktatur (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988). See also the following article: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Identität. Unheimliche Hochkonjunktur eines „Plastikwortes“," in *Konflikte des 21. Jahrhunderts: Essays*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (München, Beck, 2003), 147-155.

⁴ Viktoria Kaina and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, "EU governance and European identity," *Living Reviews in European Governance* 8 (2013), DOI: 10.12942/lreg-2013-1, 18.

⁵ Cf. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts."

word *īdem* in the meaning of ‘the same’ or ‘identical’ and can be traced back to the ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle. They reflected the issue of singularity and especially the modification of objects in different relational situations while staying the same; for example a tree in summer or winter.⁶ Over the next centuries, these reflections were subsequently advanced within the philosophical sphere of logic and resulted in different theses such as Gottfried W. Leibniz’s observation of the *principium identitatis indiscernibilium* at the end of the 17th century. He declared that two or more physical ‘real’ things were not able to be identical.⁷

The contemporary term of ‘identity’ in the sense of a human inter-related concept, however, is often conferred to the American psychologist and philosopher William James (1890).⁸ His reflections on the meaning of an individual’s relations to Others for the individual’s Self are considered the beginning and impetus of research on identity, incipiently in social psychology and psychoanalysis. Based on James’ findings, both George Herbert Mead (1934), sociologist and social psychologist and one of the founders of symbolic interactionism, and psychologist Erik H. Erikson (1959) are generally regarded to have influenced the research on identity to a high degree. Due to their reflections, ‘identity’ as an object of research finally found its way into the humanities and social sciences.⁹ Having its roots in social psychology, certain

⁶ Cf. Bernadette Müller, *Empirische Identitätsforschung. Personale, soziale und kulturelle Dimensionen der Selbstverortung* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 20.

⁷ In his work *Disputatio Metaphysica De Principio Individui* (1663) Leibniz proceeded the question of being identical to two or more objects and declared that all ‘real’ objects that are not one and the same have to be different in at least one observable characteristic, so that they cannot be absolutely identical. For detailed explanations concerning the history of the term ‘identity’ and how it was used and developed over the centuries by other philosophers such as Descartes, Locke and Kant, the following works are to be recommended: David J. de Levita, *The concept of identity* (Paris et al.: Mouton, 1965); Müller, *Empirische Identitätsforschung*; Benjamin Jörissen, *Identität und Selbst. Systematische, begriffsgeschichtliche und kritische Aspekte* (Berlin: Logos, 2000). For a detailed overview concerning different considerations and the history of the term ‘identity’, see also, as a small choice of numerous works, Benjamin Jörissen and Jörg Zirfas, eds., *Schlüsselwerke der Identitätsforschung* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010); Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität*; Aleida Assmann and Heidrun Friese, ed., *Identitäten* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998).

⁸ William James conceptualized the term ‘identity’ within the chapter on “The Consciousness of Self” within his work *The Principles of Psychology*, first published in 1890 (cf. William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (Chicago et al.: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952). Concerning the origin of identity research based on William James and the significance of his work for academic research outside the field of philosophy see, e.g., William B. Jr. Swann and Jennifer K. Bosson, “Self and Identity,” in *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Vol. 1), ed. Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey, 5th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010, first published 1935), 589ff.; de Levita, *The concept of identity*, 29; Müller, *Empirische Identitätsforschung*, 26; Esser, *Soziologie*, 338.

⁹ Cf., e.g., Viktoria Kaina, *Wir in Europa: Kollektive Identität und Demokratie in der Europäischen Union* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 40; Jörissen, *Identität und Selbst*, 9, 24f.; Kevin D. Vryan, Patricia A. Adler, and Peter Adler, “Identity,” in *Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism*, ed. Larry T. Reynolds and Nancy J. Herman-Kinney (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003), 367. As a follower of Sigmund Freud Erik H. Erikson’s theory of ego psychology particularly influenced the fields of psychoanalysis and practical psychotherapy. For his concept of personal identity see his work *Identity and the Life Cycle* (1959), for further information about himself and his influence in identity research see also Juliane

impacts of social psychology to identity-based approaches in social sciences shall be elucidated briefly. As a first systematization, the distinction into three dimensions of the term seems to be helpful, which are personal, social and collective identity:¹⁰

Personal identity (the main focus of Erikson) refers to the process of attaining continuity and coherence within the individual's Self throughout several situations and phases of life¹¹ – and therefore became an object of research in psychology rather than in the humanities and social sciences. In contrast, *social identity theory* concentrates on different social roles of individuals, interaction processes of categorizing the Self and Others as well as on an individual's identifications with different groups. Supposedly, the most-cited definition is provided by Henri Tajfel (1981) as one of the founders of *social identity theory*,¹² by describing social identity as

“that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”¹³

Noack, “Erik H. Erikson: Identität und Lebenszyklus,” in *Schlüsselwerke der Identitätsforschung*, ed. Benjamin Jörissen and Jörg Zirfas (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 37-53. In the field of social psychology George Herbert Mead is considered to be the progressive thinker concerning identity formations and inter-active processes within society. *Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* is regarded as his main work, although not written by himself but by his follower Charles W. Morris who summarized one of Mead's repeating lectures at the University of Chicago in the early 1930s. Cf. George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: From a Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, ed. and with an introduction by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992, first published 1934). For further remarks on Mead and his identity concept see also Hartmut Esser, *Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen. Band 6: Sinn und Kultur* (Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Campus, 2001), 336 ff.; Benjamin Jörissen, “George Herbert Mead: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Perspektive des Sozialbehaviorismus,” in *Schlüsselwerke der Identitätsforschung*, ed. Benjamin Jörissen and Jörg Zirfas (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 87-108. Nevertheless, Niethammer tries to destruct the aforementioned two influential sources of contemporary identity research and writes another genesis of the concept with a stronger reference to intellectual works of the interwar period, particularly based on Carl Schmitt, Georg Lukács, Sigmund Freud, C. G. Jung, Maurice Halbwachs and Aldous Huxley, cf. Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität*, 77ff.

¹⁰ Cf., e.g., Bettina Westle, “Europäische Identifikation im Spannungsfeld regionaler und nationaler Identitäten. Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde,” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 44 (2003): 455; Cäcilie Schildberg, *Politische Identität und Soziales Europe. Parteikonzeptionen und Bürgereinstellungen in Deutschland, Großbritannien und Polen* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 47ff.

¹¹ The term *personal identity* again is complex and to be divided in different terms such as *I-identity* and *self-identity*. Since it is not of central relevance in this study, this distinction shall not be followed at this point. For details see the works of Erikson (Erik H. Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle: selected papers* (New York et al.: Intern. Univ. Press, 1959) and Mead (*Mind, Self and Society*, 1934) as well as Esser, *Soziologie*, 336 ff.

¹² For details on the *social identity theory* of Tajfel and Turner, see Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour,” in *Psychology of intergroup relations*, ed. Stephen Worchel, and William G. Austin (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), 7-24.

¹³ Henri Tajfel, *Human groups and social categories* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), 255. Henri Tajfel emphasizes that this definition is still limited but he adds that it is simply necessary to give a first definition of the concept as it were part of the ongoing discussions. Cf. Tajfel, *Human groups*, 255.

In short, social identity develops from “the problems of an individual’s self-definition in a social context.”¹⁴ Thus, the concept of social identity, according to James and Mead the *Me* in contrast to the *I*,¹⁵ includes cognitive, evaluative and affective elements.¹⁶ It results from social relations and images of oneself through the perception of others, or as James identifies: “Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind”¹⁷ [emphasis in original].

Within all these multiple kinds of inter-relations, one particular social process shall be highlighted in the following – the identification of an individual with different groups of people, conceptualized here as an individual’s different ‘collective identities’. If one compares the concepts of collective and social identity, this means: Based on social psychological and sociological theories, the term collective identity is generally used to specify that part or subcategory of social identity that describes the identification processes of an individual vis-à-vis several collectives.¹⁸ ‘Several’ insofar as every human being has multiple collective identities – being a student of a certain university, a fan of a soccer club, a citizen of a region, a nation or an international community – all at the same time, albeit perceived to varying degrees, depending on the context.¹⁹ Moreover, every self-attribution to a group requires the acceptance of the collective to be a member of it. It might sound trivial but it is in fact a relevant characteristic of an individual’s multiple collective identities: The vertical relation between an individual and a group can never be a one-way road, but depends

¹⁴ Tajfel, *Human groups*, 254.

¹⁵ The notional differentiation within an individual’s identity between *Me* and *I* is a central point in George Herbert Mead’s *Mind, Self, and Society*, in which he assumes and amplifies the findings of William James in this regard. The conceptual distinction itself can even be traced back to Immanuel Kant and Gottfried W. Leibniz, as for example Müller (*Empirische Identitätsforschung*, 26) emphasizes.

¹⁶ See also the following discussion about the concept of social identity according to Henri Tajfel: Richard K. Herrmann and Marilyn B. Brewer, “Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU,” in *Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU*, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer (Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 6.

¹⁷ James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 189f.

¹⁸ Cf. Esser, *Soziologie*, 342; for purposes of illustration see also Esser’s figure on page 345 concerning different dimensions of the Self. Further examples that categorize collective identity on the individual level as a subcategory of social identity are Martin Kohli, “The Battlegrounds of European Identity,” *European Societies* 2 (2000): 115; Westle, “Europäische Identifikation,” 455; Daniel Fuss and Marita A. Grosser, “What Makes Young Europeans Feel European? Results from a Cross-Cultural Research Project,” in *European Identity. Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Insights*, ed. Ireneusz P. Karolewski and Viktoria Kaina (Münster et al.: LIT, 2006), 212. Concerning the division of the terminology of social and collective identity see, e.g., Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 53.

¹⁹ With respect to different political entities (such as nation-states or the European Union), it is controversial whether multiple identifications can be independent and not compete against each other or whether one identification rather weakens another. To obtain a good overview of different hypotheses in this respect, see for instance Westle, “Europäische Identifikation,” 455f. Westle’s empirical results on European identification processes and multiple identities show that identifying with Europe does not essentially contradict the national identities of people. Cf. Bettina Westle, “Universalismus oder Abgrenzung als Komponente der Identifikation mit der Europäischen Union?” in *Europäische Integration in der öffentlichen Meinung*, ed. Frank Bretschneider, Jan van Deth, and Edeltraud Roller (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003), 115ff.

on *inter*-relations – therefore also on those ones they want to be part of.²⁰ In social science research, however, the term collective identity refers also to a second identification level, as will be examined in the following.

Two Analytical Levels within the Concept of Collective Identity

Social science researchers that focus on the theoretical concept of collective identity usually divide the concept into two analytical levels: an individual and a collective one.²¹ Instead of focusing on single members, the latter means to centralize a collective's identity as a whole, that is to analyse the horizontal level within one collective. Thus, this level is composed of the communication processes and interactions inside a certain group constructing a collective Self, while mostly constructing common outsiders concurrently.²²

In other words, the two-level-question refers to the essential question of subject and object, of “*who* identifies with *whom* or *what*.”²³ Political scientist Viktoria Kaina systemizes the different perspectives within her analytical framework for research on European collective identity very clearly: On both the individual and collective level, the object of identification is the collective. However, the issue of who identifies as the subject depends: Whereas on the individual level the subjects are individuals who identify with a group, on the collective level it is the collective itself.²⁴ To clarify who is subject and who is object, particularly to distinguish precisely between the individual and collective level, is crucial and therefore highly recommended when dealing with collective identities, as otherwise the purpose of research is confusing and unclear – for the author as well as the reader.²⁵

In this study, both levels are relevant: On the collective level, this thesis illuminates how and in which contexts the members of the Council of Europe's Assembly – Turkish as well as non-Turkish delegates – were searching for commonalities to establish a European Self resulting in the question of ‘who are we?’. Thereby, the group of Assembly members representing European citizens is subject and object of identification at the same time. On the

²⁰ Cf. Meyer, *Die Identität Europas*, 22; Kaina and Karolewski, “EU governance,” 20; Westle, “Universalismus oder Abgrenzung,” 120.

²¹ See, for instance, Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 41; Gerd Harrie, “European Identity – Implications from the Social Theory of Norbert Elias,” in *European Identity. Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Insights*, ed. Ireneusz P. Karolewski and Viktoria Kaina (Münster et al.: LIT, 2006), 62.

²² Cf., e.g., Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 42. The construction of ‘outsiders’ will be properly examined below.

²³ Viktoria Kaina, “How to reduce disorder in European identity research?” *European Political Science* 12 (Nov. 2012): 186, DOI:10.1057/eps.2012.39. Viktoria Kaina also adds “why or for which reason,” which becomes relevant in the course of this study.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 187.

²⁵ In a similar way, Kaina and Karolewski point to the necessity of being transparent concerning the levels and perspectives on collective identities as utilized in each case. Cf. Kaina and Karolewski, “EU governance,” 18.

individual level, the analysis focuses on identification processes of Turkish representatives with the European collective, and additionally, however less intense, on reactions by non-Turkish delegates.

Both analytical levels of collective identities are examined in empirical research on European identity constructions. Studies that deal with the individual level ask to what extent, why or in which context ‘Europeans’ identify with ‘Europe’.²⁶ Those that focus on the collective level of European identity formations investigate the collective’s attempts to define itself and its demarcations to the outside, so that the core question is ‘who are *we*?’ instead of ‘who am *I*?’.²⁷ In this field, many studies focus on constructions in an internationally comparative way and analyse, for example, the discursive constructions of Europe and European identity in different national media.²⁸ For the present work, studies that analyse constructions of European identity at the European rather than the national level are particularly relevant. Among those, again, the following studies are of particular importance since they focus on a similar time period as this study and also take representatives in European institutions, including the Council of Europe, as producers of images of Europe into account: The volume *Werben für Europa* edited by Gabriele Clemens examines constructions of European identity in so-called ‘Europe films’, which are identified as propaganda films made by European institutions in the post-war period in order to create a feeling of belonging together beyond

²⁶ Such analyses with a focus on the individual level are for example: Westle, “Europäische Identifikation”; Thomas Risse, *A community of Europeans? Transnational identities and public spheres* (Ithaca, NY et al.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2010); Sophie Duchesne, “Waiting for a European Identity...Reflections on the Process of Identification with Europe,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9/4 (2008): 397-410; Fuss and Grosser, “What makes young Europeans”; David M. Green, *The Europeans: Political identity in an Emerging Polity* (Boulder et al.: Lynne Rienner, 2007). In addition, the *Eurobarometer* of the European Commission provides statistical data on the identification with Europe since 1974, see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (20 January 2020).

²⁷ Like Kaina and Karolewski sum it up, cf. Kaina and Karolewski “EU governance,” 19. Examples for studies on the collective level are: Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, “The politicization of European identities,” in *European Identity*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-25; Gudrun Quenzel, *Konstruktionen von Europa. Die europäische Identität und die Kulturpolitik der Europäischen Union* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2005). With special regard to Turkey see also: Öner, *Turkey and the European Union*; Aydın-Düzgüt, *Constructions of European Identity*, and others mentioned in this study’s introduction (Chapter 1.2).

²⁸ Wiesner (2014), Lichtenstein (2014) as well as Lichtenstein and Eilders (2015), for instance, analyse European identity constructions in different national print media in the 2000s. Cf. Claudia Wiesner, *Demokratisierung der EU durch nationale Europadiskurse? Strukturen und Prozesse europäischer Identitätsbildung im deutsch-französischen Vergleich* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014); Dennis Lichtenstein, *Europäische Identitäten. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Medienöffentlichkeiten ost- und westeuropäischer EU-Länder* (Konstanz: UVK, 2014); Dennis Lichtenstein and Christiane Eilders, “Konstruktionen europäischer Identität in den medialen Debatten zur EU-Verfassung. Ein inhaltsanalytischer Vergleich von fünf EU-Staaten,” *Publizistik* 3 (2015): 277-303. With regard to analyses with a historical perspective, Pfister, for example, focuses on images of Europe in the post-war period in newsreels in Austria, Britain, France and West Germany. Cf. Eugen Pfister, *Europa im Bild: Imaginationen Europas in Wochenschauen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und Österreich 1948-1959* (Göttingen et al.: V & R unipress, 2014).

the nation-state. The volume shows that already in post-war Europe European organizations, among them the Council of Europe, aimed at inspiring the citizens of its member states for the European integration project with the help of the medium of film. Thereby they constructed different images of what held Europe together, such as a common cultural heritage or the idea of a common economic space.²⁹ Likewise, the research points out that the term ‘European identity’ was not yet en vogue; instead, the political elites at the time spoke of a ‘European consciousness’.³⁰ The study equates these two terms as the goal of the individual identification with Europe, which is aligned with the current study. The current analysis also demonstrates that the Assembly members aspired to create a feeling of belonging when they talked about the aim of establishing a European consciousness.

Moreover, Achim Trunk’s monograph *Europa, ein Ausweg* is of central relevance for this study since it examines constructions of European identity at the collective level in the European assemblies of the 1950s. The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe is of crucial importance in his analysis. Trunk shows that the political elites of the time constructed different European commonalities and thereby ‘European selves’. These were established on the one hand, on the agreement of belonging to one and the same ‘European civilization’ based on a common heritage, and on the other hand, more dominantly, by demarcation to the outside while the most dominant other were the communist Bolsheviks.³¹

Emotional and Cognitive Identifications with ‘Imagined Communities’

Another distinction within collective identity formations is often made between emotional and cognitive processes. In particular, empirical social research on the individual level focuses on the question of whether people simply *know* about their belonging to a certain group or whether they actually *feel* a sense of a belonging together or a sense of community.³² Collective identity as part of an individual’s social identity is therefore often defined as the *emotional* sub-dimension of social identity.³³ This, of course, should be considered while

²⁹ Cf. Gabriele Clemens, ed., *Werben für Europa: Die mediale Konstruktion europäischer Identität durch Europafilme* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016).

³⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 15f. The term officially had its first use in the *Declaration on European Identity* (1973). The occasion of the document was the European Communities’ interest to formulate its foreign policy position vis-à-vis the United States.

³¹ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*. Also Wolf D. Gruner deals with imaginations of Europe in the Council of Europe’s Assembly in its early years of existence and concludes that perceptions of what was essentially understood by ‘Europe’ differentiated. He blames precisely these discrepancies for the slow pace of European unification. Cf. Gruner, “Der Europarat wird fünfzig.”

³² Cf. Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 42; Risse, *A community of Europeans?* 22.

³³ Cf. Esser, *Soziologie*, 342, see also his figure on page 345; see also Kaina and Karolewski, “EU governance,” 18.

remembering that in social identity research within sociology and particularly socio-psychology the focus is primarily on the individual itself, respectively on the social Self. However, in concentrating on other purposes such as, for example, to what extent people identify with Europe, the research interest concerns less the individual's Self but rather the meaning of Europe in the heads and hearts of Europeans. In this case, not only emotional but also cognitive elements are relevant and should be recognised in any identification processes with a collective European community.

In this context, the empirical study of Daniel Fuss and Marita Grosser (2006) titled "What Makes Young Europeans Feel European?" which focuses on different individual's identifications with Europe is worth mentioning: According to their results, several young adults consider themselves Europeans simply as a consequence of their national citizenship. To be French concurrently means to be European simply because France is a part of Europe, respectively a member of the European Union.³⁴ It is apparently possible that a cognitive attribution to Europe on the individual level takes place – the young adults are conscious about the fact that they *belong to* Europe – , whereas an emotional feeling of *belonging together*, of being one community, remains absent.³⁵ Here, however, another distinction becomes relevant, which is the distinction between political and cultural Europe, as will be part of further considerations below.

Another relevant question concerns the *strength* of collective identities, which means "the degree of loyalty that individuals are willing to invest when they identify with a social group."³⁶ Put simply, it is assumed that the higher the emotional degree of belonging together, the more powerful the collective is in acting – based on the assumption that a stronger feeling of connectedness creates a stronger solidarity among the members including a stronger willingness to make sacrifices in favour of the community.³⁷ Simply the sense of sharing precious commonalities with members in contrast to non-members is considered supportive of a strong feeling of belonging.³⁸ Against this background, it is hardly surprising that European activists who sought a politically united Europe were searching for valuable commonalities

³⁴ Cf. Fuss and Grosser, "What makes young Europeans," 228.

³⁵ Here it is referred to the distinction between *belonging to* as an individual's identification with a collective and *belonging together* as the belief in sharing commonalities with other members. Cf. Kaina and Karolewski, "EU governance," 18. See also above, in the course of the explanation of the two analytical levels of collective identities.

³⁶ Risse, *A community of Europeans?* 30.

³⁷ Cf. Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 44; Bettina Westle, *Kollektive Identität im vereinten Deutschland. Nation und Demokratie in der Wahrnehmung der Deutschen* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1999), 37. For a detailed overview of different dimensions concerning the intensity of identification and their meanings and consequences see particularly Westle, *Kollektive Identität*, 37, footnote 11.

³⁸ Cf. Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 44.

among Europeans already in the late 1940s, as apparent in the consultations within the founding process of the Council of Europe in 1948/49.³⁹

With regard to large groups such as national or international entities, these valuable commonalities (or those perceived as valuable) are imputed to an anonymous mass of people, which is why such big collectives are often described as “imagined communities,” according to a nation-state-related concept coined by Benedict Anderson in 1983.⁴⁰ *Imagined* in the sense that “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁴¹ Thereby imagined as a *community* because “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”⁴² The meaning and power of this deep bond or feeling of cohesion among nations is most apparent, according to Anderson, in the willingness to die for their nation – their imagined community.⁴³

Although Anderson emphasizes the power of nationalism and nation-states in relation to a strong collective identity, and although it is highly questionable whether people would “die for Europe,”⁴⁴ this socio-cognitive concept is considered here as transferrable to international unions, in which people may perceive themselves to be connected despite only knowing a minority of their fellows. This concept is especially suitable with an emphasis on the term *imagined* in the modified sense of having visions and imaginations of a common Europe – whether this refers to an image of a ‘greater Europe’ consisting of COE states or to the image of a rather narrow conjunction within the borders of the European Union.

In sum, it should be clarified that both cognitive and emotional facets are inherent in the concept of collective identity, in particular when it comes to an individual identifying with a

³⁹ As will be illuminated as part of the analysis below. Today, in particular within the EU, current efforts and campaigns are observable to strengthen the awareness as well as the emotional feeling to be part of the ‘European family’, starting, for example, with the strong integration of Europe-related subjects in the curricula in schools. How far all these efforts lead to successes, in addition, are measured with the help of frequently collected statistical data within the *Eurobarometer* of the European Commission, see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (20 January 2020).

⁴⁰ See Anderson’s work *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, published in 1983. References to Anderson’s concept can be found frequently, see, e.g., Kathleen R. McNamara, “The EU as an imagined community?” Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association Meetings (Boston, MA, 3 March 2011); Kaina and Karolewski, “EU governance,” 22; Karen A. Cerulo, “Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions,” *Annual Review on Sociology* 23 (1997): 390; Thomas Diez, “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17/2 (2004): 320.

⁴¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 15.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 16.

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Concerning this notion see Risse, *A community of Europeans?* 30. Anderson et al. in this regard particularly hint to the question how strong solidarity can be among strangers and whether such a feeling of solidarity among Europeans might ever be as strong as among citizens of one nation-state.

collective. Regarding European identity constructions in the Council of Europe's Assembly, however, it is difficult to distinguish between cognitive and emotional elements, as it is difficult to detect emotionality in official written texts such as the minutes of parliamentary meetings per se. Even if emotional contributions are assumable, as for instance, when talking about a 'community of destiny' in the aftermath of the Second World War, we cannot evaluate the grade of emotionality.⁴⁵ The nature of these kind of historical documents therefore limits the possibilities of any intense consideration of emotional aspects. Nevertheless, expressions of emotions will be noted, not least as part of rhetoric strategies in constructing a sense of cohesion.

Alternative Terms or: Different Connotations of 'Identity'

As shown so far, the concept of identity consists of various facets and multiple connotations. Based on its ambiguity, as aforementioned, some scholars oppose the use of the term as an analytical concept and reject it as empty due to its fluidity. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper provide a repertoire of alternative terms, which are quite useful in lightening the diverse facets of 'identity'. These alternatives include, first of all, the term *identification* as describing any active process of identifying. Firstly, the process of self-identification either *as* somebody in a relational sense – e.g. a student in relation to a teacher – or in a categorical mode *with* others – e.g. with a group of people based on one or more categories such as gender, ethnicity or nationality. Secondly, the term describes any external identification and categorization processes *by* others. This can again be differentiated into two dimensions relating to the 'identifiers': On the one hand, *people* identify and categorize others as they identify themselves. But on the other hand, authoritative *institutions* can also identify, categorize and classify people. These external identifications are then systematically formalized and codified.⁴⁶ On the whole, Kaina summarizes this when she emphasizes the great advantages of the term 'identification' by pointing out that it "does not only underline the processual character of collective identities. It also enables to incorporate cognitive as well as affective/evaluative and conative elements."⁴⁷

⁴⁵ On the 'common destiny' of Europeans see for example PACE, *Reports*, 2/4, 21st sitting, 28 August 1950, Alamanis (Greece), 1184.

⁴⁶ For the whole paragraph see Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond 'identity'," 14f.

⁴⁷ In the original German version: "Der Begriff der Identifikation unterstreicht nicht nur den Prozesscharakter kollektiver Identitäten. Er gestattet außerdem, sowohl kognitive, als auch affektive/evaluative und konative Elemente zu berücksichtigen." Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 47.

In this study, the following identification processes are relevant: Firstly, the self-identification of Turkish representatives and their country with Europe as well as secondly, the external identification and categorization of Turkey on the part of the Assembly members – identifying Turkey as a part of Europe or not. With regard to the two dimensions of external identification, the formalized institutional system of identification can be eliminated here for the simple reason that the formal part of categorization has already been fulfilled in accepting Turkey as a member of the Council of Europe in the year of its foundation in 1949. The more interesting question concerns the social external identification of Turkey on the part of European politicians.

Another inherent meaning of ‘identity’ can be expressed by the term *self-understanding*. It describes the perception of one’s social location and can be described as less active and less processual compared to the term *identification*. Brubaker and Cooper further relate *self-understanding* closely to *self-presentation*, which again “suggests at least some degree of discursive articulation.”⁴⁸

With regard to Turkish parliamentarians representing Turkey in the COE’s Assembly, it is hardly possible to analyse their *self-understanding* in contrast to their *self-presentation*. The Turkish self-understanding can thereby potentially be compatible with its self-presentation, but we simply do not know on the basis of the Assembly’s official reports of debates – since these documents have to be considered as testimonials of official political discussions in which politicians follow political strategies to a certain degree. Hence, only the way and the contexts in which Turkish deputies *present* themselves as European and their country as belonging to Europe can be analysed. On the European collective level, on the contrary, the term *self-understanding* is significant and serves as an alternative term to ‘identity’ as it describes the results of different discursive constructions of ‘who are we Europeans?’.

With regard to the collective level, Brubaker and Cooper additionally recommend alternative terms such as *commonality* describing the sharing of common attributes, *connectedness* as the relational tie between members and *groupness* in the sense of belonging as well as belonging together.⁴⁹ These inherent components of collective identity are also relevant in this study referring to the question of how and to what extent the Assembly members negotiated *commonalities* to achieve a closer *connectedness* and *groupness*. In addition, Brubaker and Cooper present the German Weberian term *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* as a feeling of

⁴⁸ Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond “identity”,” 18.

⁴⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 19f.

belonging together.⁵⁰ Kaina and Karolewski relate it to the notion of *sense of community*, which has a similar meaning but differs in the degree of its emotional content, with the latter as not confined to emotional feelings.⁵¹ Furthermore, the German term *Zugehörigkeitsgefühl* shall be presented here as a more concentrated and sharp translation of the notion of *sense of belonging* on the individual level and as a convenient complement to the term *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* on the collective level.

In conclusion, this study considers the term ‘collective identity’ as an umbrella term (which has its right to exist exactly in the sense of being an umbrella term), but favours the use of alternative terms inherent to the multifaceted concept of collective identity when it comes to different processes, such as self-identification processes and searching for commonalities.

Political Civic versus Cultural Concepts of European Identity

When talking about ‘European identity’ as a concrete case of collective identity, researchers differ in their content. The major connotations refer either to cultural or political identities of Europe. Within these considerations, what is meant by European cultural or political identity concepts differ again from each other. Once more, the importance to create transparency while working with such theoretical controversial concepts shall be emphasized.

Without going into detail relating the separation as well as connection of cultural and political identities, since it will be discussed below, major considerations on different kinds of European collective identities are the following: First of all, analyses of cultural identity formation usually concentrate on constructions of a memory-based community, imagined through a common cultural heritage such as a common history, religion or language as well as values in the sense of religious or cultural values.⁵² From this perspective, Europe is interpreted as a cultural space, independent from any political communities such as the European Union. Identifications with Europe in the sense of sharing a cultural identity refer mostly to the perception of sharing one common cultural heritage through history.⁵³ Also the COE’s Assembly members were searching for a definition of a common cultural heritage in debates on cultural affairs, and for a major part interpreted Christianity and antiquity as crucial pillars of the common heritage.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Cf. Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond “identity,”” 20.

⁵¹ Cf. Kaina and Karolewski, “EU governance,” 30f.

⁵² It is obvious that ‘culture’ can be defined in different ways. It will be part of the analysis in itself to observe how the Assembly delegates defined culture when speaking of cultural commonalities throughout Europe.

⁵³ See for instance Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 14f.; Öner, *Turkey and the European Union*, 55f.

⁵⁴ This is shown in detail in Chapter 8 (Culture).

Political collective identities, in contrast, refer primarily to political communities.⁵⁵ Current political science research on European political identities mostly focuses on the European Union as a political community.⁵⁶ Thereby, what is needed to give a community political relevance are first and foremost democratic values and common liabilities for all members.⁵⁷ These studies focus mainly on ‘EUropean’ identities rather than European identities, thereby placing value on the *political* identity concept.⁵⁸ The high degree of complexity of European and EUropean political identity constructions becomes clearly visible in a variety of studies that deal with questions about the emergence and meaning of a European public sphere, a European demos, as well as different forms of EU citizenship.⁵⁹ Concerning the latter issue, a term that is also frequently used is *civic identity*, which emphasizes in particular the reference to the institutional framework including people’s rights and obligations as EU citizens.⁶⁰ A further specific political identity concept is that of a ‘project identity’, particularly coined by Manuel Castells (2003) and Thomas Meyer (2004), highlighting the conscious belonging and responsibility for Europe as a common political project.⁶¹ Consequently, the term ‘project identity’ first and foremost refers to the future, thus to a common vision.

Nevertheless, a clear distinction between cultural and political constructions of European identity is not that simple. In fact, cultural aspects may also be influential in the construction process of a European political identity. The power of culture within political identity formations is controversially discussed within constructivism as will be explained below in

⁵⁵ Cf. Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 47.

⁵⁶ As for example, with a focus on Turkey: Öner, *Turkey and the European Union*; Aydın-Düzgüt, *Constructions of European Identity*.

⁵⁷ Cf. Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 47; Meyer, *Die Identität Europas*, 20f.

⁵⁸ In academic literature when talking about European identity it is often referred to the space of the European Union nowadays, which is why in some cases it makes sense to write the letter ‘U’ for Union in capital letters.

⁵⁹ Especially the question of a European public sphere as well as of European citizenship in the context of European identity formation is intensively discussed in the current social and specifically political science literature. Pertaining to the question of a European public sphere see, for instance, the following anthologies: Armando Salvatore, Oliver Schmidtke, and Hans-Jörg Trenz, eds., *Rethinking the Public Sphere through Transnationalizing Processes. Europe and Beyond* (Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Luciano Morganti and Léonce Bekemans, eds., *The European Public Sphere. From Critical Thinking to Responsible Action* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012). With respect to the question of European citizenship in relation to constructions of European identities see for example Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, *Citizenship and Collective Identity in Europe* (London et al.: Routledge, 2010); Engin F. Isin and Michael Saward, eds., *Enacting European Citizenship* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013); as well as Lynn Jamieson, “Theorising Identity, Nationality and Citizenship: Implications for European Citizenship Identity,” in *Sociology - Slovak Sociological Review* 6 (2002): 506-532.

⁶⁰ See, for instance, Öner, *Turkey and the European Union*, 55ff.; Michael Bruter, *Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European Identity* (Houndmills et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 102ff.

⁶¹ Cf. Meyer, *Die Identität Europas*; Manuel Castells, *Jahrtausendwende. Teil 3 der Trilogie. Das Informationszeitalter* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003). See also the different essays in the following anthology: Thomas Meyer and Johanna Eisenberg, eds., *Europäische Identität als Projekt: Innen- und Außenansichten* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009). For detailed reflections on the concept of a European project identity, on the basis of Meyer and Castells, see also Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 17ff./60ff.

detail. This entanglement, however, becomes apparent in empirical analyses on the individual level: People being interviewed these days on their degree of identification with Europe might interfuse a conscious civic belonging to the European Union as a political community with perceptions and feelings of sharing some historical or cultural commonalities throughout Europe. In this context, Kaina and Karolewski additionally allude to the false use of the term collective identity in research on European identity when actually talking about the simple support of a political institution, respectively the institutions of the European Union.⁶² This is certainly not synonymous with a common sense of belonging or the identification with other people living in the same political space.

Moreover, with respect to the question of whether European identity covers cultural or rather political elements, the meaning of the historical context is again distinct. Relating to the aforementioned example, one should keep in mind that fifty years ago – without the bonding of the current politics of the European Union, including the democratic right to vote for the European Parliament – people had different ideas of Europe, respectively they simply could have had limited and less civic imaginations of a European community when identifying with Europe. This is similar to the modified meaning of the term *nation* as Habermas emphasizes – a term that was originally used to describe ethno-cultural communities before the meaning was diluted, in the process of nation-state building, to a rather political concept in the sense of citizenship.⁶³

Within this analysis, both political and cultural identity constructions play a role: Since the sphere of analysis is a political organization and the constructors of any kind of collective identity formations are politicians, all these constructions shall be considered as political identity constructions in a way. Also regarding Turkish delegates and their strategies of identifying Turkey with Europe, all these are considered as political constructions, in the sense of constructions with political interest. However, when it comes to the contents of these political constructions, such as the search for commonalities at the collective level, this study shows that the belief in a common heritage played an important role within the formation of a sense of belonging together in the first years of European political unification.⁶⁴

⁶² Cf. Kaina and Karolewski, “EU governance,” 24.

⁶³ Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität: Überlegungen zur europäischen Zukunft* (St. Gallen: Erker, 1991), 8. Moreover, this points to the assumption of a possible separation between a cultural and political identity as represented by the post-national approach that foresees the opportunity of a European political identity simply through EU citizenship. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Post-national Constellation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), as well as the explanation regarding the post-national approach within constructivism below.

⁶⁴ This will be shown in detail in Chapter 8 (Culture).

2.2 European Identity Formation: A Constructivist Approach

While the definition of ‘collective identity’ differs, the consideration of its process of formation differs, too. For instance, what is considered as the origin of a collective identity of political communities primarily depends on the theoretical perspective on it. Within the humanities and social sciences there is a juxtaposition of essentially two theoretical perspectives on national and international collective identities: the perspective of essentialism and of constructivism.⁶⁵

Essentialist Perspectives on Collective Identities of and beyond Nation-states

Representatives of essentialism generally explain collective identity formations on the basis of a certain amount of ‘naturally’ pre-given and ‘objective’ common elements within one group. With regard to nation-states, the essentialist approach thus defines national identities as primarily based on cultural elements such as language, religion or ethnicity, which constitute the origin and necessary solid pillar of collective national identities.⁶⁶ In the context of the aforementioned relation between cultural and political collective identities, essentialists consider national (political) identities, based on cultural commonalities, as a precondition for the establishment of political communities, respectively, nation-states. In brief, the development of a collective political identity is quite linear according to essentialists – it emerges from a pre-existing cultural identity. Therefore, political communities are merely the structural continuations of cultural communities.⁶⁷

With regard to collective identities beyond nation-states, according to the classification of political scientist Lars-Erik Cederman, essentialists argue in two different directions, which is *ethno-nationalism* versus *pan-nationalism*.⁶⁸ The ethno-nationalist approach limits the development of collective identities to nation-states, while neglecting the existence of common cultural characteristics in supra- or international communities. In contrast, the pan-

⁶⁵ Cf., e.g., Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘identity,’” 2; Kaina, *Wir in Europa*, 43; Lars-Erik Cederman, “Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs,” in *Constructing Europe’s Identity. The External Dimension*, ed. Lars-Erik Cederman (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 10f.; Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 53ff.

⁶⁶ Cf. Öner, *Turkey and the European Union*, 39; Cederman, “Political Boundaries,” 10; Cerulo, “Identity Construction,” 387.

⁶⁷ Cf. Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7/2 (2001): 142, DOI: 10.1177/1354066101007002001.

⁶⁸ Cederman suggests a classification into four theoretical approaches on supranational identity formations: the two aforementioned essentialist perspectives of *ethno-* and *pan-nationalism* as well as two constructivist approaches called *bounded integration* and *post-nationalism*. Cf. *ibid.*, 145ff. See also Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 57f.

nationalist perspective enables a culture-driven identity approach beyond nation-states.⁶⁹ With respect to the emergence of a European identity, pan-nationalism supposes the potential existence of a certain European culture, respectively “to make politics fit culture. This essentialist line of reasoning assumes Europe to be a cultural entity waiting to be ‘rediscovered’.”⁷⁰ Thereby, this approach obviously contrasts ethno-nationalism which eventually denies any ‘European culture’ and considers Europe as a multicultural space and therefore as being unable to develop its own collective cultural identity – which, according to essentialism, would be necessary and pre-conditional for any collective political identity.⁷¹ Probably one of the most influential ethno-nationalist essentialists is Anthony D. Smith. His culture-driven focus on nations as autonomous ethnic-cultural entities, thereby detached from the political state, causes a sceptical perspective on collective identities beyond the nation-state. Based on the assumption that a political unit needs a common cultural origin if it asks for loyalty of its members, an identity formation across national boundaries is less promising as long as the nation-state is considered to be the biggest possible community sharing ethnic, religious and/or linguistic commonalities. This is why, according to Smith, the European Union would have to develop a collective political identity including a strong feeling of solidarity amongst those people that formally belong to this supranational union. Without the historical existence of a strong cultural community, which he rejects regarding a multicultural Europe, he does not see any reason for the emergence of abstract phenomena such as loyalty, solidarity, nor a feeling of belonging together which are comparable to those among people living in one and the same nation-state. The European Union, in his view, remains a rational political union based in particular on economic cooperation but without any potential of creating a collective identity (if not going through a cultural evolution over a very long period of time).⁷² In current times, the limits of a sense of belonging and in particular of solidarity are clearly noticeable in many European countries with regard to the task of protecting a vast number of refugees and people admitted for asylum. Some politicians, as well as citizens,

⁶⁹ Cf. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 146f. (concerning ethno-nationalism), 149f. (concerning pan-nationalism). One of the leading representatives of ethno-nationalism is Anthony D. Smith (cf. *ibid.*, 147), details on his assumptions follow below.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 149. However, Cederman emphasizes that *Pan-Europeanists* were only a small minority of supranationalists.

⁷¹ Cf. Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 57.

⁷² For further explanations on his ethno-national essentialist perspective on supranational identities see particularly Anthony D. Smith’s article “National identity and the idea of European unity” (*International Affairs* 68/1 (1992): 55-76) as well as his books *National Identity* (London et al.: Penguin, 1991), here especially Chapter 7 entitled “Beyond National Identity?” and *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge et al.: Polity Press, 1995). For a summary of his assumptions including reflections on the possibility of supranational identities, see also Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 146f.

justify their ethno-nationalist perspective of isolation by denying a European cohesion and, consequently, the collective duty of solidarity. Thus, the different views on Europe – perceived either as a mere economic space or additionally as a solidary community – are more than obvious in these days.

Due to the fact that several attempts to define a common European culture have meanwhile failed, except the general agreement to be ‘united in diversity’, it is no surprise that the pan-nationalist perspective is not popular among researchers. One prominent non-scientific representative of pan-national essentialism was the Austrian politician Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Paneuropean Movement between the two World Wars. His vision, summarized in his manifesto *Panuropa (Pan-Europe, 1923)*, was that of a powerful Pan-Europe as a political concept and as one federal European state, underpinned by cultural arguments to be one civilization. His idea also influenced the European integration process after World War Two to a certain degree, particularly within the federalist camp that was striving for a ‘United States of Europe’ as a federal republic.⁷³ When it came to the question of in- or excluding Turkey from the political concept of Pan-Europe, Coudenhove-Kalergi found in 1923 that Turkey belonged to Asia politically, although part of it belonged to Europe geographically.⁷⁴ In his second book, however, titled *Europa Erwacht! (Europe Awake!)* published in 1934, he added Turkey to his political concept of Europe.⁷⁵ Apparently, it was his visit to the country at the beginning of the 1930s and the Kemalist reforms he had learned about during his visit that helped him change his mind about Turkey’s attachment to Pan-Europe. The country’s detachment from its past, which he valued as an outcome of the reform process along European lines, especially convinced him of Turkey’s new status of being a member of European civilization.⁷⁶

⁷³ To what extent Coudenhove-Kalergi influenced the European integration process in the post-war era is hard to assess. Due to his narcissistic character (according to Niess), he ascribed all campaigns and movements pursuing a European federal state to himself; he even credited in retrospect the origin of the European integration process including the founding of the Council of Europe to his Pan-European Movement. Cf. Frank Niess, *Die europäische Idee. Aus dem Geist des Widerstands* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2001), 21. On details on Coudenhove-Kalergi and his idea of Pan-Europe in sum, see also Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 18ff. Besides Coudenhove-Kalergi, Cederman mentions Denis de Rougemont, a Swiss federalist within the European Movement, as reputedly the most prominent Pan-Europeanist. Cf. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 150. He, above all, held a pathetic speech about Europe’s rich culture at the Congress of The Hague in 1948. Cf. *Europe Unites*, 87. Details on federalist aims as well as Pan-European ideas also follow in the chapter on the creation of the Council of Europe (Chapter 4.1).

⁷⁴ Cf. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe* (New-York: Alfred a. Knopf, 1926), 31f. See also Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, “Turkey and the Idea of a European Union during the Inter-war Years, 1923-39,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 45/3 (May 2009): 427.

⁷⁵ Cf. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europa Erwacht!* (Zürich: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1934), 21.

⁷⁶ Cf. Barlas and Güvenç, “Turkey and the Idea of a European Union,” 438.

In addition, one of the most well known and most criticised theses of our times which aligns with pan-nationalist essentialism is Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" – a culturalistic approach dividing the world into civilizations as culturally defined spaces beyond nation-states.⁷⁷ In his view, a civilization stands for the "highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of identity people have."⁷⁸

Since he believes in cultural hegemony it does not come as a surprise that he explains the success of European economic integration with cultural arguments as follows:

*"Economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European Culture and Western Christianity."*⁷⁹

At the same time, even less surprising, Huntington's thesis has been criticised to a great extent for its racist content as well as its possible outcome evoking conflicts and boundaries through its hegemonic communication.⁸⁰

Constructivist Perspectives on Collective Identities of and beyond Nation-states

In contrast to the essentialist assumption that collective identities of nation-states arise from of a certain cultural "raw material"⁸¹, constructivists focus on the power of politics. They

⁷⁷ Samuel P. Huntington initially published an article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?" in *Foreign Affairs* (1993). In the course of his article he confirmed this question. He then expanded his culturalistic approach three years later in his book: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). On the whole, he constitutes the hypothesis that after the Cold War "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural." Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72/3 (1993): 22. For the classification of Huntington's approach as pan-nationalist see also Cederman, "Political Boundaries," 15.

⁷⁸ Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 24. Civilizations, however, are considered as being fluent and dynamic, "they rise and fall; they divide and merge" (ibid).

⁷⁹ Ibid., 27. The identification of Europe with Western Christianity is not a new viewpoint, but rather complies with such approaches before the Cold War era. For details concerning Western Christianity as essential of constructions of any European civilization see, for instance, Schmale, *Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität*, 91ff., particularly 98f.

⁸⁰ His thesis has been criticised as being racist, causing conflicts as well as being a new justification for United States' politics in the post-Cold War era, especially against the 'Islamic world'. Sharp critique came for example from political scientist Noam Chomsky claiming Huntington's approach was a new justification for any atrocities of US politics; see Noam Chomsky, "Clash of civilizations?" Transcript of a lecture delivered at the Delhi School of Economics on 5 November 2001, <http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/509/509%20noam%20chomsky.htm> (30 January 2014); Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance." *The Nation*, 4 October 2001, <http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance> (30 January 2014); Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York et al.: Norton, 2007). In addition, as a response to Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," the United Nations named the year 2001 the "Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations," proposed by the former Iranian President Muhammad Khatami; see the resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/55/23, <http://www.un.org/documents/r55-23.pdf> (2 February 2014).

deny a singular path between pre-given cultural heritage and political unification. Instead, constructivists consider collective identities first and foremost as contingent and as undergoing a never-ending process of negotiating and modifying. Consequently, in opposition to the essentialist self-acting bottom-up perspective based on a given cultural pool, constructivists emphasize the role of political actors in any identity formation process. This active process thereby goes top-down – constructed by intellectuals and political elites by using, selecting or manipulating common characteristics and cultural symbolism to create connectivity.⁸² Or as Cederman describes this process:

“Since cultural systems are inherently multi-dimensional, history does not deliver ready-made packages such as ethnic cores. Instead, intellectuals and political activists select the ethnic cleavages to be mobilized or suppressed, a process that may produce new cultural combinations.”⁸³

An example that underlines the role of political mechanisms in collective identity formations, is given by political scientist Bahar Rumelili, who clearly exemplifies the effects of the different theoretical viewpoints on the debate of a Turkish EU accession by indicating that

“the constructivist perspective foresees the possibility that European and Turkish identities can be reconstructed in such a way as to make the justification of Turkish membership possible and desirable from an identity viewpoint.”⁸⁴

In contrast to an essentialist (pan-national) viewpoint, constructivism offers a more positive perspective on Turkey eventually becoming a member of the EU, even in terms of identity. By emphasizing the contingent and negotiating character of collective identities, constructivists would not oppose a Turkish membership exclusively based on identity arguments.

Nevertheless, even though constructivism emphasizes the manipulating power of politics within collective identity formation, it does not completely deny the existence of any cultural commonalities within political communities per se. Cultural elements are simply not seen as

⁸¹ Cederman, “Political Boundaries,” 10.

⁸² Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, 10f.; Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 55.

⁸³ Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 142.

⁸⁴ Bahar Rumelili, “Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perspective,” *Insight Turkey* 10/1 (2008): 98.

the core, most powerful ‘identity builders’ but rather as a side effect or convenient supporters to creating communities – prevalently used by political elites or intellectuals in whichever way they decide.⁸⁵ The strength of culture’s side effect is controversial within constructivist views on political identity formation. In this regard, Cederman differentiates between the two poles of an instrumental “logic of consequences” and a sociological “logic of appropriateness.”⁸⁶

The former, more radical approach technically turns the essentialist perspective ‘from cultural to political community’ backwards and downplays the power of culture in the process of political identity formation. As a result, cultural attributes are considered as merely used by political actors to increase their influence. They “mobilize the population in question by carefully selecting out the cultural cleavages to be activated.”⁸⁷

The latter, which, according to Cederman, is the more dominant approach within current constructivism, considers the formation process of political collective identities as more complex and ascribes an influential role to cultural elements. In this case, “the freedom of choice of political entrepreneurs”⁸⁸ is limited, based on the fact that culture is not characterized as a side-effect but rather as an

“institutional ‘lock-in’ effect that traces how identity-formation is affected by the availability of cultural raw material and ethnic boundaries that acquire an autonomous role feeding back into the political process.”⁸⁹

The cultural material of nation-states is therefore not considered as arbitrary, manipulated by political agents, but as an independent dimension in identity discourses affecting the political process. Constructivists such as Cederman as well as Craig Calhoun thus highlight the constitutive character of cultural attributes within national identity formation. Cultural attributes are thereby independent of, but rather restrict identity politics.⁹⁰

In conclusion, the common point of intersection on political identity formation processes within constructivism is that it refuses the causality of a one-way road from cultural to

⁸⁵ Cf. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 142f.; Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 55.

⁸⁶ Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 143.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 142. Concerning the instrumentalist view on national identities as in first line manipulative projects see also Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2004), 30.

⁸⁸ Cederman, “Political Boundaries,” 11.

⁸⁹ Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 143.

⁹⁰ Cf. Calhoun, *Nationalism*, 11; Cederman, “Political Boundaries,” 11.

political communities.⁹¹ Overall, the current debate within constructivism concerns foremost the question of “to what extent cultural attributes are also constitutive for national identity formation processes and restrict the framework of identity politics”⁹² by affecting the political process autonomously. It is thereby assumed that political communities are more robust and consolidated in cases where cultural and political identities are observed to coincide.⁹³

Concerning the possible emergence of collective identities beyond nation-states, constructivism again can be divided into two currents. One approach, which Cederman labels *bounded integration*, is rather sceptical about the potential emergence of collective identities beyond nation-states, since it emphasizes that the construction of cultural and political boundaries are crucial in the process of creating a sense of identity.⁹⁴ These boundaries have to be constructed and reconstructed through political mechanisms and institutions to be effective in the long term. According to Benedict Anderson’s definition of nation-states as ‘imagined communities’ – following Ernest Gellner’s and Eric Hobsbawm’s constructivist assumptions on nation-states and nationalism as politically invented phenomena⁹⁵ – the approach of a bounded integration considers national communities as invented but, for all that, as ‘realized’ to such a degree that they are effective in creating a sense of identity.⁹⁶ The institutional mechanisms of nation-states are considered to be able to produce cultural and political boundaries. Among these mechanisms in particular, the role of education and the national media is frequently emphasized. Since international communities lack mechanisms that are as powerful and effective as national mechanisms, the formation of cross-national identities is postulated as possible but weak.⁹⁷ That means a collective European identity

⁹¹ Cf. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 143.

⁹² In the original German version, “inwiefern kulturelle Merkmale ebenso konstitutiv für nationale Identitätsbildungsprozesse sind und den Rahmen für Identitätspolitik einschränken.” Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 56.

⁹³ Cf. *ibid.* On the whole, for further details on this controversial debate within constructivism see particularly Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 142f.; Calhoun, *Nationalism*, 30ff.

⁹⁴ Cf. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 150.

⁹⁵ Anthropologist Ernest Gellner considered nationalism in first line as a modern political phenomenon; see especially the following study: Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). Historian Eric Hobsbawm contributed to the constructivist view on nations and nation-states specifically through his prospect on national traditions as invented; see particularly the following work: Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990).

⁹⁶ Cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. See also Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 55.

⁹⁷ Cf. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 34 (on the importance of education); Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 35f. (on printed press).

seems to be impossible or at least unlikely to emerge, as long as the EU's political mechanisms are not in a position to define clear cultural and political borders.⁹⁸

Thereby, the bounded integration approach can be opposed to essentialist pan-nationalism. Essentialist ethno-nationalism, in contrast, shares a general scepticism towards effective collective identities across national boundaries while highlighting the resistance of nation-states. Nonetheless, they completely differ from each other in terms of national identities' origin. As positioned within constructivism, representatives of a bounded integration approach emphasize the active political process in identity formation – albeit stressing the reciprocal character of culture and politics – in contrast to the ethno-nationalist emphasis on the cultural origin of national identities.

Post-nationalism as a second constructivist current also stresses the meaning of political mechanisms in political identity formation, but unlike the bounded integration outlook it clearly foresees the opportunity of cross-national identity formation. The major argument is that national identities are not considered as hindering factors for the emergence of political identities across national borders, due to the fact that the post-nationalist approach enables the separation of politics and culture in identity formation.⁹⁹ This is again based on the assumption that nationalism is an artificial consciousness formation.¹⁰⁰ Jürgen Habermas, one of the leading representatives of post-nationalist theories, emphasizes the power of “political culture” as a

“common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society.”¹⁰¹

Hence, the origin of a collective political identity formation lies in democratic citizenship, according to Habermas. What counts as the citizens' core bond is rather one common liberal political culture than one common culture. According to him, political identity adapted from democratic citizenship does not have to be connected with cultural identity in the sense of

⁹⁸ Cf. Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 57f.

⁹⁹ Cf. Cederman, “Political Boundaries,” 15; Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 58.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration,” 148.

¹⁰¹ Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,” *Praxis International* 12 (1992): 6.

identifying oneself with the same cultural nation, rather it requests the socialization of all citizens in one common political culture.¹⁰²

In sum, in contrast to the bounded integration approach, post-nationalism anticipates the opportunity of cross-national identities more positively since it separates cultural from political identity. Instead of emphasizing the necessary creation of cultural and political boundaries through politics, as bounded integration does, post-nationalism stresses the role of democratic citizenship as fundamental to the emergence of one shared political culture which supports a sense of community. By underlining the required emergence and acceptance of a common political culture as a precondition for any political collective identity formation, Habermas clearly resists the aforementioned reproach of Kaina and Karolewski, criticizing that some scholars would mistake the phenomenon of a collective identity with a simple regime support.

With regard to the question of what applies to this study, the present analysis follows a constructivist approach: it does not search for essential cultural characteristics of European identity as pre-given or historically grown, but concentrates on the process-related character of different discursive formations in the Council of Europe's Assembly. Thus, it is irrespective of how resilient or solid any perceived or constructed commonalities were. According to the constructivist perspective on collective identity formations as a top-down process, the Assembly members are considered as 'identity architects' at the top.¹⁰³ It is also interesting to examine whether politicians themselves had an essentialist or constructivist perspective on the concept of Europe, its geographical borders and its cultural heritage, and whether they considered the potential emergence of a collective identity beyond nation-states at all.

¹⁰² Cf. Habermas, *Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität*, 17. For a concise summary on Habermasian post-nationalism see also Schildberg, *Politische Identität*, 58f. The question of the relationship between citizenship and (supra-)national identity is highly discussed in academic literature, especially in the field of political science and sociology. See, e.g., Francesca Strumia, *Supranational Citizenship and the Challenge of Diversity. Immigrants, Citizens and Member States in the EU* (Leiden et al.: Martinus Nijhoff Publ., 2013); Karolewski, *Citizenship and collective identity in Europe*.

¹⁰³ However, the meaning of civil society actors, united in the European Movement, in unifying Europe and defining commonalities should not be disregarded and will be considered in the chapter on the creation of the Council of Europe (Chapter 4.1). As such, the architects of Europe were members of the political and intellectual elite.

The Meta-Theory of Constructivism in International Relations Theory

Before turning to the essence of the constructivist perspective on European identity formations, it is reasonable to give a short overview where to place the term constructivism, as it is the (meta-)theoretical “skin” of this study.¹⁰⁴ Diverse in their applications, the following section examines some basic constructivist views.¹⁰⁵ The emergence and specification of constructivism in International Relations (IR)¹⁰⁶ as a political science sub-discipline shall be notably followed, since these assumptions are treated as useful while dealing with an international political organization such as the Council of Europe. On the whole, constructivism is examined here both as a meta-theory about the composition of the social world and explicitly as a substantial approach within International Relations.¹⁰⁷

First of all, constructivism “is epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and ontologically about the (social) construction of the social world.”¹⁰⁸ Therefore, as a philosophical meta-theory, constructivism ontologically considers the social world as not given, but as socially constructed and subjective: The social world

“is not something ‘out there’ that exists independent of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it. It is not an external reality whose laws can be discovered by scientific research and explained by scientific theory as positivists and behaviouralists argue. The social and political world is not part of nature.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ The use of the word ‘skin’ is here referred to Paul Furlong and David Marsh who emphasize the fact that while doing research, ontological and epistemological questions shall be dealt as a skin of the ‘research body’ and not as a sweater that can be put on or taken off as required. Cf. Paul Furlong and David Marsh, “A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science,” in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 184-211.

¹⁰⁵ On the definitional problem of constructivism and different varieties in IR theory see for example Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 6ff.

¹⁰⁶ Capital letters (IR) shall here refer to the academic discipline, lowercase letters refer to the occurrence and processes of relations within the international system per se.

¹⁰⁷ For more details about the different sets of constructivism in IR and its relations to other IR-theories such as (neo-)realism and (neo-)liberalism see, among others, Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations. Theories and Approaches*, 4th ed. (Oxford et al.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010); Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of IR* 3/3 (1997): 319-363. In addition, it shall be mentioned that the categorization of constructivism as a theory or meta-theory is controversial itself. Specifically Nicholas Onuf who coined the term ‘constructivism’, as it is demonstrated below, emphasizes its function as rather a framework or “ontological turn – a turn that opens up the road to theory.” Onuf, *Making sense, making worlds*, 39. See also the subchapter “Approach or theory” in Karin M. Fierke, “Constructivism,” in *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Time Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 194f.

¹⁰⁸ Stefano Guzzini, *Power, Realism and Constructivism* (London et al.: Routledge, 2013), 215.

¹⁰⁹ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 164.

Thus, the point is: Every part of our social world is made by us; it is a world of human consciousness whereas “human beings are social beings.”¹¹⁰ Furthermore, this is why social sciences and humanities – in focusing on the social world made by men – cannot be ‘objective sciences’ in the positivist sense that there is an objective reality. Such an objective reality is not accessible for us in the social world of constructivism.¹¹¹

What is more meaningful for constructivists than the physical existence of formations or entities within the social world is the sense and meaning people attribute to these formations or entities. How do they perceive this or that? How do ideas and beliefs appear and influence behaviour? In this context, it is worth noting that George Herbert Mead contributed to the subsequent theory of social constructivism by developing “the notion of *interaction* as the process through which meaning is constructed.”¹¹² These interaction processes are highly relevant in IR theory in terms of interactions between international actors through which identities and interests are socially constructed.¹¹³

As a concrete contribution to IR theory, constructivism was first introduced by Nicholas G. Onuf in 1987 and especially drew attention two years later in his book *The World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* – which was the beginning of the ongoing discussion about the weight of idealist and materialist influences on international affairs. The following *constructivist turn* in IR theory refreshed and expanded the neorealist-neoliberal debate and created a middle ground between rational choice theorists of neorealism and neoliberalism on the one hand and postmodern scholars on the other hand.¹¹⁴

In sum, it is helpful at this point to allude to the fundamental contrast between the materialist view of neorealists and -liberals and the ideational perspective of constructivists. Whereas the

¹¹⁰ Onuf, *Making sense, making worlds*, 3.

¹¹¹ See, for example, Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 162. Of fundamental relevance on social constructivism is the following work from the sociology of knowledge: Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Penguin Press, 1966).

¹¹² Kees Van der Pijl, *A Survey of Global Political Economy* (Version 2.1, October 2009), <https://libcom.org/files/A%20survey%20of%20global%20political%20economy.pdf> (12 March 2021), 93. Van der Pijl refers to a paper by Mead titled “Science and the Objectivity of Perspectives,” published in 1938.

¹¹³ See especially Alexander Wendt, as it is elucidated below.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn,” *World Politics* 50/2 (1998): 327; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46/2 (1992): 391f.; Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” 319f. According to Nicholas G. Onuf himself, in creating the term ‘constructivism’ he was inspired particularly by Anthony Giddens (1984) and Jürgen Habermas (1984). His article “Rules in Moral Development” (*Human Development* 30 (1987): 257-267), in which he introduced the term, was accessible only for a few scholars which is why usually the introduction of ‘constructivism’ in International Relations is linked to his book *The World of our Making*, published in 1989. Concerning details on this see Onuf, *Making sense, making worlds*, 28.

former concentrate primarily on materialistic interests and power politics, constructivists emphasize that ideas, norms, cultures and identities indeed matter in the social and political world, and thus also in the international state system.¹¹⁵ According to Alexander Wendt two basic tenets of constructivism are

*"(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature."*¹¹⁶

Significant also is the constructivist argument that "knowledge, both everyday and scientific, is a construction shaped by its context."¹¹⁷ Most 'facts' are social facts.¹¹⁸ Any set of ideas, identities and normative structures on the international ground have thus to be referred to a particular time and space. Hence, as thoughts, ideas and ideologies of states are not static, neither is the global system.¹¹⁹ Constructivists consider "the world as a project always under construction, a case of becoming as opposed to being."¹²⁰ This again points to the important requirement of having the historical, including cultural and political context always in mind while observing discursive constructions of European identities over several decades, nonetheless based on the historicity of discourses. This, additionally, refers to language as a key role in constructing the world. Against the positivist view on language simply as a medium to represent the world as it 'is', constructivism emphasizes language as constitutive, or as a medium of social construction – "by speaking, we make the world what it is."¹²¹

It is not surprising that the increasing impact of constructivist reflections in the field of IR coincides with the end of the bipolar world system. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc marked the end of a relatively solid balance of power within the global system, whose existence was one of the core arguments of neorealism explaining international relations.¹²² As a critical

¹¹⁵ Cf. Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 165; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 14th ed. (Cambridge et al: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010, first published 1999), 370f.

¹¹⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory*, 1.

¹¹⁷ Gerard Delanty, *Social Science. Beyond Constructivism and Realism* (Buckingham: Open Univ. Press, 1997), 129.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Fierke, "Constructivism," 192.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Öner, *Turkey and the European Union*, 32.

¹²⁰ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory* (Boston et al.: Longman, 2012), 279.

¹²¹ Onuf, *Making sense, making worlds*, 29. On Onuf's constructivism including the emphasis on words in constructing social worlds, see also Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*, 151ff.

¹²² According to neorealism, a new power should have been emerged balancing against the US, but as this failed to happen, constructivists disclosed the lack of neorealism and its materialist focus. They argued instead that

approach to neorealism Alexander Wendt finally introduced social constructivism as a substantive theory to the field of International Relations in the 1990s.¹²³ Especially in respect to collective identities as central analytical categories, as it is the case in this study, Wendt's key concept of the role of identities, interests and interactive structures are worth mentioning: According to him, identities and interests of states cannot be considered as exclusively constructed on a national basis, regardless of the global system, but also as created through interaction processes with other states. Consequently, identities and interests are dependent variables and "international institutions can transform state identities and interests."¹²⁴ In addition, he argues, power politics and self-help are institutions and therefore do not 'logically' follow from anarchy, but are socially constructed – "anarchy is what states make of it."¹²⁵

Within constructivism in International Relations theory, different currents diverge, particularly *conventional* and *critical constructivism*.¹²⁶ Without going into detail about controversies of epistemological questions on the whole, the focus will remain on the facts relevant to the purpose of this study.¹²⁷ In terms of identity formation, despite "a comparatively broad consensus that the presence of an "other" is an indispensable part of the identity concept,"¹²⁸ the focusing of *difference* varies: Whereas conventional constructivists

ideas, thoughts and normative structures would also matter and lead to a better theory of balancing power and anarchy. See, e.g., Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 163.

¹²³ Therewith, Alexander Wendt can be seen as a counterbalance to Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism in IR theory. For Waltz' contributions to IR theory see particularly his first work on a critical approach to classical realism, *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis* (New York et al.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), as well as his later comprehensive book *Theory of International Politics* (Boston et al.: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

¹²⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it," 394.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 395. This often-cited article, published in 1992 in *International Organization*, was the beginning of his constructivist assumptions to IR theory. He summarized and expanded his reflections in a book-length study titled *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999).

¹²⁶ Conventional constructivism is represented, e.g., by Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Emmanuel Adler, John Ruggie and Martha Finnemore. Critical constructivism is closely connected with postmodernism and represented in IR theory, e.g., by David Campbell, Jim George, James Der Derian and R. B. J. Walker. Cf. Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 167.

¹²⁷ The main distinction between conventional and critical constructivism refers to the question on the existence of an objective world: Whereas the former accepts its existence per se (but observes it as not accessible for us as social beings), the latter denies it and emphasizes the power of language. See for example Fierke, "Constructivism," 194. Beneath conventional and critical constructivism, the academic literature provides other designations describing a specific current within constructivism such as radical, liberal or systemic constructivism. For details regarding different currents of constructivism in IR theory see for example Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*; Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, *Constructing International Relations: the next generation* (Armonk, NY et al.: Sharpe, 2001).

¹²⁸ Kaina and Karolewski, "EU governance," 15. Regarding early research on Others as necessary for constructing the Self, see for example Tajfel, *Human groups*, 256; Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88/2 (1994): 389; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, "The Construction of Collective Identity," *European Journal of Sociology*

accept but tend to downplay the significance of difference in identity formation, critical constructivists, as well as poststructuralists, strongly emphasize it as inevitable, or in Connolly's words: "Identity requires differences in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty."¹²⁹ According to Ernesto Laclau, this can be shortened by setting up the equation: "difference = identity."¹³⁰

Identity through Difference

A closer look at the meaning and role of *difference*, first of all, reveals that there are different kinds of difference, of in- and exclusion and forms of otherness: Although often represented as threatening or hostile, Others do not necessarily have to be perceived as negative and antagonistic; they can also be considered as less exclusive or less incompatible.¹³¹ They are perceived, for instance, as partly different, but at the same time as partly belonging to the Self, which Morozov and Rumelili name "liminal Others."¹³² Russia and Turkey, for example, are often discursively constructed not completely outside but also inside Europe:

*"The contemporary European identity discourse is in many ways a hybridizing discourse that situates its external Others, such as Russia and Turkey, not in directly oppositional, but in liminal partly-Self/partly-Other positions."*¹³³

Those Others and in particular 'liminal Others' are not exclusively limited to play a passive role, but can also play an active role in identity formations. This is also visible in the case of Turkey:

26/1 (1995): 74; Tzvetan Todorov, *The conquest of America. The question of the other* (New York et al.: Harper & Row, 1984).

¹²⁹ William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Minneapolis et al.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2002), 64.

¹³⁰ Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (London et al.: Verso, 1996), 38. On the diverse views on difference in identity formation see, for example, Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation," *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004): 31ff. Specifically on Othering in IR see the following anthology: Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, ed., *Portraying the Other in International Relations: Cases of Othering, their Dynamics and the Potential for Transformation* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2012).

¹³¹ Cf., e.g., Diez, "Europe's Others," 322ff. In this context, it shall be pointed to a typology of different in- and out-groups, developed by sociologists Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, in which they distinguish between primordial, sacred and civic identities. For details see Eisenstadt and Giesen, "The construction of collective identity," 76ff. See also Risse, *A community of Europeans?* 27f.

¹³² Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili, "The External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers," *Cooperation and Conflict* 47/1 (2012): 29, DOI: 10.1177/0010836711433124. On Turkey as a liminal Other see also Rumelili, "Constructing identity," 44, 46f.

¹³³ Morozov and Rumelili, "The External Constitution," 32.

*“Turkey is not afraid of opening up the discursive domain of culture: it does not (and perhaps cannot) position itself as part of an imagined homogenous European cultural space, but chooses instead to accuse its opponents within the core of defending a xenophobic image of Europe as exclusively Christian.”*¹³⁴

Thus, in accusing its opponents of acting discriminatory, or – in even sharper terms – of being xenophobic, Turkey at the same time strives towards a more open imagination of Europe’s cultural identity in pointing to the possibility of imagining Europe as a culturally heterogeneous space. To what extent, however, this recommendation of reading Europe as a multicultural and multireligious community – coming from (partly) outside – navigates the cultural discursive construction of Europe and turns Turkey into a ‘Europe-maker’ remains entirely uncertain.¹³⁵ What is more is the transforming potential of both the perception of the Self and Others; in the words of Rumelili:

*“In no sense does the constitution of identity in relation to difference imply that the categories of self and other are fixed. It is perfectly possible that collective identity can expand to include what was previously its constitutive other.”*¹³⁶

Consequently, not only does the Self consist of a character of transformation, the Other does as well. Specifically with regard to political communities, it is obvious that a previous agent outside a collective is able to become a member in transforming its political character, as for example the Eastern European countries did after the end of the Soviet occupation. And even transformation processes of ‘cultural Others’ leading from exclusion to inclusion are imaginable. For instance, the perception of a candidate as being culturally different can disappear when other interpretations of the community become more important. Contextual circumstances finally determine the (non-)dominant role of cultural arguments within discursive formations of group identities. With regard to Europe and the question of Turkey’s inclusion in European organizations, for instance, the analysis of the Assembly debates shows that, in the context of the Cold War, cultural arguments for a Turkish exclusion were less significant. Geostrategic arguments, in contrast, were all the more important. For this reason,

¹³⁴ Morozov and Rumelili, “The External Constitution,” 43.

¹³⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 28. Concerning the term “Europe-maker” see the subtitle of the cited article: “Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers.”

¹³⁶ Rumelili, “Constructing identity,” 32.

a specific constructivist approach, the approach of critical geopolitics that focuses on constructions of spaces and borders, will be examined in the following.

2.3 Where Does Europe End? The Approach of Critical Geopolitics and the Determination of Europe's Borders

Geographically, some opponents of Turkish EU access have claimed that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles separate Europe from Asia and that Turkey belongs less to Europe and more to Asia. But what does it mean to talk about a *geographical* border?

'Geography' at first glance seems to be a science close to the natural sciences, based on pre-given natural conditions. In contrast:

*"Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space."*¹³⁷

Thus, every geographically limited space, every borderline, is the result of political negotiations, power struggles or wars. Therefore, every political border is contested, including the use of natural barriers like mountains, rivers or the sea as borderlines between nation-states or other 'imagined communities', such as the Bosphorus as a borderline between Europe and Asia. An expression by historian René Girault is a convenient example for an essentialist consideration of Europe's geographical borders: "Geographers are lucky in regards to giving a reasonable definition of Europe: Geographers' Europe is a clearly defined continent, an area that has easily recognizable 'natural' borders."¹³⁸

Against this, first of all, it shall be pointed to the effects of cartography and "the power of maps"¹³⁹: Maps are suggestive of being neutral and objective representations of the world. However, they are nothing but cartographic arrangements to systematize the world, as seen,

¹³⁷ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics. The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1996), 1.

¹³⁸ In original: "Geographen haben Glück, wenn es darum geht, eine vernünftige Definition von Europa zu geben: Das Europa der Geographen ist ein klar definierter Kontinent, ein Raum, der einfach zu erkennen, „natürliche“ Grenzen hat." René Girault, "Das Europa der Historiker," in *Europa im Blick der Historiker: europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert: Bewusstsein und Institutionen*, ed. Rainer Hudemann, Hartmut Kaelble, and Klaus Schwabe (München: Oldenbourg, 1995), 55.

¹³⁹ In *Rethinking the Power of Maps* (New York et al.: Guilford Press, 2010), Denis Wood, together with John Fels and John Krygier, focuses on different capabilities, uses and effects of maps, e.g., the power and knowledge nexus as well as on counter-mapping as a way to resist political power through specific mapmaking. This book, published in 2010 is a continuation of: Denis Wood and John Fels, *The Power of Maps* (London: Routledge, 1993).

for instance, in how areas are divided into continents such as Asia and Europe, though they share the same Eurasian continental plate. Cartographic knowledge, therefore, is in no case a definite knowledge based on natural laws, but generally interpretive. The strong effect, the silent power of maps, however, is clearly visible – they determine how we perceive and classify the world.

As just indicated, not only maps but also borders and spaces are created by human beings; they are nothing but political and therefore social constructs. In this context, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, geographer and one of the pioneers of a critical geopolitics approach, disassembles the term ‘geography’ in its literal meaning: The noun ‘geography’, accordingly, emanates from a verb – *geo-graphing*, which means earth-writing – an active writing of the earth, thus a territorialization of space, which is again nothing but a political process. The outset of this demarcation can be traced back to 16th-century Europe, when royal authorities began to seize space and graph the earth based on their personal interests.¹⁴⁰ As we can see nowadays, this procedure has been followed by political powers until today – an era of an almost complete territorialized globe but by no means without ongoing struggles concerning borders and spaces, mostly resulting from cultural or ethnical separations through borderlines, best visible for instance in current East Timor, Cashmere or Kurdistan.

Based on the Foucauldian assumption that “geography as a discourse is a form of power/knowledge,”¹⁴¹ John Agnew and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1992) claim that geopolitics

*“should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas.”*¹⁴²

Three of the most obvious discursive formations of such political ‘spatializations’ are the divisions in the past and present into ‘North’ and ‘South’ regarding disparities in the level of development and prosperity, Orient and Occident as a common Eurocentric and Western dichotomy until the late 1970s, as well as into East and West during the Cold War.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, 1f.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁴² Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 11 (1992): 192.

¹⁴³ Cf. Simon Dalby, “Critical geopolitics: discourse, difference, and dissent,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 9 (1991): 273. The dichotomy between Orient and Occident was firstly criticised by Edward Said in his book *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003, first published 1978), which resulted in a wider debate on ‘Orientalism’ as, according to Said, describing the condescending and colonialist Eurocentric view of Arab or Islamic countries as the Other in constructing the West.

With these and other critical reflections on classical geopolitics – in the classical meaning of reviewing world politics with regard to certain geographical-political spaces without questioning the origin of the latter¹⁴⁴ – a critical geopolitics approach was established in the late 1980s. This approach linked Political Geography with International Relations and was influenced by poststructuralist assumptions on the concept of discourse on power and knowledge, on statecraft and identity as well as on the social and discursive construction of spatial formations and its political meanings.¹⁴⁵ This is, at the same time, to be considered in connection with the *cultural turn(s)* since the 1980s following the *linguistic turn* within the humanities and social sciences with a general emphasis on the power of discourses.¹⁴⁶ According to Derrida’s concept of deconstruction and ‘con-textuality’, critical geopolitics displaces geopolitics from ‘being-in-place’ to ‘taking-place’; in the words of Ó Tuathail:

*“Critical geopolitics is distinguished by its problematization of the logocentric infrastructures that make “geopolitics” or any spatialization of the global political scene possible. It problematizes the “is” of “geography” and “geopolitics,” their status as self-evident, natural, foundational, and eminently knowable realities. It questions how “geography” and “geopolitics” as signs have been put to work in global politics in the twentieth century and how they have supervised the production of visions of the global political scene.”*¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ To give a more specific definition of the term ‘geopolitics’ is difficult since, according to Ó Tuathail, its use has changed since world politics has changed; therefore, first of all, it has to be considered in its historical and discursive context of use. Once associated with the Nazi regime’s purpose of more *Lebensraum*, the term was avoided after World War Two, but was reflat to describe the global contest between the superpowers of the Cold War. Cf. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Introduction: Thinking Critically About Geopolitics,” in *The Geopolitics Reader*, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (London et al.: Routledge, 1998), 1f.

¹⁴⁵ As a felicitous compilation of already published papers within critical geopolitics, including pioneering work such as by Dalby, Andrew, and Ó Tuathail, the following is to be recommended: John Agnew and Virginie Mamadouh, eds., *Politics. Critical Essays in Human Geography* (Aldershot et al.: Ashgate, 2008). As further reading, the following is to be recommended: Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, eds. *The Geopolitics Reader* (London et al.: Routledge, 1998). It is a collection of academic as well as political (propaganda) texts on geopolitics, written by powerful politicians of different periods, including Hitler, Truman and Roosevelt, which again demonstrates the change of the use of the term ‘geopolitics’ very clear. Additionally, the book *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics* is highly advisable as it sheds light on the key issues of current critical geopolitics and therefore provides a comprehensive overview of this research area. See Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp, eds., *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics* (Farnham et al.: Ashgate, 2013).

¹⁴⁶ On the cultural and linguistic turn within social sciences and the humanities see for example David Walton, *Doing Cultural Theory* (London: SAGE Publication, 2012). On the specific influence of cultural studies on political science see, e.g., the following anthology: Birgit Schwelling, ed., *Politikwissenschaft als Kulturwissenschaft: Theorien, Methoden, Problemstellungen* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004).

¹⁴⁷ Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, 68. On the meaning and application of Derrida’s concept of deconstruction see *ibid.* 65f.

Thus, a critical theory on geopolitics radicalizes its two parts ‘geo’ and ‘politics’, and considers geopolitical specifications as consequences of political negotiations and discourses. Thereby, they are always contested and to be problematized. In the words of Simon Dalby, in line with Ó Tuathail, in contrast to the classical reflections of geopolitics,

*“to construct critical political geographies is to argue that we must not limit our attention to a study of the geography of politics within pre-given, taken-for-granted, commonsense spaces, but investigate the politics of the geographical specification of politics.”*¹⁴⁸

Therefore, the focus of the critical geopolitics approach is on the process, in which geographical spaces are discursively constructed and instrumentalized in international politics. As a consequence, by problematizing the formation process of spaces and spatial identities, a critical perspective on geopolitics is also concerned with forms of inclusion and exclusion as well as representations of inside and outside, thus, of the Self and Others. In line with critical constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, a specific emphasis on difference in identity formation of ‘spatial communities’ is given.¹⁴⁹ In this context, the approach also questions the political processes in which different ‘Europes’ and different imaginations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ have been discursively created including the attribution of Turkey and Russia as border regions between the two alleged continents of Europe and Asia.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Dalby, “Critical geopolitics,” 274. On the definition what is meant by taking a *critical* perspective on geopolitics see also Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, “Introduction: rethinking geopolitics. Towards a critical geopolitics,” in *Rethinking Geopolitics*, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (London: Routledge, 1998), 1-15 (see the whole chapter, but especially 2f.); Klaus Dodds, *Global Geopolitics. A Critical Introduction* (Harlow et al.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), 28ff.; John Agnew, *Geopolitics. Re-visioning world politics* (London et al.: Routledge, 1998), Introduction; Paul Reuber, Anke Strüver, and Günter Wolkersdorfer, “Europa und die Europäische Union – die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion politischer Räume,” in *Politische Geographien Europas – Annäherungen an ein umstrittenes Konstrukt*, ed. Paul Reuber, Anke Strüver, and Günter Wolkersdorfer, 2nd ed. (Berlin et al.: LIT, 2012), 8f.; Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, 57ff.

¹⁴⁹ As a small selection see Ó Tuathail and Dalby, “Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics,” 4f.; Anssi Paasi, “Borders,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, ed. Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp (Farnham et al.: Ashgate, 2013), 215ff.; Agnew, *Geopolitics*, 20ff.

¹⁵⁰ Regarding Europe as a political geographical construction the following anthology, including critical geopolitics approaches, is especially recommendable: Reuber, Paul, Anke Strüver, and Günter Wolkersdorfer, eds., *Politische Geographien Europas – Annäherungen an ein umstrittenes Konstrukt*, 2nd ed. (Berlin et al.: LIT, 2012). With respect to border conflicts within or on the brink of the European Union until 2008 see especially Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter, eds., *The European Union and Border Conflicts. The Power of Integration and Association* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008). For a specific consideration of Turkey as a border region from a critical geopolitics perspective see, e.g., Mathias Albert, “Von Rom nach Istanbul (und zurück): Europas Grenzen und ihre Entgrenzung,” in *Politische Geographien Europas – Annäherungen an ein umstrittenes Konstrukt*, ed. Paul Reuber et al., 2nd ed. (Berlin et al.: LIT, 2012), 55-72; Hans-Dietrich Schultz, “Europa, Russland und die Türkei,” in *Politische Geographien Europas*

In sum, the aforementioned critical geopolitics assumptions on the discursive constructions of geopolitics, space, and spatial identities are considered here as highly important to keep in mind when analysing Turkey's role in European identity constructions: By in- or excluding Turkey from Europe, whether by Turkish or non-Turkish actors, or perceiving it metaphorically as a bridge between 'Europe' and the 'Middle East', its geographical location is discursively constructed as exceptional. In these cases, its geopolitical meaning is often portrayed as resulting from its pre-given natural geography. From a critical geopolitics perspective, and also in this study, what matters is not its geography per se but the processes in which any geographical specifications were negotiated or instrumentalized and acquired relevance. Thus, what is meaningful is not the question of Turkey's geographical belonging per se, but the discursive practices that represented Turkey as an exceptionally important player in international politics based on its hybrid geography – placed both in Europe and Asia, or in the West and the Middle East – altogether contested concepts in themselves. As an example for representing Turkey as a country with multiple belongings, Ahmet Davutoğlu, political scientist and Turkey's former Foreign Minister, mentioned in 2008:

“In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkans, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time.”¹⁵¹

In the same year, the former Turkish President Abdullah Gül claimed:

„Turkey is a modern Eurasian country that bridges the East and the West and has successfully managed to synthesize the culture and values of both equally. Our roots in Central Asia and interaction with the Western world that dates back to centuries, grants us the exceptional situation of fully belonging to both continents at the same time.”¹⁵²

Both politicians' emphasis on Turkey's multiple regional belongings is to be considered as

– *Annäherungen an ein umstrittenes Konstrukt*, ed. Paul Reuber, Anke Strüver, and Günter Wolkersdorfer, 2nd ed. (Berlin et al.: LIT, 2012), 25-54.

¹⁵¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” *Insight Turkey* 10/1 (2008): 77.

¹⁵² For this quote by Abdullah Gül in 2008 see, e.g., Yanık: “Constructing Turkish “exceptionalism”,” 80.

part of Turkey's foreign policy goal to become a dominant power in the region at that time. First of all, this self-definition to be an influential part of multiple spaces has been part of Turkey's self-understanding even long before the AK Party clearly emphasized its foreign policy aim to become a regional power as part of Davutoğlu's concept of 'strategic depth' (*stratejik derinlik*) with the help of a 'zero-problems' method regarding Turkey's neighbours.¹⁵³ As Thomas Volk emphasizes, the Turkish Republic represented itself already in the first decades of its existence not exclusively as part of Europe but as part of the Middle East as well, and never gave up its relations to Middle Eastern countries it partly encompassed in one single empire.¹⁵⁴

How and in which contexts Turkey instrumentalized its geography and presented itself strategically as a highly important international actor, for instance, as a bridge to the Middle East in a European forum such as the Council of Europe is of central relevance in this study. An implicit look is thus on the representational practices on the part of Turkish as well as non-Turkish deputies in the COE's Assembly that helped to construct Turkey's exceptional geostrategic importance.

2.4 Conclusions, or: Europe as an 'Essentially Contested Concept'

This study observes collective identities as social constructs, thus as results and products of negotiations and interactions, produced by human beings as social actors. The processual as well as contextual character of identity constructions is considered crucial. The contextual situation determines which kind of identity formation process can be observed: In this study, political deputies thereby assume the role of the agents of any definitions of 'Europe' and what it stands for. For this reason the focus is on top-down processes in the sense that these politicians build the discursive community to be analysed in this study. Europe as a social construct can further be described as an 'essentially contested concept' – a categorization fundamental to this study, not least in constituting its point of origin. Philosopher and social theorist Walter Bryce Gallie introduced this concept in 1956 to describe abstract phenomena,

¹⁵³ The concept of 'strategic depth' essentially served as reason for Turkey's multiregional foreign policy. According to its architect Davutoğlu, it was based on the Turkish republic's historical, geographical and cultural-religious heritage, which was why journalists and researchers often labelled it as 'neo-ottomanism'. Meanwhile, however, the concept can be considered as failed, not least as a result of the revolts and conflicts in numerous Middle Eastern countries. On the 'strategic depth' concept see, e.g., Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42/6 (Nov. 2006): 945-964.

¹⁵⁴ Thomas Volk, "Turkey's Historical Involvement in Middle Eastern Alliances: Saadabad Pact, Baghdad Pact, and Phantom Pact," *L'Europe en formation* 367 (2013): 12.

which are permanently disputed and interpreted in different ways.¹⁵⁵ In other words, an essentially contested concept is “one that is widely shared but that lacks consensual agreement on its definition and rules of application.”¹⁵⁶ In more detail, William E. Connolly fittingly summarizes Gallie’s explanations on the necessary preconditions to be an ‘essentially contested concept’ as follows:

*“When the concept involved is **appraisive** in that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement, when the practice described is **internally complex** in that its characterization involves reference to several dimensions, and when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively **open**, enabling parties to interpret even those shared rules differently as new and unforeseen situations arise, then the concept in question is an “essentially contested concept.””¹⁵⁷*

Concepts of this type are, according to Gallie, for example ‘art’, ‘democracy’ and ‘social justice’. For instance, regarding ‘democracy’ one might claim that the central characteristic of democracy is the right of citizens to vote for their government, at least indirectly through an intermediary stage, whereas others consider every citizen’s opportunity to take political leadership as a primary significant criterion of democracy.¹⁵⁸ In view of the aforementioned conditions of an essentially contested concept, another suitable example is the concept of ‘Europe’. When we talk about ‘Europe’ we talk about multiple ‘Europes’. As we have seen and will see, Europe is contested in different ways – culturally, politically and also in geographical terms.¹⁵⁹ By adding the ambiguous concept of ‘collective identity’ to the contested concept of ‘Europe’, the increased inability to agree to any kind of ‘European identity’ becomes clearly visible. To put it most simply: there are multiple ‘Europes’ with multiple identities. The meaning of language as the medium to negotiate different definitions of Europe and what it means to be European shall be highlighted once again at this point. Language causes the imagination and construction of such concepts. Consequently, interpretations of ‘Europe’ as well as identification processes with a ‘European collective’ can only be examined through analysing discourses at a certain time, which will be discussed in

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 167f.

¹⁵⁶ David P. Rapkin, “The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership,” in *World Leadership and Hegemony*, ed. David P. Rapkin (Boulder et al.: Lynne Rienner 1990), 2.

¹⁵⁷ William E. Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 10. See also Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 171f.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 180; Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 10f.

¹⁵⁹ As has been conducted in more detail in the previous section on the approach of critical geopolitics. See also Diez, “Europe’s Others,” 320.

the following with regard to Turkey-related discourses.

3 Turkey and Europe in Historical Perspective: an Ambivalent Relationship

Turkey's relationship with Europe has been characterized as ambivalent throughout the centuries. Even though Europe served as a civilizational role model for a long time, the continent was concurrently looked upon with distrust.

The Turkish transformation process, along European lines, can be traced back to long before Mustafa Kemal and his companions founded the Republic of Turkey and induced far-reaching, top-down reforms both at the level of the state and society. Ottoman reformers took European standards of civilization as a model to overcome its concerns about the Empire's development lagging behind vis-à-vis France, Great Britain, the Habsburgs, Germany, and Russia. The final aim was to protect the Empire against collapse.

Based on the European model at the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman Sultan Selim III and his 'new order' (*nizam-ı cedid*) reformed the Empire's military structure and tax system. The subsequent comprehensive reforms in the so-called *tanzimat* period, as well as the later Young Turk and Kemalist reforms, were based on European precedent. Nevertheless, the relationship towards Europe had always been ambivalent, from the *tanzimat* era to the Kemalist reforms and even after: on the one hand, Ottoman and Turkish rulers followed a policy of imitation and adaption of European standards due to their admiration of and fascination for European progress, be it cultural, scientific, economic, legal or political. On the other, there was a constant fear of imperial threat coming from European powers. Both the historical development of Turkey's ambivalent relationship towards Europe in general, as well as the Empire's and Republic's efforts to 'modernize' the state, thereby equalizing 'modern' with 'European', shall be retraced chronologically in the following chapter, concluding with Turkey's foreign policy shift from Kemalist neutrality to active membership in the Western Bloc after World War Two.¹

¹ For more details from a great amount of literature on Turkey's history towards the West, the following are to be recommended: in German (thereby recognizing also overviews of Turkish history in which the relation to Europe is inevitably included): Klaus Kreiser and Christoph K. Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2005); Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*; Cengiz Günay, *Die Geschichte der Türkei. Von den Anfängen der Moderne bis heute* (Wien et al.: Böhnau, 2012); Matthes Buhbe, *Türkei. Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1996); Fikret Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei* (Mannheim et al.: BI Taschenbuchverlag, 1995); Udo Steinbach, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 4th ed. (München: Beck, 2007); Klaus Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei. Von Atatürk bis zur Gegenwart* (München: Beck, 2012); Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*. In English, the following literature is to be highlighted as detailed basic research: Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation, and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950* (Oxford et al.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London et al.: I. B. Tauris, 2004); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol. 2: Reform Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey*,

3.1 Ottoman Reforms along European Lines in the Era of *Tanzimat*

From a European perspective, the Ottoman Empire was by no means considered an inferior neighbour, but rather as ascending and superior for a long time, particularly in the 16th and 17th centuries. However, the Empire's glorious period finally came to its end, first as a result of external pressure such as European imperialism as well as internal pressure in the form of nationalist separatism.² The Empire was first identified as the 'Turkish danger'³ replaced consequently by the connotation of 'the sick man of Europe'⁴ – while the Empire became a punching bag between the Great Powers, rather than being accepted as an integral part of Europe.⁵

With Europe as its main reference point, for the Ottoman Empire, the 19th century was not only a period of decline but also of 'modernizing' the state and society, as an attempt to stabilize and promote the Empire comprehensively. As the term *tanzimat* means edicts or decrees, the comprehensive reform process between 1839 and 1876 gave this era its name. Legal and administrative reforms passed in line with European standards can be traced back to external and internal developments. On the one hand, external pressure was exerted by European powers to legally equalize Non-Muslim minorities. On the other hand, Ottoman rulers traced European progress and military successes to a different command structure and the concept of secularism; the separation between state and religion. Adopting wide-ranging

1808-1975 (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977); Kasaba, *The Cambridge History of Turkey (Vol. 4: Turkey in the Modern World)*; Altemur Kiliç, *Turkey and the World* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1959); William M. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd ed. (London et al.: Routledge, 2013); Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn. et al.: Praeger, 1999). On the contested concept of 'modernization' including the effects of forced migration, economic reorganization, and other nationalization measures in late Ottoman times see also Emre Erol, *The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia. Turkey's Belle Époque and the Transition to a Modern Nation State* (London et al.: I. B. Tauris, 2016).

² Nationalist separatism started with Greece declaring independence in 1829, and was followed in 1875 by the five Balkan states Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Wallachia and Moldova. Cf. Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 25.

³ According to the German historian Höfert, the term 'Turkish danger' or 'Turkish threat' emerged in the European discourse on Turkey uprising in the 15th century postulating the Ottomans as a danger for the whole of Europe. Cf. Almut Höfert, *Den Feind beschreiben. "Türkengefahr" und europäisches Wissen über das Osmanische Reich 1450-1600* (Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Campus, 2003), 51ff.

⁴ Interesting is the difference between the British and French definition of the Empire as 'the sick man of Europe' in contrast to the German 'sick man of the Bosphorus' (*der kranke Mann vom Bosphorus*). According to Hanioglu, it was Tsar Nicholas I. who originally coined the phrase in a conversation with a British ambassador in 1853. Cf. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk. An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton et al.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 199 (footnote 1).

⁵ Cf. Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 22ff.; Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 72ff. Regarding the history of the Ottoman Empire at a glance – its uprising and decline as well as its relations to the European powers – see i.e. the following investigation of more than 600 years of Ottoman history: Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (London: Murray, 2005); Klaus Kreiser, *Der Osmanische Staat 1300-1922*, 2nd ed. (München: Oldenbourg, 2008); Suraiya Faroqhi, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4th ed. (München: Beck, 2006).

reforms was observed to be the only way to safeguard the Empire against its further disintegration.⁶ As a result, Europe was conflictingly perceived both as a threat – intent on destroying the Empire – and as a civilizational benchmark to aspire to, not least with the aim of being “accepted as an equal rather than as the ‘sick man of Europe’.”⁷

With the first capacious decree, the *Noble Edict of Gülhane (Hatt-ı Şerifi)* implemented in 1839, Reşit Paşa, the Foreign Minister and leading reformer of the Ottoman system under Sultan Abdülmecit I (1839-1861), adopted parts of the declaration of human rights that had arisen in the course of the French Revolution. The decree of Gülhane, in addition, contained a central reform package that guaranteed security of life, honour, and property to all subjects of the Sultan, irrespective of their religion. The second reform package of 1856, the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, improved the conditions of Non-Muslims: it specifically included open access to high official positions within the administration and military for everyone, a secular education system as an alternative to the existing Islamic one, and a secular dispensation of justice in addition to traditional Islamic jurisprudence.⁸

It can be observed that these elite reformers, namely the architects of the *tanzimat*, were familiar with Ottoman as well as European ways of life. The majority had been educated in military schools aligned with European standards, specifically French and British: they had acted as ambassadors in Paris or London, or had served abroad as the Empire’s foreign ministers. Hence, they were able to speak English and French and communicated with foreign envoys. Further, they were experienced with European practices and systems, whether economically, politically, militarily, culturally or socially. These Ottomans came to attribute Europe’s economic prosperity to their progress and superiority in all these fields.⁹

However, some considered the reforms too weak, and instead demanded greater progress and a constitutional form of government. Some intellectuals sharing these aspirations started to distinguish themselves through the new channel of journalism.¹⁰ One group that emerged in these days was initially a secret society that became known as the *Young Ottomans* in 1865. They essentially opposed the state system of the Sultanate and promoted the idea of a

⁶ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 56; Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 87.

⁷ Kerem Öktem, *Turkey since 1989. Angry Nation* (London et al.: Zed Books, 2011), 14.

⁸ On the decrees during the *tanzimat* era in detail see Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity. A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven et al.: Yale Univ. Press, 2010), 88-96; Carter Vaughn Findley, “The Tanzimat,” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol 4: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 11-37 (whole article); Zürcher, *Turkey*, 56-66.

⁹ Cf. Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 334; Incesu, *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel*, 60f.

¹⁰ For further details on the development of journalism in the 19th century – the different newspapers, main contributors as well as their ideological background – see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 67ff.; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton et al.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2010), 94ff.

constitutional government to catch up with the process of European nation-state building. Concurrently, they desired to define a patriotic Ottoman national identity. Being controversial in many points, they agreed on the significance of Islam as an integral part of the Empire that should remain as the basis of Ottoman political culture.¹¹

Their ideas were partly implemented at the end of the *tanzimat* when the first constitution was promulgated, marking the preliminary end of the absolutist ruling system in 1876. Although the first Ottoman parliament was only consultative, the advent of parliamentary elections, by the people, allowed for the democratic principle of people's sovereignty.¹² Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), however, deposed this first constitutional form of monarchy only two years later in the course of internal and external crises. National movements in the Balkan region and the resulting Russo-Turkish War 1877/78 had once again isolated and disintegrated the Empire.¹³ Moreover, its dependence on the European powers, resulting from the so-called 'capitulations', the European economic privileges that enabled unlimited imports of European products, caused an interior economic crisis.¹⁴ Willing to protect the Empire as well as his personal power, the Sultan returned to an autocratic regime. He also reemphasized, in his role as Caliph, the meaning of Islam as the unifying element of the Empire.¹⁵ This again gave rise to new opposition groups that rejected the Sultan's despotism, calling instead for a European-style constitutional government.

3.2 The Young Turks' Orientation towards the European Model of a Constitutional Nation-State

In the late 19th century, Ottoman opposition groups sympathized with the European idea of increasingly building up a nation-state. Following the Young Ottomans, a new movement

¹¹ Cf. Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 474f.; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 103ff.

¹² Cf. Brigitte Moser and Michael Weithmann, *Landeskunde Türkei. Geschichte, Gesellschaft und Kultur* (Hamburg: Buske, 2008), 93; Udo Steinbach, "Vom Osmanischen Reich zum EU-Kandidaten: ein historischer Bogen," in *Länderbericht Türkei* (Schriftenreihe Band 1282), ed. Udo Steinbach (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012), 16.

¹³ On these crises in the Balkans, in particular the Russo-Turkish War at Bulgarian territory, during the rule of Abdülhamid II see Benjamin C. Fortna, "The reign of Abdülhamid II," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol 4: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 44ff.

¹⁴ The 'capitulations' were economic agreements between the Ottoman Empire and European powers in favour of the Sultan (introduced in the 16th century). However, in the 19th century, with increasing European superiority, the situation changed while these privileges were used by European colonial powers to extend their commercial power. Therefore, these contracts changed into a situation of quasi-European free trade within the Empire. Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 59, 77.

¹⁵ Abdülhamid II stressed the religion of Islam as the integrative power of the Empire by calling himself not only Sultan but also Caliph. Towards European powers, he thereby presented himself as the protector of the Muslim community throughout the world. Cf. Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 11; Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 342f.

arose in 1889 when a small group of students at the Military Medical College of Istanbul exchanged their political ideas and finally managed to be heard outside the walls of Constantinople. Under the shared appellation as *Young Turks*, different oppositional groups shortly thereafter were operating both in European exile and within the Empire's borders. Being diverse in ethnical and geographical backgrounds, common to all was their affiliation to Islam and, generally speaking, to education.¹⁶ The Young Turks' common aim was to catch up with European progress in nation-state building, thus disposing with the Sultan's autocratic regime and re-establishing a constitutional government. The *Committee of Union and Progress* (CUP), which merged diaspora and indigenous groups from both politics and military, finally managed to launch Young Turks into the reopened Ottoman parliament and elevate them into positions of power in the course of the Young Turk constitutional revolution in 1908, reinstating the constitution of 1876.¹⁷ United in its aim to establish a European-style nation-state, the revolutionaries, however, had different views on the state's national identity. With regard to the term *Young Turks*, it is worth mentioning that, initially, Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims would not identify themselves as Turks. This was possible, at first, in the wake of the political formation of a Turkish nation in the course of the rising European phenomenon of nationalism.¹⁸ Until then, calling someone a Turk was primarily negatively associated with ignorant people from the villages.¹⁹

¹⁶ On the Young Turks' ensemble, in particular Zürcher's work on *The Young Turk Legacy* is recommended. He portrays in the chapter "Who were the Young Turks?" precisely the backgrounds of the most significant Young Turks. Ironically, none of the four founding members, the students of the medical school, was an Ottoman Turk. Instead, among them there were two Kurds, an Albanian, and a Circassian. Cf. Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building. From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London et al.: I. B. Tauris 2010), 95-109.

¹⁷ It was not least the political and military alliance that enabled a successful coup in 1908/09. For details on the process of the revolution see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 93ff. For details on the reopening of the parliament, the first elections, as well as on the liberalization of the reinstated constitution of 1876 see Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 359f.

¹⁸ Cf. Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 40. In the next decades, and in particular in the early republican years, there were many attempts by intellectuals to define 'Turkishness' as part of the Turkish nation building process. These included historical theories on the origins of the Turkish people as well as the Turkish language; details on these theories follow below when it comes to the Kemalist definition of Turkish nationality. However, when exactly people began to identify themselves primarily as 'Turks' is hard to tell, not least, as Zürcher remarks, since sociological and anthropological fieldwork started not before the post-World War Two era. Even with regard to the political leadership the question of identification was complicated, as Zürcher examines in detail in his article "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908-1938," in *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 150-179.

¹⁹ Cf. Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 39.

Ideological Debates: From Ottomanism to Muslimism to Turkism

The process of nation formation in the late Ottoman period consisted of two ideological shifts: from Ottoman to Muslim to Turkish nationalism.²⁰ Whereas the initially dominant ideology of Ottomanism remained relatively inclusive, maintaining the Empire's religious and ethnic heterogeneity, the uprising ideas of Muslim and later Turkish nationalism used exclusive strategies to define its collective identities; non-Muslims or non-Turks were thereby identified as the Others.²¹

Ideological debates on the aspired nation-state's identity arose intensely in the second constitutional era since 1908, linked with the introduction of freedom of press.²² Given a consistent increase of nationalist separatism and European imperialism, the ideology of Ottomanism, as the belief in a stable heterogeneous nation-state started to vanish. Muslim nationalism also began to deteriorate during the Balkan Wars of 1912/13 when, for example, even Muslim Albanians chose to identify as ethnic Albanians rather than Ottoman Muslims. As an additional side effect of the territorial losses in the Balkan Wars, for the first time in Ottoman history, the majority of the Empire's population were ethnic Turks.²³ This again favoured Turkish-speaking nationalists in their aspiration to form a nation based on ethnic affinity. Also the Young Turk regime was dominated by a group of Turkish nationalists, among them the so-called 'Triumvirate' of Cemal, Enver and Talat Paşa. They finally accomplished a rigorous Turkification and were prepared to use utmost violence as a measure to implement their nationalist idea of a Turkish nation, Muslim in religion.²⁴ As Ümit Üngör

²⁰ For the phenomenon of Muslim nationalism scholars use either the term Muslimism or Islamism; as the term Islamism nowadays has a new impetus describing different forms of political Islam including a radical one prepared to use violence, in this study the term Muslimism is preferred to describe the ideological concept as part of the plan to establish a national identity, to construct the national Self by excluding Others.

²¹ Cf. Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 8, 29, 52. The approaches of Muslimism and Turkism also existed as Pan-versions aspiring to unify all Muslims within the former borders of the Empire, or all Turkic peoples; while Turkish nationalists, in contrast concentrated on the empowerment of the Anatolian Turks. For detailed explanations on the ideologies of Ottomanism, Muslimism and Turkism see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 127ff.; Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 8-54. On the division of Turkism and Pan-Turkism as well as Muslimism and Pan-Muslimism see also Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 259ff.

²² According to Zürcher, the number of periodicals increased thirtyfold in the first year after the Young Turk revolution compared to barely a dozen at the end of the old regime. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 127. Kreiser similarly mentions a number of 330 periodicals between 1908 and 1909, with remaining 124 in 1911. Cf. Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 358.

²³ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 109. Concerning details on the First and Second Balkan War see, e.g., Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 292ff.; Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 14f.; Günay, *Die Geschichte der Türkei*, 100ff.

²⁴ This nationalist exclusive view resulted in Armenian and Kurdish persecutions (the genocide on the Armenian population in 1915 will be explored below), which affected both interior conflicts and Turkey's relationship with Europe. Cf. Steinbach, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 20; Moser and Weithmann, *Landeskunde Türkei*, 92; Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 12f. On the 'Triumvirate' of Cemal, Enver and Talat Paşa see, e.g., Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 85f, 91, 96f. Erol and Zürcher, however, refer to the fact that

emphasizes, well before Turkish social engineers crafted the Turkish nation in early Republican years, exclusive definitions of which groups should not be part of the new nation were crystal clear. Armenians, for instance, in the 1910's nationalists' eyes, could never take part.²⁵

Politicians and intellectuals considered the role of Islam in the construction of national identity for the future nation-state, just as Turkey's affiliation with Western civilization was an essential component of Turkish identity. Regarding Western impact, the prevailing opinion was that a complete rejection of European ideas was as exceptional as entire imitation. Instead, a large majority emphasized the power of Western science and technology, thereby supporting the implementation of European principles, while at the same time insisting on respecting the culture of Anatolian people.²⁶

One of the most influential Young Turk ideologues was Ziya Gökalp, an author and professor of sociology at the *Darülfünun* in Istanbul, the first Ottoman university along European lines.²⁷ Since he established himself as “a pioneer of Young Turk social engineering,”²⁸ he enormously influenced the Turkish nation-building. In his work, “The principles of Turkism” he basically constructed a three-pillar-synthesis. According to him, identifying with the new Turkish nation should mean to say, “I am a member of the Turkish nation, the Islamic community and Western civilization.”²⁹ Based on his distinction between *culture* as a nation's

the term ‘triumvirate’ is an over-simplification that creates the illusion of absolute authority, while there were some fifty people in the CUP having great influence in creating policies between 1913 and 1918; cf. Erol, *The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia*, 151; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 110. For further details on the origins and changes of the Young Turk mental mindsets see also M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (Oxford et al.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001). Concerning the periodization of the three ideologies, Zürcher records that the ideology of Ottomanism was the official ideology of the revolution in 1908 and remained the official Young Turk ideology throughout the second constitutional era until 1913. However, he also stresses that even before 1908, Muslim as well as Turkish nationalism influenced Young Turk identity politics since the CUP leaders interpreted Ottomanism increasingly as Turkism, visible in their aspiration to turkify non-Turkish elements. This new interpretation, on the other hand, did not pass unnoticed and increased the general scepticism towards the ideology of Ottomanism. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 128f. Üngör, in contrast, schedules Ottomanism as the dominant ideology approximately to 1889, and Muslimism to 1913, while at the same time emphasizing that this periodization is rudimentary and serves only to bring some basic structure to this complex process of ideology practice. Cf. Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 26.

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 52.

²⁶ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 128.

²⁷ Cf. Incesu, *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel*, 66. The *Darülfünun University*, established under Sultan Abdülhamid II, merged within the Republic's education reforms into the *Istanbul University*. The university additionally became relevant for German scientists: in 1915 the first 20 professors were appointed to support the reformation of the university system; further scholars should follow as political refugees from the Nazi regime from 1933 onwards supporting university reforms under Mustafa Kemal along European lines. Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 81, 147f.

²⁸ Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 35.

²⁹ Ziya Gökalp, *The principles of Turkism (Türkçülüğün esasları)*, trans. and annot. Robert Devereux (Leiden: Brill, 1968; originally Ankara, 1923), 48. Robert Devereux translated and annotated Gökalp's work originally published in 1923 in Ankara from Turkish into English. In his *Türkçülüğün esasları* Ziya Gökalp composed all his analyses and assumptions on the nature and program of Turkism as a specific Turkish national ideology.

set of values and traditions, opposed to *civilization* as an international system of shared concepts, knowledge, and sciences,³⁰ he emphasized the existence of a strong Turkish culture that should “enter European civilization completely.”³¹ One of the worst errors of the *tanzimat* reformers, in his opinion, had been the intention to combine components of Western and Eastern civilization; in his view, this “was like trying to make the Middle Ages live in modern times.”³² At the same time he stressed one should not lose sight of the peoples’ own valuable culture and religion.³³ Gökalp’s ideological assumptions were not only influential with his contemporaries, but also during the reform process of the Turkish Republic, presumably because “they allowed national pride to be reconciled with the adoption of European ways.”³⁴

Political, Social, and Economic Reforms between 1913 and 1918

As with the search for a common national identity, the reforms of the Young Turks were orientated towards the European model of the nation-state, while maintaining the Empire’s traditional religious roots. The successful seizure of power in 1913, as well as the abolition of the capitulations in October 1914, had finally enabled the Young Turk regime to enact further far-reaching reforms.³⁵ A decade later, it was exactly this point of religious influence at the state level that Mustafa Kemal presented as the reason for the Empire’s final collapse, which helped him to justify his radical secularization process.³⁶

The Young Turk ‘modernization’ program in the 1910s consisted of administrative reforms to the military and provincial sectors, aiming for decentralization.³⁷ Furthermore, the judicial and educational systems were secularized,³⁸ and family law was reformed.³⁹ In the wake of

³⁰ Cf. Gökalp, *The principles of Turkism*, 22. See also Zürcher, *Turkey*, 131.

³¹ Gökalp, *The principles of Turkism*, 45f. Zürcher notices that Gökalp technically echoed the ideas of the Young Ottomans. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 131.

³² Gökalp, *The principles of Turkism*, 46f.

³³ Cf. *ibid.*, 47. As a successful model he adduces the Japanese nation which became Western while not losing its own culture and religion.

³⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 132.

³⁵ On the Young Turk takeover in 1913 see, e.g., *ibid.*, 107ff., on the beginning of the reform process see especially page 121.

³⁶ Cf. Steinbach, “Vom Osmanischen Reich,” 18.

³⁷ After the success of Edirne in July 1913, Enver was given the title of Paşa and was appointed Minister of War. He aimed to reform the army radically and therefore charged a German mission of 70 (later increased to 700) officers under the leadership of Liman von Sanders with the reorganization of the Ottoman army. The decentralization policy within the reformation of the provincial administration aimed to bind the now smallest minority of Arabs to the Ottoman regime, which was only partly successful. For more details on the military and decentralization reforms see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 121.

³⁸ The religious courts and schools were brought under the control of the secular Ministries of Justice and Education and the curriculum of the higher religious schools was reformed, e.g., by teaching European languages. Further reforms contained the release of the highest religious authority (*şeyhülislam*) from the cabinet as well as the introduction of the Ministry of Religious Foundation. Cf. *ibid.*, 121f.

³⁹ The law of inheritance, for instance, was renewed in accordance with the German code. In addition, the procedure in religious courts was regulated. One single common family law for all Ottoman subjects was

these transformations, the position of women improved with the introduction of compulsory primary education for girls and partial access to higher education for women.⁴⁰ Besides being allies in World War One, foreign experts from Germany and Austria-Hungary were commanded to support the reform process, particularly in the fields of military, education, administration, and the economy. German scientists were also appointed to the Istanbul University to support the reform process. Successful scientific consultation was put into practice, however, not until the 1930s when German scientists immigrated to Turkey as a consequence of political persecution.⁴¹

Apart from that, the Empire's economic system was industrialized and reorganized along European lines. However, Ottoman products were still preferred and a nationalist Turk bourgeoisie was established. Unsurprisingly, this next step of nationalist development became fatal for minorities such as Greek and Armenian entrepreneurs who, for example, were discriminated against and intimidated by being forced to use Turkish as the written language.⁴²

In summary, the ambiguous character of the Ottoman reforms reflects the way the former rulers perceived themselves. In Reinkowski's words: "The Ottomans understood themselves in the 19th century, in a confusing mixture of imitation, defense and adaptation, as part of the civilized world, thus Europe."⁴³ The socio-cultural dualism between the orientation towards European standards and a strong cultural tradition rooted in Islam kept on dominating the ideological debates in these times. Mustafa Kemal and his followers, in the end, held this

furthermore introduced, including special arrangements for non-Muslims. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 122. The forms of marriage of the three major religions Islam, Christianity and Judaism were integrated in one decree. Cf. Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 363.

⁴⁰ According to Zürcher, a number of courses at the University of Istanbul were opened to women in 1914. Other reforms concerned the right to divorce (while polygamy remained admissible), the legal age of marriage for women, which was moved up to 16, and the encouragement of women to take part in social life. However, Zürcher also emphasizes that these changes primarily concerned urban middle and upper class women. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 122.

⁴¹ Cf. Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 363; Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 81. According to Reinkowski, the success of German scientific consultation between 1915-1918 was not noticeable because the foreign scientists' reform efforts were not put into practice, in contrast to those successful reforms implemented with the help of German scientists in the 1930s. Cf. *ibid.*, 147f.

⁴² In the course of this development, at least 130,000 Greek entrepreneurs from the Western coast were exiled to Greece and their companies were given to the new bourgeoisie of Muslim entrepreneurs. For further details on the economic reforms between 1913 and 1918 see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 123-127; for a good survey of the 'modernization' process in this time more generally see additionally Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 305ff. Emre Erol, furthermore, gives a detailed insight into the fate of the Greeks in late Ottoman times and provides an exemplary exploration of how the Young Turk nationalization measures resulted in the decline and final disappearance of original prosperous cosmopolitan port cities of Western Anatolia; see Erol, *The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia*.

⁴³ Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 78f. Translated by the author, in original: "Die Osmanen selbst verstanden sich im 19. Jahrhundert, in einer verwirrenden Mischung aus Nachahmung, Abwehr und Anverwandlung, als Teil der zivilisierten Welt, also Europas."

dualism responsible for the final fall of the Empire. Therefore, having had learned from the past, the new task was to secularize the public sector comprehensively.⁴⁴ Drawing a line to modern Turkey, Kerem Öktem emphasizes the ambivalent relationship between Turkey and Europe originating with Ottoman reformism; Europe was perceived both as a model to aspire to and something to be afraid of. This was combined with a Turkish self-understanding of being able to survive only by living up to European standards.⁴⁵

Overall, the period of nation-state building along European lines in early Republican times was not predicated on a novel phenomenon but tied in with the ideas and requests of former Ottoman reformers.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the political and cultural reforms of the 1920s and 30s reached a new level in terms of sustainability and effectiveness as well as in strength and aggressiveness, as will be illustrated in detail in the following section on the Republican reforms.

3.3 The Time of the ‘Long War’ (1912-1922): Nationalization Measures, the Utilization of Islam, and the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’

The decade previous to the Turkish Republic is notable for the historical self-perception of the Turkish nation. Certain concepts and myths became fixed components of the collective memory of the Republic’s citizens. Some of these notions pertained to the question of Turkey’s belonging to Europe. This subchapter will examine three events that had a formative effect on Turkish collective memory lasting until today: the genocide on the Armenians in 1915, Mustafa Kemal’s utilization of Sunni Islam to unite the Anatolian residents after World War One, and the Treaty of Sèvres as an enduring trauma. As Özyürek points out, the collective memory of both successful national stories and foundational traumas serves different groups in distinct ways and creates the sense of an imagined community.⁴⁷

Firstly, one of the most pivotal historical events that shaped Turkish nation-building and still impacts Turkish-European relations to date is the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian minority in 1915. During the emergence of nationalism within the Ottoman Empire, the

⁴⁴ Cf. Steinbach, “Vom Osmanischen Reich,” 18.

⁴⁵ Cf. Öktem, *Angry Nation*, 21.

⁴⁶ Cf. Incesu, *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel*, 68. This line, drawn between the early Republican reforms under Mustafa Kemal and the former Ottoman reforms, seems to be a common statement meanwhile in the humanities.

⁴⁷ Cf. Esra Özyürek, ed., *The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2007), 11 (see the introduction of this volume).

majority of non-Muslim Armenians aimed to establish their own nation-state. They accepted foreign support, primarily Russian, in their attempt to realize this goal. Due to the rise of Muslim and Turkish nationalism, the Young Turks, in turn, accused the Armenians of supporting their enemies during World War One and decided to react radically in the form of organized persecutions, killings, and deportations that often resulted in the death of those deported. The number of Armenian victims is estimated to be between 1-1,5 million people.⁴⁸ Until today – despite European definitions of genocide – Turkey refuses to call the crimes against the Armenian population that happened within the borders of the Ottoman Empire as such.⁴⁹ In this context, the Turkish government has frequently been in conflict with those countries that categorize the persecution of Armenians as genocide. The reason for the Turkish denial lies particularly in the past: its acceptance would question the very foundation of the Turkish nation, as these crimes are immediately connected with the historical roots of the Turkish Republic, as well as the creation of the Turkish nation.⁵⁰

The utilization of Islam as a marker of collective identity played a vital role in the process of Turkish national identity formation. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, Mustafa Kemal initially resorted to Muslim nationalism rhetoric to promote a sense of unity among all Muslims, regardless of their ethnicity. He managed to motivate the leftover, war-weary Ottomans such as the Turks, Kurds, Circassians, and

⁴⁸ As the focus of this study is a different one, the genocide of 1915 cannot be discussed in more detail. However, it is worth pointing out the existence of an enormous body of literature. For deeper insights and reflections the following examinations are, inter alia, to be recommended: Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford et al.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011); Fikret Adanır and Oktay Özel, eds., *1915. Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015); Raymond H. Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010); Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Fikret Adanır and Hilmar Kaiser, “Migration, Deportation, and Nation-Building: The Case of the Ottoman Empire,” in *Migrations et migrants dans une perspective historique: permanences et innovations*, ed. René Leboutte (Brussels et al.: Peter Lang, 2000), 273-92; Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, Chapter 2 on “Genocide of Christians,” 55-106. For a specific focus on the connection between the Armenian genocide and Nazi Germany’s holocaust see Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass. et al: Harvard Univ. Press, 2016).

⁴⁹ As a European example, the German parliament passed a resolution on the categorization of the massacres on Armenians in 1915 as genocide in June 2016.

⁵⁰ Reinkowski further hints to the fact that the fear of questioning the historical roots of the Turkish nation and nation-state while accepting the whole extent of the incidents of 1915, including the recognition of the genocide, rather plays a role unconsciously than consciously. Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 99. Turkey, in sum, penalizes the notation ‘genocide’ according to Article 301, Criminal Code, on ‘insulting the Turkish nation’, as demonstrated for example through the denunciations of the authors Orhan Pamuk and Doğan Akhanlı. In foreign countries, in contrast, a denial of the Armenian genocide can be penalized, e.g., in France and Switzerland. The European Court of Human Rights, nevertheless, decided in December 2013 that any denial of the Armenian genocide could not be sentenced (in contrast to the Holocaust) along the freedom of expression.

Muslims from the Balkans to oppose the occupying allied powers and fight for a new nation-state. Common religion was the shared element supporting this diverse group's self-perception – they perceived themselves as Muslims cornered by the Christian allied powers.⁵¹ In consequence, although Mustafa Kemal and his companions fostered a Turkish rather than Muslim nationalism, much of the early Republican population identified as part of a nation unified by religion. Until today, the identification of Turkish citizens as part of a Turkish-Muslim community has effected Turkish politics and the composition of society. This is not least evident in the success of various Islamist parties in the past and present, and in the level of today's political and social polarization of society which can be traced back to the (transgressing) dualism between secularists and Islamists.⁵²

A third sustainable element, embedded in the collective memory of Turkish society, which continued to influence Turkey's relations with Europe is collective trauma; the perceived humiliation after World War One in the form of the Treaty of Sèvres. The contract was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente on 10 August 1920, 'solving' the 'Eastern question' that had become the core issue of European diplomatic debates. With the cease-fire of Mudros on 30 October 1918, the end of the Empire was finally sealed. After having lost vital parts of its territory in the Balkan Wars and the Great War fighting side by side with the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the Entente of the victorious powers finally divided the remaining Anatolian territory and put the Ottomans' destiny completely into Western hands. First, the Entente solidified the segmentations since Mudros and reduced the size of the Anatolian mainland. In the West, Izmir (former Smyrna) and Eastern Thrace were placed under Greek administration. Western Thrace, the area of straits incorporating the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, was demilitarized and fell under international control. The southern and southeastern parts of Anatolia remained British, French, and Italian zones of influence. Additionally, an independent Armenian state, and the possibility of an autonomous Kurdistan,

⁵¹ Cf. Incesu, *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel*, 56ff.

⁵² We only have to look at the current situation: Sunni Islam is an important marker of identity for a big part of Turkish society, which is not least visible in the great support of the ruling Islamist AK Party. This, however is only one aspect that polarizes society currently. Other cleavages exist between Kurds and Turks, 'black' and 'white' Turks, urban and rural Turkish citizens, and others – however, not to be simplified as being dichotomous, but rather multilayered and hybrid. For a detailed analysis of the roots of polarization and social tensions including the competing narratives about what it means to be Turkish and what it means to be Muslim (and how both create nationalism similarly), see Jenny White's monograph *New Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks* (Princeton et al.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2013) incorporating decades of her anthropological research on the Turkish society. Moreover, Ahmet Kuru focuses on the past and present struggle (until 2009) between the Kemalist assertive secularism and the Islamic challenge. See Ahmet T. Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion. The United States, France, and Turkey* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), Part III on Turkey.

was announced. The Arabic areas the Empire had lost in World War One now became British and French mandates officially.⁵³

Nevertheless, the Treaty remained unapproved by a Turkish parliament. Instead, the revolutionary resistance movement – under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal – liberated Izmir, defeated the Greek troops that had almost reached Ankara, and paved the way for the Treaty of Lausanne which abrogated the Treaty of Sèvres. Despite never coming into effect, Sèvres has always played a crucial role in the collective memory of the Turkish population. The so-called ‘Sèvres syndrome’, thereby, describes a persistent fear of foreign actions aiming to destroy the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. It has strengthened an already existent phenomenon, having been defined as one side of the ambivalent relationship towards Europe. Overall, the superiority of European powers over the Ottoman Empire, through its decades of decline, resulted in Turkish historiography, describing the historical relationship with Europe as inferior and replete with deep distrust.⁵⁴

3.4 The Birth of the Turkish Nation-State

With the disastrous territorial losses in World War One, the Young Turk triumvirate of Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pasha finally dispersed and left the country accused of being chiefly responsible for the defeat. The concurrent downfall of the Committee of Union and Progress created a “destructive power vacuum.”⁵⁵ In consequence, for the last time, the Sultan’s Palace was the only ruling power in the Empire. Besides the threatening imperial ambitions of the European powers, the Sultan’s passivity, along with his government not resisting the occupation of the Entente, resulted in the radicalization of one particular segment of the Ottoman urban bourgeoisie. Specifically, it was the “top-military officers” of the former Young Turk regime that could no longer accept the passive attitude of the Palace.⁵⁶

⁵³ For details on the Treaty of Sèvres see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 147; Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 378-381; Nurettin Alphan Tuncer, *Transformations of Turkish Foreign Policy During the Cold War* (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, 2016), 151-154.

⁵⁴ Cf. Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 25; Günay, *Die Geschichte der Türkei*, 121; An appropriate example is the following work: Hakki Keskin, *Die Türkei. Vom Osmanischen Reich zum Nationalstaat – Werdegang einer Unterentwicklung* (“*Turkey. From the Ottoman Empire to nation-state – The history of backwardness*,” translation from German by the author) (Berlin: Olle und Wolter, 1981). Steinbach traces the frequent emergence of conspiracy theories in today’s Turkey holding foreign forces responsible for interior resistance with the objective to weaken or even destroy the state back to the late Ottoman Empire. Cf. Steinbach, “Vom Osmanischen Reich,” 20.

⁵⁵ Tuncer, *Transformations of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 154.

⁵⁶ In addition, as Tuncer remarks, these top bureaucrats were also conscious of their personal loss of privileges as a result of a passive Ottoman Palace. Cf. *ibid.*

Among this group of former CUP members as well as civilian and military bureaucrats, it was Mustafa Kemal who assembled the opposition around him. As William Hale remarks, Kemal was “one of the few Turkish generals who had come out of the Great War with his reputation enhanced rather than tarnished.”⁵⁷ These actors were finally successful in forming a nationalist coalition by uniting the various disorientated resistant groups of Anatolia: the nascent Muslim bourgeoisie, landlords, intellectuals, merchants, the Kurdish tribes and the religious brotherhoods; all those who had benefited from the CUP regime. They formed the nucleus of the future Republic of Turkey and the basis of the upcoming war against the invading powers.⁵⁸ This *War of Liberation (Kurtuluş Savaşı)*, also called *War of Independence (İstiklâl Harbi, Bağımsızlık Savaşı)*, has been presented in Turkish historiography as a struggle of the Muslim nation against Western imperialism.⁵⁹

As a result of two political congresses in Erzurum and Sivas in Eastern Anatolia, at the end of 1919, the resistance fighters managed to establish a provisional government and the so-called *National Pact*, a road map for the ultimate goal of creating a new Turkish nation-state uniting all Ottoman Muslims.⁶⁰ At the end of the Erzurum Congress, Mustafa Kemal already had concrete visions for a secular republic in which religion was to be eliminated from public spaces.⁶¹

It was one of the imperialist powers, namely the British government, who supported a sudden increase of the resistant movements’ popularity by occupying the capital and dissolving the Ottoman parliament after it ratified the National Pact. As a result, the dissolution of the parliament provided Mustafa Kemal and his associates with the final legitimization to convene the Grand National Assembly (*Büyük Millet Meclisi*) in Ankara in April 1920 as the

⁵⁷ William M. Hale, *Turkish politics and the Military* (London et al.: Routledge, 1994), 59. Mustafa Kemal, born in Ottoman Salonika, was a military officer of one of the Ottoman troops that defeated the allied forces in the fight for the Dardanelles in 1915. The victory in the Battle of Gallipoli (in Turkish historiography: Battle of Çanakkale/*Çanakkale Savaşı*) was one of the most significant achievements on the part of the Ottoman troops during World War One. Therefore this ‘glorious victory’ later served as a legitimization for Mustafa Kemal’s leadership of the nationalist resistance movement. Cf. Andrew Mango, “Atatürk,” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol 4: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 155. On the Gallipoli battles see also Zürcher, *Turkey*, 118.

⁵⁸ Not least, the CUP’s secret service had established secret networks already at the end of the war to assemble those resistance groups as a bulwark against imperialist powers. Cf. Tuncer, *Transformations of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 155f.

⁵⁹ Cf. Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 129.

⁶⁰ For details on the beginning of an organized resistance movement against the invading powers and the Sultan as well as on Islam as a binding element see Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 26f.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 147ff. On the congresses of Erzurum and Sivas see also Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 344ff.

⁶¹ Historian Klaus Kreiser in this context hints to an informal conversation between Mustafa Kemal and two of his associates in Erzurum in August 1919, in which Kemal already signaled his plans to establish a republic and to secularize public life. Cf. Klaus Kreiser, *Atatürk. Eine Biographie* (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 145f.

second centre of political power and counterpart to the Sultanate.⁶² This National Assembly was still heterogeneous in its ethnic and ideological composition, as had been Mustafa Kemal's companions in the ongoing struggle for liberation. The only common motivation of those Ottoman Muslims was the resistance against foreign invasion. With support from diplomatic and military expertise, however, the circle of radical Turkish nationalists surrounding Mustafa Kemal finally consolidated their leadership within the resistance movement. During the war of liberation, they ultimately achieved the abolition of the Sultanate and persuaded the Entente powers to sign the Lausanne Peace Agreement on 24 July 1923.⁶³ The path of Turkish nationalism was cemented when, on 29 October 1923, the Grand National Assembly promulgated the Republic of Turkey after Mustafa Kemal founded the Republican People's Party (CHF, later CHP)⁶⁴ and elected Kemal for president.⁶⁵

Considering the geographical allocation of the newborn state to Europe, the Turkish Republic now consisted of a minor European (around 3-4%) and a major Asian landmass – according to the geographers' construction of Eurasia as two continents.⁶⁶ Concurrently, with the founding of a Turkish nation-state, Anatolia was chosen to be the homeland (*vatan*) of the Turkish nation.⁶⁷ This was remarkable since most of the leading politicians and military officers originally came from the Balkan region, such as Mustafa Kemal being from Saloniki.⁶⁸ Maintaining the CUP's belief in the state's European character as crucial for its survival, Kemal was determined to express Turkey's belonging in cultural rather than

⁶² Among the new parliamentarians were also some members of the old parliament – those who had not been found and arrested by the British. Cf. Tuncer, *Transformations of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 156f.

⁶³ For details on the Treaty of Lausanne in sum see, e.g., Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 365ff.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 160ff.; Günay, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 133ff.

⁶⁴ In 1935 the name Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (CHF) was changed to Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP). Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 168.

⁶⁵ In addition, the historian Kreiser remarks that the foundation of the Turkish Republic is a unique example regarding its speed as well as its weak legal fundament since it was within one day of consultations that the CHP simply changed a few regulations of the former constitution of 1921 with the help of an 'amendment law'. Cf. Kreiser, *Die Geschichte der Türkei*, 39.

⁶⁶ The territory was that of today's Turkey, except Iskenderun (today's Hatay), which remained part of the French mandate of Syria until 1939.

⁶⁷ Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 101. This construction was part of a whole construction of history of 'the Turkish nation'. Details on this Turkish history thesis are provided below.

⁶⁸ During the Balkan War and World War One some three million Turks and Muslims had emigrated from the Balkan region to Anatolia. The number of their offspring, as Reinkowski remarked in 2008, could therefore represent 15-20 million, which is approximately one quarter of the state's population. Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 101. At the same time regional designations such as 'Eastern Anatolia', 'South-Eastern Anatolia' or the 'Black Sea area' were invented (or socially constructed) to eliminate the former geographical designations Armenia, Kurdistan, Cilicia or Upper Mesopotamia. Cf. Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 16.

geographical terms to shape the Turkish state and society in the cultural mold of Europe.⁶⁹ Additionally, the founding fathers of the Republic were eager to distance the young nation from its inferior Ottoman past. In effect, they sought to conceal any relationship with the previous backwardness of the Ottoman Empire using radical reforms. Ankara as the Republic's capital was symbolic, defying the traditional seat of the Sultan and the Caliph in Istanbul and commemorating the successful revolution of the nationalists in Anatolia. On the other hand, from a European perspective – as historian Hanioglu refers to – with its capital in Asia and a predominantly Muslim population, Turkey had become an ordinary Near Eastern country on the southeastern fringes of Europe.⁷⁰

3.5 Kemalist Concepts of Nationalism and Secularism in Identity Formations

The proclamation of the Turkish Republic had virtually formed the 'shell' of the Turkish nation-state. This shell, however, had to be filled with contents, namely a nation, as Reinkowski metaphorically remarks. The constitution of 1924, as every following constitution, clearly defined 'a Turk' as a citizen of the Turkish Republic.⁷¹ The addition of 'independent of faith and race', still did not guarantee certain rights for Non-Muslims and ethnic minorities.⁷² Instead, this addition was interpreted as seeking one homogeneous nation with Turkish as the only accepted language and Sunni Islam as the only accepted faith.⁷³

In Mustafa Kemal's view, the past had demonstrated that the religion of Islam was of little help when it came to civilizing the people along European lines. Accordingly, the displacement of Islam from public spaces was one crucial 'modernization' measure intending to advance the Turkish nation to an enlightened and educated community belonging to Western civilization. After the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924, several fundamental renewals and secularizing reforms followed: these were the adoption of Swiss civil law, the reorganization of the criminal and trade law based on the Italian and German models respectively, the complete control of the education system by the secular state, the closure of the Dervish orders, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, the prohibition of traditional male

⁶⁹ Cf. Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 201. Hanioglu in this context gives another example and points to the Israeli sense of belonging to Western civilization although residing in the East.

⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

⁷¹ Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 121.

⁷² Cf. Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 17.

⁷³ For details on the handling of religious and ethnic minorities in the first years of the Turkish Republic see, e.g., Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 118f. Specific reactions such as the first Kurdish revolt in 1925 will be clarified below. To get an overview about the different ethnic groups within the borders of the Turkish Republic, the following book is to be recommended: Peter A. Andrews, ed., *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1989).

headgear, i.e. fez and turban while at the same time introducing the Western-style hat or cap, and finally the introduction of Latin instead of Arabic letters.⁷⁴ The Turkish Language Society furthermore ‘purged’ the Turkish language by removing Arabic and Persian elements.⁷⁵ In consequence, those who could read essentially became illiterate again and future generations were unable to read documents and testimonies of their predecessors.

As a result, these radical reforms enforced in merely four years from 1924 to 1928, created an immense rift in institutional, political, and socio-cultural terms. Unsurprisingly, this rift overburdened the mainly conservative Muslim population, and caused feelings of discrimination towards their cultural background and identity. The prohibition of the Kurdish language in public, and the political restrictions imposed by the centralist state against traditional Kurdish tribal organization gave rise to a heavy – and enduring – rebellion.⁷⁶ The way the Kemalist government dealt with any subsequent attempt of opposition ultimately demonstrated that the Republic, which until then had been liberal to some extent, had transmuted into a dictatorial state willing to relentlessly enforce its ideal of a well-educated, Western nation.⁷⁷ Whether one prefers to call it a “cultural revolution”⁷⁸ or an “educational dictatorship,”⁷⁹ the era of reform under President Mustafa Kemal was hardly a popular or a grassroots revolution; it was, instead, a ‘revolution from above’ in the hands of a small elite of the military and bureaucracy. These reforms were not novel in content, but their radical and rapid implementation differed from the reform era of *tanzimat* and the Young Turks in late Ottoman times.⁸⁰

The CHP constructed the ideological concept of Kemalism serving as the foundation and legitimization for any political actions. The six basic principles, depicted in the CHP emblem

⁷⁴ For details on the first Kemalist reforms see, e.g., Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 36ff.; Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 409ff.; Buhbe, *Türkei*, 40f.; Steinbach, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 31ff. Adanır points to the fact that the first reform, that of the headgear, was a supposedly superficial one. However, Kemal obviously knew of the utmost symbolic meaning of abolishing the traditional fez. It clearly demonstrated his intention. Cf. Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 36.

⁷⁵ Cf. Steinbach, “Vom Osmanischen Reich,” 30. Details on the Turkish Language Society follow below.

⁷⁶ In the war of liberation, Turks and Kurds had still fought together bound by Islam. The Kurds’ aim, however, was not the founding of a secular and ethnical (Turkish) uniform republic. In February 1925, a Kurdish revolt started under the leadership of Sheikh Said. From the Kurdish perspective, without the institution of the Caliphate, that had personified the Islamic entity, the new nation-state seemed to be defined primarily as an ethnically Turkish collective from then on. On this revolt see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 169ff.; Steinbach, “Vom Osmanischen Reich,” 33f.; Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 41ff.

⁷⁷ Subsequently, according to Zürcher, under the *Law on the Maintenance of Order*, in 1925 nearly 7,500 people were arrested and 660 were executed. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 173. See also Buhbe, *Türkei*, 41; Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 41.

⁷⁸ Cf. Günay, *Die Geschichte der Türkei*, 154.

⁷⁹ Cf. Steinbach, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 36; Kreiser, *Atatürk*, 300.

⁸⁰ A similar evaluation on the Kemalist reform era can be found in Incesu, *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel*, 68.

in the form of six arrows – secularism, nationalism, etatism, revolutionism, populism, and republicanism⁸¹ – became part of the party program in 1931. In 1937, Kemalism finally attained constitutional status and became the official state doctrine of the Turkish Republic. The concepts of nationalism, secularism, and republicanism have been constitutionally recognised until today.⁸² Looking back at almost a century of Turkish Republican history, though, it becomes clear that Kemalism is not a static concept, but rather a contested one prone to political interpretation and exploitation by different factions. That became particularly visible during the military coup d'états in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 when Kemalist principles were used to justify an overthrow. How individual principles are defined in the Turkish context must also be examined with caution; the interpretation of secularism, for example, can be confusing from a non-Turkish perspective. Banishing religion from the public space was one of the key elements of the Kemalist reform process to catch up with Western standards. However, instead of separating religion and state, it manifested as “the subjugation and integration of religion into the state bureaucracy.”⁸³ With the establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) in 1924, religious life in Turkey has been organized by the state ever since; religious life meaning the ‘Turkified’ form of Sunni Islam.⁸⁴ This concept is consistent with the second Kemalist core principle of nationalism, aiming to not only establish the Turkish Republic but also a Turkish nation. The collective national identity that was being constructed would, thus, be based on a common Turkish culture,

⁸¹ Due to the importance given to secularism and nationalism by the Kemalists as central part of the construction process of a collective national identity, these two principles will be closer discussed below. The other principles, partly not defined precisely by the Kemalists themselves, are here neglected due to this study’s different focus. Details on all the six principles are to found, e.g., in Zürcher, *Turkey*, 181f.; Buhbe, *Türkei*, 47ff.; Tuncer, *Transformations of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 177f.

⁸² However, it can be observed that the principle of etatism – Atatürk interprets it as “state capitalism” (Türkkiye Atatürk, *N.A.T.O. and Turkey* (Ankara: Ankara Univ. Press, 1970), 90.) – although decreasing through liberalizing measures after World War Two and officially being vanished by Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s liberal economic policies at the beginning of the 1980s, is still embedded in Turkish political culture today. In addition, some huge family holdings that still exist in contemporary Turkey and dominate certain economic branches resulted from the symbiotic relationship between the state and the private sector. Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 132. For a more detailed analysis on the relationship between these holdings and the state see e.g., Ayşe Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey. A Comparative Study* (New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 1994). Especially for the time after the military coup of 1980 (but also including a chapter on the early republican times until 1980) with a particular look at the role of religion in Turkey’s economy see Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *New Capitalism in Turkey. The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business* (Cheltenham, UK et al.: Elgar, 2014). On the rise of Vehbi Koç as an example of one of today’s most influential family holdings see also Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 103.

⁸³ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 233.

⁸⁴ Other Islamic currents such as the Alevi community as well as Non-Muslim religions have been redlined, not supported or even not acknowledged ever since. On the Kemalist understanding of secularism on the whole see, e.g., Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 384ff.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 181f. For a historical overview of the development of the concept of secularism from 19th century Ottoman Empire until the Kemalist Turkish Republic see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1998, first publ. 1964).

which included the religious confession of Sunni Islam. Ethnic and religious minorities within the borders of the Turkish Republic were forced to identify themselves with the Turkish state and nation.⁸⁵ The Turkish nation-building process is thus a perfect example of the top-down political construction of collective identity.⁸⁶

The new Turkish nationalism had its roots in the Young Turk intellectuals' ideology of Turkism coined by, among others, Ziya Gökalp. However, Mustafa Kemal had the idea to infuse Turkish nationalism with scientism – Darwinian theories of evolution and other racist theories – inspired by positivist thinkers such as Auguste Comte, Émile Durkheim, and Orientalist imaginations, in the sense of Western perspectives on Eastern civilizations.⁸⁷ In that way, a strong nationalism “was intended to take the place of religion in many respects.”⁸⁸ Religious and cultural characteristics also entered Turkish historiography in the form of the linguistic ‘Sun-Language Theory’ as well as the ‘Turkish History Thesis’. Both theories were created to form the collective memory of a nation that was chosen to be the origin of every glorious civilization. According to that language theory, all languages originate from one primaeval language in Central Asia, to which Turkish was the closest. Any other languages had developed from this primordial language through Turkish.⁸⁹

Similarly, the Turkish History Society constructed a historical myth surrounding the anthropological-historical origin of the Turks. According to this, the Turks were descendants of white Aryan residents of Central Asia; the root of every civilization. Following this thesis, in the course of forced emigration in pre-historic times due to climatic conditions, the Turks

⁸⁵ For some minorities, however, it was impossible to obtain Turkish citizenship: while non-Ottoman Christians had the chance to become Turkish citizens by converting, ex-Ottoman Christians, e.g., Armenians, did not. Due to the former millet system (Ottoman Christians had not belonged to the Muslim millet, of course), Ottoman Christians were considered outside the Turkish nation and therefore were unlikely to obtain Turkish citizenship, even when they converted. Cf. Soner Cağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey. Who is a Turk?* (London et al.: Routledge, 2006), 80f. (for further explanations on the construction process of the Turkish nation and the role of ethnic-religious attributes see also the whole book).

⁸⁶ In contrast to collective identities of cultural nations that exist previous to a state and commonly appeal on the establishment of one nation-state (bottom-up). The division of political and cultural identities of nation-states has been juxtaposed in detail already in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework).

⁸⁷ Cf. Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 161ff. On the influences of French positivism and Western Orientalism on Mustafa Kemal's idea of a Turkish nation, see particularly Tuncer, *Transformations of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 170-173.

⁸⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 182.

⁸⁹ The Turkish Language Society, which, as mentioned before, particularly had the task to create a new ‘clean’ Turkish language, being supported by Mustafa Kemal adopted the ‘Sun-Language Theory’ of a Viennese Orientalist named Kvergic. This theory advantageously could also be taken as reason to revive all the ‘old’ Turkish words and replace the Arabic and Persian influences, which according to the Kemalist understanding at that time had polluted the Turkish language over the centuries. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 190; Öktem, *Angry Nation*, 31; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. (New York et al.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 433f.; Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 171-178. For a detailed investigation on how this theory came into being and was scientifically widely accepted in the 1920s and 30s see Jens Peter Laut, *Das Türkische als Ursprache? Sprachwissenschaftliche Theorien in der Zeit des erwachenden türkischen Nationalismus* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000).

had carried their Central Asian civilization into the whole world and had thus created all major civilizations. The earliest residents on Anatolian ground, above all the Hittites, were also one of the emigrated Turkish tribes from Central Asia. This way, Anatolia was constructed as the homeland of the Turks.⁹⁰ Moreover, based on the assumption that the world was composed of superior and inferior races, this thesis placed the Turk race on an equal level with the European one.⁹¹

It comes as no surprise that both the language and history theory, as created by the Turkish Language and Turkish History Society,⁹² fascinated many nationalist Turks since it gave them an outstanding, superior significance in the world. In particular, Mustafa Kemal himself emphatically supported these theories, and they became part of the official history curriculum in schools from 1932 onwards. Rather than teaching the history of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, the focus remained on the Turkish nation's historical heritage – traced back to pre-Islamic times and ancient, highly civilized peoples – as well as on the Turkish revolution achieving the establishment of the Turkish Republic.⁹³ Given this historical narrative, the Kemalists transformed the Turkish nation from being a political construct based on citizenship into a cultural nation portrayed as being of superior and sacred importance. Nevertheless, because of how nationalism was interpreted in the decades after the Kemalist one-party rule, it is worth emphasizing that nationalism is a dynamic concept which has served as the ideological foundation and justification, not only for Kemalists but also for Turkish groups to the left and the right of the political spectrum.⁹⁴

Although the ideological concept of Kemalism has received some domestic criticism in public, the personality of Mustafa Kemal – or Atatürk (meaning ‘father of the Turks’), as he was called in the course of the family name reform in 1934, has been glorified by the majority

⁹⁰ The doctoral thesis submitted at the University of Geneva by Ayşe Afet İnan – one of the founding and leading members of the Society and an adopted daughter of Atatürk – is the final reference and ‘scientific’ elaboration of the Turkish History Thesis, which was established by a small group around this young historian and sociologist. Overall, on the creation of the history thesis see Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 161-171; Öktem, *Angry Nation*, 31; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 191; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 359. On the basis of this history writing it is no coincidence that in the 1930s the two major banks that were founded were called *Etibank* (Hittite Bank) and *Sümerbank* (Sumerian Bank; the Sumerians were also considered as proto-Turks in the Near East). Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 191; Buhbe, *Türkei*, 51.

⁹¹ This was determined in accordance with the thesis of the anthropologist-historian Eugène Pittard, who was Afet's dissertation supervisor. Cf. Öktem, *Angry Nation*, 31.

⁹² Both societies are today integrated in the state-run Higher Atatürk Association for Culture, Language and History (*Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu*). Although, the theses have been de-radicalized, the unitary Turkish understanding of nation is still being passed. Cf. Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 135.

⁹³ Cf. Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 45.

⁹⁴ The right wing Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP), for instance, adopted the principle of nationalism in their program in the 1960s, but interpreted it in a violent and pan-Turkist way. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 257.

ever since. This was based on the widely shared belief that he was the one who saved the Turkish nation from European imperialist oppression, and had returned it to its glorious natural superiority.⁹⁵ Accordingly, his contribution to Turkish history writing on the so-called war of liberation and the founding of the Republic, which he published in the form of a six day-long speech (in Turkish called *Nutuk*), was accepted as the ultimate interpretation of Turkish state formation.⁹⁶

Concerning European perspectives on Turkey's Western affiliation, Atatürk's goal to convince the West of belonging to the same civilization as Turkey was unsuccessful in comparison. As Hanioglu stresses, regarding history and language theories, Western scholarship paid no attention to the (in their eyes rather) pseudoscientific theories advanced by the Republican regime.⁹⁷

3.6 Shifting from Passive to Active: Turkey Entering the Western Bloc

Turkey's aspiration to be accepted as part of Europe had its first bright spot in Ottoman times. As a signatory to the Treaty of Paris in 1856 at the end of the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire was formally admitted to the 'European Concert'. However, as historian Zürcher indicates, this formal belonging did not change its financial and military weakness as well as the general situation "that they remained an object of European diplomatic intrigue rather than an active participant in it."⁹⁸ Thus, the 'Eastern question' among the European Great Powers – how to deal with 'the sick man of Europe' – remained unsolved. At the latest with the Congress of Berlin in 1878 following the Russo-Turkish War, it became clear that the Empire was not accepted as an equal part of Europe. Instead, it lost several territorial parts of the Balkans and only survived due to the European Powers' inability to agree on the remaining territory.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ This is not least still today visible through the numerous statues and monuments all over the country, in particular as regards his mausoleum in Ankara. The so-called *Anıtkabir*, an architecturally huge and powerful monument, incorporates a museum in his honour as well as his sarcophagus and has a very large attendance daily. Any official state visit starts with laying a wreath in front of the sarcophagus. On the glorification of Atatürk's personality, considered as a hero, after his death see also Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 196ff.

⁹⁶ He held this speech before the congress of the Republican People's Party in Ankara in October 1927. By focusing on himself and his Turkish nationalist followers he completely disregarded the earlier heterogeneous resistance movement. For details on the *Nutuk* as basic historiography see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 175.

⁹⁷ Cf. Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 203.

⁹⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 54.

⁹⁹ For further details on the territorial losses as well as the consequences for the Ottoman Empire resulting from the Congress of Berlin see, e.g., Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 190f.; Steinbach, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 18f.

After the Young Turk troops had suffered disastrous losses during World War One and its aftermath, the Turkish Republic's foreign policy was primarily "cautious, realistic and generally aimed at the preservation of the status-quo and the hard won victory of 1923."¹⁰⁰ Eventually, after having been involved in numerous wars causing the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal's fundamental principle was the protection of Turkey's national sovereignty. A well-balanced diplomacy and neutral foreign policy, under the slogan "peace at home – peace in the world" (*yurtta sulh – cihanda sulh*), should preserve Turkey's independence. Not least, in this way, the internal reform process was to be defended against any exterior influences.¹⁰¹

Also relevant in the times of the Cold War, initial friendship treaties were established with the later rival: in 1921, between the developing government in Ankara and the Russian Federation, and in 1925, between the then newly founded Turkish Republic and the young Soviet Union.¹⁰² These close and long-lasting relations, including economic agreements, also played a role in later perceptions of Turkey from the outside when Turkey gained significance from its position as the threshold to the communist antagonist in the Cold War.

However, despite these friendship treaties, the Turkish relationship with the Soviet Union was ambivalent in early Republican years. On the one hand, it was no secret that Mustafa Kemal adopted a generally anti-communist attitude. On the other, the Turkish government was aware that Russia had played an important role in the war of liberation as the only supportive power on the Turkish nationalists' side against the imperialist Entente powers. The conflict with the straits, however, marked a turning point of the former "Lenin-Ataturk era of friendship"¹⁰³ when Turkey – after long negotiations in Moscow in 1939 – insisted that the control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles remain exclusively in Turkish hands. Before, Turkey had again gained sovereignty over the straits in the course of the Montreux Convention in 1936.¹⁰⁴ The Soviet pressure on Turkey to revise this convention, and the Soviet territorial claims regarding parts of Turkey's Northeast that had been Russian from 1878 to 1918, resulted in Turkey increasingly aligning itself with the West, which was made official with the French-British-

¹⁰⁰ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 239; Kramer and Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa*, 154; Steinbach, "Vom Osmanischen Reich," 37.

¹⁰² The second contract, the Treaty of Non-aggression and Neutrality of 17 December 1925 followed the Treaty of Friendship of 16 March 1921. The contracts also determined the border between Turkey and the Soviet states of Georgia and Armenia. For details on the contracts see Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish Soviet Relations," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition. 1950-1974*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 81f.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁰⁴ The contract displaced the international control of the straits, which had been enforced in the Treaty of Lausanne. From now on, Turkey was able to militarize these regions again and to control the transit of foreign warships. Cf. Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 27f.

Turkish Pact of mutual assistance in 1939. The Turkish-Soviet friendship, as one of Turkey's foreign policy continuum since the Turkish war of liberation, thereby, cooled down. Even Stalin's cancellation of the non-aggression agreement of 1925 in March 1945 reinforced this process.¹⁰⁵

Turkey's resistance against the repeated Soviet demands regarding the straits and the northeastern provinces can be considered courageous and risky. At that time, the UK and the US were optimistic that international controversies could be resolved within the (forthcoming) United Nations – in cooperation with the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶ A Western security alliance did not exist yet. As a result, Turkey's early decision to act on its own against the U.S.S.R. later served Turkish politicians to argue for their country's essential Westernness/Europeanness, for example when it came to the question of including Turkey in NATO.¹⁰⁷

Other contracts the Kemalist regime made to safeguard regional peace, were the Balkan Pact of 1934 between Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia and the Non-aggression Pact of Saadabad with Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq in 1937.¹⁰⁸ Turkey's relations to its Greek neighbour had already improved even before the establishment of the Balkan Pact; in particular, since the two governments had agreed on a population exchange of Muslims in Greece and Greek-Orthodox in Anatolia in 1924.¹⁰⁹ In addition, the residual area conflicts with Great Britain and France could be balanced. Regarding the British mandate of Mosul, Turkey had given up its claim already in 1926. The negotiations on the French mandate of Hatay (the *sancak*) in northern Syria, however – with the Turkish community as the majority – were more complicated, but ultimately concluded in favour of Turkey in 1939.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Before, the Soviet Union had already put pressure on the Allies to revise the Montreux Convention in Berlin 1940 as well as at the Yalta Agreement in 1945 but any efforts were ineffective. Cf. Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 24ff.; Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 28.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 116.

¹⁰⁷ As it became apparent in the COE's Assembly debates when Turkish delegates promoted Turkey's inclusion to NATO and the planned European Army in this way; see Chapter 5 (Defence).

¹⁰⁸ For details on the Saadabad Pact see also Volk, "Turkey's Historical Involvement," 13ff.; Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 72. On the Balkan Pact guaranteeing the existing borders see Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 52f.

¹⁰⁹ Afterwards, in 1930 Greece and Turkey had signed a friendship treaty in Ankara. Cf. Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Griechenland und Zypern," in *Länderbericht Türkei* (Schriftenreihe Band 1282), ed. Udo Steinbach (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012), 413.

¹¹⁰ France announced in September 1939 that it would grant independence to Syria and intended to include the province of Hatay, which was unacceptable for Turkey. This issue was brought to the League of Nations that finally decided in favour of Turkey. Cf. Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 30f. See also Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 52f. (concerning Great Britain) and 56ff. (concerning France). On the Turkish-French relations and the question on Hatay see also Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 62ff.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 202f. Concerning the Turkish-British relations see Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 60ff. On Turkish foreign affairs in the course of World War Two at a glance see also Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 61-76 (the whole chapter); Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 30ff.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 208f.; Karpat,

After the disastrous experience of the First World War, Turkey's foreign policy strategy during the Second World War can be described as "active neutrality."¹¹¹ It was not until the end of World War Two was already foreseeable, that the Turkish regime – under Atatürk's successor İsmet İnönü – declared war on Germany and Japan in February 1945. This is interpreted as a symbolic act to be invited to the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco shortly after.¹¹²

However, in the aftermath of World War Two, with the emergence of a new uprising international conflict primarily between the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, a neutral foreign policy finally seemed to be on the ropes. From the Turkish government's perspective, the Western path was finally the only proper choice. This way, the orientation towards the US and its allies was not only considered in terms of internal societal and political 'Westernization' processes anymore, but also in terms of foreign affairs. With the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the US started its containment policy against the expansion of communism. The *European Recovery Program* (Marshall Plan) was part of this policy. Tensions between the Soviet Union and the US increased, and the beginning of the Cold War manifested.¹¹³ As for the Turkish government, its ambition to strengthen ties with the United States and Western Europe increased with the transformation of international order, and after its own experience of Stalin's expansionist policy on the straits and the eastern provinces.¹¹⁴ The enthusiasm of both the Turkish population and the Turkish government was limitless in regards to American aid.¹¹⁵

Western – specifically American decision-makers – assigned Turkey particular importance in the upcoming East-West rivalry, in the first instance because of its geographical position and strategic significance. The control of the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, the

"Turkish Soviet Relations," 83ff.; Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 73-113 (the whole chapter on "The War Years: 1939-1945"); Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 56-77 (chapter on "Turkey and the Second World War").

¹¹¹ Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 31.

¹¹² At the Yalta Conference it was decided that only the states that had declared war on Germany before 1 March 1945 would be invited to the upcoming UN conference in San Francisco. Cf. *ibid.*, 32. Overall, the question whether Turkey had already decided with its declaration of war to orientate towards the West in foreign policy affairs is controversial in academic research. Historian Sümeyra Kaya provides a good overview of the academic discussion in this context. Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 77-81.

¹¹³ On the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in short, see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209. Their meaning for Turkey's foreign affairs will be illuminated in more detail in economic, political and geostrategic terms. For a comprehensive look at Turkish-American relations before, during and after World War Two see Nur Bilge Criss, Selçuk Esenbel, Tony Greenwood, and Lois Mazzari, eds., *American Turkish Encounters. Politics and Culture, 1830-1989* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publ., 2011); Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, eds., *Turkish-American Relations. Past, Present and Future*, foreword by Norman Stone (London et al.: Routledge, 2004).

¹¹⁴ Cf. Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 35f.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 142.

nature of being surrounded by strategically important waters, its direct proximity with Soviet states, and its location and history in the Middle East, assigned Turkey particular geopolitical significance in these times.¹¹⁶ That was why the US government supported Turkish involvements in European or Western structures to stabilize the country against internal and external communist powers and to attach it on its side for strategic reasons after World War Two.¹¹⁷ Turkey's reception of US Marshall Aid finally prompted the next step in the Western Bloc, which was its involvement in the *Organization for European Economic Cooperation* (OEEC), founded primarily to administer the financial support at a European level by the recipient states themselves.¹¹⁸ Revealed in the protocols of the founding period of the Council of Europe and analysed in detail in the following chapter – Turkey's membership in the OEEC, although merely of administrative nature and not relevant to the question of Turkey's European identity – also played a role in the decision-making process of Turkey's request to become a member of Europe's first political organization in 1949.¹¹⁹ These institutional bonds enhanced Turkish commitment towards Western Europe at the beginning of European integration in the late 1940s and the following years. It also promoted greater acceptance of Turkey as a part of Europe's integration process in the context of the Cold War.

In sum, in times of a deeply split bipolar world order, a neutral foreign policy – as it had been desired and promoted by Atatürk – according to political scientist Baran Tuncer, “was not very realistic” anymore “for a country like Turkey situated in such a geopolitically important area.”¹²⁰ Besides external reasons, the Republic's long process of domestic Westernizing reforms in state and society affected the choice to affiliate with the Western Bloc. Concurrently, the Turkish foreign policy orientation towards the West caused further interior changes, not least, since Turkey had to gain acceptance as a part of the West in the first place. These days, the following American and Western European impacts, again, changed Turkey's military sector as well as its economic and political system profoundly. With American

¹¹⁶ On Turkey's geopolitical meaning in international affairs during the Cold War on the whole see, e.g., Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 1.

¹¹⁷ That should be of special importance in the further progress of the Cold War, best visible in the installation of NATO missiles on Turkish ground becoming highly relevant in the negotiations during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On the extraordinarily close relationship between Turkey and the US after World War Two see, e.g., Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 134-147. For more details on this “honeymoon fervour” of Turkish-American relations in the aftermath of World War Two see also George S. Harris, “Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine,” in *Turkish-American Relations. Past, Present and Future*, ed. Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (London et al.: Routledge, 2004), 66-88 (on the characterization as “honeymoon fervour” see p. 66).

¹¹⁸ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209.

¹¹⁹ See the next chapter on the admission process of Turkey into the Council of Europe 1948/49 (Chapter 4).

¹²⁰ Baran Tuncer, “External Financing of the Turkish Economy and its Foreign Policy Implications,” in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition. 1950-1974*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 211.

missions on Turkish grounds that supported their military and economic progress, Turkey's political and economic development was no longer in national hands nor independent from external powers.¹²¹ The Kemalist principle of etatism, amongst others, was progressively abolished in the course of closer economic ties and trade cooperation with Western states with liberal market economies. Moreover, the highly significant democratic transformation from a one-party dictatorial state to a multi-party-system in 1946, as an outstanding development in Republican history is not least – besides the internal demand for change – valued as a result of Western pressure on democratic progress in Turkey.¹²² Accordingly, Zürcher concludes, “the political and economic change in Turkey after 1945 had both domestic and international roots.”¹²³

3.7 Conclusions

As will be revealed in the following chapters, Turkey's ongoing affiliation with the West included a constant struggle to be accepted as part of the ‘Western free world’, and in particular as a part of Europe. The context of the Cold War undoubtedly worked in Turkey's favour. As debates in the Council of Europe showed, former close ties with Russia and the Soviet Union were crucial for Europe's perception of Turkey as being situated at the threshold;¹²⁴ Turkey's ambivalent relationship with Europe and its deep scepticism towards foreign powers nevertheless remained. This ambivalence can be seen as a continuity, going back to the *tanzimat* era, the Young Turks, Kemal Atatürk and leading up to today's Turkey. Europe had been considered a civilizational role model for Turkey for a long time, but concurrently – based on historical experience – was perceived as a potential threat and as an entity that had never been willing to accept Turkey as an equal constituent part.

From a European perspective, as we have seen, Turkey's ancestor was first observed as a threat and later as ‘the sick man of Europe’ in the context of the Eastern question on how to divide the declining Empire amongst itself. As detailed below, in debates among some Western European powers concerning Turkey's access to the Council of Europe in 1948/49 – despite comprehensive reforms along European lines – the Republic of Turkey was not

¹²¹ In the course of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Turkey received high amounts of monetary and practical assistance. On the US military assistance and economic aid in detail see Kiliç, *Turkey and the World*, 142ff.

¹²² Concerning the internal changes in the course of the Turkish ties with the West after World War Two see, e.g., Öktem, *Angry Nation*, 38f.; Buhbe, *Türkei*, 60f.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 206ff.

¹²³ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209.

¹²⁴ As will be shown in the further course of this study.

considered an equal part of Europe in cultural and geographical terms. Instead, despite any differences the country was considered a vital partner in geostrategic terms. However, in the context of an uprising bipolar world order, the decision on how to define the borderlines of Europe had to be re-evaluated, this time to the benefit of Turkey, as its subsequent inclusion in Transatlantic and European institutions demonstrates.

4 Turkey's Accession Process to the Council of Europe: Realpolitik Beats any Objections

Turkey's admission to the Council of Europe was all but undisputed. The fact that the country became a member directly after the organization's foundation should not be taken as a proof that Turkey was perceived as a European state without reservation in these days. Nor did the Turkish parliament unanimously accept Turkey's further shift towards Europe without contradiction.

In the following chapter, first, a brief outline of the early European integration process sums up the founding history of this study's central forum of investigation. Who were the driving actors that were searching for a common organization to unify Europe? What kind of visions of institutional cooperation did they put forward? How did they define the borders of Europe in these days? Secondly, the subsequent analysis concentrates on the debates on Turkey as a potential member in the first European organization among the Brussels Treaty Powers, and later among the ten founding member states of the Council of Europe. The research will center on the question to what extent Turkey's 'Europeanness' was part of the discussions about its admission, and what kind of discursive practices Western European representatives used to talk about Turkey. Another inherent question is whether the debate about Turkey's application for membership triggered a general debate on Europe's borders and identity. Additionally, as this chapter's last section, given the final acceptance of a Turkish involvement in the Council of Europe by the ten founding member states, a brief glance goes to the other side of the negotiation table to get an idea about how Turkish parliamentarians discussed Turkey's institutional path towards Europe. For this purpose, the minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly of 1949 will be consulted.

4.1 The Founding of the Council of Europe as a Caesura in European History

"The Hague Congress gave a new impulse and a new inspiration to the campaign, and will undoubtedly be recognized by the future historian as a milestone in the progress of Europe towards unity."

(Winston Churchill, December 1948)¹

¹ *Europe Unites*, foreword by Winston Churchill, viii.

Certainly, Winston Churchill was right in his assessment of the sustainable importance of the Hague Congress for the unification of Europe. At the Congress of Europe in the Dutch capital of The Hague on 7-10 May 1948, diverse civil society groups and European activists proposed the creation of a common European assembly as the first step towards a European union. Even though they had competing visions of how to unite, the pro-Europe activists shared the common motivation of never being at war with one another again.

In the aftermath of the Congress of Europe, the proposals of closer cooperation to stabilize and unify Europe made in The Hague were discussed at the governmental level within the scope of the Brussels Treaty Organization. However, the British objection to any step towards weakening national sovereignty hindered any progress towards supranational forms of unification. The European Movement's idea of creating a European assembly was nevertheless part of the final conclusion that sought to establish a Council of Europe that took the form of an intergovernmental organization, albeit with a Consultative Assembly. In the following, first the role and importance of civil society actors, particularly of the European Movement, will be examined prior to the analysis of how governmental representatives of the five powers of the Brussels Treaty discussed the unification of Europe.

Civil Society Movements as Initiators and Catalysts

Pro-European citizen initiatives can be considered the initial triggers, which gave rise to the unification process. These various proponent groups, founded all over Europe in 1946-47,² had different aims and essentially represented two camps in their visions of a united Europe: The so-called Federalists, on the one hand, mainly of French, Belgian and Italian origin, envisioned a European federal state as a supranational union with strong political powers.

² There had been aspirations of institutionally unifying Europe before (apart from the fact that the idea of sharing a spiritual and cultural bond throughout the European continent was even centuries old). A first remarkable peak of approaches on a unified Europe can be observed after World War One that had eventually left millions dead. It was not least the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand who cautiously presented his idea of Europe as kind of a federal union at a conference of the League of Nations in 1929; cf. Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 11, 23ff. Briand, among other European politicians at that time, was inspired by the concept of the Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, who first published his vision of a pan-European federal union in his book *Pan-Europa* in 1923 (on the pan-European idea at large see also this study's Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework). Cf. Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, 2nd ed. (London et al.: Longman, 1995), 5. For a brief overview of different ideas and visions of a united Europe in the interwar period, and a very short survey of former ideas and concepts going back to the French intellectuals Dante and Dubios in the 14th century, see, e.g., Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 11-29; on the European idea over centuries and first proposals of a politically united Europe in detail see, e.g., Kevin Wilson, *What is Europe?* in collab. with Pim den Boer (London et al.: Routledge, 2000); Rolf Hellmut Foerster, ed., *Die Idee Europa 1300-1946. Quellen zur Geschichte der politischen Einigung* (München: Dt. Taschenbuch-Verl., 1963). The civic resistance movement during and after World War Two finally transformed all these former (more or less popular) ideas into more concrete construction plans and gained increasing attention throughout Europe – had World War Two not least proved that it was definitely the only way to save a lasting peace in Europe.

This implied the willingness to surrender national sovereignty.³ The so-called Unionists, on the other hand, dominated by the British, intended to build up a rather loose European confederation on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign nation-states.⁴ To achieve the common goal of closer European cooperation, however, the different organizations proposed to meet at a large congress in The Hague. Previously, the leaders of the two major groups – the *Union of European Federalists (UEF)* and the *Unionist United Europe Movement (UEM)* – had established an *International Committee of the Movements for European Unity*, coordinating the pro-Europe actors to find joint methods to realize Europe’s institutional unification.⁵ This Committee, constituted in December 1947 under the chairman of Duncan Sandys, co-founder of the UEM (and Winston Churchill’s son-in-law), decided to set up three working groups – a Political, Economic, and Cultural Committee – preparing the Hague Congress with proposals for discussions. The Political Committee, which concentrated on institutional issues, was coordinated by Unionists.⁶ It came as no surprise then that the Unionist vision of an intergovernmental organization in the form of a Council of Europe⁷ came to dominate the Congress.

More than 700 representatives of different pro-European civic unions, as well as high-ranking European politicians, including Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Paul van Zeeland and Edgar Faure, finally met in The Hague from 7 to 10 May 1948.⁸ Overall, 18 European

³ The major pro-federal union was the Union of European Federalists (UEF), founded in December 1946, with Hendrik Brugmans (Dutch politician, historian and pro-Europe activist) as its president; cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 20; Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 77ff. On the European conference in Hertenstein/Switzerland in September 1946 and its outcome in the form of twelve theses (*Hertenstein Program*) as the basic program of the later federalist movements including the UEF, see Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 55-59, 72f; Jürgen Schwarz, ed., *Der Aufbau Europas. Pläne und Dokumente, 1945-1980*, in collab. with Hildegard Kunz and Madelaine von Buttlar (Bonn: Osang, 1980), 28. The Hertenstein Program is available at http://www.cvce.eu/obj/das_hertensteiner_programm_21_september_1946-de-f39329ae-b25a-4b04-90ff-a25ea5c17051.html (19 March 2015).

⁴ Its major movement was the Union for European Movement (UEM), founded by Winston Churchill and his son-in-law Duncan Sandys in May 1947. On the UEM in detail – its founding history, characteristics and meaning in the European unification process – see, e.g., Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 130-151. For a list of other pro-Europe groupings founded at that time see Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 158f.; *Europe Unites*, 3f.

⁵ Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 21.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁷ The term Council of Europe was coined by Winston Churchill, first used in a radio message in March 1943, then again advertised in his famous speech at the University of Zurich on 19 September 1946. He suggested to “re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe, and the first practical step will be to form a Council of Europe.” For the whole speech see Winston Churchill, *The Sinews of Peace. Post-war speeches by W.S. Churchill*, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (London et al.: Cassell, 1948), 198-202.

⁸ Cf. Gabriele Clemens, Alexander Reinfeldt, and Gerhard Wille, *Geschichte der europäischen Integration. Ein Lehrbuch* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 87. The positions of the listed personalities in short: Winston Churchill, former (and later) Prime Minister of Great Britain; Konrad Adenauer, future Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; Paul van Zeeland, former Prime Minister of Belgium; Edgar Faure, member of the French National Assembly. The Congress’s Executive Committee under the chairman of Duncan Sandys determined the invitation policy for the Congress of Europe. They decided to invite 15 delegates per nation-

countries were represented, including Turkey – even though only one single Turkish delegate participated in the congress, in comparison to some 150 deputies from the UK and France each.⁹ The contrast between the Unionist and Federalist visions influenced discussions from the first day onwards.¹⁰

The final resolution of the Political Committee that was drafted by the two Unionists, Duncan Sandys and René Courtin, was thus a compromise with Unionist leanings. The plan was to establish a European consultative assembly that would bring forward the unification process.¹¹ Nevertheless, due to the Unionists' impact, the assembly should consist of deputies sent by the national parliaments who would then fulfil the task of discussing European problems and reporting solutions to the governmental level. Originally, the Federalists' aim in contrast had been to create a constituent assembly; some had even envisioned the deputies to be elected on an overall European level.¹² With regard to surrendering sovereignty, the European countries were to transfer and merge “some portion of their sovereign rights” in order to secure common achievements in the integration process.¹³ However, more details of the extent of surrendering national sovereignty were – entirely in line with the Unionists – not given.

The political resolution further suggested the creation of a Charter of Human Rights and a Supreme Court in order to guarantee the Charter's legal support, including the implementation of sanctions.¹⁴ Moreover, the Political Committee determined the conditions of membership of the future organization on the grounds of accepting the Charter; accordingly, “the resultant Union or Federation should be open to all European nations

state plus two per every million inhabitants. For details on Sandys' invitation policy see Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 169f.

⁹ Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 21 (on the number of some 150 from the UK and France). According to the list of participants of the Congress in The Hague, the single present Turkish statesman was S.A. Yalman, titled “political writer.” See the list of participants, attached to the verbatim report of the *Congress of Europe*, edited by the COE, 450 (page 28 of the original list of participants).

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.* For different visions of a united Europe (e.g., federal vs. unionist) until today see also Schwarz, *Der Aufbau Europas*, 29f.

¹¹ Apparently the final form of unity was left open. See the verbatim report of the *Congress of Europe*, edited by the COE, 412 (page 6 of the attached original list of resolutions). The verbatim report is partly in English, partly in French, as the original speeches had been. All resolutions of the specific committees are recorded in French. For these see *Congress of Europe*, 407-422 (attached list of resolutions). In the following, however, the English version within *Europe Unites* will be cited. This work was published in 1949 by Hollis and Carter, London (an editor is not quoted), with a foreword by Winston Churchill, and contains besides a short history of the European Movement, a full report of the debates at the Congress held in The Hague including literal translations of the resolutions.

¹² Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 21f. On the text of the Political Committee's resolution in English see *Europe Unites*, 37ff. (on the constitution of the demanded European Assembly see point 8 of the political resolution, 38).

¹³ Point 3 of the political resolution, cf. *Europe Unites*, 38.

¹⁴ Cf. Point 9-13 of the political resolution, cf. *ibid.*, 39.

democratically governed and which undertake to respect a Charter of Human Rights.”¹⁵
‘Democracy’ acquired a more holistic definition, insofar that

*“in no circumstances shall a State be entitled to be called a democracy unless it does, in fact as well as in law, guarantee to its citizens liberty of thought, assembly and expression, as well as the right to form a political opposition.”*¹⁶

Thus, the foundation for a common commitment to democratic values and human rights as a precondition for membership, as it was later included into the Council of Europe’s Statute, was laid with the Hague Congress. Moreover, the term “the resultant Union or Federation” is characteristic of the Congress’s open-endedness concerning the final constitution of the achieved political organization. Whether a European union or federation should be established was therefore left to further consultations both among national governments and civil society movements.

The Economic and Cultural Committee played a less direct role in the discussions on the institutional structure of the organization to be established. Yet, they offered significant ideas on closer cooperation: The Economic Committee’s resolution suggested liberal principles such as a free market, the removal of trade barriers, and customs tariffs, as well as free movement of workers as common ground.¹⁷ Thereby, it was aware of the necessity to partly give up national sovereign rights to achieve economic prosperity all over Europe.¹⁸ Additionally, it anticipated the currency of the *Euro* about 50 years before its implementation as it already communicated the ultimate objective of creating one common currency.¹⁹

The Cultural Committee eventually promoted the creation of a European Cultural Center as well as a European Youth Institute.²⁰ Both were to be established later in the course of the Council of Europe.²¹ The Committee also emphasized the urgency of setting up a Court of Justice to safeguard human rights, which were to be defined in a Charter, responding to the proposals of the Political Committee.²²

¹⁵ Point 9 of the political resolution, cf. *Europe Unites*, 39.

¹⁶ Point 11 of the political resolution, cf. *ibid.*, 39.

¹⁷ For the full text of the economic and social resolution see *ibid.*, 68-71.

¹⁸ “The Congress recognizes that no attempt to rebuild the economy of Europe upon the basis of rigidly-divided national sovereignty can prove successful.” Point 1 of the economic and social resolution, cf. *ibid.*, 68.

¹⁹ Cf. Point 6 of the economic and social resolution, cf. *ibid.*, 70. Overall, on the resolution’s analysis see also Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 22; Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 212.

²⁰ Cf. Point 1-3 of the cultural resolution, cf. *Europe Unites*, 88f.

²¹ This will be shown within the analysis on the discourse on cultural aspects.

²² Cf. Point 4 and 5 of the cultural resolution, cf. *ibid.*, 89.

Overall, as Churchill presumed, the Congress of Europe in The Hague played a significant role in Europe's unification process by having assembled the major pro-European activists from all over Western Europe who ultimately conceived the creation of a European assembly. For better coordination of the various citizen movements that had participated in the Hague Congress, the International Coordinating Committee founded the European Movement on 25 October 1948 as an umbrella organization.²³ The significance and impact of civil society actors cannot be underestimated, as their initial efforts to create a European political organization was what sparked the European integration process.²⁴

Intergovernmental Efforts

After the Congress of Europe in The Hague, concurrent to the discussions among the European Movement at the civic level, it was within the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) that five governments engaged in ideas of how to unite Europe. France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) on 17 March 1948 predominantly as a pact of mutual assistance in case of armed attacks on Europe, as well as against any future German aggressions. This defence organization – resulting in the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954 – played a major role in strengthening European ties on the governmental level at the time, especially in the process of establishing a European political organization, which post-Nazi Germany could join later.²⁵ As was the case in The Hague, there were different opinions and visions concerning the establishment of a European institution. France and the Benelux, in particular Belgium, favoured a European assembly with parliamentary character where common issues were debated on a supranational level. While this mirrored European public opinion, the British government rejected any form of parliamentary assembly and preferred a mere intergovernmental solution at the ministerial level instead. In order to find a mutually accepted solution, the five foreign ministers building the Consultative Council of the BTO

²³ Winston Churchill, Alcide de Gasperi, León Blum and Paul-Henri Spaak became its honorary presidents. For a good overview of the European Movement's activities and efforts in the European integration process see, e.g., Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 221-233.

²⁴ Niess verbally attributes the European Movement as "the Council of Europe's obstetrician." Ibid., 231.

²⁵ On the BTO's contribution in the construction process of the Council of Europe see also, e.g., Brummer, *Der Europarat*, 23; Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 229ff. After the failure of the European Defence Community, the Brussels Treaty was extended to Western Germany and Italy and transformed into the WEU lasting from 1954 to 2009. However, its power can be described as rather limited, both in the central sphere of defence and the secondary fields of economic, cultural and social collaboration, due to other organizations founded shortly after the BTO and embodying these fields such as the NATO and the Council of Europe. Cf. Clemens et al., *Geschichte der europäischen Integration*, 86.

decided to set up a specific working group at its third meeting in October 1948.²⁶ This *Committee for the Study of European Unity* met in Paris from November 1948 to January 1949, under the chairman of the French politician Édouard Herriot, and discussed the Franco-Belgian as well as the British proposals on institutionally organizing Europe.²⁷ However, the attempt to compromise on the structure of a future European organization failed as Great Britain did not accept the Committee's – nor the a Sub-Committee's – draft constituent text for a European union consisting of a Council of Europe and a European Assembly.²⁸ In turn, the British counter-proposal did not find the Committee's consent since it did not contain a plan for a European assembly, which had been the centerpiece of the previous draft.²⁹ Finally, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty reached a compromise in its fourth meeting on 27-28 January 1949. On the basis of the report of the Committee for the Study of European Unity, they decided to create a Council of Europe consisting of two organs: a Ministerial Committee made up of one minister for each country as well as a consultative body. In accordance with the British demands, the delegates of the consultative body were to be appointed on the basis of their respective national government's procedures. The Council

²⁶ On the decision to set up this specific committee see: ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Third Meeting of the Consultative Council held in Paris, 25-26 October 1948, Part I, 58. See also Part II: Discussion of Point 6 of the Agenda relating to the Proposal for a European Assembly, 67-69 (69: Annex, Doc. A/100: Terms of Reference of the Committee for the Study of further Measures in the Direction of European Unity). Doc. A/100 manifested that the Committee's composition was to be: 5 representatives from the UK and France, 3 from Belgium and the Netherlands, and 2 from Luxembourg, nominated by their governments.

²⁷ The Committee's first sitting was on 26 November 1948. Cf. ACE, Box 14, Procès-verbal de la 1ère séance plénière du Comité d'études pour l'Union européenne, 26 novembre 1948. A copy is also available at CVCE: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/proces_verbal_de_la_1ere_seance_pleniere_du_comite_d_etudes_pour_l_union_europeenne_26_novembre_1948-fr-6f22a219-bdb5-4404-abe8-fa3983981e07.html (05 November 2019).

²⁸ On 30 November 1948, the Committee decided to transfer the task to a Sub-Committee that started its work one day later and finally launched a draft on 15 December 1948, which proposed the establishment of a Council of Europe and a European Consultative Assembly, close to the later structure of the COE. See: Draft of the Sub-Committee of the Committee for the Study of European Unity, Paris, 15 December 1948 (Doc. Europe No 7). The original document is in the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence (Council of Europe, FD.D.B. Committee for the Study of European Unity, FD.D.B.-01. Working documents, FD-206), however a copy is also available at CVCE: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/draft_of_the_sub_committee_of_the_committee_for_the_study_of_european_unity_15_december_1948-en-71325665-3950-4ab2-8fdc-57df3441cbbc.html (05 November 2019).

²⁹ Apart from a Committee of Ministers, instead of a European parliamentary assembly, the British draft proposed the creation of a 'Conference' that should consist of governmental delegations (2-12 persons per state) nominated by governments and led by a minister. See the draft heads of agreement for a Council of Europe by the British Delegation, submitted to the Committee at its fifth meeting on 18 January 1949: Committee for the Study of European Unity, Draft Heads of Agreement for a Council of Europe (Submitted to the Committee at its fifth meeting on 18 January 1949), Doc. Europe No. 8. The original document is in the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence (Council of Europe, FD.D.B. Committee for the Study of European Unity, FD.D.B.-01. Working documents, FD-206); however, a copy is also available at CVCE: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/draft_heads_of_agreement_for_a_council_of_europe_submitted_by_the_british_delegation_18_january_1949-en-967b0217-1b7d-41b3-9a0e-fe40e0b451fc.html (05 November 2019). For a summary on the different proposals (French-Belgian vs. British) and the complicated decision-making process due to British objections, see also: Cf. ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Council held in London, 27-28 January 1949, Part II: Report of the Committee of the Study of European Unity, 132f.

also decided to invite other European countries to take part in negotiations for the establishment of a Council of Europe; positive decisions were made regarding the invitation of Ireland, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Sweden.³⁰ Plans and further details on how to proceed would be worked out by the Permanent Commission of the BTO, which represented the Consultative Council between the sittings and met once a week in London. The Permanent Commission consisted of the ambassadors in London, the four non-British members, and a British representative with the rank of ambassador.³¹ Shortly thereafter, on 4 March 1949, the Permanent Commission published a detailed draft on the structure of a future Council of Europe.³² This draft was then negotiated by the *Preparatory Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe* in London from 28 March to 12 April 1949, which assembled ten delegations at the ambassadorial level – of both the five Brussels Treaty powers plus the five previously invited countries.³³

Ultimately, following the ambassadorial conference, the then foreign ministers and their advisers held a *Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe* at St. James's Palace in London on 3-5 May 1949, to undertake the final preparations for the founding of the first European political organization.³⁴ On the last day of the conference the ten ministers finally signed the Treaty of London, which has been considered the Statute of the Council of Europe ever since, coming into effect on 3 August 1949.³⁵

³⁰ Cf. ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Council held in London, 27-28 January 1949, Part II: Report of the Committee of the Study of European Unity, 140f. (141: Annex II, Doc. A/143: Communiqué issued after the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Council, London, 28 January 1949). According to Öztürk, the Permanent Commission sent the invitations to the five governments on 7 March 1949. Cf. Öztürk, *Le rôle du Conseil de l'Europe*, 84.

³¹ Cf. ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Council held in London, 27-28 January 1949, Part II: Report of the Committee of the Study of European Unity, Annex I, Doc. A/148: Directives given by the Consultative Council to the Permanent Commission concerning the Council of Europe, 140.

³² Cf. *Projet d'organisation du Conseil de l'Europe de la Commission permanente du Traité de Bruxelles*, London, 4 March 1949. The original document is in the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence (Conseil de l'Europe, FD.D.B. Comité d'études pour l'Union européenne, FD.D.B.-01. Commission permanente du traité de Bruxelles, FD-105); however, a copy is also available at CVCE: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/projet_d_organisation_du_conseil_de_l_europe_de_la_commission_permanente_du_traite_de_b_ruxelles_4_mars_1949-fr-126ea058-4952-4120-89e6-de3ebaa6938b.html (5 November 2019).

³³ Cf. ACE, Box 25/18-1, Final Report of the Preparatory Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe, London, 14 April 1949. For each delegation's composition see the Final Report's Appendix I: Composition of Delegations. On 6 April 1949, also a delegation of the European Movement attended the conference to consult in questions of European unification. See: ACE, Box 24/17, Minutes of the Preparatory Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe, London, 28 March – 12 April 1949, 1-3.

³⁴ Cf. ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949.

³⁵ The name *Council of Europe* in the end prevailed over the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's alternative proposal of the more federalist title *European Union*. The Italian and Belgian Ministers had also favoured *European Union* whereas the Swedish and Norwegian Ministers supported the British proposal *Council of Europe*, which was finally adopted. Cf. ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 5 and 14f.

The minutes of the Conference, and in particular, of the signatory ceremony are also interesting with regard to the formation of community-building, a sense of cohesion and the search for common identity-markers at the collective level. In their final speeches, the ten foreign ministers repeatedly emphasized a common spirit interlinking the peoples of the member states of the first European organization that should be seated in Strasbourg.³⁶ By naming perceived commonalities such as “the spiritual strength of Western Europe,” “the democratic ideals” as their “common heritage,” as well as “the moral, spiritual and social values” as “distinctive marks of European civilisation,” they socially constructed a collective self-understanding of ‘their Europe’. The communicated belief in the existence of a “European spirit,” an “ethical foundation” consisting of fundamental rights and principles, a “European conscience” as well as a “foundation of cultural affinities” was part of every speech in one form or the other.³⁷ The French Foreign Minister Schuman, for instance, stressed that they were laying “the foundations of a spiritual and political co-operation from which there will arise the European spirit”³⁸ and closed the conference by expressing his feeling that “the frank and understanding way in which the present Conference had been carried out was an indication the European spirit already existed amongst them.”³⁹

Also, the dilemma of defining Europe’s borders based on political, geographical and cultural considerations arose during the Conference. Minister Schuman argued that, “Europe cannot possibly wait for definition, for the end of that controversy; she does, in fact, define her own bounds by the will of her peoples.”⁴⁰ He thus consciously called to mind the social constructivist nature of Europe’s definition and the importance of themselves as Europeans being the architects and components of ‘their Europe’. He thereby opposed an essentialist

³⁶ The proposal of Strasbourg as the COE’s seat had been put forward by British Foreign Minister Bevin already in January 1949, allegedly due to its symbolic meaning in German-French history and therefore as an attempt to reconcile Germany and France and unite Europe. However, it was also in line with the British government that this little town was far away from any European transport connection, thus difficult to reach from the European capitals. Thereby, the COE’s meaning and impact should be minimized as much as possible. Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 23. Nonetheless, Bevin’s emphasis on Strasbourg’s symbolic value was overall accepted. Italian Foreign Minister Sforza for instance stated (although a grain of irony is to be questioned) “what had been a centre of disunity in the past, would, he hoped, become the centre of union for the future.” ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 7.

³⁷ For all these interpretations of European commonalities, verbally recorded, see: ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 21-26 (Annex: Statements made at the Signature of the Statute of the Council of Europe, St. Jame’s Palace, 4 pm, 5 May 1949).

³⁸ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 22.

³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 26.

⁴⁰ ACE, *ibid.*, 22.

view on Europe's borders as natural and fixed and the attitude of equating political borders with geographically constructed ones. In this process of forming a European common bond, the Consultative Assembly in particular was considered the forum "to create and maintain this European state of mind."⁴¹

What was emphasized during the signatory ceremony of the Treaty of London, was also manifested in the preamble of the COE's Statute which contained the member states' reaffirmation of the

*"devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy."*⁴²

Thus, shared values were identified as the source of common political principles, forming the spiritual basis of unification.

As the Statute of the Council of Europe demonstrates, the common commitment to shared immaterial characteristics accompanied the European unification process from the outset. Europe was considered not only as a geographical space that should be politically united for the common aim to safeguard peace and to increase its economic standards, but also as a community with a sense of cohesion resulting from a common spiritual heritage as the source of its political principles – which were primarily democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. It was reminiscent of the socially contested nature of the concept of Europe by emphasizing that it was their task as representatives and architects of a common European entity to define Europe's borders and its soul. The Council of Europe, and especially the Assembly, in contrast to the OEEC as an economic and NATO as a defence association, was therefore considered the embodiment of Europe's moral conscience and the forum to negotiate and to circulate a common European state of mind.

The creation of the Council of Europe as the first European political organization (if still intergovernmental) including a European Assembly can certainly be considered a historical caesura within the European unification process, not least due to the fact that, as historian Wassenberg highlights, it marked the end of the story of the European idea while pushing the

⁴¹ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 23 (Foreign Minister of Luxembourg).

⁴² Statute of the COE (ETS No. 1), Preamble.

start of a new story – the story of the construction process of building up a common Europe, thus putting the European idea into practice.⁴³

The COE's birth was thereby the result of consultations and proposals both on the part of civil society actors, embodied by the European Movement and its predecessors, and the subsequent work of the national governments of five – the Brussels Treaty powers – and finally ten Western European states. It is certainly no exaggeration to state that civil society actors never again have been that influential within the European integration process.⁴⁴ In the case of Duncan Sandys and Paul Henri-Spaak, the first President of the COE's Assembly, both were high-profile European politicians and activists at the same time. Thus, politics and the civil society movement were interrelated, and the understanding of interests among both parties was fundamental.⁴⁵

4.2 Questioning Turkey's Involvement in Uniting Europe among the Five Powers of the Brussels Treaty

Turkey was officially invited to become a member of the Council of Europe on 8 August 1949, which was the first sitting day of the COE's Committee of Ministers. Given the international political context, especially considering the postwar situation and the newly constructed bipolar world order dividing the world ideologically into 'the communist East' and 'the democratic West', Turkey's request to become a member of Western Europe's first political union was in accord with its new active foreign policy orientation towards the West giving up its neutrality.

Within the later debate on Turkey's belonging to Europe concerning a possible EU accession in the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey's membership in the COE was a prominent argument in favour of its long European history. Eventually, according to favouring voices, the country had been admitted to the first European political organization with a consultative body already in its first session. By this, it had taken part in the consultations on how to unite

⁴³ Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 14.

⁴⁴ However, as has been mentioned in this study's introduction, already in 1952 the COE granted consultative status to international NGO's, in 1970 then a committee was established representing this sector, and in 2003 their status finally shifted from 'consultative' to 'participatory'. Cf. Bond, *The Council of Europe*, 17f. For an overview of different current programs of the COE with NGO's see also <http://www.coe.int/en/web/ingo/overview> (25 September 2016).

⁴⁵ Cf. Niess, *Die europäische Idee*, 233. Duncan Sandys, for instance, switched as British diplomat, Conservative and co-founder of the United Europe Movement, and Paul-Henri Spaak switched as Belgian Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, then pro-Europe activist and finally President of the Council of Europe's Assembly. Moreover, a couple of French pro-Europe activists came to power in July 1948 and hence established an extraordinary link between the civic and governmental politics. Cf. *ibid.*, 228.

Europe after World War Two almost from the very beginning. However, this narrative suggests that Turkey's admission to the Council of Europe had been undisputed; this, however, shall be reviewed in the following in detail. On the basis of documents of various meetings of the Consultative Council and the Permanent Commission of the BTO in 1948 and 1949 as well of the Preparatory Conference on the establishment of the COE in March and April 1949, this sub-chapter analyses how the five Brussels Treaty powers and, finally, representatives of the ten founding member states discussed the Turkish request to take part in negotiations on setting up a Council of Europe. In the subsequent sub-chapters, the issue of Turkey's admission is at first analysed on the basis of the minutes of the constitutive conference of the COE at the beginning of May 1949 (sub-chapter 4.3), secondly on the basis of COE sources documenting the time in between the signatory ceremony of the Statute and its entering into force, respectively the first sitting day of the Committee of Ministers on 8 August 1949 (4.4), and lastly on the basis of verbatim records of the Turkish parliamentary debate on the country's entry to the COE in December 1949 (4.5). A focus is on the perceptions and representational practices depicting Turkey as in- or outside Europe and on the resulting images of Europe.

As shown above, it was among the five powers of the Brussels Treaty that it was decided which countries should be included in the process of preparing the establishment of the first political European organization. The minutes of meetings of the third sitting of the BTO's Council of 25-26 October 1948 revealed that the question of Turkey's in- or exclusion was part of the debate about the admission of other European countries to the European unity under construction already before the Turkish government had officially requested to become a member. The minutes also show that these discussions included general reflections on how to define Europe, especially on how to determine the borders of the kind of Europe they desired to present. It was the British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin who pointedly challenged, "What actually constituted Europe?" before he continued by asking whether Italy, Greece and Turkey would come into their projects, and whether the OEEC was to be taken as a basis.⁴⁶ The Belgian Prime, as well as Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, thereupon considered that the *Committee for the Study of European Unity* on whose establishment they had just decided, "in its recommendations, might take other geographic bases than those of the 5 or the 16"

⁴⁶ ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Third Meeting of the Consultative Council held in Paris, 25-26 October 1948, Part II, Discussion of Point 6 of the Agenda relating to the Proposal for a European Assembly, 67.

meaning the scope of the Brussels Treaty and the OEEC, before he added that it might also choose another boundary than that of the Iron Curtain.⁴⁷

Clearly, from the British Minister's perspective, the inclusion of Italy, Greece, and Turkey was to be questioned and not self-evident. With Italy having been an Axis power during World War Two, a sceptical glance towards the country's early incorporation is little surprising. The reasoning behind the potential exclusion of Greece and Turkey became more apparent in the following sitting.

After the special Committee had worked out some recommendations, the question of inviting countries to take part in the further process of preparing the institutional unification of Europe was taken up again in the next sitting of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organization on 27 and 28 January 1949. The sitting's Chairman Bevin circulated a draft communiqué in the afternoon of 27 January that informed about the decision to invite Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. Afterward, the Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker opened the debate about this selection by questioning the criteria of choosing these countries in particular while adding that this choice might have repercussions in those countries that have not been mentioned, for example, Portugal, Turkey, or Greece.⁴⁸ The Chairman and British Foreign Minister agreed with Stikker, noting that this was a problem to be discussed thoroughly. First, he remarked that Ireland had also been left out; however, that there was no reason to exclude it. He continued that Switzerland would raise a special problem because of its strong tradition of neutrality. Scandinavia and Italy would be important due to the Atlantic Pact's interests. He then remarked that he had no opinion on Portugal, but that Greece and Turkey might "create some difficulties at the moment."⁴⁹ Although he did not explain these potential difficulties, it can be suggested due to later utterances that he referred to the fact that the Soviet Union might have perceived it as an aggressive act, which was to be avoided at that time. Besides, neither Greece nor Turkey were considered a founding member of the Atlantic Pact, also being established in these days.⁵⁰ Turkey's neutrality in World War Two generally

⁴⁷ ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Third Meeting of the Consultative Council held in Paris, 25-26 October 1948, Part II, Discussion of Point 6 of the Agenda relating to the Proposal for a European Assembly, 67.

⁴⁸ Cf. ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Council held in London, 27-28 January 1949, Part II: Report of the Committee of the Study of European Unity, 136.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ After intense consultations starting in July 1948 between the Brussels Treaty and North America on creating a North Atlantic Pact in the aftermath of World War Two as well as in the context of the rising Cold War, finally on 4 April 1949 the Treaty on the creation of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed by the Brussels Treaty powers, the US and Canada, as well as Italy, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Iceland. For a short

played a role while considering its incorporation into Western institutions, as later utterances clearly demonstrate. Moreover, both countries were in a stage of more or less domestic political instability. Greece was engaged in civil war and Turkey in a transformation process from a one party dictatorship to a multiparty democracy. In the end, Minister Bevin underlined that, above all, he was anxious to avoid rebuffs and was ready to agree to all the members of the OEEC being invited in case his colleagues desired to do so.⁵¹

As the summary records of the next sitting day show, it was agreed not to mention the decision of inviting the Scandinavian countries and Ireland in public, but to better approach them through diplomatic channels.⁵² The minutes also reveal that the Brussels Treaty powers at that time were not prepared to take decisions on a Turkish and Greek involvement. That becomes clear in the speech of the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg who criticised a passage of the draft communiqué, which contained the Consultative Council's decision "to invite other European countries, including Italy (which had already expressed the desire to join), to take part in the drafting." He recommended deleting the words in brackets by arguing, "what would happen if Greece and Turkey also expressed the desire to be invited."⁵³ The French Minister Schuman added that his advice was not to mention Italy at all to avoid irritating other countries.⁵⁴ The final communiqué merely included a short paragraph about the general decision to invite other European countries to take part in negotiations on the establishment of the Council of Europe.⁵⁵

Ankara's request to become one of the founding members of the Council of Europe was communicated by several diplomatic efforts to the French, British and Belgian Foreign Ministers as of 20 March 1949, two weeks after Italy, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries had been invited by the BTO to take part in the further preparation process of setting up a Council of Europe. On 29 March, eventually, Ankara sent an aide-memoire to Paris asking to join the preparatory consultations, too.⁵⁶

history of the NATO from its origin until today, see its official website: <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html> (10 August 2016).

⁵¹ Cf. ANLux, UEO-BTO-013, Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Council held in London, 27-28 January 1949, Part II: Report of the Committee of the Study of European Unity, 136.

⁵² It was further agreed that the UK should approach Sweden and Denmark and that France should approach Ireland and Norway. Cf. *ibid.*, 140.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 141 (Annex II, Doc. A/143: Communiqué Issued after 4th meeting of Consultative Council London, 28 January 1949).

⁵⁶ The request towards the British Foreign Ministry will be discussed below. On Turkey's further diplomatic efforts to be included at that time, see Öztürk, *Le rôle du Conseil de l'Europe*, 84f.

Apart from the BTO's Consultative Council, its ambassadorial Permanent Commission put the Turkish and Greek requests on its weekly meeting agenda at the end of March and beginning of April 1949. In its 64th sitting on 24 March, the British representative Jebb informed the Commission about the Greek request that had been made to the British Foreign Minister Bevin to take part in the Council of Europe. He underlined that his government was in favour of the accession of Greece, however, that it was difficult to invite the country at the present stage since it would raise questions "in connection with Portugal, Turkey and perhaps even Austria."⁵⁷ The Dutch Ambassador "speaking personally"⁵⁸ pointed out, "the Greeks had fought admirably during the war, whereas Portugal and Turkey had not taken part in the war on our side, and Austria had been on the side of the enemy"; in his opinion, Greece had not been well treated.⁵⁹ The British deputy agreed but considered it difficult to proceed otherwise. The French Ambassador Baudet agreed to the British view and further explained that "from the point of view of general policy towards the U.S.S.R., it would be dangerous to admit Greece at the present stage."⁶⁰

According to a letter by the British Foreign Office dated 26 March 1949, which the BTO's Secretary General circulated to the members of the Permanent Commission two days later, the Turkish Ambassador had approached the British Foreign Ministry on 25 March 1949 to express the desire of his government to join the preparatory negotiations of the Council of Europe. In the letter it was explicitly emphasized that the Turkish government asked to be included in the on-going process instead of being acceded later when the organization was established.⁶¹ As a reply to the Turkish request, according to the letter, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, William Strang, had confined himself to saying that Turkey would not be excluded and that the request would be brought before the Permanent Commission of the BTO. However, the letter also clarified that Strang had not gone so far as to say that they hoped that Turkey would become a member of the Council of Europe.⁶²

Finally, in the next sitting of the Permanent Commission on 31 March 1949 the requests of Greece and Turkey were discussed together. The French Ambassador Baudet, the first speaker, made it clear that his government felt it was premature to invite either of the

⁵⁷ ANLux, UEO-BTO-028, Minutes of the 64th meeting of the Permanent Commission, 24 March 1949, 184.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ ANLux, UEO-BTO-122, Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission, Secretary-General's note regarding Turkey's participation in the preparations of the COE (Doc A/208), attached: Letter by the British Foreign Office, dated 26 March 1949, 164f.

⁶² ANLux, UEO-BTO-122, Letter by the British Foreign Office Brussels to the Permanent Commission, 26 March 1949, 165.

countries to join the preparatory discussions since, “Such action would give the impression that the Five were trying to encircle the countries behind the Iron Curtain.”⁶³ The French government, as the minutes further record, did not want the COE to be labeled as an organization directed against the Cominform.⁶⁴ It thought that a later accession was quite a different scenario; then the COE would decide as a whole after a free debate, in which France would support both countries’ accession; “this procedure would avoid giving the impression of any anti-Cominform group.”⁶⁵

When considering the historical context of the meetings from October 1948 to April 1949, which ran parallel to the so-called Berlin Blockade, one of the first international crises of the Cold War, the cautious manner of how to deal with Turkey as well as Greece is explainable. In these days, the Soviets blocked land routes between West Germany and West Berlin to pressure the Western Allies to withdraw the new currency of the Deutsche Mark in West Berlin. The Western Allies tried to withstand the blockade; another war, however, should be avoided. Therefore, the BTO postponed any decisions that may have escalated the situation and deteriorated East-West relations. Accordingly, the inclusion of Turkey and Greece was considered too dangerous at this point in time. Thus, it seems as if any decisions that may have escalated the situation and deteriorated East-West relations were to be avoided.⁶⁶

In the end, the Permanent Commission decided on 31 March 1949 to bring the following two questions to their governments: whether the requests should be referred to the Ten who were going to meet at the Preparatory Conference, and if so, what the position of the five governments considering the date of accession would be – whether the countries should be included at preparatory stage or accede after signature.⁶⁷ The minutes also reveal that the five delegations were very much aware of the importance of handling these questions in a cautious diplomatic way.⁶⁸

In the Commission’s next meeting on 6 April 1949, which took part in the margins of the Preparatory Conference, it became clear that several governments had reported that the matter of the two countries’ participation should be referred to the Preparatory Conference for discussion, leaving the final decision, however, to the Foreign Ministers. In this way, they

⁶³ ANLux, UEO-BTO-028, Minutes of the 65th meeting of the Permanent Commission, 31 March 1949, 207.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ The Berlin Blockade lasted from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. For more details on the background circumstances of the Berlin Blockade see, e.g., Daniel F. Harrington, *Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2012).

⁶⁷ ANLux, UEO-BTO-028, Minutes of the 65th meeting of the Permanent Commission, 31 March 1949, 208f.

⁶⁸ For instance, it was also decided that the Greek government should be asked not to publish anything at this stage. Cf. *ibid.*, 209.

wanted to avoid giving the impression of having decided behind closed doors.⁶⁹ Apart from that, the minutes reveal that Greek and Turkish participation was still controversial among the delegates. The Belgian Ambassador, Obert de Thieusies, for instance, pointed out,

*“that for reasons of sentiment his government were in favour of making some gesture towards Greece. He did not agree with the French view that the cases of Greece and Turkey should be treated in the same way. Turkey could not be considered a European Power; her capital was in Asia and 13 million of her inhabitants lived in the Asiatic continent.”*⁷⁰

Thus, he argued for excluding Turkey in the preparatory negotiations on the basis of geographical arguments. He thereby assumed the widely but socially constructed separation of the Eurasian continent into Asia and Europe as two continents. From the theoretical perspective of critical geopolitics, his line of argument is a good example of how spaces and space identities are discursively constructed and politicized in the way it serves one’s argumentation.⁷¹ He took the geographical separation for granted and, moreover, left out any other ways of identifying Europe apart from geographical terms since it served his opposing stance towards Turkey’s inclusion. Luxembourg’s Ambassador agreed with him “especially as regards the distinction to be made between the cases of Greece and Turkey.”⁷² However, this question was not discussed further. Instead, participants contemplated how to find a diplomatic way to refer the question to the current Conference of Ten. As a result, it was decided upon that the Chairman of the Conference, speaking as the UK delegate, would make a statement that very afternoon about the Greek and Turkish requests to the British and similar approaches to the other four Brussels Treaty powers. Furthermore, the Chairman would state that his government preferred the Foreign Ministers to make the decisions and direct other delegations to consult their governments and report their views.⁷³

As decided among the Five, the Chairman and British Ambassador M. Mallet of the Preparatory Conference among the Ten raised the matter on the afternoon of 6 April 1949. The minutes reveal that he informed the Conference about the Greek and Turkish requests received by his government and clarified that Foreign Minister Bevin would prefer to discuss

⁶⁹ ANLux, UEO-BTO-028, Minutes of the 66th meeting of the Permanent Commission, 6 April 1949, 222.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ On political borders as discursively constructed and politicized see the reflections on the critical geopolitics approach within this study’s chapter on the theoretical framework (Chapter 2).

⁷² ANLux, UEO-BTO-028, Minutes of the 66th meeting of the Permanent Commission, 6 April 1949, 222.

⁷³ Cf. *ibid.*, 223.

this matter among the Ministers. The Conference directly agreed upon it, and the requests were not discussed further.⁷⁴ In the final report of the Conference, it was only generally mentioned that certain governments had received requests from the governments of Turkey and Greece to take part in the further negotiations and that it was decided that “this was a political matter which must be referred to the forthcoming Conference of Foreign Ministers.”⁷⁵

After having been informed about this decision, through diplomatic contacts, the Turkish government tried to insist on France and Belgium becoming a founding member of the COE.⁷⁶ However, it was not until the constitutive conference in London that the Foreign Ministers decided it was possible to admit Turkey and Greece to the Council of Europe. As a result, neither Turkey nor Greece were involved in the preparatory negotiations and neither had the chance to become COE founding members.

4.3 The Constitutive Conference of the Council of Europe – Turkey still Excluded

At the three-day long *Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe* in London from 3 to 5 May 1949, the foreign ministers of the ten participating states – France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and the Irish Republic – had to find a common general agreement on the “admission of additional members” to be incorporated into the final Statute.⁷⁷ Again, these discussions focused particularly on Turkey and Greece as potential members. As the minutes of the constitutive conference clearly reveal, it was mainly disagreements between the French and the Scandinavian governments that determined the discussions.

The historical context with regard to the Berlin Blockade had changed as follows: When it became obvious that the Western Allies and allied countries were able to supply West Berlin entirely by airlift throughout the months of blockade, the Soviets accepted that their means of pressure had failed and therefore lifted the blockade on 12 May 1949. This was reported publicly already in April, which resulted in negotiations among the four occupying powers. Thus, when the French and other Western European governments argued for an immediate

⁷⁴ ACE, Box 24/17, Minutes of the Preparatory Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe, London, 28 March – 12 April 1949, Minutes of the 5th meeting, 6 April 1949, 7.

⁷⁵ ACE, Box 25/18-1, Final Report of the Preparatory Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe, London, 14 April 1949, 5.

⁷⁶ On the Turkish efforts to become a founding member state between the Preparatory and the Constitutive Conference, see: Öztürk, *Le rôle du Conseil de l'Europe*, 85f.

⁷⁷ Point 4 of the agenda of the conference was on the „Admission of Additional Members.” Cf. ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 4.

admission of Turkey and Greece to the COE, as will be shown below, the fear of increasing the risk of a new catastrophe through such decisions was eliminated.

The first speaker within the debate on how to deal with Turkey and Greece at the founding conference of the COE was one of the opponents, the Foreign Minister of Norway, Halvard Lange. He thought that it was important to proceed step by step since the Council of Europe was a new venture. Therefore, he suggested,

*“it would be best for the time being to limit the members of the Council to those at present represented. He thought that the representatives of Denmark and Sweden would agree with this view. It might even be subsequently decided that Greece and Turkey should be members of a different grouping of States.”*⁷⁸

The French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, in contrast, emphasized that his government was entirely favourable to the entry of these two countries and that it was important not to discriminate between the internal regimes of the various countries. However, presumably in order to appease opposing voices, he also stressed that it was important to differentiate between the admission of additional members to the signature ceremony and their admission under the normal procedure of Article 4 of the draft Statute. And unless there was complete unanimity, it would not be possible to bring in additional members to the signature ceremony.⁷⁹ Disagreements among the ten governments resulted from the fact that, at that time, it was clear that neither Turkey nor Greece would become a founding member of the COE.

Both the Belgian Ambassador in London, Vicomte Obert de Thieusies, and the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, emphasized that their governments thought “that every facility should be given to Turkey and especially to Greece to join the Council.”⁸⁰ Presumably for political reasons the Belgian government agreed to the French argument to invite Turkey as well. Geographical counter-arguments, similar to the one Obert de Thieusies had expressed towards

⁷⁸ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 4.

⁷⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

the Brussels Treaty Powers four weeks earlier in the circle of the ambassadors in London, seemed to have not been convincing to the Belgian government.⁸¹

The next speaker, Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza, also underlined that it was important not to discourage Turkey and Greece. Therefore, “a formula might be found to show to Greece and Turkey that their wishes would be brought forward at the earliest possible moment.”⁸² He further emphasized, “there should be no discrimination between democratic countries who fulfilled the qualifications in Chapter I of the Statute.”⁸³ According to Chapter I, titled “Aim of the Council of Europe,” the organization’s target was

*“to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.”*⁸⁴

He thus argued for Turkey’s admission on the basis of the COE’s aim to safeguard common value-based principles, which were their common heritage, by naturally including Turkey in the group of states that shared these principles.

The Chairman of the Conference, speaking as the British Minister, finally ended the discussion for the time being by stating that his government also favoured the admission of Turkey and Greece, “but he was afraid that prolonged discussion at the present time would hold up the signature of the Statute.”⁸⁵ The other participants agreed to continue the debate at a later point in time.⁸⁶

On the second conference day, the discussion about the admission of new members was continued. The Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Unden opened the debate by noting that the Swedish government had first considered the Council of Europe’s composition to be similar to the OEEC’s coverage, especially given that it was possible these two bodies would one day

⁸¹ Documents of the Belgian Foreign Ministry might reveal more details on the Belgian change of mind concerning Turkey’s admission to the COE; however, it was not possible to examine the appropriate archive in the context of this study.

⁸² ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 4.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Statute of the COE, Chapter I, Article 1(a).

⁸⁵ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 4.

⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

merge.⁸⁷ However, after reconsidering this matter, and after having read the text of the draft Statute and the emphasis on the qualifications for membership, his government “thought it natural to restrict the members to those with similar social problems and political thought.”⁸⁸ Therefore, even though they had not applied for membership yet, he considered Iceland amongst the first to be admitted. His preference, however, was to maintain the current composition for the time being.⁸⁹ In terms of social problems and political thought, he thus considered Turkey and Greece different to the founding members of the COE so far, and therefore as not fulfilling the qualifications for membership. Thereby, to a certain extent, he also contributed to the construction of Europe as represented in the COE by manifesting it as a social and political-cultural community.

Other representatives, in contrast, had a more positive attitude towards the admission of the two states. The Chairman Bevin, trying to mediate, encouraged his colleagues not to ignore the inquiries of membership that had already been submitted. He then proposed a short remark that would be written in the Conference’s communiqué:

*“The Conference took note of the requests of the Greek and Turkish Governments to be admitted as members of the Council of Europe. After an exchange of views it was agreed that the accession of these two States would be acceptable and that invitations to this effect under Article 4 of the Statute would be issued by the Committee of Ministers as soon as it came into being. It was generally hoped that this would enable Greek and Turkish representatives to join the deliberations of the Council of Europe shortly after its inauguration.”*⁹⁰

By pointing to the fact that it was simply not possible to leave the requests of Turkey and Greece unanswered, he argued that his proposal would be “the best alternative, since they could not agree to admit them to the signature.”⁹¹

The next speaker, the Norwegian Minister Lange, having already commented rather sceptically on a Turkish and Greek involvement the previous day, agreed with his Swedish

⁸⁷ Cf. ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 15.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 16.

⁸⁹ Cf. ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid. The Statute’s Article 4 refers to the accession process to the Council of Europe: “Any European State which is deemed to be able and willing to fulfil the provisions of Article 3 may be invited to become a member of the Council of Europe by the Committee of Ministers. Any State so invited shall become a member on the deposit on its behalf with the Secretary General of an instrument of accession to the present Statute.”

⁹¹ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 16.

colleague and questioned in general “whether Article 3 of the Statute really applied to these two countries.”⁹² Although, having allegedly “no desire to disparage them,” in his view it was “a historical fact that they were in a different stage of democratic development.”⁹³ Article 3 summarized the conditions of membership as follows:

*“Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”*⁹⁴

He thus observed Turkey and Greece as not being able to fulfil the member states’ obligations, which were the acceptance of the rule of law, and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

His reserved attitude towards Turkey’s democratic development was justifiable in so far that it was not until recently that Turkey had implemented the multi-party system, which ultimately replaced the one-party dictatorship of the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP). The first parliamentary elections of June 1946, however, had not been fairly handled. The result was that the biggest opposition party, the Democrat Party (DP), was left far behind the ruling CHP and had to wait for its first impressive election victory until 1950.⁹⁵ Against the background that this “watershed in modern Turkish history”⁹⁶ had not occurred at the time the COE founding members discussed Turkey’s admission, the Norwegian government’s objection that Turkey was in a different stage of democratic development was justifiable, and utterable among the ten.

Still, of course, how to deal with Turkey’s stage of democratic development was a contestable question of interpretation, as becomes visible in the further process of the conference when other representatives emphasized the Turkish government’s strong will to progress towards European democratic standards as an argument favouring Turkey’s admission. Among this group, the Irish Foreign Minister MacBride replied that the incorporation of Greece and Turkey would give the ten the opportunity to influence both countries’ democratic

⁹² ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 16.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Statute of the COE, Article 3.

⁹⁵ Due to a prescheduling of the elections the Democrat Party was not able to nominate enough candidates for election in 1946, as will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6 (Political Values). See, amongst others, Zürcher, *Turkey*, 221ff.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 221.

development and “getting them to change their methods if necessary.”⁹⁷ Afterwards, the Italian Minister Sforza reminded the Conference that,

*“even if there were any criticism concerning the internal régimes of Greece and Turkey, these countries were menaced by the very grave danger of the Soviet Union’s aims; they should be given all the moral assistance that was possible.”*⁹⁸

Having been implicitly present during the debates of the Conference, now for the first time recorded, the situation of Turkey and Greece in the early years of *Bloc building* was explicitly communicated as precarious and dangerous. According to the Italian Minister, the Soviet aggressor was reason enough to include these two countries in danger. He even strengthened the anti-communist argument with the help of threat scenarios. In his view, internal political instabilities and democratic deficits had to be considered less relevant.

The French Foreign Minister Schuman as the next speaker underlined that “it would be a grave political error to reject the applications of Greece and Turkey without giving them a better explanation.”⁹⁹ Then he summarized the debate and referred to the fact that “the objection had been raised that Turkey was not a fully European country.”¹⁰⁰ As a reply, he defended a Turkish contribution by emphasizing that Turkey, nonetheless, had some European territory and that it was a member of the OEEC in addition. Moreover, as a reply to the objections that had been raised regarding the internal regimes of both countries, he found that “these objections could not be to the whole of the régime but rather only to certain aspects of it at the present moment.”¹⁰¹ The Conference, in his view, should not present itself as a judge in this regard.

He further agreed with his Irish colleague that admitting them to the organization would at least make it “possible to influence them for the good.”¹⁰² The French government, he stressed again, would prefer to admit Greece and Turkey immediately, but since that was impossible, it would agree to the British proposal.¹⁰³

As becomes clear in Schuman’s speech, the French government’s decision to favour Turkey’s admission to the Council of Europe was made for political reasons. Any counter-arguments

⁹⁷ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 16.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Cf. *ibid.*

identifying Turkey as different to the ten states, for instance, based on geographical reasons as laying outside the European continent, or in terms of its different stage of democratic development, the French Minister tried to oppose with arguments portraying Turkey not as being outside but in a liminal state, resulting in the indirect conclusion that Turkey could be included also based on geographical and value-based arguments.

In contrast to Schuman, the Norwegian Minister did not agree to Bevin's proposal on how to formulate the eligibility requirements for admission of further member states. He argued again that Iceland should be admitted first and disagreed with Schuman's suggestion that the Conference should not act as a judge since they had just adopted Article 4 and 5 of the Statute.¹⁰⁴ According to these articles, the Committee of Ministers was able to invite countries to become full members (Article 4) or associate members (Article 5).¹⁰⁵

The next speaker, the Belgian Ambassador Vicomte Obert de Thieusies, was clearly not impressed by the Norwegian argument; instead, he entirely agreed with his colleagues from the UK and France.¹⁰⁶

The British Minister Bevin, afterwards, mentioned that certain conditions had changed: He emphasized, for instance, that there had been elections in Greece held under international supervision; and that the civil war was really not the Greek peoples' fault. He further pointed to the history of the political ties between the United Kingdom and the two countries. After mentioning the close friendship to Greece, "which suffered the German occupation and was now being persecuted by the Soviet Union,"¹⁰⁷ he approached Turkey and declared:

*"As regards Turkey, the United Kingdom was her ally; it was painfully obvious that she was in the centre of the war of nerves, and indeed her forces were still mobilized. In this case also a very bad effect would be caused if Turkey were to receive a political snub from the West."*¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Cf. ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 16.

¹⁰⁵ See the Statute of the COE, Article 4 and 5.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 17.

¹⁰⁷ This close connection and commitment specifically resulted from the fact that the UK was involved in the Greek civil war by supporting the conservative government militarily (besides the USA) against the communists (for details see, e.g., Richard Clogg, ed., *Greece 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War. A Documented History* (Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 9ff.). Bevin further pointed to the difficult situation of Greece due to the former German occupation and the current Soviet persecution. See: ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 17.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Thus, he strengthened the reasoning of his Italian and French colleagues and argued that a rejection of an invitation based on Turkey's geopolitical situation could be dangerous. To what extent there were other reasons for the British support of admitting Turkey is questionable. The UK was still interested in remaining influential in the region south and southeast of Turkey in the aftermath of a long colonial history and thereby considered Turkey a significant actor and as a bridge towards the Near and Middle Eastern states. That became clearly visible in the following year when the British government concretized its plan to establish a Middle East Command (MEC) that should be linked to NATO, and in which Turkey should be a key player.¹⁰⁹

In the end, as a consequence of the differences of opinions among the ten Foreign Ministers of the founding member states, Chairman Bevin suggested to redraft his first proposal in a less obliging form in the way,

“that the Conference had considered the admission of Greece and Turkey immediately, but that that had been impossible; that the general view was that their accession would be acceptable and the question would be dealt with under Article 4 of the Statute as soon as the Committee of Ministers came into being.”¹¹⁰

This seemed to be a widely accepted version; even the Norwegian Minister agreed to Bevin's redrafted proposal so that the final communiqué contained the following passage on the admission of new members:

“The Conference took note of the requests received from the Hellenic and Turkish Governments to be admitted as members of the Council of Europe. It was the general view that the accession of these two States would be acceptable and it was agreed that the matter should be dealt with under the Statute by the Committee of Ministers as soon as it comes into being. The possibility of accession to the Statute by other

¹⁰⁹ On the British plan and final implementation of a Middle East Command with Turkey as a key player see Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East. Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era* (London et al.: Tauris, 2008), 153ff. Since this issue determined US-British controversies on Turkey's form of association with NATO, it will also be part of the analysis on a Turkish involvement in the NATO in Chapter 5 (Defence).

¹¹⁰ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 17.

European States will be considered by the Committee of Ministers at the same time.”¹¹¹

4.4 Preparations for the First Session of the Council of Europe (May-August 1949) – Turkey Finally Included

After the Council of Europe was officially established with the signature of its Statute on 5 May 1949, and before the organization had its first meetings in August the same year, the Foreign Ministers of the ten signatory states continued to discuss the question of Turkey’s admission. However, a news article from June 1949, after the Statute had been signed, spread the news to the Turkish public that the ten Western European governments had been questioning Turkey’s general belonging to Europe. As the Turkish newspaper *Akşam* reported on 1 June 1949, during a visit of a delegation of Turkish parliamentarians to Britain, one of the delegates, Kasım Gülek, who was later part of the Turkish delegation in Strasbourg, expressed that Turkey was dissatisfied with the fact that there was scepticism towards his country since Turkey would be a part of Europe. According to the article, he argued that Turkey was a fortress of Western democracy and European ideas, and that it spent more than half of its budget on defence expenditure to protect the border of Western Europe. He further defended that it was Turkey’s right to become a member of the Council of Europe. His country, he explained, had shown its complete commitment to the issue of accession and its involvement was the most important goal for the future.¹¹² Through news articles like this, it became obvious to Turkish politicians that Turkey’s identity as a European state was in question. Similarly, the Turkish public was informed about Turkey’s efforts to drift further towards Western Europe in terms of foreign affairs as well as about existing doubts about Turkey’s belonging to Europe on the part of Western European governments.

On the part of the ten founding members of the COE, a document from the Archives of the Council of Europe titled *Note of the Executive Secretariat about the Admission of Turkey, Greece and Iceland*, within the set of documents of the *Preparatory Commission of the*

¹¹¹ Cf. Communiqué of the Conference on the Establishment of a Council of Europe, London, 5 May 1949, available in the Online-Archives (Doc. CE (MIN) P.8).

¹¹² Cf. Öncü and Cevizliler, “Avrupa Bütünleşmesi İçin Önemli Bir Adım,” 25f.: They refer to the following newspaper article: “İngiltere’de Bulunan Milletvekillerimiz Türkiye’nin Avrupa Konseyi Dışında Bırakılmasından Şikayet Ettiler,” *Akşam*, 1 June 1949, 2.

Council of Europe, provides a useful summary of the three countries' admission process.¹¹³ It summarizes the decisions made at three conferences before the Council of Europe finally started to operate in August 1949, which were the following: first, the above-mentioned conference on the COE's establishment in London in May 1949, secondly an ad-hoc conference of representatives of the ten signatory states in Paris on 26 and 28 July 1949 for the purpose to decide on the admission of Turkey and Greece,¹¹⁴ and thirdly a preparatory session of the Committee of Ministers in Paris on 5 August 1949. In addition, the document contains some general information about the three countries – from the size of their respective population to the past and present status of democratic development and fundamental freedoms (half a page for each country).¹¹⁵

With regard to the first recorded conference that ended with the signatory ceremony of the Treaty of London, the Secretariat's note merely contains the text of the report of the Conference on the admission of Turkey and Greece on 4 May. This text is similar to the announcement of the communiqué, yet it includes the requests of the two countries to become *founding* members, and not only members of the COE.¹¹⁶ Due to the inability to reach an agreement before the signatory ceremony, the word *founding* was omitted from the public communiqué, presumably not to affront the Turkish and Greek governments. By claiming that the two countries had requested to become members of the COE, it was possible to summarize the Conference's decision in a positive way: that these requests were acceptable and the final decisions were left to the CM as soon as it came into being.

The note about the second documented conference, which was an ad-hoc conference of the *Preparatory Commission to the Council of Europe*, consisting of representatives of the ten founding member states in Paris on 26 and 28 July 1949, starts with a reference by the

¹¹³ This document was available only in French, the original title is *Note de Secrétariat Exécutif sur l'admission de la Turquie, de la Grèce et de l'Islande*. Cf. ACE, Box 21/16-2, Commission Préparatoire du Conseil de l'Europe, 1949, Note de Secrétariat Exécutif sur l'admission de la Turquie, de la Grèce et de l'Islande (Doc. SE 101). The whole file of the Preparatory Commission is dated 1949, however the Secretariat's note is not dated at all.

¹¹⁴ In the document, in contrast, this ad-hoc conference is dated incorrectly 1948 (certainly it is a typing error). Cf. ACE, Box 21/16-2, Commission Préparatoire du Conseil de l'Europe, 1949, Note de Secrétariat Exécutif sur l'admission de la Turquie, de la Grèce et de l'Islande, 1.

¹¹⁵ Although it is only roughly dated 1949, it can be presumed that this information at a glance was prepared between 5 and 8 August for the Committee of Ministers' first sitting at 8 August since the conference at 5 August is the last documented one that is included in this note. However, it still schedules the official final decision in the future, thus on the first meeting of the CM. Another hint causing this presumption is that the protocol to the preparatory sitting of the CM on 5 August 1949 includes an instruction to the Executive Secretary to prepare a project of the quota of contribution for Turkey and Greece that should be submitted at the CM's first sitting. Possibly the country information functioned as a supplementary part of this project. Cf. ACE, Box 21/16-2, Commission Préparatoire du Conseil de l'Europe, 1949, Note de Secrétariat Exécutif sur l'admission de la Turquie, de la Grèce et de l'Islande, 2.

¹¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, 1.

Executive Secretariat that certain decisions should have been made at this conference to relieve the Ministers. These decisions especially concerned the quota of contribution as well as the number of seats of Turkish and Greek representatives in the Consultative Assembly. However, according to the note, the conference agreed on inviting both countries for the first session in August but did not make a final decision on the details of representation since objections had been raised about the number of seats proposed by France and Great Britain, which were eight for Turkey and six for Greece. These objections, according to the document, could have been removed and the French government was tasked with approaching the Turkish and Greek representatives in Paris in order to inform them what the Ministers would officially proclaim in Strasbourg on 8 August 1949.¹¹⁷

Reviewing the minutes of the ad-hoc conference in July 1949, it becomes clear that objections to the number of seats as proposed by the British and French representatives came primarily from the Irish and Dutch representatives; in their view, the numbers were too high compared to less populous states.¹¹⁸ After the Norwegian representative had also expressed objections to the number of seats and had asked for time to consult with his government, the decision was postponed by two days.¹¹⁹ However, on 28 July 1949, the final decision was eventually left to the CM since the Norwegian delegate still did not share the opinion that the ad-hoc conference was in a position to decide on the number of seats. At the same time, he announced that the Norwegian government would certainly not oppose the proposal of six and eight seats respectively for Greece and Turkey.¹²⁰ Therefore, the conference made an agreement that if Turkish or Greek representatives should ask, they were allowed to announce the expected decisions of the CM in its first session in August.¹²¹

According to an article in the Turkish newspaper *Akşam*, the French Ambassador in Ankara, on behalf of the French government, finally visited the Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak on 30

¹¹⁷ Cf. ACE, Box 21/16-2, Commission Préparatoire du Conseil de l'Europe, 1949, Note de Secrétariat Exécutif sur l'admission de la Turquie, de la Grèce et de l'Islande, 1. Some days earlier, the Permanent Commission of the BTO (the Five) had already agreed at its 77th meeting on 20 July 1949 that the French Minister Schuman as representing the host government should invite Greece and Turkey to the meeting on 8 August 1949. Cf. ANLux, UEO-BTO-122, Extract from the minutes of the 77th meeting of the Permanent Commission, 20 July 1949, 217.

¹¹⁸ Cf. ACE, Box 21/16-4, Commission Préparatoire du Conseil de l'Europe, 1949, Conférence ad-hoc des représentants des dix gouvernements signataires du statut, 26 July 1949, 2.

¹¹⁹ He argued by questioning the decision-making competence of the ad-hoc conference per se and wanted to consult his government first. Cf. *ibid.*

¹²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 28 July 1949, 1.

¹²¹ Cf. *ibid.* Obviously, this differs in detail from the Executive Secretariat's note that, as aforementioned, summarizes that the French government was enabled to inform the Turkish and Greek representatives in Paris.

July to inform him about the status of the accession process. Thus, Turkey was able to prepare itself and form a draft delegation to be sent to Strasbourg some days later.¹²²

Finally, according to the Executive Secretariat's note on the third conference, at the preparatory meeting of the CM on 5 August, besides the issue of the delegations' sizes the problem of inviting Turkey and Greece before inviting Iceland was eventually solved. Even though it was clear that Iceland, in contrast to Turkey and Greece, was not able to send a delegation immediately due to provisions stipulated by its constitution, the Committee of Minister decided to officially invite the three countries at the same time to directly participate in the first CM sitting three days later on 8 August 1949.¹²³

Due to the language and structure of the final part of the Secretariat's note, it seems obvious that it was prepared by the Executive Secretariat itself, as it briefly summarizes some general information on the three countries in a uniform structure. The description of Turkey's level of democratic development is, in contrast to prior references to domestic problems and critics on an disappointingly low level of democracy, now described in quite a positive way. After identifying Turkey's parliament, the Great National Assembly, as the exerciser of national sovereignty, the passage notes that the constitution of 20 April 1924 contains a proclamation on human and civil rights inspired by the French Declaration of 1789. Additionally, the country would be engaged in a "remarkable democratic experience" for years to come.¹²⁴ It had broken with the one-party state, the system under which the Kemalist reforms had been initiated since the vote of the republican constitution in 1924. This process, as emphasized in the brief country portrait, was apparently successful – given that in addition to 397 representatives of the ruling party, the parliament would consist of 61 deputies of the Democrat Party as well as seven independent parliamentarians.¹²⁵ In addition, certain constraints and restrictions would have completely disappeared by law: these were constraints that had hindered free elections, administrative restrictions that had affected the freedom of

¹²² Cf. Öncü and Cevizliler, "Avrupa Bütünleşmesi İçin Önemli Bir Adım," 26. They refer to the following article: "Türkiye Avrupa Konseyinde Davet Edildi," *Akşam*, 31 July 1949, 1.

¹²³ Cf. ACE, Box 21/16-2, Commission Préparatoire du Conseil de l'Europe, 1949, Note de Secrétariat Exécutif sur l'admission de la Turquie, de la Grèce et de l'Islande, 2. According to the constitution of 1944, the parliament had to ratify any signing of international conventions at first. Until the final entry an observer was allowed to take part in the Assembly sittings. Cf. *ibid.*

¹²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 2f.

¹²⁵ The numbers of DP parliamentarians, however, vary in the literature: According to Zürcher, the DP received 62 out of 465 seats, according to Kreiser 64 out of 465; the CHP received 395 seats according to Kreiser (Zürcher does not specify the number of seats for the CHP). Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 212; Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 424.

press, as well as police measures that “sometimes had ignored the individual freedoms.”¹²⁶ Moreover, Turkey’s progress, according to the note, was even more remarkable since Turkey had been on the verge of general mobilization for years as a consequence of the Cold War that was waged by its great neighbour, the Soviet Union.

The way the Cold War was described – not as a conflict between the US and the USSR or between two camps, but with the Soviet Union as its aggressor – demonstrates how the Western states’ perceived the assignment of ‘attack and defence’ at that time. The feeling of being seriously threatened by its enemy in the East is evident in this note, and the ascription of Turkey’s particular geostrategic importance becomes all the more comprehensible. Finally, the note’s final point indicates that Turkey, nonetheless, was a founding member of the UNO and the OEEC.¹²⁷

In short, the Executive Secretariat emphasized Turkey’s democratic progress and left out any critics on democratic deficits. At a time when the decision to include Turkey had already been made, this is understandable as the COE countries did not want to lose their credibility as representatives of democratic Europe. In addition, the mentioning of Turkey’s membership in the OEEC and the UNO certainly should underline the country’s credibility as a member of the COE by demonstrating its already existing institutional involvement in the international structures of the West.

Ultimately, in its first meeting on 8 August 1949 the Committee of Ministers officially announced the invitations of Turkey, Greece, and Iceland to join the Council of Europe.¹²⁸ Already the next day, the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers were welcomed as members of the Committee of Ministers,¹²⁹ and eight Turkish, as well as six Greek representatives, participated in the first sitting of the Consultative Assembly on 10 August 1949.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Cf. ACE, Box 21/16-2, Commission Préparatoire du Conseil de l’Europe, 1949, Note de Secrétariat Exécutif sur l’admission de la Turquie, de la Grèce et de l’Islande, 3.

¹²⁷ For the whole passage on the note’s general information about Turkey’s political development status see: *ibid.*, 2f.

¹²⁸ CM (CE), Papers of the First Session of the Committee of Ministers, 8-13 August 1949, Minutes of the 1st meeting, 8 August 1949, 4 (as well as: Report of the 1st meeting, 8 August 1949, 18). The decision was determined as Resolution (49) 1. Iceland finally joined the COE in March 1950, cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 31.

¹²⁹ CM (CE), Papers of the First Session of the Committee of Ministers, 8-13 August 1949, Minutes of the 1st meeting, 8 August 1949, 6.

¹³⁰ As visible in the official reports of the Assembly’s first sitting of the first session: PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 1st sitting, 10 August 1949. Since the protocols of some preparatory conferences included that Turkey and Greece might be informed previous to 8 August, the very spontaneous participation is little surprising.

4.5 The Turkish Parliamentary Debate on Turkey's Admission to the Council of Europe

Not only European circles discussed Turkey's entry into the Council of Europe; the parliamentarians of the *Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM)* dealt with this event as well, not least since it needed the approval of the Turkish parliament.¹³¹ As the records of the TBMM reveal, this was not without controversy. The parliamentary discussions previous to the voting process regarding the law on Turkey's membership were predominantly pro-European concerning Turkey's foreign policy orientation. However, some opposing voices discursively reproduced its ambivalent relationship with Europe, as shown below.

The then Foreign Minister and Sivas Deputy Necmeddin Sadak opened the debate on 12 December 1949. He started his speech by identifying the founding of the Council of Europe as an important turning point in European history and interpreted Turkey's invitation as one of the most significant developments in Turkish political history.¹³² He expressed his view by illustrating the backdrop of Europe's dark history of two world wars, the subsequent process of unification to avoid such huge catastrophes in the future, and the specific goals of the Council of Europe. The states of the COE, he stressed, were united on the grounds of a specific concept of civilization and culture. They altogether aimed to preserve the moral and mental values of European nations, respected individual freedoms that were based on democracy, and believed in the rule of law.¹³³ By unifying, he concluded, the European states had committed themselves to defending these ideals. Moreover, with reference to the Consultative Assembly, he emphasized the new form of international cooperation by remarking that those who assembled were not only governments but also representatives of national parliaments who were free to express their views and able to work as European deputies.¹³⁴

¹³¹ This bill was drafted by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then discussed within the Foreign Affairs Commission of the parliament first, before it was discussed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 12 December 1949. For details on this process see Öncü and Cevizliler, "Avrupa Bütünleşmesi İçin Önemli Bir Adım," 27f. At this point, special thanks are due to Dr. Katharina Müller for helping in translating the TBMM sources.

¹³² Cf. TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting (to be found in the online archive of the TBMM: *Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem: 8, Cilt Fihristi: 22, Birleşim: 16*), 12 December 1949, Sadak, 178.

¹³³ Cf. *ibid.*, 179.

¹³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

After having celebrated the birth of such an organization and the progress of European integration more generally, Foreign Minister Sadak then referred to the role of his own country in this process:

*“In the last years, the whole world has confirmed and repeated that Turkey, in today’s complicated Europe, is the main agent of peace and a strong trust and stability factor.”*¹³⁵

Afterward, however, he approached the sensitive issue of Turkey’s differently perceived status as being situated inside or outside of Europe, more specifically the controversy of whether Turkey was a European or an Asian state. This question, he mentioned, had been addressed at international conferences and from time to time in newspapers as well.¹³⁶ He continued by informing the audience that these hesitations, however, had been abandoned by the invitation to join the Council of Europe, which was why this success should not be underestimated.¹³⁷ At the same time, the Foreign Minister stressed that Turkey’s political and economic interest in Europe did not mean that its interests in the Near East and Asia were diminished. In contrast, he stated that the relevance of this region would even increase in the future and that the spiritual bonds between Turkey and this region would be very powerful. The alliance with Britain and France, as well as their friendship with the US, he argued, had finally resulted in Turkey’s foreign policy shift further towards the Western world.¹³⁸ This orientation, Sadak argued, was not only based on geographical reasons. Rather, the innovations realized by Atatürk had also played an important role in Turkey’s participation in the European community.¹³⁹ What becomes clear in the latter argument is that Sadak used Atatürk’s internal Western orientation to argue for an active foreign policy towards Europe and the West by leaving aside Atatürk’s focus on domestic reforms along European lines while at the same time promoting a neutral foreign policy.

The reaction to his line of reasoning was largely supportive. Several parliamentarians, belonging both to the Democrat Party (DP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP),

¹³⁵ Translated by the author (as any following quotes of the TBMM). In Turkish: “Son senelerde, yine bütün dünya, teyit ve tekrar etmektedir ki, Türkiye, bugünkü karışık Avrupada sulhun başlıca âmili, kuvvetli bir emniyet ve istikrar unsurudur.” TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, Sadak, 179.

¹³⁶ In Turkish: “Türkiye’nin bir Avrupa Devleti mi, yoksa bir Asya Devleti mi olduğunu soranlar vardı. Bu sual, bazı beynelmilel toplantılarda dahi ortaya atılmıştır. Bâzı gazeteler zaman zaman bunu yazmıştır.” Ibid.

¹³⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 180.

¹³⁸ Cf. *ibid.*

¹³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

underlined the reasons to approve the COE's Statute. They repeatedly emphasized the meaning of the Council of Europe in its role to protect and promote human rights and democracy. Furthermore, several deputies stressed the relevance of the process of unification in the times of Bloc building, as well as the significance of Turkey's involvement with regard to its acceptance to be part of Europe.¹⁴⁰ Deputy Feridun Fikri Düşünsel, a CHP member representing the province of Bingöl, and part of the first Turkish delegation in Strasbourg since August 1949, reported about his positive experiences in the Consultative Assembly and pointed out that he had been welcomed both as a man of reason and as a man with national feelings.¹⁴¹ He finished by commenting that he believed "the honor of the Turks would always be great in this great event."¹⁴² Given the strong nationalism in these days, his final remark was largely welcomed in the Grand National Assembly, evinced in some *inshallah* shouts at the end of his speech.¹⁴³

Some of the following reactions also revealed a strong self-confidence in the Turkish nation (which was constructed just some years before¹⁴⁴). The parliamentarian and Kırşehir Deputy Ismail H. Baltacıoğlu (CHP), for instance, introduced his speech by clarifying that "we do not have to ask Europeans to figure out if the Turkish nation is Asian or European, an old or modern nation."¹⁴⁵ His answer was clear: Turkey was both a modern nation and state, located on the Asian and European continents.¹⁴⁶ In his view, since Turkey was "unlimitedly in possession of social structures and institutions in European dignity" it was a European state, "not for another reason."¹⁴⁷ He continued by rhetorically asking what would happen if the Turkish nation relocated to Japan; would it become an Asian state then? Of course not, he replied; Americans for instance would also be Europeans, because the nations themselves

¹⁴⁰ For details see especially the pro-European speeches of the parliamentarians Yunus Muammer Alakant (DP), Sadi Konuk (CHP), and Feridun Fikri Düşünsel (CHP). Cf. TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, 20-24.

¹⁴¹ Cf. TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, Düşünsel, 182.

¹⁴² In Turkish: "Ve yine inanıyorum ki, bu büyük dâvada Türk'ün şeref hissesi daima büyük olacaktır arkadaşlar." Ibid., 184.

¹⁴³ Cf. ibid.

¹⁴⁴ See this study's Chapter 3 (Historical Overview).

¹⁴⁵ In Turkish: "Türk Milletinin Asyâi veya Avrupai, eski veya modern bir millet olduğunu anlamak için Avrupalılara sormak zorunda değiliz." TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, Baltacıoğlu, 185.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. ibid.

¹⁴⁷ In Turkish (including the previous sentence): "Türkiye, Avrupa ve Asya kıtalarında toprağı olan modern bir Millemdir, bir Devlettir. Çünkü, bilâkaydüşart Avrupai haysiyette sosyal müesseselere, enstitüsyonlara maliktir. Onun için Avrupai bir Devlettir, başka bir sebepten değil." Ibid.

were the ones who would determine who was European and who was not, these eventually were a state's "social morphologies."¹⁴⁸

Thus, with regard to the definition of the contested concept of Europe and what it meant to be European, he rejected any geographical definitions. Apart from that, he rejected any identification from the outside. According to Baltacıoğlu, to be a European state meant to be constituted of a nation that identified itself as European. In this way, he attributed the power of determining a state's identity to the constitutive people. By exemplifying Americans as Europeans, it becomes obvious that he equated Western with European. This points to the dominance of the newly constructed bipolar world order, as well as to the fact that Turkey's foreign policy towards Western Europe was based on a strong US orientation in these days.

In contrast to several voices supporting Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe, Kütahya Deputy Ahmet Tahtakılıç, a member of the nationalist *Nation Party (Millet Partisi)*, which was founded as a right wing spin-off of the DP in 1948, was sceptical of a closer cooperation with Europe.¹⁴⁹ He interpreted Turkey's invitation to become a member of the Council of Europe differently than Foreign Minister Sadak had done before. Instead of identifying the invitation as a great political success for Turkey, Tahtakılıç was highly sceptical towards the Western international community (both the United Nations and the united part of Europe) and interpreted the step of inviting Turkey as a strategic move towards taking power from Turkey.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, while stressing that Turkey was naturally promoting human rights and democracy, as European states did, he simultaneously advocated tighter economic, political and cultural ties with the Middle East and clearly distanced himself and his party from the foreign policy strategies of both the DP and the CHP.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Cf. TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, Baltacıoğlu, 185 ("sosyal morfolojileridir").

¹⁴⁹ The *Millet Partisi* (MP) is a predecessor of the current ultra-nationalist MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party*), one of the four represented parties in today's Turkish parliament. It was founded within the DP in 1948 by a group of people that aspired to a more radical and more nationalist opposition to the CHP than the DP represented. The parliamentary DP faction at that time was hence divided into two groups. In the parliamentary elections of 1950 the MP only won one seat, and was banned in 1953 because of its anti-laicist, Islamist party program. However, it was soon rebuilt as the CMP (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi, Republican Nation Party*) in 1954, which in 1958 merged with the Turkish Farmer's Party (TKP) into the CKMP (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, Republican Farmers' National Party*), from which the MHP emerged in 1969. For details on the MP see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 215, 223, 233.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, Tahtakılıç, 184.

¹⁵¹ Cf. *ibid.*, 184f.

His very critical speech resulted in several opposing statements from both parties defending Turkey's direction to Europe in foreign affairs.¹⁵² In the end, Foreign Minister Sadak had the final say. He expressed his appreciation for support in drafting the bill and for the opposition party DP for supporting the government in this regard. Further, he honoured every government that had been in power since the founding of the republic that had supported Turkey's integration in Europe.¹⁵³ Afterwards, he responded to the critical voices as well as those fearing for Turkey's independence by emphasizing that the national security of the country was still of utmost priority. An affiliation to the European community would not oppose it; in contrast, Turkey's involvement would even strengthen and stabilize it. Turkey would be part of European civilization and culture, which now also determined its foreign policy direction. This, nevertheless, would not influence the good relations with countries in the South and East; these relations would be continued and even intensified.¹⁵⁴

The following voting procedure on the draft law of Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe finally proved his convincing line of reasoning and resulted in unanimous approval. Despite some critical opponent speeches, 241 out of 465 MP's who were entitled to vote, voted in favour of the law. The rest did not attend; not a single deputy voted against the approval of the COE's Statute.¹⁵⁵

Nevertheless, the discussions in the Turkish parliament on Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe demonstrate that the governmental decision to shift further towards Western Europe in foreign affairs was widely supported, however not unanimously. Deputies from the Millet Party and the Republican People's Party revealed a cautious stance on an active foreign policy towards Europe. Atatürk as the founder of the CHP and the Turkish Republic was thereby interpreted differently. On the one hand, his rhetoric and emphasis on the republic's independence and security, which meant to pursue a cautious foreign policy with a focus on its own domestic sphere, was still partly existent within his own party. On the other hand, however, given that Atatürk had taken his domestic reform course along European legal standards, now in December 1949, in times of a changing world system and Western Europe's process of unification, the majority of his followers considered only one potential

¹⁵² See the speeches of the deputies Yunus Muammer Alakant (DP), Ibrahim Tali Öngören (CHP) and Abdurrahman Melek (CHP and speaker of the TBMM's Foreign Affairs Commission). Cf. TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, 186-188.

¹⁵³ Cf. *ibid.*, Sadak, 190-192.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 190f.

¹⁵⁵ We do not know if it was an open vote or not, nevertheless the records do not reveal the voter's personalities. Concerning the results of the voting procedure see TBMM, *Reports*, 8/22, 16th sitting, 12 December 1949, 204.

path as the right one: to give up Turkey's neutrality and look westwards in terms of foreign affairs. Apart from that, it was not only an active foreign policy per se but also the direction towards Europe that was criticised by some parliamentarians based on the fact that some deputies obviously identified stronger with the Middle East than with Western Europe.

In summary, even though the parliamentary majority was in favour of Turkey's admission to the Council of Europe, the discussions within the Turkish parliament demonstrate that the traditionally ambivalent relationship towards Europe – both a goal to aspire to and a dangerous imperialist threat from the outside – also determined the perspective of Turkish deputies towards their country's affiliation to the Council of Europe in the first months of its existence.

4.6 Conclusions

It was for political reasons in Cold War contexts that Turkey was invited to become a member of the Council of Europe in August 1949. Any representational practices that identified Turkey as being outside of Europe in democratic or geographical terms and therefore as not being qualified as a member of the COE were dominated by arguments of political character, as the analysed documents of the Brussels Treaty Organization and discussions among the ten COE founding members reveal.

The conference minutes on the establishment of the COE at the beginning of May 1949 demonstrate that while the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark and Sweden) argued against Turkey's admission, the other seven governments led by France formed the group of proponents.¹⁵⁶ However, minutes of previous conferences and meetings among representatives of the five Brussels Treaty powers show that these countries' support for Turkey's (as well as Greece's) admission was dependent on the respective developments in the advancing Cold War. Against the background of the Berlin Blockade, the cautious behavior when it came to the decision of how to deal with the Turkish and Greek desire to be included in the preparations of the establishment of the COE is explainable. Any decision that might have contributed to an escalation of the East-West conflict at that time was postponed. When the Berlin Blockade was finally solved, the French and other Western European

¹⁵⁶ A brief outlook is interesting here: during the debate about a Turkish association with the European Economic Community some ten years later, the French government emerged as the most dominant opponent, intensely arguing against an association. Eugen Krieger's analysis of French diplomatic documents demonstrates that the French government not only had political and economic objections against a Turkish association with the EEC, but argued also on the basis of Turkey's cultural difference. Cf. Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 236ff.

governments argued for an immediate admission of Turkey to the COE, as the minutes of the constitutive conference of the COE reveal. Thus, when the risk of triggering a new catastrophe in East-West relations was eliminated, it became more important, in their view, to assist and strengthen other democratic states such as Turkey and Greece against communist influence and pressure.

Apart from the fact that Turkey's admission to the COE was a political decision, which was made in Cold War contexts, the discussions in the decision-making process show that arguments were also raised that are to be valued independently from, or at least not directly against Cold War politics, both on the part of voices pro and contra a Turkish membership. Of particular interest within these arguments, and therefore represented in the following, are the representational practices portraying Turkey as a European or non-European state, as well as the concepts of Europe that were constructed through these attributions. Not least, for the first time in history, it was necessary to find a common understanding of what it meant to be European to decide which states were able to take part in the unification process of Europe.

First of all, what is noticeable is Turkey's attributed liminal character considering its Europeaness. Morozov and Rumelili define 'liminal Others' as being "not in directly oppositional, but in liminal partly-Self/partly-Other positions." With reference to Turkey, the analysis showed that some speakers recognised the country in a liminal position. However, they differed in their assessment of which direction Turkey tended to turn. For instance, when it came to the question of the country's state of democratic development, some speakers placed the country in a liminal position, but in a negative way. Others defended Turkey's democratic progress and placed the country in a liminal position, too, however, as tending towards the European Self. The latter, in addition, underlined the possibility to influence Turkey in its democratic development as a member of the COE. In this way, they indirectly represented the possibility to transform Turkey's liminal position into an inside position of the Self. In these identification processes, the European Self was identified as 'democratic Europe' or 'the Europe of democratic principles'.

What is also striking in this regard is the observation that in a note of the COE's Executive Secretariat about Turkey's admission process, which was produced after the final decision to affiliate Turkey, the country's liminal position had changed in favour of Turkey being a part of democratic Europe. Instead of criticizing Turkey's state of democracy, it was now argued that the country had made important efforts towards a parliamentary democracy and was determined to continue this process. Presumably, this also served to safeguard the credibility

of the Council of Europe, which eventually had defined its core task in protecting the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Not least, what becomes apparent here is the nature of borders of collective concepts, between the Self and Others, being nothing but discursively constructed and therefore contestable and renewable any time.

Also with regard to the interpretation of the geographical borders of Europe, Turkey was represented as being in a liminal position. Those arguing against Turkey's immediate admission to the COE emphasized the country's dominant spatial belonging to Asia, taking the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles as the natural geographic borders of Europe and Asia. Those arguing for its inclusion – accepting the same 'natural borders' – contradicted themselves by representing Turkey in a liminal, therefore also partly Self-position based on its (small) European land mass.¹⁵⁷ In sum, proponents argued on a political basis giving minor relevance to the geographically or cartographically constructed borders of the European continent.

Another result of the analysis is that Turkey's involvement in Western institutions that already existed at that time, specifically the OEEC, was taken as an additional argument for its inclusion. This way, the US American strategy to include Turkey in its economic recovery plan for Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan helped to argue for the country's admission to the first political European organization. In contrast to the OEEC, which was an administrative organ to coordinate the US monetary aid for Europe's recovery, the Council of Europe's self-identification, however, was based less on common economic interests and more on the common aim of realizing the European idea of uniting on the basis of certain political values and principles in order to safeguard peace. Also, from the beginning the belief in a common European spirit and a sense of belonging pushed the political unification process. In the sense of community building, the Council of Europe was completely different from the OEEC. However, Turkey's membership in the latter served as an argument to include it in the former. Thereby, this argument indirectly attributed an identity level as a Western institution to the OEEC, which in turn constructed a sense of mutual commitment.

With regard to Turkey's self-identification, the country's foreign policy orientation towards Europe was also contested domestically according to the minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), although supported by the parliamentary majority. While the

¹⁵⁷ Also decades later, supporters of a Turkish inclusion in the EC/EU took up the geographical argument raised by opponents and opposed that Turkey still had "a toehold" in Europe in geographical terms. This is cited after Jochen Walter who, in his analysis of German and British newspapers between 1960 and 2004 regarding constructions of Europe through Turkey cites an article of *The Economist* (26 December 1987, page 39) in which it is notified that according to Turkey's application to the European Community (EC) "Turkey is considered a legitimate candidate because it has a toehold in Europe." Cf. Walter, *Die Türkei*, 174f.

Turkish government refused a unilateral policy early on and instead welcomed support of the US including its efforts to involve Turkey in the European unification process, some Turkish parliamentarians criticised the government's sudden foreign policy shift from neutrality to Bloc alignment.¹⁵⁸

The records of the Turkish parliament show that Turkey's ambivalent relationship with Europe, which was considered a role model and imperialist threat at the same time, resurfaced in the debate about its membership in the COE. However, although some deputies identified themselves stronger with the Middle East, the final result that no one voted against the country's inclusion in the Council of Europe shows that especially the international context of Bloc building and Soviet menaces seemingly convinced critical parliamentarians to accept affiliation with another Western institution. This was based on the aim to preserve Turkey's internal and external national security, and was backed by Atatürk's former aspiration towards the Western way of life and values, which was transferred to the field of foreign affairs (in order to argue against the continuation of Atatürk's neutral foreign policy stance).

Finally, the Committee of Ministers' decision to invite Turkey was nothing but a political one, in the sense of 'realpolitik'. It was the new context of a constructed bipolar world order that widely produced a feeling of insecurity and affected the resolution predominantly. As a result, Turkish delegates – whether perceived as being 'true Europeans' or not – found themselves as equal members of the first political organization with a Consultative Assembly in European history. This way, they were able to contribute to early debates on how to intensify Europe's unification process and on what kind of Europe they aimed to represent.

In the next four chapters Turkey's role in these discussions will be analysed in detail. It will be shown that Turkish deputies used the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe as a stage to prove their country's importance, to see acceptance as an integral part of Europe, and to demonstrate how they contributed to the Assembly discourse on how to realize the European idea.

¹⁵⁸ Concerning Turkey's reasons for a closer linkage to the Western Bloc via Western Europe, which were in particular of economic and military nature, and addressed to the US, see Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 108-122, particularly 109f.

5 Representations of Turkey as Part of a European Defence Community

“Matters relating to national defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe.”¹ With these words the Statute of the Council of Europe excluded defence issues completely. With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, the field of defence was to be solely a matter of the Transatlantic Alliance. However, with the onset of the Korean War, the first proxy war between the two upcoming blocs – the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union and the Western Bloc led by the United States – and the involvement of COE members, it seemed to be impossible to ignore questions of security policy in the COE’s Assembly anymore. To put Europe’s defence on the Assembly’s agenda became all the more legitimate since the Committee of Ministers had appealed to the Assembly on 5 August 1950 to declare its solidarity with the UN Security Council with regards to the UN-led operation in Korea.² Subsequently, political issues surrounding security and defence were also discussed among the Assembly members, as analysed below.

This chapter argues that Turkish delegates used different representational practices to portray Turkey as exceptionally important for Europe’s security. It starts with a subchapter on the historical context, giving an overview of the most important historical events between 1949 and 1963. These are developments concerning global, European as well as Turkish affairs. This subchapter further serves as an overview of the historical context for all the four thematic chapters. Any events, which were important only selectively, are referenced throughout the thematic chapters appropriately. After this, the chapter splits into several subchapters, following the events and process of discursive practices chronologically based on the conditional contexts. Most dominantly, Turkish delegates characterized Turkey as ‘exceptional’ through liminal representations of its geography. In doing so, they argued for the country’s supposedly incomparable importance for the security of Europe and its geostrategic interests.

5.1 Historical Context

Global Cold War Politics

Grave global changes and international crises accompanied the founding history of the Council of Europe. World War Two had just ended when the next global conflict divided the

¹ Statute of the COE, Article 1d.

² See the *Message to the Consultative Assembly*, in: CM, *Documents*, 5th session, 5 August 1950, 111f.

world into two competing camps led by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Cold War resulted in different political conflicts until the collapse of the Eastern Bloc beginning in 1989 and the final dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Its definition is still contested in academia. However a widely spread interpretation, according to Stöver, is that it was primarily a conflict between two opposing ideologies that seemed to be incompatible. Specifically, it was a system conflict between the communist model of the state-socialist ‘people’s democracy’ and the liberal-capitalist model of parliamentary democracy.³ It is determined to have started when the Soviet Union and the US finally alienated from each other with the defeat of the common enemy of Nazi Germany in 1945. During the subsequent bipolar confrontations, large parts of the world attributed themselves to one of the blocs (or were forced to attribute themselves to the Eastern Bloc), except for the group of non-aligned countries and China, which aimed to keep maximum political and economic independence.⁴ The tensions reached a new level when US President Truman held a speech to the US Congress on 12 March 1947, the so-called Truman Doctrine, stipulating that the USA should support any free nations whose existence was threatened by external or internal pressure.⁵ The basis for Truman’s pronouncement emerged out of alarm from threats of Soviet and communist impacts, particularly in Greece and Turkey. Greece eventually suffered from a civil war between the communist leftists and the conservative monarchists.⁶ And Turkey at this time perceived itself under pressure after having refused the Soviet demands regarding northeastern territories as well as a common Turkish-Russian defence force in the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to guard the Black Sea.⁷ Furthermore, since bankrupted Great Britain requested the US to adopt the supporting role for both Greece and Turkey, an anti-communist global policy in the form of *containment* policy seemed to be nothing but necessary from the American perspective. The Truman Doctrine thus became the fundament

³ Cf. Bernd Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg*, 5th ed. (München: Beck, 2017), 7.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵ On the Truman Doctrine in general see also the short overviews in Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209, and Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 15f.

⁶ For more information on the Greek civil war (1946-1949) see, e.g., Heinz A. Richter, *Griechenland 1940-1950. Die Zeit der Bürgerkriege* (Mainz et al.: Rutzen, 2012).

⁷ As already mentioned in Chapter 3 (Historical Overview), concerning the common control of the straits, the USSR had demanded a revision of the *Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits* from 20 July 1936 that had given Turkey sole sovereignty over the straits. A Turkish willingness to cooperate would have been a precondition for the Soviets to renew the Turkish-Russian friendship treaty. Turkey thereafter moved closer to the West, especially towards the supportive hand of the United States who had encouraged Turkey to refuse the Soviet proposal. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 208f.; Karpát, “Turkish Soviet Relations,” 79ff.; Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, “Außenpolitik,” in *Die Türkei. Südosteuropa-Handbuch Band 4*, ed. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), 108.

of a new US foreign policy against communist regimes throughout the world.⁸ It also caused the development of closer ties between Turkey and the US, which led Turkey closer to the Western Bloc. On Turkey's sudden responsibilities in the upcoming Cold War through American aid, Athanassopoulou observes, "By one of history's ironies it was the most 'evasive neutral' of the war which was among the first to assume such a role in the Cold War."⁹

In the view of the Turkish government, American aid in the form of financial and technical assistance was deemed necessary given the country's political and economic problems: With US support, the ruling powers in Ankara were hopeful to be safeguarded against Soviet threats. More specifically, they hoped to develop their agriculture and industry sector, which, due to the perceived Soviet threat, had suffered from the state's focus on defence. They also hoped that aid from the US would further strengthen and professionalize their army, thus advancing the country's ideological 'westernization process'.¹⁰

The Soviet side, as a response to the Truman Doctrine, established the *Cominform* (Communist Information Bureau) in September 1947 and officially confirmed the *two camps theory* at its founding event, which is widely considered to be the start of the East-West conflict. Both sides interpreted the opposing positioning as a declaration of war.¹¹

To support US-Europe relations, shortly after the launch of the Truman Doctrine, the American *European Recovery Program*, also called *Marshall Plan*, was implemented in June 1947 to recover Europe's weakened economic markets. The Marshall Plan can be considered in the framework of the creation of the US containment policy. It aimed to not only create new markets for American export, but 'to help Europeans to help themselves'. Further, it had the hidden agenda to protect them from the risks of impoverishment as a breeding ground for communism. States that received US monetary aid, at the same time, were asked to build an international organization for the coordination and administration of the recovery assistance.

⁸ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209; George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance. Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Inst. for Public Policy Research, 1972), 25ff.

⁹ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952. The First Enlargement of NATO* (London et al.: Frank Cass, 1999), 63. On the meaning of the Truman Doctrine for Turkey's foreign policy see also Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 83f.; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 27ff.

¹⁰ Cf. Aslan, *Die Türkei*, 96f.

¹¹ Cf. Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg*, 24f. Concerning the terminology, Stöver points out that the concept of the 'East-West conflict' is much older than the 'Cold War' (e.g., already the Crimean War (1854-56) was interpreted as a conflict between East and West), however it was widely adopted to use both terms equally when referring to the conflict between 1947 and 1991. Herbert B. Swope coined the term 'Cold War' in 1946. He was an editor and journalist as well as an assistant of Bernard Baruch, who was an advisor to the US president and used the term in public for the first time in June 1947. However, it was the US publicist Walter Lippmann, who brought the term into the political debate with his brochure *The Cold War. A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Cf. Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg*, 8f.

The OEEC was established, as a result, with Turkey as a founding member state due to its status of receiving Marshall Aid.¹²

NATO, founded in 1949, guaranteed mutual assistance for member states in the case of an attack. As a response, in 1955, the Soviets and its allies established the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which thus cemented the bloc building process.¹³ In its 45 years of existence, the Cold War experienced several phases of détente and escalation. Most striking confrontations in the period of this study's analysis were the first and second Berlin crises (1948/49 and 1958-62 resulting in the building of the Berlin Wall), the Korean War (1950-53), and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.¹⁴ Turkey was directly involved in both the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis conflicts. Not only were US missiles stationed in Turkey, but there was Soviet demand to withdraw these missiles, with a promise to withdraw theirs from Cuba in return.¹⁵ In addition to these 'hot' conflicts were some confrontations in African and Asian states as well as in the Middle East that are to be considered (partly as proxy wars) within the scope of the Cold War. These include the Suez Crisis in Egypt in 1956 and the still ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. Overall, from the perspective of the West, it was important to fight against any Soviet and communist influence in the region.¹⁶ After the former colonial powers in the region, France and Great Britain, were stricken and isolated, the US government demonstrated their interest in the Middle East with the so-called 'Eisenhower Doctrine' in 1957. Here, US President Eisenhower declared to help Middle Eastern countries, even with military support if necessary, in the case of an attack by Soviet or communist threat.¹⁷ As will be shown below, in the COE's Assembly, Turkish delegates strategically used their country's geographical adjacency to the Middle East to argue for Turkey's exceptional importance for the West by representing Turkey as a bridge between the West and the Middle East.

¹² Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209; Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 18f. The Marshall Plan and the creation of the OEEC will be explained more detailed in Chapter 7 (Economy).

¹³ Besides, congruently to NATO other Western defence alliances were signed with Asian countries between 1951 and 1955, such as ANZUS, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Cf. Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg*, 35f.

¹⁴ On détente phases such as the Geneva summit of 1955 or the establishment of the Moscow–Washington hotline as a result of the Cuban missile crisis see *ibid.*, 81ff.

¹⁵ For details about those bipolar confrontations see, e.g., *ibid.*, 32ff. (on the first Berlin crisis and the Korean War), 51ff. (on the second Berlin crisis), 77ff. (on the Cuban missile crisis). Certain historical events additionally will be explored more detailed in this study's following chapters, particularly in Chapter 6 (Political Values) and Chapter 7 (Economy). Wassenberg also provides a comprehensive survey of the international situation during the founding process and the first years of the Council of Europe. Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 19f.

¹⁶ Cf. Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg*, 49f.

¹⁷ Cf. Haluk Gerger, *Die türkische Außenpolitik nach 1945. Vom "Kalten Krieg" zur "Neuen Weltordnung"*, trans. Tunçay Kulaoğlu (Köln: ISP, 2008), 83f.

The bipolar world order, with the ‘Iron Curtain’ as the borderline separating Western and Eastern Europe and particularly West and East Germany, also influenced the process of European integration. As will be demonstrated in detail, also in Assembly debates, the status of a bipolar world was consistently present, be it the power struggles between the superpowers, the conflicts between the two blocs, or the division of Europe. For Turkish representatives, the Cold War served, not least, to position Turkey in Europe and the West.

European Integration

After the founding of the first European intergovernmental organizations such as the OEEC and the Council of Europe, the 1950s were full of milestones in European integration history: Whereas some COE member states, particularly Great Britain, were not prepared to give up sovereignty and advocated for closer European cooperation at the intergovernmental level, six Western European states (France, the BRD, Italy, and the Benelux countries) enlarged the customs union of the Benelux created in 1948 and established the first supranational organization by giving up sovereignty in the economic field of coal and steel.¹⁸ As a result, with the Treaty of Paris and the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on 18 April 1951, two institutional forms of Europe existed: so-called ‘little Europe’ consisting of ‘the Six’ and ‘greater Europe’ embodied by the intergovernmental Council of Europe.¹⁹

With the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, the six ECSC member states sealed the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), also called Euratom.²⁰ Other European countries that were not able or willing to join the EEC, namely Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Austria, established the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1960. This economic unity, however, did not have a comparable integrative function as the Six had.²¹ Despite successes in

¹⁸ Not least, with the establishment of the ECSC, the French-German opposition should be solved. The BRD was ready to give up control over the coal and steel industry, and was, in turn, integrated in the construction process of Europe. On the ‘German problem’ see the published version of the dissertation of Mathias Schütz, *Mit und gegen Deutschland. Die europäische Einigung und das “deutsche Problem” 1945-1954* (Berlin: Logos, 2018).

¹⁹ Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 30. On the establishment of the ECSC see also Curt Gasteyger, *Europe: From Division to Unification. A documented overview 1945-2006* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006), 62-64; Clemens et al., *Geschichte der europäischen Integration*, 97-102. The foundation of the ECSC as discussed in the COE is also part of Chapter 7 (Economy).

²⁰ The difficult negotiations in first line were due to discrepancies between France and Germany, particularly on the concrete form of a Common Market. On this as well as on the final agreements that resulted in the establishment of the EEC and Euratom see Clemens et al., *Geschichte der europäischen Integration*, 128ff. On the founding of the EEC and Euratom see also Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 76ff.; Gasteyger, *Europe*, 111ff.

²¹ In 1961, also Portugal joined the EFTA. On the founding of the EFTA, see, e.g., Loth, *Building Europe*, 105.

economic integration, the progressive plan of constructing a supranational community in the form of a European Defence Community (EDC) and an interlinked European Political Community (EPC) failed since the treaty, which after lengthy negotiations, had been signed by the Six in May 1952, did not pass the French National Assembly.²² Instead, in the end, the only advance in political unification was the enlargement of the intergovernmental five-powers Brussels Treaty Organization to the Western European Union (WEU), including West Germany and Italy.²³

Any plans of integrating Europe on a supranational basis were also largely discussed in the COE's Assembly, as will be shown below. Particularly since the Six remained also members of the Council of Europe, the COE's Assembly served as a forum to discuss issues of European integration. Turkish deputies, in particular, used their participation in the Assembly to argue for their country's incorporation into various forms of European integration.

Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy

Notably, with respect to Turkish domestic developments, the Democrat Party (DP) replaced the CHP government under İnönü with the second free parliamentary elections on 14 May 1950. It was the first regime change in Turkish Republican history since its founding in 1923.²⁴ The DP program, however, differed insignificantly from the CHP position; the most meaningful self-identified difference was the aim to build the party 'from bottom to top' with

²² For a comprehensive description of the failed communities of EDC and EPC, see, e.g., Clemens et al., *Geschichte der europäischen Integration*, 108-123; Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 60-68. Great Britain announced not to become a member of the EDC in November 1951, which was surprising against the background that Winston Churchill, former supporter of a European Army, had returned as premier. The Conservatives, however, followed the Labours' line and preferred an expansion of the intergovernmental organization of the Brussels Treaty to serve as the basis of military cooperation within NATO. With regard to parliamentary voting in other countries, the EDC treaty passed the German and Benelux parliaments; Italy, however, waited for the French results for it also feared a negative result. In sum, the historian Urwin evaluates the failure of the EDC considering the point in time; in his view, the sensitive field of defence should have been one of the last spheres of giving up sovereignty, with a strong basis of integrative experience and mutual trust. Cf. Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 65ff.

²³ The WEU remained to be an intergovernmental organization, not least due to Great Britain as a member state, but in contrast to the Brussels Treaty it was extended by a consultative assembly whose delegates were the same as the COE's Assembly delegates. With the BRD's incorporation into the WEU as an equal member, the country was allowed to create its own West German army. As a result, ironically it was exactly the French Assembly's negative vote that resulted in a scenario the French government had deeply tried to avoid, which was a German military rebirth. Cf. *ibid.*, 70.

²⁴ On the basis of the Turkish electoral system, the DP received with 54% of the votes 408 seats, the CHP with 40% only 69 seats. The Grand National Assembly elected Celal Bayar for President, and Adnan Menderes became Prime Minister. These second free elections in 1950, however, were the first 'fair' elections since the first free elections of 1946 had actually been scheduled for 1947, but the CHP regime predated them to July 1946 in May 1945. As widely agreed upon in the literature on Turkish history, it is obvious that it was an attempt to hinder a DP triumph. The DP indeed was not able to organize enough candidates for election within such a short time. Cf. Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 80-84; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 217f., 221 (on the elections in 1950).

a stronger orientation towards the needs of the citizens, particularly the farmers, according to one of the DP founders and new President of Turkey, Celal Bayar.²⁵ Correspondingly, the Democrats' program consisted of increasing state support of the agricultural sector (which, according to the DP, concerned 80% of the population), as well as the respect for fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of conscience and religion.²⁶ Reintroducing the traditional Arab, instead of the Turkish call to prayer, at mosques also reinstated the country's Islamic identity.²⁷ In terms of economy, the DP advocated a more liberal economic policy.

Under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the decade of the 1950s should appear distressing for the Turkish people both in economic and political terms. The country experienced increasing inflation, its first serious economic crisis at the end of the 1950s,²⁸ and growing authoritarianism under Menderes, which finally resulted in the first military coup in Turkish republican history on 27 May 1960. Both before and after the coup, Turkish state authorities violated the shared values and political principles of the Council of Europe. The gradual return to authoritarian politics under Menderes from 1954 onwards included the restriction of press freedom, academic freedom, and judiciary freedom, among other things.²⁹ Moreover, after the coup, the legal proceedings against the Menderes regime and former high officials of the Democrat Party were closed in September 1961, with death sentences carried out in cases of Menderes and two ministers as well as numerous life sentences.³⁰ With a new, 'more liberal' constitution confirmed by a referendum on 9 July 1961 and the first parliamentary elections after the military intervention held in October 1961, Turkey returned to democracy.³¹ In January 1962, finally, also Turkish delegates re-entered the COE's Assembly.³²

²⁵ Cf. Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 80.

²⁶ For a more detailed description of the party program, see, e.g., *ibid.*, 84ff.

²⁷ Cf. Öktem, *Angry Nation*, 41.

²⁸ For a comprehensive survey of the economic developments in the 1950s in Turkey, see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 224ff. (on the accumulation of the economic problems at the end of the 1950s see especially 228f.).

²⁹ For further information on the return to authoritarian policies under Menderes and an increasing opposition to his rule, see *ibid.*, 229ff.

³⁰ Concerning the proceedings, the so-called Yassıada trials, see *ibid.*, 247f.

³¹ On the return to democracy at a glance see, e.g., *ibid.*, 244-247. Historian Udo Steinbach even evaluates the new constitution of 1961 as an "extreme liberal document" ("extrem liberales Dokument," translation from German by the author). See Steinbach, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 53. However, it should also be remarked that the army gained power through the establishment of a National Security Council. Cf. Öktem, *Angry Nation*, 46.

³² See the welcoming speech to the Turkish delegation of the Assembly's President: PACE, *Reports*, 13/3/III, 20th sitting, 16 January 1962, 658.

From the viewpoint of foreign relations, with Turkey's engagement in the Korean War (1950-53), the government proved its active foreign policy shift towards the West. In times of bipolar world order, and with the Democrat Party in power since May 1950, the preferred foreign policy strategy of the Kemalists, neutralism, was ultimately cut. When the communist North Korea invaded the Korean Republic in the South in 1950, Turkey immediately sent a brigade of about 4,500 men to join the UN forces, following some 25,000 until the end of the war in July 1953.³³ Thereby, it was the second state after the USA to respond to the UN appeal.³⁴ The decade under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1950-60) was, thus, not only a period of strengthening Turkey's economic ties with the Western capitalist system but also a new era of Turkish active foreign policy – towards the West, especially towards the US, in times of bloc building.³⁵ The decision to ally with the West, according to historical research, is primarily traced back to fears of being forced to become a satellite of the Soviets as it was currently happening in Eastern Europe. All the more after the Turkish government delivered the Soviet demands on the straits and territories in Eastern Turkey.³⁶ The Turkish government decided against a neutral stance in the Cold War since it deemed Turkey too weak economically, technically, and militarily to protect itself against a potential Soviet attack.³⁷ Joining NATO, however, was not an easy task, not at least due to the considerable suspicion regarding Turkey's commitment to Western security, based on the Turkish decision to remain outside World War Two. Turkey's engagement in Korea, as well as its cooperation with the US and the UK in setting up a Middle Eastern security alliance, can thus be considered attempts to (re-)establish Turkey's credibility as a reliable partner.³⁸ Turkey finally became a member of NATO in February 1952, after the North Atlantic Council had decided to invite Turkey and Greece to join the alliance in September 1951. For the Turkish government, this

³³ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 132 (Kaya gives a figure of 29,882 soldiers in sum). According to Zürcher, Turkey suffered some 6,000 casualties. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 235. Considering the Turkish decision process to send Turkish troops to South Korea, it is to be said that the Turkish involvement was initially intensely criticised by the opposition since it had been a governmental decision shortly after its inauguration without parliamentary consultation. Cf. *ibid.*, 133f.

³⁴ Cf. George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection. How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 77. According to McGhee, US ambassador to Turkey from 1947 to 1953, the first brigade arrived on 24 October 1950 and the fast decision Menderes had taken without consulting the opposition party was approved by an overwhelming majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in December 1950 – according to the worldwide recognition given to the fighting qualities of the Turkish troops. The historian William Hale numbers the first Turkish brigade to Korea with 5,090 men. Cf. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 85.

³⁵ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 234. See also Kaya's chapter on "Active Foreign Policy against the Background of NATO Accession" ("Aktive Außenpolitik vor dem Hintergrund des NATO-Beitritts," translation from German by the author), in Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 132-135.

³⁶ On the decision to ally with the West due to the fear of a Soviet invasion, see for instance, Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 80f.; Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo-American Security Interests*, 68.

³⁷ Cf. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 78.

³⁸ Cf. Yilmaz and Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "western" identity," 41.

was a great success, both in terms of its country's internal and external security, and with regard to its acceptance as a Western country. In the following years, Turkey was also engaged in two other – however, unsuccessful – military projects aimed at extending Western defence structures to the Balkans and the Middle East.³⁹ The Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey signed on 28 February 1953, following Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, determined to negotiate matters of common interest and military importance. The alignment, transferred into the Balkan Pact in 1954, became void in 1955 following Khrushchev's peace with Tito.⁴⁰

Turkey was encouraged by the US and UK to maintain political engagement in the Middle East after the British had decided to reduce their military presence in the region in the early 1950s. In NATO's plans of building up a new defensive system against Soviet influence, Turkey was considered a crucial player and viewed as having the strongest military in the Middle East while also being committed to the West through NATO. However, involving the core Arab states in a defence alliance, in the form of a Middle East Pact, proved unsuccessful. After all, among other things, Arab states regarded Turkey with grave suspicion, which can be traced back to Ottoman times when the Turks ruled Arab lands, and to the fact that Turkey had recognised the state of Israel in 1949.⁴¹ Besides, from the perspective of non-aligned states, the fact that an underdeveloped country such as Turkey had committed itself to the imperialist West, acting as its henchman instead of joining the movement of non-aligned countries, was considered suspicious.⁴²

Regional efforts of the Turkish government resulted in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which secured mutual assistance only among a small group of signature states, namely Iraq (as the only Middle Eastern country), Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and the UK. The pact was strongly promoted, also materially, by the US as an observer state.⁴³ However, regional protests against the pact and the coup d'état in Iraq, which overthrew the pro-Western regime of Nuri al-Said in July 1958, ensued. Consequently, the Baghdad Pact was reconstructed as a purely northern tier alliance consisting of Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan (and the US still as an observer state) in August 1959, known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Overall, without a centralized command structure, both the Baghdad Pact and CENTO suffered from

³⁹ Cf. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 90.

⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 90f.

⁴¹ Cf. *ibid.*, 91f.

⁴² Cf. Gerger, *Die türkische Außenpolitik*, 78f.

⁴³ For the process of building up the Baghdad Pact see Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 92.

structural weaknesses and were rather political than effective defensive organizations.⁴⁴ Finally, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, CENTO was dissolved in 1979.

Also, in the 1950s, Turkey was involved in another regional conflict, the island of Cyprus. Relations with Greece, which had been peaceful since the early 1930s, rapidly deteriorated as the Cyprus conflict erupted in 1954. The former Ottoman island had been under British administration since 1878 and was home to both Turkish and Greek Cypriots (around 20% and 80%, respectively). In April 1955, Greek nationalists started to attack British rulers based on the idea of uniting the island with the Greek nation-state (*enosis*) after Greece had unsuccessfully brought the case of Cyprus being under British rule to the UN in 1954. Whereas the Greek government and parts of the British Labour Party supported the idea of *enosis*, the Turkish government insisted on the status quo, in solidarity with the Turkish Cypriots, to avoid duplicating the Greek-Turkish border. Finally, after agreements could have been made in Zürich and London in 1958 and 1959, on 16 August 1960, the whole island became an independent republic for the time being, which was guaranteed by Greece, Turkey, and Britain.⁴⁵

With regard to institutional Turkish-European relations, Turkey's application for association with the European Economic Community on 31 July 1959 was crucial in those days. To what extent Ankara's application was interlinked with Athen's application a few weeks earlier, remains contested.⁴⁶ The Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, for instance, represents the popular estimation that the Turkish application would have certainly been carried out later without the Greek request.⁴⁷ Either way, in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, the applications of Greece and Turkey, "two by no means unimportant countries on the outskirts of Europe," were supported and considered "encouraging signs."⁴⁸

⁴⁴ According to Hale, from the perspective of the Middle Eastern CENTO members, the organization's main value was that it provided financial and military aid from the US. Cf. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 93.

⁴⁵ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 237f. For a more detailed consideration of the Cyprus conflict erupting in 1954 see, e.g., Clement H. Dodd, *The history and politics of the Cyprus conflict* (Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 20ff.

⁴⁶ Details on the application and negotiation process regarding Turkey's association with the EEC are provided in Chapter 7 (Economy).

⁴⁷ Cf. Mehmet Ali Birand, "Turkey and the European Community," *The World Today* 34/2 (1978): 52; see also Birand, *Türkiye'nin Gümrük Birliği macerası*, 48f.; Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 38; Heinz Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei. Entwicklung, Probleme und Perspektiven einer schwierigen Partnerschaft* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), 32. To what extent the Greek application influenced the Turkish decision to apply at that time, is discussed in the research literature, as will be shown more detailed in Chapter 7 (Economy). For an overview of the discussion see, e.g., Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 271.

⁴⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 11/2, 16th sitting, 16 September 1959, van der Goes van Naters (Netherlands), 439f.

5.2 Representations of the Common Other in Plans of Setting up a European Army

Based on the historical juncture of European involvement in the Korean War, and given that the Committee of Ministers had appealed to the COE's Assembly to declare its solidarity with the UN Security Council, the Assembly's President Paul-Henri Spaak seized the opportunity to start debating questions on a common European defence in August 1950.⁴⁹ Turkish delegates were active in these debates and presented their country as essential to safeguarding Europe's security in order to be incorporated in the future planning of common defence. This subchapter will detail the argumentative strategies used to convince their colleagues of Turkey's exceptional importance in initial discussions of a European defence alliance plan.

The initial proposals regarding the establishment of a common defence institution will provide some situational and historical context: A widely discussed idea was the European Army. The first appeal on building up such a common army in the Assembly came from the British delegate and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 11 August 1950:

*“There must be created, and in the shortest possible time, a real defensive front in Europe. Great Britain and the United States must send large forces to the Continent. France must again revive her famous Army. We welcome our Italian comrades. All – Greece, Turkey, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Scandinavian States – must bear their share and do their best.”*⁵⁰

Churchill's proposal on setting up a European Army was part of a long speech on the general political development of uniting throughout Europe. With regard to the field of defence, he submitted a motion in which he called “for the immediate creation of a unified European Army subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full co-operation with the United States and Canada.”⁵¹ The Assembly voted in favour of Churchill's motion the same day and, using his text, finally adopted a recommendation for the Committee of Ministers. However, this included the amendment that the European Army should be under the authority

⁴⁹ The Committee of Ministers' appeal to the Assembly was made a subject of discussion in the 2nd sitting on 8 August 1950. Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 2nd sitting, 8 August 1950, 22ff.

⁵⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 5th sitting, 11 August 1950, Churchill (United Kingdom), 123.

⁵¹ Cf. PACE, *Documents*, Doc. 47: Motion relative to the creation of a European Army, proposed by Churchill, 11 August 1950, 776.

of a European Minister of Defence.⁵² This proposal, considered equally as important as the Schuman Plan in the domain of coal and steel, suggested enhanced political authority of the Council of Europe.⁵³ Nonetheless, the Committee of Ministers rejected the Assembly's recommendation to establish a common army within the scope of the Council of Europe at its session in November 1950. It was not a rejection of the vision of a European Army per se, but the COE's authority to initiate the establishment of a defence alliance. It was mainly the British government that stopped any further deliberations by immediately opposing an amendment of the Statute's regulation on defence issues.⁵⁴ A British argument was that Europe's security had already been allocated to NATO and the Brussels Treaty Organization, international organizations dealing with defence issues.⁵⁵ The Ministers ultimately agreed not to decide on defence issues within the scope of the Council of Europe.⁵⁶

Outside the Council of Europe, Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had already pushed for a proposal on how to solve the European defence problem when he debated the idea of a European Army in 1949.⁵⁷ Then it was the French Prime Minister, René Pleven, who presented his vision of a European Army to the French parliament in October 1950. The so-called 'Pleven Plan', based on an outline drafted by his earlier mentor Jean Monnet, finally became the basis of further consultations on a supranational European Defence Community (EDC). It was in first line an attempt by the French government to find a way to keep West Germany's rearmament under international control. The creation of a supranational defence community intended to solve the problem of Germany's independent rearmament since the US idea of Germany's incorporation into NATO was considered an insufficient solution.⁵⁸

⁵² PACE, *Documents*, Doc. 52: Recommendation to the Committee of Ministers relative to the creation of a European Army, adopted 11 August 1950, 789. For the voting on Churchill's motion see also PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 5th sitting, 11 August 1950, 165: The result of the voting was 89 ayes, 5 noes and 27 abstentions.

⁵³ The founding process of the European Coal and Steel Community and how it was considered in the COE's Assembly is part of Chapter 6 (Political Values) and Chapter 7 (Economy).

⁵⁴ Beforehand, the chairman initiated not to avoid a debate on defence questions solely based on its regulated exclusion in the Statute for the simple reason that „a constitutional Charter was a living thing and capable of development.“ An example of this would be the British tradition since Magna Charta, he ironically continued. Ernest Davies, the British deputy of foreign minister Ernest Bevin, as the first speaker then directly opposed any attempt to change the Statute and reminded his colleagues why Article 1 (d) on the exclusion of national defence questions had been drafted – “if this prohibition had not been included, several States now represented in the Council of Europe would have felt scruples about joining the organisation.” CM, *Official Report*, 6th session, 3 November 1950, Davies (United Kingdom), 20.

⁵⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁶ Cf. CM, *Official Report*, 6th session, 3 November 1950, 22-24.

⁵⁷ Cf. Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 61.

⁵⁸ It was the French answer to American pressure since it was the US who drivingly supported West Germany's rearmament. In the light of recent experience Western European countries, in contrast to the US, eventually were highly sceptical towards German rearmament. Urwin gives a detailed overview of these discussions and developments until the compromise of creating the EDC, see *ibid.*, 60ff.

However, as aforementioned, the EDC treaty never went into effect; instead, security issues remained open for discussion within intergovernmental organizations.

While security issues were excluded within the COE, the Committee of Ministers approached the Assembly in 1950 to give an official declaration to the UN, supporting the Korean international operation. This empowered the Assembly community to continue discussing political questions in the field of defence, from their point of view.⁵⁹ Thereby, Turkish representatives used the Assembly as a forum to expose Turkey's significance for Western Europe's security in the next months and years. In late November 1950, for example, Turkish delegate Osman Kapani, a member of the DP representing the province of İzmir,⁶⁰ started a marathon of Turkish self-presentations, paving the way for a concordant Turkish argumentation within the debate about a report of the Committee on General Affairs relative to European defence. The political interest he represented was abundantly clear: his aim was Turkey's incorporation to any existing or planned Western defence organization, such as NATO or the European Army under construction. Thereby, he used several arguments and numerous rhetorical devices, presented in detail hereafter. He started his speech with geopolitical representations:

“The defence of Europe forms a whole. The European Continent is both a Mediterranean and an Atlantic power. If to-day Europe has to face the communist threat, let us not forget that its frontiers are just as much in Berlin or on the Elbe as in Macedonia or Anatolia. The people of Turkey have resisted internal communism victoriously, but they do not forget that the menace is a permanent one.”⁶¹

Several arguments served Turkey's location in Europe. The Turkish deputy was able to unite Turkey with Europe effortlessly by accentuating the most significant commonality of democratic Europe – facing the same enemy and being permanently threatened by the spread of communism. Thereby, he attracted particular attention by stressing the threat of communist

⁵⁹ Concerning the CM's request, the Assembly adopted a resolution on 11 August 1950, in which it supported the UN mission in Korea. Cf. PACE, *Documents*, Doc. 53: Resolution condemning the aggression committed by North Korea and supporting the action of the United Nations in defending international law, adopted 11 August 1950, 790.

⁶⁰ Information about Turkish delegates (here as well as in the following) and their party affiliation can be found on the following page: <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/MP-Search-Country-Archives-EN.asp?CountryID=44> (15 September 2020). The provinces they represented in the Turkish parliament can be found on: <https://everypolitician.org/turkey/assembly/> (15 September 2020).

⁶¹ PACE, *Reports*, 2/5, 28th sitting, 24 November 1950, Kapani (Turkey), 1720.

expansionism as persistent, both in Turkey as in other regions, especially in those ones bordering communist/socialist regimes. Kapani then constituted, in regards to mutual defence security, the equal importance of the borders by claiming, “in face of the peril of communism, no front is of minor importance.”⁶² Therefore, he asked the Assembly to declare seriously “here and now that it considers the security of Turkey as intimately bound up with the security of all the nations of Europe.”⁶³ His expression clearly demonstrates that he expected some European governments to oppose a Turkish contribution in Western defence alliances. Concurrently, it reveals his deep disappointment regarding the exclusion of Turkey. In his view, excluding his country was unacceptable since “Turkey was one of the first to contribute effective aid – the aid of its children and of its arms – to the action of the United Nations in Korea.”⁶⁴ Afterward, he remarked that the immediate decision taken by the government was welcomed with “tremendous ovation”⁶⁵ in the Turkish National Assembly, further exposing “the whole Turkish people,”⁶⁶ and not only the government, as supporters of the UN operation in Korea. Concluding this argument, he clearly summarized, “Hence Turkey has given obvious proof of its attachment to the Western community, and she expects from the West only a reciprocal assurance.”⁶⁷ Turkish delegates frequently used the argument of Turkey’s contribution in the Korean War to prove the country’s absolute commitment to the West in the Assembly debates of the next years, as will be demonstrated below. It must be taken into account that, at the time, European allies regarded Turkey with scepticism due to its neutrality during the Second World War.

Also striking in Kapani’s speech was his emphasis on the approval of the entire Turkish people. This strategy deterred European politicians from attributing the dedication to the West only to the government elite. In order to demonstrate the imminent danger in the case of not supporting Turkey’s security sector, the delegate Kapani then staged the following scene:

“I turn to certain members of this Assembly and I ask them: would you agree to seeing communist forces controlling the Straits, exerting their pressure suddenly on the whole of the Near East, on the Suez Canal, on your most direct lines of communication with those overseas countries with which you are so intimately associated? I then turn to other colleagues of mine and say: if one day the waves of the Red Army surged over

⁶² PACE, *Reports*, 2/5, 28th sitting, 24 November 1950, Kapani (Turkey), 1722.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Berlin or Stockholm, I assure you – and I am convinced that I speak for all my people – that all Turkey would be at one with you in your struggle.”⁶⁸

Thereby, he created a stage-like setting by imagining two possible scenarios of Soviet attacks. In the first scenario, Turkey being under attack, he reiterated Turkey’s geographical significance by representing it as the direct line from the Black Sea to the Near and Middle East. He portrayed Turkey’s geography as unique and, therefore, exceptionally important in protecting the whole Middle East from being overrun by the communist menace. From a critical geopolitics approach, more than geographies, there are geographical representations that create tools of power.⁶⁹ The political scientist Yanik finds that Turkish policy-makers constructed Turkish ‘exceptionalism’ through liminal and hybrid representations of Turkey’s geography in post-Cold War times.⁷⁰ Also apparent in the situational and historical context of the Council of Europe during the first years of the East-West division is that such hybrid representations were common. These geographical representations of Turkey as a liminal state – here as European but also Middle Eastern – served as tools of power to argue for his country’s incorporation into Western defence alliances.

The second scenario of Berlin or Stockholm being under attack also proved to be threatening and was used to emphasize Turkey’s commitment to the West in another context. The claim that Turkey would not hesitate before intervening in a conflict resulting from communist aggression in any Western European country was presumably taken seriously, with Turkey having proved its solid tie with the West in the Korean War. In short, the deputy’s message was clear: The West could count on Turkey in any case of Soviet aggression.

After describing the Turkish concept of a possible European Army as “very tangible proof of the solidarity of our countries,”⁷¹ he finalized his speech with a final emphasis on the urgency of creating such a common army:

*“In face of this danger the defence of Europe, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, is indivisible. In face of this danger we Europeans must organize as large as possible a European army.”*⁷²

⁶⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 2/5, 28th sitting, 24 November 1950, Kapani (Turkey), 1722.

⁶⁹ Cf. O’Tuathail and Dalby, “Introduction: rethinking geopolitics,” 15.

⁷⁰ See the whole article: Yanik, “Constructing Turkish “exceptionalism”.”

⁷¹ PACE, *Reports*, 2/5, 28th sitting, 24 November 1950, Kapani (Turkey), 1722.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 1724.

According to his presentation, there was no alternative solution other than creating a common defence policy among all free countries located on the European subcontinent. Furthermore, the self-designation “we Europeans” at the end of his speech constructed a sense of belonging and exemplified the strategy frequently used by Turkish delegates to identify and self-present themselves as Europeans.

Maksudi-Arsal, a member of the Democrat Party and an Ankara deputy in the National Assembly also pointed to Turkey’s outstanding geostrategic significance in the resistance of a communist spread and, thus, cemented what Kapani had previously deliberated:

“This new imperialism, this new doctrine threatens Western Europe from two sides, from the East and from the South, but particularly from the South. We southerners will know to fight against this danger, we have been accustomed to fight it for centuries. If someone comes to our aid, we will try to forestall it. But if we, by ourselves, have not the power to prevent it, then, which God forbid, this imperialism will come down to the shores of the Mediterranean and will overwhelm the coasts of Africa. What will Europe do then? Even if Western Europe is by then unified it could only resist for a very little while. Ladies and gentlemen, it must be admitted that the danger is urgent and immediate. Only a coalition of all the nations of the South and the West can prevent its victory.”⁷³

Much like his colleague Kapani, the delegate Maksudi-Arsal presented Turkey as exceptionally important for Europe’s security by representing the country’s geography as unique at international level in order to argue for the necessity of uniting the whole of Europe in terms of defence. Besides, with the help of metaphorical language, such as warning against the imperialism, that “will come down to the shores of the Mediterranean and will overwhelm the coasts of Africa,” he represented the danger of being occupied as imminent – in this case, by attributing characteristics of the sea to the Soviets, such as being as powerful and fast as waves and the flood. These threatening images served the purpose of intensifying and realizing the common vision of uniting the whole of Europe, which eventually included Turkey as part of Europe as well.

Like Kapani, he accentuated Turkey’s geostrategic meaning in the fight against communist expansion by creating threatening scenarios. There was only one sure way to avoid a “modus

⁷³ PACE, *Reports*, 2/5, 28th sitting, 24 November 1950, Maksudi-Arsal (Turkey), 1728.

vegetandi”⁷⁴ induced by communist occupation and to ensure a solid defence of Europe, namely, establishing a military organization consisting of Western and Southern Europe. This referred to no other countries than to Greece and Turkey in those days, with the rest of southeastern Europe being under Soviet or Titus’ dictatorship. The tenor he created was the same as the delegate Kapani had outlined before – Turkey was an important international player and regional power in the joint defence against the common enemy.

As exemplified in these two speeches, Turkish representatives frequently contributed to the constructions of the Soviets and the ideology of communism as the dominant Other to the European Self. They even described the “danger that comes from the East”⁷⁵ as a group of “uncivilized barbarians.”⁷⁶ By observing the enemy not as an abstract political and economic system but as human beings (though negatively), they staged the incarnate enemy as being even more threatening. They viewed these human actors as completely different and inferior compared to themselves as Europeans.

Such an image of the East was dominant not only in Turkish representatives’ rhetoric at the time. In the European assemblies of the 1950s, as historian Achim Trunk underlines, the perception of the Soviet Union was generally marked by antagonistic and competing aspects. Ways of speaking that characterized the dangerousness of the Soviet Union as a ‘Bolshevik danger’ or ‘communist danger’ were common in national and European discourses, often without mentioning the Soviet Union by name. Dominant throughout was the perception of Soviet expansionism, which coincided with a historical Russian urge to expand.⁷⁷ In reference to this study, this explains the frequently used designation of the Soviet Union as Russia in Assembly speeches. Consequently, what constituted the Other was an aggressive urge to expand. Characterizations like those cited by Turkish delegates – “the new imperialism,” the “danger from the East,” and “the communist threat” – paralleled the common descriptions of the Soviet Union in the European assemblies of that time. All the more, they were deemed suitable for assigning Turkey to the European Self, which set itself apart from the aggressive Other.

⁷⁴ Maksudi-Arsal used this term in the context of reminding the Assembly of one of the reasons why the COE was founded, which was the threatening imperialism from the East. “The aim of this new-style imperialism was not only to subjugate and enslave neighbouring countries and lay hands on their wealth, but also to substitute for the classic civilization of the West a new *modus vivendi* – if it can be called a *modus vivendi*, for already there are some who call it a *modus vegetandi*.” PACE, *Reports*, 2/5, 28th sitting, 24 November 1950, Maksudi-Arsal (Turkey), 1728.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 1730.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 171ff.

To summarize, even in the early stages of discussions on a common European defence unit, Turkish delegates feared Turkey's exclusion. This is not surprising, given Turkey's non-membership of NATO and its neutral stance in the Second World War. As illustrated in this subchapter, Turkish delegates called for Turkish involvement mainly through representations of Turkey's unwavering commitment to the West and its willingness to fight for the preservation of Western principles. In support of this argument, they strategically used above all the Turkish engagement in the Korean War and the friend-foe pattern in Cold War rhetoric through various descriptions of the enemy. The Turkish delegates' constant emphasis on the common Other allowed at the same time for consistent self-identification with the European Self, even if the latter remained quite empty in the geostrategic partial discourse. Even the interpretation of 'free Europe' can be considered Cold War rhetoric to describe that part of Europe, which was not under Soviet control. Various threatening scenarios served Turkish representatives as a means of persuasion. These scenarios imagined the resulting danger that could ensue from excluding Turkey from Western defence alliances and extended to the complete capture of Europe by the Soviets and even beyond the borders of Europe, including Africa and Asia. Concurrently, Turkish delegates contributed to the construction of Turkey's role at the international level as a bastion against Soviet expansionism. Different geographical representations, such as representations of a 'multi-geographical' identity, which they assigned to Turkey, thereby served as tools of power.

5.3 A European Army without Turkey? Turkish Representations of a Dying European Idea

The fact that the Turkish government was not invited to consultations on setting up a European Army in Paris as of 15 February 1951 resulted in deep disappointment as well as counterarguments on the part of Turkish and non-Turkish delegates in the COE's Assembly, as will be demonstrated in the following in detail.

Churchill's idea of a European Army including all – "Greece, Turkey, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Scandinavian States," as he had proposed in the Assembly in August 1950 – contradicted the French government's plan at the time.⁷⁸ France had invited only the European NATO states to consult in Paris on the establishment of a European Army, and had

⁷⁸ As aforementioned, France, in first line, was mainly interested in controlling West Germany's rearmament under the auspices of a European Army. For Churchill's speech see PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 5th sitting, 11 August 1950, Churchill (United Kingdom), 123.

asked the USA and Canada to send observers.⁷⁹ Consequently, Turkey and Greece had been left out. As a response to the Paris Conference, the Committee on General Affairs of the COE's Assembly submitted a seven-page long *Report on the Political Aspects of European Defence* on 5 May 1951. It criticised the intended limited participation of COE member states, although – according to the report – there was “no doubt that the Conference on the European Army was to a very large extent brought about by the Recommendations of the Assembly,” which entailed that “no discrimination should be made between the participating countries.”⁸⁰ For this reason and for the unification of the whole of Europe, the Committee requested, “Invitations to take part in the Paris Conference should be extended to all Member States of the Council of Europe.”⁸¹ According to this, the report ended with a draft resolution emphasizing that “the unity of Europe can only be guaranteed if all the Member States remain free to take part in the measures initiated by the Council of Europe,” which was why “all the free States of Europe who may so desire should be invited to take part in the present negotiations for the creation of a European Army.”⁸²

In the sitting period of May 1951, the Assembly members discussed this report intensely, particularly the issue of the French selection of participating countries in negotiations on a European Army, as will be examined in detail below.

Turkish delegates were very active in these discussions, which is not surprising, given that the idea of a common army had eventually been developed and discussed within the scope of the Council of Europe's Assembly in its last sessions in August and November 1950, during which Turkish representatives had emphatically supported the concept of a joint defence unit. The first Turkish delegate to ask for an explanation as to why Turkey had been ignored was Kasım Gülek, a CHP member from Adana, who had received his academic education in economic science and law at elite universities in France, the USA, the UK, and West Germany. With a Ph.D. from Columbia University and fluency in six foreign languages, he was certainly part of the highly educated cosmopolitan elite of Turkish society.⁸³ In a general

⁷⁹ Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, and Hans-Erich Volkmann, *Die EVG-Phase (Anfänge deutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 2)*, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (München: Oldenbourg, 1990), 649.

⁸⁰ PACE, *Documents*, Doc. 8: Report of the Political Aspects of European Defence, 5 May 1951, 146. In this regard, the report refers to the Recommendations of the Assembly adopted on 11 August 1950 and on 24 November 1950 (which entailed the determination against the discrimination of any country), which are the Recommendations 52 and 53 (1950).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 149.

⁸³ On his educational background and academic career in Europe and North America, see Balcı, *Kasım Gülek*, 38-42. Gülek was part of the Turkish delegation in the COE's Assembly between 1949 and 1968 (with several gaps, however). He was one of the most communicative delegates and closely linked to the European project, which is why a few words about his educational background seemed appropriate here. Cf.

debate on a report by the Committee of Ministers, he referred to Turkey's "wholeheartedly" support in the process of passing a recommendation on the creation of a European Army and asked the Committee of Ministers for details regarding the invitation procedure as well as for reasons why certain countries, among them Turkey, had been left out.⁸⁴ Turkey, according to him, eventually had the "most efficient and the strongest army in Europe" and spent the greatest proportion of its national income on the maintenance of its army.⁸⁵ He thus represented the non-observance of Turkey as a potential member of a common army as illegitimate and reassured the country's commitment to the defence of the whole of Europe by emphasizing its military strength. Additionally, he reinforced the expression his colleague, Kapani, made in the prior session and stressed that Europe's defence should eventually be considered only as a whole.⁸⁶ It should be mentioned, however, that claiming Turkey had the most efficient and strongest army in Europe was quite exaggerated and can be seen as a strategy to present the Turkish army being beneficial to Europe.⁸⁷

Days later, within the continued debates on European defence, the Turkish delegation received support from Assembly colleagues of different citizenship. As a first supporting speaker, the British deputy Duncan Sandys expressed his empathy by pointing out that the Turkish representatives "feel they have been left out in the cold, and they ask to be included in the common front."⁸⁸ He then presented two potential opportunities for how to include them into the Western defence system. One solution suggested an extension of the Atlantic Pact while another proposed creating a specific Mediterranean defence community to incorporate Turkey, Greece, and other Mediterranean states, which would associate with NATO.⁸⁹ He underlined that both arrangements were not just a question of kindness or ways

<https://web.archive.org/web/20150618210146/http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/MP-Details-EN.asp?MemberID=83&CountryID=44> (15 September 2020).

⁸⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/I, 3rd sitting, 7 May 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 58. Concerning the invitation procedure, three days later, after Gülek had repeated his question, he received a brief reply from the Assembly's President Spaak: As the invitations were sent outside the Council of Europe by one individual government, he was not able to answer his question. Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/II, 8th sitting, 10 May 1951, The President, 187.

⁸⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/I, 3rd sitting, 7 May 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 58.

⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁸⁷ It was mainly through immense US educational and technical help that the Turkish military developed from an "extremely backward military machine" at the end of the 1940s to a 'well-educated modern army' based on US model in the course of the 1950s (Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 96). In the Korean War, Hale emphasizes, the Turkish troops that were sent and that consisted of the best-trained troops still lacked technical knowledge, which resulted in the fact that 40-50% of American-supplied military vehicles were out of order at the beginning of 1952. With Turkey entering NATO the US started a massive reform of the military education system. Cf. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 96. On the dependence on US military assistance, see also Gerhard Weiher, *Militär und Entwicklung in der Türkei, 1945-1973: ein Beitrag zur Untersuchung der Rolle des Militärs in der Entwicklung der Dritten Welt* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1978), 99ff.

⁸⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/II, 12th sitting, 12 May 1951, Sandys (United Kingdom), 295.

⁸⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

to extend their “protecting arm over Greece and Turkey.”⁹⁰ Instead, the two countries’ contributions to a common defence would be crucial, first and foremost due to their strategic significance:

*“The Eastern Mediterranean is a vital factor in the defence of Western Europe, and in the event of attack on the West, it can be of major strategic importance. Apart from their efficient armies, these Eastern Mediterranean countries would provide advanced air bases for strategic bombing which might be of immense importance; secondly, they would provide the possibility for opening, if it should be decided to do so, a second front in the Balkans.”*⁹¹

He thus campaigned for Turkish and Greek incorporation in the Western defence alliances by emphasizing the strategic advantages of both countries, based on their geographical location. Yugoslavia under Tito, as he further underlined, was still a socialist dictatorship and therefore a potential source of danger, even if it was a non-aligned country at the time. In his view, a solution to the problem of incorporating two non-NATO members into a European Army that finally should link to NATO could merely be the inclusion of Turkey and Greece into the Atlantic Pact in one form or another.⁹²

A look at the historical context concerning the parallel discussions within NATO shows that views on Turkish integration diverged at that time. In particular, the British and Americans had a controversial discussion about the extent to which Turkish integration should be linked to regional commitments in the Mediterranean and Middle East.⁹³ Ultimately, the American government decided to promote full NATO membership for the country without attaching any special conditions, which was approved by the US President on 23 May 1951. London, on the other hand, wanted to make NATO membership conditional on Turkey agreeing to become part of a planned Middle East Command and to place its troops under British command in the event of war. These days, the Scandinavian NATO members, Norway and Denmark, still objected to Turkish and Greek admission to NATO since they feared involvement in a war in

⁹⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/II, 12th sitting, 12 May 1951, Sandys (United Kingdom), 295.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ On the negotiation process within NATO concerning Turkey’s role in Western defence alliances, above all on the disputes between the US and Britain, see Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey*, 153ff.

the Middle East, in which they had no interest.⁹⁴ As will be explained below, in the end, the NATO countries agreed to invite Turkey to join the Alliance as a full member.

Following Duncan Sandys, the Turkish deputy Kapani enthusiastically contributed once again to the discussions. As seen above, he had already been very active in defending Turkey's significance for Europe's security in the initial process of brainstorming on a common army. As an initial point of criticism, he also demanded an explanation on why the idea of a European Army, originally developed within the scope of the Assembly, now was realized only by Western Europe.⁹⁵ He continued,

“Can it be that my country and Greece are inhabited by Europeans of secondary importance? Is there no need to take any steps to ensure the security of the Eastern Mediterranean against every threat? How can we answer these questions other than in the negative?”⁹⁶

As Duncan Sandys had observed before, Turkish deputies felt left out in the cold. With his statement on Turkey and Greece being of secondary importance, Kapani strongly criticised how some European governments behaved towards other European countries. In addition, with the help of several rhetorical questions, he expressed his incomprehension considering the unequal treatment of countries when it came to creating a joint army. This becomes visible in the further course of his speech:

“If it were to be announced at this moment, in this Assembly, that one of our countries had been hit by aggression, we should be unanimous to stand beside it in a common struggle. Why, then, do we have this discrimination, when invitations are being sent out for a conference on the European army? It would be impossible for me to exaggerate the harm that has been done to the European idea in our part of Europe.”⁹⁷

⁹⁴ On the American, British and Scandinavian stances at that time in brief, see Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 86. On British plans regarding Turkey's involvement in Western defence alliances in detail, see Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey*, 138ff.

⁹⁵ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 330.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

With the help of using a threatening scenario rhetorically, the Turkish delegate Kapani appealed to the Assembly community not to discriminate against any country in the process of consulting on the establishment of a European army. By referring to the fact that the exclusion of certain countries contradicted the common European idea of uniting all democratic European countries, he publicly exposed the *delegitimized* behaviour of certain countries. This is what Schimmelfennig calls ‘shaming’ as part of his reflections on rhetorical strategies in international communities.⁹⁸ What can be defined as ‘delegitimized behaviour’ depends on the standard of legitimacy, which is based on common norms and values of a political community and which defines the rights and duties of its members.⁹⁹

At this point it is worth taking a closer look at Schimmelfennig’s theoretical explanations in this context. First of all, within his theoretical approach of ‘rhetorical action’ he also refers to the ‘founding myth’ of European integration to explain why certain voices have been ‘rhetorically entrapped’ in European discourses thus far. As a reminder, and as Schimmelfennig briefly summarizes, the founding myth of European integration started with a definition of the European situation after World War Two, when Europe was devastated by war and fascism, removed from the centre of the international system, and threatened by Soviet communism. This situation called for a deviation from traditional European international politics and resulted in the common notion that only a union of the democratic European states could avoid another war, strengthen their domestic and international ability to resist totalitarianism, and make Europe’s voice heard in international relations. As Schimmelfennig concludes, European integration was thus based on a pan-European, liberal, both antifascist and anti-communist ideology and identity.¹⁰⁰ This founding myth can be detected covertly within many speeches, as the current analysis of the minutes of talks after 1949 reveals at different points. Turkish delegates, for instance, instrumentalised this myth to push their own interests forward by strategically using the argument of the commonly determined goal of realizing the ‘European idea’. Since the unification of all democratic European countries was a pan-European idea and given that Turkey was a member of the Council of Europe embodying this idea, Turkish delegates had the right to argue for their inclusion in the planning of European integration.

⁹⁸ Cf. Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap,” 64f.

⁹⁹ According to Schimmelfennig, the medium of influence through ‘rhetorical action’ is legitimacy. The standard of legitimacy also determines which political purposes are allowed. For a more comprehensive execution on the standard of political legitimacy and its function as the medium of ‘rhetorical action’, see *ibid.*, 63.

¹⁰⁰ For this summary of the founding myth of European integration, see *ibid.*, 66.

After arguing for Turkey's participation in the Paris consultations on a European Army based on the community goal of uniting, when it was about to advocate for the country's admission to NATO, Kapani again accentuated Turkey's international importance. On one hand, he presented his country as the "principal balancing factor in the Middle East" with one of the strongest armies in Europe.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, he claimed that the country's unique geographic situation, being at the sentinel of the straits and the junction of two continents, might give the Soviets reason enough to attack Turkey since it was "the place where Russia seeks an outlet upon the Mediterranean."¹⁰² He thus argued for Turkey's admission to NATO by emphasizing Turkey's 'exceptionalism' on the grounds of hybrid constructions of Turkey's geography – by portraying the country as belonging to two different continents.¹⁰³ These hybrid representations served the Turkish delegate first, to assign an important international role to Turkey as a mediator between Europe and the Middle East as a part of Asia. Secondly, these discursive representations served to assign Turkey a perilous status due to its liminal geographical position, which, as he assumed, made it attractive for Soviet interests of expansion. In doing so, he advocated for inclusion using negative justifications. The designation of the Soviet Union as Russia is, once again, predicated on the continuous urge for expansionism, as commonly ascribed to the country. To clarify the effects of this urge of expansionism, also coined the "red imperialism," Kapani illustrated his anticipation that Turkey might become the "springboard whence the Soviets might place the whole of the Near East in servitude."¹⁰⁴ But this was not yet the full justification why Turkey should be admitted to NATO, as he emphasized by turning towards the immediate danger for Europe:

*"On the day when Soviet imperialism tries to annex Turkey it will be in pursuance of a general plan for the enslavement of the whole of free Europe. It will be because it wants to lay hands simultaneously on the steel and coal of the Ruhr and Lorraine, on the immense resources of skilled labour in Europe, on the oil of the Middle East and on the whole basin of the Mediterranean."*¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 331.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ On detailed reflections on constructions of Turkey's 'exceptionalism' through representations of Turkey as a liminal state grounded on hybrid constructions of Turkey's geography, see in sum also the following article: Yanik, "Constructing Turkish 'exceptionalism'."

¹⁰⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 331.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

As visible, he argued for Turkey's NATO admission with the help of constructing a detailed picture of the Soviet expansionist goals in Europe and the Middle East. With the quoted threatening scenario, he made it abundantly clear what the future would be in his eyes if Turkey's security not be guaranteed. Given the context that at the same time, consultations in London questioned the incorporation of Turkey and Greece into NATO, his long speech can also be considered a mode of expression showing his profound hopes of a positive outlet.¹⁰⁶ The conviction that the goal of Soviet policy was the annexation of the entire European continent was shared among the Assembly community, as Trunk points out. Some speakers even feared that world communism would never abandon its goal of making the whole world communist.¹⁰⁷

Kapani eventually summarized that, in times when problems were worldwide, there was merely one path, which was "on a scale no less than that of the whole of Europe."¹⁰⁸ While he recalled the Europeans behind the Iron Curtain, he requested,

*"We must march forward shoulder to shoulder and face the peril which is threatening us in order not further to increase the vast numbers of slaves – better still in order to eliminate the fact of slavery – and not to restrict further, through our fault, the scope of the Council of Europe, which is already narrow enough."*¹⁰⁹

So he expanded on his threat and, this time, stressed the potential effect on every single individual life, which was to become a slave under communist dictatorship. Strategically, he used the conflict between freedom – which the people of free Europe were currently enjoying and had fought for – and the danger of enslavement to emphasize the urgency of unification, especially militarily, to prevent the people of free Europe from this scenario. Turkey, of course, like all the other members of the Council of Europe, should be part of this common army. With the help of metaphorical rhetoric, like marching "shoulder to shoulder," he also contributed to constructions of a feeling of cohesion, again with the help of focusing on the commonality of facing a common enemy, the 'threatening peril'. Closing his long emotional

¹⁰⁶ He himself pointed to the fact that talks were going on in London regarding this issue. Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 331.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 173. Trunk, in this context, refers to a comment made by the Assembly member Mollet as an example of envisioning the Soviet annexation of the whole of Europe. To quote the original comment: "The annexation by the Russians of the continent of Europe would not only spell ruin, poverty and death for us Europeans, but would constitute a most serious threat to what remained of the free world." PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/IV, 20th sitting, 27 November 1951, Mollet (France), 491.

¹⁰⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 331.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 332.

speech, he gave a thought to their “brothers” who, at this very minute, were “valiantly fighting” in the Far East in defence of their “common heritage and for the liberty of the whole world.”¹¹⁰ Such representations of Turkish soldiers fighting in the Korean War served as proof of Turkey’s full commitment to the common values and principles, and were used strategically to argue for its inclusion to NATO and the planned European Army. Detailed in the next chapter, the Assembly considered some moral values – such as the sanctity of human dignity and equality for all people as common heritage – from which human rights and fundamental freedoms had developed. Among the political principles, derived from these political values, were the rule of law, parliamentary democracy and the welfare state.¹¹¹ Kapani advocated that the motivation to fight in the Korean War was grounded on the fact that Turkey defended common heritage and common values and thus attributed a level of collective identity to the operations in Korea that were far removed from security issues. Accordingly, his main argument for why Turkey had a right to be included in Western defence systems was that Turkish soldiers were actively defending these common values and principles in Korea. As will be examined below, this image was (re-)produced frequently in the 1950s in the Assembly.

This image also corresponds to what Milliken reveals in her analysis of the construction of the West in the Korean War, namely that the Western intervention in Korea was not merely a military operation but entailed “cultural processes of collective identity formation.”¹¹² Moreover, with a focus on Turkish foreign policy discourses, Yilmaz and Bilgin examine how Turkish intellectuals of statecraft constructed Turkey’s Western identity in the 1970s and 80s. They further reveal that the Korean intervention had become a symbolic act that helped to demonstrate Turkey’s dedication to Western norms to justify foreign policy decisions.¹¹³ The above-quoted speeches in the COE’s Assembly show that already at the beginning of the 1950s, in times of the Korean War, Turkish politicians represented the purpose of the War on the grounds of defending Western civilization.

Nadi Abalıoğlu, a colleague in support of Kapani’s arguments, especially those concerning

¹¹⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 332.

¹¹¹ See Chapter 6 (Political Values); how the Assembly debated about the ‘common heritage’ is part of Chapter 8 (Culture).

¹¹² Jennifer Milliken, “Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea,” in *Cultures of Insecurity. States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, ed. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis et al.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1999), 91. Milliken analyses in her article how ‘the West’ was set up in Korea under the leadership of the US and shows that the motivation to intervene also based on the motivation to manifest the Western community and to convince ‘the world’ of the right of Western democracies to contain what they represented as ‘Soviet imperialism’.

¹¹³ See the whole paper: Yilmaz and Bilgin, “Constructing Turkey’s “western” identity.”

the question of how to unite Europe when certain countries were excluded from plans of establishing a European Army, added the following rhetorical question:

*“What do we mean by Europe, Mr. President? Wherein lies its essence? Is it a form of social, political or economic organisation? Is it the sum total of the nations attached to the same institutional forms and belonging to the same civilisation? If that be so, wherein lies its geographic expression?”*¹¹⁴

He continued that several speakers had emphasized, “that Europe formed a cultural whole, that it was the fount of fundamental liberties,”¹¹⁵ before he criticised that still Europe’s geographical expression has not been determined yet. Therefore, he stressed his obligation to declare that the frontier-extremities of Europe did not naturally fall on the far side of the Western zone of Berlin, nor this side of the Eastern suburbs of Vienna.¹¹⁶ Abalıođlu, like his colleague Kapani, criticised those European politicians that strived for an EDC which consisted only of a few countries and who thereby ignored other European countries. Regarding the original idea of European unification (and not of Western European unification), he ‘shamed’ all those who disregarded this common goal to assert their own national interests.

The following speech of an Italian representative shows how Turkish delegates’ efforts to include Turkey in Western and European defence organizations were successful. Considering the wording of the resolution, drafted by the Committee on General Affairs, the delegate Benvenuti noted that he shared Duncan Sandys’ view that they should “bluntly and unhesitatingly” mention the countries presently outside the system of Western collective security. He continued that it was no longer right that countries represented in the Council of Europe “should not be allowed to participate with equal rights in the collective defence of free peoples.” He clarified that there was no such thing as nations of major and minor importance, and that “no nation belonging to the European family may be abandoned to aggression.”¹¹⁷ He

¹¹⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Nadi Abalıođlu (Turkey), 335. In a later sitting he repeated the problem of defining Europe’s (especially Western Europe’s) borders by noting, “Some of our colleagues in the Assembly have become all too inclined to talk in their speeches about Western Europe in a way that makes it difficult to understand what exactly they mean thereby, whether they mean certain of the Member States of the Council of Europe only or the Council of Europe as a whole.” PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VI, 36th sitting, 8 December 1951, Nadi Abalıođlu (Turkey), 946.

¹¹⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Nadi Abalıođlu (Turkey), 335.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Benvenuti (Italy), 338.

thus naturally included Turkey in the European family based on its membership in the Council of Europe and reacted to Turkish delegates who accused Western Europe of considering Turkey to be of secondary importance. At the same time, he constructed a sense of community inherited to the planned defence unit by advocating Turkey's integration on the grounds that all members of the European family should be respected. This accompanied Turkish argumentation, as it corresponded to what Turkish delegates and leaders achieved for Turkey's international status – to be fully accepted as part of the European community.

Based on these arguments, Benvenuti justified his proposal to amend the draft resolution by concretely identifying the exclusion. Together with his Italian colleague Ciacchero, he finally proposed to change the wording into, “The Assembly *affirms* that the Western system of collective security should include Greece and Turkey.”¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, Benvenuti's proposed amendment, as well as the report and the resolution proposal of the Committee on General Affairs, was not put to the vote. Instead, the Assembly members decided to postpone the subject of defence to the next session; the given reasons were, according to the Assembly President, “present conditions, with a small attendance, and in particular with our French friends absent” and unfinished discussions.¹¹⁹ Apparently, with conversations in London about Greece and Turkey's admission into NATO, plus a low attendance of Assembly delegates, those Assembly members present thought it was not the right time to make such important decisions. By November of the same year, the historical-contextual conditions had changed, which shifted the focus of discussions on European security. Since the British government had, meanwhile, announced its rejection of taking part in any proposed supranational European institution, the discussions in the Assembly, facilitated by the Committee on General Affairs, had changed focus. Specific questions, such as Turkey's role in plans of an EDC, lost importance; instead, broad questions such as how to bring forward the process of European integration, and not least, which role the COE's Assembly could play in it, were put to discussion. Accordingly, when it came to establishing a European Army, the focus was now on broader political questions such as how to place the common army under a political authority and how to unite intergovernmental and federalist

¹¹⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 13th sitting, 12 May 1951, Benvenuti (Italy), 338. See also, PACE, *Documents*, Doc. 8: Amendment to the Report of the Committee on General Affairs on the Political Aspect of European Defence, proposed by Benvenuti and Ciacchero (both Italy), 14 May 1951, 150.

¹¹⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, the President, 364.

ideas in this regard. In contrast, the problem of Turkey's exclusion from governmental negotiations did not arise again.¹²⁰

However, before the Assembly members decided to postpone any decision on collective defence systems in May 1951, the debate remained heated and emotional. The Turkish deputy Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a CHP parliamentarian from Kars, strongly criticised the separation between Western Europe and the rest of democratic Europe just as discussions on the creation of a European Army began. Eventually, he argued that it was an issue of *Western European* integration instead of a *European* one when two democratic member states of the Council of Europe were excluded in the progress of European integration. "If Greece and Turkey are European, they should, surely, be invited to Paris," he concluded.¹²¹ In his view, the reason why the two countries were excluded from the Paris Conference and from NATO until then was the following:

*"since the West does not wish to have a war and is afraid of being bombed, it is unwilling to accept Turkey in the Atlantic Treaty, since it might, one day or another, be the victim of attack. France's proposal to form a European Army to the exclusion of Turkey and Greece confirms this supposition, for, were these two countries to be incorporated in a European Army, there would be a risk of a European war, in the event of their being attacked."*¹²²

Hence, his interpretation was that France and "the West" feared involvement in a war in the event that Turkey or Greece were attacked. This was "perhaps a common-sense view, but quite at variance with the idea of European unity," he added.¹²³ Against this background, he then raised the rhetorical question of why Turkey and Greece were represented in the Council of Europe at all, before he asked, "In the face of this attitude on the part of the Western world, what are we to do, what are we to think?"¹²⁴ With his comment, he not only made clear that his country felt abandoned, but he also 'acted rhetorically' by reminding his colleagues of the shared commitment to the objective of uniting Europe. He also used the above-represented strategy of 'shaming' and exposed the illegitimate behaviour of Western European leaders

¹²⁰ See the three-days long general debate on *Aims and Prospects of European Policy*; cf. PACE, Reports, 3/2/IV, 19th-24th sitting, 27-29 November 1951.

¹²¹ PACE, Reports, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Yalçın (Turkey), 346.

¹²² Ibid., 347.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

based on the shared commitment to the goal of uniting the whole of democratic Europe. In doing so, he delegitimized any opposing voices in the Assembly. In this way, any representatives who wanted to remain credible members of the political community of the Assembly were ‘rhetorically entrapped’.

Additionally, he argued for the involvement of Greece and Turkey in European defence plans by outlining the historical-cultural connection of the countries with Europe. With regard to Greece, he rhetorically asked, how the country could be barred from European unity, “when the very sources of European civilization sprang from the wisdom of Greece,” before he added another rhetorical question, “Can one conceive of a modern, liberal, humanist Europe without Greece?”¹²⁵ With regard to his own country he uttered,

“Turkey – as we Turks are only too well aware – has been greatly misunderstood and slandered. Yet there is, after all, a good side to the country, elements with a Western outlook who have been working for a century and a half to adopt modern ways and methods, and to be worthy of entering the European community. There have been martyrs in this cause. The work continued year after year both openly and underground. Finally the goal was reached, and with the appearance of Atatürk there was a great leap forward towards modern European ideas not only in Turkey but throughout the Eastern world. Yet you are now ignoring this Turkey and depriving it of its most legitimate rights.”¹²⁶

In doing so, the delegate Yalçın argued for both countries’ admission to NATO and a European Defence Community on the grounds of cultural and political developments within both countries that he represented as having been connected to European progress. In consequence, similar to what Milliken has shown about the Korean War and the inherent social construction of the West, it becomes apparent that the establishment of the EDC was perceived, or at least represented, as a process of setting up a defence institution and as entailing cultural processes of collective identity formation.¹²⁷ Based on this, the Turkish delegate was able to use cultural and value-based arguments to justify his country’s desire to be included in a defence union.

¹²⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Yalçın (Turkey), 346.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Cf. Milliken, “Intervention and Identity,” 91.

Yalçın used a different strategy when he broached the issue of Turkish participation in World War One. In his presentation, when the Allied Powers' rejected the Turkish/Ottoman request to fight at their side, the result was the rise of the Bolsheviks. It eventually forced the Ottoman Empire to join the opposing side, the Central Powers, which led to the prolongation of the war and the Bolsheviks' triumph, according to him.¹²⁸ After this account he cynically asked,

*“Will the same mistake once more be made on the eve of a probable third World War? Will Turkey be kept outside Europe and compelled to take up a position of uncertainty?”*¹²⁹

He thus indirectly claimed that the rise of the Bolsheviks could have been avoided if the Ottoman Empire had been admitted to the Allied Powers. In doing so, he substantiated his threatening scenario in case of a further rejection of Turkey by Europe.

He then defended Turkey's credibility as a reliable partner and claimed that had a study been made of Turkish foreign policy over the past thirty years, it would prove that it has “always been inspired by a peaceful, liberal outlook.”¹³⁰ He added that Turkey was satisfied with its frontiers and had no territorial ambitions. Instead, it aimed to be an element of stability and security in the Middle East.¹³¹

Apart from these arguments, based on the common goal of a united Europe and cultural, historical and geographical representations of Turkey, he argued for Turkey's incorporation in a European Army by portraying the country's strategic and military strength. His strategy of contradicting Western Europe's fear of becoming involved in a war was to confront this fear by portraying Turkey not as a weak victim of a Soviet attack but as a strong “barrier to the probable invasion by the Bolsheviks.”¹³² To underline his argument, he then pointed to the current Korean War and asked the following rhetorical questions:

“What shall we tell our young men who are fighting for the ideal of unity in the civilised world among the distant mountains of Korea? For whom are they shedding

¹²⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Yalçın (Turkey), 346. In respect of the rejection, he pointed out, instead of accepting the Ottoman Empire, “everyone was in a hurry to share out the inheritance of the ‘Sick Man of Europe’.”

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid., 347.

their blood? Why are they making personal sacrifices, in the name of what ideal and to what end? I cannot now reply.”¹³³

A popular argument to prove Turkey’s commitment to Western values was to represent Turkey’s military contribution in Korea as being grounded in defence of the collective ideal of unity. The extent to which the defence of Western values played a role in the Turkish government’s decision to send troops to Korea is not part of the current analysis (one would have to examine other sources, such as of the Turkish Foreign Ministry); existing research at least shows that other reasons were decisive, above all the Turkish interest to protect its national sovereignty through a Western security guarantee. From the standpoint of Turkish rulers, the policy of Soviet expansion had become so severe that a NATO/US connection seemed imperative to safeguard Turkey’s national security.¹³⁴ Secondly, the Turkish interest to be fully accepted as a part of the Western Bloc and Europe was another driver for its quest for NATO membership and thus for its foreign policy decision to engage in the Korean War.¹³⁵

However, presumably, non-Turkish Assembly members, at that time, had little information about the Turkish government’s foreign policy drivers to decide about Turkey’s engagement in the Korean War. It was precisely for this reason that Turkish delegates in the Assembly were able to help shape the common knowledge and what was, ultimately, considered as reality – in discourse-analytical terms.

Overall, Turkish deputy Yalçın reiterated a large part of the repertoire of arguments and strategies found in Turkish speeches regarding Turkey’s integration into Western defence alliances. It reflects above all the ambivalence and unjust behaviour that Turkish delegates often attributed to Western European governments. On the one hand, as Turkish delegates observed, Turkey had been officially accepted as a European country with its admission to the Council of Europe and was hence involved in the process of European integration; additionally, it was perceived as geostrategically vital for Europe’s defence. On the other hand, several delegates exposed it as a paradox that some decision-makers were still not prepared to integrate Turkey into Western defence systems. According to the Turkish observation, they created a two-tier Europe, with Western Europe as the first tier and

¹³³ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Yalçın (Turkey), 347.

¹³⁴ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 132f. In the Turkish public sphere, the Turkish rulers justified the deployment in Korea initially with the maintenance of world peace, according to the goal of Atatürk, and with the obligation of UN membership. Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 133.

¹³⁵ See, e.g., Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003. The History of a Distinctive Alliance* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 68f.

Southeastern Europe as the second tier. The first tier behaved as if they were authorized to decide who was in and who was out with regard to (potential) organizations at the European level, such as a common defence community. Accordingly, by doing so, Turkish delegates used the rhetorical strategy of ‘shaming’ and exposed the illegitimate behaviour towards members of the community – deemed illegitimate since the commonly determined goal was to unite *all* the democratic European countries.

Moreover, Yalçın and many of his colleagues also used deeply moving language as means of persuasion in their speeches. For instance, by metaphorically reminding the Assembly members of the Turkish soldiers (and not the military) who were “shedding their blood” in Korea, the Turkish delegate included emotional devices such as metaphors to reach and touch his audience in order to convince it of his point. In sum, he described how Turks strongly identified as Europeans and that exclusion was difficult to cope with emotionally. Accordingly, he finished his speech by expressing, “I cannot refrain from giving expression to the dismay and sorrow in my heart.”¹³⁶ In doing so, he also ‘shamed’ European politicians who did not follow the community agreement with the help of a heartrending language.

In the same general debate, the Turkish delegate Gülek again held a speech in which he used similar strategies as his colleague Yalçın. Initially, he reminded his Assembly colleagues that the defence of Europe was the “defence of democracy as a whole”¹³⁷. With regard to defence alliances, he argued, the exclusion of certain countries from NATO was “a lamentable state of affairs”¹³⁸ because in every corner, and not only in certain parts, Europe was open to aggression. That is why – “if Europe is to be a whole” – they could not make “distinctions amongst members of the European community.”¹³⁹ Consequently, it was “an indelicacy”¹⁴⁰ not to invite certain countries to deliberate on the question of a European Army. At least, he added, he was glad that the initiative for the conference in Paris was taken without the authority of the Council of Europe. The Turkish deputy Gülek also ‘acted rhetorically’ and strategically used the commitment to the common objective of uniting the whole of democratic Europe to ‘shame’ every democratic European whose program and behaviour opposed the European idea.

¹³⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Yalçın (Turkey), 347.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, Gülek (Turkey), 355.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

After expressing his displeasure at Turkey's disregard for Western and European defence plans, he then focused on his argumentation as to why his country should be part of both NATO and a European Army. First, he made it clear that the desire to become part of these defence organizations was not because Turkey felt helpless; "On the contrary, Turkey is determined to fight even if she does not form part of a system of defence."¹⁴¹ This was being actively proven on the battlefields of Korea, where Turkey was, at the moment, showing its "brilliant military feats" and "outstanding heroism."¹⁴² Turkey was determined to do everything necessary to defend their common heritage, he noted, and he appealed to his colleagues, again, by using very emotional language.¹⁴³ Accordingly, he emphasized, Turkey desired to take part in the defence of Europe "because she believes that common defence is the only logical, possible and tenable way of defending this old continent."¹⁴⁴ For this aim, it was unavoidable to make sacrifices, he continued, and claimed that Turkey had been making these sacrifices longer than any other European country. Further, it had spent more than half of its income on the military sector in the last fifteen or twenty years.¹⁴⁵ As a consequence, in his view, Turkey was "entitled to take its rightful place in the counsels of the defence of Europe."¹⁴⁶ In his conclusion, he additionally highlighted that there was no difference of opinion in Turkey to this point: "All Turks, to whatever political party they may belong, have the same firm conviction on this matter."¹⁴⁷

As a result, his main argument was that Turkey had proven its value-based commitment to the West and should be included in any Western defence system. In doing so, he assigned a collective community character and thus an identity level to these security organizations. By invoking the commitment to defend their common heritage and fight for a free united Europe collectively, he 'acted rhetorically' in the sense of Schimmelfennig by insisting on the

¹⁴¹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 356.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 355/356. The following speaker, also a Turkish deputy, also underlined that Turkey wished to join NATO "arising rather from the desire to offer effective assistance to a free Europe and to the common cause than from the idea of receiving help from Europe." *Ibid.*, Mandalinci (Turkey), 357.

¹⁴³ To quote only a small part of his pathetic speech: "Peace is our ideal. We all strive for peace, but, unless we are determined to die, if necessary, in the defence of our homelands, there can be no security and there can be no peace. This is a sad reality, but one which we must all keep before our eyes. The defence of our common heritage can be realised only if we are determined to do everything necessary in that defence, to the utmost of our powers." *Ibid.*, Gülek (Turkey), 356.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Even if the assertion of "all Turks" was certainly not entirely true, one can already speak of a broad consensus since Turkey's integration into Western defence systems was indeed broadly welcomed among Turkish parties as well as within Turkish society (cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 235). In 1952, the National Assembly voted almost unanimously for NATO membership. The Korean mission, too, was supported not only by DP supporters but also by CHP supporters (the latter only criticised the decision-making process, which had been unconstitutionally since the parliament had not been consulted). Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 134f.

community ethos so that any contrasting opinions were locked out.¹⁴⁸ What is more, to convince his audience, he chose a mixture of pathos and logos; i.e., he rationally included objective things like numbers and emotional descriptions in his speech.

While at the time, no delegates were arguing against Turkish involvement in defence alliances, only a half a year earlier, some cautiously expressed their disapproval. In November 1950, the Danish delegate Jakobsen was still advocating for a European Army that would consist only of the European part of NATO, i.e., without Turkey and Greece, not because he wanted to exclude countries per se, but because he “dislike[d] confusion” and this was simply a “clearer conception.”¹⁴⁹ However, the historical context had changed considerably between November 1950 and May 1951. Not least because of Turkey's long and numerically strong deployment in Korea and the further rapprochement between Turkey and the US, Turkish NATO membership was no longer a distant prospect.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, as it appears, Turkish delegates were very active in this period in arguing convincingly for their participation in both NATO and a European defence community.

In any case, at the end of the debate on defence issues, there was great support for Turkey. Non-Turkish speakers emphasized the value of the debate regarding Turkey and Greece's potential role in the field of European and Western defence. The British delegate Macmillan, for example, evaluated:

*“If this Debate has done nothing else but allow our Turkish and Greek friends to speak, not of their cause but of our cause – for they would bring much more to help us at this moment than perhaps we could bring to help them – it has served a useful purpose. Turkey and Greece are gallant, well-armed military Powers with great traditions. If only that could go out from this Debate, we shall have done something good.”*¹⁵¹

His well-known colleague Duncan Sandys found similar words:

¹⁴⁸ On his reflections on the mechanism of ‘rhetorical action’ see e.g., Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap,” 62ff.

¹⁴⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 2/5, 28th sitting, 24 November 1950, Jakobsen (Denmark), 1800.

¹⁵⁰ On the decision-making process to invite Turkey to join NATO see, e.g., Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey*, 153ff.; in brief, see also Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 86f.

¹⁵¹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Macmillan (United Kingdom), 362.

“I believe that important things have been said and that points of view have been clarified. More particularly, I feel that this Assembly has sent a message of friendship and fellow-feeling to the Greek and Turkish peoples, and that, by the applause given to Mr. Macmillan’s speech, we have shown that we want to see them closely associated with us in defence of the free world.”¹⁵²

And the Danish delegate Boegholm expressed,

“I feel confident that certain words uttered here in this Assembly will go far to bring home to the peoples of Greece and Turkey that we know their fate to be our fate, and that we fully recognise the fact. It has never been forgotten here that the idea of Europe covers the whole of Europe.”¹⁵³

What becomes clear in these messages is that at the end of the debate, those assembling and consulting in Strasbourg largely supported their Turkish and Greek colleagues to become part of the Atlantic Pact as well as a future European Army; and that it was important to them to show their communion and solidarity with them. It also shows that the strategic presentations and arguments of the Turkish deputies were quite successful and helped to shape what became the dominant perception. In this perception, Turkey was a reliable family member, both militarily and ideologically, and should thus be associated with any Western defence organization.

Overall, this subchapter showed that Turkish delegates used the Assembly as a stage to promote Turkey’s inclusion with the help of different discursive practices, at a time when Turkey was still excluded from all Western defence plans. As the main argument, they pointed out that Turkey’s exclusion from any plans of creating a European Army was destroying the European idea, which was to unite the whole of Europe. Conversely, they exposed that if only the Western European states were to integrate, the European idea would be dead. With this argument, they ‘acted rhetorically’ and ‘shamed’ any politicians who endangered the European idea. By doing so, they delegitimized any oppositional statements by Assembly members – if the latter did not want to lose their credibility as members of the community. The European Defence Community was, thereby, perceived as a union

¹⁵² PACE, Reports, 3/1/III, 14th sitting, 14 May 1951, Sandys (United Kingdom), 363.

¹⁵³ PACE, Reports, 3/1/III, 17th sitting, 15 May 1951, Boegholm (Denmark), 437.

forwarding European political integration, which is grounded in the fact that the EDC plans interlinked with plans of setting up a European Political Community.

Besides, as was shown above, they again assigned to Turkey various strengths and benefits for Europe to make the country more attractive as a member of a collective defence unit, such as military strength, outstanding heroism, the willingness to make sacrifices, and last but not least a geographical belonging. This made Turkey a positive balancing factor in the Middle East, but on the other hand, exposed it to the constant danger of a Soviet attack. In the latter case, they imagined a great catastrophe, the complete enslavement of the free world – if Turkey remained outside any defence alliance. In doing so, they used this horror scenario to argue for a negatively justified inclusion of their country in any Western or European defence unit.

5.4 Turkish Representations of Security Dependencies: ‘Europe Needed Turkey more than Turkey Needed Europe’

With Turkey’s invitation to join NATO, Turkish Assembly members changed their rhetoric to embrace more confidence and power. To give a brief overview of the historical context: In September 1951, the North Atlantic Council of the Atlantic Pact finally decided at a meeting in Ottawa to recommend their governments to invite Turkey and Greece as accession candidates.¹⁵⁴ From the Turkish perspective, as Turkish political scientist Uslu concludes, a NATO membership implies a guarantee of military support by the Western Bloc, especially the US as the most powerful player, in order to countervail the Soviet threat and to secure further Western aid in the form of material support, which was essential for the development and stabilization of Turkey’s economy and armed forces. On the other hand, it also confirmed Turkey’s acceptance as an integral part of the West and as a chance to enforce its organic ties with European states.¹⁵⁵

After months of negotiations within the Atlantic Pact and between Turkey and NATO members – the US in particular – and not least after Turkey’s longstanding mission in Korea, the US government convinced its NATO allies about Turkey’s admission as a full member of

¹⁵⁴ See point 3 of the Final Communiqué of the 7th session of the North Atlantic Council, Ottawa, 21 September 1951 (the session lasted from 15-20 September 1951): “The Council, considering that the security of the North Atlantic area would be enhanced by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, agreed to recommend to the member governments that, subject to the approval of national parliaments under their respective legislative procedures, an invitation should be addressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to the Treaty.” <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v03p1/d380> (25 June 2015).

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship*, 68f.

NATO. Consequently, on 15 October 1951, Turkey and Greece were ultimately invited to join NATO (which was sealed by mid February 1952).¹⁵⁶ The US arguments that convinced its allies were particularly of geostrategic and military manner: Turkey would ultimately protect the southeastern flank of NATO against hostile forces as a full member; furthermore, Turkish divisions, which were in total 22, would strengthen NATO's power of deterrence, and not least, Turkish airfields would be available for NATO allies. Moreover, the US government argued that Turkey's strategic location would help prevent a Soviet expansion to the Middle East and its oil fields, which were of great value to the West.¹⁵⁷

Concerning the challenge of fitting both countries into the structure of NATO, the member states agreed that the ground forces should come under NATO's Southern Command. This arrangement was entirely in the spirit of the Turkish government, since, as political scientist Athanassopoulou puts it, "Ankara's wish for Turkey to be considered European and not Middle Eastern was all-pervasive in the minds of the Turkish cabinet members."¹⁵⁸

These changes in Western-Turkish relations as of autumn 1951 provided an entirely new basis for the Turkish delegation in Strasbourg to argue for their country's inclusion in a future European defence community, as will be shown in this subchapter.

To give one example, the above-quoted deputy Kapani held a speech in a general debate on the aims and prospects of European policy that demonstrated an increase of self-confidence compared to his last speech on Turkey's incorporation into NATO and a European Army. To represent his country's strategic significant role in the Western defence alliance, he explained,

"Anatolia has been defined as an aircraft carrier in the van of the Western Forces. Turkey is the keeper of the Straits, it is in the immediate proximity of certain key industrial districts and oilfields of the U.S.S.R.; it has heavy responsibilities in the organisation of the Near East; it has one of the largest armies in the whole of Europe.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship*, 69; Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo-American Security Interests*, 221. According to Uslu, Turkey's NATO membership went into effect on 18 February 1952, according to Athanassopoulou on 15 February 1952, which corresponds also to what McGhee states, who was US Ambassador to Turkey in 1952-53 and supported the Turkish NATO admission. Cf. McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 89. Regarding the preceding discussions since Turkey's application, see the detailed descriptions in McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 72ff.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship*, 69f.

¹⁵⁸ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo-American Security Interests*, 220. On the discussions on a Turkish NATO-membership in sum, with a special focus on the dispute between Great Britain and the United States see Athanassopoulou's chapter "Towards Accession," 187-230. For a brief summary on the decision-making process within NATO see also Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 86f.

This confers on it a special degree of authority and a responsibility not only in European affairs but in the general strategy of the free world.”¹⁵⁹

Due to Turkey’s geography and strategic meaning for Europe, he then explained that his country would not achieve becoming a member of a continental ‘little Europe’ of ‘the Six’ since their strategic interests finally “centred on the defence of the Alps and the Rhine.”¹⁶⁰ In contrast, he added, “if a complete European federation were set up including Britain, Scandinavia and all Members of the Council of Europe, Turkey would be quite prepared to take part unreservedly.”¹⁶¹ Any federation of such an extent could eventually also take into account the particular concerns of Turkey.¹⁶² In this kind of complete federation, the speaker also stressed, Turkey’s geographical and strategic position in the East-West conflict would give Turkey outstanding significance and responsibility in the light of defending the free world.¹⁶³ With Turkey’s invitation to join NATO, he downgraded the importance of an EDC membership for Turkey itself relating to defence but did not reduce the importance of a common Army for the European unification process. In this context, he pointed out, “We consider the European Army to be one of the most effective means of achieving that political entity which Europe must become.”¹⁶⁴ The European Army, according to him, was an undertaking of indefinite duration from which new political, economic, and social structures would develop.¹⁶⁵ He then continued by stressing his country’s military strengths:

*“Need I recall here that Turkey to-day has one of the largest armies in Europe? I think that the inclusion of a Turkish contingent in the European Army might provide one of the balancing factors which you seek.”*¹⁶⁶

After having emphasized the benefits of a Turkish involvement for Europe, he claimed that the European Army would represent a further sacrifice for Turkey and added, “I believe that Turkey is prepared to make that sacrifice for the sake of the success of European Union.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/IV, 22nd sitting, 28 November 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 544.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 544f.

¹⁶² Ibid., 545.

¹⁶³ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

By presenting Turkey's potential inclusion as an advantage for Europe on the one hand, and as a sacrifice for Turkey, on the other, he represented his country as heroic and altruistic – and thereby underlined Turkey's strong commitment to the European idea of uniting. He then even accentuated Turkey's preparedness to make sacrifices by claiming that if it was part of the European Army, it was "more likely that Turkish divisions will be sent to the Elbe front than that French or German divisions will be sent to Anatolia."¹⁶⁸ These representational practices, which constructed Turkey's military strength, along with its willingness to make sacrifices, served to prove the country's commitment to the common goal of European unity. Based on this commonly determined goal, he reminded his Assembly colleagues that the French, the British, and the German role were not the only ones that mattered in constructing a European community:

*"Remember the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean; remember that you have strong allies and friends who are ready to help you in your difficulties, and I believe that you will be better able to achieve the ideal towards which we are striving here. (Applause)."*¹⁶⁹

His argumentative and rhetorical strategies seemed to have been quite successful – the applauding audience at least demonstrated great approval of his words. By emphasizing that his country would help if other European countries were in trouble, he presented Turkey again as a kind of martyr who was prepared to make sacrifices. With this argument he also put Turkey on a pedestal regarding its importance in pursuing the common ideal of strengthening Europe in every respect through uniting.

In a further debate on the aims and prospects of European policy, Mercouris, a Greek colleague of Kapani, underlined the political significance of a common army as a vital step towards European unification.¹⁷⁰ At the time of his speech, the planned common army consisted of only six member states, without Great Britain. However, he argued, neither exclusions nor self-denials would be conducive regarding the objection of uniting.¹⁷¹ As a second argument for the inclusion of Turkey and Greece, Mercouris referred to the dangerous

¹⁶⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/IV, 22nd sitting, 28 November 1951, Kapani (Turkey), 545.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ As will also be demonstrated in Chapter 6 (Political Values). See also *ibid.*, 544/545; PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VII, 39th sitting, 10 December 1951, Mercouris (Greece), 1036.

¹⁷¹ Cf. *ibid.*

consequences for Europe if both countries were to one day become victims of a Soviet invasion,

*“would Europe be defended if Greece and Turkey were to fall? The fall of the former would have tragic results for Italy, the Dardanelles, and Yugoslavia. The fall of the latter would shake the entire Middle-Eastern bloc to its foundations.”*¹⁷²

Thus, here again, the rhetorical means of threatening scenarios were used. These were certainly effective in times of the Cold War since the image of the dangerous enemy, with a high potential of aggression, was widely shared among Europeans.¹⁷³ These scenarios, the Greek delegate claimed indirectly, could be avoided with Turkey and Greece being members of a European Army. With the help of liminal representations of Turkey’s geography, which helped justify the hypothesis that the whole Middle East would fall in case of an attack on Turkey, he even cemented this threatening scenario.

The question of why both countries had not been invited to Paris, however, remained open. Therefore, in the same debate, the Turkish delegate Gülek once more wanted to know “why the country which has the strongest army in Europe outside the Iron Curtain has not been invited to take part in the deliberations.”¹⁷⁴ He further depicted the Turkish army as one with a “great and glorious military history which has been further enhanced on the battlefields of Korea defending the rights of humanity.”¹⁷⁵ In addition to the repeated emphasis on Turkey’s commitment to Western principles, represented as having been proved in Korea, he then provided a new argument and reminded his audience of a certain point in history when Turkey resisted a Soviet demand:

“I should like to remind you of the events of 1945 when the great enemy and menace of Europe to-day then enjoyed the friendship of all the allied countries. At that time Russia made demands on Turkey. Russia asked that certain provinces in Eastern Turkey should be ceded to her and that the Dardanelles should be defended in common with Russia. Turkey was the first country to realise that the only way to

¹⁷² PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VII, 39th sitting, 10 December 1951, Mercouris (Greece), 1036.

¹⁷³ See (as mentioned above), Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 171ff.

¹⁷⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VII, 39th sitting, 10 December 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 1039.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

answer Russia was to say definitely, "No". The country which realised that first should to-day take part in the counsels devoted to preparing the defence of Europe."¹⁷⁶

He thus attributed a deciding international role to Turkey by reminding that his country, in contrast to other European countries, had realized the danger emanating from the then so-called 'friend' in the East already in 1945. With support of this heroic representation of Turkey's early intuition not to trust the Eastern neighbour, he thus argued for Turkey's inclusion through depictions of history. By portraying Turkey as a pioneer in differentiating itself from the enemy based on its early resistance to negotiate with the Soviet Union, he introduced a claim of superiority against the rest of Europe, paradoxically, as part of his quest to become part of Europe's defence plans.¹⁷⁷

In the course of Turkey and Greece's invitation to join NATO in October 1951, non-Turkish and non-Greek deputies finally demonstrated supported for the incorporation of both countries into a European Defence Community more emphatically. The Dutch deputy Fens, for example, was previously sceptical towards a Turkish and Greek inclusion in a European Army so long as they were not NATO members. Now, he argued that both countries should be invited to attend the further preliminary deliberations on a common European Army since they were both accession candidates of the Atlantic Pact; in his view, anything else would be "an astonishing discrimination!"¹⁷⁸ Additionally, he opposed the potential counterargument that Mediterranean countries could not join a Western European defence community by reminding his colleagues that Italy, which doubtlessly would contribute to the defence of Mediterranean territory in the future, was also participating in the European Army.¹⁷⁹ Altogether, he concluded, they had to align "in a spirit of unity" and build up "a dyke" protecting them against "the Red flood," which is also an example of non-Turkish rhetoric constructing a sense of community through the demarcation to the outside, to the dangerous expansionist enemy.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VII, 39th sitting, 10 December 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 1039.

¹⁷⁷ In a similar way, Yanık shows that liminal representations of Turkey's geography and history not only pave the way for Turkish 'exceptionalism' but can also turn exceptionalism into a claim of superiority against the West as part of the quest to become part of the West. Cf. Yanık, "Constructing Turkish "exceptionalism"," 83.

¹⁷⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VII, 39th sitting, 10 December 1951, Fens (Netherlands), 1054.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

In summary, Turkey's invitation to join NATO adjusted the rhetoric of the Turkish Assembly members. More confidently than before, they advocated for the inclusion of Turkey in a European Army. Their arguments included representations of Turkey's heroic behaviour, its military strengths, and willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of securing Europe's freedom, and – represented as a result – of Turkey being an asset for the planned European army. Turkish delegates even claimed Turkey's superiority over the rest of Europe, not only through representations of its unlimited willingness to make sacrifices and its military strengths as exceptional but also on the grounds of its Otherness to the Soviet Union by dating it back to 1945. Rhetorically, they wrapped up their political interests by claiming that Europe would benefit more than Turkey itself from a Turkish involvement in the planned European Army. Europe needed Turkey to achieve the goal of uniting and becoming a strong European union, so they altruistically promoted their country's admission to a common army.

A brief look at Turkey's involvement in Western organizations outside the Council of Europe shows that while the EDC plan failed, the problem of Turkey's exclusion from defence systems had also disappeared. Instead, Turkey was pleased about its incorporation into the Atlantic Pact in February 1952. This progress of Western inclusion was celebrated by both the governing Democrat Party and the opposition of the Republicans, rationally as well as emotionally. As Zürcher, among others, underlines: Rationally it was considered a guarantee against the Soviet threat as well as for material Western aid and loans. "Emotionally, it was taken as a sign that Turkey had finally been accepted by the Western nations on equal terms."¹⁸¹ In the following years, Turkey became an active NATO member, especially in its neighbouring regions. Turkish delegates in the COE's Assembly used these regional engagements to depict Turkey as mediator and role model, attributing multiple collective identities to Turkey in terms of geographical spaces, as illustrated in the following.

5.5 Representations of Turkey's Geography as Tools of Power: the Balkan Pact, the Baghdad Pact, and the Cyprus Conflict

After Turkey had become a NATO member, Turkish delegates in the COE's Assembly argued for their country's outstanding international significance in safeguarding Europe's security, particularly on the grounds of hybrid representations of the country's geography. By portraying Turkey as a Balkan, a Middle Eastern, and a European power all at the same time,

¹⁸¹ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 235.

they were able to attribute a unique mediator role to their country, representing Europe's interests, of course.

One of the areas through which Turkish parliamentarians presented their engagement in the region as indispensable was the Balkans. As mentioned in the first subchapter on the historical context, Turkey and Greece's engagement in the Balkans resulted in a friendship agreement with Yugoslavia in 1953, transferred into the Balkan Pact the following year. Before it became meaningless with the rapprochement between Khrushchev and Tito again a year later, it was used by Turkish deputies in the Council of Europe's Assembly to present their country as an exceptionally important player in European defence affairs.¹⁸²

In a general debate about the "definition of the policy of the Council of Europe in light of the recent developments in the international situation,"¹⁸³ the Turkish deputy Kapani began his lengthy speech in which he promoted Turkey's "undoubted importance" for Europe by emphasizing the conclusion of the friendship agreement with Yugoslavia as "the most sensational result" of Turkey's engagement for Europe's defence.¹⁸⁴ He backed this by stating,

*"Military experts have described this as a vital factor in the consolidation of south-eastern Europe, an essential area in the event of aggression, being one of the springboards from which an aggressor could easily deal crippling blows."*¹⁸⁵

With the help of metaphorical language and by representing the imminent danger, he presented southeastern Europe as a bulwark against the Soviets. His Turkish colleagues also emphasized their government's efforts in the Balkans as an important contribution against Soviet expansionism as well as in promoting European integration. The Turkish delegate Belger, a DP parliamentarian from Istanbul, for instance, identified the friendship pact as "a guarantee of peace and security for Eastern Europe" being "of the greatest significance," before he continued, "We must at all costs press on with European unity until it becomes a living reality."¹⁸⁶ Belger also used metaphorical language to increase the significance of the agreement made by Greece and Turkey. He, for instance, described the Balkans previous to the friendship pact with Yugoslavia as the "powder-magazine of Europe, liable at any time to

¹⁸² The fact that the Balkan Pact became meaningless was not communicated at all, certainly because it was not supportive in representing Turkey as exceptionally important for Europe and the West.

¹⁸³ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 18th sitting, 21 September 1953, 389ff.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Kapani (Turkey), 397.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 20th sitting, 22 September 1953, Belger (Turkey), 470.

explode and set fire to the whole continent.”¹⁸⁷ In doing so, he constructed the Turkish self-image of a strong state, one that was aware of and had assumed its international responsibility.

A Netherlands delegate noted that Turkish efforts in the Balkans were welcomed within NATO and underlined that they had to congratulate their

*“Greek and Turkish friends on the demonstration which they have thus given of their active membership of N. A. T. O. by seeking ways and means, in collaboration with others, of strengthening the defensive fortress of Europe at one of its most vulnerable points.”*¹⁸⁸

Concerning the Near and Middle East, which the West, especially the US, Britain, and France, dealt with throughout the period of investigation, Turkish delegates emphasized their country’s (potential) mediator role and its significance in the fight against communist expansionism. Kapani, for instance, after having underlined the significance of the tripartite pact in the Balkans, emphasized that the “geographical situation of Turkey makes it not only a Balkan Power but also one of the Powers of the Near East.”¹⁸⁹ Undeniably, it was not Turkey’s geographical position that made it a Balkan or Middle Eastern power, but human beings, in this case the Turkish deputy Kapani. His aim becomes clear throughout his long speech about the situation in the Near and Middle East, in which he promoted Turkey’s potential role as a mediator in the region on the grounds of multiple geographical attributions. At this time, Turkey tried to establish a defence alliance with Near and Middle Eastern countries after the plan of establishing a large-scale Middle East Pact, backed by the UK, the US, France, and Turkey, had been refused. Important in this context is that Kapani continued to promote the “prominent role” Turkey had in mediating. He assured that there should be no fear that the countries formerly under Turkish domination bear any resentment since these countries would “know that Turkey no longer has political or territorial claims upon them and that they can confidently co-operate with her.”¹⁹⁰ In his view, the reasons why the Middle East Pact had failed, were the following: The Great Powers would not know about the Middle Eastern countries’ needs and achievements, such as finding methods of national security

¹⁸⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 20th sitting, 22 September 1953, Belger (Turkey), 469.

¹⁸⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 19th sitting, 22 September 1953, Fens (Netherlands), 438.

¹⁸⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 18th sitting, 21 September 1953, Kapani (Turkey), 397.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 398. This is obviously contrary to what historians, such as Hale, found out. Cf. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 91f.

protection by themselves. Furthermore, they would not understand the dynamics of regional developments. Instead, they would force the Middle Eastern countries to adapt their policy of “a pre-fabricated structure.”¹⁹¹ Finally, he concluded, “the countries in the best position to guide them and act as a bridge between them and the Atlantic Community are certainly Turkey and Greece.”¹⁹²

Thereby, he argued for the Turkish mediator role by portraying Turkish policymakers as experts, justified through hybrid representations of the country as belonging to different continents and different regions such as the Balkans and the Middle East. With his utterance about Turkey “no longer” having territorial claims upon Middle Eastern countries, he indirectly made a reference to Turkey’s Ottoman past, particularly to the Ottoman Empire’s expansionist policy.

Using similar rhetorical strategies as Kapani, the next day, the Turkish parliamentarian Belger argued:

*“Turkey, with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia, has a common frontier with Russia and the satellite countries, with Iran along a large stretch of its Eastern border and with the Arab countries in the South.”*¹⁹³

In this way, also Belger used liminal representations of the country to stage Turkey as a potential mediator. With the help of constructing Turkey’s geographical belonging as multiple, particularly as belonging to two continents, Asia and Europe, he also exposed Turkey as an international key player in the Middle East. Afterwards, he presented himself – and on behalf of Turkish politicians – as an expert, underlining the necessity of engaging in this region, by giving detailed summaries about the recent conflicts, particularly those in Egypt, Iran and Israel.¹⁹⁴ In doing so, he appealed intensely to the Western Bloc to increase its efforts in the Middle East and, more so, promoted Turkey as a vital player in this context by proving expertise.

As exemplified in Kapani’s and Belger’s speeches, when it came to Turkey’s international role in establishing defence alliances linked to NATO in the Middle East, Turkish delegates attributed their country multiple geographical belongings to justify and promote its role as

¹⁹¹ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 18th sitting, 21 September 1953, Kapani (Turkey), 398.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 20th sitting, 22 September 1953, Belger (Turkey), 471.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 471f.

mediator and peacemaker. It was the bridge metaphor that supported the argument of Turkey's international importance in mediating between European/Western and Middle Eastern leaders. This metaphor was convincing and adopted by non-Turkish politicians. A Danish Assembly member, for instance, noted, "We have the bridge to the Middle East, our two Member States, Greece and Turkey."¹⁹⁵

The bridge is used as a metaphor for connection and understanding. Bridges overcome difficult gulfs that separate one side from the other. Just as a bridge spans two sides of a trench, Turkey was considered a bridge between Europe and Asia/the Middle East – both concerning the self-image of Turkish delegates and from the outside by European politicians. Moreover, as Yanık discovers, it makes a difference whether a state labels itself 'important' or, metaphorically, 'a bridge' since the latter reveals the role a state desires to play internationally, or as Yanık puts it, it contributes "to the international self of that country."¹⁹⁶ Accordingly, Turkish delegates used the bridge metaphor to represent Turkey's multiple geographical belongings as well as to accentuate the international role Turkey aspired to – the role as mediator and peacemaker.

The delegate Kapani, after he argued for Turkey becoming a key mediator in the Middle East, moved to another context in order to portray Turkey as an outstanding international actor representing Western interests. When the Soviets changed their foreign policy rhetoric towards Turkey, after the death of the Soviet leader Stalin in 1953, into a more peaceful one leaving aside any territorial claims,¹⁹⁷ Kapani claimed:

*"Since Turkey is prepared to assume heavy responsibilities both in the Balkans and in the Near East, there is little wonder that the Russian "peace offensive" has been aimed at our country."*¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 9/2, 13th sitting, 17 October 1957, Federspiel (Denmark), 378.

¹⁹⁶ Lerna K. Yanık, "The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: "Bridging" Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War," *Geopolitics* 14/3 (2009): 544, DOI: 10.1080/14650040802693515. Yanık analyses the transformation of the bridge metaphor in Turkish foreign policy discourse in the post-Cold War period. She examines, for instance, how the bridge metaphor changed its meaning from Turkey bridging the West and Asia to bridging the West and Islam in AKP discourses. Besides, on the different uses and interpretations of the bridge metaphor in advocating Turkish EU membership in the German and British press, see Walter, *Die Türkei*, 199, 211.

¹⁹⁷ In May 1953, after Stalin's death, the Soviet government publicly withdrew its territorial claims on Turkey. The Turkish government accepted the Soviet note with satisfaction, but made no further move. Cf. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 88f. Concerning the straits the Soviet note expressed that the security of the straits could be assured on conditions acceptable to the Soviet Union and Turkey. Cf. Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974* (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 85.

¹⁹⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 18th sitting, 21 September 1953, Kapani (Turkey), 398.

By constructing a causal link between Turkey's willingness to assume regional responsibilities and the recent Soviet "peace offensive," he again presented Turkey as a key international player. He continued his speech by reminding the Assembly of the Soviet demands in 1945 concerning Turkish territories and waterways connecting the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and particularly reminded of how Turkey had resisted these demands without any hesitation. In contrast to the former Soviet communication strategy towards Turkey, he claimed, the current strategy had switched "from threats to honeyed words."¹⁹⁹ However, he assured that the NATO countries could rely on the Turkish reaction to this "gentler behaviour on the part of the Russian bear."²⁰⁰ With support from the metaphor of 'the Russian bear' to attribute brutality and maybe even an uncivilized manner to the Soviets, he especially underlined Turkey's strength and resistance towards any Soviet offensive. Expansionist aggression is, here again, attributed to the Soviets by drawing a connection to Russia and its expansionist politics. Overall, Kapani emphasized the Turkish rejection to Soviet rapprochements to demonstrate Turkey's credibility as a Western state and represent the Soviet Union as Turkey's manifested Other.

One specific international project, in which Turkey was a central actor, was the Baghdad Pact of 1955. Other than the original aim of Turkey and its NATO allies to establish a defence alliance consisting of a large part of the Middle East, ultimately it only interlinked Iraq, as the only Arab country, the Central Asian countries of Pakistan and Iran, and the two NATO members Turkey and Britain with each other. After its founding, several Turkish deputies took the word to promote it in the Assembly. First, Turkish delegate Mandalinci pointed to criticisms raised that the Baghdad Pact resulted in political troubles in the region and disrupted the unity of the Arab peoples. According to the DP parliamentarian representing the southwestern province of Muğla, all accusations, also by Western politicians, considering the Baghdad Pact – those responsible for Soviet interference and the armaments race – were "all nonsense."²⁰¹ Instead, he stressed, the Baghdad Pact was a political and economic unit and, above all, a strong defence barrier set up by a number of countries threatened by a menace in order to survive. It was not directed against the Arab League, nor India, nor Israel. Instead, it was solely an outcome of the desire of the people to live in peace and prosperity.²⁰² The recent troubles in the Middle East, he explained, were to be considered against the

¹⁹⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 18th sitting, 21 September 1953, Kapani (Turkey), 398.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ PACE, *Reports*, 8/1, 11th sitting, 20 April 1956, Mandalinci (Turkey), 308.

²⁰² Cf. *ibid.*

background of world unrest. The Baghdad Pact, he concluded, should be supported if they wished to prevent “the nucleus of hatred of the West” from further spreading.²⁰³ Furthermore, he suggested imitating the Soviet method, offering material aid for economic development without linking it to political demands. He again presented himself as an expert of the region and thereby proved Turkey’s high potential as a mediator between the West and the Middle East by expressing, “convince them of respect for their national independence and way of life; provide them with the necessary economic and social aid, without asking for precarious guarantees”²⁰⁴

Almost a year later, Aktaş, a CHP parliamentarian from Kars, a province located in the northeastern part of Turkey, also underlined the Turkish achievements in the Middle East and explained that his country had tried to ensure the security of the region and “to do all she can to increase the solidarity that exists between the countries of the Middle East” through the Baghdad Pact.²⁰⁵ This is why he regretted that attacks had been made, not only by Soviets but also by Western governments, on the Baghdad Pact although it had been adopted for the sole purpose of maintaining each country’s rights and interests on a level of “absolute equality, of resisting any moral or material aggression, [...] and of ensuring the stability and economic expansion of the area.”²⁰⁶

The next day, the Turkish delegate Harunoğlu also underlined the importance of protecting the Middle East from communist influence. He encouraged Europe to take action immediately to avoid further communist successes by emphasizing that except Iraq and Iran, who shared the benefit of being secured through the Baghdad Pact, large parts of the region were “left wide open to Communist influence, unless the West can effectively and urgently act to prevent such an outcome.”²⁰⁷

Against the background of increasing Arab nationalism in the second half of the 1950s – inspired by the Egyptian president Nasser and his brand of Arab socialist nationalism²⁰⁸ – Turkish delegates notably emphasized Turkey’s significance as a bridge between the West and the Middle East. For instance, the Turkish delegate and DP parliamentarian Tokuş accentuated Turkey’s importance and vision in a general debate about the COE’s policy in light of the international situation in May 1958:

²⁰³ PACE, *Reports*, 8/1, 11th sitting, 20 April 1956, Mandalinci (Turkey), 309.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 307.

²⁰⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 8/3, 32nd sitting, 9 January 1957, Aktaş (Turkey), 1039.

²⁰⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, 1040.

²⁰⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 8/3, 35th sitting, 10 January 1957, Harunoğlu (Turkey), 1119.

²⁰⁸ Cf. e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 236.

“I shall conclude, Mr. President, by reminding you that it is Turkey that extends Europe as far as Asia and that my country has the honour of carrying the starred flag of Europe beyond that Continent’s geographical limits. Once more, may the Western European nations understand that in the Turkish people they have a vigilant and faithful ally, ready to go to any lengths for peace.”²⁰⁹

As apparent, the Turkish delegate’s goal was to make the Western European nations believe that Turkey was a reliable partner, especially when it came to the West’s Middle Eastern policy. His strategy to achieve this was to provide Turkey with different geographical belongings, while its identification with Europe was considered more dominant. Tokuş underlined this with a metaphorical language, such as carrying the flag of Europe outside the European continent. In doing so, he represented Turkey’s Europeanness as transcending geographical ‘continental’ borders (taking the two-continents theory as given). Accordingly, he defined Turkey’s identification as European not in geographical terms, in contrast to his geographical separation between the two continents, but in political-civilizational terms. Turkey, from his perspective, was a European country – identifying with the European community – on the Asian continent.

During the next Assembly session period in October 1958, the Turkish deputy Gülek held a speech within a debate about a European policy for the Middle East, in which he made clear what Europe had to do to prevent a communist expansionism in the region:

“Europe must realise that the Middle East is not its private preserve, and that the people there realise that equality is their right. Europe must realise that the remains of colonialism and imperialism must go, and we must convince the Middle Eastern countries that Europe is sincere in this. Europe must show proof of its sincere desire to co-operate with the Middle Eastern countries as equals.”²¹⁰

Thus, Gülek emphasized that Europe had to leave behind any imperial and colonial claims and behaviour in order not to fuel the communists’ propaganda about Europe and the West

²⁰⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 10/1, 7th sitting, 2 May 1958, Tokuş (Turkey), 265.

²¹⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 10/2, 14th sitting, 13 October 1958, Gülek (Turkey), 461.

and their treatment of Middle Eastern countries as minor nations.²¹¹ With regard to rhetorical means, he employed the stylistic device of anaphora by beginning every sentence with “Europe must.” By doing this, he underlined that Europe was the one that had to take actions in the first line. The verb “*must*” stressed that these actions were an absolute necessity and that there was no alternative to his demands. He then argued that the developed countries of Europe had a vital role to play in supporting the underdeveloped countries in the Middle East in economic terms, by financial aid and aid in know-how. Concerning the political developments in the region related to the ideas of nationalism and unity, he stated, “Europe must show itself sincerely in favour of such developments. In any case, Europe must show no tendency or desire to prevent these movements.”²¹² By repeating the necessity of Europe to treat the countries on an equal footing, with the help of the stylistic device of anaphora, and a forcing language, he indirectly empowered Turkish policymakers, like himself, as experts for the region.

The following speaker was Turkish delegate Bülent Ecevit, a CHP parliamentarian from Ankara and later prime minister of Turkey. He demonstrated Turkey’s pioneering role in the region while characterizing Turkey as “a successful example to the Arab world” both in terms of the country’s process of democratization and “by co-operating with the West and forming a bulwark against Soviet military penetration of the Middle East.”²¹³ He, thus, assigned Turkey the potential roles of mediator and role model for Middle Eastern states. Thereby, he portrayed Turkey as having transformed from a Middle Eastern to a European country in political and value-based terms, on the grounds of its democratization process and formation of a defence alliance against the Soviets. In this way, he also discursively constructed Turkey as exceptional and unique through representations of Turkey as a liminal state, which again was grounded in hybrid portrayals of its geography. This hybridity was constructed through representations of Turkey as a meeting place of different regions. Turkish exceptionalism was turned into a claim of superiority against the West by portraying Turkey’s geography as unique in world politics due to its belonging to multiple continents and regions. This corresponds to the research of Yanık, in which he analyses discursive practices in Turkish foreign policy discourse after the Cold War and reveals the strategy of turning Turkey’s ‘exceptionalism’ into a claim of superiority.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 10/2, 14th sitting, 13 October 1958, Gülek (Turkey), 461.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid., Ecevit (Turkey), 465.

²¹⁴ On the strategy of turning Turkey’s ‘exceptionalism’ into a claim of superiority against the West in Turkish foreign policy discourses in post-Cold War times, see Yanık, “Constructing Turkish ‘exceptionalism,’” 83.

Another region that became a conflict area in the 1950s, and in which Turkey was involved, was the island of Cyprus. Although the respective President of the Consultative Assembly continuously discouraged Greek and Turkish parliamentarians from attacking each other verbally, a few speeches of both countries' delegates got out of hand and included offensive statements.²¹⁵ However, since the conflict involved three members of the Council of Europe (Britain, Greece, and Turkey), it seemed to have not been a suitable topic for Turkish delegates to argue for their country's belonging or importance for Europe directly. There was no common Other to the European Self to be constructed, nor Turkish activities that could serve as an argument for Turkey's belonging to Europe. However, some Turkish deputies used the Cyprus conflict to emphasize the importance of European unification. The Turkish delegate Gülek, for instance, in this context stated,

*“The problem of Cyprus must be taken up boldly. We must face the facts realistically, and a solution must be found in the spirit of the Council of Europe, the spirit of «one Europe». [...] Cyprus, instead of being a cauldron of hatred, should be a means for co-operation in Europe, when even ancient differences and hatred between old countries like Germany and France have been put aside. As good Turks, good Greeks, and good Britishers, and as good Europeans, we certainly can find a solution which will end the tragedy and the potential menace to peace in Europe and in the world.”*²¹⁶

Apparently, he also brought awareness of the importance of the Council of Europe and its aim to cooperate closely throughout Europe in order to safeguard peace. Calling themselves ‘good Europeans’ certainly supported the promotion of integration and peace and creating a feeling of social cohesion. He thereby encouraged the people to use reason and to act in a rational manner. Additional Turkish delegates reiterated the importance of deepening European unity when the Cyprus conflict became a matter of discussion in the Assembly.²¹⁷ As a result, the Cyprus conflict served as an argument for closer unification throughout Europe, which again indirectly demonstrated their deep commitment to the common goal of uniting.

²¹⁵ For instance, under the agenda ‘general debate about the policy of the Council of Europe’ in 1955, the Cyprus conflict gave impetus for emotional offensives and in the end remained the only topic of the general debate. Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 22nd sitting, 21 October 1955, 655-685.

²¹⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 10/2, 14th sitting, 13 October 1958, Gülek (Turkey), 462.

²¹⁷ See, for instance, PACE, *Reports*, 6/1, 5th sitting, 25 May 1954, Mandalinci (Turkey), 99.

Their emphasis on the significance of Cyprus for the process of uniting corresponds with Achim Trunk. According to his analysis, it was recognised in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, as early as 1954, that the Cyprus question could have considerable significance for European integration. In other words, the conflict over Cyprus could block the integration of opponents into a superordinate Europe.²¹⁸

In summary, with regard to how Turkish delegates strategically represented Turkey's regional entanglements in the 1950s, most striking is the strategy of providing geographical representations of Turkey interpreted as belonging to multiple regions, such as the Balkans and the Middle East. By doing so, they assigned Turkey multiple geographical identities, which in turn attributed multi-regional expertise to Turkish state officials. In this way, they portrayed Turkey as a powerful and influential player in these regions, and as prepared to use this regional power and impact in the service of the West and 'free Europe'. As per this argumentation, there was no mention of possible scepticism towards Turkey due to its historical relations in Ottoman times from Middle Eastern states.

5.6 Turkish Defence Arguments in Times of the Desired EEC Association

“Turkey and Greece are the bulwarks of Europe in the Mediterranean, and they staunchly fulfil this role.”²¹⁹ Proudly, a Turkish delegate presented Turkey's role in the defence of Europe at the COE's Assembly in May 1962. As will be shown in this subchapter, after Turkish deputies re-entered the Assembly in January 1962 following a one and a half year break in the course of the first military coup of May 1960, Turkish deputies emphasized Turkey's geostrategic importance with more self-confidence than before.²²⁰ This corresponded with the political strategy of the new Turkish government against the background of a sharpening Cold War: Especially the new, and former, Prime Minister İnönü (CHP), who had been a close associate of Atatürk, strategically used the increasing dangerous bipolarity of the world to elevate Turkey's geopolitical relevance. Therefore, he also replaced Foreign Minister Selim Sarper with Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was known as a Cold War strategist.²²¹ For İnönü's cabinet the East-West conflict became a source of revenue for

²¹⁸ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 296.

²¹⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 4th sitting, 16 May 1962, Oran (Turkey), 108.

²²⁰ For more information on the military coup of 1960 see Chapter 6 (Political Values). Part of the results following in this subchapter are also included in the article “Ein Europa ohne die Türkei?” published by the author.

²²¹ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 288.

Turkey, as Turkish historian Haluk Gerger identifies – not least, as he accentuates, because the value of Turkey’s geopolitical position increased in times of conflicts.²²² Accordingly, Turkish rulers did not face conflicts, such as those that arose with the Cuban crisis in 1962 with fear, but instrumentalised them.²²³ And even though Menderes had accusations of treason for his American-oriented economic policy, the new cabinet under the rule of İnönü continued a similar policy and made itself dependent on Western aid. In order to mitigate the strong US orientation, it increasingly turned towards European institutions instead. By participating in European unification plans, the government hoped to create the necessary balance that Menderes had missed out on, in their view.²²⁴

Additionally, after the Turkish Republic had returned to democracy after the military coup of 1960, Turkish delegates that re-entered the Assembly considered it crucial to express with new emphasis Turkey’s on-going will to further develop towards Western standards, including democratic stability. Moreover, in the historical context of negotiations between the EEC and Turkey, Turkish delegates used security arguments to advocate for vast economic aid from Europe to remain militarily strong enough to defend Europe. In other terms, in the context of the very hot Cold War at that time, nothing else seemed to be more helpful and successful in convincing the West or Europe to strengthen its economic aid and involve Turkey in common economic policy processes than that of Turkey’s strategic significance.

The Turkish deputy, a CHP parliamentarian from Istanbul quoted at the outset, showed his deep disappointment by emphasizing Turkey’s extraordinary significance in defending Europe’s security in a general debate on two subjects; the general policy of the COE based on a report of the Political Committee, and European economic relations based on a report of the Economic Committee. In the context of economic relations, Oran criticised the developed countries of Europe for behaving “very conservatively” and “too thriftily towards the developing countries”; their support mechanism of economic aid was functioning “too slowly.”²²⁵ Then he referred to his own country’s efforts in the areas of politics and defence. Concerning politics he claimed, “Turkey has not failed to do her share in the development towards the political integration of Europe.”²²⁶ And with regard to defence, he explained, “Turkey has accepted with faith the heavy burden she has shouldered in the common defence

²²² Cf. Gerger, *Die türkische Außenpolitik*, 93.

²²³ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 288f.

²²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 289f. As Kaya notes, it was cleverly concealed in this context that the application for EEC association had been made under Menderes’ leadership.

²²⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 14/3, 21st sitting, 16 January 1963, Oran (Turkey), 732.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

of the free countries of Europe.”²²⁷ Therefore, he summed up, the attitude of the developed countries of Europe towards Turkey, “which represents, together with Greece, a bastion of peace in southeastern Europe, and is sharing much the greater part of the burden,” was “far from encouraging.”²²⁸ He then went into detail and explained that Turkey had adopted a highly praised five-year development plan, which needed foreign aid amounting to \$ 280 million, while the majority would be financed from internal sources. However, he pointed out, they “notice[d] with sorrow” that some of their “European friends” were creating difficulties about the sum, the rate of interest and the terms of this foreign aid.²²⁹ Finally, he concluded his speech by summarizing his argument:

*“The statesmen who have a guiding voice in the destiny of Europe must bear in mind that Turkey’s strength as the defender of freedom and democracy and in creating a United Europe will increase proportionately with her economic development.”*²³⁰

Accordingly, the basis of his argumentation, which pursued the goal of economic support for Turkey, was their role as a defender of Western values and being an active supporter of European political integration. His argumentative strategy was to construct a causal link between European economic aid and Turkish defence and political aid – both strengths would eventually increase proportionally with greater economic assistance.

Referring to Oran’s speech, the French delegate Pflimlin also emphasized the treatment that Turkey was entitled to:

*“We also heard a member of the Turkish delegation, Mr. Oran, who pointed out — and surely we must agree with him — that Turkey is bravely holding a key position in the front line of the free world, and that we should make allowances for her difficulties and help her, in every possible way, to carry out the development plan she has prepared.”*²³¹

Non-Turkish representatives also adopted the constructed causal link between Turkey’s defender role and the West’s duty to support their development.

²²⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 14/3, 21th sitting, 16 January 1963, Oran (Turkey), 732.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ PACE, *Reports*, 14/3, 24th sitting, 17 January 1963, Pflimlin (France), 808. On the Turkish development plan see Chapter 7 (Economy).

The connection of Turkey's demand for economic integration into the common market and its importance in defending Europe had been expressed more specifically by Oran's national colleague Gülek months before when the Assembly discussed reports of the Economic and Political Committees about economic relations and the COE's general policy. Gülek expressed his disappointment that Turkey received hardly any attention in the reports of the Committees, even though it had applied for EEC association prior to other countries. In his opinion, "in this family of nations, some should not be treated like foster-brothers." Moreover, he emphasized, "Turkey is determined to be a part of a free Europe and of the free world," before he argued for greater attention to Turkey by portraying its role in defending Europe:

*"Of course there are difficulties in Turkey's integration into the Community, but are there not difficulties about Britain's entry, or about the neutrals? The difficulties are there, but a way out can be found. I have referred to economic integration as having political implications. It also has defence implications. Turkey's position in the defence of the free world is an important one. The world is not at war but in reality it is in a state of war of some kind – the cold war – and a hot war can start at any time. A war by accident is possible at any moment. Turkey today spends a tremendous amount of energy and resources to guard a large border of the free world against an impending danger."*²³²

Emphasized are the rhetorical devices the Turkish deputy used in his speech. By describing the West repeatedly as "the free world" – a term with an exclusively positive connotation – and contrasting it to the dark "danger" of a possible upcoming war, he exposed Turkey's significance as a threshold and guardian of the whole Western free world. He further reinforced Turkey's role by describing the potentially imminent war as a *hot* war in contrast to the current situation of the *Cold* War. His rhetoric clearly corresponded to the Turkish governments' strategy: As Sümeyra Kaya shows in her analysis of the negotiation process between Turkey and the EEC, the use of threatening scenarios was also used by the Turkish government to speed up the negotiations, especially after Great Britain had sent its membership application to the EEC as well.²³³ As far as the portrayal of Turkey as a key actor

²³² PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 4th sitting, 16 May 1962, Gülek (Turkey), 120 (as the two quotes before).

²³³ Regarding threatening scenarios used by Turkish decision-makers, Kaya quotes a memorandum sent by the Turkish government to the EEC Council on 30 August 1961 (a Turkish association would finally be in the common interest of all involved partners). She makes a connection between the threatening letter and the

in Western defence and as a guardian is concerned, Jochen Walter's study shows this from the European side as well – at least from a German and British press perspective. Anyone who wrote about Turkey between 1960 and 1963, according to Walter, had to acknowledge this important role of the country. The general perception was that Turkey, as a guardian, could mitigate the threat from the Soviet Union.²³⁴

Throughout delegate Gülek's speech, he explicitly highlighted Turkey's military power as prepared to protect 'the free world':

*“One of the greatest standing armies of Europe today is the Turkish Army, ready to strike at a monster that may be a danger to the free world. The Turk has proved all through history, especially recently in Korea, that he is ready to sacrifice his life for the ideal in which he believes.”*²³⁵

He constructed an image of Turkey that, once again, demonstrated absolute loyalty to the West – prepared to enter into a struggle against the communist “monster” at any time. In his view, Turkey was a staunch and strong representative of the European ideals in contrast to the demonized rival. And, once again, Turkey's deployment in Korea served to prove their unlimited willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of Western principles.

Furthermore, the Turkish deputy Gülek extended his presentation of Turkey's army as one of the best worldwide and claimed that one of the reasons Turkey was an underdeveloped country was because Turkey was spending a substantial amount of its resources on defence expenditure.²³⁶ That the Turkish state had attached great importance to the military since the founding of the republic could not be denied. This importance resulted not least from the military's self-assigned role as guardian of the ideology of Kemalism.²³⁷

In a debate on European cooperation in the scientific field, the Turkish delegate Celal Ertuğ, a member of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP), a successor of the previously banned DP, and the coalition partner of the CHP at the time, also specified Turkey's longstanding

British membership application, which occurred after the EFTA had ultimately failed. The British application finally was considered the more urgent case and threatened to slow down the Turkish association process. Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 296f.

²³⁴ Cf. Walter, *Die Türkei*, 141, 148f., 154.

²³⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 4th sitting, 16 May 1962, Gülek (Turkey), 121.

²³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

²³⁷ On the Turkish military and its role in state and society in the second half of the 20th century see, e.g., Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 440ff.

contributions to the defence of the free world including the vast investments in the defence sector by referring to the past and present:

*“Our political and geographical situation meant that we were always defending ourselves against Russia. We fought many times to protect the free world of today, as no other country did. We lost many things; we paid very heavily to defend freedom. Today, half our annual budget is spent on our armed forces, for the defence of the free world.”*²³⁸

The main common enemy at that time, the Soviet Union, is used again here to construct an image of Turkey as being constantly at odds with Russia and its predecessor. Turkey had made many sacrifices for the defence of freedom, as the delegate clearly emphasized – it lost a lot, paid a lot, and was now spending even more. Based on the argument of Turkey’s extraordinary value in defending the free world, he asked for “technical assistance, scientific co-operation and research centres,” which would make them “more useful for free and democratic Europe.”²³⁹ Thus, the argument of being the bulwark against the common enemy was also used to gain assistance in the field of science.

The deputy Gülek furthermore stressed in his speech that economic advancement would be a great advantage and quality, but that there were just as valuable qualities for underdeveloped countries, such as “courage, determination and the supreme sacrifice for the cause one believes in.”²⁴⁰ In doing so, he again emphasized Turkey’s unconditional willingness to fight for Western values - which, as generally assumed, he was able to confidently do given the historical context of Turkey’s engagement in Korea and because of its performance as NATO’s southeastern edge.

In the context of national disparities of development, Gülek expressed his observation of the increasing transnational interrelations. He found that more developed countries had finally realized that the problems of the underdeveloped countries were theirs as well. Developing closer relations and forming collective communities beyond nation-states were, according to him, the substantial reason for the new level of solidarity among Europeans.

²³⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 6th sitting, 17 May 1962, Ertuğ (Turkey), 205.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 4th sitting, 16 May 1962, Gülek (Turkey), 121.

*“It is not a matter of charity any more. It is a matter of self-interest as well, not only because underdeveloped countries, when developed, become excellent markets, but because the realisation has come to the world that all countries form a community. This ideal of community is particularly strong among the free nations.”*²⁴¹

According to Schimmelfennig’s approach of ‘rhetorical action’, Gülek’s strategy was promising, as he based his argumentation on the community ethos. If not to help each other, per his message, the collective ideal of forming one community would be lost. Consequently, any opponents were ‘rhetorically entrapped’ if they wanted to keep their credibility as community members and believers in the shared goal of a solidarity-based Europe.²⁴² Deputy Gülek assured against any contradiction by describing the solidarity as an existing fact that was collectively self-evident and not to be questioned: “Fortunately, it is now the ideal that it is the concern of all to try and help the underdeveloped countries to go ahead.”²⁴³ Finally, he summarized his speech by concluding his argument for Turkey’s belonging to Europe:

*“Mr. President, I am through. I should like to summarise in a few words. We are an inseparable part of the free world. We believe in freedom and the democratic way of life. We are contributing to the defence of the free world with one of the largest armies in the world. We are ready to face all sacrifices for this principle, and we want to be treated with the consideration that is due to us.”*²⁴⁴

In other words, due to Turkey’s intense contributions to the defence of the free world and its unconditional willingness to make sacrifices, it requested to be treated fairly – which generally meant a higher amount of economic aid. With these words, Gülek expressed the Turkish demands of May 1962 very clearly, which must be considered in the context of on-going negotiations between Turkey and the EEC and those within the EEC. By beginning each sentence with “We” he also used anaphora as a rhetorical tool to emphasize Turkey as a strong actor and therefore as an equal member of the European community. Months later, when the Assembly members rediscussed economic relations and the general

²⁴¹ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 4th sitting, 16 May 1962, Gülek (Turkey), 121.

²⁴² Concerning Schimmelfennig’s approach of rhetorical action within political communities see, e.g., Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap,” 62ff.

²⁴³ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 4th sitting, 16 May 1962, Gülek (Turkey), 121.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

policy of the COE – and when EEC negotiations continued – Gülek again emphasized Turkey’s immeasurable willingness to make sacrifices.

*“Defence is an integral part of the European union that is coming, and defence means sacrifice. In this sense, Turkey is doing more than her due for the defence of the free world and of free Europe and for the defence of the ideals of the free world, in which she firmly believes. [...] We are exposed directly to the great danger that threatens us all. One of the largest frontiers with the common danger is in Turkey. A large army, one of the largest in Europe, defends that frontier at great sacrifice.”*²⁴⁵

In his speech, he stylised Turkey as a loyal martyr for the West, highlighting its significance for Europe in a strong emotional context. Similarly, his colleague Oran assigned Turkey the victim role and protector of its European comrades: “We rightly consider that we are making this sacrifice not only in defence of our own country, but also on behalf of friendly and allied countries in Europe.”²⁴⁶

Overall, the rhetoric of the Turkish delegates corresponded to the official foreign policy strategy of the Turkish government under Prime Minister İnönü and Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin at this time, which was grounded predominantly in Cold War rhetoric.²⁴⁷ A stronger inclination towards Europe, and with that, a reduction in US orientation – the government’s eventual foreign policy goal – is also clear in the Assembly at that time. The delegates who spoke, all of whom were members of the two governing parties after the coup (CHP and AP), confidently appealed to the European community to support Turkey economically. Strategic arguments, as examined here in the discourse on Europe’s security, played a central role in this. In the process, Turkish delegates – even more so than before – stylised Turkey as a courageous protector of free Europe and the free world, indirectly assuming this as general knowledge. Without sufficient economic aid from Europe, the message was that the continued security of the free world could not be guaranteed. In this context, the common perception of the antagonist as an expansionist aggressor was advantageous to Turkey.

²⁴⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 14/2, 17th sitting, 25 September 1962, Gülek (Turkey), 601f.

²⁴⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 15/1, 5th sitting, 8 May 1963, Oran (Turkey), 165.

²⁴⁷ Cf. Gerger, *Die türkische Außenpolitik*, 97; Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 288.

5.7 Conclusions

Debates about security policy issues were *the* discursive field for Turkish delegates in the Assembly to present their country as European. Particularly popular were strategies that ascribed exceptional character traits to the country, constructed to build up Turkey as an important security policy actor for Europe.

This chapter highlighted how Turkey's identity was discursively constructed as European in debates on Europe becoming a defence community. The key focus was on the *how*, which is why the arguments and the rhetorical techniques used to enforce them were the focal points of the analysis. Throughout the period of investigation the main argument of Turkish delegates in positioning Turkey in Europe was that Turkey was an *exceptionally* important actor in *defending free Europe*. This included arguments for why Turkey mattered to Europe's security, as well as arguments for Turkey's credibility as a representative of European security policy interests.

The key arguments were the following: Firstly, Turkish delegates used arguments to construct Turkey's *exceptionalism*, above all through liminal representations of its geography. Secondly, they argued about whom and how Europe should be *defended*. This included interpretations of demarcation to the outside, thus constructions of Europe's Other. Thirdly, they attempted to shape imaginations about what *Europe* stood for – its ideas and goals – and put forward arguments to prove Turkey's credibility as a member of the European community. However, the term *free Europe* remained an empty phrase, which can be seen as Cold War rhetoric to demarcate themselves from Eastern Europe being under Soviet control at the time.

The goal of these arguments was to not solely convince the audience about Turkey's Europeanness but also to achieve certain institutional connections; initially, the goal was Turkey's inclusion in Western and European defence systems, such as NATO and the planned European Defence Community. With Turkey being a NATO member and with a failed EDC, the new aim was to increase Turkey's power and authority at the international level, and later, as of 1959, the institutional aspiration was Turkey's association with the EEC, which led Turkish delegates to interlink defence and economic issues. Given the contextual conditions, such as developments in the field of European integration and international politics in times of the Cold War, as well as Turkish domestic affairs, discursive practices also changed.

Specifically, following the arguments that supported the assertion that Turkey was a vital actor in defending 'free Europe', the analysis has produced the following results, structured according to the three keywords differentiated above:

First, a popular strategy was to emphasize Turkey's 'exceptionalism'. Primarily, it has been shown that Turkish delegates provided liminal representations of their country, grounded in hybrid constructions of its geography, to produce Turkey's exceptionalism. These representational practices portrayed Turkey as belonging to multiple geographical spaces, such as two different continents, Europe and Asia, and to different regions, above all the Balkans and the Middle East. In addition, Turkish deputies emphasized the direct proximity to the Soviet Union to make Turkey's geographical location even more unique in global comparison. This kind of representation fulfilled various functions and was strategically used to serve the interests of the respective speaker. Most notably, in times when the West was anxious to prevent the further spread of communism in the Middle East, delegates used hybrid constructions of Turkey's geography to promote the country as a mediator and peacemaker between Europe/the West²⁴⁸ and the Middle East, and as role model for the latter region. It also served to represent Turkey as a crucial bastion against Soviet expansionism and, resulting from this, potentially protecting the whole of Europe, and even Asia and Africa from Soviet imperialism. Based on liminal representations of its geography, claiming exceptionalism became a claim of superiority against the rest of the West, ironically, as part of the quest to become an equal European/Western partner. Another paradox shown is the following: Mostly, Turkish delegates were eager to represent their country as Western, as opposed to Eastern or as European rather than Middle Eastern. However, in certain contexts, for instance, when they promoted Turkey's mediator role, they represented Turkey as belonging to the Middle East as well.

Liminal representations of Turkey's geography, however, were also used to justify the imminent danger of a Soviet/communist attack on Turkey. The aim then was to negatively justify the logic of including Turkey's into Western/European defence organizations. In this case, threatening scenarios (including if/then hypotheses) backed up the respective argument, such as 'If Turkey was not included, then all of Europe will be captured'. This kind of presentation was supplemented with the constructed logic that the Soviet Union would only attack Turkey if it were not part of a security alliance.

²⁴⁸ Turkish delegates frequently did not differentiate between Europe and the West.

In conclusion, depending on the interests of the speaker, Turkish delegates used liminal representations either to portray Turkey in a positive powerful way or in a vulnerable position.

Secondly, the keyword *defending* can be associated with Turkish arguments that constructed the Soviet Union and the ideology of communism as the Other in contrast to the European or Western Self. Representations of the Soviet Union as the Other, described as the enemy in the East, the aggressor, the peril, the expansionist menace, and so on, served Turkish delegates to assign Turkey to the European Self. In doing so, they identified Turkey as Western/European as opposed to Eastern. Furthermore, constructions of the Other served to convey a feeling of cohesion through negative difference, thus in demarcation to the outside. In this way, Turkish delegates helped to manifest the friend-foe mindset and to create a European identity in the sense of a community feeling. In conclusion, representing the communist Soviet Union as the common Other supported Turkish delegates at the individual and at the collective level, thus at both levels of collective identity formation, to identify with the European community.²⁴⁹ Positioning Turkey in Europe was a promising strategy since, as Trunk demonstrates, the perception of the Soviet Union as a demarcating negative Other was an identity-forming feature that was consistently shared among the European assemblies at that time.²⁵⁰ In any case, it was *the* master narrative of the Cold War on the part of the West.²⁵¹ Even in 1945, when Turkey refused the Soviet territorial demands, some delegates constructed the Soviet Union as Turkey's Other at a time when it was not yet considered the West's Other.

Besides, to promote Turkey as an asset for any defence organization, a common statement of Turkish delegates was that Turkey was militarily strong, maintaining a large army, and spending vast amounts of its state budget on the military. They repeatedly supported this argument with heroic representations of the Turkish military deployment in the Korean War. Turkey's direct involvement in Korea also substantiated other arguments: Turkish delegates most often mentioned their involvement when they wanted to prove Turkey's clear commitment to Western security and to Western principles – in order to overcome any scepticism towards Turkey due to its neutrality in the Second World War. According to

²⁴⁹ As illustrated in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework), collective identity formations can be separated into two analytical levels – an individual and a collective level. The individual level describes the process of identification of an individual with a group, whereas the collective level describes attempts of finding commonalities and of creating a feeling of community. For further details see Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework).

²⁵⁰ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 171ff. This perception can be observed in all assemblies and for all political tendencies represented at that time (172).

²⁵¹ Cf. Yilmaz and Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "western" identity," 51.

Turkish deputies, Turkish soldiers took part in a Western mission against the Eastern enemy as well as defended Western values and the common heritage in the Korean War.²⁵²

Similarly, Turkish delegates represented NATO not only as a security alliance but also as an institution uniting Western civilization. In doing so, they assigned it a certain level of collective identity to support their argument of Turkey's right to be included.

Additionally, representations of Turkey as a strategically important country for the defence of Europe helped Turkish delegates to argue for their country's inclusion into NATO and the forthcoming European Army at the beginning of the 1950s. Also, they represented the efforts of defending Turkey's external borders against a potential Soviet attack not as defending national but European borders. In contrast, *not* mentioned in the discursive field of the Council of Europe's Assembly was Turkey's role as a junior partner of the US in defending the West against the Eastern enemy.²⁵³ Apparently, in a circle of politicians trying to create a European Self – separate from the USA – the Turkish delegates considered it an unsuitable argument to position Turkey in Europe.²⁵⁴

Thirdly, referring to Turkish representations of defending (*free*) Europe, the following results can be summarized: a key argument among Turkish delegates was the shared commitment to the European idea and to common principles. Every country represented in the Council of Europe, so they argued, had eventually committed itself to the goal of uniting throughout Europe. According to this pan-European idea, as soon as a European country institutionalized the common principles – democracy, the rule of law and human rights – it had the right to be included in the process of uniting. This was the basis for arguing for Turkey's inclusion in any European organization, such as a European defence community. It was, not in the least, Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe and the COE's representation as the embodiment of the European idea that enabled Turkish delegates to argue this way.

According to Schimmelfennig's approach, they strategically 'acted rhetorically' in the sense that they delegitimized possible dissent by basing their argument on the common commitment of uniting. Anyone who wanted to remain a credible representative of the European idea was

²⁵² How it was tried to define a so-called 'common heritage' and 'common values' is part of Chapter 6 (Political Values) and Chapter 8 (Culture).

²⁵³ In other contexts, however, this was part of the argumentation. In the context of writings of Turkish intellectuals of statecraft, Yilmaz and Bilgin point out that during the Cold War representations of Turkey as a junior partner of the US helped to produce its Western identity. Cf. Yilmaz and Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "western" identity," 41.

²⁵⁴ According to Trunk, besides the Soviet Union and communism, European elites constructed the US as partly different than Europe. However, other than the Soviet Union, it was not considered an enemy but an all-powerful friend, to whom one felt inferior and in economic competition. Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 195ff., 206f.

‘rhetorically entrapped’ in this way. Interlinked with ‘rhetorical action’ was the strategy of ‘shaming’ which served Turkish delegates to expose those politicians who had acted against the shared commitment of uniting all of Europe. This, for instance, became clear when Turkish speakers exposed those who, in their eyes, divided Europe into first and second-class Europe.

The question of what was not said and why reveals the following: First of all, it leads to another constructed Other to the European Self. According to Trunk, another identity-creating characteristic that the Western European elites agreed on in the European assemblies of the 1950s was the defeat of Europe and its declining position in the political world order.²⁵⁵ The Turkish delegates in the Council of Europe were silent on this. On the contrary, Turkey's role in past wartime – especially its neutrality in the Second World War – was being painted over with arguments that should have otherwise proven Turkey's commitment to Western security, such as the Turkish deployment to Korea.

Moreover, when it came to arguments for Turkey's mediator role in the Middle East, it is striking that Turkish delegates did not mention any potential scepticism based on the imperialist past of Turkey's predecessor and on Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel. They only addressed the issue of territorial expansion with the assurance that Turkey no longer had any territorial aspirations. One explanation for the concealment of both the imperial past and Turkey's Israel policy is that Turkey could have been presented less convincingly as a mediator in the Middle East. With regard to Israel, it was by no means acceptable for most of the Arab states to recognise Israel as a state and to maintain diplomatic and economic relations, as Turkey had done since 1949.²⁵⁶

Turkish delegates supported all these arguments with rhetorical strategies and linguistic means to help shape the collective knowledge and social reality at the time. The use of threatening scenarios was particularly popular: the collective threat was thereby the Soviet Union that captured or ‘enslaved’ Europe, Asia, and even the world. With Turkey involved in Western/European defence systems, they argued that Europe could be saved. Turkish delegates also predicted that the European idea would lose support in Turkish society if they remained excluded from plans for a European army.

²⁵⁵ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 318.

²⁵⁶ Turkey recognised the state of Israel in 1949 and the two countries exchanged ambassadors in the same year; additionally, economic relations between the two countries grew fast in the early 1950s. Cf. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 92.

With the help of metaphorical language, they additionally underlined their arguments. Frequently used metaphors imagined Turkey as a bridge to the Middle East, as a bastion or bulwark against the common Soviet threat, and as a loyal martyr when it was about to defend Western principles. These metaphors served to prove Turkey's credibility as a Western and European country, showed how the delegates desired their country to be considered and offered a visualization of the role the country aspired to be at the international level. Finally, with remarkably emotionally charged language, they strengthened their identification with the European community. As will be discussed below, some of these strategies served Turkish delegates to identify Turkey as European when it came to constructing Europe in political and value-based terms as well.

6 Representations of Turkey as Part of a European Political and Value-Based Community

Europe had to unite in order to survive. This was a common view among the Assembly members at the beginning of the COE's existence. The concept of Europe as a 'third power', alongside the antagonists US and USSR, had become less popular due to the USSR's refusal of involvement in the Marshall Plan and the concurrent affiliation of 'free Europe' to the Western Bloc.¹ Yet, there were still aspirations to make Europe powerful and prosperous again and become independent from US aid. The question of political structure, however, particularly the question of giving up national sovereignty was controversial.

In addition to the common goal of continuing European unification (in one form or another), the Assembly members agreed that their main task was to establish a legal mechanism to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Certain values and principles thus determined the common ground for the work that lay ahead.

This chapter examines Turkey's contributions to debates on the political structure of Europe as well as their contribution to debates on how to define and protect common values and principles. It argues that Turkish delegates strategically used these debates to represent their country as a credible member of the European community, interpreted as a community of values intending to unite further. The first of three subchapters considers Turkish voices in discussions about the structural unification process. The second examines the debates about shared values and principles that primarily focused on human rights and fundamental freedoms. While these two topics were mainly discussed in the first months and years after the COE's foundation, the third subchapter considers how the first military coup in Turkey in 1960 affected the work of the Assembly – during the absence of Turkish delegates as well as after the return of a Turkish delegation. As will be shown below, Turkey's membership in the COE challenged the self-understanding of the Assembly and the COE as a protector of human rights and political principles when they were violated in Turkey during the 1960 coup. On the other hand, after the Turkish delegation returned to the Assembly, some new Turkish delegates used their membership to promote Turkey's long-term orientation towards European standards to receive support from their European colleagues.

¹ For a brief overview of the concept of Europe as a 'third power' see, e.g., Clemens et al., *Geschichte der europäischen Integration*, 65f. In the COE's Assembly, until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, some delegates promoted the idea of Europe as a 'third power'. Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 221.

6.1 Turkey's Commitment to the European Idea

The question of how to turn the European idea of uniting into reality remained. Discussions on questions like this were immediately held during the first Assembly session in August 1949. This subchapter highlights these discussions and argues that Turkish delegates used an initial debate about the common aim of uniting to represent their country as profoundly committed to this objective and therefore represented Turkey as a credible member of the 'European family' striving for the same ideal. Additionally, it argues that some Turkish delegates used this debate to define the criteria of becoming a member of a united Europe.

During the first session, the Assembly members held a general debate on changes in the political structure of Europe to achieve a greater unity, which lasted two days and in which Turkish delegates actively took part. The participants of this debate particularly focused on the question of how to bring forward the political unification of Europe, in other words, how to live the European idea. This included discussions about how to spread the European idea to the peoples of Europe. In this respect, for instance, a Dutch delegate pointed out, "the peoples of Europe must become conscious of their character as Europeans, a European conscience must be born."² Also the Turkish delegate Feridun Düşünsel, a CHP parliamentarian from the Eastern province of Bingöl, emphasized, "For the future of Europe, foremost importance should be ascribed to the psychological factors."³ Therefore, in his opinion, before introducing certain juridical structures, it was more crucial to enlighten public opinion in each European country concerning the aims of the Council of Europe.⁴

Such comments demonstrate the weak or even absent level of identifying with Europe outside political elites that were 'at home' in the European political environment. With regard to the latter group, it cannot be assumed that personal identification as Europeans was strong in every case. As Trunk notes, stronger attachment to the nation than to Europe was so natural that hardly a word was said about it.⁵

What also became clear in the general debate of the Assembly was that the pan-European idea was still alive. Countries that were observed as European (geographically defined) but were under Soviet rule at the time would become, one day, part of the European Union they were

² PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 5th sitting, 16 August 1949, Serrarens (Netherlands), 190.

³ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Düşünsel (Turkey), 272.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 231ff., particularly 232. Unfortunately, there is no empirical research on individual identification of the member states' citizens with Europe at this time. However, it is to be expected that such a study would not have shown a strong identification with Europe – if already the political elite on the European stage perceived themselves rather weakly as Europeans.

achieving, they hoped.⁶ As a symbolic sign they left some seats empty. “Our European brotherhood does not stop at the iron curtain,” as the aforementioned Dutch delegate commented about this symbolic act.⁷ The pan-European scale of the idea of uniting also became visible in a speech of the Turkish delegate Tahsin Balta, a CHP parliamentarian from the province of Rize at the Black Sea, who underlined that the common objective was to unite “all the countries of Europe” and that the COE was therefore open to those which “wish to cooperate, which can collaborate with us in our common task, and which share our ideas on essential political principles.”⁸ In a similar way, the Turkish delegate Gülek expressed the criteria for membership as follows:

“In the union we are after, no considerations of language, or religious or other distinctions, are being taken into account. Human freedom and willingness to work are the criteria we are taking into consideration. Our door is open to all European nations which are ready or will be ready to work with us in this sense.”⁹

Thus, both delegates used the general debate on changes in the political structure to express their opinion regarding the criteria to join the Council of Europe and the union they were intending to establish. Both also defined these criteria on the basis of certain values and political principles. Attempts to define these values and principles in more detail were part of debates on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (as shown in the next subchapter). However, concerning the political structure of Europe, these criteria served to demonstrate the general openness to new members of the whole European ‘continent’, as long as they shared the specified moral values and political principles. With such observations determining the criteria to become part of a collective Europe, both delegates contributed to the formation of a collective identity to a certain extent by defining commonalities of the collective. The delegate, Gülek, declared that cultural differences should not be taken into consideration when analysing the criteria necessary to belong to the union. From the Turkish point of view, this is not surprising since Turkey is a country with a predominant Muslim

⁶ See for example, PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 5th sitting, 16 August 1949, Boothby (United Kingdom), 172; PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, La Malfa (Italy), 246.

⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 5th sitting, 16 August 1949, Serrarens (Netherlands), 190. On the distinction between ‘free Europe’ and the ‘European Irredenta’ see also Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 141ff.

⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Balta (Turkey), 212.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Gülek (Turkey), 242.

population and an official language belonging to the Eurasian family of Turkic languages.¹⁰ In conclusion, these two delegates used the debate on the future political structure of Europe as an opportunity to define commonalities with an identity-forming effect, and which Turkey could fulfil.

Both delegates also belonged to the group of those who wanted to create a federalist Europe. Overall, the gap between federalists and intergovernmentalists, which had already resulted in controversial discussions at the Congress of Europe in 1948, remained unbridgeable. Although a majority of the members of the Assembly were in favour of extending the powers of the Assembly and the COE in general, plans to create a political union failed due to opposition from some governments, particularly the British and the Scandinavian governments.¹¹

Within the Turkish delegation in the Assembly many supported the federal idea. The strongest, or at least the most outspoken supporter of it was the delegate Gülek. He clearly suggested, “Our aim is, and must be, a United States of Europe.”¹² According to him, Europe had to unite if it aspired to survive. As such, it was “a matter of life and death for Europe,”¹³ which was a widespread image in those days.¹⁴ He then took the USA as a role model and argued,

“At the beginning they also started as small independent States, but soon their union made them a very strong and important world Power. The task before the union of Europe is far more difficult and complex than the one which faced America. European nations have behind them centuries of tradition and prejudice. All this must be overcome, but it can be overcome. We are sure that this union is possible, and that is why we are here to try to establish it.”¹⁵

¹⁰ On the different language families of Europe and Asia see, e.g., Ernst Kausen, *Die Sprachfamilien der Welt. Teil I: Europa und Asien* (Hamburg: Buske, 2013).

¹¹ Proposals on amending the Statute in 1949 failed due to a British veto; in 1951, recommendations on a draft new Statute failed in particular due to British and Scandinavian rejection; every proposal on setting up a European Political Authority was rejected as well. For details on the different protocols such as the Mackay Protocol see also this study’s introduction as well as, e.g., Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 27-30.

¹² PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 244.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 242.

¹⁴ Already at the beginning of World War Two, the British federalist Clement Attlee (later British Prime Minister 1945-1951) pointed out, “Europe must federate or perish” in his speech “The peace we are striving for” to the Labour Party on 8 November 1939. Cf. Attlee, *Labour’s aims in war and peace*, 106.

¹⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 244.

Gülek's contribution to bringing the European idea to life becomes clear in this quote: According to him, the objective should be a United States of Europe in the style of the United States of America, even though this process was connected with national sacrifices, while "at the head of the sacrifices will be the sacrifice of sovereignty."¹⁶ The Assembly's task, he continued, especially concerned the formation of a European parliament which in the long run should have similar competences as national parliaments had.¹⁷ He thus shared his concrete ideas concerning their own task as a semi-parliamentarian Assembly, and thereby took part in the search for further steps towards a strong political European union.

The Turkish delegate, Balta, also emphasized the necessity to restrict the national sovereignty of each member state as a precondition for becoming a powerful European institution.¹⁸ Concurrently, he believed that they still had "to go through a long-term spiritual development and transformation of ideas in order to reach this aim."¹⁹ Against the background of oppositional stances among European governments towards giving up national sovereignty, he seems to have been realistic considering the time needed. Similarly, another Turkish deputy named Yetkin, a CHP parliamentarian representing the southeastern province of Urfa, announced, "United States of Europe may appear to some people as a Utopian dream. But are there any great achievements which have not, at first, appeared to be Utopian?"²⁰ To let this dream come true, they had to reject age-old prejudices first and then co-ordinate their efforts towards achieving this goal.²¹ That was the only way to achieve everlasting peace in Europe, in his view.²² Yetkin was also a contributor in establishing further steps of the unification process and motivated the community of Assembly members not to stop dreaming and 'thinking big' in regards to their goal of a peaceful Europe.

Furthermore, in a debate on the role of the COE in the field of social security, which took place at the first Assembly session in 1949, the Turkish delegate Said Odyak (CHP), a CHP parliamentarian from the Western province of İzmir, also showed himself as a representative of the federalist position.²³ Besides, similar to Gülek, who had previously pleaded not to consider cultural differences as a criterion for membership in the future European union, Odyak argued,

¹⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 244.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, Balta (Turkey), 214.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 212/214.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Yetkin (Turkey), 322.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 320.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ His position becomes apparent in the words, "The faith, the determination and the willingness to sacrifice, which before saved Europe from complete disaster, will no doubt soon pave the path which leads to that sacred goal of a United States of Europe." PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Odyak (Turkey), 728.

*“I hope that I am in a unique factory of workers who are patiently and tolerantly endeavouring to knit the unity of Europe. I take it for granted that when that work is completed it will no doubt reveal different shades of colour and various decorative patterns, which will appeal to the varying tastes of the component countries. For my part, therein lies the great significance, the heart and the harmony of this noble work of unification.”*²⁴

He even emphasized cultural differences as an added value to the community and underlined his argument with metaphorical language.

In contrast to the aforementioned Turkish delegates, who argued for a European political union, the Turkish deputy Düşünsel emphasized the importance of respecting national sovereignties, “which have been so laboriously established.”²⁵ He called upon Assembly members to explain this problem to the national parliaments by pleading, “we must endeavour to avoid creating conflicts between the influences of these two sovereignties which, as a fact, are not incompatible.”²⁶ Concerning the communicated goal of establishing a United States of Europe inspired by the USA, as Gülek pursued, Düşünsel found that there was “a vast difference between the United States of America and the nations of Europe” which was why they had to “act prudently and avoid any conflict between sovereignties.”²⁷

Two years later, in a debate on the aims and prospects of European policy, delegate Gülek again argued for the establishment of a political union. At this time, several attempts of increasing the power of the Council of Europe and, specifically, of the Assembly had failed. What had been established was the ECSC, the first economic union with supranational authorities. The ECSC, however, consisted solely of six European countries. Starting with the clear expression, “Europe to-day needs a form of ‘United States’ for its economic sustenance and for its defence,”²⁸ he continued by discussing one of the main difficulties of political unification – namely the British position as still not being prepared to give up national sovereignty. His proposal, against this background, was the creation of a political union only among those European states that were willing to unite in a supranational political

²⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Odyak (Turkey), 728.

²⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Düşünsel (Turkey), 272.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VII, 39th sitting, 10 December 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 1038.

organization immediately. The United Kingdom could, if prepared to, accede at a later time. However, in the long run, he emphasized, a united Europe without Great Britain was impossible, just as Britain outside a united Europe seemed to be unthinkable.²⁹ He perceived the British people as different compared to continental Europeans in their way of thinking, and concretized, “The British believe in what they call ‘muddling through’, as opposed to our method of trying to have everything clearly planned and prepared beforehand.”³⁰ Indirectly, he observed the Turkish people as closer to the rest of Europe compared to the British. He concurrently constructed a self-understanding of continental Europeans as being well organized in regards to approaching matters.

In conclusion, Turkish delegates used the debate on changes in the political structure of Europe to demonstrate their commitment to the (pan-)European idea as well as to define commonalities with an identity-forming effect, and which Turkey could fulfil. Thereby, some Turkish delegates represented themselves as federalists. Regarding rhetorical means, they reinforced their argument with the help of metaphors, emotional language, and threatening scenarios that predicted Europe’s decline in the case of not uniting politically.

What is also visible is that a feeling of togetherness arose during the first session – at a time when they were still enthusiastically trying to turn the European idea into reality, without the experiences of rejection and stagnation. The British delegate Cocks, for example, clearly expressed this feeling:

“Sitting as we are, side by side, intermingled Representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, the Scandinavian countries, Turkey and Greece, we all feel that we are members of one body, engaged in one magnificent constructive task-fellow workers in one field. [...] I have felt that we are all Europeans together.”³¹

This description suggested an understandable atmosphere, given that, for the first time in history, non-governmental representatives from twelve different nation-states had assembled within the scope of a European political organization to discuss a shared future policy. What is common among all the speeches of Turkish delegates in debates on Europe’s process of uniting is the self-evident identification of Turkey being part of Europe and hence its

²⁹ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VII, 39th sitting, 10 December 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 1038. His quotation reads slightly ironically in times after the ‘Brexit’.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Cocks (United Kingdom), 248.

eligibility to be part of the further integration process. To be European in this context meant sharing the common goal of uniting and sharing specific values and political principles. How the Assembly members discussed the protection of these values is the subject of the next subchapter.

6.2 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms were considered an essential common task within the Assembly community starting in the first session in August 1949. The Council of Europe defined itself as responsible for giving legal force to the human rights that had been declared in the United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in December 1948. These included civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights based on the principles of human dignity and equality and freedom of all people. When it came to the question of protecting civil and political rights, there was a fundamental consensus among the Assembly members. Fundamental freedoms and political rights, such as the freedom of speech and assembly or the right to free and secret elections, were considered essential. From this, they derived political principles that were defined as common ground. These were primarily the principle of the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, and the welfare state.³² These values and principles, as they widely agreed to, stemmed from ancient times and Christianity.³³ The fact that different opinions existed on whether these principles should be established, not only at the nation-state level but also at the European level, was discussed in the previous subchapter with regard to the question of establishing a political supranational union. The institutionalization of these principles was eventually defined as a common feature of all member states but did not exist at the collective European level at the time.³⁴

In contrast to individual and political rights, the sphere of social and economic rights remained controversial. However, even early debates of the Assembly demonstrate the value of social security as highly relevant.³⁵ In this context, the delegates also discussed the values of solidarity and prosperity and to what extent these should be considered at the European level. The overall analysis of Turkey showed, regarding economic aid, these values continued

³² Some aspects are discussed in more detail below. For the entire section see also Trunk, *Europe, ein Ausweg*, 71-74.

³³ On the ancient times and Christianity considered as the main sources of a common heritage out of which derived certain values and principles, see Chapter 8 (Culture).

³⁴ See also Trunk, *Europe, ein Ausweg*, 75f., 80.

³⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 76f.

to be debated. The next chapter will further explore these discussions with a focus on Europe's economic unification.

As indicated, other than in the field of social and economic rights, the Council of Europe was rapidly successful in finding a consensus on the protection of civil and political rights. After more than a year of negotiations within the Council of Europe, as the first European contract of this sort, the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (in short: European Convention on Human Rights) was signed on 4 November 1950 by the COE member states,³⁶ a result of collective work by the Committee of Ministers, the Consultative Assembly, a specifically appointed Committee of Experts as well as senior officials as consultants.³⁷ The compliance of human rights and fundamental freedoms was the aim of the Council of Europe, and the Convention laid the legal fundament for this goal.³⁸ As inscribed in the preamble, it was exactly the shared commitment to these rights and principles that connected Europeans with each other:

“Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are likeminded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to

³⁶ The European Convention on Human Rights entered into force on 3 September 1953, after it had been ratified by ten member states which was the precondition for coming into force as determined in the Convention (Article 66 (2) of the Convention's original text). Turkey ratified it on 18 May 1954. The list of every member state's date of signature and ratification is available on the COE's official website: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=13/04/2015&CL=ENG> (13 April 2015). The Convention including additional protocols is available on the official website of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the form of a pdf-brochure: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (11 April 2015). For the original version of 1950 see: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Collection_Convention_1950_ENG.pdf (11 April 2015). It is also registered as ETS No. 5 at: <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680063426> (11 April 2015). The Convention meanwhile has to be signed and ratified by all new member states within one year, cf. Heinrich Klebes, “Demokratieförderung durch den Europarat,” in *50 Jahre Europarat*, ed. Uwe Holtz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 116.

³⁷ Robertson summarizes the procedure of elaborating the Convention within the Council of Europe within the introduction (pages XXIV-XXX) to the *Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights Vol. I*. All documents concerning the elaboration of the Convention as well as the first additional Protocol (signed on 20 March 1950) are published in this Collected Edition in eight volumes. The minutes of the meetings of the Committee of Experts, held in Strasbourg 2-8 February 1950 and 6-10 March 1950, are published in Vol. III (Sec. A and B) and Vol. IV (Sec. C). According to these records, every member country provided one or two experts of law; the Turkish experts Cavat Ustun, ambassador and chief adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and İlhan Lutem, Doctor of Law and lecturer in International Law at the University of Ankara, contributed intensely to the discussions on exact definitions within the convention. For their contributions see, e.g., *Collected Edition Vol. III*, 182, 184, 196, 198, 200, 202, 208. The minutes of the meetings of the Conference of Senior Officials, held in Strasbourg 8-17 June 1950, are published in Vol. IV.

³⁸ Cf. Statute of the COE, Preamble and Article 1 and 3.

take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration.”³⁹

It was the first human rights convention according to international law. Until today it is widely considered the most successful instrument in international human rights protection, as well as the most important accomplishment of the Council of Europe.⁴⁰ Additionally, whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was for the time being a formal recommendation without any control mechanism,⁴¹ the Council of Europe gradually established such a mechanism. After having introduced the possibility of inter-state applications in June 1954 and of individual complaints in July 1955, the European Commission of Human Rights (1954), as well as the European Court of Human Rights (1959) were finally created and concluded the formation process of control mechanisms of the European Convention on Human Rights.⁴² Additionally, in 1961, the Council of Europe finally adopted another human rights treaty that guaranteed social and economic rights, the so-called *European Social Charter*.⁴³ However, it should be underlined that both treaties made the Council of Europe ‘only’ responsible for controlling the compliance of those rights at national level. In other words, it was not the European collective that was responsible for the realization of an individual’s social security, for instance, but the respective nation-state. This assessment is not meant to belittle their importance in terms of legal protection of human rights, nor in terms of a sense of community created by a common commitment to all these human rights. It is only to clarify that the framework of implementation still remained the nation-state.

With a closer look at the COE’s Assembly contributions in setting up the Convention, the Assembly started to discuss human rights in general terms directly in its first session in August 1949. As the French delegate Pierre-Henri Teitgen emphasized, the main objective

³⁹ Preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights.

⁴⁰ Therefore, it served as a model for later human rights declarations of other international organizations, such as the UN human rights covenants of 1966 and the Inter-American human rights convention of 1968. Cf. Wolfgang Strasser, “45 Jahre Menschenrechtsinstitutionen des Europarats – Bilanz und Perspektiven,” in *50 Jahre Europarat*, ed. Uwe Holtz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 123.

⁴¹ Finally, in 1966 the UN adopted two conventions with control procedures. Cf. Dorthe Breucking, “Schutz der Menschenrechte und der sozialen Grundrechte,” in *Jubiläumsjahre – Historische Erinnerung – Historische Forschungen (Festgabe für Kersten Krüger zum 60. Geburtstag)*, ed. Wolf D. Gruner (Rostock: Univ., 1999), 139.

⁴² For more details on the development of this mechanisms see Strasser, “45 Jahre Menschenrechtsinstitutionen des Europarats,” 127. The Commission was abolished in 1998; until then individuals had to apply to the Commission that decided whether to put the case before the Court. With the abolishment of the Commission, the Court has been enlarged and individuals can apply directly to the Court ever since.

⁴³ The European Social Charter was opened for signature in October 1961 and became effective in February 1965 once five states had ratified it. Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 46.

that lay ahead was to create “a collective guarantee of the fundamental rights and freedoms, within the framework of the Council of Europe.”⁴⁴ Teitgen was one of the leading actors in this context who had already contributed to the political resolution that entailed the shared commitment to maintaining fundamental human rights through legal mechanism at the Congress of The Hague in May 1948.⁴⁵ It was also Teitgen who started the general debate on the maintenance and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms and reminded the Assembly of the central affirmation inscribed in the Statute calling for working out proposals, which would enable the Council of Europe to fulfil its promise.⁴⁶ “Europe should in fact be, first and foremost, the land of freedom,”⁴⁷ he postulated, and suggested the following rights to be protected:

*“security of person, freedom from arbitrary arrest; freedom from slavery and servitude; freedom of speech and expression; freedom of religious belief, practice and teaching; freedom of association and assembly; the natural rights deriving from marriage and paternity and those pertaining to the family, the sanctity of the home, equality before the law, protection from discrimination on account of religion, race, national origin, political or philosophical opinion; freedom from arbitrary deprivation of property.”*⁴⁸

Some days later, he presented a detailed proposal on behalf of the newly established Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions, which the Assembly discussed afterwards and finally, in an edited version in the form of a recommendation, forwarded it to the Committee of Ministers.⁴⁹ One year later, in the second session of the Assembly in August 1950, the Assembly members discussed a draft convention sent by the Committee of Ministers, which was particularly the product of a committee of senior officials.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 8th sitting, 19 August 1949, Teitgen (France), 408.

⁴⁵ See the political resolution of the Congress in The Hague, cf. *Europe Unites*, 39 (points 9-13). See also this study’s chapter on the founding history of the COE (Chapter 4.1).

⁴⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 8th sitting, 19 August 1949, Teitgen (France), 404.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 408.

⁴⁹ Cf. PACE, Recommendation 38 (1949): Human rights and fundamental freedoms, 8 September 1949. With this document the Assembly recommended the CM to cause a draft convention as early as possible, and proposed certain rights and freedoms to be included, as well as the establishment of a European Commission and of a Court of Justice.

⁵⁰ Wassenberg points out that this draft was particularly worked out by the committee of senior officials, after the Committee of Experts had not been able to find an agreement on the definition of fundamental rights. Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 34.

With the central questions of this study in mind, it is interesting to see how Turkish delegates behaved in these debates and how they presented their country as European in terms of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Overall, it is noticeable that they only took part in the debates to a limited extent. Within the first session in 1949, only the well-known delegate Gülek contributed to discussions on Teitgen's proposal. By emphasizing the importance of creating a guarantee of safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms and of instituting a supranational court to implement this collective guarantee, he clearly showed his commitment to the task of granting these rights to any individual.⁵¹ Moreover, he supported adding the right to own property to the draft convention, which was covered in the end in the first Protocol to the Convention signed on 20 March 1950.⁵²

At the time of the general debate on the draft convention in August 1950, the composition of the Turkish delegation in Strasbourg had changed due to the triumph of the Democrat Party in the parliamentary elections of May 1950. With the DP holding majority in the Grand National Assembly, the Turkish delegation in the COE's Assembly comprised seven Democrats out of ten parliamentarians.⁵³ One of these seven DP representatives was the delegate Baban who actively participated in the discussion on the draft convention and, above all, used the situational context to prove his country's full commitment to the defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms:

*“Mr. President, I want to assure you that the Debates on the defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms are followed in my country very closely and with an ever increasing interest. In fact, the defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms was one of the essential items on the programme of the Democratic Party to which I belong. Perhaps...No! not «perhaps» – it is certain that this attachment to the defence of human rights, which was one of the main themes of our electoral campaign, not only procured for us an overwhelming majority but also enabled Turkey to complete the revolution of its parliamentary regime.”*⁵⁴

Thus, he justified his party's election victory with the alleged focus in the election programme on human rights, presenting not only the DP but the majority of the Turkish people as

⁵¹ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 18th sitting, 8 September 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 1316.

⁵² For Gülek's speech see *ibid.* For the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights see http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (11 April 2015).

⁵³ See the list of representatives of 1952 (which is the first organized one since 1950): PACE, *Reports*, 4/1/I, 9.

⁵⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 9th sitting, 16 August 1950, Baban (Turkey), 282.

supporters of these rights and principles. Apart from representing his country's commitment to these rights, he referred to the significance of a common European convention for human rights as being worked out, and suggested it to be the basis of European public law in future.⁵⁵ To establish the rule of law, he believed that, as Europeans, they had to obey specific common rules and have the same conception of liberty. Furthermore, they should not permit any discrimination of rights or liberties between the peoples of different European countries.⁵⁶ He again referred to the development of his own country, emphasizing that his party had attacked the issue of anti-constitutional laws immediately after the elections by rapid modification.⁵⁷

With the impending threatening scenario of the common enemy's imperialist behaviour, he also considered it crucial "to ensure the protection of democratic institutions, without which the defence of human rights will be a mere illusion."⁵⁸ Otherwise he potentially imagined European countries to "be transformed into huge prisons or vast concentration camps."⁵⁹ Overall, the Turkish deputy Baban demonstrated Turkey's absolute commitment to the creation of a comprehensive convention on human rights. By emphasizing the political developments in his country, he presented Turkey as an equal part of free democratic Europe and stressed its progress in adapting European standards of law.

In the continued general debate on the draft convention, the Turkish delegate Pamukoğlu, a representative of Giresun at the Eastern Black Sea, held a speech in which he examined the function of the common enemy. In his opinion, while several deputies had underlined the necessity to unite in the face of the 'communist danger', danger alone was "an inadequate incentive for the creation of a large-scale organisation such as the European Union."⁶⁰ Accordingly, he demonstrated that politically external enemies might change and argued for defining internal commonalities and common aims as a basis for uniting instead. His argument advocated for strict observation of the general principles of international law and for creating a detailed convention guaranteeing the common ideal of warranting fundamental rights in every member state. Such a covenant should eventually – independent of any external danger – be founded "to protect the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the countries" on the national level, "while in the international field, it consolidates the cause of

⁵⁵ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 9th sitting, 16 August 1950, Baban (Turkey), 283.

⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 2/3, 16th sitting, 25 August 1950, Pamukoğlu (Turkey), 904.

peace, first from a continental point of view, and, afterwards, from a world point of view.’⁶¹ Thus, he referred to the positive drives of European unification and opposed the dominant rhetoric that proclaimed the ‘danger’ as an impulse for unification.⁶²

In conclusion, within the lengthy debates on the creation of the Convention on Human Rights, Turkish delegates held back. It can be assumed that the delegates were aware of the democratic deficits of the one-party state of Turkey during the initial discussions in August 1949 and that the new delegation in 1950 first had to get used to the new responsibility and the situational circumstances. Nevertheless, they accentuated the necessity and importance of adopting a human rights convention. Being European, as they put it in this context, meant being committed to the maintenance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Some years later, in April 1958, in a general debate on a report of the Committee of Ministers to the Assembly, Gülek, who was again part of the Turkish delegation to the Assembly after several years, criticised the CM’s information about the COE’s actions in protecting human rights: While praising the creation of the Convention on Human Rights, he was interested in the process of ratification, but especially in the application of the principles of human rights in each country.⁶³ Therefore, together with his colleague Ecevit, he submitted a motion for an order, which included the questions of ratification and application, and particularly instructed the Secretary-General “to study what new measures could be adopted in the field of civil and political rights.”⁶⁴ Gülek justified these questions and instructions in his speech by saying that it was important to show the European countries behind the Iron Curtain how sensitively ‘free Europe’ dealt with human rights in order to give them hope. Nevertheless, it is expected that the situation at home also prompted the two delegates to ask the question of application. At the very least, it is probably no coincidence that the only two CHP members of the 10-member delegation (the rest belonged to the ruling party DP) asked these questions. After all, as the next subchapter shows, the application of these principles was violated in its own country at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of 1960s.

⁶¹ PACE, *Reports*, 2/3, 16th sitting, 25 August 1950, Pamukoğlu (Turkey), 904.

⁶² Trunk only quotes two European politicians, the French representatives Margaretha Klompé and Jean Monnet, who pointed out in the Common Assembly of the ECSC in 1953 that it was not primarily the threat from the East that made European integration necessary and referred to positive drives of unification. Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 208f.

⁶³ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 10/1, 2nd sitting, 29 April 1958, Gülek (Turkey), 33f.

⁶⁴ PACE, *Documents*, Doc. 828: Motion for an order: New measures to be adopted, with a view to achieving the declared aim of the Council of Europe as defined in Article 1 of the Statute, for the safeguarding and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2 May 1958, signed by Gülek and Ecevit.

6.3 Political Principles in Times of the First Turkish Coup in 1960

Neither Turkish nor non-Turkish delegates directly discussed Turkey's compatibility with European values and principles in the 1950s, yet, around the time of the first military coup in Turkish republican history, this changed. This subchapter explores how Assembly members discussed Turkey's democratic development and its violations of fundamental freedoms in times when Turkish delegates were absent in the course of the first coup. It further reveals how the new Turkish delegates, upon reentry to the Assembly, represented their country's political status as compatible with European standards.

The historical context, above all the developments of Turkey's domestic politics before and after the coup in 1960, had anything but resulted in increasing trust in Turkey's democratic stability. Instead, several incidents had demonstrated its desolate situation: The increasingly authoritarian rule of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes at the end of the 1950s first caused massive students revolts and finally was ended by a military intervention in the form of a bloodless coup d'état in May 1960. The military handed over power to a 'National Unity Committee' under the regime of General Cemal Gürsel in order to restore and safeguard the Kemalist principles. After the introduction of a new constitution and subsequent parliamentary elections in October 1961, General Gürsel became President of Turkey and İsmet İnönü became Prime Minister of Turkey. The CHP's first attempt at a governmental coalition with the newly founded Justice Party (AP), the successor party of the DP, finally failed and was substituted with a coalition of two other smaller parties in 1962. However, the political situation remained unstable, and fears of a subsequent coup influenced the national climate as well as the observation of Turkey from the outside.⁶⁵

Concerning the European perspective towards the military coup and the subsequent interim government research, literature has found the following: Ceylanoğlu shows that the coup at first resulted in a wait-and-see attitude on the part of the EEC, and therefore in a break of negotiations. Given the uncertain future of the country, the French government in particular was initially against concluding a longer-term agreement with Turkey, while the German government favoured a rapid resumption of negotiations in order to exert a moderating

⁶⁵ For details concerning Turkey's domestic situation before and after the first coup in 1960 see, among others, Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 427ff.; Adanır, *Geschichte der Republik Türkei*, 84ff.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 239ff. Cemal Gürsel, a high-ranked general and popular person in public and military affairs, although not having been involved in the organization and execution of the coup was immediately put into power by the rebels as the head of the newly formed 'National Unity Committee', commander-in-chief, head of state as well as prime minister of an interim government. Cf., e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 241ff.

influence on the military government.⁶⁶ Negotiations with the military government resumed as early as autumn 1960, after Ankara had stressed that it was sticking to the goal of EEC association.⁶⁷ According to Incesu, the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany had expressed its concerns towards the government's reaction to the student protests shortly before the coup. After the coup and the creation of the National Unity Committee, there was hope that this would restore democratic order.⁶⁸ Walter additionally revealed in his analysis on the perception of Turkey's European identity in German and British print media that a German newspaper observed Turkey at the beginning of the 1960s as 'anything but healthy' while the disease was clearly identified: The country would suffer from a serious identity crisis. This would include the danger of deviating from its Western path, in particular when European states would distance themselves from Turkey.⁶⁹ Furthermore, according to Walter, the coup was interpreted as a short interlude that should serve the return to democracy. However, this thorny path was considered difficult, as Turkey was predominantly described as an underdeveloped democracy, and the execution of Menderes as 'orientally simple'.⁷⁰ British newspapers, in contrast, considered Turkey's democratic long-term path as enough to consider it European. The coup was predominantly observed positively and not as deviant from basic European democratic values since "the army started a revolution to restore democracy."⁷¹

The Assembly in Strasbourg directly felt the affects of the coup. The Turkish delegates lost their mandates and some – those who were members of the Democrat Party – were arrested for expressions of opinion made in the Assembly.⁷² Due to these arrests, also within the Council of Europe, general scepticism towards Turkey's stability, its status of democracy, and the rule of law heightened. An Italian representative, for instance, demonstrated the fact that their former Turkish colleagues were arrested for political reasons and dispraised, "contrary to

⁶⁶ Cf. Ceylanoğlu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 48f.

⁶⁷ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 290f.

⁶⁸ Cf. Incesu, *Ankara – Bonn – Brüssel*, 87f.

⁶⁹ Walter quotes from different articles in the German daily news *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)* between 1960 and 1963. Cf. Walter, *Die Türkei*, 144.

⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 142. Walter in this context quotes articles from the *FAZ* and *Der Spiegel*.

⁷¹ Cf. *ibid.*, 154f. (the quote is from the *Times*, 1 June 1962).

⁷² The arrests of some Turkish delegates – those of the Democrat Party – was also part of the debates in the Assembly, e.g., "They were arrested while they were still members of the Assembly of the Council for political reasons and for the opinions they had expressed here." PACE, *Reports*, 13/1, 8th sitting, 28 April 1961, Lucifero (Italy), 278. See also PACE, *Reports*, 13/2, 14th sitting, 25 September 1961, Czernetz (Austria), 456f.; PACE, *Reports*, 12/2, 10th sitting, 21 September 1960, The President, 298. Part of the results following in this subchapter are also included in the article "Ein Europa ohne die Türkei?" published by the author.

the human rights we have so often upheld here.”⁷³ And one Austrian deputy clearly expressed, “I confess that I am ashamed that such happenings are possible in our free Europe of the Council of Europe.”⁷⁴

This criticism of the disregard of the human rights and fundamental freedoms as determined in the European Convention on Human Rights also impacted the community ethos of the Assembly. For instance, under the agenda point “Turkish representation” four months after the coup, the Austrian delegate Toncic remarked that a member of the Assembly would not merely represent his own country but the whole community consisting of the COE’s then fifteen countries. “Thus, he is a truly European deputy,”⁷⁵ he pointed out, and added that this was the reason why no single country should have the right to recall any delegates.⁷⁶ Given Turkey’s democratic development, a Swedish representative cautioned against overly positive judgments as long as “the new provisional Government in Turkey has not proved or given any definite indication that it is going to revert to a democratic form of government.”⁷⁷ However, concerning the former Turkish delegates, he underlined, “we all feel that our Turkish colleagues who served in the Assembly did so as true Europeans and were imbued with the spirit of European co-operation.”⁷⁸ Overall, this was the predominant opinion among Assembly members in those days. In their view, it was important to make a distinction between their former Turkish colleagues who were esteemed as important contributors to the unification process of Europe, and the caution that should be exercised with regard to Turkey’s current democratic instability.

The fact that the Assembly members were concerned about the situation of their former colleagues becomes apparent in a correspondence between the Assembly’s President and the Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper in September 1960. This correspondence had initially started with a request put forward by the Turkish Minister on the possibility of sending a Turkish delegation to Strasbourg even previous to the first free elections. The Bureau as well as the Standing Committee of the Assembly neglected this request for constitutional reasons.⁷⁹ However, the Assembly’s President used this exchange to express widely shared concerns about the former Turkish delegates directly to the Turkish Foreign Minister. Therein

⁷³ PACE, *Reports*, 13/1, 8th sitting, 28 April 1961, Lucifero (Italy), 278.

⁷⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 13/2, 14th sitting, 25 September 1961, Czernetz (Austria), 457.

⁷⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 12/2, 10th sitting, 21 September 1960, Toncic (Austria), 301.

⁷⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Heckscher (Sweden), 302.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ In addition to the above mentioned response from the President of the Assembly, for the request of Turkey see PACE, AS/Per (12) 4, 13 September 1960: Aide-mémoire from the Turkish Government on the representation of Turkey in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

he remarked that one consideration weighed heavily in the Assembly's attitude, "namely the reluctance to take any step which might prejudice the position of the Turkish members of the Assembly."⁸⁰

This was not the last expression of concerns. Still a few months later, in a debate on a report of the Political Committee on general European policy, the Belgian delegate Dehousse and the Italian delegate Lucifero revived the issue of the arrested former Turkish delegates and emphasized the responsibility for each other as members of the Council of Europe, specifically on the common commitment to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms, manifested in the Statute and the Convention on Human Rights. Lucifero emphasized,

*"Of course, none of us want to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs. But that is not to say they do not concern us. People sometimes say that the internal affairs of another country are not our business. Surely as Europeans they are very much our business."*⁸¹

They had to grasp that internal riots no longer concerned only the single country but also the international European level if they violated jointly ratified legal provisions. As the Assembly debates show, the fact that a member state who had also signed the European Convention on Human Rights violated exactly those determinations resulted in a completely new and challenging situation. In other words, the imprisonment of former Turkish representatives finally challenged the Assembly as founder and moral guardian of the Convention.⁸²

Despite criticisms of Turkey's adherence to the common political principles, a serious debate on the exclusion of Turkey as a member of the Council of Europe did not arise before Turkey found its way back to a democratically elected parliament and civil government. Consequently, the coup of 1960 (in contrast to the coup of 1980) did not result in a serious challenge of Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe.⁸³ Nevertheless, scepticism on

⁸⁰ PACE, AS/Bur (12) 10, 29 September 1960: Letter from the President of the Assembly to Mr. Sarper, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey relating to the Turkish Representation to the Assembly.

⁸¹ PACE, *Reports*, 12/3, 23rd sitting, 2 March 1961, Lucifero (Italy), 753.

⁸² In contrast, an overview of the protocols of the Committee of Ministers sessions in 1960/61 showed that in the CM the domestic situation of Turkey was not a topic at all and Turkish representatives took part in the CM sittings.

⁸³ Cf. Edel, *Die Türkei im Europarat*, 4, 23. Ahmet Edel focuses in his unpublished, but recommendable, Magister thesis on the discussions in the COE's Assembly between 1980 and 1986 following the third and

the country's stage of democratic development, as with a stronger Turkish counterstatement, visibly increased against the background of the first coup d'état.

The new and more liberal constitution of 1961 and the subsequent free parliamentary elections on 15 October 1961 also entailed the renewed participation of a Turkish delegation in the Assembly a few months later, in January 1962.⁸⁴ The Assembly, in the first instance, welcomed the new colleagues, represented by the Assembly's President:

*"We all look forward to seeing our Turkish colleagues take a full part in our work again. The Assembly of the Council of Europe needs the active participation and support of all democratic countries in Western Europe, and we feel happy today to see that the Assembly has regained its full strength."*⁸⁵

Additionally, he expressed his wishes and hopes for Turkey's future and praised the early efforts of the new government to return to democratic stability. The President, on behalf of the Assembly, thereby stressed that they had been "profoundly impressed" by the measures taken by General Gürsel to restore a democratically elected parliament and a new government "which was constituted in full conformity with democratic parliamentary principles."⁸⁶ However, he did not leave out his deep concerns over the verdicts of their former Turkish colleagues who had been condemned solely for their political actions.⁸⁷

How did Turkish delegates argue for their country's compatibility with COE standards? On the part of a new Turkish representation, a noticeable observation is that some delegates intensely tried to prevent any form of scepticism by emphasizing their home country's long-standing path towards the West. Their strategy and goal was to eventually present Turkey as a Western coined democracy that still needed support from their European friends. The Turkish delegate and CHP parliamentarian Karasapan, for instance, argued,

gravest coup in 1980. In the aftermath, for the first time, the Turkish presence in the Council of Europe was challenged and the delegation suspended from the Assembly meetings.

⁸⁴ The new government was built by a coalition of the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party under Prime Minister İnönü. For detailed results of the elections see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 246. Overall, on the return to democracy see *ibid.*, 244-247.

⁸⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 13/3, 20th sitting, 16 January 1962, The President, 658.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

*“In adapting herself to the Western way of life and to democracy Turkey has passed through an evolutionary process lasting some 150 years. [...] We have some very difficult problems to solve in the social, in the economic and indeed in the political field, and we shall always need the support of European opinion.”*⁸⁸

Thereby, they would “count greatly on the Council of Europe.”⁸⁹ Gökay, a member of the New Turkey Party and an experienced politician, who had been governor and mayor of Istanbul from 1949 to 1957, stressed that their sole aim was to raise the standard of living of their people to that of the free European nations, “and to do this in the shortest possible time.”⁹⁰ Full of confidence he added, “We are sure that the Council of Europe will give us every support and assistance in our undertaking.”⁹¹ While presenting Turkey as a part of the European community, sharing the same values for decades, they took their partners’ support for granted based on the commitment to protect these values and principles and kept them thereby rhetorically entrapped. This rhetoric also corresponded to the new Turkish government strategy of relying more on Europe and less on the US.⁹²

As a result, the first military coup in Turkey had different effects on the COE’s Assembly. First of all, it was for the first time that a whole delegation was absent for several months. The arrest of some former delegates, members of the former ruling party DP, additionally demonstrated that internal matters could no longer be left to the individual state, especially when they disregarded a jointly agreed-upon set of rules. Instead, they were mutually responsible for ensuring adherence to these principles. It thereby indirectly strengthened the collective commitment to certain values and principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights.

From the Turkish side, it is noteworthy that after the coup, the delegates emphasized Turkey’s decades of orientation towards Western standards and asked the European community to help further stabilize their country’s political and economic development. On the grounds of being a member of the COE and with the new, more liberal constitution, their rhetoric shows that on the European side, they took for granted the willingness to help and trust in the further democratic development of Turkey.

⁸⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 13/3, 20th sitting, 16 January 1962, Karasapan (Turkey), 659f.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 660.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Gökay (Turkey), 660.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² On Turkey’s dependence on the US in the decade under Menderes see, e.g., Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, 144ff.; Harris, “Turkey and the United States,” 54ff.

6.4 Conclusions

Turkish delegates used the discussions on the political structure of a future Europe to demonstrate their commitment to the European idea and to illustrate Turkey as a credible member of the community through the shared goal of uniting. This was partly reinforced by the rhetorical strategy of using threatening scenarios such as predicting Europe's downfall if political unification did not take place. As Turkish delegates identified Turkey as being part of Europe, they remained that Turkey was entitled to be part of European integration. They also used the debate on how to unite to define commonalities with an identity-forming effect and which Turkey could fulfil. To be European in this context was defined as sharing the goal of uniting as well as sharing common values and political principles while downgrading any cultural differences. As this chapter has demonstrated, the Assembly members agreed on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, however, nation-states remained responsible for their implementation at the time. In the construction process of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was initiated by the Assembly in its first session, Turkish delegates held back. Nevertheless, they made their support clear for the adoption of a human rights convention. They thereby contributed to the general view on the common task of the COE: Being European, in this context, meant being committed to the maintenance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

As has been shown, an event that affected the work of the Assembly as well as its self-image as 'the moral conscience' of Europe was the first military coup in Turkey. Particularly the arrest of former delegates and members of the DP demonstrated to the Assembly that internal upheavals of a COE member state could no longer be left to the individual state, especially in cases of violations against the jointly agreed-upon set of rules. To a certain extent, it thereby indirectly strengthened the collective commitment to the values and principles as inscribed in the Convention on Human Rights and served as self-assurance of Europe as a community of values.

With regard to strategies of the new delegates after the coup to prove their country's Europeanness, they represented Turkey as a country orientated towards European democratic and legal standards for decades and in this way exposed and reinforced their country's commitment to the European path. By appealing to the common goal of protecting democratic countries, and against the background of widespread fear of communist expansionism, they could easily argue for the necessity to support their country's further political and economic development. While for non-Turkish delegates the 1960 coup was a caesura considering their

perspective on Turkey's state of democracy, it gave the Turkish delegates reason to campaign for the restoration and continuity of Turkish democracy.

7 Representations of Turkey as Part of a European Economic Community

The aim of economic unification has been a common achievement since the beginning of the COE's work, as stated in the Statute.¹ When the Council of Europe became operational in 1949, Europe was economically devastated after years of war. In the form of the *European Recovery Program*, the *Marshall Plan*, American aid in the millions had only recently come into being. Its establishment is to be viewed in the context of the Cold War and the US containment policy: On the one hand, the United States needed solid export markets and considered Western European states to be suitable trading partners. On the other hand, only an economically strong Europe seemed able to withstand possible Soviet expansionism. The US aid program was hence not only economically but also politically motivated. Shortly after, as the agency administering the material aid, the *Organization for European Economic Cooperation* (OEEC) was finally founded in April 1948. In this way, a free-market economy following the American example should be created. Overall, the US aid to recover and strengthen European markets was intended to be temporary and based on the principle of 'help for self-help'.² In line with the US Truman Doctrine in March 1947, Turkey was included in these recovery plans and could increase its economic strength, specifically its agricultural production enormously.³

In the following, the focus remains on the Assembly discourse on European economic relations, particularly on questions such as how – thus with the help of what kind of representational practices – Turkish delegates contributed to constructions of Turkey as a European state and as entitled to be supported and included in common plans of economic cooperation. The first subchapter focuses on the discursive practices at the end of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s when Turkish delegates contributed to the economic discourse of the Assembly, referring to initial ideas of economic unification, and agricultural cooperation in particular. The second subchapter shows Turkish social actions in the

¹ Cf. Statute of the COE, Preamble and Article 1 a) and b).

² On the US recovery program for Europe after World War Two see also, e.g., the brief outline in Siegmund Schmidt and Wolf J. Schünemann, *Europäische Union. Eine Einführung*, 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 327f.; Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 16-22. For details on the Marshall Plan see, e.g., Allen Dulles, *The Marshall Plan*, ed. and with an introduction by Michael Wala (Providence, RI et al.: Berg, 1993); John R. Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960* (Edinburgh: Keele Univ. Press, 1997). Specifically on Turkish-US economic relations at that time see, e.g., Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship*.

³ US President Truman put forward his doctrine on 12 March 1947 that instructed US help for every free country whose existence was threatened by interior and exterior powers. Initiated for military and financial support for Greece and Turkey, it was the start of the US commitment to defend anti-communist states around the globe. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 209.

Assembly in the context of European economic integration in the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s when the Assembly discussed the establishment of a free trade area and Turkey's association with the EEC. In addition, non-Turkish voices are recognised concerning questions relating to Turkey's place in an economic Europe. Overall, this chapter argues that Turkish delegates, on the one hand, used arguments that emphasized economic advantages and on the other hand, those that referred to shared values and the commitment to the common goal of re-establishing a prosperous Europe.

7.1 The Goal of Creating a Prosperous Europe and Europe's Economic Competitors

The initial Assembly debates in regards to economic unity focused on the question of whether political or economic unification should precede. The opinion of the Turkish deputy Gülek was the following, which he expressed in a debate on changes in the political structure of Europe,

“Such economic co-ordination, sponsored by an inter-European central economic organ, will open the way for a European central political organ, which will be another step towards the unification of the nations of Europe. [...] one of the most urgent is the creation of a central economic European authority which will naturally lead to a central political authority of its own.”⁴

However, there were controversies on this topic within the Turkish delegation. The deputy Balta, for instance, represented the opposite opinion in a debate on the COE's role in the economic field:

“The difficulties from which European economy is suffering are multifarious. They arise especially from the present political situation, which affects our economies; and this factor must not be underestimated. Without a rational, stable political structure, without the re-establishment of political security, European economy will have difficulty in reaching the level which we wish it to attain.”⁵

⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 242. See also Gülek's comment in the 11th sitting: “economic union is the beginning of political union.” PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 11th sitting, 24 August 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 618.

⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 11th sitting, 24 August 1949, Balta (Turkey), 646.

A year later, his colleague Kapani similarly argued for a political unification as a first step:

*“Economic unity must precede political unity. If we can co-ordinate the political interests of the Member countries of the Council of Europe, the economy of the continent will be established on permanent foundations and the spirit of unity and co-operation will be forever assured.”*⁶

He thus argued to create a political union as a first step by demonstrating the importance of creating a feeling of cohesion first. In this way – he argued – an economic union based on a foundation that formed a sense of community would also be sustainable.

Generally, while Assembly members disagreed on the question of political structure and the willingness to give up national sovereignty, they agreed that Europe needed to strengthen economically, specifically given the aim to become independent of US aid as soon as possible. In the continuation of the general debate on changes in the political structure of Europe, Gülek had a simple answer to the question of why Europe had “gone downhill and got into difficulties,” though, it possessed tremendous potentialities, raw materials, and industrial capacities.⁷ “The reason is that economically Europe is divided,” he pointed out.⁸ Therefore, his solution to this problem was to establish an economic union.⁹ In detail, his proposal on how to improve transnational trade was the creation of a customs union as a first step to remove economic barriers between European states.¹⁰ As a second implementation, he proposed the removal of monetary barriers.¹¹ Lastly, he considered a third necessity for a strong common European economy:

*“There must be what I would call the vertical enlargement of the markets of Europe. By this I mean that European countries, which are not as well developed as others, should be helped by those which are ahead. They must be made more productive, and hence richer, so that they can become better markets for a unified Europe.”*¹²

⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 2/1, 3rd sitting, 9 August 1950, Kapani (Turkey), 43.

⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 11th sitting, 24 August 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 618.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 620.

¹² *Ibid.*

The interior enhancement – which he called vertical enlargement of economic Europe – should be achieved by well-developed countries supporting the less developed ones. His argumentation was, at this point, based less on the principle of mutual solidarity, and more on the economic interests of the community. Helping the more impoverished communities would eventually result in a stronger European market; a definite benefit for the whole of Europe. Thus, he imagined an economic union consisting of all the European countries, which would be equal in economic strength in the future. From his viewpoint, as a representative of his country's national interests, his argumentation was reasonable; Turkey as a developing country in these years would doubtlessly benefit from such a construct.

In addition, he evaluated the success of the Marshall Plan: The original plan “to help Europe to help herself”¹³ evidently had not materialized. Instead, there was “a struggle among the European nations to grab as much of the aid fund as possible.”¹⁴ In his view, they needed another international institution besides the OEEC, which had been established by the USA to administrate its material aid.¹⁵ A European institution uniting Europe's markets would concurrently mean no longer being dependent on the US. By stating, “we must not agree to the world being divided into two groups – the dollar group and the non-dollar group,”¹⁶ he underlined the potential to change Europe's position of subordination and the urgency to take prompt action. The gap between European and American economic strength, as well as Europe's dependence on American aid, had to vanish, he stressed. To achieve this, he argued, the whole of Europe had to be strong, i.e. first the stronger countries of Europe would need to support the weaker ones, such as Turkey.

His Turkish colleague Odyak supported the idea of vertical enlargement and used a general debate on the role of the COE in the field of social security to stress the urgency of interior European aid to increase Europe's economic strength:

“We are all after building up a strong, prosperous and unified Europe, but I cannot see how that ideal can become a reality if a large portion of the population of Europe is left, by itself, to struggle below a decent standard of living. I therefore wish to stress that social security begins by providing a decent standard of living for the citizens of Europe, all of whom are, to my belief, the true guardians of the work which we are all

¹³ PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 11th sitting, 24 August 1949, Gülek (Turkey), 620.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 622.

heartily and sincerely endeavouring to complete. We all should and must contribute what we can to obtain that happy result."¹⁷

Thus, like his colleague Gülek, he based his demand for interior aid on the common aim of realizing the European idea of uniting and making Europe strong and prosperous again. With the help of emotional and metaphorical terms such as "heartily" and "the true guardians of the work," he constituted a sense of community and promoted the value of social security. In doing so, he encouraged the European community to build up European solidarity.

The Assembly's Committee on Economic Questions finally attended to this issue and decided to give special consideration to less developed countries, such as Greece and Turkey. According to the Committee's research, both countries' traditional markets of agricultural products were eventually broken down due to political changes at the end of the war, as one French deputy reported.¹⁸ Concerning the historical context, the situations of both countries in 1950 were desolate, and are briefly outlined as follows: Turkey's political system at that time had changed from a one-party state into a multi-party system, which resulted in a turning point of Turkish political history in May 1950 when the Democrat Party (DP) replaced the CHP after its success in the first fair and free parliamentary elections.¹⁹ Additionally, not only was the political system reformed but the economic system as well. Due to a national budget gap, as a consequence of World War Two, Turkey's economic development stagnated in the 1940s, and the Kemalist principle of etatism finally came under attack.²⁰ Interior and exterior actors intensely criticised the dominant role of the Turkish state in the economy sector: Domestic business circles, the new ruling party, the Democrat Party, and not least also external nation-states, in particular the USA, demanded liberalization of the Turkish economy. The first organization to support the DP's proposal for liberalization was the *Association of Istanbul Traders (İstanbul Tüccar Derneği)*, founded by several Istanbul businessmen in 1947.

In addition, as a result of Turkey's dependence on American aid, as well as its application for membership in the *International Monetary Fund (IMF)*, the Turkish government in 1947 –

¹⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Odyak (Turkey), 728.

¹⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 2/4, 19th sitting, 26 August 1950, Longchambon (France), 1046.

¹⁹ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 217f. Zürcher on the evaluation of 1950 as a turning point in Turkish history: "There is widespread consensus among historians that the Democratic Party's landslide election victory in May 1950 is a watershed in modern Turkish history." Zürcher, *Turkey*, 221. As mentioned in Chapter 6 (Political Values), the first elections had been brought forward from July 1947 to July 1946, in order to hinder the success of the Democrats that were just organizing themselves as a party. Cf. Kreiser, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 80-84.

²⁰ According to Kaya, almost half of the national budget between 1939 and 1945 was invested in the military sector. Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 97. On the Kemalist principle of etatism see also Chapter 3 (Historical Overview).

still under the CHP – adopted a new Turkish Development Plan instead of continuing with its traditional five-year plans from the times of etatism. The Development Plan scheduled the end of etatism and with that, the beginning of liberal economic policies. Its liberalizing measures, such as the introduction of free enterprise, complied with the businessmen's and the DP's requirements.²¹ Nevertheless, growth in the Turkish economy from 1947 onwards was minimal, resulting from the unprofitable times of the Second World War. Any economic growth was notably due to the positive development in the agricultural sector. Apart from that, a persistent trade deficit evolved from an intense increase in importing materials and machinery.²²

In Greece, the Second World War was succeeded by a civil war, which lasted until October 1949 and devastated the Greek economic (as well as political) situation strongly.²³ The difficult circumstances in both countries were of concern to the COE's Assembly. It was "certainly an urgent and particularly important duty for the other Member countries to help them to re-establish normal markets to absorb their usual production,"²⁴ a French delegate emphasized in August 1950. The motivation to support weak economies, such as Greece and Turkey, presumably resulted from the common interest of stabilizing these countries' markets for international trade as well as preventing them from communist occupation. It is difficult to tell from his speech the extent to which the French delegate felt solidarity with the Turks and Greeks. While the value of solidarity and the pursuit of prosperity were of high importance in the Assembly at the time, it was generally the nation-state, and not the European collective, that was held responsible for their implementation.²⁵ The European discourse on solidarity was characterized more by utilitarian economic considerations than by humanitarian ones.²⁶ A feeling of European solidarity was still weak at this time.²⁷ Similarly, in the eyes of the political elites of Europe, the nation-state was also responsible for promoting prosperity.²⁸

²¹ Moreover, the plan emphasized the development of agriculture and agriculturally based industry, the construction of roads instead of railways, and the development of the energy sector, particularly regarding oil. Liberalizing measures should thereby also integrate the Turkish economy into the world economy. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 216, 224f. Since that time, the DP and CHP followed almost the same economic policy. One exception was that the DP wanted to sell off the state industries while the CHP did not. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 216.

²² Cf. *ibid.*, 216, 228. With the help of the financial assistance of the Marshall Plan, Turkey imported 40,000 tractors until 1955. This resulted in a rapid increase of cultivable land on the one hand, but in a trade deficit and a scarcity of foreign exchange on the other. Cf. Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 438f.

²³ For details on the Greek Civil War see, e.g., Richter, *Griechenland 1940-1950*.

²⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 2/4, 19th sitting, 26 August 1950, Longchambon (France), 1046.

²⁵ Cf. Trunk, *Europe, ein Ausweg*, 77ff. This was shared both by Socialists and Conservatives.

²⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, 79.

²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 80.

In May 1951, within a general debate on a report of the Committee of Ministers concerning the European economic situation, the Turkish deputy Gülek again promoted the idea of establishing a monetary and customs union, and mentioned his vision of having a European Central Bank and a common currency one day.²⁹ These visions are to be interpreted in the context of contemporary economic developments outside the Council of Europe: Meanwhile, under the aegis of the OEEC, the European Payments Union had been created to foster multilateral trades within, but also outside, European boundaries. Due to a European-based payments system, this organization, existing from 1950 until 1958 and followed by the European Monetary Agreement, was a great success in the history of European economic cooperation.³⁰ While supporting the first approaches of economic unification, the Turkish deputy encouraged the Council of Europe to discuss these ideas for the advancement of Europe's revival and thus, represented a Turkish interest in these European issues. He then argued for the urgency of creating an economic union by interlinking economic and defence questions as well as by pointing to the progress Eastern Europe already had made in economic unification, in contrast to Western Europe:

“Europe to-day must produce for defence. [...] The economic union of Europe is, therefore, very important from the point of view of defence as well as from the point of view of general economy. Eastern Europe is now an economic unit brought about by force; but it is an economic unit, and this is a challenge to Western Europe. Whether or not the free Western countries can unite will prove the source and the strength of the Western way of life.”³¹

To give historical context of Eastern Europe's economic collaboration: The *Council for Mutual Economic Assistance*, better known as COMECON, had been created in January 1949 as a reply to the Western formation of the OEEC.³² However, its charter was not ratified until 1960.³³ Therefore, as Kaser adds, “it can be nicely debated whether an organization was set

²⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/II, 7th sitting, 9 May 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 162.

³⁰ For details on the European Payments Union see, e.g., Larry Neal, *The Economics of Europe and the European Union* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), 27ff.

³¹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/II, 7th sitting, 9 May 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 162.

³² It was founded by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union. Albania joined within one month and Eastern Germany in 1950. Cf. Michael Kaser, *COMECON. Integration problems of the planned economies*, 2nd ed. (London et al.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), 11.

³³ Before, according to Kaser, its existence solely derived from its founding communiqué. Cf. Kaser, *COMECON*, 43.

up *stricto sensu*.”³⁴ What is visible in Gülek’s speech is the perception of economic competition with the Eastern Bloc. This corresponds to what Trunk revealed in Assembly debates in the 1950s; the Soviet Union was perceived as an economic competitor, not just an expansionist aggressor. The competitive aspect in the demarcation from the Soviet Union was also a driving force for the self-definition of Assembly politicians as Europeans.³⁵ From another perspective: Not only the US, but also the Eastern Bloc, was perceived as an economic competitor. Against this background, Gülek portrayed Eastern Europe as the competitive Other to urge the Assembly to act immediately; to unite economically.

Gülek’s strategy to argue for European assistance was to correlate economic and defence questions. As he underlined, rearmament required investing a greater proportion of the national income to the defence industry, a heavy burden for states that devoted more than half of their national income to the defence sector. Such as his own country, which had done this “for a longer period than the rest of the world.”³⁶ Another benefit of Turkey for Europe’s defence was, according to him, the deposits of raw materials such as chromium, copper, oil, iron, and coal, which were necessary for the production of arms.³⁷ However, he added, “What is lacking is technique, the “know how”, and capital equipment.”³⁸ He thus argued for European economic assistance for Turkey by acknowledging Turkey’s benefits for Europe’s defence and the arms industry. He also emphasized Turkey’s financial burden due to high defence expenses for the sake of Europe’s security. He then concluded with the following words:

*“Our way of life is in danger. We must arm, and in order to arm we must produce. We must produce rationally, and, to be able to produce rationally, Europe must unite and form a large market. Union and a large market may not solve all our problems, but they will solve many and may be the beginning of solving them all.”*³⁹

After he had requested European economic assistance, he argued for Europe’s economic unification in general, particularly for the establishment of a common market. In this argumentation, too, the Eastern Bloc functioned as a motor for economic unification. Only within a common market was it possible to produce and effectively arm to protect their liberal

³⁴ Kaser, *COMECON*, 43.

³⁵ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 186ff.

³⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/II, 7th sitting, 9 May 1951, Gülek (Turkey), 163.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 164.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 164f.

way of life. Taken these arguments into account, in his imagination, Turkey was a natural part of this market.

Besides Turkey's raw materials enriching the arms industry, Turkey's natural agricultural resources also came into the argument as an additional benefit for Europe. In December 1951, the Turkish deputy Ürgüplü stressed the potential of Turkey's cultivable land for Europe's agricultural market within a debate on the unification of agricultural markets and the idea of creating a European Authority for Agriculture under the auspices of the COE – which failed due to divergent views within the COE on integration.⁴⁰ The DP parliamentarian emphasized that his country was “almost the only country in Europe which, in normal circumstances, can supply the needs of other countries.”⁴¹ Since the new Turkish Development Plan of 1947 had been implemented, Turkey increasingly developed its agricultural production.⁴² By importing technical equipment, especially thousands of tractors, Turkey was able to rapidly increase its area of cultivation and consequently, the export of agricultural products as well as its cotton production.⁴³ Concurrently, European countries suffered from effects of the Korean War with regard to agricultural import products and were searching for ways to improve European trade in this regard.⁴⁴

Ürgüplü represented Turkey and the rest of Europe as a perfect match in agricultural development: Turkey's natural resources, and potential to extend its cultivable land balanced Europe's agricultural deficit. While concurrently, other European countries possessed the necessary capabilities to bring forward Turkey's and, consequently, Europe's agricultural development. He also accentuated that Turkey's capital shortage was due to their large investments in the defence sector which – in the context of the Cold War – had to be considered as not only an investment in national defence but also in the defence of the whole free world.⁴⁵ The power of his argument – linking Turkey's economic and agricultural situation with Europe's defence – is again to be ranked as relatively strong, especially given the fear of communist expansion in those days.

To underline the complementary character of Turkish-European economic relations, Ürgüplü used another argument: the balance of import and export. He argued that Turkey's and

⁴⁰ Cf. Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 59.

⁴¹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/V, 27th sitting, 1 December 1951, Ürgüplü (Turkey), 705.

⁴² As mentioned above, for details on the new Turkish Development Plan implementing liberal economic policies see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 216.

⁴³ On the development of agricultural production at that time see, e.g., Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 438.

⁴⁴ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 144f.

⁴⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/V, 27th sitting, 1 December 1951, Ürgüplü (Turkey), 705.

Europe's import and export products corresponded perfectly, and had the potential to result in an expansion of trade all over Europe; a win-win situation for any participant of the planned common market. In this way, he presented the structural differences between Turkey and the majority of Europe as "particularly favourable."⁴⁶ Turkish agricultural export products were popular in the rest of Europe, and manufactured goods from Europe were popular in Turkey, he stressed to illustrate his point.⁴⁷

Afterwards, he self-evidently unified Turkey with the rest of Europe by emphasizing its effort to keep up with the economic strength of the United States:

*"The lack of European markets and European prices, the ever-increasing fear of a flooded market, ignorance of one another's difficulties and possibilities – these are the factors which stifle the energy of the European nations and increase the distance by which we are being outstripped in our race with the United States."*⁴⁸

Thus, the depiction of the US as an economic competitor again served to construct a European Self. With the help of negative justifications, his explanation for Europe's backlog compared to the US was simple: crucial to changing the situation was a common European market and a monetary community, as well as mutual understanding of the significant problems and benefits of every country. Finally, he finished his speech with an appeal to the whole Assembly:

*"If we wish to build Europe, or even begin to build it, I am convinced that it is by means of the Agricultural Pool, with a High Authority, that we can best achieve success. Let us cast aside theories, which have not so far succeeded in feeding our peoples, and let us get down to work. (Applause)."*⁴⁹

Turkey's offering of a potentially powerful agricultural sector, the creation of an Agricultural Pool, corresponded to the official Turkish governmental line. As evident by the applause given to his speech, other Assembly members approved his appeal. Support from Assembly members can be attributed to the wide-ranged consensus on the achievement of setting up

⁴⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/V, 27th sitting, 1 December 1951, Ürgüplü (Turkey), 706.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

such an authority but possibly also to his down-to-earth attitude bearing fundamental problems, such as the nutrition of the whole of Europe.

A few days later, in a debate on the situation of refugees and overpopulation in Europe, Ürgüplü's colleague Ebüzziya referred to the economic situation in Turkey to highlight the financial burden of those countries concerned. Turkey, he remarked, was challenged with assisting 160,000 refugees, only a fraction of the nearly 900,000 Turks that were expelled from Bulgaria. In his speech, the delegate and DP representative Ebüzziya encouraged the Assembly to decide on a mechanism to help his, and other concerned countries. He thereby used the country's progress of agricultural production as an example to demonstrate its development potential in case of receiving exterior help. Although in contrast to others, Turkey had received merely a small amount of Marshall Aid,⁵⁰ it had more than tripled its agricultural production, according to his research in Marshall Aid and OEEC statistics. In this way, he assigned a great potential for progress to Turkey and indirectly constructed a causal link based on this argument. If the Turkish state received even more financial assistance, it would definitely overcome its economic difficulties, which consequently would result in a stable and powerful state; a benefit for the whole of Europe.

In essence, within initial debates concerning how to bring forward the unification process in the economic field, Turkish delegates used their membership in the COE to argue not just for economic unification per se, but for economic assistance towards Turkey. An argumentative strategy was to highlight their commitment to the common goal of creating one common, prosperous Europe. In order to realize this idea and raise the standard of living all over (democratic) Europe, Turkish delegates argued, Turkey and other less developed COE countries had to be supported technically and materially. The value of social security and the significance of European solidarity were also mentioned within the argument, grounded in the common goal of a prosperous Europe.

Another argument was that through development aid to Turkey and others, Europe could offer better markets for trade for the whole of Europe and every country would benefit from the results of assistance. Turkish delegates portrayed Turkey as particularly beneficial for a united

⁵⁰ According to him, Turkey had only received 252 million dollars since the beginning of Marshall Aid, whereas Britain had received 825 million. PACE, *Reports*, 3/2/VI, 34th sitting, 7 December 1951, Ebüzziya (Turkey), 882. He does not reveal the source of these figures. However, the statistics of the German government on the Marshall Plan demonstrate an even greater distance between what Turkey and Great Britain got. Accordingly, in total (until the end of 1952) Turkey received 242.5 million dollars, whereas GB only in the first 15 months in 1948/49 received 1619.7, and in total (until December 1952) 3442.8 million dollars. Cf. Bundesminister für den Marshallplan, ed., *Wiederaufbau im Zeichen des Marshallplanes 1948-1952* (Bonn: Bundesminister für den Marshallplan, 1953), 158.

economic Europe by emphasizing its agricultural potential. Moreover, Turkish delegates argued for assistance by interlinking the fields of economy and defence and representing Turkey as a vital supplier of raw materials for Europe's defence and arms industry. In all of those attempts to argue for economic aid to Turkey, Turkish delegates represented their country as a natural part of the European economic area.

Against the historical context of the emergence of the two superpowers – the US and USSR – dominating world politics and economy, these arguments served the shared interests of the COE members. Apart from close cooperation with the US in defence and economic issues, and the formation of a Western Bloc, the COE countries desired to strengthen Europe and to become independent from US aid as soon as possible. In the Assembly discourse on economic unification, it becomes apparent that both the Soviet Union and the US were economic competitors to Europe. In this way, both 'superpowers' served, in times of the beginning Cold War, as an impetus for self-definition as Europeans; Turkey, in this regard, contributed to the process of self-definition by supporting to the social construction process of the two powers as economic competitors.

7.2 'Little Europe' versus the Pan-European Idea

Despite Turkey's weak economy in comparison with the rest of the COE states, Turkish delegates continued to argue for its inclusion in Europe's economic unification process. How they strategically managed to demonstrate Turkey as an entitled member of an economic Europe and how they successfully argued for economic aid to their country is at the heart of this subchapter. It mainly argues that they were adept at using a socially constructed community ethos as a basis of their argumentation. This subchapter gives a brief historical context concerning economic developments in Turkey and Europe. Then, Turkish arguments in the Assembly discourse on European economic relations will be examined. Contributions to the discourse by both Turkish and non-Turkish delegates decipher the perception of Turkey's role in Europe as an economic community.

Historical context

The Turkish agricultural boom of the early 1950s ended in 1954.⁵¹ Concurrently, the trade deficit from which Turkey suffered from 1947 onwards increased eightfold by 1955.

⁵¹ Zürcher founds the agricultural boom with a combination of extended cultivable land and simply good weather conditions (instead of justifying it with technical improvements), which resulted in a wheat surplus and thus in

However, the Turkish government kept up the rate of imports and state investment, which resulted in a high level of national debt and a high level of inflation.⁵² Additionally, the US gradually reduced its cash flows to Turkey as of 1955.⁵³ Not least due to the US withdrawal, Turkey orientated progressively towards Western Europe.⁵⁴ Due to the economic crisis and the urgency of foreign aid, the government finally agreed to the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1958. Consequently, the Turkish currency ‘lira’ depreciated, prices increased, and the debts were rescheduled. In exchange, Turkey received a new loan package, which was accorded both by the IMF and the Western countries – the USA as well as Western Europe.⁵⁵

Before Turkey applied for EEC association, it desired to become a member of the *European Free Trade Association* (EFTA). The first plan to establish a comprehensive free trade area was initiated by the British government in 1957, shortly after the creation of the EEC through the Treaty of Rome in March 1957. The initial plans imagined a free trade area among all OEEC countries. Due to disagreements, particularly concerning different imaginations on the part of the French and British government, these plans failed.⁵⁶ Instead, as a counterbalance to ‘the Six’ of the EEC (France, Western Germany, Italy, Benelux), a small free trade zone, in the form of EFTA, was finally established in January 1960 by ‘the outer Seven’ – Great Britain, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Portugal.⁵⁷ In contrast to the

exporting wheat. With the weather getting worse, Turkey, again, even had to import wheat. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 228.

⁵² According to Zürcher, the Turkish government could have introduced an effective taxation system, but for political purposes it decided instead to borrow from the Central Bank. Thereupon, new money was printed and inflation increased from 3% in 1950 to 20% in 1957. Cf. *ibid.*, 228f.

⁵³ Cf. Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 35; Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 265. Turkish social scientist Altemur Kılıç, press attaché of the Turkish embassy in Washington D.C. as of 1955, tries to find the reasons for the end of the “honeymoon period” of Turkey and the United States, which he dates in the year 1955. He cautiously traces it back to a change of administration in Washington, the American failure to understand the Turks with regard to their social and political problems and achievements, and the then following Turkish disappointment of not being taken for granted and understood in its ambitious objectives. Cf. Kılıç, *Turkey and the World*, 147.

⁵⁴ Cf. Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 36f.; Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 265.

⁵⁵ Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 228f.

⁵⁶ Neither France nor Great Britain was willing to immolate national economic interests. France insisted on arrangements similar to the EEC taking account on different stages of industrial development to establish fair competitive conditions. Great Britain as a strong industrial country, however, was not prepared to accept measures such as guarantees and compensations for rather weak industrial countries. For details on the disputes in the negotiation process see Clemens et al., *Geschichte der europäischen Integration*, 141f.

⁵⁷ On the creation of EFTA see, e.g., *ibid.*, 142ff.; Gasteyger, *Europe*, 115f.; Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 96ff. Another consequence of the failure of creating a large free trade zone among the OEEC countries was the restructuring and expansion of the OEEC into the *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD) as the first Atlantic economic institution between North America and Western Europe with an outward orientation outside of Europe and concentrating on international problems of economic development. For details see, e.g., Gasteyger, *Europe*, 117f.

EEC, EFTA had no supranational institutions, and every member state maintained full autonomy in trade issues with third countries.⁵⁸

Like ‘the Seven’, the Turkish government had initial reservations about moving towards a supranational alliance that might restrict the state’s freedom of action. It, therefore, expressed interest in membership in EFTA but was rejected after cautious demand.⁵⁹ Since there was no option to stay outside both economic organizations, it applied for association with the EEC in July 1959. To what extent the Greek application on 8 June 1959 influenced the Turkish decision to apply is a frequently asked question in the research literature. In the end, it is stipulatory that on the one hand, Turkey had already been interested in a closer economic and political cooperation with Western Europe for a long time and not only since Greece had sent its application. On the other hand, there is broad consensus that Greece’s application pushed the Turkish government to rapidly apply for association.⁶⁰ Not least, Greece was Turkey’s largest competitor due to having similar export products.⁶¹ Overall, Turkey’s relationship with Greece was severely affected by the Cyprus crisis as of 1954.⁶² Turkey was therefore interested in not losing its most important export market to Greece.⁶³ Moreover, with the Greek application, disputes within the ruling Democrat Party in Turkey disappeared. Until then, a minority of the party had opposed a Turkish EEC association, as it was considered a new form of economic dependence after years of being a puppet of the United States. Now, the whole nation, as Kaya emphasizes, feared that Greece would gain in strength as an EEC associate, both economically and politically, which could only be of disadvantage for Turkey in the unsolved Cyprus issue.⁶⁴

In its application to Brussels sent on 31 July 1959, Turkey used its geographical position and its significance for the defence and safety of free Europe to exert pressure on the decision-makers, as it had also done in its NATO application a few years earlier.⁶⁵ Turkey’s geographical position and size were attractive for the EEC – in the context of the Cold War –

⁵⁸ Cf. Harun Gümrükçü, “Die Veränderung der Grundlagen des Assoziierungsabkommens zwischen der Türkei und der EU,” in *Die Türkei und Europa*, ed. Gabriele Clemens (Hamburg et al.: LIT, 2007), 133.

⁵⁹ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 270f.

⁶⁰ Concerning the motives behind the Turkish application see Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 34-38; Ceylanoğlu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 103-105; Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 271.

⁶¹ Cf. Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, 32; Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 38; Ceylanoğlu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 105.

⁶² Greek nationalists finally started to revolt against the status quo of Cyprus as being under British administration in 1954. In the end, Cyprus became an independent republic on 16 August 1960, with the Greek nationalist Makarios as its first president. Cf. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 237f. The Cyprus conflict is also part of Chapter 5 (Defence).

⁶³ Cf. Ceylanoğlu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 105.

⁶⁴ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 273.

⁶⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 276f. On Turkey’s entry into the NATO in 1952 see also Chapter 5 (Defence).

also due to its rivalry with EFTA.⁶⁶ Concerning the four-year-period of the negotiation process, it is notable that an official document concerning the opening of negotiations had already determined Turkey as not being of the same developmental standard as Greece. It was also the rationale for why Turkey should not become an associate partner until January 1963 – after implementing the OEEC stabilization program.⁶⁷ In the end, the so-called Ankara Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963, only a few months after the first possible date of association. Consequently, negotiations concerning Turkish EEC association lasted more than two years longer than Greek negotiations (concluded on 9 July 1961). This, however, was not necessarily due to domestic incidents in Turkey; instead, the military coup in May 1960 defined the duration of the negotiations only marginally.⁶⁸

Furthermore, external occasions influenced Turkish association with the EEC negatively: One being the difficult Greek negotiations demonstrating the complexity and challenges of concluding an association agreement.⁶⁹ Other incidences included the British, Danish, and Irish membership applications to the EEC in summer 1961; in particular, the application of the powerful industrial country Great Britain was ranked more valuable than Turkey's.

Given the internal and external factors influencing Turkey's negotiation process, it is unsurprising that delegates representing Turkey in Western organizations – such as the COE's Assembly – attempted primarily to impact the process by exposing Turkey's benefits and significance for Europe.

Turkish Arguments in the Assembly

In the second half of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, Turkish delegates used Assembly discussions on European economic relations to demand financial assistance and their country's inclusion in economic organizations such as EFTA and the EEC. In the middle of the 1950s, during Turkey's first economic crisis – prior to both EFTA and the EEC – the

⁶⁶ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 280. Ironically, in the context of EU negotiations starting in 2005, opponents used the same arguments in order to argue against a Turkish EU membership.

⁶⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 281f. For details on the OEEC stabilization program of 1958 see Ceylanoglu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 84f.

⁶⁸ Overall, historians are divided on the question to what extent the coup influenced the negotiation process: Whereas Kaya emphasizes that the coup in first line had internal, less external consequences (cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 282), Krieger values the longer duration until an association agreement compared to the Greek process also in connection with the end of the Menderes regime. Cf. Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 52. Ceylanoglu specifically categorizes the coup as the occasion, not the reason, for a longer break of negotiations. Cf. Ceylanoglu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 48.

⁶⁹ Ceylanoglu clearly values the chronological subordination of the Turkish negotiations after the Greek ones as strongly negative for Turkey, in particular due to the fact that the EEC became conscious about the complications and costs of establishing a customs union with a developing country – and it was obvious that the complications with Turkey as an associate would be even heavier since Turkey was even more underdeveloped than Greece. Cf. *ibid.*, 177ff.

Assembly searched for ways to improve the difficult economic situation in the country, as well as in Greece and Southern Italy. Therefore, the Assembly's Committee on Economic Questions sent working groups to all three countries, which worked out detailed reports as a basis for discussing recommendations to the Committee of Ministers within the Assembly. The following presents how Turkish delegates argued for stronger economic assistance with reference to Europe as a collective community. They also argued for a Turkish association with the Common Market. Another focus is on the reactions and opinions of non-Turkish parliamentarians on why and to what extent Turkey should receive assistance. This gives insight into the then status quo of a collective understanding of mutual responsibility, which gives an impression of the formation of a feeling of community.

Federspiel, who was also part of the study trip to Turkey, was the first speaker in a general debate on the economic development of Southern Europe, in which the Assembly discussed the three reports as well as a draft recommendation for Italy by the Committee on Economic Questions, the Danish representative, and Chairman of the Committee,⁷⁰ Federspiel urged the Assembly to realize the necessity of increasing the collective aid to this region and based his argument on the principle of solidarity. By referencing the past, he pointed to the US policy of the Truman Doctrine, which, in his view, was “the deciding stimulus to the idea of European solidarity.” According to him, the US programme Marshall Aid and the subsequent creation of the OEEC required closer cooperation of the European nations and implied a policy of European integration. Therefore, he justified, “the question of developing the countries of Southern Europe is a collective responsibility of all nations.”⁷¹ Finally, he concluded his lengthy speech, by emphasizing “the necessity for being true to the principles for which we stand here and for recognising our joint responsibility for furthering and improving the economic conditions of our weaker brethren.”⁷² He thus argued for the necessity of mutual assistance on the basis of a collective commitment to certain principles, such as improving the standard of living all over Europe through closer cooperation. Also evident is that after World War Two the US policy on Europe was significant for constructing Europe as a community based on solidarity and mutual support.

⁷⁰ Cf. PACE, Doc. 434: Motion for a recommendation, Economic development of Southern Europe, Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, 18 October 1955. The report on Turkey was 13 pages long and summarized the current development, cf. PACE, Doc. 427: Report, Economic situation in Turkey, Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, 15 October 1955.

⁷¹ PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 17th sitting, 19 October 1955, Federspiel (Denmark), 498.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 503.

German delegate Mommer was among other non-Turkish delegates who emphasised the importance of closer cooperation among all European nations. In a continued debate entitled, “New Drive in European Integration,” he criticised that some countries, such as Turkey and Greece, were excluded from further plans of European integration. He made it clear that he and his colleagues from the German Social Democrats achieved “to break down the limiting frame of the Six wherever possible.”⁷³ He referred to conferences that had taken place among the Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC countries, particularly to the Messina Conference of 1955, that decided to continue European integration (which led to the creation of Euratom and the EEC in 1957). He further criticised, while “a new spirit became evident in Messina,” there was still “an old tendency to sit down together at the usual table laid for the Six” to discuss the European situation.⁷⁴ Instead, he appealed to the Assembly to do everything in their power to have all the free nations of Europe included in their plans of integration.⁷⁵ He thus insisted on commitment to the European idea of uniting the whole of (democratic) Europe.

The same day, in the continued general debate on the economic development of Southern Europe, several Turkish delegates expressed that they generally supported the document and were grateful to have visited the country to study its economic situation. They also criticised certain aspects of the report and economic relations between Turkey and other European countries. The delegate and DP representative Çelikbaş, for instance, used his speech to draw attention to a deficit in European trade: he criticised that European states were importing products from countries outside the OEEC. He stressed that Turkey was among the producers of grain as well as the only OEEC country that produced cotton for export. Instead, he observed that some countries imported cotton from Pakistan and Egypt and wheat and other grains from Argentina and the Soviet Union, partly in order to develop their own export markets.⁷⁶ Based on the argument of belonging to the same value-based community, he urged European states to increase trade with Turkey. In his words, Southern Europe was “inspired by the same faith in democratic freedom and respect for human values as the West”; they were attached “body and soul to the ideals of Western civilisation.”⁷⁷ As a consequence, he further argued, they were responsible for improving living conditions, but for this, they

⁷³ PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 22nd sitting, 21 October 1955, Mommer (Fed. Rep. of Germany), 641.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

⁷⁶ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 24th sitting, 25 October 1955, Çelikbaş (Turkey), 749.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

needed the help of the other European countries.⁷⁸ Thus, his argumentative strategy was to portray Turkey as part of Western civilization, which he defined as sharing the same values and principles, and to justify the country's demand for technical and financial help on the basis of the collective commitment to these values and principles.

His concrete idea was to imitate the Marshall Plan and to set up a fund under the COE to promote the economic development of Southern Europe. He promoted this idea as a "great service to the cause of world peace" since providing a better standard of living was "the only method of defeating the enemy."⁷⁹ In doing so, he interlinked the economic development of a country with the probability of being vulnerable to communist ideas; accordingly, a weak economy and a low standard of living would encourage the rise of communism. The reference to world peace was consistent with the general view at the European level at the time; that the goal of a prosperous Europe was a means to the higher end of securing peace.⁸⁰

The following speaker, Turkish delegate and independent deputy Somuncuoğlu, also promoted the idea of development aid to Southern European countries and criticised that the Committee on Economic Questions had not yet brought forward any recommendations ensuring practical results.⁸¹ He then presented a draft recommendation, which he had submitted to the Assembly with some of his colleagues, including Çelikbaş. They demanded assistance in the form of gifts to Southern Europe, long-term loans at favourable rates, foreign investment, and technical assistance.⁸² He concluded his speech as follows,

*"I am quite convinced that the member countries of the Council of Europe will not delay giving expression to European solidarity and understanding by extending their aid and confidence to these three countries which have a heavy burden to bear in the defence of Europe."*⁸³

He, thus, suggested a sense of solidarity and understanding towards less developed countries in Southern Europe. By reminding the Assembly of Southern Europe's role in Europe's defence, he argued for increased assistance from the other COE countries, once again, interlinking economic and defence arguments.

⁷⁸ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 24th sitting, 25 October 1955, Çelikbaş (Turkey), 749.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ On this general view within the European assemblies at the time, see Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 80.

⁸¹ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 24th sitting, 25 October 1955, Somuncuoğlu (Turkey), 751.

⁸² Cf. *ibid.*, 752; see also, PACE, Doc. 458: Motion for an Order: Economic development of Southern Europe, Çelikbaş and others (not further specified), 25 October 1955.

⁸³ PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 24th sitting, 25 October 1955, Somuncuoğlu (Turkey), 752.

As a response, the German delegate Leverkuehn proposed to extend a part of Marshall Aid – those kinds of funds that were not to be repaid to the US – to Southern Europe “in the European spirit.”⁸⁴ The Chairman of the Committee on Economic Questions ended the debate with the announcement that the Committee would study all these contributions immediately and draft a new recommendation. He encouraged the Assembly to help their neighbours by emphasizing the importance of sending technical assistance to the region, for instance, in the form of qualified engineering skills and stimulating trade with Greece and Turkey.⁸⁵

One day later, the Assembly adopted a recommendation, drafted by the Committee on Economic Questions which entailed three concrete recommendations to the CM. The first recommendation was to urge Turkey and Greece to submit programmes of development to the OEEC for urgent study and action. The second encouraged member governments to prefer these countries in technical assistance projects for underdeveloped countries. The third recommendation was to invite member governments to promote measures to expand trade with both countries.⁸⁶ Apparently, the Turkish and non-Turkish arguments for extending assistance and development aid to Turkey, Greece, and Southern Italy had been convincing to the Assembly members. Consequently, Turkish delegates were able to use Turkey’s membership in the COE to successfully present their country as a part of Southern Europe and contribute to the Assembly discourse on European solidarity.

Three years later, in April 1958, Turkish delegates promoted the principle of European solidarity to argue for their country’s involvement in plans of a European free trade area. At that time, the Assembly discussed the establishment of a wide free trade area within the scope of the OEEC. The two deputies, Şener and Gülek, were among the Turkish delegation that actively tried to convince the Assembly members to include Turkey in this plan. Among the various arguments, the most dominant ones were an insistence on the principle of European solidarity and the common aim of happiness grounded in a reasonable standard of living. They argued by interlinking political, especially defence issues, with questions of economic development. Cultural arguments also served the goal of being accepted as part of a European free trade area.

⁸⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 24th sitting, 25 October 1955, Leverkuehn (Fed. Rep. of Germany), 754.

⁸⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, Federspiel (Denmark), 756.

⁸⁶ Cf. PACE, Recommendation 91 (1955): Economic development of Southern Europe. The Assembly adopted the recommendation with 70 ayes and two noes, and no abstentions. See the vote at the 26th sitting: PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 26th sitting, 26 October 1955.

The DP deputy Şener, for instance, argued for Turkey's inclusion in a resumed general debate on the establishment of a free trade area and the Common Market by stating, "Turkey is a member of the European family of nations by reason of her social system, her traditions and her culture."⁸⁷ Thus, he insisted on Turkey's inclusion on the grounds of its belonging to the European family, also in cultural terms. Moreover, he represented Turkey's membership of a free trade area as beneficial by portraying the Turkish population as ambitious in raising the standard of living, which would result in an expanding market.⁸⁸ Furthermore, he promoted their economic focus on agriculture, which would provide Europe with an extensive, steady, and reliable market.⁸⁹ He then argued for special treatment for Turkey, as well as other countries with similar economic structures. His idea was to provide these countries with an "adequate special exemption period" instead of leaving them out entirely. The latter was not an option, he argued in his closing remarks, by emphasising the principle of collectiveness:

*"To leave out Turkey and other countries with the same economic structure would clearly not be compatible with our European solidarity or with the spirit of co-operation and support which economically developed countries should show towards those who, for various historical reasons, have not yet reached a satisfactory level of economic development."*⁹⁰

In addition to hard facts about the economic benefits, the adoption of the principle of European solidarity and a European spirit was, again, a key argument. Similarly, in the same debate, Gülek emphasized the importance of not just talking about but living the principle of European solidarity and mutual understanding. In this regard, he suggested that it was natural to think as nationals, but he appealed to the Assembly community that it was their duty "to think as Europeans."⁹¹ His argument for granting development aid to underdeveloped European countries considered the collective beyond nation-states, thus the European collective. Besides, similar to his colleague Çelikbaş, he strategically interlinked the consequences of development aid, which he determined as social equality and human happiness, with the chance to prevent communist agitation.⁹²

⁸⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 10/1, 5th sitting, 30 April 1958, Şener (Turkey), 141.

⁸⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 142.

⁸⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Gülek (Turkey), 146.

⁹² Cf. *ibid.*, 147. See also: PACE, *Reports*, 10/2, 16th sitting, 14 October 1958, Gülek (Turkey), 538.

After the plans to establish a wide free trade area within the scope of the OEEC had failed, only ‘the Seven’ set up a small free trade area organized as EFTA in January 1960. After Turkey was rejected as a potential member during the founding phase of EFTA, it increasingly oriented itself towards the EEC, the so-called Common Market set up in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, and finally submitted an application for association in July 1959. The difference between the EEC and EFTA concerning the objective of political union became clear in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. The French delegate Pisani, for instance, pointed out, “The motive power behind the Common Market was and is a political one.”⁹³ And also the metaphorical words of Walter Hallstein, who was a guest speaker in the Assembly in January 1960 and then President of the EEC Commission, “Many roads lead to Rome, and Rome here means Europe,”⁹⁴ referred to the final aim of political integration through economic integration. This, not least, corresponded to the Turkish motivation to apply for EEC association since Turkey had also applied for political reasons.⁹⁵

The following focuses on both the Turkish arguments in Assembly debates to increase economic aid to Turkey, and the arguments concerning Turkey’s integration into the Common Market after it had applied for association in July 1959.⁹⁶ Overall, Turkish representatives tried to represent Turkey’s ‘economic backwardness’ in a way that it was not seen as an obstacle to an association. With the existence of the Six and the Seven, disregarding the less developed countries, several parliamentarians strategically invoked the community ethos and appealed to the common duties as members of the same collective who shared certain values and ideals. This becomes clear, for instance, in the following expression of the Turkish deputy Şener in a debate on European economic relations:

“Are there not actions which the Six and the Seven can take together as evidence of their joint European responsibilities to help the poorer and less developed countries of the European family of nations? [...] We count on our European friends to help us.”⁹⁷

⁹³ PACE, *Reports*, 11/2, 17th sitting, 16 September 1959, Pisani (France), 469.

⁹⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 11/3, 26th sitting, 20 January 1960, Hallstein (Germany; guest speaker and President of the EEC Commission), 736.

⁹⁵ Concerning the political motivation of Turkey as well as the political reasons on the part of the EEC to include Turkey see, e.g., Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, 30f.; Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei*, 43f.

⁹⁶ Part of the following results are also included in the article “Ein Europa ohne die Türkei?” published by the author.

⁹⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 12/1, 3rd sitting, 26 April 1960, Şener (Turkey), 71.

On the grounds of European solidarity, members of the EEC and EFTA were encouraged to help their economically weaker friends and family members, as he called them. Furthermore, Şener argued:

“Assistance to the less developed, less fortunate, of our members – who are nevertheless passionately devoted to the cause of European unity – will undoubtedly contribute in a major way towards consolidating the union of Europe, the goal to which we aspire with all our hearts.”⁹⁸

He also based his argument on the commitment to the European idea of uniting the whole of Europe. With the help of emotional and personal attributes – such as “European family” and “friends” – as well as the description of the collective goal as a heartfelt desire, he constructed a kind of emotional collective to which Turkey belonged naturally. Overall, Schimmelfennig’s approach of ‘rhetorical action’ can be observed: The Turkish delegate used the argument of the collective commitment to the goal of uniting and the presumption of a feeling of belonging to request support among familiar faces as a matter of course. Based on these arguments appealing to the community ethos, the Turkish delegate hindered any scepticism towards Turkey’s entitlement to be supported – as long as all those critical heads achieved to keep their credibility as family members of a value-based community.

Moreover, in the context of promoting development aid to Southern Europe as part of a resumed debate on economic relations, the Greek parliamentarian Yerocostopoulos argued by emphasizing the importance of this region in both historical and present as well as in future terms:

“The history, culture and civilisation of these countries make them an integral part of Europe and their destiny has never been more plainly bound up with her’s than it is today. Greece, Southern Italy and Turkey, the group of Mediterranean countries to which I refer, were first the cradle of European civilisation and then its bastion and the spearhead of its defence against the enemies threatening the European family.”⁹⁹

⁹⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 12/1, 3rd sitting, 26 April 1960, Şener (Turkey), 72.

⁹⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 11/3, 27th sitting, 21 January 1960, Yerocostopoulos (Greece), 779.

This metaphorical, almost heroic, accentuation of Southern Europe as the cradle of European civilization and as Europe's bastion against the East is to be considered against the historical context of still on-going negotiations between Greece and the EEC. The inclusion of Turkey, in his argument, is unsurprising since both countries were awaiting responses from the EEC at that time and also because, presumably, it was in Greece's interest to integrate Turkey more closely into the European community for geopolitical reasons. Greece did not intend to see another neighbouring country under Soviet control.¹⁰⁰ In this context, a parallel can be drawn to Schimmelfennig's observation of the 1990s, when precisely those EU states that were direct neighbours of the new candidates promoted Eastern enlargement; being among those who would lose their function as the external border of the EU.¹⁰¹

When the Assembly was, once again, debating on European economic relations in April 1960, another Greek representative backed the Turkish delegates' arguments and finally predicted what could happen if Greece and Turkey were unsupported as trade partners. He made it clear that already in these days, on account of the decline in demand of their products – tobacco, currants, olive oil, fresh and tinned fruit – they were forced to increase trade with Eastern Europe “and thus run the risk of becoming economically dependent on the Eastern bloc.”¹⁰² This was a dangerous situation, he further evaluated, and their people were “beginning to lose their confidence in the system and methods of freedom in trade and in the concept of solidarity between free nations and Governments.”¹⁰³

Presumably, such imaginary threatening scenarios, such as Turkey and Greece becoming economically dependent from the Eastern Bloc, and their societies losing trust in Western principles and values, were definitely effective in those days. This threatening statement held even more meaning and power against the background that the Soviet regime – having observed the American withdrawal – presented Turkey with some attractive financial offers resulting in a resumption of bilateral trade since the mid-1950s.¹⁰⁴ According to Kaya, the Turkish government also used the strategy of interlinking economic with defence issues during the Cold War to argue for Turkey's association with the EEC. In a memorandum to the

¹⁰⁰ With Bulgaria, Greece already had a Soviet controlled neighbour (since 1944). Moreover, the Greek assistance of a Turkish accession to the EU under Foreign Minister Giorgos Papandreu was thus not a new phenomenon of the 1990s, it rather goes back at least to the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey at the beginning of the 1960s.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap,” 49f.

¹⁰² PACE, *Reports*, 12/1, 8th sitting, 29 April 1960, Lychnos (Greece), 257.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Although pursuing economic cooperation with the West, Turkey also restarted economic agreements with the Soviet Union in 1956. For details on the Soviet-Turkish economic relations see Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 275f.

EEC in August 1961, they emphasized that a rapid integration of their country into the EEC would be of common European interest due to Turkey's geographical situation in the context of the Cold War.¹⁰⁵ According to Schimmelfennig, threats such as those ones are a popular means of 'rhetorical action' to intimidate potential opponents and stalemate them.¹⁰⁶ These rhetorical productions of Turkish and Greek representatives are evocative of the debates in the 1990s and 2000s concerning EU enlargement to Central and East European countries when those candidates used the same threatening scenario – not being involved in the EU meant not being able to continue the path of democracy on their own. Additionally, in this case, the idea of becoming a greater European community sharing the same values would suffer.¹⁰⁷ Thus, as in the 1960s and 2000s, certain sceptical voices were rhetorically entrapped based on the community ethos.

The Turkish delegate Oran also argued that the European idea could suffer if Turkey and Greece were not sufficiently supported in their development, indicating the commitment to the common goal of uniting throughout democratic Europe. He was of the opinion that within the process of economic integration, which he saw as preceding a political integration, it was necessary to support the poorer economies by granting them access to the achieved Common Market under fair conditions. Not integrating the weaker states would be a "dangerous mistake" since otherwise valuable opportunities for unification would be lost.¹⁰⁸ Thus, he strategically represented the European idea as failed should the European economically weaker countries not be supported.

Some months later, at the beginning of 1963, as some of his colleagues had argued before, also the delegate Oran strategically linked economic questions with the East-West conflict in another general debate on European economic relations. He stressed that European decision-makers should bear in mind that "Turkey's strength as the defender of freedom and democracy and in creating a United Europe will increase proportionately with her economic development."¹⁰⁹ Again as the general debate on European economic relations continued some months later, he further argued,

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 297.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Schimmelfennig, "Rhetorisches Handeln," 229.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Schimmelfennig, "Debatten zwischen Staaten," 93.

¹⁰⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 4th sitting, 16 May 1962, Oran (Turkey), 107.

¹⁰⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 14/3, 21st sitting, 16 January 1963, Oran (Turkey), 732.

*“Any investment made in Turkey, any financial assistance she may receive, can be regarded as aiding the European countries. If Turkey is late in rising to the desired economic level, it is because she spends more on national defence in proportion to her economic potential, than any other European country.”*¹¹⁰

Thus, in his representation, supporting Turkey meant supporting Europe. He promoted Turkey as part of Europe and argued for economic aid by portraying Turkey as significant and ambitious both in terms of Europe’s defence and in terms of Europe’s unification. Against the historical, international context of a hot phase of the Cold War – with the Cuban missile crisis happening only a few months ago, bringing the world closer to the brink of nuclear war – suggests that these arguments were convincing.

This presumption becomes more definite when one observes that even non-Turkish deputies interlinked Turkey’s economic stability with the capability and degree of power to defend Europe. The deputy Linden from Luxembourg, for instance, in a debate on cooperation with newly developing countries identified Greece and Turkey as countries that had to be promoted in a special way because Europe had a “particular debt of gratitude to these European countries.”¹¹¹ The gratitude to Turkey, he specified, resulted from the fact that Turkey was “one of the most exposed nations and one of the most deeply committed to the preservation of our security and of European peace.”¹¹² In a general debate on European economic relations in January 1963, the head of the Political Committee of the Assembly, the French deputy Pflimlin, also stressed that they should help Turkey in every possible way towards its development progress, as it was “bravely holding a key position in the front line of the free world.”¹¹³ The support of Assembly members for increased economic assistance for Turkey, based on its role in Europe’s defence, becomes evident in these speeches. Moreover, the Assembly’s support of an association between Turkey and the EEC becomes apparent with the adoption of official texts, such as Resolution 221 adopted in May 1962, which included that the Assembly considered it desirable to expedite the negotiations between the EEC and Turkey. Also, Recommendation 337, adopted in September 1962, included an

¹¹⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 15/1, 5th sitting, 8 May 1963, Oran (Turkey), 164f.

¹¹¹ PACE, *Reports*, 14/2, 12th sitting, 21 September 1962, Linden (Luxembourg), 448.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ PACE, *Reports*, 14/3, 24th sitting, 17 January 1963, Pflimlin (France), 808.

appeal to the governments of ECC members to conclude negotiations with Britain on the one hand and to continue negotiations with Turkey, Denmark, and Norway on the other.¹¹⁴

In a debate on the general policy of the COE and European economic relations in May 1963 – in times of still on-going association negotiations between Turkey and the EEC – Oran argued for a conclusion of the negotiations, after he had promoted Turkey’s importance for Europe’s defence. Thereby, he compared Turkey with Greece and claimed that they were “both situated, from the strategic standpoint, in the same sector of Europe and displaying similar economic characteristics.”¹¹⁵ Against the background that, meanwhile, Greece, in contrast to Turkey, had already associated with the EEC,¹¹⁶ it is unsurprising that Oran used this comparison to achieve a rapid action on part of the EEC. However, as mentioned, from the beginning of negotiations, it was clear that the association processes for the two candidates had to be handled in different ways, also with regard to the earliest dates of agreements, based on various economic and financial conditions.¹¹⁷

Ultimately, the Ankara Agreement, signed on 12 September 1963, was warmly welcomed in the Assembly and even described “as a further step in the construction of Europe” by the Assembly’s President.¹¹⁸ Included in both a resolution and a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers, the Assembly’s welcoming of the Association Agreement was described as “a further step towards European integration.”¹¹⁹ Among European parliamentarians of the COE’s Assembly, Turkey’s inclusion into the Common Market was considered significant to the process of uniting Europe.

Overall, in the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s, Turkish delegates contributed to the discourse on an economic Europe with similar arguments to those at the beginning of the 1950s. They based their arguments for Turkish involvement in economic matters primarily on

¹¹⁴ Cf. PACE, Resolution 221 (1962): European economic relations, 17 May 1962; PACE, Recommendation 337 (1962): European integration, 25 September 1962.

¹¹⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 15/1, 5th sitting, 8 May 1963, Oran (Turkey), 164.

¹¹⁶ The association agreement between Greece and the EEC was signed in Athens on 9 July 1961, and was in comparison with the later Ankara Agreement more detailed. Cf. Gümrukçü, “Die Veränderung der Grundlagen,” 138.

¹¹⁷ According to Kaya’s analysis of the EEC documents, although Turkey’s industrial sector was better developed than the Greek one, Greece, in contrast to Turkey, had already managed to rehabilitate its finances. Cf. Kaya, *Entscheidung für Europa*, 281f. Regarding the discussions within the EEC on the question of a different handling of the two candidates see also Ceylanoğlu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, 71.

¹¹⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 15/2, 16th sitting, 24 September 1963, The President, 569.

¹¹⁹ PACE, Recommendation 380 (1964): European economic relations and Atlantic economic partnership, 15 January 1964 (this document entails the quote); PACE, Resolution 254 (1963): Reply to the 6th general report of the Commission of the European Economic Community, 19 September 1963.

the community ethos and the common goal of European unification, as will be summed up in the following.

7.3 Conclusions

In conclusion, Turkish delegates used the Assembly discourse on European economic relations between 1949 and 1963 to argue both for development aid to Turkey and for the country's inclusion in the process of economic integration with the help of several representational practices. These divide into three pillars of argument. The first pillar is based on the community ethos. The second on predicted 'what if not' scenarios; what would happen if Turkey was not supported in its economic development. The third pillar was based on 'what if' scenarios illustrating the positive consequences for Europe if the Turkish economy received greater support.

Concerning the first pillar, the community ethos, Turkish delegates based their arguments on shared commitments, such as the commitment to shared values and principles, the commitment to the common goal of uniting the whole of (democratic) Europe, and the commitment to the goal of establishing a prosperous Europe. From these commitments they acquired the principle of European solidarity to promote the support of the economically weaker member states. According to their representations, this was entirely in the European spirit; the goal eventually was to think collectively as Europeans and not solely as national citizens. In arguments of this pillar, the delegates acted rhetorically, in the sense of Schimmelfennig, by delegitimizing any dissenting votes due to community ethos. Accordingly, opposing voices did not exist in these debates. With regard to the question of which kind of images of Europe they socially constructed through language, in this context, the created image of Europe was that of a solidary Europe. Apart from that, Turkish delegates contributed to the self-definition as Europeans in demarcation to Others by representing both the Soviet Union and the United States as economic competitors.

The second pillar of 'what if not' scenarios included the following imaginations: Turkey would become vulnerable to communist agitation, the defence of the whole of Europe would be in danger, the Turkish people would lose faith in the European idea, and the European idea would fail anyway. Arguments that can be attributed to this pillar were based strongly on the historical context of the East-West conflict and worked with the friend-enemy scheme. In brief, the message was: Only an economically strong Turkey would be protected against communist agitation and able to safeguard Europe's security, and the European idea could only survive by including Turkey and others in Europe's process of economic integration.

Third pillar arguments, the ‘what if’ scenarios, showed the positive aspects of greater support for Turkey: not only would Europe’s security be guaranteed, but the European market would also be enriched by Turkish products, which were especially agricultural products and raw materials for the arms industry, and the goal of a prosperous Europe, including social equality and happiness among the people, would come closer. This would again prevent a rise of communism in Turkey and elsewhere. Promoting Turkey as beneficial for the European market, with reference to its strong agricultural sector, was particularly popular at the beginning of the 1950s, which can be explained against the historical and situational context of debating the establishment of a European Authority on Agriculture under the auspices of the COE at that time.

Overall, Turkish delegates were able to participate in and shape the Assembly discourse on a common economic Europe, including the discourse on European solidarity. The fact that these strategic arguments and representational practices were heard and became part of the common reality and thereby co-determined the economic discourse of the Assembly could be shown in speeches by non-Turkish delegates and in adopted texts. As visible in numerous arguments by non-Turkish Assembly members, they supported their Turkish colleagues’ economic interests and included Turkey as part of Europe in the discourse on European economic relations. A sense of European solidarity and a mutual commitment to help one another slowly emerged within the scope of the Council of Europe’s Assembly in the early 1950s, with respect to Southern Europe.

8 Representations of Turkey as Part of a European Cultural Community

At the Congress of The Hague, it was exposed that “a Federation should not come about solely from political necessity, but rather from a feeling of inner spiritual community.”¹ Members of the Cultural Committee of the Congress agreed that it was important to awake a feeling of cohesion among the people of Europe as a basis for European integration. The final Cultural Resolution advanced the establishment of a European Cultural Center, in which diverse cultural projects would interlink the nations and “promote an awareness of European unity through all media of information.”² This “true unity,” according to the Resolution, was “to be found in the common heritage of Christian and other spiritual and cultural values.”³ The newly founded Council of Europe adopted these ideas directly.

The following chapter provides a brief overview about the Council of Europe’s efforts in the field of cultural cooperation. Then, how these proposals were discussed and developed in the Assembly meetings will be examined. The Assembly developed ideas of the Cultural Committee in its first sessions in August and September 1949 by proposing a ‘cultural plan’ incorporating ideas on various initiatives for closer cultural and educational cooperation. Similar to the ideas that were announced at the Congress in The Hague, this plan included: the elaboration of cultural conventions, the idea of a cultural centre, the demand for free circulation and exchange of cultural works, the call for closer cooperation in scientific research, and support for private associations which were working “to promote European culture.”⁴ How they defined the so-called ‘European culture’ was part of the debates and will be discussed throughout this chapter.

The Committee of Ministers supported the Assembly’s cultural plan. They responded by establishing a Committee of Cultural Experts to conceptualize a cultural program for the Council of Europe, consisting of senior officials of the member states’ Ministries of Education.⁵ In its first decade, the COE focused intensely on close collaboration in the cultural and scientific field. One of the leading efforts was achieved in December 1954 when the European Cultural Convention opened for signature. The treaty aspired to develop an increased knowledge of each European neighbour to enhance the sense of mutual

¹ *Europe Unites*, 87. The quote is by Dr. von Schenck, a member of the Cultural Committee.

² On the promotion of a European consciousness through films made by European institutions including the Council of Europe, see the detailed volume: Clemens, *Werben für Europa*.

³ *Europe Unites*, 87f. The Cultural Resolution also entailed the proposal of setting up a European Youth Institute, amongst others, in order to support the exchange of young students throughout Europe. Cf. *ibid.*, 89.

⁴ Cf. PACE, *Documents, Working Papers*, 1949, Doc. 101: Cultural and Scientific Co-operation. Recommendations to the Committee of Ministers, 250.

⁵ Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 38.

understanding and appreciation of Europe's cultural diversity. It further aimed "to safeguard and encourage the development of European culture," and to foster "the study of the languages, history and civilisation of the others and of the civilisation which is common to them all."⁶ One of the first activities promoting European culture was an exhibition on 'Humanist Europe' in 1954/55 in Brussels. In the following years, the Council of Europe staged exhibitions on cultural aspects throughout Europe in different member states' cities, such as an exhibition on Byzantine art in Athens in 1964.⁷ Furthermore, it introduced a so-called 'Cultural Identity Card' in June 1954. The card sponsored students in visiting cultural institutions such as museums or libraries and offered research fellowships and academic conferences in the European Studies field.⁸ Accordingly, the idea of a cultural Europe was that of a transnational cultural space in which people should develop mutual understanding of their neighbours' cultural traditions and connect with each other. This image of Europe was advantageous for Turkey as it did not concern exclusion but rather learning about each other's cultures.

A further achievement of the Assembly was a specific cultural fund set up as a financial source for the COE's cultural activities in January 1959. In 1961, the Committee of Ministers also established the Council for Cultural Co-operation, an intergovernmental body at the highest level, with members of various national ministries coordinating all aspects of culture, education, and science.⁹

Debates regarding cultural affairs within the COE's Assembly reflected two central issues. First, Assembly members tried to define 'European culture' and 'European civilization'. These discussions included the search for historical commonalities forming a common heritage. Second, delegates searched for approaches to cultural cooperation among Europeans to bring people together on the civil society level and create a sense of community.¹⁰ The role

⁶ ETS No. 18, 19 December 1954, Preamble. By 1962 it was ratified by all member states at the time. Additionally, it was the first convention that was open to non-members, so that in 1957 Spain, and in 1962 Switzerland and the Holy See also signed. Cf. Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 39.

⁷ For example "The Arts in Europe 1884-1914" in Paris 1960, or "Byzantine Art" in Athens 1964. For a longer list see *ibid.*, 38. Wassenberg nominates Julien Kuypers, a Belgian member of the Committee of Cultural Experts, as the most striking feature in promoting a sense of shared cultural identity and initiator of the first exhibitions.

⁸ The introduction of a Cultural Identity Card had already been suggested by the signatory states of the Brussels Treaty. See *ibid.*

⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 39.

¹⁰ According to Doc. 101, for example, a European Cultural Centre should be built with the function "to strengthen the existing links, and to ensure appropriate co-operation between the universities and the cultural institutions of the different European countries, or of countries having the same traditions," further "to promote the circulation and the translation of works representative of the civilising values which are common to these

Turkey played in these discussions differed intensely between the first and second types of debates. As detailed in this chapter, Turkish representatives remained relatively silent in conversations about a common heritage yet demonstrated their country's commitment to Europe during debates on cultural cooperation, particularly in the field of education and science.

The following analysis is separated into two thematic fields: the first subchapter focuses on Turkey's active and passive role in early attempts of defining 'European culture', 'European civilization', and particularly 'a common heritage'. To what extent Turkey's reputation as a non-Christian but Muslim country influenced the debates is of particular interest to this study, including reactions of Turkish deputies on accentuations of Christianity. The second subchapter examines the significance placed by Turkish and non-Turkish representatives on cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation for the process of uniting and therefore reveals attempts of a future-orientated definition of a common cultural policy. This field, as shown, significantly supported Turkish delegates in demonstrating their country's Europeanness.

8.1 A Look into the Past: Europe's Common Heritage

The Preamble of the COE's Statute included a first attempt to define a common European heritage, in which the member states had devoted themselves "to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage," which again were considered the sources of individual and political rights and principles.¹¹ Immediately in its first session, which lasted from 10 August until 8 September 1949, Assembly members discussed how to define the terms 'European civilization', 'European culture' and 'common heritage'. Thereby, the existence of a European civilization, as such, was not at all contested. However, parliamentarians faced considerable challenges when defining these words; two terms, antiquity and Christianity, were repeatedly brought into the discussion as the core origins of European civilization.

countries." Moreover, the recommendations in the context of education included "the preparation of a series of impartial books dealing with the geography and the history of European countries which bring out the links between them." Cf. PACE, *Documents, Working Papers*, 1949, Doc. 101: Cultural and Scientific Co-operation. Recommendations to the Committee of Ministers, 251f.

¹¹ In original, according to the Statute's Preamble the member states reaffirmed "their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy."

This is apparent in a speech of the Assembly's President Paul-Henri Spaak at the end of the first session on 8 September 1949, when he concluded what they had achieved so far. Among those achievements, he underlined their success in defining the sources of European civilization:

“We have also once more succeeded, in spite of certain differences of opinion, in giving new emphasis, moving and sincere emphasis, to that European civilisation which we wish to protect. We can now say, in a phrase which is almost sanctified, that this European civilisation is the civilisation of Christianity and the civilisation of humanity.”¹²

This was the result of discussions on how to define European civilization. The following reveals parts of these discussions in detail. In a general debate on social security, Turkish deputy Odyak underlined the importance and necessity of uniting and urged the community of Europeans to help raise the standard of living for the citizens of Europe. He ended his speech with the following reference to European civilization:

“I am confident that the spirited citizens of Europe, who have created a common civilisation of their own, and who know how to protect it, will ingeniously and with a determined mind not lose sight of the vitally important goal of unity in Europe. As Europeans, we all possess the natural resources and the qualities necessary to decide our future destiny.”¹³

By saying, “As Europeans, we all,” he identified them as being members of the same collective, that is of Europe. Like deputy Odyak, many delegates – Turkish and non-Turkish – identified themselves frequently as Europeans and, therefore, contributed to socially constructing a sense of belonging. In other words, a fundamental requirement for forming a sense of belonging was the existence of the proper name of Europe and Europeans.¹⁴ According to Schimmelfennig's concept of rhetorical action, though there were doubts about the identification of Turks as Europeans, Turkey's admission to the COE meant it was

¹² PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 18th sitting, 8 September 1949, The President, 1328.

¹³ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Odyak (Turkey), 728f.

¹⁴ See also Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 316.

officially a European country. The country's continued commitment to the goal of uniting throughout Europe silenced any opposing voices. In essence, the commonly determined objective of realizing the European idea of uniting rhetorically entrapped potential opponents.¹⁵

Two different perspectives are visible in the Assembly debates regarding the role of Christianity in European identity constructions. In the political-democratic sense, Assembly members repeatedly underlined the basic right of freedom of religion in the context of fundamental human rights – which was and is one of the main principles of the COE's joint work.¹⁶ In contrast, within attempts of defining a common cultural heritage, Christianity was perceived as decisively meaningful; it was thought to have contributed majorly to the development of a European civilization. A Netherlands' representative, for instance, declared:

*“Born of the union of ancient civilisation with the strength of the Nordic peoples, with the benediction of Christianity, Europe became the centre of civilisation in the thousand years after Charlemagne.”*¹⁷

While Dutch deputy Serrarens was among those who included both the ancient times and Christianity in their definition of a common heritage, others disregarded the part of antiquity and instead equated European civilization with Christian civilization. This becomes apparent in comments such as, “The aim of the Council of Europe is a just peace based on the principles of Christian civilization,”¹⁸ and “The pooling of all our European resources, political, industrial, economic and moral, in order to preserve our Christian civilization is the essential task of this Assembly.”¹⁹ The assumption of a “Christian brotherhood”²⁰ among Europeans also demonstrates the importance of Christianity as a common origin for several Assembly parliamentarians. Apart from that, as Trunk mentions in his book about European

¹⁵ On Schimmelfennig's concept of rhetorical action and rhetorical entrapment see, e.g., Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap.”

¹⁶ See for example the debate on *The maintenance and further realization of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms* within the sitting period in August 1949: PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 8th sitting, 19 August 1949, 404ff.

¹⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 5th sitting, 16 August 1949, Serrarens (Netherlands), 190. Presumably, he mentioned Charlemagne (742/743-814) for he had become part of the collective European memory as *pater Europae*. In fact, as historian Klaus Oschema mentions within a review, Charlemagne was named *pater Europae* only in one single fragmentary medieval manuscript. Cf. Klaus Oschema, “Rezension zu *Gründungsmythen Europas im Mittelalter*, edited by Michael Bernsen, Matthias Becher, and Elke Brüggem, Göttingen 2013,” *H-Soz-Kult* (19.11.2014), www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-21479 (30 July 2015).

¹⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Heyman (Belgium), 708.

¹⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 2/4, 20th sitting, 28 August 1950, Crosbie (Ireland), 1102.

²⁰ PACE, *Reports*, 1/2, 11th sitting, 24 August 1949, Boggiano-Pico (Italy), 584.

identity constructions among political elites in the 1950s, such references to Christianity as a crucial source of European civilization were not only pointed out by Christian-democrats but also by socialists; this also applied to the COE's Assembly.²¹

Without explicitly mentioning Turkey as a country with Islamic roots and a predominantly Muslim population, French deputy Senghor referred to the role of Islam as a part of the common heritage of Europe. He then quoted an article from *The Times* that questioned the Council of Europe's credentials as a European club while having Turkey and Iceland as members. Unlike his colleagues, he did not just recognise the meaning of Christianity for Europe's cultural development but also included Islam in his definition of a common heritage:

*“The common heritage of Europe is the culture which was produced by grafting Christianity on Greek logic. I say Christianity but, as you know, Islam is Christianity's brother in spirit and in origin. You are aware of the important part played by Islam in transmitting the heritage of Greece.”*²²

Unique from his point of view was that Islam was accepted as a European religion when constructing the *political* identity of Europe with an emphasis on the freedom of religion, and also in *cultural* identity formations.²³ Instead of excluding or ignoring Europe's Muslim roots, he identified Islam explicitly as a part of the cultural-historical heritage of Europe. He included Islam as an important player in the development of European civilization in the discursive formation of a common heritage. The later argument – from proponents of a Turkish-EU accession – that Islam has belonged to the history of Europe since the Middle Ages goes back at least to 1949.²⁴ However, while none of his Assembly colleagues disagreed, no one explicitly supported his approach, and his consideration of Islam as a part of a common heritage remained a single comment.

²¹ Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 65.

²² PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Senghor (France), 754.

²³ With regard to the distinction between political and cultural identities in collective identity formations of nation-states and beyond national borders, see Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework).

²⁴ Cf. Walter, *Die Türkei*, 203. In this context, Walter quotes an article from the German daily news *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 2004. To put it the other way round, the French delegate's way of integrative interpretation considering Islam as a part of a European cultural heritage was also used by proponents of a Turkish possible admission to the EU in order to oppose the essentialist interpretation of Europe as a Christian occident constructed by opponents. Moreover, as Walter shows in his study about European identity constructions through Turkey in German and British media, in an including discursive reading Turkish history was considered as European history, for instance, by describing the territory of present-day Turkey as the home of Hellenistic and thus European culture. Cf. *ibid.*, 202.

Afterwards, French deputy Senghor quoted “a Western European newspaper,” which he described as isolationist, which claimed, “Strasbourg has become the home of illusions, for the Council of Europe, where Icelandics and Turks are endeavouring to find a place, is pure fantasy.”²⁵ Senghor criticised the article for emphasizing “the diversity, of language, customs, traditions, in fact, of civilisation between Europeans” and for claiming that the nations of Europe had nothing in common.²⁶ His takeaway from this article was to urge his colleagues, and the Assembly’s president, “to define the common heritage of Europe, and to maintain that it is, primarily, a cultural heritage.”²⁷ And as we know from his previous comment, he accepted Islam as “Christianity’s brother” as a part of the common cultural heritage.

The article that incentivized his appeal was published in the British newspaper, *The Times*, on 10 August 1949. The author of this news article was evident in excluding Turkey from Western Europe in cultural and historical terms while claiming that,

*“it would be absurd and indeed insulting to the Turks, a nation with a proud and glorious history of their own, to pretend that they share a common tradition with the French and English. Muslim in religion with an Asiatic language and an Arabic script, it is not easy to see how Turkey could take her place easily in a United States of Western Europe.”*²⁸

Eight days later, Kasım Gülek wrote a letter to the editor of *The Times* defending Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe.²⁹ First, he clarified that the union that was targeted in Strasbourg was not a union of Western Europe but of all Europe. He then stressed that Turkey had been a secular state by constitution for the last quarter of a century and that religion should not be a consideration in international relations; to do so would be a medieval procedure. Additionally, he defended his country’s admission to the COE by remarking that Turkey was a democratic state with two opposition parties and several independents in the Turkish parliament. In response to the editor’s claim that Turkish was an Asiatic language, he argued that the origin of the language of a country should not determine its adherence to the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, adding that the Turkish language was of the same origin as

²⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Senghor (France), 754.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ See the article “Union and Geography” in *The Times* of 10 August 1949.

²⁹ See the article “Union and Geography. To the editor of The Times” by Kasım Gülek, in *The Times*, 18 August 1949.

Hungarian, Finnish, and Estonian, he linked Turkey to countries whose belonging to “the European family of nations” could “certainly not be argued” because of the origin of their languages.³⁰ He decided to remain quiet during claims that Turkish citizens would use the Arabic script, not reminding the critical author that the Latin alphabet had been introduced more than 20 years ago as a part of Atatürk’s westernizing cultural reforms.³¹

In the Assembly meeting, Gülek remained silent when his French colleague Senghor mentioned the article, presumably because Senghor had already defended Turkey’s membership and no one had contradicted his defence. Senghor then made it clear that his demand of defining a common cultural heritage would by no means suggest that they “should work towards cultural identity, standardisation of languages, customs, art and philosophy by means of some Esperantist dictatorship.”³² Instead, he emphasized that unity included diversity and that

*“unity without diversity would be contrary to Europe’s peculiar genius, which is dynamic; it produces variations of the same theme and constantly seeks new forms of thought and life. Standardisation would be the death of beauty and of life, that is of culture, which is the spirit of civilisation, mankind’s reaction to his environment, or, if you prefer it, the relation between history and geography.”*³³

Accordingly, his definition of Europe was that of culturally dynamic space, constantly in progress and resulting in cultural variations, however “of the same theme,” which was characteristic for Europe.

Within the same debate on cultural cooperation, Greek delegate Cassimatis also accentuated Europe’s common civilisation and its cultural diversity by saying, “We have had a common

³⁰ Cf. “Union and Geography. To the editor of The Times” by Kasım Gülek, in *The Times*, 18 August 1949. Concerning linguistic research on language families at the time, some scholars represented the so-called Ural-Altai hypothesis uniting the Uralic (i.e., Hungarian, Estonian and Finnish) and Altaic languages (i.e., Turkish). Since the 1960s this proposal has been widely rejected. Cf. Lars Johanson, “The high and low spirits of Transeurasian language studies,” in *Transeurasian Verbal Morphology in a Comparative Perspective: Genealogy, Contact, Chance*, ed. Lars Johanson and Martine Robbeets (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 2010), 8.

³¹ As aforementioned in the chapter on Turkish-European relations in historical perspective (Chapter 3), the Latin alphabet was introduced in 1928 replacing the Arabic script. One of the most famous photographs of Atatürk shows him standing in front of a blackboard teaching the Latin alphabet in Sivas 1928. See, e.g., Kreiser, *Atatürk*, 273.

³² PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Senghor (France), 756.

³³ Ibid.

Greco-Christian civilisation, but our cultures, which are the concrete expression of civilisation, are different.”³⁴ Concerning cultural differences, he specifically made a distinction between European “Northerners,” which he defined as empiricists and successors of the Germano-Celtic world, and “Southerners,” which he called the idealists.³⁵ Turkey was indirectly excluded since he described the Southerners as “successors of the Greco-Latin world.”³⁶ Cassimatis also added a Nordic element to the two pillars of ancient times and Christianity as having formed a common civilisation, similar to when his Dutch colleague emphasised the influence of the “strength of the Nordic peoples”³⁷ on the development of European civilisation.³⁸ However, the addition of a Nordic element as a pillar of Europe’s historical heritage was outlined more infrequently than the pillars of Christianity and antiquity.³⁹

Apparent in this context is that socially constructed divisions within Europe have forged Europe’s path ever since – whether it was the divide between the European South and North, the East and West, or whether these divisions have been economically or politically defined.⁴⁰ Therefore, the approach of underlining the diverse cultural nature of European regions and creating coherence by determining a common cultural heritage is as old as any discussions about what holds Europe together.

The question of how crucial Christianity was for Europe’s cultural development continued a few days later as Assembly members discussed a draft report – which touched on methods for fostering cultural cooperation – elaborated by the *Committee on Cultural and Scientific Questions*. The preamble especially sparked this discussion, drafted as follows:

“European Culture has its sources in the thought and work of free peoples based on centuries of tradition. It is one and varied. Its variety is derived from its origin. The differences in the structure and living conditions of nations are reflected in it, as are

³⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Cassimatis (Greece), 774.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 5th sitting, 16 August 1949, Serrarens (Netherlands), 190.

³⁸ Achim Trunk also gives some examples outside the COE’s Assembly when European political elites emphasized the challenge of bridging the differences between Germano-Celtic and Latin peoples. Obviously, this was a usual perspective within conceptualizing a cultural Europe. Turkey was overall ignored in these cultural concepts. Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 67.

³⁹ See also *ibid.*, 66f.

⁴⁰ On different perceptions of divisions among Europeans see, e.g., William Outhwaite, “Europe Beyond East and West,” in *The SAGE Handbook of European Studies*, ed. Chris Rumford (London et al.: SAGE Publ., 2009), 52-68.

the many forms of free collective effort from which it comes. Generations of men and women of all social classes have left their mark on it. It is one in its respect for the human person, for the supremacy of the spirit, for freedom of opinion and the unfettered expression of ideas; in its uncompromising opposition to every form of tyranny."⁴¹

Several deputies criticised the preamble's first sentence and regretted that Christianity was not mentioned as a source of European culture.⁴² Moyersoen – a Belgian representative and Christian Democrat – rhetorically questioned whether it was Christianity or the ideas of ancient humanism that were predominant in creating equality and freedom for men. Even though “lofty Greek and Roman culture” was a source of European civilization, he remarked that, because Athens and Rome recognised slavery as an institution “in the days of their splendour,”⁴³ people were not treated equally. Instead, he continued,

*“It was Christianity which taught men that they were equal and which tried to teach them to be brothers. It is therefore the Church which, if European civilisation means freedom, may claim to be the mother of European civilisation, because she was the mother of freedom.”*⁴⁴

In this way, he highlighted Christianity as the moral liberation of humankind. Larock, his Socialist colleague, immediately supported his valuation of Christianity as having been highly important for the development of European culture. Although he was the rapporteur of the Committee on Cultural and Scientific Questions, Larock made it clear that he also regretted that Christianity was not mentioned in the text. Especially since it represented an immense contribution to human emancipation since its beginnings. He further argued,

“It is true that Christianity itself was preceded in this solicitude for human freedom by Socrates, Plato and the Stoics, who thus established equality of origin and destiny among men, starting from the fact that they all have a part in the same Reason; but it

⁴¹ PACE, *Documents, Working Papers*, 1949, Doc. 59: Report proposed by M. Larock on behalf of the Committee on Cultural Questions, Preamble, 2 September 1949, 137.

⁴² For the whole discussion on the report's preamble see, PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 16th sitting, 6 September 1949, 1054-1068.

⁴³ PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 16th sitting, 6 September 1949, Moyersoen (Belgium), 1058.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1058f.

is, none the less, true that it was Christianity which caused the historic revolution in the conception of humanity.”⁴⁵

More than the Christian Democrat Moyersen, he praised the Greek philosophers for their ideas on the equality of men and the Greek logic and then confirmed that it was Christianity that anchored the conception of humanity.

As a response, the French deputy and Socialist Le Bail provided counterarguments. He started by criticizing them for addressing the old antagonism between ancient humanism and Christianity and for insisting that a superior kind of European culture emerged only at a certain point in time.⁴⁶ He agreed that the “absolute notion of spiritual freedom” came from Christianity but added that political liberty already existed in practice in Athens five centuries earlier. The idea of equality, he furthermore stressed, was “very clearly defined” within the framework of the ancient city – leaving aside the problem of slavery, which was, “in certain respects, much more an economic than a political or spiritual problem.”⁴⁷ He concluded with the rhetorical question: why should they try to pretend that European civilisation dated from the first century instead of simply trying to reveal all that united them?⁴⁸ For example, he eventually strengthened the commonality between ancient and Christian humanism, which was “the universal spirit” inherent to both.⁴⁹

Regardless of political-ideological attitudes, Assembly members agreed that antiquity and Christianity were the foundations of European civilization. Christian Democrats were by no means the only ones that formulated the meaning of Christianity. However, there were reservations among the Socialists about an excessive emphasis on the religious foundation.⁵⁰

The next speaker, French deputy Bardoux, then a member of the liberal-conservative party *National Centre of Independents and Peasants*, advocated for extending the first sentence by adding Christianity as an additional, not superior, source. He proposed summarising the three sources of European culture as follows: “European culture has its sources in Greco-Roman humanism, developed by Christianity, and enriched through many centuries by the working of free ideas.”⁵¹

⁴⁵ PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 16th sitting, 6 September 1949, Larock (Belgium), 1062.

⁴⁶ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 16th sitting, 6 September 1949, Le Bail (France), 1064.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ On the political-ideological backgrounds of Assembly members and their perspective on the meaning of Christianity and antiquity for Europe’s historical development, see also Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 64f.

⁵¹ PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 16th sitting, 6 September 1949, Bardoux (France), 1064.

Having been silent until now, Turkish representative and CHP member Düşünel, finally replied to Bardoux's speech. He argued against the inclusion of Christianity and requested the Cultural Committee,

*“to maintain its text and to reject any wording which would not be consistent with the aim of the Assembly. It is the duty of our Assembly to unite nations and civilisations and to advance with an unswerving purpose towards a unification of the whole of Europe.”*⁵²

The Turkish deputy Düşünel disagreed with the inclusion of any reference to Christianity and presumably, based on the Kemalist principle of laicism, to any reference of religion in general within official texts of international character.

Ultimately, the Assembly's majority decided to maintain the original text without explicitly mentioning Christianity.⁵³ However, it was not necessarily due to his influence, as in May 1949, representatives of the ten founding member states of the COE had already discussed whether or not to include devotion to religious – i.e. Christian – values as part of the common heritage in the preamble of the COE's Statute. As a result, they also agreed to omit religious or even Christian values but include the expression of “reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values” as common ground.⁵⁴

Debates concerning the definitions of the terminology – European civilization, European culture, and a common heritage – ended with the first session in 1949. Christianity, however, came into discussion again when Assembly members searched for an emblem as a common symbol for the Council of Europe. Among various proposals preselected by the Secretariat-General, the most favoured emblem was that of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and his Paneuropean Union,⁵⁵ which entailed a red cross in a yellow sun on a blue fundament, and which had been adopted by his Parliamentary Union as well. However, the French delegate Bichet reported that “our Turkish colleagues were definitely opposed to the appearance of a cross in the emblem of the Council, and several other colleagues raised the same objection.”⁵⁶ According to Bichet, due to the Turkish delegation's opposition to an emblem with a cross –

⁵² PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 16th sitting, 6 September 1949, Düşünel (Turkey), 1066.

⁵³ Cf. PACE, *Reports*, 1/4, 16th sitting, 6 September 1949, 1068.

⁵⁴ ACE, Box 26/19, Minutes of the Conference for the Establishment of a Council of Europe held in London, 3-5 May 1949, 5.

⁵⁵ On Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and his idea of Pan-Europe, see also Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework).

⁵⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 23rd sitting, 25 September 1953, Bichet (France), 664.

given its association with the Christian church – another design was chosen, showing a circle of twelve (traditionally symbolizing unity and perfection) five-pointed stars on a blue field.⁵⁷ However, to what degree the Turkish delegation influenced the decision-making process remains unclear. According to Göldner’s research, there was only one reasonable rejection from one Turkish and one British delegate.⁵⁸ Either way, the COE adopted the design as a symbol for the whole of Europe in 1955 and suggested its usage to other European organizations as well.⁵⁹ Finally, the European Communities (EC) adopted it as its official flag in 1985, and it is still used today by the European Union.

A brief look at the history of European integration depicts Christianity’s role in forming Europe’s cultural identity as having been repeatedly negotiated. In essence, Christianity has not been mentioned in any official text regarding Europe’s identity on part of European institutions until today. Incorporating Christianity as a part of the common heritage also influenced debates concerning the preamble of the treaty to establish a constitution for Europe, and the subsequent Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007. In this case, it was decided not to reference Christianity but rather to refer to religion as a part of the common heritage.⁶⁰

To summarize, in the Assembly debates the significance of Christianity and antiquity for the development of European civilization was addressed often. The delegates widely accepted to call these two developments the pillars of European civilization and, therefore, the main sources of a common heritage. However, including them in official documents, or even in symbols, was met with resistance from some delegates. Among those were Turkish delegates who rejected any official reference to Christianity. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that

⁵⁷ Initially, the Assembly voted in favour of a flag entailing fifteen stars, one for each member state of the COE; however, the West German delegation opposed it due to the Saar Protectorate representing one of the fifteen stars while being of undeclared status at this time. The Committee of Ministers finally favoured a fix number of twelve stars symbolizing unity, and the Assembly agreed to it on 25 October 1955. For these discussions and voting procedures in the Assembly, see PACE, *Reports*, 5/3, 23rd sitting, 25 September 1953, 663ff.; PACE, *Reports*, 7/2, 25 October 1955, 25th sitting, 774ff.

⁵⁸ According to Göldner, this was communicated by the Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe in a letter of 15 February 1952 to the Chairman of the Rules of Procedure Committee, Robert Bichet. Cf. Markus Göldner, *Politische Symbole der europäischen Integration. Fahne, Hymne, Hauptstadt, Pass, Briefmarke, Auszeichnungen* (Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Peter Lang, 1984), 54f.

⁵⁹ On the different proposals for a flag for Europe and the decision-making process in the 1950s, see also Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe*, 40.

⁶⁰ In the end, the EU member countries agreed in a reference to “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law” (Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon). Concerning the previous discussions on an explicit reference to Christianity in the preamble see, e.g., Vanessa Hellmann, *Der Vertrag von Lissabon. Vom Verfassungsvertrag bis zur Änderung der bestehenden Verträge – Einführung mit Synopse und Übersichten* (Berlin: Springer VS, 2009), 15.

the content of the definition of a European cultural heritage remained diffuse.⁶¹ Especially when it came to defining commonalities of an imagined ‘European culture’, it becomes clear that the maxim of being ‘united in diversity’, adopted as the official EU motto in 2000,⁶² traces back (at least) to the first session of the Council of Europe’s Assembly in 1949. Ultimately, the identification of Europe as a culturally diverse space was beneficial for Turkey.

8.2 A Look into the Future: Cultural and Educational Cooperation

Turkish delegates were more active when discussing how to improve cooperation among COE member states in culture, education, and science compared to debates on defining a common European heritage. The following will demonstrate how the Turkish delegation contributed to plans of cultural and educational cooperation projects and how they strategically used these thematic debates for cementing Turkey’s belonging to Europe.

Within the first Assembly session in 1949, in a general debate on “any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe to achieve a greater unity between the Members of the Council of Europe and to make an effective European co-operation in the various spheres”⁶³, Turkish deputy Yetkin, a CHP Member of Parliament from Urfa, emphasized the importance of a common European education for peace throughout Europe:

*“To lay the foundation of a common education, in order that the upbringing of the younger generations may be in line with fundamental human values, should be the first task of this Assembly, if we wish to enable the States of Europe to live in peace.”*⁶⁴

He thus emphasized the importance of establishing education projects to teach Europe’s youth about “fundamental human values” to achieve closer ties between the people of Europe and prevent conflicts in the long run.

⁶¹ This is also the conclusion of Achim Trunk within his analysis of how the Assembly members tried to define the common heritage of Europe in 1949. Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 71.

⁶² The official EU motto “United in diversity” (originally “Unity in diversity”) was the result of a competition involving students from all the 15 member states. This motto, however, is also used in other contexts as for example by nation-states such as Indonesia. Similar to the discussions in 1949, according to the EU’s website this motto shall signify “how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent’s many different cultures, traditions and languages.” http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index_en.htm (13 September 2014).

⁶³ PACE, *Reports*, 1/1, 6th sitting, 17 August 1949, 212. This was the continuation of the general debate, which had started the day before.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Yetkin (Turkey), 320.

Initial steps were already being taken to ensure educational cooperation. At the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948, delegates decided to create a *College of Europe* where students from all over democratic Europe could study together. The university started its first seminars in 1949 in the Belgian city of Bruges.⁶⁵ Some days later, in August 1949, in the general debate on cultural cooperation, Yetkin highlighted the importance of common educational projects. He stated that it would be necessary to reform the education system to achieve the ideal that “the human and universal values which we so particularly cherish will predominate in all the nations.”⁶⁶ Thereby, he presented a motion in which he, collectively with other representatives, proposed the establishment of a special committee composed of “men of letters” to “prepare a list of representative works reflecting the eternal values of civilization.”⁶⁷ He then proudly presented the efforts his own country had already made in this field:

*“A section of the Ministry of National Education in less than ten years carried out the translation of more than a thousand works, following a programme prepared in advance by competent scholars. Thus we made our children familiar with the spiritual values on which European culture is based and with the unity which is concealed under its diversity. These works reflect the soul of the peoples, and the States of Europe must endeavour to reach mutual understanding, by means of mutual translation of their most representative works.”*⁶⁸

The mutual understanding, he added, should be supported, for instance, through exchanges of lecturers, students, and art exhibitions.⁶⁹ He used this topic to demonstrate Turkish progress and advancement in spreading the common values by having translated European literature. Indeed, in this context, Yetkin was rather modest since Turkish intellectuals had already translated European, mainly French, literature during the period of the tanzimat.⁷⁰ However,

⁶⁵ The College of Europe is still an elite university with an thematic emphasis on European affairs. On the history and present status of the College see, e.g., Léonce Bekemans et al., eds., *The College of Europe. Fifty Years of Service to Europe* (Bruges: College of Europe, 1999).

⁶⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Yetkin (Turkey), 768.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 768/770. See also PACE, *Documents, Working Papers*, 1949, Doc. 25: Motion by Yetkin and other representatives on “Methods by which the Council of Europe can develop cultural co-operation between its members,” 26 August 1949, 50.

⁶⁸ PACE, *Reports*, 1/3, 12th sitting, 26 August 1949, Yetkin (Turkey), 770.

⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁷⁰ These translations have been crucial means of European, especially French influence, not only concerning the content but also regarding literary genres such as the drama and the novel. For more details on the European influences in Turkish literature by translations see, e.g., Saliha Paker, “Turkey,” in *Modern Literature in the Near and Middle East 1850-1970*, ed. Robin Ostle (London et al.: Routledge, 1991), 18ff.

by talking about “spiritual values” and the “soul of the peoples” reflected in literature, he mainly emphasized the intense meaning and power of literature in strengthening mutual understanding and emotional and social cohesion among Europeans. He thereby represented his idea of Europe as a transnational intellectual space and exposed Turkey as a pioneer in promoting transcultural understanding. By portraying Turkey’s history as a long ‘European cultural history’, he represented Turkey as exceptionally progressive and successful in this regard.

The Turkish deputy Ürgüplü, Member of Parliament for the DP representing the province of Kayseri, also emphasized the importance of strengthening cultural cooperation. In an open debate on the general situation of the Council of Europe, he brought up the current difficulties in finding common solutions to defence questions and argued that they should first seek unity in the cultural, social, and economic fields. So far, they had “clearly seen that religion, race and language do not constitute barriers to the accomplishment of a common task.”⁷¹ He then emphatically stressed the necessity to *act* rather than only discuss. It was “not enough to believe in European unity,” they had to be willing to devote themselves “unhesitatingly”⁷² to these vital problems. This was the only way to escape “danger” and to “ensure for this Europe of ours, long years of peace and happiness, and a better way of life.”⁷³

With the help of rhetorical means – such as the use of threatening scenarios concerning the ‘danger in the East’ – he focused on the present and future task of uniting, also in the cultural field. Turkey, of course, was part of this uniting process, communicated simply by calling Europe as the “Europe of ours.”⁷⁴ He also acted rhetorically by not leaving space for resistance. His arguments ultimately referred to the sense of community and the common aim of living together in peace. Thereby, he delegitimized any sceptical voices based on the community ethos.

The value of education in unifying Europe and in establishing a European consciousness became even more important in the following years. In Turkey, education, science, and technological progress were considered crucial driving forces for the country’s progress along European lines – referring to the tanzimat era and the radical transformation under the rule of

⁷¹ PACE, *Reports*, 3/1/I, 2nd sitting, 7 May 1951, Ürgüplü (Turkey), 31.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

Atatürk in the 1920s and 30s. Education and science were central cornerstones of the Kemalist reform process according to Western standards.⁷⁵

Focus on these fields of development was also inherent in the speeches of Turkish deputies in the Assembly. For instance, in 1958, in a debate about how to develop the field of scientific research in Europe – based on a report of the Assembly’s Cultural Committee – the Turkish deputy Karasan held a lengthy speech, in which he promoted the idea of establishing a European cultural organization to coordinate all cultural activities throughout Europe. Before he came to this crucial point in his speech, he explained what he found as specifically European in cultural terms: “The superiority of European culture, of the European spirit, will always lie in this capacity to doubt.”⁷⁶ He made this clear by offering an example of his experience at a UNESCO conference on state education in Geneva. In a talk about illiteracy rates, Karasan reported, a Soviet delegate and Under-Secretary for national education had claimed that there was not a single illiterate in Russia at all. Meanwhile, an American participant claimed that there were eight million illiterates in the US, which turned out to be the number of US citizens who did not complete elementary education. Both, Karasan explained, would have simply believed the statistics instead of doubting the sources and interpretations of these figures. In general, Soviets and Americans would focus more on degrees held and less on their professional skills. Thus, he claimed Europeans to be superior to the Soviets and US Americans since Europeans were inclined to doubt statistics and differentiate between interpretations. Based on this argument, he accentuated the importance of improving the conditions of scientific research in Europe and better cooperation in the field of culture and science among the Council of Europe member states. Since the globally working UNESCO already aimed to improve the intellectual standard of intellectually underdeveloped peoples the new organization’s aim would be to raise the level of intellectual standard, which European countries had already achieved.⁷⁷

Later that same day, in a debate about establishing the Cultural Fund of the COE, Karasan concretized his idea of setting up a European cultural community. He proposed that the COE should have a cultural and scientific body with various centres in every member state. These “Europe Houses” would promote the cultural activities of the COE.⁷⁸ Not least, culture was

⁷⁵ For details on the reforms in the sector of education and science see, e.g., Zürcher, *Turkey*, 186ff.; Kreiser and Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 416ff. The outcome is still visible today since the only chapter that is closed within the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU is that on science and research (as one of the 35 chapters of the *aquis communautaire*).

⁷⁶ PACE, *Reports*, 10/2, 19th sitting, 16 October 1958, Karasan (Turkey), 650.

⁷⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 650f.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 662.

appealing to all countries, which was why, in his mind, “Europe should be integrated through culture.”⁷⁹ Karasan’s support of building up a European organization for education, science, and culture served as an argument for closer unification of all member states of the Council of Europe, including Turkey. Since his country was neither part of the Six (EEC) nor the Seven (EFTA) and, thus, cast aside in regards to economic unification, the field of culture and education offered a convenient course for further integrating Turkey into Europe. His image of Europeans constructed in his speeches was that of being the educated elite of the world. This coincides with the fact that education was one of the main fields of Kemalist reforms along European lines.

In the beginning of the 1960s, after the Turkish delegation had returned to the Assembly following the military coup in Turkey in 1960, the field of education and science was still extraordinary suitable for proving Turkey’s active role in promoting European unification.⁸⁰ “We believe sincerely that the unification of Europe can only be built on the basis of science and a common culture and education,”⁸¹ Turkish representative Ertuğ stressed. Thereby, he cited the Turkish Republic’s founding father, Kemal Atatürk, by quoting his statement, “Science is a real guiding light.”⁸² To promote Turkey’s resources, deputy Ertuğ declared that,

*“Turkey has plenty of unexplored resources. We say that we live in a country of treasures. That applies not only to the monuments of age-old civilisations but to our underground resources and the tremendous human energy which we have among our people.”*⁸³

Thus, he promoted his country not only by referring to its historical treasures, but he focused on its present human enrichment – a young well-educated Turkish society full of energy and willing to learn and work. Such human energy was, of course, advantageous for the future development of Europe. To emphasize the human ties between Europeans, the Turkish deputy then added,

⁷⁹ PACE, *Reports*, 10/2, 19th sitting, 16 October 1958, Karasan (Turkey), 663.

⁸⁰ Part of the following results are also included in the article “Ein Europa ohne die Türkei?” published by the author.

⁸¹ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 6th sitting, 17 May 1962, Ertuğ (Turkey), 204.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

*“We are all different organs of the same body in this Assembly — just like the different fingers of one hand. Anatomically and physiologically the countries of Europe are inseparable.”*⁸⁴

The metaphorical language in this passage is remarkable. The deputy humanized and anthropomorphized Europe by illustrating the individual countries as inseparable - like a human body consisting of body parts that were anatomically inseparable. Though Europe is often represented as one landmass, his remark translated this oneness to the human level, connecting the people of Europe. In this way, the speaker also contributed to the formation of togetherness and cohesion at the collective level. Without explicitly mentioning Turkey as being physically connected to the landmass of Europe, the country was able to take a suitable position in this metaphor.

After a long, emotional, and self-confident speech, he addressed the issue of education and urged his colleagues to act rapidly. “We have to teach each other. We have to raise the level of culture and science in Europe,”⁸⁵ he postulated. By founding specific intergovernmental organizations for culture and science, they could achieve a higher standard of education.⁸⁶ His explanatory statement was the following:

*“I repeat that scientific and cultural co-operation is a very urgent and important problem. There is no time to lose. If we can raise the average level of brain energy, political and economic integration in Europe will come about earlier than we expect. If we waste time, there will be an increase in the number of underdeveloped countries in our midst.”*⁸⁷

His connection between an increased level of education and a fast-tracked political and economic integration attributed to his philosophy that education and science were the guiding lights for the development process.⁸⁸ He focused on education and science as the scaffolding for the development of European countries. This scaffolding was crucial to achieving the goal

⁸⁴ PACE, *Reports*, 14/1, 6th sitting, 17 May 1962, Ertuğ (Turkey), 204.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 205.

⁸⁸ Moreover, his country had also experienced what it meant to secure support in the field of science, remembering the assistance of German exile academics and scientists in the 1930s in building up Turkish universities. For details on German academics in Turkish exile following 1933 and their contribution in progressing the Turkish academic system see, e.g., Christopher Kubaseck and Günter Seufert, *Deutsche Wissenschaftler im türkischen Exil. Die Wissenschaftsmigration in die Türkei 1933-1945* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2008).

of a stable and prosperous Europe. He also made his point by communicating negative future scenarios if they did not concentrate on educational cooperation. Indirectly, the contested concept of Europe was here – in the setting of a small group of privileged, well-educated politicians – constructed as a ‘Europe of education and science’ with the higher aim to foster and speed up Europe’s political and economic integration.

8.3 Conclusions

In Assembly debates about cultural matters, Turkish representatives discursively constructed Turkey’s identity as European by portraying their country as prepared and willing to advance closer cooperation in the field of culture, education and science. To achieve this, Turkish speakers focused on the future instead of the past; thus, they defined European culture in the sense of European cultural cooperation instead of a common cultural heritage. In this way, they were able to present themselves as active Europeans and discourse participants in the formation of a cultural community.

The field of educational cooperation was of particular importance and suitability for Turkish delegates to stage their country as European. In this context, they identified Turkey as a pioneer in teaching and promoting ‘Western values’, furthermore in spreading knowledge about other European societies, for instance by translating literature from other European countries. Thereby, they indirectly portrayed Turkey as a cultural mediator for the European peoples. Debates about a common education policy also had the advantage of being future-orientated and were thus open to socially designable ideas, in which Turkish deputies were able to contribute to and stage themselves as pro-active Europeans. Moreover, by identifying Turkey’s society as young, dynamic and energetic, Turkish delegates staged their country as exceptionally enriching for Europe’s future brainpower.

In sum, Turkish delegates supported the idea of Europe as a ‘Europe of education and science’ and therefore promoted proposals that managed to raise the intellectual standard of Europeans through closer cooperation. The aim was to create a transnational cultural-educational space, which would eventually affect Europe’s economic and political integration. Europeans were thereby socially constructed as possessing a high intellectual standard with the capacity to doubt. In this way they were considered the intellectual elite of the world. The promotion of a transnational cultural space left no room for contradiction. It was in line with the COE’s efforts and resulted in the European Cultural Convention and the Cultural Identity Card, which fostered transnational exchange in education and science.

Within the search for defining commonalities among the peoples of Europe, the shared opinion that Europeans were first and foremost united in diversity was beneficial for Turkey since it was not an essentialist exclusive reading of Europe's cultural landscape. Instead it gave the country (like any other countries) the chance to be included. Overall, non-Turkish delegates did not directly exclude Turkey or observe it as the Other.

Nevertheless, as could be observed, Turkey's membership in the COE provoked special handling in certain Assembly debates on cultural matters. For instance, one French delegate called Islam Christianity's brother when it was about to define the sources of European civilization and a common heritage. Furthermore – without wanting to attribute the influence solely to Turkish membership – official documents did not explicitly include Christianity as a traditional commonality. Ultimately, the preferred flag design of Coudenhove-Kalergi was not chosen to become the flag of the Council of Europe (and later of the EC/EU) but rather an emblem with a circle of twelve stars, due partly to Turkish delegates' opposition to the symbol of the cross. In line with Schimmelfennig's approach of rhetorical action and the community trap, analysis has shown that any direct opposition to Turkey's belonging to Europe was not permitted. With Turkey being an equal member of the Council of Europe, it was no longer possible to exclude the country from an imagined European civilization with a common heritage.

Concerning the question of what was not said and why, the analysis has shown that Turkish Assembly members held back slightly in discussions about Europe's common cultural heritage. Instead, they were eager to focus on present and future projects. This, nevertheless, suggests that Turkish delegates feared sceptical opinions about Turkey's cultural-historical and especially religious belonging to Europe. Their interest, therefore, was to limit space for discussing the role of religion rather than to fuel it. Beyond that, it was undoubtedly more successful when a non-Turkish delegate, like the French politician, constructed a historical link between Christian and Muslim coined countries.

Concerning the definition of a European culture, this chapter has shown that the only consensus among the parliamentarians was that there was a European civilization and a common cultural, moral heritage rooted in the ancient world and Christianity. Otherwise, Europe was vaguely characterized as 'one and varied' culturally. As a result, the Turkish delegates' approach to focusing on the future unification process through cultural cooperation, instead of looking for a definition of European culture, was widely shared.

9 Conclusion

The main objective of this study was to identify how Turkey's identity was constructed as European in the discursive field of the Council of Europe's Assembly in the early years of its existence (1949-1963). The focus of the analysis was on Turkish delegates as social architects. A second aim was to identify the images of Europe constructed through these representations of Turkey as European. The key focus was on the *how*, which is why the arguments and rhetorical techniques used to enforce the representations of Turkey as European were the focal points of the analysis. This included an analysis of the historical context as this contributed to the rules of constructions of social reality. The aim was not to show what Turkish delegates thought about their own country's identity and if they actually perceived Turkey as belonging to Europe but to reconstruct the discursive practices that helped represent Turkey as a European country.

This study has shown that Turkish delegates used the first European assembly – the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe established in 1949 – as a stage to present Turkey as a part of Europe by using various social practices and rhetorical strategies. Thereby, they also constructed Europe in distinct ways and thus contributed to and affected the attempts of defining Europe's borders and ideals.

Presented first are the main results of the discourse-analysis and thus the prevailing practices of the Turkish delegates and the images of Turkey and Europe constructed by them. Subsequently, the focus is on the question of the extent to which these social practices were powerful and discourse-determining and how they influenced the Assembly's social reality and common knowledge. In particular, it shows the extent to which these practices were successful in terms of accepting Turkey as a part of Europe. Another section focuses on the question of what was *not* said and why. This is followed by identifying the relevance of this dissertation's results for various fields of research. Finally, further research questions for scientific follow-up work will be presented.

Main Results

Referring to the conclusions of the analysis of the four discourses of the Assembly on European integration (in the field of defence, political values, economy and culture), this study showed that: The prevailing practices were those presenting Turkey as European in

defence matters.¹ Even in debates focusing on other topics, Turkish delegates interlinked economic and political issues with defence arguments. In this way, in discussions on Europe as an economic and political value-based community, arguments surrounding Turkey's role in Europe's defence were popular among Turkish delegates and not least 'successful' in Cold War contexts, apparent also in non-Turkish reactions.²

The analysis also showed that Turkish delegates frequently justified Turkey's European affiliation in a political-institutional and future-based sense, drawing attention to Turkey's significant and consistent role in the European political project. In this way, they argued for their country's involvement in European projects and the process of European unification. While they regularly emphasized Turkey's benefits for Europe, they also used the rhetorical tool of predicting threatening scenarios should Turkey be excluded from any European organization. Thereby, Turkish delegates generally took for granted that Turkey fulfilled the criterion of being European and was thus entitled to participate in shaping the European project. In the end, this also corresponded to the goal of being perceived as a self-evident part of Europe. This study also demonstrated that the historical context of the Cold War established the rules regarding the power of language – of what could and could not be said.

Turkey's entitlement to participate in European projects was not rejected by denying their 'Europeanness', as revealed in various non-Turkish statements. This is attributable to the historical and organizational context: Turkey had been an equal member of the COE since 1949 and therefore officially accepted as a European state. Since Turkish delegates already participated in the Assembly sessions as equal members, it was not permitted to exclude them officially from Europe. This alone 'rhetorically entrapped' potential sceptics if they wanted to remain credible members of the community. Turkish representations further reinforced this rhetorical entrapment, including the strategy of rhetorical action in relation to the community ethos based on values.

This study also found hardly any discernible difference in the political-ideological attitudes of the Turkish delegates. Presumably, this was because the DP and CHP pursued very similar foreign policy goals and representatives of both parties had a vested interest in Turkey's close integration with Europe and the West. On the part of non-Turkish delegates, it is noticeable that only isolated voices expressed cautious scepticism about Turkey's further integration into European projects (such as the planning of a European Army before Turkey's accession to NATO). Objections of a cultural nature that excluded Turkey from the construct of the

¹ What is also visible in the sheer size of the individual chapters.

² To what extent these practices were successful, will be detailed below.

European collective were not apparent. Hence, no distinction based on nationality could be established regarding the reactions to Turkish arguments. Instead, Assembly members broadly supported any further steps of including Turkey in European projects. Greek delegates in particular made an effort to support Turkish concerns (with the exception of Cyprus from 1954 onwards). Presumably, this was because European and Western institutions – such as NATO and the COE founding members – often dealt with Greece and Turkey together and both countries pursued similar interests in their European policies. Additionally, Greece certainly had no interest in having another supporter of the Eastern Bloc as a direct neighbour should Turkey be rejected by Europe and the West and turn back to the East.

This study concludes that the following representative practices used by Turkish delegates were most dominant:

- 1.) Representing Turkey as part of Europe's Self in demarcation to the common enemy;
- 2.) Basing an argument on the community ethos;
- 3.) Constructing Turkey's 'exceptionalism' through liminal representations of its geography;
- 4.) Imagining Europe as a future project.

1.) *Representing Turkey as part of Europe's Self in demarcation to the common enemy:*

One important finding of this research is that discursive practices of Turkish deputies in Strasbourg constructed Turkey's identity as European/Western as opposed to Eastern. The leading Western narrative of the Cold War – which represented the Soviet Union as the Other as opposed to the West – thereby helped to (re-)produce Turkey's Western and European identity in times of the Cold War. Without this narrative, positioning Turkey in the West and Europe would have been much more difficult.³ Another finding of this study is that Turkish delegates favoured the rhetorical means of threatening scenarios to emphasize the imminent danger, above all, for forecasting the consequences of the exclusion of Turkey from European affairs (in the sense of 'what if not' scenarios). The enslavement of Europe by the common enemy was a frequently predicted scenario. Since the narrative of the common enemy played a crucial role in the self-definition of European assembly members as Europeans at the time,⁴ this study contends the effectiveness of Turkish arguments based on constructions of the common enemy.

³ As also Yilmaz and Bilgin argue in their paper on Turkish constructions of Turkey's identity as Western in late Cold War times. Cf. Yilmaz and Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "western" identity," 51.

⁴ As Trunk shows, the demarcation from the Soviet Union was the dominant basis of self-definition as a European in the European assemblies of the 1950s. Cf. Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*, 171ff.

2.) *Basing an argument on the community ethos:*

Constructions of a value-based community ethos often formed the foundation of the Turkish delegates' arguments. In this way, they delegitimized the voices of potential sceptics who wanted to remain credible members of the community – which Schimmelfennig describes as 'rhetorical action' and 'community trap'. For instance, the delegates frequently used social constructions of the commitment to the European idea of uniting the whole of Europe. On this foundation, Turkish delegates argued for their integration into European projects, whether in relation to cultural or defence policy. Turkey's self-classification as part of Europe was thereby not in question. In addition, Turkish Assembly members argued for increased economic support for Turkey based on their commitment to the aim of (re)creating a prosperous Europe with a high standard of living throughout Europe. Furthermore, the commitment to common political principles and values was frequently used as a foundation, especially to portray Turkey as a credential member of the European or Western community. These goals and principles included, above all, the respect for human rights – including fundamental freedoms of the individual and political rights such as the right to freedom of speech and assembly – the pursuit of prosperity, social security of the people, the principle of parliamentary democracy, and the rule of law. Even though it was the nation-states' obligation to implement these principles, they were noted as commonalities and were, therefore, suitable as an argument for belonging to the community.

Turkish representatives discursively produced a collective identity level and attributed it to political events and institutions. For instance, they defined the Korean War as a war, in which *Western* soldiers defended *Western* values and principles. They ultimately portrayed Turkey's engagement in the War as evidence of their credibility as a Western (European) actor. They also portrayed NATO and the planned EDC as organizations that safeguarded *Western* and *European* security. Thus, they presented the institutions not only as defence alliances but specifically as *Western* or *European* alliances.

From all these commitments, Turkish delegates often inferred the principle of mutual solidarity among Europeans, which they used primarily as an argument for expanding economic support for Turkey. Turkish speakers frequently used 'imagined community commitments'⁵ as rhetorical strategies and did not reflect how deeply these commitments were anchored into Europeans' minds at the time.

⁵ Based on Benedict Anderson's concept of 'imagined communities'; see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

3.) *Constructing Turkey's 'exceptionalism' through liminal representations of its geography:*

Based on the generally accepted cartographic distinction between the European and Asian continent – with the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles as borderlines – this study revealed that Turkish delegates used liminal representations of Turkey grounded in hybrid constructions of its geography to construct Turkey's 'exceptionalism' and significance for Europe.⁶ These practices served different interests: on the one hand, they represented Turkey as a stable partner – ready to be the guardian, the bastion, and the bulwark for Europe, primarily to promote the country as a beneficial member to European/Western defence organizations. On the other hand, these liminal representations served to represent Turkey as a vulnerable member of the European family due to its direct proximity to the Soviet Union. With the help of representations of the latter kind, they encouraged the European community to support Turkey economically and to include it in common defence alliances to safeguard the security of the country – and the whole of Europe. Paradoxically, while Turkish delegates generally made all efforts to represent their country as Western, as opposed to Eastern, when they promoted Turkey's mediator role in the Middle East, they also presented Turkey as belonging to the Middle East. Hybrid constructions of Turkey's geography were thus used variably according to the speaker's interests.

4.) *Imagining Europe as a future project:*

Moreover, Turkish delegates used practices that imagined Europe as a future political project. Accordingly, in Assembly discussions on cultural matters, Turkish delegates focused on European cultural cooperation projects, more so than on defining a cultural heritage. Additionally, given the future character of economic unification, the discourse on economic affairs was particularly suitable for the constructions of Europe as a future mouldable project. Turkish delegates, in this regard, recalled the aim of raising the standard of living and creating an equal level throughout Europe. Based on this goal, they also argued for developmental aid to Turkey. In essence, by constructing future images of Europe, Turkish delegates could easily include Turkey in Europe by presenting it as a project participant motivated and ready to promote the collective European project. Turkish delegates claimed that the fate of Europe intertwined with that of Turkey's – presented as being in the hands of Europeans and their policy of in- or excluding Turkey from European projects. Such assertions thus attached great importance to Turkey for the future of Europe.

⁶ Based on Yanık's concept of Turkish 'exceptionalism'; see Yanık, "Constructing Turkish 'exceptionalism'."

Dominant images of Europe that Turkish delegates (re-)produced by these practices were the following: Europe as a community of solidarity, as a community of values, as a highly educated community, Europe as a fortress against the enemy, as a prosperous economic power, and as a community of cultural exchange. These ideas of Europe met the criterion for being able to represent Turkey as compatible with them at all times. For non-Turkish delegates, Turkey provided an opportunity to reinforce the image of Europe as a fortress against the enemy – in the security policy discourse – and a Europe of ‘solidarity’ – in the economic discourse. However, given the context of the Cold War, the latter refers to the intention to assist less-developed COE countries in order to stabilize them and safeguard peace. They also expected to gain economic advantages from an economically strong Europe as a whole. Non-Turkish delegates also recognised other constructed images of Europe, however, not specifically in connection with questions of Turkey’s integration – such as the image of the decline of Europe on a global scale.⁷

Concerning **rhetorical devices**, this study revealed that, primarily, Turkish delegates used emotional and metaphorical language to underline their argument. They, for instance, produced a collective feeling of cohesion by comparing the map of Europe with a body consisting of inseparable body parts. In another context, they argued for Turkey’s aspired international role in world politics by representing Turkey as a guardian against the ‘threatening danger in the East’ or as a bridging mediator to the Middle East to prevent the region of communist expansionism.

What Effects did these Practices Have?

These practices were quite convincing in the discursive field of the Assembly and thus helped to shape its social reality – which was apparent from the analysis of the Assembly protocols. The majority of non-Turkish delegates supported Turkish representatives in their European policy goals, such as their involvement in the planning of the EDC or association with the EEC. This support and thus the success of the social practices of the Turkish delegates are also evident in adopted texts, such as resolutions and recommendations to the Committee of Ministers. This implies that Turkey was accepted as European in the political sense. In contrast, the question of Turkey’s cultural affiliation was hardly relevant in the analysed debates.

⁷ For constructions of different images of Europe, without reference to Turkey, see overall, Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg*; for the image of the decline of Europe after the perceived ‘golden years’ of Europe at the turn of the century, see especially 317f.

It is more challenging to verify Turkey's success in the construction of Europe and its common ground. Turkey's membership in the COE allowed the Turkish delegation to participate in Assembly debates on key European issues and to help shape the definition of what their Europe, which they were currently building institutionally, should stand for. As a result, the significance of Turkish membership in the COE immediately after its founding is substantial, especially given the importance of the COE at the time. Notably, in the first sessions, during the first two to three years,⁸ the debates were fundamental for the unification of Europe. They discussed how to implement the European idea of uniting, how to make binding decisions in the future, which values and fundamental freedoms should be defined as commonalities, and how these can be protected by the COE and, in particular, the Convention on Human Rights. Turkey's membership in the COE enabled Turkish delegates to participate in these fundamental debates and, thus, to help shape the discourse on the unification of Europe. But also in the later years, the possibilities of using the Assembly as a stage to articulate their interests and present themselves as active Europeans became apparent.

Beyond the discursive field of the Assembly, Turkey has also participated in other European and Western projects. It joined NATO in 1952 and signed the association agreement with the EEC in 1963. Even though the contributions to discourse made by Turkish deputies in the Assembly of the COE alone did not lead to membership in NATO and association in the EEC association, they likely influenced the decision-making process. After all, national parliamentarians and, partly, high-ranking politicians contributed to discussions in the Assembly. By bringing their experiences from Europe home to their respective parliaments they helped shape the national public discourse. In addition, quite a few of them moved into higher government offices and were thus involved in decisions at the intergovernmental level.

What was not Said

The Turkish delegates hardly addressed the relations between Turkey and the United States, which were very close, especially in the late 1940s and 1950s. This is explainable given the context that, after Europe had become dependent on American reconstruction aid after World War Two, the remaining states of the Council of Europe pursued the goal of strengthening Europe politically and economically to become as independent as possible from the United States.

⁸ Most of the quotations within this study come from this period.

Additionally, Turkish delegates kept quiet about their Ottoman-imperial past and possible scepticism about Turkey as a mediator for the Middle Eastern states. On the contrary, they addressed imperialism by explicitly emphasizing that Turkey had no territorial aspirations whatsoever. Given the context, the goal was to present Turkey as a reliable and loyal family member and promote their country as a mediator in the Middle East.

Good relations with Israel were also not discussed. One explanation is that Turkey could have been presented less convincingly as a mediator in the entire Middle East since it was by no means acceptable for most of the states in the Middle Eastern region to recognise Israel as a state and to maintain good relations.

This research also found that Turkish delegates did not address that the Turkish people belonged to the Islamic religion by a large majority. There was presumably no added value in this – not even in the discourse about cultural commonalities of Europeans. Any emphasis would only have created a disparity from the other COE states of the time, which they wanted to avoid.

Turkish delegates also preferred to avoid the topic of Turkish neutrality during World War Two. Instead, they tried to present their country as a loyal European player and underline their commitment to European and Western security. This was particularly evident in the rhetoric of Turkish delegates regarding Turkish deployment in the Korean War.

Moreover, the ‘German question’ – the questions of how to contain Germany – as a motivating factor for European integration hardly played a role in Turkish speeches on uniting Europe.⁹ They preferred other political aspirations, such as the pan-European idea, as driving forces for European unification – which were more suitable for the argument of Turkish integration.

Contributions to Research Fields

The present study makes a noteworthy contribution to various fields of research. To the field of European integration history, it contributes its findings on the significance of the Council of Europe, especially its Consultative Assembly, in the period under study. It demonstrates that the Assembly served as a productive motor for further European integration. And also as a forum for non-governmental politicians from countries that did not – during this time – become members of the first supranational organizations, such as Turkey. Representatives of these countries still had an opportunity to discuss European concerns and promote their own

⁹ On the question of the ‘German problem’ as a driving force in the process of European integration, see Schütz, *Mit und gegen Deutschland*.

country for further European projects. This becomes relevant when considering the driving forces and contributors of European integration apart from the ‘little Europe of the Six’. In addition, this dissertation illuminates the importance of the search for the European Self in the early days of European integration history. It became clear that the Council of Europe’s Assembly also considered the question of European integration in connection with creating a sense of community, with the awareness that this was the only way to legitimize further political steps towards unification in the eyes of its national population.¹⁰ The search for a common flag, for example, must be seen against the background of collective identity-formation.¹¹

Specifically, this study complements Trunk’s research on constructions of European identities, in the European Assemblies of the 1950s, by extending the collective search for commonalities by one member state’s specific perspective. This study, thus, serves as an empirical example showing the effects of the European self-definitions, explored by Trunk, on the social practices of representatives of a specific member state. It also reveals how these, in turn, helped shape the construct of Europe and the definition of commonalities at the collective level.

This study also contributes to research on European-Turkish relations, particularly by focusing on a period that has, to date, been hardly empirically investigated. As initially outlined, there is little research regarding Turkish-European relations in the 1950s prior to the application for EEC association in July 1959. Kaya’s research focuses on this period, but she concentrates on the inner-Turkish intellectual search for Turkish identity and the various perspectives on Europe as an object of identification. In contrast, this study, whose approach for the 1950s is more relevant for the European discourse (compared to Turkey), is informed by European public space.

It is often argued that Turkey was accepted and perceived as naturally European before the EEC association in 1963. However, findings from the Brussels Treaty Organization and the founding conferences of the Council of Europe show (Chapter 4) that, at this time, the accession was controversial and, in the end, political reasons relevant to the ascending Cold War favoured the decision to include Turkey.

This dissertation not only contributes to research on European identity constructions by passively investigating the role of Turkey – i.e., to what extent it was perceived as part of the

¹⁰ This is demonstrated by speeches made directly in August 1949, which emphasize the importance of spreading a European consciousness before legal structures for binding collective decisions should be created; see Chapter 6 (Political Values) and 8 (Culture).

¹¹ The success of the European flag as an identity-building instrument cannot be denied.

European Self or as the Other – but also by showing Turkish representatives as active participants in the discursive field of the Assembly. Accordingly, this study portrays Turkish delegates as active co-constructors and architects of images of Turkey and Europe.

The dissertation also contributes to research on the concept of collective identity: the work offers an empirical example from a social constructivist perspective, in which processes of the formation of European collective identities are revealed at the collective, and even more so at the individual level. The individual and collective levels intertwine closely, as apparent from Turkish individuals identifying with Europe as a collective. Ultimately, Turkish delegates identified or represented themselves as Europeans – and their country as European. Meanwhile, they participated in the search for common ground on the collective level – without always ensuring Turkey’s acceptance as European in all contexts. This study has thus shown the influence of an aspirant trying to be accepted by the collective by contributing to the formation of a collective identity, for instance, by determining commonalities or manifesting common goals. Here it becomes clear that European constructions of identity, emanating from political institutions, must always be regarded as political identities. Participation in these construction processes is made possible simply by the right to political participation. Therefore, Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe is, as such, of outstanding importance in questions of belonging to the group of Europeans.

On the whole, a strong sense of belonging was not necessarily widespread in Europe in the 1950s. Instead, attempts to define collective commonalities occurred at the political-institutional level and individual identification with Europe by individuals in the European area (initially covering all citizens of the member states of the COE) was the goal. It was, therefore, crucial to define what constituted the European Self internally and to whom or what one was externally differentiating oneself. In the discursive field of the Assembly, the processes of socially constructing a collective Self and Other is thus inextricably linked to the search for commonalities. European identity, in the sense of an emotional identification to a group – or an individual to a group – must still be seen here as a common goal rather than existing.

Outlook

Worthwhile research questions raised by the present analysis are as follows: What role did Turkish discursive practices play in the Turkish parliament? How was Turkish Europeanism discussed in these contexts? Or, in even broader terms: How did the parliamentarians discuss

Turkey's foreign policy towards Europe? And, did the question of identifying Turkey as a European state play a role at all? An analysis of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) minutes for the entire period of investigation would also shed light on inter-discursive exchanges. In addition, this analysis could clarify the following questions: How did COE Assembly delegates influence the TBMM debates with their experiences in a European environment? And, in turn, how did debates in the National Assembly affect the behaviour of Turkish delegates in Strasbourg?

Moreover, for a stronger emphasis on the changes of discourses – part of Landwehr's methodological concept of historical discourse-analysis – one could analyse the Turkish and non-Turkish speeches of the COE's Assembly over a longer period of time. This, for instance, could provide compelling insights into the rules of language and discourse based on changes of the contextual conditions. In particular, a study of this kind could demonstrate how Turkish delegates changed their social practices of representing Turkey as European in times of domestic turmoil and foreign policy changes, in times of progressive European integration and, not least, in times of essential political global changes such as the end of the Cold War. What role did the commitment to the European idea of pan-European unification play in the Turkish argument after 1963? And what kind of self-definition as a European community was dominant after the common enemy had disappeared? Concerning the period after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, it would also be of particular interest to examine how non-Turkish representatives observed Turkey's changing role in Europe since it had previously been ascribed an important role for Europe especially in terms of security policy.

Looking at the present, and especially at the last decade of the 2010s, it is clear that Europe remains an essentially contested concept. The partial surrender of national sovereignty and the transfer of decisions to the supranational level – realized in the form of the EU for decades – has neither led to the fact that the same images of Europe prevail in the individual countries, nor that identification with Europe remains strongly pronounced in all EU states. The very definition of Europe as a community of values and a community of solidarity has been strongly disputed and even openly rejected by some national governments; for example, when considering how to deal with refugees from outside the EU. Regarding Turkey's EU bid, it is clear that the Turkish government has turned away from Europe politically after many years of 'negotiations' with the EU and little chance of success for a membership.

It would be interesting to examine how this strongly changed context has affected the discourse in the COE Assembly today, and in the recent past, and which practices were used

by Turkish representatives before the changed historical-social context to, nonetheless, present Turkey as a European country. Ultimately, this study hopes to have inspired further research in the field of Turkish and European identity constructions.

Appendix

List of Abbreviations

ACE	Archives of the Council of Europe
ANLux	National Archives of Luxembourg
Benelux	Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
BTO	Brussels Treaty Organization
CA	Consultative Assembly (of the COE)
CHP	<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> (Republican People's Party)
CM	Committee of Ministers (of the COE)
COE	Council of Europe
DP	<i>Demokrat Parti</i> (Democrat Party)
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPA	European Political Authority
EPC	European Political Community
ETS	European Treaty Series
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
GB	Great Britain
INGO	International non-governmental organization
MHP	<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> (Nationalist Movement Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
PACE	Parliamentary/Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe
TBMM	<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i> (Turkish Grand National Assembly)
UEF	Union of European Federalists
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US/USA	United States/United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

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Summary

This dissertation examines how Turkey's identity was constructed as European in debates in the Council of Europe's (COE) Assembly in the early years of its existence (1949-1963). In 1949, the year of its foundation, Turkey was admitted to the Council of Europe, ensuring that a Turkish delegation took part in the first meeting of the Consultative Assembly. Also examined in this study is the accession process, which was not without conflict as not all representatives of the founding states were convinced of Turkey's European affiliation. In the period prior to the so-called Ankara Agreement of 1963, which made Turkey an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC), the governments of the EEC states also discussed whether Turkey fulfilled the prerequisite of being a European state. But even here – decisively against the background of the East-West conflict – Turkey was officially accepted into a further European circle. Decades later, having been granted EU candidate status in 1999, Turkey was increasingly referred to publicly as non-European and even served in attempts to define a European identity as 'the Other' in distinction to 'the European self'. Today, in turn, partly consequently, the Turkish government continues to distance itself from Europe, politically and culturally.

The interest of this study's research arises from these different perceptions and representations of Turkey as European or not. With Turkey as a member of the Council of Europe since 1949, this study takes the opportunity to examine a discursive field in the midst of which Turkish delegates participated in debates about the future of Europe, about common values and common tasks. How they used these debates to argue for Turkey's Europeanness is of central interest here. The analysis, therefore, focuses on Turkish delegates as social architects and includes speeches concerning Turkey by non-Turkish speakers as well. The dissertation also aims to identify the images of Europe constructed through these representations of Turkey as European. The key focus is on the *how*, which is why the arguments and rhetorical techniques used to enforce the representations of Turkey as belonging to Europe are the focal points of the investigation. This includes an analysis of the historical context, as this contributes to the rules of constructions of social reality. The aim is to reconstruct the discursive practices that helped represent Turkey as a European country.

European identity is considered to be socially constructed, produced through discourse. Grounded in discourse-theoretical considerations by Foucault, this study is based on methodological concepts of discourse-analysis by Keller and Landwehr. The main sources of analysis are the verbatim records of the COE's Assembly debates. The discourse-analysis first revealed that representations of Turkish Europeanness took place in four thematic sub-

discourses: in debates on Europe as a defence community, a political community of values, an economic community and a cultural community.

Across sub-discourses, the study's findings show that Turkish delegates used the COE's Assembly as a stage to present Turkey as a part of Europe by using various social practices and rhetorical strategies. The dominant practices used by Turkish delegates were (1) representing Turkey as part of Europe's Self in demarcation to the common enemy, (2) basing an argument on the community ethos, (3) constructing Turkey's 'exceptionalism' through liminal representations of its geography, and (4) imagining Europe as a future project.

Concerning the first point, it was the portrayal of the Soviet Union as the Other – as opposed to the West – that helped (re-)produce Turkey's Western and European identity in times of the Cold War. Turkish delegates favoured the rhetorical method of threatening scenarios to emphasize the imminent danger, above all, to forecast the consequences of excluding Turkey from European affairs. The enslavement of Europe by the common enemy was a frequently predicted scenario. Overall, the analysis reveals that the historical context of the Cold War determined the rules of the power of language – of what could and could not be said.

Secondly, constructions of a community ethos often formed the basis of the arguments of Turkish delegates. In this way, they delegitimized the voices of potential sceptics who wanted to remain credible members of the community – which Schimmelfennig describes as 'rhetorical action' and 'rhetorical entrapment'. For instance, the delegates frequently emphasized their commitment to the European idea of uniting all of Europe. On this foundation, Turkish delegates argued particularly for Turkey's integration into European projects, whether in terms of cultural or defence policy. Turkey's self-classification as part of Europe was thereby not in question, especially given the background that Turkey was an equal member of the COE since 1949 and already officially accepted as a European state. This alone 'rhetorically entrapped' potential sceptics if they wanted to remain credible members of the community.

Turkish representatives also discursively produced a collective identity level and attributed it to political events and institutions. For instance, they defined the Korean War as a war in which *Western* soldiers defended *Western* values and principles. They ultimately portrayed Turkey's engagement in the war as evidence of their credibility as a Western (European) actor.

Regarding the third dominant argument, this study shows that Turkish delegates used liminal representations of Turkey, grounded in hybrid constructions of its geography, to construct Turkey's 'exceptionalism' and significance for Europe. These practices served different

interests: on the one hand, they represented Turkey as a stable partner – ready to be the guardian, the bastion, and the bulwark for Europe. On the other hand, these representations served to represent Turkey as a vulnerable member of the European family given its direct proximity to the Soviet Union. Turkish delegates encouraged Europeans in this way to support Turkey economically and involve them in defence alliances to protect the country and the whole of Europe. Paradoxically, while Turkish delegates generally made all efforts to represent their country as Western, as opposed to Eastern, when promoting Turkey’s mediator role in the Middle East, they also presented Turkey as belonging to the Middle East. Hybrid constructions of Turkey’s geography were, thus, used variably according to the speaker’s interests.

Lastly, Turkish delegates used practices that imagined Europe as a future political project. In this way, they could easily include Turkey in Europe by presenting it as an active participant, motivated and ready to promote the collective European project.

These practices were quite convincing and helped to shape social reality. Turkey’s entitlement to participate in European projects was not rejected by denying their ‘Europeanness’, as revealed in various Non-Turkish statements. The majority of non-Turkish delegates supported Turkish representatives in their European policy goals, which becomes evident in adopted texts, such as resolutions and recommendations to the Committee of Ministers.

Dominant images of Europe that Turkish delegates (re-)produced by these practices were the following: Europe as a community of solidarity, as a community of values, as a highly educated community, Europe as a fortress against the enemy, as a prosperous economic power, and as a community of cultural exchange. These ideas of Europe met the criterion for being able to represent Turkey as compatible with them at all times.

The research also reveals what was not said in the context of the Assembly. For instance, Turkish delegates did not address that the Turkish people belonged to the Islamic religion by a large majority. There was presumably no added value in this – not even in the discourse about cultural commonalities of Europeans. Any emphasis would only have created a disparity from the other COE states of the time, which they wanted to avoid.

Results from this study contribute to the research field of Turkish-European relations, the history of European integration, and to theoretical considerations of collective identity constructions.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Dissertation untersucht, wie die Identität der Türkei in den Debatten der Europaratsversammlung in den ersten Jahren ihrer Existenz (1949-1963) als europäisch konstruiert wurde. Noch im Gründungsjahr 1949 wurde die Türkei in den Europarat aufgenommen, sodass eine türkische Delegation bereits an der ersten Sitzung der Beratenden Versammlung teilnahm. Der Beitrittsprozess, der in dieser Studie ebenfalls untersucht wird, verlief jedoch nicht ohne Konflikte, da nicht alle Vertreter der Gründungsstaaten von der europäischen Zugehörigkeit der Türkei überzeugt waren. Auch im Vorlauf zum sogenannten Ankara-Abkommen aus dem Jahr 1963, durch das die Türkei zum Assoziierungsmitglied der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) wurde, diskutierten die Regierungen der EWG-Staaten, ob die Türkei die Voraussetzung erfülle ein europäischer Staat zu sein. Doch auch hier – maßgeblich vor dem Hintergrund des Ost-West-Konflikts – wurde die Türkei offiziell in einen weiteren europäischen Kreis aufgenommen. Jahrzehnte später, vor allem mit der Verleihung des EU-Kandidatenstatus im Jahr 1999, wurde die Türkei schließlich auch öffentlich vermehrt als nicht europäisch betitelt und diente sogar in Definitionsversuchen einer europäischen Identität als ‚das Andere‘ in Abgrenzung zum ‚europäischen Selbst‘. Heute wiederum, teilweise daraus resultierend, grenzt sich die türkische Regierung selbst immer stärker von Europa ab, sowohl politisch als auch kulturell.

Das Forschungsinteresse dieser Studie ergibt sich aus diesen unterschiedlichen Wahrnehmungen und Darstellungen der Türkei als europäisch oder eben nicht. Mit der Türkei als Mitglied im Europarat seit 1949 nutzt diese Studie die Möglichkeit, ein diskursives Feld zu untersuchen, in dessen Mitte türkische Delegierte über die Zukunft Europas, über gemeinsame Werte und gemeinsame Aufgaben mitdiskutierten. Wie sie diese Debatten nutzten, um für das Europäischsein der Türkei zu argumentieren, ist hier von zentralem Interesse. Im Fokus der Analyse stehen daher türkische Delegierte als soziale Konstrukteure einer türkischen Europazugehörigkeit, jedoch werden auch nicht-türkische Reden mit Türkei-Bezug einbezogen. Ein weiteres Ziel ist es, Bilder von Europa zu identifizieren, die durch diese Darstellungen der Türkei als europäisch konstruiert wurden. Das Hauptaugenmerk liegt auf dem *Wie*, weshalb die Argumente und rhetorischen Techniken, die zur Durchsetzung der Repräsentationen der Türkei als europäisch verwendet wurden, im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung stehen. Dies schließt eine Analyse des historischen Kontextes ein, der hier als mitbestimmend in der Konstruktion von sozialer Wirklichkeit betrachtet wird. Ziel ist es, die diskursiven Praktiken zu rekonstruieren, die dazu beitrugen, die Türkei als europäisches Land zu repräsentieren.

Europäische Identität wird als sozial konstruiert betrachtet, produziert durch Diskurse. Basierend auf diskurstheoretischen Ansätzen und Begrifflichkeiten Foucaults orientiert sich diese Studie an den methodischen Konzepten einer Diskursanalyse von Keller und Landwehr. Die Hauptquellen der Analyse sind die wörtlich aufgezeichneten Sitzungsprotokolle der Europaratsversammlung. Die Diskursanalyse ergab zunächst, dass Repräsentationen des türkischen Europäischseins in vier thematischen Teildiskursen stattfanden: in Debatten zu Europa als Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, als politische Wertegemeinschaft, als Wirtschafts- sowie als Kulturgemeinschaft.

Diskursübergreifend zeigt die Studie im Ergebnis, dass türkische Delegierte die Europaratsversammlung als Bühne nutzten, um die Türkei als Teil Europas zu präsentieren, indem sie verschiedene soziale Praktiken und rhetorische Strategien einsetzten. Die dominanten Praktiken waren: (1) die Darstellung der Türkei als Teil des europäischen Selbst in Abgrenzung zum gemeinsamen Feind, (2) Argumentationen auf der Grundlage eines wertebasierten Gemeinschaftsethos, (3) die Konstruktion des türkischen „Exzeptionalismus“ durch Darstellungen ihrer Geographie als schwellenartig und hybrid; und (4) die Vorstellung von Europa als Zukunftsprojekt.

Was den ersten Punkt betrifft, so war es die Darstellung der Sowjetunion als das Andere – im Gegensatz zum Westen – , die dazu beitrug, die westliche und europäische Identität der Türkei in Zeiten des Kalten Krieges herzustellen. Türkische Delegierte bevorzugten die rhetorische Methode der Drohszenarien, um die drohende Gefahr zu betonen, vor allem aber, um die Folgen eines Ausschlusses der Türkei aus den europäischen Angelegenheiten zu prognostizieren. Die Versklavung Europas durch den gemeinsamen Feind war ein häufig vorhergesagtes Szenario. Insgesamt zeigt die Analyse, dass der historische Kontext des Kalten Krieges die Regeln des Diskurses stark mitbestimmte – was gesagt werden konnte und was nicht.

Zweitens bildeten Konstruktionen eines wertebasierten Gemeinschaftsethos häufig die Argumentationsgrundlage der türkischen Delegierten. Auf diese Weise delegitimierten sie die Stimmen potenzieller Skeptiker, wollten sie glaubwürdige Mitglieder der Gemeinschaft bleiben – was Schimmelfennig als „rhetorisches Handeln“ und „Gemeinschaftsfalle“ beschreibt. So betonten die Delegierten immer wieder das gemeinsame Bekenntnis zur europäischen Idee der Einigung ganz Europas. Die Definition von Europa basierte dabei auf kollektiv geteilten gemeinsamen Werten wie der parlamentarischen Demokratie, der Achtung der Menschenrechte und der Rechtstaatlichkeit. Die Selbsteinstufung der Türkei als Teil des wertebasierten Europas stand dabei nicht in Frage, insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund, dass

die Türkei seit 1949 gleichberechtigtes Mitglied des Europarats und somit offiziell als europäischer Staat anerkannt war, der die gemeinsamen Werte und politischen Prinzipien teilte. Auf dieser Grundlage sowie mithilfe der Konstruktion einer europäischen Solidarität – basierend auf der Wertegemeinschaft – argumentierten die türkischen Delegierten für die Einbindung der Türkei in europäische Projekte, sei es in der Kultur- oder in der Verteidigungspolitik, sowie für die wirtschaftliche Unterstützung der Türkei seitens wohlhabenderer Mitgliedsstaaten. Zudem produzierten türkische Vertreter teilweise auch eine kollektive Identitätsebene im Hinblick auf politische Ereignisse und Institutionen. Zum Beispiel präsentierten sie den Koreakrieg zu Beginn der 1950er Jahre vor allem als einen Krieg, in dem *westliche* Soldaten *westliche* Werte und Prinzipien verteidigten. Schließlich stellten sie das Engagement der Türkei in diesem Krieg als Beweis für ihre Glaubwürdigkeit als westlicher (europäischer) Akteur dar.

In Bezug auf die dritte dominante Strategie zeigt die Arbeit, dass türkische Delegierte Repräsentationen der Türkei als schwellenartig verwendeten, die auf hybriden Konstruktionen ihrer Geographie beruhten, um so einen türkischen „Exzeptionalismus“ und ihre herausragende Bedeutung für Europa zu konstruieren. Diese Praktik diente unterschiedlichen Interessen: Einerseits stellten die Delegierten die Türkei dadurch als stabilen Partner dar – bereit, der Wächter, die Bastion und das Bollwerk für Europa zu sein. Andererseits dienten diese Darstellungen dazu, die Türkei angesichts ihrer unmittelbaren Nähe zur Sowjetunion als verletzlich Mitglied der europäischen Familie darzustellen. Die türkischen Delegierten ermutigten die Europäer auf diese Weise, die Türkei wirtschaftlich zu unterstützen und sie in Verteidigungsbündnisse zum Schutz des Landes und ganz Europas einzubinden. Paradoxerweise bemühten sich die türkischen Delegierten zwar generell darum, ihr Land als westlich und gerade nicht als östlich darzustellen; wenn sie jedoch die Vermittlerrolle der Türkei im Nahen Osten propagierten, präsentierten sie die Türkei auch als zum Nahen Osten gehörend. Hybride Konstruktionen der Geographie der Türkei wurden also je nach Interessenlage des Sprechers variabel eingesetzt.

Schließlich verwendeten die türkischen Delegierten Praktiken, die Europa als ein zukünftiges politisches Projekt imaginierten. Auf diese Weise konnten sie die Türkei problemlos als Teil Europas darstellen, indem sie das Land als aktiven Teilnehmer präsentierten, der motiviert und bereit sei, das kollektive europäische Projekt zu fördern.

Diese Praktiken waren recht überzeugend und trugen zur Konstruktion der sozialen Wirklichkeit bei. Die Berechtigung der Türkei, an europäischen Projekten teilzunehmen, wurde nicht abgelehnt, indem man ihre „Europäizität“ leugnete, wie aus verschiedenen nicht-

türkischen Stellungnahmen hervorgeht. Die Mehrheit der nicht-türkischen Delegierten unterstützte die türkischen Vertreter in ihren europapolitischen Zielen, was in den verabschiedeten Texten, wie etwa Resolutionen und Empfehlungen an das Ministerkomitee, deutlich wird.

Dominante Bilder von Europa, die die türkischen Delegierten durch diese Praktiken (re-)produzierten, waren folgende: Europa als Solidargemeinschaft, als Wertegemeinschaft, als hoch gebildete Gemeinschaft, Europa als Festung gegen den Feind, als prosperierende Wirtschaftsmacht und als Gemeinschaft des kulturellen Austauschs. Diese Vorstellungen von Europa erfüllten das Kriterium, die Türkei jederzeit als mit ihnen vereinbar darstellen zu können.

Die Untersuchung zeigt auch, was im Rahmen der Versammlung nicht gesagt wurde. So sprachen die türkischen Delegierten beispielsweise nicht an, dass das türkische Volk mit großer Mehrheit der islamischen Religion angehörte. Darin lag vermutlich kein Mehrwert – auch nicht im Diskurs über kulturelle Gemeinsamkeiten der Europäer. Jede Betonung hätte nur eine Diskrepanz zu den anderen Mitgliedsstaaten der damaligen Zeit geschaffen.

Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie tragen zum Forschungsfeld der türkisch-europäischen Beziehungen, der europäischen Integrationsgeschichte und zu theoretischen Ansätzen bezüglich kollektiver Identitätskonstruktionen bei.

Liste der Vorveröffentlichungen

Hohberger, Wiebke. “Ein Europa ohne die Türkei? Türkische Bemühungen um eine assoziierte Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1959-1963.” In *Die Türkei im Spannungsfeld von Kollektivismus und Diversität*, herausgegeben von Burcu Dođramacı, Yavuz Köse, Kerem Öktem und Tobias Völker, S. 9-35. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016.

Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich an Eides statt, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift selbst verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe. Diese Dissertation wurde nicht in einem früheren Promotionsverfahren angenommen und nicht an einer anderen Hochschule vorgelegt.

Hamburg, den 13.04.21

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